Review - Archbold e

Transcription

Review - Archbold e

Issue 8 September 21, 2015
Archbold
Review
Cases in Brief
Firearms—Possession of weapons prohibited by Firearms Act
1968, s.5(1)(af)—whether breach of Firearms Act 1968 s.5
or s.1
GOLDSBOROUGH [2015] EWCA Crim. 1278; July
21, 2015
G pleaded guilty to possessing a prohibited weapon contrary to Firearms Act 1968, s.5(1)(af), to wit an air gun using
a self-contained gas cartridge system. It was uncontested
that G had possessed the weapon before that provision was
inserted into the 1968 Act by the Anti-Social Behaviour Act
2003, s.39(3). The judge had been wrong to rule that the
effect of s.39(4) of the 2003 (if in previous possession, s.5
“shall not prevent” continued possession, that s.1 of the Act
applied and that a firearms certificate could not be denied
on a specified basis) was that, unless G held a firearms
certificate, he was guilty of the s.5 offence. Whilst it was
clear that the legislation required a person coming into possession of a prohibited weapon after April 30, 2004 to have
not only authority from the Secretary of State but also a
firearm certificate, the transitional arrangements set out
in section 39(4) did not require this. The current dual requirement for an authority and a firearm certificate could
be demonstrated by a consideration of the definition of a
firearm in section 57(1)(a) of the Firearms Act, s.1(1)(a),
and by inference from the exclusionary provision in s.1(3)
(b). Moreover, the provisions of s.31(1) and (2) confirmed
that position. Section 39(4) was a provision designed to cover a period of grace between January 20, 2004 and April 30,
2004 to enable owners in possession to regularise the position. Persons acquiring or purchasing such firearms were
caught by the provision with effect from January 20 2004.
Further, Anti-social Behaviour Act 2003 (Commencement
No. 1 and Transitional Provisions) Order 2003 (SI No. 3300
of 2003), para the 5(2) was a transitional provision disapplying Firearms Act s.1 where a person possessing this sort
of weapon had applied for a firearm certificate before April
30, 2004 and whose application was pending. It did not qualify or contradict the provisions of s.39(4). The mechanism
adopted to deal with the position of those already in possession was to permit their continued possession (ss.(4)(a));
and to require a firearm certificate (ss.(4)(b)). There was
© Thomson Reuters (Professional) UK Limited 2015
no requirement to obtain the Secretary of State’s authority,
absence of which triggered s.5 liability. There was no warrant in the statutory language for the Crown’s submission
that if a certificate was not applied for, all bets were off and
the s.5 offence was made out. As a result, G was liable under s.1 for possession without a certificate, but not s. 5 (and
the minimum five year term).
Legal professional privilege—qualification or exception where
necessary to prevent self-harm or harm to others
BROWN [2015] EWCA Crim. 1328; July 29, 2015
B was tried for attempted murder of another patient at the
secure mental hospital in which he was serving life sentences. At an early stage, he had confided to staff that he had
thought of trying to kill his solicitor, and he had a long history of self-harm. The judge had been right to require him
to be handcuffed to two nurses during meetings with his legal team at the Crown Court, rejecting B’s submission that
such meetings should have taken place with B handcuffed
in the secure dock with his lawyers outside. Where legal
professional privilege existed, it was inviolate: see McE v
Prison Service of Northern Ireland [2009] 1 AC 908, [6], Regina v Derby Magistrates’ Court, ex p. B. [1996] 1 AC 487, p.
507 D; Regina (Daly) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2001] UKHL 26; [2001] 2 AC 532, [5] and Three
Rivers District Council v Governor and Company of the Bank
of England (No 6) [2005] 1 AC 610, [25]. The question was
whether, in a particular situation, the privilege existed. It
CONTENTS
Cases in Brief.........................................................1
Sentencing..............................................................3
Case in Detail.........................................................4
Features..................................................................5
1
Archbold
Review
did not in the “fraud exception” or “iniquity exception”: R v
Cox and Railton (1884) 14 QBD 153. In B’s case, the question was whether the court should prevent the protection of
legal privilege being utilised to enable individuals to inflict
violence on themselves or others. The trial judge had identified the real possibility that B might use a meeting with
his legal adviser for this improper purpose or manner, such
as to constitute an abuse of the privilege justifying interference. The usually inviolable or absolute nature of the rule
was capable of qualification at common law outside the particular situation addressed in Cox and Railton. In B’s case,
there was no suggestion of an intention to misuse the overheard privileged communications and the nurses deployed
to prevent self-harm or harm to others were not to be equated with investigating police officers. They were not present
to eavesdrop or secure a tactical advantage over B, nor as
part of an unlawful surveillance exercise. In future cases
they would need to be instructed in the clearest terms that
they must treat anything they overheard in confidence, and
that they should not disclose the contents of the discussion
save in wholly exceptional circumstances (which may well
be limited to where the communications were intended to
further a criminal or other serious abuse of the privilege).
The court was a public authority (Human Rights Act 1998
s.6 (3) (a)) and had a positive duty to protect human life
where European Convention on Human Rights Art. 2 applied. Accordingly, an additional common law qualification
or exception to the inviolable nature of the privilege allowed
the imposition of a requirement that individuals could be
present at discussions between a defendant and his or her
lawyers if there was a real possibility that the meeting would
be misused for a purpose, or in a manner, that involved impropriety amounting to an abuse of the privilege that justified interference. Such a restriction was a proportionate
and appropriate response to the grave threats posed by B,
and did not breach Art. 6 of the Convention.
Obstructing a police officer in the execution of duty—direction
to demonstrators to move—arrest of demonstrators for misconceived offence—whether officer acting in execution of duty
MCCANN v CPS [2015] EWHC 2461 (Admin);
August 21, 2015
A police officer was acting in the execution of her duty when
she directed demonstrators blocking a road to prevent lorries from passing to move, and, when they did not, to arrest
them for an offence of obstruction the highway (Highways
Act 1980 s.137), although the road in question was a private
road (and public footpath). They were subsequently also
arrested for, and convicted of, obstructing a police officer
in the execution of her duty (Police Act 1996 s.89(2)). The
District Judge had been right to concentrate on the position of the officer concerned, and not the reasonableness
or otherwise of the beliefs of others who had briefed her
as to the status of the road (O’Hara v Chief Constable of
R.U.C. [1997] 2 WLR 1; Clarke v Chief Constable of North
Wales Police [2000] All ER (D) 477; Alford v Chief Constable
of Cambridgeshire [2009] EWCA Civ 100; R (Rawlinson and
Hunter Trustees) v Central Criminal Court [2013] 1 WLR
1634). The District Judge’s conclusion that the officer had
genuinely and reasonably relied on the information provided to her, and that the assertions by M and others that
the road was a private one did not negative the reasonableness of that reliance, was one open to him. Counsel for the
2
Crown had been right to accept that the account of the common law duty of officers in Rice v Connolly [1966] 3 WLR 17,
21A-C should nowadays be qualified, so that it related to the
taking of all steps which reasonably appeared to the officer
necessary for the prevention of crime. The District Judge’s
findings were sufficient to satisfy the element of objectivity
that qualification imported. In order for the offence to be
committed the officer must be engaging (in good faith) in a
course of conduct designed to further a proper policing purpose as described in Rice v Connolly and the conduct must
be lawful (B v DPP [2008] EWCH 1655 (Admin)). Where it
involved the use of force either for the prevention of crime
or the making of an arrest (Criminal Law Act 1967, s.4) or
in exercise of a power under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (s.117), that would only be lawful if it were
reasonable. If, in the execution of her duty, the officer used
force, or exercised a specific statutory power, she must
be acting lawfully. If she was not (as here, by directing M
to move), her conduct must be rational in the Wednesbury
sense. This level of scrutiny did not mean that every error
or unlawful act by a police officer would confer immunity
on those who were obstructive (see Metcalf v Crown Prosecution Service [2015] EWHC 1091 (Admin)). The direction
could not in the circumstances amount to anything which
was prima facie unlawful or an unlawful interference with
M’s liberty or property (R v Waterfield and Lynn [1963] 48
Cr.App.R.42,47). It was lawful to make the direction. Doing
so involved a threat that an arrest would follow if M did
not comply. Whether the threat was reasonable depended
on whether an arrest would be lawful. It was not necessary
for the officer to have had the correct offence in mind at
the time the direction was given. It was sufficient for her
to have taken steps which reasonably appeared to her to
be necessary for preventing crime. The fact that the officer
in fact had an offence of which M was not guilty in mind
did not prevent her from taking steps which in the circumstances, as she believed them to be, reasonably appeared to
her to be necessary for preventing crime: the observation
in Christie v Leachinsky [1947] AC 573, 587 that it was not
an essential condition of a lawful arrest that the constable
should formulate a charge at all was consistent with what
Lord Bingham had said about there being no need for a
constable to have in mind a specific statutory provision
in Chapman v DPP [1989] 89 Cr.App.R.190,197, and while
those authorities related to the formalities of arrest, similar
principles applied to the directions of an officer immediately
preceding arrest.
Trial—second retrials— criteria— application
BURTON [2015] EWCA Crim. 1307; July 23, 2015
In considering whether a judge should allow a second retrial, the authorities (Bell [2010] 1 Cr.App.R,27; Ali [2011]
2 Cr.App.R.22; and Bowe [2001] UKPC 19) indicated that
whilst the circumstances identified at [46] of Bell (the alleged offence was of “extreme gravity” and the prosecution
evidence “very powerful”) would usually be a sufficient
test of where the interests of justice lay in most cases, a
wider consideration of such interests stretching beyond
those factors may be required. In all cases there must be
an informed, dispassionate and searching examination of
why a third trial was justified, when there were no irregularities in the first two. The CPS Guidance to Prosecutors
correctly identified the starting point for the prosecution’s
Archbold
Review
decision-making as a presumption against second retrials unless there were exceptional circumstances, such as
jury interference or new evidence. The judge’s ruling in
B’s case fell short of the necessary careful consideration,
watering down “extreme gravity” to “an extremely serious
case” and then “in no way a minor matter.” Whilst not decisive, it was noteworthy that all the other cases involved
homicide. While there was a public interest in trying those
conspiring to import class A drugs (the charge against
B), it was a material consideration that no importation
took place. The judge also failed to address whether the
evidence was “very powerful”. A judge faced with this issue should examine why the Crown wished to proceed for
a third time, including the Crown’s decision-making. The
failure to do so here had the consequence that the judge
was simply faced with the information that a senior lawyer
in the CPS had approved a further trial without explanation
as to why it was contended that the case was exceptional.
It also appeared that the judge, considering the issue as a
species of abuse of process, emphasised that a stay should
be exceptional, thus putting the burden of showing exceptionality on the defence, not the prosecution. Given this error, the Court of Appeal considered the question afresh.
The number of cases in which a third trial would be permitted should be strictly limited in order to maintain public
confidence in the criminal justice system and provide finality for a defendant. The Court must proceed with extreme
caution. If a crime was truly one of extreme gravity and the
evidence was cogent then it may be an affront to justice
and likely to undermine public confidence not to pursue a
prosecution. The Court noted that Lord Bingham in Bowe
spoke of deterring violent crime, but it may be that other
types of crime could satisfy the test. In B’s case, the Crown
was incapable of demonstrating that it was sufficiently exceptional to justify a second retrial, and the conviction was
unsafe on that ground alone (the Court went on to find various elements of the summing-up unsatisfactory, so as to
independently justify allowing the appeal).
Sentencing
Racial aggravation
O’LEARY [2015] EWCA Crim 1306
The appellant was tried and acquitted on one count of attempted murder and two counts of wounding with intent.
He had pleaded guilty to one alternative count of assault
with intent to rob and two alternative counts of unlawful
wounding. For these he was sentenced to eight years’ imprisonment, comprising five years for the first count, plus
concurrent periods of three years for the second and third
counts, to run consecutively to the first.
The background was two knife attacks, in quick succession, on two Asians, both working in convenience stores.
When brandishing the knife at the second victim he had
said he wanted to kill a Muslim. After a struggle, the victim
sustained a deep wound to his hand. Both incidents were
captured on CCTV.
In sentencing the appellant, the judge determined that aggravating features of the last offence included the racial
nature of the threat to the victim. The judge assessed the
pre-plea starting points for each offence and deducted 25
per cent for plea; a reduced discount because of the overwhelming nature of the prosecution evidence.
The appellant submitted that the judge should have provided a 33 per cent discount for the guilty pleas and took too
high a starting point as regards the unlawful wounding offence. He further submitted that as he had not been convicted of an offence of racially aggravated unlawful wounding,
the judge could not treat racial motivation as an aggravating
factor. The appellant further submitted the overall sentence
was manifestly excessive.
Dismissing the appeal, the Court stated that given that the
prosecution case was overwhelming, there could be no criticism of the credit given for the appellant’s guilty pleas. The
pre-plea starting point selected in respect of the unlawful
wounding offence was also appropriate.
As regards the racial aggravation, after considering a number of authorities submitted by the appellant, the Court
concluded that it was significant that the appellant was not
acquitted of a racially aggravated offence, nor had the indictment been amended to delete a count charging such an
offence. Moreover, the appellant was sentenced following a
trial which allowed him to challenge the alleged racial aggravation and the judge to make a finding about it. There
was clear evidence that the assault was racially aggravated. In these circumstances the judge was entitled to treat
this as an aggravating factor. This was an extremely serious series of offences, and the sentence was not manifestly
excessive.
In the News
As predicted (see Comment, Issue 4, page 3), the new court
charge is proving hugely unpopular. In the media there
are recurrent reports of magistrates who disapprove of it
resigning in protest, or threatening to do so. Readers who
share the editor’s view that action is required, and urgently,
are invited to contact him direct by email: [email protected]
3
Archbold
Review
Case in Detail
“Many Rivers to Cross” — Sentencing for environmental
crimes
By Gerard Forlin, QC1
The recent case of R v Thames Water Utilities Ltd2 appears
to have “upped the ante” in relation to sentences imposed
on large organisations for environmental offences. A collective judgment from a Court of Appeal comprising the Lord
Chief Justice, Mitting and Lewis JJ makes it clear that fines
for serious offences by large organisations should rise.
This case was the first major appeal since the sentencing
Council’s definitive guidelines relating to environmental offences came into effect in 2014 and it arose from a six-day
discharge of untreated sewage into a river in an area of natural outstanding beauty in the North Wessex downs. The appellant had indicated a guilty plea to the one count under the
Environmental Permitting (England and Wales) Regulations
2010 at the first hearing in the Magistrates’ Court and the
Crown Court had imposed a fine of £250,000 on the basis
that the discharge was the result of negligence. At the appeal there was an application to introduce fresh evidence to
challenge the finding of negligence, but that was refused by
the court.
The Appeal Court set out the framework for Sentencing in
cases of this sort, reiterating many of the principles already
laid down in the Sellafield case last year.3 From this restatement, and its application to the present facts, two factors
emerge as particularly significant: the size of the organisation, and the degree of fault involved.
As to the first of these, a sentencing court, the Court of Appeal
said, is not bound by, or even bound to start with, the ranges of
fines suggested by the Sentencing Council when the defendant it is dealing with is large—or very large, a fortiori.
As to the second, it said that in the case of repeated operational failures, suggestive of a lack of appropriate management attention to environmental obligations:
“a substantial increase in the level of fines, sufficient to have a material impact on the finances of the company as a whole, will ordinarily be appropriate. This may therefore result in fines measured in millions of pounds.”
In the “worst cases”, where great harm has been caused by
“deliberate action or inaction”, it said that the sentencing
court should “focus on the whole financial circumstances
of the company”.
“In such a case, the objectives of punishment, deterrence and the removal
of gain (for example by the decision of the management not to expend sufficient resources in modernisation and improvement) must be achieved
by the level of penalty imposed. This may well result in a fine equal to a
substantial percentage, up to 100 per cent, of the company’s pre-tax net
profit for the year in question (or an average if there is more than one year
involved), even if this results in fines in excess of £100 million. Fines of
such magnitude are imposed in the financial services market for breach
of regulations. In a Category 1 harm case, the imposition of such a fine is
a necessary and proper consequence of the importance to be attached to
environmental protection.”
Fines, it said, “must be large enough to bring the appropri1 Cornerstone Barristers, 2-3 Gray’s Inn Square.
2 [2015] EWCA Crim 960. The Times Law Report, August 21 2015, p53.
3 Sellafield Ltd [2014] EWCA Crim 49.
4
ate message home to the directors and shareholders and
to punish them”, and in the case of repeat offenders, they
“should be far higher and should rise to the level necessary to ensure that the directors and shareholders of the
organisation take effective measures properly to reform
themselves and ensure that they fulfil their environmental
obligations.” Dismissing the appeal against sentence in the
present case, the Court added that it “would have had no
hesitation in upholding a very substantially higher fine.”
Finally the Court said:
“Sentencing very large organisations involves complex issues as is clear
from this judgment. It is for that reason that special provision is made for
such cases in Crim PD XIII, listing and classification. Such cases are categorised as class 2 C cases and must therefore be tried either by a High
Court Judge or by another judge only where either the Presiding Judge has
released the case or the Resident Judge has allocated the case to that judge.
It is essential that the terms of this Practice Direction are strictly observed.”
To these salutary words, it must further be recalled that
Section 85 of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of
Offenders Act 2012 came into effect on March 12th 2015.
This grants Magistrates’ courts unlimited powers of fining
for a wide range of offences triable either way.
Annex 3 of CPD XIII, relating to very large fines in the Magistrates’ courts, signposts the proper approach. This states
that an authorised District Judge must deal with any allocation decision, trial, and sentencing hearing in proceedings
for either-way offences in which any of a list of factors are
present. These include (inter alia):
•
death or significant life-changing injury, or a high risk of
either;
•
substantial environmental damage or polluting material of a
dangerous nature;
•
major adverse effect on human health or quality of life, animal health or flora;
•
where the defendant corporation has a turnover in excess
of £250 million;
•
where the court will be expected to analyse complex company accounts;
•
high profile cases or ones of an exceptionally sensitive nature.
Although many of cases of this type are likely to be transferred to the Crown Court, some will be more borderline.
Organisations and their legal advisors will face tough tactical decisions as to timing of pleas, submissions on criminality and Newton hearings. (The waiting list in certain Crown
Courts is currently very long.)
For corporate defendants it looks as if the climate has significantly changed and they now face blizzard-like conditions when prosecuted for regulatory offences. The days
of relatively small fines now seem to be a thing of the past!4
4 It should also be remembered that the sentencing guidelines in relation to corporate
manslaughter, health and safety, food safety and hygiene offences are expected to be
published in November 2015 and come into effect in January 2016. (See Archbold Review,
Issue 1 February 9th 2015).
Archbold
Review
Features
The arrival of EU law in criminal proceedings
Jodie Blackstock1 & Alex Tinsley2
After much consideration, the UK finally decided to continue participating in EU policing and prosecution procedures in December 2014. The measures we will cooperate
with include the familiar European Arrest Warrant (EAW)
— but also the novel European Supervision Order (ESO),
discussed here. The key message is that ESOs are relevant
not just to extradition, but also to domestic cases involving someone normally resident abroad. They are binding
on the UK, but needed domestic legislation to incorporate
them into the law. Practitioners faced with the operation
of these instruments are therefore likely to encounter uncertainty over the interpretation of the UK implementing
measures, in addition to their EU parent legislation. The assistance of the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) can now
be sought to resolve these issues. Cue: interesting litigation
opportunities at home and abroad.
Potted political history to the opt-out/opt-back-in
Between 1995 and 2009, the EU Member States agreed
135 measures relating to police and judicial cooperation in
criminal matters. These included agreements to criminalise cross-border offences, the creation of the EU police and
judicial cooperation agencies Europol and Eurojust, and 34
Framework Decisions establishing systems for, amongst
others, the exchange of criminal records information, confiscation and freezing of assets and most (in)famously, the
EAW.
These measures were all agreed unanimously by the Member States without the approval of the EU Parliament and
had limited application: the CJEU only had jurisdiction if
Member States chose to accept it, which the UK never did.
In addition, the European Commission’s enforcement powers available for ordinary European Community law were
not applicable. In short, neither the CJEU nor the Commission had any say in how the measures operated in the UK.
Indeed, though no one noticed until 2012, it was not the
European Communities Act 1972 which made them legally
effective.3
However, the Treaty of Lisbon, which entered into force
in 2009, changed this by incorporating the pre-2009 “thirdpillar” measures into the main body of EU law, after a transitional period ending December 1 2014, from which date the
ordinary powers of the CJEU and Commission apply. Concerned, the UK negotiated Protocol 36 to the Treaty on the
Functioning of the EU, enabling it to “opt out” of all of these
measures, and elect to “opt back in” to specific ones. To opt
back in meant to accept both the obligations in the instruments and the oversight of the Commission and CJEU.
Consequently, last winter we opted out en bloc of all measures, and immediately opted back in to 35 which the Government considered to be in the national interest. Among
1 Director of Criminal Justice at JUSTICE.
2 Legal & Policy Officer (Head of EU Office), Fair Trials.
3See Assange v The Swedish Prosecution Authority, [2012] 2 AC 471 (UKSC) at [210].
these was the EAW, already implemented by Part 1 of the
Extradition Act 2003 (the 2003 Act). Another 11 instruments were implemented by the Criminal Justice and Data
Protection (Protocol No. 36) Regulations 2014 (the “Regulations”). These give effect to a range of measures including
the exchange of criminal records information, intelligence,
the recognition of financial penalties, and the measure discussed here: the ESO.
The European Supervision Order
The ESO establishes a system whereby supervision measures imposed as an alternative to remand in custody — i.e.,
bail conditions — in Member State A may be forwarded to
Member State B to be enforced there on the basis of mutual recognition between judicial authorities (that is, as in
the EAW, without enquiry into the basis of the charges
against the person and with limited grounds for refusal).4
The instrument potentially enables a defendant who is lawfully and ordinarily resident in Member State B to remain
there pending trial in Member State A, so retaining their
employment, housing and family life. It recognises that free
movement in the EU results in people crossing borders
temporarily for work, holiday, or perhaps solely to commit crime. It relieves the burden of resourcing potentially
lengthy pre-trial detention in Member State A, which is a
likely consequence of prosecution given the flight risk that
such a person will be deemed to pose.5 It is the reverse of
the EAW, which requests that a person return from one
state to another to stand trial. By contrast the ESO sends
them back to their state pending trial.
Part 7 of the 2014 Regulations gives effect to the ESO
Framework Decision. Regulation 77(1) enables any UK
court which makes “a decision on supervision measures”
to request a competent authority in another Member State
to monitor the supervision measures in question. Regulation 85 makes provision for Magistrates’ courts in England
and Wales to give effect to decisions issued by competent
authorities of other Member States. Given common holidaying patterns, it is worth noting that the Framework Decision has been implemented in Spain6 and will be shortly
in France7 so that transfer of bail between the UK and these
countries can be envisaged.
Recourse to the ESO presupposes a willingness to trust another state’s supervision systems during the pre-trial stage.
Given that some criticism of the EAW relates to its disproportionate application when a summons for voluntary attendance would suffice,8 it is not clear that the ESO will be
4 Council Framework Decision 2009/829/JHA in the application, between Member States
of the European Union, of the principle of mutual recognition to decisions on supervision
measures as an alternative to provisional detention, O.J. L. 294/20 (11.11.2009) (the
“Framework Decision”).
5 Indeed, article 2 of the Framework Decision identifies promotion of non-custodial measures
as an objective of the measure.
6 Law 23/2014, entered into force December 2014 (see Articles 121-129).
7 A draft law was reviewed by the Constitutional Council in a decision of August 13.
8 See J. Blackstock, European arrest warrants: ensuring an effective defence (JUSTICE, 2012).
5
Archbold
Review
enthusiastically relied upon. However, the two systems may
complement each other; even if an EAW is initially thought
necessary in Member State A to commence proceedings,
an ESO could be used to enable the person to return home
to Member State B pending trial. Then, when Member State
A is ready for trial, if the person does not return voluntarily,
the Framework Decision envisages9 that an EAW should be
used to secure their return.
Schedule 6 to the Regulations sets out the grounds of refusal should a request be made to the UK to impose supervision measures upon a person. As well as the familiar
grounds set out as bars to extradition in the 2003 Act, the
ESO is premised upon the consent of the suspected person. This may suggest that there is less room for litigation
where the ESO is envisaged.
However, the process may give rise to some interesting
challenges, especially since clients in domestic cases may
wish to make use of the ESO to avoid a period of detention.
For example, under regulation 77(5), a UK “court” makes a
“decision on supervision measures” when it “grants bail…
to a person charged with an offence.” On a literal reading,
that clearly excludes pre-charge bail granted by the police
under s.37 of PACE. Yet a “decision on supervision measures” is defined much more broadly in the Framework
Decision as one taken “in the course of criminal proceedings”, which arguably include pre-charge procedures, and
by a “competent authority”, not just a judge.10 That would
favour a broader interpretation of the Regulations so as to
include police bail (much as the term “judicial authority”
in the 2003 Act was interpreted to include a prosecutor11).
Given that lengthy periods of pre-charge bail are known to
be imposed by British police,12 a wider interpretation in the
9 Recitals 12 and 13 and Article 21 of the Framework Decision.
10See article 4 on definitions and further article 6, which enables the designation of nonjudicial authorities, provided they have competence for taking similar decisions under national
law.
11 Assange v Swedish Prosecution Authority, ibid.
12See https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/pre-charge-bail-consultation-on-statutorytime-limits-and-related-changes. Changes are anticipated in the next Criminal Justice Bill due in
the late autumn.
UK could enable people subject to that measure to return
home under an ESO.
CJEU jurisdiction
The issues discussed above raise potential questions of interpretation that may now be referred from the UK courts
to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling in accordance with
Art. 267 TFEU. Part 75 of the Criminal Procedure Rules now
explicitly provides for this possibility, reflecting guidance issued by the CJEU. On such a request, the Court reviews
the intention of EU directives and whether the domestic
law gives proper effect to them. It is of particular note for
criminal practitioners that the CJEU has an urgent (so called
“PPU”) procedure, which may be applied when a person is
in custody and the CJEU ruling may lead to their release.
This could change the look of litigation, as already seen in
Ireland. In 2006, the Irish Supreme Court decided that provisions on expiry of time limits relating to the EAW did not
automatically entail the release of a person in custody.13 In
May, however, the High Court revisited the issue and referred the question to the CJEU, requesting the PPU procedure since the person was detained. The CJEU responded
in barely eight weeks, agreeing with the Supreme Court’s
interpretation but adding that the individual could invoke
the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights to challenge his continued detention.14
EU law has well and truly arrived in criminal proceedings, bringing a new European court and procedural rights
mechanisms applicable in domestic criminal proceedings.
In a follow up article we will introduce the measures that
can be invoked in all domestic cases, not just those with a
cross border element.
13 Dundon v The Governor of Cloverhill Prison [2005] IESC 83.
14 Case C-237/15 PPU Minister for Justice and Equality v Lanigan (unreported, July 16 2015).
Article 6 CFR is the equivalent to Article 5 ECHR on the right to liberty. Articles 52 and 53 CFR
require the Charter to be interpreted in conformity with the Convention.
In Defence of Pace and Rogers
Damien Bruneau and Aaron Taylor1
The Court of Appeal’s decision in Pace and Rogers2 has
been subjected to a torrent of academic criticism. The basis
for much of this criticism is the view that Pace decides that
a defendant must intend every element of the actus reus of
an offence (i.e. conduct, circumstance, and consequence)
in order to be liable under the Criminal Attempts Act 1981,
s.1. So understood, the court’s decision is attacked for being inconsistent both with authority and principle.
This note suggests that such criticism rests on a misreading of Pace. Properly understood, the case decides that the
mens rea for an attempt is intention as to all elements of the
actus reus of the substantive offence unless s.1(3) applies.
1 Damien Bruneau is a student at Downing College, Cambridge. Aaron Taylor is a student
at St Edmunds College, Cambridge. The authors are grateful to Professor Graham Virgo,
Emmeline Plews, and Christopher Sargeant for helpful discussions on this topic. The usual
disclaimer applies.
2 [2014] EWCA Crim 186; [2014] 1 W.L.R. 2867.
6
Under s.1(3), intention is presumed if it would have been
found under “the [circumstantial] facts as [D] believed them
to be.” Therefore, under Pace, belief is a sufficient mens rea
for the circumstance element of the substantive offence.
When this is appreciated, the court’s decision, though less
than satisfactory in dealing with the contradictory appellate
authorities, is highly satisfactory both as a reading of the
1981 Act and as a matter of policy.
Background
The facts of Pace are simple. The defendants, who worked
at a scrap metal yard, were charged with attempting to convert criminal property, contrary to s.327(1) of the Proceeds
of Crime Act 2002 (under part of the Act entitled “Money
Laundering”), after purchasing scrap metal from an undercover police officer. The substantive offence was “impossi-
Archbold
Review
ble,” since the scrap metal was not in fact criminal property,
but instead owned by the police. The prosecution nonetheless argued that the defendants had suspected that it was
stolen, and on that basis the defendants were convicted of
the inchoate offence. The conviction was overturned by
the Court of Appeal (in a judgment given by Davis LJ, with
Blake and Lewis JJ agreeing) on the grounds that suspicion
as to a circumstance (that the property was stolen), though
sufficient mens rea for the substantive offence, was insufficient for an attempt under the 1981 Act.
The crux of the court’s reasoning is contained in three short
paragraphs. At [61], it said that “belief” under s.1(3) of the
1981 Act can be disregarded because the case had been put
to the jury on the basis that suspicion was enough. At [62],
the court sets out the mens rea required under s.1(1) of the
Act. At [63], these conclusions are applied to the facts. The
wave of academic criticism of the decision has focused on
the second of these paragraphs, whilst ignoring the first.
For that reason, much has been made of the court’s sensible and straightforward reading of s.1(1) at [62]: “Turning,
then, to section 1(1) we consider that, as a matter of ordinary language and in accordance with principle, an “intent
to commit an offence” connotes an intent to commit all the
elements of the offence”– that is, conduct, circumstance,
and consequence elements.
Academic criticism of Pace and Rogers
Commentators have seen the statement at [62] as determinative and exhaustive of the mens rea for attempt. This can
be seen in the following passages:
(1) Stark: “The Court of Appeal held… that the mens rea
required for this attempt was (i) an intention to conceal the metal and (ii) an intention that the metal was
stolen.”3
(2) Virgo: “The Court of Appeal in Pace and Rogers has
destabilised the offence by holding that the only relevant mental element is intention”.4
(3) Child and Hunt: “Since Pace and Rogers acted without intention or knowledge as to every element of
the offence, their appeal against conviction… was
allowed.”5
(4) Simester: “Does [s.1 of the 1981 Act] really mean
that they must intend every element of that offence…?
With respect to the court in Pace and Rogers, the answer to that question is no.”6
(5) Dyson: “[Pace] appears to interpret s.1(1) as requiring the defendant…to have intended every actus reus
element.”7
(6) Mirfield: “It is worth emphasising what this entails.
Every single factual element of the crime allegedly
attempted must have been intended… [for] criminal
liability.”8
Having understood Pace in this way, most commentators
are rightly critical of its apparent conclusions. On the facts,
3
4
5
6
7
8
(2014) 3 Arch. Rev. 7, 7.
[2014] 73(2) CLJ 244, 244.
(2013) 78(3) J. Crim. L 220, 220.
(2015) 131 LQR 169, 170-1.
(2014) 6 Crim L.R. 445, 445.
(2015) 2 Crim. L. R. 142, 145.
the prosecution would face the insuperable hurdle of proving that the defendants intended that the goods be stolen.
As they rightly point out, a dodgy metal dealer looking for a
profit will be satisfied—indeed probably pleased—to learn
that the metal is not in fact stolen property; it is precisely
his or her prior belief that they were so that is punishable.
The commentators are united in setting out one particular
lacuna that results from Pace as they understand it—that liability for attempted rape would require that the defendant
actively intended that the victim not consent to penetration.
This conclusion would reverse the decision of the Court of
Appeal in Khan,9 in which the defendants were held liable
for attempted rape where they were merely reckless as to
the victim’s consent—recklessness being the relevant mens
rea for the substantive offence at that time.
Various alternatives are proposed. Virgo argues for the approach taken in Khan, under which intention is required as
to conduct and circumstance, but the mens rea for circumstance elements is as for the substantive offence. This interpretation has the virtue of finding liability on the facts of
Khan, but is without basis either in the 1981 Act or in principle. Further, it presents a very broad view of the mens rea
requirement for attempts. On the basis of the wide interpretation given to “more than merely preparatory act” Within
s.1(1) (see Jones (Kenneth)10 and Dagnall),11 the mens rea
elements of criminal attempts do significant work in preventing over-criminalisation, and ought not to be narrowed
without statutory authority. Dyson agrees with Virgo, suggesting as alternatives a minimum mens rea for attempts,
or separate attempt offences where “intention” would be an
unsatisfactory requirement.
Mirfield and Child and Hunt, by contrast, favour the “intention as to all elements” approach which they consider
to be the ratio in Pace, accepting the lacuna that approach
would create, and instead arguing that an intention requirement effectively “isolates the wrong” in criminal attempts.
Simester, however, argues convincingly that the appropriate mens rea requirement regarding circumstances is belief,
under s.1(3)—that is, precisely the result that we suggest
follows from Pace. Simester puts most strongly the shortcomings of the Khan approach:
Certainly, there is a superficial attraction in the thought that, if D acts with
the mens rea of a substantive offence but, luckily, does not complete the
actus reus, D is just as culpable as someone who commits the full offence.
Perhaps that is true. However, it does not follow that D’s conduct should be
criminalised. It should be remembered that mere risk-takers do not actually
cause harm.12
Stark agrees, though only for “impossible” attempts, a distinction upon which he relies heavily, ignoring the phrase
“in all cases” in s.1(3).
The ratio of Pace and Rogers
The received wisdom on Pace is based upon a misreading
of the judgment: the commentators address the statement
regarding s.1(1) at [62] whilst ignoring its crucial preface
at [61]. At [61] Davis LJ explicitly disclaims the relevance of
s.1(3) of the 1981 Act:
9 [1990] 1 W.L.R. 813.
10 [1990] 1 W.L.R. 1057.
11 [2003] EWCA Crim 2441; [2003] 147 S.J.L.B. 995.
12 Above n 6.
7
Archbold
Review
Mr Farrell did at one stage of his argument, if we understood it aright, suggest that section 1(3) of the 1981 Act of itself provided a complete answer in
favour of the Crown. But that cannot be right. That subsection only applies
where “the facts of the case” had been as the accused had believed them
to be. But in the present proceedings the Crown’s case had been put not
on the basis of belief but on the basis of suspicion. Accordingly, one has to
revert to section 1(1).
This passage concerning s.1(3) is crucial, since Davis LJ
appears to consider belief to be relevant to that subsection.
Because the Crown pleaded suspicion and not belief, that
provision was inoperative. This, indeed, is the interpretation of Pace offered by the headnote writer in the Weekly
Law Reports.
The ratio of Pace therefore turns on the meaning of s.1(3)
of the 1981 Act, which has been the source of much confusion—Davis LJ not being the first judge to describe it as
“winning no prize for lucidity.” That section provides that:
In any case where—
(a)apart from this subsection a person’s intention would
not be regarded as having amounted to an intent to
commit an offence; but
(b)if the facts of the case had been as he believed them to
be, his intention would be so regarded,
then, for the purposes of subsection (1) above, he shall be
regarded as having had an intent to commit that offence.
The most logical and straightforward reading of s.1(3),
surely, is that s.1(3) tempers the effect of s.1(1). Whilst
s.1(1) requires intention as to all elements of the offence,
s.1(3) allows for belief regarding the circumstance element.
This is the interpretation that we suggest was adopted in
Pace.
Three aspects of this interpretation require elucidation.
First, it begins “in any case.” Though Khan was distinguished in Pace on the grounds that the latter involved an
“impossible” attempt, s.1(3) surely applies both to “possible” and “impossible” attempts. Secondly, a defendant cannot be described as believing her conduct or its consequences to be something other than it is. Therefore the word
“facts” most naturally refers to “circumstances”. However, a
broader interpretation of “facts” may placate those sceptical
of the circumstance/consequence distinction.13
Thirdly, s.1(3) provides that “intention” can be presumed
if it would have existed on the facts “as [the defendant] believed them to be”. This falls short of stating explicitly its effect—that “belief” is sufficient mens rea regarding circumstances. The difficulty is that circumstance elements lend
themselves more readily to description in terms of knowledge than in terms of intention. On facts similar to Pace, the
provision appears to work as follows: if the goods in question were indeed stolen, and the defendant believed them so
to be, then the defendant would know that they were stolen,
since, for these purposes, the law defines “knowledge” as
“true belief”14. If they were not in fact stolen, but the defendant believed them so to be, then “on the facts as he believed
them to be,” he would know them to be stolen. Section 1(3)
thus acts as a deeming provision, turning belief into knowledge. Such a provision is consistent with Lord Brown’s rea13 e.g. Buxton [1984] Crim. L.R. 25.
14 Saik [2006] UKHL 18, [2007] 1 A.C. 18.
8
soning in Saik15 at [119] that, in certain contexts, the law
ought to see no difference between belief and knowledge.
A final step is required to turn this knowledge into intention in order to square the circle of s.1(3). Two approaches
can be offered. The first is teleological: if the goods had
been stolen, then the defendants would be guilty of the
substantive offence, and so must surely also be liable for
the attempt offence. Since this is so, the defendants’ knowledge, if sufficient to count as intention for s.1(1) when the
substantive offence is committed, must also count as intention under s.1(3) for the inchoate offence. The second is
a question of statutory interpretation. As Simester16 notes,
“[w]hen applied to circumstance elements within an actus
reus, the mens rea requirement of “intention” has always
been understood—translated—to mean its cognitive equivalent, i.e. knowledge or settled belief (with no significant
doubt).” This conclusion is eminently sensible; when a
defendant intentionally acts in order to bring about some
consequence in circumstances he knows to be the case and
such conduct, consequences and circumstances constitute
a crime there can be little doubt that he or she intended to
commit the crime.
The result is that s.1(3), in conjunction with s.1(1), has the
effect of equating the defendant’s belief with intention. This
is striking since “intention” may ordinarily be characterised as a belief (that a consequence will arise or that circumstances are a certain way) along with a hope or desire
(that the consequences do arise). That attendant hope has
normative value; it is what makes it morally worse for a person to intend harm than it is for that person to act merely
believing that harm will result. However, as regards circumstances it is appropriate that belief is sufficient to establish
intention. “Intention” in that context is best understood in
terms of simple belief or knowledge and there is no reason
to distinguish knowledge from belief regarding circumstances.
The conclusion of the above discussion can be restated
shortly: the mens rea under s.1(1) is intention as to all elements of the substantive offence; however, as a result of
s.1(3), belief as to the circumstance element will suffice “in
any case.” Though this conclusion is not explicit in Pace,
it nonetheless best explains Davis LJ’s reasoning. In particular, it explains his suggestion at [80]–[81] that the CPS
might more successfully have charged the defendants with
attempting to handle stolen goods. His Lordship explains:
“Th[is] necessarily will, we appreciate, require proof of a higher level of
mens rea than suspicion: and of course defendants can be expected to be
astute to emphasise that to a jury. Even so, as observed by Lord Hope in
para [62] of his speech in R v Saik17, the margin between knowledge and
suspicion is perhaps not all that great, at all events where the person has
reasonable grounds for his suspicion.”
This suggestion of charging an alternative “handling” offence makes no sense if Davis LJ had decided—as he has
been taken to decide—that intention is required for all aspects of the substantive offence regardless of s.1(3), since
such a charge would inevitably fail. Rather, Davis LJ clearly
contemplates belief as a sufficient mens rea regarding the
status of the goods. Clearly, his Lordship considered that
15 Ibid.
16 Above n 6, at 171.
17 Above n 14.
Archbold
Review
the Crown might have had more success demonstrating
that the defendants believed they had handled stolen goods
than that they were purchasing criminal property.
The Authorities
It remains to consider the relationship between Pace and
the two other appellate authorities on this point, both of
which Davis LJ cited with approval. These are Khan (cited
above) and Attorney General’s Reference No. 3 of 1992,18 in
which the defendants were held liable for attempted aggravated arson, under s.1(2) of the Criminal Damage Act 1971.
The element of “being reckless as to whether life is endangered” in that offence was held by the Court of Appeal to
be an ulterior mens rea element rather than (as the judge
had held at first instance) a consequence. The court applied
a “missing element” test, by which only those elements of
the substantive offence that are “missing” from the alleged
attempt require intention. It thus held that such ulterior elements require only the mens rea for the substantive offence,
and so mere recklessness was sufficient.
The present defence of Pace is not intended to suggest that
these two cases were effectively distinguished by Davis
LJ. Rather, both in their reasoning and their results, the
three cases present fundamentally divergent views on the
mens rea for attempt. The two grounds on which Khan was
distinguished in Pace—that the latter was an “impossible”
rather than a “possible” attempt, and that the latter involved
“suspicion” rather than “recklessness”—are highly unsatisfactory, being without basis in the statute and lacking
any exposition of their justification in principle. Indeed, as
Simester argues, it is “a distinction without a difference”.19
However, we do suggest that the result reached in Pace is
preferable.
The difficult case of attempted rape is the example most
employed in the critical commentary on Pace. Even on
the interpretation of Pace set out herein, the defendants
in Khan would not be liable on the pleaded facts. This apparent problem need cause no alarm. Following Pace, a defendant should be liable for attempted rape only if he did
the relevant act intending or believing that the victim did
not consent. On the facts of Khan—a gang rape in which
only three of the defendants succeeded in penetration—it
is almost certain that this burden would have been met. In
other cases, facts which might fail to produce a successful
conviction for attempted rape could be charged as a sexual
assault, an attempted sexual assault, or as secondary liability for rape or sexual assault. Facts which fail to satisfy any
of these or similar charges are surely undeserving of criminal conviction.
A further consequence of the present interpretation of Pace,
is that the Court of Appeal reached the incorrect result in
18 [1994] 1 WLR 409.
19 (2015) 131 LQR 169, 170.
Attorney General’s Reference No. 3 of 1992. The element of
recklessness as to endangering life in the substantive offence of aggravated arson is properly understood as a circumstance element. The additional culpability resulting
from aggravated as opposed to non-aggravated arson is that
the act is done in circumstances in which the defendant has
demonstrated disregard for human life. If “endangerment”
is understood as a circumstance element, then under Pace
only belief or intention—but not recklessness—will be sufficient mens rea. In fact, since in that case the defendants
had thrown petrol bombs, such a belief could probably have
been demonstrated. In our view, this narrowing of the law
of attempts should be welcomed; if the defendants did not
believe that they were endangering life, then they should be
liable only for attempted arson, and are not culpable for the
“aggravated” element.
The Consequences of Pace
So understood, the decision in Pace has a number of welcome consequences. First, it gives a natural (or, the most
natural available) meaning to the wording of s.1 of the Criminal Attempts Act 1981. Secondly, in locating the mens rea
requirement for attempts in the statute, it avoids the problem of ignoring the parliamentary drafting, which results
from the two pre-existing appellate tests. Thirdly, as set out
above, it provides an effective answer to the difficult case of
attempted rape, which has dominated the academic literature. Fourthly, it de-emphasises the problematic possible/
impossible distinction, which, though employed in Pace itself, was not necessary to its ratio, has no basis in the statute, and can be discarded outright if Pace is adopted more
generally. Fifthly, it narrows the law on criminal attempts
from the broad position set out in Khan. Nonetheless, the
mens rea requirement it sets out is rightly less strict than
for criminal conspiracies—the latter being further detached
from a substantive offence, only “intention or knowledge”
will suffice regarding circumstances (Saik).
The above discussion is not intended to suggest that the
Court of Appeal’s judgment in Pace is beyond reproach. As
we have seen, the court’s approach to the existing authorities is problematic. Though approved, the judgments in
Khan and Attorney General’s Reference No. 3 of 1992 are not
easily reconcilable with Pace. For this reason, the precise
status of Pace as precedent remains uncertain, especially
since it might seem, unfortunately, to rest on a spurious
distinction from Khan. However, as well as being the latest
appellate pronouncement, Pace is also, in our view, the best.
Trial judges should treat its ratio, as set out herein, as an authoritative statement of the mens rea for criminal attempts
in all cases. Should a similar case reach the Supreme Court
Pace should be followed for both “possible” and “impossible” attempts. Both Khan and Attorney General’s Reference
No. 3 of 1992 should be explicitly overruled.
9
Archbold
Review
THE PERFECT GUIDE
ARCHBOLD MAGISTRATES’
COURTS CRIMINAL PRACTICE 2016
When you’re practising in the Magistrates’ Court, you need a textbook that informs and
supports you with the turn of every page. In whichever direction you’d like your case to go,
Archbold Magistrates’ will be there to ensure you’re going about procedures in the right
way, and covering every important angle.
Available on Thomson
Reuters ProViewTM
With ProViewTM you can:
•
•
•
•
•
•
Add your own notes and annotations
Email, print, and share text
Use powerful search tools allowing
easy navigation
Scroll quickly using the navigation bar
View contents list in layers
Colour code your highlights and notes
The new edition publishes in August and is fully updated with the latest
developments in criminal law and practice affecting the magistrates’ courts.
Updates include:
Amendments effected by the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015 affecting
•
•
•
•
Reporting restrictions and low value shoplifting offences
The Youth Court by introducing the power to commit youths to the Crown Court
for sentence and changes to referral orders.
Restrictions on the issue of police cautions
New sexual offences of revenge pornography, meeting a child after sexual grooming
and possession of pornographic images of rape
Amendments brought about by the Anti-Social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014
PRINT £199
•
eBOOK £238.80
•
Anti-Social Behaviour Orders now abolished and replaced by Criminal Behaviour
Orders on conviction
SOPOs replaced by Sexual Harm Prevention Orders
PLACE YOUR ORDER TODAY:
Available on ProView
sweetandmaxwell.co.uk
[email protected]
(£199 +£39.80 VAT)
PRINT & eBOOK
£284.90 (£259+£25.90
Available on
SWEET & MAXWELL
10
Archbold
Review
ROOK & WARD
ON SEXUAL OFFENCES
LAW AND PRACTICE
4TH EDITION . SUPPLEMENT 1
HH Judge Peter Rook QC, Robert Ward CBE
WHAT’S NEW?
• SENTENCING: A full analysis of all changes to the sentencing
regime, including the new sexual offences sentencing guideline
issued by the Sentencing Council which applies to all adult sex
offenders sentenced on or after April 1, 2014.
• NON-CONSENSUALOFFENCES: A close examination of
important case law since December 2010, which has
– given a wider interpretation to the definition of consent
– stressed that context is all-important
– illuminated how evidence of grooming may be relevant
– clarified that deceptions falling short of s.76 deceptions may
entitle a jury to conclude there was no genuine consent
– taken a restrictive view of s.76
– illustrated the operation of the s.75 evidential presumptions and
– shed further light on the extent to which a defendant’s mental
disorder may be relevant to whether he had a reasonable belief
that the complainant was consenting.
• OTHERSEXUALOFFENCES: Consideration of all relevant cases
including on the offences relating to indecent images of children
and the significant developments in the law as regards the
prosecution of those who may have been the victims of trafficking.
• THELAWOFEVIDENCE: An analysis of the large number
of Court of Appeal decisions in sex cases.
• REPORTINGRESTRICTIONSINSEXCASES: Coverage of
important new case law including on the practical operation of
the complainant anonymity provision, and of the latest
developments on defendant anonymity pre- and post-charge.
• HISTORICCASES:An explanation of the important developments
relating to the trial of historic sexual offences.
Now published
• VULNERABLEWITNESSES: A survey of the plethora of useful
guidance and Court of Appeal authority of the last three years.
11
Archbold
Review
You &
Archbold
Partners in
crime.
2015
A partnership like no other
For over 190 years, Archbold has been at the side of criminal
law professionals, helping to build winning cases. Written
by practitioners for practitioners, it’s always been as much
yours as it is ours. It truly is a partnership like no other.
In Court · Online · On the go
Available 20 November 2014
sweetandmaxwell.co.uk/archbold
Editor: Professor J.R. Spencer QC
1491725A Archbold Journal Advert black and white.indd 1
15/10/2014 16:27
Cases in Brief: Richard Percival
Sentencing cases: Dr Louise Cowen
Articles for submission for Archbold Review should be emailed to [email protected]
The views expressed are those of the authors and not of the editors or publishers.
Editorial inquiries: House Editor, Archbold Review.
Sweet & Maxwell document delivery service: £9.45 plus VAT per article with an extra £1 per page if faxed.
Tel. (01422) 888019
Archbold Review is published by Thomson Reuters (Professional) UK Limited trading as Sweet & Maxwell, Friars House,
160 Blackfriars Road, London, SE1 8EZ (Registered in England & Wales, Company No 1679046.
Registered Office and address for service: 2nd floor, 1 Mark Square, Leonard Street, London EC2A 4EG.
For further information on our products and services, visit
www.sweetandmaxwell.co.uk
ISSN 0961–4249
© 2015 Thomson Reuters (Professional) UK Ltd
Sweet & Maxwell ® is a registered trademark of Thomson Reuters (Professional) UK Ltd.
Typeset by Matthew Marley
Printed in Great Britain by Hobbs the Printers Ltd, Totton, Hampshire, SO40 3WX
12
*647865*

Review - Archbold e

Transcription

Similar documents

1 Silence in this Lecture Turn off your mobile - Take notes

Criminal identification technologies

Family Fitness Flyer v9

Irby Pace – Abracadabra FotoFest 2016 Participating Space March

PACE Newsletter Winter 2015

Annual Report 2014 - Pace Community Action Agency, Inc.

Corporate Overview

PaceHouse - Potts Marketing

EPK - Pace House

Full Brochure

Oprah`s non-surgical facial offered in Bolton

The Commonwealth Criminal Code - Attorney