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2010 White Paper on Human Rights in North Korea
Preface
In 1952, the Korean Bar Association (KBA) was established as a
representative human rights organization that safeguards basic human
rights and realizes social justice. It has a proud history of having
made a huge contribution to the democratization and modernization of
the nation through ceaseless efforts for human rights improvement
and a commitment to advancing the legal culture of the nation.
However, this history of accomplishment could come only after
painful ordeals. The Korean peninsula was annexed by Japan one
hundred years ago. Subsequently sixty years ago, the peninsula was
divided and experienced the tragedy of the Korean War. As recently
as
twenty
years
ago,
the
nation
suffered
from
poverty
and
dictatorship.
The KBA’s struggle for human rights has made its way through
the darkness and mainly targeted domestic problems. However, its
human rights movement falls far short of Korea’s developing national
status. In order to become an internationally-renowned human rights
organization, the KBA should also tackle the problems of over twenty
million North Koreans, who are not even aware of the words human
rights, and also the problems of the people in the hinterland who are
suffering from starvation and war.
The KBA, in an effort to be born again as an advanced
organization that carries out expanded and enhanced human rights
activities, opened the Subcommittee on Human Rights in North Korea
under its Human Rights Committee in 2005 and established the KBA
Human Rights Association this year.
Just like previous two White Papers in 2006 and 2008, 2010 White
Paper on Human Rights in North Korea(White Paper) is one of the
Subcommittee's masterworks which was written from the legal
perspective to carry out objective research on the North Korean
human rights situation, identify problems in an honest and objective
manner and promote public debate to find possible solutions to
problems.
In
particular,
in
the
White
Paper,
the
number
of
interviewees was doubled to two hundred defectors to enhance the
credibility of the survey results, and various visual and graphic
materials were used for better understanding by readers. These new
approaches are expected to help various international human rights
agencies and related organizations in many countries to grasp the
North Korean human rights situation.
I hope the publication of the 2010 White Paper on Human Rights
in North Korea will help enhance people's interest in North Korean
human rights, facilitate more research and debate and contribute to
the improvement of the North Korean human rights situation.
I would like to express my deep gratitude to Lee Myung-sook,
Chairman of the Human Rights Committee, who gave unconditional
encouragement and support to the publication of the White Paper; and
to Lee Jae-won, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Human Rights in
North Korea; and subcommittee members and authors who took the
trouble of writing and publishing the White Paper; and lastly to
employees of the Human Rights Division at the KBA for their
support to authors and other members.
November, 2010
Korean Bar Association
Kim Pyung-woo, Chairman and President
Contents
Preface ······································································································ 3
Guideline for Readers ·········································································· 13
Ⅰ. Introduction ························································································· 39
1. Purpose of the White Paper on Human Rights in North Korea ········· 41
2. Principles Governing Research and Writing ············································ 43
3. Overview of Human Rights Conditions in North Korea ······················ 45
Ⅱ. Human Rights Policy of North Korea ············································ 53
2.1. North Korea’s Perception on Human Rights ········································· 55
1. Characteristics of the North Korean Regime and Structural Violations
of Human Rights ························································································ 55
1) Hereditary Succession and Dictatorship of the Kim’ Family and
Legal System ··························································································· 55
2) Ideological Foundation of North Korea's Concept on Human Rights
in North Korea ························································································ 62
2. North Koreans’ Perception on Human Rights ········································ 73
2.2. North Korea’s Observance of the UN Human Rights Treaties ··········· 83
1. UN Human Rights Treaties and North Korea ········································ 83
1) North Korea’s Accession to UN Human Rights Treaties ·················· 83
2) UN Human Rights Treaty Bodies ························································· 84
3) UN Human Rights Council ···································································· 85
4) The General Assembly ··········································································· 89
2. Implementation of Treaty Bodies on Human Rights in North Korea ·· 89
1) International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) ········ 90
2) International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(ICESCR) ·································································································· 95
3) Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) ································ 100
4) Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination agaist
Women (CEDAW) ················································································ 104
3. Resolutions of the Human Rights Council and the General Assembly
and etc. ······································································································ 109
1) UN Sub-Commission ············································································· 109
2) UN Commission on Human Rights and Human Rights Council ··· 110
3) UN General Assembly ·········································································· 114
4) Universal Periodic Review ··································································· 116
5) Report of the UN Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human
Rights in the DPRK ············································································· 119
2.3. Duality and Change in Human Rights Policy ····································· 124
1. Introduction ································································································ 124
2. Gap between Human Rights Commitments and North Korea’s Reality ··· 125
1) The Right to Food ················································································ 125
2) Torture and Other Inhuman or Humiliating Treatment ···················· 130
3) Freedom of Religion and Faith ··························································· 133
4) Arbitrary Detention ··············································································· 138
5) People Kidnapped and Seized in North Korea ································· 146
6) Freedom of Opinion and Expression ·················································· 153
7) Violence Against Women ····································································· 162
3. Changes in North Korea's Human Rights Policy ································· 168
4. Effects of the Resolutions on North Korea Human Rights ················ 181
5. Conclusion ································································································· 185
Ⅲ. North Korea's Human-Rights related Acts and Subordinate Statutes
and their Application ······································································· 189
3.1. North Korea’s Human-Rights related Laws and Subordinate Statutes ··· 191
1. Revision of North Korea's Constitution and Its Implication ·············· 191
2. Songun (Military-first) Politics and Human Rights ······························ 194
3. Meaning, Enactment and Revision of North Korea’s Criminal Law ·· 197
1) Meaning of Criminal Law ··································································· 197
2) Reasons of Enactment and Revision ·················································· 198
3) Relationship between the Criminal Act and the Military Criminal Act ··· 200
4. Basic Principles of North Korea’s Criminal Law ································ 200
1) Criminal Act ·························································································· 200
2) Criminal Procedure Act ········································································ 203
3) Military Criminal Act ··········································································· 204
5. Major Contents and Shortcomings of North Korea’s Criminal Act ·· 205
1) Crimes ····································································································· 205
2) Punishment ····························································································· 210
3) Special Provisions ················································································· 216
6. Major Contents and Issues of North Korea's Criminal Procedure Act ·· 226
1) Investigation ··························································································· 226
2) Pretrial Examination ·············································································· 229
3) Indictment ······························································································· 232
4) First Instance Trial ················································································ 233
5) Second Instance Trial ··········································································· 237
6) Execution of Sentence and Judgment ················································· 239
7) Evidence ································································································· 240
8) Defense ··································································································· 242
9) Dismissal of Criminal Case ································································· 244
10) Damage Indemnity ·············································································· 245
11) Documents and Period of Criminal Procedure ································ 245
7. Major Contents and Problems of Military Criminal Act ···················· 247
3.2. The Application of North Korea's Criminal Law ································ 252
1. Introduction ································································································ 252
1) Legal Ground of North Korea's Criminal Law ································· 252
2) Limitation of the Analysis on the Application of the Criminal Act ·· 253
3) Evaluation of the Current Criminal Act and Criminal Procedure Act ·· 255
4) Problems with the Application of Criminal Law ····························· 257
2. Awareness of Criminal Law ··································································· 261
3. Application of the General Chapter of the Criminal Act ··················· 263
4. Application of the Provisions for Investigative Procedure ·················· 264
5. Application of the Provisions for Pretrial Procedure ··························· 266
6. Application of Trial Provisions ······························································· 269
1) Courts ······································································································ 269
2) First Instance Trial ················································································ 273
3) Second Instance Trial ··········································································· 278
4) Extraordinary Appeal and Retrial ························································ 279
5) On-Site Public Trials ············································································ 279
7. Enforcement of Judgement and Ruling ·················································· 280
1) Death Penalty ························································································· 280
2) Correctional Prison Labor ···································································· 282
3) Disciplinary Prison Labor ····································································· 285
4) Other Penalties ······················································································· 287
5) General Pardon, Special Pardan and Release before Term ············· 287
8. Conclusion ································································································· 289
Ⅳ. Specific Cases of Human Rights Violation ·································· 293
4.1. The Rights to Food and Economic Activity ········································ 295
1. Laws Regarding the Right to Life ························································· 295
2. Status of Food Supply ············································································· 299
1) Reality of Food Supply ········································································ 299
2) Variation of Food Price ······································································· 303
3. Right to Food ··························································································· 305
1) Food Distribution Policy ······································································ 305
2) Centralization of Capital ······································································· 309
3) Excessive Military Expenditure ··························································· 312
4) Misappropriation of Food Aid ····························································· 316
5) Exploitation of Farming Area ······························································ 319
6) Control over Small Pieces of Land ···················································· 323
4. Right to Life (Economic Activities) ······················································ 326
1) Confiscation of Property by Currency Reform ································· 326
2) Market Control ······················································································ 329
4.2. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment ································································································ 336
1. Introduction ································································································ 336
2. Specific Cases of Torture and Other Cruel Treatment ························ 337
1) First-Hand Experience ··········································································· 337
2) Second-Hand Experience: Witness, Testimony and Etc ··················· 345
3. Situation of and Treatment for Torture and Other Cruel Treatment ·· 348
1) Situations Surrounding Torture and Other Cruel Treatment ············ 348
2) Recourse ································································································· 349
4. Evaluation and Solutions ········································································· 349
4.3. Freedom of Conscience and Religion ··················································· 352
1. Freedom of Thought and Conscience ···················································· 352
2. Freedom of Religion ················································································ 361
1) Freedom of Religion and People’s Perception on Religion ············ 361
2) Religious Facilities and Status of People with Religion ················· 373
3) Persecution of Religious People ·························································· 385
4) North Korea’s Unrealistic Claim on Its Religious Freedom - Based
on the State’s Second Periodic Report to the ICCPR ····················· 400
4.4. Arbitrary Detention ·················································································· 405
1. Introduction ································································································ 405
2. Overview of the Legislation Regarding Arrest and Detention ··········· 406
1) Supreme Legislation Regarding Personal Liberty ······························ 406
2) Legislation on Arrest and Detention during Investigation ··············· 407
3) Legislation on Arrest and Detention during the Pretrial Examination ·· 409
3. The Current Situation of Arbitrary Arrest and Detention ··················· 412
1) Arrest and Detention during Investigation ········································· 412
2) Situation of Arrest and Detention during the Pretrial examination ·· 417
3) Arrest and Detention in Other Situation ············································ 422
4. Conclusion ································································································· 430
4.5. Freedom of Opinion and Expression ····················································· 432
1.
2.
3.
4.
Freedom of Opinion and Expression ····················································· 432
Freedom of Opinion and Expression in North Korea ························· 432
Investigative Research Method and Objectives in 2010 ······················ 433
Mass Media and Reality ·········································································· 434
1) Television ······························································································· 434
2) Radio ······································································································· 435
3) Newspapers ····························································································· 436
4) Magazines ······························································································· 437
5) Internet ···································································································· 437
6) VCD, DVD and CD-R ········································································· 438
5. Violation against Freedom of Opinion and Expression in North Korea ·· 439
1) Strictly Prohibited Contents ································································· 439
2) Life-assessment Meeting ······································································· 440
3) Contents from Other Countries ··························································· 441
4) Mutual Observation and Reporting ····················································· 445
5) Fliers by North Korean Defectors ······················································ 447
6) Contents with Government Permission ··············································· 448
7) Contents Related to China ··································································· 450
4.6. Involuntary Disappearances ····································································· 454
1. Introduction ································································································ 454
2. Specific Current Cases ············································································· 455
1) Analysis and Comparison of Specific Cases ····································· 455
2) Violation of Norms and Normative Evaluations ······························· 460
3) Conclusions ···························································································· 461
4.7. Human Rights of Socially Marginalized Classes ································· 463
1. Women’s Rights ························································································ 463
1) Women’s Rights in North Korea ························································ 463
2) Domestic Human Rights Violations ···················································· 468
3) Gender Inequality in the Workplace and in Society ························ 481
4) Violence against Women ······································································ 484
5) Worsening of the Right to Health ······················································ 504
2. Rights of the Child ·················································································· 506
1) General Status of Children's Rights in North Korea ······················· 506
2) Right to Life ·························································································· 508
3) Right to Development (The Right to Education) ····························· 514
4) Right to Protection ················································································ 523
3. Human Rights for the Elderly ································································ 530
1) Elderly Protection Law ········································································· 530
2) Rights to Food and Survival ······························································· 534
3) Lack of a Welfare System for the Elderly ······································· 539
4. Rights of Persons with Disabilities ························································ 542
1) Legislation for Protection ····································································· 542
2) Persecution and Discrimination ···························································· 544
3) Protection and Provision of Facilities ················································· 550
5. Human Rights of the Marginalized Class by Personal Background
Classification ······························································································ 552
1) Infringement of Equal Rights ······························································ 552
2) Classification of North Korean Residents ·········································· 554
3) Infringement of Human Rights ···························································· 556
4) Emerging Market Economy and Weakening Classification System ·· 571
4.8. Human Rights Situations in Political Prison Camps ··························· 576
1. Introduction ································································································ 576
2. North Korea’s Criminal Act and Political Prisoners ···························· 580
1) Legal Ground and Application of Political Crimes ·························· 580
2) Criminal Procedure Act and the Criminal Procedure for Political
Prisoners ································································································· 586
3. Operation of Political Prison Camp ······················································· 592
1) Definition and Present Situation ·························································· 592
2) Operating system ··················································································· 603
4. Living Conditions for Political Prisoners ·············································· 607
1) Appearance ····························································································· 607
2) Clothing ·································································································· 608
3) Food ········································································································ 609
4) Residence ································································································ 612
5) Daily Routine and Forced Labor ························································ 613
5. Situation of Human Rights ······································································ 616
1) Right to Life ·························································································· 616
2) Structural Violence ················································································ 619
3) Child and Woman Abuse ····································································· 623
4) Crimes against Humanity ····································································· 627
4.9. Issues Related to North Korean Defectors ··········································· 634
1. Introduction ································································································ 634
2. Causes and Types of Defection ······························································ 635
3. Human Rights Violation during the Defection ····································· 650
1) Changes of Period from Defection to Entrance into South Korea · · 651
2) Human Trafficking ················································································ 653
3) Human Rights Violation in China ······················································ 659
4) Human Rights Violation in the Third Countries ······························ 661
4. Human Rights Violation to Repatriated North Korean Defectors ······ 666
5. Conclusion and Policy Suggestions ························································ 679
4.10. Human Rights Issues in inter-Korean Relations ································ 682
1. Introduction ································································································ 682
2. South Korean Abductees ·········································································· 683
1) Abductees after the Korean War ························································ 683
2) Abductees during the Korean War ····················································· 706
3. Issue of South Korean POWs with No Returns ·································· 726
1) Numbers of POWs ················································································ 726
2) POWs' Human Rights ··········································································· 731
4. Conclusion ································································································· 747
4.11. Issues Surrounding the Koreans repatriated from Japan to North
Korea ······································································································· 751
1. Repatriation of Korean Residents in Japan to North Korea ··············· 751
2. Human Rights Situations of Repatriated Koreans ································ 756
1) Support for the Settlement and Administration ································· 756
2) Social Discrimination ············································································ 758
3) Political Purge ······················································································· 762
4) Daily Observation and Inspection ······················································· 764
5) Issues of Receiving Remittances from the Families in Japan ········ 765
6) Lives of Japanese Wives of Repatriated Koreans ···························· 766
3. Conclusion ································································································· 767
Ⅴ. Conclusion ························································································· 769
Introduction to the Authors (in Alphabetical Order) ······················ 775
Translator’s Note ················································································· 780
Guideline for Readers
13
Song Jue-young
Ⅰ. The Romanization of Korean
South Korea revised its romanization system for Korean, which
replaced McCune-Reischause, on July 7, 2000. Based on the
official guideline requiring to comply with the revised official
system of romanization of Korean since February 28, 2008, this
White Paper follows the new system. Unlike South Korea, North
Korea is known to use McCune-Reischauer romanization. Thus, to
prevent the confusion of the readers who are familiar with the
previous romanization, the paper specifies both South Korean and
North Korean romanization of Korean systems once in the initial
part of each paper in case of a name of a place.
In addition, North and South Koreas are different in romanizing
a Korean name. In general North Korea does not distinguish a
person's last name from his or her first name, but the South
Korea's revised system requires to use one's name as the
principle (3-(4)) of the romanization system demonstrates. For
example, while North Korea uses its previous learder's name as
Kim Il Sung (Kim is the last name), South Korea writes the
same name as Kim Ilsung or Kim Il-sung. Thus, the paper
follows the latter principle to translate Korean names as most
English newspapers in South Korea follow. In case of translating
Koreans' last names, this paper follows widely used ones as
[Table 1] shows.
14
A. Romanization of Korean in South Korea (revised on July 7,
2000)
(The National Institute of the Korean Language. Available from
<http://www. korean. go.kr/eng/index.jsp>)
1. Basic Principles of Romanization
(1) Romanization is based on standard Korean pronunciation.
(2) Symbols other than Roman letters are avoided to the
greatest extent possible.
2. Summary of the Romanization System
(1) Vowels are transcribed as follows:
• simple vowels
ㅏ
ㅓ
ㅗ
ㅜ
ㅡ
ㅣ
ㅐ
ㅔ
ㅚ
ㅟ
a
eo
o
u
eu
i
ae
e
oe
w
• diphthongs
ㅑ
ㅕ
ㅛ
ㅠ
ㅒ
ㅖ
ㅘ
ㅙ
ㅝ
ㅞ
ya
yeo
yo
yu
yae
ye
wa
wae
wo
we
Note 1 : ㅢ is transcribed as ui, even when pronounced as ㅣ.
Note 2 : Long vowels are not reflected in Romanization.
(2) Consonants are transcribed as follows:
• plosives(stops)
ㄱ
ㄲ
ㅋ
ㄷ
ㄸ
ㅌ
ㅍ
ㅂ
ㅃ
g, k
kk
k
d, t
tt
t
b, p
pp
p
15
• affricates
• fricatives
ㅈ
ㅉ
ㅊ
ㅅ
ㅆ
ㅎ
j
jj
ch
s
ss
h
• nasals
• liquids
ㄴ
ㅁ
ㅇ
ㄹ
n
m
ng
r, l
Note 1 : The sounds ㄱ, ㄷ, and ㅂ are transcribed respectively
as g, d, and b when they appear before a vowel; they are
transcribed as k, t, and p when followed by another consonant or
form the final sound of a word.
(They are Romanized as pronunciation in [ ].)
Note 2 : ㄹ is transcribed as r when followed by a vowel, and
as l when followed by a consonant or when appearing at the end
of a word. ㄹㄹ is transcribed as ll.
(e.g.) 구 리 Guri 설 악 Seorak 칠 곡 Chilgok 임 실 Imsil 울 릉
Ulleung 대관령[대괄령] Daegwallyeong
3. Special Provisions for Romanization
(1) When Korean sound values change as in the following
cases, the results of those changes are Romanized as
follows:
① The case of assimilation of adjacent consonants
백마[뱅마]
Baengma
신문로[신문노]
Sinmunno
종로[종노]
Jongno
왕십리[왕심니]
Wangsimni
별내[별래]
Byeollae
신라[실라]
Silla
16
② The case of the epenthetic ㄴ and ㄹ
학여울[항녀울]
Hangnyeoul
알약[알략]
allyak
③ Cases of palatalization
해돋이[해도지]
haedoji
같이[가치]
gachi
맞히다[마치다]
machida
④ Cases where ㄱ, ㄷ, ㅂ, and ㅈ are adjacent to ㅎ
좋고[조코]
joko
놓다[노타]
nota
잡혀[자펴]
japyeo
낳지[나치]
nachi
However, aspirated sounds are not reflected in case of nouns
where ㅎ follows ㄱ, ㄷ, and ㅂ, as in the examples below.
묵호
Mukho
집현전
Jiphyeonjeon
Note : Tense (or glottalized) sounds are not reflected in cases
where morphemes are compounded, as in the examples below.
압구정
Apgujeong 낙동강 Nakdonggang 죽 변
Jukbyeon
낙성대 Nakseongdae
합 정
Hapjeong
saetbyeo
울 산
팔 당
Paldang
샛 별
Ulsan
(2) When there is the possibility of confusion in pronunciation,
a hyphen '-' may be used.
중 앙
Jung-ang
반구대
Ban-gudae
세 운
Se-un
해운대
Hae-undae
(3) The first letter is capitalized in proper names.
부 산
Busan
세 종
Sejong
17
(4) Personal names are written by family name first, followed
by a space and the given name. In principle, syllables in
given names are not separated by hyphen, but the use of a
hyphen between syllables is permitted.
① Assimilated sound changes between syllables in given names
are not transcribed.
한복남
Han Boknam (Han Bok-nam)
홍빛나
Hong Bitna (Hong Bit-na)
② Romanization of family names will be determined separately.
민용하
Min Yongha (Min Yong-ha)
송나리
Song Nari (Song Na-ri)
(5) Administrative units such as 도, 시, 군, 구, 읍, 면, 리, 동,
and 가 are transcribed respectively as do, si, gun, gu, eup,
myeon, ri, dong, and ga, and are preceded by a hyphen.
Assimilated sound changes before and after the hyphen are
not reflected in Romanization.
충청북도 Chungcheongbuk-do
제주도
Jeju-do
의정부시
Uijeongbu-si
양주군
Yangju-gun
도봉구
Dobong-gu
신창읍
Sinchang-eup
삼죽면
Samjuk-myeon
인왕리
Inwang-ri
당산동
Dangsan-dong
봉천1동 Bongcheon1(il)-dong 종로 2가 Jongno 2(i)-ga 퇴계로 3가 Toegyero 3(sam)-ga
Note : Termsforadministrativeunitssuchas 시, 군, 읍 may be
omitted.
청주시
Cheongju
함평군
Hampyeong
순창읍
Sunchang
18
(6) Names
of
geographic
features,
cultural
properties,
and
man-made structures may be written without hyphens.
남 산
Namsan
독 도
Dokdo
연화교
Yeonhwagyo
속리산
Songnisan
금 강
경복궁 Gyeongbokgung 무량수전
남한산성 Namhansanseong
Geumgang
Muryangsujeon
극락전
Geungnakjeon
안압지
Anapji
화랑대
Hwarangdae
불국사
Bulguksa
현충사
Hyeonchungsa
독립문
Dongnimmun
오죽헌
Ojukheon
촉석루
Chokseongnu
종 묘
Jongmyo
다보탑
Dabotap
(7) Proper
names
such
as
personal
names
and
those
of
companies may continue to be written as they have been
previously.
(8) When it is necessary to convert Romanized Korean back to
Hangeul in special cases such as in academic articles,
Romanization is done according to Hangeul spelling and not
pronunciation.
Each
Hangeul
letter
is
Romanized
as
explained in section 2 except that ㄱ, ㄷ, ㅂ, ㄹ are always
written as g, d, b, l. When ㅇ has no sound value, it is
replaced by a hyphen may also be used when it is
necessary to distinguish between syllables.
19
B. Romanization of Korean Last Name
* A/B : A is used more frequently
* = : same as official romanization in Korea
Last name
가(賈)
간(簡)
갈(葛)
감(甘)
강(姜康)
견(堅甄)
경(景慶)
계(桂)
고(高)
공(孔)
곽(郭)
구(丘具)
국(國菊鞠)
궁(弓)
권(權)
금(琴)
기(奇)
길(吉)
김(金)
나(羅)
남(南)
남궁(南宮)
노(盧魯)
단(段)
도(都)
동(董)
두(杜)
마(馬)
맹(孟)
명(明)
모(牟毛)
목(睦)
묵(墨)
문(文)
미(米)
민(閔)
박(朴)
반(潘)
방(房方)
배(裵)
Common Principle Last name Common Principle
use
use
Ka
Ga
백(白)
Baek
=
Kan
Gan
범(范凡)
Bum
Beom
Kal
Gal
변(卞邊)
Byun
Byeon
Kam
Gam
복(卜)
Bok
=
Kang
Gang
봉(奉)
Bong
=
Kyun
Gyeon
부(夫)
Boo
Bu
Kyung
Gyeong
빈(彬賓)
Bin
=
Kye
Gye
사(史)
Sa
=
Ko
Go
사공(司空) Sakong Sagong
Kong
Gong
상(尙)
Sang
=
Kwak
Gwak
서(徐)
Seo
=
Koo
Gu
석(石)
Suk
Seok
Kook
Guk
선(宣)
Sun
Seon
Koong
Gung
선우(鮮于) Sunwoo Seonu
Kwon
Gwon
설(薛)
Seol
=
Keum
Geum
성(成)
Sung
Seong
Ki
Gi
소(蘇)
So
=
Kil
Gil
손(孫)
Son
=
Kim
Gim
송(宋)
Song
=
Na
=
승(承)
Seung
=
Nam
=
시(柴)
Si
=
Namgung
=
신(愼申辛)
Shin
Sin
Noh/No
No
심(沈)
Shim
Sim
Dan
=
안(安)
An
=
Do
=
양(梁楊)
Yang
=
Dong
=
어(魚)
Eo
=
Doo
Du
엄(嚴)
Eom
=
Ma
=
여(呂余)
Yeo
=
Maeng
=
연(延燕)
Yeon
=
Myung Myeong
염(廉)
Yeom
=
Mo
=
예(芮)
Ye
=
Mok
=
오(吳)
Oh
O
Mook
Muk
옥(玉)
Ok
=
Moon
Mun
온(溫)
On
=
Mi
=
왕(王)
Wang
=
Min
=
용(龍)
Yong
=
Park
Bak
우(禹)
Woo
U
Ban
=
원(元)
Won
=
Bang
=
위(魏)
Wi
=
Bae
=
유(柳兪劉庾)
Yoo
Yu
Last name
육(陸)
윤(尹)
은(殷)
음(陰)
이(李異)
인(印)
임(任林)
장(張章蔣)
전(全田錢)
정(丁程鄭)
제(諸)
제갈(諸葛)
조(曺趙)
좌(左)
주(周朱)
지(池)
진(秦陳)
차(車)
채(蔡)
천(千)
최(崔)
추(秋鄒)
탁(卓)
태(太)
판(判)
팽(彭)
편(片)
표(表)
피(皮)
하(河夏)
한(韓)
함(咸)
허(許)
현(玄)
형(邢)
호(扈胡)
홍(洪)
황(黃)
Common
use
Yook
Yoon
Eun
Eum
Lee
In
Lim
Jang
Jeon
Jung
Je
Jegal
Cho
Jwa
Joo
Ji
Jin
Cha
Chae
Chun
Choi
Choo
Tak
Tae
Pan
Paeng
Pyun
Pyo
Pi
Ha
Ham
Ham
Heo
Hyun
Hyung
Ho
Hong
Hwang
Principle
Yuk
Yun
=
=
I
=
Im
=
=
Jeong
=
=
Jo
=
Ju
=
=
=
=
Cheon
Choe
Chu
=
=
=
=
Pyeon
=
=
=
=
=
=
Hyeon
Hyeong
=
=
=
<Source: Heo Cheol-gu, Seongui Romaja Pyogi Bangan (Suggestion to
Romanization of Korean Last Name), The national Institute of the Korean
Language, Saegugeo Gyeoulho(New Korean Language life) (Winter, 2000)>
20
Ⅱ. Administrative divisions of North Korea
The administrative divisions of North Korea are organized into
three hierarchical levels inaugurated by Kim Il Sung in 1952. At
the highest level are nine provinces, two directly-governed cities,
and
three
special
administrative
divisions.
The
second-level
divisions are cities, counties, wards, and districts. These are
further subdivided into third-level entities: towns, neighborhoods,
villages, and workers' districts. The name of a place is spelled in
Korean,
Chinese,
South
Korean
Romanization
system,
McCune-Reischauser system and the other combined system.
A. First-level divisions
The nine provinces (도, 道, Do, Do) derive from the traditional
provinces of Korea, but have been further subdivided since the
division of Korea. They are large areas including cities, rural and
mountainous regions. The two directly governed cities (직할시, 直
轄市, Jikhal-si, Chikhalsi;) are large metropolitan cities that have
been separated from their former provinces to become first-level
units. Four other cities have been directly governed in the past,
but were subsequently reunited with their provinces or otherwise
reorganized.
The three special administrative regions were all created in
2002 for the development of collaborative ventures with South
Korea and other countries. One of them, the Sinŭiju Special
Administrative Region, was intended to draw Chinese investment
and enterprise, but as of 2006 appears never to have been
implemented. The special administrative regions do not have any
known second- and third-level subdivisions.
21
1. The Nine Provinces (도, 道, Do, Do)
South Korean
Romanization system
McCune-Reischauser
system
Other Combined system
江原道
Gangwon-do
Kangwŏndo
Kangwŏn Province
양(량)강도
兩江道
Yanggang-do
(Ryanggang-do)
Ryanggang-do;
Ryanggang Province
자강도
慈江道
Jagang-do
Chagang-do
Chagang Province
평안남도
平安南道
Pyeongannam-do
P'yŏngan-namdo
South P'yŏngan Province
평안북도
平安北道
Pyeonganbuk-do
P'yŏngan-pukto
North P'yŏngan Province
황해남도
黃海南道
Hwanghaenam-do
Hwanghae-namdo
South Hwanghae Province
황해북도
黃海北道
Hwanghaebuk-do
Hwanghae-pukto
North Hwanghae Province
함경남도
咸鏡南道
Hamgyeongnam-do
Hamgyŏng-namdo
South Hamgyŏng Province
함경북도
咸鏡北道
Hamgyeongbuk-do
Hamgyŏng-pukto
North Hamgyŏng Province
Korean
Chinese
강원도
2. The Two Directly Governed Cities
(직할시, 直轄市, Jikhal-si, Chikhalsi)
Korean
Chinese
South Korean
Romanization system
McCune-Reischauser
system
Other combined
system
평양직할시
平壤直轄市
Pyeongyangjikhal-si
P'yŏngyang Chikhalsi
P'yŏngyang Directly
Governed City
라선(라진-선봉)
직할시
羅先 (羅津-先鋒)
直轄市
Raseon(Rajin-Seonbon Rasŏn(Rajin-Sŏnbong)
g)jikhal-si,
Chikhalsi
Rasŏn
(Rajin-Sŏnbong)
Directly Governed
City
3. The Three Special Administrative Regions
Korean
Chinese
South Korean
Romanization system
McCune-Reischauser
system
Other combined system
개성
공업지구
開城
工業地區
Gaeseong
Gongeop-jigu
Kaesŏng Kongŏp Chigu
Kaesŏng Industrial Region
금강산
관광지구
金剛山
觀光地區
Geumgangsan
Gwangwang-jigu
Kŭmgangsan
Kwan'gwang Chigu
Kŭmgangsan Tourist Region
신의주
특별
행정구
新義州
特別
行政區
Sinuiju Teukbyeol
Haengjeong-gu
Sinŭiju T'ŭkbyŏl
Haengjeonggu
Sinŭiju Special
Administrative Region
22
B. Second-level divisions
The most common second-level division is the county (군, 郡,
Gun, Kun), a less urbanized area within a province or directly
governed city. The more populous districts within provinces are
cities (시, 市, Si, Si), and the city of Nampo(Nampho) is a special
city (특급시, 特級市, Teukgeup-si, T'ŭkkŭpsi). Some provinces
also have two types of districts (구, 지구; 區, 地區; Gu, Jigu; Ku,
Chigu).
The city centers of the directly-governed cities are organized
into wards (구역, 區域, Guyeok, Kuyŏk) equivalent to South
Korean 區(Gu)). (South Korea is divided into 8 provinces (도, 道,
do), 1 special autonomous province (特別自治道, Teukbyeoljachi-do),
6 metropolitan cities (광역시, 廣域市, Gwangyeok-si), and 1 special
city (특별시, 特別市, Teukbyeol-si). Rural parts of cities and
counties are organized into villages (리, 理, Ri, Ri). The downtown
areas within cities are divided into neighborhoods (동, 洞, Dong,
Dong), and a populous part of a county forms a town (읍, 邑,
Eup, Ŭp). Some counties also have worker's districts (노동자, 勞
童子區, Rodongja-gu, Rodongjagu).
1. Subdivisions of North Korea in local language
(1) 강원도, 江原道, Gangwon-do, Kangwŏn-do, Kangwon Province
∙Capital: 원산, 元山, Wonsan, Wŏnsan
∙15 Counties (군, 郡, Gun, Kun):
23
군
郡
Gun
Kun
군
郡
고산
高山
고성
高城
금강
金剛
Geumgang
Gun
Kun
Gosan
Kosan
세포
洗浦
Sepo
Sep'o
Goseong
Kosŏng
창도
昌道
Changdo
Ch'angdo
Kŭmgang
천내
川內
Cheonnae
Ch'ŏnnae
김화
金化
Gimhwa
Kimhwa
철원
鐵原
Cheolwon
Ch'ŏrwŏn
통천
通川
Tongcheon
T'ongch'ŏn
안변
安邊
Ahnbyeon
Anbyŏn
법동
法洞
Beopdong
Pŏptong
이천
伊川
Icheon
Ich'ŏn
판교
板橋
Pangyo
P'an'gyo
회양
淮陽
Hweoyang
Hoeyang
평강
平康
Pyeonggang
P'yŏnggang
∙2 Cities (시, 市, Si, Si):
시
市
Si
Si
문천
文川
Muncheon
Munch'ŏn
원산
元山
Wonsan
금강산관광지구 金剛山觀光地區
금강산
金剛山
개성공업지구
開城工業地區
개성
開城
라선직할시
羅先直轄市
라선
羅先
Wŏnsan
Kŭmgangsan Kwan'gwang Chigu
Geumgangsan
Kŭmgangsan
Kaesŏng Kong-ŏp Chigu
Gaeseong
Kaesŏng
Rasŏn chikhalsi
Raseon
Rasŏn
∙The One Directly Governed Cities (직할시, 直轄市, Jikhal-si,
Chikhalsi)
Korean
Chinese
South Korean
Romanization
system
McCune-Reischauser
system
Other combined
system
Rasŏn
羅先
Raseon(Rajin-Seon Rasŏn(Rajin-Sŏnbong) (Rajin-Sŏnbong)
라선(라진-선봉)
(羅津-先鋒)
bong)jikhal-si,
Chikhalsi
Directly Governed
직할시
直轄市
City
(2) 량강도, 兩江道,
Yanggang-do, Ryanggang-do, Ryanggang
Province
∙Capital: 혜산, 惠山,
Hyesan, Hyesan
24
군
郡
Gun
Kun
군
郡
Gun
Kun
갑산
甲山
Gapsan
Kapsan
백암
白岩
Baegam
Paegam
김정숙
金貞淑
Gimjeongsuk
Kimjŏngsuk
풍서
豊西
Pungseo
P'ungsŏ
김형권
金亨權
Kimhyeonggwon
Kimhyŏnggwŏn
삼수
三水
Samsu
Samsu
김형직
金亨稷
Gimhyeongjik
Kimhyŏngjik
삼지연
三池淵
Samgiyeon
Samjiyŏn
대홍단
大紅湍
Daeheungdan
Taehongdan
운흥
雲興
Unheung
Unhŭng
보천
普天
Bocheon
Poch'ŏn
∙1 City (시, 市, Si, Si):
시
市
Si
Si
혜산
惠山
Hyesan
Hyesan
(3) 평안남도,
平安南道,
Pyeongannam-do,
P'yŏngan-namdo,
South P'yŏngan Province
∙Capital: 평성, 平城, Pyeongseong, P'yŏngsŏng
군
郡
Gun
Kun
군
郡
Gun
Kun
대동
大同
Daedong
Taedong
온천
溫泉
Oncheon
Onch'ŏn
대흥
大興
Daeheung
Taehŭng
은산
殷山
Eunsan
Ŭnsan
문덕
文德
Mundeok
Mundŏk
양덕
陽德
Yangdeok
Yangdŏk
맹산
孟山
Maengsan
Maengsan
회창
檜倉
Hoechang
Hoech'ang
북창
北倉
Bukchang
Pukch'ang
용강 *
龍岡
Yonggang
Yonggang
평원
平原
Pyeongwon
P'yŏngwŏn
녕원 *
寧遠
Yeongwon
Yŏngwŏn
성천
成川
Seongcheon
Sŏngch'ŏn
강서 *
江西
Ganseo
Kangsŏ
숙천
肅川
Sukcheon
Sukch'ŏn
신양
新陽
Sinyang
Sinyang
증산
甑山
Jeungsan
Chungsan
천리마 * 千里馬 Cheollima
* merged in with Nampo in 2004
대안 *
大安
Daean
Ch'ŏllima
Taean
25
시
市
Si
Si
시
市
Si
Si
개천
价川
Gaecheon
Kaech'ŏn
순천
順川
Suncheon
Sunch'ŏn
덕천
德川
Deokcheon
Tŏkch'ŏn
안주
安州
Angu
Anju
평성
平城 Pyeongseong
P'yŏngsŏng
∙2 District (지구, 地區, Jigu, Chigu):
지구
地區
Jigu
Chigu
득장
得場
Deukjang
Tŭkchang
운곡
雲谷
Ungok
Un'gok
∙1 District/Ward (구, 區, Gu, Ku):
구
區
청남
清南
Gu
Ku
CheongnamCh'ŏngnam
∙1 Sepcial City (특급시, 特級市, Teukgeup-si, Ttŭkkŭpsi):
특급시
特級市
Teukgeup-si
Ttŭkkŭpsi
남포
南浦
Nampo
Namp'o
(4) 평안북도, 平安北道, Pyeonganbuk-do, P'yŏngan-pukto, North
P'yŏngan Province
∙Capital: 신의주, 新義州, Sinuiju, Sinŭiju
26
군
郡
Gun
Kun
군
郡
구장
球場
곽산
郭山
녕변
寧邊 Nyeongbyeon
동림
東林
동창
東倉
Gun
Kun
Gujang
Kujang
삭주
朔州
Sakju
Sakchu
Gwaksan
Kwaksan
선천
宣川
Seoncheon
Sŏnch'ŏn
Nyŏngbyŏn
신도
薪島
Sindo
Sindo
Dongnim
Tongrim
창성
昌城
Changseong
Ch'angsŏng
Dongchang
Tongch'ang
천마
天摩
Cheonman
Ch'ŏnma
대관
大館
Daegwan
Taegwan
철산
鐵山
Cheolsan
Ch'ŏlsan
태천
泰川
Taecheon
T'aech'ŏn
운산
雲山
Unsan
Unsan
룡천
龍川
Ryongcheon
Ryongch'ŏn
운전
雲田
Unjeon
Unjŏn
박천
博川
Bakcheon
Pakch'ŏn
의주
義州
Uiju
Ŭiju
벽동
碧潼
Byeokdong
Pyŏktong
염주
鹽州
Yeomju
Yŏmju
피현
枇峴
Pihyeon
P'ihyŏn
향산
香山
Hyangsan
Hyangsan
시
市
Si
Si
구성
龜城
Guseong
Kusŏng
신의주
新義州
Sinuiju
Sinŭiju
정주
定州
Jeongju
Chŏngju
(5) 평양직할시, 平壤直轄市, Pyeongyang jikhal-si, P'yŏngyang
chikhalsi, Pyongyang directly governed city
∙Capital: 평양, 平壌, Pyeongyang, P'yŏngyang
군
郡
Gun
Kun
강남
江南
Gangnam
Kangnam
강동
江東
Gangdong
Kangdong
상원
祥原
Sangwon
Sangwŏn
중화
中和
Junghwa
Chunghwa
신의주
특별행정구
新義州特
別行政區
Sinuijuteukbyeolhaengjeonggu
Sinŭiju T'ŭkbyŏl
Haengjŏnggu
신의주
新義州
Sinuiju
Sinŭiju
27
∙19 Districts (구역, 區域, Guyeok, Kuyŏk):
Guyeok
Kuyŏk
구역
區域
Guyeok
Kuyŏk
동대원 東大院
구역
區域
Dongdaewon
Tongdaewŏn
사동
寺洞
Sadong
Sadong
대동강 大同江
Daedonggang
Taedonggang
삼석
三石
Samseok
Samsŏk
大城
Daeseong
Taesŏng
선교
船橋
Seongyo
Sŏn'gyo
락랑
樂浪
Rangnang
Rangrang
서성
西城
력포
力浦
Ryeokpo
Ryŏkp'o
순안
順安
룡성
龍城
Ryongseong
Ryongsŏng
승호
勝湖
중
中
Jung
Chung
은정
恩情
Eunjeong
Ŭnjŏng
Hyeongjedan
Hyŏngjesan
대성
만경대 萬景台 Mangyeongdae Man'gyŏngdae
모란봉 牡丹峰
Moranbong
Moranbong
보통강 普通江
Botonggang
Pot'onggang
Pyeongcheon
P'yŏngch'ŏn
평천
平川
형제산 兄弟山
Sŏsŏng
Sunan
Sŭngho
(6) 자강도, 慈江道, Jagang-do, Chagang-do, Chagang Province
∙Capital: 강계, 江界, Ganggye, Kanggye
군
郡
Gun
Kun
군
郡
고풍
랑림
동신
東新
룡림
龍林
성간
城干
송원
시중
자성
Gun
Kun
古豐
Gopung
Kop'ung
장강
狼林
Rangnim
Rangrim
전천
長江
Janggang
Changgang
前川
Jeoncheon
Chŏnch'ŏn
Dongsin
Tongsin
Ryongnim
Ryongrim
중강
中江
Junggang
Chunggang
초산
楚山
Chosan
Seonggan
Ch'osan
Sŏnggan
우시
雩時
Usi
Usi
松原
時中
Songwon
Songwŏn
위원
渭原
Wiwon
Wiwŏn
Sijung
Sijung
화평
和坪
Hwapyeong
Hwap'yŏng
慈城
Jaseong
Chasŏng
시
市
Si
Si
강계
江界
Ganggye
Kanggye
만포
滿浦
Manpo
Manp'o
희천
熙川
Huicheon
Hŭich'ŏn
28
(7) 함경남도, 咸鏡南道, Hamgyeongnam-do, Hamgyŏng-namdo,
Hamgyŏng
∙Capital: 함흥, 咸興, Hamheung, Hamhŭng
군
郡
Gun
Kun
군
郡
Gun
Kun
Jangjin
Changjin
고원
高原
Gowon
Kowŏn
장진
長津
금야
金野
Geumnya
Kŭmya
정평
定平
덕성
德城
Deokseong
Tŏksŏng
영광
榮光 Yeonggwang
락원
樂園
Ragwon
Ragwŏn
요덕
耀德
Yodeok
Yodŏk
리원
利原
Riwon
Riwŏn
함주
咸州
Hamju
Hamju
북청
北靑
Bukcheong
Pukch'ŏng
허천
虛川
Heocheon
Hŏch'ŏn
부전
赴戰
Bujeon
Pujŏn
홍원
洪原
Heungwon
Hongwŏn
신흥
新興
Sinheung
Sinhŭng
Jeongpyeong Ch'ŏngp'yŏng
Yŏnggwang
시
市
Si
Si
시
市
Si
Si
단천
端川
Dancheon
Tanch'on
함흥
咸興
Hamheung
Hamhŭng
신포
新浦
Sinpo
Sinp'o
흥남
興南
Heungnam
Hŭngnam
∙1 District (구, 區, Gu, Ku):
구
區
Gu
Ku
수동
水洞
Sudong
Sudong
∙1 District (지구, 地區, Jigu, Chigu):
지구
地區
Jigu
Chigu
금호
琴湖
Geumho
Kŭmho
(8) 함경북도,
咸鏡北道,
Hamgyeongbuk-do,
North Hamgyŏng Province
∙Capital: 청진, 淸津, Cheongjin, Ch'ŏngjin
Hamgyŏng-pukto,
군
郡
Gun
길주
吉州
Gilju
경성
鏡城 Gyeongseong
무산
茂山
Kun
군
郡
Kun
Kilchu
어랑
漁郞
Eorang
Ŏrang
Kyŏngsŏng
온성
穩城
Onseong
Onsŏng
Musan
은덕
恩德
Undeok
Ŭndŏk
Musan
명천
明川 Myeongcheon Myŏngch'ŏn
부령
富寧
새별
Gun
29
연사
延社
Yeonsa
Yŏnsa
Buryeong
Puryŏng
화대
花坮
Hwadae
Hwadae
Saebyeol
Saebyŏl
화성
化成
Hwaseong
Hwasŏng
시
市
Si
Si
김책
金策
Gimchaek
Kimch'aek
청진
淸津
Cheongjin
Ch'ŏngjin
회령
會寧
Hoeryeong
Hoeryŏng
(9) 황해남도,
黃海南道,
Hwanghaenam-do,
Hwanghae-namdo,
South Hwanghae Province
∙Capital: 해주, 海州, Haeju (Haeju)
군
郡
Gun
Kun
군
郡
Gun
Kun
강령
康翎
Gangnyeong
Kangryŏng
신원
新院
Sinwon
Sinwŏn
Gwail
Kwail
장연
長淵
Jangyeon
Changyŏn
과일
봉천
峰泉
Bongcheon
Pongch'ŏn
재령
載寧
Jaeryeong
Chaeryŏng
백천
白川
Baekcheon
Paekch'ŏn
청단
靑丹
Cheongdan
Ch'ŏngdan
벽성
碧城
Byeokseong
Pyŏksŏng
안악
安岳
Anak
Anak
태탄
苔灘
Taetan
T'aet'an
옹진
甕津
Ongjin
Ongjin
룡연
龍淵
Ryongyeon
Ryŏngyŏn
은률
殷栗
Eullyul
Ŭnryul
삼천
三泉
Samcheon
Samch'ŏn
은천
銀泉
Euncheon
Ŭnch'ŏn
송화
松禾
Songhwa
Songhwa
연안
延安
Yeonan
Yŏnan
신천
信川
Sincheon
Sinch'ŏn
30
∙1 City (시, 市, Si, Si):
시
市
Si
Si
해주
海州
Haeju
Haeju
(10) 황해북도,
黃海北道,
Hwanghaebuk-do,
Hwanghae-pukto,
North Hwanghae Province
∙Capital: 사리원, 沙里院, Sariwon, Sariwŏn
군
郡
Gun
Kun
군
郡
Gun
Kun
곡산
谷山
Goksan
Koksan
수안
遂安
Suan
Suan
금천
金川
Geumcheon
Kŭmch'ŏn
신계
新溪
Singye
Sin'gye
개풍
開豐
Gaepung
Kaep'ung
신평
新坪
Sinpyeong
Sinp'yŏng
토산
兎山
Tosan
T'osan
장풍
長豐
Jangpung
Changp'ung
린산
麟山
Rinsan
Rinsan
은파
銀波
Eunpa
Ŭnp'a
봉산
鳳山
Bongsan
Pongsan
연탄
燕灘
Yeontan
Yŏntan
평산
平山
Pyeongsan
P'yŏngsan
연산
延山
Yeonsan
Yŏnsan
서흥
瑞興
Seoheung
Sŏhŭng
황주
黃州
Hwangju
Hwangju
시
市
Si
Si
개성
開城
Gaeseong
Kaesŏng
사리원
沙里院
Sariwon
Sariwŏn
송림
松林
Songnim
Songrim
2. Former Directly Governed Cities
청진시(淸津市, Cheongjin(-si), Ch'ŏngjin(City)) used to be a
Directly Governed City, but is now part of Hamgyeongbuk-do.
함흥시(咸興市, Hamheng(-si), Hamhŭng(City)) was a Directly
31
Governed City in the 1960s, but is now part of Hamgyeongnam
-do.
개성시(開城市,
Gaeseong(-si),
Kaesŏng(City))
(distinct
from
Kaesŏng Industrial Region) was a Directly Governed City until
2003, but is now part of Hwanghaebuk-do.
남포 특급시(南浦特級市, Nampo Teukgeup-si, Namp'o T'ŭkkŭpsi,
Namp'o Special City) was a Directly Governed City until 2004,
but is now part of P'yŏng'annam-do.
Please
refer
to
<http://www.nationmaster.com/encyclopedia
/Administrative- divisions-of-North-Korea#First-level_divisions>
32
Ⅲ. Citation Examples
1. Book (one author)
Kenneth Roberts, Deepening Democracy? The Modern Left and
Social
Movements
in
Chile
and
Peru
(Stanford:
Stanford
University Press, 1998), p. 3.
2. Book (two authors)
Liam P. Unwin and Joseph Galloway, Peace in Ireland (Boston:
Stronghope Press, 1990).
3. Subsequent citation
Ibid., p. 6. or
Roberts, Deepening Democracy, p. 6.
4. Edited book
Anthony
B.
Tortelli,
ed.,
Sociology
Approaching
the
Twenty-first Century (Los Angeles: Peter and Sons, 1991).
5. Chapter in edited book
Herbert Kitschelt, "Partisan Competition and Welfare State
Retrenchment," in Paul Pierson, ed., The New Politics of the
Welfare State (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).
6. Foreign language title
Li Xueju, Wang Zhenyao and Tang Jinsu, eds., Zhongguo
xiangzhen zhengquan de xianzhuang yu gaige (The Current
Situation
and
Reform
of
Power
in
ChineseVillages
and
33
Townships) (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui chubanshe, 1994), p. 5.
7. Article in journal
Joseph Wong, "Resisting Reform: The Politics of Health Care in
Democratizing Taiwan," American Asian Review, vol. 21, no. 2
(2003), pp. 221-245.
8. Magazine article
Marcia Berss, "Protein Man," Forbes (October 24, 1994), pp.
64-66.
9. Newspaper article (no author)
"Globalization
Often
Means
that
the
Fast
Track
Leads
Overseas," The Financial Post, June 16, 1996, A1.
10. Newspaper article (one author)
Bruce Little, "Payroll Taxes Linked to Job Loss," The Globe
and Mail, August 9, 1995, B1.
11. Interview
Tim
G.
Peterson,
interview
by
author,
tape
recording,
Millingdon, Md., July 26, 1973.
12. Online magazine article
Robert Steuteville, "The State of Garbage in America," part 1,
BioCycle.
April 20, 1995, 54–63. [Online, cited 25 October 1995].
Available from <telnet://melvyl.uncop.edu>
34
13. Internet, World Wide Web
"Tips to Reduce, Reuse, and Recycle," Environmental Recycling
Hotline.
[Online,
cited
October
25,
<http://www.primenet.com/cgi- bin/erh.pl>
14. * indicates a translator's footnote.
1995].
Available
from
35
Ⅳ. North Korean Detention Facilities
Korean
관리소
교화소
노동단련대
교양소
구류장
집결소
Chinese
管理所
敎化所
勞動鍛鍊隊
敎養所
拘留場
集結所
Official
Korean
Phonetic
Romanization
(since 2000
South
Korea only)
Gwal-li-so
Gyo-hwa-so
Literal
English
a
management
center
a place to
edify people
a place to
train one's
body with
labor
Descriptive
English
a political
prison camp
or Gwalliso
No.XX
a long-term
corrective
labor camp
a corrective a corrective
labor camp training camp
No-dong-dal
Gyo-yang-so Gu-ryu-jang Jip-gyeol-so
-lyeon-dae
Its official
name is
"Management
Center
Number XX
(XX ho
Gwalliso).
Originally it
indicates a
It is North
local
Korea's
It is also
government
official
called
office in
detention
Kkang-pan
North Korea facility where
in which
and its
serious
petty
Explanation
location or criminals are
criminals
function.
forced to
shall be
However, in
engage in detained with
political
forced penal forced penal
prison camps,
labor.
labor.
such offices
only have
numbers to
hide their
location and
real fuction
such as
Gwalliso
No.14.
a place to
make people
civilized
(with
education)
a detention
house
a gathering
place
a detention
house
a gathering
facility for
the suspects
It is a
detention
It is a
detention
facility where
people with facility within
minor offense the Public
are detained
Security
by a decision
Agency
(PSA) or
of the Public
Security
the Bowibu
(National
Agency
(PSA)
Security
without any
Agency).
formal trial.
It is a
detention
center where
people with
offense wait
before they
are sent to
be
interrogated
by the Public
Security
Agency
(PSA).
※ There is another detention facility, Kkotjebi Suyongso, for street orphans called
Kkotjebi.
36
Ⅴ. Glossary
⦁국가안전보위부
(Guk-ga-an-jeon-bo-wi-bu): the Bowibu (the National Security Agency)
The North Korea Secret Police changed its name several times.
1) Nae-mu-seong (the Bureau of Intelligence at the Ministry
of Internal Affairs)
2) Jeong-chi-bo-wi-guk (the Bureau of Political Integrity) in
1962
3) Sa-heo-an-jeon-seong (the Ministry of Social (Security)
Safety, renamed from the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and
the predecessor of the present Ministry of Public Security)
in May 1973
4) Guk-ga-jeong-chi-bo-wi-bu
(the
National
and
Political
Integrity Agency) in 1982
5) Guk-ga-bo-wi-bu (the National Security Agency) in 1993
(For more information, please refer to Heo Man-ho, "North
Korean
Human
Relations":
Rights
Intervention
in
and
"Cooperative
Education,"
Antagonistic
Seonggok
Nonchong (Seonggok Academic and Cultural Foundation),
vol. 35 (2004), p. 188.)
- 보위(부)원 (Bo-wi-(bu)-won): a Bowibu agent or a
security agent
- 시보위부 (Si-bo-wi-bu): City Bowibu or City Security
Agency
- 도보위부(Do-bo-wi-bu): Provincial Bowibu or Provincial
Security Agency
⦁인민보안성
(In-min-bo-an-seong) : People's Safety (or Security) Agency, police.
37
Initially this institution started to train security officials and its
predecessor is Social Security (Safety) Agency until 2000. Recently it
reinforced its role to control residents and became State Security
Department in 2010.
- 보안원 (Bo-an-won) or 안전원 (An-jeon-won) : a PSA officer
or a police officer
⦁노동단련형
(No-dong-dal-lyeon-hyeong) : disciplinary prison labor
⦁노동교화형
(No-dong-gyo-hwa-hyeong) : correctional prison labor
⦁유기노동교화형
(Yu-gi-no-dong-gyo-hwa-hyeong) : limited term of correctional prison
labor
⦁무기노동교화형
(Mu-gi-no-dong-gyo-hwa-hyeong) : life-time term of correctional prison
labor
Map No. 4163 United Nations March 2001
Department of Public Information Cartographic Section
(* The names of the places are modified based on the revised Romanization of
Korean on July 7, 2000)
Ⅰ
Introduction
Lee Jae-won
41
I. Introduction
Ⅰ. Introduction
￭ Lee Jae-won (Attorney at law)
1. Purpose of the White Paper on Human Rights in North Korea
In
March
representative
2005,
the
human
Korean
rights
Bar
Association
organization
in
(KBA),
South
a
Korea,
established the Subcommittee on Human Rights in North Korea
(hereinafter referred to as ‘Subcommittee’) under its Human Rights
Committee in effort to improve the ever-worsening human rights
situation in North Korea. The Subcommittee has a plan to
undertake a project to integrate information on trends in the
situation of the human rights in North Korea which have been
collected through various studies, research and analyses and
publish a biennial White Paper. This 2010 White Paper on Human
Rights in North Korea(White Paper) is the third publication of
its kind, a sequel to the previous two White Papers of 2006 and
2008.
The
KBA’s
international
embassies
White
human
in
South
Papers
were
widely
rights
organizations,
NGOs
Korea
as
to
well
as
distributed
and
related
to
foreign
domestic
organizations. They helped enhance international awareness of the
situation of human rights and world-wide efforts to improve it
and the 2010 White Paper is expected to play the same role.
For the situation of human rights in North Korea to be
improved, objective and credible research should be undertaken
42
first, and the results should be distributed for public debate. The
2010 White Paper on Human Rights in North Korea is published
with a view to performing objective and credible research whose
main concern is to refute the hypocritical and misleading logic
that human rights issues in North Korea should be solved through
internal approaches by North Korea itself. Simultaneously, this
White Paper was published in order to make public the situation
of human rights North Korea. It also aims to analyze the causes
of North Korean human rights issues, to define their political,
social
and
normative
significance
and
to
propose
possible
countermeasures.
As the first and second White Papers of 2006 and 2008, this
2010 White Paper takes the same posture which takes legal as
well as socio-political approaches in its identification of human
rights issues in North Korea. So, based on these perspectives, it
analyzes their causes and pursues measures, relying on legal
means for possible solutions, to tackle them. From the law
professionals' point of view, the White Paper looks at whether
North Korean laws have any status and function as social norms
and it tries to establish a causal relationship between human
rights problems in North Korea and the political system or
hierarchy of legal norms. It also illustrates that the current status
of North Korea’s accession to international human rights treaties,
reviews the enactment and revision of human rights-related laws
and explains how they are applied in reality and what kind of
legal implications they have. In addition, the White Paper details
specific cases of human rights violations and explains how they
contravene generally recognized human rights norms in civilized
societies, human rights treaties acceded by North Korea, the North
I. Introduction
Korean
Constitution
and
its
human
rights-related
43
laws.
Furthermore, it examines whether those human rights violations
can be subject to legal criticism and if there can be any measures
to hold the regime responsible for the violations. Finally, mention
is made of how this kind of approach can help improve the
current human rights situation in North Korea. Therefore, the
White
Paper
is
expected
to
provide
readers
with
unique
perspectives and solutions of the association of jurists for the
human rights issues in North Korea.
2. Principles Governing Research and Writing
It is almost impossible to perform on-site inspections to assess
and verify facts concerning human rights conditions in North
Korea. However, the swiftness, credibility and quantity of the
information leaked from North Korea have been greatly enhanced
and the number of North Korean defectors has already reached
twenty thousand. Therefore, however clandestine the North Korean
human rights situations are, if scientific research methods and
accumulated data and information are well utilized, research can
reveal an objective picture.
With the above elements in mind, the Subcommittee determined
the research objects, methods, and writing principles for the 2010
White Paper on Human Rights in North Korea as follows:
In order to enhance the credibility of the survey results, the
number of defectors to be interviewed shall be doubled to two
hundred persons. The interviews shall be conducted, in principle,
on defectors who entered South Korea after 2005 and priority
shall be given to those who defected most recently. However, care
should be taken not to include defectors who participated in the
44
interviews for the 2008 White Paper. In-depth interviews shall be
conducted from February 2010 through April 2010 and the authors
of 2010 White Paper from the Subcommittee shall participate in
the interviews related with their writing subjects for a certain
period of time.
The authors of the 2010 White Paper shall cover different fields
from those of the 2008 White Paper in order to prevent its
contents from being hackneyed by stereotypes. Writings shall
focus on description of the substantive facts, and the authors may
utilize visual materials such as photographs, pictures and tables
and refer to existing documents and various statistics, articles,
investigation reports, and other interview results as well as their
own survey results. The perspective of the authors shall be based
on the substantive facts and a balance shall be maintained
between the practical facts and statistical facts.
In the meantime, in order for the White Paper to be of a
distinct quality, the actual causes of human rights conditions in
North Korea shall be analyzed from law practitioners’ viewpoints.
Furthermore, legal evaluations, measures, and prospects regarding
the human rights situation in North Korea shall be provided, after
analyzing the situation in light of international human rights
treaties acceded by North Korea, generally recognized human
rights agreements in civilized societies, constitutions and human
rights-related laws of both Koreas and other legal spirits. Since
the White Paper is of significance as a historic record of human
rights conditions in North Korea, its form and contents shall be
consistent at all times. Thus, the 2010 White Paper shall adopt
the same table of contents as the second one in 2008, but shall
add, in its appendix, the Bylaws of Ro-dong-dang (Workers’
45
I. Introduction
Party) which makes it explicit that North Korea is not a republic
but Kim Il-sung’s family hereditary dynasty by defining it as
‘Kim Il-sung Chosun (Korea’s ancient name)’ and the UPR report
on the North Korea which the Korean Bar Association submitted
to UN in collaboration with the Citizens’ Alliance for North
Korean Human Rights, a South Korean human rights NGO.
3. Overview of Human Rights Conditions in North Korea
The
noteworthy
aspects
of
North
Korean
human
rights
situations that were revealed by the interview survey are as
follows:
1) The Application of Human Rights-Related Laws
As reported in the 2008 White Paper on Human Rights in
North Korea, North Korean investigation agencies still do not
follow due procedures stipulated in its Criminal Procedure Act
when arresting criminal suspects. When detaining suspects in
detention facilities, the agencies still do not fully inform them of
related
charges,
offences
and
detention
periods.
Within
the
unsanitary detention facilities, insults to human dignity, sexual
rapes and harassments, tortures and arbitrary executions are still
prevalent. In the case of political prisoners, punishments are given,
in general, without pursuing due process or without any trials,
and even if there were trials, few suspects go through legal
procedures. Many unfair trials have occurred due to corruption,
power peddling and social background of the defendant. Arrest
and punishment of suspects is conducted not by the law but by
decrees that are not officially proclaimed. Human rights-related
46
laws of North Korea do not function as a social norm and their
existence is not fully recognized by the public either.
2) The Right to Food
The food shortage in North Korea can be attributed to the
outright shortage of food which is caused by its systematic
contradictions including the collapse of the Eastern European bloc
and ensuing the suspension of economic and agricultural support
and cooperation, North Korea’s inefficient farming system and
organizational contradiction in agriculture, lack of agricultural
fertilizer and chemicals caused by the paralysis of industrial
production, collective production system that discourages the will
to produce and inefficient resource distribution.
However, we need to face the fact that the massive number of
people who died of starvation since the 1990s are victims of the
unfair distribution system, which cannot be wholly ascribed to the
food insufficiency. When the food shortage happened, the North
Korean regime adopted a policy to distribute food only to the
ruling classes including high ranking officials in the military and
the Workers' Party, employees working in war-related industries
and the citizens of Pyeongyang (Pyongyang). The rest of the
population was deprived of access to the food ration system; they
were discriminated against due to their social classes, regions, and
types of occupation. Consequently, millions of North Korean
residents with low social class were pushed to the edge to face
the hunger crisis first. The factors which make the hunger crisis
irrevocable include a steep decrease in international food aid
caused by North Korea's boycott of food distribution monitoring,
conversion of food aid, plunder of rural villages by the military in
I. Introduction
47
the name of the Military-first ideology, restriction of market
activities and loss of purchasing power caused by currency reform
in November 2009. There are some people who have been
advocating unconditional food aid to North Korea, without any
monitoring, ignoring the situation that the majority of North
Korean residents with low social class have been denied access to
food. They need to start questioning why an absolute majority of
North Korean defectors are against the food aid program and how
unconditional food aid, provided under the name of humanitarian
aid, turns into an inhumane food ration system or a maintenance
cost of the North Korean regime.
3) Torture and other Inhumane or Humiliating Treatment
The 2010 survey also found that various abusive treatments
including torture and inhumane or humiliating treatment are
commonly inflicted in the investigation agencies of North Korea.
This phenomenon can be ascribed to a human rights concept in
North Korea which argues that human rights can only be enjoyed
by those who are loyal to the socialist revolution, and that
dissidents and criminals who are enemies of the revolution are not
entitled to human rights. So far, North Korea has revised its
human rights-related laws several times to make them compatible
with international norms. However, requirements for punishment
have recently been eased and punishments have been reinforced
through supplementary provisions in the Criminal Act. Moreover,
executions with no legal foundation were carried out on the basis
of the decrees of administrative agencies. This seems to be a
preliminary
to
strengthening
the
hereditary
power
succession
system. These regressive changes lead us to realize that efforts to
48
decorate
human
rights-related
laws
for
consumption
by
the
outside world do not have significant meaning.
4) Freedom of Religion and Belief
North Korea is presented these days as a society that upholds
the Juche Ideology as the state religion. Although the North
Korean
Constitution
stipulates
freedom
of
belief,
the
‘Ten
Principles for the Establishment of the One-Ideology System’
which precedes the Constitution in the legal hierarchy deifies Kim
Il-sung. The regime also conducts brain washing campaigns by
teaching that religion is opium and an instrument for imperialistic
invasion. Therefore, there is no religious freedom for ordinary
citizens, even though there are religious organizations, including
some churches and Buddhist temples which are used as a means
of overseas propaganda to attract aid from western religious
foundations. Furthermore, North Korean residents are not entitled
to the freedom of thought and conscience which constitutes an
essential part of human rights. The North Korean Constitution
does not stipulate freedom of conscience, either. This is because
of the privileged status given to Juche ideology; ritualization of
the idea maintained by assessment and self-criticism is enforced
by the authorities.
5) Freedom of Opinion and Expression
In an effort to maintain its political system, North Korea
restricts the freedom of opinion and expression. Mass media in
North Korea function as a propaganda tool for the maintenance of
the regime and for the personality cult of Kim Il-sung and Kim
Jong-il. Thus, anyone who talks about the private lives of Kim
I. Introduction
49
Il-sung and Kim Jong-Il or slanders them, or anyone who makes
positive comments on the openness of South Korea and expresses
dissatisfaction with North Korean society can be classified as a
political prisoner and subjected to severe punishment including
extermination. Supervision of other behaviors seems to have eased
to some extent. However, this cannot be seen as a fundamental
change.
6) Women's Human Rights
Unlike its public propaganda, North Korea is a society where a
pre-modern consciousness and patriarchal practices are prevalent
and, as a consequence, women’s political and economic activities
are neglected and restricted. Despite this situation, North Korean
women carry the burden of maintaining their households through
various economic activities, replacing male family heads who still
depend on defunct food distribution systems and unproductive
work places. It is a matter of great concern that since women
came to the forefront in economic activities, sexual violence and
human trafficking occur frequently, and the overall health of
females is worsening rapidly due to malnutrition and heavy labor.
7) North Korean Defectors
Most
North
Korean
defectors
escape
to
China.
However,
Chinese authorities do not protect the defectors as refugees; they
regard them as criminals who crossed the border illegally and
repatriate them back to North Korea. Therefore, as the defectors
cannot reveal their identity and cannot afford any legal protection
inside China, they fall into a human rights blind spot. In
particular, female defectors fall prey to sexual violence, human
50
trafficking and forced marriage. The problem of babies who were
born between Chinese men and North Korean women defectors is
an issue of great concern. The South Korean government and the
international community should urge the Chinese government to
recognize North Korean defectors as South Koreans or, at least,
as refugees.
8) The Political Prison Camp
The North Korean regime is maintained by horror, violence and
lies. Systematic violence is practiced in political prison camps as a
deterrent to any dissident behavior by North Korean residents.
The off-limit areas inside the camps are operated on the basis of
Kim Il-sung’s instructions that “Three generations of political
prisoners shall be exterminated.” These areas are a department
store of crimes; all sorts of violent crimes are perpetrated.
Political prisoners in North Korea have no human rights. They are
enemies of the people and ought to be isolated and exterminated,
not rehabilitated. Most inmates in the off-limit areas die of
beatings or starvation before they turn fifty even if they manage
to avoid execution. There are five to ten political prison camps
across the nation with 150,000 to 200,000 political prisoners in
total. What is worse, 69 percent of them are family members of
those who showed dissident behavior and 70 percent of them are
not aware of the reason for their internment. Some North Korean
defectors who once were held in the camps have made an
allegation that the North Korean authorities are carrying out
biological experiments on political prisoners. There should be a
continuous effort to verify this allegation.
I. Introduction
51
9) South Korean Abductees in North Korea, South Korean POWs
and Repatriated Korean Residents in Japan
North Korea has lured, kidnapped and detained South Koreans,
South Korean POWs and Korean residents in Japan for political
propaganda, espionage operations against South Korea and labor
extortion. They are classified as belonging to the hostile class, the
lowest echelon of society and are subject to humiliation and social
discrimination. Former administrations in South Korea, despite the
massive
economic
aid
they
provided
to
North
Korea,
have
neglected issues concerning the repatriation of these people. The
South Korean government should set this issue as an urgent
policy agenda and work to secure exchange of letters and reunion
of separated families.
Ⅱ
Human Rights Policy of
North Korea
1. North Korea’s Perception on Human Rights
Kim Tae-hoon
2. North Korea’s Observance of the UN Human
Rights Treaties
Kim Tae-hoon
3. Duality and Change in Human Rights Policy
Heo Man-ho
Ⅱ. Human Rights Policy of North Korea
55
1. North Korea’s Perception on
Human Rights
￭ Kim Tae-hoon (Attorney at law)
1. Characteristics of the North Korean Regime and Structural
Violations of Human Rights
1) Hereditary Succession and Dictatorship of the Kim’ Family and
Legal System
At the 11th session of the Working Group on the Universal
Periodic Review of the U.N. Human Rights Council convened on
December
2009,1)
7,
North
Korea
asserted
“The
Republic
(Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, DPRK) has consistently
maintained the principle of prioritizing human rights and honored
the United Nations Charter and the international human rights
treaties (Paragraph 7 of the Report of the Working Group on the
Universal Periodic Review)” and “The sovereignty of the Republic
resides in the workers, and its legal system stipulates democratic
rights and duties concretely (Paragraph 13 of the same report)
and the Workers’ Party cannot operate outside the Constitution, as
the Party itself exists within the State.”
However,
it
is
not
the
case
in
practice.
North
Korea’s
Constitution has been revised continuously and made its eighth
revision on September 5, 1998. The preamble of the Constitution
proclaims that North Korea and its Constitution were created by
1) Refer to Draft Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review prepared
on December 9, 2009 (A/HRC.WG.6/6/L.12) and A./HRC/13/13.
56
Kim Il-sung alone, by stipulating that Kim Il-sung is the founder
of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the father of
socialist Chosun (Korea’s ancient name), whichwis and created the
immortal Juche ideology, and defined North Korea's Socialist
Constitution as the Kim Il-sung Constitution. Article 11 of the
Constitution stipulates that the Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea shall carry out all its activities under the leadership of the
Workers’ Party and makes it clear that the Ro-dong-dong
(Workers’ Party) is superior to the State (government) and the
Workers’ Party’s decisions, along with its bylaws and platform are
superior norms that take priority over the Constitution.
The Workers’ Party’s Bylaws, which have not been altered for
about 30 years since the sixth Party Congress in October 1980,
were amended in the third meeting of Party Representative (Party
Conference) on September 28, 2010. The preamble of the amended
bylaws changed as the definition of the party from a “Juche
(Self-reliance)-style revolutionary Marx-Leninist party founded by
the
Suryong
Kim
Il-sung”
to
“Great
Leader
Comrade
Kim
Il-sung’s party.” A new expression, Kim Il-sung Korea Chosun
(Korea), was introduced as well, in the context that “the Workers’
Party has made an immortal achievement in the wealthy and
strong development of the Kim Il-sung Korea Chosun (Korea) and
in the success of the independence of the popular masses and
socialist tasks.” It became clear that North Korea, which had been
advocating a republic system, declared itself as the state of and
by Kim Il-sung alone, both in name and practice. Consequently,
North Korea has effectively proclaimed that it is equivalent with
the 17th absolute monarchy of France whose leader Louis XIV,
said, “I am the State.”
57
In addition, the amended preamble stresses that Kim Jong-il
has succeeded Kim Il-sung, as is evident in the following phrases:
“The Dear Leader Comrade Kim Jong-il has succeeded and
carried forward … the Great Suryong Comrade Kim Il-sung’s idea
of the construction of the Workers’ Party and accomplishment
achievement, and has strengthened and developed the Workers’
Party as a pure ideological entity and organizational monolith
established
by
the
One-Ideology
system
and
the
monolithic
leadership, ... and moved forward the Songun (Military-first)
revolution victoriously and reinforced it...”
“The Workers’ Party is … the party … with Kim Jong-il in
the center of it … ”
“The fundamental principle in the construction of the Party lies
in the guarantee of the succession.”
Around that time, North Korea also justified the hereditary
succession
system
of
the
Kim
Il-sung
family
by
officially
announcing the emergence Kim Jong-il’s third son, Kim Jong-un,
who was named a four-star general in the military and elected
vice-chairman of the Central Military Commission of the party.
The One-Ideology system and monolithic leadership of Kim
Il-sung and Kim Jong-il are embodied by the ‘Ten Principles for
the Establishment of the One-Ideology System of the Party’
(hereafter referred to as “Ten Principles”), which were officially
declared by Kim Jong-il as the supreme norm regulating the daily
lives of North Koreans in 1974. The Ten Principles, through
58
idolization of Kim Il-sung and institutionalization of his absolute
authority, command North Koreans to comply with Kim Il-sung’s
instructions unconditionally and defend to the death the monolithic
guidance from the Party head, Kim Jong-il, who succeeded Kim
Il-sung
to
inherit
and
develop
his
father
Kim
Il-sung’s
revolutionary achievement.
Because of these conditions, in the legal system in North Korea
instructions from Kim Il-sung (the Suryong) and guidance from
Kim Jong-il (the Dear Leader) became the highest norm, followed
by Ten Principles and then, decisions of the Workers’ Party.
Consequently, the Constitution is subordinate to them in the North
Korea’s legal hierarchical chain. This hierarchy is deeply rooted in
North Koreans’ consciousness in their daily lives.
The Korean Bar Association conducted interviews of 200 North
Korean defectors [ID 001-200 (2010)] from February to April of
2010. The results reveal that, as shown in the <Table II-1-1>,
almost all of the interviewees were aware of the Ten Principles.
They also responded that the instructions from Kim Il-sung and
Kim Jong-il and the Ten Principles are the most important laws
governing the daily lives of North Koreans.
<Table Ⅱ-1-1> Do you know what the Ten Principles of the One-Ideology are?
Valid
Responses
Cumulative
Percentage(%)
No. of Responses
Percentage(%)
Yes
197
98.5
98.5
No
3
1.5
100.0
200
100.0
Total
[ID 080 (2010)] replied,
“If
you
violate
Kim
Il-sung’s
instructions or policies, you are subject to
59
immediate punishment. The Ten Principles are
part
of
his
instructions.
If
you
make
an
appropriate remark or mishandle his portrait,
you get arrested. You should not fold his
picture or fold the part of bill where his
portrait is placed.”
[IDs 179, 181 (all 2010)] stated, “The Ten Principles are more
important than the laws. We had to memorize
it every day. We were required memorizing a
book entitled Ten Principles over and over
again and taking a test about it. Students and
members of the community are all supposed to
take
the
tests.
Life
assessment
meetings
convened every two days, and members were
supposed to confess flaws and mistakes they
made in their personal lives. First, we had to
recite the Ten Principles and then we critiqued
ourselves on the basis of the principles. The
idea which underlies the principles is to sacrifice
your life for Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il.”
Under this legal hierarchy, the general laws of North Korea,
including the Criminal Act as well as the Constitution, are
recognized as a means of class struggles and management of a
socialist state to fulfill the policy lines of the Workers’ Party
completely,
and
of
a
weapon
to
keep
achievement
of
the
revolutionary war. One of Kim Il-sung’s instructions said, “... Our
laws should be a weapon for protecting our socialist system and
its
achievements
proletariat.”2)
and
a
weapon
of
the
dictatorship
of
the
Due to the recognition of the laws in North Korea
60
mentioned above, its legal system effectively functions as a legal
tool to maintain the monolithic leadership of the leader Kim
Il-sung and, to take that policy one step further, to justify the
absolute
hereditary
dictatorship
of
Kim
Il-sung’s
hereditary
successors. It is a stark contrast to liberal democracies where the
major role of legal norms is to defend human rights.
Therefore, the laws of North Korea, including its Constitution,
could be regarded as a display for the outside world. It seems
that there is a considerable gap between all of the laws and
decrees, in particular those related with human rights and social
welfare, and legal practice in North Korea.
Ordinary
North
Koreans’
awareness
of
laws
and
their
effectiveness and normative power remain at a low level. The
following <Table II-1-2> related with a multiple-choice question
well illuminates the role of laws in North Korea.
<Table Ⅱ-1-2> Do you think the administration of government agencies and
social management are implemented in compliance with the laws
in North Korea?
No. of Responses Percentage(%)
Yes
No
Valid
Responses Don't Know
Total
Cumulative
Percentage(%)
22
11.0
11.0
167
83.5
94.5
11
5.5
100.0
200
100.0
2) Kim il-seong jeo-jak-jip (Selected Works of Kim Il-sung), vol. 12, pp. 219; Shim
Hyong-il, Jucheui Sahoejuui Heonbeomniron (Theory of Juche Socialist Constitution)
(Pyongyang: Sahoe-gwahak-chulpansa (Social Science Publishing Co), 1991), p. 38.
61
The ordinary North Koreans are little aware of the North
Korea’s legal norms. At the request – “If you know any of laws
in North Korea, tell us the name and its contents (Names only
will do if you don't know about their contents)” - many North
Korean
defectors
pointed
out
the
Ten
Principles
of
the
One-Ideology System as a North Korean law [IDs 002, 004, 012,
016, 052, 085, 127, 128, 144 and 177 (all 2010)]. However, there are
some defectors mentioned
the Socialist Constitution, the Criminal
Procedure Act and the Anti-Socialist Act [ID 031 (2010)]; the
Criminal Act [ID 065 (2010)]; the Constitution and the Criminal
Act [ID 103 (2010)]; the Land Reform Act [ID 129 (2010)];
Constitution [ID 132 (2010)]; the Criminal Procedure Act [IDs 137,
199 (both 2010)]; Article 215 and 110 of the Criminal Procedure
Act
and
crimes
including
illegal
border
crossing
without
certification, use of cell phones and exchange of foreign currencies
[ID 168 (2010)]; stay of execution [ID 171 (2010)].
Nonetheless,
North
Korea
published
Joseon
Minjujuui
Inmin-gonghwaguk Beopjeon (Daejungyong)(The Penal Code of
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, for public use) in August
2004 and its enlarged edition was published in March 2006.3) At
the prologue of the Code, North Korea emphasized that “laws are
the
behavioral
norms
that
all
citizens
should
observe”
and
“law-abiding spirit should be established throughout society in
order to strengthen and illuminate ‘our-own-style socialism’ and
to make a powerful and prosperous country.” In terms of the
3) The enlarged edition of Joseonminjujuui Inmingonghwaguk Beopjeon (The Penal Code
of Democratic People's Republic of Korea) was made public by Bukhanbeob Yeonguhui
(the Research Committee on North Korean Laws) (Chairman: Chang Myong-bong,
Honorary professor of Kookmin University) on July 30, 2006.
62
institutionalization of a “socialist rule of law” combined with the
system reform and door opening of North Korea, it is likely that
North Korea can establish a “rule of law” (or law-abiding spirit)
befitting its system and atmosphere of the “pursuit of practical
interest,” if the door opening, and exchanges and cooperation with
South Korea continue to expand and develop. In fact, North Korea,
since early 1990s, has enacted and implemented laws relating to
exchange and cooperation with South Korea, such as the Special
Laws on the Gaeseong (Kaesong) Special Industrial Zone and Mt.
Geumgang (Kumgang) Special Tourism Zone, in addition to laws
relating to system maintenance and economic development and
they have been quite effective.4)
2) Ideological Foundation of North Korea's Concept on Human
Rights in North Korea
(1) Perspective of the Classism and Collectivism Principles
Just like socialism in general, North Korea interprets human
rights from the perspective of classism. The preamble of the
Bylaws of Workers’ Party stipulates that the Party will firmly
stick to the class and mass lines to lay a firm foundation for the
party and revolution, defend interests of the people, serve the
people and carry out its duty as the mother party to be
accountable for the fate of the popular masses.” Article 12 of the
North Korea’s Constitution also upholds the class principle, stating
that he state shall adhere to the class line and consolidate the
dictatorship for the people’s democracy, and thus firmly protect
the people's sovereignty and socialist system from hostile strata’s
4) The Korea Bar Association, 2008 Bukhan-ingwon-baekseo (2008 White Paper on North
Korean Human Rights), pp. 28~29.
63
destructive maneuvers at home and abroad. Article 2 of the
Criminal Act revised in 2004 also stipulates that the state shall
firmly uphold the principle of working class in dealing with
criminals. This classist perspective is well exemplified in the
following editorial in the Rodong Sinmun (Newspaper of the
workers, official newspaper of the Workers’ Party). “Just as one
does not conceal one’s party identification, we do not conceal our
class inclination in regard to human rights issues. Socialist human
rights are not class-free human rights which grant freedom to
even hostile strata defying socialism or impure strata infringing
upon the interests of the people.”5)
It is good to realize a society where people enjoy humane life
after liberalizing the proletariat. However, arguing that only the
culture created by the proletariat has value is nothing more than
excessive inhuman classism which pursues only class interest
without valuing human beings themselves. In this case, the class
interest can easily turn into class egoism rather than that of
whole society and mankind. In addition, the class egoism is sure
to entails a leader's pursuing his/her own interest from which the
cult of personality and individual dictatorship is doomed to emerge
in the end.6)
As stated above, since North Korea views human rights from
the perspective of the classism, it is sure to deny the fundamental
human rights or universal human rights which advocate human
rights of every individual. North Korean classist philosophy argues
that enemies of the class should be eliminated relentlessly and
5) “Chamdaun Ingwoneul Onghohayeo (In Defense of True Human Rights),” Rodong
Sinmun, June 24, 1995.
6) Hwang Jang-yop, Hwangjangyeop Hoegorok (Hwang Jang-yop’s Memoir) (Seoul:
Shidae Jeongshin Publishing Company, 2006), p. 188.
64
brutally. Political prison camps exemplify this mode of thought,
where human rights are understood through principles of classism.
Besides,
North
Korea,
just
like
other
socialist
countries
understands human rights from collectivism. Article 63 of the
North
Korea’s
Constitution
stipulates
that
the
rights
and
responsibilities of citizens are based on the collectivism, ‘One for
all, all for one.’ So, North Korea based on collectivism puts
priority on the interests of the majority, rather than those of the
individual.
It
works
as
living
principles
that
stipulates
the
subservience of personal interests to societal interests. Therefore,
individual interests or human rights can be violated or ignored
whenever necessary to defend the groups’ interests.
The second sentence of the Article 8 of the North Korea’s
Constitution originally stated that ‘The State shall safeguard the
interests of … the working people.’ Meanwhile, in its amendment
in April 2009, the words ‘human rights’ were added and the
sentence was revised to ‘The State shall safeguard the interests
of … the working people and protect human rights.’ However, the
human rights of classist people stipulated in the Constitution are
far from so-called ‘rights of the citizen (Bürgerrechte)’ which
indicate the fundamental human rights of the ‘citizen’ regarded as
‘rights of human beings (Menschenrechte)’ bestowed by God or
known
as
natural
rights.
In
North
Korea,
the
belief
that
individuals inherently have human rights is not accepted. Only
people
armed
with
a
class
revolutionary
consciousness
are
considered members of society possessing human rights.
Furthermore,
because
the
collectivism
of
North
Korea
is
connected with the socialist theories of Confucian and patriarchal
ideas,
North
Korea
institutionalize
collectivism
to
a
degree
65
unprecedented in other socialist countries. The authority of Kim
Il-sung and Kim Jong-il is absolute. North Korean society as a
whole is conceptualized as a family, and describes the relationship
of the Suryong (Great Leader), the Party and People as that of a
father,
a
mother
and
children.
By
integrating
state,
the
a
secondary group, with the family, a primary group, the Suryong
of the revolution supplants the parents as the head of the familial
unit.
The survey responses from [ID 001-200 (all interviewed in
2010)] indicate that North Korean authorities instruct the people to
call their leaders ‘Grandfather Great Marshall Kim Il-sung’ and
‘Father
General
Kim
Jong-il’
from
kindergarten
onwards
to
reinforce the socialist theory of linking the state and the family.
Therefore, they emphasizes that once the Suryong extends
benevolence, it is natural that all members of the society should
dedicate their loyalty and filial duty to him. This kind of
identification with the family order is used to strengthen political
authority and, thus, this hierarchical social order is a factor that
suppresses the perception of human rights. As seen above,
collective
social
Furthermore,
rights
are
collectivism
is
highly
valued
connected
in
to
North
the
Korea.
theory
of
socio-political life, whereby duties take the primary position and
rights are degraded into a secondary position. This view seems to
be supported by the second sentence of Article 81 of the North
Korean Constitution which, in regard to the rights and duties of
citizens, stipulates “citizens shall value their organization and
collective
and
highly
demonstrate
the
trait
themselves to work for the society and the people.”
of
dedicating
66
(2) Juche (Self-reliance) Ideology and Military-first (Military First)
Ideology
North Korea, as stated above, argues that the Republic (North
Korea) is a socialist state that realizes the Juche (Self-reliance),
an ideology that realizes that man is the master of everything and
decides everything. In 1959, Kim Il-sung, in the midst of the
Sino-Soviet ideological dispute, came up with the Juche ideology
in his effort to creatively adapt Marxism-Leninism to the specific
realities in North Korea and turn the Stalinist personality cult into
a feudalistic Kim Il-sung cult, which laid the foundation of his
dictatorship.
In
1967,
in
the
wake
of
the
so-called
5.25
instructions, under which intellectuals were purged to establish a
monolithic ideology, Kim Il-sung commanded all North Koreans to
wear his badge and strengthened his cult of personality and
absolute
dictatorship.7)
In
1974,
the
dictatorship
was
further
solidified by the Ten Principles, the supreme norm in North Korea
which was officially announced by Kim Jong-il, who succeeded
Kim Il-sung in seizing power. Afterward, in response to the
instability caused by the demise of socialist countries in the 1990s,
Kim Jong-il established ‘our-own-style human rights,’ a peculiar
mixture of socialist human rights and Juche. Juche is the core
ideology of North Korea, and the preamble of the Workers’ Party
Bylaw states that the Party is a revolutionary party which
upholds the revolutionary idea of the Great Leader Kim Il-sung
and Juche as a monolithic governing ideology. Article 3 of the
North Korean Constitution, amended in April 2009, makes it clear
that
North
Military-first
Korea
policy
7) Ibid., pp. 151~171.
considers
the
ruling
the
Juche
principles
ideology
of
the
and
the
Democratic
67
Peoples’ Republic of Korea.
The Juche ideology begins with three propositions. The first is
that human beings are the masters of the world. The second one
is that the popular masses are the master of the world. The third
one is that the popular masses, under the leadership of the
Suryong, are the masters of the world. Eventually, the Juche
ideology ultimately is the theory of Suryong.8) The theory of
Suryong states that the Suryong leads dictatorship not because he
has the most excellent ideological ability and leadership, but
because he is the parent who gave life to the communist party
and working class, and, so, he can act just like its own mother of
the dictatorial regime. This unprecedented theory of the Suryong
eventually brings back the feudalistic heredity system.9) According
to the theory of the Suryong, the popular masses are the subject
of the evolution and construction. However, since only those who
carry out the Suryong’s instructions faithfully can become true
subjects, the popular masses are objects that can only realize their
subjectivity through the helpful guidance of the Suryong, who is
the brain of the socio-political organism. Under the theory of the
Suryong, the popular masses cannot become true subjects who
can attain the true qualification of true subject by themselves.
They, not the subject of their own rights, become merely passive
objects as well as objects of benevolence which are completely
dependent on the leadership of the Suryong. The theory of
Suryong asserts that citizens can enjoy their socio-political life
only when they dedicate their loyalty in accordance with the Ten
Principles. ‘Our-own-style human rights’ are also best guaranteed
8) Jhe Seong-ho, 2008 Bukhan-ingwon-baekseo (2008 White Paper on North Korean
Human Rights), p. 14.
9) “Hwangjangyeop Hoegorok (Hwang Jang-yop’s Memoir),” Donga Ilbo, October 12, 2010.
68
by the Suryong's politics of benevolence and magnanimousness. It
seems that under this kind of human rights policy, the citizens
cannot be aware of their own rights and self-esteem.10)
Another element that restricts the human rights of North
Koreans is the Military-First policy. Article 3 of the North Korean
Constitution, amended in April 2009, incorporated the Military-first
policy as a new governing ideology by stipulating that ‘the
Democratic
ideology
People's
and
Republic
Military-first
of
Korea
policy,
which
considers
are
the
Juche
person-centered
worldviews and revolutionary ideas for achieving the independence
of the popular masses, to be the guiding principles of its actions.’
Article 4 of the same Constitution added ‘soldiers’ to the list of
those who have sovereignty.
In addition, the preamble of the Bylaws of Workers’ Party,
revised on September 28, 2010, added ‘Military-first revolution’ as
an accomplishment of Kim Jong-il, and it states that the Workers’
Party shall establish the Military-first policy as a basic political
line of the socialist state and shall lead the revolution and
construction under the banner of the Military-first. Kim Jong-il
introduced Military-first politics, which places the military at the
core of his regime, as a means to overcome the food shortage
crisis and economic difficulties that caused a large-scale famine in
1990s and developed it into the Military-first policy. He stressed
that,
by
the
Military-first
policy,
the
desire
to
learn
the
10) The Juche ideology is full of theoretical flaws, such as a contradictory coexistence of
the absolute nature of human will and materialist economic determinism, an unclear
interrelation between the superstructure and foundation of the society, a logical conflict
between the international solidarity of the proletarian classes and nationalistic socialism.
Eventually, the Juche ideology is a disorderly mixture of mutually conflicting theories
including Marx-Leninism, Stalinism, nationalism, Confucianism, holistic totalitarianism
and human-centered spiritualism. It is simply a political tool used to justify the
one-man dictatorship and idolization of Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il.
69
revolutionary military spirit should spread throughout the Party
and society, and the power of the Korean People's Army (KPA)
should be strengthened. However, the revolutionary KPA itself is
characterized
by
strong
revolutionary
thought,
organizational
power, discipline and solidarity.11) Under the Military-first policy
which is based on these elements do not allow ordinary citizens
to develop their self-esteem. In particular, spreading the absolute
loyalty to the Suryong into ordinary people through the military
will give enormous negative impact on the people’s perception of
human rights.
Furthermore,
the
revolutionary
military
spirit
cited
in
the
Military-first policy basically requires protecting the Suryong
under
any
circumstance,
fulfilling
Suryong's
orders
and
instructions without any conditions and dedicating one’s life to the
victory of the revolution with heroic spirit of sacrifice. Because
the Military-first policy emphasizes that all members of the
society should dedicate themselves to the struggles for socialism
with the spirit of protecting Suryong with all their life, just like
that of the KPA’s. Thus, ordinary people, without being aware of
their own human rights, are portrayed as entities with absolute
obedience who worship Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il as the one
and only God.
Answers to the question ‘What is the most important law or
guideline in the life of North Koreans?’ are as follows:
[ID 007 (2010)] Protection of the Suryong.
[ID 036 (2010)] Following
the
Military-first
policy,
having
11) The control on people and social surveillance system is known to be considerably
lessened in the wake of the food shortage crisis and economic hardship of the late
1990s.
70
strong community spirit and protecting Kim
Jong-il and the Party elites.
[ID 185 (2010)] Protecting the party and the Suryong.
[ID 186 (2010)] Protection of the Suryong and worship of Kim
Il-sung.
(3) Structural Violations of Human Rights for Regime Maintenance
In an effort to maintain the absolute power of the Kim Il-sung
and Kim Jong-il through the Suryong system and to crack down
any symptom of antagonism against the system, North Korea has
conducted thorough surveillance of its people and control of
ideology by equipping with an anti-humanistic social system for
the surveillance and punishment on its people since late 1950s.
First of all, to monitor citizens’ every move, a surveillance system
was established that encompasses central agencies such as the
Bowibu (National Security Agency) and the Ministry of People’s
Security (its predecessors are the Social Safety Agency and
People’s Safety Agency) and In-min-ban (people’s neighborhood
unit). North Korea also take some policy measures including
re-registration of the people, various censuses, household survey
and
resettlement
as
means
to
control
the
people.
So
do
classification of people into different strata and discrimination
against them based on their strata. Furthermore, in its effort to
maintain the system, North Korea used education of its citizens,
from the womb to the tomb, about the Juche and Military-first
ideologies to ensure internalization of them,, food rationing system
and the suppression of the freedoms of travel, movement and
information as well as the right to be informed.12)
12) Jeon
Dok-seong,
Seongunjeongchie
Daehan
Rihae
(Understanding
Military-first
71
Answers to the following North Koreans’ answers to an
open-ended question shows that they are subject to repeated
education on the Kim Jong-il’s Military-first policy.
<Table Ⅱ-1-3> How many times did you receive the education on the Kim
Jong-il's Military-first policy in a week?
No. of
Responses
Percentage(%)
Cumulative
Percentage(%)
1 times
91
51.7
51.7
2~3 times
62
35.2
86.9
4~5 times
7
4.0
90.9
6~7 times
8
4.5
95.5
8~10 times
5
2.8
98.3
More than 10 times
3
1.7
100.0
176
100.0
24
200
Valid
Responses
Sub-Total
Missing Value
No response
Total
Additionally, North Korea has been severely repressing anyone
who opposes the maintenance of its system through torture, public
execution and political prison camps.
North Korea has defined the main goal of the state as
unification under communism, and it has been offering ideological
education
for
the
economic
hardship
people to
until
it
endure
political
completely
wins
restrictions
its
and
ideological
confrontation with South Korea. Furthermore, North Korea branded
those nations
hostile
to
it, including the United States, as
threatening elements to its security and utilized them to enhance
ideological control over the people. The preamble of the Workers’
Politics) (Pyongyang: Pyeongyangchulpansa (Pyongyang Publishing Company), 2004),
pp. 75~81.
72
Party states that the final goal of the party lies in fully achieving
the self reliance of the masses through promotion of the Juche
ideology, and the party will drive out invasion of the U.S. military
force and put an end to all kinds of rule and interference by
foreign powers.
The greatest tool of the North Korean regime’s justification of
the power succession of absolute dictatorship within the Kim
family is the propaganda that the regime is, as Kim Il-sung’s
successor, continuing the divine task of liberalization of the
fatherland and communized unification of Korean peninsula. In
short, the peninsula’s division and security threats from the
outside world have been used as a legitimacy tool of the North
Korean regime. This legitimization strategy restricts the people's
right to choose their leader and serves as a pretext that justifies
and rationalizes the systematic violation of human rights against
North Korean citizens.
This fact is reaffirmed by the following <Table II-1-4>, which
displays the answers to a multiple-choice question. When asked
“Do you think the division of South and North Korea negatively
impacts the lives of North Koreans?” 116 out of 200 respondents
answered “Yes.”
<Table Ⅱ-1-4> Do you think the division of South and North Korea negatively
impacts the lives of North Koreans?
No. of Responses
Valid
Responses
Percentage(%)
Cumulative
Percentage(%)
Yes
116
58.0
58.0
No
59
29.5
87.5
Don't know
25
12.5
100.0
Total
200
100.0
73
2. North Koreans’ Perception on Human Rights
Between
February
and
April
of
2008,
the
Korean
Bar
Association conducted interviews of 100 North Korean defectors
who have entered South Korea since 2000. When asked, “Had you
ever heard of ‘human rights’ or ‘our-own-style human rights’
while you were living in North Korea?” only 28 interviewees
answered yes, while 69 said no. Only seven of those surveyed
gave affirmative answers to the question, “Had you ever received
human rights education or any education similar to it?” whereas
92 gave negative answers.
In the meantime, the result of the 2010 survey shows an
increase, though small, in affirmative answers. It leads us to
predict that there is a positive change in the consciousness of the
human rights inside North Korea, especially given the fact that
the words ‘human rights’ were added to the second sentence of
the Article 8 of North Korean Constitution amended in April 2009.
However, it is a bit too early to make such conclusion when the
survey results below are considered.
<Table Ⅱ-1-5> “Had you ever heard of ‘human rights’ or ‘our-own-style human
rights’ while you were living in North Korea?”
Valid
Responses
No. of
Responses
Percentage(%)
Yes
70
35.0
No
125
62.5
97.5
5
2.5
100.0
200
100.0
Don't Know
Total
Cumulative
Percentage(%)
35.0
74
<Table Ⅱ-1-6> “Had you ever received human rights education or any education
similar to it?”
No. of
Responses
Valid
Responses
Percentage(%)
Cumulative
Percentage(%)
Yes
19
9.5
9.5
No
179
89.5
99.0
2
1.0
100.0
200
100.0
Don't Know
Total
The fact that the human rights awareness of North Koreans
remains poor can be confirmed through two similar yet different
questions. The Korea Bar Association asked, “Had you ever
wondered – Can this be a humane life? - while you were living
in North Korea?” to 200 North Korean defectors. According to the
<Table II-1-7>, a statistic table related with answers to the
multiple-choice question, 128 (64%) of the surveyed answered ‘had
felt it often,’ 69 (34.5%) of them answered ‘had felt it from time
to time’ and 3 (1.5%) of them answered 'no'. In the 2008 survey,
63 out of 100 respondents said “yes,” 34 of them answered “no,”
and 3 of them said they “don't know.” Meanwhile, to the question
“Had you ever felt that your human rights were violated while
you were living in North Korea?”, 94 (47%) of those surveyed
answered “yes,” 89 (44.5%) of them said “no” and 17 (8.5%) of
them said they “don't know,” as shown in the <Table II-1-8>. In
the 2008 Survey, 50 out of the 100 interviewees answered “yes.”
According to the statistics, it seems that even though the
livelihood of North Koreans are still as bad, if not worse, than
2008, North Koreans are still unaware of the infringement of their
human rights due to their poor human rights awareness.
75
<Table Ⅱ-1-7> “Had you ever wondered -‘Can this be a humane life?’ - while
you were living in North Korea?”
No. of
Responses
Valid
Responses
Percentage
(%)
Cumulative
Percentage(%)
had felt it often
128
64.0
64.0
had felt it from time to time
69
34.5
98.5
3
1.5
100.0
200
100.0
No
Total
<Table Ⅱ-1-8> “Had you ever felt that your human rights were violated while
you were living in North Korea?”
No. of
Responses
Valid
Responses
Percentage(%)
Yes
94
47.0
Cumulative Percentage
(%)
47.0
No
89
44.5
91.5
Don't Know
17
8.5
100.0
Total
200
100.0
Interviewees of the 2010 survey mentioned specific cases which
they think were the violations of human rights in North Korea,
① When they could not express their opinions freely [IDs 028,
062, 063, 103, 122, 146, 179, 181 (all 2010)]
② hen they were subjected to insults, violence or degrading
treatment by those engaging in judicial works, such as
agents in the Bowibu or the People’s Safety Agency [IDs
036, 088, 089, 091, 148, 153, 183 (all 2010)]
③ When authorities restricted travel and, at the same time,
compelled them to report or inflicted punishments [IDs 003,
065, 072, 124, 160 (all 2010)]
④ When receiving unfair treatment because of their low class
background [IDs 005, 017, 060, 121, 188, 192, 194, 198 (all
2010)]
76
⑤ When
authorities
interrupted
business
by
confiscating
business properties or order forced resettlements, and when
they
imposed
duties
without
any
reason
or
inflicted
punishments or other unfair treatment [IDs 006, 008, 026,
035, 037, 042, 044, 061, 064, 066, 071, 080, 096, 108, 109, 113,
151, 152, 159, 169, 170, 171 (all 2010)]
⑥ When receiving harsh treatment in detention facilities [IDs
056, 059, 070, 088, 097, 165, 168, 186, 200 (all 2010)]
⑦ When under surveillance [IDs 011, 023, 030, 039, 090, 116,
142, 145, 174, 175, 185 (all 2010)]
⑧ When
officials
(including
military
officials)
conducted
investigations arbitrarily, broke into houses or searched
houses frequently or arbitrarily [ID 114 (all 2010)]
⑨ When women were sexually harassed or forced to undergo
body searches [ID 106 (2010)]
⑩ When work rendered went unpaid [IDs 143, 184) (both 2010)]
⑪ When
going
through
economic
hardship
such
as
food
shortages [IDs 054, 057, 076, 079, 128, 137 (all 2010)] and
⑫ Other cases [ID 013, 045 (both 2010)].
Meanwhile, to the question, “What do you think is the most
serious violation of the human rights in North Korea?” 33%
(66/200) of the surveyed North Korean defectors pointed out the
restrictions on the freedom of expressing opinions. The cases of
violations
pointed
out
by
the remaining respondents
are
as
follows: 21.5% (41/200) of respondents reported restriction on the
freedom of movement; 11.5% (23/200) unfair distribution of food;
9% (18/200) horrors inside political prison camps; 7.5% (15/200)
arbitrary detention; 6 (3%) restriction on the freedom of religion;
77
and 31 (15.5%) other violations.
In the case of the 2008 survey for 100 North Korean defectors,
23% (23/100) of respondents pointed out the restriction on the
freedom of expression. Remaining respondents chose the types of
violations as follows: 12% (12/100) maintaining livelihood; 11%
(11/100) restriction on the freedom of movement and travel; 5%
(5/100)
discrimination
of
social
classes;
3%
(3/100)
social
surveillance; 3% (3/100) guilt by association system; and 2%
(2/100) public execution.
It is noteworthy that restricted freedom of expression was
considered the most serious violation of human rights in both 2008
and 2010, while restrictions on the freedom of movement and right
to food are successively chosen as the second and third, though
the order was changed over time.
With respect to the restriction on the freedom of expression, the
North Korean defectors surveyed in 2010 provided related cases in
more detail as follows. According to [ID 004], people cannot share
their complaints even between close relations, like parents and
children or spouses. [IDs 014, 027, 048, 049] explained that North
Korea is a society where one cannot say anything. Even between
friends, you should not express your deepest thoughts. Otherwise,
you find yourself detained in prison or a political prison camp, if
and when your friend, offended by you one day, reports it to the
Bowibu. Therefore, you should use words with extreme care, like
you are walking on thin ice. [ID 010] testified, “My father had
once been detained at a political prison camp after he said, ‘Why
can’t I be a Party member?’ at a drinking gathering.”
Regarding the restriction of movement, North Korean defectors
made the following remarks: “Here in South Korea, you can travel
78
to Busan whenever you want. However, in North Korea, if you
want to go somewhere, you need a travel permit. That was the
worst thing. It was not easy to get a permit. In many cases
when I needed to leave for family occasions, I couldn't make it on
time because the permit was issued late. It was very hard to
bear” [ID 020].
With respect to the right to access food, the following remarks
were made by North Korean defectors: “The state provides food
to military authorities, troops and security agencies first. For
ordinary citizens, food is out of reach. North Korea’s promise to
distribute was just lip service. It only goes to the military. The
citizens should be the first priority but nothing was guaranteed at
all. That kind of situation should be improved” [IDs 017, 108].
“They don't provide food, yet they prohibit business running. In
that case, monthly wages should be provided at least. But they
don't do it. It is the most serious problem. They don't arrange
ways to make a living. And they don't provide food. How could
we ensure our livelihood?” [IDs 043, 055, 056, 068, 080, 114]. “If
you live free, you can live to the full extent of your abilities.
However, this is not the case in North Korea. Being unable to eat
seems to be the worst thing” [ID 133].
Faced with the situations when their human rights are violated,
North Korean defectors responded as follows: [ID 070] protested
that he was not guilty (enough to be beaten) ; [ID 011] brought
the Bowibu agent or the investigator concerned to his/her house
and beat the agent almost death; or [ID 199] assaulted the
investigator. However, most of those affected visited their Party
secretaries and pled their innocence [IDs 036, 069], or chose tolerate
or overlook the abuse, unless they could escape it through bribes
79
[IDs 026, 072, 089, 103, 152]. Tolerance seemed the best solution
because they knew they could be taken to political prison camps
or face other, worse scenarios, if they caused problems [IDs 008,
025, 032, 035, 038, 039, 040, 042, 044, 048, 051, 053, 056, 057, 059,
060, 061, 064, 065, 066, 067, 068, 070, 072, 073, 076, 080, 083, 088,
090, 091, 097, 102, 103, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 112, 114, 117, 120,
122, 124, 125, 131, 132, 133, 137, 140, 143, 145, 146, 148, 160, 163,
165, 171, 181, 186, 191, 194, 198]. Quite a few defectors said they
decided to defect because of the human rights violations [IDs 002,
004, 006, 010, 024, 030, 033, 050, 058, 177, 185].
When asked “What do you think is most necessary for the
improvement of human rights of North Koreans?” answers were
made in the following order: The Kim Jong-il regime should be
toppled, answered 33 persons, including [IDs 004, 006, 008, 013,
016, 038, 040, 042, 044, 053, 055, 060, 066, 070, 073, 091, 098, 103,
122, 128, 131, 144, 149, 152, 165, 166, 167, 172, 173, 178, 182, 187,
193]. North Korea should open its doors to the outside world,
stated 30 persons, including [IDs 010, 012, 019, 020, 023, 028, 030,
037, 039, 048, 051, 052, 056, 062, 064, 067, 072, 083, 088, 097, 117,
120, 121, 130, 139, 144, 147, 150, 160, 164] The food shortage crisis
should be addressed, stated 27 persons, including [IDs 022, 025,
032, 033, 043, 045, 046, 059, 061, 069, 071, 075, 079, 090, 102, 105,
112, 119, 123, 124, 127, 138, 143, 154, 155, 196, 199]. Freedom of
speech should be ensured, stated 15 persons, including [IDs 017,
054, 074, 081, 084, 092, 108, 113, 137, 140, 169, 174, 185, 186, 198].
Help should be provided for North Koreans to realize their lives in
North Korea are far from normal and to rise up against the
regime themselves, stated 11 persons, including [IDs 001, 015, 058,
063, 084, 096, 104, 142, 151, 168, 184]. Administrative organizations
80
should be overhauled to ensure state agencies, such as Bowibu
agents, comply with laws, stated 9 persons, including [IDs 007,
009, 014, 024, 026, 036, 109, 170, 171]. Free markets should be
authorized, stated 7 persons, including [IDs 031, 049, 057, 077, 101,
116, 134]. Unification should occur, stated 6 persons, including [IDs
003, 021, 085, 086, 093, 094]. Freedom of movement should be
guaranteed, stated 5 persons including [IDs 076, 163, 177, 181,
183]. Political prison camps should be eliminated, stated 3 persons,
including [IDs 002, 095, 129]. Pressure should be applied from
South Korea and the international community, stated 2 persons
including [IDs 080, 179] and intelligence agencies should be
dissolved, including the Bowibu [ID 065]. In addition, improvement
of the political system [ID 133], change of laws [ID 148], rice aid
[ID 041], eradication of corruption [ID 047] spread of
Christianity
[ID 126] and abolishment of guilt by association system [ID 135]
were enumerated.
In 2008, 17 of the surveyed 100 North Korean defectors stated
that the replacement of the Kim Jong-il regime was the most
urgent task for the improvement of the human rights in North
Koreans. It was followed by North Korea’s opening door, contact
with the outside world and democratization, which was answered
by 15 persons.
In the meantime, North Korean defectors in general think that
the human rights movements of the international community and
resolutions of the U.N. General Assembly can help improve the
human
rights
situations
in
North
Korea,
as
shown
in
the
<Table-II-1-9> below, although it is hard to verify that their
view is that of all North Koreans.
81
<Table Ⅱ-1-9> Do you think the human rights movements of the international
community or resolutions of the U.N. General Assembly can help
improve the human rights situations in North Korea?
No of Responses
Valid
Response
Percentage
(%)
(%)
Yes
84
42.0
No
78
39.0
42.0
81.0
Don't Know
38
19.0
100.0
Total
200
100.0
The opinions of North Korean defectors cannot be equated with
that of all North Korean citizens. However, when asked, "What do
you think South Korea should do to improve the human rights
situations in North Korea?", those surveyed answers are listed
below. This would provide a good reference for estimating North
Koreans' views.
<Table Ⅱ-1-10> What do you think South Korea should do to improve the
human rights situations in North Korea?
Cumulative
No. of
Percentage
Percentage
Responses
(%)
(%)
Remain silent
10
5.0
5.0
Make demands for improvement
of the human rights situations to
the North Korean government.
94
47.0
52.0
Broadcast radio into North Korea.
79
39.5
91.5
Facilitate the anti-North Korea
leaflet campaign.
57
28.5
120.0
59
29.5
149.5
70
35.0
184.5
39
19.5
204.0
200
100.0
Valid
Responses Build many joint industrial
complexes like the Kaesong
Industrial Complex.
Put human rights violators,
including Kim Jong-il, on trial at
the International Criminal Tribunal.
Others
Total of the respondents
* The 200 interviewees chose more than one answers.
82
As explored above, given that 197 out of the 200 (98.5%) North
Koreans surveyed had, often or from time to time, wondered, ‘Can
this be a humane life?’, it is obvious that the human rights
situations felt by the North Korean citizens themselves are very
serious. Nevertheless, due to North Koreans' restricted awareness
of human rights, these speculations are not understood as human
rights violations. Furthermore, the surveyed North Korean defectors
pointed out that the restriction on the freedom of speech was the
worst example of human rights violations in the 2010 survey as
well as the 2008 survey. They also consider topping Kim Jong-il
regime as the most urgent task for the improvement of North
Koreans' human rights situations. Given these facts, the South
Korean
government
and
the
international
community
should
actively seek for measures to enhance North Koreans' freedom of
expression and their perception of the human rights by providing
information along with making demands for improved human
rights conditions to the North Korean government.
83
2. North Korea’s Observance of the UN
Human Rights Treaties
1. UN Human Rights Treaties and North Korea
1) North Korea’s Accession to UN Human Rights Treaties
As mentioned in the Charter of the UN, one important goal of
the UN is to enhance and encourage the rights and freedom of
the people of the world. The UN General Assembly adopted the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, an agreement of general
human rights belonging to all people. The Declaration became the
root of the international treaty on human rights which carries
legally binding force. Among the seven major international treaties
on human rights1) established since the adoption of the Declaration
of Human Rights, North Korea has acceded to the International
Covenant
on
Civil
and
Political
Rights
(ICCPR,
1966);
the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(ICESCR, 1966); the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC,
1989); and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW, 1979).2)
1) According to this classification of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Human Rights (OHCHR), North Korea, which acceded to four major human rights treaties,
also acceded to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
(ICERD) adopted of 1965, the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT) of 1984 and the Convention on the Protection
of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families of 1990.
2) Besides, North Korea acceded to the Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory. Limitations
to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity of 1968 on November 8, 1984 and the Convention
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 1948 on January 31, 1989.
84
2) UN Human Rights Treaty Bodies
The UN founded committees known as treaty bodies composed
of independent experts in order to realize the spirit of the
Declaration of Human Rights and monitor the observance of the
states which ratified it. As of September 2008, there are nine
bodies
existing.
Some
of
them
are
the
Committee
on
the
Elimination of Racial Discrimination (1970) for the International
Convention
on
the
Elimination
of
All
Forms
of
Racial
Discrimination; the Human Rights (CERD); the Human Rights
Committee (1977)* for the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR); the Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights (1985) for the International Covenant on Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICSECR); the Committee
on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (1982) for the
Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women
(CEDAW);
the
Committee
Convention
against
Torture
against
and
Torture
Other
(1987)
Cruel,
for
Inhuman
the
or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT); and the Committee
on the Rights of the Child (1991) for the Convention on the
Rights of the Child (CRC).
The State parties are obliged to observe the existing articles of
the treaties and submit periodic reports on their observance of the
treaties to the related treaty bodies. The concept of monitoring by
screening reports began from the resolution of August 1, 1956 by
the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and
was applied to other core international human rights treaties ever
since. The State parties have to submit their initial report within
a year after their accession to the treaties. After the submission
of the initial report, they have to submit their reports every four
85
years. The treaty bodies monitor the State parties by checking the
State parties’ reports and conclude their monitoring by adopting
concluding
observations
(or
comments)
which
include
recommendations. North Korea has submitted their reports to the
related
bodies.
Furthermore,
among
the
treaty
bodies,
the
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, the Human
Rights
Committee,
the
Committee
against
Torture
and
the
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women
can receive complaints or communications from individuals who
consider
violations
of
their
rights
occurring
under
any
circumstances by the government.
3) UN Human Rights Council
(1) UN Commission on Human Rights and UN Human Rights
Council
The UN Human Rights Council (hereafter referred to as
“UNHRC”) was established by resolution 60/251 of the General
Assembly on March 16, 2006. The UNHRC is the successor to the
UN Commission on Human Rights (hereafter referred to as
UNCHR) which had been the center of the UN's Human Rights
system for the past 60 years. While the UNCHR was a subsidiary
body of the UN Economic and Social Council, the UNHRC as a
direct subsidiary body of the General Assembly has become one
of three major institutions of the UN. The UNHRC is composed
of
47
countries
elected
by
the
General
Assembly
and
its
secretariat is governed by the Office of the High Commissioner
for Human Rights (OHCHR) which used to be in charge of the
secretariat of the UNCHR. While the UNCHR held meetings for
only a regular session of six weeks during a year, the UNHRC
86
holds three regular sessions of more than ten weeks in Geneva,
Switzerland. The main session takes place in March for four
weeks. The UNCHR adopted its initial resolution on North Korean
human rights in 2003. Since the UNCHR was replaced by the
UNHRC in 2006, the UNHRC has been adopting a resolution on
the human rights violations in North Korea every year. The High
Commissioner (UNHCHR) in charge of the OHCHR has shown
interest in the situation of human rights in North Korea: It
designated its dedicated officer on North Korea and requested
documents to NGOs in South Korea.
(2) Complaint Procedure, Special Procedure and Special Rapporteur
The complaint procedure in the UNHRC was established to
address
consistent
patterns
of
gross
and
reliably
attested
violations of all human rights. It has improved from reviewing all
mandate, functions, and responsibility of the former Commission
on Human Rights including the 1503 procedure.
The UNHRC has succeeded and maintains a system of special
procedures of the former Commission on Human Rights. In the
1970s, after being aware of the seriousness of the kidnapping and
disappearance of people by authoritarian regimes, particularly in
South America, the Commission on Human Rights established a
UN Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances as
an affiliate organization. Since the establishment of the Working
Group,
Working
Groups
on
thematic
mandates
and
country
mandates and Special Rapporteurs were continuously organized to
investigate and solve international issues and individual cases in
other human rights concerns. As of September 2008, 30 thematic
mandates and eight country mandates,
including the
Special
87
Rapporteur on Human Rights in North Korea, are working under
the auspices of the OHCHR.
As one of the country mandates, a Special Rapporteur on the
situation of human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea (DPRK, North Korea’s official name) was established in
March 2004 by the UNCHR resolution 2004/13. Vitit Muntarbhorn,
a
professor
of
Chulalongkorn
University
in
Thailand,
was
appointed as the Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in North
Korea. His major duty was to report the situation of human rights
in North Korea to the UNCHR, the UNHRC and the General
Assembly. Since Special Rapporteur Vitit Muntarbhorn finished his
six-year term in 2010, the UNHRC newly appointed Marzuki
th
Darusman3) from Indonesia as his successor at its 14 session
held in Geneva from May 31, 2010 to June 18, 2010. The new
Special Rapporteur began his one-year term from July 1, 2010,
and his term can be extended annually up to a maximum of six
years.
Professor
Muntarbhon’s
reports
are
reflected
in
the
resolutions of the UNCHR, the UNHRC and the General Assembly
against North Korea. His reports played an important role in
promoting recognition within the international community of the
human rights situation in North Korea.
The
UN
Working
Group
on
Enforced
or
Involuntary
Disappearance is the initial organization of the special procedure
as well as one of the thematic mandates. Mr. Hwang In-cheol, the
representative
for
Dae-han-hang-gong-gi-pi-hae-ja-ga-jok-hoe
(the Family Association for Victims of Korean Air, the family
association
for
missing
people
in
the
Korean
Air
airplane
3) Mr. Marzuki Darusman was the past Chairman of Indonesia’s National Human Rights
Commission and appointed as the Chairman/Director of the Human Rights Resource
Center for ASEAN (HRRCA) in 2006.
88
kidnapped by North Korea in 1969), filed a complaint against
North Korea to the Working Group with the help of the Citizens’
Alliance for North Korean Human Rights, a South Korean human
rights NGO. It received much attention because it was the first
complaint made for a missing person kidnapped by North Korea.
Further, it was made with the request that the Working Group
would verify Hwang In-cheol’s father, Hwang Won, as alive or
dead and help with his repatriation to South Korea.
(3) Universal Periodic Review
The Universal Periodic Review (hereafter referred to as “UPR”)
is a new cooperative human rights mechanism established by
resolution 5/1 of the UNHRC resolution 5/1 on June 18, 2007. The
UPR is a unique process that involves interactive dialogue to
review human rights records of all 192 UN Member States once
every four years. The UPR supplements the role of the treaty
bodies which does not overlap that of the UPR.4) Faced with the
criticism that the UNCHR raised selective human rights problems
on specific Member States, the UPR introduced a fair peer review
to provide all UN Member States with equal opportunities to
review their human rights records. North Korea was reviewed by
the UPR working group on December 7, 2009 and their final
th
report was adopted at the 13
session of the Humans Rights
Council on March 18, 2010.
The outcome report consists of a report by the UPR Working
Group on North Korea that was adopted on December 9, 2009,
4) The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Working with the United
Nations Human Rights Programme, A Handbook for Civil Society (Office of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights: New York and Geneva, 2008), pp. 81~82.
89
following the review process on December 7, 2009.
The UPR Working Group on North Korea reviewed North
th
Korea’s human rights records on December 7, 2009. The 13
session of the UNHRC adopted the UPR report on December 9,
2009, and the UNHRC, at the 13th session, adopted the outcome
report on March 18, 2010.
4) The General Assembly
Resolutions of the General Assembly do not have legally
binding force, but it has a powerful ‘moral power’ because the
resolutions are adopted through participations and debates of all
Member States. Therefore, the General Assembly’s resolution on
North Korea, reflecting the will of 192 Member States, can be the
basis of taking measures to promote the situation of human rights
in North Korea. With the close of the general debate, the General
Assembly allocates items relevant to its work among its major
six main Committees which in turn presents the items to a
plenary meeting of the Assembly to draft resolutions and decisions
for consideration. The Third Committee, which deals with social,
humanitarian
resolutions
and
and
cultural
human
issues,
rights
discusses
conditions,
and
human
has
rights
adopted
resolutions on the situation of human rights in North Korea every
year since 2005.
2. Implementation of Treaty Bodies on Human Rights in North Korea
The
following
are
summaries
of
concluding
observations,
including concerns and recommendations that each treaty body
adopted after reviewing North Korea’s periodic report to the
ICCPR, the CRC and the CEDAW. They can provide a general
90
overview of the international community’s evaluation concerning
the severe violation of human rights in North Korea.
1) International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)5)
The DPRK submitted the second periodic report in accordance
with Article 40 of the Covenant on December 25, 1999 and the
Committee
considered
the
report
of
the
Democratic
People’s
Republic of Korea (CCPR/C/PRK/2000/2) at its meetings held on
July 19 and 20, 2001 and adopted the following concluding
observations at its 1953rd meeting held on July 26, 2001.
(1) Introduction
The Committee regrets the considerable delay in the submission
of the report, which was due in 1987. It also regrets the lack of
information on the human rights situation in practice, as well as
the absence of facts and data on the implementation of the
Covenant. As a result, a number of credible and substantiated
allegations of violations of Covenant provisions which have been
brought to the attention of the Committee could not be addressed
effectively and the Committee found it difficult to determine
whether individuals in the State party’s territory and subject to its
jurisdiction fully and effectively enjoy their fundamental rights
under the Covenant.
5) The National Human Rights Commission of Korea, Bukhanui Gukjeingwonhyeobyak
Ihaengjaryojip : Bukhanui Bogoseo Mit Yuenui Choejonggyeonhae (The Source Book
for North Korea’s Implementation on International Human Rights Treaties: North
Korea’s National Reports and UN’s Concluding Observations), No. 05-92 (National
Human Rights Commission of Korea: Seoul, 2005), pp. 63~76.
91
(2) Positive aspects
The Committee welcomes the reduction of the number of
criminal offences carrying the death penalty from 33 to 5 and the
decision to review the issue of capital punishment with a view to
its abolition.6) It further welcomes the ratification by the State
party, in February 2001, of the Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Discrimination against Women. The Committee also
appreciates the exchange visits between families from the State
party and the Republic of Korea that have taken place since the
Pyongyang
Declaration
of
June
15,
2000
as
well
as
the
discontinuation of administrative internment in the State party.
(3) Subjects of concern and recommendations
1. The Committee remains concerned about constitutional and
legislative provisions that seriously endanger the impartiality
and independence of the judiciary.
2. The Committee is concerned that, in addition to judicial
protection, there is no independent national institution for the
promotion and protection of human rights. The State party
should consider the establishment of a national human rights
institution (article 2 of the Covenant).
3. The State party should grant access to its territory to
international
human
rights
organizations
and
other
international bodies on a regular basis at their request and
6) However, the provision of Criminal Act of North Korea adopted at the Presidium of the
Supreme People’s Assembly Order No. 2483 of December 19, 2004 made it possible to
execute criminal punishment as many as 16 crimes. In addition, because the elements of
criminal act are also ambiguously defined, it is predicted that capital punishment seems
to be frequently occur in reality. Refer to the related materials presented in the Monthly
Colloquium of Bukhanbeob Yeonguhoe (The Society for the Research on North Korean
Law) on August 24, 2009.
92
ensure accessibility to indispensable information about the
promotion and protection of human rights.
4. The Committee remains seriously concerned about the lack of
measures by the State party to deal with the food and
nutrition situation in the Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea.
5. The imposition of the death penalty may be subject to
essentially subjective criteria, and not be confined to “the
most serious crimes” only, as required under article 6,
paragraph 2, of the Covenant. The State party should review
and amend the articles of the Criminal Code to bring them
into conformity with the requirements of article 6, paragraph
2, of the Covenant. The State party should refrain from any
public executions. It is invited to work towards the declared
goal of abolishing capital punishment.
6. The Committee is deeply concerned about consistent and
substantiated allegations of violations, by law enforcement
personnel, of article 7 of the Covenant. The State party
should ensure that all instances of ill-treatment and of
torture and other abuses committed by agents of the State
are promptly considered and investigated by an independent
body.
The
State
party
should
institute
a
system
of
independent oversight of all places of detention and custody
with a view to preventing any act of abuse of power by law
enforcement personnel.
7. The Committee continues to harbour serious doubts about the
compatibility of the provisions of Chapter Two of the Labour
Law of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, especially
articles 14 and 18 thereof, with the prohibition of forced
labour
contained
Covenant.
The
in
article
State
8,
paragraph
party
should
3
(a),
of
amend
93
the
the
above-mentioned provisions of the Labour Law so as to
avoid any potential conflict with the provisions of article 8 of
the Covenant.
8. The Committee remains concerned about the compatibility of
the State party’s pre-trial detention practices and preliminary
investigation procedures with article 9 of the Covenant. The
State party must ensure that anyone arrested or detained on
a criminal charge is brought promptly before a judge. The
State party must ensure that all detainees have access to
counsel and are permitted to contact their families from the
moment of apprehension.
9. The State party should consider the elimination of the
requirement of traveler’s certificates which citizens of the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea are required to obtain
for travel within the country. In the Committee’s opinion, the
State party should eliminate the requirement of traveler’s
certificates and an exit visa for foreigners who wish to leave
the country.
10. The Committee is seriously concerned that the State party’s
practice in promoting the religious freedom does not meet
the requirements of article 18 of the Covenant. It further is
concerned that various provisions of the Press Law, and
their frequent invocation, are difficult to reconcile with the
provisions of article 19 of the Covenant. The Committee
also remains concerned about restrictions on public meetings
and
demonstrations,
requirements
of
the
including
laws
possible
governing
abuse
of
assembly.
the
The
94
Committee has taken note of the delegation’s explanation
that, as there has been no popular manifestation of any
desire to create new political parties, no regulation or
legislation governing the creation and registration of political
parties is currently envisaged. The Committee considers that
this situation runs counter to the provisions of article 25 of
the Covenant.
11. The State party should investigate the trafficking of women
further and report its findings to the Committee. The State
party is requested to take measures improve women’s
participation in the public sector workforce, especially in
senior
positions,
and
to
provide
the
Committee
with
statistical data on the status of women, in particular as to
the level of their responsibility and remuneration in the
major economic sectors.
12. The State party should ensure that its second periodic
report
and
the
present
concluding
observations
are
disseminated widely. The State party also should indicate
within one year the measures it has taken or envisages to
give effect to the Committee’s recommendations contained in
paragraphs 15, 22, 23, 24 and 26 of the present concluding
observations.
The Committee requests that the information relating to its
other recommendations and to the Covenant as a whole should be
included in the third periodic report of the DPRK, to be submitted
by January 1, 2004.
95
2) International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(ICESCR)7)
The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea submitted a second
periodic report in accordance with Article 16 and 17 of the
Covenant on April 9, 2002. The Committee considered this report
on the implementation of the ICESCR at its 44th to 46th meetings
held on November 19 and 20, 2003. The concluding observations,
adopted at the Committee’s 56th meeting held on November 23,
2003 (see E/C.12/2003/SR.56), are as follows:
(1) Introduction
The Committee regrets that the State party has not included
specific information in terms of data and updated statistics,
particularly in the field of social security, health and education.
(2) Principal subjects of concern
1. The Committee is concerned, as is the Human Rights
Committee in its own concluding observations, about the
constitutional and other legislative provisions, particularly
Article 162 of the Constitution, which seriously compromise
the impartiality and independence of the judiciary and have
an adverse impact on the protection of all human rights
guaranteed under the Covenant.
2. The Committee regrets the lack of information about the
exact functioning of the individual complaint system under
Ihaengjaryojip: Bukhanui Bogoseo Mit Yuenui Choejonggyeonhae (The Source Book for
North Korea’s Implementation on International Human Rights Treaties: North Korea’s
National Reports and UN’s Concluding Observations), pp. 137~149.
96
the Law on Complaints and Petitions, as concerns complaints
in the field of economic, social and cultural rights. The
Committee further notes with concern that the State party
has
not
ratified
the
International
Convention
on
the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.
3. The Committee expresses its concern about the persistence
of traditional societal attitudes and practices prevailing in the
State party with regard to women that negatively affect the
enjoyment of their economic, social and cultural rights. The
Committee is concerned about the lack of domestic legislation
on non-discrimination against women.
4. The Committee is concerned that the right to work may not
be
fully
assured
State-allocated
in
the
present
employment.
The
system
of
Committee
compulsory
notes
with
concern that the North Korean legislation establishes a single
trade union structure, which is controlled by the ruling party.
Furthermore, the Committee notes with concern that domestic
legislation does not recognize the right to strike or the right
to form trade unions.
5. The Committee notes with concern that there is no specific
provision
in
the
legislation
of
the
State
party
that
criminalizes and punishes domestic violence. The Committee
notes with concern that existing social and educational
policies
in
the
State
party
for
orphans
keep
them
in
segregated environments, which can lead to situations of
social exclusion. The Committee is further concerned about
the consequences of the widespread famine suffered by the
country from the mid-1990s and that certain groups, in
particular women, children and older persons, have been more
97
severely affected than others. It also expresses deep concern
about the high rate of children under 5 that are chronically
malnourished
(45
per
cent
according
to
government
statistics), as well as the high incidence of poverty-related
diseases. The Committee also notes with concern the increase
in maternal mortality rate. The declining attendance rate in
schools, from 99 to 85 per cent according to the State party,
as a consequence of national disasters is another serious
concern to the Committee.
6. The
Committee
remains
concerned
that
children
with
disabilities, whenever possible, are not included in the regular
school system.
(3) Suggestions and recommendations
1. The
Committee
invites
the
State
party
to
set
up
a
mechanism for the effective monitoring of the progressive
implementation of the Covenant.
2. The Committee recommends that the State party, in its
efforts aimed at the implementation of the rights under the
Covenant,
continue
to
seek
international
assistance
and
engage itself in international cooperation and in the regional
activities undertaken by international and regional agencies,
including
the
Office
of
the
United
Nations
High
constitutional
and
Commissioner for Human Rights.
3. The
Committee
recommends
that
the
legislative provisions that may compromise or diminish the
independence and impartiality of the judiciary be immediately
reviewed in order to guarantee its crucial role in the
protection of rights covered by the Covenant.
98
4. The Committee recommends that the State party joins the
International Labour Organization as a full member and
consequently
ratifies
the
main
International
Labour
Organization conventions in due course. In order to facilitate
the accession, the Committee recommends that the State
party speed up the necessary reform of its legislation with a
view to fulfilling the criteria of the tripartite representation
system in the International Labour Organization.
5. The
Committee
suggests
that
domestic
legislation
be
reviewed with the aim of giving full effect to the principle of
non-discrimination against women and that the State party
adopt
and
implement
a
programme
containing
specific
measures for awareness-raising, aimed at promoting the
rights of women and their advancement in all fields of
political, economic and social life.
6. The Committee encourages the State party to take legislative
measures to guarantee the right of everyone to choose
his/her career and workplace. It also recommends that the
national legislation be reviewed in order to eliminate penalties
against
persons
having
travelled
abroad
in
quest
of
employment and better living conditions. The State party
should also review its domestic legislation to bring it in line
with the provisions of article 8 of the Covenant with regard
to the trade unions rights, including the right to form
independent trade unions and the right to strike.
7. The Committee encourages the State party to provide in its
third periodic report data on the conditions for entitlement
under
the
social
security
system,
including
for
family
benefits. The Committee further invites the State party to
99
explore the possibility of increasing in due course the
budgetary allocations for social expenditure, as well as public
assistance for people in need, and of enabling persons
looking for employment, particularly women, to find jobs on
the territory of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. It
is
also
recommended
that
the
State
party
amend
its
legislation in order to include specific provisions that can be
used as grounds to fight domestic violence.
8. The Committee calls upon the State party to continue its
effort in assisting those children who have suffered from the
consequences of natural disasters to return to school. It also
urges the State party to strengthen its efforts to provide
alternative family care for orphans. It is recommended that
the
State
party
establish
appropriate
mechanisms
to
guarantee equal access for the more vulnerable groups to
international food aid and give priority to these groups in
food programmes.
9. The Committee recommends that increased attention be paid
by the competent authorities to providing adequate nutrition
to children suffering from chronic malnutrition as well as
adequate
health
care,
to
address
the
potentially
severe
consequences on their health. The Committee, furthermore,
recommends that the State party take effective measures to
improve the conditions of maternal care, including prenatal
health services and medical assistance at birth as well as to
adopt
a
comprehensive
HIV/AIDS
prevention
strategy,
including awareness-raising campaigns and a blood safety
programme.
The
Committee
invites
the
State
party
to
continue and enhance its collaboration with United Nations
100
programmes and specialized agencies, such as the United
Nations Development Programme, World Health Organization
and the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS. The
Committee further recommends that the State party include
in its third periodic report statistical data on the incidence of
HIV/AIDS and information about the measures undertaken to
prevent an epidemic.
10. The Committee recommends that the State party change the
present system concerning the education of children with
disabilities by allowing these children to be educated in the
regular school system. Moreover, the State party should
take measures to train teachers to assist them effectively in
regular classes.
While noting with appreciation the State party’s commitment to
disseminate
widely
the
present
concluding
observations,
the
Committee encourages the State party to make them available to
all institutions and public authorities dealing with the rights under
the Covenant as well as to large segments of the civil society.
Finally, the Committee requests the State party to submit its third
periodic report by June 30, 2008.
3) Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC)8)
The CRC Committee considered the combined third and fourth
periodic report of the DPRK at its 1388th and 1389th meetings held
8) The Committee on the Convention of Rights of Child, Concluding Observations on the
DPRK on March 27, 2009, (CRC/C/PRK/CO/4). Available from < http://www2.ohchr.org/
english/bodies/crc/docs/co/CRC-C-PRK-CO4.pdf>. For its Korean version, see Citizens
Alliance for North Korean Human Rights, Life and Human Rights, vol. 51, (Spring,
2009), pp. 28~46.
on
January
23,
2009
and
adopted
the
following
101
concluding
observations at its 1398th meeting held on January 29, 2009,
1. The
Committee
regrets
that
the
paucity
of
information
provided by the State party with regard to the actual
enjoyment of rights by children in DPRK has made it
difficult
to
assess
the
progress
achieved
in
the
implementation of the Convention.
2. While noting the statement by the State party that “no
restriction is placed on the activities of the NGOs and
inter-governmental organizations for the implementation of
the Convention”, the Committee however is concerned that
that existing NGOs lack the autonomy which distinguishes
them from state-sponsored organizations.
3. The Committee regrets that the lack of reliable statistics in
the State party report is hampering effective follow-up or
evaluation of the implementation of the Convention. The
Committee
is
particularly
concerned
that
data
that
is
disaggregated in important areas of the Convention are not
available, such as health, education, child abuse and neglect,
juvenile justice, and in particular, with regard to vulnerable
groups of children, such as children living in remote areas,
children in extreme poverty and children working and/or
living in streets.
4. The
Committee
is
concerned
that
children
may
face
discrimination on the basis of the political or other opinion,
social origin, or other status, either of themselves, or of their
parents.
5. The Committee recommends that the State party take all
102
necessary
measures
to
ensure
the
full
practical
implementation of the rights to freedom of expression and
freedom of association and peaceful assembly, in accordance
with articles 13 and 15 of the Convention.
6. The Committee recommends that the State party respect the
right of the child to freedom of thought, conscience and
religion.
7. The Committee is concerned about the information received
that children have been subjected to severe ill-treatment
while in detention, including street children (kkotjebis). The
Committee strongly recommends that the State party include
a provision in its domestic legislation prohibiting children
from being subjected to torture and establishing appropriate
sanctions against the perpetrators of torture. Furthermore, the
Committee regrets that the State party has not developed a
full-fledged juvenile justice system in compliance with the
Convention and other relevant United Nations standards.
Therefore the Committee also urges the State party to bring
the
system
of
juvenile
justice
fully
in
line
with
the
Convention, in and with other United Nations standards in
the field of juvenile justice.
8. The Committee is alarmed that that many of the children
placed in residential care are in fact not orphans and that a
large number of children are customarily placed in residential
institutions
due
mechanisms
or
to
the
care
lack
of
effective
alternatives.
The
gate-keeping
Committee
also
reiterates its previous concern that triplets are automatically
institutionalized
by
the
State.
The
Committee
is
also
concerned about the situation of children whose parents are
detained.
Furthermore,
the
Committee
103
recommends
the
adequate and effective monitoring of the quality of these
facilities including nurseries, kindergartens and schools.
9. The Committee is concerned about the de facto discrimination
faced
by
children
with
disabilities
and
the
lack
of
community-based services for those children and families.
The Committee recommends that the State party continue to
strengthen measures to protect and promote the rights of
children with disabilities undertaking the ratification of the
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and its
Optional Protocol.
10. The
Committee
urges
the
State
party
to
ensure
the
effectiveness of the system of fully subsidized health care
that ensures the provision of the highest standard of health
for
all
children,
paying
special
attention
to
the
most
vulnerable families, including those in rural and remote
areas and ensure that free, or affordable medicines is
available for all children. The Committee also highlights the
need to improve access by United Nations agencies in order
to ensure the equal distribution of humanitarian assistance
provision, including food aid.
11. The
Committee
non-attendance
hardship,
and
is
due
note
concerned
to
with
about
natural
concern
the
high
disasters
that
or
rate
of
economic
additional
costs
associated with schooling may be a contributing factor to
the problem of non-attendance. The Committee is also
concerned that children spend significant proportion of their
time allocated for instruction for the purposes of agricultural
work, festivity preparations including the “Arirang” festival
104
to the extent that may lower achievement and quality of
education.9)
12. The Committee recommends the State party to ensure that
army recruitment is genuinely voluntary when recruiting
children and that priority will be given to the oldest
applicants. It should also consider the ratification of the
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the
Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict at the
earliest opportunity.
13. The Committee urges the State party to strictly enforce
legislation prohibiting sale, use and trafficking of controlled
substances by children, including opium, and to provide
effective structures and procedures for treatment, counseling,
recovery and reintegration.
The Committee invites the State party to submit the fifth
periodic report, by October 20, 2012. This report should not exceed
120 pages.
4) Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
agaist Women (CEDAW)10)
The DPRK submitted its initial periodic report in accordance
with Article 18 (1) of the CEDAW on September 11, 2002. The
9) Many North Korean defectors and South Korean and international human rights
organizations have been claimed that making children perform at ‘Arirang’ is a case of
forced child labor to promote the political system and to earn foreign currency. It was
the first time that the United Nations raised the problem of the Arirang performance in
its official report.
Ihaengjaryojip : Bukhanui Bogoseo Mit Yuenui Choejonggyeonhae (The Source Book
for North Korea’s Implementation on International Human Rights Treaties: North
Korea’s National Reports and UN’s Concluding Observations), pp. 301~315.
105
Committee considered its initial report on July 18, 2005 and
adopted concluding comments on July 22, 2005. The principal
areas of concern and recommendations are as follows.
1. While appreciating the State party’s willingness to amend
national legislation and subsequently consider lifting the
reservations
to
article
2
and
article
9
the
Committee
considers that the reservations to articles 2 and 9 are
contrary to the object and purpose of the Convention.
2. The Committee requests the State party to clarify in its next
periodic report the status of the Convention in relation to
domestic legislation in the case of a conflict.
3. The Committee encourages the State party to incorporate
fully the definition of discrimination, encompassing both direct
and indirect discrimination, in line with article 1 of the
Convention, in its Constitution or other appropriate national
legislation.
It
encourages
the
State
party
to
carry
out
awareness-raising campaigns on the Convention, in particular
the meaning and scope of indirect discrimination.
4. The Committee recommends to the State party that the Law
on Sex Equality of July 1946 be revised in accordance with
the provisions of the Convention as a matter of priority.
5. The Committee is concerned about existing discriminatory
legal
provisions,
particularly
those
which
establish
a
minimum marriage age for females at 17 and for males at
18; and about article 7 of the citizenship law on the
determination of the citizenship of a child under the age of
14. It is also concerned about existing protective legislation,
which in some cases is based on the socially perceived
106
characteristics of women and men and which may perpetuate
inequality and discrimination against women.
6. While the Committee notes that the people’s committees
address and regulate almost every aspect of people’s lives,
including women’s lives at every level, it is concerned that
the
committees
and
their
procedures
may
not
address
women’s rights and needs on an equal basis with those of
men. It is also concerned about the apparent lack of effective
remedies for complaints of violations of the rights of women.
7. The Committee requests the State party to ensure that the
national machinery is provided with adequate visibility, power
and resources to promote effectively the advancement of
women.
8. The Committee encourages the State party to strengthen its
effort to eliminate the traditional and stereotyped assumptions
and attitudes in respect of the roles and responsibilities of
women and men. Furthermore the Committee is concerned
about the practice of encouraging conciliation among spouses
that apply for divorce, with the aim of protecting family
unity, which could be detrimental to women who are victims
of domestic violence and other forms of abuse.
9. The Committee urges the State party to introduce specific
poverty alleviation measures aimed at improving the situation
of women to eliminate their vulnerability. The Committee
recommends that the State party seek international assistance
in guaranteeing that women, particularly women from rural
areas, have equal access to food supplies. It urges the State
party to assist women economic returnees who went abroad
without valid travel permits to reintegrate into their families
107
and society and to protect them from all forms of violations
of their rights. It calls on the State party to train law
enforcement officials, migration officials and border police on
the causes, consequences and incidence of trafficking and
other forms of exploitation so as to enable them to render
support to women who might be at risk of becoming victims
of trafficking or commercial sexual exploitation.
recommends
that
the
State
party
conduct
It also
nationwide
awareness-raising campaigns on the risks and consequences
of trafficking targeted at women and girls.
10. The Committee recommends that the State party take
measures
to
increase
number
the
of
women
in
decision-making positions in all spheres. It also recommends
that the State party introduce temporary special measures,
in accordance with article 4, paragraph 1, of the Convention
and
the
Committee’s
general
recommendation
25,
to
strengthen and accelerate its efforts to promote and elect
women to positions of power.
11. The Committee requests the State party to include in its
next
periodic
report
detailed
information
about
the
availability of and access to general and reproductive health
services for women in all parts of the country. The
Committee
also
urges
the
State
party
to
strengthen
prevention measures for HIV/AIDS among women and men;
to develop a comprehensive HIV/AIDS research and control
programme; and ensure access to affordable antiretroviral
drugs.
12. The Committee urges the State party to provide information
on the number and condition of women in detention in its
108
next report. The Committee further recommends that the
State party provide an environment that encourages the
establishment of women’s (human rights) organizations, in
accordance with article 7 (c) of the Convention. It also calls
on the State party to create an independent human rights
institution
with
oversight
responsibilities
for
the
implementation of the State party’s obligations under the
Convention.
13. The Committee encourages the State party to ratify the
Optional Protocol to the Convention and to accept, as soon
as possible, the amendment to article 20, paragraph 1, of the
Convention. It further urges the State party to utilize fully
in
its
implementation
of
its
obligations
under
the
Convention, the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action.
14. The Committee also emphasizes that a full and effective
implementation
of
the
Convention
is
indispensable
for
achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). It
calls for the integration of a gender perspective and the
explicit reflection of the provisions of the Convention in all
efforts aimed at the achievement of the MDGs, and requests
the State party to include information thereon in its next
periodic report.
15. The Committee requests the wide dissemination in the
Democratic
People’s
Republic
of
Korea
of
the
present
concluding comments. It also requests the State party to
continue to disseminate widely, in particular to women’s and
human rights organizations, the Convention and its Optional
Protocol, the Committee’s general recommendations and the
Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, as well as the
109
outcome of the twenty-third special session of the General
Assembly,
entitled
“Women
2000:
gender
equality,
development and peace for the twenty-first century”. The
Committee also requests the State party to respond to the
concerns expressed in the present concluding comments in
its next periodic report under article 18 of the Convention,
which is due in 2006.
3. Resolutions of the Human Rights Council and the General
Assembly and etc.
1) UN Sub-Commission
The grave situation of human rights in North Korea was
neglected by the international community due to limited access to
the related information. The issue of the North Korean loggers in
Siberia in 1994 and the food crisis throughout the late 1990s called
for the attention of the UN. On August 21, 1997, the first
resolution within the boundaries of the United Nations was
adopted in the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination
and Protection of Minorities. This resolution stated concerns on
the restriction of the freedom to relocation of dwelling which is
stipulated in article 13 of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and article 12 of the ICCPR and urged North Korea to
submit a periodic report on treaty bodies which was delayed for
10
years.
This
resolution
was
resolved
institution composed of human rights
by
a
non
political
specialists rather than
government officials. It is meaningful though due to the fact that
it was the first time that the UN expressed an integrated opinion
on the status of human rights in North Korea. North Korea
110
reacted to the UN’s statements and insisted that it was a total
distortion of the reality of North Korea. They declared withdrawal
from the ICCPR and postponed the scheduled submission of the
execution report for the CRC. However, the UNHRC resolved a
general recommendation on October 29, 1997 stating that North
Korea’s withdrawal from the Agreement is an infringement of the
ICCPR and international laws. Therefore, the withdrawal could not
be accepted. The Secretary General and the Human Rights
Committee of EU also expressed the same thoughts as the
committee. Consequently, North Korea changed their mind and
submitted their 2
nd
periodic report on the status of the execution
of the ICCPR on December 25 1999. This was assessed by the
treaty
body
on
July
26 2001,
and
they
also
observed
the
assessments by the treaty body for the report on the human
rights of females and children.
North Korea’s harsh resistance boosted the attention of the
international
society.
The
same
sub-committee
adopted
a
resolution regarding the status of human rights. Since 1999, the
UNCHR decided to discuss matters related to the status of
Human Rights in North Korea and these actions resulted in the
resolution of the General Assembly.
2) UN Commission on Human Rights and Human Rights Council
The UN Commission on Human Rights adopted a resolution
concerning the human rights in the DPRK at the 59th session held
on April 16, 2003. This was quite a meaningful moment due to
the fact that matters related with Human Rights in North Korea
were initially highlighted as agendas in the UN’s body related to
human rights.
111
(1) UN Commission on Human Rights
1. Expresses
its
deep
concern
about
reports
of
systemic,
widespread and grave violations of human rights in the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea;
2. Notes with regret that the authorities of the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea have not created the necessary
conditions to permit the international community to verify
these reports in an independent manner and calls upon the
Government to respond to these reports and these concerns
urgently, including:
(a) By ratifying human rights instruments to which it is not
yet a party, in particular the Convention against Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment
and
the
International
Convention
on
the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination;
(b) By refraining from sanctioning citizens of the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea who have moved to other
countries, in particular for humanitarian reasons;
(c) By cooperating with the United Nations system in the field
of human rights;
(d) By resolving all the unresolved questions relating to the
abduction of foreigners;
(g) By adhering to internationally recognized labour standards;
3. Calls
upon
the
authorities
of
the
Democratic
People’s
Republic of Korea to ensure that humanitarian organizations,
in particular the United Nations’ agencies, have free and
unimpeded access to all parts of the Democratic People’s
Republic
of
Korea
in
order
for
them
to
ensure
that
humanitarian assistance is delivered impartially on the basis
112
of need, in accordance with humanitarian principles.
This resolution sates that: 1. Stated severe concerns on the
structural and wide range infringements of human rights in North
Korea; 2. Urged North Korea to ratify the treaty against torture
and the treaty against the discrimination of race, the termination
of punishments on defectors, collaboration with UN’s human rights
bodies, resolving the problems regarding kidnapped foreigners,
observance of international labor standards; 3. Granted the access
rights within the territories of North Korea to international aid
organizations of the UN in order to assure the transparency of the
distribution of food resources in North Korea. After this a human
rights resolution against North Korea was made every year and
this was the basis of the first resolution adopted at the 60th
session of the UN General Assembly to North Korea which was
made in December 2005. The most recent resolution for human
rights in North Korea was made at the 13th session of the Human
Rights Council and its main points are as follows.
(2) UN Human Rights Council
1. Recalling all previous resolutions adopted by the Commission
on Human Rights, the Human Rights Council and the
General Assembly on the situation of human rights in the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, including Council
resolution 10/16 of March 26, 2009 and Assembly resolution
64/175 of December 18, 2009, and urging the implementation
of those resolutions,
2. Bearing in mind the reports on the situation of human rights
in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea submitted by
113
the Special Rapporteur (A/64/224 and A/HRC/13/47) and
urging the implementation of the recommendations contained
therein,
4. Deeply concerned at the continuing reports of systematic,
widespread and grave violations of civil, political, economic,
social and cultural rights in the Democratic People’s Republic
of Korea,
5. In particular the use of torture and labour camps against
political prisoners and repatriated citizens,
6. Deeply regretting the refusal of the Government of the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to recognize the
mandate
of
the
Special
Rapporteur
or
to
extend
full
cooperation to him, and allow him access to the country.
Therefore the Human Rights Council decides to extend the
mandate of the Special Rapporteur for a period of one year,
7. Recognizing the particular vulnerability of women, children,
persons with disabilities and the elderly, and the need to
ensure their protection against neglect, abuse, exploitation and
violence,
8. Also urges the Government of the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea to ensure full, rapid and unimpeded access
of humanitarian assistance that is delivered on the basis of
need, in accordance with humanitarian principles, coupled
with adequate monitoring.
In sum, this resolution is meaningful in many ways: It succeeds
most parts of the previous UN resolutions. It made a six-year
term of the Special Rapporteur; professor Muntabhon extended his
position
for
another
year
so
that
eventually
the
UNHRC
114
designated his successor after a six-year term in 2010. The
resolution made the number of countries against a human rights
resolution on North Korea decrease significantly and increased the
international community’s recognition of the miserable situation of
human rights in North Korea.
3) UN General Assembly
The General Assembly, at its 60th session on November 17,
2005, adopted a resolution for human rights issues in North Korea.
The resolution, sponsored by the EU, was approved by a vote of
84 in favor to 22 against, with 62 abstentions. The contents of
this resolution are similar to those of the UNCHR’s resolutions
adopted on April 16 2003, on April 15, 2004 and on April 14, 2005.
The General Assembly’s adoption of the resolution on the situation
of human rights in North Korea means that human rights issues
are no longer domestic issues of its own but grave concerns of
the international community.
The General Assembly has adopted resolutions on the issues of
human rights in North Korea for the last five years up until the
th
most recent resolution 64/175 at the 64
Assembly
on
December
18,
2009.
session of the General
The
General
Assembly’s
resolution against North Korea jointly proposed by 49 countries
including the EU, Japan, South Korea and the United States was
approved by a vote of 99 in favor to 20 against, with 63
abstentions. South Korea has taken an inconsistent and negative
attitude for the resolutions, voting with an abstention in 2005, in
favor in 2006, and with an abstention in 2007. However, as a joint
proposer, South Korea has taken a positive attitude in the
resolution since 2008.
Organization
In favor:Against:
Abstention
Date
Joint proposer
60 Session of the
General Assembly
(Third Committee)
2005.11.17
EU, US, Japan and
other 45 states
UN General Assembly
2005.12.16
61th Session of the
General Assembly
(Third Committee)
2006.11.17
The General Assembly
2006.12.19
62th Session of the
General Assembly
(Third Committee)
2007.11.20
2007.12.18
63th Session of the
General Assembly
(Third Committee)
2008.11.21
2008.12.18
64th Session of the
General Assembly
(Third Committee)
2009.11.19
2009.12.18
th
115
South Korea
84:22:62
Abstention
88:21:60
91:21:60
EU,US, Japan and
other 52 states
In favor
99:21:56
97:23:60
EU,US, Japan, and
other 51 states
Abstention
101:22:59
95:24:62
EU, US, Japan,
South Korea, and
other 51 states
Joint
proposer
94:22:63
EU, US, Japan,
South Korea, and
other 53 states
97:19:65
Joint
proposer
99:20:63
The resolution adopted by the General Assembly in 2009
contains the following concerns. It expresses its very serious
concern for the persistence of continuing reports of systematic,
widespread and grave violations of human rights in North Korea,
especially regarding the severe punishment of those who leave or
try to leave the country without permission or of their families, as
well as punishment of persons who are returned. It reiterates its
very
serious
concern
concern
relating
to
for
unsolved
abductions
in
questions
the
of
form
international
of
enforced
disappearance, which violates the human rights of nationals of
other sovereign countries and urgently calls upon North Korea to
resolve these questions by ensuring the immediate return of
abductees. It calls upon North Korea to extend its full cooperation
to
the
Special
Rapporteur,
by
granting
him
full,
free
and
116
unimpeded access to North Korea, and to other UN human rights
mechanisms. It welcomes the recent resumption of the reunion of
separated families across the border. It urges State parties to
comply with their obligations under the 1951 Convention relating
to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol thereto in relation
to
refugees
from
North
Korea
who
are
covered
by
those
instruments.
However, North Korea rejected the UN human rights resolution,
strongly
arguing,
“It
is
hostile
slandering
and
scheming
of
enemies against North Korea.” The table above shows that while
the number of countries in favor of the resolutions against North
Korea has significantly increased, the number of countries against
the resolutions has decreased. This reflects the international
community’s rising awareness of the severe situation of human
rights in North Korea.
4) Universal Periodic Review
The UPR Working Group of the UNHRC held the 6th session
from November 30, 2009 to December 11, 2009. The review on
North Korea was made at the 11
which
52
State
following the 16
th
parties
made
th
session on December 7, 2009 in
167
recommendations.
In
the
session held on December 9, 2009, the Working
Group adopted the UPR report on North Korea.11) North Korea
argues that the UN selectively targets North Korea to review
their situation of human rights in the UNHRC and the General
Assembly which eventually lead to unfair resolutions against
them. They also insisted that the Special Rapporteur on North
11) Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review (A/HRC/13/13 of 4
January 2010; Previously issued under document symbol A/HRC/WG.6/6/L.12).
117
Korea
continuously
submits
reports,
based
on
distorted
information, to criticize the systems and policies of North Korea.
So, North Korea claims that they will reject all ‘resolutions,’ deny
the
Special
Rapporteur’s
all
duties,
and
stand
against
the
conflicting ‘resolutions’ and the political use of human rights for
years to come. North Korea also insist that they respect the UPR
which
fairly
deals
with
the
Member
States
with
different
ideologies, systems, cultures and traditions and it will contribute
to their deep understanding on the situation of human rights of
each state and promotion of human rights in the world.
North Korea mentioned that it will reject 50 items out of 167
items in the recommendations, but for the 117 items, they review
the rest 117 items and submit a reply for them within an
appropriate time so that the UNHRC will include it in its outcome
report to be adopted in the 13th session.
The 50 items which North Korea rejected are recommendations
on severe human rights violations in North Korea: 1. Ratification
of the Convention against Torture; 2. Suspension of arbitrary
imprisonment and concentration camps for political criminals and
customs of forced labor; 3. Allowing the visit of the Special
Rapporteur for Human Rights and the Special Rapporteur for food
aid to North Korea; 4. Suspension of discrimination of the
distribution of food aid according to family backgrounds; 5.
Suspension of public and secret executions and the deferral of the
operations
of
executions
as
a
pre
stage;
6.
Assuring
an
independent legal system and the rights to receive fair trials; 7.
Guarantee of the freedom of expression, religion and moving; 8.
Suspension of punishments on remaining family members of
defectors.
8.
Resolutions
for
problems
related
with
forced
118
kidnapping of Korean, Japanese and South East Asian Citizens;
and 9. Suspension of child labor and military exercises for
children.
North Korea, however, did not make clear statement of reply to
the 117 items which they reserved the comment on them in the
th
following the UNHRC’s 13
delegation
of
anachronistic
North
session on March 18, 2010. The
Korea
“resolutions”
claimed
and
the
that
mandate
the
of
practice
the
of
“special
rapporteur” are confrontational in nature and not conducive on
human rights because they are politically motivated. So, the
practice of “resolutions” and the “Special Rapporteur” on North
Korea must no longer be tolerated in Human Rights Council.
Regrettably, North Korea expressed that technical cooperation and
its realization to complement sector-specific legislation, and draft
reports on the implementation of the international human rights
instrument to which North Korea is a party might be possible
after no more hostile pressure on North Korea is made.
With reference to the recommendation, the Norway and France
stated that it failed to understand which recommendations were
accepted and which were rejected, thus remaining unclear as to
the outcome of the interactive dialogue, which eventually means
that none of 167 recommendations included in the working group
report was accepted by North Korea. However, the UNHRC, at its
13
th
session, adopted the Report of the Working Group on the
Universal Periodic Review on December 9, 2009 without further
clear statement of North Korea.12)
Eventually, North Korea shall be reviewed by whether they will
implement the recommendations stated in the report that is even
12) Draft report of the Human Rights Council on its thirteenth session (A/HRC/13/L.10 of
April 7, 2010).
119
unsure whether it will be accepted and this is a limitation of the
newly adopted the UPR and we look forward to the flexibility of
the UNHRC. The UPR results related with North Korea in this
case shows the importance of the preparation period is bigger
than the short review in Geneva. Consequently, North Korea shall
be reviewed with its implementation of the recommendations in
the outcome report after four years with which North Korea did
not clearly express its acceptance of it. Since it is the limitation
of the newly adopted UPR system, the UNHRC needs more
efficient strategies to maximize benefit from it. The result of the
UPR
on
North
Korea
demonstrates
that
preparation
and
implementation of the UPR are more important than review
process which is less than one hour to three hours.
5) Report of the UN Special Rapporteur on the Situation of
Human Rights in the DPRK
Professor Vitit Muntarbhorn was appointed as the Special
Rapporteur for North Korea in 2004 and his periodic reports had
hugely influenced the resolutions on North Korea’s human rights
issues in the UNCHR, The UNHRC and the General Assembly.
The Special Rapporteur presented his report to the 13
th
session of
the UNHRC on March 15, 2010 which was his final report
submitted to the Committee upon the last days of his six-year
term.13) The representatives of 20 countries14) including North
Korea, South Korea and the Human Rights Watch, an NGO based
in New York attended the session. The summary of the report is
13) Ibid, Ⅳ.A., pp. 205~207.
14) The 20 countries are EU, Japan, Spain, Canada, Syria, United States, Cuba, England,
Vietnam, China, Thailand, Angola, South Korea, Swiss, Sudan, Norway, Myanmar,
Chile, Pakistan and Australia.
120
as follows:
The North Korean regime became a complete totalitarian state,
a State of Fear or a State as one big prison, as a result of the
undemocratic
force’s
suppressing
the
people
with
excessive
undemocratic power. North Korea have made their people suffered
from with a wide range of surveillance system and have abused
their national resources, based on Songun (Military-first) politics,
for nuclear development to benefit only the military and the ruling
class. Although they inserted an article about human rights in the
constitution revised in 2009, it is a revision with no content
because the overall situation of the human rights in North Korea
is still very severe. Especially, the currency reform taken last year
to control the market system turned out to be a complete
economic failure. It remained concerned about the detention in
political prison camps; extensive enforcement of capital punishment
including public execution; violations of the freedom of movement,
expression, thought and religion; discrimination against and abuse
of the socially marginalized people including women and children;
abduction of foreigners; continuous unstable status of North
Korean defectors.
Therefore, North Korea should take the following measures in a
short run: ensure effective provision of and access to food and
other basic necessities for those in need of assistance; rectify the
distorted pattern of food distribution; adopt a moratorium on
capital punishment; terminate public executions and abuses against
the security of the person and other violations of rights and
freedom; end the punishment of those who seek asylum abroad
and who are sent back to the country; cooperate to resolve the
issue
of
foreigners
abducted
by
the
country;
and
respond
121
constructively to the recommendations of the Special Rapporteur.
For
the
longer-term
measures,
the
Special
Rapporteur
recommended to modernize the national system by instituting
reforms to ensure greater participation in the process; guarantee
personal
security
and
freedom
by
dismantling
the
pervasive
surveillance and informant/intelligent system; to institute equitable
development policies based on a “people first” policy; to abide by
the rule of law, with safeguards for accused persons, fair trials,
the development of an independent judiciary, and checks and
balances against abuses of power. The Special Rapporteur also
invites the international community: to emphasize the need for an
integrated approach that includes the prevention of violations,
effective protection of human rights; to advocate strongly for an
equitable food aid; to respect the rights of refugees, particularly,
the principle of non-refoulement; and to maximize dialogue with
South Korea. To address impunity from different viewpoints,
whether
in
terms
of
State
responsibility
and/or
individual
responsibility, and to enable the totality of the United Nations
system, especially the Security Council, and its affiliates such as
the International Criminal Court, to take measures to prevent
egregious violations, protect people from victimization and provide
effective redress.
There is the systemic issue of human rights violations caused
by the power base in the name of the State. A number of ways
of making the powers that be accountable internationally, given
that the national authorities are unable or unwilling to press for
such accountability. They include the possibility of the Security
Council
taking
up
the
issue
directly
and
of
establishing
a
Commission of Inquiry on crimes against humanity. An intriguing
122
question is to what extent the International Criminal Court can be
accessed for this purpose, on the basis of individual criminal
responsibility and interrelated with the fact that the country in
question is not a party of Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court (A/HRC/13/47 of February 17, 2010, 57-60, 89(e)).
The Special Rapporteur mentioned the possibility that UN might
take measures against North Korea’s “crimes against humanity”
and file a complaint against North Korea and their leaders to the
UN Security Council and the ICC in his reports submitted to the
4
th
session of UNHRC and the 62th session of the General
Assembly
in
2007.
Once
again,
the
Repporteur
specifically
mentioned the possible punishment for North Korean authorities
from filing a complaint the UN Security Council or the ICC as
one way of improving human rights in North Korea. This reflects
that there is a general consensus in the United States on the
punishment of the North Korean authorities on the basis of
national or individual criminal responsibility, which means a new
phrase of international campaign for human rights in North Korea.
On July 8, 2010, four years after the adoption of a resolution
against North Korea, the EU General Assembly held in Strasbourg
adopted a joint motion for a resolution on the situation of human
rights in North Korea and called on the Members of the Security
Council to work to establish a UN Commission of Inquiry to
assess grave human rights violations in North Korea, recalling the
international community’s attention to them. The EU General
Assembly expressed deep concern about the continuing reports of
systematic, widespread and grave violation of civil, political,
economic, social and cultural rights in North Korea and a
Commission of Inquiry to investigate potential crimes against
123
humanity by the government must be established. The EU
General Assembly called on the Members of the Security Council
to work to establish a UN Commission of Inquiry to assess past
and present human rights violations in North Korea to determine
to which extent such violations and impunity associated with the
abuses may constitute crimes against humanity and be subject to
international criminal jurisdiction. To do so, the EU General
Assembly
also
resolution
at
called
the
UN
on EU
General
Member
States
Assembly
to
sponsor
establishing
a
a
UN
Commission of Inquiry to assess grave human rights violations in
North Korea.
124
3. Duality and Change in Human
Rights Policy
￭ Heo Man-ho
(Professor of Political Science and Diplomacy, Kyungpook National University)
1. Introduction
It is characteristic of North Korea’s human rights policy that
there is a huge discrepancy between its public commitment to the
international community and the reality of its actual domestic
situation. According to its pronouncements to the world, North
Korea is a "human rights paradise," where "workers and farmers
are owners of the country" and the public fully enjoys respect for
human rights across all sectors–even free education and medical
benefits.
More than ever before, however, the issue of North Korea’s
human rights has become a serious issue in the international
community: Led by the EU, the UN Commission on Human
Rights (hereafter, UNCHR) adopted a resolution to promote North
Korea’s human rights for the third time in a row since 2003; the
UN General Assembly has also adopted a resolution on North
Korean human rights annually since 2005; the United States
approved the North Korean Human Rights Act in 2004; the
European Parliament adopted a resolution on North Korean human
rights in June 2006; and the Japanese Lower and Upper Houses
passed the North Korean human rights law (Law to respond to
abduction issues and human rights violation by North Korean
125
authorities) in 2006.
Being a most reclusive society, information and hard evidence
on human rights abuses in North Korea are hard to obtain. So,
some people claim, “The U.S. allegation that North Korea has the
worst human rights status is totally groundless and is nothing but
a political assault.” Even other “North Korean experts” claim
“cultural relativism” or “immanent approach” in defending North
Korea’s human rights policy. There is no doubt that North Korea’s
unique circumstances both within and beyond its borders should be
considered in the context of its human rights policy as with other
countries’ case. However, compared with the general human rights
environment, certain social conditions in North Korea undermine
the
justification
“immanent
of
its
approach.”
policies
In
with
addition,
“cultural
due
relativism”
reasons
exist
or
for
international community to make efforts for a broader application
of international human rights regulations, including the ones to
which North Korea has already acceded, to improve human rights.
This paper mainly focuses on change and continuity of North
Korea’s human rights policy in the issues that the international
community has raised in the 2000s. However, in the event that
historical analysis is warranted, the coverage period will not be
limited to the 2000s and will be extended back to the formation
period of the North Korean regime.
2. Gap between Human Rights Commitments and North Korea’s
Reality
1) The Right to Food
According to an interview with two hundred North Korean
126
defectors conducted by the Korea Bar Association (hereafter
referred to as “KBA”) in 2010, 37.1% of interviewees answered
“yes” to the question, “Do you know anyone who starved to death
in the place where you lived, after 2007?”
North Korea estimates its population in 2008 to be 23,349,859
from the census data collected from cities, provinces and regions
or 24,052,231 from the census data collected by age.1)Assuming an
adult’s food ratio is 546g a day, North Korea’s food demand is
expected to be 4,653,393,4 tons in 2008 and 4,793,361 tons in 2009.
In addition, the exchange rate of minor grains to staple grains are
rice 66%, corn 85%, wheat/barley 70%, beans 100%, other grains
70%
and
potatoes
25%.
Thus,
the
Food
and
Agriculture
Organization (hereafter referred to as FAO) predicted that North
Korea’s grain production based on staple grains would be 3,342,000
tons in 2008 and 3,882.000 tons in 2009.2) However, the imported
grains from China came to a mere 232,621 tons from November,
2007 to October 2008 and 151,233 tons from November 2008 to
July 2009.3)
North Korea’s famine crisis is basically the result of food
shortage due to a decline in crop production. However, the larger
contributor to the problem is the poor distribution system.4)
1) Korea Rural Economic Institute, KREI Bukhan Nongeop Dongjeong (North Korea’s
Agricultural Situation), vol. 12, no. 1 (April, 2010), p. 6.
2) Gwon Tae-jin and Nam Min-ji, “2010Nyeon Bukhanui Singnyangsugeup Jeonmang
(Forecast on North Korea’s food supply in 2010),” KREI Bukhan Nongeop Dongjeong,
vol. 12, no. 1 (April, 2010), p. 7.
3) Ibid., p. 6
4) Jean-Fabrice Piétri, "The Inadequacies of Food Aid In North Korea," Summary of
Comments (Plenary Session II), IVth International Conference on North Korean Human
Rights and Refugees, Prague, March, 2003.
<Table Ⅱ-3-1>
127
Changes in Supply and Demand of Food in North Korea
Year
Demand of Food
Previous Food Production
Shortage
1995
534
413
121
1996
529
345
184
1997
530
369
161
1998
495
349
146
1999
504
389
115
2000
518
422
96
2001
524
359
165
2002
536
395
141
2003
542
413
129
2004
548
425
123
2005
545
431
114
2006
560
454
106
2007
543
448
95
2008
540
401
139
2009
548
431
117
Note: The food demand is calculated on the basis of food ration for an adult person
(546g per a day)
Source: Rural Development Administration, “Bughan-ui gyeongje hyeonhwanggwa
jeonmang (Forecast and economic situation of North Korea),” p. 144,5) reorganized
by the author.
In a society where a large number of people starve to death or
migrate in search of food, the Food Availability Decline (FAD)
cannot be the only reason for the famine. Rather, the Food
Entitlement Decline (FED) can be a main cause that has been
overlooked so far.6) Hence, the solutions to the food problem have
so largely focused on the FAD rather than the FED that the main
5) [Online, cited July 28, 2010]. Available from <http://www.unikorea.go.kr/kr/CMSF/CMSFB
sub.jsp?topmenu=3&menu=2&sub=&act=&main_uid=&subtab=>.
6) There are two kinds of approaches in analyzing the cause of the current famine. One is
reviewing Food Availability Decline (FAD), the other is reviewing Food Entitlement
Decline (FED). Jeong Gwang-min, Bukhangigeunui Jeongchigyeongjehak-Suryeonggyeon
gje Jaryeokgaengsaeng Gigeun, (The Political Economy of North Korean Famine –
Suryong Economics, Self-Reliance, Famine) (Seoul: Sidaejeongsin (Zeitgeist), 2005).
128
cause and the characteristic of the problem could not be well
examined.
While many factors may contribute in specific ways to ‘the
FED,’ the KBA’s interview surveys of North Korean defectors in
2006,7)
in
20088)
and
2010,9)
respectively,
indicate
that
the
fundamental reason lies in the class discrimination policy which
divided North Koreans into 3 classes and 51 sub-categories.
In fact, a large majority of people starved to death or left the
country because of severe food shortages in the mid and late
1990s. Most of them belonged to a socially vulnerable class which
was
originated
from
the
government’s
discriminative
policy.
Therefore, the general residents’ right to food is being violated
due to North Korean regime’s political reasons.
Initially the food crisis in North Korea dates from the regime’s
strong attachment to the failed socialist agricultural policy and a
self-sufficient economic policy. Later, it was transformed into “the
problem of power to purchase things” in the situation where
people have to purchase their own food in the market insofar as
the public distribution system does not fanction. As a result, those
who can change their wage into foreign currency or farmers were
less damaged but the rest of the population degenerated into ‘the
new urban poor’.
In the early stage, the failure of socialist agriculture policy and
7) Bukhan In-gwon Jeongbo Senta (Database Center for North Korean
Bukhan Ingwon Siltae Josa Bogoseo (Report on North Korea's
Situation) (Seoul: KBA, 2006).
8) Bukhan Minjuhwanetwok (Netwok for North Korean Democracy and
9) Bukhan Minjuhwanetwok (Netwok for North Korean Democracy and
Human Rights),
Human Rights
Human Rights),
Human Rights
Human Rights),
Human Rights
129
adherence to self-sufficient economic policy contributed to the
onset of a food crisis. However, the nature of this issue has now
become “a matter of purchasing power” in the situation where
people
have
to
buy
food
at
the
market
because
of
a
malfunctioning distribution policy. While farmers and those who
can exchange their salary with foreign currency have not been
severely affected by the failure, the ordinary people who do not
fall into these categories have become the ‘new urban poor.’10)
The ‘7·1 (July 1st) Economic Management Reform Measure’ was
effectuated in an effort to narrow the gap between the statutory
and black market prices, but wage increases (18 times for
employees in manufacturing field) were unable to keep up with
the upwardly spiraling cost of staples (rice 558 times, corn 471
times). North Korean authorities tried to resolve the demand for
funding at national institutions such as state-owned companies by
issuing more money, but this then resulted in a rapidly rising
inflation rate that exceeded an average of 100% each year since
2002.11)
The North Korean government tried to normalize the planned
economy and secure national finance with the adoption of currency
reform on November 30, 2009. However, the imbalance between
supply and demand, as the side effect of currency reform, brought
about a dramatic price increase which increased the price of rice
up to 72 times that of the previous price at Jangmadango(market
place). In particular, the limited ability to exchange the old
currency for new and receive the low official average wage of
10) Stephan Haggard, and Marcus Noland. Hunger and Human Rights: The Politics of
Famine in North Korea. (Washington DC: U.S. Committee for Human Rights in North
Korea, 2005), pp. 21~22.
11) Ibid., p. 21.
130
2000 to 3000 won made it impossible for ordinary citizens to
purchase enough food. In contrast to monthly-paid workers, each
farmer received 12 months of cash amount to 15,000 to 150,000
North Korean won at once. So, the farmers holding much cash
postponed selling rice at the market in expectation of a large price
surge of the crop after the reform. As a result, according to the
investigation made by Inspection on Economic Policy Department
of the central Party, the number of people dying of starvation has
increased across the country since mid January 2010. Most victims
have been the family members of laborers in urban areas.12)
2) Torture and Other Inhuman or Humiliating Treatment
The North Korean regime strongly denies any use of torture in
official documents or declarations. For example, in Article 7 of the
periodic report (CCPR/C/PRK/2000/2, 4 May 2000) presented by
the regime on implementation of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (hereinafter referred to as ICCPR), it
stressed that torture and other inhuman treatments are banned in
the
country.
Also
according
to
Article
93
of
the
Criminal
Procedure Act revised and completed by the DPRK’s Supreme
People’s Assembly Presidium in 1999, "The pretrial agency should
not force the accused to admit a crime or make a statement.
When a statement is acquired through repression, it cannot be
regarded as evidence." This article is further strengthened in the
Criminal Procedure Act revised and completed in May 2004 and
July 2005, respectively, which states, "Statements acquired from
12) Lee Young-hoon, “Bukhan Gyeongjenanui Hyeonhwanggwa Jeonmang (Current situation
and forecast on North Korea’s economic difficulty),” JPI (Jeju Peace Insitute) Policy
Forum, no. 8 (2010).
131
the interrogate or the accused through repression or coercion
cannot be used as evidence. When their statement is the only
evidence, the crime is not proven. Also, document of voluntary
submission or statement is recognized only when other relevant
evidence is presented."
However, the torture of prisoners, especially, alleged or proven
political criminals in North Korea appear to be extreme cases in
which sadism is allowed under the shroud of ideology and in the
name of achieving collective goals.
Most defectors state that they were severely beaten and
received inhuman treatment in the Bo-wi-bu (National Security
Agency,
the
secret
police),
the
In-min-bo-an-seong
or
An-jeon-bu (it is translated into the Public Security Agency or
People’s Security Agency in English, the police, hereinafter, PSA)
the A long-term corrective labor camps, and the detention facilit
y.13) Upon being arrested in China and repatriated to the North,
they were investigated about whether they had contacted South
Koreans or religious helpers, and then received harsh treatment, to
discourage further attempts to flee the country. Moreover, in
severe cases or under specific circumstances such as when the
inter-Korean summit was being held, North Korean authorities
would crackdown on the populace and Bo-wi-sa-ryeong-bu (the
Military Security Command) would also join in resorting to harsh
13) "Special Report on Torture: Standard Questionnaire for Testimonials on Torture, for
Submission to the Special Rapporteur," testimonies via written interviews by defectors
Kim Hyeok, Mun Myeong-ok, Bae Gwon-cheol, Lee Yeong-guk, Ji Hae-nam
(February-March 2004); Ahn Myeong-cheol, Geudeuli Ulgoitda (They Are Crying for
Help) (Seoul: Cheonji Media, 1995); Ahn Hyuk, Yodeok Liszt (Yodeok List) (Seoul:
Cheonji Media, 1995); Good Friends, Human Rights in North Korea and the Food
Crisis, A Comprehensive Report on North Korean Human Rights Issues (Seoul: Good
Friends, March 2004); Hiroshi Kanto et al. (Research), Are They Telling Us the
Truth? -Brutality Beyond Belief-, (Tokyo: LFNKR & NKDB, 2004).
132
treatment, according to the 2006 interview survey of 100 defectors.
Violence or harsh treatment in the arrest and questioning
process is a violation of Article 5 of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights; treating the arrested person as a criminal without
due grounds, violates Article 11 Clause 1; and punishment for
revealing family secrets of Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il, violates
both Article 11 Clause 1 and 2. Torturing to death in the
interrogation itself is a felony and violates many North Korean
laws and international human rights regulations. Making the
family of the alleged criminal also suffer is a breach of Article 11
Clause 1 and an application of the guilt-by-association system,
which is banned in modern society.
Severely punishing defectors for crossing the river into another
country, and executing or sending a person to political prison
camps in particular, not only violates Article 13 Clause 1 of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights stipulating freedom of
movement and residence, but it also violates Article 13 Clause 2
on the freedom to exit or enter one’s country, and Article 14
Clause 1 about the right to seek refuge in a foreign country.
Sentencing defectors to death for contacting religious people in
China is religious suppression, which violates Article 18 of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
In modern society, nothing can constitute a "political crime," but
the North forces those who commit political crime to divorce,
which is a violation of Article 16 Clause 3 of the declaration.
Revocation
of
citizenship
violates
Article
15
Clause
2
and
confiscation of their wealth is a breach of Article 17 Clause 2.
Even though North Korea has not yet joined the Convention
against
Torture
and
Other
Cruel,
Inhuman
or
Degrading
133
Treatment or Punishment (CAT), the reported cases proves the
regime's
actual
breach
of
its
commitment
to
respect
the
convention, and contradicts its strong denial in public documents
or pronouncements of any torture. Moreover, the North is also
violating the ICCPR, of which it is a member.
3) Freedom of Religion and Faith
Contrary to the North's announcement, freedom of religion and
faith is not respected at all in the country. This is proved in the
KBA 2008 interview survey about 100 defectors, which followed
the one conducted in 2006.
<Table Ⅱ-3-2> 2010 Survey: Did you know that a person having a religion
would be punished if he/she was detected?
No. Response
Cumulative
Percentage(%)
Yes
110
67.9
67.9
No
52
32.1
100.0
Sub-total
162
100.0
23
185
Valid
Response
Invalid
Percentage(%)
No Response
Total
<Table Ⅱ-3-3> 2010 Survey: Have you ever heard or seen your neighbors to be
detected and punished?
No. Response
Valid
Response
Invalid
Yes
28
No
Sub-total
No Response
Total
Percentage
(%)
Cumulative
Percentage(%)
15.6
15.6
151
84.4
100.0
179
100.0
6
185
134
In an interview survey in 2006, there was a question asking
what religions were practiced in North Korea. Excluding one
respondent [ID 025 (2006)] saying that there were Buddhists who
did not reveal their belief, all others answered that Buddhism and
Christianity were believed only for as a matter of form but the
public could not display religious acts and instead, they believed
in myth or traditional religions. Though the same question was
not asked in 2008, the statement of the respondents gave similar
information.
Meanwhile, three out of six survey
participants
answered that they have heard about a church in a house and
two of them have attend a service. These testimonies about being
punished by religion or witnessing others to be punished still go
on in the 2010 interview survey. Thus, it is proved that religious
life in North Korea is not yet free and most of believers run their
lives.
They reported many cases of punishment to themselves or
others also in the 2010 survey which verifies that freedom of
religion is not guaranteed and religious people must act secretly
and risk their lives.
[ID 001 (2008)]’s response to "Please provide detailed explanation
of what you saw or heard about how religious activities were
practiced by the Christian, Catholic or Buddhist faith" revealed
traditional religion was also subject to punishment. In addition, the
survey demonstrates a bit more change than that of 2006, 2008
and
2010
about
recent
religious
activities
witnessed
by
the
respondents, though it is hard to conclude that religious activities
in North Korea are increasingly going public because they may
not represent the public as a whole in the country.
In
the
2006
survey,
most
statements
were
that
though
135
respondents did not recognize as such at that time, later found
that what they witnessed and experienced were religious activities.
Meanwhile, in 2008 survey, people testified that they actually
experienced a display of religious activities. One [ID 005 (2008)]
said, "many people gathered at an old lady's home, cooking and
eating food, reading the Bible, and chanting." Another [ID 016
(2008)] stated, "I have a sister who had become a Christian
during her stay in China, and I saw her praying in North Korea
many times." The 2010 survey introduces more about various
cases of leading a religious life and punishment given as a
consequence of the faith. In addition, it also verifies change in the
punishment of a crime for which the accused was sentenced to
disciplinary prison labor or correctional prison labor, not political
prison camps.
However,
North
Korea
still
has
its
state
religion,
Juche
Ideology. "People worship Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il under the
"Ten
Principles
for
the
Establishment
of
the
One-Ideology
System" and there are 450,000 “Kim Il-sung Revolutionary Idea
Institutes," holy places for the religion, all over the country. The
"Ten Principles" provides criteria to sort out perpetrators of
political or ideological crimes, who are deemed infidels of the
Juche, and serve as key rules to regulate all activities of the
public.14) Such environments are still maintained, according to the
responses in the 2008 and 2010 surveys. Therefore, no freedom of
religious activity of other religion can be allowed in North Korea.
According to North Korea’s official statistics, 22.2% of 9.16
million North Koreans which would be about 2 million people (1.5
14) Philo Kim, "New Religious Policy and the State of Religious Freedom in North Korea,"
NKHR & HFHR, The 5th International Conference on North Korean Human Rights &
Refugees (Warsaw: February 29 - March 2, 2004).
136
million Cheondo believers, 375,000 Buddhists, 200,000 Protestants,
57,000 Christians) believed a religion in 1945 after liberation from
Japanese colonial rule.15) Researchers and religious insiders in
South Korea think that actual numbers would be much higher.16)
The North Korean regime launched repression on religion in
earnest, harnessing anti-U.S and anti-Christianity sentiment that
was widespread among the public after the Korean War. The
effort seems to have started seriously when the regime classified
the public based on their backgrounds (1958-1960), designating
religious people and their family as those who prevent revolution,
and then oppressing them.17)
Later, the public were categorized into 3 classes and 51
sub-categories (1967-1970) based on re-registration of the people
(1966-1967). Cheondogyo Cheong-u (young cheondoist) Party
members, Christians, Buddhists, and Catholics were classified as
"hostile" or "complex" class, eventually becoming the subject of
monitoring and oppression. The number of recognized religious
people and their family members was about 450,000 of 100,000
families at that time.18) Until then, about 400,000 of such people
15) Joeseon Rodongdang (Workers' Party), Joseon Jungang Nyeongam (The Korean
Central Annual 1950) (Pyeongyang: Joeseon Rodongdang Chulpansa (Workers' Party
Press), 1950), p. 365, cited by Kang In-cheol, "Wollam Gaesin-gyo, Cheonjugyoui Ppuri
(Roots of the Protestantism and Catholicism Defected to South Korea," Yeoksabipyeong
(History Criticism) (Summer 1992) p. 109.
16) Lee Chan-yeong, Bukhan-gyohoe Sajinmyeonggam (North Korean Church Photo
Collection) (Seoul: Chonghoe Bukhan Gyohoe Jaegeon Wiwonhoe (North Korean Church
Reconstruction Committee, 2000), p. 10.
17) Kim Il-sung recalled an instruction on the Social Safety Agency (current PSA) in
1962: "Thus, we cannot move onto becoming a communist society if we have those
religious people. For that reason, we tried all religious leaders above deacons and
executed them. Among the rest, the most persistent ones were also executed. Lay
people were put to labor when they changed their belief or were locked up in prison
when they did not...Therefore, we rounded up and executed all of them in 1958. In the
end, we learned that religious people are tamed only when they are killed." Ko Tae-u,
Bukhanui Jonggyojeongchaek (North Korea's Policy on Religion) (Seoul: Minjok
Munhwasa,1989), pp. 79~80.
137
were executed or incarcerated in prison where political criminals
were sent. The 2nd or 3rd generations who survived the cleansing
are classified and controlled as family members of "reactionaries"
under the regime's watch.19)
However, the North Korean regime takes an anti-religious
stance not only because the communist ideology defines religion
as "opium" that hinders socialist revolution. Rather, its oppression
is largely based on the fear that religious people or groups may
turn into protesters against communist rule, more specifically, the
regime of Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il. This is evident, judging
from its policy against Confucianism.
Witnessing the collapse of a series of socialist regimes in
Central and Eastern Europe, North Korea adopted "the family law
of Democratic People's Republic of Korea" on October 24th, 1990.
The
contents
include,
"socialist
big
family"
(preamble),
the
principle of giving father's family name to a child (Article 26),
relatively large range of kin (Article 10), regulations on family
support among parents, siblings, grandparents and grand children
(Articles 27, 28, 35, 36, 37, 38), all reflecting the Confucian
tradition. The law is an example of drawing on traditional ethics
for the political purpose of gaining unconditional support and
obedience to the political authority by interlinking familial norms
and political ethics and developing them.
As such, North Korea uses Confucianism in creating governing
ideology, maintaining power, overcoming social and political crisis
while suppressing Christians' religious activities and allowing only
18) Lee Hang-gu, "Bukhanui Jonggyotanapgwa Sinangsaenghwal (Religious Oppression and
Religious Life of North Korea)," Hyeonsilchojeom (Reality Focus) (Summer 1990),
recited from Philo Kim, "New Religious Policy and the State of Religious Freedom in
North Korea."
19) Philo Kim, "New Religious Policy and the State of Religious Freedom in North Korea."
138
the minimum to show for the international community. At the
same
time,
the
regime
also
harnesses
Christian
ideology,
transforming Christian monotheism into the "Theory of Suryong"
and
"Ten
Principles
for
the
Establishment
of
One-Ideology
System.” Against this back drop, North Korea's policy on religion
and faith is determined by whether they are a help or a hindrance
for maintenance of Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il's power, rather
than their relation with communist ideology.
4) Arbitrary Detention
In the 2006 interview on 100 North Korean defectors by the
KBA, 90% of respondents said "no" when they were asked if the
investigation agency follows due legal procedure in North Korea.
When asked if due procedure is observed when people are put
into a detention facility, 71.1% of the interviewees said the North
Korean authorities kept investigating for more than two months
without any warrants. However, Article 11
of the Criminal
Procedure Act, as enacted in 1999, which should have been applied
to these people, says that "A person shall not be arrested or kept
in custody, if the case is not specified by law or the legal
procedure is not followed. When a person is arrested, his family
or the organization to which the arrestee belongs must be notified
of the date and reason of arrest within 48 hours of arrest. If the
prosecutor finds a person is illegally detained, the prosecutor
should set the arrestee free."
As 66% of the 2008 interviewees defected from the North since
2003 at the time of first UN Commission on Human Rights’
resolution on North Korea, they probably experienced detention
after some time had lapsed compared to interviewees in 2006. The
139
problem is confirmed again in the 2010 survey with 200 North
Korean defectors. Here the respondents who received a written
decision on arrest and detention slightly increased from 4.7% to
7.1% and those whose family members received a notice from the
interrogation agency increased from 34.9% to 39.7%, respectively.
Nevertheless, considering the selection of random sampling of the
survey, it is hard to give special meaning for the changes.
<Table Ⅱ-3-4> 2010 Survey: Have you ever received a written decision on
arrest and detention?
No. Response
Percentage(%)
Cumulative
Percentage(%)
Yes
5
7.1
7.1
Valid
Response
No
65
92.9
100.0
Sub-total
70
100.0
Invalid
No Response
6
76
Total
<Table Ⅱ-3-5> 2010 Survey: When investigating, arresting or detaining you,
does the investigation agency give a notice to your family?
Percentage(%)
Yes
29
39.7
39.7
No
44
60.3
100.0
Sub-total
73
100.0
3
76
Valid
Response
Invalid
Cumulative
Percentage(%)
No. Response
No Response
Total
The Criminal Procedure Act, revised in 2004 and 2005, provides
detailed provisions of Article 1 of the 1999 the Criminal Procedure
Act. Article 5 stipulates, "The state shall ensure that human
rights are protected in the process of criminal investigation.
140
Article 8 also stipulates “The state shall handle and process
criminal cases in accordance with principles, procedures and
method as specified in the Criminal Procedure Act.” Article 177
stipulates, “If it is not designated by law or not in accordance
with legally designated procedure, a person shall not be arrested
nor put into custody. If the prosecutor finds that a person is
illegally in detention, the prosecutor should set the arrestee free.”
Article 167 stipulates, "The pretrial officer shall not force the
defendant to acknowledge crime or ask a leading question." As
such,
the
Act
prohibits
illegal
arrest,
detention,
and
forced
investigation. In addition, the Criminal Act, revised in 2004 and
2005, stipulates that “If a prosecutor illegally arrests, confines or
takes a person into custody...(omitted)..., the prosecutor shall be
sentenced to less than two years of labor training (Article 252).
However,
in
the
2008
interview,
among
100
North
Korean
defectors, most respondents testified that they were forced into
confession when asked, "Were you forced into confession of crime
during investigation?”
When asked a question, “If you deny the suspected charge for
the crime, what will happens?” most interviewees responded that
they were forced to confess a constructive crime with violence,
threat and extension of detention ([ID 054 (2010)], [ID 200 (2010)]).
The following two testimonies give us more detailed information
on the situation at that time.
[ID 137 (2010)] I repeatedly got questioned and gave answers
with my neck tied with the rope. If I did not
say, I mean, if I did not answer for their
questions,
they
attempted
to
discipline
me.
141
They ruthlessly beat me on my head and
hands with a cleaning rod for a gun. There
was no mercy on their brutal beating."
[ID 170 (2010)] I said that I did not do that. They threatened
me and beat me with a bat even though I was
pregnant at that time. I had to admit that I
was guilty. A secretary of Provincial Party in
Yanggang-do (Yanggang Province) told me,
“Once you do as they ask you to do so, you
will be a revolutionary. So, you shouldn't do
that even though you will be beaten to death.”
So, the following day I argued that I made a
false confession because you threaten me and
what was wrong with the law.”
However, there were conflicting testimonies with regard to the
denial of the guilty for the crime. While [ID 011 (2010)] argues
“the sentence became more severe,” [IDs 124, 129 (all 2010)]
testified that “I was released.”
According to Article 178 of the Criminal Procedure Act revised
in 2004 and 2005, “Arrest and prosecution should follow after the
decision resulting from the investigation in to criminal liability.
Only in exceptional cases, may a pretrial officer arrest and detain
a person with approval of a prosecutor before decision from the
investigation into criminal liability. In the event that the decision
from the investigation into criminal liability is not made within ten
days, the detention should be withdrawn.”
142
<Table Ⅱ-3-6> 2010 Survey: Without any approval from a prosecutor within 48
hours, you are supposed to be released. Have you ever been
arrested or retained more than 48 hours?
No. Response
Percentage(%)
Cumulative
Percentage(%)
Yes
24
36.4
36.4
Valid
Response
No
42
63.6
100.0
Sub-total
66
100.0
Invalid
No response
10
Total
76
<Table Ⅱ-3-7> 2010 Survey: Have you ever been detained for more than ten
days without any evidence that you are a criminal?
No. Response
Valid
Response
Invalid
‘Political
Percentage(%)
Cumulative
Percentage(%)
Yes
13
18.8
18.8
No
56
81.2
100.0
Sub-total
69
100.0
No response
7
Total
76
prisoners’
are
treated
differently
in
many
ways.
Lacking defectors who experienced arrest after 2004, it is difficult
to verify how the detention procedure has changed since the two
recent revisions to the Criminal Procedure Act. However, when
we interviewed the defectors who were subject to the 1999
Criminal Procedure Act, asking them whether "legal procedure
was duly observed, for example, were you well informed of your
arrest or presented an arrest warrant," they said they were not
well informed about their arrest or presented with any warrant. In
a 2006 interview, only four out of 100 respondents said, "the
authorities checked their identification, explained verbally their
143
arrest, handcuffed, and arrested them. The other respondents said
there was no explanation. Four testified that mostly the authorities
checked for identification, and bound people with handcuffs, straw
rope, shoestrings, or white rope, saying that they have something
to check. In some cases, they would shackle a person and take
him away.
Two of the respondents confirmed what Ahn Hyuk - who
defected from the North in the 1980s - experienced, was still the
case.20) Three people even testified that the authorities secretly
arrest people in the middle of the night. The statement keeps
repeating in the 2008 and 2010 surveys.
Among the kidnapped arrestees, those who are suspected of a
politically important crime, but with trivial charges or without
hard evidence of crime are taken to the secret Guest House of the
Bowibu.21) Here, they arbitrarily extend the investigation period (1
year and eight months in the case of Mr. Ahn Hyuk). During the
investigation, they force people to make false confession, and
inflict severe violence to the extent that most people would rather
commit suicide. For example, in the case of some people (Kim
Hyuk, Mun Myeong-ok, Bae Gwan-cheol, Lee Yeong-guk, two
sons and a niece of Sin Jeong-ae-Jang Gyeong-cheol, Jang
Gyeong-su and Jang Mi-hwa) were arrested in August 2003 in
China and handed over to North Korea in October. But it took
20) According to defector Ahn Hyuk, if an arrestee is an individual, the person is called by
phone from ordinary agencies, such as Sa-hoe-an-jeon-bu (Social Safety Agency, the
predecessor of the Public Security Agency (PSA), and is kidnapped on his/her way to
the meeting place. Therefore, the family as well as the agency that summoned the
person have no way of knowing the person’s whereabouts. Naturally, the person goes
missing. Ahn Hyuk, Yodeok Liszt (Yodeok List), p. 61.
21) General procedure of interrogations of the defectors is described in the following book.
David Hawk, The Hidden Gulag, Exposing North Korea's Prison Camps (Washington:
U.S. Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, 2003), pp. 56~72; Good Friends,
Human Rights in North Korea and the Food Crisis, pp. 63~64.
144
nearly 1 year for the case as the sentence was given in early
September in 2004.
Regarding the trial and detention procedures, Yun Dae-il, who
is the former member of the Bowibu and defected from the North
in September 1998, said that the authorities follow formalities to
some extent even though there is no attorney or audience.22) For
example, although two sons and a niece of Sin Jeong-ae stood
their trial and were sentenced to ten years and five years of
reeducation respectively. However, Sin Jeong-ae, without going
through any court procedure, was detained for one year in the
revolutionary district of Yodeok Political Prison Camp. In case of
torture victim case 3 interviewed by the KBA in 2006,23) the
respondents was detained in Yodeok Political Prison Camp for
three years without any trial. As well as those of the 2008
survey, many testimonies of the 2010 survey also demonstrate
that any due process is allowed to political prisoners detained in
Gwalliso.
But, Ahn Hyuk testified that if a person is convicted of a major
offence, the person is not told of his sentence, and is separately
transferred via a closed prison van to a reeducation facility. At
the same time, several Bowibu agents storm to the house of the
"criminal", seize all his properties, and send the family to a prison
camp. This seems to still be taking place, since such procedures
are specified by the Article 27, 28 and 33 of the 2004 and 2005
revised Criminal Act (property confiscation) and Article 13 of the
2000 revised Act on Registration on Citizens (revoking a citizen’s
22) Yun Dae-Il, "Akui Chuk" Jiphaengbu Gukgaanjeonbowibuui Naemak (Inside Story of
National Security Agency, Governing Body of the "Axis of Evil”) (Seoul:
Wolganjoseonsa (Monthly Chosun Publications), 2000), pp. 134~135.
23) Korean Bar Association, 2006 Bukhan Ingwon Baekseo (2006 White Paper on North
Korean Human Rights), (Seoul: Korean Bar Association, 2006), pp. 111~120.
145
registration card).
In other words, in the North, the "criminal" himself and the
family do not have any idea of the charges or where they are
sent, when they are transferred to a concentration camp. As all
this procedure is handled by the Bowibu and there is no official
trial; there are no cases of arrestees being cleared of suspicion.24)
However, things do not seem to have progressed much since
the Criminal Procedure Act was revised in 2004 and 2005. It is
because, according to Yun Dae-il, the Bowibu takes care of all
cases under the Criminal Procedure Act, but concerning “Case No.
8 or No. 9 (in charge of Office No. 10)” related to gossiping about
the "Kim family", or spreading rumors, the Agency does not
observe due procedures as the case is not specified by the
Criminal Procedure Act. Therefore, a person is secretly executed
without any trial if convicted of undermining the authority of the
Kims, father and son.25) Even though the Criminal Procedure Act
was revised afterwards, there are no relevant provisions and this
omission does not help the situation.
As such, in the North, the procedures for arresting and
detaining political criminals are against “the principle of nulla
24) Ahn Hyeok, Yodeok Lizt (Yodeok List), pp. 61~62; a testimony by [ID 033 (2006)] in
the 2006 interviewed by the KBA: "When a person receives a notice from the
Anjeonbu (PSA) and is arrested, they just come to your house or office, and handcuff
and arrest you. They say that they want to ask you some questions. If a person
replies "I have not heard of anything," then they start swearing and kicking at the
person. If a person admits guilt, then the person is punished. If the person does not
admit his guilt, then they just keep him in custody for investigation and explanation. In
this case, they keep watching the person. In very rare cases, a person is cleared of
charges. Excepting the cases where a person has a good social background, or
relatives work for the security Agencies (Anjeonbu, Bowibu), a detainee is seldom
released. You cannot visit the person, but may provide food. If in a long-term
corrective labor camp, there is a limit on visiting - for example, xx times visit per
month."
National Security Agency, Governing Body of the "Axis of Evil,"), p. 134.
146
poena sine lege,” and North Korea still retains a time-old and
non-humanitarian prosecuting system, such as a family association
system. There are special detention facilities inside the military
besides the known facilities in the six political prison camps. In
other words, there are closed underground labor facilities to put a
person that has committed a mistake in the military for good.
There is also a closed place called, "Ttukkseom," where only
anti-government military officers are detained. As these facilities
are outside the law, arrestees cannot be protected by law in the
arrest and detention.
The three-rounds of interviews by the KBA revealed that the
arrest and detention procedures of the North are against its
domestic laws, such as Criminal Act and the Criminal Procedure
Act, and also against the ICCPR to which the North has acceded.
Even though the number of victims has recently decreased by
means
of
divorce,
however,
the
guilt-by-association
system,
property confiscation, withdrawal of a Citizen’s registration card
that are applicable to lineal family members are in violation of
each relevant provision of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights.
The
arbitrary
detention
and
the
consequent
human
rights
violation do take place institutionally or systematically, but, in
many cases, by arbitrary acts by the inflictors. The situation is
made even worse as the domestic remedial procedures do not
work.
5) People Kidnapped and Seized in North Korea
According
to
the
South
Korean
government,
the
North
authorities kidnapped 84,532 South Korean civilians during the
147
Korean War.26) However, civic groups say that at least 120,000
civilians were kidnapped.27) So far, five different lists of people
kidnapped during the war have been secured and have greatly
helped substantiate the case. The five lists are as follows:
First, "List of Victims in Seoul Metropolitan City," the first of
its kind, provided by the Office of Census of the Bureau of Public
Information in December 1, 1950, classify 2,438 out of 4,616 as
abductees.
Second, the "List of Abductees of 25 June (the Korean War)," a
list drafted by the "Association of Families of Abductees of the
Korean
War"
in
1951,
lists
personal
information
for
2,316
abductees such as their names, ages, addresses and abducted
dates.
This
list
was
a
keepsake
of
Haegong
Sin
Ik-hui,
late-chairman of the South Korean National Assembly.
Third, "List of Abductees in the Disaster of 25 June (the
Korean War)" prepared by the government of the Republic of
Korea in 1952 lists personal information for 82,959 abductees.
Fourth, the "List of Abductees from the 25 June Revolt (Korean
War)," a list prepared by the Bureau of Public Security of the
Ministry of Home Affairs in 1954, offers a list of 17,940 abductees
and their abductors.
Fifth,
the
"List
of
Names
of
Citizens
Who
Lost
Their
Hometowns (due to the Korean War)"offers a list of 7,034 people
26) Gukbangjeongbobonbu (Defense Intelligence Agency), Gunsajeongjeonwiwonhoe Pyeollam
Handbook of Military Armistice Commssion) (Seoul: Gukbangjeongbobonbu, 1986), p.
543.
27) A case in point: "Association of Families of Abductees to North Korea in the 25 June
War"make this claim, citing documents drafted based on South Korean Domestic
Administration records and sent on by John J. Mucho, former US Ambassador to
South Korea, to UN headquarters, in which he recorded the number of South Koreans
kidnapped to the North as 126,325. Joongang Ilbo, June 23, 2007.
148
kidnapped to the North, which was reported to the Republic of
Korea National Red Cross between June 15, 1956 and August 15,
1956.
According to those lists, most people were kidnapped during the
early stages of the Korean War. Some people were kidnapped in
September 1950, but those people who were belatedly caught in
hiding or were kidnapped, appear to have been induced. Judging
from this, it would appear that there was a plan in advance to
kidnap people to the North. As seen from the direct kidnapping by
internal affairs officers at victim's homes, the abduction appears
to have been supported by policy. Moreover, we can see the
North kidnapped South Koreans systematically from the fact that
they would have kidnapped victims at the office in the name of
their boss, or use the victims’ friends in inducing and kidnapping
them.
However,
the
North
authorities
absolutely
deny
such
kidnapping of South Korean civilians.
The kidnappees’ life in North Korean life can well be imagined
through
the
experiences
of
the
war
prisoners
or
civilians
kidnapped after war. Some of them are known to have faced a
miserable death in the prison camp for political crimes in the
North.
Along with its first abduction following the truce of ten
fishermen in May 1955, the North has so far kidnapped and
detained
407
fishermen.28)
The
North
also
detains
12
crew
28) The kidnapping process, as testified by [ID 085 (2008)] interview may help with one’s
understanding of similar cases: "I was fishing for cuttlefish in the high seas near
Ulleung Island. A boat approached us at 3 a.m. It was a patrol ship of the North. At
first, it circled around my ship, and suddenly it threatened to fire and came alongside
our boat. Then two soldiers boarded on our ship. They immediately cut the cable of
our wireless telegraph. The officer grabbed the key, and the private tied our boat to
their ship, and towed us along. I think that they did this thinking that we had entered
149
members and passengers of the Korean Airline plane, kidnapped in
December 1969, and 20 crew members of Vessel I-2, kidnapped in
June 1970. In addition, the North is also known to have detained
teacher Go Sang-mun, kidnapped at the North Korean Embassy in
Norway in April 1970; Yi Jae-hwan, a student studying in the
U.S. who was kidnapped in July 1983 during his trips in Eastern
Europe; and Reverend Ahn Seung-wun of the Full Gospel Church,
kidnapped in Yanji, China in July 1995.29)
Foreign nationals who are known to have been detained by the
North include: sixteen Japanese, four Lebanese, four Malaysians,
three French, three Italians, two Chinese, two Dutchmen, a Thai, a
Rumanian, a Singaporean, and a Jordanian.
However, the most extreme case of criminal activity by the
North Korean authorities is that of kidnapping minors for training
as secret agents. The examples of such victims are: Choe
Seung-min
and
Yi
Min-kyo,
who
were
kidnapped
as
high-schoolers on Korea’s West coast in 1977; Kim Yeong-nam,
kidnapped as a high-schooler, on Seonyu-do (island) in August
their territorial waters, when in fact, it was the high seas." "They took us to the port
of Tongcheon, Gangwon-do. For the first two days, we were forced to stay inside the
ship. The clerk, captain, and chief engineer were called ashore for investigations. After
two days, the entire crews of 33 people were transferred to an inn, called "Moonchen",
and were investigated individually for a week. Afterwards, we were again sent to
another inn at Mt. Jangdeok, Wonsan, and were waiting to be sent home, but were
handed over to the Committee for the Peaceful Unification of the Fatherland. We had
to learn facts about the North for ten months. The 33 people were scattered throughout
the North. The topics were Socialist Constitutional Law, South Korean Revolution and
Fatherland Reunification, Basic Politics and Economics of Kim Il-sung, etc. In the early
days of detention and investigation, they treated us to drinks and pretended as though
they would send us home soon, but did not do so."
29) It is reported by the Japanese Association of Rescuers of Abductees to North Korea at
the US Congress in 2006. The association thinks that the reason for doing so is to get
rid of people who witnessed to the illegal activities of North Korean agents, or to use
the kidnapped people in training spies in foreign languages and customs for their
overseas activities, or in destructive maneuvering or propaganda against the South.
Chosun Ilbo, March 22, 2007.
150
1978; and Hong Geun-pyo and Yi Myeong-wu, who disappeared
as high schooler son Hong-do (island). The abduction was
ordered by Kim Jong-il who told his people to kidnap South
Koreans and use them in political maneuvers as those defected to
the North during the Korean War were aging. Therefore, many
more people are presumed to have been kidnapped under the
order. This appears more likely when considering that quite a few
civilians and soldiers, who were sent to Vietnam during the
Vietnam War, have been found to be detained in the North.
Among those kidnapped and detained are Seong Gyeong-hui
and Jeong Gyeong-suk, stewardesses of Korean Airlines, who
were kidnapped in 1969 and used in propaganda activities against
the South; or Hong Geun-pyo and Yi Myeong-wu and others who
were used in "South-Koreanization training programs" to train the
North Korean operatives to become like South Koreans and
acquire a South Korean accent. For example, Ahn Myeong-jin, a
former North Korean operative and defector, says that he received
training about the lifestyle and mannerisms of South Korea, to
include politics, economy, society, and culture, from a total 60
teachers while undergoing trained at Kim Jong-il Political Military
University. Choe Jeong-nam, a former North Korean operative,
also
says that
he received
the same training as
did Ahn
Myeong-jin from instructor Hong (Hong Geun-pyo) and instructor
Ma (Lee Myeong-wu’s alias) when he underwent training at
Sunan Guest House in Pyeongyang (Pyongyang).
However, persons deemed as not being of use are apparently
sent off to prison camp. And the cases that pose problems are
that of unreturned POWs of the Korean War and abducted South
Korean POWs and civilians, such as those who were caught alive
151
and transferred to the North by the communist Viet Cong or
North Vietnamese Forces during the Vietnam War. According to
the official statistics provided by the Ministry of National Defense,
320,000 South Korean soldiers participated in the Vietnam War
between September 1964 and late March 1973, when the South
Korean Military Command in Vietnam "The Head quarters of the
Forces of the Republic of Korea in Vietnam" was disbanded.
Among them, only three soldiers were officially recognized as
POWs. A similar number of South Korea civilians were engineers
who belonged to the U.S. company, or military and stayed in
Vietnam to make a living. However, the missing have not merited
much attention, thus far. The experience of Pak Jeong-hwan,
author of "Neu-si" (The Great Bustard) and the RAND report
show us that a considerable number of South Korean soldiers and
civilians were forcibly repatriated to the North during the Vietnam
War.30)
Little is known of their life in the North. But we can imagine
what their lives are not much different from that of the life of the
Korean War POWs and civilian abductees during and following
the war.31) The greatest difficulty facing them is that the South
30) Park Jeong-hwan, "Neu-si" (The Great Bustard), volume 1 and 2 (Seoul: Munyedang,
2000); US Department of Defense, Defense Prisoner of War/Missing in Action Office
Reference Document, U.S. Personal Missing, Southeast Asia (and Selected Foreign
Nationals) (U), Apla, Chronological and Ref no Reports, Unclassified, May 1996,
DPMO/RD.
31) Testimony by [ID 086 (2006)] in the 2006 KBA interview: "If you want to go receive
higher education, you need a recommendation from the Educational Labor
Administration. My son wanted to go to college, but they refused to recommend my son
as I was a prisoner of war. My son and I had a disagreement over this issue. He said
he cannot succeed socially due to my background. Even when children marry, they
always look at who the parents of the in-law family are like and whether they have
good background, whether they are a member of the Workers' Party. There was a
POW, whose name was Kim Bok-man. He had an argument with his peers while
drinking. There were some physical altercations. They sent Kim to a long-term
corrective labor camp, saying he was inherently a bad person. If POWs commit a crime,
152
Korean government fails to recognize the realities of these people
and, at the same time, the North denies their existence.
However, the 2008 interview with 100 North Korean defectors
revealed that the prospect that "the issues of abduction of civilians
or detention of the POWs would be settled with progress in
inter-Korean relations" is groundless.
Most respondents said "no" when asked, "Did the improved
inter-Korean relations (e.g., the reunion of separated families and
the visit by then South Korean President Kim Dae-jung to North
Korea) somehow affect the North's policy or attitude toward
POWs? One respondent [ID 088 (2008)] said, "I decided to defect
to the South when I thought I would not be able to land in South
Korea if I do not try on my own, because there was no change
after the then President Kim Dae-Jung visited the North."
In particular, the testimony of [ID 087 (2008)] is clear evidence
of North's dual policy toward the abductees or POWs: "In the
North, we participate in shooting practice for one hour, every two
months.
When
the
South
Korean
President
Kim
Dae-jung
announced the Joint Declaration in Pyeongyang, we engaged in
shooting practice from 8 AM to 6 PM. It was the greatest-ever
drill in scale. A very fearful and tense atmosphere was created
throughout the country. I spent the whole day in shooting training
so that such an atmosphere could be created for the civilians. The
North Korean authorities spend days using appeasement policies to
certain people, or act in front of civilians under the scenario of
unification by invading South Korea as the only possible choice
when the authorities change policies."
they intentionally punish them more harshly, accusing them of being (inherently) bad."
153
6) Freedom of Opinion and Expression
North Korea stipulates that freedom of opinion and expression
is in Article 67 of 1998 Constitution ("Kim Il-sung Constitution")
and revised 2009 Constitution, the Publication Law, and other
relevant law, North Korea emphasizes that the North Koreans
enjoy these rights in every opportunity. However, Article 10 of
1998 and 2009 Constitutions stipulates, "The Democratic People's
Republic of Korea (DPRK) bases itself on the political and
ideological unity of the entire people based on the worker-peasant
alliance in which the working class plays a leading role." Article
63, 81, and 85 of the both Constitutions stress "whole," "political
and ideological unity and solidarity of people," "revolutionary
vigilance" and "security of the State." Therefore, the State’s
violation of individuals’ freedom of opinion and expression is
systematically supported by the Constitution Furthermore, "the
Ten Principles for the Establishment of the One-Ideology System,"
which stand above the constitution in real life of the public does
not allow the freedom of expression and speech of individuals, and
even goes so far as to regulate that a person is a "political
criminal" if the person fails to actively comply with these
principles.
Various controlling tools to suppress an individual's freedom of
expression and speech are developed and deeply penetrate into the
lives of citizens. The North is very swift in taking political
measures to control its people as they have constant controlling
agencies (monitoring agencies, such as the Bowibu, the PSA, the
National Censorship Committee,32)the Committee of Guidance for
32) North Korean defector, Kim Yeong-cheol (assumed name), once high official of People’s
Safety Agency, entered South Korea in February in 2008. According to his interview
154
the Socialist Legal Life, People's Neighborhood Association, and
six prison camps for political criminals, innumerable punishment
tools, forced-labor facilities, worker reeducation facilities, and
correctional facilities, etc.) and also controlling tool to respond to
specific
circumstances,
such
as
the
"Standing
Committee
of
September 27". Yun Dae-il also testifies that the North Korean
authorities review the handwriting of people aged 17 or older
every year, and use the data in investigating scribbling or leaflets
against the Kim family or the authorities.33)
The result of this control and oppression is also illustrated in
three sets of the KBA’s interviews with North Koreans defectors.
<Table Ⅱ-3-8> 2008 Survey: Have you ever seen people punished on charge of
criticizing Kim Il-sung, Kim Jong-il, or Ro-dong-dang (Workers’
Party), or remarks that the South Korea economy is better off
and good to live in?
Responses
No. Response
Percentage(%)
Effective Percentage(%)
Yes
46
46.0
46.0
No
54
54.0
54.0
Total
100
100.0
100.0
made in August 22, 2010, the major work of the National Committee on Censorship
(the predecessor of National Bureau of Censorship) audits and inspects whether
administrative agencies’ economic planning properly reflects the Party line or Kim
Il-sung and Kim Jong-il’s order based on the index of socialist planned economy and
report it to Kim Il-sung or Kim Jong-il.
National Security Agency, Governing Body of the "Axis of Evil"), pp. 81~87.
155
<Table Ⅱ-3-9> 2008 Survey: Are there any neighbors who inform the authorities
on a person that says anything good about South Korea, or
criticizes Kim Il-sung, Kim Jong-il, or Workers’ Party?
Responses
No. Response
Percentage(%)
Yes
88
88.0
No
11
11.0
11.1
Total
99
99.0
100.0
No response
Total
1
1.0
100
100.0
88.9
<Table Ⅱ-3-10> 2008 Survey: Have you ever witnessed people being punished
for listening to Korean radio programs or of other foreign
countries?
Responses
No. Response
Percentage(%)
Yes
46
46.0
46.0
No
54
54.0
54.0
Total
100
100.0
100.0
<Table Ⅱ-3-11> 2010 Survey: Can North Korean residents talk freely about the
broadcasted news or articles on domestic and international
politics or economy?
No. Response
Percentage(%)
Cumulative
Percentage(%)
Yes
61
31.4
31.4
Valid
Response
No
133
68.6
100.0
Sub-total
194
100.0
Invalid
No Response
6
200
Total
Regarding a question confined only to freedom of opinion and
expression in broadcast and print media with the permission of
the North Korean government in the 2010 survey, 31.4% of
respondents gave affirmative responses. However, it is noteworthy
156
to open-ended answers to the question rather reflect that they do
not enjoy the freedom. [ID 056 (2010)]’s testified that “Broadcasts
on South Korea usually depict scenes of people fighting with the
police in demonstrations. They comment that South Koreans
frequently demonstrate against the government. We can only
speak of that but inwardly we think: how come those students
wear such bright and beautiful clothes whereas many of us in
North Korea only wear worn-out grayish clothes? However, these
thoughts can never be spoken out loud.” [ID 065 (2010)] stated
that “Even if the North Korean government permits certain
broadcast programs, not many people have a TV set at home. So,
we don’t know what is permitted on the air. It is not wise to talk
carelessly about domestic and foreign news. If any part of what I
say contains anti government contents, people can inform the
authorities and rat on me. One in three people are spies. So, we
have to be careful.”
Nevertheless,
in
terms
of
"improvement
of
opinion
and
expression," there seems to have been a desirable progress after
the North's food crisis. In the 2006 interview among 100 defectors,
when asked, "how well do you comply with the ‘Ten Principles
for
the
Establishment
of
the
One-Ideology
System?’"
some
respondents said little or none, while quite a few said "partly or
formally." In 2008 and 2010, the same question was not asked but
there were similar testimonies from respondents.
Such developments seem to result from the failure of the state
controlling tools in addressing the "deviant phenomenon" that
greatly increased after the food crisis, rather than the progress in
"improvement
of
freedom
for
opinion
and
expression."
The
ten-pointed principle is still observed by public officials, and still
157
binds the ordinary people as reference of control through a life
assessment meeting, even though the principle fails
to win
voluntary consent from them.
The 2008 interview among 100 defectors told us how strongly a
life assessment meeting binds people in the course of regular
education program.
[ID 046 (2008)] You have to attend a life assessment meeting,
even if you do not go to school. Even if a
child is sick and cannot go to school, other
children would come to the child's home to
bring him to school, if there is an afternoon
life assessment meeting. So you must attend
the
meeting.
instruction
In
about
particular,
Kim
if
Jong-il's
there
is
an
policy,
the
child must go attend the meeting. If a child
fails to go, the child's mother, father (and
everyone) are called to school. If a little child
fails to attend the meeting, a notice is sent to
the parents and the child cleans the school. In
the case of high school students, however, the
punishment is more severe, because he is
considered to have undesirable ideologies.
As in the 2006 interview, the 2008 interview also revealed
detailed
testimonies
from
almost
all
the
respondents
in
the
question, "Have you witnessed, or heard of people who were
punished on charge of taking ill care of or destroying portraits?"
158
[ID 011 (2008)] I am not sure which year it was. Somebody
laid the portrait of Rodong Sinmun (Rodong
Newspaper)
underneath
the
paper
floor.
In
other words, somebody spread the portrait of
Rodong Sinmun as a first layer of the floor
paper, and a floor heating system repairer
came to saw it, and reported this to the
authorities. Another rumor I heard was that
there was someone who was punished for
hiding money behind the portrait on the wall.
You are also punished if you break the frame
glass of portrait: you are usually exiled to a
local province or rural area.
[ID 014 (2008)] I saw in the public execution site, People who
were selling various types of glass, and even
frame glass of portraits or big portraits were
arrested and executed publicly. I remember it
was in 2000. They (the authorities) probably
did so to make examples of such cases.
However, things have greatly changed since the late 1990s. For
example, in the late 1970s in Saetbyeol-gun, Hamgyeongbuk-do
(North Hamgyong Province), the father-in-law of a person whose
last name is Kim was sent to the prison camp in Jeonggeo-ri,
when he was caught exchanging a portrait screen of Kim Il-sung
for drinks. In 1986, a friend (born in 1976 in Musan-gun) of
interviewee [ID 001 (2006)] from the train vocation school was
sentenced to four years of correction for charges of rolling a cigar
with the newspaper photo of Kim Il-sung. In 1993, when the
159
mother of [ID 003 (2006)] had an argument with her neighbor and
pushed
her
to
the
wall,
the
neighbor’s
neck
was
pushed
backwards to touch and drop the portrait of Kim Il-sung to the
floor. The neighbor had to spend three years in a long-term
corrective labor camp along with charges of verbal reactionary.
From the 2006 interview, we found that such cases have started
to decrease in the late 1990s.
In North Korea, "verbal reactionary" is a good example of
means of suppressing the freedom of expression and speech.
Verbal
reactionary
refers
to
arbitrary
self-expression
for
unallowable speech and behaviors of criticizing Kim Il-sung and
Kim Jong-il or the state policy and regime. The 2006, 2008 and
2010 interviews are a source of many of such examples from
several respondents.
Various cases were introduced by respondents. [ID 075 (2006)]
testified in the 2006 survey that people who had made wrong
remarks or committed murder were killed twice a month in 1994
and 1995, but the execution was stopped due to negative public
sentiment. They were allegedly caught and shot to death for
saying, "I can't live here anymore." In the 2008 survey, when
asked, “Give three examples to be punished for making wrong
remarks.” [ID 009 (2008)] answered, “People should not say that
South Korea is a better place, that South Korea is better off and
that China is getting rich due to its ‘Open and Reform Policy.’ Of
course, remarks on Kim Jong-il’s family are prohibited.” [ID 003
(2008)] said, “If people talk about the South Korean president, the
Workers’ Party and Kim Jong-il’s private life, they are caught
within the hour.”
Even in the 2010 survey, [ID 078 (2010)] testified, “I have an
160
acquaintance who has a relative in China. He said that North
Korea should open its door like China. Then, after someone
snatched it, we couldn't have seen him again.” [ID 006 (2010)]
testified, “There are portraits of Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il in
every house. There was someone who had used to trade with
China around 1998. When the government authority gave an
instruction to hang the portraits in the place where many people
gather, he said, “If so, the restroom will be the right place to
hang them. Since then, nobody knows where he is.”
But a respondent [ID 066 (2006)] in the 2006 survey maintained
that as the ideas of the leader had not been realized in a recent
decade and food shortage in North Korea had worsened, people
wanted to leave the country. So, only people who behaved
improperly were caught while people who made wrong remarks
were left intact. The similar arguments are proposed in the 2008
survey.
[ID 076 (2008)] As I have been caught by the Bowibu, now I
know that people are being punished lightly for
simple wrong remarks. The punishment gets
tougher when people say bad words. The rules
have been changed as more and more people
are doing that. Now it is recognized that
people
can't
help
complaining
about
the
situation as they are starved and experience
difficult times. But blunt criticism against Kim
Il-sung and Kim Jong-il is considered an act
of terrorism. If people do that, they are sent
directly to the camp. They are called No. 7
161
and No. 9 case. No. 7 is about Kim Il-sung
and No. 9 is about Kim Jong-il. So when
people just say No. 7 or No. 9 case to a judge
or a party officer, they understand without
further explanation necessary.34)
The oppression of freedom of speech in North Korea is a
violation of Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, Article 19 and 20 of the ICCPR, Article 4 (a) and (c) and
Article 5 (d-ⅷ, of the International Convention on the Elimination
of all Forms of Racial Discrimination and Article 12 and 13 of the
Convention on the Rights of the Child.
Article 6 of the North Korean Publication Law (DPRK Law on
Publication, revised on January 21, 1999) stipulates, "A citizen can
write or create works freely. The state is obliged to make the
public participate in writing or creative works." However, Article
47
of
the
law
states,
"A
publication
organization
and
its
supervisor should prevent confidential information from being
leaked through publication and keep reactionary ideology, culture
and trend from spreading. They should register printing equipment
and regulate the use." And Article 48 stipulates, "If publications
leak
confidential
information
and
spread
reactionary
ideology,
culture and trend, production, publication, distribution and shipment
of
them
should
be
suspended
and
withdrawn."
Article
49
stipulates, "If unregistered printing equipment is used, it should be
seized." Article 50 states, "If an organization or a group violates
this
law
and
causes
serious
results,
they
should
take
34) According to the interviewed with Kim Yeong-cheol on August 22, 2010, the numbers
were originated from when Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il called the offered presents
‘No. 8 Item’ and ‘No. 9 Item.’ Generally it is called ‘bunhosagun (event number).’
162
administrative
or
criminal
responsibility
based
on
the
circumstances." Those articles oppress freedom of speech and
publication to prevent the North Korean people from engaging in
creative works freely.
Under the law, fax machines or computer printers should be
registered and the number of printed pages has been controlled.
So it is virtually impossible for the public to use the equipment.
This goes against Article 6 of the Publication Law of North
Korea as well as international norms.
7) Violence Against Women
There have been no systematic surveys on domestic violence in
North Korea until now. Only isolated cases have been revealed by
interviews with North Korean defectors conducted by the KBA.
Testimony of defectors and their lives in South Korea, however,
indicate the severity of the violence. The UN independent human
rights experts reviewed ‘The 2nd Periodic Report on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights in North Korea’ in November 2003.
Then they showed high interest in domestic violence in North
Korea and urged Pyeongyang to take preventive measures. It
might be reflected that at this time the UN Human Rights Council
adopted the 2nd resolution on North Korea and designated a
Special Rapporteur on this matter.
The 2006 interview with North Korean defectors by the KBA
shows that 90.7% of respondents have experienced domestic
abuse. As 54 out of 100 interviewees can't represent the whole
North Korean society, we can't say that is generally true. Yet the
rate is quite high. Even if we assume that domestic violence
occurring in ordinary families of North Korea is less brutal than
163
in those of 54 respondents or those that they mentioned, the rate
is much higher than in other countries.35)
In the 2008 and 2010 interviews, to the question "Have you
ever been beaten badly by your husband?" only 8.2% and 8.3% of
the respondents respectively answered "yes". This represents
a
huge change, but we should be cautious because of issues of
respondent representation and credibility.
<Table Ⅱ-3-12> 2008 Survey: Has your husband ever beaten you severely?
Choice
Frequency(number)
Percentage(%)
Effective percentage(%)
yes
4
7.3
8.2
no
40
72.7
81.6
I have no idea
5
9.1
10.2
subtotal
49
89.1
100.0
no response
6
10.9
total
55
100.0
It is hard to predict the current trend from <Table II-3-14>
and <Table II-3-15> because of the limited composition of the
questions. However, 98.% of the 2010 survey results to the
questions, "domestic violence seems prevalent in every generation"
and "only some husbands beat their wives," is higher than 98.1%
of the 2008 result.
35) Prevalence of domestic violence: U.S. 16.1% (of 3,520 in 1985), Korean families in the
U.S. 18.8% (of 260 in 1993), Hong Kong 14.2% (of 382 in 1994), Korea 31.4% (of 1,523
in 1998), Japan 17.0% (of 2,800 in 1999). Kim Jae-yeop, "Domestic Violence In Korea,"
p. 17 and Table 2, a paper presented to 'the Debate for Countermeasures Against
Domestic Violence', which was hosted by the Ministry of Health and Welfare and
supported by the World Bank on March 24-25, 2000, at Seoul gyoyuk munhwa
hoegwan (Seoul Education Culture Center), p. 17, <Table 2>.
164
<Table Ⅱ-3-13> 2010 Survey: Have you ever been badly beaten by your
husband?
No. Response
Valid
Response
Yes
11
8.3
8.3
No
114
86.4
94.7
7
5.3
100.0
132
100.0
I don’t Know
Sub-total
Invalid
Cumulative
Percentage(%)
Percent(%)
No response
Total
68
200
<Table Ⅱ-3-14> 2008 Survey: Is there any serious physical or verbal abuse
against wives by their husbands in North Korea?
Choice
Frequency
(number)
Percentage(%)
Effective
percentage(%)
Violence against wives by
husbands occurs in most families
32
58.2
60.4
Violence against wives by
husbands occurs in some families
20
36.4
37.7
others
1
1.8
1.9
subtotal
53
96.4
100.0
n/s
2
3.6
total
55
100.0
<Table Ⅱ-3-15> 2010 Survey: Is there any serious abuse by husbands against
their wives in North Korea?
No.
Response
Valid
Response
Invalid
Percentage
(%)
Cumulative
Percentage(%)
Most husbands beat their
wives.
92
69.7
69.7
Some husbands beat their
wives.
38
28.8
98.5
2
1.5
100.0
Sub-total
132
100.0
No response
68
200
There is no husband using
violence against their wives.
Total
165
Due to a lack of available data on domestic violence and relief
efforts in North Korea, a comparative study is impossible and it is
not easy to judge the general situation for the present. However,
it
has
been
revealed
that
cooperative
intervention
of
the
community can effectively reduce domestic abuse in some western
countries. And there are studies that a comprehensive approach
with the combination of arrest, fine, exclusive probation and
counseling throughout the community can produce good results.36)
The
results
of
2008
and
2010
show
that
responses
and
intervention of people in the neighborhood have been better than
in 2006 (I try to stop them first: 26.4%; I don't care: 54.6%; It's
the wife's fault: 9.4%; I think the husband is strange: 3.8%; I
report it to regulators: 3.8%). They, however, fall short of being
useful in resolving the problem.
The majority of respondents in the three interview surveys 94.4% in 2006, 88.7% in 2008 and 84% in 2010 - answered that
there
is
no
organization
to
provide
counseling
on
domestic
violence. In the 2010 survey, 52.7% of the interviewees responded
that ‘husbands get no legal punishment’ even after they were
reported for beating their wives harshly. 25.2% of the interviewees
stated, ‘the reporting person will be treated as an odd one,’ which
is more a negative result than that the survey of 2008, 54.5%,
10.9%, respectively. The survey results prove that the issue does
not take a notable attention in the North Korean society yet.
36) Daniel G. Saunders, "Programs for Men Who Batter: A Summary of Models & Recent
Research," World Bank Project on Enhancing Institutional Capacity of the Ministry of
Health and Welfare for Dealing in Family Violence on July 20, 2000, Seoul, Korea.
166
<Table Ⅱ-3-16> 2008 Survey: When a husband beats his wife seriously, what
do his neighbors think about him?
Choice
Frequency
(number)
Percentage(%)
Effective
percentage(%)
They have no idea or feeling
9
16.4
17.0
They think the husbands are fastidious
and violent (It is the husband' fault)
27
49.1
50.9
They think it is not right but
possible.
7
12.7
13.2
They think the wives might do
something wrong
4
7.3
7.5
others
6
10.9
11.3
subtotal
53
96.4
100.0
no response
2
3.6
total
55
100.0
<Table Ⅱ-3-17> 2010 Survey: When a husband beats his wife seriously, what
do his neighbors think about him?
No.
Response
Percentage(%)
Cumulative
Response(%)
They have no idea or
feeling
71
54.6
54.6
They think the husbands
are fastidious and violent
(It is the husband' fault)
43
33.1
87.7
Valid
They think it is not right
Response but possible.
5
3.8
91.5
They think the wives
might do something wrong
4
3.1
94.6
Others
7
5.4
100.0
Sub-total
130
100.0
No response
70
200
Invalid
Total
167
<Table Ⅱ-3-18> 2008 Survey: In North Korea, how do neighbors respond when
they see a husband badly abuses his wife physically or verbally?
frequency
(number)
Choice
percentage(%)
Effective
percentage(%)
I try to stop them first. I don't
take any other measure.
24
43.6
45.3
I don't care about other family's
business
25
45.5
47.2
I report it to the Bowibu agent
3
5.5
5.7
Others
1
1.8
1.9
Subtotal
53
96.4
100.0
no response
2
3.6
Total
55
100.0
<Table Ⅱ-3-19> 2010 Survey: In North Korea, how do neighbors respond when
they see a husband badly abuses his wife physically or verbally?
No.
Response
Percentage(%)
Cumulative
Percentage(%)
56
43.1
43.1
65
50.0
93.1
9
6.9
100.0
Sub-total
130
100.0
No Response
70
200
I try to stop them first. I
don't take any other
measure.
I don't care about other
Valid
Response family's business
I report it to the Bowibu
agent
Invalid
Total
It means that domestic violence remains a pathological problem
that has not yet to be recognized properly and that is why legal
measures necessary to protect women from domestic violence
have not been taken.37)
37) For example, there are laws and special acts in South Korea to protect women from
domestic and sexual violence including the Law on the Prevention of Domestic
168
It is estimated that North Korea’s uniquely high frequency rate
of domestic violence
originates from the hardship of life, followed
by economic difficulty and low public awareness of domestic
violence. Most of all, it seems that economic growth and public
awareness must be preceded. Nevertheless, little is known about
preventive policy against domestic violence has been taken by
North Korean regime until now.38)
3. Changes in North Korea's Human Rights Policy
Recently, interests in religion or unique culture patterns, such
as
international
norms
and
principled
ideas,
are
gradually
increasing in international academic world. The Five-phase “Spiral
Model” <Figure Ⅱ-3-1> is a theory that reviews and models
cause-and-effect mechanism through which these ideas are spread
out and how these international norms have mutual relationship
with different domestic structure.39) “The Spiral Model” builds up
five phases of the process during which a repressive government
adopts human rights. Applying it to changes in North Korea's
Violence and the Protection of Victims (enacted in July 1998), the Special Act for the
Punishment of Domestic Violence (enacted in July 1998 and revised on January 21,
1999), the Act on the Punishment of Sexual Crimes and Protection of Victims (enacted
in 1994 and revised in 1997 and 1998). However, Joseon Inminminjujuui Gonghwaguk
Beopjeon (Daejungyong) (The Penal Code of the Democratic People's Republic of
Korea (for the public)), which the North Korean government published in 2004 for the
first time to inform the people of North Korean laws, doesn't include any law to
relieve women from domestic or any other kind of violence, even though it includes the
constitution and 112 laws.
38) When UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights reviewed North Korea’s
nd
2 periodic report, current author watched independent experts asking this question.
Shim Hyeong-il, Vice Chair of North Korean representatives did not suggest any
alternative except that he would introduce self-criticism in the meetings of in-min-ban,
people's neighborhood unit.
39) Thomas Risse, Stephen Ropp and Kathryn Sikkink (ed.), Power of Human Rights:
International Norms and Domestic Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1999).
169
human rights policy, the North Korean government has gone
through the three phases of five from "Repression" to "Denial of
validity of international norms on human rights" to "Tactical
concessions to the human rights networks" based on the internal
and external policy environment since its establishment. It has
also taken the fourth phase of "Prescriptive status" partially.
<Figure Ⅱ-3-1> The ‘Spiral Model’ of Human Rights Change (by Thomas Risse
and Kathryn Sikkink)
society
State
Weak domestic
opposition
1. Repression
domestic opposition
Mobilization and
strengthening of
groups
engaging human rights
norms
* New domestic actors
and sustained links
to translational
networks
* Normative appeals
* Information
* Expansion in new
political space
* Human rights
assuming centerstage
in societal discourse
2. Denial
Repressive state denies
validity of human rights
norms as subject to
international jurisdiction,
claims non-intervention norm
3. Tactical concessions
* Concessions to the human
rights networks
* Reduced margin of
maneuver re human rights
Policy change
Regime change
4. Prescriptive status State
accepts international norm
* Ratifies international treaties
* Discursive practice
5. Rule-consistent behavior
International /
Transnational Networks
Transnational networks
* Receive information from
domestic opposition
* Invoke international
human rights norms
* Pressurize repressive
state
* Mobilize international
organizations and liberal
states
Sustained bilateral and
multilateral network
pressure
170
After the food crisis, it had shown cooperative gestures of
"Tactical
concessions"
to
the
international
community
in
an
attempt to get food aid until the early 2000s. But it has now
stopped dialogues and turned back to the second phase of "Denial"
as the food crisis has been relieved to some degree and the UN
and the EU have increasingly emphasized human rights while the
South Korean government has increased economic aid.40)
According
to
the
Five-phase
"Spiral
Model,"
the
network
linkages between international and domestic organizations during
phase, three is the biggest factor to change human rights policy
of the repressive state. That is, to prevent hollow pledges to
improve human rights by the government repressing them with
the strategic calculation from shackling its human rights policies,
civic or anti-regime groups should be allowed to monitor the
government's violation of its public pledges.
From this point of view, like the Helsinki Process which
functioned for human rights organizations or resistance groups to
survive and continue their movement under the communist regime
in Central and Eastern Europe, the multilateral approach toward
North Korean human rights issue should be taken to bring
changes in policy on human rights in North Korea and reach the
“Prescriptive
status”
and
eventually
to
the
final
stage,
‘Rule-consistent behavior.’
40) To be specific, the World Food Programme (WFP) conducted around 4,800 rounds of
monitoring in 2004 providing 370,000 tons of food aid while the South Korean
government did just 10 times sending 500,000 tons of food to the North. As the South
Korean government as a human aid donor did not comply with the related international
norms, it led the North Korean authorities to take extremely negative position toward
international aid organizations including the WFP, which require transparent distribution
and regulation. Finally some organizations were expelled from North Korea in 2005 and
the WFP was forced to stop its operation for 5 months. Only after reducing the range
of its operation, it could resume on May 11, 2006.
171
The North Korean government has recognized human rights as
‘all sorts of political, economic, cultural and social rights people
should necessarily have’ since the 1970s, but it has denied their
universality,
arguing
that
human
rights
are
to
be
enforced
thorough dictatorship against the class enemy.41) And it has also
disapproved of universal human rights standards, by saying, "we
have our own human rights standards as specific human rights
norms
can’t
exist
in
the
international
community."
The
government further puts an emphasis on cultural relativism,
maintaining that each country in the world has its unique
tradition, ethnicity, culture and history, so human rights standards
and the guarantee of human rights vary based on the current
situation of a country.42) Holding such a human rights perspective,
the North Korean government strongly opposed the resolution
adopted by the 49th UN Human Rights Committee in 1997 and
declared to withdraw from the ICCPR. It has also resisted a
series of resolutions since 2003 to urge North Korea to improve
human rights, considering them as conspiracy to over throw its
regime.43)
The international community has pointed out North Korean
human rights issues including torture, other cruel and inhuman
treatment, punishment, unlawful and arbitrary detention, lack of
freedom of speech and violence against women. These human
rights violations can also be found easily in underdeveloped
societies. Determining the distribution of social value based on
41) Jeongchiyongeosajeon (Dictionary of Political Terminology) (Pyeongyang: Social
Science, 1970), p. 718.
42) Rodong Sinmun (Rodong Newspaper), March 2, 2001.
43) "Buk Yuen Bug-in-gwon-gyeoluian Chaetaege "Jeokdaeso-dong" (North Korea regarded
the UN resolution on it as a "aggressive behavior)." [Online cited on September 24,
2007]. Available from <http://nk.chosun.com/news/news .html?ACT=detail&cat_id=11&re
s_id=62067&page=2>.
172
class ascription or "class origin" is similar to social ascription in
pre-modern status-based societies. And considering defection from
the North as an act of treason is similar to inflicting severe
punishment on subjects when they left the kingdom without
notice. Nevertheless these things cannot be justified as "internal
approach" or "cultural relativism" because the North is not under
an absolute monarchy and those human rights oppression have
been committed even after the government pledged to comply with
international conventions. Infanticide for racial reasons is especially
a violation of "the Convention to Prevent and Punish the Crime of
Genocide," which the North Korean government joined in 1989 and
"the Convention on the Rights of the Child" in 1990.
The North Korean government in 1990s declared its own human
rights as different from the western-style human rights as Kim
Il-sung said in an interview with the Washington Times, "Human
rights are what people like and what is in line with people’s
interests.44)" And in an attempt to devalue intervention on human
rights issues by the international community, it defines human rights
as free rights that people should exert in every field of society
including politics, economy, ideology, culture and divine rights of
social beings who want to live a voluntary and creative life and
develop themselves. Moreover, the government partially denies the
"inherent rights of man," saying that human rights are not given by
Heaven (God) and maintains that human rights are guaranteed when
the state provide legal, institutional and material conditions so that
people under its jurisdiction can enjoy their rights.45)
44) Kim Il-Sung, "Miguk (Washingtontimes) gijadan jegihan jilmune daehan daedap (Response
to the question raised by journalists group of the Washington Fimes)," Kim Il-ung
jeojakjip (Collection of Kim Il-sung's Writings), vol.44 (Pyeongyang; 1996), p. 371.
45) Rodong Sinmun (Rodong Newspaper), June 24, 2001.
173
<Table Ⅱ-3-20-①> Phase one to two of distorted Spiral Model applied to North
Korean human rights policy change
Five-Phase
Spiral Model
contents of measures and policies
․Capital punishment for a political reason,
․Setting up a large number of political prison camps,
․Broad use of forced labor,
․Regarding defection as treason and punishing by
detention, inhumane treatment and capital
punishment,
․Infanticide committed in prisons, Jipgyeolso
(gathering places), political prison camps,
․Human trafficking against women for the purpose of
prostitution, forced marriage
1. Repression
forcing pregnant deported women to abort for a
racial reason
․Violation of rights to food
․Religious intolerance
․Forced or involuntary disappearance
․Violation of freedom of speech
․Violence against women
․The issue of people kidnapped to North Korea and
South Korean POWs
․Restraint on access and monitoring by humanitarian
organizations or NGOs
2. Denial
․Emphasized 'our own human rights perspective' that
what people like is a fair human rights standard as
it is impossible to establish universal human rights,
․True human rights are self-reliant rights which
people exert equally in every field of social life
including politics, economy, society, culture and they
are not separated from state sovereignty.
․Defied the resolution on North Korea adopted by the
49th UN Human Rights Committee(1997) with
declaration of withdrawal from the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
․'Regardless of international human rights standards,
human rights are highly respected and guaranteed in
North Korea, a country of Juche Ideology that
people support.'
․'Human rights are neither fortune given by Heaven
(God) nor a gift by international organizations or
other countries.
․'Human rights are to enforce thorough dictatorship
against the class enemy.'
Evaluation
174
<Table Ⅱ-3-20-②> Phase three of distorted Spiral Model applied to North
Korean human rights
Five-Phase
Spiral Model
Measures and Contents of the Policy
Evaluation
∙Joined the World Health
Organization(WHO) (1973).
∙Joined the United Nations Development
Programme (UNDP, 1979) and
implemented cooperative projects in
1980's.
∙Pursuit of legitimacy
∙Exchanged with the United Nations
over South Korea
Population Fund (UNFPA) since 1984
∙Measures for
and received aid fund
institutional support
∙Reached an agreement of transportation
and cooperation from
support for food aid with the World
the international
Food Programme (1986).
community
∙Hosted deployment of one volunteer by
the United Nations Volunteers (UNV)
(1990).
∙Had dialogue on human rights with the
European Union countries (the early
2000s).
3. Tactical
concessions
∙Resumed operation of‘ '‘the National
Council of Churches in Korea (NCCK),’
‘Korean Buddhist Federation,’ ‘Korean
Orthodox Churches Christian Federation’
under strict state control in 1970s
∙Proposed the meeting with the Korean
∙Pursuit of United
Religious Council (1986) with the
Front with South
agenda of 'unification and
Korean religious
reconciliation',
people
∙Built Bongsu Church and Jangchung
Cathedral (1988)
∙Launched 'the Chosun Catholic
Association' and established religion
department in Kim Il Sung University
(1989).
∙Proposed free exchanges of letters and
people between the two Koreas beyond
the efforts to find separated family
members and relatives at the
inter-Korean Red Cross meeting in
1970s.
∙Approved tacitly the union of separated
family and letter exchanges in 1990s.
∙The offensive
against South Korea
on human issues
∙Gain of foreign
currency
175
<Table Ⅱ-3-20-③> Phase four to five of distorted Spiral Model applied to North
Korean human rights policy change
Five-Phase Spiral
Model
Measures and Contents of the Policy
4. Prescriptive
status
∙Ratified all of the four '1949 Geneva
Conventions', war-related humanitarian
international treaties (1966).
∙Ratified ‘International Covenant on
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights
(1981).
∙Ratified Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
(1989).
∙Ratified Convention on the Right of the
Child (1990).
∙Add Freedom of Residence and Travel in
Article 75 of 'Kim Il Sung Constitution' as
the UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion
and Protection of Human Rights (1998).
∙Adopted Law on Complaints and Petitions
in 1998 and inserted into the Constitution
∙Enacted Socialist Labor Law in 1986 and
revised it in 1999 for the first time
∙Revised and Added Criminal Act and
Criminal Procedure Act since 1990s
∙Ratified Conventions on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights (2001)
∙Established Law on the Protection of
Persons with Disabilities (2003).
5. Rule-consistent
behavior
None
Evaluation
∙Partial and
perfunctory
application
∙Lack of
Institutional
Stability
North Korea’s human rights policy is thus mainly based on
"Repression" and "Denial". However, as shown in <Table Ⅱ
-3-20-②>, the North cooperated in part with the international
community as tactically needed in terms of human rights and
humanitarian
issues.
When
Seoul
was
under
fire
from
the
international community for its human rights record after Yushin
regime and Gwangju massacre, North Korea sought to gain the
upper hand in terms of legitimacy by polishing its image as the
176
‘advanced human rights country’ compared to the South. It also
received institutional support and cooperation from the international
community. Given North Korea’s traditional stance towards the
UN-dismissing it as a problem-solving broker for imperialist
countries-its
move
was
expression
of
significant
strategic
flexibility.
As
the
North
started
inter-Korean
dialogue
in
1972,
it
restructured particular religious groups into three big organizations
of "the National Council of Churches in Korea (NCCK)," "Korean
Buddhist
Federation,"
and
the
"Korean
Orthodox
Churches
Christian Federation." This attempt is aimed at establishing a
united
national
front
with
anti-government
movements
of
progressive South Korean religion activists, while pretending to
allow for the freedom of religion within North Korea.46)
Pyeongyang showed "positive interpretation" on religion in 1986
after being under harsh criticism for lack of religious freedom in
the
1980’s
and
being
influenced
by
frequent
contacts
with
compatriot religious leaders. In 1986, North Korea suggested a
Korean Religionist Council to hold religious leaders’ meeting under
the theme of "unification and reconciliation between two Koreas."
Apparently,
North
Korea
showed
significant
changes
by
establishing Bongsu Church and Jangchung Catholic Church in
Pyeongyang in September 1988 and in January 1989, and holding
Seongdojeol Buddhist Memorial Ceremony across the nation’s
whole Buddhist temples for the first time and opening the religion
curriculum at Kim Il-sung University in 1989.
However, its series of religious-friendly policies were nothing
46) Heo Jong-ho, Juchesasange Gichohan Joguktongillirongwa Namjoseonhyeongmyeong
(Korean Unification based on Juche ideology and South Korean Revolution)
(Pyeongyang: Sahoegwahakchulpansa, 1976), pp. 112~113.
177
more than a strategy adopted for the purposes of supporting the
external propaganda and united national front. It is reflected by
the fact that North Korea scoured 86 underground church-goers in
Anak-gun in Hwanghaenam-do (South Hwanghae Province) in the
early 1990, then executed or sent them to political prison camps.47)
Internally, with the crisis of social control intensifying after the
death
of
strengthened
Kim
Il-sung
religion
and
food
persecution
in
shortage,
1998.
North
Korea
Externally,
by
introducing other religion such as Family Federation for World
Peace and Unification and the Russian Orthodox Church, North
Korea tried to curb the expansion of influence of specific religions
over its territory and to improve relations with the United States
and Russia and earn foreign currency. This supports the idea that
North Korea religion policy was a "tactical concession." North
Korea dispatched Bowibu agents more than twice a year to
educate its people not to spread Christianity since 1997. It also
ordered people who found the Bible to report to the authorities.
In the 1970’s, taking offensive position in humanitarian issue,
North Korea suggested, at the Inter-Korean red cross meeting,
free exchanges of letters between separated families along with
reunion with families. In the 1990s, the North gave a tacit consent
on reunion and letter exchanges of departed families to earn
foreign currency.48)
North Korea does not allow intervention of the international
community over its human rights record citing cultural differences,
self-justified human rights, self-reliance and creative right, but
47) Yonhap News, June 15, 2001.
48) Choi Ui-cheol, Bukhanui In-gwonbubun Oegyoui Jeon-gae Banghyang (Direction of
the North Korean Diplomatic Policy in the Field of Human Rights) (Seoul:
Tongilyeonguwon (Korea Institute for National Unification), 2003), p. 48.
178
permits
limited
monitoring
over
activities
of
international
humanitarian aid organization. North Korea tactically concedes
international human rights norms to the extent that it submits and
seeks assessment of government report on the implementation of
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights (ICESCR), the ICCPR, the Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), the
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), which it signed as
basic obligations in the management process for United Nations
Economic and Social Council’s Treaty Body. As UN Commission
on Human Rights and General Assembly adopted a series of
resolutions on human rights violations in North Korea and the US
and Japan adopted North Korean Human Rights Law, North Korea
denies validity of human rights norms as subject to international
jurisdiction.
However, when regarding characteristics of the 4th phase
"Prescriptive status" in the ‘Five-phase Spiral Model’ as discursive
practice and domestic institutionalization of norms and ratification
of international treaties, the 4th phase of North Korea as shown
in <Table Ⅱ-3-20-③> shares the characteristics of the 3rd phase
"Tactical concessions" where norms of ratified treaties were
institutionalized and implemented at a very low level.
North Korean human rights policies do not develop in a way of
the spiral model. Rather, it repeats progress and retrogression and
implements contradicting policies simultaneously. For example,
North Korea has detained more than 50,000 POWs and 80,000
abducted citizens since the Korean War. Pyeongyang signed on
1949 Geneva Conventions, which chiefly concern the treatment of
non-combatants and prisoners of war, in 1966, but it did not
179
release or repatriate any of them. Violations of the right to food
mentioned above is breach of the ICESCR signed by the North in
1981.49) Imposing the death penalty for political reasons and
political prison camps are violations of the ICCPR.
Of course, this could be regarded as incomplete application of
the 3rd stage "Tactical concession" and the 4th stage "Prescriptive
status."
However,
the
self-righteousness
of
North
Korea’s
leadership and their use of human rights issues for political
purposes indicate that North Korea’s human rights policy is based
on combatant ideology which was not noticed in the Five-phase
"Spiral Model".
49) The U.N. force totaled missing people (Missing in Action) in the South Korean military
were 82,319 in 1953. The South Korean government determined that 88,466 people were
dead from reports from families, the internal investigation by the Ministry of Home
Affairs and the confirms from police stations and special relief steps for unreported
people which were made 8 times from 1954 to 1975. Based on the information South
Korean Ministry of National Defense made [the name lists of 55,108 MIAs] from July
1993 to October 1994 and revised them excluding those listed twice, those dispatched,
those with distinguished merits in war, and those in prison. They were 41,945 people
but after the reinvestigation process the numbers (turned into 41,971, which were
treated as the dead or the missing in October 1997. The Ministry placed the list of
names in the seven local army divisions including the Ministry of National Defense and
Gyeryong-dae (Army-Navy-Air Force coordinated military base) for the people
concerned to make additional report. As a result, 264 were additionally reported and 132
people were reported dead except for the names registered twice, retired and deserted.
The Minstry of National Defense of South Korea, Gukgunpo-ro Munje-Silsanggwa
Daechaek (South Korean POWs-the Reality and the Alternatives) (Seoul: The
Ministry of National Defense of South Korea, 2004), p. 18. However, the author
estimates that 79,030 people became POWs of North Korea and more than 50,000~60,000
(MIAs during mobile warfare: 80%, 88,000, MIAs during the war of position: 60%,
14,384) were alive in 1953 considering South Korean MIA numbers calculated by the
U.N. force in the process of the truce negotiations and the announcement of North
Korean headquarters on POWs in the different periods and Chinese source,
Junggonggunui Hangukjeonjaengsa (The History of Korean War by Chinese Military)
translated by Han-guk Jeollyakmunje Yeon-guso (Korea Research Institute for
Strategy) (Seoul: Segyeongsa, 1991); 附錄 3. 抗美援朝戰爭中國人民志願軍戰果統計, 軍
事科學院軍事歷史硏究所編著; Please refer to Man-ho, “Les prisonniers de guerre
sud-coréens retenus en Corée du Nord: LES HOMMES DANS L'HISTOIRE?,”in Yim
Seong-Sook, La Corée, le peuple et ses valeurs culturelles: d'hier à aujourd'hui,
(Montréal: LES PRESS DE L'UNIVERSITE DE MONTREAL, 2000).
180
"Prescriptive status" without regime change can either be a
reflection
of
the
theoretical
gap
in
the
"spiral
model"
or
"Pseudo-Prescriptive status" of the 4th stage of North Korea’s
human rights policy.
Still,
according to
previous
research
on
policy
change
in
countries with a poor human rights record, the state can enter
into the 4th stage or initiate change in human rights policy only
when transnational networks collect intelligence from domestic
insurgents,
appeal
to
international
human
rights
norms,
put
pressure on oppressive regimes, mobilize international bodies and
free
states
and
use
sustained
pressure
from
bilateral
and
multilateral network. Since currently no homegrown insurgents or
NGOs exist in North Korea, it is urgent to make room for
international NGOs to maneuver so that they can work on behalf
of them. Fostering potential insurgents is equally important. Now
civic guides and aid agents are working under monitoring and
order of North regime, but an environment should be created so
that they could take a role of home grown insurgents or NGOs.
In this regard, the South Korean government has to take a firm
stance toward North Korean assistance policy and pursue goal
attainment in each stage. Korean humanitarian assistance groups
must work based on international norms and general practices, not
on "uniqueness and exception in goodwill." Korean Chinese can
contribute much since they have relatively easy access to North
Korea and can achieve frequent contact with North Koreans.
Accordingly, it is necessary to orient and motivate them directly
and indirectly to initiate transnational networks.
181
4. Effects of the Resolutions on North Korea Human Rights
The poor human rights situation in North Korea has been fully
exposed by resolutions of the UN subcommittee, the UNCHR, the
UN General Assembly. Particularly, the UNCHR has taken an
in-depth approach towards human rights issues in North Korea by
adopting
resolutions
three
times
since
2003.
The
UNCHR
repeatedly pointed out serious violations of human rights in North
Korea such as inhumane treatment and torture, public execution,
illegal and arbitrary detention, imposition of the death penalty for
political reasons, political prison camps and forced labor. Regarding
the issue of North Korean refugees’ repatriation, the UNCHR
th
resolution adopted in the 59
session urged North Korea not to
regard fleeing North Koreans as betrayers who shall be detained,
inhumanely treated or executed. The resolution adopted in the 60th
session of the UNCHR called for measures to prevent the killing
of infants in prisons and labor camps (camps that include
detention facilities and correctional facilities). It also called for the
North to stop human trafficking for sex slaves or enforced
marriage, forcing repatriated women to abolish babies for ethnic
reasons and killing infants who were born to imprisoned women.
In addition, it appointed a Special Rapporteur on the Freedom of
Opinion and Expression, and domestic violence respectively, and
made him investigate and report the cases.
Little was known about what steps the North regime has taken
on these matters. All it has done to date has been to revise its
Criminal Act and Criminal Procedure Act in 2004 and 2005 to
date. Then, North Korea established ‘Administrative Punishment
Law’ in July 2004 to punish misdemeanors and the newly
established ‘Criminal Law Addenda (Supplementary Provision)’ to
182
sentence heavy penalty for the existing specific criminal violations.
However, the positive change in executing the laws was not
significant enough for ordinary persons to feel, as demonstrated in
the 2008 and 2010 surveys.
Resolution adopted by the UNCHR in 2005 stipulates that the
UN General Assembly and other UN bodies have to deal with
North Korean human rights issue when the country does not
cooperate with the Special Rapporteur and no improvements are
detected. However, North Korea Foreign Ministry argued through
the statement dated on April 20, 2005 that the 3rd resolution was
a plot to slander the nation and was laden with false and
poisonous Clauses aimed at converting the North regime. A North
Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman also added that North Korea
would
accept
the
resolution
of
groundless
defamation
and
disagreed to all of it, which is in attempt to alienate the North.
He warned that the North Korea would accordingly not respond to
it if human rights issues were used as tools for anti-communist
activities. The spokesperson also added "Everyone knows that the
U.S. takes an issue with human rights and nuclear program in
order to isolate the North and escalate tension on the Korean
Peninsula. The resolution is a mean scheme planned by western
countries at the instigation of the U.S. to pressure the North." He
threatened
that
Japan
would
pay
the
price
for
joining
the
movement against North Korea by raising the "abductees issues,"
which were settled issues between the two parties, in the
resolution.50)
50) "Buk Yuen Bug-in-gwon-gyeoluian Chaetaege "Jeokdaeso-dong" (North Korea regarded
the UN resolution on it as a "aggressive behavior)." [Online cited on September 24,
2007]. Available from <http://nk.chosun.com/news/news .html?ACT=detail&cat_id=11&re
s_id=62067&page=2>.
183
However, in contrast to such an official reaction, North Korea
occasionally
took
some
positive
steps
towards
international
pressure like the UN resolutions. For example, as stated above,
North Korea inserted freedom of movement and travel, which the
UNSCHR
pointed
out,
in
Article
75
of
the
Kim
Il-sung
Constitution and significantly revised and complemented Law on
Complaints and Petitions a year after the adoption of it in 1998.
Socialist Labor Law had been no revision or complement since it
was enacted in 1986, but revised it for the first time in 1999.
Particularly, its Criminal Act and the Criminal Procedure Act have
been revised 6 and 7 times respectively since 1990 after drawing
harsh
criticism
from
the
international
communities.
The
international community saw the Disabled Protection Law, which
was enacted in 2003 as a step in the right direction. The
enactment and revision are representative examples of the UN
organizations’ achievements.
Although,
considering
North
Korean
refugees’
testimonies
regarding torture and arbitrary detention, enforcement of newly
enacted or revised laws are not consistently carried out.
In an interview survey conducted in 2008, [ID 004 (2008)] said,
"The Workers' Party gave us kind of subsidies. It was given in
cash. I saw it in Saetbyeol village." [ID 009 (2008)] said, "My
husband worked for a factory where the blind are employed.
Usually healthy people receive wage of 10,000 won but he got
3,000 won more." [ID 019 (2008)] said, "The disabled receive
several benefits. They face no discrimination. They can lean more
skills such as repairing TV, lighter, tape recorder or video
recorder." It was not identified when interviewees experienced
such situations, but it is assumed that some of their comments
184
show positive effects of law revision. It was verified partly by the
statement of [ID 034 (2010)] in the survey of 2010 in which some
interviewees
testified
that
‘North
Korean
regime
forced
handicapped people to move to a village named ‘Haha,’ build a
factory and live there.
However, it seems that there is no big change in public
awareness. According to the interview survey in 2008, to a
question of "What kind of discrimination do the disabled face in
the workplace in North Korea?" [ID 007 (2008)] answered, "Verbal
abuse such as being called as an idiot. The handicapped people
except
soldiers
discharged
with
honor
are
not
deserved
as
human." There were many testimonies in 2010 survey about
inhumane treatments that the handicapped people have to endure:
They have difficulties in selecting jobs and face with contempt,
ridicule, and discrimination in the workplace.
Particularly, in the investigation of 2008 and 2010, there were a
variety of testimonies on deportation of the disabled. To the
question of "Have you ever heard a story or witnessed a case
about deportation or forced movement out of the city to other
areas due to physical deformation?" in 2008, most of interviewees
including [ID 002 (2008)] answered specifically: "Mostly, open
cities like Najin do not allow the disabled to live within the city.
There were people who were expelled from Pyeongyang. Many of
them were kicked out in the 70’s and the 80’s, some in the 90’s."
In the 2010 survey, several respondents testified their experience
of being expelled to or forced to migrate to other regions in each
of those periods.
In addition, to the question “Have you ever heard a story or
witnessed a story that a handicapped baby was killed by the
185
North Korean authorities immediately after it was born?”, [ID 007
(2008)] testified his/her own experience:
“I gave a birth to a deformed baby in July, 2004 (after
enactment of The Disabled Protection Law), and he had a cleft
lip. I delivered my baby in Nampo Maternity Hospital and doctor
said the baby would not make it because it was deformed and he
suggested we dealt with the matter on our own. So, we buried
the baby. We didn’t know what to do since it was our first time
having such a baby. After arriving in South Korea, I regretted
having committed such a heinous crime. But, at that time, I didn’t
feel guilty at all since it was so natural to us.”
According to [ID 143 (2010)]’s testimony in the 2010 survey,
handicapped babies were killed as soon as they were born in
Musan-gun around 2004. North Korea has thus made efforts to
enact and revise its laws under pressure from the international
community through the UNCHR and the UN resolutions. The
international pressure gave positive influence on improvement of
the situation of human rights in North Korea, but still norms are
not applied consistently to North Korea. This is part of the
character of “Prescriptive status,” the 4
th
stage of ‘Five-phase
Spiral Model.’
5. Conclusion
It is expected that human rights achievements in North Korea
will reach a certain limitation without any sincere efforts to deal
with fundamental cause of human rights violation: North Korea’s
system of totalitarian societal control. However, some human
186
rights violations won’t be improved without political democracy
and institutional change. It reflects that North Korean government
th
has shown “Prescriptive status,” the 4
stage of Five-phase Spiral
Model without any preposition of the institutional change.
The most urgent thing now is to start discussions on pending
issues among related parties. It is highly required to encourage
them to resolve matters on education, economy and trade under
the frame of multilateral talks and to develop structure of dialogue
on human rights issue in the region. It is necessary to persuade
related parties to acknowledge that multilateral negotiations for
improvement of human rights condition in North Korea would be
a good starting point to make regional protection systems of
human rights which are inevitable in the face of more frequent
human contacts among Northeast Asian societies. The next step
after the multilateral negotiation is to make a standard that can
assess efforts North Korea are making and show the path North
Korea should take in the future. Moreover, monitoring should be
accompanied. It would be challenging to persuade North Korea to
accept it. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
(CSCE) took time at first, but negotiations on security issue made
it possible. So even though it takes time, the monitoring should be
on the negotiation table.
It
would
be
acceptable
to
request
rule
of
law
using
improvement of human rights issue as leverage, considering that
democracy, human rights and rule of law are on the same line. At
this juncture, we need to consistently collect information on illegal,
arbitrary punishments and to implement proactive policies, which
can link corrections with assistance, at any cost.
International
and
domestic
norms
were
already
ready
for
187
improvement of North Korean human rights condition. A key point
is to have North Korea carry out those norms through political
negotiations. Considering the current situation, it is desirable to
approach issues case by case and secure general binding force
through those approaches. Much more important is to carry out
problem-solving tactics, create constructive countermeasures and
develop a common program or project to address the issues.
Those are even more important than punishment of leadership in
North Korea.
Chances are rare that North Korea will accept democratic
pluralism and involve the citizenry in decision-making at various
levels. However, reform and opening of North Korea will enhance
civil autonomy and expand unofficial social sectors to some extent.
According to the five-phase "spiral model", international networks
in the third stage are the biggest factor in changing human rights
policy of countries with poor human rights record. Therefore, the
short and mid-term objective in North Korea human rights policy
should not be not only to create an environment where voluntary
civic organizations could communicate with international human
rights organizations, but also encourage front groups or fringe
organizations of Workers’ Party to work on behalf of voluntary
civic organizations. Equally important is to outline assistance
policy in the way that international organizations could work on
behalf of civic organizations for the time being.
Ⅲ
North Korea's Human-Rights related
Acts and Subordinate Statutes and
their Application
1. North Korea’s Human-Rights related Laws and
Subordinate Statutes
Chung Hak-jin
2. The Application of North Korean Criminal Law
Han Myung-sub
191
Ⅲ. North Korea's Human-Rights related Acts and Subordinate Statutes and their Application
1. North Korea’s Human-Rights related
Laws and Subordinate Statutes
￭ Chung Hak-jin (Attorney at law)
1. Revision of North Korea's Constitution and Its Implication
North Korea established the Constitution of the Democratic
People’s
Republic
of
Korea
(North
Korea's
official
name,
hereinafter referred to as “DPRK”) on September 8, 1948 and has
revised it four times since. This includes the first revision which
changed its name into the Socialist Constitution on December 27,
1972 and three other following corresponding dates of revision are
on April 9, 1992, September 5, 1998, and April 9, 2009. As three
times of the constitutional revisions took place in the 1990s, more
laws, rules, ordinances and regulations were newly introduced,
enacted and frequently revised during this period.1)
It was the inevitable step for North Korea to open itself to the
world in certain limited areas due to severe economic crisis in the
1990s. Therefore, in order to attract the foreign capital investment
and sustain and protect stability of the regime domestically, North
Korea had to aptly respond to the various change in conditions.
As a result, new laws, rules, ordinances and regulations have
been
rapidly
increased
and
there
was
active
progress
on
1) There were few materials entitled with “law” before 1990s and other titles instead of
law had been often used in North Korea. Yoo Uk, “Bukhanui Beopchegyewa
Bukhanbeop Ihaebangbeop (North Korea’s Legal System and Its Understanding),” a
paper submitted to 35th Tongilbeop jochan poreom (Breakfast Forum on Unification
Law) on February 3, 2010, p. 6.
192
corresponding legal system.
The North Korea's Constitution revised in 1992 played a
stepping
stone
to
establish
Kim
Jong-il’s
leadership
and
consolidate his succession after his father, Kim Il-sung, under the
name of ‘Our Style Socialism,’ as a countermeasure against the
collapse
of
socialist
system
such
as
the
demolish
of
East
European countries and the dissolution of the former Soviet Union.
The revised Constitution of 1998 demonstrated many changes in
the economic field: expanding the range of subject from “the State
and cooperative organizations,” the only subject of economic
production
stipulated
organization”(Article
in
20);
the
previous
changing
the
Constitution,
subject
of
to
“social
individual
ownership from “workers” into “citizens” and allowing tending a
kitchen garden and limited individual private economic activities
(Article 24); introducing new concepts such as production cost,
price and profit (Article 33)2); promoting trade in various fields by
avoiding government monopoly in foreign trade and creating
“social and cooperative organizations” (Article 36); encouraging
new enterprise startups in “the special economic zone” to make
legal grounds of providing economic activities in the zone (Article
37) to make legal grounds of providing economic activities in the
zone.3)
2) North Korea started accepting market economy principles by adopting the concepts of
‘cost’, ‘price’ and ‘profitability’ simultaneously which China and the Soviet Union have
adopted gradually (Article 33), indicating North Korea’s commitment towards
market-opening. Lee Cheol-Su, "Bukhanui Nodongbeop (North Korea's Labor Act),"
Bukhan Ingwongwallyeon Beomnyeong Haeseol (Explanation on North Korean Human
Right Related Laws) (Seoul: The Korean Bar Association, 2007), p. 183.
3) Jang Myeong-bong, “Bukhanui Choegeun Beopjejeongbiui Donghyanggwa Pyeongga
(North Korea's Recent Law Enactment and Its Evaluation),” 2005 Bukhanbeop Yeongu,
vol. 8. no. 2 (2005), p. 11.
The North Korea’s
Songun
(Military-first)
revised Constitution
ideology,
as
the
193
of 2009 stipulates
official
governing
ideologies, along with Juche (Self-reliance) ideology. Arguing it as
a new higher level of revolutionary theory, the Constitution
provides
the
National
Defense
Commission
with
the
major
decision-making authorities on important policies to carry on
Songun (Military-first) ideology and consolidates its authority on
governing general state affairs. The revised constitution stated
establishment of new position called the Chairman of the National
Defense Commission and empowered with similar status and
authority to the Jusuk (Premeir) in the Socialist Constitution of
1972. This gave Kim Jong-Il the authority to proceed their third
hereditary succession.4)
The basic principles of South Korea’s Constitution include the
sovereignty of the people, liberal democracy, separation of powers,
the pursuit of peaceful and democratic reunification of South and
North Korea, the pursuit of culture and international peace, the
guarantee of political neutrality of military, the respect for basic
human rights, the responsibility of the state to promote welfare
and the pursuit of social market economy.5) However, North
Korea’s Constitution contains the Juche ideology and Songun
(Military-first) ideology (Article 3), the dictatorship of people’s
democracy, class line and people’s power (Article 12) and the
collectivism principle (Article 63). Furthermore, North Korea’s
4) North Korea established the sole leadership of Kim Jong-il, Chairman of the National
Defense Commission in its Constitution like a social norms, Jang Myeong-bong,
Bukhanui Seongunjeongchiwa 2009 Heonbeopgaejeong (North Korea’s Songun
(Military-first) Politics and the Constitutional Revision in 2009), 34th Tongilbeop jochan
poreom (Breakfast Forum on Unification Law) on December 29, 2010, pp. 9-10. Yu Uk
regards it as regression of North Korea’s Constitution. Yoo Uk, Ibid., p. 37.
5) Kim Cheol-su, 2007 Heonbeophak Gaeron (Je 19Jeonjeongsinpan) (2007 Introduction to
Constitution 19th edition) (Seoul: Bagyeongsa, 2007), pp. 137~143.
194
Constitution is not the supreme laws in North Korea, because first
there are the instructions of Kim Il-sung and then the Bylaws of
the Ro-dong-dang (Workers’ Party), superior to the Constitution.
Thus, North Korea’s Constitution, which fails to recognize people
as a sovereign, has become a means to preserve the dictatorships
of Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il under the pretext of Juche and
Songun (Military-first) ideologies.6)
2. Songun (Military-first) Politics and Human Rights
The
Constitution
(Military-first)
Socialism'
as
comprehensive
revised
politics.
in
North
2009
institutionalized
Korea
the
fundamental
national
governing
considers
principle
system
by
Songun
'Our
to
Style
consolidate
strong
military
power under Kim Jong-il's leadership. The true meaning of
Songun (Military-first) politics is to regard military not just as
the forefront of the government but as the political method to
drive construction of socialism as a whole.7)The Article 3 of the
revised Constitution in 2009 stipulates that DPRK, based on
human-centered perspective, takes Juche (Self-reliance) ideology
and
Songun
(Military-first)
ideology
to
accomplish
the
self-reliance of ordinary people, as a guideline to self-activities. It
seems
that
the
new
Constitution,
stipulating
Songun
(Military-first) ideology along with Juche ideology, is designed to
rationalize the possibility of a war in the near future and
consolidate the succession of Kim Jong-un.
6) Heonbeobeul Saenggakhaneun Byeonhosa Moim (The meeting of lawyers thinking about
constitution), ed., Nambukhan Heonbeobui Ihae (Understanding on North and South
Koreas’ Constitutions), (Seoul: Samgwangchulpansa, 2002), pp. 118~119.
7) Jang Myeong-bong,“Bukhanui Seongunjeongchiwa 2009 Heonbeopgaejeong (North Korea’s
Songun (Military-first) Politics and the Constitutional Revised in 2009),” pp. 3~6.
195
The revised Constitution of 2009, without any changes in the
fundamental
human
rights,
consists
of
25
Articles.
The
Constitution stipulates the fundamental human rights in Article 5,
‘basic rights and duty of citizens’ and guarantees the individual
ownership and the right of inheritance in Article 24, and the right
of defense for the accused in Article 158. The revised Constitution
provides
legal
ordinances.8)
grounds
to
establish
subordinate
laws
and
However, it is unlikely that the new Constitution
puts its emphasis on guaranteeing human rights because its
original purpose is to realize Songun (Military-first) ideology by
placing North Korea’s People’s Army in the main force of
revolution. The revised Constitution of 2009 is required to control
and establish the relevant rules and regulation more forcefully
than before to maintain or modify North Korean regime. In this
context, there might be greater concern about neglecting human
rights related laws and regulations or treating them of secondary
importance in the process of establishing the system.
The main purpose of the Constitution in North Korea lies in
fulfilling Songun (Military-first) politics and protecting proletarian
dictatorship,
not
in advocating
fundamental
rights of
people.
Furthermore, since Kim Il-sung’s instructions are deemed to be
superior to general laws, people can hardly enjoy their basic
human rights as stipulated in human rights related laws and
regulations of the Constitution. Thus, it is quite worried that a
victim might not receive any relief measures in reality in case of
his/her human rights are violated.
Suspecting real intention and background of raising human
8) Jhe Seong-ho, “Bukhanui Ingwonjeongchaekgwa Beop Gyujeong (North Korea’s Human
Rights Policy and Regulations),” 2006 Bukhan Iingwon Baekseo (2006 White Paper on
North Korean Human Rights) (Seoul: The Korean Bar Association, 2006), pp. 32~33.
196
rights issues in North Korea, some South Koreans argue that it is
undesirable to raise human rights issues to persist favorable
relationship between the North and the South. They even insist
that peaceful economic support, rather than official pressure, is
more
effective
to
promote
human
rights
in
North
Korea.9)
However, it is strongly recommended to reconsider the issue of
human rights having been neglected in North Korea where the
dictatorship and its succession of Kim Il-sung, Kim Jong-il and
Kim Jong-un have continued. Human rights as a principle of life
are
concerned
with
‘the
universal
values’
and
worth
being
guaranteed and promoted for human beings. Currently, while Kim
Jong-il’s regime is obsessed with possessing nuclear weapons and
waging wars, millions of children are dying by starvation and
disease. Even building political prison camps, the regime brutally
deprives political criminals of their right to life and provokes a
nuclear war against South Korea. Thus, it is totally unacceptable
to disregard the fundamental human rights of people with the
same blood. In this context, it is really meaningful for human
rights in North Korea that recently the Korean Bar Association
(hereafter referred to as “KBA”), the last fortress of human
rights, established its ‘Human Rights Foundation’ on July 1, 2010.
The following chapters will review major contents and problems
of North Korea’s criminal law, which plays a key role in securing
human rights in North Korea, especially those of military criminal
law, and its comparison with South Korea’s counterpart.
9) Kim Dong-han, "Bukhanui Ingwonggwa Beop (North Korea’s Human Rights and Law),"
Bukhanbeop Yeongu, vol. 8 no. 2 (2005), pp. 284~285.
197
3. Meaning, Enactment and Revision of North Korea’s Criminal
Law
1) Meaning of Criminal Law
Most experts on North Korea’s criminal law generally believe
that North Korea’s Criminal Act is the embodiment of legal norms
defining crimes and punishment: to subdue anti-state criminals
attempting to overthrow the socialist system and state sovereignty
or
opposing
revolutionary
achievement;
to
constrain
general
criminals intending to hinder firm development of the socialist
system. The Criminal Act was nothing but a strong legal
mechanism to backup the socialist revolution and to perpetuate
Kim Il-sung’s Juche ideology, the monolithic ruling structure of
North Korea and the dictatorship of the Workers’ Party.10)
In North Korea, the Criminal Procedure Act serves as “a strong
weapon of the dictatorship of proletariat to consolidate the socialist
system in which the people have sovereignty and to realize Juche
ideology for the entire society.”11) Accordingly, criminal procedure
can find its own nature from embodying the socialist system and
enforcing instructions of Kim Il-sung and his son Kim Jong-il,
and policies of the Party. Currently, this tendency seems to be
more accelerated as a result of the succession of Kim Jong-il’s
regime in pursuit of Songun (Military-first) politics based on
Songun (Military-first) ideology.
In contrast, South Korea’s Criminal Act serves to guarantee the
10) The Ministry of Justice of South Korea, Bukhanbeop Yeongu IV- Sinhyeongbeop
(Reaserch on North Korean Law IV -New Criminal Law), Beopmujaryo, vol. 128
(1990), pp. 21~22.
11) Ri Jae-do, Heongsa Sosongbeophak (2pan) (Criminal Procedure Law (2nd edition)
(Pyongyang: Kim Il-sung University Press, 1987), p. 11.
198
fundamental human rights of each individual. It rules a crime and
executes a punishment based on the principle of nulla poena sine
lege, the principle of legality meaning that criminal law cannot be
enacted and applied retrospectively. The Criminal Act of South
Korea is quite different from its counterpart of North Korea, since
South Korea’s Criminal Act stipulates the process of punishment
of a crime clearly enough to protect individual’s human rights
from possible violation.
2) Reasons of Enactment and Revision
North Korea’s statutory criminal law consists of two parts. The
First Part includes 12 General Provisions and the Second Part
includes 11 Specific Chapters. There are a total of 301 Articles in
the Criminal Act which was enacted on March 3, 1950 and
enforced from April 1, 1950.12) It has been revised 14 times from
December 19, 1974 to unidentified date of April in 2009. The
major changes of the Criminal Act were made in the first revision
on December 19, 1974, the second revision on February 5, 1987
and the sixth revision on April 29, 2004. The rest of the revisions
involved
partial
modification
and
addition
or
modification
of
supplementary provisions. The most recently revised Constitution
in 2009 includes 9 Chapters and 303 Articles as a result of repeal
of 3 articles and new enactment. With maintaining framework of
the Criminal Act revised in 2004, its General Provisions were
partially revised and more than half of the entire Articles were
12) Han In-seob argues for changes throughout North Korea’s Criminal Act of 1974 as a
weapon of Juche power, the Criminal Act of 1987 as general control mechanism and the
rd
Criminal Act of 2004 as the principle of legality in the 3 Tongilbeop jochan poreom
(Breakfast Forum on Unification Law) “Bukhanhyeongbeobui Byeoncheongwa Hyeonjae
(Changes and Current Status of North Korea’s Criminal Act)” on October 27, 2010.
199
changed: Chapter 1, The Fundamental Principles of Criminal Law;
Chapter 2, Ordinary Rules; Chapter 3, Anti-state and Anti-national
Crimes; Chapter 4, Crimes of the Disruption to the National
Defense System; Chapter 5, Crimes of the Encroachment on
Socialist Economy; Chapter 6, Crimes of the Impairment to the
Socialist Culture; Chapter 7, Crimes of the Violation of the
Administrative Systems; Chapter 8 Crimes of the Violation of
Socialist Collective Life; Chapter 9, Crimes of the Impairment to
the Life and Property of Citizens.
In the sixth revision North Korea deleted a principle allowing
analogical interpretations that had existed in the Criminal Act
since its establishment and created Article 6 (Principle to impose
criminal responsibility only on acts stipulated in the Criminal Act).
What is noteworthy is that North Korea declared a principle to
base criminal responsibility on the law. The new provision
stipulated, “The State shall charge criminal responsibilities only in
cases of crimes prescribed in the Criminal Act.”
North Korea’s Criminal Procedure Act with 25 Chapters and 201
Articles was enacted on March 3, 1950, the same day when the
Criminal Act was established. It has been revised 9 times from
the first revision on June 15, 1954 to the latest one on July 26,
2005. The most recent dramatic revision created the Presidium of
the Supreme People’s Assembly Order No. 436 of May 6, 2004. It
consists
of
12
Chapters
and
439
Articles:
Chapter
1,
The
Fundamental Principles of Criminal Procedure; Chapter 2, Ordinary
Rules;
Chapter 3,
Jurisdiction;
Evidence;
Chapter
6,
Chapter
4,
Investigation;
Defense; Chapter 5,
Chapter
7,
Pretrial
Examination; Chapter 8, Indictment; Chapter 9, First Instance;
Chapter 10, Second Instance; Chapter 11, Emergency Appeals and
200
Retrial; Chapter 12, Execution of Sentence and Judgment.
The distinct feature of the North Korean criminal procedure is
that it separates a pre-indictment investigation into investigation
and pretrial examination. The Pretrial Agency interrogates an
interogatee,13) collects evidence necessary to prove guilt and
represents actual investigation activities.
The
trial
procedure
is
divided
into
trial
preparation
and
examination with a two-tier trial system, in principle, where
courts direct execution of the sentence.
3) Relationship between the Criminal Act and the Military Criminal
Act
Besides
the
Criminal
Act,
North
Korea
has
the
Military
Criminal Act14) to punish crimes in the military as a special law
which applies to soldiers of Korean People’s Army (inmin-gun)
and People’s Security Forces (inmin-gyeongbidae) and Bowibu
agents. North Korea’s military crimes and military-related crimes
under the Criminal Act are slightly different in the categories but,
in general, they are similar to those of South Korea.
4. Basic Principles of North Korea’s Criminal Law
1) Criminal Act
North Korea’s Criminal Act specifies the fundamental principles
of criminal law under the title of "Chapter 1 the Fundamental
13) It corresponds to the suspect under South Korean Criminal Procedure Act. A suspect
of North Korean Criminal Procedure Act is regarded as a subject to be punished, not
as the party to defend himself/ herself in a lawsuit.
14) Park Seung-nyeol, Gunsahyeongbeop (Military Criminal Act) (Pyeongyang: Kim
Il-sung Jeongchidaehak Chulpansa, 2001), p. 14.
201
Principles of the Criminal Act" (Articles 1~9). However, South
Korea’s Criminal Act is composed of general provisions and
specific
parts.
The
general
provision
defines
the
scope
of
application (Articles 1~8), offences (Articles 9~40), penalties
(Articles 41~82) and duration (Articles 83~86) without additional
description of the fundamental principles. The Criminal Act of
South Korea clarifies the principle of nulla poena sine lege in
Clause 1, Article 1 of the Act, “All citizens shall be prosecuted for
an act which constitutes a crime under the statute in force at the
time when it was committed.”
Since
the
Workers’
Party's
Bylaws
and
North
Korea’s
Constitution clearly state that Juche is the leading guideline, it is
natural that the purpose of the Criminal Act is to realize Juche. It
seems odd that Article 1 of the Criminal Act stipulates that the
state’s mission is to guarantee state sovereignty, maintain the
socialist system and self-reliance and creative life of the people. If
the state guaranteed basic rights of the people, they could have
led a self-reliant and creative life. However, it is doubtful that
such rights are guaranteed under such harsh surveillance of the
regime. It is also worrisome that such provision is mere lip
service since the Criminal Act puts more importance on the
interest of the state than on the interest of the people.15)
Setting out that historic setting and condition for class struggle
to apply rules is subject to change, the Criminal Act of North
Korea describes the principles to punish criminals according to
their labor class(Article 2), and specifies the principles to apply
punishment based on the gravity of the crime and the degree of
offender’s repentance(Article 7).16) It is noticeable that the law
15) The Ministry of Justice of South Korea, Bukhanbeopui Chegyejeok Gochal (II) (The
Systematic Review on North Korean Law), Beopmujaryo, vol. 169 (1993), p. 159.
202
presents
the
principles
to
prevent
crimes
by
emphasizing
law-abiding spirit (Article 3).
The
Criminal
Act
revised
in
2004
deleted
analogical
interpretation, which had been allowed since the establishment of
the
Criminal
Act,
and
instead
adopted
the
principle
of
no
criminality without prescribed provision in laws as required by the
principle of nulla poena sine lege, the principle of legality
meaning
that
criminal
law
cannot
be
enacted
and
applied
retrospectively (Article 6). However, what constitutes a crime is
still unclear, abstract and ambiguous. Furthermore, rules that
define the elements of crime are applied to other rules and
regulations without any limit. Therefore, it cannot be identified
with the principle of nulla poena sine lege as required in a liberal
democracy. In particular, it violates the principle as it admits
retroactive effect according to the interpretation of treason against
the people.
Article 1, Clause 1 of South Korea’s Criminal Act specifies that
"constitution and punishment of a crime shall follow the law in
force at the time of crime committed," demonstrating that South
Korean Criminal Act abides by the principle of nulla poena sine
lege.
Article 8 of North Korea’s Criminal Act adopts principles of
territory,17) citizen,18) and reality19) under the title of "Criminal
16) There is an opinion that the revised Criminal Act of 2009 has reinforced social
defensive function of criminal law in its application by changing the previous provision
for “the degree of offender’s repentance.” See Lee Beak-kyu, Sin·Gu Bukhan
Hyeongbeop Jumun Bigyo (Comparison of Provisions of Old and New Criminal Act of
North Korea) p. 1 attached to “Bukhanui 2009Nyeon Gaejeong hyeongbeop gaegwan
(Introductory Review on North Korea’s Revised Criminal Act of 2009),” a paper
presented in the Bukhanbeob Yeonguhoe (The Society for the Research on North
Korean Law), on September 16, 2010.
203
Law’s Interpersonal and Spatial Effect" which corresponds to
South Korea’s territorial, personal, and protective principles.
2) Criminal Procedure Act
North Korea’s Criminal Procedure Act is different from that of
South Korea as it sets forth the fundamental principles of the
Criminal Procedure Act under the title of ‘The Fundamental
Principles of the Criminal Procedure Act (Articles 1~8) in
Chapter 1.
Article 1 of the Criminal Procedure Act stipulates that "North
Korea’s Criminal Procedure Act establishes institutions and order
for
investigation,
pretrial
examination,
basics,
and
trial
to
appropriately handle criminal cases" as a purpose of the law. It
also sets forth that in handling criminal cases the principles of
scientific analysis, objectivity, prudence, fairness (Article 4) and
human rights will be guaranteed (Article 5), and further the
principles and procedures prescribed in the law will be observed
(Article 8), which seem to have been improved from the past.
However, it still adopts a principle for a class-based society
(Article 2) specifying that the state shall strictly identify enemies
from friends and subdue the leading minority and embrace the
following majority, and a principle of a mass line (Article 3)
requiring that the state depend on power and wisdom of the
people. Therefore, the meaning of people does not include the
enemies, and thus, the aforementioned principles are useless, and
17) It indicates a principle to punish people from other countries pursuant to North Korea’s
Criminal Act when they commit a crime stipulated in the Act in its jurisdiction.
18) It indicates a principle to apply North Korea’s Criminal Act when its citizens commit a
crime stipulated in the Act in or outside its jurisdiction.
19) It indicates a principle to apply North Korea’ Criminal Act when a foreigner commits a
crime opposing or disturbing North Korean regime overseas and enters North Korea.
204
their effectiveness doubtful.
In particular, North Korea’s Criminal Procedure Act adopts a
crime prevention principle (Article 6) just like its Criminal Act.
When a procedural law emphasizes crime prevention, punishment
can be strict and severe, and this will result in imposing
unreasonably harsh punishment on a criminal.20)
Using North Korean language in dealing with criminal cases
(Article 7) is natural, which cannot be the basic principle of the
Criminal Procedure Act.
3) Military Criminal Act
Unlike South Korea, North Korea’s military criminal law sets
forth basic principles.
First, pursuant to instructions of Kim Il-sung and his son, Kim
Jong-il, prevention of crimes within the military is the important
principle to be maintained in the struggle with military crimes.
Second, the principle mainly focuses on general culture of soldiers
but brings them to justice as well to unite the whole army and
prevent military crimes successfully. North Korea argues that the
principles can efficiently deal with criminals well enough to satisfy
both interest and revolutionary demand of working class.21)
However, general preventive effect of punishments cannot be
the basic principle of military criminal law. Moreover, there are
concerns that such principles might be contradictory to the
principle of nulla
poena sine
lege
because
the
grounds
of
20) Baek Hyeong-gu, "Bukhan Hyeongsa Sosongbeop (North Korean Criminal Procedure
Act)," Bukhan Ingwon Gwallyeon Beomnyeong Haeseol (Explanation on North Korean
Human Rights related Laws and Ordinances) (Seoul: The Korean Bar Association,
2007), p. 175.
21) Park Seung-nyeol, Gunsahyeongbeop (Military Criminal Act), pp. 15~37.
punishments,
in
their
relation
to
general
culture
205
might
be
transformed into punishment and modified in different ways.
5. Major Contents and Shortcomings of North Korea’s Criminal Act
1) Crimes
Article 10 of North Korea’s Criminal Act defines that "offences
are punishable, dangerous acts which violate the power of the
state and state laws, whether intentionally or unintentionally."
Therefore, a threat to society determines mens rea and actus reus
(element of a crime, whether an act constitutes a crime), while
the level of punishment and the threat serves as standards to
apply Criminal Law and as the highest principle to determine
mens rea and actus reus.
A
crime
is
inevitably
related
to
punishment
and
"how
dangerous an act is to society" is reflected in "the level of
criminality of the act." As a result, even though an act is defined
as a crime under North Korea’s Criminal Act, if it is little harm
to the society, such act does not result in criminal responsibility
(Article 14).
While North Korea considers a crime as a practical concept
based on a danger to society, South Korea believes it to be
reviewed
from
both
formal
and
practical
perspectives,22)
to
maintain harmony between the two perspectives23) or to be
mutually-beneficial.24)
th
22) Lee Jae-sang, Hyeongbeop Chongron (General Summary on Criminal Law (5
edition)), (Seoul: Bagyeongsa, 2003), p. 68.
23) Oh Yong-geun, Hyeongbeop Chongron Bojeongpan (General Summary on Criminal
Law, revised edition), (Seoul: Bagyeongsa, 2005), p. 86.
24) Kim Il-su and Seo Bo-hak, Hyeongbeop Chongron, Je10pan (General Summary on
Criminal Law, 10th edition), (Seoul: Bagyeongsa, 2004), p. 16.
206
(1) Exemption from Criminal Charge for Socially-Dangerous Acts
North Korea’s Criminal Act provides for justifiable defense and
emergency evacuation under the description of "cases falling
outside of social danger".25) In addition, consent by the victim,
social benefits, obedience to orders and exercise of rights are
being discussed theoretically for the same reason among scholars.
Since the latent social impact emanating from an act is a major
yardstick to determine a crime in North Korea, if an act is
deemed to be exempt from social danger by any of those reasons
above, such act will not constitute a crime. Under South Korean
criminal laws, however, there are exclusionary causes of illegality
which
include
justifiable
act,
justifiable
defense,
emergency
evacuation, self-help and consent by the victim.
(2) Persons without Capability to Take Responsibility
Under North Korea’s Criminal Act, a criminal is defined as a
natural person of 14 years or older ages, with the capacity for
responsibility,
who
has
committed
a
socially-dangerous
act.
Therefore, North Korean people and foreigners can be a subject,
but corporations such as companies, organizations, associations and
groups
do
not
take
criminal
responsibility
under
any
circumstances.
Under South Korea’s Criminal Act, corporations cannot be
categorized as criminals, either. However, the majority of people
believe that when a corporation violates an administrative rule, it
25) This term is used by Sim Heon-sang a scholar of the criminal law in North Korea.
Kim Geun-seok, an author of Hyeongbeophak I (Criminal Law 1) does not use this
term. The Ministry of Justice of South Korea, Hyeongbeobui Chegyejeok Gochal (II)
(Systematic Review on North Korean Law), p. 274.
207
must be punished.
Under North Korea’s Criminal Act, capability to take criminal
responsibility is one’s ability to understand harmful acts to the
society, to distinguish such acts and to restrain oneself from doing
them. Hence, if a person does not have such an ability to
understand the ramifications of a socially dangerous act, such act
constitute a crime. In such case, the person will be exempt from
criminal punishment.
Under North Korea’s Criminal Act, punishment shall not be
imposed on an offender under 14 years of age (Article 11) or a
person
who
is
unable
to
judge
his/her
conduct
or
control
himself/herself because of chronic mental disease or a temporary
mental
disorder
socially-dangerous
when
he/she
(Article
commits
12).
Those
an
offense
incompetent
that
is
people
excepting an offender under 14 years of age are exempt from
criminal responsibility and are provided with medical treatment to
prevent them from dangerous acts.
South Korean Criminal Act divides the mentally disabled into
‘mentally-incapacitated
person’
and
‘mentally-fragile
person.’
However, North Korea’s Criminal Act has no article defined as
"actions free of reason" in which the offender commits a crime
after willfully or mistakenly makes himself/herself physically or
mentally disabled.
North
Korea’s
Criminal
Act
does
not
sentence
capital
punishment to people under 18 years of age (minors) for whom
sentencing is more lenient (Article 29 and Clause 4 of Article 40).
As a result of the revision in 2004, crimes against family
members and relatives are exempt from criminal responsibilities if
specifically requested by the victim’s side, with the exception of
208
intentional
murder,
robbery,
rape
and
serious
injury.26)
The
Criminal Act of 2009 was revised to exempt an offender from
criminal responsibility if there was any request from a victim in
advance for crimes of human trafficking and only charge him/her
crimes against personal property.
(3) Preparation and Attempts of Commission of a Crime
The concept of preparation under North Korea’s Criminal Act is
similar to that under South Korea’s Criminal Act. The criteria to
distinguish crime preparation from an attempt are "a crime has
actually been executed", which is the same for South Korea.
Under South Korea’s Criminal Act, an attempt is punished only
if
there
is
a
particular
rule
or
provision
for
the
relevant
punishment and the punishment can be less harsh than that for
consummation. In principle, preparation is not punished unless
specific provisions stipulate otherwise. On the contrary, under
North Korea’s Criminal Act, the relevant responsibilities for crime
preparation and attempt are decided by its gravity, levels of
execution, and reasons for failure and the attempt to commit a
crime and consummation of a crime are punished under the same
provisions. There is no specific provision prescribing punishment
for attempt and consummation separately. However, Article 19 of
General Provision of the revised Criminal Act of 2004 imposes
more lenient punishment for preparation than attempt, and more
renient punishment for attempt than consummation.
26) This corresponds to the rule regarding the crimes and complaints among relatives
under South Korea’s Criminal Act. Under South Korea’s Criminal Act, either an
offender is acquitted or the prosecution is initiated only upon complaints in accordance
with the scope of relatives. This rule is only applicable to crimes such as theft,
deception, blackmail, embezzlement, breach of trust, and sale and purchase of stolen
goods, which makes South Korea’s Criminal Act different from North Korea’s.
209
(4) Complicity
Under North Korea’s Criminal Act, complicity means where
there are "more than one criminals participating in a willful
crime." In general provisions, the accomplice is divided into
organized crime syndicates and general crimes. An accomplice other
than an organized crime syndicate (hereinafter referred to as "normal
accomplice") is categorized into offender, instigator27) and supporter,
each
of
which
is
subject
to
different
punishment
prescribed
accordingly. The provision for complicity has not been changed since
the Criminal Act of North Korea was amended in 1974.
Under South Korea’s Criminal Act, an accomplice is categorized
into co-principal, instigator and accessory, where punishment for
accessories is more lenient than that for co-principals. However,
in
North
Korea,
offender
is
divided
into
sole
offender
and
co-principal. While there is no specific provision for co-principal,
it is recognized in theory to be divided into three categories. An
instigator is
punished commensurate
to or
harsher than
an
offender, while a supporter is punished commensurate to or more
lenient than an offender
(5) Criminality of Crime by Participator
Under North Korea’s Criminal Act, the crime of "concealing
criminals,"
"not
reporting
crimes"
and
"neglecting
to
inform
crimes" as participator collectively fall within crime by association
and are defined respectively in Articles 24, 25 and 26 of the
general provisions.
North Korea’s criminal law experts argue that the provisions
27) It indicates a person instigating others to commit anti-state or ordinary crimes.
210
must exist "as these are serious crimes aiding enemies and
criminals.28)"
However, as these provisions are applied not only to crimes of
anti-state or anti-people but also to ordinary crimes, they may
fuel distrust among residents and increase human rights violations
by imposing people on an expanded duty of reporting and
controlling crimes.29)
Concealing criminals and not reporting crimes under North
Korea’s
Criminal
Act
are
similar
to
harboring
criminal
as
prescribed in Article 152 of South Korea’s Criminal Act and
offense of non-information under the National Security Act of
South Korea. However, the requirement and punishment under
North Korea’s Criminal Act are significantly different from those
of South Korea’s, as South Korea’s Criminal Act reduces or
spares penalties when the offense is targeted towards family
members and relatives of the criminals. Furthermore, there is no
provision concerning neglecting to inform crimes in South Korea’s
Criminal Act.
2) Punishment
In North Korea, punishment is violent and used as a powerful
means to realize proletarian dictatorship. Punishment in North
Korea is political and based on class as it aims to serve the
interests of the North Korean people and to oppose bourgeois
legacy and old ideology.
Generally, we understand that punishment is a means of paying
28) Kim Tae-seok, Bukhan Hyeongbeope Gwanhan Yeongu (A research on North Korean
Criminal Law), Ph.D. thesis in Cheongju University, p. 155.
29) The Ministry of Justice of South Korea, Hyeongbeobui Chegyejeok Gochal (II)
(Systematic Review on Criminal Law), p. 329.
211
for the harm caused by the criminal, within the determinants of
the act, retribution and responsibility, and considered along with
both the general and special prevention of crime.30)
(1) Type of Punishment
Under the 2004 revised Criminal Act, there are eight types of
punishment. Death penalty, life-time term of correctional prison
labor, limited term of correctional prison labor and disciplinary
prison
labor31)
are
basic
methods
of
punishment,
while
the
deprivation of the right to vote, the confiscation of property, the
deprivation of a license and the suspension of a license are
additional methods of punishment (Articles 27 and 28).
Compared
with
North
Korea’s
Criminal
Act
of
1987,
the
Criminal Act of 2004 newly added the provision for disciplinary
prison labor and made the punishment of correctional prison labor
further specified into life-time term of correctional prison labor
and
limited
term
of
correctional
prison
labor.
Moreover,
punishment of deprivation and suspension of a license is divided
into deprivation of a license and suspension of a license. The
Criminal Act of 2009 was revised to apply deprivation of a license
only to intentional crimes committed by a qualified person, while
applying suspension of a license to unintentional crimes committed
by a qualified person. It fixes the period of such punishments for
3 years to exclude the discretionary authority of the court.
Under South Korea’s Criminal Act, there are nine kinds of
30) Lee Jae-sang, Hyeongbeop Chongron (General Summary on Criminal Law (5th edition)),
p. 57.
31) It is a punishment to send a criminal to a certain place for forced labor. As it does not
deprive a criminal of freedom, the criminal’s basic rights are guaranteed during the
term of execution.
212
punishment including death penalty, imprisonment, imprisonment
without prison labor, deprivation of qualifications, suspension of
qualifications, fine,32) penal detention, minor fine and confiscation.
Punishment of restricting physical freedom includes imprisonment,
imprisonment without prison labor and penal detention.
Both South and North Koreas’ Criminal Acts recognize capital
punishment.
Under North Korean Criminal Act of 2004, capital punishment is
applicable to extremely severe crime of those cases including
involving conspiracy to overturn the state (Article 59), terrorism
(Article 60), treason against the fatherland (Article 62), treason
against the people (Article 52) and premeditated murders among
ordinary crimes (Article 278). However, supplementary provisions
of the Criminal Act revised in 2007 newly added 15 articles for
capital punishment and expanded its application to grave crimes
on property without any degree of repentance, crimes on fleeting,
crimes on rogue attitude of a group of gangsters and even to sex
trade, in excess of certain limit. The Criminal Act revised in 2009
reinforced punishment so that it became possible to impose capital
punishment even for a crime of doing harm to someone secretly,
which is considered a grave crime.
Under
South
Korea’s
Criminal
Act,
capital
punishment
is
executed in prison by hanging (Article 66), even though the
Military Criminal Act recognizes execution by a firing squad
(Article 3 of the Military Criminal Act). In contrast to that of
South Korea, there is no specific provision stipulating execution of
capital punishment in North Korea’s Criminal Act, and pursuant to
32) A fine was deleted from North Korea’s Criminal Act. Nevertheless, as North Korea
created ‘principles to adopt fines’ as an order of the Leader, the penalty is applied in
reality.
213
Judgment Executive Act, it is prescribed, "execution for capital
punishment shall be done by a firing squad or others" (Article
32).
(2) Sentence Determination
North Korea’s Criminal Act takes the principle for application of
punishment under Article 7 as a basic principle and based on the
limit defined in the relevant provision, the punishment is to be
determined taking into account the nature, purpose, motive, method
and levels of execution, complicity and the degree of offenders’
repentance (Article 38).
North Korea’s Criminal Act stipulates five conditions to increase
a sentence and nine conditions to reduce a sentence for a criminal.
The Criminal Act revised in 2004 clearly sets forth that the
sentence cannot be set beyond the maximum limit nor the
minimum limit while the scope of the sentence can exceed or
mitigate half the original term or penalty. The revised Criminal
Act in 2009 amended “the scope to the half” into “the scope about
the half,” making it ambiguously interpreted.
Under North Korea’s Criminal Act, cumulative offense is not a
cause for aggravation of punishment. Extenuation of punishment
in South Korea's crminal Act is allowed within the limit of the
law. However, North Korea’s Criminal Act does not put a limit on
mitigation of punishment to the extent that it allows a sentence
lower than the lowest limit of punishment defined in each
provision under special circumstances (Article 42).
Probation is allowed both under North and South Koreas’
Criminal Act. In North Korea, however, the probation period is
three to five years in case of correctional prison labor for a period
214
up to three years, and five to seven years in case of correctional
prison labor for a period between three and five years (Article
51).
The period and the kind of punishment for probation are
different
in
North
and
South
Koreas.
Under
South
Korea’s
Criminal Act, probation is allowed with respect to three and less
years of imprisonment or imprisonment without prison labor
provided that, the total period of probation can be between one
and five years.
(3) Pardon
Article
5
of
the
fundamental
principles
of
North
Korea’s
Criminal Act stipulates a basic principle, "Even if some people
commit treason against the nation, the nation does not put
criminal responsibility on them, only if they determine to devote
themselves to national unification." The provision gives immunity
to those who contribute to the proletarian revolution.
Under North Korea’s Criminal Act, immunity for the convict is
given by great amnesty or general amnesty. Great amnesty, as a
result of new Constitution in 2009, was revised to be granted by
the Chairman of National Defense Commission, while general
amnesty by the Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly
(Article 53). This is similar to general and special amnesty under
South Korea's Amnesty Act.
Under North Korea’s Criminal Act, release before the expiration
of a prison term is granted to those who are sentenced to
life-time
or
disciplinary
limited
prison
terms
labor,
in
of
correctional
case
they
prison
have
labor
or
participated
in
correctional activities during the term of executing sentence and
215
been recognized as being on the way to improvement, in order to
spare them the remaining term. This is similar to South Korea’s
parole system. The revised Criminal Act of 2008 newly added
articles with regard to reduction of a prison term in case of a
well-behaved prisoner charged with limited term of correctional
prison labor or disciplinary prison labor, which is not stipulated in
the Criminal Act of South Korea. The system of re-deliberating a
case later and reducing the sentenced prison term contradicts
irrevocable final ruling.33)
The General Provision of North Korea’s Criminal Act sets forth
that a criminal will become free of criminal responsibility as a
certain period of time has passed from the time that the crime
was
committed.
There
is
prescribed
period
for
a
criminal
prosecution which is similar to the statute of limitation under
South Korea's Criminal Procedure Act (Article 56), although there
is no specific provision corresponding to prescription for execution
of judgment of guilty under South Korea's Criminal Act (Articles
77~80).
North Korean scholars of criminal law argue that the purpose
of the prosecution system is "to correct and encourage criminals
who lead a normal life after cutting ties with crime and to
improve the responsibility and role of law enforcement agencies
dedicated
to
a
struggle
against
crime."34)
Nevertheless,
the
Criminal Act does not show any mercy to criminals committing
treason
against
the
nation,
treason
against
the
people,
and
33) For this opinion, refer to Sin·Gu Bukhan Hyeongbeop Jumun Bigyo (Comparison of
Provisions of North Korea’s Old and New Criminal Acts) p. 8 attached to “Bukhanui
2009Nyeon Gaejeong Hyeongbeop Gaegwan (Introductory Review on North Korea’s
Revised Criminal Act of 2009), p. 8.
216
deliberate felony murder. (Article 57)
Under North Korea’s Criminal Act, statute of limitation applies
differently as follows: ① five years for a crime subject to a
sentence of disciplinary prison labor up to two years ② eight
years for a crime subject to a sentence of correctional prison
labor up to five years ③ twelve years for a crime subject to a
sentence of correctional prison labor for a period more than five
years and less than ten years ④ fifteen years for a crime subject
to a sentence of correctional prison labor for a period of ten years
or more ⑤ twenty years for a crime subject to a sentence of
life-time correctional prison labor or capital punishment.35)
Unlike South Korea’s Criminal Act, North Korea’s Criminal Act
does not recognize the system of suspension of prosecution.36)
However,
if
a
criminal
commits
a
new
crime
during
the
prosecution period or avoids pretrial examination or actual trial, or
if a written decision for commencement of investigation on such
case has been made, then the suspension of prosecution is applied.
Once the prosecution is suspended, the period that has already
passed is nullified and the prescription period resumes (Article 58).
3) Special Provisions
(1) Composition
Special Provisions of North Korea’s Criminal Act consists of
Chapter 3, Crime against the State and the People (Articles
35) The revised 2009 Criminal Act supplements legal shortcomings of the previous Criminal
Act with the new provisions for statute of limitations.
36) South Korea’s Criminal Procedure Act stipulates that a legal prescription stops running
upon the initiation of prosecution and the legal prescription resumes from the point
when the dismissal of the charges or a jurisdictional violation of trial is confirmed
(Article 249 of the Act).
217
59~72), Chapter 4, Crimes of the Disruption to the National
Defense Systems (Articles 73~88), Chapter 5, Crimes of the
Encroachment
on
the
Socialist
Economy
(Articles
193~218),
Chapter 6, Crimes of the Impairment of the Socialist Culture
(Articles 193~218), Chapter 7, Crimes of the Violation of the
Administrative Systems (Articles 219~257), Chapter 8, Crimes of
the Violation of the Socialist Collective Life (Articles 258~277)
and Chapter 9, Crimes of the Impairment of the Life and Property
of Citizens (Articles 298~303).
North Korea has categorized crimes into political crimes, those
against the state, and general crimes in the Special Provisions of
the
Criminal
Act
since
it
first
enacted
the
Criminal
Act.
Accordingly, the regulations and criminal policy, based on such a
categorization, are different.37) However, under South Korea's
Criminal Act, crimes are categorized based on the legal interest
harmed by a crime such as crimes against state legal interest,
social legal interest and individual legal interest.
(2) Characteristics
a. Ambiguous Elements
With the adoption of the principle of nulla poena sine lege in
the Criminal Act of 2004, North Korea tried to satisfy the
clarification principle of each provision.38) However, the elements
of criminal act in the special provisions are still rather abstract,
comprehensive and ambiguous, and hence violate such principle
(Systematic Review on Criminal Law), pp. 383~384.
38) Han In-seop, "Bukhanui Gaejeong Hyeongbeobui Donghyanggwa Pyeongga (Tendency
of the Revised North Korean Criminal Law and its Evaluation)," Bukhanbeop Yeongu
(2005), p. 120.
218
even in the revised Criminal Act of 2009.
The examples include: "on the purpose against the nation,"
"when extenuation is very severe," when damaging "many combat
equipment and important military facilities," "losing many military
supplies," "in particular, a large amount of property owned by the
state or social cooperatives," "large gains," "in particular large
gains", delaying for "considerable period," "far behind" the people’s
economic plans, doing "a great harm" to the state and social
cooperatives, "particularly great harm," by intentionally keeping
silent and "resulting in serious situation," "particularly important
facility," causing supply disruption for "a considerable period,"
killing
"many
livestock,"
"resulting
in
serious
situation"
by
breaking supply order, "causing serious inconvenience" to the
people’s lives by breaking supply order, wasting "large amount of
electricity," "resulting in serious situation due to irresponsible
acts,"
doing
"shameless
acts,"
presumably
"doing
socially-
dangerous acts," "dramatically lowering" labor productivity, "a
large amount" of individual property and "in particular a large
amount of" individual property.
b. Reinforced Protection of Properties owned by the State and
Cooperatives
Under
North
Korea’s
Criminal
Act,
based
on
a
planned
economic system, sentencing is harsher for protection of property
owned by the state and cooperatives (Articles 89~98) than for
that owned by individual citizen (Articles 296~303).
This is based on the socialist system which is different from
South Korea’s Criminal Act that does not separate individual
property from national property for sentencing purposes.39)
219
c. Comprehensive Application of Special Criminal Provisions
North Korea’s Criminal Act, which can be considered as basic
criminal law, has general regulations on the special areas such as
society, environment, economy and culture. In fact, it is impossible
to
regulate
such
various
and
complicated
areas
in
modern
industrial society by criminal law alone and it is not an ordinary
way to make rules,
which is quite different from the legislation
method traditionally adopted in the democratic states that make
provisions for separate laws concerning above mentioned areas.
The fact that it attempts to address and cover crimes and
punishments relating to all different areas solely in criminal law
shows
the
underdevelopment
of
North
Korea’s
criminal
law
system.
Especially, the supplementary provisions in the revised Criminal
Act of 2007 stipulate aggravation of the punishment for a ‘severe
crime’ case. In this respect, instead of revising the body of the
Criminal Act, North Korea tried to introduce a new way of
enactment, i.e., it newly established 22 provisions (including 9 new
crimes) in the supplement, which eventually resulted in the
dramatic increase of crimes to which the capital punishment could
be applied in the 15 Articles.40)
40) Han In-seop has a critical view on comprehensive regression of North Korea’s Criminal
Act in its supplementary provisions, especially in the expansion of capital punishment
and its broad application to misdemeanors. Han In-seop, “2007Nyeon Hyeongbeop
Buchik Gaejeongui Naeyonggwa Uimi (The Content and Meaning of the Amendments
th
to the Supplementary Provions of 2007 Criminal Act),” a paper presented in 33
Tongilbeop jochan poreom (Breakfast Forum on Unification Law) in the Korean Bar
Association on October 27, 2010, pp. 26~29.
220
d. Organization of Laws for Survival of the Regime and Reinforcement
of Punishment
Keeping the basic framework of dramatically revised Criminal
Act of 2004 with a few changes in some articles almost every
year, North Korea revised more than half of the articles of the
Criminal Act in 2009. This reflects changes of economy and
society of North Korea. Thus, North Korea modified laws and
regulations to cope with newly rising crimes, maintain socialist
system and pass on the power to Kim Jong-il’s son: preserving
the elements and grounds of punishment for anti-state and
anti-national crimes; reinforcing some punishments and adding
new punishments in the process of drastically revising crimes of
disruption to national defense system; reinforcing punishment for
crimes threatening the socialist systems such as defections, group
uproars, a crime on interference of executing official duties and
inventing and spreading false information and rumors. Guided by
Songun (Military-first) politics, North Korea is forecasted to
tighten its Criminal Act to consolidate the hereditary succession of
power from Kim Il-sung to his son Kim Jong-il, and then to his
grandson Kim Jong-un.
(3) Crime against the State and the Nation
The Criminal Act revised in 2004 changed the Chapter, ‘Crime
against the State’ with 12 Articles, into ‘Crime against the State
and the People’ with 14 Articles.
North Korea’s Criminal Act does not have any particular
provisions defining crimes against the state and the people. They
are defined as ‘Acts aimed at overthrowing North Korea and the
socialist system, and opposing revolution and construction.’ The
221
social relations41) harmed by those crimes are ‘state sovereignty
and internal and external security of the socialist system.’42)
Those crimes are divided into those against the state which
conflict with the state sovereignty, those against the people which
oppose the people’s liberation struggle and the crime of concealing
anti-state
crimes43)
or
anti-national
criminals,
not
reporting
anti-state
and neglecting to inform anti-state crimes.
(4) Crimes of the Disruption to the National Defense Systems
The 2004 revised Criminal Act added Chapter 4, ‘Crimes of the
Disruption to National Defense System.’ The Chapter consists of
16
provisions
including
Disobedience
of
Decision,
Order
and
Instruction (Article 73), Intentional Sabotage of Combat Equipment
or Military Facilities (Article 75), Illegal Carrying and Transfer of
Weapons or Ammunition (Article 78), Offense of Avoiding Military
Conscript (Article 83) and Offense of National Secret Divulgence
(Article 88). It increased punishment for military crimes committed
by civilians, diversified types of crime and expanded aggravated
punishment. The enactment was the reflection of the theories of
“Gangseong daeguk (Strong and prosperous nation)” and "Songun
jeongchi (Military-first politics)” which North Korean authorities
have emphasized to its residents, to overcome recent economic
slump and strengthen the socialist system.44) The Criminal Act of
41) It means the legal benefit of protection under South Korea’s Criminal Law.
(Systematic Review on North Korean Law), p. 391.
43) The Criminal Act of 2009 added the punishment of neglecting report anti-state crimes
in addition to anti-national crimes and expanded its application not only to those who
know criminals but also those who know the crime.
44) The Ministry of Justice of South Korea, Gaejeong Bukhan Hyeongsabeopje Haeseol
(Explanation on the revised North Korean Criminal Law System) (Seoul: The Ministry
of Justice of South Korea, 2005), p. 15.
222
2009
reinforced
them
and
made
some
noticeable
revisions:
clarifying decisions, orders and instructions which serve the
grounds for a crime of negligence in execution of decisions, orders
and instruction; expanding the grounds to orders and instructions
of Central Military Commission of the Workers’ Party; adding
plundering of weapons and ammunitions to a crime of intentional
damage to combat drills, military facility and intentional damage;
aggravating punishments for crime of losing secret documents for
national defense or leaking important secret of national defense or
several times, even though no severe damage has incurred.
(5) Crimes of the Encroachment on the Socialist Economy
North Korea’s economic order is based on the socialist planned
economy and starts from the entire denial of a capitalist economic
system. Accordingly, it fundamentally requires socialization of
every production tool which can be a main cause of economic
exploitation. The production tool is owned by the state and
cooperatives in accordance with the socialist production relation,
while individual ownership is recognized only to the extent that it
is for individual consumption.
North Korea’s Criminal Act takes crimes of damaging to
ownership of the state and cooperatives more seriously than South
Korea, since North Korean law is based on a completely different
economic order from that of South Korea. Therefore, unlike in
South Korea, there is a specific provision to punish crimes of
infringing the socialist ownership as well as a provision to punish
the crimes against the socialist economic system,45) in order to
45) The revised Criminal Act of 2009 eliminated a crime of transferring North Korean
currency to other countries and a crime of selling accepted and purchased goods, and
223
prop up the socialist economic management based on the planned
economy. Furthermore, there is a specific punishment provision for
crimes of infringement on land management and environmental
protection and crimes against socialist labor administrative order.46)
(6) Crimes of the Encroachment on the Socialist Culture
Upon revision of the Criminal Act in 2004, the previous 6
provisions have been more specifically classified into 26 provisions,
including new crimes. Accordingly, there are new provisions for
computer-related crimes like computer network intrusion crime
(Article 201), information destruction (Article 202), false data
dissemination crime (Article 203) which all require a correctional
prison labor, along with crime of illegal mining of historic relic
(Article 197) and crime of smuggling (Article 198) that have been
newly developed. Crime of refusing medical treatment (Article
210), the acquisition, transaction, usage of a human organ, unborn
child and blood (Article 214), the manufacturing and sales crime
of false medicines and foods (Article 215) are defined in order to
deal with various cases of medical malpractice. Those new
provisions and specific classifications in the Criminal Act are to
ultimately strengthen regulations against anti-social behavior.
Furthermore, the revised Criminal Act of 2009 newly added the
act of keeping decadent materials as a ground for punishing the
crime of introducing, keeping and distributing decadent culture,
and punish severely sexual video recording, medical malpractice
resulting in death and using drugs.
newly added crimes against keeping drugs and explosives, violating supply order and
violating real estate management.
46) The revised Criminal Act of 2009 eliminated a crime of voluntary dismissal and newly
added a crime of violating anti-fire regulations.
224
It seems that such enactment is designed to cope with lenient
social culture as North Korea has opened the door to the world
and
to
protect the
socialist
culture with
strict control
and
crackdown on residents’ life. It is expected that this tendency will
be continued in the future.
(7) Crimes of the Violation of the Administrative Systems
Upon the revision of the Criminal Act in 2004, Chapter 7 of the
Criminal Act, ‘Crimes of Disruption to the General Administrative
System,’ which had previously 28 provisions was further classified
into
39
provisions.
It
was
a
significant
move
taking
into
consideration that the provision for military crimes which were
previously included in the Chapter for crimes of disruption to the
general administrative systems moved to a separate Chapter 4
titled the crime against a defense management order. Particularly,
the main features of the revised Criminal Act in 2004 are adopting
the newly defined crimes relating to the task enforcement of
judicial
officers
and
specifying
and
expanding47)
punishment
grounds for crimes against a legal system including a crime of
illegal arrest, confinement and search (Article 252), a crime of
exaggeration and fabrication of a case (Article 253), a crime of
illegal release (Article 254), a crime of unjust ruling (Article 255),
a crime of avoiding executing judgment and decision (Article 256).
(8) Crimes of the Violation of the Socialist Collective Life
Upon the revision of the Criminal Act in 2004, the previous
provisions for ‘Crimes of the Violation of the Socialist Collective
47) The Ministry of Justice of South Korea, Gaejeong Bukhan Hyeongsabeopje Haeseol
(Explanation on the revised North Korean Criminal Law System), p. 21.
225
life’ have been further classified from 10 to 39 provisions. Crimes
relating to obscenity and customs including prostitution crime
(Article 261), unchaste and lascivious behavior crime (Article 262),
illegal marriage crime (Article 270), behavior of instigation crime
of superstitious belief (Articles 267~268) are newly defined as
social crimes or reinforced in order to develop punishment on
grounds of anti-social behavior. Emerging social crimes including
crime of false testimony as an inspector/supervisor (Article 264),
crime of group fight (Article 259), crime of false impersonation
(Article
265),
surrendering
abuse
profits
of
and
power
(Article
honorarium
269)
by
and
public
failure
of
officers
to
government organizations (Article 274) are newly defined as
crimes.
(9) Crimes of the Impairment of the Life and Property of Citizens
Upon the revision of the Criminal Act in 2004, Paragraph 1
(Crime against life, health and the character of citizens) of
Chapter 9 ‘Crimes of the Impairment of the Life and Property of
Citizens’ was expanded from the previous 14 provisions to 18
provisions, while its basic contents remains unchanged. Deliberate
felony murder and misdemeanor murder are classified into a
deliberate
felony
murder
(Article
278)
and
a
deliberate
misdemeanor murder (Article 279), respectively.
As
for
severe
injury,
severe
injury
from
overreaction
in
justifiable defense (Article 285) is separately defined just like for
crime of murder. Although South Korea does not have any
equivalent criminal act to them, in case of crime of murder or
injury, the punishment level can be reduced or an immunity
provision is applied pursuant to Clauses 2 and 3, Article 21. In
226
addition,
kidnapping
crime
(Article
290)
has
been
newly
established, while a teen sex crime (Article 295) has been
separately defined from the crime of rape.
Paragraph 2 (Crimes against personal property) maintains its
previous basic contents before the revision in 2004, but snatching
personal property specifically distinguishes the crime of plundering
personal property from the crime of extorting personal property
(Article 297, Article 298). In case of crimes against personal
property, the aggravated punishment is stipulated by classifying
the relevant facts of the crime such as the crime of theft one’s
enormous
fortune
(Article
296),
plundering
personal
property
(Article 297), extorting personal property (Article 298), deceiving
to take personal property (Article 299), embezzlement (Article 300)
and very severe robbery (Article 302).48)
6. Major Contents and Issues of North Korea's Criminal Procedure
Act
1) Investigation
An investigation before indictment is classified into investigation
and pretrial examination. The investigation is the procedure of
arresting and handing over a criminal to the pretrial examination
(Article 134 of North Korean Criminal Procedure Act, hereinafter
referred to as Article 134). The pretrial examination is the
procedure before indictment which confirms a suspect through
evidence investigates criminal fact and reveals the truth of the
case officers of Public Security Agency (Anjeonbu, the police,
48) The revised Criminal Act of 2009 newly established additional punishment on a
repeated rape even though its victims are not many and very severe extenuation of
plundering personal property.
227
hereinafter referred to as "PSA") investigate regular criminal cases
officers of National Security Agency (Bowibu, the secret police)
investigate anti-state criminal cases or anti-national crimiral cases
and prosecutors investigate regular criminal cases raised during
the oversight process on administration economic business and
status of compliance of law by legal institutions. The investigators
of Railroad Intelligence Agency, Railroad Prosecution Agency and
the Jurisdiction of Military Prosecution Agency are recognized as
special investigation agencies having jurisdiction over certain cases
(Article 123).
The investigator securing criminal evidence shall decide the
commencement
of
the
investigation
which
will
reveal
legal
evidence and immediately begin the investigation. The investigator
shall send the exemplified copy on an investigation at the
beginning of the investigation to the prosecutor within 24 hours
from the moment of the decision to start investigation has been
made. Investigations on criminal cases start with reports from
organizations, businesses, groups, and public officers or crime data
collected by relevant legal institutions (Article 30).
The investigator can request data or statements necessary for
criminal identification from organizations, businesses, groups and
public officers (Article 137), can ask expert opinion for those data
and conduct a verification, search, seizure, psychological test,
identification and cross examination in order to crack down on
criminals (Article 138).
The investigator who identified the criminals cannot collect
evidence
except
in
cases
where
he
cannot
delay
gathering
evidence due to the loss of criminal track record or evidence
(Article 141).
228
In principle, the investigator is not allowed to perform arrest,
search, and seizure against the suspect without approval, except
the following cases where do not require approval from the
prosecutor (Article 143):
First, a suspect is immediately caught upon or in the course of
completion or commencement of a criminal act (Item 1);
Second, a witness or the victim seizes or points to the suspect
(Item 2);
Third, evidence of criminal activity is visible on or near the
suspect's body (Item 3);
Fourth, the suspect or criminal tries to commit suicide, or run
from the scene, or being chased (Item 4);
Fifth, the whereabouts of the suspect or criminal is unclear
(Item 5).
When the investigator detains the arrested suspect or criminal,
a written decision on detention shall be written within 48 hours
from the arrest to get a prosecutor's approval. When failing to
prove the suspect’s actual crime within 10 days after the arrest or
to get a prosecutor's approval, the suspect shall be released
immediately (Clauses 1 and 2, Article 144).
As
soon
as
catching
a
criminal,
an
investigator
shall
immediately submit the criminal case to a pretrial examination. In
that case, the decision on pretrial examination shall be made
(Article 146). When the investigator arrests and holds a suspect
or a criminal in custody, they shall be handed over to the pretrial
examination within 10 days after the arrest (Article 144).
229
2) Pretrial Examination
(1) The Start of the Pretrial Examination and Charge with Criminal
Responsibility
A pretrial examination is conducted by pretrial officers of the
PSA, public prosecutor, the Bowibu (National Security Agency, the
secret police) and People’s Armed Forces (Article 11). The pretrial
examiner shall decide whether the pretrial examination starts
within 48 hours from the moment of the criminal case being
handed over. Then, the examiner begins the pretrial examination
(Article 157). Since the decision to charge with criminality must
be made, once evidence has fully confirmed the suspect, it is
different from an investigation during which it is not allowed to
collect evidence. The decision on charging a suspect with criminal
responsibility in North Korea is equal to criminal recognition
under South Korea's Criminal Act.
The pretrial examiner shall complete the pretrial examination
within two months from its commencement, provided that the
examination period for complicated criminal cases can be expanded
up to four months pursuant to Clauses 1 and 2 of Article 188 of
the Criminal Procedure Act.
(2) Pretrial Examination Method
The purpose of the pretrial examination is to confirm a suspect
and reveal the overall progress of the criminal case completely
and accurately. The investigation method includes interrogation,
summons, detention, arrest, confinement, verification and appraisal,
search, confiscation, examination of witness and responsibility for
properties in foreclosure.
230
The pretrial examiner shall examine a suspect within 48 hours
from the moment of informing the suspect of the decision to
confirm the case to hold criminal responsibility (Article 162).
When examining the suspect, the examiner shall not force the
suspect to admit crimes or not ask a leading question to the
suspect (Article 167) and the examiner shall confirm the suspect's
identity first and then inform the suspect of his/her rights (Article
169). Informing the suspect of the right to remain silent is not
mandatory under North Korea’s Criminal Procedure Act whereas
South
Korea’s
Criminal
Procedure
Act
sets
forth
that
an
investigation agency shall notify the suspect of such right.
In principle, arrest and confinement follows decision on criminal
responsibility, but if necessary, the pretrial examiner can proceed
with arrest and detain the suspect upon obtaining approval from
the prosecutor, before the decision on criminal responsibility is
made. If the decision on criminal responsibility is not made within
10 days, the decision on arrest and detention shall be canceled
(Article 178).
Confinement decisions are divided into detention confinement
which
confines
the
suspect
in
a
detention
facility
(Articles
185~188), house confinement which confines the suspect within
his/her own house (Article 189) and area confinement, which
confines the suspect within a specific area (Article 190).
Investigator and pretrial examiner cannot arrest a suspect
without an arrest warrant issued by a public prosecutor. A
separate statement on confinement decision is needed for the
detention followed by arrest. The pretrial examiner can detain or
arrest
the
suspect
by
making
a
written
statement
on
a
confinement decision to obtain prosecutor's approval. The fact that
231
the pretrial examiner must obtain the prosecutor's approval for the
arrest and detention of the suspect is a significant difference from
the South Korean legal practice where an arrest warrant issued
by a judge is required for arrest and detention of a suspect.
With
the
arrest
and
detention
of
a
suspect,
the
pretrial
examiner shall notify the suspect's family or organizations the
suspect belongs to of the basis for the arrest and confinement, as
well as of the detention whereabouts within 48 hours.
North Korean Criminal Procedure Act sets forth four types of
verifications, including an investigation into the scene of a crime,
evidence, a dead person, and survivors. Verification investigation
in North Korea is considered a temporary investigation, which is
quite different from those in South Korea where a verification
investigation is considered a forced investigation requiring the
investigation warrant issued by a judge.
The pretrial examiner can examine a witness (equivalent to a
reference under South Korea’s Criminal Procedure Act) (Article
225) and shall write a witness interrogation protocol for the
witness examination.
Responsibility for property in foreclosure is the seizure of a
suspect's property in order to compensate financial loss to the
state, public cooperative organization and the citizens or in order
to enforce property confiscation penalty. It requires for the pretrial
examiner to draft a write decision on a property foreclosure
(Article 248).
(3) The Conclusion of Pretrial Examination
After finishing the pretrial examination, the pretrial examiner
232
shall write a protocol on the conclusion of the pretrial examination
and hand over the case records as well as the relevant evidence
to the prosecutor. The system of transmittance of case records is
similar to the system of forwarding a case by judicial police
officers to prosecutor under South Korea’s Criminal Procedure Act.
3) Indictment
If the prosecutor confirms that a pretrial examination is enough
after reviewing the case records within 10 days, he/she shall
write an indictment to bring the suspect to court (Articles 262
and 265), turning the suspect into the defendant (Article 281),
equivalent
to
the
defendant
under
South
Korea’s
Criminal
Procedure Act.
An indictment confirms the suspect's name, the facts and
evidence investigated and proved in the pretrial examination,
criminal responsibility, critically relevant facts in determining a
penalty level and legal provisions applicable to the admitted
criminal activity (Article 266). The followings shall be attached to
the written indictment: name and address of the suspect, witness
and expert witness to be participated in the judicial examination,
detention date and place of the suspect, evidence, claims for
damages, progress on property foreclosure (Article 267).
The prosecutor shall send a written indictment, evidence and
case records to the court in order to prosecute the suspect (the
latter part of Article 265), therefore North Korean Criminal
Procedure Act does not adopt gong-so-jang-il-bon-ju-ui (*a
principle
which
permits
assertion
and
proof
concerned to be presented only in a court).49)
of
the
parties
If
the
pretrial
examination
results
are
not
233
sufficient
or
appropriate, the prosecutor shall send the case back to the pretrial
examiner with a writing pointing out such issue (Article 268).
4) First Instance Trial
(1) Objective of Trial and Structure of Court
As a final ruling on criminal cases, a trial in North Korea is an
activity requiring high level politics and responsibility as it reflects
whether Communist Party's legal policy for criminal cases is
accurately enforced or not.50) Its mission and responsibility is to
examine criminal cases, to define crimes and criminals based on
objective evidence and to give a final decision through a legal
analysis and assessment on the confirmed crimes and criminals
(Article 270).
The Criminal Procedure Act revised in 2004 added a new
provision as to the independence of the court: "The court is
independent in trials and engages in its independence based on the
law." The independence means only the independence of a court
organization, not of an individual judge. Hence it clearly violates
judicial independence, the basic principle of criminal justice in a
modern state.51)
First instance court includes the people’s court, provincial
district court, and special courts like a military tribunal and a
railroad court. In South Korea, general session court and military
49) Article 118, Clause 2 of the oregulation South Korea’s Criminal Procedure Act stipulates
gong-so-jang -il-bon-ju-ui.
50) Ri Jae-do, Heongsa sosongbeophak (2pan) (Criminal Procedure Law (2nd edition), p. 173.
51) The Ministry of Court Administration, Bukhan Sabeopjedo Gaegwan (General survey of
North Korean judicial system) (Seoul: The Ministry of Court Administration, 1996), p. 178.
234
court consist of first instance court.
A provincial (district) court tries crimes against the state and
the people and cases which may be subject to capital punishment
or unlimited term of correctional prison labor as the first instance.
The Supreme Court tries appellate cases from other courts as the
second instance and may also handle if neccessary the cases
belonging to other jurisdictions as the first instance. The People’s
Court tries regular criminal cases which do not belong to the
jurisdiction of a provincial or a district court, special court or
Supreme Court (Article 126).
The court consisting of a chief judge and two people's juries
proceed with a trial, but for special cases, three judges consist of
the court to try the first instance.
(2) Preparation for a Trial
The court which received a case record shall prepare for trial,
where the presiding judge shall take the lead in preparing for the
trial (Article 289) and the judge shall review Clauses 1 through 7
of Article 290 of the Criminal Procedure Act for the trial. If the
case is admitted for trial, the judge shall decide to send the
suspect to the court hearing.
The court shall send a duplicate indictment three days before
the court hearing starts and notify the date of the trial proceeding
to the prosecutor, the accused, the lawyer and those who claimed
damages (Clause 1, Article 298 and Clause 1, Article 299).52)
52) As an opinion that it is similar to South Korea’s service of copy of indictment, refer to
Baek Hyeong-gu, Bukhan Ingwon Gwallyeon Beomnyeong Haeseol (Explanation on
North Korean Human Rights related Laws and Ordinances), p. 139.
235
(3) Court Hearing
In principle, a prosecutor and a lawyer should attend court
hearing (Clause 1, Article 276) The prosecutor should address the
crime of the accused and scientifically prove it in the hearing and
oversee whether the hearing is conducted as required in the law
(Article 278). The lawyer should make sure that the truths of the
case are clearly addressed in public, the act of the accused is
correctly analyzed and assessed and his/her legal rights are
guaranteed (Article 297). The judge presides over the hearing and
maintains overall control (Article 279).
When an illegal act is found during the hearing, the prosecutor
can raise an objection with the issue in the court and the court
will deliberate on the opinion and resolve the issue (Article 288).
This is a provision that South Korea does not have in its
Criminal
Procedure
Act
and
this
provision
undermines
the
independence of a trial.
The accused should have the right to attend the court hearing
(Clause 1, Article 281). When the accused refuses to do so, he/she
will be detained or taken into custody for trial (Clause 2, Article
281). An arrest of the defendant is not allowed in the court.
However, if the accused tries to resist or escape, he/she can be
arrested (Article 283). The accused should answer the questions in
the
hearing53)
and
he/she
cannot
leave
the
court
without
permission of the judge (Article 284).
The first instance proceeds with the start of the court hearing,
fact-finding hearing, address and argument, closing comments of
the accused and ruling a sentence (Article 301). This is similar to
those under South Korea’s Criminal Procedure Act.
53) It is not accepted for the accused to refuse to answer the questions. Ibid., p. 140.
236
The trial shall take place in the court, but People’s Trial
System is adopted as a supplementary system of organizing the
court hearing in the region where a crime happens in order to
raise awareness of the public and prevent a crime.
The detention period is limited up to 25 days for a trial.
However, the period for a disciplinary prison labor case is only 15
days. The court of first instance shall finish the court hearing
within 25 days from date on which the case was received (Clause
1, Article 287).54)
(4) Sentence and Judgment
The court should deliver a sentence only when the truth of the
case is uncovered clearly based on scientific evidence thoroughly
verified during the court hearing (Article 340). Only the judge
who
presided
over
the
hearing
and
people's
juries
should
participate in deliberation of the sentence (Article 341).
The sentence is delivered in the name of DPRK. This is
different from South Korean practice of delivering a sentence in
the name of members of the court under the Criminal Procedure
Act.
In a judgement, there are guilty and not-guilty. The punishment
sentence and social training sentence are guilty sentences (Article
343). If the acts of the defendant do not constitute a crime or
there was no crime or if the defendant did not commit a crime,
the not-guilty sentence shall be delivered (Article 346).
54) The revised North Korean Criminal Procedure Act takes about five and a half months
in total to take a case to a trial court: 10 days for investigation (Article 44); 4 months
for pretrial (Articles 187 and 188); 10 days for indictment (Article 263); 25 day in a
trial court (Article 282). A criminal procedure takes about 6 months from investigation
to arrest in South Korea (Article 92 of South Korean Criminal Procedure Act).
237
If there are grounds for each Clause of Article 53 of North
Korean Criminal Procedure Act, the court shall dismiss the
criminal case (Clause 4, Article 55). This is equivalent to a trial
of dismissal of prosecution or acquittal under South Korean
Criminal Procedure Act (Articles 326, 327 and 328).
When the court pronounces a sentence, it shall write a ruling
document (Article 353) and send a copy of the document to the
accused and his/her lawyer (Article 354). South Korea’s Criminal
Procedure Act requires serving a copy of a ruling document
within 14 days after the sentence. However, with respect to the
accused without confinement and the confined accused to whom
an arrest warrant has become no longer effective as a result of a
judgment
of acquittal,
document
only
at
the
the
court
request
needs
therefor
to
serve
(Article
the
148
ruling
of
the
Regulations on Criminal Procedure). Thus, sending a copy of a
ruling document is not obligation in South Korea.
5) Second Instance Trial
The accused, lawyer and those who claimed damages can
appeal to a higher court about a sentence of the court of first
instance and the prosecutor can raise an objection (Article 357).
The appeal of the defendant, lawyer and those who claimed
damages is called "sang-so (an appeal)" and the appeal of the
prosecutor
is
called
"hang-ui
(an
objection)."
South
Korea’s
Criminal Procedure Act terms it an appeal from judgment by trial
court (refer to "hang-so") regardless of whether it is made from
the prosecutor or the accused when it is about the sentence of the
first instance, while an appeal from the decision of the first
instance is called "hang-go" regardless of whether it is made
238
from the prosecutor or the accused.
However, an appeal and objection about the sentence and
decision made in trial of the first instance of the Supreme Court
is not allowed (Item 1, Article 359). In such cases, the trial is
conducted only once.
To appeal or raise an objection to a higher court, a written
appeal or a written objection should be submitted to the court of
first instance within 10 days from the date of receiving the
documents of the sentence and decision (Articles 361 and 362).
Under South Korea’s Criminal Procedure Act, the relevant period
is 7 days from the date of sentencing.
The Supreme Court and provincial (district) court serve as the
court of second instance (Article 129 and Clause 2, Article 127).
The court of second instance shall consist of three judges,
provided that one of them is to be the chief justice (Article 365).
The court of second instance shall proceed with the trial within
25 days of receiving the documents of an appeal case (Article
366). The prosecutor should participate in the court of second
instance and if a lawyer appeals, he or she should be in
attendance (Clause 1, Article 367). However, the hearing can
proceed even if the prosecutor or lawyer cannot attend the hearing
for special reasons (Clause 2, Article 367). The court of second
instance should inform the prosecutor and lawyer of the trial date
three days in advance (Article 369).
The sentence of the appellate trial court is categorized as
"supportive sentence" (equivalent to
judgment of dismissing an
appeal under South Korean Criminal Procedure Act), "return
sentence" (equivalent to judgment of quashing and return of case
under South Korean Criminal Act), "transfer sentence" (equivalent
239
to judgment of quashing and transfer of case under South Korean
Criminal
Procedure
Act),
sentence" (equivalent to
and
"dismissal"
and
"a
change
in
mistrial under South Korean Criminal
Act).
The court of first instance, which proceeds with the re-trial of
a crime case whose sentence was cancelled based on an appeal,
cannot render a punishment more severe than the punishment
sentenced by the court that adjudicated the trial in first instance.
However, when the prosecutor raises an objection citing light
punishment and the objection is recognized to be reasonable so
that heavier punishment seems reasonable as well, the court of
first instance which adjudicated the case again may determine the
punishment accordingly (Article 381). This is quite different from
the principle of no change of disadvantage as specified in Article
368 and Clause 2, Article 396 of South Korean Criminal Procedure
Act in terms of applicable scope and substance.
The appeal and objection of the sentence in the court of second
instance shall not be permitted (Item 2, Article 359). While North
Korea adopts the two-tier trial system on the appeal, South Korea
adopts a three-tier trial system.
6) Execution of Sentence and Judgment
A sentence and judgment should be executed after confirmation
(Article 419). The sentence and judgment of the court of first
instance will be finally confirmed when an appeal or objection
period ends, when the second court hands down a sentence in
support of that the judgment or sentence of the court of first
instance or when the sentence cannot be appealed or objected
(Article 363), whereas the sentence and judgment of the court of
240
second instance will be finally confirmed when the sentence and
judgment are rendered by such court.
Capital punishment can be executed only after an approval from
the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly (Article 419).
Execution
of
the
punishment
is
conducted
by
punishment
enforcement agencies (Articles 422, 423, and 424).
When the accused temporarily develops a mental disease or a
serious disorder after being sentenced to life-time or limited terms
of correctional prison labor (Article 30 of North Korea’s Criminal
Procedure Act) or disciplinary prison labor (Article 31), execution
of the punishment can be suspended until the accused recovers
(Clause 1, Article 431). In case of a pregnant woman, execution
should be suspended for the period from the point that she is
three months pregnant to seven months after she delivers a baby
(Clause 2 of the same Article).55)
7) Evidence
Except
the
provision
for
restricting
evidential
value
of
confession (Article 98), there is no provision for limiting validity
of evidence prepared or gathered by the pretrial examiners and no
system in which the suspect can express his/her denial or
agreement in admitting the evidence under North Korean Criminal
Procedure Act. It is different from the provision for limiting
admissibility of evidence of investigation documents under South
Korean Criminal Procedure Act.
Resolving criminal cases in North Korea is based on scientific
evidence (Clause 1, Article 88) and the court hands down a
55) It corresponds to suspension of execution of imprisonment under South Korean
Criminal Procedure Law (Articles 470 and 471).
241
sentence in accordance with legal requirements when a criminal
case is clearly solved based on scientific evidence sufficiently
reviewed and verified in the court hearings (Article 340). Hence, it
may seem that North Korea has adopted the principle of trial by
evidence. However, there is a difference from of the principle of
trial by evidence adopted by or under South Korea's Criminal
Procedure Act, since in North Korea documents prepared in the
pretrial examination can be admitted as guilty evidence without
any legal limitations (Article 307).
Witness
testimony,
assessment
results,
verification
results,
evidential objects, evidential documents and testimony of the
accused can constitute evidence (Article 89).
The investigator, pretrial examiner and the court can collect and
make good use of evidence needed for resolving and processing
criminal cases specified in law (Article 93) and the evidence
gathered shall be fixed in the form of a written statement and
protocol, provided that evidence can be made in the form of a
picture, drawing, record or video clip, if necessary (Article 95).
The court is required to thoroughly investigate and review
evidence and evidential materials in the fact-finding hearing
(Clause 1, Article 319). A statement of the suspect and the
accused made through coercion or inducement cannot be admitted
as evidence and if such statement is the only evidence, the crime
is regarded as not proven (Clauses 1 and 2 of Article 98). Similar
to Articles 309 and 310 of South Korea's Criminal Procedure Act,
North Korea adopts the principle that confession has voluntariness
and is admissible only with corroborating evidence.
242
8) Defense
(1) Duty and Qualification
Since the right of interrogate or the accused to get an
assistance from a lawyer is guaranteed in a criminal case (Article
106), lawyers should ensure that the rights of interrogatee or the
accused be guaranteed, that the truths of the criminal case be
uncovered in hearings at trial, acts of the accused be properly
assessed,
and
their
legal
rights
be
appropriately
guaranteed
(Article 279).
However, a lawyer "as a propagandist of the Party policy in
North Korea shall make efforts to assist the people to understand
the legitimacy of the judicial system of the Party in the trial
hearing. Since he/she is in a position to defend and stand up for
party policy, lawyers must make sure that the accused will
recognize the severity of their crimes in the face of the nation
and the people and sincerely regret what they have committed." In
this
sense,
lawyers
in
North
Korea
are
not
advocates
of
defendants as they are in South Korea’s Criminal Procedure Act
and as a result, they are not defending or representing their
clients.56) Therefore, in truth and in fact, it is difficult for rights
of defense to be guaranteed.57)
Lawyers belonging to bar associations at every level are
qualified (Clause 1, Article 112). In the case the suspect or the
accused desires to designate a lawyer who does not belong to
56) Ri Jae-do, Heongsa Sosongbeophak (2pan) (Criminal Procedure Law (2nd edition), p. 207.
57) It is noteworthy that the revised law contains the right of an interrogatee and the
accused to waive to get an assistance from a lawyer (Article 109). Lee baek-gyu,
"Bukhanui Gaejeong Hyeongsasosongbeop Donghyanggwa Pyeongga (Tendency and
Evaluation of North Korea’s Revised Criminal Procedure Act," Bukhanbeop Yeongu
(Research on North Korean Law) (Seoul: Bukhanbeop Yeonguhoe, 2005), p. 163.
such
bar
associations,
it
is
required
to
obtain
243
approval
of
prosecutors or the court (Article 112). South Korea's Criminal
Procedure Act does not require such limitation or approval. North
Korea does not have a special attorney system stipulated in a
proviso Clause of Article 31 of South Korea's Criminal Procedure
Act.
(2) Attorney Selection
The suspect, accused and their family members or relatives and
heads of affiliated organizations can select a lawyer (Article 108)
and the selection of a private lawyer should be made from the
point
that
the
decision
is
delivered
to
charge
of
criminal
responsibility in accordance with the law before the fact-finding
hearing proceeds (Article 110). There are no such restrictions
under South Korean Criminal Procedure Act.
If there is no private lawyer for the accused, the court should
designate a public lawyer (Article 111). South Korean Criminal
Procedure Act calls such lawyer a public defense lawyer.
(3) Lawyer’s Right
A selected lawyer can talk with the suspect or the accused in
the
Pretrial
Examination
Agency
(hereinafter
referred
to
as
"PEA") or the court must ensure at the request of the suspect,
the accused or lawyer that the lawyer meet with the suspect or
the accused (Article 117). It corresponds to the right of interview
provided in Article 34 of South Korea’s Criminal Procedure Act.
The lawyer can read the case records anytime after closing of
pretrial examination (Article 118), but he/she has no such right
prior to closing of pretrial examination. This corresponds to the
244
right of admission provided in the Article 35 of South Korea’s
Criminal Procedure Act.
The lawyer can collect and confirm evidence necessary to
defend the suspect or the accused (Article 119).
9) Dismissal of Criminal Case
A criminal case must be dismissed in the event that any of the
following conditions take place after the decision to charge with
criminal responsibility is made (Article 53). Such causes for
dismissal are as follows:
First, the convict is less than 14 years old. (Item 1)
Second, the act committed does not constitute a crime. (Item 2)
Third, the statue of limitation has already expired. (Item 3)
Fourth, the convict is granted amnesty. (Item 4)
Fifth, there is previous final and conclusive judgment or
decision (Item 5)
Sixth, there is no sufficient evidence to bring the case before
the court within the pretrial examination period stipulated in the
Act (Item 6).
Seventh, the criminal, the suspect or the accused is dead. (Item
7)
Eighth, a convict commits a crime when he/she suffers from a
mental disease or a convict suffers from an unrecoverable mental
disease after the crime (Item 8).
An investigator must decide the cancellation of a criminal
investigation, the PEA must decide the dismissal of the case after
obtaining approval from the prosecution, the prosecutor must
245
decide to dismiss the case, and the court must make a ruling on
dismissal of the criminal case (Item 1 or 4, Article 55).
If a criminal case is dismissed, such fact must be informed to
the accuser, the victim, the suspect or the accused (Article 56)
and the detained convict,
the suspect or the accused must be
released immediately (Article 58).
10) Damage Indemnity
The institution, company, organization and individual affected by
a crime may claim damages against a convict to the PEA
responsible for the criminal case or the court, and the prosecutor
may directly claim indemnity of damage to the court for the
benefit of the institution, company, organization and individual
(Article 70). The PEA and the court must inform the affected
institution, company, organization and individual of their right to
file a claim against the suspect or accused (Article 71). The
indemnity claim can be made against the property damaged by the
crime (Article 73). This is similar to South Korea’s damage
compensation order.
The criminal victim who does not file a claim for damages to
the PEA or the court can demand a claim through a civil lawsuit
procedure (Clause 2, Article 75).
11) Documents and Period of Criminal Procedure
An investigator, the PEA, a prosecutor and a court should write
official case documents to support the procedure and the result of
the criminal case, and the act of criminal proceeding has become
legally effective only when it is written down in documents
(Article 80). The criminal procedural documents include a decision,
246
a
statement,
a
protocol,
an
indictment,
a
document
of
the
judgment and decision written during the investigation, pretrial
examination, indictment, trial preparation and court hearing (Article
81).
The criminal procedural documents are not accessible except by
those who are permitted by law (Article 83). When the given
institution,
company,
organization
or
individual
receives
the
documents, the documents are deemed to be delivered. If the given
party is absent, the adult of the family, or the representative of
the
institution,
company
or
organization
can
receive
the
documents. (Article 83)
The period of criminal cases is counted by time, day, month
and year. Counting will start from the next day or the next time
that the relevant incident or reason for calculation happened
(Clause 1, Article 84). The given period by a day will end at
twenty four o’clock of the last day (Clause 2), the given period by
a month will end when the day of the last month falling on the
same date on which the relevant reason for calculation passes or
the last day of the month passes (Clauses 2 and 3). If the last
day of the period is a national holiday, the period will end when
the next first working-day passes. (Clause 5) The North Korean
Criminal Procedure Act is based on the principle which does not
count the first day and holiday, but does not have a provision for
exceptions in respect of prescription or confinement period as
permitted in South Korea’s Criminal Procedure Act.
If a criminal case document such as a petition of appeal, a
written objection, a written decision is sent before expiration of the
period prescribed in law, the relevant document is recognized as
being delivered within the prescribed period (Clause 1, Article 85).58)
247
7. Major Contents and Problems of Military Criminal Act
The Military Criminal Act of North Korea composed of 35
articles is divided into 7 categories.
a. The crime of disrupting military service regulations and orders:
a
crime
of
absence
without
leave
(AOWL)
or
damaging
soldierly appearance, a crime of desertion, a crime of fleeing, a
crime of intentional damage to one’s body or pretend illness, a
crime of avoiding a battle, a crime of violating official trip due
and a crime of false impersonation or misfeasance.
b. The crime of disrupting order and command structures: crime
of failure to implement an order, crime of failure to organize
battle
system
or
command,
a
crime
of
disobeying
one’s
supervisor, a crime of false report in military mission status
and a crime of voluntary or perfunctory changes in combat drill
and strategy.
c. The crime of disrupting combat equipment and military facility:
a crime of stealing or plundering arms or combat strategy
manual and a crime of illegal disposal of arms, ammunition and
combat strategy manual.
d. The crime of damaging armed equipment and military facility: a
crime of violation of organizing combat strategy report and a
chain of command, a crime of violating storage and treatment
regulation of arms, a crime of neglecting report on arms in
danger and combat strategy, a crime of negligence on reporting
and repairing arms and combat strategy and a crime on poor
58) For delivering a criminal case document, as the ground of legal force, it adopts the
time of when the document was sent, and not received. For this opinion, refer to Baek
Hyeong-gu, Bukhan ingwongwanryeon beopryeonghaeseol (Explanation on North
Korean Human Rights related Laws and Ordinances), p. 173.
248
construction of military facility.
e. The crime against protection and management of national or
military secret: a crime of leaking national or military secret
and a crime of violating management of secret documents, and
a crime of failure to manage secret documents.
f. The official crime of military officer: misfeasance and act of
exceeding one’s authority, a crime of neglect of duty, a crime of
disrupting working order, a crime of violating combat duty
regulations, a crime of violating daily duty regulations, a crime
of violating execution of military responsibility, a crime of
violating regulations on prevention of accidents, a crime of
violating regulations of keeping arms and a crime of violating
regulations on treatment of captivated soldiers.
g. The crime of disrupting traditional virtues of harmony of
government forces and unity of the military and the people, a
crime of disrespecting soldiers’ life, a crime of beating military
soldiers, a crime on disrupting relationships among soldiers, a
crime of leaving a person in danger of death behind and a
crime of neglecting report on military crimes.
Special provisions of South Korea’s Military Criminal Act
consist
of
90
articles
from
Article
5
through
Article
94.
Considering numerous punishment regulations under the Act on
Protection of Military Facility or the Act on Protection of Military
Secret as special laws related to the Military Criminal Act of
South Korea, it is presumed that North Korea’s Military Criminal
Act contains fewer articles than those of South Korea’s because it
regulates matters only relating to basic military duty.
249
A crime of desertion and a crime of flight of North Korea are
similar to a crime of deserting military service of South Korea.
However, North Korea had the crime punished differently based
on the length of desertion: a crime of desertion if it is more than
3 days, and a crime of fleeting if it is more than 60 days,
regardless of any particular purpose therefor.
Compared with South Korea’s Military Criminal Act, North
Korea’s Military Criminal Act provides for special crimes such as
a crime of violating daily duty regulations (Article 26), a crime of
violating accident prevention the regulations for prevention of an
accident (Article 28), a crime of neglecting soldiers lives (Article
29) and a crime of neglecting report on a military crime (Article
35).
It is said that a crime of violating daily duty regulations
indicates a crime to interfere with social order of a day work.
Since a day work has special importance in preparing the normal
mobilization, preventing an accident in advance and maintaining
guarding of barracks and internal orders, it is asserted that the
violation thereof should be punished. However, it is appropriate to
treat such act of disrupting order with disciplinary action as South
Korea does rather than criminal punishment.
A crime of violating accident prevention regulations is deemed
to infringe on order for preventing an accident and a business
order within the military base and organization, and is determined
to reinforce military force and to prepare military battle without
any accidents. It is applied not to minor damage but to death or
severe damage to punish the outcome which influences people’s
life as a result of traffic, fire, water and explosive accidents.
Given that the elements constituting such crime are comprehensive
250
and
that
it
might
impose
criminal
responsibility
based
on
occurrence of results regardless of foreseeability or intention of
the crime, it gives rise to concern about violation of human rights.
The crime of violating military flag storage regulations was
stipulated to strictly punish damage or loss of a military flag
because the crime is regarded as the severest of all, to the State
and its people.59) It is argued that the crime disrupts the social
relationship with respect to noble dignity and maintenance of the
flag. However, the crime can be discussed because of its severe
punishment: less than 2 years of correctional prison labor in case
of damage to a military flag; more than 3 years of correctional
prison labor in case of loss of a military flag or other severe
results; sentence to death if the case is deemed to be severe
crime. Such crime, which is not stipulated in South Korea’s
Military
Criminal
Act,
should
be
dealt
with
a
disciplinary
punishment. Even if it was inevitable measure to sustain Songun
(Military-first) politics and the hereditary regime and thus to
emphasize keeping a military flag seriously, the sentence to death,
even in the severe case, can be too cruel compared with the
elements of the crime.
The crime of neglecting soldiers’ life was enacted pursuant to
the instruction of Kim Jong-il that “The commanders should love
and take care of their soldiers like their own brothers and soldiers
should follow and respect their commanders like their own older
brothers."60) The social relationship which is deemed to be
infringed by such crime is a noble communist moral relationship
between the upper and the lower, where a superior or boss is
59) Park Seung-nyeol, Gunsahyeongbeop (Military Criminal Act), p. 101.
60) 1bid., pp. 102~103
251
mainly subject to such crime. It is questionable whether it is
justifiable to prescribe such act disrupting communist moral
relationship as a crime.
The North Korea’s Criminal Act stipulates punishment for
neglecting report only with respect to crime of plundering national
property (Article 95), crime of intentional severe murder (Article
278) and crime of plundering individual property (Article 302),
among
anti-state
crimes
and
anti-national
crimes.61)
The
unexceptional punishment for neglecting report on all military
crimes reflects North Korea’s intention to keep stability of its
regime and realize Songun (Military-first) politics.
61) The North Korea’s revised Criminal Act of 2009 expanded the scope of the crimes to
be punished for neglecting report from anti-state crimes to anti-national crimes.
252
2. The Application of North Korea's
Criminal Law
￭ Han Myung-sub (Attorney at law)
1. Introduction
1) Legal Ground of North Korea's Criminal Law
The sources of criminal law in North Korea include the
Criminal Act as the basic substantive penal law, the Criminal
Procedure Act which is the basic procedural law, the Party
Statute, the Constitution, the Social Safety and Control Act, the
State Secrets Act, the Judgments and Ruling Enforcement Act, the
Investigation
and
Surveillance
Appraisal Act, and the Attorney
Act,
the
Act.1)There
Criminal
and
Civil
are also various rules
including decree, decisions, orders, and directives, many of which
pertaining to the criminal system. Bilateral and multilateral treaties
that North Korea has concluded with other states or international
organizations also form a part of North Korean criminal law.2)
Other than laws pertaining to cross-border transactions, North
Korea kept most of its statutes from the public until June 2004,
when it published Joseon Minjujuui Inmin-gonghwaguk Beopjeon
(Daejungyong)(The Penal Code of Democratic People’s Republic
of Korea (For Public Use), hereinafter referred to as “Code”) for
1) The names of all laws in North Korea include the country name, e.g. Social Safety and
Control Act of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, but this text omits the
country name other than in special circumstances.
2) The Office of Court Administration, Bukhanui Hyeongsabeop (The Criminal Law of
North Korea) (Seoul: The Office of Court Administration, 2006), p. 20.
253
the first time, which contained the text of 112 statutes including
the Criminal Act and the Criminal Procedure Act. In March 2006,
it published a revised and expanded edition that also contained 15
statutes enacted between July 2004 and December 2005 (Volume
1) and 32 statutes that were amended or supplemented (Volume
2). However, the Social Safety and Control Act, enacted on
December 28, 1992, or the Administrative Penal Code, enacted in
July 2004, are not in either the Code or the revised edition of the
Code. Though the notation “For Public Use”3) indicates that the
Code does not contain all statutes, the Social Safety and Control
Act and the Administrative Penal Code are closely connected to
the lives of ordinary North Koreans. Therefore, one cannot
discount the possibility that there are other, unknown statutes that
pertain to the criminal law system.4)
2) Limitation of the Analysis on the Application of the Criminal
Act
There are two main limits in figuring out the reality of the
application of North Korean criminal law. The first is that, as
outlined above, North Korea has not disclosed all of its criminal
laws. Therefore, there may well be other laws that we are not
aware of. This problem was highlighted when the Presidium of
the
Supreme
Addendum
to
People's
the
Assembly
Criminal
Act
enacted
of
the
Decree
No.
Democratic
2483,
People's
3) It appears that in North Korea, the published Codes have different composition and
content depending on the distribution targets. For instance, publications intended for
Workers’ Party executives are notated as being "For Party Executives." Jang
Myeong-bong, "Recent Trends in North Korean Legislation and Evaluations," North
Korean Legal Studies, vol. 9 (Seoul: North Korean Legal Studies Society, 2006), p. 13.
4) Han Myung-sub, Nambuk Gyoryuwa Hyeongsabeopsangui Je Munje (Criminal Issues
related to Inter-Korean Exchanges) (Seoul: Hanulbooks, 2008), pp. 14-15.
254
Republic of Korea (General Crimes) on December 19, 2007. North
Korea still has not made the contents of this Addendum public.5)
The above Addendum contains 23 provisions and though the
name Addendum implies a revision or a supplement to preexisting
laws, it is actually in the form of an independent enactment. The
provisions fall into two rough categories. The first is for increased
penalties in the case of "extremely aggravated circumstances."
Most North Korean criminal laws provide for basic and increased
penalties in the same provision and the requirements for heavier
penalties usually consist of ‘(especially) aggravated circumstances.’
The Addendum, on the other hand, provides for heavier penalties,
including the death penalty, in the case of "extremely" (in some
instances
"especially")
aggravated
circumstances.6)
The
other
category of provisions establishes new crimes in keeping with
social changes.7)
5) In interviews of North Korean defectors in 2010, six out of 200 respondents knew about
the enactment of the Addendum, and one said he knew of a case where its application
resulted in the death penalty.
6) These include extremely aggravated publication of battle technology, intentional
destruction of military facilities (Article 1), extremely aggravated embezzlement of public
property (Article 2), extremely aggravated robbery of public property (Article 3),
extremely aggravated intentional destruction of public property (Article 4), extremely
aggravated currency counterfeiting (Article 5), extremely aggravated smuggling of
precious and colored metals (Article 6), extremely aggravated smuggling of illegal drugs
(Article 11), especially aggravated prisoner escape (Article 14), especially aggravated
Wanton delinguency (Article 17), especially aggravated intentional infliction of grievous
bodily harm (Article 19), extremely aggravated abduction (Article 20), especially
aggravated rape (Article 21), and extremely aggravated robbery (Article 22). There is no
standard, however, for distinguishing between "especially aggravated" cases, which is
the condition for increased penalties under the Criminal Act, and "extremely aggravated"
cases, the condition for increased penalties under the Addendum. Such vagueness would
inevitably lead to arbitrary decisions.
7) The new crimes include extralegal sale of strategic reserve commodities (Article 7),
smuggling national resources (Article 8), foreign currency diversion (Article 9), violation
of building codes (Article 10), storage of illegal drugs and drug ingredients, violation of
supply orders (Article 12), extralegal cooperation with foreign residents (Article 13),
condoning criminal activity (Article 15), obstruction to solving cases (Article 16), and
conducting extralegal business (Article 18). If the smuggling of national resources is
especially aggravated, or the extralegal business includes the organization of sexual
255
The above Addendum diluted any achievements of the 2004
revision of the Criminal Act, which had received some limited
praise as a positive step. Article 17 of the Addendum, especially,
which provides for increased penalties to offenses under Article
258
of
the
Criminal
Act,
provides
for
"life-time
term
of
correctional prison labor or capital punishment for extremely
aggravated wanton delinquency" and Article 23 of the Addendum
provides for "life-time term of correctional prison labor or capital
punishment if the circumstances of concurrent crimes by one
person are especially aggravated or there is no sign of will to
improve." The concept of "wanton delinquency" is extremely
inclusive and indefinite and the death penalty can be imposed for
merely committing concurrent crimes. These provisions alone
reveal that North Korea is seriously deviating from the principle
of nulla poena sine lege.
The second problem arises from methods of research for the
conditions
of
application
of
criminal
law.
Like
most
North
Korea-related research, since it is not possible to visit the
relevant agencies, fact-finding relies heavily on interviews with
defectors.
Since
most
interviewees
lack
professional
legal
knowledge, there is difficulty in grasping the realities on the
ground.
3) Evaluation of the Current Criminal Act and Criminal Procedure
Act
The Criminal Act and Criminal Procedure Act, revised in 2004,
form the framework of North Korean criminal law.8) On April 29,
services as part of the operation of a restaurant or motel business, the death penalty
may be sentenced.
256
2004, North Korea made far-ranging revisions of its criminal law
by Directive 432 of the Presidium of the Supreme People's
Assembly. The 2004 revision saw the number of provisions
increased almost twofold from 161 Articles divided into eight
chapters to 303 Articles divided into nine chapters and the
addition of titles to the Articles made the organization much
clearer. The most notable revision is Article 6 of the Criminal
Act, which provides that "The State imposes criminal penalties
only on those acts that criminal law prescribes to be crimes,"
mandating the principle of nulla poena sine lege. Furthermore, the
Articles
that
provisions were
reorganized,
the
allowed
analogical
removed.9)
interpretation
of
criminal
The types of criminal penalties were
mandatory
sentences
were
relaxed
and
the
requirements for the crimes were clarified and made more specific,
resulting in appraisals that it was a step forward in guaranteeing
human rights.
The ninth revision of the Criminal Procedure Act on May 6,
200410) also supplemented criminal procedure in a number of ways.
The number of articles increased from 305 to 439 in the revision,
8) The revised Criminal Act was partially revised and supplemented by Directive 1084 of
the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly on April 19, 2005, and Directive 1225
of the Presidium on July 26, 2005. The substance has not changed materially since the
2004 revision, however.
9) The Criminal Act was broadly permissive of analogical interpretation in its 1950
enactment (Article 9) and then added certain requirements to such interpretation in its
1987 revision although analogical interpretation was still permitted. Article 10 sets forth:
"Punishment for an offence not provided for in this criminal law shall be imposed in
accordance with the article of the law providing for an act which is similar to it in
nature and gravity. But in cases where there is no article providing for an act which is
similar to the offence in its nature and gravity, punishment shall not be imposed and
inference shall not be drawn based on the object against which an offence is committed,
social relations, subjective criteria and the criteria for the offence provided for in the
relevant article.
10) Revised and supplemented on May 6, 2004, by Directive 436 of the Presidium of the
Supreme People's Assembly.
257
and a few articles were revised in the tenth revision on July 26,
2005.11) Formally, the Criminal Procedure Act became much more
elaborate and clearer due to the 2004 revisions, with more
guarantees for human rights than before. The detention period of
an interrogatee and the accused was shortened and the period of
confinement for the purpose of indictment and trial were limited.
Arrests were to be made with a warrant and statements made not
only
under
duress
but
also
by
inducement
were
made
inadmissible. The revision also sought greater legal safeguards for
the judicial process by prescribing specific grounds and methods
for the exercise of an investigating authority's or Yesimwon
(Pretrial Examination Agency, hereinafter referred to as “PEA”)’s
powers.
Other
guarantees
for
human
rights
included
the
prohibition on nighttime interrogation (Article 163), the prohibition
of duplicate investigation (Article 150), prohibition on divulgence of
secrets
(Article
15),
notification
of
the
interrogatee's
rights
(Article 169), limits on the detention period of a witness (Article
227), prohibition of restraints in court (Article 283), and shorter
periods for the trial and appeal (Article 287).12)
4) Problems with the Application of Criminal Law
As discussed above, the revised Criminal Act and Criminal
Procedure Act contain undeniable progress in guaranteeing human
rights, although there are still a number of problems. However,
more important than the content of the text is the application of
11) Revised and supplemented on July 26, 2004, by Directive 1225 of the Presidium of the
Supreme People's Assembly.
12) Lee Baek-Gyu, “Bukhanui Choegeun Beopjedonghyanggwa Pyeong-ga (Trends and
Evaluations of the North Korea’s Recent Legislation),” Bukhanbeob yeongu (North
Korean Legal Studies), vol. 8 (Seoul: Bukhanbeobyeonguhoe (North Korean Legal
Studies Society), 2005), p. 183.
258
the text to real-life situations. According to the testimony of
defectors even after 2004 when the revisions to the criminal law
took place, the lives of political prisoners and ordinary citizens are
in danger due to the North Korean regime's willingness to carry
out the death penalty not only for those acts that are prescribed
in the criminal law but also social deviations resulting from
economic
difficulties.13)
proclamation
issued
by
Though
the
the
North
data
is
Korea’s
outdated,
the
Sahoe-anjeon-bu
(shortly called as ‘An-jeon-bu,’ Social Safety Agency (police),
predecessor of Inmin-boan-seong, People's Safety Agency) by the
delegation of the government on August 5, 1997 states that those
who stole grains from fields, threshing floors, and storage and
whose actions were especially severe would face death by firing
squad.14)
On March 1, 2006, under the name of the Inmin-boan-seong
(People's Safety Agency, hereinafter referred to as "PSA") North
Korea issued the proclamation ‘Jeonlyeogseon, tongsinseon-eul
kkeunhgeona
eombeol-e
ma-yaggeolae
cheoham-e
haeng-wi
daeha-yeo
(The
haneun
Imposition
jadeul-eul
of
Severe
Punishments on Those Who Sever Power or Communication Lines
or Deal in Drugs).’15) The proclamation set out that severing
power lines or communication lines or dealing in illegal drugs
were
destructive
anti-state
acts
that
would
harm
economic
development and national security, and paralyzed the revolutionary
consciousness, thus tearing down the political and ideological
edifice united around the leadership of the revolution. Therefore,
13) Korea Institute for National Unification, 2006 White Paper on Human Rights in North
Korea (Seoul: Korea Institute for National Unification, 2006), p. 25.
14) Ibid., p. 26.
15) Refer to Jo-eun Beot-deol (Good Friends), Si-Seon-Jip-Jung (Attention Focus), vol.
13 (October 13, 2006)
259
the proclamation prohibited the acts of severing or destroying
power or communication lines (including cables), stealing or
selling such lines, surreptitiously selling or buying colored metals,
selling them to other countries, making processed goods of them
to sell or use, disrupting the order of the laborers who maintain,
patrol, and watch electronic and communication facilities, and the
illegal cultivation, manufacture, transaction, use, production, and
import of drugs. Those who violated the above proclamation
would be executed regardless of position, past contribution, or
affiliation. Those who organized or carried out activities violating
the proclamation could receive severe penalties up to death and
their families would be expelled.
On November 15, 2006, again under the authority of the PSA,
the proclamation called ‘The Imposition of Severe Punishments on
Those
Who
Harm
the
Production
of
Electricity
or
Waste
Electricity.’ There, the regime warned that in order to prevent the
waste of electric power, those who diverted materials necessary
for the production of electricity, those who used electricity illegally
by paying bribes, and those who diverted electricity illegally for
their use would receive monetary penalties or correctional prison
labor.16)
On December 28, 2009, the PSA issued the proclamation,
‘Joseonminjuju-ui-inmingonghwagug lyeong-yeog-eseo oehwaleul
lyutongsikineun jadeul-eul eomgyeoghi cheobeolham-e daeha-yeo
(The Imposition of Severe Punishments on Those Who Circulate
Foreign Currency within the Territory of the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea).’17) The proclamation states that "All agencies,
16) Jo-eun Beot-deol (Good Friends), O-neul-ui Buk-han So-sik (North Korean News
Today), vol. 48 (February 5, 2007)
17) Daily NK, March 22, 2010.
260
corporations, social cooperatives, and residents must refrain from
circulating foreign currency in the country," and that "this is a
severe crime that violates the interests of the state and the
people." Also, "Import stores, restaurants, service providers and all
other units must cease all services rendered in exchange for
foreign currency," it says, and that "other than units authorized by
the state, all units must destroy all data regarding exports, and
internal agencies, corporations, and social cooperatives must cease
all illegal foreign cash transactions." Agencies, corporations, or
cooperatives
that
violated
the
above
proclamation
could
be
disbanded or have their activities or business suspended, the
traded money and goods would be confiscated, and with respect to
those who bought or sold goods with foreign currency, engaged in
black-market trading of foreign currency, engaged in usury,
mediated in such deals, bribed, or otherwise illegally circulated or
stole foreign currency, or organized, condoned, or abetted such
activities, the traded money and goods would be confiscated and
they could face penalties up to death, depending on the severity of
the act.
According to interviewed defectors, such proclamations were
issued every few months, their contents were conveyed by
lectures, and violations were punished.18)This means that North
Korea, despite adopting the nulla poena sine lege principle in the
2004 revisions, violates said principle repeatedly by designating
acts as anti-state activity punishable by death, despite the fact
that such activity is not prescribed as a crime punishable by
death penalty under criminal laws. The proclamation entitled ‘The
Imposition of Severe Punishments on Those Who Sever Power or
18) Testimony of [ID 179 (2010)] interviewed by the KBA on March 17, 2010.
261
Communication Lines or Deal in Drugs’ provides for punishment
not only against the individual who violated the proclamation but
also his or her family by punishing the families with expulsion.
More seriously, these proclamations are not temporary laws of
limited duration. The contents of the proclamations lead to the
conclusion that they have continuous effect once issued. If such
proclamations were issued once every few months, as testified,
then the myriad prohibitions and penalties contained therein may
well have precluded the application of the Criminal Act. This
greatly reduces the value of the Criminal Act and Criminal
Procedure Act in analyzing the real-life application of North
Korean criminal laws. However, since the Addendum to the
Criminal Act and the various proclamations relate to increased
penalties for acts proscribed under the Special Chapter of the
Criminal Act. Therefore, the General Chapter of the Criminal Act
and the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Act still appear to
have effect. It is on these provisions that we base the specific
applications of criminal law.
2. Awareness of Criminal Law
According to interviews with North Korean defectors conducted
by the Korean Bar Association in 2010 (hereinafter referred to as
"the interview"), 44 out of the 200 respondents (22%) knew that
the Criminal Act and Criminal Procedure Act were revised in
2004. Seven of them had actually seen the code book. Education
about the contents of the criminal laws was provided through
such means as newspaper, radio, organized lectures, meetings of
neighborhood units, and workplace education projects. Anyone
could look at the related information, but most residents were not
262
interested. The various methods of criminal law education appear
to be a means to maximize control over the populace.
Meanwhile, by Directive 546 of the Presidium of the Supreme
People's Assembly on July 14, 2004, North Korea enacted the
Administrative Penal Code to impose administrative penalties on
illegal acts that were not at the level of warranting criminal
penalties. These included warnings, severe warnings, unpaid work,
labor
education,
demotion,
dismissal,
suspension,
fines,
compensation, and confiscation. According to the interview, 36 out
of 199 respondents (18.1%) knew the contents of the Code. [ID
168 (2010)] and [ID 179 (2010)] testified that a similar law existed
since before 2004, but the 2004 enactment simply refined the
earlier
law.
Also,
the
Beophaksajeon
(Legal
Encyclopedia),
published by the Legal Research Center of Academy of Social
Sciences in 1971, introduces administrative penalties, and most
administrative provisions set forth that administrative penalties
may be imposed depending on the severity of the violation.
Regarding the application of the Administrative Penal Code, while
administrative penalties may be imposed only on individuals who
are sixteen years of age or older, 26% of respondents say this is
not true. The statute of limitations is three years, but 25.3% of
respondents say this does not accord with reality. In fact, one
respondent testified about receiving two months of unpaid work as
punishment for an offense committed eight years before, even at
that time the Administrative Penal Code had not been enacted ye
t.19)This indicates that in reality the Administrative Penal Code is
also not applied in accordance with the provisions stipulated
therein.
19) Testimony of [ID 168 (2010)] interviewed by the KBA on April 2, 2010.
263
3. Application of the General Chapter of the Criminal Act
Article 11 of the North Korean Criminal Act provides that
punishment shall be imposed only on offenders who are over 14
years of age when they commit an offence. 24.5% of responses to
the interview, however, stated that this did not accord with
reality. Substantial numbers of respondents witnessed children of
twelve or thirteen years of age at disciplinary prison labor camps,
juvenile correctional labor camps, and juvenile correctional training
camps. Children who commit robbery, larceny, murder, and battery
are sent to juvenile training camps or juvenile correctional labor
camps. One response recounted the case of a next-door neighbor's
child who was arrested at twelve years of age and only returned
fourteen years later.20) More fact-finding and analysis are needed
for a fuller picture of how such juvenile correctional training
camps and juvenile correctional labor camps are administered.
Article 12 of the North Korean Criminal Act stipulates that
punishment shall not be imposed on an offender who commits
socially dangerous acts while he or she is unable to judge his or
her conduct or control himseif or herself because of chronic
mental disease or a temporary mental disorder; medical measures
may
be
adopted
in
such
cases.
Accordingly,
the
Criminal
Procedure Act provides for procedures for the suspension of
criminal proceeding by the pretrial officer, prosecutor or judge, if
the interrogatee or the accused suffers from temporary insanity or
serious illness, allowing for decisions on medical measures instead
(Articles 43 through 45). Medical measures include special isolated
medical measures for mental illness patients who cannot recover,
20) Testimony of [ID 179 (2010)] same as fn 18 above.
264
general isolated medical measures for temporary sufferers of
mental illness, and local medical measures for those suffering from
serious illness (Article 46). According to the book of commentaries
published by the government, patients for special isolated medical
measure are transported to Mental Hospital 83, patients for
general isolated medical measure to Prevention Hospital 49 or
Convalescent Hospital 49, and local medical measure patients are
housed at hospitals, home, or the home of a relative.21) Forty-four
respondents (22.1%) said mental patients are sent to Hospital 49
for
life
instead
of
receiving
criminal
penalty.
None
of
the
respondents had first-hand experience, however, so there was little
information about how the provisions of Article 43 et seq. were
implemented, nor about the administration of Hospital 49.
Regarding crimes between related parties, Article 18 of the
Criminal Act provides that no criminal penalties would be imposed
if the victim's family or relatives were opposed to the sanctions,
other than in cases of intentional murder, robbery, and intentional
infliction of aggravated bodily injury. Only 14.1% of interview
respondents replied that this provision was actually applied, while
32.7% said it was not, and one said that it required bribery to
avoid criminal penalties even if the families desired not to punis
h.22)
4. Application of the Provisions for Investigative Procedure
Investigation is the process of apprehending the suspect and
handing the case over to the PEA. Article 6 of the Criminal
21) Anonymous, Commentary on the Criminal Procedure Act of the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea (June 29, 2004), p. 37.
265
Procedure Act lays down the authority, role, and procedures of the
investigators. The situations where the investigators can arrest a
suspect or a criminal without authorization from a prosecutor are
limited to when the individual is caught in flagrante delictio,
when caught in a semi-flagrant offense, when the person attempts
suicide or flight or is in flight, and when the person has no fixed
residence (Article 143). When a suspect or criminal is in custody
after
being
arrested
in
one
of
the
above
situations,
the
Investigation Bureau must draw up a Custodial Decision document
within 48 hours and receive the prosecutor's authorization, and
investigate the person and deliver the case to the PEA within ten
days of arrest. If the above authorization is not given or there is
no confirmation of the person's complicity in the crime within ten
days, the Bureau must release him or her immediately (Article
144).
However,
respondents
to
according
who
had
been
the
interview,
investigated
24
among
(36.4%)
the
66
persons
experienced detention exceeding 48 hours, and 13 (18.85%) were
detained for over 10 days despite there being no evidence of
criminal activity. Also, although detention is to be discontinued in
the event of serious illness, 13 out of 72 respondents (18.1%) said
there were cases when detention continued despite serious illness.
When
the
suspect
or
criminal
denied
the
charges,
most
respondents answered that they had experienced battery.
The time period it takes to lead to a case before the PEA is
irregular. A shorter one ends in three days, but the pre-trial
detention also ranged to one month and even eight months.
Although the testimony of respondents leaves some doubt whether
they had clearly distinguished between investigation and pretrial
examination,
even
if
one
adds
up
the
10-day
maximum
266
investigation period, the maximum pretrial examination period of
four months, and the 10 days for the prosecution to bring an
indictment, eight months is far in excess of the allowed time
period. Some respondents said there were cases where bribery led
to release before the pretrial examination, and one respondent was
released before pretrial examination by paying 2,000 North Korean
won to the Bowibu agent.23)
According to the Criminal Procedure Act, suspects or criminals
under investigation can be detained only up to 10 days. However,
the most crucial phases of the process, namely arrest, detention,
and interrogation, lack the provisions guaranteed at the pretrial
phase such as the prohibition of extralegal arrest or detention
(Article 177), limits on detention and confinement for pregnant
individuals (Article 179), production of an arrest warrant (Article
182), notification of arrest or detention (Article 183), the right to
legal representation, the prohibition of nighttime interrogation
(Article 163), and the prohibition of coerced interrogation (Article
167). The relevant provisions of the pre-trial procedure do apply
mutatis mutandis to the process of verification, search, seizure,
psychological testing, identification, confrontation, and appraisal
(Article 183). The prosecutor can participate in the investigation
and review case records, and can correct illegal investigative acts
or issue written commands to the investigator (Article 147).
5. Application of the Provisions for Pretrial Procedure
In accordance with the Criminal Procedure Act, the pretrial
examination is the process of confirming the interrogatee and
267
revealing the account of the criminal case fully and accurately.
Objective evidence should be used to bring to light the nature of
the interrogatee’s crime, the motive and objective, the means and
method of the crime, the act and its results, the role and
culpability in the crime, and all factors that have meaning in the
solution of the case (Articles 148 and 149). The PEA must make
a decision on initiating the examination and begin examination
within 48 hours of receiving the case (Article 157). However,
42.9% of interview respondents said that they did not receive
examination within 48 hours, with some starting as late as five
days, a week, or even 20 days after the case was turned over to
the PEA.24)
The PEA decides to pursue criminal charges if it gathers
sufficient evidence to confirm the interrogatee's criminal activity
(Article 158). The interrogatee must be notified of this fact within
48 hours, and it is at this time that the interrogatee, for the first
time, is informed of his right to legal representation by a lawyer
(Article 159). This raises the serious problem that the right to
legal representation is not at all guaranteed in the investigative
phase
or
the
early
pre-trial
procedure,
when
an
attorney's
assistance is most needed.
According to the interview, 31 out of 35 respondents (88.6%)
were not notified within 48 hours of the decision to pursue
criminal charges, and only one of the 35 were told of their right
to an attorney, while the other 34 were never told that they had
the right to be represented by a lawyer.
In order for the PEA to arrest an interrogatee and confine
him/her, (pretrial) officers must present the interrogatee with a
268
proof of identity and an arrest warrant (Article 182). However,
according to the interview, only one out of 13 respondents were
presented with an arrest warrant; the other 12 (92.3%) were never
presented with either identification or a warrant. When asked
whether the PEA had informed their families or affiliated group of
their place of detention, nine out of 13 (69.2%) replied they did
not. Regarding legal representation, no one said that the lawyer
was of actual assistance, and none replied in the affirmative when
asked whether there was a designated place to confer with the
lawyer.
As for meals while in confinement, four out of 12 respondents
(33.3%) replied they themselves or their families had to prepare
meals because none was issued, and the rest said that the meals
were seriously deficient in amount or almost inedible. Eight out of
11 (72.7%) said that they were not allowed visits from family or
friends, while three (27.3%) received visitors, which leads to the
conclusion that visits are not generally allowed, or the visitor
policy is run arbitrarily. With responses stating that it took six to
eight months to go to court after arrest, the time limit on pretrial
examination does not appear to be effective.
The PEA prepares
examination conclusion
report when it
concludes its duties, and delivers the case records and evidence to
the prosecutor on the day of the conclusion. The prosecutor
reviews the case records de novo, and brings the interrogatee’s
case to court if it is confirmed that the pretrial examination fully
and accurately revealed criminal activity. This is the process of
indictment, for which the prosecutor produces a bill of indictment
(Articles 261 and 266). The prosecutor must process the case
within 10 days (three days if the case warrants disciplinary prison
269
labor) of receiving records from the PEA (Article 262). The
interrogatee may be detained for 10 days (three days if the case
warrants disciplinary prison labor) for the purpose of indictment
(Article
263).
If
the
pretrial
examination
is
inadequate
for
indictment, the court must remand the case to the PEA along
with written comments to that effect (Article 268). The Criminal
Procedure Act prohibits repeat indictment by prohibiting indictment
if it still fails to collect relevant evidence in cases remanded by
the trial court for reasons of inadequate evidence (Article 269).
6. Application of Trial Provisions
1) Courts
Trials in North Korea are handled by the courts, and the
imposition of criminal penalties is done by judgement of the
courts (Article 13 of the Criminal Procedure Act). North Korean
courts include the central court, provincial/directly governed city
courts, city/district/county people's courts, and special courts
(Article 159 of the Constitution). Currently, special courts include
military and railroad courts (Article 3 of the Court Organization
Act).
The trial system has three levels with one appeal possible.
Under the Criminal Procedure Act, a people's court is the court of
first instance for general criminal cases that do not fall under the
jurisdiction of the special courts or the central court (Article 126).
The provincial and directly governed city courts try in the first
instance anti-state and anti-people criminal cases and general
criminal cases for which the death penalty or life-time term of
disciplinary prison labor is sought. The provincial and directly
270
governed city courts serve as appeals courts for cases tried at the
people's courts within the province or directly governed city.
However, if necessary, they may try directly a case within the
people's court's jurisdiction by themselves or send the case to
another people's court (Article 127). Of the special courts, military
courts
have
jurisdiction
over
crimes
committed
by
military
personnel, PSA officer (police officer), or worker at a military
facility.
The
railroad
courts
have
jurisdiction
over
crimes
committed by rail transportation workers and crimes that disrupt
transport by rail (Article 128). The central court is the appeals
court for cases tried by provincial or directly governed city courts
and by railroad courts. However, if necessary, the central court
may by itself try any case under the trial jurisdiction of any court
in the first instance or remove the case to a court of the same
level or type (Article 129).
As shown by the jurisdiction of the central court, a central
court's trial of a case under the trial jurisdiction of another court
would render the appeals process meaningless. Article 359 Clause
1 of the Criminal Procedure Act prohibits appeal from a central
court judgement and ruling. Furthermore, there is no limit on the
range of cases that the central court can try in the first instance,
meaning it can try any case at any time as it deems necessary.
A leading example of a case the central court tried in the first
instance recently is that of the U.S. journalists Laura Ling and
Euna Lee. The two women were arrested on March 17, 2009 on
charges of entering the country illegally, found guilty in early
June of 2009 by the central court of hostile acts against the
Korean people (Article 69 of the North Korean Criminal Act) and
illegal border entry (Article 233), and sentenced to 12 years of
271
correctional prison labor.25) On January 25, 2010, the central court
also tried and found Aijalon Mahli Gomes, a U.S. reporter who
entered North Korea via the Chinese border, guilty of hostile acts
against the Korean people and illegal border entry, sentencing him
to eight years of correctional prison labor and 70,000,000 North
Korean won in fines.26) This was also a trial in the first instance
by the central court, and as such immediately became final.27)
The independence of the courts is guaranteed so that they may
exercise their legal functions without pressure (Article 166 of the
Constitution, Article 272 of the Criminal Procedure Act). In reality,
however, the courts of North Korea are subordinate to the
Supreme People's Assembly, the National Defense Commission,
and the Cabinet, which results in judicial independence being
virtually nonexistent. The above provision for independence is not
a guarantee for individual judges but the court organization as a
body, therefore precluding actual independence. Furthermore, the
25) See Han Myung-Sub, “Bukhanhyeongsabeopgwa Gaeseonggongdan Eongnyuja
Sinbyeonanjeon Munje (North Korean Criminal Law and the Problem of Personal
Safety for the Gaeseong Industrial Complex Detainees)," 2009 Symposium on
South-North Relations and Cooperation and Personal Protection, Focusing on the Attack
on the Mt. Geum-Gang Tourist and the Gaeseong Industrial Complex Detainees (Seoul:
National Human Rights Commission of Korea, July 2009), pp. 70~75
26) Dong-a Ilbo, April 10, 2010. On July 9, 2010, the Joseon Jung-ang Tongsin (Joseon
Central Communications) reported that "the American Gomes, who is in the process of
correction, attempted suicide out of deep guilt and disappointment in the U.S.
government which is not taking steps to rescue him. He has been transported to a
hospital and receiving emergency care."
27) It is noteworthy in the Gomes case that he was levied a fine, unlike the Ling and Lee
case. Neither the crime of hostile acts against the Korean people nor of illegal border
entry carries a monetary penalty; under North Korean criminal law, fines are a form of
administrative penalty, not criminal penalty. Article 46 of the Immigration Act (revised
and supplemented on January 28, 1999 by Directive 382 of the Presidium of the
Supreme People's Assembly) provides for a fine if a foreigner violates the Act, but in
such case the relevant body that levies the fine should be the Foreign Office or the
Immigration Service, which are in charge of immigration. It seems that there is no
legal basis for the court to levy fines in a criminal trial. Meanwhile, neither the
Immigration Act nor the Administrative Penal Code set a minimum or maximum for
fines.
272
judges have political liability for their decisions.
In accordance with Article 6 of the Court Organization Act, any
North Korean resident with the right to vote can become a judge.
Pursuant to Article 66 of the Constitution, all citizens aged
seventeen or above who have not been stripped of their voting
rights by a court ruling or suffered from mental illness have
suffrage and are eligible to be elected to office. In accordance
with these provisions, individuals with no legal expertise at all
can be appointed as judges. In practice, though, North Korean
judges are usually elected among those who received five years of
formal legal education at institutions such as the legal department
of the Kim Il Sung University and served as a trainee, staff
member, or assistant judge in court for five or more years.28)
North Korea adopts a people’s jury system in trial procedures.
Under Article 157 of the Constitution and Article 9 of the Court
Organization Act, the court of first instance is formed of one
judge and two people's assessors. Judges and people's assessors
are to be elected by the Presidium of the Supreme People’s
Assembly and local (province, directly governed city, city, county,
district) People's Assemblies in accordance with Article 116
Subparagraph
13
and
Article
140
Subparagraph
5
of
the
Constitution. Since people's assessors have identical status and
authority to judges, the institution is criticized as a means of
control over the judiciary by the Ro-dong-dang (Workers’ Party
).29)
In April of 2006, the Office of Court Administration interviewed
28) Lee Seung-Ryeon, “Bukhanui Jaepanjedo (The Judicial System of North Korea,”
Bukhanbeob yeongu (North Korean Legal Studies), vol. 7 (Seoul: Society of North
Korean Legal Studies, 2004), p. 113, p. 12.
29) Korea Institute for National Unification, 2005 White Paper on North Korean Human
Rights (Seoul: Korea Institute for National Unification, 2005), p. 71.
273
defectors about the judicial system of North Korea. There was
testimony that provincial, city, and county People's Assemblies
had Legal Affairs Committees, and judges presiding important
criminal cases had to hear the opinion of their local Legal Affairs
Committee before making a ruling. A Legal Affairs Committee
was composed of five persons, a director of the PSA, a court
president, a prosecutor general, a director of the Bowibu, and chair
of the (local) People's committee who becomes the chairperson of
the Committee.30)
2) First Instance Trial
(1) Summary of the Procedure
The North Korean Criminal Procedure Act does not provide for
a trial immediately after indictment; rather, there is a trial
preparation phase first. Before the trial examination, the presiding
judge reviews to see whether there was adequate inquiry into the
crime during the pre-trial phase, whether there are grounds for
the indictment, whether the criminal law was applied correctly,
and whether the interrogatee should be detained. The judge may
also review the scene of the crime and evidence (Article 291). If
the judge ascertains that the pretrial examination was adequate
the interrogatee is tried by the court (Article 292); if not, the case
is returned to the prosecutor (Article 293). The trial in the first
instance proceeds in the following order: Initiation of examination,
the examination on the facts, argument and defense, the accused’s
final statement, and ruling (Article 301). The object of the trial is
to hear the case with the concerned parties participating, to
confirm the crime and the criminal based on objective evidence,
30) The Office of Court Administration, as fn. 2 above, p. 26
274
and to issue a ruling based on analytical legal evaluation (Article
270).
During the Korean Bar Association’s 2008 interviews, only three
respondents had received a criminal trial, making it difficult to
discover how the criminal procedure law was applied. However, in
the 2010 interviews twenty persons corresponding to 10% of the
200 respondents had received a criminal trial, comparatively more
facilitating the fact-finding process than before.
(2) Open Trial
Opening trial proceedings to the public is essential to the
transparency and fairness of the trial. Article 158 of the North
Korean Constitution makes public trials the rule, but it also
stipulates that a trial may not be opened to public pursuant to the
relevant provisions in law. Accordingly, Article 271 also makes
public examination the norm while permitting broad exceptions,
including for the protection of state and personal secrets or to
prevent
socially
harmful
effects.
The
interview
responses
corroborate this, with seven out of 16 respondents (43.8%) having
been in closed examination, with the ruling also made behind
closed doors.
(3) Participation by the Prosecution and Defense
As a rule, examination is held with the prosecutor and defense
attorney present (Article 273). However, 31.3% of respondents
answered that examination proceeded with neither the prosecution
nor defense in attendance. This, too, shows that North Korean
trials are little more than a formality.
275
(4) Witness Examination
Questioning the witness is a crucial component in discovering
the substantive truth and gathering information about extenuating
or aggravating circumstances. Under the Criminal Procedure Act,
witnesses are examined one by one in order (Article 311 Clause
1), and the presiding judge informs the witness that lying will
incur a criminal penalty and instructs the witness to tell the court
what he or she knows (Article 311 Clause 2). Once the witness
finishes speaking, the judge directs the party who requested the
witness to examine the witness. Afterward, the parties request
permission from the judge to examine the witness (Article 312).
The judge gives the accused the opportunity to question the
witness, and the witness may be confronted as necessary (Article
313). However, according to the interviews, witness examination is
exceedingly rare in actual trial proceedings. Asked if they were
able to conduct favorable witness examination during the trial,
only
two
of
the
16
respondents
(12.5%)
answered
in
the
affirmative. Asked about the reason for not holding witness
examination, of the 13 respondents eight (61.5%) replied they did
not
know
unnecessary,
they
and
had
the
right,
one
(7.7%)
said
two
it
(15.4%)
would
said
have
it
made
was
no
difference.
(5) Trial Period
Under the Criminal Procedure Act, the trial court in the first
instance must conclude examination within 25 days of filing the
case records (Article 287), with the first extension not exceeding
10 days, the second, five days (Article 287). The period during
which the accused may be confined for trial is 25 days, or 15
276
days for the accused whose charges warrant disciplinary prison
labor. Since the trial is of such short duration, it is structurally
unrealistic
to
expect
adversarial
back-and-forth
between
the
prosecution and defense in a battle for the substantive truth. In
the end, the court's actual role would be little more than a
formality, to confirm the prosecution's indictment and to decide
the sentence. According to the interviews, of the 13 respondents
who were tried while detained, only three received a ruling within
the required 25 days; the other 10 were all detained in excess of
such period, with three reporting detainment of five months or
longer. This demonstrates that the detention limits under the
Criminal Procedure Act have little meaning in reality.
(6) Right to Legal Representation
Article 164 of the North Korean Constitution guarantees the
accused’s right to defense, and Article 108 of the Criminal
Procedure Act also provides that interrogatees and the accused
have the right to engage and receive legal services from a lawyer.
However, as seen above, the Code does not guarantee the right to
legal representation of a suspect who is under investigation by the
Investigation Bureau, despite the fact that legal services are most
crucial at the investigation stage. Meanwhile, Article 109 of the
Code provides that the interrogates and the accused may waive
the right to legal service, in which case the examination may be
held without a lawyer present (Article 276).
Article 12 of the North Korean Attorneys-At-Law Act provides
that "A lawyer, if called by an interrogatee or the accused’s
application of the court’s request of to be the defense attorney at
a criminal trial, shall aid the court in making a fair ruling by
277
illuminating the case and through correct analysis and evaluation,
and furthermore shall guarantee the legal rights and interests of
the interrogate or the accused." However, on the other hand, a
lawyer, as a disseminator of Party policy, also has the obligation
to raise the correct perception in the people of the justness of the
Party's judicial policy, and to defend and struggle for Party
policy.31) He must also deeply analyze the seriousness of the
accused's crime and the motivations and causes for the crime,
thereby inducing the interrogatee or the accused to realize the
severity of his guilt before the state and the people, and to deeply
repent.32) In other words, it is difficult for an interrogatee or the
accused to expect zealous advocacy from the lawyer. In the
interviews, there was not a single response that was positive
about the role of the lawyer. When asked if they knew the right
to legal representation was guaranteed by law, seven out of the
18 respondents (38.9%) answered "yes," while 11 answered "no."
Asked whether the lawyer had spoken to them in person, only
one of the 14 respondents answered "yes." Asked whether the
lawyer was on the respondent's side, understood the respondent's
situation, and proactively advocated for the respondent, all 12 valid
respondents answered in the negative, with not one saying that
they received an effective defense from their lawyer.33)
31) Lee Jae-do, Hyeongsasosongbeophak (Criminal Procedure Law) 2nd ed. (Pyeong-yang:
Kim Il-sung University Press, 1987), p. 76.
32) Ibid., p. 207.
33) [ID 168, as fn. 19 above.] The lawyer summoned me, and asked whether I did such
and such a wrong. When I said no, he said I did commit this crime and I should
admit I was wrong. [ID 169 (2010)] There was nothing at all. He was only trying to
confirm I was guilty (March 11, 2010). [ID 171 (2010)] He just followed the prosecutor
and judge's decision. He did not even ask the judge for clemency when the
examination was done. The lawyer was there because of formalities, for the sake of
having a lawyer there, but did not help at all (March 8, 2010).
278
(7) Final Statement
Article 330 of the Criminal Procedure Act provides that the
judge should give the interrogatee one last opportunity to speak
after the arguments are completed. According to the interviews,
however, 50% of the respondents had never received the chance to
speak. 14 out of 16 respondents (87.5%) said that the outcome of
the trial was not fair, and when asked whether they were
discriminated against because of their association or family, eight
of 17 respondents (47.1%) replied they were.34)
3) Second Instance Trial
The appeal reviews the case records and the appeal materials
to determine whether the trial court's judgement and ruling
followed the requirements of law and were based on scientific
evidence, and corrects errors, if any (Article 364). The appeals
chamber is composed of three judges (Article 365) and the review
must be concluded within 25 days of receiving the case records
(Article 366). Once the review is complete, depending on the
results, the court can affirm the trial court's judgement and
ruling, remand the case to the lower court, remove the case to a
different court, or dismiss the action, or modify the ruling directly
if they decide to lighten the sentence.
According to the interviews, only two of 17 respondents
appealed the trial court's ruling, and the other 15 (88.2%) did not.
Asked whether their appeal resulted in a more favorable ruling,
34) [ID 008 (2010)] My younger sibling did not do anything bad enough to get three years
of correctional prison labor, but it was family associations that got him/her such a
heavy sentence (April 9, 2010). [ID 171, as fn. 33 above] If a sibling or cousin is in a
legal institution or a state body, the sentence can be lighter. You might even be
released without a trial. Without connections like that, the sentence can be very heavy
279
seven out of eight respondents (87.5%) said no, and only one who
appealed a trial court sentence of eight years of correctional prison
labor received three years in the higher court. This was because
he visited the court secretary and paid 50,000 won, enlisting the
secretary's help.35)
4) Extraordinary Appeal and Retrial
An extraordinary appeal rectifies a final judgement and ruling
when it violates the requirements of law (Article 384), while a
retrial rectifies a final judgement and ruling when there are new
facts available (Article 403). Asked if they have seen or heard of
these procedures being used, 185 out of 198 respondents (93.4%)
replied they did not know of them, only 13 (6.6%) professed
knowledge, and eight of the 13 (61.5%) said a wrongful ruling
was rectified by an extraordinary appeal or retrial.
5) On-Site Public Trials
Article
286
of
the
North
Korean
Criminal
Procedure
Act
provides that "A court may organize examination on site in order
to educate the masses and prevent crime. In this case, they may
have
the
representative
of
an
institution,
corporation,
or
organization expose and condemn the criminal's actions." This
on-site public trial is used zealously in real life as well.
Asked if they had attended someone else’s trial examination,
only 18.5% replied that they had,36) but 46.7% had witnessed or
heard of an on-site public trial.37) When asked if the on-site
36) In the 2008 interviews, the rate was 15.3%. Korean Bar Association, 2008 White Paper
on Human Rights in North Korea (Seoul: Korean Bar Association, 2008), p. 215.
280
public trial they watched concluded after the first session, 80.2%
replied that it was,38)while 6.6% said no. In answer to the
question whether the sentence was an amount they could accept,
41.2% said yes. As to the frequency, the answers were generally
once or twice a year, but some said five or six times, or even 20
or more. The acts that were tried in this way were mostly
economic crimes such as attempts to cross the river or defect to
China or larceny, but there were reports of human trafficking,
murder, or robbery on public trial as well. Interestingly, a
significant number of respondents say political crimes are not tried
in on-site public courts. Common venues for public trial are
places
where
the
masses
can
congregate,
such
as
school
playgrounds, market squares, town halls, station squares, river
banks,
movie
theatres,
public
athletic
grounds,
and
farmer's
markets, since the goal is to instill fear in the public. The
sentence is usually death or correctional prison labor.
7. Enforcement of Judgement and Ruling
Chapter
provides
12
for
of
the
the
North
Korean
enforcement
of
Criminal
sentences,
Procedure
including
Act
capital
punishment, release before expiry of term, and stay of sentence.
There is the Enforcement of Judgement and Ruling Act that deals
with the specific procedures for enforcing judicial rulings.
1) Death Penalty
When
asked
in
interviews
whether
they
37) In the 2008 interview, the percentage was 56.5%. Ibid., p. 215.
38) In the 2008 interview, the percentage was 42.0%. Ibid., p. 216.
had
firsthand
281
experience with a family or other acquaintance receiving the death
penalty and being executed, 99 of the 200 respondents (49.5%)
replied they had. Article 29 of the Criminal Act stipulates that the
death penalty may not be imposed on those who under 18 years
of age when they committed the offence, but may it be executed
against pregnant woman. However, the interviews reveal a very
different reality. 16 of the respondents (16.3%) said they knew of
a case where a child under 18 had been sentenced to death and
executed,39) and 56 (58.3%) said pregnant women were being
executed as well, showing that the provisions of the Criminal Act
are not properly implemented.40) The executions were carried out
39) [ID 001 (2010)] I heard this story from a judge in 2005. A child had killed a woman,
and I heard these kids are locked up in some underground jail of the Bowibu (National
Security Agency) and killed in secret. It came from a judge, so it would be almost
certainly true (April 10, 2010). [ID 002 (2010)] In 2001 or 2002, in Hoe-ryeong a
sixteen-year-old was shot for cannibalism of his family and others (March 16, 2010).
[ID 053 (2010)] During the March of Adversity (in the mid to late 1990s, when millions
starved in North Korea --trans.), we didn't have fuel for agricultural machines. Kim
Jong-il said to treat plowing oxen like family, and then there was this family that ate
their ox. I went down there to revolutionize and took care of it by myself. Five years
old, ten years, it didn't matter. I remember thinking that this would never have
happened if Kim Il-sung were here (April 8, 2010). [ID 135 (2010)] When I was in
school, there was a gang led by Kim Seong-do that had a criminal organization and
was trying to overthrow the government. I was studying when they said we had to
watch these people be shot, so I went. He was seventeen years old or so, and he was
shot and killed (March 14, 2010). [ID 179, as note 18 above] When they publicly
executed 12 people for stealing from a threshing yard in May of 1998, one of them
was a little kid who was keeping watch. The mother's mind broke down. [ID 199
(2010)] It was a friend of my brother's, and you know how there can't be any
unofficial organization, beside the Workers’ Party that Kim Il-sung founded? Funny,
but he was seventeen and it was just like a criminal gang. He was executed for the
unofficial organization. Seventeen, and publicly killed (February 22, 2010).)
40) [ID 027 (2010)] If she's one or two months along, they usually abort the pregnancy
and then kill her. If she's farther along, they lock her up to wait until she's delivered
the baby (April 1, 2010). [ID 053, as note 39 above] I haven't seen it, but I've heard
lots of story. They don't care about this pregnant woman stuff. They just kill them
all. [ID 113 (2010)] I heard they forced an abortion and then executed. They're treated
the same as everyone else depending on the crime (March 5, 2010). [ID 174 (2010)] I
haven't seen it, but I know from the stories that four months pregnant women face
the firing squad, too (March 14, 2010). [ID 184 (2010)] According to what I know from
rumors, they have a forcible abortion and then execute (March 31, 2010). [ID 199, as
282
by firing squad, according to most witnesses, but some reported
witnessing hangings. Place of execution includes under bridges,
markets, empty lots, station squares, the hills, school playgrounds,
and the wilderness, with the nature of the places indicating that
most of the executions are public. As in the 2008 interviews, 89
respondents (90.3%) reported witnessing public executions,41) and
86 respondents (86.9%) said residents are forced to witness public
executions.42)
2) Correctional Prison Labor
Article 30 of the North Korean Criminal Act provides that
life-time term and limited-life term correctional prison labor are to
be carried out by a long-term corrective prison camp. Among
those interviewed in 2010, 81 of the 197 valid respondents (41.1%)
said they had experienced or witnessed this sentence, and 37
(19.1%) had experienced it by themselves. When asked whether
everyone who was sentenced to correctional labor labor were sent
to a long-term corrective labor camp, 75 of 81 (92.6%) said yes.
Once
the
sentence
is
issued, some
of
the
basic
rights
of
citizenship are suspended (Article 30 of the Criminal Act).43) Most
interviewees said that one was stripped of citizenship, the right to
vote, and all human rights.
When asked whether men and women and adults and children
fn. 39 above] Pregnant or not, once they're branded traitors to the people they say the
seed has to be stamped out and they forcibly abort even if the woman's pregnant. I've
seen a woman be executed, including one who ate the ox.
41) In the 2008 interviews, the percentage was 80%. Korean Bar Association, as fn. 36
above, p. 217.
42) In the 2008 interviews, the percentage was 66%. Korean Bar Association, as fn. 36
above, p. 217.
43) Revision in July 2005. The previous version states that "the basic rights of citizenship"
are suspended.
283
are detained separately in these facilities, 26 (89.7%) answered in
the affirmative. There is a physical examination at the time of
detention, and especially, many women were subjected to sexual
humiliation in the process.44) Regarding hygiene, 86.9% said the
conditions were dirty, and 90% said there was a heavy stench due
to lack of ventilation, 90% said
it was too dark regarding
lighting condition, and 80% said they received no supplies such as
blankets against the cold in winter, all indicating desperate
conditions in the long-term corrective labor camps.45) When asked
whether family and friends were allowed to visit, 16 respondents
(55.2%) said yes, while 13 (44.8%) said no. 23 (76.7%) said they
were forced to work, 25 (86.2%) witnessed or experienced violence
and brutality within the detainment facility, and five (17.9%)
witnessed
sexual
abuse
and
sexual
violence
against
women
44) [ID 010 (2010)] They force the woman to strip, and then a female Bowibu (security)
agent does a cavity search of the genitals to see if they have any money. They hang
up a blanket like a curtain to block out one side of the room, then they inspect each
woman in turn with a gloved hand. It was so humiliating, I thought so this is how
North Koreans are treated (April 10, 2010). [ID 014 (2010)] They search you for
money. They strip you, and even check the anus. Women are even searched in the
genital area. They make them squat and stand up continuously, waiting for any money
to fall out (March 5, 2010). [ID 079 (2010)] They make you strip, the hands have to be
raised up and backwards, you squat and stand 50 times each, and you're not supposed
to raise your head or anything (March 17, 2010). [ID 081 (2010)] The first inspection,
the men are ordered to stand on one side of the room and the women on the other.
Then they ordered us to strip, right in front of each other. They called in three female
inmates to check the stripped-off clothes, and the women had to squat and stand 100
times, naked. That way, no matter how deep they hid the money inside their vaginae,
it all dropped out (March 16, 2010). [ID 106 (2010)] They stripped the women for
inspection. They put their hands in their genitals to check (April 1, 2010). [ID 175
(2010)] When the women were inspected, they checked her anus and vagina while the
woman looked on. It was like I was a beast from the moment I was caught. I wanted
to die (April 1, 2010).
45) [ID 056 (2010)] There were a hundred of us, and we were issued only three or four
blankets. Only the chief guard and his underlings could use them, we had to make do
with our clothes. If family visits, we can get some clothes from them, but you had to
get on the good side of the chief or the guards to keep them (February 23, 2010). [ID
088 (2010)] There's no such thing as electricity. We had to feel our way by touching
the walls. It was a low underground cave that didn't have sunlight (March 9, 2010).
284
inmates.46)
20 respondents (71.4%) said they had seen inmates die of
violence, frailty, and sickness.47) It is difficult for invalids to
receive treatment and those who may die imminently may be let
46) [ID 106, as fn. 44 above] She was from On-seong like me, and she was dragged away
and raped every night. All the pretty women were called away every night like that.
[ID 198 (2010)] When I was at the Musan-gun (Musan County) Corrective Labor
Camp, it was extremely common for women to be molested and raped. The PSA in
charge of the camp call in the pretty women. When they've been to that room, it's
logical to think they've been raped. These women get free time and easy work, like
cleaning their own room or working at the cafeteria. I think they also get two to three
days of outside leave (April 8, 2010).
47) [ID 001, as fn. 39 above] I heard someone died of paratyphoid before I came in. So
when an inmate has a high fever, fellow inmates and guards are all afraid. [ID 010, as
fn. 44 above] Five PSA officers beat an old man in his sixties with belts and threw
plastic bowls, demanding money. They were at it for hours, and he eventually died. No
one else died while I was there. [ID 011 (2010)] In 2002 at Jeung-san, someone drank
dirty water trying to get medical bail, but fellow inmates informed on the person's
intentions and the person was left to die without treatment (March 18, 2010) [ID 014,
as fn. 44 above] Two men died in the three months starting from June of 2003. They
were weak from lack of food, so many died from tuberculosis, typhoid, or paratyphoid.
[ID 016 (2010)] It was May 2003, a man in his forties from On-seong. He wasn't very
well, quite frail. He was dead in the morning (April 3, 2010). [ID 088, as fn. 45 above]
I don't know the details. Around August, October of 2005, three people in our cell died.
They were rolled up in blankets and buried in the hills, and they were dying every
day. [ID 089 (2010)] Once every few months, the men couldn't bear it. They took sick
quickly and died. It was disease or malnutrition (March 3, 2010). [ID 111 (2010)] It
was a man from Hamkyeongbuk-do (North Hamgyong Province) in October 2004. He
got paratyphoid and died in the end (April 11, 2010). [ID 127 (2010)] Two died, both
from Hoe-Ryeong. Their rectums came undone, they got the weakness and die. I don't
know who they were. This was between March and August of 2005 (March 13, 2010).
[ID 165 (2010)] A lot of people die of malnutrition. About three or four a week
(February 26, 2010). [ID 169, as fn. 33 above] I saw about five die in 2003. About 32
years old, from Hoe-ryeong. He was so weak and malnourished, he threw up all the
medicine and food, and died vomiting blood. Some were beaten to death, I saw some
try to escape and be killed. There's even someone in charge of burning the bodies. [ID
170 (2010)] This person had the weakness, and when I got up in the morning I saw
the body covered with a burlap bag. There was someone from Go-seong in
Gang-weon-do, a fortune-teller. Nine years for that, all bones in the end and died at
some point. About one died every week (March 11, 2010). [ID 179, as fn. 18 above]
There were too many. An elderly woman in the next cell died in the night of colon
inflammation. The food isn't good, there's a lot of weakness from stress, and they die
often. I saw two, a woman of 39 and an old lady in her 70s, of malnutrition and an
ankle injury during labor. [ID 180 (2010)] During 2003 when I was locked up, there
was a new death every morning. They worked without enough food, that's why
(March 19, 2010).
285
out on medical bail.48) Asked if anyone escaped or attempted to
escape, 50% said yes. As for those inmates who did not work or
could not because they were not well, most respondents said they
were beaten or even beaten to death.
3) Disciplinary Prison Labor
Pursuant to Article 30 of the North Korean Criminal Act,
disciplinary prison labor is carried out by sending the prisoner to
a place to labor and its term is from six months to two years.
Unlike in correctional prison labor, the convicted retain the full
rights of citizenship. Each day of prior detainment counts as two
days of disciplinary prison labor. Although this penalty was newly
instituted as a basic criminal penalty in the 2004 Criminal Act
revision, 96 respondents (48.7%) said they had received or knew
of
someone
receiving
disciplinary
prison
labor,
indicating
widespread usage as a sentence. Crimes for which disciplinary
prison labor was sentenced include possession of a cell phone,
illegal
crossing
of
borders,
free
rides
on
public
transit,
or
48) [ID 010 as fn. 44 above] They give you no medicine, no matter how sick you are. If
there's no other way, they let you out briefly to get your strength back at home. It's
called medical bail. [ID 014 as fn. 44 above] It's hard to be treated unless the family
buys medicine and brings it to you. Even if that happens, it doesn't all go to the sick
person's treatment. The instructor embezzles about half of it. [ID 111 as fn. 47 above]
There's no treatment unless the person is close to death, and if death is almost certain
they send you out on medical bail. [ID 169 as fn. 33 above] They give you treatment
but there's no medicine. Unless the family manages to get you medicine, there's no
such thing as treatment. [ID 177 (2010)] No one can get treated unless they're critical.
In summer, about 50 got malaria, typhoid. We were having two, three deaths a day.
Then they dispensed medicine about once a day. When they couldn't swallow, they
used a hose. Festering mosquito or bedbug bites don't get any treatment. It's not
illness there unless it's about to kill you (April 5, 2010). [ID 180 as fn. 47 above] If
it's not about to kill you, they let it be. When my leg was swollen so badly I couldn't
work, they let me out on medical bail. [ID 198 as fn 46 above] They don't give you
any medicine, but you do get seen. The "doctors" are just one or two inmates who
were working in medicine or a similar field. There's no real benefit to being seen by
them.
286
watching illegal videos or DVDs. This sentence is customarily
carried out by corrective labor camps. 92 respondents (96.8%) said
the sentence was served in detention, while only two said they
worked without being detained. The work usually consists of
gathering
firewood
or
working
in
rural
areas,
mines,
or
construction sites. Of the difference from correctional prison labor,
17 replied that the term was different, 18 said the place of
enforcement was different, and 17 said the intensity of the labor
was different. 47, on the other hand, said there was no difference.
Asked whether family visits were permitted, 68 (86.1%) said yes.
41 respondents (56.2%) experienced disciplinary prison labor said
they had experienced or witnessed violence or other brutality, and
25 (34.2%) said they witnessed individuals be disabled or killed
due to the harsh treatment. In answer to the question whether the
disciplinary prison labor was differentiated by gender or age, 68
(86.1%) said it was not. Asked whether they had experienced
molestation or rape, six (7.6%) said yes, and 28 respondents
(36.8%) said they had heard of or witnessed molestation or rape
of women. Asked whether there were deaths or disabilities caused
by accident or illness in the corrective labor camps, 30 (42.3%)
said yes. Four respondents (5.3%) said that they had received or
knew of someone receiving two or longer years of disciplinary
prison labor, indicating that there are cases where sentences are
rendered beyond the legal maximum.
The North Korea's Administrative Act, meanwhile, allows for
one to six months of unpaid labor without trial for violating the
provisions thereof. Interviewees were asked how this differed from
disciplinary
prison
labor.
Respondents
said
those
who
were
administratively punished were not watched, while those serving a
287
criminal sentence were under guard,49) unpaid labor consisted of
working at one's usual place of work without pay, while those
undergoing disciplinary prison labor were sent to another region,50)
and unpaid laborers lived home and commuted, while disciplinary
prison laborers were incarcerated.51) There was also testimony
that entering Pyeongyang (Pyongyang) without authorization resulted
in one month of unpaid labor.52)
4) Other Penalties
Other criminal penalties include deprivation of the right to vote,
the confiscation of property, the deprivation of a license, and
suspension of a licence. These are all imposed in addition to other
types of sentence. Pursuant to Article 32 of the Criminal Act,
deprivation of the right to vote is punishment for anti-state and
anti-national crimes. However, according to the interviews, even
those convicted of other crimes are deprived of their citizenship
cards and suffrage if they are sentenced to correctional prison
labor. Article 33 provides that in the case of confiscation of
property, the family should be left enough food, basic necessities,
and money to maintain minimum living standards, but according
to the interviews only the bare minimum of food, kitchen utensils,
and closets are spared,53) and no money is left behind.54)
5) General Pardon, Special Pardan and Release before Term
Article 53 of the Criminal Act provides for the general pardon
49)
50)
51)
52)
53)
54)
Testimony of [ID 068 (2010)] interviewed by the
Testimony of ID 175, as fn. 44 above.
Testimonies of [ID 021 (2010)], ID 168 as fn. 19
Testimony of [ID 021], as above.
KBA on March 28, 2010.
above, [ID 174] as fn. 40 above.
288
and special pardon as exemptions to criminal penalty. Pardons and
special pardons are decided by the Presidium of the Supreme
People's Assembly (Article 53, Clause 2 of the Criminal Act).
Before the 2009 revision of the North Korean Constitution, the
Constitution also stipulated that the power of pardon belonged to
the Presidium. However, in the revision and supplementation of
the Constitution on April 9, 2009 at the first meeting of the 12th
Supreme People's Assembly, the power of special pardon was
transferred from the Presidium to the head of the National
Defense
Commission.
According
to
a
report
by
the
Joseon
Jung-ang Tongsin (Korean Central News Agency, North Korea’s
official news agency), the two Current TV reporters released at
the visit of former U.S. President Clinton on August 5, 2009 were
released by special pardon of the head of the National Defense
Commission under the revised Constitution. According to the
interviews, 84.3% of respondents know about general pardons and
special
pardons,
and
51.5%
had
received
or
had
witnessed
someone receiving a general pardon or special pardon. As in the
2008 interviews, pardons were given predominantly during the
birthdays of Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il, indicating that pardons
are used to promote the regime. Some responses said that there
were pardons on the anniversary of the Party and the anniversary
of the founding of the DPRK (North Korea). Most responses said
that individuals who were pardoned are usually those convicted of
economic crimes and had a record of good behavior, but three
respondents
reported
cases
where
someone serving time
for
murder was pardoned.55) However, most respondents said that
55) Testimonies of [ID 006 (2010)], [ID 009 (2010)], [ID 030 (2010)], interviewed by the
KBA on March 26, 2010, February 22, 2010, April 10, 2010.
289
political criminals were not pardoned.
Article 54 of the Criminal Act provides that if an individual
serving life-time term correctional prison labor, limited-time term
of
correctional
prison
labor
or
disciplinary
prison
labor
is
genuinely remorseful, actively worked to reform, and achieved the
object of education and reformation, he/she may be exempted from
the rest of his/her sentence after half the term of limited-time
term correctional prison labor or disciplinary prison labor elapsed,
or, for life-time term correctional prison labor sentence, after 15
years. Alternately, life-time term correctional prison labor could be
commuted to limited-time term correctional prison labor. 24.5% of
interviewees had experienced or witnessed such release before the
end of the sentence, but when they went into specifics, these
were mostly cases of pardon or prison bail. It was therefore
difficult to ascertain whether there were cases of the enforcement
agency initiating and a court of law deciding on early release in
accordance with Article 54 of the Criminal Act.
8. Conclusion
North Korea greatly revised its Criminal Act and Criminal
Procedure Act in 2004, and these revised laws still constitute the
framework of current North Korean criminal law although there
have
been
some
minor
subsequent
revisions.
Despite
many
shortcomings, the revised Acts are praised for the improvements
in human rights guarantees over the previous versions.
The 2010 interviews focused on finding out from defectors after
the year 2004 whether the revised Criminal Act and Criminal
Procedure Act were properly applied in real life. Of course, there
are some fundamental limitations in trying to grasp the actual
290
application of North Korean criminal law from these two Acts. A
prominent example is the enactment of the Addendum to the
Criminal Act (General Crimes) in 2007, a law that so far remains
undisclosed,
and
criminal
penalties
based
on
frequent
proclamations. The above Addendum and the heavier penalties
imposed on certain crimes due to the proclamations may render
any attempt to ascertain the reality of North Korean criminal law
from the Criminal Act and Criminal Procedure Act meaningless.
There may be other bodies of criminal law that the outside world
does not know about.
On the other hand, the Addendum and proclamations usually
deal with additional penalties to the specific crimes listed in the
Special Chapter of the Criminal Act. Therefore, the General
Chapter of the Criminal Act and the procedures in the Criminal
Procedure Act still appear to be valid in real life.
Although the results were somewhat expected from earlier
interviews, this round of interviews confirmed that the human
rights provisions of the Criminal Act and Criminal Procedure Act
were not applied very well in real-life situations. As for the
General Chapter of the Criminal Act, a significant number of
respondents said that criminal minors under 14 years of age were
subject to criminal penalties. The interviews also revealed facts
about Hospital 49, which is said to house the mentally ill. The
application of the provisions for medical measures for the mentally
ill and the conditions of Hospital 49 remain areas for further
study.
The procedural provisions under the Criminal Procedure Act
were not properly applied either in reality. Leaving aside the
question of whether the indictment and sentencing were proper,
291
North Korea did nevertheless comply with the provisions of the
Code during the investigation, pre-trial phase, and trial of the two
Current TV reporters. However, this was a high-profile case that
the world, including the United States, was watching, and not a
good indication of ordinary criminal procedures. Particularly in the
investigation stage, the rights guaranteed in the pre-trial phase
including the right to legal representation are omitted, paving the
way for rampant arbitrary uses of investigative powers. The
limits on the detention period are routinely violated in the pre-trial
phase, and the right to legal representation had little effect in real
life. The provisions for trial duration are not observed during the
trial; the central court may appoint itself as a court of first
instance without any restrictions, thereby invalidating judicial
appeal; and legal representation still had no benefits. On-site
public trials and public executions which have been used as
means to control North Korean residents through fear are still
rampant. At the enforcement stage, individuals under 18 years of
age and pregnant women were being executed in violation of the
Criminal Act. The testimonies on conditions in long-term corrective
labor camps that enforce correctional prison labor also show that
there are no improvements over the previous interview results.
As pointed out before, however, the 2010 interviews were also
limited
because
most
of
the
respondents
were
not
legal
professionals, resulting in irrelevant responses for some questions.
This
may
also
be
due
to
the
interviewers'
own
lack
of
understanding of the North Korean criminal law system, and their
resulting inability to guide the respondents to give more useful
responses. There should be efforts to improve interview methods
in the future.
Ⅳ
Specific Cases of Human
Rights Violation
1. The Rights to Food and Economic
Activity
Song Hyun-uk
7. Human Rights of Socially
Marginalized Classes
Kim Tae-hoon
2. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment
Wang Mi-yang
8. Human Rights Situations in Political
Prison Camps
Oh Gyeong-seob
3. Freedom of Conscience and Religion
Jhe Seong-ho
9. Issues Related to North Korean
Defectors
Heo Man-ho
4. Arbitrary Detention
Kim Hyeon-seong
5. Freedom of Opinion and Expression
Hwang Tae-yoon
6. Involuntary Disappearances
Chung Jae-hoon
10. Human Rights Issues in interKorean Relations
Jhe Seong-ho
11. Issues Surrounding the Koreans
repatriated from Japan to North
Korea
Jhe Seong-ho
Ⅳ. Specific Cases of Human Rights Violation
295
1. The Rights to Food and Economic
Activity
￭ Song Hyun-uk
(Doctoral. Candidate in Law, Yonsei University)
1. Laws Regarding the Right to Life
The freedom from starvation and malnutrition is a fundamental
human right. The main contents of the right to food mean that
enough food must be guaranteed to fulfill personal nutritional
needs of citizens both in its quality and quantity. Thus, the right
to food is inseparably linked with human dignity and become an
indispensible right to guarantee other human rights as well.
The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights (ICESCR) acceded by North Korea in September 1981
stipulates that the State parties would recognize the right of all
citizens to maintain an adequate standard of living for North
Korean citizens and their families, including access to adequate
food, clothing, and housing, and to continuous improvement of
living conditions (Article 11, Paragraph 1).
Also, the Covenant made it clear that the State parties have a
responsibility to recognize the fundamental right of all citizens to
be free from hunger and to implement, individually and through
international
co-operation,
measures
to
improve
methods
of
production, conservation, and distribution of food by developing or
reforming
its
agricultural
system
and
ensuring
distribution of food supplies (Article 11, Paragraph 2).
an
equitable
296
Mass starvation occurs due to lack of food, but it cannot be
simply considered an economic phenomenon on grounds that the
prevention of starvation is not exceedingly difficult. Therefore, the
extent of political democratization and the level of response by the
international community in regards to the concerned country
matter in the occurrence of food shortage.
Thus, the country should respect, protect, and fulfill the right to
food and should not violate the right to food and also should
protect its people from the violations of other rights related to
food. Furthermore, the country should perform its national duty,
such as providing its citizens with food in cases when people
cannot find food for themselves, by creating an environment for
people to find, produce and fulfill their need for food. If the
country cannot guarantee the right to food for its people, it should
ask for international aid.
As stated in the second periodic report from April 2002,
following its first report in January 1989, North Korea, as one of
the State parties of the ICESCR, emphasized the point that the
cause of food shortage had been due to natural disaster by which
the right to food of its people, especially the vulnerable, had not
been guaranteed properly.
In the report, North Korea said there is no need for its citizens
to have more than two jobs just to make a living because the
government provides workers with all necessities like food, clothes
and housing in accordance with Article 25 of its Constitution.
Also, the report said that “the government periodically provides
workers and their families with food to meet their ‘rights to
proper food’ according to its ‘rule of national food supply,’ and the
workers of collective farms set aside a year's worth of food and
297
sell farm surpluses to the government after completing the
year-end account settlements and distribution.” The report also
said “the government provides security pension to senior citizens
and equivalent food supplies to the recipients of social security
and
their
families.”1)
This
North
Korean
government
report
became a token submission to illustrate its faithful implementation
of the standard of its international agreement.
Meanwhile,
stipulates,
Article
“...
the
25
of
the
foremost
North
principle
Constitution2)
Korea’s
of
self-activity
is
to
constantly improve people's material and cultural life. In our
country, which abolished taxes, increasing materialistic wealth in
our society is totally shifted to the promotion of worker's welfare.
The
government
provides
every
worker
with
all
kinds
of
conditions for eating, wearing, using, and housing. Also, Article 26
stipulates, “the government guarantees the genuine democratic
rights, freedom and happy, material, and cultural lives of all
citizens.” Article 65 stipulates “people have equivalent rights in
every part of their social lives.”
Also,
Article
24
of
the
Constitution
stipulates
“individual
possession is for people's personal and consumption purpose.
Individual possession is made up of socialistic distribution through
labor and additional benefits from the government and society.
Products
produced
through
individual
side-job
accounting,
including farm accounting and income earned by legal accounting,
also belonged to individuals.”
1) National Human Rights Commission of Korea, Bukhanui Gukjeingwonhyeobyak:Bukhanui
Bogoseo Mit Yuenui Choejonggyeonhae (The Sourcebook on the Implementation of
North Korea’s International Convention on Human Rights: North Korean Report and
the Final Views of the UN) (Seoul: National Human Rights Commission of Korea,
2005), pp. 77-95.
2) The 9th updated constitution was revised and supplemented at the first session of the
12th Supreme People’s Assembly on April 9, 2009.
298
As specified in the Constitution, the North Korean government
insists that it is the government’s responsibility to rectify the
problems of food, and the government will completely guarantee
people's basic human rights for existence. However, the North
Korean Constitution thus far has been an empty rhetoric because
the fundamental rights for existence, such as the right to food and
the right to economic activities, remains an empty shell.
The reality below shows that the causes of chronic food
shortage since the 1990s, which has continued throughout the
2000s and until now, and the reason for the infringement of
people’s basic right to food and Right to Economic Activities
completely is due to the North Korean authority.
Still, the North Korean authority only distributes supplies to the
privileged class, such as the military and the party organization,
and turns a blind eye to how the rest of its citizens eat. People’s
right to access to food is completely restricted by the North
Korean authority and the rights of the vulnerable who are not
capable of living by themselves have been menaced for a long
time.
To maintain their subsistence, a functioning economic system is
desperately needed for the absolute majority who are excluded
from the food distribution system by the North Korean authority.
Due to soaring food prices, the people with weak purchasing
power are faced with an incredibly difficult situation and are
having problems of surviving under the authority's control over
the economic activities. On the other hand, the citizens from the
privileged class who receives food rations from the government
are taking advantage of this situation by accumulating wealth
through embezzlement of food, which is provided via foreign aid.
299
These facts were exposed by the survey conducted in 2010 by the
Korean Bar Association (hereafter referred to as “KBA”) which
interviewed 200 North Korean refugees.
2. Status of Food Supply
1) Reality of Food Supply
It is believed that North Korea’s difficulty in obtaining food
since its serious food crisis has been alleviated due to the
international aid and the recovery of its food production in the
early 2000s. However, the current level of food production in the
country is still much lower than the land’s potential productive
capacity.
The great number of victims that suffered from starvation in
North Korea has been mostly during 1994-2000, a period of
'March of Suffering' in 1995, 1996 and 1997. It is difficult to
extract an exact figure from the closed North Korean society.
While the Rural Development Administration (RDA) estimates that
the total food supply during this period for each year was
respectively
4,410,000,
4,740,000
and
5,120,000,
the
Food
and
Agricultural Organization (FAO) estimates 4,750,000, 3,650,000 and
4,500,000.3) Accordingly, it appears clear that current total food
supply in 2007 remains at a similar level to that of the ‘March of
Suffering’ period.
The grain produced and released to the public in 2007 was
much lower than usual. According to the Rural Development
Administration, North Korea's grain production in 2007 decreased
to 4.1 million ton, which is a reduction of 500,000 tons from the
3) The estimation of total production and foreign food aid are included.
300
previous year. FAO’s estimation was 3 million, about 1 million
less than the other estimate, and the Korea Rural Economic
Institute (KREI) estimates North Korea's lowest grain demand at
around 5,200,000 tons. The Ministry of Unification in South Korea
finds the tentative amount of total grain imported from outside
North Korea in 2007 to be around 700,000 tons including 400,000
tons from South Korea's rice aid. According to this standard, the
food shortage in 2008 reached 490,000-1,500,000 tons. Thus, it
appears that the total production by the sum of production and
introduction is only 3,700,000-4,710,000 tons.
Although
many
domestic
and
foreign
Non-Governmental
Organizations (NGOs) related to North Korea warned that there
might be mass starvation similar to the ‘March of Suffering’
period during the 1990s under the food status in 2008, others
denied
the
likelihood
of
mass
calculation of North Korea's grain
Meanwhile,
the
U.S.
food
food
shortage
based
on
the
demand.4)
aid
to
North
Korea
has
been
suspended since September 2008, as the North Korean authority
has refused to accept additional food aid from the U.S. through
WFP in March 2008. North Korea has also expelled the staff
members of the relief NGOs that have been monitoring food
distribution activities. In the past, North Korea had demonstrated a
cooperative attitude toward food distribution programs of such
organizations.
The North Korean government’s refusal to accept foreign food
aid during their dire situation of serious food shortage is a
4) For instance, the death caused by starvation could be prevented in North Korea if
around 38 million ton of grain were made available to the public and a daily sustenance
of 546 gram of grain per adult (under the standard of reducing food supply by 22%
from 1987) was distributed to every citizen.
301
straightforward demonstration which illustrates the government’s
disregard of its citizens’ food shortage crisis for the sake of its
political benefits.5)
The food condition was the same in both 2009 and 2010.
10,000,000
USD
in
UN
aid
through
the
Central
Emergency
Response Fund (CERF) in the first half year funded North Korea
in accordance with each business via the UN WFP, WHO, FAO
and UNICEF. The biggest recorded UN food aid to North Korea
in the first half of 2009 was 6,500,000 USD via WFP.6)
<Graph Ⅳ-1-1> The Estimation of North Korean Food Demand and Supply7)
7,000
6,000
5,000
Food Aid
4,000
Import
3,000
Production
Minimum (Amount of)
Consumption
2,000
1,000
0
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Year
5) At the time of its refusal to accept food aid from the international community, the North
Korean authority did not state any reasons for its actions. However, many North
Korean experts believe that the refusal to accept international food aid was done in part
to express its displeasure toward the early Obama administration's strong policies
against North Korea and to send a message that the regime will not be easily swayed
in future US-North Korea negotiations. Furthermore, the experts believe that North
Korea's refusal to except food aid was a "pre-emptive attack" by the regime to render
further US sanctions against North Korea useless after its missile launch.
6) Yonhap News, June 20, 2010.
7) Kwon, Tae-jin, “Bukhanui Singnyangwigi- Baegyeong Mit Jeonmang (North Korea’s
Food Crisis: Its Background and Prospects),” JPI Policy Forum, (Jeju: Jeju Peace
Institute, May, 2010), p.5. The data on food supply show a little difference with “The
Right to Food,” 2008 White Paper on Human Rights in North Korea, (Seoul: KBA,
2008) p. 232, because North Korea has no official statistical data on it.
302
According to the special report on Crop and Food Security
Assessment Mission to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea
of FAO, which was presented on May 21, 2010, the amount of
foreign food aid given to North Korea for the period of 6 months
from November 2009 to April 2010 was 177,000 tons.
WFP and FAO estimated that North Korea would suffer a food
shortage
in
the
current
fiscal
year
(Nov.2009-Oct.2010)
by
1,100,000 tons and stated the country could run out of food in
September 2010.8)
North
destroyed
Korea’s
the
sudden
market
currency
economy
reform
base,
in
which
November
the
people
2009
had
developed in the last decade, and it has had an impact on causing
the chronic instability of food supply and demand. Since the
currency
reform,
the
government-designated
North
prices
Korean
on
major
authority
daily
has
set
necessaries
beginning on December 13, 2009. However, this measure has
aggravated people’s suffering in purchasing food due to the price
increases in the market.
In some regions and classes, people are dying of starvation.
The people need to buy most of their food at the market, but it
has been difficult to buy enough food at the market due to its
high prices. Because of this difficult current situation, it has
become increasingly common for citizens to have two meals a
day, some of whom cook rice porridge with corn or unglutinous
rice.
In this context, WFP and FAO estimated in the report that the
number of North Koreans suffering from malnutrition reached
around 7,500,000 from 2004 to 2006. If the total population of
8) Radio Free Asia (RFA), July 2, 2010 and Joongang Il-bo, July 3, 2010.
303
North Korea is 23,000,000, this figure shows that over 32% of the
country’s total population is malnourished and North Korea is the
only country in which more than 30% of the population is
suffering from starvation.9)
In accordance with the testimony of North Korean refugees,
most of the poor in North Korea subsist on ‘corn soup’ and ‘corn
noodle’ during this period. It is analyzed that even though people
have three meals a day with ‘corn soup’ and ‘corn noodle,’ their
nutritive
conditions
cannot help their
suffering
of nutritional
imbalance.
2) Variation of Food Price
When the patterns of food price variations in the North Korean
market were observed, it showed that the North Korean food
prices
increased
slightly
around
harvest
season.
But
shortly
thereafter, the food prices again decreased. The food prices
reached their climax when the prices increased two-fold from the
second half of the year to the poverty season, which was the
spring of the following year.
The rice prices increased two-fold from around 750 won per
1kg in March 2007 to about 1,500 won in September 2007. The
price of rice remained at a steady level without any decrease in
March 2008. By July 2010, it was found that the North Korean
people had been suffering from malnutrition because the market
prices of food in North Korea had been soaring to previous high
levels in only about 6 months time after the country’s currency
reform in November 2009. The rice prices, which hovered at
around 500 won level increased to around 800 won and the corn
9) FAO and WFP, The State of Food Insecurity in the World 2009, (Rome: FAO, 2009).
304
prices increased from 350 won to 400 won.
The price of rice in Hamheung was around 800 won on July 8,
2009 and the corn prices had increased by 450 won. The rice
prices increased by 1,100 won in Cheongjin (Chongjin) on July
th
10 , by 1,050 won in Heoryeong (Heoryong) in Hamgyeongbuk-do
(North
Hamgyong
Province),
by
1,150
won
in
Onseng
(Onsong)-gun, by 1,150 won in Musan-gun, by 1,100 won in
Hyesan
in
Yanggang-gun
and
by
1,050
in
Pyeongseng
(Pyongsong) in Pyeongannam-do (South Pyongan Province). The
figures show that the rice prices increased by more than 1,000
won across the whole country. The rice prices on July 30, 2009
increased by 1,500 won.
The soaring rice prices have had an impact on other daily
necessities. Currently, the average salary of general working
people in North Korea is about 3,000 won a month, and with such
salary, it is estimated that the general public can only afford less
than 3kg of rice, 4kg of corn (600 won), 7kg of potato (350 won)
and 1.4kg of soybean oil (2,200 won) with their monthly salary
when each of the standard unit is set as 1kg.
Before the currency reform, the price of food had risen to
around 2,300 won. After the currency reform, the current food
prices will have increased to about 50 times more if the new food
prices are calculated by the currency exchange rate (standard of
100:1) set by the North Korean government. Due to the soaring
food prices, it is reported that over 60% of the North Korean
population can hardly afford at least two meals a day.10)
The value of the North Korean currency was assessed by
comparing the exchange rate of the North Korean won against the
10) This is based on the materials from the Daily NK, Good Friends and NGOs related to
North Korea and on the fact confirmed by phone call to North Korea.
305
currencies of three countries, including South Korea, the U.S., and
China. The analysis showed that the North Korean economy was
suffering from extreme inflation, as evidenced by two key factors:
the weak exchange rate of the North Korean won against the
th
U.S. dollar (equivalent to 1,204 KRW and 6.7 CNY) on July 30 ,
2000, valuing at only 142 won and surging rice costs at round
1,500 won per 1㎏ when the average salary of the working public
was only about 3,000 won.11)
<Graph Ⅳ-1-2> Development of Food Price Variation during 2002-2010
(unit: 1㎏/period)
3,500
3,000
2,500
2,000
1,500
1,000
500
0
02.8 03.8 04.4 05.2 05.8 06.10 07.9 08.3 08.5 08.6 08.10 09.4 09.9 09.11 09.12 10.1 10.3 10.4 10.6 10.7
The source is based on each material from Daily NK, Good Friends and NGOs related to North Korea.
3. Right to Food
1) Food Distribution Policy
The primary reason for the long-running food shortage in
North Korea is its policy of determining the order of food
distribution under a status system based on the rank of the
central authority.12) Since the so-called ‘loyal class’ with vested
rights, whose number is estimated to be about 5,000, monopolizes
11) During the same period, the price of rice in South Korea was around 2,250 per 1 kg.
12) See 2008 Bukhaningwonbaekseo (2008 White Paper on Human Rights in North Korea)
(Seoul: Korean Bar Association, 2008), pp. 227-229.
306
the food distribution process, people are often left without access
to food. The ‘loyal class’ often takes advantage of their stable
food supply by pocketing and selling the food surplus to the
market middlemen to make profit.
The existing hierarchical distribution system in North Korea
and the reality of food distribution are as follows.13)
Hierarchical Distribution System
∙ First Place: The privileged class, which is the core that
maintains of the North Korean system, receives special favor
from the Ro-dong-dang (hereafter referred to as “Workers’
Party”), Military Authority, the Bowibu (National Security
Agency), People’s Safety Agency, Prosecution, Court and the
like. They are regularly supplied with ample amount of food
and
high-priced
groceries
under
the
special
distribution
system and are estimated to account for 2.5% (half a million)
of the total population’s supply in North Korea.
∙ Second
Place:
includes
families
of
soldiers,
policemen,
executives of the court system, and local administrative
organs (province, city, county, party, the machinery of law,
and administrative agency). Although they do not receive as
much supply as high-ranking executives, the second level of
the distribution system also receive a basic supply to live on.
∙ Third Place: includes the staff members of the war industry
and state enterprises, which have great importance to the
North Korean authority and their families. The third level of
13) Limitations are abound when collecting information about North Korea, since sources of
information are often secondary sources, such as interviews with North Korean
refugees and reports from NGOs, and no official government reports from the North
Korean regime are available.
the distribution system
is
also
307
supplied with food and
necessities from their workplace but their supply would be
suspended during times of food stock shortage.
∙ Fourth Place: consists of laborers and their family, among
others, and they are estimated to number around 7 million.
Since the mass starvation in 1995, the distribution system
has actually been paralyzed and has not reached the fourth
level of distribution.
In addition, more than 5 million peasants14) that work at
collective farm have been currently downgraded to the vulnerable
class because many of them have only received some food for
less than half year under the policy of prioritizing and securing
rice for military.
In the end, with the exception of the merchants who are barely
making ends meet through their businesses at the market, the
vulnerable and peasant of the fourth class are suffering from
malnutrition and starvation caused by serious food shortage.15)
The
malnutrition
of
the
fourth
class
is
severe.
Since
three-fourths of the households in North Korea cannot afford
high-protein foods and scrape a living mainly through cereals and
vegetables, many people cannot help but look for wild plants that
have no nutritional value and cause indigestion. It is widely
known that one in every three people and one in every four
infants and children under five-year old weighs below average
due to malnutrition in North Korea.
14) Refer to the testimony of the former secretary of the Worker’s Party, Hwang
Jang-yop, North Korean Human Rights Problems (1999).
15) For more detailed information on the vulnerable class, see 2008 White Paper on
Human Rights in North Korea, (Seoul: Korean Bar Association), pp. 239-242.
308
For example, if people were to cook noodle with 1kg of corn,
the supply will disappear too quickly. Therefore, the people would
rather put more water into 1kg of corn as if cooking an
unglutinous rice porridge, or making loose noodles, so that they
would have three more meals with 1㎏ of corn to sustain
themselves.
In a survey conducted by the Korean Bar Association in 2010,
most people responded to the question “How did you secure food
in North Korea?” by stating they usually secured food through
planting small vegetable gardens on their land and purchasing
needed food supplies at the market with money made from their
side businesses.
In another question, “Who were continuously supplied with food
in your community?,” 75% of the respondents (60 people) said
that the privileged class, such as the Workers’ Party, the Bowibu,
Prosecution, the People’s Safety Agency officers, military officers
and the like, were given priority in securing the food supply.
These executives would in turn sell their surplus at the market to
make extra money. Interestingly, some laborers working for the
railroad and at mines also occasionally received food supplies, as
the North Korean authority regarded them as important industries.
<Graph Ⅳ-1-3> Which strata are supplied with food continuously?
Pyeongyang
7%
railroad, mine
13%
etc
5%
Party, military,
prosecution,
Bowibu, public
officials
75%
309
In another question asked in the survey regarding the victim of
starvation, 25 respondents answered that they have seen the
victims of starvation in person around their town, near train
stations, and in markets since 2007 and/or have indirectly heard
about them through people around them.
2) Centralization of Capital
In general, the inflow and expenses of North Korean funds
show that the funds are mostly concentrated around so-called
‘party funds,’ which primarily are under the control of Kim Jong-il
and secondly under the influence of market economies. The
testimony of facts below illustrates how Kim Jong-il has made
use of enormous funds on personal agendas that are completely
unrelated to the country’s national economic budget through an
organization of Room No. 39.
The following is the testimony of former secretary of the Workers’
Party; Hwang Jang-yop (defected to South Korea in 1997):
“Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il have squandered state property
as if the national budget was their personal rice bowl. Even
though many people have died from starvation in 1995 and 1996,
Kim Jong-il mobilized enormous amount of materials, funds and
efforts to preserve Kim Il-sung’s body and to continue funding
the idolization propaganda campaigns of the Great Leader. It was
calculated that saving one-third of the funds used for decorating
the palace could have purchased 2 million ton of corn. With that
amount of food, it would have been possible to prevent people
from dying of hunger immediately.16)
16) Hwang Jang-yop, Bukhanui Ingwonmunje (Human Rights Problems in North Korea)
310
“There are many troops. According to the most important
deputy Prime Minister of the cabinet in 1990 who had worked for
the Party for several years, the number of armed men is around 2
million including 1.7 million in the regular army and 300,000 in
Anjeongun (police force and State Security Department force). The
secretary of the Workers’ Party who is in charge of agricultural
affairs has once said that the amount of food consumed by the
North Korean army was equivalent to that consumed by 5 million
peasants including their families.17)
“Zhirinovsky, the leader of the Liberal Democratic Party of
Russia, visited Pyeongyang with scores of delegates and his
family. Kim Jong-il considered this visit an event of great
importance,
and
he
shared
his
plan
with
me
to
convince
Zhirinovsky and his delegates to be his pillar of support in Russia.
Kim Jong-il told me that he would invest one million dollars to
prepare for the event. At the time, Kim Jong-il probably had a lot
of foreign currency. Since I had known that the secretary of
Agricultural Affairs was condemned due to the massive food
shortage of those days, I thought the surplus of foreign currency
should not have been wasted for such an inconsequential reason.
During those uneasy days, nobody knew when the nation would
go bankrupt. Up until that time, 1.2 million dollars were being
spent every year to fund the Juche Ideology propaganda of Kim
Jong-il. The amount of foreign currency used for the propaganda
was three times more than the foreign currency budget of the
International Office.18)
(Seoul: Hanul,1999).
17) Hwang Jang-yop, Bukhanui Byeonhwawa Daeeungwonchik (The Change in North
Korea and Its Matching Principle) (Seoul: Hanul, 2001).
18) Hwang Jang-yop, Naneun Yeoksaui Jillireul Boatda (I Saw the Truth of the History)
(Seoul: Hanul, 1998).
311
“The Party economics completely belonged to Kim Jong-il as
his
personal
companies
property.
that
had
As
the
such,
best
Kim
Jong-il
technical
included
equipment
and
all
was
considered an important source of foreign currency for the Party
economics.
Since
gold
was
equivalent
to
foreign
currency,
resources like gold mines were primarily incorporated into the
Party economics. A number of companies were affiliated under
Room No. 38 and were also given preferential treatment as the
Party’s companies. The Party was earning foreign currencies by
monopolizing everything that the country could export at very
high prices, such as pine mushrooms, abalone, and other local
products. Although the Prime Minister was at a loss due to the
lack of hundreds of thousands of dollars, Kim Jong-il freely
wasted away hundreds of thousands of dollars through his
personal
daily
events
and
liquor
monopolized the country’s foreign
parties
because
he
had
currency.19)
From the lecture of Jang Yong-sun, former vice director of the
Workers’ Party
“If we now transform the war industries into civilian industries,
we will become an economic power instantly. … During the
March of Suffering, our Great General personally fostered nuclear
scientists now in their 30s and 40s. Rocket launch sites located in
Musudan-ri, Hwadae-gun, Hamgyeongbuk-do (North Hamgyong
Province) were in flames several times (which mean failed
experiments). On all such occasions, the Great General ordered the
experiments to continue by saying “It’s all right.” To develop a
rocket costs a lot of money, but the fruits of developing a rocket
19) Hwang Jang-yop, Bukhanui Ingwonmunje (Human Rights Problems in North Korea).
312
cannot be compared against any amount of money regardless of
how many 50 huge factories like Kimchaek Iron and Steel
Complex are sold off. Therefore, the Great General said he
continued to put money into here despite knowing clearly that
people were suffering
from starvation during
the
March
of
Suffering.”20)
The testimony and deposition above are only the tip of the
iceberg due to the concealment of inside materials, but the
testimony above is an example, which illustrates a relatively
objective reality of North Korea.
3) Excessive Military Expenditure
North Korea's military expenditures have reached alarming and
unbelievable levels.21) According to the North Korean report from
2006, the North Korean military expenditure is estimated to be
around 1.45 billion to 1.69 billion dollars. This figure according to
our results would be 3.1 to 7.3 times higher than the optimum
level in military spending. Furthermore, the total projected base
military budget of North Korea for the same year, including all of
20) Through this remark of the executive of the Workers’ Party, it was confirmed that
Kim Jong-il invested foreign currency into nuclear development in the middle of ‘mass
starvation’ at the time. For more detailed information, see the deposition of the
executive of the Workers’ Party in “Du Eolgul Bukhan Silche to Deureonatda (The
Reality of the Janus-faced North Korea Was Illustrated Again),” Monthly Joongang
(July 2007).
21) Yoon Hong-suk and Hong Song-kuk, “Bukhan Gunsabi Jeokjeong Mit Gwadajichul
Gyumo Chujeong (The Estimation of the Optimum and Excess Level of North Korea’s
Military Expenditure),” The Studies of International Affairs, vol.9, no. 2 (Seoul: Institute
for National Security Strategy, 2009), pp. 151-187; Seong Chae-gi, “Bukhanui
Gunsugyeongjewa Inmingyeongje Siltae (The Reality of the North Korean Military
Economics and People’s Economies),” Gimilseongui Seongunjeongchiwa Bukhangyeongjeui
Jeonmang (Kim Jong-il’s Military-First Policy and the Prospects for the North
Korean Economy), Seminar at the Institute for National Security Strategy (INSS) on
October 26, 2009.
313
its concealed military expenditures, is estimated to be around 6.0
to 6.24 billion dollars, which would be 12.8 to 27.1 times higher
than the maximum military spending level. Among the Second
World countries whose GDP per capita is between 500 to 2000
dollars, the scale of military spending by North Korea dwarfs the
military spending of Armenia which boasts the largest military
expenditure size among all the Second World countries (8.8 times
higher than the optimum level).
North
Korea’s
incredibly
large
military
expenditure,
which
continues despite the great economic hardships of its people, can
be analyzed as a sign that the country is firmly committed at the
present to its Military-first policy and is devoted to investing
necessary
resources
in
nuclear
power
projects,
missile
development, and national defense industries regardless of its
economic conditions or difficulties. This Military-first policy of the
North Korean regime has clearly forced the North Korean public
to sacrifice a great deal, and the policy projects to be a great
impediment to the economic development of North Korea.
In addition, it is well known that the North Korean authority
spends billions of dollars every year to maintain the world’s fourth
largest standing army although the country’s yearly GDP is only
one-thirtieth of that of South Korea’s. As a result of this
situation, the budget cuts, which have impacted the everyday lives
of citizens, have been naturally brushed aside by the authority’s
military-first distribution system under its claim of Military-first
Politics. This adds to deepen the food shortage.
One reason why North Korea has been able to establish and
operate such large military capacities despite its small economic
scale is due to its wartime and barrack systems, which suppress
314
the people’s consumption of food and necessities over a long haul.
Another reason is the constant brainwashing and a system of
suppression that controls and monitors the public. Lastly, the
extreme and preferential considerations that the military receives
in resource allocation and distribution, as well as its economic
uniqueness, could be considered as other viable reasons.
<Table Ⅳ-1-1> The Organization and Size of North Korean Military Economics22)
Classification
Main
Organization
-Second
Economic
Committee
-Second
National
Second
Econom Academy of
ics
Natural
Science
-Special
Research
Military
Institute
Econom
ics
Economic Unit
Number of
Manpower
-Total 300-500
munitions
factory and
workplace
related to
military
component
-Affiliated
trading
company
About
50-60
million
Weapon,
equipment,
R&D,
production
About
11.5
million
-Production
and
operation of
military
supplies
-Maintenance
of military
operations
-70 self
munitions
factories
-Affiliated
-100 trading
organization
Military
to the
companies
Econom
Ministry of
and its
ics
People’s
affiliated
Armed Forces
factories,
agricultural
farm
Basic
Function
In the survey, when a subjective question, “What do you think
is the reason for the continued food shortage?” was asked, 44% of
the
respondents
answered
that
the
distribution
of
food and
resources to be first used by the military as war supplies and
22) Seong Chae-gi, ibid.
315
nuclear development was the reason. 38% of respondents believed
that wrong policy decisions were the reason.
<Graph Ⅳ-1-4> What is the cause of food crisis?
etc
10%
dictatorship
8%
military, war
supplies, nuclear
development, etc.
44%
wrong policy
38%
Some
noteworthy
answers
and
remarks
of
North
Korean
refugees to the survey are listed below:
[ID 007 (2010)] All foods are turned into war supplies, not
given to the people.
[ID 011 (2010)] Since there are many troops, the military needs
a lot of rice. In fact, the conditions for the
people would not be as difficult if rice supplies
were not going to the military.
[ID 027 (2010)] If
necessary
rice
rations
were
regularly
distributed to the people, the people’s needs
might
be
somewhat
fulfilled.
However,
the
people are forced to make up for the shortage
by buying food in the market for ten times the
normal prices.
[ID 036 (2010)] Even though the rice goes to the military
authority, the soldiers barely eat rice.
316
[IDs 041, 043 (both 2010)] That’s because Kim Jong-il is not
doing well.
[ID 049 (2010)] The
freedom
of
economic
activity
for
individuals leads to the release of food. The
reason for the scarcity of food and its high
cost is due to the government’s restrictions.
[ID 055 (2010)] If only one-third of the food given to the
military or war industry were to be distributed
to the people, the people would not be in such
trouble like this.
<Graph Ⅳ-1-5> Who pockets the relief food?
I don't know well. I just
see it at the market.
5%
The military have
mearchants take
it away from the
port or the
station.
33%
High officials (Party,
Bowibu, police) and
the local grain policy
enterprise do it.
62%
4) Misappropriation of Food Aid
In the survey, 62% of the respondents said that the executives
(the Party, State Security Department, police) and Grain Policy
Division, which are responsible for distributing the food aid from
the international community, often pass on the food to the rice
merchants of different markets. 33% of the respondents testified
that the military handed the food over to the merchants while
transporting the food at seaports and train stations.
[ID 011 (2010)] The military first takes the rice that enters the
317
port of Songrim. If the military sells the food
to
the
merchants
during
the
transportation
process, the buyer sells the food at the market.
[ID 031 (2010)] When the food is coming into the port of
Nampo, Heungnam, Songrim and Haeju, the
supply is primarily taken by the sailor guards
as quickly as possible from the ships. Since
the UN takes photos, the soldiers in plain
clothes change their car plate numbers and
wait. Since they have no gasoline, they sell
their food to gasoline merchants, who in turn
sell their procured rice to rice merchants.
[ID 051 (2010)] When rice comes into the port of Heungnam,
the soldiers take off their military uniforms,
change military cars to common cars, and then
hand the food over to the market.
[ID 053 (2010)] When an executive takes the food, his children
sell it off at the market at times.
[ID 084 (2010)] I know it very well since my female cousin
used
to
work
for
the
Local
Grain
Policy
Enterprise. There are shock troops for party
members. They put all the supplies into burlap
sacks made in North Korea and deliver them
to
the
military.
The
rest
of
the
rice
is
delivered to the market.
[ID 114 (2010)] When I worked for Jangryong Rest Center, my
boyfriend,
who
was
a
soldier,
specially
transported food. His mother received some
rice when he gave some of it to her.
318
[ID 137 (2010)] An executive would select a few merchants
among his relatives, or close associates, and let
them wholesale rice.
[ID 160 (2010)] Since
the
military
troops
cannot
move
to
remote places, they usually come to Cheongjin
port
to
receive
their
rice
and
fertilizer.
Afterwards, they take the cash by handing
over the rice to rice merchants of Cheongjin.
[ID 173 (2010)] The military sells their rice to the market and
buys corn with the proceeds again to fill up
their weights. With the profit made from the
transaction, they illegally accumulate wealth.
[ID 174 (2010)] The
executives
hand
the
food
over
to
merchants and receive money back from them.
As widely expected, 100% of the interviewees have seen the
marked
logos
of
the
“UN,”
“International
Red
Cross,”
“the
Republic of Korea National Red Cross,” “U.S.A.” and the like on
the sacks of the rice sold at the market. Therefore, it is verified
again that the food aid given to North Korea by the international
community can be seen at the market.
[ID 073 (2010)] I have seen it before, but it has increased
rapidly since 2008.
[ID 036 (2010)] The sack was marked with ‘Rice from the
Republic of Korea National Red Cross, Rice
from the Honam Plains.
[ID 034 (2010)] I have seen rice sacks with ‘rice from South
Korea’ written on it, but I could not get it
319
because it was too expensive.
(The rest is omitted)
The North Korean refugees testified that the flow of food aid
given to North Korea by the international community was sold to
the
market
merchants
through
the
military
and
the
food
distribution authority. The cash from the sale profited military
officers and executives. Nevertheless, the refugees who were once
North Korean soldiers unanimously agreed that there are a lot of
rank and file soldiers suffering from malnutrition after the military
officers take the food.23)
5) Exploitation of Farming Area
All agricultural products produced from the collective farms
owned by the North Korean authority are used under the order of
the authority. The food distribution in farm villages takes a form
of explicit exploitation by requisitioning a fixed quantity of food
from the collective farms by force under the pretext of securing
the military’s rice.
Since
the
state
authority
cannot
help
but
stick
to
its
Military-first policy due to its dependence on its last bastion, the
military, as a result of the long-running food shortage and
economic collapse, this has intensified its control and exploitation
of the agricultural surpluses in order to feed the military and to
prevent the privileged class from going into a political unrest. The
Military-first
politics,
especially,
worsens
the
society’s
food
shortage by giving the military a priority in the food distribution
23) For detailed information on the diversion of food aid, refer to 2008 White Paper on
Human Rights in North Korea, (Seoul: Korean Bar Association), pp. 242~248.
320
system. This reality illustrates how the agricultural problems are
a part of a complicated conflict of interest that is at the heart of
the North Korean system’s survival and resource distribution.
Thus, the future of farm villages in North Korea, so to speak, is
gloomy.24) The following statements from the interviews illustrate
the realities of North Korean farm villages:
[IDs 007 ,049, 061, 096 (all 2010)] There was no distribution at
all.
[ID 008 (2010)] The food is delivered to the military first, and
taken by a judge next. The rest is distributed
to the peasants for another 3 months after
getting the necessary seeds. Many people were
dying of hunger and were not even able to
sow the seeds in the spring.
[ID 011 (2010)] I was supplied with 3-4 bags of corn full of
ears and with 3-4 bags of rice as it is.
[ID 017 (2010)] The poorest people are the peasants.
[ID 022 (2010)] Even farmers cook porridge with corn powder
by soaking mugwort.
[ID 031 (2010)] Due to the lack of required rice for the
military and the false reports of executives, it
is the peasants who have difficulties.
[ID 032 (2010)] At least 400kg should be offered per capita,
but (the authority) does not even supply 100㎏.
[ID 035 (2010)] After being supplied with three months’ worth
of food, the rest needs to be secured by one’s
24) Jeong Eun-mee, “Bukhanui Chejesaengjollyeokgwa Nongchonui Yeokhal (The Viability
of North Korea and the Role of Its Rural Society),” Nongchonsahoe (Agricultural
Society), vol.19, no. 1 (2009), pp. 49~81.
321
own.
[ID 036 (2010)] After offering some to the government, we get
150kg. If we cannot steal some food in the fall,
that means we have to starve.
[ID 041 (2010)] 50% of the food goes to the military and to
the Central Party.
[ID 042 (2010)] Since the food rations were last distributed, we
have been without food for 6 months.
[ID 049 (2010)] Sometimes,
corn
from
my
own
vegetable
garden was taken away by the authority to
meet its planned quota.
[ID 050 (2010)] After the spring, a lot of peasants eat porridge.
[ID 055 (2010)] It is all right in the fall, but it is too difficult
to live on from the winter to summer.
[ID 088 (2010)] The food firstly goes to the military. We are
asked to raise and offer pigs to the military. If
we can’t comply, we lose our food rations
instead. So, we have almost nothing.
[ID 105 (2010)] Even though the house in front of mine was a
farm in the past, people were just lying down
all day long and wander around in bare feet
because there was nothing to eat.
[ID 125 (2010)] Since I can’t bear the sight of the executives
carrying our food in the fall, I told them I
would not participate in the farming. The
poorest
are
the
peasants
because
there
is
nothing for them but farming. The people in
city, on the other hand, can open their own
businesses at the market.
322
[ID 161 (2010)] There is a certain amount of food, so called
‘5·14 military support’, to offer to the military.
[ID 169 (2010)] If I say that I can’t do farming because I only
get five months’ worth of food, it is considered
as a challenge against the law or the Party.
[ID 173 (2010)] The amount of food in return for my one-year
labor is just 3 months’ worth of corn.
[ID 093 (2010)] It is hard to live only with the rationed food.
So, we cook porridge or rice cooked with
vegetables.
As testified above, the peasants have many things to offer to
the nation. Each household is required to raise and offer pigs and
other things to the military in the various pretexts. Under harsh
pressures, citizens are inevitably forced to offer cash by selling
food.
Also
at
times,
‘farm
village
support’
or
‘farm
village
mobilization’ and so-called ‘mobilization without compensation’ take
on the form of labor exploitation. Typically, the authority sets a
‘farming first policy’ in advance during the spring, fall and the
farming season and forces soldiers, factory workers, citizens and
even students to mobilize, creating massive farming support units
during the farming season under the disguise of resolving the
country’s chronic food shortage.
During the rice planting season, all citizens are required to
participate in farming activities, because the government mandates
that ‘all consumers of rice must support agricultural activities’ of
Collective Farms and so are students and college students. When
entering the market place and engaging in business activities at
323
the market, all citizens are required to produce a ‘pass,’ which
certifies their participation in the collective farming effort. The
time in which the authorities allow the market to open is after 4
pm and only then is the general public allowed to enter the
market. At times, the local North Korean authorities actively
patrol all major roads to forcibly recruit citizens in cars, on
bicycles, and on foot to work in farmlands all day. In cases where
a member of a household is found to have not participated in the
collective farm effort, the household is forced to pay a fine to
In-min-ban (people’s neighborhood unit).
Under such an economic policy in which farmland support is
mobilized by force, the lack of compensation for laborers has been
common in North Korea for a long time. In terms of agricultural
outputs produced in autumn, the North Korean authority has
consistently rewarded itself handsomely without regard to its people
by taking most of the total agricultural output. In the name of
supporting the North Korean regime, the North Korean public has
been forced to work without compensation for quite some time.
6) Control over Small Pieces of Land
For the North Korean people, personal arable lands25) and
individual
businesses
are
an
important
means
of
survival.
Therefore, although farming for personal consumption in North
Korea is prohibited, the North Korea people actively cultivate
barren
patches
of
fields
and/or
vegetable
gardens
to
partly
25) In North Korea, small personal farmlands are referred to as "small pieces of land," and
these small farmlands are generally created by cultivating mountain slopes. Due to the
small size of the farmland, the yield is mostly small, but the grains harvested from
these lands help in supplementing the food shortage. When the size of the personal
farmland is fairly large, the yield of grain can also be substantial, thus contributing to
the food supply of the people.
324
compensate for their food shortage. The grains produced from
personal farming operations could equal between 3-6 months’ supply
of food, or in some cases, a year’s worth of food supply. For the
people who are able to run businesses at the market, surplus corns
from personal farming operations are saved and sold to purchase
their daily necessaries (laundry soap, shoes, cooking oil, etc).
Presently,
the
combined
size
of
land
areas
cultivated
for
personal use by the North Korean public is approximately one
hundred thousand hectare and the agricultural products produced
from these lands, such as corn and beans, are estimated to be
around three hundred thousand ton.26) During 2004-2005, the North
Korean authority allowed organizations, companies, and individuals
to cultivate farmlands deemed undesirable but, during 2006-2007,
the authorities began to crack down on the practice. Under the
decision of the Central Committee Cabinet in 2008, the authority
made a policy that forbade all organizations, companies and
individuals from engaging in personal farming operations and
confiscated all personal farmlands, which were cultivated by
individuals.27)
On September 20, 2009, the Local People’s Committee, in the
name
of
farmlands,
measuring
issued
an
exact
grain
executive
yields
order
from
small
regarding
personal
‘the
exact
judgment of the expected food yield through the national register
project over small personal farmlands.’
In accordance with an order of the National Defense Committee
to remove all small personal farmlands in 2009, the local officials
26) It was estimated by Dr. Kwon, Tae-jin at the Korea Rural Economic Institute.
27) Lee Seung-yong, “Bukhandanggugui Tongjeganghwawa Juminsaengjongwon (North
Korea’s Strengthening Control and People’s Right to Life),” at the 21st Expert Forum
of Peace Foundation on May 13, 2008.
325
from
Onseong-gun
in
Hamgyeongbuk-do
(North
Hamgyong
Province) forcibly confiscated all small personal farmlands to plant
seedlings. However, when the local people organized a major
opposition by pulling seedlings out to plant grains, the military
soon permitted the cultivation of small farmlands on the condition
that
the
people
guarantee
the
growth
of
seedlings
around
mountainous areas for this year only, except around major roads
and rivers.28)
In
Eundeok-gun
of
Hamgyeongbuk-do
(North
Hamgyong
Province), 75% of the entire workforce was engaged in the
cultivation of small personal farmlands in 2010 on account that
personal farming management was relatively easy to begin. For
years, the people have been getting into trouble for farming
personal lands in secret, because the practice had been banned
until last year when, due to the rampant spread and prevalence of
small personal farming among the large public majority, the
cultivation of small farmlands was permitted. During the last two
months of May and June 2010, the North Korean laborers received
no food supply at all. Therefore, they prolonged their lives by
only having two meals a day with porridge boiled with corn
power, wormwood and wild greens.29)
With respect to the North Korean policy regarding small
personal farmlands thus far, the authority has permitted small
personal
farming
on
restricted
levels.
However,
due
to
the
authority’s fears that its complete acceptance of such policy could
lead to negative side effects, such as people’s negligence of its
collective
farms, the authority has controlled small, personal
28) North Korea Intellectuals Solidarity, “Choegeun Bukhannaebu Sosik (Recent North
Korean News),” Bukhan Sahoe (North Korean Society), no. 3 (2009). p. 154.
29) Good Friends, Oneurui Bukhansosik (North Korea Today) (July 12, 2010).
326
farming operations by the means of frequent confiscations.
4. Right to Life (Economic Activities)
1) Confiscation of Property by Currency Reform
North
Korea’s
sudden
currency
reform
in
November
2009
worsened the hardships of people under the country’s economic
downturn. In North Korea, the growth of its private sector has
been a major source of its economic revitalization. However,
because the authority could not collect the floating currency used
for individual trade at the market, the growth of uncontrolled
currency exchange among the public has caused the exhaustion of
the national strongbox. In this context, the North Korean currency
reform could be seen as a measure by the North Korean government
to confiscate the uncontrolled flow of the public market’s currency.
The North Korean currency reform measures were completely
different
from
the
currency
exchange
for
trade.
No
prior
notification for the currency exchange was given to the public,
and a strict restriction was placed on the amount of currency that
could be exchanged at one time. The exchange period only lasted
for 7 days from November 30, 2009 to December 6, and the
exchange rates for cash and bank deposits were different. Cash
was exchanged in the ratio of 100:1, whereas money in banks
was exchanged at a ratio of 10:1. The total number of newly
issued currency was 14; 9 different types of bills (5,000 won,
2,000 won, 1,000 won, 500 won, 200 won, 100 won, 50 won, 10
won, 5 won), 5 different types of coins (1won, 50 jeon, 10 jeon, 5
jeon and 1 jeon).30)
30) Choo Seok-young, “Bukhan Hwapyegaehyeogui Baegyeonggwa Gyeongjejeok Cheungmyeoneseoui
327
By executing the currency reform measure, the North Korean
state authority showed that it could make the public’s hard-earned
savings a scrap of paper whenever the state authority desired or
saw fit. The authority set a fixed 7-day exchange period and
restricted the amount of currency that could be exchanged in a
single day to prevent the public from exceeding a set standard of
wealth allowed, regardless of how much money the people had in
their possession. The forced currency exchange reform, which
restricted the wealth of the public, is literally the tyranny of the
merciless North Korean state authority.
In an interview, the North Korean refugees testified that the
true motive behind the currency reform was to suppress the
market forces and
to
guarantee the special
benefits
of the
executive by filling up the authority’s strongbox through a ‘forcible
distribution’ and was not for the economic benefits of the people.
<Graph Ⅳ-1-6> What is the purpose of currency reform?
Etc.
7%
To Control
(capitalistic
elements or trade)
27%
To confiscate
money for the
regime stability
66%
The livelihood of all local people, who were prolonging their
lives through their small businesses, was severely hit by the
currency reform measure. This currency confiscation measure has
Jeonmang (The Background of North Korean Currency Reform and Its Economic Prospect),”
Gukbang-jeoneol (National Defense Journal), Jannary, 2010.
328
resulted in a vicious cycle of soaring prices for food and goods
due to the market suppression caused by the exhaustion of the
floating currency supply. Since the public was not prepared for
the money confiscation, the people could neither buy nor sell
goods. What is worse, the prices of goods inevitably increased
since the people could not buy goods.
Although the North Korean state authority set new national
prices for all major necessities soon after the currency reform on
December 13, 2009, the prices of goods increased greatly in the
market.
In
July
2010,
the
market
prices
in
North
Korea
skyrocketed to previous high levels in only a half-a-year after the
execution of the currency reform in November 2009. The local
people were extremely troubled with this situation, as the price of
rice, which in May 2010 was around the level of 500 won,
increased to about 800 won and the price of corn also soared from
350 won to 400 won.
On July 10, 2010, the prices of rice increased to 1,100 won in
Cheonjin, 1,050 won in Hoeryong of Hamgyeongbuk-do, 1,150 won
in Onseong-gun, 1,150 won in Musan-gun, and 1,100 won in
Pyeongseong of Pyeongannam-do (South Pyongan Province). By
July 30, 2010, the price of rice in the whole country had increased
by more than 1,000 won, as rice prices soared to 1,500 won.31)
The market’s soaring grain prices, which are largely due to the
currency reform, have reached a point of crisis for the local people
who lack the purchasing power and are dying from hunger. In
short, the North Korean people are currently threatened by
conditions even more difficult than their situations before the
currency reform due to the decrease in people’s food purchasing
31) Refer to the previous table on “Food Price Variation.”
329
power following the cash confiscation and increases in prices of
goods caused by the reduction of market functions and shortages
of food and daily necessities.
2) Market Control
One of the reasons for the prolonged food shortage in North
Korea
since
the
1990s
is
the
fact
that
the
North
Korean
government has had absolute control over its people’s individual
economic activities, which in many countries is the people’s
fundamental right.
With the collapse of the North Korean food distribution system,
which dates back to the country’s worst food shortage during the
1990s, the North Korean people have been relying on the market
for their survival, and those with resources have rushed into
businesses randomly. Since the most daily necessities, including
food and even factory materials that the people need in their lives,
are available in the expanded market, the market has become an
indispensable
place
for
the
sustenance
of
people’s
economic
activities to maintain their lives. Presently, the North Korean
people largely believe that ‘they should find their own ways to
survive without depending on the nation anymore.’
In a survey, 77% of the respondents said they had engaged in
personal economic activities (business, day labor, small pieces of
land, etc.) while living in North Korea, illustrating how critical
and essential personal economic activities had become for the
North Korean people in terms of their survival.
The inevitable truth of the reality is as follows. If the North
Korean state authority does not guarantee the rights of its citizens
to engage in private economic activities as means of securing
330
foodstuffs and other daily essentials, the food shortage situation of
North Korea will intensify as time goes on.
In this regard, the North Korean authority has a responsibility
to protect its public from hunger and death by allowing the people
the opportunity to conduct personal economic activities in market
places where the people can have open access to daily goods that
they need to sustain their lives when the government is unable to
provide for its people. The North Korean state authority, however,
has decided to suppress the expansion of its local markets
because it is a form of capitalism.
<Graph Ⅳ-1-7> What economic activities were you involved in before you
defected to South Korea?
Workplace
and farm
23%
Personal economic
activities (trade,
labor, general
goods, vegetable
garden, small land)
77%
<Graph Ⅳ-1-8> Was personal business or your workplace enough to do for a
living?
Enough
17%
Not enough
to manage it
28%
Hardly
enough to
survive
55%
331
<Graph Ⅳ-1-9> What is the state authority's control over your personal
economic activities?
Restriction on movement
(travel permit)
6%
Consistent bribe
for trade
3%
Prohibition of trade
for those less than
40 years old,
crackdown
25%
Confiscation of goods
(often need money to
get them back)
66%
When people were asked in the survey, “How strict was the
government’s
control
over
economic
activities?”,
the
people
answered that the buyers hardly had any problems, while the
sellers endured great difficulties due to the frequent government
crackdowns at the market.
[ID 007 (2010)] In 2008, a security guard took the clothes I
was selling. I was only able to get them back
after I paid him some money.
[ID 009 (2010)] I hid scrap metals under the firewood and sold
them secretly. A people’s safety agent found
that out and took them all from me.
[ID 017 (2010)] A young child got busted for selling medical
herbs by a people’s safety agent, but I heard
that he could not get them back.
[ID 023 (2010)] There’s actually no difficulty for buyers at the
market, but sellers were chased by crackdowns
many times.
[ID 026 (2010)] At times, there were big jumps in the rice
prices due to the control over food. It makes
332
me upset that I can’t buy food.
[ID 030 (2010)] The authority cracked down on selling rice for
about three days in the winter. So, people who
bought 1kg of rice everyday were in trouble.
[ID 032 (2010)] The young people were not allowed to sit
down at the market, because they made them
go out for work.
[ID 055 (2010)] Since the authority would sometimes control
rice sales, it was hard to buy rice because of
the increases in prices.
[ID 081 (2010)] There were crackdowns on food at times.
Instead, industrial supplies were forbidden from
being sold.
[ID 105 (2010)] It cracks down on people who are older than
40 for selling stuffs.
[ID 173 (2010)] The authority sought people older than 40 and
let them sell stuffs off instead. If caught, all
stuffs were taken.
[ID 174 (2010)] In around 2008, I had seen people get their
goods confiscated while selling used goods,
because South Korean trademarks were on
them.
[ID 185 (2010)] People’s safety agents in charge of the market
cracked down on the market every day, and
the
Department
of
Inspections
under
the
military’s Ministry of Security also cracked
down on the market frequently.
333
In analyzing the answers of interviewees, it is possible to
identify the patterns of North Korea’s busts. It appears that the
state authority could not completely confiscate all industrial goods
since most of them were made in China. However, the state
authority had no problems confiscating rice and taking proceeds
from its sale.
According to various materials, the total number of existing
markets in North Korea is estimated to be about 300-350 and at
its maximum capacity, a regular-sized North Korean market could
accommodate a population of around 2,000-10,000 people. The
number of technical businessmen is around 0.7-0.8 million, or
about 3-4% of the whole population. In Pyeongyang, about 40
markets exist, whereas only 3-5 markets exist within other city
units and 1-2 markets exist within county units.
It is widely known that the floating population of North Korea’s
biggest
market,
Pyeongannam-do
100,000 people per
the
Pyeongseng
(South
day.32)
Pyongan
(Pyongsong)
Province),
market
reached
in
around
Therefore, it was easy to figure why
the Pyeongseong Market, which was located near Pyeongyang,
was appointed as the representative symbol that had to be shut
down by the North Korean authorities during its busts of markets.
Pyeongseong Market was growing as the biggest wholesale
market and had become a specialized market that handled all
goods professionally, because all goods bound for Pyeongyang via
Sinuiju had gathered in the market. At the Pyeongseong Market,
there were more than 30,000 stores, and initially in 2008, the
market, through the organization of its vendors, was able to resist
the attempt of the North Korean authorities to close down the
32) “Gimjeongildo Monmangneun Bukhansijang (North Korean Market Which Cannot Be
Prevented By Kim, Jong-il),” Chosun Ilbo, January 14, 2009.
334
Market. But in June 2009, the authorities finally decided to close
up the Market by dividing it into 2-3 smaller-scale markets.33)
When the North Korean markets had become revitalized, the
North Korean authorities began to consider public market places
as the fountainhead of ‘Capitalistic Yellow Wind,’ and it started to
crackdown on them. The authority clarified that the government
would resume the food supply system in October 2005 and has
only permitted women older than 40 to conduct their business
since 2007. In addition, it announced 60 kinds of prohibited items
at the market, such as products made in South Korea and the
like.
Under the 7.1 Economic Measures passed in 2002, the personal
ownership of small farmlands, restaurants, karaoke clubs, and
vehicles was once allowed for the North Korean people. However,
in 2006, the authority forcibly repossessed businesses, such as
restaurants
confiscated
and
karaoke
under
the
clubs,
while
pretext
of
small
farmlands
‘eradicating
were
Capitalistic
delinquent.’
The crackdowns to limit the floating population around markets
and
streets
reached
its
peak
every
farming
season.34)
The
procedures often made it difficult (for example, travelers were
required
to
have
a
pass
issued
by
the
government)
and
cumbersome for people to move to another region for their
economic activities. If people were busted for moving without a
pass, they would lose their goods and/or get punished by the
authorities.
In addition to the obvious shortage in the quantity of food and
33) Good Friends, Oneurui Bukhansosik (North Korea Today), Special Issue no. 300.
34) For detailed information, refer to the previous part of the paper, “Exploitation of Farm
Villages.”
335
the ever-declining purchasing power of the North Korean people,
the North Korean state authority’s crackdown on market places
and small vegetable gardens. Since, in the past, it has been the
only
dependable
survival
mechanisms
for
people,
the
state’s
crackdown has made people’s continuous struggle for survival
almost impossible. As long as the North Korea authority continues
to control the market, the future prospects of resolving the current
food shortage seems dim, despite the valiant efforts of the North
Korean people to survive through their own means.
336
2. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment
￭ Wang Mi-yang (Attorney at law)
1. Introduction
Article 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and
Article 7 and 10 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR) state that no one shall be subjected to
torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment
and that all persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with
humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the human
person. According to Article 5 of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, the United Nations passed the Convention against
Torture
and
Cruel,
Inhuman
or
Degrading
Treatment
or
Punishment (CAT) on December 10, 1984.
Furthermore, in 1993, the World Conference on Human Rights
issued the Vienna Declaration, which states that freedom from
torture is a right that must be protected under all circumstances
and urges the universal ratification of human rights treaties. This
means that no circumstance, even administering criminal penalties
or trying to obtain intelligence or a confession from suspected
terrorists and other criminals, can justify torture or other cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment.1)
North Korea added some positive human rights protections to
1) Korean Bar Association, Beoblyulgaleul wihan gugje ingwonbeob manual (The Jurist's
Manual of International Human Rights Law), (Seoul: Korean Bar Association, 2008), p.
337.
its
2008
revision
of
the
Criminal
Procedure
Act,
337
including
clarifying its arrest procedures, but it has not acceded to the CAT
yet.
The
following
are
cases
of
North
Korean
defectors,
in
interviews conducted in 2010 by the Korean Bar Association
(hereafter referred to as “KBA”), where the defectors relate their
experiences with arbitrary torture and other cruel treatment, the
circumstances of these experiences, and recourse against such
actions.
2. Specific Cases of Torture and Other Cruel Treatment
1) First-Hand Experience
[ID 171 (2010)]2) In 1998, I was smuggling pine mushrooms
into China. In October of that year, people
from the Bisagruppa (Anti-Socialist Conscience
Patrol),3)
Investigation
graduates
in
the
Hamgyeongbuk
formed
of
inspection
-do
college
agency
(North
in
Hamkyong
Province), burst into my home and dragged
me out, saying they had something to talk
about. The Bisagruppa members locked me in
a
secluded
Osandeok
motel
room
(Osanduck)
in
in
the
the
region
of
Hoeryeong-si
(Hoeryong city). They forced me to confess
2) A male defected in 2006 and interviewed by the KBA on March 8, 2010.
3) Its full name is “Bisahoejuuigeuruppa Geomnyeoljo.” It was formed in 1992 to discover
and punish anti-socialist activities conducted by the people. Private citizens, party
leadership and members of the Bowibu are all possible targets for inspection. Good
Friends, Oneurui Bukhan, Bukhanui Naeil (North Korea Today and North Korea's
Tomorrow) (Seoul: Jeongto-chulpan, 2006), p. 56.
338
to the smuggling so that they could prove
their loyalty to Kim Jong-Il, and tortured me
to find out whether I had committed any
other crimes. They used all kinds of forceful
measures to interrogate me. There were no
constraints on their actions even when they
beat me, since I was in a motel and not the
inspection agency. They had me sit kneeling
at every interrogation, and my knees ached.
Just
shaking
my
head
or
shifting
my
shoulders earned me a kick. They bullied me
and beat me, demanding to know if I had
done things other than smuggling mushrooms.
I was held and tortured for ten days, and my
whole body was worn and aching like I had
been in jail for a year. I still have small
scars all over my body from that time, and
get treatment for the pain in my joints.
[ID 172
(2010)]4)
In about July of 2004, I was arrested by the
Bowibu
(National
Security
Agency)
in
Onseong (Onsong) for illegal river crossing
and held at a detention house. There were
about 20 of us in a cell built for six. They
would tie our hands to the bars and beat our
hands until we were bleeding, made us sit
and stand about 600 times in a row and
sometimes did not feed us. My hands were
injured in the process, my teeth were broken,
339
and my back still hurts.
[ID 173 (2010)]5) In about May of 2008, I was arrested and
detained by the Onseong Bowibu. The agents
beat me mercilessly with firewood, demanding
that I give them the statement they wanted.
My head bled, and my leg was badly beaten.
[ID 174
(2010)]6)
I was taken to the Bowibu in November of
2008 and tortured by electricity once. They
wanted to know how my daughters defected,
when and how they went over, where they
were, and their phone numbers. They put
electrodes on my fingers and ran electricity
through them. I was not externally wounded
but my
kidneys
felt stiff and pained
as
though I had been struck. The aftereffects
remain to this day. I was examined in South
Korea, where I was told I have no problem,
but I still feel the stiffness and the pain.
[ID 175
(2010)]7)
In March of 1999, I was arrested and detained
by the Hoeryeong-si (Hoeryong City) Bowibu
on charges of crossing the river to China.
During interrogation, they demanded that I
admit meeting a South Korean while I was in
China. When I did not, they beat my face,
torso, and legs with hands, feet, and chairs,
and
beat
me
for
three
days
including
slamming my head to a wall. My head bled,
7) A female defected in 2006 and interviewed by the KBA on April 1, 2010.
340
my arm was broken, and as a result my head
still frequently hurts and I cannot move my
arm freely.
[ID 176 (2010)]8) I was detained in the detention house of
Sambong police station because my family
defected. I was beaten like an animal and
verbally abused for a week.
[ID 177
(2010)]9)
In June of 2004, I was forcibly extradited
from China and detained at the Onseong
Bowibu detention house. In November 2004, a
friend
collapsed
while
sitting,
and
I
was
tortured for defending her. Because they hung
me
by
the
arms
from
about
11
in
the
morning to 3:30 in the afternoon, my arms
were in agony and broke out in bruises. I
was also beaten with clubs and firearms for
no reason at all. It seemed to be arbitrary.
My arms are thankfully alright, but I had
difficulty moving them for about ten days at
the time, and my pistol-whipped knees still
hurt.
[ID 178
(2010)]10)
In June of 2006, I was arrested by Anjeonbu
(People's Security Agency) for having gone
to China and come back and detained at the
Songpyeong
(Songpyong)
gathering
facility
and Jeungsan corrective labor camp. From
June to October of 2006, we were forced to
10) A female defected in 2006 and interviewed by the KBA on March 15, 2010.
341
kneel for hours on a windowsill if we moved
when we were told not to or spoke with
another prisoner. When we fell down, they
shouted at us to get up and kicked us. They
would order us not to move with our hands
on steel bars and beat our hands with iron
pokers when we moved even a little. When I
collapsed from the news of my mother's
death, they splashed cold water on me and
slapped my face over and over. I had two
ribs broken from the beatings I took while I
was there.
[ID 179
(2010)]11)
On June 9, 2005, I was arrested by the
Bowibu at the Mongolian border for defection
and tortured at Onseong Bowibu in November
2005 because I would not confess that I was
on my way to South Korea. This type of
coercion happened all the time. Usually they
used violence while interrogating me once a
day, forcing me to kneel all day without even
a bathroom break, and beating me with a
switch or kicking me if I moved. My eardrum
burst from the torture and I became hard of
hearing. The ligaments in my right shoulder
were stretched but I was unable to get proper
treatment
in
North
Korea.
It
took
about
100,000 (KRW) to operate on my ear in South
Korea
and
I
needed
an
MRI
scan
and
342
treatment for my headaches but put off the
checkup
because
it
costs
about
500,000
(KRW).
[ID 180 (2010)]12) In May of 2003, I was arrested by the
Bowibu for defection and detained at the
Jeungsan long-term corrective labor camp. In
the interrogation room in September 2005, I
was beaten in the calves and thighs with
switches for disobedience. They also beat my
head and slammed it against a wall. I was
beaten to the point of bleeding but was sent
out to the field without treatment, causing my
wounds to fester. I have become forgetful for
being beaten in the head so badly and there
are scars on my thighs.
[ID 181
(2010)]13)
I was arrested by the Onseong Bowibu for
illegally
crossing
the
river
to
China
in
September 2003 and detained at the Onseong
detention house. While there, I was forced to
kneel in place almost every day and they
forbade me from moving. If I moved even a
little, I had to kneel longer, or I was kicked
or yelled at. Kneeling without moving is truly
agonizing. I don't know how the others were
treated but I was interrogated separately three
or four times, and I was beaten every time
except once. They started the interrogations
343
with a beating before even asking anything
and the violence was particularly bad the first
one or two times. They hit my head and
thighs with clubs, laming me for a time.
They pressed me to confess that I was trying
to go to South Korea, but I survived because
I denied it to the last.
[ID 182
(2010)]14)
In February of 2005, I was arrested by the
Hamyeon (Hamyon) Bowibu and detained at
the detention house there for about a month.
They
said
I
must
have
helped
a
South
Korean soldier escape, and berated, threatened,
and
kicked
me
all
over
throughout
that
month.
[ID 183
(2010)]15)
On March 18, 2004, I crossed the river to
China,
was
arrested
by
the
Saet-byeol
Bowibu, and was detained in the Saet-byeol
Bowibu detention house. I did not cross the
river to go to South Korea, but the Bowibu
agents wanted me to confess that I was
trying to defect to South Korea. They dug a
hole in the detention wall and made me crawl
back and forth about 10 times, shackled and
beat me, trying to force me to confess. They
grasped
my
hair
and
slammed
my
head
against the wall, then knelt me down, pressed
down on my knees with their feet and tore at
344
my mouth with their fingers. I was tortured
for about four hours a day for three days. As
a result, I am hard of hearing in my right ear
and have a bad headache.
[ID 184 (2010)]16) On November 27, 2004, I was arrested and
detained by the Namyang Bowibu. At the
detention house, you need to call out your
inmate
number
urinate.
When
and
I
receive
tried
to
permission
urinate
to
without
permission, I was tortured. My right wrist
was fractured while I was forced to stand on
my head and a left rib protruded after I was
kicked for resisting. I was never properly
treated, though.
[ID 185
(2010)]17)
On February 9, 2005, I was arrested and
detained in the Onjeong (Onjong) Bowibu for
speaking on the phone with my son in South
Korea. Over the course of the interrogation,
the
Bowibu
agents
investigating
a
spy
demanded that I turn over the phone, which I
did
not.
They
slapped
me
in
the
face
mercilessly and I was beaten many times
over those two days. As a result, my hearing
is not very good.
[ID 186
(2010)]18)
Near the end of November in 2004 I was
arrested by the Onseong Provincial People's
Safety Agency and detained in the detention
345
house
at
the
station.
The
guard,
Kim
Seong-cheol, took me out of my cell to beat
me, saying I was neither telling the truth nor
keeping
prison
regulations.
He
struck
me
indiscriminately with hands and feet. The
blows landed mainly on my torso and thighs.
This went on for two months, two or three
times a day. I was already ill and receiving
such a beating resulted in chronic illness.
[ID 187
(2010)]19)
In February of 2008, I was talking to a South
Korean
broker
in
Hyesan,
near
the
Yalu
River, when I was arrested by a Pyeongyang
(Pyongyang)
Anti-Socialist
Conscience
Investigation Patrol and held at the Hyesan
Bowibu. The Hyesan Bowibu agent took me
to a torture chamber on the third story of the
five-story Bowibu building and interrogated
me, striking me all over with a wooden stick.
He
interrogated
me
with
his
leg
hooked
around the stick, prepared to hit me at any
time. As a result, my leg joints hurt when I
sleep at night and I have insomnia.
2) Second-Hand Experience: Witness, Testimony and Etc
This year, the KBA asked those defectors who had experienced
cruel treatment such as arbitrary torture whether they had witnessed
or heard of others being tortured or abused. 10 out of the 16
respondents replied in the affirmative. The specifics are as follow.
19) A male defected in 2008 and interviewed by the KBA on February 27, 2010.
346
[ID 173 (2010)]
In
2008,
someone
from
my
town,
Onseong-gun, was discovered using a Chinese
cell phone. They hung him upside down and
beat him over the course of the interrogation,
eventually killing him.
[ID 175 (2010)]
It was a man of about 35 years old who was
captured and brought from China with me. He
was beaten much more than I was during
interrogation. They tied him up, covered his
eyes and struck him with clubs. He was later
released but I heard that he died eventually
after constant suffering.
[ID 177 (2010)]
At the detention house, prisoners are struck if
they speak to each other. As a result, we did
not know each other well. While there, I saw
a man kneeling all day with a shovel on his
back. I don't know why, though.
[ID 179 (2010)]
I saw the abuse of a man and a woman who
were sent on an errand. They were made to
sit behind the steel bars and if they moved
because of the fleas they were forced to stick
their hands out of the bars and their fingers
struck hard with a steel ruler. If they avoided
the blows, their heads were struck against
the bars. Their heads were bleeding and the
violence was so terrible that they wanted to
kill themselves for shame. If they groaned or
made any such sound, they both had to sit
and stand a hundred times each. If they fell
while doing so, the numbers were increased.
347
If they could not finish, they were subjected
to torture such as standing for two hours.
[ID 181 (2010)]
There were four other people in the detention
house and they were all forced to kneel
without moving. The reasons for detention
included illegally crossing the river to China
and smuggling, I think mostly for money.
The
guards
struck
them
with
clubs
and
kicked them, accusing them of trying to go to
South Korea.
[ID 184 (2010)]
This
was
when
I
was
at
the
Bowibu.
Because it has such a tense and secretive
atmosphere, you cannot know if the person in
the next cell was killed. I had no information
whatsoever about any deaths. There was a
woman from Onseong-gun and Saetbyeol-gun
in my cell. She was all but dead when she
came in, and could hardly hold herself up. I
think she was eventually beaten to death
during interrogation.
[ID 185 (2010)]
I was arrested with my 40-year-old younger
brother and he was being strung up and
beaten with shovels there. We were released
together but he was constantly sick. I heard
he died later when I went to Thailand.
[ID 186 (2010)]
When I was at the People’s Security Agency
detention house at Onseong-gun, I witnessed
brutality almost on a daily basis. About 43 or
44 year-old man, whose name I don't know,
348
was
dragged
out
by
the
guards
and
mercilessly beaten in front of us. He was one
of the people who had been illegally to China
because of the food shortage. He was kicked
and beaten with belts and sticks.
3. Situation of and Treatment for Torture and Other Cruel Treatment
1) Situations Surrounding Torture and Other Cruel Treatment
The KBA, in its interview survey conducted in 2010, asked
those interviewees who had experienced cruel treatment whether
they were treated by a doctor, either while they received the
abuse or afterward. 100% (16/16) of the relevant respondents
answered in the negative. When asked whether the injuries
resulting from torture and other abuses were appropriately treated,
87.5% (14/16) said “no” and the other 12.5% (2/16) said “yes.”
However,
of
those
two
who
were
treated,
one20)
received
treatment after entering South Korea and the other21) turned to a
traditional remedy after coming home from the torture. None of
the respondents, therefore, was treated by the person or institution
that perpetuated the torture. These results do not differ greatly
from the KBA’s interview survey in 2008.22)
The torture victims were asked whether they were allowed
visits by legal counsel or friends during their incarceration and
81% (13/16) of the respondents replied that it was not possible.
22) According to [ID 075 (2008)], in the 2008 interviews, nine of the ten torture victims
said no, and the remaining one [ID 075 (2008)] was seen by an army surgeon who he
thought belonged to the Bowibu. The treatment consisted of sterilizing the areas that
had festered.
349
Only 2 out of 16 (12.5%)23) said it was allowed and the remaining
one,24) being an orphan, did not know because there were no
visitation requests.
In response to the question, whether there were autopsies or
forensic examinations of victims who had died in detention, all
100% (16/16) respondents said “no.”
2) Recourse
The defectors interviewed in 2010 were asked whether there
were procedural remedies for torture and other cruel treatment, 18
out of the 20 (90%) respondents said they did not know. Two
said there were remedies such as lawsuits and petitions. Of these
two, one25) appealed on abuse against one’s father to the head of
the
Yanggang-do
People’s
Safety
Agency
and
also
to
the
administrative agency, and later went directly to Pyeongyang to
seek government relief. As a result, the central government sent
an inspector over and his/her father was pardoned. These results
also do not differ significantly from those of the KBA’s interview
survey in 2008.
4. Evaluation and Solutions
Much like the interview surveys on defectors in 2006 and 2008,
the interviews conducted from February to April in 2010 by the
23) According to [ID 177 (2010)], the Bowibu agents like it when there are visitors. If a
detainee is dead, the agent is held responsible and the number of deaths will be in the
news. They think the visits will deter deaths. [ID 178 (2010)] testified that the families
can visit if they bring food, clothing, and ask to see the detainee. It costs a lot,
though, so not many come.
25) [ID 184 (2010)] also mentioned that the petition must be in writing, not in oral.
350
KBA
confirmed
that
violence,
torture,
and
other
inhumane
treatment are perpetuated in detention facilities such as corrective
labor camps, gathering facilities and detention houses.
North Korea is in violation of Article 5 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights by illegally detaining suspects in the
course
of
investigation
and
pretrial
examination.
Arrest
and
penalization of defectors for illegally crossing the river between
North Korea and China, and especially torture and other cruel
treatment of individuals suspected of trying to defect to South
Korea, are violations of the right to freedom of movement and
residence within the borders of each state (Article 13 (1)), the
right to leave any country, including one’s own, and to return
(Article 13 (2)) and the right to seek and to enjoy in other
countries asylum from persecution (Article 14 (1)). Furthermore,
these acts of violence and other acts of cruelty are in clear
violation of the ICCPR, to which North Korea has formally
acceded.
Many of the defectors interviewed in 2010 who experienced
torture and other cruel treatment26) were illegally arrested after
North Korea revised its Criminal Procedure Act in 2004. This
demonstrates
that
while
North
Korea
added
human
rights
guarantees in the text of the Act, these revisions were not for
actual application but for the sake of display to the international
community. Thus, the criticism is still valid that the procedures
guaranteed in the Criminal Procedure Act and other laws are
nothing but a show.
In the meantime, the 2010 North Korea report by Amnesty
International states that most areas in North Korea are suffering
26) Seven of the seventeen defectors were subjected to cruel treatment after 2005.
351
from food shortage and there are fears of the crisis growing
worse due to failed economic policies and reduced international
aid. Thousands have crossed the Chinese border, most of whom
are desperately in search of food. The Chinese government
arrested and forcefully returned these North Koreans who face
detention, interrogation, and torture in their home country.
North Korea entered into the two International Covenants, Civil
and Political Rights, and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
before South Korea did but was highly neglectful of complying
with their provisions. Since 2000 it has been submitting human
rights reports, but only as a formality in response to continued
international pressure. The UN Human Rights Council and the
General Assembly have called for North Korea to improve its
human rights situation in a Human Rights Resolution in 2005 and
the subsequent three years, which the regime denounced as
interference with domestic affairs and a sham.
North Korea’s stance does not seem likely to change in the
foreseeable
future,
and
it
is
vital
that
South
Koreans
pay
heightened attention to the systematic and grave human rights
violations visited upon their northern compatriots. It is necessary
for us to have a sense of responsibility in seeking solutions to
make North Korea cease these human rights violations at once,
cooperate with the UN Special Rapporteur, respect international
norms and standards, and become a responsible member of the
international community.
352
3. Freedom of Conscience and Religion
￭ Jhe Seong-ho
(Ph.D. in Law, Professor at Chung-Ang University)
1. Freedom of Thought and Conscience
In principle, freedom of thought refers to the freedom of an
individual to hold or consider a fact, viewpoint or thought,
independent of state interference and the viewpoints of others. In
addition, freedom of conscience refers to the freedom to form
one’s own conscience and to act according to one’s conscience,
independent of external restraints. These two human rights are
regarded as the core of mental basic human rights.
The
Universal
Declaration
of
Human
Rights,
adopted
on
December 10, 1948 by the United Nations General Assembly,
declares:
“Everyone
has
the
right
to
freedom
of
thought,
conscience …; this right includes freedom to change his … belief,
and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in
public or private, to manifest his … belief in …, practice, … and
observance” (Article 18). In addition, the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (hereafter referred to as ICCPR) adopted
on December 16, 1966, by the United Nations General Assembly,
contains a similar regulation in Article 18, Paragraph 1.1) Such
1) Article 18, Paragraph 1 of the ICCPR defines that “Everyone shall have the right to
freedom of thought, conscience and ... This right shall include freedom to have or to
adopt … belief of his choice, and freedom, either individually or in community with
others and in public or private, to manifest his … belief in observance, practice.” Jung
353
regulations can be interpreted as manifesting natural rights (whole
national and transnational characteristics) and the inherent rights
of man in freedom of thought and conscience.
Although there are degrees of difference from country to
country,
the
constitution
of
each
individual
state
guarantees
freedom of thought and conscience as basic human rights so as to
prevent any legal prohibition or illegal coercion associated with it.
Article 19 of South Korea’s Constitution also stipulates such
freedom.2) However, the constitution does not specifically state
freedom of thought although it states freedom of conscience.3)
Nevertheless, it can be interpreted that freedom of conscience in
South Korea’s Constitution encompasses freedom of thought.4)
In contrast, the North Korean people are not allowed freedom of
thought and conscience. Freedom of conscience is not even defined
in the Socialist Constitution of the Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea (DPRK, North Korea’s official name). The reason is that
Juche (self-reliance) ideology, created by Kim Il-sung, is the only
In-seop, Gukjeingwonjoyakjip (Compilation of International Human Rights Treaties)
(Seoul: Saramsaenggak, 2000), p. 47.
2) Constitution of the Republic of Korea, Article 19: All citizens shall enjoy freedom of
conscience.
3) Freedom of conscience refers to the freedom of an individual not to be forced to
manifest individual ethics and ideas against one’s own will, which form the basis of the
dignity and value of men, and not to be forced to act against one’s own ethics and
ideas. Constitutional Law Advocates, Nambukhan Heonbeobui Ihae (Understanding the
constitution of North and South Korea) (Seoul: Samgwang press, 2002), p. 191.
4) The conscience mentioned in article 19 of the constitution of Republic of Korea includes
worldview, view of life, principle, creed, and, in a broad sense, value and ethical
judgment in one’s mind related to formation of individual character. One can distinguish
between conscience and idea as conscience is thinking at the ethical level while idea is
thinking at the logical level. However, both conscience and idea have the similarity in
that they guarantee free mental activities in one’s mind. In particular, idea is inseparable
from conscience as it refers to systemic thinking or belief based on a certain value
system. In this view, it should be interpreted that the conscience defined in the
constitution encompasses not only moral and ethical judgments, but also ideas, which is
a chain of value systems or normal creed. Gwon Yeong-seong, Heonbeobhag-wonlon
(Principles of Constitutional Study) (Seoul: Beommunsa, 2003), pp. 451-452.
354
ideology
tolerated
in
North
Korean
society
and
also
conscientization of the masses is forcefully imposed on the people.
It is predictable that freedom of thought and conscience cannot
exist in North Korea where Juche ideology is emphasized as the
one
and
only
ideology
and
imposed
through
criticism
and
self-criticism.5) In this regard, it is worth noting that 50% of
North Korean defectors who participated in the survey responded
that when they lived in North Korea, they believed Juche ideology
was better than any other ideology. Also, it is worth noting that
80% of them responded that they never had any doubts about
Juche ideology.
<Table Ⅳ-3-1> Did you believe that Juche ideology was an excellent ideology,
that it was better than any religion?
No. of
response
Percentage
(%)
Cumulative
Percentage(%)
Yes
99
50.0
50.0
Valid response
No
99
50.0
100.0
Total
198
100.0
Invalid
No Response
Total
2
200
<Table Ⅳ-3-2> Have you had doubts about Juche ideology?
No. of
response
Valid response
Invalid
Cumulative
Percentage(%)
Yes
33
16.7
16.7
No
165
83.3
100.0
Total
198
100.0
No Response
Total
Percentage
(%)
2
200
5) Constitutional Law Advocates, Nambukhan Heonbeobui Ihae (Understanding
Constitution of North and South Korea) (Seoul: Samgwang press, 2002), p. 191.
the
355
Article 3 of North Korea’s Socialist Constitution, the 9th revision
of which was made on April 2009, states that “The DPRK (North
Korea) is guided in its activities by Juche ideology, a world
outlook centered on people, and a revolutionary ideology for
achieving the independence of the masses of the people.” This
implies that Juche ideology and Songun (Military-first) ideology
manifested and systemized Juche ideology in the military field,
developed from Juche ideology by Kim Jong-il, are deemed to be
leading
guidelines
for
North
Korea’s
national
activities.
In
accordance with such a constitutional regulation, North Korea
began to unify society with Juche ideology from the late 1960s.
According to the interview survey with North Korean defectors
conducted by the KBA (hereafter referred to as the “KBA”) in
2010, most of the interviewees responded that they formed their
ideas as follows: (1) books related to Juche ideology, (2) books
related
to
Kim
Il-sung
and
his
son,
(3)
books
related
to
revolutionary history and (4) editorials in Rodong Newspaper or
propaganda of broadcast media on Juche ideology. In relation to
this, survey participants testified that middle school students learn
about Juche ideology 2-3 hours per week,6) while adults go to an
Institute of Kim Il-sung’s Revolutionary Idea to learn about the
ideology once a week (maximum 2-3 times).7) It is known that
there
are
around
46,000-47,000
Institutes
of
Kim
Il-sung’s
6) The North Korean defectors, who were the subjects of the survey, testified that they
were taught about Juche ideology in a class called “communism ethics” and half of the
entire classes were devoted to teaching revolutionary history. Also [ID 013 (2010)]
responded “I cannot think of any other ideology as I was trained from a young age to
arm myself with the firm belief and ideology that only focused on the great leader. The
testimony of the North Korean defector [ID 013 (2010)] interviewed by Korean Bar
Association (KBA) on February 24, 2010.
7) Around half of the defectors (one of two) responded that they had been to a study
room of Comrade Kim Il-sung’s Revolutionary Idea once or twice a week. There was
also testimony that some party members had been to a study room even on Saturday.
356
Revolutionary Idea. Thus, life and idea formation in North Korea
are closely related to Kim Il-sung’s Juche ideology as well as a
revolutionary view of history based on Juche ideology and the
revolutionary life of Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il.
North Korean authorities established the Party standard in the
area of one’s faith system for the purpose of unifying society with
Juche
ideology.
One-Ideology”8)
The
standard
is
called
“Ten
Principles
for
and the main idea of the ‘Ten Principles’ is as
follows.
<Ten Principles for the Establishment of the One-Ideology System
of the Party>
1. We must give our all in the struggle to unify society with
the revolutionary ideology of the Great Leader Kim Il-sung.
2. We must honor the Great Leader comrade Kim Il-sung with
all our loyalty.
3. We must make absolute the authority of the Great Leader
comrade Kim Il-sung.
4. We must make the Great Leader comrade Kim Il-sung’s
revolutionary ideology our faith and make his instructions
our creed.
5. We must adhere strictly to the principle of unconditional
8) The official name of the ten principles is ‘Ten Principles for the Establishment of the
One-Ideology System of the Party’. The ten principles were proposed by Kim Yeong-ju
in 1967 and officially announced by Kim Jong-il in 1974 and currently the principles are
the highest-level ideological standard for North Korean people that discipline their
ordinary lives. For the whole text of the ten principles, refer to Korean Worker’s Party
Press, Kim Jong-il juche hyeongmyeong wieobui wanseongeulr wihayeo (For the sake
of accomplishing the great achievement of Kim Jong-il’s Juche revolution), 3rd volume,
(Pyeongyang: Worker’s Party of Korea Press, 1987); Korean Bar Association, 2008
Bukhan ingwon baekseo (2008 White paper on Human Rights in North Korea) (Seoul:
Korean Bar Association, 2008), pp. 755~761.
357
obedience in carrying out the Great Leader comrade Kim
Il-sung’s instructions.
6. We must strengthen the entire party’s ideology and willpower
and
revolutionary
unity,
centering
on
the
Great
Leader
comrade Kim Il-sung.
7. We must learn from the Great Leader comrade Kim Il-sung
and adopt the communist look, revolutionary work methods
and people-oriented work style.
8. We must value the political life we were given by the Great
Leader comrade Kim Il-sung, and loyally repay his great
political trust and thoughtfulness with heightened political
awareness and skill.
9. We must establish strong organizational regulations so that
party, nation and military move as one under the leadership
of the Great Leader comrade Kim Il-sung.
10. We must pass down the great achievement of the revolution
by the Great Leader comrade Kim Il-sung from generation
to generation, inheriting and completing it to the end.
Of the Ten Principles, the fourth principle urges the North
Korean people to make the Great Leader comrade Kim Il-sung’s
revolutionary ideology their faith and make his instructions their
creed, while the sixth principle urges them to strengthen the
entire party’s ideology and willpower and revolutionary unity,
centering on the Great Leader comrade Kim Il-sung. According to
these principles, the North Korean authorities demand that the
people memorize and mentally internalize the contents of the Ten
Principles. According to the interview survey with North Korean
defectors conducted by the Korean Bar Association (KBA) in
2010, one out of four responded that he or she can recite the ‘Ten
358
Principles.’ Such a result may indicate that the North Korean
authorities have always emphasized ideological cultivation based
on the Ten Principles.9)
<Table Ⅳ-3-3> Do you know the ‘Ten Principles for One-Ideology System’?
Valid response
No. of
response
Percentage
(%)
Yes
197
98.5
98.5
No
3
1.5
100.0
200
100.0
Total
Cumulative
Percentage(%)
<Table Ⅳ-3-4> Can you recite the ‘Ten Principles for One-Ideology System’?
No. of
response
Valid response
Percentage
(%)
Cumulative
Percentage(%)
Yes
51
25.5
25.5
No
149
74.5
100.0
Total
200
100.0
Moreover, along with deification of the Great Leader comrade
Kim Il-sung, the ‘Ten Principles’ have functioned as de-facto law
that controls the North Korean people; since 1974 when the
principles were publicly announced, they have been applied to
criminal regulations above the constitution or any other laws and
regulations. Also, since the Ten Principles can be arbitrarily
interpreted, it has become common to utilize the principles in
finding legal measures for framing political dissidents as political
9) However, due to North Korea’s chronic economic hardships, ordinary North Korean
people do not acknowledge the ten principles although they do not violate them either.
While ordinary citizens are still careful about Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il, they do not
memorize the content of the principles. It is important for a party member to memorize
the principles when he enters the party. However, it was testified that most of the party
members could not memorize the principles. Korea Institute for National Unification, 2009
Bukhan ingwon baekseo (White paper on Human Rights in North Korea) (Seoul: Korea
Institute for National Unification, 2009), pp. 215-216.
359
or ideological offenders and to publish them accordingly.10) In
answer to the question “What did you think would happen to you
if your words or actions violated the Ten Principles during your
school or social life?”, the survey participants responded in the
order of
a. ‘I would be forcefully detained in a political prison camp’ (44
people),
b. ‘I would be punished as a reactionary’ (31 people),
c. ‘I would be criticized at life-assessment meetings’ (28 people),
d. ‘I would die’ (18 people),
e. ‘I would be dragged to the Bowibu (National Security
Agency) and interrogated’ (12 people),
f. ‘I would be sentenced to death by shooting’ (eight people),
g. ‘I and my family would be deported’ (two people) or receive
a warning (one person).
In accordance with such principles and policies, it is considered
to be anti-national, anti-party, and anti-people for North Koreans
to have any ideology or conscience opposed to Juche ideology, or
to propagate and spread such an opposed ideology or conscience.
Needless to say, such behavior would be the subject of powerful
suppression or criminal punishment. For instance, there were
incidents such as the case where a whole family went missing
after their child in his second year of people’s school (nine years
old) scribbled on the faces of Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il in the
textbook or an old lady used the pieces of Rodong sinmun
(Newspaper of workers) with pictures of Kim Il-sung or Kim
Jong-il for wallpapering.11)
10) Ibid., pp. 212~213.
11) Ibid., p. 213. Regarding this, one defector, [ID 027 (2010)] testified that “the ten
principles dominates all the books, lectures or meetings. The principles say that I
360
Kim Jong-il was appointed general secretary of the Workers’
Party of Korea while the Songun (Military-first) ideology was
given the same status as Juche ideology. As mentioned before,
North Korea’s constitution, amended in 2009, confirms the status
of the military-first ideology. It is known that recently North
Korea enhanced the learning of the Military-first ideology.
<Table Ⅳ-3-5> How many times a week did you learn about Kim Jong-il’s
military-first ideology?
No. of
response
Valid response
Cumulative
Response(%)
Once
91
51.7
51.7
2-3 times
62
35.2
86.9
4-5 times
7
4.0
90.9
6-7 times
8
4.5
95.5
8-10 times
5
2.8
98.3
Over 10 times
3
1.7
100.0
176
100.0
Total
Invalid
Percentage
(%)
No Response
24
Total
200
Also, it is strictly forbidden in North Korea to have any
ideology or conscience opposed to the Military-first policy, which
has the same status as Juche ideology. Since criticizing the
Military-first policy could be accompanied by cruel punishment
and criticism from society, it would be a dangerous political
choice
for
conscience
North
that
Korean
does
not
people
to
have
fall
under
any
Juche
ideology
ideology
or
and
Military-first policy. Such deviation could be classified as a crime
should devote all I have to the great leader. Therefore, we are educated that we should
protect the dignity of the great leader when storing his portrait or making statements
about him.” (Interviewed by KBA on April 1, 2010)
361
of conscience (the criminal would be a prisoner of conscience) but
North Korea does not accommodate crimes of conscience as
prisoners
of
conscience
would
become
subjects
of
special
dictatorship.
2. Freedom of Religion
1) Freedom of Religion and People’s Perception on Religion
Freedom of religion refers to the freedom of an individual to
believe in religion regardless of others’ viewpoints or illegal and
inappropriate coercion. Freedom of religion includes freedom of
religious
faith,
religious
observance
including
worship,
and
religious assembly and association. It is accepted that everyone
has a certain degree of religiousness. Therefore, freedom of
religion is one of the most important basic human rights that
support the mental activities of men, along with freedom of
thought and conscience.
In relation to this, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
declares: “Everyone has the right to freedom of … and religion;
this right includes freedom to change his religion …, and freedom,
either alone or in community with others and in public or private,
to manifest his religion … in teaching, practice, worship and
observance (Article 18).” In addition, Article 18, Paragraph 1 of
the ICCPR has a similar regulation.12) These regulations can be
interpreted as clarifying the national characteristic and inherent
rights of man in freedom of religion.
12) Article 18, paragraph 1 of the Civil Covenant defines that “everyone shall have the
right to freedom of … religion. This right shall include freedom to have or to adopt a
religion … of his choice, and freedom, either individually or in community with others
and in public or private, to manifest his religion … in worship, observance, practice
and teaching.”
362
Although there are degrees of difference from country to
country, the constitution of each country guarantees freedom of
religion as a basic human right so as to prevent any legal
prohibition or illegal coercion associated with it. Article 20 of
South Korea’s Constitution codifies such freedom.13) Nominally,
North Korea also defines freedom of religion in Article 68 of its
Socialist Constitution revised in 2009.14)
However, in reality, freedom of religion in North Korea is a
different story. First of all, North Korea’s view on religion is well
reflected in Kim Il-sung’s comments such as “Religion is a kind
of superstition. Whether you believe in Jesus or Buddha, in
essence, it is a superstition”15) or “Religion is reactionary and an
unscientific
worldview.
Religion
is
the
same
as
opium.”16)
Moreover, the North Korean authorities explain religion as a tool
for imperialistic invasion which supports the exploitation of the
ruling class in a class society. The Dictionary of Philosophy in
North Korea argues that “Historically, religion was dominated by
the ruling class and used as a tool for deceiving, exploiting and
suppressing the people. Also in modern times, religion was used
as an ideological tool by imperialists to invade underdeveloped
countries.”17)
13) Constitution of the Republic of Korea, Article 19: “1. All citizens shall enjoy freedom of
religion. 2. No state religion shall be recognized, and church and state shall be
separated.”
14) DPRK (North Korea) Socialist Constitution, Article 68: “Citizens have freedom of
religious beliefs. This right is granted by approving the construction of religious
buildings and the holding of religious ceremonies. No one may use religion as a pretext
for drawing in foreign forces or for harming the State and social order.”
15) Workers’ Party of Korea Press, Kim Il-sung Jeojak seonjip 1 (The Selected Works of
Kim Il-sung), (Pyeongyang: Workers’ Party of Korea Press, 1967), p. 173.
16) Workers’ Party of Korea Press, Kim Il-sung Jeojak seonjip 5 (The Selected Works of
Kim Il-sung), (Pyeongyang: Workers’ Party of Korea Press, 1967), p. 173.
17) Institute of Philosophy, Academy of Social Science, Cheolhak sajeon (Dictionary of
Philosophy) (Pyeongyang: Institute of Philosophy, Academy of Social Science), p. 490;
363
With such a view, the North Korean authority has educated its
people from early on that religion is a vestige of imperialism and
as bad as a drug. (Refer to the result of the survey on North
Korean defectors, on <table IV-3-6> and <table IV-3-7> below).
The education took place not only in schools but also at the
social level. Hence, it can be said that North Korea today has
become a society or a nation that made Juche ideology its state
religion.
Through
the
aforementioned
‘Ten
Principles
for
One-Ideology,’ activities worshiping Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il
take place nation-wide. The second principle states “We must
honor the Great Leader comrade Kim Il-sung with all our loyalty”
while the third principle states “We must make absolute the
authority of the Great Leader comrade Kim Il-sung,” implying the
deification or idolization of Kim Il-sung. Also, it can be argued
that the Institute of Kim Il-sung’s Revolutionary Idea is the North
Korean equivalent of a holy place while the Ten Principles are the
North Korean equivalent of the Ten Commandments. Therefore,
free religious activities of certain religions are not allowed in
North Korea.18)
According to the interview survey with North Korean defectors
in 2010, around 60% of them learned that believing in religion is
not helpful to socialist life, socialist activities and the cultivation
Korea Institute for National Unification, 2009 Bukhan ingwon baekseo (2009 White
paper on Human Rights in North Korea 2009), p. 198. Regarding North Korea’s view
toward religion, refer to Institute of Modern Society, Study on Religion in North Korea
I, Research paper pp. 92-95 (Seongnam: Institute of Modern Society, 1992), pp. 18-73.
18) Philo Kim, “New Religious Policy and the State of Religious Freedom in North Korea,”
Citizens’ Alliance for North Korean Human Rights (NKHR) & Helsinki Foundation for
Human Rights (HFHR), Human Rights Light to North Korea, The 5th International
Conference on North Korean Human Rights & Refugees: 2004 Warsaw, Poland (29
February – 2 March, 2004), pp. 85-86, Korean Bar Association (KBA), 2006 Bukhan
ingwon baekseo (2006 White paper on North Korean human rights) (Seoul: Korean
Bar Association, 2006), p. 148.
364
of the revolution, and around 70% of them learned that believing
in religion is not helpful to their social life. Along with the effect
of such political education, due to the influence of social and
psychological environment, North Korean people have a very low
level of awareness of religion and they do not even have a
thought or desire to enjoy freedom of religion. It can be said in
some ways that there is no need for other religions since the
great leader Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il are the subjects of
religious worship. Against this backdrop, freedom of religion or
religious life only exists in the provision of the constitution in
North Korea and religion is alienated from North Korean people in
reality.19)The following tables indicate the result of the survey
regarding religion in North Korea (the specific year was not
indicated for the sake of convenience).
<Table Ⅳ-3-6> While you were in North Korea, were you ever taught that
religion is the opium of the people?
No. of
response
Percentage
(%)
Cumulative
Percentage(%)
Yes
89
61.4
61.4
Valid response
No
56
38.6
100.0
Total
145
100.0
Missing
No Response
55
Total
200
19) According to the interview survey with North Korean defectors conducted by the KBA
in 2010, one North Korean defector, [ID 117 (2010)] testified “there is no religious
freedom in North Korea, Although the constitution guarantees
freedom, they will
regard you as a political offender if you believe in religion in reality.” The testimony
of [ID 117 (2010)] interviewed by the KBA on April 4, 2010.
365
<Table Ⅳ-3-7> Were you ever taught that believing in religion is not helpful to
socialist life, socialist activities and the cultivation of the
revolutionary spirit?
No. of
response
Percentage
(%)
Cumulative
Percentage(%)
Yes
81
57.9
57.9
Valid response
No
59
42.1
100.0
Total
140
100.0
Missing
No Response
60
Total
200
<Table Ⅳ-3-8> Have you ever thought that believing in religion is not helpful to
your social life?
No. of
response
Valid response
Missing
Cumulative
Percentage(%)
Yes
93
66.4
66.4
No
47
33.6
100.0
Total
140
100.0
No Response
Total
Percentage
(%)
60
200
[Question IV-3-1] What do they say in North Korea when they
insist that you should believe in the Great Father or Great Leader
comrade and should not believe in other things (religion or
superstition)?
[ID 007 (2010)] I heard “you should not believe in other things.
You must believe in only Kim Jong-il.”
[ID 010 (2010)] They teach that missionaries are bad people
and might kidnap and kill women. Also, they
do not allow us to believe in religion as it is
not a revolutionary instrument.
[ID 011 (2010)] they told me to believe in God, the God of
366
Chosun
(previous
name
of
Korea),
which
means I should believe in Kim Il-sung.
[ID 014 (2010)] They said “there is only one sun in the sky.
There is only one Kim Il-sung and only one
Kim
Jong-il.
You
should
not
believe
in
anything else.”
[ID 015 (2010)] They said “the cult of personality is not
allowed
in
the
One-Ideology
System.
You
should believe in only Kim Il-sung and Kim
Jong-il.”
[ID 016 (2010)] They said “you should believe in the sky of
Chosun, Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il, if you
want to believe in God. Where else would you
find God?”
[ID 023 (2010)] I was taught that you should believe in Kim
Il-sung and Kim Jong-il as they built and
protected the nation.
[ID 026 (2010)] The North Korean regime taught us from a
young age that ‘Kim Il-sung recovered the
country and made great achievements for the
people.’ We also learned that there is no God.
[ID 033 (2010)] I heard that religion is useless and you should
listen to only what the general says.
[ID 040 (2010)] They said that I should believe in general Kim
Jong-il just like the sky.
[ID 041 (2010)] They said that I should believe in only Kim
Jong-il and the Workers’ Party of Korea.
[ID 043 (2010)] I was told that every religion is a lie and the
great
father
Kim
Il-sung
and
the
leader
367
comrade Kim Jong-il are the only ones who
will save North Korea.
[ID 045 (2010)] The said that believing in religion is like
betraying the great leader Kim Il-sung, the
party and the country. They also said “religion
is a fabrication of imperialists who are trying
to deceive the people.”
[ID 052 (2010)] I heard that there is no religion and you
should worship only Kim Il-sung as the great
leader.
[ID 056 (2010)] They said we should follow the instructions of
the great leader as he is the same as God and
other
religions
are
just
mere
superstitions.
They also said that superstitions, rather than
religion are what blind the people and therefore
should not be relied upon.
[ID 065 (2010)] They said that the will of the great leader is
the will of God.
[ID 068 (2010)] They said that religion itself is a lie.
[ID 069 (2010)] They taught me about the loyalty, absoluteness
and unconditionality of our devotion to the
great leader Kim Il-sung and told me that
there is no one we can believe other than the
great leader Kim Il-sung and General Kim
Jong-il. They also taught me that the great
leader and the general are God.
[ID 070 (2010)] They said “we should regard the words of the
great leader, who is greater than the sky, as
precious
jewels
and
all
other
things
are
368
superstitions that we should oppose.”
[ID 072 (2010)] I was taught in school and in revolutionary
history
study
that
Christianity
is
like
a
poisonous mushroom.
[ID 073 (2010)] I heard that we can live well if only we
believe
in
comrade
Kim
Il-sung
and
Kim
Jong-il, and they are our fathers and the
heroes who will save the country. They told
me everything else is superstition.
[ID 075 (2010)] They often said that everything will be well if
we believe in the great leader and it is
pointless to believe in superstitions.
[ID 079 (2010)] I was told that I should believe in only the
great leader and I would be punished by
heaven if I believe in something else.
[ID 080 (2010)] They told me not to believe in religion
[ID 083 (2010)] As I have constantly heard about it since I
was a child, I naturally thought that believing
in superstitions is like betraying the great
leader.
[ID 091 (2010)] Believing in superstition is all reactionary.
[ID 106 (2010)] Religion is a drug that can corrode ideology.
[ID 109 (2010)] I was told that I should not believe in religions
and superstitious activities altogether and I
should believe in only the great leader and the
leader comrade.
[ID 110 (2010)] They said that I should not believe in the
Christian God, the Catholic Church or Buddha.
[ID 113 (2010)] There is no such a word as ‘you should not
369
believe in this.’ Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il
were naturally the only ones I believe in my
life.
[ID 121 (2010)] I was not aware of other things at all. I was
supposed to believe that Kim Il-sung and Kim
Jong-il are the greatest and never heard about
the word religion itself.
[ID 133 (2010)] The ‘Ten Principles for One-Ideology’ tell us
that we should only believe in the great leader.
[ID 134 (2010)] I heard that I should trust and follow only the
great
leader
otherwise
I
would
become
a
betrayer of the country.
[ID 136 (2010)] Religion corrodes socialist ideology. It does
more harm than good.
[ID 140 (2010)] They said I should believe in the great leader.
The word ‘religions’ is not often used.
[ID 145 (2010)] The great leader is the absolute. He cannot be
even compared to Jesus or Buddha.
[ID 148 (2010)] They said “we should treat the leader comrade
like God”
[ID 152 (2010)] “Do not believe in religions and ideologies
other than Kim Il-sung’s ideology.”
[ID 154 (2010)] I was told that all religions are a lie and the
great leader and leader comrade are the only
ones who will save North Korea.
[ID 157 (2010)] I heard that I should believe in the great
leader Kim Jong-il only and believing in other
things is like abandoning my loyalty.
[ID 159 (2010)] Religion is like a poison that paralyzes our
370
thought. Kim Il-sung’s words become the law
itself.
[ID 160 (2010)] They said that I should not believe in religion
and nor should I know capitalism.
[ID 165 (2010)] I felt I should regard the words of Kim
Il-sung and Kim Jong-il as God’s word and
serve the party. I thought believing in religion
is a bad thing.
[ID 168 (2010)] From the time when I was born until I
became an adult, I heard ‘for the party and the
great leader.’ I could not think of anything
else.
[ID 171 (2010)] Kim Il-sung once said that we should believe
in religion for the sake of our country. They
educate people about religion in a way that
makes
the
ordinary
people
have
negative
perceptions of religion.
[ID 174 (2010)] They said that I should only believe in the
great leader as believing in religion would
corrupt my ideology and lead me to bad ways.
[ID 178 (2010)] They said I should believe in my own power
and exercise it. If you believe in yourself, there
is no such thing as believing in God.
[ID 179 (2010)] The great leader Kim Il-sung is God
[ID 185 (2010)] I was told that religion makes us acquire bad
habits and we should protect socialism (by not
believing in religion).
[ID 186 (2010)] We were constantly told that the great leader
is the progenitor of Chosun, North Korea is
371
the center of the earth and capitalist society is
rotten and sick.
[ID 187 (2010)] They
told
revolution.
created
me
The
religion
“Religion
is
landowners
so
that
the
opium
and
capitalists
people
would
of
be
ignorant and submissive.
[ID 188 (2010)] They educate people in a way that makes the
ordinary people have negative perceptions of
religion.
[ID 194 (2010)] They told me that I should not believe in
anything other than the great leader’s ideology.
[ID 197 (2010)] They told me not to believe in other religions
at all.
[ID 200 (2010)] They
said
that
religion
is
a
superstitious
activity and I should not engage in or believe
in superstitious activities and I should be loyal
only to Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il. (Some
of the 200 responses were extracted.)
Based on the above-mentioned testimonies, it can be argued that
in general terms North Korean people currently have negative
perceptions towards religion; they do not feel any need to have a
religious life and they never actively think about believing in any
religion. In addition, it was revealed by the survey that few North
Korean people know who Buddha is (refer to <table IV-3-9>. We
do not have well-arranged survey results for the awareness level of
Jesus. However, we believe that it would also be low). Moreover,
according to the North Korean defectors, it is understood that North
Korean people rarely come across the bible (refer to <table IV-3-10>).
372
<Table Ⅳ-3-9> When you were in North Korea, did you hear or learn about
Buddha?
No. of
response
Valid response
Percentage
(%)
Cumulative
Response(%)
Yes
19
9.5
9.5
No
181
90.5
100.0
Total
200
100.0
<Table Ⅳ-3-10> Have you ever seen a bible?
No. of
response
Valid response
Missing
Percentage
(%)
Cumulative
Response(%)
Yes
15
8.3
8.3
No
166
91.7
100.0
Total
181
100.0
No Response
Total
4
185
As religious people from South Korea visited North Korea more
often after 2000, vitalizing religious exchange in the process, a
number of Buddhist temples and churches were constructed for
the purpose of religious exchange between the North and the
South. However, such exchanges took place at a symbolic level
and had very little influence on the North Korean people’s
perceptions of religion. In contrast, just as capitalism is regarded
as a threat to North Korea’s socialist regime, religion is regarded
as anti-regime and something that should be warned against.20) In
other words, religion is perceived in North Korean society as
thought or ideology that corrodes society. It can be said that such
20) Institute of North Korean
Gwanhan Gungnaetalbukja
defectors regarding North
Human Rights Commission
Studies, Dongguk University, Bukhan ingwon sanghwange
Uisikjosa (The consciousness survey of North Korean
Korea’s Human Rights Status), 2004 Report for National
of Korea, in January 2005, p. 148.
373
an analysis or evaluation has not fundamentally changed for the
last 5 or 6 years.
2) Religious Facilities and Status of People with Religion
North Korea builds and operates religious facilities at a policy
level because it wants to show the international community that it
allows freedom of religion. North Korea also utilizes religious
facilities for exchanges between religious people and uses them as
a tool to receive humanitarian aid from the international community.
The
North
Korean
authorities
built
Bongsu
church
and
Jangchung cathedral in late 1988, Chilgol church in 1989 and Jeil
church in 2005. After Kim Jong-il’s visit to the Far East region
of Russia and the Russian Orthodox Church, an orthodox church
began to be built in June 2003. As a result, the construction of
Jeongbaek church, a Russian orthodox church was completed in
Jeongbaek-dong, Rangnang district, Pyeongyang (Pyongyang), on
August 13, 2006. In April 2003, in order to serve at Jeongbaek
temple after its completion, four North Koreans went to Russia to
study
at
the
Moscow
Theological
seminary,
which
educates
students to become Russian orthodox priests. It is currently
known that two of them, who were baptized and became deacons,
are serving at the temple.21)
Let us briefly look at the status of religious facilities and
religious people in North Korea. Based on the statistics on
religious facilities revealed by a North Korean representative on
21) Korea Institute of National Unification, 2009 Bukhan ingwon baekseo (2009 White
Paper on Human Rights in North Korea), p. 200. However the Database Center for
North Korean Human Rights estimates that there are 5 Russian Orthodox priests (also
these 5 people represent the total number of believers in the Russian Orthodox
Church.). Database Center for North Korean Human Rights, 2009 Bukhan jonggyojayu
baekseo (2009 White Paper on Religious Freedom In North Korea) (Seoul: Database
Center for North Korean Human Rights, 2009), p. 45.
374
July 2001 during the reviewing process of the Human Rights
Committee22) on North Korea’s second periodic report concerning
compliance
with
the
Civil
Covenant,
we
have
these
recent
estimates, taking into account the increasing trend.
(i) Unlike the estimates by the Korea Institute of National
Unification, the Database Center for North Korean Human
Rights estimates that there are 3 churches, 65 Buddhist
temples, 60 ministers, 250 Chondogyo priests and 3,000
Catholic believers in North Korea.23)
(ii) On the other hand, there is a news report that the Korean
Christian Federation of North Korea claimed the number of
Christians in North Korea is 14,000 in total, including 300
members of Bongsu church, 150 members of Chilgol church
and members of around 500 home churches.24)
<Table Ⅳ-3-11> Status of North Korea’s religious facilities
Religion
Christianity
No. of churches
(temples)
No. of priests
2
300
(500 home churches) (20 reverends)
No. of
Name of organization
believers
12,000
Korean Christian
Federation
Catholic
1(2 stations)
-
800
North Korean
Catholic Association
Buddhism
60
200
10,000
North Korean
Buddhist Federation
Chondogyo
80
(secret prayer rooms)
-
15,000
Central Directing
Committee of Korean
Chondogyo
<Source: Korea Institute of National Unification, 2009 Bukhan jonggyojayu baekseo (2009
White Paper on North Korean Human Rights), p. 201.>
22) The Human Rights Committee was established in 1966 in accordance with the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and it is also known as UN
Human Rights Committee.
23) Bukhan ingwon jeongbo senteo (Database Center for North Korean Human Rights),
2009 Bukhan jonggyojayu baekseo (2009 White Paper on Religious Freedom in North
Korea) (Seoul: Bukhan ingwon jeongbo senteo, 2009), p. 45.
24) No-Cut News, February 4, 2009.
375
Many Pyeongyang citizens, elites in particular, know about the
variety of religious facilities. However, generally even if they
know about religious facilities, they perceive them as restricted
areas where only permitted people are allowed to enter.25)With
regard to this, according to the interview survey with the North
Korean defectors conducted by the Korean Bar Association in
2010, only one person answered ‘yes’ to the question “Have you
ever visited Bongsu church or Chilgol church?” Of course, there
are many Pyeongyang citizens who do not know about Bongsu
church or Jangchung cathedral. When we met young North
Korean
waitresses
(most
of
them
were
graduates
from
Pyeongyang Commercial College) at North Korean restaurants in
areas such as Shenyang, Dandong, and Yanji in China and
Cambodia in the early or mid-2000s, no one answered yes to our
question whether they knew about Bongsu church. Also, people
living in the countryside do not know about the religious facilities
in Pyeongyang. Even if they know that such facilities exist in
Pyeongyang, they perceive them as propaganda facilities for
foreigners, rather than religious facilities.
Whether they live in Pyeongyang or in the countryside, there
are few North Korean people who clearly know the difference
between church and cathedral. Also, few North Koreans perceive a
Buddhist temple as a religious facility while most of them
perceive it as a historic site, touristic site or visiting place for
foreigners. Also, very few North Koreans are aware of the
religious role of Buddhist monks.26)
However, North Korea established a department of religious
25) Korea Institute of National Unification, 2009 Bukhan ingwon baekseo (2009 White
Paper on Human Rights in North Korea), p. 201.
26) Ibid., p. 201.
376
studies in the department of history at Kim Il-sung University,
where they teach religious doctrines of five major religions,
Christianity, Catholicism, Buddhism, Chondogyo and Islam.27) In
addition, North Korea has set up and operates education institutes
(training
priests)
for
Theological
Seminary
established
in
each
and
religion,
the
Jeungheung-si
such
Institute
of
(Jeungheung
(Samsu county),Yanggang-do (Yanggang
as
Pyeongyang
Buddhist
city),
Studies
Samsu-gun
province).28)
The interview survey with North Korean defectors investigated
the North Korean people’s awareness of religious facilities. The
result was as follows:
<Table Ⅳ-3-12> Have you ever heard that there are famous temples in Mt.
Geumgang or Mt. Myohyang and a church or cathedral in
Pyeongyang?
No. of
response
Percentage
(%)
Cumulative
Response(%)
Yes
94
52.2
52.5
Valid response
No
86
47.8
100.0
Total
180
100.0
Invalid
No Response
Total
5
185
27) In the beginning, there was only one department of religious studies at the university
and later it was divided into 5 different departments, Christianity, Catholicism,
Buddhism, Chondogyo and Islam. Also, recently it is said that the university has
established a Greek Orthodox department and is teaching Greek Orthodox doctrines.
28) The Ministry of Unification, North Korea Summary 2004 (Seoul: Ministry of
Unification), p. 431; Oh Il-hwan, “Bukhanui Jonggyosilsanggwa Nambuk Jonggyogyoryu
Jeonmang (Status of Religion in North Korea and Prospects of Religious Exchange
between North and South Korea),” Jujega Inneun Tongilmunje Gangjwa 17 (17th
Thematic Lectures on Unification issue) (Seoul: Education Center for Unification, 2006),
pp. 23~24; Bukhan ingwon jeongbo senteo (Database Center North Korean Human
Rights), 2009 Bukhan jonggyojayu baekseo (2009 White Paper on Religious Freedom
in North Korea), p. 55.
377
In addition, during the interview survey, only one person
affirmatively answered the question “Have you ever heard about
the theological seminary in Pyeongyang?” The result indicates that
the
North
Korean
people
hardly
know
about
the
religious
education institutes.
If you have heard of a famous Buddhist temple in Mt. Geumgang or
Mt. Myohyang, or a chapel or a Catholic church in Pyeongyang,
what were you told these places are for?
[ID 005 (2010)] I knew what a Buddhist temple was for, but
did not know about any other religions.
[ID 007 (2010)] I heard people going to church believe in Jesus
and God, but did not know what that meant. I
have never heard of other religions.
[IDs 008, 045, 062, 066, 093, 185, 200 (all 2010)] They were only
built for foreigners or foreign believers who visit
North
Korea,
for
showing
them
to
other
countries, or for foreign relations.
[ID 010 (2010)] Ordinary citizens cannot go to church, but the
staffs
from
foreign
embassies
go
there
on
Sunday.
[ID 015 (2010)] I heard there is a church in Pyeongyang. It
was not a place where citizens go; instead, it
was built to show to the world that we have
a church and freedom of religion in North
Korea
in
response
to
the
criticism
of
international society. I heard the pastor was a
person who was working in an embassy.
[ID 028 (2010)] There is a Buddhist temple called Bohyunsa in
378
Gujang (Mt. Myohyang).
[ID 031 (2010)] I know that when the State disguised Juche
Ideology as a kind of religion for spreading
overseas, it was used to attract South Koreans
who have faith in religion for unification.
[IDs 035, 047, 048, 049, 057, 074, 079, 105, 132, 163, 164 (all
2010)] As far as I know a Buddhist temple is
not for religious ceremonies; it is simply a
historic site or tourist attraction. I don’t know
about the rest.
[ID 042 (2010)] I heard there is a Buddhist temple in Mt.
Geumgang. I know it as a historic site.
[ID 051 (2010)] North Korea preserves Buddhist temples and
Buddha images as cultural heritages. But, no
one told me about a church since North Korea
doesn’t recognize Christianity, so I did not
know what the church is for.
[ID 052 (2010)] Church is not for ordinary citizens. Rather, it
was built to show the world that we have one
in North Korea. I heard foreigners worship
there.
[ID 054 (2010)] I think that a temple or church is where
people pray.
[ID 059 (2010)] People know what those places are for. They
are for religious activities. But, people do not
go there since the government persecutes you
if you do.
[ID 068 (2010)] I know that a church is a place where North
Koreans cannot enter; it is used to show
379
Christian organizations from abroad when they
visit.
[ID 075 (2010)] A Buddhist temple is a place where monks
reside and cultural properties are stored. When
foreigners come, they visit those places.
[ID 078 (2010)] I heard there is a church, but no one went
there. I was told that foreigners are brought to
the church when they come to North Korea.
[ID 081 (2010)] In
Hamgyeongbuk-do
province),
there
was
(South
a
Hamgyeong
temple.
It
was
publicized that Kim Jong-il visited there.
[ID 083 (2010)] I thought it was not built for actually doing
something, but a place to show the world that
we have one here.
[ID 086 (2010)] The Church in Pyeongyang is a place for
foreigners when they visit North Korea.
[ID 088 (2010)] The Buddhist temple in Mt. Geumgang or
Myohyang is just a tourist attraction.
[ID 089 (2010)] I did not know it is Buddhism. I thought it
was some kind of superstition.
[ID 091 (2010)] I thought that a Buddhist temple is just where
monks stay.
[ID 097 (2010)] I heard they were built in the 1980s. They
were built to show the world that there is
freedom of religion in North Korea.
[ID 101 (2010)] I heard there was one, but did not know what
it was for.
[ID 107 (2010)] Buddhist temples in Mt. Geumgang and Mt.
Myohyang are historic sites.
380
[ID 110 (2010)] They were built for form’s sake.
[ID 113 (2010)] It is used as an historic heritage. It is said
that American missionaries built churches in
Pyeongyang in the 1900s.
[ID 114 (2010)] I thought of a temple as a place where monks
chant Buddhist prayers with moktak (wooden
gong)
to
propagandize
their
ancestors.
A
church is the place where people believe in
God.
[ID 117 (2010)] I heard it was built for form’s sake and it is
where foreigners are served.
[ID 119 (2010)] I
didn’t
know
the
meaning
of
a
Catholic
church. I didn’t want any trouble so even if I
heard what it was for, I pretended not to hear.
[ID 120 (2010)] I once heard temples are a cultural heritage.
[ID 122 (2010)] It was built on a lie. It was built for foreign
visitors to show them that we have religious
freedom; it is not for the believers.
[ID 124 (2010)] Ordinary citizens do not go there. It is for
foreigners to show them that we have religious
freedom.
[ID 129 (2010)] I thought it is just a traditional place from the
past.
[ID 133 (2010)] I heard the temple is a cultural heritage, but
did not know of church and Catholic church.
[ID 134 (2010)] I never thought about what the place is for. I
think of a temple as a place for monks.
[ID 137 (2010)] I knew they are for Christianity, Buddhism,
and other religions. And I knew that ordinary
381
citizens cannot go there.
[ID 139 (2010)] I knew a temple is a cultural heritage but I
did not know of church and Catholic church.
[ID 140 (2010)] I heard there is a temple and Buddha which
are well preserved on Mt. Chilbo, Hamgyeongbuk
-do (North Hamgyong province).
[ID 150 (2010)] I knew a temple was a cultural heritage.
[ID 151 (2010)] I was educated that religion was the opium of
the revolution so I thought it was a bad place.
[ID 152 (2010)] I knew it was built for form’s sake.
[ID 154 (2010)] I heard there is no monk in a temple. I am not
sure about Protestant churches and Catholic
churches.
[ID 155 (2010)] Bongsu church is in Pyeongyang missionary
district. But, I neither talked nor heard of what
the church was for. In Pyeongyang, people also
lead a hard life, so they do not care.
[ID 157 (2010)] In case foreign journalists visit North Korea
and ask about religion, we were educated to
answer that we have freedom of religion, but
we do not believe it.
[ID 158 (2010)] It used be a place that monks used. I heard it
is just for exhibition now.
[ID 167 (2010)] I knew a temple as a place where people visit
for fun and pray as a matter of form.
[ID 168 (2010)] They educated us to believe a temple is a
historical heritage. I do not know about the
rest.
[ID 169 (2010)] I heard ordinary citizens cannot believe any
382
religion; they were built for foreigners.
[ID 170 (2010)] I knew it as a place where people worship.
[ID 171 (2010)] Someone I know went to Mt. Geumgang in
1968 and he told me he saw a temple. I heard
it has disappeared now, but I am not sure.
[ID 172 (2010)] I think a temple is a cultural heritage.
[ID 175 (2010)] I know foreigners who believe in religion go
there.
[ID 176 (2010)] I
heard
historical
that
temples
remains
or
are
for
preserving
sightseeing,
and
the
church is for showing to foreign pastors when
we invite them.
[ID 184 (2010)] I did not know exactly what they were for. I
only knew it was a place for worship.
[ID 186 (2010)] I knew there is a temple in Mt. Geumgang
and a church in Pyeongyang. In Mt. Chilbo,
there is Gyesim temple.
[ID 187 (2010)] I knew a temple as a cultural heritage, and the
church and Catholic churches are where people
believe in religion.
[ID 190 (2010)] I heard it is a sort of place for worship. And
when foreigners visit, they go there.
[ID 193 (2010)] I
knew
there
is
Buddhism,
but
ordinary
citizens are not allowed to believe.
[ID 194 (2010)] I knew a temple as a historic sight, and a
church in Pyeongyang exists for foreigners.
[ID 198 (2010)] I knew it existed. After I went back from
China, I knew that a church is where people
worship God.
383
As you can see above, for the most part, North Koreans knew
a Protestant church or a Catholic church as a place built for
foreign visitors or foreign relations, and a Buddhist temple as a
cultural heritage or a tourist attraction. The fact that they failed
to recognize these places as places where real worship or religious
activity takes place tells us that for North Koreans, religion
cannot be truly felt and their enjoyment of freedom of religion in
North Korea is just a fiction.
In the meantime, <Table IV-3-11> ‘Status quo of religion in
North Korea’ shows that only about 40,000 which is less than
0.2% of the total population of 23~24 million are categorized as
believers of four major religions.29) Even this figure was just
numbers reported to the Human Rights Committee which is an
international organization. There is no guarantee that this figure
matches the real numbers of believers in North Korea at all. It is
more likely that it is a make-believe figure which was manipulated
to publicize freedom of religion in North Korea. Even if we believe
the numbers in <Table IV-3-11>, the fact that only 0.2% of the
total population is believers tells us that the reality of religious
freedom in North Korea is the worst in the international community.
According to the North Korean explanation, believers who
*
participate in about 500 house churches. A house church spreads
through the entire country should number 11,500 or 13,500. Most
29) Human Rights Committee, “Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee:
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,” Seventy-second session, CCPR/CO/72/PRK, 27
August 2001 Available from <http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/385c2add1632f4a8c12565
a9004dc311/39396fdc150c23c0c1256a990049a498?OpenDocument>; The National Human
Rights Committee, Document Collection of Implementing International Human Rights
Treaties in North Korea: Country report by North Korea and Concluding Observation
of the UN Human Rights Council, , NHRC 05-92 (Seoul: The NHRC, 2005), p. 67; Jhe
Seong-ho, “Current Status on Implementing International Human Rights Treaties in
North Korea,” 2008 Bukhan ingwon baekseo baekseo (2008 White Paper Human Rights
in North Korea) (Seoul: KBA, 2008), p. 58.
384
North Korean defectors when asked about the numbers of house
churches and believers answered that they did not know or gave
a negative response. Among 200 surveyed defectors, only 3 and
only 2 respectively answered yes to the question, “Have you
heard of any story of house churches in North Korea?” and “Have
you attended a house church in North Korea?”
Also, research institutes understand the uncertainty of the
number of house churches and the total Christian population.30) It
hardly makes sense that North Korea allows the operation of 500
house churches in the country since North Korea is in “A War
against Christianity” while cracking down on believers because it
sees Christianity as a threat to its socialist system. So, the total
number of believers of Buddhism, Cheondogyo, and the Catholic
Church is not reliable either. Nevertheless, it is hard to conclude
that there is no house church in North Korea.
The possible existence of a so called ‘underground church’ has
become an object of interest in relation to the status quo of
religion in North Korea. In the interviews conducted by the KBA
in 2010, most defectors did not know of the existence of an
underground church. Only six people answered the question,
“Having heard of the existence of underground churches in North
Korea, how many underground church-goers do you think there
are?” and half of them said there is no underground church in
North Korea. This demonstrates the doubt about its existence.31)
In this regard, some media reported that there are 400~500
thousand
Christians
who
attend
the
house
churches
and
30) Bukhan ingwon jeongbo senteo (Database Center North Korean Human Rights), 2009
Bukhan jonggyojayu baekseo (2009 White Paper on Religious Freedom in North
Korea), p. 54.
31) Meanwhile, two of the interviewees answered that they attended the house church. I
cannot exclude the possibility that those churches are in fact, underground churches.
underground
church
in
North
Korea,32)
while
some
385
activists
pointed out that this number is possibly exaggerated.33)
<Table Ⅳ-3-13> “Having heard of the existence of underground churches in
North Korea, how many underground church-goers do you think
there are?”
No. of
response
Valid Response
Percentage
(%)
Cumulative
Percentage(%)
None
3
50.0
50.0
Less than 100
2
33.3
83.3
5,000 ~ 10,000
1
16.7
100.0
Total
6
100.0
3) Persecution of Religious People
North Korea, according to its Constitution, allows freedom of
religion, but it is uncertain that it actually guarantees the freedom
of belief. From the deportation story of a Korean pastor who tried
to evangelize people on the streets of North Korea in the 1990s, it
seems certain that North Korea does not allow missionary work.
The fact that North Korea strongly controls and persecutes the
religious life of its citizens is well represented in a paper based
on a lecture called Gang-yeon-je-gang entitled, “Let’s firmly
destroy the wicked scheme of the enemy who tries to spread
32) The numbers are quoted from an official of the Open Doors International, an
international Christian organization. Radio Free Asia (RFA), Dec. 25, 2009; “About
500,000 underground Christians in North Korea,” KBS WORLD Report, [Online, cited on
Dec. 25, 2009]. Available from <http://world.kbs.co.kr/korean/news_IK_detail.htm·No=
145997>; Senior editor of RFA, Park Bong-hyun, predicted that there are about 100,000
underground Christians in North Korea, “Jeunggahaneun Jihagyohoe Sinjadeul
(Increasing numbers of underground Christians)” in the [North Korea Observatory of
Park Bong-hyun] broadcasted by RFA on August 6, 2009. Besides, unidentified news
reported that there have been 540 underground churches since 1994.
33) See Charlie Kim, “Chunggyeok bogo! Bukhan seongyo hyeonjang (Shocking Report!
The field of North Korea Mission),” Haengbokhan Tongillo (Toward Happy unification),
a Webzine published by Seonjin Tongil Gyoyuk Center, August 2009, p. 12.
386
religion among us” which was acquired and revealed by Good
Friends, a South Korean Human Rights NGO. The contents are
outlined below.34)
∙Mentioning the enactment of the U.S. North Korea Human
Rights
Act and
South
Korea’s
Radio
Free Asia (RFA)
sponsored by 2 million U.S. dollars, North Korea criticizes
that U.S. makes efforts to promote international public opinion
and pressure through religious propaganda to isolate and block
North Korea.
∙North Korea criticizes South Korea for its efforts to send in
religious publications including the bible, audio and video
recordings by bribing illegal immigrants, travelers and traders.
∙North Korea criticizes that religion manipulates children’s
physiological characteristics and mind which hardly forget
what they heard and saw in their childhood. After teaching
them
short-course
of
religious
education,
religious
organizations use them to spread religion among their friends
and families to take advantage of their future activities of
underground religious organizations.
∙North Korea recognizes religion as a tool to overturn the
national system, infringe nation’s self-autonomy, and violate
human rights.
∙North Korea declares that “prohibiting religious activities in
North Korea is not just a simple practical endeavor but a
serious ideological confrontation in order to politically protect
respectable Kim Il-sung who is the leader of our revolution.”
34) Good Friends, “2005Nyeon 7Wol Jonggyohaengwi Dansoge Daehan Gangyeonjegang (A
paper based on a lecture called Gangyeonjegang about cracking down religious
activities in July 2005,” Today’s North Korea News <NEWS LETTER>, vol. 16,
October 30, 2006; Korea Institute for National Unification, 2009 Bukhan ingwon baekseo
(2009 White Paper on Human Rights in North Korea), p. 210.
387
North Korea eliminated the ‘freedom of anti-religious propaganda’
Clause in Article 54 of the former Constitution by revising it in
April 1992. The revision would become its seventh one since the
Socialist Constitution was first revised in 1972.35) However, North
Korean
government
and
media
have
continued
anti-religious
propaganda disparaging other religions except Juche ideology.36)
The paper proves that North Korea has not given up anti-religious
propaganda. According to the survey conducted by the KBA in
2010, 37% of North Korea defectors answered that they saw or
read anti-religious propaganda in news media or newspapers. This
confirms
that
North
Korea
is
still
conducting
anti-religious
propaganda (See the results of the survey <Table IV-3-13>).
<Table Ⅳ-3-14> Have you seen or read any article related to anti-religious
propaganda in broadcast media or newspapers in North Korea?
No. of
response
Percentage
(%)
Cumulative
Percentage(%)
Yes
52
37.1
37.1
Valid Response
No
88
62.9
100.0
Total
140
100.0
Invalid
No response
60
Total
200
The North Korean government so far from stopping passive
anti-religious propaganda is even more active and aggressive in
finding and oppressing believers. Its efforts to find believers are
mainly aimed at Christians (Underground churchgoers). According
to the Database Center for North Korea Human Rights, analysis
35) Article 54 of the Socialist Constitution enacted in December 1972, stipulated, “Citizens
have freedom of religion and anti-religious propaganda.”
36) For the cases of anti-religious propaganda in North Korea, see Go Tae-woo, “Bukhanui
Jonggyo (Religion in North Korea),” Tongil-chongseo (Unification Series), vol. 8, 4th
edition (Seoul: Education Center for Unification, 1992), pp. 25~31.
388
of 345 cases of religious persecution (252 concerned people) shows
that
more than 57.9% were cases of persecution of Christians
while
2.0%
and
1.6%
related
to
Buddhism
and
Catholicism
respectively (32.1% is not identified).37) In regard to this, some
North Korean defectors testified that more than two times in a
year,
Bowibu
Christianity.
agents
The
educate
contents
of
citizens
the
not
to
education
propagandize
are
mainly
necessity of uncovering Christians and ways to identify
the
them.38)
Interviews conducted by the KBA in 2010 shows that North
Koreans are generally aware that conducting religious activities
such as prayer is punished when discovered. However, the effective
percentage of the answers to the question, “Have you seen or
heard
of
neighbors
who
were
persecuted
for
praying
when
discovered?” is only 15.6% (28 out of 179). Nevertheless, this does
not mean that the North Korean government does not persecute
religious activity. That is because 78.8% of the respondents
answered
punishment
yes
if
to
the
captured
question
after
“Are
you
you
contact
subject
a
to
South
capital
Korean
missionary and are then repatriated to North Korea?” Also, 77.9%
(106 out of 136) of the respondents answered yes to the question,
“Are you sent to a political prison camp when you are captured
after contacting a South Korean missionary while outside the
country?” These facts lead to the conclusion that the government
of North Korea vigorously persecutes Christians. The Human
Rights Committee which was put into place according to the ICCPR
stated that there was a report on continuing religious persecution in
37) Bukhan ingwon jeongbo senteo (The Database Center for North Korea Human Rights),
2009 Bukhan jonggyojayu baekseo (2009 White Paper on Freedom of Religion in
North Korea), p. 5, p. 130.
38) Korea Institute for National Unification, 2009 Bukhan ingwon baekseo (2009 White
389
North Korea from its sources obtained in August 27, 2001.39)
<Table Ⅳ-3-15> Did you know that you are punished for praying when you are
discovered?
Yes
Valid Response
Invalid
No. of
response
Percentage
(%)
110
67.9
67.9
100.0
No
52
32.1
Total
162
100.0
No response
23
Total
Cumulative
Percentage(%)
185
<Table Ⅳ-3-16> Have you seen or heard of neighbors who were persecuted for
praying when discovered?
No. of
response
Percentage
(%)
Cumulative
Percentage(%)
Yes
28
15.6
15.6
Valid Response
No
151
84.4
100.0
Total
179
100.0
Invalid
No response
Total
6
185
<Table Ⅳ-3-17> Are you subjected to capital punishment if captured after you
contact a South Korean missionary and then repatriated to
North Korea?
No. of
response
Valid Response
Invalid
Cumulative
Percentage(%)
Yes
108
78.8
78.8
No
29
21.2
100.0
Total
137
100.0
No response
Total
Percentage
(%)
63
200
39) Human Rights Committee, “Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee:
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,” Seventy-second session, CCPR/CO/72/PRK, 27
August 2001. Available from <Http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/385c2add1632f4a8c12565
a9004dc311/39396fdc150c23c0c1256a990049a498?OpenDocument>.
390
<Table Ⅳ-3-18> Are you sent to a political prison camp when you are captured
after contacting a South Korean missionary while outside the
country?
No. of
response
Percentage
(%)
Cumulative
Percentage(%)
Yes
106
77.9
77.9
Valid Response
No
30
22.1
100.0
Total
136
100.0
Invalid
No response
64
Total
200
The following are representative questions and answers related
to religious persecution in North Korea from the interviews of
North Korean defectors conducted in 2010.
What kind of punishment do you think you will get if it is found
out that you believed in a religion?
[ID 002 (2010)] You will be sent to a political prison camp.
[ID 003 (2010)] I heard such people are shot immediately.
[ID 006 (2010)] I think punishment for Buddhism is less severe
since North Koreans believe superstition related
to Buddhism. It may be more severe in the
case of Christianity. I guess they are sent to
places like a long-term corrective labor camp.
[ID 038 (2010)] I heard that if it is less severe, you are sent
to a corrective labor camp. If severe, you are
sent to a long-term corrective labor camp.
[ID 051 (2010)] I heard that they are shot.
[ID 065 (2010)] I heard that they are sent to Aoji coal mine,
whole families are sent to rural regions, or
sentenced
to
391
a long-term corrective prison
labor.
[ID 066 (2010)] Everyone is taken to the Bowibu. We never
see them after wards.
[ID 068 (2010)] Punishment for believers in Buddhism is less
severe.
In
the
case
of
Christianity
and
Catholicism, whole families are annihilated.
[ID 075 (2010)] Death. You should not believe in any religion.
It is just propaganda.
[ID 079 (2010)] They are sentenced to capital punishment, or
sent to a long-term corrective labor camp.
[IDs 091, 093, 097, 109, 159, 181, 186, 194 (all 2010)] Christians
are more severely punished. They are sent to
a political prison camp. I am not sure about
other religions.
[ID 105 (2010)] I know that punishment for defecting to South
Korea is more severe than defecting to China.
I heard they are sentenced to more than 3
years of punishment and sent to a political
prison camp.
[ID 123 (2010)] They are considered as political prisoners and
sent to No. 22 Political Prison Camp.
[ID 124 (2010)] They are sent to a political prison camp which
is an everlasting long-term corrective labor
camp
[ID 137 (2010)] I know that they are normally sentenced to 10
years of correctional prison labor. You are sent
to a political prison camp when you come
across such things as Christian books or a
392
missionary.
[ID 145 (2010)] There
are
various
punishments:
disciplinary
prison labor, correctional prison labor etc. I
heard you are even sent to a coal mine.
[ID 150 (2010)] Punishment for Christians is serious. I don’t
know about the rest.
[IDs 152, 197 (both 2010)] Regardless of religion, you are sent
to a political prison camp.
[ID 157 (2010)] Capital punishment.
[ID 164 (2010)] You are sentenced to public execution or sent
to a political prison camp.
[IDs 165, 172, 181, 182 (all 2010)] No matter what religion you
believe in, you are arrested in secret.
[ID 167 (2010)] Either you are sent to a political prison camp
or executed in public.
[ID 169 (2010)] It doesn’t matter what religion you believe.
Every believer is shot to death or sent to a
political prison camp.
[ID 171 (2010)] I thought if you are found out, you are
sentenced to life imprisonment and sent to a
long-term prison labor camp.
[ID 174 (2010)] They deport you. They don’t open this to the
public.
It
is
either
dismissal
or
layoff.
I
witnessed that a junior secretary of the Party
was
laid
off
because
he
consulted
a
fortune-teller.
[ID 175 (2010)] Imprisonment for more than ten years.
[ID 183 (2010)] Three generations of the family are sent to a
political prison camp.
393
[ID 184 (2010)] I saw someone who returned to North Korea
and
was
put
to
correctional
prison
labor
because of his belief in God.
[ID 198 (2010)] I know they are sent to a political prison
camp. I, myself, was sent to a political prison
camp because I read the bible.
※ The other testimonies not listed here are mostly stated that
they shall be sent to a political prison camp.
Have you ever seen or heard about neighbors who were punished
after they were found out?
[ID 001 (2010)] My
neighbor’s
husband
after
retiring
from
In-min-ban (people’s neighborhood unit), went
to China for sightseeing. He brought a bible
when
he
returned,
but
was
not
caught.
However, husband and wife fought on this
matter
and
proceeded,
got
the
divorced.
husband
While
was
found
the
out
trial
to
possess a bible so that he was sent to a
long-term corrective labor camp.
[ID 004 (2010)] In 2003, it seemed that some young people did
bible study in Musan. I heard they were found
out and sent to a political prison camp. A
Bowibu agent accused them; he said it is our
Suryong (Great leader) who feeds them, not
God. He dragged them out because they were
tainted with decadent ideology.
[ID 005 (2010)] I heard from my cousin that an old lady next
394
door was captured while reading a religious
book and died.
[ID 006 (2010)] There
was
Soon-geum
a
man
who
whose
lived
in
name
is
Ahn
Cheongjin.
His
daughter went to China and brought a bible
back. Ahn showed it to his friend and told
him, “There is a book like this in China.”
However, his friend reported it to Anjeonbu
(People’s
Safety
daughter
were
Agency).
Ahn
interrogated
in
and
the
his
People’s
Safety Agency. I can’t remember what kind of
punishment they received. I vaguely remember
that it was disciplinary prison labor.
[ID 007 (2010)] Two of my neighbors were arrested while
reading a bible. One was the father of a family
who was arrested in 1995. The other one was
arrested in 2008.
[ID 018 (2010)] I
saw
a
man
who
was
severely
treated
because he became a Christian after returning
from China when I was taken into the custody
of Sinuiju Bowibu in 2005.
[ID 020 (2010)] A married couple went to China in 2002, and
they started to believe in Christianity. They
were
arrested
and
sent
to
a
long-term
corrective labor camp. The wife was very sick,
so
she
was
released
from
the
long-term
corrective labor camp. While at home, she
studied the bible and got rid of the portraits of
Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il. Neighbors saw
395
and reported her to the government, so she
went back to the long-term corrective labor
camp again. She died there from her illness.
[ID 035 (2010)] A man working for the people’s neighborhood
unit went to China and believed Christianity.
He was caught by the Bowibu while spreading
Christianity to others.
[ID 037 (2010)] I think a man who helped me defect from
North Korea went to church in China. I heard
from his brother that he was arrested and sent
to a long-term corrective labor camp where he
died after 8 months.
[ID 042 (2010)] In
1997,
I
was
arrested
in
China
and
repatriated to North Korea. At that time, when
it was discovered that you went to church in
China,
they
connection
investigation
in
considered
South
process
you
Korea.
very
to
have
a
It
made
your
hard
and
even
increased the number of punishments. I don’t
know the details.
[ID 044 (2010)] There was a lady who was sentenced to 10
years for believing Christianity. She imputed
her daughter’s work of Christian evangelization
to herself. Her son and daughter who spread
Christianity in China were repatriated to North
Korea, and even in a detention house, they did
not stop doing it. Someone reported this so
that the son died during interrogation, but the
daughter survived.
396
[ID 056 (2010)] They divided the group of defectors and those
who believed in Christianity when I was in
jail. So, I knew there were quite a number of
Christians.
[ID 062 (2010)] I heard someone who believed in Catholicism
through his uncle was taken to a political
prison camp in the middle of the night in 2000.
[ID 067 (2010)] I heard a story that a whole family was
arrested because of their belief in Christianity
in Suncheon.
[ID 069 (2010)] I heard a women’s story in 2002. She was
captured in China and taken into the custody
of the Bowibu. While in custody, she publicly
prayed
while
claiming
she
was
doing
it
because she believed in God. A Bowibu agent
asked, “What is God? Why do you believe it?”
and she answered that only thing she had was
God. The agent asked again what she was
going to do if he killed her, and she replied
that if it is done it is God’s will. In the end, I
heard that she was shot.
[ID 079 (2010)] I
heard
that
someone
was
found
out
evangelizing. The people he evangelized went
to jail and died there.
[ID 091 (2010)] There was a tailor whose bible was discovered
at home. He was sent to a place where he
could never come back and the rest of his
family ran away into the mountain valley.
[ID 105 (2010)] My neighbor brought a Christian book from
397
China. She burned it in the furnace the day
before censorship, so she was released from
preliminary
proceedings
because
they
found
nothing.
[ID 109 (2010)] A man brought a bible from China. His friend
saw it and reported to the Bowibu. I knew the
man who had the bible received correctional
prison labor.
[ID 129 (2010)] My grandparents on my mother’s side lived in
Saetbyeol County. One villager of that town
was found out believing Christianity. So, he
and his family were sent to a political prison
camp.
[ID 136 (2010)] There was a Christian family. They prayed in
secret, but someone reported them. The whole
family was arrested.
[ID 183 (2010)] I
used
to
know
a
lady
whose
name
is
Song-chun. She had her house searched and a
bible was discovered. She was sentenced to
correctional prison labor. And I heard she died
there.
[ID 187 (2010)] My mother who was 80 years old in 1999 was
arrested because of her belief in Buddhism.
She could not get out of there.
[ID 192 (2010)] My friend and his wife were taken by the
Bowibu due to their belief in religion. They
were sent to a political prison camp. And I
have never heard from them again.
398
Moreover, a North Korean whose name is Lee Hyun-ok (33
years old, female) was executed in public on June 16, 2009 on the
charge
of
distributing
bibles,
organizing
an
anti-government
movement, and being a spy who had connections in the U.S. and
South Korea as a Christian. Her family was known to be interned
in a political prison camp. Also, Seo Geum-ok (30 years old,
female), a believer who attended a house church, was arrested by
the Bowibu on the charge of distributing bibles and CDs and
being a spy who had connections in the U.S. and South Korea as
a Christian on March 10, 2009. It is not confirmed if she is still
alive after the severe tortures she received and her husband and
children are still missing.40)
It is not too much of an exaggeration to say that North Korea
is
a
country
of
organized
religious
persecution
when
the
testimonies of North Korean defectors and press releases are
considered.
The
United
States
Commission
on
International
Religious Freedom (USCIRF) presented their Annual Report on
International Religious Freedom on April 29, 2010. In this report,
the Commission pointed to North Korea as the worst country of
religious persecution and recommended to appoint North Korea as
a Country of Particular Concern (CPC) to the State Department.41)
40) The stories are from the presentation of Crimes against Humanity Investigation
Committee at the press conference for its inauguration in July 24, 2009. “A Christian in
North Korea executed in Public”, KMC Times, July 30, 2009; Nam Min-woo,
“Bukhanui Jonggyotanap (Persecution of Religion in North Korea),” Webzine Toward
Happy Unification, December 2009, p. 25.
41) International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 (IRFA) of the U.S. has annually nominated
the country which persecutes or violates the religious freedom in organized manner.
According to this Act, the U.S. State department nominates the country of religious
persecution in every fall based on the annual report of the USCIRF (Writing of a
report and its submission to the president, the State Department, and Congress before
st
May 1 are based on the Article 203. Submission of the report can take the form of
secret documentation) which is a bipartisan governmental organization. The Annual
Report on International Religious Freedom is submitted to the Congress according to
399
The report claimed, “North Korea is the one of the worst
oppressing nations in the world, and serious infringements of
religious freedom have continuously taken place in North Korea”
and “North Korea has continuously maintained the regretful cases
of human rights violations and oppression of religious freedom.”
This report also showed that the public security bureau of North
Korea recently infiltrated into churches in China and started to set
up ‘false prayer meetings’ in order to arrest North Korean
believers. In addition to this, many people who have religion are
known to be confined in a political prison camp called Gwalliso
and the number of people imprisoned because of their belief is
40,000 at maximum.42)
In
this
regard,
Carl
Moeller,
president
of
Open
Doors
International, a Christian organization in the U.S., noted that
“Christians in North Korea are threatened by its government
through arrest, torture, and execution. 50,000 Christians, which is
25% of the total Christian population, are imprisoned in political
the Article 102, Provision (b) of International Religious Freedom Act and posted on the
homepage of the State Department. Available from <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internat
ional_Religious_Freedom_Act_of_1998;http://web. archive.org/web/20070608190937/ http://usin
fo.state.gov/usa/infousa/laws/majorlaw/intlrel.htm; http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/>
The Country of Particular Concern (CPC) that the USCIRF recommended to nominate
on April 29, 2010 are 13 countries, including Iran, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia,
Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Vietnam, Eritrea, Nigeria, and North Korea. North Korea,
especially, has been nominated as CPC since 2001. The USCIRF’s report stated that the
North Korean government has continuously and gravely persecuted the religious
freedom of its citizens. “North Korea has been appointed to the worst nation of
persecuting a religion for the past 10 years. Recommendation from the USCIRF to
engage in aid project for North Korea,” Yonhap News, April 30, 2010.
42) Dr. Elizabeth Prodromou, a vice chair of the USCIRF, pointed out “North Korea is one
of the worst countries in the world in which the government controls and oppresses all
religions of its citizens. Any religious activities of the citizens of North Korea are
gravely oppressed through detention, torture, and execution in organized and
comprehensive manner”. She continued, “There have continuously been severe
oppressions on human rights and religious freedom in North Korea in the last year,
and many believers are imprisoned in a political prison camp.” “USCIRF reappointed
North Korea to CPC,” VOA News (VOANews.com), April 29, 2010.
400
prison camps.”43) Likewise, the U.S. estimates the number of
Christians imprisoned in political prison camps at from 40,000 to
50,000 or perhaps even70,000.
4) North Korea’s Unrealistic Claim on Its Religious Freedom
- Based on the State’s Second Periodic Report to the ICCPR
On May 4, 2000, North Korea submitted the second periodic
report on its implementation of the Covenant to the Human Rights
Committee. North Korea insisted that the citizens of North Korea
enjoy freedom of religion in paragraphs 111 to 116 of the report.44)
Firstly, North Korea claims that the Socialist Constitution
allows freedom of choice in religion, religious assembly, and
construction of religious buildings based on Article 68 (1) of the
DPRK’s Socialist Constitution revised on September 5, 1998. In
addition, they insist that North Koreans can individually or jointly
perform religious ceremonies either in public or in private and
also, its citizens can deny religious ceremonies. Moreover, they
report that citizens can form religious organizations and teach
their religion to others. However, this report is just to mislead the
reality of religious freedom in North Korea.
The problem is Article 68 (3) of North Korea’s poison pill
Clause in the Constitution. It stipulates, “Religion cannot be used
to draw in foreign influence or damage the national social order.”
This Article consists of ‘the prohibition of religion as a mean to
draw in foreign influence’ and ‘the prohibition of religion for
damaging the national social order.’ It was because of foreign
43) Nam Min-woo, “Bukhanui Jonggyotanap (Religious oppression in North Korea),” p. 27.
44) The second periodic report of Democratic People's Republic of Korea. 2000-05-04.
CCPR/C/PRK/2000/2. Available from <http://www. unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/0/2847aadfc262
cfe0c12569e40057e41a/$FILE/G0041814.pdf.>
401
missionaries that foreign religion was practiced on the Korean
Peninsula.
Allowing
religious
freedom
means
historically
and
naturally to allow the freedom of propagation of religion. However,
to prohibit religious freedom for the reason of ‘drawing in foreign
influence’ means that North Korea eventually would not allow any
missionary
works
in
its
territory
whether
by
nationals
or
foreigners. It is the expression of their will to completely block
foreign religions from the west. This could mean that the freedom
of religion in North Korea is meaningless.
Also,
limiting
the
freedom
of
religion
for
the
reason
of
‘damaging the national social order’ is another expression which
can limit the freedom of missionary works in North Korea.
Furthermore, it is analyzed to deter the presence of any religion
except Juche ideology. In this view, the freedom of religious
ceremony, religious assembly and education mentioned in the
second periodic report is a pseudo freedom of religion which is
allowed only under the limits set by the government.
In addition, the expression stipulating that citizens of North
Korea ‘can deny religious ceremonies’ could be considered as a
skillfully expressed possibility for citizens to criticize or obstruct
religion. It is in the same as when the Soviet Union declared
freedom of anti-religious propaganda under the Soviet Socialist
Constitution.45)
Secondly, North Korea insists that there is nothing to stop
citizens
organizing
religious
groups
and
performing
religious
activities since the latter part of Article 67 of the Constitution
45) Article 124 of the Constitution of the Soviet Union amended in July, 1973 stipulates “In
order to protect the freedom of consciousness, churches are separated from the country,
and schools are separated from the churches. Every citizen can have the freedom of
religious worship and anti-religious propaganda.”
402
stipulates, “The State guarantees the freedom of activities of
democratic civil organizations.” Nevertheless, this claim is a pure
fiction. An assembly which the government of North Korea
doesn’t allow, especially ‘the meeting of Christians,’ is neither a
‘democratic party nor a civil organization’ as in Article 67 of the
Socialist Constitution. Therefore, this kind of meeting is considered
as an illegal assembly and banned so that it is not protected by
the Constitution of North Korea. Rather, the members of such
meetings can be punished with the charge of political crimes or
anti-state crimes.
Meanwhile, North Korea presents the existence of the Chosun
Christian
Federation,
Chosun
Buddhist
Federation,
Chosun
Catholics Association and Chosun Religious People’s Association
as evidence of the freedom of religion in North Korea. However,
in these organizations which are permitted by the State, Bowibu
agents lead and represent the organizations. Also, the North
Korean defectors testified that these agents act under the guidance
of the Workers’ Party.
Thirdly, the authorities of North Korea offer the fact that there
are religious publications, such as the Catholic prayer book, as
evidence of the freedom of religion. Most experts on this matter,
however, analyze these religious publications as only to be shown
to the world. Currently, followed by North Korean authority’s
instructions, a guide for foreigners acts as if he/she is a catholic.
In that case, the guide must carry a Catholic prayer or hymnbook
to fulfill his duty. North Korean government prints religious
publications for this necessity.
As is generally known, Jangchung Catholic church is in North
Korea. However, it does not enshrine the host. This is plain
403
evidence which shows that Jangchung Catholic church is a false
religious institution. Moreover, North Korean defectors testify that
real believers, in fear, cannot access this church. They only make
the sign of the cross in secret while being afraid that their
immature grandchildren or children might see them doing it.
Fourthly,
the
North
Korean
government
gives
the
false
impression that Jangchung Catholic church and Bongsu church
were voluntarily built by its citizens. However, according to the
testimonies of the defectors, no one can approach these religious
facilities without permission from the State. The citizens of North
Korea are well aware that this Catholic church is not for the
religious activities of citizens, but for purposes of advertisement to
the international community.
Fifthly, North Korea claims that every religion in North Korea
is equal and is not subjected to government interference. ‘Ten
Principles for the Establishment of the One-Ideology System of
the Party’ standardized North Korea’s theocratic system and
worship of Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il as absolute beings.
Under such coerced circumstances, the religious life of Christians
or Catholics is treated as anti-party, anti-social and anti-national
activity since it is against the worship of Kim Il-sung and Kim
Jong-il. North Korean defectors consistently testify that when
such an act is uncovered, people are immediately dragged to a
political prison camp. This proves the interference, violation, and
eventual destruction of freedom of religion by the State.
Lastly, it is the reality that among the people who are
repatriated to North Korea, those who possess the bible or
contacted a missionary from South Korea are more severely
punished. This is a kind of religious purge that has been
404
unparalleled in the 21st century. It is doubtful what meaning the
Chosun Christian Federation, a false Christian organization, and its
Pyeongyang Theological Academy can have. Above all, it is
urgently necessary to change the anti-religious activities which
convict Christians as anti-social criminals, rather than advertising
religious
associations
and
education
facilities
or
offering
the
relevant provision of the constitution to international human rights
organizations.46)
46) This content is edited and revised by the author based on the paper written by Lim
Gwang-gyu, “The freedom of religious belief,” of 2008 White Paper on North Korea
Human Rights, pp. 610-612.
405
4. Arbitrary Detention
￭ Kim Hyeon-seong (Attorney at law)
1. Introduction
On April 9, 2009, at the first session of the 12th Supreme
People’s Assembly, North Korea revised its Constitution, which
was last revised in 1998. The most prominent change of the
Constitution strengthened the authority and status of the Chairman
of the National Defense Commission, which is the official title of
North Korea’s leader, Kim Jong-il. However, another notable
change was made in Article 2, Paragraph 8 of the Constitution.
The previous Constitution stated, “The State shall defend and
protect
the
interests
of the
workers, peasants
and
working
intellectuals, who have been freed from exploitation and oppression
and become masters of the State and society,” whereas the
revised
Constitution proclaims,
“The State shall
respect
and
protect the human rights of the workers, peasants and working
intellectuals, who have been freed from exploitation and oppression
and become masters of the State and society.” Only time will tell
if these modifications indicate changes in North Korea’s social
awareness toward human rights or are merely a superficial
response to increasing international criticism of its human rights
abuses.
The 2010 interview of North Korean defectors by the Korean
Bar Association (hereafter referred to as “KBA”) included 200
406
interviewees, a number twice as large as that of the 2008 survey,
in order to obtain a thorough understanding of the current status
of
human
rights
in
North
Korea.
Interview
surveys
were
conducted with the most recent North Korean defectors to ensure
their
testimonies
are
relatively
fresh
regarding
state-ordered
arbitrary detention. This chapter will provide an overview of
arrest and detention based on North Korea’s Criminal Procedure
Act and examine recent cases of arrest and detention during
interrogation and pretrial procedures. Cases of arbitrary detention
resulting in incarceration at a political prison camp will be
addressed in the “Involuntary Disappearances” chapter of this
book.
2. Overview of the Legislation Regarding Arrest and Detention
1) Supreme Legislation Regarding Personal Liberty
The right to personal liberty is one of the fundamental rights
for all people. Article 9 of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights declares that: “No one shall be subjected to arbitrary
arrest, detention or exile.” Moreover, North Korea has signed the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),
which stipulates in Article 9, Paragraph 1 that “Everyone has the
right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be subjected
to arbitrary arrest or detention. No one shall be deprived of his
liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with such
procedure as are established by law” and the following Paragraph
2 states that “Anyone who is arrested shall be informed, at the
time of arrest, of the reasons for his arrest and shall be promptly
informed of any charges against him.”
407
North Korea’s Constitution clearly stipulates the inviolability of
the
person in
Article
79, declaring that: “Citizens
shall
be
guaranteed inviolability of the person and the home and privacy of
correspondence. Citizens cannot be detained or arrested and their
homes cannot be searched without legal grounds.” Article 177 of
the Criminal Procedure Act of North Korea also stipulates that no
one shall be arrested or detained in a manner not provided for in
the law or without following the procedures prescribed in the law.
Meanwhile,
Article
180
of
the
Act
stipulates
that
only
investigators and pretrial officers can make an arrest and no
arrest shall be made without a warrant. The following section will
examine laws related to arrest and detention during interrogation
and pretrial examination procedures which take place prior to
indictment.
2) Legislation on Arrest and Detention during Investigation
North Korea’s Criminal Procedure Act defines investigation as
the act of a investigator’s finding and summoning a person
suspected of a crime and transferring him/her * to a pretrial
47)
examination
(Article
13).
Once
detecting
the
suspect,
the
investigator is immediately required to hand over the case for a
pretrial examination. Thus, the investigator’s collecting evidence of
the crime is inevitably limited to collecting and preserving the
evidence which cannot be delayed (Article 141). Because of this,
the collection of evidence of the crime is very superficial, and
limited to what is immediately accessible.
The investigation
* The term “an interrogatee” indicates a suspect in the process of interrogation without
any due legal process or trial. While South Korean criminal procedure follows “the
suspect → the prosecuted → the defendant,” North Korea’s criminal procedure follows “the
suspect → the interrogatee → the accused.”
408
process, in principle, does not allow arrest and detention for a
full-scale
evidence-collecting
process.
In
other
words,
North
Korea’s Criminal Procedure Act is based on the assumption that
legal disposition including arrest and detention occurs during a
pretrial examination.
However,
investigator
there
can
are
arrest
some
a
exceptional
suspect
or
a
cases
criminal
where
without
an
a
prosecutor’s approval. Such cases are warranted (Article 143,
Criminal Procedure Act):
First, when the offender is attempting to commit a crime or
caught in the act of committing a crime or immediately after the
crime has been committed;
Second, when a crime victim or a witness to the crime
apprehends or identifies the offender;
Third, when evidence of a crime is found on the offender’s
person or in his/her residence;
Fourth, when the suspect attempts suicide or becomes a flight
risk;
Or fifth, when the residence of the suspect is unclear.
When an interrogator arrests or detains a criminal suspect
under one of the grounds stated above, he/she must submit a
document
outlining
the
detention
decision
to
secure
the
prosecutor’s approval and transfer the case to the next pretrial
examination within ten days of the date of the arrest or detention.
By North Korean law, the suspect must be immediately released if
the prosecutor denies the request for detention or fails to verify
that the suspect committed the crime within ten days of the
409
arrest or detention (Article 144, Criminal Procedure Act).
A
suspect,
who
was
arrested
by
an
interrogator
as
an
exceptional case, shall be detained for a maximum of ten days for
investigation. In this case, however, the North Korea’s Criminal
Procedure Act does not allow the suspect to have the following
rights that a person in a pretrial examination does: protection of
an individual from illegal arrest and detention (Article 177);
protection of a pregnant woman by restricting
her detention and
confinement (Article 179); protection of an individual by issuing an
arrest
warrant
(Article
182);
protection
of
an
individual
by
notifying his/her of the reason for arrest or detention (Article
183); protection of the individual’s right to an attorney and
protection of an individual by restricting overnight interrogation
(Article 163); and protection of an individual by prohibiting
coercive interrogation (Article 167). Since North Korea’s Criminal
Procedure Act does not guarantee enough legal protections from
arbitrary
arrest
and
detention
during
interrogation,
current
legislation will necessarily raise serious and critical problems.
3) Legislation on Arrest and Detention during the Pretrial Examination
North
Korea’s
Criminal
Procedure
Act
defines
a
pretrial
examination as an act of collecting evidence to confirm the
interrogatee
thoroughly
and
and
disclosing
accurately,
the
which
whole
is
picture
similar
of
to
the
the
crime
criminal
investigation process of South Korea. In other words, this stage
exists to uncover all the facts involved, including the nature of
the crime defined by objective evidence; motive and intent;
weapon and method; degree and result of the crime; the suspect’s
role and responsibility in the crime; and so on, in order to solve
410
the case (Article 148 and 149, Criminal Procedure Act).
Ye-shim-won (Pretrial Examination Agency, hereafter referred
to as “PEA”) must set a date for a pretrial examination of a case
and begin it within 48 hours after receiving the case from the
investigation agency (Article 157, Criminal Procedure Act). The
pretrial examination must close the case within two months of
starting the examination; If the case is complicated, the pretrial
examination can be extended one month at a time to a maximum
of four months (Clause 1, 2 of Article 188, Criminal Procedure
Act).
After all the necessary evidence to convict the interrogatee is
gathered, the PEA must charge him/her (Article 158, Criminal
Procedure Act). Once this takes place, the PEA must inform the
interrogatee of his/her charge within 48 hours, and only then is
the PEA required to notify the interrogatee of their right to an
attorney (Article 159, Criminal Procedure Act). In other words,
North Korea’s Criminal Procedure Act has a drawback within the
law itself; the accused is most in need of an attorney during an
interrogation
and
a
pretrial
examination,
yet
the
Criminal
Procedure Act does not guarantee a suspect’s right to an attorney
during this time.
Pretrial
examiners
can
immediately
arrest
or
detain
any
interrogatees considered to be a risk in terms of their capacity to
avoid a pretrial examination/ or a trial or interfere with the crime
investigation.
In
principle,
arrest
or
detention
under
such
circumstances must occur only after criminal liability is decided
from the investigation. However, in special cases the pretrial
examiner
can
suspend
detention
and
confinement
before
the
decision of criminal liability is made, if they have a prosecutor’s
411
approval. The accused must be released and the arrest or
detention cancelled if the investigation does not lead to an
indictment of criminal liability within ten days (Article 176, 178,
Criminal Procedure Act).
Under the Criminal Procedure Act, an arrest can be made when
an interrogator or a pretrial examiner submits an application for
the arrest and receives an arrest warrant from the prosecutor
(Article 181). In order to keep the accused in custody, the pretrial
examiner must draw up a document regarding the confinement
decision
approved
by
the
prosecutor
(Article
185,
186).
In
accordance with these procedures, the Criminal Act of North
Korea is largely different from that of South Korea: the prosecutor
makes the final decision on the arrest and issues a warrant in
North Korea, whereas an arrest warrant is issued by the judge in
South Korea.
When
a
pretrial
officer
decides
to
enforce
detention
and
confinement, he/she must present an identification document and
an arrest warrant to the interrogatee (Article 182). North Korea
has been continuously criticized for some time because of the lack
of familial notification of arrest or detention, so, the revised
Criminal Procedure Act stipulates in Article 183 that if the PEA
officer decides to arrest or detain the accused, he/she must inform
the interrogatee’s family or affiliated organization within 48 hours
of the interrogatee’s whereabouts and reason for the arrest or
detention.
The PEA officer must also fill out a document outlining the
conclusion of a pretrial examination and have all case files and
evidence to the prosecutor upon the end of a pretrial examination.
This is relatively similar to transferring a case to a court in
412
South Korea’s Criminal Procedure Law where a judicial police
officer hands over relevant case materials to the prosecutor. Upon
receipt of the case, the prosecutor reviews case materials and
decides whether or not the nature of the crime has been fully and
accurately revealed. If yes, the prosecutor is indicted for trial
(Article 265, Criminal Procedure Act). If the prosecutor concludes
that the interrogate cannot be indicted, the prosecutor returns the
case to the PEA with a written explanation (Article 268, Criminal
Procedure Act). Such procedures must take place within ten days
(or three days for cases where an accused may be sentenced to
disciplinary prison labor.) of receipt of the case from the PEA
(Article 252, Criminal Procedure Act). Hence, ten days (three days
for disciplinary prison labor) is the maximum period for the
accused to be held in custody by a prosecutor during the
indictment period.
3. The Current Situation of Arbitrary Arrest and Detention
1) Arrest and Detention during Investigation
According to the survey results, out of seventy-six interviewees
who replied that they or one of their family members underwent
criminal investigation, up to 85% answered that they had been
arrested
or
detained,
indicating
that
investigation-under-
imprisonment takes place frequently.1) Based on these results, the
reality of the situation in North Korea indicates an absence of
authority in North Korea’s Criminal Procedure Act, which, in
principle, prohibits arrest and detention during investigation.
1) There was little difference with the interview results (89.7%, 35/39) conducted in 2008.
Refer to 2008 White Paper on Human Rights in North Korea, the Korean Bar
Association, 2008, p. 663.
Moreover,
92.9%
(65/70)2)
answered
that
they
had
413
never
received an official arrest warrant or detention order form. 60.3%
(44/77)3) replied that their family members were never notified of
their arrest or detention and 97.1% (68/70)4) testified that they did
not have the right to an attorney during interrogation. These
results indicate that, in practice, suspects of crime evidently do
not have the right to defense by law.
Even when exceptional cases when an arrest is made during
the interrogation, under the Criminal Procedure Act (Article 144),
a suspect must be released when the agency fails to receive a
prosecutor’s approval within forty-eight hours or does not discover
strong evidence linking the suspect to the crime within ten days.
However, twenty-four out of sixty-six interviewees (36.4%) have
been
detained
for
more
than
forty-eight
hours
without
a
prosecutor’s approval and thirteen out of sixty-nine interviewees
(18.8%) have been detained over ten days despite lack of evidence.
These
testimonies
clearly
indicate
that
arbitrary
arrest
and
detention is still rampant during the interrogation period, despite
being prohibited by law.
91.8% (67/73) of the interviewees were unaware of the law
which ordered immediate release of the suspect after 48 hours of
arrest if the interrogator failed to secure a prosecutor’s approval
4) In 2008, 92.1% (35/38) interviewees answered “no” to the question “did the agency read
you the rights to an attorney?” which indicates little or no fundamental difference in
that the right to attorney is not aptly advocated.
414
and 77.8% (56/72) were unaware of the fact that the interrogatee
must be released within ten days if the PEA fails to get evidence
indicating the suspect. In sum, the interview results showed
extremely low awareness among North Koreans on the law
statute prohibiting illegal arrest and detention.
Interrogators have a maximum of ten days until they turned
over a case to the PEA (Article 144, Criminal Procedure Act).
However, the survey results demonstrate that not only did the
interrogators violate the regulation limiting arrest to a maximum
of ten days, they detained the interrogatee for arbitrary periods of
time. In some cases it was three days, while others were detained
for one month, three months and even up to eight months.
Although,
after
reviewing
elaborate
statements
from
the
interviewees, their answer were vague as to whether the periods
mentioned above (three days, one month, two months, and eight
months) indicated the interrogation or the pretrial examination.
Either
way,
eight
months
detention
far
exceeds
the
legally
mandated detention periods. Therefore, it violates the legal statute:
eight months is more than the sum of ten days maximum
detention during the interrogation, four months of maximum
detention during the pretrial examination and ten days allowed for
prosecutor’s approval combined.
Some of the interviewees said bribery could ensure release
before moving on to the pretrial examination. One interviewee
even replied that he/she was released when he/she paid 2,000
North Korean won as bribery to the Bowibu (National Security
Agency) agent who was handling his/her case not to transfer the
case to the PEA.5)
5) The testimony of [ID 152 (2010)] interviewed by the KBA.
415
The following tables are the research result related to specific
investigation process.
<Table Ⅳ-4-1> Have you or your family ever been investigated by an
investigation agency?
No. of
response
valid
response
Cumulative
Percentage(%)
Yes
76
38.4
38.4
No
118
59.6
98.0
4
2.0
100.0
198
100.0
I don’t know how it would
be different, but I was
investigated by an
investigation agency.
Total
Invalid
Percentage
(%)
No response
2
Total
200
<Table Ⅳ-4-2> Were you investigated after arrested or detained?
Yes
valid response
No. of
response
Percentage
(%)
Cumulative
Percentage(%)
65
85.5
85.5
100.0
No
11
14.5
Total
76
100.0
<Table Ⅳ-4-3> Have you received any document on arrest or detention?
No. of
response
Percentage
(%)
Cumulative
Percentage(%)
Yes
5
7.1
7.1
valid response
No
65
92.9
100.0
Total
70
100.0
Invalid
No response
6
Total
76
416
<Table Ⅳ-4-4> When you were arrested and detained, did the investigation
agency notify your family of it?
No. of
response
Percentage
(%)
Cumulative
Percentage(%)
Yes
29
39.7
39.7
No
44
60.3
100.0
Total
73
100.0
No response
3
valid
response
Invalid
Total
76
<Table Ⅳ-4-5> Can you receive any legal assistance from an attorney while
your case was investigated before it was transferred to the PEA?
No. of
response
Cumulative
Percentage(%)
Yes
2
2.9
2.9
No
68
97.1
100.0
Total
70
100.0
No response
6
valid
response
Invalid
Percentage
(%)
Total
76
<Table Ⅳ-4-6> Did you know that you must be released if there is no
prosecutor’s approval of your case within 48 hours?
No. of
response
Cumulative
Percentage(%)
Yes
6
8.2
8.2
No
67
91.8
100.0
Total
73
100.0
No response
3
valid
response
Invalid
Percentage
(%)
Total
76
417
<Table Ⅳ-4-7> Have you ever arrested or detained more than 48 hours?
No. of
response
Percentage
(%)
Cumulative
Percentage(%)
Yes
24
36.4
36.4
valid
response
No
42
63.6
100.0
Total
66
100.0
Invalid
No response
10
Total
76
<Table Ⅳ-4-8> Did you know that you must be set free immediately after they
fail to prove that you are a criminal within ten days?
No. of
response
valid
response
Invalid
Percentage
(%)
Cumulative
Percentage(%)
22.2
22.2
100.0
Yes
16
No
56
77.8
Total
72
100.0
No response
Total
4
76
<Table Ⅳ-4-9> Have you ever detained more than ten days even though there
is no proof that your are a criminal?
No. of
response
valid
response
Invalid
Yes
13
Percentage
(%)
Cumulative
Percentage(%)
18.8
18.8
100.0
No
56
81.2
Total
69
100.0
No response
7
Total
76
2) Situation of Arrest and Detention during the Pretrial examination
According to North Korean law, the PEA must decide a pretrial
hearing
within 48
hours
of transferring
the case from
the
interrogation (Article 157, Criminal Procedure Act). However,
418
42.9% (20/35) of the interviewees replied that pretrial examinations
did not take place within the required time-frame. Respondents
answered that the waiting period for pretrial examinations were
five days, one week or even up to twenty days.6) Out of
interviewees who experienced a pretrial examination, 94.6% (35/37)
of the respondents answered that they were not aware that a
pretrial examination had to begin within forty-eight hours after
their arrest. This indicates very low awareness among North
Koreans of the legislation pertaining to a pretrial examination.
88.6% (31/35) of the respondents answered that they had never
notified of the decision to investigate their criminal liability within
48 hours of their arrest. Only 1 out of the same 35 persons was
informed of their right to an attorney, whereas the other 34
respondents were not.
Out of interviewees who experienced a pretrial examination,
34.3% (12/37) responded that pretrial examiners had arrested and
detained them. This result suggests widespread detention after
indictment in North Korea.
According to North Korean law, when the pretrial examiners
arrest the accused, they must present identification documents and
an arrest warrant to him/her (Article 182, Criminal Procedure
Act). However, while only one out of thirteen survey respondents
responded that he/she received these documents, the other 92.3%
(12/13) did not. Also, nine out of thirteen interviewees answered
that none of their family members or affiliated organizations
received information regarding the location of the detention facility
of the PEA.
As such, the survey results have two implications regarding the
6) The testimony of [IDs 054, 111, 186 (all 2010)] interviewed by the KBA
419
presentation of identification and arrest warrants, and informing
family members of the arrest and the location of the accused’s
detention during his/her pretrial examination. First, the rules and
regulations regarding the issues above clearly stipulated in the
Criminal Procedure Act are not being followed by the pretrial
examiner any more than by those who control the interrogation
period. Second, North Korea’s Criminal Procedure Act is neglected
in reality and exists simply as a form of ink on paper.
Furthermore, in terms of the accused’s right to an attorney,
none of the interviewees who received an attorney found them
helpful, nor was a private space provide for the accused to
discuss the case with the attorney during the pretrial examination.
This indicates that the pretrial examination is not much different
from the interrogation period which does not expressly stipulate
the accused’s rights to defend themselves and their rights to an
attorney.
It seems that pretrial examiners often neglect legally determined
period of a pretrial examination. One respondent answered that
he/she waited for six to eight months before standing in Court
after he/she was arrested by the PEA.
The following tables are the research results related to specific
procedures of a pretrial examination.
<Table Ⅳ-4-10> Have you or your family ever experienced a pretrial examination
by the PEA of North Korea?
No. of
response
valid
response
Percentage
(%)
Cumulative
Percentage(%)
Yes
37
18.5
18.5
No
163
81.5
100.0
Total
200
100.0
420
<Table Ⅳ-4-11> Did you know that pretrial examiners must begin a pretrial
examination within 48 hours after they made the decision?
No. of response
valid
response
Percentage(%)
Cumulative
Percentage(%)
Yes
2
5.4
5.4
No
35
94.6
100.0
Total
37
100.0
<Table Ⅳ-4-12> Have you ever experienced that pretrial examiners did not begin
pretrial examination within 48 hours?
No. of response
Percentage(%)
Cumulative
Percentage(%)
Yes
15
42.9
42.9
valid
response
No
20
57.1
100.0
Total
35
100.0
Invalid
No response
2
Total
37
<Table Ⅳ-4-13> When you were charged with criminal liability, did the PEA
notify you of it within 48 hours?
No. of response
valid
response
Invalid
Percentage(%)
Cumulative
Percentage(%)
Yes
4
11.4
11.4
No
31
88.6
100.0
Total
35
100.0
No response
Total
2
37
<Table Ⅳ-4-14> Have anybody let you know that you could appoint an attorney
and get his/her legal assistance?
No. of response
valid
response
Invalid
Yes
1
어니오
Total
No response
Total
Percentage(%)
Cumulative
Percentage(%)
2.9
2.9
34
97.1
100.0
35
100.0
2
37
421
<Table Ⅳ-4-15> Have you ever arrested or detained by the PEA?
No. of
response
Percentage(%)
Cumulative
Percentage(%)
Yes
12
34.3
34.3
valid
response
No
23
65.7
100.0
Total
35
100.0
Invalid
No response
2
Total
37
<Table Ⅳ-4-16> Did the pretrial examiners suggest a document to check their
identity and a warrant when they arrest you?
No. of
response
Percentage(%)
Cumulative
Percentage(%)
Yes
1
7.7
7.7
valid
response
No
12
92.3
100.0
Total
13
100.0
Invalid
No response
24
Total
37
<Table Ⅳ-4-17> Did they inform your family or the organization you belong of
the place that you were detained?
No. of
response
Percentage(%)
Cumulative
Percentage(%)
Yes
4
30.8
30.8
valid
response
No
9
69.2
100.0
Total
13
100.0
Invalid
No response
24
Total
37
<Table Ⅳ-4-18> Were there any separated places where you could meet an
attorney?
No. of
response
valid response
No
6
Invalid
No response
31
Total
37
Percentage(%)
100.0
Cumulative
Percentage(%)
100.0
422
<Table Ⅳ-4-19> Was there anyone who kept an eye on you while you met an
attorney?
No. of
response
valid response
No
4
Invalid
No response
33
Total
Percentage(%)
Cumulative
Percentage(%)
100.0
100.0
37
<Table Ⅳ-4-20> Do you think that an attorney’s legal assistance was actually
helpful?
No. of
response
valid response
No
5
Invalid
No response
32
Total
Percentage(%)
Cumulative
Percentage(%)
100.0
100.0
37
3) Arrest and Detention in Other Situation
(1) The following is a survey result indicating that legal
processes are not followed when arrest or detention takes
place in North Korea. Although arrest and detention are
prohibited during the investigation by law, these activities
occur frequently and appropriate legal procedures (such as
presenting an arrest warrant, notifying family members of
the arrest and detention and notifying the accused of their
right to an attorney before the arrest) are often infringed.
The
following
lists
the
major
testimonies
interviewees.
Please state the procedure of your arrest or detention
of
the
423
[ID 001 (2010)] I was home when an agent from the People’s
Safety
Agency
(hereafter
referred
to
as
“PSA”), came and said, “You Seong-il, why do
you have so many unauthorized absences at
work? I need to see you in my office.” My
husband wasn’t intimidated at that time; he
simply followed the agent and it was only then
that
he
was
told
“we
brought
you
here
because of another crime you’ve committed.”
[ID 006 (2010)] A prosecutor named Kim Yeong-jin came to
Rajin City and requested that I should go with
him to answer some questions regarding my
*
son. Together we walked 30 ri to the railroad
station and afterwards we moved to Cheongam
(Chungam) district by car.
[ID 017 (2010)] A large group of Bowibu agents came by and
demanded to take away my brother without
any explanation. Then they conducted a full
body search of him and searched our home as
well. During the body search, the agents found
a cell phone on my brother. I never knew my
brother was carrying a cell phone. They hauled
him away. The agents did not further explain
what his exact crime was.
[ID 036 (2010)] We were home when the Bowibu agents burst
in and took my brother away.
[ID 044 (2010)] I was at home when the Bowibu agents burst
in and accused me of illegal trade.
[ID 045 (2010)] My father was taken away from work in an
424
abduction-style arrest and my sister’s entire
family was arrested in a night raid.
[ID 051 (2010)] I
was
staying
at
my
sister’s
place
in
Hamheung when the Bowibu agents raided her
home. My husband, his second eldest brother
and I were taken by the agents.
[ID 053 (2010)] I
was
having
lunch
a
when
young
man
wearing plain clothes came in and took me to
his car. He said a guest was waiting. During
the
next
forty
Pyeongyang
minutes,
we
(Pyongyang)
drove
and
out
into
of
the
mountains.
[ID 084 (2010)] The arrest was not official, so there were no
handcuffs and shackles. I was told about the
situation I was in and then interrogated. Once
I arrived at the Bowibu, I was in cuffs. The
official arrest warrant was issued.
[ID 089 (2010)] After binding me with a rope I was hauled
away.
[ID 091 (2010)] After I lent my cell phone to someone I know,
the Bowibu agents came barging into my
house and I was taken away.
[ID 100 (2010)] My husband was a forest ranger. However,
when I went to see him during a training
session for forest rangers, he wasn’t there. I
later learned that he was arrested by the
Bowibu in Hamheung.
[ID 106 (2010)] There weren’t any kind of legal procedures. I
was just arrested and forced to follow them
425
wherever they went.
[ID 129 (2010)] The Bowibu agents came to my house and
demanded that I go with them. The agents
said they had to investigate something – my
brother was missing.
[ID 137 (2010)] I was at my military base when a Bowibu
agent told me that I was arrested and to get
in the car. I asked him what I was charged
with. He answered that I would find out once
I get there. He blind-folded me, hauled me
away and locked me up in jail.
[ID 151 (2010)] They
arrest
people
without
any
legal
procedures.
[ID 155 (2010)] A safety officer in charge is placed in every
company. The safety officers of the Resin
Chemical
Enterprise
were
looking
for
my
brother under the order of the PSA. So I went
there with my brother.
[ID 165 (2010)] I was sleeping at home when they took me
away.
[ID 171 (2010)] Arrest warrants are rarely issued in North
Korea.
It
was
the
same
with
me.
They
intruded into my home without a warrant and
took all my possessions. Then they said “come
with us” and took me to a dark and remote
location.
[ID 176 (2010)] They arrested me at home with no reason.
There was no explanation, they simply arrested
me and hauled me away.
426
[ID 186 (2010)] They announced they were trying to find out
where my family members were and took me
away.
[ID 198 (2010)] Three Bowibu agents in Musan-gun (Musan
Province) raided my home, tied my hands with
rope and forced me into a car. The agents also
searched my house. When they were searching
my house, they found a note with the message
“believe in God” on it, which I received when I
was in China. Then I was taken to the
Musan-gun Bowibu.
[ID 200 (2010)] I was arrested without even knowing it. I was
immediately
arrested
once
they
made
me
confess what I’ve done wrong.
(2) The following is a survey result indicating that the period
of detention and decisions to release the suspect in custody
is arbitrarily administered. Although substantive enactment
on detention and release during an investigation or a
pretrial examination is stipulated in the Criminal Procedure
Act, in practice, the interrogatee can be released through
bribes. It seems that law is perfunctory in North Korea.
The following is the major testimonies by the interviewees.
Please elaborate and answer in detail about the process of your
arrest or detention.
[ID 022 (2010)] My mother was arrested where she was trying
to cross the river (the scene of the crime) and
was taken straight to the PSA. In North
Korea,
‘being
seated in
the
waiting
room’
427
means he/she is being interrogated. My mother
was only interrogated. She could have been
sentenced to prison if I hadn’t given them
bribe money.
[ID 083 (2010)] An
agent
from
the
Bowibu
in
Heoryeong
(Hoeryong) came looking for me at my home
claiming that he knew about my visit to
China. He told me to come with him to the
station
where
I
was
interrogated.
I
was
interrogated for half a day but wasn’t arrested
because I gave him a bribe.
After your arrest, how long was your waiting period until the
case was handed over to a pretrial examination?
[ID 001 (2010)] I was only interrogated for nine days, and my
case
wasn’t
handed
over
to
the
PEA.
I
persistently argued that it (the alleged crime)
wasn’t my doing. Because I partially lied when
answering
their
questions
and
gave
them
bribes, I was released. The second time I was
taken to the Bowibu, I wasn’t sent to the
pretrial examination because I ran away.
[ID 072 (2010)] There was no pretrial examination. My mother
gave them some bribe money and I was
released.
[ID 084 (2010)] I avoided trial twice because of bribes.
[ID 091 (2010)] I was released before the pretrial examination
began because I gave bribes.
[ID 126 (2010)] After fifteen days in Heoryeong I was released
428
because I gave (the guards or the agents)
bribes. It took 1 month at Sinuiju.
[ID 128 (2010)] I can’t remember in details. I remember being
released
after
giving
(the
guards
or
the
agents) a bribe.
[ID 140 (2010)] There was no trial for my case. When a crime
is committed, they (the agents) calculate what
kind of benefits the offender provided the
country before committing the crime. I had
some medal of honors. I had one Medal of the
Third Class National Flag, a Medal of Military
Service Honor in the first, second, and third
levels, and I also received a Kim Il sung
Medal of Honor before I got married. I worked
as a fisherman in winter on a boat to catch
walleyed
pollocks.
I
won
first
place
in
a
details.
I
competition.
[ID 144 (2010)] I
can’t
remember
in
specific
remember being released after giving a bribe.
[ID 152 (2010)] I was released before the pretrial examination
began because I gave 2,000 North Korean won
as bribe to the Bowibu agent who was in
charge of my case.
[ID 070 (2010)] One morning, one day prior to my case being
handed over to the pretrial examination, I
insisted on meeting the directive officer in
charge of the provincial Party and attempted to
escape. I was released after I met the directive
officer because I gave him a bribe.
429
After being arrested by an investigator, were you ever arrested
or detained for more than 48 hours without Prosecutor’s
Approval? (If yes, please elaborate and answer in details on the
alleged charges against you and the period of you detention.)
[ID 091 (2010)] I
was
in
a
detention
facility
for
illegal
possession of a cell phone in 2005. I was in
the
facility
for
46
days
and
immediately
released. I wasn’t followed, and bribe money
got me released.
Once you were arrested and detained by an interrogator, were
you ever detained for more than ten days even with lack of
evidence to charge you as the offender of the alleged crime? (If
yes, please elaborate on the alleged charges against you and the
period of your detention.)
[ID 140 (2010)] I was caught for business activities, which
was
a
shameful
crime.
So
I
obediently
followed. The prosecutor came to me after I
was in the detention facility for three months.
They said that I was going to court and that I
should prepare for a trial. Then they saw my
documents, where they found a list of awards
I had received, and said I wasn’t going to be
sentenced.
Each
award
can
reduce
your
sentence up to two or three years. So my
sentence went down to zero.
430
[ID 199 (2010)] In principle, being involved in the illegal trade
of cultural heritage violates North Korean law.
It is also illegal to be involved in a business
deal involving a higher amount of money than
the amount decided for you beforehand. North
Korean
law
is
outrageous.
You
can
even
somehow survive when you are sentenced to
“execution by firing squad.”
4. Conclusion
One serious problem in the current system of North Korea’s
Criminal Procedure Act is that the law permits arrest and
detention during the interrogation in exceptional cases yet fails to
have a control mechanism, unlike in the pretrial examination. Also,
the interview results demonstrate that regulations surrounding
arrest and detention during interrogation are not followed in
practice. Hence, it is safe to conclude that laws and regulations
regarding personal liberty are dysfunctional. There is no progress
in North Korea’s arbitrary detention since the interview contents
do not widely differ from the research done in the 2008 White
Paper on Human Rights in North Korea.
Even though most of the interviewees were recent North
Korean defectors, it is difficult to acknowledge with high certainty
that the contents of the interviewees’ answers are of recent
events. Extremely low awareness of North Korean criminal law
also makes it difficult to gather accurate data and materials. Some
of the interviewees described indirect experiences during the
survey, such as the experiences of family members or stories they
have heard, making it harder for them to provide concrete and
431
elaborate answers. These are the limitations of the 2010 interview
results. Nonetheless, there is enough evidence to determine that
arbitrary arrest and detention is taking place in North Korea, even
under the existing Criminal Procedure Act. Furthermore, the
interview results can be used as source data for internal or
external cases reviewing North Korea’s human rights violations
and urging North Korea to improve their human rights issues.
432
￭ Hwang Tae-yoon (Attorney at law)
Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
provides that everyone has the right to express his/her opinion,
which also includes the freedom to seek information and thought
regardless
of
the
borders.
Furthermore,
Article
19
of
the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) states
that everyone shall have freedom to seek, receive and impart
information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either
orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through’ any
other method.
2. Freedom of Opinion and Expression in North Korea
Article 67 of the Constitution of North Korea stipulates that
citizens have freedom of speech and press. However, North Korea
has strongly enforced a repressive policy on the freedom of
opinion and expression through surveillance systems, including the
Bowibu (National Security Agency), Anjeonbu (People’s Safety
Agency),
the
Law-Abiding
State
Inspection
Commission
Life
Guidance
Committee
and
and
the
Socialist
punishment
mechanisms such as political prison camps and a long-term
corrective labor camps. Especially, the North Korean version of
433
the Ten Commandments, ‘Ten Principles for the Establishment of
the One-Ideology System’ has been used by the government in
such a way that people watch and report on one another in their
daily lives.
North Korea has strictly controlled all means of communication
and publication in North Korea in order to block people from
attempting to obtain information. The radio frequency is tied up to
the Central broadcasting station and newspapers only deliver
contents of praise and encouragement for Kim Jong-il and his
work, reporting the superiority of the North Korean regime and
condemning South Korea and the US. To maintain Kim Jong-il’s
power and the regime, North Korea has extremely restricted basic
rights, especially the freedom of opinion and expression. Moreover,
all of the North Korean media play only a part role in stabilizing
Kim Jong-il’s seizure of power as well as idolizing Kim Il-sung
and Kim Jong-il. Furthermore, North Korean authorities are
over-sensitive to the people’s opinions because they do not have
fundamental solutions for the deepening economic crisis and food
problem.
Restriction of the freedom of opinion and expression is an
extensive prerequisite to maintaining the system; fundamental
change is hardly expected under the current regime. Nevertheless,
the absolute control jus of ancient times can hardly be continued,
with North Koreans witnessing gradual economic development in
its neighboring country, China, while their own government cannot
provide even the minimum standard of living.
3. Investigative Research Method and Objectives in 2010
In 2008, the Korean Bar Association, in its White Paper on
434
Human Rights in North Korea, examined matters of punishment
in the area of regarding freedom of opinions and expression in
North Korea, reporting procedures, case examples, degrees of
punishment and etc. The findings were based on a survey of 100
North Korean defectors in South Korea.
The survey has been conducted to 200 North Korean defectors,
67 male and 133 female, residing in South Korea. Based on the
survey results, further research was made about the current
degree of North Korean freedom of opinion and expression and
the current situation of North Korean media communication in
broadcasting,
radio,
newspaper,
magazines,
internet
etc.
Furthermore, the survey looked into how much freedom North
Koreans enjoy in their opinions of China, a country upon which
North Korea heavily depends.
4. Mass Media and Reality
1) Television
Television
channels broadcast programs which idolize Kim
Il-sung and Kim Jong-il: Examples are Kim Jong-il’s visits to
military bases and local regions, visits by presidents from other
countries,
party
policy
news
and
documentary
films.
Most
interviewees only watch North Korean Central News Agency.
The following are North Korean defectors’ comment on television
programs in North Korea.
[ID 013 (2010)] TV broadcasts Kim Jong-il’s visits to Korean
People’s Army bases every half an hour.
[ID 159 (2010)] We received electronic signals from China and
435
watched South Korean dramas.
[ID 184 (2010)] There are three TV channels in Pyeongyang
(Pyongyang), two in Gaeseong (Kaesong) and
one
channel
in
the
regional
area.
TV
broadcasts from 9 a.m. through 9 p.m. on
Sundays and 9 a.m. till 5 p.m. on all other
days. Every day except Sunday has the same
program schedule - news and movies.
2) Radio
Due to the long-standing economic crisis in the country, not
many North Koreans have a radio these days. North Korean Radio
primarily broadcasts news and propaganda vilifying South Korea
and the outside world along with local news and songs. There are
some people who still listen to the radio but it seems the culture
of listening to the radio has faded away.
The following are North Korean defectors’ comment on radio
programs in North Korea.
[ID 012 (2008)] I have never seen a person who was punished
for a radio and no one listens to the radio
nowadays. Not many people listen to the radio;
they prefer to watch VCDs.
[ID 123 (2010)] I’ve never heard a radio broadcast because a
radio is too expensive in North Korea.
[ID 127 (2010)] I have never thought of a radio.
436
3) Newspapers
There are a variety of newspapers: Rodong Sinmun (Newspaper
of the Workers, the official newspaper of the Central Committee
of
the
Workers’
Party
of
Korea);
Rodong
Cheongnyeon
(Newspaper of the Young (Men) Workers); Joseon Inmingun
(Korean People’s Army’s official newspaper) ; and Minju Joseon
(Democratic Korea, a Cabinet publication). Also, it is said that
there are do-Ilbo (a daily newspaper issued by each province)
and other newspapers like Sonyeon Ilbo (Youth Daily Newspaper).
However, the contents of these various newspapers are all
almost exactly the same. They run issues on Kim Jong-il’s local
guidance, introductions to exemplary companies and people who
have provided distinguished services to the government. There are
no advertisements in the newspapers.
The following are North Korean defectors’ comment on newspapers
in North Korea.
[ID 045 (2010)] Although such newspapers are issued, people
hardly read them. 80% of the newspapers are
used
to
roll
up
tobacco
leaves
and
the
remaining 20% are used as wallpaper. The
newspapers
pass
through
a
facility
called
Publication Distribution before they reach the
public readers. During this process, high party
officials and people who work for them stash
away 50% of the newspapers and supply them
to the vendors. These vendors then sell them
as tobacco paper and wallpaper.
437
4) Magazines
Interviewees answered that the majority of the magazines are
disappearing due to the economic crisis. Representative magazines
in North Korea are Nodongja (Laborer) and Sidae (The Era),
which
contain
political
propaganda.
Magazine,
Sidae,
carries
foreign news, especially about Japanese affairs and its readers are
people from foreign countries like Jeo-chong-nyeon (the General
Association of Korean Residents in Japan, a pro-North Korean
residents’ league in Japan). Sidae is not released to ordinary
citizens but it is available at the library. There are no magazines
or publications voluntarily produced by North Korean citizens.
This is because every publication must be authorized by the
government.
5) Internet
Private individuals do not use the internet in normal households
in North Korea. However, places located inside some government
departments and various companies and universities have internet
access. Very few people have a computer and the majority of
people who have a computer cannot use it due to insufficient or
no electricity. Although there is no internet access, people still
exchange hard-drives to watch videos.
The following are North Korean defectors’ comment on internet in
North Korea.
[ID 200 (2010)] Only high ranking government officials such as
the Director of People’s Safety Agency can use
the internet but normal households cannot.
438
6) VCD, DVD and CD-R
North Koreans smuggle VCD called “alpan,” DVD, CD-R etc.
from China and play music and visuals on DVD players and
laptops, also smuggled from China. Some survey respondents said
people often watched VCD, DVD and CD-Rs by using car
batteries to power the player because electricity was not adequate.
People would turn off all the lights, lock the front door and draw
the curtains before watching. Almost every household has a DVD
player or a player to watch a video (clip). People share their CD,
CD-R and DVD products with close neighbors and friends. The
smuggled products are purchased from peddlers with a pack who
often bribe the border guards to illegally import goods. People
most often watch South Korean dramas. ‘Winter Sonata,’ ‘Autumn
in My Heart,’ ‘Stairway to Heaven,’ ‘The Yellow Handkerchief’
and ‘All-in’ are North Korean favorites. South Korean pop-songs
are popular amongst the younger generation.
The following are North Korean defectors’ comment on VCD, DVD
and CD-R in North Korea.
[ID 168 (2010)] When I was in prison in 2006, a woman who
was
caught
in
Ranam
region
in
Southern
Cheongjin (Chongjin) came in as an inmate.
She was sentenced to two years of long-term
correctional
labor
for
getting
caught
while
watching a South Korean Drama. In 2007, my
friend’s wife was caught with for having a
video in the house but she paid a bribe of
1,500,000 North Korean won and was released.
439
5. Violation against Freedom of Opinion and Expression in North
Korea
1) Strictly Prohibited Contents
Criticism or negative comments regarding Kim Il-sung and Kim
Jong-il, North Korea’s political system and economy and positive
comments toward South Korea are heavily prohibited. People who
openly express their opinions or feelings can be reported to the
Bowibu and punished at any time.
The following are North Korean defectors’ comment on strictly
prohibited contents in North Korea.
[ID 045 (2010)] gave the following unique answer: People must
report to a worker who is under the Workers’
Party Korea payroll. If a person reports a case
to someone other than the appointed official,
the
person
who
made
the
report
will
be
punished too. The government believes that the
act
of
reporting
itself
spreads
unnecessary
words and contents. In this case, you can be
punished without a trial. You must go to the
designated
payroll
worker
or
an
agent
appointed by the Bowibu even when you go to
the Bowibu to make a report.
The collapse of North Korea’s distribution system caused North
Korea’s strict control over its society to become even more
dysfunctional
than
before.
Such
phenomena
induced
the
government to gradually lose control over censoring people’s
440
freedom of opinion and expression.
2) Life-assessment Meeting
A life-assessment meeting refers to a gathering of citizens to
criticize themselves and point out each others’ mistakes. The
meeting can be divided into monthly, quarterly and yearly ones.
Attendance is obligatory and criticism of others is compulsory.
The degree of punishment for the absence differs from region to
region. The following are representative answers:
The following are North Korean defectors’ comment on lifeassessment meeting in North Korea.
[ID 002 (2010)] We were not punished just for our failure to
attend the life-assessment meeting. At least in
the 1990s, we weren’t.
[ID 003 (2010)] We are not punished but have to criticize
ourselves.
[ID 004 (2010)] You tell the chair of the Women’s Union in
advance that you cannot attend the meeting
because of work (selling goods in the market).
If she allows it, you don’t need to go. This
still works.
[ID 014 (2010)] If you are absent from the meeting, you are
criticized at the next meeting. The criticism is
milder now than in the 1990s.
[ID 016 (2010)] These days, if you bribe the chair, you do not
need to go to the meeting.
[ID 022 (2010)] I have never been to a meeting. People with a
job do not attend the meeting. If you inform a
person
in
charge
of the
meeting
441
of
your
absence in advance, it is not a big problem.
However, you cannot be absent every week, so
you ask the person in charge to overlook your
absence
by
buying
some
drinks
or
other
things.
[ID 049 (2010)] There is no severe punishment but we have to
criticize one’s ideological background or one’s
behavior. It is not different from the 1990s.
[ID 162 (2010)] Nowadays, the meetings are rarely held.
[ID 198 (2010)] You will not be punished but you will be
blamed. It is similar to the 1990s.
3) Contents from Other Countries
In North Korea, people are prohibited from watching all the
audio-visual contents from the outside, including South Korea,
without permission. If one violates this and is found guilty of
watching foreign contents, one usually gets light punishment such
as disciplinary prison labor. However, the punishment can be as
harsh as the death penalty. The representative answers to the
questions related to contents from other countries are as follows:
The following are North Korean defectors’ comment on contents
from other countries in North Korea.
[ID 005 (2010)] In 2007, 18 people were caught and sentenced
to correctional prison labor in a public trial for
copying and watching a CD-R. The first one
who passed around the CD was sentenced to
imprisonment for life.
442
[ID 006 (2010)] It happened in Suseong-dong in 2005. They
were middle aged women, known for making
good money from a small business. The five
women
were
caught
passing
around
and
watching South Korean soap operas and films.
In a gathering place for suspects, all five were
sentenced to disciplinary prison labor.
[ID 007 (2010)] In 2009, three people in Pungin were sentenced
to six years in a long-term corrective labor
camp for watching South Korean soap operas
and the man who lent the CDs to them ran
away from the Prosecutor’s Office and escaped
to enter South Korea. In 2008, there were
around
20
people
who
were
sent
to
a
long-term corrective labor camp on the charge
of watching South Korean soap operas in
Onseong (Onsong).
[ID 023 (2010)] When I was caught watching South Korean
CDs
and
gadgets
other
like
TV
audio-visual
and
CD
contents,
player
all
were
confiscated. Because I was a student, I was
neither sent for labor nor punished. However, I
went to the Youth League and wrote a letter
of self-criticism.
[ID 026 (2010)] My second cousin was sent for two years to a
long-term corrective labor camp because he
was caught for watching foreign audio-visual
materials. The materials were found during a
search of his home.
443
[ID 032 (2010)] You will be sent for correctional prison labor.
My acquaintance was sentenced to thirteen
years of prison labor on charge of selling
VCDs. He escaped from the Prosecutor’s Office
and is now in South Korea.
[ID 042 (2010)] In
April
2008,
one
person
in
my
village
watched a South Korean film with his friends.
He was not caught at the time when he was
watching it but was caught later because one
of his friends secretly reported the matter to a
Bowibu agent. So, he was sentenced to prison
labor for six months.
[ID 060 (2010)] Recently, I have seen a person’s TVs and CDs
being confiscated during crackdowns but no
one was punished severely because of that.
[ID 062 (2010)] I was reported for watching a video in my
friend’s house but I was just investigated in
the People’s Safety Agency and then released.
[ID 069 (2010)] No one around me was caught because we all
were very cautious.
[ID 072 (2010)] In principle, those people were supposed to be
sent to a long-term corrective labor camp but
I heard that they were released after bribing
officials.
[ID 084 (2010)] That is why I was fired from my teaching job.
Six lecturers including me watched a video
together but I don’t know who reported it to
the authority. Anyway, I was degenerated into
a laborer. Fortunately I did not go on trial
444
because I bribed everyone. However, all that I
have studied has become useless.
[ID 124 (2010)] In 2008, a student from Kimchaek University
of Technology was caught watching South
Korean soap operas and his entire family were
expelled from Pyeongyang to Hwanghae-do
(Hwanghae Province).
[ID 137 (2010)] In January 2007, Choi Hoon, a son of Choi
Young-soo
(soccer
around
years
20
coach),
old
and
who
I
was
were
also
caught
watching a South Korean film, ‘A Promise.’
However, we gave a bribe and then were
released. It cost around 1million North Korean
won.
[ID 143 (2010)] In January 2005, Cheol-yong, a driver of the
place where I worked, was caught watching a
video. While he was detained, his wife ran
over and told me about him. So, I tried to help
him but I was told it would be difficult to get
him out of detention because his case was
reported to the provincial branch of the Party.
I met the head of the organization and begged
him for Cheol-Yong’s release but he said he
could
not
help
it
because
the
case
was
exposed. Then, the section head asked me to
bring something to eat, so I gave him a duck
and eggs. By doing that, I got permission to
release Cheol-yong. However, when I went to
the People’s Safety Agency (PSA), a PSA
445
officer demanded a bribe and I delivered him a
carload of wood. Finally I managed to get
Cheol-yong released.
[ID 146 (2010)] In 2006, we exchanged VCDs and watched
South Korean soap opera. When another person
was arrested for watching, my mother was
caught too. My mother was released after
paying the fine and all tapes were confiscated.
[ID 169 (2010)] In
2007,
the
foreman
of
a
work
unit
at
Goseong Farm in Onseong (Onsong) brought
over 130 VCDs from China, which included
‘Sex-crazed Young-Ho’ and action movies of
South
Korea.
He
secretly
sold
the
VCDs.
However, he was caught later because he
copied
and
sold
them
across
the
country.
Those who distributed the VCDs and sold
them were sentenced to 15 years of prison
labor.
4) Mutual Observation and Reporting
In North Korea, people observe each other and report to the
authorities what they hear. Depending on contents, they can lead
to get severe punishment.
The following are North Korean defectors’ comment on recent
examples of mutual observation and reporting in North Korea.
[ID 007 (2010)] In 2007, a laborer in Pungin coal mine was
arrested the day after he said that South
Korea is developed – he had been watching
446
South
Korean
soap
operas.
Someone
had
reported him to the Bowibu. I do not know
where he was taken.
[ID 073 (2010)] My neighbor used to come and go to China.
Perhaps, he said something wrong but all his
family has disappeared. People in my village
said that the Bowibu agents came to his house
at night and took him to a political prison
camp. I heard that his entire family members
were taken to a political prison camp.
[ID 075 (2010)] I heard of someone who was arrested because
the
person
did
not
address
Kim
Jong-il
without title of honor. However, I do not know
to
what
extent
he/she
was
punished.
It
happened around 2004 as far as I remember.
[ID 091 (2010)] A worker in a coal mine used to visit China
occasionally. On one such visit, one of his
relative from South Korea came to China to
see him. Later, he was arrested because he
told others that South Korea is better off after
returning to North Korea. I do not know what
happened to him. I am not quite sure but I
heard that he was sentenced to three years in
prison on the charge of spreading canards.
[ID 198 (2010)] After being released from a political prison
camp in 2003, I told a close friend of mine that
South Korea is better off and that I want to
go and live there. I was sentenced to a year
of correctional prison labor for attempting to
447
escape to South Korea.
5) Fliers by North Korean Defectors
Organizations of North Korean defectors in South Korea such
as Fighters for a Free North Korea and others, send fliers in
large balloons from the Imjin River and other places to North
Korea. Portable radios and a roll of one dollar bills are sent with
the fliers in a large balloon. North Korea is very sensitive to such
fliers
sent
by
defectors:
Pyeongyang
Broadcasting
Station
continues to threaten defectors because of the fliers; and the head
of the North Korean delegation, in inter-Korean defense talks,
demanded that the South Korean government stop defectors from
distributing fliers.
The authorities are very sensitive to the fliers because the
fliers are widely spread across the country and North Koreans
tend to easily believe the contents of the fliers because the fliers
are sent by fellow North Koreans. Stories of Kim Jong-il’s wild
private life are frequently contained in the fliers, which is a shock
to North Korean soldiers. In the summer of 2009, a large balloon
exploded and fliers were widely spread in the Nampo district. The
Bowibu promptly collected the fliers after imposing a curfew on
the area.
The following are North Korean defectors’ comment on fliers by
North Korean defectors in North Korea.
[ID 031 (2010)]
Fliers were spread among the military and
even brought to Pyeongyang. Fliers written by
defectors are very influential.
448
6) Contents with Government Permission
Regarding freedom of opinion and expression in broadcast and
print media with the permission of the North Korean government,
interviewees answered as follows:
with the government permission in North Korea.
[ID 001 (2010)] We can talk about another country’s situation
but can never compare it with North Korea’s.
[ID 013 (2010)] The news covers international political matters.
People frequently talk about foreign situations.
[ID 014 (2010)] If a paper consists of around six pages, there
are only a few words in foreign reports. Most
people hardly read a newspaper and have little
time to watch TV. Thus, one knows little
about foreign news. Even if one knows, one
cannot speak of the news thoughtlessly. We
must be very cautious.
[ID 017 (2010)] Contents with the theme “South Korea always
tries
to
invade
North
Korea”
are
usually
broadcast on the TV. Thus, that is, what we
can only speak of. If you spoke out loud such
stories,
you
would
receive
people’s
much
respect just like a revolutionary.
[ID 021 (2010)] Even if the government allows it, we can
never speak of domestic and foreign politics
and the economy thoughtlessly. If we did, a
spy among when the people we talk to would
report it to the authorities. We should never
449
mention politics and the economy carelessly.
[ID 029 (2010)] We spoke about the news in the paper. We
speak ill of the regime and Kim Jong-il with
close acquaintances but never mention anything
against the law.
[ID 031 (2010)] These days, we often talk about politics and
the economy. It is not like before.
[ID 038 (2010)] We can speak freely of the news once it is
legally broadcast.
[ID 042 (2010)] We are free to talk about news reported by a
newspaper
or
Broadcasting
the
North
Station.
Korean
Broadcasts
Central
are
made
after a number of inspections. Contents not in
the authorities’ interest are not broadcast.
[ID 049 (2010)] We cannot talk freely. TV broadcasts only the
bad news about South Korea and the good
news about North Korea. We can speak freely
of such news. However, we are not allowed to
speak of South Korea freely.
[ID 056 (2010)] Broadcasts
on
South
Korea
usually
depict
scenes of people fighting with the police in
demonstrations.
Koreans
They
frequently
comment
demonstrate
that
South
against
the
government. We can only speak of that but
inwardly we think: how come those students
wear such bright and beautiful clothes whereas
many of us in North Korea only wear worn-out
grayish clothes? However, these thoughts can
never be spoken out loud.
450
[ID 060 (2010)] Politically sensitive stories are never talked
about even between close friends.
[ID 065 (2010)] Even if the North Korean government permits
certain broadcast programs, not many people
have a TV set at home. So, we don’t know
what is permitted on the air. It is not wise to
talk
carelessly
about
domestic
and
foreign
news. If any part of what I say contains anti
government contents, people can inform the
authorities and rat on me. One in three people
are spies. So, we have to be careful.
[ID 068 (2010)] We are not allowed to watch or discuss news
on the politics and economy of other countries.
We can sometimes share stories of socialist
countries, China and India.
[ID 122 (2010)] 70% or 80% of broadcasts are about Kim
Il-sung and Kim Jong-il. There is nothing to
talk about since nothing was said or heard.
When asked if North Korean citizens receive any specific orders
from the government indicating certain boundaries and limitations
to conversation when discussing internal and external political and
economic news, interviewees answered that although there are no
directives in most cases, people self-censor the contents of their
speech.
7) Contents Related to China
Because currently North Korea receives a great amount of aid
from China, North Korean citizens can freely discuss China’s
451
open-door policy and economy. However, it is prohibited to
discuss North Korea negatively by directly comparing China and
North Korea’s economy.
The representative answers to the questions are as follows:
related to China in North Korea.
[ID 030 (2010)] Since
discussing
China
is
not
a
political
statement, it’s okay. There is little restriction
on talking about China which is in a good
relationship with North Korea.
[ID 017 (2010)] We talk about China quite often. Since China
is much more developed than North Korea, it’s
easier to eat food, buy goods and wear clothes
there. We all know that if it were not for
China, we North Koreans would all die.
[ID 043 (2010)] We can openly talk about China’s political and
economic
system.
However,
we
can
never
discuss South Korea. It’s still a little dangerous
to ask things like why North Korea isn’t
opening up like China but still I’ve seen people
saying that once in a while.
[ID 069 (2010)] It’s okay to talk about China. We say that
China used to be poor but is well off now
because of a unique socialist system. And we
also ask questions like why isn’t North Korean
opening up like China and we make comments
on how we should follow China’s path to an
open-door policy. But we don’t say this too
452
bluntly.
North
Korea
strictly
forbids
an
open-door policy, so we say that in a very
hush-hush secret way.
[ID 073 (2010)] We should not directly compare North Korea
with China. It’s possible to talk about China
alone. We can’t discuss questions like why
North Korea can’t open up like China has.
When North Korea opened the Rajin-Soenbong
area, the economic special zone, Kim Jong-il is
supposed to have said that the cost was higher
than the benefits, meaning that the Chinese
culture
and
products
which
came
in
and
messed up the North Korean mentality and
mindset.
[ID 117 (2010)] Everyone knows that China is well off, so no
one
blows
the
whistle
on
others
or
gets
punished for saying it out loud.
[ID 124 (2010)] Nobody gets punished for that. Some people
even bluntly say, “Why are you forbidding an
open-door policy? Just kill us if you’re going
to keep on regulating us like this.”
[ID 154 (2010)] In most cases, it’s not much of a problem
anymore. Twenty years ago, you could get
into serious trouble by comparing North Korea
with China. However, it’s not the same now.
[ID 129 (2010)] I was selling things in the market place and
was arrested for saying that changing our
money
into
these
days.
Chinese
I
currency
wrote
a
was
difficult
statement
of
453
self-criticism
at
the
Bowibu
and
served
two-three months of disciplinary prison labor.
[ID 131 (2010)] I know someone who was sentenced to six
months
of
disciplinary
prison
labor
for
comparing North Korea’s economy with that of
China.
454
6. Involuntary Disappearances
￭ Chung Jae-hoon (Attorney at law)
1. Introduction
According to a recent press release, the Working Group on
Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances under the United Nations
Human Rights Council has been reviewing 26 countries, including
North Korea. The Working Group determines if they are dealing
with their missing people in appropriate ways and will publish its
comprehensive report by the end of 2010. In addition to this
review,
the
Working
Group
announced
that
nine
cases
of
involuntary disappearance including five missing female North
Koreans were filed to the Working Group in 2009, but they
remain unsettled due to North Korea’s non-cooperation.7)
These involuntary and enforced disappearances are not just an
issue of North Korea. However, since the international community’s
concern about the issues has been on the rise, North Korean
government cannot whitewash the issue of the involuntary or
enforced disappearances occurred in the country.
Article 2 of the International Convention for the Protection of
all Persons from Enforced Disappearances, adopted at the 61st
session of UN Security Council on December 20, 2006, states,
“‘Enforced disappearance’ is considered to be the arrest, detention,
7) Radio Free Asia, July 7, 2010, Nocut news, July 8, 2010.
455
abduction or any other form of deprivation of liberty by agents of
the State or by persons or groups of persons action with the
authorization, support or acquiescence of the State, followed by a
refusal
to
acknowledge
the
deprivation
of
liberty
or
by
concealment of the fate or whereabouts of the disappeared person,
which place such a person outside the protection of the law.”
Likewise, according to the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court, Article 7, paragraph 2 (i),“‘Enforced disappearance
of persons’ means the arrest, detention or abduction of persons by,
or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, a State or a
political organization, followed by a refusal to acknowledge that
deprivation of freedom or to give information on the fate or
whereabouts of those persons, with the intention of removing
them from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of
time.”8)
2. Specific Current Cases
1) Analysis and Comparison of Specific Cases
North Korean defectors, in their interviews with the Korean Bar
Association (hereafter referred to as KBA) answered that the year
2005
was
the
latest
year
when
involuntary
or
enforced
disappearances occurred in North Korea. However, the KBA could
ascertain that involuntary or enforce disappearances still occurred
even in 2008. The followings are some conclusions that the KBA
could draw from analyzing the cases in the interview.
First, 104 North Korean defectors reported that they or their
8) Kim Heon-jin, ICCGyujeonggwa Hyeongbeop (Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court, International Criminal Court and Criminal Law) (Seoul: Haksuljeongbo,
2006), p. 94, p. 177.
456
immediate
acquaintances
experienced
involuntary
or
enforced
disappearance, which accounts for 52% (104/200) overall subjects
in the survey conducted by the KBA in 2008. The percentage of
the respondents directly or indirectly experienced these cases have
decreased from the 70% (70/100) in 2006 to 52% (104/200) in
2008. However, the decreased percentage does not necessarily
indicate an overall decreased numbers of cases of involuntary or
enforced disappearance in North Korea. If there were other 36
defectors who answered that their family members also knew
people who had been subject to enforced disappearances or
banishments in a separate question. If the defectors are counted,
the numbers of the defectors would increase to more than 140
people which will be about 70% of the total 200 respondents.
Second, the respondents definitely did not know exactly where
the missing people were taken. They just assume that the missing
are sent to political prison camps or killed. According to the
respondents, if the North Korean government discovers a citizen
defected to China or South Korea, his or her family members will
be banished to other provinces rather than being sent to the
political prison camps. [ID 058 (2010)],9) [ID 171 (2010)]10) and [ID
173 (2010)],11) interviewed in 2010, testified that the family
members of North Korean defectors would be expelled to Jangjin,
far from the border.
Third, there seems to be a variety of reasons for one’s
disappearances. One shall disappear: if one has family members
defected North Korea; if one say or does something inappropriate;
if one drinks without being aware that Kim Il-sung was dead [ID
457
012 (2010)]12); if one badly draws Kim Il-sung [ID 013 (2010)]13);
if one listens to a South Korean radio broadcast [ID 015 (2010)],14)
[ID 029 (2010)],15) [ID 030 (2010)]16); if one converts to Christianity;
if one takes a bribe; if one gets films from China; if one consults
a fortune-teller; if one steals; or if one has a family member
whose once was a landowner. However, considerable number of
respondents did not know the reason for the disappearance.
Fourth, it seems that the Bowibu (National Security Agency,
hereafter referred to as Bowibu) plays a leading role in cases of
missing people. The testimonies of the North Korean defectors
verify this by claiming that missing persons were taken by the
Bowibu agents suddenly at night or dawn.
Fifth, it seems that not all family members are forcefully
disappeared. One defector, [ID 116 (2010)],17) reported, “When a
high-level official in the Bowibu went to South Korea, his wife
reported
him.
She
thought
that
she
would
avoid
negative
consequences because she had reported it. Nonetheless, the whole
family members including her were disappeared in the middle of
the night.” However, it seems to be more common in similar
cases that the person who reports the crime is exempt from
enforced disappearance. [ID 056 (2010)]18) states, “Since Kim
Jung-il seized power, many people have been taken by the
Bowibu. When someone made a mistake in front of a Bowibu
agent, the person was sent to a political prison camp. When a
12)
13)
14)
15)
16)
17)
18)
Testimony
Testimony
Testimony
Testimony
Testimony
Testimony
Testimony
of
of
of
of
of
of
of
[ID
[ID
[ID
[ID
[ID
[ID
[ID
012
013
015
029
030
116
056
(2010)]
(2010)]
(2010)]
(2010)]
(2010)]
(2010)]
(2010)]
interviewed
interviewed
interviewed
interviewed
interviewed
interviewed
interviewed
by
by
by
by
by
by
by
the
the
the
the
the
the
the
KBA
KBA
KBA
KBA
KBA
KBA
KBA
on
on
on
on
on
on
on
February 23, 2010.
February 24, 2010.
March 20, 2010.
March 2, 2010.
April 10, 2010.
April 8, 2010
February 23, 2010
458
woman trading with a Chinese was arrested, so were her family
members. Her husband was not arrested because he said that he
would divorce her.” [ID 100 (2010)]19) testifies, “My husband took
a class from a forest ranger in 1997 and did not come back home.
Later, I realized that he was taken to the Provincial Bowibu in
Hamheung because one of his relatives was sent to a political
prison camp after being arrested in China.” [ID 148 (2010)]20)
says, “When I was young, my father disappeared because he was
not in favor of Kim Jong-il. He divorced my mother. I don’t know
what happened to him. The only thing I know is that he was
against Kim Jong-Il.” These cases show that not all family
members were necessarily arrested.
Sixth, the interview demonstrates that the families of those who
are involuntary or forcedly disappeared are kept under guard
secretly by Im-min-ban (the People’s Neighborhood Unit) or the
Bowibu, and the North Korean state authorities confiscate their
property.
There
are
significant
disadvantageous
socio-political
consequences for remaining family members. For example, [ID 047
(2010)]21) says, “If you are in an executive position, you will be
degraded to a laborer,” and [ID 062 (2010)]22) testifies, “If the
family was a member of the Party, he or she will be deprived of
the membership to the Workers’ Party of Korea.” [ID 072
(2010)]23) adds, “We have been under surveillance and have not
been promoted.” [ID 133 (2010)]24) testifies, “The whole family
were politically banished, and they cannot get ahead by living in
19)
20)
21)
22)
23)
24)
Testimony
Testimony
Testimony
Testimony
Testimony
Testimony
of
of
of
of
of
of
[ID
[ID
[ID
[ID
[ID
[ID
100
148
147
062
072
133
(2010)]
(2010)]
(2010)]
(2010)]
(2010)]
(2010)]
interviewed
interviewed
interviewed
interviewed
interviewed
interviewed
by
by
by
by
by
by
the
the
the
the
the
the
KBA
KBA
KBA
KBA
KBA
KBA
on
on
on
on
on
on
April 3, 2010
February 27, 2010
March 29, 2010
April 8, 2010
February 26, 2010
February 24, 2010
459
poverty.”
Lastly, these interviews with the North Korean defectors reveal
that there have been a few changes relating to the involuntary or
enforced
everybody
disappearances.
knows
that
[ID
the
184
(2010)]25)
North
Korean
said,
“Now
that
authorities
are
incompetent, enforcement has become relatively lax. Five out of
ten cases are overlooked. But some involuntary or enforced
disappearances have happened since 2000. I heard that a person
from Hyesan abruptly disappeared in 2001 and became a political
prisoner.” In response to the question regarding the disappearance
of North Korean defectors, [ID 123 (2010)]26) testifies, “During the
food crisis, many families of North Korean defectors disappeared,
but it became difficult because of the increasing number of
escapers.” [ID 140 (2010)]27) says, “Because I worked with a lot
of employees, I know that the Bowibu dealt with the North
Korean defectors as missing people. They didn’t even consider the
possibility that they fled to China, the Soviet Union, or South
Korea. My family consists of six people, and five of them are still
in North Korea. They were labeled as a family with a missing
person. However, they were safe until I was arrested in China
and officially investigated by the North Korean authorities.” Hence,
it seems that nowadays North Korean authorities take less severe
measures than before.
25) Testimony of [ID 184 (2010)] interviewed by the KBA on March 31, 2010
26) Testimony of [ID 123 (2010)] interviewed by the KBA on March 12, 2010
27) Testimony of [ID 140 (2010)] interviewed by the KBA on February 24, 2010
460
2) Violation of Norms and Normative Evaluations
According to the International Convention for the Protection of
All Persons from Enforced Disappearance adopted by the United
Nations on December 13, 2006, the United Nations is entitled to
investigate involuntary or enforced disappearances. The Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court defines involuntary or
enforced disappearances as crimes against humanity.28) South
Korea29) also defines enforced disappearances as one of the crimes
against human rights in its Punishment of Crimes within
the Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court Act, enacted by
the Rome Statue of the International Criminal Court. The person
convicted of enforcing disappearance will be sentenced to more
than five years of prison labor or to life imprisonment under
Article 9 of the law.
Article 79 of the New Constitution of the DPRK (North Korea),
revised on September 5, 1998, stipulates, “Citizens are guaranteed
inviolability
of
the
person
and
the
home
and
privacy
of
correspondence. No citizens can be placed under control or be
arrested, nor can their homes be searched without a legal
warrant.” North Korea’s Criminal Act in 2004 stipulates the
contents corresponding to its New Constitution in Article 177 of
the Act: “Without a legal warrant, citizens cannot be arrested or
detained.” Furthermore, the New Constitution delineates that the
apprehension of a suspect must be executed by the pretrial
examiner or investigator with a legal warrant (Article 180), and
28) The Republic of Korea ratified the ICC regulations, and became effective in July 2003.
29) The Constitution of the Republic of Korea defines the personal liberty in Article 12,
and Article 124 and 135 of the Criminal Law define punishment regulations on the
illegal arrest, detention and harsh action. Also, the Criminal Procedure Law provides
the specific regulations for protection of the arrested suspects such as the legal
procedure of the arrest, condition and notice etc.
461
the reasons for apprehension and detention must be shared with
the suspect’s family within 48 hours of the person’s arrested and
detainment (Article 183).
The interview with the North Korean defectors demonstrates
that
there
is
no
doubt
that
the
involuntary
or
enforced
disappearances, which were mainly driven by the Bowibu, were
crimes of violating basic human rights in terms of domestic and
international law.
3) Conclusions
These interviews with the North Korean defectors highlight the
fact
that
the
context
surrounding
involuntary
and
enforced
disappearances in North Korea have not changed much over the
last several years. In the meantime, as North Korean government
raises the level of penalty for reactionaries who shall forcedly
disappear, the rate of enforced disappearances has decreased in
correspondence with the government’s weakened control.
The Amnesty International Report 2010 states that the North
Korean state authorities failed to acknowledge the use of enforced
disappearances. Since the 1950s, the authorities have subjected
North Koreans and nationals of other counties such as South
Korea and Japan to enforced disappearances. North Korean family
members of suspected dissidents disappeared under the principle of
“guilt by association,” a form of collective punishment for those
associated with someone deemed hostile to the regime. It also
adds that thousands of North Koreans forcedly returned from
China during the year were unaccounted for. The Amnesty
International concludes that even if North Korean authorities do
not
acknowledge
the
enforced
disappearances,
enforced
462
disappearances still do exist in North Korea,
In the upcoming days, the international community must ask
North Korea to explain the matter of involuntary or enforced
disappearances. The criticism and condemnation of North Korean
authorities’ crimes should be sustained if North Korea does not
implement legal solutions.
463
7. Human Rights of Socially Marginalized
Classes
1. Women’s Rights
1) Women’s Rights in North Korea
3 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR) and Article 3 of the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) both emphasize the equal
rights of men and women. The Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) also
specifies that, “States Parties shall take in all fields, in particular
in the political, social, economic and cultural fields, all appropriate
measures, including legislation, to ensure the full development and
advancement of women, for the purpose of guaranteeing them the
exercise and enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms
on a basis of equality with men (Article 3).”
Motivated
by
the
opportunity
to
condemn
human
rights
conditions in South Korea, North Korea
acceded to the ICESCR and the ICCPR in 1981, ten years
before South Korea. North Korea also acceded
to the CEDAW in February 2001.1) In September 2002, a
national conciliation commission was formed to implement these
agreements. Moreover, North Korea has revised or adopted many
1) Prior to this, North Korea also ratified the CRC on September 21, 1990.
464
legal statutes, including the following: the Statute on Equal Rights
for Men and Women (1946, before North Korea was founded); the
Constitutional Decrees (1948, after the foundation of North Korea);
the
Socialist
Constitution
(1972
and
1998);
the
Child
Care
Education Law (1976); the Socialist Labor Law (1978); and the
Family Law (1990). With the passage of the above legislation and
the submission of its initial report on implementation of the
CEDAW
on
September
1,
2002,
North
Korea
claims
that
discrimination against women in North Korea has long been
abolished, and that gender equality, in contrast with the notion of
simple equality, has made women’s rights an important factor in
policy making and the legislative process.
However, in contrast to the above formalities, research shows
that North Korea remains a highly patriarchal society. Generally
speaking, women in North Korea are solely responsible for
household chores; but at the same time women are forced to
actively participate in the nation’s labor force at the same level of
contribution as men. This combination results in work overload
for women. In particular, the quality of life for women in North
Korea worsened after the food crisis in the mid 1990s and they
have become representatives of socially marginalized classes in
North Korean society, along with children and the elderly.2) In
fact, in a survey of 100 North Korean defectors conducted by the
Korean Bar Association (hereafter referred to as “KBA”) in 2008,
50.9% of respondents agreed that women are discriminated against
in North Korea, while 43.4% did not agree.
In contrast, the KBA’s 2010 survey of 200 North Korean
2) Sim Nyeong-hui, “Tebukhan Nyeoseongui Ingwon Siltaewa Yoin (North Korean
women’s human rights situation and major elements),” Asiayeoseongyeon-gu (Asian
Women), vol. 45, no. 2, p. 163.
465
defectors found that 41.7% (55/132) of respondents agreed that
there is discrimination against women in North Korea, but more
than half of the respondents, 53.8% (71/132), disagreed.
It is also noteworthy that, as <Table IV-7-2> shows, 58.9% of
respondents answered negatively to the question of whether they
regretted having been born as women.
<Table Ⅳ-7-1> Do you think that, compared to men, women are discriminated at
home, society, and work places?
No. of
response
Valid response
(%)
Yes
55
41.7
41.7
No
71
53.8
95.5
I don’t know
Total
Invalid
Percentage
(%)
No response
Total
6
4.5
100.0
132
100.0
68
200
<Table Ⅳ-7-2> Have you ever regretted that you were born as a woman?
No. of
response
Often
13
(%)
10.1
10.1
Sometimes
40
31.0
41.1
No
76
58.9
100.0
Total
129
100.0
No response
71
200
Valid response
Invalid
Percentage
(%)
Total
In 2010, the KBA interviewed North Korean defectors from [ID
001-184,
all
2010)]
and
asked
the
following
an
open-ended
question: “If women are discriminated against in North Korea, tell
me
the
specific
discrimination
they
suffer.”
A
total
of
47
interviewees reported that there is discrimination against women
466
in most areas, including politics, economy, society, culture and at
home. Excerpts from some answers are provided below (for the
interviewee's
privacy
and
safety,
ID
with
numbers
and
interviewed year are used instead of real names):
[ID 006 (2010)] In selecting the foreman of a working unit,
they would not give an opportunity to women.
Women have to be responsible for household
chores
because
of
the
severe
patriarchal
system. This is a major type of discrimination
at home. However capable a woman is, a man
has to move his house as he gets a job, which
usually happens as he intends.
[ID 015 (2010)] North Korea is patriarchal. Since we do not
eat or dress well and are uncivilized in North
Korea, men look down on women. Men still
have authority in daily life in North Korea.
Women serve food to men.
[ID 036 (2010)] In general, there is the perception that women
must obey men at home or in society in North
Korea.
[ID 044 (2010)] Men have authority at home and at work since
there
is
the
perception
that
women
must
respect men.
[ID 048 (2010)] Women do most of the work but they are
discriminated against more in society.
[ID 055 (2010)] South Korea respects women a lot but North
Korea respects men more.”
[ID 056 (2010)] Women cannot be leaders at work. North
467
Korean society has the strong perception that
women are the ones responsible for household
chores, not for social activities.
[ID 103 (2010)] The idea of the predominance of men over
women is prevalent in society, which creates a
terrible
social
atmosphere.
No
one
says
anything even when he/she witnesses a man
beating a woman. In contrast, women must not
hit men. Married women cannot resist when
being told indecent words by their husbands
on the street or even from other women.
There is nothing they can do when they are
being beaten. Every man propositions a woman
without a husband.
[ID 120 (2010)]
Women must obey men unconditionally.”
[ID 129 (2010)] Women have a great burden in both at home
and in the economy. They are even verbally
abused
or
completely
ignored.
Men
ignore
women a lot. They have no respect for women.
[ID 149 (2010)] North Korea is the last country where women
can not live free. All women just survive,
enduring the situation.
[ID 167 (2010)] Women are usually responsible for household
chores and are always looked down on. There
are more feudalistic elements in North Korea.
In fact, although most women are in the
workplace, men do not appreciate it.
[ID 184 (2010)] Influenced by Confucian ideas, North Korea
has a strong atmosphere of forcing women to
468
obey men. Women suffer from disadvantages
in the workplace.
Finally, and in contract, [ID 073 (2010)] reported that, as life in
North Korea has become more difficult, discrimination against
women becomes less severe. [ID 073 (2010)] stated, “It is partly
because women have begun to be responsible for the basic role of
earning a living. In this respect, recently the discrimination against
women in North Korea has eased and women have begun to have
economic power and a bigger say as they have been continuously
involved in economic activity since the food crisis.”
2) Domestic Human Rights Violations
(1) Violation of Equal Rights by Patriarchal Authoritarianism
In its statute on Equal Rights for Men and Women (1946),
North Korea emphasized equality between men and women and
declared that, "Chosun (ancient name of Korea) women are
liberated from inequality in the political, economic, cultural, and
domestic
fields"
and
emphasized
equality
between
men
and
women. In addition, Article 18 of North Korea’s Family Law of
1990 stipulates that, “husband and wife enjoy equal rights in the
domestic field." In reality, however, North Korean women are
severely discriminated against under the country’s patriarchal
system. In North Korea, wives are responsible for housekeeping
duties and child rearing: within the patriarchal order, these duties
are performed with the husband at the center, who also assumes
superior authority in every aspect of the household. The table
below <Table IV-7-3> shows an overwhelming percentage of
88.5% of North Korean defectors who say that the wife has full
responsibility for all housekeeping.
469
<Table Ⅳ-7-3> Who takes the main responsibility for the housework?
No. of Percentage
response
(%)
Wives are responsible for all
housework
Valid
response
Cumulative
Percentage(%)
116
88.5
88.5
94.7
Husband and wife share it
8
6.1
Husband are responsible for it
6
4.6
99.2
Others
1
0.8
100.0
Total
131
100.0
No response
69
200
Invalid
Total
In terms of life outside of the house, women are not allowed to
ride bicycles, which constitute an important mode of transportation
in North Korea, because it is considered a violation of the
feminine code of conduct.3)
In Hamheung, businesswomen who
must travel long distances for private trade ride bicycles by
disguising themselves as men in order to avoid being penalized. In
addition, women are expected wear skirts even during cold
winters because trousers are unfeminine.4) This vague standard of
“femininity” limits women’s individual rights in private matters.
Because women are forced to wear skirts, those women who do
not have their own skirts have to borrow them whenever they go
out. Some women first wear trousers and then wear skirts just
like sacks over them.5) These examples illustrate the irrational
results of discrimination against women.
The
CEDAW
Committee
recommended,
in
its
concluding
observation after reviewing North Korea’s initial report submitted
3) Network for North Korean Democracy and Human Rights, NK Vision, no. 2 , July 2007.
4) Goodfriends. 2006-2007 Bukhan Sahoe Byeonhwawa Ingwon (2006-2007 Changes in
North Korean Society and Human Rights) (Seoul: Goodfriends, 2007), p. 116.
5) Goodfriends, North Korea Today, no. 285, (June 30, 2009).
470
on September 1, 2002, that North Korea enforce efforts to remove
preconceived
prejudices
toward
women
that
are
based
on
stereotypical gender roles including employing women on the basis
of feminine characteristics or perceiving women as the only ones
responsible for household chores.6)
(2) Excessive Workload as Direct Result of Dual Responsibilities
In
a
North
Korean
household,
the
responsibilities
for
housekeeping and child rearing at home are not shared and
women were solely responsible for them. Furthermore, as the
nation’s economic conditions began to deteriorate, most enterprises
and factories could not operate any more, and North Korean
authorities could not give wages or rations. Nevertheless, they
required men to come to the workplace, out of the fear of losing
control over the population.7) In this situation, most women, in
addition to household chores, also took up responsibility for
providing a living for their family instead of their husbands, and
began to start businesses such as farming patches of land.
Interviews of North Korean defectors revealed the following.8)
6) The National Human Rights Commission of Korea, Bukhaningwon Gollyeon Gukga,
Gukjegigu Mit INGOui Donghyang Bunseok (Analysis on North Korean Human Rights
Trends among Related Nations, International Organizations and NGOs) (Seoul: The
National Human Rights Commission of Korea, 2007), p. 125.
7) The Article 18 of North Korean Socialist Labor Law states that the “laborers must obey
socialist labor regulations and working hours; are not allowed to leave work places
without following appropriate measures. As the food to distribute to people was depleted
due to prolonged food shortages, factories too closed doors. Oh Man-bok (22), a North
Korean defector who left North Korea in September 2007 reported that "All factories in
Najin stopped operation," and "Even now people still gather at the factories but they all
just sit around to chat or go back home because there's no work. With a bit of luck,
they sometimes receive 15 days worth of corn for the monthly wage." Na Gyeong-su,
Newsis, November 20, 2007.
8) The Korea Institute for National Unification, 2007 Bukhan Ingwon Baekseo (2007 White
Paper on Human Rights in North Korea), pp. 229-230.; Lim, Su-hui. "Gyeongjenangwa
Bukhan Yeoseong (Economic Hardship and North Korean Women)," Toilnonchong. no.
[ID 014 (2010)
471
Women are treated like cattle. They had to
work outside of the society where men could
not get rations to support the family.
[ID 058 (2010)] Women have to earn money because North
Korean men don’t care about it much. They go
to work even though there is nothing to do,
just taking up their seats. North Korean men
have the idea of male superiority over women.
They drive women to the corner, even making
them build a house or do other physical labor.
According to the following <Table IV-7-4>, only 11.4% (15/132)
of North Korean defectors interviewed said that, these days,
husbands have economic responsibility for the family, while 70.5%
(93/132) responded that wives share responsibility and 16.7%
(22/132) said that both husbands and wives do.
<Table Ⅳ-7-4> Nowadays, who generally assumes economic responsibility for the
family in North Korea?
No. of
response
(%)
Husband
15
11.4
11.4
Wife
93
70.5
81.8
Valid
response
Invalid
Percentage
(%)
Both
22
16.7
98.5
Others
2
1.5
100.0
Total
132
100.0
No response
68
200
Total
25, pp. 21~22.; The Korean Bar Association, 2006 Bukhan Ingwon Baekseo (2006 White
Paper on North Korean Human Rights) (Seoul: Korean Bar Association, 2006), pp.
177-179.
472
In addition to their expanded responsibility for the household,
most North Korean women also must join a “People’s Street
Mainterance Group,” which is another type of social control
mechanism.
Such
groups
are
mobilized
to
carry
out
public
services, including the cleaning of streets and towns, and also
repairing damage after floods, all without any compensation.
Women who suffer from this double-to-triple-labor load cannot
enjoy a decent life. Furthermore, in terms of food rations, the
daily
ration for
women is
300g which
is
the same
as
a
kindergartener only half that of a regular male laborer’s, which
demonstrates the harsh treatment of women in North Korea.
In response to North Korea’s first report submitted to the
CEDAW
Committee
on
September
1,
2002,
the
Committee
expressed deep concerns in its concluding observations on July 22,
2005. In particular, the CEDAW Committee said, “The Committee
finds it astonishing to see such a huge number of housewives
who do not participate in productive activities and subsequently
are entitled to a smaller food ration.” The Committee also declared
that, “such entitlement to food is an obstacle for the achievement
of real equality and the basis for the indirect inequality in
residence, food and medical care services. The Committee finds it
perplexing to see such little understanding on such conditions and
is deeply concerned since such inequality multiplies in situations
of natural disaster and crisis.”9)
9) Hanna Beate Schöpp-Schilling (Deputy Chair, UNCEDAW), “North Korean Women’s
Rights and Remedy for Restoration of Rights through International Cooperation,”
National Commission for Human Rights of Korea, Bukhan Ingwon Gwallyeon
Yeongubogoseo (Reports on North Korean Human Rights), 2003-2005, p. 442.
473
(3) Increase of Domestic Violence and Divorce Rate
In North Korea’s patriarchal society, husbands often beat their
wives.
Particularly,
as
housewives
have
taken
on
more
responsibility for obtaining food since start of the food crisis, the
level
of
drinking
and
spousal
abuse
related
to
feelings
of
inferiority has increased among stay at-home husbands.
The <Table IV-7-5> below shows that 60.4 % of respondents
answered that most husbands use violence against their wives.
This rate of domestic violence is much higher than that reported
for other countries (16.1% in the U.S. in 1985, 18.8% among
Korean-Americans in 1993, 14.2% in Hong Kong in 1994, 31.4%
for South Korea in 1998, and 17% for Japan in 1999).10)
<Table Ⅳ-7-5> Do husbands use violence or abusive language against their
wives in North Korea?
No. of Percentage
response
(%)
Valid
response
Invalid
Cumulative
Percentage(%)
Most husbands beat their
wives.
92
69.7
69.7
Most husbands do not beat
their wives and only some of
them do.
38
28.8
98.5
Few husbands beat or curse
their wives.
2
1.5
100.0
Total
132
100.0
No response
68
200
Total
10) Kim, Jae-yeop, “Hanguginui Ga"Bukhan Adong Ingwongwa Gukje Hyeomnyeok Bangan
(Human rights for North Korean Children and Plans for International Cooperation),"
2003-2005 Beukhaningwon Gwallyeon Yeongu Bogoseo (Research Reports on Human
Rights in North Korea 2003-2005) (Seoul: National Commission for Human Rights in
Korea)pongnyeok Siltaewa Hyeonsang (A Report on Domestic Violence in Korea),” 2006
Bukhan Ingwon Baekseo (2006 White Paper on North Korean Human Rights), p. 165.
474
Neighbors show little interest in domestic violence. According to
the following <Table IV-7-6>, 45.3% of those polled responded that
they would stop a husband from beating his wife but would not
take any further action, while 47.2% said they would not do
anything because it is between husband and wife. Only 5.7% said
that they would report it to the authorities.
<Table Ⅳ-7-6> How do neighbors react when they witness a husband beating
up on or cursing his wife?
No. of Percentage
response
(%)
Valid
response
Invalid
Cumulative
Percentage(%)
They stop the fight first but
they do not take any other
measures.
56
43.1
43.1
They don't bother it because it
is none of their business.
65
50.0
93.1
They report to a PSA officer
(police officer)
9
6.9
100.0
Total
130
100.0
No response
70
200
Total
Related institutions also do not take active measures either.
According to <Table IV-7-7>, for the punishment of a husband
who abuses his wife, 17.65% (23/131) of respondents answered
that, “he would be punished
by
law,”
52.7
% (69/131)
of
respondents replied that, “the offending husband did not receive
any punishment for his violence,” and 25.2 % (69/131) responded
that, “the person who reports domestic violence would be treated
like a strange person.” Such results indicate that authorities tend
to be sympathetic towards husbands in cases of domestic violence.
475
<Table Ⅳ-7-7> What happens to the husband who physically and verbally
abuses their wives when they are reported to the authorities?
No. of
response
Percentage
(%)
Cumulative
Percentage(%)
The husband would get
punished by law.
23
17.6
17.6
The husband would get no
punishment.
69
52.7
70.2
33
25.2
95.4
Valid
A person report on the violence
response
would be treated a strange
person.
Invalid
Others
6
4.6
100.0
Total
131
100.0
69
200
No response
Total
As to the question of <Table IV-7-8>, whether there were any
counseling organizations for women, only 0.7% (1/131) replied
“yes.” This indicates that domestic violence is not considered a
major problem that severely infringes on women’s fundamental
human rights in North Korea.
<Table Ⅳ-7-8> Is there any counseling organization where women can receive
counseling on domestic violence and family problems in North
Korea?
No. of
response
Valid
response
Invalid
Percentage
(%)
Yes
1
0.8
(%)
0.8
No
110
84.0
84.7
I don’t know
20
15.3
100.0
Total
131
100.0
69
200
No response
Total
476
The following is a selection of response to the query, “Tell us
if you know about any efforts made by the North Korean
government or social organizations or others to solve the problem
of domestic violence by husbands.”
[ID 005 (2010)] There are no other measures except that the
leader
of
their
people's
neighborhood
unit
comes and tells the husband not to do it.
[ID 006 (2010)] There are no efforts at all. If violence happens,
the leader of their people's neighborhood unit
asks the couple why they fight and warns
them not to make a disturbance.
[ID 018 (2010)] There are no such efforts. If a couple fights
severely, there is the leader of their people's
neighborhood unit.
In its concluding observations on North Korea’s national report
submitted
on
September
1,
2002,
the
CEDAW
Committee
expressed its concern that North Korea did not recognize the
existence of domestic violence, and consequently did not offer
preventive and protective measures for victims. The Committee
urged the state to establish a statute against domestic violence
and to specify violence against women to be subject to criminal
law. Besides, subsequently, it recommended that North Korea
provide relief measures that victims of domestic violence can
access easily.11)
11) The National Human Rights Commission of Korea, Bukhaningwon Gollyeon Gukga,
Gukjegigu Mit INGOui Donghyang Bunseok (Analysis on North Korean Human
Rights Trends among Related Nations, International Organizations and NGOs), pp.
125-126.
477
However, according to responses to the question of <Table
IV-7-9>, what a wife would do if husband’s violence was too
severe for her to bear, a total of 45.8% (60/131) of respondents
answered they would just endure it. Another 19.1% (25/131)
responded that they would pack and run to their parent’s house,
while 29.8% (39/131) said they would report to the authorities and
demand a divorce. In general, the data show that, unlike in the
past, when women used to aspire to be a good mother and a
submissive wife, North Korean women are no longer as tolerant
of domestic violence.
In North Korea, divorce is allowed only through a court order
(Clause 2 of Article 20, North Korean Family Law) and a social
stigma towards divorce and second marriages still dominates
society. However, an increase in the number of divorces illustrates
the changing perception of family among North Korean women.
<Table Ⅳ-7-9> What would the wife do when she cannot endure her husband’s
severe violence?
No. of Percentage
response
(%)
Valid
response
Invalid
She should flee to her parents'
house with her luggage.
25
19.1
19.1
She reports to the authorities
and demands a divorce
39
29.8
48.9
She cannot help enduring.
60
45.8
94.7
Others
7
5.3
100.0
Total
131
100.0
No response
Total
<Table
Cumulative
Percentage(%)
IV-7-10>
reveals
that
69
200
85.5%
respondents
believe,
“Women are free to file for a divorce at a court,” while the
478
majority of 58.1 %, respondents confirms “Divorce cannot be
completed if the wife does not agree to it” (<Table IV-7-11>).
These results seem to indicate that women’s right to claim the
right to marriage is well acknowledged.
<Table Ⅳ-7-10> In North Korea, can women petition for a divorce to the court?
No. of
response
Percentage
(%)
(%)
Yes
112
85.5
85.5
No
9
6.9
92.4
100.0
Valid
response
Invalid
I don’t know
10
7.6
Total
131
100.0
No response
69
Total
200
<Table Ⅳ-7-11> In North Korea, can a divorce be concluded when the wife
doesn't agree to a divorce?
No. of
response
Valid
response
Invalid
Percentage
(%)
(%)
Yes
30
23.3
23.3
No
75
58.1
81.4
I don’t know
24
18.6
100.0
Total
129
100.0
No response
Total
71
200
Regarding the right to property in cases of divorce, only 7 %
agreed that the husband “has it all" in terms of division of assets,
while 62.8 % expected that a division between the husband and
wife and another 28.7 % marked “others” as their response in
(<Table IV-7-12>). As to child custody after a divorce, 83.7%
responded that the woman holds the right to custody (<Table
479
IV-7-13>). Alimony does not exist in North Korea’s Family La
w;12) in line with this, 45% of respondents replied that a wife
cannot petition for alimony even if the husband is at fault and
provided a reason for a divorce, and 40.3% answered they did not
know (<Table IV-7-14>).
<Table Ⅳ-7-12> In case of divorce, how do you take care of the property?
No. of Percentage
response
(%)
Cumulative
Percentage(%)
A husband and a wife share
the property.
81
62.8
62.8
A husband takes it all.
9
7.0
69.8
A wife takes it all.
2
1.6
71.3
Others
37
28.7
100.0
Total
129
100.0
No response
71
200
Valid
response
Invalid
Total
<Table Ⅳ-7-13> In case of divorce, does the wife have a right to child custody?
No. of
response
Percentage
(%)
(%)
Yes
108
83.7
83.7
Valid
response
No
1
0.8
84.5
I don’t know
20
15.5
100.0
Total
129
100.0
Invalid
No response
71
Total
200
12) The Korean Bar Association, 2006 Bukhan Ingwon Baekseo (2006 White Paper on
North Korean Human Rights), p. 196.
480
<Table Ⅳ-7-14> In case of a divorce suit on the ground of a husband’s fault,
can his wife have right to pursue alimony?
No. of
response
Valid
response
Invalid
Percentage
(%)
(%)
Yes
19
14.7
14.7
No
58
45.0
59.7
I don’t know
52
40.3
100.0
Total
129
100.0
71
200
No response
Total
It should be noted that North Korean authorities seem to
discourage
divorce
by
making
amount of money, similar to a
materials,14)
divorce
fine.13)
petitioners
pay
some
According to related
North Korea has recently made it even more difficult
to file a divorce via a guideline for sending those men who intend
to divorce to disciplinary prison labor camps. Even in early April
2009, North Korea caused a couple filing for a divorce be tried in
a people’s court held in a high school in Hwagok-ri, Onseong
(Onsong)-gun, Hamkyeongbuk-do (North Hamgyong Province),
and used to make them feel ashamed and give up the divorce.15)
However, one can file for divorce by offering a bribe, reported to
be from as low as 25 dollars (100,000 North Korean won) to as
high as 350 dollars (1,350,000 North Korean won). Thus, for
example in Sinuiju, the divorce filing rate has been increasing,
reaching five to ten cases a month.16)
13) Ministry of Court Administration of South Korea, Private Law Policy Research Center,
News release on "Bukhanui Gajokbeop Balgangwa Gwallyeonhayeo (Publication of
North Korean Family Law)."
14) Goodfriends, North Korea Today, no. 132, (May 28, 2008).
15) North Korea Intellectuals Solidarity, internet news on April 9, 2009. Available from
<http://www.nkis.kr/>.
16) “Divorce Possible Only When It Contributes to Revolutionary Benefit,” Open Radio for
481
3) Gender Inequality in the Workplace and in Society
(1) Gender Inequality
North Korean laws on issues related to women declare that
women enjoy equal rights in economic, social, cultural, citizenry
and political fields. In actuality, however, North Korean women
are subject to discrimination in terms of entering the Party, and
promotion to higher positions, and other opportunities to advance
in society.
North Korean women are employed in low income jobs, such as
public healthcare, retail, childcare, education, communications, and
art. Consequently, wage discrimination is a widespread practice.
Women make up 50% of the labor force, but are put to work in
socially under-appreciated sectors.17) One female North Korean
defector, [ID 046 (2010)], testified that, “Women must go to
factories after graduation. Men, on the other hand, normally join
the military, but those who don’t work in administrative positions,
not at factories. Women generally do all the hard labor.”
Additional excerpts from interviews of North Korean defectors
are provided below.
[ID 001 (2010)] Women who want to join the Party must work
several times harder than men, which makes it
almost impossible for a woman to join the
Party.
[ID 006 (2010)] Women cannot be promoted to the highest
North Korea. [Online, cited on November 16, 2009]. Available from
<http://www.nkradio.org/news/1433>
North Korean Human Rights), pp. 183-186.
482
positions and usually only men become high
officials. In my case, I became a leader of a
people’s neighborhood unit but could not be
promoted to a high position.
[ID 018 (2010)] When being promoted or joining the Party, the
number of women can be is limited to about
one fourth of that of men.
[ID 055 (2010)] Men can join the Party earlier than women.
[ID 113 (2010)] I could not be promoted just because I am a
woman and detested working, trying to read
my supervisor’s mind.
[ID 060 (2010)] I worked at a company that reeled silk off of
cocoons where women could be neither a team
leader nor a supervisor.
[ID 184 (2010)] The rate of promotion is 9 men to only 1
woman.
The CEDAW Committee expressed concern over and gave
recommendations on this issue in its concluding observations on
July 22, 2005.18) The Women’s League is an organization that
women from 31 to 60 years old are obliged to join unless they
belong to the other organizations. However, this organization is
nothing but an external one to assert the Workers’ Party’s official
policies and mobilize women for the building of the socialist
economy. Thus, it is far from a voluntary organization to protect
and improve women’s rights.19) On July 2005, the CEDAW
18) The National Commission for Human Rights in Korea, Bukhaningwon Gollyeon Gukga,
Gukjegigu Mit INGOui Donghyang Bunseok (Analysis on North Korean Human
Rights Trends among Related Nations, International Organizations and NGOs), p. 126.
Paper on Human Rights in North Korea), pp. 224~225.
483
Committee also expressed concern that there are no women’s
organizations
or
independent
human
rights
organizations
to
monitor implementation of the principles set forth in the CEDAW.
(2) Absence of Protective Measures for Women’s Overloaded Labor
Similar to corresponding regulations in South Korea, in Article
192 of North Korea’s Socialist Labor Law, and in Article 192 of
the North Korea Penal Code, North Korea stipulates protections
and restrictions related to women’s labor. As shown in <Table
IV-7-15>, special legal measures for working women are available
in
North
Korea.
These
measures
include
maternity
leave,
menstruation leave, a 6-working-hour system for women with
babies and guaranteed breast feeding time.20)
However, according to the responses to an open-ended question
on this issue by North Korean defectors [ID 001 (2010)] and [ID
195 (2010)], the actual time women take for maternity leave may
vary from 1 month to 10 months, depending on the workplace.
This deviation seems too wide for maternity leave to be actually
widely practiced in North Korea.
As <Table IV-7-16> illustrates, there seems to be no special
protections or a social security system for women. The question
“Is there any special policy only applicable to women in the
workplace?” received the following replies:
[ID 032 (2010)] Maternity leave before or after giving birth to
a child.
[ID 057 (2010)] Maternity leave after giving birth to a child.
484
[ID 072 (2010)] There is a policy to pay additional money if
giving birth to a child.
[ID 081 (2010)] They gave me an hour to nurse my baby per
day.
<Table Ⅳ-7-15> Is there a policy for women to take maternity leave before or
after her giving birth to a child?
No. of
response
Valid
response
Invalid
Percentage
(%)
(%)
Yes
110
83.3
83.3
No
5
3.8
87.1
I don’t know
17
12.9
100.0
Total
132
100.0
68
200
No response
Total
<Table Ⅳ-7-16> Is there any special policy only applicable to women in the
workplace in North Korea?
No. of
response
Valid
response
Percentage
(%)
Yes
8
6.2
6.2
No
103
79.2
85.4
100.0
I don’t know
19
14.6
Total
130
100.0
Invalid
(%)
No response
Total
70
200
4) Violence against Women
(1) Violence in Society and at the Workplace
Violence
violence,
is
against
quite
women,
common
particularly
in
the
sexual
patriarchal
and
domestic
North
Korea’s
patriarchal society, where male chauvinism prevails. Even women
485
themselves do not think it problematic because North Korean
society in general looks down upon women.
A selection of responses given during interviews of North
Korean
defectors
to
open-ended
questions,
including
verbal
violence, follows:
[ID 064 (2010)] North Korean men have such an unrefined
way of talking. It is so unrefined that women
despise it.
[ID 069 (2010)] Men smoke a lot in trains in North Korea.
Even though the train is full of smoke, they
never smoke outside. Even when a woman is
holding a baby, they would not offer their
seats to her. They often abuse a woman for
no reason at all.
[ID 103 (2010)] The idea of predominance of men over women
still remains in North Korea. It is too much.
For example, if women arrive late, every man
will blame her. However, in the opposite case,
women cannot say anything. Men can beat
women, but women shouldn’t. Even if hearing
vulgar language inside and outside of the
home, women have no measure to take. Even
if we are being beaten, there is nothing we
can do.
[ID 133 (2010)] When
traveling,
even
if
a
man
takes
a
woman’s seat, she cannot complain about it. If
she complains, she can be beaten immediately.
486
<Table Ⅳ-7-17> Have you ever experienced or witnessed sexual harassment in
verbal or physical forms, such as male bosses or coworkers
saying things that cause you to feel shame, trying to force
bodily contact, or embracing you from behind at the workplace?
No. of
response
Percentage
(%)
(%)
Yes
27
20.5
20.5
Valid
response
No
105
79.5
100.0
Total
132
100.0
Invalid
No response
68
200
Total
In the 2010 KBA survey of 200 North Korean defectors, when
asked
whether
harassment
in
they
ever
verbal
or
experienced
physical
or
sexual
witnessed
sexual
harassment,
20.5%
(27/132) of respondents answered affirmatively; meanwhile 79.5%
(105/132) responded negatively to the question of whether they
had experienced or witnessed sexual harassment at work places.
This high percentage of positive answers is significant for a
society where there is little sense of sexual harassment.
When
asked
the
question,
“in
case
you
experienced
or
witnessed sexual harassment, how did you or others respond to
that?”
<Table
IV-7-18>
among
those
who
showed
positive
responses, 77.8% (27/21) answered that they would “stay quiet
and just move on” while 11.1% (3/21) said they would “report to
the party or the authorities.” This clearly illustrates a lack of
recognition that sexual harassment or sexual assault is a violation
of human rights.
The North Korean criminal law of 2004 stipulates that a man
who rapes a woman or has sexual intercourse with a female
minor (less than 15 years of age) will face a heavy penalty
487
(Article 153); and a man who has demanded that a female
subordinate have a sexual relationship will also be subject to
criminal punishment (Article 154). Nevertheless, sexual assault
including rape occurs frequently in North Korea. Formerly, many
cases of sexual assault occurred as a result of luring a woman
into believing she would be admitted to the Party or that her
work conditions would improve. However, in recent years, severe
economic conditions have driven women to the markets, where
they are sexually molested by the Bowibu officers and soldiers.
The overall social understanding is that women are second class
citizens, so women cannot but submit to sexual assaults. In cases
where
such
sexual
assault
becomes
publically
known,
In-min-bo-an-seong (also called the Anjeonbu which translates
into
Public
Security
Agency
or
People's
Safety
Agency
in
English; hereinafter referred to as the “PSA”) intervenes and
legally deals with the case. However, because of the social
atmosphere in which men look down on women, women cannot
but endure sexual violence. North Korea’s Criminal Act of 2004
stipulates that a man who rapes a woman or has sexual
intercourse with a female minor (less than 15 years of age) will
face a heavy penalty (Article 153); a man who has demanded that
a female subordinate have a sexual relationship will also be
subject to criminal punishment (Article 154). Because of the social
atmosphere in which men look down on women, women cannot
but endure sexual violence.
488
<Table Ⅳ-7-18> In case you experienced or witnessed sexual harassment, how
did you or others respond to that?
No. of Percentage
Cumulative
response
(%)
Percentage(%)
Valid
response
I endure it alone, pretending that
nothing has happened
21
77.8
77.8
I reported it to the Party of the
agencies concerned.
3
11.1
88.9
I informed others about it openly.
1
3.7
92.6
Others
2
7.4
100.0
Total
27
100.0
(2) Sexual Harassment in Detention Facilities
Female prisoners are subject to shameful conditions. A female
North Korean defector held in China who had escaped from a
long-term corrective labor camp in Jeongeo-ri, Hamgyeongbuk-do
testified as follows: “After being transferred from the Bowibu and
the PSA to the camp, I never witnessed any woman who had a
period
there
because
of
malnutrition.”21)
Related
to
this,
in
response to the question of <Table IV-7-19>, “Have you received
enough sanitary pads and female supplies?”, an overwhelming
96.1% (74/77) of respondents replied that they were not given
anything, and 3.9% (3/77) answered that they were not given
enough, which further reveals the poor treatment of women in
society.
21) Online, cited July 28, 2010]. Available from <http://www.nkradio.org/news/3870>
“Malnutrition Strips Female Inmates,” Open Radio for North Korea. [Online, cited July
26, 2010]. Available from<http://www.nkradio.org/news/3870>
489
<Table Ⅳ-7-19> Have you received enough sanitary pads and female supplies?
No. of response
Percentage (%)
Cumulative
Percentage(%)
Yes
3
3.9
3.9
Valid
response
No
74
96.1
100.0
Total
77
100.0
Invalid
No response
123
Total
200
According to defectors’ replies to the open-ended questions,
North Korean authorities force men and women of all ages
sentenced to a long-term correctional prison labor to work (Based
on statements made by [IDs 003, 007, 008, 014, 037, 043, 061, 062,
065, 070, 077, 106, 113, 138, 142, 145, 167, 169, 174, 183, 186, 188,
198, 200 (all 2010)]
For women who escaped to China and were then repatriated to
North Korea, there is severe sexual harassment during the
physical examinations in detention facilities. Using as an excuse
the goal to seek money or classified documents hidden in the
body, Bowibu agents ordered repatriated women who went to
China to get food because of the economic crisis to undress, and
they inspect even inside women’s genitalia with their hands while
wearing rubber gloves.22) Most of all, they use a torturous
technique that is called “pump,” which consists of repeated
squatting and standing numerously to make any hidden things
inside
come
out.
This
technique
is
notorious
because
it
exaggerates women’s shame along with the abnormal desire of the
agents.23)
22) Kim, Hye-Suk. Inganigo Shipda (Longing to Be Treated as Human) (Seoul: Essay,
2009), pp. 37~43, pp. 232~235.
23) In an interview with Chosun Ilbo, a 25-year-old North Korean female defector testified
490
The followings are the responses by North Korean defectors to
open-ended questions from a KBA survey related to this matter.
[ID 010 (2010)] The female Bowibu agent orders women to
undress and inspect their genitalia to search
for money. Making a curtain with a blanket at
the corner of a prison cell, an agent checks
each woman while wearing rubber gloves. I
was so ashamed that I despaired about the
way
North
Koreans
are
treated
by
the
government.
[ID 014 (2010)] There is no physical examination, but there is
a body search to seek money. The Bowibu
agents undress prisoners and inspect even their
anuses. The agents inspect genitalia of female
prisoners. They order women to repeat sitting
and standing until any money hidden inside
comes out.
[ID 079 (2010)] They make a female detainees undress and
repeat
sitting
and
standing
50
times
with
hands lifted behind and without raising her
head.
[ID 081 (2010)] When investigating at first, they ordered men
to stand on one side and women to stand on
the other, and made them take off their clothes
even in the place where both the men and the
women can see each other. Then, they called
three
female
detainers
and
checked
their
of ‘pump’ torture she experienced in the Bowibu when she was repatriated to North
Korea in 2006. Chosun Ilbo, October 22, 2007.
491
clothes and made the naked women sit and
stand 100 times. Once they did, any hidden
money deep inside the womb came out.
[ID 106 (2010)] They
made
women
naked
to
search
their
bodies. They inspected even deep inside the
genitalia with hands.
[ID 126 (2010)] There was a body search. Since I used to
come and go (to China), they searched my
body
to
see
whether
I
had
money
and
valuables or not. They never allowed iron
things because some people died after eating
them.
I
was
not
able
to
overcome
the
humiliation.
[ID 175 (2010)] If they searched my body, they inspected my
anus and even womb in a location where the
other women were watching it. I wanted to die
at the moment I was caught since I felt like
an animal.
On June 22, 2005, the CEDAW Committee expressed the opinion
that
North
Korea
must
for
economic
reasons
support
the
reintegration of women defectors into the family and the society
and protect them against all forms of human rights violations.
Forced abortion or the beating of pregnant women occurs in
North Korea. The following are answer responses to related
open-ended questions asked to defectors.
[ID 029 (2010)] I heard that a pregnant woman who came
from China had a miscarriage after being
492
kicked. This happens quite often. Even though
the woman gives birth to a child, they kill it,
calling it a Chinese seed.
[ID 037 (2010)] It happened in 2000. There were many women
caught from China after secretly crossing the
border. They forced the women to induce
abortion. When I went to Musan hospital, I
witnessed those women having abortions.
[ID 086 (2010)] If a North Korean woman having the baby of
a Chinese man is caught, she can be despised
by
other
North
Koreans.
Some
of
them
naturally lose their babies because they are
interrogated too much. If interrogated by the
Bowibu, they usually lose their babies.
[ID 110 (2010)] While I was in Hoeryeong Bowibu in May
2004,
the
Bowibu
agents
took
a
pregnant
woman to an obstetrician and killed the baby
with acupuncture, and then took the woman to
the prison.
[ID 163 (2010)] The Onseong Bowibu agents kicked a pregnant
woman’s belly and made her lose her baby in
October 2004.
[ID 123 (2010)] They forced a girl caught in China to lose her
baby, blaming her for having a Chinese seed.
[ID 183 (2010)] A pregnant woman in China was repatriated to
North Korea and lost her baby when her
womb was searched by an agent.
Sexual violence by male prison officers happens frequently. The
following
are
responses
by
North
Korean
defectors
to
an
493
open-ended question on sexual violence.
[ID 010 (2010)] I heard that a prison guard who had two
hours of free time asked a woman to clean
and then raped her at the Sinuiju gathering
facility for suspects in 2005. They often called
for a 24-year old girl caught in China and had
sex with her.
[ID 046 (2010)] While I was in Musan mine corrective labor
camp in 2003, I witnessed that North Koreans
make verbal violence against women returned
from China, saying ‘let’s see how good they
are at it because they have lived with Chinese
men.’
[ID 065 (2010)] There are so many people who want to die in
the corrective labor camp. So, they cannot but
sell their bodies to supervisors or officials. So,
it happens quite often.
[ID 077 (2010)] I saw that they took a pretty young woman
silently at night.
[ID 168 (2010)] It happens quite often. It is prohibited by law.
If there is any sexual harassment against a
prisoner, the offender shall be punished by a
criminal law. However, it is just a law and the
reality is different. When the Supreme People’s
Assembly investigated in 2007, one or two
people were punished for sexual harassment in
the
Yanggang-do
(Yanggang
Province)
corrective labor camp. There were inspections
494
in a corrective labor camp, a detention house
and a long-term corrective labor camp.
[ID 198 (2010)] Sexual harassment occurs quite often in at
corrective
labor
camps.
The
PSA
officers
usually do it. They summoned the women with
pretty faces for sexual violence.24)
Especially, a defector, [ID 081 (2008)], in his/her answer to the
subjective question on sexual harassment in the political prison
camp, testifies as follows: “About 1993 to 1994, I witnessed my
mother obliging as a sex slave to a Bowibu agent who was her
supervisor. This is not a problem my mother faced alone. It could
be said that tens of thousands female political prisoners suffer
from being sex slaves. In September 1996, my aunt and elder
cousin Shin Hye-suk went to a mountain to gather acorns. My
cousin was harassed and raped by a guard. While she was naked,
she became unconscious and died that day. When an unmarried
female prisoner becomes pregnant after being sexually harassed
by a Bowibu agent, she disappears as soon as her pregnancy is
discovered. No one knows where she is taken. The Shin’s recent
book delivers details of actual conditions of the political prison
camp including rampant sexual abuse in the camp.
(3) Human Trafficking and Prostitution
As contact with the outside world has increased, North Koreans’
perception toward sex has changed. In addition, with the pressure
24) Shin, Dong-hyuk, Jeongchibeom Suyongso Wanjeontongjeguyeok Sesang Bakkeuro
Naoda (Escape to the Outside World) (Seoul: North Korean Human Rights Database
Center), pp. 27~28.
495
to provide for their families, people are forced to “sell” whatever
they can offer to sell; therefore, prostitution has increased. As
shown
in
<Table
IV-7-20>,
55.3%
(73/132)
of
respondents
acknowledged the existence of prostitution in North Korea.
<Table Ⅳ-7-20> Does prostitution exist in North Korea?
No. of
response
Percentage
(%)
(%)
Yes
73
55.3
55.3
Valid
response
No
59
44.7
100.0
Total
132
100.0
Invalid
No response
68
200
Total
In late June 2007,25) the PSA issued a public proclamation on
prohibition of massages by female service clerks at public baths
and barbershops in Pyeongyang clearly reflecting the current
existence and practice of prostitution in North Korea. According to
information from a North Korean defector [ID 001-183 (2010)] to
open-ended questions, a prostitute can be secured for 20,000 North
Korean won, with the woman calling out “Buy a flower” to lure
men in front of a station or an inn.
On July 2, 2010, Free North Korea radio, which is broadcast for
North Korea, stated that there is an increasing number of “couple
managers” offering a chance to meet teenage female college
students who take drugs and prostitute themselves at night near
the Station at Cheongjin-si (Chongjin City), Hamgyeongbuk-do
(North
Hamgyong
Province).
Most
of
customers
are
active
military officials waiting for a train and men in their thirties. The
25) Network for North Korean Democracy and Human Rights, NK Vision, no. 3 (2007)
496
money they offer to the manger is about 5,000 to 8,000 North
Korean won (about 10,000 to 13,000 South Korean won). After
managers take about 30% of the money, and 20% is for a room
charge, so the women can receive 2,500 to 4,000 won. The
prostitution of female college students is increasing because they
use drugs and want to cover various fees and boarding expenses
which their colleges frequently impose on them. It is the same
with other universities in North Korea.
North Korea’s Criminal Law Article 261 stipulates that a person
who has committed prostitution multiple times shall be subject to
disciplinary prison labor for up to 2 years; a frequent offender and
a
person
who
aforementioned
has
caused
behavior
a
shall
social
be
disturbance
subject
to
from
the
correctional,
disciplinary prison labor for up to 2 years. Article 262 of the same
law also stipulates that men and women exhibiting adulterous
behaviors shall be subject to correctional prison labor for up to 5
years; a frequent offender and a person who has caused social
disturbance from the aforementioned behavior shall be subject to
up to 5 to 10 years of correctional prison labor.
In general, prostitutes, if arrested, are detained in long-term
corrective labor camps for 3 to 6 months,26) but the punitive
measures for the offense are not consistent. At public baths in
Wonsan, women trading sex at public baths were arrested for
disputes among customers in October 2007. As a result, one
prostitute and a broker were said to be publicly executed.27)
Recently in Sinuiju, a person named Shin (24 years old) was
26) Lim, Sun-Hui, "Gyeongjenangwa Bukhan Yeoseong (Economic Hardship and North
Korean Women)," p. 17.
27) Network for North Korean Democracy and Human Rights, NK Vision, no. 5, (March
2008).
497
arrested for involvement in the sex trade and was sentenced to 2
years of correctional prison labor. As seen in <Table Ⅳ-7-21>,
there
does
not
seem
to
be
a
consistent
punishment
for
prostitution.
<Table Ⅳ-7-21> If a prostitute is caught, how would he be punished?
No. of Percentage
response
(%)
Valid
response
Cumulative
Percentage(%)
Only the prostitute get punished
27
38.0
38.0
Both male and female in
prostitution get punished
28
39.4
77.5
Neither of them gets punished
4
5.6
83.1
Others
12
16.9
100.0
Total
71
100.0
Invalid
No response
2
Total
73
Meanwhile, regarding the sexual harassment against women
with special jobs including artists and actresses, 13.6% (18/132) of
the respondents in <Table IV-7-22> answered that they have
seen or heard of it but 86.4% (114/132) of them haven’t.
<Table Ⅳ-7-22> Have you heard of sexual harassment against women by the
state authorities in North Korea?
No. of
response
Valid
response
Invalid
Yes
18
Percentage
(%)
13.6
13.6
100.0
No
114
86.4
Total
132
100.0
No response
68
Total
(%)
200
The following are excerpts from interviews with North Korean
498
defectors related to this extremely confidential issue.
[ID 007 (2010)] I
heard
that
some
women
singing
in
Bocheon-bojeon musical band and ‘Wangjaesan
Electric Musical Band’ are the pleasure team
for Kim Jong-il.
[ID 010 (2010)] Art organizations have concentration guidance
once a year. They have a meeting about what
infidelity is. Someone from the Central Party
comes and attends the meeting. Well, in fact, it
is not a real meeting, but having a relationship
with a woman by force.
[ID 013 (2010)] There was an incident where Woo In-hee was
shot to death. I heard that she was shot to
death because she had a messy sex life with
the Party officials.
[ID 023 (2010)] I heard that there are female performers who
perform on stage only for Kim Jong-il in
Pyeongyang.
It
was
said
that
they
wore
lingerie when performing. I also heard that an
actress could be considered to be distinguished
only after she slept with Kim Jong-il.
[ID 036 (2010)] I
heard
that
Choe
Ryong,
son
of
Choe
Hyeon-hui took women and made them his
playthings.
[ID 052 (2010)] I heard that Kim Jong-il chooses pretty girls
and allowed officials in numerical order to
enjoy these girls.
[ID 064 (2010)] I heard that there was a female organization
499
made up of talented women selected by the
Fifth Bureau. There was a rumor that they
dance in front of Kim Jong-il.
[ID 069 (2010)] I heard that those bastards in power have five
to six women to have sexual intercourse with
them. Those absurd things would be disclosed
in detail in South Korea but in the North
everybody pretends not to know it. Although it
happens
openly
in
North
Korea,
there
is
nothing we can do but ignore it.
[ID 126 (2010)] I know that one cannot be an actor without
Kim
Jong-il’s
permission.
An
actor
needs
Kim’s permission even when he/she marries.
Officially there is a pleasure team but I don’t
know if there is any unofficial organization. It
is said that Kim Jong-il likes women. I heard
it while working for a dance troupe.
[ID 163 (2010)] I heard that the pleasure team members are
harassed.
Article 4 of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights states
that no one shall be subject to slavery and subjugation and all
forms of slavery and slave trading28) shall be prohibited.29) The
28) According to UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons,
Especially Women and Children, Supplementing the Convention on Transnational
Crime established on December 25, 2003, “Trafficking in persons” shall mean the
recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the
threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception,
of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of
payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another
person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the
exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced
labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of
500
State Department of the United States publishes Trafficking In
Persons Report annually to evaluate each state’s effort to get rid
of grave forms of human trafficking based on the Victims of
Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000 (VTVPA). On
June 14, 2010, US State Department renewed its classification of
North Korea as a third rated country which fails to meet
minimum standard to prevent human trafficking.30) Since 2003,
North Korea has remained as the worst rated country.
In particular, since the food crisis in North Korea in the
mid-1990s, human trafficking in North Korea has widely occurred
among North Korean defectors crossing the border into China, as
shown in <Table IV-7-23>. Investigations31) have revealed that
60-70% of the defectors are women, and that 70-80% of these
women defectors experience human trafficking.
<Table Ⅳ-7-23> Have you heard of Human traffickers deceiving women to cross
the river and force them into a marriage to a Chinese man?
No. of
response
Percentage
(%)
(%)
Yes
72
55.0
55.0
Valid
response
No
59
45.0
100.0
Total
131
100.0
Invalid
No response
69
Total
200
organs.
29) Munhwa Ilbo, June 15, 2010.
30) In the annual report of 2010, the U.S. State Department announced 13 countries
including North Korea, Myanmar and Cuba as level three countries, ranking the lowest
among the 175 countries reviewed, in terms of national efforts to prevent human
trafficking. (South Korea is classified as a level 1 country that has the basic
regulations to eradicate human trafficking.)
501
The followings are answers of North Korean defectors to the
open-ended question.
[ID 001 (2010)] When I was in North Korea, I followed my
friend living in Hoeryeong, who went to China
to make some money. I know that suddenly, a
Chinese Korean forced her to do as he wanted
claiming that he bought her, and hit and raped
her. Later, I heard, she escaped secretly and
returned to North Korea.
[ID 006 (2010)] There was a 28 year-old woman whose name
was Kim Yeong-ran living in Ranam Distrcit.
A homeroom teacher in the village sold her to
a Chinese man. The teacher told her, “Do
some business with me in China” and she
could be rich in North Korea after earning a
lot of money in China.
[ID 015 (2010)] There were some cases in Hoeryeong and
Musan where brokers lied to women, telling
them that they could make a lot of money in
China and then sold them to Chinese men. As
I know, some of them were shot to death.
[ID 049 (2010)] My sister was caught by human traffickers
after crossing the border and forced to marry
a Chinese man. She crossed Tuman River
around March 2000. As soon as she crossed
the river, Chinese Koreans caught her and took
to the countryside. They forced her to work
and threatened her to marry her off if she
502
asked for money. Finally, she was sold to a
Chinese man. After living with him for three
years, she secretly escaped and came to South
Korea.
[ID 069 (2010)] I paid money to a broker to go to China, and
suddenly she confessed that she sold herself to
an old ethnic Korean living in China who
hadn’t married at that time. In fact, she went
to China to make money though.
[ID 073 (2010)] It happens quite often. Most women are to be
sold and married to Chinese men after they
cross the border, except for those women who
go to China with their husbands. If a woman
insists that she will not marry, these brokers
threaten her to sell to a karaoke.
[ID 086 (2010)] I experienced it. In fact, I was not supposed to
live in China. I just wanted to go around
China for about a week and then go back to
North Korea. However, those people in China
already made a plan. I came to China with
three other women. One was a married woman
but the other, who was the same age with me,
was sold to Heilong Jiang. Some of the women
sold to Chinese men live well but some don’t.
North Koreans who come to China, in general,
are sold.
According to recent reports,32)some brokers in North Korea that
32) [Online, cited on November 12, 2009]. Available from
<http://www.nkradio.org/news/1642>.
503
cooperated with Chinese human traffickers were arrested by
Hoeryong-si Bowibu. North Korean border guards caught them
while they were forcing three North Korean women to cross the
border. It is said that the three women, one 18-year old and two
25-year olds were the residents of Dongmyeong (Dongmyung)-dong,
Hoeryeong-si (Hoeryong City) and were supposed to marry
Chinese men. The women did not know that they would be sold
to Chinese men. These women were deceived by the brokers, who
told them they could do some business and earn money in China.
It is said that the arrested North Korean broker was supposed to
receive 15,000 CNY (2,700,000 KRW) for the 18-year old woman,
10,000 CNY (1,800,000 KRW) for another woman and 8,000 CNY
(1,400,000 KRW) for the third..
Faced with criticism by the international community, North
Korea has cracked down on the human traffickers and even
carried out a public execution.33) However, there are many North
Korean women, regardless their marital status, who to feed their
families volunteer to be sold to Chinese men. Responses to
interview of defectors included the following:
[ID 105 (2010)] My friend’s brother, who was shot to death,
was a human trafficker. It seemed that he was
forced to do it. In many cases, women would
like to go to China. He seemed to receive
some money.
[ID 132 (2010)] Well, those women who want to go to China
33) It has been reported that on May 30, 2007 at a stadium next to Hoeryeong-si
(Hoeryŏng city) mine machinery factory, 15 people who were suspected for human
trafficking were on open trial, and 4 of them were sentenced to death by public
execution. Network for North Korean Democracy and Human Rights, NK Vision, no. 2.
504
already know what will happen. They seemed
to receive some money in advance.
5) Worsening of the Right to Health
Due to severe food shortages since the 1990s, malnutrition
among
North
Korean
women
has
become
serious.
This
is
especially true among mothers because most mothers tend to give
their own food to other family members. According to a 2004
study, among women of child-bearing age who have children
under the age of two, 32.4% suffered from malnutrition; 21.1%
were underweight (at a weight of less than 45 kg), and 34.7%
were
anemic.
This
severe
malnutrition
directly
affects
child-bearing, child-birth, and child-rearing. Mothers’ malnutrition
is often the cause of miscarriages, still-births, and the births of
premature and underweight babies, resulting in poor health not
only of the mother but of the baby. The collapse of the medical
system in North Korea has made it difficult to acquire safe forms
of birth control. As a result, mismanaged abortion often risks the
life of both mother and baby. In North Korea, the maternity death
rate per 100,000 new-born babies has increased from 67 in 2004 to
110 in 2007. This rate is seven times higher than that of South
Korea. As the birth rate sharply decreased because women
refused to get pregnant (the birth rate per 1,000 was 21.8 in the
early 1990s, but the figure has dropped by 50% to 11),34)
34) According to the World Health Statistics 2008 by WHO on May 20, 2008, the overall
average birth rate in North Korea decreased over the years in that 2.4 in 1990, 2.0 in
2000, and 1.9 in 2006. The average life expectancy was 0.5 shortened compared to the
previous years at 66 years (men: 64 years, women: 68 years). The average birthrate
from South Korean women was 1.2 and scored the world’s lowest, and the life
expectancy is 78.5 years which was the 23rd in the world. The average life expectancy
for men and women are 75 and 82, respectively, Donga Ilbo (Donga Daily), May 22,
2008.
505
child-birth has been encouraged since 199835) and abortion was
officially banned. However, this policy has led to an increase in
illegal abortion practices and has resulted in much harm to
women's health.
The data in <Table Ⅳ-7-24> indicates that women in North
Korea can have an abortion at will. However, answers by
defectors to open-ended questions [ID 002 (2010) or ID 195 (2010)]
show that women often must bribe doctors to have an abortion.
Therefore, the survey data more likely illustrates a wide-spread
concept in North Korea that anything can be done through
bribery.
<Table Ⅳ-7-24> In North Korea, can pregnant women have an abortion at will?
Valid
response
Invalid
No. of
response
Percentage
(%)
(%)
Yes
92
69.7
69.7
No
19
14.4
84.1
100.0
I don’t know
21
15.9
Total
132
100.0
No response
Total
68
200
The UNFPA undertook research into 156 countries and released
its World Population Prospects: the 2008 Revision jointly with
the Planned Parenthood Federation of Korea (PPFK). In the report,
the maternal mortality ratio indicates the number of deaths of
mothers
per
newborn
babies
related
to
complications
during
th
in the
pregnancy and delivery. While South Korea ranked 35
35) Hamheung-si has decided to give food ration to the families with a second child for
six months and to increase the time period of ration if a third child is born as a
promotional method for childbirth. Network for North Korean Democracy and Human
Rights, NK Vision, no. 2, July 2007.
506
world with 14 cases, North Korea ranked 99th with 370 cases.36)
In addition, women's health has worsened because of the heavy
physical burden imposed on them after the food shortage situation
became more severe. Due to the food crisis, more and more
women contracted TB, womb and breast cancers, diabetes, and
sexually transmitted diseases related to the sex trade. However,
few hospitals can deal with such women's diseases; so many
patients have no access to the appropriate treatment. In North
Korea, people are not well-educated on women's health issues and
this low awareness of women’s diseases among North Koreans is
worsening the situation.37)
2. Rights of the Child
1) General Status of Children's Rights in North Korea
The current laws of North Korea on their face seem to protect
children's rights. North Korea joined the CRC in September 1990.
The CRC emphasizes that children should be well prepared to live
as an individual in society, and should be raised in the spirit of
peace, dignity, tolerance, freedom, equity, and solidarity. North
Korea has also joined the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR). Article 24 of the ICCPR stipulates that
every child, given their status as minors, has the right to be
protected from their family, society and state. North Korea
submitted an initial report on the protection of children's rights in
February 1996 and also established a National Committee on the
36) Donga Ilbo (Donga Daily), November 13, 2008.
37) Lim, Sun-hui. "Gyeongjenangwa Bukhan Yeoseong (Economic Hardship and North
Korean Women)," pp. 9~11.
507
Rights of Child (CRC Committee) to implement the CRC in April
1999. A second periodic report was submitted in May 2002 and
reviewed by the CRC Committee. In 2004, North Korea invited
two members of the Committee and a Special Rapporteur on
Violence against Women. North Korea seems to have become
open-minded. In November, 2007, North Korea submitted its third
and fourth periodic reports (CRC/C/PRK/4) to the CRC Committee,
which reviewed the combined periodic reports at the 1388th and
1389th sessions on January 23, 2009 and chose the Committee’s
concluding observations on January 29, 2009.
North Korea’s domestic laws are almost in line with their
obligations outlined in the CRC. In 1972, the North Korean
Constitution (amended in 1992 and 1998), stipulated eleven years
of compulsory education, including a one-year period of pre-school
(Article 45); a free education for every child (Article 47); provision
for kindergartens or other child care facilities for every child
which the government financially supports (Article 49); a free
medical
service
system
(Article
56);
substantial
support
for
children without protection (Article 72); and special protection for
mother
and
child
(Article
77).
The
Law
on
Nursing
and
Upbringing of Children, which was enacted in 1976, specifies that
in accordance with the principle of 'the best things for children', the state and social groups should be responsible for all issues
involving the child-care system (Article12) and that children
without protection from parents should be taken care of in child
care facilities (Article18). In addition, various policies to protect
children include education, medical, epidemic prevention and family
and civil laws. The North revised its education law in 1999 to
expand the 11-year compulsory education benefit to disabled
508
children.
Research reveals, however, that, in reality, as the food shortage
and economic crisis have worsened since the 1990s, the quality of
children's life in North Korea has significantly deteriorated and
their human rights are being severely violated.
2) Right to Life
The segments of the population that suffer most from the food
shortages in North Korea are the children and the elderly.
Supported by UNICEF and WFP, North Korea conducted large
scale surveys to examine the nutritional status of its people in
1998, 2002 and 2004. The status has gradually improved, but in
the 2004 survey, among 4,800 children under the age of six, 23%
were underweight, 37% had a chronic malnutrition, and 7% were
acutely malnourished.
As a result of North Korea’s food crisis, its free health care
system, which had been the pride of North Korea to show off its
superior socialism, was almost destroyed and left behind all medical
instruments and equipment. So, North Koreans’ equal rights of
access to treatment were denied and became influenced by social
status and background, money and power. This tendency means that
ordinary North Koreans are unable to access even basic treatment.
North Korea is a place where a patient was in a coma for a week
because of the great pain after having gotten an operation to
amputate a leg by candlelight without having an anesthetic.38)
Even a stethoscope is very precious to North Korean doctors
who carry bamboo cans to listen to the heartbeats of patients.
38) Amnesty International. [Online, cited July 14, 2010]. Available from
< http://www.amnesty.org/>.
509
There are few medical supplies, let alone medical equipment
including X-ray machines. Even if a small cut has become
infected and formed a head of pus, there are no antibiotics for the
cut. Thus, small cuts can eventually lead to fatal blood poisoning
by repeating the vicious circle. It is possible to save many North
Koreans, especially children dying of preventable diseases which
can be easily cured by the use of basic medicines.
While only 33.5% (67/200) responded positively to the question
whether children are provided with vaccinations or health care, in
<Table IV-7-25>, the other 66.5% (133/200) replied negatively.
<Table Ⅳ-7-25> Are children provided with vaccinations and health care?
No. of response
Yes
Valid
response
67
Percentage(%)
Cumulative Percentage(%)
33.5
33.5
100.0
No
133
66.5
Total
200
100.0
As shown in <Table IV-7-26>, in response to the question,
“Do children have the right to medical treatment in North Korea?”
only 26.5% (53/200) gave a positive response, while negative
responses accounted for an overwhelming 73.5% (147/200).
<Table Ⅳ-7-26> Do children receive direct treatment such as surgery or the
provision of drugs?
No. of response
Valid
response
Percentage(%)
Yes
53
26.5
26.5
No
147
73.5
100.0
Total
200
100.0
In reply to the open-ended question, “Where can North Korean
residents get medical benefits for their health or preventive
510
inoculation for their children?” [ID 086 (2010)] stated, “After the
food crisis, we had to pay for whatever we wanted. Doctors used
to come to school to treat us, but doctors could not help but
receive money since they didn’t receive food rations either. In the
past, people were afraid of getting injections. So they pretended as
if they had gotten an injection, rubbing their arms with the cotton
used by another person. These days, people who are sick cannot
get a shot because they cannot pay for it. Before I went to
school, I got paratyphoid fever. At that time, I was in the hospital
to get some treatment. Now, it is no longer available for ordinary
residents and only those with money can survive.”
In addition, in response to the question, “Why can’t children in
North Korea receive direct treatment such as getting an operation
or medical supplies?” the following responses were recorded:
[ID 001 (2010)] Because
we
cannot
get
medical
supplies
provided by UN for free, we have to buy
them.
[ID 007 (2010)] We do not pay charges for an operation but
we must buy medical supplies for ourselves.
Only officials get them for free at a hospital.
[ID 018 (2010)] Since the food crisis, medical supplies have no
longer
been
available
in
a
hospitals,
each
individual has to buy medical supplies in the
market (Jang-ma-dang) to get an operation in
a hospital.
[ID 143 (2010)] I receive a prescription in a hospital that asks
me to get the medicine in the market. If the
UN-sent medical supplies come in, the director
511
of the hospital sells them to the market. What
a pathetic sight! Everyone is rotten to the
core.
Based on the annual studies of 8,214 North Korean defectors
who entered South Korea from 2005 to 2008, the Korea Centers
for Disease and Prevention published its Medical Check-ups for
North Korean Defectors during Four Years. Of the total, 6,967 of
the defectors are over 19 years old while 1,257 are under 18 years
old. According to the report, the average heights of North Korean
male and female teenagers from 13-18 years old are 155.7cma and
151.1cm, respectively, which is 13.5cm and 8.3cm shorter than
average heights of South Korean teenagers (169.2cm for South
Korean males and 159.4cm for South Korean females. In addition,
the average weights of male and female teenage defectors are
47.3kg and 46.9kg, respectively, which is 13.5kg and 5.4kg less
than corresponding South Korean male and female teenagers. For
adults over 19 years old, the average heights of North Korean
male and female defectors are 165.4cm and 154.2cm, respectively,
which is 4-6 cm shorter than South Korean counterparts (171.4cm
and 158.4cm, respectively). The average weights of adult male and
female defectors (60.2kg and 52.8kg, respectively) are 11.8kg and
4.3kg less than those of South Korean male and female adults
(72.0kg and 57.1kg).
Furthermore,
development
not
but
only
also
North
their
Korean
general
defectors’
health
physical
conditions
are
worrisome. The parasite infection rates of teenage defectors
(35.8%) and adult defectors (24.6%) who entered South Korea
during the most recent four years studied were 8-12 times higher
512
than the infection rates of South Korean teenagers and adults
(about 3%). The average infection rates of North Korean defectors
were 38.0% in 2005, 23.1% in 2006 and 17.7% in 2007; the rate
rose again to 28.6% in 2008. In particular, research conducted in
2008 revealed that almost half of North Korean teenage defectors,
48.3%, were infected. The percentage of North Korean male and
female defectors suffering from anemia are 8.4% and 24.7%
respectively, which are 4 times and 1.8 times higher the rate of
South
Korean
check-ups
of
male
and
female
North
Korean
adults.
defectors,
Results
which
of
physical
were
recently
released recently to the public, should be a good source to infer
health conditions of North Korean citizens.39)
According to World Population Prospects: The 2008 Revision,
which was released on November 12, 2008, and based on UNFPA
research into 157 countries and jointly released with the Planned
Parenthood Federation of Korea (PPFK), the life expectancies of
male and female South Koreans is 75.1 (29th) and 82.3 (16th),
respectively. While South Korean age expectancies exceed the
average life expectancies in developed countries (73.0 for men and
80.2 for women), those of male and female North Korean residents
are only 65.1 and 69.3, respectively. In terms of infant mortality
rates, in North Korea, the number of deaths of infants under one
th
year old per 1,000 live births is 48 (ranking 99 ), which is 12
times higher than the rate of South Korea, which is 4 (ranking
5th). While the infant mortality rate for children less than five
years old in South Korea is 5, while that of North Korea is 62.40)
The poor health condition of North Korean residents seems to
39) Chosun Ilbo, February 16, 2010.
513
have become a vicious circle. The extended food crisis has in
particular impacted North Korean women, in particular, whose
health
condition
and
level
of
immunity
are
worsening
and,
consequently they are delivering babies with low weights and
poor health. The vicious circle is further accelerating because
these children, who cannot have balanced nutritious diets because
of the food crisis, are easily exposed to diseases and weak even
after becoming adults. The poor health condition of these children
may have a negative influence on their physical, intellectual,
spiritual, moral and social development. Particularly, there is a
concern that people’s strong attachment to height and appearance
might become criteria to illuminate the difference among Koreans
and cause social discrimination against North Koreans. Eventually,
this social stigma might cause a high possibility of long-term
systematic human rights violations between people of the two
Koreas.41)
The CRC Committee, in its concluding observations on January
29, 2009, strongly recommended that North Korea ensure a more
balanced distribution of resources throughout the country and
prioritize budgetary allocations for the implementation of the
economic, social and cultural rights of all children, including those
belonging to economically disadvantageous groups (para. 16). In
addition,
the
attention to
childhood
Committee
urged
chronic and severe
diseases
such
as
that
pay
more
childhood malnutrition,
early
acute
North
Korea
respiratory
infections
and
diarrhea, anemia and malnutrition of pregnant women, poor quality
41) Jeong Byeong-ho, "Bukhan Adong Ingwongwa Gukje Hyeomnyeok Bangan (Human
rights for North Korean Children and Plans for International Cooperation)," 2003-2005
Beukhaningwon Gwallyeon Yeongu Bogoseo (Research Reports on Human Rights in
North Korea 2003-2005) (Seoul: National Commission for Human Rights in Korea,
2006), p. 448.
514
of drinking water and poor hygiene practices. Furthermore, the
Committee continued to address, as matter of urgency, the high
rates of malnutrition among children and mothers, which requires
North Korea to develop continuous measures and establish a
government body in charge of maternal and child health (para.
44-45).
3) Right to Development (The Right to Education)
(1) Collapse of the Public Education System
Because of severe food shortages since the mid-1990s, the
compulsory eleven-year education system that North Korea used
to boast of exists now in name only. Due to irregular rations,
North Koreans must feed themselves, and even teachers are
absent from class in order to search for food. Students do not pay
tuition, but they must buy textbooks and other school supplies.
Parents are even asked to pay for school facilities and equipment.
As a result, parents in some rural and remote areas are reluctant
to send their children to school. Class attendance rates have
decreased significantly, showing one aspect of the public education
system’s collapse.
In paragraph 71 of North Korea’s state report42)in response to
the UPR of 2009, which was issued on August 27, 2009, North
Korea claims that the admission rate for elementary schools is
100%, and the ratio of students who go on to a higher stages of
education is 99.7%, and that the ratio of their graduation is 100%.
In contrast, however, it has been reported that children who do
not go to school account for 20-30% of the all school-age
42) North Korea’s national report submitted in accordance with paragraph 15 (a) of the
annex to Human Rights Council resolution 5/1, A/HRC/WG.6/6/PRK/1.
515
children.43)
A recent report44) based on testimonies from North Korean
defectors described the challenges that students and parents face
with the education system. The challenges listed, in decreasing
order, are: lack of school supplies (23.3%), food shortage (22.3%),
mobilizing activities for students (15.3%), demand to provide for
educational equipment for the school (14.9%), and lack of facilities
at school (9.3%). As these answers suggest, that shortage of
educational facilities and materials along with economic hardship
are the biggest obstacles to children's right to education.
Number of
Respondents
Difficulty in education
( ) indicates % and
repeated respond
Difficulty in
school
education
Number of
Respondents
( ) indicates % and
repeated respond
Lack of school
supplies
and educational
materials
50 (23.3)
Strict school
regulation
5 (2.3)
Food condition
(economic condition)
48 (22.3)
Poor school
facility
20 (9.3)
Lack of teachers
5 (2.3)
Friends
5 (2.3)
Students' low learning
ability
6 (2.8)
Ideology
Education
12 (5.6)
Demand for
educational supplies
by school
32 (14.9)
Parent's
indifference
to education
3 (1.4)
Mobilization activity
33 (15.3)
Total
215 (100.0)
<Source: Han, Man-gil et al., Bukhan Gyoyugui Hyeonsilgwa Byeonhwa (Current
Education in North Korean and Changes) (Seoul: Korean Educational Development
Institute, 2001), p. 85.>
43) Kim Byeong-Yeon. “Bukhanui Bunggoewa Jaegeon (Collapse and Reconstruction of
North Korea),” Sidae Jeongshin (Winter, 2009).
44) Han Man-gil et al., Bukhan Gyoyugui Hyeonsilgwa Byeonhwa (Current Education in
North Korean and Changes) (Seoul: Korean Educational Development Institute, 2001)
pp. 83~85.
516
Supporting these findings, to the question "Have you ever seen
children
who
don't
go
to
school?"(<Table
Ⅳ-7-27>),
an
overwhelming 97% (194/200) responded that they have, which is
higher than the 96% (96/100) in 2008. In addition, to the question
"If parents don't send their school-aged children to school, would
they be punished? (<Table Ⅳ-7-28>), a total of 99% (195/197) of
the respondents said "No", which is also higher than the 98%
(98/100) in 2008. It appears to have become prevalent in North
Korea for schoolchildren not to go to school. In addition, it can be
assumed that most parents would not face any punishment even if
they fail to fulfill their duty to educate their children.
<Table Ⅳ-7-27> Have you ever seen a school-age child who doesn't go to
school?
Valid
response
No. of response
Percentage(%)
Yes
194
97.0
97.0
No
6
3.0
100.0
200
100.0
Total
<Table Ⅳ-7-28> If parents don't send their school-age child to school, would
they get punished for it?
Valid
response
Invalid
No. of
response
Percentage
(%)
(%)
Yes
2
1.0
1.0
No
195
99.0
100.0
Total
197
100.0
No response
Total
3
200
Based on a survey of 200 North Korean defectors who were
asked open-ended questions on the reasons for children to be
517
absent from schools, the main reasons are financial difficulty,
inability to get enough food, and the pressure to submit scrap
paper or scrap metal, rabbit pelts, bottles, or bracken and pine
resin for earning foreign currency [IDs 002, 004, 006, 007, 024, 026,
043, 069, 076, 088, 107, 160, 190 (all 2010)]. Some of the specific
responses are as follows:
[ID 069 (2010)] We don't go to school because there is not
enough food to eat. In addition, there are so
many things we have to submit to the school.
We
must
submit
a
few
rabbit
pelts
per
semester but we can’t catch those rabbits, so,
we have to buy them. So, we can’t go to
school.
[ID 107 (2010)] There are many things that schools ask people
to submit. Those people without money do not
let their children go to school. Children also
wouldn’t go to school because they have to
work more rather than study.
[ID 160 (2010)] Children would not go to school since there
are many things to submit. If schools force
them to submit rabbit pelts or some bracken to
export, the moms of those children must buy
them to submit. So, they would not let their
children go to school.
[ID 190 (2010)] If children go to school, they have to pay
money and do a lot of assignments. Well, the
assignments are submitting pelts of rabbits or
pine resin and even paying money. Then, how
518
can
those
children
without
money
go
to
school?
The CRC Committee reviewed the combined third and fourth
periodic
reports
of
the
DPRK
(North
Korea)
and
adopted
concluding observations on January 29, 2009. In paragraph 52 of
its concluding observation, the Committee expressed concern that
additional costs associated with schooling may be a contributing
factor to the problem of non-attendance.
According to a source,45) on March 13, 2009, the North Korean
state authority placed a notice for registration of new students in
public places or crowded streets. The notice declared, “Children
more than 7 years old must enroll in a school and finish the
registration by March 25, 2009.” The state authority even also
delivered an announcement in inminban (people’s neighborhood
unit) meetings, announcing that parents whose children did not
enroll in a school could receive disadvantages, including prison
labor at a corrective labor camp. These measures appear to be a
reaction to those parents who feel the financial burden for child
education is so great that they cannot afford to register their
children. Poor people must all send their children out to make a
living to survive, for instance by working together in some
business with the parents at the market, or engage independently
in making a living, for instance by cutting down trees for
firewood or gathering medical herbs. However, even affluent
people do not make their children go to school because they can
hire a private teacher for their children with a little extra money
in addition to the monthly payment required for school. Children
45) North Korea Intellectuals Solidarity. [Online, cited March 17, 2009]. Available from
<http://www.nkis.kr/>.
519
without parents become orphans and wander around, begging [ID
1, 100 (2010)].
In conclusion, research finds that children in North Korea fail to
receive decent education to improve themselves and to learn
competence through formal education at schools during their
childhood and adolescence. They also do not receive quality
education to become well-rounded adults.
(2) Insufficient Educational Contents and Unequal Opportunities for
Education.
Educational goals must strive for development of integrity in a
person and the promotion of human dignity (ICESCR, Article 13,
paragraph 1) and education for children must aim for complete
development
of
character,
talent,
and
mental
and
physical
competency (CRC, Article 29).
In contrast, however, according to reports from North Korean
defectors, for children aged as young as 2-3 years old and up, the
most important education in North Korea is, “… to consider the
words of Suryong, who is greater than a god, as precious as
jewelry, and believe them [ID 070 (2010)].” It appears that children
are educated to idolize Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il, while
education to cultivate common humanitarian values, knowledge and
personality is downplayed. Furthermore, North Korean teenagers
are unable to fully develop balanced personalities, talents, and
mental as well as physical capacities through education because
they are routinely mobilized for obligatory routine organizations,
including Joseon sonyeondan (North Korean Boys’ League), Kim
Il-sung sahoejuui cheongnyeon dongmaeng (Kim Il Sung Socialist
Youth League)46)
520
In paragraph 53, 54 and 55 of the concluding observations on
January 29, 2009, the CRC Committee issued its regrets that the
values
and
rights
recognized
in
Article
29(b)
of
the
CRC
regarding the aims of education and human rights education, are
not included in the school curricula. The Committee recommended
that North Korea focus on an overall improvement of the quality
of education provided and ensure that school curricula and teacher
training programs fully reflect Article 29 of the CRC.
CRC Article 32 stipulates that the state guarantee children’s
rights
to
be
protected
from
exploitation
or
employment
in
dangerous labor that forfeits their right to education and any labor
which may be harmful to children’s physical, mental, moral and
social
development.
In
addition,
Article
31
of
the
Socialist
Constitution Act and Article 15 of the Socialist Labor Law
prohibit children aged 16 or under from being employed.
In reality, however, North Korean youth are mobilized for
mandatory work in rural areas under the name of revolutionary
training (in reality combat training). As mentioned earlier, this is
one of the reasons why children are absent from school. Labor
mobilization to rural areas for planting seeds for agricultural crops
begins from as early as mid-May and continues to as late as
early July. In middle schools, students from the 4th grade to 6th
grade are mobilized for physical labor. They are sent to fields to
plant seeds without appropriate farming tools or equipment. Thus,
work that is physically demanding for adults is imposed on young
students. The official labor mobilization to rural areas continues
through the end of June. In July, students are mobilized for
grass-cutting work, which is then collected to make into fertilizer.
46) Hwang Jang-yop. “Hwang Jang-yop Hoegorok (Memoir of Hwang Jang-yeop),” Sidae
Jeongshin (October 25, 2006).
521
Starting in September, students have to participate in harvesting,
which is virtually forced labor.
47)
In the meantime, fifth grade
students in North Korea receive military training in the Red
Guard for two weeks, and also get trained in shooting for 2 or 3
days.
In paragraph 53 of its January 29, 2009 concluding observations,
the Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC Committee)
expressed
its
concern
that
North
Korean
children
spend
a
significant proportion of their time allocated to instruction for the
purpose of agricultural work, festivity preparations including the
“Arirang” festival48), and providing services to teachers to an
extent that may lower achievement and quality of education.
Furthermore, since
2000 the North has illegally graduated
16-year-old students from school early (in March) in order to
enlist them into the military. These students, whose immature
bones are weak, soon seek to escape from the army due to the
difficulty
of
adapting
to
military
life.
malnutrition and are often kicked out of the
In
a
related
matter,
in
paragraph
They
suffer
from
army.49)
58
of
its
concluding
observations, the CRC Committee noted that North Korea “is still
under a state of armistice and under constant threat and pressure
from outside hostile forces” (State party report, para. 89). The
Committee noted with concern that such a political climate and
47) Goodfreinds, Bukhansahoe Byeonhwawa Ingwon (Changes in North Korean Society and
Human Rights), pp. 40~41.
48) Many North Korean defectors and South Korean and international human rights
organizations have claimed that making children perform at ‘Arirang’ is a case of
forced child labor to promote the political system and to earn foreign currency. It was
the first time that the United Nations raised the problem of the Arirang performance in
its official report.
49) Park Myeong-ho, “Indojeok Jiwongwa Gaebal Jiwon, Oneurui Bukhan Hyeonsil
(Humanitarian Assistance and Development Assistance, Today's Reality of North
Korea)," Saengmyeonggwa Ingwon (Life and Human Rights), vol. 47, no. 1, 2008, p. 23.
522
the military aspect of education have a negative impact on
children and on the realization of the aims of education as
described in Article 29 of the CRC. The CRC recommended that
the protection and promotion of children’s rights be given due
consideration
in
an
effort
to
reach
peace
negotiations
and
cease-fire agreements, and that recruitment be genuinely voluntary
when recruiting children, and that priority be given to the oldest
applicants. The Committee also recommended that North Korea
take all necessary measures to avoid early militarization of
children and consider ratification of the Optional Protocol to the
CRC on the involvement of children in armed conflicts at the
earliest opportunity.
The CRC (Article 28, paragraph 1) clearly stipulates that the
opportunity for higher education should be open to everyone on a
merit
basis
with
all
the
proper
measures.
Regarding
equal
opportunities for education, North Korea’s Education Law states
that recruiting students for higher education or education for gifted
children should be based on children’s competency (Article 48).
However, research reveals severe discrimination in the education
sector. Mothers without employment have a hard time sending
their children to a daycare center or kindergarten. As a result,
kids without education from day care centers or kindergartens
show
poorer
school
performance
than
others.
Corruption
is
rampant, and rich parents often bribe teachers to manipulate
school grades and to show favoritism to their children. This is a
form of discrimination based on parents’ social status or economic
capacity. Some teachers even encourage parents to give a bribe or
order the students to ask their parents to visit the school for
counseling. Some North Korean defectors reported that one must
give 1kg worth of food per month to teachers or send holiday
523
food during the holiday season. Only then will their children
receive fair treatment from the teacher.50).
In
addition,
instead
of
personal
merit,
it
is
the
social
background and party membership status of individual students
that are the most important selection criteria for entering colleges
or universities. Social background is especially important for
students who wish to enter Kim Il Sung University or Kimchaek
University of Technology. Since the economic crisis, it is common
for the children of the rich who had accumulated enough foreign
currency reserves to enter a major university after offering a
bribe. Money matters more than background since the Arduous
March period (period of great famine), and without money, college
is only a dream.
4) Right to Protection
(1) Child Abuse and Negligence
Articles 19 and 20 of the CRC specify that in order to protect
children from all forms of physical and mental violence, abuse,
abandonment, sexual abuse, and exploitation, the state must take
multilateral measures, and the children who are deprived of a
normal family environment or who are living in extreme poverty
are entitled to receive the protection and assistance from the state.
North Korean children strictly obey parents’ instruction due to
the authoritarian patriarchic culture. Because of misuse of such
obedience to parental authority, many children are exposed to
50) Bukhanhak Yeonguso (Institute for North Korean Studies) of Dongguk University,
"Bukhan Ingwon Sanghwange Gwanhan Gungnae Talbukja Uisikjosa (A Rearch on
North Korean Defectors' Perception on North Korean Human Rights)," a research paper
submitted to the National Human Rights Commission of Korea in 2004. The Korean
Bar Association, 2006 Bukhan Ingwon Baekseo (2006 White Paper on North Korean
524
physical abuse by parents, especially by their fathers. According
to the statistical survey results, 73.5% (147/200) of respondents
answered that there are no punitive measures for parents who
physically abuse their children (<Table Ⅳ-7-29>). For the question
of "Do your neighbors report child abuse or abandonment to the
authority?" <Table Ⅳ-7-30>, 80% (160/200) responded, "No." Under
North Korea’s Criminal Act, injury and violence are banned, but
those restrictions are not applied to the parent/child relationship.
There seem to be few cases where a report is filed by a third
party about domestic violence, and according to an open-ended
question on physical abuse by parents, respondents said that
abusive parents receive punishment only when the child dies [IDs
173, 197 (both 2010)].
<Table Ⅳ-7-29> Is there any punishment for parents who physically abuse or
neglect their children in North Korea?
No. of
response
Valid
response
Percentage
(%)
(%)
Yes
14
7.0
7.0
No
147
73.5
80.5
100.0
I don’t know
39
19.5
Total
200
100.0
<Table Ⅳ-7-30> Have you ever seen that someone reports a parent for physical
abuse or neglecting their children in North Korea resulting in
punishment?
No. of
response
Valid
response
Percentage
(%)
Yes
5
2.5
(%)
2.5
No
160
80.0
82.5
3.00
35
17.5
100.0
Total
200
100.0
525
Child abandonment by parents occurs frequently because of food
shortages. Parents leave home to find food elsewhere for the
family, or they try to escape to China and leave their children
behind to avoid subjecting them to danger, or they abandon their
children to avoid the burden of raising them alone after a divorce
or the death of a spouse. Those children who live on the streets
after being abandoned by their parents who are divorced or dead
are called Kkotjebi (street orphans). These children survive by
begging or stealing.
Article 271 of the Criminal Law, revised in April 2004, states
that, "In the case of those who have the duty to protect their
children fail to do so and cause harm to their child’s health, they
shall be subject to up to two years of disciplinary prison labor. If
the degree goes beyond the normal, they shall be sentenced to up
to two years of correctional prison labor." As such, ‘deliberately
neglecting his or her duty to protect the children’ is stipulated as
a crime under the law, but in actuality, this law regarding
parents’ abandonment of their children is not strictly enforced.
(2) Poor Daycare Center and Welfare Facilities
Under the official daycare system, infants are taken care of in
daycare centers operated by state-owned companies and collective
farms
right
after
their
mothers
complete
their
three-month
maternity leave after childbirth. However, since the mid-1990s,
daycare centers or kindergartens have not been not operated
properly. Unlike in the past, these facilities no longer provide
lunch. As a result, they only take care of children in the morning
and then send them back home after noon, and the number of
children in kindergarten is in decline. Moreover, children in the
526
‘upper class’ at the kindergarten, which is mandatory education in
the North, must attend classes against their will in order to enter
primary school.51)
The number of children who live on the streets due to the
death or divorce of their parents, or separation from their parents,
is on the rise, but the condition of facilities such as orphanages or
day care centers, which officially accept and foster such children,
are economically strapped. At least Kkotjebi (street orphans) have
a chance to live from day to day by begging, but those who are
in the facilities suffer from severe malnutrition due to food
shortages to the extent that they think ‘we cannot help but die
here.’
Some
orphans
in
Pyeongannam-do
(South
Pyongan
Province) have not received food supplies since February 2008 and
have received only 200g of corn soup once a day since March.
Many facilities let children go because they do not have any food
to give to them.
On
September
27,
1997,
the
North
Korean
government
established ‘9.27 Detention Facilities’ and began to protect and
manage those who lost their ability to survive as well as
Kkotjebi. Such protective facilities are set up in empty daycare
centers, kindergartens, motels or apartments, but the number of
homeless has increased to a point that these facilities cannot hold
all the people on the streets. As we have seen in the answers by
the North Korean defectors in South Korea, Kkotjebi live in
misery due to severe food shortage and economic hardship.
52)
51) Bukhanhak Yeonguso (Institute for North Korean Studies) of Dongguk University,
"Bukhan Ingwon Sanghwange Gwanhan Gungnae Talbukja Uisikjosa (A Rearch on
North Korean Defectors' Perception on North Korean Human Rights)," a research paper
submitted to the National Human Rights Commission of Korea in 2004, Korean Bar
Association, 2006 Bukhan Ingwon Baekseo (2006 White Paper on North Korean
52) Goodfriends, Bukhansahoe Byeonhwawa Ingwon (Changes in North Korean Society and
527
In paragraph 36 of its January 2009 concluding observations, the
CRC Committee noted that North Korea expresses its concern at
the significant number of children who are placed in institutions
and
that
many
of
these
institutions
continue
to
be
below
internationally acceptable standards. The Committee is concerned
that adequate and effective monitoring of the quality of these
facilities
is
lacking
and
that
the
placement
of
children
in
alternative care is frequently not decided with respect to the best
interest of the child.
(3) Protection for Minor Defectors
Article 22 of the CRC provides that states must implement
proper measures to provide protection and humanitarian assistance
to children who are seeking the status of refugee or can be
regarded as refugees.
Children whose mothers are defectors and whose fathers are
Chinese lose their mothers or even both parents due to police
raids, deportation of the mother, or migration to the inland. Those
children under 18 became Kkotjebi, begging and living on the
streets for fear of arrest and repatriation.53)
Related to legal rights for children, as stated in Article 37 of
the CRC, children who experienced detention after being deported
to the North became the victims of verbal and physical abuse,
including torture, during the questioning stage, and then during
the detention period, they experienced forced labor, hunger, and
physical abuse. Hamgyeongnam-do (South Hamgyong Province)
53) Susan Scholte, president of the Defense Forum of the U.S. said "The number of North
Korean orphans in China are currently estimated to be about 1000," Chosun Ilbo
(Chosun Daily), 2007.
528
decided that children more than 14 years old would get punished
the same as adults, if they were caught while crossing the border
th
to China from January 20, 2009 on. So, two 5
and 6th graders in
a middle school were sentenced to three years of long-term
correctional prison labor in a public trial held at Nammun-dong,
Hoeryeong-si on February 1, 2009.54) The CRC Committee, in its
concluding observations on January 29, 2009, strongly recommends
that North Korea prohibit children from being subjected to torture
and consider ratifying the Convention against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and its
Optional Protocol.
Regarding Article 7 of the CRC on the national identity of
children, North Korea claims that children shall not be without
national identity and government’s protection. Therefore, if a child
has one parent who is a North Korean citizen, the child is a
citizen of the DPRK (North Korea). Currently, the number of
children of North Korean female defectors is estimated to be
approximately 50,000.55) However, these female defectors in China
are not entitled to Chinese citizenship, so their children by default
are not allowed to officially be registered as Chinese citizens.
Moreover, most female defectors who were forced to marry
Chinese men due to human trafficking do not have legal marital
status or legal protection from the Chinese government since they
were not legally married. Consequently, their children become
displaced and without citizenship. Without rights to citizenship, the
children cannot receive formal education, and also usually have
54) Goodfriends, North Korea Today, no. 266, February 17, 2009.
55) Beomnyun, “Talbukja Ingwonsanghwanggwa Gaeseonbangan (The Human Rights
Situation of North Korean Defectors and Alternatives," A paper presented at the
International Symposium for North Korean Human Rights by the National Human
Rights Commission of Korea at Seoul on November 30, 2006, pp. 258~259.
529
poor fathers who are not able to send them to schools.56) Since
these children born between North Korean mothers and Chinese
fathers are considered illegal immigrants, they are excluded from
proper medical treatment even when they become ill. To protect
the basic human rights of North Korean defector children, in
particular the current stance of the Chinese government must be
altered. It is China's obligation to guarantee the rights of children
born in Chinese territory to a name and a legal identification, to
be provided with temporary residency and guarantee to education
as a State Concerned in the CRC. The rights of the child must be
protected
regardless
of
immigrants).
Active
international
community
their
legal
intervention
are
status
and
necessary
the
to
(refugee
or
illegal
cooperation
of
change
current
the
the
condition of the rights of North Korean defector children in China.57)
(4) Child Labor and Prostitution
The North Korean Labor Law and Criminal Act stipulate that
children shall be protected from labor and those who offend such
law shall be penalized. More specifically, Article 15 of the
Socialist Labor Law of the DPRK defines the legal age to work
as 16, and anyone under 16 shall be prevented from being
employed in any form of labor. Article 191 of the Criminal Act
stipulates that those who put minors to work will be punished
with up to two years of imprisonment in a long term corrective
labor camp.
However, the ban on child labor and child prostitution is not
Paper on Human Rights in North Korea), pp. 244~247.
rights for North Korean Children and Plans for International Cooperation)," p. 455.
530
enforced
due
to
economic
hardship
and
the
food
crisis.
In
particular, child prostitution is forced upon orphaned street children
by organized criminal groups or human traffickers. According to
testimony from [ID 040 (2010)], “Children have nothing to eat and
don’t even have their parents. So, they prostitute themselves for
noodles and rice.”
Meanwhile, many experts particularly criticized the mandatory
mobilization
of
children
for
mass
games
like
“Arirang
Performance.” This performance was produced and put on stage
on Kim Il-sung's 90th commemorative birthday in 2002 as a
means to consolidate the socialist regime. Most performers at this
mass game were students, and it has been reported that they
trained for 10 to 18 hours a day for more than six months to
perfect their movements like robots. This mobilization for mass
games has been subject to international debates on human rights
violation against children in North Korea. As we discussed before,
the CRC Committee expressed grave concern over it in its
January 2009 concluding observations.
3. Human Rights for the Elderly
1) Elderly Protection Law
The rights of older persons are a set of rights that protect the
elderly to enable them to live with dignity.58) In 1991, the UN
General Assembly adopted the UN Principles for Older Persons
and
presented
18
principles
in
five
areas:
independence,
participation, care, self-fulfillment, and dignity of older persons.
58) The National Human Rights Commission of Korea, 2006 Noine Daehan Sahoe Chabyeol
Siltae Josa (A Research on Social Discrimination on Senior Citizens in 2006) (Seoul:
The National Human Rights Commission of Korea, 2006), p. 20.
531
More specifically, the UN General Assembly emphasized health
and
nutrition,
consumer
protection,
living
environment,
social
welfare, insurance of income and employment, and education of
the elderly, manifesting that discrimination against the elderly
should never occur. In particular, in the area of dignity, the
Principles state that the elderly should be able to live "with
dignity and in safety" and "should be free from physical and
mental
abuse
and
any
extortion.”
Moreover,
the
Madrid
International Plan of Action on Aging (2002) presented 98 different
plans of action.59) These included the limitation of all forms of
abandonment, abuse and violence against the elderly, promotion of
public campaigns on elderly abuse, enactment of a law and
promotion
of
legal
efforts
to
eliminate
elderly
abuse,
the
establishment of a cooperative system between civil society and
governments to respond to elderly abuse, the instillation of public
awareness of abandonment, abuse and violence against the elderly,
identification
of
all
causes
and
forms
of
violence,
and
the
establishment of new supportive services for managing elderly abuse.
According to North Korea’s 1972 Constitution (revised in 1992
and 1998), citizens have the right to free medical treatment. Those
who cannot work due to old age, illness, or disability, as well as
seniors and children without family, are entitled to obtain material
assistance from the government. These rights are guaranteed
under the institution of free medical treatment, the increasing
number of hospitals and clinics, and the state-owned insurance
and social security services (Article 72). ‘Guk-ga-sa-hoe-bo-jange-gwan-ha-yeo (about a state's social security),' which was
59) The National Human Rights Commission of Korea, 2006 Noine Daehan Sahoe Chabyeol
Siltae Josa (A Research on Social Discrimination on Senior Citizens in 2006) (Seoul:
The National Human Rights Commission of Korea, 2006), p. 17, p. 21.
532
established in August 1951, can be considered a system of social
security in North Korea that guarantees the state's protection of
veterans who became disabled during their participation in the
Korean War, bereaved
families, and the elderly. The social
security benefits are paid to retirees and the handicapped in the
form of pensions.60) Moreover, Article 74 of Socialist Labor Law,
established in 1978 and mandated in 1986 and 1999, states that the
state must provide pension benefits to workers who have reached
a certain age (men over 60; women over 55) and who have a
certain number of years of employment. Article 78 of the same
law specifies that the state must provide free facilities for the
elderly and the disabled who have lost the ability to work and/or
have no care giver.
Despite the existence of such laws, however, the elderly are the
most vulnerable, and their human rights are highly threatened in
many ways. A recent study suggests the life expectancy in North
Korea decreased from 73.2 years (1993) and 75.5 years (1995) to
70.1 years (1996) and to 67.1 years (2002), and then finally down
to 64.4 years (male: 61.4, female: 67.3).
Subhash
Management
Gupta,
the
Services,
Director
found
of
that,
the
UNFPA
“North
Division
Korea’s
of
medical
healthcare system has almost collapsed because of economic
difficulties, the food crisis and great flood” and “the difference of
life expectancy between the two Koreas results from their medical
health systems.” WHO suggests that prevention and management
of contagious diseases, including tuberculosis, malaria, and AIDS,
is a top priority. The major causes of death of North Korean
residents in 2002 were infection and parasitosis, which accounted
60) The Korean Bar Association, Bukhan ingwon gwanyeon beopryeong
(Explanation on Laws Related to North Korean Human Rights), pp. 250~251.
haeseol
533
for 12.6% of the total, the second highest percentage after cardiac
and
vascular
respiratory
disease.
disease,
There
syringe
are
high
disease
rates
right
of
after
death
from
delivery,
and
malnutrition. Many people die of infectious diseases that are
preventable by properly functioning medical healthcare systems.61)
Kim Il-sung62)
once said, ‘a sixty-year-old person is still his
or her youth, and a ninety-year-old person is still as young as he
or she was sixty years old,’ but most North Koreans die soon
after they reach 60 years of age. If this trend continues, it will be
hard to expect labor productivity from North Korean citizens over
50 years of age. In addition, increasing cases of illness and
disability will cause a rise in medical expenses, and the overall
social cost will increase as well.
As reported in the following <Table IV-7-31>, an overwhelming
78.5% (157/200) of respondents reported that older persons in
North Korea defines people over 60 years old. In general, it seems
that the concept of the age of “older people” in North Korea
seems to be younger than that in South Korea
<Table Ⅳ-7-31> How old is ‘old’ in North Korea?
No. of
response
Valid
response
Percentage
(%)
(%)
From 55 years old
28
14.0
14.0
From 60 years old
157
78.5
92.5
From 65 years old
12
6.0
98.5
From 70 years old
1
0.5
99.0
100.0
Others
2
1.0
Total
200
100.0
62) Huh, Jae-seok, Nae Ireumeun Ttongganna Saekkiyeotda (My Name Was a Son of
Bitch) (Seoul: Doseochulpan Onebooks, 2008), pp. 342~343.
534
In a related matter, North Korea also has a regular retirement
system per <Table IV-7-32>. The regular retirement age is
different from job to job. In a survey of 200 North Korean
defectors, from [ID 001 (2010)] to [ID 200 (2010)], 70 of them
answered that the regular retirement ages are 60 years for men
and 55 years for women, but 40 of them answered that the
retirement age is 60 years old for both men and women.
<Table Ⅳ-7-32> Is there a the age-limit system (for senior citizens) in the work
place of North Korea?
No. of response
Valid
response
Percentage(%)
Yes
185
92.5
No
12
6.0
92.5
98.5
Others
3
1.5
100.0
Total
200
100.0
2) Rights to Food and Survival
The elderly in North Korea are the most vulnerable segment of
the population. They have suffered the most from the food crisis
since the mid-1990s. According to an expert who in July and
December
children
of
and
1999
conducted
youth
defectors
ethnographic
in
Yanji,
fieldwork
China,
most
covering
of
the
informant’s family members died of hunger and illness. Their
grandparents
were
the
first
victims
of
the
hardship.
The
anthropologist heard repeatedly that the elderly had gradually
reduced the amount of food for themselves in order to feed their
grandchildren and died from starvation.63)
rights for North Korean Children and Plans for International Cooperation)," 2003-2005
Bukhaningwon Gwallyeon Yeongu Bogoseo (Research Reports on Human Rights in
North Korea 2003-2005), pp. 448~449.
535
The type of benefits that the elderly can receive for their
retirement
includes
pensions
for
those
with
no
family,
for
honorable soldiers, and for persons of merit. There is no general
pension or retirement grant. However, when questioned about
benefits related to the pension system, North Korean defectors
gave responses as follows:
[ID 006 (2010)] There is a benefit, called Yeonno bojanggeum
(secured money for the elders) for the elderly
who have continued to work for the nation,
but it is not much
[ID 009 (2010)] There is a regulation to pay a subsidy. In the
past, people used to receive it. In my case, I
heard I could get 15 North Korean won per a
month for the subsidy, but I never received it
after I become 60 years old.
[ID 017 (2010)] They used to pay a subsidy for the elderly in
the past, but now there is no subsidy at all.
[ID 021 (2010)] If you get old, you can get Yeonnobi (money
for the elderly) like a pension, which is less
than 100 North Korean won. Now, we don’t
have it anymore.
From the above we can derive that today there is no pension
benefit after retirement. Thus, it can be said that there is no
substantial social benefit for the elderly.
As shown in <Table V-7-33>, a majority of 96.5% (193/200) of
respondents stated that there are no special benefits for the
elderly in North Korea. In response to the open-ended question,
536
“Did North Korean state authorities supply socially marginalized
class including the elderly, children, orphans, the disabled, and the
sick with food?”, some interviewees [IDs 027, 038, 040, 047, 048,
051, 053, 057, 083 and 095 (all 2008)] answered that the state
authorities
supplied
orphanages
with
food.
However,
most
respondents [IDs 007, 025, 028, 030, 032, 036, 039, 042, 044, 046,
049, 055, 067, 070, 077, 080, 082, 084, 085, 091, 096, 100 (all 2010)]
stated that there was no special food supply for the elderly. Thus,
the elderly who became poor in health as they got old became the
first victims of the food crisis in the mid- 1990s and mostly died
of starvation.
<Table Ⅳ-7-33> Are there any special food supply benefits or medical or
transportation expenses for the elderly in North Korea?
No. of response
Valid
response
Yes
7
No
Total
Percentage(%)
3.5
3.5
193
96.5
100.0
200
100.0
To the question "Have you ever seen a sick old man dead from
being abandoned and not treated?" <Table Ⅳ-7-34>, 17% (34/200)
said that they have while 83% (166/200) answered that they have
not. These answers seem to suggest that the elderly are not
experiencing dire conditions, but given that the elderly issue is not
generally
<Table Ⅳ-7-34> Have you ever seen a sick old man dead by being abandoned
and not being treated?
No. of response
Valid
response
Percentage(%)
Yes
34
17.0
17.0
No
166
83.0
100.0
Total
200
100
537
exposed to the outside since it is a domestic issue, far more old
people may be dying from illness, cold, or hunger as a result of
abandonment.64) This can be easily noted in the following written
answers to the question, "Have you ever seen a sick old man
dead by being abandoned and not being treated?"
[ID 005 (2010)] When there was no food provided by the
government, an old man walking on the street
suddenly fell down. He was dead because there
was nobody to take care of him.
[ID 026 (2010)] I often saw neglected people die from hunger.
[ID 032 (2010)] When I belonged to a Women’s League, an old
woman came and asked me to feed her. So,
the leader of the Women’s League called the
daughter-in-law of the woman and asked what
happened. The daughter-in-law said that the
old
woman
stole
and
ate
all
the
food.
Consequently, the old woman died a few days
later.
[ID 049 (2010)] There was an old man who belonged to a
people’s neighborhood unit where I lived in
2005. He lived with his daughter-in-law and
his
son
went
to
work
at
another
place.
Whenever she went out, she took the old man
out of the house. While she came home, the
old man had to stay outside. So, the old man
64) Only one in ten cases of elderly abuse is known to the neighborhood. Since 90% of
such abuse is done by sons and daughters, elderly parents who are abused do not
want to report their children as criminals so the cases are not known to outsiders, said
Lee Jong-jun, Director of Noin Boho Jeonmun Gigwan (Korea Elder Protection
Agency), Munhwa Ilbo (Munhwa Daily), June 13, 2008.
538
was worn out and killed himself somewhere in
a fruit garden. There were several old men
who died because their children had nothing to
eat and couldn’t support them.
[ID 099 (2010)] Since people do not live with their parents, old
women who cannot walk well usually die of
hunger. Most of them do.
[ID 119 (2010)] It happens many times. In 1997, even healthy
people died of hunger, and there is no one who
wants to take care of a sick old man. So, it
happens quite often.
[ID 143 (2010)] Well, when there is no food ration, a healthy
person can die. I saw dead bodies of old men very
many times when many people died of hunger.
[ID 173 (2010)] From 2006 to 2008, people used to say that
they die when they get old. They become and
sick and die because there is nothing to eat.
Even as late as February 2007, many elderly people living in
apartments located in downtown Pyeongyang (Pyongyang) could not
leave their homes because there was no electricity to operate
elevators, so they starved to death in the cold.65) It was reported that
many of the elderly froze to death on the street while they wandered
around seeking food in January in Seongyo, Sadong, and Sunan
districts, Pyeongyang.66) For weak and incapable elderly people the
right to food and the right to live are seriously threatened.
65) Goodfriends, Bukhansahoe Byeonhwawa Ingwon (Changes in North Korean Society and
66) Goodfriends, North Korea Today, no. 355, March 9, 2010.
539
3) Lack of a Welfare System for the Elderly
There are many neglected elderly at home or in society and
they can be seen often on the street, near the stations and the
markets as in <Table IV-7-35>. There appear to be no government
measures to establish specific legal guidelines for the welfare of
the elderly or convenient facilities for the elderly in public areas.
<Table Ⅳ-7-35> Can you often find an elderly person going around on the
street without his/her guardian in North Korea?
No. of response
Yes
Percentage(%)
133
66.5
66.5
No
Valid
response Others
66
33.0
99.5
1
0.5
100.0
Total
200
100.0
<Table Ⅳ-7-36> Is there any social benefit only for the elderly at home or in
the society?
No. of response
Valid
response
Percentage(%)
Yes
10
5.0
5.0
No
187
93.5
98.5
Others
3
1.5
100.0
Total
200
100.0
As <Table IV-7-36> shows, 93.5% (187/200) of respondents
answered negatively. As shown in <Table IV-7-37>, there are no
special measures, including seats for the elderly in the public
transportation.
540
<Table Ⅳ-7-37> Are there any special seats designated for the elderly on public
transportation such as subways and buses in North Korea? (As
a way to respect the elderly, there are special seats only for
the elderly on public transportation in South Korea.)
Valid
response
No. of
response
Percentage
(%)
Yes
5
2.5
(%)
2.5
No
179
89.5
92.0
I don’t know
16
8.0
100.0
Total
200
100.0
<Table Ⅳ-7-38> Do sons and daughters live with their parents or separately if
they are married? (Traditionally Koreans have a large family
system and usually the eldest sons live with their parents)
No. of
response
Valid
response
Percentage
(%)
(%)
They live separately.
14
7.0
7.0
They live together.
61
30.5
37.5
It depends on the
situation.
125
62.5
100.0
Total
200
100.0
<Table Ⅳ-7-39> How do sons and daughters take care of their parents when
the parents become old and cannot move well?
No. of
response
Valid
response
Percentage Cumulative Percentage
(%)
(%)
Children take care of
their parents in the
house.
184
92.0
92.0
Parents stay in a
hospital or a nursing
home.
2
1.0
93.0
100.0
Others
14
7.0
Total
200
100.0
541
Because many North Korean families have become nuclearized,
married sons and daughters do not always live together with their
parents, as shown in <Table Ⅳ-7-38>. However, when parents
are older and cannot move well, 92% (184/200) of sons and
daughters live with parents in order to take care of them. [See
Table Ⅳ-7-39] Only 1% (1/200) of respondents said that they
would put their parents in a hospital or protective facility (nursing
home), which indicates that there is no real social welfare system
available for the elderly in North Korea.
Official state-designated nursing homes are available to the
elderly without family members to take care of them. However,
the facilities are severely deteriorated and suffered from food
storages. Because even the best nursing home in Yanghwa-ri,
Shinpo
(Sinpo)-gun,
Hamgyeongnam-do
(South
Hamgyong
Province) does not have enough food for the residents (May 2008).
They could only provide the elderly only with porridge cooked
with low quality corn and leftovers. As a result, more and more
elderly people have lost strength and have difficulty moving about
due to lack of nutrition. It is said that more than eight elderly
people starved to death a month. It is reported that more than
eight elderly people died of hunger a month near May 2008.67) As
they get out of poor nursing homes and wander around the
countryside, the elderly often cause social problems, including
wandering,
People’s
begging,
Safety
panhandling,
Agency
ordered
and
the
stealing.
Because
establishment
the
of
a
barbed-wire fence around nursing homes all across the country
from December 2008, there are two meter high barbed-wire fences
68)
around nursing homes in North Korea.
Since then, the elderly
67) Goodfriends, North Korea Today, no. 127, May 20, 2008, and no. 134, May 29, 2008.
542
could not get out of nursing homes and 14 elderly people were
reported to have starved to death in the nursing home at
Wonsan-ri, Hoeryeong-si, Hamgyeongbuk-do, by May 2009.69)
There is a saying that nursing homes in North Korea are a
modern Goryeojang, an ancient burial practice whereby the elderly
are left to die in an open tomb.
4. Rights of Persons with Disabilities
1) Legislation for Protection
On December 13, 2006, the United Nations General Assembly
unanimously voted for the approval of the Convention on Rights
of Persons with Disabilities. As of March in 2008, 125 countries,
including South Korea, signed the Convention, and 17 Countries
ratified the agreement. As the eighth convention on international
human rights, the Convention reconfirms the human dignity of
persons with disabilities and specifies the duties to guarantee
rights of the persons with disabilities in all fields in life.
North Korea enacted its Disabled Persons Protection Law on
June 18, 2003. The law has six chapters and 54 articles that, for
the first time, build a legal foundation for protecting the rights of
people with disabilities. The Disabled Persons Protection Law
(article no. 2) defines a ‘person with disability' as a citizen who
cannot enjoy a normal life for an extended period of time due to
his/her limited or lost mental or physical abilities. Chapter one of
this Law details the basic principles of the Law (Article 1-8), its
second chapter is about rehabilitation treatment (Articles 9-14), its
68) Open Radio for North Korea. [Online, cited January 8, 2009]. Available from
<http://www.nkradio.org>.
69) Goodfriends, North Korea Today, no. 341, June 16, 2010.
543
third chapter deals with the education of persons with disabilities
(Articles 15-23), its forth chapter includes the cultural activities of
persons with disabilities (Articles 24-29), its fifth chapter deals
with employment of persons with disabilities (Articles 30-41), and
its sixth chapter is comprised of guidance and control measures
for protection programs for persons with disabilities (Articles
42-54). Based on Article 45 of the Disabled Persons Protection
Law,
the
(KFPD),
Korean
Federation
formerly
known
for
as
Protection
of
the
Disabled
Chosun-bulguja-jiwon-hyeophoe
(Association for supporting North Korean disabled people), has
been working as the only social organization for the rights of
people with disabilities and arranging colorful functions annually
on June 18, the day of the person with disabilities.70)
Despite the enactment of the Disabled Persons Protection Law,
it appears that the law is not taking effect because of the high
cost of supporting it in the midst of continuing shortages of food
since the mid 1990s. Moreover, substantial measures for protecting
the disabled are insufficient in the law, as there is no enforcement
ordinance.
The
law
is
restricted
only
to
improving
living
conditions and environment such as undertaking rehabilitation
treatment and providing education, cultural activities, and work.
Thus, the law does not guarantee rights to a decent quality of
life,
which
includes
prevention,
improvement of one’s living
vocational
environment.71)
rehabilitation,
and
The law considers
persons with disabilities as mere recipients of welfare benefits, not
70) The national report of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea submitted on August
27, 2009, A/HRC/WG.6/6/PRK/1, para. 75.
71) Jhe, Sung-ho, "Sahoejeok Chwiyak Gyecheungui Ingwon (Human Rights of the Socially
Marginalized)," 2007 Bukhan Ingwon Gwallyeon Beomnyeong Haeseol (Legal
Terminology on Human Rights in North Korea, 2007) (Seoul, Korea: Korean Bar
Association), p. 269. The Korean Bar Association, 2006 Bukhan Ingwon Baekseo (2006
White Paper on North Korean Human Rights), p. 212.
544
as subjects who are entitled to practicing their rights; therefore,
effective means to ensure their rights are deficient in this law.
Article 54 of the law stipulates that organizations, business
enterprises, and individuals should face administrative or criminal
responsibility
when
they
violate
the
law
and
cause
serious
problems. However, the penalty clauses are abstract and vague so
their effectiveness is doubted.
2) Persecution and Discrimination
As of 1999, the number of persons with disabilities in North
Korea totaled 763,237, accounting for 3.41% of the total population.
Over 64% of persons with disabilities live in urban areas. There
have been further studies and population surveys on persons with
disabilities since then. Persons with disabilities in North Korea are
classified into two categories. The first is persons with disabilities
from natural causes, illness, or any other general causes (known
as “cripples” among the general public). The other group consists
of honorable veterans who became disabled while defending the
socialist system. There is a vast amount of difference in the way
these two groups are treated and viewed in the society. The
honorable veterans have been generously supported by the state
for the sake of the legitimacy of the state system.72) These
veterans are then divided into the special, first, and second
classes. Currently, except for those veterans in the second class
who are able to physically carry out daily activities, the veterans
with disabilities in the special and the first classes are suffering
from severe food shortages since they cannot carry out normal
545
activities. Periodic rations are given to the latter group, but only
the veterans alone qualify for the rations, so it is impossible to
support their families. Also, the monthly stipend is only about
2,000~3,000 North Korean won, so they face difficulties sustaining
themselves.73)
North Korea emphasized the protection of all persons with
disabilities in its second report of the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights submitted in 2003. It claimed
that persons with disabilities in North Korea were properly
employed accordingly to their competence level and their rights in
the Constitution. However, except for some honorable veterans
with
disabilities,
most
persons
with
disabilities
are
heavily
discriminated against in society. The areas where they
are
discriminated against areas follows.
First, the disabled have been restricted from rights to residence.
North Korean authorities strongly regulate and limit the disabled
from
living
in
cities
where
foreigners
frequent,
such
as
Pyeongyang, Nampo, Gaeseong and Cheongjin, so that they will
not create a bad impression (of the country) on the foreigners.74)
However, according to a recent survey of defectors, only 27.5%
(55/200) in <Table Ⅳ-7-40> responded that they have heard of
or witnessed the limited place of residence for the disabled, while
the majority of 72.5% (144/200) answered that it was not true. In
addition, as shown in <Table IV-7-41>, 55.5% (111/200) responded
“no” and 24% (48/200) answered “yes” to a question, "Can
persons with a disability live in Pyeongyang?"
The result of the
73) Network for North Korean Democracy and Human Rights, NK Vision, no. 4, December
2007.
546
question
of
whether
persons
with
disabilities
can
live
in
Pyeongyang is much lower than the results (80%) of the same
question asked by the KBA in 2006. It can therefore be deduced
that the limitations on place of residence for the disabled may
have been relaxed after the implementation of the handicapped
person protective law. Indeed, according to testimony by recent
visitors to Pyeongyang and North Korean defectors, disabled
people did live in Pyeongyang.75)
<Table Ⅳ-7-40> Have you ever heard or witnessed a case where the disabled
have been forced to move to other areas or expelled?
No. of response
Percentage(%)
Cumulative Percentage %)
Yes
55
27.5
27.5
No
145
72.5
100.0
Total
200
100.0
Valid
response
<Table Ⅳ-7-41> Can people with disabilities live in Pyeongyang?
No. of
response
Valid
response
Percentage
(%)
(%)
24.0
Yes
48
24.0
No
111
55.5
79.5
I don’t know
41
20.5
100.0
Total
200
100.0
Second,
the
North
Korean
regime
has
implemented
discrimination policies, forcing overly small people to be sterilized
or quarantining them in concentration camps.76) However, it is not
clear
that
the
discrimination
policy
still
persists
after
the
547
implementation of the Disabled Persons Protection Law.
Third, the disabled often encounter discrimination and scorn at
the work place and in society. In response to the question, “Is
there any workplace where the disabled can work,” as shown in
<Table IV-7-42>, 37.5% (75/200) of North Korean defectors
answered “yes,” while 33% (66/200) responded “no.” However,
workplaces that the disabled can enter are limited to specific types
of occupation, including small manufacturing factories and factories
for the blind [ID 003 (2010)], a clock hospital, a place for carving
seals or a photo studio [ID 021 (2010)], a factory for honorable
soldiers [ID 011 (2010)], a factory for the aged [ID 014 (2010)], a
factory for the blind [ID 123 (2010)] and so on.
<Table Ⅳ-7-42> Is there any discrimination against the disabled in the
workplace?
No. of
response
Percentage
(%)
(%)
Yes
75
37.5
37.5
No
66
33.0
70.5
59
29.5
100.0
Total
200
100.0
Valid
response I don’t know
According to <Table Ⅳ-7-43>, only 9.5% (19/200) of survey
respondents
replied
“yes”
to
the
question,
“Is
there
any
discrimination against the disabled in the workplace?” However,
this result seems to reflect the North Korean reality in which the
disabled rarely get a job and, accordingly, don’t have a chance to
experience discrimination in the workplace. In response to an
open-ended question, “What kinds of discrimination against the
disabled are there in the workplace?”, respondents [IDs 13, 40, 89,
95, 104, 124 (all 2010)] stated, “People do not consider the disabled
548
to be human beings.” Because these investigation results are
based on data accumulated before the implementation of the
Disabled Persons Protection Law, continuous monitoring should be
made to see if the same level of discrimination continues.
<Table Ⅳ-7-43> Is there any discrimination against the disabled in the
workplace?
Valid
response
No. of
response
Percentage
(%)
(%)
Yes
19
9.5
9.5
No
99
49.5
59.0
I don’t know
82
41.0
100.0
Total
200
100.0
An underdeveloped social environment intolerant of handicapped
people causes many cases of killing disabled babies, as shown in
<Table
Ⅳ-7-44>
as
well
as
negligence
to
act
to
save
handicapped people as shown in <Table Ⅳ-7-45>.
<Table Ⅳ-7-44> Have you ever heard of or witnessed that a disabled baby was
killed as soon as he/she was born?
Valid
response
No. of response
Percentage(%)
Yes
23
11.5
11.5
No
177
88.5
100.0
Total
200
100.0
<Table Ⅳ-7-45> Have you ever heard of or witnessed a disabled person dying
because he/she couldn't get treatment?
No. of response
Valid
response
Percentage(%)
Yes
14
7.0
7.0
No
186
93.0
100.0
Total
200
100.0
549
Only a few respondents confirmed the existence of such cases,
but this is because infanticide cases are not easily reported to
others. The survival of the disabled is seriously threatened, as
reflected in the following responses.
[ID 011 (2010)] When? I am not quite sure. Where? “I heard
that they made a baby with two heads lay
down on its face and die.”
[ID 019 (2010)] When? In 1992. Where? “At Gyeongseong. It is
said that they rolled a baby with a cleft lip
with a blanket and buried it.”
[ID 028 (2010)] When? When I was young. Where? “I heard
that they took a handicapped baby as soon as
it was born after its parent allowed that.”
[ID 071 (2010)] When? In 1999. Where? At Dancheon. “It is
said that they made the baby lay its face
down and died after it was born with fingers
stuck together.”
[ID 119 (2010)] When? In 2003. Where? In Cheongjin.
[ID 121 (2010)] When? In 2003. Where? Musan-gun, Hamgyeongbuk
-do.
[ID 135 (2010)] When? In January 2004. Where? Hyesanwon.
[ID 138 (2010)] When? In 2002. Where? Pyeongyang.
[ID 143 (2010)] When? In 2004. Where? Musan-gun
[ID 153 (2010)] When? In December 2002. Where? “A woman
left a baby on the railroad.”
[ID 198 (2010)] When? In 1998. Where? “I heard that a baby
born with one leg was buried because it was
not considered able to grow up well.”
550
[ID 200 (2010)] When? In 2000. Where? Sariwon-si.
3) Protection and Provision of Facilities
(1) Protection Law
Generally, in North Korea persons with disabilities, except
veterans with disabilities, have been exposed to persecution and
discrimination, and there appears to be no special protection
system for them. According to the answers to the question, "Are
there any special protective measures for the disabled in the
workplace?" in <Table Ⅳ-7-46>, only 9.9 % (19/192) replied “yes.”
In contrast to the survey data, according to the responses by
the North Korean defectors to an open-ended question on this
issue, North Korea’s state authorities allow not only honorable
disabled soldiers of national merit but also general disabled people
to gather together and work in separate factories for the elderly
with relatively easy work.
<Table Ⅳ-7-46> Is there any law specifically designed only for persons with
disabilities?
No. of
response
Percentage
(%)
(%)
Yes
19
9.9
9.9
Valid
response
No
115
59.9
69.8
I don’t know
58
30.2
100.0
Total
192
100.0
Invalid
No response
Total
8
200
However, educational institutions for the disabled have relatively
poorer conditions. In terms of special schools for the disabled,
551
there are 12, including 9 schools for the deaf and 3 schools for
the blind. Yet, these schools cater only to the vision impaired and
the hearing impaired, and their number is insufficient for all
children with disabilities. Mentally challenged people are cared for
by a day nursery. There are two factories producing artificial
limbs and compensators: the Hamheung factory established in 1951
and supported by Handicapped International (HI) and the Songri
factory opened with the support of International Committee of the
Red Cross (ICRC).77)
The Yang-saeng-weon (rehabilitation facility) takes care of the
disabled who cannot work (Article 78, Socialism Labor Law).
However, the free care of the disabled has not been properly
practiced due to financial difficulties, shortage of food, and the fragile
base of the national economy.78) A report shows that recently noodles
or a half bowl of porridge is provided as a meal at the Institute for
the
mute
in
Sanbong-gu,
Onseogn-gun,
students steal things together because of
Hamkyeongbuk-do,
so
hunger.79)
(2) Provision of Facilities
It is not an exaggeration to say that the provision of facilities
exclusively designed for the disabled is null due to economic
hardship and fragile national finance. This is revealed in survey
results (see <Table Ⅳ-7-47>) where 99.5 % of respondents say
that they have not seen or heard about features such as stairs
adapted for the disabled, and furthermore, in <Table Ⅳ-7-48>, 95
% (95/100) replied that they have not seen or heard about special
77) Ibid., pp. 215~216.
78) Ibid., p. 216.
79) Goodfriends, North Korea Today, no. 133, March 28, 2008.
552
facilities for the disabled such as medical centers, educational
facilities, rest rooms, physical training facilities or libraries.
<Table Ⅳ-7-47> Have you ever seen or heard about specially built roads and
stairs for the convenient movement of the disabled?
No. of response
Yes
Valid
response
Percentage(%)
1
0.5
0.5
100.0
No
199
99.5
Total
200
100.0
<Table Ⅳ-7-48> Have you ever seen or heard about exclusive medical
institutions and educational institutions, bathrooms, physical
training facilities, libraries, and other things for the disabled?
No. of response
Valid
response
Percentage(%)
Yes
4
2.0
2.0
No
195
97.5
99.5
1
0.5
100.0
200
100.0
3.00
Total
5. Human Rights of the Marginalized Class by Personal Background
Classification
1) Infringement of Equal Rights
Under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, all human
beings are born free and equal with dignity and rights (Article 1,
the first half of Article 2 and Article 7). The ICCPR, to which
North Korea is a party, also stipulates that all persons are equal
before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the
equal protection of the law (Article 14, 26).
The Constitution of North Korea, as revised in 1998, stipulates
that every citizen has equal rights in every aspect of social life
553
(Constitution, Article 65). North Korea also asserted that the State
guarantees equal rights in its second periodic report to the Human
Rights Committee on December 25, 1999. In addition, in its
national report submitted at the sixth session of the Working
Group on the UPR of the Human Rights Council on August, 27,
2009, North Korea, declared that “No citizen is discriminated on
the basis of his/her race, sex, language, religion, education,
occupation and position and property, and all citizens exercise
equal rights in all fields of the State and public activities
(A/HRC/WG.6/6/PRK/1, para. 32).”
Nevertheless, despite such claims of equal rights for all citizens,
North Korea has conducted several investigations into the personal
backgrounds of its citizens since independence in 1945, and
classified each citizen into one of three classes: the core strata
(nuclear class) having a close relationship with the regime; the
basic strata (agitated class) of the intermediate layer; and the
complex strata (hostile class to the regime).
According to a North Korean defector [ID 065 (2010)], “North
Korean citizens are classified into three categories of core, basic
(agitated), and complex (hostile to the regime) groups. Among
these groups, the complex strata are most discriminated against in
many ways. Because I have a good voice and talent, I can sing
well. However, after I said that my father had been a South
Korean POW, they never allowed me to attend a singing contest.
Even if I was a bright student, I was not allowed to go to
college.” According to <Table IV-7-48> surveyed in 2008, 89%
(89/100) confirmed that they used to hear that the North Korean
regime classified North Korean residents into three categories,
while 9% (9/100) answered “No” and 2% (2/100) answered
“others.”
554
<Table Ⅳ-7-49> Have you ever heard that citizens are classified into three
categories of core, basic (agitated), and complex (hostile to the
regime) strata?
Choices
Frequency (no)
Percentage(%)
Yes
89
89.0
89.0
No
9
9.0
9.0
Others
2
2.0
2.0
Total
100
100.0
100.0
2) Classification of North Korean Residents
The core strata constitutes 10~20% of the total North Korean
population80) and is the ruling group, including Kim Il-sung, Kim
Jong-il, and the families and relatives who lead the North Korean
system. According to information from North Korean defectors
surveyed in 2010, the people in this group come from families
with a good background, such as patriots, children of guerrilla
fighters who with fought with Kim Il-sung against Japanese
imperialism, war participants whose names are known for their
valor and their families [ID 007 (2010)], families whose ancestors
were servants, PSA officers or Party members, independence
movement activists and their families, North Korean heroes, [ID
011 (2010)], relatives of Kim Il-sung, Kim Jong-il and Kim
Jong-suk and their families [IDs 029, 072 (all 2010)], families of
North Korean heroes [ID 013 (2010)], participants in the Korean
War, high officials of initial Kim Il Sung University, children of
commando
units
and
North
Korean
spies,
children
of
80) According to re-registration of North Koreas in the 1970s, core strata account for 28%
of the entire population, basic strata for 45% and the complex strata for 27%, Ministry
of Unification, Bukhan-gaeyo (Outline of North Korea), p. 420, quoted again from The
Korea Institute for National Unification, 2007 Bukhan Ingwon Baekseo (2007 White
555
representatives of the Supreme People’s Assembly, children of the
intelligence agency in the Party, [ID 038 (2010)] and members of
legal institutes and the Public Prosecutor’s Office and their
children.
With the economic crisis, bribery prevails, as does buying and
selling of government positions in smaller administrative provinces.
Thus, class distinction as social control is losing its effect.
However, based on the information available to date, the following
have been the general division of North Korean society.
Most members of the core strata live in metropolitan areas
including Pyeongyang, and are preferred in terms of appointment
as executive members in the party, government and military. As
they enjoy preference in all fields including education, promotion,
distribution,
residence,
and
medical
treatment,
they
have
a
privileged social position that is inherited by the next generation.
The basic strata (agitated class) consists of laborers, technical
engineers, farmers, clerks, teachers, and their families (but not if
party members). They manage to live their daily lives with
irregularly paid wages or run small private businesses. Most of
them are in small to medium sized cities and in rural villages and
lead a life of poverty with insufficient and inconsistent health
benefits. It is possible for some members of the basic strata to
“upgrade” their ranking to the “core” group, depending on their
loyalty and contribution.
The third group, the complex strata (hostile class to the
regime), account for the bottom 10-20% of the population, and is
comprised of class antagonists and national offenders. They are
called an “impure faction,” and are branded as reactionaries and
are direct victims of the social classification policy in North
556
Korea.
The people in this category include released convicts who
committed political offenses and their families [IDs 001, 004, 009,
197 (all 2010)], the families of defectors to South Korea [IDs 006,
007, 120 (all 2010)], former landowners or capitalists and their
families [IDs 003, 016, 060, 200 (all 2010)], POWs and their
families [IDs 005, 058. 062, 106, 128, 181, 196 (all 2010)], families
of North Korean defectors in recent years [IDs 072, 076, 154, 167
(all 2010)], families of South Korean law enforcement authorities,
[IDs 122, 126, 149, 159, 160 (all 2010)] and pro-Japanese and their
families [ID 152 (2010)].
3) Infringement of Human Rights
The third class complex stratum is continuously discriminated
against in every social aspect, including employment, education,
residence and medical benefits. This occurs for entire families
across generations in a version of applied “guilt by association”
under the North Korean legal structure.
(1) Discrimination in Distribution
Faced
with
serious
food
shortage,
North
Korean
state
authorities prioritize food distribution based on people’s social
background from the core strata to the complex strata. So, most
residents including those in the complex strata are excluded from
the food distribution because food is preferentially distributed to
people in Pyeongyang where those in the complex strata are not
allowed to live. In a survey <Table IV-7-50>, 15.1% (30/199) of
defectors answered “yes,” while 75.9 % (151/199) of defectors said
“no” to the question, "Are people with a weak social background
557
unjustly treated in the distribution system?" The relatively low
percentage of negative responses demonstrates the disadvantage of
the complex strata, hostile to the government, which could not get
enough food during the situation on short food rations across the
country.
<Table Ⅳ-7-50> Are people with weak social backgrounds unjustly treated in the
distribution system?
No. of
response
Valid
response
Invalid
Percentage
(%)
(%)
Yes
30
15.1
15.1
No
151
75.9
91.0
100.0
I don’t know
18
9.0
Total
199
100.0
No response
1
Total
200
According to the U.N. Special Rapporteur for North Korea,81)
food
distribution
is
divided
into
five
categories,
ranked
by
importance. For food distribution, the first tier consists of public
servants
who
organizations
are
members
(totaling
one
of
the
million
party,
persons,
government,
and
or
the
4%
of
population). The second tier consists of military authorities and
the Bowibu, the PSA, and law and prosecution authorities (1.5
million persons, or 6% of the population). The third tier consists
of employees and families of munitions factories and special
enterprises (4 million persons, or 20% of the population). The
fourth tier consists of employees of general state enterprises,
81) Goodfriends. Bukhan Saheo Byunhwawa Ingwon (Changes in North Korea Society and
Human Rights), November 2007. pp. 18-20; Para. 20 of A/HRC/13/47, which was
submitted by Vitit Muntabhorn, UN Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human
Rights in North Korea at the 13th session of the UNHRC on February 17, 2010.
558
teachers, doctors and workers in the service sector (6 million
persons, or 30% of the population). In the bottom fifth tier are
farmers, who are excluded from the distribution chain (8 million
persons, or 40% of the population). Classes suffering from food
shortages are below the fourth rank. It is natural that the complex
strata belong to the underprivileged class, shunned in terms of the
distribution of food.
(2) Discrimination in Admission to the Army, the Party and Higher
Education
According to <Table IV-7-51>, among defectors surveyed, 53.5%
(106/198) answered that joining the army or the Party is still
important in North Korea, while 26.8% (53/198) replied that money
is more important.
<Table Ⅳ-7-51> Is it still important to join the army or the Party in North Korea?
Valid
response
Invalid
No. of
response
Percentage
(%)
(%)
Yes
106
53.5
53.5
No
37
18.7
72.2
Money is more
important.
53
26.8
99.0
Others
2
1.0
100.0
Total
198
100.0
No response
Total
2
200
The people belonging to the third-class complex strata have a
limited opportunity to join the army or the Party, which are basic
criteria for those interested in public affairs in North Korea. The
following are representative replies by North Korean defectors
559
related to this matter:
[ID 010 (2010)] Because I am the son of a political criminal,
even thought I was in an art troupe, I could
not attend a ceremony where people stand with
flowers to welcome Kim Il-sung and Kim
Jong-il marching on the street. When one is
20
years
old,
one
can
usually
become
a
member of the Party, but I couldn’t. Later,
however, Kim Jong-il delivered a special order
called Gwang-pok-jeong-chi that communism
must include all political criminals and families
of North Korean defectors. So, I could be a
member of the Party when I was 40 years old.
[ID 014 (2010)] My mother’s father and his family all defected
to South Korea. So, my brother could not join
the
army.
Also,
my
father
couldn’t
be
a
member of the Party.
[ID 019 (2010)] Because my friend’s father came from South
Korea, all three of his sons, who were working
in a mine, could not join the army. They were
smart
and
worked
well
but
they
couldn’t
advance.
[ID 033 (2010)] My friend’s father killed a cow and ate it.
Because of this, my friend could not join the
army. If one’s social background is not good,
one shall be assigned to a place where one
can hardly endure.
[ID 015 (2010)] My friend’s brother was shot to death. Once
560
he was executed, the rest of his brothers were
not
allowed
to
join
the
army.
If
one
is
executed, then three generations will receive
discriminatory treatment, as if one has his/her
own tag in his document.
Discrimination
can
also
be
experienced
during
education.
Although officially there is compulsory education in North Korea
through middle school, even children are discriminated against
according to statements made by North Korean defectors, as
follows:
[ID 045 (2010)] Because my father was a political criminal, I
could not be a leader of Soyeondan (Boys’
League).
[ID 132 (2010)] Many
people
discriminated.
My
husband
wanted to participate in a welcoming New
Year
performance
when he
was
a second
grader in elementary school. However, he was
immediately disqualified away because of his
social background.
[ID 020 (2008)] When choosing a class leader, someone with a
disadvantageous social background cannot be a
class president or a section leader.
[ID 036 (2008)] One
does
not
disadvantages
school,
middle
any
particular
finishes
elementary
receive
until
one
school,
and
high
school.
However, in many cases, one can be isolated
from friends because one’s personal information
561
can be disclosed to the public.
The complex stratum also seems to have limited access to
higher education. According to replies to the question, “Can
someone from the complex strata category go to a college in
North Korea” in <Table IV-7-52>, a total of 56.3% (112/199) of
respondents answered positively, while 27.1% (54/199) of them
answered “No,” and 12.1% (24/199) answered “I don’t know.” To
illuminate the above data, open-ended questions revealed the
following information:
[ID 005 (2010)] Their admission to a college depends on how
much money and power they can mobilize.
[ID 002 (2008)] Up until the 1990s, the people in the complex
strata
group
were
heavily
discriminated
against, but after 2003, you can do anything if
you had money, so its more important to have
money than a good background.
[IDs 045, 076 (both 2008)] both reported: These days, you can
go to a university with money, even if it's not
as good as ones in Pyeongyang.
These statements reveal that, with the continuing economic
strain, bribery is common and the classification of one's social
background has weakened in North Korea. Consequently, it seems
that college admission restrictions have somewhat loosened.
562
<Table Ⅳ-7-52> Can someone from the complex strata category go to a college
in North Korea?
No. of
response
Valid
response
Invalid
Percentage
(%)
(%)
Yes
112
56.3
56.3
No
54
27.1
83.4
I don’t know
24
12.1
95.5
Others
9
4.5
100.0
Total
199
100.0
1
200
No response
Total
However, additional statements from North Korean defectors in
response to the question of <Table IV-7-53> indicate that there
are
some
colleges
that
people
with
disadvantageous
social
backgrounds cannot enter. These colleges include, for example:
Kim Il Sung University, Kim Il Sung National War College, Angil
University [ID 004 (2010)], Geumsong University of Politics,
educational facilities related to politicians, Kimchaek University of
Technology [ID 045 (2010)], the Military Academy, and Kim
Hyong Jik University of Education [ID 138 (2010)]. In particular:
[ID 062 (2010)] I have a friend whose father was a political
criminal.
My
friend’s
father
could
not
be
promoted in the workplace. My friend’s brother
was very bright but could not go to Kim Il
Sung University but instead had to go to a
regional college.
[ID 103 (2010)] My brother was very bright but could not go
to Kimchaek University of Technology.
[ID 170 (2010)] My second brother wanted to go to Kim Jong
563
Il Bowidaehak (Kimg Jong-il People’s Security
University)
after
being
discharged
from
military duty, but he couldn’t because our
father came from Munsan, South Korea. So, he
came home and cried bitterly, asking why our
father was a spy.
[ID 190 (2010)] I originally came from South Korea. My only
son joined the Korean People’s Army and he
wanted
to
go
to
the
Military
Academy.
However, since I was from South Korea, my
son could not go to the Military Academy and
instead went to an agricultural and forestry
school at Hyesan-si, Yanggang-do.
<Table Ⅳ-7-53> Is there any college that those from the complex strata
category are unable to enter in North Korea?
Valid
response
Invalid
No. of
response
Percentage
(%)
Yes
139
70.6
70.6
No
13
6.6
77.2
Others
44
22.3
99.5
Others
1
0.5
100.0
Total
197
100.0
No response
Total
(%)
3
200
(3) Discrimination in the Workplace
People
in
the
complex
strata
cannot
even
choose
their
profession. To the question, “If there is a workplace where people
with unfavorable social backgrounds could not work in North
Korea, where is it?” a few defectors gave negative answers: [ID
564
022 (2008)] said that, “In fact, if you have money, you can get
any job,” and [ID 027 (2008)] stated, “If you are competent, you
can get any job you want.”
However, many respondents reported that such people cannot
work for the military, the Party, the Bowibu, a prosecutor’s office
[ID
001
(2010)],
or
munitions
factories
[ID
009
(2010)],
or
enterprises that earn foreign currency [ID 019 (2010)], or as
telephone operators [ID 037 (2010)], or at workplaces such as the
military or the judicial branch [ID 170 (2010)]. In terms of the
military, [ID 009 (2010)] stated: “Originally, the Korea People’s
Army did not accept those people, but recently it has begun to
accept them because of personnel shortages.
Members of the complex strata are usually assigned to physical
laborer generation after generation, working in factories or coal
mines, collective farms, and munitions factories; the types of
occupations that many people avoid because of overwork, hard
work and dangerous substances. For example:
[ID 070 (2010)] I joined the army. Although I became a senior
officer before I retired, I was discriminated
against.
There
is
a
discrimination
against
farmers. Even after being released from the
military, farmers only engage in farming. The
social stratum cannot be changed. My child
must do farming. It was the most sorrowful
thing. I thought, “why did my father become a
farmer?” because I got discriminated against
even though I was a former high officer in the
565
military.
[ID 073 (2010)] We cannot choose a workplace as we want. If
one’s father did farming, then one’s children
must do farming generation after generation. If
one’s father was a miner, one must work in a
mine. One can pass down one’s job to other
generations. If one with a disadvantageous
social background works in a lower level, then
so does one’s child.
[ID 148 (2010)] I wanted to be an artist, but I couldn’t because
of my disadvantageous social background. I
could have been a singer in 2000, when they
lacked people with ability to sing.
[ID 152 (2010)] There
were
some
POWs
in
Jongseong
(Jongsong)-gun. No matter how smart their
children might have been, they were to be
dispatched to cooperative farms.
Furthermore, socially vulnerable people suffer from various
types of discrimination, including restricted promotion, even after
they are hired. For example:
[ID 016 (2010)] My friend who worked at a trading company
got
promoted
more
quickly
than
me.
I
confidentially asked him where I would end up.
He would not say at first, but after I urged
him a few times, he said that I couldn’t even
be a manager. Later I found out that my
grandfather
had
five
Japanese colonial era.
servants
during
the
566
[ID 030 (2010)] If your social background is not favorable, you
can be an administrative worker, such as a
manager or a leader of your workplace, but
not a political officer, such as a cell secretary,
a Party secretary or a Party manager.
[ID 073 (2010)] My
father
background.
working
had
He
unit.
a
disadvantageous
became
However,
a
manager
he
social
of
couldn’t
a
be
promoted any higher. In general, people with
disadvantageous social backgrounds cannot be
managers. My father was exceptional because
he was very competent.
(4) Restriction on Residence
In
the
2008
White
Paper
published
by
the
KBA,
pages
435-to-437 reveal that people from the complex strata live in
different residential areas, such as rural mountain villages, mining
villages in Hamgyeong-do (North and South Hamgyong Province),
and other areas away from the border. This situation has been
confirmed by statements from [ID 006 to 099 (2010)]. For example,
[ID 006 (2010)] reported that, “Many people with disadvantageous
social backgrounds lived in Onseong, where there were mining
villages.
Also,
some
lived
in
deep
mountain
villages
in
Yanggang-do. The North Korean government intentionally moved
people with disadvantageous social background to remote areas.”
According to Hu Gae-seok, who used to work at a coal mine
in Aoji, Gyeongheung (Kyungheung)-gun, Hamgyeongbuk-do and
escaped from there on July 8, 2000, there were prison camps at
every mine throughout North Korea after the Korean War,
567
because the Kim Il-sung regime sought a cheap labor force from
the prison camps for post war reconstruction.82)
(5) Discrimination in Due Process
North Korea has discriminatory legal practices against people
with
low
social
backgrounds.
When
people
with
a
poor
background commit a crime, they face harsher punishment.
Interviews of defectors confirm that North Korea discriminates
in terms of charges or punishment based on a suspects’ social
background. As shown in <Table IV-7-54>, a large majority of
68.8% (137/199) agree that a person with a disadvantageous social
background gets a more severe punishment for the same crime.
Responses to the questions, "Have you ever not been punished
because you have good backgrounds or have you been punished
more for having a no-good background?” or “Have you seen
anyone treated like that?" reveal the degree of discrimination
based on background.
<Table Ⅳ-7-54> Do North Koreans with bad backgrounds get harsher
punishment than others for the same crime?
Valid
response
Invalid
No. of
response
Percentage
(%)
Yes
137
68.8
68.8
No
28
14.1
82.9
I don’t know
31
15.6
98.5
Others
3
1.5
100.0
Total
199
100.0
No response
Total
(%)
1
200
82) Heo Jae-seok, Nae Ireumeun Ttongganna Saekkiyeotda (My name was a son of bitch)
(Seoul: Doseochulpan wonbuks), pp. 31~32.
568
[ID 008 (2010)] My son was not supposed to get correctional
prison labor, but he was sentenced to that
anyway because of his disadvantageous social
background.
[ID 014 (2010)] For example, even if two people commit a
crime, let’s say they kill a cow and eat it
together; if the parents of one are military
officers, that one will not be punished. But the
other is shot to death.
[ID 022 (2010)] Five sixth-grade students, three females and
three males, played together, watching a sex
video. Two male students and a female student
were
from
families
with
good
social
backgrounds. The other two female students
from
powerless
families
were
sent
to
a
long-term corrective labor camp.
[ID 047 (2010)] Three people were caught for fighting among
friends. Since the father of one of them was a
lower level Party secretary, that one was set
free, but the others were released 20 days later.
[ID 073 (2010)] It just happens. Even when two people commit
the same crime, one with a disadvantageous
social
background
may
receive
a
stricter
punishment. The other one with a good social
background can easily be freed without any
bribe.
[ID 090 (2010)] One person was falsely executed for stealing a
bag of 50kg of corn and a few liquor bottles
in a farm near 1994.”
569
[ID 113 (2010)] There was a group fight in the place where I
used
to
live,
in
Donghungsan
district
at
Hamheung, near 2005. One child of a high
official was hurt while he was wielding a deadly
weapon. Later, the boy was released, but another
boy with a disadvantageous social background
had to take all the blame for the crime.
[ID 124 (2010)] Near 2008, two boys fought each other. One
was the child of a high official and the other
wasn’t. Even though they committed the same
crime, one was released but the other with
disadvantageous social background had to take
all the blame.
[ID 138 (2010)] North Korea is a country that forces one with
a disadvantageous social background to take all
the blame. The North Korean government once
caught people who went to sea to catch clams
and sell them to China; they committed the
crime of crossing the border to China. Of
those, people whose family were high officials
were released, but the others were sent to a
prison for eight months, and most died.
[ID 196 (2010)] I was investigated because two of my friends
were repatriated to North Korea after defecting
in 2004. One friend whose father was a high
official
was
easily
released,
but
the
other
without anyone to depend on was sentenced to
disciplinary prison labor.
[ID 197 (2010)] Even if caught for human trafficking, a person
570
with a good social background can be released
within
a
sentenced
month.
to
10
Otherwise,
years
of
one
prison
can
be
labor.
It
happens quite often.
[ID 198 (2010)] It happens all the time. Officers will turn a blind
eye to illegal activities of children of high officials,
but they will make those with a disadvantageous
social background worse. Generally the children of
high officials, except those who commit political
crimes, are easily released.
(6) Infringement on the Right to Marriage
Bad social background can also affect marriage. In response to
the question, “Do couples with bad backgrounds face difficulties?”
<Table Ⅳ-7-53> a majority of 63% of respondents answered
"yes," while 14% answered "no," and 21% answered "I don’t know."
According research conducted in 2008 by the KBA, North
Korean defectors believed that a person with good background
would
not
want
to
get
married
to
a
person
with
a
bad
background because she/he can be also discriminated against and
also bad social backgrounds are passed on to offspring [IDs 053,
060, 066, 078, 091 (all 2008)]. In particular, [ID 001 (2008)] revealed
that parents with good backgrounds run a background check on
their son-in-law or daughter-in-law candidate, and strongly object
to their child getting married to a person with a bad background.
As a result many people commit suicide. To support this finding,
in the 2010 KBA research, the following was reported:
[ID 002 (2010)] One whose social background is not good
571
cannot enter Pyeongyang. Marriage to someone
with a better background is impossible. People
with good social backgrounds should marry
each other. The family of a woman checks
even third cousins of a man if he is a political
official
and
second
cousins
if
he
is
an
administrative officer. In my family, female
relatives of my sister in law are all political
officials. Likewise, a man can get a high position
because
of
his
wife.
Our
parents
have
a
daughter-in-law whose parents were in high
positions. For one’s own development, one should
marry a person whom one’s parents introduce.
[ID 020 (2010)] One with a bad social background can neither
be a Party member nor a high official. In
many cases, one would not even talk about
marriage
to
a
beautiful
girl
whose
social
background is not good.
4) Emerging Market Economy and Weakening Classification System
North Korea witnessed the collapse of its two economic pillars,
planned economy and distribution system, due to serious food and
economic crises in the mid-1990s. That period witnessed the halt
of allocations from the state authority and local regions; factories
and state enterprises had to raise funds themselves. Because
many factories were shut down, North Koreans had no choice but
to sell things in the markets to survive.
To prevent the collapse of the regime the North’s leadership
adopted the 7.1 Economic Management Improvement Measure in
572
2002 and a general market in 2003, which were designed to
facilitate a market economy. The advent of the two-job System
and local markets reinvigorated the non-state-run economy, which
was 100 times bigger than the state-run economy.
According to recent data, the average monthly living expense is
around 50,000 or 60,000 North Korean won, while the average
monthly income is only about 3000 or 4000 North Korean won.
Given the ongoing distribution stoppage, many will face a crisis if
the market activities slow down. Consequently, individual economic
activities, which were pursued for survival at first, have now
become more important than official jobs. This has led to the
birth of the Two-job System and an ever widening income gap
due
to
accumulation
of
wealth.
Now
we
are
witnessing
transformation from a "status-based" system to an "income-based"
system. As North Koreans have put more emphasis on survival
and money as a means of getting a good job, fame or political
involvement has become less important. Because they can buy and
sell what they wanted before by offering a bribe, the social class
system, which once was the condition of success, is losing control
over North Korean society.83)84)
Survey results found that 59.5% (119/200) of defectors agreed
that, “If they have money, even people with bad social background
do not receive any discrimination in the workplace, the military,
punishment or marriage.” Meanwhile, 21.5% (119/200) said “no” to
the question of <Table IV-7-55>. Also, 55% (110/220) of respondents
agreed that, “In current North Korea, money is more important
83) Park Jeong-dong, "Sanginui Cheonguk Doeganeun Bukhan Gyeongje (Merchants'
Haven, North Korean Economy)," Chosun Ilbo (Chosun Daily), November 14, 2007.
84) Hong Min, "Bukhan sahoe wa juminui saenghwal (North Korean Society and the Life
of its Residents)," 2007 Bukhan Ingwon Toronhoe (Seminar on North Korean Human
Rights) (Seoul: National Commissioner for Human Rights of Korea, 2007), pp. 96-97.
573
than social background or status,” while 37.5% (75/200) said,
“Money is important but so is social background,” while only
7.5% (15/200) said, “Social background is still important.”
As a legal idiom, “from status to contract,” says, North Korea
currently is now transforming itself from federalism to capitalism,
and from a medieval absolute state to a modern civil state. Facing
a threat to its regime, on November 30, 2009, the North Korean
government implemented currency reforms to control the market
economy, but the reforms eventually failed. Contrary to the
government policy, a video clip on the Chaeha market at Sinuij
u85), presumably shot on August 2010, shows that the market,
which once was dull after the currency reform, has become even
more crowded than before the reform. It is reported that there is
Jungang market in Tongilgeori (unification street), Pyeongyang
and about 300 markets are actively functioning in North Korea
including
those
at
Sanseong, Chaeha and
Pyeongseong,
Gangseo,
Sunam,
Sariwon,
Hoeryeong.86)
<Table Ⅳ-7-55> Is it correct that North Koreans having money despite their bad
backgrounds are no longer discriminated against in the army,
school, punishment, and marriage?
No. of
response
Valid
response
Percentage
(%)
(%)
Yes
119
59.5
59.5
81.0
No
43
21.5
I don’t know
36
18.0
99.0
Other
2
1.0
100.0
Total
200
100.0
85) Chosun Ilbo, August 19, 2008, A1, p. 3.
86) Chosun Ilbo, October 14, 2010.
574
<Table Ⅳ-7-56> It is correct that currently money is more important than social
background in North Korea?
No. of
response
Valid
response
Percentage
(%)
Cumulative
Percentage(%)
Yes
110
55.0
55.0
Money is important.
So is social background.
75
37.5
92.5
Still social background is
more important.
15
7.5
100.0
Total
200
100.0
Related comments by North Korean defectors are as follows:
[ID 013 (2010)] In the past, they were discriminated against,
but nowadays if they have a lot of money it
does not matter.
[ID 013 (2010)] In the past, people with bad social backgrounds
were sent to a remote village, but now they
are
allowed
to
live
any
place
except
for
Pyeongyang.
[ID 038 (2010)] Until
the
1980s,
people
married
after
considering one’s social background, but now
they consider money. People don’t care much
(about other things).
[ID 022 (2008)] One was discriminated against in the 1990s if
one’s
social
background
However,
someone
whatever
he/she
social
background
with
wanted
is
was
money
after
less
not
good.
could
do
2003.
Now,
important
than
money.
[ID 012 (2008)] There is little discrimination in the workplace.
There are just some jobs of high social status
575
which people rarely get.
[ID 055 (2010)
One with bad social background could not join
the army in the past. Now, one with money
can do whatever he/she wants.
[ID 127 (2010)] Well, there were so many cases in the past.
Discrimination was too harsh. As everyone
used to do it, I have nothing to say. Well,
these days, people do not talk much about
social background.
In
sum,
the
testimony
of
North
Korean
defectors
well
demonstrates changing social class structure in North Korean
society.
576
8. Human Rights Situations in Political
Prison Camps
￭ Oh Gyeong-seob
(Research Fellow, The Sejong Institute)
1. Introduction
The North Korean political system is a totalitarian regime.1)
The supreme leader, in conjunction with a central party, exercises
absolute considerable political influence and control over the affairs
of the society and its people. Furthermore, a totalitarian regime is
a governing system that rules through terror. Hannah Arendt
suggested that one of critical features of the totalitarian regime is
the reign of terror conducted by the secret police and the ultimate
threat of concentration camps and genocide camps.2) Using secret
police, totalitarian leaders terrorize the population, subdue their
opponents and operate a testing ground for overall control which
includes concentration camps and genocide camps. Friedrich and
Brzezinski also mentioned control systems operated by terror
police as one of six “syndromes” of totalitarian dictatorships.3)
A totalitarian regime operates a control mechanism to induce
political obedience of the citizens terrified by terror-producing
governing bodies such as secret police and political camps.
First, terror-producing governing bodies detain, imprison, expel,
1) Jerry F. Hough and Merle Fainsod, How the Soviet Union is Governed (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press. 1979), p. 519.
2) Hannah Arendt, Jeonchejuuiui Giwon 2 (The Origin of Totalitarianism II) Lee Jin-wu
and Park Mi-ae, trs. (Seoul: Hangilsa)
3) Carl J. Friedrich, Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy, 4th
ed. (New York: Praeger, 1964).
577
and murder people so that the people could neither manage
ordinary life nor survive in the society.
Second, by punishing citizens refusing to conform to the social
norms,
terror-producing
governing
bodies
make
the
citizens
hesitate to take the same actions and hence achieve ongoing
control and constraint of the citizens.
Third, terror-producing control instruments generally constrain
people
and
prevent
their
participation
in
“subversive”
or
undesirable activities. The general constraint runs only if people
recognize things that might happen when they go beyond the
permitted limits.4)
To maintain Kim Il-sung and Kin Jong-il’s power, North Korea
has
a
totalitarian
policy
that
uses
terror-producing
control
instruments such as the Bowibu (National Security Agency) and
political prison camps. The North Korean regime is sustainable
because of the terror-producing control mechanism which can both
suppress political action and also promote an obedient citizenry.
Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il run political prison camps as a
means of terror that roots out political opponents and constrains
political protest.
There has been some research on human rights situation of
political prison camps in North Korea. International organizations
and domestic and foreign research institutes and human rights
organizations have released reports on human rights situation in
the political prison camps. The political prison camps came to be
known to the public by the activities of international human rights
organizations.
Asia
Watch
and
the
Minnesota
Lawyers
International Human Rights Committee published a report entitled
4) Donna Bahry, Brian D. Silver, “Intimidation and the Symbolic Uses of Terror in the
USSR,” American Political Science Review, vol. 81, no. 4, December 1987, p. 1067.
578
Human Rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,
which first revealed human rights situations in North Korea to the
public. That report includes locations of two Special Dictatorship
Zones
(teuk-byeol-dok-je-dae-sang-gu-yeoks),
the
charge
of
imprisonment, general information on their human rights situation,
arguing that there are 150,000 political prisoners in political prison
camps.5) Amnesty International (AI)’s report on prisoners in the
camps in 1993 began to raise international attention. It also
disclosed the human rights situation of Shin Suk-ja and her
daughters and the Sibata family imprisoned in Gwalliso No. 18
located in Seungho-ri. In addition, AI unveiled a list of forty-nine
political
prisoners’
names,
and
challenged
the
North
Korean
authorities to announce the reasons for their imprisonment, details
on their trials, and the whereabouts of the prisoners and their
relatives.6) In 2003, David Hawk from the U.S. Committee for
Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK) examined the human
rights situation in North Korea. His report Hidden Gulag deals
with the human rights situation of both opened and closed
detention facilities such as a political prison camps and long-term
corrective labor camps. Hidden Gulag is based on information
gathered by defectors who were once imprisoned in either a
political corrective labor camp or a long-term corrective labor camp.7)
Recently many domestic research institutes and human rights
organizations began to release their own reports on human rights
situations of political prison camps in North Korea. The White
5) Asia Watch, ed. Song Cheol-bok Translation, Bukhanui Ingwon (Human Rights in
North Korea) (Seoul: Goryeowon, 1990), pp. 115-117.
6) The Bureau of Public Information, Bukhanui Ingwon: Amnesty International Report on
North Korea, 1993-1994, (Human Rights in North Korea) (Seoul: Eunseongmunhwa,
1994).
7) David Hawk, Gamchwojin Suyongso (Hidden Gulag) translated by Lee Jae-gwang
(Seoul: Sidaejeongsin, 2003).
579
Papers on Human Rights in North Korea published in 2006 and
2008 by the Korean Bar Association (KBA) were written from the
testimonies and articles of former political prisoners, in-depth
investigations and surveys of North Korean defectors. The two
White Papers discuss the legal ground and process for the
punishment of political prisoners, current status, operation and
surveillance system of political prison camps, and daily routine
and human rights situations of political prisoners. The South
Korean Institute for National Unification (KINU) publishes the
White Paper on Human Rights in North Korea which deals with
the present conditions of the prison camps and the human rights
situations. Its information is gained from in-depth interviews with
North Korean defectors every year. In 2009, the National Human
Rights
Commission
of
the
Republic
of
Korea
released
The
Research on Actual Conditions of Political Prison Camp in North
Korea which outlines the current status, imprisonment and release
process, internal managing system, and human rights situation of
political prison camps from the in-depth interview with the former
prisoners. Free the NK Gulag issued a report on the actual
situation of the political prison camps, Names lost to the NK
Gulag, which deals with the personal information of 617 political
prisoners and an analysis and investigation of the missing and the
imprisoned in the political prison camps.
In this context, this paper will discuss the actual situation of
political prison camps among terror-producing governing bodies to
ascertain the degree of human rights violations spawned by this
political reign of terror. Just as the KBA’s previous White Papers
used the testimonies and articles of former political prisoners,
in-depth investigation and survey on North Korean defectors, the
580
2010 White Paper on Human Rights in North Korea will mainly
use the surveys and in-depth interviews with 200 North Korean
defectors including four former political prisoners and relevant
materials on political prison camps which have been published
after 2008.
2. North Korea’s Criminal Act and Political Prisoners
1) Legal Ground and Application of Political Crimes
(1) Criminal Charges on Political Prisoners and Guilt by Association
Until its 5th revision in 2004, North Korea’s Criminal Act had
defined the concept and range of a political prisoner ambiguously
such as ‘an anti-revolutionary’ ‘a person possessed of unsound
ideas’ or ‘a person with hostile elements,’ which consequently
served North Korean government to purge whoever they wanted.
The ambiguous expressions in the Act have been revised into
specific articles, but the Act still contains articles on political
prisoners
in
Article
3,
regulations
on
anti-government
and
anti-national crimes. Thus, according to North Korea’s Criminal
Act, a political prisoner can be defined as ‘a person committing
anti-government and anti-national crimes.’ However, the concept
of a political prisoner in the application of the Act needs to be
redefined because 60% of the inmates of political prison camps are
in fact political prisoners’ family members arrested under the guilt
by association system.
‘Names lost to NK Gulag’ published by the Free the NK Gulag
shows specific instances of the guilt by association system. This
report analyzes the types of political prisoners after reviewing
581
charges against 617 people imprisoned in the Edification District
for Revolution. The research results show the reasons of the
people’s imprisonment: guilt by association system (59%); treason
against one’s nation (9%); reactionary agitation and propaganda
(9%); religion, anti-party activity and purges (8%); conspiracy and
espionage
(7%);
smuggling
anti-socialist activity
and
economic
crime
(5%);
(3%).8)
The North Korean government began to use the guilt by
association system to purge the Yenan faction, the Soviet faction
and the Domestic faction in 1958 when Kim Il-sung ordered the
Bowibu, the National Security Agency, to “exterminate three
generations of political prisoners.” Since then, North Korean
authorities applied the system to three generations of political
prisoners who were the object of class struggle, anti-revolutionary
and anti-socialist forces, opponents of the autocratic Kim Il-sung
system, and counter forces to Kim Jong-il’s leadership after he
replaced Kim Il-sung.
(2) Provisions and Application of Political Crimes
The legal grounds to punish political prisoners are stipulated in
North Korea’s Criminal Act. Article 44 and Article 55 of that Act
define the concept and range of the punishment of anti-state
crimes. Specifically, it consists of eight articles for crimes against
the State sovereignty, two articles for opposing the people’s
liberation struggle for national liberation and two articles for
concealing and/or neglecting to inform on anti-state crimes.9)
8) Free the NK Gulag, Ithyeojin Ireumdeul (Forgotten Names) (Seoul: Sidaejeongsin,
2004), p. 99.
9) Seo Jae-jin et al., 2003 Bukhan Ingwon Baekseo (White Paper on Human Rights in North
Korea) (Seoul: Tongil Yeonguwon (Korea Institute for National Unification), 2003), p. 172.
582
Since
the
revised
Criminal
Act
of
2004,
charges
and
punishments of anti-state and anti-national crimes have been
stipulated from Article 59 to Article 72. Specifically, eight articles
of anti-state crimes, three articles of anti-national crimes and
three articles of crimes of concealing, not reporting and neglecting
to inform on anti-state or anti-national crimes. The punishments
are divided into ‘correctional prison labor less than five years,’
‘correctional prison labor from more than five years to less than
ten
years,’
‘correctional
prison
labor’
more
than
ten
years,
‘correctional prison labor less than four years’ and ‘correctional
prison labor less than three years.’ Capital punishment or a
life-time term of unlimited prison labor and the penalty of
property
confiscation
are
reserved
for
those
serious
cases
involving conspiracy to overturn the State, terrorism, treason
against the fatherland, and treason against the people.
From the testimonies of North Korean defectors who have
escaped
from
political
prison
camps,
it
seems
that
political
prisoners who are sentenced to death or ‘life-time term of
correctional prison labor’ are imprisoned in “Complete Control
Districts” whilst those who are sentenced to ‘correctional prison
labor’ less than ten years are imprisoned in Edification Districts
for Revolution. Placement can vary for those who are sentenced to
correctional prison labor of more than 10 years but are not in the
most serious category. The North Korean defectors from Yodeok
Political Prison Camps including Kang Chol-hwan testified that
many Korean descendents who used to live in Japan have been
imprisoned for more than 10 years in these re-education camps.
Shin Suk-ja and her family, a case that concerns the international
community, are imprisoned in one of these a long-tern corrective
583
prison camp.
Under the North Korean Criminal Act, the application of the
Articles to a political prisoner is clarified through an analysis of
the charges against the prisoners in a political prison camp. There
are six categories of charges: The first category of charge
includes
an
enemy
of
class
struggle
such
as
landowners,
capitalists, collaborators with the Japanese occupation, religious
leaders and their families. The second category of charge includes
a collaborator with the South Korean forces or a family member
of one who went to South Korea during the Korean War. The
third category of charge includes purged factions or those people
having at least one family member judged as a reactionary or an
anti-revolutionary. The fourth category of charge includes any
member of a family, including the accused who is considered an
opponent of the Kim Il-sung regime and the succeeding Kim
Jong-il regime. The fifth category of charge includes a prisoner
against the Party’s Ten Principles for the Establishment of the
One-Ideology System (Ten Principles) and verbal reactionaries
criticizing the regime, The sixth category of charge includes a
capitalist,
such
as
a
diplomat,
an
overseas
student,
a
Korean-Japanese who was repatriated to North Korea or one who
tried to cross the border.
(3) Testimony of North Korean Defectors
[ID 086 (2006)]10) testified that the Edification District for
Revolution of Gwalliso No. 15, houses mainly people who have
10) Interviews are identified by number and year (e.g. [ID 000 (2008)] or by a letter of the
alphabet and a number (e.g. A00) in order to protect their privacy and security. The
first method is now the standard but the latter method is sometimes used of interviews
dating from 2006.
584
been imprisoned for uttering undesirable comments or for verbally
criticizing the regime or polity, failed defectors to China, and
overseas students who studied in Russia. [ID 086 (2006)] also
provided evidence about the people he met in the camp. He met
Oh Gil-nam’s wife and his two daughters Oh Hae-won (then, 22
years old) and Oh Gyu-won there, but he lost contact with them
once the family moved. Kim Geum-chun (then, 27 years old, from
Onseong (Onsong) had been imprisoned there from June 1993 to
June 1994 before the escape from North Korea. Kim Ok-hee (then,
24 years old) was in the prison camp for three years from March
1993 to March 1996 because she had contacted a South Korean
while she worked at a North Korean noodle restaurant
in
Dandong, China. Gong Hae-yeong (then, 24 years old) was once a
nurse in Libya; she was arrested because she had attempted to
elope with a Tanzanian doctor. As a result, she was sentenced to
three years in prison. Kim Seong-ho (then, 31 years old) used to
be an air-force pilot. When he was studying in Russia, he
mistakenly uttered undesirable comments while drinking with
friends. During Kim’s three years of imprisonment, his eight
colleagues who studied in Russia were all arrested. Even after he
finished his three year-jail-sentence, he was not released. The
remainders of the people Gong mentioned include the director of
the South Korea Liaison office, a military captain and a second
lieutenant, a low-level Party secretary, an ex-ambassador to Libya
and a nuclear weapons researcher (Choi Byeong-rok, then 27
years old). When he was released, there were four defectors and
Ju Hyeon-il (then, 22 years old) is said to be imprisoned for
verbal criticism.11) [ID 198 (2010)] testified that the North Korean
11) In-dept interview with an anonymous North Korean defector [ID 086 (2006)] on June
22, 2006.
585
hero, Song Gen-il was imprisoned for 3 years for criticizing the
government. [ID 200 (2010)] also testified that Baek Cheol-jin was
imprisoned for 5 years for starting a foreign bank account while
working overseas.12)
There were also testimonies confirming the application of guilt
by association which is applied to families of political prisoners.
Guilt by association applies to the families of a political prisoner
who have committed a grave political crime, enough to be
imprisoned in a total isolation camp. Most of these people are
imprisoned in Complete Control Districts. The families of those of
Japanese of Korean decent or people receiving special attention
from the international community. In addition, a wife and a
daughter-in-law of political prisoners could be exempted from
imprisonment in the prison camp, if they accept a forced divorce.
Family members of those such as Ahn Hyuk, Lee Young-guk,
Kim Young-sun, Kim Tae-jin and others who were imprisoned
due to minor political offense were not targeted by guilt by
association.
Shin Dong-hyuk could not find out why he was imprisoned in
the political prison camp. He assumed it was because the two of
his father’s brothers went to South Korea during the Korean War.
Therefore, all family members including his grandmother, parents,
uncles and cousins were imprisoned in the Complete Control
District of Gwalliso No. 14, in Gaecheon (Kaechon).13) Shin
testified that the prisoners would not ask each other about their
charges and 70% of them had no idea why they were sent to the
12) In-dept interview with an anonymous North Korean defector [ID 200 (2010)] on March
21, 2010.
13) Shin Dong-hyuk Saesang Bakkeuro Naoda (Escaping to the Outside World) (Seoul:
Database Center for North Korean Human Rights, 2007), p. 20.
586
place. Ahn Myung-chul testified that under the instructions of
Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il three generations of a a political
prisoner who was an ‘enemy of class’ was to be “wiped out.”14)
Kang Chol-hwan mentioned that three generations of his family
including his grandmother, his uncles, he and his sister were
confined in Gwalliso No. 15 in Yodeok located in Hamgyeongnam-do
for 10 years after his grandfather had become a political prisoner.
A02 testified that people made a politically resistant remark
against Kim Il-sung and was imprisoned in Gwalliso No. 22, most
of whom used to be high officials or intellectuals with higher
degrees. According to A08’s testimony, Gwalliso No. 13 was
established about April 1964, and had held previous land owners
and their families from Pyeongyang, Shinuiju, Hamheung and
Hwanghae-do, people against the Party or counter-revolutionary
factions and their children studying abroad.15)
2) Criminal Procedure Act and the Criminal Procedure for Political
Prisoners
The North Korean authorities regard a political prisoner as an
enemy, not a target to be edified but one to be isolated from the
society
forever.
North
Korea
has
kept
political
prisoners’
whereabouts in secret and even has hidden their death to their
families and workplaces. Considering political prisoners as ‘an
enemy’ against the North Korean regime, North Korea confiscates
their citizen’s IDs in the detention process and deprives them of
14) Kim Yong-sam "Imsinja Bimil Cheohyeonggwa Saengche Silheomui Naemak (Behind
Story of Secret Execution of the Pregnant and Biological Experiments)" Monthly
Chosun, March (1995), p. 175.
15) National Human Rights Commission, Bukhan jeongchibeom suyongso Siltaejosa (The
Research on Actual Condition on Political Prisons in North Korea), A research paper
on actual condition of human rights in North Korea in 2009, p. 384.
587
all rights including the right to vote and be voted. Moreover, the
government takes measure to restrict the political prisoner’s food
ration,
medical
benefits,
marriage
and
childbirth,
visit
and
correspondence with relatives, and any contact from outsiders.16)
In principle, political prisoners are considered as the first target
of execution and are shot to death because they might revolt and
disturb from the rear guard. Every political prison camp has an
operation
manual
about
getting
rid
of
political
prisoners
in
emergency and training security guards for mopping-up operation
during peacetime.17)
North Korea’s Bowibu, in charge of political crimes, including
being responsible for arrest, interrogation, pretrial examination and
detention of political prisoners. Once arrested by the Bowibu, a
suspect is usually detained for about two months in a detention
house. In case of a complicated case, the pretrial for the suspect
can be longer, up to six months. Article 7 of the Criminal
Procedure Act stipulates that the Pretrial Examination Agency
(PEA) under the Bowibu, shall be in charge of crimes against
state. However, in the case of political prisoners, the interrogation
period can be extended at will, even more than one year
depending on the importance of the crime. The suspects are
forced to confess during the pretrial, experiencing brutal torture
including water torture, electricity torture, picking the skin under
the fingernails with a needle or twisting fingers and sleep
deprivation. The suspects often get sick or die from the torture
16) Choi Seong-cheol, "Bukhan Jeongchibeom Suyongsoui Chamsanggwa Bukhanui Ingwon
(Wretched Reality of North Korean Gulg and Human Rights)" Tongil (August 1997), p.
33.
17) Jeong Yu-jin, "Ilban Jumindo Gulmeo Jugeoganeun Pane Jeongchibeomdeureun Eojji
Dwaeseulkka? (What Would Have Happened to Political Prisoners in the Days the
Public are Dying from Starvation?)," Saemulgyeol July (Seoul: Jayupyeongronsa, 1997),
p. 121.
588
and its aftereffects, malnutrition, and beating from a group of
agents.18)
The
Bowibu
unilaterally
decides
the
treatment
of
political
prisoners. The Bowibu is in charge of interrogation and pretrial of
political prisoners and determines the length of detention after the
internal procedure at the end of the pretrial. North Korean
defectors from political prison camps have testified that the
Bowibu have a process to confirm an affidavit of a suspect and
his/her prisoner number by an interrogator and his/her superior at
the end of the pretrial. They confirm details of a crime and
criminal behaviors and determine the place of confinement and the
length of the prison term. It is known that they usually detain the
suspect without any notice to the accused himself/herself or even
to his/her family.19) Political prisoners and even their families
have no a chance of a judicial defense or an explanation. During
pretrial, arrest and trial, the accused are deprived of fundamental
rights, even though the the Criminal Procedure Act mandates
meeting with the accuser, appointing an attorney and having
chances of self-defense.20) Besides, it is known that political
prisoners are hardly brought to justice.
Depending
on
the
result
of
interrogation
and
pretrial
examination by the Bowibu, those accused of committing relatively
minor crimes are imprisoned in Edification District for Revolution
or
other
political
prison
camps.
However,
those
accused
of
committing more serious crimes, such as crimes against the North
18) Kim Seung-cheol, "Bukhan Pyeonganbuk-do Gukgabowibu Jihagamok Siltae(Reality of
North Korea’s Basement Prison in Pyeonganbuk-do Bowibu)," North Korea, vol. 399
(2005), pp. 176-178.
19) Bukhan jeongchibeom suyongso Siltaejosa (The Research on Actual Condition on
Political Prisons in North Korea), A research paper on actual condition of human
rights in North Korea in 2009, pp. 53-56.
20) Hawk, Gamchwojin Suyongso (Hidden Gulag), p. 64.
589
Korean government, and Kim Il-sung and his son Kim Jong-il,
are sentenced to death or ‘life-long correctional prison labor’ and
imprisoned in Complete Control District. If a felon is sentenced,
his property is confiscated and family members, because of guilt
by association, can also be imprisoned.
Many witnesses have testified about human rights violation
during criminal procedures for political prisoners. [ID 023 (2006)]
testified that there was a secret operation base of the Bowibu in
charge of serious political cases in Jangsaeng-ri, Jongseong,
Onseong-gun in the northern part of Hamgyeongbuk-do, where no
one has been released so far. [ID 078 (2006)] testified that
Jangsaeng-ri had been used for a secret Bowibu detention house
since
Gwalliso
No.
21,
previously
located
in
Jangsaeng-ri,
Onseong-gun, Hamgyeongbuk-do, moved to Gwalliso No. 22 in
Hoeryong. The detention house is located inside of a cave. [ID
078 (2006)] witnessed frequently the Bowibu agents driving a
truck filled with handcuffed prisoners.21) [ID 023 (2006)] happened
to know that a 40-year-old person, who used to be an antique
dealer, died in a underground jail at Jeongseong Political Prison
Camp.22) [ID 082 (2008)] also testified, “I have been interrogated
at Hoeryong-si (city) Bowibu by Hong Jong-hwan, the provincial
Bowibu
agent,
for
10
months.23)
During
the
interrogation
procedure, I was beaten every day.” The prisoners have to sit
with cross- legged from 6 a.m. when they get up until 10 p.m.
when they go to bed. They are not allowed to talk with other
inmates. They are forced to kneel down to the ground and bend
their head and are brutally beaten and harassed during the
21) Testimony of [ID 078 (2006)] interviewed by the KBA on July 8, 2006.
22) Testimony of [ID 023 (2008)] interviewed by the KBA
590
interrogation.24)
[ID 084 (2008)] made detailed testimonies about the interrogation
practices
of
the
Bowibu,
life
at
a
detention
house,
and
imprisonment procedures at Yodeok Political Prison Camp. While
attempting to go to South Korea in 2003, [ID 084 (2008)] was
caught and repatriated to the Bowibu in Onseong-gun. During
each interrogation, a Bowibu agent beat [ID 084 (2008)] with a
club from 3 to 6 times to make [ID 084 (2008)] confessed. In the
detention house, [ID 084 (2008)] had to sit with the legs crossed
from 5 a.m. to 10 p.m. If someone happens to budge, all prisoners
had to repeat pump squat 100 times. The place was filled with
the smell of sweat and mixed with the stench. Since no sanitary
napkins were available, female inmates had to rip a piece of cloth
to make one and use it again after rinsing it with water.25)
[ID 198 (2010)] was interrogated for 8 month in the detention
house at Musan-gun Bowibu. Inmates was forced to bend their
head from 5 a.m. to 10 p.m. and could not move their bodies and
exercise for only 15 minutes in the morning and 10 minutes in the
afternoon. They had to live, repeating being tied and released
while they are tied all day long. The meal was only 5 to 6
spoonfuls of food, corn or beans. While being interrogated, they
were not allowed to sleep. Since prisoners were forced to kneel
down, tie their hands and neck together with a rope behind their
back, and put beer bottles under the arms, their arms got all
severely bruised because the blood could not flow well. In
addition, they were beaten brutally with their legs tied with
shackles and even when they slightly moved in the detention
591
house. The Bowibu agents beat the inmates with anything that
they can take: a tool, a weeding hoe, a shovel and a stick.26) [ID
199 (2010)] testified that while being tied to the steel-barred
window, he was not allowed to sleep for 24 hours during 4 days
during the interrogation in the Bowibu detention house where
many people die.27)
North Korean defectors testified that political prisoners do not
receive judicial procedures. After the interrogation in the Bowibu,
a director told Lee Young-guk that “You deserve to die, but you
will be sent to ‘Edification District for Revolution,’ Gwalliso No.
15, for a few years because of the magnanimity of our dear
leader.”28) [ID 086 (2006)] arrested in 1993 after defection to China
was interrogated in the Bowibu at Gimchaek, Hamgyeongbuk-do.
He testified, “Two officials from the liaison office at Yalu river
confirmed what they found from the interrogation by asking
questions and checking my answers.” After the Bowibu agent
asked me whether I had more to say and said, “Let’s go to the
Edification District for Revolution for three years.”29) [ID 084
(2006)] was arrested in China after a failed escape attempt in
1993. After 6 months of interrogation by the Bowibu, [ID 084
(2006)] was imprisoned in the Edification District for Revolution at
Daesuk-ri. [ID 084 (2006)] did not know where [ID 084 (2006)]
was going while being transported to a political prison camp. [ID
084 (2006)] testified that a Bowibu director in the political prison
camp said, “Since you are supposed to be here for 3 years, you
27) Testimony of [ID 199 (2010)] interviewed by the KBA on February 22, 2010.
28) Lee Yeong-guk, Naneun Gimjeongil Gyeonghowonieotda (I was a Kim Jong-il’s
bodyguard) (Seoul: Sidaejeongsin, 2002), pp. 129~143.
592
must do your best while in jail,” from which [ID 084 (2006)]
knew the place and the period of imprisonment.30) [ID 083 (2008)]
said that there is no judicial procedure even after the interrogation
and only received a notice from a Bowibu agent that [ID 083
(2008)] would be sent to Yodeok Political Prison Camp from and
all the procedures were set up.31) [ID 084 (2008)] was said to get
though-remodeling
by
procedures after the
a
Bowibu
agent
interrogation.32)
without
any
judicial
[ID 198 (2010)] and [ID 200
(2010)] also testified that they were imprisoned in Yodeok Political
Prison Camp with no judicial procedure after interrogation by the
Bowibu.33)
3. Operation of Political Prison Camp
1) Definition and Present Situation
(1) Definition
Political Prison camps in North Korea have several names.
North Korean officials normally refer to them as “Gwalliso No.
XX,” which means “a controlled and managed place.” Ordinary
inhabitants of North Korea call it “a control zone,” “Complete
Control District,” “Special Dictatorship Zone (teuk-byeol-dok-jedae-sang-gu-yeok),” “the area for movement (i-ju-gu-yeok),” “a
political
prison
camp,”
“an
isolated
place
for
prisoners
(yu-bae-so),” “a place for harmful factions (jong-pa-gul)” and so
on. North Korean authorities call a political prison camp “XXX
30)
31)
32)
33)
Testimony of [ID 084 (2006)] interviewed by the KBA on July 24, 2006.
Testimony of [ID 083 (2008)] interviewed by the KBA on March 14, 2008.
Testimony of [ID 084 (2008)] interviewed by the KBA on March 21, 2008.
Testimony of [ID 010 (2010)] interviewed by the KBA April 4, 2010, [ID 200 (2010)]
interviewed by the KBA on March 21, 2010.
593
Gwalli-so”
putting
a
document
number
defining
a
charge
considered necessary to keep their system, or a unique regional
number of each political prison camp.34) The North Korean
government disguises the camps with names like “No. XXX
Garrison of People’s Army of Korea” in order to prevent its
exposure to the outside. [ID 086 (2006)] gave evidence that his
document of release indicated “Garrison No. 405” rather than
Dasuk-ri Edification District for Revolution in Yodeok Political
Prison Camp.35) Lee also said when [ID 085 (2006)] and his/her
family were released from the prison that there was “Garrison No.
2918 of North Korean People’s Army” below the pledge paper.36)
A North Korean prison camp is divided into two sections:
“Edification
District
for
Revolution”
and
“Complete
Control
District.” The Edification District for Revolution is located only at
Gwalliso
No.
15
(Yodeok,
Hamgyeonbuk-do).
The
Edification
District for Revolution has only the prisoners of those who were
dispatched overseas such as students, diplomats and those who
committed
minor
crimes
such
as
ideological
perverts,
Korean-Japanese who were repatriated to North Korea and those
who attempted to cross the border. North Korea tries to make
non-serious
torturing
prisoners
obey
the
country
by
imprisoning
and
them.37)
[ID 082 (2008)] testified he was imprisoned at Gwalliso No. 15,
Yodeok Political Prison Camp located in Guyeup-ri, Yodeok-gun,
Hamgyeongnam-do (South Hwanghae Province) with 200 prisoners
34) Lee Geum-sun et al., 2004 Buthan Ingwon baekseo (White Paper on Human Rights in
North Korea) (Seoul: Tongil Yeonguwon(Korea Institute for National Unification)), p.
271.
37) Lee, Buthan Ingwon baekseo (White Paper on Human Rights in North Korea), p. 190.
594
and worked for the Agriculture Production Department.38) [ID 083
(2008)] said the number of prisoners is 140 in Gwalliso No. 15,
Yodeok
Political
Prison
Camp.39)
[ID
084
(2008)]
who
once
detained at the Edification District for Revolution of Yodeok
Political Prison Camp testified that there were about 200 political
prisoners supposed to be released after three years of revolutionary
training.40)
The Edification District for Revolution are also divided into
“family district” and “singles district,” (i.e. a place for families and
the other for singles). One who has almost finished the prison
service takes a revolutionizing verdict. If one’s imprisonment
period ends, one can eventually be released from the prison and
citizenship is restored. However if there is a trouble during the
imprisonment at the Edification District for Revolution, one’s
confinement period becomes extended and he or she may even be
transferred to a ‘the complete control zone.’
The release process from an Edification District for Revolution
occurs when the Bowibu Director is present. He announces a list
of names and grants citizen Ids, normally on February 16, Kim
Jong-il’s birthday. Those released have to pledge that they will
never disclose the details of life inside the camp. Since North
Korean citizen IDs list the person’s career including time in a
political prison camp, the released have limited freedom in society.
The Bowibu agents keep those people under observation. Even
their social positions are limited to those for hard labor work. Kim
Yong-seon says that those people who have economic capability
can live freely if they offer money and bribes. However, it is also
595
impossible for them to move up in society enough to be high
class officials or work for a major government agency.41)
The Complete Control District (wan-jeon-tong-je-gu-yeok) is a
place used to imprison those people who are sentenced to life for
egregious crimes. This district has absolute confinement, which
includes total surveillance and control, as well as many guards.
There are two witnesses for the district; Ahn Myung-chul,
previously
a
driver
at
Gwalliso
No.
13
and
22
and
Shin
Dong-hyuk, a defector from Gwalliso No. 14 in Gaecheon, who
entered South Korea in August, 2006.
The Complete Control District is not only a place where
prisoners are isolated from the society forever but are never
released. Prisoners in the Complete Control District suffer forced
labor daily from 12 to 15 hours for life. Even meals distributed to
them are minimized to barely sustain their life. The prisoners in
this zone are not the objects for revolutionizing. Thus, there is no
picture of Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il and no additional
education on ideology. The political prison camps run by the
Bowibu except the Edification District for Revolution in Gwalliso
No. 15, are all Complete Control Districts.
At the early stage of the establishment, the Complete Control
District is for those defined by North Korea as enemies of class,
such as the exploiting class including landlords and capitalists,
and enemies of class struggle including pro-Japanese collaborators
during
Japanese
occupation
Afterwards,
purged
factions
Throughout
Kim
Il-sung’s
in
and
Korea,
their
and
religious
families
One-ideology
are
system
leaders.
included.
and
the
succeeding Kim Jong-il regime, most of their opponents were
41) In-depth interview with Kim Yeong-sun (assumed name), a former prisoner in the
political prison camp in North Korea, on June 27, 2006.
596
imprisoned. The environment of the Complete Control District is
much poorer than that of the Edification District for Revolution,
food is scarce and prisoners suffer extreme hard labor.42)
(2) Operation Situation
There has been no information on political prison camps
including their numbers and inmates, but it is estimated that there
are five or ten camps and 200,000 prisoners in the camps. The
dimension of a prison camp is about 51~250 ㎢ and one political
prison camp accommodates, apparently somewhere between 5,000
and 50,000 prisoners. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the North
Korean
authorities
(Kaesong),
dissolved
Hamgyeongbuk-do,
Gwalliso
No.
11
in
Gaeseong
Gwalliso
No.
12
in
Onseong,
Hamgyeongbuk-do, Gwalliso No. 13 in Onseong, Hamgyeongbuk-do,
Gwalliso No. 26 in Seungho (Sungho), Pyeongyang (Pyongyang),
and
Gwalliso
No.
27
Cheonma
(Chonma),
Pyeongan-do
(Pyongan-do, North and South P’yŏngan Province) because of
their locations close to the border and the fear of detection.
Currently, it is reported that five political prisons including
Gwalliso No. 14, Gwalliso No. 15, Gwalliso No. 16, Gwalliso No. 22
and Gwalliso No. 25 (refer to <Table IV-8-1>) still exist. The
satellite pictures of Gwalliso No. 14, Gwalliso No. 15 and Gwalliso
No. 22 are published in David Hawk’s Hidden Gulag. They
include the camps’ location, facilities and dimensions.
42) Lee, 2004 Bukhan Ingwon Baekseo (2004 White Paper on Human Rights in North
Korea), p. 189.
597
<Table Ⅳ-8-1> Confirmed Operation Camps43)
Gwalliso
No. 22
Gwalliso
No. 25
Bobong-ri
and
Oedong-ri,
Yodeok -gun, Gochang-ri,
Gaecheon
Hamgyeongnam Hamgyeong
-gun,
-do
nam-do
Hamgyeongb
uk-do-do
Hoeryong,
Hamgyeongb
uk-do
Suseong-do
ng,
Chengjin,
Hamgyeong
buk-do
official
name
No. 2915
Gwalliso No. Garrison of
14 in
North Korean
Gaecheon
People‘s
Army
No.2209
Garrison of
North Korean
People‘s
Army
Dimension
approximately, approximately,
280㎢
460㎢
approximately,
650㎢
Name
Location
Gwalliso
No. 14
Gwalliso
No. 15
Gwalliso
No. 16
number of approximately, approximately, approximately, approximately,
prisoners 50 thousand 50 thousand
10 thousand 50 thousand
Typeof
prisoners
Family and
divided into
gender
prisoners and
family
Family
Established
in 1959
Establishin under the
g period suggestion
of Choi
Yong-gun
Features
of
Prisoners
Anti-Kim
Il-sung
officials from
the Party,
government,
and military,
and their
family aged
Family
approximately,
3 thousand
Family
established in
1974
In the
Edification
District for
Revolution,
Korean-Japan
ese and
political
prisoner as a
revolutionizin
Those
purged
officials
including
Kim
Dong-gyu
(former vice
chief of
nation) in
Collaborators
with the
Japanese
occupation,
land lords,
police,
capitalists,
prostitute,
religious
Felons:
religious
leaders,
spies and
factions
43) This table is based on the testimony of the North Korean defectors Ahn Myeong-cheol
and Kang Cheol-hwan who were once imprisoned in the political prison camps. The
content of Gwalliso No. 14 was complimented by the testimony of Shin Dong-hyuk.
598
Name
Gwalliso
No. 14
from
50 to 60
Comment
Solely
operates
Edification
District for
Revolution,
Gwalliso
No. 15
g target
In Complete
Control
District,
enemy of
class struggle
and his
families such
as
landowners
and
capitalists,
collaborators
with the
Japanese
occupation,
defector’s
family.
among 15
Japanese
wives in the
town for
repatriates
from Japan,
10 were
already died
Gwalliso
No. 16
70s - 80s
while Kim
Jong-il
regime
formed
the most
dangerous
prisoners
who once
tried to
subvert the
regime
Gwalliso
No. 22
Gwalliso
No. 25
leaders,
defector’s
family,
factions’
family,
opponent of
sole
leadership of
Suryong,
Collaborators
with the
South Korean
forces and
some family
members
70 % of
prisoners are
25-40 years
old, and
proportion of
males to
female is 4
to 6.
There are
many
product
with good
quality
such as a
Galmeagi
(brand
name)
bicycle, a
fridge
without
motor, a
sewing
machine, a
radiator for
heating,
599
Shin Dong-hyuk testified and gave detailed information about
the location, towns, and numbers of prisoners in Gwalliso No. 14,
which is actually a political prison camp.
Gwalliso
No.
14
is
located
in
Oedong-ri
Gaecheon-si,
Pyeongannam-do (Pyongan-namdo, South Pyongan Province). The
Daedong river marks the boundary between Gwalliso No. 14 at
the upper side and Gwalliso No.18 run by the PSA. Oedong-ri
where Shin lived, has a main town with 40 cottages. Four
families live in each cottage, so there are a total of 160 families
in
the
political
prison
camp
in
Oedong-ri.
The
number
of
prisoners confined in Gwalliso No. 14 is about 50 thousand.
Gwalliso No. 14 consists of the town and five valleys. The
prisoners who live in No. 1 valley are capable of going out
temporarily to the main town if they are good at their jobs. In
contrast to the prisoners in the No. 1 valley, the prisoners in No.
4 and 5 valleys cannot go out at all. However, the prisoners of
No. 4 and 5 valleys are able to go inside No. 3 valley as long as
they are good at their jobs.44)
Shin Dong-hyuk testified that Gwalliso No. 18 run by the
People’s Safety Agency (PSA) is located across Gwalliso No.14
over the Daedong river. So far, few defectors have testified about
the existence of Gwalliso No. 18. [ID 085 (2006)] testified about
Gwalliso No. 18, which is governed by the PSA and located in
Pukchang-gun, Pyeongannam-do. Because [ID 085 (2006)]’s father
was executed in November 15, 1977, [ID 085 (2006)]’s family was
44) 2008 Korean Bar Association Study; in-depth interview with Shin, Dong-hyuk escaped
from Gwalliso No. 14; Shin, Saesang Bakkeuro Naoda (Escaping to the Outside World),
pp. 39-42.
600
sentenced to one year of revolutionizing in Gwalliso No. 18. Even
though [ID 085 (2006)] was sentenced for one year, [ID 085
(2006)]’s family were eventually released after almost 6 years on
December 1, 1983.
Food distribution in Gwalliso No. 18 is made once every 15
days, but the amount of food is only enough for five days.
Subsidiary food such as a soy source and soybean paste is also
distributed.
Salt
is
distributed
only
once
a
year.
For
the
preparation of winter Kimchi, 15kg of Chinese cabbages and 5kg
of radishes are provided. Additionally, the people in the Camp
cultivate a patch for vegetables such as cabbages and pumpkins.
[ID 085 (2006)] said that there were fewer days with meals than
days without meals and [ID 085 (2006)] had to endure up to five
days without food. The miners worked at a salary of 130 won.
No clothes were distributed, only the miners received working
clothes; one pair of summer clothes for a year, one pair of winter
clothes for three years and one pair of work shoes for six
months.45)
[ID 073(2006)] and family member of his wife were imprisoned
as political prisoners in Gwalliso No. 18. In the camp, people were
treated like dogs and their citizen IDs were taken away.46) [ID
072 (2006)]’s brother-in-law once fled to South Korea temporarily
during his military service as a messenger for a regiment
commander in North Korean People’s army before Korean War. In
the
late
1960s,
his
family
members
were
sentenced
to
imprisonment in the No. 18 Pukchang Colliery Prison Camp. After
the death of his parents, [ID 072 (2006)]’s nephew was released
45) Testimony of [ID 073 (2006)] interviewed by the KBA on June 28, 2006.
601
and visited [ID 072 (2006)]’s house in the late 1980s. In Pukchang
Political Prison Camp, those defectors who attempted to enter
South Korea and families of political factions were isolated from
ordinary people. The inmates could marry other prisoners, if they
worked hard.47) Kim Yong testified that prisoners of Gwalliso
No.18 are previous land owners, activists for public safety corps
during the Korean War, collaborators for US and Korean army,
accomplices to a revolt, political opponents of Kim Jong-il. Gang
Myeong-do also said that Gwalliso No.18 was established around
1958 in which many people from Hwanghae-do had a family
member having gone to South Korea; 70% of inmates were family
members and relatives of a person having gone to South Korea
and the rest 30% of them were political prisoners.48)
Kim Yong provided evidence that those prisoners in Gwalliso
No. 18 were mostly landlords, collaborators with South Korea and
the U.S. forces, accomplices in the rebellion, political enemies of
Kim Jong-il and so on. Kang Myeong-do said that Gwalliso No.
18 was established around 1958 and the inmates were mostly from
Hanghaebuk-do (North Hwanghae Province) and were the family
members of the people who had fled to South Korea. 70% of the
prisoners were the family and relatives of escapees and remainder
(30%) were political prisoners.
Gwalliso No. 18 located in Pukchang, Pyeonganbuk-do is close
by Gwalliso No. 14 in Gaecheon, Pyeongannam-do. Most of the
prisoners in No. 18 Prison Camp are families of escapees to South
Korea. 50% of prisoners’ family members are females since the
48) Kim Yong-sam, "Segye Choechoui Saenghwanja Jeungeon-Bukhanui Ausyubicheu 14Ho
Gwallisoui Naemak (The testimony of the world’s first survivor: the inside story on
North Korea’s Auschwitz No. 14 Gwalliso)" Monthly Chosun (May 2000), pp. 333~337.
602
father of each family was executed or the zone he was imprisoned
in was the Complete Control District. Those prisoners were forced
to work in a mine and all coal collected in the mine were sent to
the Pukchang thermal power plant. Because the PSA was in
charge of Gwalliso No. 18, the living conditions were relatively
better than the other political prison camps operated by the
Bowibu. However there were still serious human rights violations
in Gwalliso No. 18. It seems that prisoners in No. 18 Prison Camp
are allowed to leave the Camp after a certain period of time or
when a political prisoner is sick.
There are testimonies about additional political prison camps
run by North Korean government, over and above the ones
already mentioned. These camps include Gwalliso No. 21 located
in Changpyeong (Changpyong)-ri, Gyeongseong (Kyongsong)-gun,
Hamgyeongnam-do; Gwalliso No. 23 in Rimangji-ri, Deokseonggun
(Toksong)-gun, Hamgyeongnam-do; Gwalliso No.xx in Jeongpyeong
(Chongpyong)-gun,
Hamgyeongnam-do;
Gwalliso
No.
17
in
Seoksan-ri, Pukchang-gun, Pyeongannam-do and Gwalliso; No.xx
in Hecheon-si, Jagang-do (Chagang Province, Chagang-do).49)
However, these political prison camps have not been accurately
confirmed.
[ID 071 (2006)] who worked as an agent of People’s Safety
Agency at a magnesite mine camp in Daeheung-ri, Dancheon
(Tanchon), Hamgyeongnam-do described the living conditions of
the prisoners. People were treated like dogs in the camp and the
majority of the forced laborers were the families of the people
who had been purged from the authorities. He also said that
49) Yoon Dae-il, Aguichuk Jiphaengbu Guk-ga Anjeon Bowibuui Naemak(Inside truth of
the axis of evil’s administrator, the Bowibu (National Security Agency)) (Seoul:
Monthly Chosun, 2002), p. 79.
603
married inmates were separated in order to prevent pregnancy.50)
[ID 090 (2006)] testified that she heard from her husband that
there was a confidential facility to hold military officials who went
against the North Korean political system or agenda. She also
stated they were taken to an underground clandestine labor
facility once an error in their military record had been found.51)
2) Operating system
The 7th Bureau of the Bowibu governs political prison camps,
whose operation system is the same as the following <Diagram>.
A director of a political prison camp controls the governing body
composed with Political Bureau, the Bowibu, Management Bureau,
Guard, and Rear Bureau, Material Division, Gunpowder Division,
Finance
Division,
Communication
Division
and
Transportation
Division. According to the testimony of a defector, once a Bowibu
agent at a political prison camp, the number of employees is about
200 and would be 500, if including the Bowibu agents working at
factories, mines, or ri (a village). The Director, as the highest
official in charge, controls Political Bureau and Administration
Bureau, under which there are 10 Divisions.52)
rights in North Korea in 2009, p. 67.
604
<Diagram> The Organizational Structure in Political Prison Camp
Commandant of a Political Prison Camp
Director of Political Department
Political Department
Security
Department
Division
I
Management
Department
Division
II
Division
I
Security
Department
Logistics
Department
Division
II
Commercial
Division
Camp Guard
Search Unit
Materials
Division
Logistics
Division
Explosive
Materials Division
Treasury
Division
Transportation
Division
Communicati
on Division
Source: Ahn Myung-chul, They Are Crying for Help(Seoul: Chonji Media, 1997), p. 184.
The Organization of Management System of Political Prison
Camps has Management Committee made up of inmates for
control inmates and their work. The committee has a Chairperson
of the Management Committee, a bookkeeper, a lower-level Party
secretary, the Head of the Workshop Unit, the Chairperson of the
League of the Socialist Working Youth and an operator. The
Bowibu agents manage and supervise working units or factories,
and appoint the general manager and supervisor.53) [ID 082 (2008)]
testified that Yodeok Political Prisoner’s system consists of one
safety
officer,
chairpersons
of
the
management
committee,
supervisors, team leaders, leaders of a 3-person team.54) [ID 083
(2008)] testified about the work unit organization, supervision, and
life regulations of No.15 Yodeok Political Prison Camp.55)
Yodeok Political Prison Camp consists of 2 work units and each
rights in North Korea in 2009, p. 70.
work
unit
was
responsibility
made
work
up
unit,
of
one
five
teams.
inner
work,
There
and
were
one
605
one
general
personnel responsible for per each work unit. 2 to 3 people acted
as secret informers. The political prison camp’s slogan was
“prepare to become a wholesome human.” The Political Prison
Camp’s life regulation was based on three people as a group and
there was no liberalism. We could not leave the group for more
than 15 minutes. [ID 198 (2010)] testified that the Political Prison
Camp
consists
of
chairpersons
of
a
committee,
secretaries
responsible for ideology education, dormitory deans, company
commanders, platoon leaders and group leaders (three people for a
group).56) Shin Dong-hyuk gave testimony on the management
system of the clothing factory in the Camp. According to his
testimony, there was one Bowibu agent and a general manager,
and a supervisor chosen among the camp prisoners who managed
the system in the factory.57)
Political prison camps have a life regulation called ‘10 rules and
regulations’ which apply to all prisoners in political prison camps.
The ‘10 rules and regulations’ are designed not simply to keep
order
but
to
prevent
political
prisoners’
from
rebelling
and
escaping as well as inducing unconditional obedience. If they
violate the regulations, political prisoners are mostly likely to be
executed.
There is no propaganda message in the political prison camp
except for one message ‘all people must obey the laws and
regulations’ at schools and nearby mountains. There are ‘10 rules
and regulations’ which everyone must memorize and abide by.
57) The KBA’s interview in 2008 with a North Korean defector, Shin, Dong-hyuk escaped
from Gwalliso No. 14.
606
The following are the detailed regulations: (a) you must not
escape. (b) Three or more inmates must not meet together. (c)
You must not steal. (d) You must absolutely obey the orders of
the
Protection
Agency
guidance
officers.
(e)
You
must
immediately report if you saw any outsiders or suspicious people.
(f)
All
inmates
must
carefully
watch
over
each
other
and
immediately report each others’ unusual behavior. (g) You must
"over-fulfill"
all
tasks
assigned
to
you.
(h)
Unless
it
is
job-related, no contact between male and female is allowed. (i)
You must be truly remorseful with your own mistakes. (j) You
shall be immediately shot by a firing squad if you ever violate
‘these rules and regulations’ of the camp.
Political prison camps require a basic posture that the prisoners
must perform when facing Bowibu agents or guards. Prisoners
must put their hands behind their back, turn to the side and move
toward the opposite direction of a Bowibu agent only after the
Seon-saeng-nim (originally people use it to call a teacher or to
respect someone, but in the political prison camps it is used to
call a Bowibu agent) passes by. This rule must be obeyed
whenever and wherever. In Gwalliso No. 22, male prisoners must
take off their hats and female prisoners must take off the towels
that cover their head, holding them in their hands and bending
their heads 90 degrees in a stand-to-attention position when
Bowibu agents or guards are close by. They must also do this
when a guard is looking for a certain prisoner or asking questions
when prisoners meet them in the workplace.
In addition, prisoners are assumed to be escapees and punished
if they are caught while possessing food such as salt and meat or
matches, or if they are wandering around or climbing a mountain
607
late at night without permission. Political prisoners must also
move in a group unit consisting of three people. They must not
converse with other district inmates and must not try to gain
information about the outside world or spread the information
inside the camp. The prison camp’s daily regulations are carried
out in order to deprive them of their liberty. Every move of the
prisoners is thoroughly supervised and regulated in order to
prevent them from ever attempting escape or resistance.
The safety officers carry out supervision by keeping secret
informers, which allows inmates to monitor one another within a
political prison camp. [ID 082 (2008)] confessed that [ID 082
(2008)] once was a secret informer for a Bowibu agent.58) So had
been Shin Dong-hyuk in the political prison camp.
4. Living Conditions for Political Prisoners
1) Appearance
The average height for political prisoners is 150 cm and many
of them are bent more than 90 Degree at their waists. Their faces
are swollen and appear yellowish. Children’s stomachs are inflated
like that of a tadpole. The political prisoners suffer from chronic
hunger, which only leaves them with the appearance of a human
being
with
no
flesh.
They
are
unbearably
scrawny
and
underweight to the level where it appears they consist of only
skin and a bone. Ahn Hyuk whose weight was 75kg, dropped to
38kg
after
being
imprisoned
in
the
Edification
District
for
Revolution in Yodeok Political Prison Camp for two years.59)
59) Seo Dong-ik, Inmini Saneun Moseup 1(Life of the Public 1) (Seoul: Jaryowon, 1995),
p. 122.
608
In addition, the political prisoners are allowed only one set of
garments, which are usually worn to the point of being rags. It is
difficult to differentiate their appearance between an animal and a
human being due the rags they wear and the fact they do not
wash. According to testimony by Ahn Myung-chul, political
prisoners
in
the
Complete
Control
District
have
often
been
imprisoned for 20 to 30 years. However, the majority of the actual
detainees considered political prisoners are deceased and the
detainees’ family are left behind and still imprisoned. Ahn testified
that their waist begins to bend at a 90 degree angle at the age of
45 and they die a natural death at the age of 50.
2) Clothing
Political prison camps do not supply necessities for basic living,
therefore prisoners must bring their own kitchenware, bedclothes
and garments. Garments are hardly provided, which drives the
detainees to make clothing out of gunny sacks they take from the
work space or to quarrel over the clothes or a blanket of a
deceased person. Political prisoners must survive the harsh winter
where the temperature is somewhere around -20 degrees. The
prisoners pull out wormwood (mugwort) and dry it in midsummer
and quilt it inside their clothes like cotton during winter. They
also tie cloths around their hands and feet to prevent frostbite.
For family households in the Edification District for Revolution
of Gwalliso No. 15 in the Yodeok Political Prison Camp, only one
blanket and one quilted winter garment are supplied per family
unit. Working uniforms are provided every three years but not to
unmarried
singles.
Underclothing
such
as
socks
and
undergarments are never supplied. Political prisoners have to
609
repeatedly mend their garments with mop-rags because they are
not provided with any clothing while they are in prison. In terms
of shoes, work shoes are supplied, one pair every eighteen months
and cotton shoes for winter are given once every five years.
Political prisoners make shoes from f discarded tractor or car tires
and weave them with iron wire or make ji-wha-jok, a kind of
shoes made from elm trees.
[ID 086 (2006)] testified that the prison camp provides nothing
and bedclothes, garments, shoes, soap and working clothes must
be prepared before entering the camp. Political prisoners repeatedly
patch up their clothes or secretly exchange items that new
inmates need for the newcomer’s garment. According to testimony,
people take all the clothes and bedclothes from someone when
they die.60) In additions, [ID 082 (2008)] said that once a month
the prisoners are given a half bar of soap and discarded military
uniforms once a month.61) Shin Dong-hyuk testified that regarding
clothing, work garments are given once every six months and two
pairs of shoes once a year. Gloves and socks are not supplied.
Two sheets of blankets are provided. Cigarette or alcohol is not
supplied but coal is provided.62)
3) Food
The food distribution system is administered in political prison
camps. The staple food is corn. Although the amount of food
distributed per person may differ according to each camp, it is the
same that the authorities supply only enough food for prisoners to
610
barely stay alive. Vegetables are not supplied. three square meters
of farm land is given to each household for the cultivation of
food.63) Because the amount of food distributed is insufficient,
prisoners mix dried radish leaves into corn and catch frogs, mice
and snakes for food as well.
A household in the Edification District for Revolution of No.15
Yodeok Camp receives 550g of corn and salt as side dish per one
adult and one spoon of acorn soy bean paste once a week.
Prisoners cannot receive their daily rations if they miss work and
show negligence during work. Three times of being late for work
are the equivalent of one absence, which also means no food for
one day. People have to mix corn with edible green plants and
th
dried radish leaves because food runs out after the 15 of each
month. [ID 082 (2008)] testified that 600g of corn was provided a
day.64) [ID 083 (2008)] stated that prisoners received about 200g of
corn soup on average, but if they worked hard they got 300g of
corn soup but they only got 100g of corn soup if they failed to
achieve their goals.65)
The political prisoners imprisoned in a single district receive
360 kg of corn and some salt per day. However, if they are
punished for dereliction of duty, they receive 250 kg of corn and
suffer
from
severe
hunger
and
malnutrition.
The
seats
of
restaurants in the single district are divided into the first class,
the second class and the third class in order to serve food
63) Go Se-hun, "Bukhan jeongchibeom suyongso gyeongbiwon Ahn, Myeong-cheolui
bongyeok jeungon: Aido mot gatge haneun cheojeolnan geukhan sanghwang gangnaengi
batgwa tangwangguleseo sayukinganui bonneungi ggumteuldaenda (Testimony of Ahn,
Myeong-cheol, a former guard of North Korean prison camp: Wretched desperate
conditions that does not even allow pregnancy. Incarceration breeds survival instincts
in the cornfields and coal mines.)" Monthly Joongang (January, 1995), p. 448.
611
according to work performance. The prisoners who performed and
reached their goals for the year in non-san-so-dae sit at the first
class seats and receive 200g of steamed ground corn (it is called
"Ok-su-su-bap." "Oksusu" means corn and "bap" means rice.
North Koreans grind corn into something like rice); those people
who sit at the second class seats receive 180g of steamed ground
corn; and the people who sit at the third class seats receive 160g
of steamed ground corn, which is almost equal to five spoons of
steamed ground corn with in a salty soup. However, in 1996 when
the worst food shortage in North Korean history took place, only
80g of corn was provided per meal. [ID 198 (2010)] testified that
political prisoners receive corns with some beans for the meal, but
the prisoners unable to accomplish their work only ate 3 spoonfuls
of rice with 5 to 6 spoonful of salty soup.66) [ID 199 (2010)]
testified that corns mixed with some rice are provided for the
meal, and bean paste soup and kimchi for a side dish.67)
Mine laborers in Gwalliso No. 22 receive 700g of rice per day,
but a certain amount of food is reduced in the name of
‘nationalism rice’ because the safety officers steal it. Therefore,
they receive about only 500g per day. Farm laborers receive 500g
of rice, but actually receive only 300g because of the reason
above. Children receive 100g when there is not enough steamed
ground corn, we receive flour or barley in the spring and potatoes
in the fall. [ID 086 (2006)] testified that the staple dish is steamed
ground corn and there is also salty dried radish leaves soup,
white kimchi, salted cabbage, and salted radish as side dishes.
According to [ID 086 (2006)], the prisoners cannot survive with
612
only basic food provided in the political prison camp. They steal
food and eat lizards, snakes and mice.68) Shin Dong-hyuk testified
about the situation of food distribution to households and the side
dishes supplied at Gwalliso No. 14.
“The prisoners in the family unit receive their meal at the end
of work everyday. So if you miss work, you have nothing to eat.
Food for miners and farmers for a day is 900g of steamed ground
corn per person, but we received 700g during the 1990s. In the
case of primary students, 300g or 400g of steamed ground corn
was provided for students up to 4th grade of middle school and
500g of steamed ground corn up to 6th grade. Side dishes are
three heads of salted cabbage and salt.”69)
4) Residence
Five to ten political prisoner households live together as a unit
in a straight line of apartment houses where one house consists
of a kitchen and a room regardless of the number of people in the
family. Because the housing resembles a harmonica, the houses
are called ‘Harmonica’ houses. People use a public bathroom.
Houses are built of mud clay and a rice straw. Housing units in
the Edification District for Revolution at Gwalliso No. 15, Yodeok
Political Prison Camp include a kitchen and two small rooms
roughly built of mud brick, board and matting. The interior floor
and the wall of the housing are all dirt with a Japanese style
floor mat made of the bark of a linden tree. A single person lives
in a five pyeong (a unit of area, a land measure of six square)
613
space with 12 to 14 other people in a barrack which consists of
240 people. Electricity in a village is produced from a small
waterpower station. Each house has only one light bulb. The
electricity is supplied only twice from 7 p.m. till 12 a.m. and 2
a.m. till 5 a.m. When there is not enough rain to operate the
waterpower station, the villagers use fire set with pine knots.70)
5) Daily Routine and Forced Labor
The following <Table Ⅳ-8-2> and <Table Ⅳ-8-3> are the
daily routine in the political prison camps, Gwalliso No. 13,
Gwalliso No. 14, and Gwalliso No. 15. The large portion of work
taking in the daily routine of political prisoners is forced labor
which
is
a
little different
from
each
political
prison camp.
However, most of the inmates have to endure forced labor more
than 12 hours a day.
North
Korea
authorities
impose
forced
labor
on
political
prisoners as a means of edification or correction. They argue that
the forced labor can change inmates’ intrinsic nature and restore
their true characteristics.
71)
At least, the forced labor can be a
means of punishment and rehabilitation in the Edification District
for Revolutionary of the political prison camps and a revolutionary
process from their retraining.72) However, forced labor for the
political prisoners imprisoned in the Complete Control District does
not have such a purpose. Since the political prisoners in the
70) Naewoe Tongshin (Press organization that used to report news from Communist
countries), Bukhan Silsang Jonghap Jaryojip (Collection of Writings on North Korea)
(Seoul: Naewoe Tongshinsa, 1995), p. 161.
71) Pierre Rigoulot, "Characteristics of Nazi Germany, Former Soviet Union, and North
Korean Political Prison Camps," in the 1st International Meeting on North Korean
Human Rights, Meeting Proceedings, p. 6.
72) Ibid., p. 6.
614
Complete Control District are targeted to be isolated or eliminated
from the society, the purpose of the forced labor imposed on them
is completely different. The authorities impose political prisoners in
the Complete Control District the forced labor to efficiently control
them and take advantage of them as a source of labor force or a
means of production.
<Table Ⅳ-8-2> Gwalliso’s (Political Prison Camp) Daily Routine for Political
Prisoners
Camp
Daily Routine
Kang
Chol-hwan
Rise
5:00
Breakfast
Rank inspection
ID AAA
5:30
ID 082
summer
winter
4:30
5:30
5:30
7:30
Morning Task
Afternoon task
8:00~12:00
12:00~12:30
12:30~20:00
6:00
7:00
Dinner
12:00~13:00
13:00~18:00
13:00~20:00
(summer)
13:00~17: 30
(winter)
20:00
19:00
23:00
23:00
19:00~20:00
Group training
session and
personnel inspection
22:00
Thought control
22:00~23:00
Extension and
surplus task
18:00~21:00
7:30~12:00
12:00~13:00
Afternoon rest time 17:00~17:30
Sleep
5:30
7:00~7:30
Enter work field
Lunch
ID 084
20:00~21:00
22:00
615
<Table Ⅳ-8-3> The Daily Routine of a Political Prison Camp
Camp
Daily Routine
Gwalliso No. 13 and 22
(Ahn Myung-chul)
Gwalliso No. 14
(Shin Dong-hyuk )
Rising
4:00~5:00
5:00
Rank inspection
6:30
Breakfast
7:00
Enter work field
6:30~7:00
7:30
Morning task
7:00~12:00
8:00~12:00
Afternoon task
14:00~20:00
13:00~20:00
Dinner
20:30~21:30
20:00~20:30
Assessment meeting
and personnel
inspection
21:30~22:00
Thought Control.
None
22:00~23:00
Sleep
23:00 (irregular)
Political prisoners usually get up at 5 a.m., engage in forced
labor for more than 12 hours on average until 7 p.m. or 8 p.m.,
and go to bed at 10 or 11 p.m. The political prisoners over 16
years old are considered as adult who must engage in the forced
work until 65 years old in the allocated workplace. It is known
that
the
old,
over
65,
are
exempted
from
work
in
the
Revolutionary District in Yodeok Political Prison Camp. However,
the old in the Complete Control District in Gwalliso No. 14 are
forced to work in the working unit of senior citizen until their
death. [ID 198 (2010)] testified that [ID 198 (2010)] got up at 5
a.m. and work until 8 p.m. in the field.73)
616
5. Situation of Human Rights
1) Right to Life
(1) Hunger and Malnutrition
The authorities of political prison camps use food distribution
system as a punishment by providing the minimum amount of
food as a means to efficiently control political prisoners. The food
distribution system discriminates the amount of food according to
each prisoner’s work participation days and the degree of work
completion. The prisoners are provided with enough food to barely
mange their lives. In addition, the actual food ration decreases
because safety officers take hold of the food during the food
distribution process. Furthermore, the authorities reduce the food
ration of the prisoners who fail to complete the work to be done
each day. The punishment is very cruel and drives prisoners to
death because they cannot secure enough food to survive.
Not enough food rations lead political prisoners to suffer from
chronic hunger. To survive, inmates catch and cook frogs, snakes,
rats, salamanders, worms and squirrels or eat edible grass. People
constantly die from starvation in the political prison camps. Their
teeth shake and fall out due to lack of calcium and protein during
the early stages of starvation. A bruise is left on the spot where
the teeth fell out and it deteriorates and turns black. The bone
structure of a head decreases, weight and height decreases, and
the body swells as it becomes filled with water and finally when
the water bursts, people die from starvation.74) [ID 086 (2006)]
testified that 15% of the inmates died of starvation and witnessed
74) Lee, Naneun Kim Jong-il ui Gyeonghowon Ieotda (I was a Kim Jong-il’s bodyguard),
p. 166.
617
eight people die from malnutrition and pellagra. According to
testimony from October, 1995, Han Sin-ae, about 50 years old,
died from pellagra six months after imprisonment and Choi
Do-guk, about 72 years old, died of malnutrition.75) [ID 199
(2010)] testified that many political prisoners die of malnutrition
which breaks down their immune system and causes many other
diseases.76)
(2) Disease and Poor Medical Care
There is a medical center in political prison camps and the
doctors are political prisoners. There are barely enough medical
supplies in the medical center, which is also unequipped with
proper medical facilities. The medical center only provides basic
medications such as cold medicine, digestion pills and anti-fever
medicine, but no medications for various other diseases which
leave the patients to depend on natural healing. There are no
vaccinations
for
infectious
diseases
and
no
proper
medical
treatment for them while the unsanitary environment frequently
causes epidemic. Absence of medication often leads to the death of
political prisoners from easily curable diseases such as pneumonia
or distoma.
Malnutrition,
pellagra,
pulmonary
tuberculosis,
hepatitis,
gastroenteric disorder, frostbite, and mental disease are the most
frequent diseases in political prison camps. Malnutrition and
pellagra are the most common diseases in the camps. As political
prisoners suffer from severe starvation which results in chronic
malnutrition and low immunity, the majority of them are exposed
618
to various types of disease. When protracted malnutrition is in
progress, pellagra can kill the patient. Shin Dong-hyuk testified
that inmates in the political prison camps are suffering from
disease and are not treated with proper medication.
There are many inmates suffering from diseases. The most
common diseases are pellagra and cold. A prisoner can receive
medication if he or she claims pain suffering and the Bowibu
gives consent. But, the prisoners are never allowed to leave the
political prison camp no matter how severely they are hurt. When
someone goes to a hospital inside the political prison camp,
his/her injury is washed with saline solution and the person is
asked to come once a week for treatment. If managers do not
give consent, prisoners cannot even go to the hospital...(omitted)
...My finger was cut off once in the camp and a doctor did not
stitch up the wound. Instead, he simply poured saline solution on
it and rapped it with plain cloth.77)
The Edification District for Revolution’ of Gwalliso No. 15
Yodeok Political Prison Camp separately accommodates inmates
with mental diseases for the purpose of isolation rather than
treatment. Political prisoners suffering from pulmonary tuberculosis
and
hepatitis
are
also
quarantined
for
isolation
rather
than
treatment. However, poor medical facilities and supplies lead to
high mortality rates among the ill inmates. People with mental
diseases are involved in simple labor such as digging pumpkin
pits and weeding dry fields. People suffering from tuberculosis and
hepatitis are not exempt from forced labor. Meals are distributed
77) The KBA’s interview in 2008 with Shin, Dong-hyuk escaped from Gwalliso No. 14.
619
according to the amount of work done for all these inmates.
Political prisoners imprisoned in the isolation ward cannot leave
the
camp
without
being
cured
of
disease,
which
makes
it
impossible for them to leave the camp alive. The average
temperature during the winter in the political prison camp is -20
degrees. Nevertheless, winter garments such as clothes, shoes,
socks, and gloves are not supplied to the prisoners, which lead
them to suffer from frostbite. But there are many prisoners whose
fingers and toes are cut off because of the lack of medical
treatment. The fingers and toes remaining on the inmates often
indicate the years they served in the camp. This reflects the
common damage done by frostbite.
2) Structural Violence
(1) Violence, Torture and Detention
Violence is institutionalized by Bowibu agents in the political
prison camps. The Bowibu agents have disciplinary authority over
the
political
prisoners
and
violence
is
legitimatized
through
punishments based on their arbitrary and emotional judgment,
which is tacitly consented and structuralized. The agents are at
liberty to use violent means against political prisoners and take no
legal responsibility if political prisoners die during the process.
About August 1987, Ahn Hyuk who came from the Edification
District for Revolution of Gwalliso No. 15, Yodeok Political Prison
Camp testified that he and three other platoon members were
eating leftover pork bone when they were discovered by a guard.
They were tied up to a tree from 10 a.m. until 6 p.m. and
assaulted without being able to drink a sip of water. According to
[ID 086 (2006)]’s testimony, [ID 086 (2006)] was a platoon leader
620
about December 1995 and was caught by a Bowibu agent named
Choi ** who assaulted [ID 086 (2006)] by hitting ID86’s forehead
with a shovel blade. [ID 086 (2006)] received 12 stitches on the
forehead. [ID 086 (2006)] also testified about being beaten with an
ash tree stick until bleeding.78) [ID 082 (2008)] was also assaulted
by a Bowibu agent and Park Yong-gi, Kim Jong-bok died of
brutal violence of a Bowibu agent.79) Shin Dong-hyuk testified
that brutal assaults occur frequently on a daily basis in Gwalliso
No. 14.
The following is an incident that occurred during the winter of
1999. Four elderly people were discovered taking an unauthorized
break by the Bowibu agent while moving manure on an A-frame
carrier on their way to the mountain. The agent removed their
trousers and shoes and punished them in their undergarments
kneeling on the ground. After about 2 hours of such discipline,
they were brought to a place. It was said that its room floor
which was heated through an under-floor heating system was
heated with firewood to a degree that people could get burned.
Four people’s feet and knee were frozen and then burned. These
four elderly people eventually died.80)
When political prisoners violate the regulations, complain or
show an unfaithful attitude, they are either sent to a forced labor
field or imprisoned in a detention house. The detention jail is a
typical facility of terror, which usually equals death for the
prisoners. A detention house has a jail inside the political prison
621
camps. The purpose is to punish people who violate camp
regulations such as theft, love affairs, disobey orders, show
interest in news outside, or if they are out of favor with the
supervisor or the Bowibu agent. Detention facilities are estimated
to exist in all the political prison camps. The detention house in
Gwalliso No. 15 holds small jail cells with bars along both sides
of the hallway. The detention house of Gwalliso No. 22 has jail
cells which can accommodate 50 prisoners each. Once political
prisoners are imprisoned in a detention house, their hair is shaved
regardless of their age and gender. They are randomly beaten
until near death. The detainees of the detention house must sit on
their knees from 5 a.m. until 12 p.m. except during mealtime and
when using the toilet. Depending on the nature of the crime,
detainees’ are divided into three groups: the subject for secret
execution, the subject for labor in large-scaled construction, and
the subject for release.
Prisoners must kneel with a square piece of wood between
their knees in the detention house at Gwalliso No. 22. In addition,
they are randomly assaulted by the prison staff if they get caught
moving their bodies or easing their knees without permission.
100g of steamed ground corn divided and served into three meals
and the detainees eat it with salty soup. Even healthy political
prisoners become disabled cripples who can barely walk on their
own two feet after serving a month in the detention house.
Therefore, even if they are released from the facility, the majority
of the political prisoners detained in the detention house die
without being able to restore their health. The detention house at
Gwalliso No. 14 is called ‘a special jail or a safe house’ where
rule violators or runaways are imprisoned. Being forced to go to
622
jail usually means death among the inmates. Political prisoners
imprisoned in the detention house at Gwalliso No. 13 may see
daylight outside their cell once a month. In this facility, it is
difficult to differentiate them from animals due to starvation and
severe torture. The situation is serious as the prisoners have
wounds that are sometimes filled with oozing pus which causes a
disgusting smell and also forces them to move about on all fours.
[ID 198 (2010)] testified that [ID 198 (2010)] received reduced
cooked rice about 3 spoons and had to sit for all day long at the
detention house. [ID 198 (2010)] added that once detained there,
people usually return home in sick.81)
The prisoners of Gwalliso No. 15 commonly refer to the forced
labor fields as the most feared areas. Imprisonment at a forced
labor field is for prisoners who are discovered when dating or
stealing or making mistakes during work. These prisoners must
serve at least 3 months in detention and work in a forced labor
field. The labor intensity in the forced labor field is incomparable
to that of the political prison camp. The Absolute Nonpayment
Principle only permits one meal of bean rice per day with no
corn. According to Kang Chol-hwan ’s testimony, prisoners in the
forced labor field sleep in a shabby warehouse located on 2-Ban
(the smallest unit of neighborhood association) in Gangbyon and
wake up at 5 a.m. followed by group double-march. Field-work is
mostly building dykes along the river. However, the prisoners’
physical condition is damaged from only one meal of bean rice per
day while doing heavy labor.82)
82) Kang Chol-hwan, Suyongsoui Norae (II) (Song of the Prison Camp II) (Seoul:
Sidaejeongsin, 2003), pp. 346-348.
623
3) Child and Woman Abuse
(1) Child Abuse
In political prison camps, children are imprisoned by force and
structurally abused by the government authorities through the
guilt by association system. Children in political prison camps
suffer from abuse such as starvation, malnutrition, lack of normal
education, cruel forced labor and random assaults.
Kang Chol-hwan testified that children receive education for 4
years in primary school and 5 years in middle school. They are
then stationed at a work field at the age of 17 in the Edification
District for Revolution in Gwalliso No. 15, Yodeok Political Prison
Camp. Schools in the political prison camp provide basic education,
usually just enough to prevent illiteracy. The schools also have
functions such as the supervision and control of the children and
production
abnormally
through
forced
functioning
labor.
through
The
school
imposing
educations
forced
labor,
are
no
instructors with teacher’s license, unreliable educational contents
and regulation through violence.
Normal education is not provided in schools. School education
focuses on preventing illiteracy through minimum input and the
education system is based on coercive means such as violence.
Teachers are Bowibu agents without any teacher’s license and
they always carry a gun. Subjects such as North Korean writing,
math, and physical education lack proper content because the
teachers have no enthusiasm for teaching.
In addition, teachers organize and regulate the class with
violence. If children talk in class or raise questions, they are
beaten for annoying the teacher. Teachers kick children in the
stomach with their military boots for not preparing homework for
624
the ‘the Kim Il Sung revolution history research’ class. Teachers
who
are
sympathetic
to
students
are
banished
for
‘being
kind-hearted to the children of prisoners or anti-communists.’
Children must do forced labor in the political prison camp. After
three classes in the morning, children must do forced labor during
the afternoon. Each child has his/her own work load. The children
cannot return home if the work is incomplete and must remain for
extra-working hours.
Children suffer from forced labor during school hours all year
round. Labor involves collecting woods, corn farming, ground
digging, making humus soil, taking care of corn fields, corn
transplanting, rice planting and removing weeds. These tasks are
done during spring season. Classes are all dismissed in mid
October to prepare for winter. At that time, students are engaged
in ‘expansion project of grass for rabbits’ and ‘firewood expansion
project.’ In addition, as a part of the ‘Seven Year-Plan for
Children’s Earning for Foreign Currency,’ children raise rabbits.
They also engage in ‘Searching for gold of loyalty project’ in the
rivers
two
months
preparation process for
prior
to
Kim
Il-sung’s
birthday
as
a
gifts.83)
In addition, the children’s morality rate is extremely high due to
accidental death during work, assault and disease. Children are
often killed due to accidents resulting from poor safety conditions.
They also die from brutal assaults and punishment for leaving
their work area, complaining, and having an unfaithful working
attitude. According to Kang Chol-hwan’s testimony, children were
killed under mass dirt collapse while expanding a rabbit warren.
One student was killed from a brutal assault as punishment for
83) Kang Chol-hwan, Suyongsoui Norae (I) (Song of the Prison Camp I) (Seoul:
Sidaejeongsin, 2003), pp. 194-229.
625
swearing at a teacher. There was an incident where a child
wished to work in the vegetable garden. The child was washed
away by flood while working in the vegetable garden. The child
was severely beaten and became lame with a mental disorder.
Child abuse kills or disables many children on a daily basis in
the political prison camps. Kang Chol-hwan testified that there
were 100 students in his grade when he first entered school, but
15 students died during his school years and 20 others were
forced to go to the Complete Control District at Yongpyong and
some were released from the Camp, which left only few students
84)
to graduate in the end.
Shin Dong-hyuk testified of an incident
where a child was beaten to death by her teacher.
An assaults and cruel acts happen frequently on a daily basis
in a political prison camp. In the summer of 1989, during a body
search before class five grains of wheat were found in a pocket
of an eight-year-old girl who was my classmate from primary
school. The teacher began to hit the girl’s head with a pointer.
She passed out and her nose was bleeding after being beaten for
an hour and a half. The girl died that evening.85)
(2) Women Abuse
There is absolutely no consideration for women’s physiological
status in a political prison camp. Women suffer from violence and
forced labor equal to men. Supplies such as bras, and sanitary
napkins are not provided. Sexual abuse toward female prisoners
by
the
Bowibu
agents
happens
on
daily
basis
in
coerced,
84) Ibid., p. 307.
626
semi-coerced
and
voluntarily
forms.
Although
North
Korean
government authorities regard sexual acts with female political
prisoners as deviation from the social class system and officially
prohibits it, however, it is more or less tolerated. Female prisoners
cannot resist against sexual abuse for it is directly related to their
own
survival.
Female
prisoners
face
punishment,
detention,
lock-ups or mine-labor even when they are the victim of coerced
or semi-coerced rape.
According to [ID 086 (2006)]’s testimony, in February 1996, a
Kim from Pyeongyang who was 24 was raped three times in a
conversation room by a 46-year-old Bowibu agent responsible for
unit three and had a child. Kim was transferred to work as a
telephone operator and had to visit a clinic for a sexually
transmitted disease she contracted.86) [ID 082 (2008)] testified that
the director raped Park and Chong. Shin Dong-hyuk testified that
he witnessed a Bowibu agent raping his mother.87)
About 1993 to 1994, I witnessed my mother being forced into
being a sex slave by a Bowibu agent who was her supervisor.
This is not a problem my mother faced alone. It could be said
that tens of thousands female political prisoners suffer from being
a sex slave. In September 1996, my aunt and elder cousin Shin
Hye-suk went to a mountain to gather acorns. My cousin was
harassed and raped by a guard. While she was naked, she became
unconscious
and
died
that
day.
When an unmarried female
prisoner is sexually abused by a Bowibu agent and becomes
pregnant
and
her
pregnancy
is
discovered,
she
immediately
627
disappears. No one knows where she is taken.
North Korean authorities use ‘a commendation marriage’ as a
means of controlling inmates in the political prison camps. The
Bowibu agents recommend some prisoners who keep regulations,
work hard, and work well as secret informers and arrange
couples. The Bowibu agents report the recommended prisoners to
the director of the Bowibu and marry them after his consent. Shin
Dong-hyuk testified that 60% of political prisoners in their 20s
married in this way in Gwalliso No. 14 at Gaecheon.
4) Crimes against Humanity
(1) Summary Execution, Open Execution and Secret Execution
There are three types of executions carried out frequently by
Bowibu officers - summary, open and secret executions. A
summary execution, the most common execution, is same as an
arbitrary murder because an execution is decided by an officer’s
own decision without any legal procedure. Managers of political
prison camps can perform executions independently, without any
judicial process or reference to a precedent, because they have
absolute authority over the prisoners. Such summary executions
are
generally
carried
out
according
to
the
managers’
will,
irrespective of the nature of the crime.
Ahn Myung-chul testified about three executions. First, Kim
Bok-deok, a 26 -year-old female prisoner detained in Gwalliso No.
13 in Dongpo-gun, was arrested for writing a letter to Japan. The
Bowibu agents used cruel torture methods to get a confession
about her helper and she died during the torture. Second, there
was a homicide committed by an armed guard of a political
628
prisoner who was grazing and tanning. The guard hit the
prisoner’s chin and back with an AK 58 rifle. Third, a prisoner in
his/her forties who was imprisoned in the mine district of
Gwalliso No. 6 was killed in a traffic accident. According to Ahn,
the prisoner was covering his ears because of cold weather, 30
degree below zero. Thus, the prisoner did not seem to hear the
horn sound from the truck. Then, Ju Seung-cheol, a master
sergeant and squad leader of conveyance troops, hit the man by
the truck.
The public execution of political prisoners is performed in order
to create an atmosphere of terror within the prison camp by
giving the other prisoners the impression of arbitrary conviction.
All prisoners must gather at the public execution place and attend
a public trial which is nothing but a perfunctory ritual. North
Korea executes prisoners such as fugitives and potential fugitives
who attempt to escape or violate an order and so on. All
prisoners over 16 years old must attend a public execution. After
all prisoners in the Edification District for Revolution in Gwalliso
No. 15 gathered at around 7 a.m., they were moved to the site of
public execution located in the close-by the fifth town. After the
director of the Bowibu sat on the stage, the execution procedure
started. The executioner enumerated all the charges against the
condemned prisoners, and then the head of the Camp announced
the transcript of the trial: "By Article X of the Constitution of the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, prisoner Y is sentenced to
death by firing squad." Three shooters lined up, and they shot
three times to the head, the chest and the stomach of the
prisoners. It rained blood through from their bodies and their
brains. The prisoners were dead. The authorities then ordered the
629
political prisoners to throw stones at the dead bodies. Public
executions happened on a regular basis in the Edification District
for Revolution of Gwalliso No. 15.
Kang Chol-hwan witnessed 15 to 20 public executions every
year for 10 years88) and Choi Dong-cheol testified that five family
members including a 60-year-old woman, a 37 or 38 -year-old
man and three children less than 10 years old had been executed
in front of people for attempting to escape in June or July 1985.
[ID 086 (2006)] testified that an illegal border crosser had been
shot to death in the field next to a duck farm in Daesuk-ri on
89)
August 28, 2000.
[ID 082 (2008)] said that he had witnessed the
open executions of Choi Gwang-ho on August 28, 2000 and of
Kim Ho-seok on March 5, 2003 for escape.90)
Shin Dong-hyuk testified that he had witnessed his mother and
brother’s public execution because of their attempting to escape
Gwalliso No. 14.
“I witnessed my mother and brother’s public execution on
November 29, 1996. My brother was tied to a log placed in
advance around his head, chest, waist and thigh with a rope.
Three soldiers shot him three times respectively. My mother was
killed by hanging on the gallows. They were executed without
their eyes covered but only with their mouths covered.91)"
Secret executions happen because of the fear of the impact of
88) Yeo Man-cheol et al., Heengeotdo Geomda (White is also Black) (Seoul: Dana, 1997),
p. 38.
90) Testimony of [ID 082 (2008)] interviewed by the KBA on March 10, 2008, [ID 083
(2008)] interviewed by the KBA on March 14, 2006.
91) The KBA’s interview in 2008 with Shin, Dong-hyuk escaped from Gwalliso No. 14
630
public executions which has breed resistance from other political
prisoners’ rather than its intended purpose to stimulate fear. To
solve this problem, political prison camps in North Korea began
secret executions from the late 1980s. This policy change is the
result of a revolt by political prisoners who were instigated by a
public execution in Gwalliso No. 14 in the early 1990s. Eight
Bowibu agents were murdered and 1500 political prisoners were
executed.
Officials in political prison camps execute serious violators
including
pregnant
relationships,
complaints,
women
prisoners
challenges
and
threatening
and
those
the
escapes,
engaged
prison
in
sexual
system
dangerous
with
prisoners
threatening the prison, and the Bowibu agents who disclose
secrets. Since Bureau 1 of the Bowibu is responsible for the
secret execution of political prisoners and the agents determine
and execute them by themselves, the execution is administered in
inhumane and very cruel ways.
Ahn Myung-chul testified about many secret executions are
based on his own experience and frequent contact with the
Bowibu agents. There is one secret execution place in Onseokgoji
in Gwalliso No. 13 and one in Namseokjigu Sugol Valley in
Gwalliso No. 22, which guards call "the valley for the dead and
crows." Ahn witnessed that he found a woman’s dead body
unidentifiable due to the condition of the skull when he went to
Onseokgoji with other soldiers to bring some rocks to build a
protective wall against shooting. In addition, while digging the
ground with a shovel to set up a tent to stay at night, he found
human bones in the ground where the executed political prisoners
were buried.92) Furthermore, he witnessed political prisoners who
631
had been detained in the detention house of Bureau 1 of the
Bowibu. A defector testified: In winter, 1989, Bureau 1 of the
Bowibu
had
political
prisoners,
who
were
scheduled to
die,
searched for dead bodies of political prisoners for three days in
Onseokgoji, put them in trucks and then burned them all. The
dead had reportedly been executed in secret. Shin Dong-hyuk
testified that "I don’t know much about secret executions but I
have seen some people suddenly disappeared. I thought they were
dead somewhere."93)
(2) Human Experimentation
Testimony that immoral human experiments are clandestinely
conducted in the political prison camp in North Korea was given
by Lee Yeong-guk and Ahn Myeong-cheol. However rumors that
even the Bowibu agents or guards may be executed if they know
the existence and activities of the Bureau 3rd Division of the
Bowibu describes the degree to which the Bowibu is feared and
also of its extremely high security. Hence, it is difficult to know
its
full
activities
and
no
conclusive
evidence
on
human
experiments have been found. However, it is possible to verify
that Bureau 3rd Division of the Bowibu, which takes full charge
of human experiment operation, are made up of high ranking
officials
above
second
lieutenant
who
graduated
from
the
University of Politics. These agents conduct research on torture
techniques or human experiments, according to the testimony by
Lee Yeong-guk and Ahn Myeong-cheol. Their testimony also
92) Ahn Myeong-cheol, Geudeuri Ulgo Itda (They Are Crying for Help) (Seoul: Cheonji
Media, 1995), p. 234.
632
claims that branch offices are dispatched to the nearby political
prison
camps
to
administer
secret
executions
and
human
experimentation.
Recently, more testimony and evidence has become available
that supports the claims made by Ahn Myung-chul and Lee
Young-guk. Hwang Jang-yop testified that during his time as the
Workers’ Party secretary, an official responsible for military
supplies reported to Kim Jong-il that the Department of War
Supplies had developed a new sniper weapon and successfully
experimented the efficiency test on by killing a dog. Hwang
Jang-yop witnessed Kim Jong-il replying to the secretary that a
dog is not the same as a person and gave the following order: "I
will order the Bowibu to send political prisoners so you may
94)
experiment on them."
A defector, Jeong Dae-seong (pseudonym), a
54-year-old chemist also testified that North Korea has been
conducting experiments to study the lethal dosage of poisonous
gas in an experimental lab in the military based political prison
camps over past 25 years. Abraham Cooper, vice-chief of the
Jewish
international
Wiesenthal
Center,
human
raised
rights
the
organization
suspicion
of
at
North
Simon
Korea’s
continuing human experiments based on the defectors’ testimony
and called upon to the international community to make efforts to
find out the truth.95)
94) Hwang Jang-yop, Odumui pyeoni doen haetbyoteun odumeul balkilsu opda. (The Sun
On the Side of Darkness Cannot Light Up the Darkness) (Seoul:Monthly Chosun,
2001), p. 126.
95) Yonhap News 2004. 11. 23. "Rabbi Abraham Cooper raised a question that North Korea
was conducting biological experiments. This claim was based on the testimony given
by a North Korean defector, Jeong, Dae-seong which stated North Korea was using
the biological reaction against poisonous materials in their research. Available from
<http://www3.yonhapnews.co.kr/cgi-bin/naver/getnews?1420041123027001726+
20041123+1726>.
633
However, testimony on human experiments does not provide
solid evidence, which makes it hard to judge the veracity of the
experiments. Even under the assumption that the North Korean
government
is
conducting
human
experiments,
it
would
be
conducted under heavy security and secrecy, which further makes
it difficult to determine the truth about human experiments in
North Korea. Nevertheless, it is important not to exclude the
testimony on North Korean government’s human experiments
because there is not enough evidence. Constant effort must be
made to verify the testimonies that accuse the North Korean
government’ of undertaking human experimentation.
634
9. Issues Related to North Korean
Defectors
￭ Heo Man-ho
(Professor of Political Science and Diplomacy, Kyungpook National University)
1. Introduction
In South Korea, a variety of labels are used for North Korean
defectors. These include "North Korean defectors," "North Korean
refugees," "People who fled North Korea," "Compatriots who fled
North Korea" and "People in a new land." This variety of labels
in part reflects differences between government authorities and
ordinary people in their attitudes toward North Korean defectors.
It also in part reflects the fact that each Korean government
administration took different policy stances toward the defectors.
In fact, the term "People in a new land," which is preferred by
some North Korean defectors themselves, was widely adopted as
the official term used by the Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun
administrations, which had relatively friendly approaches toward
North Korea.
Using international law definitions, North Korean defectors can
be called "Refugees," "Defectors," "Asylum seekers," or "Displaced
persons." The term "People in a new land" can be favorably
compared to "Displaced persons," since the term does not hint at
the reasons for their defections or their status under international
law, or offer other inferences into their situation. That is to say,
the term does not automatically give rise to following questions:
635
Why did they defect from North Korea? Why did they come to
South Korea? What will happen to them after being repatriated to
North Korea?
It is important to understand that although many North Korean
defectors may have deserted their nation because they couldn't
maintain their livelihoods or for other non-political motives, once
repatriated to North Korea, either voluntarily or by force, they will
be subject to oppression as 'political prisoners' who betrayed their
country.
Given this
fact, North
Korean defectors should
be
accepted as "Refugee sur place." Further discussion on their status
under
international
law
set
aside,
the
term
"North
Korean
defector" is thought to be most appropriate for most if not all
such persons.
Under this premise, this chapter will first discuss certain trends
among North Korean defectors revealed by an analysis of their
sex, age, birth place and social status. Next, an analysis will be
made of economic, social and political factors that comprise 'push
effects' and 'pull effects' which precipitate large-scale defections
of North Koreans. Those factors will be illuminated in terms of
international human rights norms. Also addressed is the question
of whether relations between the defectors and third parties
involved in the process of defection can be categorized as human
trafficking or human smuggling in the context of the international
human
rights
norms.
Results
of
the
examination
will
be
interpreted in light of current situations in North Korea.
2. Causes and Types of Defection
According to a report released by South Korea’s Ministry of
Unification, as of January 2010, the cumulative number of North
636
Korean men and women defected to South Korea reached 5,817 and
12,345, respectively.1) The gender ratio imbalance in favor of women
began from the year 2002, and represents a significant reversal of
the previous trend. It is difficult to generalize the ratios shown in
<Table Ⅳ-9-1>, as the group in the Table does not represent North
Korean defectors as a whole. However, the gender imbalance
resulting in a remarkably high ration of women has been observed
and reported by many field activists, and may be attributed to the
third parties' involvement during the defection from North Korea in
the forms of human trafficking or human smuggling.
<Table Ⅳ-9-1> Number of North Korean Defectors by Year of Entrance
Year
Men
(persons)
～1989
562
45
607
7%
～1993
32
2
34
6%
～1998
235
71
306
23%
～2001
563
480
1,043
46%
～2002
506
632
1,138
55%
～2003
469
812
1,281
63%
～2004
626
1,268
1,894
67%
～2005
423
960
1,383
69%
～2006
509
1,509
2,018
75%
～2007
570
1,974
2,544
78%
～2008
612
2,197
2,809
78%
～2009
668
2,259
2,927
77%
～Jan. 2010
Total
Women
(persons)
Sub-total
(persons)
Percentage
of Women
42
136
178
76%
5,817
12,345
18,162
68%
<Source: A re-composition of the data from “Bukhan Italjumin Hyeonhwang
(Current Situations of North Korean Defectors)”>
1) “Bukhan Italjumin Hyeonhwang (Current Situations of North Korean Defectors),” [Online,
cited on July 24th, 2010] Available from [http://www.unikorea.go.kr/kr/CMSF/CMSFBsub
.jsp?topmenu=6&menu=3&sub=3>.
637
An analysis of the age dis

Untitled

Transcription

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