Being Different in Turkey

Transcription

Religion, Conservatism and Otherization
Research Group
BİNNAZ TOPRAK
İrfan Bozan, Tan Morgül, Nedim Şener
Research Report on Neighbourhood Pressure
2009
Research Group
BİNNAZ TOPRAK
Research Report on Neighbourhood Pressure
2009
Published by
Boğaziçi University , Open Society Foundation (Turkey)
ISBN No: 978-975-518-309-1
Author
Binnaz Toprak
Researchers
Translator
Cem Deniz Kut
Editor
Hale Akay
Boğaziçi University Cataloging –in-Publication Data
Toprak, Binnaz.
Being different in Turkey : religion, conservatism and otherization / Binnaz
Toprak, İrfan Bozan, Tan Morgül, Nedim Şener.
ii, 148 p.; 21 cm.
1.Religious thought-- Turkey. 2. Laicism-- Turkey. 3. Group identity -- Religious aspects.
4. Identity (Psychology) -- Religious aspects -- Islam.I. Title.
BP43.T8
CONTENTS
Acknowledgments
3
INTRODUCTION
5
Purpose of the Research
Methodology of the Research
General Observations I. THE OTHERIZATION OF PEOPLE WITH DIFFERENT IDENTITIES AND SOCIAL PRESSURE 1- DIFFERENT LIFESTYLES FACING SOCIAL PRESSURE
7
9
13
16
16
What the “Neighborhood” Cannot Tolerate: The Young People
The New Others of Anatolia: The Seculars
17
28
2- CHANGING MUSLIMHOOD IN ANATOLIA AND SOCIAL PRESSURE
31
Public Spaces during Ramadan
3- UNCHANGABLE IDENTITIES AND SOCIAL PRESSURE
“Obliged” to be Invisible, or the Invisible Victims of Anatolia: Alevis
Subjects of Social Pressure beyond Time and Space: Women
The Dispossessed Children of the City: “Half a Nation, the Gypsies”
Forced to Live Inwardly: Christians in Anatolia
II. REPRESSION EMANATING FROM THE SOURCES OF POLITICAL POWER AND ACTS OF
RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES
1- PUBLIC SERVANTS AND APPOINTMENT OF PARTISANS TO PUBLIC OFFICES
31
40
41
57
74
76
79
80
2- INTERVENTION IN LIFESTYLES: ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES AND THE VENUES SERVING
ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES
92
3- ENFORCED CHANGE OF WORKING HOURS: “CUMA (HOLY FRIDAY)”
100
4- A NEWLY INVENTED EVENT: THE HOLY BIRTH WEEK
104
5- THE FETHULLAH GÜLEN COMMUNITY: IT’S IMPACT ON EDUCATION AND BUSINESS LIFE
106
An Alternative Model to the Social State: Community Dershanes and “Işık Evleri”
Tradesmen, Business Life and the Fethullah Gülen Community
108
120
CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS
126
Epilogue
135
BİNNAZ TOPRAK was born in Sivas in 1942. She received her BA degreee from the Hunter College of the City
University of New York and her PhD degree from the Graduate Center of the CUNY. In 1976, she joined the
Department of Political Science and International Relations at Boğaziçi University, İstanbul, Turkey, where she
taught and served as department chair until 2008. She is currently the Chair of Department of Political Science
and International Relations at Bahçeşehir University in İstanbul. She has published extensively in English on
secularism and political Islam in Turkey. Her publications in Turkish include Türkiye’de Din, Toplum ve Siyaset
(Religion, Society and Politics in Turkey, with Ali Çarkoğlu, TESEV, 2000), Değişen Türkiye’de Din, Toplum ve
Siyaset (Religion, Society and Politics in a Changing Turkey, with Ali Çarkoğlu, TESEV, 2006) and İş Yaşamı, Üst
Yönetim ve Siyasette Kadın (Women in Business, High Management and Politics, with Ersin Kalaycıoğlu, TESEV,
2004).
İRFAN BOZAN was born in Germany in 1970. He graduated from the Faculty of Aeronautics and Astronautics at
Istanbul Technical University. He has been a journalist since 1996 and currently working as a news reporter for
the NTV. Mr. Bozan has published various books on religious high schools and on the Directorate of Religious
Affairs. He also teaches Radio and Televison Reporting in the Faculty of Communication at Maltepe University in
İstanbul.
TAN MORGÜL was born in İstanbul in 1973. He graduated as a teacher of mathematics (in English) from the
Faculty of Education at Marmara University, İstanbul. He received his MA in Cultural Studies at İstanbul Bilgi
University. He produced radio programs for Açık Radyo and published on social movements, the political, social
and cultural aspects of football, urban issues, civil society, travel, and politics in various journals (Birikim,
Express, İstanbul, Bant), newspapers (Birgün, Taraf) and on the web sites (bianet, ntvmsnbc, açıksite).
NEDİM ŞENER was born in Germany in 1966. He is a news reporter for Milliyet since 1994. He received his
master’s degree in Economics from the İstanbul University in 1992 and currrently has been working on his PhD
in Economics in the same university. He is a recepient of many professional achievement awards of various
journalist and other civil associations, including the Anti-Corruption Award given by the Association for Social
Transparency Movement of Turkey of the Tranparency International in 2003. He represented Turkey with this
award in South Korea for the International Honesty Award. He published books on corruption, financing of
terrorism, and intelligence.
2
Acknowledgments
Acknowledgments*
This research is supported by the Open Society Institute (Project Code: 20022515) and Boğaziçi
University Scientific Research Project (Project Code: 08M105). We thank both institutions for
their support. We would also like to thank the Open Society Foundation (Turkey) for their
support for the dissemination of the English version of this research.
Many people helped us during our study. Starting with our new friends who offered us
Anatolian hospitality in the cities we visited, we want to thank Hakan Altınay, the Director of
the Open Society Institute in Turkey, Professors Yeşim Arat and Hakan Yılmaz from Boğaziçi
University and Ahmet İnsel from Galatasaray University, who shared their views with us, Gökçe
Tüylüoğlu, the Program Coordinator at the Open Society Institute, who took care of every
administrative problem we encountered, and Güliz Atsız, Ayşe Çavdar, Jaklin Çelik and Filiz
Öğretmen, who deciphered the recordings of the interviews we conducted in twelve cities in
Turkey and two districts in Istanbul.
We would also like to add that, from the initial stages of research design and the conduct of field
work through the evaluation of our findings and the final analysis, we have encountered no
interference in our research at any stage by the institutions that provided financial support for
this study.
*
The translator would like to thank Ferhunde Özgüler, Carol LaMotte and Ayşe Özbay Erozan for their contributions during
the translation and editing of this text.
3
4
Introduction
INTRODUCTION
The distinction that identifies two different models of society defined as transition from
community to society in which social pressure is dominant in the former but diminished in the
latter has been considered as one of the most important elements of modernity in the social
sciences literature since Ferdinand Tönnies.
As pre-modern societies in which everyone knew one another, social norms were formed through
face-to-face interaction, lives of individuals were under the observation and control of others,
and religion and tradition guided the lives of individuals transformed into modern societies
individual freedoms have been broadened, the lives of individuals are no longer public, and the
individual has become able to determine his living space and preferences free from the pressure
of others.
There is no doubt that modern society is not free of any and all pressures on individuals. The
transition from traditional to modern societies has brought out different types of social pressure.
The critical commentaries of theoretical studies in the social sciences draw our attention to
these types.
According to those criticisms, yes, the individual is free in modern society, but he is all by
himself in his freedom. He lives in big cities, is crushed under the wheels of tremendous
bureaucracies, -except casting his vote from time to time- is unable to participate in the
decision-making on issues considering his life, and is becoming gradually more passive. The
individual is condemned to loneliness and desperation. The capitalist economy forces the
individual to possess the same “things” others own and the greed for money determines the
meaning of life.
In this context, the definition of an “ordinary person” is determined by the capitalistic
conceptualizations of competition and work discipline. The individual is forced to conform to
this discipline through schools, military, workplace, prisons and mental institutions. Sexuality
is commodified, male and female roles are defined along capitalistic lines, and the human body
is subjected to the inner logic of capitalism.
As the spread of anorexia and bulimia in developed countries demonstrate the power and
the pressure of the fashion industry has begun to prevent the individual from enjoying the
possession of his/her own body. Since the conflicting evidences of modern science makes it
difficult to find solace in the safety of science, the individual of modern society is under the
impression that his life and health are continually at risk because of the constant informational
bombardment of science on the one hand, and the media and advertisement sector on the other.
In sum, according to those criticisms, the individual lives in a world which he cannot control; a
world in which he cannot even completely grasp how the wheels turn.
On the other hand, one cannot claim that traditional society is totally based on repression at
the expense of individual happiness. Agreed, the traditional society monitors the life of the
individual; but at the same time it offers a safe and secure life under the protection of extended
5
families where intimate relationships, neighborliness, solidarity, cooperation and hospitality
prevail.
Despite the brand-new problems brought to light by modern society and the favorable qualities
of traditional society, the main difference between these two models is the capability of the
individual in modern society to make his own decisions concerning his preferences in life and
legal system’s support for free choice.
At the same time, modern society also leaves the individual free in his moral decisions.
Individual morality is determined solely by the individual himself with the backing of the legal
system and not by religious principles or tradition. He is free to base his morality on tradition
and religion as well as on secular ethical principles.
We believe that the definitions of contemporary law and liberal democracy are closely related to
the legitimacy of individual choice. The rule of law in modern democracies aims to protect the
individual not only from the pressure of the state, but also from the pressure of the community,
as opposed to the frightening dystopia in George Orwell’s novel 1984 in which the state in
totalitarian societies monitors the individual even in the most intimate areas of life.
With modernity, the religion’s role as the most prominent force among norms and institutions
restricting the individual in traditional societies has been diminished and by removing
religious pressure from the legal realm, the secular state has reduced it to a control mechanism
internalized by individuals.
In other words, in a secular state religion is a legitimate control mechanism as long as the
individual accepts religious principles and shapes his life accordingly. Secular law does not
accord religion such a sphere of legitimacy.
Therefore, the history of modernization is in one sense the history of the redemption of the
individual from the hold of absolute rulers, religious institutions, communities, neighborhoods
and families. In modern societies where face-to-face relations have been substituted by
anonymity and bureaucratic relations, the human-being is not a member of a community, but is
an individual and a citizen. His rights as an individual and a citizen, as well as the limitations
thereof, are determined by law.
Nevertheless, the prevalence of religious principles and norms within social structures reduces
the protection offered by secular law to individuals with different identities to merely liberties
existing within the legal realm. Behaviors such as the exclusion of the individual within the
community, contempt of others, halting of neighborly relations, being frowned upon, halting of
trade relations, etc., are not included under the shield of law.
Any individual not conforming to social norms and patterns of behavior may suffer a form of
exclusion in almost all societies. However, in modern societies, the law helps build leeway for
individuals in so far as it backs up individual liberties.
It is inevitable that this leeway is reduced and individuals are forced to accept common
moral rules, when individual liberties are restricted by limitations that are legally justified
or tolerated or even encouraged by administrative measures on the basis of being in line with
common ethics, religious principles and prohibitions.
6
Introduction
Purpose of the Research
Since the Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to power after receiving almost half of
the votes in the latest general elections, the relation between religion, conservatism and social
pressure has become one of the hottest discussion topics in Turkey. The “deception” claims
concerning the AKP’s intention to alter the secular regime and establish an Islamic state have
transformed into arguments that Turkey is being “Islamicized” day by day. This debate has
concentrated on the notion of “neighborhood pressure” brought to light by Şerif Mardin, one of
the most prominent figures of the Turkish social sciences community.
Many social science researchers have detected a connection between religiosity and
conservatism in their studies carried out in Turkey. For instance, the results of two survey-based
studies published in 1999 and 2006 has shown that distancing oneself from the “different ones”
is widespread among those defining themselves as religious.
While the most undesirable neighbors include Kurds, Alevis, non-Muslims, foreigners and
homosexuals, the religiosity of the other party has been given prominence in making
preferences regarding people such as partners, friends, neighbors, trade partners, local market
owners, landlords, tenants, trustworthy tradesmen, etc1 and conservative attitudes towards
behaviors and practices such as the donning of short skirts by young ladies, co-education in
high schools, and unfamiliar men and women sitting next to each other on intercity buses
intensify as religiosity increases2.
Another survey-based study carried out in 2004 on gender issues points out that the positive
approach towards women’s political participation decreases as religiosity increases3. In a study
on conservatism in Turkey carried out in 2005, 84% of the respondents answered the question
“who is more loyal to traditional values?” as “people living in villages and Anatolian cities as
well as those who practiced religion to the fullest extent”.4
The purpose of our research was to examine thoroughly the relationship between religiosity
and conservatism revealed by the aforementioned studies and to determine whether persons
with different identities or preferences in Anatolian cities were faced with repression and
“otherization” related to religion and conservatism.
Our starting point was to embody the notion of “neighborhood pressure” underlined by Şerif
Mardin and to understand how it is formed and against whom it is directed in case it exists. In
particular, our plan was to investigate whether this type of pressure resulting from religious
conservatism as stated by Mardin in various interviews published in daily newspapers do exist
and to find out whether the notion of “neighborhood pressure” corresponds more to the reality
in Anatolian cities as opposed to metropolitan centers where individuals act more freely.
However, during the field research, we realized that the subject is broader than we originally
envisaged and cannot be limited to the pressures exerted by society. Throughout the cities we
visited, we were informed about the isolation/otherization of or government pressure on secular
1
Ali Çarkoğlu and Binnaz Toprak, Degisen Turkiye’de Din, Toplum ve Siyaset, İstanbul, TESEV, 2006, 79-80.
2
Ali Çarkoğlu and Binnaz Toprak, Turkiye’de Din, Toplum ve Siyaset, İstanbul, TESEV, 2000, 100-18.
3
Ersin Kalaycioglu and Binnaz Toprak, Iş Yaşamı, Üst Yönetim ve Siyasette Kadın, İstanbul, TESEV, 2004, 95.
4
Hakan Yılmaz, ‘Türkiye’de Muhafazakarlık’, public opinion research carried out with the support of Open Society Institute
and Bogazici University Scientific Research Project, unpublished report, 2005, 13.
7
individuals emerging as a result of cadre-ization (the practice of favoring party supporters
and people of the same opinion for cadres) under the AKP rule and the economic power and the
extensive organization of religious communities.
Undoubtedly, in Turkey, the parties faced with discrimination and repression cannot be
restricted to ethnic or religious minorities, or to persons with secular sensitivities. For instance,
similar concerns have been expressed by persons with Islamic identities.
For years, these [Islamic] groups have continuously expressed that they have been excluded
from the centers of power by Republican secularism, that there is no place for “blacks” within
the “white Turkish” realm of social status and intellectual prestige, and that they have been
belittled and marginalized.
However, this study was not constructed in a fashion to include the “Islamic” segment of the
society. Although the pressures faced by those with Islamic lifestyles have been frequently
debated in public and many studies5 have been carried out on this topic, no study has ever
focused on the question if those with secular identities faced social pressure. Therefore, we
decided to limit our research with the groups mentioned above.
Moreover, in our opinion, the argument that “Islamic” segments of the society have been subject
to discrimination articulated by many among these groups is not meaningful when the purpose
of our research is considered. Therefore, the ultimate aims of our study may be defined as to
achieve the dominance of pluralism in Turkey, to correct the practices of discrimination and
exclusion against those with different identities within the rule of law through legal decisions
and administrative measures, and, in spite of a retrospective score-settling, to present the
problems observed to those who propose ideas for prospective action.
We are convinced that in order to relieve the political tension in Turkey, it is necessary for the
authorities of AKP who frequently state that the differences in Turkey are its wealth and that
the life and preference of persons should not be meddled to notice the contradictions between
the aforementioned rhetoric of upper management and the practices of local administrations.
This cannot be done by retrospective reckoning, but can be achieved by avoiding the mistakes
committed in the past. We must also add here that complaints voiced by Islamists seem to have
been reduced since the AKP has come to power.
As the findings of the two studies carried out in 1999 and 2006 demonstrate, while 42% of the
population thought religious people were under pressure in 1999, this ratio dropped to 17% in
2006.6
5
For some examples on this topic, see : Hasan Hüseyin Ceylan, Cumhuriyet Dönemi Din Devlet İlişkileri, 3 volumes, Rehber,
1989; Nilüfer Göle, Modern Mahrem, Medeniyet ve Örtünme, Metis, 1991; Ruşen Çakır, Direniş ve İtaat, İki İktidar Arasında
İslamcı Kadın, Metis, 2000; Örtülemeyen Sorun Başörtüsü, Temel Boyutları ile Türkiye’de Başörtüsü Yasağı Sorunu, AKDER,
2008; Aynur İlyasoğlu, Örtülü Kimlik, İslamcı Kadın Kimliğinin Oluşum Öğeleri, Metis, 1994; Binnaz Toprak, Islam and Political
Development in Turkey, Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1981; Binnaz Toprak, “Islam and Democracy in Turkey”, Turkish Studies, Volume 6,
Issue 2, June 2005, 167-87.
6
Çarkoğlu and Toprak, 2000, 69; Çarkoğlu and Toprak, 2006, 30.
8
Introduction
Methodology of the Research
We conducted field research in twelve Anatolian cities between December 2007 and July 2008. We
carried out in-depth interviews in Erzurum, Kayseri, Konya, Malatya, Sivas, Batman, Trabzon,
Denizli, Aydın, Eskişehir, Adapazarı (Sakarya) and Balıkesir. In order to make comparisons,
we also went to two districts in Istanbul, Sultanbeyli and Avcılar, where the majority of the
population consists of migrants from Anatolia.
The selection of the cities was made according to the following criterion: We included at
least one city from almost each region in Turkey, excluding coastal cities of the Aegean and
Mediterranean regions where tourism has taken root. The selected cities according to their
regional distribution are as follows: Eskişehir, Kayseri, Konya, and Sivas from Central Anatolia,
Malatya and Erzurum from Eastern Anatolia, Batman from Southeastern Anatolia, Trabzon from
the Black Sea region, Adapazarı (Sakarya) and Balıkesir from the Marmara region, and Aydın
and Denizli from the Aegean region.
While determining the cities, we also considered their level of development. According to the
latest report of the State Planning Organization published in 2003, the cities in our sample have
the following ranking among 81 cities in Turkey in terms of development: Eskişehir, 6th; Denizli,
12th; Balıkesir, 15th; Kayseri, 19th; Aydın, 22nd; Adapazarı (Sakarya), 23rd; Konya, 26th; Trabzon, 38th;
Malatya, 41st; Sivas, 53rd, Erzurum, 60th and Batman, 70th.7
Nevertheless, assuming that there may be a correlation between the voter support for the AKP
and religious conservatism, we also took into account the voting patterns of those cities in the
2007 general elections. Given that AKP received approximately 47% of the votes in 2007 elections,
we selected cities with AKP votes below, above and significantly above the national score.
Accordingly, the ranking of the cities in our sample according to their vote rates for the AKP is
as follows: Erzurum 68% (the highest rate), Malatya 67%, Kayseri 66%, Konya 65%, Trabzon 57%,
Sivas 55%, Adapazarı (Sakarya) 53%, Batman 46%, Eskişehir 44%, Denizli 43%, Balıkesir 41% and
Aydın, 29% (the lowest rate).
The votes of the Republican People’s Party (CHP) which is inversely related to AKP votes also
vary in different cities. Following are the cities and the respective CHP vote rates in each:
Eskişehir with 25% has the highest rate for the CHP. After Eskişehir, cities with vote rates above
the CHP’s national rate of 21% are as follows: Aydın 24%, Balıkesir 24%, Denizli, 22%. Cities with
vote percentages in favor of CHP below the national rate and their respective percentages are:
Malatya 19%, Sivas 16%, Trabzon 14%, Kayseri 10%, Konya 8%, Erzurum 5% and Batman, 4%, (the
lowest rate).
We interviewed a total of 401 people (265 male, 136 female) and spent three or four days in each
city we visited. We conducted some of our interviews in institutions contacted beforehand,
some in locations we went as a result of our investigations or by coincidence. By revealing
information on the problems of their cities, these contacts directed us to other people and gave
us clues about the locations we had to discover,
7
The Undersecretariat of State Planning Organization, Bölgesel Gelişme, 2003.
9
For instance, visiting chambers of commerce or trade run by people siding with the government
or religious communities would be meaningless in terms of our research purposes. In the same
manner, we were able to learn the identities of people with different opinions within the local
media only through our contacts.
Our contacts also informed us on, say, which coffeehouses Alevis frequented and in which
districts they lived, in which bookstores we could find persons with secular sensitivities or the
places popular among youngsters.
The institutions that we decided to conduct our interviews included CHP provincial
headquarters, Atatürkçü Düşünce Derneği (Atatürkist Thought Association-ADD), Eğitim-Sen
(Education and Science Workers Union), Eğitim-İş (Education and Science Employees Union),
Pir Sultan Abdal Association, Hacı Bektaş Veli Association, Cem Foundation8, local media
institutions, universities, student clubs, women’s associations, Chambers of Industry and
Commerce, hospitals and chambers of doctors. In accordance with our pre-expressed request,
in all of these institutions we interviewed with lots of people who were keenly interested in
talking to us.
Moreover, a restaurant managed and run solely by women, two art houses organized by women,
a non-governmental organization on women’s issues, an office and headquarters of a company
belonging to a family of local notables, a factory, Alevi districts and coffeehouses, the home
of an Alevi couple, the restaurant of a local chamber of industry, the canteen of an hospital,
the villa of a female producer of a local television channel, locations such as pharmacies,
architects’ offices, doctors’ offices, bookstores, etc. the owners of which are known to dissidents,
an Armenian church, a Syrian monastery, a jewelry shop owned by an Armenian, a Roma
district, bars and restaurants selling alcoholic drinks, the cafeteria of TPAO (Turkish Petroleum
Corporation) residences, Judges’ House, Teachers’ House, hotel lobbies, cafeterias and canteens
frequented by university students, a disco, a folk music house, a play staged by youngsters, a
café where a poetry performance took place, and a DTP (Democratic Society Party) municipality
were among the places we visited.
In addition to these, we also wandered around the main streets, shopping malls, side streets,
kebab restaurants, traditional and modern restaurants, bazaars, commercial buildings and
weekly markets.
We are aware that some of the institutions we interviewed, such as CHP, ADD and Eğitim-İş, may
be subject to criticism. Different factions in Turkey with opposing opinions on issues regarding
religion, conservatism and secularism have diverse evaluations about these institutions. Since
our research framework was to examine whether people with secular identities were under
pressure or not, it was natural for us to include in our study the institutions known by the public
for their secular sensitivities.
Furthermore, we observed that institutions like CHP and ADD, which are known to be
sectarian and as groups confined to a certain point of view when evaluated from the political
environment in Istanbul, played a different role in Anatolia. People who gathered around these
institutions did not only consist of those with secular sensitivities or those for whom secularism
had a central place in life. They provided a space where people with different identities could
8
10
Pir Sultan Abdal Association, Hacı Bektaş Veli Association, and Cem Foundation are organizations of Alevis.
Introduction
meet and have a candid chat. Among others, these people also included youngsters facing social
pressure because of their long hair, earrings or colorful t-shirts; university students with leftist
tendencies or Kurdish identities; state workers with secular identities; Alevi women or women
with or without headscarf; and high school students. In the conservative cities of Anatolia
where NGOs do not have local branches, these places provided safe havens where many different
identities could find refuge.
Since our purpose was not to discover the institutional identity or the viewpoint of an
institution, we clearly stated to our interviewees that we were not interested in their general
impressions, evaluations or analysis and that we wanted to listen to their personal stories and
concrete events instead.
When the chairperson of a local branch of a political party or an institution attempted
to express his/her opinion about secularism and religious fundamentalism in Turkey, we
underlined the fact that our study did not include those subjects and that we were interested
only in their personal experiences.
This study does not include any views or analyses on the current political atmosphere in Turkey
conveyed to us despite all our caveats. Therefore the report does not contain the personal
opinions of the interviewees and is based completely on their concrete experiences.
We would like to emphasize that no statistical generalization can be made regarding Turkey as
a whole by using the findings of this research. For instance, we do not know what percentage of
the population is faced with the kind of pressures that will be related in the next sections. This
research has not been carried out on a representative sample using a survey technique or with
an aim to identify public tendencies in Turkey.
In line with our research purpose, we selected our target population among minority groups
with different identities. In other words, we specifically searched for such persons. Such samples
are called purposive samples.
However, we do not think that we suffer from a selection bias; a problem that is observed
when the sample is selected to justify the anticipated result and is frequently mentioned
in the discussions on the methodology of social sciences. Our sample included many cities
and segments of the population, including but not restricted to cities with varying levels of
development from different regions, women, Alevis, those with secular identities and different
dress styles, and leftist and Kurdish students.
We had the opportunity to compare the different stories narrated by people of different social
status and with different identities from different cities with various socio-economic indicators.
Comparative analysis showed us that most of the problems related to us in different cities
formed clusters on the same issues. In other words, the stories tended to repeat themselves.
For instance, a common complaint voiced in many Anatolian cities was that unveiled women
were not offered seats on buses and minibuses and that men preferred to give their seats to
young veiled women rather than elder unveiled women.
We were surprised to hear similar complaints in Bağcılar-İstanbul, even though we had not
mentioned the existence of such complaints in Anatolian cities. Since such commonalities in the
stories of different people living in different cities cannot be explained as mere coincidence, we
believe that our findings are instructive in explaining a widespread problem.
11
Besides, repetition of events plays an important role in the formation of social science theories.
Like other scientific endeavors, the aim of the social sciences is to make generalizations and
produce theories with the help of comparative studies.
Social science theories do not rely on laboratory test-findings. Since it is not possible to repeat
major social events like revolution, revolt or regime change, theorization of the factors that
influence such events is only possible through the comparison of similar incidents in different
times or places.
It is not always possible to gather statistically significant information on every aspect of a
social reality. The generalizations made by social scientists are based on patterns emerging
from similar events being repeated over time and space.
The aim is to come up with a theory regarding how an event and conditions observed are related
if the same event takes place under similar conditions assuming that they are correlated. In
other words, the social sciences do not set off with the claim that events are case-specific and
cannot be compared with other examples.
However, we do not deem that our findings cannot be generalized because of the research
method we chose instead of a survey. Surveys determine general tendencies. They are helpful
in providing data on the population as a whole, but they do not provide reliable information on
small groups within the population. In general, it is not even possible to catch a glimpse of these
smaller groups in surveys.
For example, had a random sample of 1,500 people representative of Turkey’s population been
used, many of the stories mentioned in this study might not have been conveyed. Besides, it
would have been more difficult to capture events, relevant emotions, worlds of meaning, etc.,
significant to the participants. These are the reasons why in-depth interviews are widely used
in social sciences.
We did not feel the need to check the veracity of what we were told because the final decision
on the reality of potentially contradicting accounts would require a legal process. Moreover,
rather than revealing the truth, our research aims to understand the perception and actual
experiences of people with different identities.
Since, instead of using a research firm we conducted the interviews ourselves, we rarely came
across situations where the person or the situation led us to suspect about the reliability of the
story we were told. We did not take dubious stories into consideration in our report.
Barring a few exceptions, our perception is that our interviewees were sincere in relating their
experiences. However, despite their complaints, they were uncomfortable with the fact that
“foreigners” like us may have the impression that their “home town” is “bad”.
In fact, most of the time, they felt the need to specifically emphasize that their hometown
was not “that bad after all”. They expressed anxiety over the fact that they suffered from
discrimination and pressure in the public sphere or in their workplaces. Still, they stated, such
pressure was not specific to their town and theirs were common problems also observed in other
cities in Turkey.
In other words, we even had the impression that, far from fabricating any lies, they were at
times self-censoring their stories.
12
Introduction
General Observations
The findings of this research does not offer a ground for the claim that social pressure on people
with different identities, such as Alevis, women or young people wearing less ordinary outfits
can be associated with the AKP government. We paid a special attention to separate societal
pressure and governmental pressure from each other. We do not know whether the pressure
in the cities we visited was shaped by the ever-present conservative atmosphere or by the
expansion of religious community activities and cadre-ization under the AKP government.
While many people argued that their city was formerly not so conservative, others stated the
opposite. However, our findings indicate that, combined with the effects of the activities of AKP
officials and religious communities, the existing social pressure towards people with different
identities draws a worrisome picture for the future of Turkey.
In this report where we present our findings, we paid a strict attention to relate the stories as
they were told to us. Instead of regarding the stories as cases of “pressure” with an “outsider’s
point of view” or trying to make verifications, we focused on understanding how people
perceived and experienced them.
Social pressure is not only related with reality, but in some cases with perceptions as well.
Perceptions may vary from person to person as they are associated with personal values. In
fact, when in Erzurum, the first city we visited, we found out that the word “pressure” could
have different meanings to us and to local people; we noticed how hard it is to explain a
complex situation by using only a single factor. The practices we find to be “pressurizing” as
the inhabitants of İstanbul (where there is anonymity and personal preferences are relatively
untouched), were not perceived as such by the people of Erzurum.
For example, Alevi women said that they covered their hair when going out. The fact that
Alevi women, who do not cover their hair indoors even in the presence of male strangers, use
headscarves when they go out can be considered as pressure. However, they do not perceive it as
such; on the contrary, they say they feel more comfortable in that way and that it is a tradition
in Erzurum for women to cover their hair.
A high school student complained that her family urged her to cover her hair after graduation.
She then proudly went on to say that there was only one student in her class who did not fast
and when they told her that she was sinning by not fasting, she started to fast. Interpreting
“pressure” within the limits of her own existence, she did not seem to be aware of the fact that
both situations belonged to the same category of “pressure”.
A male high school student found unveiled girls more attractive, but he wanted his wife to be
veiled. The contradiction between his preference and the societal norms did not disturb him and
he did not perceive the fact that social norms dictated the way he lived as “pressure”. He said,
“Ultimately, you have to comply.”
On the other hand, cases that we would have hesitated to identify as pressure were presented
to us as examples of it. The most significant of such examples is that, despite our efforts to
underline the subject of our research, in every city we visited people mentioned how widespread
Fethullah Gülen’s organization had become and the expansion of its activities. It is difficult to
classify all of these examples of volunteering, solidarity and incentives as sources of pressure
towards individuals. Notwithstanding, as will be stated in the upcoming pages, it is also
13
impossible to claim that stories about this particular religious community involve life practices
totally based on personal preferences with no elements of pressure at all.
In summary, to employ the words we use among ourselves, “although we were not looking for
them, the religious communities found us”. Perhaps the most significant findings of our study
concern the data we collected on the Gülen movement and its activities in connection with the
argument of the ever-increasing Islamization of Turkey. Although this data was beyond the
original purpose of our research, we included it in our study. Attempting to discover whether
a link existed between the AKP and the Gülen movement was not among the topics of our
research.
Many of our interviewees told us many aspects of their lives in detail as a token of their trust.
However, some of them were worried that their identities could be disclosed. For example,
an associate professor in an Anatolian university first accepted to make an interview; then,
despite all our reassurances, declined and asked never to be contacted again. A state employee
in another city, who claimed that he was being repressed by his executives due to his secular
identity, later wrote us that he was not able to sleep for days because he was afraid something
ominous could happen to him and asked us to delete his voice from the tapes and not to write
anything about him.
In the interviews we clearly indicated that the names of the participants would not be revealed
whether they were hesitant about it or not. Keeping our word, not only the names, but, due to
our reservation that in small cities where everyone know one another it is easier to understand
the identity of the person interviewed, also the workplaces or the cities of the interviewees have
not been mentioned in this study as a result. Undoubtedly these examples give clues about the
level of intimidation felt by inhabitants of small cities.
When we started our project in December 2007, the lawsuit on the closing of the AKP was not on
the agenda. Once the lawsuit was initiated, we were worried about suspicions that may arise
about the purpose of our study.
Unfortunately every person or institution that carries out research studies in Turkey can be
questioned about the purpose of their work because of the tension concerning issues such
as religion, secularism and conservatism in the country where conflicting views of “liberal”,
“nationalist”, “secular” and “Islamic”9 tendencies have brought out an environment divided
into fractions and an intellectual atmosphere in which all academic studies are interpreted
according these fractions.
Despite our concerns stated above, with the Constitutional Court decision not to close down the
AKP but to issue a warning to the government, we are hopeful that the findings of our research
will contribute to the calls of people with both Islamic and secular sensitivities for mutual
action to resolve this tension in the country.
From the perspective of the AKP central administration, learning more about the activities
of local AKP administrations and AKP cadres, comprehending the specific practices that the
secular segments of the population worry about, realizing the environment these practices
9
14
The reason we use those adjectives in quotation marks is to show that we do not attach any value judgement to them. We
use them as they are widely used in public and as a short-cut reference. In the main text we will not use them in quotation
marks.
Introduction
create when combined with the already existing social prejudice against different identities,
and finding out about the activities of religious communities can be instructive in shaping the
prospective policies of the AKP.
It is our hope that the dialogue gap between the fractions mentioned above may be filled, if
the public “hears” the concerns of the people who conveyed us that they have been facing
discrimination because of their religious, ethnic or secular identities, feeling confined in the
conservative atmosphere of small cities, having distress in their professional lives because they
are distanced from the centers of power, considering themselves as weak and excluded due to
the monetary power of the government and religious communities, and failing in defending
their rights as when they attempt to do so they cannot find potent authorities willing to listen
to them.
As mentioned above, the ultimate aim of this study is to inform the government and the
opposition in a threefold manner. First, it aims to help to dispel the increasingly deepening
social division regarding secularism by the implementation of policies involving common
sense and consensus as opposed to authoritarian measures. Second, it intends to support the
establishment of our democracy, strengthen the rule of law and respect for human and citizen
rights. Finally, it wishes to contribute to the formation of a tradition of constructive criticism
that has been conspicuously absent among the parties since the transition to democracy in 1946
and the elimination of prejudice and discrimination against people with different identities
through a total mobilization strategy making use of ‘good citizenship’ education.
In this regard, we are convinced that those who believe that the problem of secularism, which
has occupied the public agenda since the establishment of the Republic, can only be resolved by
authoritarian means only worsen the problem by deepening it and suspend the implementation
of rational solutions enabling social peace.
15
I.THE OTHERIZATION OF PEOPLE WITH DIFFERENT IDENTITIES
AND SOCIAL PRESSURE
In most of the Anatolian cities we visited, especially in the more conservative10 ones, having a
different identity means being harassed in the public sphere, being excluded and isolated, being
left without resources, being unable to find a job and being condemned to failure in business
life. These identity differences can be attained by birth or be acquired at any time in a person’s
life through individual lifestyle preferences.
In this section we will deal separately with the members of both groups. This section explains
that minorities are being repressed by the majorities due to prejudice, conservatism or for
political reasons. In the next section, we will deal with discrimination and repression on
individuals with secular identities emanating from the sources of political power and the
existing religious communities.
There is no doubt that problems such as social prejudice and repression are not novel issues.
Prejudice against Alevi and Roma/Gypsy populations is deeply rooted in Anatolia and goes far
back in history.
Similarly, the negative attitudes towards non-Muslims, who lived relatively in peace with
Muslims during the Ottoman Empire period, seems to be related to the separatist movements of
the 19th-century and the nationalist movements of the late 19th- and early 20th-century.
The root of the attitude against the Kurds can be traced back and related to Kurdish rebellions of
the 1920s and 1930s as well as to the PKK activities since the 1980s. Another one, the exclusion of
women from the public sphere, is a long-standing problem for Anatolian towns.
In other words, it cannot be argued that social prejudices are new phenomena. However,
discrimination and repression against people of secular disposition, activities of the religious
communities in the field of education, exclusion of secular people from business life, the ban
on alcoholic beverages, the intolerance displayed to those who do not fast during the Muslim
holy month of Ramadan, the “necessity” to participate in the holy Friday prayers, etc., are all
signs of a new environment which did not previously exist. We think that this new environment
reinforces prejudices rather than diminishing them.
1. DIFFERENT LIFESTYLES FACING SOCIAL PRESSURE
In this section we will focus on those who are subject to social pressure due to their different
outfits, political opinions or religious choices. Our examples will include young people with
different identities, people who define themselves as “secular” and people who do not fast
during Ramadan.
10 Here we define the concept of conservatism with reference to the differences between modern and traditional societies
that we have discussed in the introduction. What we mean by conservatism is the collective mentality that is observed in
social structures where every individual knows one another, where social norms are formed through face-to-face relations,
where the lives of individuals are exposed in public and subject to constant supervision, and where individual lives are
guided by custom and tradition.
16
The Otherization of People with Different Idenditities and Social Pressure
This repression manifests itself in various ways. It can be in the form of beating, humiliation
or exclusion from business life. As mentioned in the introduction part, since we did not include
those who are subject to social repression due to their “Islamic” identities in our research,
examples of such repression and discrimination are not stated in this study.
What the “Neighborhood” Cannot Tolerate: The Young People
In Kayseri, in a türkü evi (a music hall with a folkloric and traditional atmosphere where people
play and sing traditional folk songs) where young people get together, one of the male students
that we interviewed informed us that he had cut his once-long hair and had stopped wearing his
earring. He had had enough of the reactions he faced in the neighborhood, in the street or on the
bus such as, “You should try to look more like your father than your mother!”
When we asked a Kurdish student, who had come from a southeastern town to Karadeniz
Technical University in Trabzon whether he felt more comfortable on campus or in town, his
reply was: “Only at home.”
The public opinion surveys about young people in Turkey draw our attention to an alarming
fact. A significant proportion of young people, especially the educated ones from urban areas,
are dreaming about living abroad and are ready to leave the country if they can find the
means. What demographers forecast is that from the year 2010 onwards the proportion of the
population between ages 15-24 will gradually decline in Turkey’s labor market.11
According to the 2002 Euro-Barometer surveys including Turkey and the 12 newest members of
the EU, 7% of the people between ages 25-39 in Turkey want to move to the first 15 member states
of the EU. With this rate, Turkey ranks first among the 13 countries surveyed. The age group
of 15-24 follows this with 8%. What is more striking is that among the university graduates
of the other 12 countries this rate is about 3-4 % ,while in Turkey it is more than 15%. Among
undergraduates this rate is as high as 12 %.
In an article based on these surveys, it is argued that in the years ahead the immigrants from
Turkey to Western European countries will mostly consist of university graduates or young
people continuing their education will emigrate from Turkey to Western European countries.
The authors of the article define this situation as the “brain and youth drain”.12 Yet it is
forecasted that Turkey’s population will gradually decrease up until the year 2050 and by that
time it will not be possible for the Turkish economy to cope with such a “brain drain”.13
According to the Goldman Sachs reports on the global economy published regularly14, Turkey
is going to be one of the ten global economic actors by the year 2050. However, the economists
of Goldman Sachs emphasize the importance of Turkey’s human capital in fulfilling its
potential. This seems closely related to Turkey’s ability to restructure its education system,
expand educational opportunities for its youth, and, in particular, to increase employment
opportunities for its female workforce.
11 Cem Behar, “Demographic Developments and ‘Complementarities’: Ageing, Labor and Migration,” Turkish Studies, Vol. 7, No.
1, 17-31 March 2006, 17-32.
12 Hubert Krieger and Bertrand Maitre, ”Migration Trends in an Enlarging European Union,” 45-66.
13 Behar, op.cit.
14 Goldman Sachs, Global Economics Papers. See Report No. 164. We would like to thank Osman Ulagay for drawing our
attention to these reports.
17
For example, according to their calculations, if the difference between the male-female ratio in
the labor force which is around 50% today drops by half in the next ten years and drops again by
half in the following ten years, even this change alone will increase Turkey’s per capita income
by 14 % in the year 2020 and 20 % in the year 2030.
In many of the towns where we conducted our interviews, the most thought-provoking
comments were expressed by the university students. Universities are open to students from
any part of the country by definition and they are institutions that can accommodate diversity
in opinions, identities and lifestyles in theory. However, in the Anatolian towns we have
visited, from the young male students with long hair or earrings to ”Atatürkçü” (Atatürkist) or
leftist students, from the Kurdish students to those with Alevi identities, the repression and
suppression practiced against different identities were extremely worrying.
Apart from the lack of creative stimulus in the textbooks and the heavily emphasized concept
of discipline in primary and secondary education, the path to freedom of thought and action
is hindered even in higher education with the exception of a small number of universities. We
believe that, in a world where human capital is so valuable, this is one of the most important
problems of Turkey.
After our interviews with teachers of primary and secondary schools and university students,
our worries about the Turkish education system where freedom is nonexistent have increased
even further as we discovered that it is prone to the influence of the activities and direction of
religious communities.15
In Turkey where the number of university graduates is already low the migration of young
graduates will necessarily mean a further decrease in the qualified human capital the country
needs. The young people whom we have interviewed with in Anatolia are on the one hand
becoming acquainted with the colorful and free environment of the world outside via the
internet and television, yet trying to content themselves with the limited and restrictive
conditions of the Anatolian towns in which they live on the other.
Those towns do not provide them enough opportunities to express themselves, defend their
opinions, interact with the opposite sex, wear what they want to wear, have freedom of choice,
improve their talents, travel, jump into adventures with the excitement of youth, wander around
and have fun. They are living in towns where they are always being watched, where all of their
behaviors from clothing to lifestyles have been restricted, and where they are distressed due
to social conservatism. When these aspects are taken into account, it is hard to claim that the
results of the surveys are surprising at all.
We handled the problems that young Alevis face, the social pressures on young girls and on the
strictly controlled lives of poor students who stay in religious community houses in separate
sections.
In this section, we will explore the problems faced by the students who do not conform to the
general dispositions and outlooks and the ones with Kurdish backgrounds. Almost every young
person we have interviewed, male or female, was a student at a university in Anatolia. Some of
15 Educational activities of the religious communities will be explored in another section.
18
them were born and raised in that town, while some others were obliged to move there for their
university education.
In almost all of the towns we visited, one of the most distinct complaints of male students was
about the reactions against their beards, long hair and earrings. In the street, on the bus and on
campus they were verbally harassed by questions such as, “Are you the gun or the ammunition?”
(an offensive and indirect way of asking whether he is gay) or by remarks such as, “Hey, try
looking like your father rather than your mother!” as mentioned earlier. A young man with long
hair whom we interviewed in a türkü evi in Kayseri conveyed us that he wore a cap to hide his
hair since he is often faced with the question “Are you a boy or a girl?” when using public busses.
Sometimes their lives were threatened. An undergraduate university student in Trabzon had
once hitchhiked on the way back home. The person who took him into his car made that remark:
“Look at that beard; one wonders what kind of a person your father is!” When he was angered
by the young man’s harsh response, he pulled out his gun. The brawl between the two became
“more and more absurd”; in the end the driver said, “People like you should be whacked” and the
student was kicked out of the car. A young man we interviewed in Kayseri reported us that an
Alevi friend of his got his nose broken because of his round beard and long hair.
Even though such extreme examples were rare, we have heard a great deal about the attitudes
against “uncommon” outfits. A university student from Erzurum was harassed by other boys in
the neighborhood because he wore colored t-shirts and was told not to wear such t-shirts ever
again.
A long-haired young man actively working in CHP’s local branch in Erzurum conveyed us that
even his own mother perceived him as a “gavur” (non-Muslim or, pejoratively, infidel) and asked
him to “get out” of the house when neighbors were invited. A 16 year-old high school student
confessed that if his best friend were to wear an earring, he would be “estranged” from him.
The students who had come from the western regions of Turkey to Anatolia’s more conservative
towns for university education mentioned that they had to change their lifestyles because
of that. For example, a university student we interviewed in Adapazarı reported us that one
summer evening, while having dinner with his flat-mates on their balcony, police officers
arrived and declared that there were complaints about them.
Their neighbors complained to the police because these students were wearing shorts while
sitting on the balcony. The female neighbors in the opposite building had told the police that
they could not go out onto their balconies because of the young pupils were wearing shorts out
there. The “request” of the police was to eat inside. They were speechless with the initial shock.
However, the student appeared to have received the message. He informed us that in downtown
Adapazarı young women would not be able to wear miniskirts freely and young men could not
easily walk around wearing shorts. “You should be prepared for an “intervention” if you wear
shorts, even if you are on your own balcony,” he added.
A female student, who came to Karadeniz Technical University in Trabzon from the Thrace
region of Turkey, stayed in the Ögretmen Evi (Teacher Guesthouse) in Trabzon when she
arrived to the city for the first time. One day, while sitting in the garden, the back of her waist
“accidentally” opened. She felt that everyone was looking at her and before she could understand
what was going on, an old man warned her harshly to “dress properly”.
19
Another female student from Malatya studying at İnönü University reported us that one day,
while she was walking in the street with a friend, an old man approached and told them: “Girls,
aren’t you ashamed of wearing these skirts? You have already uncovered your hair!” They were
“petrified with horror”. Besides, their clothes were not even “that extremely immodest”.
She added that living in Malatya was too difficult and that after that incident she was afraid
to wear skirts. The young university students we interviewed in Sivas complained about being
verbally harassed in the streets by young ‘tough guys’ of the neighborhood.
Intolerance was displayed not only in the streets or in their neighborhoods, but it was also
apparent on the university campuses. In many of the universities in Anatolia, the students
with different identities whom we interviewed mostly complained about the assaults on their
lifestyles by people who define themselves as “ülkücü” (members of the ultra-nationalist
conservative wave in Turkey).
Many students we interviewed in different universities complained about the fact that the
canteens and dormitories were controlled by “ülkücü reises” (chiefs) who exerted pressure
and used violence against those students with different identities in the event that the latter
resisted.
A faculty member of the Karadeniz Technical University put it in such a way: “Here, there is
pressure on the students exerted by ülkücüs who think that this country belongs only to them.”
For example, if male students were wearing earrings, “ülkücü”s swore and cursed at them. There
was reaction against the music they were listening to or the books and magazines they were
reading. A student from Diyarbakir, whom we interviewed with in Erzurum, informed us that
these problems were not so common in the canteens of the faculty buildings, but were plentiful
in the dormitories, especially at night-time.
“There are times that these guys wake people up from their sleep and beat them,” he mentioned.
He told us that these violent acts were not committed by students, but by people from outside
who sneak into dormitories after waiting in their cars until midnight.
A student from Tunceli who was studying at Ataturk University in Erzurum was beaten because
he listened to music popular among leftist students. A young student studying in the Faculty of
Fine Arts had styled his hair with hair gel, grown sideburns and wore a green sweater. He stated
that he was verbally abused many times for his appearance, but as he did not respond to them,
they didn’t do anything else to him.
A member of Adapazarı ADD, who was a university student, told us that he faced verbal
harassment and repression of ülkücüs in the dormitory because of his round beard and earring.
A faculty member in Aydın talked about ülkücü groups who threatened female students that
wore miniskirts or a little low-cut clothing by saying, “Watch out, girls, we are here to guard the
honor of this place.”
In Ataturk University in Erzurum, leftist students have claimed that they were under constant
observation and that, because of the music they listen to and the newspapers and books they
read, they had become targets. For example, once a student who was reading the newspaper
Cumhuriyet left it on the table for other people to read. When he returned to his table, he saw
that the newspaper was torn into pieces.
20
When he asked the people around him what happened to the newspaper, he was told that if
he wanted his newspaper not to be torn up, he should not read it at all or he should hide it in
his locker where no one could see it. A student from Diyarbakir was cautioned because he was
reading a popular culture magazine. They thought that students who brought some specific
daily newspapers to the dormitories also took the risk of having a fight.
In Erzurum, a lady from the district administration of the CHP reported us that once they had to
intervene to a case in which a student from Sivas was beaten by ülkücüs in Ataturk University,
but they did not manage to get any results. This young man had run to the only place where he
could take refuge; the CHP district headquarters. She asked him what had happened; he told
her that he was beaten by the supporters of MHP. When she asked him why he was beaten, he
acknowledged that they said to him: “You are from Sivas; you are an Alevi and a leftist! Boy, you
have no other choice but to be beaten”.
They paid a visit to the University as a group representing the CHP district organization. The
District Head of the CHP was a “big” guy. There were tables for the “Reis” (leader of the ülkücüs)
who hit on one of the tables with his fist and announced, “If you touch this kid again, it will be
the end of you!”
After a while, she came across the student in the marketplace and he said that he was beaten
again. He told her that he went to the police station, but the police did nothing. She told him
to keep a low profile since it was Erzurum and people could be “lost”. She advised him to study
hard and succeed in life. “But how?” she reflected, “They don’t let him!”
The complaints included that the university administrations did not take the necessary
measures and the professors chose not to intervene in such cases. We have heard these
complaints from many young people with different identities, varying from members of ADD to
“leftists”, from students of Kurdish origin to young men wearing earrings and/or colorful t-shirts
and/or having long hair.
The university students in Trabzon also complained that the ideological opinions of some
faculty members paved the way for such pressure. For example, students have claimed that a
faculty member had openly stated in a classroom that he did not acknowledge “any nationality
apart from Turkish, any religion apart from Islam” and warned the students: “If there is anyone
who claims otherwise, he should know in advance that he cannot pass my course and should
leave the classroom.”
A student at Karadeniz Technical University in Trabzon believed that the university
administration was also intervening in their outfits or lifestyle. The administration was strict
about the dress code and male students with long hair were not allowed to enter the classes.
Once, he untied his hair at the end of the class and when the teacher saw his hair, he told him
not to come to his class anymore. Nowadays he was sitting at the back of the classroom hoping
not to be noticed. Most of his friends had their hair and beards cut. Another interviewee, a
student being interrogated because of participating to a political demonstration, claimed that
every time he had to stand in front of the Disciplinary Committee, academics that took their
statement told him to “Leave at once, cut that hair and beard, and come back then.”
21
Nevertheless, in spite of these incidents, it was obvious that the only places where students of
Anatolian universities felt relatively free in terms of their appearance and their relations with
the opposite sex were still the university campuses.
A female student in Sivas revealed us that the only place she felt comfortable was the campus of
her university. In Malatya, students have told us that they spent most of their time on campus
because the environment at İnönü University was “so different from downtown”.
The problems of students who wanted to rent a place in the downtown area constituted another
category. We have heard countless stories about landlords trying to control the way students
live.
In almost all of the towns we visited, we were told that the locals were “distant” to those
students coming from different towns and that “where they were from”, the first question
that the landlords asked, was the main obstacle they faced when they searched for a place to
rent. If this question were answered as “from Şırnak, Diyarbakır, Tunceli or Muş” (cities at the
southeastern part of Turkey), the conversation ended instantly. Therefore they developed new
tactics to avoid the consequences of the “wrong town” response.
For example, a student from Tunceli had started to avoid this “trap” by saying that he was from
Ankara. While searching for a place to rent, a student who came to Erzurum from another city
encountered landlords who told him that “They would not rent their place to a bachelor because
they had honor, daughters and wives”; he had to use the relations of his friends from Erzurum as
a tactic for finding a house.
However this “method” did not work either. Although they managed to rent a flat, they had to
move out after a short period because the land-lord living on the upper floor made frequent
“drop-by visits” and treated them as perverts when they invited over some female friends.
The students we interviewed complained about being “tested” if they had a different attitude
which was accepted as an indicator of their “life styles”. A student in Trabzon explained us with
laughter that they had to face questions like “Do you fast, do you perform prayers?” and that one
of his housemates was caught by the landlord while drinking coke during Ramadan and their
rent was raised immediately. “This is not a joke, this is real,” he added.
A female student in Trabzon reported us that when she called a landlord in order to find a flat
for a friend of hers, the first question he asked was whether the person who was looking for the
place was a male or a female. When he learned that the prospective tenant was a female, he told
her that they should not even bother with an interview if they were not veiled. Another female
student told us of an incident she and her flatmate had experienced while they were moving out
because of the problems caused by the landlord and which they found terrifying.
They had removed most of their stuff and when they went back the following day to take the
rest, they saw that the lights of their flat were on. First they thought that one of them had
forgotten to turn the lights off. Soon after, they realized that a bottle of wine had been emptied
into the sink and the bottle was broken. They immediately realized that it was their landlord
who had done that and they asked him how he was able to get in. “We already had the keys,” he
answered.
Students in various towns told us that inviting friends of the opposite sex to their houses was
the major problem in renting a flat. The most crucial requirement for renting a flat was not to
22
bring home friends of the opposite sex. This situation was incomprehensible and unbearable for
the university students, yet most essential for the landlords.
The students we interviewed pointed out that the society they live in is very intolerant and
conservative in terms of male-female relations. Gatherings of girls and boys do not only
constitute a problem inside the students’ houses but also in the streets and in the neighborhood.
In such an environment, socializing or starting a romantic relationship with the opposite sex is
almost impossible for university students.
A young female member of Eskişehir Women’s Platform stated that there were restrictions in
“inviting male friends to their homes or going out late,” and, when their male friends visited
them, the problems started with complaints, continued with “disapproving glances” and evolved
even to the stage of “no greetings at all”.
A university student in Trabzon told us that the landlord threatened to kick him out if he ever
“brought a female friend in”. Besides, he was so much involved with the student’s private life (to
the extent of intrusion, in fact) that he once said to him: “If a female must come, I would be the
first to see her; then, if I approve, she could visit you.” He added that if the student’s mother or
a female relative came to stay, she should stay with the landlord’s wife and he would stay with
the student.
A male student in Sivas told us that once when he was going to a female friends’ home, he rang
their landlord’s bell by mistake and when he apologized and headed towards his friends’ place,
he heard the landlord’s muttering, “They weren’t supposed to bring any male friends home”.
To protect his friends, he had to pretend that he was leaving the town; therefore he explained
to the landlord: “Sir, I just wanted to say farewell to my friends before I leave.” “Thankfully,
the girls were not at home; if they had been, the landlord was so angry that he might have
attempted to beat them,” he commented to us.
Another student stated that his landlord complained to him about the previous tenants who
“turned their home into a brothel”. When he asked what he meant by that, the answer was: “You
couldn’t tell who came to their home; boys and girls were all together.”
A university student who is a member of Adapazarı ADD reported us that one of his female
friends had to move out of her apartment the very next day after her neighbors complained to
the landlord that she invited a male friend over to study.
The same student informed that he could only meet his girlfriend in ay time. People “looked
at them disapprovingly” when they walked around hand in hand and they were buying their
movie tickets from the back rows so that “nobody could see them.”
A male student in Trabzon stated that while he was walking on the main avenue with his
girlfriend, a plastic bottle was thrown at them from a minibus and someone inside yelled: “They
should not walk around at that time of the day.” “I am wearing shorts and I have a goatee, I am a
sitting duck for the youngsters of Trabzon” he said to us.
There were relatively more tolerant landlords too. For instance; a student in Malatya, who lived
together with four friends, said that their hajji landlord treated them very well and that he
was “more understanding than his own father”. The landlord’s children had experienced similar
problems as they also had gone to other cities to study. One of his children even had to quit
university because of such problems.
23
The student thought that the problems his own children faced considerably influenced the
landlord’s positive attitude towards them. However, the landlord’s behavior had no influence
on neighbors. They complained that “they [the students] were making too much noise” and that
they were “communists and separatists”.
A male undergraduate university student in Adapazarı reported us that “their female friends
could easily come to their home” and they did not experience such problems since “they had a
social democrat landlord”. What an undergraduate university student in Trabzon told us was
almost like a summary of what people have gone through while “flat-hunting”: “We are not
hunting for flats, but for landlords; landlords with places to rent where we could live in peace.”
In the cities we have visited, there were a limited number of places for young people to meet
and hang around. An undergraduate university student in Adapazarı stated that they could
not go out after certain hours and there were three or four cafes where they could go, but
unfortunately they closed early.
He also explained that one of the hosts of the local radio station he listened to once conveyed to
the audience during a live transmission that he a saw a female university student sitting in a
park in the evening and he reacted her by saying “How disrespectful of you; what are you doing
outside, a young girl all alone?”. In Sivas the students we interviewed have informed us that not
only there were no places for entertainment, there were not even parks or places where they
could walk around or hang out without experiencing such problems.
It was surprising to hear similar complaints even in Balıkesir, a city which has touristic coastal
districts. The university students told us that there were places where live music was performed,
but even in those places they could not, for instance, dance. A few nice bars or places selling
alcoholic beverages which they visited regularly, had either closed down or been forced to close.
They said that at the university there were no parties with dancing. Due to the lack of favorable
conditions, people who wished to “get together, drink and chat” could only do so in the privacy
of their homes. They had “no other place where they could be comfortable”.
The above examples demonstrate that having a little fun is not easy at all for those students,
even in the sanctuary of their homes. To consume alcohol every once in a while is also quite a
problem. A student in Adapazarı informed us that they would wrap the empty beer bottles in old
newspapers and try to hide them from the neighbors or the janitor when taking out the garbage.
A student in Trabzon who came to the city for the Physical Training Academy exams reported
us that a mixed group of boys and girls, who “failed to grasp the sensitivities” of Trabzon, were
approached by a group of “men in business suits” while they were drinking alcohol at the
seaside. The men assaulted the youths and shouted, “How come you drink here!” and the kids
were “barely saved from being beaten thanks to the help of others who intervened.”
Nevertheless, starting with Eskişehir, some cities including Aydın, Denizli and to some extent
Trabzon were relatively more comfortable places for the students. In particular, alongside the
Porsuk River in Eskişehir there were many places where the young people could go. The head of
the Social Democracy Association of Eskişehir told us that Eskişehir was no different from İzmir
and that both male and female students were living in a free environment.
The head of ADD reported us that the residential model was also designed according to students’
needs. He continued by saying that the high number of the student population in Eskişehir was
24
important for the city’s economy. In general this consciousness changed the attitude of the local
people. Consequently, male and female students in Eskişehir were free to spend time together
without experiencing any problems.
Even though it was midweek, a türkü bar we visited in Aydın, a place where you could drink
alcohol and dance was full. On the other hand, we have also noticed that in more conservative
cities different lifestyles co-existed and as long as those did not touch one another, this coexistence did not necessarily create problems. For instance, a female lawyer we interviewed
in Trabzon expressed that the young people in her social circle, both males and females, could
easily socialize.
Throughout the cities that we visited, we also met many students of Kurdish origin. Since the
Kurdish problem in Turkey constitutes an area of study by and in itself, originally we had not
included the issue of Kurdish identity in our research. However, as the problems of the students
of Kurdish origin were different from the problems of other young people, we decided to convey
their complaints in our study as well.
We also have to mention that the examples cited below are limited to what the students of
Kurdish origin have told us and far from grasping the complex set of problems Kurdish people
face in Turkey in general.
We met students of Kurdish origin only in a few cities we visited. All of them had come from
the southeastern region of Turkey to these cities in which they now lived for their university
education. Even though they belonged to the majority in their hometowns, they became
minorities in these cities, especially in the universities they attended.
When they first came to the city, most of them were led by the dershanes - the private
institutions that prepare students in Turkey for the university entrance examination - they had
attended to stay in the community houses of the Fettullah Gülen community, while some moved
into the university dormitories. However, due to various pressures none of them could stay in
those places for a long time and eventually rented flats in downtown with other friends from
the southeast region of Turkey who were attending the same university.
They seemed to accept the discrimination, pressure and even violence they had to face. They told
their stories about being beaten or verbally harassed and cursed in a manner as if they were
“telling jokes”. It was as if they had sensed that the only way to protect their mental health was
laughter not anger with an instinctive reflex.
A student from Atatürk University in Erzurum told us that the moment he went to the
dormitories, he was asked where he was from. When he replied that he was from Diyarbakır,
they told him that “if he was from Diyarbakır, he should watch out himself in Erzurum”. He
complained about the fact that other students in the dormitory had avoided even chatting
with him although he had tried hard to break the ice. In the end he had left the dormitory and
become friends with people from his region; they tried to support one another by forming a
small community.
The reason that forced him to leave the dormitory was a reaction he faced while he was
watching a soccer game on television. During a game between a Spanish soccer club and the
Fenerbahçe soccer team, some people had entered the field with a banner saying, “Freedom
25
for Kurdistan”16. The people in the dormitory started “swearing” at all the Kurds, even their
“mothers and sisters”. Without saying a word, he had slammed his chair to the ground and left
the room. The place he took refuge was the CHP headquarters in the city. Thanks to his frequent
visits to the CHP headquarters, he had managed to acquire himself a “shield”.
A female student in Balıkesir narrated that a friend of hers had reached an agreement with a
landlord to rent his place; then, while he was moving in, the owner asked him where he was
from. The student answered: “from Mardin”. Hearing this, the landlord told him that he did not
have a place to rent to him and called the deal off. A student in Trabzon informed us that, in
order to overcome this problem, they were handling all the communication with real estate
agents and landlords via their friends from the western regions of the country.
A young female student in Sakarya University in Adapazarı told us that one of her friends
suddenly stopped their friendship. To “clear her name” she went from door to door in the dorm
telling other girls, “I was friends with her only because I was not aware that she was a Kurd”. We
often heard that when people learned they were Kurds, many “stopped greeting” them.
A female student in Balıkesir told us that a young man, who supported her during a dispute at
the hospital, had said “God forbid! Never!” and walked away when he learned that she was from
Diyarbakır. “His exact words were “‘God forbid! Never!’, ‘God forbid! Never!’” she repeated, unable
to believe what she had heard. “Here, there is a “‘God forbid! attitude’ against the Kurds,” she
commented.
Among the Kurdish students, there were those who were behaving secretive about their
hometowns in order to avoid problems. A student in Trabzon reported us that, because of the
prejudice against people from the southeast, he had friends who would say that they are from
“Adana” or “Mersin” when people asked them where they were from. Lying about this was
adopted as a “method” by many of his friends, since it dispersed problems both in friendships
and in sharing class notes.
The thing that they mostly complained about was the impossibility of speaking or listening
to music in their mother tongue. A student in Erzurum told us he once was beaten by ülkücüs
because he listened to a Kurdish song in the dormitory. Another student told that a friend of his
from Mardin was beaten by ülkücüs when he was caught listening to Kurdish songs on his cell
phone.
A student from Karadeniz Technical University, who was also a member of ADD, reported us that
a group with “guns at their waists” frantically searched the entire campus in an attempt to find
a student from Diyarbakir Dicle University who had come to Trabzon for a sports competition.
The crisis did not escalate since they couldn’t find him, but they recalled the “terror” that the
group had caused for a long time. “Here, for example, Newroz is not treated as Kurdish festival,
but rather as ‘the payback’ day,” he stated. We have heard many stories about the problems
encountered as a result of speaking Kurdish and listening to Kurdish songs. These could
constitute suitable examples for the theories of sociology which draws our attention to the fact
that the weak have no language.
16 In the UEFA Cup game between Celta de Vigo and Fenerbahçe on November 30, 2006, some people among the spectators
unfurled banners in support of the PKK.
26
The most striking story we heard was the one told by a Kurdish student who came from
southeastern Turkey to Trabzon. His mother occasionally called him on his cell phone, but if by
chance she called him while he was outdoors in the street, he would speak to her in Turkish. He
was afraid of speaking in Kurdish with his mother, who could not speak in Turkish.
In Balıkesir students explained that when family members who cannot speak Turkish called
them while they were using public transportation, they hung up the phone and called them later
to explain the situation. A student of Karadeniz Technical University in Trabzon described how
he and a friend were warned in an internet café because they conversed in Kurdish. When they
reacted outspokenly, both were beaten up. He was hit and even got a “hole in the head”. When
his mother who could barely speak Turkish called him the next day, he responded in Turkish.
When his mother said, “Son, why are you speaking Turkish? I cannot understand what you are
saying”, his response was: “Mother, I spoke in Kurdish and got a hole in my head, so I am now
being more careful.”
Once, the family of a student came from their “hometown” to visit him in Balıkesir. They went to
a park and as they were conversing in Kurdish among themselves, a group of women reacted to
them, saying “Why are you speaking in this language? It is the language of gavur (infidels).”
A female student from Balıkesir University related that almost nobody has spoken to them since
she and her friend conversed in Kurdish in class. Each student had been given a number for
keeping track of the deliverance day of their homework and she asked her friend sitting next to
her in Kurdish “what her number was”. A couple of students overheard their conversation and
asked them to “translate from whatever language that was”. She stated that they were almost
“ex-communicated” after this incident and nobody has talked to them ever again.
The students of Kurdish origin also complained about the political groups in the universities.
In this regard, they were particularly uncomfortable with the “Ülkücü Gençlik” or the “Alperen
Ocakları17” of the BBP (Grand Union Party). In Erzurum, all the students we interviewed,
regardless of their political affiliation, agreed that the “Ülkücü Gençlik” was the dominating
political group in the university.
Students reported us that there was a red table in each university canteen reserved for the
leaders or “Reis” of the Ülkücü groups and that no one else was allowed to sit at those tables.
According to the students, the “Reis” was responsible for the “maintenance of order” in the
canteens and the buildings. The students also agreed that the university was under the
domination of the “right wing”.
A student, who himself was not of Kurdish origin, related us that he was accused of being a
“separatist” because of the views he expressed in a discussion on the Kurdish question. He told
us that the “Reis” said to him; “Be careful, this is Erzurum; no one will even be able to recognize
your corpse.”
We were informed that “Alperen Ocakları” along with the “Ülkücü”s was also influential in
Adapazarı. A student of Kurdish origin told us that they encountered verbal assaults by the
members of “Alperen Ocakları” on campus. When the members of the “Ocak” took a picture of
one of their friends, they presented a petition to the Rector; yet could not get any concrete result.
17 Editor’s note: The Alperen Ocakları of BBP, like MHP’s Ülkü Ocakları are the party’s local hubs where younger members of the
party gather.
27
The Kurdish students also complained about the abusive language in their neighborhoods. A
female student we interviewed reported us that while she was in the grocery store the other
day, the young men waiting in front of the store were making insinuating remarks: “‘It is not
possible for such a beautiful girl to be a terrorist’, they were saying,” she related. She told us
that their Kurdish identity was known by the people and therefore they encountered such
harassment in the streets.
Not a single student of Kurdish origin we interviewed wanted to live in the town in which they
were studying. Their common aim was to finish the university and leave.
Examples of the restricted lives and pressures mentioned above apparently affected the young
people we interviewed by creating fear and disgust, making them feel insecure, and by making
them uncomfortable as they could not live as they wished and could not express themselves freely.
The things we heard from the students about their life experiences in those cities we visited
indicates that the possibility of the “brain drain” we mentioned at the beginning of this section
must be taken seriously.
All of these students expressed their desire to graduate as soon as possible and move to a big
city or to the “West” where they can live more freely. “I am preparing again for the university
entrance examination; I hope I will be successful and escape from here”, a student in Adapazarı
told us. His closest friend took the examination again last year and managed to enroll in a
university in Istanbul.
“I ask my friends from Trabzon if any of them want to stay here after graduation and there is
almost no one who wants to stay. Trabzon is losing even the people from Trabzon”, a student we
interviewed in Trabzon informed.
The young people we interviewed in Malatya have stated that, when they came to the university
campus, “they felt like they were living in another country”. This expression, “to feel like living
in another country” was almost a summary of the desires of those young people: desire for
countries “altogether different” from their immediate environment, countries whose streets,
avenues, concert halls and entertainment places they know of through the movies, internet and
television; the countries where young people live as they wish without feeling any pressure on
them and where they can express their ideas freely.
The New Others of Anatolia: The Seculars
“We are going to publish a journal and we are soliciting an advertisement. The
guy says, “We’ll give you the money, but do not publish our ad”. The people are so
polarized, they are afraid of the reaction from the outside if their names appear in
our journal.”
A Member of the Atatürkist Thought Association (ADD) in Malatya
The “Atatürkist” segment, which has put its own imprint on Turkish politics and political
thought throughout the history of the Republic, have complained to us in almost every city
we have been to that it takes guts to defend “Atatürkist” thoughts and that those views
are perceived in the society as crimes. They believed that they were excluded or subject to
persecution because of their political views.
The university student members of the ADD we have interviewed stated that it was possible
to carry out political activities on the university campuses and they were not faced with any
28
systematic assault, but it was not at all that easy to undertake any political action to promote
Atatürkist thought or secularism in the city centers.
A member of the ADD Malatya claimed that they had not met with any obstruction during
their activities; however, he also stated that they themselves or the speakers on their panels
have been verbally assaulted during the panels and when they requested a place from the
municipalities, they were asked to fulfill all sorts of conditions that were not asked from other
groups. “To say ‘I am an Atatürkist’ takes courage,” he said.
Someone we interviewed at the headquarters of the CHP in Malatya related us the following:
“You cannot conduct any activity in the schools in this city to promote secularist consciousness.
This is Malatya; it is out of the question here.” A member of the ADD in Adapazarı, a teacher,
confided in us that the most significant condition of political activity in the city was “to be
careful about your discourse”. Because of the fact that the “most crucial” messages of the
previous ADD people, who did not refrain from using “a sharp language” in their declarations,
were not published in the local press or were cut from the texts in the past, they have now
changed their methods and opted for issuing more moderate declarations without “making
concessions from their opinions”.
Someone in the same city realized that Atatürk’s picture was not hung on during the panel
prepared by the municipalities of Adapazarı and Sakarya for the commemoration of the
Çanakkale (Gallipoli) War. It was only made possible after the ADD organized a press conference.
This individual complained that, whereas in the past pharmacies, jewelries and other stores in
downtown area had displayed pictures of Atatürk, now it was only here and there.
It was frequently conveyed to us that the people who were known for their Atatürkist identity
in the past were now behaving differently. The members of the Atatürkist Thought Association
resented the fact that the people who had used to be close to them were now afraid to appear at
or were not attending their activities at all and that even if they gave support, they were doing
it discreetly.
A member of ADD in Kayseri told us the story of one of his friends, another ADD member who
was the headmaster of one of the schools in Kayseri. He was proposed to become the head
of ADD and refused this while he was still the headmaster. He accepted candidacy only after
he was “dismissed from” his position. The most significant concern was related to survival
in business life. They were convinced that being a member of ADD necessarily meant being
excluded from business circles and being exposed to pressure in professional life. A member of
Adapazarı ADD stated: “We have such friends whose views are close to ours, yet they do not want
to become members because they are tradesmen.”
A person we interviewed at the Association for Social Democracy in Eskişehir told us that their
members were “hesitant” to take part in the recent activities of ADD. We were reported that
the invitations for the annual dinners were sold out in the past; now people were buying the
invitation tickets but they were refraining from attending to these dinners. “To be an ADD
member, to be an ulusalcı (nationalist) is a crime in Turkey now, you know,” he said.
A member of Malatya ADD told us that although they could have published ads in their journal
in the past, they no longer tried to get ads, simply because they did not want “to cause trouble
for people”.
29
One cannot claim that the forms of pressure the ADD members face in general involve violence
or threat. However, we also listened to such stories. We were told by the members of the
Adapazarı ADD that the doors of their building were broken and their sign was taken down a
few times. They complained of conservatism and intolerance in their city, claiming that things
were getting worse each day.
A respondent we interviewed in the ADD in Bağcılar-İstanbul, reported us that a member of ADD
was stubbed to death in the building on a dark night one week after their opening in 1999. The
name “IBDA-C” was written on the walls to claim responsibility, but after nine years, the case is
still not closed. The association now has a solidly-constructed door.
A student member of ADD in Malatya related us that their pamphlets and even the ADD holiday
greeting cards were torn up, as well as the posters of a play they staged, because it was about
“the nationalist struggle” even though the posters did not display the ADD signature.
A member of Adapazarı ADD told us that a police officer had approached her saying, “Be careful
abla (big sister); even when you are crossing the street at a green light, they run you down and
then say that it was an accident”. They were heart-broken and most resentful about the behavior
of the police. Members of the Adapazarı ADD claimed that the police did not pay any attention to
the threats or assaults against the Association; it was always the “military” that would support
the ADD.
She has witnessed many occasions when military personnel were “standing on guard” in civilian
clothes in front of the ADD. She said to us: “I’ll be very straightforward and honest. It was the
military that protected us most. It was the only protection we received. The police, however, did
not come at all. When we attend demonstrations and the like, the police asks, ‘How many of you
are going; who is going; when are you going; when are you going to come back?’ and take our
names and phone numbers, but when it comes to protection, there is none whatsoever.”
A female professor was running for the rectorship of her university in one of the cities we
visited.18 According to her own perception, “because she was from a family of the CHP tradition
and because her husband was a member of the ADD, rumors were spread first that she was
a “member of the PKK” and a “communist”; then that she was a Kurd and an Alevi”. When she
asked her mother “if they were Alevis”, “I don’t have the slightest idea. I wish your father was
alive,” said her mother. Although they were originally from Erzincan, rumors then were spread
that she was “from Tunceli”, that she was “from Dersim”. She asked her mother once again and
her mother replied: “We don’t have any connection whatsoever; I don’t know anything about
such matters”. A couple of months later, the rumor were that she was a follower of Fethullah
Gülen. A colleague of hers reacted by telling her jokingly: “How nice it is my professor, you have
embraced everyone!”
The story above is like a summary of our in the Anatolian cities. Almost everyone who was
subject to discrimination in Anatolia was one of the heroes in this story.
It was perceived almost as a crime or blasphemy to belong to these groups and it was used as a
tool for anti-propaganda and pressure against individuals. The positive side of the story is that
in spite of all, there were people in Turkey who accepted such differences as natural and who
were not even aware of their own origins and/or attached any significance to them.
18 We refrain from mentioning the name of the city in order not to disclose her identity.
30
2. CHANGING MUSLIMHOOD IN ANATOLIA AND SOCIAL PRESSURE
Throughout the cities we visited, we were informed that the people who are not fasting during
Ramadan are being faced to an ever-increasing pressure. This pressure differs from the identityrelated social pressures mentioned above.
However, since the issue of fasting is also related to social pressure, we find it appropriate
to include it here at the end of this section. We will deal with the pressure emanating from
government practices or originating from the activities of religious communities in another
section.
Public Spaces during Ramadan
“This … city is a total nightmare for people who don’t fast during the month of
Ramadan… Before iftar (mealtime at sunset for fasting people), it is impossible to
find an open café, restaurant, pastry shop, etc. in this huge city. People who open
their places before iftar are attacked by the ülkücüs and their places are raided and
trashed. People who attempt to drink water or smoke a cigarette in the street are
being beaten almost to death in front of everyone… The situation in the university is
no different from the city… Their justification is rather interesting: ‘People who fast
must not be disrespected’… As if it is a month of suffering, not fasting.
Özgür Can, Radikal Genç, December 2, 2007.19
Milliyet reporter Filiz Aygündüz, who visited Erzurum, Erzincan, Sivas and Yozgat during the
month of Ramadan, also wrote about what the above-quoted student from Ataturk University
had expressed. Aygündüz quoted another student who did not give his name, just like Özgür
Can: “Here, there is this impression that it is as if you are fasting for the people of Erzurum.” The
student told Aygündüz that food and beverage sales in the university canteen and the lunch
services were stopped. She confirms the things she heard from the student when she goes to the
university to check if that was indeed the case.
She writes about a pastry shop which was stoned the previous year for remaining open during
the month of Ramadan. She also mentions that people who wanted to have lunch during
Ramadan were either going to the bus terminal or the state hospital’s restaurants. From what
she writes, it is understood that even educated people may be intrusive against those that eat
during Ramadan. When Aygündüz asked a female columnist at a local newspaper what she
would do if she were to take out a piece of pastry and eat since she was a seferi (expeditionary
status; you are excused from fulfilling your religious obligations since you are travelling), the
columnist answered: “I would say, ‘Eat dirt.’”
A young teacher of physics who recently graduated from Atatürk University says “to respect a
fasting person is a must”. He tells us that the day before, he said “Hey, Dadaş (a local expression
for ‘Brother’), this is Erzurum, you cannot smoke here (during Ramadan)” to three persons who
lit cigarettes after getting out of the bus. He adds that they had to put out their cigarettes.20
19 After his letter was published, we contacted this student from Erzurum Ataturk University via e-mail. In his reply message,
he wrote that the name Özgür Can –literally meaning “free spirit”- was in fact an alias and “in order to not to be subjected
to violence by the known dominant groups”, he had asked the administrators of the newspaper Radikal not to disclose his
name, adding that even feeling the need to make such a request was enough to indicate the dimension of “social pressure”
in the city where he was living. He did not write his name in the message he sent us, either.
20 Filiz Aygündüz, “Anadolu Ne Kadar Hoşgörülü?” Milliyet, Pazar newspaper supplement, October 14, 2007.
31
The people we talked with in Erzurum confirmed the stories conveyed by Filiz Aygündüz.
We learned that all the restaurants, except for the ones at the bus station and the canteen
at the state hospital, were closed. The university’s canteen was open, but there was no food
service. Even in the Teachers’ Guesthouse there was no food service during Ramadan. The open
restaurants were forced to stop their service as a result of social pressure; the only restaurant
which managed to remain open and several Alevi coffeehouses had to put curtains on their
windows during Ramadan.
We were told that there was a raid at the state hospital’s canteen and the patients’ relatives
who were having lunch there were assaulted; an incident they claimed known by everyone
in Erzurum. Everyone we spoke with told us that the previous year a restaurant serving food
during Ramadan had been lapidated. They even showed us this restaurant which at the time
was shut down and had its windows covered with old newspapers.
In most of the cities we visited, eating something or smoking in the street during Ramadan was
considered discouragingly dangerous. In Erzurum, Konya, Kayseri and Trabzon, many people
who forgot it was Ramadan and lit a cigarette were warned harshly; some of them were even
beaten.
Similar to Aygündüz’s observations, we learned during our interviews that, since there was no
food service in the canteens of Ataturk University in Erzurum, students who wanted to have
lunch had to go to the state hospital or the bus station far from the university. Apart from their
homes, the only place people could drink tea or smoke cigarettes were the coffeehouses in Alevi
neighborhood which had to draw their curtains or cover their windows with newspapers during
Ramadan.21
The owner of one of the Alevi coffeehouses which was open during Ramadan told us that Sunnis
sometimes tease him pejoratively by saying that his place was full of Alevis. When he invites
them in and shows them that only a few of his customers are Alevi and the rest are Sunni, they
say, “You were right, Vallahi (by Jingo)!”
Not to fast during Ramadan constituted a problem even among high school and primary school
students. A high school student from Erzurum explained: “You know the saying ‘Your home is
not where you were born but where you eat’; if a person is living here, he has to comply with the
customs of this place, whether he likes it or not. If we are fasting, other people will also have to
fast”. He informed us that they were “excommunicating” their friends who don’t fast as well.
We posed the following question to a female high school student: “Well, when you are talking
among yourselves, aren’t there people who think that it is necessary to respect people with
different lifestyles? For example, isn’t there anybody who thinks that if the girls want to cover
their hair they should, and if they don’t want to, they should not, or if someone doesn’t want
to fast, it’s his or her own choice to do so and he or she has a right to or not?” Her answer was
“No.” She added: “Here we directly consider those people who don’t fast ‘Kızılbaş’ (a specific
derogatory word to imply that someone is Alevi) and even if that person is Sunni, from then on
he or she will be known as Alevi.”
21 This information about the Alevi coffeehouses in Erzurum is also given in Aygündüz, op. cit.
32
It was understood that the young students were affected by the “Secular-Islamist” debate in
Turkey as they assessed their friends in this framework. A high school student in Erzurum
reported that in the vocational school that her older sister was attending, there was “a military
officer’s daughter” and that the girls at school did not believe that she fasted. When we asked if
that was because she was the daughter of a military officer, our respondent answered by saying,
“There is picture of Ataturk and stuff like that in her home, that’s why.” They did not believe that
she was fasting, because she was not wearing a headscarf either.
A primary school teacher we interviewed in Erzurum told us that on the first day of Ramadan
students were asking him,“Teacher, are you fasting?” and questioning each other, “Are you a
lion or a fox?” Since the lion symbolizes courage, it implied a person who fasts and since the fox
symbolizes ruse and distrust, it implied a person who does not fast.
An Alevi in Bağcılar-İstanbul related us that the friends of his grandchildren were asking them
why they didn’t fast during Ramadan and were telling them they would go to hell if they did not
fast.
A student at Karadeniz Technical University in Trabzon, who is also a member of Atatürkist
Thought Club, reported us that the university canteen was open only for the girls, considering
that the girls would stop fasting during menstruation. Once, in his freshman year, he had
lunch with his friends at home and when they went out, he lit a cigarette. Suddenly he felt that
everyone was staring at him, but he could not understand why because he had forgotten that it
was Ramadan.
Some people approached him saying “What do you think you are doing?” in a very rude manner.
He was surprised and replied: “Nothing, what am I doing?” He got a slap on the face and he had
“cowered so as not to be beaten more”. They had started the “This is Trabzon discourse.” “To say
‘This is Trabzon’ is a characteristic of this place, it is the first thing they say to warn you” he said
to us.
Another time, the same student, while walking with a friend early in the morning, lit a cigarette
since there was nobody around; suddenly someone hit his shoulder with a cane. An old man who
ran to catch them yelled: “’What are you doing?’ you infidels!” Yet, the student explained that
during Ramadan he did not smoke cigarettes “normally” when there were other people around
because it would be “disrespectful”.
One time a “faithful” friend of his could not fast because he was sick. While he was secretly
eating the biscuits hidden under his coat, someone approached and slapped him using the same
classic sentence: “What do you think you are doing? This is Trabzon”.
A teacher we interviewed in Trabzon stated that apart from primary schools, “almost all” of
the school canteens are closed during Ramadan and students who didn’t fast feel the need to
disguise themselves.
He added: “Turkey is one of the countries where Islam can be lived at its best: no one in
Turkey would be treated contemptuously for fasting and no one would be reproached for
performing ritual prayer or going on the pilgrimage to Mecca. Everybody respects the hajji, but
unfortunately we have seen violence against people who don’t fast in this country. You wonder
where this country is headed when you see the reactions against differences; it’s dreadful.”
33
A university student in Trabzon said that during every Ramadan there were “one or two
incidents” and a tense atmosphere in the university and that there were some students who
were beaten because of smoking or not fasting. There was even an “armed incident” three years
ago where someone got wounded.
A female student in the same university once went to the canteen during Ramadan since she did
not fast. A female employee in the canteen said to her: “Even my child who is going to primary
school fasts, have you no shame? No meal for you!” Another female student, when she was new
at the university, went to the canteen and bought water. She was reproached for not fasting by a
group of male students.
Another student told us that there were only a few people fasting during Ramadan in his
freshman year, yet “Now” he said, “the entire class is fasting and the courses are cancelled
if they coincide with iftar.” “Only to resist against this pressure,” he was smoking during
Ramadan.
“I am doing this to provoke, I swear I am doing this on purpose and I am not smoking secretly, I
am smoking in front of that building,” he said to us. He told that he was doing this because he
did not want his university to become a place like the one in Erzurum, where a student was
killed for not fasting during the month of Ramadan.
When we asked a student if there were social pressure during Ramadan, he replied to us that
this was the wrong question in Trabzon. The right question would be whether anybody ever
recalled a Ramadan without pressure.
Some of the people we interviewed in Trabzon drew a picture different from the one above. A
person from the Trabzon Health Laborer’s Union we talked to, told us that the staff canteen of
the hospital where he worked was closed during Ramadan the previous year “under the pretext
of reparations”, but “it would not be that easy” to close it again for the following Ramadan.
A member of the Women Artists’ Association of Trabzon told us that “up until ten years ago”
all the restaurants had been closed for Ramadan and there had been a few people who were
not fasting, yet nowadays, there remained no closed restaurants and there were many people
who actually did not fast. She explained that this change was due in part to the presence of
university students in the city.
However, she said, “You still cannot eat or drink anything on the streets of Trabzon (during
Ramadan); the atmosphere here is different from İstanbul or İzmir.” “You cannot smoke here on
the street during Ramadan; well, women can’t smoke any other time either anyway, but in the
parts of the town where the young people gather they smoke and they smoke quite freely,” she
added.
An administrator of the Trabzon Human Rights Association stated that some of the restaurants
in Trabzon were kept open during Ramadan. He and his friends could even eat outdoors in the
Central Park of Trabzon and no one would intervene. “Here the problem lies not with people, but
with the state; this state is a secular republic, but if you ask if the tea-room in the governor’s
office is open (during Ramadan), the answer is ‘Never’,” he explained.
A civil servant in Malatya whom we interviewed at the ADD informed us that during Ramadan,
the practice of serving tea in the government offices was stopped; for instance, at the institution
he worked, there would not be any tea service during Ramadan.
34
Someone from the CHP headquarters in Malatya stated that most of the restaurants had
been closed during Ramadan in the past too, but with the expansion of the university, the
environment was becoming more relaxed. Yet, he indicated that the situation in the government
offices was different and that there was no food service during Ramadan. He told us that they,
as CHP administration, were receiving many complaints about the issue.
A student from Mersin who came there for university education was complaining about the
city as there was not even a single simitçi (a person who sells savory rolls covered with sesame
seeds) on the streets, whereas in Mersin, apart from the restaurants, even places which sell
alcohol would be open during Ramadan. One time, “at a moment of distraction” he lit a cigarette.
A young man approached him saying, “Don’t breach our abdest (state of cleanliness); put out that
cigarette”. He told him, “I am fasting as well but I forgot; I am sorry, you see how I breached my
fast” and threw the cigarette away. He related us that he was not really fasting, but given the
circumstances, he had to act as if he was.
That year during Ramadan in downtown Malatya a man approached two young girls who were
wearing short sleeves and said, “Look, here are the whores of Malatya”. Suddenly things got
heated and the girls “attacked the guy”. A policeman was called, but he did nothing, although he
had witnessed the whole incident. The student remarked to us that it was truly a scene of mass
condemnation.
An Alevi businessman from Malatya reported that in business circles, because of the fear of not
being able to close deals, many people quitted drinking, went on pilgrimage and pretended that
they were fasting. “To say that there is no ‘neighborhood pressure’ is a gross lie,” he claimed. He
mentioned that during Ramadan the restaurants which served alcoholic beverages were closed.
It was even impossible to find a place to drink tea and people could not smoke on the streets. He
added that this situation caused tensions. He stated: “There are civil servants and students here people cannot find a place to go, it’s like a prison.”
Another businessman we interviewed in Malatya told us that the tea service in the government
offices was being stopped and there was not a single public institution in which people could
drink tea. Even in the university, the situation was the same.
He expressed his concerns about his future. The thing he feared most was the possibility of
the transformation of his country into an extremely repressive one. He thought that peoples’
freedom was restrained by “the threat of economic crisis” and he added: “Is there a greater
repression? This is repression.” “What will happen tomorrow? It is not a problem if I will have
no bread to eat, but I should be able to live in this country without giving up my liberties,” he
reflected.
A teacher from Eğitim-Sen in Malatya informed us in particular that the canteens of the
secondary and high schools were mostly closed during Ramadan; in the ones that were open
there would be psychological pressure exerted on students who went to the canteens. There was
also no tea service for the teachers. When he ate biscuits offered by a student of his, the viceprincipal called him to his office and said: “For god’s sake, isn’t it shameful to eat biscuits openly
like that?”
A friend of his, a teacher who worked at another school, was warned for having a cup of tea
in his hand while he was at the corridor calling the students into the class and was told that
he should not be seen with a cup of tea in his hand during Ramadan. The very same day an
35
investigation was initiated against him. He indicated that even the Alevi teachers felt obliged to
fast when they were at school. However, a member of the Malatya Pir Sultan Abdal Association
told us that he did not face any problems as a result of not fasting.
The representative of one of the national television channels whom we interviewed in Malatya
told us that during Ramadan their office acted as a “free lane” and even their “pious friends”
would come there to have tea. A government official who had stopped by their office rejected it
at first when they offered him a cup of tea; but later, emphasizing that he had diabetes, he said:
“Okay, I’ll have some.”
The representative told us that there was no tea service even in the pastry shops (after the
coffeehouses, they are the most popular places to have tea). One day during the previous
Ramadan, he was in a playful mood when the waiter in Cumhuriyet pastry shop asked him if he
was “niyetli” (a synonym for fasting, the direct translation of which is to be willing or to have
an intention). “I am very well-intentioned and I have no bad intentions,” he replied. Since the
waiter thought that he did not understand his question, he asked him again: “Are you fasting?”
The representative responded: “I am not fasting, but I have good intentions.” He said to us, “I had
a half-hour meeting with an acquaintance and the tea arrived in the last three minutes from
wherever they had managed to find it”.
A producer at a local TV channel in Malatya related that people who were not fasting “had to
prepare” themselves for Ramadan as there would not be any lunch service. “Probably they
think,” she said, “that it’s not necessary to serve lunch; people who don’t fast should take care of
themselves.” “However,” she remarked, “if you serve lunch the rest of the year, you should serve
it during Ramadan as well”.
During the previous Ramadan she witnessed a very “surprising” incident when she was passing
through Akpınar Square, “where there are cheap night clubs, where lower-income men go to
be with women, and where there are places that women work”. She saw that even in that part
of town the business owners felt the need to cover the windows of their kebab-houses and
restaurants with drapes.
We also heard that people visiting Anatolia during Ramadan faced many problems. A member of
the local press we talked to in Batman reported us that there were no open restaurants in the
city and the few places that someone could have a bite were either those “draped” ones or caféstyle places located on the upper floors of the buildings.
He mentioned that an official from the Japanese Embassy, visiting Batman during Ramadan,
once came to see him. When the journalist asked him if he was hungry, he was very surprised
to the possibility that he might be able eat something during Ramadan. The journalist offered
him biscuits, milk and juice from his refrigerator. Later, the official sent a thank-you note to the
journalist.
A teacher we interviewed in the same city told us that if a teacher were to eat something in
the teacher’s room during Ramadan, someone would come and shut the door. Another teacher
observed that even the female teachers could not easily eat or drink anything “during their
periods” (when they are ‘excused’ from fasting) and they rather took a bite or two quickly in the
teacher’s room and left.
36
He also said that, even the teachers who did not fast and drank tea during Ramadan were faced
with “looks of disapproval” of others. “Yet, we try to avoid that pressure exerted on us as much
as we can and try to live these days as they are normal, ordinary ones” he added.
A student we interviewed at Sivas Cumhuriyet University told us that once he was drinking
coke in the canteen and the ülkücüs came and asked him if he was fasting. When he told them
he was not, they said, “Then please don’t drink this here”. He asked them the reason and they
replied: “There are people around who do fast.” He said to them, “Alright, but if you are fasting,
you shouldn’t even be here” as a response. They reproached him by saying, “Who are you to tell
us what to do? You are not going to drink that here” and forced him to leave.
On another occasion, a different student from the same university lit a cigarette on the street,
forgetting that it was Ramadan. A group of young people approaching asked him in a rude
manner: “What do you think you are doing?” He was barely able to get on the bus and make it
to the university. An Alevi in Sivas told us that people who smoke on the street during Ramadan
were being hissed at and cursed. A young man we interviewed in Balıkesir reported us that
when he was studying in Çanakkale, he was beaten by four people just because he drank tea
during Ramadan.
A teacher in Balıkesir informed us that, although their school’s canteen remained open during
Ramadan, there was no proper service. Once when he wanted to drink tea, the operator of the
canteen turned down this request saying, “Sorry, sir, but I do not prepare tea, since I cannot sell
even a single potful of tea before noon.”
However, he knew that there were “at least thirty” of them who were not fasting. Believing that
these teachers were not drinking tea because they tried to avoid pressure, he was asking us
“who would respect the ones who did not fast, while everyone respected the ones who did”. He
commented on the situation: “You can call it whatever pressure you want, but what they do is
pressure.”
Another teacher in the same city complained that he started to exert self-pressure. He was
telling us that during earlier Ramadans he would be eating lunch “without any problem”, but
for the past five or six years this was not the case. He could not eat comfortably as whenever
he looked around, he would see that most of his colleagues were fasting and he could not even
drink a cup of tea when he was with them. He expressed his feelings: “I started to feel such
pressure around me.”
A faculty member we interviewed in Denizli touched upon the same issue, saying that he was
hesitant to eat something on the street during Ramadan, wondering in his head, “Is it okay to
eat?” or “Would something happen if I eat?” He was afraid to eat even in the university canteen.
Many restaurants were closed during Ramadan in Kayseri, too. A teacher we interviewed said
that the people who did not fast were questioned on the matter. A teacher who is a member of
Eğitim-Sen informed us that there were no open restaurants during Ramadan up until three
to five years ago and the open restaurants were being stoned and shut down at that time. She
added: “Nowadays restaurants are open, but no one would eat out on the street, otherwise
people would give them dirty looks.”
Another teacher stated that the relations among teachers were going normal “to a certain
degree” at other times; however, tensions would build up among them during Ramadan and the
37
same tension was present also among neighbors. “They distance themselves, if you don’t fast”
he said.
The same tension could be felt at the university in Kayseri as well. Last year, at Erciyes
University, there were incidents between the students who fasted and those who did not. A
faculty member we interviewed was then the dean of one of the faculties.
He visited the faculty canteen to put an end to the reactions towards the students who did not
fast and did something no one dared by sitting on the chair of the chief of the ülkücüs. He lit a
cigarette and started to drink tea afterwards. An ülkücü student approached him saying, “You
managed to become a professor, but not a decent man” and a crowd left the canteen along with
this student.
An Alevi worker we talked to in a coffeehouse in Kayseri was working in a factory of a large
enterprise that was owned by an Islamist entrepreneur. During Ramadan, while they were
searching him, the security at the main gate of the factory took his bread which he kept hidden
in his pocket in order to eat secretly later on.
They reminded him that they were all had been warned before that no one would be allowed
to eat it the workplace during Ramadan. He informed the administration about his gastrointestinal problem and only after he took a report from the doctor, he was allowed to eat in the
workplace. Other workers in the coffeehouse confirmed this, recounting that the workers who
did not fast were either fired or “forced to resign” as they were consequently assigned to heavier
duties.
An Alevi we interviewed at the Kayseri Pir Sultan Abdal Association related that an unveiled
woman was attacked and beaten while she was taking her child to school last Ramadan. The
ones who assaulted her were yelling, “How dare you walk around in Ramadan with your hair
uncovered?” “They wouldn’t give jobs to the people who drink tea or eat something during
Ramadan” he remarked. Another Alevi explained that the social pressure over the issue of
fasting was leading people into fraudulent practices: “Some people tell people around that they
are fasting, but then they come to our coffeehouses and eat secretly.”
The situation was no different in Konya. A teacher we interviewed reported us that most of the
restaurants were closed during Ramadan and the tea urn at the teacher’s room was removed. A
doctor in the same city said that the staff canteen of the hospital was open during Ramadan but
the number of the doctors who went there (among 180 doctors) was at most ten and the number
of personnel was no more than thirty or forty out of almost a thousand.
“Probably half of them do not actually fast, yet they do not go to the canteen to eat, either”, he
stated. He added that no one asked others if they were fasting; those who did not fast acted as if
they did.
Yet a businessman drew a picture different from the one described above. He told us that
restaurants and the like are not closed during Ramadan and “though he might be exaggerating
a bit”, there were times when even he wanted to say to those people whom he saw eating outside,
“That’s enough, at least turn around while you are eating, so the passers-by won’t see you”. “You
may not be fasting, fine, but I consider it disrespectful of you when you enjoy your meal so
indiscreetly before my eyes,” he added.
38
He claimed that there was “no such conservatism, pressure or problem in Konya”. “Believe me,”
he said “the people of Konya have acquired the taste for money to the extent that it now comes
before Islam; money has finally ruined us”.
In Bağcılar, İstanbul, a former public employee retired from the municipality was telling us
that tea service during work hours at the municipality had been stopped during the months of
Ramadan since the AKP came to power. “Come during Ramadan and let’s go to the bus stations
or to the municipality headquarters in Bağcılar and see for yourself whether the cafeteria and
the tea-rooms are closed or not,” he said. He added that those who told us that there was no
pressure in Bağcılar were “definitely lying”. He pointed out that “at least the neighbors would
interrogate you” by asking, “Why aren’t you fasting? Why aren’t you covering your head?”
An Alevi woman we interviewed in Sultanbeyli, İstanbul, told us that none of her co-workers in
her former workplace in Sarıgazi spoke with her, because while everyone was fasting during
Ramadan, she was not. No lunch was served in the workplace and she was eating outside.
“However,” she said, “I was eating lunch, but they were devouring me.”
There were also other towns in which there were either no significant tensions or some rare
incidents during Ramadan. A teacher from Adapazarı, who was also a union member, told
us that they did not experience such problems in her school and that the school canteen
remained open during Ramadan. A member of the Foundation for the Support of Women’s Work
Adapazarı branch said that the restaurants in the town were kept open during Ramadan. “Their
reaction against the pressure to fast has played a part in achieving a relatively comfortable
environment,” she noted.
Once, university students were beaten in the street for not fasting. A group of women including
her went to the “grand avenue” and smoked cigarettes together to protest. No one dared to
say anything. “I’ll do it again if necessary,” she said. Someone we interviewed at the CHP
headquarters in Aydın told us that they did not encounter any problems during Ramadan and
that even the places that served alcoholic beverages were open. A member of the AD stated that
she “had not heard at all” that such a problem ever occurred on the university campus.
A businessman in Denizli said that people who did not fast were not found strange, but eating
publicly during Ramadan when people who fast were around was disapproved.
Disagreeing with the statement above, a doctor from Denizli told us that sometimes tension
and clashes occurred between some groups in their city during Ramadan. On one occasion, he
witnessed a fight between young people because of fasting and some of them were hurt. He
added that such incidents did occur also at the university from time to time.
A doctor from the Eskişehir Chamber of Physicians reported that in the hospital where he
worked, they could drink tea and smoke cigarettes and the cafeteria was kept open during the
month of Ramadan. Yet, he pointed out that there were many employees who did not go there for
lunch fearing that “they could be noticed by or blabbed to the administration”. “We come across
those types who would say, ‘Ah, I see, you don’t fast,’ when they see you drinking tea,” he said to
us.
A member of the Eskişehir Social Democracy Association, a pharmacist, told us that the
restaurants in the city did not close during Ramadan, so the city was comfortable in that respect.
“Yet, there is also this: it was much more comfortable before; all the restaurants serving alcoholic
39
beverages were open, people could smoke on the streets,” he added. He could no longer eat his
lunch in his pharmacy because of “the terrible glances.”
A member of the Eskişehir Atatürkist Thought Association related that more and more people
were organizing iftar dinners – the evening meal for breaking the daily fast. She explained that
interest in this social ritual was growing because people either hoped to avoid criticisms or tried
to appear close to the government circles.
A teacher we saw at the headquarters of Eğitim-İş in Eskişehir said that the tea service
continued in their school during Ramadan, yet the students visiting the canteen were not
comfortable when purchasing something for the fear of being seen by other students.
A young member of the Eskişehir Women’s Platform described an incident involving herself and
her friends. As they were about to enter a restaurant for lunch, two passers-by, a man and his
wife, said, “Look at their clothes, too” and, when one of her friends reacted by saying, “What’s
wrong with our clothes?”, a fight broke out. Her friends were beaten and asked for help from the
policemen standing in front of the police station across the street, but no one was interested
in their call. When things got out of control, they were taken to the police station. There her
friends and the man who had assaulted them were treated differently. “Boy, these students!
They deserve anything you do. But, you forget about them now, calm down, let’s have our iftar
together now,” said a policeman.
The conclusion we drew from everything we had heard was that the tolerance which had long
been embedded in Anatolian Islam has turned into pressure exerted by the people who fast over
those who do not. In the past, when a person who did not fast asked permission to eat or drink
in the presence of those fasting, the response would be that fasting was for the sake of God and
not for the sake of others and that it indeed would not hurt them at all, as fasting was a matter
of testing one’s inner strength.
It was as if fasting has led to a strange deception: fasting is now perceived as if it is an
obligation instead of a ritual designed to educate one’s soul through controlling one’s own
desires. Fasting has become an obligation that is hardly bearable and bearable only if others do
not eat either. As seeing other people eating while fasting might lead a fasting person to desire
eating too, instead of controlling their own desires which is precisely the aim of fasting, people
now try to control other so as not to breach the fast.
3. UNCHANGABLE IDENTITIES AND SOCIAL PRESSURE
In this section, we are going to explore the cases of those who are faced with social pressure
and prejudice in the cities where they live because of the identities they acquired by birth as
opposed to choice. These pressures range from insult to marginalization, unemployment and
exclusion from economic life.
The stories we shall convey are those of Alevis, Roma and Christians who remain in the minority
due to their ethnic and religious origins and that of women, who throughout history have been
pushed to the margins of public life by social conservatism in the dominating world of men.
Our research did not include an in-depth study of the Roma population and Christians. Hence we
will suffice with only partial observations, drawing upon a few cases we came across.
40
“Obliged” to be Invisible, or the Invisible Victims of Anatolia: Alevis
In one of the towns we visited, an associate professor and the president of a non-governmental
organization22 had known each other for years and they had been working together in the
same NGO. Both were Alevis, yet they only realized this during our conversation. They had
not mentioned their Alevi identity to one another; maybe because they did not attribute any
significance to it or because they might have felt a need to hide it. It was puzzling to us why
they had not brought up this issue so far in a town where everyone knew everyone else’s life. Yet
we did not question it.
In most of the cities where we conducted our research, especially in places with a large Alevi
population like Erzurum, Kayseri, Malatya and Sivas, Alevis took the lead among similarly
oppressed groups in terms of encountering social pressure and prejudice.
In the words of an administrator from the Hacı Bektaş Veli Foundation in Eskişehir, “The
cemetery is the only place where discrimination ends.” Our perception was that the social
pressure and the prejudice against Alevis, although less visible in some towns, prevailed almost
everywhere.
According to a businessman we interviewed in Malatya, even in those social circles where the
prejudices against Alevis were minimal, people talked about Alevis by emphasizing a “but”
reservation: “he is an Alevi but he is a good person”, “he is an Alevi but an honest guy”, etc…
There were those who chose to fight against the pressure and the prejudice through joining
the Alevi associations, as well as others who chose to hide their Alevi identity or either adopted
Sunni customs and practice, or acted as if they do so, because they were either tired of the
pressure or were afraid that their business interests would suffer.
It is a long-known fact in Turkey that Alevis hide their identity. Most Alevis do not express their
identity in order to protect themselves as they have been subject to prejudice and repression in
the world of Sunnis throughout history.
This “identity hiding” was something we frequently heard about during our interviews among
Alevis. A member of Pir Sultan Abdal Association in Malatya said, “Many Alevis will not tell you
their identity; if you ask, they will say, “Neither Alevi, nor Sunni”, they are repressed to such an
extent.”
He pointed out that Alevis migrating from their villages to the city “changed the names of their
children from Hasan, Hüseyin and Ali to (neutral) names like Orkun because they were afraid
of their neighbors. “However, another Alevi man complained that he was unable to escape
discrimination all his life even if his name was “Ebubekir” (usually a Sunni name).23 An Alevi
woman we interviewed in Erzurum also brought up this issue of names: “Nowadays, there are
even people who suffer in business life simply because their name is ‘Haydar’.”
In fact, a shopkeeper whose name happened to be “Haydar” indicated that he had suffered
discrimination all his life because “he bore an Alevi name”, adding that “the Sunnis did not shop”
from them.
22 We do not identify the town and the organization in order to protect the identity of our respondents.
23 We do not disclose the name of the town in order to protect the respondent’s identity.
41
Sometimes their birthplaces revealed their identities. A student in Karadeniz Technical
University in Trabzon said that whenever he mentioned that he was from Tokat, he was
immediately faced with the question, “Are you an Alevi?”
An Alevi woman from Erzurum pointed out that the Alevi population was much larger in the
past; “they were repressed, they migrated or they now hide themselves,” she said.
A teacher who is a member of the Adapazarı Eğitim-Sen told us a story about a family that
moved to their apartment thirty years ago. Although they had warm relations with the new
neighbors, it was only after one year that the newcomers, requesting them never to make this
“secret” public, disclosed the information that they were Alevis.
One of the two young girls we met at a türkü bar in Kayseri only recently found out that her
other friend, whom she had been friends with for 10 years, was an Alevi.
A high school student we met in the Sultanbeyli neighborhood of İstanbul told us that many of
his Alevi friends were hiding their identity.
An administrator of the Hacı Bektaş Veli Foundation in Eskişehir pointed out that, before their
foundation was established, Alevis mostly kept their identity as a secret.
A leftist student from Karadeniz Technical University in Trabzon mentioned that his Alevi
friends could not reveal their identity to anyone at the dorms; they pretended to be fasting and
were eating secretly during Ramadan.
A member of the Women’s Platform in Eskişehir told us that Alevis did not disclose their
identities at their workplaces; in the event that they did, they were reproached by their
co-workers for not fasting, and the men were forced to go to the mosque for ritual prayer
(namaz) on Fridays.
Moreover, she recalled that, while she had been living in Mahmudiye during secondary school,
the teachers of the religion lessons had forced the Alevi students, including her, to perform
ritual prayers in class on tables.
An executive working at the Malatya Cem Foundation talked about the son of a family he
knew, who complained about obscene remarks made by his religion lesson teacher about Alevis.
She also stated that the officials at the National Education Office in Malatya24 were sensitive
towards such issues and would not permit acts such as forcing Alevis to perform ritual prayer or
the use of hate speech against Alevis. “With its Alevis and Sunnis, with its leftists and rightists,
Malatya has learned its lesson from the pre-1980 events,” she added.
However, in some cases it is not at all easy to hide one’s identity. Sometimes it becomes
impossible for Alevis to keep their identities as secret, because they form a large community
in big cities, or names of their villages that they came from are known, or they have settled in
Alevi neighborhoods in the city.
A student from Cumhuriyet University in Sivas, who was not hiding his identity, told us that
when he first came to the city, he started going out with a girl from Sivas. When he told her that
24 The “leftist” or “dissidents” among the Alevis would not agree with this kind of positive interpretation of state practices as
expressed by the members of Cem Foundation or Hacı Bektaş Veli Association, known to be closer to the center. The former
claimed that such practices were only for “show purposes”.
42
he was Alevi, she left him. When he asked if she had a problem with him, “No”, the girl replied,
“just because you are Alevi.”
She also added that her family would “definitely” not accept this relationship. Without
resistance, he said, “Oh, all right then”. “As it happened to me for the first time, it was like a
shock” he told us.
A young architect from Kayseri told us that she had a veiled colleague with whom she was
working on a project together and the two had become good friends. One day, she mentioned
to her friend that she wanted to introduce her to a young associate professor at the university.
However, after she told this friend that she was a Kurd and an Alevi, her friend never opened up
this match-making subject ever again.
An Alevi from Sivas studying at Karadeniz Technical University in Trabzon said that he was
not ‘wandering around telling people that he was an Alevi, but, if asked, he was not hiding his
identity either. He stated that whenever he expressed his identity, questions on the negative
perceptions concerning Alevis would follow, but apart from that, he did not face discrimination.
“I did not face discrimination; however, it was because my social environment mostly consists of
relatively educated and democratic people,” he added.
A high school student in Sultanbeyli, Istanbul, told us that in order to avoid problems in her
friendships, she did not mention to anyone at school that she was Alevi. A friend of her once
declared that she was from Tokat, but not Alevi. When she asked her friend why she felt the need
to make such a clarification, the girl answered: “I don’t want to be like Alevis; they don’t fast,
they don’t practice ritual prayer, they practice “mum söndü”.” (The latter refers to widespread
allegations that Alevis perform rituals with men and women together, in which it is said that
the lights are extinguished.)
This student has met with serious discrimination since she came to Sultanbeyli. “Everyone sees
Alevism as a nightmare,” she said.
Among the prejudices we have heard, the “food” issue was the most frequent complaint they
talked about. For instance, Alevis from Erzurum had heard so many times the phrase, “You
cannot eat Alevi food.” They mentioned to us that many times the pieces of sacrificial meat
(kurban) they took to their neighbors were given to dogs before their very eyes or the aşure
pudding they cooked during the holy month of Muharrem was taken directly to waste bin by
their neighbors.
Someone we interviewed in an Alevi coffeehouse said, “Not everyone would eat what we
offer them; for instance, they won’t eat our kurban, meat, because they consider ours haram
(unclean)”. “It has been like this for as long as I’ve known myself,” he said.
An Alevi from Kayseri told us that his father, knowing that the Circassians working in the fields
in their village would not eat the meat he butchered himself, asked his friend, in a tone that
the workers could hear, from which butcher he had purchased the meat; he wanted to be sure
they would not go hungry. When they heard the reply of his friend, they said, “Oh, his meat is all
right.”
Someone we talked to in an Alevi coffeehouse in Sultanbeyli recalled that when they first moved
to this place, there was no city water supply in their neighborhood, so they went to a Sunni
43
neighborhood to get water from the well where people warned them “not to take water from
there”, because, “they are not “not clean” (without abdest)”.
Once, together with two of his friends, they helped a very poor Sunni family who had moved to
their neighborhood by sending coal and food. One day, his wife noticed that they were feeding
a cat with the kurban meat they had sent. Since then, they have ended their relationship with
this family.
On one occasion his wife overheard a Sunni woman was saying to another, “These are Alevis,
they are Kızılbaş; they spit on the bread before they give it to you.”
We even listened to a tragicomic story. A person we interviewed in an Alevi coffeehouse told us
a story about his friend. A Sunni man, an acquaintance of his friend, calls a butcher for kurban
(sacrificial animal). He does not know that the butcher is an Alevi. He tells them how careful
he is about this matter, adding that the meat will be inedible if the animal is butchered by an
Alevi. The brother of the butcher says to his friend, “Go and tell him that we are Alevis and let’s
get the meat”. When his friend tells the butcher that they are Alevis, he pretends not to hear it.
Obviously, the money paid for the sheep outweighed the fear of haram – i.e., things forbidden by
the faith.
Another issue they complained about was the various fabrications about Alevis. Many of Alevis
we interviewed deeply resented being called “Kızılbaş”. An administrator from the Hacı Bektaş
Veli Foundation even took a professor to court as he used the word “Kızılbaş” in his book.
We heard from many Alevis that primary school students were mocking their friends, shouting,
“Alevi, Alevi”, while chasing them after school.
A young man we interviewed at an Alevi coffeehouse in Erzurum related that, when his son
started school last year, his schoolmates were teasing him by calling him “Alevi” and “Kızılbaş”.
He came home he asked his father what Alevism is. When his father explained, he went on to ask,
“Fine, but why are they calling us Kızılbaş?” The kids apparently also called him with whatever
words had heard from their elders.
A lawyer from Sivas has heard all his life people not knowing that he is also an Alevi calling
Alevis Kızılbaş. An Alevi woman actively working at the CHP provincial organization in Erzurum
said, “When you tell them you are an Alevi, they give you a look as if you are not a citizen of
Turkey, as if you’ve come here from somewhere else.” She has often heard people saying that
Alevis do not believe in God as well. “You are an Alevi, not a Muslim, you don’t fast, you don’t
perform ritual prayers; they say anything,” she added.
An Alevi we interviewed in Sivas complained to us that the Sunni Muslims “when talking
accepted Alevism as a part of Islam, but considered it outside the faith and non-Muslim in their
minds and conscience.”
An Alevi lady who lives in Bağcılar, İstanbul, has told us that in the social gatherings she has
been attending at her neighbor’s house, other women would read the Quran and would speak of
Alevis all the time in an ill-mannered way.
It is especially the fabricated stories regarding their honor (namus) that cause a major reaction
among the Alevi community. An Alevi taxi driver we talked to in Erzurum told us that a Sunni
customer of his told him how he was questioned by his neighbors because he was sending his
44
wife to the market in the car of an Alevi. “How could he entrust his wife to an Alevi?” questioned
the neighbors.
Many Alevis mentioned that they themselves had heard such comments implying that Alevis’
“honor” was not trustworthy many times.
Students from other cities told an Alevi woman in Aydın that when they first met, the first thing
their classmates asked them was the so-called “mum söndü” ritual.
An Alevi man we interviewed in one of the cities25 we visited passed on us a story his sister had
told him. A woman doctor (wearing a headscarf), who worked in the same health clinic where
his sister worked as a nurse, asked an Alevi woman that started to work there as a cleaning lady
about how they perform “mum söndü”. “However if we go there right now and talk face-to-face,”
he said, “my sister will not talk at your presence, she is a public employee, she will be scared to
death”.
Someone from the Eskişehir Hacı Bektaş Veli Cultural Foundation said that although he did not
hear anything bad from anyone regarding his own character, he heard people saying in his
presence that “Alevis perform “mum söndü”, accompanied by sentences like, “for them it does
not matter, even their own mothers or sisters”. (Most of the time there are allegations of incest
about Alevis which is usually implicitly or explicitly implied when people talk about “mum
söndü”)
Alevis also complained that they were held responsible whenever an unpleasant or disturbing
incident occurred in their city. An Alevi we met in Eskişehir stated that whenever something
disturbing occurred in their city, the immediate judgment was that “It must be the work of a
Kızılbaş”.
A teacher in Balıkesir remembered an incident from the days he first moved there. When the
teachers saw that the table in the teachers’ room was scratched, a colleague of his said, “This
must be the work of that traitor; it can’t be anyone else”. Later he found out that the person in
question was an Alevi working at the school.
An Alevi we interviewed in Bağcılar, İstanbul, told us that one of his acquaintances who is
a Turkish immigrant from Bulgaria would tell that he is an Alevi to cut it short when people
asked him why he does not fast during Ramadan. Our respondent added that Alevis are held
responsible even for his actions.
An Alevi businesswoman in Kayseri mentioned that two years ago her neighbors were convinced
that a young man who was frequenting their neighborhood in his car was probably visiting an
Alevi girl living there. Later, however, it was learned that the man was in fact the boyfriend of
another girl -who wore the headscarf- living in the same apartment.
The most embarrassing example was given by someone working at the Hacı Bektaş Veli
Association in Sivas. Among his most distasteful childhood memories, the bitterest ones were
witnessing the old Alevis being forced to coat their white beards with tar and being ridiculed
with tin cans tied to the back of their coats.
25 We prefer not to disclose the name of the city in order to protect the respondent’s identity.
45
As evidenced by the examples above, Alevis are seriously disturbed by living in an environment
where they can be subjected to the insults and stigmatizing of Sunnis at any moment. Hence,
it may well be argued that, as a result of this, intermarriage between Alevis and Sunnis -a
phenomenon that exited in the past, as constantly pointed out by people- may become more
problematic in the future.
When the results of the two surveys mentioned above that were conducted in the years 1999 and
2006 are compared, it can be argued that relations are in fact getting worse between the two
groups. In 1999, the percentage of those among the Turkish population who would not accept
their son’s or daughter’s marrying someone from a different Muslim sect was around 42%. In the
year 2006, this ratio had risen to approximately 51%, reflecting a 9% increase since 1999. 26
The ratio of those who were against their daughter’s or son’s marrying a non-Muslim, on the
other hand, was 76% (in the case of daughters) and 71% (in the case of sons) in 1999. In 2006, these
ratios fell to 70% and 67% respectively, reflecting a 4-6 % decrease. In other words, while the
negative attitude against inter-faith marriages has declined, the negative attitude against intersect marriages has contrastingly risen.
The following incident we witnessed in our meeting with women at the CHP District
Headquarters in Erzurum is an example of the increasing tension between the two groups.
When an Alevi woman stated that she would definitely object to her daughter marrying a Sunni
Muslim, a quarrel broke out between her and a Sunni woman. The latter felt offended -probably
because the weaker side in a very unusual way despised the stronger - and as the others joined
in the heated discussion, the tension mounted to the extent that the meeting had to be ended by
the chair.
We asked an Alevi woman with whom we had a warm dialogue at Pir Sultan Abdal Association
in Denizli whether she would approve of her daughter marrying our son if we had one. “Sorry,”
she replied, “don’t take it personally, but I wouldn’t approve of even your son”.
On the other hand, in almost all the cities we visited, people told us that Alevi-Sunni marriages,
though problematic at times, were quite common. For instance, we were told at the Hacı Bektaş
Veli Anatolian Cultural Foundation in Eskişehir that there is not much of a problem in the
city regarding this issue. However, in many places we visited, the problems of inter-sectarian
marriages were recounted.
An administrator at Malatya Cem Foundation told us that there were intermarriages, though not
in large numbers, that Alevis did not differentiate between Sunni, Jew, Christian, etc., and their
children could marry people from any of these religions. He also added, however, that Sunni
families did not display a similar tolerance and tried to convert Alevi brides to their own sect.
An Alevi small-businessman from Erzurum reported that it is quite common to give and take
brides between sects, yet the Alevi brides married to Sunnis usually return back to their parents’
home after a while.
Someone from the Cem Foundation in Sivas told us that when a Sunni man married an Alevi
woman, Sunnis behaved as if it was a favor to the bride. They force the brides to practice daily
26 Çarkoğlu and Toprak, 2006, Table 5.7, 53.
46
rituals and fasting and, as a result, most of the Alevi women marrying Sunni men get divorced
in a short time.
An Alevi woman we interviewed in Denizli recounted that a teacher, a “seemingly intellectual
and democratic man” from Konya, whom she had met in Erzincan, married an Alevi woman.
Two years later, when they moved to Konya, he began forcing her to wear tesettür (hijab) and in
religious meetings she was forced to say, “We, Alevis, practice mum söndü”. She added that “later,
the girl was somehow rescued”.
An Alevi woman in the same city expressed that that neither the Sunni brides in Alevi families
nor the Alevi brides in “democratic” Sunni families were faced with pressure; however Alevi
brides in the religiously conservative and pious families were required to cover and practice
the daily rituals. An Alevi in Sultanbeyli, İstanbul, stated that the Alevi brides in Sunni families
were forced to wear tesettür and “convert to Sunnism”.
However, an Alevi from Cem Foundation in Sivas thought these types of pressures were mostly
common among the radical circles, as not all the marriages between Alevis and Sunnis were
problematic and there were very happy couples as well.
We heard many examples of public employees or government officials and even elected mayors
freely expressing their prejudices against Alevis or resorting to practices that hurt Alevis.
An Alevi man in Kayseri told us that after a long and arduous process they finally managed
to acquire a piece of land from the municipality to build a cemevi in Kayseri in exchange for
another piece of land that belonged to Alevis. On the first day of the construction, the building
site was blessed with Sunni prayers by the mufti of Kayseri who was sent there solely for that
purpose. They were not allowed to perform prayers in their own fashion.
The Sultanbeyli municipality in İstanbul has named an Alevi neighborhood after Yavuz Sultan
Selim, who had practically wiped out Alevis from Anatolia during his reign. A young Alevi
woman we met there complained to us that every day she had to mention Sultan Selim’s name
more often than that of her prophet Ali. They collected signatures for a petition for the name of
the street to be changed and visited the mayor’s office. “No one in this country can say anything
against Yavuz Selim; whoever tries will get the same answer. Don’t even think of proposing a
name change!” the mayor responded. This event was also reported by dailies.
An Alevi man from the administration of the Hacı Bektaş Veli Association in Sivas said that an
imam (Muslim preacher) was appointed to a village without a mosque. One of the national TV
channels made a clip about this event.
An outspoken Alevi woman we met in Erzurum quoted the mayor of a province of Erzurum who
used to be the head of the National Education Office in the same province27 as saying, “You are
Alevis. I don’t eat what you cook,” during his visits to the Alevi villages.
27 The name of the province was also mentioned during the interview. However, we do not disclose it as we have not
contacted the mayor himself about this matter.
47
A person in charge of the administration of the Hacı Bektaş Veli Cultural Association in Eskişehir
filed a charge against a mufti of a city in Anatolia for saying “It is not allowed to eat the meat
butchered by Alevis or to wear the hat of an Alevi” while preaching in the mosque in 1993.28
An Alevi who is quite influential in the CHP district organization in Sivas invited the prominent
government officials in the city to his village for an iftar dinner in Ramadan, but none of them
came. “Why didn’t they come?” he asked us and answered it himself: “Because the meat cut by
Alevis is not to be eaten.”
A retired teacher of Alevi origin we interviewed in Balıkesir told us that, once, when he
participated to a prayer session in a Şafi village in Diyarbakır, he noticed that the imam was
muttering something like “hısh” from time to time while speaking in Kurdish. When he asked
people around what the subject was, people told him that the imam was talking about the Battle
of Çaldıran and he was making that particular sound as a gesture of pleasure he derived from
the mass killings of Alevis in that battle.
The same person recalled another incident happened in a coffeehouse in Çanakkale. The
neighborhood muhtar, headman, who heard that he was an Alevi had remarked, “No way”.
“When you hear something disgusting, you somehow instinctively show your hatred you know;
that’s the way he reacted when I said ‘I am an Alevi,” he commented.
Many times, people complained us about the lack of public services in Alevi neighborhoods or
villages. An executive we interviewed in Sivas, in a cemevi which was still under construction,
noted that there were discrimination against Alevis in the implementation of state policies. He
defined the education in Alevi villages as a “transportation system” (Alevi children have to go
schools in other villages every day) and mentioned that their demand for additional teachers
were never met.
People from his village had to walk five kilometers in order to get water and, since the roads
were demolished, it was not possible to go by car after nineteen kilometers from the main road
to their village. “Go and see it yourself,” he told us. Questioning why the road to his village was
not covered in asphalt while all the roads to Sunni villages were, he added: “God did not create
us as Alevis, he created us as humans.”29
The roads in a neighborhood we visited in Sultanbeyli, İstanbul, were all asphalt; the only
exception was a street where Alevis lived. In between the perpendicular asphalt roads cutting
it, the street looked weird with its all dusty and muddy road. At first glance you could think that
it was under reconstruction. However, the people we talked to in the Alevi coffeehouse on that
street, reported us that the road had been left like that for years by the municipality. Although
they kept submitting petitions for its repair, they had not managed to get a response from the
municipality.
On the fate of the petitions, an Alevi we interviewed in an Alevi coffeehouse said: “They are very
clever people. They meet all those, who have long been insulted, excluded and mistreated by the
28 The name of the city was also mentioned during the interview. However, we do not disclose it because we could not confirm
this story.
29 However, an administrator from the CHP Province Organization in Sivas stated that the AKP municipality does not
discriminate in the delivery of municipal services and has built the roads, infrastructure and bridge in his village.
48
state for being peasants, at the door. They offer them tea. They instantly win the hearts of those
people. They say, ‘We’ll do it inşallah; we’ll do it, of course’. It has been like that for years.”
The same person talked about a recurrent “dream” he had: “I have such a feeling for quite a long
time. One day everyone will gather here, they will come in masses. I will address the crowd and
I will tell the Sunni families among us, my Sunni brothers, “Brothers, forgive me, just because
we are Alevis, you also suffer as you can’t receive public services and your roads and sewage
systems are not repaired either.”
It was heartbreaking to listen to these words. It was almost a summary of the ultimate
estrangement of a person from his society and, more importantly, from himself that he could
think of offering his apology to others because they were also hurt by his identity; it was as if he
was apologizing from people “for being himself”.
Another complaint we heard was that Alevis were isolated even if they adopted some of the
Sunni practices by tradition. For instance, most of Alevis we met in the more traditional Eastern
cities were in fact fasting during Ramadan. They told us that “they were fasting by their own
choice, because after all, they too believed in God”.
Animal sacrificing also seemed common. Just like their Sunni fellows, Alevi women covered their
heads when they went out. Some stated that they fasted because of their “respect for Sunnis”.
The owner of an Alevi coffeehouse in Erzurum told us that he and his sisters had been fasting
since their school years. They were doing this to prevent any reaction and “out of respect”. He
stated that most Alevis were fasting at their workplaces. “If his Sunni friends are fasting, one
must also fast; he has to go along with the society in order not to let them say ’look, there are
Kızılbaş people among us who do not fast’,” he added.
He wouldn’t eat in secret either, as in his opinion, such a behavior was unacceptable.
In most of the cities we visited, we were told that Alevi shopkeepers were closing their shops
during the Friday prayer and hiding in them and that some were even actually going to the
mosque for the ritual, just because they feared otherwise they would lose their customers. For
the same reason, there were Alevis who fasted during Ramadan or acted as if they were fasting.
A member of Pir Sultan Association in Malatya told us that the rich Alevis were giving iftar
dinners during the month of Ramadan in order to “adapt themselves to the belief structures of
Sunni citizens”. However, they could not escape from the discrimination of Sunnis even if they
actually fasted.
An Alevi woman from Erzurum, who stated that she did not fast, commented on the ones who
fast: “We are Alevis no matter what; we are Alevis if we fast during Ramadan or not. They don’t
believe us anyway, they are convinced that we are lying; so they (Alevis) should let themselves
eat, why bother?” She added that her children felt uneasy about this at school and that her
son, who actually fasts every Ramadan, expressed his frustration, saying “What’s the use of it”,
because after all his friends at school still did not believe in him.
49
According to the 1999 survey mentioned above, the percentage of those who stated that they
had never fasted in their lives was only 3.7%.30 Hence, the claim that Alevis do not fast during
Ramadan does not seem to be verified as Alevi population is much greater than this percentage
indicates. Moreover, according to the same survey, 82% of the Turkish population does not
consider fasting as a prerequisite for being Muslim. The percentage of those who stated that
someone who did not fast could not be considered Muslim, even if he believed in God and the
Prophet Mohammed, was only 11.5%.31
However, as the examples below will clarify, the fact that repressive attitude regarding fasting
and Friday prayers have been escalating and that such behavior is exhibited even in public
institutions may indicate a significant change in social perceptions and reactions since 1999.
Most of the Alevis believed that they respected Sunni rituals and traditions but that they were
denied a similar respect. For instance, an Alevi from Sivas states that work stops at public
offices a couple of hours before iftar during Ramadan, whereas Alevis are not allowed to leave
work a bit earlier for their own iftar during the month of Muharrem.
An Alevi woman from Bağcılar in İstanbul complained that her neighbor was intentionally
sending her aşure (a pudding) cooked with meat; Alevis consider it sinful to put meat in aşure.32
An Alevi we interviewed in Denizli related that his neighbor of fifteen years had been pressuring
him almost every day to go to the mosque. When he said, “All right, but you come with me to the
cemevi as well”, “We don’t go to such places” was his neighbor’s reply.
Throughout the cities we visited, Alevis also complained that they were unable to find jobs in
the government or the municipality offices. For example, an Alevi who had retired from the
state hospital in Erzurum said that there had been about 150 Alevis working in the hospital
when he first started to work there. Now, however, this number was down to one or two. He
claimed that Alevis were denied employment and that the hospital employees were recruited
from among the AKP followers.
In one of the cities we visited, we met an administrator33 at the Cem Foundation who has been a
deputy director of the state hospital there for the last seven years. “Apart from a couple of Alevi
workers and a few doctors who hide their identity,” he reported “there are none, none, none”.
When he first started working there in 1975, however, half of the employees were Alevis. He
stated that there were around five Alevis working in the municipality, underlining that these
people started to work there during the term of the previous mayor. “From electricity to water,
we pay our taxes for every service we get here, but we cannot get a job at the municipality, not
even for the minimum wage,” he said, adding that Alevis were “excluded during the formation of
staff payrolls”.
He claimed that even for the private sector companies, the list of Alevis who could be employed
was sent from the AKP and they could be employed only via the references of AKP deputies.
30 Çarkoğlu and Toprak, 2000, 13.
31 Ibid, 18.
32 Another Alevi woman intervened there saying that this may actually be unintentional, because in some regions in Turkey
aşure is traditionally cooked with meat. However, she was unable to convince the former, who interpreted it as a sign of
intentional disrespect.
33 We prefer not to disclose the name of the city here in order to protect our respondent’s identity.
50
Someone from the administration of the Hacı Bektaş Veli Foundation in Eskişehir pointed out
that in the last four or five years, Alevis in higher positions in public institutions were being
withdrawn from their offices. An Alevi from Malatya told us that the former mayor was openly
asking the candidates at the municipality if they were Alevis or Sunnis and, in the event they
were Alevis, they were denied jobs.
An Alevi we interviewed in Denizli informed that the public employees or workers of Alevi
origin did not come to the Cem for fear of losing their jobs, as this would reveal their identity. An
active member of the CHP Erzurum district organization pointed out that, apart from the one
and only elected member of the municipal council, it was not possible to find any Alevis in the
governmental or municipality offices, as “they were recruiting their own party’s followers for
these jobs”. Hence, Alevis were forced to hide their identity in order to be able to be recruited.
“No jobs for Alevis, no jobs whatsoever,” she added.
In Kayseri, we asked how come people knew that they were Alevis and did not employ them.
They told us that they could detect their identity from their addresses written on the application
forms, as they lived at Alevi neighborhoods. According to an official from the Pir Sultan Abdal
Association in Kayseri, if someone from Sarızlı, a district with a predominant Alevi population,
looked for a job or a flat for rent, “people thought twice if he/she admitted that he/she was from
Sarızlı”. “Mentioning the name Sarızlı means being marked,” he claimed.
An Alevi we interviewed in Sultanbeyli, İstanbul, claimed that not even a single Alevi was
employed at the Sultanbeyli Municipality. An official from the Hacı Bektaş Veli Association in
Balıkesir reported that Alevis were denied jobs in both the public and the private sectors. As it
is usual to ask the applicants’ residential address during the job applications, when they learn
that an applicant is from Çepni, Çorak or Çukurhüseyin, the standard response they give is:
“Thanks, we’ll call you later.”
He stated that there were only three or four Alevis working at the municipality in Balıkesir, who
were able to get jobs there only because they hid their identity and that it was simply impossible
for an Alevi to become a director, as they were employed only as “manual laborers”.
Underlining that her family has been living there for half a century, an active CHP member in
Erzurum informed that individuals whose Alevi identity are known are denied employment
even as construction workers. “They tell them”, she said, “you are a Kızılbaş, we have no jobs for
you”.
An Alevi lawyer in Sivas told us that, if they brought a case to him, his Sunni clients were
immediately faced with the same question: “Where did you find this Kızılbaş?” “Twenty years
ago, when I first began practicing my profession, such things happened. Nowadays, I am
witnessing the same,” he complained.
An official from the Cem Foundation in Sivas indicated that their major problem was
unemployment. When we pointed out that this was a general problem in Turkey and that it
cannot be an indication of discrimination against Alevis, he refuted this by saying that only
the İmam-Hatip graduates were recruited. He added that when they went to the municipality
in search of jobs, for instance, people said, “Come on, we are all brothers, how come there can
be any difference among us”. “But, they do not give you a job. They won’t employ you even as a
garbage collector,” he further added.
51
In some cases, the situation required the attention of the ministries or the governors when
Alevis were denied jobs or removed from office in some cities. Someone from the Cem Foundation
in Malatya mentioned that Alevis working in the health sector were removed from their posts
and sent to “disadvantageous regions” before the AKP came into power. He added that even the
Ministry of Health investigators had come to the city on a couple of occasions to investigate the
related complaints.
Someone from the Cem Foundation in Sivas related that an Alevi filed a complaint when his
posting was changed, claiming that the change was made because of his identity. When the
problem was taken to the Governor’s Office, the two deputy head-nurses who had effected this
change were removed from their positions and the Alevi employee returned to his post.
Such complaints seem to be derived from the acts of the political administration rather than
social pressure and, as we will discuss later, constitute another category.
According to Alevis we talked to in Erzurum, they also face discrimination in business life. We
were informed that in many places Sunnis do not shop in Alevi stores.
A cab-driver in Erzurum, for example, told us that his Sunni clients were warned and questioned
because of riding in an Alevi’s car.
An Alevi woman we interviewed in Denizli mentioned an Alevi friend of hers who owns a fabric
store. This woman was hiding her identity and her customers thought she was a Sunni. “Not a
single customer will remain if they hear I am an Alevi; I win my bread here, I have to disguise
my identity,” she quoted her friend.
Another Alevi woman in Denizli had to struggle for a week to hang a picture of Atatürk on the
wall of her workplace. Her own Alevi friends asked her not to: “Don’t do this; we don’t need to
exhibit our identity.”
When we were told in Erzurum that businessmen who were not close to the AKP or the Fethullah
Gülen community could not win any state tenders or get any major contracts, we asked whether
the Alevi investors were hence disadvantaged in competition. Someone from Erzurum replied to
us by saying “There are no Alevi capitalists in Erzurum; if there is one, either he must be hiding
himself, or he has invested his capital in another city, or he has not raised any capital here”.
In fact, the only notable Alevi businessman in Erzurum was the owner of the hotel near the ski
facilities on Palandöken Mountain. He was able to make an investment in the city using what
he had earned from his business ventures in İstanbul.
We do not know if Alevis are subject to systematic discrimination in business life. We also
came across other Alevis who gave us a contrary account by stating that they did not face any
problems in their businesses.
A young Alevi girl we interviewed in Sivas told us that her elder brother, who had just started to
work as an accountant in a supermarket, was faced with pressure because he did not go to the
mosque for Friday prayers. “Another market nearby,” she said, “does not employ anyone from the
Ali Baba neighborhood”.
As a general observation, however, from our interviews we can draw the conclusion that Alevis
try to adapt as much as possible to the Sunni surroundings where they live.
52
As mentioned above, it seems more common among the Alevi men in the professions of trade
and business to adhere to Sunni practices such as fasting in Ramadan or going to the mosque for
Friday prayer.
In fact, an outspoken Alevi woman from Erzurum jokingly describes her neighbor who fasts
during Ramadan and goes to the Friday prayers as “wishy-washy” to his face. She admitted that
he had indeed no other choice if he wanted to protect his business. The neighbor had stated that
he did not experience any discrimination from Sunnis.34
An Alevi contractor from Erzurum reported that the Alevi businessmen feel compelled to adapt
to Sunnis and perform Sunni practices such as going to the Friday prayers and fasting.
A member of the Women’s Platform of Eskişehir told us that Alevi employees in the workplaces
were forced to go to the Friday prayers. She has not seen anyone fired for not going, but the
ones who do not go to the mosque are labeled as “rakı and wine drinkers”. She believed that the
workers felt obliged to go, especially if their foreman went.
Throughout the cities we visited, we felt that one of the most significant problems of Alevis were
the cemevis. Either there was not a cemevi in the city center where they could perform their
religious rituals and handle their funerals, or, in case there was one, it was too small for the
Alevi population in that city, or they were faced with numerous problems when they applied for
the construction of a cemevi.
Among the 12 cities we visited, only a few had a cemevi. In some, applications had been filed, but
there was no outcome. In others, mayors were strictly against the construction of cemevi and,
yet, in others, there was not even an application for one.
There was an attempt to open a cemevi in Erzurum in the 1990s, albeit an unsuccessful one. The
failure of the project was due as much to the financial difficulties as to the fact that the owners
were reluctant to lend their buildings for a cemevi and there were reactions because some
played saz (a music instrument) inside. An Alevi woman from Erzurum even stated that if they
had had a cemevi, she would have worried that it would be attacked.
An official at an Alevi association in Aydın informed us that the former Minister of Culture and
Tourism allocated them a budget of “40 billion lira” for the construction of a cemevi, but the
mayor in office has not transferred the money to them yet. When they asked for land, they were
told that they should place a bid; and as they could not afford it, no progress was made on the
issue.
An Alevi association’s administrator we interviewed in Balıkesir told us that they built cemevis
for six villages with the help and the contribution of the villagers, but since they did not have
one in the city center, they had to take their dead to the villages for burial. They approached
the mayor on this matter a year ago. The mayor first mentioned that a large piece of land was
needed for building a cemevi in the city center and that the municipality did not have such a
34 Such behavior may be related to the history of Erzurum. In a book on Erzurum’s past, the author writes that the Ahi orders
observed strict rules for the discipline of the craftsmen. Anyone who did not respect the rules of the craft would be expelled
from the profession. The author further notes that “similarly, there is a heavy pressure to curb social extremism and this
pressure is even heavier in Erzurum”, adding that “those who exaggerate their way of eating, drinking, clothing and even
walking … face intimidation by various means and are strictly disciplined”. See M. Sıtkı Aras, Bir Şehrin Ruhu: Erzurum,
Istanbul, 1999, 51-52.
53
large one. When they agreed to accept his offer of a 500 m2 piece of property, he said “Let me look
into it” and they did not hear anything from him since.
On the other hand, there were others who claimed that even when there was support by the
state for Alevi activities, that support was actually given in return for making Alevis get closer
to Sunni beliefs and traditions. For example, an individual from the ADD in Malatya stated that
the costs of the activities of Alevi foundations such as conferences or distribution of food to the
needy and etc. were paid by the Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet); in return, Alevis were
transformed to “fundamentalists”.
There was a cemevi in Malatya built by the Hacı Bektaş Veli Foundation. When the Cem
Foundation requested a second building from the mayor, he gave his word. However, he did not
keep it.
Alevis in Denizli asked the mayor for a piece of land for the construction of a cemevi. The mayor
responded: “If you want to worship, here is the mosque”. They replied by saying “Mr. Mayor, you
must have forgotten that we are Alevis and if we could visit the mosque, we wouldn’t be here in
the first place”. The mayor closed the subject by saying, “I am not going to give any concessions
or discuss this issue anymore; if you want to worship, you’ll have to do it in the mosque.”
As a result of the efforts by the Hacı Bektaş Veli Foundation, the construction of a cemevi
had begun in Sivas. When we visited the construction site, the person in charge of the
administration of the cemevi told us that the construction costs were paid by individual
donations and that 40% of the total donations came from non-Alevis. According to him, the
state’s abstinence from giving support was discrimination. As similar costs for building mosques
were paid from the Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) budget; therefore, he wondered why
they were not receiving anything for the construction of their cemevi.
He criticized the fact that there were 170 mosques in the center of Sivas, whereas there were
only two cemevis in a city with 35,000 Alevis. He questioned why the cemevi pays for its water
and electricity while the mosques do not pay for theirs.35In his opinion, given the fact that
Alevis also pay taxes and serve in the military as citizens of the same state, having no financial
support from the state for cemevis could only be described as an act of discrimination.
He argued against a recent declaration by the head of Diyanet who recommended Alevis to go
to the mosque as they, too, are Muslims. “Mosques are not the alternatives of cemevis, just as
churches are not the alternatives of mosques,” he protested.36
A woman administrator we met at the construction site of the cemevi in Sultanbeyli told us that
when they applied to the municipality with a petition for the opening of a cemevi signed by
more than ten thousand people, the mayor’s response was: “If you are Muslims, you worship in
35 In September 2008, Kuşadası Municipal Council unanimously decided that “the cemevi must be regarded as a site for
worship; hence its use of water must be subject to the same conditions as other sites of worship”. The decision was taken
as a result of an application by the cemevi administration in Kuşadası. We hope this decision will constitute a precedent in
Turkey.
36 In a recent interview, Ali Bardakoğlu, the Director of Diyanet, stated that his Directorate supports “the economic, political,
social and cultural initiatives” regarding Alevism. “However”, he further stated, “the ritual practices performed in cemevis
make a person happy, but they are not alternative to ritual prayers”. He claimed that the Alevis asked him to recognize
“what they do” in the cemevi as equal to ritual prayer. We must underline that we have not heard anything to this effect
from the Alevis we have met. Their demand is not to receive such an approval from the Diyanet; what they want is that the
cemevi be given the status of a place of worship. For the text of the interview, see Milliyet, 4 September 2008, 16.
54
the mosques and mescits. A cemevi is not a place for worshipping; I cannot provide you land for
that.”
She told us that they then purchased the land with their own money, but the municipality
refused to grant a permit for the construction, claiming it was within the İSKİ (Istanbul Water
and Sewage Administration) area. However, she argued that the place was full of apartments,
mosques, schools and health centers. “If this is an İSKİ area, then the whole neighborhood is
sitting on it,” she added.
Nevertheless, they started the construction illegally without getting the necessary permit. At
first, they could not find cement because the cement firms said, “We’ve got instructions, and we
cannot sell cement to you”. When they managed to take care of that problem, the municipality
took them to court; they won most of the cases and there were two others still pending.
On a couple of occasions, the municipality closed down the construction site and banned the
construction machinery, but because they actively resisted and organized demonstrations, the
municipality forces were not even attempting to enter the site anymore. “It is something like a
war,” she added.
As the above examples indicate, it is hard to conclude that the public authorities have a
uniform policy on cemevis. While the municipalities in some cities provide support, others
are of the opinion that “Muslims worship in the mosques”. However, in most of the cities, the
municipalities under AKP administration and Alevis come into conflict on issues such as
construction permits or land grants.
Cemevis and other associations around which Alevis organize to follow their faith are not
supported by the local governments under the AKP. Compared to the case of Sunni associations
and foundations, this indicates a serious inequality. We think that Alevis face an obvious
discrimination, especially regarding the allocation of municipality halls and facilities for their
activities.
We also observed in our conversations at Alevi associations that this tension was not the same
everywhere. Eskişehir was one of the cities where there was little tension.
An official from the Hacı Bektaş Veli Cultural Foundation in Eskişehir expressed his opinion that
Alevis did not face any pressure in Eskişehir. He reported that the presidents of the Eskişehir
Chamber of Trade, Chamber of Agriculture and the Beet Cooperative with 150,000 members were
Alevis, that Alevi-Sunni marriages were common and that there was no Alevi-Sunni conflict in
the city.
A member of Eskişehir Women’s Platform confirmed that there was no pressure against Alevis
in the city and that they could practice their faith freely. She added, however, that the situation
was different in smaller towns.
Another official we met at the cemevi in Bağcılar, İstanbul, also stating that they did not have
any problems, stressed the importance of resolving the possible conflicts by peaceful means.
Alevis we interviewed in Aydın told us that they did not face any pressure except “some
intimidating words rarely expressed unintentionally by the subconscious”.
55
An official at an Alevi association stated that they had recently been informed about an Alevi
student who was expelled from a student dorm. When they investigated the matter, they found
out that the student himself had left the dorm because he was not comfortable there with other
students who were all “extremely religious”. “There is nothing worth mentioning in this regard
in Aydın,” he said. The governor of Aydın participated in one of the chat sessions after their Cem;
“The governor comes and eats our aşure, too,” he added.
It was not possible, however, not to feel the irony hidden in the sentence, “He eats our aşure, too”,
as if it was not natural for a guest to eat what he was offered, as if it needed to be stressed. It
was impossible to overlook the strange bitterness in that expression of gratitude.
In our opinion, the relatively low level of prejudice against Alevis in the more developed western
cities of Turkey such as Eskişehir and Aydın is a result of the variety in and richness of public
life in these cities, rather than their wealth.
For example, the pressure and exclusion did not seem to have declined in the relatively more
developed cities such as Kayseri and Konya, where the public life is constructed around
conservatism. On the other hand, when we compare the Sultanbeyli and Bağcılar neighborhoods
of İstanbul, the fact that Bağcılar is close to Bakırköy and Sultanbeyi is a relatively isolated
neighborhood has enabled Bağcılar to be more integrated with the city, allowing it to become a
less suppressive neighborhood.
We had the impression that, the exclusion, the otherization and the discrimination Alevis have
experienced in both past and present gradually has become less bearable leading to a common
feeling of protest, a common awareness, a collective consciousness that paved the way for their
organized attempts to voice their demands for their rights.
Among the Alevis we met, the ones who shared this awareness no longer felt the need to disguise
their identity and openly expressed their feelings of anger towards Sunnis who were prejudiced
against them.
Alevi associations play a significant role in raising this collective awareness. An Alevi woman in
Erzurum underlined that, in addition to those associations, television channels owned by Alevis
were also influential.
Seven or eight years ago, a young Alevi man was killed in Malatya because he was not fasting.
An official at the CHP headquarters in Malatya, while mentioning that incident, also explained:
“Malatya was terribly tense during those days, but after the death of that young boy, something
unusual happened: the streets were full of people, people walked from the university to the
graveyard; it was extremely cold and snowy, nevertheless, people were out in the streets; ninety
percent of those who walked were Alevis”.
In Erzurum, an Alevi noted that Alevis in Erzurum gained an awareness of their identity and
started to give up hiding it after the Güner Ümit incident37 on Star TV. This incident seems to
have been a breaking point for them, as this was the first time Alevis in Erzurum had ever risen
in protest.
37 In 1995, Güner Ümit used an outrageous expression insulting Alevis in his show program on Star TV. Alevis strongly reacted
against it and as a result, he had to end his program altogether.
56
One of the most significant breaking points was the Sivas massacre. In most of the Alevi
associations in the cities we visited, there were posters of the Sivas massacre on the walls.
However we have also observed in many of these cities that the officials of Alevi associations
and the leaders of the Alevi community were actively striving for the burial of the past and
looking forward to construct a peaceful future. It was our impression that even in the cities
where the Alevi problem was most severe; such an approach was generally approved by Alevis.
For instance, an official from the Cem Foundation in Sivas said: “We wish to be in favor of unity
in Sivas; we do not want segregation in society; we want to be at peace with this society”.
In Erzurum, Alevis who told us that they were insulted in their daily lives because of their
identity also stated that they were trying to get along with the Sunnis and they respected Sunni
traditions even if they did not observe a similar sensitivity among the Sunnis. They also added
that there are many Sunni families with no such prejudices against Alevis, with whom they live
together in peace and establish friendships and in the words of the well-known phrase, with
whom they give and take brides.
However, it would be hard to claim that this repressive environment, which is ignored for the
time being and almost “ridiculized” at times by that unique sense of humor of the Anatolian
people, will not lead to serious social outbursts in the future in the cities where prejudice
against Alevis is prevalent.
Obviously, one cannot argue that the prejudices mentioned above are true for all Sunnis in
Turkey. Alevis whom we have interviewed did not claim this either. To the contrary, most of
them actually said that they have Sunni friends and they have no problems with them. What
we have reflected upon in this section is the expression of a deep-rooted psychology and a longestablished feeling of exclusion among the Alevi population.
We think that it is important to convey those feelings. Only after the problems of Alevis are
widely accepted and understood, it will be possible for the governments, the political parties,
the NGOs and the media to come up with the projects and policies that will allow for a change of
attitude toward the Alevi identity so that future generations will be free of such prejudice.
We hope that the findings of this research will provide a background for such an environment of
discussion as well as social peace and consensus.
Subjects of Social Pressure beyond Time and Space: Women
Flying Broom (Uçan Süpürge), a women’s association, started a project called “We Are Building
Bridges” in 2004. They have encouraged women to come together and talk about their own
problems. The problems that were voiced women, whether they live at the same city, or at
different ones, had so much in common, were so similar…
They express well-known difficulties, such as obstacles to their education; unhappy marriages or
marriages against their will; not having their own economic means; and their concerns for the
future. However, there is one particular problem they speak about and even to express it may
help its solution: going out. To go out of the house, to go out in the streets, to walk around, to be
a part of public life… however you describe it, they cannot go there. Even if they do go out, there
is no place outside their homes where they find comfort.
57
To be a woman in a provincial town… means not being able to go out… At best, they can go to
the main street, which has the same name in every small town or city: Atatürk or Cumhuriyet
(Republic) avenue. It is called çarşı (market) everywhere and there are codes of behavior that
govern going out to the çarşı. You can’t simply go out and walk around freely. What if your
grandfather, father, husband, cousins, even your neighbors say to you, “Hey girl, why are you
wandering around?” What are you going to tell them? Can you tell them “Nothing, I was just
bored and went out”? No way… What is so natural for a man –“Why are you sitting at home like a
woman?”- is not considered natural for a woman…
Going out for a woman is a freedom if and only if men “leave her alone”. Otherwise, both parties
know very well that the responsibility is on the woman’s shoulder under any circumstances.
They look at you if you are beautiful. They look at you if you are not, too. It is hard to be the one
who is looked at. You don’t know what to do. You feel clumsy. Because on the streets, you are
the guests and men are the owners. You are to be watched. If you attempt to look around, you
are immediately labeled as “looking for” a man. Strangers are truly a nuisance for a woman
and covering oneself is as much a practical necessity in provincial areas as it is a religious
requirement…
The province devours its women. That is, it devours the weakest among those who go against its
rule.38
Scientific studies on social values have revealed that the most significant factors differentiating
Muslim and non-Muslim societies are male-female relations and gender-related issues.
For instance, according to the results of the World Values Surveys which are carried out at
regular intervals by a research team led by Ronald Inglehart, one of the most notable names
in the field of quantitative research and covers 85% of the world population, the most striking
difference between Muslim and other (Christian, Buddhist, Hindu, etc.) societies lies in their
approach to gender-related issues.39
Inglehart questions Samuel Huntington’s famous “Clash of Civilizations” thesis and, in contrast
to Huntington, argues that the views regarding democratic rule and political values in the
Muslim world are no different than the rest. He claims, however, that the Muslim societies differ
from the others sharply on the issues of gender equality and sexual freedom. In Inglehart’s own
words, “the cultural difference that separates Islam from the West is more related to Eros than
Demos”.40
We think that the way that the dominant interpretations of Islam view of women is really
problematic. When this is coupled with the prevalent traditions in Anatolia, the women in
Anatolia get more than their share of repressive conservatism in those cities.
Our study included a broad range of different social groups and our aim was not a thorough
examination of women’s issues. Hence we make only partial observations regarding the issues
of women.
38 Arzu Çur, “Kadınlar: Taşranın Yurtsuzları”, in Tanıl Bora (ed.) Taşraya Bakmak, İstanbul, İletişim, 2006, 124-6.
39 Yılmaz Esmer, “Is There an Islamic Civilization?” in Ronald Inglehart (ed.), Human Values and Social Change: Findings from
Values Surveys, Brill, 2003, 35-68.
40 Ibid, Ronald Inlehart, “Introduction”, 5-6.
58
First of all, we would like to underline the fact that the existence of public spaces where mixed
groups of men and women can get together during the day or at night is the main characteristic
of urban life. This is the basic indicator that distinguishes a city from a small town or village
and shapes the life in the city.
When we analyze the development of Western cities, we see that the cultural fabric of those
cities has been changed when life at home was extended to the streets, centers, avenues,
theaters, coffeehouses, parks, etc., transforming the major cities of the West from town-like
places to centers of production of social values.41
When viewed from this perspective, we must note that we came across those distinctive
features in only a few of the Anatolian cities we visited. In most of those cities, women were
isolated from city life, especially during the night time. When you went out at night or entered a
restaurant, you could easily think that only men lived there.
Anatolia at night was like a sum of all those dull, lightless, deeply silent streets of womanless
cities where womanless men lived. After sunset, cities were no more like cities; they looked more
like military camps run under the toughest discipline.
Arzu Çur, the author quoted above, writes that the Anatolian cities, on the one hand, looked
“closed into themselves” and, on the other hand, was “hungry” for everything. “Hungry for
everything new, for change, richness and glamour; hungry for people, for children who would
wish to live there rather than leave it; hungry for happy men, free and beautiful women, for
laughter and bright nights”. And the Anatolian city “had none of these”. However, “knowing that
everything it longed for would also cause its own end, it also felt scared to death”.42
We think Arzu Çur’s observation was right for most of the Anatolian cities we visited. In most of
these cities, people told us, besides other things, that the city life had profoundly changed as the
notable families left and migration from rural areas to urban centers had increased.
People who claimed that their city was becoming more and more conservative than it used to
be emphasized the fact that most of the educated persons and well-known families in their city
had moved to the big cities. Hence, while newcomers to the city from rural areas 20-25 years ago
would take them as role models and “adapt” themselves, now things have changed and life in
their cities has become less colorful.
According to many interviewees, subsequent to the departure of the prominent families, the
public spaces in their cities were left to the newcomers from rural areas and they have changed
the identity of the city. It was a widespread belief among the secular urban groups that the
urban texture had become more conservative since 1994 as a result of the policies of the Refah
(Welfare) Party (RP) and the AKP at the local level.
Throughout the cities we visited, we observed the change towards a conservative identity
could not be explained via the political transformation in Turkey. We think that it would be
insufficient to explain the evolution of this identity by the rise of political Islam, a phenomenon
that has been debated in Turkey for a long time. We believe that the conservatism in those cities
41 For a very noteworthy work on the historic transformation of Paris and London, see Richard Sennett, The Fall of Public Man,
Penguin, 2003.
42 Arzu Çur, ibid., 119.
59
has more to do with a more complex process rooted in the history, traditions and socio-economic
conditions of the cities in question.
In fact, when we asked our respondents to compare their city’s past and present, we received
conflicting accounts. Those who claimed that nowadays they are faced with pressures, were
arguing that before 1980 the environment had been more liberal and that it changed with Özal
and the successive RP rule. Others noted that the negative change was associated with the AKP
rule and particularly became apparent after the last elections; while on the contrary, some were
thinking that their life was now much more relaxed.
Nevertheless, especially in the more conservative cities, the ones that found the current
environment more liberal than before constituted only a small minority. Most of our
respondents thought that there was a negative change in their city.
Even under the assumption that since the 1990s the political parties with religious sensitivities
such as RP and AKP might have played a role in this rise of conservatism, one must also admit
that AKP’s approach to gender problems has also led to significant changes in Turkey. For
example, the new Penal Code adopted by the parliament under the AKP rule contains heavier
penalties for sexual harassment and abolishes the ‘palliative reasons’ clause. In the case of
“honor killings”, the new Penal Code calls for penalties for the family members who participate
in the killing decision. Marital sexual harassment, which is considered as a punishable offense
in only a very few countries, is also forbidden by this new law.
Despite the fact that the AKP has not accepted the quota system the feminist organizations have
been insistently asking for and has not actually followed a reformist line on this issue, it was
during the AKP rule that the number of female deputies in the parliament almost doubled and
reached its highest point since the foundation of the Republic.
Women in some cities looked more comfortable. Eskişehir, run by a legendary mayor from the
DSP (Democratic Left Party), was one of them. The outlook of the city and the daily lives of its
inhabitants were no different from any mid-sized European city.
The municipality had cleaned up the Porsuk River and built many bridges over it, decorated with
statues and sculptures. On the riverbanks there were teahouses, cafés, bars and restaurants
serving and entertaining mixed crowds of men and women. Though less lively, the environment
resembled the Beyoğlu district in Istanbul.
Apart from Eskişehir, cities near the Aegean coast such as Denizli and Aydın seemed to
accommodate a modern life style. An Alevi woman from Aydın told us that women’s lives were
not restricted in the city; young girls could easily walk around on the main boulevard even at
midnight. We were also informed that there were many places serving alcoholic beverages in
Aydın that were run by a mayor who had resigned from the AKP.
A member of the Atatürkist Thought Association in Denizli stated that women were not harassed
outdoors because of their outfit. Others, however, told us that, compared to the past, Denizli has
been rapidly becoming more and more conservative.
A teacher noted that she and her female friends used to go out in the evenings and they
continued to do so in the first few years of the AKP government as well. However, things had
changed. Nowadays her friends drop her home and she “does not ever attempt” to take a walk in
the evenings like she used to do.
60
The Denizli municipality, governed by the AKP, was enforcing prohibitions on alcohol. The good
restaurants where alcoholic beverages were served, places where you could go with your family
were closed and the ones that were still open were to be moved to the tannery district outside
the city according to the municipality’s has decision.
A female academic noted that, in the past, students could drink even on the street in an area
called “Back Street”. Denizli was already a city with a modern lifestyle at that time. However
instead of becoming more colorful over time as one would expect, it was turning into an
introverted city.
Batman was another city where women appeared to be relatively more comfortable. This may be
due to the fact that the mayor of Batman was from the DTP (Democratic Society Party); the DTP
has a different approach towards gender issues.
The mayor during our visit jokingly told us that he found DTP’s view of women too liberal and
complained that while every proposal made by women was immediately implemented, male
members sometimes could not have a voice in. He noted that many among the Islamists were
uncomfortable with women gathering with men or living more freely. He added, “Our problem as
DTP is to create a modern type of woman”.
In front of the Yılmaz Güney Movie Theater on the main avenue in Batman, men and women in
jeans and T-shirts had set up a table in the evening and were selling tickets for their play, which
was being performed in the hall next door. Some young girls were even smoking cigarettes
rather freely in this town of Anatolia where generally women’s smoking in the street is
disapproved.43 On the street next to the movie theater, young women were displaying jewelry,
dresses, t-shirts, etc. for sale on a table. We sat down at a table outside a cafe on this side street
and had a chat with the young performers.
When we went to see their play the next evening, we were astonished by their talent. They were
again chatting in mixed groups in the foyer of the municipality hall where they staged their
play.
Batman has recovered despite a painful period in its past and it appears to have been
transformed into a city where the public spaces are rather colorful, with malls, cafés, pastry
shops, restaurants and cinemas along its main avenue.
In Trabzon, which is governed by a mayor from the CHP, we came across such cafés where
one could sit outside in the evenings in mixed groups and even have a drink. Albeit not as
numerous as one would see in the big cities, in the piazzas of Trabzon there were pubs, cafés and
restaurants where young women were serving mixed groups of men and women and where one
could even drink alcohol outside at tables set out on the street.
We were told that this difference was as much due to the presence of many Russians in the city
as it was to the fact that the mayor was from the CHP. We were even told that the women of
Trabzon had begun to dress more fashionably and that most of them dyed their hair blond after
the arrival of the Russian women in the city.
43 We must note here that we neither approve nor disapprove of the acts of smoking and drinking. We do not claim that such
acts or preferences are an indication of modernity, either. The reason we cite these examples is because we see these acts
as a matter of personal freedom and, as such, we want to distinguish the social or official environments which allow them
from those which do not.
61
Yet, as mentioned above, in other cities it was hard to find a single woman outside during
the evenings; urban life features, such as men and women taking a walk together or going to
restaurants in mixed groups were almost absent.
Arzu Çur’s account, written with a novelist’s sensitivity of how women are unable to go out in
the Anatolian cities, is also confirmed by Filiz Aygündüz’s interview for the Milliyet daily, with a
young girl who had recently graduated from high school. 44
The young girl says, “Here, to be a woman is something awful”. She complains that people “stare
at them” when they go out: “First time you go out, nothing happens. You go out for a second
time and they start talking about you: ‘So-and-so’s daughter is going out too often’. This is what
chains us to our homes”.
Even the young university students whose families lived in the same city complained about
the restrictions of outdoor life. A young girl from a well-known family in Sivas was a student in
Cumhuriyet University. She told us that when she went out with a male friend, she was afraid
someone would see her.
One day, she went to see a movie with her girlfriends and she came across her neighbors. The
neighbors mentioned this movie adventure to her mother with a tone of implication. As a
consequence, she was faced with a scolding from her mother: “Go wherever you wish, but I do
not want to hear from anyone that they saw you anywhere”. She said, “Of course somebody will
see me; I cannot fly away or disappear, right?”
A journalist in Batman gave us an interesting example that revealed how conservatism in
the family leads to women’s isolation. In their city, 99% of all the incoming calls to the music
programs of the local radio stations were from women. Women were subject to constant
pressure by countless prohibitions: “Don’t answer the phone! Don’t go out! Don’t go shopping!
Don’t lean over the balcony! Don’t go near the window!” “What is it when that young girl calls
the radio station?” he asked and answered himself: “It is communication”.
The only exceptions were the female university students whose families did not live in the same
city. Most of the female students told us that, despite other problems, the place that they felt
most comfortable was their university campus. The university campuses in Anatolia seemed
relatively more relaxed since female students were free to a certain extent to wear whatever
they want, participate in student activities together with male students and make friends with
them.
Someone from the Atatürkist Thought Association in Malatya mentioned that the couples who
would walk “hand- in-hand, arm-in-arm” on their vacations would not dare to do it when they
returned to Malatya. He stated that the wealthy in Malatya have started to separate men and
women at weddings. On one occasion, he couldn’t persuade his wife to go to such a wedding and
when he asked their host why they felt the need for such a practice, he learned that “the bride’s
family insisted on that”. He added that, when one received a wedding invitation, “to accept or
not to accept it” was equally hard.
One of the problems women faced on the street concerned their outfits. They were unable to
wear what they wanted in public spaces. A young woman in Erzurum said: “You will hardly ever
44 Filiz Aygündüz, op.cit.
62
see a skirt above the knees or a blouse with shoulder straps in Erzurum. Women feel the need to
wear long outfits to cover their hips; they can’t wear tan colored stockings. Even the students
coming from other cities realize after a while that they have actually started wearing longer
sleeves without being aware of it.” She was complaining that she was unable to go out wearing
simple jeans and a sweater. “No way,” she said, “you have to wear an overcoat”. Otherwise, they
were reproached and isolated.
Another woman we interviewed in Erzurum has been veiled since the age of fifteen because
every woman around her did the same. However, this was not the only reason. It was “rather
hard” to dress differently, to wear pants outside for example, as she would be disturbed by men.
Hence, she has chosen to cover her hair.
A young girl from Erzurum had grown up in the city center. She has seen old photographs in
which her mother was wearing short skirts during her high school years. She, however, could
not wear them. When she showed her friends her vacation pictures in which she was wearing a
bikini, the friends reacted by saying, “You are an infidel; you are going to burn in hell”.
An official at a women’s institution in Batman told us that a young girl was killed at a wedding
two years ago because she was wearing pants. A woman from the CHP in Denizli related that
her neighbor told her once that she was committing a sin by wearing dresses with thin shoulder
straps.
A woman we met in Aydın had once attended a mevlid [prayer] after the death of her friend’s
daughter. Implying her polished nails, the woman sitting next to her during the mevlid told her
that “her recitation of the Quran would not be accepted”.
In the more conservative cities such as Erzurum, neither men nor women thought that women
who did not cover their hair would be disturbed by men on the street. In fact, we were told in
Erzurum that unveiled women or the female university students who did not cover their hair
were not harassed by men. Probably it was not possible in a conservative place like Erzurum for
men to go beyond “glancing strangely” at unveiled women, as the same conservatism also had
control on their behaviors.
On the contrary, it was reported that incidents of harassment were on the rise in places like
Eskişehir, which may be described as “cities in-between”; where conservative structures were
melting away, but modernization has not yet taken root.
A university student who is a member of the Eskişehir Women’s Platform reported us that,
even if Eskişehir is “the most comfortable city” in Anatolia, she cannot claim that “there is
no conservatism or reactionaries or neighborhood pressure” there. She noted that incidents
of harassment and rape had increased in Eskişehir and that women going out alone in the
evenings and transvestites had been assaulted.
A university student from Sivas complained that she found it hard to go out at the first week she
was back from İzmir, where she regularly went for the summer holidays. “It is as if everyone is
coming on to me,” she said. She denounced the men who harass women on the streets, saying,
“They are a different race; I do not consider them as members of the human race”. Another
university student from Erciyes University in Kayseri told us that she could not go out after four
o’clock in the afternoon.
63
The female students could be harassed verbally even by the security staff at Anadolu University
in Eskişehir. On one occasion, they complained about this to a female legal adviser at the
University. They assumed that she would be more considerate because she, too, was a woman.
However, their complaint went unheard. Instead, they were told that the members of security
staff were “married with children”, so they would not do such things. The reason why the
security guards could dare to attempt such an act was perhaps because the students in question
were leftists and activists.
The same student was assaulted by an old man near the train station. When she screamed, the
security guard at the station pushed her on the shoulder, saying, “Why are you wearing yourself
out shrieking like that?” “What is the use of reporting?” she asked us.
A friend of hers was assaulted by a man with a knife in a busy street and when she called for
help, no one came to her rescue. When she finally took refuge in a shop, she asked why no one
had helped her when she was almost killed. The reply she received was: “We thought that the
guy was your lover or your husband”.
The above reply demonstrates that when a woman is beaten or even suffers attempted murder,
if this assault is committed by her “spouse”, then it may be perceived as an act that can be
overlooked, or at least can be considered as a “family matter”, and therefore called for no
intervention.
A similar incident caused a public reaction a couple of years ago when a man stabbing his wife
in the middle of the street was broadcasted on TV. The policemen around just watched the whole
scene and did nothing to stop him.
A woman in Trabzon underlined that it was not only unveiled woman who were harassed in the
streets; veiled women were also harassed by men.
A university student who is a member of the Atatürkist Thought Association in Malatya had
witnessed veiled women who were also the targets of such offenses. Her mother was veiled; in
a shop where they went together, the shopkeeper verbally harassed her mother. An attractive
young woman wearing make-up stated that, though she wore a headscarf, she was also verbally
harassed.
Such sexual harassment, verbal or otherwise, was relatively easier to talk about. However, since
rape is usually regarded as a matter of “one’s honor”, most of the time it is disguised and not
spoken out: therefore, collecting data on the subject becomes impossible, although it is one of
the issues that women’s organizations concentrate on.45
The real problem in Batman, where women were relatively more comfortable in public spaces,
seems to be the suicides committed by women in towns and villages. Although they have
decreased in number in recent times, such suicides are still a matter of concern. However, most
people preferred not to talk about them, including people in the women’s associations; it was
considered dangerous to talk about that subject.
45 For an academic study based on field research, supported by TUBITAK, see, Ayşe Gül Altınay and Yeşim Arat, Türkiye’de
Kadına Yönelik Şiddet, 2007.
64
The head of a local women’s NGO did not give us any information and acted as if she was
hearing about the problem of women’s suicides in Batman for the first time. Even some people
with a leftist or liberal disposition claimed that women were unable to cope with the change
when they came to live in Batman from their towns or villages. They implied that the women
were immediately starting to behave too liberally; hence, they committed suicide when they
were unable to handle the gap between their expectations and the reality of their lives.
The former chairperson of a women’s association was the only person from whom we could
gather information about the suicides in Batman. She told us, without any hesitation, that
usually the real cause was incest or incidents of rape by family members. Some feminist
associations have claimed that some of those women were forced to commit suicide by their
families; some were killed by family members and the deaths were disguised as suicide. These
claims have also been proven by the court verdicts in some of the cases.
A pharmacist’s account of an event involving her affirmed that this was among the taboo
issues in Turkey. She was an active member of a women’s association in Kayseri. She once was
participating as a speaker in a three-day event for human rights training. When she began to
describe sexual offenses against women in Turkey such as harassment with the help of official
statistics, her speech was cut off by an elderly bureaucrat. “You cannot talk like that in front of
the governor, the prefect, and young people,” he protested. She was able to continue her speech
only after the intervention of the deputy governor.
As noted by Arzu Çur above, women prefer to use headscarves for religious reasons, but also
with the hope to escape from harassment in those cities where it is not easy for them to feel
comfortable in public places. This is among the subjects that require further research.46
The surveys based on questionnaires or in-depth interviews found that an overwhelming
majority of the veiled women indicate that they are covered for religious reasons.47 Those who
point out family or neighborhood pressure as a reason constitute only a small minority. From
their answers, however, we cannot know what percentage of those veiled women who genuinely
believe in Islamic teachings or were made to believe in them, had actually decided to wear the
headscarf for the first time because of the pressure of their own families or by their husbands
and their families when they married. Similarly, we do not know actually what percentage of
them have done so because they were afraid they would be harassed if and when they did not
wear headscarves in public places.
In other words, it is quite probable that the women first begin to use headscarves as a result of
pressure, but later accept and internalize it by interpreting it as a “religious requirement”.
In fact, many women we interviewed in Anatolia reported us that the women cover their hair
as a result of pressure or persuasion. For example, it can be drawn from the story of a young
girl graduating from a vocational high school who explained us that girls in Erzurum would be
forced by their families to veil themselves as soon as they finished school.
46 For two important studies supporting the argument that women from conservative families cover themselves in order to
take part in public space, see Nilüfer Göle, Modern Mahrem, İstanbul, Metis, 1991, and Yeşim Arat, Rethinking Islam and
Liberal Democracy: Islamist Women in Turkish Politics, State University of New York Press, 2005.
47 For example, in a survey conducted in 2006, 71.5% of the (veiled) respondents stated that they have covered themselves
because it was Islam’s command for women to cover. See Ali Çarkoğlu and Binnaz Toprak, 2006, 62.
65
This young girl was resisting her family’s demand to cover her hair after graduation. She told us
that she would go to a university preferably in another city and she would not veil herself under
any circumstances. When asked what she would do if she fell in love with a man who wants her
to veil, she responded that she would not marry such a man no matter how much she loved him.
She noted that some of her friends had started to wear headscarves under family pressure, but
they were uncovering their hair in places where their families would not see them, in the school
bus for instance.
A school teacher in Balıkesir talked about her former students who were forced to use veil and
to go to the religious schools. Teachers from different cities recounted that the high school girls
were beginning to use headscarves after they started going to the dershanes [prep schools] or
Işık Evleri [“Houses of Light”] that are run by the Fethullah Gülen community.
A woman we interviewed in Bağcılar, İstanbul, told us that although the people around her
knew she is an Alevi, they were trying to persuade her to veil herself. Another Alevi we met there
told us that her nine-year-old niece was questioned by the children from a nearby neighborhood
as to why she was not covering her hair. The children were scaring her niece with phrases like,
“You will burn in hell forever” and insulting her by saying, “So, you’ll be a prostitute”.
A pharmacist in Kayseri told us that an old man once said to her: “My dear child, you are young
and ignorant; you don’t know anything, why don’t you cover your hair with a veil.” A teacher,
again in Kayseri, quoted three women who were their neighbors, going to the Quran classes in
an apartment next door, saying to his wife who is a public servant: “You will probably cover
after retirement, right?” An Alevi from Kayseri witnessed some women insulting another woman
because she was not veiled during Ramadan.
A woman we talked to in Adapazarı said that even her 13-year-old daughter is conscious of what
she wears. They had taken out her summer and winter cloths a couple of days earlier to organize
her closets. When she saw her mini-skirts and tops with shoulder straps, she said, “Mom, do you
really think I could wear these here? Just give them all away.”
We were told that unveiled young girls had difficulty in finding marriage partners. A woman in
Erzurum said that if a man wanted to marry a girl who did not cover her hair, his family would
object. “She would either have to veil herself or they would not be able to get married,” she said.
The daughter of her neighbor who was a teacher was engaged to another teacher. The man’s
family asked her to cover her hair. Since she refused, the engagement was broken off.
When we asked an old lady in Erzurum if her son would have married her daughter-in-law (who
was sitting next to her at the moment) had she not been veiled, her answer was: “No way; there
is no such thing in our family; we wouldn’t have taken her as a bride.”
We were also informed that women who wore headscarves had an advantage over the ones who
didn’t. Many women, both veiled and unveiled, mentioned that men would immediately give up
their seat in public busses when they saw a veiled woman standing. Moreover, most of the time,
they even preferred to give their seat to a veiled young girl rather than an unveiled elderly.
That men avoided offering their seat to unveiled women was an issue that we heard in most
of the cities we visited. As mentioned in the introduction, this was even the case in İstanbul’s
Bağcılar neighborhood.
66
It is reasonable to assume that this respect towards veiled women arises from the perception
that they are more honorable. In fact, some veiled women presume themselves more honorable
compared to others. A teacher from the CHP district organization in Trabzon told us the
following story: Once, a retired teacher from Bursa was visiting them in Trabzon. One day, while
she was riding in a dolmuş [a type of shared taxi], a veiled woman stopped the car to get on; as
soon as she saw that the only available seat was the one next to the driver, she asked the lady
from Bursa sitting in the back seat to switch seats. “Your hair is already uncovered; let me sit in
the back, you sit in front,” she said. The lady from Bursa reacted by saying, “How dare you think
you are more honorable than me!” and there started an altercation.
Some also pointed out that veiled women may face difficulties if they decide to give up wearing
headscarf. An architect from Kayseri quoted her veiled friend saying: “I veil myself because I
believe a woman should hide herself; but sometimes when I see your hair uncovered, I wish I too
could walk around my hair uncovered. I am losing my hair because I keep it covered all the time.
I feel I have lost my beauty.” “However, giving up veil is a problem in itself”, the architect added.
Many women reported us that it was women, rather than men, that reacted most against
women who do not use veil. For instance, most of the veiled women we interviewed in Erzurum
told us that, if they ever had opened their hair, the real pressure and criticism would have come
from other women.
An Alevi man from Erzurum supported their claim. He said his wife would never wear a
headscarf if they lived in a city like İstanbul or İzmir; but in Erzurum, this was out of question.
A university student who is a member of ADD in Malatya told us that when they complained
to other women about being disturbed by men, the women would respond by saying, “Nothing
would happen if only you dressed properly”.
A member of a women’s association in Kayseri remembered her new neighbors telling her that
“it is not proper for her to wear pants” when she moved to a new apartment. On many occasions
she heard veiled women in Kayseri criticizing other women wearing pants by saying, “Pants
show your features and our men are aroused.”
In most Anatolian cities where we had the impression that men and women had two separate
worlds, it was quite remarkable for us to find out that the real source of social pressure over
women were actually other women. In other words, in those conservative cities where there is
limited social interaction between men and women and where men are not even able to talk
freely to women other than their family members, the castigation of women took place within
the sphere of women.
Veiling oneself may have something to do with tradition as well. In Erzurum, except for
students, it was almost impossible to come across any unveiled women in the streets. As
mentioned in the introduction, even Alevi women reported that they wear headscarves in
Erzurum when they go out.
We also observed that most of the Alevi women in Erzurum wore headscarves when they were
outdoors, even though they did not cover themselves while they were indoors with strangers.
When we asked if they wore headscarves because of social pressure, they replied that no one
actually would intervene if they did not, but it was the custom in Erzurum for women to cover
67
their hair. They added that they would attract strange glances if they went out without wearing
their headscarves, so they feel more comfortable wearing them.
An argument frequently mentioned within the political debates in Turkey is that the turban
type of head cover cannot be allowed because, contrary to the traditional forms of headscarves,
it is also “a political symbol”. This argument was not an issue among the people of Erzurum.
Both men and women who found it natural that women cover their hair outdoors, made almost
no distinction between various ways of covering. What was important for them was covering it,
not how they covered it.
At a meeting with a group of women from the CHP, we noticed that most of them covered their
hair in one way or another. Some wore headscarves, some wore turbans, some had a black cloth
and some had thrown a traditional Erzurum shawl over themselves. When asked if they viewed
the turban as a political symbol, they argued that making such distinctions were inappropriate.
We were also informed that the conservative view on the provocativeness of female body was
also one of the reasons why women wore headscarves. An Alevi we interviewed in Sultanbeyli,
İstanbul, told us that she was an executive member of an association that was founded for
supporting the primary school in her neighborhood. One of the teachers in that school made the
following comment to a female student: “The upper half of women’s and girls’ bodies is human,
the lower half is devilish”.
When they heard this, as the executive body of the association they filed a complaint against
him and he was appointed to another school. When the possibility that this teacher may now be
working in a better neighborhood came to her mind, she said to us: “Maybe we did him a favor.”
A female lawyer in Trabzon reported us that a male colleague had founded an association called
the “Association for the Prohibition of People Dressing Improperly” and informed the members
of the local bar association of its foundation by sending them a letter. According to her, the
content of the letter was disgusting. It was describing the thighs and breasts of female body
as “crevasses and balls”, while arguing that “even the animals covered their genitals with their
tails”. They organized a press conference together with the president of the bar association and
the lawyer in turn took them to court several times, while some newspapers published articles
calling them “immoral lawyers”.
After that incident, women lawyers stopped wearing skirts at the bar association. The local
television channels ran discussion programs and their friends participating in those programs
received threatening calls. She was most disappointed by the fact that none of the NGOs they
applied gave them support. Furthermore, none of the relevant officials they applied has taken
any precautions against these threats; instead they received a warning about “proper clothing”
via a decree sent to all public institutions.
A woman in Denizli reported that, as they pass by an unveiled woman, “men with white beards,
wearing cloaks and turbans” would utter the remark: “Stones will rain on our heads, stones.”
A teacher in Denizli cited the neighbors who visited her friend at her home as saying that the
reason of drought is unveiled women and doomsday will soon arrive because of them as well.
A journalist from Batman noted: “There are even fathers who cannot stand their own daughters
natural physical growth; the fact that at the ages of seventeen-eighteen their breasts grow and
their hips get larger. If they could, they would cast concrete around their children.”
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Some people we talked to reported that the women were not only harassed verbally or physically,
they received threats as well. A woman we interviewed in Adapazarı related an incident she
heard from a friend of hers.
Her friend attended a promotion meeting of a firm that sells durable household items. She and
another woman were the only two unveiled women in the room. After the speeches and program
ended, a woman stood up and shouted from the back: “Friends, we are all here; death to the
unveiled!” Her friend left the meeting and filed a legal complaint against this woman.
Later, however, she was convinced to withdraw her complaint when she was told that the
woman had a baby and was still nursing. Similarly, a businessman from Malatya remembered
that during the opening ceremony of a new park in the city, a man had pointed out a young girl
who was not wearing the headscarf and said: “These people should be killed; look how she came
to the park.”
These two examples can be regarded as a warning about how far the political polarization
around the headscarf conflict and the consequent social division can reach. In this regard, we
believe that both the ruling party’s and the opposition parties’ efforts to take this subject out of
the political struggle arena has an extreme importance.
In sum, it may be stated that the women in the more conservative cities face serious social
pressure to cover themselves when they are outside. Since most women have internalized this
pressure, they may perceive veiling as a matter of personal choice or tradition. However, it
is hard to claim that the social environment they live in actually leaves them any space for
making their own choices.
We have also noticed that the subject of women’s veil could also create domestic problems. An
Alevi in Konya informed that her son, affected by the environment in his primary school, was
pressuring her to veil herself and telling her that it was a sin for women not to cover.
A member of a women’s association in Kayseri told us that her son attending secondary school
was affected by his teacher of religion who was lecturing his students that working women
were committing a sin and would go to hell. “My child came home and started to question me,”
she said.
A member of the Women Artists Association in Trabzon told us that she got married at the age
of eighteen; the family and the relatives of her husband had forced her to veil herself. “I was so
young, I accepted at the time,” she said. Years later, when her son commented about her outfit
one day, she said to him: “You don’t have the right to talk about this.” “He didn’t say a single
word about it again,” she added.
In one of the cities48 we visited, a woman wearing a “turban” recounted an incident between her,
her son and husband. They were invited to a wedding; as always she wore her çarşaf [burqa-like
enveloping garment] from head to toe. Her older son, thinking that this would be scandalous,
objected to it and asked her to take it off. When she refused, things got out of control; her
husband got angry, grabbed the çarşaf and cut it into pieces. From that day on she has been
wearing turban.
48 We do not disclose the name of the city in order to protect the respondent’s identity.
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This last story can be considered as a counter-example against the argument that turban is
worn just for political reasons. As this example suggests, the turban may sometimes be worn as
a more modern and urban alternative to the çarşaf.
However, as our research did not include the problem of headscarf specifically, we could
not gather sufficient information concerning it. The results of another research based on
questionnaires shows that the number of women who wear çarşaf has in fact become so small in
Turkey that they did not even make it into the sample.49
Some women also mentioned the prejudices against working women and the difficulty of
working or of being efficient while working due to those prejudices. For example, a teacher
we interviewed in Batman noticed that her students were not listening to her when she was
appointed for the first time to İkiköprü. When she asked them the reason, they simply replied:
“You are a woman.”
In one of the cities,50 we spoke to a woman who had moved there after marriage. At the city
she had lived before marrying, she did not cover her hair and had worked as a public servant;
however, thereafter, to her husband’s insistence, she quit working and veiled herself. At that
time, her husband explained her that her family would not approve an unveiled and working
woman as a bride. She got used to her newly acquired role and, though she was not allowed to
go out even for shopping without her husband’s permission, she seemed to have accepted her
situation.
However, her brother-in-law had recently married an unveiled woman. Neither the family nor
her husband objected to this. When she realized that a problem which was imposed to her for
years as a strict family tradition could easily be resolved, she rose up and regarded it as an
unacceptable injustice. She was determined to take the risk; if she could find a job, she was
going to work no matter what.
A woman we interviewed in Batman was working in a restaurant managed and run by women.
She told us her husband had to face constant criticism and pressure from others. “Why is your
wife out at this hour? Why does she come home after you do? Why are you cooking? Why are you
taking care of the child?” He was under constant criticism, “because” she said, “there is a role
assigned to him and a role assigned to me”, adding, “I do not have a problem with my husband; I
am struggling with the society.”
An administrator from the Foundation for the Support of Women’s Work Adapazarı branch
reported: “The social role distribution forces the women to tie themselves to an outfit from the
past in such a way that they do not even consider taking it off.”
Once, some women, participating one of their meetings, told her that they wanted to work but
either their husbands or mothers in law did not allow them. She could not stand and told them:
“Dear friends, everyday you take the risk to fight either with your husbands or mothers in law
just for some guest coming home or to have a permission to participate a gathering. Just once,
behave honorably and fight for doing something for your life.” “Maybe it is not very nice to put it
like that, but this is partly a problem related to our women,” she said to us.
49 Çarkoğlu and Toprak, 2006.
50 We do not disclose the name of the city in order to keep the interviewee’s name hidden.
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That working men and women have started to feel uneasy about sharing a common space was
one of the things we were informed. A member of a women’s association in Kayseri related that
once she met a male neighbor at the entrance of an apartment. When the elevator came, she
welcomed him to come in, but he refused by saying that he was going to take the next one. Later
she found out that the residents of that apartment had decided that men would not use the
elevator, when women do.
On another occasion, a woman running her own business in Kayseri attended a meeting at
which a politician from the AKP’s senior management was also present. When she entered
the lobby of the hotel where the meeting was taking place, she saw that there were long lines
in front of the elevators and men and women were taking different elevators. A male hotel
customer who attempted to take the elevator she was in had to step out when the women in the
elevator objected.
A doctor we interviewed in Konya reported us that they have a common room at the hospital for
the doctors where they can have coffee and tea. In the past, male and female doctors would sit
and chat together. However, for the past few years, the women doctors were not using this place
as if there was an “implicit agreement”. His female colleagues would rather talk to him at the
door of his office, even when they came to see him for a consultation about a patient.
“What is weird is that we have also begun to feel uneasy now when a woman colleague steps
into our office by accident. We wonder what she may actually be looking for. Hence, men and
women doctors have been practically separated from one another,” he explained to us.
A woman, working as a public employee in the same city, had realized that with the fear that
they would reject to shake, she unconsciously avoided to offer her hand to men.
A woman we talked to in Sultanbeyli quoted a minibus driver who refused to take money from
her hand: “Put it on the seat,” he said, “because if your hand touches mine, my ablution will be
spoiled”.
A lawyer in Trabzon reported that, a few times, just as she was about to shake hands with men,
her hand stand alone in the air as the others did not respond. In order to avoid such a situation,
now she first makes a guess about the person and if she suspects that he may reject to shake
hands, she never attempts to do it.
This type of separations could also be observed among students. A female teacher in Batman, for
instance, reported that girls and boys have started to sit separately. “When you mix them, they
go crazy,” she said.
A student at Karadeniz Technical University in Trabzon complained that precautions were taken
in the dolmuş cars so that men and women would not sit next to each other. She noted that if
she sat next to a man by accident, he would try to move away from her.
It was also almost impossible for working women to have a separate home, if their families lived
in the same city. A lawyer from Trabzon, for example, reported that her daughter was living
quite freely and her own environment she shared with people like herself was also not also too
restrictive. On the other hand, she also noted that single women did not have the chance to live
alone and she had never heard any woman declaring, “I’ve decided to live away from my family.”
71
When we asked a woman who, despite all the social pressure she faced, took the risk of opening
up her own restaurant whether she was living alone or ever considered it, we got a similar
response.
A young single woman working in the local media in Malatya “had to live” with her family
although “they were very open-minded”. She was coming home from work very late and had
to be very quite when entering their apartment. Her father waited for her every night on their
balcony in order to avert the reactions of neighbors.
Nonetheless, she also mentioned the advantages of living with her family: “My friends from
work visit our home easily; if I lived alone, this would not be possible. My family would accept it,
but the neighbors would not.”
She had spent her youth in big cities and had begun her career in İstanbul. Yet, after she moved
to Malatya, her skirts got longer, she was not able to wear her old “comfortable” outfits, and she
had to watch her “outfit” all the time.
A single faculty member from Erciyes University in Kayseri was complaining that though she
was living in a rather modern part of the city, she was nonetheless unable to step out onto her
balcony wearing shorts. When a man enters the door of their apartment building, the single
women are faced with the same question: “Did he come to visit you?”
It is possible to argue that in the socially conservative cities of Anatolia, as in all traditional
societies, tradition continues its existence through women. However, it is also possible to claim
that as long as they give up their personal freedom in favor of tradition and accept the given
social order, women are also able to create their own sphere of living.
It is likely that, within this sphere, the world of women is quite flexible. In fact, most of the
women we interviewed in Anatolia were far from giving the impression of a submissive person.
Some have accepted their social roles and developed strong personalities within the scope of
those roles; others were resisting against that role and looked for an exit.
For instance, an Alevi woman who had migrated from an Alevi village of Erzurum to the city,
probably thanks to her Alevi identity, had managed to get accepted by the society though she
was not veiled and, with the help of her strong personality, entered to the men’s world. She
didn’t care about Erzurum’s social conservatism, she didn’t question it much. However, because
of her energy, straightforwardness and fearlessness in bringing up the problems within the
party organization, it was as if she was almost a constant challenge to the men in the CHP
organization where she was active for years,
Obviously, the attitude of men, who indeed have a great role in the transmission of tradition
from generation to generation, is also important in the formation of such strong personalities.
In fact, we do not think that the type of man who could “bear” the above image of a woman is
widespread in a conservative society such as Erzurum.
The husband of the woman in the above-mentioned case was certainly proud of his wife. As a
person sharing the same political views, he supported his wife. When he mentioned that his
wife may sometimes go a bit far in her criticisms, she laughingly accepted this, saying that she
received similar criticisms from many other people as well. It was obvious that theirs was a
relation between equals.
72
We met the same type of intellectual, self-confident men in our meeting with the Eğitim-Sen
commissioners in Erzurum as well. A Kurdish teacher, grown up in a village of Erzurum, was a
child of a father with three wives.
He was planning to gather the tragic stories of his “three mothers” in a novel he started to write.
His own mother’s drama had affected him deeply and, probably owing to this example, he had
derived a life lesson on the importance of women making decisions about their own lives.
The daughter of this teacher had fallen in love with a young man when she was at high school
and told it to her father. Since her father accepted it as natural, she later married to the man.
We asked her what he would think if the story progressed differently and instead of marrying,
her daughter broke up with her boyfriend and started going out with others. His response was
interesting.
According to him, education meant teaching people how to realize mistakes. This was true for
life as well as science. As a father, who is also a teacher, his responsibility was not to correct her
daughter’s mistakes, but to help her realize them.
We believe the role of such a male model in transforming women’s lives deserves further inquiry.
We also think that the effect of social conservatism on men as well as women is worth studying
too. For instance, in cities like Erzurum, we got the impression that, if they wanted to marry
with women who did not wear headscarves, the men, too, would be subject to social pressures
similar to those faced by women. In fact, in most of the cities conservatism has also taken men
into its grasp and restricted their lives and preferences.
In this regard, we think that the absence of interest on the consequences of the imposition of
traditional male roles on men’s inner worlds is a serious shortcoming of the gender studies in
Turkey.51
In sum, throughout the cities we visited, we got the impression that women lived under constant
surveillance. This impression was particularly true for the Eastern and Central Anatolian cities.
For women, the natural rituals of urban life, such as wearing what they want, strolling through
the streets, going out at night, going to a place that serves alcohol-even with their women
friends, living in a place of their own instead of their father’s, making friends with men, etc.,
were considered an anomaly in the Anatolian cities.
Many women we met in Anatolia gave similar examples to describe the obstacles they face when
they want to shape their life freely and participate public life as equals to men.
In Sivas, a university student’s reaction to our questions manifested how strong the restrictions
on women’s lives can be.
We asked her whether she would ever consider moving to her own place at the age of thirty, if
she is not married. She told us that she could never ask her family something like that. When
we asked her how her family would react if she wanted to marry an Alevi; she told us that they
would object. “What about a Kurd?” we asked. She finally exploded: “Are you trying to get me
killed?”
51 Serpil Sancar’s forthcoming book (Türkiye’de Erkekliğin İnşası: Hane ve Piyasa Arasında Erkeklik) by Metis Publications
offers a significant contribution on the subject. (ed.’s note)
73
A woman producer at a local television channel in Malatya summarized the life-limiting social
pressure that women in Anatolia face as follows: “The situation in Malatya is like that, I, too,
have learned it here. When you look at it from the outside, you see a city where men and women
gather together for social occasions, and, from working women to housewives and young girls,
women in all kinds of outfits walk in its streets. However, when you dig a bit deeper, different
things come out. There are only two concepts here: sin and shame.”
In many Anatolian cities, the definitions of “sin and shame” when coupled with the notion
of “honor” seem to restrict women’s ability to decide about their own lives, to claim their own
bodies, to go outside, to dress as they wish - free of harassment by men, and to exist in public
spaces as equals to and alongside men.
A middle-aged woman we spoke to in Erzurum repeated a sentence that who knows how many
Anatolian women have told themselves many times: “It is very difficult to be a woman.”
The Dispossessed Children of the City: “Half a Nation, the Gypsies”
Almost all the men in the Roma neighborhood in Aydın were unemployed. When we asked if
they looked for jobs, a young man - married, with many children, who told us that we would not
be able to recognize him when he is dressed neatly when applying for a job - said: “How are we
going to find jobs? They ask where our home is. When they hear Ilıcabaşı, they don’t give us any
jobs. They exclude us.”
We would like to make a few observations about the Roma people who, like Alevis, are subject
to discrimination because of an identity acquired by birth. Discrimination against the Roma in
Anatolian cities was not originally a part of our research. However, when we heard that there
was a Roma neighborhood in Aydın, we wanted to visit it and see what kind of difficulties the
Roma living in Anatolian cities experienced.
The roots of the Roma population in these territories go back to the tenth century and their
oldest settlement was İstanbul. The Ottomans considered them “half a nation”. They are usually
described as nomadic, dirty, noisy, unemployed people who are unfit for regular jobs, drinking,
singing and dancing most of the time, and earning their livelihoods by selling flowers in the
streets and bars or by begging.
The problems of this ethnic group are not discussed in the society and they are not on the
agenda of any political party, either. However, everyone knows that they are not only the
poorest, most dispossessed and most helpless group of people in any city in this country, but
that they also have no social security whatsoever, in contrast to almost any other inhabitants of
those cities.
When we went to the neighborhood in Aydın, we were immediately encircled. We were offered
plastic chairs to sit on. When were invited to see inside their house, we saw a place looking like
a hole or a cave. There was a small room and another space like a closet in a corner, without a
door. An old woman, a husband and his wife and their children were living at this house. There
was no kitchen or toilet. The most striking thing about the place was that it was spanking clean.
There were carpets on the floor and religious pictures (representing the prophet Ali, they said)
woven on fabric were hung on the walls. They were clean, too. When we asked where they go for
a shower or to use the toilet, they said they use the bathroom in their neighbor’s home, which
was the only proper house in the neighborhood.
74
The former mayor from ANAP (Anavatan Partisi [Motherland Party]) had helped the
neighborhood quite a bit. He had renovated the buildings that seemed livable, paved the muddy
roads with stone and solved the problems of infrastructure. However, they complained about the
newly elected mayor from the AKP. Not only he was not doing anything for their neighborhood,
but he was also refusing them when they applied for jobs. They were not allowed to work, even
on the construction sites of the municipality.
When we asked how their identities are disclosed, they told us the same thing Alevis in Kayseri
mentioned: from their addresses. Moreover, both the residents of the Alevi neighborhood in
Kayseri and the Roma people in Aydın were the most disadvantageous groups in employment.
The Roma in this neighborhood could earn money only by selling hand-woven straw baskets
on the boulevard nearby. Apart from the primary school, it seemed that no public service was
provided for these people. They did not benefit from the assistance to the poor distributed by
some religious communities because their piety was doubted. We had asked about the same
issue in the Alevi neighborhood in Kayseri and learned that not a single member of these
communities had ever stopped by their neighborhood.
An Alevi in Sultanbeyli, İstanbul, when riding in a minibus, had witnessed a conversation
between someone from his neighborhood and a member of the municipal council from the AKP.
When the poor complained that they could not get any help or aid from the municipality, the
AKP council member replied, “People who give alms expect it to go to those who practice their
daily ritual prayers and fast.” The other man asked, “Don’t I believe in God? Don’t I believe
in the Prophet and his Quran?” “You may, of course, be a Muslim, but you are in the middle,
you are walking on a thin rope” responded the council member. He said to us, “I heard this
conversation with my own ears!”
Our general observation was that the religious communities or brotherhoods were distributing
aid only to the families known to be pious and only to Sunni families. In other words, the aid
was distributed with a sectarian approach; hence it never reached the poor Alevi or Roma
neighborhoods.
Finally, we also noticed that, interestingly enough, the Roma in Aydın, who occupied the “lowest”
echelon in society, have found an even lower group to despise. When we asked what they call
themselves, “Roma” or “Gypsy”, their reply was: “Roma, of course.” They stressed that they did
not ride in horse carriages like the “Gypsies” who traveled from one place to another and lived
in tents. It was obvious that they despised the “Gypsies”, just as they were despised by others.
In Eskişehir we witnessed that even those who suffered from social prejudice themselves had
their own prejudices against others.
An influential Alevi businessman in Eskişehir knew important people in the city. He took a
history professor, who had emigrated from Bulgaria and whose husband is a friend of his, to
court for some sentences in one of her books, claiming that they contained anti-Alevi views. He
told us that he has called her a “Russian germ, Russian-perverted, Bulgarian-spoiled”, adding
that he is a rather high-strung person.
75
Forced to Live Inwardly: Christians in Anatolia
In the Eastern and Central Anatolian cities we visited, churches were the only reminders of the
fact that Armenians had lived there once upon a time. We had not included the Armenians in
our research because we thought it would be hard to find any Armenian communities in the
Anatolian cities.
However, when we found ourselves in front of an Armenian church in Kayseri, we decided to
knock on its door. When we told the zangoç [bell ringer] of the church, who finally opened the
door as a result of our insistent knocking, that we wanted to see the priest, he said that he had
gone to the city and that he did not know his cell phone number, and did not give us any further
information.
He was obviously afraid of us; he was living almost invisibly in this lonely environment in a
state of self-imprisonment.
An Armenian jeweler in Sivas, just like the zangoç in Kayseri, did not talk to us about anything
except his jewelry. He was originally from Sivas. When we asked how many Armenian families
lived in Sivas, he said there were very few. When we asked him if he has been subject to
discrimination as an Armenian in Sivas, he told us that he doesn’t think about it and is not
interested in such matters. Obviously, he did not want to talk to strangers about matters that
might cause trouble for him.
Apart from these two places, we also went to an Assyrian monastery near Batman. After the
greeting with the head priest, we asked a few questions about the monastery. His answers were
polite, but short. We left the monastery since we felt that he didn’t want to be disturbed.
How people in Malatya talked about the Christians, whose population in Anatolia has decreased
sharply in recent times, was really disturbing. You could still feel the effect of the murder of
missionaries in 2007 over the city. A teacher who is a member of Eğitim-Sen informed that
Malatya was one of the cities where social conflicts were most intense in the past.
He noted that every group that was considered “outside the system” was obliged to face social
pressure. Although the murdering of the missionaries was regarded as the act of a few people,
according to him, these murders were in fact an indication of “pressure against the other” in
Malatya. He said that when they evaluated the event afterwards, they “decided that the city had
a favorable potential for the organization of such a crime”.
An Alevi we talked to in Malatya told us the following: “When I heard that the missionaries
were killed, I went there. Their corpses were being carried away. The round-bearded ones were
everywhere. Let me tell you what I heard with my own ears - they were saying, ‘They didn’t do
enough’. I couldn’t bring myself to ask, ‘Are you one of them too?’”
A student in Malatya who is a member of the ADD told us that there was no reaction among the
students to the murder of the missionaries. There was even a student who asked, “What did they
do to deserve having their throats cut?” He reported to us: “There were many people who were
acting as if they were celebrating a victory. Some people even enjoyed the fact that people from
Malatya were on the agenda, that the name of Malatya was on the news and that the governor
of Malatya was in front of cameras constantly. They regarded it as some kind of ‘advertisement’
of Malatya.”
76
An Alevi businessman, on the other hand, pointed out: “There were reactions to the murder of
missionaries, but there were also people saying, ‘What were these missionaries doing here? How
can you do such things here?’”. An official at the Malatya headquarters of the CHP said they
could not protest the murder of the missionaries, as they were afraid of reactions.
A leftist local journalist in Malatya noted that some local media had played a role in this
incident by pointing out the missionaries as targets. A local newspaper, he claimed, had even
published articles on Christian households in Malatya which had given the number of the
houses Christians had been living in different neighborhoods and by warning people about the
increase in the number of the missionaries, had called them not to rent their apartments to
Christians.52
He also stated that the archives of the above-mentioned local newspaper were destroyed after
the murders, while the national and international presses were told that the archives had been
burnt because of a fire. He claimed that no newspaper would dare to publish the archive he has
and that he was subjected to an investigation and lost his subscriptions and advertisements
after he had published pieces about the murders and the gangs who were involved in it. He also
told us that he could not get any support from “citizens” either, as even the most democratic
ones said: “They should not have come here for that purpose; why are they conducting activities
here?”
A lawyer and a member of DSP in Trabzon told us that there were many people who defined
themselves as “Turks” along with some university students who attended church. She said that
this was regarded as normal, but that there were also those who have been converted as the
result of missionary activities.
A member of a Trabzon People’s House who told us his opinions about the murder of Hrant Dink
said that there was great tolerance in the culture of Trabzon for people from different religions,
and thus the incident could not be generalized to include the entire population of Trabzon.
On the contrary, an official from the Trabzon Human Rights Association (İHD) told us that they
had gone to Pelitli during the incidents that took place subsequent to Dink’s murder and that
“some people in suits and ties” came and warned each and every person in the coffeehouse “not
to talk to anybody”. He was trying to explain the extent of pressure people were subject to by
telling us that when he asked a neighbor he saw there “How are you? What is going on?” the
man had not replied to him. He thought the events were not spontaneous; “There are some
powers who would like to push Trabzon in some direction” said he.
According to the same official, the Human Rights Association has “of course” reacted strongly
against that murder. They had placed flowers at the church. He claimed: “Someone was about to
shoot me for that; he barely missed.”
Later he faced with this man whom he thought was struggling with his conscience and had
even drunk “a small rakı” with him. “You don’t know me, I don’t know you. What kind of a past
do we have together?” he asked. The man replied: “You left flowers in the church when Hrant
was killed”. “Why did I leave them? Did you ever think of that?” he asked. “Why?” the guy asked.
52 We choose not to disclose the names of the newspapers that he had given us since we did not check the accuracy of the
information.
77
He told him that the genocide resolution was about to be voted on in the American Senate and
explained to him that he did it because he wanted to show that “we are not enemies with the
Armenians and we are against such murders”.
“The guy cried on my shoulder saying ‘They are not telling us that’” he narrated and added: “That
group we mentioned is provoking these guys”.
The president of the Human Rights Association whom we saw in Trabzon made a speech at a
conference titled “Turkey Searching for Its Peace” and his speech was widely acclaimed. He was
called that same day by the Directorate of Security who wanted to talk to him. When he was
about to meet them, he heard the news that Hrant Dink had been murdered. He was called to
talk about this event.
When he was about to leave, the Director General asked him if he was afraid. “I am afraid, but
you will protect me,” he remarked, even though he didn’t really believe what he said. Later the
NTV channel produced a program about his life and family. His wife and children also appeared
on the program. His middle daughter, who was “reactive” against him said, “I don’t share most of
my father’s views.” “But,” she later added, “Somebody’s father needed to do this”. His eyes filled
with tears while he recalled this.
The conclusion we derive from these limited examples point to a well-known reality in
Turkey. The Armenians or Assyrians, who had lived together with the other people of Anatolia
throughout history and who had left their imprint on the life and art of Anatolian cities, and
moreover who have been decimated today, prefer to be invisible. They survive by isolating
themselves from the city’s life and imprisoning themselves in a world of their own. Like Alevis,
they need to be invisible in the Anatolia of the Sunni Turks.
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Repression Emanating from the Sources of Political Power and Acts of Religious Communities
II. REPRESSION EMANATING FROM THE SOURCES OF POLITICAL
POWER AND ACTS OF RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES
While categorizing authority types in history, Max Weber, one of the most influential
theoreticians of political sociology,, proposed that bureaucratic administration based on “legalrational authority” is the major characteristic of a modern state.
In Weberian terms, whereas “traditional authority” is legitimized by tradition and by feudal or
patrimonial structures with hereditary succession and “charismatic authority” is legitimized by
divine or supernatural powers of a single individual, e.g., the prophets, “legal-rational authority”
is empowered by a formalistic belief in the content of the law and a set of uniform principles.
These uniform principles including merit-based recruitment -the criteria that set the roles
for promotion and prevent discrimination-, rules shaping the relations within the chain of
command, explicit mission statements, notion of indiscrimination in public services, and
separation between personal properties of public servants and official property, has caused
the “legal-rational authority” to become the essential administrative model for contemporary
bureaucratic institutions and the modern state.
According to Weber, due to those characteristics, “legal-rational authority” is the most adequate
administrative model for complex societies, as it achieves both intra-organizational and
political efficiency53. Administrative models that approximate Max Weber’s definition of “ideal
type” of “legal-rational authority” are observed in economically and politically developed
societies. On the other hand, when we review the political science literature, we notice that such
administrative models rarely exist in underdeveloped or developing countries.
The absence of a Weberian “legal-rational authority” results in the prevalence of unlawful
endeavors like bribery and corruption as well as disorganization, whereas it hinders formation
of the conditions essential to follow for an efficient development policy and the solidification of
the rule of law, and thus delays the integration of such countries into the modern world.
Turkey has a relatively advanced bureaucratic structure and administrative resources, partly
because of its state tradition of more than six hundred years of duration. However, in line with
our observations concerning the other underdeveloped or developing countries, it is also hard to
argue that such a Weberian “legal-rational authority” prevails in Turkey.
In recent times and also historically, governing parties’ practice of cadre-ization (kadrolaşma) 54
hinders the sine qua non of a rational bureaucratic structure, i.e., the principal of merit in
employment and promotion, encourages discrimination in public services, and entails violations
of law.
53 Max Weber, The Three Types of Legitimate Rule. Tr. by Hans H. Gerth, Berkeley Publications in Society and Institutions, 4:1,
1958
54 Editor’s Note: Kadrolaşma is a concept denoting that the government sets up its own cadres in public offices.
79
When long-term claims of corruption and bribery are added to this picture, Turkish society,
which has been steadily becoming more and more complex, is now dealing with the question of
“good governance”.55
If Turkey wants to institutionalize its democracy , improve its economy, and consequently reach
the target of EU membership in the coming decades, then the country needs to employ different
policies from those pursued in the past. Unfortunately this research verifies that the current
government, just like the previous ones, has not appreciated that this is a matter of urgency and
has been unable to establish a rational form of administration.
Given the significance of human capital in the globalized world, cadre-ization and its
consequences may become a serious setback for Turkey’s prospects.
It is also plausible to argue that the AKP government’s practice of partisanship in public
employment deepens the social divisions in Turkey, as this practice overlaps with the ongoing
secularism debate that has been dividing the country for a long time.
In the following sections, by referring to the stories of our interviewees, we are going to describe
the practices of discrimination and repression of senior managers appointed during the AKP
rule against the public servants with secular identities. The “Prohibition of Alcoholic Beverages”
put in force by local AKP cadres, the alteration of office hours in public offices on Fridays and
the Holy Birth Week celebrations in schools, which should have no place in a secular system of
education are going to be addressed. Moreover, we will also deal with describing the conditions
in which religious organizations in these cities are included in the category of “pressure” by
groups that are remote from these organizations and/or the centers of power.
1. PUBLIC SERVANTS AND APPOINTMENT OF PARTISANS TO PUBLIC OFFICES
I was working as chief technician in the technical department of the hospital.
They appointed someone else to my position. He didn’t have any knowledge on
construction nor had he the technical know-how. The only virtue he had was being
an AKP supporter. He was appointed as the chief of our group of twenty technicians,
yet he was not capable of giving out correct orders to any of the foreman or qualified
staff.
The department chief insisted, “He’s going to take care of business on my behalf and
all of you are going to take orders from him from now on,” and he added, “You are
trained and experienced, so you have to support him.”
We protested: “We won’t cooperate with him in any way because he doesn’t know
even the abc’s of the construction business.” You appoint someone here for political
reasons and then ask for our help? Sorry, but no!
A technician working at the state hospital in one of the cities we visited.56
The above citation is like a proof of how imperative a Weberian bureaucratic administration
is in complex systems to ensure harmony and efficiency within the organization. Within a
system in which merit-based promotion is not respected, problems like slowing-down of work,
55 This conceptualization refers to E. Fuat Keyman, “Türkiye’de İyi Toplum Yönetimi ve Demokratikleşme”, Aydınlanma
Sempozyumu, İstanbul, Osmanlı Bankası Arşiv ve Araştırma Merkezi, 2007, pp 170-186
56 We hereby refrain from naming the city because of privacy concerns.
80
increasing mistakes, avoiding liability and cooperation with superiors because people (staff)
believe that they are treated unfairly, etc, stand as the fundamental factors paralyzing the
bureaucracy down to its smallest units because of the practice of partisan appointments by the
ruling party.
Throughout the adaptation process to the European Union in which the Turkish system requires
a period of swift alteration in the administrative structure, the system efficiency constitutes
a major problem, since it is drastically held up by the ruling parties that still insist on the
appointment of public personnel according to their party allegiance.
Doctors, nurses, civil servants, teachers and many others, whom we interviewed, have all
complained of an extensive cadre-ization policy of the AKP. They mentioned that most of the
managers in the public offices are AKP supporters. The common complaint is that this process
works at the expense of leftists, Alevis and groups who are known as “secular”, or in a nutshell,
at the expense of those who do not support the politics of the ruling party.
This practice of “cadre-ization” in all senior positions especially in the education and health
services sectors, beginning from under secretaries to department chiefs, school principals and
their deputies, was presented to us as a prominent factor creating unjust treatment. A faculty
member at Eskişehir Osmangazi University even named it as a “slaughter” against those that
are not close to the ruling party.
In addition to partisanship, pressure and discrimination against people with “secular” identities
were among the complaints that were mentioned to us. People gave us examples of those
practices, such as night shifts at hospitals intentionally assigned to the unveiled female doctors
and nurses; against the common practice, classes purposely assigned to cover every weekday to
the teachers with “secular identities”; appointments from the city centers to distant towns and
villages, and even the appointment of husbands and wives to schools in different cities. Similar
examples were also given for doctors and nurses.
Whenever we heard such examples about public servants, we asked them whether a complaint
was filed against it or not. The complainants stated that the claims they filed were buried since
their superiors, “who are also AKP supporters”, naturally did nothing. Furthermore, it was
mentioned that even the objections and complaints of NGOs were not taken into account. Some
others told us that they filed no claims because it was useless: “Who are you going to complain
about and to whom?” they asked.
Many of them related that they remained silent because they were afraid of repression. In fact,
a primary school teacher in Konya informed the principal that some students were coming up
to the very entrance of the school with veils. Immediately afterwards more than eighty parents
and three muhtars57 filed a petition at the governor’s office for the teacher’s deposition, and
consequently the teacher was “exiled”. He also mentioned that on another occasion he was
punished with a forfeiture of salary by a primary school inspector because of his April 23 speech
which in fact had been previously approved by the school commission.
One may have suspects about these claims as in Turkey people have the opportunity to seek
justice through law. However, there are justifiable reasons for public servants to avoid from
57 Editor’s note: A muhtar is the elected administrator of a neighborhood.
81
appealing such cases: Since most of the teachers and the public servants we interviewed are
low-income persons, even if they appeal, it is difficult for them to pay the expenses of legal
advice and the court fees. Moreover, the judicial process may take years. Besides, in order to sue
against their immediate superior, they need to get the permission of higher superiors and this
permission is rarely given. Last but not least, as a result of going to law, they may be appointed
to another position or a place during the legal process.
A lawyer from Trabzon, believing that the behavior of longtime bureaucrats has changed
completely, explains: “The people are the same, but the way they talk, the way they greet each
other and their manners have changed drastically.”
According to him, on the busses, in the public offices people seem to disguise a religious identity.
Mentioning that public servants in particular feel themselves obliged to behave like that, he
claims: “From the way they walk to their mustache styles, you can see that this new fraction
acts uniformly.”
A doctor, who is a member of District Chamber of Physicians working at Eskişehir State Hospital,
argues that there are a considerable number of partisan appointments in the city and everybody,
including the cleaning and the bus service staff, “pass through an assessment”. Furthermore, in
all hospitals, many services such as the security, cleaning, catering, and office-stationery and so
forth have passed to sub-contractors by outsourcing.
He “presumes” that those outsourcing agreements are concluded by the administration or the
ruling party, and thus, even the low level staff like janitors, secretaries, security officers, and
canteen workers consist of the party’s supporters or persons that find those jobs through an
intermediary close to the party.
Furthermore, he claims that as a result of cadre-ization, people are faced with unfair
competition, not only professionally, but also financially, e.g., religious persons are favored
during the distribution of working capital. A teacher from Adapazarı Eğitim-İş describes a
new method of partisanship implemented by extending the terms of office of the temporarily
appointed directors.
In the section on Alevis, we cited the complaints of Alevi citizens who were appointed not only
to different workplaces, but also to other positions against their will or were not employed at all
in the AKP municipality offices.
All of them claimed that they have been subject to discrimination, that the AKP’s appointments
have excluded Alevis from business life and that the appointees to public offices are either AKP
supporters or members of religious communities. Furthermore, they pointed out that, while in
the past there were several Alevi citizens employed in the public offices and municipalities in
the cities in which they resided, today the number of Alevis working in these jobs has decreased
almost to zero. They argued that even in the private sector, jobs are given to people close to AKP
circles as companies follow the advice of the local AKP executives or religious communities.
As mentioned before, when we inquired how the employers understand that the applicants
are Alevis and subsequently reject their application, they explained us that their identity is
disclosed from the address they write on the application form.
Another frequently stressed claim was that being a member of pro-government MemurSen and its affiliated unions such as Eğitim-Bir-Sen and Sağlık-Sen also plays an important
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role. Moreover, it was also claimed that Memur-Sen membership is even useful when people
apply for buying a house from the collective housing projects of TOKİ (Housing Development
Administration of Turkey.)
We were also repeatedly informed that the number of Memur-Sen members has increased
significantly since the year 2002, whereas the “leftist” Public Workers Union Confederation Kamu Emekçileri Sendikaları Konfederasyonu (KESK) - has lost members during the same time
span.
In accord with these claims, we were faced with a striking fact when we studied the
membership figures of unions. According to the Ministry of Labor and Social Security figures
published in the Official Gazette in the year 2002, the membership of Türk Kamu-Sen -also
known as the union of the “nationalist” segment- was approximately 329,000, while KESK’s
was 262,000. Conversely, 2008 figures show a slight increase in the number of Türk KamuSen members but a decrease in KESK’s. Nonetheless, the number of Memur-Sen members has
increased to 315,000 in 2008, whereas it had only 42,000 members in 2002.58
These figures show that the membership of Türk Kamu-Sen has increased by 29,000 new
members and KESK’s has decreased by 39,000. The difference between these two figures
demonstrates that a membership of 10,000 is missing from the total figure of the two unions. Yet
the number of Memur-Sen members has increased by 273,000.
If we presume the missing 10,000 members of the other two unions have switched to Memur-Sen,
it means that Memur-Sen has accomplished 263,000 new memberships in the last six years.
This enormous increase in the number of members of the pro-government Memur-Sen cannot
be explained by inter-union poaching. This situation only supports the argument that the AKP
government is promoting recruitment and appointment based on political allegiances.
In other words, it is understood that more than 263,000 new members are either those appointed
by the AKP or that the civil servants who previously were not members of any union now prefer
to be members of the pro-government union.
Though the separation in Eğitim-Sen - the associate union of KESK for teachers - and the
subsequent formation of Eğitim-İş by a group of dissidents also played a role in KESK’s loss
of members, the more significant factor in this loss seems to be the advantageous appeal of
membership in Eğitim-Bir-Sen, which is an affiliate of the pro-government Memur-Sen.
Many of the teachers whom we interviewed reported that their co-workers, even the ones with
secular identities, have switched from Eğitim-İş to Eğitim-Bir-Sen so as to get a promotion or to
have a positive record.
A teacher we met in Eskişehir informed us that many of his co-workers who want to be
appointed from the county to the city center or to rise in their careers and become school
principals in the future, receive the ‘blunt’ suggestion to resign from Eğitim-İş and apply for
membership in Eğitim-Bir-Sen. “Sorry, I need to resign and switch to the other union, but I will
always be your friend and your ally,” they say to others.
58 See Resmi Gazete [Official Gazette] dated July 7, 2002 and July 5, 2008.
83
Moreover, the same teacher conveyed that the Odunpazarı and Tepebaşı neighborhoods of the
city were about to become boroughs. As the Directorate of Public Education has to be organized
in these new boroughs by appointing new chiefs and branch managers, “a few” friends of his
from Eğitim-Sen switched to Eğitim-Bir-Sen, hoping that the assignments might be in their favor.
He also added: “We used to have sixty or seventy members at the Directorate of Public Education
and nearly all of them have switched to Eğitim-Bir-Sen, so now we have only one member left at
the Directorate.”
A teacher in Aydın, a member of Eğitim-Sen, reported that one of his friends who wanted to be
appointed from the country side to the city center was called by the vice principal and received
such an offer: “If you switch to Eğitim-Bir-Sen, we will consider your appointment.”
A member of ADD in Malatya described the attitude of a fellow teacher in ADD who became an
Eğitim-Bir-Sen member just to benefit from its advantages of his membership as “contradictory”
and found it bizarre.
Yet, as mentioned above, we do not agree that the increase in the membership of Memur-Sen to
which Eğitim-Sen is affiliated can be only explained by that kind of switches between unions.
A teacher in Adapazarı informed that though there is no pressure for Eğitim-Bir-Sen membership,
when it comes to restitution and notification of their rights, they are put in a disadvantageous
position as members of Eğitim-İş which has been struggling against discrimination in
appointments.
Claiming that they are under extreme pressure, a teacher in Eskişehir was worried because
the commissioner who was going to decide his record grade was a member of Eğitim-Bir-Sen
and thought he would not get the ninety-point score he believed he was entitled to due to his
“secular identity”.
Another teacher we interviewed in Eskişehir reported that starting from the Directorate of
Public Education, the AKP government has been changing all of the executive staff and priority
is given to Eğitim-Bir-Sen members. He also mentioned that pro-government staff constantly
sends inspectors to the schools whose principals are Eğitim-Sen members, annoy “the ones
who do not belong to their group” with enquiries and repress them by “humiliation in front of
students and parents.”
For instance, a friend of his, a principal who is “a democrat and a seasoned educator”, was
“exiled” to the East, and another friend to some distant town of the Konya province. Even though
they managed to take their positions back at the end of legal struggles initiated by the union,
still the pro-government staff has been “trying hard to intimidate” their colleagues with secular
identity.
A teacher in Aydın, who criticized that he was still being put “on duty” (during break times or offschool hours) despite his twenty-three years of professional career, was believing that he was
being victimized because he was not an Eğitim-Bir-Sen member. He claimed that according to
the common practice, teachers with a career equal and above 20 years are not assigned to these
duties, and thus he was “almost punished” for being a member of Eğitim-İş. Moreover, he was
afraid that the school administration, which remained silent about teachers that arrived late to
their classes due to Friday prayer, could “cause him trouble” even if he was 10 minutes late for
class because he missed the bus.
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A teacher in Adapazarı reported that the repression is not unique to the teachers but is also
out there for the janitors. He recalled that once he witnessed a principal questioning a janitor,
asking “What are you doing in Eğitim-Sen?” The principal then forced this janitor to give a letter
of resignation from Eğitim-Sen.
A teacher in Konya informed that almost all of the school principals or vice-principals in that
region were teachers of religion, and that mescits [designated rooms for performing prayers]
had been opened at “all” high schools and “many” primary schools.
In the same city, a philosophy teacher argued that he has been banished continuously because
of his secular identity. Because he was relocated so frequently, we made a jocular remark: “You
are a bit difficult to get along with, then?” Upon this joke, he recounted an occasion that had
given him trouble with the school administration.
He saw the religion teacher of the school performing his ablution with his trouser legs rolled up
at the entrance of the school and a student pouring water over his feet with a ewer. The school
library was being closed at the times when the religion teacher was performing ritual prayers.
When he reacted against these practices, the religion teacher lodged a complaint about him for
“preventing his exercise of religion.”
A medical doctor in Aydın reported that co-workers who are against the AKP government policies
or who are members of unions of which the pro-AKP groups do not approve, have been banished
constantly to distant locations via rotational provisional duty assignments of a few weeks’
duration.
Stating that he is a leftist and is actively involved in the activities of leftist unions, a teacher
in Konya claimed that he instituted a lawsuit against the Directorate of National Education,
because, though his appointment to a school in the center had been approved, he was sent to
another place outside of Konya.
Another teacher we interviewed in Sivas stressed that there was a definite nepotism practiced
for “pro-government” people so that they were offered career opportunities such as being
promoted to the positions of commissioners and vice-principals. Arguing that people close to
the AKP circles and religious communities were treated with “positive discrimination”, he said:
“If even being an Eğitim-İş member has become a disadvantage, then this is definitely a form of
oppression, even if it is not by brute force.”
A teacher from the same city complained about “being subject to otherization” unless a “pro-AKP
attitude” is exhibited. An ADD member in Malatya told us that public servants are switching to
pro-government unions increasingly every day; otherwise their appointments and promotions
are suspended.
A public servant in Aydın reported that his superiors oppose him harshly because he reads
Cumhuriyet newspaper and that they claimed “Every penny spent on this paper returns to us as
bullets.”
In the previous section on the repression in Anatolian cities during Holy Ramadan, we
mentioned that lunch services were stopped in the schools, the universities and public offices,
and that there was even an inquiry about a teacher who had strolled through the school corridor
with a cup of tea in his hand as he was not fasting.
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Given the competition between the unions in Turkey, it is natural to have doubts about the
reliability of many of the above-mentioned examples as most of the stories are related to union
membership. However, we believe that these stories are not exaggerated or one-sided, because
both Eğitim-Sen and Eğitim-İş members we interviewed in several different cities repeatedly put
forward the same complaints.
Moreover, since being a pro-government union member is usually interpreted as an evidence of
having an “Islamic lifestyle” or supporting the AKP government, whereas it is well known that
Eğitim-İş is preferred by teachers with secular identities, explaining these complaints solely
with reference to inter-union competition seems to be quite insufficient.
In other words, what appears as unionist competition on the surface essentially looks as an
indicator of “Islamic-secular” polarization and the discrimination and oppression on local
level against citizens with secular identities encouraged by the local authorities of the current
government.
Certainly, one cannot claim that these pressures produce the same results everywhere. For
instance, a teacher, an Eğitim-İş member from Trabzon, informed us that kinship, friendship
and fellowship have been stronger than politics in his city. Oppression does not originate from
“neighborhood”, but political power, and it is rather difficult to banish a teacher from Trabzon,
as s/he always has a relative or two in the related institution. The other teachers in the meeting
room also agreed to this argument.
In terms of pressure, health industry workers had similar complaints as the teachers. On the
issue of nepotism, a doctor from the Eskişehir Chamber of Physicians, claimed that the “pro-AKP”
hospital administration was tolerant to those close to them and covered them up when they
don’t come to work, whereas the same administration called the doctors with secular identities
to account just because they are “five-ten minutes” late.
A health industry worker we interviewed in Sivas reported that at the hospital he worked people
with “two-three years of experience” could be appointed as managers or deputy managers, as
it was the case when someone with an “imam hatip high school [high school specialized in
religious education] background” appointed to the hospital by the Directorate of Religious
Affairs, was first assigned as a warehouse official and later was promoted to the position of
deputy manager of the hospital.
Another health industry worker we interviewed in the same city informed that contracted
employees with “two-three months of experience” were assigned as chief nurses and became
superiors to the nurses with “twenty to twenty-five years of experience” who indeed deserved
such promotions.
A doctor in Konya argued that “the ones going with the flow were the winners”; for instance,
a friend of his that uses alcohol suddenly started to attend daily prayer, whilst some other
colleagues began attending social meetings of the religious communities. He further stated that
these persons’ “deficits” were ignored by the administration, and since they were appointed as
clinic chiefs, they also were granted greater shares from the working capital.
A nurse from the Eskişehir Women’s Platform expressed that Sağlık-Sen, an affiliate of progovernment Memur-Sen, viewed the hospital she worked at as its “backyard”. Some of her
co-workers were promised to promote to “better positions” on the condition that they “dress
86
decently, behave decently, and become a member of Sağlık-Sen” and were faced with suggestions
like, “Don’t go to the rival union, even if you don’t become a member to ours”.
A public health industry worker in Sivas reported us there were people switching unions
because of the pressures in the hospitals. When they were asked the reason for this change, the
reply was: “If I hadn’t resigned from my union, they either would not approve my appointment
or they would not relocate me to a place I preferred. So I am not happy about this, but I have to
resign.” This worker also added that these types of complaints were more common among the
employees working in the provinces rather than the ones working in the city centers.
Another medical staff member in Sivas pointed out that being a member of Sağlık Emekçileri
Sendikası (Health Laborers’ Union-SES), an affiliate of the opposing union KESK, is
disadvantageous. Getting a position as a chief or a manager at any branch or being appointed
from the district to the center is not likely for the members of SES, which is regarded as an
adversary organization. He emphasized that having approximately 500 members in Sivas should
be considered as a success for SES.
Whilst one of his friends, who later became a member of SES, was considering membership,
she was warned that “it would not be good for her”. When she asked “Why not?”, she was
not threatened directly, but she was informed that SES members or employees who identify
themselves with a “leftist political identity” might have difficulties in relocating from the
districts to the center; i.e., if she were a midwife, she might be assigned to the districts from the
center or if she were a nurse, she might be assigned to busier departments. “They talk about it
quite openly when the milieu is convenient” her friend remarked.
In the hospital this interviewee worked, the personnel department chief sent Sağlık-Sen
membership forms with the drivers who went to the districts on duty. The staff manager also
called the village clinics and asked employees to fill out the forms.
He informed that since their contracts are to be renewed every year, the staff working in health
care clinics acted timidly due to the lack of “employment guarantee”, and eventually signed the
forms sent to them. He also said to us: “We are going to follow up on this because it is illegal,
a crime is being committed; the staff manager both threatens the employees and abuses his
authority.”
The lawyers we interviewed in Adapazarı and Trabzon brought up similar complaints. The bar
administrators in Adapazarı were also of the opinion that some of their colleagues who were
not close to the pro-government groups suffered injustices. A lawyer in Adapazarı claimed that
all the lawyers employed at the public offices were “pro-AKP” and that the lawyers with leftist
identities were subject to discrimination.
Another lawyer who was a member of the Trabzon Bar Association argued that most of the bar
administrators had “İmam Hatip backgrounds.” Furthermore, he stressed that even in an “elite”
place like the bar association, “religious feelings have become more important than professional
ethics” and most of the official cases were being delivered to the pro-government law firms
whose religious inclination is well-known.
Additionally, he claimed that these people earned “trillions of liras” from the cases of large
public enterprises they take en masse, Noticing this income, young lawyers “turned into AKP
87
supporters” and in an effort to get their share from these cases, they took part in the bar
administration.
He also argued that if a new lawyer wanted to take cases in Trabzon, he had to be seen together
with “the bar administrators with religious school backgrounds” and made the following
remark: “Even the general public supports this situation; as they expect that pro-AKP lawyers
can have an influence on judges and prosecutors, they give their cases to these lawyers.”
We were also informed that advantages are provided to the “veiled female civil servants” in the
public offices administered by pro-government union members. It was claimed that the number
of veiled employees has increased in hospitals, schools and city halls.
A female teacher in Denizli reported that there was a teacher in her school coming work wearing
headscarf; she was threatened by the husband of that teacher because once she warned her
about the veil. She also claimed that if the teachers took a stand in favor of compliance to the
dress code, they were “punished” by the school administrators who had been appointed by the
government.
For instance, a teacher from an Eğitim-İş in Eskişehir mentioned that she reported the students
attending the open high school examinations while their hair was covered; as a result, instead
of “being appreciated for acting lawfully,” she was sent to “exile” to a pre-school class far away.
A teacher from Eğitim-Sen in Malatya stated that the students, as well as them, were affected
from the problems concerning dressing. She claimed that in the books approved by the Board
of Education and Discipline, there were sections that encouraged violence against the girls
wearing miniskirts and “wearing the headscarf was promoted” also. She added that these kinds
of practices gave rise to an environment of conflict in schools.
A teacher in Kayseri recalled that some teachers cautioned female students against wearing
short-sleeved shirts and, as a result, the parents complained about these teachers.
Another teacher in Denizli told us that once the Zaman newspaper published an article related
to a female colleague of hers. Later, abusive sentences were written on the school walls about
the same teacher. The student who took the blame stated that “he was influenced by the Zaman
newspaper”. They requested from the district prosecution office to open up an investigation; but
the prosecutor called her to his office and advised her to persuade her friend to withdraw her
complaint.
An engineer in Aydın argued that the education in schools was influencing students and causing
a polarization on religious issues among them. He also told us that he and his son liked to
read physics books together and discuss; however his wife warned him: “Do not talk with the
children on these subjects, because then they have trouble at school.”
His wife’s warning turned out to be right as they once called him from school and when he went
there, he found his son crying. His son, who was attending a private school, shared his views
about the nature publicly and was manhandled by a couple of his schoolmates as a result.
Among the things we heard from the teachers with secular identities, what concerned us most
was stories about the attitudes of some teachers in schools. A high school student in Sultanbeyli,
İstanbul, reported us that some of his teachers are talking about seculars and people with
different identities in a prejudiced way.
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For example, his history teacher was mostly lecturing about Sunni Islam instead of historical
events and when he was talking about the conquest of İstanbul, he was calling Christians
“idiots” and “morons”.
The same teacher told his students that “unveiled women resembled dogs”, pointing out that
these women’s head was open just like dogs. According to him, “God did not grant the gift of
reason to dogs, but although he had granted it to humans, these women do not know how to use
it.”
He defined seculars as “materialists”, as people who would say, ‘I haven’t seen Allah so I don’t
believe in Him’; furthermore he labeled them as “communists” that are “attempting to defend
themselves with the pictures of Atatürk.”
Taking courage from these words, a student suggested calling unveiled women “cows” and
another one viewed seculars as “godless and faithless.”
His biology teacher told them that the people involved in the Sivas Madımak Hotel pogrom were
completing their sentence in jail, but the people who died there “paid the consequences of their
actions” by being burned.
Once he secretly recorded his teacher‘s speech in class, but his mother later deleted the
recording because she feared “that he might get into trouble”. It was obvious that he was also
concerned. He did not let us know the name of the school he was attending.
Another young man who was a student at Erzurum Atatürk University sent us a message with an
alias and informed us that the deputy principal of the school where he was training was calling
Alevis “devils, separatists and atheists”.
An Alevi woman in Erzurum stressed that her children at high school complained about teachers
who were talking against Alevis during class. She even provided us of the names of the schools
her children were attending.59
On one occasion when her son’s history teacher was speaking against Alevis, her son could not
keep silent any further and let the teacher know he was an Alevi and that Alevis were not at all
the people that the teacher described. The teacher then asked him if they performed ablution
and if they fasted. All the other students in the class were encouraged by the teacher and agreed
with him by summing up the conversation: “Alevis are like that, teacher.”
Her daughter interfered once when the same teacher said “Alevism is perversion” during class.
The following day the mother went to school to talk to the teacher. She said to the teacher:
“Teacher, you know Erzurum, you know how they look at Alevis in Erzurum, and you are an
educator. So, do you think it is proper for a teacher to talk like this?” The issue was closed with
an apology from the teacher.
An Alevi in Denizli mentioned that many Alevi families warned their children not to disclose
their identities at school. Those children even fasted during Ramadan for this reason. He
reported that the child of one of his friends was beaten by his teacher of religion because he
59 Because we were not able to prove the claims against these schools, we are not revealing their names here.
89
didn’t know his prayers by heart. Moreover, “in order to humiliate them in front of everyone”,
the teachers called the Alevi kids particularly to perform prayers in class.
A businessman from Malatya stated that a friend’s daughter had psychological problems
because she was repeatedly required to perform the prayer ritual on the classroom desks. A
local journalist in Malatya reported us that, right after the missionaries were murdered in 2007,
he heard from a friend’s daughter that her history teacher told the students in his classroom,
“People who do not accept the Islamic religion would be massacred like this”.
Though we are not quite sure if it is about fasting or about Alevism, the story we listened from a
young boy in one of these cities60 we visited was probably the most disturbing one we heard in
Anatolia. This youngster was unemployed. He worked in constructions only on the days he was
able to “curry favor” with the subcontractors. His life had changed abruptly after an argument
with his teacher at the university.
One day in the classroom his teacher called him because he had objected to his examination
score. As soon as he came closer, the teacher, while pushing him, realized that he had smoked
before class and therefore not fasting, He shouted: “Get away! You forced me to touch you. My
fast is spoiled now.” As the argument continued, the student was unable to restrain himself and
struck at the teacher. They both submitted petitions of complaint, but the case was smoothed
over by mediators. However, the young man had to drop out of the university.
A teacher we interviewed in Batman reminded us that the city was the center of the radical
Islamist group Hizbullah. He mentioned that many students who were involved in that radical
movement ten years ago are now working as teachers. He claimed that these teachers have been
encouraging the female students to cover their hair by comments like, “Good girl, you will be a
decent adult”; as a result female students in their classes began wearing headscarves.
A teacher in Konya reported that the school administrations are provoking situations that
reflect a so-called need to open mescits, and unless there was opposition to it, they would
immediately make this practice widespread.
An Alevi we talked to in Sultanbeyli, İstanbul, mentioned that commissioners such as the
principals and the deputy principals at the nearby schools were “entirely pro-government
people” and that his son was subject to bad treatment of his teachers who knew he is an Alevi.
The prejudice of the teachers against Alevis was also reflected to their grades and therefore
many students tried to hide that they are Alevis.
A teacher from Eğitim-Sen in Malatya reported that some of his colleagues greet their classes
with “Selamün aleyküm.” and the Alevi students in those classes objected to this greeting by
saying: “Teacher isn’t it better to say ‘good morning’ when you enter the class? How will you
react if we behave ideologically and reply to you, ‘Greetings, Comrade’ when you greet us with
‘Selamünaleyküm’.”
Furthermore, though it is not a part of the curriculum, by referring to the interpretations of
Muhammed’s hadiths (sayings), these teachers were explaining that in old times Alevis also
used veil so as to convince the Alevi students to cover their hair. He also claimed that the
students were given copies of the Quran.
60 We refrain from mentioning the name of the city in order not to disclose the narrator’s identity.
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A young female teacher in Batman conveyed us that when she was an intern, an inspector
visiting the course told the teacher candidates that men and women are not equal. When she
objected to this claim, the inspector explained that he was not against women’s education and
working, but he believed that there had to be rules about it.
She asked what these rules were. He advised her that women should be educated only in schools
for girls, they should get degrees in fields like gynecology where they would serve only other
women, they should work at institutions only for women and even the transportation should
be separate for men and women. This inspector was subsequently appointed as the Director of
Education in another city.
This young teacher claimed that there are teachers whom she described as “cemaatçi” –members
of a religious community -- who do not shake hands with women. Last year an instruction was
given to female teachers to wear white coats. When she asked the reason for this instruction,
she was told that the male students and teachers could get aroused because the female teachers
were wearing tight trousers.
She then told the administration that “she” also could get aroused, since the male teachers were
also wearing tight trousers. This incident was confirmed by all the teachers in the meeting
room. Because the instruction was directed to women only, all the teachers objected and none of
the female teachers followed the instruction.
An Eğitim-Sen member teacher in Adapazarı reported that an organization called the Sapanca
Education, Culture and Solidarity Association held a competition on “writing a letter to our Holy
Prophet Mohammed.” with the aim of “directing students during their learning years towards
specific issues” and the competition announcement was delivered to the schools by a directive
stating that compositions should be “delivered by hand to the Association” under the authorized
signature of the Director of the District Board of Public Education. 61
These stories seem to approve the argument that the AKP pursues a policy of cadre-ization
in public institutions by both key executives and local public officials it appoints. Whenever
the issue of cadres is reflected to the party’s senior management, they validate it with
pronouncements that it is only natural to appoint people who share their views and with whom
they can work at ease.
This practice which is also common in western democracies can be understood up to a point.
However, if the claims that this practice covers all bureaucratic cadres as a whole and most
of the executive appointed to hospitals and schools and other public offices are either party
members or pro-AKP people is true, then the situation violates the principle of merit and
democratic norms.
This situation which can also be observed in the single-party regimes of both the past and the
present targets the extensification of the leading single party’s ideology through state power.
In this regard, although there is not a single-party regime in Turkey, the fact that the AKP
government pursues a policy of partisanship for cadres, combined with the activities of
religious communities that we are going to explain below, seem to pave the way for the more
61 We have been given a copy of this official correspondence.
91
conservative point of view promulgated by these religious community members and partisans
to get established throughout the society.
Especially, the ideas of some teachers in the education system cited above, along with their
negative attitudes toward other identities, create particular concerns that their students may
not learn to respect multiculturalism and liberal thinking, which are the major features of
today’s democracies.
2. INTERVENTION IN LIFESTYLES
ALCHOLIC BEVERAGES AND THE VENUES SERVING ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES
According to a survey conducted in 1999, 66% of the people living in Turkey confirmed that
a person would be accepted as a Muslim if he believed in Allah and the Prophet, even if he
consumed alcohol. Excluding the 7% of the respondents who did not have an idea or refused to
answer the question, 27% answered negatively.62
Throughout the cities we visited in Anatolia, venues serving alcoholic beverages were either
located remote from the cities or non-existent. The ones that were in the city had been given
instructions by the municipalities to relocate outside the cities. The only exceptions were
touristic hotels.
We were told that even in İstanbul, in the Sultanbeyli area, there was neither a cocktail bar
nor a restaurant serving alcoholic beverages. Among the complaints we heard was that the
municipalities did not approve liquor licenses anymore. All the liquor shops working currently
had had their licenses before and new applications were all declined.
As a matter of fact, according to the international retail measurement company Nielsen’s data
covering a period between 2005 and the first quarter of 2008, with the exception of supermarkets,
there was a 3,9% decrease in the number of small liquor shops and grocery stores.63
In many of those cities we were told that social life had formerly been much more colorful and
that there had been decent places where families enjoyed a drink or two, located, they said, at
the fairgrounds and public parks. As well as public places such as the Teachers’ Clubs and the
State Railways Clubs, alcoholic beverages were served also at wedding celebrations and official
ceremonies and was sold over-the-counter.
Whenever the issue of liquor prohibition comes up, it has been related to oppression and
authoritativeness or has faced public opposition. The best-known example from our history
is the Murat IV era of Ottoman rule, which is remembered only for this prohibition even in
the memories of children. In U.S. history the years between 1920 and 1933 are known as the
“prohibition era” and recalled as period of repression during which the liquor prohibition was
implemented.
In our recent history, liquor prohibition first came to the fore with the Prohibition of Intoxicants
Law (Men-i Müskirat Kanunu) that was adopted by the First Assembly in 1920. It was annulled
in 1926, three years after the proclamation of the Republic. The debates on the act, tie votes and
62 Ali Çarkoğlu and Binnaz Toprak, Türkiye’de Din, Toplum ve Siyaset, İstanbul, TESEV, 2000.
63 Milliyet, October 21, 2008.
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approval only after the Assembly President’s tie-breaking vote prove that, even in the 1920s,
there was a considerable opposition to the prohibition of liquor.64
We would like to emphasize here that we do not agree with opinions that the ‘prohibition’ by
AKP municipalities in some locations has been blown out of proportion, or that prohibition is
being kept on the agenda just for criticizing the government, or that consumption should be
controlled because alcohol is hazardous to human health; and we wish to make it clear that we
see the prohibition of alcohol as an element of social pressure.
Lifestyle interventions of this kind no longer have a place in modern societies. Examples of this
in today’s world are mainly experienced in Islamic states. From this perspective, worries of
the secular segment about the implementation of liquor prohibition, enforced by parties with
religious sensitivities such as the RP and the AKP, is inevitable.
We think that the liquor prohibition has aggravated existing concerns about the gradual
Islamization of Turkish society and triggers worries about the possible imposition of other
bans. Furthermore, it reinforces conservatism and prejudice and hinders the creation of liberal
environments needed to transform the life in Anatolia.
We believe that this prohibition blocks the formation of a colorful public life that assures the
participation of both women and man; that is, it hinders the type of urban transformation we
addressed in the previous section when we addressed the position of women in Anatolia.
At the same time, such a ban exhibits intolerance to both individual freedoms and different
lifestyles, identifies the venues serving alcoholic beverages with violence and intoxication,
prevents the development of awareness on the rules of good manners in public drinking, and
provokes public reaction against the people who drink alcohol.
We think that the AKP government’s support to this prohibition contradicts with its opposition
against interventions to life styles, especially on the case of “headscarf/turban” problem.
The people we interviewed in Erzurum reported that there was only one restaurant in the
entire city which served alcoholic beverages and it was closed during Ramadan; furthermore
municipal officials declined liquor license applications saying, “We know you and we know you
would never do something wrong, but these types of things are unacceptable here.” Many people
informed us that when men wanted to drink, they did it in their cars, parked on the road to the
ski center that was located outside the city.
Indeed, on the way to our hotel we saw people drinking in their cars parked along the road. The
people who believed that Erzurum was gradually becoming more conservative stated that many
educated people of Erzurum have moved to other cities, and social life in Erzurum has become
“colorless” compared to thirty or forty years ago. They mentioned that though in the 1970s
there had been four or five music halls or restaurants serving alcohol, where people could have
enjoyed dinner and listened to performers singing türkü, nowadays these types of places could
rarely be found.
The only restaurant serving liquor in Kayseri was almost outside the city borders. When we
visited that restaurant, we saw that there were no women among the customers. In Kayseri, at
64 See Onur Karahanoğulları, Birinci Meclisin İçki Yasağı: Men-i Müskirat Kanunu, Ankara, Phoenix, 2008, 89-90.
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a türkü bar, to which students usually go at nights, male and female university students, while
enjoying the music, were drinking tea. The owner of the türkü bar had applied for a liquor
license several times, but had been declined repeatedly. He was advised to open a venue at a
location outside the city.
A youngster we interviewed at this türkü evi told us that he and his parents used to live in a
garden house in which they organized banquets with alcohol for twenty or twenty-five people
among whom there were governors and the police commissioners of the time. He also mentioned
to us: “At that time manners were much more refined, but things began to degenerate; when we
were in that garden, we thought that everywhere else was like our place.”
An executive of a local TV network in Kayseri informed us that in the past balls were organized
at the Sümerbank’s workers club as well as the social facilities of the “Şeker” (Sugar) and
“Tayyare (Airplane)” factories. Moreover, there were movie theatres for summer and both men
and women could attend the restaurant with alcohol inside the City Club. There were other
similar restaurants as well. A worker we interviewed in the Alevi neighborhood reported that
even drinking alcohol inside the cars was prohibited; yet in the past people could drink publicly
in the parks.
Informing us that in the city there is “no place where youngsters could go and enjoy a drink or
two, no bars, no coffee shops”, a female academic in Kayseri stated that even she would hesitate
to buy alcoholic beverages from the grocery store as the bottle inside the nylon bag could be
noticed. She also asserted that there were a few places serving alcoholic beverages, but none of
them were appropriate for women; therefore, “when they wanted to enjoy themselves, they went
to Cappadocia or Ürgüp”.
According to another teacher in the same city, when men want to have fun and drink alcohol,
they go to İstanbul for debauchery. A female student conveyed that her elder brother once was
invited to a “night gathering for the people of Kayseri” during a visit to İstanbul. He attended
the party with a friend of his, thinking that nobody will bring his spouse: however he was very
surprised when he saw people enjoying the evening as couples and “modern” ladies “with lowcut dresses and make-up”.
A lawyer in Trabzon informed that, whilst in the past liquor had been usually served at
receptions, recently even the people who actually consume alcohol refrain from drinking it and
he added: “There is so much pressure surrounding this issue and because it is related to their
careers, men are under greater pressure than women.”
A commissioner from the CHP Trabzon provincial directorate claimed that many people they
know well have changed dramatically over the course of the AKP’s administration. For instance,
he asserted, men have impelled their wives to cover their hair and people who used to drink at
the gatherings don’t do this nowadays. Once, they were invited to a dinner party held by the
Bar Association whose administration is pro-AKP. He attended it with his wife, who is a retired
teacher. AKP district representative arrived without his spouse. Though the invitation was for
couples, the businessmen also came without their spouses.
He related to us: “The dinner service began. I saw fruit juice, fruit juice, fruit juice everywhere.
I ordered raki. Although I am not much of a drinker myself, it was just as a reaction to this
situation.” The businessman sitting next to him was an acquaintance. Since he was a “modern”
man, it was impossible for that fellow to be an AKP supporter; but rumor had it that he might be
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the next AKP provincial chairman. Our interviewee asked him why his wife had not attended
the dinner and learned from the response that his wife went to umrah. When he asked the
businessman why he did not drink alcohol, the businessman told him that he was on antibiotics.
Our interviewee concluded the story by saying, “You see the extent of the pressure.”
In Konya, amidst exclamations of “May God make you believe this”, the owner of a 45 years old
restaurant with alcohol at the fairground of the municipality reported us that his restaurant’s
entrance door was lined up by two policemen who were asking identification from the
customers and this went on for three months; eventually the municipality pulled down his
restaurant. But he persisted and opened another restaurant with alcohol by the Ministry of
Culture and Tourism’s permission for which he justified his case via the fact that there are many
tourists visiting Konya.
A teacher we interviewed there confirmed the anecdote of the restaurant owner and informed
us that the night clubs once located at the fairground were all being taken down and relocated
outside the city. He mentioned that “it was not possible for people to reach the new location by
public transportation”, so there were almost no places left to have a drink within the city.
Another teacher in Konya reported that a decision was made to move alcohol serving
restaurants to the intercity bus station outside the city; however, this time the mayor of this
district objected to this decision and said in a television broadcast, “Those places should be
moved from here as well”.
Pointing out that they are “people who use alcohol”, a businessman in Konya stated that they
“wanted to go to a place where they could drink alcohol every now and then”; but there was no
other place except the university’s restaurant and the Mountaineers’ Club and the municipality
“would make all the effort” in order to prevent the opening of restaurants with alcohol. “We have
difficulties around the issue of alcoholic beverages” commented he.
A doctor from Konya, whom we interviewed in his office, told us that the physicians working
in the city were “divided” on this issue; for example, they did not attend the reception held on
March 14th, the Annual Celebration of Medicine, because alcoholic beverages were not served;
and instead they attended the activities organized at a touristic hotel together with other
friends who also don’t have religious lifestyles.
Drinking alcohol was prohibited in the Konya Teachers’ Club as well. The teacher advised us that
he struggled to get the ban lifted, but the Konya Director of Public Education said to him: “I will
not let people talk about me as the man who allows drinking alcohol in the Teachers’ Club.”
All the people we interviewed reported that the news at the local and national media about the
negative reactions of the people of Konya against places with alcohol are not reflecting the
truth and claimed that such news are manipulated.
Actually, we also witnessed this manipulation. On the day that we arrived in the city, 3 April
2008, a local newspaper named Yeni Konya, known for its closeness to the religious communities,
was published with the headline, “Beware! Cartel Media in the City”, and claimed that “three
media outlets were coming to the city in order to make distorted news reports about the
malignant venues serving alcoholic drinks”.
The same article also asserted that “these three media outlets were going to launch a negative
campaign using the concept of ‘neighborhood pressure on venues with alcohol” and added:
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“Notwithstanding the public’s opposition to these places, mass media’s protectionist attitude
towards venues with alcohol is noteworthy.” We thought that the article, which also pointed
us out as targets, intentionally gave incorrect information regarding both the identities of the
researchers and the aim of the research. The article itself was an example of “neighborhood
pressure” in Konya.
Alcoholic beverages were not served in the most luxurious hotel in Sivas. The only venue serving
alcoholic beverages was the deluxe restaurant on the roof of the Chamber of Industry; The
Chamber’s President, thanks to his strong personality, had managed to keep it open.
However, a teacher we interviewed pointed out that since it was not possible for everyone to
afford the Chamber of Industry’s restaurant, the only place they could go was the university’s
guest house. Though drinking alcohol in parked cars on the streets of the (primarily Alevi) Ali
Baba neighborhood had been banned, this prohibition was somehow constantly flouted and
people who wanted to enjoy a few drinks went to the Ali Baba neighborhood and drink secretly
in their cars.
The Denizli municipality decided to relocate such venues outside the city limits to the tannery
district. Claiming that it was impossible to open restaurants in that area because of the
unpleasant smell, the restaurant owners objected; but it did not work.
A female teacher we interviewed in Denizli informed us that she was threatened on the phone
because she criticized the municipality’s instruction to relocate the restaurants and also
because she exposed the distribution of some books “encouraging the students to Jihad and
eulogizing suicide commandos”. Her son answered one of those phone calls in which they said,
“We will chop your mother’s head off.” She was interrogated about these calls at the Anti-Terror
Department and Common Detention Facility two times.
An academic we interviewed in Denizli commented that it was contradictory to ban venues
serving alcoholic beverages in Pamukkale on the one hand and to try every possible way to
attract tourists to the city on the other. An Alevi woman in Denizli pointed out that she and her
friends frequently went to a restaurant with alcohol; however, a few says ago when she went
there with her husband, they saw the sign “without alcohol” on the restaurant’s door.
In the same city a female teacher told us that the Teachers’ Club had previously served beer,
but had stopped doing so. A businessman mentioned that in the past liquor had been served at
official meetings attended by the governors or ministers from Ankara; lately the only beverage
served was orange juice.
As the prohibition had not yet entered into force at the time we visited the city, alcohol could be
consumed at a café where we were invited for a poetry reading accompanied by saz performers.
The prohibition of alcohol was also brought to agenda in Balıkesir. A commissioner at
the Chamber of Commerce reported us that there were five restaurants serving alcoholic
beverages in Atatürk Park, but all had been shut down with the excuse of the restructuring
and improvement of the park area. The Mayor had once promised them he would not institute
prohibition. When he was asked why the places serving alcohol were being shut down, he gave a
reply that no one believed: “The owner turned the restaurant into one without alcohol.”
At that time there was only one café and one tea-garden left. They informed that there were
two restaurants serving alcohol in a district called Çamlık; however they had heard that the
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Çamlık area was also going to be restructured. They remarked: “People doing business with
the municipality or the government do not want to be seen in such public places; to entertain
themselves, they go to places where no one can see them.”
In Adapazarı, apart from the upper floor of one of the two Teachers’ Clubs, a venue to enjoy
a drink with your family or friends could only be found in Sapanca. Or, as it was noted by an
Adapazarı Eğitim-İş delegate, who is also a teacher, “on the balcony of one’s home.” The same
teacher also mentioned, “When you consume alcohol in public places, you feel the stares”; and
added: “This is the Malaysia inside us.”
“Before the eighties, when you dropped into any restaurant and asked for a plate of beans and a
small bottle of rakı, you could find it [alcohol] everywhere”, recounted a local newspaper owner
in Adapazarı. An administrator at the Foundation for the Support of Women’s Work Adapazarı
branch related: “In the old days, woman-to-woman, we could go to a restaurant and drink our
beer at lunch.” A tradesman in Adapazarı thought that it had become more difficult to drink
alcohol in Adapazarı in the last ten years.
An officer from the Malatya ADD narrated that they also invited the state officials in their city
to the receptions with alcohol they organized, but whereas in the old times the waiters had been
circulating the glasses on trays, now they now set up a table for serving drinks in a separate
room. Some of the guests were shocked and left immediately as soon as they saw there was
alcohol. He also pointed out that lately venues serving alcoholic beverages were forced either to
stop selling alcohol or to close the venue.
The mayor of Malatya was not hosting any events serving alcohol. A student in Malatya
mentioned that “the upper echelons” were not approving liquor license applications even
though there was no public demand for the closure of venues with alcohol. Alcoholic beverages
were served in a türkü bar in Malatya frequented by young people. An Alevi businessman in
Malatya told us that there were three or four restaurants serving alcohol where he could go with
his wife, but in general this was not welcomed in Malatya.
An official of the Malatya CHP Provincial Directorate remarked that “the city is one of the most
underdeveloped cities of Turkey from the social aspect”, and added: “For instance, places serving
alcohol are outside the city.” Clubs with alcohol had been relocated out of town by the decision
of the municipality.
When we asked a businessman in Malatya if they served alcohol at the Association of Malatya
Contractors, he acknowledged: “If we do such a thing, nobody will attend our events; none of the
administrators will come.” He confirmed that there were restaurants with alcohol in the town,
but it was “definitely over” for the officials to go to such places. “If these government officials
see that alcohol is served in a restaurant, they will leave the place, one by one.”
The same observation was confirmed by an NGO representative in Sivas as well. He informed
that among the bureaucrats in Sivas, whom he knew well, even those who drank in their daily
lives stayed away from alcohol at official receptions.
A teacher from Eğitim-Sen claimed that alcohol had been served at the Malatya Teachers’ Club
during the administration of the previous manager; however, after the AKP came into power,
the manager was removed and the new one banned alcoholic beverages. Considering the exmanager, he also heard people say, “That man turned the Malatya Teachers’ Club into a tavern.”
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A single young woman in Malatya, who works in the media, said that it was not possible in
Malatya to go out with friends and enjoy a few drinks afterhours. She complained that, when
they wanted to celebrate birthdays with friends, they could not find a place where “they could
dance and wear themselves out”; and even if they went to that kind of places by chance, “they
were obliged to behave according to the people sitting nearby”.
She also mentioned that there was the problem of “décolleté”. When she first came to the city
from İstanbul, she went with her friends to a restaurant with drinks which was open. She
narrated that, when their executive found about it, he reacted to them: “What were you doing
there? Couldn’t you find another place to eat?”
The manager also told her: “There are men sitting at the table next to you drinking and they
probably think you are there to get in their cars and go off with them.” She thought that this
sentence “had to be the crudest viewpoint made about a single woman.”
There was no liquor prohibition implemented by the DTP municipality in Batman. However,
though formerly there had been three or four restaurants serving alcohol, recently the only
place left was a hotel in the city. They narrated that “Islamists” had attacked the places serving
alcohol, and in the past, Hezbollah bombed one of them; moreover they had received threats.
Due to fear, they had been closed one by one.
Nevertheless, the mayor from the DTP seemed very determined to erase that fear. He invited
us to join him at the opening reception of a restaurant serving alcohol that was located on the
main street of the city.
A young female teacher told us that they had stopped serving drinks at the Teachers’ Club.
She claimed that they couldn’t buy alcohol from the liquor store because they were followed
and “marked”. The only store where they could purchase alcoholic beverages was Migros (a
supermarket chain). She also commented: “Here, it is just like Konya. People are doing it under
the counter.”
There were many restaurants, cafes and bistros serving drinks in Eskişehir. However, it was
argued that the AKP-governed municipalities of Tepebaşı and Odunpazarı were making it
difficult to obtain liquor licenses. A member of Eskişehir Women’s Initiative told us that the
police were immediately fining drivers who stopped to drink in their cars at Şahintepesi, a
hilltop overlooking the city.
An executive from Eskişehir ADD informed us that the number of publicly owned places with
alcohol were decreasing; for example, at the State Railways Club, there used to be “stunning
receptions, events and wedding parties”, but “as to his knowledge” first they stopped serving
alcohol and then they were closed for good. A female Eğitim-İş member mentioned that she used
to have beer in the Teachers’ Club garden, but the sale of alcoholic beverages there and in its
pastry shop was banned after the AKP came into power.
It seemed like in Aydın there were no problems concerning alcohol. A teacher we interviewed
in Aydın reported us that women could go to restaurants serving liquor with their spouses. A
commissioner in the CHP Provincial Directorate informed that in Aydın the venues serving
alcohol were kept open even during the holy month of Ramadan and no one opposed this.
On the other hand, we heard a “the other side of the bridge tale” in almost every city we visited.
For instance, in Kayseri, the other side of the bridge was the Boğazköprü and Cappadocia
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regions. These had become the only places where families could escape from Kayseri on Sundays.
The women got rid of their headscarves after they “crossed the bridge” and they enjoyed dinner
with their families in restaurants with alcohol on the other side.
A women’s association member in Kayseri reported us that even women with headscarves in
Kayseri uncovered their heads when they went to Nevşehir and danced at discos. A female
academic from Erciyes University confirmed this observation as well. She once witnessed
a veiled woman on the bus who uncovered her head as soon as they crossed the bridge.
Businessmen and tradesmen from Kayseri talked to us about their ranches and farmhouses
which they went on weekends. They expressed that, without their spouses, they drank alcohol
while watching the performance of a “çengi” (belly dancer) in those places.
A taxi driver told us a memory of his own on the subject. His wife had gone to Mersin with one
of her neighbors in Kayseri to visit her relatives. When he and the neighbor’s husband went to
Mersin to pick up their wives, her relatives invited them to dinner with alcohol on the balcony of
their house. He noticed that his neighbor went inside whenever he wanted to take a sip from his
glass.
The driver became curious and asked him the reason. The husband acknowledged that he was
afraid to be seen accidentally by some other person from Kayseri who might be passing by. He
was pursued by the pressure of Kayseri even in Mersin.
In Konya, the name for “the other side of the bridge” was “Makas”. A female public official
we interviewed in Konya told us that once they rented a bus to drive them to Ankara for the
annual assembly of the union of which she was a member. Most of the attendees belonged to
the conservative segment. All the passengers slept on the bus until they crossed the spot called
Makas on the Konya-Ankara highway, and just after that they all woke up and started to dance
inside the bus. In Ankara, after the annual assembly, “they danced till morning and drank
alcohol”. The next day they “kept singing and dancing” till their bus arrived to Makas, but as
soon as they entered “Konya territory”, all of the passengers started to sleep again. “It was a
very interesting experience,” she remarked.
“The other side of the bridge” in Malatya was Mersin. A student and a member of the Malatya
ADD, informed us that most of the wealthy tradesmen in Malatya had a vacation house in
Mersin and went there for the weekends to enjoy themselves without being gossiped about.
“The other side of the bridge” in Denizli was the touristic coast of Izmir or other Aegean summer
spots. It was the same for Balıkesir. For Adapazarı it was Sapanca. “The other side of the bridge”
in Erzurum was the cars parked on either side of Kayak Yolu, the road to the ski center. In Sivas
it was the cars parked on the streets of the Ali Baba neighborhood.
The conservatism in those cities or the prohibition recently enforced by municipalities also
seemed to bring along with it a peculiar hypocrisy. As a businesswoman in Kayseri put it,
“everybody is curious about each others’ lives.”
Somehow people were forced to act secretly, not because they thought drinking alcohol was a
sin, but because it had become an unapproved behavior.
Drinking was being pushed out of the public sphere far more than before. This made drinking
places less than decent and in fact many places serving alcoholic beverages were indeed
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transformed into taverns where solitary and drunken men were to be found. Because of this,
these venues had begun to attract the reaction of the general public.
A young academic we interviewed in Sivas was able to explain this vicious cycle very well: “For
the people who go to Ankara from Sivas, Sakarya Street is like a utopia. You go there, sit in
public places, watch the traffic and sip your rakı.” And he added, “If you do the same thing here,
be sure that other men will learn something from your decent way of consuming alcohol, from
your drinking and eating habits. This is how people become socialized.”
Indeed, the alcohol ban of the AKP municipalities seems to obstruct the major feature of the
modern city, i.e., “socialization” within the public sphere.
3. ENFORCED CHANGE OF WORKING HOURS: “CUMA (HOLY FRIDAY)”
You frequently have highly urgent matters related to patients’ lives. Then you find
out that the person in charge has gone to the mosque to perform the Friday prayer.
Of course the head physician of the hospital is there in the mosque as well. When all
the administrators are there to perform prayers, undoubtedly the others would like
to be seen at prayer themselves. For example, suddenly you need a critical medicine;
you search for it but cannot find because the department responsible for supplying
it is closed; they are at the prayer. Friday prayer has become even more important
than human life.
- A female physician in Eskişehir
In addition to the tense atmosphere in Anatolian cities during the holy month of Ramadan, we
have been informed that taking part in the Friday prayers also has also become a new type of
pressure. Even the greetings have changed and it has become obligatory to shut down stores
during the Friday prayer and greet each other with, “Selamünaleyküm” (Peace be with you) and
“May Friday bring you good fortune”. We were also told that changes in public office hours had
become noticeable.
What we most frequently heard was that public offices, schools and hospitals were not working
during the Friday prayer hours, that employees felt obliged to perform Friday prayers at the
mosque because their superiors were doing so, and that those who did not attend to the payers
were faced with insistence and pressure.
A member of the media, who has been working as a journalist in Balıkesir for quite a long time,
reported us that the senior bureaucrats’ interest in the Friday prayers had increased and their
wives had started to cover their heads as well. A teacher in Balıkesir, who he had been working
with in the same high school since 1992, remarked that although participation in the Friday
prayer had not previously been considered an issue, recently there were attempts to portray
failure to attend the Friday prayer as a “deficiency”.
A public official we interviewed at the Malatya ADD claimed that all the public offices were
closed during the Friday prayer hours. A teacher in Batman narrated us that the teachers and
students at his school were so “comfortable” that they performed prayers together in the school
laboratory. They even kept their “mini prayer rugs” in the laboratory and used it as their mescit
[place of worship].
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An academic in Balıkesir complained about how his junior colleagues kept silent when the
administration transformed laboratories and administrative rooms into mescits and their
lessons’ durations were modified in accordance with the Friday prayer by the deans of the
faculties who regularly participated in these prayers. Due to his senior position, he had the
chance to discuss these matters with the administration, but the junior academics were
reluctant to criticize because of their concerns about the future of their careers.
A teacher in Eskişehir told us that most of the other teachers “queued up” to go to the mosque
as the principals and the deputy principals at their schools were going to perform the Friday
prayer and many classes scheduled at noon time on Fridays could not be done. “You could never
imagine who would go for the prayers. Even the people you thought ‘Oh, no! It’s impossible to see
him in the mosque’, go to the Friday prayer,” remarked he.
On the other hand, a female teacher from the same city told us that they had been informed
only once of the “Friday issue”. They were told that the principal and the deputy principal left
the janitor in charge of the school and went to the Friday prayer. But because this was never
officially documented, no further action was taken. She did mention that such events were not
frequently experienced in Eskişehir.
A doctor, a member of the Eskişehir Chamber of Physicians, reported that many doctors went to
perform the Friday prayers although “their genuine feelings were not necessarily supportive
of this behavior,”; mainly because mescits had been opened in the hospital and since the
administrators attended the prayers, the junior staff felt the need to demonstrate their loyalty
to their superiors and be seen as “following the order”. He complained that sometimes the Friday
prayer was performed all together with employees, patients and visitors in the corridors of the
state hospital.
A teacher in Konya expressed that he could understand to an extent why the classes would be
delayed for Friday prayers at the Imam Hatip (religious) high schools. However, he said that,
even in the most distinguished high schools of the city, they could not find any students to
attend the classes during the Friday prayers. A high school student in Adapazarı reported that
the teachers gave permission to students who were going to perform the Friday prayers.
A delegate from Eğitim-İş in Denizli stated that the book titled, Dinin Direği Namaz (Keystone
of Religion: the Prayer) which was prepared by Namaz Gönüllüleri Platformu (The Prayer
Volunteers Initiative) was being distributed at a boarding primary school. Eğitim-İş Denizli
Branch gave us a copy of their official publication in which they had made citations from this
book which was “neither recommended by the Ministry of Public Education nor supervised by
the Board of Education and Discipline.”
Some of the remarks in that book is as follows: “Avoiding to perform prayer is not one evil, but
thousands of evils.”; “God will not bless those who don’t perform prayers.”; “Chechen fighters
continued their prayers while they were being bombed, proof that performing prayer would
make a soul richer than ever so that he could sacrifice his life in the name of Allah as the
Chechen fighters did. Thus we should live a life centered on the mosque.”
A teacher in Malatya reported us that in some of the schools there was a “special arrangement”
related to the holy prayer of Friday. For instance, Friday morning classes needed to be
rescheduled to suit the prayer hours. When they questioned the school principals about that
practice, their replies were; “What can I do if the student is going to the mosque?”
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Furthermore, he pointed out that most teachers were going to prayers on Fridays and the
students would follow them to the mosque because they had chosen them as their role models.
He related: “I did not see it with my own eyes, but for instance I heard that the teacher’s training
school was empty on Friday prayer times and all the students were taken to the mosque”.
One Friday, a businessman from Malatya needed to send a document to the governor’s office for
his signature, but the person whom he gave this job told him: “Sir, there would be no one there
during these hours.”
A teacher in Batman said that the students spent free hours on their own during the Friday noon
classes because there were no teachers attending these. Once he talked to the principal about it
and discovered that he also had complaints. The principal said that he had warned the teachers
several times, but they said, “Go ahead and keep a record; you will see that it won’t work.” “To
whom should I address the record? To whom should I send the record?” reflected the principal.
A teacher in Adapazarı said that no administrator in his school ever said “no” to the students
going to the mosques for the Friday prayer; they only advised the students “to ask permission
from their teachers” so that the responsibility was “pinned” on the teachers. “They bring
you face to face with the students; I mean if you do not permit, then they will say ‘the
administration allowed, but the teacher did not’” he stated to us.
He pointed out that what he cared in fact was not the students going to-coming back from
Friday prayer; but it was not possible for him to understand how these youngsters were driven
away from the education they got and were “drawn together and reshaped”.
He reflected: “These are not individual actions; they do not decide to go to Friday prayer or
“cover their hair” with an individual faith in religion. These are children who are encouraged
and convinced; this is what I think. These children are generally different up until their senior
year, but, for example, they suddenly begin using headscarves. I do not know if this is related to
the dershane they are attending or to the new relationships they form. This situation should be
investigated deeply.”
The public officials also complained about co-worker pressure and the insistence on attending
Friday prayer. An Alevi teacher in Kayseri whom we interviewed at the Pir Sultan Abdal
Association told us that although he informed his colleagues several times that he did not
perform prayers, every time they insistently invited him to the mosque on Friday.
Another Alevi teacher complained about how a friend of his, who knew he did not perform
prayers, was insistent on inviting him to the prayer every Friday. Only after the teacher gave a
“harsh response” did his friend stop insisting.
A teacher working at the Konya Imam Hatip high school told us that losing the faith and not
going to the Friday prayer meant almost the same thing to his co-workers. For a long time they
constantly invited him to go to the Friday prayer together but he always declined. Thereupon,
he thought, “they set the students on him” so as to force him to surrender.
The students came along and insisted him, saying “Come on teacher, we are going to the
mosque”. After a time, he reacted very strongly to the students as well. Eventually his colleagues
said to him: “Why are you insisting that much? Why don’t you at least come with us to the
Friday prayer for once? What is wrong with it? All right, you may think differently, but you can
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compromise once. Why don’t you come while so many people do, or are you an Alevi?” He replied:
“Yes, I am.”
A female teacher in Konya stated that every Friday she received “holy Friday” text messages. An
Alevi philosophy teacher in the same city complained about the students who were texting him
hundreds of “Holy Friday” messages. A teacher in Trabzon told us that his students pushed him
too much to go to the Friday prayer, but he didn’t think that the students were “guided”.
In most of the cities we visited, one of the common incidents related was that apart from
the large supermarkets, most of the stores are closed for Friday prayer and taking down the
shutter have become obligatory even if a shopkeeper do not perform the prayer. Moreover, as
we mentioned in the Alevi section before, in many cities Alevis are forced to attend the prayers.
Whereas some of the Alevi shopkeepers and tradesmen go to perform the prayer due to the fear
of losing customers, others go because of the insistence of their foremen or co-workers.
An Alevi merchant in Kayseri informed us that many “centrally located” shops owned by Alevi
shopkeepers were also obliged to take down the shutters during the Friday prayer. A member
of Kayseri ADD, who mentioned that it was a must for the merchants to go to the Friday prayer,
also reflected: “This attitude is not sincere at all; even those who don’t go to prayer do not show
themselves in public in order to pretend that they are at the prayer.” An Alevi worker in the same
city reported that there were buses arranged to take all the workers from the factories to the
prayer service, and those who preferred not to go to prayer were being told, “Why don’t you go to
Friday? Are you an infidel? You will lose your faith!”
Another worker expressed that a bus was arranged at their factory on Fridays to take them to
the mosque. He remarked: “You have to go; otherwise you would attract attention.” A teacher,
who informed that all the stores in Kayseri city center were closed for the Friday prayer and,
indeed, no shops were being kept open during the prayer hours, also commented: “Perhaps not
all of them close their shops to go to prayer, but because the shop next door is closed, the others
need to close as well.”
A doctor we interviewed in Konya said that the pharmacists preferred “not being seen in public”
even if they did not go to the prayer. They used to make their assistants keep the shop open
during their absence, but now they didn’t dare even to do this and took down the shutters.
A person we interviewed in Malatya said that the offices were closed during the Friday prayer,
and the merchants complained about it by claiming that “they close down because they were
obliged to”. A shopkeeper in Sivas told us that the merchants were going to prayer on Fridays in
“crowds” and remarked: “They don’t do it because they are pure Muslims or because of they are
religious; they just do it to show off.”
For instance, he said, no shops were kept open in the “small-industry complex” during the Friday
prayers, but the only reason for that was the “pressure of the one next door”. He reported that
all the bureaucrats in Sivas went to the Yenişehir Mosque for the Friday prayer and due to the
“enormously” increased number of cars around the mosque, they experienced traffic jams there
every Friday.
A local politician we interviewed at the Sivas CHP Provincial Directorate stated: “The interesting
thing is that some of the people that take down the shutters and go voted for CHP in the
elections. You see a friend, who even worked for the party actively before, takes down the
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shutter and goes to the Teachers’ Club to play cards.” An Alevi woman in Denizli told us that her
husband closed the window shades in his office during the Friday prayer hours and told the
others to say “He is at the prayer”, if someone asks.
Even the words of greeting have changed. In most of the cities we visited, people reported that
“Selamünaleyküm” has become almost obligatory. Nearly all the people we interviewed pointed
out this change. We will only mention two of them below.
A university student in Adapazarı informed us that the greeting had been switched to
“Selamünaleyküm” although it was previously “merhaba (hello)” or “günaydın (good morning)” or
“iyi akşamlar (good evening).”
“There must be something wrong if even the teachers greet you with ‘Selamünaleyküm’ when
they enter the class. Whoever enters says, ‘Selamünaleyküm’, and if you don’t reply with,
‘Aleykümselam’, they stare you in such a way that it is as if they say “Ok, we noted this down”
with their eyes,” related he to us.
A businessman in Malatya reported us that everybody has started to use “Selamünaleyküm”
instead of “merhaba” or “günaydın”, and that this has became habitual, especially widespread
in business life; furthermore even those known as social democrats have started to say
“Selamünaleyküm.”
He commented: “Selamünaleyküm” is ultimately a lifestyle. The trendiest greeting of the last
two years, ‘May Friday brings you good fortune’ is a life style.”
4. A NEWLY INVENTED EVENT: THE HOLY BIRTH WEEK
The descriptions of the old religious feast days and Ramadan now remain only in memories and
in books, and this is an indication of how rapidly these traditions are subject to change.
Religious feasts in large metropolises like İstanbul are not celebrated like it was done in the
old happy days when people got together with their families, gave candies and handkerchief
as presents to children that came to kiss the hands of the elderly, bought new outfit for the
children including everything from ribbons to shoes, helped the poor, and reconciled with the
estranged; now they are defined as days when people escape from the city for vacation.
Instead of making these old traditions enliven again, the solution that the AKP officials who
give importance to Islamic sensitivities have found is a recently invented event which seems to
imitate the Christmas day heralding the birth of Jesus and celebrated by no one except primary
school students that feel “obliged to” celebrate it because their teachers and principals place
such emphasis on it: The Holy Birth Week.
The teachers we interviewed stressed their complaints about this new event. We also believe
that celebrating Holy Birth Week or religious feasts like Kurban Bayramı (Feast of Sacrifice)
and Şeker Bayramı (Feast of Ramadan)65 in schools, which has not been the practice until recent
times, is a violation of the principles of secular education.
65 The familiar name in urban areas for the Feast of Ramadan is Şeker Bayramı in Turkish. In the past few years AKP senior
officials particularly, who pay special attention to the use of IsIamic language, have imposed the widespread use of the
expression Ramazan (Ramadan)Bayramı instead of Şeker Bayramı. With such policies, it is easy to understand that the
changes in expressions and attitudes are not happening by themselves.
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For example, in the United States of America, during the successive terms of Reagan and George
Bush, the efforts to legalize morning prayers at primary schools were dismissed by the Supreme
Court a and even the proposal that included a one minute silence everyday for students to
perform their daily prayer according to their religion was concluded in the same way.
A teacher and a member of the Malatya Eğitim-Sen told us that when the District Directorate
of National Education and schools were instructed about the Holy Birth Week celebrations,
the union chairman of Eğitim-Sen personally negotiated with the National Education
Undersecretary in order to take these celebrations out of the schools; yet, he could not get any
results.
“This practice, this ideological attitude has been continuing” said he. Another teacher from
the same city confirmed this information and said that they had lodged a complaint with the
district administrator regarding the celebration of Holy Birth Week in schools because it is not
an official holiday. The district administration replied that they were not informed on the issue,
but would investigate it; however he did not take any precautions.
An Eğitim-Sen member teacher in Adapazarı reported us that a competition announcement
bearing the authorized signature of the District Board of Public Education Director had been
delivered to the primary schools in Sapanca. The subject of the announcement was the Holy
Birth Week and a copy66 of the related communication with the Sapanca Education, Culture and
Solidarity Association was attached. The competition was on “writing a letter or a poem to our
Holy Prophet Mohammed” and the participants were to have their essays hand-delivered to the
association.
A teacher working in a district of Batman stated that the school administrations paid a special
attention to the Holy Birth Week activities that coincided with the week of April 23 Children’s
Fest. The students were given extracurricular religious books and furthermore, the winners of
the essay competitions were even awarded gold coins.
The principal had read one of the essays that won a prize in the competition and noticed
sentences like, “I would like to throw stones to the houses of those who do not perform the
Morning Prayer.” He then called the president of the commission who had organized the
competition and asked him if he had read the paper the student had written. The president of
the commission admitted that they had not read the essay and they just awarded the prize to
this student “because his parents were acquaintances and they did not want the prize to be won
by someone they didn’t know”.
A female teacher in Denizli, who is also a member of Eğitim-İş, told us that one of her co-workers
who opposed the Holy Birth Week celebration was called by the principal who whispered to her:
“Look, I will give you some information that you can report.” When her co-worker asked “What
information?” , he acknowledged: “Go and tell your union that all the mosques are giving calls to
prayer.”
A teacher in Balıkesir, who told us that he had worked in a village in Balıkesir province for ten
years, narrated that in the old days on every national holiday all of the villagers came to the
66 A copy of this announcement was given to us, as well.
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school to watch the student performance in plays they put on. He claimed that the celebration of
national holidays had been supplanted by Holy Birth Week.
Some teachers reported that there were other days like the Holy Birth Week that had begun to be
celebrated as well. A teacher, who is a member of the Eğitim-İş union in Trabzon, recounted that
once he saw some pictures of Afghanistan and Iran on the walls of the school where he worked.
When he asked why these pictures “resembling a Sharia country” were hung on the walls, he
was acknowledged that they were on the wall because of the “Mevlana Week.”
We also heard that any sort of activity was used as an excuse to bring religious topics
forward. For example, an ADD member public official in Aydın informed us that a fictional
commemoration named “Forest Martyrs’ Day” had been invented during which Quran is being
read in the public offices.
5. EDUCATION, BUSINESS LIFE, AND THE FETHULLAH GÜLEN COMMUNITY:
When we first initiated our field surveys, our aim was not to conduct research on Islamic
communities in Turkey. In our very first stop, the people we interviewed in Erzurum talked
about the activities of the Fethullah Gülen community when we asked them if they were
repressed due to their identities.
At the beginning, what they talked about seemed awkward to us and we could not understand
its relation with our research topic, i.e., social pressure. We thought the reason why we crossed
paths with the community at that stage of our research was because Fethullah Gülen was from
Erzurum.
However, as we visited other cities, though we never directed a specific question on this issue,
almost everywhere people talked about the activities of the Fethullah Gülen community and its
impact on the society. What we realized towards the end of our survey was that the Fethullah
Gülen community had come and found us everywhere, although we had not searched for it.
Among the students, businessmen, merchants and housewives we interviewed, we did not
meet a single person who had not experienced some type of contact with the Fethullah Gülen
community at least once. We were informed about the “Işık Evleri (Houses of Light)” by students
who had stayed in them. We heard anecdotes about the people called “Ağabey (Elder Brother)”
and “Abla (Elder Sister)”. We met businessmen and merchants who attended the “Perşembe
Oturmaları (Thursday Meetings)” that were widespread in Anatolian cities and housewives who
went to the meetings of the “Hoca Hanım (Lady Teacher)”.
What we learned made it necessary for us to launch an individual chapter on the Fethullah
Gülen community, although it was not a part of the original aim of our research.
One cannot claim that this community, actively involved in the education and business life in
many cities, applies some sort of explicit pressure. Many people we interviewed mentioned that
neither joining nor leaving the community, or taking part in its activities was based on pressure.
Most of the students who had formerly stayed in the community houses or had been contacted
by the community were not of the opinion that they were forced towards the Islamic way of
life by the community. It is apparent that starting to perform prayers, reading religious books,
deciding on covering their hair (for female students) and other activities of this kind is rather
initiated by suggestion.
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On the other hand, we deduced that flirting with the opposite sex, bringing home friends of
the opposite sex, watching TV channels other than Islamic ones, listening to music, going out
at night, (for male students) wearing jeans and having long hair and a beard, and (for female
students) wearing trousers of any kind seemed to be out of the question.
We were also reported that the students, who attended preparatory courses for the university
entrance examination at the dershanes that are owned by the community were accompanied
from the city where they lived to the university they would attend, were lodged in the
community houses at no charge or for a very low rent, were given scholarships, were assisted
in marrying with another member of the community, received assistance for finding jobs
after graduation, and were offered jobs with higher wages as a way to keep them within the
community.
It was also claimed that, compared to members of the community, non-members were faced with
disadvantages and exclusion in business life and difficulties in terms of living conditions, and
the volume of their business diminished.
This exclusion included a range of practices including like nullifying of contracts, failure to be
awarded public tender, loss of customers, and, if they are in the publication business, decline in
advertisements.
From this perspective, one can claim that, even though there is no pressure for joining the
community, abstaining from doing it has a price. Besides, the people we interviewed did not
agree to the argument that the community does not use repression. On the contrary, they
believed that they were faced with an “implicit” pressure.
Throughout the interviews we conducted, it was obvious that there was a connection between
being a community member and having advantages in terms of living conditions such as
finding jobs in an environment with high unemployment, having financial means for education
beyond the limits that families can afford, extending the business, increasing the sales, getting
support via advertisements and so on.
Declining to be a member of the community meant exclusion and falling behind in competition.
The only exception was the long-established family-owned businesses that had no financial
connection to the government.
Apart from the Fethullah Gülen community, we were also informed of another community called
“Süleymancılar” also operative in some other cities. But this community, which was mostly
organized via Quran courses and student dormitories, had a limited effectiveness compared to
the Fethullah Gülen community. Given the prevalence of its activities and influence over society,
in this section we will only focus on the Fethullah Gülen community.
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An Alternative Model to the Social State: Community Dershanes and “Işık Evleri”
When I was in high school, there were two private preparatory schools in the city. I
attended the dershane run by the community members. As soon as it was announced
that I was admitted to the university in Trabzon, dershane administrators called me
and said, “We are going to accompany you to the University and assist you in your
registration.” We came to Trabzon with a teacher from the dershane. We were seven
people in the car. There were others who were admitted to different universities at the
Black Sea region. The teacher put me in the hands of someone in Trabzon. They rented
me a house and I moved there.
A student we interviewed at Karadeniz Technical University
The citation above points out to important problems within the education system in Turkey. We
think the alternative that the Fethullah Gülen community has developed within the system
of education is a product of the inefficient state policies in this area. It is also clear that the
demand for the community schools, the community dershanes and the dormitories originated
from families’ lack of financial means.
It is evident that the community has directed its activities in the field of education particularly
towards clever and hardworking students of poor families. We believe that the power the
community in the area of education is the result of public policies’ failure in providing an equal
opportunity to everyone.
It is understood that the community has taken advantage of the inadequacy of large-scale social
policies as an opportunity to attract the lower classes and to extend its power.
When one analyzes the publications regarding the work of the Fethullah Gülen community in
the field of education at home and abroad, you see that the general opinion is that the private
dershanes and the schools belonging to the community are primarily successful in the areas of
science and mathematics.67
The community had started it activities in education after 1980. In Turkey, the number of
community dershanes and schools, that were only a few in the early 1980s, increased to a total
of 300 of which half were operating as dershanes and the other half as schools in the year 1999.
Apart from the dershanes and the schools that belong to the community, there are also many
dormitories.
In the educational institutions run by the community that had begun conducting educational
activities abroad in the early 1990s, 26,500 students were being educated at more than 250
schools in 50 countries by the year 1997.68
67 See Berna Turam, Between Islam and the State: The Politics of Engagement, Stanford University Press, 2007 for the most
recent and the most detailed study on the overseas schools of the Gülen Community. Another publication detailing the
other aspects of the community as well as it activities in the field of education is M. Hakan Yavuz and John L. Esposito
(ed.), Turkish Islam and The Secular State: The Gülen Movement, Syracuse University Press, 2003. For media coverage on this
subject in Turkey, see Mustafa Armağan and Ali Ünal (ed.) Medya Aynasında Fethullah Gülen: Kozadan Kelebeğe, İstanbul,
Gazeteciler ve Yazarlar Vakfı, 1999
68 Bekim Agai, “The Gülen Movement’s Islamic Ethic of Education”, in Yavuz and Espisito, pp. 48-68; Thomas Mitchel, “Fethullah
Gülen as Educator”, in Yavuz and Espesito, pp. 69-84; Elizabeth Özdalga, “Following in the Footsteps of Fethullah Gülen”, in
Yavuz and Espetiso, pp. 85-114.
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In the Anatolian cities where we conducted the survey, we met many students who had been
educated in dershanes, “Işık Evleri” and dorms that belong to the Fethullah Gülen community.
As a teacher in Eskişehir pointed out that the exam pressure sustained throughout the all stages
of Turkish education system steers children coming from financially limited families to the
Ağabeys and Ablas, who give free private lessons in the Işık Evleri that belong to the community.
For example, a teacher of “secular identity” working in Denizli stated that all three of her sister’s
children were staying in community houses because of financial restrictions.
In addition to the financial problems, these houses seemed to be also preferred by the families
for safety reasons. A teacher we interviewed in Eskişehir informed us that even the wealthy
families were sending their children to Işık Evleri for various reasons such as to make them
“learn their religion” and to “stop fooling around”.
A teacher in Kayseri explained that families were not opposing these houses because in addition
to being assisted in their studies, their daughters were also taught to perform prayer and read
the Quran there.
A teacher in Batman pointed out that the assistance in providing a residence plays a major
role on the decision to send the students to the community’s houses, especially in the case of
students coming from rural areas. The family of a student from a village in the Kozluk district
sent their son to the community’s dormitory in Batman because they thought the education
facilities in Batman were better than those in Kozluk.
It was also reported that the students who were sent to the community’s houses and schools
were chosen from among the bright and hardworking children.
For example, a teacher we interviewed in Konya told us that one of his friends working as
a public official had to accept the scholarship offered by an executive from a community’s
dershane to his son who had been successful at the pilot test. Although his friend was a “person
distant from the community, he was obliged” to accept the offer because of his low salary.
A teacher in Erzurum talked about the insistence she faced to send his child, who was at the
second grade and had achieved a high score in mathematics in the placement test, to the
community’s school. He claimed that his son’s examination ID was their home telephone number
and that they did not keep the promise that this could be changed upon complaint. Instead, they
persistently continued to call him and even visited him at his workplace when he declined their
offer. He also added that they were never interested in students that are not successful in those
examinations.
The teachers we interviewed pointed out that the students staying at community’s houses had
difficulties in adapting to school. A teacher in Aydın said that one of his successful students
suddenly lost his enthusiasm for the lectures and became sleepy and absent-minded, as if “he
was wandering in the world of spirits”.
The teacher also said that when he asked the student the reason, his student (who was a sixth
grader) complained about being awakened early in the mornings to perform his prayers, after
which he was made to read the books of Said-i Nursi until it was time for school. The teacher
also talked with the student’s parents; however, though the family was wealthy, they refused to
take their son from this dormitory because the students were also made to study hard there.
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A teacher we interviewed in Batman recounted that one of his students who came from a village
was very active in class during the first week, replied to all the questions immediately and
raised his hand all the time; but after the second week, the student started to look sleepy during
the lessons. When the teacher asked him “Where are you staying, son?”, he learned that the
student was staying at a dormitory of the community. There was no other place for the students
in Batman to stay.
“The child gets up as early as four-thirty a.m., he performs his prayer, and then he studies Arabic.
Of course, there is no time left for him to study his lessons,” commented he. His grades had
become significantly lower. He also conveyed that the student, who told him that “he did not
want to stay there anymore”, wanted to “be freed” from the dormitory. “But”, the teacher said,
“he has no other options and the state does not provide one for him either.”
He reported that the community “seized” the sixth and seventh grade students as soon as they
arrived from their villages.
A teacher in Kayseri mentioned that the community members even made plans for the future
of some of the children whom they assisted in studying for examinations. One of his bright
students who liked to read was receiving assistance in a community dershane to prepare for the
OKS (Secondary School Entrance Exam).
After some time, some members of the community informed the student’s father that they would
like to take him out of the course and support him with private lessons for the Military School
Entrance Exam. The father called the teacher and after, reflecting on the situation, he finally he
made his son stop going to this dershane.
A teacher in Malatya was informed in detail about daily activities there from one of his students
who was attending a community dershane. They had to be present at the dershane just in time.
The students were separated into groups and they first studied mathematics, science, and
subjects from the general primary education curriculum. Then they had a one-hour free time
during which they read religious books. Noon and evening prayers were performed by the
students in the dershane building. They performed the prayers all together and the Ağabey led
the prayers as their imam.
We also were informed that “superstitious beliefs” that are not related to scientific truth were
imposed on the students who stayed in the dorms and studied at the community dershanes.
For example, a teacher in Aydın once noticed one of his students wrote prayers on her exam
paper. When he asked the reason for this, the student acknowledged that at the community
dershane she was attending, she was advised to write this particular prayer on her exam paper
in order to remember what she had learned.
A teacher in Adapazarı heard from his students who were studying with Ağabeys that the battle
of Çanakkale (the Dardanelles) had been won with the help of the holy graves. He couldn’t stop
himself and asked: “So why do think the holy graves that helped in Çanakkale didn’t help in
Sarıkamış?” He said to us: “We are not taking it too far because there’s no point in entering an
argument.”
A high school student in Adapazarı once visited one of the community’s houses because a friend
of his had asked him insistently to do so “just once”. In his words, the house, “where the Ağabeys
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and Ablas of Fethullah Gülen were staying”, were full of Fethullah Gülen’s books and other
religious publications. There was a box in the corner into which everyone put prayers they had
written on a piece of paper. The student told us that writing the prayer and putting it in the box
was “obligatory”, so he also wrote the prayer with the hope of “passing the OKS Exam.”
The Gülen community was brought to our attention by high school teachers as well; they also
talked about the community dershanes and houses with their Ablas and Ağabeys.
The high school teachers we spoke to claimed that the female students who had not been
veiled until the tenth grade started to use headscarves in their senior years after attending the
meetings in these houses. In particular, some of the senior students visited these houses and
some even stayed there even though their families resided in the same city. Among other things
we frequently heard was that there were many Işık Evi in every city.
The teachers claimed that some of the students who were sent to the community houses
internalized the community’s opinions so deeply that they even became alienated from their
own families. A teacher in Eskişehir mentioned that the families who had voluntarily sent their
children to the community houses became strangers to their children in two-three years’ time.
These families claimed that “their own children had become their enemies”.
A businessman from Malatya remarked: “We have a really big problem now.” He said that his
nephew was a student in a state high school. One day his sister asked him, “My child goes to the
Ağabeys house – who are these Ağabeys”?” This was the first time he had ever heard of Ağabeys.
Coincidentally, on the same day, his brother-in-law, a teacher at a religious high school in
Adıyaman, arrived. When they brought the issue forward, he asked: “Are there Ablas and
Ağabeys here too?” He told them that they were highly active in Adıyaman. He spoke to his
nephew “face-to-face”. “The child is finished; he has been completely brainwashed,” commented
he to us.
It is clear that both community members and students staying in the dormitories try hard to
get other students to attend the community dershanes and stay in these dorms. For example, a
university student in Sivas explained us: “Even if you tell them that you are a strict leftist but
you still want to stay in a community house, no one objects.”
A high school student in Adapazarı went to a community house for the first time upon the
insistent request of one of his friends. The next day, when her friend offered to make another
visit, he declined. The Ağabeys at the house kept sending him messages and offered assistance
for OKS preparations. As he rejected all their offers, in the end they “let him go”
A university student in Trabzon told us that his girlfriend tried an interesting method to get rid
of such offers. The student members of “the community” kept insisting on inviting her to their
meetings. But they were doing it “in such a gracious way” that she couldn’t respond to them
unkindly though they were boring.
She finally could not resist their requests and attended meetings once or twice. In the end she
bought a necklace with a cross-shaped pendant. In order to “be free of them”, she told them that
she had accepted Christianity and requested them to leave her alone. But this time they became
even more insistent because they wanted to “win her back”.
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A young female university student in Kayseri was in the library for the university entrance
exam when she heard the call to prayer. She left the library for the mosque to perform the
prayer and when she returned, she found a note in her book reading, “I know that you went to
the mosque. I would like to help you.” The person who wrote the note was a university student
sitting next to her.
This student told her that she could help her with her lessons. The first thing she noticed in the
house she visited was the religious publications. She took a look at the books and asked her, “Are
you Nurcu [a member of the community of ‘Light’]?” The other girl replied, “No,” and asked about
“her point of view.” And the student said, “I’m Ülkücü [ultra-nationalist].” Still, she suggested
helping her with her examination once again. The student then let her know that she smoked,
but this still did not alienate her; she acknowledged her that she could smoke on the balcony.
The student visited the house where the other girl was staying a few times, but later stopped.
“She taught very well,” she said to us. “Their aim was to make me a member of the group while
helping me with my exam. That’s their aim; first they would say, ‘Look, this is a good book,’
and then they would hand me the book to read; after that they would ask me to attend their
meetings, and then to stay in their house. And suddenly they would start to exaggerate religion
and to impose the performance of a particular prayer.”
Throughout the cities we visited for the survey, we were also frequently informed on the
relations between university students and the Fethullah Gülen community. There was not
a single student who was not familiar with the name of the community. Nearly all of them
knew a student or two who was a member of the community, even if they themselves were
not connected directly. Some of them had attended the community dershanes during the
preparation period for the university entrance exam and the remainder had become acquainted
with community members at university.
Some of those we interviewed had even stayed in these dormitories. We heard interesting stories
about the internal order in these houses. In these houses, run separately for male and female
students, Ablas and Ağabeys provided a comfortable environment for the students. They had
meals regularly and they were assisted in their lessons. But they were also prompted during the
religious discussions held after dinner to perform prayers, to fast and in case of female students,
to cover their hair.
The young student at Karadeniz Technical University in Trabzon, whose words we quoted above,
told us that he was unable to remain at the community house for long after he had been taken
to Trabzon by his dershane teacher from the town where he had attended high school.
He was told that he had to perform prayers and read the Quran in the community where he was
staying. He rebelled and said to them: “If I wanted to perform the prayer, I would do that myself.
Why do you force me to do it?” Sometimes when he sang in Kurdish, they tried to stop him. He
could not get along well with the other residents of the house. Therefore he moved to another
house of the community.
He reported us that not only that there were university students, who were either seniors or
graduates of the university, in charge of the community houses in Trabzon; but there was also
someone “in charge of the students in charge”. When a problem emerged, those persons would
move students to another house.
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He had already changed five different houses. He was forced to subscribe to Zaman newspaper
and Sızıntı magazine in other houses too. He was being questioned about whether he had
performed his noon prayer when he went to the university. Students were only permitted to
watch the television broadcasts of a particular television station, namely Samanyolu,
Every day at a given time he was questioned about whether he had read the books of Said-i Nursi
and the other religious publications he had been given. He opposed to them: “It is none of your
business. If I wanted to read it, I would.” They told him “not to speak Kurdish”, but he kept doing it.
Once, there was an argument in the house because some other residents had insulted the Kurds.
He was complained to the higher ranked members of the community. “I would like to leave,” he
would say, but they “did not let him go.” Each time he was relocated to another house and was
convinced to stay there. Eventually, he left the community housing.
Another student we interviewed did his best to “save” one of his friends from these dormitories.
Finally he managed to convince him, but he returned when the dormitory administration
offered his friend a job with a high salary.
The recount of a student who came to Balıkesir from an eastern city was almost the same: “You
come from a distant city; you might have difficulties during registration because you have
neither seen nor experienced university life before, and you don’t know how to register. It’s a
different state of mind. You feel as if you found a shelter.”
When he first came to Balıkesir, he stayed at a community house for two months. “They work
in a very organized way. They have dershanes in my home town. And when we come here, the
dershane there puts us in contact with them directly. This is the way the system works,” he
related.
He himself had studied at the community’s dershanes. His teacher at the dershane contacted the
dormitory administration in Balıkesir when he was admitted to Balıkesir University.
They met him at the bus station, asked whether he smoked or not, and questioned if his family
was conservative and religious. He told them that he was not close to the community, but that
his father had forced him to attend the community’s dershane. He mentioned: “They worked on
me a lot and tried to convert me, but they couldn’t.” He was not staying at the community house
anymore.
A student in Adapazarı met an Ağabey who was staying at the community dormitory when
he first arrived in the city. He was anxious because he had not experienced the university
environment before, and that Ağabey took good care of him.
He was impressed from the help of an unfamiliar person and thought, “what a good person he
is.” Even his mother called this Ağabey a “good person.” After a month the Ağabey invited him
and some of his friends to play football. They started playing football every week.
On one occasion this Ağabey invited them for tea to the house where he was staying. First they
drank tea, and then the “conversation” started. They first told them, “Our prophet had had four
wives, you see, that is normal”, and then asked everyone to “make their points”.
He and his friends were surprised at first, but then they understood what was “happening”. At
that time it became apparent to them that the place was a community house. They understood
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that they were “using football to convince them to join the community”. He said to us, “We
looked over these things immaturely at those times”.
A female student in Kayseri listed the rules of the Işık Evleri where she had stayed for a while as
follows: “You should not have a boyfriend; you have to be at home by 6 pm; you have to teach the
high school students between 6 pm and 10 pm. You are still a ‘rookie’ in your sophomore year;
in your junior year you become Abla and start to teach those in their freshmen and sophomore
years. In your senior year you will be replaced by the juniors.”
As it is understood from the description of this girl, the most important rule for female students
in the community group is having no boyfriend.
A student in Erzurum visited the community houses once or twice but had not stayed there. One
of her close friends became “rebellious”. This friend of hers needed to be in the community house
by 5 pm every evening. They would not let her smoke. She had begun to oppose these sorts of
restrictions, and eventually had an argument with the Ablas in the dormitory related to the
smoking issue.
During the exam period, she would pick up her friend from the dormitory to drive her home in
order to study together. The Ablas in the community dormitory where her friend was staying
noticed that she was being picked up every morning and asked her if that was her boyfriend’s
car, and accused her of going to her boyfriend’s house. She was unable to convince them no
matter what she said and was finally expelled from the dormitory.
It seems like even the male students were having their share of the rules applied to female
students staying in the community’s dorms. They mentioned frequently that it was never
acceptable to flirt with a member of the opposite sex.
A young boy studying in Balıkesir mentioned that there were many restrictions in the
community’s houses, such as listening to music and having a girlfriend. He informed us that
there was a system made up of many rules about music, lifestyle, clothing, social relations, etc.,
in the dorms.
For example, the students could not wear jeans. He said “They dislike jeans; you cannot wear
tight, skinny jeans.” Also, they were not allowed to wear shorts or tracksuits when younger
students, whom they were helping with their religion and other lessons, were around.
When the junior students were around, the Ağabeys needed to “smarten themselves up” and had
to fit into the community’s required “type and mold”; i.e., they had to wear fabric trousers and
shave. There were many arguments about growing a beard; beards and long hair were forbidden.
Hours for entering and leaving the community houses were fixed. If a student were to be late, he
had to inform the Ağabey “in charge” or the “preacher” of his excuse.
They were not allowed to have girlfriends. They were allowed to talk to the girls at school;
however, the visits of both girlfriends and female relatives were forbidden. If they were seen
holding hands with a girl, they would be warned immediately.
A close friend of a student studying in Malatya had left the community’s house and moved to the
university’s dormitory. She had watched a movie without informing the Abla and when she was
caught, she was scolded. They could only watch the news on television and listen to hymns.
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Her friend was not allowed to wear trousers while she was staying in the community’s house.
She bought a pair of trousers as soon as she left the house. However her family could not afford
the university’s dormitory, so she had to go back to the community’s house where she began to
use headscarf again the day she returned.
When she stayed at the university dormitory, she was following a television serial. When they
first met after she moved back, the first thing she asked was what happened in this serial.
It was also said that marriages among community members were encouraged, although
friendships between members of the opposite sex were not allowed. Marriages of these kinds
were being arranged through a method called, “opening a notebook”.
A female student studying in Sivas told us that the male and the female students staying
in different community houses could marry one other if they wanted to. To arrange these
marriages, these notebooks contained the photos of the male students along with their personal
information. She told us that the girl would be introduced to the candidate whose photograph
she had chosen.
In addition to this opportunity of marriage provided to the students, it is apparent that there
are other advantages of being in touch with the community. The students are given scholarships
throughout their education and offered jobs as soon as they graduate. In return, they begin to
make donations to the community when they start to earn a living.
A student from Sivas Cumhuriyet University drew our attention to this issue as well. The
students who stayed in the community houses would then be employed in the offices belonging
to community members and start to make monthly donations from a specified amount of their
salaries to the community.
Another reason for staying in the community houses was that these houses were affordable. A
female student in Malatya complained that her landlord requested rent increases steadily for
the past five years. “That’s why,” she said “staying in the community’s houses is affordable.” The
houses were rented to Ablas and Ağabeys were even cheaper.
We were also informed that religious rituals in groups were performed in some of the
community houses. A statement announcing these days was hung on the door of the community
house. A female student in Malatya attended one of these meetings on a Kandil Day (an Islamic
holy day). The house was consisting of a living-room, where the meeting was held, and an
another room. Not every visitor was admitted to the other room; they were reading the Quran,
the books of Said-i Nursi and other religious books and listening to hymns there.
According to the information provided by the students, there is not a serious repression and
coercion to perform the religious rituals.
A university student in Sivas said that he had faced no pressure in the community houses he
stayed or visited. They only said, “We will perform prayers in the other room. You are welcome if
you would like to join us.” They could perform ablutions and pray if they wanted to. He was one
of the persons who did not participate.
They even ignored smoking, although it was not particularly approved. Because the residents
were not allowed to go out at night, Ağabeys would deliberately send the smokers to the nearby
fountains “to bring drinking water” home. Telling them, “Go son and bring us some drinking
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water” also had the concealed meaning, “Go out and smoke, then come back home”. He told
us that he thought the community’s houses were much more comfortable than the university
dorms.
Yet the words of a student in Sivas proved that there was serious perseverance even if no
pressure was applied to perform the prayer. He “hung around” with members of the Gülen
community for some time. He had friends staying in the community’s houses. He would go
to these houses to study or to chat with his friends. There were generally five or six students
living in these houses with an Ağabey and an Imam or a preacher, who had special ranks such
as ‘house responsible’ and ‘district responsible’. Most of his friends performed prayers regularly.
Even though some of his family members performed prayers, he did not.
On one occasion, while his friends were performing the prayer, the Ağabey of the house said to
him: “Look, it has many benefits. You become healthier, you wake up early, you pray and you
acquire merit in the sight of God.” When he told the Ağabey that he preferred not perform it, the
Ağabey insisted: “Why don’t you perform it? It would be nice if you did. Do it for me once. Do it as
a favor to me. Don’t let me down.” He never visited that house again.
They called him and asked why he did not visit them anymore. He replied to them: “I don’t want
to come because of your behavior. What I know about religion is that there is tolerance, not
pressure in it.”
A young merchant in Adapazarı used to visit the community houses when he was a university
student. He mentioned that there was no pressure in these houses. However, he found it
disturbing “to stay alone there” when everybody went to perform the prayer with the Ağabeys.
After a while he got bored of this situation and stopped visiting them.
A university student in Sivas reported that they had never faced pressure in the community
houses because they did not want the wealthy students who did not participate in prayers
to leave the house and choose somewhere else to stay. Several of her wealthy friends in the
community did not perform the rituals. Probably they did not want to lose the ones who were
already members.
A university student in Balıkesir informed us that the students who did not follow the rules of
the community’s houses were cautioned: “They warn them, but do not alienate them. Alienating
them is the last thing they would do. Their efforts are always directed towards winning over
and converting.”
The students we interviewed reported us that the community is effective in the universities and
the state dorms as well. The students staying in the state dorms were regularly invited to the
community’s houses so that the bond between them and the students was “strengthened.”
A female university student in Balıkesir had stayed in the state dormitory in her freshman year.
She had come to Balıkesir from one of the southeastern provinces. There were attendants of
the community in the state dorms as well. An Abla from the community was in charge of the
dormitory. In her he first days in Balıkesir, this Abla noticed that she was reading the Quran.
The Abla approached her and said: “You come from a distant place. Don’t ever think that you are
alone here! We are backing you up.” She visited the community houses a couple of times and
each time stayed there for a few days.
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The community attendants in these houses were constantly suggesting the female students
visiting them to cover their hair and providing them religious justifications. “Every night
before they went to sleep, they had a ritual of collective recitation,” she said to us. This prayer
performed collectively had a name, but she did not remember what it was.69
She also commented: “The remarkable part was that they were very interested in me. They tried
to convince me to stay in the house.” In the dormitory where she stayed, one of the rooms was
used as a prayer room. On Thursday nights each room would be visited and the students were
announced that the Ya-sin Surah of the Quran would be read. During Ramadan at each pre-dawn
meal they gathered and read the Ya-sin Surah.
Aside from the “Houses of Light” that belonged to the community, it was mentioned that there
are also community dorms. A female student staying in the community dormitory in Sivas told
us that she stayed there because she could not find any other place when she arrived in Sivas.
The dormitory was managed by Ablas. They had to be back in the dormitory by 7 pm latest. They
were threatening the students that their families would be informed if they did not.
They did not tell her that she had to cover her hair in order to remain in the dormitory, but that
“it would be good if she did”. She was required to attend “tesbihat”, which was a daily collective
ritual. They also wanted her to get up for the morning prayers, but did not insist when she failed
to do so.
After the first semester they wanted to relocate all of the students to the community’s houses.
Only twenty students were left out of the eighty who had initially stayed in the dormitory. She
rejected relocation to a community house and considered sharing a rented house with her
friends.
However the Ablas in the dormitory called her father and frightened his family: “The rented
houses are bad. Don’t you ever let your daughter do this! Sivas is a dangerous place.” Therefore
they did not permit her to rent a house. “They directed us to their houses; they didn’t want us to
move into our own houses,” she said to us.
Students we interviewed reported us that there are also community member students in the
state dormitories and they frequently invite other students to the community houses. The
community members choose a single student on the very first day of the semester and the
chosen one is invited to speeches, dinners and iftars (the evening fast-breaking meal during
Ramadan) at the community houses. A student explained us how persistent they are: “They
invite you over and over again, even if they just catch you in the corridor.”
An Alevi student in Sivas moved to the state dormitory in his freshman year. He had classmates
who were staying in the community houses. He was invited to iftar even though they knew that
he was an Alevi. He accepted the invitation and went with two of his Alevi friends. Although
they were told that dinner was ready, there was nothing to be served in the house where eight
students were staying.
The Ağabey of the house told them that they were expecting a phone call to learn the address
they would go for iftar. They went to a family home. The daughter of the family, who did not join
69 As we mentioned in the next paragraph, we learned that the name of this prayer was “tesbihat.” This refers to praying to
God while fingering beads, much like reciting a rosary.
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them and spent all evening in the kitchen, was veiled. There were “plenty of dishes”, enough for
ten to fifteen people. “I hadn’t known that they were so well organized,” he commented to us.
When it was the time for prayer they were told, “Should you like to perform the prayer, you can
go into the next room,” but there was no insistence.
It appears that inviting the students who lived in dormitories to dinner at the community’s
houses was quite a regular event. In order to create a convenient environment for chatting, they
organized “maklube” 70 meetings.
A student we interviewed in Sivas was staying in the same room as his friend, who was one of
the dormitory attendants of the community. His friend was constantly inviting him over dinners,
and they went to one of the community houses for dinner every Wednesday. After the dinner,
they would chat with the Ağabeys.
We were informed that community member students are not actively involved in politics on
campus. A student in Denizli explained to us: “They are not politically visible on the campus.
They don’t stand out with their political thoughts. For example, everybody in the school knows
my political views, but you never know who the community members are.”
A student studying in Balıkesir provided a similar recount: “For example, the ülkücüs [ultranationalists] organize memorial events every year to commemorate Alparslan Türkeş, but
you never see the community members do anything publicly. They do whatever they do in the
community houses, but never in public. They are not active in politics when they are at the
university.”
Aside from those associated with the Fethullah Gülen community we also encountered students
who were in contact with the “Süleymancılar” at some point.
A student in Adapazarı once helped one of his classmates who were staying in the
Süleymancılar’s dormitory to leave there. He never wore jeans and when he was asked for the
reason, he said that he did not have any. They later learned that they were not allowed to wear
jeans in the dormitory where he was staying and that a year earlier two of his friends had been
banished from the dormitory because their jeans had been found in their closets. He took this
friend to the house where he stayed and this student liked the ambience and his housemates. It
took them a year to convince him to leave the dormitory and share the house with them. They
finally succeeded.
A student, who had stayed in the Süleymancılar dormitory when he first came to Sivas, told us
that he could not stand there for more than fifteen days. A teacher who was a leading member of
the Süleymancılar had told him “We will find you a place to stay and you can help us by giving
lessons to younger students.”
He came to Sivas with a note and was sent to a teacher in this city. There were ninety people
staying in the dormitory. Primary school students also stayed there. He recounted: “They beat
70 We were informed that “maklube” was a kind of rice pilaf with meat. During the interviews we were told that it was called
“makrube”. We could not find it even in the Osmanlı Türkçesi Sözlüğü (Ottoman Turkish Dictionary) by İsmail Parlatır or the
Osmanlıca-Türkçe Ansiklopedik Lugat (Ottoman-Turkish Encyclopedic Dictionary) by Ferit Devellioğlu. The word “makrube”
did not have a place in Turkish dictionaries by the Turkish Language Institute, Ali Püsküllüoğlu or the National Ministry of
Education, nor could we find “maklube” in any of these dicitonaries. Google gave the word “makrube” under the heading
of “Hakkari Cusine.” It is possible that this is a regional dish. It can be considered that the Gülen community has been
developing a specific language based heavily on Arabic words that are not common in Turkey.
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the primary school students and forced them to perform the prayers. I couldn’t stand it, I was
about to fight with them.” So he left the dormitory within a short time.
In sum, it is clear that practices experienced in Gülen community’s houses and dorms have
become significant breaking points during the socialization processes of young people. It is
apparent that these houses inflicted significant limitations on the freedom of these youngsters
as having friends of the opposite sex is not allowed, wearing jeans or having long hair and
beards are forbidden, female students are encouraged to wear veil, and even the television
programs to be watched are determined by Ağabeys and Ablas.
We think that these “islands of morality” formed via the community’s houses provide an
alternative model to the educational policies implemented since the foundation of the Republic
and serve as stepping stones for the vision of creating a conservative society.
We can say that the Fethullah Gülen Community’s “democratic and moderate” attitude
towards outside in terms of its macro policies continues on the grassroots level. An example
of this moderate manner is the absence of the “pressure for ritual worship” in the community
institutions.
Yet, as the lives of the young people are taken under control and they are advised to embrace
an “Islamic way of life” as soon as they become members of the community, one can say that
there are severe contradictions between the faces the community show inside itself and outside
towards others.
For instance, social scientists researching this topic71 have pointed out that the community’s
approach towards women is hypocritical; although they publicly proclaim the equality of men
and women, within the community the women are pressured to take a back seat and, apart from
the wives of upper class members, their duties are limited with housework and raising children.
Given the extend and the prevalence of the community’s activities, one can anticipate that this
process will lead to a single-dimensional socialization as it will be difficult for the young people
that enter the community at early ages to orient themselves towards different alternatives
and as the restrictions dominating the life in the community will make impervious to the
choices that modern life offers, and further more as the community’s point of view will reduce
modernity to economic development and wealth.
Because of these aspects, it can be said that the activities of the Fethullah Gülen community in
the field of education is in contrast with the model based on the equality of men and women as
independent individuals that Turkey needs in the 21st century.
When we evaluate all the stories that we have listened, we think that the result of allowing the
religious communities to have a widespread influence on education is a crucial issue that has to
be considered seriously from the standpoint of the younger generation in Turkey.
71 See Turam, 2007; Özdalga, 2003.
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Tradesmen, Business Life and the Fethullah Gülen Community
They have formed a circle. They do not let others into this circle. They pretend
to be playing a game, but they just make short-passes to each other. The name
of this circle is, “you, me and ours.” Those who are outside the circle are close to
bankruptcy.
A businessman we interviewed at the Kayseri Chamber of Commerce
In this section, we are going to cover problems faced by merchants and businessmen who are
not members of the new business organizations and networks that were established after the
emergence of the “Anatolian Tigers”, as they were called in the past by Necmettin Erbakan, the
Chairman of the Refah Party.
We will discuss the economic activities and the networks established by the Fethullah Gülen
community that were mentioned in almost all of the cities we visited.
It is widely known that the new economic power that has emerged in Anatolia comes
primarily from the members of more religious and conservative groups in the society. These
new entrepreneurs were even called the “Islami Kalvinistler (Islamic Calvinists)” in a survey
conducted in Central Anatolian cities, first and foremost in Kayseri, by a non-governmental
organization named European Stability Initiative.72
By using this impression, they wanted to imply the type of entrepreneur who is devout and
conservative, who believes that extravagance is sin, and who thinks that working is an
indication of one’s devotion to God as described in the works of well-known German sociologist
Max Weber73 who has focused on the relationship between capitalism and Protestantism.
In the cities we visited, we listened to the complaints of tradesmen and businessmen who were
not included in this new economic circle established by the Fethullah Gülen community. We
heard similar complaints from almost every craftsman and tradesman we talked.
The only exceptions we encountered were company owners who were members of the long time
wealthy families of that city, who had proven their success in business life, and whose economic
activities were not linked to state resources such as tenders, credit, etc.
All of the others, especially craftsman and those who had been trying to establish new
businesses told us that they had to either go with the Islamic circle or stay out and go bankrupt.
Some of them defined the community’s attitude towards businessman out of its circle as some
type of “implicit” pressure mechanism which is never made apparent.
They also claimed that, in addition to the local organizations, larger-scale organizations are also
being established. Just like the case of private dershanes, business organizations with different
names in different cities were indeed gathered under the umbrella of a central federation.
Erzurum was one of the economically underdeveloped cities that we visited. Many people we
interviewed in Erzurum pointed out the Fethullah Gülen community as the address of the
problem. Both Alevi and Sunni men complained that the economy of the city had been turned
over to “Fethullahists”.
72 European Stability Initiative, “İslami Kalvinistler”, report, 2005.
73 Max Weber, Protestan Ahlakı ve Kapitalizmin Ruhu, trans. by Zeynep Gürata, İstanbul, Ayraç, 2008.
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They thought that this situation originated both from “the association of the community with
the AKP government” and the efficient networking of the community throughout the province.74
It was reported that large-scale investments needed the proximity to the AKP government,
whereas the business volume of small commercial entities needed the support of the
“community” in Erzurum. The small-scale merchants mentioned that remaining a non-member
had become disadvantageous. A bookshop owner claimed that they had withdrawn from selling
stationery supplies because the teachers in the primary and secondary schools were giving the
students a stationery list together with the names of the stationery shops owned by community
members.
The same situation is applicable to the textbooks. Even the academics were telling their students
where to shop for their course books. As a result of this, there were only a few bookshops left,
although there had been many in the past.
Similar examples were given by others. An Alevi driver told us that taxis in the city belonged to
the community members. The owner of a private radio station complained that he had almost
gone bankrupt several times because the advertisements on his broadcasts were stopped by the
community members since he was known as a leftist.
He believed that he had been embargoed by the community members because he had
broadcasted an incident in a community school on the news. He told us that he had noticed
small-scale merchants in the town made song requests to his programs. He talked to them and
expostulated: “You give your advertisements to others, but you listen to us.” They acknowledged
that they were afraid they “could be misunderstood” and face slowdown in business if they gave
their advertisements to his station.
We heard similar complaints from the business circles in Erzurum. They alleged that largescale state tenders and other state investments had been allocated to the supporters of the AKP
government or the religious community members, even to ones who were not from Erzurum.
For instance a businessman who had had significant influence on the economic network of
the city during the AP (Justice Party) government complained about this unfair practice that
almost brought his “family-owned investment with massive production capacity” to the point of
bankruptcy because it was known that he did not vote for the AKP.
However it was also possible that this businessman, who was that much complainant about
the AKP’s rent allocation to its supporters and community members, had enjoyed the benefit
of similar practices of favoritism in the past during the governance period of the party he
supported.
We asked why there were no major entrepreneurs who could make considerable investments
in Erzurum and the businessmen of the city advised us that this was mostly the result of the
favoritism. They also told us that the small tradesmen as well as the major businessmen in the
city were faced with implicit pressure to join the community. Moreover, “going to Friday prayer”,
“fasting during Ramadan”, and greeting people with “Selamünaleyküm” were listed among the
conditions for success in business life.
74 We have not searched for any association between the Gülen community and the AKP government.
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Last but not least, many people argued that among the small businessman greeting by saying
“Merhaba” [Hello]” were attracting hostile stares. They also recounted that making umrah visits
had become widespread. They explained us that umrah visits was an important means for
communicating the message, “I’m one of you.”
Many tradesmen told us that they felt as if they had to have Zaman newspaper in their stores
even if they didn’t read it; otherwise they were afraid their business would be negatively
affected. In some places Zaman newspaper was even being distributed to merchants free of
charge. We heard several examples of similar situations frequently throughout the interviews
with tradesmen and businessmen.
However, we have to stress that community type of organizations among small business owners
and craftsman is not a recent phenomenon. The religious communities have always been
widespread in this section of the society almost in every city in Turkey.
Explaining this city’s economy solely with reference to the community factor would be
oversimplification as Erzurum does not have a strong industry and, compared to other
Anatolian cities such as Kayseri, Gaziantep, Bursa and Eskişehir, have never found place in
the Turkish economy’s opening up to world markets. The influence of an economic structure
based on the competitiveness of small-scale merchants and tradesmen is of course limited in a
globalizing world.
Many people have brought the Fethullah Gülen community subject forward to prove the
hypothesis about the increasing conservatism in Erzurum. One may argue that this thesis
confuses the concerns on religious matters and trade competition. It seems to be difficult to
understand whether the reason for the concern is the conservatism experienced in daily life
or the inability to compete in the sphere of commerce and industry and which one is more
prevalent.
It is possible to provide economic explanations for the fact that Erzurum remains one of
the most introverted cities in Turkey with one of the most stagnant structures in societal
relationships. For instance, we did not observe such stagnation in cities whose economies had
opened up through tourism or some other large-scale investment.
Nonetheless, we do not know if the conservative culture in Erzurum contributes to the
stagnation in its economy or if there are other reasons why economic inactivity might trigger
conservatism. This situation unfortunately reduces our evaluation of Erzurum to the dilemma of
“the chicken or the egg”.
For instance, the merchants located in the center claimed that the major source of economic
activity is the sales made to university students. However, if what a female student told us is
true, the same merchants on the other hand were reacting to the women wearing jeans. The
students drew our attention to the contradiction in this situation and remarked that if they had
not been buying these jeans, several apparel stores in Erzurum might go bankrupt.
Also in the economically developed cities, we were reported that being a member of the
Fethullah Gülen community was a way to improve financial wellbeing.
A businessman we interviewed in Adapazarı told us that, unlike TUSIAD, the Gülen community
was in favor of organizing at the local level in cities and therefore it was “very attractive” for
newly-established companies seeking for a successful launch in business.
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For example, one of his friends, an electrician, became a member of one of the community’s
networks and they gave him a pin. He felt happy for being “adopted”. Being a member of the
community made him possible to find clients. He informed us that the windows of almost every
shop in Adapazarı contained posters announcing the charity events held by the “Kimse Yok
mu? Derneği [‘Is there Anyone out there?’ Association]” and the association raised funds by this
method.
A businessman from a well-known family pointed out that the businessman from the community
had got wealthier in recent years. He claimed that for the executives of the companies that had
business relations with state institutions performing Umrah or Hajj pilgrimage were regarded
as the “club admission card.”
Furthermore, he told us that the community member businessmen had had enormous
commercial profits in just a “couple of years” or were promoted to the highest positions: “They
haven’t become ordinary businessman, they have become emperors. Men you hardly heard of
five or ten years ago have multiplied the money we accumulated by three generations twenty,
thirty times.”
A commissioner we interviewed at the Kayseri Chamber of Commerce told us that merchants of
no prior significance had become “Aghas”, like feudal lords. Additionally, he claimed that while
it was said that tenders were open to everyone, only the ones who were either AKP supporters
or religious community members inside the circle could win them. Tenders could be given to
bidders even not from Kayseri. Furthermore, he informed us that “at least a hundred” of the
chamber members who did not support the AKP government were being advanced on by tax
inspections and other methods of that sort.
The observation that the Fethullah Gülen community members had become successful because
they preferred to shop only from each other was also common.
A businessman in Denizli said, “It is indeed crystal clear. They all do business only with each
other. They set themselves apart from MUSIAD [Independent Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s
Association] and they established their own network. They are very active in Anatolia. They
demonstrate an economic alliance with their stores and outlets and they do business mostly
with each other.” He regarded it as unfair competition.
A businesswoman in Denizli stated that her male colleagues had been won over by the
community by means of economic solidarity. She also explained that there were religious
community members that kept track of the people establishing new companies, going bankrupt
or having serious financial problems in every neighborhood in the city. They invited them to
the community meetings and after they began to attend meetings, these persons would benefit
from the new business directed to them.
In many cities, it was mentioned that there were “meetings” held at homes on Thursday
evenings. We heard this many times from different sources.
As far as we understand, these “meetings” are different from social gatherings such as the
“weekly receptions” held by women that are common in all Anatolian cities. People who wanted
to establish a new business or open a shop were invited to the houses of the community
members and were excluded in business life unless they responded to the invitation.
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These “meetings” also provided a “network-like” establishment for the businessmen for getting
in touch with people who share the same understanding and initiating business contacts.
Moreover, attending these “meetings” also had the function of proving stability and loyalty to
the community.
After every “meeting”, “huge” donations were collected for community aid. We were also
informed frequently that people from business life were invited to the community’s “meetings”.
A female architect we interviewed in Kayseri talked about the significance of these “meetings”
in business life and pointed out that attending these “meetings” brought several benefits to
one’s business life. Chains of two-way relationships were formed by means of these “meetings.”
Sometimes, when they were having difficulties in their business, she and her partner would
jokingly say, “It’s time to attend a community meeting”. “There is such a circle. Everybody thinks
about joining it at least once a day,” she said to us. She witnessed that people who became
members of this circle were suddenly raised in business. “This is a reality that we witness and
live with,” she remarked.
A housewife in Kayseri, whose husband was an accountant, told us that her husband had been
repeatedly invited to a “meeting” at one of his clients’ house. When he attended one of them,
he was asked to support a student financially; they declined his request to meet the student
and therefore he did not agree to give money. The following day, that client came to take
his accounting ledgers from her husband, saying, “Sorry, we won’t be able to work with you
anymore.” Her husband had told her that it did not “surprise” him.
We were also reported many times that the Fethullah Gülen community was also organized
among the housewives. The women we interviewed informed us that gatherings similar to the
“meetings” held for the merchants and the businessmen were also held among the women who
gathered in some flats; the ladies who did not attend these “meetings” were excluded; and they
made religious conversations and collected donations at these meetings.
A person we interviewed in Aydın explained us how “Hoca Hanım”s [Lady Teachers] organized
the women: They rented a flat in one neighborhood first, gave Quran lessons in this house and
organized “meetings” later, and gradually enlarged their circles.
She reported us that this networking had expanded “enormously” in Aydın; there were many
houses like the one described above in every neighborhood and women who did not attend the
meetings were “isolated”. “The [isolated] woman resists as much as she can; when she cannot
resist anymore, she moves from the neighborhood, but after moving from one house to another,
there is nowhere left, only the main avenue, and it is an expensive place. It was a place they
could hardly enter but now they are gradually getting through there too, they are also founding
houses there,” she narrated.
A female teacher in Kayseri received a telephone solicitation to subscribe to Zaman newspaper.
She declined the offer, but later on a neighbor paid a visit to her as she moved a short time ago
and gave a “house-warming” gift including a copy of Zaman newspaper.
A retired woman in Bağcılar, İstanbul, had been living in the same neighborhood since 1978.
She was invited to the community “meetings” because she was sociable and interested in her
environment. She noticed that “there was incorrect information about Islam” in the books she
was handed during her visit and did not participate the “meetings” again.
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A woman we interviewed in Aydın at her first “meeting” was faced with “directives” such
as, “You will fast on Thursdays and Fridays, you have night prayers that you will perform, and
you will attend our ‘meetings’.” They cooked meals in one of the neighborhood houses and ate
together. “There is widespread social transformation and social pressure. Whether you like it or
not, you feel isolated,” she said.
It is also understood that the female members of the community not only establish the network
among the women, but also collect donations for the community. People who worked in the city
center, in public offices and even in hospitals informed us that, to support students without
financial means, the female members of the community come to their workplaces at lunchtime
selling sandwiches at very reasonable prices.
We mentioned above that businessman members of the community, as well as student members
who graduated and got jobs, supported the community financially. These donations are not
collected in return of receipts, but regarded as “Sevap [merit].”
In a nutshell, in every city we visited we were reported that these networks based on religious
and financial solidarity established by the community members strengthened the community
financially and the members’ wealth increased enormously. In order to extend the community,
a fraction of this wealth was distributed among the needy community members and both the
scholarships provided to the students and the education activities ensured the participation of
the young people to the community.
This solidarity network also made it difficult to remain outside it. It looked as if people who
resisted against all odds were excluded from business life and fell behind in competition.
Nevertheless, there is no doubt that such powerful economic networking has transformed the
Anatolian cities, has contributed to the economic development in Turkey, and created a new
middle class and entrepreneurs
On the other hand, it may not be wrong to claim this community network founded on social
conservatism has made the Anatolian cities more conservative and provided evidence for the
argument that Turkish society is becoming more “Islamicized”.
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CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS
We advise everyone who want to understand Turkey, to go and “see” Anatolia. But Not as
a “tourist”. Looking through the eyes of a tourist; Turkey is a promising country with wide
boulevards, luxury shops, shopping malls, five star hotels and brand-new buildings.
However; despite one’s expectations, this modernity is not reflected in daily life in many places.
When you examine Anatolia “from the inside” you might feel depressed, as we did on our way
back.
The results of this study conducted in twelve Anatolian cities show that the Republic, which has
been loyal to the discourse of equal citizenship since it was founded, have not managed to put
this discourse into practice after all these years.
In many of these cities to live with a different identity, to create an oasis within which
individual capacities and imagination can be highlighted and to create a living space that is
remote from social pressure is quite difficult.
It can be observed that the Anatolian cities have a social structure that discourages
individualism and pushes both men and women to conformism. Combined with the results
of previous studies, the conclusion we have derived from this research is that the Sunni-Turk
majority is insensitive to the rights and demands of all other groups in the society.75
More importantly, a social structure in which people benefit equally from the employment
opportunities and the services provided by the state without facing discrimination does not
exist.
We think that this is a perilous picture with regard to the principles of pluralistic democracy. It
must be understood that the target of bringing Turkey to the level of contemporary civilizations
cannot be reached only by economic development. In order to accomplish this, creating a well
educated population and a pluralist democratic structure that adopts liberal values are indeed
imperative. We believe that it is the responsibility of the political elites, first and foremost the
parties in power, to achieve such a goal.
Political science studies conducted on political elites imply that the democratic systems in
essence are the governance of the elites; the consensus reached among the elites plays a
75 For example, in a survey conducted in 2006 the opportunity for covered students to attend university was supported
by around 43% of the survey participants and admission criteria in the university entrance exams to be the same for
Imam Hatip (religious high school) graduates as for standard high school graduates had the support of 18%, whereas the
availability of education in their mother tongue for Kurds was supported by 11% and the availability of the state subsidy
to cemevleri supported by only 5%. In the same manner, in a question investigating which norms are essential during
voting, the response stating, “Establishment of a political party preserving the rights of the Alevis and the Alevi identity”
was supported at the lowest level, followed by, “A political party putting forth effort to preserving the cultural identity of
the Kurds.” 24% of the public do not want a neighbor who belongs to a different religious sect; 28% of them do not want
a Kurdish neighbor; 39% do not want Jewish neighbors; 42% do not want Armenian neighbors and 43% do not want Greek
neighbors. One of the results obtained in this survey is that the Turkish public has a sectarian perception of democracy
rather than a pluralistic one. While “our” rights are defended, the rights of “others” are thrust aside. Here what is defined
as “our” refers to those of Turkish-Sunni Muslims, whereas “others” are Kurds, Alevis and non-Muslims. See Çarkoğlu and
Toprak, 2006.
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Conclusions and Suggestions
significant role in managing social problems; and the principles of good governmentability
should be taken into consideration by both the opposition and the government.
When we analyze the history of Western European countries, we see that the prejudices and
pressure derived from differences of religion, languages, sects and ethnicities created conflict
zones and that the contradictions between labor and capital led to the revolutions or changes in
political systems that were milestones in the histories of these countries.
Following the Second World War, the stability achieved in the political life of Western Europe
was the result of the consensus achieved among political parties on fundamental issues.
Realizing that it was difficult to establish a consensus among the general public to build social
peace and to eliminate the differences between social classes and identities in a divided society,
the political elites of that period preferred to reach a consensus among themselves.
The lack of a similar consensus among the political elites in Turkey makes it difficult to provide
solutions to the country’s problems. The political tension between the government and the
opposition that goes back to İttihat ve Terakki (Union and Progress) and the period of transition
to democracy in the 1950s has left a bad legacy for our political life.
As a result of this legacy, rather than reaching for consensus on the fundamental principles
and searching for mutual answers to public issues, politics in Turkey has come to be defined
as blaming the opposition, assuming that a “quarrel” will garner votes, and “scoring a goal”
instead of advising voters of their political options.
Condemning political life in Turkey to such a misapprehension makes it impossible to eliminate
and manage problems with common sense and a political environment that is perceived as
“quarrelling” challenges the trust of the public in politics and politicians. The identity of the
politician has already been proved to be the most untrustworthy identity in several public
opinion researches, and this could be considered as a sign of voters’ disgust of the political
environment.
We think that the persistence of this political style in Turkey in the 21st century and the failure
of the political elites to establish a constructive and problem-solving dialogue is deadlocking
Turkey.
Based on the above argument, we can hardly believe that it is possible to explain away the
repressive conservatism and the prejudices against different identities in the cities we visited by
claiming that these cities were already conservative even in the old days; that tension between
Sunnis and Alevis results from their historical background; that drinking alcoholic beverages
was not common and drinkers were excluded in Anatolian cities; that there was already
discrimination against women in the society; and so forth.
All of these observations could be correct. Yet, with reference to the above arguments, the
significant issue here is that the persistence observed in social prejudice and repressive
conservatism relates to the attitude of the political elites.
In this respect, the results of the study we conducted in twelve Anatolian cities show that the
AKP government has not played a transformative role in overcoming repressive conservatism
and assuring an environment in which people tolerate different identities and respect for
individual rights and freedoms.
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On the contrary, we think that the AKP’s practice of cadre-ization, in combination with the
religious community networking and their activities in Anatolian cities, have created a more
ominous environment compared to the past.
On the other hand, we do not claim that the opposition parties have made an effort towards that
direction either. Throughout the cities we visited, we noticed that the attitude against people
with different identities primarily emanated from the “ülkücü” [extreme nationalist] circles.
Thus, it is unlikely for MHP, which has a relatively larger public support compared to other
opposition parties, to take on such a mission.
We also concluded that the local policies of the CHP, which positions its identity as “social
democrat”, went no further than opposition to the AKP and their repeated statements of support
for secularism. It’s obvious that CHP commissioners are satisfied with making these statements,
rather than developing concrete policies to establish an egalitarian environment.
The stories we heard in the Anatolian cities proved to us that, the absence of a “legal rational
authority” that is equally distant and serving to all its citizens, made the individuals dependent
on the party in power and the organizations formed to support such parties. The public space
is being transformed into an environment shaped by the interests and profits of the governing
party and the social organizations supporting it.
Rather than insisting on their rights as citizens, individuals are forced to “prefer” being
integrated into the governing organization through the use of the “patronage” relationships
that are frequently mentioned in the political science literature in Turkey.
This environment presents a highly volatile and unstable ground even for the individuals who
would be expected to be more powerful. For instance, a businessman has to be included in
the circle of sovereignty of the new government following a change in office and in order to
maintain his financial footing and his reputation; he needs to participate to the rituals of this
new circle.
As a matter of fact, the people we interviewed gave us several examples of a recently emerged
“prototype” that could be seen in the public under the governance of the AKP.
They told us that these prototypes from business life included the merchants, businessmen and
public officials who began performing the Friday prayer in order to give the “I am also one of
you” impression or closed their shutters so that it would appear that they had gone to prayer;
whose wives have begun to cover their hair although they were open before; who have started
to use “Selamünaleyküm” instead of the Turkish expressions of “merhaba” or “günaydın.”; who,
even if they like to drink alcohol, abstain from doing it in public; who follows the “trend” to visit
the Kaaba, perform the pilgrimage to Mecca and hold “iftar” receptions; who behave as if they
fast all through Ramadan even though they do not; who feel the obligation to keep a copy of
Zaman newspaper in the office and attend the religious community meetings; and who resign
from leftist or secular unions and switch to the new unions supporting the government.
However in many of the cities we visited, we were also told that these “prototypes” were not
only related to the AKP government. For instance if the “communists76” were to win the next
election and become the governing party, then these prototypes in business life and public
76 This ‘communist’ expression was given as the most extreme example in many cities.
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offices would start saying, “My grandfather was a communist, too,” and change their way of life
immediately in order to adjust to the new governing circle.
These examples explain why Alevis, the Roma, secularists and other individuals with different
identities feel themselves excluded from the privileged world of Sunnis which seems to solidify
with the AKP government as a result cadre-ization on the one hand, and the automatic reflex to
support the powerful on the other.
It is indeed very difficult to find the answer to the question, “What to do?” But in fact, our study
contains the clues for what is required. Rather than being a majority government that dishes
out state resources to its supporters, the obvious things to achieve can be listed as follows:
remaining equally distant from each segment of society and taking the lead in a structural
transformation enabling transparency in administration; searching for methods to normalize
the relationship between the government and the opposition; strengthening the citizenry by
increasing their freedoms and broadening their rights; helping to develop an awareness of good
citizenship; providing public service at its best to the low-income segment of the society by
broadening social state policies; fighting discrimination through the use of political schemes
as well as educational support to erase the repression and discrimination that citizens with
different identities have faced.
The answer to this question initially requires the existence of an intelligentsia that considers
the question itself. On the other hand, in Turkey for a long time both the intellectuals and the
politicians have been interested in “mega” issues rather than concrete suggestions.
Although the arguments held in the public sphere give the impression of a Turkey in dialogue, in
fact, this manner of “dialogue” consists of a monologue delivered and heard by the very same
persons. They barely “touch” each other in a “closed circuit” game of different factions, rather
than exchanging ideas in order to arrive at a shared conclusion.
At the same time, this dissociation among the intelligentsia hinders the efficiency of nongovernmental organizations that approach the issues more concretely.
Eliminating the repression and discrimination related to identity can be achieved only after
abandoning these “mega” issues and initiating a campaign for resolving the problems. It is
imperative that the intelligentsia, the politicians and the non-governmental organizations lead
such a campaign. Consequently, in this section we will be content to offer only some partial
answers to the question of “What to do?”.
►We believe that the ombudsman institution would play an important role in the resolution
of these issues. It was brought into the foreground as a prerequisite in Turkey’s period of preaccession to the European Union, but annulled by the Constitutional Court. We definitely believe
that it has to be put on the agenda again.
The ombudsman institution, which has been functioning in Sweden since 1809, is now
operational in many countries of the world. This institution is responsible to investigate
whether procedures are concordant with the law and whether the rights and the freedoms
of citizens that are inalienable in democracies have been violated by public officials due to
discrimination or injustice.
Every citizen, as it has been implemented in Sweden, can apply to this authority, even foreigners
residing in Sweden. Four ombudsmen and their appointed research specialists, who have been
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working as subordinates to the Swedish Parliament and whose sphere of duties have been
differentiated, investigate approximately five thousand claims per annum.
Since the issues we have dealt with in the framework of our study are related to individuals who
define themselves as “secular”, here we suggest the establishment of an ombudsman institution
specialized in and concerned only with secularism. An institution of this kind may have an
important function in lessening the tension and reducing the anxiety on the secularism issue by
investigating whether the complaints are genuine.
However this institution should be independent from politics and overcome the narrow
framework of ‘cadre’ appointments that has been the ruling perspective for a long time in
Turkey. As evidence of a more reputable policy than the conventional practice, the appointment
of a respected person as ombudsman who is known for his objectivity by members of different
segments of society is imperative. In order to enable this institution to work efficiently, it is
necessary to assign a considerable budget and a work force adequate to perform the research
and advise the public of its services.
The structure, bylaws, mission and authority of the institution should be formed with the
support of all segments of society, under the guidance of legalists and non-governmental
organizations. Having conducted this survey and listened to many complaints from persons
of different identities, our suggestion to ensure the objectivity of the person who would be
appointed as ombudsman is that the name of the person agreed upon by both the governing
and the opposition parties be proposed to the Human Rights Commission of the Grand National
Assembly of Turkey, after which the individual would be questioned in a commission session by
the commission members. We think that this method, which is exercised in the United States
of America for the appointments of key positions, would play a significant role in ensuring the
objectivity criteria.
In addition, the existence of the ombudsman institution should be announced to the public
through the websites of municipalities and state organizations as well as frequent television
broadcasts. The institution should publish annual reports detailing the complaints and the
related actions in order to present this information to the public. It should become mandatory
to register it in an official’s record should he be found to have treated citizens in an unjust or
discriminatory manner.
•
One of the topics of major importance touched upon by the people we interviewed through
our survey was the discrimination, alienation and violation of rights that was primarily
experienced in public institutions. These venues, where all citizens should be treated equally
and receive equal services, have been all but transformed into realms where pro-government
administrators and bureaucrats exercise “displays of power”.
In order for this situation to change, it is imperative that the relationship between the providers
and recipients of services in such places as government offices, hospitals and schools be
structured, not according to the priorities of the ruling party or religious communities, but
according to the conventions of democracy and international human rights, and that the
providers be educated according to these principles and subject to constant oversight.
The employment procedures for public officials, in other words the process of “cadre-ization”,
appear to be one of the areas where social harmony and coexistence has suffered the greatest
damage.
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According to what we were told in the cities we visited, because there is a concentration of
power in a single entity where all local administrators in public offices and municipalities, up
to and including the mayors and governors, are either members of the governing party or their
supporters, citizens who believe they have suffered an injustice feel that there is no higher
authority to whom they can address their complaints. .
On the other hand, since a judicial process requires financial resources and a time-consuming
struggle, citizens normally do not seek justice in the courts.
In the section where we discussed state officials, we mentioned that the officials are appointed
in accordance with their association to the government rather than professional competence
and experience. This practice leads not only to removing experienced officials from business life,
but also causes them to lose their enthusiasm for their professions, and at the same time causes
a severe degradation in the quality of public works and services in addition to bureaucratic
corruption.
The termination of “cadre-ization” that should be accomplished during the pre-accession period
to European Union membership can only be made possible by instituting the administrative
reforms that have been sensitively monitored by the European Union, and ensuring the
transparency of bureaucratic mechanisms.
A major part of this practice should be the policy of transparency to be applied in appointments
and promotions. The criteria that are used in appointments should be open to the inspection of
the public. In this respect, the publication of biographies of appointed senior officials on the
websites of the related governmental organizations in all provinces could be suggested.
Such an application might make more accurate criteria available for appointments, so that
assigning teachers of religion as principals in schools and employing personnel with no
technical education or experience to supervise a group of technicians could be discouraged.
• Throughout the eastern regions we visited, we noticed that the base of conservatism has
deepened and that it is the public and the neighborhood that continuously renews the
pressure, whereas in the western regions, the pressure is derived from the implementations
of local governments.
We believe that the transparency policy we mentioned above should be obligatory for
appointments to local and regional public institutions and service procurement as well.
• We suggest that a “campaign” be initiated in order to eliminate the prejudice against
different identities and women within the society. We believe that the most important base
of this campaign should be the field of education.
One alternative that might be considered is the establishment of mandatory classes, starting
in the first grade, in which the importance of respect for different identities and the equality of
men and women are emphasized, to be taught by teachers who have received the appropriate
professional training.
Encouragement of media support via tax incentives to media channels that broadcast
advertisements, editorials, movies, serials and panel discussion against discrimination, and
particularly the use of TRT [Turkish Radio and Television] channels to this end could also be
considered.
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• We think that the acceptance of the principle of positive discrimination should be the
other leg of this campaign. For instance, in Western European countries as well as in the
United States, the campaign against discrimination against women has been implemented
through the policies of positive discrimination that are practiced in the fields of education,
employment and politics.
In a similar way, in the United States of America the elimination of racist hatred and practices
against Afro-Americans has been attempted through the utilization of principles of positive
discrimination by the federal government. With the implementation of such policies an AfroAmerican, who up until only fifty years ago might have been forced to live in “the black ghetto”,
could be elected president of the United States of America. This change has been realized not
only through rendering the pronouncement of racial epithets in the public sphere unthinkable,
but also by the adoption of the principles of positive discrimination.
We think that, among other solutions, similar principles of positive discrimination should be put
into practice for women in Turkey. In order to boost women’s participation in politics, a quota
application should be utilized and policies of positive discrimination applied to encourage and
increase the employment of women, in which a serious decline has been observed in recent
years.
Furthermore, the Department of Religious Affairs, whose budget is derived from taxes collected
from all citizens, should allocate a portion of its budget to provide Alevis with religious services
instead of solely serving Sunnis.77
• In modern societies there is a close relationship between the display of respect to others and
the construct of ethnic, religious and cultural diversity and the visibility and provision of
information and education about minority groups or groups who have suffered systematic
discrimination during the course of history.
In this context, we think that discrimination against Alevis and their alienation is due in
great measure to the lack of knowledge about the beliefs and practices of Alevism. A world
of perception based on rumors rather than facts, constitutes the major reason for social
polarization and cultural disruption.
In order to eliminate the existing prejudices in society it seems important that during the
process of education serious and objective information be provided about Alevism and
communicated clearly to the society so that Alevism is consequently freed from this atmosphere
of secrecy and obscurity. To this end, the design of a special informative and awareness-raising
campaign should be considered, making full use of all the communication facilities at the state’s
disposal.
• The efficiency of the Fethullah Gülen community in the schools, neighborhoods and
bureaucracy was remarked upon in every Anatolian city we visited. The “democratic and
moderate” attitude of the community that has been well accepted by the media and leaders of
public opinion in major cities appears to have been replaced by conservative, discriminative
and repressive provincials in the smaller districts. In our opinion, the activities of these
77 Some Alevi organizations suggest that the Department of Religious Affairs should be entirely eliminated. See Express,
January 2009, pp 38-47 for a recent discussion on this subject.
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groups in the smaller districts deepen the repressive conservatism that already exists in
Anatolian cities.
It would be unthinkable to restrict the organization of community members for solidarity
purposes when one considers that there is no overt pressure exerted either on the members or
the outsiders by the Fethullah Gülen community. However, we believe that the transparency
principle that is applicable to all other organizations should also be implemented with respect
to this movement.
The problematic aspect of the community movements in terms of public affairs is that the
enormous financial resources that are collected as charity are not open to public inspection.
We find it unacceptable for these religious communities to be exempted from public inspection
when all other associations and foundations are subject to it.
In this connection, it is necessary to determine if these communities will be liable to render
account and accepted as fiscally immune under the same criteria that are applied to the other
public associations and foundations. Transparency in issues such as organizational charts and
the definition of the mission of the organization in addition to disclosure of the community
budget is also necessary. We believe that such an opaque and unclear organization can hardly
be considered acceptable in such a powerful and influential community.
Another aspect that we find problematic in the Fethullah Gülen community has to do with their
activities in the field of education. It is not acceptable that the dershane, dormitories and “Işık
Evleri” that belong to the community, where formation according to their particular world view
is provided to students from primary school onwards, are not subject to any kind of inspection
whatsoever.
From what we were told, it appears necessary to examine the effect of the community on youth
in terms of the prohibitions in these places, particularly the indoctrination of female students to
be covered. When it is considered that these students are mainly from poor families and that the
community chooses particularly the ones who are the brightest and most successful, it is truly
a matter of concern that the community’s effect on children and youth is not supervised by the
Ministry of National Education.
The secondary school and university students we interviewed who were residents of the
community houses said that although it was difficult for them to cope with the discipline in
these houses, they felt obliged to stay there because they were looked after and assisted in an
unknown environment and that they had no other options for accommodation.
Our observation on this subject is that the efficiency of the community is directly related to
the inadequacy of social state practice. We think that state resources should be diverted to
the construction of more dormitories in order to ensure accommodation opportunities to all
students.
Among the solutions to this problem that could be considered, particularly for students who
come from village primary schools to cities for their secondary education or university students
whose families do not reside in the same cities, are increasing the numbers of such dormitories,
keeping fees low and providing scholarships for those unable to afford them, and developing
orientation programs in order to help students adapt to both the cities and the universities.
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Another solution to be considered could be the establishment in all state and private educational
institutions of special offices subject to legal jurisdiction to deal with complaints of students,
parents and teachers on discrimination and repression regarding education issues.
• We also think that the criminalization of the consumption of alcoholic beverages and the
removal of venues serving alcoholic beverages from the public sphere by local governments
are arbitrary restrictions of individual freedom. The claims of AKP municipalities that the
public is disturbed by venues serving alcohol and people drinking alcoholic beverages is
unacceptable in terms of public administration..
The sanctions applicable to people who behave unlawfully are indicated in the penal code. It
is not possible to implement restrictions in the public sphere for subjective and ambiguous
reasons like “discomfort.” Consequently, state institutions and municipalities should ensure via
rules and by-laws that the rights which are considered individual freedoms cannot be infringed
unless it can be proven beyond doubt that they constitute immediate, concrete and verifiable
danger to the public.
Lastly, it seems extremely important in terms of “What to do” with respect to future-oriented
projects that there be an interconnection with the deepening of democracy in Turkey. We
think that authoritarian methods like diplomatic warnings and closing down political parties
intensify repressive environments, hinder democratic expansion and push the relationship
between the government and the public outside “regular politics” in addition to aggravating
division and conflict not only among the elites but also among the public. On the other hand,
we would like to mention that we disagree with those who are insensitive to the problems
of people who feel they have been pushed into a corner by anxiety over the legitimization of
authoritarian alternatives.
In this work we have attempted to address only a few issues out of the web of problems that
Turkey faces and needs to resolve. For instance, in this study, we have not addressed the
ethnicity problem, which is the most important of the breaking points. The observations in this
limited study all point to the need for Turkey to combat discrimination in order to sustain a
democracy based on freedom and pluralism, based on the equality of the rights of its citizens, in
order for its membership in the European Union to become a reality. Our findings, once again,
remind us of the importance of taking responsibility for our constitutional rights as citizens.
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Epilogue
Epilogue
Since December 19, 2008, the day we announced the conclusions of our study entitled “Being
Different in Turkey -- Otherization on the Axis of Religion and Conservatism”, more than
700 news items, columns and discussions have appeared in the print and visual media. The
reactions still continue. Some of them were analyses stating that the study pointed out some
important issues and should be considered seriously, which considered the issues as part of a
whole, which I found objective. Some of the positive comments contained remarks with which
we could neither agree nor find it possible to conclude from our study, and displayed opinions
binding only their authors that were even so exaggerated as to claim that the conclusions
proved that “Islamo-Fascism” had taken root in Turkey. The third group of comments contained
negative criticism. In this section I will try to respond to this last group of critics. Some of my
remarks here were also published in Milliyet newspaper on January 20 and 21, 2009. In addition,
I have appended a part of my article dated January 2nd, 2009, which is a reply to the critiques
published in Taraf newspaper. Hereby I would like elaborate on the responses that I had to
summarize because they were to be published in a daily newspaper.
I am of the opinion that the effect this survey has produced within the society has been
transformed into a sociological incident that requires further research in itself. I take these
reactions as an indication of the difficulty of establishing reconciliation among the social
segments with differing point of views on religion, modernity and secularism that have
divided our intellectual life in Turkey since the Tanzimat era (Reorganization Period – 18391876), especially during the Republican period. Today Turkey is experiencing a state of disunity
in which no declarations of public harmony and solidarity are capable of veiling the truth.
The findings of our study and the responses we received do not display a group of people who
have a mutual vision and destiny, who consider diversity a form of wealth, who have a mutual
understanding of basic social issues.
It is for this reason that I cannot say that the debate initiated by our study has been inclined
to engender calm and common sense. Unfortunately, apart from a couple of “articles” which
managed to include insulting remarks in displays of verbal acrobatics rather than discussing
the conclusions of the survey, almost all of the opposing critics preferred to take refuge in
claims that the survey was unscientific.
The critiques included a wide variety of comments ranging from statements like, “There is no
otherization in Islam”, which are related more to theology than to social reality, to the espousal
of sentiments such as, “There has always been prejudice in Anatolia anyway,”, whereas in this
research report, we have tried to clarify the differences between the alienation and pressure
rooted in the historical background of this geographic region, the use of ‘cadre-ization’ by the
AKP government and the newly-emerged climate resulting from the activities of the Fethullah
Gülen movement in Anatolia.
The objection to the criterion of being scientific was related to the methodology of the research.
First of all, I should say that I was not aware that so many people had a great command of the
methodologies used in the social sciences, whereas there are only a few academics specialized
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in these methodologies. Nonetheless, I am not aware of any research conducted and published
by any of “our methodologists.”
One of the opposing criticisms was the claim that the research was conducted by “ordinary
journalists” and I had only put my signature to this research done by my friends. Like many
other comments against the research, this claim too is a baseless hypothesis based on the
assumption that a female academic would not go to Anatolia in the dead of winter. Aside from
a couple of locations, the four of us were not together in most of the cities we visited. Yet, as
the person responsible for the research project, I visited all of them but Malatya. Because the
transcription of the voice recordings of the 401 interviews we conducted came to hundreds of
pages, these three friends undertook the organization of the stories by subject. I personally
compiled and edited the few chapters they had prepared and took on the responsibility of
writing up the entire research project. Therefore, it is totally incorrect to assert that I put my
signature to research that had been conducted and written up by others while I sat in my
comfortable room at the university.
If one takes the trouble to examine their resumes, it is easy to understand that the friends with
whom I worked on this project are not “ordinary journalists.” I would like to inform the people
who have asked why I did not prefer to conduct this research with social sciences students that
it would not have been possible to conduct a research project of this nature with inexperienced
students rather than these friends who helped us to get in touch with institutions in the cities
we visited through their contacts in the media, who had a deep knowledge of Turkey’s politics
and society, and who had written books on similar topics or conducted similar research. I have
learned a lot from each of these friends of mine. I have great respect and admiration for each
and every one of them. I believe that the columnists who mentioned them in such a humiliating
manner without any information about their character or accomplishments should be
castigated.
Another topic of criticism was that the research had been financed by the Open Society Institute.
First of all, the claim that OSI “had us do” this research is incorrect. I took this topic to them and
asked for their financial support with the funds of Boğaziçi University Research Projects. These
institutions have never interfered with the processes of mounting, conducting or writing of the
research. These institutions are not responsible for the conclusions or the reports. I particularly
believe that highlighting this issue is very important, because in the two articles published
in both Zaman newspaper and Aksiyon magazine it was mentioned that the chairman of OSI
criticized the report and did not agree with it. Any study will certainly be open to the criticism
of everyone, including the directors and employees of the institutions that support the research.
A columnist declared that he did not trust “so-called scientists who conduct ‘scientific research’
against payment” (The words in italics and the quotations belong to the writer himself.)
Doubtless, this columnist either thinks that such research can be conducted with no budget
and that Anatolian cities can be easily visited without spending a penny, or that academics
are paid such huge salaries that they can afford to conduct this research out of pocket. If more
research projects can be conducted in Turkey today, it is because of the increased availability of
such funds provided to scientists. The prevalent prejudices, such as that the institutions which
provide financial support can easily interfere with the research process and that scientists
can distort the research because they are paid for it, also carries with it the implication that
professionals who work at an institution for their livelihood are devoid of honor, reliability and
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Epilogue
objectivity. For instance, should we assume that the columnist who mentioned this argument
has not been paid by his employer for his writing? Besides, the claims that the Open Society
Institute, from which I had previous support as well, has secret goals and interferes with
research are also based on prejudice. Indeed, the critique by OSI’s chairman is itself proof that
they had not interfered in the conclusions of the research.
Another criticism was that the research included only individuals of secular identity. I find it
difficult to understand why our methodology was questioned because the Islamic segment was
not included in our research, while there has never been a question of methodology concerning
why research on covered women did not include the segment without headcoverings.
The Islamic segment was not included because this research was not intended to examine them,
but those who were outside that circle. Just as it doesn’t mean much to talk to healthy people in
order to understand the feelings of those who are dying. Moreover, it is not true that we limited
the research subjects to persons and groups who had hostile approaches to the Islamic segment,
as some of the liberal columnists claimed. More to the point, regarding our interviews with
individuals of secular identity, one of the columnists on Taraf newspaper commented, “You are
asking a ‘member of the resistance’ what he thinks about the ‘enemy forces of occupation’ in his
land.” This analogy, defining the division in Turkey with similes like “member of the resistance”
and “enemy forces of occupation” goes far beyond the “otherization” that we mentioned in our
study and has been transformed into an expression that creates an “enemy”. Additionally, most
of the people we interviewed: Alevis, youth, students of Kurdish origin, leftists, women, the
Roma, merchants and businessmen, were not preoccupied with laicism as the core of their lives.
A considerable part of our report was devoted to discussions of methodology. As one can see
if one reads it, it is not possible to consider social reality in all its aspects by conducting polls,
which is the only method that is considered to possess “scientific” validity among the general
public. Polls are neither productive nor appropriate for most of the topics covered in the social
sciences. The social sciences abandoned this type of positivist scientific approach long ago.
That is why social scientists frequently employ methodologies that reveal a pattern by
comparing events that occurred in different time lines and locations; by trying to discover the
reality of a text or an interview by reading between the lines; by living for long periods in the
society where the research is conducted, as anthropologists do, and by accomplishing in-depth
interviews in order to understand people’s world of meaning. These kinds of methodologies are
not appropriate to develop generalizations about the entirety of the universe that is the subject
of the research; still, it gives us significant information about this universe.
We used the in-depth interview method with 401 persons in this research within a one-year
period, whereas research using this methodology is generally conducted with fewer people.
Although we stated repeatedly that our conclusions from the interviews with 401 people exposed
an issue that should be considered seriously but that was not a generalization about Turkey, the
parties objecting to the methodology we used questioned how interviews conducted with only
401 people enabled us to develop a generalization for all of Turkey.
Moreover, some columnists claimed that in-depth interviews demanded long periods of time, but
that we only spared “10 minutes” or at most “an hour” for each interview. It was not possible for
them to know how much time we spent on each interview, because they were not with us during
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the survey. Besides, the field survey phase of this research would not have lasted a year if we
had been satisfied with such short interviews.
Suffice it to say that it was not easy to conduct such research. In December 2007, when we
commenced the research, and in the succeeding months it was not only physically exhausting
listening to people in freezing rooms on the upper floors of the desolate blocks throughout
eastern and central Anatolian cities buried under snow, but also very emotionally abrasive due
to the content of the conversations. Tan Morgül, a friend of mine with whom I conducted the
research, speaks of this process in his article published in Birikim magazine as follows;
Now, let’s talk about the people who are being discussed constantly and will go on living in the
places they have been living, and whose lives will not change just because they are included in
our report. First of all, we neither talked to them briefly nor did we include every word they said
in our report. With some of them we had long conversations, whereas we spent a shorter time
with others. Of course, we had political “lessons” from most of them at the beginning. Just think,
three journalists and an academic from Istanbul have visited there to listen to them in lands far
removed from “prime-time” news broadcasting. Each of them had his own thoughts and words
about Turkey. Whether we liked the conclusions they drew or not, they were reading, watching
and making contact.
We would have liked those who criticized us on the details of the interviews and the length
of the conversations to guess just how long it might take to get to their personal stories after
finishing the introductory chat of “agitation and propaganda” just to “let İstanbul hear my
voice.” We certainly listened to those parts, as well. In any event, these people were not our
laboratory subjects, and consequently, we often had to listen to them when they started talking
about subjects that were not the main target of our research. Yet every time, we cautioned them
that we could not use these personal details “as data.”
Moreover this “silent and passive” contact that was established from the very beginning
helped us to gain the trust of the interviewees, making their stories more personalized and
dissociating them from their acknowledged collective identity. After that, we were able to collect
the “concrete” data about personal “perception”. I have to say that it was not that easy, because
we sometimes faced cases where even being a much-complained-of “social scientist” was not
enough at all. And we also witnessed how deeply we had been “psychologically” drained on the
way back from the last city we visited.
… Among the flood of oppositional critics, the most disturbing point for me was that this
discussion was going on around the “private lives of people.” It was as if we, the researchers,
had created sui generis “mutants” in different locations in Anatolia and made up stories about
them. We hoped that people would display respect and empathy toward the numerous stories of
the persons we listened to…in fact, we rather naively expected it. Whether you are a journalist,
a researcher or a social scientist, all of the things you have witnessed create not only a kind
of intense hopelessness but a strange sense of expectation as well. This may be because of the
expectation that healthy empathy would lead to a ”different sort of discussion.”
I have to share here as a private note that it was very heartrending for us to listen to some
of these stories, whereas this was not the case with others. This was because some of the
interviewees barely shared their experiences with us for personal reasons, i.e., either because
they were afraid or they did not want to remember it, or they were ashamed or hurt. There
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Epilogue
definitely were those who did not want to share anything with us. And there were also those
who talked with us off the record, who called us afterwards to request that we not include
their stories in our report, who told us not to call them again, even though they had previously
confirmed a meeting with us.
Yet the most striking part of the research was the expressions of the interviewees: their voices,
their silence, the look in their eyes, their glances away, in summary, the state of mind that was
reflected in their body language, which it is not possible to put into words or include in a report.
The feelings of a mother whose teenager had been offended because of a discussion against
Alevis at school, whose voice trembled and whose eyes were full of tears because of the reaction
her child faced from some of his friends and teachers because of his own reaction, who was
prepared to accompany her child to school every day just to protect him from trouble, cannot
be expressed warmly enough with pen and paper. Moreover, we can only describe in words the
stubbornness and adolescent rebellion of a teenager, and the cynical expression on his face
while he related this tragedy as if it was just a text to be read on the news: how he had been
beaten by who knows how many people, then humiliated by the police force although he was
one who was beaten, and how an inquiry had been instituted against him, all because he was a
leftist…78
Among the criticisms of the research, we were most surprised by the ones that seemed to feel
no empathy for the stories told in the report. Judging the stories told in the report in terms of
politics and failing to empathize with those who are different is an indication that the division
in Turkey has also made people insensitive to others.
A columnist for Taraf newspaper said in one of his columns that “the mind is a mechanism of
perception and selection.” I think what he meant here is that our minds distorted what is said
according to our perception and picked up views which we thought were similar to our own,
instead of what we had actually been told. However in our report, we mentioned that we did not
define incidents as “pressure” according to our own perception, while the interviewees did not
perceive some of the incidents as “pressure” which we thought were; in some other cases stories
that we never took as “pressure” were perceived by the interviewees as examples of “pressure.”
We also gave some examples of different forms of perception.
However, we expected that the minds who objected to our research would “perceive” and “select”
the people who had been humiliated because of their different identities, who had been beaten,
who had been marginalized, who were alienated from themselves, who faced discrimination
just because they were not supporters of the governing party and the communities, who were
exiled to remote places during their public service, whose job applications were rejected just
because they were the Roma or Alevis, who said they only felt themselves comfortable in their
own homes just because of their inborn identities, who were afraid of speaking in their mother
tongue on the telephone with their parents who did not speak Turkish, who wished to apologize
to the Sunnis just because they were Alevis. For instance, it is difficult to understand hearing
and not being touched by the childhood memory of an Alevi who witnessed elderly Alevis being
forced to cover their white beards with tar and were ridiculed with tin cans tied to the back of
their coats, and not being ashamed of this story not as a Turk but as a human being, considering
such stories in terms of politics only and remaining indifferent to them.
78 Tan Morgül, “Toplumsal Baskı ve Mahallenin Muhtarları”, Birikim, Vol. 238, February 2009, pp. 93-101.
139
Some critics found our research biased because the pressures on the Islamic segment were not
mentioned. We were even accused of having a colonialist point of view. For instance, we were
questioned about why we did not research the pressure which covered women or Turkish people
working in Germany faced. I find it difficult to understand why our work was criticized for not
researching a different subject rather than its announced subject. Judging even the subject of
our work is based on prejudice, as if we had to research all possible subjects. As it is not possible
for a social scientist to research each and every subject, accumulating information about society
is based on the studies of different social scientists on different subjects. In this respect there
are numerous works on covered women and Turkish workers in Germany as well as the Islamic
segment in the literature. On the other hand, I did not come across any studies on the secular
population before we commenced our research. That is precisely the reason we chose this
subject.
Another objection related to this research was the claim that we pointed to the Islamic segment
and the Fethullah Gülen movement as the responsible for otherization. The title of our research
was shown as the proof for this claim. If the research had been entitled, “Otherization on the
axis of religious conservatism”, this might give the impression that otherization only originated
from religious people. Yet, the word “and” we put into “otherization on the axis of religion and
conservatism” demonstrates that we do not identify conservatism with being religious. In
fact, we have also mentioned how the “ülkücü” ultra-nationalists have intervened with people
who think, dress or behave differently from the general public, such as leftist students, male
students with long hair or earrings, female students wearing mini-skirts or sleeveless blouses,
people who smoke in public places during Ramadan. We can hardly say that there is no religious
dimension to the “ülkücü” movement, nor we can say that there is no connection between
religion and conservatism. Indeed, there are many research projects demonstrating that these
two are closely connected. We mentioned several findings from these research projects in our
report. On the other hand, we made no oversimplification to the effect that all religious people
are conservative or that their personalities are repressive.
The majority of the criticisms have originated from the newspapers, magazines and television
channels that are closely associated to the Fethullah Gülen movement. These criticisms even
almost became campaigns against us. I would have expected a reaction and opposition from
the people I know and respect from the Gülen movement who were said to care about principles
such as dialogue, living together and cultural plurality and who were subjected to similar
repression, exclusion, humiliation and even violence due to their ‘Islamic identities’. However,
not only did they fail to oppose this reaction against our work, but also no one from that
movement raised a voice disapproving of repression, discrimination or otherization. No one had
taken the issue at hand seriously, and they all failed to show sympathy for the people we talked
about. Surely this was a heavy blow to the Gülen movement, which constantly appeals for
dialogue and the reconciliation of differences.
In many of the research projects that I have done and in some of the articles that I have
published, I dealt with issues about the ‘Islamist camp’ and I argued that they were
marginalized by the Republican elite and they were deprived of political power, social status,
intellectual prestige, were caricaturized, etc. I have openly expressed that to prevent female
students with covered heads from attending universities is a violation of rights. However, I don’t
think that the people from the Islamist camp are the only people who face repression in Turkey.
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This is why we took the people from outside the Islamist camp into account. Our assessment
indicated that being the other is problematic for every segment in Turkey.
In spite of the fact that they are aware of this background of mine, behind the Gülen
Movement’s campaign against us was, of course, the fact that there were sections of the report
that dealt with their activities. Gathering information about this subject was not one of our
goals. However, we had to include what the interviewees said about the Gülen Movement in
this report even though we had not asked about it. The people in this movement who care about
dialogue and tolerance should be concerned about the fact that the Gülen movement is the first
thing that came to our interviewees’ minds when they were asked about “repression”. Yet the
people running the campaign not only would not engage in any self-criticism, but their reaction
showed that concepts such as engaging in a dialogue or reconciliation cannot possibly be
relevant, since they are intolerant of hearing anything other than praise.
In none of the criticisms of the report have I encountered any questioning of the reliability
of the stories that were told us. The only mistake we were able to find was that the name of
a dish made with rice and meat that was offered to students in some dinner invitations was
actually “maklube” instead of “makrube”. In the column of Ekrem Dumanlı and Ali Bulaç
in Zaman, they claimed that this crucial mistake was proof of the frivolity of this report.
However, we had specified that we looked up the word “makrube” in both Turkish and Ottoman
Turkish dictionaries and could not find it. Moreover, the word “maklube” was not in any of the
dictionaries either.
We have reported in the book that there are many restrictions on the students staying at Gülen’s
“Işık Evleri” regarding how they should dress, what kind of music they should listen to, which
television programs they should watch, what type of books, magazines or newspapers they
should read, to what extent they can be friends with the opposite sex, how late they can stay out,
etc. We also related from the students stories that their lifestyles are shaped by the “older sisters,
brothers and preachers” with a point of view different from the philosophy they were exposed to
during their formation within Turkey’s system of education , that female students are cautioned
to cover their heads, because we suggested that these “Işık Evleri” be subject to inspection as
a result of these practices, we were accused of being ‘statist’, that is, defenders of the official
secular discourse which is totally against ‘Islamist’ tendencies.
It seems that since neo-liberal teachings have pushed the role of the state into the background,
it has been forgotten that today’s modern states are responsible for the availability of education,
health and services for all of its citizens alike, and that producing textiles, sugar or plastic shoes
is not in the same category as the education of young people. Probably because the concept of
the social state in Turkey is, to a great degree, nothing more than an article in the Constitution,
the services provided by the state in nearly every contemporary democracy are regarded as
symbols of old-fashioned statism.
The newspaper article by Ekrem Dumanlı that was published on December 22, 2008, in Zaman
is the best example of the campaign that was launched against us. The language and wording
he used to discredit our study, with comments such as “calamitous research”, “it has no
consistency”, “it carries traces of prejudice in every line”, “it distorts reality”, “it must have been
done in outer space”, is not the language and wording of the “real” scientific approach that he
seemingly cares for so much.
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He says that the most important reason for his opposition is that exclusion as such has no place
in Islam. Ali Bulaç has also expressed this view in his television broadcasts. Of course there
is no place for it. Like all other religions, Islam too teaches compassion, not to exclude people,
to be honest and correct, not to deviate from what is right, to help each other and to act with
solidarity. The really pious people that I have met in my life make the effort to acquire these
qualities. However, to argue that all pious people are this way is only possible when theology
and sociology get mixed up.
We did not come to the conclusion that the AKP or the religious communities are responsible for
the examples of repression and exclusion that are presented in our report. However, since our
findings were somehow related to either AKP or religious communities, we said that the leaders
and elders of the AKP and Gülen movements should pay attention to what we have discovered. It
is certainly important that a party or movement’s leader and opinion leaders are aware of what
is being done in the name of their organizations. It is important for them to take the necessary
precautions. Anyone who reads history knows what happens when ordinary people acquire
more power than they can handle.
As I have mentioned before, the aim of this research was not to examine the activities of the
Fethullah Gülen movement. Otherwise we should have done much more profound research on
the Gülen movement. We do not have sufficient knowledge about the aims of this movement, its
organization or its teachings. The issues that we focus on in our report are limited to what was
said to us. Therefore the findings of our research are not enough to draw general conclusions
about the Gülen movement. For example, a thorough examination of the aims of the opinion
leaders of this movement, as mentioned in an article published in the daily newspaper Zaman,
such as establishing good relations with the Christian world, receiving the non-Muslim and
Alevi population in Turkey with open arms, creating a dialogue with the intelligentsia, and, in
general, drawing the ‘introverted” and “otherized” masses away from radicalism and into the
modern world, would require much deeper research.
As mentioned in the same article, when dealing with communities with such blurred boundaries
rather than communities which clearly define their sphere of existence, it would be hard to
say who is a member and who is not. This is precisely why we wanted the Gülen community’s
opinion leaders to be aware of the results that are presented in this report and why we
mentioned the need for transparency with respect to the group’s sources of financing. In fact
, the Gülen movement differs from other religious communities in its schools, dershanes [prep
schools], dorms, media organs, commercial relations, financial power, conference/symposium/
conversational gatherings, etc.79 Attempts to control the members of such a widespread
community from a single center and ensuring that they behave in accordance with the
community’s opinion leaders is a significant problem for all such societal organizations.
In the article published in Taraf newspaper that I referred to above, it was stated that the
conservative camp has “bombarded” this research for all the right reasons. I personally think
that the reasons are different. Since I think that the criticisms of methodology coming from
this camp are quite weak, I argue that the real reason that we were “bombarded” was exactly
related to the ideological ‘separation into camps’ mentioned earlier in our report that I believe
has paralyzed the intellectual world in Turkey. Dialogues shaped within this environment
79 Since we used ‘religious community’ in our report, we did not change it in the book.
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are almost like monologues, since what is said revolves around the camp and stays within the
camp, rarely goes beyond mutual congratulation among camp members and which can only be
described as “talk” if it appears in quotation marks. It is not discussion conducted in the interest
of achieving common ground. The moment we started to get the first results of our research,
we knew that the conservative camp and “liberal intellectuals” would “bombard” it, just as my
earlier works were “bombarded” by the secular camp, as anyone familiar with the intellectual
environment in Turkey could imagine.
There are reactions directed at our study other than those I find to be balanced but which I
have not included here. They constitute an example of how issues are not really discussed in
Turkey, but that the pretense of the discussion or expression of ideas is functional, and is used
as a tool to the advantage of the “team” one belongs to. The worst part is that some of the
people adopting the functionalist approach are intellectual heavyweights with respect to the
formation of public opinion. In an intellectual environment where no one tries to understand
the other and bypassing arguments in discussions is the order of the day, anyone belonging to
one “team” accuses those on the other “team” of conspiracy, bias, being an informant and even a
traitor.
Within such an environment, some people commenting on the research findings went beyond
our report and either came up with conclusions we did not draw or distorted the report. For
instance, despite the fact that we indicated in our report that we were not of the same opinion
as those calling the army to do their duty or demanding that the AKP be closed, and that such
authoritarian measures would weaken the efforts of people working to discuss and eliminate
the problem, our concern was disregarded. While the Islamist section declared the research to be
“operational”, some “liberal” writers went a step further and blamed us for providing the “statewithin” with data, and some writers or commentators in the secular wing overlooked that fact
that such a schism in the society could actually be related to such authoritarian measures.
Some of the columnists making positive comments on the research said that it was in
contradiction with my former research and views. I think that it is not possible to deny that the
secularists have exerted pressure on the Islamists for years. There is no change to this belief of
mine.
Because the current research has been evaluated in terms of the worldviews of the
commentators, as all research is, a significant part of the findings of my previous research has
been ignored within the unilateralism of the culture struggle in Turkey..
For instance, the study, Religion, Society and Politics in changing Turkey, which I did with
my colleague Ali Carkoglu, was published under the aforementioned name in 2006 by TESEV,
and found a place on the public agenda in terms of the “turban” issue. We were criticized by
the secularists because we indicated that the rate of women with their heads covered was
approximately 10% lower than that in Religion, Society and Politics in Turkey, a study Ali
Carkoglu and I did, which was published under the aforementioned name in 2000 by TESEV.
Other findings were consequently overlooked.
However, the findings of the current research were evident in both studies. The previous
studies were conducted using surveys and random samples, thus were representative of the
Turkish population as a whole. The findings of these studies showed that distance from what is
different was evident especially among those defining themselves as religious. Kurdish, Alevi,
143
non-muslim, foreigner, homosexual and similar identities were among those least desirable as
neighbors, and in commercial life, shopping from or partnerships with religious people was
preferred. In addition, conservative attitudes, such as negative views on mini-skirts, people of
the opposite sex sitting side by side on intercity buses or male and female high school students
sitting together, increased proportionally with religiosity.
We mentioned in our 2006 study that otherization in Turkey was at a worrisome level:
Another significant observation we have made is that the electorate in Turkey is
in favor of a sectarian understanding of democracy. In Turkey, where the majority
of the population is Sunni, issues brought forward mainly by the Sunni sector such
as covering, religious high schools and religion lessons are assessed within the
framework of basic rights and freedoms, but a similar sensitivity is lacking when it
comes to the expression of rights by groups of different religious schools, religious
or ethnic background. This sectarian attitude is readily visible in approaches to the
various problems of Kurdish, Alevi and non-muslim citizens. In all such questions,
the proportion of those who are sensitive to minority rights is lower than those
who are not. Without a doubt, such a view obstructs the expansion and application
of rights within Turkey’s democratization process.
In connection with the above, it is possible to talk about the existence of a social
division of “us” versus “the others”. It is also an indication of the introversion of the
society. People do not appear to be enthusiastic about developing common values
within a multicultural social structure. Within this context, “us” refers to “TurkishMuslim-Sunni” and “the others” to Kurdish, Alevi and non-muslim. The majority
do not look favorably upon “divergent” personalities who defy social values and
norms. For instance, the most undesirable as neighbors are homosexuals. Distance
from what is different is also seen in the evaluation of foreign countries. Among
the citizens of 12 countries including those bordering Turkey and also including
Japanese, Brazilians and Europeans, those rated most frequently as “friends” are
Palestinians, Iranians and Saudis, all Muslims. The lowest ranking on the list
are Armenians, followed in equal numbers by Israelis and Americans and then
by Greeks. Similarly, the percentage of people convinced that people from other
religions could be good decreased from 89% in 1999 to 72% in 2006. Attitudes
reminiscent of xenophobia were observed in many issues, including restrictions on
missionary activities and the monitoring of the commercial activities of the Jewish
population, and religious communities are increasingly more visible in the economic
sphere.
…The most significant finding of our study is the existence of a dual social structure
in terms of values, culture, worldview and political choices. It is as if two clearly
delineated societies coexist in Turkey. On the one hand, there is a sector that is more
urban, better educated, of relatively higher income, consisting of people who do
not feel bound by religious dictates and who describe themselves as secular. On the
other, there is the section of society that is more rural, less educated, of relatively
lower income, consisting of people who define themselves as Islamist and religious.
From this standpoint, we might say that with the increase in economic development,
urbanization and educational opportunities, these two sectors will grow closer.
However, to state that this duality will resolve itself, when it continues to exist and
has become even more chronic in its metamorphosis despite the recent economic
144
Epilogue
development and urbanization in Turkey, may be a gross oversimplification. In this
sense, educational policies that will help resolve this dual structure and bring the
two sides closer together become ever more significant.
Discussions on the turban had overshadowed the findings and warnings Çarkoglu and I
expressed in our report and on television programs in 2006, and the issue of the “other” did
not find a place on the public agenda. To the people who believe that the current study cannot
be taken seriously because it was accomplished using the interview method rather than the
survey method, the use of which would have ensured the representation of the whole of Turkey,
I suggest that they re-read the aforementioned study, which used the survey method they so
clearly trust. When one considers this along with other studies, it is evident that the problem
of otherization in Turkey is not limited, as claimed, to a series of separate, individual cases
involving only a few people.
It is probably unnecessary for me to reiterate that the fact that some so-called “liberal”
columnists and commentators in Turkey behaved in accordance with the “team” spirit
mentioned above instead of protecting the rights of people subjected to pressure, insult,
exclusion and even violence has nothing to do with the philosophy of rights and liberties which
forms the basis of political liberalism. In the same manner, it is difficult to understand how
people who define themselves as good Muslims, and by implication, highly conscientious, can
be insensitive to the heartbreaking stories mentioned in the report. I am not even sure how to
address distorted written or verbal criticism to the effect that the research findings somehow
object to religious obligations.
There is a certain myth in the public mind in Turkey that has stood the test of time. According to
this myth, the majority of the public is extremely tolerant and open-minded, and has accepted
a multicultural way of life alongside people of different identities. Directly opposite are the
“secularist”, repressive republican elite siding with the army and the “state” who protect this
elite. There is an undeniably true facet to this myth. There definitely is such a republican elite,
but not everyone sensitive about the issue of secularism falls into this category. Of course
there has been a repressive state mechanism throughout the history of the Republic, but not all
incidents of repression are limited to the state. Pressure by ruling parties, religious communities
and the ordinary public also exists. If this is not acknowledged, it is both easy and inevitable for
various segments of society to be crammed into categories to which they do not belong.
I believe that the reason why this study has become a center of attention and subjected to so
much reaction is that it demonstrates the inadequacy of such plain-sailing categorizations. For
instance, it shows that the state is not an incorporeal entity, and that the governing party is
very much part of the state mechanism. It pointed out, for example, that it was not the state, as
declared in one of the televised discussions, that prevented the Alevi community from building
a prayer house (cemevi) , but the AKP mayor of Sultanbeyli. It showed that the banishment of
self-defined “secular” state employees, teachers, nurses and doctors was accomplished not by
an immaterial specter of the “state” but by directors, as in the past, whose allegiance lies with
the governing party. Despite the claims of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security regarding
employment based on merit demonstrated in examinations, the research uncovered the
necessity for an explanation as to why the increase in the number of members of the Memur-Sen
union oriented to the government from 42,000 in 2002 to 315,000 in 2008 was not proof of the
formation of cadres.
145
In a similar manner, the research also revealed another fact that social science theoreticians
have been aware of since the 1970s, but is only vaguely recognized in the Turkish experience.
It demonstrated that, in contrast to the modernization paradigms of the 1950s and 1960s, the
expectation that economic development would be accompanied by social and cultural change
leading to the social adoption of modern values was not realistic. If what is meant by “the rapid
modernization of religious people, leaving the old community values behind and forming into
new communities within a more global atmosphere” is integration into the production and
consumption society, then I totally agree. However, if “modernization” also applies to ideas,
which I think it definitely should, both the findings of our research and the reactions of the
religiously-oriented people to our study demonstrate that no such modernization has taken place.
As we stated in the report, one is filled with hope for the future of Turkey when one visits the
Anatolian cities as a “tourist” and sees the wide boulevards, five-star hotels, gigantic shopping
malls and brand-new buildings. Unfortunately, when one observes from the inside, the feeling
of hope is replaced by one of distress. The religious “new middle class” and “communities
incorporating modern values” that have been mentioned for so long do not at all promise to
bring us a life of greater freedom.
Another claim questioned by the findings of the research is the statement that this cultural
schism in Turkey is in fact related to class conflict, and that part of the “secular” elite, unable
to integrate with global economic structures and thus turning its back on the modern world, is
reacting to the success of the religious entrepreneurs. Such a view overlooks the fact that, for
example, the Gülen movement, as far as we are told, is involved in practices against those who
are not in its ranks, such as restricting publicity through limiting advertisements, preventing
shopping, posing difficulties in public tenders, boycotting businesses providing intermediary
services. In addition, it assumes that public employees with no hope of integration into the
global economy and ordinary workers denied the opportunity to work in municipal construction
jobs because of their differing identities dream of becoming global actors despite their barely
adequate living conditions, and are in class conflict with these global actors. I do not think that
large companies who have accommodated to the global economy, who are neither dependent on
the state nor members of the “Islamic” sector of the society, have any such concerns.
The acceptance of multiculturalism has never taken effect on its own accord in societies where
prejudice, exclusion and otherization existed. For instance, the election of a black president
in the US in 2008 was possible because of the civil rights movement in the 1960s under the
leadership of President John F. Kennedy and black leaders, and its continuation by subsequent
governments. Racist Americans who used the word “nigger”, almost a swear word, in the 1960s
to refer to blacks did not come to the realization all by themselves that it was unacceptable.
The fact that there is not a single American brave enough to use the word “nigger” in the public
arena today is not an outcome of their preference. The federal government stopped financial aid
to public schools and universities that did not meet certain quotas regarding the ratio of black
students or academics. Despite protests and demonstrations by white parents, school buses
carried black students to schools attended by white children and vice versa. A similar conflict
took place in the United States regarding discrimination against women.
We are convinced that unless a similar struggle takes place in Turkey, the grave picture painted
by the findings of our research will not change. We stated that the ultimate aim of our research
was to inform both the government and the opposition to assist in the attempt to dispel the
146
Epilogue
increasingly deepening social division regarding secularism through the implementation
of policies involving common sense and consensus as opposed to authoritarian measures,
to support the strengthening of rule of law respectful of human and citizen rights, and to
eliminate prejudice and discrimination against people with different identities through a total
mobilization strategy making use of good citizen education. The reactions have indicated that
this was not a very realistic aim, despite the existence of a minority who shared it.
It is not possible to ascertain how much longer this fighting will continue unless we arrive at
a common understanding. Since it is also a political struggle, every research conducted, every
thought expressed, is open to distortion dependent on to whose advantage it is. Establishing
a common understanding is only made possible in the first place by empathy, by listening to
others, and by everyone and every sector of the society being able to say to others, “We hear you
and will take measures to ensure that you will never again experience this distress.”.
Binnaz Toprak
Istanbul, February2009
147
148

Being Different in Turkey

Transcription

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