Edward Snowden-Insider Threat
Transcription
Edward Snowden-Insider Threat
Edward Snowden “The Ultimate Insider Threat” James Kiely Director of Security March 18, 2014 Overview • • • • • • • • • • • • Who is Edward Snowden? What was his objective? Snowden Timeline How did he gain access? NSA Damage Assessment Pursuit of political asylum Amnesty consideration Whistle-Blower or Traitor? Insider Threat lessons learned Cleared Defense Contractor Consequences Obama restructuring of NSA Collection Program Insider Threat Awareness Review 2 Who is Edward Snowden? • • • • w/m age 29 Grew up in Maryland High school drop-out, later earned GED Associates viewed him as a “reticent man” Quiet and reserved • Described himself as an “ascetic” A person who renounces comforts and pleasures in order to lead a life of rigid self denial 3 Who is Edward Snowden? Personality Traits • Organizational Citizen Strong sense of justice in what he believes Feels his view is correct and no room for negotiating • Narcissist Views himself as much more important than he actually is Access • Held TS-SCI clearance based on IT positions with CIA and NSA 4 What was Snowden’s objective? • Obtain BAH IT System Administrator contractor job with NSA to gain access to their domestic surveillance collection program 5 What was Snowden’s objective? Felt public needed to know and draw their own conclusions Responsibility to expose what he viewed as NSA wrong doing Claimed to be a whistleblower acting against the threat NSA posed to civil liberties Indicated exposure of NSA secret programs didn’t make him a hero or a traitor, just an American 6 What was Snowden’s objective? • Realized NSA, Hawaii facility lacked software to trace his unauthorized access to classified computer files Necessary security software was in place at most other NSA locations • Convinced over 20 NSA, Hawaii employees to share their logins and PWs Allowed him to access/ download tens of thousands of classified docs 7 What was Snowden’s objective? • Claims hasn’t revealed any classified NSA information re “legitimate military targets” Only NSA efforts against civilian infrastructure • Feels decision to expose NSA surveillance programs was vindicated by a federal judge’s 12/16/2013 ruling Mass NSA collection of US phone data may be unconstitutional Case will eventually be heard by Supreme Court Based on above a small portion of the public view Snowden as a hero 8 What was Snowden’s objective? • December 2013 Snowden interview with the Washington Post Snowden claimed he exceeded initial expectations NSA was now facing scrutiny it had not endured since the 1970s or actually ever from Congress, federal courts, the public and world leaders “I am not trying to bring down NSA, I’m working to improve NSA.” I have no relationship with the Russian or Chinese government and haven’t directly provided them with NSA information 9 Snowden Timeline 2013 January • Starts to identify journalists for leaking of NSA classified February • Contacts Glenn Greenwald, reporter, The Guardian and Laura Poitras, a documentary film maker re NSA story March • Greenwald/Poitras meet in NYC re Snowden emails May • Snowden sends Greenwald sample classified NSA docs • Snowden flees to Hong Kong for meetings/interviews with Greenwald/Poitras Reveals details of classified NSA Prism Program to track suspected terrorists Also possible interaction with Russian Intelligence Service 10 Snowden Timeline 2013 June • The Guardian publishes a highly classified court order demanding Verizon produce phone records • The Guardian and Washington Post disclose existence of Prism Program • While in Hong Kong Snowden reveals himself as NSA leaker • He initiates requests for political asylum in several South American countries • Vladimir Putin allows Snowden to enter Russia 11 Snowden Timeline 2013 July-September • Leaks a steady stream of classified NSA documents British GCHQ intercepted communications of foreign politicians participating in the April and September 2009 G20 Summit NSA bugged European Union offices in NYC/ WDC NSA ongoing targeting of 38 foreign embassies for communication intercept NSA intercepted United Nations communications 12 Snowden Timeline 2013 July-September • Snowden granted temporary political asylum in Russia 13 Snowden Timeline 2013 October • Snowden’s father visits him in Moscow • Snowden claims he took no classified NSA files to Russia and hasn’t shared any information with Russian Intelligence Service (SVR) • Claims he has access to every active NSA operation against China November • Releases “A Manifesto for Truth” claiming NSA and GCHQ are the worst offenders of mass communication surveillance w/o oversight 14 Snowden Timeline 2013 November • British Intelligence officials indicate the Snowden leaks have seriously damaged their ability to keep Britain safe December • President Obama advises there will be no amnesty in return for Snowden’s cooperation • Snowden provides Washington Post with a two day interview Claims to have accomplished his objective 15 Snowden Timeline 2014 January • Washington Post releases lengthy update interview with Snowden • New York Times Editorial Board recommends a plea bargain or clemency for Snowden “Based on enormous value of information he provided and abuses he exposed” • House and Senate Intelligence Committee leaders opine leak was supported by Russia No proof provided 16 Snowden Timeline 2014 January • Obama announces NSA Collection Program reforms • Snowden claims NSA conducting industrial espionage against major German companies Intent is for US economic gain vs. national security Failed to provide any proof • Snowden claims impossible to receive fair trial in US and USG officials want him killed 17 Snowden Timeline 2014 January • Russian officials advise Snowden’s asylum protection will be extended beyond 8/2014 • NSA and GCHQ capable of collecting data from smart phone apps Without knowledge of companies that distribute them • Snowden nominated for Nobel Peace Prize Winners will be announced in October 2014 18 Snowden Timeline 2014 February • Initially kept quiet while Russia hosted the Winter Olympics in Sochi • Leaked documents indicating GCHQ intercepted webcam images from millions of Yahoo users around the world (2008-2010) 19 Snowden Timeline 2014 March • Claimed NSA’s “mass surveillance” approach caused them to miss critical terrorist communications Possible clues prior to 2013 Boston Marathon bombing • Indicated NSA disguised itself as Facebook servers to gain access to computers of individual intelligence targets 20 How did Snowden gain access? Flawed USIS Reinvestigation for TS Clearance • Largest security background check contractor DOJ civil complaint -USIS filed 660,000 flawed BIs and obtained $12 million in bonuses Failed to properly vet Snowden’s 2011 reinvestigation • Practice known as “Dumping” or “Flushing” Aimed at pumping up revenue for expeditious BIs USIS paid $1900 for BIs submitted before next to last day of the month, but only 75% after that deadline 21 How did Snowden gain access? Flawed USIS Reinvestigation for TS Clearance • Failed to verify Snowden’s account of a previous security violation while employed at CIA • Didn’t address fact that he failed to report a trip to India • Failed to interview anyone other than his mother and girlfriend 22 How did Snowden gain access? • CIA never provided NSA with derogatory report from Snowden’s supervisor Noted concerning changes in behavior and work habits just prior to leaving CIA for NSA CIA suspected he attempted to breach classified computer files prior to his departure 23 How did Snowden gain access? • NSA IT System Administrator position provided the perfect cover for accessing classified docs Maintained in a file-sharing location on NSA’s intranet portal Classified docs kept on portal so analysts and other officials could review and discuss online His authorized access provided the opportunity to identify and move classified docs to a more secure location w/o raising red flags He also used social engineering to persuade his colleagues to share their passwords 24 NSA Damage Assessment Has been conducting an ongoing Snowden Damage Assessment since June 2013 • Downloaded 1.7 million classified documents Still has access to 1.5 million unleaked after sharing 200,000 Only released 1% to date! • As IT System Administrator had PWs to circumvent system security measures Part of job to maintain NSA computers and move large data sets between systems 25 NSA Damage Assessment • Used available tools to “scrape” tons of classified from NSA websites and move to a location for downloading • He succeeded in obscuring some electronic traces of how he accessed classified • Believe he has enough classified for at least two years of additional news stories US Intelligence officials feel the worst is yet to come! 26 NSA Damage Assessment Most Critical Information Taken or Exposed • Topics of interest to NSA and associated gaps (31,000 classified docs) Includes US, China, Russia and Iran country specific capabilities and gaps These reports would be a “gold mine” for our adversaries if leaked Provides a road map of what the US knows and doesn’t know about its enemies • Names of all IC agents and undercover assets worldwide 27 NSA Damage Assessment • NSA’s greatest concern focuses on whether Russia or China managed to download the archive from Snowden’s computer US officials have acknowledged there is no evidence to that affect Snowden has repeatedly denied directly furnishing Russia or China with any classified documents 28 NSA Damage Assessment • Massive fallout for US foreign relations based on Snowden release of monitoring/eavesdropping of foreign nations and allies In reality most countries spy and collect on each other, but it wasn’t previously public knowledge • To date thousands of NSA man hours and tens of millions of dollars have been spent trying to reconstruct what Snowden took Remains a work in progress and may never be clear 29 NSA Damage Assessment • Exploring possibility Snowden may have left a virus behind in NSA’s system (a time bomb) As a result all computers he accessed were removed from NSA’s classified network Also all computers and actual cables with access to unclassified network • Intelligence officials fear Snowden created a heavily encrypted data cloud Access limited to him and three others via ever changing PWs Snowden views this cache as his “insurance policy” 30 NSA Damage Assessment • Snowden’s disclosures will result in grave harm to existing intelligence gathering techniques Exposing methods that adversaries will learn to avoid Already see Al Qaeda adjusting the way they communicate 31 Snowden Mitigation Task Force • General Martin Dempsey, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff is heading Snowden Mitigation Task Force, to investigate extent of theft and determine how to overcome it Vast majority of documents taken relate to military capabilities, operations, tactics, techniques and procedures It will take the US at least two years and possibly billions of dollars to overcome harm done 32 NSA Damage Assessment FBI leading Criminal investigation • Snowden methodically downloaded massive amounts of NSA classified files while working in Hawaii Believed to have acted alone • Indicted by a FGJ-June 2014 Charged with Espionage and Theft of Government Property Russia rejected US request to extradite Snowden during July 2013 33 Pursuit of Political Asylum • Snowden initially granted temporary political asylum in Russia until August 2014 • He continues to pursue political asylum in Brazil, Bolivia, Ecuador, Venezuela, Nicaraqua and Iceland • Snowden stated ”Until a country grants me permanent political asylum the USG will continue to interfere with my ability to speak out” 34 Pursuit of Political Asylum Did Snowden have help from the Russians? • US House Intelligence Committee Chairman Mike Rodgers believes Snowden ended up in Russia for a reason Cooperating with Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) Stolen NSA information had more to do with US overseas operations than US citizens’ privacy Snowden not skilled enough to pull off the leak alone Recent disclosures are too sophisticated in there content and timing for Snowden • Senator Dianne Feinstein, Chairman of the Select Committee on Intelligence and Mike Morell, former Deputy Director, CIA concur, but no actual proof so far 35 Amnesty Consideration Snowden indicated that he would return to the US if given amnesty • Some high level NSA executives think that option warrants further discussion (12/2013) Considering the potential for more damage to national security Requires assurance that all remaining classified documents would be returned and secured 36 Amnesty Consideration • General Keith Alexander, Director, NSA feels amnesty for Snowden is a bad idea (12/2013) Needs to be held accountable for his actions Is not trustworthy of returning all NSA data • President Obama advised “there will be no amnesty for Snowden” (12/2013) Recommended Snowden voluntarily return to the US to face felony charges and receive full due process and protections within the legal system 37 Whistle-Blower or Traitor? Intelligence Community and national security establishment widely view Snowden as a traitor • Recently released classified Pentagon report reflects Leaks have endangered US troops by providing terrorists with a copy of our country’s playbook Damaged US allies efforts to combat terrorism, cybercrime and WMD proliferation • Warrants federal prosecution for compromising classified information to the benefit of US adversaries • Caused irreparable damage via the largest classified data dump in US history 38 Whistle-Blower or Traitor? • Severely damaged foreign relations with US allies • Several members of Congress strongly support federal prosecution of Snowden and oppose any plea bargaining or amnesty considerations • Broke his oath of secrecy to protect classified (SF-312) 39 Whistle-Blower or Traitor? Some elements outside the Intelligence Community view Snowden as a hero • Provided the public with details on how NSA exceeded and abused its authority • Revelations prompted two out of three federal judges to accuse NSA of violating the Constitution • A panel appointed by President Obama cited NSA’s invasion of privacy and called for a major overhaul of its operations 40 Whistle-Blower or Traitor? • Some members of Congress have expressed their outrage over NSA’s collection practices involving US citizens 41 Lessons Learned What is NSA doing to avoid future Insider Threats? • NSA and IC revamping network security Installing software to spot/track employee attempts to access/download classified w/o prior authorization Senate Intelligence Committee to fund $100 million security upgrade • NSA and IC implementation of “two person handling rule” When accessing or moving classified database information Must remove anonymity for those accessing classified systems 42 Lessons Learned What is NSA doing to avoid future Insider Threats? • Tagging classified documents to ensure only staff with “need to know” can access a given document Tagging rule also allows security auditors to see how individuals with authorized access are actually using it • New guidance to never provide your password, even to an IT System Administrator Especially as pertains to classified document access 43 Lessons Learned What is NSA doing to avoid future Insider Threats? • Need for timely, through and competent initial BIs and clearance reinvestigations • Recognition that contractors, IT personnel and disgruntled employees pose the greatest Insider Threat • Impossible to fully protect against an Insider Threat Key is to initially hire quality employees Responsibility of all employees to recognize and report suspicious Insider Threat activity 44 Lessons Learned What is NSA doing to avoid future Insider Threats? • Establishing an Insider Threat Working Group Provide staff with ongoing training and awareness Key is to root out/identify and neutralize Insider Threats before they inflict extensive damage • Enforce Security ban on removable media in classified work areas • Recognition that the Snowden incident could have happened to any of the IC agencies 45 Cleared Defense Contractor (CDC) Consequences • Office of Personnel Management (OPM), who conducts CDC security clearance investigations proposed Changing TS re-investigations from 5 years to annually Secret re-investigations from10 years to 5 years • DIA subjecting its contractors with TS-SCI clearances to security interview and CI polygraph • Effective 1/2015 DSS requiring all CDC to have a viable Insider Threat Program 46 Obama Restructuring of NSA Surveillance Program (1/17/14) • Data collection program remains a critical tool for IC to identify and deter terrorist plots • No more eavesdropping on foreign leaders and governments who are allies • Requires IC to obtain FISA Court permission before accessing US citizens’ telephone records • AG Eric Holder tasked to design a plan moving control of phone records away from USG 47 Insider Threat Awareness Review • It’s essential for CDC facilities to establish an Insider Threat Program Assists in mitigating the risk Trains staff to observe, recognize and report suspicious activity Must have a specific reporting process in place 48 Insider Threat Awareness Review • Key is to identify and neutralize Insider Threat before they inflict extensive damage Watch for behavioral changes Identify and report personality traits of concern Employee observations are one of the best ways to identify an Insider Threat Awareness that most Insider Threats occur a month before an employee plans to leave the company Security is every employee’s responsibility!!! 49 Insider Threat Awareness Review Insider Motives • Ego based • To exact revenge • Financial gain • Anti-US sentiment • Foreign National ties • To expose what they view as hypocrisy or wrong doing 50 Insider Threat Awareness Review Factors Creating an Insider Threat • Employee experiencing financial difficulties • Company’s deteriorating financial condition • Company decision to furlough employees or reduce salaries • Philosophical differences • Perceived moral obligation 51 Insider Threat Awareness Review How to spot an Insider Threat? • Failure to report overseas travel or contact with foreign nationals (Snowden) • Efforts to gain higher security clearance access outside normal work scope (Snowden) • Working odd hours inconsistent with responsibilities or insisting on working alone • Attempting to enter limited access areas outside their “need to know” (Snowden) 52 Insider Threat Awareness Review How to spot an Insider Threat? • Living beyond one’s means • Exhibiting exploitable behaviors Drug or alcohol issues Financial difficulties Complaints about pay or work conditions Anti-USG comments Loyalty to foreign interests 53 Insider Threat Awareness Review Snowden isn’t a typical Insider Threat • Most Insiders betray their employer after becoming disgruntled or developing financial problems Then become vulnerable for recruitment by a FIS • He obtained BAH IT System Administrator position with the sole intent of accessing and leaking NSA classified docs 54 QUESTIONS??????? 55