christian huynh pass tam

Transcription

NORMS AND PRACTICES
IN CONTEMPORARY RURAL VIETNAM
SOCIAL INTERACTION BETWEEN
AUTHORITIES AND PEOPLE
Cover, maps and Layout: Mikael Brodu
ISBN 978-616-90282-7-7
© IRASEC, October 2010
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted,
in any form or means, without prior permission of the author or the publisher.
The opinions expressed in these papers are solely those of the author(s).
A collection under the supervision of Benoît de Tréglodé
Norms and Practices
in Contemporary Rural Vietnam
Social Interaction between Authorities and People
Christian Culas, Nguyễn Văn Sửu & Nguyễn Thị Thanh Bình
Edited by Christian Culas & Nguyễn Văn Sửu
Carnet de l’Irasec / Occasional Paper n°15
L’Institut de recherche sur l’Asie du Sud-Est contemporaine (USR 3142 –
UMIFRE 22 CNRS MAEE) s’intéresse depuis 2001 aux évolutions politiques,
sociales et environnementales en cours dans les onze pays de la région. Basé à
Bangkok, l’Institut fait appel à des chercheurs de tous horizons disciplinaires et
académiques qu’il associe au gré des problématiques. Il privilégie autant que
possible les démarches transversales.
The Research Institute on Contemporary Southeast Asia (USR 3142 – UMIFRE 22),
based in Bangkok, Thailand, calls on specialists from all academic fields to study the
important social, political, economic and environmental developments that affect, together
or separately, the eleven countries of the region (Brunei, Burma, Cambodia, Indonesia,
Lao, Malaysia, The Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Timor-Leste and Viet Nam).
COMITÉ DE PILOTAGE
• Bénédict BRAC de LA PERRIÈRE
(Case-CNRS-EHESS)
• Stéphane DOVERT (MAEE)
• Guy FAURE (CNRS-IAO)
• Christophe JAFFRELOT (CNRSCeri)
• Christian LECHERVY (MAEE)
• Jean-Francois SABOURET
(CNRS)
• Benoît de TRÉGLODÉ (Irasec)
• Marie-Sybille de VIENNE (Inalco)
COMITÉ SCIENTIFIQUE
• Jean BAFFIE (CNRS - Irsea)
• Romain BERTRAND (CNRS-Ceri)
• Sophie BOISSEAU du ROCHER
(Asia Centre-Sc. Po)
• Christian CULAS (CNRS-Irasec)
• Alain FOREST (Paris VII)
• Emmanuel POISSON (Paris VII)
• Yves GOUDINEAU (EFEO)
• William GUERAICHE (Université
américaine de Dubai)
• Jacques IVANOFF (CNRS-Irasec)
• Rémy MADINIER (CNRS-Irasec)
• Vatthana PHOLSENA (CNRS-IAO)
• Hugues TERTRAIS (Paris I)
Table of Contents
Localisation maps ........................................................................................................... 7-11
Introduction — by Christian Culas & Nguyen Van Suu
Social Interaction between Authorities and People in Contemporary
Rural Vietnam: Evidence from Three Case Studies ..........................................................13
Chapter 1 — by Christian Culas
A failed "success story" for Tourist Development Projects in Tam Dao:
Gaps between Laws and their Application ......................................................................21
Introduction ........................................................................................................................................21
I - Temples, Farmers and Tourist projects: are these the key ingredients
in the making of a success story? ...............................................................................................24
1 - Den Thong village and Tay Thien Temples ..................................................................24
2 - Agriculture and tourism: income security and opportunities ...................................26
3 - Why tourism services have not yet become the main activities
of Den Thong villagers? ....................................................................................................29
II - A brief history of local projects in Den Thong village ...........................................................32
1 - Project 1: Building a parking lot in the heart of the rice fields (2005-2006)..............33
2 - Project 2 Phase 1: Extension of the tourist area to 51 ha,
resulting in the village centre being consumed (2007-2009) .......................................35
3 - Project 2 Phase 2: Tourist complex zone of 163 ha
over four villages (2009-2011) ..........................................................................................37
4 - Project 3: Tay Thien Cableway and Tourist complex area for 170 ha
on four villages (2009-2013)..............................................................................................40
III - Sources of tension and conflicts between local administration and villagers..................43
1 - How land was "officially" reclaimed three months before
the official decision of the province ................................................................................44
2 - One law, two practical applications ...............................................................................45
3 - With official decisions often being contradictory,
how can one find a suitable solution? ............................................................................47
IV - What are the possibilities to file a complaint or to have one’s rights recognized? .........50
1 - Requests of information and complaint procedures....................................................50
2 - Forms of resistance to the tourism development projects ..........................................52
5
V - Key elements in understanding the current tensions
between villagers and local authorities .................................................................................... 55
1 - Questions about the future of the village:
are they taken into account in projects?......................................................................... 56
2 - Who are considered “project stakeholders” and by whom?...................................... 57
3 - Assumptions on the basis of the relationship
between authorities and the people ............................................................................... 60
VI - What are the possibilities of governance within a complex legal framework? ............... 66
1 - A hierarchy of norms at the foundation of law............................................................ 66
2 - Forms of local governance and expressions of civil society....................................... 70
Conclusion .......................................................................................................................................... 74
Chapter 2 — by Nguyen Van Suu
Agricultural Land Claims in the Red River Delta during Decollectivization .................. 79
Introduction........................................................................................................................................ 79
I - State Laws and Regulations about Claims to Land
in Contemporary Vietnam .......................................................................................................... 81
II - The Practices of Villagers’ Claims to Land since the Decollectivization Period:
The Case of Red River Delta Villages ....................................................................................... 83
III - Consequences: Local Conflicts................................................................................................. 91
IV - Implications: The Importance of Property Rights ................................................................ 94
Conclusion .......................................................................................................................................... 96
Chapter 3 — by Nguyen Thi Thanh Binh
Practical Norms and Gaining Legitimacy in Ha Nam Province........................................ 99
I - Profane Power ............................................................................................................................. 102
II - Tolerance and Sentiment in the Building of Legitimacy .................................................... 109
III - Rebuilding Trust and Decision: “Enter into the Hearts” of People................................. 115
IV - Conclusion ................................................................................................................................ 122
Bibliography ..................................................................................................................... 125
6
Vietnam
Cao Bang
Ha Giang
Lai Chau
Lao Cai
Tuyen Bac Can
Quang
Yen Bai
Dien
Bien
Lang Son
Son La
Ha Noi
Quang Ninh
Hai Phong
Thai Binh
Thanh
Hoa
Tuyen
Quang
Nam Dinh
Lang Son
Thai
Nguyen
Nghe An
Vinh
Bac Giang
Phuc Ha
Noi Bac
Ninh
Hai
Ha
Tay Hung Duong
Yen
Hoa Binh
Hai
Ha
Phong
Nam
Phu Tho
Thanh Hoa
Ha Tinh
Quang Binh
Thai
Binh
Ninh
Binh
Quang Tri
Nam Dinh
Thua Thien-Hue
Da Nang
Binh
Phuoc
Tay Ninh
Quang Nam
Binh
Duong
Hô Chi Minh
Kon Tum
Dong Nai
An
Giang
Dong
Thap
Can
Tho
Kien
Giang
Quang
Ngai
Long An
Binh
Dinh
Gia Lai
Tien Giang
Vinh
Long
Hau
Giang
Ben Tre
Ba RiaVung Tau
Phu
Yen
Tra
Vinh
Dac Lac
Soc Trang
Tay Ninh
Bac Lieu
Binh
Phuoc
Dak
Nong
Lam Dong
Binh Thuan
An Giang
The following provinces are
municipalities with the province status:
Ha Noi (Thu Do Ha Noi)
Hai Phong (Thanh Pho Hai Phong)
Da Nang (Thanh Pho Da Nang)
Hô Chi Minh (Thanh Pho Hô Chi Minh)
Can Tho (Thanh Pho Can Tho)
Hô Chi Minh-Ville
Khanh
Hoa
Ninh
Thuan
Kien
Giang
Ca
Mau
0
100
200 km
7
8
LAOS
Dien
Bien
Lai Chau
CHINA
Son La
Lao Cai
In grey, the 3 provinces where field studies were conducted
Noi Bac
Vinh
Phuc Ha
Thai
Nguyen
Bac Can
Bac Giang
Lang Son
Cao Bang
0
Ninh Hai
Ha
Duong
Tay
Hung
Yen
Hoa Binh
Ha
Thai
Nam
Binh
Nam
Ninh
Dinh
Binh
Thanh
Hoa
Phu
Tho
Nghe An
Yen Bai
Tuyen
Quang
Ha Giang
100
Hai Phong
Quang
Ninh
200 km
CHINA
Northern Vietnam
Bac Ninh Province
BAC GIANG
Yen Phong
Bac Ninh
Tu Son
Que Vo
Tien Du
Gia Binh
HA NOI
Thuan Thanh
Luong Tai
HUNG YEN
HAI DUONG
The * marks where field studies were conducted
9
Ha Nam Province
HA TAY
HUNG YEN
Duy Tien
THAI BINH
Kim Bang
Ly Nhan
Phu Ly
Binh Luc
HOA BINH
Thanh Liem
NAM DINH
NINH BINH
10
Vinh Phuc Province
TUYEN QUANG
THAI NGUYEN
Tam Dao
Lap Thach
Tam Duong
Vinh Yen
Binh Xuyen
Phuc Yen
HA NOI
PHU THO
Vinh Tuong
Yen Lac
Me Linh
HA TAY
11
12
Introduction
Social Interaction between
Authorities and People in
Contemporary Rural Vietnam:
Evidence from Three Case Studies
Christian Culas & Nguyen Van Suu
Since the 1980s, while trying to maintain political stability and territorial
integrity, the Vietnamese state has strongly moved towards the transformation
of a centrally-planned economy to a more market-oriented model, in which
private, foreign and joint-venture businesses are increasingly becoming the key
pillars of the national economy. Another key aspect of the Đổi Mới’s agenda
was a fundamental shift in the party-state’s foreign relations policy toward a
normalization of Vietnam’s diplomatic and trading relations with China, the
United States, and other countries since the early 1990s. Over twenty years after
the Đổi Mới renewal renovation, Vietnam has been praised by various domestic
and international institutions for its “impressive” achievements in socioeconomic development and poverty reduction and for its gradual liberalization
and market diversification, coupled with its commitment to equality.
Consequently, this has changed the relationship between the party-state and
society in a number of fields, including the control of agricultural land and other
forms of natural resources.
Such transition marks a great change in our scholarly understanding of
Vietnam. It has opened the door for intellectual exchange between academics
and has resulted in a great amount of research and new knowledge/publications
in different languages about various domains regarding Vietnamese society,
including the relationships between the state and society at different levels and
in various sectors or geographic areas. Among them, studies like those of
13
NORMS AND PRACTICES IN CONTEMPORARY RURAL VIETNAM
Kerkvliet,1 Fforde2 and others3, have developed the “everyday politics
approach”, which examines social interactions on an everyday action basis. This
approach "from below" has given a fresh impetus to the study of social relations
in Vietnam.
However, our observations regarding academic research show that besides
a number of rich ethnographic studies, there are many analyses from different
social science disciplines that give a generalized view of trends of development
and change in Vietnamese society over the past decades with limited field data.
This means that research projects based on first-hand data from longer periods
of fieldwork and qualitative investigations are still inadequate. As a result, we
are suggesting that more field-based research be carried out in order to enhance
and promote our understanding of Vietnam, especially its processes of sociopolitical changes.
This Occasional Paper will contribute useful elements for understanding
the social, political and economic dimensions of contemporary rural Vietnam.
For epistemological and methodological reasons, the observations on social
interactions in this paper were often made at a micro-level: individual
actors/farmers, family, village/community. This has enabled the authors to
engage in thorough descriptions and multi-layer analyses and to provide
1
Ben Kerkvliet 1995 “Village-State Relations in Vietnam: The Effects of Everyday Politics on
Decollectivization”, Journal of Asian Studies, 54 (2): 396-418; Ben Kerkvliet 2001 “An approach
for analyzing state–society relations in Vietnam”, Sojourn, 16 (2): 238–78 ; Ben Kerkvliet 2003
“Authorities and the people: An analysis of state–society relations in Vietnam” in Luong Van Hy
(ed.) Postwar Vietnam: Dynamics of a transforming society, Singapore : ISEAS, pp. 27–53.; Ben
Kerkvliet 2005 The Power of Everyday Politics: How Vietnamese Peasants Transformed National
Policy, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
2
Fforde Adam, 1986, “The unimplementability of policy and the notion of law in Vietnamese
Communist thought”, Southeast Asian Journal of Social Science. No. 1.; Fforde A., 2003,
Decentralisation in Vietnam – Working Effectively at Provincial and Local Government Level – A
Comparative Analysis of Long An and Quang Ngai Provinces. Report by A. Fforde and Associates
Pty Ltd for AusAID. November 2003, Online, p. 92; Fforde A., 2005a, “Vietnam in 2004: Popular
Authority Seeking Power’, Asian Survey. January/February 45 (1): 146-152.; Fforde A., 2005b,
“Farmers' Organizations in Vietnam - Rural Members of an Emerging Civil Society?” in Towards
Good Society: Civil Society Actors, the State, and the Business Class in Southeast Asia -Facilitators
or Impediments to a Strong, Democratic, and Fair Society? Berlin, Heinrich Boell Foundation, pp.
173-192.
3
David W. H. Koh 2006. Wards of Hanoi. Singapore: ISEAS.; Vasavakul Thaveeporn, 2006,
“Public Administration Reform and Practices of Co-Governance: Towards a Change in Governance
and Governance Cultures in Vietnam’ in Active Citizens Under Political Wraps: Experiences from
Myanmar/Burma and Vietnam, The Heinrich Boell Foundation, Southeast Asia Regional Office, pp.
143-165.
14
SOCIAL INTERACTION BETWEEN AUTHORITIES AND PEOPLE
explanations from a variety of perspectives, all based on first-hand field data.
Furthermore, this methodology has enabled them to assume that, in order to
understand a complex system of socio-political interactions in transition such as
in contemporary rural Vietnam, it is necessary to begin with concrete situations,
to describe the specific context of each situation and to analyze the many
articulations underpinning the observed actions.
Regarding the issue of social interaction between the people and
authorities respectively,4 we call for research to avoid seeing the state
organization in Vietnam as a single institution with a mono-focus orientation.
This means it is necessary to describe the party-state system with its different
levels and its various institutions, which on the one hand pursue a single aim of
socialist orientation, while sometimes and in some cases entail a number of
actions that are often contradictory or competitive to each other.5
The social and cultural anthropological approaches used in this paper
provide us with the capacity to give a field-based description of socio-political
situations in Vietnam in order to ‘enter the heart’ of human relationships, their
dynamics and their real or apparent contradictions. The pre-established and less
flexible methods would not have this ability to stick to different observable
realities. By studying data from daily actions, we can highlight a few principles
on how the relationship between population and authorities could make possible
the chances for good governance and civil society expression.
In addition to the different chapters in this study, with each being based on
specific cases,6, the overall goal of this Occasional Paper is to offer a new look
into the social interactions between the different actors/institutions in
contemporary rural Vietnam, especially local and higher central authorities with
4
Joel S. Migdal 1994. “The state in society: An approach to struggles for domination” in J. S.
Migdal, A. Kohli, and V. Shue (eds.) State power and social forces: Domination and
transformations in the Third World, , Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, pp. 1–34; Ben
Kerkvliet 2001, “An approach for analyzing state–society relations in Vietnam”, Sojourn, 16 (2):
238–78 ; Ben Kerkvliet 2003 “Authorities and the people…”.
5
Ben Kerkvliet 2003, “Authorities and the people…”; David Koh 2006, Wards of Hanoi…; for a
Thai case, see Andrew Turton 1989 “Local powers and rural differentiation” in G. Heart, A. Turton,
and B. While (eds.) Agrarian transformations: Local processes and the state in Southeast Asia,
University of California Press, pp. 70–97.
6
In what follows, we do not always distinguish between different forms of administration (groups,
committees, boards and institutions) and local authorities (state officials) because they usually
operate together.
15
different actors of society, including farmers, entrepreneurs, local cadres,
intellectuals, etc.
This occasional paper emphasizes several points:
First, this study is to prioritize some "methods of approach to reality “is”
that are as flexible as possible and most productive empirically7.” What the
authors want to highlight are the views of different actors and different
perspectives: those of various administrative bodies, the legal entity, the local
group (farmers, traders, women, etc.) in order to be able to analyze their
interactions and the power games that are established.
Secondly, tensions seem to be dominant in all three case studies. However,
we are not claiming that this reflects a general situation. This is, however, the
case in the areas where fieldwork for this study was conducted. This is related to
governance and especially "good governance", which is the objective of many
development projects, and has a direct relationship with the norms and their
applications. Norms and their application will be two transversal topics in this
study. Governance can be defined descriptively as one form of balance between
official norms (laws, regulations) and enforcement of these norms (the actual
practices observed). The game plays between norms and practices are also a
major theme in our research. Similar to China and other countries, it is argued
that in Vietnam there are significant differences between official norms
governing these institutions (the Communist Party, People's Committee,
People's Council, etc.) and the real behaviour of their agents8. It is the
articulation of these differences that will bear our analysis. Again, the
qualitative approach will stay closer to the realities and their complexity.
Thirdly, for each case study, understanding the contexts in which words
and actions are expressed to show the relationships between population and
authorities are important. Strong causal links exist between the social, political
and economic contexts as well as the quality of their relationships, and therefore
will be discussed in detail throughout the text. On the other hand, the
relationships between population and authorities are an important part of the
7
Olivier de Sardan (2008 : 6).
The official standards are not confined to laws or legal rules (rules of law). For example, they may
take on the form of special agreements, local ordinances, administrative or professional procedures;
but in the field of public policy or professional practice, they are necessarily formalized or codified,
and express requirements, like in a "manual". In other words, official norms are; in this field, close
enough to the sense that the neo-institutionalists give the word "institution" (rules of the game).
(According to Olivier de Sardan 2009a: 1).
8
16
governance process9, consequently a crucial observation spot of social and
political life and a true place of debate in Vietnam10.
Fourthly, we believe that our descriptions can be of valuable evidence in
present relevant situations and of use to assess the current history of sociopolitical changes, assuming that current transformation processes will directly
affect these relationships. These descriptions and interpretations are also
arguments to show that the transition process in the economic and legal spheres
(especially in the production of laws) are much more advanced than in politics,
including forms of local governance and civil society expression.
We will look at every social situation, their legal frameworks and the
issues underpinning their implementation. Our approach to society will not be
normative. We do not seek to define what is "good", “correct” or “not”. Instead,
we are trying to describe and uncover how relationships between population and
authorities "work" in different realities, therefore, new empirical evidence in the
debate on the causality between the development of governance and civil
society and economic development (measured primarily by growth). This debate
was launched by Janos Kornai in his book The Road to a Free Economy.
Shifting from a Socialist System: The Example of Hungary (1990). Since then,
further studies have been made on these assertions both on China11, on Cuba12
and on Vietnam13, with even a global perspective in a comparative analysis of
economic performance and governance of the above countries by two
economists from the French Development Agency (AFD), Nicolas Meisel and
Jacques Ould Aoudia (2008).14 In brief, all links of direct cause and effect
between the economic development and the development of governance and
civil society are at their best just hypothetical in orientation and in many welldocumented cases irrelevant.
9
"By taking the concept of "governance" in a purely descriptive, analytical and empirical method,
we will define it as an organized form of any issue of public goods and services or collective
according to specific logical norms. This issue can occur in a liberal or bureaucratic way, centralized
or decentralized, client or despotic, formal or informal, market-oriented or the state. It may be
efficient or not, focus on quality goods and services or not." (Olivier de Sardan 2009a: 4).
10
Salemink 2003, Vasavakul 2006.
11
Sing Ming (1996) and White, Howell and Shang (1996).
12
Betancourt (2007).
13
Beresford and Dang (2000) and Paquet (2004).
14
2008, Is “Good Governance”: a Good Development Strategy? Paris : Agence Française de
Développement (AFD), Working Paper N°58, January 2008, p. 72
17
Each chapter in the book is a specific case study of social interactions
between people and authorities around three main themes related to the
relationship between population and authorities in contemporary rural Vietnam:
1) the build up phase of tension and conflict with attempts at conciliation and
bottlenecks; 2) the conflict phase in itself with the respective actions of parties
to defend their positions; 4) the post-conflict phase when the situation returns to
normal, whether it was resolved or not. We noticed immediately that there was a
phase 3, which deals with the tensions in conflict transformation in other
aspects, but this is not discussed in detail here, even if it is implicit in the three
chapters.
In chapter one, ‘A failed « success story » for Tourist Development
Projects in Tam Dao: Gaps between Laws and their Application’, Christian
Culas examines a buffer zone village of Tam Dao National Park, which received
four successive development projects in tourism since 2005. The author sees the
projects and their applications as an arena in which specific exchanges between
villagers and the various administrations in village take place. This shows the
genesis of tensions and conflicts around the purchase of land and promises of
direct employment in projects for expropriated villagers, as well as repeated
attempts from farmers to request clarification and justification on projects. This
explains the modes of expression and protest the villagers use against the
administration.
In chapter two, entitled ‘Agricultural Land Claims in the Red River Delta
during Decollectivization’, Nguyen Van Suu analyses and explains conflicts
over the holding and utilization of certain areas of agricultural land between
groups of villagers, and between villagers and cadres in Bắc Ninh province. The
author also illustrates the forms and the extent of such conflicts and exposes the
root of collective claims to land by villagers during the process of agricultural
decollectivization. Throughout the chapter, he argues that there exists not only a
major gap between official norms and the practices of the villagers, but also a
space for the villagers to move around what the party-state wants to do and how
the people in society struggle for their daily needs. All of the above shows the
importance of land property rights and indicate how the everyday practices of
land holdings and land use have influenced the official norms of the party-state
over the question of land ownership, management and land use in contemporary
Vietnamese society.
In chapter three, Nguyen Thi Thanh Binh offers a case study of ‘Practical
Norms and Gaining Legitimacy in Hà Nam Province’, which shows, in a post18
conflict context, how local officials are "assessed", appreciated or rejected by
villagers according to various criteria. These criteria are both objective, such as
corruption and governance effectiveness, but also more subjective (criteria) such
as the adaptation of the "envelope theory" (to pay the administrative legal fee or
not) depending on the level of wealth seekers and their family and emotional
proximity. Ms Binh’s article also shows how the application of certain national
guidelines for local cultural expression, such as the renovation of Đình temples
and pagodas, can be initiated by local officials to anticipate or meet the demand
of the village for identity and symbolic expressions. For their part, villagers are
actively involved in renovations and cultural incentives controlled by the Partystate, but have also rediscovered the concrete symbol of their local identity,
which had remained silent for 50 years. The game of power and authority are
organized symmetrically, but not always in a balanced manner, making it
difficult or improbable to formulate an explanation with nomological arguments
or simply in terms of linear causality.
19
20
Chapter 1
A failed "success story" for Tourist
Development Projects in Tam Dao:
Gaps between Laws and their
Application
Christian Culas
Introduction
The main objective of this paper is to describe and to understand the
various relationships between villagers and local authorities through different
tourism development projects in rural areas. These links, relationships, tensions,
conflicts and various negotiation methods will bring to light how different
groups of local actors can use, and sometimes abuse rules and norms, and even
the law, to their advantage. Based on one specific case study, we will analyse
the main sources of tension and conflict. Furthermore, we will examine
Vietnamese administrative procedures and the possibility for people to
communicate with authorities.
This research paper is based on the case of the village of Đền Thõng,
which is the centre of the four tourism projects included in this study, and on
four neighbouring villages within the Đại Đình commune. Despite the
geographic and demographic limits of this research work, we consider that the
issues observed within this site are not isolated cases, and that they reveal more
general problems concerning the relationship between the population and
administrative bodies in rural Vietnam. Our second objective is to show that the
detailed situations exposed herein (with) can be thought of as revealing the more
or less common relationship patterns between the population and local
authorities.
21
The research site15, Đền Thõng village (Đại Đình commune, Tam Đảo
district, Vĩnh Phúc province), is located on the Tam Đảo massif piedmont. The
famous Tây Thiên complex of Buddhist temples belongs to Đền Thõng village
territories. Đền Thõng is an agricultural village, in a buffer zone within Tam
Đảo National Park, that has benefitted from a significant source of income from
tourist services over the last ten years. On their own initiative, either with very
little or no support from the government, local farmers have progressively been
trying to transform their professional activities in order to integrate an
increasing number of tourism services and trade.
Between 2005 and 2013, the government, the Communist Party Congress
and Vĩnh Phúc provincial authorities have planned to organize four tourism
projects centred on the Tây Thiên temples and Đền Thõng village. These
projects were, are and will be organized on an individual case basis, and thus
take on various sizes and forms in order to suit different objectives. These
projects have had a profound impact on the economic and social life of local
villagers.
The idea of writing this paper stemmed directly from situations we
observed in July 2008 and September 2009 in Đền Thõng village. Indeed, the
villagers stand at the crossroads of several important issues that are key in
understanding the changes in Vietnamese society since the reforms of the Đổi
Mới renovation. Firstly, these development projects are either entirely or partly
State-run as part of a series modernization programmes taking place in rural
15
Fieldwork data has been collected in July 2008 and September 2009 during the Training
Workshop “Anthropological Survey Methodology” on Tam Dao Summer School 2008 and 2009
organized by Claude Arditi (EHESS – Paris), Christian Culas (CNRS – IRASEC) and Olivier
Tessier (EFEO – Hà Nội). Each year, a group of 16 to 20 trainees and coordinators (Claude Arditi,
Christian Culas and Olivier Tessier) have collected data and documents in the commune and villages
for one week, and presented a first level of analysis for Tam Dao Summer School. I would like to
sincerely thank Claude Arditi, Olivier Tessier and the trainees for their work and their knowledge of
the local situation. Full texts of 2008 workshops have been published (see Culas and Tessier, 2008).
There are documents available online in French and Vietnamese: http://www.tamdaoconf.com/;
http://www.reseau-asie.com/cgibin/prog/pform.cgi?langue=fr&TypeListe=showdoc&Mcenter=article_standard&my_id_societe=1&
PRINTMcenter=&mot_cle_show=&ID_document=594;
http://www.efeo.fr/publications/ligne.shtml;
http://www.vietnam.ird.fr/fr/centre/actualites/parutions.htm. Full texts of 2009 workshops are
published in Arditi, Culas and Tessier «Atelier. Enquêtes de terrain : méthodes et flexibilité.
Formation en sociologie et anthropologie et organisation du recueil des données», in Lagrée S.,
Cling J.-P., Razafindrakoto M., Roubaud F. (eds.), Les Journées de Tam Đảo. Stratégies de
réduction de la pauvreté : approches méthodologiques et transversales, Université d’été en Sciences
Sociales, 2010, Editions Tri Thuc, Hà Nội. [http://www.tamdaoconf.com/ available online for free in
July 2010 in French and Vietnamese].
22
Vietnam. Here, we are trying to understand how large-scale development
projects at national or provincial levels can integrate social, economic and
relational local practices. Other issues that arise involve preparations for such
projects, such as feasability surveys, studies on their eventual social, economic
and environmental impact and the prominence given to local people. As these
projects require a significant degree of communication between the various
administrative bodies and the villagers who are directly affected by them, we
will try to understand the mode of contact, exchange and perhaps dialogue and
negotiation between them. Finally, the logical continuation of the previous
question, through the degree of communication and exchange that can be
observed around tourism development projects, leads to asking what forms of
governance can become more effective and what is the role of civil society
groups in the dialogue between macro (State, province) and micro (village,
families) levels?
For methodological reasons, this paper includes a long descriptive section
which will allow the reader to enter the local context, sometimes complex and
multifaceted, and will raise the villagers' positions on various projects,
particularly those in which compensation is offered for expropriated land and
for future insurance. Then, we will analyze in detail the relationship between
villagers, government administration and private companies involved in these
projects. In the first chapter, we will introduce the main social and economic
components of the village. In the second, we will give a summary of the four
projects, focusing on their impact on village land management and the panel of
compensation put forward by local authorities. In the third, we will analyse
some major communication and understanding problems between villagers and
local authorities. In the fourth, we will show the main possibilities for villagers
to make demands and complaints to have their rights recognized, and the
villagers' reaction to this issue. In the fifth, we will explain some key elements
in understanding the current conflict between villagers and local authorities. In
the sixth, we will show how the problems experienced by this village are part of
more widespead issues on the hierarchy of norms and local governance. In the
conclusion, we will try explain why, after a variety of five-year relationships
with different administrations and despite a majority of villagers supporting the
implementation of new projects and the transformation of their professional
activities, many are now opposing them as the conditions in which they are
being established do not appear positive and do not represent enough security
for the future.
23
I - Temples, Farmers and Tourist projects:
are these the key ingredients in the making
of a success story?
1 - Den Thong village and Tay Thien Temples
Đền Thõng is one of the 15 rural villages within Đại Đình commune, in
Tam Đảo district, Vĩnh Phúc province, and is located 80km North of Hà Nội
City. The population is made up of 699 habitants (160 families), of which 60%
are ethnic Kinh (Vietnam's national ethnic group) and 40% are ethnic Sán Dìu
(Miao-Yao linguistic family). Inter-ethnic marriages between them are highly
common. For this study, there is no significant difference between Sán Dìu and
Kinh farmers. The projects affect all lands.
According to the 2007 commune data, 70 families (38% of the total
population) are involved in regular services and commercial activities that are
directly and indirectly related to tourism. During the annual religious festival,
almost all the villagers work for tourist purposes. The average income for Đền
Thõng is 6.5 million VND16 per person per year. At the commune level, the
average income is 5.5 million VND per person per year. In the village, the
number of families "officially classified" as "poor" is estimated at 9.4%, amply
less than at the commune level, which is 21.5%.
Comparisons between income, percentage of poor households and living
conditions in Đại Đình commune and Đền Thõng village clearly show that the
economic situation is much better in Đền Thõng than Đại Đình17 as a whole.
However, not a single main road goes through this village and means of
communication are poor. As a result, special means must be taken to go there.
This village is located on the buffer zone, in the western part of Tam Đảo
National Park. Located 30km from Tam Đảo city, the Đền Thõng-Tây Thiên
site is well-known for its pagoda, beautiful forests, streams, waterfalls, and
grottoes. From the centre of the village in the National Park, a mere 5km trail
along the river takes one to Tây Thiên Quốc Mẫu Temple18, at the height of a
complex of several Buddhist temples including Thiền Viện Trúc Lâm Tây
16
In 2009-2010, one euro = 25,000 VND.
Culas and Tessier, 2009.
18
Literally "Temple of East Heaven National Mother".
17
24
Thiên, a famous centre of Vietnamese Zen Buddhism19 and many pagodas in the
mountain. This complex was classified as a "National Historic and Cultural
Heritage" site by the Ministry of Culture and Information20.
Tây Thiên “remarkable Bouddhist temples”
The site, with its temples and pagoda, situated in a valley, counts among the most
meaningful places for Buddhism in Vietnam. Tây Thiên is located northwest to Chat Dau
Valley in the Tam Đảo National Park area. The site contains 4 temples and pagodas,
situated a beautiful valley with a river and a waterfall. Tây Thiên is known to be the
source area for Buddhism in Vietnam. The whole area has a size of approximately
250 ha.
The valley and its temples can be visited on a hiking trail within 6 hrs walk (including
return to the entrance). The trail is approximately 5 Km long (one way) and easily
accessible because of its hiking trail with natural stone pavement and stairs at the
steeper parts.
During the period between February and April (the first two months of the Lunar
Calendar), the site is visited by up to 1000 visitors per day, who are coming for the
Festival. This event is celebrated according to the Lunar calendar. Tây Thiên is a wellknown location for fulfilling wishes, which are addressed to the temples21.
Before 1995-1996, Đền Thõng was a quiet agricultural village with some
complementary economic activities centred on the mountain forest in the eastern
side of the territory and some seasonal migrations for work. 1996, the date of
Tam Đảo National Park's creation22, marked the beginning of the first religious
tourists coming to visit the modest and difficult to access Tây Thiên Quốc Mẫu
Temple23 at an altitude of 530m. Since then, some local families have started to
organize part of their space and time to provide services, religious materials
(incense, candles, flowers, votive objects, etc.), food and beverage, especially
for pilgrimages that take place within the first two months of the Lunar
calendar.
19
With the Dalat Truc Lam Monastery and Truc Lam Yen Tu, Tây Thiên is one of three biggest
monasteries in Vietnam. It was totally rebuilt in 2005-2006 by the best craftsmen in Vietnam, for 30
billion VND (1.2 million euros).
20
Decision 1371/QD-VHTT, 3rd August 1991.
21
Otto, 2006, p. 4.
22
March 6th 1996, the Prime Minister issued Decision No. 136/TTg. On June 15th 1996, Tam Đảo
National Park was established with a total area of 36,883 ha at an altitude of 100 m a.s.l upwards.
23
For example, the book Vietnam's Famous Pagodas (originally in Vietnamese) published in 1995
by Vo Van Tuong and Huynh Nhu Phuong (Art Publisher) does not mention the name of Tây Thien
Temple or other pagodas in this area.
25
Limits of Official Data
Official data on the economic and social activities of the commune's People’s Committee
are not perfectly reliable for two reasons. First, data collectors are not experts, but rather
civil servants, nurses, and local teachers, who are often poorly trained, provided with few
tools, and almost no methodology. They do, however, collect required data willingly in
order to provide the People's Committee with information to draft reports. Second, these
reports are written with targeted objectives. Party instructions, as well as those of the
province and district, are sometimes divergent or even contradictory. These reports are
used to prove good results have been achieved at the economic and “cultural24” level,
which can provide access to the status of “cultural family”, then “cultural village” and
“cultural commune”. These reports can also be useful during periods of difficulty or of
dynamic growth in allowing the commune to obtain aid and other developmental support
from the province. These reports are written with two goals in mind: showing higher
authorities that the commune has “good results” and highlighting the difficulties in
obtaining development grants. All these reasons show that the contents of these reports
are "oriented" and therefore must be used cautiously after a critical reading and
contextualization. Without detailed knowledge of the situation, it is impossible to interpret
these reports responsibly and effectively.
2 - Agriculture and tourism:
income security and opportunities
We will be studying the local situation on a more descriptive level based
on survey data and opinion polls. Interviews were carried out with a variety of
people ranging from the vice-president of the People’s Committee of Đại Đình
to the itinerant vendors who are regularly pursued by the police, and also
include several officials from the village of Đền Thõng, religious leaders and
laymen of different temples, the majority of store owners with shops leading up
to the temple, the Director of Hotel Văn Hóa, and of course the many villagers
who have been "expropriated" for different projects. The objective is to
24
In this specific context the notion of "culture" refers to specific social standards applied first at
family level (gia đình văn hoá). The four main criteria: a) have a stable economic life that gradually
develops, b) have a cultural, moral, healthy and wealthy (such as children’s school attendance,
respect of moral values: no conflicts, no gambling, no drugs, no prostitution, etc.), c) have a clean
and beautiful environment and landscape, d) implementing the law properly and the options and
policies of the Party and State (Minister of Culture – Information of Vietnam, 01/02/2002, Decision
No. 01/2002/QD-BVHTT).
26
understand the reasons and constraints of the development of tourism in this
rural area that lies far from main roads.
The Đền Thõng village economy is organized around three different
complementary activities. The primary source is agriculture (rice, livestock,
vegetables, charcoal production, tea, and alpine medicinal plants). The second
source of income comes from the influx of cash from the many migrants such as
masons, carpenters, and an increasing number of factory workers. The third
source of income comes from tourism-related activities: the sale of religious
goods, food and beverage, and a delivery service for pilgrim offerings along the
5km path up the mountain to Đền Thương temple. This last activity is physically
demanding and poorly paid. It is therefore handed over to the peasants in the
outlying villages of Đền Thõng.
Đền Thõng is the district's main attraction after Tam Đảo city. The Zen
Monastry and Meditation Institute of Trúc Lâm Tây Thiên and Tây Thiên
pagoda and temples network offer an unique cultural, tourist and natural
potential, especially for religious pilgrims during the first two months of the
Lunar calendar (February to April). Nevertheless, this famous religious spot is
deserted the rest of the year. The main difference between Đền Thõng and other
villages in the proximity of Tây Thiên is their capacity to generate significant
yet irregular income from tourist services since the mid-1990s.
On the one hand, in the interviews carried out, those responsible for Đại
Đình commune’s People Committee and Đền Thõng village regard the current
economic transformation of Đền Thõng village in a positive angle, giving us
figures on the income per inhabitant, the very low percentage of "poor"
households, and highlighting the fact that 100% of households are made of brick
and that there is at least one motorbike per family, etc.
On the other hand, farmers and families who engage in mixed activities
(agriculture and tourism) clearly outlined other complex elements of reality.
Each family emphasized the economic difficulties and the lack of confidence in
the future of the area's economy.
Many families underlined their current economic and social difficulties by
enumerating the family members who worked outside the village and the
commune. They thus emphasized that despite having a slightly higher income
thanks to tourism, they still had to migrate to find jobs.
27
There are many reasons to migrate, with commune services ranked as the
main factors in their decision to leave (Collectif 200825).
Among the important factors highlighted by the villagers are the "lack of
good farm land" and the "low yields of local crops", which together are
economically unprofitable. The second factor is related to the lack of investment
or the inability to develop secondary economic activities such as raising
livestock, growing medicinal herbs, or creating small businesses. The third is
characterized by the more or less forceful rejection of rural lifestyles. This stems
from the specific position of migrants with diplomas from urban institutions as
well as those who have spent many years in an urban context and who only
return to their villages a few days each year. They often return for the lunar New
Year holidays or for large family events such as weddings, construction of new
homes, or funerals26.
Personal accounts, as told by families and data colected from the 2008
socio-economic development report, contrasts with the consensual discourse
held by local authorities who insist on the good economic performance of the
village. For many farmers, the future is very dark and uncertain: locally,
employment opportunities are scarce, there are too few outlets for their crops,
and there no possibilities for career advancement27. This is why these economic
migrations are thought to be vital. Even though migration is short-term with
long periods back in the home village, especially to participate in the economic
activities of the festival in the first months of the year, its tendency is on the
rise.
We will see further along this study that the different tourist projects have
diminished the available surface of farm lands to such an extent that villagers
have stated that if there is not a massive number of non-agricultural jobs created
very quickly, dozens if not hundreds of families may have to migrate to survive
in these new conditions. Migrants work as construction labourers in Hà Nội and
Hồ Chí Minh city, as well as in factories surrounding the major cities. Families
have stated that a large part of their earnings is sent back to family members in
the village to help them directly. Many families hope that the tourism projects
will soon materialize so that their husbands, brothers and children can come
back to live in their home villages. Since 2000, in addition to the flow of
“Socio-economic Development Report 2006– 2007, Đại Đình commune”, 2008.
Interviews made in 2008 and 2009.
27
Culas and Tessier, 2009.
25
26
28
seasonal migrants that are a part of village tradition, long-term migration has
become more and more common.
There is no doubt that tourism, in different aspects, contributes to improve
the quality of life in Đèn Thõng village and a few surrounding villages because
Tây Thiên temple and its festival attract thousands of tourists and pilgrims every
year. But several Đèn Thõng villagers said, "profits from tourism vary
depending on the kind of activities and location." The first shopkeepers, who
bought their land and built shop in 1994, three years after the Tây Thiên temples
were classified as a National Historic and Cultural Heritage site (1991), took up
the best business shops along the path leading from the valley until Tây Thiên
Temple. Newcomers do not have a choice in terms of location to set-up shop
and must deal with the increase of land price28. This new form of local
competition has started to create strong tensions between villagers because of
the pressure on land acquisition for small business developments. Several times
during interviews, villagers emphasized this new problem and did not have any
solution to reduce the tensions.
We made the following notes from the interviews and economic reports to
allow an overview of the contrasting economic situation of the village: in the
claims made by local leaders, the economic results are good and the future
seems assured; however, according to local villagers, their life is difficult,
sources of income are limited, and the future does not only seem uncertain, it
looks darker. We will see below that these contrasts in opinion between official
discourses (relay of national instructions and propaganda) and information given
by villagers (with questions unanswered) are probably a sign of profound
disagreement on how to understand the economic reality and the future of local
development projects.
3 - Why tourism services have not yet become
the main activities of Den Thong villagers?
All tourist development projects planed in Đền Thõng are based the same
hypothesis: because the project requires a big part of the agricultural and
housing lands, villagers should invest in tourism services. This implicitly
assumes that these new activities could be profitable for local families, and that
28
Culas and Tessier, 2009, p. 312 and interviews made in 2008.
29
the villagers should accept this major change. We will see below that this
assumption is based on the authorities' low level of awareness of social and
economic realities in the villages, and no surveys have been conducted to assess
the profitability of these new activities and to record the will of the people to
participate in various projects.
Now, let’s look at how, despite the supposedly high tourism potential, only
some families have converted their business to tourism. From fieldwork data,
we have defined three main reasons.
Firstly, it is because tourist activities in Đền Thõng-Tây Thiên are only
concentrated in two months per year (March-April). Some texts from the
provincial administration tout the qualities of this site and its high potential of
attraction, and refer to the passage of 2000 pilgrims per day to make offerings to
the three temples in the mountains. However, they neglect to mention that these
streams of pilgrims and visitors are concentrated within a very short period. To
quantify these statements, we made a graph from the Hotel Văn Hóa’s
“Customers Register”, the only hotel in Đền Thõng, from May 2006 to April
2007.
Number of customers at Hotel Văn Hóa (2006-2007)
350
Guests
300
250
200
150
100
50
0
May
2006
Jun
2006
Jul
2006
Aug
2006
Sep
2006
Oct
2006
Nov
2006
Dec
2006
Source: Culas and Tessier, 2009, p. 313
30
Jan
2007
Feb
2007
Mar
2007
Apr
2007
Customers during the months of March and April represent 83% of the
yearly total. The most active three months are March, April and May, which is
89.4% of the annual total. It should be noted that most pilgrims and visitors do
not spend the night in Đền Thõng, but in absence of other forms of quantitative
data (there are no records of the numbers of pilgrims and visitors, no official
parking tickets), the above figures best help to explain why the villagers insist
on saying that tourism activities do not thrive all year round. In Đèn Thõng, the
tourist trade is thus merely one among other components of the local economy,
after agriculture and the influx of money sent by migrants.
We know that this situation is common to many seasonal attractions in
rural areas. In this context, the "sustainable development" of commercial
activities in the village is not guaranteed. Local practices and interviews show
that most Đền Thõng households who left agricultural work to become fully
involved in the tourist trade are failing29. Many reasons can explain these
failures: lack of experience in tourism services, investment in a non-profitable
store in brick, irregularity of tourists, etc. But these failures are particularly hard
for households that have lost their farmland by "expropriation" in 2005 and
2007 for the development of Tây Thiên tourist Project 2 Phase 1 (51 ha).
Pressure on land acquisition at the village level is high, and today the
"expropriated” households do not have the possibility to rent or buy "quality"
farmland in the vicinity, as they were able to do before these projects. All of the
above helps to understand the farmers’ position vis-à-vis the expropriation of
large areas of farmland.
Secondly, due to the number of shops selling ritual and religious material
and food and beverage being already significant and all of them being located in
the best business locations on the trail leading to the temples, new shops, on less
strategic places, would have less income. According to their experiences, people
say that establishing new stalls on the pilgrimage route may reduce the income
of former traders and bring about new difficulties30.
The third reason is that since 1998, when the first shop in concrete and
bricks was built, every year the number of tourists has not been regular. For
example, between 1997 and 1998, there was an 11% decrease. Between 2002
and 2003, because of the global SARS epidemic, the decrease was around 16%.
However, tourist activities increased by 17.8% between 2006 and 2007. But
29
30
Interview in 2008.
Interviews made in 2008 and 2009.
31
between 2008 and 2009, we notice a decrease of 11%. These figures for the
number of tourists for the whole of Vietnam31 give us an idea of the
unpredictable variations that may affect this site. They can also show how
difficult it is for local shopkeepers to put their trust in an activity such as
tourism to become the family's main, and sometimes only, source of income.
The above reasons show that the villagers see tourism only as a
complementary activity, because of the short period in which the pilgrimages
take place and the uncontrollable movements from one year to the other. Most
villagers are interested in investing in tourism services, but for the majority,
they are not worth abandoning farming altogether, which has throughout the
years provided a modest but very stable income. However, the expropriation of
land belonging to families for projects has deprived them of 80% of their
irrigated rice fields. The choices available to them are limited. Some try to find
alternatives between rice cultivation and tourism activities at 100%. This is the
case with wild pig and porcupine farms. But by participating in the state’s
interests, they can receive state grants, because the goal for this region is to
“develop tourism on a massive scale32”. Many times during interviews, villagers
said they did not understand the state’s stubbornness and the fact that local
authorities are pushing so strongly to move solely towards tourism. The
villagers try proposals to diversify their income with fruits and flowers grown
from domestic or wild areas (orchids) and with medicinal plants, but their
demands do not reflect the interests of the state. The smoke-and-mirrors nature
of this tourism scheme and the lack of study in these projects’ profitability are
preventing other possibilities for integrated and sustainable development from
taking shape, even when they are at the initiative of the villagers themselves.
II - A brief history of local projects
in Den Thong village
Between 2005 and 2010, Đền Thõng village received three development
projects, with the second project being organized in two different phases. We
will make a short introduction to each project with the key elements (technical,
financial, economic, social and legal implications) necessary to understand them
and to reveal how control over land changes over time.
31
General Statistics Office of Vietnam, http://www.vietnamtourism.com/f_pages/news/index.asp?loai=2&uid=5112
For details, see Chap. V – Some keys to understand the current tensions between villagers and
local authorities, 3.b) The character "priority" of major development projects and law enforcement.
32
32
Poster of the Tây Thiên temples complex (Photo: Team Tam Dao Summer School 22/09/2009).
1 - Project 1: Building a parking lot in the heart
of the rice fields (2005-2006)
Project 1 is entitled "Construction of a parking lot in Đền Thõng”. From
October-November 2005, 1.05ha of terrain was purchased from 38 families at
the request of the Tam Đảo district People’s Committee and the Đại Đình
commune People’s Committee. The land represented Đền Thõng's irrigated rice
fields and produced 2 harvests a year. Filling and grading of the lot took place
very quickly so that the car park would be functional for the Inauguration of the
Meditation centre and the Zen Monastery of Thien Truc Lam Tay, on November
27th 2005. In May 2005, at a formal meeting, commune and village authorities
announced the recovery of 10554.7 square meters of land, which was to be
allocated to private company Bình Minh for the construction and operation of
car parks at Đền Thõng. According to the meeting announcement, each
household with land in the recovered area would be compensated with
9,843,000 VND/sào33, vocational training, exemption from registration fees for
educational purposes and financial assistance for students. Vĩnh Phúc Province's
People's Committee published the Official Decision34 concerning the operation
of land recovery for the development of tourism activities on January 25th 2006,
i.e. three months after the implementation, construction, and economic
33
34
Pháp Lý 09/2009. One sào = 360m². 9.843.000 VND/sào = 394 euro/sào.
Decision N° 226/QĐ.
33
development of the parking lot. We will see how the allocation of "reclaimed
land" before the official provincial decision would constitute the core of a
protracted conflict.
“Eight feet tree” front of Đền Thõng temple (Source: C. Culas 21/09/2009)
34
To buy these lands, intermediaries of the Bình Minh Company have met
many difficulties. Here are the main reasons that we have collected from
villagers. Some families accepted their proposals easily because they have other
lands. Others hesitated but were not given time to think it through, because
authorities, sometimes with the help of the police35, pushed them to sign, while
others refused because this is their best land for rice production. Facing farmers
that were too hesitant, intermediaries of Bình Minh Company told them “this is
a project supported by the People’s Committee of Vĩnh Phúc Province and Tam
Đảo district36”. As a result, many farmers ended up accepting out of respect
towards an official adminstrative decision.
2 - Project 2 Phase 1: Extension of the tourist area
to 51 ha, resulting in the village centre being
consumed (2007-2009)
Project 2 Phase 1 began in 2007 and was extended over a two-year period.
Its goal was to build a complex for spiritual tourism over 51.1ha37 of land
named « The Famous site of Tây Thiên – Tam Đảo – Vĩnh Phúc38 ». The project
went well beyond the central area of the village of Đền Thõng. A development
map on both sides of the river Suối Trường Sinh was produced in 2006. It went
more than 3km from the temple in the village of Đền Thõng, above the Đền
Thượng through the “Silver Waterfall”. On the map, we can see many solid
structures, probably old and new stores39.
All the land purhased or recovered belonged to the village of Đền Thõng,
with the majority of the best rice fields disappearing under roads and buildings.
More than 60 families were forced to sell their land at a compensatory rate of
12.6 million VND/sào40 Villagers were promised compensation in paddy,
tourism training courses for themselves and their children, exemption from
registration fees for educational purposes and financial assistance for students,
35
Interviews made in 2008 and 2009, and Pháp Lý, 09/2009.
Interviews made in 2009.
37
The 30ha announced in the media does not include the roads and empty spaces of the central part
of the project. The central project's total area is in fact 51.1 ha. We do not have the exact surface
information regarding the project that involves the land running along the river beds of the stream
that runs from Den Thuong temple. However, it does cover several hectars.
38
“Khu trung tâm lễ hội Tây Thiên”
39
Map reproduced in Otto, 2006, p. 46. We have not presented it here because of the poor quality of
the document.
40
505 Euros/sào.
36
35
since they would no longer be able to live from farming. The project is under
the administrative responsibility of the Tam Đảo district People’s Committee,
while the Lạc Hồng Company is in charge of building and operating the site.
This project has had a significant impact on productive activities and
household economics due to the expropriation of rice fields and the ensuing
prohibition to farm them. This new context forced villagers to participate more
actively in tourism whenever possible or to migrate to other regions where more
stable work was available.
General map of the "Tây Thiên - Tam Đảo - Vinh Phuc Famous Site " 2007-2009,
total area of 51.1 ha. (Source C. Culas 07/2008)
One of the main differences between Project 1 and Project 2 Phase 1 is the
creation in 2006 of the “Tây Thiên Tourism Management Board” whose
intension is to develop ecotourism in co-operation with Tam Đảo National Park
and the Buffer Zone Management Project (TDMP)41.” This initiative carried the
promise for better functioning projects and especially greater communication
between local populations and authorities. We will see a little later that the Tây
41
Otto, 2006, p. 42.
36
Thiên Tourism Management Board follows the top-down management logic
most often seen in Vietnam.
3 - Project 2 Phase 2: Tourist complex zone
of 163 ha over four villages (2009-2011)
The Project 2 Phase 2 has officially been designated as the “Development
Projects for Construction in the Central Area for the Tây Thiên Festival42”. It
involves the building of a tourism complex providing spiritual, cultural and
leisure activities year-round. The duration of the construction project is
scheduled to last two years (2009-2011). Four villages in the commune of Đài
Dinh will be included in the project area: Đền Thõng, Sơn Đình, Ấp Đồn, Đồng
Lính. The total project area is 163 ha43. Đền Thõng village is the central area in
the project and 131.8 ha of agricultural land, houses and businesses will be
expropriated. The rate of compensation provided goes up to 31.6 million
VND/sào44. The official decision of Vĩnh Phúc province’s People’s Committee45
involves the moving and relocation of 163 households and 800 people. Some
households lost 80% of their productive land, their homes, their businesses and
their cemeteries. 50.005m² for resettlement will be reserved, but no information
on surface areas for residential and commercial purposes has been given. The
precise location of new houses and shops has not yet been shown. Many key
issues arise in daily papers. Despite the villagers’ repeated requests from the
commune, district and provincial officials do not provide them with answers.
This phase of the project is under the administrative responsibility of Vĩnh Phúc
province’s People’s Committee. The construction and operation of the site is
entrusted to the Lạc Hồng Company.
According to the provincial decision of 27/07/2009, the schedule for the
implementation of the work is as follows:
• 8/2009: Publishing the Decision of the general plan for compensation
from those who have recovered the land
• 9/2009: Promulgating the Decision of land recovery and doing a
detailed census of land and property
• 12/2009: Checking and approving the compensation plan details
“Dự án đầu tư xây dựng phát triển khu trung tâm lễ hội Tây Thiên”.
baotuyenquang.com.vn Theo VNN 06/12/2009.
44
1264 Euros/sào. The cost of land according to their status has been published on 27/07/2009 by
« Decision N° 2279/QD-UBND » Vĩnh Phúc province’s People’s Committee.
45
Decision N° 2279/QD-UBND, 27/07/2009: "Approval of the general plan of compensation,
support and settlement services to the book: the central area of Tây Thiên cultural festival.”
42
43
37
For our study, it is interesting to note that the Inauguration of the official
opening session of the Đền Thõng-Tây Thiên cable took place on December 5th
2009 (see illustration below). Thus, the early stages of construction of Project 3
(Cable car system and more) will take place even before the compensation plan
for Project 2 Phase 2 has been “checked and approved”. As Project 2 Phase 2
and Project 3 use basically the same areas of land expropriated, it is very likely
that works (05/12/2009) have commenced before the whole legal process has
been completed (late December 2009). This specific issue is one of the main
causes of tensions between villagers and authorities. The first reason for these
tensions being: the project starting before the official opening date is considered
by authorities as "out of regulations promulgated in the official decisions."
Below, we discuss in detail the case of land expropriation in the parking lot in
November 2005, whose "formal decision of expropriation" was only received in
January 2006.
Second temple (Đền Cậu) along the trail. In 2011-2012, a cable station will be built here at an
altitude of 120 m. (Source: C. Culas 21/09/2009)
38
General map "Development Projects for Construction in the Central Area for the Tây Thiên
Festival" 2009-2013, total area 163ha (including the surface of Project 2 Phase 2).
(Source: N.H. Manh, 22/09/2009)
39
4 - Project 3: Tay Thien Cableway and Tourist complex
area for 170 ha on four villages (2009-2013)
December 5th 2009: Opening cerenony of Tây Thiên cableway project.
“Comrades: Trịnh Đình Dũng, member of Party Central Committee, Secretary; Nguyễn Ngọc
Phi, Deputy Secretary of Provincial Committee, president of province’s People’s Committee; Phùng
Quang Hùng, member of Standing Provincial Party Committee, Permanent Vice-Chairman of
province’s People’s Committee and delegates participating in inaugurating the construction of the
cultural centre and festivals Tây Thiên cableway project.” (Source: Vĩnh Phúc Province official
website, Quang Nam 46)
Project 3 is called “Tây Thiên Cultural Centre Festival and Cable Car
Project for the Relics of the Famous Site of Tây Thiên.”47. The opening
cerenony of the Tây Thiên cableway was held on December 5th 2009 with in the
presence of important personalities from the country and the region. This project
is under the administrative responsibility of Vĩnh Phúc Province People's
46
http://www.baovinhphuc.com.vn/front-end/index.php?type=ARTICLE&fuseaction=DISPLAY_SINGLE_
ARTICLE&website_id=1&channel_id=314&parent_channel_id=312&article_id=14145, accessed
24/02/2010.
47
“Trung tâm văn hóa lễ hội Tây Thiên và dự án cáp treo lên khu di tích thắng cảnh Tây Thiên”, from
http://tinmoi.phanvien.com/338/vinh-phuc-260-ty-dong-cho-cap-treo-tay-thien.html; 06/12/2009.
40
Committee. The investments come from the State budget and the Lac Hong
Company is responsible for operating the site.
The main differences between Project 2 Phase 2 and Project 3 are:
1. The project’s thematic focuses on a cultural festival and the relics of
the Tây Thiên temples – this guidance is summarized by the slogan: « Đến
với Phật, về với Mẫu » ("Come to the Buddha, return to the Mother48”).
2. The construction of a cable car to reach the temple that lies above, Đền
Thượng (see illustration “Main entrance”), with three intermediate stations
to reach the temples of Đền Cậu and Đền Cô and the "Silver Waterfall”
3. The programming of the project is different in time.
The total area of the project is 170 ha49. The total project costs amount to
547 billion VND50.
There are some contradictions between the different sources of information
on Project 3. Step 1 (2009-201051) mobilized 482 billion VND52 for the Tây
Thiên cable (2400m long), for the cultural centre for festivals and for
resettlement areas for expropriated inhabitants.
Step 1 of this project will see constructions over 27.73 ha, with 1.73 ha
devoted specifically for the cableway with 3 intermediate stations 53. The most
important part of the cable will be inside Tam Đảo National Park. Works
concretely started in December 2009 and will be completed in 2011. French
company Poma will build the cable.
However, we could not find any sources giving financial details or surface
estimates for Step 2 (2011-201254). We only know that the province wants to
increase tourism and administrative services, such as postal services and
banking, and develop a rural market.
It is surprising that Step 1 will develop over an area of 27.73 ha and will
utilize 482 billion VND, while the development of the 146.27 ha remaining will
use only 65 billion VND. Step 1 has 16% less surface area yet uses 88% more of
the budget.
48
Here, Mẫu (“Mother”), in the religious and mythical context, as in Tây Thiên Quốc Mẫu Temple
(literally "Temple of East Heaven National Mother")
49
http://tinmoi.phanvien.com/338/vinh-phuc-260-ty-dong-cho-cap-treo-tay-thien.html
50
Around 21.88 million euros. http://tinmoi.phanvien.com/338/vinh-phuc-260-ty-dong-cho-captreo-tay-thien.html
51
vietnamnet.vn, 05/12/2009.
52
19.28 million Euros.
53
Official website of Ministry of Culture, Tourism and Sport.
54
vietnamnet.vn, 05/12/2009.
41
We have also noted that Project 3 of the draft no longer involves
construction such as the building of hotels, restaurants, spas, etc. It was
precisely around this infrastructure and its potential demand for staff that
villagers whose possessions have been expropriated hoped to gain from. But
again, official documents and communications made by local authorities do not
let the villagers have a clear vision of their future and nor of the opportunities
for mass conversion (163 families) to tourism services55.
Villagers interviewed in 2008 and 2009 only have vague information on
current projects. They say the authorities and the Tây Thiên Tourism
Management Board do not inform them of anything. Only a few people have
seen project map of 163 ha – Project 2 Phase 2 (see illustration) but without
understanding how the project will be organized in terms of space and time.
For example, Mr. T.V.S. from Đền Thõng, one of the interviewees, said in
September 2009:
“Since 2006, I am opposed to the project of the parking lot and other larger
ones, because there are legal problems. I have discussed these problems with my
family, my neighbours and my friends in the village. I was directly threatened
with being arrested by the district police if I did not stop rallying people against
the project. I heard of a big project on the river Suối Trường Sinh which
descends from the Valley of the Temples: a 70m high dam with an artificial
waterfall and pass underneath the road, there is a lake with a bridge, with same
design of the Perfume Pagoda…”
Rumours or relevant information?
Among official documents, the "Detailed Planning for buildings (at
1/2000e scale), central area for Tây Thiên festivals, Project plan to use land"
map (see illustration) dated July 2009, signed by provincial, district and
communal authorities, points out the creation of an island in the northern lake
that is 400m wide by 450m long (18ha.), with a bridge for access. The
development on the river Suối Trường Sinh does not appear on the maps that we
have obtained.
In September 2009, we also met a geometer team that was laying
landmarks for future construction. When asked what will be built here or there,
they said they did not know the specific objective of their work, and were not
aware of the cable car. They have obviously been instructed not to give
information on the project.
55
According to official website of Vĩnh Phúc province: http://tnmtvinhphuc.gov.vn/index.php?nre
_vp=News&in=viewst&sid=1711, 22.07.2009. Consulted 15/01.2010.
42
Project 3 is probably an extension or transformation of Project 2 Phase 2,
but the types of planned construction and timings are different. We do not have
access to official documents of Project 3, such as administrative decisions and a
map of how the land shall be used.
III - Sources of tension and conflicts between
local administration and villagers
A synthesis of the tension and conflicts will help us to have an overview of
the situation.
In 2005, 1.05 ha of the best paddy fields were expropriated without official
permission. In 2007, these expropriations reached 51 ha in the heart of the
village, and farmers are still waiting in vain for the infrastructure (restaurants,
hotels, tourist information centre, etc.) and what would be given in compensation for the deadweight losses due to the sale of their land. Until now (March
2010) nothing has been done. No precise information has been given, no
explanation has been advanced by the authorities, despite numerous formal and
informal requests.
In 2009, the phenomenon reached a considerable scale: a 170 ha project,
with 131.8 ha expropriating all of Đền Thõng’s best rice fields and those of
three neighbouring villages, and most houses and shops in the centre of Đền
Thõng and its tombs56. The need for replacement activities is becoming urgent.
Migration to the cities could be accelerated due to the lack of land, and the
authorities have not provided specifics, either in terms of relocation (where,
when? under what conditions?), or in terms of new business activities (which
jobs? for whom? what types of training?). Based on the important issues that
give rise to the conflict between authorities and villagers, we propose an
analysis of the complex processes at the foundations of these tensions.
All the relationship issues were collected during the 2008 and 2009
interviews, and some were detailed in Gia đình & Xã hội (Family & Society
Journal) and Pháp Lý (Legal Journal). For this chapter, we will retain only those
that allow us to highlight functional or structural problems in exchanges
between the administration and the population. Other problems, such as those
56
Decision N° 2279/QD-UBND on 27/07/2009, « Approval of plan for compensation, support and
settlement services to the project: the cultural center area of the festival Tây Thiên », Vĩnh Phúc
province’s People Committee.
43
related to corruption, insider trading, and abuse of power by officials and local
police will not be discussed here. The newspapers have amply covered the topic.
The analysis of tension and conflict can primarily be found in a grid
proposed by Albert Hirschman in his book Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Responses
to Decline in Firms, Organisations, and States (1970). In different political
contexts, he shows that relations between conflicting social groups can be
described and analyzed in 3 complementary angles: Loyalty: it is the acceptance,
without visible resistance57, of constraints and pressures produced by one group
over another. Voice: the group that suffers the constraints will speak out to try to
start a dialogue, a negotiation with the antagonist group. Exit: it is the refusal of
the group to enter a forced relationship with the oppressor group, the action of
avoiding contact.
1 - How land was "officially" reclaimed three months
before the official decision of the province
On January 25th 2006, Vĩnh Phúc Province People's Committee Decision
No. 226/QĐ-UBND concerning the recovery of 10.723 m2 of land in the area of
Tây Thiên (Đài Dinh commune, Tam Đảo District) to be allocated to the
People's Committee of Tam Đảo District to build a parking lot on the Tây Thiên
site was made. In fact, the surface of the parking lot was already filled and
levelled on November 27th 2005 for the inaugural ceremony of Tây Thiên's Trúc
Lâm Zen Monastery. Villagers pointed out that in fact the land in question had
been recovered, developed, and paid off through the car park rental three months
before the publication of the province's official decision. They state that this
shows that “the local district and the commune authorities made all these
transactions before receiving the written agreement from the province58”.
The first issue is that the province's official decision giving the order to
"recover" Đền Thõng's land came 3 months after the implementation of the
decisions taken by the district and commune. This seeming "detail" will become
the crux of conflicts between villagers and district and commune authorities,
which had still not been resolved in March 2010.
57
For everyday forms of resistance, often invisible and difficult to grasp in sociological surveys, see
Michel de Certeau, in L’Invention du quotidien (The Invention of Everyday), 1981: the « stratégies
d’accommodement », “compromise strategies” of social groups without official power.
58
Đền Thõng villagers’ letter of complaint (2009) and Gia đình & Xã hội, 22/01/2010.
44
The villagers understood that the district and commune authorities did not
comply with the province’s decisions regarding the procedures for expropriation
and compensation. They also know they have very few effective means to claim
recognition for their rights. This leads to a loss of confidence in local
authorities. Several villagers expressed directly, and sometimes forcefully in the
2008 and 2009 interviews, this "broken social contract" between the population,
politicians and administrators.
2 - One law, two practical applications
Since 2008, several joint letters of complaint from the inhabitants of Đền
Thõng were first sent to the commune, then to the district. No answer was ever
received and no actions were taken. In 2009, a delegation of women from the
village59 went to Vĩnh Phúc Province People's Committee, after having made an
appointment with the authorities to present a letter of complaint signed by
28 households whose “land had been recovered” (đất thu hồi) for the car park
project in 2005. The province level contacts refused to meet with them, arguing
their letter was not acceptable because it had not been filled in properly and was
not a photocopy of the original. They were advised to redo these documents and
make another appointment. These statements angered the women because they
were only too aware how difficult it had been to obtain the signatures for their
collective letter. To repeat the process with each family and explain the
province's refusal would very likely put the village women in a difficult spot.
Firstly (November 2005), the commune and the district would sell the land
of Đền Thõng village to a private company before they had the provincial
decision of land recovery from the State. In a second step, when the villagers
would want to enforce their rights for compensation for expropriation as
specified in the decision of the province (N°226, 25 Janvier 2006), the district
and the commune would use the following argument: “The decision of land
recovery by the People's Committee of the province is not accompanied by an
original: the commune does not have the original version but only a
photocopy60.” And because “a photocopy does not have the same legal value”,
the district and commune refuse to apply the province's decision – the People's
Committee of Tam Đảo district should decide on the detailed recovery of lands.
In other words, the district and the commune are responsible for applying the
59
60
Data from 2008 and 2009 interviews.
Gia đình & Xã hội, 20/01/2010.
45
law on individual land recovery according to the needs of the country's
economic development (Land Act 2003, article 39, see note above).
Legally, this means that in addition to paying for the recovered surfaces,
families would obtain other compensations such as rice, training programs and
financial support for study. Following several requests from those whose
possessions have been expropriated, the district and the commune People's
Committee responded that these were “reclaimed lands that did not benefit from
an expropriation decision.”61
For five years, it has not been possible to find a solution: each
administrative body denied responsibility and claimed it lied with other
governing bodies. In March 2010, no detailed decision on the expropriation had
yet to be taken. The farmers fought to demand the decision be applied in its
integrity. In January 2010, an inhabitant of Đền Thõng specified: “We need a
written decision that details the terms instead of mere oral promises62.”
In one situation, when the farmers demanded their rights be applied
concerning state expropriated lands, the district and the commune answered that
a simple photocopy was insufficient to implement the law on land
compensation. However, a simple photocopy allowed the district and the
commune to “sell” the villagers' land to a private company to build a car park in
November 2005. The power of photocopies is therefore relative to the context in
which it is used and also relative to the interests of those it can defend.
In another case, the delegation of women was not able to present their
letter of complaint at the provincial level because it was only a photocopy. A
photocopy therefore can be used by authorities when needed, even if this means
transgressing laws on the sale of land in Đền Thõng in November 2005.
However, authorities are very strict about the uselessness of photocopies in
terms of requests from the population.
The same law does not apply in the same terms or with the same rigour
depending on whether it deals with administrative documents that are useful for
authorities or a document formulating demands written by farmers. In these
conditions, the fiduciary relationship with authorities and the law are broken,
with direct consequences on the villagers who are henceforth wary of the
authorities’ proposals and constraints, even if they know that these constraints
can be good for the future. Any future project will be under great suspicion and
will probably meet active resistance.
61
62
Pháp Lý, 09/2009.
46
3 - With official decisions often being contradictory,
how can one find a suitable solution?
At a May 2005 briefing in the commune, officials announced that
10,554.7m² of land will be expropriated for the tourism project launched by the
province63 and that the compensation would amount to 9,843,000 VND/sào. The
compensation will be the provision of training and 108 kg of paddy/sào for five
years for members of households whose property has been expropriated. During
the meeting, the villagers did not ask to see official documents that specified the
circumstances. They simply trusted the local authority they dealt with. We have
seen that the province issued a decision in January 2006 asking the district and
the commune to implement the recovery of land for Đền Thõng village.
Furthermore, on May 15th 2009, “According to the Inter-Service Guide
N° 241 People's Committee of Vĩnh Phúc province”64 on compensation income
restricted to households, with regard to individuals who provide land to the state
for the purpose of developing the economy, following the recovery decision,
and with regard to the land that the state has recovered from 1/1/1997 to
31/12/2013, persons affected will receive the assistance of 108kg of paddy/sào
per year for 5 consecutive years65”.
Despite provincial decisions published in 2006 and 2009 and despite oral
promises from the district and the commune since 2005, when villagers asked to
receive training and paddy compensation for lands expropriated for the purpose
of provincial development, they were faced with categorical refusal from the
district and commune.
More precisely, "[the district and commune authorities] have responded
that the land for the construction of the parking by Bình Minh Company was
“recovered without the Decision of recovery”, which is why the local
government does not certify [the compensation]66.”
The people wondered: “This land reclamation by district People's
Committee of Tam Đảo has made the decision without recovery? Have they
violated the land law of 2003 or not? […] One would think that the People's
63
In May 2005, information from Commune People's Committee information mentioned
10,554.7m², but Vĩnh Phúc Province People's Committee Decision No. 226/QĐ-UBND
(25/01/2006) concerned the recovery of 10,723 m2. Which is the correct figure?
64
« Implementation of Resolution No. 20/2008 of the People's Council of Vĩnh Phúc Province ».
65
66
Pháp Lý 09/2009.
47
Committee of Vĩnh Phúc province and relevant bodies should arrive early to
consider the recovery of land in the Đại Đình commune and the role of
individuals involved67.”
In an official statement "in response to motions of voters at the 15th
meeting of the People's Council of the province68", on July 22nd 2009, Vĩnh
Phúc Province's People’s Committee requested that the district authorities
"inform the public beforehand on projects that take place in the territory of Đại
Đình commune, in accordance to Article 39 of the Land Law69 of 2003, which
states “the reallocation of land to the state (recovery-expropriation) must be
publicly announced within 90 days.”
Moreover, in the same document, the province of Vĩnh Phúc asked “its
department to build and Tam Đảo district to work with residents to report details
of the land reclaimed for parking and to ensure the smooth running of the
project.”
This is the only answer that the province gave villagers. It only repeats the
contents of previous decisions, without indicating the date of deposit for the
records, or specifying that compensation must be granted by the National Land
Act (2003) and by the province’s Inter-guide service in 2009. This response will
have no effect on the the district and commune’s refusal.
On February 3rd 2010, “a key cadre of the Party and of People’s Council of
Đại Đồng commune said that so far there is still no decision from the district on
the recovery of detailed area of reclaimed land [at Đền Thõng].70”
A sentence from the collective letter of complaint from Đền Thõng
residents71 to the province in 2009 sums up the situation: “If the recovery of
land has really made the decision without recovery of the province, then it is an
illegal action and is misleading.”
67
Pháp Lý 09/2009.
« Sở Tài nguyên và Môi trường: Trả lời kiến nghị của cử tri tại kỳ họp thứ 15 HĐND tỉnh. »
http://tnmtvinhphuc.gov.vn/index.php?nre_vp=News&in=viewst&sid=1711, 22.07.2009
69
« Land Law 2003, Article 39 « Recovering land for use for purposes of defense, security, national
interests, public interests. 1. The State shall recover land, pay compensations, clear ground after the
land use plannings and/or plans are publicized or when the investment projects with the land use
demands being in line with the land use plannings and/or plans are considered and approved by
competent State agencies. 2. At least ninety (90) days before land recovery, for agricultural land,
and 180 days, for non-agricultural land, the competent State agencies shall have to notify the
persons with land to be recovered of the reasons for recovery, time and plan for evacuation, the
overall schemes for compensations, ground clearance and resettlement. »
70
71
Collected during surveys from 2009.
68
48
These examples show stark contradictions between official provincial
decisions and the district and commune’s refusal in applying them. From a legal
standpoint, it is surprising that this refusal to apply the law has not resulted in
the province resorting to taking measures of control and coercion. To describe
the case of Đền Thõng land reclaimed by the district outside the legal
framework, the Family and Society Journal (22/01/2010) entitled an article with
the traditional saying « Tiền trảm, hậu tấu » which literally translates to
“Beheading someone before making his report to the king.” In other words, an
official of lower rank did something far beyond his or her jurisdiction prior to
requesting permission from their superior. Thus, summarizing the abuse of local
power and virtually assured that there will be no prosecution for the perpetrators
of such abuses, it can also create a sense of impunity among authorities that
villagers openly criticize.
The same problem of non-compliance with national laws on the protection
of national parks was so acute in 2007 in the case of the "Ecological Tourism
Tam Đảo 2 and Tây Thiên" project, managed by Vĩnh Phúc province’s People’s
Committee, that some newspapers referred to it with the following title:
“Economic development, but it must respect the law!72”
We address here the much more general problem of articulation between
the legal system and its application in Vietnam73. As in all modern legal
systems, Vietnamese law provides for a hierarchy of standards to define which
authorities have more power of control than others. For example, as far as
Planning and Land Use is concerned, Land Law of 2003 is clear:
« Land Act 2003: Article 26. Competence to decide on, consider and approve the land use
plannings and plans
1. The National Assembly decides on the land use plannings and plans of the whole country, which
are submitted by the Government.
2. The Government considers and approves the land use plannings and plans of the provinces and
centrally-run cities.
3. The provincial/municipal People's Committees consider and approve the land use plannings and
plans of their immediate subordinate administrative units.
4. The People's Committees of the rural districts, provincial capitals or towns consider and approve
the commune land use plannings and plans prescribed in Clause 4, Article 25 of this Law. »
« Article 25 4. The People's Committees of communes not located in areas of urbanized during a
cycle of land use, organize the preparation of development plans and land use in their respective
territories74. »
72
« Phát triển kinh tế nhưng phải tôn trọng luật pháp! » (Thien Nhien [Nature], 15/08/2007).
See Hoang Ngoc Giao, 2009.
74
Official translation.
73
49
In a more general view, the Land Law, Policy, Law and Development
Institute says:
“Most scholars and officials have offered […] the main reasons to account
for the increase in citizens’ complaints about the administrative activities of the
state's organs. […] The legal system of Vietnam is still inadequate in many
regards, overlapping, and contradictory in content. […] As such, the
implementation of laws produces many contradictions, damaging the rights and
interests of citizens, and therefore, generating complaints. Not only is it not an
effective tool in assisting state administrative organs to settle citizens’
complaints, but the mechanism itself has become a factor stimulating the
increase of complaints and making those complaints even more complicated and
long lasting75.”
The case presented above shows that laws are not always met and that the
villagers do not have the legal instruments, nor the power to enforce their rights.
In addition, a law that is not accompanied by means of control and coercion in
the event of non-compliance has few chances to be implemented. This was the
situation as observed at Đền Thõng village for 5 years.
IV - What are the possibilities to file a complaint
or to have one’s rights recognized?
We will see that the means of expression and the channels used by
villagers to make their voices heard by authorities have evolved over time. We
will try to give a more complete panorama of these collective actions. On the
other hand, we will see that, in response to villages’ requests, provincial, district
and communal levels of communication remained low and often contradictory.
1 - Requests of information and complaint procedures
As a first recourse, villagers need to inform officials then request a meeting
with them. Since 2006, several villagers who have not received 108 kg paddy
per sao of rice field that was expropriated had asked to meet the Chairman of
Commune’s People’s Committee, and the President of District’s People’s
Committee: they requested explanations and compensations as their lawful right
75
Hoang Ngoc Giao, 2009, p. 3.
50
according to a 2006 provincial decision. The commune answered that they had
no information on this subject on the grounds that land management belonged to
the district and the province. Finally, the district refused to consider their
request to meet them.
This first form of collective action is characterized by a demand for
dialogue and explanation. It corresponds to the type of relationship known as
"Voice" (see Hirschman, 1970). The aim of these actions is to try to resolve
tensions and conflicts by sharing and negotiating. In this case, it is a series of
unilateral actions initiated by villagers. In their view, the different
administrative institutions failed to meet the demands of the people. The lack of
response will generate forms of collective actions that will be discussed below.
For villagers, participation and non-participation in project meetings are
also a means to express their rejection of existing communication methods. A
large group of villagers were called in and came to official meetings. They told
us “if the officials’ discourses are ambiguous and if they refuse to answer
questions, the villagers leave the meeting as a sign of protesting. This happened
several times in 2008 and 2009.
One example was told with irony by many Đền Thõng inhabitants about a
meeting held at the Commune’s People's Committee in August 2009 with about
40 heads of families from the four villages affected by the project (Project 2
Phase 2 and Project 3). Local authorities were represented by an engineer of the
development plan and some commune officials, but representatives of the
district and the province were absent. All the villagers noted the harm of this
absence. Commune authorities keep repeating that "they do not have all the
information on projects, and have no power of decision on expropriation and
compensation.” Under these prevalent conditions, many of them refuse to go to
formal meetings on these projects that they describe as "masquerade". The
refusal to participate is a way for the villagers to show their objection.
This specific position can be qualified as “passive resistance”, a form
of protest that has already been heavily used by pacific leaders like Gandhi in
India. In Hirschman’s analytical frame, "exit" means the release of the
exchange, and the distancing of the mutual relationship. In the passage of
"Voice" to "Exit", there is a deterioration in the quality of exchanges with a
view to resolve tensions.
For several years, different groups of villagers have written collective
letters of complaint delivered by hand to the Commune People's Committee and
51
District People's Committee76. Finally in 2009, they wrote to the Province
People’s Committee. We have in our possession a copy of a letter of complaint
from last spring 2009 to the Province People’s Committee. The letter is signed
by 28 families who demanded that the decisions of the province be respected in
terms of compensation for land expropriated by the state. We have seen earlier
how such letters were received. Since none of these governing bodies have
responded to their repeated requests, several villagers plan to bring the case
before the authorities of Hà Nội. But they know that such a move has virtually
no chance of success if it is not backed by powerful personalities.
2 - Forms of resistance to the tourism development
projects
Since September 2009, villagers have upped their protest via physical
actions against arrangements of expropriated land. For example, on September
23rd, 2009, in late morning, a truck was bringing a bulldozer on the land to be
developed near the car park. The bulldozer’s task was to level the land, which
immediately brought about twenty villagers running, or riding on bicycles and
motorbikes to oppose the work of the bulldower. The discussion between
farmers, the site manager and the driver of the bulldozer took about 30 minutes,
but given the villagers’ strong determination, and their threats if the machine
moved any soil, the bulldozer did not get its work done that day.
Conflict between villagers and a bulldozer driver on the task of extending the parking area:
23/09/2009 (Source N. T. Quỳnh 09 2009)
76
According to interviews made in 2009 and Gia đình & Xã hội, 20/01/2010.
52
In November 2009, villagers were informed of the Official Opening
ceremony of Tây Thiên cableway, which would be held in the presence of
important personalities from the country and the region at the beginning of
December 2009. On November 20th, 2009, they decided to block the entrance to
the car park, so that authorities could not park for the ceremony, as well as
urged for the Bình Minh conpany not to continue to make profit with from this
parking area while operating without official permission. Therefore the district
police had to intervene to open the parking, because this event came just few
days before the grand opening special event of Tây Thiên cableway
(05/12/2009)77.
On November 20, 2009, the Gateway parking is blocked by the villagers, a few days before the
Official Opening ceremony of Tây Thiên cableway78.
On his inteview to Family and Society Journal79 (20/01/2010), a key cadre
of the Party and of the People’s Council of Đại Đồng commune said “Obstacles
to the recovery of land for parking construction in 2005 cause many difficulties
for local authorities. In November 2009, District police intervened. The day
77
Gia đình & Xã hội, 20/01/2010 - 22/01/2010. http://giadinh.net.vn/home/20100122084745405p0c
1000/khuat-tat-quanh-bai-do-xe-khu-danh-thang-tay-thien-vinh-phuc-tinh-chua-quyet-huyen-da-lam
-xong.htm, 21 03 10.
78
79
Gia đình & Xã hội.
53
before the ceremony for the construction of the Tây Thiên cable, he and some
leaders of the commune had to go to each person to persuade them because
officials were afraid of difficulties with the people on the day of the big
ceremony”.
Mr. T.V.B., from Đền Thõng village, said: « November 20, 2009, the
district police came to the village and called on the people to come to voice their
remarks and express their wishes for them to be heard by higher levels of
administration. In the minutes prepared by the police, it said that in one month,
if nobody could solve this case, the people will block the parking lot. But more
than a month later, in these administrative levels cared to to solve this problem.
Until 23/12/2009 […] we, the people again blocked the door of the parking. If
any administrative person cannot resolve this matter, we will continue to block
the car park. Because as long as there is no decision of recovery, these lands
remain our property80.”
Between 2006 and 2009, the villagers moved from passive resistance in
their writing letters of protest to concrete actions against the projects imposed
on their village. As for the various authorities, no strong signal has been issued
to resolve this problem. Only when the authorities realized that the villagers
would probably use the Opening Ceremony of the cable work and the presence
of many members of the media to express their discontent that officials came to
reassure the villagers. The police then recorded grievances and complaints from
residents. But since November 2009, no authority has helped to unblock the
situation of expropriated land.
To complete the overview of the relationship between population and
administrations, we will describe the case of a Đền Thõng trading family living
mainly from tourism and agricultural land rented to others. In interviews (2009),
the head of the family presented the different phases of tourism projects as
totally positive changes, noting that many villagers did not understand the value
of these projects. After several hours of interviews, we learned that this family
sold the land in Project 1 (2005-2006) project. But it has also bought large lots
of land on the boundaries of the 51-hectare project - Project 2 Phase 1. This
family made a good deal because the lands purchased in 2007 were at very low
price, but the land bought by the project – Project 2 Phase 2 in 2009, was at a
higher rate. While most villagers are unaware of the details of these projects,
how has this family been able to invest in land that would soon take on more
80
54
value? In a second interview with another member of this family, we learned
that a son of the family works in a department of the district that manages Đền
Thõng’s tourism projects. It is through "insider" information that the family was
able to make a successful real estate transaction, while the majority of villagers
feel cheated by the projects.
Through Hirschman’s analysis, the position of this family is "Loyalty":
they accept - even support - the positions of administrative bodies on projects,
and this for two reasons. The first: the family is itself directly involved in the
administrative system, therefore it belongs simultaneously to two groups: the
villagers and the administration. The second: this family has used confidential
information about the land and plans to make a good real estate transaction.
This particular example can show that the social groups involved do not
have exclusive positions. Some families and some people81 belong
simultaneously to two or several groups with divergent interests on tourism
projects. This set of multiple memberships is also an important factor in
understanding how social dynamics can be organized beyond the dual approach.
V - Key elements in understanding the current
tensions between villagers and local authorities
Since November 2005, relations between villagers and authorities have
continued to deteriorate to such an extent that by 2009, the villagers displayed
acts of physical resistance against the implementation of projects on their land.
Tensions and conflicts are certainly due to a series of factors, both structural and
human. The space allotted here does not allow us develop them all in detail. For
this reason, and because of the communication problems observed here that
overlap those observed in many development projects, we shall first present the
villagers with repeated questions about their future in unfamiliar projects they
did not master. Then we shall look for who are considered the "actors involved
in the project”, otherwise known as the "stakeholders" in the vocabulary of
development. Finally, we shall advance three possible explanations for
Gia đình & Xã hội Newspaper (22/01/2010) describes an interview with an officer from the
District who claims to be the main shareholder of Bình Minh Company. This company owns the car
park of 1.05 ha and is responsible for its operation. We know from other interviews (2009) that this
officer is also the one who pushed the villagers to sign sales deeds for their land in 2005. Proceeds
from the sale of parking tickets for the project - Phase 3 will be considerable (see figure for location
of parking in the centre of this project).
81
55
understanding the basis of relations between villagers and authorities around
these projects.
1 - Questions about the future of the village:
are they taken into account in projects?
During 2008 and 2009 interviews, we noted the points that villagers raised.
They, in turn, asked us, the researchers, many questions about current projects
and their future potential. Two major problems appear through their questions.
a) What are the means and ways to run seasonal
and religious tourism as a regular yearly leisure activity?
- How will the authorities and private companies be able to attract tourists
every month of the year, in Đền Thõng - Tây Thiên, while the great
pilgrimage takes place only two months a year?
- Most Đền Thõng families with regular and sufficient income have
diversified their activities. Traditionnally, they produce irrigated rice, but
because rice is not enough for profit, they turn to more diversified
agricultural activities such as intensive poultry or high-value wild-animal
rearing (such as porcupines and wild boars). Many of them are involved in
tourist activities only a few months per year, so the villagers wondered if
local authorities provide for the diversification of activities to ensure a
regular flow of income.
- If the new tourism projects include activities such as golf and leisure
(massage, karaoke, spa82), would they harm the image of the site, which is
mainly centred on Buddhism and spirituality?
b) They also raised more technical issues:
- When will authorities and private companies begin to build the
infrastructure to welcome tourists?
- Will Hotels and restaurants be built in our village and give employement
to the village or commune?
There is no clear information or answer to these questions.
82
Three entertainment activities that are strongly connected with the « sex trade » in Vietnam.
56
Many families have relatives in the villages in Tam Đảo National Park’s
buffer zone which have recently welcomed golf courses and resorts, and they
know that companies have given contracts to people in Hà Nội and Hải Phòng
because they are better trained than local staff. Local employees only have lowquality jobs. The doubts and anger of the villagers who are "turned away" from
these projects through unfulfilled promises over the past 5 years seem to be
legitimate.
In other words, none of these key issues in the organization of local life has
been answered, by official voices (not even partially). Almost all the villagers
interviewed in 2008 and 2009 expressed their deep feeling of uneasiness and
uncertainty about their future in tourism projects.
These questions show repeatedly that people do not yet know the detailed
project plans that affect them closely. But by reversing the question one might
ask whether projects and the people in charge are aware of the local population
included within their scope of development? Many factors lead to thinking that
this is not the case. For instance, no serious economic or sociological study has
been conducted since 2005 on the needs of different projects83. This is
surprising when you consider that 800 people will be relocated for the project’s
needs.
From a methodological point of view, one wonders why, during none of
the 4 phases of projects imposed on the village, no time has been taken to ask
people how to better integrate the project into their lives and the local
equilibrium. Going further in the analysis, one wonders which groups are
considered "project actors" or "stakeholders" with the project leaders.
2 - Who are considered “project stakeholders”
and by whom?
This is the first question that arises when a project manager comes in
contact with fieldwork. Developing new activities and transforming landscapes,
jobs and the habits of villagers, all of the above require knowing at least some
information on the situation “before the project”. More importantly, one needs
to identify the groups of social actors that will be involved in the project at
varying degrees. We will not give an analysis of the different groups of Đền
Thõng’s actors. We will only show that the short survey conducted by the
83
In 2006, GTZ experts conducted surveys over a few days on the technical implementation of
Tourist projects in Tam Đảo National Park, without any special attention paid to social issues.
57
Tourism and Regional Development Consultant84 is the only thing that lists the
stakeholders of Tây Thiên project. Our analysis based on their 2006 mission
report will attempt to show how the choice of stakeholders can have strong
consequences on project management.
The Consultant’s report (2006) said “tasks of the fieldwork mission are to
develop, discuss and agree with all main stakeholders on a vision and starting
ideas for sustainable tourism development at Tây Thiên Pagoda85.” “Finally a
common discussion with Tây Thiên Tourism board and stakeholders was agreed
in order to come to an agreement on what should be understood to be essential
for ecotourism development, but also to discuss ideas and the following steps
for implementation86.”
a) Who are the stakeholders and the Tây Thiên
Tourism Management Board?
“Stakeholders: The Following stakeholders appeared at the workshop at
3rd November 2006 and should be considered for further activities:
- Tam Đảo district People’s Committee,
- Department for Tourism [from Vĩnh Phúc province People’s Committee]
- Department for Culture and Information [from Vĩnh Phúc province
People’s Committee]
- Tam Đảo National Park
- Tam Đảo Management Project
- Private sector/tourism firms” (Otto 2006: 42)
This German consultant team describes “stakeholders” as official
institutions and departments, management board, formal groups and private
firms. Here, we are faced with a classic symptom of almost all development
projects: official, formal and institutional groups are considered as “usual
regular stakeholders”, while the local population which include farmers, traders
and shopkeepers are not included on the list of projects stakeholders. There is no
place on the stakeholders list for the few hundred families of farmers who have
already lost a large part of the best rice fields and residential and commercial
land. How is it possible for villagers to be included among the stakeholders?
84
Development and Partial Finalisation of Sustainable Tourism Development Concepts for Key
Areas in Tam Đảo National Park, Vietnam, November 2006, Tam Đảo, p. 94, on behalf of Deutsche
Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) and Ministry of Agriculture and Rural
Development (MARD)
85
Otto, 2006, p. 1.
86
Otto, 2006, p. 42.
58
In official Vietnamese documents of the development project, we can find
the same kind of classification where all stakeholders are leaders or responsible
for official organizations, committees and associations. The main reason is
because all of these official and formal groups are supposed to “be
representative of the whole population”. This is a serious limitation to the
concept of “people participation” projects and of local forms of governance. In
brief, this approach to the social realities and affiliation dramatically reduces the
possibility and opportunity for social groups without official affiliation to
participate in the local governance process.
However, the Consultant’s report also mentioned that the “Tây Thiên
Tourism Management Board” may include non-affiliated and non-official
members of the population.
b) Who are Tây Thiên Tourism Management Board members?
Because the Consultants' report did not give details, we looked at the
composition of the Tây Thiên Tourism Management Board through official
documents. A decision (03/11/2005) N°701/2005/QD-UB) from Tam Đảo
District People’s Committee gave helped to provide an answer:
“Article 5: Organizational structure:
The Tây Thiên Management Board is composed of one head, two deputy
heads (one is a full-time deputy head and another is part-time deputy head), and
other staff under overall leadership of the head. Whenever necessary, the Board
may sign additional contracts to recruit extra local labourers to fill in necessary
positions.
In addition to assigned key tasks, each part-time staff is asked to do
additional tasks assigned by the head and is also responsible to local Communist
Party, District People’s Committee and cultural agencies in terms of fulfillment
of his tasks87.”
This article clearly states: “each part-time staff is asked to do additional
tasks assigned by the head and is also responsible for the local Communist
Party, District People’s Committee and cultural agencies in terms of the
fulfillment of his tasks.” On the one hand, this means that political leaders
(Communist Party), responsible administrators (District People’s Committee)
and officials from the cultural department are ex officio members of the Tây
Thiên Tourism Management Board. On the other hand, this shows that the
Management Board does not include anyone who is not already an official
Decision on “Regulation on Management and Exploitation of Tây Thiên Tourist Site” Tam Đảo,
3rd November, 2005, Tam Đảo District People’s Committee, No 701/2005/QD-UB.
87
59
person validated by higher authorities, such as peasants, merchants or monks
from local monasteries. The local population is not directly present in this
Management Board and no member of civil society will be represented. Here,
we encounter a specific point in the local organization of Vietnam’s
management committees and project organization. These are established on a
top-down frame, often with financial and technical assistance from international
bodies (World Bank, European Union, UN, etc.). But from a practical point of
view, as their members are all major players in political and administrative
structures, these management committees have very little autonomy and little
power in decision-making, therefore any risk of conflict between these
committees and various authorities are immediately silenced by the fact that
they belong to both institutions. From a theoretical and official viewpoint, it is
easy to show that "local governance" and "civil society" are developing rapidly,
if we refer to the tables that show how many “independent” groups and
associations have been created. In this case, the notion of “independence” is
more a demonstration of propaganda than a description of observable social
realities. From a practical point of view, the double loyalties of members
renders obsolete any dissents and of course any real possibility to create a real
dialogue.
It is interesting to note that the major and recurring patterns of people
representation in the civil structure of organization in Vietnam have not been
highlighted by GTZ’s experts in 2006. But they clearly show that the Tây Thiên
Tourism Management Board had no real power of decision in these projects.
They also stressed that the proper functioning of the project required that the
Management Board be substantially increased (this will not happen). However,
they did not think that, due to its composition and the status of its members, this
board was the main limitation to this option.
3 - Assumptions on the basis of the relationship
between authorities and the people
In the specific context of Đền Thõng’s projects and using the available
data, I would suggest three main reasons to try to understand the basis of this
relationship, and the issues that arise between authorities and citizens.
60
a) « The peasants do not understand how the system works.
They must follow the directives of the authorities »
This sentence is often heard coming from the mouths of administrators,
especially in situations of difficulty and misunderstanding with the local people.
It is tinged with paternalism and especially emphasizes the disparities between
two worlds: those who know and others who don’t. We have seen that the
complexity and contradictions between administrative decisions and their
applications can lead to understanding why it is possible to say "peasants do not
understand the administrative system." To get a more balanced view, we should
find out whether administrators, the drafters of decisions and those responsible
for their practical applications have a real and better understanding of the
system. Without going too far in that direction, it is possible to say that
producers of official norms, laws and regulations are generally better equipped
to navigate the "grey areas of law" than the average Vietnamese citizen, whether
urban or peasant. But this journey into "troubled waters" is possible because
they know that ordinary people are very hesitant to use the law against
responsible authorities. For example, since 2005, despite the tensions and
obvious conflict, Đền Thõng villagers have taken only one legal action (a
collective letter of complaint) against the authorities regarding suspicious
activity. However, this action has been rejected.
In 2008, some Vietnamese sociologists do not hesitate to assert that
“Vietnamese peasants are afraid of paper work and administrative matters.”
Again, it would be interesting to find the origins and foundations of this
"supposed fear", which is perhaps not solely linked to farmers. Unfortunately,
this would lead us astray from the main lines of our subject. To nuance that
statement, I will only recall that, in the case of Đền Thõng after the first meeting
in May 2005, villagers have not called in to check on promises made on paper
by local authorities in relation to compensation. This was not out of "fear of
paper" but rather because their confidence in their leaders was over.
Let us remember this exasperated woman who said “we want guarantees
written and verbal promises”. Fear of paper disappears when they realize that
the official discourse is more trust-worthy, as was the case on several occasions
since 2005 in Đền Thõng projects. In 2009, a farmer woman from Đền Thõng
who regularly works in tourism explains her her perception of relations with
officials as such: “For the authorities, we are regarded as naïve: we listen to
political cadres, officials of the People's Committee, and ultimately accept their
policies. But since 2005, they have gone too far, and now we are trying to learn
and we do not trust them88.”
88
Interview made in 2009.
61
b) The character "priority" of major development projects
and law enforcement
Đền Thõng - Tây Thiên projects, such as the huge "Tam Đảo 2" project a
few years ago89, are parts of a major national campaign in tourism development
supported by ministerial90 and provincial91 decisions. Administrative authorities
at all levels know that they are acting within the framework of a large project
and officialy supported by the government, giving them more freedom and
sometimes more audacity.
In 2006, in the heart of the controversy around project "Tam Đảo 2", the
GTZ reports the province’s announcement by giving it an extremely positive
tone even though it is completely unrealistic.
“The 5-year Socio-Economic Development Plan (SEDP) (2006-2010) of
Vĩnh Phúc province92 considers Vĩnh Phúc as a province with “huge potentials
for tourism that is a good basis for development of internationally, and
nationally-important tourism and recreation service sites”. As for orientations
for sub-regional development, the Tam Đảo mountain range is considered as a
centre for modern and eco-touristic development. According to the Resolution
of the District Party’s Congress for the period of 2005-2010: in a section
mentioning the tasks and solutions for socio-economic development until 2020,
the Resolution considers tourism development as a key economic pillar. […]”
Accelerated construction of Tam Đảo trading and commercial centre and
Tây Thiên tourism site so that it becomes a tourist centre in the province and
within the whole country93.”
In March 2010, extolling the merits of Tây Thiên Project 3 (cable car and
tourist constructions over 170 hectares) at the provincial, national and regional
(Southeast Asia) levels, the report of the province also makes highly optimistic
forecasts:
“This [Tây Thiên] will be one of the the most important festivals in Vĩnh
Phúc. It aims to meet the annual celebration of the province. […] According to
estimates, after the completion of the project, spiritual and cultural tourism in
89
This huge project (600 ha and 300 millions USD) stopped totally in September 2007 under
pressure from environmental associations (Vietnam National Parks and Protected Areas Association:
Hội Bảo vệ Thiên nhiên và Môi trường Việt Nam), scientists and the media (Anonymous, 2007).
90
Prime Minister of Vietnam, 17 May 2002, “List of national projects calling for foreign direct
investment in the 2001-2005 period”, Decision No. 62/2002/QD-TTg.
91
UBND Vĩnh Phúc, 2006, “Essential Report on the ecotourism Project Tam Đảo and Tây Thiên”.
[in Vietnamese].
92
Report Vĩnh Phúc Provincial People’s Committee, March 2005.
93
Otto, 2006, p.20 annexe.
62
Tây Thiên will welcome millions of visitors each year, allowing local people to
transform their economic structure, develop their society94.”
These development projects which are spreading throughout Tam Đảo
National Park and its buffer zone have been launched without any form of
rigorous prior survey, in terms of market study, social and environmental
impacts, in order to establish such estimates. Despite this low level of
knowledge concerning local situations, these projects are presented as “a
necessity for economic development, for the country and the province”. Could
this ‘national necessity’ be an argument to enable the authorities that are
implicated in these projects to avoid certain laws in order to reach their
development objectives?
Thus, some major tourism development projects (as “Tam Đảo 2” in 20022007, 600 ha, 300 million USD, and “Đền Thõng-Tây Thiên” in 2009-2013,
173 ha, 22 million euro, 800 people relocated) have been launched without prior
serious studies of feasibility and impact (social, economical, environment, etc.).
Such projects developed on theoretical bases are often failures, or "relatively
successful", especially in the integration of local populations. Are these
"national interest" and the official support of the "Prime Minister" sufficient to
offset or replace the study of impact? In the case of Đền Thõng, projects
supported by national and provincial administrations could explain the absence
of sanctions by the province for not complying with the legislation of
expropriation by the district and commune.
In this context, however, we have noted that the regulation of large tourism
projects began to develop. For example, the end to tourist complex project "Tam
Đảo 2" at the heart of Tam Đảo National Park was supported by the Prime
Minister in 2008, and in June 2009, prohibited the construction of 50 golf
courses (on the 166 forecast ...) because they were threatening agriculture in
Vietnam95, but not for environmental reasons or reasons of ratio between areas
of land use and jobs provided as we would have thought96.
« Danh thắng Tây Thiên - tầm vóc khu du lịch trọng điểm của tỉnh và quốc gia » [Tây Thiên
Scenic magnitude of key tourist areas of the province and country] VinhPhuconline 25/03/2010
http://www.baovinhphuc.com.vn/frontend/index.php?type=ARTICLE&fuseaction=DISPLAY_SINGLE_ARTICLE&website_id=1&chan
nel_id=321&parent_channel_id=321&article_id=15331.
95
See Official Website of Ministry Of Natural Resources and Environment, “Eliminate More Than
50 Golf Course Projects, NA Advised,” http://www.monre.gov.vn/monreNet/default.aspx?tabid=
254&ItemID=66977, consulted 25/03/2010, and Thanh Nien News, 06/13/2009
96
For the prohibition of 7 golf projects around Ho Chi Minh City city, see Tuoi Tre, 04/05/09.
94
63
c) Top-down and “leading practices”
It is necessary to discuss here some of the features of historical
relationships between population and government and more broadly in
governance. Since the 1980s and 1990s decollectivization period, the
implementation of Đổi Mới reforms (which legally start in 1986) and the
involvement of international bodies in the « economic and social development »
of Vietnam increased since the 2000s, the Vietnamese political and
administrative authorities are increasingly forced to be accountable for their
decisions and their management of public property. Some recent laws, such as
those on "grassroots democracy" (1998 and 2003), were produced specifically
for this purpose, but their applications at the local level is still rare or partial.
This legal framework and national advertising practices around the "democratic"
and "participatory" are new elements in Vietnam, but many case studies show
that it remains largely theoretical. As we have seen, administrative practices on
the « fringe » of the law and officials decisions are still relevant. For Đền Thõng
this has been the case for over 5 years, sometimes with the use of public force to
cover these excesses97.
In 2005, when land was expropriated for parking, authorities "played" on
their status and respectable position that: “According to households who have
recovered land in 2005, they just thought it was a decision on the State’s part,
therefore it must be observed 98.”
Those who hold authorityThis attitude that the holder of the authority will
use, and sometimes abuse, its image and real and symbolic power has been
reported by several villagers who attended the briefing of August 2009 at Đại
Đình. They explained to us that during this meeting, they tried to understand
“why they should accept things contrary to official decisions, and they have
asked officials to explain in detail the status of projects.” After four years of
waiting, still no answers have been provided, and with the collective feeling of
being abused on several levels, villagers have insisted on getting concrete
answers. Probably short of arguments and threatened by his authority being
questioned, and certainly caught between decision and implementation, one
representative of the People's commune Đại Đình stood up and said « This is a
decision of the province, you must obey. » The villagers' demand for dialogue is
put to an end by the recourse to higher authority. But this injunction loses its
force when it is known that the commune itself has not respected the decisions
of the province about the parking lot since 2005.
97
98
Pháp Lý, 09/2009.
64
These “leading practices” have prompted villagers to change their
relations with authorities and with the law:
“On behalf of the affected households, Mrs. H. states: « We do not ask
why no decision has been made to expropriate the land since they have taken it
anyway, [We ask first and foremost] whether this action is consistent with State
laws or not? After losing our land, we watched TV and we learned about laws
and policies, we can know [what our rights are]99. »” (my emphasis).
Villagers are progressively aware of their rights, they gather
information, compare situations and ask for written documentation to
authorities. But once informed, can they enforce their rights? The crucial issue
is the application of laws and practical situations, to which is added the
complexity of legislative arsenal.
With regard to development projects, authorities – in conjunction with
private companies – usually act "routinely" without enough accurate data on the
socio-economic situation, and without taking into account the views of people
affected by the project. We have noted that decisions are often made without a
direct relationship with the local equilibrium and the wishes of the people. The
"top-down" process is the rule of thumb, and will likely continue because
authorities know that, if difficulties arise, they are almost assured that higher
authorities will not use means of coercion (the case of the province of Vĩnh
Phúc against Tam Đảo district and Đại Đình commune). They also know that
people will not go to court to secure these rights. Through a combination of lack
of control by hierarchies and the people's inability to enforce the law, authorities
have carte-blanche to implement interventionist practices that do not concur
with the law. The proof is in Đền Thõng, even after 5 years of tension and
conflict, no legal proceedings against the commune and district have been
officially filed. The villagers say that such an appeal is long and expensive and
the final decision is almost always favourable to the administration100. This
action is not thought of as an effective instrument to recognize these rights
among among most of the population. All of the above gives free rein to manage
top-down and sometimes “leading practices” in development by local
authorities101.
On means of appointing judges and lawyers in Vietnam, and the levels of judicial independence
in Vietnam, see Salomon (2004), Thayer (2008), Hoang Ngoc Giao (2009).
101
The case of the Tây Thiên project is not isolated, in many projects of local economic interests
(under the control of local administration) come before any considerations for local populations. The
film "Who owns the land?" (Vietnamese original title " Đất đai thuộc về ai?" director: Đoàn Hồng
99
100
65
VI - What are the possibilities of governance
within a complex legal framework?
As mentioned in the opening paragraphs, I will propose to show that Đền
Thõng projects help to highlight some general problems of coordination
between the law and its application in Vietnam. I have chosen to bring these
issues in two axis. First, it is to question the hierarchy of norms in direct relation
with the lack of coordination between certain administrative decisions and their
applications. Finally, to open our paper on wider perspectives, we discuss issues
of governance and civil society through the tensions and conflicts between
people and government, and through the legal frameworks in which they can
express themselves.
1 - A hierarchy of norms at the foundation of law
As we have seen above, in many cases, official texts are not always
respected by the authorities themselves. We will try to understand how and
perhaps why.
From a legal standpoint, the four tourism projects implemented in the
village of Đền Thõng since 2005 have necessitated the issuance of over
30 official administrative documents of legal value102, (directives, decrees,
decisions, resolutions, minutes, inter-service guides, notes, plans of land tenure,
etc.). These documents came from several departments (the Prime Minister, the
Minister of Agriculture and Rural Development, the Ministry of Forestry, the
Forest Protection Department's management), from the province of Vĩnh Phúc
People's Committee and its various departments (Department of Agriculture and
Rural Development Department of Natural Resources and Environment,
Department of Planning and Investment, Department of Finance, Department of
Construction, etc.), People's Committee of Tam Đảo district, People's
Committee of commune Đài Dinh, the Provincial and District Party's Congress
and the instances of the Tam Đảo National Park.
Note that none of these agencies or institutions ad hoc has been aware of
all the legal documents issued about Đền Thõng–Tây Thiên projects. Their
Lê, produced by Ateliers Varan Vietnam et le Studio National du film documentaire et scientifique,
2010, duration: 54'48 ") illustrates the strong social problems in the case of construction of a golf
course near Da Nang.
102
Part of the administrative documents are certainly unknown.
66
theoretical coordination is virtually impossible, so we understand that the
problem is more acute for their practical applications.
Since the 1980s and the Đổi Mới reforms, the production of many laws,
decrees, codes, regulations and decisions in all areas is exponential103. On the
other hand, the monitoring tools for their application and enforcement for noncompliance are negligible in comparison, hence the enormous weakness in the
implementation of the legal system104.
In an attempt to understand the foundations of the legal system and
especially the public law that particularly governs the relationship between
individuals and governments, due to my lack of legal experience, we sought
advice from Vietnamese and French lawyers105. Their research on the hierarchy
of norms has shown that it is not defined clearly and definitively in texts. They
showed that Vietnamese law has more than twenty levels of hierarchy from
different political and administrative bodies stricto sensu: constitution,
ordinances and resolutions of the Standing Committee of the National
Assembly, codes, decrees and decisions of the State President, Government
resolutions and decrees, decisions and directives of the Prime Minister, the
decisions, directives and circulars of ministers and heads of agencies ministerial
rank, etc. Such kind of norms can also be published by representatives of local
power: the People's Council and the People's Committees of provinces and
districts, and political bodies like the Regional Congress of the Communist
Party.
The difficulties in understanding this system are also related to the small
number of studies and publications in the field of public law in Vietnam106.
Several other reasons may explain these difficulties. Firstly, access to data on
Vietnamese law is difficult: the complexity of the norms set, no hierarchy
between them, no publication and no systematic publication of court decisions.
One consequence is the abundant production of law by the government, which
created a real "underground law", which is known only to certain people,
through their network of contacts. Then, for historical and political reasons,
103
See Abuza (2000) and Salomon (2004).
Hoang Ngoc Giao, 2009.
105
In 2008-2009, with the Franco-Vietnamese Graduate School of Law, and with the support of its
coordinator Carole Cayssials and Vietnamese Ph.D candidates, most of which are already legal
professionals in Vietnamese institutions.
106
In comparison, private law, in particular the branch of business law, is highly developed in
Vietnam since the Đổi Mới renovation. It is also the branch that offers the best career opportunities
and remuneration. For available studies, see Nicholson (2003) and Nicholson and Nguyen Q.H.
(2007).
104
67
there is no real Vietnam doctrine of public law that would help the overall
understanding of the system107.
All these elements combined will produce "grey areas" characterized by
inaccuracies or contradictions in texts and the level of law enforcement. This
"legal limbo" or "law fuzziness" has been highlighted by several researchers on
land law108. Among several complete texts, none can establish the hierarchy of
norms between them.
In the case of Đền Thõng, we saw that the three administrative levels
(province, district and commune) have regularly been rejecting their
responsibility one after the other for decisions to expropriate or not expropriate
land since 2005. « The [official] agencies tried to avoid the advisory
responsibility, passing responsibility to each other. Or, advisory agencies have
different views on the same case109.” The administration itself seemed lost in its
own operations. But does it really get lost in the system? In practice, some "grey
areas of the law" will be used to the advantage of those who have detailed
knowledge of the legal system and the networks that are necessary for its
implementation. These conditions favour people close to the administration and
officials at the expense of ordinary citizens. For their part, citizens such as Đền
Thõng farmers told us they do not know at what level or to what service they
may address their requests and complaints to get results. In some specific cases,
as in Đền Thõng, this system, however, based on legal texts that give rights to
citizens, creates in practice a form of recurrent injustice because citizens cannot
enforce the texts, and cannot enforce their basic rights. For its part, the
administration has produced these texts and voted without any real dialogue
between departments, so they are often contradictory.
“Some laws were issued by the organ without power over the matter; and
there is a lack of compatibility and consistency between sub-laws,
administrative documents, laws, and the Constitution110.” Such a situation gives
the administration the freedom to have large areas of uncontrolled action for
top-down attitudes and non-transparency. These grey areas are causing the vast
107
According to Carole Cayssials (2008) “Application of research Project in National Research
Agency - ANR,"To govern and to be governed".” See also Fforde (1986), Sidel (1994) and Gillespie
(2005).
108
Nguyen Van Suu in this Occasional Paper and Janet C. Sturgeon and Thomas Sikor (2004)
“Post–Socialist Property in Asia and Europe: Variation on ‘Fuzziness’” in Conservation & Society,
Vol. 2, No. 1, pp. 1–17; Katherine Verdery (2004) “The Property Regime of Socialism” in
Conservation & Society, Vol. 2, No. 1, pp. 189–198.
109
Hoang Ngoc Giao, 2009, p. 12).
110
Hoang Ngoc Giao, 2009, p. 3).
68
majority of tensions and conflicts between people and the Vietnamese
administration.
The next difficulty is that, in Vietnam, in practice, there are no
standardized methods of dispute resolution mechanisms with the government.
No independent body would resolve these difficulties111, such as "administrative
courts" in the French system. In these circumstances, citizens have thus resorted
to arrangements in a "list of possible actions" that the system allows or tolerates.
Some collective actions have been detailed above, among other effective and
observable possibilities: the one-off event of dissatisfaction with the ministry in
Hà Nội, or the application of the "envelope theory112" that can pay for “extra
services" for an officer to resolve a problem.
Given the many constraints and the Kafkaesque nature of legal texts,
people often put up indirect forms of resistance, usually discrete and difficult to
discern.
This is what Benedict Kerkvliet calls "Evereyday Politics" (1995 and
2005). For Michel de Certeau113, these non-frontal forms of resistance in social
interactions are described as “compromised tactics”114. Such discrete and
diverted actions also include what Nguyen Van Suu describes as “the power of
the people over the state in the process of policy-making and policy
implementation115.” Ultimately, it helps build little freedom for everyday use on
the margins of the system, but these spaces often remain in the area of the tacit
and unspoken. For this reason, they generally pass through the mesh of
researchers.
We have seen that in the real jungle of official texts, conflict resolution
with the administration is long and generally benefits the authorities more than
the people. The "grey areas" created by the administration itself, through the
production of laws and legal texts, can be analyzed as an instrument to defend
the interests of the administration and officials at the expense of those of the
population. Finally, having many "grey areas" in different fields of the law is
therefore contrary to the “formal” processes and well-publicized policies of
"grassroots democracy" and "good governance" in Vietnam.
111
“Not only is it not an effective tool in assisting state administrative organs to settle citizens’
complaints, but the mechanism itself has become a factor in stimulating the increase of complaints
and making those complaints even more complicated and long lasting.” (Hoang Ngoc Giao, 2009, p. 3).
112
See Nguyen Thi Thanh Bình’s chapter in this Occasional Paper for specific examples.
113
In L’Invention du quotidien (Invention of Everyday), 1981.
114
« Tactiques d’accommodement » in French.
115
See his article in this book.
69
2 - Forms of local governance and expressions
of civil society
Since 2005, despite the many causes of tensions and even their rise to
physical action in 2009, no Đền Thõng villagers, individually or in groups 116,
have decided to file a complaint for breach of certain laws on the purchase of
land and legal compensation from the courts. As we have shown above, they
explain that the process is long, complex and expensive, and believe that the
chances of "fairness" are too low. Having excluded forms of litigation and
methods of action that have already been developed, the only thing that is left is
the status quo or a search for a form of mediation between the government and
the people. We will consider this second option. What are the possibilities of
dialogue and mediation in this type of litigation117?
Some observers argue, with UNDP support, that, in contemporary
Vietnamese society, the Vietnam Fatherland Front (VFF118) and the mass
organizations that depend on the VFF such as the Women’s Union, Farmers’
Union, Association of Young Communists, etc.119 are "the main organizations of
civil society in Vietnam" (Norlund 2006). We will not discuss here the specific
positions of the Vietnam Fatherland Front and mass organizations120 in the
relations between government and people. I will merely give a concrete example
concerning Đền Thõng, having noted the legal definition of the Fatherland
Front:
“Vietnam Fatherland Front constitutes a part of the political system of the
Socialist Republic of Vietnam, led by the Communist Party of Vietnam; and
116
“As provided by the Law on Complaints and Denunciations, citizens can only exercise his/her
right to complain directly. In cases where more than one person share the same grounds for their
complaints (for example, they all were moved from their home to make way for an industrial park,
or suffered from environmental pollution from the same source, etc.), each complainant must write a
separate complaint letter. As such, the law does not recognize collective complaints while ensuring
the individual right to complain.” (Hoang Ngoc Giao, 2009, p. 12).
117
We will not discuss here the role of lawyers in the administration. For further information, see
Salomon (2004) and Hoang Ngoc Giao (2009).
118
Mặt Trận Tổ Quốc Việt Nam.
119
In 2009, the Vietnam Fatherland Front had produced and controlled 31 social, political, technical,
educational or cultural associations. This allows the State/Party to have a grip on the entire spectrum
of associational activities in the country.
120
This topic will be analysed in a book on the emergence of civil society in Vietnam (forthcoming 2010).
70
constitutes a political base of the people’s administration, a place where the
people express their will and aspirations121...”
If one respects the spirit of this legislation, it is difficult to include the
Vietnam Fatherland Front in civil society as being part of the political system
and different state levels. This particular institution does not have the slightest
degree of independence and autonomy to establish a dialogue with offical
institutions. In other words, “[the] Fatherland Front [...] is actually the secular
arm of Party for the population, known as « the political tool of People's Power
with the objective to strengthen unanimously politics122. »”
Consider the specific example of Đền Thõng. During interviews in
September 2009, a Đền Thõng woman explains the specific position of the
Vietnam Fatherland Front and mass organizations in the conflict with the
administration. She is one of the leaders of the Women's Union in the commune
of Đài Dinh, and she is also directly involved in the conflict with the commune
and district on expropriated land at unfair prices and without legal
compensation. Because of her status in the Union of Women, she says her role
is to mobilize the villagers to sign the documents for tourism projects, as the
Women's Union is one of the relays of government and Party to the people. Note
that the relay operates mainly in a "top–down” sense, and communications in
the "bottom-up" sense are rare and difficult123. Due to her position as owner of
expriopriated land in 2005, she said that it was not officially and properly
conducted and that it does not guarantee the economic future of the village. In
addition, she participated in requests for compliance with legal compensation
related to state expropriation. In this example, we can clearly see the almost
schizophrenic situation of some local officials caught between their legal
position and their direct interests.
What can also be noted is that the group of Đền Thõng women who
attempted to file the letter of complaint to the province in 2009 did not support
the Women's Union of the commune.
The Vietnam Fatherland Front and mass organizations cannot both perform
their official function to mobilize the population to best implement the
121
Article 1, Law on the Vietnam Fatherland Front, June 12, 1999 ”...the entire people’s great
solidarity bloc is built up, the people’s mastery is brought into full play, where its members hold
consultative meetings, and coordinate and unify their actions, thus contributing to the firm
maintenance of national independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, and successfully
carrying out the cause of national industrialization and modernization, so as to achieve the objective
of a prosperous people, a strong country and an equitable and civilized society.”
122
Nguyen Thê Anh, 1992.
123
Data from Surveys in Lao Cai (2003 à 2009), Surveys in Nam Dinh (2006 à 2009), Surveys in
Bac Ninh (2007), Surveys in Đền Thõng – Vĩnh Phúc (2008-2009).
71
directives of the Party and State and become the instrument to express the
demands and claims of the population, which are often contrary to official
guidelines.
Let me give another example of a major contradiction between laws and
practices. It is the law on "grassroots democracy" (1998). Article 2 states:
“Bringing into full play the people's mastery must be closely linked with
the mechanism of "the Party leadership, State management and the people's
mastery"; the representative democracy regime must be well promoted, the
working quality and efficiency of the People's Councils and the People's
Committees must be raised. The direct democracy regime must be well
implemented in localities so that the people can directly discuss and decide
important and practical issues which are closely associated with their
interests.” 124. »
And Article 4: “The local administration shall have to promptly and openly
inform the people of the following major things: 1. The State's policies and
laws. 2. The State's and local administration's regulations on the administrative
procedures for settling matters that concern people. 3. The communes' long-term
and annual socio-economic development plans. 4. Land use planning and
plans.” (my emphasis)
In this specific context, local authorities are supposed to apply the law on
"grassroots democracy" (1998 and 2003) and, in particular, they must inform the
population on "socio-economic development plans and land use planning and
plans", but this is not always the case. On the other hand, the instruments of
control and coercion are not in place or are not functional, even though these
laws are generally not respected. Official bodies, such as the Vietnam
Fatherland Front and mass organizations, which according to their legal status,
should be the mediators of the people's demands to the government, are really a
means to transmit official directives to the population. The public knows that
these Official Bodies will not help them and that litigation will not have serious
results. The right to independent associations, in other words not controlled and
managed by the State and the Party, does not exist. This law has been under
discussion for over 12 years in the National Assembly125. All these factors bring
into question both the local structures of governance, modes of dialogue,
negotiation between the people and government, but also the conditions for the
emergence of groups which may be termed “civil society”. It is precisely the
124
125
Laws « Grassroot Democracy », 1998, Article 2 (Official translation).
Nguyen Ngoc Lam, 2005.
72
role of civil society to bridge the gap between citizens and administrations, as
shown in Savelsberg’s work on former communist countries of Eastern Europe:
« Civil society is not just an appreciated feature of those who applaud the
participation of societal groups in government decision making in principle.
Civil society also serves as a conduit or communication tool between those who
formulate laws and policies and the populace. Without this tool, government
policies and laws will be passed without consideration of problems and
grievances as perceived by the population. Such lawmaking creates a legal
reality that is profoundly disconnected from the social reality of everyday
life126. »
Indeed, the fundamentals of local governance such as civil society are
based on the possibility for citizens to file official requests for information, and
claims against the government. In short, they should provide the opportunity to
engage in genuine dialogue. As we have seen in this case study, this is not yet
feasible in practice, even if the legal arsenal can sometimes be misleading. This
is a classic situation of Communist political systems in which all official bodies
of the Party and government, including the Vietnam Fatherland Front and other
mass organizations, « those who claim to represent the general [population],
[…] are able to suppress the views of groups who might disagree with them127. »
This has been observed in Đền Thõng for the last several years.
On the one hand, the administrative system tolerates, or turns a blind eye
to, some repeated abuse from officials, while other leaders are beginning to take
risky measures of social upheaval because of the pressures and constraints
experienced by the population without the opportunity to have their voice heard.
Christophe Gironde summarizes these concerns from an official report of the
Vietnam Academy of Social Sciences (2007) and a study from the Harvard
Vietnam Program (2008):
« A concern expressed within the Vietnamese authorities about the
reactions of people who accepted the end of egalitarianism and greater social
differentiation in that growth has benefited the vast majority (VASS 2007: 27).
In the countryside, it is the land issue, with the concentration of land and
corruption, which is the more disturbing protest contained but known
populations are evidence of an inability of authorities to ensure social cohesion
(HVP 2008: 15)128. »
126
Savelsberg, 2000, p. 1028.
Giddens, 1995, pp. xiii-xiv, cited by Savelsberg, 2000, p. 1028.
128
Gironde, 2009, pp. 262-263.
127
73
Conclusion
We are in a situation which seems at first paradoxical, since generally the
projects proposed by local authorities are largely at the request of villagers in
terms of development. But in the end, there is a more or less direct opposition –
and more or less physical interaction – between large groups of villagers and
district and commune authorities. So, ideally, we would think that the Đền
Thõng situation brings together all the elements for a « success story » of
tourism development in rural areas. However we have learned through this
investigation and through the media that the situation is increasingly tense and
that no negotiations have been opened, despite numerous attempts made by
villagers.
This situation may seem paradoxical only if one forgets to take into
account the ways in which these projects have been literally forced, sometimes
with the complicity of the police, upon the villagers who owned the land needed
for the projects, not to mention the lack of ability or willingness to communicate
on the part of authorities who act as if the population had no opinion on the use
of their land and their immediate future. But this paradox is a classic case of
many development projects in Vietnam and elsewhere: the terms of reference
that are the basis for these projects are often written after overly brief studies of
local situations or no study at all, therefore carry very weak or null knowledge
of the local situations and socio-economic balances in the existing project. In the
end, most projects have little regard for local people and their opinions, and the
people’s thoughts are literally being treated as "troublesome elements" for the
development of the project which they sought to integrate. But I am perhaps
going astray in thinking that development projects are intended to help poor
people of the grassroots?
Returning to the Tam Đảo foothills, during the first project in 2005, the
majority of Đền Thõng villagers were mostly positive towards the implentation
of tourism projects in their villages. Moreover, many of them participated in
full-time or regular tourist services and they sought their own ways to diversify
their professional activities (new agricultural production: livestock, vegetables,
making charcoal, tea, alpine medicinal plants and important income from
migration). More generally, conventional agricultural products (rice, vegetables
and fruits) are inefficient in Vietnam129. Most farmers hoping to diversify their
129
Merely compare the price of rice and vegetables over the last 10 years with that of other
commodities to convince the unprofitable character of traditional agriculture. Some specific
products, such as “clean” vegetables (rau sạch), vegetables from "sustainable agriculture", “organic”
74
activities even completely abandon agriculture to other higher sources of
income, but the issue of security and stability of income that arises is always so
acute. Similarly, the abandoning of farming often means selling the bulk of
cultivated land for industrial buildings for residential or tourism projects such as
in Đền Thõng. On the one hand, this sale provides a significant financial capital
in the short-term, but on the other hand, creates a very stressful environment
because of the loss of guaranteed capital represented by land, especially for
inheritance and the establishment of new couples in the family.
Thus, it is not as a form of resistance to development, a fear of change of
professional activity or their commitment to "traditional land" that villagers
have resisted the implementation of projects on their land.
As we have shown, this is a result of poor and bad communication or no
communication at all, and sometimes abusive behaviour from authorities who
are responsible for the betrayal and abuse of trust among the villagers. This
context, which is not unique to Đền Thõng, drives many Vietnamese villagers to
cast considerable doubts on their future in the hands of unscrupulous leaders
who pay no attention to them.
In other words, the issue is not that they merely refuse to leave their farms
and land, but that they refuse to leave their farms under certain conditions. The
first problem is that the price of expropriated land is still under-estimated for
expropriations by the state. The second is that the legal compensation and
promises to push the owners to sign on quickly (108 kg of paddy per sao for five
years, training to conversion to the tourism trade, exemption of tuition fees and
financial aid for students of families whose lands have been expropriated) are
not met. If some have, this was only fulfilled after repeated requests from
villagers.
The refusal to leave farming altogether is getting stronger, even obsessive,
especially when local authorities, who are responsible for the future in terms of
the creation of new professions in the local area, have not kept their word since
the first contracts for expropriation were made in 2005. These contracts were
signed without being properly discharged by the authorities and finally are no
longer "expropriations for the state" but merely "sales between individuals”,
which negates all the compensation that had been promised130. Land generates a
valuable source of guaranteed income, even if this remains low. Đền Thõng
vegetables (rau hữu cơ) and medicinal plants, can have higher incomes. See Moustier, Vagneron et
Bui Thi Thai (2004), Gironde (2001), Gironde (2009)
130
Because the photocopy of the provincial decision is without any legal value.
75
Villagers were ready to take the risk of partially or totally abandoning
agriculture because they thought their chances for development in this field
were very limited. But this career transition and the change in society at the
village level could not be achieved with the help of local authorities (provincial,
district and commune), who have not fulfilled their duties: they were not able to
convince the villagers of the interests of tourism projects (information and lack
of clear communication), they have not fulfilled their commitments in respect to
expropriation (breach of trust), they have not responded, even mildly, to
requests for clarification from villagers who felt excluded from projects in their
village, a form of top-down projects. Alongside this cumulative set of
difficulties, authorities continue to implement even larger projects without prior
consultation: 1.05 ha in 2005, 51 ha in 2007 and 173 ha in 2009.
From the data we have, we have noted that the various forms of resistance
from villagers in tourism projects were based on two key factors:
1. Economic reasons: farmers feel or know that the authorities have not
taken the necessary precautions to ensure the profitability of tourism
projects. In fact, the lack of market research and weak level of studies on
their socio-economic risks have weighed hard on the future of many
thousands of villagers. The breach of trust with local power drives
villagers to seek assurances and to learn about their rights.
2. Political and administrative reasons: we have seen that authorities were
directly involved in development projects, for example through the
decision to expropriate land for national development needs and through
the control of these projects’ implementation and operation. But because of
several cases of non-compliance with official decisions, there is a real
break from the "social contract" between the people and their political
representatives and administration. This failure is particularly serious
because the population has no effective means to recognize their rights, or
to start a dialogue or negotiations.
In this context what are the possible scenarios for the future?
- They know from experience that their fight, even though legitimate and
well within reason, is doomed to failure due to the lack of effective means to
enforce their rights131. They give up and try to do the best with projects that are
unsustainable and imposed on them by the force of conflicting laws. But the
131
This analysis overlaps with the Policy, Law and Development Institute on a range of several
hundred cases in Vietnam (Hoang Ngoc Giao 2009).
76
consequence of this is that relations of trust with authorities will suffer for a
long time to come.
- Some people may have in their personal networks of family and “well
placed” friends in Vĩnh Phúc Province’s People’s Committee or a relevant
ministry in Hà Nội. These people will then try to use this support to assert some
of their rights, but this does not apply to most villagers. The inequality of rights
is a reality in Vietnam.
- Villagers who are tired of seeing their claims rejected at the provincial
level may eventually manifest their anger at a government building in Hà Nội.
In a typical scenario, the police would arrive a few minutes later and take away
any signs that express too explicitely their local difficulties, and villagers would
remain on the sidewalk for a few hours without getting an appointment with the
competent persons and eventually return home disappointed.
- Finally, they will continue acting out their resistance against these
concrete local projects (continued closure of the parking lot, and most certainly
other actions). Again, the government will intervene to ensure that public order
is restored.
In this paper, we have modestly related a recent history of the development
of tensions between local governmental bodies and villages in reaction to a
specific site. From the viewpoint of legal norms, the problem is almost
impossible to resolve satisfactorily due to a major contradiction and lack of
forms of independent jurisdiction. In other words, it is the various social groups
(authorities at different levels) that have created legal norms and the decisions
that are not respected. Meanwhile, independent jurisdictions, which should work
in theory, in practice act only rarely in tensions and conflict between the
population and authorities132. Only radical changes in the principles that
underlie relationships between people and administration and major changes in
law enforcement (Actual coordination of the different laws and standards, real
hierarchy of norms, and effective monitoring and enforcement) can help prevent
such blockages that are damaging “social harmony and unity”, one of the
common goals of all official institutions Vietnamese society.
In conclusion I would like to repeat here the words of a person who is
officially at "the head of the control laws by the commune authorities” and
states that despite his official status "he has no way to enforce these laws". This
is an "inspector of the people" (Thanh tra nhân dân) of the province of Nam
Dinh who described the position of commune authorities and the Vietnam
132
Hoang Ngoc Giao, 2009.
77
Fatherland Front on various local conflicts in these terms: "How is the game
possible if one person is being both the player and the referee?133”
Spontaneously, because this kind of situation occurs often in Vietnam, this
Inspector stated that the people fits the definition of game players arbitrarily
made by the anthropologist Bailey on political games: "In games, the referee is
not one of the players. This is obvious: he cannot win the trophy134.”
133
134
Interviews made between May and September 2008.
Bailey, 1971, p. 47.
78
Chapter 2
Agricultural Land Claims in the Red
River Delta during Decollectivization
Nguyen Van Suu
Introduction
In the 1960s, in the field of political anthropology, after the structuralfunctional analysis, in addition to the process approach that focuses on the
processual dimension of politics, the game theory was introduced into political
anthropology, and it soon became a classic approach for analyzing politics from
an anthropological perspective.135 The game theory has been well developed in
Stratagems and Spoils by Bailey.136 It seeks to discover the normative and
pragmatic rules of political manipulation. It views politics as a game composed
of teams competing for prizes.
As the author of the book stated, understanding what people do, what they
think and why they think and act that way helps us to better understand what
goes on in societies. Like Claude Levi-Strauss, Bailey goes under the particulars
to find out the common rules across societies. He assumes that (1) ‘the world
has a discoverable order in it’ and (2) ‘knowledge of that order is made up of
propositions which have been tested by experience’. In Stratagems and Spoils,
he emphasizes the distinction between normative and pragmatic rules (norms),
with the latter being capable of causing structural (normative rules) change.
This theoretical approach influenced Jean-Pierre Olivier de Sardan in a
study about the practical norms of real governance in Africa, in which he
135
For example, a reader on the anthropology of politics edited by Joan Vincent considers his work
as one of the classic studies in the field (See Joan Vincent (ed.) The Anthropology of Politics: A
Reader in Ethnography, Theory, and Critique. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2004.
136
F. G. Bailey, Stratagems and Spoils: A Social Anthropology of Politics. Boulder, Colo :
Westview Press, 2001.
79
strongly calls for in-depth empirical studies to better understand the diversity
and complexity underneath our ‘vague’ understanding of the differences
between official norms and practical norms in everyday social interaction.137
In regard to Vietnam, research literature has highlighted the divergence
between norms and the everyday practices in various sectors of Vietnamese
society and culture. For example, researchers have observed that, similar to
China:
“[the ] division between rules, on the one hand, and practices, on
the other, is perhaps more cemented in Vietnam, where there is a
legacy of unpopular policies combined with Confucian heritage that
deters question of authority. Until recently, research by Vietnamese
scholars generally sought to affirm policy decisions or document
success stories, such as the mechanization of agriculture in a model
commune in the Red River Delta. People were reluctant to talk about
everyday practices that may run encounter to given policies or social
norms. Of course, everyone knew that disputed practices existed, but
to openly acknowledge these strategies of resistance and their
incongruity with officials discourses or norms was generally not
viewed as appropriate in general, and certainly not as an appropriate
topic for research.”138
In this chapter, I adapt the game approach to examine the differences and
conformities between formal legal laws and under-law regulations of the partystate institutions and the real practices of the Red river delta villagers139 on the
holding and use of agricultural land. More specifically, this chapter emphasizes
official norms, in this case the study of agricultural land claims regarded as
formal legal laws and under-law regulations of the party-state institutions.
Furthermore, it examines how and why the practices of agricultural land claims
of villagers from the Red River Delta contradict with such official norms over
137
Jean-Pierre Olivier de Sardan, “Researching the Practical Norms of Real Governance in Africa”.
The African Power and Politics Program: Discussion Paper No. 5, 2008.
138
Steffanie Scott, Fiona Miller and Kaste Lloyd, “Doing Fieldwork in Development Geography:
Research Culture and Research Spaces in Vietnam”. Geographical Research, Vol. 44, No. 1 (2006),
28-40, p. 33.
139
I use the term ‘villagers’ in addition to ‘farmers’ because in many claims the participants are not
‘farmers’ alone, but also non-agricultural producers who reside in the village. The concept of
villagers sometimes is also used in contrast to another categories of local population (‘local cadres’
for example, who reside in the village but work for the party-state and receive salary or phụ cấp
from the state budget).
80
the holding of use rights on certain areas or plots of agricultural land during the
1980s-1990s agricultural decollectivization period. Endorsing the arguments
made in the available literature on this topic, the chapter postulates that there is
a major gap between official norms and villagers’ practices in Vietnam’s rural
areas. It also highlights the space for the villagers to move around what the
party-state wants to do (through its policy) and the people’s struggle to pursue
their everyday needs and desires. In this chapter, I also discuss the importance
of land property rights and indicate how the everyday practices of land holdings
and land use have influenced the official norms of the party-state over the
question of ownership, management and use of agricultural land in
contemporary Vietnam.
Data used in this chapter has been accumulated over the past 10 years of
my research. In addition to the research literature and mass media materials
relevant to the theme of the chapter, the majority of local archive data was
collected in 2002 in a number of party-state offices at district and provincial
levels of Bắc Ninh and Bắc Giang provinces. The fieldwork made in villages,
which is not limited to the two case studies described in the sections below, was
also conducted in 2002, with the use of participation observation and semistructural interviews. In the following pages, given the sensitivity of the issue,
for some documents I only mention their main contents instead of presenting
their full names and sources.
I - State Laws and Regulations about Claims
to Land in Contemporary Vietnam
In the 20th century, land tenure structure and relations in Vietnam have
experienced fundamental changes. In the 1950s,140 at the onset of the final Điện
Biên Phủ battle for the country’s independence, party-state authorities carried
out a radical land reform so as to, alongside other aims, redistribute the land of
rich peasants and landlords to poor ones, and to deconstruct the feudal and
140
For an analysis and discussion about land tenure and land tenure changes in Vietnam prior to the
1950s, see Vũ Huy Phúc 1979. Tìm hiểu chế độ ruộng đất Việt Nam nửa đầu thế kỷ XIX. Hà Nội:
NXB. Khoa học Xã hội; Trương Hữu Quýnh 1982, 1983. Chế độ ruộng đất ở Việt Nam thế kỷ XIXVIII. Hà Nội: NXB. Khoa học Xã hội (2 vols); Trương Hữu Quýnh và Đỗ Bang (chủ biên) 1997.
Tình hình ruộng đất và đời sống nông dân dưới triều Nguyễn. Huế: NXB. Thuận Hóa.
81
colonial foundations for building a new society.141 Shortly after, however, the
party-state began collectivization programmes in the North, which had gradually
gathered most of the agricultural land and other means of production of small
peasant households into cooperatives for collective production.142 In the South,
from 1954 to 1975, meanwhile, the Republic of Vietnam Administration and
National Liberation Front also carried out land reforms, with different aims, in
their occupied rural areas. After the war, Vietnam reunified and this also marked
the introduction of agricultural collectivization programmes in the South.
Since the early 1980s, after 30 years of agricultural collectivization,
Vietnam started to reform the agricultural sector, then other economic sectors.
This process of decollectivization proceeded for a decade,143 which has not only
shaped a new land tenure regime but also involved the evolution of a legal
system governing land ownership, management and land use in Vietnam.144
In this section, I focus on some key points about this new land tenure
regime. Firstly, the state’s has proclaimed the division of three key rights to
land, which are held by different entities: ownership rights (quyền sở hữu)
which belong to the entire people, controlling rights (quyền quản lý) belonging
to the state, and use rights (quyền sử dụng) allocated to individuals, family
households and organizations for a certain period of time. Among these three
Trần Phương (chủ biên) 1968. Cách mạng ruộng đất ở Việt Nam. Hà Nội: NXB. Khoa học Xã
hội; Edwin Moise, Land reform in China and North Vietnam: Consolidating the revolution at the
village level. Chapel Hill : University of North Carolina Press, 1976; Edwin Moise, “Land Reform
and Land Reform Errors in North Vietnam”. Pacific Affairs, Vol. 49, No. 1 (1976), pp. 70–92;
Luong Van Hy, Revolution in the Village: Tradition and Transformation in North Vietnam, 1925–
1988. Honolulu : University of Hawaii Press, 1992, pp. 189–192; S. K. Malarney, ‘Ritual and
Revolution in Vietnam.’ PhD. diss., The University of Michigan, 1993; John Kleinen, Facing the
Future, Reviving the Past: A Study of Social Change in a Northern Vietnamese Village. Singapore :
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1999; Lâm Quang Huyên, Vấn đề ruộng đất ở Việt Nam. Hà
Nội: NXB. Khoa học Xã hội, 2002.
142
Chử Văn Lâm, Nguyễn Thái Nguyên, Phùng Hữu Phú, Hợp tác hóa nông nghiệp Việt Nam: Lịch
sử – vấn đề – triển vọng. Hà Nội: Nxb. Sự Thật, 1992; Ben Kerkvliet, “Village-State Relations in
Vietnam: The Effects of Everyday Politics on Decollectivization”. Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 54,
Issue 2 (1995), pp. 396-418; and The Power of Everyday Politics: How Vietnamese Peasants
Transformed National Policy. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005.
143
Chử Văn Lâm, Nguyễn Thái Nguyên, Phùng Hữu Phú, Hợp tác hóa nông nghiệp Việt Nam: Lịch
sử – vấn đề – triển vọng. Hà Nội: NXB, 1992. Sự Thật; Ben Kerkvliet, “Village-State Relations in
Vietnam: The Effects of Everyday Politics on Decollectivization”. Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 54,
Issue 2 (1995), pp. 396-418; and Trương Thị Tiến, Đổi mới cơ chế quản lý kinh tế nông nghiệp ở
Việt Nam. Hà Nội: NXB, 1999. Chính trị Quốc gia.
144
The legal system includes, but is not limited to, the constitution, land laws, regulations, etc., the
governing of land issues.
141
82
vital kinds of rights to agricultural land, what the villagers can hold is the right
to use the land for a certain period of time.
Secondly, the state legal system has ensured the ownership of ‘the entire
people’, represented by the socialist state. This means the party-state does not
accept private land ownership in Vietnam. This results in a further essential
issue: the party-state prevents all individuals and organizations from claiming
their ‘old land’ in any way. In other words, in contrast to agricultural
decollectivization in Eastern European socialist countries,145 Vietnam’s partystate does not accept any claims to redeem old land. This means that the process
of agricultural decollectivization in Vietnam is a process of distributing
collective land among local villagers, not a process of land restitution. But did
the villagers agree with and conform to such norms and the broad agenda of the
party-state about decollectivization? If not, what did they do?
II - The Practices of Villagers’ Claims
to Land since the Decollectivization Period:
The Case of Red River Delta Villages
Several publications of mine have illuminated the two layers of land
ownership in Vietnam’s contemporary land tenure system: the ultimate
ownership of the entire people and the practical level of ownership of various
holders, which I argue, is equivalent to the land use rights stated in state land
laws.146 In my view, the various claims to agricultural land since the
decollectivization period are the villagers’ claims to use rights on certain areas
or plots of agricultural land.
In the Vietnamese context, the question of land claim has been analysed in
various studies on different cases in various locations at different times. For
145
In contrast to Vietnam and China, which carried out land distribution or allocation to
decollectivize agriculture, Verdery has shown the common practice of land restitution in the process
of decollectivization in several Eastern European countries after the collapse of socialism (see
Katherine Verdery, The Vanishing Hectare: Property and Value in Postsocialist Transylvania.
Ithaca & London: Cornell University Press, 2003).
146
For a detailed analysis and exlaination of of this, see Nguyễn Văn Sửu “Về sở hữu, sử dụng và
sai phạm trong quản lý đất đai ở Việt Nam từ khi đổi mới”. Tạp chí Nghiên cứu Lịch sử, số 5 (2007),
trang 18–27; and Đổi mới chính sách đất đai ở Việt Nam: Từ lý thuyết đến thực tiễn. Hà Nội : NXB,
2010. Chính trị Quốc gia (forthcoming).
83
example, Tạ Thị Thúy documented Vietnamese farmers’ claim to land during
the colonial period,147 Kerkvliet analysed land claims in Vietnam and compared
them to other countries through the perspective of everyday politics and
everyday forms of peasant resistance. 148 Others have examined land claims
between the Kinh (Việt ethnic group) and other ethnic groups in northern
villages, which as the authors argue, resulted in the loss of land of the Kinh
during the decollectivization period.149 Meanwhile, other researchers have dealt
with land claims and conflicts in the Highlands, the consequence of which is the
loss of rights to land use among native ethnic groups, in contrast to the situation
in Northern villages.150
In this section, I have limited my analysis to land claims in the Red River
Delta during the process of agricultural decollectivization, which in many cases
has its roots in the collectivization period. My synthesis of research literature
and my ethnographic data show five broad forms of villagers’ claims to land use
rights since the 1980s throughout the country. The process of agricultural
decollectivization often encountered (1) claims to land use rights on old land
territory; (2) claims to old agricultural land; (3) claims to old worshipping
land.151 Since the early 1990s, under the 1993-revised version of Land Law, the
use rights of communal land (đất công ích) have been moved from being
managed by the village to be being managed by the commune. Villagers’ claims
in many cases also relate to (4) this land and its output. As the pace of
Tạ Thị Thuý, Đồn điền của người Pháp ở Bắc Kỳ 1884–1914. Hà Nội : NXB, 1996. Thế giới;
and Việc nhượng đất, khẩn hoang ở Bắc Kỳ từ 1919 đến 1945, Hà Nội : NXB, 2001. Thế giới.
Ben Kerkvliet, “Claiming the Land: Take-overs by Villagers in the Philippines with Comparisons
to Indonesia, Peru, Portugal, and Russia”. The Journal of Peasant Studies, Vol. 20, No. 3 (1993), pp.
459-493; Land Struggles and Land Regimnes in the Philippines and Vietnam during the Twentieth
Century, Amsterdam : CASA-Centre for Asian Studies, 1997.
149
Steffanie Scott, “Changing Rules of the Game: Local Responses to Decollecivization in Thai
Nguyen, Vietnam”. Asia Pacific Viewpoint, Vol. 41, No. 1 (2000), pp. 69-84, p. 81; Jean-Christophe
Castella, Trần Quốc Hoà, Vũ Hải Nam, Đặng Đình Quang “Thành phần dân tộc trong sự phân hoá
nông hộ: Trường hợp xã Ngọc Phái, huyện Chợ Đồn, tỉnh Bắc Cạn, Việt Nam”. Trong: Đổi mới ở
vùng miền núi: Chuyển đổi sử dụng đất và chiến lược sản xuất của nông dân tỉnh Bắc Cạn, Việt
Nam, do Jean–Christophe Castella và Đặng Đình Quang chủ biên. Hà Nội : NXB. Nông nghiệp,
2002, trang 49–73.
150
Vũ Đình Lợi, Bùi Minh Đạo, Vũ Thị Hồng, Sở hữu và sử dụng đất đai ở các tỉnh Tây Nguyên. Hà
Nội : NXB, 2002. Khoa học Xã hội; Đặng Nghiêm Vạn, “Vấn đề đất đai ở các tỉnh Tây Nguyên”.
Trong: Một số vấn đề phát triển kinh tế xã hội buôn làng các dân tộc Tây Nguyên. Hà Nội : NXB,
2002. Khoa học Xã hội, trang 324–352.
151
Bộ Chính trị 1988. “Chỉ thị số 47–CT/TW về việc giải quyết một số vấn đề cấp bách về ruộng
đất”. Đồng Tháp: Nxb. Đồng Tháp; Tổng cục Quản lý Ruộng đất 1992. "Báo cáo về tranh chấp đất
đai." Ha Noi, pp. 2-3 and 13-15; Trần Đức 1992. Cuộc cách mạng nâu đang tiếp bước. Hà Nội :
NXB. Văn hóa – Thông tin, trang 7-10.
147
148
84
industrialization and urbanization increase, state authorities annually seize a
large area of land, especially agricultural land, for non-agricultural purposes.
Claims from rural (and urban) inhabitants have become widespread throughout
the country over (5) the level of reasonable compensation for their land use
rights.152
In the following pages, due to the limited number of words, I shall focus
my analysis and discussion on one of these five types of land claims: claims to
agricultural land during agricultural decollectivization in Red River Delta
villages, especially those in that are now in Bắc Ninh province and Tiên Du
district (see the map)153 and formerly belonged to Hà Bắc province154 and Tiên
Sơn district.155
In the process of agricultural decollectivization, the most widespread claim
to land occurred in the form of villagers collectively requesting the return of old
agricultural land use rights in their village, which had been taken away for
another village to use. To understand why this had occurred, we need to look
back on the agricultural collectivization period in Northern Vietnam, just a few
years after low-scale cooperatives (hợp tác xã bậc thấp) within the village were
set up. Since the early 1960s, many of these low-scale cooperatives had been
merged to form larger ones to build high-scale cooperatives, which often
included several villages, called inter-village-based cooperatives (hợp tác xã
liên thôn), and even some involving the whole commune, named communebased cooperatives (hợp tác xã toàn xã). As a result, after the unification, per
capita agricultural land in a number of cases greatly differed from one group of
cooperative members to another. To eliminate this large disparity, or in other
words, to balance agricultural land per capita among cooperative members of
the large-scale cooperatives, cooperative cadres in many cases reallocated fields
152
For a short overview of land appropriation for non-agricultural purposes in Vietnam since the
renovation period and its effects on farmers, see Nguyen Van Suu, “Agricultural Land Conversion
and Its Effects on Vietnamese Farmers”, Focaal–European Journal of Anthropology, Number 54
(2009), pp. 106-113.
153
The two case studies presented in the following pages administratively belong to the current
district of Tiên Du in Bắc Ninh province (see the map).
154
Hà Bắc was one of the former Red river Delta and Northern provinces, established in 1962 by
merging two former provinces: Bắc Ninh and Bắc Giang. In 1996, it was divided to form the two
former provinces of what are currently Bắc Giang and Bắc Ninh.
155
One of Hà Bắc’s district was Tiên Sơn, which in 1963 was set up by emerging two former
districts of the former Bắc Ninh province: Từ Sơn and Tiên Du. After Hà Bắc was divided, Tiên Sơn
was also divided into two former districts, that are Từ Sơn and Tiên Du.
85
within the new production structure.156 Consequently, by joining in the largescale cooperative, a number of villagers, or the village as a whole, lost part of
their agricultural land, while others gained some.
Thus, during the agricultural decollectivization process, claims to retrieve
appropriated land were made in many locales. On a national level, such claims
occurred both individually and collectively, and varied from region to region. In
the southern half of the country, individual villagers frequently demanded the
return of their old agricultural land use rights that had been removed from them
for other villagers to use in the years following the 1975 reunification of
Northern and Southern Vietnam. In contrast, in the northern half, groups of
villagers who often belonged to one village collectively asked for the return of
their old village agricultural land that had been allocated to another group in a
large-scale cooperative that belonged to another village. In 1992, a report
prepared by the Bureau of Land Management (Tổng cục Quản lý Ruộng đất)
revealed nearly 1,000 cases of this later pattern of agricultural land use rights
claim, which often occurred in a collective, organized, and critical manner with
a large number of participants.157
In Hà Bắc province, villagers’ claims to land use rights were diverse, and
related to different kinds of land, but the most dominant was associated with
claims to the use rights on old agricultural land. Over the course of a single year,
in 1992, there were 40 cases of such claims, among which 36 had been solved
by 1992.158 Later, 30 more cases occurred throughout the province.159 In Tiên
Sơn district, by 1988, the district contained 40 cooperatives in total, including
18 commune-based cooperatives, and 22 other inter-village ones. Collective
claims to old agricultural land use rights in their village, which finally led to
agricultural land use rights disputes between the claimants and defenders,
occurred in 11 cooperatives, comprising ten commune-based cooperatives and
one inter-village-based one.160
156
I have not seen any document offering figures about this. This action on the part of local
cooperative cadres may have never been reported to higher authrorities.
157
See Tổng cục Quản lý Ruộng đất, "Báo cáo về tranh chấp đất đai." Ha Noi, 1992.
158
BCĐ cấp CGN và LSBT 1992. "Thông báo kết quả thực hiện kế hoạch giao ruộng ổn định lâu
dài, cấp GCN quyền SDĐ và LSBT đến hộ gia đình nông dân." Hà Bắc, trang 7.
159
Sở Địa chính Hà Bắc 1995. "Tình hình thực tế, các giải pháp và kiến nghị nhằm thực hiện tốt
công tác quản lý nhà nước về đất đai – tỉnh Hà Bắc." Hà Bắc, trang 7.
160
Tổ công tác 1988. "Báo cáo tình hình tranh chấp ruộng đất của một số HTX nông nghiệp thuộc
huyện Tiên Sơn." Tiên Sơn, trang 1; and according to a report composed in 1993 by Hà Bắc
People’s Committee on the situation of hot-spots in Hà Bắc province from 1990 to 1993.
86
In response to villagers’ claims regarding their old agricultural land use
rights, together with other types of land use rights claims, national state
agencies,161 provincial offices,162 and district authorities,163 issued directives for
resolving the problem. A basic view that ran through these directives
emphasized what I have highlighted above, that all land belongs to the entire
people, is managed by the state, and is used by the people. In one sense, this
means that it is illegal for the villagers to reclaim land use rights which the state
authorities think the villagers do not hold at the time when they reclaimed them.
In the case of Tiên Sơn, the District Party Organization clarified the situation by
directing:
[Any] unit or individual that uses the name of a production
brigade, hamlet, or village to reclaim old [agricultural] land [use
rights] which belong to the cooperative’s holdings is illegal. […]
Anyone who purposefully disputes [agricultural] land [use rights],
violates the Land Law, will be seriously punished by the Commune’s
People’s Committee and other offices of the district in accordance to
current state laws.164
From the point of view of the party-state, most of the
agricultural land use rights of the cooperatives had to retain the same
status and area (giữ nguyên hiện trạng) as the land area each village
farmed at the time of use rights distribution and redistribution.
Agricultural land use rights could only be considered for subdivision
among villages, or between villages, in the case of reorganization of
large-scale cooperatives (tổ chức lại hợp tác xã) into smaller ones.
Such a reorganization of cooperatives, however, could only be done
in cases where a large-scale cooperative had over 800 hectares of
agricultural land, long-term weak management, had many times tried
to maintain the large-scale cooperative without positive change, and
the majority of its cadres, party members, as well as cooperative
members, thought it necessary to reorganize. Villagers’ claims
regarding old agricultural land use rights could also be considered in
BCHTW 1988. "Chỉ thị về việc giải quyết một số vấn đề cấp bách về ruộng đất."
UBND tỉnh Hà Bắc 1992. "Chỉ thị v/v tăng cường công tác quản lý và giải quyết các vụ tranh
chấp về đất đai"; and 1992 "Báo cáo (bổ sung) tình hình chống tham nhũng cuối năm 1992." Bắc
Giang.
163
UBND huyện Tiên Sơn 1988. "Chỉ thị về việc giải quyết tranh chấp ruộng đất giữa các đội sản
xuất trong HTX." Tiên Sơn.
164
UBND huyện Tiên Sơn 1988. "Chỉ thị về việc giải quyết tranh chấp ruộng đất giữa các đội sản
xuất trong HTX." Tiên Sơn, trang 1-2.
161
162
87
cases in which the per capita agricultural land among villages of the
large-scale cooperative is seriously imbalanced. In both
circumstances, the District People’s Committee has to democratically
discuss with the commune authorities and cooperative members
whether to divide land use rights, or to return the agricultural land use
rights to their former holders.165
From the perspective of many villagers, however, a village’s agricultural
land use rights should be used for and by its villagers. To many of them, the
rationale of per capita agricultural land should be based only on the land use
rights that their village holds, not compared to others! In other words, how much
agricultural land use rights one could attain for farming depends on the area of
agricultural land of the village to which one belongs. The taking of one village’s
land use rights for another to use is, therefore, not reasonable and unacceptable.
As a result, a number of villagers started demanding the return of their former
agricultural land use rights. Describing the situation in Tiên Sơn, the District
Party Organization pointed out that villagers’ claims for their old agricultural
land use rights happened “sometimes quietly (ngấm ngầm), sometimes publicly,
fiercely and heatedly (công khai, quyết liệt và nóng bỏng), mainly in the years
from 1989 to 1991”.166 In some villages, the villagers even reclaimed their old
agricultural land use rights shortly after they had been taken, i.e. years before
the distribution of agricultural land use rights in 1988. However, in the context
of high collectivization at the time, their claims attracted no positive feedback.
With such perceptions, people in a number of villages made their own way
through the state land tenure policy and its views on the resolution of
agricultural land use rights claims to propose the reorganization of large-scale
cooperatives into the former ones, which often coincided with the village
territory, as a strategy to successfully reclaim old agricultural land use rights. In
so doing, they could satisfy two desires at the same time: to reorganize the
cooperative on the basis of village territory, and to retrieve their village’s old
agricultural land use rights. In any case where a large-scale cooperative is
subdivided into smaller ones, the agricultural land use rights and other forms of
collective property must also be divided. The most reasonable division of
agricultural land use rights, in the view of most claimants, was to return
TU Hà Bắc 1989. "Báo cáo sơ kết thực hiện Nghị quyết 10 của Bộ Chính trị về đổi mới quản lý
kinh tế nông nghiệp." Bắc Giang, trang 13
HU Tiên Sơn 1993. "Dự thảo báo cáo tình hình nông nghiệp Tiên Sơn sau những năm đổi mới,
chủ trương và biện pháp thực hiện NQ 5 BCHTW Đảng." Tiên Sơn, trang 9
165
166
88
agricultural land use rights to its former village, as they were prior to the
development of high-scale cooperatives.
Such collectives determined, and even prolonged, villagers’ struggles for
the return of old agricultural land use rights, either directly or through
cooperative separation, which has succeeded in many cases. As a result, a
number of high-scale cooperatives were separated into smaller ones, often based
on the village territory. As a result, the number of cooperatives increased during
the few years of agricultural land use rights distribution and redistribution. At
the provincial level, in 1987, Hà Bắc’s agricultural cooperatives numbered 856,
however, this increased to 902 in 1988, 940 in 1989, and over 1,000 in 1993.
Within two years, from 1987 to 1988, 75 new cooperatives had been newly
established due to cases of subdivision.167 In the following years, in 1992-1993,
when agricultural land use rights continued to be redistributed among villagers
for longer terms of use, villagers’ claims to old agricultural land use rights and
demands to split high-scale cooperatives into smaller ones continued in some
places.168
At the level of Tiên Sơn district, villagers in a number of villages also
succeeded in reclaiming their former areas of agricultural land for their villages.
The clearest examples include the cases of Phật Tích and Tri Phương communesized cooperatives (currently belonging to Tiên Du district). In Phật Tích, the
commune-based cooperative was created in 1976 by merging two village-sized
ones: Phật Tích and Cổ Phú.169 Prior to their integration, the Phật Tích villagesized cooperative had 220 mẫu and eight sào of farmland (đất canh tác), equal
to 79,392 square metres.170 After the 1976 merger, however, commune-based
cooperative cadres took 31,296 square metres of farmland from Phật Tích
village, which amounted to 39.4 per cent of its total farmland area, for villagers
of former Cổ Phú village-based cooperative to use in order to balance the
agricultural land per capita. This soon created reactions from villagers of the
former Phật Tích village-based cooperative. From 1982 they publicly started
demanding the commune-based cooperative be re-divided into the former
TU Hà Bắc 1989. "Báo cáo sơ kết thực hiện Nghị quyết 10 của Bộ Chính trị về đổi mới quản lý
kinh tế nông nghiệp." Bắc Giang, trang 8
168
TU Hà Bắc 1992. "Thông báo kết quả thực hiện kết luận của tỉnh ủy về đổi mới hoàn thiện cơ chế
quản lý HTX nông nghiệp theo Nghị quyết 10 của BCT (Khóa VI) và Nghị quyết Đại hội VII của
Đảng." Bắc Giang, trang 3.
169
The commune and village have the same name.
170
Mẫu, sào and thước are traditional units of land measure in Vietnam with different meanings in
different regions. In the Red River Delta, one mẫu is 10 sào = 3,600 square metres; one sào is 15
thước = 360 square metres; and one thước = 24 square metres.
167
89
village-based ones, and reclaiming the 31,296 square metres of farmland that
had been taken.
The claim to divide the cooperative and to redeem lost farmland continued
from 1982 to 1988, under the leadership of the Phật Tích village party cell.
During the years from 1984 to 1988, the village party cell met nine times (họp
chín kỳ) to discuss their claims, making six resolutions (nghị quyết) to propose
(đề nghị) to commune authorities and commune-based cooperative cadres that
the cooperative be separated and that Phật Tích’s farmland use rights be
returned. The cooperative cadres, as well as commune and higher authorities,
however, did not agree with the request from the Phật Tích party cell. Thus, in
May 1988, Phật Tích villagers moved so that they may occupy their old area of
farmland, and allocated farmland use rights among them for rice cultivation. By
July 1988, the Commune Party Organization and People’s Committee, “with the
assistance of the district,” tried to help Cổ Phú villagers to reoccupy that area of
farmland, but were unsuccessful, because Phật Tích villagers reacted strongly
(phản ứng quyết liệt).171
A similar case took place regarding the Tri Phương commune-based
cooperative that had been formed from two village-based cooperatives: Nghĩa
Dũng and Dũng Vi, in 1976. After the unification, 89 mẫu, one sào, and five
thước of farmland (320,880 square metres) of the former Dũng Vi village-based
cooperative were taken for the cooperative members from the former Nghĩa
Dũng village-based cooperative. The main aim of this was also to reduce the
disparity in per capita agricultural land among members of the commune-based
cooperative. From 1985, however, members of former Dũng Vi village-based
cooperative started requesting a division of the commune-based cooperative into
the former village-based ones so as to retrieve their old area of 320,880 square
metres of farmland to which they had use rights.
In March 1988, shortly before the distribution of agricultural land use
rights, Dũng Vi villagers again demanded the return of their taken farmland use
rights. When this was not approved by the authorities, they asked to exchange
25 mẫu and seven sào of river-bank land use rights (đất bãi), which could
neither be used for a full year nor for rice cultivation, for 27 mẫu and five sào of
inside-the-dyke farmland use rights (đất đồng) that could be used for rice
farming. This would mean that the Dũng Vi villagers would farm 27 mẫu and
huyện Tiên Sơn." Tiên Sơn, trang 2.
171
90
five sào đất đồng that Nghĩa Dũng villagers were farming, and vice versa.
While the cooperative cadres and commune authorities were still considering
their request, Dũng Vi villagers moved to occupy this area of farmland and
allocated its use rights among themselves for rice farming. To resolve this
action, the Commune Party Organization and People’s Committee issued a
decision to confiscate “the disputed farmland” and allocate its use rights equally
to 12 production brigades of the commune-based cooperative for farming.
However, the outcome was not positive because Dũng Vi villagers reacted
strongly when the plan was being implemented.172
III - Consequences: Local Conflicts
As Klatt broadly observed, land has often been the cause of conflict.173
Villagers’ claims to agricultural land in the Red River Delta is one of the key
factors that created local conflicts during the process of agricultural
decollectivization.174 A key feature of such conflicts over land is public
resistance between parties, which may be one group of villagers and another
(i.e. among villagers) or, more frequently, a group of villagers and a certain
local cadre, group of local cadres, officials, or state programmes in relation to
land resources (i.e. between villagers and the state). This form of public
resistance differs from the well-known form of everyday struggle of the poor,
weak, and marginalized people against the rich, powerful elites and the state in a
specific social context.175 Furthermore, it cannot be assimilated to the “popular”
and “rightful resistance” of contemporary Chinese villagers that O’Brien and Li
have highlighted in several studies.176
Public resistance, in these cases, ranges from peaceful reactions like
gossip, debate and questioning to blunt and confrontational reactions. It has
occurred within and outside local communities where protesting villagers reside
huyện Tiên Sơn.” Tiên Sơn, trang 2.
173
W. Klatt, “Agrarian Issues in Asia: I. Land as a Source of Conflict”. International Affairs, Vol.
48, No. 2 (1972), pp. 226 – 241.
174
Also see my other study: Nguyen Van Suu, “The Polictics of Land: Inequality in Land Access
and Local Conflicts in the Red River Delta sinc Decollectivization” in Social Inequality in Vietnam
and the Challenges to Reform, edited by Philip Taylor, Singapore : ISEAS, 2004, pp. 270 – 296.
175
James C. Scott and Ben Kerkvliet, Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance in Southeast Asia.
London : Frank Cass, 1986.
176
Kevin J. O'Brien, "Rightful Resistance." World Politics 41, No. 1 (1996), pp. 31-55; Liangjian Li
Li and Kevin J. O'Brien, "Villagers and Popular Resistance in Contemporary China." Modern China
22, No. 1 (1996), pp. 28-61.
172
91
and have conformed to official norms but have also moved beyond the
boundaries of official norms. Generally speaking, public resistance first occurs
at the local level in the form of gossip, debate, questioning, and negotiation
through official norms in order to meet demands and desires. When these are
not met or treated in a way which satisfies the protesting villagers, they then
proceed towards higher levels of the party-state to seek resolution, investigation,
and explanation. In this arena, if problems or queries are again not met or
satisfied, the protesting villagers in some cases will then return to their village
communities and continue to resist in blunt and confrontational ways and, of
course, do not limit their resistance to official norms. Blunt and confrontational
reactions might also occur during the period in which protesting villagers are
seeking a settlement from the higher state, depending on the specific resolution
of issues.
In many cases, public resistance occurs in a collective form. It can
therefore be organized and planned in terms of leadership and tactics of
resistance such as who, what, how, where and when to resist. Like rightful
resistance, state laws and policies, alongside traditional values, are also cited to
endorse and strengthen public resistance.
Like everyday popular and rightful forms of resistance, public resistance
ultimately creates dynamics for change. In regards to the party-state, public
resistance can affect the behaviour and conduct of state policy and policymaking at different levels, such as leading to a better regime of land
management and use, as well as a more rational policy for land use rights
compensation at a national level, eliminating bad local cadres and reducing their
corruption or misbehaviour towards villagers in local communities. In his
research, Kirkville demonstrates the great impact of ordinary people’s everyday
political behaviour on the state’s process of agricultural collectivization in
Vietnam.177 My research has also illustrated that villagers’ pressures in claiming
their old land and the resulting conflicts have continued to force the state to
revise Land laws over the past ten years. For example, the first Land Law
177
Ben Kerkvliet, "Village-State Relations in Vietnam: The Effects of Evereyday Politics on
Decollectivization." Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 54, Issue 2 (1995), pp. 396-418; 2005; The
Power of Everyday Politics: How Vietnamese Peasants Transformed National Policy. Ithaca, NY :
Cornell University Press, 2005.
92
passed in 1988 by the National Assembly has then been revised in 1993, 1998,
2001, 2003, and is currently in the process of being revised again.178
In the broadest terms, conflicts have been identified by two key signals:
villagers’ petitions and acts of denunciation in state offices, and their
confrontational actions in their local communities. Regarding the first aspect of
conflict, state authorities at different levels have noted a large number of
villagers’ petitions and acts of denouncement related to land and local cadres
since decollectivization. The villagers’ petitions and denunciations did not stop
at the level of district authorities: in many cases they often moved further up to
provincial authorities and even to the central organs of the party-state in Hanoi,
because the villagers considered their complaints were not being handled
properly by district authorities, or because authorities had failed to settle the
underlying issues in a way that satisfied the petitioners and denouncers. A more
critical aspect of conflict appears to be the villagers' confrontational actions that
occur their local villages. Villagers’ reactions have in many cases led to tensions
in communities, and the state has called them “complicated cases and hot
spots”.179 In former Hà Bắc for example, from 1987 to 1997, 148 cases of
conflict occurred. Among these, 83 were complex, and 27 cases became hot
spots, including 7 cases in which the authorities had to use force to resolve the
problem.180 In regards to the 83 complicated cases, 48 cases arose because of
land use rights disputes (57.8%), 27 cases were due to local cadre corruption
(32.53%), and the rest (9.67%) resulted from other problems.181 In short,
conflicts over land stemmed from different reasons, and claim to land is one of
them.
178
Also see Nguyen Van Suu, Contending views and Conflicts over Land in the Red River Delta
since Decollectivization. PhD. Dissertation, Department o Anthropology, Research School of Pacific
and Asian Studies, The Australian National University, 2004, pp. 91 – 137.
179
According to a report made in 1993 by Hà Bắc People’s Committee on the situation of hot-spots
in Hà Bắc province from 1990 to 1993.
180
According to a report made in 1998 by Bắc Ninh Party Organisation on the situation and
resolutions for settling internal conflicts in the province’s rural areas from 1987 to 1997, p. 1.
181
According to a report made in 1998 by Bắc Ninh Party Organization on the situation and
resolutions for settling internal conflicts in the province’s rural areas from 1987 to 1997, p. 2.
93
IV - Implications:
The Importance of Property Rights
To understand the rationale for villagers’ grievances over land use rights,
the data that I have collected indicates a number of different perspectives. In a
context where the party-state emphasized the entire people’s ownership over
land and where villagers were prevented from reclaiming their old plots of
agricultural land during the decollectivization process, a report prepared by the
Bureau of Land Management shifted the blame to the state as a whole. It argued
that, firstly, the state land tenure policy lacked agreement and clearness;
secondly, the state authorities had been weak in the management of land;
thirdly, local cadres had committed wrongdoings and abused their official
positions for private gain in the process of governing agricultural land; and
lastly, it alleged the ineffective resolution of land use rights claims by
authorities resulting in conflicts with villagers.182
Data from Hà Bắc and Tiên Sơn authorities gives a more detailed
explanation. Provincial authorities argued that villagers’ claims to their old land
use rights, which led the subsequent disputes, originated firstly within the local
government, particularly the local cadres who had loosened their management
(buông lỏng quản lý), and committed wrongdoings and were corrupt for private
gain. This reduced the agricultural land area at a local level, and consequently
created suspicion and adverse reactions among villagers. Secondly, they blamed
the villagers, who, during the period of collectivization, were merely focused on
the working points, and cared little about agricultural land use rights and
working productivity. After decollectivization, however, villagers began to care
very much about land use rights. In addition to these two points were the
influences of extreme localism (tư tưởng cục bộ địa phương) – an notion that is
deeply embedded in the minds of individual groups of villagers – the villagers’
poor understanding of the state legal system (kém hiểu biết pháp luật), and the
problem of opportunists and bad elements, like some ex-cadres who had been
punished, or those whose moral decay and changed nature (thoái hóa biến chất)
had incited (xúi giục) other villagers to claim old land use rights.183 The Tiên
Sơn District Party Organization presented a further crucial factor: the villagers’
urgent need (bức xúc) of agricultural land use rights for farming. This increasing
Tổng cục Quản lý ruộng đất 1992. "Báo cáo về tranh chấp đất đai." Hà Nội, trang 5-6.
UBND tỉnh Hà Bắc 1990. "Báo cáo kiểm điểm kết quả ba năm thi hành Luật Đất đai." Bắc
Giang, trang 10-13.
182
183
94
necessity stemmed from the fact that during the years of đổi mới, a number of
state staff members and soldiers retired, and consequently the population in the
countryside increased.184
These perspectives are reasonable but only partially explain the problem,
and have not yet touched upon the root of the issue. My analysis critically shows
the importance of property rights in agricultural land individually and in
Vietnamese society at large, because in both traditional and modern times, many
farmers still value agricultural lands as it is a means of production that provides
them with their livelihood185 and a valuable form of property.186 Therefore, since
time immemorial, many Vietnamese have considered tấc đất tấc vàng (a piece
of land, a piece of gold). Moreover, the political and socio-economic values of
land tend to increase when there are few alternative livelihood sources for
farmers, like in the case of Filipino farmers that Lewis analysed.187
This allows me to assume that the number one reason why the villagers’
claim their old agricultural land use rights is related to their perception about
their rights to land or, more specifically, that they or their villages are entitled to
land use rights that have been taken away from them. Many claimants often saw
these rights as belonging to them or their village institutions. The use rights,
thus, must be held, used by and for the inhabitants of the village to whom
agricultural land use rights (as well as worshipping rights) originally belonged.
In such a view, the taking of agricultural land use rights from a group of
villagers, or from the village as a whole, to give to other parties and institutions
to use without any prior form of compensation or agreement would provoke
reactions from those who have lost their land rights.
There are numerous reasons that add to villagers’ claims to their old
agricultural land use rights, including those that different levels of party-state
HU Tiên Sơn 1993. "Dự thảo báo cáo tình hình nông nghiệp Tiên Sơn sau những năm đổi mới,
chủ trương và biện pháp thực hiện NQ 5 BCHTW Đảng." Tiên Sơn, trang 9.
185
Pierre Gourou, The Peasants of the Tonkin Delta: A Study of Human Geography, New Haven,
Human Relations Area Files, 1955, 2 Vols; Scott, James, The Moral Economy of the Peasant:
Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia, New Haven : Yale University Press, 1976; Đỗ Hoài
Nam, Lê Cao Đàm (chủ biên), Xây dựng cơ sở hạ tầng nông thôn trong qúa trình công nghiệp hóa,
hiện đại hóa ở Việt Nam. Hà Nội: NXB, 2001. Khoa học Xã hội.
186
Katherine Verdery has argued that, for Romanian farmers, land is valued as a route towards
political capital. (Katherine Verdery, The Vanishing Hectare: Property and Value in Postsocialist
Transylvania, Ithaca & London : Cornell University Press, 2003, p. 120).
187
Lewis, Henry, Ilocano Rice Farmers: A Comparative Study of Two Philipine Barrios, Honolulu :
University of Hawaii Press, 1971, pp. 86-95.
184
95
authorities have suggested. Particularly, since decollectivization, under the
impact of the market economy, modernization, industrialization and
urbanization, land use rights have become a valuable form of property because
they can be exchanged just like other goods. Also, in the context of increasing
demand for land use rights and decreased supply, values of land use rights have
been increasing.
All these perceptions and perspectives have participated in provoking
villagers’ claims and consolidated the struggle to retrieve their old agricultural
land use rights. Villagers’ claims to their old agricultural land use rights
critically happened during the years of distribution and redistribution because
this was a key point in time. In fact, the distribution and redistribution of
agricultural land use rights to villagers for long-term use is a form of
privatization of agricultural land use rights. After this privatization, nearly all
agricultural land use rights in communities would no longer be held by the
cooperative or the village as a whole, but by individual villagers or family
households which are legally verified by a land use rights certificate from the
state. Once the privatization of agricultural land use rights was completed and
consolidated by legal land use rights certificates (giấy chứng nhận quyền sử
dụng đất, or sổ đỏ), villagers’ claims to their old agricultural land use rights
would have much less weight in terms of legal and moral grounds, thus making
it difficult to justify.
Conclusion
After 30 years of agricultural collectivization efforts, Vietnam’s party-state
started to dismantle agricultural cooperatives by, among other methods,
‘privatizing’ collective land and other forms of collective property for the
villagers’ use. In the process of land use rights privatization, or
distribution/allocation as the Vietnamese authorities call it, the party-state
critically emphasizes the ownership of the entire people’s land and the state’s
rights to land management. Since, it has developed a legal system to ensure this
in order to prevent various categories of people and institutions from making
claims to retrieve old land or other land rights, both on an individual and
collective basis over a certain area or plot of land.
Despite determined actions as such as these, the practices of claims to
agricultural land use rights during the process of decollectivization occurred in
96
various parts of Vietnam, to the extent that it became a concern to the partystate. In these respective villages in the Red River Delta, agricultural land
claims during this period involved lots of tension, negotiations and resistance
among different parties. One of the consequences was the development of local
conflicts, which in contrast to everyday forms of resistance, or rightful
resistance, took the shape of public resistance. Such practices of land claims,
and their resulting local conflicts, show what land property rights mean to
villagers in the Red River Delta’s rural areas, both in their perception and
everyday actions, collectively and individually.
This chapter also endorses what Verdery and others have argued about
“fuzziness” in property relations in Vietnam and post-socialist countries.188
More importantly, though this has not been thoroughly discussed in previous
sections, it endorses the arguments made in available literature on the power of
the people over the state in the process of policy-making and policy
implementation.189 Whether or not such practices of land claims contribute to
reduce the gap between norms and practices is not yet clear. However, we
clearly see how practices that contradict official norms of the party-state over
the holding and use of land during the agricultural decollectivization process in
respective Red River Delta villages and land claims in Vietnamese society at
large do contribute to recreating or reproducing state laws and regulations in
regard to land. Over the past 20 years, the party-state has taken such practices
from the people into consideration in the process of revising land laws and many
other regulations over the issues of land management, land use, and especially
the holding of land use rights.
188
Janet C. Sturgeon and Thomas Sikor, “Post–Socialist Property in Asia and Europe: Variation on
‘Fuzziness’” in Conservation & Society, Vol. 2, No. 1 (2004), pp. 1–17; Katherine Verdery, “The
Property Regime of Socialism” in Conservation & Society, Vol. 2, No. 1 (2004), pp. 189–198.
189
For example, to understand how Vietnamese farmers transformed the party-state policies over the
programmes of agricultural collectivization and decollectivization, see Ben Kerkvliet, "Village-State
Relations in Vietnam: The Effects of Evereyday Politics on Decollectivization." Journal of Asian
Studies, Vol. 54, Issue 2 (1995), pp. 396-418; The Power of Everyday Politics: How Vietnamese
Peasants Transformed National Policy, Ithaca, NY : Cornell University Press, 2005; to see how
local conflicts over land have influenced the Vietnamese party-state over the formation and
reformation of comtemporary land regime, see Nguyen Van Suu, Contending views and Conflicts
over Land in the Red River Delta since Decollectivization. PhD. Dissertation, Department of
Anthropology, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, The Australian National University,
2004; and “Contending Views and Conflicts over Land in Vietnam’s Red River Delta” in Journal of
Southeast Asian Studies, Vol. 38, No. 2 (2007), pp. 309–334; for China, see Kate Xiao Zhou, How
the Farmers Changed China: Power of the People, Boulder, Colo : Westview Press, 1996.
97
As this chapter shows only one of the five broad forms of land claims in
Vietnam since the period of agricultural decollectivization, I would say that the
examination of other forms of land claims will help us to have a more in-depth
understanding of the variety empirical examples that show how, in what ways
and to what extent the divergence between the party-state’s official norms and
the practices of the people in different locations occur over how land in Vietnam
should be owned, managed and used for and by whom, and for whose benefit,
and how and in what ways these practices would cause official norms to
change.190
190
In other pieces of research, I have examined other forms of land claims in the Red river delta, for
example the villagers’ claims over the output of communal land, the reasonal level of compensation
for land use rights (See Nguyen Van Suu, “The Politics of Land: Inequality in Land Access and
Local Conflicts in the Red River Delta since Decollectivization.” in Social Inequality in Vietnam
and the Challenges to Reform, edited by Philip Taylor, Singapore : ISEAS, 2004, pp. 270–296;
“Contending Views and Conflicts over Land in the Red River Delta since Decollectivization”. Ph.D
dissertation, Department of Anthropology, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian
National University, 2004; and “Industrialization and Urbanization in Vietnam: How Appropriation
of Agricultural Land Use Rights Transformed Framers’ Livelihoods in a Peri-Urban Hanoi
Village?” East Asian Development Network Working Paper No. 38), 2007.
98
Chapter 3
Practical Norms and Gaining
Legitimacy in Ha Nam Province
Nguyen Thi Thanh Binh
Recent studies made on local government and authority in Vietnam have
pointed out that local cadres play an important role in everyday life politics in
rural areas191. They are implementing most of the central government’s laws,
programmes and policies, while being representatives of local residents. Those
cadres, especially village heads, are the state officials that are closest to the
people and with whom they have the most interaction192. As a result, they
confront a major challenge of how to be accountable to both local people and
the state. As the authors conclude, local people would like their village cadres to
combine fair-mindedness and impartiality with being “goofy with the people”
and somewhat flexible in order to accommodate particular circumstances.
People favour officials who can get results while also being morally upright193.
However, some cadres often lack the training, skill and experience to do their
job well. Their inadequate compensation and allowance are also the main
reasons for dishonesty and corruption. Ineffective and immoral local leaders
easily lead to discontent and protest among rural residents194. These suggest that
the Vietnamese have developed a set of norms for their local authorities’
professional and personal behaviour, and it is not easy for local cadres to
measure up to the people’s expectations, therefore the dynamics of everyday life
interactions between local leaders and the people are interesting to explore.
191
BENEDICT, Kerkvliet J. Tria and DAVID, Marr G. (eds.), Beyond Hanoi: Local Government in
Vietnam, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore : NIAS Press, 2004.
192
PHAM QUANG MINH, “Caught in the Middle: Local Cadres in Hai Duong Province”, Beyond
Hanoi: local government in Vietnam B.J. Kerkvliet and D.G. Marr, (eds.), Pp. 90-109, Vietnam
update series. Singapore : Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2004.
193
BENEDICT and DAVID (eds.), Beyond Hanoi:…, 2004, page 17.
194
PHAM QUANG MINH, “Caught in the Middle:.., 2004, page 100.
99
Shaun Marlarney195, through an examination of two politicians’ careers in
a suburb commune of Hanoi, has clarified different moral notions by which
Vietnamese people evaluate their leaders and illustrated how the application of
these standards affect local political life. He aims to show that there is a sociocultural construction of ideas of good leadership in rural Vietnam and these
local standards are different, sometimes contradictory, from the ideas and
expectations of the party. The application of these local ideas and values,
according to Malarney, has contributed to the development of civil society and
enabled the Vietnamese to construct their own post-socialist political culture.
Although the author could examine the construction of notions of prestige
leaders that local people choose through their village election, he has not
researched the interplay between the people and their leaders in everyday life
interactions to see how the ideas or norms of good leadership constructed by
local socio-cultural values work in practice, nor does he deal with what happens
when most local leaders violate the norm or none of them entirely fit their
standards? In that situation, how do local authorities gain legitimacy and
mobilize the people to follow their leadership? I suggest that there are more
dynamics in the relationship between the norms of a good leader and how they
are practiced, which can only be understood through every day life politics in
the village.
In this chapter, I will examine the interplay between local authorities and
rural residents to see how the cadres gain prestige and to what extent the people
give them legitimacy. Through this interaction, I am aiming to illustrate how the
norms of good leadership exist in Vietnamese contemporary society, their extent
and what roles they have had in everyday village politics. Can these norms
alone, as a socio-cultural construction, play a decisive role in gaining prestige
among rural leaders, or are there any other factors that influence this process?
My analysis draws upon long-term ethnographic research in a village in Ha
Nam province. Located in the centre of the Red River delta, Bắc Đồng village196
is one among thousands of rural communities in Vietnam, which is the lowest
administrative unit of government and has long been a central focus for
195
MALARNEY (Shaun Kingsley), “Culture, Virtue, and Political Transformation in Contemporary
Northern Vietnam”, The Journal of Asian Studies, Nov 1997, Vol. 56, No. 4.
196
Bắc Đồng is not the official name of the village where I carried out one year fieldwork from June
2007 to June May 2008. In fact, is one version of the revolutionary name of the village during the
collectivization period. I prefer to use it as it is a beautiful name and it protects my informants.
100
discussion on the social structure of Vietnamese society197,198. The village is
about 60 km from Hanoi and 10 km from its provincial centre, Phu Ly town, Ha
Nam province. Historically, it was formed by different lineages coming from
surrounding provinces in the delta in the late 1700s. Over time, the population
of Bắc Đồng has now reached over 4,000 inhabitants. Like other residents in the
delta, rice cultivation has been the main livelihood of the villagers, combined
with handicrafts and small forms of trade. Only a few people live and work
within the village for their whole lives given the limited resources of the local
area.
Bắc Đồng people say that it was only after 1995 did they really have
enough food to eat and only recently, after 2000, were their lives truly
improved. Wars, conflicts, natural disasters and low rice productivity both
before and during colonial times were the main reasons for poverty. After the
1954 Dien Bien Phu victory, the new revolutionary government led people in
the delta into a campaign of socialism building. Difficulties during the war and
even after the war, together with the subsidized economic policy, made people
suffer a life of deprivation. In 1986, the economic renovation policy (known as
Doi Moi) was launched, but it took about ten more years for people to catch up
with the market economy and get out of the crisis. Towards the end of this
crisis, a protest took place in Bắc Đồng that began with the idea of claiming
back some land which had been given to a neighbouring village during the
period of collectivism from the 1960s to the 1980s. The villagers believe this
land to be their ancestral home and sent complaints, holding demonstrations at
the government office and ultimately used force to get the land back. In the
midst of the protest, the villagers started a fight against corruption among local
authorities. The dynamics of the conflict between local people and their leaders
during this period go beyond the scope of this paper. After the protest ended,
Bắc Đồng people were swept by various movements started at the same time by
the local government in their area and elsewhere in Vietnam. New policies on
agricultural land, the promotion of rice cultivation, and a poverty-alleviation
programme had made changes to the face of this rural area. At the same time as
these economic improvements were taking place, social and ritual life in rural
areas was enhanced by the movement to revive spiritual life. It is possible to say
that after the protest, villagers merely followed the lead of local authorities and
the government’s programmes. It is interesting to explore the dynamics of these
197
LUONG Hy V, Revolution in the Village: Tradition and Transformation in North Vietnam. 19251988, Honolulu : University of Hawaii Press, 1992.
198
KLEINEN John, Facing the future, reviving the past: a study of social change in a Northern
Vietnamese village, Singapore : Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1999.
101
programmes to see how leaders gained and regained the trust of the people, and
how they ‘entered into the heart’ of the villagers.
In this paper, I will describe the different methods of mobilizing villagers
into a campaign aimed at building village infrastructure and a new life after the
protest. One method was compulsory in style, which created a ‘cold war’ in the
relationship between cadres and the people, while the most recent, more
successful, method has used culture and ritual as a way for the villagers to
communicate with their leaders. This accommodation of the local government
with religion and culture has paved the way for people to imagine and practice
their beliefs. The village god suddenly emerged as a popular authority who
could create a strong passion for the villagers to recreate their village identity, a
sense of communal spirit, and more importantly helped them communicate with
local cadres. By quenching the people’s thirst for culture, local authorities
gained power through the enthusiasm of the people. Its relationship with people,
as I will conclude, was rebuilt through performances and ritual, together with
the norms of good leadership.
I - Profane Power
Just three days after I commenced my fieldwork at Bắc Đồng, an event
occurred which produced a stir in the village. It was the sudden death of the
only son of a former chairman – Mr Lê Thời. At that time, I did not know
anything about him or the situation in the village but I was curious when people
had a strange attitude towards this death. They gossiped to each other in a state
of awe and shock. I heard words like “oh how fearful, it is true that God knows
everything” (sợ thật, ông trời đúng là có mắt”, or “sow the wind, reap the
whirlwind” “ác giả ác báo”). Normally, villagers feel sorry for a person who
passes away and his or her family. In this case too, they felt compassion for that
young and handsome man who had died suddenly at his house at the age of
twenty. But his death reminded villagers about his father and his past. It made
them think about the law of causality. The dead man was affected by the bad
attitudes of villagers toward his father. What was the reason for this gossip and
did everyone in the village share the same opinion and attitude?
Before the protest began in Bắc Đồng, Lê Thời was an ordinary
accountant in the Commune’s People’s Committee. He had no influence in the
village. By supporting his cousin, Lê Quý - who was chairman at that time, Thời
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emerged as an influential local cadre as a result of how he had coped with the
protesters. After the protest, he took advantage of his new relationships and
prestige to gain a promotion. He even turned against his cousin to get a higher
position. Two years after the resistance ended, Thời became vice chairman and
then chairman of the commune, a position he held for almost 10 years. The
villagers, however, cannot understand how he could rise to such a place of
authority (nảy nòi). They believed that his rise was due to pure luck (dựa thời).
Thời’s power in village affairs is related to the fact that the apparatus of
local government in Bắc Đồng is a bit different from the surrounding communes
in particular and the rest of the delta in general. Since 1993, the position of
village head has re-emerged in northern rural Vietnam199. This is the person who
has direct contact with villagers. His/her task can be seen as an assistant to the
commune chairman in the implementation of work and the instructions of local
government, as well as the collection of fees and contributions. Normally,
village heads are party members and are men. But recently there has been a
more open-minded atmosphere in many localities and villagers elect heads who
are not party members. In a few cases, children of former landlord families have
gained this position.200 In Bắc Đồng, there is no such title as village head
(trưởng thôn), but instead there is an area head (trưởng miền), a key leader in
the Commune’s People’s Committee, who must live in the village. He has two
titles and is responsible for both the commune and the village. Instead of being
an assistant to the administration, the area head is a representative of local
government in the village. Thus, his status is more important and empowering
than ordinary village heads in other locations. The main reason for the existence
of this title in Bắc Đồng’s commune is the local government’s aim to strengthen
its guidance at the village level and create a consensus among all the village
leaders so it can implement its policies and instructions.
During his ten years in power, Thời assumed the role of village leader
along with his high position on the People’s Committee. He was a handsome
forty-year-old man when he first assumed these roles. Although he only finished
secondary school, according to villagers he had good oratory skills (giỏi ăn nói).
People believe that he was a clever person (khôn khéo) and skilled in the art of
living (giỏi về nghệ thuật sống). He knew how to develop and maintain
199
See PHAM QUANG MINH, “Caught in the Middle…”, 2004.
My fieldwork in another commune in Hoài Đức district, Hà Tây province (now in Hanoi) shows
that in this area, young people and non-party members are elected as village heads. Many people
hesitate to do this work as it is considered as ‘eating at home, but shouldering the work of assisting
the Canton’ (ăn cơm nhà vác tù và hàng tổng).
200
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relationships with higher echelons to protect his position and get things done
(giải quyết mọi việc) while making subordinates follow his instructions. During
his time of leadership, Bắc Đồng village implemented various infrastructure
projects in which Thời played an important role. When the district launched the
programme to build a village road, he told his assistants (hamlet heads ‘trưởng
xóm’, and security team members ‘tổ an ninh’) to mobilize villagers to respond
to the movement. Each household (khẩu) contributed 100 thousand đồng for this
project. The contribution was made in two instalments. At harvest time,
households paid these instalments together with other fees and taxes. As a
result, the main village road and lanes were concreted by the mid 1990s. Some
years after that, he continued to mobilize people to build a water supply system.
A water station was built at the edge of the village and pipes were installed
along the main road and lanes. However, pipes did not reach each household.
Therefore, only about 20 percent of households close to the main road and lanes
could afford to connect to the water supply, although every family had
contributed a large amount of money, 100 thousand đồng per household. Every
year, households were also required to contribute towards small construction
and repair jobs such as roads, fields, market or electricity station maintenance.
When Thời was in power, no one in the village complained about his
projects. Instead, many admitted that he had done a lot of work for the village
(làm được nhiều việc). Only when he lost his power did villagers begin to look
back on his behaviour, gossip about him and his corrupt ways. Many of them
said that he corruptly appropriated materials for road building and issued fake
receipts to report a larger quantity of cement than was really used. People felt
discontent about some of his decision making, which lacked the people’s
involvement. The water supply system was an example. In fact, this would have
been a good project if it had been well constructed as the people had actively
responded to it. At that time and even now, most of the villagers in Bắc Đồng
are not interested in a public water system. They do not want to invest a large
amount of money into it, preferring to use private wells equipped with pumps to
keep their freedom and their independence. They are hesitant to depend on the
public supply, reluctant to pay monthly fees and are not satisfied with the water
quality. This is a problem of habit and calculation. People said that the village
cadres organized a meeting about water to which they only invited some old
people who would undoubtedly support their ideas and decisions. Then, since it
was considered to be a community decision, individuals and households had to
comply. Some claimed they had to contribute even when in disagreement (nhiều
khi mình không đồng ý cũng phải đóng).
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According to village gossip, Thời’s benefits from building and
construction were small compared to his gains from land transactions. By the
end of the 1990s, Bắc Đồng was allowed to sell communal ponds and lakes near
the main roads and market to expand the residential land of the village. A part of
the sales income was kept for the commune and most of it was submitted to the
higher administration. People say that they are not sure whether or not Thời
stole some of this money, but they definitely know that he earned a lot from
bribes. As Bắc Đồng is a crowded village, villagers are very interested in
expanding their living space and accumulating land for their children. Therefore
people flocked to buy land. Most of them came to entreat Thời to help them buy
a portion of land. Later on, it turned out that Thời took about 2 million đồng
from each person to whom he promised to sell land. People estimated that, since
there were about a hundred portions of land, he could have earned 200 million
đồng in 1998. In addition, he and his siblings acquired many pieces of land
surrounding the village without any transparent auction or buying procedure.
After one year, he was able to build a big two-storey house on new residential
land near the inter-district road.
Another kind of abuse of power that many people accused Thời of was his
involvement in administrative formalities. It is difficult to find real evidence for
this type of behaviour in the delta, however, one old man in Bắc Đồng told me:
“Before the 1954 land reform, my eldest brother was the
secretary of the village. Anyone who wanted to ask for papers like
tax, birth or death certificates, had to submit a form with money
clamped inside. During collectivization, such negative things rarely
happened but people had to crawl before the cadres. Nowadays,
people no longer have to do that. They have gone back to using
money. Some years ago, it was complicated to apply for papers.
Recently, thanks to Doi Moi the renovation procedures, it is simple
and easier.” (Mr. Lâm, 70 years old).
Many villagers said that Thời took amounts ranging from five thousand to
ten thousand or twenty thousand đồng each time he signed a paper for someone.
Two men in the village told me that they had heard about that, so when they
asked for his signature, they gave him ten thousand but he refused. Maybe Thời
regarded them as old friends from his youth so he signed it without question. Or
Bắc Đồng people might have been exaggerating when describing Thời as
‘eating dirt’ (ăn bẩn) and worshipping ‘the omnivorous fish deity’ (thần me lai
ăn tạp). Nevertheless they told me that he often tried to find a reason or
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opportunity to take money from people. If a village man dug some soil from the
canal in the field to add to his garden, he would be summoned to meet Thời at
the communal office (bị gọi lên xã). When he went there at the appointed time,
Thời found an excuse not to meet saying that he was busy. After several
repetitions of this, other villagers would recommend that the man visit Thời at
his house in the evening. By seeing him privately and giving him some money,
everything would be solved. People liked to conclude that he ‘ate’ without
consideration for others and without exception, even towards relatives (không
nể, không chừa một ai).
As he was in a high position and had relationships with high echelons in
the district and province, some villagers went to him to ask for help in difficult
situations that they were facing with the law. People say that on one occasion he
succeeded in helping one villager to avoid a trial through back door means
(chạy). He boasted about it (huênh hoang). After this, many villagers came to
ask for his help. They gave him money, but their problems were not solved. For
instance, a village man who provided a money exchange service at the border
with China in Lạng Sơn province was involved in a criminal case. He came
back to the village, asked for Thời’s help, and gave him money. However, Thời
did nothing to make his situation better except signing a paper to certify that this
man had never been involved in any criminal case before. In daily life, villagers
often needed to circumvent the regulations of the government and went to ask
Thời for permission, or simply to turn a blind eye to what they were doing. He
often agreed after receiving a bribe but at the end did not really let people do
what they had sought permission for. This was the main reason why many
villagers resented Thời and gossiped about him.
Many people talked about Thời’s various weaknesses and evil habits. He
was considered a superficial person (nông nổi) when he decided to build a big
house which cost several hundred million đồng after only one year in power. He
was approachable (dễ gần) but imperious (hách dịch) and was considered a
vengeful person (hay thù vặt). If he had a grudge against someone he would use
his power or relationship to take revenge on them or repress them, whether they
were colleagues or ordinary villagers. He might induce someone to sue his
enemy or simply order his lackeys to disturb them. After the protest ended, Lê
Quý, his cousin, became his rival when they both competed for the position of
vice chairman. He took revenge on Quý’s whole family, despite them being
close relatives. Quý’s mother said Thời used his authority to ask the association
of elderly women at the pagoda to abolish her role as the chief ritual officer (chủ
tế) there. The village security team was given the task of watching for her
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family’s mistakes. Whenever they saw her family’s ducks or chickens
wandering from her garden to the rice field, they would take them to the
communal head office and ask her to come for retribution.
The majority of Bắc Đồng villagers seem to have created a ‘legend’ about
Thời as an example of strength, power and corruption. Nevertheless, people do
recognize his ability and some of his contributions to the village. One said
‘about thirty percent of what he did was good/moral work’ ‘có đức khoảng ba
mươi phần trăm’. He ‘ate’ but could work as well (ăn được, làm được). A few
villagers think he was quite good (ông ấy cũng tốt) and did not do anything bad
to them. Some people said ‘he ‘ate’ to the marrow of popularity’ ‘ăn đến tận
xương tuỷ của dân’ while others told me that ‘he stole from the state, not from
the people’. In general, most people did not like how he used his power. When
he was the authority, people followed him because they were afraid of his
power, not because they had high esteem for his talent or moral values. His
relationship with high-level authorities and the power of his siblings in the
village became obstacles for anyone who was ambitious or wanted to challenge
him. After the protest, when the emotion of people was compared to ‘detached
grains of sand’ (những hạt cát rã rời), villagers were hesitant to resist Thời or
any formal power. This created a situation of ‘willing face but unwilling heart’
(bằng mặt không bằng lòng) in the relations between him and the people.
Surprisingly, when he was in power, people appeared to respect him, especially
a number of people who benefitted from exchanging gifts and favours and
holding banquets with him. Whenever his family held a big activity like
emptying the pond for fishing or having a wedding party, many people came to
help him enthusiastically. He always stood out from the crowd by speaking
loudly and directing people about what to do and how. Only when his power
declined did people criticize him (giậu đổ bìm leo).
Thời went too far when he embezzled donations the commune had
collected for victims of the storm in the South and the purchase of some hospital
beds for the commune’s health clinic. His brother was urged to stop threatening
people after he beat up the son of a commune cadre who lived in a neighbouring
village. It took the combined pressure of most cadres and communist party
members in the whole commune to discipline Thời, who then lost his position in
the early 2000s. Some villagers say that he was lucky to avoid imprisonment
given his corrupt ways. Since then, no one cared about or maintained a
relationship with him. When he appears at communal activities like a wedding
or ritual in the village, no one takes an interest in him. He keeps silent instead of
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speaking in his sonorous voice. People have moved from honouring to
disdaining him.
After losing formal power, Thời continued to use his relationships to
develop a business in the provincial town. He opened a coffee shop and ran it as
a brothel. After some years, his illegal activity was discovered and he was
arrested. With his connections, he was able to avoid a trial, and the death of his
son was seen as a consequence of this immoral trade. According to villagers, the
son died from a drug overdose, rather than from an electric shock as his family
claimed. After all these stories, Thời does not often stay in the village now. He
avoids travelling on the main village road to avoid curses. His story stimulated a
discourse among villagers about the concept of virtue (phúc đức) and karma
(quả báo). People remind themselves about how to live a virtuous life. They
believe that the example of Lê Thời will help the new generation of village
cadres be aware of and try to avoid following these ‘tire tracks of falling
vehicles’ (tránh vết xe đổ).
Although young cadres dislike Thời, they are dissatisfied with the people’s
attitude towards him. Villagers still harbour the prejudice that being a cadre
means being corrupt. The case of Thời and similar officials has shown what
villagers’ bribes and favours can achieve. One retired cadre told me
‘ungratefulness is typical of the people, wickedness of the soldier ‘bạc như dân,
ác như quân lính’. He complained that villagers often insisted cadres help them
and then turned around and scolded them. All these discussions raise the
question of whether a number of villagers encouraged Thời to become corrupt
and misuse his authority by exchanging gifts and giving him bribes or whether
the system let him do it. It was similar during the period of collectivization.
There have always been a number of villagers, about one third of the population
some villagers estimate, who have tried to exploit the system by giving gifts and
favours and holding banquets for cadres for their own benefit. These give more
room for local officials to utilize their position to earn benefits.
The dynamics of Thời’s leadership show that in the transitional stage to a
new economy in the 1990s, there was a certainty of increasing resources and
economic opportunities for prosperity. Thus, local people had little choice but to
accept the profit-seeking behaviour in the economy that Thời had practiced in
order to better their lives, even though it went against both moral values and the
law. Relationships between people and village cadres and between people
themselves were based on pragmatism alone. As people were not entirely happy
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with that model, Thời could not create a feeling of confidence within the village
community.
II - Tolerance and Sentiment in the Building
of Legitimacy
Thời’s fall ended the obsession with the protest within the village itself. By
the early 2000s when he lost power, people’s painful memories of the past were
fading and the social atmosphere outside was much more open to them. The
new generation of village cadres replacing Thời was quite well received by
community members. Under Thời’s leadership, most hamlet heads were not
approved of by villagers as Thời was not concerned about whether the candidate
he nominated suited the will of the people or not. Recently, Bắc Đồng people
think that most of candidates nominated by the authorities are in line with their
opinions.
At present, there are two important cadres in the village, Hiền and Khôi.
They are both vice chairmen on the Commune’s People’s Committee and had an
equal opportunity to play the role of Bắc Đồng village head. Right after Thời
was dismissed, Hiền replaced him to lead the village. However, after six months
he decided to resign. Hiền is the eldest son of one of the brigade leaders during
the collectivization period, and is about 49 years old. When he was young, he
joined the army for some years and then went to Eastern Europe to work. After
returning to the village, he became a member of the People’s Committee. He
was then sent to study at the provincial political school for one year to become
chief of the office; now, as noted above, he is vice chairman of the People’s
Committee. In the eyes of villagers and his colleagues, Hiền is a gentle and
outspoken person. He is not a calculating worldly person and is quite strict in
matters of principle. He is considered more suited to deskwork than governance.
When he took on the role of village head, he found it difficult to run the system.
Hamlet heads did not cooperate well with him in implementing tasks and affairs.
The main reason for this was that Hiền did not establish good relationships with
them. He did not clearly show how the activities would benefit them and their
hamlets. No one knows whether he did not dare to do this or simply lacked the
ability to do so. For villagers, Hiền is a timid person and not skilful in speech
and behaviour. This shows the importance of leaders’ relational skills in this
society.
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Khôi is the same age and has the same background as Hiền, but has
different qualities and abilities. After completing several years of military
service, he was first selected to be a staff member at the communal military
department. Over the last ten years, he has improved his education by
completing his high school certificate, and then passing a political course, just
like Hiền. More importantly, however, Khôi has experienced and learned a lot
about how to develop relationships and gain influence. As a co-vice chairman in
the commune, he easily took over the role of village head after Hiền resigned.
So far, he is considered to be a cadre who knows how to contact, talk to and
humour people.
“Lê Thời could not enter into the hearts of people because he
sold so much land, even the pagoda’s land to fill his own pocket.
Thus, villagers did not respond to his call for village affairs. Mr. Khôi
is cleverer and has gained more within people’s hearts. He does not
sell land, only builds up the village (chỉ có kiến thiết). He is more
sensible (khôn ngoan) and sentimental (tình cảm hơn). Thời, before,
always threatened villagers with bringing their problems/troubles to
the Commune’s People’s Committee to take their money. Nowadays,
Khôi mainly solves village internal affairs by consensus (giải quyết
bằng tình cảm là chính), not by sending people or their matters to the
commune. By acting within good reason, he managed to endure his
position (khôn như vậy mới được bền) (Mrs. Đức, 55 years old, a
famer in the village).
“Khôi appeals to people’s sentiments, treats people properly and
kindly (sống có tình, hẳn hoi tử tế). He talks to people in both a
logical and sentimental way (ăn nói có tình có lý). And he does not
treat people with contempt (không khinh người) (Mrs. Hoa, 70 years
old, who used to be a farmer and petty trader).
Although most people in Bắc Đồng at present are quite happy about the
attitude of the new generation of cadres, they still are not happy with the
excessive contributions for agricultural services and duty they have to pay. In
2003, the government launched a decree which exempted or reduced tax on
agricultural land usage201. Since 2004, like other peasant households in the Red
River delta, all Bắc Đồng families have benefitted from this new policy. But
Thông tư 112/2003 của Bộ Tài chính hướng dẫn miễn, giảm thuế sử dụng đất nông nghiệp (năm
2003 đến 2010 theo Nghị định 129/2003 của Chính phủ) [Circular 112/2003 of the Ministry of
Finance on reducing and exempting agricultural land tax from 2003 till 2010 according to the decree
number 129/2003 of the government]
201
110
they still have to pay contributions while some surrounding communes were
exempt. Each household in Bắc Đồng pays 14 to 16 fees. For each sào of
allocated rice land, they pay almost 10 kilograms of rice for the irrigation fee202,
4 kilograms for field protection and smaller amounts for insect prevention, a
veterinary fund or agricultural extension203. They are also required to make
payments for social funds like the conscripted labour fund, children’s health
care fund, fund for the poor, educational promotion fund, Peasant Association
fees and the brigade/hamlet operation fee. In addition, depending on the annual
plan of the village for building common works or activities like roads, schools
or festivals, each household has to contribute money according to the amount of
rice field they are allocated or the number of family members.
Among these contributions, the irrigation fees, conscripted labour fund and
contributions for common construction work and village affairs are the most
onerous. On average, a household with 5 sào of rice land had to pay about five
hundred thousand đồng (about 27.5 USD) for each crop before 2004. After the
land use tax was abolished, the amount dropped to about three hundred thousand
đồng. Villagers say that these duties are still too much compared to what they
earn from cultivation. The average income from one sào of rice land is around
two to three hundred thousand đồng per crop after all the production expenses
are paid. People think that it is not proper and fair that children born after 1993,
who are not allocated rice land, are still subject to contributions levies on
household members. Many villagers question why they have to contribute fees
and duties that are not required by the state and why rural inhabitants such as
themselves have to contribute money to build roads while urban dwellers never
have to. The answer lies in local government policies. In many rural locations,
the local government invests part of the income gained from selling land for
residential expansion in village infrastructure after giving a certain percentage to
the state. People living in those villages do not have to contribute, or if they do
only very little, to the construction of roads, schools or electricity station. In
these cases, the local cadres are implementing a kind of ‘converting land into
infrastructure’ policy, which is in line with state policy.
202
On 15th October 2007, the government issued the decree No 154/2007/NĐ-CP on exemption of
irrigation fees for peasants. In the Red River delta, people in many locations were free from these
burden fees right after this policy was launched. But in some provinces, the policy was still not
applied.
203
A household in Đông La commune, Hoài Đức district, Hà Tây province (now in Hanoi) showed
me a range of their receipts for contributions in recent years. They only have two main fees for
irrigation and crop protection. With over 3 sào of rice land, they only have to contribute about one
hundred thousand dong per crop.
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Many Bắc Đồng villagers are hesitant to question the local government or
openly complain about the fees and charges because of their memories and
experience of the protest period. They just concentrate on working and earning
enough money to enable them to meet the contribution requirements. In other
villages where people are poorer than them, villagers might sue local authorities
about excessive duty. However, this situation in Bắc Đồng might change in the
near future. Recently an anonymous complaint appeared in a neighbouring
village in the same commune denouncing the local cadres’ abuse of power over
people’s contributions. Some villagers said that “everything has a threshold, as
things go beyond it, they will not accept it”.
Villagers often claim that their village cadres earn income from
contributions based on the area of rice land cultivated and from tractor contracts.
After de-collectivization, each household had to take care of their own
production. During the 1990s and early 2000s, people in the village prepared the
land for cultivation with their own family’s ox or hired someone to use a small
tractor to do it. Recently, new seeds and cultivation techniques require a strict
and comprehensive schedule. Hamlet leaders have taken over the role of hiring a
tractor and preparing the land for people to speed up the process, and they
collect money from each household to pay for a driver. Villagers understand that
cadres can benefit from both sides of the contract, the households and the driver.
If households hire a tractor themselves, they might only have to pay ten
thousand đồng per sào. Through the hamlet leader, they have to pay twelve
thousand đồng, but the quality of land tilled is not ensured as the mechanic often
has to pay commission to the leader so he reduces his costs by tilling carelessly.
Bắc Đồng people estimate that a hamlet leader in their village can earn about
thirty million đồng a year, an income equal to a well-to-do person in the village,
while their boss – the village head – might earn double that. However, they have
quite a calm attitude toward this phenomenon. They think that there is a
consensus among village cadres about the level of contributions and that it is
difficult for a normal villager to make any changes. Moreover, people nowadays
tend to concentrate on their own family and have become more self-centred.
“Nowadays people care more for their families than for common
interest. Everyone is busy earning a living as agriculture is not their
main livelihood. Every family takes charge of how to earn at least ten
million đồng a year to cover expenses. Therefore, they are not
bothered about what village cadres ‘eat’. In meetings, someone may
raise questions and ideas for the higher echelons but we are not sure
112
if those are passed on to higher authority… Thus, it is better to turn a
blind eye to everything” (Mr. Tý, 58 years old).
“…As cadres, they have to take care of common affairs and at
the same time think about how to have a life, at least like the ‘well-todo’’ in the hamlet. However, they should keep in mind and only ‘eat’
in certain circumstances (biết ăn tuỳ chỗ) and leave something for the
people (Mr. Tú, 65 years old).
There is a widespread idea among villagers that during collectivization
cadres only ‘ate’ paddy and rice, while nowadays hamlet and village heads earn
money from household contributions. People believe that this form of corruption
is very skilful. It is difficult to find evidence as the contribution is strictly
regulated, from the commune down to the hamlet. The income of village cadres
mainly comes from their agreements with contractors. This applies equally to
other construction contracts in the village like repairing the roads, canals and
other infrastructure projects. The leader no longer has to write fake receipts to
siphon money from the construction projects. Instead, he earns money indirectly
through the contractors.
Nowadays, people tend to accept and tolerate the fact that cadres benefit
monetarily from their positions. A quite well-to-do man in the village at present
can earn about three to four million đồng a month from production, trade or
craft. In the opinion of villagers, a head of the hamlet must have the same
capacity, quality of life and standard of living. He should therefore earn about
that amount of income by devoting his time to the village. Nevertheless, people
expect and require a good response and attitude from him. One elderly woman
in Bắc Đồng gave an example of one former hamlet head who knew how to use
the hamlet funds to sponsor parties and long dresses (áo dài) for women in the
hamlet on the occasion of Women’ s Day. Villagers considered him a clever
man who knew how to flatter the people. Bắc Đồng villagers accept that cadres
need to improve their low wages and allowances by taking part of the
households’ and individuals’ contributions for public funds or village affairs. At
the same time, however, they want to set a notional threshold for this. Details
about this limit vary according to context, event and story. However, two main
general rules are: the amount should not to be too much and should not be
applied in every case. Taking contributions people have donated for spiritual
affairs, like donations to repair or build a pagoda or temple, is not acceptable.
The percentage of the creamed off portion should not be too high compared to
the total fund or contribution. To maintain those rules satisfactorily, a cadre
113
must respect the people (nể dân) and their wishes, and be cautious in his dealing
with the people (gờm dân).
At the moment, Bắc Đồng people are fairly satisfied with their current
arrangements. However, their relationship with the cadres is an ongoing
dialogue. Villagers still believe that ‘to be a cadre one must be corrupt’,
therefore they always carefully monitor their actions. Their trust and responses
towards cadres and their call for action fluctuate depending on the dynamics of
everyday life. In their discourse on contemporary politics, villagers rarely
mention concepts of virtue and talent, which were previously seen as essential
qualities for a leader. People are very practical and assume that, nowadays, it is
difficult to apply the revolution’s moral standards such as “industry, thrift,
incorruptibility, public spirit and impartiality” (Cần, kiệm, liêm, chính . Chí
công vô tư) that Uncle Hồ embodied as a defining image of political morality204.
The most important qualities that Bắc Đồng residents expect in their leaders are
sentimentality and kindness. If the leader does more good work for the village,
he will earn more prestige, but the above qualities are critical to becoming an
esteemed political leader. The dynamics of everyday life politics in Bắc Đồng
show that under the intensification of the market economy, local people have
given more tolerance to the threshold of corruption and the norms of moral
leadership, but there is still no consensus among people on a good leader
according to criteria of the norm. Although many Bắc Đồng villagers have high
esteem for Khoi’s good sentiment and ability, at the same time they still doubt
his honesty and transparency. Thus, he and other village cadres are always
worried that when they retire or quit their jobs, they might have to go through a
similar situation or suffer the same criticism that Thoi experienced. In this
situation, their commitment to the norm of good leadership was not enough to
create a good relationship with people or to gain popular legitimacy. The
following example will illustrate that in order to change their discourse with
people and to gain of prestige, local government should meet the people’s desire
for a new ritual and religious life.
204
See MALARNEY (Shaun Kingsley), “Culture, Virtue, And Political Transformation… ”, 1997,
page 908.
114
III - Rebuilding Trust and Decision:
“Enter into the Hearts” of People
In the early 2000s, Bắc Đồng people could make a sigh of relief and feel
more relaxed when a more convincing form of local governance replaced the old
order. However, when socio-economic life really improved, people had more
room to think beyond subsistence level concerns. Villagers suddenly found that
they were being left behind compared to the surrounding villages. The
appearance of Bắc Đồng had improved with new concrete roads, more tileroofed and flat-roof houses and a public hygiene system, but it still lacked the
new social and cultural institutions and titles that many other communities in the
region had already received. During Khôi’s leadership, a program was initiated
that gave villagers a new sense of hope, a new image and model of the
responsive leader.
The movement of building Cultural Village (làng văn hoá) was introduced
during the period of 1991-2000, and was officially adopted at the fifth
Resolution of the 8th Party Congress in 1998. In the early 1990s, a small number
of cultural villages were built according to strict criteria. After 1998, locations
in the Red River delta became more actively involved in this programme205.
Aware of these developments, the new generation of Bắc Đồng village cadres
started to mobilize villagers to join the movement in the early 2000s. They
began by building cultural houses in five hamlets in the village to cater to
contemporary formal meetings and cultural performances.
In 2003, Mr. Bách, the leader of hamlet number five took the initiative in
this movement in Bắc Đồng. He himself borrowed money to build a house on
the foundation of a vacant pond in the hamlet. By showing people that he
devoted his time and whole heart to the project without stealing any building
material, he convinced people to contribute one hundred thousand đồng per
inhabitant for the project. The opening ceremony of this house became a festival
for the villagers. People were not only happy with the bright and spacious
building in their neighbourhood. What’s more is that they were very proud of
their own contribution and confidence. Since then, others have followed and
responded to the movement. By 2005, all five hamlets of Bắc Đồng had cultural
205
After the Central Government launched a Resolution on this movement, provincial governments
like Vĩnh Phúc province introduced their own Resolution to implement the target. See Resolution 7,
Vĩnh Phúc People’s Council on Building Cultural Family – Cultural Village in the period 19982004.
115
houses, which cost a total of about one billion đồng. Besides getting involved in
the construction, village cadres also mobilized people to participate in various
social activities launched and implemented by the Veteran’s Association,
Women’s Union, or Youth League. The main content and aim of these activities
was to promote agricultural production by training villagers about new seeds,
skills and techniques; to introduce new secondary jobs, or to increase people’s
awareness of social problems like drug addiction, transport accidents and
AIDS/HIV.
Despite the fact that villagers regard contemporary movements as formal
activities, under the leadership and mobilization of a new generation of cadres,
they have tried to carry out the instructions and tasks as well as meet the targets
set by higher levels government. Their efforts were acknowledged in 2005 when
they received the title of ‘Cultural Village’ for the first time. As a poor woman
who receives only three hundred thousand đồng a month for cleaning the village
road said:
“…to gain that certificate cost the villagers’ blood, sweat and
tears. Everybody had to work hard for improvement and to build big
houses from hollow foundations. Women in the village had to be
active in movements to be recognized”.
For the many Bắc Đồng people, the title is not only the a manifestation of
the government’s recognition of their well-being and improved socio-economic
life, but more importantly it abolishes their complex about the adverse political
attitude towards their village. As some of the criteria to be a cultural village is
that villagers implement state policy as well as the law, and that they ensure
order and security, the title therefore certifies that Bắc Đồng people are good
citizens who always obey the guidelines and policies of the government.
Since receiving the title of Cultural Village, many Bắc Đồng people have
been thinking of another plan for a long time. Most of the other villages in the
region had revived the festivals connected to the village guardian deity cult at
the communal house. Bắc Đồng village, however, could only revive and
maintain the Confucian-inspired tế-ritual on special occasions each year. In
principle, a village has to apply for approval from the Ministry of Culture and
Information or the Provincial Department of Culture and Information to rank its
communal house or temple as a historical building before the village can hold a
festival. Under Lê Thời’ s leadership, some old villagers raised the idea of
applying for approval of the đình, and started to prepare documents, which they
116
then sent to some officials, but no result came of this. People wondered if this
was because Thời was not sufficiently enthusiastic in pursuing the matter or
whether the government was prejudiced because of the villagers’ former
political resistance. Only in 2004, under the leadership of Khôi, was this process
resumed and promoted.
For a long time, small repairs had been made to the đình, but then, a large
amount of money was needed for it to be certified as a historical building.
Village cadres and the village Committee of Rituals decided to organize a big
movement to collect funds. Loudspeakers were used everyday to call for
donations. Speeches praising the village’s socio-economic development and
poems about the đình’s sacred nature (copied from somewhere else) were
broadcast to stimulate the villagers’ community spirit. The organizing
committee also drew up a letter to invite Bắc Đồng villagers who had moved
away from the village to give money to help restore the đình. For many migrants
in the northern mountainous provinces, the Central Highlands or Mekong delta,
who have been far away from Bắc Đồng for several decades, this was the first
time that cadres and the people at home had shown any interest in them. All
these efforts brought amazing results. Seventy million đồng was contributed by
people within the village and over forty million đồng was donated by migrants,
particularly migrants in the South. Several successful companies owned by Bắc
Đồng people donated items for the đình which were worth ten million đồng. The
donations Bắc Đồng villagers made were not as large as some other villages in
the delta where long ago villagers had contributed several hundred million or a
billion đồng to repair or rebuild their ritual spaces206 207. However, it was the
biggest amount of money that Bắc Đồng people had ever spent on a communal
activity. Some villagers told me that they responded to the call as it was a Party
decision that embraced their soul (ý Đảng lòng dân).
The village association of elderly people was given the task of preparing
the documents and records needed for the application. In this process, rituals,
festivals and history of the village tutelary deity which had been interrupted for
70 years were revived through the memories of contemporary villagers with the
assistance of the officials of Ha Nam museum. There are many new factors and
methods of invention that come with the process when villagers remember,
206
MICHAEL DiGregorio, “Things held in common: Memory, space and the reconstitution of
community life”, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, Vol. 38, No. 3 (2007), pp. 441-465.
207
TA LONG (ed), Sự phát triển của làng nghề La Phù [The development of La Phu Craft
Village], Hanoi : NXB Khoa học Xã hội, 2007.
117
imagine and select their history and tradition. However, this goes beyond the
scope of this chapter. What’s important was the swiftness in which construction
and requests went during that year, in 2006. This brought great happiness to the
villagers who were not only glad to have a certificate like others, but more
importantly they could be proud of their village god and their communal house.
Villagers said that before this event, they only had a vague knowledge of their
village god, King Đinh Tiên Hoàng208 through legends and stories that had been
passed down. They thought of him more as a spirit than a historical character.
Through the efforts of the cultural staff and the elders, people learned more
about King Đinh and the communal house. They became prouder of their village
god’s deeds of merit towards the country and confident that their communal
house was related to a significant historical milestone for the nation. As one
woman described in her poem ‘the đình had entered into the orthodox history’
(đi vào Sử xanh).
Our Bắc Đồng209 community house
Happily received the provincial certification
Village people and cadres are proud of that
Having the Đình enter into orthodox history210
Villager’s recognized Khôi, the village head, as a person who had the merit
of gaining the certificate of historical building. Villagers thought that without
the efforts of the local government, this title would never have been given to
them. They understand that Khôi acted as he did partly for the to have a good
memory of his time of leadership. After he received the approval in 2007, Khôi
organized a ceremony to receive the certificate as well as a three-day village
festival.
Đinh Tiên Hoàng (Đinh Bộ Lĩnh) is a famous character in history of Vietnam. He was born
around 924 and died in 979. When he was young, the country was in a historical period called
‘disorder of twelve warlords’ (loạn mười hai sứ quân). In that situation, Đinh Bộ Lĩnh gathered
followers and built a base in his home land, Hoa Lư - Ninh Bình province. From this area, he
expanded his influence, defeated all the warlords and reunified the country. In 968, Đinh Bộ Lĩnh
became king and gave the country a new name: Đại Cồ Việt. Historians praise him as the person
who established federal centralism in Vietnam. Since his time, Vietnam has been officially
recognized as an independent country from China (see QUỲNH CƯ and ĐỖ ĐỨC HÙNG, Các
Triều Đại Việt Nam [Dynasties of Vietnam], NXB Thanh Niên, 1993; TRẦN QUỐC VƯỢNG and
HÀ VĂN TẤN (eds.), Lịch sử chế độ phong kiến Việt Nam [History of feudal regimes in Vietnam],
Volume 1. Hanoi : NXB Giáo Dục, 1960.
209
This is a pseudonym.
210
Quoted in ‘Niềm tự hào’ (Pride), Hương Bắc Đồng, Ha Nam : NXB VHTT, 2007. p. 67. The real
village name was replaced by Bắc Đồng.
208
118
On the first day, the villagers took part in the procession of King Đinh Tiên
Hoàng’s statue from his small temples to the communal house, where rituals
were performed. During the procession, when the village cadres carried his
statue from behind the palace of the temple to the palanquin outside, it was the
first time that nearly all Bắc Đồng people were able to see the physiology of the
King. That moment made a strong impression and sparked a lot of emotion
amongst them. Many villagers suddenly felt that their king/god was extremely
sacred (linh thiêng). Since then, this historical character who had been
concealed in the temple for seventy years has received more care from local
government and villagers, and has started participating actively in the everyday
life dynamics of the community.
Moving the village deity’s statue from the spirit palace to the communal house
On the morning of the second day, an official ceremony was held to
receive the certificate of ‘historical and architectural building’ for the Đình.
With the help of one retired journalist in the village, Khôi turned this occasion
119
into a display of Bắc Đồng people’s achievements and spirit. Another
procession was held to carry the certificate from the People’s Committee head
office to the đình. An official ceremony was held at the communal house. The
village was proud to welcome high-ranking leaders of the province, district and
commune to this event. In his speech at this ceremony, Khôi made a brief
presentation on the history of the building. He emphasized its value by
highlighting Đinh Bộ Lĩnh’s struggle in unifying the country and acquiring
independence, as well as the revolutionary cause when the đình became a
meeting place for revolutionary fighters in the region and a ceremonial venue to
send young people off to fight during the American war. Khôi also described the
efforts and achievements of the people of Bắc Đồng in relation to social and
economic development. He took this chance to call on the people for further
unification and good implementation of the state policies. This ceremony and
the festival became an opportunity for village cadres to encourage people to
successfully implement production tasks and to build a more beautiful and rich
homeland.
Before the festival began, Khôi and the organizing committee were very
worried about the villagers’ response. They thought about erecting a barrier at
the village gate to stop people leaving the village, a strategy similar to the one
used by the government during the collectivization period to keep their members
at work. However, contrarily to their worries, villagers were highly enthusiastic
about the festival. No one went to the rice field or city to work during the
festival. All stayed home to participate in the processions and organized
activities. Unexpectedly, people set up archways for their own hamlets,
decorated them beautifully, which they turned into a gathering place for three
days and nights. In all the hamlets, people gathered and contributed money for
banquet feasts and drinks. For most Bắc Đồng villagers, the festival thus revived
a communal spirit, which had long been lost. Many people say that they were
very sad at the end of the festival when the village gods’ statue was put back in
the temple and people dismantled the archways and tents, ending three warm
and happy days.
120
The incense table of one hamlet (behind it, people gathered to chat, drink,
and even sing and dance, especially in the evening)
The night before the festival began, most Bắc Đồng people did not sleep.
They were busy preparing the offerings and rituals. Many families brought their
own offerings to the deity at the communal house between midnight and 5am to
make sure that their prayers to him were fulfilled before the procession. One
woman in the village said that “nowadays, only spiritual life can make people
forgo their sleep”. People did not hesitate to donate money for the ritual and
each family spent several hundreds of thousands of đồng to contribute to feasts
and celebrations in the hamlets. Almost one year after the festival, one man still
remembered its atmosphere as follows:
“The festival really entered into the heart of the people (lễ hội
thực sự đi vào lòng dân). Many people were so absorbed in this
village affair that they forgot their family’s work. Nothing happened
in families where both husband and wife participated in preparing for
121
the ceremony and rituals. But in families where only the wife was
busy with rituals and performances, there were quarrels and conflicts
when the housework was left undone and the husband became
jealous. In total, seven couples in the village quarrelled because of the
festival. Everyone felt excited, ebullient and blessed (sôi nổi, rạo rực
và linh thiêng). It entered into people’s heart so strongly” (Mr.
Phương, 50 years old)
Although some people, especially the oldest men, were dissatisfied about
the way local leaders treated them during the festival, all Bắc Đồng villagers
were very proud of their festival as they considered it a big and beautiful event.
Local cadres evaluated the festival as a great success which gave the village a
good reputation. Meanwhile, the villagers were excited about the festival, as it
was a good opportunity for them to rest, enjoy and enhance their feeling of
unity. No festival had been held in previous years because people’s lives had not
really improved and, more importantly, villagers were not satisfied with the
local government. Thời was so corrupt that people were not enthusiastic about
any movement he tried to organize. At present, Khôi is held in higher esteem
and people feel his decisions can enter their hearts. Following the festival, Khôi
decided to continue the villager’s interest in spiritual movements by mobilizing
people to rebuild the old road to the temple, which had fallen into disrepair, and
to renovate the pagoda. By meeting the demands of the people to revive spiritual
life, he could mobilize and unite villagers to make their community more
beautiful and warm. However, the dynamics of his success in these new projects
depend on whether he violates the norm of good leadership or oversteps the
threshold.
IV - Conclusion
Through the interaction between Thời, Khôi, some village cadres and Bắc
Đồng people, we could see the existence of many socio-cultural norms for the
leader’s moral values and prestige in Vietnamese society. The above examples
have shown that these norms play an important role in guiding the every day
political and social life of the village. However, in the new socio-economic
situation, some criteria of these norms turned out to be idealistic. In situations as
such, local people have adjusted and given more tolerance to compensate for the
shortage of effective authorities with good moral values. Additionally,
authorities also find a new way to introduce new social movements into their
122
locality to mobilize people and build trust. In the case of Bắc Đồng, cadres
consider their success in organizing the festival as a measure of their prestige
among villagers. In reality, Bắc Đồng authorities have acted in response to a
nation-wide social movement. The model is a result of a significant change in
official policy towards religion after the 1986 economic renovation. After over
thirty years of strict control over cultural life through propaganda and
surveillance activities, the Vietnamese state now sees in religion a source of
inner strength that might aid the development of a prosperous, orderly and
wholesome society211 212. Together with the religious efflorescence and the
resurgence of tradition, leaders in many localities have found that they should
meet the people’s desire for self-image, personal identity and a national cultural
identity in a transitional society 213 214 215. Cadres and local governments have
played the leading role in reviving and organizing festivals and rituals for the
community. By doing so, they aim to gain popular legitimacy and to change
their relationship with the people. As a consequence, recently, the country has
been shaped by the image of a spiritual and cultural society. Governance via
culture, despite being a ‘soft’ mode of governance, has become a modern
principle of contemporary Vietnamese socialism.
Beyond the expectations of its leader, Bắc Đồng people were extremely
enthusiastic in their response to the idea of reconstructing their village identity
through the ritual. They not only revived their village god as a form of moral
support, but also recreated his nexus and involvement in daily life. They
imagined their village territory as being the King’s land and under his
patronage, as well as seeing him as a close authority who manages and decides
the fate of their concerns. This imagination created a great level of emotion,
sentiment and excitement among the community. In this case, King Đinh Tiên
Hoàng became a symbol to unite villagers and rebuild village identity. His
magic power, potency and prestige are considered as resources to empower
people, improve their lives and find meaning in their local leaders. The god has
211
MALARNEY Shaun Kingsley, Culture, ritual and revolution in Vietnam, London : RoutledgeCurzon, 2002.
212
TAYLOR Philip (ed), Modernity and Re-enchanment: Religion in Post-revolutionary Vietnam,
Singapore : Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2007.
213
ENDRES Kristen, “Spirit Performance and the Ritual Construction of Personal Identity in
Modern Vietnam” in FJELSTAD and NGUYEN (eds) Possessed by the Spirits: Mediumship in
Contemporary Vietnamese Communities, Ithaca New York : Cornell University, 2006, pp. 77-94.
214
PHAM QUYNH PHUONG, Hero and Deity: Tran Hung Dao and the Resurgence of Popular
Religion in Vietnam, Mekong Press, 2009.
215
SALEMINK Oscar, “Embodying the Nation: Mediumship, Rituals and the National
Imagination”, Journal of Vietnamese Studies, Vol. 3, No. 3 (2008), pp. 261-290.
123
even become a bridge between people and their local leaders. By showing a set
of values through performance and ritual, the villagers could communicate with
their leaders about their personal identities. Meanwhile, by introducing this
national style of responding to people’s thirst for culture in harmonious
agreement with local self-respect, the cadres could reclaim some power and
legitimacy through the enthusiasm of the people. In this context, life in
contemporary rural politics is not only guided by socio-cultural ideas or
frameworks, but also by emotion and imagination.
124
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Études régionales Asie du Sud-Est
Anti-Trafficking Regional Cooperation in Southeast Asia and the Global
Linkages from Geopolitical Perspectives, note d’Anne-Lise Sauterey
Armée du peuple, armée du roi, les militaires face à la société en Indonésie et
en Thaïlande par Nicolas Révise et Arnaud Dubus
Asie du Sud-Est 2007, par la revue Focus Asie du Sud-Est
Asie du Sud-Est 2008, par la revue Focus Asie du Sud-Est
Asie du Sud-Est 2009, sous la direction d’Arnaud Leveau
Asie du Sud-Est 2010, sous la direction d’Arnaud Leveau & Benoît de Tréglodé
Atlas des minorités musulmanes en Asie méridionale et orientale, sous la
direction de Michel Gilquin
Des catastrophes naturelles au désastre humain, conséquences et enjeux de
l’aide humanitaire après le tsunami et le cyclone Nargis en Thaïlande et en
Birmanie, Occasional Paper par Maxime Boutry & Olivier Ferrari
Des montagnards aux minorités ethniques, quelle intégration nationale pour
les habitants des hautes terres du Viêt Nam et du Cambodge, par Stan Tan
Boon Hwee, Nguyen Van Chinh, Andrew Hardy, Mathieu Guérin
Investigating the Grey Areas of the Chinese communities in Southeast Asia,
Occasional Paper sous la direction d’Arnaud Leveau
La Monnaie des frontières - Migrations birmanes dans le sud de la Thaïlande,
structure des réseaux et internationalisation des frontières, Occasional
Paper série Observatoire par Maxime Boutry & Jacques Ivanoff
L’impact des catastrophes naturelles sur la résolution des conflits en Asie. Les
cas du Sri Lanka, de l’Indonésie et du Cachemire, note de Clarisse Hervet
L’Islamisme combattant en Asie du Sud-Est par Philippe Migaux
Le destin des fils du dragon, l’influence de la communauté chinoise au Viêt
Nam et en Thaïlande, par Arnaud Leveau
Les messagers divins, aspects esthétiques et symboliques des oiseaux en Asie
du Sud-Est, sous la direction de Pierre Le Roux et Bernard Sellato
Les musulmans d’Asie du Sud-Est face au vertige de la radicalisation sous la
direction de Stéphane Dovert et de Rémy Madinier
Mekong–Ganga Initiative, Occasional Paper par Swaran Singh
Outre-Terre, Asies, tiers du monde (revue)
Pavillon Noir sur l’Asie du Sud-Est, histoire d’une résurgence de la piraterie
maritime en Asie du Sud-Est, par Eric Frécon
Perception of Borders and Human Migration - The Human (In)security of
Shan Migrant Workers in Thailand, Occasional Paper série Observatoire par
Ropharat Aphijanyatham
Présence économique européenne en Asie du Sud-Est, sous la direction de Guy
Faure et David Hoyrup
Réfléchir l’Asie du Sud-Est, essai d’épistémologie sous la direction de Stéphane
Dovert
The Resurgence of Sea Piracy in Southeast Asia, Occasional Paper by Eric
Frecon
The Trade in Human Beings for Sex in Southeast Asia, sous la direction de
Pierre Le Roux, Jean Baffie & Gilles Beullier
Yaa Baa, Production, Traffic and Consumption of methamphetamine in
Mainland Southeast Asia by Joël Meissonnier and Pierre-Arnaud Chouvy
Yaa Baa, production, trafic et consommation de méthamphétamine en Asie du
Sud-Est continentale par Joël Meissonnier et Pierre-Arnaud Chouvy
Brunei
Brunei, les métamorphoses d’un Etat-réseau, par Marie Sybille de Vienne (à
paraître en 2011)
Birmanie
Back to Old Habits, Isolationism ot the Self-Preservation of Burma’s Military
Regime, Occasional Paper par Renaud Egreteau and Larry Jagan
Birmanie contemporaine, monographie nationale, sous la direction de Gabriel
Defert
Cambodge
Cambodge contemporain, monographie nationale, sous la direction d’Alain
Forest
Cambodge soir, chroniques sociales d’un pays au quotidien, sous la direction
de Grégoire Rochigneux
Le dictionnaire des Khmers rouges, par Solomon Kane
Indonésie
Islam and the 2009 Indonesian Elections, Political and Cultural Issues –
The Case of the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), par Ahmad-Norma Permata
et Najib Kailani, Occasional Paper sous la direction de Rémy Madinier
La fin de l’innocence, l’islam indonésien face à la tentation radicale de 1967 à
nos jours, par Rémy Madinier et Andrée Feillard
Les relations centre périphérie en Indonésie, note de Lucas Patriat
Aceh : l’histoire inachavée. La fière histoire d’une terre dévastée par
les tsunami par Voja Miladinovic et Jean-Claude Pomonti
Laos
Laos, From Buffer State to Crossroads, par Vatthana Pholsena & Ruth Banomyong
Le Laos au XXIe siècle, les defies de l’intégration régionale, par Vatthana
Pholsena & Ruth Banomyong
Malaisie
From the Mosque to the Ballot Box, An Introduction to Political Islam in
Malaysia, Occasional Paper sous la direction de Sophie Lemière
Philippines
Elites et développement aux Philippines : un pari perdu ? par Cristina JimenezHallare, Roberto Galang et Stéphane Auvray
La Croix et le Kriss, violences et rancoeurs entre chrétiens et musulmans dans
le sud des Philippines, par Solomon Kane et Felice Noelle Rodriguez
Singapour
A roof Overt Every Head, par Wong Tai-Chee and Xavier Guillot
The Hegemony of an Idea: The Sources of the SAF’s Fascination with
Technology and the Revolution in Military Affairs, note de Ho Shu Huang
Thaïlande
Alternatives agricoles en Thaïlande, par Roland Poupon
Bangkok, formes du commerce et évolutions urbaines, par Davisi Boontharm
Education, Economy and Identity - Ten Years of Educational Reform in
Thailand, Occasional Paper par Audrey Baron-Gutty et Supat Chupradit (Eds.)
Femmes prostituées dans la region du sud de la Thaïlande, Occasional Paper
par Jean Baffie
Les musulmans de Thaïlande, par Michel Gilquin
State and Media in Thailand During Political Crisis, Occasional Paper sous la
direction d’Arnaud Leveau et Chavarong Limpattamapanee
Thaïlande - Aux origines d’une crise, Occasional Paper par Olivier Ferrari,
Narumon Hinshiranan Arunotai, Jacques Ivanoff & Arnaud Leveau
Thaïlande - Ressources documentaires françaises, par Laurent Hennequin
Thaïlande contemporaine, monographie nationale sous la direction de
Stéphane Dovert (réédition actualisée prévue en 2010)
The Muslims of Thailand, par Michel Gilquin
Trafficking for Sexual Exploitation into Southern Thailand, Occasional Paper
sous la direction de Patacharawalai Wongboonsin
Timor-Leste
Catholicisme et protestantisme dans l’île de Timor : 1556-2003. Construction
d’une identité chrétienne et engagement politique contemporain, par
Frédéric Durand
East-Timor, How to Build a New Nation in Southeast Asia in the 21st Century?
sous la direction de Christine Cabasset-Semedo & Frédéric Durand
Timor Lorosa’e, A Country at the Crossroads of Asia and the Pacific,
a Geo-Historical Atlas par Frédéric Durand
Timor Lorosa’e, Pays Carrefour de l’Asie et du Pacifique. Un atlas
géohistorique, par Frédéric Durand
Timor : 1250-2005, 750 de cartographie et de voyages, par Frédéric Durand
Timor-Leste en quête de repères, perspectives économico-politiques et
intégration régionale, par Frédéric Durand
Timor-Leste, The Dragon’s Newest Friend, note de Loro Horta
Viêt Nam
Agriculture, environnement et sociétés sur les hautes terres du Viêt Nam, par
Frédéric Fortunel, Frédéric Durand, Rodolphe de Konnick
Japan-Viêt Nam, history of a relationship under influences par Guy Faure and
Laurent Schwab
Japon-Viêt Nam, histoire d’une relation sous influences, par Guy Faure et
Laurent Schwab
Le Viêt Nam dans l’Organisation mondiale du commerce, Impact sur la
croissance et l’emploi, Occasional Paper sous la direction de Jean-Pierre
Cling, Stéphane Lagrée, Mireille Razafindrakoto & François Roubaud
Viêt Nam contemporain, monographie nationale, sous la direction de Stéphane
Dovert et Benoît de Tréglodé
Volées, envolées, convolées - Vendues, en fuite ou re-socialisées :
les « fiancées » vietnamiennes en Chine, par Caroline Grillot

christian huynh pass tam

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