Romanian Review of Political Sciences and International Relations

Transcription

R O M A N I A N REVIEW OF POLITICA L
S C I E N C E S A N D I NTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
VOL. VI
No. 1
2009
CONTENTS
(POST)MODERN, POLITICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL APPROACHES
SARROUKH ABDENBI, Hannah Arendt and the Political Evil ..........................
ANA BAZAC, Relations entre les États de l’Europe Occidentale et l’Afrique: le
thème de la tolérance libérale ...........................................................................
VIORELLA MANOLACHE, Zygmund Bauman and the Postmodern Approach:
“Weak” Guidelines over the Postmodern Ethics ...............................................
LUIS R. ORO TAPIA, ¿El fin de la Historia? Notas sobre el espejismo de Francis
Fukuyama ..........................................................................................................
JAOUAD EL HABBOUCH, Deconstructing the End of History: The Clash of
Civilization Theory ............................................................................................
HENRIETA ANIªOARA ªERBAN, The Ironist “Traveler” .................................
RÃZVAN PANTELIMON, El enfoque sistémico y el enfoque sobre la Cultura
Política — Dos visiones distintas — ................................................................
IN FOCUS
LEONTE IVANOV, The Basarabian Letters of Ivan Aksakov ..............................
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56
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INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. PRACTICAL APPROACHES
ABDELLATIF AKBIB, Academic Peace Post 9/11: The Erosion of the American
Democratic Dream ............................................................................................
PERRI GIOVANNUCCI, The Pentagon’s Palimpsest: How the Screening of Battle
Of Algiers Underlies the Torture at Abu Ghraib ..............................................
SHABANA FAYYAZ, Terrorism: A Human Security Challenge in South Asia .......
NARDJES FLICI, L’Iran face aux sanction internationales...................................
LUCIAN JORA, Accounts on Soviet Union Cultural Diplomacy (1953-1959).........
FRANCESCO ALBERTINI, L’ultima statua di Lenin. L’isolamento della Comunita’
Russa Nell’artico ...............................................................................................
ALEJANDRA VIZCARRA, Opposition’s Parties and Functions of Legislative Power
in Mexico ..........................................................................................................
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104
113
124
135
141
SCIENTIFIC LIFE .................................................................................................
155
THE REVIEW OF REVIEWS ...............................................................................
165
BOOK REVIEWS...................................................................................................
THE AUTHORS ....................................................................................................
Pol. Sc. Int. Rel., VI, 1, p. 1–172, Bucharest, 2009.
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TOME VI
R E V I E W RO U MA INE DE SCIENC ES
P O LI TI Q U ES ET RELATION S
I N T ERNATIONAL ES
No 1
2009
SOMMAIRE
(POST) MODERNE, POLITIQUE ET PHILOSOPHIQUE DÉMARCHES
SARROUKH ABDENBI, Hannah Arendt et le mal politique ..............................
ANA BAZAC, Relations entre les États de l’Europe Occidentale et l’Afrique: la
thème de la tolérance libérale ...........................................................................
VIORELLA MANOLACHE, Zygmund Bauman et la démarche postmoderne: la
faiblesse des lignes directrices concernant l’éthique postmoderne ..................
LUIS R. ORO TAPIA, ¿El fin de la Historia? Notas sobre el espejismo de Francis
Fukuyama ..........................................................................................................
JAOUAD EL HABBOUCH, La déconstruction de la fin de l'histoire: la théorie
du choc des civilizations ...................................................................................
HENRIETA ANIªOARA ªERBAN, Le «voyageur» ironist .................................
RÃZVAN PANTELIMON, El enfoque sistémico y el enfoque sobre la Cultura
Política — Dos visiones distintas — ...............................................................
EN ATTENTION
LEONTE IVANOV, Le lettres du Bassarabie d'Ivan Aksakov ..............................
RELATIONS INTERNATIONALES. DÉMARCHES PRATIQUES
ABDELLATIF AKBIB, Le paix academic après le 11/9: l’érosion du rêve
démocratique américain ...................................................................................
PERRI GIOVANNUCCI, Le Pentagone palimpseste: comment le dépistage de
Bataille d'Alger sous-tend les actes de torture à Abu Ghraib ...........................
SHABANA FAYYAZ, Terrorisme: Un défi de la sécurité humaine en Asie du Sud....
NARDJES FLICI, L’Iran face aux sanction internationales ..................................
LUCIAN JORA, Comptes sur la diplomatie culturelle de l’Union Soviétique
(1953-1959) .......................................................................................................
FRANCESCO ALBERTINI, L’ultima statua di Lenin. L’isolamento della Comunita’
Russa Nell’artico ...............................................................................................
ALEJANDRA VIZCARRA, Parties de l’opposition et les fonctions du pouvoir
législatif en Mexique ........................................................................................
LA VIE SCIENTIFIQUE........................................................................................
COMPTES RENDUS .............................................................................................
REVUE DES REVUES ..........................................................................................
AUTEURS ..............................................................................................................
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(POST)MODERN, POLITICAL
AND PHILOSOPHICAL APPROACHES
HANNAH ARENDT AND THE POLITICAL EVIL
SARROUKH ABDENBI
Abstract. One can say that contrary to the pessimistic Schopenhauer,
Hannah Arendt refuses the esthetic solution that dissolves the problem of
evil and pain in the clutches of will artistically in tragedy and music.
Rather, she seems to share the world view of Hegel, who has a dramatic view
of world history. Thus, she seems to condemn the mere contemplation of
a world, where evil is a scandal, since the result will be afterwards either
its forgetfulness or an experience of pessimism under the cover of the
traditional concept of man’s fallibility. What is ironic in her attempt is that,
though she does not claim to eradicate terror and evil, in her endeavor to
reflect on it by presenting to the reader its nature, she shows the way
towards awareness of the essence of ideology behind such a totalitarian
political system. Hence her closeness to Kant’s philosophy of duty, in his
expression “you should, therefore you can”, shows optimism to make
clear the problem of evil as she sees it.
The one common point on which modern political commentators agree, is that
power politics is not an attribute of one man but a relation. In Jack le Fataliste as
in Hegel, power is a shared domain of belief in authority, and naturally without a
slave there is no master. Bonfils-Mabilon and Etienne call this relation a
socialization in their recent book La science politique est-elle une science? From
the point of view of socialization one may ask, whether the mystery of civil
obeisance and voluntary submission make the object of political science. The
authors of this book refer to a well known question in Western political literature:
„Est si La Boètie avait posé la seule vraie question: [...] ‚Comment ce peut-il que
tant d’hommes, tant de peuples, tant de nations supportent parfois tout d’un tyran
qui n’a d’autre pouvoir que celui qu’on lui donne?’”1 In modern political thought
Hannah Arendt poses the problem of radical evil in a different way from moral and
philosophical or psychological treatment of the problem. Ideology and terror of a
form of a regime, namely the Nazi one, turns out to be, at the hands of Hannah
Arendt, the principle cause of the upsurge of absolute and radical evil.
Hannah Arendt dedicated one third of her work in an attempt to understand
the upsurge of a radically new form of political power in the twentieth century,
——————
1 Bonfils-Mabilon, Béatrice & Etienne, Bruno, La science politique est-elle une science?, Paris,
Flammarion 1998, 25.
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different from the classical despotism and tyranny. In her major work, The
Origins of Totalitarianism just as in some of her conferences and essays like
Truth and Politics, she approaches the heavy concept of evil, not by reflecting
on its symbolic dimension nor by tracing its development and transformation
philosophically, nor presenting it psychologically. Rather, in a world where the
law “Thou shall kill” replaces the traditional biblical commandment and other
symbols of the by now part of the grand narrative such as, original sin, defilement,
guilt etc., she suspects modern man, who encloses himself in the fanaticism of
closed societies or holds a coercive opinion and believes in the logic of the idea
(ideology) of the elected community, race and even in the limited Aufklärung,
faith in reason and in progress. She is one of the modern thinkers, who moved
the problem of evil from its relegated place as the final topic among other courses
or chapters in the academic syllabus, as to become a basic issue, which deserves
to be reflected on, away from traditional methods of its treatment.
As a political philosopher she makes the question of human radical evil, what
one may call a problem-limit which raises doubts about the true task of modern
philosophy, when the latter does not deal with public sphere and man. For her
the task of philosophy is to shed light on the nature of thought that is practical
at the time of crisis, when terror is reflected on to reveal the urgent task and the
essence of philosophy. Thus she pushed the fundamental uneasiness, if not the
distress of modern man about anguish, to the limit of horror in front of the revelation
of terror and radical evil (National Socialism).
So different from the existential concept of nothingness, her thought is mainly
oriented, in the above mentioned works, towards the first reality that is omitted
willingly by her colleague Martin Heidegger, namely the radical nonsense of the
Shoah and the unveiling of the machinations and lies of German National
Socialist party and is manipulation of the public sphere. The latter modern German
philosopher is an example of a thinker, who remained silent about the “crisis”
Auschwitz. In his recent book, La problématique du sujet aujourd’hui, Robert
Misrahi points out to the fact that in spite of Heidegger inscription in the
National Socialist party, critics who adopts the point of view of politics do not
touch on his philosophical doctrine and others, who deal with the political aspect
of his work, do not say a word about his doctrine. They do not see “Le lien
interne qui unit la doctrine (celle de la mort et du destin ‘historial’ du peuple
allemand) à la politique, (non seulement l’adhésion au parti Nazi, mais le quitus
accordé au Führer, la critique de la democratie et le silence sur les camps de
concentration et l’antisémitisme.”2
For Hannah Arendt the anxiety, that nourished philosophy, became astonishment
in her political philosophy in front of the scandal of lived and witnessed evil,
different from the totally absolute evil, in the sense of the divinely destined
human fallibility. Her final analysis shows an un-atoned human crime, which
threatens to make human life nonsense. Hence she apprehends evil in existence
and she has a doubt to reduce the issue to a confession of evil of existence. Her
——————
2 Misrahi, Robert, La problématique du sujet aujourd’hui, Paris, Encre marine 1994, 14.
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political philosophy, one can say then, is an anxious quest for a sense, that liberates
thoughts from both an overwhelming and intense trauma, as it is also a departure
from abstraction and speculation, which limits themselves in narrow confines of
mere critical revision of the question of human anguish, in relation to the problem
of evil. Before coming close to what Arendt says about evil, it is interesting to set
her reflections against the preceding treatment of the question of evil.
According to the Pyramid texts, ancient Egypt knew a relative aspect of evil in
the worshipped deity of Seth, who is every year defeated by Horus, a representation
of rejuvenation from the depths of the realm of the dead: Osiris. Ideologically
the person of the king, Pharaoh, is legitimized by the priests, as the only one who
totalizes the duality (Duat) of the good (Horus) and evil (Seth), to ascend to the
heaven of Re and to be assimilated by him. Hence his authority lies in the fact
that he is the only representative of Amun in Egypt. However, natural catastrophes
were not taken as evil, when in June the waters overwhelm the borders of the
Nile, since it brings fertility.
Although ancient India did not develop theology and cosmogony, Buddhism
knew a negative aspect in the malefic power of the god Kali. Brahmanism too
did not elaborate a complex philosophical system to account for the original
nature of evil, excepting the negative aspect of the absolute Brahma: Shiva. Yet
the unwelcome tripartite social structure of priests (Brahmans), warriors (Ksatriya)
and the impure rest of the population (Pariah: the untouchable) accounts for
social evil, based on the so called initiated pure priests, who maintain political
power. However in so far as most of the religions of India were pantheists, they
interiorized both, the good and the evil. The first as knowledge or light (Sat or
Jnana), the second as the dark side of man, namely false ideas, illusion and
ignorance (Asat and Shita). The Sanscrit word for evil, Shita, and the Egyptian
Seth and the Semitic satan share the same root and have the same function with
a slight variation in their symbolic meaning.
By contrast to ancient Egypt and India, the Greco-Abrahamic tradition has
elaborated on a monolithic, ontological and moral concept of a higher and absolute
god. In such a moralizing system, what is more subtle, is also better, and evil is
the absence of the good, or as Plotinus defines it in his Aenades: “Privatio boni”.
The Greeks had no word for evil as Nietzsche pointed out in Beyond Good and
Evil. In his dialogues, Plato posited the good versus the bad, the intelligible
versus the sensible; the world of ideas and the world of copies and no mention
was made to evil. The Greek’s love for the good, the true and the beautiful is
developed in their dialectical discursive reason that conceptualized most of the
mythos of the representative symbolic heritage of the ancient Egypt and the
ancient Middle East.
Yet, since reliance on epistemology and rational theories paves the way for
later reevaluations of the preceding certitudes is inevitable for the development
of all theories, Plato’s reliance on mathematics introduced to Athens by Hypocrate
of Chios made the Pythagorean’s Arithmetic incapable to account for the rotation
of the fixed stars. With Plato such a theory based on numbers and accounting
only for multiplicity in unity without solving the problem of the nature of the
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eternal surrounding sphere reduced to pneuma, is rejected since only a separate
intelligence or Noûs, as Anaximandre also advances, could posit “l’unité du monde
qui est issu d’une origine simple d’où se sont engagés toutes les diversifications.”3
It is here, that all the project of Platonism lies: all action including political action
should conform with the ideal order. In book seven of The Republic the
development of this project of coherence as it initiates the philosopher to the
intelligible and to the functions of mathematics by their practical applications.
While Pythagoras’s arithmetic helps to show the contradiction in unity, mathematics
supposing the intuition of a world of eternal forms points out to an hypothetic
absolute good. Xavier Rennou remarks, that here lies a “magnifique fusion de
l’effort moral [...] vertu théorique et politique à la fois.”4 Here the epistemological
seems to be coined to justify the ruling of a class of philosophers kings, or in
favour for an aristocratic elite versus tyrants. As to the ideological implication of
the tripartite structure in the project it is made explicit when put into parallelism
with the psychological episteme in Plato’s Pheadrus, namely the structure of
man-society: the chariot (artisans), the two horses (soldiers), and the charioteer
(the philosopher king).
The young Hegel, in his The Spirit of Judaism condemned Israel of being
unable to understand beauty that is convinced by the lie that world is harmonious
and that evil is an accident and fades away at the realization that the aesthetic
view reveals. Actually the Judaic consciousness knew more than any other tradition
a profound anguish in front of evil and the experience of sin and unhappiness.
The prophet Job is a case par excellence of a search for god by means of the
anxiety of evil, congealing by the violence of sprit all illusive consolations, and
thinking the paradox of human condition in pain suffering and radical evil. Yet
before the rise of the force and resources of Greek reason, a full development of
a philosophy of evil could not be achieved. Only later with the Alexandrian
variety of philosophies like Philon’s and Plotinus’ can one find the problem of
evil conceptualized within an interpreted Neo-Platonism. For instance Plotinus,
the representative figure after the decline of Hellenism proposes a deliverance
from evil by intelligence and a happy wisdom that is blind to the reality of evil.
For Plotinus, “Le mal n’existe pas isolément... il se montre nécessairement pris
dans les liens de la beauté, comme un captif couvert de chaîne d’or.”5
If pre-modern scientific theories were used to justify political organization of
the Greek polis, the later Christian theological order of the world from the
cherubim, seraphim, etc., is clear in St Augustine’s Civitas Dei. Later with the
rise of the methods of modern science namely with Descartes’ mathesis and his
saying that the world speaks mathematics science served as a “repertoire d’idées
pour interpréter le monde et pour gérer la cité.”6 In the nineteenth century
Schopenhauer was the first one to break with away from classical tradition. For
him the origin of the negative will not only in the world but also in man leads to
——————
3 Rennou, Xavier, L’infini a limites du calcul: Anaximandre, Platon, Galilée, Paris, Maspero 1978, 172.
4 Rennou, op. cit., 188.
5 Borne, Etienne, Le problème du mal, Paris, Quadrige 1992, 73.
6 Bonfils & Etienne, op. cit., 14.
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the conflict of all against all. In his introduction to to Schopenhauer’s Le monde
comme représentation et volenté Angle Kremer-Marietti says, that what the author
presents is a world “où la présence du mal est flafrante. Et cette postion pessimiste
fait également du mal une propriété de la psyché humaine; une leçon nécessaire
que Nietzsche retiendra.”7 Yet liberation from evil as such is in the hands of
man’s intelligence to wok his way out of the illusive negative will of the world.
As such the solution proposed here is ethical and aesthetical. That is to say in the
highest form of art, music and tragedy and in self mortification and asceticism
to relieve man from pain that is he most existential evil.
Hegel’s dialectics is not only part of the movement of abstract thought, but
also moves history forward through war. And since man is defined, for him in
Phenomenology of Spirit as action and what he does, evil in Hegel’s thought is
relativized and seems to be part of human philosophical imperfection and the
absence of self awareness. The process of man’s freedom should move from the
natural (animal) state, then the subjective (egoism or family) to the objective
(political). Man’s perfect ultimate ideal is the realization of freedom and equality
in the polis. Such an ideal state is heralded historically by the canons of Napoleon,
who was used by the cunning absolute reason in history, to achieve Kant’s hope
for the perfect liberated society of nations or the common wealth in his Idea of
a Universal History. Hence Hegel’s idea of the biblical symbolism of evil as the
eating of the fruit merely indicates the issue of the desire for unmediated knowledge
and therefore “the Adamic myth is a story of proliferating dualism [...]. The fall
from innocence to experience [...] we fall from an undifferentiated knowledge of
good to a differentiated and fatal knowledge of good and evil”.8 One could say
then, that Hegel’s various lectures on the history of philosophy traces the passage
of the spirit from the state of evil manifest in man’s imperfection to the gradual
ascent to ultimate self-mediating identity in God. And whereas the Christian
religious discourse and knowledge remains an expression at the level of myths
and images, philosophy attempts to conceptualize them cognitively using concepts
(Begriff). His demythologizing of theology turns out to be knowledge itself or as
he says in his Lectures in the History of Philosophy: “Philosophy is thus the true
theodicy.”9
In late nineteenth and the beginning of twentieth century sociology with
Durkheim claims to treat social facts as things in experimental sciences, and a
new obstacle rises, which is to try to decompose human activities, as one studies
a colony of ants. Such a method was welcomed by the Nazi regime and man was
the object of an unethical study and manipulation, supposed to be scientific. The
latter party’s enthusiasm for the German Volksgeist, serenity, Aryan race, Heimat
and other ideologies misinterpreted and often vulgarized from Heidegger, Hegel,
Hölderlin and Nietzsche ended up with the rise of a an unprecedented form of
——————
7 Kremmer-Marietti, Angèle, Schopenhauer,Ethique et politique, Paris, Livre de poche 1996, 6.
8 Hart, Kevin, The trespass of the Sign, Deconstruction, Theology and Philosophy, New York, Cambridge
University Press 1989, 5.
9 Hegel, Frederick, Lectures on the History of philosophy, London, Routhledge 1955, vol. 3, 546.
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totalitarian regime, whose ideology is the main principal feature that Hannah Arendt
focuses on.
From the point of view of modern psychology, C.G. Jung and Sigmund Freud
focused in some of their writings on evil as a deviation of the masses to blind
illusions giving rise to instincts of aggressiveness and the absence of responsibility.
In his book Present et Avenir, Jung remarks, that “Une masse qui engendre [...]
par compensation de Führer qui, pour ainsi dire obligatoirement, succombe à
l’inflation dont son moi ne peut pas être victime.”10 Evil for Jung is the time
when the true sense of individuation worked out by the symbols of the Self
development towards self realization is replaced by an anti-religious worldly
power represented by the state. That is why the upsurge of socialist dictators are
for him new religions, and the domination of the state is a kind of a divine cult
to the masse. Freud’s analysis of evil in his The Future of an Illusion deals with
the cultural danger inherent in the psychological poverty of the mass in modern
Europe. Here he criticizes religion and the socialist illusion of a better world, but
he has a certain hope in the intellect and in the achievements of science in the
future. In his Le malaise dans la culture he makes it clear that he adopts the point
of view that “le penchment à l’agression est une prédisposition pulsionnelle
originelle et autonome de l’homme”,11 to which the program of culture is opposed,
since it is basically the result of Eros, that gathered isolated individuals and later
families, then tribes and communities and nations in a great unity: humanity. While
for Freud culture imposes rules, laws and constraints to organize social life, the
natural human aggression manifests itself in the hostility of one against the all
and the all against the one. For him such an impulse of destruction is the
principal representative of the impulse towards death, which exists side by side
with Eros and shares with it the domination (Thanatos) of the world. Hobbes’
definition of the basic human tendency “homini homo lupus” comes close to
what Freud advances about the instinct of aggressiveness in man but with the
difference that, he goes further in analysis and theory in relation to culture.
Part of Hannah Arendt political reflections in her essay “Truth and Politics”
show, how truthfulness has never been considered among the political virtues,
since it has little to add to the change of the world. The latter is the main legitimate
objective in politics. For her this explains why the Socratic proposition. “It is
better to suffer wrong, than to do wrong”, was unpersuasive to both his friends
and enemies. Yet, Socrates decided to stake his life on this truth. On the one
hand, the implication is that consensus and agreement in politics are based on
the ever changing opinion and not on the self-evident truth in philosophical
saying about justice. The masses which agree on an opinion may be manipulated
by the rhetoric of a power seeker and consequently put in his hands, an absolute
power, that he likely abuses since all kinds of powers tend to be misused. On the
other hand, this explains, why Plato’s whole project is intended to defend
Socrates truthfulness against the tyrants and hosts of sophists as enemies of
——————
10 Jung, C.G., Present et avenir. De quoi l’avenir sera-il fait?, Paris, Denöel 1962, 25-26.
11 Freud, Sigmund, Le malaise dans la culture, Paris, Quadrige 1995, 64.
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justice. The propagators of the relativity of truth and subjective opinions as
Protagoras together with poets also threaten the polis establishment of rules on
the basis of fixed self-evident truths. Hence Plato’s appeal for the intelligible
order founded on reason and Logos gives hope of a city, where tyranny and evil
will find no room and a similar fate as Socrates suffered would not take place
again. However, even the philosophical truth, in its exclusion of other views runs
the risk of being coercive and tyrannical, since only the solitary philosopher
could be initiated to it in his contemplation, while the political and the public
sphere is in need of another discourse, that ridicules all truths, but is based on
facts interpreted and travestied to change reality fort he better or worse. Later
Aristotle, Machiavelli and Hobbes understood, that the market place of the public
sphere, while it conforms with opinion, is in antagonism with the philosopher’s
truth just as Andalusian peripatetic philosophers, like Maimonides, Ibn Tufail,
Ibn Hazm etc., affirmed the separation between politics and morality.
Since the rise of modern politics, whose subjects is praxis and change of the
worldly affairs, it preoccupies itself only with factual truths — truth, that takes
place in mundane reality, which may be witnessed. However, ideological modern
governments distort the facts and transform them into ever-changing opinions.
Consequently, a whole representative machine of travestying events, documents
and facts becomes the main processes through which the mass is informed and
deformed in being asked to believe in lies. The result is a setting up of a screen
that separates a totalitarian conscious creativity of a masquerade from the mass
which continue naively to submit itself to this power monopoly. Hannah Arendt
remarks that, “All these lies, whether their authors know it or not, harbor an
element of violence, organized lying always tend to destroy whatever it has
decided to negate, although only totalitarian governments have consciously
adopted lying as the first step to murder.”12
After the reception of her major book, The Origins of Totalitarianism, Karl
Jaspers asked her, whether Yahweh has not so much disappeared. Her answer in
her correspondences with him was, that the traditional religions, Jewish and
Christian, are of no importance for her anymore. She doubts whether they still
have any role to play in the foundation of something political as laws. She explains
that “Le mal s’est avéré plus radical que prévu. Exprimé plus superficiellement:
Le Décalogue n’a pas prévu les crimes moderne.”13 When Gehen took place on
earth, namely when the camps for death were allowed, the notions of sin and
punishment have no more authority for her. She considers as “blasphemous” and
“absurd” the expressions of “political, secular religions” used by the American
political philosopher, Eric Vegelin, with whom she had a debate about the nature
of the Nazi and the Bolshevik totalitarianism. She seems rather to come close, in
a certain way, to Freud and Jung, that the above systems pretend to announce
Eden on earth and that the state replaces the mythical religious ideal of happiness,
——————
12 Arendt, Hannah, Truth and Politics, in Between Past and Future. New York, The Waking Press 1977
(1961), 252.
13 Arendt, Hannah, Karl Jaspers, Correspondance 1926-1969. Lettre du 4 Mars 1951, Paris, Payot 1995.
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proclaiming themselves as nations without Jews and without classes and where
the only proletariat plays the role of the messiah. Like the critique of Freud and
Jung, of the global European mass culture in their The Illusion of Religion and
The Present and the Future, respectively, Hannah Arendt view is that, “les masses
moderne se caractérisent en effet moins par leur agnosticism que par leur
absence de tout intérèt commun [...] ils sont prêts à croire n’importe quoi.”14
Hannah Arendt distinguishes not only between religion and politics, but also
between the former and ideology: Totalitarianism is far away from a political
religion. It is basically an ideology: a logic of an idea. It is in pretending to consider
the totality of history in the light of their ideas, that Nazism becomes a totalitarian
ideology, inventing fables like the pure Aryan race, the race unable to exist
(Jews) must be exterminated, and the fiction that the bourgeois class must be
condemned. Hence indoctrination replaces thought to make the mass in movement.
In her major work, she establishes differences among communism, religions and
atheistic totalitarianism. For instance, she remarks that “les idéologies qui se
préoccupent toujours de rendre compte de l’évolution historique, ne proposent
pas le même type d’explication que la théologie. Celle ci traite de l’homme
comme un être raisonnable [...] Une idéologie — et le communisme, sous sa
forme totalitaire politiquement effective, plus que tout autre — traite l’homme
comme un corps, qui tombe, mais serait doué de conscience et lois newtoniennes
de la gravité.”15
To sum up, one can say that contrary to the pessimistic Schopenhauer, Hannah
Arendt refuses the esthetic solution that dissolves the problem of evil and pain
in the clutches of will artistically in tragedy and music. Rather, she seems to
share the world view of Hegel, who has a dramatic view of world history. As
Bernard Bourgeois in his La penseé politique de Hegel said: “Mais pour l’homme
moderne, le drame réel, c’est selon Hegel lui-même la vie politique.”16 Hannah
Arendt equally takes the tragic aspect of modern political life as ideology.
Namely, the factual truth of the absence of divinity to prevent the Shoah, and her
active practical passion is a politic of resistance against the Nazi evil with an
urgent and a necessary unveiling of the nature of its barbarism. Thus, she seems
to condemn the mere contemplation of a world, where evil is a scandal, since the
result will be afterwards either its forgetfulness or an experience of pessimism
under the cover of the traditional concept of man’s fallibility. What is ironic in
her attempt is that, though she does not claim to eradicate terror and evil, in her
endeavor to reflect on it by presenting to the reader its nature, she shows the way
towards awareness of the essence of ideology behind such a totalitarian political
system. Hence her closeness to Kant’s philosophy of duty, in his expression “you
should, therefore you can”, shows optimism to make clear the problem of evil as
she sees it. However, man can not eradicate all the forces of evil alone.
——————
14 Courtine-Denamy, Sylvie, Religion et idéologie selon Hannah Arendt, In Les textes fondamentaux de
la pesée juive, Le point, N:16, Janvier-Février 2oo8.
15 Arendt, Hannah, La nature du totalitarisme, Paris, Payot 1990, 144.
16 Bourgeois, Bernard, La pensée politique de Hegel, Tunis: Cérès Edition 1994, 19.
RELATIONS ENTRE LES ÉTATS DE L’EUROPE
OCCIDENTALE ET L’AFRIQUE:
LE THÈME DE LA TOLÉRANCE LIBÉRALE
ANA BAZAC
Abstract. The paper analyzes the significances of Hegel’s theory concerning
the superiority of culture and the necessity of colonialist relationships for
the preservation and development of the modern western society. The
sketch of this theory of Hegel which could be conceived as founding the
entire ideology that legitimises the Centre-periphery relationships, and
corresponding to the structural logic of modernity in which are included
the relationships with the Eastern Europe is emphasized. The author concludes
underlining the contemporary legitimacy of the philosophical theme of
liberal tolerance by pointing out the concept of public good and its chance
to be “applied” to the present historical events.
La légitimation de la subjugation des peuples d’Afrique a été un des thèmes
de la pensée européenne des l’avènement de la modernité. À juste titre on a
mentionné Montesquieu, Voltaire, Hume, Hegel et assez d’autres. Ce qui est
important est de n’ignorer pas l’inhérente fonction des intellectuels, qui forment
une couche bureaucratique, de servir le pouvoir, au fond les relations de domination
et soumission.
La constitution de la modernité a mis devant les philosophes une réalité
contradictoire et embarrassante. D’une part, le nouveau apparaissait comme la
lumière après la nuit du Moyen Age parce qu’il était nourri d’avec les illusions
promues par la liberté juridique acquise après l’abolition du servage, et parmi
ces illusions — les désirs d’égalité sociale. De ce point de vue, les maîtres
penseurs, liés à l’aspiration d’être des penseurs maîtres, ont tenté à dissoudre ces
désirs au nom de l’ordre et de la loi préservés par le monarque incarnant le
contrat social. D’autre part, le nouveau — et pas seulement à cause de l’inertie
de l’ancien — était marqué par une hiérarchisation sociale qui démontrait une
continuité inquiétante de la subordination et même un renforcement de la
polarisation.1 Une solution a été le soutient de la politique esclavagiste, et plus
tard colonialiste, pour que les dirigeants n’aient pas des remords face au discours
moderne qu’ils prononçaient et aussi pour que la population européenne soumise
ait un motif de complexe de supériorité apte à estomper l’infériorité sociale.
——————
1 Voir l’entier numéro «De l’économie à la politique. Le thème des classes sociales», Cahiers pour
l’analyse concrète, no. 35, Centre de Sociologie Historique, Montargis, 1995.
12
ANA BAZAC
2
Mais la théorie justificative du colonialisme esquissée par Hegel dans son
Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts (1821) est plus qu’une simple légitimation
de la politique occidentale sauvage envers les peuples de civilisations différentes.
En tout cas, elle est nettement supérieure aux clichés colportés par Montesquieu,
Voltaire, Hume, Cuvier, Gobineau concernant «l’infériorité des africains».2
De plus on doit distinguer entre les deux étapes dans la pensée sociale et
politique de Hegel: la première entre 1793 et 1814, l’autre de 1814 (1817) à
1831.3 Même si la contradiction entre la méthode et le système commence déjà
de 1807, la distinction mentionnée, concernant le contenu des écrits sociaux et
politiques de Hegel, est entre les idées critiques, démocratiques et humanistes
développées dans la première période et, d’autre part, les thèses conservatrices
apparues avec la fin de la guerre de libération allemande et la modification de la
situation politique européenne après le congrès de Vienne de 1815. Évidemment
on ne doit considérer mécaniquement cette distinction. Il y a un mélange entre
les deux types d’idées dans toutes les œuvres de Hegel. Le problème est la
proportion des unes et des autres et cette proportion est liée d’avec la pression
des phénomènes sociaux et politiques réels sur la théorisation philosophique.
Et le plus important est que Hegel ne pouvait pas, malgré toutes les significations
qu’il a donné à la liberté, la concevoir dans la manière universaliste qu’il a d’ailleurs
tant aimé: pour le dire tout court, il a conçu la société moderne seulement au
niveau des pays occidentaux et dans ce contexte le capitalisme ne pouvait pas
être que «dans un pays».4 Ainsi on peut saisir la contradiction entre l’aspiration
à la liberté, qui sont (l’aspiration et la liberté) universelles et, d’autre part, l’assertion
que le colonialisme est nécessaire pour que la liberté soit réalisée dans les pays
occidentaux.5 Mais cette contradiction est liée justement d’avec le caractère
contradictoire de la classe dirigeante moderne: celle-ci a luté pour sa liberté
——————
2
L’idéologie occidentale et l’histoire de l’Afrique. La falsification de l’histoire: comment l’Egypte ancienne
a été arrachée de son univers naturel négro-africain. La résistance africaine. La restauration de la conscience
historique africaine, http://www.ankhonline.com/cad_contex_oeuvr.htm (18-X-2006).
3 C. I. Gouliane, Hegel ou la philosophie de la crise, Paris, Payot, 1970, p. 27, 40-41, 48-50, 211-212,
239-242. «…l’évolution assez lente et les remous politiques d’une bourgeoisie nettement progressiste;
l’ignorance de cet état de choses (stimulant historique et social objectif de la dialectique) rendrait inexplicable
la dialectique hégélienne. Cette dernière ne demeurerait pas moins mystérieuse si nous nous bornions à l’expliquer
par les événements survenus en Allemagne, sans mettre en relief l’influence exercée par la Révolution française
sur les idéologues de la bourgeoisie allemande», p: 48. «L’année 1817… les premiers germes de l’adaptation
progressive du philosophe aux objectifs et aux intérêts du régime, un changement profond dans ses sentiments
pour les masses ainsi que la subordination de la morale à l’État. Assurément, les ouvrages parus en 1817 ne
sont pas le fruit d’une volte-face totale… la classe dont il était le champion…se complaisait aux hésitations,
compromis, demi-mesures… À dater de l’Encyclopédie, Hegel se détourne des exigences de l’homme concret
— sensibilité, affectivité, personnalité. Le «sentiment», la sensibilité — legs de l’humanisme que Herder faisait
sonner bien haut — Hegel les assimile à la notion de subjectivité à laquelle il oppose le «général», p. 211-212.
4 L’expression paraphrase la formule que Trotsky a utilisé dans la critique du stalinisme qui était, pour lui,
«socialisme dans un pays».
5 «Le concept hégélien de la liberté est contradictoire. L’évolution de l’histoire semble au philosophe
associer l’évasion spirituelle stérile aux libertés politiques très positives. C’est cependant selon un second —
et positif — critère que Hegel juge les périodes de l’histoire et les peuples: c’est à travers ceux-ci que se
manifeste la liberté, la connaissance de soi et la prise de conscience… Hegel, à l’instar de la classe dont il s’est
fait le porte-parole, balance entre le désir de jouir des libertés politiques et les consolations offertes par la
liberté spirituelle. Obsédé par la ‘conscience de soi’, il trace d’un certain nombre de peuples des portraits absurdes.
C’est ainsi qu’il enveloppe dans le même mépris tous les peuples orientaux, qui, dit-il, ‘ignore encore que
l’esprit ou l’homme en soi est libre‘», Gouliane, op. cit., p. 239.
3
RELATIONS ENTRE LES ÉTATS DE L’EUROPE OCCIDENTALE ET L’AFRIQUE
13
politique, naturellement au nom et avec le slogan d’une libération générale, en
voulant en même temps la préservation des relations de domination, c’est-à-dire
la continuité des rapports sociaux non libres. C’est d’ici l’impossibilité de Hegel
de concevoir d’une autre manière la liberté. En dernier instant, la vision contradictoire
de Hegel consiste dans le fait que la liberté de conscience a été conçue comme
la suprême forme de la liberté (même si, l’avait averti Kant, elle est seulement
le moyen de faire le bien à Autrui/ou d’éliminer le mal envers Autrui6) qui peut
ainsi s’accommoder avec les rapports sociaux non libres.
Mais Hegel est passé, comme on l’a noté là-haut, par une histoire tourmentée
et confuse: celle de l’enthousiasme des Lumières pour les valeurs de la modernité
transfigurées dans le splendide slogan Liberté Égalité Fraternité et, en même
temps, celle de la confiance dans le marché libre, celle de la guerre de libération
nationale et, en même temps, celle de la Restauration et de la consolidation de
l’État comme garant des libertés des citoyens. Ainsi l’époque a été marquée par
des éléments de déchirements et de la crise qui déterminent une «oscillation
entre le désir d’agir et la résignation, entre la volonté d’intervenir directement
dans les contradictions et la conviction que la pensée, l’art et l’éthique se justifient
seulement en reflétant tous les problèmes et toutes les prises de position. D’où
une ambiguïté: dans la mesure de ses forces (et dans les limites de l’histoire)
faut-il opter pour l’analyse ou pour le combat?»7. La mixture des valeurs que Hegel
a assumé pendant sa vie a reflété le mélange entre les attitudes de critique radicale
et celles d’écartement, évasion, mystification manifestées par les populations
occidentales face à la rupture sociale.
En somme une conception sur la société ne peut pas être analysée sans la
sociologie de cette conception-là. Et celle de Hegel, ensemble d’humanisme et
d’esprit de compensation, a témoigné la position médiane entre l’extrême de
Fichte et l’extrême de Schelling, position médiane qui correspond au désir de
dépasser l’époque de la crise et d’entrer dans le temps démocratique de la raison
d’État. De la même manière, le courage même d’affronter la cruauté de la vie et
de saisir les contradictions de l’existence, la dialectique — ainsi le développement
du devenir et de la totalité — ont eu une évolution, marquée justement par la
coexistence des éléments contradictoires du spiritualisme et des Lumières.
Discutant notre problème, on peut voir facilement que dans son première
étape, le déploiement de l’effort théorique de rechercher et de démontrer que die
Warheit ist das Ganze (la vérité c’est le tout (la totalité)), Hegel n’a pas été
raciste.8 Dans sa Phénoménologie de l’esprit, il a repoussé l’explication du
comportement humain à partir de l’apparence du corps. Dans le chapitre Raison,
Certitude et vérité de la raison, le point c) Observation du rapport de la conscience
——————
6 Et même si en effet la vita contemplativa permet à la vita activa «de se comprendre et de réfléchir sur
sa condition temporelle», Paul Ricoeur, Préface à Hannah Arendt, Condition de l’homme moderne (1958),
Paris, Calmann-Lévy, 1983, p. 18.
7 Gouliane, op. cit., p. 14-15.
8 Cette position et la demande d’être plus nuancé en ce qui concerne l’attitude de Hegel envers l’Afrique
appartient aussi à Amady Aly Dieng, Hegel et l’Afrique noire: Hegel était-il raciste?, 2006, http://www.codesria.org/
Links/Publications/new_publ/dieng_hegel.htm (21-X-2006).
14
ANA BAZAC
4
de soi avec sa réalité effective immédiate: Physiognomonie et Phrénologie, Hegel
a démontré que celles-ci sont des fausses sciences.9
L’extérieur est un signe de l’intérieur et, en même temps, a valeur pour la
connaissance seulement si cet extérieur est lié de et encadré dans l’action complexe
de l’être humain. Puisque c’est «l’opération comme opération en acte, ou l’intérieur
comme tel»10 qui a la signification d’un certain individu comme des gens
en général. Les fausses sciences nommées là-haut ne font que conjecturer sur
«l’être-là visé» qui serait l’expression d’un «intérieur également visé»11. Mais
déduire de la «déterminabilité concrète indéfinie de l’individu singulier» sur la
base de quelques traits — du corps (du visage, du crâne) ou du comportement12
— des caractéristiques généraux c’est un faux infini en ce qui concerne l’individu
et aussi en ce qui concerne le groupe (et l’humanité entière).
Puisque «l’être vrai de l’homme est bien plutôt son opération; c’est en elle que
l’individualité est effectivement réelle, et c’est elle qui supprime le visé dans ses
deux côtés... Dans l’opération accomplie, cette fausse infini est anéantie… l’être
n’est pas seulement un signe, mais la chose même.»13 Ainsi, «la figure n’est pas
l’en-soi, mais peut être plutôt un objet de manipulation.»14 Et «l’extérieur est
finalement une réalité effective complètement inerte, qui n’est pas en elle-même
un signe parlant, mais qui, tout à fait séparée du mouvement conscient du soi, se
présente pour soi, et comme seule chose.»15
«Reste toujours la possibilité indéniable qu’à une propriété, qu’à une passion
quelconque, etc…, soit conjointe, ici ou là, une protubérance.»16 Mais «l’homme
est libre: on concédera que l’être originaire de l’homme consiste seulement en
——————
9 G. W. F. Hegel, Phénoménologie de l’esprit (1807), traduction Jean Hyppolite (1941), Paris, Aubier,
1999, p. 260. Mais aussi: «La science de la connaissance de l’homme qui porte sur l’homme présumé…autant
que celle de la physiognomonie qui porte sur la réalité effective présumée, et veut élever les jugements
inconscients de la physiognomonie naturelle à une science, est par là quelque chose d’inachevable et de sans
base, qui ne peut parvenir à dire ce qu’elle vise, parce qu’elle vise seulement, et parce que son contenu est
seulement quelque chose de visé.», ibidem, p. 266.
10 Ibidem, p. 259.
11 Ibidem, p. 265.
12 Dans les pages mentionnées, Hegel donne l’exemple d’un assassin et d’un voleur qui ne peuvent pas
être connus en ce qui concerne «la capacité de l’être» (Hegel, ibidem, p. 265) s’ils sont réduits seulement aux
actes incriminés. De la même manière a écrit Hegel son article Wer denkt abstrakt? (1807) — reproduit du
volume XX de l’édition Glockner, Stuttgart, 1930. L’article se trouve aussi dans G. W. F. Hegel, Werke in zwanzig
Bänden, Frankfurt am Main, Surkamp Verlag, 1970, 2 Band (Jenaer Schriften — 1801-1807), p. 575-580) —
où il a insisté sur la nécessité de comprendre l’anamnèse ainsi que les relations qui ont construit les conditions
pour le fait de l’assassinat. C’est l’atmosphère des Lumières qui a pénétré les consciences. Il ne serait pas
improbable que Hegel ait été influencé par le célèbre livre du marquis de Beccaria, Des délits et des peines
(1764) — Paris, Brière libraire, Brissot-Thivars libraires, 1822 — qui a avancé la nécessité que le droit soit
basé sur: le principe laïque, le principe du droit de la personne, le principe des lois unitaires, le principe de la
proportionnalité entre les sanctions et les faits incriminés, enfin le principe de la clémence et de la rationalité.
13 Hegel, Phénoménologie de l’esprit, p. 267.
14 Ibidem, p. 268.
15 Ibidem, p. 269. Voir aussi: «La boîte crânienne n’est aucunement un organe de l’activité, n’est pas non
plus un mouvement expressif; on ne vole pas, on ne commet pas un meurtre avec la boîte crânienne, et par de
semblable faits elle ne s’altère pas le moins du monde et ne devient pas ainsi un geste expressif. Cet étant n’a
pas non plus la valeur d’un signe.», p. 275.
16 Ibidem, p. 278.
5
15
dispositions sur les quels il peut beaucoup, ou qui ont besoin de circonstances
favorables pour se développer.»17 Dans cette compréhension, les circonstances
complexes sont essentielles pour l’être humain et son devenir et, même si cette
observation n’a pas liaison directe à notre thème, elles marquent la liberté de
penser et d’agir et les faits, ainsi que «langage et travail sont des extériorisations
dans lesquelles l’individu ne se conserve plus et ne se possède plus en lui-même»18.
La conclusion de Hegel en ce qui concerne l’aliénation — réelle et tragique pour
toutes les parts, mais en même temps objective et éternel — est ouverte aux
interprétations de signes contraires. En tout cas, la soumission, dans le cadre des
relations aliénées, n’a pas été une question d’infériorité, ni physique ni psychique.
La tournure des années 1815 a été l’impulse (ou, dans l’expression de Hegel,
la circonstance) qui a raffermi la tendance légitimiste — et pas celle critique face
aux contradictions de la réalité — du philosophe. Évidemment que Hegel a été
le fils de son age, il ne pouvait que porter son Zeitgeist bourgeois et forcément
contradictoire. L’État (l’État-nation) est devenu le sauveur qui devait adoucir la
domination dans son cadre: les bonnes lois, la rigueur des dirigeants, même si
dans la vieille structure pyramidale, ses propositions d’intervention étatiste, devaient
construire une société acceptable puisque rationnelle. Une société rationnelle
dans le cadre de l’État-nation occidental, si non simplement allemand: «…et ce
qui est réel est rationnel.»19 Mais pour l’essor de l’État et le bien-être de ses
citoyens — même si Hegel n’a pas ignoré la division sociale et la pauvreté — il
y a un prix. C’est la domination des régions et des pays colonisés, a trouvé Hegel.
La supériorité de Hegel sur les idéologues mainstream «basés» sur l’infériorité
des races a consisté justement dans son explication «objectiviste» du développement
du capitalisme occidental aux dépens des régions de civilisation pré moderne. En
effet, je crois qu’on ne peut pas comprendre l’écartement, la chute de la vision
critique et dialectique de Hegel des années finales20 que si on subordonne toute
la représentation hégélienne sur l’Afrique a sa théorie historiciste sur la logique
de la colonisation de Principes de la philosophie du droit (1821). Et même si la
théorie est encadrée par sa conception de l’histoire où le progrès serait inexorablement
réalisé même par des actions mauvaises dans leur essence, l’idée de l’interdépendance
entre les pays capitalistes avancés et les pays sous-développés, au moins de point
de vue capitaliste, c’est-à-dire l’idée de la domination du Sud par le Nord (si on
nous permet ces expressions) comme condition internationale de l’avancement
et de la stabilité du système est remarquable. L’idée même dépasse l’image
kantienne sur la possibilité de la paix, met en évidence la distinction entre la
politique et l’éthique et critique le mélange de celles-ci, et à juste titre peut être
——————
17 Ibidem, p. 279.
18 «Mais, continue Hegel, il laisse aller l’intérieur tout à fait en dehors de soi, et l’abandonne à la merci
de quelque chose d’Autre», ibidem, p . 259. (Ana Bazac: cette dernière phrase contient deux idées: la première
est celle de l’essence qui se démontre dans le dehors de soi; la seconde est celle de l’aliénation objective qui
soutient et légitime les relations sociales aliénées.)
19 G. W. F. Hegel, Principes de la philosophie du droit (1821), traduction d’André Kaan, Préface de Jean
Hyppolite, Paris, Gallimard, 1940, Préface de Hegel de 1820, p. 30.
20 Voir l’analyse précoce de Pierre Quillet, «Hegel et l’Afriqu», en Ethiopiques, numéro 6, 1976,
http://www.refer.sn/ethiopiques/article.php3?id_article=415 (10-X-2006).
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ANA BAZAC
6
considérée comme une source de la realpolitik et, en même temps, de la théorie
de la dépendance.
Pour cette raison, je crois que ce n’est pas suffisant de déplorer l’information
superficielle de Hegel sur l’Afrique et ses préjugées pleines de mépris envers les
africains, sans mentionner que cette position a été liée explicitement de la théorie
de légitimation de la domination des pays notamment africains par les pays
occidentaux. Hegel a été le premier qui a donné le soutien théorique «respectable»
pour la politique colonialiste systématique des pays «démocratiques». À coup sur,
ces pays ont copieusement utilisé, en parallèle, les slogans racistes qui ont «décrit»
l’infériorité des africains et, généralement, des pays visés à être dominés. Ainsi,
ce qui est important est de comprendre le rôle du complexe: slogans racistes
vulgaires, irrationalistes, bêtes, plus théorie «scientifique neutre», pour la légitimation
des relations internationales modernes.
Avec la théorie étalée en 1821, Hegel a illustré la difficulté constitutive de
l’idéologie21 moderne: celle-ci a été et certainement est profondément intéressée
d’analyser les contradictions de la réalité pour les maîtriser; en même temps, elle
assume le cynisme à cause des freines mises à l’analyse dialectique. Pour Hegel,
l’évolution générée par les situations contradictoires (y inclus les réponses
contradictoires à ces situations et la combinaison de ces situations et de ces
réponses ainsi qu’elles constituent des bases/des directions nouvelles de l’évolution)
et qui devrait être ouverte est devenue terminée22, «projetée» par la force objective
de l’esprit. Celle-ci aurait donné le modèle de l’histoire et du futur, y inclus des
relations de domination internes et internationales.23 Mais cet historicisme est
tout à fait antidialectique.
La construction de la théorie de 1821 est contradictoire de point de vue
épistémologique. D’un côté, Hegel «a prouvé» la légitimité de la colonisation par
l’attitude en face de la mer des nations où l’industrie a prospéré et celle «repliés
sur eux-mêmes et enfoncés dans les superstitions...».24 De l’autre coté, le philosophe
a démontré la nécessité de la colonisation en découlant de la logique même du
——————
21 Idéologie = concept qui décrit le fait que toutes les idées concernant la société reflètent, sciemment ou
non, une position sociale : celle de celui qui réfléchit, parle, écrit ou celle d’un/une autre, même adverse. Il y
a, ainsi, de la «fausse conscience», comme l’avaient formulé au commencement Marx et Engels, la conscience
qui n’assume pas le caractère social de la perspective selon laquelle elle avance ses idées et, en même temps,
considère que sa perspective seulement est véritable et éternelle. En somme, la fausse conscience est celle qui
n’accepte pas la critique de soi.
22 La fin de l’histoire: l’État allemand moderne, considérait Hegel (voir «L’État n’est plus inférieur à
l’Eglise et ne lui est plus subordonné… La liberté a trouvé le moyen propre à réaliser son concept ainsi que sa
vérité. C’est là la fin de l’histoire universelle…», G. W. F. Hegel, Leçons de la philosophie de l’histoire (18221831, édition posthume), traduction J. Gibelin, Paris, Vrin, 1946, Fondements géographiques de l’histoire
universelle, p. 100-101)); le modèle de la démocratie représentative occidentale, nous rappellerait Fukuyama,
et transposé dans les relations internationales, voir John Rawls, Paix et démocratie. Le droit des peuples et la
raison publique (1999), Paris, La Découverte, 2006.
23 En ce qui me concerne, je me joints à la théorie qui considère le caractère historique du développement
des sociétés humaines (des forces productives, des relations de pouvoir, de la force des différentes idéologies,
etc., de la combinaison de tous ces facteurs) et le caractère ouvert du temps historique. Voir Ana Bazac,
«Aristotle and the labour force. Aristotle’s tradition in the present-day industrial revolution ideology», Revue
roumaine de philosophie, 1-2, 2004.
24 G. W. F. Hegel, Principes de la philosophie du droit, § 247, p. 185.
7
17
système, cette structure de relations ne dépendant pas de la couleur de la population
soumise, mais certainement du niveau des relations de production. Cet aspect est
tout à fait important parce qu’il éclaire le moule universel de la dépendance et
du sous-développement, même s’il s’agit des formes historiques différentes. Un
exemple est la dépendance des pays de l’Est de l’Europe face à l’Occident dès
«le deuxième servage» qui a commencé au 17ième siècle.25
Mais voyons la théorie de Hegel. Tout d’abord elle est formée de deux parties.
La première est celle qui exalte l’importance et le rôle historique de l’État
dans le développement de l’objectivation de l’esprit. Hegel a eu une vision
simple sur l’histoire: c’était celle qui a dominé jusqu’aux découvertes faites vers
le moitié du 19ième siècle. Le modèle a été jusqu’alors l’histoire en trois stades:
esclavagisme, féodalisme, modernité. Et parce que la société moderne a impliqué
la négation de la subordination antique et féodale (la libération juridique et
politique de la force de travail et l’organisation unitaire en États nationaux basés
sur la loi et sur des droits — même si ces derniers très faibles encore), Hegel a
considéré que l’organisation étatique serait la seule qui donnerait pour une
civilisation le droit à l’histoire.
En discutant la deuxième partie de la théorie, on doit noter que Hegel a été le
porte-parole de l’efficacité moderne: pour lui, les relations économiques modernes
étaient celles qui généraient le vrai avancement de l’histoire, et pas la subjugation
politique des territoires et des gens. De ce point de vue, il a ajouté, dans l’addition
faite à la section § 248, que la libération (AB, politique) des colonies a le même
avantage pour l’État occidental que la libération des esclaves pour le maître.
La colonisation a été pour Hegel le moyen de réaliser dans les pays industrialisés
«une société civile achevée»26, c’est-à-dire l’essor des relations capitalistes, la
croissance du profit et ainsi du tissu du pouvoir, et en même temps d’une certaine
paix sociale: par «le retour au principe familial, et, en même temps, de se procurer
à soi- même, un nouveau débouché pour son travail»27, ainsi pour les emplois
des travailleurs de la métropole. Puisqu’on ne doit pas oublier les tensions sociales
générées par le fait que «malgré son excès de richesse, la société civile n’est pas
assez riche, c’est-à-dire que dans sa richesse, elle ne possède pas assez de biens
pour payer tribut à l’excès de misère et à la plèbe qu’elle engendre.»28 Justement
«par cette dialectique qui lui est propre, la société civile est poussée au-delà
d’elle-même… à chercher, en dehors d’elle-même des consommateurs, et par
suite des moyens de subsister chez d’autres peuples», attention, «qui lui sont
inférieurs quant aux ressources qu’elle a en excès, ou, en général, en industrie.»29
En effet, il s’agissait de l’État moderne qui a été le correspondant d’un niveau
supérieur des forces productives, y inclus d’armement et des ressources centralisées
plus puissantes et qui, en vertu de ce fait a imposé, comme une autre relation
——————
25 Voir Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World System, vol. I, vol. II, N.Y. and San Diego, Academic
Press, 1980, 1989.
26 G. W. F. Hegel, Principes de la philosophie du droit, § 248, p. 185.
27 Ibidem.
28 Ibidem, § 245, p. 184.
29 Ibidem, § 246, p. 184.
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ANA BAZAC
8
structurelle de la modernité, les relations d’exploitation et de domination des
pays qui se trouvaient à un degré pré moderne face aux pays occidentaux. Ce qui
se continue dans l’entière histoire du système: au 19ième et 20ième siècles, après
la décolonisation, comme relation avantageuse pour les pays développés et
désavantageuse pour les autres. Aujourd’hui l’abîme entre ces deux types de
pays s’est enfoncé.30
Mais on sait qu’une fois des images (notions, théories) simples s’avaient
constituées, elles deviennent très fortes et les autres représentations idéologiques
sont construites dans le cadre formé par les premières. C’est justement le cas de
la théorie que Hegel a rédigé après31 ce qu’il a montré la nécessité de la colonisation
et de la dépendance pour la santé des pays occidentaux: si l’entreprise de 1821
a eu la sincérité que la dialectique engendre, c’est la théorie des peuples sans histoire
(sans État, ou bien sans État moderne et sans démocratie représentative)32, voués
par le hasard de la géographie à la soumission perpétuelle, qui a plutôt fait époque
justement à cause de son caractère légitimatrice, simple et non scientifique.
Parce que l’échafaudage avancé en 1822-1831 annule pratiquement l’explication
issue de l’analyse des relations structurelles de la société moderne (la
——————
30 Voir seulement que, dans plus de 80 pays, le revenu par personne est plus petit qu’il y a 10 ans et que
le rapport entre la cinquième partie la plus pauvre et la cinquième partie la plus riche des pays du monde, qui
était de 30 à un en 1960, est devenue 60 à un en 1990, tandis qu’en 2003 d’environ 80 à un, cf. Peter
Lamprecht, «Idéologie pan-économique et bien commun», dans Le bien commun comme réponse politique à
la mondialisation (sous la dir. de Olivier Delas et Christian Deblock), Bruxelles, Bruylant, 2003; p. 6.
31 Pour cette raison, je ne suis pas d’accord avec Bernard Bourgeois (1992) qui a considéré —
conformément à Jürgen Hengelbrock, The Stranger Between Oppression and Superiority. Close encounter with
Heinz Kimmerle, http://home.concepts-ict.nl/~kimmerle/ceheng.htm (25-X-2006) — que l’erreur de Hegel
concernant l’Afrique serait été seulement un accident.
32 G. W. F. Hegel, Leçons de la philosophie de l’histoire (1822-1831, édition posthume), traduction
J. Gibelin, Paris, Vrin, 1946, Fondements géographiques de l’histoire universelle.
Et aussi la troisième partie de l’Encyclopédie des sciences philosophiques (1817): Philosophie de l’esprit,
traduction en français pour la première fois par A. Véra, Paris, Germer Baillière, 1867, surtout tome premier,
Esprit subjectif, Ame. Esprits naturels particuliers. Races, Remarque à, § 394, et Esprits locaux, § 395 et
Remarque, p.120-139. Voir la note de A. Véra des pages 121-122: «D’où il ne faudrait conclure que dans la
pensée, et suivant la doctrine de Hegel, toutes les races et tous les hommes sont réellement et actuellement
égaux, et qu’il n’y a et il ne doit pas y avoir d’inégalité entre eux. L’homme est virtuellement raisonnable (Der
Mensch ist an sich vernünftig), et à ce titre tous les hommes sont égaux par là qu’ils sont tous compris dans la
même définition, c’est-à-dire dans la même notion, comme tous les animaux, toutes les plantes, etc., sont
compris dans la leur. Ce moment virtuel, cette possibilité a sa réalité et son importance, mais ce n’est qu’un
moment, et le moment le plus abstrait de la nature humaine, ce qui veut dire qu’il y a d’autres moments plus
concrets qui le modifient et le dominent, et qui y introduise des différences et d’inégalités, moments ou
nécessités qui font que non seulement tous les hommes ne peuvent actuellement être égaux, mais qu’ils ne
doivent point l’être… Toutes les races et toutes les nations sont virtuellement égales, en ce sens qu’elles
appartiennent toutes à l’humanité. Mais dans l’histoire concrète du monde, il y a et il doit y avoir des
différences, et par suite des inégalités. C’est aussi d’après ce critérium qu’il faut considérer la question de
l’esclavage. Par là que le nègre appartient au genre humain, l’esclavage est irrationnel et illégitime. Mais il ne
suit nullement de là que la race nègre soit égale à la race blanche et que, comme telle, elle doive être admise
avec elle au partage des mêmes droits et à l’exercice des mêmes fonctions, ou qu’elle ait la même importance
et puisse jouer le même rôle dans l’histoire. Voir sur ce point Philosophie de l’histoire de Hegel (Afrique) et
sa Philosophie de la religion, I, 284 et 289».
Voir aussi la focalisation sur les Leçons de la philosophie de l’histoire chez David Clinton Wills, Hegel’s
Europe (Spirit). Hegel’s Africa (Nature), 2004, http://thesis.haverford.edu/208/01/2004WillsD.pdf (26-X2006), et Olufemi Taiwo, “Exorcising Hegel’s Ghost: Africa’s Challenge to philosophy”, en African Studies
Quarterly, The Online Journal for African Studies, http://www.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v1/4/2.htm (29-X-2006).
9
19
dépendance du développement moderne de la domination de type, permettez moi
d’utiliser un concept court, impérialiste). Pas la logique interne de la modernité,
logique qui explique pourquoi est la situation des pays africains telle qu’elle
l’est, mais les clichés sur l’infériorité des africains en partant de la situation
existante qui, à son tour, est seulement affirmée: «Ce qui est rationnel est réel et
ce qui est réel est rationnel».
Parce que le pourquoi mène à et en même temps est l’équivalent de
l’approfondissement des relations structurelles ou de la logique du système.
Tandis que l’affirmation ou la description de la réalité mène à et est l’équivalent
de la justification par l’imaginaire lié aux abstractions. Ainsi l’évolution devient
fausse: seulement une concrétisation de l’esprit absolu.
Dans la seconde étape philosophique, la réalité conçue comme évidence est
devenu, chez Hegel, la «preuve», la légitimation de l’imaginaire, au lieu de rester
seulement le terrain et l’objet de la recherche. Dans ce moment-là Hegel a enfreint
son exigence même d’aller au-delà des apparences. C’est d’ici qu’on comprend
la tentative de Marx.
En vérité, il y a des peuples sans puissance de décision dans l’histoire moderne
présente, principalement dans les relations économiques et politiques, mais cette
situation n’est pas le résultat de leur essence, de la raison immanente à l’esprit
absolu, mais justement des relations structurelles du capitalisme. Ainsi, justement
à cause de ses contradictions, à cause des oppositions et tensions sociales, à cause
de la logique même de la modernité liée au développement des forces productives
pour atteindre le maximum du profit, la société se développe à l’échelle du monde
entier. Ce développement est marqué par la domination et la soumission, par
la polarisation sociale, à l’intérieur des pays et mondialement. Seulement le
développement des forces productives au plus haut niveau sera le terrain possible
des transformations structurelles.
Marx n’a pas été seulement un théoricien dialoguant avec ses précurseurs. En
montrant que le travail des esclaves a été inclus dans la logique de l’accumulation
primitive du capital33, il a manifesté son profond sentiment de compassion pour
les millions des êtres humains enlevés de leur terre et destinés au travail et à la
condition esclavagiste. Mais il a considéré que la défense de tous les oppressés,
paysans et travailleurs européens et esclaves et habitants de l’Afrique, est plus
puissante si elle va au delà de la perspective éthique sur le monde et dévoile le
complexe mécanisme social qui les contraint.34
——————
33
Cet aspect, comment on l’avait noté en haut, a été connu par Hegel: le travail des esclaves a été
considéré comme une question de pré modernité et il a conseillé que la libération des esclaves soit faite justement
parce que l’efficacité du travail des hommes libres est plus grande que celle du travail des esclaves.
34 Karl Marx, Capital, I, VIII part, chapter 31, http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1867-c1/cg31.htm,
(25-VIII-2006). Le mode de production capitaliste presse, évidemment, pour que les sociétés soient jetées dans
la modernité qui comporte tant des souffrances et injustices, mais le développement du capitalisme est le
résultat des forces objectives.
Est-ce que le capitalisme serait absolument nécessaire pour que finalement l’exploitation fût abolie? Plutôt
oui: les observations de Marx sur la situation de la Russie montrent seulement que la question est très complexe
et que les gens doivent «innover», comment disait Sartre. Mais justement les relations arriérées et (discutant
de l’occupation britannique de l’Inde) le colonialisme constituent l’obstacle contre la réalisation des objectifs
des révolutions bourgeoises dans ce genre de pays, et contre une révolution anti-capitaliste aussi: la décolonisation
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10
Pour cette raison, l’étude marxienne de la logique du capitalisme au son plus
haut niveau, réalisé à l’Occident, n’a pas été une forme sophistiquée d’exclusion
de l’Afrique35 et, en général, des pays sous développés du champ des préoccupations
et des problèmes de la philosophie et des sciences sociales. Au contraire, en
accentuant la détermination structurelle de l’aliénation, on ne peut plus la considérer
comme une question d’étape de la modernité et comme une question locale,
disons européenne: ainsi on doit se focaliser sur la réalité sociale concrète de tout
le monde, de toutes les régions et tous les pays, qui n’ont plus une place préétablie
et donnée. S’opposant à la philosophie de l’histoire de Hegel — concernant les
différentes civilisations comme marches de l’évolution, mais en même temps
chacune étant éternellement dans la même position dans le système mondial (au
fond, une vision statique) —, Marx a cherché à démontrer les causes historiques,
sociales, économiques de la domination et de l’exploitation moderne interne et
internationale36. En cette ligne d’explication le mouvement anticoloniale — contre
ces causes-là — parait le plus voué au succès mouvement radical contemporain.37
Certainement le futur est ouvert: les causes s’entrecoupent et se combinent, le poids
de différentes tendances dépende des actions, des tournures, de la responsabilité.
Mais en ce cas, il serait difficile de trouver l’inspiration pour la compréhension
de la société, et concrètement des relations Nord-Sud, dans le finalisme hégélien.38
L’avancement de la recherche philosophique sur la spécificité de l’Afrique et
les spécificités des africains, l’offensive contre le complexe d’infériorité induite
dans le processus de colonisation ne peut pas éluder le contenu et les problèmes
sociaux des théories mainstream, comme celui de Hegel, et des théories critiques,
comme celui de Marx. De ce point de vue, la recherche philosophique africaine
qui considère la richesse et les significations des idées et de la création populaire
africaine, et dispute si cette-ci est ou n’est pas philosophie comme telle, s’il y a du
synchronisme (ou même du proto-chronisme), est très intéressante.39 Cette
——————
et le développement du capitalisme interne sont importants pour que l’ennemi ne soit plus le colonisateur,
pensait Marx. L’impérialisme transnational d’aujourd’hui ne dément pas Marx. En tout cas, la logique de la
théorie marxienne a contenu deux pas/variantes: la révolution socialiste dans un pays avancé comme la Grande
Bretagne mènerait aux changements dans tout le monde, y inclus dans les pays sous-développés; la révolution
anti-impérialiste dans les pays colonisés mènerait aux changements dans les pays avancés.
35 C’est le point de vue de Pierre Quillet, op. cit.
36 Voir aussi le compte-rendu sur Robert Biel, The New Imperialism: Crisis and Contradictions in North/South
Relations, Londres, Zed Books, 2000, http://www.columbia.edu/~lnp3/mydocs/economics/biel.htm Le livre de
Biel sur http://www.columbia.edu/~Inp3/mydocs/economics/biel.htm, (25-III-2006).
37 Terry Eagleton, A shelter in the tempest of history, http://www.redpepper.org.uk/article602.html (20-I-2008).
38 Voir la critique de David North concernant justement la tendance actuelle de révitaliser la philosophie
de Hegel (Errol Harris, Paul Franco, David MacGregor, Warren Breckman,Tom Rockmore), David North,
Hegel, Marx, Engels, and the Origins of Marxism, 2 May 2006, 3 May 2006, http://www.wsws.org (3-V-2006).
39 Voir Kwasi Wiredu, Toward Decolonizing African Philosophy and Religion, http://web.africa.ufl.edu/
asq/v1/4/3.htm, Théophile Obenga, La philosophie africaine de la période pharaonique 2780-330 avant notre
ère, http://www.ankhonline.com/philosop1.htm, et spécialement Innocent I Asouzu, The Method and Principles
of Complementary Reflection in and beyond African Philosophy, 2004, http://www.frasouzu.com, avec Reply
to Heinz Kimmerle, Zoetermeer’s review and critical comments on Innocent Asouzu’s Approach to African
Philosophy, et Pierre Bamony, Du problème de la philosophie africaine, http://www.hommes-et-faits.com/
philosophie/PB_Philo_Afr.htm (25-X-2006).
11
21
atmosphère parmi l’intelligentsia africaine correspond dans un sens à celle de la
Roumanie, un pays de l’Est européen, dépendant et périphérique.
Dans ce contexte, il serait très important que les philosophes travaillent autour
de l’idée-force (Fouillère) qui est le concept de bien commun/publique. Près du
multiculturalisme imprégné de tolérance libérale qui suppose la séparation et
l’ignorance polie de questions essentielles de la vie, on ne devrait pas ignorer le
débat permanent concernant le bien qui transcende les différences culturelles. On
sait qu’après la deuxième guerre mondiale, l’époque a été propice au développement
de la notion de droits de l’homme pas seulement au plan des cultures et des droits
démocratiques, mais aussi au plan social et économique. L’essor du capitalisme
transnational a pressé et presse pour la limitations des biens publiques et, en
même temps, pour des nouvelles significations données au bien commun. La guerre
et l’alliance pour la guerre deviennent, comme dans le newspeak d’Orwell, la
paix et la solidarité pour la paix, suprême bien commun. Le respect des droits et
l’aide — suprêmes preuves de solidarité humaine — apparaissent sous la forme
de la «liberté» individuelle pour se débrouiller.
C’est un renouvellement du concept d’accumulation par dépossession,
pendant du néo-impérialisme,40 et paire de la notion de néo-libéralisme comme
réformes institutionnelles contre l’État social.41 Et même si le protectionnisme
ne serait pas du tout être la solution pour la diminution des inégalités tant à l’intérieur
qu’entre les pays.42 Tous ça appartient aussi au «processus philosophique»43 et
la philosophie reste endettée aux hommes si elle n’est pas vigilante à temps. Mais
la tendance de minimiser le bien public n’est pas la seule: à elle se contre pose
celle qui le soutient et veut le réaliser. En n’étant pas neutre envers ces
tendances, la philosophie représente aujourd’hui plus que jamais un modèle
privilégié de choix.
C’est justement par le biais de la philosophie que les tendances apparaissaient
et les mises se révèlent le plus clair possible. En suggérant la société civile
hégélienne, le concept d’action chez Hannah Arendt insiste sur la constitution et
signification du domaine public44: et même si celui-ci parait être distinct du
domaine privé (celui de l’économie) — circonscrit par des lois libérales de dire,
raconter et faire la politique, et ainsi par une hiérarchie organiciste où l’homme
d’État ne se mêle pas avec l’artisan et l’artiste, le moins avec le labeur — il suppose
toutefois la manifestation des gens comme citoyens, la qualité citoyenne. La
——————
40 David Harvey, The New Imperialism (2003), voir la traduction roumaine Noul imperialism, Bucureºti,
Editura Bic All, 2004.
41 Voir aussi Conversation with David Harvey, http://www.logosjournal.com/issue_5.1/harvey.htm
(14-I-2008) et David Harvey, War Waged by the Wealthy, Interview by Joseph Choonara, February 2006,
http://www.socialistreview.org.uk/article.php?articlenumber=9655 (14-I-2008).
42 Joseph Stiglitz, Making Globalization Work, Penguin Books, 2006, voir p. 274, 277 (besoin des
nouvelles institutions mondiales)-287, soutien des pays en cours de développement pour un nouveau contrat
social mondial (287-288).
43 Emmanuel Lévinas, «Transcendance et hauteur», 1962, dans Emmanuel Lévinas, cahier dirigé par
Catherine Chalier et Miguel Abensour, Paris, Éditions de l’Herne, 1991, p. 100.
44 Hannah Arendt, Condition de l’homme moderne (1958), Paris, Calmann-Lévy, 1983, p. 31-90.
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12
représentation de la citoyenneté, après sa longue histoire engendrée par la naissance
et la consolidation des États-nations et confronté aujourd’hui avec les nouvelles
réalités de la mondialisation et de l’Empire, tende à changer ses présuppositions:
le caractère mondial (global citizenship) de la citoyenneté et le droit au
réappropriation deviennent les tendances et en même temps les mots d’ordre.45
La destruction des vieux préjugés de la domination et de l’infériorité des
dominés est difficile, mais «le plan révolutionnaire de l’immanence»46 parait
soutenir «l’idée d’un droit cosmopolitique» «qui contient le droit publique aussi
bien que le droit des gens, en vue de la réalisation des droits de l’homme en général
et par là en vue de la paix perpétuelle.»47 De Hegel en arrière à l’éclatement
kantienne des Lumières? C’est seulement un mouvement en spirale.
——————
45 Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire (2000), Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, England,
Harvard University Press, 2001 (tenth printing), p. 361, 400, 403.
46 Ibidem, p. 70.
47 Immanuel Kant, Projet de paix perpétuelle (1795), texte intégral, traduction originale de PierreFrançois Burger, Notes explicatives, questionnaires, documents et parcours philosophique établis par Monique
Castillo, professeur à l’Université de Poitiers, Paris, Hachette, 1998, p. 39.
ZYGMUND BAUMAN AND THE POSTMODERN APPROACH:
“WEAK” GUIDELINES OVER THE POSTMODERN ETHICS
VIORELLA MANOLACHE
Abstract. According to the theoreticians of Postmodernism, we would
(politically) be tempted to find a reason for this effort of taking a stand in
Modernism — Postmodernism. From the political philosophy point of
view, the answer to this (political) matter is connected to the proximal
inheritance and to denying what is considered stable structures of the
human being. The great ethical principles (human rights, social justice, the
balance between peaceful cooperation and personal achievement, the
synchronizing of the private behavior and joint happiness), besides keeping
their present state, have to be analyzed, according to Zygmund Bauman,
from a “different perspective”.
It is obvious the fact that by the end of the 1960s (if we were to consider just
the political effects of the well-known year 1968), the European world (and not
only it!) engaged in passing through a series of visible changes. These were so
strong that despite of the “dropped curtains”, they could be experienced from the
Eastern reserved, communist World to the Islamic one, from the authoritative
political regime to the open-minded societies, having the image of a world where
interdependent phenomena could be felt simultaneously. These are the steps that
led to the joining of the new type of international communities that Marshall
McLuhan called “planetary village”. Both communist and socialist Governments
and the liberal-conservative ones connected their speeches to the progressive
perspective centered round the development of new types of technology: genetic,
of studying robots, spatial and, especially, electronic one. All these changed
the industrial world, illustrative of the late economic modernism, into a
postindustrial one. Thus, the image of a more dynamic, more transitive, more
anarchical, more colorful world appeared (as a proof the writings of some
“prophets” of the 1960s)1, reminding of the motley “fortress” from Platon’s
Republic. David Harvey2 suggested an analysis of Postmodernism as mimesis of
the social, political and economic activities. From this point of view, Postmodernism
——————
1 See Alvin Toffler, Future’s Shock, Marshall McLuhan, The Guttenberg Galaxy, Herbert Marcuse, The
Liberation from the Society of Richness etc. etc.
2 David Harvey, The Postmodern Condition, Amarcord, Timisoara, 2002.
24
VIORELLA MANOLACHE
2
would overlap a strong and chaotic movement, aiming at surpassing all the
mistakes of the Modernism. Therefore, any kind of passing over the material
achievements of the Modern activities is not recommended. As the Modern
writers found a way of controlling and limiting the explosive character of
capitalism. They proved to be very efficient in organizing the urban life and in
creating living space. However, Postmodernism had great importance regarding
the recognition of the varied ways of the others existence; as a result of
differences caused by subjectivity, tenancy gender and sexuality, race and social
class and temporal, geographical and spatial disintegration. Postmodernism can
be recognized in this crisis of the historical materialism, as well as in the
interference of the liberalism, of the computer technology in the Eastern World,
and also in the fear related to economic and political supremacy and indoctrination
(the Western one).
The historical materialism appeared as an inexhaustible dialectical method of
searching rather than a close, stable and centered body. The theory does not
imply revealing the whole truth anymore, but finding a way of reconciliation
with the historical realities that characterize capitalism both in its general and its
actual stage3. According to the theoreticians of Postmodernism, we would
(politically) be tempted to find a reason for this effort of taking a stand in
Modernism — Postmodernism. From the political philosophy point of view, the
answer to this (political) matter is connected to the proximal inheritance and to
denying what is considered stable structures of the human being. The dissolution
of the stability of the human being is partial in “the great systems of the
metaphysical historicism of the twentieth century”. There, as Vattimo says4, the
human being does not live, it becomes, according to some established and
necessary rhythms that still keep a certain ideal stability, which Nietzsche and
Heidegger called incident. The ontology is nothing else but the interpretation of
this condition, as out of such incident, our existence becomes history. From a
political point of view, a cyclic and naturalist vision would prevail over the
characteristic phenomena of the Modernism as a model of developing and
elaboration in purely secular and mundane terms. Thus, according to our place
in the development of the political events, any speech related to Postmodernism
remains contradictory. Saying that we are in a subsequent moment of Modernism
and considering it final, means accepting the point of view of Modernism (according
to Vattimo5 “the idea of history with its corollaries, the notion of progress and
topping”). Starting from this idea, the postmodern ethics, as it is understood by
Bauman, seems opposed to the modern ethics (mostly metaphysical) which is
centered round development, growth, progress, charity etc. However, according
to Bauman, the society with risks remains a reflexive stage of Modernism. From
the very beginning, Zygmund Bauman warned us that the research “Postmodern
Ethics” is an explanation of Postmodern ethics and not of Postmodern morality.
——————
3 Viorella Manolache, The Romanian Postmodernism Between Ontological Experience and Political
Necessity, Lucian Blaga University Press, Sibiu, 2004
4 Gianni Vattimo, Societatea transparentã, Editura Pontica, Constanþa, 1995.
5 Ibidem.
3
ZYGMUND BAUMAN AND THE POSTMODERN APPROACH
25
The novelty of the Postmodern perspective6 concerning ethics lies firstly not in
abandoning the typically modern moral concerns, but in rejecting the typical
modern ways of approaching the moral issues (how one reacts at the moral
challenge through standard coercive rules taken from the political activities and
searching from the perspective of philosophy of absolute, universal and
fundamental).
The great ethical principles (human rights, social justice, the balance between
peaceful cooperation and personal achievement, the synchronizing of the private
behavior and joint happiness), besides keeping their present state, have to be
analyzed, according to Zygmund Bauman, from a “different perspective”.
Adopting major themes of political, philosophical and sociological reflection
in the studies on Modernism and Postmodernism (Legislators and Interpreters,
Modernity and the Holocaust, Modernity and Ambivalence, Thinking Sociologically),
Bauman suggests o complete perspective over expressing and explaining
Postmodernism, as guide mark that influenced the political philosophy and its
concepts; this perspective accepts those sociologists’ “opinion” (not necessarily
Marxists, social-democrats or liberals) who suggest understanding Postmodernism
without conditioning it by Postmodernism. If we review the key-elements of the
postmodern ethics, we may say that the perspective suggested by Z. Bauman is
organized on several levels that propose and define “the postmodern approach”.
These levels concern:
— taking account of the properties of Postmodern ethics, seen as an intersection
point between the social-individual “system”, on the one hand, and on the other
hand, the total contest — as a Postmodern political form of government (private
ethics vs. public risks);
— diagnosing the sources of the ethics power; Postmodern ethics is a reaction
to the ethical challenges through coercive standard rules applied in the political
activities (moral responsibility vs. ethical rule; ambiguous universality; asymmetrical
“ethical association”; form vs. anti-form; moral, aesthetic, cognitive spaces etc.)
— universality and basis; the modern model of the state that suggests the
antinomy subject vs. rational morality, non-ambivalence politically promoted
through replacing certain “networks” as the final product of aggregating the
political power field with ethical claims.
According to these guidelines, it seems that we are involved, as the author of
Postmodern Ethics says, in a new world disorder, or to say it another way, in a
game of re-organizing the world. It is the rule of a political puzzle where the
possibility of disagreement and discord between (moral, political, ethical etc)
spaces bursts and “comes to light”, as it has never been really stopped. Bauman’s
belief reduces to the fact that there is no control efficiently centered which can
offer a certain naturalness to the unsafe, continuously imitated space. It is true,
as Foucault proved too, “the fight for power and permanent war” is the only
certain basis of an organized living. Nowadays, despite globalization and its
effects that can be seen in the human effort to build a new social, economic,
——————
6 Zygmund Bauman, Postmodern Ethics, Amarcord, Timisoara, 2000.
26
VIORELLA MANOLACHE
4
political space, according to Bauman we are crossing a period of uncertainty and
unburdening the megalothymy in the liberal contemporary democracies.
Therefore, the liberal democracy could be reversed either by the excess of
megalothymy or by the excess of izothymy, namely by the fanatic wish of equal
recognition. The only forms of megalothymy that are forbidden in contemporary
societies are those that lead to political tyranny. The difference between these
societies and the aristocratic ones is that megalothymy was not banished, but it
existed underground. The democratic societies start from the premise that all
people are born equal, and their predominant ethos is the equality one. So, those
demonstrations of megalothymy that survived in the modern democracies can be
rediscovered in contrast with the ideals that the society affirms publicly.
According to Bauman, both the periods of uncertainty and the typical response
to them appear as a result of the collapse of “empires” or, simultaneously, of the
elements caused by great and fast social events that can not be assimilated
anymore by existing controlling agents. The present outburst of the efforts of
reorganizing the political-social space, the inactive persistency of such attempts
in the postcolonial/postmodern world can be justified, according to Bauman,
through appealing to the early Orthodox motifs.
According to Postmodern Ethics, the political life has a certain unique structure.
Bauman considered that, socially, the relation between socialization and sociability
would correspond, in fact, to the relation between the enlightenment, progressive
project of Modernity and the out of centre one, belonging to Postmodernism. If
socialization anticipates the condition that is about to be realized “in nuce”, it
supervises and reinterprets it as it moves forward, sociability has no direction,
“does not know where it should arrive at”. Furthermore, if socializing can be
rendered valuable in time, sociability remains bound to present, “no matter how
long its forms would last”. If socialization is a cumulative process, based upon
past to achieve its future ends, sociability is “flat”, moving without changing its
place, starting all over again. According to Bauman, sociability has no biography
and it rather interrupts than it creates history. While socialization reduces the
number of options “still open”, sociability releases these possibilities.
As a conclusion, sociability is assaulted by socializing. It is a tendency that
gained consistency together with the methods of recovering the social and political
system. Bauman was convinced that such a tendency gained strength as the local
traditions lost their influence and “the power to establish the ethical duties and
to supervise their insertion”. “The postmodern divorce” that Zygmund Bauman
mentions, can be recognized in the fact that the state does not claim anymore the
capacity, the need and the wish of supremacy, and it frees, on purpose or
unwillingly, the anti-structural forces of sociability. According to Bauman, these
can be seen in the capacity of controlling, in the power of colonization and
coercive arranging of every day life that the state had acquired from combining
sovereignty over all “crucial dimensions of the human being”.
That is why the economic role of the Governments generally is reduced to
maintaining some local, attractive conditions expressed by, what Bauman called,
submissive labor power, low taxes, good hotels, entertaining night life etc. The
5
27
cultural sovereignty refused even the posthumous existence of myth, because the
cultural industry and that of the producers of culture infringe the rules imposed
by the traditional limits of the state. The present divorce between the politics
centered round the state and the “ethical” existence of its citizens or, as Bauman
puts it, between the socialization of the institutions governed by the state and the
joint sociability, seems to have disappeared forever.
According to the same Bauman, Postmodernism is a “modernism without
illusions”7. The immediate effects of Postmodernism are the “un-charming” of
the world; from this point of view, the re-personalizing of morality really means
the returning of the moral responsibility to the starting point of the ethical
process. Linked to such a model, the assumption of universality was built as a
reflection on the modern activities of generalizing, similar to the concepts of
“human nature” and “human essence”; this really showed the intention of using
the term citizen as the person with attributes given by the only and
unquestionable authority that acts in the name of the sovereign and unitary state.
Agreeing with the author of Postmodern Ethics, the postmodern variant of
universality is the ‘globalization’ perspective — the idea of global spreading of
information, of technology and of the economic interdependence, which does
not include religious recognition of the moral, cultural and political authorities.
In this political-social space, Bauman places the neo-tribes8; these
are outbreaks of sociability, “unplanned expeditions” in the world of
unapproachable morality. As they are not anymore strictly structured by the
hereditary communities or by the legislative bodies of the political system, the
neo-tribes are organized in short invasions of acknowledgement. They look like
the phenomena described by Prigogine, that of creating the crystals in saturated
solutions. Despite the high technology instruments avaible, these “neo-tribal
crow” have small life expectancy. Together with the concept of decentralization,
with the global network, efficient in communicating and with the illusion of
approaching given by the field of vision (mainly television), it is extremely easy
——————
7 Modernity relied on the humans’ freedom “card”, namely all that involved faith in progress and in the
rational capacity to create freedom. The results can be seen in the following types of societies: agricultural,
capital, rationalized, without a clear historical direction (Durhkeim), work alienation, exploitation (Marx) and
the wandering of the individual between structures (Weber), the atomizing of the society (Simmel), increasing
the supervising groups (Foucault). Postmodernism is organized as a “system of objects”, a society marked by
consumption, by hiding the means that assure the social prestige. By giving up the “fundament”, Postmodernism
implies the collapse of the hierarchies of knowledge, taste, opinion, a replacement of the real, living image
with that created on the television screen, the migration of the words towards images, of speech towards
person. New types of spreading and dividing (a world of pure semblance, models, codes, digital systems) are
looking for identifying freedom in disorientation.
8 The main character of this sociological-political story is not the modern period’s worker anymore, but
its consumer, as Bauman says. Consumer’s behavior becomes the mark of the cognitive and moral accent of
life, the way in which people are integrated in society, as well as their connection to the systematic management.
Meaning that seeing urbanity as a scene, Bauman underlined the fusing between merchandise and client,
between buying and being the result of buying. The special commercial spaces built for this game offers to
Bauman’s “loiterers” a true paradise. The historical connection between the game of these “loiterers” and the
modern/postmodern consumerism, between observing and changing the observer in the object of observation,
between buying and being bought, was done through creating some social prototypes, as consumers and object
of consuming.
28
VIORELLA MANOLACHE
6
for some small scale events to become national or even international. According
to Bauman, the fact that these models are transmitted through media and have
no other sources of credibility determine their short existence. Therefore, each
neo-tribe is sentenced to an “episodic and unimportant experience”. What really
is neither episodic, nor unimportant, is the postmodern condition where the
neo-tribes become the dominant way of “anti-structural and social” expression.
Politically, as Bauman says, the low, notorious results of the political efforts
are the consequences of a “selfish short-sightedness”, of some wrong strategies
or some extremely hesitating solutions9.
Because these postmodern neo-tribes10 remain, for the political leaders, systems
concerned with a single matter (the case of the sexual, religious, ethnic minorities),
interested in just a subject matter that concerns the public so that it can be
absorbed by the dissimilar and un-balanced persons. Given such a theoretical
background, where one of the values is “denying the social itself”, Postmodernism
encourages creating certain tendencies that seem to be rather centripetal.
Bauman explains such a tendency through the fact that the states admit the rights
of the categories smaller than the nation (founded on ethnic, territorial, religious
or sexual politics basis) to moral specificity and self-determination. In this sense,
“the human rights”, marked by the state’s giving up certain legislative prerogatives
and the ambition of controlling suspiciously, indiscreetly the private life, become
on the one hand, a slogan and on the other hand a way of being blackmailed by
the “community leaders” who wish to gain the powers that the state has given up
to. According to Bauman, such a phenomenon can be recognized in the
individualization of the differences, of a new moral autonomy, doubled by the
hidden intention of (re)” collectivizing” the difference and reanimating a new
heteronomy.
For Bauman, the morality legislated by the state and the vague moral pressures
put on by the named representatives of the postulated communities do nothing
else but deny and reduce the moral freedom of the individual by replacing the
autonomous moral responsibility with the ethical duty.
Starting from the interpersonal relationships theorized by Kant or Levinas,
Bauman considers that the world of morality remains governed by the over
individualized universality, the individuals being placed in an asymmetrical
relation. If Heidegger is liable to be accused of “irreparable ethical neutrality”,
Bauman subscribes to Heidegger’s perspective that of the self placed on the
coordinates of a “being with”, essentially symmetrical. According to Bauman,
Postmodernism launches and sustains “the solitude of the moral subject”,
opposing the moral self to a self without any moral basis. In a circuit from
——————
9 “The theory of the voting society” can also be applied to the political reactions of the public towards
risks. According to this theory, only the political strategies that reach, thanks suggestions, the interests of the
voter society, are ahead; this excludes from the viable strategies those strategies that frankly represent only the
interests of a minority and that, according to Bauman, offers to majority the perspective of “paying the price
of other people’s sorrows”, namely of a great hardships. The political leaders are preoccupied with
“improving” these postmodern structures of anti-structural collective sociability.
10 Bauman uses the terms “flaneur” and “flaneuses” to refer to the spectator’s model, whose curiosity is
continual, loiterer’s freedom, accepted both as a scenarist and as a director of the postmodern world.
7
29
Modernity to Postmodernism, Bauman considered “the essential scene” of morality
the space of intimate meeting with the Other; this equilibrium becomes fragmentary
from the moment when The Third meeting appears on the “field” of Social
Order, which is governed by Justice and not by morality.
Such a theorizing of the distinct philosophical-political spaces launches the
effective difference between communitas and societas. Taking over such a
dichotomy from Victor W. Turner, Bauman considers that it becomes functional
only in well-structured society, every time an individual or a group passes by or
moves from one structure into another, in fact from a structure into an anti-structure.
If societas is characterized by heterogeneousness, inequality, the statutes’
differentiation or nominal system, communitas is marked by homogeneousness,
equality, the absence of statutes, anonymity: “in other words, communitas destroys
what societas tries very hard to create and use. Or societas adapts and changes
everything that in communitas is liquid and shapeless”11.
In the inside “network” of this relational system, Postmodern Ethics discusses
another dichotomy: material space vs. social space, specifying the fact that the
social space through its forms (cognitive, aesthetic and moral) is the one that
expresses the notions of proximity and distance, of closeness and openness;
although, according to Bauman, these “mechanisms” of creating space are
different precisely because of their results and pragmatics. If the cognitive space
is built intellectually, through acquiring and sharing information, the aesthetic
space is emotionally represented, through the attention directed by curiosity and
through looking for intensity of experience; while the moral space is “built” through
an unequal distribution of the assumed/felt responsibility. The total effect of
Postmodernism is precisely the “de-socialization” of the possible social space or
preventing the changing of the material space in a social one — changing that,
according to Bauman, imposes “the false techniques” of a space that has interaction
and involvement rules.
Taking the terms “foreign” and “settled” over Norbert Elias, Bauman considers
that this couple of terms is a type of social configuration where the two groups
coexist; they fight for settling the boundaries of their territories, but still connected
by the favors that they do to each other in searching their identity. Applying
these concepts to Modernism, Bauman considers that the parting of “settled” and
“foreigners” was established by “the asymmetry of power as it used to be imposed
in creating the social space”, in the effort of sharing the social space after “the
cognitive map promoted by the managers”.
According to Postmodern Ethics, the direct impact of the modern state and
market is the “un-modernization” of those exposed to their impact, reducing to
minimum the modern person’s qualities and, implicitly, his capacity of taking his
own decisions. If the market’s and the state’s solutions to the moral ambivalence
are illusory, Bauman suggests “the civil society” as the background of
recovering the moral autonomy; this is “a negotiated practice between the agents
able to develop, on the one hand, and between the culture able to change, on the
——————
11 Bauman, Postmodern Ethics, 2000, p. 129.
30
VIORELLA MANOLACHE
8
other hand”. Placed in such an equation, modern people are nothing else but
some “technological objects”. According to Bauman, such a “technological action”
produces just a “local order” formed of a selection of fragments; the result of such
structure is nothing else but total disorder: “local order is unbalanced alongside
with the rest; the local development rarely surpasses the secondary effects of the
new lack of balance”, establishing forever “the society with risks” as the final
stage of technology. According to Bauman, “the society with risks” presupposes
extending the responsibilities doubled by the of self-limiting ethics. The postmodern
reorganization starts from “the society with risks”, adding to this new structure
political and economic elements, because “the separation between the political
and economic autarchy can no longer be complete and also seems to be irrevocable”.
Paradoxically, in the period of cosmopolitan economy, the territory of the
political sovereignty is diagnosed by Bauman as a major factor that facilitates
the free capital and merchandise movement. Therefore, the globalization of economy
and information and separation of political sovereignty are not opposed, conflicting
or incompatible tendencies, but factors permanently engaged in recreating a new
postmodern background12.
In the last subchapter of the Postmodern Ethics, Bauman pleads for a clear
inventory of the “postmodern wisdom” and of the “postmodern helplessness”.
Although accepted as a period of crisis, the postmodern spirit proves its “wisdom”
through giving up searching the all comprehensive, total and final formula of the
life freed from ambiguity, risk, danger or error, being aware of the fact that each
treatment (be it local, specialized, individualized or efficient) becomes its main
“aim”. “The postmodern helplessness” is a political one, because the politics of
the postmodern existence (either because it is one of the politicians, or because
it is evasive and uncontrolled) remains lacunose precisely concerning the extending
and institutionalizing the moral responsibility.
——————
12 Idem, p. 207-212; 250-252.
¿EL FIN DE LA HISTORIA?
NOTAS SOBRE EL ESPEJISMO DE FRANCIS FUKUYAMA
LUIS R. ORO TAPIA
Héctor Herrera Cajas (1930-1997)
Abstract. The study reaffirms F. Fukuyama main theses. Fukuyama qualified
his original “end of history” thesis, arguing that since biotechnology
increasingly allows humans to control their own evolution, it may allow
humans to alter human nature, thereby putting liberal democracy at risk.
One possible outcome could be that an altered human nature could end in
radical inequality. The struggle for recognition, the willingness to risk one’s
life for a purely abstract goal, the worldwide ideological struggle that
called forth daring, courage, imagination, and idealism, will be replaced by
economic calculation, the endless solving of technical problems, environmental
concerns, and the satisfaction of sophisticated consumer demands. In the
post-historical period there will be neither art nor philosophy, just the
perpetual caretaking of the museum of human history. These are the main
supports for a study upon F.Fukuyama!
La caída del Muro de Berlín, el 9 de noviembre de 1989, sorprendió a la opinión
pública mundial, desconcertó a los políticos y dejó estupefactos a los intelectuales.
Fue un evento que nadie previó — ni siquiera los futurólogos y, menos aún, los
politicals sciences —, excepto Francis Fukuyama. En efecto, Fukuyama un año
antes había vaticinado, en un artículo titulado ¿El fin de la historia?1, el ineluctable
triunfo del liberalismo sobre el bolchevismo y, en general, del modo de vida de
las sociedades euroatlánticas respecto de las no occidentales.
Fukuyama se inspiró en la filosofía de la historia de Georg Wilhelm Friedrich
Hegel para realizar su pronóstico. La interpretación que Fukuyama realizó de los
acontecimientos de la segunda mitad de la década de 1980 aparecía “avalada”
por la autoridad intelectual del filósofo berlinés. Pero el éxito del artículo no se
explica sólo por la filiación intelectual de su autor, sino que también porque en
su momento brindó una explicación — bastante satisfactoria — de un proceso
que a todos cogió por sorpresa. Más aún, acontecimientos posteriores a la caída
——————
1 El artículo fue publicado originalmente en los Estados Unidos en la revista The National Interest en el
número correspondiente al verano de 1988. En Chile fue traducido y publicado por la revista Estudios Públicos
en el número 37, correspondiente al verano de 1990.
32
LUIS R. ORO TAPIA
2
del Muro, como la desintegración de la Unión Soviética y la disolución del Pacto
de Varsovia, parecían corroborar a cabalidad la tesis de Fukuyama.
No obstante los aciertos del artículo en cuestión, sus planteamientos deben
ser revisados. Por eso, es pertinente comparar las ideas del profesor de Harvard
con las del filósofo berlinés. Ello, con el propósito de determinar hasta qué punto
el planteamiento del primero se ajusta al del segundo.
Para cumplir con tal meta, mi análisis seguirá el siguiente itinerario. En primer
lugar, esbozaré a grandes rasgos, en lo que el asunto en cuestión concierne, la
concepción hegeliana de la historia. En seguida, expondré los principales aspectos
del planteamiento de Fukuyama. Finalmente, trataré de determinar si existe
compatibilidad entre las ideas de Fukuyama y las de Hegel.
La visión de la historia en Hegel
Para Hegel la historia está signada por el devenir. En ella nada es eterno; todo
es fugaz. Sus protagonistas son las agrupaciones humanas, las entidades colectivas.
Ellas son portadoras de un espíritu que está en incesante movimiento. Éste despliega
de manera progresiva su racionalidad. Y en cuanto más se desarrolla más se
incrementa la conciencia que tiene de sí mismo. El espíritu es libre en la medida
que se auto-posee plenamente, es decir, en la medida que se torna más consciente
de sí mismo.
El espíritu es inquieto. Ni siquiera en su momento de mayor plenitud cesa su
movimiento. Por eso, cuando logra su madurez, al igual que una fruta que está
en su sazón, se encamina hacia su ocaso hasta que finalmente se marchita y
fenece. Hegel, en su obra Lecciones sobre la filosofía de la historia universal2,
sostiene que el espíritu es como un individuo natural y “como tal florece, madura,
decae y muere”3. Por eso, “cuando el espíritu del pueblo ha llevado a cabo toda
su actividad […] vive el tránsito de la virilidad a la vejez”.
Pero en la senectud, en los últimos días del otoño, deviene en una nueva
forma y adquiere así una nueva identidad. En efecto, desde las cenizas el espíritu
vuelve a resurgir azuzado por las pasiones4 y nuevamente se transforma en algo
objetivo y configura nuevas macroformas colectivas. Es el comienzo de una nueva
era. Ella también tendrá su momento de esplendor y, posteriormente, también
desfallecerá. Al espíritu del pueblo hay que concebirlo, entonces, “como el
desarrollo de un principio, que está encubierto en la forma de un oscuro impulso,
que se expansiona y tiende hacerse objetivo”5, hasta que cristaliza en un orden.
Pero su “realización es, a la vez, su decadencia”. Y ésta, a su vez, constituye la
base para la creación de una nueva macroforma, de un nuevo orden, de una
nueva era del espíritu. Así “el espíritu de un pueblo se realiza sirviendo de
——————
2 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Lecciones sobre la filosofía de la historia universal, Editorial Alianza,
Madrid, 1989.
3 Hegel, op. cit., p. 71.
4 Qué son las pasiones para Hegel? Es la “actividad del hombre, impulsada por intereses particulares, por
fines especiales, o, si se quiere, por propósitos egoístas”. Hegel, op. cit., p. 83.
3
¿EL FIN DE LA HISTORIA? NOTAS SOBRE EL ESPEJISMO DE F. FUKUYAMA
33
transito al principio de otro pueblo. Y de este modo los principios de los pueblos
se suceden, surgen y desaparecen”.
Cuando declina el espíritu, es decir, cuando se agota una forma de racionalidad,
las pasiones comienzan a desbordarse hasta que logran erosionarla y destruirla.
Pero una vez que el derrumbe está consumado las pasiones comienzan a alentar
el surgimiento de una nueva aventura de la razón, de una nueva creación del
espíritu. En efecto, en la etapa formativa y ascendente de un pueblo las pasiones
cumplen un rol crucial, en cuanto propulsan al espíritu, pero una vez que éste
alcanza su madurez ellas tratan (aunque parezca paradójico) de barrenar su
hegemonía, y así sucesivamente.
Por eso, para Hegel, las dos principales características que rigen la lógica de
la historia universal son la incesante variación de las formas y el permanente
rejuvenecimiento del espíritu. Tales categorías dan cuenta de diferentes momentos
de un mismo fenómeno. Ambas, en efecto, constatan la omnipresencia del
cambio, del devenir, de las transmutaciones.
La primera categoría (la de variación) enfatiza la precariedad y volatilidad de
las conquistas humanas. Tras ella subyace la certeza del carácter finito de las
creaciones del espíritu. No obstante cuando el espíritu alcanza su plenitud, él y
sus realizaciones parecen inmarcesibles. En momentos así, sus logros resoplan
eternidad; sus creaciones exudan inmortalidad; sus éxitos parecen insuperables.
Pero ello es sólo un espejismo de la razón triunfante. Lo real, lo sempiterno, es
otra cosa: la fugacidad, el cambio, la metamorfosis.
En concreto, ¿qué entiende Hegel por variación? En la obra que he venido
citando, Hegel configura de manera nítida la categoría de variación. En ella
sostiene que “la más rica figura, la vida más bella encuentra su ocaso en la
historia. En la historia caminamos ante las ruinas de lo egregio. La historia nos
arranca de lo más noble y más hermoso […] Las pasiones lo han hecho
sucumbir. Todo es perecedero. Todo parece pasar y nada permanecer. Todo
viajero ha sentido esta melancolía. ¿Quién no ha estado ante las ruinas de
Cartago, Palmira, Persépolis o Roma, sin entregarse a consideraciones sobre la
caducidad de los imperios y de los hombres, al duelo por una vida pasada,
fuerte y rica?”6.
Los individuos realizan sus fines particulares en el mundo histórico que el
espíritu ha configurado, es decir, en el orden político que él ha instituido. Pero
en las épocas en que el espíritu del pueblo comienza a declinar las motivaciones
individuales predominan en desmedro de las metas colectivas. En efecto, en
víspera del ocaso, esto es, “de la ruina de los pueblos cada cual se propone sus
propios fines, según sus pasiones”7. El ethos público es derruido, y posteriormente
——————
7 La personalidad de los individuos, a pesar de sus singularidades, es configurada por el espíritu del pueblo
y, en tal sentido, es expresión de él. Por cierto, él la constituye y la sustenta. Más aún, ninguna personalidad
puede trascender al espíritu que la modela. “Puede sí, distinguirse de otros individuos, pero no del espíritu del
pueblo. Puede tener un ingenio más rico que muchos otros hombres, pero no puede superar al espíritu del
pueblo. Los hombres de más talento son aquellos que conocen el espíritu del pueblo y saben dirigirse a él”.
Hegel, op. cit., p. 66.
34
LUIS R. ORO TAPIA
4
destruido, por el pathos privado. Así, el espíritu del pueblo se derrumba y se
diluye en la opacidad del crepúsculo.
Pero el derrumbe de los Estados, el colapso de los imperios y la muerte de las
civilizaciones no implica en modo alguno el fin de la historia. La vida y la
historia continúan. El espíritu después del ocaso resucita, vuelve a rejuvenecer,
adquiere nuevos bríos, cuaja en nuevas formas y afronta y resuelve nuevos
problemas. En efecto, él se despliega una vez más, alcanza el umbral de su
nuevo horizonte, y otra vez se hace consciente de sí mismo y se torna libre.
Por cierto, el espíritu experimenta una incesante metamorfosis, en cuanto
cuaja en una forma la colma de plenitud, pero una vez que ha alcanzado la madurez,
su propia dinámica trasciende la forma y la destruye. Al respecto Hegel sostiene
que “en la historia vemos al espíritu propagarse en inagotable multitud de aspectos,
y gozarse y satisfacerse en ellos. Pero su trabajo tiene siempre el mismo resultado:
aumentar de nuevo su actividad y consumirse de nuevo. Cada una de las creaciones,
en que se ha satisfecho, se le presenta como una nueva materia que exige nueva
elaboración. La forma que ésta ha recibido se convierte en material que el
trabajo del espíritu eleva a una nueva forma”8.
Las categorías de variación y rejuvenecimiento dan cuenta de las incesantes
mutaciones que se producen en el decurso de la historia universal. No obstante,
y a pesar de ellas, la naturaleza humana permanece incólume. ¿Qué permanece
inmutable en ella? La tensión existente entre las pasiones y la razón; entre el
alma y el espíritu; entre lo dionisiaco y apolíneo. Tales polaridades son las que
alimentan el antagonismo y suscitan la incesante transformación del mundo
histórico. Por cierto, la naturaleza humana — según Hegel — permanece invariable,
en cuanto sigue siendo “la misma y única esencia [a pesar de] las más diversas
modificaciones”9.
Pero si la naturaleza humana –concebida de manera hegeleana- permanece
invariable, ¿será posible que ella alguna vez logre construir un orden perfecto y
armónico, es decir, sin deficiencias ni antagonismos? De acuerdo a lo expuesto,
la respuesta a esta pregunta sería negativa. Ahora bien, si tuviese una respuesta
positiva no sólo sería factible el fin de la historia, sino que además el fin del
hombre en cuanto tal, es decir, como mixtura de pasión y razón. Tal mixtura es
la que otorga identidad al hombre, a pesar de la espectacularidad de los
cambios10, y si ella se transmutase en algo radicalmente diferente, esa nueva
entidad ya no podría ser calificada de humana.
Revisión crítica del planteamiento de Fukuyama
En este apartado centraré mí análisis en dos aspectos del planteamiento de
Fukuyama. Intentaré, por una parte, detectar las flaquezas de su discurso desde
una óptica exclusivamente intelectual y, por otra, trataré de confrontar su
diagnóstico con la experiencia histórica para determinar si existe concordancia
——————
8
Hegel, op. cit., p. 73.
10 Por cierto, a pesar de todos los cambios que ocurren en el mundo histórico, la naturaleza humana, por
ser tal, permanece invariable. Dicho metafóricamente, en palabras de Hegel, “en el rostro más desfigurado
cabe aún rastrear lo humano”. Hegel, op. cit., p. 60.
5
35
entre sus ideas y la realidad factual. Al proceder de esta manera no creo que desvirtúe
el planteamiento de Fukuyama, porque de acuerdo a su línea de razonamiento
ambas dimensiones están entrelazadas.
El fin de la historia para Fukuyama supone la finalización de los conflictos
ideológicos. Fukuyama entiende la historia como un drama que tiene por
protagonistas a las ideas; y, en tal sentido, ella sería la expresión de las pugnas
ideológicas. Entendidas así las cosas, es factible conjeturar, que la historia
alcanzaría su máxima intensidad en los siglos correspondientes a la modernidad;
llegando al punto más alto en el período que va de 1917 hasta 1989 (años de
paroxismo ideológico), vale decir, desde el comienzo de la Revolución Bolchevique
hasta la caída del Muro de Berlín.
Lo que interesa aquí es consignar que para Fukuyama la historia supone
enfrentamientos no sólo de las ideologías, sino que también de las ideas.
Entonces, el fin de la historia implica el fin de las pugnas, sean éstas de índole
ideológica, en sentido estricto, o no. Por consiguiente, en el mundo poshistórico,
afirma Fukuyama, “no hay lucha en torno a grandes asuntos y, en consecuencia,
no se precisa ni de generales ni estadistas”11. En suma, el mundo poshistórico
en su madurez es un mundo sin conflictos.
Respecto a la tesis del fin del antagonismo, los errores en que incurre Fukuyama,
en mi opinión, son cuatro. Primero, parte del supuesto que el conflicto solamente
es suscitado por una disparidad de criterios en torno a los fines; no obstante, el
conflicto también puede surgir como una disputa respecto a los medios para alcanzar
un fin. Segundo, los antagonismos no sólo son suscitados por motivaciones
ideológicas sino que también por intereses de variada índole y, en general, por
las pasiones y por unavariedad de móviles extra racionales. Tercero, las razones
por las cuales los hombres entran en pugna son cambiantes en el tiempo; dicho
de otro modo: no sabemos qué entidades pueden suscitar confrontaciones en el
futuro. Cuarto, en el supuesto que exista un dispositivo de reglas para encausar
los antagonismos es probable que el conflicto surja en torno a la interpretación
de dichas reglas.
Por otra parte, en lo que concierne a la tesis del Estado Homogéneo Universal,
es pertinente consignar que es una noción que permanece indefinida en el
planteamiento de Fukuyama. Sin embargo, es posible presumir que dicha noción
supone un tipo de asociación política supranacional propia del mundo poshistórico,
es decir, de un mundo en el que no existen conflictos o por lo menos donde están
ausentes los antagonismos de envergadura.
Este punto es discutible, como ya lo hice notar. No obstante, podemos obviar
la objeción suponiendo (aun contra la evidencia empírica) que la naturaleza
humana en todas sus manifestaciones es intrínsecamente pacífica y altruista. Si
fuera así, se podría aceptar la tesis del fin de la historia sin mayores problemas.
Incluso es posible imaginar que los hombres se pueden agrupar en instituciones
que tienen una configuración legal similar y que además ellas se sustentan en
——————
11 Francis Fukuyama, “¿El fin de la historia?”. En revista Estudios Públicos. Número 37, año 1990, p. 9.
36
LUIS R. ORO TAPIA
6
una misma fuente de legitimidad. Entonces, ¿cuál es la objeción? El punto
discutible es que dicho Estado sea universal.
Recordemos que el Estado es un tipo de asociación política que se constituye,
por una parte, para proteger a la población que está al interior de sus propias
fronteras con el propósito de sofocar las relaciones intempestivas entre los
individuos y, por otra, para proteger a la población de las agresiones de aquellos
individuos o asociaciones que están más allá de sus fronteras. Las asociaciones
(incluido el Estado como la asociación política suprema) se articulan en torno a
intereses.
Las finalidades que incitan a los individuos a agruparse en unidades políticas
son, básicamente, tres: en primer lugar, se aglutinan para conservar su propia
vida frente a la agresión de otros; en seguida, para preservar su propiedad de la
rapiña de terceros; y, finalmente, para velar por la peculiar concepción que la
asociación tiene de su propia seguridad, como asimismo de lo bueno y deseable.
Mas los intereses que cohesionan a los individuos son variables, porque no
todos los hombres valoran de igual manera la realidad, por ende, no todos se
aglutinan y orientan su acción en función de las mismas valoraciones. Suponer
lo contrario sería utópico. Por cierto, uno de los rasgos del pensamiento utópico
— consigna Isaiah Berlin — es que éste “presupone que los seres humanos
como tales buscan las mismas metas esenciales, idénticas para todos, en todo
momento y en todas partes”12. De manera, pues, que resulta utópico suponer que
todos rigen su conducta atendiendo a los mismos intereses.
Por consiguiente, no es plausible suponer que todos los individuos se van
aglutinar de manera espontánea en una misma entidad, en circunstancias que
ellos tienen diferentes intereses y, por añadidura, desiguales motivaciones. En
consecuencia, la configuración de un Estado Homogéneo Universal no resulta
del todo factible, no porque sea técnicamente imposible, sino por el antagonismo
de intereses y por la heterogeneidad de valoraciones.
Ambos constituyen un obstáculo difícilmente esquivable. Las anteriores
consideraciones no tienden a erosionar el discurso de la globalización. La globalización
es un factum. Pero el hecho de que el mundo actualmente sea una totalidad
interconectada no implica en modo alguno que funcione como una unidad.
Como ya lo hizo notar con cierto matiz de ironía Carl Schmitt en 1932, la
única razón para que la humanidad constituya un Estado planetario es la presencia
de una amenaza que provenga de más allá de la biosfera, por tanto, se requiere
la existencia de un enemigo que sea común a todo el género humano13. La ironía
de Schmitt apunta a poner de relieve un hecho básico: que las asociaciones
políticas se constituyen en función de intereses comunes. Así por ejemplo, las
alianzas políticas tanto entre individuos como entre los Estados se constituyen,
como observó certeramente Maquiavelo, “o para defenderse o por miedo a ser
——————
12 Isaiah Berlin, “La declinación de las ideas utópicas en occidente”. En revista Estudios Públicos.
Número 53, año 1994, p. 212.
13 Cf. Carl Schmitt, El concepto de lo político, Alianza Editorial, Madrid, 1991, p. 83.
7
37
atacados o para sacar algún beneficio”14. Luego, en el corazón de la política
está el interés; el interés que lleva a asociarse, pero que al mismo tiempo suscita
conflictos entre los aliados. La amistad política, como observó Aristóteles hace
veinticinco siglos, es una amistad quejumbrosa15.
En suma, Fukuyama se solaza con la idea de un mundo sin conflictos y de
una humanidad que será capaz de organizarse en un Estado Homogéneo Universal.
Por cierto, Fukuyama tiene la expectativa de que Occidente, y con él todo el
planeta, llegará a una etapa (más temprano que tarde) en el que no habrán grandes
conflictos y, por lo tanto, un mundo donde ya no existirán crisis que tensen el
sistema. En definitiva, según Fukuyama, el modo de vida occidental se extenderá
por todo el globo y junto a él la paz y las comodidades del Estado Homogéneo
Universal.
Fukuyama, sin embargo, parece no conocer, o por lo menos no poner reparo,
en una peculiaridad distintiva de Occidente, a saber: la idea de crisis. Occidente
siempre está tensado por algún tipo de conflicto. En Occidente no hay órdenes
sociales, políticos, económicos, o de otra índole, dados de una vez para siempre,
porque él está en incesante mutación. Tal peculiaridad la identifica con nitidez
Karl Jaspers cuando afirma que “Occidente no es estable en ningún sentido; en
ello radica su permanente inquietud, su constante insatisfacción, su incapacidad
de contentarse con algo perfecto y acabado”16. En consecuencia, una de las
características distintivas de Occidente es que éste vive en crisis. La idea de crisis,
como asimismo la capacidad de transmutación, es consustancial a Occidente.
En efecto, en Occidente no hay soluciones incuestionables que tengan una
validez intemporal, absoluta, definitiva. No obstante, en momentos excepcionales
de su devenir histórico ha tenido la ilusión de eternidad; de haber alcanzado el
orden definitivo y perfecto; son momentos fugaces, “de plenitud, aparentemente
armoniosa y definitiva y, por lo mismo, ingeniosamente seductores”17, afirmaba
el historiador Héctor
Herrera Cajas, en 1983, cinco años antes que Fukuyama enunciara su
controvertida tesis del fin de la historia.En este contexto, la tesis de Fukuyama
es un espejismo más, entre otros. Ilusiones similares también se han tenido en el
pasado. Son los fugaces Siglos de Oro, en los cuales, según José Ortega y
Gasset, el hombre “tiene un mínimo de problemas sin resolver”18. En ellos la
vida exhibe su dimensión esplendorosa y luce un rostro sonriente, lozano,
primaveral, pero fugaz. En definitiva, son los momentos estelares de una
civilización; momentos como el Siglo de Oro de Pericles o el siglo XIII de
nuestra era. Son coyunturas, asevera el profesor Herrera, “en que parece que se
——————
14 Nicolás Maquiavelo, “Informe sobre la situación de Alemania”. Texto incluido en la recopilación de
escritos políticos de Maquiavelo realizada por Miguel Ángel Grenada, publicada con el título Antología.
Ediciones Península, Barcelona, 1987, p. 202.
15 Aristóteles, Ética Nicomaquea, 1162 b 5-20.
16 Karl Jaspers, Origen y meta de la historia, Editorial Revista de Occidente, Madrid, 1965, pp. 94 y 95.
17 Héctor Herrera Cajas, “El sentido de la crisis en occidente”. Ensayo incluido en el libro del profesor
Herrera titulado, Dimensiones de la responsabilidad educacional, Editorial Universitaria, Santiago, 1988, p. 72.
18 José Ortega y Gasset, Obras completas, Editorial Alianza, Madrid, 1983, tomo V, p. 81.
38
LUIS R. ORO TAPIA
8
vive un estado de armonía, en que todo ha sido resuelto”19; sin embargo, “allí
ya están incorporados los fermentos de la crisis a esa situación histórica” y que
eclosionarán en las décadas siguientes.
En suma, la tesis de Fukuyama que sostiene la superación definitiva de los
antagonismos y el surgimiento de un Estado Homogéneo Universal, es difícilmente
admisible por las razones anteriormente expuestas.
Algunas consideraciones finales a modo de conclusión
Estimo que los planteamientos de Fukuyama, por los menos en dos aspectos,
no se ajustan a cabalidad al pensamiento de Hegel. Uno de ellos concierne al
triunfo del liberalismo y el otro al fin de la historia.
Respecto al primero, cabe preguntarse si la concepción del liberalismo que
tenía Hegel es la misma que tiene Fukuyama. Dicho de otro modo, ¿utilizan,
ambos autores, la misma palabra con idéntico significado? Personalmente creo
que el liberalismo al que se refiere Hegel es diferente del de Fukuyama, por los
menos en dos aspectos. Por una parte, la concepción del individuo que tiene
Hegel no es atomista, en el sentido de individualista, puesto que para Hegel el
individuo es siempre un sujeto colectivo, una agrupación, un pueblo. En cambio,
para Fukuyama el individuo es siempre una persona, esto es, un sujeto singular.
Por otra parte, la concepción de la libertad que tiene Hegel es, por decirlo de
alguna manera, “orgánica”, en cuanto el individuo es libre en la medida en que
participa conscientemente del espíritu del pueblo y se realiza al interior del
Estado. Fukuyama, en cambio, concibe la libertad en términos negativos, es
decir, como libertad frente al Estado.
Respecto al segundo aspecto, cabe señalar que Hegel concibe un final de la
historia, pero en términos religiosos, es decir, como consumación de los fines y
designios de la Divina Providencia20. Fukuyama, en cambio, concibe el final de
la historia en términos estrictamente seculares.
Quizás la visión de Fukuyama del fin de la historia se asemeja más al ideal
de la paz perpetua de Kant21, con su confederación de repúblicas que constituyen
un gobierno mundial, que a la tesis del fin de la historia que concibe Hegel.
——————
19 Héctor Herrera Cajas, op. cit., p. 72.
20 Cf. Emmanuel Kant, Sobre la paz perpetua, Editorial Técnos, Madrid, 1995.
21 Cf. Hegel, op. cit., p. 701.
DECONSTRUCTING THE END OF HISTORY:
THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATION THEORY
JAOUAD EL HABBOUCH
Abstract. In his book The End of History and the Last Man (1992),
Francis Fukuyama argues that a good deal of consensus regarding the
“legitimacy of liberal democracy as a system of government” had emerged
worldwide in the last few decades, as it triumphed over “rival ideologies”
such as “hereditary” “monarchy,” “fascism” and “Communism” most
recently. Fukuyama contends that liberal democracy constituted the “end
of mankind’s ideological evolution” and “the final form of human
governments” and as such constituted “the end of history.” Since the
collapse of Communism in 1989, Samuel Huntington argues that Western
economic and cultural dominance has been increasingly liable to threats
from other cultures, especially Islamic culture. “The rise of economic
unions such as the European Union and the North American Free Trade
Area in the West and the East Asian economic bloc centred on China,
deriving their success from shared values and mutual understanding, is
seen as proof of this as well as representing another influence tending to
reinforce the differences between civilisations.
The East-West rivalry that “… has been brewing ever since the middle Ages,
seems to have considerably allayed as the Soviet block came to play the role of
the dreaded Other in Western politics.”1 However, “As bulldozers were busy
burying the Cold War beneath the rubble of the Berlin Wall, Islam started again
to surface as the arch-enemy of the West.”2 Since then, Edward Said further
explains: “there has been a rush by some scholars and journalists in the United
States to find in an Orientalized Islam a new empire of evil.”3 Said’s argument
is based on the notion that “…American interest in the Orient [is] political …and
it was culture that created that interest, that acted dynamically along with brute
political, economic and military rationales to rule over, to dominate and even “to
incorporate what is a manifestly different world.”4 Francis Fukuyma, Samuel
——————
1 In Bekkaoui Khalid, Signs of Spectacular Resistance: the Spanish Moor and British Orientalism,
Casablanca, Najah El Jadida, 1998, p. 3.
2 Loc. sit.
3 Loc. sit.
4 Said Edward, Orientalism, London, Penguin Books, 1978, p. 12.
40
JAOUAD EL HABBOUCH
2
Huntington and Bernard Lewis, in this respect, are three orientalist voices that I
intend to critique in this chapter for the sake of highlighting the ostensibly seen
interchange between Western academic knowledge and power. Complicity of
Western knowledge with politics is apparently manifested in the United States
“Clash of Civilizations-based” discourse on terror, which has been taken since
9/11 as an excuse to rationalize its colonial ambitions.
In his book The End of History and the Last Man (1992), Francis Fukuyama
argues that a good deal of consensus regarding the “legitimacy of liberal democracy
as a system of government” had emerged worldwide in the last few decades, as
it triumphed over “rival ideologies” such as “hereditary” “monarchy,” “fascism”
and “Communism” most recently.5 Fukuyama contends that liberal democracy
constituted the “end of mankind’s ideological evolution” and the final form of
human governments” and as such constituted “the end of history.” Fukuyama’s
insight, then, does not simply point to history as the “occurrence of events” in a
strictly conventional sense whereby, the events following the fall of the Berlin
Wall in 1989, acted as shrewd evidence that “history was continuing” and that
he was “…ipso facto proven wrong.”6 What Fukuyama seems to suggest is history
“…as a single, coherent, evolutionary process, when taking into account the
experience of all people in all times.”7 His conception of history is deeply seated
in the political views of the German philosopher G. W. Hegel and Karl Marx.
Both Hegel and Marx argued that the evolution of world communities was
not an open-ended process. They believed that evolution would end when people
had established a society that satisfied their deepest longings.8 With the demise
of Communism that was symbolically manifested in the fall of the Berlin Wall
in 1989, liberal democracy became to embody the very longings that characterized
people’s struggle for satisfaction. The triumph of liberal democracy over totalitarian
forms of governments by the end of the Twentieth century pointed for Fukuyama
to the fact that it satisfied two important elements in human life: one can be seen
as part of a material process which has to do with “economics;” the other signifies
a thoroughly spiritual process whose label is “self-recognition.”9 For Fukuyama,
then, Communism had been superseded by liberal democracy in the 1980s “because
of the realization that the former provides a gravely defective form of recognition.”10
Fukuyama’s tendency to invoke Hegel’s philosophical insight arises out of
his deep belief that Marx’s material account of history tends to reduce human
beings into economic creatures. For this reason, Fukuyma argues:
If man is primarily an economic animal driven by his desire and reason,
then the dialectical process of historical evolution should be reasonably similar
for different human societies and cultures. This was the conclusion of
‘modernization theory,’ which borrowed from Marxism an essentially
——————
5 Fukuyama Francis, The End of History and the Last Man, London, Penguin Books Ltd, 1992, p. xi.
6 Ibid., p. 2.
7 Loc. sit.
8 Loc. sit.
9 Ibid., p. xix.
10 Loc. sit.
DECONSTRUCTING THE END OF HISTORY
3
economic view of the underlying forces of historical change. However, like
all economic theories of history, modernization theory is somehow not
satisfying. It is a theory that works to the extent that man is an economic
creature, to the extent that he is driven by the imperatives of economic
growth and industrial rationality...11
41
Accordingly, for Fukuyama, “there are other aspects of human motivation
that have nothing to do with economics, and it is here that the discontinuities in
history — the majority of man’s wars, the sudden eruptions of religious or
ideological or nationalist passion that lead to phenomena [of violence and abuse]
— find their origins.”12
Unlike Marx, Hegel’s non-material account of history is based on the idea
that “the primary motor of human history is not modern natural science or the
ever expanding horizon of desire that powers it, but rather a totally non-economic
drive, the struggle for recognition.”13 For Fukuyama, then, following Hegel’s
philosophical insight, human struggle for recognition; i.e., self-esteem and dignity
on the individual level, and identity on the international level for nation-states,
provides us with a framework for understanding whether “we have reached the
end of history” or not. His argument, though, seems to be grounded upon the
Hegelian-Marxist thesis, whereby Fukuyama’s contention celebrates an attempt
to reconcile the materialist view of history with its idealist counterpart. The two
accounts of history are celebrated for the sake of highlighting the “apparently
victorious social system;” i.e., Western liberal democracy, which he believes to
be the optimal and final stage of human evolution.
Fukuyama’s attempt to reconcile Marx with Hegel is based on the idea that
when “...society as a whole achieves a greater equality of condition, people
begin to demand not simply more wealth but recognition of their status.”14
However, the question I would love to address here is whether people’s deepest
longing for “economic satisfaction” and “self-recognition” — be it on the
individuals’ or on the states’ level — is thoroughly attainable. People’s struggle
for “economic satisfaction” and “self-recognition,” I believe, is a never ending
process because they are likely to be abused by those who possess power.
Significantly enough, it was this struggle of ambitious European “princes for
recognition” and glory that gave rise to tyranny, injustice and imperialism
throughout European colonial history. And once again, the insinuations of such
idea are ostensibly evident in the world current warring situation…
If liberal democracy, as Fukuyama claims, were the optimal and final phase
of evolution of human deepest longings for “economic satisfaction” and “self
recognition,” it should have important consequences for individuals within a
particular society as well as international relations. That is to say, “[i]f the advent
of the universal and homogeneous state means the establishment of rational
——————
11 Ibid., pp. 133-34.
12 Ibid., pp. 133-34.
13 Ibid., p. 135.
14 Ibid., p. xix.
42
JAOUAD EL HABBOUCH
4
recognition on the level of individuals living within one society and the abolition
of the relationship of lordship and bandage between them, then the spread of that
type of state throughout the international system of states should…” contribute,
as a consequence, to “…the end of relationships of lordship and bondage between
nations as well-that is, the end of imperialism, and with it, a decrease in the
likelihood of wars based on imperialism.”15 But is this the case with the world
current situation?
Fukuyama’s adulation of Western liberal democracy, as the most rational
form of government, by which he intends to end “the end of history” seems to
be shortsightedly conceived, since much tension has emerged in the world with
the collapse of Communism. Liberal policies had failed because as Strauss had
anticipated a long time ago: “it was the very basis of the liberal idea — the belief
in individual freedom — that was causing the chaos, because it undermined the
shared moral framework that held society together. Individuals pursued their
own self interests, and this led inevitably to conflict…”16 If this is the case with
Western liberal societies, what Fukuyma advocates as a model for the rest of the
world, namely the Arabo Islamic world, can be seen as part of an attempt to
further legitimate and authenticate the superiority of the West. This is ostensibly
evident in the dominant discourse of European and most recently American
imperialism, in which the United States claim to promote liberal democracy
within the Arabo-Islamic world is taken as an ideology to legitimize its global
economic, political as well cultural hegemony.
Significantly enough, it was this tendency to homogenize the world through
a unified universal paradigm that led to European imperialism over the last Four
hundred years. More importantly, it was the enlightenment philosophical discourse
as Jamal Eddine Benhayoun asserts through Robert Young’s critique of historicism
and Hegelianism, that “endorsed the representation of the world as a unified
whole.”17 And it was “…this view that motivated and provided the epistemological
basis for Europe to colonize most of the regions of the world and to engage in
the erasure of all forms of multiplicities — cultural or otherwise — that would
challenge political and cultural conformity as prescribed from within the centers
of the West’s imperium.18 The world can “… never be represented recreated, or
reproduced as one.” For, to take Benhayoun’s words with little additions,
“[h]umanity’s geographical, imaginative, historical, cultural, and scientific accounts
of the world are so diverse, conflictual and uncoordinated that it is impossible to
locate…”19 or assert one originary universal model.
In advancing his argument, Fukuyama contends that “power politics” are
likely to continue among states that are non-liberal democracies. “The relatively
late arrival of industrialization and nationalism to the Third World will lead to a
——————
15 Ibid., p. 245.
16 Curtis Adam, The Power of Nightmares, BBC2, 2004, p. 6.
17Qtd. in Benhayoun Jamal Eddine, Narration, Navigation, and Colonialism: A Critical Account of
Seventeenth and Eighteenth Century English Narratives of Adventure and Captivity, p. 167.
18 Loc. sit.
19 Loc. sit.
5
43
sharp distinction between the behaviour of much of the Third World, on the one
hand, and of the industrial democracies.”20 His anticipation seems to be grounded
on the idea that the world will be divided into two halves: the post-historical
world and the historical world which is “still stuck in history.” As for the
post-historical world, “the chief axis of interaction between states would be
economic and the old rules of power would have a decreasing relevance…there
would be a considerable economic but little military competition.”21 The historical
world, on the other hand, “will be riven with a variety of religious, national, and
ideological conflicts depending on the stage of development of the particular
countries concerned, in which the old rules of power politics continue to
apply.”22 Sediment within the verbal texture of such a statement is an antienlightenment assertion through which the rationality of the West versus the
irrationality of the East is taken as an ideology to legitimate Western supremacy.
This is further invoked in the following passage where Fukuyama argues: “if the
post-historical behaves differently from the historical world…then, the posthistorical democracies will have a common interest both in protecting themselves
from external threats, and in promoting the cause of democracy in countries
where it does not exist.”23
Considering the United States foreign policy, the so-called chief leader of
liberal democracy after the collapse of the Soviet Union, vis-à-vis the so-called
non-democratic Islamic countries, we find a lot of echoes of Fukuyama’s
anticipatory academic, yet politically-oriented, insight. Fukuyama’s academic
voice, representing an academic institution in the West, parallels the old Orientalist
logic of Western knowledge and power, which Edward Said effectively invoked
in Orientalism, 1978. The sort of academic “knowledge” Fukuyama provides in
The End of History and the Last Man, is not only ideologically biased but
politically oriented as well. This latter’s emphasis on the necessity to transport
Western universal ideals into the historical world is intended to further
authenticate the power of the West, via rendering knowledge at the service of
power. It is at the interface of Western/U.S. political practices, on the one had,
and cultural institutions, on the other, that Said is worth remembering. The subtle
complicity of Knowledge and power is ostensibly evident in the United States
imperial practices, where liberal values whose twin pillars are freedom and
democracy/liberty and equality as propounded, by major enlightenment philosophers,
have been adopted since 9/11 as ideological tricks to veil the imposition of the
United States imperial order over what Fukuyama terms the “non-democratic”
Arabo-Islamic countries.
For Fukuyama, liberal democracy as a virtuous form of government,
characteristic of post-historical liberal societies marked the end of history. And
“At the end of history there are no serious ideological competitors to liberal
——————
20 Ibid., p. 276.
21 Loc. sit.
22 Loc. sit.
23 Ibid., p. 278.
44
JAOUAD EL HABBOUCH
6
democracy.”24 Fukuyama contends, in this respect, that “[I]n the past, people
rejected liberal democracy because they believed that it was inferior to monarchy,
aristocracy, theocracy, fascism, communist totalitarianism, or what ever ideology
they happened to believe in.” However, with the demise of Communism, there
appeared to be, with the exception of the Arabo Islamic world, “…a general
consensus that accepts liberal democracy’s claim as the most rational form of
government.”25 If this is so, Fukuyama asks: “why are then all countries outside
the Islamic world not democratic?”26 A good answer to this question can be
elicited through the following set of questions: why does liberal democracy have
to be promoted within, I mean imposed on, the Islamic world? And if liberal
democracy is a matter of necessity for both the “post-historical” and “historical”
worlds, is the rhetoric of abuse, war, and suppression, as in the case of the United
States invasion of Iraq recently, the only means through which it can be accentuated?
Francis Fukuyama’s conception of the sort of interaction that was likely to
emerge between Western democratic countries and the Islamic world after the
collapse of the Berlin Wall, I believe, is adequately sufficient to answer the
aforementioned set of questions. As Fukuyama puts it in The End of History and
the Last Man,
In many respects, the historical and post historical worlds will maintain
parallel but separate existences, with relatively little interaction between
them. There will, however, be several axes along which these will collide.
The first is oil…Oil production remains concentrated in the historical
world and is crucial for the post-historical well-being…oil remains the
only one whose production is sufficiently concentrated that the market in
it can be manipulated or disrupted for political reasons, and whose
disruption can result in immediately devastating economic consequences
for the post historical world.27
Oil, as the passage above clearly demonstrates, remains the source of conflict
that shapes contemporary world politics. The fact that oil is concentrated in Third
World countries, explains much about the world current situation.
Western attempt to promote liberal democracy within the so-called nondemocratic Islamic countries is flawed in nature, as it is directed to serve, at the
expense of the Arabo-Islamic cultural, historical and political idiosyncrasy, the
well-being of the West. This is because democracy is not something that can be
exported, but is rather, as Panayota Gounari asserts in her article “Contesting the
Cynicism of Neo-liberal Discourse: Moving towards a Language of Possibility,”
something tied to specific cultural, historical, political as well as geographical
conditions28 of its peoples. Read in this light, what Francis Fukuyama seems to
——————
24 Fukuyama Francis, The End of History and the Last Man, London, Penguin Books Ltd, 1992, p. 211.
25 Loc. sit.
26 Ibid., p. 212.
27 Ibid., p. 277.
28 Gounari Panayota, “Contesting the Cynicism of Neo-liberal Discourse: Moving towards a language of
possibility”, University of Massachussette Boston, 10 Sep. 2008, http://www-staff.lboro.ac.uk/~ssjer/SLC1/
SLC1-4_Gounari.pdf, p. 3.
7
45
suggest in The End of History and the Last Man is intended to take part “in the
intellectual branch of current Western hegemony and the spreading of its New
Gospel.”29 His celebration of Western liberal democracy as the most rational form
of governance is just an ideological trick to veil the imposition of a thoroughly
anti-enlightenment liberal form of Western hegemony.
Unlike theorists such as Francis Fukuyama, who argue that “human rights,
liberal democracy and capitalist free market economy have become the only
remaining ideological alternative for nation states”30 in the post-Cold War era,
Samuel Huntington believes that the age of ideology had come to an end with
the collapse of Communism, and that the world has lapsed into a state of affairs
characterized by inter-civilizational conflicts. In the 1993 Foreign Affairs article,
Huntington asserts:
It is my hypothesis that the fundamental source of conflict in this new
world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great
divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be
cultural. Nation states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs,
but the principle conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and
groups of different civilizations. The fault lines between civilizations will
be the battle lines of the future.31
Identity, he assumes, would be a determining factor in the definition of states’
identities and interests in the post-Cold War Era.32
For Huntington, a civilization involves “the highest cultural grouping of
people and the broadest level of cultural identity people have short of that which
distinguishes them from other species.”33 Civilizations, in this respect, will clash
because of the incommensurability and irreconcilability of the differences between
them. The clash is likely to arise between civilizations because of their different
conceptions or “views on the relations between God and man, individual and
state, parents and children, man and wife as well as…rights and responsibilities,
liberty and authority, equality and hierarchy.”34 For Huntington, then, the fact
that people are becoming increasingly aware of their differences would lead
them to define themselves in a sort of extreme fundamentalist ethnic and religious
terms. Read in this light, “contest for power will occur at an inter-civilizational
context, especially between Islam and the West. For him this relationship forms
a central axis of difference and conflict in contemporary world politics, because
the antipathy between the West and Islam is inflamed by culture, as well as a
long-term history of rivalry and Islamic resentment35 to Western secular values.
——————
29 “Criticisms of Fukuyama’s Thesis”, RevisionNotes.Co.Uk — Free Revision and Course Notes for UK
Students, 4 Sep. Retrieved from http://www.revision-notes.co.uk/revision/966.html. N.P.
30 “The Clash of Civilizations?”, Foreign Affairs, Summer 1993, p 22.
31 Loc. sit.
32 Jacinta O’Han, “Beyond the Clash of Civilizations”, Australian Journal of International Affairs, Sep.
2005, Vol. 59 Issue 3, p. 384.
33 In Osborn A. Major, “The Clash of Civilizations Thesis as a Tool for Explaining Conflict in
Contemporary World”, p. 394.
34 Loc. sit.
35 Loc. sit.
46
JAOUAD EL HABBOUCH
8
Nevertheless, the sort of inter-civilizational conflict that was likely to emerge
in the post-Cold War era, especially between Islam and the West, is flawed, for
contemporary world politics are shaped primarily by economic motives. And for
those who subscribe to Huntington’s philosophy, to say that what the world
witnessed in 9/11 pointed to the fact that Huntington was ipse facto right, amounts
to saying that there is an irresolvable civilizational conflict between Islam and
the West. Subscription to Huntington’s argument would mean reading history as
a battle field where cultures can never coexist. For this reason, I believe, It is not
tension between cultures that fuels many contemporary conflicts, but rather, as
Tariq Ali argues in his book The Clash of Fundamentalisms: Crusades, Jihad
and Modernity, the ambitions and intransigence and repressive nature of
fundamentalists from both Western and non-Western countries. The clash, he
suggests, is fabricated by the manoeuvrings of such “instrumentalists who play
upon and utilize the fears and desperation of the masses to further their own
political”36 agendas.
Taking at face value Samuel Huntington’s’ rhetoric as regards the “Clash of
Civilizations” thesis, the 2001 attacks on the World Trade Centre appeared to be
amazingly prophetic of an irreconcilable clash between Western and Islamic
values. However, as Edward Said points: the “Clash of Civilizations” thesis, to
take M. Asadi’s words, is no more than a “… fictional gimmick, something like
the ‘War of the Worlds’.”37 And “for those of you who are not aware of what the
‘War of Worlds’ was, it was a fictional account of how a group of aliens planned
to attack earth and destroy humanity. It was first broadcast as a radio play and
when the broadcast took place, the radio listeners were misled into believing that
an actual ‘War of the Worlds’ was taking place.”38 And this is what the cheerleaders
of the Clash of Civilizations thesis have discovered in 9/11 terrorists attacks.
The manufactured “Clash of Civilizations” thesis does not only disguise the
United States ideological bias but also people’s distraction from real issues;
issues related to “control of the cultural apparatuses and the power to assign
labels and set precedents for the rest of the world.”39 The “Clash of Civilizations”
thesis is flawed in nature and in order to understand its flaw, M. Asadi argues:
We need to consider history... This ‘Clash of Civilizations’ thesis is dismantled
historically, as soon as we realize that it is nothing new. It is the same Cold
War mythology, re-branded for maximum impact, a contrived clash, that
the U.S. was pursuing for several decades, by converting an old ally into
a foe, post-World War II. This repackaging of a new era was necessary
because the old enemy, the Soviet Union, does not exist anymore. Further,
the sources that describe this so-called ‘Clash of Civilizations’ are not new
either. They are the same age-old Orientalist stereotypes of Islam, nurtured
——————
36 in Jacinta O’Han, “Beyond the Clash of Civilizations”, Australian Journal of International Affairs,
Sep. 2005, Vol. 59, Issue 3, p. 388.
37Asadi M., “Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations Thesis”, Chowk Writers, February 2, 2007, retrieved
from http://63.194.130.82/articles/11602, p. 1.
38 Loc. sit.
39 Ibid., 2.
9
47
and crystallized historically by the West that have been resurrected for
fresh geopolitical motives.40
Hence, what the world has witnessed recently is just a manifestation of the
circularity of history whose motto is driven by a tendency to repeat itself. Seen
in this light, the United States imperialism can be seen as “no more than a
revisiting” of the old European dynamics of power over Oriental geographies,
cultures as well as economics.
In the face of 9/11, the “Clash of Civilizations” thesis has been invested to
legitimate the “moral superiority” and “goodwill of the United States decision
makers,” whose war against the sources of evil in the world has given them both
reason and legitimacy to pursue their long standing goals. Being a command of
cultural apparatuses such as media and education, Asadi argues, the United
States has made of the “Clash of Civilizations” thesis and attempt “…to ferment
a foe that is well reorganized by the U.S. public due to a well-developed history
of stereotypes against Islam and Muslims.”41 It has been part of an attempt to
justify to the masses the legitimacy of war, whose ultimate purpose, they would
have the world believe, is to rub out the sources of evil from the face of earth.
War, in the eyes of the US elite as well as its public stance, has become the
ultimate purpose of safety, peace and order in the world.
Equally significant, those who are familiar with Bernard Lewis know that he
belongs to the same ideological and methodological school of thought as Samuel
Huntington, the author of the well-known mega-historical book, The Clash of
Civilizations; a phrase which was first coined by Bernard Lewis. The two
famous scholars are considered to be voices of conservative political thought in
the West. They cite the difference between Islam and the West as the root cause
of the problems that we are facing nowadays.42 Like Huntington, Lewis’ conception
of contemporary problems is based on the notion that conflict between Islam and
Christianity has been brewing ever since Medieval Ages. What the world
witnessed in 9/11, in this respect, pointed, for Lewis, to the fact that there is an
irreconcilable conflict between Islam and the West.
In his book What Went Wrong? Western Impact and Middle Eastern Response,
Bernard Lewis argues that the roots of contemporary problems lie in Islam’s
resentment to Western progressive and secular values, which triumphed over its
Islamic counterpart ever since the Renaissance. Lewis states, in this respect,
For centuries the world view and self view of Muslims seemed well grounded.
Islam represented the greatest military power on earth …it was the
foremost economic power in the world…it had achieved the highest level
so far in human history in the arts and sciences of civilization… Europe
was a pupil and in a sense dependent of the Islamic world… And then,
——————
40 Loc. sit.
41 Ibid., 3.
42 Alamdari Kazem, “Terrorism Cuts across the East and the West. Deconstructing Lewis’ Orientalism.”
www. ingentaconnect.com. 20June./ http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/routledg/ctwq/2003/00000024/
00000001/art00011;jsessionid=1t8tyxyyghte.alexandra, p. 1.
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JAOUAD EL HABBOUCH
10
suddenly, the relationship changed…even before the Renaissance Europeans
were beginning to make a significant progress…leaving the scientific and
technological and eventually the cultural heritage of the Islamic world far
behind.43
And the fact that Muslims remained for so long unaware of this, he goes on
to say, brought about a profound kind of hostility to the West, the outcome of
which is the world current warring situation. 9/11, following Lewis’ interpretive
potential, is seen as the ultimate end result of a long-term history of rivalry
between the Christian West and its Islamic counterpart.
Throughout his oeuvres, the overall style and tone of Lewis lend themselves
to the old European and recently American Orientalist penchant for “imperial
hubris.” Lewis’ image of a decaying Islamic civilization — as is described in
What Went Wrong? Western Impact and Middle Eastern Response — can be seen
as part of an attempt to justify to the masses the legitimacy as well as legality of
the United States imperial practices. Following Lewis’ line of thought, in this
light, so as to come to terms with the so-called defective Islamic civilizations,
“…it becomes the West’s burden to impose the right medicine, ‘capitalism,
modernity and democracy,’ to this moribund civilization, perhaps even by military
force if Muslims resist… [T]he powerful knowledge of the Orientalist expert, in
this regard,” is used to give both reasons for and legitimacy to material occupation.44
Interestingly, it was this sort of relationship between politics and academic
knowledge that gave rise to postcolonial studies as a regnant academic paradigm.
Surveying the history of British and recently American imperialism, in this
respect, we get to discover that Orientalist scholarship provided a powerful
epistemological medium through which the West advanced its geopolitical
motives. Imperialism did not only involve a physical exercise of violence but an
epistemological exercise of power as well. The postcolonial, in this regard,
questioning the very premises upon which Western physical as well as epistemic
forms of domination have been based, deems Orientalist scholarship to be a
powerful means through which the West sought to rationalize its colonial
ambitions. Said’s seminal book, Orientalism (1978), constitutes an elaborate
account of those highly distorted and bigoted academic attempts through which
European and most recently American imperial aggression have been mediated.
Since the collapse of Communism in 1989, Samuel Huntington argues that
Western economic and cultural dominance has been increasingly liable to threats
from other cultures, especially Islamic culture. “The rise of economic unions
such as the European Union and the North American Free Trade Area in the West
and the East Asian economic bloc centred on China, deriving their success from
shared values and mutual understanding, is seen as proof of this as well as
representing another influence tending to reinforce the differences between
civilisations.”45
——————
43
Lewis Bernard, What Went Wrong? Western Impact and Middle Eastern Response, London, Phoenix,
2002, pp. 6-7.
44 Aydin Cemil, “The Politics of Conceptualizing Islam and the West”, www.cceia.org, 20 August 2008,
http://www.cceia.org/resources/journal/18_3/review_essays/5058.html, p. 3.
45 Asdi M. Huntingtong’s Clash of Civilizations thesis, p. 1 Chowk Writers, February 2, 2007, retrieved
from http://63.194.130.82/articles/11602.
THE IRONIST “TRAVELER”
HENRIETA ANIªOARA ªERBAN
Abstract. Who is the ironist? The paper starts from the Rortian definition
of the ironist and explains the metaphorical vision of travelling identity
attached to the ironist. For instance, opening the perspective of the ironist
seen as a traveler among various vocabularies, the core argument of the paper
underlines the dimension of polyphony and dialogue between identity and
alterity, between cultural relativism and cultural specificity. In the process
it invokes the (“third woman” Lipovetskian feminist) as a precursor of the
ironist. Which is the relevance of the ironist “traveler”? The paper argues
that she creates a specific relativist culture around her, benefic for tolerance
and celebrating both diversity and specificity. At the same time the paper
sustains that the ironist traveler” is a factor of bridging cultures together,
as she is articulating, at a different and more contextual level, postmodernity
and modernity.
The traveler is a being returning to her own authenticity. The traveler is conceived
in this paper in a philosophical and highly metaphorical perspective. She travels
within, in between and across cultures. The traveler I am discussing about here
is more like a “bee” in the process of pollination. Only that she is consciously
self-pollinating, as well.
This is not a wildly new perspective on the metaphor of the traveler. Sir
Francis Bacon used the metaphor of flower centuries ago, in 1625. In his work
Of Travel, he said:
“And let it appear that he doth not change his country manners for those
of foreign parts, but only prick in some flowers of that he hath learned
abroad into the customs of his own country.”1
Who is the ironist? The paper starts from the Rortian definition of the ironist
and explains the metaphorical vision of travelling identity attached to the ironist.
Rorty’s ironism is a post-analytical notion created around a certain profile of
an individual, an ironist. Considering Rorty’s definition in Private Irony and
Liberal Hope an “ironist” is “someone who fulfills three conditions: (1) She has
radical and continuing doubts about the final vocabulary she currently uses,
because she has been impressed by other vocabularies, vocabularies taken as
——————
1 Sir Francis Bacon, Of travel, first published in 1625.
50
2
final by people or books she has encountered; (2) she realizes that argument phrased
in her present vocabulary can neither underwrite or dissolve these doubts;
(3) insofar as she philosophizes about her situation, she does not think that her
vocabulary is closer to reality than others, that is in touch with a power not herself.
Ironists who are inclined to philosophize see choice between vocabularies made
neither within a neutral and universal metavocabulary nor by an attempt to fight
one’s way past appearances to the real, but simply by playing the new off against
the old.”2
Rorty does not explain the phrase “final vocabulary.” From his argumentation
in the text quoted as from this very definition of an ironist, I understand that it
is the outcome of socialization and education and that it has local, cultural, social
and political pregnant features. She is the product of her communities to which
she belongs and at which she aspires. Traveling among the worlds of life and
experience she is not caught among them, but a modest pollination factor.
The definition captures the fact that the ironist enjoys creatively other
vocabularies as a continuous inspiration to their own vocabulary, continuously
“under construction.” The ironist entertains an open vocabulary welcoming
change and difference.
A first very important aspect concerning Rorty’s ironist is that she is not the
ironical person. Irony is enjoyable but it puts a distance between the person who
is ironic and the others, a distance that often gives way to malice or intolerance,
presented in a more attractive, humorist package.
An ironist may be a philosopher either by training or by orientation, but not
an analytic philosopher and, more precisely, not a “metaphysician,” that is, not
someone who considers that “any term in his vocabulary has as correspondent
something of a real essence.” Both intellectual types have in common the desire
to know, but this has different manifestations and outcomes, in the case of the
ironist and in that of the metaphysician. For the ironist the desire to know is not
oriented to a unique and final vocabulary in the detriment of the others.
Vocabulary exposure and polyphony
Opening the perspective of the ironist seen as a traveler among various
vocabularies, the core argument of the paper underlines the dimension of polyphony
and dialogue between identity and alterity, between cultural relativism and cultural
specificity.
The first point of the definition underlined the radical and continuing doubts
about the final vocabulary currently used. The ironist has the crucial ability to be
impressed by other people vocabularies; vocabularies taken as final by people or
books she has encountered. It is this type of metaphorical travelling among
vocabularies that bring both cultural relativism and cultural specificity at their
best.
——————
2 Rorty, R., Private Irony and Liberal Hope, în Walter Brogan, James Risser (eds.), American Continental
Philosophy. A Reader, Bloomington and Indianapolis, Indiana University Press, 2000, p. 46.
3
51
The bodies occupy the space with vocabularies of both pragmatism and
desire. The network of dreams, interests, and aims shape vocabularies closer to
a final vocabulary, while they bound people to places. In a phrasing of Michel de
Certeau:
“These dances of bodies haunted by the desire to live somewhere tell
interminable stories of the Utopia we construct in sites through which we
pass.”3
And this network may be indeed a Utopia. Or, sometimes the network would
be a Distopia, when the people are forced to inhabit a prescribed final vocabulary
as in the newspeak imposed within the totalitarian regimes of Eastern Europe,
and especially in Romania, or as in Orwell’s 1984. Such people were the opposite
of travelers as the prisoners of vocabulary, space, and ideology.
The vocabulary we inhabit, the vocabulary that bounds us to a place offers
multitudes of suggestions concerning the meta-narratives and the minutenarratives of our lives. The final vocabulary of a person is her home and castle.
The ironist is capable of living his castle instead of carrying it along everywhere.
The flowers of difference shape her castle along her spiritual, lifelong learning
and political journey of self-pollination. And this is why she realizes that
argument phrased in her present vocabulary can neither underwrite or dissolve
these doubts concerning her own final vocabulary.
The ironist approach is definitely feminine. It is totally uninterested in gaining
the upper hand in “conversation,” in offering solutions and sentences. This aspect
brings into discussion Gilles Lipovetsky’s feminist, “the third woman”4 as a
precursor of the ironist. “The third woman” is defined as the emancipated women
of our contemporary times, as a reconciliation of the woman who is radically
different and the woman who is always renewed. She is a synthesis of radical
feminist and reforming feminist type. In my view, both these types of woman,
points of reference on the continuum spectrum of feminism, correspond to the
third wave of feminism, but their synthesis may not even be a feminist, but
solely a woman taking advantage of the feminist victories of the last century.
The feminine element remains powerful in the identity of the third woman. In
Rortian terms, the feminine would be considered a hard core of the final vocabularies
of contemporary women. While they are open to other people vocabularies and
do not think their own as neither superior, nor closer to reality, the great majority
is prisoner to the Utopia of the femininity.
The contemporary hyper-modern times recycle the pre-modern element of
the feminine affecting the role and the place of women within the society. On the
one hand, the democratic dynamic did not break up with the historical past, but,
on the other hand, men have still rather public and instrumental roles, while
women associate more with private, aesthetic and affective roles. The roles they
——————
3 Michel de Certeau, The Practices of Everyday Life, transl. by Steven Rendall, University of California
Press, 1988, p. 253.
4 Gilles Lipovetsky, Le troisième femme, PUF, 1999, passim.
52
4
play in society definitely shape their vocabularies and for the time being there is
a limit to the possibility of change when exposed to other people vocabularies,
precisely because they do not doubt the feminine vocabulary enough. It is still
considered “natural” for the great majority of the feminine population. These
doubts, this suspicion, might be just the newly found goal for the third wave
feminism.
The doubts raise the critical awareness of the ironist traveler in what concerns
the world. Such doubts make her a cosmopolite and an ideal traveler. The ironist
traveler increases the polyphony and does not reduce all she is exposed and selfexposed to a smaller denominator or to a mere synthesis. Increasing polyphony
is in this perspective a result of the disposition towards critical thinking and
philosophy, but not towards criticism, irony, or cultural imperialism of some
sort. This traveler philosophizes about her situation, but she does not think that
her vocabulary is closer to reality than others.
The relevance of the ironist traveler
The lessons in tolerance brought to the fore by the ironist traveler are
obviously valuable but tremendously difficult to grasp.
The ironist traveler does not believe she is in touch with a power not herself,
meaning that she does not believe is closer to reality than the others. Hence, her
perspective over things is an inherently tolerant, non-judgmental, on the one hand
and postmodern, on the other. From her standpoint, traveling through cultures may
a heroic endeavor because it is individualizing, but in a way she is continuously
challenging this individualization herself. She is quite the opposite of the
traveler described by Albert Camus. I remember his perspective in L’Étranger,
1942, considering that what gives value to travel is fear. At a certain moment,
when we are so far from our country, we are sized by a vague fear, and the
instinctive desire to go back to the protection of old habits. This is the most
obvious benefit of travel. Then, we are feverish, but also porous, so that the
slightest touch makes us quiver to the depths of our being. This is why we should
not say that we travel for pleasure. There is no pleasure in traveling, and Camus
looks upon it as an occasion for spiritual testing. Pleasure takes us away from
ourselves in the same way that distraction, as in Pascal’s use of the word, takes
us away from God. Travel, which is in his perspective like a greater and graver
science, brings us back to ourselves.
The ironist traveler is in this manner brought to herself, as well, but never
tempted by the instinctive desire to go back to the protection of previous final
vocabularies, because her own vocabulary is continuously under self-suspicion.
This is the reason why she is continuously exposing herself to other people
vocabularies. While she does not appreciate her own vocabulary closer to reality
than the vocabularies employed by the others, she considers that vocabularies
have the chance to get closer to the reality which is the potential sufferance and
humiliation. From this perspective fear of potential sufferance and humiliation
is not only what gives value to travel. It also triggers the desire to travel to get
5
53
enriched, empowered, and even, to some extent, reassured by the experience of
other people and vocabularies. In Rortian terms, the human being is always
threatened by the illusion to possibly get to a final vocabulary that is clear, true
and definitive for all, but hopefully, the ironist traveler is not tempted to give
way to this illusion.
The ironist traveler is both a modern and postmodern character. She creates
a specific relativist culture around her, benefic for tolerance and celebrating both
diversity and specificity. The exposures of vocabularies to one another both
clarify and change the vocabularies in question. At the same time the perspective
sustains that the ironist “traveler” is a factor bridging cultures together, as long
as it spreads this attitude rose to the rank of method. She does not create
something entirely new. Traveling trough a different vocabulary she is clarifying
first of all her own suspicions in what concerns the shortcomings of her own
vocabulary and she answers to them. She does not borrow the other vocabulary
nor advertise or impose hers.
The ironist traveler is articulating, at a different and more contextual level,
postmodernity and modernity, postmodernism and modernism. She encounters
humans not cases and their vocabularies are treated as metaphors for other
people lives, and not as theories or paradigms that might just prove to be
imperfect at a closer investigation. From this perspective she has many of the
features of the traveler. Her own vocabulary is a heavy luggage. Many pieces of
it may prove to be unnecessary for all she knows. But all that she drops and all
that she might pick up will happen in time and with an effort, after a wise
consideration of consequences. Within the realm of this metaphor of the ironist
traveler the most feared consequences are sufferance and humiliation, and they
are common to all human beings.
Modernism and postmodernism: questioning relativism
Given the constellations of ambiguities related to all the defining perspectives
on postmodernism and the matter of truth Stanley Grenz shows in A Primer on
Postmodernism that:
“[Postmodernism] affirms that whatever we accept as truth and even the way we
envision truth are dependent on the community in which we participate... There is no
absolute truth: rather truth is relative to the community in which we participate.”5
But this description of postmodernism is not ascribing truth exclusively to a
certain community. The truth of a vocabulary is only relative. But one vocabulary
can be closer to reality than others in some cases. This observation does not
necessarily lead to the elimination of the “failing vocabulary” or to labeling it as
such.
The new scientific findings do not necessarily erase the preceding theories.
The awareness of the ironist traveler that no vocabulary should be final retains
——————
5 Grenz, S. J., A Primer on Postmodernism, Grand Rapids: Cambridge University Press, 1995, p. 8.
54
6
the core of evolving historical existence of the human being and at the same time
it explains the dynamics of a more ironist-like thirst for knowledge.6
The ironist thirst for knowledge is the engine of her travelling thrives. Her
appetite for knowledge is not entirely modern. It is not based on the search for
truth or on scientific methods. It is more sensitivity to metaphor than a scientific
endeavor.
Rorty said once:
“Our culture has not only been carried upward by a bubbling fountain of
puns and metaphors; it has been increasingly conscious of itself as resting
on nothing more solid than such a geyser.”
The ironist traveler is a metaphor creating and receiving being. Knowledge
comes through metaphors but also through rationalizing, demonstrating, or
pragmatically perceiving and analyzing the facts. An error might be more
illuminating than following scientific procedures at some point.
It is the assumption that the vocabulary assigned to a certain person or community
is closer to reality that is dangerous. Certain experiments and certain reasoning
might led to a hierarchy of positions and sentences, but not of vocabularies.
Vocabularies equal life experience in Rortian terms.
Changing the perspective, I am as well interpreting in this paper that the
exposure to different vocabularies is like an exposure to mystery. But it is never
easy; to understand different vocabularies is to open you, oneself, to alterity and
to the contextualism and historicism characterizing somebody else. Always
something remains postponed, to be understood latter and always something
awakens in us as we encounter through (or behind?) vocabularies the complex
ethical and almost religious experience of suffering and humiliation.
“Is ironism an awakening from “the infinite sleep where our being floats”?”
And is traveling itself such an awakening? The entire study is an attempt to
sustain a positive answer for this question. We can awake from this infinite sleep
reading.7
The ironist traveler challenges mystery, and this is the hard work that the
human being owes to his or her self. People have to go beyond their context,
challenging mysteries around them and the universes of otherness around them,
endlessly. Because, as the poet warns in his Inscription: “The roads we do not
walk on,/roads at rest within us,/they also take us, numberless, somewhere/The
——————
6 An ironist-like thirst for knowledge is as well cultivated as quenched, for instance, in the contemporary
reading-groups experiences. A reading-group organized in 1996 by professor William Stearns and professor
John Elly, both visiting professors in a Civic Education Program of the Foundation for Open Society, with the
participation of the authors of this communication (ªerban and Gilder), brought together into Romanian
attention two different universes of interest for Romanian and universally for the human kind contemporary
humanities — Slavoj Zizek and Anthony Giddens.
7 And, at once, we get better prepared to interact in a manner of solidarity with the others, since more
attentive and more accustomed with their universe of life through their specific vocabularies. Then, a valuable
lesson from Rorty — in the light of Blaga’s ideas, though — there is that we all need to expose ourselves to
different vocabularies in order to understand both the linguistic aspects of otherness and the nonlinguistic
aspects of otherness, that glow beyond the linguistics...
7
55
words we do not utter,/words at rest within us,/they also discover, immeasurable,
the being (…)”.
The ironist traveler challenges the cultural imperialism. The ironist traveler
challenges the last word and the perennial truth. She challenges the upper hand
of the future and present over the past. She challenges any reductive journey. Her
exposure to difference is neither reductive nor simplifying. Eric J. Leed appreciated:
“Thus originates a new species of the old tradition of philosophical travel,
a search for cultural origins, stimulated by a hunger for meaning and content
which is itself the product of generations of wasting simplifying, and
reductive journeys. On these return journeys the old motives may operate
in a new way, and a modern death may be avoided, postponed. Those do
not die who connect their endings to their beginnings. Therefore wander.”8
She has to wander through and wonder at vocabularies. There is no final frontier,
no final words. “Truth” seen as “work in progress” does not mislead the ironist
traveler. Maps — cognitive and linguistic maps, as well — might efficiently
guide us, while they are subject to frequent adjustment. Paradoxically, it is
alterity that brings the ironist traveler “safely” to herself.
——————
8 Eric J. Leed, The Mind of the Traveller. From Gilgamesh to Global Tourism, Basic Books, 1994, p. 293.
EL ENFOQUE SISTÉMICO Y EL ENFOQUE
SOBRE LA CULTURA POLÍTICA
— DOS VISIONES DISTINTAS —
RÃZVAN PANTELIMON
Abstract. In David Easton’s view, the highest level of abstraction could
make scientific generalizations about politics possible. In sum, politics should
be seen as a whole, not as a collection of different problems to be solved.
The political culture is such an example. For Almond and Verba, the
values and attitudes which emerge with, and work to sustain, participatory
democratic institutions relate to the manner in which people within a
polity view their relationships with others vis a vis their own interests. The
civic culture is pluralistic, and based on communication and persuasion, a
culture of consensus and diversity, a culture that permits but moderates it.
Moreover, in its position of general values and attitudes shared by the
populace, political culture is formulated as the connecting link between
micro- and macropolitics.
Hemos elegido para analizar dos enfoques sobre la ciencia política, que nos
parecen interesantes y que han desarrollado unas direcciones nuevas en esta
ciencia. Uno apartiene a David Easton y es centrado sobre el sistema político, el
segundo es el enfoque clásico sobre la cultura política que lo han realizado
Gabriel Almond y Sydney Verba en los años sesenta.
En la visión de Easton al realizar un análisis de la vida política cabe preguntarse
cómo los sistemas políticos logran sobrevivir a las circunstancias que los rodean.
Para responder coherentemente a esta cuestión es necesario partir de la premisa
de que la vida política es un sistema de conducta que está inmerso en un
ambiente necesario para su existencia que influye sobre él y lo hace reaccionar,
ya que es un sistema abierto, porque recibe constantemente influencias de los
sistemas que lo rodean que condicionan la actuación de sus miembros. Todos los
sistemas sociales y en especial los sistemas políticos deben poseer una gran
capacidad de respuesta ante setas circunstancias para sobrevivir; así poseen
mecanismos para enfrentarse a las perturbaciones provenientes del ambiente y
regular su propia conducta.
Sin embargo, el análisis clásico de la política, esto es, el análisis del equilibrio,
no ha tenido en cuenta esta capacidad de los sistemas políticos de enfrentarse a
estas influencias de los sistemas que los rodean, lo que no es coherente ya que
2
EL ENFOQUE SISTÉMICO Y EL ENFOQUE SOBRE LA CULTURA POLÍTICA
57
son justamente éstas las que pueden romper el equilibrio, en cuyo caso el sistema
podría volver al anterior equilibrio o se establecería un nuevo punto de equilibrio;
así esta idea del equilibrio no resultó eficaz para analizar la vida política debido
a que surgen dos dificultades:
1. Este enfoque sugiere que el único fin del sistema cuando se enfrenta a las
perturbaciones es la búsqueda de la estabilidad, bien restableciendo el antiguo
equilibrio o buscando uno nuevo. En realidad el sistema político puede perseguir
otros fines, sus miembros en un momento dado puede preferir destruir el
equilibrio anterior, o incluso alcanzar no ya un nuevo punto de equilibrio, sino
un punto de desequilibrio para mantenerse en el poder.
2. No se otorga importancia a los mecanismos utilizados en su búsqueda de
la estabilidad para restablecer el antiguo equilibrio o para alcanzar uno nuevo.
Sin embargo, posee gran relevancia el hecho de que los sistemas políticos pueden
hacer frente a las perturbaciones desviándolas o absorbiéndolas; así puede tratar
de cambiar el ambiente para no recibir de él influencias negativas, puede aislarse
para no recibir ninguna clase de influencias o puede transformar sus relaciones
con él para manejar las influencias recibidas.
El análisis del equilibrio no tiene en cuenta los fines del sistema que no busquen
el equilibrio ni los caminos para alcanzar estos otros fines, y sin embargo ante las
influencias negativas los sistemas políticos no se adaptan realizando un simple
ajuste, sino que tienden a modificar el ambiente para protegerse de las perturbaciones
o a controlarlo para incorporarlas al sistema. Ante estos fallos del análisis
clásico, el análisis sistémico ofrece un enfoque más completo y flexible, pero es
necesario desarrollar sus categorías propias; los conceptos mínimos son los
siguientes:
— Sistema político: teniendo en cuenta que “sistema” es cualquier conjunto
de variables independientemente del grado de relación entre ellas, sistema
político es aquel sistema en el que las interacciones entre sus miembros asignan
autoritariamente valores en una sociedad.
— Ambiente: el ambiente total que rodea a un sistema político está conformado
por dos partes, siendo la primera de ellas la intrasocial, que está formada por
todos los sistemas que pertenecen a la sociedad del sistema político y son segmentos
funcionales de la sociedad, series de conducta, actitudes e ideas que constituyen
la fuente de muchas influencias que conforman las circunstancias entre las que
opera el sistema político. La segunda parte del ambiente es la extrasocial, que
comprende todos los sistemas que están fuera de la sociedad a la que pertenece
el sistema político estudiado, son componentes de la sociedad internacional.
— Perturbaciones: influencias del ambiente total que actúan sobre el sistema
político y lo modifican, bien sean favorables a la persistencia del sistema, neutrales
o por el contrario contribuyan a aumentar la tensión.
En este punto surgen dificultades cuando se intenta señalar qué perturbaciones
del ambiente producen tensión en el sistema político; se debe partir del hecho
de que, para su persistencia, es necesario que los sistemas políticos asignen con
éxito valores dentro de la sociedad y que logren que sus miembros los acepten
como obligatorios. Estas dos funciones son las variables esenciales de la vida
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RÃZVAN PANTELIMON
3
política y su identificación permite señalar cuándo causan tensión las influencias
que actúan sobre el sistema político: cuando corren peligro de que traspasen su
margen crítico (por ejemplo, cuando las autoridades sean incapaces de tomar
decisiones o éstas no sean aceptadas como obligatorias), en cuyo caso el sistema
está sometido a tal tensión que no puede persistir. Sin embargo, normalmente
aunque exista tensión el sistema político persiste cuando las autoridades son
capaces de tomar algunas decisiones y éstas son aceptadas mínimamente; en este
caso las variables sólo están un poco desplazadas pero permanecen dentro de un
margen de funcionamiento normal y el sistema político persiste. Aunque todo
sistema tiene capacidad para enfrentarse a las perturbaciones del ambiente,
puede que fracase y se desmorone si no adopta decisiones para responder a la
tensión; la clase de respuesta sirve para evaluar la probabilidad de que logre
persistir y para interpretar la conducta de los miembros del sistema político. Tras
esclarecer el concepto de tensión, surge la cuestión de la comunicación entre el
sistema político y las influencias ambientales que actúan sobre él; teniendo en
cuenta que estas tensiones son enormemente diversas, que se tratara cada cambio
en el ambiente como una perturbación específica y singular sería un problema
insuperable para el análisis sistémico, por lo que la amplia variedad de influencias
debe reducirse a un número manipulable de indicadores. Así surgen dos tipos de
transacciones entre el sistema político y el ambiente en el que está inmerso: de
entrada al sistema o inputs y de salida del sistema o outputs.
Los inputs son variables resúmenes que concentran la gran variedad de
circunstancias ambientales que tienen efecto sobre la tensión política y la persistencia
del sistema político. Si se concibieran como todo acontecimiento externo al
sistema que lo afecte serían tan numerosas que no ayudarían en absoluto a
simplificar y organizar la realidad, por lo que el análisis sistémico debe limitarse
a cierta clase de inputs que sirvan de indicadores sintéticos de las influencias
ambientales más relevantes: las demandas que se le hacen al sistema y los
apoyos que recibe, que engloban muchas de las actividades externas al sistema
que influyen en la vida política y sirven como indicadores del modo en que estas
circunstancias la modifican.
Los outputs ayudan a organizar las consecuencias resultantes de la conducta
de los miembros del sistema, que poseen gran importancia por las acciones o
circunstancias subsiguientes. Hay que tener en cuenta que dentro de la vida política
se da una extensísima actividad en la conducta de los miembros del sistema, por
lo que deben simplificarse averiguando sus efectos sobre los outputs políticos,
las decisiones y acciones de las autoridades, que ayudarán a averiguar las
consecuencias de la conducta del sistema político sobre su ambiente; también
ayudan a determinar todos los outputs que penetran en el sistema político, ya que
se da un circuito de retroalimentación por el que se aprovecha lo sucedido
modificando en consecuencia la conducta futura.
Esta retroalimentación posee gran importancia para las autoridades, las personas
que hablan en nombre o por cuenta del sistema, ya que son los que toman las
decisiones para satisfacer los inputs de demanda y por tanto han de conocer los
efectos de los otros outputs para no actuar a ciegas. Las autoridades procuran
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59
incrementar los inputs de apoyo (ya que su disminución es una fuente de tensión
que crea peligro para la persistencia del sistema) mediante la toma de decisiones
oportunas, para lo que deben contar con información sobre las circunstancias
que les rodean y las consecuencias de los outputs; esta retroalimentación influirá
decisivamente sobre las capacidades del sistema de enfrentamiento a la tensión
y de persistencia. El circuito de retroalimentación de un sistema político consta
de diferentes procesos: elaboración por las autoridades de outputs, respuesta de
la sociedad, comunicación de esta reacción a las autoridades, resoluciones
posteriores de las autoridades.
La mayor parte de las investigaciones políticas actuales parecen convencidas
de que los procesos políticos acaban en los outputs y se limitan a estudiar
minuciosamente los procesos de toma y ejecución de decisiones. Sin embargo la
cuestión más importante en el estudio de la política es averiguar cómo actúan los
sistemas políticos ante las tensiones para seguir subsistiendo. Una de las
principales ventajas del análisis sistémico es que analiza el sistema político en
términos dinámicos, como un flujo continuo y entrelazado de conductas, ya que
la conducta del sistema influye sobre las fases posteriores. El análisis sistémico
se basa en la premisa de que los sistemas políticos están expuestos a las influencias
del ambiente en el que están insertos, los cuales pueden arrastrar a sus variables
esenciales más allá de su margen crítico; ante esta tensión el sistema debe ser
capaz de responder con medidas para atenuarlo, pero las autoridades responsables
de tomar estas decisiones necesitan ser informadas sobre lo que ocurre en el
ambiente para ser capaces de recabar apoyos para el sistema.
El intento de David Easton de construir una nueva forma de análisis de la
vida política resulta muy interesante, pues es cierto que el análisis del equilibrio
no respondía a las situaciones reales que se viven en Política, pero no por ello en
análisis sistémico está libre de críticas, en primer lugar porque es un modelo de
análisis muy conservador, ya que el mantenimiento del equilibrio es el fin último
del sistema aunque tenga que realizar reajustes para adaptarse a las nuevas
circunstancias.
Sin embargo, este estudio aporta muchos aspectos interesantes, como la
reciprocidad de las relaciones entre el sistema político y los demás sistemas
pertenecientes a su ambiente, la retroalimentación del sistema, la importancia de
la información sobre las respuestas de la sociedad a las decisiones de las
autoridades, etc. Los estudios posteriores sobre estas cuestiones y las planteadas
por el propio Easton al final de su artículo quizá logren dotar de sustancia y vida
al esquema del análisis sistémico planteado.
Otro enfoque que me parece más conveniente es el de Almond y Verba que
tiene como elemento central el concepto de cultura política. En la opinión de
estos dos politólogos actualmente, el problema central al que se enfrenta la
Ciencia Política es averiguar cuál será el contenido de la futura cultura política;
dos veces en este siglo han surgido problemas de alcance mundial sobre el futuro
de la democracia: tras la Primera Guerra Mundial con el desarrollo de regímenes
totalitarios fascistas y comunistas y tras la Segunda Guerra Mundial con el
movimiento descolonizador, que hizo nacer un centenar de nuevas naciones en
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RÃZVAN PANTELIMON
5
Asia y África que pugnan por ser admitidas en el mundo moderno. Debido al
hecho de que ciertas facetas de la cultura occidental como son sus modelos de
producción, su tecnología y su burocracia racional se difunden fácilmente en
estos nuevos países, el contenido de la nueva cultura mundial que presenta
problemas de identificación es su faceta política, de la que el único rasgo
vislumbradle con claridad es la importancia de la participación activa de los
individuos en el sistema político.
Los nuevos estados pueden elegir entre los modelos de estado totalitario y
democrático, ya que ambos ofrecen participación del ciudadano aunque a un
nivel diferente. Para que triunfe el modelo democrático no será suficiente la
implantación de sus instituciones características, ya que éstas también existen en
el modelo totalitario; se requerirá una cultura política democrática, pero ésta no
puede transplantarse desde las naciones democráticas occidentales como sus
instituciones por dos motivos:
1. Los grandes ideales que son los pilares de la democracia atraen a los líderes
de los nuevos estados, pero los principios que impulsan una política democrática
están compuestos de elementos culturales relacionados con las creencias personales,
por lo que no pueden difundirse fácilmente.
2. Estas naciones se sienten atraídas por una política tecnocrática debido a su
particular problemática: sistemas tecnológicos y sociales arcaicos.
Los propios líderes de estas naciones son conscientes de los peligros que
supondría adoptar el modelo autoritario, y que el modelo democrático es el sistema
político más humano, pero por otra parte desean respetar sus propias culturas
tradicionales. La cultura cívica responde a esta ambivalencia, pues es una mezcla
de modernización y tradición que surgió como una forma de cambio cultural en
Inglaterra a resultas de los choques que se produjeron entre modernización y
tradicionalismo, por lo que nació como una cultura pluralista, de consenso y
diversidad, que permitía el cambio moderándolo a la vez.
La cultura cívica y el sistema político parlamentario son los dones que el mundo
occidental ofrece a las nuevas naciones, pero es difícil que se difundan tan fácil
y ampliamente como su ciencia o su tecnología. El hecho de que sólo una pequeña
parte de la humanidad haya conseguido tras mucho esfuerzo un sistema que
sirva a todos los intereses hace temer que no sea fácil trasladar un sistema que
se asienta en acuerdos y actitudes tan sutiles y complicadas sin su contexto
histórico y cultural.
Para comprender los problemas que presenta la difusión de la cultura democrática
hay que señalar en primer lugar las condiciones que favorecen el desarrollo de una
democracia estable; de ello se han ocupado distintos tipos de investigaciones:
— Sobre las actitudes y el comportamiento que deben existir en el país que
desee alcanzar un sistema político democrático.
— Sobre cómo debe ser un ciudadano democrático si quiere comportarse de
acuerdo con el sistema.
— Sobre las condiciones económicas y sociales asociadas a regímenes
democráticos.
— Sobre las características de la personalidad de un demócrata.
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El estudio de Almond y Verba, aunque surge de estas teorías sobre las condiciones
previas de la cultura democrática, intenta definir su contenido e inferir si estas
condiciones previas se dan en sistemas democráticos reales; su trabajo se ha visto
además influenciado por el enfoque psicocultural del estudio de los fenómenos
políticos. En su investigación emplean el término “cultura política” para diferenciar
las actitudes orientadas específicamente al sistema político de otras no-políticas, y
para poder utilizar enfoques propios de la Psicología, la Sociología y la Antropología.
La cultura política es la orientación psicológica (conocimientos, sentimientos
y valoraciones) que tiene como objeto el sistema político; consiste en la distribución
entre los miembros de una nación de las orientaciones hacia objetos políticos. En
esta definición existen dos conceptos que conviene aclarar:
1. Orientaciones: aspectos internalizados de objetos y relaciones; son la
cognición, el afecto y la evaluación.
2. Objetos políticos: pueden ser la visión de uno mismo como elemento
político activo o los componentes del sistema político: sus estructuras, los
titulares de los roles y sus decisiones, bien estén conectadas al sistema político
(inputs), el cual convierte las demandas de la sociedad al sistema político en
principios gubernativos de autoridad, o al proceso administrativo (outputs), que
aplica los principios de autoridad del gobierno.
La orientación política de un individuo puede ser comprobada al analizar sus
conocimientos, sentimientos, opiniones y juicios sobre:
— Su nación y su sistema político: historia, potencia características
constitucionales...
— Las estructuras del sistema político, los roles de las élites políticos y los
principios y programas de gobierno.
— Las estructuras, individuos y decisiones de la corriente inferior de la imposición
política.
— Él mismo como miembro del sistema político: derechos y obligaciones,
estrategias para acceder a la influencia política, etc.
Así se puede caracterizar la cultura política de una nación rellenando una
matriz 3x4 donde se relacionen las orientaciones y los objetos políticos, ya que
la cultura política es la frecuencia de las orientaciones cognitivas, afectivas y
evaluativos hacia el sistema político en general, sus aspectos políticos y
administrativos y la propia persona como miembro activo de la política. Según
la frecuencia de estas orientaciones se dan tres tipos de cultura política:
1. Cultura política parroquial: la frecuencia de orientación hacia objetos
políticos se acerca a 0. En ella no hay roles políticos especializados, sino que son
difusos, de tipo político-económico-religioso, y supone una ausencia de previsiones
de evolución, ya que los individuos no esperan nada del sistema político. En esta
categoría entran las sociedades tribales africanas, pero también programas de
gobierno de mayor escala como el Imperio Otomano; estos sistemas políticos
representan un parroquialismo puro, que en sistemas políticos más diferenciados
es más afectivo o normativo que cognitivo: sus miembros tienen una conciencia
difusa de la existencia de un régimen político, pero sus sentimientos son negativos
o inexistentes.
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RÃZVAN PANTELIMON
7
2. Cultura política de súbdito: cuando hay orientaciones hacia un sistema
político diferenciado y hacia aspectos administrativos del mismo pero las
orientaciones hacia los otros dos objetos políticos se aproximan a 0. Esta cultura
se dará en sociedades donde no existe una estructura política diferenciada, por
lo que no se tiene conciencia de la existencia de un sistema político (de una
manera afectiva y normativa antes que cognitiva), pero su relación con este
sistema es muy general y con el elemento administrativo es pasiva.
3. Cultura política de participación: cuando los miembros de la sociedad
están explícitamente orientados hacia el sistema político, sus estructuras y sus
procesos políticos y administrativos y tienden a asumir un rol activo de su persona
en política, aunque sus juicios sobre ello pueden ser de aceptación o rechazo.
Esta clasificación no supone que una orientación sustituya a otra, ya que pueden
darse adiciones de orientación de participación a otras más primitivas, ni tampoco
supone homogeneidad de las culturas políticas (culturas políticas predominantemente
de participación pueden incluir culturas parroquiales y de súbdito incluso en
democracias estables), ya que la cultura cívica es una mezcla de ciudadanos, súbditos
y elementos parroquiales.
Las culturas políticas pueden ser congruentes o no con las estructuras del sistema
político: cultura parroquial/comunidad tribal o rural, cultura de súbdito/estructura
autoritaria centralizada, cultura de participación/sistema democrático, pero debido
a la evolución de los sistemas políticos, la cultura y la estructura política no
concuerdan con frecuencia. Las culturas leales se dan cuando las orientaciones
hacia los objetos políticos se acercan a la congruencia entre cultura y estructura;
la incongruencia puede deberse a un rechazo de los líderes o de un cambio
sistemático. Así todas las culturas políticas son sistemáticamente mixtas: hay
orientaciones más simples y más complejas; ello no supone que tiendan a
desarrollarse hasta alcanzar una forma pura, sino que pueden permanecer
sistemáticamente mixtas por largos períodos, aunque esto conlleva roces entre la
cultura política y la estructura y que se tienda a la inestabilidad estructural.
Existen tres tipos de cultura política sistemáticamente mixta:
1. Cultura parroquial de súbdito: cuando parte de la población rechaza la
autoridad tribal o rural y es leal a un sistema centralizado y autoritario; este impulso
puede estabilizarse antes de que se forme totalmente la cultura de súbdito. La
evolución desde la cultura parroquial a la de súbdito es difícil y provoca inestabilidad
y movimientos de avance y retroceso; es el caso del nacimiento de los reinos.
2. Cultura de súbdito-participante: cuando parte de la población ha adquirido
orientaciones políticas especializadas y auto orientaciones activas mientras que
el resto continúa orientado a una cultura de súbdito; ello lleva a una inestabilidad
estructural con períodos alternos de gobiernos autoritarios y democráticos y a
una ineficacia de la estructura democrática, ya que las orientaciones de participación
se suspenden durante los intervalos autoritarios, que tienden a desarrollar un
tono populista y a alterar toscamente las instituciones democráticas.
3. Cultura parroquial-participante: cuando se introducen normas estructurales
de participación en una cultura política predominantemente parroquial, para lo
que es necesario desarrollar orientaciones especializadas políticas y administrativas.
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Éste es el caso del desarrollo cultural de las nuevas naciones, oscilando entre el
modelo totalitario y la democracia; el problema no es de fácil solución, que pasa
por transformar los sistemas parroquiales sin destruirlos en grupos de interés
político.
Las culturas sistemáticamente mixtas están compuestas por elementos a los
que los autores llaman subculturas, diferentes orientaciones hacia la estructura
política; el paso de una subcultura de súbdito a otra de participación es uno de
los problemas más actuales d Occidente, y los fenómenos subculturales que
fragmentan la cultura de súbdito-participante reflejan lo que ocurrió en la disolución
de imperios plurinacionales como el ruso o el austrohúngaro. Las subculturas pueden
transformarse en estructurales, como ocurrió durante la Guerra Civil norteamericana
con la Confederación, por ejemplo.
Los sistemas políticos complejos poseen estructuras especializadas de roles,
lo que también produce heterogeneidad cultural, bien porque las élites que
desempeñan estos roles han salido de subculturas políticas particulares (como la
aristocracia), o porque el proceso de socialización en el rol produce conocimientos
y valores distintos; estas culturas de rol pueden afectar a los sistemas políticos
por la importancia de estas élites en la formulación y ejecución de la política. En
un sistema político estable estas diferencias se limitan al contenido de la acción
política, pero en los sistemas inestables, donde coinciden con orientaciones
estructurales, pueden provocar fragmentación cultural.
La cultura cívica no es sólo la cultura política, que señala la manera en que
deben actuar los ciudadanos de un sistema democrático, enfatizando la participación
racional; la cultura cívica es una cultura leal de participación (la cultura y la estructura
política son congruentes) en la que se combinan las orientaciones políticas de
participación con las de súbdito y parroquiales, que son congruentes con las
primeras porque en cierto sentido las mantienen en su lugar. Esta fusión es lo que
lleva a una cultura política equilibrada.
Para los autores, la importancia de la cultura política reside en que es el nexo
de unión entre la micro política (el enfoque sobre el individuo, sus actitudes y
motivaciones políticas como persona individual o como miembro de un grupo
mayor) y la macro política (estudio de la estructura, funciones e instituciones de
los sistemas políticos); su estudio servirá para relacionar los fenómenos de
orientación política individual con los de la estructura política, lo que permitirá
utilizar el gran potencial que ofrece el enfoque psicocultural en el estudio del
sistema político. En realidad es un punto de partida inmejorable, ya que su
conceptualización permite determinar las inclinaciones políticas de agrupaciones de
orientación especial (subculturas) o de grupos decisivos de la estructura política
(culturas de rol) y estudiar sociedades que están experimentando una evolución
o que sean inestables y fragmentadas políticamente (culturas políticas mixtas);
además este esquema puede incluir información más específica y más precisa.
Así las teorías que presentan los autores son ideales para estudiar los aspectos
culturales de los sistemas políticos.
Los puntos débiles del sistema de Easton se derivan del hecho de que el
enfoque sistémico sea la aplicación de la Teoría General de Sistemas, de aplicación
64
RÃZVAN PANTELIMON
9
general para todas las Ciencias, a la Ciencia Política, por lo que los conceptos y
categorías no se adaptan perfectamente a las circunstancias de la realidad
política; por otra parte, como fruto de la reacción ante la parcelación excesiva
del Positivismo, se olvida de que en realidad las Ciencias no poseen una lógica
común que pueda ser aplicada a todas ellas. Además el análisis sistémico de la
política propuesto por Easton adolece de un fallo, ya que en su afán de concentrar
las influencias ambientales relevantes para la tensión política, las simplifica
demasiado, ya que resume todas las alteraciones ambientales existentes en dos
inputs, demandas y apoyos, y no plantea que pueda haber inputs que no encajen
bien perfectamente, bien en absoluto, en ninguna de estas dos categorías; así el
autor sintetiza demasiado, la política supone unas relaciones muchísimo más
complejas que las planteadas por Easton, por lo que su análisis, aunque está muy
bien sistematizado, tampoco responde a la realidad.
El estudio de Easton es realizado, podemos decir, al nivelo macro politic, al
nivelo de los sistemas políticos, de repuestos de acuestas a los poblemos planteados
por los ciudadanos. Los estudios sobre la cultura política son más cerca del nivel
del individuo, el nivel de sus actitudes y motivaciones. Creo que la grande
diferencia entre estos dos enfoques es aquí en el objeto del estudio. Por Easton
el apartiene a la macro política y par Almond y Verba el apartiene a que podemos
denominar micro política.
Almond y Verba explican cuales son los origines y como se forman los inputs
del sistema, y cuales son los resultados, los outputs, sobre los actitudes y
creencias políticos del individuo. Easton no explica muy claro estos vínculos al
nivel del ciudadano, que forman en permanente un circulo que se retroalimento
y que se desarrollo.
Ambas explicaciones tienen un grado de incertidumbre y inclaridades en cual
que se pasa a os políticas reales y practicas. La visión sistémica no puede explicar
todo por su intento mismo: a explicar un sistema muy complejo el sistema
político, y es imposible de no omitir unos casos, especialmente por el hecho que
aisló analicamente los sistemas políticas de la sociedad. A su lado el concepto de
cultura política tiene muchos conexiones con las aspectos psicológicos y sociológicos
de la vida, aspectos que no es pueden explicar en totalidad porque tienen un alto
grado de irracional y escapan de los intenciones de les matematizar y les regularizar.
IN FOCUS
THE BASARABIAN LETTERS OF IVAN AKSAKOV1
LEONTE IVANOV
Abstract. “Letters to my Family” first published in 1888, only two years
after Ivan Aksakov disappeared, roused readers’ interest. It presented a
complex and vivid description of Russia, from the middle of nineteenth
century. Not only is the cultural side of Russia observed, but also the new
ideas of different social categories or the hidden regions of this country;
he depicted the Russia of those who suffered, of drawbacks, of abuse and
injustice. The incisive character of his speech, the polemic aspect of his
writings, his frank style and spirit of justice that marked Ivan Aksakov,
were some of the reasons for which his name appeared on the Russian
magazines. Talking of magazines, almost all that had been edited by him
were suppressed by censure starting with their first numbers.
As the “muskals”* had to be considered enemies and ill-willed persons regarding
“our nationality” and “despising their authors” was a sort of a “duty” as Al. Odobescu2
puts it ironically. He says that it was a common thing that the name of Ivan Aksakov,
who was a poet, a literary critic and a publicist, remained unknown. Only one member
of this family of noblemen and Russian writers3 is mentioned in the works of
Hasdeu and Odobescu: it is Serghei Aksakov. His work, “Notes about a Hunter and
His Shot Gun”4 drew attention to the author of “False Dissertation...”, starting with
its theme. At the risk of “drawing attention upon his work and warming up people’s
spirits”, Odobescu writes down using his “swarthy, slow, insipid and colorless”
pencil, the names of other two “singers” of the southern Russian steppe: Gogol and
Turgheniev. He admitted they were a model that could not be found somewhere else
in the entire world of autochthonous literature.
Ivan Aksakov, whose letters are the subject of the present work, was educated
and spent his best years in the “suffocating atmosphere” from Russia. This kind
of ambient could be noticed from the moment Nikolai I ascended the throne. He
——————
* Muskal was a person or a part of the basic Moscow population.
1 Translated by Ioana and Emilia Turcu.
2 A. I. Odobescu, Historical Scenes. Pseudo-cynegeticos, Minerva Publishing House, Bucharest, 1984, p. 176.
3 Aksakov’s ascent can be documentary followed up to 11th century. On cultural area, Serghei Aksakov
(1791-1859) drew attention upon his work. He was writer, memoirist and drama critic. His sons, Konstantin
Aksakov (1817-1860) — who was one of the important ideologists of Slavic language, a poet, publicist and
historian — and Ivan Aksakov. Bielinski, a critic, wrote that he “had such a serene inner life that you feel sorry
for him, as Russian life is appropriate only for practical men, especially if they are mean”.
4 Aksakov’s volume, known by Odobescu according to “the notes written by Hasdeu”, was published in
1852. It was the same year Turgheniev’s well known book, “The Stories of a Hunter”, appeared.
66
LEONTE IVANOV
2
stopped the most noble attempts and ideals of the intellectual people and set up
the Third Station of Secret Police; this was meant to terrify the entire empire5.
Neither even after four years of juridical studies at the Imperial School from
Sankt-Petersburg, nor after working for the state, could he give up his passionate
nature that required freedom. The youngest son of the noble family was more
interested in literature and philosophy. As a matter of fact, poetry and dreaming
about foreign places gave him enough strength to work in the capital of Russia
or in some other forgotten places. He was sent there as a reviser. The pages that
describe this period reveal the discrepancy between what he had to do and what
he felt, between formalism and the real life he hoped to discover there. He
preferred travelling all over Russia, from Astrahan to Kaluga and from Bassarabia
to Iaroslav, as he wanted to come in contact with a great variety of human characters.
He was eager to find out about people’s sorrows, the injustice they had to bear.
In a word, he wanted to get the experience that could not be acquired by working
at the imperial office. “What kind of life is this I live in Moscow?” he used to
write to A.O. Smirnova, a family friend6. “You do not have any moment to be
alone or take care of anything important: you have company from ten in the
morning until almost midnight. And the topics of conversation are intelligent
indeed, but they do not take you anywhere; they are irrelevant and abstract”7.
Although he fulfilled his duties seriously and energetically, although he tried to
solve the problems starting from their basis, Aksakov realized that justice would
not triumph over Russia as long as law did not correspond. It allowed a lot of
interpretations and was useful only to the authorities. The system was corrupted
and most of the ones who worked for the state were incompetent. “What is law
good for if its application represents the highest offence?” used to ask him, the
reviser with literary concerns. After working for the Ministry of Justice, he was
transferred to the Ministry of Internal Affairs. This happened in 1848 when
nervousness caused by the revolution covered the Central and Eastern Europe.
This was also the year when the persecution of those who continued to think
free, was intensified. As a functionary, he had special duties. One of these was
the secret mission he was sent to, in order to study the religious schism. He had
to follow the Orthodox people from Bassarabia8 and notice their attitude towards
Russia. This real purpose of the journey was not told and his official responsibility
was to check the cereals deposited in the warehouses. He also had to check the
Jewish schools. The Russian authorities undertook this actions because in 1848
was founded the Metropolitan Seat from the White Well. This gave birth to great
enthusiasm among Orthodox people. The second reason for these actions was
——————
5 We should name some of the consequences regarding such politics: stopping the Decembrist revolution,
breaking up of the Polish state; the great number of deportation to Siberia, army’s interventions during the
revolution that took place in the 19th century; Court’s interference regarding the way the poets, Puskin and
Lermotov, died.
6 Aleksandra Osipovna Smirniva-Rosset(i) ( 1810-1882), was a writer and one of the most educated lady
that formed the suite of empress Maria and Aleksandra Feodorovna; some of her friends were important
Russian writers, such as: Jukovski, Puskin, Lermotov, Gogol, Viazemski. She was in correspondence with
them and evoked them in her memoirs.
7 Apud A.G. Dementiev, T.F. Pirojkova, I.S. Aksakov and the Letters He Sent to His Family. 1844-1849,
in vol. I.S. Aksakov, Letters to My Family. 1844-1849, Moscow, 1988 (written in Russian language).
8 Between Prut and Nistru Rivers, as in our country, they are named Lippovan.
3
THE BASARABIAN LETTERS OF IVAN AKSAKOV
67
that a group of Polish immigrants settled in the Principalities. They were suspected
of making propaganda “among the rebels that sheltered themselves away from
Russia; the emigrants hoped they would rise against the muskals”9. Thus, at the
beginning of November 1848, Aksakov crossed the Nistru River and went to the
southern areas of the Empire, to observe people, places, customs and events, in
his own way. Chronologically, he was proved to be the third Russian writer, after
I.P. Liprandi10 and N.I. Nadejdin11; he was interested in Romanian realities
represented by Bassarabia and in Principalities or by Lippovan people who lived
there. For two months he studied the economic aspects, living conditions, political
ideas, the psychology and traditions of different ethnical groups; he also checked
the attitude of the submissive people towards the authorities and their loyalty
regarding the sovereign power. The official report sent to his superior, secretary
of the interior, called L.A. Perovski, “Notes about the Schismatic Persons from
Bassarabia”, was published in “Ruskii arhiv” magazine, in 1888. The text contains
not only information about how the Russian refugees lived and the way they got
along with other people, but it also presents the decisions made by the Empire’s
government in order to determine the revolutionaries return to Official Church.
The authorities wanted the refugees to come back from Dobrogea and the
Principalities, and settle in the area that belonged to the Empire: “ceasing the
persecution related to religion, the police would not interfere in problems
concerning religion, reduction of economic sanctions etc.”12, was the official
information written in that report. But the “unofficial” side of the things seen or
heard would be noted in a series of epistles that were sent to his family who lived
in Moskow, from different parts of the region placed between Prut River and
Nistru. These are a real travel diary.
“Letters to my Family”, first published in 1888, only two years after Ivan
Aksakov disappeared, roused readers’ interest. It presented a complex and vivid
description of Russia, from the middle of nineteenth century. Not only is the
cultural side of Russia observed, but also the new ideas of different social
categories or the hidden regions of this country; he depicted the Russia of those
who suffered, of drawbacks, of abuse and injustice. Aksakov had an unconformable
and incisive spirit; he paid attention to all that happened inside the Empire. First
of all, he was reviewer of those times; the realities described in his writings were
noted while they were still fresh in his memory. They suffered no change
according to memory’s volutes; they were not filtered to fit in those times and
were not literary adjusted. The great documentary value of his notes, the special
——————
9
V. P.P. Panaitescu, Polish Emigration from 1848. Study and Documents, Bucharest, 1929, p. 5.
10 Ivan Petrovici Liprandi (1790-1880), major general, memoirist, historian friend of Puskin, the one that
he would accompany on his way from Basarabia to Odessa. From 1840 he was a functionary of the Ministry
for Internal Affairs, and had special duties.
11 Nikolai Ivanovici Nadejdin (1804-1856) was a literary critic, scientist; studied at the Theological
Academy from Moscow. Among 1845-1846 he would be sent by the same Perovski to the Principalities. His
duty was to study Lippovan’s reactions the day before the Orthodox Metropolitan Church was founded at the
White Well. His report handed to his superiors, gives us important information about the situation from the two
Romanian countries. Entitled, “About the Schismatic Persons that Live Across the Border”, the report
described the realities that existed in the 19th century.
12 As he expected, Aksakov’s ideas represented just some ideas, and the report itself was sent to the
minister Perovski at Nadejdin, to be analyzed.
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LEONTE IVANOV
4
coloring of that epoch that comes to us when we read the lines, makes us regret
that this journey stopped at Prut. However, he gave us much information about the
Principalities. The author is aware of what happened during the revolutionary actions
that took place in Moldavia and Wallachia. He made an opinion about the character
of the Romanian ruler; he outlined the ethnic portraits of each type of nationality
he encountered in that region. We can observe in his texts the way he efficiently
combined the functionary’s exigent and critical analysis with artist’s ingenuous,
free and synthetic spirit. Thus, the keys to interpret his work may be very varied.
Finding himself on the domain where the tartars13 used to travel, Ivan Aksakov
got some spare moments to discuss with the people from those areas, even if he
lacked time. He wanted to analyze their behavior, traditions, language and costumes.
He wrote down the main historical events of those areas, the economic and the
city’s development. He did not forget he real purpose of his journey and showed
interest in checking the Nekrasovic Cossacks14 who lived in southern Bassarabia
and in Dobrogea. He was preoccupied in the way they related to other centers
populated by orthodox persons; wanted to know how some restricted communities,
such as Moloch and Scoptsi lived; was concerned with the immigration of the
Polish people, slave trade, with propagandist literature that was illustrative for
that region. In establishing the valuable judgments, he was helped by comparison,
talent, the experience accumulated from his journeys. The information received
from Nadejdin, before leaving, was very useful. He also knew very well the
Bassarabian realities, as well as the information about schism contained by the
documents from the secretary’s office. Some of his epistles had been intercepted
by the Secret Police and this caused his arresting in 1849. Proceedings were taken
against him for the rest of his life. The incisive character of his speech, the polemic
aspect of his writings, his frank style and spirit of justice that marked Ivan Aksakov,
were some of the reasons for which his name appeared on the Russian magazines.
Talking of magazines, almost all that had been edited by him were suppressed by
censure starting with their first numbers. The same happened to his poems.
In the course of time, the texts started to have a more documentary value;
they imposed to be reedited and introduced in critical editions that would correspond
to our days’ literature15. It was also requested that more ample sequences that
belong to Aksakov’s correspondence be inserted in complete editions. More and
more critics consider that his letters are the most fascinating and valuable
segment of his work16. This is also the reason why we offer to critics a Romanian
version of on of his epistles.
——————
13 Ivan Aksakov visited for two times Basarabia, first in 1848 and then in 1855-1856; the impressions he
made during the first journey are more important. He describes the realities from the right side of Nistru River.
14 Their name comes from Ignat Nekrasov, the one that led them after Bulavin’s rebellion was suppressed
(1707-1708); it took place in Kuban, Russia; they moved to a new place, in Dobrogea of those times, starting
with 1730.
15 Ivan Aksakov, Letters to my Family.1844-1849, Moscow, 1988; Ivan Aksakov, Letters to My Family,
1849-1856, Moscow, 1994 (in Russian language).
16 Ivan Aksakov left an impressive inheritance to Russian culture: poems and poetry, critical essays,
philosophical essays, memoirist texts. According to their value, he was considered on of the most important
writers of his country. We shall mention only a few titles: The Vagabond poem, A Day of Work at the Court of
Apeal (a drama), essays — Petersburg and Moscow, What does Russia’s Power Consists in?, We are equally
guilty, Why People Have such a Bad Life in Russia?, Notes about Puskin, What is our Historical Responsibility?
About the Social Life that exists in Dwelling Places, Notes about V.S. Soloviov’s Article “About Church and Schism”.
5
69
Letters from Bassarabia
Suculeni, November 22, 1848
Take a map and seek after the border of that country, at a distance of 18 versts
from Iasi, the capital of Moldavia17. From this place I write down these lines,
even though the letter will travel by my side to Hotin. Wednesday was the last
time I wrote to you and the epistle was sent only on Sunday. You know that I had
to leave and check the bakeries from the County of Chisinau. So, I left on Sunday
morning with a coach being accompanied by Lambrovici18, the one who ruled
the zemstva*. We wended our way to Ialoveni19, a village where there was a cereal
warehouse. Lambrovici is an intelligent man, has a good heart and is an admirable
person; he feels pretty comfortable in Bassarabia. He was born in Smirna20, his
parents had been native of these places; at first he was educated in the native
place, then at Petersburg, and ended by working for the army; during the Turkish
campaign, he had an important role as he could speak Turkish language very
well. He was accustomed to those areas and to people’s traditions. He told me a
lot of interesting anecdotes about this event. He was sent there for several times
in order to negotiate with the viziers and to convince the Turkish return the
fortress. He was fully justified to expect great success from his work, but a
continuous misfortune followed him. For example… I am telling you all details
because it is surprising how according to different circumstances or events life
proves to be a total failure. We should take this in its most common way. I will
give you an example: he was sent to convince some kind of pasha to return the
fortress as soon as possible. But he considered that a sort of nonsense and talked
to Lambrovici in a pleasant manner. Right at that moment, the chief of state and
another officer showed up on horseback; they were worried because Lambrovici
was missing for a long time. He showed them the keys. “That’s great, said the
chief, take them rapidly to the head of state and I will remain here”. Lambrivici
mounted his horse and left: “Excuse me, dear Ivan Dimitrieich — said the chief
— how will I communicate with the pasha if we do not have a translator?”;
“so-and-so, go with the keys and we will take care of the pasha”. That person
left and when he gave the keys to the chief, this hugged him and congratulated
him for the promotion. Another time, they did not send a printed form on time
in order to advance in rank, and because the term passed he was denied this
promotion. The third time, after doing a great action, they omitted him in order
to do a favor to an old man. They considered that Lambrovici was young and had
enough time to serve his country. After all, it happened once that he captured 20
flags from the enemy and went to let them at the general district. His chief and
colleagues from war congratulated him before receiving the medals. And he got
there. But the chief of state had important guests and was not interested in such
things; besides that it was pretty late. He ordered him to let the flags and the
officer said he should leave and send the chief’s compliments to his superior.
——————
17 At that moment, Iasi was the capital of Moldavia.
18 His full name was Ivan Dimitrievici Lambrovici.
* Zemstva, was a Russian provincial or district council established by Tsar Alexander II. These councils
were responsable for local administration until the revolution of 1917.
19 A place founded in 1502 and situated near Chisinau.
20 In Little Asia; nowadays, Izmir town from Turkey.
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LEONTE IVANOV
6
Lambrovici admitted that on his way back, late at night, cried like a baby all the
time... You may be bored, Konstantin especially, because I do not talk about
myself, but the epistle replaces my journal and I note here everything I hear...
Short time after that, peace installed, Lambrovici got married, was put in reserve,
settled in Bassarabia and remained with the feeling of a failed life. He has not
changed; he is still an ambitious man and I do not think that it is appropriate to
talk in front of him about the great mission of man. His wife was born in Gruzia;
her father was German and her mother, Polish. She was educated at Petersburg
and got married in Bassarabia!... This is a normal thing among the people who
live in these areas. The functionaries themselves come from a country where there
appeared an amalgam of persons that spoke Moldavian language.
After this small digression, I return to Ialoveni and continue the story started
before. As a matter of fact, there is not much to say about Ialoveni. – The village
looks like other places from here. But you do not know how villages from this
area are! The nature that characterizes these places — the area from Chisinau, the
central and the northern parts of Bassarabia — has a special shape. I have not seen
such a thing. It seems a forgotten wild place. The relief of this region is represented
by hills. They are higher than those seen in Orensburg but not so arid; they were
larger, vaster and seemed to be uninterrupted. The road was at higher altitude, so
I could have a large view of the landscape. I observed chain of human beings, of
one hill after another. Almost all places had been covered by virgin vegetation,
as the lazy hand of the Moldavian man did not transform it into productive fields.
These hills form large valleys and surround them with big, green sides; they
encircle them on both sides in defiles. In such valleys the villages are located. They
are spread all over the region without having any kind of order; there are no streets.
The white houses covered with roofs made of black straws are not surrounded by
trees as they were in Malorussia; you do not see many forests; on heights there are
some spread vine cultures. But, at this moment they do not do anything that
might interest me… All over the place, there are wells without a wheel; it is hard
to explain this. They have a shadoof or a lever, or something like that.
There are such things in our country, but are a bit different. The tight well is
dug and surrounded by a stone that is pierced in the middle or by stones gathered
from the river. There are not too many rivers in Bassarabia, and the well is of
great importance in this area. Often, in full solitude, you can find a well built by
the Moldavian man in order to cherish the memory of his parents or of the loved
ones. It was meant to be useful to people who passed over and were thirsty.
Houses are made of high knitted red bent. They glue them together with clay and
paint them with quick lime; houses are always clean on both sides. Moldavian
people are even lazier than the Ukrainian ones21. They are spoiled by the land’s
richness and does not worry about anything else: about winter like us. Almost all
kind of job is done outdoor or in front of the house... That is the reason why their
house is so clean. The Moldavian man does nothing else, except plugging the
land fertilized with dung. It would bear fruits that were seeded; he ploughs the
surface that is sufficient to feed him and his family with maize porridge... If, by
——————
21 The Russian people used to call the Ukrainians in this way, according to their way of shaving their head
and let only a tuft of it.
7
71
chance, there are rich people they have another preoccupations. But they could
have been ten times richer. Crossing the border, money earned by selling bread
is good and the Moldavian understood this very well. Horned cattle are preferred
because of their weight; they are sold at a good price in Austria; is not too expensive
to go there, as the forage is for free... The Russian peasants who moved here
became very rich person; but there is something that may change this: the price
of wine has got higher and they are known to drink a lot... When Moldavian see
a Russian going by cart in the evening, always says: “Look at this foolish man!
God commanded us to work during day time and rest on night. So, he does listen
to what God told us!” In the morning, he does not go to work before eating the
breakfast; when he arrives at his land, dragging the oxen after him, he stops to
get some rest; when he finally starts working, his wife brings the lunch. Now, he
stops working, releases the oxen, eats his lunch and after only one hour of work,
he waters the animals; a boy is requested to continue the work and he takes a
nap; this is how it happens all the time. Their laziness is typically Italian! It is
hard to identify in their behavior any Roman origin! The woman is the one who
does all the work at home; she helps the man even he is working the land; she
dresses him up, weaves carpets. If enter their house, you will be surprised to see
how clean and organized they are. Big benches are always covered with carpets.
If you take a look at the wall, there is a carpet or ornamental pillows; in the
corner, on a bottom drawer, you can see a lot of pillows one above another. On
top, you can see some carpets folded up and covered with weaved material. It
almost reaches to the ceiling. Tables are covered with table cloth.
Usually, their house is made of two parts: the room described above is
separated from another one through a wall that has in the middle the shape of an
arch; there is a small oven where they set fire to a bundle of chips. Smoke heats
the entire wall and is removed through a small funnel. Richer people have
another room that is used for working and their oven is bigger. You can always
see ornaments on walls even if they are only some rooster feathers. You would
never see any kind of labels as I observed in some of the houses that are at home:
labels belonging to Musatov22 crème are glued on walls. Another important thing
is that here, when the son grows up, gets married and has his own home. They
do not live too many in a house. That is why such cleaned houses belong to the
most rude, uneducated and despicable persons who can irritate even the calmest
Russian. Besides that, the Moldavian is not forced to live inside his house for a
half an year, and having to burn more than half of caret of woods. Or to keep the
animals in the same house, to be warm. Nor does he have 30 persons around
him... Even though, the Russian should keep a cleaner house; he could gather the
bugs in a corner instead of smashing them on walls, as they used to do. The
Moldavian woman is more beautiful than the Russian, more refined and cleaner.
Talking about the woman from this area, I have noticed that it is not extremely
beautiful; I only observed that they are generally tall and supple. They wear a
skirt and a shirt. The skirt surrounds their body and is encircled with a belt. Another
thing that she wears is a sort of a short coat; it is pretty large. This may be replaced
by a dress that buttoned in front and may be blue, red or green. She may wear a
——————
22 It is about Musatov’s famous perfumery from Moscow.
72
LEONTE IVANOV
8
large coat that is made of silk (is worn on holidays); it is short and lined inside
with fur. Her head is covered with a printed silk, according to their custom. This
may be more or less expensive. Her hair is braided in two queues. The clothes worn
by the rich on holidays are similar to one that are worn by priests; are woven
with silk and lined inside with fur.
I have forgotten to tell you another example of Moldavian laziness. When
corn is ripped, its stem is as high as a man and the Moldavian does not cut it, he
only takes the corn cob; some of the grains fall and spread on earth. He walks
on them and does not have to seed the next year. But bread was not sufficient
these years as there were locusts and it was drought. The Russians were an example
because they requested that the warehouses be filled up. As the army had to be
fed, the Moldavians were forced to work harder, so they started mowing. Rye and
other cereals are seeded only for bakeries; they prefer eating maize porridge.
When I say this, I do not talk about rich people or the landowners, but about peasants.
Now, you are accustomed to the Moldavian food. I will tell you later about
the external life and its meaning. So, I got to Ialoveni, a village situated at almost
12 versts from Chisinau. Only free holders live here. Oh dear, now I have to
explain what free holders are23. They are called adnodvort peasants but without
referring to their origin. They own their piece of land even if it is not longer than
two archins. On ancient times, the rulers shared the land in the following way:
the land given to peasants had a two fingers breadth and stretched on the length
of that part. For this reason, there were a lot of trials, discussions and fighting.
The present government has not stopped this process of sharing land and now
it even requires that each strip and lot be delimitated by boundaries path. This
has not been until now. After I revised the warehouse from Ialoveni, I changed
horses and moved on. You must be laughing when you think about the way I
revise the warehouses... I show a serious attitude when I receive the agricultural
implements from the chief or the head. I am welcomed by all employees. I check
everything carefully, according to the information written on registers, climb on
a stair and verify whether the compartment corresponds. Then I take some
samples of grains and examine their quality. As you can see, there is a real ritual.
As I am extremely cautious, I talked to different persons and I am able to make
judicious remarks. Without irony, I had dealt with a serious situation here. One
of the workers wrote a report on my name and I hope it would be useful to him...
Most of the heads barely speak Russian language, the manager and the peasants
do not understand it at all; besides that, some of the zemtvei policemen speak
only Moldavian language; the official documents are written in Russian language
by the clerk. At Ialoveni I was welcomed by Aleksandr Russo. This name is pretty
common around this area as well as Ivani Iakovlevici24. You may see that I did
not count or check the warehouse but I spread the rumor that I would verify at
least one compartment; its name and place would not be told, so all had to be
organized for fear they might have any problems. I left that village and after
——————
23 Free holders included those landowners who lost their rights and became tax payers; after they paid the
tax called ragged, they would be except from any tax. To this category belonged numerous Russian immigrants.
24 He refers to Jean-Jacques Rousseau, a philosopher and important writer of the Enlightenment. During
the period Puskin spent in Basarabia, he met Ivan Iakolevici Russo ( Iancu Rosso). This was a dilettante writer
and landowner.
9
73
travelling for 20 versts I arrived at Hincesti25. It was a small town and it belonged
to Manuc-bey26. His father27 went to Russia because he had stolen the sultan’s
treasury, during war. This happened on Aleksandr’s28 times. For such an action,
the Russian government offered him the title of counselor; he bought an estate
there and lived a luxurious life.
After I checked the warehouses from Hincesti, a place where a lot of Jewish
merchans lived, I went to Lapusna29, and then I arrived at Bujor30, in the evening.
As the revision had to be postponed for the next day, we were invited to stay over
night at Keske, a landowner. He was one of the richest men from Bassarabia. He
received us with great hospitality; this was an opportunity for me, to observe their
living conditions. I was surprised by the fact that Keske was a sort of a brute,
made only of meat and muscles. He was a forty years old man, had an enormous
belly; was about to get divorced, argued with his children, thought only of a
more efficient way of earning money; he despised the poor, the simple man.
Contrary to his richness, the house did not look like ours: it was small, whitewashed,
a bit more spacious and cleaned.
He hated Moldavia and Walachia and is grateful to Russian government for
the safety it offers to landowners. I will talk to you later about the political position
of Bassarabia, regarding its relation with Moldavia and Gaul. For the moment, I
want to end as soon as possible the story I have just started... Keske has a lot of
gipsy slaves. I have not met any nomadic gipsy all over Bassarabia; they may be
seen in in the centre of Russia. Immigration was restricted and in these areas, the
rule was even more seriously respected. These nomadic gipsies had been registered
in the place they were revision met them and the majority became slaves. There
is the chance the government release them in time, but for the moment this is an
arrangement in order to make them renounce to nomadic customs… but the
situation is not as we expected it to be: gipsies do not plough the land, are not
capable of this type of work; many of them even tried to escape. Landowners
gave them different responsibilities: driver, cookers, smiths, maids etc. They
show a greater interest in this kind of duties than the Moldavians do. I almost
——————
25
Situated at 36 km away from Chisinau.
26 Most likely, is about Murat, one of Manuc-boy’s sons.
27 It is about Emanuel Mirsaian Manuc Bey (1769, Rusciuc — 1817, Hincesti). He was a complex
personality that had a great influence upon political life of that period: “he had an imposing economic situation
and impressed also by his allure, intelligence and qualities” (Gh. Bezviconi). He was a merchant and a great
landowner; worked for the state of Turkey and was bey of Moldavia during 1807-1808. At his place, in
Bucharest the Russian-Turkish Treat was signed, at May16/28, 1812. According to this treat Basarabia was
annexed to Russia. For a year, the people who lived on both sides of the Prut River were given the permission
to move from one side to another, to change estate, or sell their property if they had to. According to the
information offered by Aksakov, Manuc-bey did not steal the treasure of Mustafa-pasha. It was only a rumor
spread by French (by Counts Langeron and Lagarde).
28 Aleksandr I — Russian emperor (1801-1825), king of Poland after it was annexed the Principality of
Warsaw (1815) and Great Duke of Finland. The ideas he wanted to apply at the beginning of his reign would
be left aside. His reign lasted for 25 years and it was a period full of wars. His empire extended as Finland
(1809), Basarabia (1812) and Azerbaidjan (1813) were annexed. By the end of his life he wanted to retire and
left the throne. He wrote “The legends of abbot Fiodor Kuzmici”. According to this story, the emperor was not
buried in 1925, but someone who looked like him. The emperor lived longer somewhere in Siberia. In fact,
Aleksandr died of typhus at Taganrog, in the mentioned year.
29 Lapusna was documentary attested in 1470 and gave history a ruler, in the person of Alexandru
Lapusneanu. Another important person borne here was Mihail Hincul. When Aksakov travelled along Basarabia,
that place was a part of Chisinau and had almost 1700 inhabitants.
30 A place from Hincesti district, with a church from 1778.
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LEONTE IVANOV
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started laughing, but felt sorrow at the same time when I saw a gipsy boy, dressed
up in a long and inappropriate coat. He served us tea and I noticed that his face
had the serenity of a strange character; his hair was as black as cod, his eyes were
quick, looking for freedom. Generally, the landowners from these areas detest
servants. They treat them bad, spend little money to offer them any kind of conditions;
the slaves are forced to live in poverty and dirt. They totally despise slaves. It is
true, there are not too many of them. Moldavian landowners are not as rich as
the ones who live in our country; these are very temperate. They often call a
smarter Ukrainian girl to serve them. She does not wear any shoes, is dressed
with a dirty shirt that looks like a sack, and is called svitca31. She walks from the
kitchen to the living-room. At Heske’s home, I tasted milk and butter of buffalo
cow. They are extremely nutritious. I also tasted different assortments of cheese,
but I did not like them. Everybody knows the food is not very tasty in these
areas. Even if Bassarabia carries on trade with cows, you will not find any sort of
tasty beef as oxen get fat on their way back. Even if Mr. Keske tried to present us
the image of a European man — by silk, carpets, pillows, tobacco and other
objects he owned — you could still feel the perfume of the Asian life. The next
day — on Friday — after checking the warehouses, we left further, to Zberoaia32.
Zberoaia is situated on Prut’s bank, right on the border. This land belongs to
Ganapo, a landowner. You may see how far we got: right at the Russian borders!
I had such a strange feeling at that moment. Prut River has a very small flow that
during summertime even a chicken may cross it in different places. But eves so,
it resisted to big and immense Russia. The opposite bank belongs to Moldavia:
you can see some houses and notice the language they speak. The only difference
is that there is something else. Russia influenced Bassarabia and its people.
Here, in this region situated on the border, one can notice the positive effects of
Russian power and one cannot feel any sign of sympathy related to this. The
peasants also have enough reasons to be displeased regarding the landowners,
but they have become more patient and say that the czar is not aware of their
situation. They thought that the noblemen did not tell him the truth and that he
has a good attitude regarding their status. They needed to believe such things and
admit the strength and the power of Russia, in order to feel that it cares about
their faith. The orthodox side of Bassarabia gave up to Turkish domination and
submitted to Russia. Faith is an amazing thing: no matter the relations between
the governments, people who share the same religion seem to be blood brothers.
In Moldavia the peasants are richer, but the Moldavian people do not cross the
border even if it is not simple to do that: pickets of frontier guards are close to
one another; they are at 1 verst distance. If there is fog on some nights, an entire
regiment may pass without being observed. Many people come from the other
bank in order to settle in Russia. On this side of the river, there is the rumor that
people were instigated against the owners and made them the promise they would
be free and bread would be given to them.
On the other side, the Polish, who were the guiltiest of all, bought the pot houses
and instigated people. You can see that such things could not happen on this side.
Not even the weakest police would have allowed this; it was funny to see how,
contrary to all efforts of Russian army, common men stepped in caring a cross,
——————
31 It used to be a large and long coat, without buttons, that was worn above all clothes.
32 At the moment is situated in Nisiporeni district.
11
75
some bread and salt. They are upset because Russia did not only accept their paying
tribute to Turkish sultan, but because is supported this deal. Many of the Moldavian
landowners sustained that the purpose of the revolution that took place in
Walachia33 was to gain freedom and become a republic. Bassarabia would not be a
part of it because it was under Russian protection. They hoped that the internal
situation would change totally; they thought that Greek people would fight and
send the Turkish conquerors away from Europe and Russia would agree to that.
It is possible that many people believed that, but the Polish men who participated
to this action, make us think of another truth. They say that Sturza34, the Moldavian
ruler, invented this story. He was considered a thief, an evil person that had no
personality. In Moldavia, the revolution was about to start; this was not in the
benefit of the young men who studied in Paris. It was against Sturza. He foresaw
this and because he wanted to gain more time to receive help from the Russian
army, he spread the rumor that they were fighting not against him, but in order
to release Bassarabia etc. Some of the landowners who lived in those areas say,
smiling and nodding at the same time, that when Russia will ask them pay the
army’s expenses, and there will be no sum of money, Moldavia is going to
belong to Russia. But that is a foolish thing. Everyone sustains that that Russia
pays hard cash for everything: huge reserves of provisions are taken to that place.
Liders35 conquered a part of Bucharest; Turkish armies conquered the other side.
Investigations are done and everybody asks for Liders’ mercy and moderation.
A part of Turkish army is placed at the border with Transilvania, in order to scare
the Hungarian people. Besides, if revolution starts in Bassarabia, it would not be
against the leading part, but against the landowners who act like regular pigs. I
will talk to you later about the relations between the peasants and landowners. It
is easy to understand that Poles would sustain such a rebellion… A strange thing
happened: in that area, along the border, at quarantine stations and at customs, a
lot of Polish people showed up. They did not seem to be reliable persons. In the
New Lance36, on the Austria’s land borders they let a lot of books that had an
instigative content. Talking about them, I must mention that they had been collected.
From Zberoaia to Nimoreni37 and from Nimoreni to Vorniceni38, I walked on
the bank of Prut River. Many places are covered by dense reed that remained
inoffensive regarding the mosquitoes and the miasma. I remained over night at
Vorniceni. I was received by a landowner. These types of landowners consider
themselves descendent of the courtiers.
——————
33
This revolution that took place in Walachia was more important than Aksakov says.
34 At that time, Moldavia was ruled by Mihail (Mihalache) Sturza (1834-1849). His name is related to
important economic actions that were benefic to his country (built roads, reduced owners’ abuse towards
peasants, founded of new institution). He practiced a conservative politics, due to his avarice. He was the
founder of the first University form the Principalities (The Mihaileana Academy from Iasi), coordinated the
construction of Copou Park, developed Mihaileni town (county of Botosani). This town was transformed into
a customs’ point between the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the capital of Dorohoi. Regarding his character,
Aksakov was not wrong (if we take into consideration the information offered by Iorga, for example).
35 Aleksandr Nikolaevici Liders (1790-1878), was a count, adjutant-general; he stood out among the wars
between Russia and Turkey from 1828-1829. He was the commander of the Russian army during the fights
that took place in the Principalities.
36 A town from Cernauti, place near Prut river; it was documentary attested in 1456, when Petru III Aron
was the ruler of Moldavia; he was the son of Aleksandr the Good.
37 A place situated 18 km away from Chisinau, attested at 1600. Nowadays it is a part of Ialoveni district.
38 It is a village from Chisinau, has an old wooden church (the 18th century); its patron was “Assumption
of the Virgin”.
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LEONTE IVANOV
12
In spite of this, they submit to corporal punishment, but only by judicial sentence.
There are some kinds of boyars that are departed from corporal punishment39; it
is the case of those who originate from the clerical strata40. My host could not
speak Russian at all, but my arrival made him very happy and gave his best to
take care of me; he offered me some wine made by him. His home looked like
those of the other peasants, except it was a bit more spacious, cleaner, had more
carpets and pillows. I have not seen his family so I do not know if he had any.
After showing him such a great honor, I left his house in the morning and
accompanied by Lambrivici, we went further. On our way to Siret41 we diverted
from our way and went to Capriana Monastery42. It is dedicated, along with its
incomes, to a monastic place that is situated in the Holly Mountain. These monasteries
have a lot of domains that may be granted to lease or administered by them in a
worse way than landowners do. Capriana Monastery is very rich and it owns
some things that you rarely see in Bassarabia: forests, which have wood used for
construction. It is easy to understand that you do not see pines or birches. Birch
tree can be seen only in the county of Hotin. The archimandrite was not at the
monastery when we got there; the steward priest, originated from Bulgaria, presented
us the places and the churches. These are not so old, but they are poor regarding
their architecture and ornaments. Inside, everything was empty: the walls were
whitewashed; the iconostas was pretty small and did not have any old icon.
There are only a few monarchs; some of them came from Athos Mountain. To
this place are sent all incomes that are obtained from working the domain returned
to them after being confiscated by the heads of autocephalous church43 during the
Turkish domination. I noticed something different: the pews and archimandrite’s
chair are not placed towards the celestial doors; they are opposite one another.
After we visited the monastery and refused to have lunch, we went to Siret in a
hurry. We were walking along the hill’s ridge; a deep valley showed up down the
hill; it was covered with fog. Mist started to disappear and the view was amazing:
the haze formed a sort of an immense white sea. Finally, after checking the
warehouse from Siret, observing all kinds of cereals and corn, did we arrive on
Sunday, at noon, in Chisinau. We had been helped by the horses received from
the people who lived in Siret. Nichita44 welcomed me. He seemed bored of
waiting for such a long time and said smiling: “When are we going to leave these
Jewish places? I went to the market; Jews are everywhere and nobody understands
Russian”. I composed him saying that we were going to leave further the next day.
Our destination was the depth of Bassarabia. This news made him more peaceful.
——————
39
Landowners of a superior rank; their economic situation could not be compared to those of greatlandowners.
40 Until 1847, these kept intact their rights, privileges and duties; after that they enjoy the same rights. Their
fortune could be taken from them and the corporal punishment could be applied only according to a judicial
decision. They did not have to pay any tax to state or to zemstva. At mid 19th century, Bassarabia had 915 000
inhabitants. 12 000 were Cossacks that worked for the Novorosia’s army; almost 500 000 were peasants, 88 000
colonists, 21000 free holders, 67 500 peasants that worked on domains and over 10 000 slaves.
41 Nowadays in Straseni district.
42 Monastery of monks, most probably built in 1429, by Alexandru the Good. Its name comes from the
father superior “Ciprian de la Visnevat”. The church has the patronate of “Assumption of the Virgin”. It is the
oldest of all churches from that monastery. Stephen the Great ordered to be built. The former bishop of
Bassarabia was buried in this church. His name was Gavriil Banulescu-Bodoni (1746-1821).
43 From gr. Exarchos-chief. They were the heads of the autocephalous church or persons who had to check
orthodox monasteries.
44 In one of his letters sent from Odessa, Ivan Aksakov makes this description of his servant: “is a
hardworking man; a good and honest person, but too dull; is not educated or smart at all. He is a bit lop-eared”.
I N T E R N AT I O N A L R E L AT I O N S .
PRACTICAL APPROACHES
ACADEMIC PEACE POST 9/11:
THE EROSION OF THE AMERICAN DEMOCRATIC DREAM
ABDELLATIF AKBIB
Abstract. The context of this paper is America’s decision to go to war after
9/11 to “dry up the sources of terrorism” and “establish peace, democracy
and freedom in the world”. Ironically, this enterprise appeared to be
impossible without the curtailment of freedom within the United States to
hem in domestic opposition to that scheme. It thus turned out that American
academia got the brunt of the American Administration’s assault on what
is supposed to be one of the unalienable rights — the right to free speech
and expression. In so doing, then, the US is flouting its own democratic
principles and undermining its leadership position as a defender of democratic
values in the world.
“An aggressive attack on freedom has been launched upon America's college
campuses. Its perpetrators seek the elimination of ideas and activities that place
Sept. 11 in historical context, or critique the so-called war on terrorism.” These are
the opening words of Roberto J. Gonzalez’s article entitled “Lynne Cheney-Joe
Lieberman Group Puts Out a Blacklist.”1 In another article entitled “The New
McCarthyism: Academic Freedom After 9/11”, Neve Gordon confirms that
“Immediately after September 11, the American Council of Trustees and Alumni
(ACTA), founded by Lynn Cheney and Senator Joseph Lieberman, published a
report [entitled “Defending Civilization: How Our Universities Are Failing America
and What Can Be Done about It”], accusing universities of being the weak link
in the war against terror and a potential fifth column,”2 to which Amber Hussung
adds in her “Academic Freedom Under Fire” that ACTA’s statement on academic
freedom suggests that “The barbarians are not at the gates; they are inside the
walls”.3
With the benefit of hindsight, these articles, published three months after the
attack, seem to anticipate the manipulation of homeland public opinion for the
new course which the American policy had decided to steer immediately after
——————
1 Roberto J. Gonzalez, “Lynne Cheney-Joe Lieberman Group Puts Out a Blacklist” Published on Thursday,
December 13, 2001 in the San Jose Mercury News.
2 Neve Gordon, “The New McCarthyism: Academic Freedom After 9/11”, http://www. counterpunch.org/
gordon08052006.html
3 Amber Hussung, “Academic Freedom Under Fire”, http://www.oah.org/pubs/nl/2003may/hussung.htm
78
ABDELLATIF AKBIB
2
the events. For, according to Jason Leopold, “On September13, 2001, [two days after
the attack] during a meeting at Camp David with President Bush, Rumsfeld, and
others in the Bush administration, Wolfowitz said he discussed with President Bush
the prospects of launching an attack against Iraq, for no apparent reason other
than a ‘gut feeling’ Saddam Hussein was involved in the attacks, and there was
a debate about “what place if any Iraq should have in a counter-terrorist strategy.”4
It is not my intention in this paper to talk about this peculiar offshoot of the
9/11 events; Mike Ruppert’s Crossing the Rubicon gives irrefutable evidence
that the American official version of the events was a huge lie and a pretext to
justify all the atrocities that followed on the heels of the 9/11 attacks. But this
colossal event — the Iraq war — lies at the heart of my concern with academic
peace in this paper; my opinion is that whatever the Bush Administration did
after 9/11 would not have been possible unless the domestic front had been
weakened enough to blunt the edge of opposition in a situation that is strongly
reminiscent of George Orwell’s Animal Farm.5
Rushing to war, once said the Nazi leader Hermann Göring, is easy if the
proponent of war portrays opponents as unpatriotic. With the so-called war on
terrorism in view, then, what was necessary after 9/11 was not only to find
someone to blame, but also to stem the tide of any source of domestic resistance.
Thus, the culprits turned out to be Al Kaida and the rogue states, while the
potential critics were very likely to come from the university, the academic circles
having always been the reservoir of the conscience of their country and the
guardians of its democratic principles. The aim of the American Administration,
consequently, was to wage a pre-emptive attack on the intellectually recalcitrant,
to corner the educated elite into a defensive position by accusing them of
“un-patriotism” so that they were hardly able to respond effectively to the new
Administration’s policies: their defensive position would undermine their ability
to voice a critique that was vigorous enough to change the course of events.
According to Beshara Doumani, a professor of history at the University of
California at Berkeley, and editor of Academic Freedom after September 11,
Academic freedom is facing its most serious threat since the McCarthy era
of the 1950s... [T]he Global War on Terrorism is distinct from previous
wars in ways that do not bode well for the future of academic freedom.
The unprecedented curtailment of civil liberties following the passage of
the Patriot Act in October 2001, the national “Take Back the Campus”
campaigns of special interest groups, the changes in the grant language of
major foundations, and the attempts to legislate political intervention in
area studies programs are but some of the developments post 9/11 that
have impacted academic freedom in structural ways. This comes at a time
when the academy is in the midst of an economic and institutional
——————
4 Jason Leopold, “Wolfowitz Admits Iraq War Planned Two Days After 9-11”, http://www.utne.com/
2003-08-01/Wolfowitz-Admits-Iraq-War-Planned-Two-Days-After-9-11.aspx
5 In Animal Farm, Squealer — a staunch opponent of Napoleon’s policies — is blamed whenever
anything goes wrong on the farm; eventually, Napoleon expels him from the farm, paving thus the way to
totalitarian rule.
ACADEMIC PEACE POST 9/11
3
79
transformation driven by the increasing commercialization of knowledge.
Buffeted between the forces of anti-liberal coercion and neo-liberal
privatization, colleges and universities are more vulnerable than ever to
the myriad ways in which outside government agencies and special
interest groups are reshaping the landscape of intellectual production.6
The Big-Brother-watching-you approach to academic dissent was, indeed,
well planned as it had devised schemes to affect all aspects of academic life.
Mostly inspired by the Patriot Act, the “myriad ways” Doumani is talking about
range from the curtailment of free inquiry and the limitation on the free
circulation of research to monitoring on-campus extra-curricular activities,
spying on professors, denying them promotion and tenure, blacklisting them and
firing those who are politically too controversial — even suing them in court, as
is the case of Dr. Sami Al Arian.7 When we look into what is considered
“politically too controversial”, we find that it is no more than the advocacy of a
fair, balanced approach to managing world affairs that would leave military
intervention as a last option to be resorted to only in situations where the international
community is unanimous through a UN Security Council’s resolution.
But some would say that this is common practice the world over, why are we
talking about it in relation to the United States?
Well, it is precisely because this is happening in America that we are talking
about it, for the simple reason that this country claims to be the most democratic
state in the world, a nation for whose Founding Fathers freedom of speech and
the press was the best method to prevent the tyranny of the people by their own
government. Policing thought in this country, therefore, shows a state defeated
at its own game — the democratic game — which might turn into a nightmare
the American dream in its democratic dimension, and consequently affect its role
as a leader of democracy in the world. For a better understanding of this situation,
we ought to put it in its proper political and historical context.
The concept of the American Dream was born with the first settlers on the
colonies back in the 16th and 17th centuries, when Europeans, especially Englishmen,
were persuaded to move to a land that promised so much, it being a land of
plenty, opportunity, and destiny. Thus, in John de Crèvecoeur’s words, America
was becoming a safe haven for “Europeans ... who have suddenly passed from
oppression, dread of government, and fear of laws, into the unlimited freedom
of the woods.”8
Having suffered the tyranny of British rule, it must have been a challenge to
the American Founding Fathers to think of a socio-political system that could set
the pillars of democracy in a state that, after the Declaration of Independence,
——————
6 Scott Jaschik, “Academic Freedom After September 11”, http:// www. insidehighered. com/news/2006/
03/07/acfree
7 For a comprehensive list of such abuses, see “Academic Freedom and National Security in a Time of
Crisis” by American Association of University Professors, November-December 2003, http://www.aaup.org/
statements/REPORTS/911report.htm
8 J. Hector St. John Crevecoeur, “LETTER III.: WHAT IS AN AMERICAN” Letters from an American
Farmer http://xroads. virginia.edu/~hyper/CREV/letter03.html
80
ABDELLATIF AKBIB
4
resembled the state of nature as postulated by the Social Contract theorists.
Indeed, a social contract was necessary, but the Founding Fathers were well
equipped to meet this contingency: all their speeches, statements and writings
show that they had tapped the fountains of the then most sophisticated social and
political thinking to turn that dream into reality. Accordingly, benefiting from
Enlightenment philosophy, the Founding Fathers of America were capable of
erecting the new nation on the pedestal of Liberalism, which holds among its
most sacred principles extensive freedom of thought and speech, limitations on
government power, and a see-through system of government.
Given the limited scope of this paper, I would like to consider the present
academic situation in America in relation to the social and political philosophy
of one of the most prominent American founding fathers, namely Thomas Jefferson.
The choice of this eminent historical figure among his generation, who were
exposed to basically the same strands of thought, is justified by his great
contribution to American independence and his promotion of the ideals of
Republicanism in the United States as well as by his staunch lifelong defence of
freedom as the surest groundwork for that system of government. Interestingly,
too, he was the founder of the University of Virginia, which he conceived “on
the most extensive and liberal scale that our circumstances would call for and
our faculties meet”9.
According to J. W. Cooke in his article “Jefferson on Liberty”,
From the Summary View of 1774 and the Declaration of Independence of
1776 until his death fifty years later there is no evidence of a significant
modification in [Jefferson’s] basic idea of freedom. His thinking about
liberty, original only in detail and emphasis [underlining mine] became
identifiably American when he wrote with eloquence, as in the Declaration
of Independence, of man’s inalienable right to liberty, and when he spoke
and wrote with the passion of a lover and the vision of a prophet [underlining
mine] about his country’s future as an “Empire of Liberty”.10
True: in essence, Jefferson’s thinking about liberty was not original, for we
can hardly overstate the influence of Enlightenment philosophy on the founding
fathers’ conception of the American Republic. Echoes of the Social Contract
theory, as conceived by Locke, Hume and Rousseau, are strongly felt in all the
documents forming the groundwork of the new nation; but, importantly, Jefferson’s
concept of freedom appears to have been a distillation — as well as an ingenious
adaptation — of relevant philosophical thought.
The first, perhaps the most important document in American political history,
the Declaration of Independence, written by Jefferson himself, states that the
thirteen American colonies of the time are obliged to sever their ties with
England on the grounds that the mother country, has failed to preserve those
unalienable rights which he calls “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness”. Of
——————
9 http://wapedia.mobi/en/University_of_Virginia. Thomas Jefferson was the first and only President of the
United States to found an institution of higher learning.
10 J.W. Cooke, “Jefferson on Liberty”, Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 34, N° 4 (Oct.-Dec. 1973), p. 576.
5
81
course, the three rights cited in this document are interrelated in a number of
ways, but perhaps the one right that haunted Jefferson most all his life is liberty
— a strong suggestion that this value lies at the core of his conception of an ideal
viable society, inasmuch as the “concept of liberty” was, in J. W. Cooke’s words,
“a controlling assumption in [Jefferson’s] religious, social and political thought.”11
A brief survey of Jefferson’s concept of freedom would no doubt put in
perspective the political mind of the founders of America and provide a clear
idea regarding what they wanted their new country to be and to symbolize. The
framework thus established would put in relief the present assault on academia
through the violation of the basic form of liberty stated in the first amendment
of the American Constitution: the freedom of expression in all its manifestations.
For Jefferson,
Men were… born with natural rights… the most important of which were
“individual liberty and social freedom.” More specifically, Jefferson had
in mind three essential liberties: freedom of thought, freedom from tyrannical
political authority, and freedom in choosing and plying one’s livelihood.
Such liberties were never to be abridged or denied by any man-made
institution. They were the gift of God to all men and were, further, the only
basis upon which a society or a government could be founded. Men did
not give up a single one of these natural rights when they entered society;
it was the duty of the legislator, Jefferson wrote Francis W. Gilmer [1816],
“to declare and enforce only our natural rights and duties, and to take none
of them away from us [emphasis mine].”12
Jefferson was convinced, too, that these natural rights were essential to
building a society where people could give “strong uncoerced” loyalty to government
institutions.13
But what is perhaps most interesting in Jefferson’s political thought in this
respect is that, though he once admitted that certain natural rights might be
abridged by the consent of a freely and honestly chosen majority,14 “the rights
of thinking, and publishing our thoughts by speaking or writing… [and] the right
of personal freedom [are rights] which it is useless to surrender to the government.”15
As a first-rate political thinker, Jefferson was also concerned about the potential
harm some lobbies might represent; he once “warned that standing armies,
monopolies, banks, and a concentration of power in the hands of the federal
government were dangers to political freedom… ‘God send,’ he wrote to Francis
Hopkinson, ‘that our country may never have a government which it can
feel’”.16 He was accordingly aware that “[t]he natural progress of things,” as
[he] warned Edward Carrington [in 1788] “is for liberty to yeild [sic] and
government to gain ground,” in which case the only antidote, according to him,
——————
11 Ibid., p. 563.
12 Ibid., pp. 565-566.
13 Ibid., p. 567.
14 Loc. Cit.
15 Loc. Cit.
16 Ibid., p. 570-1.
82
ABDELLATIF AKBIB
6
is giving citizens a “free right to the unbounded exercise of reason and freedom
of opinion.”17
In all this, Jefferson was convinced of the value of education as the strongest
pillar upon which the inalienable rights can rest. As early as 1786 — that is,
before the Constitutional Convention — Jefferson wrote George Wythe
identifying education as the surest way of preserving the unalienable rights
charted in the Declaration of Independence: “No other sure foundation [than
education], can be devised for the preservation of freedom and happiness,”18 he
said. No wonder, then, that his University of Virginia project was conceived on
the most extensive and liberal scale possible at the turn of the 19th century.
This is the frame of mind within which the new American state was born and
was no doubt meant to grow into an “Empire of Liberty” to honour the promises
of the Manifest Destiny in its global reach-out — that is, to fulfil the belief in
America’s “mission” in the world, as expressed by Thomas Paine in Common
Sense when he wrote: “We have it in our power to begin the world over again.”19
The present academic witch-hunt to de-legitimize academic opposition, with
such a striking likeness to McCarthyism as Neve Gordon and Beshara Doumani
say, does show that “standing armies, monopolies, banks, and a concentration of
power in the hands of the federal government [are indeed] dangers to political
freedom”, which may cause liberty to yield and government to gain ground.
Ironically, while, for Jefferson, the only antidote to such a condition is “free right
to the unbounded exercise of reason and freedom of opinion”, the present
situation shows that this very right/antidote is denied, which can only trap the
nation into a vicious circle by making room for more checks on political freedom.
The present state of American democracy thus seems to be a fulfilment of
Jefferson’s worst fears: the American government is now steering clear of the
road map conceived by the Founding Fathers’ to lead to a vineyard of liberty for
the whole world called America. Accordingly, the American Administration, after
having tarnished the image of America that was through previous miscalculated,
short-sighted policies, is now demolishing what remains of the essence of
Americanism.
The fact is that, like the definitions of such concepts as democracy, liberty,
and national security, that of patriotism, has been stretched to make room for
labelling university teachers anti-American or unpatriotic for their “attempt at
analyzing the events in terms more illuminating than the clash of good and
evil… [for] Even while Americans adopted President Bush’s declaration that
‘freedom was attacked today’,” says Dr. Durtal, “such an influential
conservative citizen as Attorney General Ashcroft insisted that exercising this
freedom was tantamount to treason.”20 And so criticizing the President’s
——————
17 Ibid., p. 571.
18 Ibid., p. 572.
19 Thomas Paine, Common Sense, Appendix to the Third Edition, http://www. ushistory.org/paine/
commonsense/singlehtml.htm
20 Dr. Durtal, “Defending Civilization: How Our Conservative Citizens are Failing America And What
Can Be Done About It” http://www.democraticunderground.com/articles/01/12/21_defending.html
7
83
decisions, even when they are potentially harmful to the nation, became antiAmerican and unpatriotic, when in fact loyalty to the country, in Senator Schurz’s
words, should be an unswerving adherence to the maxim: “My Country right or
wrong: when right, to keep her right; when wrong, to put her right.”21 What is
actually unpatriotic is the current tendency in American political life to conflate
dissent with treason. I think this is one of those situations to which applies
Samuel Johnson’s saying: “Patriotism is the last refuge of a scoundrel.” It is
Samuel Johnson again who, in his essay “The Patriot” (1774) said that “He that
wishes to see his country robbed of its rights cannot be a patriot.”22
True patriotism, according to Theodore Roosevelt, the twenty-sixth President
of the United States, “means to stand by the country. It does not mean to stand
by the president or any other public official, save exactly to the degree in which
he himself stands by the country. It is patriotic to support him insofar as he
efficiently serves the country. It is unpatriotic not to oppose him to the exact
extent that by inefficiency or otherwise he fails in his duty to stand by the country
[underlining mine]. In either event, it is unpatriotic not to tell the truth, whether
about the president or anyone else.”23
It is very significant that the First Amendment to the American Constitution
came to establish the freedom of expression, but “Americans’ First Amendment
rights are currently facing rigorous scrutiny in the wake of September 11 and the
war with Iraq,” says Amber Hussung.24 Can we assume at present that anyone
can exercise this right under the protection of the First Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution? In 1988 Larry Flynt won an important Supreme Court decision,
Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, after having been sued by Jerry Falwell in 1983
over an offensive ad parody in Hustler that featured Falwell.25 The case is worth
invoking, as it pitted the publisher of a pornographic magazine to a fundamentalist
Baptist Minister (two people on the opposite ends of the moral scale, as it were).
Yet the Supreme Court rendered a unanimous decision in favour of Flynt, giving
thus a clear message that the First Amendment of the Constitution is sacred and
that in no circumstance can it be flouted. I now wonder, twenty years on, and
with even academic liberty trespassed on, if the same court would reach the
same verdict.
The world having become a global village, the echoes of the American
Administration’s approach to academic resistance, in my opinion, is bound to
reverberate in the four corners of the planet earth and will consequently have
long term effects on its suitability as a spearhead in the defence of universal
values. True leadership, of whatever kind, is a matter of conviction through the
ability to serve as a role model. During his campaign against the Indians to
smooth out the American expansion westwards, the career U.S. Army officer and
——————
21 Loc. Cit.
22 http://www.samueljohnson.com/thepatriot.html
23 Tamim Ansary, “What Does It Mean to Be Patriotic?”, http://encarta.msn.com/column_patriotismmain/
tamimhome/what_does_it_mean_to_be_patriotic.html
24 Amber Hussung, “Academic Freedom Under Fire”, http://www.oah.org/pubs/nl/2003may/hussung.htm
25 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Larry_Flynt#Legal_battles
84
ABDELLATIF AKBIB
8
a Union general in the American Civil War Philip Henry Sheridan brandished his
arms in the face of indigenous population along with his famous motto “The
only good Indian is a dead Indian.” Now, in their fixation with the global war on
terrorism, with its unmistakable undertones of an overseas expansion, the hawks
in the American Administration are brandishing their military might for the
world to see, along with an aside to the intellectual society at home — “the only
good academia is dead academia”, closing their eyes to the fact that the university
is the womb wherein that superiority was conceived in the first place, and that
democracy and freedom are the very values that nurtured it. Destroy the university,
then, and you destroy all the ideals it stands for — material and otherwise — and
in front of the whole world, on top of it.
When we talk about the American Dream, we are actually talking not only
about those who live the American dream or those who pursue it, but also about
those who are in search of it the world over. What is happening now on American
campuses signals a process of erosion of that dream, which may eventually inspire
a sense of vulnerability in those who already live it, baffle those who are chasing
it, and repel those who, on the other side of the US borders, think it worth
looking for. “No more is the image of America one of strong, yet benevolent
peacekeeper,” says with bitterness Senator Robert Bird, the longest serving
member in the Senate history. “The image of America has changed. Around the
globe, our friends mistrust us, our word is disputed, our intentions are questioned.”26
With the global war on terrorism, the concept of peace has metamorphosed
into something whose shape is not yet sharply defined; what is sure, however, is
that for the present American Administration the meaning of domestic freedom
has to be recast to fit the new pattern. Ironically, the assault on academic freedom
in the US to intimidate the American liberal intelligentsia, which has had a
remarkably destabilizing effect on academic peace on campuses, is part of a
larger effort to hush condemnation of government policies and intimidate the
American people into abandoning hard-won standards of civil liberties — the
very soul of the American Dream. “[W]e contend,” concludes the AAUP Special
Committee’s Report, “that in these critical times the need is for more freedom,
not less.”27
If the American approach to global war on terrorism has undermined global
peace by making the world a less friendly, less safe place to live in, within its
homeland marketing strategy the Administration’s approach to the intellectual
body’s advocacy of wisdom in managing crucial situations has caused serious
damage to peace within the college community. The tense environment engendered
by this situation has often turned the parties intervening on the academic field
into warring factions for whom, quite often according to the AAUP Special
Committee’s Report, nothing short of recourse to litigation was any satisfaction.
“Are the attacks on academic freedom after 9/11 a passing storm, or do they
——————
26 Robert Bird, “The Arrogance of Power”, http://www.antiwar.com/orig/byrd3.html
27 “Academic Freedom and National Security in a Time of Crisis”, http://www.aaup.org/statements/
REPORTS/911report.htm
9
85
represent a structural shift that undermines one of the pillars of democratic
societies?”28 This is what the American university is concerned with now. No
one can venture a definite answer at the moment, but the prospects do not look
very promising; on the one hand, in 2005 efforts were made to render permanent
the Patriot Act sunsetting provisions, and the debates in the two houses were
reconciled in a bill that was criticized by Senators from both the Republican and
Democratic parties for disregarding civil liberty concerns.29 On the other hand,
the future of academic freedom, predicts Kathleen J. Frydl, “will ... be determined...
by budgets, whereby those who challenge the powers that be will be cut off from
resources, while knowledge will be privatized and become the property of those
who have the assets to produce it.”30 Overall, and according to the AAUP Special
Committee’s Report, “a return to conditions as they existed before September 11
seems unlikely.”31
But even if this is passing storm, the current American Administration, through
oppression and psychological warfare, will have prevented the university from
fulfilling its role within the checks and balances system upon which American
democracy rests. According to the AAUP Special Committee’s Report, “the
government invokes claims of security to justify an infringement on our civil or
academic freedom;”32 but, even if we assumed this to be the case, “They who
can give up essential liberty to obtain a little temporary safety, deserve neither
liberty nor safety,”33 said Benjamin Franklin more than two hundred years ago.
REFERENCES
“Academic Freedom and National Security in a Time of Crisis” by American Association of University
Professors, November- December 2003
http://www.aaup.org/statements/REPORTS/911report.htm (27 April 2008)
Ansary, Tamim. “What Does It Mean to Be Patriotic?”
http://encarta.msn.com/column_patriotismmain_tamimhome/what_does_it_mean_to_be_patriotic.html (17
April 2008)
Bird, Robert. “The Arrogance of Power”
http://www.antiwar.com/orig/byrd3.html (11 June 2008)
Cooke, J.W. “Jefferson on Liberty”, Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 34, N° 4. Oct.-Dec. 1973.
Crevecoeur, J. Hector St. John. “LETTER III.: WHAT IS AN AMERICAN” Letters from an American Farmer.
http://xroads.virginia.edu/~hyper/CREV/letter03.html (5 May 2008)
Durtal, Dr. “Defending Civilization: How Our Conservative Citizens are Failing America And What Can Be
Done About It”
http://www.democraticunderground.com/articles/01/12/21_defending.html (16 May 2008)
Gonzalez, Roberto J., “Lynne Cheney-Joe Lieberman Group Puts Out a Blacklist” Published on Thursday,
December 13, 2001 in the San Jose Mercury News.
Gordon, Neve, “The New McCarthyism: Academic Freedom After 9/11”.
——————
28 http://mitpress.mit.edu/catalog/item/default.asp?ttype=2&tid=10799
29 The bill was signed into law by President George W. Bush on March 9, 2006.
30 Neve Gordon, “The New McCarthyism Academic Freedom After 9/11”.
31 “Academic Freedom and National Security in a Time of Crisis”, http://www.aaup.org/statements/
REPORTS/911report.htm
32 Loc. cit.
33 http://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Benjamin_Franklin
86
ABDELLATIF AKBIB
10
http://www.counterpunch.org/gordon08052006.html (27April 2008)
Hussung, Amber. “Academic Freedom Under Fire”.
http://www.oah.org/pubs/nl/2003may/hussung.htm (27April 2008)
Jaschik, Scott. “Academic Freedom After September 11”.
http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2006/03/07/acfree (2 May 2008)
Leopold, Jason. “Wolfowitz Admits Iraq War Planned Two Days After 9-11”.
http://www.utne.com/2003-08-01/Wolfowitz-Admits-Iraq-War-Planned-Two-Days-After-9-11.aspx (2May
2008)
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Larry_Flynt#Legal_battles (27 April 2008)
http://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Benjamin_Franklin (16 May 2008)
http://mitpress.mit.edu/catalog/item/default.asp?ttype=2&tid=10799 (16 May 2008)
http://wapedia.mobi/en/University_of_Virginia. (30 April 2008)
http://www.samueljohnson.com/thepatriot.html (27 April 2008)
Paine, Thomas. Common Sense, Appendix to the Third Edition
http://www.ushistory.org/paine/commonsense/singlehtml.htm (30 April 2008)
THE PENTAGON’S PALIMPSEST:
HOW THE SCREENING OF BATTLE OF ALGIERS
UNDERLIES THE TORTURE AT ABU GHRAIB
PERRI GIOVANNUCCI
Abstract. The Pentagonists were seeking an analogy in The Battle of
Algiers for the war they were fighting in Iraq. Apparently, they wanted to
consider the French counter-insurgency at Algiers and what they, the
Americans, would have done in their place. The Pentagon viewers of
Pontecorvo’s film approached their case study with a fetishized notion of
insurgency “tactics” and “counter-tactics.” With a blanket mentality, lacking
historicity or context, the Pentagonists projected the images of the Algerian
militants portrayed in the film upon the spectral figures in the “war on
terror.” The same mentality has superimposed the 9/11 hijackers upon the
nation of Iraq. Thus a confused logic has ruled the Pentagon’s strategy ever
since the invasion of Baghdad. Perhaps the confusion is why the Pentagon
viewers were unable to grasp the implications of Pontecorvo’s film.
In the first year of the Iraq War, Pentagon officials held a private screening
of the old film by Gillo Pontecorvo, The Battle of Algiers. The notion of hawks
gathering for a film that, in the U.S. as elsewhere, has long been celebrated as a
counter-cultural icon was not without irony. The film tells of the pivotal battle in
the Algerian War of Independence. Algeria had been colonized by the French
since 1830, a situation which came to an end in 1962, after an eight-year struggle
led by the Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN). The urban battle which
took place in Algiers in 1957 catalyzed the popular resistance to foreign domination,
as the film depicts. The guerrillas of the Algiers cell of the FLN engaged with
French paratroopers under the command of Colonel Jacques Massu, called
Mathieu in the film. It was a bloody battle in a bitter war. Referring to the event
which was the reference for Pontecorvo’s film, one historian comments:
It was truly … a horrendous battle, during which bombs blew dozens of
European victims to pieces, while paratroopers dismantled the [guerrilla]
networks by uncovering their hierarchy, discovered [weapons] caches and
flushed out the FLN leaders installed in the city. Their means? Electrodes… [,]
dunkings in bathtubs, beatings. Some of the torturers were sadists to be sure.
But many officers, noncommissioned officers, and soldiers would live
with that nightmare for the rest of their lives. (Stora 50)
88
PERRI GIOVANNUCCI
2
For the French, the battle of Algiers was a campaign of “pacification,” a military
misnomer which refers to conquest rather than to peace. “Pacification” in this
case meant the putting down of the local insurrection. This was eventually achieved,
but at great cost and diminished returns. The French victory at Algiers was a
pyrrhic one. The Pentagonists were clearly looking for object lessons from the
French. But for what objectives? After all, it was the Algerians who won the war.
The Pentagon viewers wanted, obviously, to analyze the tactics and countertactics of the Franco-Algerian war in order to determine how one camp of
combatants may overcome the other. They were seeking insights about how to
defeat the insurgents in Iraq. The New York Times, which reported the Pentagon’s
screening of The Battle of Algiers, commented upon the similarity of insurgent
tactics in both the historic case of Algeria and the contemporary case of Iraq. The
Times also refers to what might be logically concluded about the direction of the
Pentagon’s post-screening discussion:
During the last four decades the events re-enacted in [Pontecorvo’s] film
and the wider war in Algeria have been cited as an effective use of the
tactics of a “people’s war,” where fighters emerge from seemingly ordinary
lives to mount attacks and then retreat to the cover of their everyday
identities. The question of how conventional armies can contend with such
tactics and subdue their enemies seems as pressing today in Iraq as it did
in Algiers in 1957. In both instances the need for on-the-ground intelligence
is required to learn of impending attacks. Even in a world of electronic
devices, human infiltration and interrogations remain indispensable, but
how far should modern states go in the pursuit of such information?
The Pentagonists were seeking an analogy in The Battle of Algiers for the war
they were fighting in Iraq. Apparently, they wanted to consider the French
counter-insurgency at Algiers and what they, the Americans, would have done in
their place. The insights they sought from the film, they thought, would help
them to put down the Iraqi insurgents. For this objective, however, they were
watching the wrong movie. Pontecorvo’s film does not suggest the best way to
defeat an insurrection. It portrays the opposite idea: that resistance to oppression
cannot be crushed. The Pentagon viewers surely did not grasp this meaning. But
if they had, ironically, the film could have provided them insight about the Iraq
War, if not exactly the kind they were after. That is, unless their purpose was merely
cynical, the Pentagon viewers might have understood what the film actually
implies about the U.S. forces in Iraq. For the figures of the French paratroopers
in Algeria do indeed serve as an analogy for the American military in Iraq. The
analogy lies in the oppressive role of an occupying army that meets with fierce
local resistance. Analogy lies also in the occupiers’ use of misnomers, such as
“pacification,” in the French case and “democratization” in the American case,
to describe objectives which, in both cases, have little to do with peace and democracy
and everything to do with conquest and injustice. But an analogy lies perhaps
most graphically in the method used by both the French and the Americans to
achieve their objectives in these two wars of imperialism, that is, the military’s
3
THE PENTAGON’S PALIMPSEST
89
arbitrary use of torture upon suspects and detainees swept up in local raids. This
understanding is likely not to have been the insight which the Pentagon viewers
were seeking, of course. But if they had grasped the implications of the film,
they might have avoided the untenable situation of the U.S. occupation in Iraq.
They may also have avoided the scandal which has come to characterize the U.S.
forces in Iraq as it did the French in Algeria — the military’s use of torture upon
local people detained for “interrogation.” For the Americans in Iraq, the scandal
of torture has had its own portrayal in film: the infamous photos taken at the Abu
Ghraib prison near Baghdad. Indeed like The Battle of Algiers, the Abu Ghraib
torture photos illustrate the true meaning of military “pacification” and the —
ultimately — futile attempt to occupy and to oppress.
The great irony of the Pentagon’s screening of The Battle of Algiers resides
in the viewers’ misunderstanding of the very analogy they sought from it. Yet
they are not the only viewers to have missed the insights of Pontecorvo’s film,
despite its long-held regard as a cinematic work. Commentators frequently
misrepresent the film in their rush to describe what, in their views, appears to be
its radical chic appeal, rather than its themes. They elide not only the themes but
also the critical intentions of Pontecorvo and the film’s producers, among them
Yacef Saadi, the former commander of the FLN’s Algiers cell. Perhaps of all the
misreadings of the film, however, the Pentagon’s is the most unfortunate, given
that the viewers intended to apply their interpretations in combat. Indeed, these
viewers were not drawn in by the alleged appeal of radical chic. Rather, the
Pentagonists would see the film as depicting a nuanced battle of arms and ideas.
They wanted to analyze tactics and counter-tactics to determine how one camp
of combatants may overcome the other. But this reductive understanding of the
Franco-Algerian conflict misses entirely the humanistic insight of the film.
Above all other interpretations, Pontecorvo’s film is an anti-colonial film. The
director presents an unambiguous struggle: that of the colonized against the colonizer
for self determination. The clear outlines of the struggle are represented in the
director’s use of black and white film, which, impacted by the dazzling sunlight
and deep shadows of its Algiers location, achieves a chiaroscuro effect. Pontecorvo’s
work is a visual account of the anti-colonial ideas of his contemporaries, Albert
Memmi and Frantz Fanon. Works such as Memmi’s Colonizer and the Colonized,
and Fanon’s Wretched of the Earth, about French colonial Tunisia and Algeria,
respectively, contextualized the Franco-Algerian struggle within the broader
movement toward decolonization in the postwar era. The power of these works
lay in their ability to transcend their own specificity and to portray, as Memmi
noted, an “inventory of conditions of colonized people” (viii). Similar to Pontecorvo’s
film about Algeria, the depictions of Tunisian colonial life in Memmi’s widelyread book, his portrait of the colonized subject, spoke of “the fate of a multitude
across the world” (ix):
So many different persons saw themselves in this portrait that it became
impossible to pretend that it was mine alone, or only that of colonized
Tunisians, or even North Africans. I was told that in many parts of the
90
PERRI GIOVANNUCCI
world the colonial police confiscated the book in the cells of the militant
nationalists. I am convinced that I gave them nothing they did not already
know, had not already experienced; but as they recognized their own emotions,
their revolt, their aspirations, I suppose they appeared more legitimate to
them. (viii-ix)
4
What Memmi describes above is not the so-called appeal of radical chic but
simple empathy, the recognition of a common condition among the oppressed.
But the heart of his and Fanon’s works is the contention that colonialism will be
undone by the same means it uses to occupy and to oppress — violence, now
reified as the violence of the colonized people’s revolt, the inevitable response
to the colonizer. Of course, Memmi’s and Fanon’s contentions about violence
have always been viewed as controversial because they theorize local armed
struggle as both necessary and emancipatory. Pontecorvo portrays the role of armed
struggle in a similar fashion as his contemporaries, but he also foregrounds the
tragedy of violence to the communities it consumes. The dimension of tragedy
gives nuance to the film, but it should not be seen as the definitive tone. On the
contrary, Pontecorvo’s film is hopeful because it envisions emancipation as the
immediate result of liberation struggle. The oppressed have already prevailed,
Pontecorvo shows, because their struggle for self determination is the enactment
of the thing itself. The film’s main theme is that although the battle may be lost,
the human will for freedom cannot be defeated. This theme has resonated with
viewers the world over. Even barely literate viewers have seen their own struggle
reflected in, or at least have sympathized with, the anti-colonial struggle of the
FLN militants portrayed in the film. To view the film, no doubt as the Pentagon
did, as merely the conflict of two opposed groups of combatants is thus a shortsighted reduction. That view would divest the film of its meaning. But simply
because the Pentagonists would not see the meaning does not mean that is
actually gone. Indeed through the analogy offered by the film, the Pentagonists
could watch, if not recognize, their counterparts enact their role in the drama. In
Pontecorvo’s crisp chiaroscuro, they would see their own silhouettes in the
figures of the colonial army; in the film, these are the people’s oppressors.
The context of liberation struggle, and of the contemporary discourse of
liberation theory, is the key to a humanistic understanding of Pontecorvo’s film.
Of course, the Pentagon was not likely to have been concerned with the film’s
humanistic themes. The viewers would instead have focused on elements in the
film which had pragmatic meanings for them. They would have evaluated the
tactics of battle used by the French and Algerian combatants as depicted in the
film. But they would have missed the critical insights which Pontecorvo intended
by portraying such battle tactics. The French applied localized force: Colonel
Massu, the man charged with “pacifying” the resistance in Algiers, mobilized
8.000 soldiers of the 10th Paratroopers Division into the city. This is portrayed in
the film when Colonel Mathieu, looking nearly as if he is goose-stepping, leads
the formation in the street. The scene of the parade is meant to visually suggest
Nazism; it criticizes the French campaign as tyrannical through image and
5
91
gesture which conjure the very notion, for a postwar audience, of fascistic tyranny.
Pontecorvo, who had been an anti-fascist partisan in the Second World War, renders
an implication here made also by French observers, including the philosopher
Jean-Paul Sartre, that there was a Nazi-like quality to the French campaign in
Algeria. Many such observers, like Sartre, had once played a role in the resistance
to the Nazi occupation of France. They were therefore critical of tactics which
reminded them of their own oppression, only a little more than a decade earlier.
When in 1957, the Algiers police chief Paul Teitgen toured the camps where
suspected Algerian militants were incarcerated, he commented: “I recognized on
certain detainees the deep marks of abuse or torture that I personally endured
fourteen years ago in the basement of the Gestapo in Nancy” (Stora 51). He
resigned his post in protest. The French General Paris de Bollardiere also saw an
analogy to the Gestapo in the interrogation tactics of the French soldiers in
Algeria; he, too, resigned his post in protest. Due to the conscientious action and
testimonies of French and Algerian critics, the conduct of the war in Algeria
eventually came to light in metropolitan France. Notable in this regard was the
testimony of Henri Alleg, a French Algerian dissident who was interrogated and
tortured by French soldiers. His book, The Question, would help to illumine the
process of “pacification” in Algeria; though his work was banned, it was widely
read and discussed. Public outrage in France polarized critics and supporters of
the military’s “pacification” campaign throughout the Franco-Algerian struggle.
When The Battle of Algiers was released in 1966, the public rift was still an open
wound. It was only four years after the Evian Accords had been signed with the
FLN leaders by the government of Charles de Gaulle — a man synonymous with
French national integrity and the resistance to Nazism. The Evian peace treaty
recognized Algerian independence. But in the aftermath of the Algerian war,
Pontecorvo’s film was banned in France for fear of the public controversy it
would incite. However the criticism rendered in the film’s parade scene, its
specifically Nazi overtones, would have been recognized by other Europeans,
likely so with the visceral immediacy of postwar popular consciousness. One
wonders how the Nazi gesture of the scene would have been misunderstood by
the military strategists at the Pentagon.
If the Pentagon missed the parade, it was because the viewers’ attention was
focused elsewhere. They would have been watching closely for aspects of Algerian
guerrilla warfare that seemed similar to the insurgency in Iraq. The guerrilla tactics
would have hit home for the viewers at the Pentagon. One of the eponymous five
sides of their headquarters had lately been taken out by an airplane in the 9/11
suicide attacks. The FLN, for its part, responded to the French paratroopers with
irregular tactics, much as Pontecorvo portrays in the film. The FLN strikes in
civilian areas, with homemade bombs. The guerrillas hit their targets in secret.
They recruit women and young boys for militant activities. Lacking arms, they
will use themselves as weapons. In one scene, militants have killed a doctor and
taken over an ambulance which they use to terrify a pied noir neighborhood.
They crash the van rather than be captured; at the last moment the driver swerves
to run down a group of civilians as he and his passenger go to their own deaths.
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The terrible irony of the scene is purely visual: the ambulance and doctor are
symbols of medicine and healing; but the militants have inverted the symbols in
a purgative bloodletting. Yet the Pentagon audience would miss the irony for the
tactics. They would see the suicide missions, improvised explosives, and civilian
targets of the FLN in the strategy of the militant organizations in the “war on
terror.” “Their forces,” wrote Sartre about the Algerian guerrillas, whose cause
he supported, “in relation to ours oblige them to attack us by surprise”:
invisible, elusive, unexpected, they must strike and then disappear or else
be exterminated. Hence our discomfort: we are struggling against a secret
enemy: a hand throws a bomb in a street, a rifle shot injures one of our
soldiers out on the road; we come running; there is no one there. (73)
Like the Americans in Iraq, the French forces had superior organization and
weaponry. These were methods by which they sought to “pacify” local resistance
to the French occupation. Massu’s pacification mission resulted in the arrest of
thousands of Algerians. The French commander could count among his successes
the arrest of Larbi Ben M’Hidi, the leader of the FLN who was later alleged to
have committed suicide in custody; the death or neutralization of several local
leaders; and, the arrest of the Algiers cell commander Yacef Saadi, who later acted
a role in Pontecorvo’s film based upon himself. In reality the French paratroopers
succeeded in busting up the Algiers cell. The Pentagonists would have seen this
result as evidence of effective counter-insurgency. But as the film depicts, the
paratroopers’ success does not really matter. Their checkpoints police the
population. Their surveillance network anticipates the moves of suspects. They
capture and interrogate. Still the resistance eludes them.
The true meaning of military “pacification” is made clear in scenes such as
those which depict the paratroopers’ occupation of the city and the guerrillas’
attacks upon the colonial infrastructure. Pacification aims at submission; the
military seeks to compel the guerrillas to submit to colonial rule. The derivation
of the term, “pacification” from “peace,” is misleading. Discursively, it connotes
the intention to secure “peace” as it is commonly and universally understood: a
state of popular contentment based on stability, security, and justice. In actual
practice, however, “pacification” refers not to this serene state but rather to a pax
Romana, the yield of the vanquished. The French had been disingenuously engaged
in “pacification” in Algeria for several generations; their campaigns, beginning
with the fall of Algiers in 1830, had entailed the annexation of ever greater areas
of native lands (Haddour). French “pacification,” a method not of peace but one
of conquest, has long been understood by historians and post-colonial critics as
a misnomer. But the French were neither the first nor only to engage in such
fallacious peace-making. In the modern era, one recalls the term, “pacification,”
was also used to describe the American military campaign in Vietnam. The
Pentagonists might have sought an analogy for Iraq from their own history of
“pacification” during the long war of attrition they pursued in Vietnam. Instead
they seem to have learned as little from the French who preceded them in
Indochine, the old colonial name ascribed to that country, as they apparently
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derived from the Algerian example portrayed by Pontecorvo. In Americanoccupied Vietnam as well as in French Algeria, the colonial reality was apparent
to the native people, despite the rhetoric of the colonizer. Similarly, the avowed
intention to “democratize” Iraq reinvents the old colonial term, “pacification.”
There is nothing democratic about the occupation of a country by a foreign power.
Nor is occupation, “freedom.” Indeed the Pentagon has found the “democratization”
of Iraq as disastrous as their “pacification” of Vietnam. At the time of the
Pentagon’s screening of The Battle of Algiers, the instability of the Iraq occupation
would have been clear to the viewers. Blinded perhaps by military hubris, however,
they sought out for case study the historic French failure to “pacify,” rather than
their own.
In considering the pacification tactics of the French, the Pentagon viewers
wanted to see what, in their views, they thought had worked. Undoubtedly, they
would have evaluated a key method identified in the film: the French soldiers
used torture in the interrogation of militants and their suspected sympathizers.
“Terrorism served to justify recourse to every means possible,” writes the
historian Benjamin Stora, “Massu’s men made massive arrests, systematically
took down names, and, in the ‘transit sorting centers’ located on the periphery of
the city, practiced torture” (50). Pontecorvo portrays the “rough interrogations”
carried out by the paratroopers, such as the near-drowning of detainees in a
bucket of water, a technique similar to the “water boarding” of prisoners in the
“war on terror,” lately condoned in Bush Administration internal memos. The
portrayal of torture is an integral part of the film’s critique of the French campaign
as fascistic. It shows the tyranny of organized, state violence; this violence is
simply another form of terrorism, hypocritically sanctioned through military and
colonial agency. The hypocrisy is inherent in the paratroopers’ use of terrorism
to put down an insurgency led by guerrillas whom the French state deems as
terrorists. To the degree that Pontecorvo shows that torture “works,” it works to
solidify the militants’, and by extension, the people’s resistance to colonial
oppression. Pontecorvo, as do other liberation theorists, avoids the liberal
tendency to simply equate “terrorisms,” both organized and clandestine, i.e.,
those of the state and those of the guerrillas. Rather, The Battle of Algiers shows
how colonial violence begets militant resistance; this, again, is a key insight of
Memmi and Fanon, as well as that of Sartre who, in his writings on Algeria,
concurred with the former men’s views. Pontecorvo shows the problematic of
violence in the colonial situation as an ever expanding hall of mirrors; the
dimensions of human tragedy are infinite. But this tragedy is engendered
through occupation and oppression; it is essentially the violence of the colonizer
turned back upon him by the colonized subject, again and again. For this very
reason, however, colonial violence has a limited, “shelf life;” it will expire when
the colonizer gives up the occupation. Pontecorvo tells that the end of
colonialism, rather than the pacification campaign of imperialists, will attain the
much desired peace. One notes that it was the Evian Accords, by which France
relinquished its claim to Algerian territory, and not military “pacification,”
which brought the Franco-Algerian peace in 1962. This insight is the hopeful
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note, sounded in the trilling of the Algerian women, upon which the film ends:
the moment of liberation.
Of course, the context of liberation and its theorists was irrelevant to the
objectives of the Pentagon viewers of the film. Their interests in Pontecorvo’s
depiction of torture were, again, pragmatic rather than philosophical. Indeed,
around the time of the screening of the film, the Pentagon was struggling over
the boundaries that define interrogation, despite the long established standards
which prohibit the military from torture. The recent declassification of a
government memo makes the Pentagon debate clear. The memo, released under
a Freedom of Information Act request filed by the American Civil Liberties
Union (ACLU), was sent to the Pentagon from the Justice Department. Written
by John Yoo, then a deputy, the second highest ranking position at the Office of
Legal Counsel there, it was addressed to William Haynes, who was then the
Pentagon’s general counsel. The memo gives military interrogators “broad authority
to use extreme methods in questioning detainees and argues that wartime powers
largely exempted interrogators from laws banning harsh treatment” (Mazzetti).
If military interrogators were to run afoul of the laws which prohibit torture, the
memo stated, they could claim the right of self defense, seeing as their conduct
was intended for the aims of national security. The guidelines set out in the
memo chillingly recall the aerial bombardment of Baghdad, a campaign which
the generals called, “Shock & Awe.” Conduct which may be considered illegal,
Yoo wrote, must “shock the conscience.” But further:
Whether conduct is conscious-shocking turns in part on whether it is without
any justification, Yoo wrote, explaining for example, that it would have to
be inspired by malice or sadism before it could be prosecuted. (Eggen and
White)
The Pentagon memo is similar to one Yoo wrote in 2002 to provide guidance
for the interrogation procedures of the CIA. Though both memos were eventually
rescinded, the Bush Administration has for years advocated procedures such as
water boarding, so-called stress positions, exposure to extreme heat or cold,
humiliation, sleep deprivation, and the slapping, poking, shoving, and hooding
of prisoners. At the time of Yoo’s memo, however, there was dissension within
the Pentagon over how to proceed with the ill defined war on terror. But based
on Yoo’s argument, a Pentagon working group in April 2003 endorsed the use of
extreme interrogation tactics (Eggen and White). One can imagine that members
of this working group attended the Pentagon showing of The Battle of Algiers,
which took place just a few months later, in August, to see the tactics they
endorsed portrayed on screen. The idea to show the film, according to the New
York Times, “came from the Directorate for Special Operations and Low
Intensity Conflict, which a Defense Department official described as a civilianled group with ‘responsibility for thinking aggressively and creatively’ on issues
of guerilla war.” About forty officers and so-called civilian experts attended the
screening (Kaufman). Little was disclosed about what the officials and experts
thought of Pontecorvo’s film. But one can imagine it as a riveting scene from the
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story itself, when Colonel Mathieu gathers the paratroopers for a talk and a film
about strategy. Surely facilities at the Pentagon would seem space-age in
comparison to the clattering film projector and the school desks used by the
French paratroopers. Yet the scene would form a strange palimpsest, as the
Americans watch the French watch the surveillance film recorded by the watchful
eye of the security camera. The Pentagon moderator, like the French colonel,
might point out the lovely young woman, as she slips through the checkpoint.
She tells the guard that she is on her way to the beach. But she was not going to
the beach, the Frenchman and the American say, one echoing the other. No. She
was on her way to town, to plant a bomb in a civilian café. She glances flirtatiously
over her shoulder and exits the frame. Erroneously, the guards shake down a
peasant standing in line at the checkpoint. Here the French colonel begins to
digress, and the surveillance film runs unattended in the background. The
paratroopers listen to him, some with a visible sense of unease. Intelligence is of
the utmost importance, the colonel says. It must be obtained, he says, in what
seems a malapropism of Malcolm X’s well known words of resistance, by any
means which are necessary. Meanwhile Pontecorvo’s camera cuts through this
palimpsest and reveals the action in the surveillance film. Guards harass the
peasant; they take his box from him and dump out his belongings. But the man’s
innocence only makes them suspect everyone around them. They begin to panic
and close down the checkpoint. Here the American viewers might note that
Colonel Mathieu had removed his mirrored sunglasses. Now he puts them back
on as light returns to the room. He looks out at his audience from behind the
mirrors. The notion of torture should be removed of its sentimental associations,
he says. It is an efficient tactic, among others which the military may use toward
the objective: to put down the resistance.
One wonders if, like the French paratroopers in the film, the Americans, too,
were uneasy at the thought of committing torture. The fallacious logic argued in
the Yoo memo did not convince everyone at the Pentagon; indeed, there was
resistance to the interrogation methods endorsed by the Justice Department. Yet
the Pentagon was clearly considering just how far it should go to acquire
intelligence about the Iraqi insurgents. One wonders, therefore, at the parameters
it envisioned. The limit may have been one of decency or legality, or it may have
been seen simply as a point of diminishing returns. If there is something which
any viewer of Pontecorvo’s film would come away with, it is an understanding
of torture as the very thing which epitomizes tyranny and catalyzes resistance.
In the film, the thief Ali La Pointe is made conscious of the resistance, and of the
part he may play in it, when he watches another man go to the guillotine. The
guillotine crystallizes in an image the tyranny of colonial occupation as it also
catalyzes Ali’s will to resist. Thus in considering the use of torture, the
Pentagonists who viewed The Battle of Algiers may have debated where the
“point of diminishing returns” similarly lay for the Iraq War. In retrospect,
perhaps, one finds it in imagery as crystalline as the moment in the film when
the condemned man is led along the prison corridor, filled with the shouts of his
comrades, to the yard outside where the guillotine waits to free him. Among the
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images of tyranny which have similarly come to epitomize the U.S. occupation
in Iraq, one shows an Iraqi prisoner at Abu Ghraib, wired for electrocution and
standing on a box, in a peaked hood suggestive of the Ku Klux Klan. The
association with that age-old American terrorist institution, the KKK, attaches,
of course, not to the victim but to the torturers and contextualizes the racialist
tenor of the “abuse” suffered by the Iraqi man. This image, more than any of the
others that have circulated after the prison scandal, has assumed an iconic
dimension in the world media; the scandal itself, as revealed by the photos,
cannot have failed to stir Iraqi resistance as it has incited repulsion and reproach
from the international community.
To consider the use of torture opens a profound moral debate. But if pragmatism
were the guiding thread of the Pentagon’s discussion of The Battle of Algiers, the
viewers would have skirted the moral implications. Instead, their consideration
of torture, as a method or tactic, would beg the question of utility. Will the
“intelligence” gained in this manner be usable? The Pentagon viewers would
likely have debated this question, arguing over the veracity or timeliness of
information gleaned from subjects after periods of extreme physical duress.
Meanwhile, the viewers would have missed the insight which Pontecorvo
provides about such “intelligence:” it does not matter if it is usable. The film
opens as an old man, presumably an FLN sympathizer, is tortured into a confession
by French soldiers. The torture of the frail elder by the young soldiers, while not
especially graphic, is visually repugnant. He seems merely to be someone
arrested at random in a sweep of the Casbah. A viewer can imagine the backstory
of this man. Perhaps it is similar to that of Faiz Muhammad, the “partially deaf,
shriveled old man” from an Afghan village who was taken by U.S. soldiers and
incarcerated at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (Hersh 15). Muhammad was one of the
first prisoners to be released from the prison camp, where 270 other inmates are
still being held today (Reynolds). Upon his return home, the suspected Taliban
militant was shown on TV news lying in a bed, too weak to stand. Apparently he
was also a little senile. One wonders at the arguments put forward at the
Pentagon for the usefulness of prisoners like the aged Afghan or the tactics by
which information was gleaned from him: “You know what they say sometimes
to justify torturers: that you have to bring yourself to torture one man if his
confession enables hundreds of lives to be spared” (Sartre 72). Sartre spoke of
these kinds of arguments fifty years ago, when they were similarly put forward
during the Franco-Algerian War. Of course, he found the logic of torture to be
hypocritical and absurd. He uses a term he has borrowed from his contemporary,
Primo Levi, a survivor of another infamous camp, the one at Auschwitz, and
calls torture a “[u]seless violence” (74). Levi had observed how his captors
terrorized the prisoners as a matter of policy, even without an apparent objective,
such as having one inmate lay a brick wall, so that another could be ordered to
break it down. He called this psychological torture, “useless violence.” It creates
a climate of terror for terror’s sake, he said. Perhaps it is the reason also for Faiz
Muhammad’s incarceration, useless in and of itself, violent nonetheless. Sartre
uses the term in a different sense than does Levi, however. He sees a different
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consequence to the useless violence of torture. Whether the victim talks, observes
Sartre about the FLN militants, or:
[whether he] dies beneath the blows, the vast secret is elsewhere, always
elsewhere, out of reach; the torturer turns into Sisyphus: if he applies torture
he will have to begin over and over again. (74)
What Sartre means is that torture does not so much produce an end as it
becomes an end in itself; there can be no black act which produces a just end.
Furthermore, while one might torture a bit of information from a victim, one
cannot torture the humanity out of a people. It is self-perpetuated futility; yet it
is the hill to which one is enslaved, when he or she hoists the stone or lifts the
implements of torture. The process makes the torturer him or her self progressively
more monstrous.
The moral questions considered by Sartre are not time bound. Like others of
his day who theorized the consequences of violence, he saw that acts of tyranny
diminish the humanity of the oppressor as much as the oppressed. Yet however
much violence “works” for the tyrant in a given situation, it cannot extinguish
what liberation theorists find to be the essence of humanity: the will to be free
of oppression. The Pentagon viewers might have gotten this insight from
Pontecorvo’s film. The futility of torture to defeat the resistance is portrayed in
the story. Meanwhile, the tyranny of the soldiers escalates. The old man submits
to torture and, indeed, he yields accurate intelligence about the safe house where
the last members of the Algiers cell hide. The tip precedes an almost montagelike sequence, portrayed in flashback, of the soldiers’ raid and torture missions
throughout the Casbah. Yet while the French make gains, finding and neutralizing
the militants one or two at a time, the cell continues to operate; and when there
is no more cell to operate, the last members refuse to give themselves up. Instead,
they allow the soldiers to blow up their refuge, with everyone inside. The refusal
of Ali, Hassiba, the boy called Petit Omar, and a fourth man, is yet one more
strike at the occupation. Their refusal to submit is their victory, even in death,
over the soldiers. As Pontecorvo shows, the militants see the resistance as a
communal struggle larger than the individuals who wage it. Their resistance
lives in the people who survive them and carry on the struggle. This communal
understanding is what Sartre calls the “vast secret” always out of reach of the
oppressor. It must surely be the “secret” of anyone who willingly gives up his or
her life for a cause, no matter how terrible the act or the cause may be. The film’s
insight about communal struggle is what gives analogy to resistance movements
radically removed in time and circumstance from the Algerian battle. It is an
analogy which the Pentagon failed to understand.
As Pontecorvo’s black and white imagery filled the movie screen at the
Pentagon, another photostory was in the making in Iraq. The prison at Abu Ghraib,
notorious under Sadaam Hussein, was soon to become even more notorious
under the American occupation. That September, the prison began to fill with
detainees taken in security raids by U.S. forces. Around this time, the military
had made the decision to run the prison at Abu Ghraib as an interrogation center.
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General Geoffrey Miller, a stand-in for the filmic Colonel Mathieu, was brought
from Cuba to “Gitmo-ize” the prison system in occupied Iraq, that is, to operate
as in Guantanamo. By the end of September 2003 over 6,000 people taken in
raids were interned at Abu Ghraib, then under the command of General Janis
Karpinski. A journalist who visited the prison on Karpinski’s watch commented
that as many as 15,000 detainees were held at any one time in the open-air camp
areas of the prison (Parenti 141). As with the French paratroopers in Algiers, the
U.S. military’s decision to prioritize “intelligence-gathering” was partly a result
of the inability to deal with local insurgents: “The [Bush] Administration’s answer
to the growing insurgency, and the lack of intelligence about it, however, was to
get tough with the Iraqi men and women in detention — to treat them behind prison
walls as if they had been captured on the battlefields of Afghanistan” (Hersh 20).
The prisons of Iraq would serve as the sites where such intelligence would be
gathered, and indeed be retrieved and stored. The army’s conduct at Abu Ghraib
was the result of the new policy. The journalist Seymour Hersh, who broke the
story of Abu Ghraib, quickly saw the context of the torture scandal: “The roots
of the … scandal lie not in the inclination of a few army reservists,” he writes,
referring to the convicted MPs, “but in the reliance of George Bush and Donald
Rumsfeld on secret operations and the use of coercion … Rumsfeld’s most
fateful decision, endorsed by the White House, came at a time of crisis in August
2003, when the defense secretary expanded the highly secret special-access
program into the prisons of Iraq” (46). Of course the most stunning aspect of the
interrogation and torture conducted at Abu Ghraib was that most of the people
detained there were not even combatants. They were civilians who had been
picked up during sweeps and at checkpoints. Karpinski, in an interview after her
demotion, estimated that 90 percent of the inmates were innocent; the percentage
corresponds with a contemporary assessment by the Red Cross.
The Abu Ghraib torture scandal was revealed only a few months after the
Pentagon’s screening of The Battle of Algiers. Indeed some of the events of the
scandal were occurring as the viewers sat down to Pontecorvo’s imagery. If the
Pentagonists doubted the limits of interrogation, the scandal made clear what the
limits were. And if there were any confusion, as suggested in the Justice
Department’s memo, over what defines torture, then as Hersh puts it, “The
photographs tell it all.” There is no need to describe the photos here as the
images from Abu Ghraib are now iconographic; each one worth a thousand
words, each word a synonym for terror. The images achieved notoriety instantly;
they were posted on Internet web sites, published in newspapers, broadcasted on
television, cable, and satellite. The common assumption by people who have
seen them is that the photos were taken by the guards for kicks. Hersh, however,
thought it was unlikely that the guards had originated the procedure they
practiced on the victims. Upon further investigation, he found that taking the
photographs was not simply a whim, but was a component of the interrogation
procedure itself. One of his sources, a government consultant, told him that the
photographs were intended to extort the victim to become an informer. As Hersh
explains:
13
The government consultant said “I was told that the purpose of the photographs
was to create an army of informants, people you could insert back into the
population.” The idea was that they would be motivated by fear of exposure,
and gather information about impending insurgency action, the consultant
said. (39)
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If the photos were intended to be used for extortion, they would acquire, in
neoliberal parlance, what is called “value added.” The photos would continue to
hold the victim hostage, long after release from the prison. The victims, once
“reinserted” into their communities, would fear the exposure of the photos; the
threat of humiliation would follow them indefinitely. The captors would continue
to yank the victim’s chain, getting leads from the victim, acquiring the names of
new victims, new subjects to photograph. Indeed, the camera’s eye would never
sleep. The photographs were intended to fuel a limitless cycle, by which
“intelligence” would be gleaned through interrogation, torture and extortion.
Three levels of “value” would thus be achieved in a single photograph: the
physical and emotional pain of the victim during captivity; and the post captivity,
emotional pain which could be brought later to bear upon him or her. The strategy
of the photos was intended to create a matrix of spies and collaborators out of
released prisoners. They would become, through extortion, accessories to torture
in their own right, according to the plan described by the government consultant.
The “use value” of the photos to the military depended upon the victim’s fear
of having his or her identity exposed. Most of the photos with which the public
is today familiar, those shown by the media and other sources, do not provide
any criteria for identifying the victims. The photos do not clearly exhibit the faces
of the victims as they do those of the torturers. Either the black bar of anonymity
obscures the victims’ faces, or else the identifying features are not in the focus
or frame. Military agents would, of course, be able to identify the victim by
name, family, town, etc., in order to expose him or her to the local community.
They would have access to more explicit photos and information to reveal; thus
further humiliation would be a grievous threat for the victim. Certainly, the
victim’s pain regarding the photos is quite acute. Hersh recounts that several
women slipped notes from the prison to family members, asking for help to end
their lives (44). One man at Abu Ghraib remembers the camera flashing
repeatedly through his ordeal (38). He might have chosen to remain anonymous.
Yet he gave his name and an interview to the New York Times. Several victims
whose captors made them pose for degrading photos have allowed themselves to
be identified in the press to a world of horrified onlookers. Prisoners released
from Guantanamo, who suffered similar and worse treatment, if without photographs,
have also given their names and interviews to the media. The former prisoner,
Moazzam Begg, has published a book telling about the conditions at Camps
Echo and Delta, and the torture he experienced there. The names of those who
have died in military custody from so-called “rough treatment” have been given
by those who survive them. Often the names are public because of the lawsuits
which are filed on behalf of the victims. The torturous photographs clearly have
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not done their job. If they have not intimidated the victims, it is because the
victims do not share the values of their captors. The military was counting upon
the victims’ fears. But they failed to anticipate their courage. The same strength
which would carry one through torture is manifest in the victims’ collective testimony
and their refusal to accept the abrogation of their human rights. If indeed the
photographs were seen as a strategy or tactic to gather intelligence through shame,
the military, once again, missed the mark. It seems they did not understand where
the shame really lies — not with victims, but with the torturers and their bosses.
The use of torture by the American military crystallizes the objectives of the
Iraq occupation. These objectives do not establish peace or democracy, but seek
to conquer and command. It is disingenuous to suggest, as the Bush Administration
has done, that the torture at Abu Ghraib was an anomaly conjured by low level
MPs. Rather, if the photographing of prisoners was a deliberate military procedure,
it would have been an order issued from the Secretary of Defense, Donald
Rumsfeld and from President Bush, the Commander-in-Chief (Hersh). Thus it is
worth remembering how the Pentagon responded to the publication of the photos
and the exposure they brought to the Administration’s pursuit of the war. In
Chain of Command, Hersh describes the Defense Secretary’s attitude of denial
about the photographs:
Rumsfeld testified at length before the House and Senate and apologized
for what he said was “fundamentally un-American” wrong doing at Abu
Ghraib. He also warned that more, and even uglier, disclosures were to
come. He said that he had not actually looked at any of the photographs
until they appeared in the press, and hadn’t reviewed the Army’s copies
until the day before. When he did, they were “hard to believe,” he said.
“There are other photos that depict … acts that can only be described as
blatantly sadistic, cruel, and inhuman” (43).
Rumsfeld’s choice of words was not random for an Administration that has
hinged its rationale for war on clauses which seem designed to allow the speaker
to evade prosecution. One recalls such calculated phrasing as: “our British
friends tell us” of Saddam’s nuclear ambitions; and, that the Iraqi leader supports
terrorist groups “like Al Qaeda;” and, that we need not wait for the “mushroom
cloud” of smoke to exude from his smoking gun. Such locutions seemed even
then designed to obscure the agency and responsibility of those who called for
war, even as the calls fell from their mouths. Thus if the Secretary of Defense
seemed to be in denial about the torture committed at Abu Ghraib, it was because
he did not want to be responsible for denying what the photographs made so
explicit. Instead, his words seem carefully chosen to insinuate doubt: the pictures,
he says, are hard to believe; they depict acts, yes, but he will not say that they
record them. He can only describe the acts, but he does not say what they are.
The acts are “fundamentally un-American.” Even his description is a denial: if
the acts are not American, then the Americans have not committed them.
Furthermore, though there had been an internal military inquiry into the torture
at Abu Ghraib in early 2004, and a substantial report filed by General Antonio
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Taguba in which the photographs were key evidence, Rumsfeld claimed not to
have seen the pictures until the newspapers picked up the story. His demurral
seemed affected, as if he were too sensitive to view the obscenity of the photos.
Of course, his words were calculated to remove him from responsibility: he
cannot be implicated because he did not know; he did not know because he did
not see; he was not there, he did not even get the postcard. The President and the
Defense Secretary were ready with admonitions, in the days after the photographs
were published, about the “disgusting” nature of the photos and how offended
they were to see them. Their remarks conveyed the sense that it was the photographs
which were the problem rather than the atrocities which they recorded. Their
address of the torture scandal in this way, by fetishizing the pictures, seemed,
again, calculated to insinuate doubt that the acts really occurred. In the same month,
the British paper Daily Mirror reported, then, retracted a story about torture
photos taken by British soldiers and announced that the photos were phonies.
This, too, seemed calculated; the timing seemed orchestrated to suggest doubts about
the torture photos from Abu Ghraib. Senate hearings followed the exposure of
the crimes at Abu Ghraib; but they were inconclusive. The hearings themselves
seemed calculated as a venue for the Pentagon’s generals, as well as for the Bush
Administration, to express their feelings of disgust about the photos and the
“abuse” they depicted. Indeed, nausea seemed to afflict everyone at the proceedings.
But one does not need to extract a confession from the Pentagon or the White
House about the torture of prisoners in the “war on terror.” Anyone who has
followed the Iraq war on TV since the beginning can attest to the sudden,
unprecedented sight of regular American soldiers conducting scenes of captivity
and bondage. In these scenes, which have played out with no comment or
explanation from news anchors, there is a generic quality so blatant as to seem
normalized. The hooded figure of a man, sometimes clad in the now iconic
orange jumpsuit, bound and shackled, is led off by the American soldiers. He is
jammed into a truck with other prisoners, or made to squat in the dirt until he is
transported someplace — presumably — off camera. The American soldiers
sweat in the Iraq heat; their discomfort is visible. The hooded man’s discomfort
is hidden. The hood makes him look like a conflated image: both victim and
executioner. Yet the soldiers’ fear is often apparent in the way they handle the
captive, gingerly, as if the man were a hooded falcon. Indeed what has been
readily observable all along on the evening news belies the claims of the
government that the abuses at Abu Ghraib were random and anomalous acts.
Even the most embedded network TV footage suggests the standardization of a
new procedure in the army’s handling of prisoners of war. Apologists for torture,
such as the former Attorney General Alberto Gonzalez, could not have made it
clearer that the military’s rules had changed. The practice among army regulars
of tactics such as hooding, unventilated confinement, and, exposure to extreme
heat or cold in the handling and transport of detainees suggests as well that the
standard here is not defined by law. These are the tactics of aggressive interrogation
which the disclosed Pentagon memo reserves for intelligence gathering. But one
can witness the application of so-called rough treatment in the routine handling
102
PERRI GIOVANNUCCI
16
of prisoners — handling so routine as to fill our TV screens without censure.
Arguably, the photos from Abu Ghraib are simply the intensification of imagery
to which Americans have been insensate since the “war on terror” began. But the
complacency toward what, by any just standard, is considered war crimes has
startling implications; it suggests a kind of unconscious collaboration.
What comes across in the imagery of the Iraq war, if not Guantanamo as well,
is the idea of “rough treatment” as an intentional, standardized practice. If it
were not intentional, the Bush Administration would not have engaged its lawyers
to press the argument that the Geneva Conventions do not apply to the
President’s conduct of the “war on terror.” The Administration’s will to torture
is evident in the date of the memo written by John Yoo: April 2003, the month
prior to the “Shock & Awe” bombing of Baghdad. The Patriot Act, passed by
Congress soon after 9/11, claims the right for the President to hold anyone,
anywhere, for any length of time. These initiatives cannot be viewed in isolation,
obviously. According to the accumulated evidence, the photographs from Abu
Ghraib expose not an anomaly but the policy which the Pentagon and Bush
Administration decided to implement. Official documents which have come to
light since the Senate inquiry, such as Yoo’s memos and the Taguba report,
demonstrate that torture was sanctioned at the highest levels of the Bush
government. Similarly, the Pentagon’s screening of The Battle of Algiers reveals
that the tactical use of torture was evaluated and pursued at much higher military
levels than merely “on the ground.”
The Pentagon had sought an analogy in The Battle of Algiers; but it seems
instead to have found great irony. For the better analogy to be derived from
Pontecorvo’s film relates not to the tactics of the insurgents but to those of the
occupying forces. The analogy lies in the military’s use of torture to “pacify”
resistance to the occupation. The analogy lies in the pursuit of a war of imperialism.
Indeed, if the guillotine in Pontecorvo’s film symbolizes the kind of “peace”
which the colonial forces pursued in Algeria, one sees what kind of “freedom”
is portended by the photos from Abu Ghraib. The Pentagon’s screening of The
Battle of Algiers exposes the truth about how the Bush Administration really
does envision the purpose of what it calls by the misnomer, “Operation Iraqi
Freedom.” It should be pointed out, however, that the Pentagon needed no object
lessons from the French. Rather, the American military’s own “pacification”
campaign during the Vietnam War provides a clear precedent for the occupation
of Iraq. Tragic irony lies in that the Pentagonists failed to understand the analogies
of that earlier war. But others did not fail to observe them. One notes that Hersh,
who broke the story about Abu Ghraib, is the same journalist who exposed the
atrocities committed by American soldiers at My Lai in Vietnam. Similarly, the
lessons of our own history have not been let waste on many Americans who
oppose the occupation of Iraq. Yet the poor hindsight of the Pentagonists regarding
Vietnam is not singular. It is uncannily reflected in their failure to understand
The Battle of Algiers as in their failure in Iraq.
The Pentagon viewers of Pontecorvo’s film approached their case study with
a fetishized notion of insurgency “tactics” and “counter-tactics.” With a blanket
17
103
mentality, lacking historicity or context, the Pentagonists projected the images
of the Algerian militants portrayed in the film upon the spectral figures in the
“war on terror.” The same mentality has superimposed the 9/11 hijackers upon
the nation of Iraq. Thus a confused logic has ruled the Pentagon’s strategy ever
since the invasion of Baghdad. Perhaps the confusion is why the Pentagon
viewers were unable to grasp the implications of Pontecorvo’s film. Again, one
assumes that the viewers’ motives were not merely cynical. To overlook the
reason why the FLN militants fought the French soldiers, and to reduce their
insurgency to the flattened concept of “terrorism,” is to lose the meaning not only
of the film but also of the Algerian war. The FLN carried out a resistance to
colonialism. For the Pentagonists to recognize the colonial nature of the FrancoAlgerian War, however, they would also have to recognize the illegitimacy of
foreign occupation. They would have to recognize the Algerian battle for national
sovereignty. They would have also to recognize, therefore, the right of the guerrillas
to participate in armed struggle. These recognitions run counter not only to how
the Pentagon has conceived the “war on terror,” but counter also to how the
Pentagonists portray themselves and their objectives. But if they had understood
The Battle of Algiers, they might also have recognized themselves, starkly exposed
by Pontecorvo’s black and white images of the colonizer and the colonized.
They might have learned from this film text of liberation theory. There is no best
method to occupy a country. There can only be struggle and resistance.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Banbury, Jen. “Rummy’s Scapegoat.” Salon.com. 10 Nov. 2005. http://dir.salon.com/story/books/int/2005/11/
10/karpinski/index2.html
The Battle of Algiers. Dir. Gillo Pontecorvo. Restored 1999. Cinecitta, 1966.
Begg, Moazzam. Enemy Combatant. NY: New Press, 2006.
Eggen, Dan and Josh White. “Memo: Laws Didn’t Apply to Interrogators.” Washington Post. 2 April 2008.
A01. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/ content/article/2008/04/01/AR2008040102213_ pf.html
Fanon, Frantz. The Wretched of the Earth. Trans. Constance Farrington. NY: Grove, 1993.
Haddour, Azzedine. Colonial Myths: History and Narrative. Manchester: Manchester UP, 2000.
Hersh, Seymour M. Chain of Command: The Road From 9/11 to Abu Ghraib. NY: Harper Perennial, 2005.
Horne, Alistair. A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962. NY: Viking, 1978.
Kaufman, Michael. “What Does Pentagon See in Battle of Algiers?” New York Times. 7 Sept. 2003. Common
Dreams.org. http://commondreams.org/headlines03/0907.htm.
Levi, Primo. The Drowned and the Saved. Trans. Raymond Rosenthal. NY: Vintage International, 1989.
Mazzetti, Mark, “’03 Memo Approved Harsh Interrogations”, NYTimes.com. 2 April 2008. http://www.nytimes.com/
2008/04/02/washington/02terror.html?ei=5090&en=c4ef401cd0be0b11&ex=1364788800&partner=rssus
erland&emc=rss&pagewanted=print
Memmi, Albert. The Colonizer and the Colonized. Trans. Howard Greenfield. Boston: Beacon, 1967.
Parenti, Christian. The Freedom: Shadows and Hallucinations in Occupied Iraq. NY: New Press, 2005.
Reynolds, Paul. “Why U.S. is Stuck with Guantanamo Bay.” BBC News Website. 21 May 2008.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/1/hi/world/americas/7413181.stm
Sartre, Jean-Paul. Colonialism and Neocolonialism. Trans. Azzedine Haddour, Steve Brewer and Terry McWilliams.
London: Routledge, 2001.
Stora, Benjamin. Algeria 1830-2000. Trans. Jane Marie Todd. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2004.
TERRORISM: A HUMAN SECURITY
CHALLENGE IN SOUTH ASIA
SHABANA FAYYAZ
Abstract. Terrorism is defined “as an act or threat of violence against noncombatants with the objective of exacting revenge, intimidating or
otherwise influencing an audience”. Who carries the act of terrorism? Is it
non-state groups or state or government? Is remains a matter of debate
both for academics and policy-makers at the state and regional level. The
paper aims to underscore the gravity of terrorism as a crime against humanity
and a non-traditional security challenge that requires a holistic approach
to the ‘national security’ of the modern South Asian states.
How to address and analyze the impact of political violence, and, its new
genre, terrorism1 on the lives of the individuals is a challenge to the creativity of
policy makers and thinkers in South Asia. The paper aims to underscore the
gravity of terrorism as a crime against humanity and a non-traditional security
challenge that requires a holistic approach to the ‘national security’ of the
modern South Asian states. That is, what constitutes a security threat to state and
individual and can range from territorial integrity, extreme poverty, spread of
infectious diseases, internal wars, to the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction, organized crime and terrorism. Thus, the state security cannot be
achieved without ensuring the security of people. To probe more deeply into the
impact of terrorism on human security in South Asia the paper raises the
following inter-related key queries:
— How the contemporary terrorism challenges the peace and security
dynamics at the individual, state and regional level in South Asia?
— How violence as a strategy of terrorist acts aggravates the human insecurities
in the region?, and, finally,
— What has been the South Asian response towards the scourge of terrorism
as a threat to human security?
— To deliberate on the above mentioned concerns the paper proposes the
framework for discussion based on tri-lateral strands:
——————
1 Terrorism is defined “as an act or threat of violence against non-combatants with the objective of
exacting revenge, intimidating or otherwise influencing an audience”. Who carries the act of terrorism? Is it
non-state groups or state or government? It remains a matter of debate both for academics and policy-makers
at the state and regional level.
2
TERRORISM: A HUMAN SECURITY CHALLENGE IN SOUTH ASIA
105
Firstly, national security imperatives of the South Asian states are in a state
of flux today. There are no clear divisions between the traditional (that is territorial
integrity) and non-traditional security challenges and state role as a key provider
and facilitator of physical and human security cannot be ignored. Rather, it has
become more critical and pressing than earlier. The role of civil society and
market forces to ensure state and human security requires parallel focus to counter
the trans-national scourge of terrorism.
Secondly, a realization to embrace a broad vision of comprehensive security
that perceives terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, organized crime, and civil
violence along with the traditional border war as threats to the South Asian regional
peace and security is required. These threats meshed with the prevalence of human
insecurities (that is, poverty, political alienation, social, religious and ethnic
discrimination, environmental degradation) can have catastrophic consequences
at the individual, state and regional level.
Finally, phenomenon of terrorism (particularly post 9/11) deeply impacts the
quality of human life in the negative sense. That is, terrorist acts that range from
sudden attacks on populated spot, communication networks, kidnapping and
killing of civilians, targeting of known persons and lately recourse to suicidal
attacks create an environment full of desperation, intimidation and fear.
To quote an eminent South Asian political and security expert, Dr Pervaiz Iqbal
Cheema2:
“Terrorism in post 9/11 has mutated into a new form of warfare, where
there is no compunction against killing of the innocent, women, children
and unarmed civilians... In South Asia, political violence and terrorism is
deeply rooted in socio-economic conditions of underdevelopment,
inequitable distribution of resources and marginalization of the poor...
Good governance, political pluralism, population control, education, fair
and equitable development, and people friendly policies are remedies that
could alleviate, if not eliminate, political violence and terrorism.”3
Given this backdrop the paper argues that to fully comprehend the impact of
terrorism, human aspect of the security cannot be ignored. The impact on individual
security is translated in terms of dislocation of people, psychological and physical
suffering, economic vulnerabilities, and collapse of institutions. This leads to the
dilemma for the statesmen: How to counter transnational terrorist networks that
are recruited in one place, trained in another, have surprise attack capacity, and
ensure a peaceful and healthy environment for human development at the same
time. The challenge to formulate and implement a comprehensive anti-terrorism
strategy is multi-layered and multi-dimensional in nature and scope in South
Asia. Thus to deliberate on the human security implications of the terrorism the
point of departure is:
——————
2 Dr Cheema is an authority on South Asian security issues and presently heading Islamabad Policy
Research Institute, Pakistan.
3 Dr Pevaiz Iqbal Cheema, Maqsudul Hasan Nuri, and Ahmed Rashid, edit, Political Violence and
Terrorism In South Asia, IPRI publication, 2006. p. i-ii.
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SHABANA FAYYAZ
3
“Human security is a child who did not die, a disease that did not spread,
a job that was not cut, an ethnic tension that did not explode in violence,
a dissident who was not silenced. Human security is not a concern with
weapons — it is a concern with human life and dignity... It is concerned
with how people live and breathe in a society, how freely they exercise their
many choices, how much access they have to market and social opportunities
— and whether they live in conflict and peace”4.
Relating this definition of human security to the present security canvas of
South Asia where terrorism presents itself in various forms (sectarian, ethnic,
religious, etc), its impact on the livelihood and security of individual and community
is of negative nature. The fact is how can one feel safe to live and work and invest
in a society gripped with the “sense of insecurity” and “helplessness”, by-products
of terrorist acts and incidents?
The key point to be stressed here, terrorism aims for intimidation through
random, sudden and indiscriminate violence and thus disrupts the people’s lives
in a drastic way. The socio-economic and political costs of such happenings
underscore a fact that there exists a deep and complex nexus between the
traditional security threats (threats to territory) and non-traditional issues such as
terrorism. Any analysis of national security is incomplete without looking into
the inter-connection between the state (territorial) and human security. To quote
President General Pervaiz Musharraf:
“Terrorism threatens the whole world and every one directly or indirectly
is involved or gets affected... We have a collective responsibility to prevent
conversion of human beings into human bombs... Lack of education and
poverty are the two elements which drive an illiterate man, a poor man, to
such acts when he is indoctrinated and given the hope if he leaves this
world, he can be given the key to Paradise... It is poverty and lack of education
which lead people to extremism because they can be indoctrinated to do
terrorist acts”5.
At this juncture, an attempt is made to probe the key queries mentioned earlier
that, how Terrorism particularly after 9/11 has impacted the security dynamics
of south Asia.
How Terrorism and Violence impacts Human security in South Asia?
To discuss the implications of terrorism on the human aspects of security
within South Asia one has to understand the complexity of security threats that
prevails in the region. In this region transnational terrorism is an another critical
security challenge that threatens individuals within states, impacts the bilateral
relations between states (particularly, India and Pakistan) and can have grave
consequences for the regional peace and prosperity. Violence that is indiscriminately
——————
4 Late Dr Mabub-ul Haq, “Redefining Security”, UNDP’s Human Development Report 1994, p. 229.
5 President Pervaiz Musharraf “Holistic Approach to Tackle Terrorism”, Inaugural Address at the
International seminar on Global Terrorism, Institute of Regional Studies, Islamabad, 29 August 2005.
4
107
against the civilians in the acts of terrorism aims to “kill one and frighten 10
million”6. The terrorist networks operating in South Asia are diversified in
composition and ideology. Plus well equipped with the financial means, advanced
communication technology, and extremely motivated. To say, terrorism is a single
agenda or Islamic in nature is a gross simplification of an entirely complex reality.
Terrorism after the 9/11 2001, has been widely recognized as major threat to
world peace ad security. All of the South Asian states have sided with the US
lead “War on Terror” particularly, Pakistan that remains a frontline ally of the
United States in the ongoing counter terrorism campaign (with the focus on
Afghanistan).The costs for this strategic alliance has been enormous for Pakistan
both at the domestic, and regional level. The challenge for the state is how to
ensure the safety of the citizens and security of frontiers at the same time. The
complexity of situation is well captured in the Mahbub ul Haq Development
Centre’s Human Development in South Asia 2005 report (Human Security in
South Asia):
“National security is still paramount, but its attainment is linked more and
more with the human security. It is widely recognized that national security
cannot be achieved in a situation where people starve but arms accumulate;
where social expenditure falls and military expenditure rises”7.
As national security is a multi-layered concept the boundary wall between the
civilian and military realm has become blurred and as a consequence terrorism
is recognized essentially a direct threat to individual security than earlier. This is
applicable to all the states within South Asia where prevalence of human insecurities
(political, economic, social, health, education, ethnic, religious, environmental)
is a stark reality. Terrorism is essentially a disruption that combines with existing
human insecurities and vulnerabilities and thus deeply impacts the fabric of the
society and the state. The impact is relative in nature and varies from context to
context.
To dub all forms of resistance (particularly in case of Kashmir) as purely a
terrorism sponsored externally (as India accuses Pakistan) is unjustified. The
fact is, Kashmir, Palestine and Chechnya are cases where “self-determination
rights are denied, a repressive system foisted, and use of indiscriminate military
force adopted. While political violence and allied terrorism have taken a global
character, their roots lie in denial, deprivation and injustice”8.
However, if the groups engaged in the self-determination struggle or any
other defined objective use systematic force against civilians and noncombatants who are not directly responsible for their problems, it is terrorism.
Their actions cannot be condoned if even their cause is just.9
A plausible question here is: Is the impact of terrorism on the human security
of the south Asians can be analyzed in seclusion to the overall security context
——————
6 Dr Prvaiz Iqbal Cheema, op. cit.
7 Human Development in South Asia 2005: Human Security in South Asia, Mehbub ul Haq Development
Center, Islamabad: Oxford University Press, 2006. p. 24.
8 Dr Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, op. cit.
9 For details see, A. Toma and Robert F. Gorman, International Relations: Understanding Global Issues
(Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole Publishing Company, 1991), p. 198.
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SHABANA FAYYAZ
5
of the region? The key point here is we live in a world of inter-connected threats
and opportunities. South Asia is no exception to this reality, there is not a direct
and clear linkage between terrorism and human insecurity, and it is interwoven
and meshed with the other equally critical imperatives of security in the region. Arms
race (particularly between India and Pakistan), presence of nuclear weapons,
tension and hostility between neighbors, and unresolved bilateral disputes are
the contours of south Asia, resulting in being one of the most militarized and
poorest region of the world. Given this scenario, terrorism irrespective of who
commits it (that is, state or non-state actor) definitely erodes the basis of human
security and development by curtailing life, livelihood and violating rights. In
the ongoing insurgency or conflict areas threats to civilians life range from increased
death casualties, forced displacement, loss of income sources, infant mortality,
incidence of diseases, disruption of social and public sector.
According to a study on terrorism, “A report on Patterns of Global Terrorism
2000” published by the State Department Washington, DC:
“Asia already accounts for 75 percent of all terrorism causalities worldwide,
while the southern belt is racked by terrorist, insurgent, and separatist
violence that is unmatched anywhere else in the world. The list of countries
in this arc of terrorism include Afghanistan, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan,
China’s autonomous regions of Xinjiang and Tibet, India, Nepal, Sri
Lanka, Bangladesh, and Myanmar. In South Asia alone, the annual number
of fatalities in terrorist-related violence the death toll in the Middle East,
which is often seen as the traditional place of terrorism”10.
All most all of the South Asian states continue to experience different forms
of terrorism: sectarian, communal, religious, ethnic and political resulting in the
threat to the life and property of innocent people. The state at times is unable to
provide a basic sense of security, resulting in the “privatization of security”
where “small arms”11 and “light weapons”12 have become the main tools of
violence in the ethnic and other internal conflicts by both state and non-state
actors. Referred to as “weapons of mass destruction”13 these are responsible for
the majority — between 60 and 90 per cent, depending on the conflict — of
direct conflict deaths14. The situation becomes adverse when arms find their way
into the hands of the non-state actors (that is, terrorist groups, militant rebel
groups or just civilians), through the black market.
In the absence of an effective state monitoring mechanism over the small
arms transfers the impact on civilian life and security is tremendous. The threat
is highlighted in the following citation:
“The availability of arms tends to increase the incidence of armed violence,
prolong wars once they break out, and enable grave and widespread abuses
——————
10 Quoted in Sridhar K. Khatri,, “Introduction” in Sridhar K. Khatri and Gert Kueck, Terrorism in South
Asia: Impact on Development and Democratic Process, Delhi: Shipra Publications 2003. p. 2.
11 Small arms refer to hand-held weapons like assault rifles, carbines, pistols, and submachine guns.
12 Light weapons refer to easily portable crew-served weapons like heavy machine guns, bazookas, and
light mortars.
13 Wezeman 2003.
14 Small Arms Survey 2005.
6
109
of human rights. The failure of the police and the military to maintain law
and order has led to the formation of vigilante mob violence. These mobs,
with easy access to arms are terrorizing the local communities. New recruits
for such groups are being trained in military barracks... The easy availability
of these weapons has led to the militarization of society and privatization
of violence. In some societies, these surplus weapons may create a “culture
of violence” that traps whole populations in an endless cycle of war”15.
Hence, the use of violence for personal, ideological or other purposes become
a mode of behavior. To quote an eminent South Asian scholar Dr Hasan Askari Rizvi:
“Children who experience violence at an early age tend to adopt violence
and terrorism as a way of life unless they are de-linked from the early
experiences and rehabilitated in a society as normal citizens. The case of
Child soldiers in Sri Lanka is an example of how children are exposed to
acute violence at an early age. Likewise, the young generation of Pakistani
students of Islamic seminaries who participated and experienced war in
Afghanistan during the Taliban period are said to be vulnerable in the
adoption of violent behavior in later life”16.
The point to be noted here is terrorism is essentially a multi-dimensional
phenomenon, and host of inter-related factors lead to the adoption of systematic
violence as strategy of the terrorists. The impact on human security is essentially
of negative value and varies from context to context. One can analyze and discuss
terrorism and its impact with the help of enlarged framework that includes:
crime, politics, warfare, communication, and religious fundamentalism17. Terrorism
at times flows from the sense of deprivation and adds to the human insecurities
at the same time.
It is argued that human insecurities whether of economic, political, social,
cultural, or religious nature provide a fertile ground and an environment to be
exploited by the trans-national terrorist groups for generating fear and advancing
their line of thinking. In South Asia conflicts and violence is identified as a key
obstacle to development and a potential threat to achieving the Millennium
Development Goals (MDGs) set by the United Nations. More specifically,
internal conflicts — wars, insurgencies and separatist movements for regional
independence — pose a threat for individual well-being and stability of states18.
Terrorist acts threaten the capital infrastructure, disrupt the social services and
law and order mechanism on the long term basis. That is, “societies in war-affected
areas are characterized by ‘depressed livelihoods’ which is at the very least a
long term, if not a permanent condition. People regardless of their ethnicity and
religion are displaced from their homes and businesses, experience loss of
property, injury and death and break up of communities”.19
In South Asia more than 1.2 million people have been killed in internal armed
conflicts and more than 700,000 have been internally displaced or live as refugees
——————
15
Human Development in South Asia 2005 Report, op. cit., p. 34-35.
16 Dr Hasan Askari Rizvi, “Theoretical Formulations on Terrorism”, in IRS publication Global Terrorism,
op. cit., p. 14.
17 Alex P. Schmidt, “Frameworks for Conceptualizing Terrorism”, Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol.
16, No. 2, Summer 2004, pp. 197-221.
18 Human Development in South Asia 2005, op. cit., p. 42-45.
19 Ibid.
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SHABANA FAYYAZ
7
in neighbouring countries20. Parallel to this human right question is of critical
value in discussing the impact of terrorism on Human security in the region. It is
often observed that states in the name of counter terrorism conduct extreme repression
(particularly in case of Kashmir) and adopt laws to coerce some sections of the
society into submission in violation of the human rights and their legitimate political
claim21 In case of Kashmir, its been widely reported that, both the security forces
and the militants have systematically used rape as a weapon to punish, intimidate,
coerce, humiliate or degrade. According to human rights investigations, mass
rape began to be routinely used in search and cordon operations.22
Reflecting on the need to protect the human dignity in the ongoing US led
“War on Terror” the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan observed:
“I cannot believe that there can be trade off between the effective fight
against terrorism and protection of civil liberties. If as individuals we are
asked to give up our freedom, our liberties, our human rights, as protection
against terrorism, do we in the end have protection?”23
At this juncture a pertinent question arises that, how South Asian states have
responded to the challenge of terrorism and its negative impact on human security?
Conclusion: SAARC Collective Stand towards Terrorism — A Way Forward!
Almost all the South Asian countries are a victim of terrorism ranging from
suicide attack, bomb blasts, target killings and has aggravated the insecurity of
innocent people in all aspects of life. While most of the governments are
increasingly conscious of the need to invest in human capital as means to
minimize the extremism that leads to terrorism, a unified and comprehensive
approach at regional level is lacking.
South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) has adopted
number of regional conventions on suppression of Terrorism from time to time.
The Dhaka Summit (December 7-8, 1985) and the Bangalore Summit Declaration
of 17 November 1986 it was agreed by the Heads of State of SAARC that terrorism
poses a serious threat to the security and stability of the region. The SAARC
regional convention on suppression of Terrorism (Non 4, 1987) observes:
“Cooperation among SAARC states was vital if terrorism was to be
prevented and eliminated from the region; unequivocally condemned all
acts, methods and practices of terrorism as criminal and deplored their
impact on life and property, socio-economic development, political
stability, regional and international peace and cooperation; and recognized
the importance of the principles laid down in UN Resolution 2625 (XXV)
which among others required that each state should refrain from
organizing instigating, assisting or participating in acts of civil strife or
terrorist acts in another state or acquiescing in organized activities within
its territory directed towards the commission of such acts.”24
——————
20
Ibid.
21 Dr Hasan Askari Rizvi, op. cit.
22 Note: In 1990 first documented incident of gang rape was recorded in Srinagar. Since then
investigations into incidents of gang rape in Pazipora (August 1990), Kunana Poshpara (Feb 1991), Chak
Saidpora (Oct 1992), Theno Budpathery Kangan (Sep 1994) and Aviisa (1997) have established rape as a form
of collective punishment. Manchanda 2001, p. 79. Human Development in South Asia 2005, op. cit.
23 Http:www.un.org
24 SAARC Regional Convention On Suppression of Terrorism 1987, Http: //www.ciaonet.org/cbr/cbr00/
video/cbr_ctd/cbr_cdt_36.html.
8
111
Similarly, in January 2004 Twelfth SAARC Summit held in Islamabad,
Additional Protocol to the SAARC Regional Convention on the Suppression of
Terrorism was signed by the South Asian leaders. The additional protocol aims
to deal effectively with the checking and controlling the illegal financing of
terrorist networks through mutual coordination. Recognizing terrorism as critically
impacting the human dignity “The Islamabad Declaration” adopted by the
SAARC states in January 2004 stipulates:
“We condemn terrorist violence in all its forms and manifestations and note
the people of South Asia continue to face a serious threat from terrorism...
it’s a challenge to all states and to all of humanity, and cannot be justified
on any ground, whatsoever. Terrorism violates the fundamental values of the
United Nations and the SAARC Charter and constitutes one of the most
serious threats to international peace and security. ...It affects the security,
stability, and development of the region... The signing of the Additional
Protocol to the SAARC Regional Convention to the Suppression of Terrorism
to deal effectively with financing of terrorism is a further manifestation of
our determination to eliminate all forms of terrorism from South Asia.”25
Additional Protocol to the SAARC Regional Convention on Suppression of
Terrorism came into force on 12th January 2006 following its ratification by all
Member States. The First Meeting of SAARC Ministers of Interior/Home (Dhaka,
11 May, 2006) and the Second Meeting of SAARC Ministers of Interior/Home
(New Delhi, 25 October 2007 reviewed the progress in the implementation of
the Convention and its Additional Protocol. At the Fourteenth SAARC Summit
(New Delhi, 3-4 April 2007), the Heads of State or Government agreed to work
on the modalities to implement the provisions of the existing SAARC Conventions
to combat terrorism, narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, trafficking in
women and children and other transnational crimes.26
Recently at the Fifteenth Summit meeting of the South Asian Association for
Regional Cooperation (SAARC) held in Colombo, Sri Lanka on August 2-3,
2008 eight member states adopted a regional anti-terrorism cooperation agreement.
The anti-terrorism agreement calls for freezing funds that might be used for terrorist
activities, regular meetings between security chiefs, the exchange of intelligence,
and training of personnel dealing with terrorism and drug offences. Parallel to
this, a Convention for Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters was also
finalized. This convention calls for mutual cooperation and assistance in the
investigation and prosecution of crime, including terrorism, and tracing, restraining,
and forfeiture of the proceeds and instruments of crime.27
The above mentioned agreements though not yet fully implemented are
promising steps in a region that has long been a victim of the scourge of
terrorism, both of the home-grown sort as well as the trans-border variety. In the
past, while the subject of terrorism always loomed large in stirring plenary
statements by South Asian leaders, minimum actionable measures were agreed
upon about how to tackle the menace, on a regional basis.
——————
25 Http: //www.saarc-sec.org/main.
26 Http: //www.saarc-sec.org/main.
27 Ibid.
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Conclusion
What follows form the overleaf discussion is, though the direct linkage
between the terrorism and human security is not that clear but indirect linkage
cannot be whisked away. Terrorism in South Asia is a multi-dimensional
phenomenon. Its impact on human security is of complex and inter-related nature.
In some cases it is a “home grown” reality, which has evolved as a “result of
the emergence of various violent groups which, after feeling marginalized
resorted to unwarranted use of force. Economic sense of deprivation, illiteracy,
tribal and feudal culture, political discrimination, ethnic and religious extremism
also contributed to the rise of “home grown” terrorism... Unresolved issues like
Jammu and Kashmir between India and Pakistan, Tamil-Sinhala ethnic strife in
Sri Lanka and the Maoist Movement in Nepal provided fuel to various terrorist
groups. In some cases, the failure of state actors to peacefully resolve conflicts
led to the upsurge of terrorist groups causing serious loss of life and property.”28
Despite the number of conventions adopted by the SAARC members form
time to time on the issue of terrorism, there exists a gap between the agreed
policy pronouncements and its implementation on ground. The key reason is the
prevalence of unresolved disputes between the states, and gap in perception of
what constitutes terrorism (particularly in case of India and Pakistan). Unless,
political will combines with the stated objectives to eradicate the scourge of
terrorism in South Asia — terrorism will remain a faceless and borderless threat
to humanity in the region.
What follows from the discussion is role of state as the provider and guarantor
of human security in South Asia remains of critical value. Transnational terrorism
is a threat that impacts individual security and state security at the same time.
The states should aim for a comprehensive anti-terrorism strategy based on Six
“D’s”:
— Dissuading people from resorting to terrorism or supporting it;
— Denying terrorist access to funds and materials;
— Deterring states from sponsoring terrorism;
— Developing state capacity to defeat terrorism and extremism — through
reforming the structures of society and ensuring investment in human development;
— Defending human rights, and finally;
— Dialogue and debate to resolve differences within SAARC on how to
effectively combat the challenge of terrorism and contain the human costs associated
with it.
In a nutshell, the need to adopt a holistic and long term approach encompassing
the human dimensions of security at the individual and state level is a plausible
way out of the scourge of terrorism in South Asia.
——————
28 Lt Gen Moin Uddin Haider, “Terrorism in South-West and South Asia: Its Nature and
Countermeasures”, Global Terrorism, op. cit., p. 403-404.
L’IRAN FACE AUX SANCTIONS INTERNATIONALES
NARDJES FLICI
Abstract. This article presents a case study of the effectiveness of the
international sanctions on Iran, concluding that, overall, the sanctions’
economic effect has been significant, while its political effect has been
minimal. The Security Council resolution extends sanctions against Iran.
It notes that the Iranian government attempts to enrich uranium — potentially
a key component in the development of nuclear weapons. The text restricts
the import of “dual use” technology used for both peaceful and military
purposes, and asks UN member states to inspect cargos suspected of
transporting nuclear material to and from Iran.
De la coopération aux sanctions internationales
Contrairement à une idée reçue, le programme nucléaire iranien ne date pas
d’hier, Téhéran figure même parmi les nations pionnières. Dès 1957, le shah
Mohamed Reza Pahlavi signe avec les Etats-Unis un programme de coopération
nucléaire civile, dix ans plus tard, le premier réacteur de recherche d’une
puissance de 5 Mégawatts est opérationnel, mais le chantier sera suspendu après
la révolution islamique et pendant la guerre Iran-Irak; cet été la, Téhéran avait
annoncé que la centrale de Bouchehr entrerait finalement en service en automne,
grâce à l’aide de Moscou. En 1958, l’Iran signa le Traité de non-prolifération
(TNP) et posa les fondations d’une véritable industrie, un objectif est fixé pour
l’an 2000: mettre en service 23 centrales; Outre ce volet civil, le shah d’Iran ne
cache pas ses ambitions géopolitiques: posséder la bombe.
En 1975, Paris avait conclue un accord de coopération autour du cycle de
production du minerai, à l’époque, la Cogema (aujourd’hui Areva-Nuclear Cycle)
voulait fabriquer une immense usine d’enrichissement d’uranium à Pierrelatte
(Drôme). A cet effet, elle créa en 1973 un consortium européen nommé Eurodif,
rassemblant la France, la Belgique, l’Espagne, l’Italie et la Suède. En 1975,
l’Iran rachète la part suédoise (10% du capital d’Eurodif), par un montage complexe
qui va se révéler redoutable; Paris et Téhéran créent ensemble la Sofidif (Société
franco-iranienne pour l’enrichissement de l’uranium par diffusion gazeuse),
avec des participations respectives de 60% et 40%, la Sofidif acquiert un quart
du capital d’Eurodif, ce qui, en droit, revient à donner à l’Iran le contrôle de 10%
du capital de la société, mieux encore, une disposition spécifique autorise
Téhéran à enlever 10% de la production annuelle d’uranium enrichi, de quoi
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2
faire tourner toute son industrie ; en échange, le très riche régime du Shah prêta
un milliard de dollars au consortium pour financer la construction de l’usine,
inaugurée en avril 1979 par Raymond Barre.
A l’arrivée au pouvoir de l’imam Khomeiny, le nouveau régime dénonça
l’accord de fourniture de centrales (technologie américaine Westinghouse, sous
licence française de Framatome et allemande de Siemens), en représailles, Paris
refusa à Téhéran le droit d’exercer son pouvoir d’actionnaire d’Eurodif, en
suspendant les livraisons d’uranium enrichi. Une longue guerre secrète, ponctuée
d’attentats, d’assassinats et de négociations discrètes sur le “contentieux Eurodif”
commença; ce conflit culmina avec la crise des otages du Liban dont la libération
passera par un compromis sur le dossier Eurodif, finalement, la France rembourse
l’intégralité de la somme prêtée par le Shah, sans oublier les “dommages et
intérêts”, estimés à plus de 600 millions de dollars. L’affaire est provisoirement
réglée vers la fin décembre 1992, par une série de voyages à Téhéran du ministre
des Affaires étrangères «Roland Dumas».
Après une période d’accalmie, grâce à la ligne modérée adoptée par le président
Khatami, l’Iran cherche à reprendre le dialogue sur le nucléaire; aidée en cela
par l’Agence internationale de l’énergie atomique (AIEA) qui, dès février 2003
après la diffusion de photos satellites américaines des sites nucléaires, a lancée
une vaste mission d’inspection sur le programme Iranien, afin de vérifier que cet
arsenal ne masque pas un programme clandestin de mise au point de la bombe.
Toute l’argumentation, un brin hypocrite d’un côté comme de l’autre, consistait
à faire croire que nucléaire civil et nucléaire militaire n’ont absolument rien à
voir, ainsi, Téhéran pourrait développer son industrie nucléaire sans se constituer
un arsenal atomique. En réalité, la seule différence entre les deux utilisations,
tient au niveau d’enrichissement de l’uranium de qualité militaire (à partir de
85% de concentration d’isotope 235) qui réclame de nombreuses manipulations
et autant d’équipements.
Après avoir entamé des négociations avec Moscou, qui proposait de fournir
à l’Iran de l’uranium enrichi et d’assurer ensuite son retraitement en Russie, Téhéran
s’est lancée dans une course à la bombe, le 16 juin 2003, dans un rapport établi
après cinq mois de travail sur place, par les inspecteurs de l’Agence internationale
de l’énergie atomique (AIEA), et présenté devant le conseil des gouverneurs de
l’agence, le directeur général, Mohamed El Baradei, déclara que: «l’Iran a omis
de rendre compte de certaines de ses activités nucléaires et n’a pas informé sur
certains matériaux nucléaires dont elle dispose»; le 19 juin, le conseil des
gouverneurs a demandait a l’Iran de “signer et de mettre rapidement en oeuvre
et sans condition, un protocole additionnel”, dit 93+2, au TNP (Traité de nonprolifération nucléaire) devant permettre des inspections inopinées de ses sites.
Le conseil des gouverneurs de l’AIEA, réuni du 8 au 12 septembre à Téhéran,
lanca un ultimatum à l’Iran pour qu’il prouve jusqu’au 31 octobre, qu’il ne
développe pas la bombe nucléaire sous couvert d’un programme civil d’énergie
nucléaire; le 21 octobre 2003, au cours d’une visite des ministres des affaires
étrangères français, allemand et britannique, destinée à obtenir des garanties de
l’Iran prouvant la nature purement civile de ses activités nucléaires, Téhéran
3
115
s’engaga par écrit à accepter un contrôle renforcé de ses activités, en déclarant
qu’elle va signer le protocole additionnel au TNP (Traité de non-prolifération
nucléaire); elle s’engaga également à suspendre tout enrichissement et retraitement
d’uranium, et à montrer une coopération et une transparence totales vis à vis de
l’Agence internationale de l’énergie atomique; le 10 novembre l’Iran annonca la
suspension effective de ses opérations d’enrichissement d’uranium, et signa le
18 décembre à Genève, au siège de l’AIEA, le protocole additionnel au TNP.
Revenant sur son engagement de suspension en juillet 2004, le Conseil des
gouverneurs de l’AIEA a adopté le 18 septembre 2004 à Vienne, une résolution
présentée par trois pays européens, la Troïka — Allemagne, France et GrandeBretagne —, soutenue par les Américains et adoptée par consensus, demandant
à l’Iran de suspendre immédiatement ses activités d’enrichissement d’uranium,
et fixant la date butoir du 25 novembre pour clarifier “impérativement” les
“questions en suspens” avec l’Agence concernant son programme nucléaire.
Suite à la Réunion à Vienne du Conseil des gouverneurs de l’AIEA le 14-17 juin
2004, une résolution soulignant les omissions de l’Iran dans ses déclarations sur
son programme nucléaire, fut adapter et en novembre 2004, La France, le
Royaume-Uni, l’Allemagne, avec le soutien du Haut Représentant à la PESC, se
sont engagés à entamer avec l’Iran dans la première moitié du mois de décembre,
les négociations d’un accord de long terme, ces négociations portaient sur les
questions politiques et de sécurités, sur la technologie et la coopération, et sur
les questions nucléaires; Téhéran accepta finalement de geler l’enrichissement
d’uranium.
Le 15 novembre 2004, suite à un accord avec la Troïka, désignés sous le sigle
“E3” et l’Union européenne signé le 14, l’Iran s’engaga à une coopération
entière et transparente avec l’AIEA, ainsi qu’à poursuivre la mise en oeuvre du
Protocole additionnel au TNP en attendant sa ratification, par ailleurs, et “afin de
renforcer la confiance”, l’Iran a décidé “à titre volontaire” de poursuivre et
d’étendre la suspension à toutes les activités d’enrichissement et de retraitement
de l’uranium, notamment la fabrication et l’importation de gaz centrifuges, ainsi
que toute activité de séparation du plutonium et de conversion de l’uranium.
L’AIEA est chargée de la vérification de cette suspension et d’en assurer le suivi,
mais en février 2005, l’Iran a désavoué les promesses qu’il a faites aux Européens.
Les autorités iraniennes ont affirmées leur volonté de reprendre prochainement
l’enrichissement d’uranium, et ont refusées de renoncer à la construction d’un
réacteur à eau lourde, qui peut être facilement détourné à des fins militaires alors
que les Européens proposaient de le remplacer par un réacteur à eau légère.
Des négociations continuent quand même, car les Européens espéraient parvenir
à convaincre les Iraniens de renoncer durablement à enrichir, pour éviter de
transférer le dossier au Conseil de sécurité des Nations unies et imposer des
sanctions, comme Washington le préconisait. Le 8 août 2005, l’Iran annonca la
reprise de ses activités de conversion d’uranium dans l’usine d’Ispahan, prenant
le risque d’une confrontation diplomatique avec la communauté internationale et
la saisine du Conseil de sécurité de l’ONU. Le lendemain, le Conseil des gouverneurs
de l’Agence internationale de l’énergie atomique (AIEA), sis à Vienne, adopta
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4
par consensus une résolution enjoignant l’Iran de cesser la production de combustible
nucléaire, et de remettre en place les scellés apposés par l’Agence qui ont été
enlevés à l’usine d’Ispahan.
Le 24 septembre 2005, l’AIEA adopta à Vienne une résolution condamnant
les activités nucléaires de l’Iran, permettant un renvoi devant le Conseil de sécurité
de l’ONU. La résolution présentée par l’Allemagne, la France et la Grande-Bretagne
(UE3) est adoptée par 22 des 35 pays du conseil des gouverneurs, contre 1 (le
Venezuela) et 12 abstentions (dont la Russie et la Chine), elle condamne l’Iran
pour avoir repris la conversion d’uranium en août, et affirme que “la politique
de dissimulation de l’Iran a conduit à de nombreux manquements, et violations
de ses obligations” concernant les garanties, ce qui constitue un “non-respect”
du Traité de non-prolifération (TNP), elle ne demanda pas expressément la
saisine du Conseil de sécurité de l’ONU, mais elle établit les conditions d’un
transfert ultérieur.
Le 4 février 2006, après que l’Iran ait lancé en janvier un nouveau défi à la
communauté internationale, en annonçant la levée des scellés de plusieurs
centres de recherche dont celui de Natanz, le Conseil des gouverneurs de l’AIEA,
réuni en session extraordinaire, adopta une résolution présentée par les Européens,
demandant à son directeur de transférer le dossier nucléaire iranien au Conseil
de sécurité de l’ONU; 27 des 35 membres du Conseil des gouverneurs votent
pour, dont le P5 (les 5 membres permanents du Conseil de sécurité: Chine, EtatsUnis, Russie, France et Royaume-Uni), 3 votent contre — Cuba, Syrie et Venezuela
— et 5 s’abstiennent — Algérie, Biélorussie, Indonésie, Libye et Afrique du
Sud. Le 29 mars, L’ONU a lancé un ultimatum à l’Iran, le Conseil de sécurité
adopta une déclaration élaborée par les cinq membres permanents (Chine, EtatsUnis, France, Grande-Bretagne et Russie), donnant 30 jours à Téhéran pour
abandonner ses activités sensibles d’enrichissement de l’uranium, et l’enjoignant à
se plier aux résolutions de l’AIEA, visant à lui permettre de vérifier le caractère
strictement civil de son programme nucléaire. Le Conseil pria le directeur de
l’AIEA, Mohamed El-Baradei, de soumettre dans les 30 jours un rapport sur la
manière dont l’Iran se serait conformé à ces dispositions, le texte ne menace
toujours pas de sanctions.
Le 19 avril, lors d’une réunion avec la troïka européenne (Allemagne, France
et Grande-Bretagne), Téhéran annonca une intensification de son programme
nucléaire, avec la mise en route de nouvelles centrifugeuses pour enrichir de
l’uranium, et invita même l’Europe à “accompagner” son programme nucléaire.
Une seule cascade de centrifugeuses fonctionne actuellement en Iran à l’usine de
Natanz, où Téhéran a certifié avoir réussi à y enrichir de l’uranium à 3,5%;
parallèlement, des négociations se déroulaient au sein de la communauté
internationale, sur la teneur de sanctions éventuelles. Le 28 avril, à la date de
l’ultimatum fixé par l’ONU, le directeur de l’AIEA a remit au Conseil de
sécurité son rapport sur le programme nucléaire Iranien, reprochant à Téhéran
d’avoir inauguré la production d’uranium enrichi le 9 avril, malgré les avertissements
de la communauté internationale, et son refus dans le même temps, de reprendre
une “coopération pleine et entière” avec les inspecteurs de l’AIEA. Le 6 juin
5
117
2006, Une offre faite par les cinq membres permanents du Conseil de sécurité et
par l’Allemagne, contenant une série de propositions incitatives: «si Téhéran
suspend l’enrichissement d’uranium», dix jours plus tard, Téhéran se dit «prêt à
commencer à négocier» mais «sans conditions préalables».
Le conseil de sécurité adopta le 31 juillet 2006 (par 14 voix contre 1) la
résolution 1696 — art. 39637, qui rend obligatoire la suspension par l’Iran de
toutes ses activités liées à l’enrichissement et au retraitement, y compris la
recherche-développement et demande un rapport au DG de l’AIEA pour le 31
août, il prévoit aussi que si l’Iran ne s’est pas conformé à ses obligations d’ici à
cette date, le Conseil travaillera alors à l’adoption de mesures au titre de l’article
41 du chapitre VII de la Charte. Le 31 août 2006, le DG de l’AIEA confirme que
l’Iran ne se trouve pas en conformité avec la résolution 1696 — art. 40509 et n’a
pas suspendu ses activités liées à l’enrichissement; qu’il ne coopère pas de
manière satisfaisante avec l’Agence et qu’il ne fournit pas la transparence
nécessaire, aussi, de nouvelles questions sont relevées par l’Agence, en
particulier de nouvelles contaminations d’uranium hautement enrichi. Le 6
septembre 2006, dans un nouveau rapport de l’AIEA sur le programme nucléaire
iranien, Mohamed El-Baradei souligne que l’Iran n’a toujours pas suspendu ses
opérations liées à l’enrichissement d’uranium à la date butoir du 31 août, fixée
par la résolution 1696; Il annonce qu’en conclusion, l’Agence se déclare “incapable
de progresser davantage dans ses efforts visant à vérifier l’exactitude et
l’exhaustivité des déclarations de l’Iran, en vue de confirmer la nature pacifique
de son programme nucléaire”, alors que des négociations au sein de la communauté
internationale sur des sanctions contre l’Iran sont toujours en cours.
Sur le rapport de M. Javier Solana du 6 octobre 2006, les trois 3 Ministres
des Affaires étrangères européens et leurs homologues américain, chinois et
russe (E3+3) ont estimés qu’il n’y avait pas d’autre choix que de reprendre au
Conseil de sécurité la voie tracée par la résolution 1696, et d’entamer les
consultations nécessaires à l’adoption de mesures au titre de l’article 41. Le 23
décembre 2006, le Conseil de sécurité de l’ONU adopte la résolution 1737
imposant des sanctions à l’Iran sur son programme nucléaire1, la résolution
demande à l’Iran de suspendre ses activités nucléaires, posant un risque de
prolifération y compris celles liées à l’enrichissement et au retraitement, ainsi
que les travaux sur tous projets liés à l’eau lourde, y compris la construction d’un
réacteur modéré à l’eau lourde. Le Conseil de sécurité enjoint aux Etats Membres
de prendre les mesures nécessaires pour prévenir la fourniture, la vente ou le
transfert à l’Iran, notamment de tous articles, matières, équipements, biens et
technologies susceptibles de contribuer à la mise au point de vecteurs d’armes
nucléaires.
Il s’agissait d’un embargo en réponse au programme nucléaire et au programme
de missiles balistiques, aussi, des mesures ciblées individuelles ont étaient énoncées,
dont un gel des avoirs; il a été décidé que tous les États devront geler les fonds,
les avoirs financiers et les ressources économiques qui sont la propriété ou sous
——————
1 Résolution publiée sous la cote GOV/2006/14.
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6
le contrôle des personnes ou entités visées dans l’annexe à la résolution 1737
(2006), ainsi que ceux des autres personnes ou entités que le Conseil ou le
Comité pourront désigner comme participant, étant directement associées ou
apportant un appui aux activités nucléaires de l’Iran, posant un risque de
prolifération ou à la mise au point de vecteurs d’armes nucléaires, ainsi des
personnes ou entités agissant en leur nom ou sur leurs instructions, ou des entités
qui sont leur propriété ou sont sous leur contrôle (Ultérieurement appliquées
aussi à toutes les personnes et entités énumérées dans l’annexe I à la résolution
1747 (2007); des mesures liées aux déplacements ont aussi étaient prises, visant
les personnes et entités désignées dans une annexe à la résolution, ainsi que
toutes autres personnes et entités désignées par le Conseil de sécurité, ou par le
Comité, compte tenu des critères énoncés dans la résolution.
Cette résolution engage tous les États à faire preuve de vigilance concernant
l’entrée ou le passage en transit sur leur territoire de personnes qui participent,
ou qui sont directement associées ou apportent un appui aux activités nucléaires
de l’Iran, posant un risque de prolifération ou au développement de vecteurs
d’armes nucléaires, et décide à cet égard que tous les États devront notifier au
Comité l’entrée ou le passage en transit sur leur territoire des personnes
désignées dans l’annexe de la résolution 1737 (2006), ainsi que des autres
personnes que le Conseil ou le Comité pourront désigner.
Sans oublier l’Interdiction des exportations d’armes d’Iran, ce qui implique
que l’Iran ne doit fournir, vendre ou transférer, directement ou indirectement, à
partir de son territoire ou par l’intermédiaire de ses nationaux, ou au moyen de
navires ou d’aéronefs battant son pavillon. Tous les États devront interdire
l’acquisition de ces articles auprès de l’Iran par leurs ressortissants, ou au moyen
de navires ou d’aéronefs battant leur pavillon, que ces articles aient ou non leur
origine dans le territoire iranien; plus encore, le Conseil a engagé tous les États
à empêcher que des ressortissants iraniens reçoivent un enseignement ou une
formation spécialisés dans des disciplines qui favoriseraient les activités nucléaires
de l’Iran, posant un risque de prolifération et la mise au point de vecteurs d’armes
nucléaires. A ces sanctions, le Comité du Conseil de sécurité créé par la résolution
1737 (2006) concernant la République islamique d’Iran, a été établi afin de surveiller
l’application des mesures énoncées dans ladite résolution et de s’acquitter des
tâches prévues au paragraphe 18 de cette dernière.
Le 22 février 2007, le rapport du Directeur Général de l’AIEA sur la mise en
oeuvre par l’Iran de ses obligations au titre de la résolution 1737, confirme que
l’Iran ne remplit toujours pas ses obligations au titre de la résolution 1737, car
il n’a pas suspendu ses activités liées à l’enrichissement et au retraitement, ainsi
que ses projets relatifs à l’eau lourde, et ne coopère pas dutout de manière
satisfaisante avec l’Agence, ne fournissant pas la transparence nécessaire2. Face
au refus persistant de l’Iran de suspendre l’enrichissement d’uranium, le Conseil
de sécurité a adopté le 24 mars 2007 la résolution 17473 qui alourdit, tout en
——————
2 Rapport contenu dans le document publié sous la cote S/2007/100.
3 Résolution publiée sous la cote S/2007/170.
7
119
réaffirmant les sanctions déjà imposées au pays par la résolution 1737, ces
sanctions alourdies comprennent un embargo sur les exploitations d’armes iraniennes
et “de matériel connexe”, et des restrictions financières et commerciales, en outre,
des restrictions sur les voyages qui s’appliqueraient à une liste élargie de personnalités
et d’entités impliquées dans les programmes nucléaire ou balistique de l’Iran.
Le texte indique également que le Conseil de sécurité suspendra les sanctions
si l’Iran cesse d’enrichir de l’uranium. Le Conseil a aussi engagé tous les États
à faire preuve de vigilance et de retenue concernant la fourniture d’armes
lourdes et des services connexes à l’Iran, ainsi que l’engagement des États et de
toutes les institutions financières internationales à ne pas souscrire de nouveaux
engagements aux fins de l’octroi de subventions, d’une assistance financière et
de prêts assortis de conditions libérales au Gouvernement iranien, sauf à des fins
humanitaires et de développement.
Le 30 mars 2007, l’Iran informe officiellement l’AIEA de la suspension de
l’application de la disposition des arrangements subsidiaires à l’accord de garanties
qui, depuis 2003, l’obligeait à déclarer les installations nouvelles dès la décision
de construction, le 9 avril de la même année, le Président Ahmadinejad annonce
officiellement que le programme d’enrichissement est entré «dans sa phase
industrielle», le Président de l’Organisation de l’énergie atomique iranienne
réaffirme également l’objectif d’installation de 50 000 centrifugeuses à Natanz;
le lendemain, Le ministre iranien des Affaires étrangères Mottaki déclare que
l’Iran n’acceptera aucune suspension de ses activités d’enrichissement d’uranium et
implore activement les puissances mondiales à accepter la “nouvelle réalité” de
la République islamique du programme nucléaire. Le 4 octobre 2007, après que
l’Iran et l’AIEA s’accordèrent sur un plan de travail pour répondre aux questions
en suspens sur le programme nucléaire iranien et cela le 21 août 20074; des
diplomates déclarent que l’Iran a installé près de 3000 centrifugeuses, soit
suffisamment pour commencer à affiner des quantités de combustible nucléaire,
le 24 octobre 2007, les États-Unis imposent de nouvelles sanctions à l’Iran et
accuse le corps de la Garde révolutionnaire iranienne d’être à l’origine de la
propagation d’armes de destruction massive, ces sanctions sont suivies le 2
novembre par une réunion des cinq membres permanents du Conseil de sécurité
des Nations unies, incluant la Grande-Bretagne, la France, les États-Unis, la
Russie et la Chine puis l’Allemagne, et cela pour la troisième fois, afin
d’entamer des discussions relatives aux durcissements des sanctions après le
rapport mitigé de l’AIEA, du 15 novembre 2007 ou il demandé explicitement à
l’Iran de coopérer. L’Etat Islamique est qualifié de “réactif plutôt que proactif”5.
Entre mensonge et vérité, qui croire!
Ainsi, et tout en réaffirment le droit de l’Iran en vertu du TNP et de ses
obligations de développer la recherche, la production et l’utilisation de l’énergie
nucléaire à des fins pacifiques, l’Iran se trouve alourdi par des sanctions
——————
4 Timeline: Irans nuclear program, Reuters, 2 November 2007.
5 “Iran fails to resolve nuclear questions”, Financial Times, 15 November 2007.
120
NARDJES FLICI
8
multiples malgré ses déclarations et ses affirmations que ses recherches ont des fins
pacifiques; les Etats-Unis, en s’appuyant sur des critères qu’eux seuls connaissent,
affirment le contraire et braillent les tendances belliqueuses de l’Iran, en soutenant
que les Iraniens sont résolus à mettre au point des armes nucléaires malgré ses
obligations et les pressions internationales; conformément à cette certitude, les
six grandes puissances participaient aux négociations sur le nucléaire Iranien
pour discuter d’une troisième résolution, renforçant les sanctions prise contre
cette état voyou (terme inventé par les Américains) pour l’amener à suspendre
ses activités suspectes, et surtout l’enrichissement de l’uranium; lorsque un rapport
du renseignement américain affirma le 3 décembre 2007 que l’Iran n’aurait pas
du tout les ambitions nucléaires que lui prête l’administration Bush, et que Téhéran
aurait arrêter ses plans d’armes nucléaires à l’automne 2003 et semble moins
déterminé à fabriquer des bombes atomiques que l’occident prétend, et que
l’enrichissement d’uranium, engagé depuis janvier 2006, doit produire le
combustible pour les futures centrales civiles Iraniennes; en contre-partie, le
rapport présenté par les 16 agences de renseignement dit que l’Iran se réserve
apparemment l’option de l’arme nucléaire, et pourrait être capable entre 2010 et
2015 de produire assez d’uranium hautement enrichi pour la bombe atomique,
car enrichi à plus de 90%, l’uranium peut servir de matériau pour la bombe6.
Le gouvernement américain a argué avec force une telle possibilité pour
réaffirmer le péril et la nécessité d’augmenter la pression internationale sur
l’Iran, mais l’opposition démocrate au président Bush s’est appuyée sur ce rapport
pour réclamer une “nouvelle politique envers l’Iran”, selon les termes de la
présidente de la Chambre des représentants Nancy Pelosi; tandis que le chef de
la majorité démocrate du Sénat Harry Reid, en appelait à un “sursaut diplomatique”,
quelques semaines après que le président Bush eut brandi le spectre d’un
“holocauste nucléaire” ou d’une Troisième Guerre mondiale si l’Iran avait la
bombe, l’administration était poussée à la défensive par les comparaisons
défavorables avec le précédent irakien, quand elle avait invoqué à tort le danger
des armes de destruction massive de Saddam Hussein, elle fut contrainte
d’admettre que le rapport risquait de desservir les Etats-Unis au moment où ils
cherchent à obtenir de nouvelles sanctions internationales contre l’Iran.
“Nous jugeons avec un haut degré de confiance qu’à l’automne 2003, Téhéran
a arrêté son programme d’armes nucléaires”, dit le renseignement, qui pense que
l’Iran n’a pas actuellement d’arme nucléaire, la décision prise en 2003 suggère
que l’Iran “est moins déterminé” à avoir l’arme nucléaire que ne le croyait le
renseignement depuis 2005, estimant alors “avec un haut degré de confiance”
que l’Iran était résolu à cela, il déclara aussi: “Nous ne savons pas si (l’Iran) a
actuellement l’intention de développer des armes nucléaires”, mais il juge
probable que l’Iran, “au minimum, garde ouverte (cette) option”, il est clair que
maintenant, ça sera précisément cette “option” que les Occidentaux veulent
retirer à l’Iran. Le renseignement note que si l’Iran a coupé court son programme
nucléaire militaire en 2003, c’est d’abord à cause de la pression internationa à
——————
6 L’Iran aurait arrêté son programme nucléaire militaire en 2003 sous la pression internationale, Agence
de presse, le 3 décembre 2007.
9
121
laquelle l’Iran serait donc peut-être plus sensible que le gouvernement américain
ne le pensait, il révèle aussi, et pour la première fois, que l’Iran avait bel et bien
des plans secrets avant 2003, et qu’il continue à avoir des activités aux possibles
applications nucléaires comme l’enrichissement, mais il minimise les menaces
que la maison blanche persiste a dramatiser.
Confronté aux questions sur la possibilité que le président américain ait
exagéré la menace iranienne, le conseiller de M. Bush pour la sécurité nationale,
a réaffirmé la réalité du péril iranien et que la communauté internationale doit
“augmenter la pression”, en isolant diplomatiquement et en sanctionnant l’Iran
tout en offrant la perspective d’un dialogue, a-t-il dit; cette nouvelle donnée
embarrasse certes les Etats-Unis, mais elle va surtout a l’encontre des intérêts
Israélien dont les renseignements pensent que l’Iran essaie toujours de mettre au
point une arme nucléaire, a affirmé le ministre israélien de la Défense, mardi le
4 décembre, remettant ainsi en cause l’analyse des renseignements américains
sur l’Iran7, “Il semble qu’il soit vrai qu’en 2003, l’Iran ait interrompu son
programme nucléaire militaire pendant un temps, mais à notre avis, l’Iran a
depuis repris ce programme”, a dit Ehoud Barak à la radio israélienne; “Nous
connaissions cette analyse américaine”, a dit Barak, “Il y a des différences entre
les évaluations des différentes organisations dans le monde à ce sujet, et seul le
temps nous dira qui a raison”, a estimé l’ancien Premier ministre travailliste qui
fut également chef d’état-major des armées. Interrogé pour savoir si cette nouvelle
analyse américaine éloignait la possibilité d’une frappe militaire américaine sur
l’Iran, Ehoud Barak a répondu que c’était “possible”, toutefois, a-t-il aussitôt
ajouté, “nous ne pouvons pas nous permettre de baisser la garde au simple motif
qu’un rapport venu de l’autre côté de la Terre, même si ce rapport nous vient de
notre plus grand ami”; cette déclaration de Jérusalem est tout a fait légitime mais
probablement infondée, en sachant que Téhéran est le plus grand danger pour
cette état, vu sa puissance et leurs relations belligérantes, il est donc dans
l’intérêt d’Israël d’encourager une éventuelle intervention militaire en Iran,
comme celle qui à détruit l’Irak, afin d’affaiblir l’état qui lui tien tête et qui
menace ses intérêts stratégiques et sa sécurité dans la région.
Le document publié coïncide avec les refus persistant de Téhéran de
suspendre ses activités d’enrichissement d’uranium, comme l’exige la
communauté internationale, Etats-Unis en tête (malgré deux trains de sanctions
internationales et le danger d’un troisième) car ce dernier doit produire le
combustible pour ses futures centrales civiles, assure le régime islamique8; de
toute évidence, il est pratiquement impossible de savoir lequel d’entre ces
antagonistes dit la vérité, et lequel à réellement des intensions nobles. Le plus
important est de poursuivre la voie diplomatique des négociations et des compromis
en évitant de passer du régime des sanctions a une intervention armée, cela ne
sera possible que si les Etats-Unis acceptent la possibilité que Téhéran pourrait
——————
7 Nucléaire: Israël conteste l’analyse des renseignements américains sur l’Iran, Agence de presse, le 4
décembre 2007.
8 L’Iran aurait arrêté son programme nucléaire militaire en 2003 sous la pression internationale, Agence
de presse, le 3 décembre 2007.
122
NARDJES FLICI
10
avoir des intensions pacifiques, et si l’Iran renonce à son rôle de provocateur;
depuis trois ans, l’hypothèse selon laquelle l’Iran serait sur le point d’acquérir
l’arme nucléaire, fait l’objet d’intenses discussions au sein des instances
internationales et suscite un intérêt particulier dans les médias, la conséquence
directe de cette amalgame fut la multiplication des pressions internationales qui
ont amené l’Iran à suspendre ses activités nucléaires à la fin de 2003, et l’ouvertures
de négociations entre l’Iran et la «Troïka» européenne (France, Grande-Bretagne,
Allemagne), elles avaient pour objectif de convaincre l’Iran d’abandonner
définitivement son programme nucléaire, toutefois, ces pourparlers n’ont donné
aucun résultat probant.
Face à cette impasse, l’Iran a décidé récemment de reprendre ses activités
d’enrichissement d’uranium, face a ces faits, Sean McCormack, le porte-parole
du département d’État américain déclara: «Il s’impose à la raison, que l’unique
conclusion logique d’une participation de l’armée à un programme nucléaire,
c’est qu’ils essaient de fabriquer une arme atomique9»,dès lors, une action
préventive semble imminente, la question qui se pose est de savoir, si les
Occidentaux sont-ils justifiés d’intervenir militairement en Iran, s’ils apprennent
que ce pays possède l’arme atomique? Au sein du système international, une
action militaire dite légitime, est celle qui découle d’une volonté onusienne, en
effet, il faut qu’elle soit discutée au Conseil de Sécurité et qu’elle soit inscrite
comme importante, c’est-à-dire, présentant une menace à la sécurité internationale,
mais la possession d’une bombe atomique ne peut à elle seule constituer une
menace directe à la paix du monde, si c’était le cas, les membres permanents du
Conseil de Sécurité seraient eux aussi des dangers permanents pour le reste du
monde, une telle action préventive contre l’Iran relèverait donc de l’unilatéralisme
flagrant des Occidentaux.
D’autre part, rappelons que l’Iran se situe dans une zone en proie aux
conflits, ainsi, la possession de l’arme atomique par l’Iran s’inscrirait dans une
logique d’équilibre des puissances avec Israël qui possède déjà cette bombe;
durant la décennie 1980, l’Iran a vécu au rythme d’une longue guerre contre
l’Irak, la présence de l’arme nucléaire éviterait donc à l’Iran toute attaque de ses
voisins et imposerait en même temps une certaine stabilité dans la région,
comme le souligne Jean-Michel Boucheron: «Depuis qu’Israël dispose de l’arme
atomique, ce pays n’a plus jamais fait l’objet d’attaques d’États voisins, la paix
entre Israël et l’Égypte puis entre Israël et la Jordanie a été la conséquence
logique de la non-guerre imposée par l’arme atomique10», en appliquant cette
logique au cas Iranien, on constatera que la bombe atomique iranienne ne
représente pas une menace à la paix, elle présenterait plutôt un gage de stabilité,
elle ne nécessite donc, ni une guerre préventive, ni une guerre punitive; l’histoire
nous démontre que la possession des armes nucléaires par les Américains et les
Soviétiques durant la Guerre Froide, a évité au monde une Troisième guerre
——————
9 Iran Focus: «Iran-USA: Le rôle de l’armée dans le nucléaire en Iran inquiète les Etats-Unis», 6 octobre
2005, http://www.survivreausida.net/site.php3?id_syndic=113.
10 Boucheron, Jean-Michel. «L’Iran aura la bombe», Le Monde, 21 février 2005, http://www.lemonde.fr/
web/article.
11
123
mondiale, d’ailleurs la crise des missiles à Cuba en 1961 confirme cette logique
qui est également effective en Asie centrale, selon Jean-Michel Boucheron: «De
la même façon, la guerre entre l’Inde et la Chine devenait impossible, ainsi que
tout conflit majeur entre l’Inde et le Pakistan, malgré les combats dans les
montagnes du Cachemire11».
A ceux qui pensent que l’Iran est un danger pour la planète, il est tentant de
répondre que le véritable danger proviendrait du Pakistan, en effet, la poussée
des mouvements extrémistes «fragilise» le gouvernement pakistanais, et la tentative
d’assassinat contre le Président pakistanais montre la détermination des extrémistes
à vouloir prendre le pouvoir, si un tel évènement se produisait, le monde pourrait
craindre le pire. En somme, une attaque contre l’Iran serait injuste d’autant plus
qu’Israël, le Pakistan et l’Inde n’ont pas eu le même traitement, même si sur la
plan juridique, l’Iran a enfreint ses obligations internationales, une intervention
militaire ne peut se justifier, tant et aussi longtemps qu’une menace formelle à
la paix ne serait pas faite par l’Iran.
——————
11 Ibidem.
ACCOUNTS ON SOVIET UNION CULTURAL DIPLOMACY
(1953–1959)
LUCIAN JORA
Abstract. While Lenin’s and Stalin’s propaganda and foreign policies
were rather defensive, dominated by rudeness, secrecy and violence, Post
Stalin foreign policy was less defensive in cultural and ideological terms
as a result of the enormous increase in absolute power, industrial development
and acquisition of mass destruction weapons, for instance it could afford
to pursue a more confident policy than in the past. Also the very existence
of nuclear weapons and danger of mutual destruction imposed a more
subtle diplomatic policy. It was a time of chaos and turbulence, the process
of decolonization at least for a while had put many new governments in
the situation to look for alternatives of social, economic and cultural fast
development as opposed to those of the former rulers. In this context at the
time Moscow had strong incentives to play the card of the alternative world
center of progress, civilization, spiritual cultivation and enlightenment easy
accessible to the ordinary people and above all the “new liberated ones”.
Talking about cultural diplomacy and propaganda an important chapter still
uncovered by the contemporary researchers for various reasons is the Soviet
cultural diplomacy during the cold war. There were some researches most of
them being based on interviews and memorial sources. The hard sources consisting
in official reports and recommendation at the pick of Cold War were opened only
recently and partially. There were from the American side at the time some efforts
coming from scholars to project an image of the Soviet techniques carefully
calculated to facilitate Soviet foreign policy objectives, and at the same time to
reveal the Kremlin efforts to avoid harmful “alien” influences towards its
citizens.1 David C. Munford, The Ford Foundation and the Political Sciences
Department of Yale University at the beginning of the 60’s granted a scholarship
whose result was the first public designated report analyzing the Soviet cultural
diplomacy techniques at that particular time. His research was widely used in
addition to the personal experience of various scholars, diplomats or political
activists in US. Most of the considerations made at the time resisted the time test
being valid and useful today. Having a 50 year perspective it is in our intention to
——————
1 Frederick C. Barghoorn, The Soviet cultural offensive: The role of cultural diplomacy in Soviet foreign
policy, Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1976, c1960.
2
ACCOUNTS ON SOVIET UNION CULTURAL DIPLOMACY (1953–1959)
125
present in this article a commented and annotated account of various comments and
reports written at the time.
The first study of the kind, to our knowledge had appeared in a moment of
partial openness of the USSR during Nikita Hruskhev when the first contacts
and significant exchanges of scholars and tourists were organized.2 To the
stupefaction of political analysts even Mongolia (a puppet regime into the Soviet
hands) invited foreign scholars, including Americans to take part in a
philological conference held in Ulan-Bator in September 1959. It was the so
called “Soviet cultural offensive” initiated by the Hruskehev regime of such an
unexpected scale that it forced the British and American governments to set up
new administrative systems capable to deal with the new and unsuspected problem.
Are usually quoted two significant documents “The State Department Circular”
of June 1959, of a Bureau of Intercultural Relations and the assignment to the
US Embassy in Moscow of a Counselor for Cultural Affairs. These moves were
rather administrative as they were not followed by the corresponding financial
support. Some scholars were also to blame the lack of sophistication at the time
of the US diplomacy towards the Communist regimes; an attitude with considerable
consequences towards the mutual exchanges of people and students which after
all was in favor of the close regimes, namely the Communist ones.
In order to create the necessary ground for the subject that is to be analyzed
here, we will start with few considerations regarding the international exchanges
and cultural diplomacy as it was practiced by the most powerful state actors.
France was the first great power to embark on an extensive program of officially
organized cultural diplomacy. This program started under the direction of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the second half of the nineteenth century in the
Near and Far East. The official efforts were supplemented by the activity of
private agencies, some of them still active such as the Alliance Francaise, which
since 1883 has organized courses, schools, lectures, and gifts of books to
encourage the teaching of the French language and to disseminate French culture
beyond the frontiers of France.3 At the time this kind of approach was or was
seen rather ethnocentric and chauvinistic in tone as an article on the Alliance
Francaise specified in 1886 in the Grande Encyclopedia. The article stated that
the best way of “conquering” the natives of French colonies was by inoculating
them a love for the French language and culture. After the WWI this effort was
intensified to cope with the German revancharde propaganda. Some German
officials during the Hitler regime regarded French cultural diplomacy as a highly
sophisticated weapon. A Nazi study talks of French academic exchange with
Denmark referred to the “universalism and at the same type imperialist” character
of French cultural pressure abroad. In exchange both before and after WWI,
Germany carried vigorous programs of exchange of students and professors abroad,
including with Romania, and also attempted to utilize persons of German background
resident abroad as instruments of German propaganda.
——————
policy, Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1976, c1960, p. 1.
3 Ruth Emily Mc Murry and Muna Lee, The Cultural Approach, Chapel Hill 1947, p. 9-38.
126
LUCIAN JORA
3
The United Kingdom initiated in an systematic way the field of cultural
diplomacy in 1934 with the creation of British Council, which was incorporated
by royal charter in 1940. The impressive budget increased in there years from
5000 GBP in 1935 to over 100000 GBP in 1938 tells everything about the importance
granted to its activities and role. As of 1939 it was estimated that the Germans
in seeking to counter the financially modest British effort, were spending about
4,000000 to 6,000000 GBP annually on propaganda abroad activities, while
France 1,200000 GBP and Italy nearly 1,000000.4 By 1957 the British Council
had for the conduct of cultural propaganda an annual budget of over 3,000000
GBP, not a big budget as compared with USSR but one which reflected the
growing significance attributed to this instrument of international politics.5 However,
according to the American officials interviewed, the Council apparently had
larger funds than the corresponding American governmental units at that particular
time for similar objectives and activities, namely the International Educational
Exchange Service of the Department of State and the same department East-West
Contacts Staff. At the time the British Council was able to enter vigorously into
actual cooperation, particularly private and semiprivate fields, while the official
US cultural agencies kept largely advisory and facilitative functions, except for
the official Soviet-American exchanges in which they were directly involved.
The US reports in the early 60’s mentioned the remarkable success the British
Council had in the field of cultural diplomacy in the Commonwealth countries
and in particular India.
The increasing interest and attention showed by the Soviets for propaganda
and cultural diplomacy as the way to transmit it abroad, received some answers
in US. In 1958 the Governmental Affairs Institute of Washington, D.C, established
an Information Center for American Travelers to Russia, “in response” to the
need and interest of the American public for essential background information
on Soviet affairs and on the opportunities and limitations of tourist travel in
Russia. There was also mentioned as a significant gesture the publication of a
Russian-language guidebook to New York, for the benefit, reported the New
York Times of July 17, 1959 of Russians in the city for the Soviet exhibition, or
of literature for American travelers published by the East European Student and
Youth Service in New York. By mid 1959 the East-West exchanges had been
beneficial to Western in particular American knowledge of conditions behind the
Iron Curtain. At the time started a mutually beneficial graduate student exchange
between US, France and USSR.6 This program began in 1954-1955 in the case
of France and 1959 in the case of US. A political observer at the time noticed the
irregular and financially mediocre US response to the streamlined centralized
Soviet cultural diplomacy program. Henry L . Roberts the director of the Russian
Institute of Columbia University, pointed out in an address at Harvard University
in January 1958 “...the maximization of democratic values in a relationship
——————
4 Harold Nicolson, Diplomacy, New York, 1939, p. 173.
5 Ibid, p. 174.
policy, Westport, Conn. : Greenwood Press, 1976, c1960, p. 10-11.
4
127
which cannot be truly reciprocical is an immensely difficult task. It is however a
task that should not be shirked; for it is evident that as the communist world
becomes richer and more powerful and achieves a gradually rising level of
civilization, it will display in a carefully controlled an increasingly ingratiating
fashion, more and more of its achievements to growing numbers of foreigners.”7
There was within the academic community in debate the attitude of the US press
and officials towards the Soviet exhibition in the New York Coliseum on July
1959, the exposure of “consumer goods” together with another technical equipment
was treated with irony as someone “caring gadgets to Gadget-land”. Some
political scientists were accusing the counterproductive effects of irony; nevertheless
the motivation was by no means condemnable. Is enough to quote: “...it also
expresses a pride of achievements on the part of Russian scientists, engineers,
and workmen that we shall do to appreciate if we wish to get on as friendly terms
as possible with the people still suffering from the consequences of a century old
inferiority complex, and consequently inclined at times toward a touchy
exaggeration of the significance of their achievements and quick express
indignation against those display condescension regarding them or ignorance of
the Russian cultural heritage of which they are increasingly proud”.8 The
commentator can be brutal but true. At the time many analysts doubted if the US
had any cultural diplomacy at all as compared to the “cultural propaganda”
machinery of the USSR but we think that is rather an assertion regarding the
sense those analysts were using the term “cultural diplomacy” or “propaganda”.
The reports at the time “central” to communist cultural diplomacy’s: “the
systematic utilization of information, artistic, scientific, and other cultural materials,
symbols and personnel, and ideas, as instruments of foreign policy”.9
While Lenin’s and Stalin’s propaganda and foreign policies were rather
defensive, dominated by rudeness, secrecy and violence, Post Stalin foreign
policy was less defensive in cultural and ideological terms as a result of the
enormous increase in absolute power, industrial development and acquisition of
mass destruction weapons, for instance it could afford to pursue a more confident
policy than in the past. Also the very existence of nuclear weapons and danger
of mutual destruction imposed a more subtle diplomatic policy. It was a time of
chaos and turbulence, the process of decolonization at least for a while, put many
new governments in the situation to look for alternatives of social, economic and
cultural fast development, as opposed to those of the former rulers. In this
context, Moscow had strong incentives to play the card of the alternative world
center of progress, civilization, spiritual cultivation and enlightenment easily
accessible to the ordinary people and above all to the “new liberated ones”. In
order to understand the Soviet strategies the US political scientists at the time
were trying to understand the content and significance of the “cultural
revolution” in Soviet terms. According with the Soviet Great Encyclopedia the
——————
7 Ibid, p. 10.
8 Ibid, p. 9.
9 Lindlay Fraser, Propaganda, London 1957, p. 1.
128
LUCIAN JORA
5
cultural revolution is an integral part of the socialist revolution and it is directed
by the socialist party. The concept as such was developed systematically for
foreign audiences in a book entitled On Soviet Culture and the Cultural Revolution
in the USSR, published in 1954 by G.G. Karpov head of the government agency
which supervised the activity of the Russian Orthodox Church. In the book the
Soviet Union is declared the most advanced citadel of culture civilization while
the bourgeois culture the main obstacle to the progressive development of the
mankind. According to Karpov the Russian culture was always superior to the
other cultures but only under Leninist principles guidance it reached its full
flowering. Anyway the US diplomats publishing their memories found difficult
to assess the real impact of this propaganda having in mind the afflux of ordinary
people showing rather curiosity towards anything Westerner as often as they
could. Even today the opinions about the deepness and dimension of this
propaganda results into the mind of ordinary Soviet citizens are unconcludent
and a matter of debate. There were quoted the visits in Leningrad of the Dutch
and British fleet in 1955 and 1956.10 To our understanding most of American
and Western scholars at the time didn’t realize the dimension and vulnerability
of Soviet society to foreign culture penetration. And also the American scholars
even after ’89 did not make the necessary distinction between the great diversity
different societies within the Eastern bloc used to develop and live. There is a
significant degree and difference between the amounts of information about the
west different societies in the Eastern bloc used to have. While in the Soviet
Union the availability of information through Radio such as Radio Free Europe
of Voice of America was scarce, it was a daily source of information for other
Western bloc countries at all levels of the society. However the Kremlin’s expectation
of gaining prestige among foreigners is not entirely unfounded. Evidences
collected as early as 1956 prove the impact of Soviet showmanship even to
wealthy American businessman. Partly because they used to carry in their minds
grotesque images of Soviet underdevelopment and poverty propagated by the
CIA’s propaganda, and partly because they were carefully shown only the best
Moscow has to offer. This custom was carefully kept until the late 80’s even for
groups of Eastern block tourists. The richest reward of Soviet cultural diplomacy
surprisingly enough came from foreign intellectuals, artists and scientists, not by
display of own achievements but by courteous and sympathetic appreciation of
those of other countries. Soviet leaders including the not very polished Khrushchev
have demonstrated considerable sensitivity to the self image of almost every
kind of national and cultural group. They seemed to realize more clearly than the
Americans that one of the most effective ways of flattering an individual is to
express appreciation of his national language, literature and art. This strategy is
explained by some American scholars as being the result of governing a big
multinational state. However in our opinion the Soviets didn’t show the same
kind of respect and carefulness towards the native cultures of different Soviet
Union republics, in contrary most native traditions if were saved and preserved
——————
10 Idem.
6
129
it was thanks to the isolation and backwardness and not necessary thanks to the
carefulness of the Soviet system towards them. One of the major differences
between post Stalin strategy and that of the late Stalin era was the realization in
the Kremlin that an appeal to nationalism and anti-Americanism might pay
bigger political dividends into the post-colonial world, than an attempt at early
overthrow of “bourgeois” governments, such as those of Nehru, Sukarno or
Nasser. The narrowly political aspects of Soviet cultural diplomacy, in so far as
it is concerned with Asia and Africa were revealed in an anonymous leading
article in the journal of Institute of Orientalogy. The editorial urged the study of
the ancient and modern history of Asian and African countries in order to dispel
the “myth of the civilized mission of the Western nations”.11 It praised Soviet
scholars for producing literary and linguistic studies which “strengthened the
positions of the people of the East in struggle against imperialism“ and asserted
that such studies had already struck a shattering blow against “reactionary
theories of Europacentrism”.
On both sides Soviet non-Soviet exchanges have involved relatively few
“workers and peasants” and a heavy proportion of executives and celebrities.
Famous authors like H.G. Wells, press moguls like the head of the Associated
Press. Roy Howard both received by Stalin in Kremlin. Is less known the fact
that the Soviet propaganda made few thousands American workers and
Westerners move into the USSR during the 30’s, they returned home tempered
by their experience and the years as manual workers in the “workers’ paradise”.
Among them for example was John Scott, who as a young college graduate,
learned welding in order to do useful work in USSR and recorded his experience
in a useful account who became a classic of its kind Behind the Urals and Walter
Reuther who worked for more than a year in the first big Soviet automobile plant
at Gorki.12 However, travel to Russia was not a matter of tourism but rather a
cultural diplomacy exercise for Kremlin, performed in large part by opinion
leaders from the upper strata of their professional branch. And above all always
under official guidance and supervision. Most visits were done during the 30’s
within the Intourist auspices. Both before and since the WWII, very few persons
who traveled into the USSR whether alone (under supervision) or in delegations,
had either the background knowledge or the linguistic equipment necessary to
look well behind the official version of Soviet Society. Some interesting material
in Russia both before and after the establishment of Intourist is contained in the
Soviet Union Review described by American scientists as a rather objective
magazine published in the 20’s and 30’s by Amtorg a Soviet trading organization
which operated in US since 1923. It used to keep an account of foreign tourists
who visited Soviet Union. For example in 1928 we know that there were 1600
foreign tourists who visited Moscow during the summer months (the daily visits
of an average size French or Italian museum). There was quantitative growth in
some major categories of exchanges. In 1953 only forty-two private travelers to
——————
11 Ibid, p. 22.
12 Andrew Smith, I was a Soviet worker, New York, 1936.
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7
USSR were recorded by the US analysts. 1955 and 1956 saw the first startling
expansion of the Soviet cultural exchange program, although even as late as
1959 this program remained rather symbolic in comparison with travel and
exchanges among the Western countries and continued to be dominated (as would
be till 1990) by “guided tours” pat. However, the records show a considerable
increase in the number of persons. In each of the years 1056 and 1957, it appears
between 2,500 and 3,000 Americans visited the Soviet Union, and according to
some reports an astonishing number of 14,000 in 1959.13 By the summer of 1958
American tourists had to wait only about two weeks for Soviet visas — a
considerable improvement over the situation in 1956. From the other side before
1956 hardly any Soviet citizens traveled as tourists to countries not under
communist rule. By 1956 about 2000 distinguished, highly placed, and highly
paid Soviet citizens in that year enjoyed a trip abroad. Also in 1959 at Odessa,
foreign cruise ships again began to visit the Soviet Union. The year 1958 came
with new surprises with an astonishing number of 10,000 Soviet tourists visiting
the Brussels World’s Fair, and the first Soviet private tourists visiting the US. For
the US commentators was suspicious the fact that for example the Soviet visitors
of World Fair in Brussels were hosted by their own cruise ship. We rather think
that it was a choice favored by the tourists as such having in mind the high cost
of accommodation at the time for a Soviet citizen pocket. In 1958 four groups of
Soviet citizens visited the US for two weeks organized trips. Not surprisingly the
first one was led by Vladimir Babkin an Intourist official — the group consisting
mostly in highly ranked engineers. Is significant the fact that the cost of the trip
on most cases was partially or totally supported by different organizations mainly
the union organizations.
Soviet travel to noncommunist countries was done, at least until recent times,
on a much smaller scale than travel by bourgeois foreigners to Russia. However,
the sending of cultural, scientific and athletic groups abroad did play an important
part in Soviet foreign relations even before WWII.
Of particular interests to Americans and perhaps second in significance to the
Soviet show at Brussels as a device for telling the world about Soviet achievements
was the 1959 Soviet Exhibition of Science and Technology and Culture at the
New York Coliseum. The proportions of the exhibition devoted to culture were
overshadowed by its overwhelming emphasis on scientific achievement and
industrial development, they also offered a generous sampling of the best
contemporary Soviet art, books, and even fashion. The response exhibition
organized in Moscow one year latter in June and July 1959 was a considerable
success although it adopted a different strategy. It was the strategy of emphasizing
American everyday life rather than machinery and technology. According with
diverse American reports the “technomania” of some segments of Soviet
engineering and administrative elite was not entirely satisfied by the American
——————
13 Accounts provided by Frederick C. Barghoorn, (The Soviet cultural offensive: The role of cultural
diplomacy in Soviet foreign policy, Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1976, c1960, p. 78-81), without
specifying the source.
8
131
exponates. Attendance at the American pavilion was twice as big as at the Soviet
one, however is hard to attribute this success to the quality and impressiveness
of the exponates but rather to the natural curiosity for such a display of American
products, for many ordinary citizens the first and only encounter with the eternal
enemy and technological challenger. Most of the visitors were different ranks
officials as the available tickets were scarce and limited. The reports show that
the non-communists Soviet citizens were not allowed to attend the exhibition.
With the same occasion the most famous TV Show set in US by Ed Sullivan was
recording a full variety show speculating the potential high interest of the American
public for a Russian reportage filmed on the spot. The difficulties encountered
by Ed Sullivan in connection with the Soviet bureaucracy and secrecy obsession
in Moscow and Leningrad were latter described in an article in Mc Call’s
magazine for November 1959. The Sullivan show made for the Soviet public
was appreciated as rather a failure by the critics as for the ordinary Soviet citizen
it proved to be incomprehensible.
Most probably the best results were obtained by the Soviets in cultural
diplomacy terms in Asia, Africa and Latin America. Here they proved to be more
experienced and skilled and with a discourse and strategy which cope the best
with the political environment at the time, within the process of decolonization.
It is the underdeveloped world the place where the Stalin message achieved its
greatest success proving once again the George Kennan theory. It is the place
where the Americans had at the time the biggest failures in propaganda and
cultural diplomacy terms. By not understanding the momentum, the local cultures
and mentalities the US cultural diplomacy in the underdeveloped world paved
the way to diplomatic disasters as those in the Middle East, Indochina, Central
and South America whose traces can be noticed even today. Although in terms
of number of exchanges, Soviet contacts with Asia or Africa and Latin America
have not bulked as large as those with US or Western Europe the Soviet press
and propaganda devoted more space and attention to exchanges with the less
developed countries. For example between 1954-1957, 196 Indian delegations
visited the Soviet Union compared to 348 from France, 360 from Great
Britain.14 It proved the significances of those areas in the Kremlin’s calculations.
It also according to the American analysts reflect’s the fact that Soviet Union
was capable to make a more impressive figure in the unindustrialized world (as
an industrial advanced power than in the developed western industrial countries.
Also ideologically the Soviet intellectuals feel less constrained about expressing
admiration for the culture and folk of India, Iraq or Indonesia than for Western
culture. There was not an ideological fear that Brazilian, Burmese, or Indian
culture and individuals could subvert Soviet students or intellectuals. For
instance within the USSR at the time for the ordinary or the official intellectual
was both ideologically safe and also profitable to display interest and enthusiasm
——————
14 The accounts were published in Pravda and are quoted by Frederick C. Barghoorn, in The Soviet
cultural offensive: The role of cultural diplomacy in Soviet foreign policy, Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press,
1976, c1960, p. 188.
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LUCIAN JORA
9
for those cultures and in response it was a potent instrument for winning the
affection of those people coming from such backgrounds. The sense of inferiority
and the resentments against the Western Imperialism gave a buster to these
feelings. The Soviet wooing of Asia and Africa is as old as Leninism — an
attempt to realize with other weapons and means what the Russian tsars were
unable to do. Although the ultimate goal of Soviet propaganda towards the
underdeveloped world was the eventual accession of communists to power
under the Soviet control and influence, there were short-run objectives, among
them the undermining Western influence. Another major purpose was to present
to the people and in particular to the intellectuals an appealing picture of Soviet
stile domestic and foreign policy, achievements and models of fast development
towards and industrial society. A related purpose is the establishment of personal
and organizational links between Soviet artistic, scientific, and academic community
in target areas. Soviet scholars were to demonstrate how the “republics of the
Soviet East” with the active help of the Great Russian people had overcome their
former backwardness in the shortest possible time. Two major techniques are
quoted by the American analysts as characterizing the Soviet propaganda. One
of these was to utilize exchange visits as occasions to publicizing these Soviet
achievements most calculated to convince Asians, Africans or Latin Americans
of Soviet solicitude towards them. The other and closely related technique
consisted in the careful cultivation of the predisposition and susceptibilities of
peoples whose traditions, aspirations, and grievances had been carefully studied.
An attempt was even made to camouflate the unfavorable impression made on
African, Asian and above all Moslems by traditional Soviet antireligious
propaganda. Much publicity was given to such events as the 1954 visit of a
group of Indonesian women to a Muslim seminary in Soviet Central Asia or the
pilgrimage in 1957 of Soviet Moslems to Mecca and Medina and Cairo.15
Another typical gesture of religious sentiments was the interview with the
Imam of the Moscow on its Near Eastern Service in Turkish of May 24, 1958.
The Imam criticized Western denial that there was freedom of religion in the
USSR. All religions, he declared including the Moslem faith was separate from
the state.
Numerous reports were published in the Soviet press on scientific atheistic
parties in houses of cultures. Also antireligious museums were being reopened
during the very same years. A technique which is characterized by American
reports as “collective flattering” by which Moscow attempts to cultivate particular
ethnic religious political or other groups is also applied on a national level in
efforts to win the good will of entire peoples. The mass deportation of the Moslem
Chechens and other small peoples during the WWII for alleged collaboration
with the Germans were careful hided, or even if those experiences were known
at the time, many countries were looking for a model of rapid industrialization
——————
15 Pravda, August 13, 1954 and Isvestya , July 2, 1957 quoted by Frederick C. Barghoorn, The Soviet
cultural offensive: The role of cultural diplomacy in Soviet foreign policy, Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press,
1976, c1960, p. 192. The issue was also commented by Richard. E Pipes, “The Soviet Impact in Central Asia”
in “The problems of Communism”, Vol. VI, no. 2 , March-April 1957.
10
133
and development a third way alternative form offered by the former colonial powers.
Another approach was to blame the US “imperialism” and “cosmopolitanism”
threatening to destroy native cultures and to substitute for cherished folk values
“the decadence of Hollywood”.
We had already mentioned the impressive number of Indian delegations to
visit Soviet Union between 1953-1957 this number being facilitated by a highly
sophisticated infrastructure of agreements between different ministries, cultural
associations, friendship associations, days of Indian culture, Soviet, Indian film
coproductions, campaigns of popularization and flattering of Indian culture in
Pravda or Literaturnaya Gazeta, and the not negligible preferential treatment as
compared to the Western delegations. Reports are mentioning the presence of
luxury goods at the table of Indian delegations (such as oranges).
The Soviets have trained, or exported technologies, and not invested capital
in local industrial enterprises and therefore escaped some of the criticism leveled
at Western private firms, which could be accused of seeking to gain control of
Asian industries. The Soviets and their Communist partners also were able
according to many reports to foster the appearance of nonintervention into the
economic life of developing countries by requiring their technical personnel
employed in those countries to live modestly and to limit their social contacts
with the local population. Also we may say that most of the technicians coming
from the Communist block were rather interested to save some money than to
expose any sigh of consumerism or wealth toward the locals.
In contrast the very high standard of living by local criteria of Americans ant
their often obtrusive display of wealth has reportedly aroused resentment.
Egypt offers a striking example of the eagerness and ability of the Kremlin to
pour cultural resources into areas where poverty, economic underdevelopment,
and anti-Western feeling could partly because of Western arrogance be exploited
to Soviet political advantage. Soviet exploitation of Israeli-Arab differences
since 1948 are well known. The corrupt monarchy of King Farouk supported by
the British and the efflorescence of Egyptian nationalism which followed offered
a fertile land for Soviet cultural penetration. The campaign began rather modestly
with favorable Egyptian articles on Egyptian history, culture and the publication
of scholarly works or holding of exhibitions. The articles on Egypt and not only
by different ideologues used to combine classical archeology with Marxist social
analysis. The poor human conditions in the midst of potentially rich natural
resources, the sharp contrast between peasant huts and the palatial villas of the
wealthy businessman, most of them allegedly connected with foreign capital, as
well as symbols of the “American way of life” furnished the ideologist with
incendiary texts. There were basic economic reasons for the Egyptian choice
over Russian assistance but also the general Western Imperialism paid a high
role. Soviet cultural diplomacy was carefully calculated to play upon Egyptian
grievances against the West and Israel as well as upon Egyptian national pride
and President Nasser’s personal ambitions. A flood of high tech gifts consisting
usually in jet planes offered to the rulers of the underdeveloped countries was
also a common custom practiced by the Soviets at the time. In countries were the
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LUCIAN JORA
11
regime is signified by the desire of a single person or a few ruling elite the
Soviets knew how to court them. In strict cultural terms some analysts support
the idea that the neo-classicism of Soviet painting and architecture and music
was easier to understand and master than Western modernism.16
In 1957 a wave of African trade union delegations flooded Moscow as a
clear sign that Kremlin started a vigorous campaign toward that part of the world
namely sub Saharan Africa. Soviet trade increased consistently even with
potentially hostile countries such as Pakistan and Turkey. The signs of respect
toward revolutionary Algeria, collection of food and other signs of friendship
were exponents of even further sympathy all over the third world.
As a general conclusion of this brief account for the Cultural Diplomacy and
its techniques at the peak of the Cold War we can remember the general
flattering of the subjects, the exploitation of their resentments and animosities,
the use of political momentum and above all the conquest of the ruling elite. For
us is difficult to assess the success or failure of those attempts or the extent to
which the relative success or in success of the Soviet propaganda is to be
attributed to the political momentum, the geopolitical situation or to the real
skills of the Soviets propagandists. The cultural diplomacy was rather an attribute,
an ingredient which insured relative advantages to the Soviet Union within the
geopolitical arena of the Cold War.
——————
16 Walter Z. Laqueur, The Soviet Union and The Middle East, New York, 1959, p. 292. This book contains
in its second part an interesting chapter for the issue: “Soviet cultural policy and the Intellectual Climate in the
Arab World”.
L’ULTIMA STATUA DI LENIN. L’ISOLAMENTO
DELLA COMUNITA’ RUSSA NELL’ARTICO
FRANCESCO ALBERTINI
Abstract. This contribution deals with geopolitical and geo-economics
implications in the Arctic Ocean about coal mining industry: in one of the
remotest corners of the earth, the Russian settlement of Barentsburg, a
community of 200 Ukrainians coalminers still pursue the anachronistic
and disadvantageous extraction of coal despite ecological and technological
paradoxes.
In the name of an obstinate opposition to invisible enemies of the past. Or
something else?
Introduzione
Nei primi anni novanta del Novecento, nel totale disinteresse generale, sono
stati chiusi definitivamente gli ultimi bacini carboniferi belgi di Charleroi, Liegi
e Limburgo spesso ricordati come “esordi della convivenza europea”1 e che per
numerosi italiani avevano rappresentato un’opportunità occupazionale a seguito
degli accordi italo-belgi del 1946 che prevedevano il trasferimento di manodopera
italiana in cambio di due quintali di carbone al giorno per ogni operaio.
Contemporaneamente si sono avviate alla chiusura anche le miniere di
carbone inglesi e quelle del Portogallo: la distribuzione geologica del pianeta ha
regalato proprio all’Inghilterra le più grandi riserve di carbone di buona qualità
e facilmente estraibile del Vecchio Continente tanto che già agli inizi del 1700
ne erano estratte circa 3 milioni di tonnellate all’anno che, due secoli dopo,
sarebbero diventate 2502 prima del rapido declino della produzione europea che
ebbe inizio dal secondo dopoguerra: nel 2000 la produzione complessiva europea
è scesa a circa 86 milioni di tonnellate.
Così, proprio nei paesi europei che con la Germania devono al carbone il loro
successo commerciale e la nascita della moderna società industriale, il carbone
si avvia verso il declino per lasciare il passo ad una riconversione industriale
fondata sul petrolio del Vicino Oriente, a distanza di appena mezzo secolo dalla
creazione della Comunità Europea del Carbone e dell’Acciaio (CECA) che fu
uno dei trattati costitutivi della futura Unione Europea e che fu istituita nel
——————
1 Ettore Gialdi, “I casalaschi nelle miniere di carbone in Belgio”, Archivio storico CGIL Cremona, 1998.
2 Dati Associazione ASPO-Italia, Università di Firenze.
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FRANCESCO ALBERTINI
2
tentativo di creare migliori condizioni per l’approvvigionamento regolare ed
equo di una fonte energetica ritenuta essenziale per lo sviluppo economico.
Per contro, dal 1960 la Cina cominciava la sua rivoluzione industriale basata
sul carbone ripercorrendo la stessa strada che l’Inghilterra aveva seguito un secolo
prima arrivando a produrre nel 2005 circa dieci volte in più carbone di quanto ne
sia mai stato prodotto in Inghilterra. Ed il suo ciclo è tuttora in pieno svolgimento.
La concorrenza di risorse minerali fossili ad alto ritorno energetico, come
petrolio e gas naturale, ha reso “meno economica” l’estrazione del carbone in
Europa portando ad un declino graduale della sua produzione ben prima che
abbia avuto inizio il suo esaurimento fisico. Le analisi degli economisti odierni
e passati3 a volte sembrano coincidere: il timore dell’esaurimento del petrolio
può indurre il ritorno al carbone nella guerra delle risorse energetiche?
Il carbone, ritenuto in passato il “re” delle fonti energetiche, è sulla via definitiva
del tramonto o rappresenta ancora una scelta strategica all’interno delle politiche
orientate alla diversificazione e alla sicurezza degli approvvigionamenti energetici?
Alcune risposte, che non lasciano dubbi interpretativi, arrivano dai risultati
del bilancio energetico tracciato nel Libro Verde della Commissione “Verso una
strategia europea di sicurezza dell’approvvigionamento energetico”, dai quali
emerge che il carbone e gli altri combustibili solidi (lignite e torba), con una
quota del 16% sulla copertura del fabbisogno energetico europeo, occupano la
terza posizione dopo il petrolio (41%) e il gas (22%), precedendo il contributo
del nucleare (15%) e quello offerto dall’insieme delle fonti rinnovabili (6%)4.
La strategia della Russia fornisce altre chiare risposte: vero è che il business
del carbone è pressappoco inesistente sui mercati nazionale ed estero, attrae scarsa
attenzione da parte dei politici e non registra ad oggi nessun oligarca, al contrario
delle compagnie petrolifere. Altrettanto vero però che in Russia esistono ancora vaste
risorse carbonifere e che negli ultimi tempi alcune regioni hanno avviato la
riconversione delle proprie centrali da gas a carbone con il placet del monopolista
Gazprom: l’oblast di Kemerovo, nella Siberia sud-occidentale, che comprende
lo storico bacino carbonifero del Kuzbass, ne effettuerà 16 nei prossimi anni.
La Russia mira a conservare la propria posizione in Europa nella produzione
di energia elettrica sfruttando anche le preoccupazioni di ordine ambientale che
hanno già frenato un’ulteriore espansione dell’utilizzo dei combustibili solidi, a
vantaggio del gas naturale proveniente proprio dalla Russia che ha guadagnato
in Europa molte posizioni negli ultimi anni nella generazione di energia elettrica.
Emblematico in questo senso quanto sta accadendo nella remota regione di
Barentsburg, nel Mar Glaciale Artico, a 78° di latitudine nord. Un antico centro
minerario popolato esclusivamente da poche centinaia di russi ed ucraini che
oggi rischia di scomparire. Questa caduta libera demografica, determinata da ragioni
economiche, sembra essere tuttavia in aperto contrasto con i progetti di investimento
che la Russia ha finanziato proprio negli ultimi tempi. Contraddizioni tipiche del
mercato o piuttosto un rilancio dello sfruttamento minerario?
——————
3 Stanley William Jevons, “La Questione del Carbone”, 1856.
4 Archivio Energy Views, “L’Opzione carbone”, N° 1-Aprile 2006, http://www.enel.it/attivita/novita_eventi/
energy_views/archivio/index_01.asp.
3
L’ULTIMA STATUA DI LENIN
137
A varie scale geografiche, una analisi della popolazione russa insediata nelle
Isole Svalbard e dei processi di cambiamento che la interessano rappresenta un
punto di riferimento essenziale per seguire da vicino le politiche di sviluppo che
Mosca intende perseguire nell’immediato futuro in questa regione ritenuta
ancora di vitale importanza strategica.
L’obiettivo di questa indagine, che riscopre una pista già tracciata nel 1995
dal Professor Franco Pelliccioni5, è anzitutto quello di comprendere come, in
correlazione con i processi di mobilità geografica, si rafforzino nell’Artico polarità
esistenti e si mettano in atto contemporaneamente nuove attività economiche che
vanno ad incidere sulle forme e i processi dello sviluppo locale.
Dall’attivita’ baleniera alle risorse minerarie
Nel 1630 in Inghilterra delitti, furti, e rapine non si contavano. In uno degli
innumerevoli processi che si svolgevano a Londra, otto criminali ebbero dal
giudice un’alternativa alla condanna a morte: un soggiorno di cinque inverni in
una stazione di caccia alle balene nelle isole Svalbard, scoperte tre decenni
prima dal navigatore olandese Willem Barents e ribattezzate Spitzbergen a causa
delle aguzze punte montagnose. Naturalmente gli otto scelsero la vita e qui
furono trasferiti, ma dopo il primo inverno, fecero pervenire una preghiera: “Per
favore veniteci a prendere e ad impiccare. Lo preferiamo a quest’ inferno”. Nel
XVII° sec., da queste parti, catturare una balena significava ricchezza: l’olio
distillato dal suo pannicolo adiposo serviva per illuminare le strade della città e
per lavorare la lana nelle filande, i fanoni per ottenere stecche di ombrelli, grate
per finestre, molle per divani. Allora la caccia non era un’inutile strage. Un
discorso simile, che forse oggi gli animalisti contesteranno, riguardava i “Trappers”,
o cacciatori di pellicce, che catturavano orsi e volpi con l’ausilio di trappole per
fare commercio delle loro pelli.
Di quella lontana epoca rimangono oggi soltanto alcune minuscole capanne
(hut) nelle località più remote dove i cacciatori erano soliti stabilirsi, mirabilmente
conservatesi grazie al clima e piacevoli attrazioni turistiche dell’arcipelago delle
Svalbard.
Il Trattato del 1925, che stabilì la sovranità norvegese sulle isole, impegnava
il Re Haakon VII a smilitarizzarle e a permetterne lo sfruttamento minerario
anche ad altre nazioni, così le Svalbard da allora sono diventate oggetto di
contesa per le ricche miniere di carbone: con il progressivo declino dell’attività
baleniera, i cacciatori furono sostituiti dai minatori.
Ugualmente le prime esplorazioni polari ebbero dei fini commerciali, come
la ricerca del passaggio a Nord-Est e a Nord-Ovest per aggirare rispettivamente
la Russia e la Groenlandia verso lo stretto di Bering: esploratori e scienziati
come Nansen, Amundsen e Nobile, mossi forse più dall’ambizione e dallo
spirito d’avventura che da interessi economici, hanno scritto le prime pagine di
storia di queste terre negli anni che precedettero lo scoppio della II Guerra Mondiale.
——————
5 F. Pelliccioni, “Viaggio ai confini del mondo: nelle polari isole Svalbard tra i minatori russi e norvegesi”,
L’Universo, LXXV, 6, Nov-Dic. 1995, p. 800-818.
138
FRANCESCO ALBERTINI
4
Nascita dei centri minerari sovietici
Durante gli anni del conflitto l’arcipelago fu teatro di scontro tra tedeschi e
britannici: il 6 Settembre 1943 due navi da guerra germaniche, gli incrociatori
Scharnhorst e la ben più celebre Tirpitz insieme ad altre navi rasero al suolo tutte
le cittadine delle Svalbard, tra le quali Barentsburg, situata lungo il Grønfjorden
(il Fiordo verde), sbarcandovi anche truppe d’assalto. Furono bombardati
l’osservatorio meteorologico ed altre installazioni alle Spitzbergen.
Il giorno di Natale del 1943 la Scharnhorst fu affondata dai siluri di un caccia
norvegese mentre si apprestava ad attaccare un convoglio diretto a Murmansk:
dei millenovecento uomini salpati il giorno prima, ne sopravvissero solo trentasei.
La ricostruzione di Barentsburg, operata dai sovietici dopo la fine della
seconda guerra mondiale, fu piuttosto rapida. Già nel 1947 la ripresa delle attività
da parte della Compagnia Trust Arktikugol garantiva il costante rifornimento di
carbone per l’industria siderurgica olandese e per quella sovietica.
Barentsburg dopo lo scioglimento dell’URSS: decremento
demografico e nuovi investimenti nell’estrazione mineraria
Il 29 Agosto 1996, tutti i centoquarantuno passeggeri a bordo del volo 2601
della Vnokovo Airlines persero la vita nel tragico schianto di un Tupolev 154
sulla montagna Operafjellet, poco distante da Barentsburg. Si trattava per la
maggior parte di cittadini di nazionalità ucraina diretti nella comunità per trascorrere
le vacanze assieme ai propri famigliari e di operai destinati a raggiungere il
luogo di lavoro.
“Mountains!!!” furono le ultime parole del co-pilota, il quale non parlava
inglese, la lingua operativa, e anziché effettuare la classica manovra di turn over
prevista per gli atterraggi sull’Artico “(…) entrò dritto in una stretta valle stanti
incertezze procedurali”.
Un secondo incidente si aggiunse a questa tragedia appena un anno dopo, nel
Settembre 1997, quando ventitre minatori morirono a causa di una esplosione in
una miniera nella stessa Barentsburg. Gli standard di sicurezza delle miniere
russe nell’Artico, ritenuti comunque superiori a quelli esistenti nelle miniere
ucraine, si rilevarono inadeguati a tal punto che la stessa miniera fu chiusa a
seguito dell’apertura di un’inchiesta delle autorità norvegesi sui fatti accaduti.
Oggi gli impianti hanno ripreso regolarmente a funzionare.
Ma le cause del decremento demografico nella comunità di Barentsburg non
sono solamente accidentali. In primo luogo la transizione attualmente in atto, rompe
una consolidata relazione fra economia e territorio. Questo ha determinato per
gli operai “sopravvissuti” (oggi ne contiamo circa trecento) la necessità di
despecializzazione, tipica delle condizioni di crisi, ma anche di rispecializzazione, in
relazione alle opportunità. Entrambi gli stimoli sono sempre richiamati nel caso
di Barentsburg dove la minaccia della chiusura degli impianti ha dapprima prevalso
sulle opportunità di mobilitazione delle risorse locali per poi cedere il passo6.
——————
6 Cfr., su questo punto, Paolo Doccioli, “Lo sviluppo dei sistemi locali fra territorio e reti: autoriconoscimento,
despecializzazione, rispecializzazione” — articolo apparso su Geotema n. 3/2004, Patron Editore, p. 39-58.
5
L’ULTIMA STATUA DI LENIN
139
Secondo il quarantesimo Rapporto Anagrafico presentato al Parlamento
Norvegese nel 1985, all’epoca del regime sovietico, 1.220 persone erano registrate
come residenti a Barentsburg. Nell’estate del 1994 la popolazione subì una
prima brusca diminuzione perché tutti i bambini e le donne che non avevano un
impiego furono rispediti a casa a seguito di misure di austerità apportate dalla
Compagnia: Barentsburg cessò così da allora di essere una Comunità Familiare.
All’epoca del censimento del 1999, quando la Compagnia permise di nuovo ai
minatori di ricongiungersi con i familiari, 939 persone erano presenti a Barentsburg,
in prevalenza di nazionalità russa ed ucraina, la maggior parte dei quali dipendenti
della Trust Arktikugol.
Sono trascorsi settantacinque anni dall’inizio dello sfruttamento delle miniere di
carbone da parte della Russia nell’Alto Artico. Ancora oggi, nel 2006, la Compagnia
Trust Arktikugol (con sede a Mosca) amministra la Comunità di Barentsburg
come nella passata era sovietica: il contratto iniziale, che ha una durata biennale,
garantisce ai minatori praticamente tutti i servizi, compresi la mensa, gli alloggi,
l’utilizzo della piscina di 25 metri nella Casa dello Sport ultimata nel 1988, un
anno prima dell’inaugurazione del nuovo hotel lungo il corso principale.
Teoricamente gli operai non hanno bisogno di denaro. Praticamente non ne
hanno e questo fa si che l’attuale struttura sociale della Comunità non differisca
molto da quella passata.
Malgrado tutto Barentsburg appare ancora come un’area tipicamente
marginale rispetto alla madrepatria, penalizzata dai suoi vincoli geomorfologici
e pertanto impossibilitata a partecipare alla crescita socioeconomica riscontrata
negli altri insediamenti distaccati russi. Il pensiero va anzitutto qui a Kaliningrad,
alle isole del Commodoro ed all’isola di Wrangel. Remote regioni dove sopravvivono
modelli di comportamento e stili di vita considerati arcaici.
L’assenza di una rete regolare di trasporti tra la comunità mineraria di
Barentsburg ed i restanti insediamenti delle Svalbard, provoca in aggiunta a ciò
un diffuso senso di isolamento specialmente tra i Russi. Attualmente la
Compagnia Trust Arktikugol si serve per i propri collegamenti internazionali e
per i rimpatri urgenti della base di Kapp Heer, dove staziona un solo elicottero.
La Compagnia si è dimostrata incapace di trattenere la popolazione, attratta
dalla migliore qualità della vita e dai più alti e dinamici livelli dell’attività
sociale, relazionale e culturale riscontrabili sulla terraferma. Conseguenza di
questo un impoverimento del tessuto sociale ed economico, ridotto al ruolo di
custode e gestore delle risorse territoriali (il carbone, appunto) localmente presenti.
A parte pochi turisti curiosi che arrivano a Barentsburg da Longyearbyen,
distante 45 km, una modesta attività di studi meteorologici e sismici che ha dato
origine alla nascita di un piccolo Museo di Storia naturale ed archeologica e, dal
1992, una piccola industria tessile, la Barents Tekstil, dove una quarantina di
donne (norvegesi) lavorano nella confezione di abiti per bambini destinati al
mercato sulla terraferma, l’estrazione mineraria rappresenta oggi come in passato
a Barentsburg la principale risorsa economica della Comunità.
La gran parte del carbone estratto dalle miniere di Barentsburg (nel 1998,
secondo i dati resi disponibili dal Commissario Minerario delle Svalbard, 419
140
FRANCESCO ALBERTINI
6
tonn.) è destinato al mercato olandese, il restante viene inviato a Murmansk, nella
penisola di Kola, ed utilizzato per alimentare le centrali russe del Mar Bianco di
Kem, Severodvinsk ed Arcangelo. Da novembre a maggio questi porti sono gelati
paralizzando di fatto i traffici commerciali.
Anche se oggi il carbone non riveste più quella importanza strategica che
aveva in passato la Trust Arktikugol sta progettando la riapertura della vicina
miniera di Grumant (chiusa dal 1961) ed ha richiesto alle autorità norvegesi
l’autorizzazione per la costruzione di una strada asfaltata che metterà in diretto
collegamento Barentsburg e Colesbukta.
Sembra che da Mosca arrivino segnali di accelerazione nell’accoglimento e
nello sviluppo dell’innovazione, vero motore dei moderni processi di sviluppo.
La “montagna aguzza” di Barentsburg non è più pensata come luogo di
sopravvivenza di tecniche e procedimenti obsoleti e scarsamente efficienti. Oggi
si punta verso il superamento dei suddetti vincoli geomorfologici e climatici, che
resta ad ogni modo particolarmente difficile e problematico dal punto di vista
tecnico e da quello economico, perché richiede grandi capacità tecnologiche e
grande impiego di capitali.
Una volta attenuato il ruolo marginalizzante della geomorfologia l’obiettivo
principale da raggiungere sarà quello di allacciare il bacino carbonifero artico
alla rete continentale. Del resto l’industria estrattiva non è stata mai del tutto
abbandonata, né avrebbe potuto esserlo, dato che il materiale va estratto dove si
trova. Il carbone ha mantenuto una buona redditività, si è continuato ad estrarlo,
ma ciò ha potuto essere realizzato grazie ad un grosso impegno nel contenere “il
disturbo” sugli altri settori Non sarà neppure necessario limitare alla bocca della
miniera il processo di primo trattamento, trasferendo le successive fasi di lavorazione
nel continente, in quanto a Barentsburg il disturbo ambientale e l’interferenza
con le altre attività economiche sono decisamente contenuti.
BIBLIOGRAFIA
Coro’ G. (1996) Nordest: Morfologia di un paesaggio industriale, Torino, Fondazione Agnelli.
G. Jones, I Vichinghi, Roma: Newton Compton, 1978 (1968).
F. Pelliccioni, “Viaggio ai confini del mondo: nelle polari isole Svalbard tra i minatori russi e norvegesi”,
L’Universo, LXXV, 6, Nov-Dic. 1995, p. 800-818.
J. Rothschild, Etnopolitica. Il fattore etnico nella realtà politica internazionale, Milano: SugarCo, 1984
(1981).
E. Wahlgren, I Vichinghi e l’America, Milano: Bompiani, 1991 (1986).
Franciosi, Maria Laura, Sergio Scocci e Anna Tanini, a cura di, Per un sacco di carbone, Bruxelles, Acli
Belgio, 1996.
OPPOSITION’S PARTIES AND FUNCTIONS
OF LEGISLATIVE POWER IN MEXICO
ALEJANDRA VIZCARRA
Abstract. In Mexico, the opposition’s parties saw reduced their possibilities
of acting like political counterbalance of the governing party to the legislative
organs for more than seven decades. The present article gives account of
the trajectory followed by the opposition’s parties in the Mexican Congress
and the role carried out by the legislative Power in the political system. It
analyzes the legislative activity of the Chamber of Deputies in a period of
low partisan competitiveness and little legislative representation of the
opposition’s parties, as well as the changes that this activity presents as
soon as the opponents obtain a number of parliamentary seats that, as a whole,
surpasses those of the party in the government. It is stated that the competitive
opposition’s parties are essential elements that start up the parliamentary
mechanisms and invigorate the functions of the Legislative Power.
The parliaments or congresses described as democratic are distinguished like
institutions that regulate and allow the coexistence of a plurality of political
orientations. According to Morlino it means “to allow in a continued way the
expression of the opposition” and to guarantee it an institutional space.1 The
literature on legislatures stands out like main functions the representation of the
diversity, the deliberation, the generation of information, its decision-making
character, and the control on the majority and the government.2 Functions that
intensify or reduce according to the power whereupon they count such organs or
rather, of the power that the parliamentary groups in their interior obtain, “more
power for parliament is to speak of more power for the opposition”.3 Between
the several aspects that the opposition’s phenomenon presents, the parliamentary
opposition has an individual importance because it refers to a stage of improvement
of the political orderings. It is at the parliament where the political opposition
——————
1 The author points other aspects such as: collective character, nonhierarchic; the permanence of the
institution and general competition; the mandate temporarily defined of its members, their entailment with the
institutional processes of the representation, in Cotta, Maurizio, Leonardo Morlino and Donatella Della Porta,
Scienza Politica, Bologna, Il Mulino, 2001, p. 310.
2 Carey, M. John, “Legislative organization” in R. A. W. Rodees, Sarah A. Binder and Bert A. Rockman,
Political Institutions, London, Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 431.
3 Gallagher, Michael, Laver Michael and Peter Mair, Representative government in Modern Europe.
Institutions, parties, and governments, New York, McGraw-Hill, 2005, 4th ed., p. 70.
142
ALEJANDRA VIZCARRA
2
simultaneously assumes a form of institutional control and component necessary
for power limitation.4
The Mexican Congress under one party predominance
Per decades the Mexican Congress reduces the functions of control, legislative
and representation attributed in a central way to the representative assemblies. In
its dawn (1917-1929), the congress was constituted like a space in which the
revolutionary factions dissolved their political conflicts, a space in which the
legislators fronted the presidential proposals based on personal loyalties towards
their “caudillos”, than in ideologies or programs. In spite of the fragmentation of
the political power and the absence of an institutionalized system of parties, the
Congress, in his first periods,5 works like an element of counterbalance to the
decisions of the president due partly to the heterogeneity of the revolutionary
groups that integrated it, and the not predominance of only one of them.
The formation of Partido Nacional Revolucionario (PNR) in 1929 marked
the beginning of a new stage in the legislative life when developing mechanisms
that sanctioned the indiscipline and compensated the cooperation of the legislators
in the congress.6 The intervention of the Comite Ejecutivo Nacional (CEN) of
the PNR served then, to discourage the competing formation of blocks or currents,
and to integrate consistent and disciplined majorities in favour of the initiatives
of the president. In the congress, therefore, a one party dynamic prevailed of
powers and the control of the governmental actions.
More than an institution guarantor of the liberal democracy, the Mexican congress
performed a function of maintenance for the authoritarian political system in
gestation, when serving like source for legitimizing the presidencialism7, like
space of mobility of the political class and element of balance between
the political forces of the hegemonic party.8 The submission of the congress to
the presidential aims came together with a model of corporative representation,
based on the centralized power of organized groups of interest, as well as on a
strategy of state political integration that consists in the establishment of tripartite
relations between enterprise organizations and unions under the regulation of the
State.9 Thus, the legislative took care of the interests articulated by the president
in turn and of his initiatives without public debate.
——————
4 De Vergottini, Giuseppe, Lo Shadow Cabinet, Milano, Giuffrè Editore, 1973, pp. 2-3.
5 Weldon, Jeffrey, “Las estrategias presidenciales con gobierno dividido en México, 1917-1937” in Casar, María
Amparo and Ignacio Marván (coord.), Gobernar sin mayoría. México 1867-1997, México, Taurus-CIDE,
2002, pp. 265-292.
6 Benito Nacif indicates as main means of pressure the threat of expulsion of the party and the control on
the nomination of candidates, which was reinforced when the right of the local parties was suppressed to
participate in the federal elections and to cancel the re-election. “El impacto del PNR en la lucha por la
presidencia y la supervivencia política de los legisladores” in Casar, María Amparo and Ignacio Marván (coords.)
Gobernar sin mayoría. México 1867-1997, México, Taurus-CIDE, 2002, p. 254.
7This term, more than talk about a particular form of government, indicates the over-sized exercise of the
political power that had the mexican president, mainly, by practices of informal type that were effective in the
Mexican political system. See Carpizo, Jorge, El presidencialismo mexicano, Editorial Siglo XXI, México, 1979.
8 Santiago Castillo, Javier, “El poder legislativo: de la hegemonía al pluralismo” in Diálogo y debate,
1999, p. 51.
9 Held, David, Modelos de democracia, México, Alianza Universidad, 1996, pp. 259-260.
LEGISLATIVE POWER IN MEXICO
3
143
The sectorial and corporative policy articulated under the auspice of the
government of President Lazaro Cárdenas at the end of the thirties, reinforced the
monopoly of the political representation of the renovated PRM, later PRI10 inside
of both chambers, as much as the policy of informal negotiation and “closed
doors” moved away of the public scrutiny. With it, the role of the congress as supreme
centre for the agreement and the joint of policies went eroding making of it a
structure of transaction of laws previously decided, and of ratification of the
presidential initiatives. In this scene, beyond the limitations that the State imposed
through the manipulation of the electoral process, the partisan opposition hardly
would find institutional channels to represent the social interests of its members
and followers. Less still, to stay in the political game. The parliamentary
representation served to the functional representation of interests through
delegates of the corporations, unions and organizations of the State, privileging
therefore the extra parliamentary political processes. This situation began to
generate problems in the political system: the presence of oppositions
antisystems became more consistent and, the Partido Acción Nacional (PAN)
constituted since 1939, being the only partisan opposition with autonomy of the
regimen and attached to the rules, refused his participation on the legislature.11
At the beginnings of seventies, the “corporative umbrella” was already narrow
to include a society that, product of the modernization of the country, varied in
its composition like in supporting the government and its party. The absence of
pluralism in the legislative chambers reflected the total control that the governing
party exerted on the political representation and the asphyxia of the opposition
parties; situation that paid to the critics against the regime, cracking the democratic
facade with which it was tried to cover the true authoritarianism. The new format
of the representation changed, when incorporated the figure of the “deputies of
party” (1963) and with this were integrated in the Chamber of deputies the political
minorities; but in fact, the legislative representation continued operating remote
of the liberal democratic principles and with the same discipline imposed by the
majority party. Although the House of Representatives counted with the presence
of diverse oppositional parties. They had low representation of them. In this way
avoided to put in risk the legislative one-party predominance, as well as the consistent
approval of the presidential initiatives.
Majority opposition and redefinition of the political power
in the Chamber of deputies
The activity of the congress without competing dynamics lasted until 1988,
year in which the oppositions parties increased significantly their competitiveness
obtaining 47.8% of the representation in the Chamber of deputies, and on whom
for the first time they became indispensable to carry out constitutional reforms.
——————
9
Held, David, Modelos de democracia, México, Alianza Universidad, 1996, pp. 259-260.
10 The PNR, after their foundation, had two transformations: one in 1938 promoted by the President
Lazaro Cárdenas, thus the party’s name changed first, as Partido de la Revolución Mexicana (PRM), and then,
in 1946 as the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI), this name being conserved to our present time.
11 In 1962 after the legislative elections, the PAN ordered its deputies to retire of the Chamber of deputies
in protest by the fraud that, according to this party, had been committed in the electoral process.
144
ALEJANDRA VIZCARRA
4
After an interval of two periods of recovery of the governing party, in the federal
elections of 1991 and 1994, the opposition parties, as a whole, obtained, in the LVII
legislature (1997), the majority necessary to approve secondary legislations without
the aid of the governing party when holding the 52.2% of the seats.
Period
TABLE 1
Evolution of the opposition parties in the Chamber of deputies,
1961-2003 (in percentage of seats)
Party in
government*
%
Oppositions parties
%
1961-1964
97.19
2.81
PAN, PPS, PARM, PNM
1967-1970
82.94
17.06
PAN, PPS, PARM
1964-1967
1970-1973
1973-1976
1976-1979
1979-1982
1982-1985
1985-1988
1988-1991
1991-1994
1994-1997
1997-2000
2000-2003
2003-2006
84.76
83.57
83.12
81.86
74.5
74.7
72
52.2
65.4
60.2
47.6
41.2
29.59
15.24
16.43
16.88
18.14
25.5
25.3
28
47.8
34.6
39.8
52.4
58.8
69.91
PAN, PPS, PARM
PAN, PPS, PARM
PAN, PPS, PARM
PAN, PPS, PARM
PAN, PPS, PARM, PDM, PC, PST
PAN, PPS, PDM, PSUM, PST
PAN, PPS, PDM, PSUM, PST, PRT, PMT
PAN, FDN (PPS, PARM, PMS, PFCRN)
PAN, PPS, PARM, PRD, PFCRN
PAN, PRD, PT
PAN, PRD, PVEM, PT, IND.
PRI, PRD, PVEM, PT, PAS, CD-PPN, PSN, IND.
PRI, PRD, PVEM, CONVER., PT, IND.
* PRI until the year 2000, PAN in the period of 2000-2006.
Sources: Luis Carlos Ugalde, The mexican congress. Old Player, New Power, Washington, D.C,
CSIS, 2001, p. 146; Silvia Gómez Tagle, La transición inconclusa. Treinta años de elecciones en México,
México, COLMEX, 2nd. ed., 2001, pp. 67-69.
On the other hand, the Senate, in spite of observing a much slower evolution,
also registered changes as far as its composition and influences to perform its
function of revisory chamber of the legislative proposals. Already from 1997,
5
145
when being into the hands of the governing party the majority in the Senate, this
have the possibility of stopping the initiatives of law of the Chamber of deputies,
conformed in its majority by political parties from opposition to the government.
The introduction of Senators of first minority (1993) and the introduction of
a proportional representation system (1996) in this Chamber, made easy the way
so that the competing parties acceded to a space of the representation that had to
them been striped,12 activating with it the control systems that require a structure
of government with division of powers. With the change of party at the federal
government in the elections of 2000, for the first time the opposition as a whole
obtained the majority control of both chambers.
Period
TABLE 2
Evolution of the partisan opposition at the Senate,
(1988-2003 in percentage of seats)
Party in
government*
%
Oppositions parties
%
1988-1991
93.75
6.25
Frente Democrático
1994-1997
76.56
23.44
PAN, PRD
1991-1994
1997-2000
2000-2003
95.31
59.38
35.94
4.69
40.62
64.06
PAN, PRD
PAN, PRD, PT
PRI, PRD, PVEM
* PRI until the year 2000, PAN for the period 2000-2003.
Source: Josefina Cortés Campos and Luis Raigosa Sotelo, Las facultades de control del Senado
de la República, México, ITAM, Porrúa, Senado de la República LIX Legislatura, 2003, p. 32.
The historical trajectory followed by the Congress in Mexico pays evidence
to the theoretical affirmation of which the competitive parties are essential elements
to start up the parliamentary mechanisms and to avoid the separation of powers
to the merely formal plane.13 Carl Smith indicated that the parliament does not
have to be only a member of balance, but indeed being the legislative power, must
be balance in itself, to restore a system of negotiations instead of an absolute unit,
of balance of points of view and opinions; the author indicated that “the existence
of an opposition belongs to the same essence of the parliament and each chamber.”14
——————
12
In 1988 five Senators of opposition by the majority principle entered by first occasion the Chamber of
Senators.
13 Brennan Geoffrey and Alan Hamlin, Democratic devices and desires, London, Cambrige University
Press, 2000, p. 213.
14 Schmitt, Carl, Sobre el parlamentarismo, Madrid, Ed. Tecnos, 1996, p. 52.
146
ALEJANDRA VIZCARRA
6
With the plural integration of parties in both chambers new balances between
powers have been generated, as result from a confrontation between the winning
political forces, and of those they are against to. From 1988 the competing parties
could agree to a series of electoral reforms that made possible the accomplishment
of more and more competitive elections, thus the democratic transition in Mexico
implied more than the substitution of a party for another, a new distribution of
the partisan power that it has required of continuous multipartisan operations for
guaranteeing effectiveness in the decisions and to maintain the governability in
the country.15
The fact that no party reaches the relative majority to approve secondary
legislation, has forced government to decide with the future minorities courses
of action to carry out its governmental program. When a single party held in
addition to the absolute majority, the two third parts in both cameras, it could be
annulled one of the procedures that the political theory indicates like guarantee
of protection of the right of the political minorities against the abuses of the
majorities. The new competitive conditions and the consequent distribution of
benches, generated a different logic from which traditionally stayed during the
presidential period and the hegemonic party system. The governmental politic
from then, consisted not only of tolerating to the partisan opposition and yielding
to its demands at moments in which the conjuncture demands it, but in respecting
the competing parties like minorities but representative forces of a part of the
population, still more considering that, from 1997, altogether represent a greater
number of wills than those of the governing party.
Although the electoral reforms that introduced the principle of proportionality
favoured the relative alternance16, in reality was the alliance of all the political
forces of opposition in the chambers of deputies17 that made possible change the
norms and the majority practices in the representative institution to agree them
with a democracy of consensual type, one of the possible forms to organize and
to govern the democracy that, according to Lijphart, refers to a model in which
a great participation of different actors in the government and in the decision
making is privileged, that is to say, a model in which the amplitude of the
majorities is preferrable instead of concentrating the political power into the
hands of a little and sometimes relative majority.18
——————
15 Lujambio, Alonso, El poder compartido. Un ensayo sobre la democratización mexicana, México, Ed.
Océano, 2000, pp. 27-30.
16 There are diverse modalities of alternance, being these presidential or congressional, in this last
assumption the president could have the majority in the two cameras, a single one or no. The alternance is
relative when the opposition obtains the power in one of the organs, that is to say, when the legislative and the
presidency corresponds to different holders, in Quermonne, Jean-Luois, L´alternance au pouvoir, Press Universitaire
de France, Paris, 1988, pp. 27-28.
17 At beginnings of the LVII legislature (1997) was constituted an alliance only between oppositions
parties with presence at the chamber to install the commissions and to guarantee a proportional distribution of
them. The commissions are a central piece in the legislative process because in them is discussed the content
of the legislation before it was voted in the plenary session. The ideological differences between their members
(PAN, PRD, PT and PVE) prevented the durability of this alliance in time. Passed three months the parties
guided their legislative activity based more on his owns principles.
18 Lijphart, Arend, Modelos de democracia. Formas de gobierno y resultados en treinta y seis países,
Barcelona, Editorial Ariel, 2000.
147
7
In as much the governing party maintained the handling centralized of the
commissions, the representative institution had operated under logic of one party
majority. The opposition legislators consequently, had privileged the public debate
in tribune in damage of their critical contribution in commissions where most of
priístas legislators exerted his power rejecting or stopping the procedure of the
proposals of the opponents.19
After 1997, no party counted with absolute majorities in a commission, and
the distribution of the presidencies of them between the parties has been seen
holds to a proportionality criterion (see table 3); with this, the agreements began
to be forced in the parliamentary practice. Thus, after coming to the institutional
adjustment of proportionality in the commissions, and the measurement in which,
no political force could have more of the half of their members, the oppositions
parties increased its level of influence to alter the contents and the course of the
initiatives of the governing party, but also to promote initiatives of its interest
with greater probabilities of success; which meant the first step of a chain of
parliamentary regulations that would allow to the competing parties the attainment
of a greater participation in the government decisions.
TABLE 3
Proportionality representation in votes,
Percentage of seats and presidencies of commissions (1988-2006)
Legislature
LIV Legislature
(1988-1991)
LV Legislature
(1991-1994)
LVI Legislature
(1994-1997)
LVII Legislature
(1997-2000)
LVIII Legislature
(2000-2003)
LIX Legislature
(2003-2006)
LX Legislature
(2006-2009)
PRI
PAN
PRD
Percentage
of
of
of
of
of
of
of
of
of
pressident’s
pressident’s
pressident’s
vote seats
vote seats
vote seats
commissions
commissions
commissions
51.1
52
89.8
17.9 20.2
5.1
29.1 27.8
5.1
58.4
64
81.4
16.8 17.8
4.7
7.9
8.2
4.7
66.7
24.9 23.8
18.8
16.1
14
12.5
47.4
48.1
25.8 23.4
24.1
24.9 24.0
20.4
36.8 41.7
42.5
38.2 41.5
40
18.6 10.4
10.0
36.7 40.6
42.9
30.7 29.5
28.6
17.6 19.5
19.0
28.1 21.2
25.0
33.4 41.4
34.1
28.9 25.4
25.0
48.5 60.2
38
Sources: Silvia Gómez Tagle, La transición inconclusa. Treinta años de elecciones en
México, México, COLMEX, 2da. edición, 2001, Database of IFE in http://www.ife.org.mx and
http://sil.gobernacion.gob.mx/Numeralia/Legisladores/index.php (sistema de información
legislativa de la Secretaría de Gobernación)
——————
19 Nacif Hernández, Benito, “El sistema de comisiones permanentes” in Germán Pérez and Antonia
Martínez, La Cámara de diputados en México, México, Ed. Porrúa, FLACSO and Cámara de Diputados LVII
Legislatura, 2000, pp. 58-59.
148
ALEJANDRA VIZCARRA
8
The new model of parliamentary activity
The new capacity of decision of the competing opposition parties and the
increment of legislative political power modified the forms in which the varied
social and political interests were discussed and negotiated; thus, the parliamentary
negotiation began to be developed in at least five dimensions: a) of the executive
authority to the Legislative one; b) of the local governments20 to the Congress; c)
of the groups organized to the Legislative one; d) those that are exerted between the
parliamentary groups in the chambers; e) and those that take place inside the
parliamentary groups. Between these it must consider in addition the adjustments
between the President and his party. This new format of political negotiation
between diverse actors was reinforced with specialized offices of connection
between the Executive authority and the Legislative one upon maturity to take the
agreements in the camera; on the other hand, the local executives by means of the
National Conference of Governors, and the sectors organized and of the private
initiative using itself specialized consultancies have looked for to influence the
sense of the legislative decisions concentrating the lobbying and the promotion of
initiatives of their interest with the members of the different commissions.21 The
opposition parties represented in this scheme new channels of influence to give
course to the demands and interest, in addition, when increasing its power of
amendment and obstruction (veto), were generated incentives for contribution to
elaborate the legislation.
As it can well be observed in the data presented in table 4, one of the aspects that
varied substantially from the presence of a competing majority in the Congress was
the legislative performance as much of the president as of the oppositions parties.
Great part of the legislative work in the Congress had concentrated in the analysis
and approval of the presidential initiatives, not even of the parliamentary fraction of
the PRI, (although if the president counted on a disciplined support of this party).22
As we can see, the president was located like the main legislator. He obtained a
high percentage of approval of his bills over any other formal actor in the Chamber
of deputies. However, during the periods of government with opposition majority
in the Chamber of deputies (1997 to 2006), in average, the president proposed a
total of 49 initiatives of law, an inferior number in order to the main political parties
(PRI 433), (PRD 305) and (PAN 320). The presidential legislative agenda, denote
a contraction in the rate of approval that varies of 98.5 percents of bills proposed in
the LV legislature (1991-1994), to only 63.3 percents in the LIX legislature (20002006). The decrement in the approval of presidential initiatives of law agrees with
the gradual diminution of the parliamentary presence of the party in the government
in both chambers. Although in 1997, the president loses the absolute majority in the
——————
20 Mexico is based in federal system of government, with a local government for each state (32 in total).
21 Mascott Sánchez, María de los Ángeles, “Cabildeando a la nación”, Metapolítica, July-September
2007, no. 54, p. 80.
22 Meyenberg Leycegui, Yolanda, “La Cámara de Diputados y la oposición en México”, in Germán Pérez
and Antonia Martínez, La Cámara de diputados en México, México, Ed. Porrúa, FLACSO y Cámara de
Diputados LVII Legislatura, 2000, pp. 132 and 136.
9
149
TABLE 4
Legislative production (1991-1997)
Chamber of deputies he still conserved the absolute majority in the Senate; in 2000,
the alternance in the presidency, was not accompanied by the congressional
alternance, leaving to the President in quality of minority in both Chambers, in the
federal elections of 2003, the representation of the opposition is fortified still more,
locating the party of the president like the second force.
TABLE 4
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151
11
TABLE 4
LIX Legislature (2003-2006)
Executive
Total of
Bills
introduced
49
Bills
without
resolution
13
Bills refused
5
Bills
approved
31
PRI
965
692
143
130
PRD
485
392
56
37
PAN
Other parties
or independent
deputies
Local congress
Alliance of
parties
Total
558
433
66
59
Percentage
of bills
approved
63.3
13.5
10.6
7.6
682
452
172
58
8.5
117
84
20
13
11.1
84
39
15
30
35.7
2940
2105
477
358
12.2
Sources: For the numbers of LV y LVI legislatures, Meyenberg Leycegui, Yolanda, “La
Cámara de Diputados y la oposición en México”, Germán Pérez y Antonia Martínez, La Cámara
de diputados en México, México, Ed. Porrúa, FLACSO y Cámara de Diputados LVII Legislatura,
2000, p. 135; for the LVII, LVIII y LIX legislatures, I refer the statistic information of the Sistema
de información legislativa de la Secretaría de Gobernación http://sil.gobernacion.gob.mx/
Numeralia/Legisladores/index.php
The opposition parties showed a noticeable interest to present greater number
of initiatives of law than the President. As a consequence, the legislative
production increment in volume but the percentage of approval was smaller.
Taking like referring of comparison the LV Legislature (1991-1994) and the LIX
Legislature (2003-2006), the total of bills proposed passed of 266 to 2,940, in
absolute terms has been approved little more of the double (163 bills in the first
legislative period of reference in contrast to 358) but in percentage terms it
represents the fifth part of which it was approved previously (from the 61.1
percents of bills approved there were reduced to the 12.2 percent). This suggests
that the greater volume of bills not necessarily is translated in greater legislative
efficiency. It can be understood because the increment of bills proposed render
more complex their resolution, not only by a technical and operative question of
the own commissions but by the consensuses that must be constructed between
the main political forces.
The mentioned data shows that after a long lethargy with respect of
introduction of bills and control over the governmental proposals, the
Congress in Mexico has assumed a role more dynamic that give a different
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12
sense to the Legislative Power, and the power that hold the political parties
like opposition poles.23
The number of bills presented by the deputies in damage of which the
Executive proposes, has been attributed to the absence of a legislative majority
of the party of the president. It is argued that when the Executive authority facing
a greater plurality in the Chamber, it limits its projects of law because it is forced
to negotiate, and to value the risk of which they can be rejected, in as much the
opposition parties are more susceptible to propose initiatives because they could
greater possibilities of success.24 In addition to the majority or minority
condition of the governing party respect to its opponents, the increase of the
number of proposals of law on the part of the deputies obeys to the perception
that the legislators have about their own role in the Congress. At the beginnings
of the LVII Legislature (1997-2000) the deputies of the main parties granted a
considerable importance to the task of elaborating the legislation, over the
function to control the government.25
The increase in the number of legislative proposals on the part of the
deputies, in the Mexican case, can also be attributed to the increasing partisan
competitiveness, because the promotion of initiatives not only grants notoriety
to the legislator, but this could be translated in means of allocation of resources
that gives the possibility of extending the base of voters and attracting new
supporters to the parties, that would explain the greater propensity to legislate of
the oppositions parties respect of those presented by the governing party. Still if
the approval possibilities are reduced, the single proposal of legislation
represents an action in itself, it indicates the interest of the legislator by a certain
subject or sector of the population that can be taken advantage in favour of the
party or a future candidate. For a competitive opposition party is essential to try
to convince a majority of the electorate about the idea that another government
——————
23 The survey of Latinobarómetro 2006 reveals that 65% of the Mexicans locate the government like the
institution with more power, followed by the political parties (36%) this result contrasts with those expressed
in other countries of the region, in which they mention in first or second site to the great companies like the
most empowerments. Respect to the evaluation that the citizens make of the performance of the Congress and
the parties, Mexico is located respectively in the tenth (37%) and seventh (32%) site of eighteen countries,
whereas to the question of if a democracy without parties and congress can exist the Mexicans place in the
eighth site, with a 22% that responds in affirmative sense and in eleventh site of which that respond that
without parties (52%) and without congress (54%) cannot have democracy, in www.latinobarometro.org. The
mentioned results are significant considering that the presidencialism and the hegemonic party system
characterized our country by more of 75 years and that reduced the capacity of political influence of the
competing parties to the PRI.
24 Casar, María Amparo, “Coaliciones y cohesión partidista en un congreso sin mayoría: la Cámara de
Diputados de México, 1997-1999” in Política y Gobierno, Vol. VII, no. 1, 2000, p. 188 and Nava P., María del
Carmen, Jeffrey A. Weldon, Jorge Yánez L., “Cambio político, presidencialismo y producción legislativa en la
Cámara de Diputados: 1988-1998” in Pérez, Germán and Antonia Martínez (comp.) La Cámara de Diputados
en México, México, FLACSO, Ed. Porrúa, Cámara de Diputados LVII Legislatura, 2000, p. 90.
25 In a survey made to deputies of different parliamentary groups in 1998, it contrast the importance that
they give to legislative function (PRI, 98.3; PAN, 93.6; PRD, 93.6) respect to the political control of the
government (67,8, 90, and 83,8, respectively) Loyola Díaz, Rafael and Antonia Martínez “Diputados, grupos
y trabajo parlamentario en la Cámara de Diputados” in Pérez, Germán and Antonia Martínez (comp.) La
Cámara de Diputados en México, México, FLACSO, Ed. Porrúa, Cámara de Diputados LVII Legislatura,
2000, pp. 76-77.
13
153
is better and possible, for that reason its activity focus in the groups of interest
and the voters, and despite the few possibilities of approval of their proposals,
they result important for generating inflexions of opinion that allow the formation
of new majorities.26
Conclusions
The opposition as organized expression in political parties had a slow
development in Mexico. Before the impossibility to dispute the positions of
representation in equality of conditions by the electoral route, the opposition
parties assumes a marginal role in the political process oriented more to the
expression of dissent and the canalization of the critic into an authoritarian
political system characterized by a strong one party control in all the organs of
decision. The little partisan competitiveness and the strategies of electoral
manipulation, beyond as much guaranteeing the almost absolute presence of the
governing party as their continuity in the political positions, prevented to
activate the institutional mechanisms to control the exercise of presidential
political power. In other words the opposition’s parties couldn’t work like an
alternative option to the government or means of control of the confirmed
presidential political decisions in the Congress, affecting with this the balance of
the political institutions that suppose the exercise of a liberal democracy.
The opposition’s parties opened breach in the measurement in which their
right to be against was recognized and guaranteed to them, in one first stage,
with the allocation of “party’s deputies” and proportional representation, and in
a second stage, with the introduction of the right of the minorities to participate
actively in the exercise of the political power, as much in the constitution as in
the secondary legislation. The opposition parties left to be mere dialectic
contrast for working like institutional limit to the concentration of the power and
like means of control of the presidential political decisions. The pluralist context
of the representation and the later institutionalization of the rule of the
proportionality in the chambers favoured a greater incidence of the competing
parties in the formulation of proposals and of the integration of the minority
points of view. The low index of rejection about the presidential initiatives
shows that the opposition activity has tended to concentrate itself in the
orientation of the governmental policies. Consequently, the function of the
control on the part of the opposition parties, and by the Congress himself, has
expressed more like the power to condition the elaboration of the legislative
agenda that like limit to specific governmental proposals.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Brennan Geoffrey and Alan Hamlin, Democratic devices and desires, London, Cambrige University Press, 2000.
Carey, M. John, “Legislative organization” in R. A. W. Rodees, Sarah A. Binder and Bert A. Rockman,
Political Institutions, London, Oxford University Press, 2006.
——————
26 Molas, Isidre, “La oposición en el parlamentarismo mayoritario” Revista del Centro de Estudios
Constitucionales, no. 2, January-April, Madrid, 1989. pp. 59-61.
154
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14
Carpizo, Jorge, El presidencialismo mexicano, Editorial Siglo XXI, México, 1979.
Casar, María Amparo, “Coaliciones y cohesión partidista en un congreso sin mayoría: la Cámara de Diputados
de México, 1997-1999” in Política y Gobierno, Vol. VII, no. 1, 2000.
Cotta, Maurizio, Leonardo Morlino and Donatella Della Porta, Scienza Politica, Bologna, Il Mulino, De
Vergottini, Giuseppe, Lo Shadow Cabinet, Milano, Giuffrè Editore, 1973.
Encuesta de Latinobarómetro 2006, www.latinobarometro.org
Gallagher, Michael, Laver Michael y Peter Mair, Representative government in Modern Europe. Institutions,
parties, and governments, New York, McGraw-Hill, 4ta. Edición, 2005.
Held, David, Modelos de democracia, México, Alianza Universidad, 1996.
Lijphart, Arend, Modelos de democracia. Formas de gobierno y resultados en treinta y seis países, Barcelona,
Editorial Ariel, 2000.
Loyola Díaz, Rafael y Antonia Martínez “Diputados, grupos y trabajo parlamentario en la Cámara de Diputados”
en Pérez, Germán y Antonia Martínez (comp.) La Cámara de Diputados en México, México, FLACSO,
Ed. Porrúa, Cámara de Diputados LVII Legislatura, 2000, págs. 61- 83.
Lujambio, Alonso, El poder compartido. Un ensayo sobre la democratización mexicana, México, Ed. Océano,
2000.
Mascott Sánchez, María de los Ángeles, “Cabildeando a la nación”, Metapolítica, julio-septiembre 2007, núm.
54, págs. 79-85.
Meyenberg Leycegui, Yolanda, “La Cámara de Diputados y la oposición en México”, en Germán Pérez y
Antonia Martínez, La Cámara de diputados en México, México, Ed. Porrúa, FLACSO y Cámara de
Diputados LVII Legislatura, 2000, págs. 119-138.
Molas, Isidre, “La oposición en el parlamentarismo mayoritario” Revista del Centro de Estudios Constitucionales,
no. 2, Enero-abril, Madrid, 1989.
Nacif, Benito, “El impacto del PNR en la lucha por la presidencia y la supervivencia política de los
legisladores” en Casar, María Amparo e Ignacio Marván (coords.)Gobernar sin mayoría. México 18671997, México, Taurus-CIDE, 2002.
Nacif Hernández, Benito, “El sistema de comisiones permanentes” en Germán Pérez y Antonia Martínez, La
Cámara de diputados en México, México, Ed. Porrúa, FLACSO y Cámara de Diputados LVII Legislatura,
2000, págs. 33-59.
Nava P., María del Carmen, Jeffrey A. Weldon, Jorge Yánez L., “Cambio político, presidencialismo y producción
legislativa en la Cámara de Diputados: 1988-1998” in Pérez, Germán and Antonia Martínez (comp.) La
Cámara de Diputados en México, México, FLACSO, Ed. Porrúa, Cámara de Diputados LVII Legislatura,
2000, págs. 85-103.
Quermonne, Jean-Luois, L´alternance au pouvoir, Press Universitaire de France, Paris, 1988.
Santiago Castillo, Javier, “El poder legislativo: de la hegemonía al pluralismo” in Diálogo y debate, 1999.
Schmitt, Carl, Sobre el parlamentarismo, Madrid, Ed. Tecnos, 1996.
Weldon, Jeffrey, “Las estrategias presidenciales con gobierno dividido en México, 1917-1937” en Casar, María
Amparo and Ignacio Marván (coord.), Gobernar sin mayoría. México 1867-1997, México, Taurus-CIDE,
2002.
SCIENTIFIC LIFE
SOCIOLOGICAL AND POLITICAL ASPECTS
OF THE CONTEMPORARY ROMANIAN FILM
Wednesday, June 11, 2008, the Institute of Political Sciences and International Relations belonging
to Romanian Academy housed Wiliam Stearns’s conference about Sociological and political aspects
of the contemporary Romanian film.
The reconsideration of the Romanian new wave in cinema, as an intermediate visual dimension
of “arranged chaos” launches the temptations of the esthetical and political choices.
Organized as tales from the (past) Golden Age of Communism, the contemporary Romanian
film accelerates the manner of browsing and scanning the rebirthing of the past into the present.
For Wiliam Stearns the new wave of the Romanian film directors have the same age, same film
school, being very good political and sociological storytellers, setting the history into a story, elaborating
a “social and political vision” anchored in an cinematographically attitude.
4 months, 3 weeks and 2 days, The death of Mr. Lãzãrescu and 12.08 East of Bucharest are
Wiliam Stearns’s representative movies for a non venial culture.
For Wiliam Stearns, one can understand these films as interventions in politics, films about
collected memory and totems. According to Wiliam Stearns’s presentation, the collected memory
is marking memories inherently fragmented, developing the notion of communicative memory.
Collective memory, as an interaction between the memory policies, refers to a “historical
memory”, to a “common memory,” of what has been experienced in common. It lies at the point
where individual meets collective, and psychic meets social.
In other words, collective memories are built up in the work of homogenizing representations
of the past and of reducing the diversity of recollections, possibly taking place in the events of
communication between individuals; in the inter-individual relationships that constitute the reality
of social groups, within affective communities; or intermediate groups between the individual and
the Nation, groups defined as symbolic reality founded in history.
The second part of the conference was focused upon 12.08 East of Bucharest by Corneliu Porumboiu.
The film is set not in Bucharest or Timiºoara, but in some unnamed small town. About half the
film’s running time is given over to a hilarious live TV discussion of the burning question: Did the
revolution happen in their town, or not? In such a context, Porumboiu sketches a deconstructive
reality made-up by moments which run in unbroken — medium — too long shots, in order to point
the collective memories of the December 1989. The main role is that of the mass-media: the
Romanian Revolution is another story, a particular outlook, because everything becomes an object
of communication, even the false, the particular detail.
For Wiliam Stearns, 12.08 East of Bucharest is a black documentary comedy, ironical and
deconstructive — critical, framing a political reality in the cinematographical flux (story), as a
“problematized return”. As a form of ironical representation, the film is, “in political terms”, doubly
codified: it legitimates, but also undermines what it parodies.
Moderated by Henrieta Aniºoara ªerban, the conference provoked dynamic discussions launched
by professor and researcher Ion Goian, Bogdan Popescu, Rodica Iamandi, Lucian Jora and Viorella
Manolache, resuming that the contemporary Romanian film tends to make a pact with the sociological
and political reality, describing everyday life.
Filming a small act of existence, or recording the reactions of a small social group, the voices
of the Romanian film make the chronicle of a street with a camera. The contemporary Romanian
film directors do not make reportage, but use the technique of the reportage in their visual and epic
scenarios. Technically, the montage, the movement of the camera, the inter-title, the sound, are the
achievements of a new view, one with personal notes, in order to serve as possible “reference
points” for a sociological and political reality.
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For Wiliam Stearns the sociological and political aspects of the contemporary Romanian film remain
positive icons, preoccupied with recording and recreating reality through a vigilant camera, which
recomposes some fragments from the flux of the Romanian Communist and Post communist life!
Viorella Manolache
THE NEW MEANINGS OF PEACE AFTER 9/11, 2001
CONFERENCE REPORT
Throughout history, the idea of peace has been defined and redefined in accordance with the
different zones of conflict, violence and war. After World War II, peace emerged as a follow-up to
the military victory of the Allies against Nazism and dictatorship. Up to 1991, the date of the
disintegration of the USSR, peace was negotiated in a context of race towards technological and
military supremacy between Western and Eastern blocks, two hostile camps with a corresponding
range of cold war attributes. Nevertheless, the 9/11 events have transferred the world scene to a
new alleged “global war on terror” and set a new stage for the war of ideologies and ideas, on the
one hand, and for devastating military interventions, on the other. The acuteness of the situation lies
in the fact that the implementation of peace in such a war cannot be dependent on clearly defined
battlefields. Therefore, in a context of global war, in what way can world peace be restored and
spread? And if the arms race elevates powerful states at the expense of the interests of underdeveloped
nations, how can we spread a culture of tolerance and peace?1
These and many other questions were raised at a three-day international conference entitled
“The New meanings of Peace After 9/11, 2001” held at Abdelmalek Essaadi University in Tetuan,
Morocco from 19 to 21 June, 2008. The conference was jointly organized by the Research Group
on Culture and Globalization (RGCG) and the department of English Studies, and directed by
Dr. Jamal Eddine Benhayoun, Professor of English and Cultural Studies and the RGCG Coordinator.
The conference attracted delegates from Morocco, USA, Sweden, Pakistan, Romania, Germany, and
UAE. The audience consisted mainly of the conference participants and postgraduate as well as
undergraduate students.
As problematic and wide as the meaning(s) of peace seems to be, the treatment of the concept
of peace in the conference proved to be similarly diverse in perspective and rich in approach. From
a theological point of view, Dr. Mohamed K. Ennassiri (Abdelmalek Essaadi University, Tetuan,
Morocco) chose the Quran as the ultimate resource in which the concept of peace proves to be at
the core of divine discourse. A detailed survey of relevant Quranic verses was presented to illustrate
the multifaceted nature of peace in the Islamic tradition. In the same vein, Dr. Vanessa Paloma
(Senior Fulbright Research Scholar and Artist, Morocco-USA) fragmented the word “peace” in
Hebrew and from that she departed to explicate the different manifestations of the root (shalom)
with its corresponding Jewish numerological values in the Kabala tradition. As a matter of fact,
away from religious “clashes” (as Huntington might suggest) that proliferated after the events of
the 9/11, Ennassiri and Paloma’s mystic take on the concept of peace testified to its centrality in
both Judaic and Islamic traditions, advocating, thus, that if a religion’s core message is the
implementation of peace and equality among human beings, such religion can never generate a
discourse of violence and become a source of conflict. By the same token, religious concepts and
metaphors can be re-interpreted and re-examined in a way that facilitates peace and reconciliation
rather than enmity and othering.
Nevertheless, in a world where religion is organized and politicized, words such as peace,
democracy and freedom become “meaningless”, as Dr. William A. Cook (University of La Verne,
——————
1 See the Call for Papers on the Conference’s website: http://www.newmeaningsofpeaceconference2008.
blogspot.com/
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USA) maintained, because they are made achievable through fear, a tool used by political parties
and capitalistic systems to solidify “mass stupidity”. Dr. Cook asserted that the tyrannical and corrupted
systems that rule the world work to disable and nullify human intellect, the only attribute that
raises the value of individuals and creates a profound awareness of the universal equality of humans,
without which peace cannot be fostered. However, the atrocious situation in Palestine is a
microcosm of human behavior that defies any definition of peace, Dr. Cook sadly maintained, and
unless the international community accept, without reservation, the moral rights imbedded in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights as stated by the United Nations, “peace” will remain a
word devoid of meaning and morality. Dr. Jamal Eddine Benhayoun on the other hand suggested
that because the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is the oldest and the most disturbing problem in the
Middle East, the creation of an autonomous Palestinian state and thereof a possibility for peace
between the two parties can only be achieved if the long-aged narrative of bloodshed, anger and
revenge is provisionally overlooked to leave room for hope for the present “as a new condition for
peace rather than just a sequel to a traumatic, divided, and dividing past.” Furthermore, for Dr.
Benhayoun, political initiatives remain only political in their outreach. In other words, they are
only able to set borders and draw new maps; intellectual and cultural efforts, however, are the ones
that can help establish a culture of peace, liable to bridge cultural gaps among people and create a
shared vision for the future of the region.
From another perspective, Dr. Kerstin W. Shands (Södertörn University College, Stockholm,
Sweden) believed that forgiveness is a primordial and extremely beneficial precept at the spiritual,
religious, and psychological levels for the achievement of inner peace, and at the political and
national levels for outer peace. Whereas the word “forgive” is superficially used to exchange false
emotions, real forgiving “means accepting the vulnerability involved in venturing beyond the
intellect into territories of turbulent emotion.” After a detailed survey of the concept of forgiveness
from a philosophical, psychological, spiritual and medical point of view, Dr. Shands concluded
that peace must begin with forgiveness within each individual for political conflicts, war and hatred
cannot be solved while working only on the political or military levels and disregarding the spiritual
and psychological ones.
The conference provided opportunities to enjoy stimulating exchanges in the treatment of such
problematic concepts as peace and violence, and their spectrum in some presentations tended to
be clearly philosophical and abstract. In Professor Abdenbi Sarroukh’s (Abdelmalek Essaadi
University, Tetuan, Morocco) lecture, the audience was taken into the thought-provoking ideas of
ethical metaphysics upon which Prof. Sarroukh built his analysis of the concept of the Other
within a critique of the philosophy of violence. Ms. Viorella Manolache (the Institute of Political
Science and International Relations, Bucharest, Romania) similarly maintained that the United
States after 9/11 has deployed “historian pressure and oppression” as the American power resorts
to “war against terror” to validate and legitimize its military and economic authority. Accordingly,
the 9/11 events are now part of the universal calendar and require not only political analysis but
also that of philosophical and social theories.
The conference’s title in fact, proved to be as controversial as the concept of peace itself for
many questions were raised with regard to the connections between the new meanings of peace
and the old ones. Answers varied in this respect but there seemed to be a general consensus around
the idea that the world order has, directly or indirectly, been affected by the 9/11 events and it is
precisely this impact that calls for scrutiny and requires deep analysis and discussion in order to
come to terms with the different perspectives and manifestations of conflict, and to settle new
grounds for peace. In this respect, Dr. Perri Giovannucci, (American University in Dubai, UAE)
and Dr. Abdellatif Akbib (Abdelmalek Essaadi University, Tetuan, Morocco) sharply criticized the
use of peace by the United States as a rhetoric of democracy and freedom that is in fact laden with
practices of hegemony, control and violence. Whereas Dr. Giovannucci’s examination of the
concept of peace and its associated terms was set in the context of the “war on terror” in which
these terms are employed primarily to reflect the White House military and commercial objectives
and self interests, Dr. Akbib’s concern was American alleged freedom of expression in the realm
of academia. The controversy intrinsic to America’s very first amendment of The Declaration of
Independence drafted by Jefferson that underlines the freedom of expression as the unalienable
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right of every American citizen becomes unveiled in the control, pursuit and even prosecution of
university professors and researchers who “dare” to challenge the order established by the White
House.
In addition to this remarkable series of interventions by the conference speakers, the program
was varied enough to cover other “practical” ways of dealing with the meanings and connotations
of peace. Ms. Laura Val (Filmmaker and interculturalist, Maine, USA) directed a workshop about
the different ways of communicating effectively across cultures. Students and conference participants
took part in a creative activity that demonstrated the different ways reality can be interpreted and
evaluated through the lenses of a given culture and the extent to which our perception of cultural
diversity rewards us the ability to manage conflicts across cultures. Mr. Peter Svarzbein
(Photographer & Journalist, NYC, USA) was also interested in the cultural dimension of peace.
He presented a collection of photographs of his acquaintances in habitual situations and made the
argument that by seeing the common humanity within us all, we have an inborn willingness for
peaceful reconciliation. Mr. Abderrahman Boukhaffa (American Language Center, Tangier, Morocco)
introduced the audience to the organizational work in the field of peace-promotion through the
organization “People to People International.” The purpose of PTPI, the presenter explained, is to
enhance international understanding and friendship through educational, cultural and humanitarian
activities.
In a paper presented in absentia, entitled “After Grand Theory: Musings on Dialogue, Diversity,
and World Formation,” Dr. Lester Edwin J. Ruiz (New York University, NYC, USA) addressed the
problems related to “grand theorizing” as the desirability to formulate a general theory of society
that claims universality and exceptionalism. In fact, as post-modern or post-colonial critique of
grand narratives is about the weaving of knowledge and power, such a critique becomes necessary
to approach any political/intellectual project, including the quest for a grand theory for a
comprehensive peace. Dr. Ruiz asserted that in the attempt to constitute a grand theory of peace as
a mandatory framework for peace studies, it is important to uncover the ways in which peace
studies may function as “empty signifiers” through which “patriarchal, war-mongering, chauvinistic
ideologies and sensibilities associated with some aspects of both western and non-western
cultures” may circulate under the guise of peace. Accordingly, peace, at its worst, becomes a bilateral
practice and only realized as the peace of the victor. In the same vein, Prof. Abderrazzak Essrhir
(Abdelmalek Essaadi University, Tetuan, Morocco) drew attention to the importance of postcolonial
studies in any debate about peace. Issues of identity in a postcolonial world, he discussed, are
inextricably intertwined with the location of peace in the age of globalization. Dr. Shabana
Fayyaz’s (Quaid-I-Azam University, Islamabad, Pakistan) presentation however was more
geographically oriented as she discussed the new meanings of peace in the light of the “war on
terror” in her country, Pakistan.
The culmination of the conference was the final panel discussion between speakers and
audience. Debate around the application of peace to specific conflict areas took still other nuances
according to the discussants’ backgrounds, which testifies to the fact that while peace remains the
ultimate objective of both academics and politicians, translating it from theory to praxis is a thorny
enterprise. Nevertheless, there was a general consensus on the rationale behind this conference
which is the work towards the installation and proliferation of a “culture of peace”, regardless of
one’s racial, political or religious allegiance. A central idea that was particularly underscored was
that commitment to justice is the surest path to genuine peace.
In the age of globalization, the new meanings of peace in the post 9/11 world proved to be an
issue urgent and delicate enough to appeal to the immediate response of international speakers
who came from far away to convene in Abdelmalek Essaadi University in the small town of
Tetuan, a location that was quite a new discovery for many. In a way, the local and the global
dimensions were harmoniously intermixed and fecund; it was a conference held in the English
language, in a Moroccan university, organized by Moroccan academics and enriched by cosmopolitan
scholars. This rich intellectual and cultural gathering was in itself a constituent of the significance
of the conference theme; it provided an opportunity for interdisciplinary approaches and crosscultural concerns to interconnect and cover in great detail a wide range of issues that the idea of
peace may trigger, and the students’ participation proved to be diligent enough to raise the most
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pertinent questions and comments. However, although the conference’s three days were long enough
to encompass the program, this extraordinary group of international speakers expressed a strong
urge for future academic events that may bring about other controversial issues that enhance crosscultural dialogues. To conclude, ranging from theological, metaphysical to postcolonial and political
perspectives, “the new meanings of peace after 9/11, 2001” was a remarkable academic, cultural
and spiritual success.
Sawsan Malla Hussein
ROMANIAN INTERWAR LEFT AND RIGHT WING
Wednesday, June 25, 2008, the Institute of Political Sciences and International Relations belonging
to Romanian Academy housed Florin Müller’s conference about Romanian interwar left and right
wing.
Analyzing and clarifying the Left and Right concepts in the Romanian interwar period, professor
and researcher Florin Müller’s presentation was organized as a response of the new trends in the
Romanian historical preoccupations, that’s of revealing the major theoretical developments in the
history of the Romanian interwar political ideas and concrete political action. Appearing on the
background of recovering some historical marks too often confiscated by the various (old or new)
political-historical speech, Florin Müller’s Romanian interwar left and right wing conference
consisted in the interpretation/appraisal of the process and tendencies with historical signification
which embedded in our history (and in which our history was embedded).
Bringing together Left and Right historical and political alternatives with a context-sensitive
approach of situating them in a particular cultural-political setting, Florin Müller’s presentation
was focused on the various manifestations of radical identity — politics and criticism of
modernity, as an emergence of an anti-modernist discourse. If the dictatorships of the right aimed
a political modernization, keeping intact the rest of the modernization program, the left dictatorship
had in view the economic development, invalidating the remainder of the same program. Both
dictatorships believed that it is possible, and even necessary to disclose the components of modernity,
carrying out some of them, while suspending or destroying others. However, all dictatorships
intended to take over only the target of modernization.
Apart from the methodological gains of getting a deeper insight into the ways history of
modern political thought, developing a framework of interpreting the discourses of nationalism or
historiographical canon-building, Florin Müller’s presentation caught the essential identification
marks of the interwar Left and Right wing.
Professor and researcher Ion Bulei, the director of the Institute of Politic Sciences and International
Relations, opened the conference, considering the year 1936 as the year of the left-right’s major
confrontations.
According to Florin Müller there are three sections of analytical priorities: theoretical analysis
of right and its inter career; the genealogy and the cultural benchmarks of the right and left and
the “Left” Review, in the early ’30.
Following N. Bobbio’s arguments, Florin Müller’s presentation argues that those who claim
left/right distinctions no longer hold are normally members of groups whose political fortunes
have grown weak or non-existent and are seeking a means of regaining some power. Florin Müller
agrees that left and right can change over time and place, but that the basic distinction based on
the attitude toward equality will always remain at some level. There is a right because there is a
left, and vice-versa. Of these, the center is possibly the most dangerous to the public welfare since
it is most liable to be opportunistic in the extreme, adopting left policies in one geographical area
and right policies in another. The Romanian interwar period manifested a certain (pre)disposition
towards recessive behavior as the principle of great oppositions, antitheses and antinomies,
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6
tolerated by — and at the same time tolerating — existence (be it political, social, cultural, elective
etc.) “knowledge”, value. The recessive duality of Romanian political relief does not imply the
existence of equally powerful and equally valuable terms, but rather of relations of one prevailing
over the other.
According to Cristinel Pantelimon’s intervention it existed only an imaginary interwar center,
because the Right imposed a state religion, a mystification of the democracy.
Establishing who was left and who was right? according to Florin Müller, in Romania, there was
a national right, a revolutionary and a conservative one. Left was radical and democratic.
Emerging from the obscurity of cleansing history in regard to the interwar period, Florin Müller’s
conference about Romanian Interwar left and right wing has launched a provocation: Legionary
Movement is a popular communism of the year 1930!
For Lorena Pãvãlan Stuparu the major aspect to take in consideration is the voluntary or
involuntary adherence, in an age in which, according to researcher Constantin Nica, the issue of
workers was one built. If for Bogdan Popescu, the psychoanalytic criteria is not exactly a criterion
for analysis, for Cãlin Câmpeanu, the Legionary Movement was an elite subordinated to the State.
According to the researcher Gheorghe Stoica, many intellectuals found meaning and renewal in the
revolutionary possibilities of radical politics, because contributing to the polarization in interwar
politics was the wide-spread participation of intellectuals.
Tributary to some exhausted models or to some rhetorical way of approaching the (often doubtful)
Romanian interwar coordinates, Florin Müller’s conference still proposes in the academic landscape,
a sense of mechanistic synchronization and/or the pressure of dogma!
Viorella Manolache
BOOK REVIEWS
Lucian Jora (coord.)
Din politica externã a Uniunii Europene. Relaþiile de Vecinãtate, Editura ISPRI, Bucureºti, 2007,
207 p.
The volume represents a new approach in the relations between the EU and its neighbors, an approach that
exceeds the tradition based on cooperation and common theoretical trends.
This initiative is a framework to strengthen the neighborhood and cooperation with the states in the
enlarged EU in order to create a zone of prosperity and a circle of friendly collaboration at the borders.
European Neighborhood Policy does not provide the Member concerned (states in eastern Europe and the
Mediterranean, and since June 2004 the South Caucasus States) prospect of EU accession, but allows a
privileged relationship with neighbors and a better focus efforts in areas of importance vital for the approximation
of member covered by European standards.
According to the studies published in the volume, the action plans will be differentiated, so as to reflect
the existing state of relations with each EU country in question. Drawing the Action Plan for each state-neighbor
will depend on the needs and capacities taking into account the interests of both parties.
European Union and Russia have decided to develop the strategic partnership already existing, by creating
four common spaces, according to the decisions adopted at the summit in St. Petersburg (Russia) in May 2003.
Romania welcomed the definition of a coherent vision of the Union on its neighbors in March 2003 when
the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) was launched by the Commission Communication or Wider Europe
Neighborhood as a new framework for the EU future relations with its neighbors. These imperatives are
subordinated to the backdrop of the enlargement of The European Union in particular to Central and Eastern
Europe and to the need to intensify relations with neighbors coming from the new borders of the Union. The
central concept refers to a circle of friends, including states bordering the Mediterranean (Algeria, Morocco,
Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan, Israel and the Palestinian National Authority, Lebanon, Libya and Syria) and the east
(Republic of Moldova, Ukraine, Belarus and subsequently since June 2004 the three states in the South
Caucasus).
The volume is aimed at evaluating more than one tier, by a reporting issue dealing with: Russia and the
European Union partners and neighbors (Dan Dungaciu), European Union policy on neighborhoods:
difficulties and divergent (Cristina Vohn), European neighborhood policy and European identity (Lucian Jora),
European Union and the wider of the Black Sea (Sanda Cincã), European Union and the Mediterranean basin:
difficulties of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership (Ruxandra Luca), Security Strategy at the Black Sea and its
importance for the Republic of Moldova (Alexandra Vasile), European Union and neighbors: the South
Caucasus (Oana Neagu), Energy policy and the relations with Russia (Irina Stoica), Romania's energy policy,
between European Union and Russia (Daniela Ionescu), European Union and Russia Relations (Cãlin
Câmpean).
As the volume concludes, the neighborhood policy is the main European Union strategy designed to face
challenges related with a geopolitical unprecedented expansion in 2004-2007. The neighborhood policy is
addressed to the Member in the vicinity of EU borders in the configuration of 2007 who have not the prospect
of becoming medium-term members of the European Union. The European neighborhood policy aims to avoid
the creation of new division lines in Europe, through a privileged relationship with neighbors on the basis of
respect for common values (democracy, human rights, market economy and a sustained development).
The volume contributes to the European Union policy issues, offering dynamical and practical solutions,
opening new approach and avoiding the verdicts of a categorical conclusion, choosing with lucidity a scientific
analysis applied to the device.
Gheorghe Stoica, Rãzvan Victor Pantelimon, Enache Tuºa (coord.)
Gramsci ºi Sartre. Mari gânditori ai secolului XX, Editura ISPRI, Bucureºti, 2007, 174 p.
Appearing on the background of recovering some philosophical marks too often confiscated by the various
(old or new) political speeches, the volume Gramsci and Sartre, representative thinkers of the XXth century
resuscitates Gramsci and Sartre’s points of view avoiding a common and canonical understanding.
According to Gh.Lencan Stoica, the rediscovery of the philosophical and political main thoughts is a
synchronic concern, an open lesson. The collective volume is an invitation to read and to capture thoughts, to
meet relevant dissertation held during the symposium at the old Pontus Euxinus (p. 7-8).
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The first part is focused on Antonio Gramsci. Giuseppe Cascione, Salvo Mastellone, Rãzvan Victor Pantelimon,
Michele Prospero, Giovanni Semeraro, Gheorghe Lencan Stoica and Enache Tuºa propose a clarification and
a partial justification of the gramscian approaches.
The studies aim to avoid reductionism, intellectualism, and one-sidedness, as well as the traditional practice
of conflating Gramsci’s political thought with his active political life.
Placing Gramsci in a new tradition, the documentation involves essential key points as: Gramsci’s common
methodological orientation, a particular method or approach, a common theoretical view (Rãzvan Pantelimon;
Enache Tuºa); the fundamental principle that in all societies organized elites rule over the popular masses and
the emblematic practice of the democracy (S. Mastellone); Gramscian praxis (G. Semeraro); the concept of
hegemony as a “substance with a life of its own” settled over the whole public of capitalist societies and the
“uomo occidentale” (G. Cascione); Gramscian theories and their application in the East Europe (Gheorghe
Stoica) or the relation Machiavelli-Gramsci (M. Prospero).
Concepts like globalization and historic block, north and south, Orient vs. Occident, have been consistently
distorted. In order to rediscover Antonio Gramsci, the studies extend the discussion about the state, rethinking
the idea of democracy. In the case of theory of democracy, Gramsci was able to articulate his insights by
engaging not only with the work of Marx and Lenin but also with the nonliberal contributions of Rousseau and
Hegel, developing new ideas to move beyond the limits and aporias of their work.
Apprehending in different manner hegemony, Gramsci imposed in the language of contemporary political
thoughts a viable, nuanced and actual concept. The references to this notion and to Gramscian analyses are
more and more frequent today, due to its efficiency on an interpretative, and even on a political and pragmatic
level, as well as due to the applicability of the concept in varied social, historical, philosophical, cultural, economic,
religious and literary fields. According to Gh. Lencan Stoica, the meaning of hegemony in Gramscian conception
refers to the affirmation and the interpretation of the importance of the facts of culture in the process of hegemonic
leadership, at the level of the social system.
The second part is focused on Jean-Paul Sartre. Ana Bazac, Giuseppe Cacciatore, Gabriella Farina,
Izabella Ghiþã, Adriana Neacºu, Lorena Pãvãlan Stuparu, Tibor Szabó place Sartre into a relation of mediation,
underlining the belief that the philosophical experience is an actual preoccupation, understood more as a procedure
and less as a textual engineering.
Confronted with an impossibility of individual authenticity, the Sartrean man continues to explore other
venues for authenticity. He finds refuge in an attempt to surpass the given situation and be dialectically related
with it so much so that while he embraces the limitation brought about by his world, he persists in fighting for
his subjectivity. Sartre argues that Humanistic Marxism will not be forever warranted. It will fade away at the
dawn of a real philosophy of freedom. In the same manner that Sartre suggested the dissolution of
Existentialism to Marxist thought, he prognosticates the inevitability of the dissolution of Marxism in the face
of a real philosophy of freedom. Sartre’s espousal of Marxism is then but transitory. He sees it as a palliative
cure to bourgeois in authenticity while at the same time serving as a means towards the establishment of a real
philosophy of freedom.
The studies from the second part of the volume are focused on: gramscian ontology and the Sartre’s theory
of rarity (Ana Bazac); Sartrean praxis (G. Cacciatore); the main ideas on Sartre (G. Farina); the relation between
Sartre and the Frankfurt School (I. Ghiþã); the Sartrean method of evaluating the historic fact (A. Neacºu); the
historical concrete (L.P. Stuparu) and the philosophical anthropology on Sartre and Gramsci (Tibor Szabó).
Synchronizing with the new trends of the philosophical or political intentions, the volume Gramsci and
Sartre, representative thinkers of the XXth century is a concrete project of evaluating the modern reconsideration
of the opening perspective of Gramsci and Sartre.
Viorella Manolache
Jean-Luc Nancy
Vérité de la démocratie, Éditions Galilée, Paris, 2008, 63 p.
The work unfolds under the aegis of a quote from Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract, vol. III,
chapter IV, where he states that: “If there would be a people of God, they would govern themselves democratically”.
This reveals the intent to cast a critical view over the democratic world of the (European) West after the moment
May 1968. The author points at this moment as to a turning point, as well for the politics of the Western
Europe, as for the capitalism from this part of the world.
Jean-Luc Nancy is one of the most interesting contemporary French writers, author of numerous philosophical,
political, but also poetics, aesthetics and postmodern books, among which one should remind the reader at least
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a few: La Communauté désœuvrée, 1986, L’expérience de la liberté, 1988, Le Mythe nazi, with Philippe
Lacoue-Labarthe, 1991, Hegel, l’inquiétude du négatif, 1997, La Communauté affrontée, 2001.
The volume is structured in thirteen chapters: “68-08”, “The Inadequation of Democracy”, “Highlighting
Democracy”, “The Fear of Democracy”, “The Power to Be”, “Infinite and common”, “The Separation of the
Incommensurable Aspects”, “Infinite in the Finite”, “Discerning Politics, “Inequivalence”, “A Space Formed
for the Infinite”, “Praxis” and “Truth”. The argument of the author is triggered by the observation of a profound
connexion between evoking the anniversary of 40 years since the moment 68 and the present-day efervescence
around the subject of democracy, documented by the many and various publications on this topic. Noticing
that, the author announces his pledge for the necessity of an emblematic reconstruction of the democratic spirit
of contemporary times.
Nancy proposes indepth meditation on the representative (both formal and bourgeois) inadequation in
democracy, within a context where the democratic politics of our times seem to vanish suffocated by the
burden of a double decline: that of the (social) justice and of human dignity. Following the Second World War,
democracy was frequently reconsidered, yet, less for its own benefit, as to situate democracy in opposition with
the “totalitarianisms” of the 20th century. Overcoming totalitarianism brought humanity on the brink of distrusting
democracy for its modest achievements. At the same time, democracy is now put in the situation to reconsider
its position overpassing the predetermined visions and the theoretical paradigms limiting ita horizon, leading
to an exit from the age of History, signaled by Levi-Strauss, Foucault, Deleuze or Derrida, while consolidating
an age of meditation over the social praxis (that interested Sartre, too).
Given the heritage of 68, democracy is defined less from the perspective of the political exercise of
undertaking and exercizing power, or by referring to political ideological and doctrine models, and more by
considering the democratic habits and a democratic ethos, closely inter-related. “The ‘subject’ of democracy is
presupposed to be in itself self-producing, self-forming and having itself as a thelos, subject of its own
presuppositions and previsions, that, in any event, — be it individual or collective — unveils itself as already
overpass during events” (p. 25).
Even more, the author explains: “if democracy has a meaning, it might be very well that of not disposing
of another identifiable authority, or starting from any other situation or desire than that — of a will, tentative,
thought — through which the real possibility to be all together, all and each of us is expressed and recognized”
(p. 29).
Situating himself in an interesting theoretical frame where he interprets Pascal and Rousseau with Marx
and Derrida, Nancy construes democracy with the thought that “man exceeds man infinitely (l’homme excède
infiniment l’homme)” (p. 38).
The condition of democracy after 68 is thus related to the idea that the demos can be sovereign unless
separated by the presupposition of the sovereignty of the state, and by the political conformity deriving from
hereon. Meanwhile, the truth of democracy is that that the order of the state cannot be also an end for the human
being or for the human existence, be it conceived in common or individually. When the sovereignty of the state
represents a democratic condition, the truth of democracy is that man, whether as individual or as a member
of the demos, exceeds his or her self and the order of the state, as aim in himself or herself.
Henrieta ªerban
17 gânditori în autoreprezentãri subiective
collection made by Marin Diaconu, Aius PrintEd, Craiova, 2008, 292 p.
It is well-known that the “sense of biographies” represents a personal form of a specific writing.
The volume, 17 thinkers in subjective self representations, is made up upon the imperative of a generation
project, dominated by the model of the diarium.
Marin Diaconu gathers unfinished intellectual experiences, determined by some historical and formative
intervals (temporal, cultural, and even political!) in order to describe dynamically, personal intellectual
strategies. According to Marin Diaconu’s argument, the volume provokes the authors to submit testimony,
to be front and to provide (in a subjective way!), benchmarks required for an intellectual and philosophical
testament.
The volume offers printed models, recreating, during the personal story telling, a generation model, style
and even utopia, in order to make a pact with the real.
Ana Bazac, Angela Botez, Gh. Al. Cazan, Viorel Cernica, G.G. Costandache, Florica Diaconu, Marin
Diaconu, Ion Goian, Georgeta Marghescu, Ionel Necula, Laura Panã, Florian Roatiº, Ioan N. Roºca, Grigore
Smeu, Constantin Stroe, Ion Tudosescu, Marin Þurlea are summarizing, in a chronological surface, their subjective
points of view, recomposing personal observation and experience, promoting a personal narrative status.
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4
Concerned primarily with themselves as subject matter, recording from personal observation and experience,
the 17 thinkers follow a prefabricate scheme proposed as a formal guide, in order to reaffirm their active
intellectual status.
The dynamic framework information refers to: name, surname (from the birth certificate), date of birth, city,
parents and their occupation, childhood, education and training, marriage, children, studies and publications,
pseudonym, critical appreciation, friends, devices, failures, correspondences, photo-portrait, autograph signature,
the cover of a book etc.
According to the coordinator, the subjectivism rules (alphabetical names and their substance are subjective),
because the volume is a temptation to write in a subjective conscious about the self: “when it comes writing
about us, whether we are metaphorizing, hyperbolizing, inhibiting or auto censoring ourselves” (p. 6-7).
These personal and subjective details pass over the malleable borders (the proposed scheme), extending
the self representation into a new existential commitment, avoiding the traps of a confessive “naïveté”,
sketching a social-cultural climate, rebuilding a philosophical atmosphere. From the perspective of a “gentle
eye” view, more relaxed, and maybe not less “metaphysically restless”, the self representations (with the
mention that the 17 thinkers’ profile is a variant for what we can call as an associative group) gathered by
Marin Diaconu, remain a space of a possible “experience of being”, with a forte profile, capable of articulating
itself in what Heidegger called Lichtung.
Coordinating all the “data of the text”, Marin Diaconu obtains the effect of authenticity, considering every
personal detail as a fragment put into a real relation with the other ones, as a general intellectual assembly. On
the other hand, the reader is asked to accept the subjective point of view, being thus guided to transgress with
the author, decomposing the conventions and the exterior filters of the representation.
Viorella Manolache
THE REVIEW OF REVIEWS
TRANSILVANIA MAGAZINE — 140 YEARS
The 33rd chapter of the Statutes of the Transylvanian Association for Romanian Literature and for
Romanian People’s Culture, whose goal was “the development of Romanian literature and Romanian culture
in its various branches by study, elaboration and publication of different works” (as specified in the 2nd
chapter), also stipulates the creation of a periodical where one could publish the “affairs” of the Association
(protocols of the Central Committee’s meetings, and also those of the special committees and general gatherings,
contest launchings for various prizes, study scholarships, clerks’ reports, etc.), as well as matters of literature
and literary criticism, history, philosophy, etc., except for “discussions on political and religious topics, because
they relate to the present” (3rd chapter); the responsibility of editing the periodical was delegated, again
according with the statutes, to the 1st secretary of the Association (chapter 16)1. Out of pecuniary reasons, the
publication of the magazine was only be possible after the General Gathering from Cluj, in 1867; having “the
mission of dealing with the consideration of topics relative to the material and spiritual interests of our
nation”2, the magazine, bearing the name Transilvania. Paper of the Transylvanian Association for Romanian
Literature and for Romanian People’s Culture, appeared starting with the 1st of January, 1868, in Braºov, twice
a month, in 80 format, with a circulation of 750 copies for the first issue and 500 for the subsequent ones; the
Central Committee decided that the magazine should be edited and printed in Braºov (in Romer & Kamner’s
printing house), where George Bariþiu was living at that time, the man in charge with the publication of the
magazine until 1889 (with a gap in 1879-1880, and then, starting with 1881, with the magazine’s editorial
office moved to Sibiu).
The magazine did not enjoy the impact (economically, at least) expected by the officials of the
Association, the number of subscribers being in the first year only that of 3613. The economic situation of the
magazine did not change for a consistent span of time; after a paranthesis during which George Bariþiu resigns
(the General Gathering from Fãgãraº, 1871), recommending that the magazine should be edited in Sibiu, under
the care of the Central Committee — he reconsidered his position only after the negative vote expressed by
most of the officials regarding the proposal of interrupting the publication of the magazine, and only at the
insistent solicitations of some Committee members4 —, the publication of the magazine was brought to a halt
——————
1 Statutes of the Transylvanian Association for Romanian Literature and for Romanian People’s Culture,
in Acts regarding the Conception and Creation of the Transylvanian Association for Romanian Literature and
for Romanian People’s Culture, sent IN PRINT by the Association Itself, Sibiu, in the Diocesan Printing
House, 1862, p. 25, 34, and 29.
2 As regards the contents of the magazine, there were three proposals prior to its apparition: the
publication of historical documents, both in their original tongue and translated (George Bariþ), the
popularization of information for and accessible to the majority (Vasile Ladislau Pop), and the use of the
editorial space in order to publish the acts of the Association. V. Gelu Neamþu, Din activitatea lui G. Bariþiu
pentru editarea unui organ de presã al ASTREI, in Astra 1861-1950. Asociaþiunea Transilvanã pentru
Literatura Românã ºi Cultura Poporului Român. 125 de ani de la înfiinþare, coordinated by Victor V. Grecu,
Sibiu, 1987, p. 284; these three tendencies will be intertwined during almost the whole period of the initial
series of the magazine (until 1946). We replicate here the opening lines of the first issue: “We inaugurate this
issue of the Transilvania magazine with the papers of the General Gathering from 1867, not only because we
have to publish the same things as before, but also because this particular gathering gave life to this periodical,
fact for which it has earned its right to public gratitude” (in Transilvania, 1/1st of January, 1868, p. 1).
3 V. Raportul secretariului II, despre activitatea comitetului asociatiunei transilvane in decursulu anului
1867/8, in Transilvania, 20/1st of October, 1868, p. 472-475.
4 Visarion Roman and Ion Rusu upheld the idea of continuing the publication of the magazine, drawing
the attention on the fact that “our association is not a bank for material gain, but has a purely intellectual
purpose and thus we should not search for material advantages from this publication, and, then, from the
intellectual point of view, the publication is quite significant and corresponds with the Association’s goal”.
Transilvania, 18/15th of September, 1871, p. 210-211.
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by the decision of the Central Committee taken in the meeting from the 28th of July, 1878, and it was replaced
by the Annals of the Transylvanian Association for Romanian Literature and for Romanian People’s Culture,
beginning with 1879; in 1880, the General Gathering from Turda decided that Transilvania magazine was to
be published instead of the Annals, starting with the 1st of January, 1881, still with 24 issues per year, but in
Sibiu this time5.
After the election of George Bariþiu as president of the Association (the General Gathering from Abrud,
1888), he kept editing the magazine until next year, when on the position of 1st secretary was elected Ioan
Popescu, protopope and headmaster of the Civil School for Girls; according with the decision of the Central
Committee taken in the meeting from the 21st of December, 1889, the magazine’s format was modified and
was adopted the orthography settled by the Romanian Academy6.
Zaharia Boiu was in charge with the editorial office of the publication as he was elected on the position
of 1st secretary of the Association (the General Gathering from Sibiu, 1892; the former 1st secretary died in
March, the same year) and remained on this position until 1895; the magazine was re-organized in ten different
sections, the orientation of the magazine’s contents towards the scientific areas being thus obvious. Cornel
Diaconovici, elected as 1st secretary in August 1895 (the General Gathering from Blaj; Zaharia Boiu had quit),
reduce the number of sections to five; the entire editorial activity of the Association experiencimg a most fertile
phase, articles of Romanian cultural propaganda, as well as those of popularization of information about
agriculture, pomiculture, etc. being favored in the magazine’s economy, disadvantaging literature and literary
criticism; starting with 1902, the grey literature originating in the Association’s activity (neinutes, reports, etc.)
was published in Transilvania’s supplement, Annals of the Transylvanian Association..., its first division being
reserved to the articles with scientific and cultural content. Octavian Goga was elected as 1st secretary of the
Association as a result of Cornel Diaconovici’s resignation (the General Gathering from Braºov, 1906); the
magazine was again transformed in annals, without the modification of the title (but keeping the annals as
subtitle), being edited as such for two years by the administrative secretary Octavian C. Tãslãuanu. He
officially published the magazine until 1913 (Octavian Goga was to become literary secretary of the
Association); we witnessed the magazine’s return to the initial profile starting with 1909 (on the title page it
was specified the fact that it was published under “the care of literary-scientific departments”), as a result of
the interruption of the publication of the Þara noastrã (Our country) magazine.
During Octavian C. Tãslãuanu’s directorate some of the most important collaborations started being
payed; the magazine was published every two months and, beginning with 1912, besides Octavian Tãslãuanu,
mentioned as director, was present an editorial committee: Silviu Dragomir — from the historical department
—, Victor Stanciu — the scientific department —, Onisifor Ghibu — the educational department —, and Ioan
I. Lapedatu — the economic department. Beginning with the 1st of January, 1914, according with the decision
of the General Gathering from Orãºtie (1913), the magazine returned to a monthly edition inside which there
were to be published only popularization articles for the large audience; the annals were to appear several times
a year, as the necessities required; the task of editing the magazine came in the charge of the Association’s
president, Andrei Bârseanu. During 1914-1919, as war was the background, the magazine appeared in 12
issues, respectively volumes, in 1914, two volumes in 1915, 1916, 1917, and a volume for the 12 issues in
1918 and 1919; the editorial committee only comprised Silviu Dragomir, Ioan I. Lapedatu and Victor Stanciu
(Octavian Tãslãuanu and Octavian Goga had to resign, given the situation created by the war). Starting with
1920, Ioan Georgescu, the literary secretary of the Association, became editor-in-chief (Andrei Bârseanu
remained director of the magazine); the new sections of the magazine corresponded to the revigorated profile
of the magazine, that was of popularization of literary and scientific works, attracting collaborators from the
entire new Romania; the issues became again monthly, and the heft of the scientific and cultural studies was
increasingly higher in the magazine’s pages.
The issues dedicated to some important historical personalities and events were frequent. Horia PetraPetrescu was provisionally in charge with the publication of the magazine in 1923 (after the resignation of Ioan
Georgescu); the provisionality ended next year, when he was appointed editor (after the publication of the
announcement of the contest for the position of editor no one applied.) From 1928, the task of editing the
magazine was assumed by Ion Agârbiceanu in collaboration with Horia Petra-Petrescu, the editorial committee
——————
5 V. Mihai Sofronie, Activitatea editorialã a Asociaþiunii Transilvane pânã la 1918, in Astra 1861-1950.
Asociaþiunea Transilvanã pentru Literatura Românã ºi Cultura Poporului Român. 125 de ani de la înfiinþare,
coordinated by Victor V. Grecu, Sibiu, 1987, p. 288; Pamfil Matei, Asociaþiunea în lumina documentelor
(1861-1950). Noi contribuþii, Sibiu, “Lucian Blaga” University’s Publishing House, 2005, p. 209.
6 Transilvania, 1/15th of January, 1890, p. 32; see also Pamfil Matei, op. cit., p. 211.
3
167
being composed by a representative of each section: Vladimir Ghidionescu, Leon Silviu Daniello, S.
Moroianu, Alexandru Borza, ªtefan Meteº, Sabin Opreanu, Victor Oniºor; each scientific section had to deliver
a collaborator for each issue of the magazine, and a study for every year, for each active member of the
sections. Beginning with the 1st of January, 1934, the editorial committee of the magazine, henceforth entitled
“bulletin of cultural technique”, was composed of Iuliu Moldovan, director, Gheorghe Preda, Ioan Bunea (from
1935 Nicolae Colan, from 1936 Ion Dãncilã), Horia Petra-Petrescu and Alexandru Dima, editors; with its new
format, the magazine was to ensure the generalization of the cultural initiatives of Association’s various
departments and cultural organizations, to deliver studies for conferences and debates, to inform about the
activity of other cultural societies; the sections of the magazine are being also adapted for the new orientation.
Until 1939, the magazine returned to its initial frequency (bi-monthly).
The editing committee was composed, in 1939 and 1940, from Iuliu Moldovan, Gheorghe Preda, Ioan
Dãncilã, Dumitru Stãniloae and Ioan Sandu, with Horia Petra-Petrescu and Alexandru Dima as editors. The
return to the format of “monthly cultural magazine” happened beginning with 1941, when, after the refuge in
Sibiu of the “Ferdinand the 1st” University from Cluj, the editing committee also contained academics from
Cluj; under the editorial coordination of Ion Breazu (and with an editorial committee formed from Constantin
Daicoviciu, Silviu Dragomir, ªtefan Manciulea, Ion Muºlea, Sabin Oprean, Ionel Pop, and V. Râmneanþu), 10
issues were published in 1941, 12 next year, another 12 and an administrative issue in 1943, respectively 1944,
2 volumes (4 issues) in 1945; the initial series of the magazine end with a volume (4 issues) in 1946, the
publication being forbidden by the new authorities from Bucharest, with the promise that it was to re-appear
in 1948 in Cluj7.
In 1968, there was organized in Sibiu a session of conferences (11th and 12th of May) dedicated to the
centennial of the Transilvania magazine8; this fact, as well as Sibiu’s transformation in an academic centre
beginning with 1969, led to the re-apparition of the magazine; its new series started in May 1972, this time as
“political, social-cultural, and literary” magazine, edited by the Sibiu County Committee for Socialist Culture
and Education, under the care of an editorial college formed from Titus Andronic, Wolf Aichelburg, Mircea
Avram, Mircea Braga, Al. Dima, Maria Fanache, Ioan Folea, Dorin Fulea, Carol Göllner, Ilie Guþan, Alexandru
Hudiþeanu, Cornel Irimie, Ion Itu, Erwin Kuttler, Pamfil Matei, Christian Maurer, Eugen Onu, Mircea Opriºiu,
Marin Panait, ªtefan, Pascu, Mira Preda, George Popa, Henry Selbing, Georg Scherg, Mircea Tomuº, Vasile
Trifu, C. Voiciulescu; beginning with 1974 (6th issue), the editorial college was composed of an editor-in-chief
(Mircea Tomuº), a general secretary of the editing team (Titu Popescu), and a smaller number of editors (Wolf
Aichelburg, Titus Andronic, Mircea Braga, Maria Fanache, Carol Göllner, Ilie Guþan, Cornel Irimie, Mircea
Ivãnescu, Marin Panait, Pamfil Matei, ªtefan Pascu, Georg Scherg, Gheorghe Stoica); were made another
modifications in the structure of the editorial college, so that in 1987 it was composed from Mircea Tomuº,
Mircea Braga, Mircea Opriºiu, Teofil ªleam, and ªtefan Tancou; Mircea Tomuº remains editor-in-chief of the
magazine until November 1989, when the new series ended. The artistic appearance of the magazine was due
to Vasile Pop Silaghi, until 1985, when he dies, the graphic presentation being then the responsibility of Doina
ªteflea. The illustrations in full color of the time belonged, respectively, to Szabo Toma, Gheorghe Lãzãroiu,
Ion Miclea, Horst Wächter, ªtefan Orth.
Beginning with 1987, each issue of the magazine had a supervising editor chosen of its permanent
collaborators; the contents of the magazine were mostly literary and cultural, the special issues dedicated to
some important personalities or historical events being quite frequent9. The poet Ion Mircea became editor-inchief in 1990; he remained in this position until 1999, when the magazine ceased again its apparition; from
——————
7 Cf. Pamfil Matei, Asociaþiunea Transilvanã pentru Literatura Românã ºi Cultura Poporului Român
(ASTRA) ºi rolul ei în cultura naþionalã (1861-1950), Cluj-Napoca, Editura Dacia, 1986, p. 207-208. For more
information about the activity of Transilvania cultural magazine, the initial series, see also Vasile
Curticãpeanu, Miºcarea culturalã româneascã pentru Unirea din 1918, Bucureºti, Editura ªtiinþificã, 1968, p.
84-93; Centenarul Revistei Transilvania, Sibiu, 1969, 213 p.; Transilvania, the new series, 9/1986, 72 p.; Astra
1861-1950. Asociaþiunea Transilvanã pentru Literatura Românã ºi Cultura Poporului Român. 125 de ani de
la înfiinþare, coordinated by Victor V. Grecu, Sibiu, 1987, 520 p.; Astra 1861-1991. Asociaþiunea Transilvanã
pentru Literatura Românã ºi Cultura Poporului Român. 130 de ani de la înfiinþare, Sibiu, 1992, 239 p.; Pamfil
Matei, op. cit., p. 201-208; idem, Asociaþiunea în lumina documentelor (1861-1950). Noi contribuþii, Sibiu,
Editura Universitãþii “Lucian Blaga”, 2005, p. 200-295 et. al.
8 As a result of this event, there was published a collection of studies. See supra, footnote 7.
9 Eugenia Criºan, Revista Transilvania, serie nouã, 1972-1989. Indice bibliografic analitic, Sibiu, Editura
Technomedia, 2008.
168
4
2000, Mircea Tomuº is again appointed in charge with the magazine, and beginning with 2002 the position of
editor-in-chief was held by Corvin Lupu. From the same year, the magazine was edited by the “Transilvania
Cultural Interethnical Centre”, under the authority of Sibiu County Council.
With an inter- and trans-disciplinary nature, the magazine was acknowledged in the B+ category, as a
result of the national evaluation of the National Council for Scientific Research in Academic Education;
it published studies and articles with scientific character and reviews from various fields, such as the
history of social, economic, cultural, and political thinking, philosophy, religion, literature and literary
sciences, art, also offering the readers its electronic version with free access on the magazine’s website
(http://www.revistatransilvania.ro).
Silviu Borº
THE AUTHORS
Abdenbi Sarroukh is a member of the English Department at Abdelmalik Essaâdi University,
Tétouan, Morocco. He is a member of the Moroccan Association of Human rights in Tetouan;
member of “The research group in theatre and drama” and a formerly member of “The research
group in linguistics and thought” in Tetouan. Publications: A call in “Aljisr”, a monthly journal in
Tetouan, 1993 , third number; The question of Moral in Nietzsche’s work in Arabic, in the daily
journal “Al Itihad Alichtiraki” May 1997; When we were in Challa in “Revue” n: 3, “Picturing Tangier”,
July, 2007.
Ana Bazac Ph.D., Professor of Social Philosophy and Political Science at “Politehnica”
University of Bucharest. Research and teaching interests: social philosophy, politics linked to
economy, meditations in the frame of the social relationships, interests behind mentalities and their
disclosure, international relations and the new technologies, ethics, political communication.
She has published chapters in edited books, studies and numerous academic papers in different
Romanian and international journals. Edited book: Comunicarea politicã: repere teoretice ºi
decizionale (The Political Communication: Theoretical and Decision Guiding Marks), Bucureºti,
Editura Vremea, 2006, 384 p.
Viorella Manolache graduated Political Science Faculty, Law Faculty, has a master in Journalism
and Public Relations and PhD with a research theme concerning the Romanian Political Elitism
(Bucharest University.
She published several books: Postmodernitatea româneascã între experienþã ontologicã ºi
necesitate politicã (Romanian Postmodernity/ Between Ontological Experience and Political
Necessity) “Lucian Blaga” University, Sibiu, 2004; Cecitatea politicã — între sindrom ereditar ºi
faza lungã a maºinistului (Political Blindness as a Heredity Syndrome), “Lucian Blaga”
University, Sibiu, 2004, Sibiu, 2005; Ipostaze ale fetiºului în presa culturalã româneascã (Fetishism.
Hypostasis of the Romanian Cultural Press), “Lucian Blaga” University, Sibiu, 2006; Elite.
Conceptualizãri moderne (Elitism. Modern Conceptualization), “Lucian Blaga” University, Sibiu,
2006; Antielitele. Forme tipice ºi atipice ale elitismului politic contemporan (Antielites. Typical
and atypical forms of elitism), “Lucian Blaga” University, Sibiu, 2007; Elita politicã româneascã
între deconstrucþia comunismului ºi reconstrucþia democraþiei (Romanian Political Elites), Techno
Media, Sibiu, 2008. She works as a researcher at the Romanian Academy, Institute of Political
Science and International Relations, at the Department of Political Philosophy.
Luis R. Oro Tapia was a BA in history, Master Degree in political science and is PhD Candidate
in Philosophy. Author of the books ¿Qué es la política?, RIL Editores, Santiago, 2003 and El
poder: adicción y dependencia, Brickle Ediciones, Santiago, 2006. Actually he teaches classes in
the Institute of History from the Pontificia Catolical University of Valparaiso.
Jaouad El Habbouch is a post-graduate student at the Faculty of Letters, Abdelmalek Saadi
University in Tetouan. He took his BA Degree in English Literature in 2004. He is now working
170
THE AUTHORS
2
on his MA dissertation under the title The USA Global War on Terror: a Postcolonial Reading. His
main fields of interest for academic research are modernism, postmodernism, postcolonialism,
cultural studies, documentary films, the Enlightenment and the American Political Thought,
Mediterranean Studies and Comparative Literature.
Henrieta Aniºoara ªerban is a researcher within the Institute of Political Sciences and
International Relations (Romanian Academy) in Bucharest. She is specialized in political
communication, with a PhD in Philosophy from the Romanian Academy. She obtained grants at
Naples and Maastricht, and she presented several topics related to communication and ideology at
the Catholic University of Brussels and at Louborough University, UK. Authored books: Limbajul
politic în democraþie (Political Language in Democracy), Bucharest, Editura Institutului de ªtiinþe
Politice ºi Relaþii Internaþionale al Academiei Române, 2006 and Paradigmele diferenþei în filosofia
comunicãrii. Modernism ºi postmodernism (The Paradigms of Difference. Modernism and
Postmodernism), Bucharest, Editura Institutului de ªtiinþe Politice ºi Relaþii Internaþionale al
Academiei Române, 2007. Edited volume, with Angela Botez and Marius Drãghici, Construcþie ºi
deconstrucþie în filosofia americanã contemporanã (Construction and Deconstruction in the American
Contemporary Philosophy), Bucharest, Editura Academiei, 2006. Several articles in Appraisal,
Higher Education in Europe, Revue roumaine de philosophie.
Rãzvan Victor Pantelimon graduated from the Faculty of Political Science at Bucharest
University and the Faculty of Law at “Nicolae Titulescu” University, Bucharest. He has a Master
Degree in “Romanian Politics and European Policies” from the Faculty of Political Science at the
Bucharest University. At present he is a PhD student in Political Science at Bologna University
and Bucharest University. Research interests: political parties, systems and doctrines in South America.
Participations at national conferences. Several studies and articles published in various scientific
journals.
Leonte Ivanov is a PhD lecturer at the “Al. I. Cuza” University, Iaºi and the headmaster of
the Slavic Language and Literature, Iasi. He published several studies as Literaturã rusã veche
(secolele X-XVII) — Old Russian literature (the X-XVII); Literatura secolului al XVIII-lea (Literature
of the XVIII century); Introducere în Imagologie (Introduction to Imagology); Imagologie slavã
(Slavic Imagology); Literatura ºi cultura exilului rus (Literature and Culture of Russian Exile);
Literatura secolului al XIX-lea ( a doua jumãtate) — Literature of the Nineteenth Century (second
half). He is the author of the volumes: Imaginea rusului ºi a Rusiei în literatura românã. 1840-1948
(The image of Russian and Russia in the Romanian literature. 1840-1948), “Cartier” Publishing
House, Chiºinãu 2004, Studii tolstoievskiene. Retrospecþii literare (Tolstoievskian Studies. Literary
Restrospections), “Timpul” Publishing House, Iaºi, 2007, and of an edition about Prinþesa Cantemir.
Portret de epocã ºi corespondenþã ineditã (Princess Cantemir. Portrait of an époque and inedited
correspondence) “Al. I. Cuza” Publishing House, Iaºi, 2005.
Abdellatif Akbib is a Senior Lecturer at the Department of English Studies, Abdelmalek
Essaadi University, Tétouan, Morocco. He is a Professor of English Language and Literature, with
special interest in the Novel, the Short Story, and American Studies. He has recently designed a
full module of American Studies for the Master programme. Fiction writer (published three collections
of short stories, a novel, and a travelogue). Most recent publications: “Choukri’s Tangier: The Old
Sow that Eats Her Farrow”, Voices of Tangier: Conference Proceedings, Tanger: Altopress, 2006;
“Bankruptcy in Mohamed Choukri’s ‘The Flower Freak’”. Journal of Middle Eastern and North
3
THE AUTHORS
171
African Intellectual and Cultural Studies. Special Issue: “Writing Tangier” (2005); Hearts of Embers
(Novel). Tangier: Altopress, 2004; Between the Lines (Collected Short Stories) 2nd edition. Fedala:
Mohammedia, 2003.
Perri Giovannucci is an Assistant Professor of English at the American University in Dubai.
She has PhD in English, University of Miami, Coral Gables, Florida, USA, MA in English, Wayne
State University, Detroit, Michigan, USA and BA in Journalism, Wayne State University, Detroit,
Michigan, USA; with a minor in Classical Civilizations. She teaches classes in world literature,
humanities, English composition, and, literature and composition. She also looks at films as literary
texts and uses them in her pedagogy.
She is interested in the literature of the Middle East, particularly the modern literature of the
Maghreb countries of North Africa. Her book, Literature and Development in North Africa: The
Modernizing Mission was published in the spring of 2008 by Routledge. She won the AUD
Provost Award for outstanding literary achievement for this work. Other areas of interest include
globalization; cultural studies; anti-colonialism and post-colonialism; historiography and historical
materialism; psychoanalytic theory; feminism; and, issues of human rights and social justice. Her
current research focuses on the war in Iraq.
Shabana Fayyaz is an Assistant Professor at the Defense & Strategic Studies Department,
Quaid-I-Azam University, from Islamabad. Presently she is pursuing PhD in Political Science at
The University of Birmingham, UK.
Nardjes Flici graduated from the Faculty of Political Science and International Relations at
the University of Alger with a graduation paper entitled: “The Phenomenon of the international
terrorism against the international law”. She specialized in International Relations. She is a PhD
student in International Relations at Bucharest University. Dissertation thesis: “The management
of the international conflicts. Case study: the conflict in Western Sahara”. She has published
“Stratégie et prévention du terrorisme”, communication presented at the conference “La lutte contre
le terrorisme, une affaire de tous”, the first international conference on terrorism, Alger, 22-23
March 2008, in Revue spéciale de colloque international sur le terrorisme, p. 44. She was a consultant
for the National Organization for the victims of terrorism (2000-2003).
Lucian Jora is a researcher within the Institute of Political Sciences and International
Relations (Romanian Academy) in Bucharest. Postgraduate studies at the University of Catania,
Copenhagen University and Jangelonian University. At the moment is preparing a PhD at BabeºBolyai University in European Studies with a research on Cultural Diplomacy through the
representation in History. He authored several articles with a focus on International Relations,
European Studies and Cultural Diplomacy.
Francesco Albertini is a PhD student in Economic Geography at University of Rome “La
Sapienza”, Department for Geo-economics Studies, author of several contribution and field researches
for Italian geopolitical magazines in the sectors of energy and development cooperation, including
publications over Balkans crisis, Danube basin, Tumen River Area and Kaliningrad status. He is
actually employed within UNICEF after a 5 years experience within UN system agencies in African
countries (United Nations Development Programme), working for the participation of disadvantaged
children to school and monitoring their overall enrolments ratio in sub-Saharan countries.
172
THE AUTHORS
4
María Alejandra Vizcarra Ruiz is a researcher at the Department of Studies about Social
Movements, University of Guadalajara, PhD Candidate in Political Science at Department of
Politics, Institutions and History, University of Bologna, Italy.
She won in 2001 the “Guillermo Rousset Banda” National Prize on political essay, the most
important prize of this type in Mexico. She has some publications on subjects like democracy and
politics in Mexico: El proceso de democratización en México 1812-2000, UACJ, Ciudad Juárez,
Chihuahua, 2002 ºi Jalisco, sociedad, economía, política y cultura, UNAM, México, 2000. She
teaches some classes about Mexican political system and has been member of Mexican electoral
institutions.

Romanian Review of Political Sciences and International Relations

Transcription

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