The Naval Review

THE
N AVA L
REVIEW
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Think wisely. Plan boldly. Act swiftly."
T H E OBJECT
m NAVAL
REVIEW, by providing a vehicle
for the expression of personal opinions on
matters of naval interest, aims to stimulate
thought and discussion on such matters
among naval officers and others connected
with the Navies of the Commonwealth.
The views of junior officers are especially
welcome. Technical details, such as are
more appropriate to turt books, should be
omitted from contributions.
Founded in I9I 2
I S S U E D Q U A R T E R L Y FOR P R I V A T E C I R C U L A T I O N
For the Regulations of THE NAVAL REVIEW see overleaf.
It is important that they be carefully studied.
Copyrighted under Act of 191 1
Vol. XLIX
No.4 October, 1961
Editor's N o t e s
T
HESE are indeed perplexing times and it seems that our leaders will need
almost superhuman foresight and statesmanship in their deliberations on the
fundamental problems that face them. The 'Common Market', whether or not
we should take the staggeringly important step of joining, dominates the domestic
horizon. It is a question which seems likely to split the nation from top to bottom.
Every day one reads arguments which prove, to their writers' satisfaction, that to
join (or not to join, as the case may be) spells ruin and eclipse. How to decide?
At any rate it seems fairly clear that the 'party boys', who dominate the Trades
Unions and take their orders from Moscow, are firmly against us joining; this may
give the clue we are all looking for as to our best course!
There are, broadly speaking, two sorts of war in which we might be involved
in the future-'total'
and 'limited'. But there is another sort of war in which we
have been involved for the last fifteen years-the 'cold' war against Communism,
which is made no less deadly to our survival by the fact that the country as a whole
does not realise that it is going on. It is, in fact, a war in which only the other side is
fighting and which we are, very naturally, losing. The main Communist weapon
is industrial subversion and they have captured control of industrial labour in a
number of key industries to an extent which the man in the street does not begin
to realise. The current E.T.U. scandal is only some indication of their methods,
which apparently even now no one has any serious intention of curbing. It would
be comforting to believe that this is the only Union in which such goings-on are
rife but, of course, this is far from the case.
It is idle to bleat that the British working man is basically sensible and hardworking; the British working man is too scared-and who can blame him ?-to stand
out against the 'strong-arm boys' and their Communist bosses. He knows better
than to attend branch meetings, which they dominate, and if he attends mass meetings,
he knows better than to vote against the 'party line'. Responsible Trade Union
control of labour in the industries concerned has been completely demolished by
the 'shop steward' system, which has been virtually taken over by the Communists.
All employers of industrial labour know this but they are powerless to fight without
Government aid. So perhaps it would be as well if our leaders thought less about
'total war', or even 'limited war', and made some recognisable attempt to resist in the
subversive war which Russia has been waging, quite openly and blatantly, against
this country for fifteen years.
Annual General Meeting
W
3P4
3
B
m
THEAnnual General Meeting will be held on Friday, 15th December, 1961, at the
Naval and Military Club, 94 Piccadilly, from 5.15 p.m. to 7 p.m.
Vice-Admiral Sir Charles Hughes-Hallett will take the Chair. The meeting will
be devoted to a general discussion of NAVAL REVIEW affairs. Afterwards, at about
6 p.m., the meeting will become a social one. Wives of those attending will be
welcome, also at the business meeting if they so wish. After 6 p.m. refreshments
will be provided and members will be asked to pay for what they order.
It is hoped that all those who can make it convenient to attend will do so. Those
intending to attend are requested to inform the Secretary of THE NAVAL REVIEW in
advance.
It is suggested this Notice be detached and kept separately as a reminder.
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NOTICES
And supposing we do join the Common Market, what will be the effect on the
Services? Shall we be committed for ever to the 'continental strategy' which has
entailed the virtual annihilation of the Navy? Or will the logic of our situation
soon begin to filter through to those responsible for the shape of our armed forces ?
We still regard ourselves as a 'world power' but the dissolution of the Empire
proceeds apace and it seems that we may soon look in vain for any overseas bases
at all. Some, as in the case of Colombo, Trincomalee and Simonstown, have been
returned to their 'uncommitted' owners; others, such as Cyprus, Freetown, Singapore
and Kahawa, the new Army base in Kenya, depend for their use on approval of our
operations by their current leaders or dictators-a quite unpredictable factor. Which
of us at this moment would care to invest his own savings in a base in Kenya ? In
the present world situation it is difficult to take Hong Kong very seriously as a base.
And if the few hundred inhabitants of the Maldives decide, on the advice of some
'big brother', that they would like to become 'uncommitted', no doubt we shall
have to abandon the R.A.F. staging post at Gan. And so it goes on. It is surely
becoming clearer every day that in the not distant future any influence which we
hope to exert in far places will have to be exerted by sea.
The authors of the letters on 'Effective Working Hours' and 'The New Battleground' in the July edition will find replies 'straight from the horse's mouth' in the
Correspondence section of this issue.
We have been informed that printing charges for THE NAVAL REVIEW are to go
up by another 10 per cent from this month and this will largely cancel out the
improvement in our income resulting from covenanted subscriptions. Continued
efforts are needed therefore to increase our membership.
Matter for the January 1962 edition should be sent in as early as possible and
not later than 1st December.
Notices
Annual Subscription, 1962
THEannual subscription for 1962 is due on 1st January. If payment is not already
authorised by Banker's standing order members are requested to send their subscription direct to THE NAVAL REVIEW Bankers, National Provincial Bank Ltd.,
18 Cromwell Place, London, S.W.7.
Changes in Address
WILL members please notify every change of address to the Secretary, thereby
saving considerable expense in postage, and replacement of copies damaged in
transit following delivery to incorrect addresses.
Soft on Communism . . . . .?.
This article was written by a member stationed in the United States and was
addressed to the American, non-military reader.
he trouble with him, is that he's soft on communism. . . .' A potent taunt
and very hard to rebut. It is amongst the last but most persistent legacies of
McCarthyism, and like all broad smears relies upon an ignorance of the subject which
is only matched by the readiness to accept such a sweeping judgment on a fellowman. And what does a person have to do or say to lay himself open to such imputations ? It would seem to be almost anything, depending upon the venom and lack
of scruple of the accuser, and even a man with the stature of General Eisenhower
is not safe from such attack. But even if we restrict consideration to the genuinely
sincere critics, the list of opinions which automatically classify one as 'soft' is very
extensive, though it may only entail some divergence from the accepted wisdom in
the matter of handling the Soviets, unless it should be in the direction of bigger and
better bombs. If we are to avoid such charges we must pay the price of conformity,
and with it the inevitable loss of flexibility and freedom of action. And it is to this
lack of flexibility in dealing with the Soviets that I propose to turn my attention.
But lest I should suffer immediate dismissal as a woolly-brained intellectual who has
fallen prey to Communist blandishments, I intend to state my case in terms of sound
and accepted military logic.
As it is necessary to approach this question of 'dealing with the Russians' from
the beginning, let me first enter a strong warning against over-dogmatism in the
interpretation of Soviet intentions. There are at least ten major and quite different
lines of approach to this problem of interpretation which are followed by the various
prominent analysts in this field, and from these various approaches several perfectly
respectable but frequently conflicting conclusions emerge. These analysts have
however, one very important qualification in common, a qualification usually completely absent from the armchair pundits, namely, a thorough knowledge of the
subject and a deep understanding of the people, the country, and the ideology they
are analysing. And although they may differ somewhat in their final interpretation
of Communist intentions, there is a comforting unanimity both in the majority of
their basic assumptions and in their more general conclusions, many of which,
however, conflict with the conventional wisdom on the subject.
We know that statistics can be made to prove anything. This is even more true
of the apt quotation, usually both out of date and out of context. Equally applicable
in this particular field, is the old adage that a little knowledge is a dangerous thing.
Even amongst the more broadly educated members of the community, general and
categorical conclusions are too often formed upon inadequate knowledge, the
potted analysis and a sub-conscious selection of information which best accords
with preconceived opinions. It is ironical that amongst those accused of being
'Soft on Communism' are some with the broadest knowledge of the subject, who
know in the greatest detail the full and barbaric history of the Soviet state and who
understand most clearly the deeper evils of the system, some of which are often
more insidious than the obvious ones of which we are all aware. And it is no coincidence that it is the small minority of analysts who approach the problem in a
'T
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. . . . 3.
spirit of vindictiveness or as a crusade to prove that Western Capitalism has the
monopoly of all virtue, who come closest to popular opinion, but who achieve this
largely by forfeiting the objectivity of their studies, and allowing prejudice to cloud
the analysis.
So much for our warning, which is in essence a plea for objectivity, and the need
to know our enemy for what he really is, and not what we assume he ought to be.
We will return to this later, but first we must get back to this main question of how
we are to deal with the Russians. And although somewhat obvious, it is important
that before we decide as to how we are to deal with the Russians we must first decide
what it is we intend to do with them. Or, in the military jargon, which is now part
of our daily life, what is our Objective in the struggle with Leninist Communism ?
This question of the Objective is vital and all too frequently neglected. From
our time in the armed services, some of us may remember that it formed an essential
part of the Commander's 'Estimate of the Situation'. This estimate is a stylised
form of staff paper, designed to provide a framework for a methodical process of
successive logical deductions, and is used to determine the best course of action
to take in any given set of circumstances in order to attain, or accomplish, one's
predetermined Objective. This objective is, however, usually handed down from
above, since it is derived directly from one's assigned mission; as a result, the actual
selection of the objective is rarely a matter of great concern to the Commander or
his staff.
This type of Commander's Estimate is of course not peculiar to the U.S. armed
services, being found in various forms throughout the teachings of all military staffs,
and in this respect the British Navy is of particular interest to us when considering
the question of our objective. The British Navy is somewhat exceptional, even
amongst its sister services, in that it requires that the Commander who is making
the Estimate should almost invariably determine his own objective, or as they call
it, his Aim. This requirement is founded in history and the nature of naval operations before the invention of modern communications. when naval commanders at
all levels were continuously required to make decisions on the best course of
action, with their only guidance some broad directive such as 'Act as necessary
to protect Her Majesty's interests'. As a result, the British Navy places considerable emphasis upon the process of selecting the correct Aim, because they contend
that unless the Aim is correct, the rest of the estimate, and hence the plan, is
useless, since the crucial test of the finally selected course of action must be the
question 'Does it best gain and maintain the Aim ?' As an essential corollary to this,
they require that it must be possible to achieve the Aim with the forces available
and the circumstances pertaining, and that if none of the possible alternative courses
of action can do so, then the Aim must by definition be incorrect, and it is mandatory
to select another Aim, which can be achieved. As a further refinement, they require
the wording to be precise and concise, and except when absolutely unavoidable, to
be stated in positive and active terms; a negative, or defensively worded Aim is not
generally acceptable. And as a final comment on the general art of writing estimates,
the most unforgivable sin is that of 'Situating the Estimate' instead of 'Estimating
the Situation', i.e., of providing a post-facto justification for a course of action which
has already been arbitrarily decided.
This excursion into the field of international staff technics was not designed to
impress, but rather to emphasise the importance of selecting the correct objective,
SOFT ON COMMUNISM
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and to provide a certain degree of authenticity to the discussion which follows.
For it would appear that the West has never reasoned out any clear-cut objective
from fundamentals, but rather that their objective grew up like Topsy, as a postfacto rationalisation arising from the various courses of action which we were forced
to take in response to Soviet initiatives. That I am not alone in my concern about
selecting the correct objective was shown by the formation of President Eisenhower's
special committee on the selection of National goals, which was charged with a
similar problem, though on a much broader canvas. For the moment, however, I
will confine myself to considering what our objective should be, in our struggle
with Leninist Communism.
.
The West is fighting against the Communist Bloc because Leninist Communism
seeks to destroy it. The Communist doctrine proclaims that the ultimate collapse
of capitalism is inevitable, and it is therefore the duty of international Communism
to hasten that collapse, so that world Socialism may be established. Despite all talk
of peaceful coexistence, the essential need for world-wide Communist hegemony,
brought about by some form of revolution, whether constitutional or violent, is a
continuing tenet of Communist doctrine, and is now recognised as such by the West.
The West is in conflict with Soviet Communism because the latter has declared
war on the established order. It is the Soviets' insistence on the ultimate triumph
of their particular version of World Socialism with the concomitant liquidation of
Western Capitalism, that has forced the West to fight for its survival.
Once the West had woken up to the situation which it found itself in, there were
three broad policies open to them in their struggle against Communism:
They could attack, and attempt to destroy the Communists before the latter
could achieve their aim.
They could capitulate, and accept an imposed revolution.
They could adopt the middle course and attempt to contain the threat,
meanwhile having by necessity to coexist with the enemy.
The West in fact chose this last course of action, and for the last several years
has been attempting to contain and live with the problem. Although popular
opinion would generally have it otherwise, once the West had fully appreciated the
threat which it faced, for several years it was unexpectedly successful in containing
this danger, if results are assessed in terms of what the Soviets were trying to achieve
at that time. It is of course important to assess it from this viewpoint, in order to
avoid confusion with other developments in the world, and in particular with the
post-war surge of nationalism and other historical trends arising from the rapid
economic and social advances which were made during the last 100 years. I realise
that such a categorical statement as to the effectiveness of containment is likely to
arouse violent protests, since it has long been fashionably realistic to talk of the
unchecked advance of Communism since 1945. And it is perhaps unwise even to
attempt to defend such a contentious statement without being able to argue it out
in very great detail. But there is a disturbing tendency to credit the Russians
with superhuman clarity of thought and penetration of analysis, coupled with unlimited patience and guile and a complete understanding of all situations which
they exploit always to their own advantage. This is of course the way the Russians
would like to have it, but even allowing the political capacity for very long range
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planning, the evaluators, planners and operators are only human and hence fallible,
and indeed have proven themselves so. Whilst there is little chance of the conventional wisdom underestimating the Communist threat, it often adopts the
opposite and equally dangerous extreme of overestimation, which induces pessimism,
inflexibility, and an immobility which verges on defeatism. It may therefore be
instructive to attempt a rough balance of the profit and loss account of Soviet
external policy between 1917 and 1958, to see how successful they have been in
these &odd years, in implementing their stated intentions.
If we exclude the subjugation of the European satellites which was the direct
result of our policies during the Second World War, we see that major Communist
territorial accessions outside the old Tsarist frontiers are limited to Czechoslovakia,
China, N. Vietnam and Tibet. Although the last three represent a sizeable part of
the earth's surface and population, the successes in China and N. Vietnam were the
result of indigenous movements which did not derive their impetus from Moscow.
It has always been stated Communist Policy to capture Nationalist rebellions and
adapt them into Communist revolutions, yet in Asia, the Soviets failed to do this in
all cases except for part of French Indochina, and as we have said Moscow can claim
little credit for the success of Ho Chi Min in N. Vietnam. On the other hand, by
the end of 1958, a vast number of other previously dependent countries had achieved
full independence, and none of them had fallen under Communist domination.
Meanwhile, a whole series of Communist adventures, ranging from the Greek insurrection, through the Berlin blockade and the Korean War, have been thwarted
by the West; Jugoslavia has asserted her independence from the bloc, and internal
Communism has been actively and openly attacked in the newly independent but
still neutralist countries such as the United Arab Republic, Malaya, India and
Burma. Most important of all, throughout the world the majority of national authorities, if not all their peoples, are now aware of the dangers of Soviet Communism,
even if many think that they are skilful enough to sup with the devil, and see little to
choose between the two opposing blocs, anyway as far as their own national interests
are concerned.
There is no denying that the West has also had many serious setbacks to their
own most cherished policies but few of these originated from Soviet initiatives,
although Communism is a convenient whipping boy. As we have said, just as it is
important not to be complacent about the Communist threat, so is it important not
to paint them 10 feet tall, and not to credit them with ubiquity. It is therefore
necessary to assess Soviet successes in terms of what they were setting out to
achieve, and to realise that many of the developments which were seemingly unfavourable to the West were basically the result of historical trends; sometimes
these were compounded by Western indecision and obtuseness, and often were
exploited by the Communists, but they were rarely the result of Soviet long-range
initiatives.
During the period since the war it would be true to say that the West's main long
term objective has been 'To contain further Communist expansion', and that this
is still largely the case. In the past this containment was accomplished in many
ways ranging from full scale deterrence of total war to military and economic support
of likely threatened areas, and is currently seen as stretching far into the future.
But in my survey of Soviet gains I deliberately stopped at the beginning of 1959,
partly because in many cases it is still too soon to judge results, but mainly because
SOFT ON COMMUNISM
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325
the maintenance of our main objective has become progressively more difficult and
less successful, as Russia has sought to outflank our conventional modes of containment. Not only is physical containment as practised in the past tending to become
ever less effective, but its relevance to the future conflict is daily being placed in
question. Furthermore, if present attitudes and trends persist, direct conflict with
the growing power of China appears ultimately inevitable, whilst the efficacy of the
deterrent to prevent such a war becomes ever less credible.
This last prospect of a major war must obviously be unfavourable to the real
interests of the West, if only for the reason that they rejected such a course of action
when a victory might have been more easily attainable. Taken in conjunction with
the relative lack of success of current containment it raises doubt as to the merit
of our recent policies, and therefore of the main objective which they are designed
to maintain. The force of logic appears to dictate that the West must discard its
current objective whose sole element is 'Containment', and seek some better objective, more suited to the present situation, and one which gives hope of some future
solution of the conflict.
To forestall those who are poised to condemn me as a left-wing deviationist from
the Capitalist party-line, let me hasten to emphasise that I do not consider that
containment as an element of policy is wrong; with present Communist attitudes
and ideology, it is an essential component of any policy if the West and the rest of
the world is to resist absorption, and as I have already argued, in the past it has been
much more effective than is usually credited. Containment is only unsatisfactory
when it is the sole, or main, objective. This has always been so, because it deals only
with the symptoms of the conflict and neglects the root cause; but now in addition,
it also suffers from the overriding disadvantage that it can no longer be effectively
maintained.
The objective of containment is inherently negative and defensive, and the
resultant policies are governed by mainly military considerations. Conceived in
haste, and as a reaction to Soviet initiatives, these policies were based upon an attempt
to freeze existing boundaries and political allegiances, and the resultant defensive
line grew up haphazardly, with no regard for military geography, nor for the political
complexions of those who cared to join the West. Arising from this predominantly
defensive policy, the West has found it necessary to counter every single thing the
Soviet Bloc has done. Working from the correct assumption that the Soviets will
only act in their own best interests, the West automatically assumes that it must
therefore by definition be against Western interests, and acts to counter it. Arising
from the military nature of the policy, the West interprets all its own actions in terms
of military advantage, and sees only the military implications in all Soviet actions.
Thus the West may offer the Communists nothing which could conceivably be of any
military benefit to them, even if it were in the west's economic or political interests
to do so. In the same manner, any form of centralised collectivism, however suitable
to the local economic situation has automatically been suspect, and until recently
the West has tended to confuse opinions which dissent from Western economic
theory, with the real danger of World revolution.
All these reactions inevitably arose from a narrowly defined and purely defensive
objective, which as we have said, we can now no longer maintain. Although such an
objective appeared acceptable for a certain period in the post-war years, this is most
certainly no longer true. Western planners have been guilty of the unforgivable
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. . . .?.
sin of Situating the Estimate, so that the objective might fit an already established
course of action. If the West is to survive, it must discard such a stultifying objective,
which restricts the freedom of manoeuvre and denies it flexibility.
Having rejected our existing objective, we must next select what we consider
to be the correct one, and to do so, it is necessary to !ill in some more background
on both sides.
On the Western side, a survey of the last 50 or 60 or so years shows a remarkable
sociological advance amongst the leading nations of the West. However distasteful
Marx's teachings may have been to the ruling classes in the mid-Nineteenth Century,
few sociologists deny that his theories were based upon sound observation of the
conditions at the time. It was not the observations which were at fault, but his
theory of the resultant developments. Marx would have been amazed to see the
present forms of so-called Western Capitalism to be found amongst the more
enlightened exponents, ranging from barely disguised socialism to economies which
whilst theoretically bastions of private enterprise, are in fact severely restricted by
Government controls. This is not to pretend that everything in the West is perfect,
but there has unquestionably been a very great advance from the attitudes and
socio-economic situation of Marx's time.
Turning to the Communists, for the moment we will only consider the Soviets,
leaving China to a later stage. We see that in Russia, starting from a relatively low
standard, the Soviets have achieved a very large degree of industrialisation. Having
recovered from the tremendous economic setback of World War 11, they can now
claim a much higher standard of living than previously, and with it, an easing of
internal tensions and a relaxation of controls. In certain technical fields they are
even ahead of the West. Yet despite this apparent growing together of the two
opposing systems in economic and even social terms, there has been no relaxation
in the international conflict.
This continuing struggle can partly be accounted for by the straight conflict of
interest between the two power blocs, with the Soviet Bloc trying to establish a
sphere of influence for herself in a world which, until the second world war, was
dominated most effectively, albeit (in their own eyes) benevolently, by the Western
nations. But this conflict of interest is subsidiary to the root cause of the conflict,
which is contained in the dogma of world revolution. The Communist doctrine still
predicts the inevitability of some kind of conflict with Western Capitalism and the
ultimate victory of World Communism. It would seem incontrovertible that as
long as this element of the doctrine remains a tenet of Communist faith, there
can be no chance of the conflict being resolved, no matter how closely the two
systems meanwhile evolve towards each other. Unless the dogma is renounced or
modified, the conflict must persist until one side or the other is defeated or capitulates.
I have made here a fairly categorical assertion that it is the Communist dogma
which is at the root of the conflict. Against this, there is of course the argument
that we are faced by historic Russian imperialism, and since this question of whether
the Soviets are primarily motivated by doctrinal impulses or by national imperialism
is most important, I must deal very briefly with this counter-claim.
The importance of this argument lies in the fact that it would be far more difficult
SOFT ON COMMUNISN
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327
for the West to deflect the driving course of nationalism which seeks physical world
domination, than to effect an adjustment of an extreme ideology which is in any
case likely to be moderated by time. We have already allowed that there is an
element of both in Soviet motives but where national aggrandisement is dominant
it can usually only be checked by a head-on confrontation, i.e., by war.
Whilst we accept that there is this element in Soviet policy which reflects the
natural instincts of a powerful and growing nation to establish its own position in a
largely antipathetic world, and in itself this must generate a conflict of interest,
this instinct cannot be equated with all-conquering imperialism. It is the additional,
Messianic element which is so disturbing to the West, the element which rejects any
offer of part-shares, but requires that all these spheres of influence shall necessarily
become communist-style states, and which even seeks to replace governments already
friendly to the Soviets with a version modelled more closely to the Soviet pattern.
There is insufficient space to present the very convincing case supporting this
assertion, which not only places the facts of Tsarist Imperialism in their proper
perspective, but also draws together the threads of Russian post-revolutionary
expansion, and show how the pattern reflects the pre-eminence of doctrine. The most
persuasive argument comes from the numerous examples throughout the brief
Soviet history, where Moscow has behaved in a manner least suited to achieve their
aims, but in full accord with the body of theory and doctrine built up over the years.
Superficially and tactically, the Soviets appear extremely supple as they twist the
party line to changing circumstances; but the very need to do so is an indication of
the inherent inflexibility of the system, and shows that to a certain extent they are
prisoners of their own doctrine and dogma. And now, as Khrushchev tries to
break away from some of the restrictions of the dogma, he finds himself engaged
in a bitter doctrinal argument with China. And the continuing rift with Jugoslavia
has been kept alive by a fundamental doctrinal schism, despite sporadic attempts
to heal the breach, since a rapprochement is so greatly in the Soviet interest. It
is these contradictions, together with the mass of similar evidence which leads one
to conclude that the main threat posed by Soviet Russia stems from the ascendency
of the Communist doctrine, and is not due to a heavily disguised form of Russian
imperialism. The root of the conflict lies in the dogma of the need for world revolution.
Having isolated the root of the conflict, we must next consider very briefly certain
assumptions which will further aid us in selecting our new objectives. For a start,
it would seem fair to assume that it is not in the interests of either side to become
involved in an all-out nuclear war; in fact, irrespective of doctrine, we can assume that
present Russian leaders place the continued safety and well-being of the Soviet
Union above all other considerations. We can also claim, on the basis of history,
that it is possible for any doctrine to evolve, or to be changed as the result of the
persuasions of external circumstances and internal rationalisation, and that this
possibility also applies to Communist doctrine. And finally, we must allow that
for any settlement to be effective and lasting, it must be in the true interests of all
parties to that settlement.
We have seen that the West is fighting against Communism because the latter
is bent on destroying it. Of the three broad policies open to them, the West has
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. . . . 2.
chosen the middle one of trying to contain and meanwhile live with the problem, and
has specifically rejected the possibility of destroying Communisn at its source.
Furthermore, there is little evidence in the past century of genuine crusading instincts amongst the Western nations, and it would seem likely that if the Soviets
had been content to practise their theories within the confines of Russia the present
form of conflict would not exist. As we have said, the root of the conflict lies in the
dogma of the need for revolution. Correspondingly, if we could only remove, or
alter this dogma, the main cause of the conflict would disappear.
The West's correct objective now becomes inescapable. Their aim must be 'to
change the Soviet's mind as to the need for World Revolution'.
'To persuade the enemy to change his mind' . . . the classic objective in politics
and war, by methods ranging from bribery to armed conflict. How does this new
objective measure up to the criteria we discussed earlier; it has the advantages of being
positively worded and requires positive or offensive action; it would seem to be both
concise and precise, and we cannot be accused of 'Situating the Estimate' in our
choice of this objective. We must, however, now subject it to the most crucial test
of 'Is it possible to achieve this objective ?'
The objective rests upon the assumption that nothing human is immutable, and
although this assumption would seem almost incontrovertible, there are two main
objections most frequently raised against the possibility of any change in Soviet
attitude. They run roughly as follows:a. Russia does not want any change, nor does she wish for any settlement. A
change in the present situation is not in her interests.
b. If Russia should accept any kind of settlement, it will only be because it is
in her interest to do so. By implied definition, such a settlement must be
inimical to the West.
The first part of the statement at b. is only logical and of course applies equally
to both sides of the conflict; but it does not constitute an objection. Any settlement
to be effective must be considered by both parties to be in their real interests; any
other kind of settlement can only be applied and persist under some form of duress.
However, the implication in the second part of b. is not conceded and is disposed of
later in the discussion.
The first argument at a. is of course far too sweeping. The fact that Soviet Russia
may be satisfied with things as they are does not mean that there cannot be other
situations which she might consider more favourable. Russia will not change unless
she considers it to be in her interests to do so. . . but then again, are we so sure
that we know what she considers to be her true interests ? We assume that her best
interests are world domination. . . . but except for the requirements of doctrine,
is this in fact any more valid than the Soviet assumption that American Capitalists
want war ?
It would seem obvious that a change of dogma cannot be imposed upon the
Russians except by going to war. Therefore, with the assumptions we have taken,
such a change would have to be voluntarily carried out by the Communists. For this
to happen, circumstances would have to be conducive to such a change and the
Communists would have to be convinced that it was in their best interests to make
one. For them to modify their doctrine so that it was no longer actively antagonistic
SOFT ON COMMUNISM
. . . . ?.
329
to the West, circumstances would have to exist which would convince the Soviets
of the following four factors:a. That the doctrine as it stands is no longer yielding any positive benefits.
b. That there will be positive advantages accruing from a genuine entente with
the West.
c. That any modifications can be rationalised in doctrinal terms, with no need
for recantation or loss of face.
d. That the West is not antagonistic to the aim of national communism as a socioeconomic theory for local application if appropriate.
Although we have not generally appreciated it at the time, factor a. has come
about several times in the past, and on each occasion it has caused a slight adjustment in Soviet policies and sometimes a rationalisation of doctrine. This situation
was partly the result of effective containment, but also due to both the good sense
of newly independent countries, and to fresh minds in the Kremlin being brought to
bear on the more glaring contradictions of Stalin's policies. At present, the world
situation is extremely fluid but even so in the recent months the Soviets have lost
as often as they have won with their many initiatives. Although this fluidity may
hamper our efforts to actively negate all possible Soviet initiatives, we should
remember that the vast majority of Communist successes have been derived almost
directly from our weaknesses, failures or sins of omission, and it is in these areas
that we should be able to affect improvements irrespective of Soviet actions. It
would seem therefore that factor a. could in due course be re-established if we adopt
the correct policies.
The factor at b. is new, and although in the 1950s no conscious attempt was made
to persuade them of the advantages to be gained from co-operation, it is obvious
that the Western world has much to offer, which could be of great benefit to the
Soviet bloc. If the narrowly restrictive considerations of our previous objective can
be excluded from a future policy based upon our new and more far-reaching aim,
there appears to be no reason why this requirement cannot be met, particularly
since we can reject the sterile notion that anything that is of benefit to the Russians
must be definition by bad for the West.
Turning to the requirement at c., we know that the Communists are adept at
the verbal somersault, and such an adjustment should be fairly simple to achieve,
as long as the West is not too concerned with the hollow meaning of words. This
might entail allowing a Communist rationalisation of Western Social theory, which
would in fact continue unchanged, whilst permitting the Soviets to soft pedal the
need for world revolution, on the grounds that it had already been largely achieved.
The factor at d. would appear to present little problem, since the West is slowly
learning to differentiate between economic doctrines and world-wide revolutionary
movements, and we have already accepted the Jugoslav experiment, and in fact
financially support it.
It would therefore seem that almost against expectations, the West could bring
about all four of the necessary factors, if they set their minds to it, and adjusted
their policies accordingly.
As predicted, in determining whether the objective can be achieved, the argument
has of necessity been concentrated upon Russia since she presents the most immediate
threat. China, without the Soviets to support her with money and material, would
present a lesser threat than at present; Russia, without China, has already proved
-
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SOFT ON COMMUNISM
. . . . ?.
herself capable of shaking the world, and is still, for the time being at least, the
dominant partner in the bloc. It is also unlikely that, at this stage of its revolutionary
evolution, China would respond to such approaches, and she has in fact shown an
aggressive intransigence on this score. This does not, however, invalidate the
objective in its long term application to China, but merely at this time places greater
emphasis, above other elements of policy, on containment in this particular area.
We have shown that the West is capable of achieving this objective with respect
to Soviet Russia, allowing that we apply the right policies. Opposition inside Russia
could be expected from certain of the old guard Communists, but support would
be likely from the rising generation of managerial technocrats who are less fettered
by doctrine and more directly concerned with the progress of their country. We may
also assume that such policies will be opposed in this country by the staunchest of
anti-communists, convinced that we were selling our heritage for a mirage. But the
logic of our attack on the root of the conflict is inescapable; since the West does not
wish to capitulate, nor does it consider it expedient to attack the source, it must of
necessity contain the problem until such time as some dilution of the doctrine takes
place. This is in fact what we have been doing for the last 16 years. The argument
really centres on whether the West should sit back and wait for this change to take
place through the process of time, meanwhile living on the perpetual brink of war,
or whether the West should actively assist in bringing about this change, by creating
circumstances favourable to such a change.
Several centuries ago, the wars rooted in the Spanish inquisition were at their
height. No one could then visualise a foreseeable future when either side would
relent from their firm conviction that the others were fit only to be tortured on the
rack or burnt at the stake. During the religious conquests of the Mohammedans,
who considered it mandatory to convert as they conquered, no one could visualise
the day when Moslems and Christians would coexist in peace. This analogy serves
to bring out two points. Firstly, in these cases the Messianic fervour receded with
time, even though movements had the added impetus of religious ideologies.
Secondly, the factor which allowed these movements to come to terms, and live with
the rest of the world, was the modification of their doctrine; a modification which
diluted the previously dominant need for conversion, until the doctrine was no
longer dangerous to other members of the community.
There is no suggestion that there will necessarily be any genuine relaxation of
Soviet despotism as it affects Russia. The lessons of history, the Russian character
and current developments, none give much hope that their governmental system
will move radically from some form of centralised oligarchy. Nor should this disturb
the West, since this is the form of government which Russia has traditionally enjoyed
for centuries. What, however, does concern the West, is that the Communists should
renounce the need to convert the rest of the world and should forego their aim of
World Revolution. Present Western policy is in fact based upon the hope of change;
an unspoken hope, that if we can sweat it out for long enough the two systems will
evolve towards each other and the menace will go away. It is therefore obviously in
the West's true interest to strive for an international climate which supports the
Soviet advocates of change, and which serves to blunt the arguments of those Communist zealots in favour of continuing with the doctrine as it is today.
SOFT ON COMMUNISM
. . . .?.
33I
Allowing that we accept the new objective, what effect will this have on our
policies ? To discuss the possible results in any detail would take at least another
full length article, but there is nevertheless a need to stress two very important principles which this objective will immediately allow us to reintroduce into our
planning, namely, the dominance of policital considerations in policy, and. . . .
flexibility.
Whilst containment was the sole objective, military considerations were inevitably
paramount, since there were few other factors to balance against them. With the
proposed new objective, which is so much more far-reaching and broader in its
scope, consideration can be given to many other factors, which will in turn serve to
produce a more balanced policy. Thus, the demands of absolute military security
will be weighed against the more positive aspects of the new policy.
As a result of forsaking the sterile policy of military immobilism, where every
alternative course of action was assessed solely in terms of military advantage or disadvantage, the West will also be able to counteract the military inflexibility which
has permeated through the policy-making levels of most governments. In military
parlance 'negotiation' is synonymous with retreat; yet negotiation (not unilateral
concession) is an essential method of achieving our objective. Present Western
military policy must inevitably be defensive. It must not, however, be allowed to
overshadow alternative approaches to the problem which are both more constructive
and more offensive. This new objective will restore flexibility to Western deliberations.
The West must have a double-sided volicv. On the one hand there must be a
politico-military policy against further Communist territorial or ideological expansion; this is largely a defensive policy, which is already in existence as the dominant attitude of the West. The right military mix would need to be assessed primarily
on enemy capabilities, moderated by a reasonable assessment of his intentions, but
the policy itself would not be dominated solely by military considerations.
Equal in importance to this existing defensive element of containment is the other
new policy, which is offensive in intent, and which is more directly aimed at the
root cause of the conflict. This policy taken in conjunction with effective containment, will aim at creating a situation in which it becomes in the Soviet's own best
interests to voluntarily modify their doctrine, or else to declare that its conditions
have largely been fulfilled. This offensive policy, with its aim of changing the
enemy's mind, will be the dominant factor when considering guidelines for future
conduct.
In fact, there is nothing very novel in these proposals. Historically, the underlying rationale of a successful foreign policy has always lain in the old adage 'If you
can't break it, you must join it'. The West having declined to break the Communists, has however done nothing positive instead, and as a result the problem
merely increases. It is not suggested that the West should compromise its principles,
nor is that the underlying sense of the old adage. Rather, one 'joins with it', in order
to influence it to your way of thinking, so that you may finally achieve your objective,
by stealth rather than by head-on clash. Perhaps in unconscious revolt against its
past defensive policy, and partly due to the strong military influence, the West
constantly thinks, acts and talks in terms of achieving a victory over the Soviets. But
in reality the West does not seek to defeat the Russians; if that had been their intention, it should have been attempted directly after the war. Right or wrong, the West
A
.
33=
SOFT ON COMMUNISM
. . . .?.
has accepted the existence of the Soviets, with the present need for containment,
and with coexistence as the remote goal. There is no question of engaging the
Soviets unless they attack first, neither is 'Victory' an element in either present
or future objectives, unless war should break out. Unfortunately, this residual urge
to achieve a victory serves only to distort Western policies and pronouncements,
and bears no relation to the main objective of changing the enemy's mind.
Referring back to the beginning of this article, I there expressed concern over our
lack of flexibility in dealing with the Soviets, which I felt was partly the result of the
fear of being termed 'soft on Communism'. T o summarise the argument on how
to remedy this state of affairs, which has been expressed in largely military terms, we
see that in any Commander's Estimate of the Situation, it is of overriding importance
that the correct objective be selected; without that, all-plans and policies must
inevitably be misdirected. It is therefore vital that the West should be aware of its
correct objective in its conflict with Communism.
The present Western objective deals only with the symptoms of the conflict.
Containment, as the main objective, can only produce policies which are defensive
and inherently military in nature, and thoroughly inflexible. As long as military
containment, based upon massive deterrence, is the only objective, a sterile Western
policy is inevitable, since too often the only alternatives are nuclear war or Western
defeat. Such policies do not offer even the possibility of a favourable solution to the
conflict, and meanwhile serve to confirm the Communist belief in their doctrine;
this doctrine, the necessity for World revolution, is the root cause of the conflict.
Any objective to have a chance of success must attack this root cause. The West's
objective should therefore be 'To change the Soviet's mind as to the need for World
Revolution'. Until this is done, conflict is inevitable; but if this objective can be
achieved, then true coexistence will be possible. Such an objective would include
amongst its tasks the previous defensive objective of containment, but both this
and other subsidiary tasks would be reinterpreted in the light of the more positive
aspects of the main objective.
'To persuade the enemy to change his mind'; this is the classic objective of history.
The Soviets wish to convert the West to Communism, thereby altering the whole
western way of life. But the correct aim of the West is far more subtle, and in
some ways more simple; they only need to persuade the Communists to modify
just one element of their doctrine, in a manner no way detrimental to themselves.
With this as an objective, the West will have ample room for manoeuvre. Flexibility will return to their policies, and even the task of containment can be carried
out less rigidly and military absolutes need no longer be the criteria for governmental
policies. There is no pretence that such a change in Communist doctrine can be
brought about overnight; it would be a long and tedious policy, requiring great skill
and statesmanship. The line between appeasement and attaining the objective would
be finely drawn, and its application would need great flexibility and judgment. But
such a policy offers a resolution to the conflict; something positive to strive for,
even whilst the old objective is still being maintained as an element of the larger
plan.
Soviet Communism is only one of the many forces and problems in the world
today; because it so directly threatens the West, there is a tendency to become com-
SOFT ON COMMUNISM
. . . . ?.
333
pletely absorbed in it, and to see all other problems in terms of the direct struggle
with the Russians. But this new objective of changing the enemy's mind will allow
the West to be constructive, and more important, it will bring with it a sense of
proportion, so that the West can once again see things in historical perspective.
Released from the egocentric and often amoral rationalisations required by the
objective of containment, the West will be able to pay more than lip-service to the
Ideas which it claims to stand for.
Will these conclusions lead people to suppose that I too am 'soft on Communism ?'
If so, it will concern me little, for unless I am much mistaken I am in very good
company, as it would seem that the present administration's approach to Foreign
Policy reflects a very similar line of reasoning. Nor do I claim that there is anything
original in my ideas, for certain of the more far-sighted experts on both foreign
affairs and Soviet Russia have been propounding such policies for many years past.
George F. Kennan was one of the earlier proponents of greater flexibility, even in
the dark days of 1947, and similar views are reputed to be held by many of the
present State Department teams.
When Kennan's ideas reached a mass audience as the result of the B.B.C. Reith
Lectures in 1957, they had a tremendous impact largely because they seemed to
offer a way of escape from the ever growing dilemma. But though some who understood the subject as well as Kennan, found themselves convinced by the cold logic
of his proposals, much of the favourable response reflected the natural human
reluctance to face up to any long term unpleasantness. And it was in reaction to this
response and the knowledge that the will power of human resistance is weak, that
the West sought to bolster their own internal morale. In their concern for any
slackening in their people's determination, they tended to dismiss Kennan's proprosals as wishful thinking which placed undue reliance upon Soviet good faith;
meanwhile the West stepped up its own external intransigence. Indeed, it can be
said that in certain sectors the West has become as much a prisoner of its own
propaganda as ever did the Russians.
In 1957, I too found Kennan's proposals most beguiling, but like the rest I steeled
myself against them, feeling that there must be some flaw; and when Khrushchev
was driving so hard for coexistence in 1959, I loudly reasserted that the aims of
Communism had not changed, but merely their tactics. This of course was true,
but I also echoed the fallacy that we must retain our rigid posture dominated by
containment, lest we be seduced by false professions of friendship. This was the
direct result of my failing to carry the analysis of the Russian situation through to its
logical conclusion. It is strange that whilst we are always seeking indications of
internal change in Russia, we fail to take the next step and recognise that our very
interest in such a change bespeaks its importance to us, and therefrom deduce that we
should do all in our power to bring about such a change.
This article has therefore been written in the hope that by adopting a formal and
proven deductive process, I may be able to penetrate established attitudes in a
Western world which is accustomed to talk casually of 'massive deterrence' and
'mutual national suicide' and where until recently negotiation automatically implied
unilateral concessions. I realise that it may even be dangerous to present the argument in such a sketchy form, since it is possible to counter but briefly only some of
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HISTORY AND TRAINING I N THE NUCLEAR AGE
the more obvious objections, but it seemed worth the risk in order to establish quite
clearly which of the two alternative policies is not only the most offensive, but also
the most clearly in the best interests of the West. It seems to me that it is only those
who lack the certainty of purpose, the confidence in their cause and the long-range
vision necessary for them to engage and defeat the Soviets at their own game, who
are forced to seek the refuge of the weak and obtuse in a policy of negative immobilism. As it is, these same people, who include those who have set themselves
up as our contemporary Inquisition, are the very ones who are in fact 'Soft on
Communism'.
'WILLOW'
History and Training in the
Nuclear Age
T
HIS paper, with a short introduction added, comprises a lecture which I gave
to the officers of the America and West Indies Squadron in May, 1934, nearly
thirty years ago and just five years before Hitler's war. It was recalled to my memory
by one of the subjects quoted for the 1961 Gold Medal competition of the R.U.S.I.,
viz: 'The introduction of nuclear weapons, both strategic and tactical, would seem
to have altered the conditions of any future war completely. Discuss the extent
to which the study of past campaigns is still of any value in the training of future
commanders of all three Services or could help in the formation of tactical or strategic
concepts for use in such a war'. There are many officers who will think that the value
now to be obtained from the study of history and of past campaigns must be very
small. I should be happy to write at any time a paper to prove the contrary, but
educated officers ought really to be able to do it for themselves. First we must be
quite clear about what we can get from History. Mainly, it will answer two questions
for us:1. What kind of men were the great commanders of the past and what were
the chief qualities in their characters ?
2. What are the principles that we find them constantly applying?
T o these two we might add:
3. Among the leaders who were defeated, do we find clear evidence that they
often failed either due to some defect in their make-up, or to neglecting some
of those principles to which all successful leaders attach great importance ?
History will not help us to write orders for a battle or a campaign that will
cover all possible eventualities, because History shows that to attempt such a
thing is and always has been quite futile. But it will help us to find, if we look
for them, a number of guiding principles which are of immense value. Napoleon told us to read and re-read the campaigns of the great commanders, for
by doing so we can discover principles that guided them to victory and can
see at the same time how the violation of sound principles brought ruin to their
opponents. Principles have been set down in writing by Napoleon, Foch,
HISTORY AND TRAINING I N THE NUCLEAR AGE
335
Clausewitz, Mahan, Richmond, Montgomery and many others, and in every
case they have drawn on recorded history to support their opinions.
An interesting example is that of Admiral Sir R. Custance, G.C.B., etc., who,
before 1914, showed that he was technically up to date by writing books on 'The
Ship of the line in Battle', 'The Whitehead Torpedo in War', etc. After the first
world war he published, in 1919, a book entitled 'War at Sea': moderr, theory and
ancient practice', and his Preface contains these words: 'the object of the author
is to spread a knowledge of some principles underlying the conduct of war at sea'.
He was of course fully aware of the many lessons that could be drawn from the
great war just ended, so readers may be surprised to hear that the period from
which he deduced his principles is entirely confined to the wars of the ancient Greeks,
between the years 500 and 400 B.c., i.e., well over 2,000 years ago! The truth is of
course that sound principles are fundamental and eternal. Many of them will apply
to Strategy and even to Tactics, to any fighting service, in any part of the world and
in any century. Many of them, though well known to most great Commanders,
have never been put down in a set form of words that is accepted by all. But the
searchlight of history will always light them up for us, and will show us that they
remain unaffected by all technical advances such as the invention of gunpowder,
of dynamite, of aircraft and torpedoes, or even of atom bombs.
In the paper that follows, the suggestions put forward are based on well-known
principles and are likely, I submit, to be as acceptable today as they were 30 years
ago.
TRAINING OF T H E FLEET I N PEACE
( A lecture delivered in 1934)
Gentlemen, this is mainly a short talk to Junior Officers. I propose to range over
various subjects all connected with the training of the Fleet, by which I mean the
training of officers and men, for you will realise I hope that 'in battle it is not ships
that fight, but men'.
First, and all the time, one must develop discipline, on which everything else
rests, and ability as a Seaman, which makes a man self-reliant and able to think for
himself. Discipline and Seamanship in large measure go together, and can be
cultivated by General Drill, Boat Sailing, Boat Cruising, etc., combined with
parades under arms, landing parties and so on. One must also develop weapon
training, and technical knowledge of gunnery and torpedo work. This problem is
not easy, because there is never enough time to do all the training we ought to do:
also we must remember that too much weapon training may make the men stale or
turn them into machines. Too much seamanship may leave them insufficient time
to study the weapons they have to handle in battle, and too much discipline, if it
be of the wrong sort, may destroy their initiative.
We must strike a happy mean, and it is obvious I think that these things require
much thought and constant attention, so when you hear someone criticising the
sailor, saying he lacks initiative, or is stupid, or the Petty Officers don't take charge
properly, I would ask you to remember what Napoleon said: 'There is no such thing
as bad men; there are only bad officers.'
I want now to suggest to you a few general principles that in my opinion should
be applied in our training.
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HISTORY AND TRAINING I N THE NUCLEAR AGE
Ship's companies should be happy and contented, not by being pampered but
by knowing that their officers are really anxious to keep them happy. Divisional
officers should aim to discover obvious needs, or improvements that can be easily
brought about, and any legitimate cause of discontent. Then apply Napoleon's rule
'Faites moi savoir'--i.e. 'Make sure that your captain or senior officers are f d y
aware of things they ought to know about, and things that obviously need improvement'. Above all, let us never take ourselves too seriously. Take your job seriously
but do not reckon yourself of equal importance. 'Smile, damn you, smile' is a maxim
that has hung for some time over my desk and it is addressed to all my staff and particularly to myself. A happy ship, a ship where the men not only respect their
Captain but also have a real affection for him, is nearly always a ship where the
Captain has a happy disposition, looks and is cheerful, and never (or anyway very
seldom!) looks sour, peevish or ill-tempered.
OVERWORK
AND DECENTRALISATION
No one should be consistently overworked in peacetime. I once rather shocked
the First Lord by saying 'In War I work 7 days a week, but in Peace I reckon I have
done my duty if I stop at 6 days'. I remember a captain who worked his men
pretty hard because he had a passion for efficiency. Another captain remarked of
him, 'One should keep the pot hotted up and ready to bring to the boil when trouble
starts, but it should not be kept constantly boiling over'. Commanders in large ships
should learn to reduce their work and to teach younger officers by decentralising.
This always works well but of course mistakes are made at times. Some Commanders
suffering from 'Promotionitis' will not decentralise for fear that some error by a
junior may get them a black mark. Actually, a man can more easily wreck his
career by a fear of taking risks and too much 'Safety First'. Without doubt 'Fortune
loves a daring suitor' and we may remember Nelson's comment, 'If I had been
censured every time I have run my ship or fleets under my command into great
danger, I should long ago have been out of the Service and never in the House of
Lords'. Life is full of paradoxes. The man who takes most risks will quite likely
live longer than the man who is so scared of microbes that he wraps himself up in
cotton wool.
Officers muit learn to develop qualities of leadership and to remember that the
really good officer will, without doubt, always get good results from his men. I t is
not only a matter of study and experience but also of character training for, as it
was wisely said of certain great leaders in the past, 'If you would do what these men
did you must make yourselves what these men were'. Perhaps the most important
thing in war is to have sufficiently cultivated the offensive spirit, which goes, of course,
with plenty of initiative and unlimited physical courage. General Sheridan in the
American Civil War put his finger on a weak spot when he said that certain of the
Northern Commanders 'Never went out to lick anybody, but always thought first
of keeping from getting licked'. A brilliant contrast is the story of Paul Jones who,
having engaged for some time with a larger British ship, was summoned by the
Captain to surrender. Jones replied, 'Surrender! Why, I haven't begun to fight
yet!' The fight became more and more fierce and finally, thanks to the dominant
HISTORY AND TRAINING I N THE NUCLEAR AGE
337
personality of Paul Jones, it was the British ship that had to surrender. It is an
ancient military maxim that no battle is ever lost until the General in command
thinks he has lost it. Xenophon wisely remarked, 'The good horseman should know
neither fear nor anger', which is quite a good rule for officers in time of war. Many
things affect the morale of the men, especially the conduct of their C.O. He should
always appear to them to be cheerful, confident and efficient, with a good grasp
of the whole situation. He must maintain good discipline, but that should not be
difficult if he is fair-minded and just. Finally, in all matters requiring his personal
attention, he must apply the rule 'See for yourself, and make yourself seen'. This
point is of special importance to military officers on the field of battle.*
INITIATIVE
In the past we have often suffered from signals such as 'Request instructions',
from a Junior officer, or 'Follow Senior Officer's motions', from a flag officer. Both
of these are detrimental to proper training for war and it has even happened that
officers taking their ships into battle have, before opening fire, waited for their
Senior officer to do so first. In all detached positions it is the duty of juniors to try
to anticipate their Senior Officer's wishes, and the simplest way to do this is to say
to yourself, 'What would my Senior Officer wish me to do if he were standing here
beside me ?' A sound maxim taught at the Camberley Staff College some 25 years
ago was 'Better an error in judgement than a lack of initiative'.
TIME
'In war, time is counted in minutes not in hours'. It is impossible to overestimate
the importance of this rule. 'Time', said Nelson, 'is everything. I sometimes achieved
success simply because I was always ready ten minutes before the other man'. Lord
Charles Beresford made a rule in peacetime exercises that he would always start
his movements or his offensive immediately the rules permitted him to do so. The
Royal Oak was sunk at Scapa Flow because the German 'U' Boat came in immediately
the time and tide enabled her to do so: in consequence she got through a narrow
passage just before the arrival of a block ship which had been sent up to close it.
Vacillation and needless delays nearly always lead to trouble. Hannibal could
easily have taken Rome if he had followed up his victorious offensive and pressed
straight on to the gates of the city. Quick decisions are often needed in time of war,
and sometimes without your possessing more than half the data you would like to
be given on the subject. But don't forget that if you wait to get all the information
you would like to have, the action you then decide to take may well be too late to be
of any use.
The 'friction of war' is intense and often causes failure. In peacetime, friction
between adjacent commanders sometimes causes discord and discontent: in war it
may lose a battle, so 'Never let the sun go down upon your wrath' and eliminate
friction by all possible means. This can often be done by good staff work, supplying
information to all who ought to have it, etc. One does not want to hear again the
* P.S.(1961) The memoirs of Lord Wavell, Lord Montgomery and Lord Alexander show
how they always complied with this rule.
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HISTORY AND TRAINING IN THE NUCLEAR AGE
comment of a certain Admiral in the '14-'18 war, who said that he spent more time
fighting the Admiralty than fighting the enemy.
Officers should set an example of loyalty to their men. One of the commonest
forms of disloyalty is criticism, often ill-informed and unjustified, by Junior Officers
of their Seniors. 'Any fool can criticise, most fools do7. Constructive criticism is
always of value and, though some Junior Officers may not think so, it is nearly always
welcomed if it is handed in politely and at the right time. I remember an Admiral
in 1916 quoting Nelson:-'See
how that noble fellow Collingwood leads his ships
into action'. 'Today', he said, 'you are more likely to hear someone say 'Look at that
old fool Jones bringing his ship into harbour: I am sure he is going to make a mess
of it7.
Now, gentlemen I have almost finished. I have not the eloquence to impress on
you the great importance of those things I have been speaking of, but I hope you
will try to remember them for three reasons.
First, I think they may help you to make a success of your own careers-as I hope
you all will.
Next, the British Empire has never been bigger than it is today: the Navy relatively has seldom been smaller. Mahan, in his fine tribute to Nelson's fleet, said,
'Those far-distant storm-beaten ships, on which the Grand Army had never looked,
stood between it and the dominion of the world'. I believe that the utter dependence
of the Empire on our Navy today is no less than it was then.
Lastly, it may or may not be true of a nation but it must be true of a fighting
service, that if you wish for peace you must prepare for war. It is our duty to hope
and to work for peace, but it is a sad fact that peace has not been made more secure
by British disarmament, or by the conferences of the past 10 years. On the contrary,
the cynic would say that those fundamental causes which give rise to wars, such
as hunger, greed, the competition for world markets, or hatred and envy of prosperous neighbours, are more widespread on the face of the earth today than at any
time in the present century. There is certainly today, as someone said recently,
'an atmosphere in which the doves of peace find the olive branches withering in their
amiable beaks'.
In such an atmosphere we especially must take pains to be prepared, for those
who have seen naval battles will not readily forget the grim truth of that ancient
maxim, 'A thousand years scarce serve to form a State, an hour may lay it in the
dust'.
N.B.-War
with Germany came just 5 years later.
R. P. ERNLE-ERLE-DRAX
Lecture to Officers,
At Bermuda.
21.5.34.
Little Acorns
I
WOULD not have you think that in telling this story I found myself a principal
in what transpired. I was just one of the several liaison links without, indeed,
either the experience or the standing to be capable of anything further. T o be
frank, I had hoped for a very different kind of job, and went with reluctance to
the American appointment. I now realise that it led to an unique experience, and
that the developments to which I was a very minor party had consequences of great
significance. One further caveat-I made no private record of the many conversations, interviews and meetings which transpired. I would never have dared to keep
that kind of personal record: and so today what I recall is stimulated only by the
limited aid of the usual kind of desk diary which just registers day by day the engagements in which I was involved. You should also bear in mind that all this took
place twenty years ago, that memory is treacherous, and that inevitably therefore
there will be both errors and omissions in my recollection of those events.
There is a background to why I was sent to the States in 1940: the direct one
that at the time I was available; the indirect one that by nature of my previous
appointment I could be expected to have a reasonable insight into the workings of
the minds of the United Kingdom War Cabinet Committees and particularly of the
Chiefs of Staff, This circumstance had come about as follows.
In July, 1939, as a newly promoted Captain I had been appointed an additional
Naval Assistant Secretary to the Committee of Imperial Defence; or rather perhaps
I should say I was recalled to the Committee because of previous experience of the
organisation from 1933 to 1936-better the devil you know than the one you don't,
as it were! In the summer of 1939 the Secretariat was already being expanded in
anticipation and streamlining itself to convert to the planned War Cabinet Secretariat if the worst came about. Within the potential war organisation the necessity
to provide for Anglo-French (I) Military co-ordination was self-evident. It was
felt that as a backing to regular Supreme War Council meetings and other direct
commerce at the top level, a day-to-day liaison should be established in London in
the form of a Committee comprising representatives of the British and French
Chiefs of Staff to provide a two-way channel for the conveyance of views, appreciations and the like, and to undertake such exploratory tasks as the Chiefs of Staff
collectively wished. I was detailed as the British Secretary to this body whose
business, it was envisaged, would be run (secretarially speaking) on the lines to which
the Cabinet Office and Committee of Imperial Defence were accustomed, and which
I may add had no equal in economy of purpose and effectiveness.
A week before war was declared, the French representatives joined their British
colleagues in Gwydyr House, Whitehall, and business started. The events that
followed over the next ten months until the collapse of France are another story
and have no place here. Sufficient to say that things did not always go smoothly. In
the light of after events it is clear enough that there was too much wishful thinking
engendered largely by the hope that a Western war front on the pattern of 1914-18,
with its ghastly casualties, would somehow be avoided. There was, of course, much
Military with a capital 'M', implying common inter-Service interests.
339
340
LITTLE ACORNS
else in the way of mistaken anticipation which history has since recorded. Anyway,
the Allied Military Committee met daily, worked away at appreciations and the
like, and kept the Secretariat busy, though I still feel that the contributions were of
doubtful value and sometimes 'crossed the bows' of the British Joint Planners.
What is relevant to the succeeding narrative is that my secretarial duties included
attending as an 'observer' at the daily wartime meetings of the British Chiefs of
Staff; acting as Assistant Secretary to six of the eight Supreme War Council meetings
which took place alternately in England and France; sometimes also taking notes
at particular War Cabinet meetings where Military policy was under discussion;
being au fait with other Committee discussions and conclusions either through
attendance or by reading up the subsequent minutes; and finally keeping in touch
with affairs at the other end through mutual exchanges of visits with Redman (2)
at his outpost of the War Cabinet Secretariat alongside the French High Command.
All this apart from the natural 'grapevine' available through being a part of the War
Cabinet Office with an entree to the Service Ministries. In a way, I was a kind of
approved 'fly on the wall' and hence capable of keeping the Allied Military Committee
informed of developments relevant to its work and enabling me in my secretarial
capacity the better to help in the drafting of the papers and the like arising from
across-the-table discussions.
Thus, as with other members of the War Cabinet Secretariat, I kept abreast of
developments and should have been able to see how the minds of those responsible
for the conduct of the war were working, and why.
I have no substantial recollection now of what impression it all left on my mind.
They were strange 'twilight' months. Only the war at sea was real. Not that the
'Top Level' was taking anything for granted exactly. Queer things were happening.
There were apprehensive glances over shoulders at the Balkans. The Russian
exploitation of their opportunities was a nagging tooth; and there was a not unexpected lack of confidence in the effectiveness of the Maginot Line which so
obviously had open flanks. Nor I think was General Gamelin, the Supreme Commander of the Western armies, any more confident. What, however, the 'inside
track' did seem to do for me was, curiously enough, to give me a kind of optimistic
outlook; though why that should have been so, I have no idea, except probably that
I am one of those people who have a great respect for my seniors and an endemic
trust in them; and rightly, as I have long since found to be a fact. Certainly my
optimism that things would 'come out in the wash' was of the greatest self-help
in my subsequent assignment, though possibly some of those I met then may have
thought I was just putting on a front.
The blow fell on 10th May, 1940, with the invasion of Holland and Belgium
and only three weeks later the evacuation of the B.E.F. was, luckily, in full swing.
A fortnight afterwards the Italian vulture swooped and the collapse of the alliance
was complete. As for the Allied Military Committee, the armistice was marked
in my mind by the appearance of the French members the next morning in plain
clothes. My current job seemed to be over.
There was a certain amount of 'washing up' to be completed, and I also became
Now Lieutenant-General Sir Harold Redrnan, K.C.B., C.B.E.: then a Lieutenant-Colonel.
Later the first Secretary to the Anglo-American Combined Chiefs of Staff organisation, and
subsequently rose to be in turn Vice-Chief of the Imperial General Staff and Governor and
Commander-in-Chief, Gibraltar.
LITTLE ACORNS
34I
involved in Free French considerations and other committee work; but I had
selfishly in the meantime hastily waited on the Naval Secretary in the hope of a sea
appointment. Reactions were favourable and I was promised command of our
cruiser minelayer, the Adventure, in the near future.
And then the personal blow fell. On 8th July, I was sent for by the Vice-Chief of
the Naval Staff, Vice-Admiral Phillips, (S) and told that I was being sent to America
as an additional Assistant Naval Attache. The gist of the conversation that followed
ran something like this: There was the present need to keep as close as possible to
American thinking in the event that the States came into the war as an ally. This
was particularly so in the field of Naval strategy if overlapping was to be prevented
and our collective Naval resources could be then exploited to the best mutual
advantage. All this had become still more important *with Italy as an additional
enemy, the German occupation of France which opened the gates of the Atlantic
to the foe, and with a side glance at the Yellow Peril dormant but potent in the Far
East. The Admiraltv was of course in close touch with the U.S. Naval Attach6 and
his staff in London, but now it was thought worthwhile to have someone in Washington ready to act as a liaison officer with the U.S. Naval Staff if the latter found that
this might serve any useful purpose. Our Naval Attach6 Rear-Admiral Pott, and
his lone assistant, a Commander (E), were already necessarily facing an everincreasing load of day-to-day work, and so in any case a further Assistant was
desirable. This alone would give me plenty to do, but my particular interest was to
remain on call, as it were, for anything the Navy Department might be ready to say
in the policy field. Nothing might come of this, probably. It was just a precaution.
Steps would be taken to let the Navy Department know that I was available. Anything I had in due course to report should in the proper manner come to the Admiralty
from our Naval Attach6, but I could consider myself a kind of personal representative of the Vice-Chief of Staff and if I wanted to write direct to him I should not
hesitate, naturally letting my boss, the Naval Attach6, know what I was doing.
Finally, I was going because I was immediately available, understood (it was hoped)
the machinery of Whitehall, and possessed (again it was hoped) a good idea of how
the war was going and what were the high-level feelings about it. I think I was also
told that the Americans were shortly to augment their Naval representation in London with a special Naval Mission headed by an Admiral, so that a back link from our
side seemed equally desirable.
To say that I was appalled would be an overstatement. But I was a bit dismayed.
Apart from the fact that my hoped-for ship had gone for a Burton, I couldn't help
wbndering in what circumstances the N & ~ e p a r t m e n twould ever contemplate
unburdening itself to a junior Captain, particularly if they already had a Flag officer
of standing and discretion in London. Moreover, I knew practically nothing of
America, and little more of the U.S. Navy than could be culled from 'Jane's Fighting
Ships'. I also feared that the Naval Attach6 might well think I was treading on his
toes. To a degree I tentatively put up these fences: at once demolished by Admiral
Phillips with that beguiling and charming smile of his and 'Well, there you are.
Do the best vou can. Good luck'. Manv+ vears before. I had served under him
when he was a Commander on the staff of the Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean.
I had then developed the highest possible regard for his brains and efficiency, and
d
Later Admiral Sir Tom Phillips, K.C.B., killed in action in the forlorn hope of intercepting
the Japanese seaborne invasion of Malaya.
342
LITTLE ACORNS
for his understanding and the encouragement he gave his juniors. This was anyway
a compensation for the shock and also put me on my mettle, as it were.
The ensuing fortnight was the familiar hectic one for any Naval officer who
receives an unexpected appointment. There was the uprooting of the family, resolved through Foreign Office permission to take them to the States with me; there
were interviews with the Director of Naval Intelligence (responsible for Naval
Attachis), the First Lord of the Admiralty, and the Head of the Foreign Office
American Department-I have no recollection whatsoever of the briefing, if any, I
received from them. Finally there was the need to turn over my Cabinet Office work
to Richard Coleridge ('), say good-bye all round, and get my gear together, borrow
a pair of aiguillettes, obtain passports and generally gird the loins.
After an uneventful passage in the Britannic we arrived via New York in Washington on 29th July, and were kindly received by the Naval Attach6 and the Embassy
as a whole. As someone had forgotten to let the former know of my arrival date,
there was difficulty over immediate accommodation for the family, but, like everything else, this was resolved in time and we became conveniently installed in a flat
near to my place of work in the Chancery. The usual peacetime routine of visitingcard distribution was started off and arrangements made for me to pay the appropriate
official calls. Meantime, protocol was short-circuited by an invitation to come down
to the Navy Department and meet the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, RearAdmiral Ghormley, who was on the point of leading the Mission to London, This I
felt was an encouraging sign. Evidently 'the steps had been taken', and though our
short meeting did not give rise to any serious conversation, it was helpful to meet the
officer who would, I felt sure, carry with him to London the full authority of the
Chief of Naval Operations (the equivalent of our First Sea Lord). The second
pleasant experience was when I paid my official calls on the Navy Department a
few days later and was introduced amongst others to the Director of Naval Intelligence and the Chief of Naval Operations himself. Rear-Admiral Anderson and
Admiral Stark respectively could not have been kinder, expressing the hope that
the Naval Attach6 and I would not hesitate to approach them whenever we wished,
and generally making the newcomer welcome in the inimitable way that Americans
have.
The ensuing weeks passed quickly enough. Calling and receiving the complimentary returns pursued its inexorable way. There were the kind people who held the
familiar small cocktail parties 'to meet our friends'; there were also lunch and dinner
parties for the same purpose, and one must admit that it was a startling change from
London with its pressing concerns and blanket of nightly darkness, though with
inevitable constant backward thoughts of what people there were going throughthe blitz started shortly after our arrival in peacetime America. The confidential
news from home was discouraging, and damping to my own optimism. As a minor
interest, I should add that personal exchanges of courtesies arose with the Japanese
Naval Attach6 and his assistants, and that I had more than one sight of the German
and Italian Naval Attachts (both Admirals) at formal neutral Embassy receptions.
According to the accepted protocol, warring parties politely affected not to 'see'
He had for some time, as Assistant Secretary in the War Cabinet Office, been assisting in
Anglo-French liaison duties. Succeeded Brigadier Cornwall-Jones as British Secretary to the
Combined Chiefs of Staff organisation. Today Captain Lord Coleridge, C.B.E., Royal Navy
and Executive Secretary to the N.A.T.O. Council.
LITTLE ACORNS
343
their opposite numbers. There was the occasion when the wife of our Naval Attacht,
slowly retreating before a circle of friends-as one does-bumped back to back
with the wife of the German Naval Attache, who was doing the same thing. The
aplomb withwhich each bowed apologeticallyyet coldly to the other, without speaking,
was a perfect example of how such a contretemps should be passed off. During
this period of what most would believe were just social junketings, but which all
have a purpose, I was not exactly idle. In August the Assistant Naval Attache (E)
and I made two visits to New Orleans to inspect and further the purchase of fast
motor boats, and there was a great amount to do in connection with the transfer of
the fifty U.S. destroyers to the White Ensign, even though the final turnover took
place at Halifax. There was also, if I remember rightly, quite an amount of coming
and going about the French warships, and the French gold, in Mariinique, and over
odd German merchant ships attempting to return home from neutral ports.
Towards the end of September there was one social occasion somewhat out of the
ordinary. I was invited to dine with Mr. Knox, the Secretary of the Navy, on board
the U.S. Navy Department's yacht. During the evening we steamed down the balmy
Potomac while dining and subsequently taking things comfortably in long chairs
on the poop. The party was not a large one, some half-dozen guests. None of the
others as I recollect was a Naval officer, and apart from one member, I never ide7tified what the others did for a living. This in a way was embarrassing, as the postdinner conversation turned exclusively to the war, how we were doing, particularly
at sea, and why. Whereas I would have been ready enough to say all I really knew
(as far as it went) to Mr. Knox himself, I hesitated considerably in an unidentified
company. At the same time I naturally didn't want to give an impression that I
knew more than I did, and be rated a conceited young pup. I'm sure that Mr. Knox
was only extending a kindly hand to a newcomer, and at the same time sizing
me up for what, if anything, I might be worth; but it was still a curious feeling to
find oneself a lone 'Limey' in the company of an evidently exclusive and erudite
American circle.
Four days after the above occasion, on 27th September, the world heard of the
German-Italian-Japanese Pact. The Axis was complete, and the future looked dark
indeed. A week later I was called to the Navy Department and found myself closeted
with the Director of Plans, Captain Turner. For nearly two hours he talked, and I
listened. And so for the first time I was given a real chance to see the war at sea
through American eyes as presented by an officer of the highest quality. He never
minced his words, it was not in his nature. Many of his observations were hard to
take, but everything he said bore the stamp of a professionally objective approach
without fear or favour. It was an object-lesson in how an oral appreciation should be
presented and, I would add, I always subsequently met that kind of honest, objective,
down-to-earth approach to any subject-even if it hurt-by American Naval officers
both in the ensuing months and again in the last years of the war when I was back
in America in another capacity. On this occasion there was no precise talk of what the
U.S. Navy would do in any kind of war situation. The appreciation was broader
than that; on the lines of what had to be done at sea and where, as it were, we were
not succeeding or could not succeed.
During the following week I was twice sent down to the Navy Department under
instructions to raise matters unconnected with sea strategy, and then at the end
of October I was once again invited to attend in the afternoon. This time I was led
344
LITTLE ACORNS
by the Director of Plans direct to Admiral Stark. The Chief of Naval Operations
opened the conversation by almost casually saying that they were proposing to show
me the American Navy's plan for war against Japan, something which he added no
outsider had so far ever read. I stammered my thanks and just retained sufficient
composure to ask whether I was allowed to tell the Admiralty of what I might hoist
in. The reply was a simple one. 'You wouldn't be much use if you couldn't', adding
with a twinkle, 'I hope your cyphers are secure'. With that I was sternly led away;
not sure from Captain Turner's attitude whether I was a criminal going to the last
drop, or a pet who should be humoured!
In the Director of Plans' room a safe was opened and I was handed a huge tome
and invited to sit down and digest its contents at my leisure. Captain Turner, in
passing over the volume, observed with a kind of wry smile: 'We've other plans in
this safe-war with Great Britain is one of them'. And of course very sensible too,
but in the circumstances I didn't ask whether I could have a glance at that also, just
as a matter of personal interest!
The Director then excused himself, said he had other work to do and the room was
mine, and vanished. T o this day I have wondered whether this was a tactful hint
that if he wasn't there I would feel free to take surreptitious notes. Certainly I
did not. After all, I felt that would be going too far, apart from the security angle.
But what faced me was stupendous. The 'Plan' was comprehensive to the last
degree. Chapter after chapter; ranging from principles through strategic intentions
to allocation of forces, command structures, responsibilities, communications, logistic
support and so on. I could necessarily do little more than skim the outlines and try
to get some overall picture into my mind, and twenty years after I remember very
little of what I read. It was, however, enough to impress me with certain salient
points amongst which, again if I'm not confusing that occasion with later events,
was the intention to keep the main U.S. naval strength concentrated in the central
Pacific-to wit, Pearl Harbour-and
carry forward from there a step-by-step
offensive advance westwards to Japan. Just as in reality the American Pacific strategy
ultimately took form. What the Plan did not cater for, nor at the time did I, for one,
even think of such a thing, was the treacherous initial blow which at once severely
circumscribed the opening phases.
After about two hours my reading came to an end and late into the night I shut
myself up in the Chancery and composed the telegraphed and follow-up written
reports. I recollect that Admiral Stark was that evening giving an At Home at which
my wife and I were to be amongst the guests. I think he will have realised why I
excused myself at the last moment.
Three days later I was down in the Plans Division again when Captains Turner
and Cooke (=)showed me further papers which expressed the Naval Staffs' appreciation of the situation which might arise in certain contingencies; and in the weeks
following, my engagement book shows several further visits, presumably on the same
subjects.
Meantime, developments had evidently proceeded apace in London. Cabinet
Officer papers sent to the Embassy showed that Admiral Ghorrnley had long since
been close to our Chief of Staff. I emphasise this lest you should think that I was the
only channel conveying the consequences of the American forthcoming attitude.
Both subsequently rose to high rank with great responsibilities during the war.
LITTLE ACORNS
345
Actually I feel sure that earlier and more authoritative information had been provided by the U.S. Mission in London. I have never heard since whether what I
reported coincided with the information provided by Admiral Ghormley. Obviously
he would be the more experienced observer, and at the best I only hope that my
limited understanding may have helped to dot a few 1's and cross some T's.
What arose, and quickly, from the moment when Japan showed its Axis hand
was the clear sign that the sands of time were running out and that there was nearly a
need for Staff discussions of some kind between the two potential allies if only to
ventilate the inevitable differences of opini~nand try and reach a common appreciation of probabilities and who should do what with which if, with emphasis on the 'if',
the United States joined the war with us. Politically this was tricky. The isolationists
were by no means a negligible quantity, and though the President had already gone
a long way in openly indicating where American sympathies should and did lie, the
decision to hold Staff talks, if it became known, could easily have been interpreted
as highly improper in that by inference it would commit the country to a war alliance
and prejudice America's neutrality.
I do not know how agreement was reached in the matter--obviously our Ambassador, the State Department and the President himself will have been closely
involved; and conceivably it is relevant that the latter was re-elected for a further term
of four years on 5th November, a few days before Air Vice-Marshal Slessor (')
arrived, representing the British Chiefs of Staff, to further the idea, authoritatively
armed to lift the subject on to the high plane in concert with our Embassy. I really
played little part in this stage beyond briefing the Air Vice-Marshal as best I could
on what had so far transpired, and listening in on the several meetings he had with
our Embassy and also those of the Dominions. Meantime the Navy Department
was kind enough to keep me in the picture of how minds were working. I recollect
one such occasion when I met the Staff Officer, Plans, to the Commander-in-Chief
Pacific Fleet, and heard of the interesting things he had to say. All this was a helpful
background to the time when for sure the Staff conversations would start.
Meanwhile, I had the more routine work to do in assisting the Naval Attache in
the variety of problems that kept cropping up; amongst them, dealing with the
steady trickle of enthusiastic inventors, each of whom professed to have the certain
answer to a successful sea war. Some ideas were not unexpectedly ones which,
unknown to their originators, had long since been developed. Others were just
cranky dreams. For example; (complete with drawings) we should envelop all our
ships with thick rubber mattresses so that torpedoes would bounce off and explode
harmlessly at a distance!
In December another straw in the wind became visible when the Admiralty was
invited to send Naval 'observers' to the U.S. Pacific Fleet. This was an invaluable
suggestion. Unlike to day, where N.A.T.O. ensures that all the fighting services
of the allies have common 'fighting' systems (including above all one comprehensive
and common set of communications) and regularly practise operating together, no
such thing existed then. America and ourselves had in no way been in alliance since
1918. U.S. Navy techniques were in several ways very different, and even elementary manoeuvring together at sea, involving as it did flag and radio signals, would
Now Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir John Slessor, G.C.B., D.S.O., M.C.; Chief of the
Air Staff, 1950-52.
346
LITTLE ACORNS
have been impossible without at least mutual liaison teams on board all respective
units.
The American invitation enabled the Royal Navy better to get to know potential
opposite numbers, and it should be said that we also had something to subscribe
from over a year's bitter experience, which might be helpful to the U.S.N. Evidently
the Admiralty fully appreciated the value of the suggestion, for the half-dozen
officers picked were up-and-coming ones with more than average qualities. By all
subsequent account, they were made very welcome in the Pacific Fleet, and their
services became greatly valued in both directions. Each was an executive specialist
in a particular field. It seems I passed on the first three, complete with their orders,
on 9th December, just a year before America came into the war.
On 24th January, 1941, Lord Halifax arrived off Annapolis in H.M.S. King
George V, to take on the post of Ambassador to the United States in the place of the
late Lord Lothian. Rear-Admirals Bellairs and Danckwerts (9 had also taken
passage as the nominated Naval Members for the forthcoming Staff conversations,
and with them came Lieutenant-Colonel Cornwall-Jones
one of the War Cabinet
Office secretariat, to act as Secretary to the British Delegation. The other two U.K.
representatives, Major-General Morris (9 and Air Vice-Marshal Slessor, arrived
almost simultaneously by air.
For myself, I had rather anticipated that it would fall to my lot to act as Secretary.
Instead I was told that I was nominated as an additional member of the Delegation.
Observing the seniority of the other members and that one and all had a professional
past history as Directors of Plans in their respective Services, I did feel considerably
out of place, but somewhere behind I sensed Admiral Phillips saying 'Thank you',
and I do hope that I kept sufficiently quiet over the ensuing months in the surrounding of officers with far more 'know-how' than I possessed. At least I was able at the
start to put our representatives from overseas in the local picture, and also help
Cornwall-Jones to settle in on his not inconsiderable forthcoming responsibilities.
An office was set up for our party in a converted Embassy bedroom and the first
few days after arrival were devoted to exchanging calls, meeting the U.S. representatives and discussing and settling procedure and the like. As regards security,
the visitors came disguised as an augmentation to the already functioning British
Purchasing Commission to the States. This was a very thin cover and I am morally
certain that their real purpose must soon have become known to at least a few people
not supposed to be acquainted with what was going on. If it did reach the ears of any
of the top-level Pressmen permanently close to American Government affairs in
Washington, it certainly says much for their discretion and understanding that,
as far as I know, not a single word of U.S.-U.K. Staff conversations ever appeared
in public print.
The first full meeting took place on 31st January, and discussions continued
throughout the next two months. There were in all nineteen collective meetings,
The late Rear-Admiral R. M. Bellairs, C.B., C.M.G., for many years after the war Head
of the Admiralty Historical Section: and the late Vice-Admiral V. H. Danckwerts, C.B.,
C.M.G., who died on service during the war while Deputy Commander-in-Chief, Eastern
Fleet.
Later relieved Brigadier Redman as British Secretary to the Combined Chiefs of StafT organisation. Today Brigadier A. T. Cornwall-Jones, C.M.G., C.B.E., on the Directing Staff of
the Administrative Staff College.
Now General Sir Edwin Morris, K.C.B., O.B.E., M.C.
LITTLE ACORNS
347
not to mention a number of informal gatherings of individuals for more informal
talks. Each party tabled many papers and appreciations. It was altogether a very
busy time, and the number of meetings alone should indicate the wide range of
matters ventilated, all inter-related in the search for a common strategic policy and the
means thereto if, as I have already emphasised, the United States entered the war
on the side of the Allies. On the whole the talks went well, with digerences of
opinion, naturally, but without rancour; and were probably helped by the fact that
the examination of the potential situation was uninhibited by political considerations.
It was for the parties concerned to report collectively to their respective chiefs on
where they had found common grounds for agreement and, for that matter, where
they had not; and to make such combined recommendations as they together saw
fit. The injection of political considerations was for higher authority and not for professional sailors, soldiers and airmen. I would be only guessing now if I tried to
expose all the subject-matter which came up. The potential Naval position at the
start obviously predominated in relation to the opening war phase. Here, maritime
areas of primary responsibility were not difficult to decide upon, but it was a great
deal more difficult to agree on the desirable initial dispositions of the collective
Naval forces likely to be available. Indeed, only a measure of agreement was ultimately found, with reservations on the part of both delegations. Understandably,
the Americans' first consideration was to ensure the security of the western seaboard
of the States from surprise aggression, while British eyes unavoidably turned towards
Australasia and the East Indies area, the defence of which was not only a moral
responsibility but a highly desirable practical aim. With the initiative in Japanese
hands, either a main drive eastwards across the Pacific or one south and westwards
from Japan was equally possible and, even to a degree, both could be undertaken
simultaneously with sufficient strength to preoccupy considerable allied naval forces.
In South-East Asia Britain possessed the main base of Singapore and in mid-Pacific
there was Pearl Harbour. Each was in effect a focal point from which a Japanese
forward movement should be circumscribed and from which the forces needed to
take the offensive at the earliest moment could be launched.
Our difficulty was that the Royal Navy was already stretched to the limit in holding
the Mediterranean position, fighting the Battle of the Atlantic and maintaining a
sufficient capital ship strength in northern waters to deal with any break-out of German heavy ships. If Japan declared war, there was virtually nothing of substance
to spare for Far Eastern waters (or even the Indian Ocean) in support of the small
Dutch East Indies Fleet and the few warships of Australia and New Zealand.
One suggestion made was that the Americans should consider basing some proportion of their main Pacific Fleet on Singapore as an insurance; or at least stockpiling reserves of stores and ammunition at that base in anticipation of a need to
operate thence; but this idea of dividing their available Pacific forces proved unacceptable. The compromise, such as it was, was that sufficient heavy units would
remain with their Atlantic Fleet to relieve our main Home Fleet of some of its
inexorable responsibilities and so permit of a British task force moving eastwards
in the event of a Japanese drive south-westwards. As it all came about, it was of
paramount necessity to transfer units from their Atlantic Fleet to the Pacific because
of the losses at Pearl Harbour; and the force the Admiralty was able to send to the
Malayan area was both unbalanced and inadequate for the purpose. The Japanese
massive drive south-westward swept all before it and for a time the new enemy
348
LITTLE ACORNS
even possessed virtual control of the Indian Ocean. It is not at all easy to be wise
afier the event. Japan could always have readjusted its initial strategy in the light
of the actual Anglo-American dispositions. There could, too, have been two simultaneous surprise 'TarantosY-one on Pearl Harbour and one on Singapore. It would
have been well within the resources of the Japanese carrier strength. War Colleges
have no doubt since 'played' many 'games' with different initial strategic settings.
The discussions ended on 29th March, 1941, with a plenary meeting to sign the
combined report to our superiors in the form of our respective Chiefs of Staff.
The date is implanted in my mind because my wife had only the day before undergone a serious and successful operation in the Johns Hopkins Hospital at Baltimore;
and it should be recorded that the surgeon who undertook the job subsequently
tendered a fee which bore no relation to what should have been charged. My feeble
protests were silenced by his statement that it was just his small contribution to
'British Aid'. How very, very kind of him. It has never been forgotten by us.
There were important immediate consequences arising from the conclusion of
these long-drawn-out discussions; but before I refer to them something happened
a week previous to the finale which was both interesting and may be of considerable
significance. On occasions since I had arrived in the United States I had been asked
how the overall direction of the war was exercised by us, with particular reference
to the Chiefs of Staff organisation and the War Cabinet Office machinery to provide
the means through which co-ordination of thinking and execution could be achieved.
Well, that was something about which I did know a good deal. Cornwall-Jones,
subsequent to his arrival, was also similarly interrogated, and incidentally gave
practical evidence of how things did work. After all, the American representatives
at the talks had their superiors locally to hand and could so simply by visit discuss
progress, obtain guidance and so on. It was different with the visitors. Their
Chiefs of St& were far away in London. Yet it must have been apparent that the
British representatives were able to discuss with one voice in a corporate capacity
and that consequently their briefing and guidance stemmed from a corporate source.
The reasonu7asstraightforward enough: the minutes of meetings and our delegation's
comments upon them, were remitted back to the War Cabinet Office in London and
thence to the Chiefs of Staff Committee or other supporting inter-Service bodies
as may have been appropriate for collective consideration, comments and the
preparation of further guidance where necessary. There was really no parallel to
this in Washington circles.
So anyway it was that on 20th March I have a note that I, with Cornwall-Jones,
Air Vice-Marshal Slessor and two members of the Embassy staff were invited to
lunch with Mr. Fielding Elliott, the well-known and distinguished writer on politicomilitary matters. There we found ourselves in company with several Americans in
U.S. Government Departments. After lunch we settled to discuss, 'off the record',
for over two hours the virtues (and defects) of our pre-war Committee of Imperial
Defence co-ordination machinery and its subsequent functioning in its War Cabinet
Office guise. I expect we all talked a lot. The trend was certainly on the lines of
what the Americans might feel was useful to them.
Why Mr. Fielding Elliot had taken the initiative I don't pretend to know. What I
do feel is that though the ball may well have started rolling earlier, that afternoon
must have caused it to accelerate. I am not for a moment suggesting that co-ordination of Military thought was unknown in American circles-that would be absurd-
LITTLE ACORNS
349
but certainly when the Anglo-American Combined Chiefs of Staff organisation in
due course came into being, the implementation of the business ran, by all accounts,
smoothly from the start. The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff and the British Chiefs of
Staff both functioned in corporate capacities and were both supported by similar
organisations and comparable Secretarial facilities. The combination of these
similar means to provide the combined and concerted Military advice to the heads of
Government hence presented no difficulty. The only differences really in the composition of the two allied bodies was that the American Chiefs of Staff had a Chairman
in the person of the Chief of Staff to the President in the latter's capacity of Commander-in-Chief of all American Forces, while the British Chiefs of Staff had no
separate Chairman and instead, as an additional member, the Chief St& Officer
to the Prime Minister in his capacity also as Minister of Defence. The American
Professor Johnson, in his comprehensive historical analysis 'Defence by Committee',
goes a good deal further than I can, and makes much play with the growth in effectiveness of our Committee of Defence organisation over the pre-war years, and how
the Americans in essence ultimately adopted the system wholeheartedly, greatly
to their subsequent advantage and to that of the Allied cause. I believe that afternoon in Mr. Fielding Elliot's private room had much to do with what later transpired.
An immediate consequence of the end of the Staff talks was a generous suggestion
by the Navy Department that a visit should be made to the Commander-in-Chief,
U.S. Pacific Fleet, to tell him of what had transpired as seen by our side. This
offer was accepted with gratitude and appreciation of the liberal thought behind it.
It was decided that Admiral Danckwerts should undertake the visit, and he took
me with him. While therefore the rest of the Mission returned to the U.K., we flew
out to Hawaii, arriving on 9th April, and spent two days hospitably housed by the
Commander-in-Chief in his own quarters. During this time my Admiral exposed
our thoughts to the Commander-in-Chief, his Chief of Staff and others; we were
toured round the Fleet and met a great many evidently extremely busy people.
It was quite clear that America's main forces were exercising hard in every way,
certain that the trial of strength was sure to come, sooner or later. It was my first,
though not my last visit to Pearl Harbour, and greatly impressed me with the
efficiency and scope of that great bastion and main Pacific base.
The most interesting moment as far as I was concerned occurred when, in the
dog watches of the second day, and while my Admiral was out about some business,
the Commander-in-Chief unexpectedly appeared in our sitting-room where, I fancy,
I was taking it easy with my feet up. He had come, he said, for a yarn, but the conversation was quickly led by him to the lately released facts about the Matapan
engagement, which had taken place some ten days previously. Evidently, he assumed,
we were prepared for close night action encounters with heavy ships, and what
about it ? I gave him as well as I could the story of our Navy's change of policy after
Jutland. Up to then it had been considered imprudent voluntarily to engage major
units in night action, the accidents of chance being too heavy to accept, but subsequently our attitude had undergone a fundamental change and, far from declining
such close encounters, we had trained assiduously between the wars not only to be
in a position to accept the opportunities, but to court them if conditions looked right.
Our belief was that word-perfect drill from the Captain downwards and splitsecond timing would provide the means of, essentially, getting the initial, and usually
350
LITTLE ACORNS
vital, broadside off first. (I write of the days when the limit of range was just that of
the searchlight and/or starshell).
I was cross-examined. How many annual practices with main armament had we
regularly carried out, what was the 'word-perfect drill' and so on ? I did my best to
answer, and the Admiral concluded the gentle inquisition by observing that the big
ships of the U.S.N. had not for a considerable number of years (I think he said)
indulged in similar night main armament firing exercises. The tailpiece to this is
that not much later one of our Naval 'observers7-a gunnery specialist-actually
delivered himself of a detailed paper on night action procedure as practised by the
Royal Navy which, I have heard, was well received in the U.S. Pacific Fleet. Whatever may or may not have been the direct consequences, it is certainly a fact that their
heavy ships did subsequently engage in such night actions with admirable results;
the Surigao Straits action is a case in point.
My heart bled for Admiral Kimmel later when I read that he had been held in part
to blame for the unreadiness at Pearl Harbour on 7th December, 1941, and I have
since often wondered what it was held he should have done in anticipation without
receiving a direct warning that the Japanese were on the warpath. It must have been
the bitterest of blows to him to be deprived of his great command at the moment of
war after all he, with his drive and energy, had done to bring it to a peak of efficiency.
It is a sad reflection that frequently in the past the existing Military leaders at the
outbreak of a major war have soon been displaced because of alleged inadequacy; a
condition which was almost always due to causes beyond their control. When the
enemy is a ruthless aggressor without conscience or any intention of conforming
to international decencies or the once accepted rules of war, anything can happen,
and anticipation of the moment or the circumstances would require a remarkable
second sight. I t can happen again.
Possibly a 'Limey', such as I, should not so intrude, but my sympathy remains.
You will see how impressed I was by Admiral Kimmel in such a short period of
two days only.
An important outcome of the talks was an agreement that if America entered the
war, British Staff Missions should be set up in Washington to represent respectively
the Admiralty, War Office and Air Ministry, with their Heads collectively representing the British Chiefs of Staff Committee in day to day business with the American
Chiefs of Staff. Moreover, in anticipation of this arrangement, it would be provident
to establish a nucleus of that Joint Mission without undue delay.
This involved those of us already in Washington in the necessary preparations to
receive this nucleus; and on our return from Pearl Harbour we all got down to it.
Admiral Danckwerts assumed the post of Designate Head of the nucleus Naval
Staff Mission, and concerned himself primarily with the inevitable 'follow-ups' to
the talks with the Navy Department. I realigned myself as his Chief Staff Officer
and mainly concerned myself, in concert with the British Purchasing Mission and
appropriate U.S. authorities, in obtaining office and living accommodation for the
impending influx. I also, as it were, rejoined the War Cabinet Office temporarily,
once again, as an Assistant Secretary to open up an outpost in Washington of that
machinery to serve the Heads of the Missions in their joint liaison capacity.
Six weeks later, on 1st June, the nucleus Mission arrived--one hundred strong,
including a feminine element in the form of W.R.N.S. cypher officers. With the
contingent came Belben to relieve me as Chief Staff Officer to the temporary Head
ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS
35I
of the Naval Mission, and Coleridge once again to relieve me, this time as Secretary
to the Joint Missions. Admiral Phillips had not forgotten his assurance that I should
go to sea when the time was ripe.
Three days were enough for the usual 'turnovers', and three more to pack, say my
farewells, depart for New York and an uneventful passage in a Dutch trooper to
England. Under a month later I hoisted my pendant in a cruiser of the Home Fleet,
and subsequent events provide quite a different kind of story.
I would like to conclude by putting on record for what it may be worth my profound respect and admiration for all those in the U.S. Navy Department and further
afield with whom I had become associated during that out-of-the-ordinary period in
my Service career. They were, one and all, always downright and objective. They
were never evasive, while yet sympathetic and understanding. They were, moreover, personally charming, kindly and hospitable to a stranger such as I. Of course
their views and approaches to the common problems were different. Their first
concern was naturally for the security of the United States, and for them Japan was
the predominant threat to that security. When it is borne in mind that to American
eyes in 1940-41 we were well on the way to losing the war (and were they so wrong ?)
it is all the more remarkable that they were still prepared, and wholeheartedly too,
not just to converse with us, but to go much further and collaborate in concerting
arrangements for Allied co-operation in the event that war came to them. In effect,
everything they did and said committed them to our side and evidently as they saw it
in support of the right as against the wrong. It is perhaps difficult these days to
realise what a momentous decision that really was then-a decision which was, I feel,
not just a State one, but also individual. Both practically and morally it was of
incalculable value to us. I certainly hadn't the vision at the time to see where it was
all going to lead; but we have since-and may this mutual understanding and cooperation long continue.
'ONLOOKER'
Anglo- American Relations
I
had a variety of 'hats' to wear in Washington, but the one most frequently on my
head was undoubtedly that symbolising my responsibilities as Commander of the
British Naval Staff. With this hat went the responsibility for initiating, watching
and furthering Admiralty interests with the United States Navy.
The extent to which I and my staff were able to deal with this responsibility was
dependent not only on our knowledge of, and our contacts with, the United States
Navy and with the industrial activity which supports it, but also on the relations
that existed between our two countries and particularly between our two Navies.
The establishment, maintenance and improvement of these relations were therefore
never far from one's thoughts, and quite often in one's hair.
Present day relations between our two countries rest primarily I suppose on our
common history and instutitions, reinforced by our partnership and common
experience in World War 11. There is nothing in writing that I know of to govern
3s2
ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS
the relations that rest on these things, but much good-will, respect and inherent
trust stems from them. As the years pass however, the impact of our past 'togetherness' is becoming obscured in a rapidly changing worid, particularly now that
men who worked together in World War I1 are moving into retirement.
More specifically, but to a lesser extent, our relationship rests on our joint membership of U.N., N.A.T.O., S.E.A.T.O. and C.E.N.T.O. In the various regional
agreements we in the U.K. are but one of several countries and the forces we might
provide in support of these pacts are not such as to put us in any special position.
Furthermore it is clearly not feasible for the United States to favour the United
Kingdom in this setting--officially at any rate-any more than any other member.
But the fact is that we and the United States are the only two countries who are
members of all these pacts, and as a result we are used to each others' faces and
this helps to strengthen our partnership.
Finally, there is Interdependence. This intended shot in the arm to AngloAmerican relations in the field of defence administered by the President and our
Prime Minister in 1957 misfired. If, as I have always supposed, Interdependence
was meant to mean depending on each other, it was perhaps somewhat naive to
suppose that the united stateswould depend on us for ;nything that their Government could develop and produce themselves. Perhaps it was equally naive of us to
suppose that we would be able to afford to buy the modern weapons and weapon
systems we might like to have from the United States. Interdependence is a vague
word. It can mean much or nothing. Our politicians still use it considerably in their
speeches, but I doubt if they have a clear concept of what they mean. I am even
more doubtful if any one else does. In the United States it was never taken seriously
and is now forgotten. We might well do the same.
However, the Interdependence agreement put a spur to technical co-operation
between the two countries, and the joint agencies that flowed fkom this have done
much useful work, particularly in the research area. Again, the Interdependence
agreement cleared the way for bilateral agreements of real value in the nuclear
field.
In general then, it might be fair to say that through our joint membership of the
united Nations and various regional agencies, we are a close ally of the United States,
and that our 'togetherness' in the past bolstered by recent bilateral agreements and
arrangements puts this alliance on a special plane.
I do not think the alliance will stay on this special plane unless sufficient people
on each side of the Atlantic are convinced that it should, and see that it does.
From the American point of view, the benefits accruing from this special relationship are apt to look a little thin, concerned as they are with such intangibles as
British experience, our focal position in the Commonwealth (a subject of much
misconception), our links w i t h ~ u r o and
~ e our common heritage. Many Americans
are too prone to measure usefulness as an ally in terms of dollars and weapons to
enable them to value these benefits correctly. Furthermore they are understandably
reluctant to take advice from a much smaller and weaker nation.
Nevertheless there is no doubt that a great number of Americans continue to think
of us as a special friend and ally. I had constant evidence of this as I travelled about
the country. Often it was expressed by ordinary people; there was no doubt it was
genuine. Indeed the general image we project across the Atlantic is good in spite of
the stones that get thrown at it. There is also no doubt in my mind that the majority
ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS
353
of those in positions of responsibility feel our two countries to be complementary
and that our special relationship is essential to the strength of the West. I t is not
easy for them to admit this officially for fear of the effect such views might have on
their relationship with other nations of the West, but unofficially, and where
matters can be carried on without publicity, there is no doubt we receive special
and beneficial treatment. For instance, the British Naval Staff in Washingtonsome sixty persons-is housed rent free in the Old Navy Building alongside most
of the U.S. Navy departments with whom it deals.
From the British point of view the benefits accruing from this special relationship
would appear obvious to anyone who believes we need an efficient and effective
defence, and who believes that, despite our comparative weakness, we have a vital
contribution to make to the overall strength of the West and to the maintenance
of peace by virtue of our experience and position in the world.
Yet we seem very apathetic and very inactive in our relations with the United
States. At times we almost seem to be doing more to undermine the alliance than
strengthen it. Looked at from the other side of the Atlantic, our approach to the
Americans often seemed badly thought out, sometimes tactless. Many of the stream
of visitors sent out by service departments at home seemed unnecessary, duplicating
the work of other visitors or the staff on the spot; and the patience of the Americans
was on occasion worn thin by our enquiries and search for knowledge only to find
later that we did not intend to do anything with it. Again, our Service departments
never seemed to appreciate U.S. Security regulations and at times failed to comply
with them; and sometimes visitors offended by trying to find out more than was
necessary for the task in hand. Such things strained our relationship from time to
time, something which could have been avoided with more understanding and
effort on our part. It says much for the U.S. leaders that such strains were not
allowed to produce breaks.
I have a feeling that when the representative of a British Government department
approaches a French or German Government department on some matter of
importance, the method of approach is given thought and the contact is made with
circumspection. But when it comes to dealing with Americans we do not seem to
bother much. We feel we are dealing with people of the same blood (cousins if you
like) who are bound to have the same thought processes and feelings as ourselves,
like the man in the next office. So we give little or no thought to the approach,
blunder straight in and then cannot understand where things went wrong.
In this connection I am intrigued by the fact that when an Englishman goes to
France or Germany, or any other country, he expresses surprise in finding that the
people do certain things the same way as the British. 'Why! We have a system
just like that' you can almost hear him exclaim. But when an Englishman goes
to the States, he is not a bit surprised at similarities. What shocks him, and indeed
is likely to bring forth critical remarks, are the many things he finds done differently.
To my mind, misguided behaviour on our part towards Americans stems from
two roots--or rather is caused by lack of roots where roots should be. In spite
of the power and importance of the United States in the World, British people make
little effort to learn about her history and civilisation or about her geography. And
because she is so far away and so large, very few British people get the opportunity
to know Americans and their way of life. These two shortcomings lead to a marked
354
A LAYMAN LOOKS AT THE NUCLEAR NAVY
lack of understanding. We take it for granted that Americans are made in our own
image. They are not.
There is another aspect I have noticed since returning. It is that we seem to be
growing increasingly suspicious that Americans are 'nuzzling in' on our preserves
and using our retreat from colonialism to advance their own big business. They
undoubtedly are. They are a virile go-ahead people. Their action should not
engender suspicion and distrust. They should be a spur to our own efforts in the
business and commercial world.
Maybe the Americans are suspicious of us too at times, but on the credit side they
learn British history at school and substantial numbers of them get or make the
opportunity to work or travel in England. Maybe this is why today Americans
seem to me to be more tolerant and understanding of the British than we are of
them.
T o sum up, we need to maintain and indeed strengthen the special relationship
that exists today between the United States and the United Kingdom. This partnership is essential to the overall strength and unity of the West and to the preservation
of peace. If this partnership is to remain effective in the future, at a time when our
strong ties of the past are fading and relative British power is declining, positive
efforts must be made. On our part, I would like to see more encouragement given
the young to learn about the United States and later to visit the Country. Quite a
number of girls are today improving their knowledge and experience by taking
temporary jobs in the United States. Young men should be given opportunities
to do the same.
Then I would like to see many more exchanges. At present, so far as I know,
these are confined to a few students, teachers, Service officers and clergymen.
Surely the whole scope of this scheme could well be widened to include greater
numbers of many professions.
Finally we should take trouble individually to understand Americans, their
background and their way of life. So many of us take for granted that Americans
have so much in common with us that there is no real problem here. In fact there is.
It would be better if we were to look on them more as people of a foreign landwhich indeed they are, a people with whom we wish to maintain a particularly
close friendship.
GEOFFREY
THISTLETON-SMITH
A Lavman Looks at the Nuclear Navy
YR harbour at 0500 isn't a place to be recommended on a cold, wet June dayespecially without any prospect of breakfast and last night's British Railways'
dinner a dim and not very happy memory. Only one of our little group seemed unaffected-a disgustingly cheerful Scot complete with tam o'shanter. Full of porridge
and bonhomie his red face was in marked contrast to the grey and pinched countenances of us Sassenachs.
Alongside the jetty was a black and yellow Admiralty P.A.S. M.F.V. 'all right,
gentlemen-let's go', said our escort, a Lieutenant (JG) from the U.S. Navy H.Q. in
A
A LAYMAN LOOKS AT THE NUCLEAR NAVY
355
London. He tried to sound 'on the ball' and confident but the prospect of a trip for
five hours in an M.F.V. daunted even him. I know, because he'd asked me where
the boat was as we stood on the jetty alongside her!
There wasn't room for everybody below so we took it in turns to get 'a breath of
fresh air'. But after a while as we rounded the southern tip of Arran there was more
space below-and less in the heads.
Those of us still on our feet sniffed round the wheelhouse and galley but, despite
the growing protests from our stomachs, raw potatoes-even if they were Arranswere a bit too much. Not so much as a sniff of kye or tea did we find. Meanwhile
our skipper eyed us from the comfort of the wheelhouse over a cup of steaming
coffee.
At length some trans-Atlantic tones crackled over the T.B.S. in the wheelhouse
but we could still see nothing. Those of us who'd been in the Regiment began
trying to brush up our knowledge of submarines. An old acquaintance from the
home of Fleet Street's 'Crusader' volunteered that he'd been a scribe aboard the
Prince of Wales for the Atlantic Charter Meeting but he didn't think that would help
much. I tried to remember what happened during the couple of hours I'd spent
submerged many years ago in an 'S' boat off Portland but all I could remember
were some shots from 'We Dive at Dawn' which had recently been shown to some
local Sea Cadets to encourage them to become submariners.
After a good deal of rather one-sided dialogue on the T.B.S. (I believe it's called
something different now) we finally saw a dark grey shape parting itself from the
equally dark grey background of the Mull of Kintyre. After a few more minutes we
were able to distinguish the outline of a submarine coming towards us with quite a
bone in her teeth.
So this was a nuclear submarine! The most distinctive feature was the two fins
on either side of the 'sail' (never conning tower). She circled us once-no doubt
for the benefit of the photographers and T.V. cameramen who were, for the most
part, just awakening to the grim realisation that they would, literally, have to stand
on their own feet.
The Officer of the Deck (no such thing as the O.O.W. in U.S.N. parlance) surveyed us from his perch on one of the fins and then went below on being relieved by
the Captain. Forward, a small party had scrambled through a door in the side of the
sail and were busily securing themselves with lifelines to ringbolts in the hull-there
being no casing.
For some time we wondered how we were to go aboard. Visions of a soaking wet,
black night in a dockyard tug waiting for three hours trying to secure alongside
Herrnes off Spithead came to my mind. Even our cheerful Scot looked a little apprehensive I was happy to see while our escort officer seemed to have acquired new
hope now that there seemed to be a chance of escaping from these mad Limeys in
their doggone bumboat. He was only worried that we might not, in the end, get
alongside at all.
With a beautiful bit of handling our skipper brought the M.F.V.'s bows to within
two or three feet of the submarine's bow. But even that distance is an awfully long
way if you're humping about half a hundredweight of T.V. camera and gear costing
about .&2-3,000 with you. Our ruddy Scot led the way with a passable imitation of a
surprised Monarch of the Glen. Before he could slither very far down the sloping
hull he was grabbed by two ratings and almost carried to the sail door. The rest of us
356
A LAYMAN LOOKS AT THE NUCLEAR NAVY
followed a trifle gingerly and some, like myself, arrived on board in a position of
supplication. The cameras and so on were brought aboard with a line from the sail
fin. We climbed down about three decks into the control room and were hurried
through into the forward mess. Apparently we had acquitted ourselves well and
weren't quite such a laugh as some elderly business executives who'd boarded the
submarine before she sailed from the States.
Over coffee and buns we had time to square up a bit and look around. So this was
the U.S.S. Scorpion, 12th nuclear submarine to join the American Navy. Commanded by Cdr. N. B. Bessac, U.S.N., she was first commissioned on 29th July,
1960. She is the first of the '588' class high speed attack type submarines to go to sea.
She has a displacement of 3,000 tons, overall length 252 feet and a speed 'greater than
20 knots submerged'. Steam for her turbines is produced by heat from a S5W
pressurised water-cooled reactor. Her diving depth is 'greater than 400 feet'. She
was built by the Electric Boat Division of General Dynamics Corpn., Groton, Conn.,
and was launched on 19th December, 1959. Her cost to build was approximately
E l 7 million. Her complement is eight officers and eighty-six ratings, though with
personnel under training she usually carries more than 100 officers and men. So
much for the Scorp'on's 'vital statistics'.
While a coffe-making machine made ominous noises in the background we listened
to a brief introductory talk from the Engineer Officer. Before arriving in the Clyde
the Scorpion had been submerged almost exactly a week while on passage from
Norfolk, Va. Since commissioning she'd taken part in 'Fallex' last autumn and
'Rum Tub', during the latter exercise it was suspected she'd 'sunk' Hermes.
Apart from the 'Sherwood Forest' missile space in the Polaris submarines they
are almost identical to Scorpion, we learnt. Indeed the original Scorpion was cut in
two, lengthened and renamed George Washington-first of the Fleet Ballistic Missile
submarines (F.B.M.s).
T o build up our native egos Cdr. Bessac said that within 15 minutes of surfacing
100 miles west of 'Derry' he'd been picked up by a Shackleton. He spoilt the story
though by admitting he'd given his exact position (thanks to SINS) to Admiralty.
Nuclear submarines have vastly improved handling qualities compared with
conventional boats and can 'bank' like an aircraft to an angle of 45 degrees. But they
dive rather more slowly and even in emergency they take at least a minute, we
gathered, to submerge from a 'hull under' condition.
Air conditioning is fitted in all compartments and smoking is permitted when
underway. 'Scrubber' units remove CO, and convert carbon monoxide into CO,
for removal from the atmosphere. Taking one ton air conditioning to equal one ton
of melted ice, the air conditioning plant produces 240 tons a day. For oxygen replenishment, bottles are stored in the ballast tanks.
Nevertheless, there are a number of 'don'ts' to be observed. Refrigeration
systems must be secure and leaks dealt with promptly. No painting is done underway and the ship (never boat if nuclear powered) has to be ventilated for at least a
fortnight after a refit. The use of solvents, wax polish for the deck, tetrachloride for
clothes or normal duplicator machine ink is forbidden. For the ship's office duplicator
an alcohol-base ink is used-the only 'hard liquor' on board!
There are three living decks and dining halls are separate from the messes. Each
man has his own bunk complete with curtains and reading light. A typical menu
for the 'enlisted men' might consist of grilled steak, saute mushrooms, potatoes
A LAYMAN LOOKS AT THE NUCLEAR NAVY
357
O'Brien (we never did discover what these were), green beans, bread and butter,
coffee (inevitably), cold soft drinks, strawberry shortcake and whipped cream.
Meat is generally frozen but much of the food is 'rationdense': this is an advanced
form of dehydration. Gash disposal is done by means of a compressed air ejection
tube. Before leaving New London, Conn., at the start of a 6-8 week cruise30,OOO lb.
of provisions were loaded. Bread, pastry and ice cream are made on bcard.
All members of the ship's company are volunteers and each officer is personally
interviewed by Admiral Rickover, 'father of the nuclear submarines', before appointment. The ideal rating must be 'stable, ambitious and intelligent'. He must be
prepared to work one hell of a lot more than a 40-hour week, according to Cdr.
Bessac. The lowest paid rating receives about £50 a month minimum. Some Chiefs
make about El90 a month, plus a form of marriage allowance.
Following the introductory talk from the Engineer Officer we were given a 'Cook's
Tour'. On the lowest of the three decks is the principal accommodation area. Here
also are heads and bathrooms and some storage compartments. In the messdecks
there was an impression of soft greens and greys from bunk curtains and dust covers.
Below again are the batteries for the electric motors. The ship has both diesel and
electric drive in the event of reactor 'seam' or close down. The former are known as
the 'belt and suspenders'. The electric motors are used occasionally for a silent run
in to the target though apparently the noise factor aboard nuclear submarines caused
by the cooling water pumps has to some extent been alleviated. Certainly there was
no sign of the plastic cutlery once found in earlier ships such as Nautilus! As much
as anything reliance is placed on high speed to avoid enemy counter-measures.
On main deck level are the wardroom, officers' cabins (usually two-berth), galley,
SINS compartment, torpedo stowage and the reactor compartment which in fact
passes vertically through all three decks. The torpedoes carried vary in type according
to the nature of the patrol but the short-type A/S torpedoes seemed to predominate.
On the first deck is the control room, ship's offices and Sonar compartment. An
interesting feature of the control room is the ballast state indication board; each
external opening in the hull when secured is shown as a slot light and when open as a
circular disc. Thus the Chief in charge of the board signifies that all openings are
shut by singing out 'straight line shut!' There are two periscopes giving the normal
high and medium magnification. The helmsman and planesman sit side by side on
the port side forward. They use aircraft type wheels. There is no upperdeck conning
position as in some conventional submarines. The periscopes are placed side by
side also and the officer of the deck stands on a raised platform when using either of
them. The chart table is so placed that he can scan it without leaving the platform.
On the starboard side forward is the target indicator board while the radars are
placed on the port side, again close to the periscope platform. The Sonar compartment is adjacent to the control room on the starboard side close to the wardroom
access hatch. The W.T. office is also on this deck.
Externally, the SINS (Ship's Inertial Navigation System) is uninspiring, consisting of a large grey dome. This system, in a nutshell, provides a constant indication of the ship's actual position on the earth's surface and takes currents and tides
automatically into account. It was, of course, SINS which has largely contributed
to the brilliant achievements of U.S. submarines in their trans-Arctic voyages.
But what of the reactor itself? This, unfortunately, was in an area of maximum
security and we saw nothing of it. In Scorpion as in most other nuclear submarines
358
A LAYMAN LOOKS AT THE NUCLEAR NAVY
the reactor 'Scram' order has been given on occasions. This means that the control
rods are inserted which shut down the reactor. But this in each case has not been due
to a fault in the reactor itself but in the indicating and data recording instruments.
The reactor is heavily shielded with lead, polyethylene and water tanks. Radiation
only becomes a problem, according to Cdr. Bessac, when maintenance parties are
working in the lower section of the reactor when the ship is alongside. The permitted 'dosage' per year is on the 5 roentgen standard. In fact the crew receive one
third of one week's 'dosage' in a year at this standard. This is equivalent to a third
of the amount of radiation received in one normal chest X-ray. But precautions
are taken. Every member of the ship's company wears a 'dosimeter' which records on
a hair-line gauge the amount of radiation received over a given period. Also 'film'
clips, usually worn on the belt, go cloudy if the radiation level shows any marked
rise inside the ship. Before coming alongside the ship's Hospital Corpsman (S.B.A.)
makes at least 25 s ~ o checks
t
both inside and outside the shiv. A auick check with
a counter shows whether samples such as scrapings from ladders or drops of water
on the outside of the hull are contaminated. This form of checking was instituted
after the Theodore Roosevelt contaminated a wide area round her berth as a result of
a leak in the primary water system.
The use of nuclear reactors at sea has brought about a completely new language.
Apart from 'scram', a nuclear submarine's crew have to acquaint themselves with
such things as 'crud'--radio-active corrosion products-'clean
clothes', which
needn't necessarily be brighter and whiter but must be free from radio-active particles
which are located by 'frisking'. And if the 'frisking' finds contamination the clothes
must be ~ u int 'hot bins'. Reactor time is measured in milli-seconds. Reactor shutdown time is based on the time of formation for each successive 'generation' of
neutrons and therefore control of the reaction is inherently based on maintaining
this rate at a predetermined equilibrium-with corresponding changes in this rate
or level known as 'transients'. These are just a few minor examples of what even the
most humble members of a nuclear submarine's crew have to know. No doubt
someone in the Pentagon or Whitehall will coin a word like 'nuclear-submarinology'
before long, but, grammatical horrors apart, nuclear submarines undoubtedly call for
the finest officers and ratings available. Quite apart from pure technical knowledge
patrols of perhaps 60 days constantly submerged demand a very high standard of
discipline and what can be described, though hackneyed, as team spirit. The
'difficult' man, whether officer or rating, will not last for long.
Before lunch in the functional but comfortable wardroom we watched the ship's
company go to diving stations. Apart from the occasional hiss of the servo-motors
there wasn't a sound. Only an occasional glance at the depth-gauge and a slight
incline at the bows told us we were diving at all. When surfaced, even with the sail
hatch above the control room open, there is none of the tremendous down-draught
common to conventional boats.
Once at a comfortable depth Cdr. Bessac showed us some of his command's
capabilities. After some 'left rudder' orders we began to heel alarmingly. Then we
realised the significance of the dog-lead clip strops some of the control room staff
were holding. Luckily for us, being strop-less, we didn't need to do any underwater strap-hanging but when manoeuvring at speed they are essential. 'About the
only thing I haven't done is an Immelmann turn', Cdr. Bessac told us. Half way
through the evolution the rating standing by the telephone sang out: 'Cap'n, sir,
Jonesie says "don't dump the tableyJ-he's got it all set up for lunch!' Highly
informal maybe, but the crews of these submarines certainly seem to know their job.
Over lunch we tried to give ourselves an insight into the wider tactical implications resulting from the employment of nuclear submarines in various forms of warfare. Cdr. Bessac, perhaps with just a trace of understandable bias, maintained that
the balance in warfare at sea is in favour of nuclear submarines. He contended that
the anti-submarine submarine, preferably nuclear, is the only real answer to the
Polaris and other nuclear submarines.
The Admiralty has been much maligned for its policy of making certainly the
first two of our own nuclear submarines 'hunter-killer' boats. But if Russia's recent
claims to have a fleet of nuclear submarines contain only a grain of truth the Admiralty's decision is undoubtedly the right one so long as our naval expenditure has
to be very much cut to suit our economic cloth. Nevertheless, we shall need many
more than two of these versatile vessels. The United States has forty already in
commission.
When we surfaced we had a chance to see something of the ship's external features
at close quarters. The bows are curved and the bow wave was reminiscent of a
spoon being pushed through treacle! These ships are clearly true submarines
and when surfaced gave the impression of not being highly manoeuvrable. With
no casing or external ballast tanks the hull is completely rounded except for a narrow
catwalk fore and aft. Even the anchors fit neatly into recesses flush with the hull
line. Fairleads and the for'ard capstan all slide up from tubes in the hull. About the
only thing that has to be brought up from below after diving is the jackstaff.
Moving up the Holy Loch we were escorted by an R.F.A. tug, a couple of launches
and an L.C.A. from Proteus-but to the annoyance of the cameramen among us
not one woolly-haired weirdie did we see. So after a trip in the duty motor boat
from Proteus we offered ourselves once more to the tender mercies of British
Railways at Gourock-bound for Glasgow and the delights of the night sleeper.
D.W.
The Commando Carrier's First
Lornrnission
D
OUBTLESS some naval officers will think enough has already been written
about H.M.S. Bulwark. The Commando Carrier idea seems to have appealed
to the general public and parliament and we have had more than our share of
publicity. The Navy-in many quarters-has not been so enthusiastic. However,
this first commission has been full of interest and I shall try to go beyond the usual
press reports.
We commissioned at Portsmouth in January, 1960, did our trials and some work-up
in the Channel, embarked the Commando and the helicopter squadron and left the
United Kingdom in March. The 'Assault' work-up took place in the Mediterranean; we passed through the Canal in May and arrived Singapore in June. Since
then, although based at Singapore, we have spent most of our time away and we have
steamed many thousands of miles, including six crossings of the Indian Ocean.
A good deal of our time has been spent in the Western half of the Indian Ocean-the
East African coast, Aden and the Gulf, whilst at the other end we have not been
allowed 'beyond' Hong Kong. Too valuable a ship! It has been sad not to visit
Australia or Japan. Twice we 'stood by' for operations and finally we justified our
existence and all our training by putting the first unit into Kuwait, a properly
equipped and supported unit which for some days was the envy of the Army units as
they arrived piecemeal and without much of their equipment, supplies or vehicles.
ASHOREAND AFLOAT
This brief historical survey of the commission immediately highlights one of the
most debatable points about the Commando Carrier. For how long should the
Commando be embarked ? The 'Royals' argue that they must spend the majority of
their time training ashore to be militarily efficient. Without adequate periods for
military training, the Commando, like a pilot deprived of flying practice, quickly
loses his skill; the opposite view is that the Marines only justify themselves by being
mobile sea soldiers. The Commandos saw themselves as one third at sea, and otherwise training at their Barracks at Singapore. In the ship, without a refit, we achieved
about two-thirds of our time away. In the event, the Commando actually came for
half their time and the balance was made up with one trip with a Gurkha battalion
embarked-much enjoyed on both sides-and another cruise in which we had one
troop of the Commando only. In the future it is hoped, on the Marine side, to run
two Commandos, each doing one third of its time in the carrier. This is probably
the best solution but it will be a pity to weaken the special association that has been
built up between '42' and Bulwark. However arranged, it is clear that, whenever the
ship leaves base she should be complete with helicopters, troops and supplies.
COMMANDOS
ON BOARD
How have the Commandos fitted in on board? Considering everything I think
we can say very well. But there are several things to take into account. First, the
modern Marine is basically a land animal: he is not used to the crowded conditions
of ship life. Few have been in ship's detachments. Consequently they have taken
time to get used to the ship. Secondly with about 600, it has been difficult to
employ them all usefully during our many long passages. The use of the flight deck
has been an important factor: this conflicts with flying and other activities and I
have heard 'The Battle of the Flight Deck' referred to as the Commandos' major
battle at sea.
Actually in the really hot weather we have worked tropical routine and the afternoon sees the flight deck a whirl of games and P.T. and rifle ranges. Apart from their
keep-fit and military activities the Commandos have assisted to keep the ship
cleaned and maintained. They have been attached to ship's departments but best
results have naturally been obtained when they can be given their own 'parts of ship'.
However, with the best will in the world I do not think we can say the Commandos
have been enthusiastic over this ship husbandry business. After the sea passages
there have nearly always been exercises and if the ship has spent any considerable
time at a port-as at Mombasa in August, 1960-arrangements have been made to
get the Commando ashore into a camp or bivouac area where they can train and live
in their own element. It is on return from such jaunts that the ship amenities such
as baths, good meals, cinema and so on are appreciated.
Another factor which has affected service in the ship has been the Admiralty
decision to make the Commando an 'accompanied' draft to Singapore whilst the
ship's company remained 'foreign service'. The families have numbered about 120
and it would have been strange had their presence passed unnoticed by the ship's
company. Incidentally the helicopter squadron personnel have been on a third type
of service and this has not helped to make the ship-squadron-commando into a
united whole, but I think in actual fact there has been less jealousy than might be
expected and each element has been tolerant of the other.
The system of discipline on board may be mentioned as of interest. Broadly the
Commandos have remained under disciplinary control of their Colonel, using the
Army Act, except for 'Ship Offences' when they have come under the NavaI
Discipline Act and ultimately under the Captain of the ship. This is roughly the
system that applies to any embarked troops. There has been much arguing about
this, the defining of ship offences, the confusion to the man who 'doesn't know where
he stands', the requirement for the Colonel to be seen to command his own unit, the
ultimate need for the Captain of the ship to be responsible for discipline on board and
so on. In actual fact a perfectly reasonable modus &vendi was reached, though the
matter is by no means dead or likely to remain so.
In sport, whilst away from Singapore we have presented a united front to our
enemies. Early on, the combined teams usually contained a majority of Commandos,
they having been longer in commission. Latterly, as the Commando has changed,
the situation has been reversed. In shore-going the tiger has lain down with the lamb
but perhaps not so much as one hoped. Whether Malta and Aden were broken up
more by ship or Commando has always remained a moot point.
The reader, in hearing about the more domestic matters, may so far be rather
more aware of the differences and difficulties than of the undoubted overall success
of the new venture. The ship has been proud to be associated with '42' and I hope
the reverse is true. But of course it is in an operational role that the co-operation is
most important. Let us now look at the ship as dawn breaks off one of our out-posts
of empire.
The helicopters are emerging from the hangar up both lifts; the rotors are spread
and the aircraft pushed away to their 'spots'.
There are nine helicopter spots down the flight deck rather to port of the centre
line, but when all the Commando transport is being carried some of the after spots
may be covered with vehicles. On the starboard side a broad red line delineates a
safety area clear of whirling rotors. This safety area is used for mustering the 'sticks'
of marines, the dumping of stores, and during an initial fly off, the parking of helicopters that cannot be spotted.
The ship was converted to carry twenty-four helicopters but we have always been
well under this figure. At our best we have had sixteen 'runners' and apart from the
nine spotted aircraft there is just room for seven standing by behind the red line, so
that we can have all our runners on deck initially.
On an order from 'Flyco', the forward lift now comes up with a load of Commandos, who having prepared on their messdecks are routed through the hangar
362
THE COMMANDO CARRIER'S FIRST COMMISSION
where they divide into their pre-planned 'sticks' and receive their final briefing.
The sticks are led by Seaman Flight Deck Guides with numbered caps and surcoats,
and as the lift reaches the top, the guides lead their sticks away to the marshalling
points opposite each aircraft.
Now Flyco orders 'Five-four-three-two-one-start up' and we hope that sixteen
Leonides engines leap into life. Starting, as a matter of fact, has been one of our
troubles and plenty of time must be allowed. Then, one by one, rotors are engaged
in the spotted aircraft. While the engines warm up, the Commando sticks emplane,
usually four men to each aircraft together with their weapons, ammunition and
essential equipment.
The director at each aircraft spot gives the thumbs up sign as soon as his helicopter is ready, and when all are reported and the correct time is reached, the green
light shows, the chockmen double away from their positions at the aircraft wheels,
and the helicopters rise in turn from forward to aft at about ten second intervals.
As soon as the first flight is away, the remainder on deck are pushed forward,
spotted, rotors engaged and loaded. They can be got away within ten minutes to
join with the first flight if required, and thus an initial landing can be up to about
sixty men. Darkness is no serious obstacle, although operations are slower.
If the first landing is successful it is usual for the helicopters then to work 'in
stream' to avoid all delays. As individual aircraft return they are directed to a spot
where they alight, pick up a new load, and probably refuel, to take off again within
seconds. As the exercise or operation proceeds, loads become more varied: supplies
of food, water, ammunition, etc., are interspersed with the continuing sticks of men.
Supplies may be loaded inside or may be slung externally under the helicopter. Our
light Citroen trucks and the anti-tank guns are amongst the loads which must be
carried externally.
With a full quota of helicopters working perhaps over a shortish range the flight
deck presents a picture of tremendous animation as aircraft alight and take off and
loads are rushed out, or hooked on. As a spectacle I found the sight enthralling.
Needless to say, a considerable organisation is required to ensure everything runs
smoothly. This has largely been worked out on board in the early part of the commission and we like to think that a reasonable system has been evolved. For sometime
we had the assistance of a Work Study Team, and we have been well supplied with
mechanical aids and new types of equipment. Some of our methods will need
modifying when the bigger Wessex helicopters come into service: they will carry
about three times the loads of the Whirlwinds.
This is not the place to enumerate the vast number of 'lessons learned' in the first
commission, but a few general points may be touched on.
The Commando Carrier should not be regarded merely as a very expensive and
sophisticated transport. Having landed the Commando, there is a vital role to play
in keeping it supplied with everything it wants. Furthermore the helicopters, in what
we have called their 'tactical role' ashore, confer unique mobility on the Commando. Because of their vulnerability the use of the helicopters in the tactical role
has to be carefully planned and controlled.
The control of helicopters when operating ashore has been the subject of long and
complicated arguments. We have established the need for a naval aviator to 'advise'
the military commander: much depends on his communications. If the operations
move inland, or the ship has to leave the area for some reason, we have practised
the establishment of an advanced helicopter base, known as an 'Oasis' which reminds
us that many of the exercises have been in desert areas but we have also however had
our share of jungle and mountain areas. We have done a lot of night flying and several
night exercises : the advantage of night operations can be clearly imagined for certain
circumstances. This has added a club to our bag. Reconnaissance and surveillance
of the battle area, are further tactical roles in which we have done some experimenting:
much remains to be done and there is a need for a light reconnaissance helicopter
in the future. The armed helicopter is another experiment further back in development but we can see interesting and exciting uses both for the gun armed helicopter
and the anti-tank guided missile-armed helicopter.
VEHICLES
Vehicles were mentioned earlier: originally it was envisaged that the Commando
would use the light Citroen trucks and leave their larger vehicles behind. From the
start they have been reluctant to go anywhere without these vehicles, about sixty of
them. Although the helicopters give mobility to a portion of the Commando they do
not and cannot take the place of these vehicles in nearly every kind of campaign
envisaged. Consequently we have come to accept these vehicles, we have learnt
to juggle them between flight deck and hangar, and we have always managed to
get them ashore somehow. The Landrovers go in our four landing craft (L.C.A.3)
but for the larger ones we have to go alongside or we need rafts or lighters. A special
inflatable raft is in course of development and will be invaluable if and when it works.
It may be mentioned here that the L.C.A.'s designed originally for this one purpose
have proved absolutely invaluable for troop and store carrying to supplement the
helicopters, and for libertymen and many other peaceable purposes.
Evacuation of casualties by helicopter which proved so successful at Port Said is
allowed for but has mainly been limited to our heat exhaustion cases at Kuwait, and
practice. It is a quality of the Commando Carrier which makes us popular with the
Commando as of course it has a good effect on morale.
A frequent and justified criticism of the ship is the comparatively large number of
sailors it takes to launch and support one Commando of 600 men. The Americans
do very much better than we do here, but their Marines do not usually live on board
for very long.
From the habitability point of view the ship is very old fashioned and this 'eats up'
men on unproductive cleaning and maintenance. Reductions in complement are
unlikely to be achieved unless money is authorised to improve habitability. Like
most conversions the ship is not altogether suitable for the job. On the other side
we have found it practicable to embark a second Commando and still fly, but this
can only be considered an emergency measure for a short time.
The original concept allowed for the ship having a secondary role as an A/S
Carrier. The story is too long and complicated to go into here and it is sufficient to
say that the secondary role with our own squadron is very tenuous, but we have
exercised with other A/S squadrons embarked. This is a pity when we all need to be
as versatile as we can.
364
SUBMARINE DEFENSE
The much publicised comprehensive air-conditioning has proved a tremendous
boon particularly during the operations off Kuwait. It does not produce the ice cold
atmosphere usually associated with air-conditioned compartments, but it does
make the ship a reasonable place to live in, and this item has probably been of more
moment to the ship's company than anything else. Off Kuwait in the latter stages we
gave 200 soldiers daily, twenty-four hours 'Rest and Recreation in Bulwark's
Butlins'.
Before finishing it is perhaps right to return to the helicopters and pilots who
formed the front line. A great deal of flying was done, over 9,000 landings on deck
including more than one thousand at night. Most of the time it has been necessary
to fly aircraft near the limits of load and a high standard of flying has been maintained in a great variety of climates and terrain. Confidence has been created
between the Marines and pilots by this high standard and by living and training
together both at sea and ashore. We had our quota of accidents, some of them
spectacular, but we had the good fortune to have no casualties.
And so one could go on: there has been never-ending incident and interest. One
could mention that famous body of men known as The Bulwark Light Horse, a
special naval landing party trained to land and assist the Commando ashore when
they could be spared. In the future no doubt Commando Carrier service will become
as common as cruiser service. But the first commission of our first Commando
Carrier is something to record and remember.
R.D.F.
Submarine Defense
Reprinted by permission from Proceedings; Copyright 1961 by United States
Naval Institute, and by perrnissio~zof the author, Captain Thomas D.
McGrath, U.S. Navy (Ret.).
A
DISCUSSION of submarine defense should start with some consideration of
the necessity for its existence. Available facts show that the Soviets have concentrated on submarine construction and, presumably, intend to use their submarines. They have shifted their emphasis from defensive to long-range submarines,
and their development efforts are now concentrating on submarine-to-surface
missiles, i.e. anti-shipping weapons. Significantly, in disarmament proposals, the
submarine has not been mentioned. Soviet plans include the employment of the
submarine in its conventional role, but this does not necessarily preclude an eventual
mass destruction capability. This conclusion is supported by repeated Soviet
statements that victory will come through the collapse of the allegedly precarious
financial structure of the capitalistic world. Submarine warfare is an effective
method of producing stresses in an economy. Recent events indicate that weapons of
mass destruction may ultimately be restricted, and Russia's willingness to discuss
such proposals seems to support the thesis that they expect to accomplish their aims
by other means. The strong protests of the non-nuclear powers against France's
SUBMARINE DEFENSE
365
atomic tests indicate that a large sector of world opinion advocates complete nuclear
disarmament. Such opinion must be taken into account by major powers.
Submarines offer wide possibilities for limited and cold war and could be a prime
instrument in the future. Soviet insistence that the conflict is in the commercial
world strengthens this conviction, because submarine warfare affords a means of
retrieving a commercial defeat. Prudence then dictates that the United States have
an effective submarine defense.
Many presentations on anti-submarine warfare remind one of the story of the blind
men examining an elephant. The first felt his leg and said 'Like a tree'; the second
touched his side and said' No, like a wall'; another found his trunk to be 'A python';
the fourth, an old sailor, siezed his tail and tried to tie a knot in it; aggravated, the
elephant sprayed the fifth, who gasped 'A waterfall'; and the sixth, in the excitement,
fell into the zoo's moat. So, anti-submarine warfare is described as submarines,
destroyers, aircraft, blimps, helicopters, warning nets--or a bottomless pit for
scarce money. It may be each of these, but more importantly it is the whole elephant.
Until the beast is presented as an entity, the Navy will not get full public support,
Congressional support or even whole-hearted Navy support.
As long as the possibility exists that enemy submarines could prevent movement
of our supplies and forces through the seas, or could launch destruction from under
the seas, we must be prepared to stop them doing so. This is the objective of submarine defense.
Its tasks are to ensure movements of forces and supplies and to prevent hostile
submarines from being stationed where missile attacks could be launched against
targets important to us. The first task requires prevention of enemy submarines
from reaching the proximity of naval forces or merchant shipping. The second
requires effective surveillance of large ocean areas to great depths and preventing
access thereto. The former can be accomplished by establishing defence zones or by
denying enemy submarines access to shipping lanes. The former would tend to
obviate the latter.
Thus, the three main categories of anti-submarine warfare operations are defense
of shipping, defense of naval forces and area defense. The last category overlaps the
others in amphibious operations and near terminals and bases.
To effect these operations five elements exist (1) surface, (2) air, (3) mines,
(4) submarine and (5) fixed installations. Surface forces have been used to provide
defense zones around naval and merchant ship formations, air to furnish area surveillance, and mines for protection of limited areas. Submarines and shore installations are new elements. The submarine now has a definite place in submarine
defense particularly in denying enemy access to ocean areas. Fixed installations
offer possibilities for area detection. Mine warfare is being reorientated against
submarine targets.
A sixth element, not always considered, is intelligence. It includes operational
intelligence of the enemy and knowledge of the environment. Operational intelligence presumably will be available from our national intelligence agencies;
intelligence on the environment will come from the recently augmented programme
in oceanography. The major post-war development is the certainty that these
364
SUBMARINE DEFENSE
The much publicised comprehensive air-conditioning has proved a tremendous
boon particularly during the operations off Kuwait. It does not produce the ice cold
atmosphere usually associated with air-conditioned compartments, but it does
make the ship a reasonable place to live in, and this item has probably been of more
moment to the ship's company than anything else. Off Kuwait in the latter stages we
gave 200 soldiers daily, twenty-four hours 'Rest and Recreation in Bulwark's
Butlins'.
Before finishing it is perhaps right to return to the helicopters and pilots who
formed the front line. A great deal of flying was done, over 9,000 landings on deck
including more than one thousand at night. Most of the time it has been necessary
to fly aircraft near the limits of load and a high standard of flying has been maintained in a great variety of climates and terrain. Confidence has been created
between the Marines and pilots by this high standard and by living and training
together both at sea and ashore. We had our quota of accidents, some of them
spectacular, but we had the good fortune to have no casualties.
And so one could go on: there has been never-ending incident and interest. One
could mention that famous body of men known as The Bulwark Light Horse, a
special naval landing party trained to land and assist the Commando ashore when
they could be spared. In the future no doubt Commando Carrier service will become
as common as cruiser service. But the first commission of our first Commando
Carrier is something to record and remember.
R.D.F.
Submarine Defense
Reprinted by permission from Proceedings; Copyright 1961 by United States
Naval Institute, and by permission of the author, Captain Thomas D.
McGrath, U.S. Navy (Ret.).
A
DISCUSSION of submarine defense should start with some consideration of
the necessity for its existence. Available facts show that the Soviets have concentrated on submarine construction and, presumably, intend to use their submarines. They have shifted their emphasis from defensive to long-range submarines,
and their development efforts are now concentrating on submarine-to-surface
missiles, i.e. anti-shipping weapons. Significantly, in disarmament proposals, the
submarine has not been mentioned. Soviet plans include the employment of the
submarine in its conventional role, but this does not necessarily preclude an eventual
mass destruction capability. This conclusion is supported by repeated Soviet
statements that victory will come through the collapse of the allegedly precarious
financial structure of the capitalistic world. Submarine warfare is an effective
method of producing stresses in an economy. Recent events indicate that weapons of
mass destruction may ultimately be restricted, and Russia's willingness to discuss
such proposals seems to support the thesis that they expect to accomplish their aims
by other means. The strong protests of the non-nuclear powers against France's
SUBMARINE DEFENSE
365
atomic tests indicate that a large sector of world opinion advocates complete nuclear
disarmament. Such opinion must be taken into account by major powers.
Submarines offer wide possibilities for limited and cold war and could be a prime
instrument in the future. Soviet insistence that the conflict is in the commerciaI
world strengthens this conviction, because submarine warfare affords a means of
retrieving a commercial defeat. Prudence then dictates that the United States have
an effective submarine defense.
Many presentations on anti-submarine warfare remind one of the story of the blind
men examining an elephant. The first felt his leg and said 'Like a tree'; the second
touched his side and said' No, like a wall'; another found his trunk to be 'A python';
the fourth, an old sailor, siezed his tail and tried to tie a knot in it; aggravated, the
elephant sprayed the fifth, who gasped 'A waterfall'; and the sixth, in the excitement,
fell into the zoo's moat. So, anti-submarine warfare is described as submarines,
destroyers, aircraft, blimps, helicopters, warning nets-or a bottomless pit for
scarce money. It may be each of these, but more importantly it is the whole elephant.
Until the beast is presented as an entity, the Navy will not get full public support,
Congressional support or even whole-hearted Navy support.
As long as the possibility exists that enemy submarines could prevent movement
of our supplies and forces through the seas, or could launch destruction from under
the seas, we must be prepared to stop them doing so. This is the objective of submarine defense.
Its tasks are to ensure movements of forces and supplies and to prevent hostile
submarines from being stationed where missile attacks could be launched against
targets important to us. The first task requires prevention of enemy submarines
from reaching the proximity of naval forces or merchant shipping. The second
requires effective surveillance of large ocean areas to great depths and preventing
access thereto. The former can be accomplished by establishing defence zones or by
denying enemy submarines access to shipping lanes. The former would tend to
obviate the latter.
Thus, the three main categories of anti-submarine warfare operations are defense
of shipping, defense of naval forces and area defense. The last category overlaps the
others in amphibious operations and near terminals and bases.
To effect these operations five elements exist (1) surface, (2) air, (3) mines,
(4) submarine and (5) fixed installations. Surface forces have been used to provide
defense zones around naval and merchant ship formations, air to furnish area surveillance, and mines for protection of limited areas. Submarines and shore installations are new elements. The submarine now has a definite place in submarine
defense particularly in denying enemy access to ocean areas. Fixed installations
offer possibilities for area detection. Mine warfare is being reorientated against
submarine targets.
A sixth element, not always considered, is intelligence. It includes operational
intelligence of the enemy and knowledge of the environment. Operational intelligence presumably will be available from our national intelligence agencies;
intelligence on the environment will come from the recently augmented programme
in oceanography. The major post-war development is the certainty that these
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SUBMARINE DEFENSE
elements should not be considered singly but in combination and as being mutually
supporting.
Thinking on submarine defense has not always been clear-cut. Proponents of
single elements tend to ensure predominance of that element without determining
if it is justified, and the element with the most enthusiastic and vociferous proponents
has assumed the greatest importance. Consequently air, surface, and submarine
elements overshadow the mine, fixed installations and intelligence. These have
sought more and more of what they have. Each seems to strive for elimination of the
necessity for the others. This, despite post-war experience demonstrating that all
elements are necessarily mutually supporting. Thus, the most productive areas are
not necessarily the most stressed. This is stated to emphasize the necessity for an
over-all concept of submarine defense, one which would provide positions of relative
importance to A.S.W. elements based on projected potentialities. Then the enthusiasm and energy of all elements can be channelled to produce cumulative progress
towards a common objective. An over-all concept would have other advantages. I t
would allow presentation to the public of a unified approach. Now the problem is presented piecemeal and sometimes contradictorily. While one element is announcing
progress another is delineating its problems. The result can only be confusion in the
public mind. A unified concept can serve as a guide to budgeting and, if public
support is gained, will command Congressional support. Industry's main criticism
of the Navy's anti-submarine effort is that it cannot determine where any one company or industry can apply its skills and know-how. Lacking guidance, industry
picks its own areas. The result, coupled with the salesmanship for which American
industry is famous, is considerable expenditure of funds and efforts in marginal
areas. An overall concept will guide industry where available talents and facilities
will yield greatest dividends. Therefore, a broad concept of over-all submarine
defense is needed for co-ordination of the Navy's efforts, for a logical presentation to
the public, for industry's guidance, and as a basis for a programme to the Congress.
That which follows will be a discussion of the principles and possible content for
an over-all concept of anti-submarine warfare. Russia possesses the preponderance of
submarines in the world, divided between her various fleets. Some are also in
Albania and others are on loan to Egypt. Other countries which may willingly or
unwillingly become Communist can furnish bases. Communist target areas can be
assumed, but there is no certainty that such assumptions coincide with Soviet
intentions. Attack can come from almost any direction against many locations.
Logically then, the first principle of the plan must be that it is not rigidly orientated
toward any geographical area.
It is often stated that the submarine can be destroyed while building, at bases, in
transit and on station. Destruction of the enemy's building and base complex, however, requires attacks on enemy territority, which is possible only in event of all-out
hostilities. In transit or on station it may not be possible to attack the submarines
until commission of an overt act. The Communists are adept at utilising hostilities
short of general war and will do so whenever i t is to their advantage. Therefore the
SUBMARINE DEFENSE
367
second principle of the plan must be that, while providing for all-out hostilities, its
effectiveness is not dependent on general war.
Anti-submarine warfare does not involve clashes between large opposing forces,
with the decision a result of a single battle. It is a war of attrition, of single actions,
of an exchange of losses. This exchange must result in our ending up with some
effective units. Initially, having fewer units of some elements-especially submarines-than the opponent, our capabilities need to be sufficiently greater than
theirs, so that the exchange will be in our favour. Therefore, the third principle of
the plan must be that it does not depend for effectiveness on engagement by the same
types, unless at an assured favourable exchange rate.
The submarine has increased its effectiveness by several orders of magnitude since
World War 11. Its speed has increased, it operates at increasingly greater depths, its
submerged endurance is becoming unlimited, and it will become even more silent.
The next developments will probably be in weaponry. The missile can gradually be
expected to replace the torpedo. As detection ranges increase, weapons will be
developed to attack other submarines and surface craft at these ranges. Therefore
the fourth principle of the plan must be that it provide for continuously increasing
capabilities in the opponent.
No element can accomplish the total objective of submarine defense. Some
elements support the others, but all have limitations. Some limitations of one
element can be compensated for by a capability of another. Elements used in combination will increase the overall capability more than the sum of the capabilities of
the individual elements. Therefore, the plan's fifth principle must be that it
capitalise on the capabilities of all elements in combination.
Conceivably the submarine defense problem can be solved by sufficient forces.
Numbers would be astronomical and current fiscal policies make this an impractical
solution. Shipbuilding, aircraft procurement, and weapon programmes indicate
that there will not be enough of anything. Therefore any measures taken in peacetime which will decrease force requirements in war will contribute greatly to success
when hostilities occur. Therefore, the sixth principle of the plan must be that it
concentrate on current measures which will reduce future force requirements.
The world is constantly changing; what was new yesterday is obsolescent today.
The seventh principle of the plan is self-evident; it must be flexible enough to
allow for technological breakthroughs, scientific progress, and changes in world
conditions.
To this point the need for an over-all plan for submarine defense has been demonstrated, the mission has been stated, broad principles delineating its content laid
down, and the supporting elements listed. Before considering these elements in
more detail an additional requirement should be stated. Large area coverage will
accomplish all other tasks. Therefore, because reduction in tasks results in reduction
of forces required, the plan should provide for expanding area coverage. But it must
be remembered that the plan should not be orientated geographically. Consequently,
the system giving area coverage (if such coverage is less than worldwide) must be
flexible and hence at least partially mobile. Since effective area coverage appears
fairly remote, the requirement can be borne in mind while considering the elements :
air, surface, sub-surface, fixed installations, mines and intelligence. These are
368
SUBMARINE DEFENSE
arranged approximately in the order of the vociferousness of their proponents but
will be discussed in the reverse order in the hope that the true order of importance
will result.
Intelligence, as used herein, will include information of possible opponents and on
the environments which can affect operations. These can be referred to as operational
intelligence and environmental intelligence. In submarine defense these must have
maximum stress. Good operational intelligence can ensure sound planning, greatly
reduce force requirements, and increase tactical effectiveness. Environmental
intelligence is just as important. The ocean presently co-operates with the target.
Full knowledge of the science of oceanography can bring the environment to our
side, resulting in an increase in effectiveness of equipment and tactics, a decrease in
enemy capabilities, and the development of methods of capitalising on the environment. Therefore, improved intelligence will result in reduced force requirements
and, as it supports all other elements, rates a top priority. Gathering intelligence is
important, but of equal importance is its translation into usable form.
A programme is needed to translate the results of oceanographic research into
tactical and operating instructions. Approaching this problem on a statistical basis is
invalid, because the opponent has the same sources available and will be encountered
not under average conditions, but under the conditions most advantageous to him.
Therefore the on-the-scene commander must have detailed operating instructions
based on measurement of conditions in the area, at the time of encounter. All
capabilities must be used to maximum advantage then. Temperature, wind, oxygen
content, depth, bottom character, and animal life are the chief variables. There may
be others. Variations in sound velocity should be measured rather than temperature,
because more of the variables would be encompassed. These variations must
eventually be measured horizontally as well as vertically. Progress in predicting
water conditions is encouraging, but little guidance is available to the man at sea on
the use of such information. A concurrent effort is needed to make oceanographic
data useful on the spot.
Mine Warfare has in the past been directed against surface targets. By its nature
it has always been of great psychological advantage and small efforts have required
considerably greater counter-efforts. Mines are being increasingly oriented against
submarine targets. They are still considered to be for use in restricted waters however, and targets must come within a few yards of them. Mines need to be recognized as a major element in anti-submarine warfare, employment extended to deep
water, and have their effective area per unit increased. Mines can be used to deny
access to great areas; they are difficult to counter, cost little to maintain until required, and can be put into place quickly. A most attractive feature is that detection
and attack are combined in a single package. Effective employment will reduce
force requirements. For example, effective mine barriers from Florida to Cuba and
across the Yucatan Channel from Cuba to Mexico would remove all requirements
for harbour defence, inshore patrol, convoy escort, shipping control and mine
defence for the entire Gulf of Mexico. More extended systems, covering all passages
into the Caribbean, would free the Caribbean and the Gulf of Mexico from the
previously listed requirements. Systems covering the Gulf of St. Lawrence and
possibly the entire coasts of the United States are not impossible. Such mine defense
systems could permit concentration of mobile forces in the open oceans, with consequent increase in the probability of success. The advantages inherent in mine
SUBMARINE DEFENSE
369
warfare justify as great an importance for this element as is accorded any of the other
elements.
Fixed Installations are increasingly advocated as the problem of area defense
emerges. The proponents are scientific and technical men who exercise considerable
influence on their military counterparts. Systems which detect submarines over
wide areas are attractive although they can only be 'burglar alarms'. Mobile forces
are required to localise and attack detected targets since the systems are not capable
of pinpointing a target. Such systems are expensive and are oriented geographically.
In an over-all A.S.W. concept, dependence on and effort expended for such systems
should be limited to those with proven capabilities. No general installation should
be made until a model installation has been proved and its maximum capability
determined. In addition, proposals for fixed installations should be carefully weighed
against a counterpart mobile system. For fixed installations will always lack the
flexibility that should be inherent in naval systems.
The Submarine has become increasingly attractive as an anti-submarine weapon
system. It operates in its target's environment and any advantage gained therefrom
by the target is shared by the attacker. But the submarine is a weapon of ambush
and therefore always in danger of being ambushed. In such combat the advantage
will always be with the stealthier, i.e. the quieter, submarine. In a war of attrition
losses must be expected, and since the Soviets possess three or four submarines to
our one, such a war must not end with our having no submarines. The submarine
has potential as a warning system. In certain circumstances and areas it is effective.
Coupled with aircraft its usefulness has increased. It has an important place in
submarine defence for it forces the enemy to diversify his defences, complicates his
weapon loading and forces restrictions on his operations. Therefore its place in the
over-all concept should be to provide warning and protection of areas where a
favourable exchange rate can be assured by aircraft support or favourable operating
conditions.
As operating depths of submarines increase, the submarine might become the
only weapon which can attack, therefore continued stress must be placed on increasing its capabilities in submarine defense. The anti-submarine needs much greater
detection capabilities, the capability of detecting quiet submarines, positive classification means, weapons to attack at maximum ranges and depths, and communications
to enable it to co-ordinate with other submarines, aircraft and surface ships.
Surface Ships have been the workhorses of submarine defense. Employment was
in screening shipping formations and landing areas. Types ranged from subchasers
to small aircraft carriers. The most numerous types used in the deep ocean areas
were destroyers. Later in World War I1 the escort carrier, as the hub of the hunterkiller force employing aircraft and destroyers for area search, became an integral
part of anti-submarine warfare. Development of the submarine opponent has
placed the surface element of anti-submarine warfare at a considerable disadvantage.
Since submarine speeds are approaching and may soon surpass destroyer speeds, the
latter's ability even to engage a detected but reluctant opponent will probably
become marginal. The speed problem has two solutions-increase the speed of the
surface ships themselves or put the speed into the weapon. The first solution
requires partially airborne vehicles such as hydrofoils or air cushion types. The
alternative is realised by using aircraft (fixed-wing or helicopters) as extensions of
surface ships systems. New systems use rocket-propelled missiles and pilotless
37O
SUBMARINE DEFENSE
helicopters. Drone aircraft could be used. Eventually such extension of attack
capability by airborne vehicles will broaden to include detection, classification and
gathering of environmental data.
A second disadvantage of the destroyer arises from the differing requirements of
its tasks. For protection of naval forces the destroyer must have speed, endurance
and seakeeping qualities to keep up with them. These forces will operate in areas
where control of the air may be in dispute and air defence must be provided. This
results in ships of almost cruiser size, with consequent reduction in numbers. For
protection of logistical shipping large numbers of smaller ships with little air defence
capability are needed. Utilization of the multi-purpose ships in this latter task would
waste a large proportion of their capabilities.
The above considerations outline requirements for three categories of surface
ships : high-speed, semi-airborne ships; slower, small ships with high-speed attack
means; and large, all-purpose ships. There can never be enough destroyer types and
every utilization of intelligence, mines and aircraft must be exploited to cope with
the anti-submarine problem. The remaining vehicle, the support carrier, is needed
until area coverage is greatly extended. It provides a means of concentrating all
mobile anti-submarine warfare elements in areas of maximum opportunity. Until
integral airborne weapon systems are a part of surface ship armament the carrier
will be required as a base to supply the high speed extension of the surface ship's
means of attack. It also provides the best platform for direction and control of
combined anti-submarine warfare operations. The use of submarines as an extension
of surface ships' capabilities needs to be developed, for a combination of surface,
sub-surface and air may prove the most effective weapon system. This requires
development of underwater communications comparable to surface communications.
In spite of its limitations the surface ship will remain the major element of submarine
defence, particularly for directing and controlling. Its capabilities must be extended
to the maximum however, by close integration with air and sub-surface vehicles.
The Aeroplane became an effective element of anti-submarine warfare during
World War 11, but it was effective only when submarines were exposed on the
surface. This advantage decreases as the opponent becomes a true submarine.
Hunter-killer groups were effective but much of this effectiveness derived from
excellent intelligence. Comparable intelligence cannot be depended on in the future.
The aircraft capability of covering large distances in short periods makes it an
attractive vehicle. But this capability adds little to submarine defence unless it is
coupled with a means of detection of submerged quiet targets. Realization of such a
capability appears remote at present, although much effort is being expended to
develop it. If our concept is to be realistic the aeroplane should be given a support
role in anti-submarine warfare: to gather intelligence, lay mines, support fixed
installations and extend the capabilities of surface ships and submarines. The
airborne anti-submarine vehicles are patrol craft, carrier-based aircraft, helicopters
and blimps. Blimps, if continued in operation, will be most useful in support of fixed
installations, especially on the west coast where weather is generally favourable.
Helicopters appear most useful in support of surface ships to extend detection,
classification and attack capability. Fixed-wing aircraft can perform the same
functions and are needed to deny the surface to the opponent. Therefore the aircraft
should be integrated into the plan as an important support element.
SUBMARINE DEFENSE
37I
From the analysis possible here the outline of the plan for submarine defense
begins to emerge. Surface ships should be the major element. Submarines should
augment surface capabilities as developments allow, while developing their own
capabilities as forward warning posts and weapons of opportunity. Aircraft should
be developed to the maximum as support for all other elements. Finally emphasis
on intelligence and mine warfare should be increased because they offer the greatest
possibilities for reducing the requirements on the other elements. Fixed installations
should continue to be developed but major networks should be installed only on a
basis of proven capabilities and when no mobile alternative is available.
CAPABILITIES
PROVIDING
EFFECTIVENESS
While the operating elements of submarine defence have been discussed, the
capabilitiesproviding their effectiveness have only been referred to. These capabilities
are detection, identification, localisation (for vehicles incapable of holding continuous
contact) and attack. An additional capability, not directly applicable, but necessary
whenever multiple units are involved, is control. This includes the necessary communications, command centers and means for correlating and analysing information
in order to bring available elements to bear most effectively. All capabilities are
equally important but emphasis needs to be varied to stress the weakest.
At present, underwater detection is almost wholly dependent on sound, and is
obtained actively by putting sound into the water and detecting the reflected echo,
or passively by detecting the sound of the target. Passive systems depend on target
co-operation and this co-operation, already poor, will decrease. Therefore passive
systems will become gradually less effective. Such systems must be recognised as
short term and interim measures and expenditures must be carefully weighed to
insure that reasonable dividends can be realised before the systems become ineffective.
Active detection needs to be emphasised, especially aspects that can cut weight and
cost. Most effort to date has been expended on getting acoustic power into the
water and the limit will soon be reached. Efforts need to be redirected to improving
receivers, echo recognition, reducing noise and capitalising on water phenomena.
Means of getting sound energy into the water by a method other than conversion
of electrical energy should be stressed. Finally, quieting of all waterborne vehicles is
necessary. Yet sound put into the water either for detection or unwillingly by the
target has many limitations. Research needs to be concentrated in utilization of the
sound always present in the oceans and in searching for other phenomena to replace
or augment sound.
Propulsion systems using direct conversion of energy should be developed at high
priority because such plants should be extremely quiet, having no moving parts.
They are needed in both surface ships and submarines. The possibility exists that
the Communists may bypass our nuclear boiler/turbine drive and concentrate on
developing such a submarine propulsion system. They can afford to take time for this
since we conceded them the initiative.
Weapons are getting so expensive and the opponent so elusive that each attack
made must be on an enemy submarine. Classification and identification are becoming
as important as detection but are not being given equal emphasis, possibly because
there are so few solutions in sight. The solution will be found only by fullest investigation of all characteristics of the submarine to determine which can be used to
differentiate it from other noises when detected actively or passively. The interim
372
S U B W R I N E DEFENSE
solution appears to be to view targets from as many different aspects and by as many
different means as possible.
Localisation is a problem limited to vehicles whose detection means can only make
intermittent contact. It can be solved by giving means of holding continuous contact.
The more practical solution appears to be to use such vehicles in support of other
vehicles that can maintain contact once it is gained.
Attack is the culmination of the anti-submarine duel. Its objective is the delivery
of an explosive charge, nuclear or conventional, by direct means or by torpedo,
sufficiently close to the target to insure its destruction. It is dependent for its
effectiveness on the detection system's ability to gain and maintain contact. If the
detection system is passive then its effectiveness is dependent on the attacker being
more quiet than the target. Since this condition cannot always be met and effectiveness of an expensive weapon cannot depend on fortuirous chance, the value of any
attack system needs to be weighed carefully and reasonable determination made of
the time-span of effectiveness of such systems to insure our getting full value for our
money. In active systems designed for use at extended ranges the speed of sound in
water must be considered along with the fact that the target will be alerted when the
sound reaches it. Thus at thirty-five miles, the target will hear the sound minutes
before the echo can reach the attacker. Couple this lag with the times required from
receipt of last usable information in a system, to arrival of a weapon at the target and
it will be seen that almost all ballistic-type systems are likely to become ineffective
at long range. Long range anti-submarine systems must have the capability to
guide the missile up to the moment of impact. Since ability to use nuclear warheads
is problematical systems should have a conventional as well as a nuclear capability.
Finally, although the Navy has recognised the advantages of using vehicles in
combination, no detection and attack system has been so designed. Such,a system
gives promise of producing the greatest effectiveness. Single transmitters with
multiple receivers would be one such method. The receivers might be in smaller
ships or in helicopters. An integrated system of surface ships, aircraft, helicopters
and submarines could be developed and certainly needs to be studied. Using vehicles
in combination creates requirements for control and communications. While the
weapon system concept is much advocated, no anti-submarine system has been
developed, with the exception of the drone anti-submarine helicopter (DASH),
which utilises multiple vehicles in combination.
A final factor influencing all these capabilities is time. The faster an encounter
can proceed through its phases from detection to destruction, the less our forces can
be diverted and the more they can concentrate on the mission. Time assumes
almost paramount importance when many submarines are in opposition.
CONCLUSION
From such a broad plan as is advocated supporting plans could be developed
which would be in fact the operation orders for the implementation. Such supporting
plans would include an Operational Intelligence Plan, Oceanographic Plan, Material
Development Plan, Tactical Development Plan, a Training Plan and possibly an
Operations Plan. In the broad plan and in all supporting plans, the criteria which
should be applied when an item is considered for inclusion are two: What can we
reasonably expect to get for our money? Will the dividend be realised in the
operating forces before technological improvement in the target cancels the profit ?
THE TRIBALS MEMORIAL FUND RECALLS NAVAL HISTORY
373
When discussion of a plan is started ideas for reorganisation eventually are brought
up. There is always a tendency to try to correct conditions by reorganizing, probably
because that is something that can always be done while other corrective action
requires waiting on developments or obtaining money. Reorganisation in advance of
proven necessity generally results in organisation which is not satisfactory for the
situation as it ultimately develops. It is considered that the concept and its implementation would indicate when reorganisation would be required to make it most
effective. It is better to allow the organisation to follow developments than to try to
anticipate them.
While submarine defense alone has been discussed it would be unrealistic to
suppose that it exists in a vacuum. At the highest levels it must be weighed against
the other missions of the Navy and its relation to Strike Warfare, Amphibious Warfare, Air Defence and the Polaris programme. Such an over-all concept as is advocated however, would result in a better appreciation of the place of anti-submarine
warfare in the entire defense effort and help the Navy achieve the most effective
balance among its many obligations and commitments.
The Tribals Memorial Fund Recalls
Naval History
T
HIS year sees the reappearance in the Royal Navy of the famous Tribal names,
with two general purpose frigates of the new Tribal Class commissioning by the
Autumn. They are H.M.S. Ashanti and H.M.S. Gurkha, and five more of these
Type 81 frigates are to follow.
The Battle Honours of all the war-time Tribals-of which there were 16 in the
Royal Navy-are believed to be unrivalled by any other class of ship, and H.M.S.
Nubian gained 13 individual Battle Honours between 1939 and 1945, which is a
record only bettered by H.M.S. Warspite's total of 14.
To commemorate this record of service it is hoped to make a presentation to each
new Tribal frigate and a Committee has been formed to organise an appeal to be
known as the Tribals Memorial Fund. Patrons of the Fund are Admiral of the
Fleet Sir Philip L. Vian, G.C.B., K.B.E., D.S.O. and two Bars, and Admiral Sir
R. S. Gresham Nicholson, K.C.B., C.B., D.S.O., D.S.C. Chairman of the Fund
is Admiral Sir Frederick R. Parham, G.B.E., K.C.B., D.S.O.
The man who first conceived the idea of naming a flotilla of destroyers after
well known tribes chose better than he thought. His own name, unfortunately, has
sunk into oblivion, but the ships he named have become a tradition in the Navy.
We may, perhaps, raise our eyebrows a little at Crusader as a tribal name-Coeurde-Lion, one thinks, would not have approved-but the others were magnificent
for destroyers.
Some of the first tribal names were ready-made, so to speak. Amazon and Saracen,
Mohawk, Cossack, and Tartar, already had a respectable history in the Navy. There
374
THE TRIBALS MEMORIAL FUND RECALLS NAVAL HISTORY
had been a Tartar in 1702 which had fought at Velez Malaga with Rooke and
Clowdisley Shovel, and such was her fame as a fighter that when she captured a
French warship in 1705, it was added to the English fleet as H.M.S. Child's Play.
In 1854, when two ships were building in British yards to the order of the Russian
Navy, they were both taken over when the Crimean War was declared. Both fought
against Russia in that war, and what more natural than that they should be named
Tartar and Cossack.
The first Tribals were ordered in 1906. They were, rather optimistically, described
as ocean-going destroyers although they carried only enough oil to steam 1,500
miles at economical speed. At full speed they did 33-34 knots, a big advance on the
preceding 'River' class with a mere 26. All the first Tribals were different, as the
individual designs were left to the builders, with as much as 38 feet between the
longest and shortest and 220 tons between the heaviest and lightest. Some had
three funnels, others four.
Throughout the first world war they served in the Dover Patrol, an endless,
exacting duty of long patrol and short and fierce action with few highlights. Two,
the Ghurka and the Maori, were sunk by mines; two more, the Nubian and the
Zulu, were badly damaged by torpedo and mine respectively. Each, however, had
still a part, or half a part, to play in the Dover Patrol. The undamaged fore part
of the Zulu was joined to the undamaged after part of the Nubian, and the new ship
sailed as the Zubian. She earned her keep when she sank the German submarine
U.C.50 in 1918.
Bv 1919 these first Tribals had finished their careers. those that survived the
war-being sold for breaking-up. In 1936, two new flotillas of large destroyers were
ordered as a counter to the big German destroyers laid down in 1934-35 and the
large Italian 'Scout' destroyers commissioned in 1928-29. Too big and too expensive
for work with the fleet, their appearance gave an opportunity to depart from the
pre-war practice of giving each destroyer class names beginning with the same
letter of the alphabet. The Ships' Names Committee had worked through the
alphabet from A to I since the war and here was a chance to revive names that had
been well-loved among destroyer men. A second generation of Tribals was born,
ships whose fame was to spread all over the world.
Sixteen of the new Tribals were built, big destroyers with very long forecastles,
handsome in the extreme. They carried the unusual armament-for destroyers of
eight 4.7-inch guns and only four torpedo tubes. All had a speed of over 36 knots,
and their size, speed, and armament made them formidable opponents of anything
the Germans or Italians could put out in the destroyer line. About the only ocean
that did not see them during thi war was the Pacific, and of the sixteen ~ r i b a &
which
served in the fleet in 1939, only four remained in 1945.
It was in February, 1940, that the first Tribal name sprang into the public consciousness. On the night of the 16th the Cossack, having discovered the German
Altmark in Norwegian territorial waters, steamed into Josing Fiord and removed
from her empty holds the British merchant seamen who had been captured by the
Graf Spee during her cruise in the Indian and South Atlantic oceans. 'The Navy's
hereY,which was the cry of the Cossack's boarding party as it swarmed on board
the Altmark, tickled the public fancy almost to become a naval watchword.
Hard on the Altmark incident came the second battle of Narvik on 13th April.
Four Tribals were engaged there, the Cossack, Bedouin, Punjabi, and Eskimo, and the
THE TRIBALS MEMORIAL FUND RECALLS NAVAL HISTORY
375
destruction of eight German destroyers and one U-boat without loss made it a
memorable victory, though for a time it was touch and go with the Eskimo. A
torpedo from an enemy destroyer blew her bows off, and for a time she was firmly
anchored by the wreckage of her forecastle until the rising tide lifted her clear.
She steamed down the fiord stern first to a quiet corner for running repairs, and
patched herself up sufficiently for the passage home. She was back, with new bows
built onto her, in five months.
She was more fortunate than the Gurkha, which sank as the result of a bombing
attack off Bergen on 9th April. Her loss was so deeply felt by the men after whom
she was named that every officer and man in the Gurkha Brigade voluntarily subscribed one day's pay to buy a new Gurkha. The destroyer Larne, then building,
was renamed to take her place, only to fall a victim to a U-boat's torpedo in the
Mediterranean two years later.
The chase of the Bismark gave the Tribals another opportunity of proving their
mettle. The Somali, Tartar, and Mashona were escorting the Rodney and were in
at the death; the Cossack, Maori, Zulu, and Sikh were even more fortunate. As the
last light was dying an 26th May, 1941, the four destroyers, spread on a line of
bearing, found the enemy. Their job was to shadow and hold her through the
night until the avenging guns of the Home Fleet could come up with her in the
morning.
As darkness fell, the weather deteriorated, with high winds and heavy rain squalls.
Although the Bismarck had been heavily damaged in an air attack from the Ark
Royal, her radar-directed gunfire was uncannily accurate in the darkness. Eight
15-inch, twelve 5.9 inch, and sixteen 4.1-inch guns, expertly fired and controlled,
made her still a formidable adversary for four Tribals. Yet they held her fast throughout the tempestuous night and delivered her in the morning to theKing George V
and the Rodney. What was more, they had in the meantime hit her twice with
torpedoes.
Farther south, other Tribals were active in the Mediterranean. The Mohawk
and Nubian had been at Matapan, and a fortnight later both were engaged, with two
other destroyers, in an action off Sfax, in Tunisia, in which three Italian destroyers
and a convoy of five supply ships were obliterated. Most of the big Mediterranean
actions-the convoys to Malta, the second battle of Sirte, Greece, and Crete-had
their Tribal representatives, and the number of smaller actions up and down those
waters in which they fought was legion.
By 1944 the tide of war, which had turned earlier and was now flowing strongly
towards an allied victory, no more than four Tribals were left out of the original 16,
the Ashanti, Eskimo, Nubian and Tartar. All four were engaged in the Normandy
landings, and with that great operation safely launched, the Tartar, Nubian and
Eskimo sailed for the Indian Ocean to take a part in the war against Japan.
Between them, the sixteen Tribals collected no fewer than 95 Battle Honours,
of which the Nubian was responsible for 13 and the Tartar for 12. In the whole
fleet, only the ubiquitous Warspite put up a nobler score with 14, and only one
other destroyer, the Jervis, equalled the Nubian's bag.
The bones of these famous ships lie scattered up and down the oceans of the
world. Three of them reached their end in the Arctic, one of them tragically under
the bows of theKing George V in a thick fog. Two lie off Tobruk, victims of the
fierce fight for that bleak fortress on the North African shore. Two more, one of
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SURVIVAL AT SEA
them the Cossack, mingle their bones with those of that great host of ships which
met their end in the Atlantic.
When the war ended in 1945, the day of these Tribals was over. They had made
their names known and admired throughout the naval world, catching the eye
and the ear of the public as, perhaps, no other destroyers had done, and adding a
second 'cachet' to the older Tribals of the Dover Patrol in the first German war.
The four survivors of 1945 did not last long. Naval technology was advancing too
fast for them and the new weapons being evolved overtook their usefulness. By
1949, all were gone.
A third generation of Tribals is on the stocks, and the first of them, the Ashaltti,
should be at sea this year. These new Tribals are general purpose frigates, the
first frigates in the fleet designed to carry a helicopter for anti-submarine reconnaissance. Seven of them have been ordered, and their names ring like bells with
the memories of their illustrious ancestors. Ashanti, Eskimo, Gurkha, Mohawk,
Nubian, Tartar and Zulu; in the Navy, these are names to conjure with.
The Tribals Memorial Fund will, through its presentations to the new generation
of ships, help to link the old names with the new. Treasurer of the Fund is Captain
E. N. Sinclair, D.S.C., R.N., Captain of H.M.S. Sea Eagle, Londonderry, Northern
Ireland, who is hoping to receive contributions from not only all those officers and
ratings of the Royal Navy who served in the old Tribals, but also those of the Commonwealth Navies who fought in this famous Class from 1938 onwards.
Contributions, which in the case of individuals it has been suggested should be
limited to two guineas, should be made out to the Tribals Memorial Fund and
forwarded to Captain Sinclair, at H.M.S. Sea Eagle.
Survival a t Sea
u
P to the time of the Battle of Trafalgar, nothing at all appears to have been done
to provide life-saving equipment for the seafarer. If a ship sank, her survivors
had literally to 'sink or swim'-unless they were lucky enough to find a piece of
floating wreckage to cling to. In 1806, however, Daniel of Wapping invented an
inflatable leather lifebelt for which he was awarded the Gold Medal of the Society of
Arts, but there is no evidence that this life-jacket was adopted by either the Mercantile
Marine or the Royal Navy.
I t does not seem to have been until the time of the Great Exhibition of 1851 that
some kind of official recognition was given to life-saving inventions. A flood of
articles and 'machines' was submitted, though whether the inventors were attracted
by the possibility of a Gold Medal or were genuinely moved by an affection for the
British sailor it would be hard to say. Among those who produced ideas at this time
was John Reeks of Chelsea, whose 'Nautical Cap' was intended to be worn as a
regular item of clothing, as well as providing a means of saving life. This was
improved upon by Commander Inglefield who developed it into a 'life preserver
hat.' This contained a 'double air-tight lining made of prepared mackintosh material
with a becket on the lower crown to pull, and so open up the cap; there is a valve on
SURVIVAL AT SEA
377
the upper half for inflation'. Inglefield pointed out the further advantage that it
would be nearest to hand to throw to a man overboard, and suggested that it should
be understood that no disciplinary action would be taken against a man seen to
throw this one item of his clothing deliberately over the side.
At about this time Alexander Carte produced an adjustable cork life-belt, and this
did not differ much from the equivalent found today. Apart from the National Lifeboat Institution, which later adopted this cork belt, no one seems to have done
anything much as a result of this mid-19th century spate of enthusiasm. But although
the seaman was really no better off, at least a promising start had been made, and the
public was beginning to take an interest in the subject.
All the same, it is not until two months after the outbreak of the 1914-18 war that
one can find mention of any new type of life-saving equipment. Then an ill-conceived rubber collar was introduced and issued to all hands in the Home and
Mediterranean Fleets. I t was designed to fit round a man's neck to keep his head
above water. When H.M.S. Formidable was sunk in January, 1915, a number of
men wearing these collars broke their necks on jumping into the water. The collar
was promptly withdrawn, and was replaced by a rubber belt in 1916. The 'Carley
Float' was brought into service during the 1914-18 war also.
When the Second World War started, no personal life-saving gear was available,
and ships of the Fleet were equipped only with Carley Floats for the numbers of the
ships' companies in excess of the full 'abandon ship' capacity of the ships' boats.
Although inflatable life-belts were issued later, the story of Survival at Sea during
this war is not a pretty one, and with the cheers of VJ Day still ringing in its ears, a
dedicated group under Admiral Talbot got down to the business of improving the
Navy's life-saving methods and equipment. The archives of all seafaring contestants
of World War I1 were studied-as well as a considerable amount of American,
German and Japanese hardware-and the Talbot Report was laid before the Board
of Admiralty in April, 1946. Something of the sensation it caused can be judged
from the following extracts :'Though no accurate records are available as to the cause of deaths, an
examination of the casualty reports shows that between 30,000 and 40,000
officers and men, some 66 per cent of the total R.N. casualties, probably lost
their lives through drowning. Though no records exist, it is clear from the
reports of survivors that the number of men who died after reaching some
temporary lodgement in the water was very large indeed.'
'The standard life-jacket used by the R.N. during the period 1939-45 was
condemned by the P. and R.T. School in 1940.'
'No allowance was made in the ships' drawings for the provision of Carley
Floats and equipment, and it was left to the Executive Officer to decide how
many rafts were required, and of what type, and where to stow them.'
'Only 10 per cent of the Carley Floats carried by H.M. ships sunk ever
became water-borne.'
'We have been unable to find any directive detailing any one Admiralty
Department as being specifically responsible for life-saving matters-matters
which can only be described as of paramount importance, not only to personnel
afloat, but also to the war effort as a whole.'
'There seems to have been little research and no planned effort in connection
with Survival at Sea except in the Fleet Air Arm.'
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SURVIVAL AT SEA
Among many important recommendations made by the Talbot Committee were
the adoption by the Royal Navy of inflatable life-saving equipment, and the formation
of a permanent committee charged with the task of providing the Fleet with the most
efficient gear-and of keeping under review new developments in this field.
The Naval Life-Saving Committee was formed early in 1947, and largely as a
result of its endeavours the Royal Navy today is better equipped life-saving-wise
than any other. The efforts of the R.N.L.S.C. have also done more than anything
else to promote the use of inflatable life rafts in the Merchant Navies of the world,
and British trawlers are now bound by law to carry them. One trawler skipper, after
being ship-wrecked and picked up in one, said he would in no circumstances ever sail
in future without it!
The standard Naval 20-man raft was decided upon after a very considerable
number of most exhaustive (and exhausting) tests and trials. The raft consists of an
oval-shaped main buoyancy chamber to which are attached a thwart, a floor and two
arches, all of which are inflatable. A 'tent', which consists of two layers of material
separated by an air space, is supported by the arches, and fixed to the buoyancy tube.
Two inflatable 'cushions' are fitted round the circumference of the floor, one each side
of the thwart. Those in the raft are thus protected by a layer of air which insulates
them from extremes of temperature outside the raft. It is, in effect, a floating thermos
container.
Prototype trials were conducted at Tromso in 1950, and the value of the double
skin was very soon proved when, despite an outside temperature of 15" below
freezing point, within thirty minutes the inside of the 'tent' was so warm that the
entrance had to be opened to let the twenty people there cool down. One intrepid
volunteer showed his confidence in the raft by swimming to it (sea and air temperatures of 35°F and 15°F respectively), relying on being resuscitated solely by the
body heat of the men already in it. The R.N.L.S.C. report noted that if any type of
life-saving equipment in use in H.M. ships during World War I1 had been used, the
subjects could not have been expected to survive for more than a few hours-instead
of the 4$ days of this trial.
The R.N.L.S.C. has sponsored a new inflatable life-jacket also, and this is with the
Fleet now. It is entirely self-righting, and the angle of flotation is such that a man's
occipital (i.e. back of head) area is kept clear of the water. The importance of this in
prolonging survival in the water was one of the lessons learnt from the results of the
gruesome German concentration camps' experiments studied by the Talbot Committee. Two further life-jackets, one inherently buoyant, the other inflating automatically when immersed in water, are about to be introduced for special uses. For
example, the inherently buoyant one will be used by sea-boat passengers; the selfinflating one by men working in exposed positions at sea.
The Committee is still trying to produce economically a 'Survival Suit' to keep the
sailor warm and dry for the journey from ship to raft in cold climates, and it is
hoped to issue these to the Fleet before very long.
The survival pack supplied for each naval raft contains enough food and water to
allow the twenty men to survive for more than five days. Now that radio homing
beacons are being provided also, there can be few parts of the world where a seafarer might abandon ship without every prospect of living to tell the tale; a remarkable achievement, and a far and happy cry from the days of Trafalgar.
M.M.O.
Musings of an Octogenarian
The author, Captain T. Dannreuther, now rising 90, joined the 'Britannia'
in 1885 and qualified 'NT' in 1897.
MAGIC SWORD
N 1895 H.M.S. Melita was a sloop employed in the Red Sea. She was built
in Malta, square rigged on the fore and mainmast, with no bridge or conning
tower; her five-inch guns were in sponsons of which a pair were on the upper deck
below the fore end of the poop, which also served as the station for the officer of the
watch, with a standard Thompson compass and a binnacle for the hand wheel on the
upper deck below.
As was customary, the Commander-in-command (a Gunnery expert) appointed
the action stations of the three Lieutenants and of these the Navigating Officer became officer of the watch and also in charge of the pair of 5-inch guns below what
served as a bridge and the Commander insisted that officers of quarters at action
stations should wear their swords. As the Navigating Officer I remonstrated without
effect; so the next time our dynamo was working to supply a searchlight I took my
sword down to it and made it a good magnet with a blue point and red hilt.
Next time we exercised 'general quarters' on a Friday at sea I invited the Commander to watch the standard compass whilst I paced below it and demonstrated
that it was impossible to use the compass whilst wearing a sword. The Commander
compromised by having a pair of hooks placed on his skylight aft and said my
sword might be placed there at 'quarters' and so this was the practice for the rest
of the commission.
I
In 1902, when serving as Navigating Officer of H.M.S. Hood at Malta, I happened
to be the Officer of the Guard for the day when I had to take the duty picket boat
out to meet the Japanese Flagship (a British built battleship) on her way to King
Edward VII's Coronation Review at Spithead. This meant my wearing cocked hat
and epaulettes with sword. A mile off the entrance to Valetta I was asked on board
and agreed after pointing out that I would have to remain until the formality of
pratique had concluded. I asked the Flag Lieutenant to enquire when it would be
convenient to exchange visits and was then conducted to the compass platform
(monkey island) where I was introduced to the Captain who spoke good English. A
Maltese boat hailed to ask if a pilot was wanted and he declined when I pointed
out that there were no dangers underwater and offered to show him how our battleships went to their appointed buoys.
Then a curious incident occurred. The Japanese Navigating Officer was fiddling
with his Thompson standard compass and appeared very puzzled and nervous when
I broke out in uncontrolled laughter which I could not explain. I realised that the
red magnetic hilt of my old sword was twisting his compass card round. When I
recovered I pointed out the pair of beacons he had to keep in line for entrance
through the breakwater and asked him to tell his quartermaster to follow them, which
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MUSINGS OF A N OCTOGENARIAN
he did. I told the Captain when to stop and when to reverse to turn round at his
buoys and the ship went round like a top in record time and secured.
A few days later when I was again Officer of the Guard, just before 7.30 a.m.
I was sent for to Admiralty House where the Commander-in-Chief (Admiral Sir
John Fisher) gave me his own photograph which I was to deliver to the Japanese
Admiral as a parting gift, the ship being due to sail at 8 a.m. This I managed to do
and to my surprise was met on board by the Admiral himself who shook hands and
said our C-in-C had complimented him on the way his ship was handled and he in
turn wished to thank me for my help. No one in our Service even knew that I had
piloted her into her berth.
Later, when Sir John Fisher was giving up command to become Second Sea
Lord I had been given the task of writing his Mediterranean lectures to Officers
at Admiralty House and when I presented the typed copies he asked me if I had any
ideas for him to use at the Admiralty. I told him that Navigating Officers were
not satisfied with the promotion system. The reason was that when St& Commanders became obsolete it was promised that there should always be 70 Commanders (N) and in practice this meant that those promoted from Lieutenants were
always behind the Gunnery and Torpedo specialists. We would like our extra 6d.
a day withdrawn and our chances of promotion to be by merit. I found out that
neither he nor his Flag Captain had known who had piloted the Japanese Flagship
into Valetta and that he was so satisfied with the competence of Navigating Officers
that it was not necessary to select one for any special job. Gunnery officers promotions depend upon annual target practice results; the Navigating Officer whenever a ship puts to sea. I offered to bring in the Japanese Flagship in our Naval
fashion on my own; but if I had made a mess of it I would certainly have been
Court-Martialled and my Service career ruined. The Admiral appeared much
impressed but made the remark that Navigating Officers would have to take their
turn as executive officers and First Lieutenants to show ability in organisation
and fitness for command. I offered to be the first to undertake such duties and was
appointed 'First and N' of the new Leuiathan fitting out for China.
I must remember to get my sword de-magnetised some time!
T H E TRUTH ABOUT T H E RED SEA
In 1896 the Viceroy of India had appointed an Indian surveyor as a Vice Consul
at Jeddah in the Red Sea to investigate a project for running a railway from Jeddah
to Mecca for our pilgrims. The local Bedouins, who lived by preying upon the
pilgrim traffic, caught the new Vice Consul out riding near Eve's Tomb and killed
him. Our Foreign Office demanded reparation and the Sultan of Turkey ordered
the Jeddah Custom House to collect the damages and H.M.S. Melita was to remain
in Jeddah until they were paid. There were only three Englishmen resident in
Jeddah and no leave to land was granted to officers or men; but during this stay we
had some welcome visitors and this is where the Longitude story begins. The
Austrian Navy had commissioned their surveying vessel Pola to make astronomical
observations with a 12-inch grand instrument-it was a large theodolite which could
be set up on marked stones-and, with this, sets of pairs of stars were observed at
different altitudes east and west for Longitude and ex-meridian for Latitude. The
idea was not only to determine the Longitude from the Greenwich meridian but
also to rescale the normal Refraction, to be subtracted from a star's apparent altitude
MUSINGS OF AN OCTOGENARIAN
38 1
based on a temperature of 50 degrees F., which was known to be abnormal between
land and sea breezes in the Red Sea summer. As Navigating Officer of the Melita
I was much interested in these observations and checked the work out. The Admiralty
Sailing Directions of the. period pointed out that abnormal transverse currents
had been common in the Red Sea and were not due to 'leeway' in sailing ships only
but were unaccounted for. Well, the net result of the 'grand instrument' observation
at all the ports on both sides of the Red Sea proved that the Sea itself was nearly
five miles narrower than as charted! This was reported to our Hydrographer with
the evidence and he replied that the chart had been made up of six surveys of
different dates and nationality and that errors in the prime meridians used had
caused the confusion. Redrawing the chart meant eliminating bogus transverse
currents and this is the story of how it was discovered. We had no six pips from
Greenwich to obtain chronometer errors, but the Austrian Pola had a fine set
which chimed with Melita.
CALIFORNIA, HERE I COME!
A hundred years ago one of Her Majesty's Surveying Vessels had just completed
a survey of the harbour and entrance bar to San Diego in California, but had another
week's work sounding in the approaches to the port. During sounding operations
it was the custom to set up a tide pole on the beach and leave an Able Seaman in
charge to record the local times of high and low water and the height then shown
by the tide gauge. He had a small tent, watch and signal lantern, and a fortnight's
provisions.
A young Irish Able Seaman, named O'Brien, was thus employed when the
American Civil War caused the Admiralty to order H.M. Ships on the Pacific Coast
to leave their Station and assemble up the East coast of North America. A frigate
collected the surveying vessel and took her South, leaving O'Brien stranded ashore.
When his provisions ran out O'Brien bargained with the nearest fruit farmer to
work on his farm for his keep provided he was allowed time off to carry on his tide
gauge duties. This he did for over two years and, meanwhile, married the farmer's
daughter.
After the Civil War one of H.M. Ships called at San Diego and O'Brien reported
on board with his tide gauge logs. He should have joined the ship but requested,
as he had more than two years pay due to him, which was more than sufficient to
purchase his discharge, that he be left at the farm until his discharge was approved
-which it was. Our Hydrographer thus obtained the first long series of tidal records
ever made on the Pacific Coast.
When the farmer died, O'Brien inherited the farm and prospered. He spent all
he had in buying the foreshore land between his farm and the small San Diego
town. He laid it out in seaside plots of which he sold alternate plots and connected
them up to town with road and cable tram-car services and his land became valuable.
Next he built the Hotel del Coronado, the 'finest hotel on earth'. It had 3 to 500
guest rooms fitted with bathrooms which let, all-found, board and many extras,
at an all-in charge of 5 dollars a day, paid in advance; it became very popular with
holiday makers. The amenities did not include liquor but there were no other
'extras'. There were free trams, free boating and sailing, an ostrich farm, bowling
greens, a jackass rabbit hunt with (mongrel) hounds with horses and stabling free;
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MUSINGS OF A N OCTOGENARIAN
indoors there were free meals at all times, a swimming pool, a skittle alley, billiards
and a ball room with dance band.
It was said that he practically owned San Diego and was elected Mayor year
after year, but he declined to become an American citizen which displeased the
Federal Authorities. He was still Mayor when we met him in 1897 and he showed
us one of his unsold plots in his fruit farm which he declared was an 'oil strike'
though it only produced half a barrel of treacle-like oil a day; he said he had no
intention of selling until it was a 'gold mine'.
\
In 1897, H.M.S. Leander, a second-class cruiser, after taking part in the Spithead
Diamond Jubilee Review of that year was destined for the Pacific Station and
ordered to convoy a new destroyer, Virago, to Esquimalt, calling at ports to refuel
her. We towed her across the Atlantic, passed through the Straits of Magellan
and Smythe's Channels and called at Acapulco in Mexico in December. Here, all
we could get for Christmas was 30 turkeys for our ship's company. However, we
were due to coal Virago on December 26th, at San Diego, which was renowned
for its orchards and American food; but coming up the coast the previous night
we ran into a thick fog. As we approached San Diego and the water shallowed we
stopped and were about to anchor until the weather cleared when we heard the
Bell Buoy which marks the entrance to the bar and channel into harbour, so we
proceeded by leadline soundings at slow speed knowing exactly where we were.
We passed the Harbour Master and Quarantine Station Jetty and went on until
we heard so many fog bells of ships at anchor that, about midnight, Leander
anchored with our destroyer Virago just ahead.
This was our first visit to the United States and we did not know what sort of a
reception to expect; according to custom at 8 a.m. (still in fog) we fired a 21-gun
salute to the American Flag.
The first sign of life we saw was an eight-oared gig manned by girls in swim suits,
attracted to us by the gunfire, asking to come on board. We replied that we were
waiting for the doctor to give us pratique and they said they would dig him out.
They pulled ashore and telephoned the Mayor! O'Brien in turn raised hell with
the harbour master, quarantine station, the U.S. gunboats in port, and asked the
Military Post why they took an hour to answer our salute knowing that our Consul
expected us in to coal Virago.
Then O'Brien himself came off to the Leander, before any of these officials or our
Consul showed up, and at once struck up a friendship with our Captain, who was
also an Irishman (Captain Frederick Fogarty Fegen). O'Brien called on our Ward
Room and made us all guests of his grand hotel and the local clubs. It was not
until noon that we could move up to the coaling station berth off Spreckler's Wharf.
It appears that the Federal officials were all hostile or jealous of O'Brien, now
over 60 but still Mayor, though not an American; and no doubt he was delighted
at a chance to take the change out of them. The climax came when a U.S. Revenue
Cutter came in three days later saying that they had been unable to make port
because of the fog. 'What!' roared O'Brien, 'our own coast-guard cannot find their
own harbour when a Britisher comes in to find the whole lot of you asleep! Is this
how Columbus discovered America ?'
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
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MUSINGS OF AN OCTOGENARIAN
383
ST. FELIX STORY
In 1900 after a period of diplomatic tensions, H.M.S. Leander at Coquimbo
was alerted by a cable from the Admiralty. Earlier, with the Consul and British
Agents, we had been ordered to buy up all Welsh coal available on the South
American coast and when times appeared more peaceful surplus stocks were sold;
but it appeared the Admiralty had still on hand the Welsh coal cargoes of three
British sailing ships which had left Wales on voyage to Valparaiso for orders and
which had been directed on to Esquimalc Naval Yard. These three sailing ships
were never heard of again and, as Government property, cargoes were uninsured.
Some 500 sea miles West of Coquimbo there lies in Longitude 80" West a group
of small uninhabited and unlit islets belonging to Chile and our unexpected cable
was an order to search these-St. Felix and St. Ambrose Islands-for any trace
of wreckage which might account for the lost sailing ships.
Thus it was that at 4 a.m. on October 7th, we sighted St. Ambrose Island and,
after a complete circuit close in, moved into an open roadstead off St. Felix Island
where we found depth to anchor for a few hours and explore. Ashore there was
green grass and the effect of tidal rise was shown by salted white rocks.
As the Navigating Officer, since 4 a.m. I had kept a record of soundings made
every ten minutes and made a sextant survey of the coast lines. When at anchor I
borrowed the Gunnery Lieutenant's new toy, a 4 feet 6 inch Barr & Stroud range
finder, on the pretext that I wanted to test its reliability and I used a boat to sound
out the anchorage whilst my 'tankey' midshipman at the standard compass recorded
my bearing and distance by range finder whilst I took simultaneous masthead angles.
This produced quite a good plot on a mooring board. The shore party returned
with nothing except an empty rifle cartridge case which I kept; they found nothing
alive; the grass was not eaten down and no nests found. Fish were abundant and
one even tried to bite the hand lead with which I was sounding. At 6 p.m. we
proceeded to circle the remainder of the islets, rounding the north of St. Felix
Island still surveying until dark.
On return to Coquimbo we cabled 'Nothing found' to Admiralty; but my story
does not end there.
We went to Valparaiso where I called upon the Chilean Hydrographer and
showed him the fair sheet of my survey of the islands and said I was sending it to
our Hydrographer to chart. He was delighted and his own investigations determined
from the ordnance depot the date the cartridge case had been issued; he found that
his government had offered a free lease of the island to any farmer who would
agree to maintain a lighthouse on St. Felix on moonless nights. A volunteer was
taken by a gunboat to examine but, as they could find no fresh water, sheep could
not be maintained, and so the farmer declined and they left.
I was not only thanked by the Hydrographer, but my anchorage of St. Felix
Road was issued on a chart 'full size', which is rare. The reason was that it was
rated a secret coaling station for war and in the First World War was actually used
by H.M.S. Australia and a Japanese cruiser searching for the German Scharnhorst
and Gneisenau, later sunk by H.M.S. Invincible and Infexible off the Falkland Isles.
T.D.
'Women Aboard'
W
OMEN in a man-of-war. No novelty under Elizabeth 11, but for a Victorian
a news headline recalling old misgivings. Not even a happy mother's rapturous
account of a recent day at sea in a carrier, has wholly dispelled them. The problems
women's presence can bring led me to a head-on collision with my Admiral when
I took over my first command as a captain at Hong Kong in 1923. How far my
prejudices derived from experience or from shyness, I am no judge.
During Queen Victoria's visit to Dublin in April 1900, one battleship of the
Channel Fleet was open daily to the public. As a raw midshipman in charge of the
Majestic's steam pinnace I first heard of this when my fatherly bearded coxswain
jerked a pitying thumb at a sister ship and said 'Women aboard'. This leading
seaman, ex-chief petty officer, was laconic but I had learned more from his few
words and expressive nods and winks than from anyone else in that tough flagship.
His tone mingled warning with a touch of regret, suddenly making me wonder if
his own fall had been connected with those snares for sailors ashore-women and
wine. The then fashionable method of 'larning warts' was to misinform them and
send them on fool's errands, to tell them of no laws till they had broken them, when
'Little Benjamin' would ensure that one being remembered. Max Horton and I
received 3 of the best the day after joining, for not locking our sea chests, and learned
of more important rules only from other and worse sufferers. The Majestic was
open on the following Saturday from 2 to 5 but I can only remember a prolonged
hectic and cheerful riot, with nothing specially feminine about it. Our gunroom
inhabited by 33 officers, aged 16 to 26 seemed to me excessively masculine, and an
unimaginable setting for womenfolk. My impressions of the happy Dublin crowd
were akin to those of a monkey in the zoo on an August Bank holiday.
My next experience of women on board was more characteristic of the period and
King and Queen of
more vivid. My log for 6th December, 1900, says:-'4-15.
Portugal came on board. 7.00. Undressed ship. 9.00. Illuminated'.
Affable King Carlos and the Crown Prince quickly had enough of the 'walk
round' planned for them, but Queen Amelie amply atoned for their lack of interest.
Of imposing stature, she combined Gallic grace and royal graciousness and wanted
to see everything, asked penetrating and intelligent questions of all and sundry and
left a trail of delighted sailors behind her. As junior midshipman of the first dog
watch, I was told to divert the Crown Prince, who had appeared on the quarterdeck
looking sulky and bored. His father had shown great hospitality to wardroom and
gunroom, and in spite of his bulk had been too good for them at tennis. The Royal
family all spoke good English, but the Crown Prince, already fat though about my
own age, lacked his parents' charm. He refused all my gambits and seemed pompous
though it may have been shyness. When his mother's head appeared through the
gunlayer's hatch on top of the 12-inch turret, and the equally large lieutenant
(Oliver Backhouse) helped her to struggle gaily out, he turned his back on what he
evidently thought an undignified spectacle. She had made a strenuous inspection
and for days afterwards stories were swapped of her lively comments, delivered in
perfect English adorned by an attractive French lisp. In the gunroom flat crowded
by newly painted chests, she had asked to see inside one: Her numerous escort
competed in trying to lift open the heavy lids, only to find them obediently locked.
Unfortunately, seeing her disappointment, a zealous and hefty lieutenant forced open
one wedged shut by a young officer apt to mislay keys. He was also untidy, and
hurrying on watch after a change and wash, had left chaos under the lid. Delight
in the hope of seeing secrets changed to a cry of mock horror-'He ought to pee
flogged'. Automatically he would have been, for the double crime of slovenliness
and insecurity. I believe it due to the Queen's intuition and charm that he was not.
I fancy her noting the naval reaction to her gay involuntary remark, and quickly
saying to our first lieutenant (Robert Falcon-Scott) 'No! Promise me!' But I was
plagued with 'He ought to pee flogged' for the rest of the nineteenth century.
The Navy in December 1900, might have complacently looked back at 100 years
of the Pax Britannica imposed on the lesser breeds by its might, but none of us did.
The death of Queen Victoria within a month was unthinkable, and the assassination,
within a decade, of the King of Portugal by his subjects, even more so, if we had
thought about it, but we were far too busy avoiding minor more personal dangers.
Women in submarines I thought more distracting than in battleships. In 1905
the captain of A.11, my first submarine appointment, was strongly of that opinion,
after an incident in the Holland boat from which he had recently come. When
H.M.S. Bulwark was launched, the lively lady due to crack the bottle, expressed
(probably the night before to the C-in-C Portsmouth) the wish to go down in a
submarine. The Thames and her half dozen submarines were high up Fareham
creek, in company with the old powder hulks also regarded as dangerous. The
lunacy of ordering even the smallest submarine to dive in that narrow and shallow
creek, is obvious from a glance at the chart. The lady and a black-coated Admiralty
official arrived in the C-in-C's barge close on the heels of the signal ordering her
wish to be fulfilled. Old Prowse (actually 24). a dear chap, with a long lugubrious
face and a sense of humour to match, had hurriedly cast off from alongside, protesting vainly but told to obey orders. The crew of a Holland boat was 6 and two
more made a crowd, but they were quickly on board and down the two foot high
conning tower, followed by Prowse closing the lid after him. Hearing the launch
was barely an hour away, he at once started to flood his tanks and go ahead. Inevitably in that narrow ill-marked creek, after a short run and happily before he could
gain depth, he dipped his nose straight into the mud. Blowing tanks and going
astern failed to move her and the conning tower was under water. Luckily only
a matter of inches with the tide ebbing. The lady, though the danger to her clothes
at any rate was real, laughed gaily. Poor Prowse in his sepulchral voice said 'It's
fun for you: It's death for me; we are not allowed to make mistakes'. Her civilian
escort murmured he hoped not, but Prowse took little notice of him. The tide fell,
the lid was opened and the lady and First Lord-Selborne-just
made their date.
Prowse survived and in 1905 brought A.ll-the latest of the new A class-from
Vickers' at Barrow to Fort Blockhouse, lately taken over from the garrison gunners
as H.M.S. Dolphin. That he was let in for another dangerous VIP dip, was my
fault, which needed a lot of explanation. The C-in-C who expected submarines to
dive more safely in harbour than outside, was the genial Admiral Douglas, famous
as father to the Japanese Navy. Early in the nineties he and his wife had been
visitors at my home and the family all loved him, in spite of his relegation from
tennis to croquet, and being seen back-heeling his ball towards a hoop. For years
after his visit 'Archibald' was our watchword against excess at table. The full for-
mula was 'Archibald! You know port (or cream or sweet) isn't good for you'. To the
indignation of children in for dessert, Archibald went without. At Portsmouth he
seemed to me distinctly younger, but the same friendly hospitable old gentleman.
When Prince Arthur of Connaught visited Portsmouth and stayed at Admiralty
House, Admiral Douglas gave a large 'stag' dinner in his honour. As a junior
lieutenant (having recently shipped my second stripe on my 21st birthday) known
to play the piano, I was asked by the Admiral to come in with the bandmaster and
the port, as he planned a sing-song and needed an accompanist. The Stags seemed
to me very senior, and the Prince relieved to meet someone of his own age. Brandy
followed the port and our elders gossiping about sailing days, forgot about songs.
I evidently talked too much about submarines, then a novelty, to Prince Arthur,
for next morning about ten the strenuous peace of the depot was broken by a signal
from the C-in-C:-'Lieut. Brodie's (!) submarine is to be off the entrance to Haslar
creek at 11.30 to embark Prince Arthur of Connaught and the C-in-C for a short
dive'. Criticism of the operation was unspoken, but not that of a youngster barely
out of the training class, presumed to have talked big about his submarine and what
she could do. Cursed by all, shocked to the core, I had little time to kick myself.
My job was to get A.ll ready for diving, and to make sure that the crew's working rig, was at its best. Luckily the 16-cylinder petrol engine, the oiliest smelliest
feature of a submarine, would not be needed, as A.ll had only about a hundred
yards to go to midstream, there to face the flood tide and await the royal barge.
Stemming a 3-4 knot current she could keep her position while trimming. An 'A'
boat displacing nearly 300 tons must get rid of nearly all her 25 tons of surface
buoyancy before the water laps the slender 10 ft. conning tower. Submarines then
trimmed stopped, going ahead only when buoyancy became nearly nil or negative.
Having only one horizontal tail diving rudder A.ll dived slightly down by the bow,
a delicate operation requiring much practice. Our R.V. was uncomfortably close
to the Gosport floating bridge chains, and already ships had hooted indignantly
at a submarine idling in the middle of the harbour entrance, hardly 200 yards wide.
Sharp on time, we inside heard the boathooks of the barge on the hull and four
guests came down the conning tower ladder, the portly admiral a close fit in the
hatch, preceded by his watchful coxswain guiding his waving feet. An 'A' boat's crew
was 12. At diving stations the captain was in the conning tower at the periscope,
the crew--4 on stools at their wheels or groups of valves, the rest on the battery
boards by their Kingston and other valves. Only the No. 2 officer mobile, watchful
over all. 'A' boats had far more space than Hollands, but an admiral on a stool and
three more bodies on the battery boards, cramp control of the quiet interior where
all listen and the captain need not raise his voice. Halfway up the ladder he was
using the conning tower scuttles to supplement his slow all round view through the
periscope and issuing orders to the helm and motors in low tones, traffic keeping him
busy. I was instructor-'Now we are flooding main ballast tanks through those
big valves-that's the diving gauge 0 to 100 ft., the big needle will start flicking
when they are nearly full, and show 1 ft. as the water reaches the foot of the conning
tower-10 ft. when it tops the lid'. The Admiral after finding his feet and recovering
his breath, realised Prowse was remaining half-way up the ladder and said to me
'Just go down and come up again at once'. I murmured that trimming had to be
cautious and take time, and only then could we dive by forcing her under at speed.
Soon he began to ask questions and I had to show, by interrupting with orders to
hands at their stations, that silence was necessary. When the trim is roughly known,
one can flood the 4 main tanks in 3-4 minutes and then deal with the remaining
margin of buoyancy by means of the smaller auxiliaries, but with four passengers
and other unknown weights, one could not risk finding the boat 'heavy'. She might
sink tilting uncomfortably and necessitate blowing and starting trim all over again.
So a pause and 'Test pet cocks!' These, on top of the tanks, vent air until tanks are
full. 'No. 1. Dry-Very good, No. 4. Dry . . . etc'. The Prince's A.D.C., a Rifle
Brigade Major, a young veteran of the Boer War had asked 'Where do you get the
water from ?' when I began by saying 'Now we are letting the water into the ballast
tanks'. This became a classic in 'the Trade'. I feebly continued 'They take 3 to 4
minutes with the vents full open'. After perhaps 2 minutes 'Are we
down yet'
from the Admiral. After 3 minutes I closed the vents nearly shut from timidity with
Prowse's 'Hard a port: Speed up: Starboard ten' coming from the conning tower
in quick succession. Knowing the final phase of trimming could be tricky, and a real
dive in that narrow trafficky entrance, mildly dangerous,-I was forced to-go cannily.
Another 'Are we going down yet' from the Admiral, revealed growing impatience,
but the big diving gauge I had told them to watch, was steady at '0'. At last 'No. 4
pet cock! Water' and I ordered 'Stand by to flood X and Y auxiliaries'. Two men
shifted their positions on the boards and reported. 'Are we going down yet' for the
third time in tones Canute might have used in ultimatum to the waves. 'No. 3 pet
Cock! water!' Staccato, from the sailor close behind the Admiral, and at last the
first flicker of the depth gauge needle. 'Are we going down yet' fortissimo, from an
angry Admiral to whom 'No' would have been insubordination. 'Yes, Sir, just
beginning to' pointing at the needle wavering between 0 and 1 ft., and the 'Yes'
loudest. 'Then come up at once', decisively an order. With relief I sang out 'Surface
-blow all main ballast-Diving rudder hard up.' Movement and the noise of
blowing tanks ended the overlong quiet. The Prince had been a model passenger,
sitting still saying no word but observing what went on. I think he knew as well as I
did, that the water was barely topping the base of the conning tower, the 'bubble'
shewing the boat still up by the bow, and the superstructure not visibly lower than
when he'd come on board. We had not dived, but he had seen and grasped the
process and the mens' part in it. Now his A.D.C. knew the Prince would be back
in time for lunch and the Admiral, that the ladies would not be waiting long. It
was women aboard the barge that spoiled the submarine set-piece. Sir Archibald,
in his kind hospitable way, had planned the dive as preliminary to a luncheon and
invited my lady friends to join the party. My dancing partner, besides being the best
dancer I have known, when one waltzed to Viennese violins, was a personality who
had brightened several naval lives, and caused a few tongues in Southsea to wag. A
county golfer, the Admiral and I had more than once played a foursome against
her and her elderly K.C. husband. A cheerful affair, the coxwain as caddy seeing
to it that Archibald got good lies, which helped us to make a game of it. she also
drove a smart pair of greys in tandem, and had teased her shyest admirer by riding
one of them into the square at Blockhouse at noon and enquiring for him. Both
the Admiral and his 23 year old son had fallen completely under her spell, Lady
Douglas, as far as I can remember, less so. Thus it was that when I opened A.llYs
forehatch to lead the perspiring Admiral into the fresh air and call the boat alongside,
I got a shock. The barge was already there! She had never shoved off! Her stern
sheets were full of women among whom, I saw with foreboding, my own large blonde
cousin. As the Admiral emerged, a mocking voice from behind her rang out 'Hello
Gordon! Why didn't you go down ?'
Though suspected of being better at bridge and dancing than at my job, I managed
to avoid being thrown out, and thanks to an expanding submarine service, reached
command of A.12 in April '06. From then on, with work great fun and games
only a little more serious, life in the Navy before 1914 was bliss nearly all the time.
Women, adorable ashore on their pedestals, were well away from the world's best
club-a bachelor wardroom. Not till March '14 did I get another warning of the
risks that come aboard with them. At Gibraltar, the Rapid-my new command,
was secured to the seaward arm of the North Mole, with 2 of her 3 B. Class submarines alongside. On the night of the Gunners' Ball, the captain of B.6 (my former
No. 2 in C.ll) invited to dinner a Galway girl and her hospitable aunt from the
Reina Cristina at Algeciras. With 8 wardroom officers all told and little space for
more, a party required co-operation and was a rare event. During dinner a gale
sprang up and the Rapid began to strain unhappily at her wires, and the submarines
to bump. This meant no dance for some of us, but worse was to come. News that
the dance was off and all boat services to Algeciras suspended, and finally that cabs
ordered, had refused to cross the exposed mole. Our guest thought this more fun
than a dance and her partners delightedly offered to put their cabins or their submarines at her service, while her chaperone showed serene confidence in the Navy.
Only to me the situation seemed sinister and 'stagey' with myself cast for the role
of stooge. Happily I had one supporter, also of the ripe age of thirty and wearing
an extra half stripe, who was a tower of strength. While I dealt with the safety of
the ships, he made a sortie and returned driving a cab with a scared 'Scorp' inside,
and having proved it practicable, drove our guests across the spray swept mole.
Scouring Gibraltar he found them accommodation, if sadly below Reina Cristina
standard.
The warnings of that stormy night were not heeded.
My first fortnight's leave after 2 years of war took me in trepidation to Galway.
My second-2 years later-in a daze to Westminster Cathedral and thence to the
top of the world above Lodore, after which I studied the problem from a fresh angle.
The next four years were generous as regards leave and gave us interludes of married
life ashore, while my jobs-K.16, Admiralty and then M.l led to promotion to
captain in June, 1922. But not till we boarded a P. and 0 . at Millwall in February,
1923, had I seen more than the briefest glimpse of my wife in a ship.
At Singapore, in the Raffles bar, I was introduced to a million dollar cocktail and
local nabobs. T o my surprise the name of the ship I was bound for, was greeted with
shouts of laughter-'Oh.
The Warship' with an emphasis deriding more than her
lack of guns. I was not amused. My host explained she was in the news recently,
towed into Hong Kong after breaking down on the way to Manila for an entente
with the U.S. Navy, carrying a bevy of naval ladies.
On reaching Hong Kong, I found my predecessor had organised a model turnover-past records, future programmes cut and dried--everything on a plate for me.
Within 24 hours I was alone on the promenade deck outside my spacious captain's
cabin, watching him being pulled to his P. and 0. by an officers cutter's crew,
escorted by all hands in sampans, cheering and letting off crackers. Only when the
crackers started a fire in the deserted ship, did I discover drawbacks. This slight
anti-climax led me to brass tacks with the first lieutenant. From him and from my
coxswain I learned the reverse side of the rosy picture of the flotilla and my parent
ship. Nine submarines out of 12, out of action in dockyard hands, sounded to me
more serious than grievances arising from ladies as passengers. But the latter were
real enough. The Titania was an ex-passenger ship, whose promenade deck forward,
the inevitable gallery for passengers, looked straight down on the well deck and
foc'sle, where the crew took their ease, washed clothes, smoked and sunbathed.
The Titania was lying alongside the dockyard and at 0750 Vice-Admiral Sir Arthur
Leveson walked up her gangway. I just reached the inboard end before he did.
I'd not met him but had heard lots about 'Levi' as he was known to all and sundry.
The nickname was not used disrespectfully, rather with awe sometimes tinged with
affection. Usually followed by 'He's a holy terror' and a tale of the latest forceful
and original stunt serving his purpose. An old friend, C. V. Robinson, Levi's right
hand man at Singapore, and an admirer, had told me 'He puts his head down a11d
charges like the Bull of Bashan-Don't get out in front'.
Possibly disappointed of catching me ashore or unshaven, he looked heavily
disapproving, and delivered a quick right and left. 'I came to warn you that I want
.you to come with me in Ambrose to Singapore'. This was rather a bombshell, at
first sight unfair to my Comdr(S), and highly inconvenient for me. Ambrose
was due to sail in a few days with 3 L. Class submarines for hot weather patrol tests.
Then, 'I want you on board Hawkins at eleven to discuss my scheme for making fuller
use of Titania. No ceremonial calls'.
At eleven the Admiral opened unceremoniously-'Your Titania and Ambrose
have empty spare cabins, and others occupied by submarine officers away in their
boats. My Hawkins is overcrowded. I want cabins allotted to my Engineer Captain
and others of my staffy--This sounded reasonable, though each ship, mothering 6
submarines, had on occasion to fend for 9, and cabins were a problem needing a margin.
Brushing aside my feeble protests Levi went quickly to the heart of his scheme,
evidently dear to his own. He spoke emotionally of the lot of naval wives, and his
wish to encourage officers to marry and to have their wives with them. He shook a
fierce finger at me, apparently taking me for a bachelor (or perhaps a gay grass
widower) 'I want the Titania to take all the wives she can carry up to Wei-Hai-Wei
in April, and down again to Hong Kong in October'. A year later I could find something to be said for the idea, and today perhaps more, but at the moment it struck
me as outrageous. I could find nothing helpful to say, and no doubt looked mulish.
I was shouted at until goaded to a retort, probably incoherent, to the effect that I
had no wish to command a ship already a laughing stock on the station, known by a
nasty nickname. This was a body blow, how foul and how effective I did not then
know. If I'd had any inkling that his wife and daughters had been passengers for
Manila, I could not have used it. Luckily for my case, and for our future relations,
my ignorance of the background to his proposal was profound, and my innocence
of malice transparent. I didn't even know his family were in Hong Kong, still less
that they could be chief among the intended passengers. In the ensuing pause, I
played my only trump, saying 'When (as ordered), I submit details to implement the
scheme, I must record a protest, and in my monthly report to Rear Admiral (S)
inform him that I have protested against the proposal as detrimental to the efficiency
of the flotilla'. This monthly report, sent 'through C-in-C' already a red rag to him,
revived the stricken bull and I was tossed out of his cabin, unsure that I was not
under arrest. Back in my ship, a queue was waiting with more immediate if easier
problems, towards its end a message from my wife. She was handily housed by
the helpful captain of the dockyard, and warned me not to be too late since Lady
Leveson had bidden us to dine 'at short notice-no ceremony' having just heard of
her arrival. Feminine influence, not to be denied ashore, had entered the arena.
At Admiralty House, Lady Leveson, if she had heard any hint of my being an obstructive misogynist, gave no sign of it. Starting a friendship that became close and
lasting, she christened my wife Pat, almost at sight. Levi waistiff with me, charming
to my wife. Pat, never conscious of stripes, got on famously with him from the start,
and later when they had lively differences, always won in the end. The passenger
plan died quietly, and the subject was tabu thereafter. I felt no pride in victory,
and unlike Pat, lost most of my subsequent skirmishes with Levi. He came on board
again, a day or two later-'You needn't come to Singapore with me, I didn't know
your wife had come out'. A handsome amende, but I was glad to be able to say
'Thank you, Sir, but I've fixed everything up and want to go'. I stuck to it and
did not regret, but it was hard on Pat, to be left in the air, so soon after arrival. Paper
and dockyard work piled up at Hong Kong, but I was able to learn for myself that
submarines could patrol in the tropics, and also to hear a good deal of Levi's interesting views on a variety of subjects. Before leaving in Ambrose I took the Titania
out for the day, to learn how the single screwed old tub handled, and to practice the
skeleton crew at seagoing evolutions. The Paymaster Commander came in the day
before and said rather perfunctorily 'Request permission for wives to come out siry.
Evidently a routine request, but new to me. Knowing that all the sailors especially
myself, would be exposing their ignorance and lack of practice by every sort of
muddle, the thought of a gallery was unwelcome and my reply unsympathetic.
In the Ambrose at Singapore, I can only remember one lady on board and she
was on a chain. It was very hot and a mattress on the quarter deck was my choice
for the night. The attractive little Malayan bear had hers the other side, and in spite
of a look at the length of the chain, and the strength of the stanchion it was made
fast to, 1had an uneasy night. Of a friendly disposition and foiled in her first approach,
every time she woke she tried again and charged towards me till brought down with
a thump. She confirmed my instinct for apartheid at sea.
For submarine officers life on the China Station in 1923 was, especially at Wei-Hai,
a happy blend of work and play. A delightful climate, just evading being monotonously fine, a perfect exercising area outside, good games facilities, even a little
shooting, if nothing to what old China hands remembered. Plenty to do, but nobody
overworked except the Captain (S). Yet one of my bachelor C.O.'s got engaged and
his wedding led to the incident, the subject of my next cautionary tale. The autumn
exodus had begun, and the Titania on her way down to Hong Kong, was to pause
for the event at Foochow, where the bride's father was the 'Big Noisey-Head of the
Customs. The Petersfield, the C-in-C's yacht, with Levi's ladies plus Pat, commandeered as spare chaperone, left Shanghai for Foochow a day or two later. The
weather turned nasty, and after dark I was ordered to turn back and rendezvous with
Petersfield off Chusan. The yacht was unpleasantly lively, Lady Leveson ill, and
Titania must embark her. I nosed into an unlit tideswept anchorage where the
Petersfield had found a measure of shelter, and, thankful for her guidance, anchored
200 yards from her. It was near slack water with a strong wind and nasty lop, and I
sent over the first lieutenant in charge of the whaler. She came back emity. At
the PetersJieldYsshort ladder, the rise and fall was steep and the jump required agility
and right timing. Woolrych handled the boat well, Pat had confidence in him, and
to show it feasible, jumped safely at his word, but only proved it far from easy.
Lady Leveson, not at her strongest after severe seasickness, sensibly refrained.
The Petersjield's captain proposed coming alongside Titania and our steadiness
encouraged me to agree. Meanwhile the tide turned swinging us across wind, and
when the Petersjield arrived, she was as lively as the whaler had been. The Titania's
promenade deck was a little below the level of Petersjield's boat deck. She began
to roll, causing damage to boats and upper works, gang planks were impossible,
speed vital with the rolling getting worse. The head room above the solid 4ft.
rail was five feet, and the gap through which the jump must be made rose and fell
two feet above and below take-off. The background was pure Hollywood,
splintering sounds, pitch darkness and rain, lit by the signalmen's flashing lamps.
Lady Leveson, angry with herself for failing the whaler, wafted up and down a few
feet from me, waited for a far more dangerous leap. I shouted 'Not till I say "Go"
and stretch out my arms'. After some rather long waits, the right lull came and
she dived across the gap, myself underneath breaking her fall. It was not a ceremonious entry. Picking ourselves up in sudden darkness, as the lamps turned aside,
we both burst out laughing after our moments of tension. It was a gallant and
lucky leap. If I'd had a little longer to look at the chances of decapitation as the
Petersjield rubbed upwards at her closest, or being crushed if we had fallen between
as she rolled away, and realised my responsibility, I must have shouted 'No'. Fortunately it was a hustle and I did not think nor Lady Leveson hesitate. She was soon in
bed in my cabin, rocked gently in the bigger ship. Her amah did not follow her, but
some baggage must have-the Chinese always rise to the occasion. My 'boys' were
delighted at the chance of serving 'No. 1 Missie' in 'top fashion'. We had about 300
miles to go to reach Foochow a day and a half later, and delivered our guest restored
and looking her best for the wedding. She indeed looked young to be the mother
of two equally decorative daughters, notably adorning a cheerful naval occasion.
A further example of the mishaps that seem to attend ladies' visits, occurred the
following summer. The captain of the Marazion, our target ship, was nearing the
end of his time and so was I. Neither of the wives of two submarine veterans had
ever seen submarines attack, so I asked the Admiral's permission for them to come
out in the Marazion for the day, a 5 or 6 hour trip. There is normally very little
to see, since being hit by the torpedo should be the first hint of a submarine's presence to the target ship. With expert help one may catch a momentary glimpse of the
'feather' made by a periscope 700 yards away, and see the track of the torpedo after
it has passed under the target. The day was fine, the submarine C.O.'s skilled and
everyone enjoyed themselves, but the torpedoes which are the central feature, were
temperamental. They were set to run 20 feet deep and to surface at 1,600 yards or
perhaps less. The first attack was at long range, and the torpedo did not shut off
properly on surfacing. Picking up from a dinghy is an evolution, with all concerned
trying to cut seconds off the time. Each time the dinghy touched the torpedo, it
started off afresh, running slowly in circles for a few yards and shutting off again.
For the men in the boat-infuriating. For the spectators in the Marazion, a Lupino
Lane sketch which the ladies thought brilliant. The next attack provided more
comedy, but one that threatened me with heart failure. The Marazion was an oldish
ship with thin hull plating, distinctly vulnerable to a heavy torpedo at 40 knots,
for all its collision head. The attack was good, nobody sighted the periscope, the first
39=
NAVAL AFFAIRS
shout was 'Red 70' for a splash just before the beam 600 yards away or more. It
was the torpedo well aimed, breaking surface in a series of leaps. The ladies were
not on the bridge and I remember running aft at full speed, while the captain shouted
'Full ahead, Hard a'starboard!' I reached the quarterdeck in time to see the torpedo
leap over it at high speed. The first lieutenant was snatching a snooze in a deck chair,
waiting for the second attack, and it cleared him by about 2 feet, actually a bit abaft
him, between him and the ensign staff. I'd been really scared, fearing Pat might have
gone down to the wardroom, but the scene turned quickly to farce. A tubby choleric
li.ttle man rudely woken by a 1924 doodle bug missing him by a few feet, upset by
the helm going hard over, and nobody to vent his wrath upon. The damage could
have been serious, and it was distinctly lucky for Marazion that the torpedo was at
one of the highest peaks of its switchback course.
The list of shocks that a susceptible sailor can suffer if he allows sirens to add
spice to ship life, grows too long. I must look for the moral. The fact is that a ship
is a jealous mistress. Mistresses seldom run smoothly in double harness with wives.
Even Nelson couldn't manage it. Fanny could not match his fighting spirit. Emma
aboard the Vanguard in a gale, proved hers, but ashore was a millstone. The Wrens,
whose advent was opposed by many of my generation, converted us all, and braced
the crews of every ship they joined. From the little I know of the Navy today, I
believe that wives can more often and easily 'belong' in their husband's ships than in
my day. They know more of the ships and each other, and if mishaps still pursue
them they are well worth risking.
'SEA GEE'
Naval Affairs
FIRST NAVAL FLYERS.
The 1961 Farnborough Air Display had a special significance for the Fleet Air Arm. Although
it is not till next year that we mark the Golden Jubilee of the official foundation of the Naval
Wing of the Royal Flying Corps-shortly afterwards to be known as the Royal Naval Air Service1911 saw in fact the early beginnings of aviation in the Royal Navy; the first selection of a small
body of officers to undertake an approved course of training as pilots.
I n March of that year, out of some 200 volunteers, four officers were chosen to take advantage
of an offer of training at the Royal Aero Club's aerodrome at Eastchurch in the Isle of Sheppey.
One member of the Club had offered to lend two Farman machines, and another to instruct.
The four officers selected-all, be it noted, from sea-were Lieutenants R. Gregory, R.N., of
H.M.S. Antrim, A. M. Longmore, R.N., of H.M. Torpedo Boat 24, C. R. Samson, R.N., of
H.M.S. Foresight, and D. Wildman-Lushington, Royal Marine Artillery, of H.M.S. Bulwark.
The latter fell sick and was not able to join the course till later on; his place, however, was at
once taken by Lieutenant E. L. Gerrard, Royal Marine Light Infantry, of H.M.S. Hermione.
All five qualified after six weeks' instruction and eventually the Admiralty was persuaded to buy
the two machines and to send twelve ratings to form the nucleus of a flying school. Additional
aircraft, consisting of one Bleriot monoplane and two Short twin-engined biplanes, were added
to the establishment.
From the start, attention was given to the problem of operating with and from ships of the
fleet, and in December, 1911, Lieutenant Samson, in a Short biplane, took off from a landing
platform built on the forecastle of H.M.S. Africa, at anchor at Chatham. He made a safe descent
alongside, using flotation bags lashed to the wheels.
These men were the Fleet Air Arm's pioneers and their efforts should inspire us towards the
continued ideal of an effective and well-equipped Fleet Air Arm. Their successors, who represent
NAVAL AFFAIRS
393
the Royal Navy at this year's Farnborough Show, with their Scimitars and Sea Vixens, will be
demonstrating not only their own prowess and the skill of the designers and manufacturers, but
the vision of those First Few.
IMPROVED EQUIPMENT
The first front-line Squadron of the Fleet Air Arm to be equipped with the new gas-turbineengined Wessex helicopter commissioned at Culdrose on July 4th. The greater space and lifting
capacity of the Wessex will obviously have an important bearing on Commando operations of
the future, each machine being able to carry some fifteen men as against the five at present
carried by the Whirlwind.
When it is a question of anti-submarine operations, the Wessex will be a 'single package'
machine, able to carry both detection equipment and the weapon for killing the submarine,
instead of these having to be carried in separate aircraft.
As for tradition, the new machines will be in safe hands. Squadron 815 has a proud history
which includes such famous occasions as the attack at Taranto and the battle of Cape Matapan,
in both of which actions its legendary Swordfish aircraft achieved considerable success.
ROYAL MARINE HELICOPTER PILOTS.
In future the Royal Marines will select officers to fly some of the helicopters in the Commando
carriers, H.M.S. Bulwark and H.M.S. Albion. At present all the Commando helicopters
are flown by Royal Naval pilots. Selected officers will have twelve months' flying training
followed by two years in a Commando Helicopter Squadron. This will be followed by two years'
regimental duties and a further two years with a Commando Squadron before returning to
general Royal Marine service.
Royal Marines already train cliff assault specialists, 'frogmen', canoeists, parachutists and
signals personnel for service on, under and over the sea throughout the world in H.M. ships
and R.M. Commando units.
ROYAL MARINES COMMEMORATE 200-YEAR-OLD BATTLE
Royal Marine buglers in units of the Corps serving all over the world sounded a fanfare on
June 7th, to commemorate the 200th anniversary of the capture of Belle Isle-a battle which
earned for the Royal Marines the right to adopt the laurel wreath for their famous globe and
laurel cap badge. It was on June 7th, 1761, during the Seven Years War, that the Royal Marines
finally captured the citadel and port of Palais, the capital town of Belle Isle off the south-east
coast of Brittany.
THE N.A.T.O. DEFENCE COLLEGE: TENTH ANNIVERSARY
The Annual Conference of the N.A.T.O. Defence College was held in Paris on June 15th-17th,
1961, and coincided with the tenth anniversary celebrations of the founding of the College.
Earl Attlee gave an address.
The College owes its origin to the early days of N.A.T.O. when the first Supreme Allied
Commander Europe, General Eisenhower, was confronted with the vroblem of finding
- suitably
trained staff to fillfill&eposts in the N.A.T:O. organisation.
His proposal to form a Defence College to fulfil this function was agreed by the Standing
Group and the French Government set aside part of the historic Ecole Militaire in Paris, facing
the Champ de Mars and Eiffel Tower, to house the College. The first course began in November,
1951, and the nineteenth course is now in progress (August, 1961).
Each course lasts about six months, and consists of some sixty students, of which threequarters are naval, army and air force officers of the rapk of Colonel or equivalent, the remainder
being officials from Government departments concerned with defence and foreign affairs; on
the eighteenth course thirteen of the fifteen N.A.T.O. countries were represented, the exceptions
being Iceland and Luxembourg.
The programme of each course includes lectures, discussions, work on problems in syndicates,
instructional tours to N.A.T.O. countries in Europe, and language instruction. The College
has an extensive library. Lecturers have included some of the most important personalities in
N.A.T.0.-Mr.
Spaak, Lord Ismay, Mr. van Kleffens, General Beauffre, Field-Marshal Lord
Montgomery, General Speidel, Admiral Denny, M. Schumann, General Kuter, Admiral
Dennison, Mr. Omsby-Gore, General Norstad and Admiral of the Fleet Lord Mountbatten
are examples.
All students must have a reasonable knowledge of either French or English, the two official
languages of N.A.T.O. All the work of the College is carried out in these languages-lectures
and discussions being interpreted into English or French, as necessary, simultaneously. Language
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NAVAL AFFAIRS
instruction is compulsory except for those who are fluent in both languages-if French or
English happens t o be the mother tongue, study of the other language has to be undertaken.
The first Commandant of the College was Admiral Lemonnier of France, who was succeeded
by Air Marshal Sir Lawrence Darvall of Great Britain, Lieut.-General Byers of the United
States Army, Lieut.-General de Renzi of the Italian Army, Major-General Estcourt of Great
Britain, and Lieut.-General Ariburum of the Turkish Air Force. The present Commandant
is Lieut.-General 0. Harteon of the Belgian Army, who is assisted by an international directing
staff of one civil and three military deputies, and twelve 'faculty advisers'.
The College provides unique opportunities for the free exchange of ideas and experiences,
unfettered by local or national interests. Students discover how to work together on an international basis, learning to listen to and understand the other person's point of view. No other
military college can offer a comparable experience.
T o perpetuate the associations formed during their courses, graduates from the College,
known by the French word 'Anciens', have formed 'N.A.T.O. Defence College Associations'
in their own countries. These Associations keep in touch with each other through the College:
the annual conference held this summer at the College was attended by as many 'Anciens' as
could get together in Paris to renew old acquaintances.
The following 'breakdown' of officers who attended the first eighteen courses has been
prepared from the unofficial records of the United Kingdom N.A.T.O. Defence College
Association. I t includes officers who have served on the College Staff as well as students; ranks
are those now held:Royal hTavy-27, including 2 Rear-Admirals, 1 Commodore, 1 Brigadier,
R.M., 9 Captains,
10 Commanders.
Army-40, including 1 Major-General, 18 Brigadiers, 17 Colonels, 3 Lieut.-Colonels.
Royal Air Force-36, including 1 Air Marshal, 1 Air Vice-Marshal, 1 Air Commodore, 14 Group
Captains, 18 Wing Commanders.
Civil-32, including 12 Foreign Office, 6 Ministry of Aviation, 5 War Office, 2 Board of
Trade, 1 Ministry of Supply, 1 Treasury, 1 Home Office, 1 Ministry of Transport.
VICKERS HOVERCRAFT
(See 'Dreamboats', NAVAL REVIEW, October, 1959)
A new transport concept is in being and Vickers-Armstrongs (South Marston) Limited, in
conjunction with Hovercraft Development Limited, are in the process of projecting, designing
and constructing several sizes of Hovercraft. The basic design of the first generation of these
vehicles comprises a primary structure in the form of a stiff platform, taking the distributed
pressure of the air cushion on the bottom surface. Fan lift engines, and distribution ducts
for the peripheral jet are mourned on this platform, with the remaining area providing accommodation for passenger cabins and/or cargo holds. Controls are provided to stabilize the craft in
heave, pitch and roll, and to counteract the effects of side loads and yawing movements. Model
tests have been made, over water, ground and in the wind tunnel, to determine the aerodynamic
behaviour and ground interference effects. T o follow up these tests a research Hovercraft VA-1
was built.
VA- 1
The design principles outlined above were incorporated in the research vehicle, which was
fitted with bare essentials only for the first overland tests. I n this condition it first became
operational in 1960 at weight of 3,300 lb. and a hoverheight of 4.5 inches.
I t has been operated continuously since that time, with various modifications including several
different lift curtain systems. Stability devices, such as compartmentation of the cushion and
associated controls, have also been developed. Various fairings and a cabin have now been
added as protection for over-water trials. These modifications increase the weight to 3,500 lb.
and the hoverheight is now 4-1 inches.
I t is recognised, at this state in Hovercraft development, that practical demonstration, particularly overseas, is essential with such a new type of vehicle. The difficulties attendant on
transporting a large Hovercraft to distant trials have prompted the Company to construct a
vehicle small enough to be air-freighted to demonstration sites and sufficiently developed to
prove the engineering design and the practicability of application.
VA-2
T h e Company is therefore building the small craft designated VA-2. This is a utility vehicle,
carrying four or five people, with a speed of 40 knots and an endurance of 1&hours. I n addition
to demonstrations in remote parts of the world and route assessments for prospective Hovercraft operators, the craft has immediate applications as a fast executive transport over sheltered
and inland waters and for the transport of personnel and equipment over difficult terrain where
existing types of vehicles cannot operate.
NAVAL AFFAIRS
395
To provide the required width for loading into current British transport aircraft, three sections
on either side of the main structure are made readily detachable. T o provide height clearance
for loading, the two fin and rudder assemblies and complete propulsion units with support
struts, are made as detachable units. These units permit rapid re-assembly, with a minimum
of adjustments, to make the craft operational on remote demonstration sites.
The vehicle is powered by three light aircraft piston engines, two for lift and one for propulsion, and the hoverheight over a solid surface is 8.5 inches.
Overall dimensions of the assembled craft: length, 28ft. 4in.; breadth, 14ft. loin.; height,
loft. 4in.
VA-3
The next craft, VA-3, is already under construction. This is a 10-ton vehicle and at this size
a useful load can be carried. In the role of fast passenger ferry or personnel transport, it can
operate in river estuaries and similar terrain where its amphibious capabilities allow it to operate
over water with waves up to 2 feet, and over shoals and mudbanks. I n this role the cabin is fitted
to accommodate twenty-four passengers and crew. For survey, exploration or patrol, the craft
can be fitted with a cargo area and could then carry some 4,000 lb. of equipment plus crew for
80 nautical miles at high speed. The structure design follows the same principles as already
outlined, and a similar lift system is employed.
Four Blackburn Turmo-turbine engines are specified for the lift fans and propulsion drives,
but the design is sufficiently flexible to permit the use of alternative power units. For the propulsion system, two reversible, variable pitch, four-bladed propellers are used. The pitch
change provides reverse thrust which is used for braking the craft and to aid manoeuvrability. In
addition to the directional control provided by the propulsion system, cable-operated control
surfaces on the port and starboard coamings provide effective 'keel' area to prevent drift and to
assist in turning.
The overall dimensions of the assembled craft are: length, 52ft. 6in.; breadth, 25ft. Oin.;
height, 17ft. gin.
Future Projects
A great deal of advanced scheming has been done at South Marston on Hovercraft of the
deep sea-going type. For the type of seas likely to be encountered on unprotected waters Hovercraft sizes from 100 to 1,000 tons should be considered. Such sizes are dictated by two factors.
First, for open water operation all through the year, the wave conditions require larger craft
with greater hover-height. This is to keep the structural loads and power requirements to
reasonable values. The second factor, which derives from the relationship of cushion area to
perimeter, leads to improved economy of operation, in terms of ton miles per horse-power
installed. This is due to the relative saving in power and the greater disposable load in the larger
craft. Thus the larger ranges required for open sea journeys become economic in terms of fuel
to payload ratio.
For operation closer to the surface, both overland and over waves, the development of flexible
structures is receiving attention. The structure of a Hovercraft is largely dictated by the impact
loads. In the first designs, adequate clearance was provided by having higher powered lift systems,
since the structural penalties in designing for greater impact are prohibitive. By introducing
flexible skirts the major design limitations are overcome. Local impacts and abrasion is not
borne by the main structures, but by the flexible components. These can be designed to accept
high accelerations, and thus the accelerations and loads transferred to the main structure can be
greatly reduced.
The projected developments described are a long way off in terms of engineering. Although
flexibility in its simplest form is already being tried in the form of rubber sidewalls or skirts,
the ultimate servo-actuated mechanical device may take 10 years. A similar time scale is likely
for the large sea-going craft, and with its great capacity for work its application to progressively
widening markets is foreseen. However, an economic size short haul passenger car ferry is
considered much nearer attainment and Vickers are working on a number of such projects.
Large Ferry Craft VA-4
An early scheme for a craft of around 100 tons has been projected as type VA-4. This craft,
with a hoverheight of up to 3 feet and capable of speeds between 70 and 80 knots, can be an
economic proposition.
The dimensions of type VA-4 are: length, 173 feet; beam, 58 feet; equipped
weight,
61 tons;
- -fuel and payload, 49 tons.
A number of features may be changed for particular requirements, but at the moment the
craft is designed to operate a frequent, high speed service to off-shore islands in more sheltered
seas and channels. To improve manoeuvrability in restricted waterways the propulsion engines
are mounted amidships and given mechanical means of deflecting thrust. The bows and sidewalls and the configuration of air cushion are suited to the expected waves, floating debris or
solid obstacles likely to be encountered. Emphasis on ferrying cars or other cargo and speed of
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NAVAL AFFAIRS
turn-around will govern the design of doors and hatches. Side versus end loading for the hold
is another operational feature to be evaluated.
Vickers and the Future of Hovercraft
T h e essential concept will be exploited; that of a truly amphibious vehicle with a high overwater speed. Shore installations will be kept to a minimum for on-and-off loadmg. Whilst
navigation aids will be essential these may be integrated with existing radiolradar facilities being
provided in busy waterways for conventional craft.
I n parallel with the engineering developments described, it will be essential for what may
be termed political developments to keep pace. The transport licensing departments and port
authorities must agree on requirements which will ensure the safety of passengers and crew
and regulate traffic between various users of waterways, without penalising the new capabilities
of this class of vehicle. One must avoid this 'man with a warning flag' type of restriction which
has accompanied the introduction of new forms of transport in the past. Air traffic and the
growing volume of motorists already have forced more realistic customs procedures in international travel. T o realise the potential of Hovercraft transport, these precedents must be
followed.
T h e engineering problems are thus being solved and, if free of artificial restrictions, the
Hovercraft may have a great impact in the next 5 or 10 years, first, in meeting the growing
demands of the tourist market and, then, by adding a stimulus to international travel and trade.
HOME
ADMIRALTY OFFICE CHANGES
A number of Admiralty departments in the London area and at Bath are to be moved to new
locations within the next eighteen months. Some 3,000 Admiralty employees and serving naval
personnel are involved.
A new office block being erected at Earls Court and to be known as the Empress State Building
will accommodate most of the Admiralty staff at present housed in Queen Anne's Mansions
and at Northwood Hills, Pinner-both of which will be vacated by the Admiralty-and other
staff will go to the existing Admiralty accommodation in Whitehall and Rex House, Lower
Regent Street.
At Bath a number of departments will be re-accommodated at Warminster Road and Foxhill,
and branches of two departments at present at Admiralty Main Building, Whitehall, and
Northwood Hills, Pinner, will move to Ensleigh, Bath, about June next year.
The general aims of these accommodation changes are twofold. I n London they will improve
the concentration of departments i n more suitable offices, and in Bath will concentrate the
Weapons Department in one locality (as recommended by the Select Committee on Estimates)
and assist the amalgamation of Naval Accounts departments into one organisation.
FUTURE O F R.N. BARRACKS, DEVONPORT
I n order to ensure that the uniformed manpower of the Navy is kept deployed to the best effect
the tasks and complements of shore establishments are regularly reviewed. Such a review has
recently been completed at the Royal Naval Barracks, Devonport. The centralised drafting system
inaugurated four years ago has proved most effective in reducing the number of men previously
held there i n transit or awaiting draft. Other developments have made possible the re-allocation
of certain training tasks. This will lead to a further reduction in the number of men borne in
barracks. The various steps will take effect during the next two years and reductions in
administrative services will follow automatically. It is also intended to replace 140 naval ratings
by civilians for various maintenance, domestic and administrative services which will still be
required. In all, the changes will free some 400 or more naval personnel from shore based jobs
at Devonport.
The prime tasks of H.M.S. Drake in future will be to serve as an accommodation centre for
naval personnel in transit and for certain ships refitting in Devonport Dockyard; and to act
as an accounting centre for those ships and establishments of the Plymouth Command which
do not carry their own accounts. H.M.S. Drake will still play her part in local municipal affairs,
albeit on a somewhat smaller scale.
Members of the W.R.N.S. will continue to serve at Devonport and will perform the same
tasks as at present but on a somewhat reduced scale. Consideration is being given to the
possibility or fmding them accommodation within H.M.S. Drake to enable their present quarters
at St. Budeaux to be closed.
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397
FREEDOM O F GOSPORT FOR R.N. SUBMARINE BRANCH
Gosport-home of the Royal Navy's submarine branch since its formation sixty years agogranted the Freedom of the Borough to Submarine Command at a parade and presentation
on July 7th, when famous wartime submariners joined nearly 400 serving members of the
Submarine Branch to receive a silver casket containing the Scroll of Freedom.
Fort Blockhouse, Gosport, has been the traditional 'home' of the Royal Navy's Submarine
Branch since its formation with the launch of the first 'Holland' boat in October, '901. All the
history of famous submarine actions, accounts of gallantry by the fourteen Victoria Cross submariners, and the headquarters of Flag Officer, Submarines, are housed in tne seventeenth
century defensive fort of Portsmouth.
At the ceremony the Mayor of Gosport (Councillor J. F. Fairhall, J.P.) presented the Scroll
of Freedom of the Borough to Rear-Admiral A. R. Hezlet, C.B., D.S.O. and Bar, D.S.C. (Flag
Officer. Submarines). in the Dresence of Admiral Sir Manlev Power, K.C.B., C.B.E.. D.S.C.
and B& (command&-in-chief, Portsmouth), who representid the ~ o a r dof Admiralty. After
the presentation ceremony nearly 400 officers and men of the Submarine Branch marched
through Gosport with bayonets fixed. On parade for the first time since its presentation was
the Queen's Colour of the Submarine Branch, presented by Her Majesty the Queen in 1959.
Among others attending the ceremony were Admiral Sir Wilfrid Woods, K.C.B., D.S.C.
(Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleet and a former Flag Officer, Submarines), senior local Naval,
Army and R.A.F. officers, together with holders of the Victoria Cross, and their relatives.
NEW NAVAL HELICOPTER SQUADRON
A new Royal Naval Air Squadron commissioned at Portland on July Ilth, with four diRerercnt
types of helicopters. I t is 771 Helicopter Training and Trials Squadron, which is the first in the
Royal Navy to be specifically commissioned and equipped for a training and trials task.
The Squadron is commanded by Lieut.-Commander A. I. R. Shaw, M.B.E., A.F.R.Ae.S.,
R.N., and equipped with Wessex, Whirlwind, Dragonfly and P.531 helicopters.
FRIGATE SQUADRON FOR LONDONDERRY
It has been decided to re-establish a squadron of four frigates, operating from Londonderry,
to concentrate on the practical training of ships and aircraft and the advanced training of officers
in anti-submarine operations; also on the evaluation of modern anti-submarine equipment.
H.M.S. Undaunted is already engaged on these tasks at Londonderry and will be joined in
the new squadron (the 20th Frigate Squadron) by H.M. Ships Falmourh, Rothesay and Blackwosd.
The squadron will be at full strength by early 1962.
The ships and men for this commitment will come from adjustments to other types of training
and from changes in the planned deployment of some ships. I n particular there will be a
reduction in the Dartmouth Training Squadron, from which the two ocean minesweepers, H.M.
Ships Jewel and Acute, will be paid off at the end of this summer. The training these two ships
now provide would, in any case, have ceased at the end of 1962 and until then will be undertaken
in other ships.
The four frigates will normally give leave at Londonderry and their ships' companies will
be eligible to move their families to that area if they wish. The ships will, however, carry out
their refits and intermediate dockings at their base pons, i.e. Devonport, Portsmouth and Rosyth.
S P A R T A N S P I R I T SETS O F F ROUND T H E WORLD
Mr. A. H. J. Wakefield, a 39-year-old ex-Royal Navy Chief Engine Room Artificer and submariner, and two companions left Bristol with an Admiralty send-off on August 26th to sail
round the world the hard way-from west to east in an 18ft. 6in. boat, the smallest ever to attempt
the circumnavigation-carrying out experiments for the Royal Navy on the way.
With Mr. Wakefield, in his boat Spartan Spirit is 17-year-old Merchant Navy seaman Ian
Dunham, and former painter and decorator Tom Cox, aged 20, who saw Mr. Wakefield's
newspaper advertisement for a sailing companion nearly six months ago and promptly got on his
bicycle to join him. He worked each day until the early hours of the morning at Mr. Wakefield's
house in Bristol, helping to complete preparations for the 30,000-mile ocean voyage which will
bring the three mariners back to Bristol in September, 1963.
When Spartan Spirit left Bristol she was given an official send-off by the Admiralty's Director
of Naval Equipment (Captain F. W. Hayden, D.S.C., R.N.) and other Admiralty officials.
Admiralty and their contractors have advised during the preparations for the voyage and have
loaned and given equipment which includes an inflatable rubber boat, clothing, Solar stills for
making fresh water, lifejackets, charts, and distress signals taken by Lieut.-Colonel H . G. Haslar
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NAVAL AFFAIRS
for his single-handed double crossing of the Atlantic last year. It is to be hoped that Mr.
Wakefield and his colleagues will have no need to use the signals.
Spartan Spirit is of wooden construction to Ian Procter's well-known design, but adapted
and built in Mr. Wakefield's garage to suit the special requirements for long ocean sailing. She
has a Bermudian rig. The boat is so small that only a very limited amount of food and water
can be carried. The water ration will be barely more than that provided in liferafts and it is
expected that much useful data on survival is therefore likely to result. The three voyagers
will carry out experiments with shark repellents and evaluate various items of equipment for the
Royal Naval Life-Saving Committee.
MEDITERRANEAN
ADMIRALTY HOUSE, VALETTA, VACATED
A 140-year-old link between the Royal Navy and Admiralty House in Valetta was broken
this month when the Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Sir Deric Holland-Martin, and his family
moved to their new official residence, the Villa Portelli in Kalkara, the other side of Grand
Harbour.
The house, which was built between 1761 and 1763, was leased to the Naval Authorities on
January lst, 1821, and has been the official residence of the Commander-in-Chief ever since.
Now it is to be returned to the Government of Malta, who intend that it 'be properly maintained
and put to a use appropriate to its historic character'.
I.N.S. VZKRANT T O WORK UP I N THE MEDITERRANEAN
The Indian Navy's first aircraft carrier, the I.N.S. Vikrant, arrived in Malta on August 20th,
to begin working up in the Mediterranean. Commanded by Captain P. S. Mahindroo, I.N.,
the Vikrant has embarked Sea Hawk and French Alize aircraft.
The ship started life as H.M.S. Hercules, one of the Colossus class of light fleet carriers, but
was never completed. Since 1957 she has been extensively modernised for the I.N. by Harland
and Wolf, and is now up-to-date in every respect. She has two sisters in the Commonwealth
navies, H.M.A.S. Melbourne (ex-H.M.S. Majestic) and H.M.C.S. Bonaventure (ex-H.M.S.
Powerful).
FAR EAST
KUWAIT
If any proof were needed of the Navy's undiminished role in our Defence system, it can be
seen in the recent operations at Kuwait. The ability of the Navy to concentrate forces speedily
and effectively has seldom been better demonstrated and it is hoped that the lesson has not
been lost, not only on those responsible for the higher direction of affairs, but on the great mass
of the public on whom ultimately the support of the Navy depends. In the words of the 'Daily
Express' leader, 'If anybody thinks that the day of the navies is over, Kuwait should make him
change his opinion. For this police operation has been launched mainly by means of a sea-lift'.
Background
The recently concluded defence agreement between the Ruler of Kuwait and H.M. Government and the announcement of Kuwait's intention to apply for membership of the United
Nations, were used by General Kassem as the occasion to announce his intention of annexing
this small but wealthy oil sheikdom, which produces about 40 per cent of our oil. This called
for immediate steps on our part to alert the necessary forces and to make preparations for giving
military assistance to the Ruler should he require it. This proved in fact to be the case. On
June 30th the Ruler of Kuwait asked H.M. Government for British forces to enter Kuwait and
the Commander-in-Chief, Middle East was instructed to begin landing on July 1st.
The Naval Build-up
Already at Bahrein on June 27th were H.M.S. Loch Alvie and the Amphibious Warfare
Squadron, H.M.S. Striker having half a squadron of Centurion tanks embarked, which she
was due to exchange with those carried in the Army's landing ship Empire Gull. In dock at
Karachi was H.M.S. Loch Fyne, whilst H.M.S. Loch Ruthven was at Mombasa.
H.M.S. Bulwark, with No. 42 Commando embarked, was about to visit Karachi before
proceeding to the Persian Gulf for hot weather trials. She was thereupon sailed from Karachi
with all dispatch in order to arrive at Bahrein on July lst, while the Loch Ruthven sailed from
NAVAL AFFAIRS
399
Mombasa for the Persian Gulf. The Loch Fyne was ordered to cut short her docking and selfmaintenance and, with the assistance of the Pakistan Navy, succeeded in sailing from Karachi
on July lst, ten days ahead of schedule.
From Far East
Meanwhile, the aircraft carrier Victorious, with the destroyer Cassandra and the frigate Lincoln
in company, were approaching Hong Kong. These were turned round and routed to the Persian
Gulf at 22 knots. Towards the end of the voyage the Cassandra was sent on ahead and thus
became the first ship from the Far East to enter the Persian Gulf. H.M. Ships Yarmouth and
Llandaff were sailed from Hong Kong to join the Victorious, and her replenishment group were
ordered to follow up. Certain other dispositions of R.F.A.s were made.
From Other Stations
H.M.S. Centaur, accompanied by the destroyers Solebay, Finisterre and Camperdown and the
R.F.A. Olna, were sailed from Gibraltar, passing through the Suez Canal without incident on
the night of July 5th.
H.M.S. Loch Znsh, with two minesweepers (H.M. Ships Ashton and Rodington) and H.M.S.
Messina, followed three days later.
The mining threat could not be ignored and it was decided to sail 108th Minesweeping
Squadron from the Mediterranean. T o provide an extra minesweeper, one was brought forward
from the reserve squadron at Aden and a separate crew flown out from the United Kingdom.
Commandos in 'First Wave'
The fact that the Bulwark was so readily available enabled 42 Commando to be put ashore
in Kuwait inside twenty-four hours of the Ruler's request for help. T h e following day 45 Commando was flown up from Aden, so the Commandos were properly i n the 'first wave'. This
was particularly valuable because of difficulties which hampered flying in reinforcements from
outside the theatre. The build-up to a balanced force of approximately 5,700 men was completed
in nine days and was considered a very satisfactory achievement i n the circumstances.
Headquarters Ship
The duties of headquarters ship and communications link with the land forces was carried
out throughout the operation by H.M.S. Meon.
The Popular 'Bulwark'
The air-conditioned facilities in H.M.S. Bulwark added much to her popularity, and some
200 men daily were sent on board for a clean-up and rest. The ship also acted as the early
warning radar guard.
H.M.S. Victorious and Control in the Air
A noteworthy feature of the operation was that H.M.S. Victorious assumed full air defence
responsibility on arrival in the Gulf, controlling both her own aircraft and the R.A.F. Hunters
from Kuwait airfield. This was the first occasion that type 984 radar equipment has been used
operationally.
The Rundown
Certain naval units, after operating in support of Kuwait for three weeks in the world's hottest
sea, were soon withdrawn to cooler waters. The first to leave was the destroyer Cassandra,
which had been at sea continuously for eight weeks. Soon after the carrier Victorious and her
escorts Lincoln, Yarmouth, Finisterre and Loch Fyne left. Most of the early arrivals were from
the Far East and were replaced by ships drawn from the Mediterranean and Home Stations.
Far East ships steamed 4,500 miles to get to the Persian Gulf and Victorious won the distance
championship with 12,000 logged in the operation. Fuelling, feeding and storing this force
amounting to 3,500 sailors was the job of the underway replenishment ships, the R.F.A.s Tidereach,
Reliant and Resurgent, who had to provide over 600 tons of fuel, stores and provisions for each
day of the operation.
Living Conditions
Climatic conditions made life in all ships unpleasant, despite air conditioning, which was vital
in operating delicate electronic equipment on board. Living and sleeping quarters averaged
95 to 100 degrees F. and machinery spaces up to 130 degrees F. T h e high humidity, over 90 per
cent soon after sunrise, completed the heat discomfort. Even at night little respite was gained
due to the high sea-water temperatures and effect of the sun beating down on steel decks all
day. Everyone rose to the challenge of these unpleasant conditions and morale was high and
health good. Much ingenuity was shown in alleviating these hardships, ships' routines were
adjusted so that work was done i n the cool dawn periods. Thirst quenching barrels of iced water
and lime juice were strategically placed. Formality in dress was relaxed and men went near
naked about their work. Salt water showers and canvas baths were rigged on the upper deck
so that men could refresh themselves without wasting fresh water. Other factors which supported
morale were the regular airmail deliveries three to five days only from home, ample film supplies,
opportunities for impromptu sport such as volley ball, tug-of-war, deck hockey, rifle shooting.
400
NAVAL AFFAIRS
It was not a spectacular job but ships have been busy. Victorious kept her aircraft in flying
practice day and night, ready to support the force ashore in Kuwait at any moment should
Kassem decide to invade the Sheikdom of Kuwait.
The Small Ships
The small ships, the maids-of-all-work, were ceaselessly active, guarding the carrier, carrying
despatches, stores and mail, protecting the approaches to Kuwait, searching dhows and preparing
to support with naval gunfire their comrades in arms ashore.
As a practical demonstration of the Navy's versatility and mobility there is no doubt that
this operation has been a great success.
T H E COMMANDOS AT KUWAIT
The following is an account of the successful deployment of Royal Marines Commandos in
conditions where the temperature reached 124 degrees and incessant sandstorms reduced
visibility to 200-500 yards.
In such conditions, with the thermometer never dropping below 90 degrees even in the early
morning, the Commandos dug slit trenches when they were flown ashore from the Commando
carrier, H.M.S. Bulwark. They were the first troops to arrive; they at once secured the Kuwait
airfield and water distillation plant, then proceeded to dig themselves in in a key position on a
dominating ridge.
For the first few days circumstances were specially severe. A relentless wind whipped up
the sand and men suffered from sore eyes and parched lips. Despite this, cases of heat exhaustion
were few and the majority were able to resume work after a few hours rest.
No. 42 Commando (Lieut.-Colonel E. R. Bridges), which was embarked in the carrier, was
able to take up positions and hold them for forty-eight hours before other effective forces were
available. They were put ashore, supplied and supported by the helicopters of No. 848 Squadron
of the Fleet Air Arm and were fully equipped and in fighting order well before communications
were established by road.
Later, with bivouacs and camouflage nets providing the only shade from the gruelling sun,
the helicopters of the Bulwark were welcomed as 'flying angels' bringing ice, fruit and other
commodities to relieve the stress of heat and to supplement food packs.
The Bulwark herself, with air conditioning which kept the temperature below decks at an
even 82 degrees, was an equable haven of comfort for men-Royal Marines and Army personneltemporarily sent back from their arduous desert positions.
The ship also proved invaluable to No. 45 Commando (Lieut.-Colonel L. G. Marsh, M.C.),
flown in from Aden in support of 42 Commando the following day.
No. 42 Commando continued to fulfil its traditional role of holding ground until it was relieved
in the forward position by an Army battalion. The Commando was then withdrawn into reserve
to a position from which full advantage could be taken of its special helicopter-borne manoeuvreability.
No. 45 Commando remained deployed in defensive positions until, with 42 Commando and
the Bulwark, they were withdrawn from Kuwait.
I n this, the first operation in which a Commando carrier has been employed, the ability of
the Navy to concentrate forces speedily, unobtrusively and effectively has been amply demonstrated. I t is felt that the value of the Commando ship concept has been fully confirmed.
Powerful land forces, fully equipped, were made available at short notice where they were
required.
AUSTRALIA
R.A.N. FIFTY YEARS OLD
The Royal Australian Navy celebrated its fiftieth birthday recently. It was on July loth, 1911,
that a signature by King George V transformed the Australian Naval Forces into the 'Royal
Australian Navy'.
Throughout Australia and overseas, the men of the Royal Australian Navy celebrated the
fiftieth anniversary of their Service. All ships 'spliced the mainbrace', and there were special
activities at naval establishments ashore.
The Duke of Edinburgh, who is an Admiral of the Fleet in the R.A.N., sent a special congratulatory message: 'In half a century the Royal Australian Navy has gained distinctions out
of all proportion to its years. I n two world wars and during the Korean war its ships and
men won an enviable reputation for gallantry and seamanship. This is a particular source of
pride and happiness to the Royal Navy which was so intimately involved in the development
of the Royal Australian Navy in its early days'.
NAVAL AFFAIRS
401
'For me this is more than a formal occasion. There were Australian cadets in my term when
I joined the Navy. I served alongside Australians in many parts of the world and in Australian
waters d y i n g the last war, and I have seen something of the present day Navy in visits to
Australia.
The following exchange of signals took place between Admiralty and the Australian Commonwealth Naval Board:From Admiralty to A.C.N.B.
The Board of Admiralty, the Royal Navy and the Royal Marines send to the Naval Board
and the Officers and Men of the Roval Australian N a w conrrratulations and good wishes on
the occasion of its fiftieth anniversajr. The Royal ah ha; always greatly valued its close
co-operation and warm comradeship with the Royal Australian Navy in both peace and war.
This is a case in which they look forward to the Australians scoring many centuries.
From A.C.N.B. to Admiralty.
The Naval Board and the Officers and Men of the R.A.N. thank the Board of Admiralty,
the Royal Navy and the Royal Marines for their good wishes which are very greatly appreciated. The R.A.N. is deeply conscious of the great debt of gratitude which we owe to the
Royal Navy, our parent, for our traditions, guidance, training and so much material assistance.
We greatly value the close association and friendship which we have enjoyed with the Royal
Navy since our childhood, and we look forward to its continuance in our riper years. We hope
that we shall do better than our last Test Score!
Book Reviews
FROM T H E DREADNOUGHT T O SCAPA FLOW
VOLUh4E I : THE ROAD TO WAR, 1904- I9 I4
By A. J. MARDER
(Oxford University Press.
42s.)
DESPITEits somewhat illogical title this is one of the best and most important books
written since the first publication of THE NAVAL REVIEW.
It is a pleasure and a privilege to review it, but it is also a sad reflection on
English scholarship that it is a foreigner-albeit a benevolent American-who has
written it from the veritable 'corner' which he has made in this part of our history.
Since his 'English Armament Industry and Navalism in the '90s' in 1938, Professor
Marder has devoted his considerable talents to studying the development of British
sea power during that critical half-century which ended with the scuttling of the
German fleet at Scapa Flow. In 1940 he published in America 'The Anatomy
of British Sea Power' which was sub-titled 'A History of British Naval Policy in the
Pre-Dreadnought Era'; an English edition appeared in 1941 and received less
attention than it deserved because of those troubled times. Since then, while the
battleships have been disappearing, he has published in three volumes a selection
of the letters of Lord Fisher and one of those of Sir Herbert Richmond, each
supported by masterly summaries of the lives and times of their writers. Now appears
the first of two volumes dealing with the Royal Navy in the Fisher era, sub-titled
'The Road to War', and covering the period 1904-1914.
Inevitably there is some repetition in the author's writings. This book overlaps
the last chapters of his first book and repeats some of the editorial matter in the
four volumes of correspondence, but on the other hand it presents new material
to supplement the previous works. And at least Fisher has had his wish-the dowager
Duchess of Hamilton told Marder that 'he always wanted his biography to be
written by an American because he thought an English writer would want to cut
too much'.
Its merit lies in the lucidity and scope of the account of policies and events
resulting from the author's patient and diligent researches. There can be few
sources he has not explored and few important survivors of the period he has not
consulted. Richmond's aim was to disseminate not 'drum and trumpet history'
but 'naval history linked up with the political, military and economic histories of
which it is an integral part', and this is a perfect summary of Marder's efforts. He
has attributed to Richmond 'all the assets of a great naval historian-a passion for
the discovery and spread of truth, a succinct and lucid style, the brilliant ability
to analyse situations, and to deduce from them fundamental principles, and a keen
sense of the great importance of sea power in British history'. These words apply
to their own writer. But he does not forget or disobey the rule, which he quotes
in his preface, that 'the art of telling a story is an essential qualification for writing
history'.
FROM THE DREADNOUGHT TO SCAPA FLOW
4O3
Inevitably the narrative hinges on Fisher for it is concerned with the years
when the redoubtable Jackie 'dominated the Navy as it has never been dominated
by any other individual'. Marder's affection for the old ruffian is evident despite
his efforts to be fair, and one can feel him striving to present accurately a balanced
picture of the man who had so many critics that they could not all have been wrong.
But how triumphantly he emerges, despite the irritating style of letter writing and
the follies of grandeur that marred his later years and culminated in the pathetic
abdication of 1915. How fortunate this country was to have had in the years before
the war a rising officer with the necessary and extraordinary vision and ability, plus
the power to use them forcefully and logically, in easygoing days of complacent
conservatism. Some people doubtless regret that Fisher was 73 when war broke
out (exactly when he had predicted, some years before, that it would), but in fact
he did more for his country in forcing the preparations for war in the years of peace
than he could have done in waging it. As Lord Hankey has recently said in 'The
Supreme Command', 'this contribution took the form of a great reorganisation,
amounting to a renaissance of the fleet, which began at sea in the Mediteranean
and later on was continued in a wider sphere at the Admiralty and in the Committee
of Imperial Defence'. This book is probably the only relevant major work not
available to Marder; though he acknowledges some debt to Lord Hankey in his
preface their books must have been in the course of printing at the same time.
A comparison of the two works is most interesting-to Hankey the belief in our
need for a strong Navy 'amounted almost to a religion' and both he and Fisher
were agreed that the best role for the small British army was to land it at will, a
manoeuvre possible only because of our sea power, rather than to commit it to the
support of land-locked allies.
The nub of the book is stated early: on p. 13 we are told that 'although some
Englishmen have never been quite sure of it, the verdict of history is that in Fisher
the Navy and the nation had found their man-a strong man ready to face the
tremendous responsibility and personal risk of carrying out a constructive revolution
in the Service rendered by the very pride of its traditions, one of the most conservative in the world'. The rest of the book is to some extent a justification of the
man and his methods within the various contexts in which he had to work-with
the Sea Lords (who generally supported him), a succession of First Lords, changes
of Government, the Committee of Imperial Defence and a developing public
opinion increasingly aware of naval affairs. His measures need no summary here
and they are dealt with favourably and fairly in the book.
After reading Volume I one is left with a feeling that the recent past is now
appearing in a new light. Not only has it never been explained so accurately or
lucidly before, but also to all except the most senior readers the period has been
known to us mainly from a series of memoirs and books so essentially contemporary
in outlook that they are in the 'current affairs' category. Their style is already
curiously dated; e.g. the coming war was ofien referred to as Armageddon. Now
the period is treated historically for the first time, and yet one is fortunate in stin
being near enough, as it were, for the paint to smell fresh. We now know better
how much reliance to place on the more dogmatic writings of Admiral Bacon and
Admiral Dewar, and how much correction some of their accounts need. An entirely
new view of the younger Churchill is presented, for which alone the book would
be valuable, and the credit normally given to him for mobilizing the fleet in 1914
404
FROM THE DREADNOUGHT TO SCAPA FLOW
is correctly attributed mainly to Battenburg. Churchill dominates the end of the
book almost as much as Fisher the beginning-what a combination they must have
been! And what astonishing latitude was allowed to Lord Charles Beresford. It
is hard to disagree with Fisher's claim that in parleying with his insubordinate
colleague the Cabinet were 'coquetting with mutiny, and dealing an irreparable blow
to naval discipline'. Yet there is evidence on which to criticise some of Fisher's
own decisions. Did he, for example, concentrate our strength in home waters to
such an extent that he weakened dangerously our position in the Far East? It is
probably too much to say that he was responsible for the Emden episode, or the
temporary successes of the Scharnhorst and Cneisnau. We could never be strong
everywhere.
All the problems of the period are stated clearly and concisely: the likelihood of
invasion, and the chance of a 'bolt from the blue' seem real. All the developments
of material-the mine, the aeroplane and the submarine especially-and the struggle
to keep the more sublime aspects of the naval profession in proportion are related
with neatness and detachment. The details of the German challenge, the Navy
scare of 1909 and the changes of policies both at home and abroad are explained
so clearly and so readably that one takes in the background with far less difficulty
and tedium than might have been the case, though there is still room left to doubt
exactly which was cause and which effect in the naval race. Public opinion is
carefully recorded and the ample evidence of its assessment shows the author's zeal
and perception. It is surprising to find quite so many quotations from 'The Navy
From Within' and so few from Woodward's more scholarly 'Great Britain and the
German Navy', but as Marder has said, he finds Woodward deficient in the attention
paid to the influence of public opinion on naval policies.
Throughout the book diverse personalities emerge-all the illustrations are of
First Lords and First Sea Lords-and above all, behind all, in office or retirement,
towers Fisher: that man 'truly great despite his idiocyncrasies and truly good despite
his violence'.
There is an interesting reference to the foundation of THE NAVAL REVIEW, and
a new emphasis on the part played both by King Edward VII and by a section of
the press as supporters of Fisher and his policies. No single expressions remain
in the memory as do so many of Archbishop Matthews', and there are no Mahanlike phrases about 'distant storm-beaten ships', but the book must be recognized
as important as any by these two authors. One's only real doubt is whether Marder
is always quite wise in his technique. He admits that he has eliminated the
impedimenta of scholarship, such as the meticulous acknowledgment of every word
that he has borrowed, in order to make the book more readable. This is not quite
the same thing as attributing to a man words within quotation marks which even
in their source appeared only as reported speech. Contrast, for example, the remark
on p. 435 which is made to come from Beatty with its source on p. 120 of Lord
Chatfield's 'The Navy and Defence', where, while admittedly the same sentiment
is expressed, it can only be assumed to be a statement of Beatty's attitude and then
expressed only in Lord Chatfield's own words. But this is by no means typical
of the book, and must not be regarded as impugning its value.
Richmond wondered in 1916 'if we shall ever live to see a true history of the
war published'. His diary, which was fortunately spotted on his shelves by Marder,
contains many scents for the discerning hunter, and much raw material for that
THE STRATEGIC AIR OFFENSIVE AGAINST GERMANY,
1939-45
4O5
still awaited true history. Now we must wait and see whether Volume I1 will bring
it. The accident which has delayed its publication can only increase our impatience,
but it may have the compensation of making more sources available. If it is as good
as Volume I our founder would probably have been satisfied.
A. B. SAINSBURY
THE STRATEGIC AIR OFFENSIVE AGAINST GERMANY, 1939-45
VOLUME I : PREPARATION
By Sir CHARLES
WEBSTER
and NOBLEFRANKLAND
(H.M.S.O.
42s.)
THEfirst of the long-awaited volumes of the Official Military History series dealing
with the Strategic Air Offensive carries the story up to the end of 1942. In several
respects the broad principles established for this series have been departed from
in these volumes. In the first place the authors state in their Preface that 'the
controversial and complicated nature of the subject' has necessitated 'fuller documentation than has usually been employed in the oficial histories'. The publication
of full references is to be welcomed, and would surely have been welcomed had
it been universally applied in the official histories-none of which is, however,
noticeably free from 'controversial and complicated' subjects. But the decision
that all three of Sir Charles Webster's and Dr. Frankland's volumes (totalling over
1,100 pages, excluding the volume devoted to Appendices) should make their bow
on the same day is less advantageous-if only because it is scarcely possible for
reviewers or readers properly to digest such a meal within a reasonable time. For
lack of any explanation by the editor or authors one can only guess that the decision
arises from the fact that the story told in the first volume is, to quote from the
Introduction, 'in many respects a melancholy oneY;and that the authors desired to
offset the impact of the errors, misjudgements and failures of the early years by the
successes recounted in the later volumes. Whether that hypothesis is correct or not,
we shall probably never know; for Sir Charles Webster's tragic death only a few
weeks before publication of a history to which he had devoted ten years' work
precludes any request for enlightenment from him. It is, however, worth remarking
that the first volume of 'The War at Sea' is also to a great extent a record of tragedy
and error; yet it was not considered desirable to hold it back until the story of
later victories was available.
These volumes also differ in one other respect from the practice established for
the rest of the Official Military History series, namely that they are not written from
an inter-Service angle. Nor are they even a one-Service history; rather are they a
forthright, graphic and at times brilliant account of the organisation, purposes and
plans, and the accomplishments and failures, of one Command of one Service.
Indeed the nearest parallel that occurs to this reviewer would have been three
volumes devoted to the Western Approaches Command's part in the long Atlantic
struggle; yet even that could only have been told as a joint story of the Royal Navy
and of Coastal Command of the R.A.F. It is inevitable, but in this reviewer's opinion
406
THE STRATEGIC AIR OFFENSIVE AGAINST GERMANY,
1939-45
regrettable, that the restricted angle from which the historians of the Strategic Air
Offensive view their subject has led them to make or to quote statements which
are less than fair to the other Services-and especially to the Navy. Thus we are
told that 'the B.E.F. was driven into the sea at Dunkirk', which is an odd phrase
with which to describe the rescue of 338,000 soldiers; the resentment of Bomber
Command over being required to 'hurl bombs into Brest harbour' when the
Scharnhorst and Gneisenau were in that base is several times emphasised. But the
profound influence of those ships on our strategy in 1941 receives no recognition.
The Atlantic battle is repeatedly referred to as 'defensive', which in one sense it was,
and many complaints from Bomber Command are quoted regarding 'the heavy
commitment of assisting the Navy' in that campaign. Even the historians' admission
that it 'was obvious to all (my italics) that the whole Allied war effort depended on
the outcome of this gruelling and long-drawn-out maritime struggle', and that it
'had an ultimately offensive purpose', is vitiated by the many quotations from
statements by Lord Trenchard and Air Marshal Harris to the opposite effect. To
give only one example, on June 17th, 1942, Harris stated in a minute addressed
directly to the Prime Minister that he regarded Coastal Command 'merely as an
obstacle to victory'!
This reviewer was particularly anxious to find out whether the historians' view
would support or contradict the conviction that so many of us felt during the warnamely that Bomber Command was predominantly concerned in prosecuting a
separate strategy, with too little regard for the other Services' needs and purposes.
And as a result of reading this volume he is more than ever convinced that the concept of the separate strategy was a reality. Two men prevented it being carried so far
as to prove disastrous-Sir Charles Portal, as Chief of Air Staff, and Sir Winston
Churchill who, after a shaky start, developed a clear mistrust of what are here called
'cut and dried schemes for winning the war'.
At the outset of their work the historians state that 'General Smuts hinted at
the possibility (of victory through air power alone) in 1917 and there were moments
(my italics) during the Second World War when Sir Arthur Harris seemed to
have adopted the idea. Perhaps it even entered into Sir Winston Churchill's
calculations in 1940 . . .' As regards Air Marshal Harris, and Lord Trenchard too,
the foregoing quotation is shown, from this work, to be a considerable understatement. Thus a few pages later the historians state that 'in its extreme form
this (i.e. the Trenchard) doctrine claimed that the next war could be won by bombing
alone by destroying the enemy's will to resist'; in October, 1940, Harris wrote to
Air Marshal Peirse that 'we are the only people that can win the war, and we are
winning it7;while on May 19th, 1941, Trenchard told Churchill 'that if the bombers
went often enough they could smash the morale of Germany. Meanwhile the Army
and the Navy would have to recognise that they could make no contribution to
victory until this had been done'. Finally we have Harris's minute to the Prime
Minister of June 17th, 1942, in which he stated that 'victory, speedy and complete,
awaits the side which first employs air power as it should be employed . . . in such
a manner as would avail to knock Germany out of the war in a matter of months
. . . it is imperative to abandon the disastrous policy of military interventions in the
land campaigns of Europe'. Quite apart from the ethics of a C.-in-C. of a Command
and a distinguished retired officer short-circuiting the Chiefs of St& Committee
by pressing their views directly on the Prime Minister (and if many C.s-in-C. had
THE STRATEGIC AIR OFFENSIVE AGAINST GERMANY,
1939-45
407
copied the example the whole basis of our war direction might have broken down),
it is pertinent to ask how such extreme views came to be held, and what is the
background to the theory of the 'independent air strategy'.
The answer is given in the authors' first two chapters. Briefly stated the long
struggle of the recently born R.A.F. to avoid being re-absorbed into the Army and
Navy in the 1920s left a legacy of mistrust towards the other Services, and a determination to preserve 'independence' in strategic thought as well as in everything
else. The young R.A.F. was, understandably, what today would be called
existentialist; and people of that way of thinking are prone to exaggeration. Thus
'the separate identity (of the R.A.F.)', write the historians, 'was closely bound up
with the plan for a strategic bombing offensive'; and that concept was the child of
the decade (1919-1929) during which Trenchard was Chief of the Air Staff. Not
until 1937 was 'the emphasis on defence imposed on the Air Staff from outsideyin this reviewer's opinion most fortunately for the nation.
There is undoubtedly truth in the statement that in the 1920s the Army and
Navy repeatedly tried to divide the R.A.F. between them; but the authors do not
make plain that, as regards the Navy, the reason was that the Smuts Committee
had made no provision for the continued development of specialised naval aviation.
Had that been done in 1918, or had the Air Ministry under Trenchard been prepared
later to allow it, the Admiralty would have been satisfied. As it was the Admiralty
did not regain control of the Fleet Air Arm until 1937, with the result that it was
the Japanese and the Americans who demonstrated the full capabilities of carrierborne aircraft. I have been told on good authority that, towards the end of his
life, Lord Trenchard himself admitted that things would have gone better had the
Air Ministry relinquished its claim to share in the control of naval aviation earlier.
What is beyond doubt is that, however exaggerated Trenchard's views on the effects of
bombing were, the continuation of the R.A.F. as a separate Service was in the
main his accomplishment; and had he failed in that purpose our survival in 1940
seems very problematical.
The chief fallacy propagated and universally accepted in Air Force circles
during the Trenchard era and afterwards was that 'offence is all important and
defence completely ineffective'; but there were many others as well, and they are
fully and frankly admitted in these pages. High on the list stands the belief that
'bombers could defend themselves'; and that led to the total neglect of the possibility
that the capital ships of the air would, like those of the sea, have to be escorted if
the purposes of their missions were to be fulfilled. Next, operational difficulties
were greatly underestimated, and the expected results were, in the authors' view,
'grossly exaggerated'. There was also a total failure to appreciate the importance
of navigation, or to recognise that cameras were essential to accurate target identification. Though not mentioned here it was a pity that the R.A.F. took no account
of Fleet Air Arm experience in navigation; for we had been training Observers in
that difficult art since 1921, and by the 1930s we possessed an invaluable cadre of
skilled and experienced men. Incidentally on the outbreak of war, and for the next
two years or so, they were repeatedly lent to Bomber Command to help in navigation
and ship recognition-a fact which might have received some acknowledgement
here. The consequence of the persistent belief that navigation was a simple matter,
and of all the errors in thinking and planning was, we are told, that in 1939 'Bomber
Command was not trained or equipped either to penetrate into enemy territory by
408
THE STRATEGIC AIR OFFENSIVE AGAINST GERMANY,
1939-45
day or to find its target areas, let alone its targets, by night'. I t is hardly surprising
that in such circumstances the first two years produced small results, and appalling
casualties.
The first pre-war dogma to be shattered by hard experience was that of the
'self-defending bomber force'. Yet two years later the need for fighter escorts was still
being disputed, and when the Americans restarted the daylight offensive in which
Bomber Command has been so severely repulsed, they had to relearn the same
lesson the hard way. The parallel with American rejection of our experience
regarding the effectiveness of the escort-of-convoy strategy in 1942 is striking.
Though the early attempts to attack the German fleet ended in a costly fiasco, and
it was also quickly revealed that Bomber Command 'could not carry out a strategic
offensive in daylight', the switch to night bombing for a long time produced no
better results. 'It took', we are told, 'more than two years to discover how to
drop these bombs on a target area as large as a big city'. The first plan was to
attack the German oil refineries-and it was only in the estimate that Germany
might suffer a critical shortage of oil that our assessments of the possible effect of
bombing came anywhere near the truth. The C.-in-C., Bomber Command foretold
'immense damage' to oil plants: but in fact it was negligible. In July, 1940, the
priority was altered to place the aircraft industry first, oil targets second, and communications third-but it was a very long time before bombing had any appreciable
effect on any of them. Gradually, and in direct contradiction of the views previously
expressed by Sir Charles Portal and Air Marshal Slessor, the idea of precision
attacks on selected targets was replaced by the proposal to adopt indiscriminate
bombing of German cities. By October, 1940, oil and 'morale' were the 'primary
objectives'; but no one ever succeeded in defining what was really meant by 'morale'
-or perhaps our leaders were reluctant to admit that it really meant an unrestricted
attack on the civilian population. 'Thus', write the historians, 'the fiction that the
bombers were attacking military objectives in the towns was officially abandoned'.
And Sir Charles Portal then foretold 'a quick death clinch'. Unfortunately once
again we greatly underestimated our enemy, and the belief that the Germans would
'not stand a quarter of the bombing that the British have shown they can take'
was as wide of the mark as all the other wishful thoughts on the effects of bombing.
Indeed for many months the acceptance that Bomber Command, having failed to
prove itself a 'rapier', could achieve its aim as 'a bludgeon' was shown to be totally
erroneous. The reason was 'the appalling inaccuracy' of night bombing, which was
first exposed in a report by Mr. Butt of the War Cabinet Secretariat in August,
1941. He showed that in all attacks only one-fifth of the bombers taking part in a
raid (or one-tenth if the attack was on the Ruhr area) was actually dropping its
bombs within five miles of the target. Yet there was widespread reluctance to accept
the figures, and aircrews were inclined to regard the installation of cameras to take
photographs at bomb release as carrying 'an official spy'. Yet in the following
month Portal suggested that, given 4,000 bombers, Germany could be broken in
six months. I n a very soberly worded minute Churchill replied that 'the effects
(of bombing), both moral and physical, are greatly exaggerated'. By the end of 1941
Bomber Command was 'at the nadir of its fortunes'. 'If it was to remain in the war',
we are told, 'it had no alternative but to fight in the dark'; but in the dark it was
hopelessly inaccurate. On February 22nd, 1942, Air Marshal Harris became
C.-in-C., and his drive and determination put new heart into a Command which
THE STRATEGIC AIR OFFENSIVE AGAINST GERMANY,
1939-45
409
sorely lacked success, and whose losses had been wholly disproportionate to its
achievements. Unfortunately there was a 'formidable legacy of previous neglect
(which) could not be overcome in a day', and 'a tendency not to look facts in the
face persisted'. None the less by the time Harris took over 'the limitations which
beset the night bomber' had been 'gradually and ruthlessly revealed'. The authors
hold that lack of cameras and the failure to realise the importance of Photographic
Reconnaissance were 'one of the gravest omissions by the Air Ministry in the
preparation for the bombing offensive'. Though many things continued to go wrong
in 1942, Bomber Command showed itself to be 'incomparably more effective' in
that year than in the preceding one. Yet we are told (somewhat contradictorily) that
'in reality the damage inflicted on Germany up to the end of 1942 . . . had but
little effect on her war production or on the morale of her population'.
At this point we may revert to Bomber Command's share in the Atlantic battle;
for 1942 was a crucial year at sea. The attacks on U-boat bases and submarine
building yards had been almost total failures, and the crying need then was for
long-range air escorts to work with our convoys. The authors say that Bomber
Command was 'regularly plundered' in the interests of other theatres (especially
the Middle East) and functions (by which they mean Coastal Command). They
protest against the Admiralty refusal to allow any Coastal Command aircraft to
take part in the first 'Thousand Bomber' raid on May 30th, 1942, without taking
any account of what was then happening at sea, and they dismiss in a footnote as
'tedious and irrelevant' any discussion of the crucial problem of the allocation of
long-range reconnaissance-bombers to the Atlantic struggle. As, however, we are
told that in January, 1943, the average daily availability of Lancasters in Bomber
Command was no less than 178, the impartial reader may well feel that the dozen
or two which might have tipped the scales in the Atlantic, and saved us enormous
losses, could well have been spared. Not long ago a distinguished airman wrote
to this reviewer that Roy Chadwick, the famous Avro designer, had told him in
1941 that he had plans for a Coastal Command version of the Lancaster. 'Bomber
Command', said Chadwick, 'would never miss a dozen of those from their intake,
and they could close the gap in which we cannot provide cover for the Atlantic
convoys'. 'But', wrote my correspondent, 'our Cinderella Command could never
acquire sufficient priority to get them. I have always considered that with those
aircraft in operation from both sides of the ocean we could have won the battle of
the Atlantic twelve or eighteen months earlier, with incalculable benefit to our
war potential in other directions'. So much for the 'plundering' of Bomber Command. Actually the squadrons loaned by it were generally manned by crews under
training, or by those not considered advanced enough to bomb German towns.
The new directive to Bomber Command of February 14th, 1942, named 'the morale
of the civil population, especially industrial workers' as the primary objective, and
by the autumn of that year 'the policy of general area attack reigned supreme'. On
March 3rd, 1942, the bombers at last scored 'an outstanding success' against the
Renault works at Billancourt near Paris; but it is admitted that the conditions were
on that occasion exceptionally favourable. Many pages later we learn that 6.73 per
cent of the factory buildings were destroyed or severely damaged, that about 2,000
trucks were lost, and that four months after the raid 'production was higher than
before'. So much for the 'outstanding success'. In March and April Liibeck and
Rostock were heavily raided in 'two brilliant feats' which burnt the medieval towns
41°
THE STRATEGIC AIR OFFENSIVE AGAINST GERMANY,
1939-45
but accomplished little else. Rostock was chosen by Harris because it was 'built
more like a fire-lighter than a human habitation'. At Lubeck 312 people were killed
and 1,425 houses destroyed. The raid on Rostock (where the Heinkel factory
suffered some damage) is described as 'another great victory'. Then came the
Thousand Bomber raid on Cologne on May 30th; undoubtedly a remarkable feat
of planning and organisation. Forty bombers were lost, 474 Germans were killed,
and 3,330 houses were destroyed, and over 40,000 people were temporarily rendered
homeless. This is described as 'an amazing success' and 'a major victory'; which
provokes the question 'victory over what ?' The next two 'Thousand ~ o m b e rraids
'
(on Essen and Bremen) 'went largely astray'; and in the attack on Bremen the
docks were undamaged and forty-four bombers were lost. Obviously the navigation
of the aircrews and the accuracy of bomb-aiming still left much to- be desired. In
August, 1942, the Pathfinder force, to which Harris had expressed himself as
'decisively and adamantly opposed', was formed-thanks to an intervention by Portal;
and this, together with the increasing use of the new radar and radio aids (Gee,
H2S and Oboe) at last held ~romiseof better results to come.
Also in 1942'a reversion to 'precision' attacks in daylight by comparatively small
forces of Lancasters was tried-against Eindhoven, Augsburg, Danzig and Le
Creusot, all of which contained especially important factories. The short-range
Eindhoven operation was a success, but the longer-range attacks were shown to
be 'not a feasible proposition of war'. At Augsburg seven out of twelve Lancasters
were lost, and at Danzig the submarine yards suffered no damage. Throughout
the year all our estimates of the effects of bombing on Germany's economy and
war production were 'the exact reverse of the real situation'. Production actually
increased by 50 per cent, and total production was 80 per cent above 1941. By
June, 1942, Rostock, Lubeck and Bremen, which Harris had claimed to have
'destroyed' a few weeks earlier, were 'in full production' and Cologne was 'rapidly
recovering'. The actual loss of production was under 1 per cent in 1942, German
'morale' had not been affected, and 'the claim that Bomber Command could do
more to help the battle of the Atlantic by bombing submarine construction yards
than the ports from which they set out was not substantiated'. Exactly. But was
air convoy escorts, and not attacks on yards or ports of exit, that were really needed
to help master the U-boats.
One must admire the forthright manner in which the authors have set out their
conclusions, and the trenchant style of this work. For example, in March, 1941,
Sir Charles Portal told the C.-in-C., Bomber Command that 'a very high proportion of bomber effort will inevitably be required to pull the Admiralty out of the
mess they have got intoy-rather an odd remark by the C.A.S., observing that it
was in that very month that our surface escorts scored their first outstanding success
and eliminated the three most famous U-boat aces. 'It was in effect', comment the
historians, 'the Admiralty which had got the Air Ministry out of the "mess", for
if Bomber Command had, at this stage, been left free to carry out the oil plan it
would probably have done a great deal more damage to its prestige than to its
targets'.
Though the volume contains much excellent writing, and is obviously the result
of exhaustive research, there is in it a lot of repetition (possibly the result of two
writers being engaged on it), and this reviewer found the chronology exceedingly
difficult to follow-for the reader is constantly taken back to periods and events
411
BRITAIN I N WORLD AFFAIRS
about which he has already read. Why, for example, are the actual results of the
1942 raids, which are recounted on pages 392-3 and 403-8, not given until the last
chapter ? There are a few errors. For example, on p. 320 two, not three German
battle-cruisers were in Brest in 1941; and it is certainly not true to say (p. 269)
that 'few people except journalists ventured to advise the Army and Navy on how
to conduct the war'. The Admiralty had to form a special section to handle proposals
received from outside the Service!
The historians wisely leave it to the reader to arrive at his own broad conclusions
regarding the period. To this reviewer the volume constitutes a striking indictment of the 'separate offensive strategy' concept, and provides the strongest
possible vindication of our organisation for the higher conduct of the war by joint
Service committees-with a view to framing and executing a truly combined strategy.
In the end we accomplished precisely that-in large measure thanks to Churchill,
and to the statesmanlike attitude of his Service advisers. But it is hard not to feel
that the appalling tale of error and of waste here recorded must have delayed the
day when we could turn to a truly combined offensive of all arms.
S.W.R.
Editor's Note: Volumes 11, I11 and 1V of The Strategic Air Offensive against Germaszy
will be reviewed in the next edition.
BRITAIN I N WORLD AFFAIRS
A SURVEY OF THE FLUCTUATIONS IN BRITISH POWER AND INFLUENCE:
HENRY VIII TO ELIZABETH I1
By LORDSTRANG,
G.C.B., G.C.M.G., 1i.B.E.
(Faber and Faber and Andre Deutsch.
30s.)
HEREare the reflections of a distinguished servant of the Foreign Office on the
flowing and ebbing of our country's standing in the world, and on the predicaments
which have successively faced our statesmen.
Lord Strang was born in 1893. He served in the 1914-18 war with the Worcestershire Regiment and later at Divisional H.Q. He joined the Foreign Office in 1919,
rose to Permanent Under-Secretary in 1949, and retired in 1953. He had service
abroad in Moscow and in Germany, and I think was one of those attending on the
Peace Conference of 1919.
Of his subtitle Lord Strang says: 'Power is here taken to mean the capacity to
coerce. . . . Influence is the capacity to persuade, based in some measure . . upon
the possession of power. Together, they mean the capacity of a government to
get its own way in international affairs. . . . Political sagacity and the exercise of
diplomacy, the skill of manoeuvre, have a great part to play'.
Lord Strang's summing-up, much abbreviated here, follows below:Looked at in retrospect, British foreign policy may seem to be characterised
by alternation rather than by continuity. But the continuity lies in the objective
while the alternation arises from the method.
.
412
BRITAIN I N WORLD AFFAIRS
Under Elizabeth I, England was a relatively weak state in a strong strategic
position, forced to fight, chiefly by sea, first to avoid subjugation and then for
security. Under the early Stuarts England was more secure than before and
could be in or out of war as she chose, and she kept out of the Thirty Years
War. The Protectorate was secure, but aggressive, and there comes one of the
turning points in our foreign policy, to mercantilism. (Mercantilism, as
opposed to free trade, is the use of the power of the state to stimulate exports.)
William and Anne had to meet a great peril from France, and did so successfully by promoting coalitions and by engaging in land operations. Under
Walpole, England could again be in or out of war as she chose, and for the
most part she kept out. Under Chatham, England, now a world power, was
aggressively bent on expansion overseas in the interest of trade.
After this, a descent from the pinnacle, when Great Britain had to face a
great continental coalition, frustrated by Rodney's victory. The peril from
France under Napoleon was met as before. Then came a second turning
point in our foreign policy, associated with Castlereagh-international consultation for the maintenance of peace, and concern for the general as we11
as for the national interest. Under Canning and Palmerston Great Britain
could ride high upon the crest of power and prestige, and she remained secure,
though not always unperturbed, till near the end of the century. Then came a
fourth turning point, with the new peril from Germany, a return from isolation,
and the sketching out of the Triple Entente. Between the two wars, a deceptive
and dangerous lull, with more reliance than was prudent upon an ineffective
system of collective security. Great Britain was not now free to go in or out
of war as she chose; the decision lay with Germany. Then, at mid-century,
a fifth turning point, Great Britain, with like-minded states in western Europe,
stretching out hands across the Atlantic in a bond of mutual assistance for
common security.
The special quality of Lord Strang's survey can best be shown by a few
quotations :'It is a mistake in foreign affairs to frame a policy closely upon a distant prognosis,
or, in time of trouble, to throw up the sponge too soon, as Foreign Secretaries are
so often urged to do by people to whom future trends in the international situation
can present themselves with a certainty and a clarity which may be belied by the
wayward, accidental or recalcitrant course of events themselves. The apparently
inevitable does not always occur. If not accepted, it sometimes does not happen.
It may well be a good maxim in politics to guess what is going to happen, and back
it. But the possibility or even the probability that a thing may happen some time
is no good reason for behaving as though it was certain to happen tomorrow. The
better course is to bide your time and be ready for it, if it does happen'.
'It is useful for a statesman to declare the general objectives of his policy in
concrete terms. . . . It is much less useful if general policies are laid down not
in concrete form but in terms of moral concepts. This Gladstone was prone to do,
as was his disciple Woodrow Wilson after him. For both of them the compulsions
of international life too often ran counter to moral aspirations'.
'Here, in our situation in late 1940, was a divorce between power and influence.
Our effective military power, apart from the Navy, was small. We were on the verge
of financial collapse. But we stood as an inspiration to men of free mind throughout
the world. The exiled governments of Europe were established among us. The
voice of London day by day, gave encouragement to resistance and hope of victory.
The Commonwealth sustained us.'
'If we cannot now defend our interests abroad as effectively as we once could,
this is not simply or even mainly due to lack of power, but to the way in which
the world is organised and the way in which the world behaves. If we were a good
deal more powerful than we now are, we should not be in a much better position
in this respect unless we threw aside all scruple and took the law by force into
our own hands, where our power was sufficient for the purpose. This is not a thing
we could easily do, because it has for long been, and still is, a British interest that
in the world at large international law should be respected and international
obligations observed'.
Lord Strang's reflections are what one would expect from a good Foreign Office
hand. They give both sides of each case for the reader's consideration, not without
guidance from the writer's personal conclusions.
Throughout the book he shows himself as fully conscious of the dominating
influence of Sea Power as Mahan or as the authors of the Preamble to the Articles
of War. British power and influence rose and fell with the world's respect for the
prowess of the Royal Navy and the conduct and skill of the men who followed the
sea.
A.H.T.
OUR TIMES, 1900-1960
By SIR STEPHEN
KING-HALL
(Faber and Faber.
28s.)
THEauthor, in the prelude to this book, says: 'The period 1900-1960 is remarkable
for the great changes which have occurred in the story of mankind and for the rapidity
with which they have taken place.' T o the reviewer, on first gIancing through the
book, what strikes him as remarkable is the amount of interesting matter covered
in its 342 pages. But Commander King-Hall, the author of many books, has a
crispness of expression which saves a lot of words. This crispness too, enhances
the reader's interest in new angles of approach to old subjects.
The book starts with a glance over the shoulder at early western civilization
which, in so far as Britain was concerned, led to her rise as a sea power and ultimately
to the Pax Britannica which, to quote the author, 'left her in a position of undisputed
power, the like of which had never been seen before and is never likely to be seen
again'. He also says that it would have been a stupendous act of world statesmanship had we worked to transform the Pax Britannica into a World Commonwealth
of Nations. But, as he says, 'such an idea would not at the time have found support
from other great powers'. Is it not possible, some of us might say, that if Britain
and the big Commonwealth countries work up their common sea power and design
better arrangements for inter-emigration and immigration, the Commonwealth as
a whole might, in time, be a great factor in bringing about a Pax Mundi?
4I4
SALERNO AND ANZIO
Next we come to a series of chapters leading up to World War I-'The War to
end Wary-the setting of the stage for the great conflict. Then a critical review
of the more important events in that war. This is followed by an exposition of
the post-war situation, a situation which soon showed the most confirmed optimists
that the world had not done with war. The rise of Communist Russia, for instance,
was not exactly a harbinger of peace. The war, as we know, had stirred up new
troubles and dangers. All these are set down. The panorama is clear and well lit.
The second half of the book deals with the late war and the situation up to date.
The most controversial subject discussed deals with defence in the nuclear age, a
subject on which the author has already written two books. He holds that Great
Britain, preferably with like-minded nations but if necessary alone, should renounce
the use of nuclear energy for military purposes. Though many will doubtless disagree
strongly with this particular policy they will probably agree with the author in many
of his reflections on strategy and politics; and having read his book, will go away
refreshed.
G. C. DICKENS
SALERNO
By HUGHPOND
(Kimber.
30s.)
ANZIO
By WYNFORD
VAUGHAN-THOMAS
(Longmans.
30s.)
THEfirst of these books deals with the combined operation by which the Allies
entered the Italian mainland on September 9th, 1943, and the second tells the
story of the assault from the sea by which, in January, 1944, we hoped to break
the stalemate onthe Gustav Line, to save the Fifth and Eighth Armies from further
costly frontal attacks, and to capture Rome. It was in the Salerno undertaking
(Operation 'Avalanche') that we first encountered first-class German troops installed
in carefully prepared posirions, and in Major Pond's opinion the B.B.C. broadcast
announcing the Italian armistice, which was received during the actual approach
to the assault area, produced a feeling of complacency among the troops which
vitiated their preparedness to face what was to prove a very stern test. In spite of a
number of errors, and a good deal of confusion, the assault forces got ashore successfully. But the beachhead was still very shallow when the Germans counter-attacked
in strength, and threatened to divide the British and American Army Corps. It
was at this time of crisis (September 13th) that General Mark Clark, the Fifth
Army Commander, ordered plans to be prepared to withdraw either the British
or the American Corps and to land the re-embarked troops through the other Corpsy
sector-a proposal which Commodore G. N. Oliver, who was in command of the
northern (British) assault force, at once pronounced impossible of accomplishment,
SALERNO AND ANZIO
4I5
and certain to lead to utter disaster. What is most astonishing is, as Major Pond
says, that General Clark failed to inform either of his Corps Commanders of this
plan. Indeed General McCreery, Commander of X Corps, first heard about it
from Commodore Oliver, and at once took energetic steps to convince General
Clark of the futility of the idea. A signal was despatched to Admiral Cunningham,
the Naval Commander-in-Chief, who sent cruisers to embark more troops in North
Africa and rushed up the battleships Warspite and Valiant to strengthen the naval
gun support. Major Pond gives a vivid picture of the arrival of the battleships
and of the effectiveness of their 15-inch salvos. 'This was naval gunnery at its
best', he writes; and his final conclusion is that 'above all it was naval shelling that
was causing the enemy dismay. Wherever they moved, wherever they fired from,
they were certain to get in return a salvo from the ships' guns'. As he writes mainly
from the soldiers' angle his tribute (which is actually well authenticated elsewhere)
may be accepted without reserve.
Though all ended happily, and on October 1st British troops entered Naples,
the lessons of the operation are plain. Apart from the effects of the B.B.C. broadcast, already mentioned, Major Pond holds that American lack of enthusiasm for
the Italian campaign as a whole was a major contributory cause to the near failure.
General Clark himself emerges as a somewhat ambiguous character. Though his
personal bravery is beyond doubt, his experience was not adequate to the command
of such a critical undertaking; and his vanity certainly did not commend itself to
many on the British side. General Montgomery, the author considers, could have
helped the Fifth Army far earlier, and perhaps have forestalled the crisis altogether,
had his Eighth Army pressed northwards at full speed after landing unopposed at
Reggio on September 3rd; and one must admit that the lapse of thirteen days before
contact was made with the assault forces landed from the sea does suggest that the
Eighth Army's progress towards the scene of such bitter fighting was astonishingly
leisurely. Major Pond tells how the war correspondents actually went ahead of the
troops, telephoning the villages to discover whether the enemy had departed! I t
is interesting to find in this account of an undertaking in which a great deal did not
go according to plan (including a mutiny by a large number of Eighth Army men
who were brought by sea to the Fifth Army's front) that he has nothing but praise
for the manner in which the Navy and the Royal Marine Commandos carried out
their tasks. One criticism of his work only comes to mind: he does not mention
that the troubles in the American sector arose largely from the inadequate training
of officers and men. The best troops were still in Sicily when VI Corps ran into
such serious trouble.
The planning of the assault at Anzio (Operation 'Shingle') was bedevilled by the
same basic difficulties that had beset the Salerno landing-namely shortage of landing
ships and craft, due fundamentally to the priority given by the Americans to the
Pacific war, to preparations for the Normandy invasion, and to disagreements
in the high command. Mr. Vaughan-Thomas sets his stage with a very clear account
of the reasons why the assault could not be made by more than two divisions,
and he makes plain that the chief responsibility for the decision to accept the risks
and go ahead lay with Mr. Churchill. Yet the gamble came off, complete surprise
was achieved, and when the troops got ashore on January 22nd, 1944, there was
very little to prevent them at once seizing their main objectives in the Alban hills,
or even driving straight into Rome. Unfortunately the American General Lucas,
416
GREEK TRAGEDY '41
who was in command of the assault forces, seems to have been infected by deep
pessimism right from the beginning: he totally failed to seize the opportunity, the
soldiers merely dug in and awaited the inevitable counter-attack, the beachhead
was soon contained, and four months of bitter fighting followed before the junction
of the forces landed from the sea with those coming up from the south took place.
It is impossible not to feel that the assault at Anzio was one of the most imaginative
conceptions of the war; and that the failure to accomplish its initial purpose was a
tragedy of lost opportunities. If the soldiers were not prepared to accept the risks
inherent in landing only two divisions there could be no possible point in launching
the undertaking. But once the high command had decided to go ahead, the need for
vigour and resolution should have been obvious. The parallel to the great chance
lost when our landing in Suvla Bay in 1915, behind the enemy lines on Cape Helles,
achieved complete surprise but was not exploited, is uncomfortably exact-as indeed
Admiral Sir John Cunningham, the Naval C.-in-C., pointed out at the time in a
letter to the First Sea Lord.
Both these books, if they contain rather a lot of military detail, deserve wide
study for the basic lessons they contain. They are the same as were driven home
by the scores of combined operations in which British forces have been engaged
since the sixteenth century. Firstly that complete unity of purpose in the high
command and vigour and resolution in execution are essential to success; secondly,
that a high degree of individual and collective training of all the many units taking
part is required; thirdly, that surprise can bring unlooked-for opportunities, which
must be seized with both hands; and, lastly, that naval fire support is an essential
ingredient-until the Army's heavy artillery is got ashore. But, in fact, history
contains abundant examples of those needs, and Sir Herbert Richmond had summarised them all during the war in a Historical Association pamphlet (No. 119,
published in 1941). It does seem tragic that the same mistakes are so often repeated,
and at such a heavy cost. Major Pond and Mr. Vaughan-Thomas have done well
to remind us of them in these well-constructed and highly readable books; but
they do leave a big question hanging in the mind. Are these lessons really understood
and appreciated today ?
MEMOR
GREEK TRAGEDY '41
By ANTHONY
HECKSTALL-SMITH
and Vice-Admiral BAILLIE-GROHMAN
(Anthony Blond.
25s.)
AT the time of the Italian invasion of Albania in 1939 the British Government,
under Mr. Chamberlain, had made promises to Greece, then governed by the
dictatorship of General Metaxas, to go to her aid in the event of an Italian aggression.
By August, 1940, however, the balance of power in Europe was very different,
with Great Britain fighting virtually alone except for the Commonwealth. An
enquiry by Metaxas in that month, as to what help Greece could expect from Great
Britain under her guarantee, if his country was invaded by Italy, therefore placed
the War Cabinet and the Chiefs of Staff in a very unenviable position. On the
GREEK TRAGEDY '41
4I7
one hand, to renounce their obligations would be morally wrong; we had given
our word and we could not go back on it. On the other hand, in Egypt and the
Middle East General Wave11 with a small force of some fifty thousand was outnumbered by five to one by Marshal Graziani's army massed in Libya for an assault
on the Nile Delta and the Suez Canal, and it was short of all the materials and
sinews of war which had to be brought out round the Cape of Good Hope. If Egypt
were to be lost, any aid sent to Greece would have been in vain. Italy in fact invaded
Greece on October 28th, 1940, and was held by the Greeks who fought valiantly.
This book recounts how Britain and the Commonwealth, stretched to the limit in
all parts of the world, honoured their agreement after much political ambiguity
and duplicity in Greece. In response to a direct appeal from Greece, British forces
began to arrive at Piraeus on March 21st, 1941. Highly mechanised and fully
equipped German forces under Field Marshal Von List came quickly to the support
of Italy and entered Greece on April 6th, 1941. Before many of the British forces
could even arrive, it was evident to Admiral Cunningham, though not to G.H.Q.,
Middle East, that an early evacuation might be necessary, and accordingly Operation
'Demon', the evacuation of British forces, was planned.
Baillie-Grohman, then a Rear-Admiral, was the Naval Commander of this operation,
and here he tells the whole tragic story in conjunction with Mr. Heckstall-Smith,
who was in command of a tank landing craft at the time and saw the operation
from another angle.
It is a story of a combination of heroism and muddle and superb improvisation,
interspersed with occasional episodes which do no credit to individuals or a Service.
The political and strategical arguments as to whether forces should ever have been
sent to Greece are well set forth-and without prejudice. The actual events as
they took place, in Piraeus and other Greek ports during the evacuation, are
described in detail and do much to supplement the very clear outline account in
Captain Roskill's 'The War at Sea', Volume I.
The authors have some trenchant remarks on certain aspects of the events which
they describe, both on a high level and a more practical level, of which the following
are examples :'wave11 was our greatest Army Commander in the war. Now, his name is
in danger of being forgotten and his brilliance obscured by the fog of acrimonious and ill-mannered arguments over the merits of the Generals who
succeeded him in the Middle East'.
And again :'We were beaten in Greece for the same reason we were beaten in France
and Norway. Because our pre-war policy of appeasement had left us totally
unprepared for war, while, when the war began, our policy was to concentrate
on the production of bombers rather than fighters'.
Of international co-operation the authors say:'However, from the moment we landed at Piraeus we were at a fearful
disadvantage because of the language question. . . . It is a deplorable fact
that our senior officers were so tongue-tied as to be entirely dependent upon
interpreters, and few of their subordinates were any better linguists.. . . It is
to be hoped that in future the officers of our Services will have more than a
smattering of, say, Russian or even Mandarin Chinese as well as of some
language common to all those serving in the forces of the United Nations'
418
MEN I N UNIFORM
In a final summing up:'Operation "Demon" and the campaign in Greece are now history. Like
"Dynamo" at Dunkirk, "Demon" was made necessary by the defeat of the
Allied armies by the Germans'.
Cunningham, in his despatch to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty
written on December llth, 1941, referred to 'Demon' as a 'melancholy operation
nobly shouldered'. At that time, and viewed in its right perspective in relation
to what had happened to our Expeditionary Forces in France and Norway, the
Commander-in-Chief's words were just. Nevertheless Cunningham claimed it to
be an episode to which the Merchant Service could look back with pride.
Captain Roskill's summary in 'The War at Sea', by comparison, says:'. . . It is perhaps in these records that the purpose and justification of all
that was endured by the Maritime Services at this time is to be found. Admiral
Cunningham well knew what was required when he gave his clarion call to
the Fleet that "we must not let the Army down". That summons, and, perhaps,
a deep instinctive understanding of the issues involved and the tradition to be
maintained, must surely have been the inspiration which brought the Mediterranean Fleet, scarred but triumphant, through its supreme ordeal'.
The book is provided with a good map, some excellent illustrations, and gives
a vivid picture of the human sufferings and hardships endured in this chaotic
campaign.
G.A.F.
MEN I N UNIFORM
MILITARY MANPOWER IN MODERN INDUSTRIAL SOCIETIES
By M. R. D. FOOT
(Published for the Institute For Strategic Studies
by Weidenfeld & Nicolson. 21s.)
This book is the third in a series of studies in International Security sponsored by
the Institute For Strategic Studies, but the book is written by Mr. Foot, who
brings much insight as well as practical experience to this crucial and rather baffling
problem. The author was a scholar of Winchester and New College, Oxford. In
the war he served at C.O.H.Q. and as a parachutist, and was wounded and decorated.
He has taught history and politics at Oxford and is now engaged in historical
research.
The book examines the various methods that modern industrial States adopt
to man their armed forces, and compares the possible systems; volunteer, conscript,
citizen militia and a mixture of all three. Mr. Foot describes the advantages and
disadvantages of each method and relates them to the historic and economic background of each country employing particular methods.
He produces some most useful statistics, perhaps for the first time, showing
many comparative figures for some thirty countries, including rates of pay, length
of service, proportion of the population in uniform, and so on.
MEN IN UNIFORM
4I9
It might surprise the more naive, if there be any, who believe that Russian
Communism is synonymous with Egalitarianism to learn that the pay differential
between a Russian General and a Private is 115 to 1, the similar figure in the British
service being 204 to 1, and in the United States 15 to 1.
It is fascinating to read that the average annual cost per head of a Canadian
fighting man is in the ratio of 4223, expressed in terms of U.S. dollars, compared
to 89 for a Turk. Intermediate figures include the Briton at 1503.
The chapter on the United Kingdom problem is naturally of the greatest interest
at the time when Conscription is about to end and where it is the hope that all
Services can once more be filled to quota by voluntary recruitment. On this theme
Mr. Foot says:'For all the ancient traditions of the armed services of the Crown, they are
now embarked on a new voyage that is set about with perils. As was said earlier,
the dropping of compulsory National Service is a gamble; the odds are no doubt
in favour of success, but success is no certainty. It is of particular importance
that the Services should keep open minds about whether the gamble comes off,
and should be prepared to change to some other system-in good enough time.
The butter of forces in being is going to be spread exceedingly thin over some
parts of the bread of British commitments in the coming few years. Too thin a
spread produces severe overstrain for regular forces, lowers their morale and
hence their fighting quality, and must be avoided. Nor will the nation be really
secure if the forces available can only deal with a single emergency at a time.
If there turn out not to be enough men in uniform for safety, then the Chiefs of
Staff must persuade the Government, and the Government must persuade the
public, to accept some form of compulsion again. It is important that if a change
along these lines turns out to be needed, it should be made before an avoidable
national humiliation persuades the public of the need for it, and not after. The
present policy of Government spokesmen on this subject in Parliament can only
be described as prevaricating. They seem to forget the old saw that honesty
is the best policy, and to be reluctant to admit that they may have made a mistake.
No one now can know whether their decision was a right one, it would be straightforward to say so, and to trust the public by telling it the truth'.
This book will be read by those who have any responsibility for our defence;
and especially by senior officers, politicians and civil servants who can influence
policy. At the moment of writing, the national unemployment rate is averaging
only 1.2 per cent of all men and women over the age of 15. Incidentally the
frontispiece of the Naval War Manual is a picture of a splendid looking Petty Officer
beneath which is the inscription 'The most important single factor in war'.
G.A.F.
COMMAND T H E FAR SEAS
By KEITHMIDDLEMASS
(Hutchinson.
25s.)
THERE
seems recently to have been a renewed interest in the Kaiser's war, mainly
among writers of the rising generation, and in this book an author in his twenties
retells the story of the German cruisers that were at large in August, 1914, and our
widespread endeavours to keep them in check. The subject is certainly a dramatic
one. Though only four months elapsed before all these cruisers were virtually
eliminated they were stirring times, both for the participants and for an anxious
Admiralty with no concrete experience of trade protection under steam. The
problems involved had been studied during the previous thirty years or more, but
many factors were difficult to assess, particularly how long a steam warship could
be expected to remain at large if she succeeded in refuelling from captured colliers.
It was assumed that military transports must be escorted, but to convoy trade was
thought impracticable without an unacceptable dislocation of our world-wide
commerce; and to this objection was added an unjustified mistrust of the ability
of tramp steamers to sail in company. If, however, the focal areas of the trade
routes were held in strength and care was taken to vary the tracks of ships between
these areas, losses should be few. There was also a hope, far less justifiable, that it
would be possible to hunt down the enemy cruisers, a specious phrase which bedevilled
the protection of the Indian Ocean trade against the Emden (destroyed eventually,
not by her hunters but by the escort of a passing troop convoy) and which sometimes
exercised its distracting influence even in the last war.
What happened when these matters were put to the test is told by Mr. Middlemass
from most of the available British and German sources. His account is an engrossing
one and on the human and strategical side it is well told. Full justice is done to the
participants and there are some lifelike portraits of several of the protagonists. The
most dramatic operations were, of course, those of the German China squadron:
its voyage across the Pacific to no clear outcome; the annihilation of Cradock's
armoured cruisers; and von Spee's unlucky decision to attack Port Stanley, leading
by chance to his fatal encounter with Sturdee's battle-cruisers. But the careers of
the other cruisers are also fully recounted: the Karlsruhe and Dresden and a few
armed merchant cruisers that joined them in the Atlantic; and the Emden and
Konigsberg in the Indian Ocean. And so too, though not part of the trade war, are
the operations of the Goeben and Breslau in the Mediterranean.
But if the strategic story is clear, this cannot be said of tactical matters. Unfortunately Mr. Middlemass has only a sketchy knowledge of the naval background
and is woefully ignorant of rudimentary technical matters. This makes many of
his remarks and his accounts of battles hard to understand. For example, a
prefatory remark that the German 4-1-inch guns outranged our 6-inch and were
nearly as destructive is shown to be wrong in his account of the Sydney-Emden
action. They did in fact outrange our 6-inch on the older mountings, but to equate
their 35 lb. shell with the 100 lb. of the 6-inch does not make sense. T o go further
and aver that their 8.9s (a misprint for 8-2) were up to our 12-inch (250 lb. against
850 lb.) is hardly pardonable. On that valuation the Falklands battle would have
been a contest between equals. To say that common shell were filled with cordite
COMMAND THE FAR SEAS
42 I
is perhaps an excusable, if unnecessary, error. But when it seems that he does
not know the difference between an engine room and a boiler room, and this leads
to such a flight of fancy as:
'. . (The Cornwall's) engine room seemed like a mediaeval picture of hell with
every stoker feeding the boilers till they were heated far beyond their capacity,
while the engines throbbed unmercifully under their feet . . .'
one can hardly take any of his descriptions seriously. In addition, misprints and
slips abound. Twice in the text and once under a photograph Winston Churchill
is the First Sea Lord. The Invincible's boiler brickwork becomes her brick boilers.
Casemates are casements throughout. The U.S.S. Monitor of Hampton Roads'
fame becomes the Minotaur. The County class armoured cruisers are called light
cruisers. 'Three miles ahead on the port beam' is difficult to understand. 'Since
Tudor days the tradition of the Navy had been that a British warship sank rather
than surrendered' is not true of our renowned wars of the eighteenth century. The
battle fleet went to Scapa Flow, not Cromarty, at the end of July, 1914, and Jellicoe
did not become C.-in-C. until August 4th. And so on and so on.
These are not matters of great importance, but there is one error that might pass
unnoticed which affects the escape of the Goeben on August 7th and the question
whether the First Cruiser Squadron could have brought her to successful action
if Troubridge had stood on. In general the Goeben and Breslau story is well told
here, with balanced and generous judgements. But it is stated that, from 10.40 p.m.
on August 6th to the afternoon of August 7th the Goeben 'made a speed of 27/28
knots'. In fact she averaged 17 knots during that period. (The author does not
include the relevant volume of the German official history in his bibliography, but
it should have been obvious that the Gloucester could not have kept touch at 27 knots.)
Because of boiler defects the Goeben had been extensively re-tubed at Pola in July but,
despite this, her full-power escape from the Invincible and Indomitable on August
4th had started more trouble, and with tubes constantly giving out it is doubtful
if she could now have done more than 20 knots. If that was so. the justifiable fear
that the First Cruiser Squadron would be picked off piecemeal at loni range would
have been disposed of, and they might have been able to close, though slowly, to
a range at which their more numerous 9-2s and 7-5s might possibly have been a
match for her 11-inch. Troubridge could not have known this, but it is one of the
'might-have-beens' of history; for it is said that when he turned-in that night he
had determined to accept the risks of a daylight battle if he failed to intercept the
enemy before dawn, but that, in the middle watch, his Flag Captain woke him
and persuaded him that to do so would not only be dead against his orders but
clearly unsound-which in the light of existing knowledge it would have been. And
so he reluctantly turned back. Despite, therefore, what might conceivably have
been a favourable outcome, Mr. Middlemass's judgement that 'Troubridge was no
coward, but a man of too great caution and too little initiative for this moment of
crisis' seems unduly harsh-on an officer whose subsequent activities with the Serbian
army were a shining example of courage and leadership.
That the events of the First World War should now be reviewed by writers to
whom they must seem old-time history is much to be welcomed, and it is to be
hoped that Mr. Middlemass will try his hand at some further aspects of that struggle.
But it would be to the good if he could cultivate a sounder knowledge of naval affairs
before chancing his arm as hazardously as he has done here.
J.C.
.
GREAT SEAMEN
By OLIVERWARNER
(Bell.
16s.)
'Seamanship is the art of managing a boat, a ship, or a fleet in open water. It is
exercised in peace and war, in storm and calm, in trading and discovery; and
because under most circumstances, it cannot be practised alone, it implies leadership'. In these words the author defines the quality that he sets out to demonstrate.
He has picked out ten British seamen, starting with Drake and ending with
Cunningham, and devoted a chapter to each, in which he gives a brief account of
their lives and times, paying particular attention to their most famous exploits.
The author abides by his definition of seamanship by not only including the
great battle-winning Admirals such as Hawke, Howe and Nelson and the circumnavigators Drake, Anson and Cooke, but also Captain Kane for his magnificent
shiphandling during the hurricane at Samoa and Shackleton whose epic boat
journey is surely unrivalled.
He has avoided the mistake of over-dramatising his account or of over-praising
its heroes; he writes with masterly simplicitly and although there is nothing in
this book that has not been said before and in much greater detail by others, it
is a story that cannot be written or read too often as long as Britain is interested
in trying to produce Great Seamen.
D.B.M.
BLACKWOOD'S MAGAZINE
September, 1961
(William Blackwood and Son.
2s. 6d.)
WHILEit is not usual to review magazines in THE NAVAL REVIEW, the appearance
of an article by a senior and distinguished naval officer, whose nom de plume ('Blake')
members will recognise, in the current edition of 'Blackwood's', seems a sufficient
pretext for departing from precedent; and, anyway, 'Maga' is in a class by itself.
In the article entitled 'The Modern Navy', the author sets out to discuss the
required 'shape and size' of the Navy in order that it may be able to fulfd its present
and foreseen tasks. If it had no other claim to attention it would be unique in the
fact that that fatuous abstraction, beloved of StafFColleges, 'Sea Communications', is
not mentioned. Perhaps this is because the author knows, perhaps better than
any other officer now on the active list, that what the Navy has to try to defend in
war is no abstraction but merchant seamen, living flesh and blood, 'living' ships
and their priceless cargoes.
The conclusions seem worth quoting: 'The Navy's size and shape must be dictated
mainly by the need to fight limited wars. But both the aircraft and the ships must
be capable of taking their place alongside our allies in a global nuclear war if it
should come. They must therefore be designed to compete with the most advanced
weapons, and as a result they will be both complex and expensive. Quality must
not be sacrificed for quantity. The wide range of possible threats in a limited war
makes it necessary, in addition, to prepare both for "sophisticated" and "unsophisticated" attacks. Thus the Navy must keep all techniques of warfare available and must keep them well exercised. In particular, minesweepers are needed
which can make ocean passages and operate on their own for reasonable periods.
Modern amphibious ships and craft are required and aircraft are needed to support
military operations ashore'.
'As for numbers, a full insurance policy would be unbearably expensive. But
surely a minimum policy would be to maintain east of Suez one strong task force,
kept constantly up to strength and ready for action and capable of escorting and
supporting a military expedition, and of keeping itself at sea for long periods away
from its main base. West of Suez the nucleus of such a task force is required in
order to fulfil our obligations to N.A.T.O., and it would be understood that in the
event of global war the ships east of Suez must return to the Atlantic'.
'It is clear that in the foreseeable future there will be need for aircraft carriers
in the Navy, though the advent of vertical take-off aircraft may eventually affect
their design. Commando carriers must be available, and to carry the number of
anti-submarine helicopters that will be required it may be more economical to
build comparatively small ships as "helicopter carriers".
'The Navy must take seriously the "Fleet train" concept. More tankers, store
and victualling ships, repair ships and mobile floating docks are required. Of these,
the replenishment ships must be capable of high speed. If the cost of this Fleet
train makes necessary a reduction in the number of combatant ships in the Navy,
the sacrifice must be accepted. For too long the potential mobility of the Navy
has been stressed, while little has been done to make such mobility genuinely
possible'.
'The critic may easily say, "This seems an old-fashioned plan. Surely you are
looking backwards instead of forwards. You are falling into the trap into which all
military men fall, of preparing to fight the last war".'
'If you believe, as I do, that the most probable war to be fought is a limited war
fought without nuclear weapons, then the plan is not so old-fashioned and not so
stupid. I believe that the most pressing danger facing our country and the West
as a whole is not the danger of nuclear destruction, but of insidious or overt gradual
encroachments which will end in an almost bloodless victory for the Communists
unless firm opposition is provided. I believe that the Navy can do much to help
provide that firm opposition'.
'But when it comes to considering the possibility of fighting global nuclear wars,
we must be realistic and remember that we can no longer "take on the world" at
sea. That is why we have allies in N.A.T.O., C.E.N.T.O. and S.E.A.T.O., and
why, in particular, it is vital, in the true sense of the word, to keep close, both i n
policy and in technical matters, with the United States of America'.
Your reviewer can but voice a heartfelt 'Hear, hear!'
G.M.
T H E EYE OF T H E WIND
(Hodder and Stoughton, London.
42s.)
'IT seems that I was serendipitous'. 1Mr. Scott has, as he confesses, a liking for
out-of-the-way words, for the nomenclature and specialised language (QuillerCouch would have called it 'jargon') of whatever activity is at the time engaging
his attention. Who among those of us who like messing about in boats would say
or write that 'the interplay of the main sheet and the tiller requires an extreme
exility of touch'? But it is good for us all to be driven to our dictionaries, and
being, I confess, so driven, I felt I had found in his use of the word 'serendipity' a
clue of some importance to this prolifically gifted person.
Coined in 1754 by Horace Walpole, from the old name of Ceylon-Serendipthe word was used to mean the faculty of making happy and unexpected discoveries
by accident. In his chapter 'The Lure of Serendipity', Scott says, 'I wanted things
to happen; I was not so much interested in the causes of their happening, nor in
the human conflicts and relationships which made them happen, but rather in the
effects of the happening on my day-to-day life. For me to be happy things had
to be happening, and in a curious way they seemed to happen all the time. It seems
that I was serendipitous.' It ought perhaps to be said that the 'by accident' of the
definition cannot strictly be applied to a man who has so consistently bent events
to be independent of accident, shaping them to his purposes and to his desires.
So many talents are proved, beyond doubt, in this fascinating book, to have been
subject to his mastery, that it seems well-nigh indecent that the dispenser of gifts
should at his birth have dealt so many trump-cards into the hand of the young
Peter. Small wonder that as he sits, his big book finished, looking through his huge
plate-glass window at Slimbridge upon his Wild Fowl Sanctuary, he concludes
&th the conviction which begins his Foreword-that he is without question the
luckiest and, as he believes, the happiest man he knows.
The reader searches for basic and unifying principles underlying Mr. Scott's
so varied interests and activities. These can perhaps be found in the artistry which
he inherited from his sculptor mother and the courage he had instinctively learnt
from his greatly courageous father. In the narrower sense his artistry has found
its outlet in his drawings and paintings; the line drawings and colour plates which
make 'The Eye of the Wind' so handsome a book give evidence of this. His paintings
of wildfowl have an acknowledged place in the affections of bird-lovers throughout
the world. But in the wider sense, his artistic perfectionism-and he is in all things
a perfectionist-is seen in all he has done, in his handling of boats, planes and
gliders, in his love of skating (he might in this have become a world champion), in
the creation of his Slimbridge Wildfowl Trust. In his wildfowling his joy was
surely-though not only-in the beauty of the bird on the wing, in the line and
colour of marsh and fen more than in the mere killing which he later coi~sciously
and conscientiously abandoned. In his sailing, the set i f the sails in all their beauty,
the play of light upon the waters, has entranced him; in his flying and gliding the
architecture of the clouds has delighted him-and from early boyhood he has loved
and been moved by the music of the great masters.
THE EYE OF THE WIND
4=5
With the courage he had learnt by emulation from his father he took the modesty
that is almost always characteristic of the brave man. He is ambitious, setting his
sights high, and he likes recognition, but he admits his mistakes and prints praise
and blame alike. Writing of his thoughts before the Dieppe raid, described with
great vividness as he saw it from his new S.G.B.9, he writes of leaving behind his
young and newly-wedded wife Jane: 'This (the raid) was the sort of operation I
had always wanted to take part in-something so different from the routine work
of the destroyers in the North Atlantic. . . . I t was a special party with its own
special dangers and I suddenly realised that I had got more to lose than I had had
before. I wondered how brave I was going to be now that I had personal responsibilities. . . . My courage, I realised, was not so robust that I could afford to undermine
it. Such things were not to be thought of in too much detail. One would be as
brave as the chemicals in one's body allowed. It was all a question of adrenaline
anyway'. His courage is manifest, and taken for granted, in the happenings related
in the thirty-five chapters (out of a total of ninety-three) covering his wartime
experiences in the Navy. His account of his entry into the Navy is not without
interest and humour. 'Since my father had linked me more strongly with the Navy
and my yachting experience had qualified me for the Royal Naval Volunteer Supplementary Reserve, this was where I had finally been enrolled at the beginning of
1939. The Supplementary Reserve was a special band composed largely of yachtsmen
who believed themselves to have an assured place in the wartime Navy from the
very beginning of hostilities. I was soon to discover that my impatience to start a
new life in the Navy was most unpopular with the authorities. When I wrote to
the Admiralty I had no reply for three weeks. . . . When an answer finally came
from Their Lordships, it was to inform me that I should on no account communicate with them again on the subject of being called up, that I was not wanted
now, and that it was even possible that I should not be wanted at all. About a
week later I was called up.' This to a man who had already twice won the Prince
of Wales Cup and was an Olympic bronze medallist in dinghy sailing, who was
to end the war as a Lieutenant-Commander mentioned three times in despatches,
M.B.E. and D.S.C. with Bar!
Those for whom these naval chapters of 'The Eye of the Wind' have most appeal
will follow with deep interest Mr. Scott's life and experiences for some two years
in H.M.S. Broke, and perhaps most of all the chapter on 'Fire at Sea', in which is
vividly told the story of the rescue work, at dead of night and in gale conditions.
from the blazing ex-liner of 15,000 tons, H.M.S. Cornorin, turned cruiser. This is
but one of a succession of enthralling episodes-at Dieppe, off and on the Cherbourg
Peninsula, the seven minesweepers in the Channel, and many more, all recounted
with a faithful and sincere pen. A famous E-boat Commander, Kapitan-Leutnant
'Charlie' Miiller, with whom, taken prisoner, Scott made friends, comes into these
chapters, bearing witness to the sincerity of Scott's writing. 'Charlie' had been
allowed to read the MS of his book on the work of the Coastal Forces in the Channel
and the North Sea. 'There are many scenes so well described that I-because I
had quite the same often only on the other side-thought I was once more in those
situations. The description of feelings during eventless patrols, sighting the enemy,
the moment when the torpedo slips away, the endlessness of time until the fish
hits his target or not, the sighting of phantoms afler a hard look-out for hours, the
eternal talking about the proceedings in the action after having got into harbour,
426
CORAL AND COLOUR OF GOLD
the daily life of the Senior Officer, etc., are particularly genuine. . . . You often
made life a hell for us'.
The half has not been told about this exciting book. Nothing has been said of the
great variety of interesting people with whom his 'happeningsy have brought him
into contact, from Queen Alexandra whom as a small boy he pushed forward by
the bustle with the exclamation, 'Now let's be a train . . . Chuff,
chuff, chuff, chuff,
chuff!' to his friends on the lower deck; nothing of his Oundle days or of his time
at Cambridge, where he took a foremost place among the roof climbers of his
college; nothing of his first exciting sallies into the world of flight during the war
to learn something of the problems of co-operation between R.A.F. and R.N.;
nothing of his important work on camouflage; nothing of the delicacy with which
he touches upon his married life; nothing of his hair-raising beginnings as a glider
pilot or of the way in which he has come right to the top in this domain; nothing
of his exploration of the Perry River area in the Canadian Arctic; nothing of his
experiences at 'The Hustings' at Wembley North; nothing of his rise to eminence
as a broadcaster and television personality; nothing of the 'bees' that buzzed from
time to time in his incubatory bonnet-and far too little about that by which he
will most surely be most remembered, his beloved Wildfowl Sanctuary at Slimbridge
and all that is therein. All these are woven into his story along with many a delicious
light touch which make the book a joy to read. The wind blows from well-nigh
every point of the compass.
It is the privilege of the reviewer to voice a grumble or two! The line drawings are
irresistible, the photographs are very good, but this reader at any rate has longed
for the occasional chart or map to help him. The colour plates are modern in feeling
and doubtless convey the atmosphere of the scene better than did Mr. Scott's
earlier pictures; but such a picture as 'White-footed geese . . .', in which the birds
are draped in total black, with no trace of white or any other colour, make one long
for his earlier style. Mr. Scott would perhaps say that for the detail we must go to
his 'Coloured Key to the Wildfowl of the World'.
CORAL AND COLOUR OF GOLD
By ROYSTRUBEN
(Faber.
2 1s.)
'THISis the story of a discarded naval officer, sailing for a living amongst the coral
reefs of the South Seas, and seeking gold in New Guinea'. Thus the author introduces and explains himself at the beginning of his beguiling book.
After twelve years' service Roy Struben was invalided out of the Navy, and had
to look for fresh employment. Starting on a business training, he says he was haunted
by a vivid mental picture of 'a fleet of little brigantines sailing out of Malta on the
first breeze after a long calm', as he had seen them from a reconnaissance plane.
A particularly dull lecture on Common Law one murky afternoon settled the
matter, and he decided to go to Fiji to look for a trading schooner. After several
false starts he at last bought the Navanora, lying in a rather poor state of repair,
CORAL AND COLOUR OF GOLD
4=7
at Tulagi in the Solomon Islands. She had been built in New Zealand for the
coasting trade and had carried gravel and timber. Sixty-one feet long, with very
thick timbers, she had been sailing for fifty-seven years and she cost him E495,
including repairs.
With the Navanora, Struben, with a crew of kanakas, mostly a very mixed bunch
and full of wiles, traded in the Solomons, and his relations with his crew, and their
kind, make amusing and enlightening reading. He traded mostly in copra and
trocas shell. This was fairly profitable and gave him some varied voyages, which
he describes with enthusiasm.
But he also, as a sideline, owned a gold-claim in New Guinea, which he had
won for a El entry fee in a ballot put up by the New Guinea Government. It was
being worked by an unknown partner, and although life was good, with work
coming in, and he was sailing in those lovely seas as his own master, Struben decided
to sail up to New Guinea to see how things were progressing. After many complications with the crew they set off, and from this moment his days as a 'mangrove
mariner' were over and he became a gold miner.
The Navanora was taken over by a friend on a share basis, and Struben went
up to his gold claim. The ethics and jargon of goldmining are like Chinese to
the unitiated, and a little more explanation of the terms would have been welcome.
It seems endlessly disappointing work and, at best, chancy. The claim not being
very profitable, he decided to set out with his dog and a party of long-suffering
bearers, further into the unexplored wilds of New Guinea, and he tells of fantastically
hard going and setbacks with humour and equanimity. Anyone contemplating a
similar expedition can learn a lot-or decide dead against it. One can sympathise
with the bearers for their periodic faint hearts and fits of gloom and depression.
At last, with practically nothing to show for their efforts, and worn out with shortage
of food, endless rain, and impossible terrain, the expedition turned back. But the
author reckoned, philosophically enough, that none of his time had been wasted,
his intangible gains being adventures on sea and land, a better understanding of
himself and other human beings, and he had learnt 'how unnecessary but how
pleasant is personal comfort'.
He now farms in Cape Province but, as a postscript, he tells how after the war,
in which he served again in the Navy, he revisited the Solomons and found they
had lost none of their enchantment. The Navanora, alas, had been sunk. His
partner was still mining near their old worked-out claim, but the rich days are
over and gold mining is now an unrewarding struggle.
P.H.
Correspondence
LETTER FROM A FAILURE
SIR,-In his article 'The Return of the Midshipman', 'Falconer' has again stated
the opinions of the Fleet on the last Training Scheme. I am a product of it. It
doesn't seem to have occurred to him and many others that possibly the Fleet itself
was to blame for the failure, through not appreciating what the new Acting SubLieutenants coming out of Dartmouth were, and the training they needed. In fact,
the Fleet hadn't briefed itself for the new era, and as in all walks of life, new ideas
cannot ever succeed if those concerned in bringing them to fruition know nothing
about them.
The great majority of the Captains and First Lieutenants of our first shipswhose job it was to continue the training we had had at Dartmouth-were of the
13-year-old entry. Many of them had not read the current A.F.0.s on us new types,
and all they seem to have heard, and that through unofficial channels, was that we
hadn't the sea-time and experience that they themselves had at the same stage in
life: this immediately prejudiced them against us. They knew what splendid fellows
they had been with one brand new stripe on their arm, and expected us to be the
same. We weren't, and those who had devised the scheme realised it. But those
of relatively junior rank in charge of our training hadn't themselves wide enough
experience to take us new problems in their stride.
On leaving Dartmouth, the new Acting Subs. were drafted into three channels:
the big ships, the coastal minesweepers and, thirdly, the frigates and destroyers.
In the first category, the inevitable happened; the new 'types' took on the status
of the Midshipmen they had relieved. There were too many of them to be given
useful jobs; on the other hand, as they had that stripe and lived in the wardroom,
they couldn't be given the kind of training the Midshipmen had had. Many were
left to their own devices, not wanted by anyone as they were thought parasites by the
working community. They got no responsibility and little guidance.
In the second category, the exact opposite happened. As third and fourth hands
of the minesweepers, the new officers had positions of considerable responsibility.
They had sailors to look after seriously and much of the necessary but mundane
paper-work that even a junior administrator is involved with. They were virtually
bosses of their departments and received little help. Nevertheless their seniors
were only too pleased to drive home their mistakes. The result was that at the end
of their first commission, they came away with an undeserved confidence at having
coped with their small jobs in the very specialised little Navy of their own; in fact
they were still lacking in much of the more comprehensive training of the Fleet,
and had been allowed to develop their own way of doing things, often not the best
way for anything but their own minesweeper.
I myself was lucky enough to come under the third heading. I was sent to a
frigate whcre the Captain had made it his business to find out what sort of officers
he was training, and took considerable care to ensure that our time was sensibly
employed. I was given the jobs of Sports Officer and Education Officer, both of
which required little professional knowledge, but which gave me the opportunity
to mix with a great proportion of the ship's company and to take away the stigma
CORRESPONDENCE
429
of passenger. For my training, I was made second navigator, second officer of the
watch at sea and second officer of the day in harbour under the senior watchkeeper. He had enough experience and confidence in himself to allow me to do
most of the work, whilst keeping a firm eye that the situation remained in hand
and that I was corrected when wrong. After some months in the ship, when I felt
more sure of my surroundings, I was sent to the technical departnents and so
obtained a useful working knowledge of everyone's business. Thus st the end of
my time in that ship I came away with the confidence of a sound training, and
happy that I had been able to play a useful part in the commission.
I am certain this was the way that the authors of our scheme would have wanted
it; but as I have pointed out, this was more often not the case. I had been lucky
in my ship and Captain. Others may have had equally good Captains in every
respect but their training. Any scheme will die unless the tezchers know what they
have to do. Let us hope that this new scheme is circulated su%ciently to the active
Fleet, so that those in command may know what to put into effect.
Yours truly,
WYNCOLL
INTELLIGENCE
is heartening to have tangible evidence that a letter or article in THE
is read by those in higher places. I was therefore delighted when
N.I.D. accepted the challenge and replied to some of the charges in my October
letter by a recent editorial to the Quarterly Intelligence Report.
My present purpose is to draw other members' attention to this encouraging
indication that there may perhaps be more purpose in writing to THE NAVAL REVIEW
than just to remove a bee from one's bonnet. But having started, I cannot resist
the temptation to return to the attack on this question of educating our Navy
about their potential enemies. I have no quarrel with the Division over their
dissemination of classified information, since the standard of both content and
presentation has steadily improved over the years. We must all concede that recent
issues of Q.I.R. bear little resemblance to those of a few years back, which often
paralleled more closely the 'Tatler' than an intelligence review. Current numbers
are both up-to-date and highly informative, and if properly and ccnstantly read,
provide all that the majority of officers should need to know about their potential
enemies.
The more general dissemination of unclassified information is far less satisfactory;
in fact it is virtually negligible, and paradoxically, inhibitions concerning security
are probably the root cause of this deficiency. But, whilst security in all matters
affecting intelligence is of course vital, its twofold purpose would seem to be:(a) To protect your sources.
(b) To deceive the enemy as to the extent of your knowledge about him, if it
is to your advantage to do so.
Once any information is published openly, any classified source of that same
information cannot then be compromised by further dissemination; at the same
time, the enemy must necessarily assume that you are aware of that information
about him, and you cannot deceive him by continuing to preserve silence on the
SIR,-It
NAVAL REVIEW
43O
CORRESPONDENCE
subject. It can thus be seen that much information which was originally received
in classified form can subsequently be downgraded. In any case the importance of
any one item of information is not necessarily related to its security classification,
and this is particularly applicable to the more general background type of information. We could therefore go a very long way to teaching the Navy all it needs to
know about its enemy by using only overt material.
There already exists a mass of such information on the Russian armed services
which is readily available to the public, and one has only to take Jane's, or the
Swedish, German or French equivalents, to find a very broad cover of the Soviet
navy. Unclassified American technical and service journals contain a continuous
flow of relevant information and there are several authoritative books in print.
Unfortunately, this mass of material is either not readily available to the Fleet, or
else it is in a form which cannot easily be assimilated. If therefore unclassified
information is to provide the Navy with its essential background knowledge of the
enemy, it must first be collated and re-issued in easily digestible form. Harking
back to security considerations, we would of course have to be careful that unclassified straws were not built into a high-grade haystack, or of unintentional
compromise by our selection of the information we publish. But assuming that the
general picture presented is both logical and probable, and is also supported by the
broad mass of unclassified material available, no compromise should result.
I consider that there exists a need for such a periodic unclasssified publication
which can be distributed in quantity to ships and establishments, and whose sole
purpose would be to keep all personnel informed about the men, ships and weapons
belonging to other navies which one day we may be called upon to fight. It is
perhaps unfair to blame N.I.D. for the lack of such a publication and unrealistic
to expect him to produce one in the future. Intelligence organisations have to deal
so continuously with highly classified material that they tend to overlook the
existence of much of the same information in unclassified form, and in anv case
there would always be the danger of their classified knowledge kither shading or
distorting their unclassified presentation. I therefore suggest that this task might
more properly be laid at the door of C.N.I., or perhaps even D.N.E.S., who would
then be entirely responsible for producing such a periodical, with N.I.D. only
checking the finished product for any seriously misleading statements. I am confident
that such a publication can be produced and be of value, since a few years back I
saw a most effective version produced by H.Q. USAREUR for their troops in
Germany.
Yours truly,
EFFECTIVE WORKING HOURS
SIR,-In the stimulating and pertinent article on 'Effective Working Hours' in
the July, 1961 number of THE NAVAL REVIEW, the Training Department was urged
to assume responsibility for training in Management. The author can rest assured
that they need no urging as they have long been keen to do so. Space is being kept
for it in the syllabuses of officers and senior ratings and a start has been made on
CORRESPONDENCE
43 I
a small scale. The trouble is that Management, like Training, provokes many widely
differing opinions and training cannot start until it is agreed how the Navy and its
ships should be Managed! But before long Management will be taught at all levels
from Captains to Petty Officers.
Yours very truly,
'TRAINER'
T H E NEW BATTLEGROUND
S1~,-The author of 'The New Battleground' in the July issue of THE NAVAL
suggests that the Hydrographer of the Navy should organise and co-ordinate
the collection of oceanographic data in order that there should be a better understanding of the deep oceans. This is already the Hydrographer's responsibility, as
he is Adviser to the Board of Admiralty on oceanographic matters.
Since the Forsters, father and son, accompanied Captain Cook into the Pacific
to observe sea surface temperatures the Royal Navy has continued, whenever
possible, to foster the study of oceanography. In 1872 there set out from England
H.M.S. Challenger, a vessel administered by the Hydrographer of the Navy and
under the command of Captain Nares, which, carrying a strong team of scientists,
circled the globe in three and a half years and made the first scientific observations
in the deep oceans. Modern oceanography stems from this great naval expedition.
The oceanographic tradition in the Surveying Service has been continued to the
present day with the modest means available. Another H.M.S. Challenger, carrying
scientists, made a world oceanographic voyage in 1950-52. H.M.S. Owen made
valuable observations on her passages in the Atlantic to and from South Georgia
in 1960-61. This ship will also play a major role in the International Indian Ocean
Expedition starting this autumn and extending over the next three years.
But these single-ship cruises only provide a limited quantity of material,. it is
necessary, as, for example, in meteorology, to collect a great amount of information
regularly, continuously and frequently, in order to build up sufficient material for
the weather forecasts; similarly, for a better knowledge of the ocean, a large quantity
of observations must be obtained before the necessary charts or tables can be produced for both the scientist and the seaman.
There is a general lack of understanding of oceanography within the Fleet and
lack of oceanographic instruments for use in H.M. ships. There is a tendency,
even when instruments are provided, to regard oceanographic observing as a drudgery
and it is frequently ignored or even forgotten on the score of other pressing business.
'Doppler' has pointed out that a major piece of equipment, the echo sounder, has
received little attention. No more than a dozen ships in the Royal Navy are capable
of sounding in depths exceeding 2,000 fathoms, yet it is imperative that as complete
a picture of the seabed as possible is built up, as the conformation of the ocean floor
forms the framework within which is contained the sea itself with its complex
surface and sub-surface currents and its diverse thermal and chemical structure.
A far more comprehensive series of bathythermograph 'dips' throughout the
oceans, and at greater depths, is required to provide data for the more efficient
use of anti-submarine weapons. We have a long way to go before synoptic charts
REVIEW
432
CORRESPONDENCE
showing prevailing oceanographic conditions will be available to the Fleet, but
such a requirement is highly desirable.
The future of oceanography within the Fleet envisages more oceanographic
education for officers and the increasing supply of the simpler oceanographic instruments to ships, such as deeper bathythermographs, recording thermographs, salinometers, improved echo-sounders, and possibly, at a later stage, towed magnetometers
and built-in gravimeters. As more instruments become available, directions for
regular use will be given. With the enthusiastic support of Senior Officers it is
hoped that oceanographic observing will become as much a part of the Navy as
Gunnery or Meteorology, for it is an integral part of modern submarine and antisubmarine operations.
With his own ships, the Hydrographer will continue to carry out more comprehensive oceanographic surveys, assisted by scientists both from within and without
the Naval Service. But General Service ships will also be expected on occasions
to embark oceanographers for specific projects and to allow them every facility to
progress their data collection.
Data collection at sea is only one side of the problem; there must be built up
ashore adequate facilities for processing the accumulated data, and then for providing
the resulting material in the form most convenient for the naval user at sea who is
either engaged in hunting a submarine or, in a submarine himself, in avoiding
detection. And it is to the form in which this material is required that the user must
now devote his attention-the Hydrographer maintains the facilities for producing
this material in graphic or tabular form. Departments and Divisions in the
Admiralty concerned in this subject are getting together and plans are being
formulated, but more than plans are needed. Money is essential to provide the
observing equipment; enthusiasm and understanding are required at sea; cooperation is required between naval and scientific staffs to collate, digest, process
and publish the material; Universities and professional oceanographers must be
called in to assist.
A great thrust forward is required with all these rasks and the Hydrographer
is willing and eager to foster the science of oceanography in the Royal Navy, which
is essential if we are to be 'at home' in the New Battleground beneath the sea in
the same way as we have always been upon the surface.
Yours truly,
E. G. IRVING
END OF AN ERA
SIR,-In the Home section of 'Naval Agairs' in the July number is an article,
'End of an Era'. Sad though it is that the Commander-in-Chief, The Nore has
ceased to exist, the memories recalled by the article, and many more, have been directly
inherited by the new Sub-command of the Commander-in-Chief, Portsmouth
which I command as Flag Officer, Medway.
I fear that some people may have gained the very mistaken impression that the
Navy left Chatham when the Nore Command closed. This was very far from the
case. First, H.M. Dockyard, Chatham is as busy as ever it was and I have no
CORRESPONDENCE
433
doubt that Mr. Pepys and Mr. Pett are delighted with its progress and the fact
that it is the Pilot Yard for the new functional organisation which is being introduced in conformity with the latest industrial practice. The Dockyard continues
and will continue to refit, repair, reconstruct and build ships for Her Majesty's
Fleet on the same scale as before, and this is borne out by considerable expenditure
on capital equipment recently authorised to modernise its facilities.
Ships from the Fleet continue to be based on Chatham, just as they were before
the Nore Command ceased, so that there is no difference in the number of seagoing
officers and men to be seen in the Medway Towns.
The Barracks have now become the Fleet Accommodation Centre and the Supply
and Secretariat School. Here again Chatham is pointing the way and showing the
Navy how to make better use of good accommodation than in housing an idle drafting
margin. I understand the example is being followed elsewhere. In other fields
Chatham remains as flourishing as ever: cricket, rugger, soccer, sailing, golf, etc.,
are still played and enjoyed and, with the help of the Army, strong United Services
teams are fielded.
We regret the loss of the Commander-in-Chief, The Nore and his staff, and we
mourn the departure of the Royal Marines, but the Royal Navy is very much present
at Chatham and will ensure that the traditions are kept. We consider ourselves an
example of the modern Navy-streamlined, efficient and go-ahead. Let us now
discard our mourning bands and continue our progress.
Yours faithfully,
I. W. T. BELOE
THE PAPERS OF ADMIRAL SIR JOHN FISHER
S1~,-The setting up of a 'Committee on Designs' and the furore of argument
and publicity which preceded and followed the advent of the Dreadnought and
Invincible in the early years of the century, are referred to in the review of 'The
Papers of Admiral Sir John Fisher' in the July edition of THE NAVAL REVIEW. This
turmoil sharply contrasts with the unobtrusive advent, some thirty odd years later,
of the Illustrious class, the world's first armoured aircraft carriers.
In both instances many technical difficulties had to be overcome, but for the
carriers there was also the severe handicap of a Treaty displacement limitation.
When the Treaty was being negotiated it is clear that the possibility of armoured
carriers was not envisaged, or this country would not have advocated reducing the
displacement limit from 27,000 to 22,000 tons, or eventually have accepted
23,000 tons. In retrospect it is a little curious that the demand for armoured
carriers did not arise earlier than it did, but perhaps the strenuous and persistent
objections of Naval Constructors to the addition of a few tons of extra topweight
in existing ships inhibited naval officers from pressing for the addition of many
hundreds of tons of armour on the flight decks of new designs of carriers.
In the spring of 1936 the growing power of Hitler in Germany made it imperative
to lay down new carriers without delay. It would have been possible to order repeat
Ark Royals, but the late Admiral Sir Reginald Henderson, who was then Controller,
was adamant that the new ships must be fully armoured carriers. The difficulties
facing Sir Reginald were formidable. There was no D.N.C. for Sir Arthur Johns
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CORRESPONDENCE
was sick and absent from the Admiralty. There were no agreed Staff Requirements
for armoured carriers, for no one at that time believed that a worthwhile armoured
carrier could be designed on a displacement of 23,000 tons and hence no design
studies for such ships had been made. The aircraft carrier design section was
'bows under' with the flood of detailed design drawings for the Ark Royal, then
building at Cammell Lairds.
If the normal design procedure for a new class of major warship had been followed,
including the agreement of Staff Requirements, it would have been at least two or
three years before orders for ships could have been placed. Yet such was the
compelling magic of this most unorthodox Controller that he secured Board approval
for a sketch design of fully armoured carrier in the very short period of three months.
It was a considerable achievement.
The building drawings and specifications for the new carriers were prepared
under the supervision of Sir Stanley Goodall, who signed them on his appointment
as D.N.C. and thus took full responsibility for the design of the Illustrious class.
The nation has good cause to be grateful to Admiral Sir Reginald Henderson, for
it was only because of the swift and decisive action he took in the spring of 1936
that the world's first armoured carriers were available so early in the war. No other
carrier could have survived the tremendous hammering that Illustrious received
from the Luftwaffe off Sicily, while the ability of this class of carrier to stand up
to the Kamikase attacks saved many lives and enabled them to be quickly operational
again after the attacks. The unarmoured United States carriers did not fare so
well and it seems possible that if the carriers of the British Pacific Fleet had not
had armoured decks they 'would all have been sunk.
The angled deck, the mirror sight and the steam catapult are not the only British
inventions to have been adopted by the United States Navy for the armoured
carrier itself is a British invention.
Yours truly,
W.A.D.F.
QUERIES ON UNIFORM
SIR,-I should be most gratef~dif any of your readers could help me with notes
as to variations in uniform worn during the last war, especially on foreign stations.
According to the Regulations the following changes were authorised:1939 Either watch coat or great coat permitted.
1940 Wearing of white cap covers in home waters suspended.
Either blue or khaki shoulder straps to be worn with khaki.
1941 Lace to only go halfway round the cuff.
Sub-Lieutenants and Warrant Officers not required to wear swords, nor
Midshipmen dirks.
R.N.V.R. Lieut.-Commanders to have a waved instead of a straight halfstripe.
1942 Blue bottledress forbidden. Khaki battledress only to be worn by beach
communication parties and other specially authorised.
Serge uniform may be worn instead of cloth in all climates.
1943 Blue working dress approved except in hot climates. Not to be worn on
leave.
CORRESPONDENCE
1944 Shoulder straps with woven 'lace' introduced.
Helmet no longer required.
1945 Working dress may be worn on passage by air.
Special blue working dress for air crews.
Action and anti-malarial dress of blue shirt and blue cotton trousers.
Khaki bush shirt and shorts when khaki tropical dress is authorised.
Blue beret for naval air crews.
But regulations are seldom strictly observed in wartime and any innovation
made officially is usually preceded by its unofficial introduction over a long period.
The sort of questions I should like answered include: When did the wearing of
shorts give place to the idea that trousers must be worn as a guard against flash ?
When was the wearing of sun helmets abandoned ? T o what extent was blue battledress worn before 'working dress' was authorised? Was khaki worn by anyone
not actually serving with the Army? Were there any particular variations between
the customs of different stations ? What did officers and men wear in submarines
while on patrol.
Finally, were any officers notorious for particular idiosyncrasies of dress ? Nelson
wore a coat with ten buttons instead of nine, Beatty one with three buttons
instead of four. Surely this war must have thrown up something strange.
Yours faithfully,
W. E. my
OPPOSED LANDINGS
SIR,-Whilst in no way gainsaying the fine work done by Captain Creswell i n
1936 in rewriting the Manual of Combined Operations, I have a considerable
sympathy with the remarks of the reviewer of 'The Watery Maze' regarding the
neglect of the art of Combined Operations between World Wars I and 11.
A reference to the official History of Combined Operations which we produced
in Amphibious Warfare Headquarters in 1956 shews the following significant
paragraph under the heading of 'The Inter-Services Training and Development
Centre' :'As one of their duties, the officers (i.e. the staff officers of the newly-formed
I.S.T.D.C.) witnessed a combined exercise carried out by a cruiser squadron
and some destroyers (in 1938) at Slapon Sands. Here, the soldiers were
landed in open boats with muffled oars. No progress in technique had taken
place since the Crimea'.
I am, Sir,
Yours faithfully,
B. S. MALLORY
CORRESPONDENCE
LESSONS LEARNT
SIR,-From his comments on my letter about the lessons to be learnt from naval
operations it seems that Captain Roskill and I look on a naval historian's duty from
different angles. He says: 'Captain Creswell comes very near to suggesting that,
rather than publish the criticisms of Sir Dudley Pound's (and presumably Mr.
Churchill's) interventions in the conduct of operations, I should have suppressed
the views of the Commanders-in-Chief concerned. It does not seem to have occurred
to him that such action by me would have resulted in the responsibility for things
that went wrong (such as the disaster to convoy PQ.17) being placed where it definitely
did not belong. Had I done that I would indeed have been guilty of the worst dishonesty that a historian can commit'. This I interpret to mean that when there is a
disaster someone must be blamed by the historian.
Personally, I am unable to subscribe to that view. It seems to me that in the
stresses of a great war the Fates are often stronger than man, even man at his best:
that an enterprise may fail, and fail disastrously, without the officer responsible for
it necessarily deserving castigation.
The test case is, of course, convoy PQ.17. It will be remembered that in the
spring of 1942 Stalin was insisting on the vital need for all possible arms from America
and Britain if the Russians were to withstand a new German onslaught. In April,
Roosevelt, answering a message from Churchill about 'the serious convoy situation',
had wired '. . . I fear not only the political repercussions in Russia, but even more
the fact that our supplies will not reach them promptly'. It was in these circumstances that on May 17th the Prime Minister ended a minute to the Chiefs of Staffs
Committee, summarising the pressure being put upon him, with the words: 'My
own feeling, mingled with much anxiety, is that the convoy ought to sail on the 18th.
The operation is justified if half gets through. Failure on our part to make the
attempt would weaken our influence with both our major allies. There are always
the uncertainties of weather and luck, which may aid us. I share your misgivings,
but I feel it is a matter of duty'. On the following day Pound wrote to King: 'The
whole thing is a most unsound operation with the dice loaded heavily against us';
and with this King agreed. But with Pound there was no question of refusing the
burden laid upon him. In the event the convoy, PQ.16, sailed from Iceland on May
21st and, though it suffered severe losses from air attack and some from submarines,
about threequarters got through.
The situation facing the next convoy, PQ.17, was however more hazardous still.
Daylight was now continuous and by this time the enemy had the Tirpitz, Hipper,
two pocket battleships and ten destroyers in northern waters. Because of this Pound
had it in mind that if a serious threat &om the surface forces arose it would be better
to scatter the convoy, accepting some inevitable losses from air and submarine attack,
rather than court annihilation as a body. For the scattering to be effective the order
must be given several hours before the enemy could strike.
At 9.30 p.m. on July 4th he judged the moment had come and gave the order.
At noon next day the Tirpitz and Co. left Alten Fiord, rounded the North Cape
and steered to the eastward. At 9.30 that night they were recalled. Captain Roskill
says ('The War at Sea', Vol. 11): 'When the allied sighting reports already mentioned
(sighting of Tirpitz by submarines and aircraft) were intercepted, and it became
clear that the scattered convoy was suffering heavily at the hands of U-boats and
CORRESPONDENCE
437
aircraft, Admiral Raeder cancelled the operations'. Here, without further information,
one cannot disentangle post hoc and propter hoc. But it seems fair to suppose that
in Raeder's view the risks to the big ships, acceptable when they were offered a concentrated target, became less and less acceptable the more widely the convoy
scattered. In his orders he had stressed that 'the operation should be quickly
executed', and this was no longer possible.
In the outcome the attacks on the merchant ships by submarines and aircraft
were so heavy that only a third of the convoy reached harbour. It was in truth a
disastrous voyage;
Captain Roskill makes it clear in his history that in his opinion:(a) if the convoy and escort had kept together, more ships would have got
through :
(b) 'the enemy was never likely to risk the Tirpitz in close attack on a convoy
protected by an escort which was heavily armed with torpedoes', and
previous experience of the cautious handling of German ships operating
against our Atlantic trade should have made this clear to Pound.
If, despite what seems evidence to the contrary in the Fuehrer Conferences on
Naval Affairs, the German squadron had no real intention of coming to grips with
an escorted convoy, (a), above, would of course be true. But this brings us to (b).
This, Captain Roskill says, is plain. That Broome's six destroyers would have been
aggressively handled there is no doubt; but is it really to be believed that they could
have kept away the Tirpitz, Hipper, Scheer and seven destroyers throughout the
endless Arctic daylight? There is no evidence for this, and the analogy with the
Atlantic trade attacks is unconvincing. In those, single ships or a pair were operating
on their own, thousands of miles from their base. Here the big ships had destroyers
with them and aircraft at hand, and they need only go a few hundred miles. And
here the target was believed to be a far more important one than the average Atlantic
convoy. Both sides considered that these supplies, though comparatively small in
tonnage, were vital to a campaign which might spell Russia's downfall. (Raeder, at a
conference with Hitler the following month, said: 'Supplies to northern ports of
Russia remain decisive for the conduct of the war waged by the Anglo-Saxons'. And
Hitler agreed.) It was in these circumstances that Pound made his most difficult
decision. A disaster followed. Bur had he not ordered the convoy to scatter, the
disaster might well have been heavier still.
Yours truly,
J. CRESWELL
Captain Roskill writes :-
I welcome discussion in these columns about historical events regarding which
more than one opinion is obviously possible. But I deprecate the attribution to
others of a point of view (e.g. 'that when there is a disaster someone must be blamed
for it by the historian'), for which no grounds whatever exist. In actual fact many
disasters are, alas, recounted in 'The War at Sea', and in the vast majority of cases
no attribution of responsibility (it is Captain Creswell who introduces the word
'blame') is suggested. What the historian must, I think, do is to investigate the
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CORRESPONDENCE
evidence as thoroughly as possible and then state his conclusions fearlessly, but in
the full knowledge that he can never hope to establish the final and absolute truth.
The weakness of Captain Creswell's well-argued case lies in the fact that he has
only seen a very small proportion of the considerable mass of evidence about PQ.17.
Thus the published extracts from some of the so-called 'Fiihrer Conferences' have
insignificant importance compared with the evidence in the German OKM
records in the captured German archives. These contain the full record of the
discussions on the sortie of the Tirpitz and her consorts, the orders to Schniewind,
and the messages that passed between him and the Naval Staff. The most important
point is the extreme caution of the German high authorities over committing the
Tirpitz to such an operation, and the restrictions placed upon the C.-in-C. in carrying
out the attempt. Though this could not, of course, have been definitely known in
London, the quality of our Intelligence was at the time such as to afford strong
indications that such was the case. Furthermore, good though our Intelligence was,
we did not know what the Tirpitz was doing when the order to the cruisers to withdraw and the convoy to scatter was sent at about 9 p.m. on July 4th, 1942. The
orders were sent on the assumption that a plan of which we had received reliable
indications was actually in train. In other words the 'negative Intelligence' (which,
as every Intelligence Officer knows, can be as important as positive Intelligence)
was ignored; and the officer in charge of the surface ship plot in the O.I.C. represented at the time the danger of doing precisely that.
Captain Creswell makes light of the lessons to be learnt from earlier attacks on
convoys by German warships; but he ignores the sortie by the Tirpitz and destroyers
against convoys PQ.12 and QP.8 in the preceding March. Although we were fully
aware that, for about two days, she was searching for those convoys, and once
passed very close to them, so far as I am aware no one considered ordering them to
scatter. Yet even before PQ.17 had sailed Admiral Pound told the C.-in-C., Home
Fleet (according to the latter's account) that 'if the convoy runs into trouble we
can always order it to scatter'; to which the C.-in-C.'s reaction was to state very
unequivocally that to do any such thing would be utterly disastrous. Why, one
wonders, was that desperate expedient in the First Sea Lord's mind from the beginning
of the operation ? One can only guess the reasons, but it is worth remarking that the
1939 Fighting Instructions (which were signed by Admirals Pound and Forbes)
contained a categorical statement that if a convoy was attacked by a superior force
'the ships in convoy should be ordered to scatter and the escorts to- concentrate' (my
italics); and that in 1941, obviously as a result of the war experience which Captain
Creswell decries, that sentence was cancelled and far less rigid instructionsnamely that 'the action of the escort must depend upon circumstances . . . the
safety of the convoy may be furthered by ordering it to scattery-were substituted.
It should also be noted that those instructions obviously intended that the decision
should rest with the senior officer of the escort. I hold no particular brief for
Fighting Instructions, especially if they are rigid, but it is a fact that Admiral Pound's
actions ran contrary to the amended instruction which he had recently approved.
I cannot accept the complete distinction that Captain Creswell attempts to draw
between eariier attacks (or attempted attacks) on our convoys by enemy surface
ships and the case of PQ.17. T o give one example, the Scheer attacked convoy
HX.84 when it was escorted only by one A.M.C. That convoy scattered when the
attack began, the Jervii Bay sacrificed herself heroically, and only five of the thirty-
CORRESPONDENCE
439
seven merchantmen were lost. On the evening of July 4th, 1942, the four cruisers
(whose withdrawal by the Admiralty Captain Creswell ignores) expected to be engaged
shortly with superior enemy forces, and would surely have acquitted themselves
as valiantly as the Jervis Bay had the need arisen.
Captain Creswell lays justifiable stress on the political pressure to which the
Admiralty was subjected, and to the length of daylight at the time of PQ.17's passage;
but so did I in my account! However he makes no mention of the fact that the very
fickle weather in the Barents Sea could not possibly be predicted in London. On
July 2nd-3rd PQ.17 did actually enjoy the protection of fog, and the chances of war
might well have produced weather in which it was very difficult for the enemy to
locate it two days later. This was what actually occurred in the Tirpitz's March sortie,
and it is the sort of imponderable factor which makes the signalling of rigid tactical
orders from a shore headquarters hundreds of miles away so dangerous. Had the
intelligence actually available in London been signalled to the C.-in-C., repeated
to the Senior Officer of the Escort, it is surely beyond doubt that, probably without
further orders, Admiral Hamilton and the destroyers would have held on. Indeed
on the afternoon of the 4th Admiral Hamilton reported that it was his intention to
hold on-possibly as late as the following afternoon-'until the enemy surface
situation had clarified'. Moreover, throughout the 4th the convoy was within range
of the Victorious's air striking force, and had the intelligence been signalled, indicating
a likely attack on the 5th, it is at least possible that Admiral Tovey (who had fourteen
destroyers with the main fleet) would have accepted the risk of moving east to keep
within air striking distance on that day. Actually during the night of 5th/6th the
Admiralty signalled three times to the C.-in-C. suggesting precisely that measure;
but it was of course by that time too late. In the Bismarck operation the Admiralty
signalled to the C.-in-C. when the vital intelligence came into their hands to 'act
on the assumption' that the Bismarck was making for Brest: when the Scharnhorst
attempted to attack JW.55B in December, 1943, the signalling of intelligence to the
C.-in-C. was brilliantly handled. Surely the correct measure to take on the evening
of July 4th, 1942, was either to signal the intelligence to the C.-in-C. or to order
him 'to act on the assumption that the Tirpitz, etc., would sail from Alten Fiord to
attack PQ.17 within the next twenty-four hours'. That would have placed the
responsibility for the necessary countermeasures, including the defence of the convoy,
squarely where it belonged. As it was, Admiral Tovey was left largely in the dark
regarding the reasons for the emergency messages sent.
Turning now to the consequences of the Admiralty's orders, it is of course
impossible to prove that, had the enemy surface ship attack taken place, the losses
would have been greater or less than were actually suffered. What is beyond argument
is that the moral effect of the withdrawal of the cruisers and destroyers was catastrophic both among the merchant seamen and among at any rate some of the warship
crews. The Commander of the Norfolk (the cruiser flagship) jotted down this note
at the time: 'The effect (of the withdrawal) on the ship's company was devastating.
Twenty-four hours earlier there had been only one thought-that at last we were
going to bring enemy surface ships to action. I had never known the men in such good
heart. . . Then in the space of a few hours we abandoned our aircraft and its crew,
and we abandoned the convoy. The ship was in a turmoil . . . it was the blackest
day we ever knew'. Of course the action of July 5th, 1942, had it been fought, might
have been a desperate one against heavy odds. But would it have been any more
.
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CORRESPONDENCE
desperate than that which Sherbrooke was to fight in defence of convoy JW.51B a
few months later ? Or any less successful ? In sum it was not only what was done
but how it was done that was so disastrous; for the merchantmen unquestionably
felt that they had been abandoned by the Royal Navy at a moment of crisis.
Lastly I do not understand Captain Creswell's remark about 'one cannot disentangle post hoc and propter hoc' in the sentence he quotes from me about the German
cancellation of the sortie. It reads plainly enough to me-that Raeder recalled the
squadron because he knew it had been reported and because he was aware that the
Luftwaffe and U-boats were doing all that the surface ships might have done to the
convoy. T o continue would thus have been futile as well as dangerous. There is,
so far as I know, no evidence of any kind to support what Captain Creswell suggests
is 'fair to suppose'-namely that 'the risks to the big ships, acceptable when they
were offered a concentrated target, became less and less acceptable the more widely
the convoy scattered'.
SOME REMARKS BY A JUNIOR OFFICER
SIR,-Thank you for the article 'Some Remarks by a Junior Officer' in your April
as I joined
1961 issue. I suppose the author would regard me as a 'silly old b--',
the Service in 1935; but because one was born in the past, it does not necessarily
mean that one need live in the past, and indeed we have one great advantage over
the Junior Officer in that we can compare different periods in naval history.
I agree 100 per cent with the author that there is nothing wrong with the sailor;
he is as good as I was, and as good as my father was, but I do maintain he is not
being strongly and purposefully led. Whether this stems from political pressure,
a change in the social pattern or a false doctrine at Dartmouth, I don't know; but
I do know that the attitude of many Senior Officers is 'soft' in the extreme.
We are fast becoming a Navy of meetings, discussion, and 'Would you mind,
please'; individual decisions are rarely taken and crisp firm orders almost never
given. It is old-fashioned to give a 'blast', and whatever happens we must never
hurt anyone's feelings. It is also old-fashioned to put men in the report, except for
certain offences where there is no option, and over the last few years I have been
appalled at the way many officers neglect their duty in this respect, even in cases
of gross misconduct.
Democracy, which is desirable for the country as a whole, is nevertheless the
most inefficient system in the world. The Service traditionally, and by law, is an
autocratic system, but since the war, and particularly over the last few years, we
have tried to play at democracy and sooner or later we shall have to make up our
minds which way to go in order to avoid a head-on collision. When things go wrong
people are baffled and puzzled, and the usual remedy is to spend more money on
more fancy schemes or democratic 'get-togethersy-the reason is not hard to find.
I am reminded of an old saying based on Napoleon's dictum, 'There are no bad
sailors, only bad officers', which, apart from the odd exception, I believe to be true.
Until we forget what I can only describe as 'this democratic nonsense' or 'cult of
fellowship', and demand from everyone a much higher standard in thought, word
and deed, the Service will never be as 'Swift' or 'All about' as it used to be.
Yours truly,
F. R. BROWN
CORRESPONDENCE
441
T H E BRITISH DESTROYER
SIR,--With aU due regard, I feel I should correct 'Fame' on the last paragraph
of his review of 'The British Destroyer'. This excellent publication contains at
least two other errors, one being in the caption to Plate 102 and text of page 103:
the early 'L' class mounted eight 4-inch and not 4.7-inch as stated. The other error
is on page 113, where the 1943 'Battles' are quoted as having a fifth 4-7-inch gun
mounted amidships. This should, of course, read 4-5-inch.
Yours faithfully,
R.N. J.W.
OLD SEA SONGS
S1R,-L00king back at THE NAVAL REVIEW for 1941, page 566, and your contributor's query about the song 'Home, Dearie, Home', to which I made a reply
on page 649, it may be of interest to know that a few years ago I made further
inquiries at the British Mseum and discovered that the lines are by W. E. Henley
in verses entitled '0 Falmouth is a Fine Town'. Obviously someone substituted
'Pompey' for 'Falmouth'. Anyway I set the lines to music as Henley wrote them
and I enclose the result which may interest your contributor if you can still locate
him (duly forwarded-ED.). The song was broadcast by the B.B.C. Male Voice
Choir in a Friday night programme some months ago.
As a matter of similar interest I have also recently set to music the very clever
lines by an unknown author entitled 'The Lords of the Admiraltee', about which
there were some queries in the Mariner's Mirror in 1935. I have had to amend
Admiral Phillimore's version (and, I think, improved on it) to make metrical, and
more 'sensible nonsense' of the lines. This will be published before the end of the
year. But I wish I could discover who really did write the words. They refer to the
Vanguard/Iron Duke collision off Dublin in 1875 (the court martial proceedings of
which I have here in the R.I.N.A. Library). I fear we shall never find out who the
author really was unless some very aged member of THE NAVAL REVIEW is alive
today who could help. Though he might remember the song from gunroom days
in the 1880s, he would probably not know the author. I first heard the song in
1915, in Birmingham, when our 'Chief' (Eng. Commander Hewitt) used to sing a
version of the words more akin to those I now use. The musical setting is of course
quite different.
Yours truly,
AUSTRALIAN VIGNETTE
SIR,-I was conscious of enjoying the light reading of 'Australian Vignette' in
the July NAVAL REVIEW, its amusing anecdotes, and its unpretentious common sense,
necessarily coloured by the brevity of the author's experience of Australia. It is,
however, a pity that he did not allow readers to form their own conclusions, as
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CORRESPONDENCE
those which he chose to make bear little relevance to his article, are difficult to
understand, and, in my opinion, more difficult to justify.
Take, for instance, the second paragraph. As I interpret it, the first sentence
states that Britain is indifferent to the 'bond' between Australia and herself, one of
the 'factors' of which is 'defence'; while the third sentence, in apparent contradiction,
has it that 'Britain is now more interested than Australia' in 'defence co-operation'.
Where lies the conclusion ?
Again, to write an article about Australia, her people, and her problems, and then
to illustrate a conclusion concerning Australia by referring to New Zealand is
hardly logical. Nor, I imagine, would an Australian consider it complimentary!
T o make matters worse, the statement which is made concerning New Zealand
and the Common Market appears to be based on some of the ill-informed outcry
which took place in that country, much to Lord Beaverbrook's delight, before the
British Government's policy was made clear. (Although there is nothing new in
New Zealand seeking other overseas markets besides Britain for her goods.) Has
K. R. J. Arnold read Mr. Holyoake's, or Mr. Nash's, published and up-to-date
views on this subject? If not, he should.
Yours faithfully,
JOHNF. ALLAN
SIR,-While expressing thanks for J. F. Allan's opening remarks, I take exception
to the remainder of his letter to you.
'. . . coloured by the brevity of the author's experience of Australia' is the kind
of remark attributable to a mainly destructive critic. I submit that two years in a
country is sufficient to form sound conclusions concerning that country.
In his second paragraph, which I assume refers to my 'Conclusion', he says I
am illogical. A failure to interpret correctly has led him to this. Surely he can see
that it is possible for there to be indifference on the part of one member (I did
not say complete indifference), yet for that member to be more interested than the
other in one particular factor.
In referring to New Zealand's problems in connection with Britain joining the
Common Market, I was drawing a distinction rather than illustrating a conclusion.
Your correspondent's objection is therefore ridiculous. Even more so is his contention that an Australian would find it uncomplimentary.
Whatever Mr. Nash or Mr. Holyoake may have said since I wrote my article,
it cannot alter the fact that if Britain joins the Common Market, Australia and New
Zealand are going to find greater difficulty in exporting their primary produce to
Britain.
Would J. F. Allan please tell us exactly what his objections to my conclusions
are, and their foundations; rather than invite me to read the same papers, periodicals
and so on, as does he.
Yours truly,
K. R.J. ARNOLD
New Members
The following have been enrolled as new members during the last six months:AGA,J. P., I.N.
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HALLID~Y, J. M., R.N.Z.N. . . . . . . . . .
HARGREAVES,
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HARRINGTON,
W. H. c.B.E.,'D.s.o~;'R.A.N.
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LAING,E. A. M.. R.N:R.
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