The University of North Carolina at Asheville More Than Family: B

The University of North Carolina at Asheville
More Than Family:
B-17 Crews In WWII Europe
A Senior Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of the Department of History in
Candidacy for the Degree of Bachelor of Arts in History
by
Rebecca Carlson
Asheville, North Carolina
22 November, 2004
The truck rattled on and the flight line came into view. I
saw the tail low profile of my plane. She seemed poised, thrusting
forward, leaning breathless toward the sky. She was waiting with
the grace of a good creature to do my will. One who could not
understand her divinity might say she was only dirt out of the
ground except for the mind of man; that she was a machine and not
a valiant steed; that life would never touch her; that she was as
indifferent to her creation as she would be to her death; that she
was without soul or spirit. But there was something else, a mystery
pilots know of her great beating heart, and a sacred vow she made
to me; that she would put her strength in my hands; that she would
bear me to the end; that she would give herself to my mad purpose
with perfect courage and beyond all human love. And so I
approached her, my noble friend, to do this day’s work.1
John Muirhead writes eloquently of his approach to the B-17 he would pilot into
Germany on his first mission as a B-17 captain. His emotional response to the machine he
depended on is an powerful representation of how men responded to the heavy bombers known
as “Flying Fortresses.” The connection to the planes bonded the men to each other and the
machine that would be their safe haven in the sky. Their relationship to each other strengthened
the men’s abilities in flight, allowing a stronger and more effective crew to survive where a
weaker, less cohesive crew might not.
Highly trained individuals formed the B-17 crews. They created a strong bond with one
another, which allowed them to cope with the challenges of aviation warfare in World War II.
This paper will prove that the relationships between the crewmen was vital to how they dealt
with combat stress, through the unique practice of adorning their planes artistically and by the
absolute confidence they had in their planes and crewmates, in spite of facing extremely difficult
circumstances in battle and the negative aspects of the strong bonds between the men.
1
John Muirhead, Those Who Fall (New York: Random House, 1986) 14-15.
2
The period of 1941 to 1945 when the United States participated in the Second World War
has brought out intense interest in the initiation and development of the long-range bomber class
of airplanes, which includes the B-17 “Flying Fortress.” Military aviation history covers a vast
amount of ground between the advent of the airplane as weapon at the end of the First World
War through modern techniques. Historian Frederick A. Johnsen, who wrote a comprehensive
biography of the B-17 from its inception to the last plane’s final mission, started his work with a
discussion of the first stages of the creation of the B-17. David A. Johnson discussed the doctrine
developed by the Army, of high-altitude, unescorted, daylight precision bombing, which became
the B-17’s specifications.2 According to Alan J. Levine, whose book focused on the strategic
bombing of Germany, while some B-17’s did fly in the Pacific, it remained the preferred bomber
in Europe when the B-24 came into action in the Pacific.3
George Raudzens pointed out that the important members of American bomber lobby”
had enormous faith in their planes, believing that “daylight precision bombing would fatally
cripple the German war machine.”4 He shows that British forces believed the answer to the
slaughter of trench warfare was the bomber, not tank armies and infantry. Britain had the only
long-range heavy bomber force in Europe, consisting of a combination of the British Lancaster
and the American B-17.5 Crane indicates that while full-scale bombing runs could be very
effective, rarely were the planes exactly on target, and competing factors for accuracy included
the height that the B-17 flew when bombing, the intense cold at altitude affecting the men, and
2
David A. Johnson, Fast Tanks and Heavy Bombers: Innovation in the U.S. Army, 1917-1945 (London:
Cornell University Press, 1998), 222.
3
Ibid., 73.
4
George Raudzens, “War-Winning Weapons: The Measurement of Technological Determinism in Military
History,” The Journal of Military History 54 (1990): 428, online via JSTOR, < www.jstor.org/ > (1 April 2004).
5
Ibid.
3
fatigue.6 Precision bombing was not an accurate term for what was really only the lead bomber
dropping his bomb load close to the intended target, with the remainder of the flight just
following along in his path.7 However, Crane does insist that the crews in the field actually
carrying out precision bombing runs “were convinced of the effectiveness and appropriateness of
their pinpoint tactics.”8
Michael J. Lyons wrote of the effectiveness of the B-17 towards the goals of the war of
protecting the Allied countries and regaining the territory lost to the Axis. The B-17 took part in
one of the most horrific bombing attacks against a German city in late summer, 1943. Combined
bombing runs with the Royal Air Force at night and the U.S. during the day left the city of
Hamburg in ruins from high-explosive, incendiary, and phosphorus bombs, that culminated on
the night of July 26, forming a firestorm that killed thousands of civilians.9 The retreating view
from the bombers compared to the evening sky at sunset; a lasting impression for at least one
pilot that would leave him unable to enjoy the setting sun from that moment on.10
These authors and historians all detailed the abilities of the B-17 along with its
importance in the war effort, but do not discuss with sufficient detail the connections between the
crews as men and as members of a team that included the plane they flew. Aviation historians
have concentrated on the plane as machine and its influence in the war effort. The influence of
the airplane as weapon shows most significantly in the Second World War as the dedication of
the aviators and the technology of their planes came together. In the long-range bombers, the
6
Conrad C. Crane, Bombs, Cities and Civilians: American Airpower Strategy in World War II (Lawrence:
University of Kansas Press, 1993), 50-51.
7
I.C.B. Dear, ed., The Oxford Companion to World War II (Oxford and New York: Oxford University
Press), 912.
8
Crane, 10.
9
Michael J. Lyons, World War II: A Short History (Upper Saddle River: Pearson/Prentice Hall, 2004), 230231.
10
J.M. Carlson, telephone interview by author, March 14, 2004.
4
crew relationships illustrate the significance of this combination of man and machine in the manto-man connection as well as the man-to-machine connection. No other war inspired crews to
name and decorate their craft with the distinctive nose art adorning most of the heavy bombers of
this era.11
The United States entered the second major world conflict with limited experience and
technology only barely adapted from the first war, a major challenge to the men expected to fly
combat missions against Germany and her allies. Seasoned airmen such as Jimmy Doolittle and
Billy Mitchell, both veterans of the First World War, asserted that the airplane was the ultimate
weapon. They believed it would be the definitive factor in winning any future wars, but the proof
of their conviction came along only after the introduction of the Boeing B-17 heavy bomber,
called the “Flying Fortress” by the crews that flew it into battle.12
Before the war began, the United States Army, in an effort to increase its fighting
capabilities, began serious study of the impact of airpower in combat in 1934.13 Orders to
competing manufacturers set out basic specifications for a heavy-duty, long-range plane for use
as a defensive and offensive craft. Boeing’s response, the prototype Model 299, later called the
YB-17, and then B-17C through -G, proved to be what the Army wanted, a long-range bomber
capable of flying high enough to make daylight bombing a reality.14 When the B-17 went to war
in England in 1942, it “arrived firmly entrenched in the belief that continuous and accurate
daylight precision bombing was the only way to decisively crush German industrial capacity.”15
11
Peter M. Bowers, 50th Anniversary Boeing B-17 Flying Fortress 1935-1985 (Museum of Flight, 1985),
65.
12
Ibid.
Johnson, 3-6.
14
Ibid.
15
Richard Rule, “Daylight Bombing Gamble,” World War II (September 2004), 56.
13
5
An important factor in building crew confidence was the B-17’s offensive capability, and
a significant part of that capability was the long-range bombing ability of the plane. As recalled
by men in combat, “By September 1944, bombing temporarily halted enemy oil production
entirely in a campaign that deprived the German air force of flight and training time, severely
hampered the mobility of ground forces, and even limited supply of U-boat fuel. It was U.S.
strategic bombing’s finest achievement, the destruction of a vital compact target system with
minimal damage to civilians.”16 This kind of success helped the crews see the importance of their
work and bolstered their sense of achievement.
The problem affecting crew confidence in long-range bombing was the lack of accuracy
in precision bombing. While full-scale bombing runs could be very effective, rarely were the
planes exactly on target, and competing factors for accuracy included the height that the B-17
flew when bombing, the intense cold at altitude affecting the men, and fatigue.17 Precision
bombing was not an accurate term for what was really only the lead bomber dropping his bomb
load close to the intended target, with the remainder of the flight just following along in his
path.18 However, the crews in the field actually carrying out precision bombing runs “were
convinced of the effectiveness and appropriateness of their pinpoint tactics.”19
Pilots of these new planes faced the added difficulty of knowing they would fly without
fighter escort into dangerous territory, but there was a technique that would prove to be effective.
The new standard brought about by the B-17 and its flight abilities had left it without suitable
fighter support on missions due to the fighter planes’ limited flight ranges due to fuel capacity.
The B-17 was the longest-ranging plane to date, and no fighter could match it. In order to
16
William T. Youngblood, ed., Reflections and Remembrances (Air Force History and Museums Program,
17
Crane, 50-51.
Dear, 912.
2000), 5.
18
6
provide maximum protection within each flight unit, the B-17 had to be flown in cover
formations, with enough weaponry to defend itself against the enemy fighters that could fly up to
meet it from their positions inside Germany and other targets. According to pilot Robert Felgar,
assigned to the 379th commanded by a colonel who insisted on exceptionally tight formations,
this technique assisted with greater bombing accuracy and better defense.20 The planes flew in
multi-level, defensive cover formations that presented a minimum target to the opposition while
maximizing guns on the B-17’s. The so-called “combat box,” squadrons consisting of groups of
three planes in a stacked and staggered formation, made the B-17’s better able to live up to the
nickname “Flying Fortress.”21 Colonel Robert Morgan, pilot of the Memphis Belle, attributed
formation flying as the “salvation, really—that was the whole thing. And that was the thing the
British did not realize… the whole secret was formation flying.”22 The protection of formation
flying leant security to the crews and kept them feeling safe, even in the face of incredibly high
odds against success and survival.23 Formation flying did not provide ultimate protection, and
enemy fighters could still successfully attack, damage, and destroy B-17’s in the “combat box,”
but the formation meant that if one plane’s guns could not defend it, another in the formation
above or behind might be able to fend off the incoming combatant.24
The “combat box” could only help with the crew’s sense of security for the length of a
successful mission. Crews had to find other ways of coping with the stresses of combat when
they were not facing daily missions, but instead spending time on the ground preparing for them.
When weather became an issue, it lead to increased tension for the men who had to abort
19
Crane, 10.
John Bryant, interview with Robert Felgar, A Bomber Pilot Remembers (World War II, May 2004), 27.
21
Martin Caidin, Flying Forts: The B-17 in World War II (New York: Ballantine, 1968), 375.
22
Charles Griffith, interview with Col. Robert Morgan, February 6, 1988. Folder 31, Box 13, MS 1608,
University of Tennessee Special Collections.
23
Harry E. Garner and Paul Chryst, A B-17 Crew’s Odyssey (Aviation History, January 2004), 37.
20
7
missions mid-flight because the weather could not be overcome.25 Men in John Muirhead’s unit
filled their down time in a variety of ways, including playing card games, writing letters home,
reading, sleeping, or they might go to the Red Cross canteen and “sit mindlessly…sipping coffee
while gossiping about missions and exchanging rumors.”26 Muirhead recalled, “On the ground
there was only waiting as the long minutes emptied into hours untended by fear.”27
Formation flying alone was not enough to provide for the sense of security and
attachment the men felt towards their airplanes. A significant way of adding crew confidence for
the potentially deadly missions was the practice of painting symbols and figures onto the front of
the aircraft, personalizing each plane, which came to be called “nose art.”28 Modifying the
exterior appearance and interior of the plane individualized each bomber for its crew, which
significantly added to the sense of possession for the crew and provided an additional layer of
perceived safety. Nose art lifted spirits and served as a visual reminder of missions completed, as
they added bomb symbols for each mission, serving as a countdown and brag book at the same
time.29
Nose art included mission insignia, the name given to the plane by its crew, the plane’s
mascot or namesake, caricatures or cartoons, or detailed paintings created by talented artists.30 It
was common to see paintings of beautiful women, modeled on pin-up girls of the era. Cartoon
characters made it to the sides of the B-17’s as well, like the decoration on the Fuddy Duddy, of
popular character Elmer Fudd.31 Occasionally, caricatures of the enemy would also appear in
24
Morgan interview.
Muirhead, 9.
26
Ibid.
27
Ibid.
28
Bowers, 65.
29
Ann Cooper, In WWII, Missions Symbols Painted on a Bomber’s Nose Helped The Crew Keep Plugging
Toward Its Magic Number (Aviation History, September 1996), accessed via EBSCOhost, November 11, 2004.
30
Cooper.
31
“Flying Fuddy Duddy Comes To Town,” Asheville Citizen-Times, September 8, 2004. See appendix I.
25
8
nose art.32 Mission insignia indicated not only that the plane had completed a certain number of
missions, but also allowed the crews to brag about gunner prowess with kill symbols, showing
how many enemy planes had fallen victim to the sharp shooting gunners onboard.33 They would
indicate the headcount for these with painted swastikas or tiny flags after verifying with mission
debriefing the confirmation of credit for the kill.34 Nose art added significantly to the crew’s
confidence and sense of security as it was a visual reminder not only that they had survived but
that they were doing their jobs as well, giving them pride in accomplishment and reinforcing the
skills supporting the missions.
The significance of the artwork on the plane was how it represented the crew’s
connection to the plane, as well as the crew as a cohesive unit. Names and paintings served a
purpose beyond identification of the plane; it gave the plane its own personality as well, helping
the crews keep morale high.35 Owen Hughes’ official duties for the Army during the war
included painting signs, but when flight crews discovered his talent for art, they would seek him
out to decorate their planes. Requests included famous actresses from Hollywood, or “some
voluptuous woman whose likeness couldn’t be printed in a family newspaper.”36 Hughes’ fee for
providing this service to the aviators was ten dollars, paid by the crew personally or the
individual who requested the art, unless he could convince them to take him up for a flight.37
In addition to exterior artwork, the B-17’s went through technical modifications as well,
heightening the crew’s confidence in its equipment. Pilot Eugene Fletcher recalls the first plane
32
Frederick A. Johnsen, B-17 Flying Fortress: The Symbol of Second World War Air Power (New York:
McGraw-Hill, 2000), 80. See appendix I.
33
Cooper.
34
Johnsen, 76.
35
Stan Finger, Artist paints nose art for last B-29 bomber (Wichita Eagle, June 19, 2002) accessed via
EBSCOhost, November 11, 2004.
36
Ibid.
37
Ibid.
9
assigned to his crew, the Knock Out Baby, and how the ground crew added some extras to it for
the crew about to take it into battle.38 Fletcher felt just as others before him had felt, that by
naming the plane and making it unique to his crew, it would become important not only as a
piece of equipment but provide the crew with that little extra element of security.39 The only
plane to come out of Boeing with an official name was the Five Grand, so named because it was
the five thousandth B-17 to come off the assembly lines; and it was uniquely marked as well, as
every person who had worked on it had painted their signature in the plane somewhere.40 These
planes took on individual identities, even personalities. Part of that process occurred as each
sustained battle damages and underwent repairs that altered flying capabilities, making each
plane highly individual not only from its crews’ perspective but on an almost daily basis with
changes to equipment and corrections after flak and bullet damage.41
Strongly influencing crew confidence was their ability to make important, potentially
life-saving repairs to their own planes. Quick fixes during flight were possible if an emergency
arose and the men had the right equipment. In-flight repairs to the plane on the crew’s very first
combat mission taught Eugene Fletcher’s group that the B-17 could make it through battle and
keep them safe. Upon successfully dropping the bomb load, the bomb bay doors malfunctioned.
A short in the wiring had begun to smoke, and if it continued to burn, an engine fire or even
explosion could occur. The crew determined that lowering the co-pilot on his parachute harness
to sever the wire would provide the fix; and the pilot learned the B-17 could be flown, and
landed, with bomb-bay doors wide open, safely and without further incident.42 This was
important for two reasons; one, it gave the pilot and his crew a needed boost, that they could
38
Eugene Fletcher, Fletcher’s Gang (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1988), 152.
Ibid.
40
Johnsen, 109.
41
Muirhead, 37.
39
10
cope with the unexpected; and secondly, the B-17 performed under the difficult circumstance of
equipment breakdown.
Another example from Fletcher’s crew involved a much later mission, and illustrates the
teamwork among the crew. On the occasion of the twenty-ninth mission for Fletcher and his
crew, a shell entered the fuselage of the plane after all bombs were away but before the door had
closed, causing interior damage which included loss of control to the elevators. Immediately
after noticing the problem, the pilot called the engineer on the plane’s interphone, asking if he
could somehow splice the cables together.43 By virtue of quick thinking, combined with
teamwork and aircraft design, the pilots regained control and made a safe landing. “We had a
crew that had experienced some very terrifying moments, and knew it is of fear that heroes are
born. But we also had an engineer who could take pride in the knowledge that he had saved an
aircraft from certain destruction.”44 Reinforcing the abilities of the B-17 during training taught
the men that they had a plane they could rely on, as interviews with crew reveal stories of
unusual training tactics like alternate landing techniques.
Intensive training in preparation for B-17 work added much-needed confidence for the
men coming in to fly. The instructors, many former combat pilots, knew of the B-17’s abilities
and passed that on to the new crews.45 While training in Idaho pilots of one particular B-17
learned to land without the use of the rudder mechanism, completely controlling the landing with
the engines and the control column.46 Training together and learning the peculiarities of the plane
as a group cemented the bond the crew would need later in combat. More experienced pilots
42
Fletcher, 60.
Ibid., 196.
44
Ibid., 196-7.
45
Carlson interview.
46
Brian D. O’Neill, Half a Wing, Three Engines and a Prayer (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1999), 7.
43
11
would take on the newest pilots coming to the unit, at times just to save the lives of the rest of the
crews if the inexperienced pilots might jeopardize the missions.47
Training together as a unit made working the B-17 as a crew easier on the men and added
to their sense of camaraderie, helping them to gel as a cohesive unit. Knowing one another from
the training days allowed the men to get to know each other before the stresses of combat, and
formed a tight bond as each knew the capabilities of the others.48 While training in Ardmore,
Oklahoma, Eugene Fletcher gave the following anonymously authored verse, “You Lucky One
You,” to his co-pilot as a morale booster, “to make him feel better when the going gets rough,”
in part because of the disappointment the man had felt when assigned as a co-pilot and not as
pilot of his own crew.49
For nine long months
I’ve toiled in the sun
Just dreaming of flying
A P-51.
Then came that great day
Our sweat wasn’t in vain
To think that now
We would fly a hot plane.
But out of each group
Some will get screwed
And just sure as hell
I was one of those few.
My fighter pilot dreams
Have gone up in stream
I’m now a co-pilot
On a B-17.
The job is exciting
Oh, the thrill that one feels
When the pilot says, Now,
You may pull up the wheels.
I let down the flaps
And keep the cylinder heads cool
I call off his airspeed
47
Muirhead, 24.
O’Neill, 7.
49
Fletcher, 7.
48
12
But hell I’m no fool.
I’m now in my glory
In my highest esteem
I’m second in command
On a B-17. 50
Training together from the beginning added a sense of security to crews fortunate enough
to start together and move into combat operation as a crew. The B-17 set a high standard for
airplane and aircrew performance. Long-distance records based on combat missions occurred on
a regular basis from the start of offensive operations into Germany itself. As relayed by a lead
crew captain, Eugene Adkins, “Much of our training was designed to develop a capacity for deep
penetrations into Germany, where many heavily defended key industrial targets were located. …
The length of missions ran anywhere from 5 to 8 hours; much of the airtime was spent on oxygen
at high altitude. On a number of missions we set oxygen duration records, particularly when
flying to such areas as Münich, Leipzig, Berlin, etc.”51 Ball turret gunner Sergeant Richard
Bowman spent as long as ten hours in his combat position, a tightly cramped space below the
belly of the plane, as he stayed on alert at his guns the longest of any man on the plane save the
pilots.52
Essential to the crew’s confidence in their planes was the B-17 ‘s flying capabilities and
how its construction kept it intact even after sustaining major damages. The Fortresses could take
massive abuse and still fly back to bases hundreds of miles away.53 By attacking during the day
and at long ranges inland, it inflicted heavy damage while maintaining its defenses. The strength
of this plane kept the faith of its crews and earned a high degree of loyalty and trust from the
50
Fletcher, 6-7.
Eugene Adkins, personal narrative. Folder 2, Box 1, MS 1608, University of Tennessee Special
Collections.
52
Johnsen, 108.
53
Muirhead, 51-57.
51
13
men who flew it. Colonel Morgan knew he had the best plane for the job, and his description
shows his emotional attachment to the plane as well as his belief in its abilities. This kind of
eloquence illustrates the deep connection he felt for the B-17, the respect he had for it, and the
faith he had in its purpose.
Finest airplane ever built…Well, it was an airplane,
particularly in World War II, that was ahead of its time. You had
people like General Mitchell and people like that who really had
been behind the bomber idea with the Army Air Corps. And they
built an airplane that would take an awful lot of punishment. I
mean it was amazing. It would fly on two engines and I’ve seen
them come home with three engines out—one engine, if they were
downhill, of course, but it was amazing, because I flew B-29’s in
the Pacific and the B-29 wouldn’t take anything to what the B-17
would. We could never have flown the B-29 in Europe. It wouldn’t
have taken the punishment. People ask me about that and, you see,
the B-29 was built for an entirely different purpose; long range,
high altitude, and the B-17 was built to fight and that’s what it did,
it fought.54
Just as it took a certain kind of plane to successfully fly combat missions in this war, it
also took a certain kind of man to fly in a bomber crew. He must have the endurance to fly hours
on end towards a single target, yet able to divert to the secondary target on a moment’s notice.
He must have faith in the abilities of the rest of the men aboard. He must have a strong mind and
body to cope with the severity of cold at high altitude in the face of high odds against a return
trip.55 Most crewmen had undergone training in more than one specialty and could take on a
wounded counterpart’s duties in an emergency, but to have the presence of mind to do that took
something special from within.56 Colonel Morgan summed up his responsibilities when asked
what his duties were as pilot of a B-17. He said, simply, “Well, my duties were getting it off the
54
Morgan interview.
Elizabeth Mullener, War Stories: Remembering World War II (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University
Press, 2002), 132.
56
O’Neill, 7-11.
55
14
ground, getting it over the target, drop the bombs, and bring it home.”57 He trusted his crew to
take care of the rest, and they did.
The crews had so much confidence in their planes and each other that even with casualty
rates over fifty percent and higher in some bomber groups they still flew on.58 Over Münster,
Germany, on October 10 1943, the “Bloody 100th” lost twelve of fourteen planes, the 390th lost
eight of eighteen, and the lead group, the 95th, lost five of seventeen; fifty percent of the planes
completely destroyed in a single daylight bombing run.59 Even so, the men fought on. Lieutenant
Colonel Harry Crosby, who served in the “Bloody 100th” as a navigator, recalls that only
fourteen percent of the 100th Heavy Bomb Group survived the war.60 Responding to a question
about whether it was just bad luck, or if the Luftwaffe had specifically targeted the planes of the
100th because of the distinctive markings on the tails of the planes, Crosby responded, “In
retrospect, we can see that the Luftwaffe had many techniques for hitting us…it was hitting from
the tail when the 100th was ‘Tail End Charlie’ on the August 17th double strike on Schweinfurt
and Regensburg…they [the Luftwaffe] switched before October 1st, and wouldn’t you know it,
the 100th, with me in one of the planes, was leading the whole Eighth Air Force on October 8th,
and the Luftwaffe just knocked out our whole front end.”61 While the men followed orders to
continue flying these missions, the inner belief that they could proceed against this kind of
mortality kept them going with the next mission after returning from deadly experiences like the
ones faced by Crosby.
Opposing the men’s confidence levels were the problems encountered by all combatants,
including fear of death, fear of failure, and the difficulty for the airmen to cope with the attack
57
Morgan interview.
Freeman, 66.
59
O’Neill, 121.
60
Youngblood, 23-26.
58
15
from an often unseen enemy.62 While the B-17 had its impact on the war effort, the war had its
own impact on the men fighting. The bomber crews may have experienced a higher rate of battle
fatigue due to factors including the physically stressful environment of the high-altitude flying,
the intense combat conditions, and the attachment of the crews to one another and their plane.
Combat stress, or battle fatigue, affected bomber crews with alarming regularity. Noted Brain
Chermol of the Academy of Health Sciences, “BF [Battle fatigue] rates were highest for bomber
crews followed by fighter pilots then reconnaissance and transport crews.”63 Other important
causes of BF among the airmen included “the noise or vibration within armored vehicles or
aircraft…the anticipation of heavy combat action (particularly among aviators)…and the
inability to take personal, aggressive action against an enemy threat.”64 It is important to note,
however, that the B-17 did inspire more confidence in its crews than the other heavy bomber, the
B-24, resulting in battle fatigue rates lower due to the crews’ belief in the equipment protecting
and supporting them.65
The issues relating to battle fatigue recovery and reintegration within other bomber crews
evidence the negative side to the strong relationships formed in bomber crews. The men’s
commitment to the plane and the unit kept them from integrating well within other units, as
shown by the challenges faced by personnel attempting to recover from battle fatigue.66 The
crew’s dependence on each other led to a deep attachment and confidence in each other’s
abilities and made it hard to place newly trained airmen into tightly-knit groups of combatseasoned men, or return rehabilitated men back into combat after treatment. It was a consistent
61
Ibid., 24.
Brian H. Chermol, “Wounds Without Scars: Treatment of Battle Fatigue in the U.S. Armed Forces in the
Second World War,” Military Affairs 49 (1985): 10, online via JSTOR, < www.jstor.org/ > (1 April 2004).
63
Ibid.
64
Ibid.
65
Ibid.
62
16
Allied policy to treat battle fatigue casualties as close to the front as possible with the intention
of returning them to combat as quickly as they could manage.67 The benefit of reintegrating crew
into other groups was the familiarity the men had with the equipment, which required no
additional training for them to resume their duties. In milder cases of battle fatigue, treatment
included temporary assignment to ground duty or administrative detail, medically restricting
flight status for observation, or seven to fourteen days at an Army Air Force rest home.68
One very serious issue affecting combat stress levels for the aviators was the addition of
civilians as suitable targets. Historian Conrad Crane asserts that this became the most effective
factor for the B-17 crews as they eventually accepted civilians as legitimate targets. Crane
reflected on the change of opinion towards German factory workers after the factories became
targets. He noted that once the factories began to take hits, the changed view of noncombatants
as belligerents in the war made the bombers’ crews more able to deal with the missions they
flew. “It was only a matter of time until the justification would be made, as in Japan, that
everyone supported the war in some way.”69
While primarily focused on eliminating Germany’s war production capabilities, it soon
came about that the people on the ground working the factories could be considered as integral to
the war effort, therefore valuable as targets. Altering personal opinion about killing meant the
crews had to dehumanize the enemy; calling them “Jerry” or “The Hun” lumped all Germans
into one group and replaced humans with animals or monsters.70 This dehumanization kept the
men dropping the bombs. If intelligence discovered legitimate human targets, issuing commands
to directly target civilians occurred. “…HQ seems to think there are a lot more Nazi big-dogs
66
Ibid.
Ibid.
68
Ibid.
69
Crane, 9.
67
17
there today. Regardless of the rules of civilized warfare we’re out to kill Germans with these
incendiary bombs! Our aiming point if it’s blind bombing—which it probably will be—is the
center of the city [Berlin]. We’re going after arms, legs, and elbows!”71 This change in strategy
led to severe emotional distress to men who had previously either avoided civilian targets or who
had not experienced a mission where it was made clear to the men that civilian casualties were
not only accepted, but also expected.72
Crew confidence levels affected entire squadrons at times. Incidences of so-called
“personnel failure” that forced a plane or entire squadron to abort the mission are recorded
cryptically in group records, but acknowledged as a problem faced by men under combat stress
for long periods of time.73 “Over time, the flight surgeons and psychiatrists charged with
evaluating the Eighth’s combat crews believed they had identified three phases of a crew’s
response to combat.”74 The first, occurring during the initial stage of combat flight lasting
through perhaps the fifth mission, was marked by two extremes of behavior from the men; either
behaving overly assured, or “mouse quiet.” The second stage lasted through approximately the
tenth mission, when fear of the unknowable was openly accepted and expressed. The third stage,
the home stretch, was when the stress of combat came to a head, “paradoxically … when the
medical profile indicated that the crew should all be ‘effective, careful fighting men, quiet and
cool on the ground and in the air’.”75 The relevance of these stages and that they did not
accurately represent how the men reacted in reality shows how each person behaved
unpredictably, yet still within a certain field of behaviors that could be monitored and treated.
70
Fletcher, 61.
Ibid., 67.
72
Chermol, 11.
73
O’Neill, 290.
74
Ibid., 284.
75
Ibid, 284.
71
18
Showing the positive aspect of the bond between the crews is the relatively low
percentage of bomber crewmembers that did succumb to combat stress when compared with
infantry divisions or other combat organizations.76 The belief in, and respect for, the crews held
for the B-17 not only kept them from experiencing battle fatigue at the same high levels as other
aviators, but it helped them stay confident through difficult missions as well. Self-confidence
seemed to play a key role, as Major General Louis Lyle recalled during a reunion. “Early in the
war, I can remember, a lot of people felt they weren’t going to make it. After briefings, when we
had a few minutes to wait, some guy would say, ‘You know, I just don’t believe I’m going to
make it through this war.’ It’s uncanny, but a lot of the guys who didn’t make it had predicted
they wouldn’t.”77
The commitment of each crew to the team played a significant part in survival
confidence, when the pilots served as morale leaders and supporters, and guided the rest of the
men towards a positive attitude. The bomber crews faced an exceedingly difficult task and knew
their chances of living through it were marginal. As the war progressed and the casualty statistics
increased, incidences of so-called “personnel failure” that forced a plane or entire squadron to
abort the mission appear cryptically in group records, but acknowledged as a problem faced by
men under combat stress for long periods of time.78
Even in the face of seemingly insurmountable injury to the plane, a crew would choose to
stay together, as the pilot, co-pilot and bombardier of the Bertie Lee did after sustaining massive
damages and losing its place in the formation.79 During a combat mission over Germany, the
pilot, Lieutenant Edward S. Michael, ordered his crew to bail out of the plane. Seven of the men
76
Chermol, 11.
Youngblood, 17.
78
O’Neill, 290.
77
19
obeyed, but two stayed aboard, refusing to leave him flying the crippled plane alone. Lt. Michael
managed to bring the plane back to England, enduring three hours of intense enemy fire.80
Michael received the Medal of Honor for his heroic actions, but regrets that his loyal crewmen
did not get the same recognition for their bravery.81
Odds were against the bombers in this war, with some units experiencing eighty percent
losses to the enemy’s bullets or bombs.82 On November 29, 1943, more than three hundred B17’s flew out in a mission against Germany that proved to be fatal for many men and planes, but
a story of amazing heroism is an example of the connection between the men of each crew.
Sergeant Joseph Sawicki, flying the position of tail gunner aboard the Dark Horse, saved the
lives of two crewmates at the expense of his own life. As related by Robert A. Hand, a 303rd
veteran, the story of the young sergeant Sawicki details the intense devotion the men had for one
another. The sergeant managed to save the lives of two other crewmen but could not save his
own.83 Crews recovered Sawicki’s body in the wreckage. This kind of dedication to one’s crew
shines clearly in each surviving man’s accounts of the war experience.
Upper turret gunner Harold Loch, of arguably the most famous B-17 to come out of this
war, the Memphis Belle, attributes its successful completion of twenty-five missions without
losing a single crewmember in part to the cohesive crew. “We had good teamwork on our plane.
I think that is the reason we were able to complete 25 missions without a casualty.”84 Notably,
79
J.L Galloway, The Miracle Mission (U.S. News and World Report, Vol. 109, Issue 10, September 1990),
accessed via EBSCOhost November 9, 2004.
80
Ibid.
81
Ibid.
82
Morgan interview.
83
O’Neill, 215.
84
Menno Dueksen, The Memphis Belle (Memphis: Castle Books, 1987), 206.
20
the Memphis Belle crew maintained their friendships through the years, never releasing the bonds
that formed during combat.85
The crew’s intense personal connection became dangerous when one or more men were
lost in battle. “Camaraderie among crews that had been together a long time made each member
vulnerable and was a burden of love that couldn’t flourish,”86 according to John Muirhead, a
combat pilot replacement transferred in from a B-29 crew to the B-17’s in 1944. Once the bond
had broken, and the team’s vulnerability exposed, the crew squarely faced its mortality. Units
such as Muirhead’s refused to assign crews as groups, instead treating each man as a replacement
part, and sending out crews with no connection to one another. While this made for an effective
fighting force, it eliminated compassion among the crews and created difficult situations, as “it
was considered inefficient and contributed to morale problems when men were killed or
wounded.”87 The connection that existed between men in the same crew did not extend beyond
to other crews; attachment was a dangerous luxury. Accordingly, Col. Morgan related to trainees
that it could mean having breakfast with ten men, and dinner with two.88 While the crew
attachments to one another were a benefit, the liability of that attachment meant dealing with
extremes of grief and loss when one or more men were lost, or entire crews.
By examining the close relationships that evolved between the men of the B-17 crews,
the psychological importance of nose art on each plane, and how they were affected by battle
fatigue at lower rates than other aviators, this paper has helped to show that the unique
relationships formed helped each person in his individual effort to survive the war. The B-17
Heavy Bomber, with its long range capability, high-altitude flying, payload capacity, and the
85
Morgan interview.
Muirhead, 6.
87
Ibid., 15.
88
Morgan interview.
86
21
engineering to be able to survive massive damage and still be flight-worthy, made a significant
difference to the war effort in Europe. The men who crewed these planes faced enormous
obstacles that challenged them mentally, emotionally, and physically. Through intensive training
both initially in the U.S. and upon arrival to their duty assignments, each man became part of a
coherent team. The effort made by these men and their commitment to the war’s objectives made
them key to the success of the Allied force against the enemy.89 The cohesive bond between
crewmen made a significant difference in each man’s abilities to perform his duties and survive
the war.
89
Ibid., xxiii.
22
Works Cited
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Adkins, Eugene. Personal narrative. Folder 2, Box 1, MS 1608, University of Tennessee
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Bryant, John. “A Bomber Pilot Remembers: Interview with Robert Felgar.” World War II
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Carlson, J.M. Telephone interview by author, March 14, 2004.
Chermol, Brian H. “Wounds Without Scars: Treatment of Battle Fatigue in the U.S. Armed
Forces in the Second World War.” Military Affairs 49, no. 1 (1985): 9-12. Online via
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hand the issues facing reintegration of battle fatigued troops back into active
duty, as well as treatment options.
Dueksen, Menno. The Memphis Belle. Memphis: Castle Books, 1987.
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Fletcher, Eugene. Fletcher’s Gang. Seattle: The University of Washington Press, 1988.
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members, diary entries, and correspondence.
“Flying Fuddy Duddy Comes To Town,” Asheville Citizen-Times, September 8, 2004
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Accessed via EBSCOhost, November 11, 2004.
Interview with artist who painted many B-17’s and B-29’s in WWII.
Galloway, J.L. “The ‘Miracle Mission’.” U.S. News and World Report, Vol. 109, no. 10
(1990). Online via EBSCOhost. < http://0web5.epnet.com.wncln.wncln.org/search.asp > (9 November 2004).
Interview text with men who accomplished successful mission, including the
awarding of the Medal of Honor to pilot.
Garner, Harry E. and Paul Chryst. “Time’s-A-Wastin’: A B-17 Crew’s Odyssey.” Aviation
History (January 2004): 34-64. Online via EBSCOhost. < http://0web5.epnet.com.wncln.wncln.org/search.asp > (9 November 2004)
Article written by two members of the B-17 crew that includes interviews
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Griffith, Charles. Interview with Col. Robert Morgan, February 6, 1988. University of
23
Tennessee Special Collections, Folder 31, Box 13, MS 1608.
Muirhead, John. Those Who Fall. New York: Random House, 1986.
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Individual narratives of WWII survivors.
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Interviews, personal narratives, journal entries and correspondence of men
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25
Appendix I
“Flying Fuddy Duddy Comes To Town,” Asheville Citizen-Times, September 8, 2004.
Frederick A. Johnsen, B-17 Flying Fortress: The Symbol of Second World War Air Power (New York: McGraw-Hill,
2000), 80. Photo credited to Jerry Cole.
26
Appendix II
Nose art on both planes indicates these are veterans of many missions. The plane in the top photograph is older, as it has
the green camouflage paint scheme; later in the war, the B-17 kept its aluminum shine. (Frederick A. Johnsen, B-17
Flying Fortress: The Symbol of Second World War Air Power, New York: McGraw-Hill, 2000, photos credited
Brown/USAFA.)
27
Appendix III
Nose art typical of the B-17 Heavy Bombers going into battle in the skies over Europe. The stylized female forms are
clearly visible, as are the symbols of bombs indicating completion of missions (Roger Freeman, The Mighty Eighth,
London: Jane’s, 1986).