The Naval Review

Transcription

The Naval Review

THE
NAVAL
REVIEW
TO PROMOTE TEIE ADVANCEMENT AND SPREADING WITHIN
THE SERVICE OF KNOWLEDGE RELEVANT TO THE HIGHER
ASPECTS OF THE NAVAL PROFESSION.
Founded in October, 1912, by the following officers, who
had formed a Naval Society:
Captain H. W. Richmond R.N.
Commander K. G. B. Dewar R.N.
Commander the Hon. R. A. E. Plunkett R.N.
Lieutenant R. M. Bellairs R.N.
Lieutenant T. Fisher R.N.
Lieutenant H. G . Thursfield R.N.
Captain E. W. Harding R.M.A.
Admiral W. H. Henderson (Honorary Editor)
It is only by the possession of a trained and
developed mind that the fullest capacity can,
as a rule, be obtained. There are, of course,
exceptional individuals with rare natural gifts
which make up for deficiencies. But such
gifts are indeed rare. We are coming more
and more to recognise that the best specialist
can be produced only after a long training
in general learning. The grasp of principle
which makes detail easy can only come
when ~nnatecapacity has been evoked and
moulded by high training.
Lord Kaldane
Issued quarterly for private circulation, in accordance
with the Regulations printed herein, which should
be carefully studied.
Copyright under Act of 1911
Vol. 64
No.4
OCTOBER 1976
Contents
EDITORIAL
ARTICLES:
...
...
TECHNOLOGY AND THE NAVAL ART
...
UP. UP. AND ALMOST AWAY
THE STRATEGY GAP
...
...
...
EDUCATIONAL PASTIMES
. . . . . .
...
THE ART OF COURSE COMPUTING
...
THE MEDIUM MARITIME POWER-111
...
LET THE FALKLAND ISLANDS STAY BRITISH
...
MOSTLY FROM THE BRIDGE-111
...
ECONOMIC MARITIME STRENGTH
WHATEVER HAPPENED TO AFO
CORRESPONDENCE
...
...
1/56?
...
...
...
THE RECEIVING END .
TO RE-SILVERING
H.M.S.
Ganges -
PHYSICAL
FITNESS
5.5-INCHGUNS -
R.N.A.S.
...
THE MIRROR
KATUKURANDA
TEST
-
DEEP
SOUNDINGS
REVISITED
INVERGORDON-'NO
-
...
FLEET
...
356
.
-
SIDE' EXERCISES
BETWEEN THE WARS
BOOK REVIEWS
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
365
NEW MEMBERS
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
384
H.M.S. ARK ROYAL
4 JULY 1976 - U.S. BICENTENNIAL CELEBRATIONS
Whilst the fourth naval review organised by the United States was taking place in New York, with twenty countries represented at the
Bicentennial Naval Review, (Royal Naval presence being the Guided Missile Destroyer, H.M.S. London, with the frigates H.M.S.
Bacchante and H.M.S. Lowestoft), H.M.S. Ark Royal, by special request, took part in Bicentennial celebrations at Fort Lauderdale,
Florida.
Before entering harbour Ark Royal parti~ipatedin Exercise OPERATION 200 - named specially for the occasion - designed to
exercise Anglo-American-Dutch units, including cross-deck operating w ~ t hthe U.S.N. carrier John F. Kennedy.
On entering harbour in Procedure ALPHA, with aircraft lined up on deck and sailors manning the edges of the Flight Deck, the Ark
Royal prepared a spectacular configuration for entry into Fort Lauderdale. Some 650 sailors formed up on the Flight Deck to spell out
the tribute 1776*1976. Sea Kings from the ship flew along the Florida coast, streaming American and British flags with the rear helicopter
carrying the Bicentennial Flag and the U.S. Flag of 1776.
Editorial
Let Britain invest in 'Droggie'
It is something to have achieved a
debate in the House of Commons on the
Hydrographic Service (4 August 1976),
but to read it in Hansard takes one's
mind back to Munich and the phrase 'a
small, far-off country, of which we know
little'. A member: 'I did not realise the
importance of this subject until I read
about it'. The Minister: 'It was an awareness of the new responsibilities and the
new challenges inherent in them that the
Hydrographer of the Navy was having to
meet that led to the recent renewal of
public and parliamentary interest in the
future of the hydrographic fleet. A mismatch between the role and resources
was suspected'. This awareness has been
engendered by the tireless, determined
and skilful advocacy of successive
Hydrographers of the Navy in recent
years. But to what effect? A Hydrographic Study Group was formed in July
1974, representing:
The Foreign and Commonwealth
Office
The Department of Trade
The Department of Energy
The General Council of British
Shipping
Trinity House
The National Ports Council
The British Ports Association
The Offshore Operators Association
The Oil Companies International
Marine Forum
Evidence was also taken from many
other interes'ted organisations, including
the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries
and Lloyds.
The task of the Study Group was to
assess the future civil hydrographic
requirement, the military requirement
being assessed as part of the Defence
Review.
A comprehensive and well-drafted
Report was submitted to the Under
Secretary of State for Defence (Royal
Navy) on 27 March 1975. 'After some
pressure', as Mr du Cann (Taunton)
commented in the Houx, 'it was
published in August 1975. Exactly a year
later the Government, apparently, has
made no decision on the recommendations of the Report.' 'We are looking',
said the Minister, 'for a solution which
will ensure that the needs of the Royal
Navy and the needs of the civil sector
are met equitably, effectively and efficiently within the resources available'.
'The resources available' . . . Aye, there's
the rub . . . Mr. Brotherton (Louth) was
blunt: 'At the moment, the way in which
money is being taken from the service
means that the Russians will become the
producers of the world's charts'.
As this is being written Britain's
seamen are about to go on strike. Of the
merits of their case let us not be judge;
but suddenly the great British public is
being told by the media chorus that
Britain's economy depends on the sea not just marginally, but critically.
Wonderful. Yet ask the public to accept
a modest sacrifice of public expenditure
upon non-productive services in order to
enable our ships and installations to use
the sea safely; to ensure that our ships
trading world-wide shall never risk the
blackmail of 'sorry, no charts'; to provide
practical aid to the developing maritime
nations whom we should like to have as
friends; to keep our matitime links with
the Commonwealth; above all, to reinforce the almost uniquely (in Britain's
sorry state) productive hydrographic
service? Oh, no! As the Minister said:
'I shall be quite frank wirh the House.
I shall not attempt to disguise the fact
that although expansion of the hydrographic fleet is desirable, in the present
economic circumstances it is likely to be
290
EDITORIAL
as much as the Government can do to
maintain a fleet of the present size'.
According to the Study Group, to
meet the estimated civil and military
requirements of highest priority only
would require:
4 Ocean Survey Ships (2 more than
at present planned)
8 Coastal Survey Vessels (4 more
than at present planned)
8 Inshore Survey Craft (3 more than
at present planned)
The cost of procuring and running this
expanded fleet over the seven years
1975-1982 (at 1974 prices) would be
roughly £90m., divided about 50:50 between ciVil and rniiitary tasks. Taunton
would cost about f3m. more, over the
period, Than it would at existing levels.
On present form the Oovernment will
spend, over the next seven years, about
2273,000m. of our money. In comparison
with this sum, surely f93m. or so is a
minuscle amount to pay, spread over the
same period, for a service so highly
productive, and supportive of vital
national interests, as the Hydrographic
Sewice. Whether the money should be
voted entirely through the Defence Vote,
or in part through some other, is irrelevant except in terms of political and
departmental in-fighting. What is at stake
is whether a wise, or a foolish, decision
is made regarding the apportionment of
a tiny part of the nation's total resources.
The Government is continually crying
out for more investment. Let it invest in
the Hydrographic Service.
The Fast Patrol Ship
The Iura class 'offshore patrol craft'
offers a cheap and quickly produced
response to a new and urgent requirement. But consideration must surely now
be given to the development of what will
be. in effect. a new type of warship. Its
primary function d l 1 be to provide the
sea-borne element of the joint sea-air
supervision and control force which most
modern navies (in conjunction with airforces) will have to maintain in order to
exercise the responsibilities of their
governments for the security and management of extended sea-areas. This type
of ship, for which the term 'fast patrol
ship' is proposed, will be a warship; but
it would not be designed to form part of
the carrier-groups, or cruiser-groups,
into which the general-purpose combat
force is organised. The next issue of
The Naval Review will include an a*le
on the concept and characteristics of the
fast patrol ship, which it is hoped will
generate a useful discussion.
Up, Up, and Almost Away
THEINTRODUCTIONOF V / m L INTO THE
ROYALNAVY
On 15 May 1975 the Secretary of State
for Defence announced the British
Government's intention to go ahead with
development of the Sea Harrier aircraft
(originally known as the Maritime
Harrier). At the same time it was confirmed that the Royal Navy will have a
total of three through deck cruisers,
officially designated Carriers Assault
Helicopter (CAH), in which the Sea
Harriers will be deployed.'
This statement was received with
varying degrees of satisfaction by the
British civilian population, the Royal
Navy, the other Services and Britain's
allies. More important, it marked the
intention of the Government to maintain
fixed wing carrier aircraft for the foreseeable future after Ark Royal ends her
useful life. The long and, to many,
unnecessary debate and delay was over:
but what debate, why the delay, why the
Sea Harrier and CAH?
The Background
To find the answers to these questions
we must go back to 1962. At that time
Britain had five fixed wing carriers,
Ark Royal, Eagle, Victorious, Hermes
and Centaur and :two commando askers,
Albion and Bulwark. The fixed wing
aircraft embarked in the carriers were
capable of the roles of reconnaissance,
conventional and nuclear strike, all
weather fighter and airborne early
warning. The carrier force was small
compared with that of the United States
Navy, which had eighteen fixed wing
carriers, but was nevertheless a force of
immense power. However, one carrier
had always to be kept east of Suez and
generally another was refitting, so the
three modem carriers Eagle. Victorious
and Hermes were seldom available to act
as a single force. Further, since 1957
when the Statement on Defence had
included the somewhat damping remark
that the role of naval forces in total war
was uncertain: the case for the carriers
had become more and more their use in
limited wars such as the Kuwait crisis
of 1961 and the East African mutinies.'
In the 1962 Statement on the Defence
Estimates the Government stated a naval
requirement for amphibious concentrations based on the two commando
carriers and laid down that the function
of the fixed wing Fleet Air Arm was to
carry out reconnaissance, tactical strike,
close support and air defence for such
operations. This policy was the Admiralty's choice of maritime strategy, had
the full support of the Fleet Air Arm and
had the effect of tying up the main
strength of the Royal Navy in a 'peacekeeping' or 'fire brigade' role east of
Suez.'
The Defence Review of ghat fiftieth
year of naval aviation mentioned that
the designs for a new carrier, CVA 01.
were in hand and estimated that it would
take nine years to put her into service,
so that in 1971 she would join the fleet
to replace V i c t o r i o ~ sConstmatkn
.~
was
authorised in mid-1963 at a projected
cost of sixty million pounds. Concurrently, following Government policy
laid down in 1962 for the develop
ment of aircraft suitable for use either
on land or from carriers, the Royal Navy
and Royal Air Force were working on
the Hawker P1154. This was t o be a
supersonic version of the Hawker P1127
'Derek Wood, Harrier - The Horizon
Widens, Znternational Defense Review
(December 1975): p. 849.
'Sir Arthur Hezlet, Aircraft and Sea Power
(New York: Stein and Day, 1970); p. 336.
'Zbid., p. 337.
'Ibid., p. 338.
Wugh Popham, Into Wind (London: Hamish
Hamilton, 1969); p. 242.
292
UP, UP, AND ALMOST AWAY
V/STOL aircraft, which had made its
first vertical landings and take offs a t
sea in A r k Royal o n 8 February 1963.'
The development of such a dual purpose
aircraft was seen as inevitable with the
ever increasing cost of research and
development. By 1964 however, the
project had run into trouble because of
the impossibility of designing a n aircraft
t o meet adequately the differing requirements of the two Services.' The navy
decided to buy the American Phantom
while the Royal Air Force ultimately
developed the subsonic Harrier from the
P1127. The P1154 project was cancelled
as a n economy measure in 1965.
I n October 1964 a new Government
was voted into office and it immediately
set about a review of defence. The
intended overall course of the review was
to match expenditure to what the
Government considered the economy
could stand, then to match policy to the
arms the money would buy. Accordingly
a series of studies was set in train,
designed t o halt the rising trend in
defence expenditure, then approaching
£2,000m. a year. One such study was
carried out by the Templer Committee
on (the rationalisa'tion of air power: it
advocated a pooling of resources for the
deployment of tactical air power by the
Royal Navy and Royal Air Force and
envisaged the retention of the carriers as
floating air bases complemerftary to and
not in competition with static air bases
ashore.'
The 1966 Decision
O n 22 February 1966 the Defence
Review was published and the Government's axe fell. A ceiling of £2,00Om.
was vat on the defence budaet and it was
the carriers that had to g o . - ~ o ralthough
the Defence Estimates stated that:
The aircraft carrier is the most
important element of the fleet for
offensive action against a n enemy a t
sea o r ashore and makes a large
contribution to the defence of our
seaborne forces. I t can also play a n
important part in operations where
local air superiority has to be
gained and maintained and offensive
support for ground forces is
required.'
the Defence Review, in contradictory
fashion, said:
Experience and study have shown
that only one type of operation
exists for which carriers and
carrier-borne aircraft would be
indispensable: that is the landing or
withdrawal of troops against sophisticated opposition outside the range
of land based air cover. I t is only
realistic to recognise that we, unaided by our allies, could not expect
to undertake operations of this
character in the 1970s - even if we
could afford a larger carrier force."
So how and where was air cover to be
provided in the 1970s? The Review went
on:
We also believe that the tasks for
which carrier-borne aircraft might
be required in the latter 1970s can
be more cheaply performed in other
ways. Our plan is that, in the future,
aircraft operating from land bases
should take over the strikereconnaissance and air defence roles
of the carrier on the reduced scale
which we envisage that our commitments will require after the mid1970s. Close anti-submarine protection of the naval force will be given
by helicopters operating from ships
other than carriers. Airborne early
warning will continue to be operated
from existing carriers and subsequently from land bases.
W. M. Yool, 'Review of Air Matters,' Army
Quarterly (April 1963): p. 23.
'W. M. Yool, 'Review of Air Matters,' Army
euarterly ( ~ ~1964)
f i: ~p. 18.
'Peter K. Kemp, History of the Royal Navy
(New York: G. P. Putnam & Sons, 1969):
P. 297'Popham: p. 250.
M.
'Review of Air Matters,,
Army Quarterly (July 1966): p. 135.
Strike capability against enemy ships
would be provided by a new surface to
surface missile which was to be developed but '. . . . we attach great importance
to continuing the existing carrier force
as far as possible into the 1970s."'
It was not expected that all the carriers
would go before 1975 and so, although
CVA 01 was cancelled and Centaur
placed in reserve, plans were announced
to modernise Ark Royal to take the
Phantom aircraft.
The Government's decision was a
severe blow to the Royal Navy and, in
the opinion of some writers, to Britain's
long term defence policy." One wrote:
'It would not be reasonable to minimise
the sacrifice this decision entails. Over
and above a real loss of independent
capability, Britain will surrender a way
in which she could have rendered
assistance to the United States. .
as
virtually the only other substantial
practitioner of the carrier art.'"
Why had matters turned out this way?
Mainly because the navy's strength had
been concentrated on a peacekeeping role
east of Suez and the case for the retention of carriers was wholly based on this
role, which the Government had decided
could be carried out from land bases.
The weakness of the Soviet fleet in 1945
and the overwhelming superiority of the
United States had resulted in command
of the sea being taken for granted and
the need for it obscured by limited war
operations in which it had not been
challenged. The evolution of a nuclearmissile-armed Soviet fleet in the 1960s
had made little impact,I4 although as
early as 1963, during the debate on the
Navy Estimates, particular attention had
been drawn to Russia's development of a
maritime strategy and to the need for
Britain to maintain her naval strength."
The development of a new aircraft
carrier at enormous cost, containing
nothing but the best, to carry out a
diminishing role, was seen by the
Government as a luxury the country
..
293
could no longer afford and so it went to
the wall. Attention was also drawn to
the Fleet Air Arm's rejection of a
V/STOL aircraft in 1964 - 'perhaps the
most egregious naval blunder of the last
decade""
amidst the controversy and
furore surrounding the Defence Review.
Aftermath - the late 60s
Meanwhile the timetable of contradictions continued. Almost immediately
after the fateful review protagonists of
the carrier were able to point to the
success of Eagle and then Ark Royal in
the blockade of Beira. The 1967 Defence
Statement declared:
Air power will be as indispensable
to the fleet of tomorrow as it is
today. . . . After the last carriers go
(in the mid-1970s) the Royal Navy,
like the Army, will rely on Royal
Air Force land-based aircraft to
support it.17
Victorious was paid off,two years earlier
than planned, in December 1967 following a fire which, although serious, far
from crippled the ship. In 1968:
The carrier force will be phased out
as soon as the withdrawals from
Malaysia, Singapore and the Persian
Gulf have been completed."
This was now scheduled to take place at
the end of 1971, an advance of four
years. Shortly before the 1968 review, on
economy grounds, the Royal Air Force
had lost the F 111 aircraft, which in 1966
was planned to have assumed the over-
"lbid.
12Brian B. Schofield, 'Maritime Affairs,
Army Q y r t e r l y (July 1%6): p. 130; Tom
Pocock, Strategy of the Seventies, Navy
Year Bwk (London: Navy League, 1%7),
p. 27.
13Popham,p. 251.
14Hazlet,p. 340.
lSKemp,p. 296.
"Brian B. Schofield, 'Maritime Affairs,'
17Popham,p. 250.
''Popham, p. 251.
294
seas strike and reconnaissance roles
hitherto carried out by the Fleet Air
Arm. The F Ill's replacements were to
be the navy's Buccaneers when the
carriers were phased out.
A supplementary Defence Statement in
July 1968 declared that the Services of
the 70s would be concentrated in defence
of Europe and NATO. Welcome as it
was to see a mission more in keeping
with the resources available, there was
wide support for the view of the editor of
Jane's Fighting Ships khat 'for minimum
peactime security and insurance for war
the Fleet Air Arm requires a fixed wing
element for at least the next decade,'"
because the Royal Air Force would not
be able to provide it in future outside the
North Atlantic and Mediterranean areas.
Ships of escort cruiser size, or small
carriers, and even converted container
ships carrying V/STOL aircraft, were
proposed as the solution. For between
the Defence Reviews of 1965-66 and 1968
certain events had either taken place or
were planned which tended to emphasise
the importance of the carrier and
demanded as much naval controlled air
power as could be assembled. Indonesian
confrontation with Malaysia in 1965, the
Beira patrol from 1966, the large carrier
based force covering the withdrawal from
Aden in 1968 and the projected withdrawal from the Far East in 1971 were
cited.w Sufficient perhaps that in
November 1968 The Times wuld pronounce 'Now is the time to admit the
folly of robbing the Navy of its air
power. '"
During the next year or so, Government Defence Statements maintained the
position of withdrawing the carriers
after 1971 but admitted that if the
V/STOL Harrier made sense operationally and financially it would be flown
from flat top ships. I t was not intended
to build special ships to operate the
Harrier." However design studies for
through deck cruisers to carry ASW
helicopters were being progressed and
the cruisers' construction would provide
for an optional capability of operating
V/STOL aircraft subject to cost.
Fresh look
I n political circles, Britain's world role
was still being argued furiously and in
1970 a change of Government brought
another immediate change in policy. A
fresh look was taken at the threat and
from that the forces required to meet it
in the context of world power groupings
were to be assessed. The carriers' rundown was suspended while their future
was reconsidered. In October 1970 a
reprieve was announced in the light of
the new Government's determination to
restore Britain's security to the high place
it must take in national priorities.
By this time only Ark Royal and Eagle
remained in commission as fixed wing
carriers, Hermes h~ving paid off for
conversion to the ASW role. Eagle was
planned to run on until 1972 and did so.
Ark Royal, having been recently refitted
to take the Phantom, was extended until
the late 1970s while the Royal Air Force
could gradually take over its assigned
tasks, consequent upon its slow build
up of aircraft after the Defence Reviews
of 1966 to 1969. The Government kept
open the option of V/STOL for the
through deck cruisers depending on the
aircraft's cost effectiveness." Ark Royal
however was not to be replaced.
In view of the requirement seen to
keep Ark Royal in commission until the
late 1970s (later refined to 1978) and the
growth which the Harrier was demonstrating in development, the gap between
19RaymOndV. B. Blackman, Jane's Fighting
Ships 1968-69 (New York: McGraw Hill,
P.vi.
wR. F. Pemberton, 'The Defence Forces in
Parliament,' The Royal Air Forces Quarterly
(Spring 1970): pp. 65-66.
"Popham, p. 248.
w. M. Y001, 'Aerospace AfEairs,' Army
Quarterly (July 1969): p. 153.
23'British~~f~~~~ policy,' ~
~(
~J
1971): p. 10.
~~
UP, UP, AND ALMOST A W A Y
Ark Royal's end and 1980, when the
first through deck cruiser was expected
to join the fleet, did not now make sense.
A further problem was that the Royal
Air Force was experiencing difficulties
in taking on a variety of maritime roles
with inadequate forces. Apart from
initial problems of control and operating
procedures, communications and unfamiliarity with the environment which
could be expected to be resolved, the
shortcomings of using land-based aircraft
to support naval forces had become
manifest. The resources were inadequate
to meet the requirements of both
Services and the additional flying time
between land bases and the area of naval
interest created long reaction times and
required air to air refuelling of tactical
aircraft as often as not, thus buying up
more resources. Without more and
different aircraft the Royal Air Force
was in an invidious position and the need
for land-based and ship-based aircraft to
complement each other's capabilities was
becoming very apparent. Further trials
of the Harrier were carried out on board
Ark Royal in 1971. They showed that
further development was desirable
before it should take on the envisaged
roles of reconnaissance/strike and air
defence but as expected there were no
deck operating problems." I t is noteworthy that representatives of the United
States, Indian and Argentine navies
attended the trials.
1972 witnessed the first reports of an
aircraft carrier being built at the Soviet
Black Sea shipyard at Nikolayev. I t was
assessed as being for the operation of
V/STOL aircraft and ASW helicopters.
This gave added weight to the statement
by the Under Secretary of State for
Defence for the Royal Navy on 10 April
1972, when he said:
The capability of the Royal Navy
today and our plans to maintain and
improve it in the years ahead must
be seen in the context of Western
security as a whole and the con-
295
tinuing threat to that security
throughout the world.%
This served also t o emphasise that the
size and shape of the navy should not
be influenced by the boundaries of
NATO. However, although design work
on the through deck cruisers continued,
Eagle was paid off on the grounds of
financial priorities and manpower costs,
insufficient aircraft for her and, possibly
the most important legacy of the previous
six years, insufficient manpower without
laying up other operational units of the
fleet.26
Through deck cruisers
The first through deck cruiser, to be
named Invincible, was ordered on
17 April 1973. A building time of five
years was quoted and this would have
filled the gap between 1978 and 1980
previously mentioned. Conceived as an
attempt to offset the disastrous decision
of the previous Government on CVA 01,
the end product is intended to carry nine
Sea King helicopters, primarily for ASW.
However some could possibly be required
for airborne early warning, as the fleet
will otherwise lose this capability when
Ark Royal goes, except when supported
from shore. Conversion of the Sea King
to this role would be expensive, even if
it is technically feasible. The question of
providing some air to surface, air to air
and reconnaissance capability utilising
V/STOL aircraft was avoided when the
order of Invincible was announced but
it was said to be still under active examinattion. That same month Kiev, (the first
Soviet aircraft carrier and now estimated
at 45,000 tons and some 900 feet in
length, was launched. The keel of a
Army Quarterly (July 1971) : p. 403.
"Peter Kirk, 'Britain's Navy in the Changing
Balance of Sea Power,' Jane's Fighting Ships
1972-73 (New York: McGraw Hill, 1972):
p. 685.
296
UP, UP, ASD ALMOST AWAY
sister ship was quickly laid in the same
dock.
1974 saw further delay in making a
decision on V/STOL due to the continuing Government requirement for
defence economies, while the United
States Marine Corps demonstrated its
capability in the sea control role with
Harriers on board U.S.S. Guam. However the end of the road had almost been
reached. Another change of Government
in 1974 led to a further Defence Review,
which pronounced that Britain's defence
efforts in the next decade were to be
confined in the maritime sphere to the
Eastern Atlantic, northern waters and
the Channel in support of NATO; the
home base itself, which with the development of North Sea oil and gas resources
had taken on new importance; and the
opportunity to exercise ships in the
Mediterranean and further afield from
time to time. NATO's situation in the
Norwegian Sea in particular had given
rise to serious concern, not only because
of dramatically increased Soviet armament but just as much because of the
weakness of the West - specifically the
decline of British sea power, since the
Norwegian Sea originally fell within the
British sphere of responsibility in the
NATO f r a m e ~ o r k . ~
Present posture
The Review, published in December
1974, referred to 'ships of higher quality'
without defining their role. In the NATO
EASTLANT area the naval mission was
defined rather by what should not be
allowed to happen:
Deterrence on the mainland of
Europe would not remain credible
without a parallel strategy in the
Eastern Atlantic and Channel
areas. . . .
Seaborne supply and reinforcement
routes . . . pass through these areas.
If the balance of maritime power
were allowed to shift so far in
favour of the Warsaw Pact that it
had an evident ability in a period
of tension to isolate Europe by sea,
the effect on Allied confidence and
political cohesion would be profound.=
The nub of what matters it seems is not
convoy protection across the Atlantic
nor protection of sea lines of communication but that Soviet maritime power
should be broadly matched. This is not
an unreasonable rationale for a substantial naval presence in the EASTLANT
area, recognising as it does the politicomilitary threat to 'confidence and
cohesion' but translating this into firm
and urgent ship and weapon requirements is an unenviable task for the
Royal Navy.'' The statement which
began this article, the announcement of
the Sea Harrier programme, was the
culmination of one part of that task after
the years of cuts and vacillation.
The Sea Harrier
What will the Sea Harrier/CAH do?
The programme covers twenty-four
single-seat Sea Harrier FRS (fighter/
reconnaissance/strike) Mark 1 aircraft,
one standard T Mark 4 trainer identical
to the model used by the Royal Air
Force and two Hunter T Mark 8M
two-seat radar trainers, at an estimated
cost of some &80m. pounds." Ckarance
for service use of the Sea Harrier is
expected in early 1979 and it is expected
that the type will be operational
in early 1980. The aircraft is similar
externally to the Mark 3 version in Royal
Air Force service but with a redesigned
nose and raised cockpit to allow space
for equipment and also give the pilot an
improved all-round lookout capability.
Internally the main differences are the
incorporation of a radar, essential for all
"Edward Wegener, The Soviet Naval Offensive (Annapolis, Maryland : Naval Institute
Press, 1975): p. 34.
"David Greenwood, 'Sights Lowered : The
United Kingdom's Defence Effort 19751984,'
The Royal Air Forces Quarterly
(Autumn 1975): p. 195.
*'Zbid.
aOWood,p. 850.
297
the maritime roles, and a doppler/ capped at best and powerless at worst.
inertial
navigation system. Other Of importance for future considerations,
differences will probably include the the Znvincible ckss will almost certaJnly
replacement of magnesium-based alloys still be in service in the year 2000.
in the engine by materials with better
resistance to corrosion. The weapon Future prospects
equipment has not been announced but
And the future? On the aircraft side,
in addition to missiles for the air to air the development of vectored thrust
role and guns, the task of defence against V/STOL based on the Harrier is conmissile armed fast patrol boats suggests tinuing in the United States: the United
a stand-off air to surface mi~sile.~'
States Marine Corps has a requirement
The first carrier to embark the Sea for over 300 aircraft of an improved
H a d e r is expected to be Hermes (unless type. In Britain, with a fair degree of
Ark Royal is still in commission!). The commonality between the Royal Navy
aircraft's role will be divided principally and Royal Air Force Harriers, there is
between strike and air defence. Using a good prospect of development conthe short take off along the length of the tinuing side by side both for our own use
deck it will have a useful combination of and for export.
As far as the carrier is concerned, it
weapon load and strike radius or alternatively loiter time for air defence. is arguable that possibly once again the
Operating limits from the deck are navy may be standing into danger with
expected to permit flying operations in the CAH on the cost and complexity of
foul weather by day and night. The its major warships. To revert to the
carrier will need to be turned into wind arguments of the 1960s, all that is really
for launches but not necessarily so for required is a mobile floating airfield large
landings, as these will always be vertical, enough to operate the aircraft designed
akin to helicopter landing techniques on for it. A recent proposal which merits
serious attention is the Vosper Thorneyboard.
croft 'Harrier Carrier'" conceived as a
cheap, frigate sized aircraft carrier to
The carrier assault helicopter
Invincible, ahe first major surface exploit the unique capabilities of the Sea
warship to be built for the Royal Navy Harrier, of which it could carry eight or
in thirty years, appears to be suffering alternatively eight Sea King helicopters.
from the disease of post-design altera- With a displacement of 6,000 tons, an
tions and 'improvements devised by the overall length of 450 feet, gas tufbines
numerous interested parties during her giving twenty-five to thirty knots and a
long period of gestation, with con- complement of 250 officers and ratings,
sequent delay in her completion date the design and probable cost would bring
until 1980 and increased costs above the it within the reach of many countries
1973 estimate of sixty-three million which cannot contemplate the acquisition
pounds." She will displace about 20,000 and operation of a conventional aircraft
tons, be 650 feet long overall and achieve
thirty knots under gas turbine propulsion. "Brian B. Schofield. 'Maritime Affairs'.
Her complement will be approximately Army Quarterly ( ~ u l y1975): p. 263.
S2Brian B. Schofield, 'Maritime Affairs',
1,200 officers and ratings, including air Army
Quarterly (July 1973): p. 408.
per~onnel.~
=John E. Moore, ed., Jane's Fighting Ships
All in all, the aircraftlship combina- 1974-75 (New York: Watts, 1974): p. 333.
tion promises to retain for lthe com- "Brian B. Schofield, 'The Vosper Thorney" 'Harrier
Carrier' Design', Army
mander at sea the independence and croft
Quarterly (October 1975): pp. 404-406;
flexibility without which he is handi- Wood; pp. 853-854.
298
UP, UP, A'JD ALMOST AWAY
carrier or even a CAH. Even in the reasoning of the Soviet Naval ComUnited States Navy, where interest in mander-in-Chief, Admiral Gorshkov:
Only our powerful Armed Forces
V/STOL is reawakening after more than
capable of blocking the unrestrained
a decade of the 'studies' which have a
expansionism displayed today all
familiar ring, a carrier design such as
over the world by imperialism can
this would fill the gap in the sea control
deter its aggressiveness.'"
force structure which calls for ships
smaller than the present aircraft carriers 'The Fleet Air Arm can look forward
and aircraft more capable than heli- confidently to the f~;ture."'
The Prime Minister
copter~.~'
7 October 1975.
So where does this leave us? The
OCSERVER
present situation makes it almost inevitable that Ark Royal will have yet another
extension of life until the Sea Harder is "Gerald G. O'~ourke, 'Why V/STOL?',
United States Naval Institute Proceedings
in service at sea, although the manpower (January
1976) : p. 42.
and materiel requirements to effect this 36sergei G. ~ ~ ~~~d~starhRising
k at ~Sea ~
will be taxing. Thereafter the future is (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institue Press,
relatively rosy, albeit in a maritime 1974): Pa 131.
J. Wilson, Opening of the Fleet
environment which can only be more "Harold
Air Arm Museum Extension, Royal Naval
hostile than it is today. For to use the Air Station, Yeovilton, 7 October 1975.
Technology and the Naval Art
'The history of wars and the military art
is a most important source of knowledge.
Its profound study contributes to broad
thought and a military outlook in officers
and generals; to their morale qualities
and character building; it assists them in
mastering contemporary theories of the
military art; it develops skills in the
creative approach to the solution of
practical tasks which have been brought
about by rapid developments in military
affairs; and it provides material for
exposing bourgeois falsifiers of history."
Although some might quibble with the
last of the points made here by General
Lototskii, most naval officers also seem
to believe that history, and especially
naval history, is 'relevant' to the present.
By this they do not simply mean that it
is interesting in its own right, or even
that it helps to explain how the present
state of affairs has been arrived at. They
mean that the naval past offers positive
guides that sensible men can recognise
and act upon in their preparations for
the future.
The recent series of articles by
Admiral Gorshkov is an excellent case
in point. Gorshkov used Soviet (and
Russian) history to confute '. . the
slanderous assertion (of Tsarists, imperialists and other such disreputables)
that the Russians are not a sea-going
nation, that the sea is alien to them, and
that ,they are not good at seafaring'. He
proceeded from this to point out more
specific 'lessons' of Russia's naval past.
'When a threat has arisen of enemy e-croac'hment on (the territory of Russia
from the south-west,' he observed, 'the
.
'Lt. Gen. S. Lototskii: 'The Classics of
Marxism-Leninism on the Development of
the Military Art', Strategic Review, Spring
1974.
Russian Navy has been moved into the
Med'iterranean Sea where it has successfully executed major strategic missions
in defending the country's borders from
aggression. In other words, our Navy
has shown the whole world that the
Mediterranean Sea is not anyone's
preserve or a closed lake and that
Russia is a Mediterranean power." One
could not hope for a more obvious not to say heavy handed - 'historical'
justification for the continued existence
of the Soviet Mediterranean Squadron.
More specifically still, Gorshkov used
the failure of the German Navy in the
Second World War as a stick with which
to belabour those Soviet authorities who
evidently believed (and perhaps still do)
that the Soviet Union could 'make do'
with a navy based on submarines and
missiles. This shows that all naval history
is considered relevant - even that of
foreign states and class enemies.
I t is fairly plain that Gorshkov is
using such arguments in his struggle
against the forces of darkness (i.e.
economisers, army leaders, and so forth)
in the Soviet Union mainly because the
system prevents him using the less subtle
methods of the West. Debarred from
making straightforward public statements
of the direction he would like the Soviet
Navy to take, he has had to unearth
precedents and parallels from the past
to outflank the conventions of the Soviet
System. Of course, marching back into
the past in search of evidence to support
preconceived ideas will not necessarily
produce 'good history' but the prevalence
of this practice does at least show that
the belief in the relevance of the past to
an understanding of the future is widespread - and not least amongst naval
officers.
Naval missions redefined
A central tenet of this belief is the
proposition that while the techniques of
naval war may change, its principles do
not. Hwxever, change has been so rapid
299
and so extensive over the past generation
or so that there now seems good reason
to doubt whether the fundamentals of
naval warfare will, this time, survive
revolutionary transformations in the
technical, social, economic and political
scene. If this is so, the lessons of the past
may become not only irrelevant but
also downright misleading. The durability
of traditional naval concepts in the face
of technical change is therefore a problem
which warrants some analysis.
A few years ago the U.S. Navy defined
its tasks in a clear, crisp manner which
offers a refreshing contrast to the turgid
and elliptical prose of Admiral Gorshkov.
The Americans consider themselves to
have four 'missions,' namely:
1 Strategic Deterrence
2 Sea Control
3 Projection of Power Ashore
4 Naval Presence
The stress placed on the first and last of
these in modern naval strategy is surely
quite novel, and is one which can be
attributed to Gorshkov as well. While
the third mission, on the other hand, is
quite familiar, the concepts of the
second, Sea Control (and Sea Denial),
are new, at least semantically.
'The term "Sea Control,"' wrote
Admiral Stansfield Turner, 'derives from
the traditional phrase "control of the
sea". This change in terminology may
seem minor, but it is a deliberate attempt
to acknowledge the limitations on ocean
control brought about by the development of the submarine and the airplane
. . . I t is no longer conceivable, except
in the most limited sense, to totally
control the seas for one's own use or to
totally deny them to an enemy. . . The
term "Sea Control" is intended to
connote more realistic control in limited
areas and for limited periods of time."
"dm. Sergei Gorshkov: 'Navies in War and
in Peace', Morskoi Sbornik: 1972-3.
'Adm. Stansfield Turner: Missions of the
U.S. Navy,' Naval War College Review.
March-April 1974.
300
competes for funds with other more
traditional naval tasks, but it tends to
undermine, or at least greatly change
their theoretical importance as well. The
nuclear dimension can be said to affect
the purposes of conventional naval power
in a host of different ways. If, for
example, nuclear war broke out at sea,
either as part of a general conflagration,
or as a conflict fought wholly or partly
at sea, then it seems obvious that
conventional naval power would largely
be an irrelevance. This is bound to affect
spending priorities, especially as nuclear
power can hardly ever be said to be an
'irrelevance' even if it is not in fact used.
The objection could be made that
sustained conflict at sea need not
The impact of nuclear weapons
The vulnerabilty of the lessons of the necessarily escalate and that the nuclear
past to technological innovation is potential of one adversary would offset
probably best demonstrated by looking that of the other in a way which left
at some more specific instances, starting opposing fleets free to manoeuvre in the
with the possible naval implications of way they always have. Commonsense
the arrival of nuclear weapons. The suggests, however, that such a contest
most obvious consequence of this would be fought with so many military
particular development is that it has and political constraints as to make it
made full-scale war an even less rational quite unlike anything preceding it.
way of resolving disputes than it was Reportedly, one of the main points of the
before. The attention of statesmen has bitter 1962 controversy between Secretary
therefore switched away from the use of of Defence McNamara and his Chief of
force to the threat of its use as an Naval Operations was precisely over the
whether
the U.S.
Navy's
instrument of political coercion and this point
has apparently meant a relative rise in experience of past blockades was relevant
the importance of the deterrent role of to the quarantine currently being
naval power - and in its ability to prepared against Cuba. The C.N.O.
thought it was; his political chief
display or apply limited force.
In the past, naval power has been thought, doubtless correctly, that it
brought to bear directly on the enemy's wasn't. Again, it is especially difficult to
will and capacity to fight, especially by imagine a sustained campaign of any
total see blockades such as those imposed kind takling place between the superon Germany in the First World War and powers which could bear more than the
Japan in the Second. But any analogy most superficial resemblance to the
between this and the use, or threatened campaigns, for example, of the Second
use, of sea-based strategic nuclear World War. So, even if the idea of a
weapons would surely be paper thin. limited non-nuclear naval war is
The 'Strategic Deterrence' mission is in accepted, the nuclear dimension would
fact so novel that the naval past has little prdbably mean that conventional power
of significance and relevance to offer for could not be exercised in the traditional
comparison.
way, and not least because the partici'Strategic
Deterrence'
obviously pant's fear of nuclear escalation would
Although one may well be sceptical
about the implication that navies have
ever been able 'to totally control the
seas for one's own use,' the admiral's
proposition is significant in that it
apparently vindicates Fisher in his
prophesy of 'the immense impending
revolution which the submarines will
effect as offensive weapons of war.'
Further, the way in which one of the
most basic concepts of traditional naval
strategy has thus been altered by the
advent of the submarine clearly
demonstrates the deterministic effect of
technical change and, therefore, the
transience of naval strategic concepts.
301
no doubt be the main thing to keep the West's oil supplies through such devices
as the 'accidental' mining of the Straits
conflict limited.
I t might be worth trying to draw the of Hormuz. I t would seem, though, that
strands of this part of the argument in this, as indeed in all other scenarios
together by looking again at the much of an oil blockade involving nuclear
discussed issue of the vulnerability to powers, it is hard to think that the
Soviet pressure of the West's sea-borne responses of previous wars would be at
oil supplies. If such an attack was all appropriate.
The argument so far has been largely
intended directly to cripple the military
power of the West by cutting off one of concerned with Europe and the superits most important requirements, it could powers; even if 'true, it would still
be conducted either as an isolated allow traditional naval activity to take
campaign or as part of a concerted attack place between major and minor powers,
on the whole of the West's military or indeed between the minor powers
position. If the latter, existing oil stocks themselves. The memory of a hitherto
in the West would surely mean that such mothballed U.S. battleship turning up
a campaign could not hope to achieve for coastal bombardment duty off
decisive superiority in the time likely to Vietnam confirms that there is truth in
be available. A protracted campaign in this assertion but, all the same, the Pueblo
Europe is unlikely if only because the incident and the Cod War demonstrate
Soviet Army is unprepared for it, either that it is often very difficult for major
tactically or logistically. This means that powers to use their naval forces in the
the issue is likely to be decided, one way traditional way. With one or two
or another, long before the West runs exceptions, such as the recent Turkish
out of oil.
invasion of Cyprus, few of the countless
1 f F o n the other hand, the Soviet 'local' wars which lesser powers have
Union deliberately restricted herself to fought since 1945 have had much of
the imposi'tion of an oil blockade and decisive traditional naval component and
nothing else, she would doubtless have this suggests that the point, though valid,
to accept a very real possibility of general can easily be made too much of.
naval war with all the risks of escalation
that this entailed. The Western riposte The impact of non-nuclear technology
The development of naval technology
to such a blockade, for example, might
well be the occasional heavily escorted has produced other results which,
convoy of the kind sent to Malta in although less apparently dramatic than
the last war. In this case, however, the advent of nuclear weapons, could still
the objective would probably be less to imply revolutionary changes in naval
get the oil through than to oblige the warfare and the irrelevance of past
Soviet Union to 'up the ante' if she concepts. Many of the characteristics of
wanted to stop it. The West's tactics, in traditional naval warfare, for example,
other words, would be primarily dictated derived from the participants' habitual
by the desire to demonstrate that an oil ignorance of each other's position. In
blockade could not be considered a the Battle of the Atlantic, many of the
discrete event. Such tactics would, in U-boats' activities were devoted to the
consequence, be different from those in task of actually finding something to
sink; this is surely not likely to be the
past 'blockade-busting' operations.
Finally, a good deal of attention is case in the future. Again, how different
paid to the rather less apocalyptic possi- would the First World War 'have been
bility of the Soviet Union seeking only had a surveillance satellite kept the
political advantage by harassing the Admiralty informed of every move made
302
by the High Seas Fleet!
The impact of the increase in the
destructive power of many naval weapons
is likely to have an even greater effect
on the tactics and strategy of naval
warfare. In the past, firepower was
concentrated so that quantity would
make up for individual weaknesses in
quality. The naval expression of this
universal law was the 'baittle-fleet,' a
constitutional dislike of dividing or
dispersing H.M. ships and a tendency to
shoot or ruin admirals who 'broke the
line.'
Nowadays, even quite small ships can
apparently pack a big enough punch to
raise doubts as to the wisdom of
concentrating ships or even going on
with surface ships at all. As Mr.
Khruschev said: 'This weapon to a great
extent has become outmoded for conducting wars in modern conditions
because all surface means are now
vulnerable from the air as well as the
shore, and they can be destroyed by an
enemy from a far distance." Such
feelings may have contributed to the
supposed stress on the 'first salvo'
betrayed by the design of Soviet warships.
The claimed vulnerability of large ships
was apparently confirmed by the subsequent sinking of the Eilath in 1967
which led many to propose that surface
navies of the future would primarily
consist of ships whose protection would
lie in their speed and dispersed deployment.
In 1970. however, the C.N.O. said: 'I
certainly don't accept the allegations that
the carrier is vulnerable to the degree
that has often been mentioned. . . I don't
believe surface ships are vulnerable. I
believe in the next war we will perhaps
suffer greater losses than we have in the
past, but I am confident that we can
stay out there and o ~ e r a t e . ' ~The
counter-proposition is that the biggest
weapons platform provides facilities for
the most sophisticated and effective
defence systems and therefore the safest
(surface) ship is the biggest.
This raises obvious echoes of the
interwar dispute over the vulnerability
of the battleship to submarine and aircraft. I n this dispute, reformers usually
reacted to claims that battleships could
cope with the new threats in one of two
ways. Some rejected it as a matter of
scientific fact and argued, on the
contrary, that since the defence could
not keep pace with developments in
aerial and submarine offence, the battleship was doomed however big and
sophisticated it became. Nowadays, they
would doubtless say: 'Since we can't
reliably shoot down their missiles, let's
multiply their targets by having more,
smaller, ships!'
Other reformers stressed that even
if the surface ship could be made reasonably secure against air attack, then the
defensive configuration of the vessel
would rob it of much of its capacity to
do harm to the enemy. As one interwar
commentator noted: 'The inevitable
result is the production of a ship too
costly and representing too large a proportion of total fighting power to be
lightly risked. She is stultified by virtue
of her superlative qualities, and spends
most of her war career in a boom-closed
anchorage.'Wow there is doubt whether
any country will be able to afford enough
of the really good ships to make the
whole thing worthwhile. 'If the pincers
of technological development and
financial stringency were to invest the
Navy's wartime role with the character
of a forlorn hope,' noted James Cable,
'it might be desirable to give priority to
those lesser dangers which could actually
be countered. . . Might the superpowers
be forced to maintain two navies, one a
mere floating adjunct to the deterrent,
'pravda, 9 juiy 1964.
'Adm. Thomas H. Moorer, quoted in G. H.
@ester (Ed): Seapower in the 1970s9
and
Record, 5 Aug. 1925.
9~$2~:1W2z1~~&~~
the other equipped for more humdrum
(coastal and diplomatic), and we may
hope, more likely tasks?
it seems
worth asKing whether, in the 1970s and
1980s, the size and shape of the Navy
ought still to be determined by the needs
of war."
...
Ocean technology
In the past few years, technology has
rendered the full exploitation of the
resources of the sea both more necessary
and more feasible, and most authorities
accept that a likely consequence of this
will be a territorial sea of twelve miles
and an Exclusive Economic Zone of
200. In all probability this will result in
a considerable enlargement of what has
hitherto been regarded as one of the
Navy's more minor tasks.
The increased importance of this task
seems likely to affect the theory of naval
warfare if nothing else. Mahan thought
that man's interest in the sea sprang
from its role in the carriage of trade.
Hence the capacity to move freely on the
sea and inhibit a similar capacity in
others is central to his theory of sea
supremacy. The Times summed it up
well in 1969: 'One misconception is that
the sea is an area to be defended against
intrusions. Sea power is not about
possession of the sea but about its
freedom. Basically sea power means
freedom to move across any sea, and the
ability to guarantee that freedom against
interference.'
The need to protect fixed installations
like oil rigs means that parts of the sea
are now an 'area to be defended.' I t is
very hard to see what the practical results
of this theoretical change might be but
I suspect that, taken with other things,
it could well require a profound modification of the kind of 'seek and destroy'
doctrine that underlies such approved
views as: 'The Water Gates of England
are the Ports of the Enemy' (Hawkins,
1587). Judging by the reluctance of the
Admiralty partially to suspend such a
303
creed in favour of convoy, they might
find it difficult indeed to obey the injunction to 'look (instead) to your
moaite.'
This new task could actually make it
more difficult for navies to carry out
their traditional ones. I t might, for
instance, be thought to reqdre a reallocation of resources, whereas 'naval
money . . ought to be spent on ships,
submarines and aircraft together with
the weapons appropriate to meeting the
higher level war tasks.''
More fundamentally, however, the
progressive enclosure of the oceans has
been opposed by both the superpowers
even though they would be the chief
beneficiaries of a wide EEZ and territorial sea. I n the U.S., in fact, a most
interesting struggle took place between
1968 and 1974 where this dilemma was
tackled by the Defence Department
(representing the 'strategic interest') and
the Petroleum Industry (representing
the 'coastal interest'). I n the Soviet
Union, too, the navy argued: 'A highly
alarming symptom is the practice of the
extension by certain states of the limits
of their territorial sea up to 200 miles,
which is nothing more than an attempt
to seize great expanses of the ocean.''
The naval fear, and it seems a most
justifiable one, is that wide EEZs and the
kind of 'creeping jurisdiction' likely to
follow their institution would greatly
reduce the area where naval powers
could deploy their forces. Could flagshowing operations and the like indeed
degenerate into mere 'folkloristic manifestation(~)to be performed only in the
territorial waters of already friendly and
aligned states.'?"
.
'James Cable: Gunboat Diplomacy, Chatto
and Windus, 1970, pp. 76-7, 166.
'D. P. R. Roessler (P. E.-MOD), quoted in:
"The Securitv of North Sea Oil and the
Overall Soviei Threat," June 1975, published
by British Atlantic Committee, p. 56.
'Gorshkov, op. cit.
"Elizabeth Young, Survival, Nov./Dec.
1974.
304
TECEINOLOGY AND THE NAVAL ART
Even a twelve mile territorial sea
could close over a hundred important
straits at least in the sense that the
interpretation of 'innocent passage' could
rest in the hands of the governments of
littoral states. This could gravely
compromise the ability of naval forces
to get to crisis areas quickly. European
refusals to grant over-flying rights to the
U.S. in her attempt to re-supply Israel
during the Yom Kippur War illustrate
the extent to which the naval and foreign
policy of even the superpowers could be
at the mercy of third parties.
The point can be illustrated by
reference to the passage of an American
task force centred on Enterprise through
the Straits of Malacca en route for the
Indo-Pakistan War of 1971. At this time
the U.S.A. refused to concede that
'innocent
passage'
required
prior
notification. In 1973, for example,
John R. Stevenson (Chief U.S. delegate
to the U.N. Seabed Committee) stated:
'We would not contemplate notifying,
because if such a requirement is introduced, there is of course ultimately a
risk of tfiis leading to control of transit
through straits."' Since an Indonesian
spokesman subsequently reaffirmed the
rights of littoral states to control such
passages but said that prior notification
had, in fact, been received, the imbroglio
was evidently resolved to the mutual
satisfaction of both friendly states. Had
Indonesia still been ruled by the Sukarno
regime, another complication - to put
it mildly - would have been introduced
into the U.S.A.'s problem of how to
influence events on the Indian subcontinent.
More ominously, perhaps, innocent
passage is sometimes held to require
submarines (including SSBNs) to surface
when passing through straits. The U.S.
may, however, take at least some consolation from the fact that in this, as
indeed in many other aspects of her
capacity to operate her naval forces at
will, the Soviet Unton is much worse off!
Conclusion
To sum up, the whole argument seems
to suggest that an increasingly large
proportion of naval activities will,
perforce, take place within coastal
waters, however defined. The increasing
range of SSBNs such as the Deltas and
Tridents, and in fact many of the
advances in weapons technology noted
earlier could point in the same direction.
If this supposition is correct, then the
relevance of past naval experience would
certainly be open to considerable doubt
- except, possibly, in that it would show
how different everything is now.
GEOFFREYTILL
"uoted in A. L. Hollick and R. E. Osgood:
New Era of Ocean Politics, John Hopkins
U.P., 1974, p. 103.
The Strategy Gap
I t would be easy to despair of the ability
of Western Europe to survive the next
few years, at any rate with its current
structures and values intact. The stark
facts of military imbalance and military
budgets and their constant and discernible
shifts in favour of the Soviets, the dashing of any hopes which Helsinki might
- however optimistically - have raised,
the widespread confusion of thinking
over the meaning of dgtente, set in clear
relief by the events in Angola; all,
against a backdrop of doom and foreboding sketched in the gloomy colours
of Solzhenitsyn's vision, tend to support
a view of irreversible and accelerating
THE STRATEGY GAP
decline towards a future of unrelieved,
inevitable disaster. Opposing such a
progress, the ritual and rhetorical
fulminations of western politicians, of
no matter what shades of opinion, are
plainly no proof.
In the same way, it would be easy to
insist that the only contribution which
the western European military establishment can make to any possible solution
would be to withdraw into 'fortress
NATO', and prepare for a long siege.
What the French have come to call the
'dkmobilisation des esprits' works In
more senses than one. Many apparently
respectable military men think in just
such a way. Indeed it can be argued that
in 'defence' terms alone it is right. But
the uncomfortable question left hanging
menacingly over the ostrich rump of
such military thinking is 'whatever became of deterrence?' Realistic, necessary,
even reassuring and convenient, as it
may appear to focus the entire output
of western military efforts on the static
defence of a shrinking area of terrestial
and maritime real estate in and off
western Europe, does it really make
sense to abandon everywhere else all
ideas of deterring, let alone resisting, the
thrust of Soviet power? To many, and
not least to the Soviets, it must seem that
this is just what the west is in fact doing.
'East is East, and West is West', and
between them yawns a widening 'strategy
gap' which reveals itself as much in
politico-military thinking - and therefore in the related field of military
capabilities - as in all the other
divergencies of aim, endeavour, or credo
which separate the 'free world' from that
of the Soviets and their allies. On the
one hand is a monolithic coherence, an
integrated thrust embodying the political
considerations with the military, economic, and cultural; an identity between
the global purposes of government and
the activity of every component in its
support, energised and stiffened by a
generous admixture of social mobilisation
305
wholly foreign to western ideas. On the
other hand, the fragmentary nature of
western efforts -if that is the right word
- presents a sharp contrast. However
strong the arguments which reinforce
western ideas of free association and
democratic choice of destiny - and not
only are they very powerful but there is
mercifully no foreseeable likelihood of
the'ir suppression jus't so long as the West
remains free - the resultant limitations
in terms of opposition to the Soviet thrust
are very severe indeed.
Only the precarious balance of nuclear
capabilities at present bridges this
strategy gap. Beneath the umbrella of
these capabilities unified Soviet pressures
encounter western responses, military,
political, economic or others, ebbing and
flowing in uneasy compromise, rarely
cobbled together in more than one sense,
and never - so far - in a comparable
whole. That such a state of affairs
operates massively in favour of the
Soviets has been convincingly demonstrated everywhere from Vietnam to
Angola. I1t is, at present, hard to see
where it could not be demonstrated. But
whereas the problem, in the total scale
of world politics, must remain the
province of the statesman, the degree to
which even the western military response
lacks not only coherence within itself but
also a recognisable and purposeful place
in relation t o other western attitudes,
must cause concern t o the military
strategist whose task it is to advise
governments. So far as Britain, in
particular, is concerned there exists
plenty of evidence, in the recent history
of defence policies, of an almost eager
readiness t o make distinctions between
what is seen as militarily 'essential' and
the politically desirable, then to advance
solely budgetary arguments for discarding
the latter. Britain of course is not alone
in this dilemma. But the blinkered view
which is all that such distinctions allow
is demonstrably and increasingly leading
western military leaders up the cul-de-sac
306
THE SrRATECY CAP
thing very constructive, the social dimension in the construction of national
policies, drawing clear distinctions between the Soviets and the west. But the
British 1976 Defence White Paper, apart
from a brief reference to the fact that
'the social and economic problems now
facing the west could, if not satisfactorily
resolved, have consequences for the
external security of Western countries'.
Whither strategy?
In terms of the utilisation and can be searched in vain for any reflection
deployment of armed force, it is true to of the idea that the acknowledged and
say that except in the area of nuclear increasing menace of Soviet capabilities
activities the field of military strategy has should, let alone could, be countered by
been effectively abandoned by the west. anything but closer concentration on the
This phenomenon receives more recogni- military needs of NATO. The strategic
tion outside Britain than within. The significance of such 'non-NATO commit'Posture Statement for Fiscal Year 1977', ments' as Britain still supports, even in
prepared for the United States Congress connection with CENTO, is not once
by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of mentioned. Britain - indeed the west in
Staff, refers to the erosion of what was general, with the possible exception of
for years a common western perception the United States and France - has no
of the threat, and returns repeatedly military strategy with which to address,
throughout its wide-ranging survey to beyond the arbitrary geographical consuch concepts as the continuing strategic fines of NATO, the thrust of unified
importance of protecting lines of com- Soviet policies. In the light of the
munication all over the world. Recent consistent contraction of British defence
French writings, including those of efforts in the last two decades, the
General MCry, the Chief of Defence, progress of the 'long recessional', one
emphasise the need not only for the can but wonder what value the Chiefs of
developed military strategy of a nation to Staff now attach to their collective
be part of, and integrated with, the responsibility, laid down in 1963, for
general, but for a flexibility in the former professional advice to the government on
which will match the demands of the strategy.
latter in an age of widening, not contractFor the argument, blandly stated in
ing, international dependencies. Indeed, the 1976 White Paper, that NATO's
Giscardian France has coined a new word 'defensive' strategy, and the forces at its
- {the 'mondialisation' of prablems - command, 'protect members of the
by which is meant the tendency of any Alliance from attempts at coercion . . . .
event of importance to have repercus- and from other forms of direct and
sions elsewhere in the world, not in indirect political pressure deriving from
geographical terms alone but perhaps in military power' simply does not carry
different fields of human activilty. In a set conviction. On a simplistic level, the
of national policies coherently developed limited application area of the strategy
in such circumstances, the concept of means that it can be continuously,
'defence' becomes 'secufity'; and the perhaps indefinitely, circumvented. But
latest West German 'defence' White on another plane, it cannot be denied
Paper which (is enltitled 'The Security of that members of the Alliance suffer, to
the Federal Republic . . . .', explores at the extent that the political, economic
some length, but without deriving any- or other options which are or might be
of concentration on the single strategic
option of defence through NATO. Such
an option in Soviet eyes, and in the light
of all the other options which they
sedulously cultivate, and which they are
manifestly more and more capable of
exploiting, must appear to be no more
than tactical.
T I ~ ESTRATEGY GAP
307
open to them are cuftailed or foreclosed, perhaps for that reason insufficiently
by any exercise of Soviet military power studied. Yet imperfect understanding of
in any way inimical to their national the workings of deterrence could prove
interests. The distinction between - and, some would argue, is now
'direct' and 'indirect' can be ignored; the proving - disastrous for the west.
latter, the more likely to be employed by Fundamental to the concept is the idea
the Soviets, is no less dangerous than the of credibility, which encompasses not
former. How then can NATO's 'defen- only considerations of political will but
sive strategy' be said to have protected of military capability: and in this conits members from Soviet pressures in nection a central issue is how long it will
Angola, where they took a new and remain right (let alone practicable) to
significant form by demonstrating a sacrifice quantity - particularly outside
willingness to use military air power over the NATO area - in pursuit of the
long distances? How will it help if such costly and spurious up-market quality of
usages develop elsewhere, for example 'warmaking capabilities' deployed on the
in Tonga? The essence of strategy, it has Central Front. Assuming (and, equally,
been said, is 'the battle for freedom of without assuming) further U.S.-Soviet
action'. To the extent that the Soviets agreement on strategic arms limitation,
are acquiring more of it, and the NATO how are conventional capabilities likely
nations have evidently chosen not only to develop: and to what extent will such
not to contest them in doing so but weapons as precision-guided missiles,
actually to confine the limits of their with or without 'cruise' ranges, have the
own, it !is hard to see how the benefits effect of
decoupling conventional
claimed for the 'defensive Strategy' can deterrence from conventional defence?
be realised.
Or affect, by their adoption amongst
second-tier powers in or beyond Europe,
the long-standing arguments about the
A view from Europe
It is therefore of special importance stabilizing or destabilizing influences of
that two clear warnings have in recent super-power armouries? With what
months been uttered by General effects? And if deterrence should fail,
Alexander Haig, NATO's Supreme Allied do the strategic imperatives of the
Commander in Europe and a man who western interest demand the winning of
might be expected to personify the a war, or the stopping of it? Are the
concept of a NATO stratkgy rigorously weapons and dispositions required in
focussed on the real estate of the Alliance each case the same? SACEUR's first
- an archetypal, one might say, 'Central- warning raises enough questions to be
Frontiersman'. In the first of these, he going on with, without pursuing any
told an American correspondent of further and more basic considerations of
Newsweek thaft members of NATO the utility of military power to such
'should not be totally preoccupied with conclusions as, for example, that it
the purely warmaking capabilities of the might be better to spend the money on
alliance on the Central Front'. This buying oil-wells. The available evidence
statement, with its hint of misdirected of Brittsh defence thinking, whether
energies and its implied emphasis on the expressed in recent White Papers as
need to apply effort to deterrent commentary or in terms of procurement
capability, and on a wide canvas, begs a decisions, in statements to the Select
number of questions of varied strategic Committee on Expenditure or elsewhere,
significance. They stem from the issue of bears no indication that such questions
whnt is meant by deterrence, a concept are being addressed in Whitehall.
General Haig's second warning was
much subtler than that of defence, and
308
THE STRATEGY GAP
spelt out bath in the Newsweek interview
and shortly afterwards in his discussion
with Mr. Robin Day on BBC Television.
In the former, he stated his view that the
greatest danger to the Wedt 'comes from
the perception and reality of global
Soviet power and the West's lack of
ability or will to manage it': and to
Robin Day he stressed the problem of
the management of global Soviet power.
This is a very telling turn of phrase.
Because the growing weight and compass
of maritime influence is its most obvious
(if not, as we have seen, the only)
manifestation, the lack of an ability to
'manage' global Soviet power points to
the want of a maritime strategy which is
relevant to it. General Haig's remark
begs therefore not only the question of
what may be required to 'manage'
Soviet power, but that of how it is to be
made effective globally.
Global Soviet power can evidently not
be 'managed' by confronting its instruments, wherever they appear, in sufficient
strength to oppose them. Arguably, it
can be assumed to be 'managed' if it
does not have 'unmanageable' political,
military or other effects: if, in fact, it can
be lived with in reasonable assurance
that national interests are secure.
Adverse effects will only be manageable
if those concerned can be made aware
of what is going on before it is too late
to react appropriately: diplomatic protest,
concerted international action in the
UN or elsewhere, military reinforcement,
or whatever. (The Soviets would have an
answer, even if the West is caught short
for lack of foresight). Hence the need for
the instruments to be watched, surveyed,
reported; for their activities to be
monitored and analysed. In practice, this
is what deterrence is. If deterrence fails,
aggression must be countered or not, if
that is the choice: but let there be a
choice. Once again, the questions of how
to develop and operate a deterrent
strategy, as well as how to structure
forces for deterrence, clamour for a
share of the attention which has for so
long been concentrated not on managing
global Soviet power but on the capability
to meet it in battle. And it must be
recognised that there is no effective
alternative to a global deterrent strategy.
The idea of a 'NATO' maritime strategy,
focussed on perceptions of tension or
hostilities limited (as if you could limit a
tension) to the geographical boundaries
of the Alliance's area of commitment,
makes only limited sense in the context
of the Soviet threat of aggression towards
NATO. A strategy so defined makes no
sense at all in the context of the actual,
constant, and continual facts of global
Soviet power, exercised as it is in a set of
international circumstances which wholly
denies what a French writer has called
the fictions juridiques of ':war' and
'peace', and in a manner which by
purposeful circumvention successfully
avoids threatening NATO in any way
likely to prompt collective activation of
its responses. The military capabilities
of the Alliance, contracting in the face
of budgetary pressures under leaders,
both political and military, who in seeking to defend their various arguments
readily resort to the philosophies of
earlier wars (a daunting parallel with the
1930s) present no obstacle to a wide range
of useful Soviet designs for the furtherance of their objectives. I t is presumably
for this reason that General Haig speaks
not of NATO, but of Yhe West': and it is
abundantly clear that the nations of 'the
West' have no answer, either collective
or individual, to his requirement.
There exist of course serious political
objections to any formal extension of
NATO's physical area of commitment:
but for western military strategists to use
them as an excuse for not thinking in
the same global terms as those of the
Soviets is not only intellectually and
professional craven. I t is a positive
encouragement to Soviet perceptions of
what little they have to fear from the
fragmented nature of the West's responses
THE STRATEGY GAP
to any initiative they chose in pursuit of
their purposes. Is it really acceptable to
the western nations that such purposes
should be allowed to go forward unchecked? General Haig is clearly of the
opinion that it is not, and surely he is not
alone.
. . ..
On the other hand
It may be that this state of affairs is
acceptable, or at least must be accepted
because of the realities of present western
social and economic circumstances. But
if this is so, Yhe military strategist with
responsibility for advising government
must in all honesty examine his conscience, his performance, and not least
the arguments which support his policies,
to ensure that it is in no way his intransigence, or his misreading of the
309
fundamental problem, which has led the
politician to such a conclusion.
There emerge from the pages of the
r m o t Defence White Paper no 'hints of
the sort of thinking prompted by General
Haig's two warnings: no indication but
that the government accepts without
question, in a world of rapidly changing
realities, that Britain's place in it
continues to demand concentration on
support of a military alliance geared to
the single option of overt Soviet aggression in a limited geographical setting:
no suggestion that a wider, if not a
different, strategic purpose might find a
place in the policies of the nation or its
allies.
The 'Strategy Gap' is alive, and well,
and living in Whitehall.
SPLITCANE
Educational Pastimes
One of A. Hitler's less widely reported
achievements was to curtail the education of me and my Dartmouth entry
contemporaries; not that any of us had
any regrets at the time. Indeed we could
well have given him three cheers, as we
set off, not to the training cruiser as
cadets but to real ships as midshipmen.
Thereafter with the reduction of subs
courses to four months at the specialist
schools, those fortunate enough to find
helpful instructors and indulgent commanding officers could acquire a watchkeeping ticket and the rank of confirmed
Sub-Lieutenant at the age of nineteen.
Three cheers for Adolf again: being
navigator of a fleet destroyer in wartime
seemed a good deal more worthwhile than
being under instruction at Greenwich.
One's practical professional knowledge
grew accordingly even if the academic
background was a bit thin. Unlike 1919,
when officers similarly affected were sent
to Cambridge after the war for a- six
months course, the authorities took no
such steps to make good the leeway in
1946. Fifteen love to Adolf.
A snag
To digress, this accelerated advancement subsequently gave rise to an
unexpected penalty of another kind.
Having begun one's commissioned
service at nineteen, time served and
seniority began to roll from then.
On reaching that point in middle age
when pensions emerge from the realms
of distant fantasy to become a foreseeable
drop in income, it was a setback to find
that, as a result of changes to the small
print made in 1948, time under twentyone no longer counted and one's pension
for the regulation full career of thirtyfour years service became only 32134th~
of the full rate. Thirty love to Adolf.
(Lest any readers suffering this mulct be
310
now tempted to reach for their biros
and 'have the honour to submit' on the
subject, I would advise that their 'demo'
is probably twenty-five years too late.
One gets a polite reply saying that the
pension scheme is the very best that able
civil servants in the MOD could wring
from a reluctant Treasury, any changes
would undermine its actuarial basis and
that it confers many benefits, not least
on those who opt to leave the Navy
early(!) ).
Discovery
However if one can't recover a shortfall in pension, one can do something
oneself about shortfalls in education. The
thought first struck me when serving in a
destroyer based on Malta in the 1950s.
We were host ship to a U.S. Sixth Fleet
opposite number. I remember that they
kept three parts of the watch onboard
and all radars operating for fear of a
repetition of Pearl Harbour in Dockyard
Creek. We exchanged the usual wardroom hospitality; cold tea, Maryland
corn-fed ham and ice cream for too many
horse's necks, fried lampuki and chips.
We also exchanged lists of officers; theirs
read:
Name: C o m m a n d e r Cyrus J.
Hickenlooper Jnr. USN.
Duty: Command.
Duty in training for: Higher Command.
Education: Masters degree in
Human Psychology, University of
Wisconsin.
and so on.
Simple me was impressed. University
degrees were rare in R.N. wardrooms of
that time and if you did have a
graduate he was usually in overalls trying
to make the radar work (now, I believe,
they are excessively common and judging
by the advertisements in the press rather
non-U).
Later, I was equally impressed by a
scientist with whom I shared an office
and who has since risen to high rank. He
started his career by taking an external
degree in physics, swotting at the kitchen
table in the evenings while supporting a
wife on £5 a week as a laboratory assistant.
Subsequent closer acquaintance with
the United States forces gave a glimpse
of their extensive adult education programmes, apparently all largely free and
well subscribed to by all ranks. Some
appear to get a year off in mid-career to
get their 'Masters degree'. Sceptics may
point out that American degrees are not
quite the same as English ones.
Decision
These hitherto idle thoughts finally
crystallised when yet another of those
dreaded week-ending shore jobs loomed
over the horizon. These, one fears, must
become a more frequent hazard. Once it
was the housing problem; but now it is
more likely t o be the rocketing cost of
boarding school education which will
condemn one to live in distant messes or
London bed-sits while the better half
tends the home fires within the catchment
area of one's chosen comprehensive.
What to do on those four weekday evenings to avoid yielding to the bottle or the
temptations of the big city with consequent damage to health and wealth is
an important question to which there are
many answers. These range from staying
far too late in the office to the discomfort
of one's juniors who are thereby driven
to fuel the paper explosion, down to rug
making or social work. One possibility
is to take some kind of educational
course, either for amusement - perhaps
to satisfy a long suppressed fascination
for some abstruse subject - or to
improve the mind; to acquire a manual
skill; to prepare for a job outside; or even
to improve one's professional abilities
as a naval officer; possibly a combination
of several.
Methods
There seem to be four basic methods.
311
One is just to read books; however, the by any standards. Naval officers may be
existence of an Education vote now less prone to dropping out than some,
higher than that for Defence is an indica- but the basic pitfall is underestimation
tion that better results are thought to be of the amount of work and time required
obtained by organised courses of instruc- to complete the course to which both
tion requiring a positive contribution by students and sellers of courses contribute.
For example if one chose to aim high
the pupil.
Another ploy is to enrol for evening and go for an external university degree,
classes. This is probably the most efficient which is not to be lightly undertaken,
method of learning since one has a real one may find that the course may be
live teacher with whom one can engage programmed, for say, four and a half
in two-way communication. One snag is years for external students rather than
that having enrolled for fretwork on the normal three for internal students.
Tuesday evenings you will be invited out Exams are usually mandatory milestones
to dinner or be sent away on a duty trip which occur at fixed dates; if you fail
one or are unable to sit due to illness or
for the next four Tuesdays running.
Then there is the Open University the exigencies of the service, add another
with lectures on TV or radio supplement- year. Again, during the course you may
ed by a correspondence course. But the have at least one appointment in which
lectures are strictly one way communica- you are kept too busy to maintain your
tion and I wonder if this is much better planned schedule of studies; add another
(for subjects other than languages) than year. Thus seven years could be a
using a good textbook. They are also at prudent planning fignre, though it has
fixed times. I once found an acquaintance been done in very much less.
lurking in the lavatory at a cocktail party
An easier target are the various
with a transistor pressed to his ear. He examinations and qualifications of the
just had to catch a vital twenty minutes various professional institutions lecture in his O.U. Russian course. This Chartered Secretaries for example; there
difficulty can be overcome by buying a is a wide selection to choose from and an
time switch and a tape recorder.
education officer can advise.
Finally there is the correspondence
On a lower plane but not to be scoffed
course; flexible as to timing, but you're at are A levels. Many of the peacetime
mostly on your own; although lecture problems of the Navy reduce themselves
notes and text books are sent to you, in the end to in-fighting over money,
regular questions and essays set, and your long term castings, dockyard refits, nonanswers returned corrected, marked and public funds etc. There are few naval
covered in scathing comments in red ink officers who could not improve their
by your tutor. One also has to read a lot grasp of such things and their negotiating
- easy in London where almost any power by taking an A level in economics
book ever written can be obtained free and a short course in accountancy, if
from public l$braries; less easy if you are they haven't already done so.
R.N.O. Diego Garcia where you will
As to the time set aside for work, this
have to take your library with you.
is an individual personal problem. Speaking for myself I have found a target of
The difficulties
three weekday evenings per week (not
Well, what are the difficulties? First always achieved) maintains my schedule;
and foremost staying-power; it is weekend work is taboo, but reading can
generally reckoned that the average be done any time in trains, aeroplanes,
drop-out rate for correspondence course in bed or anywhere by foregoing one's
students approaches 9076, a high figure previous quota of paper-back thrillers.
312
If behind schedule one can try catching
up before breakfast but this requires
more will power. The alarm goes at 0630,
you decide not to get up but to master
those two chapters in bed. The next
event is the realisation that it is 0830, the
two chapters are not mastered and one
has the choice of missing breakfast or
being late for work.
The choice of subject is another difficult decision which can be made after
lengthy forethought or with a pin. Once
one gets into it in depth almost any
subject can become interesting.
one's appointer and commanding officer
in order to secure an appointment to a
lengthy full time course at a seat of
learning such as Greenwich, Latimer or
Belgrave Square (or the Army or Air
Force colleges). Indeed if so inclined
and cards are played well one may be
able to go to two or three of these and
perhaps get a job on the directing staff as
well, thereby absenting oneself from the
practical business of one's profession for
up to four or five years (the really artful
may follow this up with a Defence
Fellowship). In days of yore and everyfinger-a-marlinspike there was probably
only a limited number of officers with
An anomaly
In the process of selecting a subject the intellectual capacity and inclination
one curious gap becomes apparent. One for such frolics, but today most officers
can carry out extramural studies in could profit from the courses and most
almost any subject except that of one's of us sooner or later became staff officers
own military profession. The Royal Navy or policy formulators; but manpower
will give advice, encouragement and even considerations alone require Drafty to
a very small measure of financial assist- limit the numbers. This restriction may
ance towards a wide variety of courses be welcome to those who have an interest
aimed at further academic education or in boosting the image and standing of
at resettlement, but offers no options con- the various colleges by cultivating an
cerned with Defence, War or Maritime aura of exclusiveness. However it is
Strategy. It is possible that there is no difficult to refute the argument that the
demand. Indeed it is difficult for an service would benefit if the output were
individual extramural student such as the increased.
writer to discern whether he is a member
One method of achieving this would
of a small lunatic fringe who have lost be to cater for extramural students. The
touch with the telly and can thus find objections of the directing staffs can be
time to study, or whether one is part of imagined - 'My dear chap, students
the tip of an iceberg composed of a must be here to imbibe the atmosphere.
substantial number of officers who would Anyway we haven't got the staff to cope
do likewise if they could see some with all the paperwork which external
professional profit in it. Who knows? But students would generate. Look at me, on
it is an observable fact that most naval overtime dl1 Christmas; staff colleges'
officers are interested in their profession, golf tournament next week; a new
are prepared to argue at length about scheme to prepare before the November
defence strategy at the wardroom bar, course joins and then all the arrangethat even engineers may be seen reading ments for the South American tour to be
Roskill in the train to Bath, and that a made -yes, I know our defence interests
few go to such extremes as to subscribe are in Europe now, but it broadens the
to The Naval Review.
mind, and the embassies are awfully glad
to see us. They say it helps with exports.
Staff colleges
I'm hoping to go myself next year to help
As things stand the only option in with the admin.'
higher professional studies is to cultivate
Joking apart, the system works well
enough, is much respected abroad and
has stood the test of time (this is beginning to sound like the defence of
grammar schools); nevertheless it presents curious contrasts. So many separate
colleges, single service and joint, each
with staff (count the stars), real estate,
overheads; all teaching variations of the
same subject to a very limited intake.
Compare this with civilian universities
and polytechnics where large single
institutions offer a very wide variety of
course from theology to economics and
from agriculture to electronics, often
catering for external as well as internal
students. Is concentration into a large
single unit cheaper, more effective, or
does a more expensive bureaucracy
result? Are extramural staff courses
possible?
Their introduction would certainly
please drafty but what about the practical aspects, syndicate work, presentations
etc.? Well there is always the weekend
seminar, quite a common feature of
civilian life. I t may sound horrifying, but
consider a Friday evening to Sunday
afternoon programme of first class
313
professional interest in pleasant surroundings. Add a free railway warrant, a party
on Saturday night, and accommodation
and divertissements for any wives who
cared to string along. I t could make an
agreeable change from gardening and
golf if it didn't occur too often.
Another cause for dismay could be
that the only method of assessing external students is to introduce exams
which would be less than popular with
the presently unexamined internal
students. One must contrast this again
with civilian life where institutions which
award qualifications on the basis of
course attendance only are none too
highly respected.
However a new look would cost money
and if it proved that only a small lunatic
fringe were interested then they would
do better to stick to their fretwork. On
the other hand it would not cost money
to have an exploratory look at whether
the Navy could do itself some good by
helping those who are prepared to help
themselves.
The Art of Course Computing
(THE NAVALREVIEWis indebted to the
NAVALELECTRICAL
REVIEWfor permission to reproduce this article by one of
our members, whom we thank, also, for
his contribution-EDITOR)
'If the Navy is to be fully effective
in the future, it must have a corps
of officers who have been trained in
'the techniques of handling information as part of their basic education.'
'The Information Revolution', The
Naval Review (October 1968); p.219.
Introduction
Training in a naval context may be
described as the process of matching the
men to the material requirements of the
Fleet. This article describes a computer
system t o assist management in the
optimisation of Naval Weapons and
Electrical Engineering training at H.M.S.
Collingwood.
The complexity of the training problem
is considerable. Changes in the long term
programmes of ships or in the intended
equipment fits occur frequently; and
these, coupled with alterations t o career
patterns of naval personnel, lead to a
requirement regularly to update calculations of courses and associated training
resources in order that the demands of
314
the fleet may be met. I t is now necessary
to forecast the needs for every year of
the life of the ships that are building, as
well as keeping pace with the refitting of
those already in the fleet.
In H.M.S. Collingwood an establishment staff of nearly 1,000 teach some
300 different courses of anything between
one day and two years duration, at levels
from junior mechanic to advanced technician. With running costs in the order
of £10 million a year, optimisation of
training effort is clearly desirable. About
14 per cent of the total training effort is
devoted to Foreign and Commonwealth
students who are sent here because many
foreign governments think that the
Royal Navy gives good value for money.
The gestation period for setting up a
new type of course may be as long as six
years, during which equipment and
buildings must be obtained, course
content designed, and instructors trained;
before starting we should therefore be
fairly confident that the requirement
exists and that the proposed answer is
correct. But the major factors affecting
planning are totally outside our control:
enemy posture, national attitudes,
defence policy, ship building and refit
programmes, equipment fits, weapon
systems development, engineering and
maintenance techniques, maintainerf
operator policy, manning policy, recruiting and manpower wastage. Some of
these factors are more variable than
others, and some are interdependent but they exist and we must try to predict
them in terms of training requirements
now for ten and twenty years ahead.
Whenever any variations are recognised,
our planning must be updated immediately; the penalty for a wrong or tardy
decision could be great in terms of
defence unpreparedness or in waste of
taxpayers money in years to come.
TRAMPIS
The Training Requirements and Management Planning Information System
(TRAMPIS) is a means of representing
relevant naval circumstances, such that
the resources needed for naval training
and the general content of courses may
be calculated with the aid of a computer.
TRAMPIS has now been developed to
give a picture of the actual situation present and future, so as to produce
results which are sufficiently reliable to
allow decisions about future training
requirements to be made with an acceptable degree of confidence, thus leading
to considerable savings in the training
field. Diagram 1 shows how TRAMPIS
fits into the WE Branch training system.
So far, the system has been confined to
the calculation of courses and resources
for WE training in H.M.S. Collingwood,
but the methodology employed could be
applied to the whole field of manpower
policy and training.
[ST;(141111N6
111MP1S
. C OL O* TUI *ITI I
'
. Il)AiMLD
TRllWlNG
lXfCYTlON
"IIUIIIb
"1IO""CII
0IIllll"TIII
COURSE
DEllG*
Illl"l*L
*I,*ODI
''al'
.Pclllli
1SStSS*W7
LIIIs*I"r
Diagram 1. Outline of the WE Branch
training system.
A gun control analogy
The training system for which we plan
may be likened to a simple control system
for a gun-mounting; aim must be
accurate, and there must be provision for
rapid changes of target without endangering our accuracy.
In Diagram 2 the fire control system
TKE A R T OF COURSE COMPUTING
provides inputs ordering the gun to train
and elevate to point at a given target.
The gun drives into line until the error
from requirement is zero. T o increase
accuracy, we simply increase the size of
the gun drive system. This is how naval
training used to be carried out. We
optimised results at sea by expanding
training with little thought to cost in
terms of training effort. Continuing with
the gun analogy however, we shall
eventually reach a stage where the gun
system is too big and consumes too much
power for the ship, and a compromise
is necessary.
If we measure some function which
relates to the size of the machinery (say
power consumed) in addition to the
physical alignment error, we can combine
them to get a Performance Index and a
controller may balance size against
accuracy to arrive a t an optimum solution -the cheapest for a given accuracy,
or the best accuracy for a given cost
(Diagram 3). We may also expand our
analogy t o monitor the effects of many
outputs (Diagram 4), but the system will
tend to become over complicated, and
I
Diagram 4. Multiple inputloutput
optimal control.
because of the time delay in the feedback
loop, it is likely t o produce heavy oscillations in the quality of the output - in
our case, the trained man. Another
situation with which we are well
acquainted.
If, however, we can model our training
system well enough, we can programme
a computer t o do the work for us.
Diagram 5 shows this. The computers
speed of operation - about 1,000 times
faster than real life - will enable a total
calculation t o be made for any given set
of requirements, t o try out various
selections o r by optimising for each
variable in a hill-climbing process t o
arrive a t a best solution. The controller
-
MANVOWER
PhllDUC
ON
-----}OUTPUT
SISlt*
SERVO
SYSTEM
OUTPUTS
-
ERROR
REOUIRtMtYT
Diagram 2. Simple gun control system.
x
COYTROLLER
PERFORMANCE
INDEX
Hill
i!lM8
CONTROLLER
Diagram 5. Stable system for near
optimal control of multiple inputloutput
Diagram 3. System for optimal control. process.
316
THE ART OF
cotJRSE
will only pass the optimum solution to
the training system. As we already know
it to be the optimum solution, system
control is not dependent on monitoring
the output, and the cause of oscillation
is removed. I n theory, the only variations
in output are caused by changes in input,
or changes introduced at the discretion
of the controller, and are in any case
rapidly stabilised. We are thus in a strong
position to withstand abrupt changes in
defence policy with absolute minimum
disruption - an important consideration.
The key to the whole system lies in
making our model to be an exact representation of real life. Obviously, unless it
is exact, the answers the computer
produces will be less than optimum if
not grossly in error.
Training courses
At H.M.S. CoNingwood there are two
different types of course t o be considered:
(a) Pre-Joining Training Courses largely
equipment
orientated
courses intended to prepare a man
for his next job.
(b) Career Courses - academic and
technique based courses intended
t o prepare a man for employment
at his next level of advancement
(this implies the provision of
suitable background knowledge to
enable a man to cope with a PJT
Course at a specified level).
Training requirements
Before a course can be executed:
(a) The necessary resources euilding,
equipment and instructional staff)
must be provided;
@) The course must be designed and
validated. Before course design
can commence, however, what is
required to be taught must be
defined. In this article 'training
Requirements' are taken to be:
(1) The definition of the required
resources;
(2) The definition of the required
course content.
COMPUTING
The function of TRAMPIS
The place of a model in the overall
WE Branch training system has been
discussed above, but a model built in
isolation would be of little value. I t is
essential that its results can be easily
communicated to the outside world and
that there exists a system of data capture
so that the model can be adapted to
reflect changing circumstances. This
system, w'hich must be 'thoroughly integrated as a whole, constitutes TRAMPIS.
The major function of the system is to
distil out of Ministry of Defence Manning
and Material policies the following:
(a) A feed-back of the resources
required to execute those policies;
(b) An outline definition of course
content for subsequent detailed
Course Design action;
(c) Estimates of training loads to
enable effective control of training
to take place.
Outline description of TRAMPIS
An overall block diagram of
T R A W I S is shown in Diagram 6. This
shows that the forecasting problem can
be reduced t o four basic functions:
(a) Fleet Requirements File. To assess
the overall fleet manning and PJT
Course requirements for as far
ahead as possible, based on official
planning information on both the
present and future RN fleet;
(b) Branch Manpower Model. To
estimate Career Course loading
for as far ahead as possible by
extrapolating past behaviourial
patterns into future WE branch
structures;
(c) Training Resource File. To wnvert course loading predictions
into statements of resource
requirements;
(d) Course Content Model. To provide
an outline of what a student needs
to be taught to fulfil any specified
function.
To complete the system we must add
317
.
COLLlNGWOO 0
STATISTICS
FILE
FOREIGN A N D
PJT DCl
TRAINING
MANPOWER
" UNOERTRAINING
BRANCH
MANPOWER
MODEL
-
T R A I N I N G L O A D WORKING P A R T Y DATA
L
COMMONWEALTH
LOADING
.
LOAD
FlLE
.
,
.
R N CAREER
TOTAL COURSE
COURSE LOADING
LOADING
TRAINING
RESOURCES
FILE
AVAILABLE
r\
RESOURCE
c
REQUIREMENTS
P R O P O S E D COURSE
RESOURCES
ri
FLEET
REQUIREMENTS
FILE
COURSE
DATA F l L E
.
COURSE D E T A I L S
T
COURSE
CONTENT
MODEL
.
i
.
R N SEA B I L L E T S
I
1
P J T PACKAGES
Diagram 6. TRAMPISoutline
three functions concerned with collecting categories of the WE Branch. These men
and disseminating data.
are chosen not because they are com(a) COLLlNGWOOD Statistics File puter experts but because they have been
'to assess and store data on the in the Navy a long time and have the
flow of manpower through the experience to be able to screen input
training system, including non-RN data for errors. Most of the data from
personnel.
external authorities is available on mag(b) Course Data File - to assess and netic tape and the computer will shortly
store data describing courses be enhanced with a tape handler so that
(present and future) undertaken this can be read directly.
at H.M.S. Collingwood
There is provision for human inter(c) Training Load File - to establish action with the system at two points,
the total training load and number
firstly with the Manpower Model to get
of courses required to meet it, to
present this data to the Training the best prediction of future manpower
Load Working Party in a form uzng curve fitting programs and secondly
easily assimilated, and to extract with the Course Content Model to assist
data in the form required for the in obtaining optimum strategies and to
annual Defence Council Instruc- reject unworkable solutions. Plans are in
tions which promulgates the yearly hand to do this work using a graphical
display. Each of the seven basic blocks
plan for WE Training.
The system is run on an IBM 1130 are closely inter-related and fast comcomputer. Data is stored on magnetic munication between blocks is essential.
discs with input on cards and output on Because of the limited size of the
a line printer. Control and operation is computer it is often necessary to use
by fleet chief petty officers and chief punched cards for transfer of data
petty officers from each of the three between blocks but here again the
318
DGW PLANNING
CHART
CND
S C H E M E S OF
COMPLEMENT
-
CURRENT P J T
COURSE LOADING
D
PACKAGES
PLANNING CHART
--
R N SEA B I L L E T S
FTR
DGWIN)
OFFICE
COURSE DESIGN
,
.
.
,
F U T U R E SCHEMES
COMPLEMENT
F U T U R E PJT PACKAGES
( U P T O 3 PER S H I P 1
P J T PACKAGES
*
W I T H LOADING
I
COURSES
AVAILABLE
Diagram 7. The Fleet requirements file.
magnetic tape system should provide
considerable improvement.
The Fleet Requirements File
The Fleet Requirements File (FRF) is
used to assess the overall fleet manning
and PJT course requirements for as far
ahead as ~ossible(maximum 20 years).
The several sources of information
available to achieve this objective are
summarised in Diagram 7. It has been
found that the programme section of
DGW(N)s Planning Chart provides an
adequate time base for long term forecasting of ships programmes and is
generally satisfactory for equipment
policy but sometimes it is necessary to
refer to DGW(N)s 'Weapon Fitting
Guide.'
PJT packages for ships' current equipment fits are obtained from the Schemes
of Complement issued by CND. Packages
for future fits and new ships are generated manually from various sources of
policy information, issued by MOD.
Some PJT data is taken from the Course
Data File. The data obtained from the
sources described above is processed
using standard file manipulation techniques to provide outputs giving the
input data combined in different ways.
The standard output from the file is PJT
course loading - the number of RN
ratings requiring each PJT over a period,
and RN sea billets for the whole surface
fleet in any year. A printout of ships PJT
packages with the training load in manweeks can also be made.
~ h ,~ i is l kept
~ constantly updated
so that as the time of a prediction
approaches its accuracy is improved.
The Branch Manpower Model
The Branch Manpower Model (BMM)
predicts numbers borne in each rate,
category and structure (i.e. mechanic/
artificer/mechanician) of the WE branch
for the next twenty-five years. The data
flow for the model is shown 'in Diagram
8.
The present numbers borne in each
rate for each category are obtained from
three sources, firstly H.M.S. Centurion
drafting files, secondly H.M.S. Collingwood records and thirdly from MOD
records. These data are often in conflict
and discrepancies have to be resolved
manually.
Data on advancement, reversion, discharge etc. which affect the above data
are obtained from H.M.S. Centurion pay
files and H.M.S. Collingwood records.
Numbers for future annual intake can be
varied but are based upon DGNMT's
MOO S T A ~ I ~ ~ I ~ ~
DRIFTING
rlLts
5161 L I S T I N G
YIW
BRLHCN
UIINPOVIR
MODIL
t ' l F~I G ~
~ R I~
S
___f_-
Y.NPOWIR
Y U ~ ~ R
TRIININ~
,,
CVRVE
FIT,tNG
a
319
The Training Resources File
The Training Resources File (TRF)
obtains data on course loadings from the
c r a r E R caunsr LO,OING
FRF and BMM as modified by the WE
Branch Training Load Working Party
~ n r o ~ c r r o n r r ~ ~ ~ and
~ s
data on PJTs and Career Courses
from the Course Data File and other
internal establishment documents (see
diagram 9). As in the case of the F R F
only simple file manipulation is required.
The resultant outputs provide a loading
in periods for both instructor and faci-
nunha
Diagram 8.
Branch manpower model.
New Entry Plans. The BMM takes these
data for each rate in each category and
using figures for wastage and advancement based on previous statistics, predicts
future numbers in that rate. The
advancement figures are derived from an
equation which generates a curve called
an advancement profile. This expresses a
man's probability of advancement as a
function of his years of service. The
observed shape of this profile is matched
to the equation using curve fitting
techniques to get the best relationship
between the equation and reality. This
process is essentially an interactive one
with the work being shared between man
and computer and demands the use of a
graphic display unit if its full potential
in smoothing out statistical errors
without introducing those due to using
out of date data is to be realised. As
with the FRF, the BMM is regularly
updated to ensure as reliable a forecast
as is possible. Standard outputs from the
BMM are, firstly career course loading
i.e. the expected number of men requiring each career course over a period, and
secondly, the numbers of men expected
to 'be borne by rate category and structure at any time during the next twenty
years. A printout of the percentage
wastage and advancement for each rate
in each year of service is also available.
TRAIYIYC
RESOURCE
REPUIREH~YT~
Diagram 9. The training resources file.
lities (e.g. classrooms, laboratory equipment~)for each teaching group over a
particular time interval. This information
is used in scheduling, in planning the
purchase of training equipment, in
complement changes and in making
major works proposals.
Course Data File
Information for the Course Data File
(CDF) is gathered from course data
sheets supplied by the various schools
within H.M.S. Collingwood and from
H.M.5. Vernon, H.M.S. Daedalus and
H.M.S. Excellent. These da'ta sheets are
amended using the computer. The
contents of the data sheets is kept on file
in the computer to be called upon by the
TRF and the Training Load File.
Collingwood Statistics File
This file is presently maintained
manually. The Collingwood Statistics
File (CSF) draws on the records of the
Radio, Control and Ordnance Schools as
well as those kept by Ratings Control
Office and H.M.S. Collingwood's record
office. The information is used to
produce foreign and Commonwealth,
320
civilian and officer course loading
requirements to be fed into the Training
Load File.
job-analysis studies undertaken in the
Royal Navy.
Description of 'task' and 'capability'
For each ship the Scheme of
Complement containing information on
rate, category, and PJT requirement for
each billet in the complement, has
inherent within it a complete statement
of the PJT and career courses which are
required if the complement is to have the
ability to carry out its task. If we know
the future fleet then it is possible to
describe the total WE Branch task in
terms which can be used to describe
capability - i.e. modules of training.
H.M.S.
Collingwood's
Furthermore,
system of objective design is geared to
meeting set objectives with checks by
means of internal quality control. At
present the results of quality control
studies which are conducted with strict
The course content model
objectivity and those of Naval Manpower
The objective of this part of TRAMPIS Utilisation Unit teams must be inter(see diagram 10) is to balance the preted subjectively. If in future these
capability of the men of WE Branch investigations are directed towards
against the tasks they are required to validating the training requirements for
perform, and to propose changes where billets in terms of training modules, it
any inbalance occurs. Before such a will be possible to use their results in a
balance can be struck, it is necessary to purely objective manner by means of the
describe both capability and task in model.
terms common to both. I n the past this
The CCM, which is a new departure
has proved to be a grave stumbling block in the field of training management, is
in making use of the results of the many still under development with the Future
Training Requirements Group at H.M.S.
Collingwood. A system study has been
PJl rAClrtEs
completed and a pilot scheme is now
R U S E ~~
I
L
~
~
~
~
being programmed. The data processing
COURSE
COURSE D L T L ~ L S
task is complex and a detailed description
CONTtYT
MAYPOWI1
MODEL
of it is beyond the scope of this article.
PREDICTIONS
The approach is essentially an interCOURSE MODULES
arsouncr
active
one using a computer with a fast
A ?RE #CPUISITES
FILE
and flexible man-machine interface. The
lWTERlCTlYE
INTIRACTIVE
I N f o R M A T I O Y I\
INfORMhTIOu
operator is able to adapt and constrain
the problem and its solution to improve
the computer-genera'ted solution. The
PROPOSED 8RANCM
output from the CCM is then fed into
cTuRE 6R.rrG.Es
the TRF, its output being used to assess
VDU
HUMIN
- the
optimality of the total solution. The
Diagram 10. Course content model.
process is iterative.
The Training Load File
The Training Load File (TLF) uses
information on course loading from the
CSF, the FRF and the BMM to produce
course profiles and training load forecasts.
A course profile is the numbers of each
course that will be needed for a period
of years. A training load forecast gives
the training load for any year in terms
of man-years for each course.
This file gives a second output which
summarises the course loading predictions and later compares them with the
records of courses actually run for use
by the WE Branch Training Load
Working Party.
-I
--
Dsr..
Conclusion
TRAMPIS, as described in outline
above, is a system which will allow the
planning of training and courses to meet
an evolving branch requirement in an
orderly manner. The WE Branch will
soon be faced with two major changes in
requirement: the implementation of
321
maintainer-operator concepts, and the
change in fleet weapons systems from
analogue to digital techniques. All
the speed and flexibility inherent in
TRAMPIS will be called upon if these
changes are to be implemented with
minimum cost and disruption.
C. P. E. BROWN
The Medium Maritime Power - I11
In the first two parts of this series an
attempt was made to establish some of
the common characteristics and objectives of medium maritime powers, and to
state their technical options with particular reference to those which were
critically high in cost.
Keeping all these matters in mind, it
is now possible to go ahead and
establish a general theory of sea power
for medium powers. The first step in
this process, inevitably, is t o list the conceprual tools of the trade; and equally
inevitably much of this will make
familiar reading. The only novelty
offered, Pndeed, is that all the tools will
be applied specifically to medium-power
interests and resources. Not for us the
comfortable assumption that we can do
anything we are prepared to pay for;
nor, conversely, that we need do nothing
because Big Brother will always rescue
US.
Vital interests
A particularly fierce mentor, whose
writing in great balloons round my drafts
I can still vividly recall, taught me that
'vital' is a word to be used once a year.
Well, tBis is my allocation for 1976; but
the spirit of the advice is wise and should
be applied by medium powers no less
than anyone else. A proper humility over
vital interests is something that all
nations find difficult to achieve, and
medium powers are prone to misappraisal, particularly those which have
occupied more prom'inent positions in
world affairs than they do now.
I t has indeed been argued that a
nation's vital interests are definitively
summed up in the admirably concise
words of Article 2(4) of the United
Nations Charter: 'Territorial Integrity
and Political Independence'. Certainly
these are the core of identity of any
nation-state; from them spring many of
the pr'inciples of non-interference in
internal affairs, nonaggression, selfdefence, inviolability of
frontiers,
sovereign immunities - the common
currency of international relations.
On their own they will not do, newrtheless. A nation may have territorial
integrity and political independence and
yet be unable t o feed its people adequately, to trade on fair terms, safeguard
its investments abroad from expropriation, safeguard its native resources from
foreign exploitation, preserve a distinct
culture and freely take part in international exchanges of knowledge and
techniques.
Any o r all of these may be vital
interests. They tend to come under the
rubric of National Well-Being and the
safeguarding of them tends to fall under
the heading of Free Access. Access to
322
THE MEDIUM M A R I T I ~ ~FO\VER-III
E
markets, to knowledge, t o other
nationals: if, to summarise vital interests,
one were allowed to add only two more
words to Terr'itorial Integrity and
Political Independence, surely they would
be 'Free Access.'
I t is not invariably so, of course. A few
nations perceive their vital interest
differently; the preservation, perhaps, of
ideological purity. For the time, a t any
rate, access is the last thing they want.
Albania is a current example. But it is
hard to think of a medium maritime
power, by any definition, being of this
sort.
An obvious point, but one that needs
to be made, is that the relative weight
given to the three broad areas of vital
interest will vary with each medium
maritime power. For some (Israel, West
Germany, Indonesia) territorial integrity
is of relatively great weight; for others
(Italy, Canada, and perhaps in a n odd
way Cuba) political independence; for
others (Britain, Japan) access. No doubt
each in its preoccupation feels hard done
by.
As they used to say a t one particular
(civilian) defence establishment that
seemed t o recognise no law but
Parkinson's: 'any organisation that is not
expanding is moribund.' That may not be
true, but it is near enough to the truth to
make the older medium maritime powers
uneasy. Because territorial aggrandisement (except into water areas) is
unfashionable, and because political
independence is or should be an absolute,
the only room for expansion is in wellbeing, and perhaps in influence abroad,
through free access. I think it important
t o make this point here because so much
defence thinking, particularly in the
West, seems based on preservation of the
status quo. The idea of access las ia vital
interest allows some dynamic to creep
into the situation where. f m m the ~ o i n t
of view of national aspirations if no
other, it is sorely needed.
Threats and alliances
Probably every medium power feels its
vital interests threatened. Even huge
countries like Brazil and Australia may
feel vulnerable to territorial nibbling at
their peripheries. But they will be far
more concerned at the prospects of
hegemonial influence, in their areas,
from a power inimical to them. This will
affect both their political independence
and their access to the rest of the world.
This is an example of the way threats
to vital interests almost always interact,
and indeed almost always come not only
from the presence of military force but
from economic, political and diplomatic
pressures. This complication plays always
into the hands of the no-threat pundits,
who can pdint to the relative inactivity
of military elements, compare them with
the dynamism of economic, propaganda
and diplomatic actions, and conclude
that the former do not matter and the
latter do.
This is, of course, usually a fallacious
argument; the presence of military force
is aimed a t establishing a 'commanding
advantage in pursuit of foreign policy
goals" inimical to, in our case, the
medEum power. All too often such a
preponderance of force is exercised by a
superpower, or by a power of such
potential that the medium power cannot
of itself withstand it. Thus most medium
powers need allies. And the medium
power must if possible so structure its
alliances that its opponents' 'commanding
advantage' cannot be used against its
vital interests.
If possible. For there are pitfalls along
every path, and the alliance path has
many. Suppose no like-minded allies
exist? South Africa is hard put t o it to
find any a t present. Or suppose the price
of alliance is a substantial surrender of
'This wording, the most concise and accurate
I have encountered as expressing the
influence of military force in peacetime,
occurred in an Economist Foreign Report
in July 1976.
THE MEDIUM MARITIME POWER-1x1
political independence? Albania - not
even a medium power by any standard rejected the Warsaw Pact. Or suppose
territorial integrity must be attenuated?
France rejected foreign bases on her soil,
or rather ejected them from it. Is the ally
strategically appropriate? The record of
weak, disparate alliances against Nazi
Germany in the 1930s shows that even
multiple alliances can be badly chosen
and serve no conceivable strategic
purpose. And finally, what military price
will be exacted? Will it involve the production by the medium power of forces
that are appropriate only to a certain
alliance which, in the event, may not
last?
All these questions need to be
answered by the medium power, in search
not of perfection, for that dill not exist,
but of the best rough-hewn answer it can
get.
323
able, or acceptable at least, to their
friends in combat.
Third, we have no way of knodng for
at least twenty years (when the published
records and diaries are more complete)
and we probably never shall fully know,
how many potential shooting conflicts
have been averted !by the post-World War
Two deterrent machinery. There can be
no doubt from our own experience, let
alone from observation of other nations'
actions or inactions, that the number is
very large. Of course we are talking here
about deterrence that comprehends
diplomatic, legal and economic factors
as well as military ones2; but few of the
real decision-makers doubt where the
core of deterrence lies.
Before summing up the deterrence
situadon one should perhaps make a
point that is not always clear, or welcome
either, in Western eyes. Deterrence can
be a shield for activity which is 'aggressive' in the sense !in which an American
Deterrence
Very few armed conflicts have gone by businessman uses the word. For example,
in the past thirty years (and there have the Soviet Mediterranean Squadron has
been many, mostly concerning medium deterred, from 1969 onwards, American
powers) without someone or other saying intervention in the Lebanon on the 1958
'this could start World War Three'. I t model; and behind this shield have taken
hasn't. How does the evidence square place the events in that country. I t is a
mistake to think of the consequences of
with deterrent theory?
In the first place, 5t is clear that people deterrence as invariably good.
But we are still here, most of us, and
are sure enough scared of throwing the
that
is good and to the credit of deterfirst nuclear bomb. At that level,
deterrence has worked fine. Even the rence over the past thirty years. I t has
proliferation of nuclear weapons to six, kept us clear of nuclear war, has very
possibly seven or more, key-holders has largely prevented the geographical spread
of conflicts and has untold unsung
not weakened the structure.
Second, deterrence has been generally victories 'in wars that have not happened.
successful in preventing the geographical I t is chiefly these victories that lead one
to conclude that the idea of all-level
spread of wars. In nearly all conflicts deterrence based on the threat of
there has been a marked absence of big escalation and allied involvement, which
fellows piling in behind the smaller has formed a cornerstone of maridme
protagonists. This is not to say they have strategic theory for some years, is still
been standing idly by, as that delightful generally valid.
clichd has it. Generally, they hlave been
The medium power must however take
in intense diplomatic act'ivity (not without showing a mailed fist or two) aimed 'See K. Booth's article on 'The Utility of
Navies', N.R. Vol. 64 No. 3, July 1976,
at securing a peaceful settlement favour- p. 204.
324
THE MEDIUM MARITIME POWER-III
note that the structure is least firm in
local areas, where only its own interests
are seriously threatened. Here the
sympathy of allies 'is not readily aroused.
Border incidents, whether on land or at
sea, do not make of Wemselves la cams
belli for World War Three; neither do
political infiltrations, espionage or nibbles
at free access. Some autonomy in
deterrence seems to be indicated, a t the
lower levels 'at any rate. And lit is to the
idea of levels of conflict that we now
turn.
but historically a characteristic of such
operations, limited as they are in aim,
scope and area, has been the failure of
allies to become directly Involved.
Except, alas, on the other side sometimes.
I n Higher Level Conflict, shooting which at Low Intensity w'ill have been
limited or even non-existent - becomes
more general. Rules of engagement,
previously rigid and often custom-made,
become more liberal and general in
character. The first use of force in anv
encounter is much more likely to be
allowed. Escalation tends to become less
controlled though combatants will still
Levels of conflict
Standard phraseology about levels of attempt to regulate it. Allies will certainly
conflict is still lacking, but the following be involved diplomatically, and may be
categories are fairly self-explanatory and involved in the fighting. Typical operain general enough use for our purpose tions at the Higher Level aim to keep the
use of an area of sea (sometimes a
here:
moving area) or to deny the opponent
Normal Conditions
such use. But there may be room still
Low Intensity Conflict
for demonstrative actions, aimed mainly
Higher Level Conflict
at indicating how the conflict could be
General War
Under Normal Conditions, the situa- widened; by the use of heavier weapons,
tion is stable in the sense that tensions or the active participation of allies.
are well compensated, change is managed Finally, all sea operations that spill over
by negotiation, and vital interests are not on to the land - whether as amphibious
being eroded or attacked. Deterrence is warfare, or as bombardment from sea or
operating correctly. The operations of air - are at least a t the Higher Level of
maritime forces are conducted under the conflict.
I n General War, restraints on the
international law of peace and include
training, routine surveillance of potential scope and area of conflict are confined
threats, regulation in offshore waters, to the requirement for military necessity
flag-showing and did in natural disasters - which historically tends not to be
both home and foreign. Many operati~ns much of a restraint at all. There may be
considerable control over the use of
may of course be on an alliance basis.
I n Low Intengity Conflict, vital nuclear weapons but apart from this rules
interests are under threat - even if only of engagement will be very liberal, and
as a nibble. Deterrence is either in danger operations will be answerable to the
of breaking down o r has broken down. requirements of the grand strategy of the
The operations of maritime forces tend alliances - for at this stage, by definito be conducted under the law, or the tion, alliances are fully involved - and
pretext, of self-defence, though other will include attempts to control, or deny,
fadors of international law are still of or both, large sea areas for movement of
importancea. Operations include recon- men and materials and perhaps also for
ndssance, demonstrations of resolve to strategic bombardment.
use sea areas, exclusion of opponents
from sea areas, intensified regulation in 3 e e D. P. O'Connell. The Influence of Law
offshore zones. Allies may be involved: on sea Power, partic'ularly C%apters &-xii.
In that very brief summary there is an
underlying assumption that one sort of
conflicts grows out of the previous one.
This is tidy but not necessarily true. I t is
generally likely t o be the pattern for
conflicts that have their roots in sea
matters, but a conflict which spreads
from land to sea may enter the sea area
at the higher level; the India-Pakistan
war of 1971 was almost a case in point
though there were one or two guerilla
incidents at sea in the low-intensity phase.
Of all the tools of the trade available
to the medium-power maritime planner,
this discipline of Levels of Conflict is
perhaps the most attractive. I t gives some
indication of the kind and scope of those
operations one may have t o undertake
without active help from allies. Its
descriptions of the limits, particularly
political-legal limits, t o conflict help to
generate material requirements for forces
to operate at the lower levels. It is, in
fact, when linked to the other factors we
are consideiing, a guide to the limits of
autonomy.
325
a medium maritime power which has
opted to play only at home, yet a glance
at the composition of her Maiitime SelfDefence Force shows that its potential
reach is a good deal further than is
strictly necessary for the defence of
coastal waters. I t would need little addition to make it fulfil a conflict role away
from home. And even then, as has been
suggested, Japan with her large overseas
interests is taking considerable risks in
entrusting them so fully to allies.
Most medium maritime powers, then,
will want some capacity to play away
from home. Their decisions will concern
more the relative weight to be given to
home and away functions than a total
opting out of either.
Sea use and sea denial
It is almost a platitude now to say that
command of the sea, in the absolute
sense that it was used by some of the
simpler publicists of sea power4, is no
longer a valid objective. This tends to be
said even by the representatives of superpowers. How much more, therefore,
should the medium power do away With
Home and away
Every professional naval operator 'the notion in favour of the more modest
knows that there Is a world of difference @ut still hard to attain) aims of using
between distant-water operations and those parts of the sea demanded by its
those around one's own coast; and every vital interests, and (or) denying to its
planner can tell you how different are the opponent those parts he requires in order
requirements in terms of ship design and t o achieve any aim inimical to those
logistics. The medium power, therefore, interests.
Because navies take so long W evolve,
must decide early in the evolution of its
maritime policy whether it is going to it will be a brave medium power that
play away from home at all.
ever deliberately builds maiitime forces
If it does not, its material, manpower solely for sea use or for sea denial. The
and training provision will be greatly situation, and the objectives, may change.
simplified. But t o provide the necessary But then most maritime units can be
protection of its vital interests, particu- used for sea use and for sea denial too;
larly those of free access, it will need to they are merely much more suited to one
pay a high premium elsewhere in the than to another, that is all. So, once
form, probably, of stress on its diplomatic
and economic resources; because expect- 'I am not sure that the more acute sea
ing allies to do all one's dktant-water power pundits like Mahan and Corbett ever
work is, as we have previously suggested, used 'Command of the sea' in an absolute
way. They were always careful to qualify
illogical in the light of recent experience. the term at some stage, to allow for local
Japan Is the nearest example we have of challenges and anomalies.
326
THE MEDIUM MARITIME POWER-111
again, it is a question of the relative
w i g h t to be applied to the two sorts of
operation. If teriitorial integrity is
paramount, no doubt sea denial will be
uppermost in the medium power's policy;
if free access, sea use. And it goes
without saying that the homelaway
weighting will have an influence on the
balance that is finally achieved.
I t is worth pointing out that the use
of a small fixed area of sea can be
secured by the denial of it to all foreign
ships. Economic zones spring to mind,
but the observation does not apply only
to home waters necessarily; think of the
French nuclear tests in the Pacific. The
method is undoubtedly crude, and
probably takes disproportionate resources. Most medium powers would be
better advised to confine sea-denial
operations to home security (antigunrunning, for instance) and actual
conflicts approaching o r at the higher
level. But some of the newer medium
powers seem set on some form of sea
denial, in normal conditions, in their
adjacent waters.
Discussion
I t is almost a matter of definition, and
certainly flows from the first two articles
lin this series, as well as the present one,
that a medium power cannot unaided
protect all its vital interests in the
maritime field. I t may do all it can to be
self-sufficient without exploiting anyone
else, to be on ffiendly terms with all and
sundry, to cult in fact la bella figura in
the world; it may even try, as W. W.
Fisher said, to be 'very strong, and
always right'. But there are a great many
incompatibilities in such aspirat5ons, and
even the nation that overcomes them will
find that the world is a wicked place
notwithstanding, d t h enough fear, greed
and spite t o make even the righteous
blanch.
So, once again, we return to the
question of allies, but now in the light of
all the other factors that have been
considered. No excuses need to be made
for harping on the alliance question; as I
said in the first article, it dominates the
strategy of medium powers.
First, a superpower threat demands a
superpower ally. All the careful cooperation and ccrordination in the world
between medium powers will not, when
the chips are down, help them against a
superpower if it chooses to call in aid its
'commanding advantage'. Any medium
power that does not feel itself threatened
by superpower can look for less potent
allies, and the best of luck to it.
But a superpower ally need not be in
the foreground of the action. Brazil, for
instance, no doubt relies on her membership of the Organisation of American
States, and on the Monroe Doctrine, and
regards these as quite sufficient earnest
of American help in dire trouble. The
closeness and formality of a superpowe:
alliance depend on the immediacy of the
threat and the potency of the help that
can be given, among a host of other
considerations.
I t must be remembered that in normal
conditions, and usually in low intensity
and sometimes higher level operations,
the help given by a superpower ally is
deterrent in character. I t is, typically, a
safeguard aga'inst escalation by the
opposing superpower, if directly engaged,
or against 5ts active participation if not.
But it will also be a check to actions by
any opponent, if the correct attitudes are
struck. A little more than not 'standing
idly by' perhaps; the actions of both
U.S.A. and U.S.S.R. in the various ArabIsraeli wars show the sort of limits to be
expected.
They also give a pretty good indication
of the lengths to which conflicts can go
without direct superpower 'intervention.
At sea, to be sure, conflicts are likely to
be at once less sens'itive and more internationally pervasive in their effect, and
both these considerations suggest that a
superpower might be prepared to intervene at an earlier stage than in land
conflict. But the prudent medium power
must be ready to run its own conflict up
to the higher-level threshold and some
way beyond.
This will particularly apply to conflicts
played at home on local maritime fssues.
Superpowers tend to think their clients
ought to be able to manage sea affairs
round thdr own coasts. One doubts, for
instance, if the United States would come
too briskly to the aid of Canada in a cod
war against, say, Poland. There are
certain special factors there, of course,
but there always are special factors.
In the same way, a superpower is
inclined for presentational reasons to be
more warm towards an ally conducting
sea use than sea denial operations. The
latter may look aggressive. An exception
to this rule may soon make its appearance; so strong are the nationalist
pressures for exclusive rights in coastal
waters - notably in 200-mile economic
zones - that sea-denial by a coastal
state in such areas may acquire a certain
respectabilty, and hence a better chance
of superpower support.
So far as allies other than superpowers
are concerned, it is an unpalatable fact
that they have achieved remarkably little
weight in limited (including maritime)
dispute and conflict over the past thirty
years. Once again the 1973 Arab-Israeli
war h instructive. For some years previously, pundits had been saying the
world had stopped being 'bipolar'; superpower was eroding; there were at least
five centres of power. But in October,
1973, beyond the protagonists, only
Ametica and Russia mattered. Of course
this is a harsh judgment. And yes, the
solidatity of European NATO is very
important; and no doubt Pakistan and
Iran feel heartened by each other's
relative strength in the Arabian Sea. But
the collective defence achieved by these
groupings has not proved particularly
effective in cris'is when unbacked by
superpower.
What, then, is the medium power really
327
trying to do to protect its vital interests?
If these are coincident with those of a
superpower ally, that is fine: it can
shelter, making such contribution as will
make the ally stay an ally. But they will
not be coincident, that is the trouble.
Thus the medium power must - given
the reluctance of superpowers to get
involved - be able to take on, at home
and probably away, a range of operations
at low intensity and at the transition to
higher level, in defence of its own vital
interests at sea.
What happens after that transition is
the crucial question. I think the best
way of answering it is this. The medium
power must be able t o convince ~ t s
opponent and its superpower ally that it
is not going to give in without a major
and sustained act of war, extending well
into the higher level of operations. The
ally must be faced with a very fair
prospect of having to intervene militarily
- to satisfy its own public opinion, to
maintain its reputation as a reliable ally,
to keep the friendship of its medium
power ally, or to forestall unacceptable
damage to the medium power's vital
interests, or a combination of these
reasons.
Translate this now back into deterrent
terms. If the medium power has the
maiitime forces capable of conducting
low intensity operations effectively over a
long period; and then of sustaining
operations at a higher level such that
superpower involvement becomes likely,
or even a fair possibility, then a rational
opponent will see all ithose moves abead
on the chessboard and will see that his
option of using force in this case is
blocked. He has been deterred.
The price of superpower loyalty will,
of course, have to be paid by the medium
power. I t may be in terms of economic
advantages to the superpower; or bases;
o r political support; or military support
on occasion. It must not, in my view,
extend to a distortion of medium-power
328
THE MEDIUM MARITIME POWER-1x1
forces that will negate the process
described above.
Gaullism or realism?
There is not much room for altruism
in the conduct of international relations.
The nearest most nations get to it is
'enlightened selfinterest'. So there will
be no apology from me for putting
forward a theory that depends, if you
want t o be nasty, on buying and then
blackmailing allies, bullying enemies and
playing both ends against the middle. I t
is the protection of d t a l interests that we
are talking about, and those of medium
powers at that. Come the day when, for
instance, Western European nation-states
become federated states of an United
Europe, then all will be changed; for a
european superpower must evolve. Till
then, we must live by our wits.
And yes, it probably h Gaull!ist as well
as realist. Translated into, and limited to,
maritime terms, it is certainly the sort of
strategy I think de Gaulle was driving ats.
If to seek real autonomy, not just its
Illusion, in the defence of one's vital
interests is GaulEist, then I believe no
apology is required for Gaullism.
Operational and material implications
One might be forgiven for thinking
that the emphasis on autonomy and
independence of action, which has been
a characteristic of this series and has
reached an apparent culmination in the
last page or so, will lead t o force
requirements that are beyond the means
of any medium power.
But I believe this is not so. When one
goes carefully into the homelaway
equation; the emphasis on low-intensity
and limited higher-level operations; and
the criteria of vital interests, it will I
believe be possible to suggest quite
sens'ible force requirements for the consideration of medium powers. This, with
perhaps some special applications for the
very old or the very young among the
medium powers, will be the subject of
the next article.
'Pace Vice-Admiral A. Sanguinetti. In his
brilliantly-written set of articles in Le Monde
at the end of J 3 e 1976 entitled Ze
Changement a Petits Pas' Sanguinetti puts
forward a muoh more extreme account of
Gaullit strategy Yet I find it significant
that at one critlcal point in his development
of France's 'struggle for her (strategic)
independence' he says she is in a 'position
de perturbateur'. Just so. This seems to me
a function of medium power (and an
accurate description of France's m l position) much more than the 'grandeur' which
Sanguinetti advocates elsewhere.
MARLOWE
( t o be continued)
Let the Falkland Islands Stay British
In March 1968 the following appeal
signed by four Members of the Fallcland
Islands' Executive Committee was sent
to all Members of Parliament:
Negotiations are now proceeding
between the British and Argentine
governments which may result at
any moment in the handing over
of the Falkland Islands to
Argentina. The inhabitants of the
islands have never yet been consulted regarding their future.
They do not want to become
Argentinians. They are as British
as you are, mostly of English and
Scottish ancestry, even to the sixth
generation . . . The people of the
islands do not wish to submit to a
foreign language, law, customs
and culture because for 135 years
they have happily pursued their
own peaceful way of life - a
very British way of life.
The letter ended: Is our tiny community to be used as a pawn in power
politics? . . . . What can you do to
prevent it? . . . . We need your help! '
Such an emotive appeal could have left
no doubt in any reader's mind as to the
Falkland Islanders true feelings.
Now, eight years later, such pleas are
still voiced despite continued assurances
from the British Government that
Britain intends to retain sovereignty over
the islands and that there are no plans
for a 'sell-out' to Argentina. Why then
should these fears continue, especially
at a time when the pink of the far-flung
British Empire has long since vanished,
almost entirely, from the world map?
There is no short or easy answer. However, it is the purpose of this article to
trace in some detail the negotiations that
have taken place between Great Britain
and Argentina, to look at the present
p i t i o n of the Islands and their
inhabitants and to show why, beyond the
passionate jingoism, there are several
continuing and substantial reasons why
the Falkland Islands should remain
British. First, though, there is a need to
look briefly at their geographical position
and historical background. Such considerations, when studying the Falklands,
cannot be ignored for it is their natural
remoteness, the continuation by the
Islanders of an almost feudal way of life
and an inbred understanding of their
history that colours so much of their
thinking and relationships with Great
Britain and Argentina.
Geography
The Falkland Islands (known in
Argentina as Las Islas Malvinas) consist
of two large and some three hundred
small islands with a total land area of
about 4,700 square miles. They are set
deep in the South Atlantic, 200 miles
from Argentina and 300 miles from
Cape Horn. Their physical appearance
is one of deeply indented fiord-type
coastlines, with several good anchorages,
sharp-peaked hills and treeless moofland
countryside. Such characteristics as
these, despite being 8,000 miles from
Britain, make them similar ~
many
II ways
to the Western and Northern Isles of
Scotland. Yet it is not only that there
are geographical similarities but recently
the Falklands have, like the Scottish
islands, suffered a sharp decline in their
land-based economy and, in turn, a
steady exodus of the population. As it is,
their population is now less than 2,000,
about half of whom live in Stanley, the
capital, the remainder in settlements in
the countryside, or 'Camp' as it is known
locally.
The Islands are in the same latitude
south as London is north, but there is
little similarity in the climate which is
appreciably colder, and there are per-
330
LET THE FALKLAND ISLANDS
sistent strong winds. Nearly all the
population is of British descent and
English is the only language spoken.
Sheep raising is the main occupation and
provides work for nearly a quarter of
the population. The Falkland Islands
also have as dependencies South Georgia
and the Sandwich Islands which lie
nearly 1,000 miles south-east in the
South Atlantic. Except for a small
British Antarctic Survey research
station on South Georgia these islands
are uninhabited and of IMe, or unknown, economic value.
History
The hidtory of the discovery and early
occupation of the islands is much more
complicated and obscure. Although
probably sighted a hundred years earlier,
the first known landing was not until
1690. This was by Captain John Strong
who named the Islands after Viscount
Falkland, then Treasurer of the Navy.
I t was the French, however, who were
the first t o establish themselves there
with a small colony in 1764. Two years
later a British expedition, unaware of
their presence, also established a settlement of about a hundred people and
claimed the islands for King George 111.
In the meantime France had sold her
rights to Spain who in 1770 compelled
the British to leave and almost brought
the two countries to the verge of war
al,though, after protracted negotiations with the Spaniards, the Btitish
settlement was handed back and conflict
averted. Then, in 1774, the British
withdrew their settlement for reasons of
economy though not without leaving
behind a plaque claiming the islands as
their 'sole right and property'. The
Spanish likewise withdrew in 1811, but
also maintained their claim.
In 1828 a new settlement was established by Luis Vernet, a Frenchman by
birth, but South American by naturalisation, who proclaimed the islands for the
Buenos Aires government which had
STAY BRITISH
declared its independence of Spain some
ten years earlier and therefore regarded
itself as the legal inheritor of all Spanish
claims to the islands. However, this
claim was not recognised and the United
States of America, alleging acts of sealing piracy by the Argentinians, sent a
warship to destroy the new settlement.
I n 1833 a British warship visited the
remains of the settlement; the Argentine
garrison left under protest and the
British occupation of the islands was
resumed. Since then the islands have
remained under continuous British
occupation and administration, indeed
several of the Island's families today can
trace their ancestry back to the settlers
of over one hundred years ago.
Argentine claims
I t is mainly, therefore, on historical
grounds that Argentina today bases her
claim to the 'Islas Malvinas'. Although
there have now been added declarations
that they are Argentine by right of
geographical proximity and that their
present colonial status is anachronistic.
Such claims to sovereignty have been
advanced over many years and are still
today, besides being an important
weapon in the Argentine diplomatic
armoury, a very highly charged issue to
certain right-wing Argentine political
parties.
This was clearly demonstrated in
October 1975 when Argentina, on hearing that Great Britain intended sending
an economic mission to the Falkland
Islands, immediately withdrew her
ambassador in London, Senor Manuel de
Anchorena, to Buenos Aires. The
mission, headed by Lord Shackleton,
eventually arrived in the Falklands on
4 January 1976 having taken passage
from Montevideo (Uruguay) on'board the
Royal Navy's ice-patrol ship H.M.S.
Endurance. This %&-door' method of
entry inflamed the sovereignty issue once
again and despite Argentina having been
invited to add their own observers to the
team they demanded that Great Britain
withdraw
her
ambassador
from
Buenos Aires. The Foreign Secretary,
Mr. James Callaghan, bowed to this
pressure and Mr. Derrick Ashe was
officially recalled 'for consultations'. This
latest move is believed to be a conciliatory gesture designed to play down
the seriousness of the situation which
was only precipitated by Argentina's
angry reaction over the survey. Probably
a further reason for the continued
Argentine propaganda about the Falklands is that their Government, beset by
so many internal problems, uses this
dispute as an issue which has popular
support to divert attention from some of
the
more
controversial
domestic
measures they are frequently compelled
to enforce.
Argentina has also put forward claims
to the Falkland Islands Dependencies.
These, like the claim to the Islands
themselves, have either been based on
their proximity to Argentina or on the
alleged inheritance of the title from
Spain. Britain has rejected all these
claims as being without legal or historical
foundation, and since 1947 has offered to
submit the dispute to the International
Court of Justice at The Hague.
Argentina, however, has declined to
reccugnise the Court's jurisdiction in
the matter which remains for the present
unresolved.
The British Government has always
stated that it has no doubt about its
rightful sovereignty over the Falkland
Islands although this, as demonstrated
by the islanders' appeal quoted earlier, is
certainly not an attitude which is entirely
believed.
Developments between Great Britain and
Argentina
Appeal to the United Nations. The
Falkland Islands' position as a non-seifgoverning territory was first debated by
the United Nations Committee on
Cobnialism in 1964. This was after
331
elected representatives of the Islands had
informed the Committee of the population's wish to retain its association with
Britain and not to become independent
or associated with any other country. It
was on this first occasion too that the
British delegation to the Committee
pointed out that the Argentine claim was
contrary to the principle of selfdetermination contained in Article 73 of
the UN Charter wherein both countries
were 'bound as a matter of duty to have
regard first and foremost to the wishes
of the inhabitants'. Nevertheless the UN
Committee recommended that the
governments should be invited to hold
discussions 'with a view to finding a
peaceful solution to the problem', bearing in mind the interests of the Falkland
Islanders themselves. This resolution
was finally adopted in the same words by
the 20th General Assembly of the
United Nations on 16 December 1965
and although Argentina voted for the
resolution, Great Britain abstained.
Initial Talks. In January of the year
following the UN recommendation,
Mr. Michael Stewart, then British
Foreign Secretary, visited Argentina and
agreed with the Argentine Foreign
Minister, Dr. Zavala Ortiz, that officials
of both countries should pursue discussions through the normal diplomatic
channels. Accordingly, exploratory talks
commenced on 18 July 1966 in London
between the Foreign Office and members
of the Argentine Embassy. At the time,
though, the British Press reported that
it was the U.K. government's view that
sovereignty could not be discussed unless
the shipping restrictions then in force
between the Falklands and Argentine
ports were removed. Whether this was
the reason for the stalemate in the talks
or not is unknown, but it was agreed
that they would be postponed until later
in the year and the arrival of a new
Argentine ambassador in London.
Attempted 'Invasion'. A rather bizarre
incident then occurred which served to
332
show that feelings over sovereignty, in
spite of the comparative diplomatic
equanimity, still ran high in Argentina
and in the Falklands. This was the
'symbolic' invasion of the Falkland
Islands by a self-styled 'commando'
group of eighteen members of the
extreme right wing nationalistic organisation, Movimiento Nuevo Argentino
(New Argentine Movement). The
invasion took the form of hijacking a
Tierra del Fuego bound DC4 of
Aerolineas Argentinas and forcing it to
land safely on the 300 yard long racecourse at Stanley. There the 'commandos' donned battledress, stuck
Argentine flags in the ground and formed
an armed cordon around the airliner
whilst they read a proclamation to the
effect that all inhabitants of the 'Islas
Mal~inas' were henceforth Argentine
citizens. They also seized some hostageq
but after twenty-four hours the invasion
petered out and the invaders were persuaded to surrender. However, the commandos had managed to send a message
to Buenos Aires giving their reasons for
the invasion and this led to a wave of
anti-British demonstrations, mainly by
neo-fascist parties and 'peronistas',
throughout Argentina. President Ongania
of the Argentine, although condemning
the demonstration and dissociating his
government from the incident by promising trial for conspiracy for the commandos, did not lose the opportunity to
re-affirm his country's claim t o the
Falkland Islands. The invaders were
eventually shipped back to Argentina in
a naval transPo&.
Vulnerability o f the Islands. This incident, despite its Gilbert and Sullivan-ish
overtones and its negligible influence on
political moves by either of the major
governments, did clearly illustrate to the
Falkland
Islanders
their
extreme
vulnerability to any Argentine invasion,
'symbolic' or otherwise. I t also increased
their fears that the British Government
was neither prepared nor willing to back
them should such a situation occur.
These fears were not allayed, either by
the joint note sent by Britain and
Argentina in December 1967 to the UN
Secretary General stating that both
countries had been able to make progress,
or by the UN reply that urged them 'to
continue with their negotiations so as to
find a peaceful solution as soon as
possible'.
Further Negotiations. High level and
confidential negotiations continued in
London throughout 1968 only gaining
widespread publicity on publication of
the Falklanders' written appeal to MPs.
This encouraged a spate of questions in
both the House of Lords and the House
of Commons as to the British Government's true motives. Though it was
Mr. Goronwy Roberts, then Minister of
State at the Foreign Office who, when
asked for an assurance that the Falkland
Islands would not be ceded to Argentina
against the wishes of the inhabitants,
forcefully replied 'I am aware that the
great majority of the population of the
Falkland Islands wish to retain their
Bfitish citizenship. I do not know of any
plans to take it away from them. In any
event the Government will see that there
is the fullest consultation with the
population.' This was firmly in line with
Britain's previously expressed views to
the United Nations that the selfdetermination of the Islanders would
always be of paramount importance.
Visit by Lord Chalfont. In November
1968 feelings in the Falkland Islands and
questions in both Houses on the need for
the government talks to be 'confidential',
prompted Lord Chalfont, then Minister
of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, to visit the Islands and
explain the intentions of the British
Government himself. There he constantly
reiterated the British pledge not to
transfer sovereignty without prior
consent of the Islanders but he did
remind the inhabitants that Great Britain
was no longer the great imperialist
power of the 19th Century and that when
they waved flags 'Keep the Falklands
British' they should know that this stood
for something different to what it did in
1900. In other words the days of
'gunboat diplomacy', with a heavily
armed battle-cruiser flying the White
Ensign at anchor in Stanley harbour,
had long since passed.
Predictably, on Lord Chalfont's return
to Britain there was a further round of
questions in both Houses whioh kept the
Falkland Islands negotiations very much
a subject of public interest. However,
except for reports that two Argentine
newspapers had favourably reported his
visit and agreed that any changes in
sovereignty should take account of the
islanders' wishes, there was no statement
other than one in similar terms by British
politicians. I t had become apparent,
though, that for the first time the
Falklands Islands Executive Council had
finally accepted that the British Government had been acting in good faith in the
talks with Argentina and would continue
to do so.
Agreement
Over
Communications.
Further confidential talks between the
British and Argentine Governments on
the future of the territory continued
throughout 1969. I t was at this time too
that Argentina first made known its
readiness to discuss lifting the ban on
direct communications between the
mainland and the islands and special talks
to promote communications began in
London in 1970. For the first time
such discussions included participants
from the Falkland Islands. By 1971,
it became even more important
to establish good communications between the Colony and Argentina in view
of the decision by the Falkland Islands
Company to withdraw from service by
the end of that year the only regular
shipping link with the mainland, the
mailboat Darwin which had hitherto
made twelve journeys a year between
Stanley and Montevideo. As a result of
333
special discussions agreement was reached
over a wide field covering air and sea
communications, postal services, education and medical facilities for Falkland
Islanders in Buenos Aires, relaxation of
travel documentation and customs
measures. The full arrangements were
contained in a Joint Statement initialled
by officials of the British and Argentine
Governments in Buenos Aires on 1 July
1971.
At last, therefore, progress had been
made although many Falkland Islanders
remained far from convinced that their
future with Britain was secure. This may
have come from a conclusion in the Joint
Statement where the joint delegates
agreed that certain measures should be
adopted on the understanding that they
might contribute to the 'process of a
solution' in the disputes between the two
governments over
the
Falklands.
However, two months
later an
Exchange of Notes between the British
and Argentine governments announced
that nothing in the Joint Statement
should be interpreted as a renunciation
of any right of territorial sovereignty
over the Islands or a recognition of the
other government's position in this
matter. Thus, despite the very significant
agreements that had been reached, there
was still a very cool approach by both
major powers to the underlying problem
of sovereignty.
Current Developments. As part of bhe
Joint Statement the Argentine Government had agreed to provide an amphibian
air service after the cessation of the sea
link and this they did until the Argentine
Air Force built a temporary airfield at
Stanley in 1972. This established the
islands with their first ever regular air
link with the Argentine and provided a
once weekly flight from Commodoro
Rivaderia to Stanley. The airfield is at
present being extended by engineers of
the Argentine Army using sections of
portable airstrip which will allow bigger
and faster aircraft to land and provide a
334
greater margin of safety.
Further meetings were held in Stanley
in 1972 and London in 1973 and at the
latter the British Government announced
a grant of £43 million for the construction of a permanent airfield at Cape
Pembroke which is now taking place
under the direction of a British firm.
Despite difficulties in getting heavy
equipment to the Islands, movement of
it once there, and the discovery of an
old naval gunnery range on the proposed
site, it is now expected that the venture
will be completed in 1976.
However, there can be few good
economic reasons for building this
airfield as it is doubtful if any commercial company would have been interested
in providing the capital, so that its only
justification must be purely political.
Britain has also agreed to the construction of a fuel depot for both commercial
and domestic fuel and this has recently
been completed in Stanley by an
Argentine oil company YPF (Yaciementos Petroliferos Fiscales) and with
Argentine labour. Since the 1971 Joint
Statement therefore, there has been a
growing Argentine influence and physical
presence in the Falklands which,
although confined to Stanley and entirely
logical and justified in the circumstances,
is still viewed with the utmost suspicion
by many of the Islanders.
The Fallcland Islands Committee. Such
views are also held by the Falkland
Islands Committee, a private Londonbased group of MPs and businessmen,
which was founded in 1968 for the
purpose of 'assisting the Islanders to
formulate views on all questions of their
future and to represent their views to the
UN and the world'. This Committee was,
and still is, reluctant to support any
commercial activity unless it is in the
interest of the Islanders.
Results o f Anglo-Argentine Negotiation.
Britain has continually refuted any
suggestion that the communications
arrangements represent an erosion of
British sovereignty or are part of a
scheme designed to speed integration
with
the
Argentine.
Conversely,
Argentina has accused Great Britain and
the Falklands of regarding the communications agreement as a substitute
solution for the 'definite' problem,
although a further United Nations resolution In November 1973 called on both
the UK and the Argentine to 'accelerate
negotiations'. There has been no wavering in Britain's resolve to transfer
sovereignty against the wishes of the
Islanders and the belief is that inter alia,
the communications arrangements have
gone some way towards softening the
Argentine claim.
Economic position
Wool Trade. As !to be expected in a
community where sheep farming is the
main occupation, the income of the
Colony is derived almost entirely from
wool. However, prices of wool depend
on the London Wool Market and after
two extraordinarily good seasons,
1972173 and 1973174, the prices for the
current season are expected to be half
that of previous years. This, coupled
with the gradual de-population, does not
present an encouraging picture. In recent
years scientific studies have been made
of methods of improving the pastures
and the sheep farming industry. Experts
have now come to the unanimous conclusion that unless there is heavy reinvestment of farm profits in pasture
improvement as a long term policy then
the wealth of the Falkland Islands will
certainly decline. There are no other
exports from the Islands besides wool
and virtually everything has to be
imported, particularly foodstuffs, manufactured goods and machinery.
New Industries. Other possible sources
of income for the Islands that have been
considered are the export of sheep on
the hoof and the refrigeration of
carcasses on the islands and their
subsequent export. Neither has achieved
any success and the latter project proved
to be badly managed and a failure. A
new industry, Alginate Industries Ltd.,
was established in Stanley two years ago
to exploit the extensive beds of seaweed
(kelp) which are a feature of the colony's
coas'tline, by extracting the alginic acid
which is used extensively in the plastics
and textiles industries. This commercial
utilisation of seaweed has proved
exceptionally profitably on certain of
Scotland's west coast islands, thus
providing another similarity to the
Falklands, but after an encouraging start
plans for any further production were
postponed in July 1975.
The Falklands
Islands
Company.
Involved in almost every facet of the
Island's economy is the Falkland Islands
Company. This was founded in 1851 and
is now the largest landowner and trading
company. They own nearly half the
freehold estate of the islands which
produces half the annual wool crop, thus
making their profitability, like that of
the Islands, largely dependent on the
state of the London Wool Market.
Their revenue from shipping, banking,
stevedoring, wholesale and retail traae
around the islands is very much subsidiary to their profits from wool and
during 1974 they began negotiations f6r
the sale of some of these ancillary assets.
The Company has a secure base in
London and has been taken over twice
in recent years, the latest occasion being
in 1974 by Charrington, Gardner and
Locket, a financial company within the
Charrington Group. Although their
attempts to sell off their assets have
petered out, Argentina has from time to
time shown an interest in buying a share
in the Falkland Islands Company, in the
hope that this might diminish opposition
to their sovereignty pretensions. Predictably enough the Falkland Islands
Executive Council, the elected governing
body in the islands, has stzited that it
would never agree to the issue of land-
335
holding licences to an Argentine
company.
Increases in the Tourist Trade. Tourism
has continually been heralded by some
as the saviour of the Island's economy
but except for wild life, fishing and some
rugged scenery there is not a great deal
to offer. Neither could more than four
hundred tourists in a season be comfortably envisaged. Nevertheless, the weekly
air service has produced a steady flow of
tourists and cruise ships of all nationalities, including Argentine, regularly
call and a brisk business in duty free
luxury goods is done by Stanley shopkeepers. At this level there can be no
appreciable benefit to the economy
overall so representations have been
made to the British Government suggesting that the airfield at present being built
should be extended to take long distance
jets. Without an accurate advance assessment of the economic potential of such
a project there is little likelihood of it
taking place. Likewise there is not really
a strong case for a large new hotel in
Stanley; it is conceivable, however, that
an overseas investor might find this
attractive or, again, that an injection of
public capital could get such a project off
the ground. Nevertheless, Britain has
been involved in a number of Develop
ment Aid projects, including grants for
the extension of the power station and
electricity supply system and a fencing
subsidy scheme.
At present, however, the economy
remains in a poor state and tourism,
whilst being important to a degree, can
have no hope of saving the colony on
its own. The question remains, what
could save it? The answer to this is
thought to be oil. I t is this subject which
gives the Falkland Islands their last and
most significant similarity to the islands
off Scotland's northern coast.
Oil potential
Exploration. Since 1969 land the issue
of one prospecting licence by the
336
Falkland Islands Executive Council,
which was promptly withdrawn when
the full implications of such a decision
were appreciated, the British Government
has received a number of enquires to
explore for oil in the Falkland Islands
continental shelf. However, no licences
have been issued, neither have any
promises been made. In an effort to
establish the geological likelihood of oil
being contained offshore in the Falklands,
Professor D. H. Griffiths of Birmingham
University was commissioned by Britain
in 1972 to make a critical study of the
area. His report, completed in 1975,
concluded that 'the prognosis in certain
areas was sufficiently promising to
encourage commercial exploitation'.
With such a recommendation the report
was submitted to Sir Peter Kent, Chairman of the Natural Environment
Research Council and an eminent
geologist, for his evaluation. He in turn
confirmed Professor Griffiths' findings
which, he thought, although of a
reconnaissance nature, were such as 'to
encourage rather than discourage further
exploration'. Professor Griffiths' data is
now being enhanced by computer
processing which when complete will
enable the structure of the parts of the
Falkland Islands continental shelf he
surveyed to be even more thoroughly
assessed.
The issue of licences remains a
contentious subject. After the first
mistake it was realised that the present
system was inadequate and would not
enable the Falkland Islands government
to reap the sort of benefits that offshore
oil licencing authorities expect. The
British Government is therefore at
present reviewing the Falkland Islands
legislation relating to offshore oil
exploration and exploitation and the
results are expected in 1976.
lntcrrzational Law. Even ncw Britain
could, under International Law, claim
exclusive rights to issue mineral prospecting licences. These would be for the
seabed under the territorial sea of the
Falkland Islands and beyond that area
on the continental shelf to a depth of
200 metres, or outside that limit to
where the depth of water still allows the
natural resources of the sea to be
exploited. This would naturally be
subject to the proviso that any continental shelf going beyond the median
line between Argentina and the Falklands
could not be claimed. Argentina, unlike
the U.K., has not ratified the Geneva
Convention Agreement (1958) relating to
the Continental Shelf and thus again the
question of sovereignty looms large. This
could become even further complicated
by the outcome of the proposals put
forward alt the Third United Nations
Conference on the Law of the Sea held
at Geneva in May 1975. Here a territorial
limit of 200 miles out from the coastline
was claimed by Latin American
countries, including Argentina, although
Great Britain was amongst those who
favoured a 200 mile exclusive economic
zone (EEZ). There was also the suggestion
that such EEZs could be claimed for
colonies as well as sovereign states, so
that if this was to happen Great Britain
could claim an economic zone stretching
out for 200 miles around the Islands.
Present Situation. The laltest application
for exclusive rights to explore for oil in
the Falklands area was made in
November 1974 by the Ashland Oil Co.
of Canada. Although refused, it sparked
off a campaign in a Buenos Aires
newspaper that 'Argentine' oil was being
stolen by the British Government.
Nevertheless, there is no doubt that any
unilateral issue of licences would seriously
damage relations between the two
countries. Indeed those companies that
have made requests for oil exploration
licences have confirmed that before
starting work they would want AngloArgentine agreement, thus ensuring that
their operations could proceed without
harassment. Therefore there is no
escape from the conclusion that if oil is
to be found and extracted for the benefit
of the Falkland Islands and the United
Kingdom, it can only be done in agreement with Argentina. Most islanders
likewise believe that exploitation of their
offshore oil must be with the cooperation
of the Argentine.
Defence considerations
337
in the South Atlantic and, therefore,
possibly the Falkland Islands, deserves
consideration, because South Africa is
keen to encourage defence links based
on such common interests. Whereas
trade in the early 1960s between the two
continents was on a very small scale
marked increases have taken plhce in the
last ten years. This is noticeable in the
figures for Brazilian and Argentinian
trade with South Africa and other
African countries. The indications are
that the precentage of their total trade
which is with Africa, whilst not yet large,
is increasing.
There have been suggestions too that
in view of the recent Soviet naval
expansion world-wide, including into the
South Atlantic, a South Atlantic Treaty
Organisation (SATO) could be formed
from those countries primarily interested.
One of these would undoubtedly be
Argentina who, at the same time as
developing her foreign policy, is building
up her Navy. This has included the
purchase of two 'IKL 1000' submarines
from West Germany and two Type 42
destroyers from Great Britain (one of
which is being built in Buenos Aires) as
well as the possible purchase of six
Type 21 frigates, also from the United
Kingdom. The Soviet Union has
been active militarily in Angola and
would undoubtedly covet a naval base on
that coastline to supplement the air base
she already has at Conakry in Guinea.
Whilst there is no mention of the
Falkland Islands in such developments,
distances can shrink almost as fast as
facilities in distant countries can expand.
I t is conceivable therefore that the
Falkland Islands, once considered so
remote, could achieve a maritime
strategic importance that they have only
experienced, perhaps significantly, in the
last two World Wars.
Defence of the Islands. The bcal defence
of the Falkland Islands is at present in
the hands of the Falkland Islands
Defence Force which is a voluntary and
part-time organisation. There is also a
unit (NP 8901) of Royal Marines on a
year's detachment from the UK. They
comprise one officer and thirty-five
marines and are stationed in barracks at
Moody Brook just outside Stanley. Their
main function is one of aid to the civil
community although they do provide a
continuous British military presence in
the Islands and help with the training of
the local volunteer force.
The possibility of an invasion by
Argentina cannot really be taken
seriously in spite of the abortive 'attempt'
in 1968. However, if a full-scale military
landing was attempted, there would be
very little in the form of real opposition.
On the other hand, Argentina must
realise that such an attack would completely destroy their claim in the United
Nations to rightful sovereignty as well as
shattering any hopes they undoubtedly
have for co-operation with the United
Kingdom in the exploitation of offshore
oil.
Strategic Importance. Thus It (is not $he
military importance of the Falkland
Tslands themselves which claims interest,
but their geographical position and
possible strategic importance in the
South Atlantic. Trading links between
South America and South Africa are
becoming more important and the
Falkland Islands are not so far south of
the direct shipping routes between Conclusion
Bahia Blanca or Buenos Aires and
I t is ten years since the Falkland
Capetown. The Latin American interest Islands first publicly voiced, in the United
338
Nations, dissatisfaction with their status.
Since then the governments of Great
Britain and the Argentine Republic have
had continuous meetings and reached
agreement on a number of important
subjects. Unfortunately, these have not
included the fundamental question of
sovereignty. Both countries wholeheartedly believe in their sovereign rights
to determine their own future. This
statement alone, it could be argued, is
enough reason for the Falkland Islands
to remain British, as there can be no
doubt that this is the way they would
determine their own future if ever it
became necessary.
Moreover, the negotiations have shown
that the Islands should remain British,
if they are ever to salvage anything from
their rapidly declining economy. This is
particularly important in view of the
exploitation of their possible offshore oil.
Britain's recognition of this and her
continued interest is illustrated by the
recent Government mission to discuss
further economic aid. Politically, too, the
Falkland Islands should begin to realise
that their colonial status is a thing of the
past and to understand that relationships
between countries are no longer a straight
settlement of black and white issues but
rather a slow and meticulous process of
bargaining and co-operation. That
Great Britain is prepared to conduct, on
the Falkland Islands behalf, such discussions with her neighbour should only
serve to highlight another reason why
the islands should remain British.
If these are reasons for the Falkland
Islands to remain British, then there are
similar political and economic justifications for Great Britain herself to ensure
that this is so. For beyond the moral
obligations, wgich are considerable, there
is the possible wealth from offshore oil;
the bargaining over extending territorial
waters, which would have repercussions
elsewhere; the unassessed potential of
tourism and the increased strategic
importance of the Islands in relation to
the possible formation of a SAT0 or to
Soviet expansion in the South Atlantic.
All are subjects which deserve continued
examination and which could never be
dismissed in a matter of months, or even
years.
If the inhabitants of Stanley, or the
'Camp', wish to continue painting their
corrugated-iron roof-tops in rainbow
colours, stopping work in mid-morning
for a colonial 'smoko' or watching the
Union Jack fluttering over Government
House, then there should be little to
prevent them. They should realise
though, that it is now the mid-1970s and
changes to their way of life, more important than changes in their local
customs, are not only inevitable, but
would always be negotiated in good faith
by Great Britain and to their ultimate
advantage. If the Falkland Islands were
a 'pawn in power politics' they would
most likely have been swept from the
board several years ago. They are not;
and that is another reason why they
should remain British.
R. C. PAINE
Mostly From the Bridge-I11
DUNKIRK
- OPERATION Dynamo
'. . . . I hope and trust in God that we shall all behave as becomes us. . .'
(Camin George Duff, H.M.S. Mars, writing to ,his wife as 'the B~litishFleet
closed the enemy off Cape Trafalgar, 21 October 1805)
Captain (D)16 (Captain T. E. Halsey,
R.N.) on arrival off Dover at about 2200
on 27 May 1940, had been ordered to
take four destroyers under his orders, and
proceed to La Panne to embark troops.
Captains and navigating officers who
knew the Channel and East Coast of
England in the war will remember the
mass navigational warnings one had to
deal with, and the speed with which
information could become out of date.
With time to get my charts up to date
during the previous week I was luckier
than many. Nevertheless one was always
a bit anxious when entering unfamiliar
waters in case unfriendly Germans had
laid mines in one's path, or one had made
a slip in plotting a mark or minefield;
and if one failed 'to sight a buoy, had
one made a mistake or had it been
sunk or removed? A good sounding
machine was one's best friend (as it still
is in these days of radar). So we set
course for La Panne with qualified
confidence on my part, though I tried
not to show it.
Luckily all the essential sea-marks
proved to be on station and we buoyhopped without much difficulty round the
shoals and across the deeps. Before we
left the Downs we removed our asdic
dome, which was of an early type which
could not be housed internally and had
to be unbolted and pulled up over the
ship's side like a collision mat. This at
least reduced one possible damage hazard
and its absence was unimportant in
waters where submarines were most
unlikely to operate, though its minedetection capacity, not very high anyway,
might be missed. This reduced our
draught forward by about three feet,
leaving the screws as the deepest part of
the ship. Having planned the passage,
my thoughts turned to the job we were
being sent to do. Such was my
ignorance of the real situation that I
supposed we were going to bring off some
army unit that had got cut off (as at
Boulogne shortly beforehand) and that
we might be able to do most of it in the
hours of darkness before we would be
exposed to air attack, about which our
earlier experiences had left us with no
illusions. When I shared my thoughts
with the Captain he only grunted. No
doubt he knew that the whole British
Army was retreating to the coast and
we were going to have to go on as long
as there was anyone t o pick up.
We anchored off La Panne at about
0100, relieved at having got there so
easily, lowered all our boats (two
motor boats and two whalers), and sent
them off towards the beach to look for
soldiers. Apart from general instructions
to our consorts there was little we could
tell them, and in fact as the situation
developed ships acted independently
under the direction of Flag Officer,
Dover (Vice-Admiral B. S. Ramsay),
with their only objective to embark
soldiers as fast as possible and take them
back to Dover, or other specified Channel
port. On that day, troops on the beach
were mainly supporting services who had
not been heavily involved in the fighting,
and their discipline was not too good.
There was a bit of 'every man for
himself' which resulted in boats being
rushed and only too often capsized.
There were a few local boats drifting
340
MOSTLY FROM THE BRIDGE-III
about unmanned, one of which Ian Cox
brought alongside and whose engine was
eventually got going by ship's staff; he
went inshore with a pistol and returned
with a load of soldiers but the engine
failed altogether before long and the boat
was discarded. It was a brilliant sunny
day with a light breeze, but a bit of swell
breaking on the beaches. Embarkation
was painfully slow, with small groups of
soldiers arriving in anything that would
float.
By 1600 we had about 450 men on
board, and returned to Dover to land
them, for Captain (D) to report on
progress to F.O. Dover, and then return
to the beaches. There had been sporadic
high level bombing all day, which we had
successfully dodged by choosing our
moment to go full ahead under full wheel.
The trouble was that there were several
other destroyers doing the same thing in
a very limited area, and why there were
no collisions I don't know. The outer
end of the Dunkirk mole had been
separated from the rest of it by a direct
hit, and a transport had been sunk on its
outer side. The mole seemed to be a
special target and we had the impression
that it was not in use for embarking
troops, but no doubt smaller vessels
(which we could not see from the eastward) were in fact using it. The next day
(Wednesday 29 May) we were working
the beaches again in much the same
conditions, but about 1545 there came a
moment when we saw a bomber flying
level and straight over us. We were
stopped at the time, and either for lack
of sea-room or lack of time, I forget
which, couldn't go ahead. Very often you
can tell as soon as the bombs leave the
aircraft whether they are going clear of
you or not, and this time they looked
nasty. The stick straddled us, a 'bomb
falling just short and another just over,
abreast the bridge. Luckily they went off
after hitting the bottom, and all we got
was a bridge-full of muddy water. As we
shook ourselves and verified that the
341
ship was undamaged we saw, a few cables
off, the Clan MacAllister on fire, so went
alongside her to see if we could help.
She was anchored and had brought eight
ALCs and their crews, consisting of
forty-five naval ratings under Captain
Cassidi and a couple of R.N.V.R.
lieutenants. All these three cfficers had
gone inshore with the first of the ALCs,
and two unserviceable craft were still on
board. The ship was ablaze aft and
smoke was coming from No. 5 hold
which we were given to understand
contained the 4-inch magazine. Her
upper deck firemain was shattered in
several places, and though water was
running out of it, it wasn't possible to get
any pressure in a hose attached to it.
No-one was taking charge on board Clan
MacAllister, so Ian Cox and Igot a
couple of hoses over from our own after
end and played them down No. 5 hold,
though the smoke emerging prevented us
from seeing what was down below. After
a bit the smoke seemed to be diminishing
so I went aft to see if anything could be
done about the fire on the poop. The
gun platform was nearly red hot and the
shot mats round the gun were blazing,
fanned by the breeze, but as the ship was
head to wind the fire was not spreading
and seemed likely to burn out. Certainly
there was no chance of our hoses doing
any good, as the nozzle pressure in them
was too low (owing to the height above
the pumps).
As I looked round I suddenly realized
that the blackened inanimate objects on
deck were corpses - scores of soldiers
who had been lying in the sun, mostly
having taken their trousers off to dry.
The most grisly sight was that of a man
who had been sitting upright against the
guardrails and had been cut in half
amidships - his haunches continued to
sit there with nothing above the waist.
In the meanwhile the troops, some
wounded, had been transferred to
Malcolm land some of &he Lascar crew
had been climbing over to us despite
342
efforts to make them stay in their own
ship. The master of (theClan MacAllister,
small blame to him, was badly shaken
and had apparently had no definite
orders. Tom Halsey told him to weigh
and return to Dover. 'I'll go if you give
me an escort' he said. 'We can't wait for
you; sail independently' said Tom.
Reading his report* one cannot but feel
what an immense burden the poor chap
was carrying, with a large ocean-going
ship attracting air attack, and no doubt
an economy outfit of officers to help him.
I now believe that navigation was half
of his anxieties, as in his report he said
he'd been reluctant to leave the Downs,
originally, without .a pilat. Anyway Clan
MacAllister was hit again soon afterwards and became a blazing wreck,
eventually settling evenly on the bottom
and becoming a useful attraction for
enemy bombers on subsequent days. The
survivors, including the master, were
taken off by H.M.S. Pangbourne.
One of the difficulties about writing
without access to official records is that
though individual events are clear in my
mind, the sequence is not: so I hope
readers who notice mistakes in chronology will forgive me. (Corrections will
be welcome).
On what must have been our third trip
(30 May) we were allocated to the Mole,
which was proving to be far the most
efficient means of embarking troops, and
had escaped further damage. In fact the
usable part of it was long enough to berth
nine destroyers and/or minesweepers (or
a mixture of both) in trots of three
vessels abreast. I t was another lovely day
and exhilarating racing other destroyers
through the Downs on the outward
passage. By this time there was the smell
of a certain sort of success in the air,
because the figures for troops brought
home were rising faster than anyone
could have hoped. However, enemy
bombing was increasing and casualties
mounting. We berthed on the mole with
ships outside us and so were immobilized
until all our trot had loaded. The soldiers
embarked without fuss. I t was very noisy,
bombs going off and AA fire from the
beaches and the ships, as well as almost
continuous small arms fire from troops
not otherwise occupied - almost entirely
ineffective. Sub-lieutenant Paul Jones, in
charge of our 3-inch AA gun mounted
between the funnels, had permission to
fire at his discretion and exercised it
manfully. He claimed to have shot down
a German aircraft, and may well have
done so, but unhappily no-one else
noticed it. Luckily he didn't succeed in
shooting down three Hudsons which
were flying low in our vicinity (and were
a real morale booster), though he did try.
I had nothing to do while we were
alongside and the thought occurred to me
that for once people might enjoy my
bagpipes, even if only as a counterirritant. So I got them out and played on
the fo'c's'le for a bit, forward of the
gangway over which troops were
embarking. This led to a ridiculous story
in which I was credited with a pied piper
act, collecting soldiers from the town,
though what a navigating officer would
be doing in the town escapes me. The
story was briefly mentioned in a Blackwoods Magazine articie, and after the war
I found a reference to it in DBvine's
Dunkirk (which is full of inaccurades),
including the snarky comment 'There is
no evidence on record as to the skill with
which he played them'. Then a distant
cousin in the U.S.A. wrote to my mother
and reported hearing the story. Anyway,
no-one mentioned me by name and I
thought it best to let the story die a
natural death. I t is extraordinary how
some such trivial incident gets exaggerated and given more currency than
thousands of infinitely more worthwhile
events. My reward came completely
unexpectedly a week later when our
Chief T.G.M. told me he was feeling
*Quoted in A.
lished in 1945.
.,,
DBvine,s Dunkirk pub-
pretty low until he heard the pipes and
then thought 'If the Navvie can do that
why shouldn't we keep our peckers up
too?' and felt better.
It is a funny thing about the pipes that
their particular form of music really does
put heart into people under stress - I
believe the fact that the pipes use the
natural scale stimulates adrenalin, which
is why people either love them or hate
them in ordinary life, and, in trouble,
benefit from an increase in their aggressive instincts. The ancients understood
the power of music as a stimulant or
healing agent, but the invention of the
modified scale in Europe, whilst opening
the way t o much more elaborate and
sophisticated possibilities in music, to
some extent emasculated it. I am in no
doubt that Orpheus used the natural
scale on his lute, and there is good
evidence that cows milk better if they
listen to the pipes regularly, which they
do with obvious pleasure.
I have said nothing about the R.A.F.
The fact was that H.M.G. knew they
couldn't afford to commit the whole of
Fighter Command to covering the B.E.F.,
as that would deprive London and other
areas, of vital importance to the
country's survival, of defence. Nevertheless a considerable effort was made and
our fighters were engaging bomber
formations and breaking them up well
inshore of the evacuation areas, so we
did not see much of them. What we saw
were the bombers who broke through,
and without doubt their aim was much
worse and their numbers much smaller
than they would otherwise have been.
We saw a few dogfights, and one, a
particularly exciting one, ended with a
fuselage, without engine or wings, coming
down like a falling silver leaf, followed
by a parachute with a pilot dangling from
it. I am sorry to say that gun and rifle
fire from the beach were directed at the
unfortunate pilot. No-one knew whether
he was 'ours' or 'theirs' but even if he
were 'theirs' it seemed a bit unsporting.
343
However the story ended happily when
a little man in light blue came running
along the mole and asked for a hitch
home, he being the pilot whose Spitfire
had just been shot from under him.
When we and the two destroyers
outside us were filled to capacity, both
down below and on deck, with men
standing so close together that they
couldn't fall over, let alone sit down, we
sailed for Dover once again. As we were
approaching the Downs, a Spitfire,
obviously in trouble, flew low down our
port side and ditched a few cables ahead.
We sent the whaler away, which recovered the pilot safely, but then the
problem was to hoist the whaler, as the
iron deck was crowded with soldiers.
When the falls were rove the soldiers
were invited to man them and the boat
came up to the davit head in style. The
Captain went to the back of the bridge
and shouted 'Well done the Army' and
a tremendous cheer answered him. We
all felt we were engaged on a very good
tri-service operation. We had over 1,000
passengers on board, more than half of
them on deck, and it is not surprising
that the ship felt unstable, and lolled
unpleasantly round corners, despite using
minimum wheel. (According t o the
records our maximum load was 1,200
men on 1 June).
On Wednesday 29 May the Bideford
had been hit whilst embarking troops off
Bray. Everyone abaft the mainmast,
including those embarking from boats
alongside the quarter deck, had been
killed. She was my previous ship and
there were still a lot of my friends on
board. Two who were killed were
Lieutenant Commander Paul Stewart
(the First Lieutenant) and Petty Officer
Collins, who as a young leading hand
had been coxswain, and I the midshipman, of @he first cutter in Malaya in
1932. Establishing mutual confidence
with him, after a sticky start, had been
one of the milestones in my growing
up, and we had a happy understanding
344
when we both found ourselves in the
Bideford in 1938. Now, in 1940, the
ship had drifted ashore and the first
tugs sent to her help had failed to find
her. Eventually the Locust (gunboat)
got her afloat and towed her for
thirty-six hours in what must have
been a nightmare for all concerned. A
heavily yawing tow is bad enough normally but when the tower draws only
five feet and the towed has no stern, and
in the traffic conditions prevailing, it was
miraculous that they made it. We berthed
alongside her overnight (31 May-1 June)
and her upper deck was still covered with
dead under flags. I went on board in the
morning to find out who had been killed
and found the officers calm but rather
Stunned; I returned on 'board Malcolm
in time to sail for our next trip. As we
cast off more reports of sinkings came
in and I think we all felt we were starting
on our last trip. We made silly jokes
on the bridge which everyone laughed
at out of suppressed nervousness. As we
cleared the breakwater a signal was
handed to the Captain: 'Immediate. F.O.
Dover t o (D)16. Return to harbour
forthwith. Daylight evacuation is being
suspended.' Now we knew what a
reprieved prisoner feels like.
Talking of feelings, those days of
brilliant light and dark shadows left some
indelible impressions. When we started
the evacuation at La Panne on the first
morning we were wondering uneasily
whether we were going to be safely back
that day. I t was not till we got F. 0 .
Dover's signal to the evacuation fleet
'Well done. Only you stand between the
British Army and disaster' that I personally realized we were in one of the
really big shows of the war and had a
chance to make up for our absence from
the Boulogne evacuation. One took a
deep breath, and if one may say so with
humility, decided that this was a worthwhile cause to lose one's life in. From
then on a sort of exaltation filled us, and
every load of soldiers that we delivered
increased the rate of exchange in our
favour. I had been married six weeks
and had everything t o live for, which
made every moment more worth living,
but my mind was at peace and I was
sustained by the satisfaction of using
what skills I had ~acqui~edto real
purpose. All this in the context of serving
a Captain whom we loved, and sharing
the hours with a wonderful set of officers
whose only thought was to do the job as
well as possible. We didn't think, as we
saw other ships hit, 'It couldn't happen
to us', but accepted that it would be time
enough to worry about it when it did.
Once the decision to stop daylight
evacuation had been made and it was
realized that the destroyers and minesweepers could be most efficiently employed embarking troops from what was
left of the mole, we were given a
sequence and a rough time-table for
going alongside, and left Dover after
dark. One night we berthed on the mole
in dead silence and I thought 'Good God,
the bloody pongoes aren't ready for us
and we'll have to wait till they turn up'.
Then through the darkness one made out
ranks of silent soldiers fallen in, in
perfectly dressed lines, who turned into
file and marched over the gangway as
soon as it was in position. What a change
from the chaotic first day, and how uplifting to see the discipline of the real
fighting men.
For some reason which I can't now
remember, we decided one early morning
to berth bows out, which involved turning
180 degrees in the harbour entrance and
making a stern-board alongside. Tom
Halsey, the bravest man alive but no
ship-handler, had a bad habit of using
too much power when manoeuvring and
as a result got into that awful see-saw
situation gathering way ahead and astern
increasingly as excessive power was
applied in alternate directions. The result
was that we hit the mole with a crunch
and folded up our bow to the paint-shop
bulkhead, giving us the effect of per-
MOSTLY FROM THE BRIDGE-I11
manent port rudder. Going ahead this
was manageable, but it was difficult t o
steer astern, and we stopped berthing
stern first thereafter. Tom and the Chief
inspected the damage and decided we
could still run on the paint-shop bulkhead
and from then on we looked magnificent
with a great bow-wave with revolutions
for twenty-four knots (to which we
restricted ourselves). Inspection at Dover
confirmed the theory that we were still
seaworthy. From then on Tom left the
handling of the ship t o me which made
it all the more fun for me, except for
one unforeseen result. Our revolution
table no longer provided an accurate
index of the ship's speed, and the
Chernikeef log, never a totally satisfactory instrument, worked erratically in the
turbulence caused by the bow damage.
Those who were there, or have seen
photographs, will remember that the oil
tanks at Dunkirk were on fire and blazed
throughout the operation. The smoke
drifted in a westerly direction down the
coast, and by great good fortune masked
German guns which could otherwise have
made it impossible to use the most convenient approach from the westward.
The channel buoy, which we turned
round to make the last leg parallel t o the
coast, was just clear of the smoke and
one never knew whether a slight shift of
wind would obscure it. This was very
much on my mind on our next trip (in
darkness), and being uncertain of our
speed I was afraid of over-running the
channel and ending up on the beach. The
sea bottom consists of a series of 4-5
fathom shoals and alternate deeps, and
sounding as we crossed them was a good
check, but the time came when I was
uncertain whether we were in the
second-last deep or the main channel (no
buoy being in sight) and decided not to
risk going ashore, so got Tom's approval
to turn up parallel to the coast, still
sounding. After a bit the soundings
shoaled and before long we went astern
and stopped the ship with less than a
345
fathom under our bottom. The echosounder was now ineffective, but being
an old fashioned navigating officer I had
two well-trained leadsmen available, so
they manned the chains and we backed
down the deep with the leadsmen calling
the soundings as we went. All this toolr:
time and as a result we missed our place
in the queue for the mole, and had not
got alongside when daylight came, and
were ordered back to Dover empty. Of
course this made no difference to the
evacuation as there were several other
destroyers sent back empty and loading
had not been interrupted. But I think
Tom felt we had done badly, and though
he wasn't unkind in any way, he justifiably ascribed it to me. I am sure he never
connected the bow damage with my
difficulties, and I liked him too much to
draw attention to it, although suffering
in silence has never been a conspicuous
quality in me.
On another night we encountered a
French trawler on our outward passage,
who would have gone clear down our
port side if he had not got excited and
put his wheel over. His stern cut our
degaussing coils and bent our side-plating
and from then on we were not protected
against magnetic mines.
On reaching Dover after our eighth
trip (counting the abortive one), a.m. on
3 June, we heard that all British personnel had been evacuated and that the
operation was over. Never was such a
merry breakfast! We were all very tired
and I soon fell on my bunk with my
clothes on and slept happily. Some hours
later I was woken by the sound .~f men's
feet on the deck overhead and realized
something was up, so got up and found
that Lower Deck had been cleared and
the Captain was about to address us. He
had just come back from Flag Officer
Dover's HQ. He said 'The last of the
B.E.F. was able to come off because the
French took over the perimeter round
Dunkirk last night. Now the French have
346
asked us to take them off. We can't do
anything else, can we?'.
There was a mutter of assent and we
dispersed. This was easily the worst
moment of the whole show, because one
had started to react and relax and
thought we had after all 'got away with
it7. I know it took me about half an hour
t o screw myself up again. We were due
*tosail late, so we dined properly in messundress and by general consent kept our
bow ties on with our monkey jackets
when we sailed. By then we had recaptured most of our fatalism. On the
way over we had had a signal marked
'Most Immediate' but Flags had t o admit
with some embarrassment that we
couldn't decode it as we had drawn
tomorrow's syko* card instead of today's.
We said so 'en clair' and forgot about it.
As we approached Dunkirk we overtook
a block-ship on her way to seal the
harbour entrance, but as we passed her
she blew up on a magnetic mine, or so
we thought, and sank near the channel.
Actually I now understand she was sunk
by collision with a French ship. We
berthed without incident and the minesweeper Hebe following us in, berthed
immediately inshore of us. As she passed,
her captain (Johnn.ie Temple) shouted
'What about the Western Channel?'.
Tom said to me 'You'd better go and
talk t o him' so I went along the mole
and told him that we'd had no trouble
and suggested that he should follow us
out, which in due course he did.
Although latterly we always left Dover
in the dark, the nights were short and it
was usually light before we got alongside.
There was a period of waiting outside
Dunkirk until one's turn came to go in,
during which one was backing and filling
near other ships in a similar position. I
remember this last night better than
most, perhaps because of the end-of-term
feeling about it. The oil fires were still
illuminating the harbour but a new
feature was that shells were occasionally
arriving, making their own individual
noises and reminding one that the enemy
was almost at the gates; but not, I think,
doing much damage. I t was full daylight
by the time we berthed and the (mostly
Belgian) soldiers who were allocated to
us took much longer than our own to
embark because their packs kept sticking
in the handrails of the ladders from the
fo'c's'le to the iron deck. This induced
a slight feeling of impatience, and one
had t o remind oneself that but for these
chaps we would not have got so many of
the B.E.F. away. I think we left when
the supply of troops dried up, as this was
not one of our biggest loads.
After we had cleared the Western
Channel we got the signal re-coded by
tomorrow's syko card which said
'Western Channel is heavily mined. The
following route is to be used. . .;' there
followed elaborate instructions for passing buoys on the wrong side and generally
avoiding the route we had been using,
and had just used itwioe! Hebe was clear
by then and undamaged and I shall never
forget the shout of laughter which went
up on our bridge, as the signal was read
out.
On the way back I suggested to Tom
that as it was the fourth of June, we
should enter harbour with 'Floreat
Etona' flying from the mast head
halliards (he being an Old Etonian) to
which he agreed. However we came on
an M.T.B. drifting with damaged screws
and found that Vice-Admiral Abrial, the
French Senior Naval Officer at Dunkirk
(Commandant du Nord) was on board,
so we embarked him and took the M.T.B.
in tow and unfortunately forgot to hoist
our signal. I think my general idea was
that Waterloo had been won on the
playing fields of Eton and that the
allusion was appropriate, especially on
that date and with that Captain.
That really was the end of the opera-
,* coding device which changed daily. Only
issued one day ahead to minimise the
chances of compromise.
tion and figures were better than could
have been hoped. A total of 338, 226, of
whom 198,315 were British and 139,911
Allied troops, had been evacuated. We
ourselves had done nine trips to Dunkirk,
but because of the abortive one only
eight counted. Sabre, a tiny 'S' class
destroyer, did ten. No otfher ship
equalled that number. We were
officially credited with evacuating 5,851
troops and Sabre with 5,765. The highest
figure for a single ship (personnel ship
Tynwald), was 8,953, much higher than
ours, but being a troop carrier her
capacity enabled her to do that in four
trips.
And what of our own ship's company?
It was composed largely of R.F.R. men
recalled for war service, and brand new
Hostilities Only young men. Tom's
tremendous warm personality and complette straight-forwardness got through to
the troops, and we, his staff and ship's
officers were totally united in relation to
him, and usually, certainly at that time,
in relation to each other. So the formula
was mutual trust in both directions. Our
Chief Petty Officers and some of the
Petty Officers were magnificent. This was
very early in the war and dilution of
trained manpower had not really begun,
but Malcolm had been dug out of
Reserve at Rosyth for the Fleet Review
immediately preceding the outbreak of
war, which is why the junior ratings
were less homogeneous than in ships
already in commission at the time.
However, as always happens, firmness
of leadership at the top created confidence right through the ship and there
was never any question of morale failure.
347
In extension of this, we were also
conscious that the Dover H.Q. was doing
everything that could be done to help us,
despite the tremendous organisational
problems of receiving and clearing
thousands of soldiers every day, not only
at Dover but at the other channel ports
involved. The berthing problem was a
major one in itself, but moves were kept
to a minimum, and when required, the
reasons were always apparent; parties of
cleaners came on board and cleared up
below decks while we got some sleep; and
the salvage organisation for casualties
enabled ships which were still operational
to get on with the evacuation without
interruption. I have never before or since
felt such confidence in a shore headquarters.
As soon as we were clear of Belgian
and French soldiers we sailed for
Chatham, and as we approached the lock
gates received a signal saying that
shipkeepers were being sent on board and
three days leave was to be given to both
watches. I cannot now imagine how my
wife and I were able to arrange a
rendezvous that night, and I nearly
missed it by going to sleep in the train,
but luckily got woken up by an aged
cleaner at Waterloo before the train
started its return journey to Chatham.
The next day we went up to Scotland
for three glorious days of sunshine.
Note: The attached diagram, from information kindly supplied by the Naval
Historical Branch, helps to correct the
romantlic ideas about 'Operation Dynamo'
fostered by some post-war literature.
D.B.N.M.
(concluded)
Economic Maritime Strength
Despite its massive numerical superiority
over NATO in conventional land and
air forces, the Warsaw Pact, contemplating armed aggression, may well
reject the obvious land invasion of
Western Europe because of the virtual
certainty that NATO would be obliged
to use tactical nuclear weapons to halt
it, and that escalation to a mutually
genocidal strategic nuclear exchange,
unprofitable even to Communist philosophy, would inevitably follow. If
however, military action were restricted
to a conventional maritime war of
attrition against the seaborne supplies
and trade, upon which all European
NATO States, and no longer Britain
alone,
have
become
increasingly
dependent for continued existence, the
nuclear risk would be eliminated, sincpu
no NATO government could deter a
sea attack by a threat of nuclear reprisal
against Communist land targets because
of the certainty of annihilating retaliation in kind.
The expansion of the Red Fleet,
during the past twenty-five years, from
a non-descript maritime defence force
to the world's most modern, and second
largest Navy, fully capable of worldwide
action, is sufficient proof that such a
strategy has not been overlooked by the
Kremlin. It is therefore clear that NATO
must give a 'high, if not $@he topmost,
priority to the prov'ision of maritime
forces adequate to counter the assault
of the Red Fleet and its supporting air
arm, and, in particular, the submarines
which constitute so powerful an element,
bearing in mind that a single submarine
requires many hunters, and that in
general, enemy warships will not confine
their activities to a conveniently limited
NATO sea area north of the Tropic of
Cancer.
It is also clear that if this requirement
for adequate maritime forces is to be
met in an era of severe economic stress,
rapidly rising costs, and of reductions,
in real terms, in Western defence votes,
effective measures to optimise naval
strength from whatever funds are
allocated must command constant and
searching attention. The Chairman of
the NATO Military Committee, Admiral
of the Fleet Sir Peter Hill-Norton, in a
lecture to the Royal United Services
Institute on 28 November 1974, stressing
the absolute necessity for greater costeffectiveness, pointed to the appalling
waste of resources resulting from the
failure of the NATO partners to unify
their efforts in the research, development
and production of war equipment, and
to the dangers, inefficiencies and inconveniences attending the consequent
lack of standardization. An effective
remedy for such folly is certainly
essential to our prospects of survival,
but so also is the need to ensure that
every item of unified NATO equipment
is as cost-effective as it can be, both
individually and in combination with
others.
The purpose of this article is briefly
to review the fundamentals of maritime
strength and to make some suggestions,
not necessarily orthodox, for their more
effective realization.
Fighting strength at sea
Fighting strength at sea comprises
three basic elements - manpower,
weapon-systems, and vehicles. Manpower
now accounts for more than a half of
western naval budgets (thmgh not, be it
noted, those of the Warsaw Pact), and
this fact severely limits the funds available to NATO for warships and maritime
aircraft. Ma'terial excellence pursued
regardless of cost is bound to reduce
their
numbers
further,
rendering
adequate cover for convoys more difficult. If we are to avoid starvation and
industrial collapse, and consequent
defeat, the defence of merchant shipping
must remain the first task of the NATO
navies, and convoy still constitutes the
basic and only effective framework. How
is that frame to be properly clothed?
Broadly speaking, the answer must
lie in minimizing manning requirements
consisten't with maintaining seagoing
and fighting efficiency, and in foregoing
marginal improvements achievable only
by excessively costly research and
development on the frontiers of technology. Weapon-systems whose more
expensive components can be recovered
for re-use should be preferred to those
which are necessarily consumed in
action, and merchant ships themselves
must be employed whenever possible as
vehicles and operating platforms for
those weapon-systems, thereby reducing
the requirement for specialised warship
escorts and the manpower for their
operation*. The wastage of funds on
weak and ineffective prestige projects,
such as the through-deck cruiser, must
be ruthlessly eliminated, and consideration must be given to the building of
some relatively simple and cheap
warships for the less exacting roles. If
this last is not acceptable on the grounds
that it would reduce the already inadequate numbers of sophisticated
warships, the same effect may be
achieved by building standard hulls
designed to accommodate a variety of
modular weapons-systems, which need
not all be installed in peacetime, bearing
in mind that ships take longer to produce
than equipment.
Manpower, and the space which it
occupies in warships, can be reduced
by careful organization, and by automation - itself costly but, on balance,
often rewarding. There is no simple
answer to the problem of correctly
striking this balance between man and
machine, and it will fluctuate anyway
with technological development. The
smaller complement of the type 21
349
frigate as compared wrth the preceding
'Leander' class suggests that the Royal
Navy, at any rate, is tackling this
problem effectively, and it need not
therefore be further discussed here.
The best is the enemy of the good
A major snag with advanced technology, apart from its astronomic cost,
is that scientists are difficult to pin down
when it comes to actual production of
hardware, since there is always something even more advanced in the pipeline
to engage and divert their professional
expertise. The danger then is that vast
expenditure is likely to result only in
prototypes, leaving the fleet short of
effective weaponry. I t may frequently
pay to settle for less advanced material
if only because it has reached the production stage and is acceptably priced.
Having overcome its teething troubles,
such material will have the virtue of
reliability, and, for a given outlay, more
of it will be procurable. I t is not difficult
to visualize circumstances in which a
concentration of simple weapon-systems
could be expected to prevail against one
or two sophisticated ones. If, by way of
example, a resurrected and well trained
squadron of Stuka dive-bombers were
to encounter a GMD, no doubt several
would be shot down by SAMs, but the
remainder, having swamped the defence,
would plant their bombs on or close
alongside the target, with fatal results
for the GMD, especially in the absence
of armour protection. This, unfortunately, is an argument likely to appeal
even more to the Warsaw Pact, with its
unlimited manpower reserves and scant
regard for the lives of its fighting men,
but it is one that NATO also should not
reject out of hand.
Missile recovery was not practicable
in the days when naval warfare was
dominated by the gun, and in any case,
*See also 'Self-Defence for Merchant
Shipping,(The Naval Revim July 1972).
See also ~ ~ i g 28
h t ~ u g u s t1975 p. 290.
350
shells were cheap. The advent of the
more costly torpedo suggested retrieval,
at least after practice firings, and it was
accordingly fitted with a blowing head
so that it would float at the end of its
run.
Modern surface-to-surface and
surface-to-air missiles are far more costly
than torpedoes on account of their
complex propulsion, guidance and
homing systems. If these could be recovered, even in part, heavy expenditure
would be saved, and peacetime firing
practice, so essential for confident and
competent operation in battle, would no
longer be inhibited as it now is. The
answer lies in the two-stage weaponsystem, the first stage to carry the warhead to the vicinity of the target and
then return to the firing $hip, leaving
the short-range second stage to home
on the target.
nuts out of the fire, despite a lamentable
and unforgiveable delay of fifteen years
in accepting it for naval use.
A possible alternative, now under
development in the United States, is the
Remotely Piloted Vehicle (RPV) - a
recoverable wireless controlled drone
aircraft with a weapon-carrying potential
comparable with the Harrier and, with
the help of television, capable of
performing the same operational role.
Being much smaller than the Harrier,
and able to use a simpler VTOL system,
standing on its tail for take-off and
landing, thus obviating the need for
jet deflection, its unit cost should be
substantially lower when produced in
large numbers; moreover, being pilotless,
aircrew costs are eliminated, risk of loss
is more readily acceptable, and it can
therefore operate in less favourable
tactical circumstances and in worse
weather.
V/STOL and RPV
Both Harrier and RPV will be capable
The manned aircraft constitutes such
a system, in association with its missiles, of performing the triple role of reconcannon or bombs, and it possesses other naissance, interception and surface strike,
advantages over the pure missile system and probably also such functions as
such as greater range, lesser susceptibility sono-buoy and A/S torpedo dropping,
to ECM, positive target identification, with the inherent economy deriving from
and the ability to engage several targets such versatility, and although each one
in succession during the course of a single will take up more on-board space than
sortie. Its reaction time, if flown from a missile, this is counter-balanced by the
the deck, is slower, but given adequate fact that each represents the equivalent
AEW, not unacceptably so, and its of many of the larger, long-range type,
increasing vulnerability to ship defences missiles. The Harrier is already a proven
can be offset by the co-ordinated swamp- weapon-system and represen'ts, so to
ing attack or by the use of 'stand-off' speak, a bird in the hand. The naval
ASMs. Unfortunately, the conventional RPV represents a later development of
carrier aircraft was permitted to the two-stage weapon-system, but may
increase in weighst and landing speed to not entirely displace the manned airan extent which made it impracticable craft. Meanwhile, the NATO navies
for it to operate from any except the should adopt the Harrier, and use it to
largest fleet carriers, and these, in the full.
sufficient numbers, can now only be
afforded by super-powers such as the Close range defence
Point defence weapons will still be
United States; but the advent of the
V/STOL Harrier, capable of operation needed, however, for close-range A/A
from small, cheap, escort carriers and and A/Missile defence. To be fully
even from converted merchant ships effective, these should be fired from the
(MAC) has enabled us to pull our chest- ship under attack, and, since the enemy
target is primarily the merchant ship,
the real requirement is for a system
which can be quickly fitted on board
merchant ships rather than for one built
painstakingly into costly type 22 frigates.
This calls for a transferable modular
weapon-system such as The 'Rapier',
which should be capable of operation at
sea with very little adaptation. In
addition, there is still scope for light
automatic A/A guns.
As regards ASW, the frigate screen
now appears to have had its day. The
chances of its detecting a submarine
before it is itself detected by the enemy
and attacked are becoming increasingly
slim, since passive sonar (hydrophone)
operated by the lurking submarine has a
much greater range than the active sonar
which, on account of water and ship
noise, the frigate is obliged to employ;
thus the provision of expensive screening
surface vessels merely adds hostages to
fortune. The Sea King, flown from
small, simple and cheap helicopter
carriers such as Engadine (which cost
under f 2 millions, compared with the
£60 millions for an Invincible), and also
from MACs and RFAs, has been
claimed to be the equivalent of an ASW
frigate, but, bearing in mind its relatively
low operational availability owing to the
three to fourfold excess of maintenance
over flying hours, it too is very costly in
overall terms. For the time being, it can
be supplemented by smaller, less expensive helicopters, such as the Lynx,
capable of dropping, (and later recovering) sonobuoys, both passive and active,
and when a contact has been established,
A/S torpedoes.
But the use of the 'Sea King' and
'Lynx' consrtitutes no more than an
ad hoc solution until a better. c h e a ~ e r
and
more
operattionally available
aircraft can be developed and brought
into service. If this is to be an improved
helicopter, it should be worthwhile
having another look at the tip-jet rotor
drive, successfully demonstrated in the
351
Rotodyne. This eliminates the heavy
gearing otherwise needed between
engines and main rotor, and dispenses
with the need for a tail rotor and its
gearing, since the tip-jet rotor imposes
no torque. The potential savings, both
in cost and maintenance hours, need no
emphasis. Nor should the complementary
merits of the blimp, or small airship, be
overlooked in the search for a better
ASW vehicle. As the U.S. Navy has
demonstrated, the blimp can remain
airborne for weeks at a time and can
therefore operate as an independent unit
without the need for carrier support. I n
the circumstances of its employment, it
is not unduly vulnerable to enemy
action, and it has been established that
it can operate in bad weather. One
further and important advantage is its
fuel economy. Although its unit cost
may be greater than the helicopter's, its
overall costs, bearing in mind that it can
replace three or four of them, and that
it involves no other warship provision,
are certainly much less.
If the foregoing be accepted, it would
seem that the only other surface requirement in ASW may be for a co-ordinating
and directing ship, and she could, in fact,
be an escort carrier. She would steam
in the body of the convoy, and to conceal
her identity from the listening submarine, would be driven by merchantship type diesels; thus high speed is no
longer a necessity and its cost and
complexity can also be eliminated. Until
these escort carrierldirection ships are
built, we shall have to make do with
the existing frigates and GMDs, and
some of the latter will in any case be
needed for area A/A defence until area
A/A missile modules for merchant ships
can be produced. When these carriers
enter service, it will become possible to
terminate the wasteful and costly
practice of embarking single helicopters
in the GMDs and frigates, where they
occupy too much space and are un-
352
economic in the use of maintenance
manpower.
Convoy defence
The pattern which emerges for the
all-important defence of convoys is one
of greater emphasis on merchant ship
self-defence by means of Harriers,
helicopters and modular missile and gun
systems, with a minimal stiffening of
warship escorts to co-ordinate and direct
the ASW effort, and to amplify the A/A
and ASW effort with the more advanced
existing weapons such as Seadavt and
Ikara. This would free warships for
other purposes and reduce the total
requirement. On this basis we could
be less unhappy about recent defence
cuts involving the scrapping of older
frigates, the cancellation of some new
ones, and the slowing-down of GMD
new-construction. What we must have,
however, is an expansion of the Sea
Harrier programme, more and better
helicopters, and small, cheap escort
carriers to operate them, with back-up
plans for the rapid conversion of earmarked mechant ships into MACs. We
cannot afford, and we do not need,
vulnerable white elephants like the
Invincible, but perhaps we could
persuade the Shah of Iran to buy her
with some of his surplus oil revenues?
F. P. U. CROKER
Whatever Happened to AFO 1/56?
On the twentieth anniversary of this
historic document it seems appropiate
t o examine what 'it set out to do, and
how much has been achieved. For the
benefit of the very @d
l and the very young
a brief resum6 of the AFO is necessary.
Exceptionally the AFO started with
'An Introductory Message from the
(Admiralty) Board to all officers of the
Royal Navy'. This summed up the background, assessment and intent. The
Board were basically concerned to
achieve three aims:
1. To recognise the executive nature
of all officers' tasks.
2. To integrate officers from all
branches into the higher administration of the Navy.
3. To improve the promotion
chances for career officers.
The first aim was to be achieved by
the formation of the General List, and
a greater degree of common training for
young officers; the former executive
branch was re-named the seaman branch.
The third aim was to be achieved by
the change from the Branch List to the
Special Duties List and by the creation
of the Supplementary List.
Mast people would agree that these
two aims have been broadly achieved.
All officers are now equally capable of
executive duties and do carry them out,
although there must be some reservations about sthe equality of opportunity.
The evolution of the SD and Supplementary Lists have ensured that, whatever
the difficulties associated with officer
recruiting, prom3tion chance to commander is not one of them.
This leaves the second aim. I think it
was accepted that this was the knottiest
problem a t the time, and the remaining
twenty-seven pages of the AFO were
devoted almost entirely to the m i n g up
of the proposed solutions to the first and
third aims. Clearly the second aim was
t o 'fall out' d the other two, towards
the end of the extensive transitional
period foreseen in the introductory
message. The Board had proposed, it
was up to their successors to dispose.
Consideration of this aim comprises the
remainder of this article.
What was this aim? It was no more
and no less than a conviction that the
senior management of the Navy should
be conducted, as far as possible, by the
Navy's most capable officers regardless
of specialisation. The qualifying phrase
'as far as possible' recognises that there
will inevitably be posts in the higher
structure which demand specialised
knowledge and experience from their
holders. I t was certainly a respectable
aim. Their Lordships could hardly have
envisaged the difficult days which would
assalil their successors but they surely
appreciated that the science of Admiralty
would continue to demand the highest
standards of intellect, leadership and
management ability and these muld only
be satisfied by the most outstanding
officers the Navy as a whole could
provide. Nor was the aim novef. Something very much of the same kind was
envisaged as the result of the new
system of training of officers inaugurated
in 1902. Perhaps the title of this artscle
should be 'Whatever happened to AFO
1/02?'!
How far has the aim been achieved?
I t is difficult to answer this fully because
it requires one t o make value-judgements
of senior officers. It may be instructive
however to examine the present dtuation:
Tahle 1
Admirals of
the Fleet
Admirals
Vice Admirals
Rear Admirals
Captains
(incl. Cdres.)
Commanders
Seaman Engineer Supply Total
200
480
128
439
39 367
1201039
Source : Navy List Spring 1975
On a simple statistical basis, and
disregarding all other inpub ahis should
look like this (based on number of
Commanders in each
shown in Table 1).
Table 2
Admirals of
the Fleet
Admirals
Vice Admirals
Rear Admirals
Captains
Commanders
specialbation
Seaman Engineer Supply Total
3
6
22
171
480
3
6
20
154
439
1
13
5
47
42 367
120 1039
Well, we can certainly see that pafity
has not been achieved. This could be
explained by a number of factors, either
sepa~atelyor, more probably, in combination. I t may be true that seaman officers
are superior to officers from the other
branches in the ratios shown in Table 1.
It was for instance true, when I was a t
Dartmouth, that the seaman list of candidates was habitually oversubscribed,
and the Supply and Engineering fists
were 'topped up' from the bottom of the
candidates list (set in order by a a m bination of Snterview and academic
marks). I t may be true that a large
proportion of flag rank appointments
have, as essential prerequisites, a requirement f w skills or expertise only available to seaman officers. I t may be true
that the chief amongst these is seen to
be regular and frequent exercise of
command. I t may Ire true that engineer
officers, in their internecine struggle with
the R.C.N.C., the R.N.E.S. and the
former R.N.S.S. for positions of technical
authority have vitiated themselves for
further naval advancement. It may be
true that supply officers hlave so immersed themselves in the higher posts of
administration and the secretariat that
they have suppressed that vital spark of
independent and far-s'ighted vision necessary for flag rank. All these @hingsmay
be true in part, and yet I doubt Whether
the sum of these effects can legitimately
be claimed to account for the disparity
between Tables 1 and 2.
I t would be wrong to suggest that no
progress has been made since 1956. Jt
might be instructive t o examine Table 1
against its equivalent at that date.
Certainly we know that some changes
have occurred. Sir Francis Turner, and,
as I write, Sir Peter White have both
been promoted to admiral whilst in the
appointment of Chief of Fleet Support
- an elevation for non-seaman officers
for which, I think, no precedent before
1956 existed. But of course, at this level,
the sample is very small and of
exceptional quality. And, in any case,
alongside those two there must have
been promoted some thirty-eight seaman
officers to admiral in the twenty year
period. Whilst the TurnerIWhite promotions may be taken as straws in the
wind for the future, they cannot be
taken as invalidating the statisticit1 case
that disparity exists.
Two effects can be claimed to have
caused this disparity. The first is an
understandable (understandable but improper) reluctance on the part of rhe
naval
management
(already
predominantly seaman officers) to define
objectively the prerequisites for flag and
other senior appointments. Is it not
'letting down the side' to release these
precious posts, so long the preserve of
'the seaman officer with command
experience', to officers of 'any' specialisation? I't is - it is. But we hope that our
leaders will allow the gwod of the service
to transcend the good of the branch.
The second effect is the difference in
promotion zones between branches.
Whilst many theoretical equalities can be
claimed for this arrangement, the fact
remains *hat man for man, the seaman
officer at present can gain promotion
earlier than his coilleagues of other
specialisations and thus gain more
experience faster; we are concerned here
with the 'fliers', not the average. Not
only can he gain experience faster, he
starts influencing events sooner.
Returning to the matter of sea command, one may view this xs a vital issue.
Is st really such a valuable pre-requllte
to flag posts? If so, can the unlique edge
that it provides to its recipients be
replicated elsewhere? If n&, should it be
confined to the seaman officer? The
traditional answers to these questions
have been emphatically Yes, No and
Yes. I don't believe that the case could
be proved today.
I t 'is many years since the commanding
officers of ships needed much in the way
of a sense of history, or of politics.
Communications technology changed all
that. Even knowledge of strategy and
tactics have become much less important
with the increased use of standard
procedures and the centralised control
of warships from Fleet or Maritime
Headquarters. Sea command may be
described as comprising the following
elements:
Ship handling
Fighting
Navigation
Care and Maintenance of (the Fabric
Adminktration and Personnel
Management
Relations with external authorities
Of these, the commanding officer
commonly delegates at least a sharing
of the responsibility for the last four.
Thus the unique expenience of the
commanding officer is limited to the
handling and fighting of his ship. The
advent of the PWO is perhaps even
nibbling away at this latter. One can see
that this ability to handle a warship in
a seaway and destroy the enemy is a
difficult and laudable thing - but is it an
essential prerequisite for senior management posts? Now if the Naval Staff spent
its time deciding tactics and rewriting
FOTIS and FXTIS and Volume I11 of
the Seamanship Manual of course it
would be, but thankfully the Naval Staff
does not indulge in such activities; it
tends to spend 'its time considering:
Global operations and navigation
The procurement, care and maintenance of the Fleet
Administration
and
Personnel
Management and Relations with
external authorities.
this particular chimera can be quietly
Hang on, though, isn't that a bit led away (to its bestiary).
familiar? Oh yes, those were the activiIn the end, it comes down to this: that
ties that commanding officers commonly any responsible, thoughtful, humane
delegated to their subordinates.
management owes it to its subordinates
So, although no-one should under- to:
estimate the difficulties of sea command,
a. formulate or revalidate objective
the fact that 5t is a demanding, lonely,
policies for the good of the overall
responsible job does not necessarily make
organisation and if possible for each
it a particularly ideal preparation for
individual within it.
flag rank. A proportion of those flag and b. inform those individuals, whenappointments which are only appropriate
ever possible, what those policies
to seaman officers will indeed need sea
are, and how they affect them
command as a prerequisite; timilarly
personally.
those flag appointments which are only AF01/56 recognized the problem and
appropriate to engineer or supply officers p r o p e d a qualitative solu~on.Twenty
will often demand experience in years on, we deserve a quantitative
particular plumbing or pusserial enter- update of where we are now, where we
are going, how we are going to get there,
prises.
(Since I have now suggested that sea and why. In a profession where so much
command does n d pmvide a unique or policy 5s shrouded by security or clouded
uniquely useful cutting ledge, it remains by the vicissitudes of political unto say in parenthesis that I do not believe certainty, personnel administration is a
that old will o' the wisp, sea command rare area which dews open managefor any General List officer, should be ment. It is entirely reasonable that the
further pursued. Our profession is now oEcers of the Fleet should ask 'Whatever
so complex in terms of tactics, tech- happened to AFO 1/56?'.
nology and organisation, and o p p r SNIPE
tunities for service at sea so limited in (Notes: ( I ) SNIPEhas omitted to mention
the crucial pefiod of an officer's career, Vice-Admiral Sir Louis Le Bailly K.B.E.,
that any dilution of an officer's specialist C.B., an engineering specialist who, in
expertise seems liable to reduce his 1975, was Director General o f Znteleffectiveness unacceptably. However if ligence in The Ministry o f Defence.)
sea command is no longer seen as an ( 2 ) See under CORRESPONDENCE
for an'open Sesame' to the higher ranks, then other view o f AFO 1/56 - Editor)
Correspondence
THE RECEIVING END
of the rank of commander and above.
(In 1957 many young seaman comThe Golden Bowler scheme has
manders, promoted 'dry', wondered what enabled a cut to be made in the total
the future held and whether to 'bowler' number of officers serving commensurate
themselves. A.F.O. 1/56 had relegated with the general reduction being made
them to share chances for flag rank with in the size of the navy. This incidentally
the other members o f the General List, removed the bulge of officers in the list
the 'plumbers' and the 'pussers'. The caused by over recruiting in 1938-1940
thoughts that follow were put together and by the acceptance of too many ESC
at the time by such a man. Readers o f officers during the Korean war.
The Naval Review may like to consider
There are however not enough billets
whether hindsight now shows that Their at sea for commanders and captains to
Lordships kept their side o f the bargain provide an adequate chance of promotion
for those who stayed.
(i.e. career structure) for seaman officers
Not long ago, the Dry List was without the device of the Post and
abolished and the present method sub- General Lists. The institution of these
stituted. This moment was before any Lists narrows the field of selection for
promoted to the Dry List in 1956 or later command at sea and enables Engineer,
had reached the top o f the Captains List. Electrical and Supply specialists at long
Thus on selection for Flag rank these dry last to compete on, more or less, equal
officers competed with their Post List terms with Seaman specialists for some
peers and not with their General List General List appointments.
contemporaries, to the advantage presumThat this device or something like it
ably o f the 'plumbers' and 'pussers' . . . .) was needed is beyond doubt. Its impact
Sir,-We are faced with a shrinking navy on the loyal seaman officer who at one
- shrinking that is in men and ships. blow may be deprived of even tbe chance
This is forced upon us quite simply by of his most cherished ambition has
the country being unable to pay for perhaps not been given enough study.
more than a fixed sum on defence and The effect of this impact upon the young
at the same time by war machines seaman officers must also be considered.
From the inception of the split lists
becoming progressively more complicatTheir Lordships have made clear an
ed and expensive.
This shrinking in the number of ships intention to afford the same career
had resulted in a great part of the shore prospects to both the Post and General
backing for the navy becoming re- List officers. This intention can be given
dundant. The activities of the Way a fairly wide interpretation. For example,
Ahead committee have gone a long way the intention might be for commanders
towards reducing this shore backing to a promoted on the Post List to have the
more appropriate size, but in spite of this same chance as seamen officers on the
a combination of factors has resulted in General List in their batch of reaching
a grea'ter part of the navy living ashore the rank of rear admiral. Alternatively
than was the case between the wars. it could mean no more than that indiNaval aviation, the increased effort in vidual commanders on promotion have
research and development, the growth the same prospect of reaching the rank of
of national and NATO shore head- rear admiral as they had on the day
quarters: all conspire to reduce the before they were selected for promotion,
proportion of seagoing billets. This is regardless of the list upon which they
particularly true in the case of officers were promoted.
CORRESPONDENCE
The latter would seem to be the fairer
interpretation, but this leads at once to a
study of seniorities on promotion. Early
promotion is the reward of merit. The
best must reach the top. The top must
command. Hence, naturally enough, the
majority of early promotions are to the
Post List and the later ones to the
General List. There is of course some
overlapping. Soon the zones of promotion to captain are to be adjusted so that
at that stage there will be less overlapping
and in general Post List officers will be
promoted earlier than General List
officers. If this is the reward of merit can
we then deduce that in general Post List
officers are more deserving of promotion
to flag rank than those in the General
List? Not so - because Their Lordships
intend the same career prospects for both
lists. Where then is the fallacy?
All these thoughts and many more
face the seaman officer promoted to the
General List. He is pleased to have been
promoted, even proud - but, and this
applies especially to some who may be
as young as thirty-five with the prospect
of twenty more years useful service, what
is his aim to be?
NOS are accustomed to going where
they are sent, pierhead jumps included,
but in the course d their service they can
impose upon providence their personal
leanings and inclinations. Some specialise,
some do not. Some do so deliberately,
some are press-ganged. However this
experience may have been acquired, they
reach the brass hat stage in quite remarkable varielty: (C), (G) or (TAS); (N) or
(D); aviator or submariner; p.s.c. or
p.s.a.; subspecialist or salthorse. Some
are married, some are not. Some have
had command, some have particular
staff, training or technical experience.
Some are born seamen, some have had
seamanship thrust upon them.
For some of these on reaching the
General List as a commander the aim is
reasonably clear. The gunnery expert can
have his eye on DGD, Whale Island or
3 57
ASRE. The other experts can view their
alma maters in the same way. Perhaps a
dry aviator could aspire even to Fifth Sea
Lord, certainly to command an air
station. The grounded submariner and
the dry salthorse can at first discern an
infinity of possibilities in the staff or
training worlds, but for them, and indeed
for those specialists who seek wider
experience, it seems that there may be
some dead ends.
Take the Naval Staff for instance:
there will be jabs there for dry officers but the plums (DOD, DofP etc.) must
surely go to those who need the experience there for later use further up the
tree as ACNS, DCNS, VCNS or ISL,
appointments which it is assumed must
be reserved to those qualified to exercise
sea command. Will the General List
officer make his niche in the Naval Staff
at his peril? - there is no flag appointment there for him. Could he ever be a
Chief d Staff to a Commander-in-Chief?
Perhaps personnel offers a better
avenue, but how can officers be chosen
for jobs at sea by those who have forgotten what the sea looks like? Could
Dartmouth be commanded by a senior
captain wl~o had not been to sea
for fourteen years? Perhaps a seaman
(General List) should command at
Manadon? DCNP could be dry perhaps,
could the Second Sea Lord? DNT is dry
- but not necessarily a seaman.
The Controller and 4SL have room for
General List officers of every kind and
the seaman with a technical or logistic
bent has an even chance with the
technical and supply subspecialists for
many jobs here. This could lead to staff
or dockyard appointments, but would not
appeal to all.
The Air is a closed shop.
M.O.D. and NATO Staffs give wide
experience but for the General List
officer can lead to the Naval Staff dead
end.
Misgivings there are then that there
may be no future for the non sub-
358
CORRESPONDENCE
The conductor of an orchestra handles
the simplest possible musical instrument
Which itself cannot play a note; he brings
together a wide selection of extremely
complex skills without necessarily having
a competence in the operation of more
than a few of them; yet he is recognised
the world over as a very sklilled manager
who should possess most of the qualities
R.W. chwse t o sum up as 'infallibility'
and yet who patently does not. It's a
question of attitude I suspect; the impression R.W. gives is that if the
captain should ask a sailor how something works, tbe sailor must deride
him. No doubt R.W. would too. I would
have hoped however that the saibr would
f e d it a part of his responsibility to
SETREAL impart any such knowledge he may have
TO RESILVERING THE MIRROR
and be proud of his personal skills which
Sir,-For the first time in my life, and can now be seen by him as a necessary
strictly as a result I imagine of R.W.'s contribution to his ship.
predictions (see article in April h u e ) of
But perhaps that's enough on infalrising hackles and flying fur now proven libility; R.W.'s 'cannon fodder' may hope
correct, I have been tempted t o write to their seniors are infallible but it's an
The Naval Review. In particulhr to essentia'l part of growing up to realise and
examine how many of his predictions adjust to the fact that they are not; just
and statements seem correct in my view. as, having grown up, it's vital to be
'Infallibility o f the senior officer': as an reminded like the Caesars of old that
officer recently moved into the 'infallible' fallibility remains at your elbow.
group by R.W.'s definition, if no one 'The precise duties o f the commanding
elses, I have to confess t o aspirations in officer must not be specified'. R.W.'s
that direction because I recognise that it comments Emply that they can and should
is a handy 'trick' t o be able to show any be specified. I would agree that they
man on board my ship how t o do his job could be but shudder at the dze of the
in detail. At the same time, I trust that task since if anything much more than
I am aware of my own limitations in 'conduct the orche$traYis specified, you'd
thcis 'era of very rapidly changing be all too likely to specify every single
technology' and therefore select care- detail of every single instrumentalist'r
fully for thorough learning only those job. I believe, while recognising that
detailed skills I need to do my job, plus improvement is usually possible, that the
a few for pleasure if time permits. For duties of the commanding officer are
the rest I rely on delegation to res- adequately specified by a range of means,
ponsible and well trained subordtnates education, training, tradition, order,
who can only be the better for su& trust. even counter-order and that to do so
If I didn't do this, I might become the further could severely limit the commaster of all trades (though I am con- manding officer's freedom of action to
vinced this is no longer possible) but so adjust to special local circumstances. I
blinded by their detail that I could no sulspect that R.W. should he find himself
longer see how t o bring them together. in command, would not thank anyone
specialist seaman on the General List
especially by the time that he has reached
the top of the Captain's Lifi and spent
fifteen years ashore.
Should not Their Lordships therefore
give encouragement to the General List
Seaman at the receiving end by indicating
precisely which Flag appointments can
be attained by these officers, and by
demonstrating by actual appointment in
the next few years that no captain's
command ashore is reserved to the Post
List?
Not only would this allay the anxieties
of the dry list officers, but it would bring
up The younger officers to understand
and in due course accept their promotion
to the General List with good grace.
CORRESPONDENCE
for telling him precisely what he should
do in every conceivable eventuality
unless he is proplosing that our technwlogy is already so far advanced as to
make the Remotely Piloted Ship a
sensible military project.
"Time in the Job'. Nevertheless, I have
to agree with R.W.'s main theme that
our sea officers should <spendsufficient
time at sea not only to learn their jobs
but also to apply and develop that learning. First Sea Lord material dhould be
able t o achieve this triple competence
iin any given task much more quickly
than his less fortunate fellows. The
judgement to make here is whether to
swerve the high flyer around the wide
range of experience presently thought
desirable for high command in the Navy
or whether to specialise lfim by holding
him longer in one type of appointment.
My judgement settles for the first course
since the maintenance of an effective
naval force is clearly not simply a matter
of pursuing fighting effectiveness at sea
to the exclusion of everything else; it is
an end product which must take into
account the many other factors which
contribute 'less directly, not least conducting the arguments which extract the
money from the other pressing government expenditure requirements in face of
the cont$numsly shift5ng sands of
national and interna+ional finance.
Pefhaps R.W. hasn't yet noticed that
command is simply the top of the combat
sailor's tree, that a competence in command is only one inessential qual5fication
for higher management and that life
'starts again at (aboult) forty' with only
occasional nostalgic visits to the
command scene for the lucky few.
Homily on this subject neafly completed but again some compromise is
both desirable and achievable. It is easy
for R.W. to suggest that the Wet/Dry
lists should be re-instituted on a 'youshouldn't-have-joined' basis but one does
n d lightly disregard the aspirations of
potential future top management; thereby
359
their motivation and performance might
drop; if that happens the selectability
base would narrow excessively thus
assuring the inadequate management
R.W. is so keen to avoid. But I would
agree that promotion to commander
should never be considered as constituting entitlement to command (one hopes
that S.A.R.B. is primarily concerned with
this problem) and I would agree that, for
the something-less-than-First Sea Lordmaterial officer, longer periods and
second opportunities for command are
worth serious consideration. Considerat5on I hould add, that cannot be
adequately addressed in this already over
long letter.
'It isn't a trickle it's a flood'. An emotive
phrase which all too closely describes the
seagoers' experience. I too would wish
to be assured that there really is no
other solution. R.W.'s overall theme
that everyone should spend longer in any
ship should allow some training emphasis
to shift to sea. Classrooms are still no
substitute for the real thing; the three
year man is scant improvement on the
national serviceman; the jab sattisfaction
of the petty officer is still as important
as ever. Tticlcling 'is adversely affecting
the whole fleet, below, on and above the
surface but I have not yet had the wide
experience R.W. is prepared to see
discarded, to put the case for a better
solution.
'Quite capable o f identifying potential
. . . . by . . . . their early thirties'. Resorting t o the N.O.'s argument, the next
stage should be insults. Frankly, R.W.'s
plea for better understanding of young
people should, along with fallibility in
seniors, take into account the difficulties
and dangers of over early selection When
the selection is itself made on scanty
evidence by fallible people examining the
performance of fallible subordinates as
recorded by their fallible immediate
superiors. The astonishing feature of our
selection system is that lit ever throws
up the right man, much less as many of
360
CORRESPONDENCE
the right men as it does. The reason that
it contfives a reasonable success rate is
that selection relies heavily on attrition
a t each and every stage. If you select
eafly, you 'attrit' early and commit your
organisation to living with its poorer
choices in dangerously responsible jobs.
No doubt this is happening today and
has been happening for centuriies but a
further resttiction on numbers selected
a t an eafly age is as likely to reduce
competence at the bigher levels as it is
to increase it. And anyway, the modern
young man, whom I recognise I am
disqualified by R.W. from understanding,
may not leap at the 99% chances of
failure to reach captain or the 97%
chances of fatlure to reach commander
which are accompanied by the same
chances of having Q find employment
elsewhere just at the time he is most
likely to be trying to support a grow'ing
family.
Conclusion
Well, there isn't one really. Hopefully
this letter is as tendentious as its provocation, which, ito my mind, is what The
Naval Review should be at least partly
about.
J.W.
H.M.S. GANGES
Sir,-My reaction to the press reports
about the closure of H.M.S. Ganges was
very much that expressed in your editorial comment in the July 1976 issue of
The Naval Review.
As the presen't Commanding Officer of
H.M.S. Raleigh I also looked in vain for
the answer to a question wh'ich I hoped
might be posed by those interested in
the manning of the Royal Navy, namely
'If Ganges is being shut down, where do
young men go to receive their recruit
training?'
I would like to reassure you, Sir, that
men betwen the ages of s'ixteen and
thirty-three who do not enter the Royal
Navy through the gates of B.R.N.C.
Ihntmouth (Officers) or H.M.S. Fisgard
(Artificer Apprentices) now all join the
SeMice a t H.M.S. Raleigh where they
undergo a six weeks' course of basic
training aimed at preparing them for life
in 'the Royal Navy. Raleigh is situated
at Torpoint on the west bank of the
Tamar opposite Ikvonport and during
the last four years has undergone a
rebuild to replace a World War I1
hutted camp with a purpose-built modern
establishment. At present we have eleven
hundred young men under trainhg
under the roof with a training and
support staff of ninety officers, two
hundred and fifty senior rates and two
hundred junior rates. In addition to the
recruit course for all new entries,
Raleigh also undemkes the seama~whip
element of the seamen operators' eaining from which they progress to operator
rtmiining d Dryad, Vernon, Cambridge
and Dolphin. Other activities at Raleigh
include training in seamanship, leadership and fire fighting for personnel of
the Fleet.
Each week some 160 recruits arrive
from all over the country and are given
a warm welcome to the Royal Navy.
Any member who is passing would be
similarly welcome for a walk round and
the chance of w i n g the recruits and
instructors at work.
R. W. F. GERKEN
R.N.A.S. KATUKURUNDA
REVISITED
Sir,-Early
this year my vrrife and I
decided to do a trip round the world,
and enroute we visited Ceylon. So we
decided to try to find my old air station
at Katukurunda some thirtyane years
a k r I left it. I had been appointed to
command this station in 1942, when we
were still a little nervous about the
Japanese, and just after the R.N. had
taken it over from the R.A.F., w%o had
used it as a single runway strip with no
facilities. I had 'thifty officers and men
to begin with, and my one mom
bungalow with a =randah also served
CORRESPONDENCE
as the wardroom for my three officers.
The Civil Engineer, Mr. Johnston, and
I designed the entire station, including
Repair Yard, Airfield, and Camp. We
walked the jungly land deciding on sites
for hangars, dormitory huts, messes etc.
Living sites had to be healthy and scenic,
with a chance of air and thmugh drafts
h r coolness in that steamy atmosphere.
And, d course, we had to see that fields
of fire from our strong points (never
used), weR kept clear. The design of
all buildings was done to our requirements - and as we grew we had
experts in most fields - finalised in
my bungalow over Canadian Club (we
had no Scdch). After agreement no
changes were allowed. A happy and
efficient arrangement. We were given a
hospital, to Admiralty requirements, but
this was little used. The area was healthy,
and with every opportunity taken for
bathing and games we never used more
than a small section, wi$h few beds.
Two and a half years later, when I
left, the station had swollen to 300
officers and 3,000 men (when full), with
a Royal Marine Defence Detachment,
some 1,000 civilians, and 1,000 Italian
Prisoners (or co-belligerents) employed
on extending the Repair Yard. During
the expansion period I had to continually
rewrite my orders and reform myself, as
commanding a small unit is very
different from commanding a sprawling
giant, like Katukarunda.
We were, I believe, a wry happy place,
and it was a delight to find the Camp in
good hands. The Airfield and Repair
Yard had gone, save for runways,
truncated, overgrown, and deserted; but
the Camp had been taken over by the
Ceylon Police as their training starion.
On learning who I was, the sergeant at
the gate shaok me warmly by the hand
and supplied me with a guide t o show me
round. To my joy the camp was in
wonderful shape, the only temporary
buildings had been improved, and there
were two more playing fields. Our hockey
361
and parade ground was now only a
parade ground. The only major changes
were the Petty Officers' Mess, which had
a wonderful site and has been replaced
by a figure of Buddah; the large
Wardroom (our third during expansion)
now used as offices and for procedng
work by the Geological Department; and
f i e Wrennery which has been replaced
by a small factory.
I was welcomed by the Commandant,
and my wife and I had tea with him and
his wife in my old bungalow (the scene
of many curry lunches). He remembered
coming t o me once to solicit my
assistance En closing down some house
of .ill-repute which he considered bad
for my sailors. He told me that he got
full co-operation. One hates to be a
spoil sport but the reputation of indiscriminate girls in Ceylon left a lot to
be desired.
In reading the last paragraph of
Manoel's article on Alexandria in the
April 76 issue of @heReview where he
comments on the installation of colour
T/V in messdecks I was reminded of
an incident at Katukurunda. Shortly
after the completion of our large movie
house with stage, I met the President of
the Petty Officers' Mess somewhere on
the station. As usual we stopped to chat.
I asked him how he liked the new mode.
He replied: 'Yes, it is very nice, Sir, but
you know we have lost something. Every
night we used t o do something in the
mess - a whist dtive - a darts competition - a sing song - something - but
now, Sir, we just go to the movies.'
I &odd be so glad if any of the many
who passed through this station would
care to write to me, and perhaps we
could exchange reminiscences of the old
place.
HANKROTHERHAM
(G. A. ROTHERHAM,
D.s.o., o.B.E..
Captain R.C.N.(R)
formerly Captain R.N. (reitd.))
P.O. Box 598 Knowlton
Quebec Canada.
362
CORRESP 'ONDENCE
PHYSICAL FITNESS TEST
Sir,-Many
H.M. ships and establishments have been taking part recently in
an exercise designed tu evaluate the
level of physical fitness in the Fleet. My
ship was no exception and we have just
completed this trial, I am happy to say,
with no casualties.
The physical fitness test is 'voluntary'
and can take the form of a walk, a swim
or a run. The distance is specified in
each case and the 'volunteer' is invited
to travel from point A to point B as
quickly as possible. I have so far heard
of very few attempts at the walk and
the swim so 'it would appear that the run
is the most 'popular'. I will therefore
dwell on this.
The distance t o be attempted is one
and a half miles and a time scale,
dependent on one's age, is used to give a
value to fitness. I volunteered to do this
run on an extremely hot day in the
middle of June. Being only twenty-four
years of age I was expected t o complete
the course in under twelve minutes. I
failed. On completion of the prescribed
distance I discovexd that I had taken
something in excess of fourteen minutes.
I am not proud of thlis performance, but
nor am I an aspirant for the olympin.
I have drawn certain conclusions from
this exercise and they are as follows:
1. I t is e x t ~ m e l ydangerous to expect
individuals, no matter what their age,
to partake 'in such a venture. Already
one fI'igate that I know of has 'lost a
senior rating as a result of it. I believe
he suffered heart failure - someone
will correct me if I am wrong - and
whilst I appreciate that he was not
perhaps sufficiently healthy t o continue
in the Service I do feel that his widow
and family must be more than a little
concerned about the way he was discharged.
2. I believe that this exercise, on its
own, is misconceived. I am no keep
fit fanatic but I M n k that I would
have been a little more impressed with
the idea of physical fitness if, instead
of hitting the Fleet with an idea out
of the blue, a set physical fitness
programme had been introduced with
a reasonable explanation of its aims.
3. I do not believe that bringing each
and every man in the Service to a peak
of physical fitness is going t o increase
efficiency. On the contrary, I believe
it could w l l have the opposite effect.
This venture, for example, if every
member of the Service t m k part,
could well cost the Navy as much as
£80,000 in lost man hours at a time
when it can ill afford to lose one
penny. I t follms that any form of
phydcal training programme k going
to cost the Navy money unless it is
undertaken at the expense of leave
and hence at the h k of impairing
morale.
4. Fina'lly, it seems important to State
emphatically at the outset whether or
not such a scheme is voluntary or
compulsory. In most ships and
establishments a competition was run,
not formally but made so by the
method of recording. This had the
effect of making those who did not
wish to take part go against their
leanings, for to opt out would have
given one the label of 'Bad Egg' or
some'th'ing even less complimentary.
This competitive spirit was undoubtedly one of the main reasons why the
senior rating mentioned above is no
longer with us. He gave everything to
it - including his life.
I know that my remarks will provoke
argument. I slincerely want them to do
just that.
S. W. HAINES
-
INVERGORDON
'NO SIDE'
Sir,-May I be permitted a final word in
order to correct, 'for the record', certain
errors in C. A. Herdman's letter, published in the July N.R.? Eirst, it has been
established beyond doubt (see Stephen
CORRESPONDENCE
363
Roskill, Naval Policy Between the Wars, all round (as it was finally), there would
Vo1.2, p.96), that AL.CW 8284 of have been no mutiny.
H. PURSEY.
10 September 1931 was received in
Nelson, the fleet flagship, before she (This correspondence is now closedEditor)
sailed from Portsmouth (as a pr'ivate
ship) to join the fleet at Invergordon. I t
5.5-INCH GUNS
may be that the Admiralty Letter was
'sat on' by the Chief of Staff and the Sir,-Reference to guns of this calibre
is made in your issue for July 1976.
Admiral's Secretary.
Given that my memory is to be
Secondly, the Captain of the Fleet,
never Yook charge' of the situation, nor depended upon, Chester's guns were
was he 'responsible' for a signal to the manufactured by the Coventry Ordnance
Company, which I have an idea did not
Admiralty; he was a staff officer.
As Roskill points out, 'command of normally manufacture guns for the
the fleet automatically devwlved on Royal Navy. Their calibre also was 5.5
Admiral Tomkinson' - who, as A.C.Q. inches.
in Hood, had only a squadron staff What is perhaps of more consequence
'but the adminidration of the fleet was is that the guns were fitted with the
to remain in the hands of the C-in-C's Holmstrom breech mechanism. That
staff in Nelson - an arrangement which mechanism was more complicated than
certa'inly contained plentiful seeds of the Welin mechanism which had been
standardised for the Service generally.
muddle and confusion.'
It ill becomes a member of that staff, But, anyhow under unfavourable cirone might think, to write patronisingly cumstances, it was claimed that it
of the flag officers who had to pull the conferred certain advantages in operaAdmiralty's (and the Government's) tion.
chestnuts out of rhe fire. Nor do the facts
W. M. PHIPPSHORNBY
(as established d t h such meticulous care
by our leading naval historian) support
DEEP SEA SOUNDINGS
C. A. Herdman's h collection of the Sir,-May I draw attention to the followsequence of events and signals. Indeed, ing words of Admiral Sir William James,
considering that in matters of pay the in his address to a Reunion Dinner of
paymasters were the experts; and that the Officers of the Royal Naval Surveythe job of admirals' secretaries was to ing Service in London in 1937:
give advice on 'hot' administrative
I venture to suggest to you thrte
matters, it may be thought that Inverreasons why you are one of the
gordon revealed some weakness in that
happiest communities in the world.
quarter. Surely the senior paymasters,
The first is that at an early age you
both at the Admiralty and in the fleet,
rid yourselves of that form of
should have been quick to realise, and
ambition which ruins the happiness
point out forcibly, that whereas a cut of
of so many men in a competitiw
Is. per day was ten per cent for a C.P.O.,
service, the ambit5on which produces
it was twenty-five per cent of the basic
jealousy and prefers success to
pay of an A.B. (and by definition those
friendship. Your ambition lies elseon the 1919 scale of pay were, by 1931,
where; it is to make the seas more
mostly badgemen with famdy responsisafe for mankind - to ass'ist your
bilities). Not only was there a 'breach of
fellow men and bwther officers.
contract', per se, but gross unfairness
A second reason is that, with few
coupled with real hardship in many
exceptions, men engaged in scientific
cases. Had the pay cut been ten per cent
pursuits are happy men. It Is, I
364
CORRESPONDENCE
think, true, that if a man is a grow'ing collection of photographs taken
scientific labourer - a doctor, during these annual events and would
engineer or m a h e surveyor - he is appreciate background information. The
impervious to the impulse to acquire pictures show that Gibraltar was the
wealth and 'is supremely content in usual base for the combined fleets, but it
his endeavours to add something to is possible that during the 1920s Pdlensa
the knowledge of the human race.
Bay was used; the exercises seem to begin
A third reason is that marine in 1922 and end in 1938; it is doubtful
surveyors, beyond any others d o go if there were any in 1936. Can these
down to the sea in ships, do see the details be confirmed? I am also seeking
wonders of the Lord En full measure. information on the names of ships taking
Robert Louis Stevenson said: 'If a part and a n outline of the problems
man love the labour of any trade studied (see, for example, A Sailor':
apart from any question of success Odyssey for the 1934 Exercises).
or fame, the gods have called him'.
According to Naval Policy Between the
I have been dining tonight with men Wars, Vol. 1 p. 531, the official records of
who have been called by Ithe gods.
the exercises were destroyed during
I am indebted (to the International World War Two, so that other than in a
Hydrographic Review for tlhis quotation, few biographies, it is extremely difficult
taken from the Admiml's book to obtain information. It could, therefore, be a worthwhile project to collect as
Hotch-Potch, published in 1968.
GODFREY
FRENCH
much first 'hand information as possible
and to lodge it in the National Maritime
FLEET EXERCISES 'BETWEEN THE Museum.
J. DIXON
WARS'
Sir,-Could any members help regarding 10 Banbury Drive
Combined Home/Medierranean Fleet Timperley
Exercises between the wars? I have a Altl'incham, Cheshire, WAlU 5BD.
Book Reviews
LE'ITERS AND PAPERS OF
ALFRED THAYER MAHAN (3 Vols.)
an American academic who has taught
history at the U.S. Naval Academy,
Annapolis. I t is a more wide-ranging
Eds. R. SEAGAR
II and DORISMAGUIREstudy than Kennedy's work and shows
(United States Naval Insti'tulte P~ess; great knowledge of maritime empires
U.K., Commonwealth and European and warfare of all periods; but its author
publisher and distributor Patrick Stephens deschbes Mahan as 'an undoubted
Ltd., Bar Hill, Cambridge-£60 the set.) racist' - which I think too simplistic a
dismissal of a complex but extremely
By an odd coincidence two books on the intelligent character. After all, towards
development and application of sea the clme of the 19th century, when
power came into my hands shortly before Mahan's influence was at its peak, a
our Editor asked me to review these great many prominent Europeans and
volumes of Mahan's letters and papers, Americans regarded the white races as
and as both of 'them are to some extent inherently superior to the coloured ones;
relevant to his theories and thinking it is and the concept of racial equality and of
perhaps appropriate to discuss briefly a multi-racial society are not only of
these recent reappraisals of his work. quite recent origin but so far offer no
Paul Kennedy in The Rise and Fall of proof of be'ing universally applicable British Naval Mastery (reviewed in these or indeed workable. However, these
columns in July 1976) argues that the books did show that Mahan's theories
whole of Mahan's teaching was based on about sea power and naval strategy are
false, or at any rate dubious premises still at least subjects for discussion, and
because 'strategy, leadership and battles' that the political philosophy which he
are the stuff of his study and not 'the played a part in formulating k not as
growth of trade, industry and colonies'. dead as some would have us believe.
He revives, and supports, Sir Halford
I think it is true to say that Mahan was
Mackinder's theory that power depends to a considerable extent responsible for
on control of the 'heartland' of the the creation of what may be called the
Eurasian land mass, and not on the 'battle fleet concept', and that he underelements propounded and analysed by played the importance of trade defence
Mahan. Today it is obvious that Soviet as a primary naval function, holding that
Russia exerts considerable, but by no victory would be won through a Trafalgar
means complete o r undisputed influence type battle, and that the attack on trade
over the Mackinder heartland. But at the would not prove decisive even if losses
same time she is unquestionably looking were heavy. Certainly he never foresaw,
outwards into the oceans of the world as did 'Jacky' Fisher early in the present
for the first time since Peter the Great; century, the immense influence which
and she appears to be fallowing many of the submarine would have on every
the precepts propounded by Mahan for aspect of naval warfare - though it is
the successful application of sea power. fair to mention that Fisher by no means
My own view is that Kennedy tilts the jettisoned the capital ship as an instrubalance too far towards Mackinder and ment of sea power. Indeed with the
away from Mahan. The ather book to Dreadnought he revoludonised ithem, and
which I refer is Command of the Sea: he constantly endeavoured to build more
The History and Strategy o f Maritime powerful ships of that type. If, however,
Empires by Professor Chrk G. Reynolds, criticisms such as Kennedy's have some
366
BOOK REVIEWS
substance in them it is fair to record that
Mahan was absolutely fight in stressing
that the convoy and escort strategy was
a far more effective antidote to commerce raiders than hunting for them;
and so it proved against the submarine
in both world wars.
Mahan's entire thesis was certainly
concerned with (the influence and
applioation of surface sea power; but at
the time when he produced his most
influential works in the 1890s it is hard
to see how this could have been otherwise. I t is also true to say that his
political philosophy was based on the
use of force, and that he was a convinced
and unabashed imperialist; but again it
is unfair to judge him by the concepts of
half a century and two world wars later.
Mahan admired profoundly the British
Empire, saw in it a powerful instrument
for peace and stability, and wanted his
country to take it as the model for its
own development. Imperialism of that
type has of course only recently come to
be regarded as reprehensible; while
Soviet Russia, with typically Orwellian
'double think', has developed and propagated its own meaning of it and its
own peculiar practice of it. Nor have
endeavours to achieve world peace
through the United Nations Organisation
either eliminated the use of force or
produced a degree of stability comparable
to the old imperialism. Rather do its
efforts seem to result in a virtually
continuous succession of small (and some
not so small) wars - a state of affairs
which
another
American
writer,
Harry Elmer Barnes, has ironically described as waging 'perpetual war for
perpetual peace'. As this condition was
certainly not foreseen by those who
framed the charter of the United
Nations Organisation in the 1940s, it is
surely asking rather a ldt to suggest that
Mahan should have foreseen it half a
century earlier.
Mahan has already been the subject
of no less than three biographies and
biographical studies - namely Charles C.
Taylor's The Life of Admiral Mahan,
Naval Philosopher (Doran, 1920),
William D. Puleston's The Life and Work
o f Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan (Yale
U.P., 1939) and William E. Livezey's
Mahan on Sea Power (Oklahoma U.P.,
1947); and he figures prominently in
viIitually every book on sea power and
maritime strategy produced during the
present century. His importance is therefore beyond doubt; but the questions
which tease one today are 'How did he
come to achieve that stature?' and 'How
far was it justified?'. Before suggesting
answers to those questions it must be
made clear that whereas Mahan's
military and political influence has been
intensively studied, his role as scholar
and historian, which undoubtedly predominated, has ndt been subject to such
thorough and careful scrutiny. In fact he
only wrote one book on strategy, and
that was not very well received. Of his
twenty-two other published volumes
eleven were history or biography, two
autobiography and nine were merely
collections of lectures, articles and
essays.
As a historian he must therefore stand
or fall by his famous 'Sea Power' series
- The Influence o f Sea Power upon
History 1660-1783 (1890), The Influence
o f Sea Power Upon the French Revolution and Empire ( 2 Vols. 1892), and Sea
Power in Its Relation to the War of 1812
(1905). Here it should be ndted that he
was born in 1840 and produced nothing
of historical or literary distinction until
he was well past forty years old. Then in
1885 the door to fame was suddenly
opened to him by his captain of the Civil
War period Commodore Stephen B.
Luce, who had become the firs$ President
of the newly-founded U.S. Naval War
College at Newport, Rhode Island.
Mahan at once accepted Luce's offer of
the post of lecturer on naval history and
tactics, and flung himself into preparatory
reading on a very wide range and scope.
BOOK REVIEWS
367
His lectures were ready by early 1886, the book, already mentioned, it achieved
and reached the public four years later as enormous success - especially in this
The Influence o f Sea Power Upon country and in Germany. Though it had
not been Mahan's purpose he had in fact
History.
Here perhaps I may intersperse the supplied the British with a cogent explanfact that my copies of the Sea Power ation for their achievements, while to
series were all part of tbe Admiralty prize the Germany of Wilhelm I1 and Tirpitz
awarded for getting first-class certificates he appeared to signpost the raad to the
in 811 five examinations for the rank of acquisition of comparable power and
Lieutenant, and I know that at first wealth.
Mahan's next series of lectures enabled
reading I found them completely absorbing. The fact that my copy of the first 'him to carry his story forward to 1815,
of the series came from the 14th edition and were published as The Influence o f
is sufficient proof of the success achieved Sea Power on the French Revolution and
by the book. Yet today, perhaps as a Empire. Here one may note that his
result of wider experience, I realise that style became more rhetorical as he
Mahan's thesis is deficient on at least one developed the gift for producing the
vital lfistorical issue - namely the memorable phrase or the graphic desenormous effect of the successes or cription. But the purpose of rhetoric it
failures of Britain's continental allies is well to remember is persuasion rather
(notably Frederick the Great in the than truth; and all1 rhetorical history or
Seven Years' War) on what the navy was speeches, from Cicero to Churchill, must
able to accomplish all over the world. for that reason be regarded with some
He practically ignores the fact that in degree of scepticism. Yet there can be
the only major war of his period iin which few officers of my generation who do not
we suffered decisive defeat, namely the recall, for example, Mahan's words about
War of American Independence, the how: 'Those far distant, storm-beaten
French revival 'is largely attributable to sh$ps,upon which the Grand Army never
their having no continental enemy to looked, stood between it and the
absorb their strength and attention this dominion of the world'; or his eulogy of
this country: 'But the English temper,
rime.
In the first chapter of The Influence when once aroused, was marked by a
of Sea Power on History Mahan tenacity of purpose, a constancy of
postulated six requirements for the endurance, which strongly supported the
successful application of sea power and a conservative tendencies of the race' maritime strategy. It may be worth words which may surely be considered
repeating them here, since all are today applicable to 1939-45.
The next phase of Mahan's career was
valid, at any rate to some extent - as
the U.S.S.R. has plainly come to under- an unhappy story. His historical successes
stand since 1945. The first was a and His very evident intellectual powers
favourable geographic position such as aroused jealousy among his seniors, and
Britain possessed vis ir vis Holland or in 1893 he was sent to sea as captain of
Germany; the second was physical con- the U.S.S. Chicago, which flew lthe flag
formation of the country, particularly of Rear-Adm'iral Henry Erben, for a
d t h regard to well-placed and sheltered European cruise during which the limeanchorages; the third was the extent of light inevitably fell on the internationally
territory; fourth came the size of famous captain - t o the mounting
population; fifth the character of the annoyance of a conventional and rather
people, and last the character of the stupid admiral. I n retrospect the choice
government. Despite the Smbalance in of such a disparate pair for such an
368
BOOK REVIEWS
important assignment seems to have been
astonishingly ill-judged. Mahan was, not
unnaturally, angered and distressed by
Erben's classification of him in his
Fitness Report as no better than 'tolerable' under the headings of 'Professional
Ability' and 'Devotion to Duty'. But he
had influential friends in Theodore
Roosevelt, Henry Cabot Lodge and the
Secretary of the Navy Hilary Herbert,
and they ensured his return to the War
College in 1895, where he worked chiefly
on his life of Nelson which, though
superseded by 'biographers who have been
able to use recently discovered material,
still remains a brilliant work. Mahan
retired in 1896, and in 1905 produced his
last and perhaps most satisfactory work
in the series here considered, namely
Sea Power in its Relation to the War o f
1812. One may sum up his work by
saying that, despite its weaknesses and
deficiencies, no historian before or since
him has succeeded in presenting the
influence of sea power so effectively and
so readably.
Mahan was a very prolific letter
writer, and the editors of the volumes
under review tell us that lthey estimate
that they have not been able to recover
and prinlt more than a quarter to a fifth
of those he wrote. If a few here reproduced, such as those giving his
travelling expenses on various journeys,
may be classed as trivia which could well
have been excluded, most are of
compelling interest - though as with all
books of this type one does regret the
absence of the other side of the
correspondence. The editorial work is
quite admirable, and the production is of
a quality too rarely encountered in these
days.
To members of The Naval Review the
greatest interest of the books probably
lies in the letters to British correspondents; and it is not surpfising to find
prominent among them Captain (later
Admiral Sir William) Henderson, the
'Busy Bill' uaho became the first
Honorary Treasurer of the Naval Society
and was Honorary Editor of this journal
for twenty years. Among other 'naval
intellectuals' of the period the Colomb
brothers, Admiral Philip and Captain Sir
John, figure frequently in Mahan's letters
though he does not appear to have
corresponded direct with them. The first
letter to Henderson is a very formal one
dated 16 October 1888, and discusses
Henderson's remarks on Philip Colomb's
recent article in the RUSI Journal; but
Mahan was plainly attracted to a likeminded officer since he tells Henderson
that 'My first motive in writing to you
was simply to shake hands as it were
with an officer of allied views'. They
evidently got on friendly terms quickly,
since in the very next letter Mahan
dropped the formal mode of address.
It told Henderson that he was 'amused
and somewhat comforted in my own
difficulties to find that you were meding
nearly the same'. And so it always has
been with pioneers working within a
conservative service; for Admiral
Stephen Luce was to prove mentor and
saviour to Mahan just as Sir David Beatty
was to Herbert Richmond, our Founder,
a generation later. On 5 May 1890
Mahan sent Henderson a copy of The
Influence o f Sea Power on History wi'th
an explanation of the thought and
purpose whEch had inspired the work.
Two vears later we find Mahan
corresponding with George Sydenham
Clarke (later Lord Sydenham), who was
soon to become the first secretary of the
Committee of Imperial Defence, and in
1893 Mahan sent his wife a long description of his adulatory reception in
London, including a magnificent dinner
given by Earl Spencer, the First Lord,
ulith three former First Lords o f t h e
Admiralty present. Though Admiral
Erben was placed on Spencer's right he
can hardly have failed to realise that the
dinner was in reality in honour of the
Flag Captain of whose interests and
BOOK REVIEWS
activities he took a far from favourable
view.
Mahan missed meeting Henderson
when he was in London, but by chance
they met in Naples in February 1894
when Henderson was on his way to take
wmmand of the cruiser Edgar. The
letters here printed make it plain that the
encounter was a great success, and in
March they met again onboard
Henderson's ship, when he gave a dinner
in honour of Mahzm and concluded it
with a very flattering speech. It should
not I think be assumed that, because
Mahan mentioned such incidents in
letters to his wife, he was a vain man though like most authors he certainly
relished favourable notice being taken of
his works.
It is interesting to remark how quickly
Mahan's friendssp with forward-looking
British officers and academics matured
and expanded. Apart from Henderson
and Clarke he was soon corresponding
with Professor J.K. (later Sir Jcvhn)
Laughton, and James R. Thursfield the
naval historian and journalist, whose son
Admiral H. G. Thursfield was for many
years naval correspondent of The Times
and a strong supporter of this journal.
It is, however, curious to find that
Mahan seems to have had little or no
direct contact or correspondence with
J.S. (later Sir Julian) Corbett, though in
letters to third parties he praises Corbett's
books such cis England in the Seven
Years' War (1907) and Some Principles
of Maritime Strategy (1911). Nor are m y
letters from Mahan listed in the catalogue
of the Corbett papers prepared by his
son-in-law Brian Tunstall. One may
regret Vhis lacuna the more because,
although Corbett never exercised anything like the influence of Mahan, his
views on naval strategy were in some
respects (notably on defence of trade)
to be proved the sounder. A discussion
between the two greatest theorists and
writers on sea power of the period would
surely have proved fascinating entertain-
369
ment, and in all probability highly
instructive.
After his retirement Mahan continued
to send advice on naval policy and
dispositions to President Theodore
Roosevelt, who evidently never wavered
in his support of his prot6g6's theories
on the application of sea powe;. He also
exchanged papers and ideas with
Henderson, of whom he shrewdly wrote
(19 January 1907) 'I feel very sure that
your temperament is too active to enjoy
unlimited repose'. The final section of
Volume I11 of this series comprises a
selection of papers on a very d d e variety
of subjects written by Mahan between
1883 and 1914. He remained a staunch
Anglophil to the end, and early in August
1914 said at a newspaper interview 'You
people in England do not realise the
immense admiration felt all over the
world, yes, and in Germany also, for the
British Navy . . . personally I hold that
the British Navy today, in all essentials,
remains as incomparably superb as ever'
There is irony in the fact that the conflict
which followed was to go a long way
towards disproving the theories which he
had so assiduously propagated. That
Mahan exercised great influence on
maritime strategy between 1870 and 1914
is beyond doubt, and these volumes help
to explain 'how and why that was so.
History is of course an 'unceasing
debate', and no historian is right all the
time. That Mahan bas come to be
ignored, and even discredited by the
country and the service he most admired
probably owes a good deal to the misfortune that he wrote his major works
just when the world stood on {thebrink
of far-reaching technological changes.
There may be a warning in the story of
his life against the 'determinist' view of
history -the &tempt to apply the lessons
of history to current problems and to
project them into the future. Despite the
fact that the acquisition of historical
knowledge seems to be regarded in the
Navy of today as an unnecessary
370
BOOK REVIEWS
encumbrance I do not doubt that young
officers who turn to Mahan's 'Sea Power'
books and read them merely for the
pleasure of the stories told therein will
never find themselves bored. Furthermore it is possible that Mahan's affection
for the Royal Navy at the period of its
greatesrt influence, and his admiration for
its leaders, contributed to that pride of
service, confidence in its own capacity
and awareness of its great traditions
which, despite all that went wrong, can
surely be said to have contributed to
surmounting all $he trials and tragedies
of both World Wars. For Mahan
certainly did understand that the sources
from which, in the ultimate issue, any
fighting service draws its strength are not
wholly material.
Though the price of these volumes
obviously places them far beyond the
depth of virtually all British taxpayers'
pockets we should be grateful to rhe
editors and the Naval Institute Press for
making them available - presumably
chiefly for libraries.
STEPHEN ROSKILL
NAVAL POLICY BETWEEN THE
WARS
Vol.II - The Period of Reluctant
Rearmament 1930-1939
by STEPHENROSKILL
(Collins-£12.00)
'It is my earnest 'h?pe', wrote Winston
Churchill, in the Preface to his history
of what President Roosevelt suggested he
call 'The Unnecessary War', 'that
pondering upon the past may give
guidance in days to come, enable a new
generation to repair some of the errors
of former years and thus govern, in
accordance with the needs and glory of
man, the awful unfolding science of the
future'. Let us ponder, therefore,
inspired but
unbemused
by the
Cburchillian rhetoric, upon the second
and final part of Captain Roskill's
indispensable account of naval policy
'between the wars' ('which wars?' do I
hear some young man ask?). But first,
let the author himself explain the long
interval between the publication of the
first volume of this work in 1968 and the
appearance of the present one:
I had originally intended to carry on
immediately with this second
volume, but when my research had
progressed as far as about 1935 I
found that the records I needed had
not yet reached the Publtic Record
Office. Thmgh the departments concerned offered to allow me to carry
on my research in their own Record
Offices I was aware from my work
on the maritime side of World War
I1 (The War at Sea 1939-1945) that
'it would involve me in going through
a vast mass of papers many of which
were irrelevant to my purposes . . .
While I was deliberating on the
problem facing me I was asked if I
would write the authorised biography
of the first Lord Hankey; and as I
found that this large collection of
papers and diaries had been left untouched since hlis death in 1963, I
decided to undertake that work first
and then return to Naval Policy
Between the Wars. This led to the
'production of $hree volumes entitled
Hankey. Man of Secrets (Collins,
1970-74).
Setting the stage
As in his first volume, but this time
within the compass of a single chapter,
Roshill reviews with fluent economy the
background to the naval plans, policy
and strength of the principal powers.
The second Labour government, having
taken office on 30 May 1929 (though
with a minority of seats against Conservative and Liberals combined), was
almost immediately faced w'it'h the
collapse af the whole structure of the
international post-war economy. Not
only idealism, therefore, but economic
necessity impelled the government to
continue the quest for disarmament
BOOK REVIEWS
371
agreements, with naval limitation as first ment, but automatically raised the level
priority. But this propensity of statesmen against wbich the Japanese measured
to eliminate the instruments of war their need, which in turn raised that of
before removing the causes of it, even Britain by a sort of ratchet effect. At the
under the compulsion of economic ciisis, same time two other naval powers,
contained the seeds of coming conflict. namely France and Italy, neither of
It may be objected that arms expenditure which was deemed by Britain, in 1930, to
itself is a primary cause of war, in that be a possible adversary, were locked in
it depdves a people of the material the iivalry caused by the aspirations of
means to achieve the ever-higher a resurgent Italy to naval parity with
standard of living to which they aspire. France. In such a complex situation it
But it is the duty of political leaders to is hardly surprising that, although a
put first tliings first. The reluctance of Three Power agreement was reached as
Britain's leaders to do so pro$ides the a result of the 1930 London Naval Conleitmotiv for this volume. Its particular ference, the sacrifice of naval autonomy
importance to a proper understanding by those Powers, for the sake of an
of the history of the time derives from accommodation 'can hardly', En Roskill's
the circumstance that nearly all the words, 'be described as having contriresponsible men, ministers, officials and buted to world peace'. In contrast,
service chiefs, attributed to naval power however, to the Anglo-Ametican acrian 'absolute' quality differentiating it mony generated at the previous post-war
from the other types of military power. naval conferences. the relations between
Because of this, considerations of the two navies took a turn for the better.
national prestige tended to obscure the Much of the credit for this was due to
real issues of national secutity. Pre- Admiral W. V. Pratt U.S.N., Chief of
occupation with 'tonnage and gunnage' Naval Operations. Not only did he
at the London Naval Conference of 1930 question the prevailing American desire
revealed the determination of Japan, in to build more and bigger warthips than
particular, to achieve parity, or at least anyone else, but was prepared, also, to
the appearance of it, with the other two propose that 'the U.S. Navy "should
major naval powers, U.S.A. and Britain, depart from its position as a great
following upon the expiry in 1931 of the neutral", and adopt the British view of
Washington Naval Treaty of 1922. For Belligerent Rights; which of course was
Britain, the 'absolute' character of naval a complete reversal of the doctrine of
strength was seen as a function of her "Freedom of the Seas".'
Imperial sea-communications, which
according to the estimates of the day The Ten Year Rule
required a certain minimum number of
On 15 August 1919 the War Cabinet
cruisers for protection, operating under had decided that: 'It should be assumed
the cover of one or more battle-fleets. for framing revised Estimates, that the
Because war with the U.S.A. was not British Empire will not be engaged in
considered a possibility, the number of any great war during the next ten years,
up-to-date balttleships forming the main and that no Expeditionary Force is
fleet should be not less than that of the required for this purpose'. In 1928 the
next strongest naval pomr, namely Cabinet (at the behest of the Chancellor
Japan. The U.S. A., determined upon of the Exechequer, Mr. Winston
having a navy 'second to none', not only Churchill) reaffirmed:
That it should be assumed, for the
in terms of numbers, but of size 'type for
purpose of framing the Estimates of
type', not only opposed the British
the Fighting Services, that at any
independently arrived at cruiser require-
BOOK REVIEWS
given date there will be no major days is false. The Valiant and Rodney
war for ten years. (Although pro- were the only ships in that condition
vision was made for review.)
from 6.00 a.m. Tuesday to 5.0 p.m.
Secondly, the mutiny
Soon after the end of the London Wednesday.'
Naval Conference the Admiralty asked happened spontaneously in consequence
the Foreign Office for their opinion of of the sudden imposition, as a part of
the continuing validity of the 'Ten Year drastic pay-cuts nation-wide, of reducRule'. To his credit 'the Permanent Secre- tions which fell with disproportionate
tary of the Foreign Office (Vansittart) severity upon junior ratings and certain
replied that although Britain must con- married men. There was no question of
tinue to support the League (of Nations) a Communist (or any other) conspiracy.
her difficulties and dangers would be Thirdly, the affair did, howeVer, adenormously increased if she allowed minister a sharp shock to the corporate
herself to $become'enfeebled', in view of consciousness of the officer corps, which
the war-talk on the European continent. had remained, for the most part, unI t was not unltil 1932, however, that the moved by the quasi-revolutionary social
'Ten Year Rule' was cancelled by changes which had been in progress since
Cabinet dedsion, following strong repre- the First World War. Whilst introspecsentations from the Chiefs of Staff. tion may, in some instances, have been
Another eighteen months were to elapse exaggerated, the reforms of style, of
before action was taken to repair the attitudes, and of organisation which
grave deficiencies in Britain's defences followed Invergordon certainly bore
which adherence to it had brought about. fruit in the high morale of the Navy in
Beset by economic disaster, and still the Second World War. Captain Roskfll
hoping to achieve security through dis- has never been afraid to pass judgment
armament, the government remained on individuals whom he deems to
uncommitted to any specific level of have failed in certain respects; he is
defence expenditure.
equally ready to commend ability. 'Phe
present volume is no exception, and, as
Naval administration
m+ght be expected, analysis wf InverThe recruitment, training, organisa- gordon without attribution of blame
tion and conditions of service of the would have been anodyne. But k will
officers and men of the Fleet form a be surpdsing if the judgments are
vital and continuous accompaniment to questioned.
the formulation and execution of naval
In regard to the continuing conduct
policy. Upon their successful conduct of naval business much depends upon
depend the morale and efficiency of the those w%o fill 'the top ministerial, civil
navy as a fighting force. Opfnhns may service and professional naval posts
differ as to the importance of the and the relationship between them. As
Invergordon Mutiny in causing the First Lord of %heAdmiralty Sir Bolton
sudden 'run on the pound' which forced Eyres Monsell, who took over immeBritain to abandon the Gold Standard. diately after Invergordon and brought
But the definitive account with which we the Navy through first, the making good
are now provided by Captain Roskill, in of deficiencies in the early 1930s, and
a chapter on 'Tnvergordon and the then the beginning of re-armament, was
Aftermath', establishes beyond doubt a tower of strength. So also was Sir
three facts of particular concern t o the Oswyn Murray, Permanent Secretary to
Royal Navy itself. First, 'the impression the Admiralty for twenty years, until his
sometimes given that the whole fleet was deafh in 1937. Many names of captains
in a state of mutiny for two complete and junior admirals, which were to
BOOK REVIEWS
373
become familiar when they rose to high ment of the Asdic, without understandcommand during 'the 'war at sea' appear, ing the inherent limitations of range and
as they played their part in preparing the reliability to which it was subject.
navy for it. But the greatest name of Similarly, no doubt as a consequence of
all, that of Admiral of the Fleet Lord the ever-increasing pressure of work
Cha'tfield, First Sea Lord from 1933 to with which the exiguous naval staff had
1938, was not in Britain's war-fighting to compete, coupled with the realisation
team. In Captain Roskill's view, which that we would have to fight the coming
as usual is firmly based and persuasive, war with what we had got, our naval
dhen Chatfield's successor (Backhouse) leaders and their political supporters
died only seven months after taking over, hopelessly overestimated the efficacy of
'by far the best decision would have been our defence of the Fleet and shipping
to recall Chatfield . . . .' No doubt against air attack. Britain's failure to
Winston Churchill's judgment, never equip her Fleet with a tachymettic
reliable in regard to personalities, was system of anti-aircraft fire-control has
'irretrievably warped by h!is former naval yet to be satisfactorily explained. As to
experience when, at the outset of the our submarines, the general naval view
First World War, he had recalled the that 'the submarine is the weapon of the
already senile 'Jacky' Fisher, with weaker power' prevailed; its place in a
disastrous results for the Navy and the hierarchy of 'the Snstruments of sea
country; he was, therefore content to power' headed by the battleship was
auxiliary - useful for reconnaissance
retain Sir Dudley Pound.
and minelaying, with the opportune
Naval aviation, submarine warfare, A/A damaging of enemy capital ships and We
sinking of those already damaged by
and A/S
'Depend upon it, Sir, when a man gunfire as a bonus. The fact that the
knows he is to be hanged in a fortnight, 'One Power Standard' meant that Britain
it concentrates his mind mnderfully.' would be the weaker naval power at one
The threat of armed aggression by the side of tbe world or the other seems not
Axis powers had just this effect upon the to have been taken seriously into
resolution of the main conflicts of naval, account, when considering the part which
air and army professhnal opinion (except British submarines might play in a future
for 'the indidsibility of air power') in war at sea.
Britain as 1939 drew nearer, and our
political leaders, whether in or out of Grand strategy
The virtual collapse of the Geneva
power, became frightened. Churchill,
who in May 1936 had wfitten to Chatfield Conference on disarmament in October
'You ought 'to be able to prove . . . . that 1933, following Hitler's notice of German
you can build battleships that you would withdrawal and her intention to leave
not be afraid . . . . to send readily to sea the League of Nations, led the British
in the teeth of mine, torpedo o r aero- government reluctantly to congider the
plane', a year later was insisting, in the rnobilsation and deployment of the
House of Commons, that 'the Fleet must nation's resources, together with the
have absolute control in all its integrity enlistment of those of friendly powers,
of all the aeroplanes . . . . which start for the defence of Britain and her
from ships of war br aircraft cartiers'. Empire (now an amalgam of India, the
But, in company with the majority of self-governing Dominions and the
influential naval officers, Churchill Colonies) against German, and possibly
accepted as the effective counter to a Japanese, aggression. France, Italy and
fu'ture submarine menace the develop- the U.S.A. were to be taken as friendly
374
BOOK REVIEWS
powers against whom no defensive preparations were thought necessary. A
Defence Requirements Sub-committee
of the Committee of Imperial Defence
was set up, in the first instance to say
what had to be done t o make good the
deficiencies of the 'locust years' of
economic stringency and idealistic disarmament. The D.R.C., as this Subcommittee was called, consisted of the
Permanent Secretaries of the Treasury
and the Foreign Office, the three Chiefs
of Staff and, as Chairman, the Secretary
of the Commlittee of Imperial Defence.
Within three months this strong team
had, despite important differences of
opinion, made its first report. I t was not
until five months later, Roskill records,
that the Cabinet decided t o act upon the
recommendations. The reasons for the
delay, though instructive, do not forni
part of a review of naval policy as such.
What does emerge, however, from a
study of the transition from 'making good
deficiencies' to 'reluctant rearmament',
is the absence of a coherent political
formulation of Britain's objectives in the
situation d t h which she was faced,
sufficiently rigorous to bring into line the
divergent appreciations of the respective
Fighting Services, the Treasury and the
Foreign Office, not to mention public
opinion, when once this began to
respond t o the perception of danger. As
early as 1934, sufficient was known about
the lines upon which the D.R.C. was
working for Churchill to point out,
during a debate in the House of Commons, that while the Navy regarded as
predominant the threat from Japan, and
particulaily to sea communications with
Australia and New Zealand, the Army's
first concern was to protect the North
West Frontier of India, and the Air
Force was matching itself against 'the
nearest and most probable antagonist'.
More naval conferences
The conduct of naval policy before and
dulting the Second London Naval
Conference, 1935-1936, is dealt with, as
was that of 1930, in a separate chapter.
Once again Captain Roskill's impressive
skill in recounting prolonged and tortuous negotiations is evident, and his
summing up laptidary:
The signature of the London Treaty
on 25 March 1936 marked a watershed in the naval policy of the
democratic nations, since the protracted negotiations and the withdrawal of Japan had shown beyond
doubt that the era of naval limitation by agreement, initiated a t
Washington in 1921-22 had come to
an end.
What now seems so strange, however,
and difficult to explain, is that, as early
as February 1934, the D.R.C. had
described Germany as the country's
'ultimate potential enemy' and yet the
impact made by Germany's revelation of
plans to build six capital ships, 44,000
tons of carriers, eighteen cruisers, 37,500
tons of destroyers and 17,500 tons of
submarines by 1942, ostens'ibly to confront Russia in the Baltic, was minimal.
Indeed the Anglo-German naval agreement of 18 June 1935 could be justified,
5f a t all, purely as a tactical move to
establish the lowest practicable 'benchmark' against which the 'pecking order'
of the five existing major naval powers
might be measured a t the immediately
forthcoming London Naval Conference.
Again Britain's failure to integrate the
air, sea and land aspects of her rearmament programme was manifest.
The chickens come home to roost
As early as 1933 the Commander-inChief Mediterranean had become concerned about the defences, and espedially
the air defence, of Malta, in view of
Mussolini's expansionist aims. Nothing
was done. When Italy invaded Abyssinia,
therefore, in December 1934, not only
did the Fleerthave to move to Alexandria,
as the prospect of hostilit5es against Italy
grew; but Chatfield felt bound to advise
375
BOOK REVIEWS
the government, through the Committee
of Imperial Defence, that an accommodation must be made with Italy, even
although the outcome of a fleet acdon
with the Italians was not in doubt. 'It is a
disaster', Chatfield wrote to a naval colleague at this time, 'that our statesmen
have got us into this quarrel with Italy,
~ % ougbt
o
to be our best friend because
her position in the Mediterranean is a
dominant one'. Certainly 'collective
security' (not to be confused with
'collective defence', of which NATO is
an expression) had failed.
The next 'away match' on the prewar naval fixture list was Vhe Spanish
Civil War. In dealing with this, as
with the Abyssinian crisis, Captain
Roskill deploys his recognised skill
in blending the political, straltegic and
naval operational and administrative
factors into an eminently readable
narrative. By this time the strain up011
senior officers was beginning to tell. Yet
the performance of the Fleet, and
especially of commanding officers, senior
and junior, was of a sigh order. I t seems
fair to put down to 9heer pressure of
work what might be regarded as failure
to note, from experience in hunting
Italian submarines, that the performance
of Asdic, when put to the operational
test, fell far short of the '80% effic'iency'
upon which was based the belief that the
submarine was no longer a serious
menace. Nor was faith in the air-defence
capabil'ity of the Fleet shaken as it should
have been. With the accession, on
6 November 1937, of Italy to the 'AntiComintern Pact' signed a year earlier by
Germany and Japan, the line-up for war
was complete - it was just a matter of
wa'iting for the whistle. Tra'ining, exercising, prepating for a particular war and
determining how it ~houldbe fought were
the predominant features of naval policy
during this final period, enlivened by the
Munich cfisis - as good a rehearsal as
any. Many members of The Naval
Review will rdain vivid memories of the
particular part they were called upon to
play, and the feeling of inevitability akin
to Greek tragedy which events called
forth.
I t is, perhaps, fitting to conclude this
review of Captain Roskill's invaluable
history of naval policy between the First
and Second World Wars to note that it is
dedicated to:
The officers and men of the Royal
Navy who fought in the Second
World War, and in memory of those
who gave their lives.
M.N.
-
TO USE THE SEA
READINGS IN
SEAPOWER AND MARITIME
AFFAIRS
(Naval Institute Press, Annapolis,
Maryland, 1973-£4.2513.)
1975 Supplement - 95p.
These publications, of which the first
appeared in 1973, are compilations of
papers initially published, with one
exception, between 1967 and 1974 in the
Udted States Naval Institute Proceedings, the Naval Review (U.S. version)
'and the Naval War College Review.
They ~epresent, h the words of the
editors, 'a cross section of recent dews
on the subjects of seapower and maritime
affairs', intended as source books for
'seminar style analyds and study of
these areas'. The editors add their hope
that the books 'will be of value t o
instructors and students alike.'
The collection is a formidable one.
I t is almost a truism that every difference
between British and Ametican percep
tions stems from differences of scale as
between one side of the Atlantic and
the other. George I11 failed to hoist it in:
and even after two hundred years the
sheer mass of American undertakings
still catches Britons unawares. So it is
with these 'Readings in Seapower and
Maritime Affairs', as they are sub-titled.
The forty-nine papers - amounting to
someth5ng over 300,000 words - are
grouped under broad headhgs, which
376
BOOK RE
are insufficiently precise to avoid some invigorated by being grafted on to fresh
overdlapping of subject matter between shoots of passing relevance or respectthem but which nevertheless suggest the ability but in most cases characteristically
principal avenues of approach to a study revealed by a straining of the argument
of the maritime factors that shape a as examples of special pleading for the
nation's policy. In fact the headings may auehws' sacred cows. Of such are the
do more, in that $hey suggest the basis papers on mining, aircraft carriers,
d the current U.S. approach to the amphibious forces, conventional subsubject. The two books between them marines, and so on: the most lively is on
include twelve papers under the heading anti-submarine warfare ('ASW - Now
'Sea Power', eleven under 'Tactics and or Never') and involves a fictitious desTools', six under 'The Influence of truction by Soviet submarine-launched
Geography', four under 'Shipping', ten missiles of the U.S. strategic nuclear
under 'The Soviets at Sea', and Six under capability, with no warning and in ten
mlinutes flat, as reponted in The Times,
'Uses and Laws of the Sea'.
Within each bracket there are wide an 'Admiralty Report', and a covering
va~iations of length, depth, treatment letter from the Defence Minister to the
and authotity. There is exhaustive and Prime Minister. Others are less enterdetailed analysis, supported by tables and taining.
But in a full cover-to-cover reading of
charts of doubtless impeccable authenticity, of certain aspects of each subject the two books (a daunting task which
within the whole, from uses of the sea only an editor in pursuit of a review
by nation and ship and cargo carried, would impose on any reader, for the
by way of ship building and marine dlection is not a coherent whole) two
investment, to comparisons of rail or three themes recur. They appear, not
trackage, truck mileage, and inland by design but seemingly by accident, or
waterway traffic in the Soviet Union, and at least by a process of more or less subcomparative maximum speeds versus cons@ious surfacing through the argulength in U.S. and Soviet warship ments about other things; to some extent
designs. Some d the papers suffer from they claim identities entitling them to
undue prdlixity of style, some from sheer study in their own right; and they leave
banality, and some from highly one with intriguing questions begging
Sndigest?ble admixtures of non-English further examination both as to their
(where did Admiral Kidd, a sort of nature and their relative importance in
Samuel Goldwyn of the 6bh Fleet, get the structure of maritime l~oliclies.The
the verb 'to atttite'?): yet they reflect by first such theme is a dominant concern,
and large a deep and very American wholly understandable yet only occasense of earnest professional purpose. sionally amounting to an obsession, with
This does not always make them easy to the US.-Soviet super-power relationship.
read: and the collection is by no means The general and well-informed dseven a simple anthology, let alone a cussiions of global maritime affairs are
bedside book. I t can be seen not only as either abundantly spiced with, or quickly
a contribution to the study of sea power focus on, consideration of the Soviet
but also, perhaps more widely, as a factors in whatever context. This is
source of inputs under any one of the obviously to be expected, but it has the
Readings used into studies covered by effect of pointing up 'in stmng relief the
virtues of one or two articles which
another.
Under one or two of these headings concentrate on the weaknesses of the
- notably 'Tactics and Tools' - there Soviet position, notably in respect of such
appear some elderly chestnuts, re- truths of maritime real estate as are
377
BOOK REVIEWS
examined in 'The Constraints d Naval
Geography on Sdid Naval Forces' and
'The Meaning and Significance of the
Gorshkov Articles'. Anybody who has
spent any time in the close proximity a t
sea of Soviet wanhips will agree that the
overall impression created by their
operation is far from one of overwhelming efficiency, and the use of the heading
'The Soviets a t Sea', as well as a number
of the papers under it, reveals a sound
awareness of the need to study this facet
of the whole. Equally there are lessons
for such as us in a paper entitled 'Of
Wars and Warriors (American Style)' in
v&ich the author draws broad conclusions, whi& are well worth noting, on
how to resist the dangerous tendency of
modern industrial societies to eschew
combat. But thinking in terms of superpower relationships does tend to predominate. Of the only four papers by
non-U.S. authors, two (by Admiral
Wegener of the Federal German Navy)
are concerned ~ 5 t hthe %det threat,
one ('Quo Vadis, Small Naval /Power?')
is by a R.A.N. officer still pursuing the
by now unfashionable chimera of an
all-purpose big ship; and one is a
magisterial lecture on 'The Objective in
War', delivered by Ltddell Hart to the
Naval War College in 1952, which
concentrates more on past Germans than
on present and future Soviets. For the
rest, the tone is largely set by the Introduction. 'In strategic policy' it states in
each book, 'U.S. thinking has been
dominated by the theor'ies of Alfred
Thayer Mahan for over half a century.
The U.S.S.R. on the other hand has
based its doctrine on Clausewitdan
concepts of a "continental" or land
strategy. As indicated by the growing
Sloviet fleet, these traditional doctrinal
concepts appear to be changing'. And
indeed the power d the Soviets looms
- not entirely unchallenged - over
most horizons, though only one author
('Toward a Navy Second to One') allows
himself really gloomy misgivings. But the
place of what MARLOWFJ
calls, in his
current analysis in this journal, the
'middle maritime power', b almost whvlly
ignored, and this suggests deficiencies
not only in U.S. thinking but
to the
extent that they have so far failed to
develop any strategic momentum of their
own, le4 alone impact - in that of the
middle maritime powers.
A second strong theme concerns the
place of merchant shipping in the
complex of activities and interests which
constitute sea power. To quote the paper
which gives the whale collection its name
- written be it said, by a retired U.S.
Marine Corps Colonel - ' "Seapower",
as the word will be employed in this
discussion, connotes the merger of
military strategy with the wmmercizll
philosophy and aspirations of a given
nation, and the resultant ability of that
nation, at its discretion, to use the sea to
further its ocean4mrne trade'. Amidst the
welter of comparisons of bui'lding figures
and tanker tonnages and freighting
capacities, and through the blinding
glimpses of the obvious 'The sea is
liquid . . . Because the sea is liquid, it is
capable of supporting the vehicles of the
sea
.') there emerges by fits and stilrts
the question of whether or not M&an
- who comes in, by and large, for some
severe battering - was right in his
argument on bow sea power was derived.
On the way, there are of course innumerable arguments about what sea
power means, as defined by practically
everybody who has ever sought to define
it: and indeed $he k u e of whether sea
power is any more than what Corbett
disdainfully called 'one of those ringing
phases which haunt the ear while they
continue to confuse the judgement',
whether it is the parent or the offspring
of commerce, may be regarded as
academic. But perhaps the main interest
of the question lies in the discussion set
out in a paper baldly entitled 'Soviet
Maritime Palides', in which the author
argues with conviction the reasons for
-
..
378
BOOK REVIEWS
which Russia, with no history of maritime power and - as modern naval
strategists constantly reiterate - with no
need for a massive navy t o protect her
trade, has been deliberately building up
her merchant fleet at a rate far in excess
of other major trading nations. Reflection
on this reasoning, which includes condderations of politics, economics, and
just influence, as wdl as on its apparently
somewhat
chicken-and-egg
nature,
pmmpts the question of whether the
merchant shipping aspects of the western
maritime posture receive as much attention, at least in Europe, as they should
do.
A third theme is less vibrant, and
indeed if one is perhaps unduly sensitive
to its resonance to begin with one may
be accused of making more of its
quantity and volume than is strictly
there. But nobody concerned with the
raw reality of global power relationships,
with the operation of deterrent strategies
the success of which is measured, as
Dr. Kissinger has said, by 'things which
don't happen', can afford to ignore the
need t o develop thinking on how best to
manage global Soviet power in all its
man'ifestations: and where, outside the
European glacis,these are not d~iplomatic,
they are predominantly maritime. Thus,
amongst much routine airing of such
ideas as 'The Soviet Navy's Role in
Foreign Pdlicy', $here is a refreshing
vigour in the note sounded fsadly at
somewhat inordinate length) by the
author of 'Naval Presence - The Misunderstood Mission', even if there is
small comfort in the thought that that
sort of misunderstanding h not confined
to the authorities in the United States.
And the sections on 'Uses and Laws of
the Sea' contain some thoughts not
remarkable for their originality so much
as for the witness they continually bear
that in an age when overt aggression 'is
the least likely mode in which host2lities
are liable to break out, the area of
operations at the contested boundaries
of legally claimed rights or jurisdictions
is the richest histotical source of postwar use of force. Thus again it is to some
extent what is not written, or only
obliquely emerges, which strikes the
reader.
And this is as it should be. No work
such as this - certainly not $his one can be definitive: and its purpose should
be to stimulate questions and discussion,
'seminar-style analysis' or no. These two
books between them, lengthy and occasionally turgid as they are, contain much
thait is useful, some of it new and
original; and whilst I would hesitate to
commend thelir purchase to any but the
full-time - or temporarily full-time student of defence affairs they are worthy
of a place in any naval library.
P.M.S.
REPORT BY THE HYDROGRAPHER
OF THE NAVY FOR 1975
This report, as beautifully produced and
illustrated as ever, and published by the
Hydrographic Department at Taunton,
in June, has already been reviewed in the
leading newspapers but seems to have
attracted little attention in the 'popular
press', which is a pity.
The report opens with a splendid
portrait of Rear Admiral G . P. D. Hall,
C.B., D.S.C., who, having reached the
highest rank now open to an officer of
the (H) branch and held the ancient
and impofiant post of Hydrographer of
the Navy for nearly the customary five
years, was relieved on 12 September 1975
by Rear Admiral D. W. Haslam, O.B.E.
The new Hydrographer faces the
increasingly difficult task of meeting
greatly increased commitments with
decreasing resources, and in the face of
the current defence cuts and indecision.
The whole report is forty pages long
and greatly exceeds in detail and information the average company report issued
to shareholders.
The Hydrographic Department is
perhaps unique as a department of
BOOK REVIEWS
Admiralty as it sells 'its products and is a
good source of income. In 1975, in
addition to free issues to government
departments, it has sold a total of
2,891,906 charts and 436,133 books,
which include Admiralty Sailing Directions, Tide Tables, Light Lists, Lists of
Radio Signals and many olther publications to assist the mariner in safe navigation.
The Repod describes how, follow'ing
on the 1974 Defence Review, the
Government decided to re-assess the
national requirement for hydrographic
surveying and charting and, on 12 July
1974, announced the setting up of an
inter-departmental working party, with
non-governmental advice and representation, known as the Hydrographic Study
Group.
The terms of reference of this group
were:
(a) To consider the extent of the
hydrographic task posed by the existing
and developing needs of merchant
shipping, offshore resource industries,
and other commercial, scientific and
public interests.
(b) To identify the resources needed to
meet $his task and the timescale in which
they should be provided.
(c) To establish the extent to which
the resources in (b) above will need to be
provided as an addition to those needed
for defence purposes following the (1974)
Defence Review.
(d) To consider how the resources in
(c) might be provided.
Some of the factors involved may
briefly be summarised thus:
(a) Owing to the defence cuts, and the
almost total withdrawal of the British
~ a v aforces
l
into home waters, the purely
deLence needs for surveying and charting
are said to be able to be met by a smaller
survey fleet than exists at present.
(b) Yet the Hydrographer of the Navy
remains the principal charting authority
for international world charting used by
merchant vessels of all countdes, and
379
without which our trade as well as world
trade would suffer an appalling setback.
(c) Modern tankers may now draw up
to sixty or seventy feet (eighteen or
twenty-one metres), and the Hydrographic Study Group estimated that 284
ship-years of survey fleet work are
necessary in home waters alone to bring
our present Admiralty charts to the
modern required standard, let alone the
remainder.
(d) The international (metrication) of
all charts is throwing an enormously
increased load on the understaffed
cartographic (civilian) branch of the
Hydrographic Department, Whose craftsmanship, skill and excellence is also
under the same strain. There are,
however, some signs that the Government are beginning to be aware of this
latter need.
(e) A new international system of
buoyage will be introduced in 1977,
spread over five years, involving tlie
alteration of enormous numbers of
Charts, over 200 of these being in N.W.
Europe alone. 250 new editions will have
to be produced in 1977 alone.
(f) The technical and electronic
developments are not only improving the
potentials of survey work, but involve the
personnel, the ultimate arbiters of
efficiency, in ever more exacting trdining.
In this connection the report highlights
the activities of the R.N. Hydrographic
School at Plymouth which trains not only
our own (H) officers and Survey
Recorders, but also those of many
foreign navies. I t is one of the schools
from which private firms engaged in the
new lucraftiveoffshore industry indirectly
draw many of their recruits. Though the
entry of (H) officers and Survey
Recorders is better, the other side of the
picture is that the naval prospects of a
career in the (H) branch do not seem at
present to offer the inducements that 'the
other side of the hill' offers; the turn over
is too quick; and so .the professional
nature of the branch is changing.
3 80
BOOK XLEVIEWS
It is not the object of this short review,
by a n 'outsider', to summarise this
splendid report, but to stimulate readers,
both those who already know the
enormous potentials, as well as those who
should but don't, to get hold of the
report and read 'it for themselves and
cast their weight into the balance before
this long-established and world famous,
almost unique little 'set-up' follows the
declining trends of our ship-building,
marine engineering and related branches
of what was once, and still could be,
British maritime excellence.
As a way of life it offers a superb
opportunity, and were I a young man I
should grasp it with both hfands,and a lot
of faith.
The Hydrographer ends h5s report with
the following words:
Whilst attention throughout the
year has been mostly concentrated
on resolving the dilemma summarised in the Hydrographic Study
Group Report of how t o fund the
increasing demands to meet the
national hydrographic task from a
shrinking defence vote, the
Hydrogmphic Department has
continued to meet the mounting
challenge - both at sea and on
shore.
There has been general recognition of the Hydrographer's
significant contribution to the civil
community and the importance of
h5s national role, and of the
crucial dependence of the country's economy on that role in
supp0I.t of our present and future
reliance on the sea.
It is therefore to be hoped that
this recognition will result in
decisions as to the essential longterm funding before casualties
occur at sea or disillusionment
affects the morale of the men and
women involved.
A warning indeed to be heeded!
The one cu?ious, obvious and serious
omission from the Hydrographer's
Report for 1975 is an indication of its
availability and to whom it is addressed.
It is didtributed within Government
departments to press agencies, and I
believe to some selected outside interests.
Itt is not restricted, but it has no public
circulation, and it Is not clear where an
interested member of the public can
obtain a copy.
It should be available at every
bookstall, and in every university,
scientific establishment and careers
service office. Try writing to the Hydrographic Department, at Taunton. I feel
sure you'll get one direct. But do let the
Department sell it, like they do their
other productions.
G.A.F.
THE ROYAL NAVY IN THE W A R
OF AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE
by GERALD
S. GRAHAM
(Her Majesty's Stationery Office-£1.70)
This essay is an international combined
operation. Written by the well-known
historian, a Canadian living 'r'n Britain, it
is introduced in a foreword by Professor
John R. Alden of Duke University,
North Carolina, sponsored by the
Matitime
Museum and
National
embellished with illustrations largely
from Greenwich. The result is one of the
most refreshing efforts to mark the
American Bicentennial that have
appeared in @hexpants. Inter alia, it is
notably free from an obsessive profitmaking motive and from the legends that
shroud so much America history.
Legends, however, are not confined to
the western shores of the Atlantic. Some
of us burnt-out veterans learned from
Sir Geoffrey Callender's Sea Kings of
Britain that the remlting colonists'
greatest naval asset was our First Lord
of the Admiralty, John, Fourth Earl of
Sandwich. This view was largely folbwed
by Admiral S.ir William James (then a
Captain) in The British Navy in
Adversity. The subsequent publication of
381
BOOK REVIEWS
The Sandwich Papers has contributed to
a more balanced judgment. As Professor
Graham points out: 'Lethargy and shortsightedness were just as evident during
the beginnings of every great war in the
eighteenth century' and they have not
been unknown 'in later years. Fierce
politcal partisanship and divided sympathies accentuated the problems in this
war, and when France, Spain and
Holland came in, Britain faced a worldWide war without a single ally. I n the
circumstances, it was remarkable that
she emerged in better condition navally
than her European enemies.
Withholding of mast timber from
America added to the difficulty of mainta'ining the Royal Navy, but Professor
Graham gives this less weight than
Robert G. Albion, who thought that 'the
loss of the North American pines contributed . . . . materially t o the loss of the
colonies which had hitherto produced
them'.
Professor Graham remarks that 'The
"ifs" of history should be recreational
pursuits, but during the War of American
Tndependence they follow one another in
temptingly impressive array.' It is hard
to believe, however, that military defeat
would long have ensured the Colonists'
loyahty. One recalls a New Yorker
cartoon in which one of the Founding
Fathers remarks that even with representation, taxation has few attractions.
Once the threat from French Canada
was removed, surely the divisive factors
must have multiplied. On the other hand,
although in the nineteenth century
Thoreau's New England blood was to
boil at the thought of British redcoats
remaining anywhere in North America,
most Canadians were to welcome their
presence as a safeguard against 'liberation' by American expansionists.
Amongst a minor point or two on
which this adm'irable essay might be
challenged, one might perhaps consider
the alleged limitations of New York as a
base. Though the reported difficulties of
pilotage prevented d'Estaing
from
attempting to enter in July 1778, Warren
wrote Pn 1744 that 'ships of fifty and
sixty guns may with care, at proper times
of tide, come into the port of New York
and careen pretty comfortably', and it
was not until 1885 that dredging the
Narrows was considered necessdry.
Commander John R. Owen, 'Friend
and Indispensable Counsellor', to whom
this essay is dedicated, was in fact
John Hely Owen, one of the editors of
The Sandwich Papers. He was also an
early member of The Naval Review, a
regular contributor, a trustee and our
Honorary Secretary from 1934 to 1939
when, on his recall to service, his wife
took over until the end of the Second
War. He continues to be missed by his
friends.
BEAVER
THE FOUR ARK ROYALS
by MICHAEL
APPS
(William Kimber-illus. £5.50)
The name of a ship is very important;
&ips companies live up to a great name.
Lord Howard of Effingham and his
company in the first Ark Royal
bequeathed a great legacy in the lustre
they gave the name of their ship.
Three of (the Ark Royals were among
the greatest shlips of their time. The other,
ignom~iniouslyrenamed Pegasus, was a
Il'tltle ship, which, as a seaplane carrier in
the Kaiser's war, played a special part in
naval history, being one of the first ships
to provide the fleet with air cover.
Michael Apps has wfitten a h'l'story of all
four ships of the name in one book.
The first chapter, Ralegh's (sic) Ark, is
a highly readable 'history of the Armada,
and the part played by the Ark Royal.
It brings out the quality of the sailors,
and the parsimonious attitude of the
government, demonstrating that 'the
battle could well have been lost by the
English for want of powder and victuals.
For me, this brought the story right up
3 82
BOOK RI
to date. Wtars continue to be won by the
quality of ships' companies, handicapped
by the meanness of governments.
After the first chapter the book is a
historical narrative of the succeeding
ships of the name, and is limited by the
difficulty of adequately c o ~ r i n gsuch a
vast subject in one volume. The account
of the seaplane cartier and the third
Ark Royal are first class, and most readable; even in this short account the
author brings out, as he does throughout
the book, the personalities of the people
involved, and the personalities of the
ships. I must point out that in hlis stirring
account of the forlorn attack on the
Scharnhorst at Trondheim in June 1940.
when eight out of fifteen Skuas were lost,
the author has misnamed the squadrons
taking part. They were 803 and either
800 or 801; he does not mention 803.
I happen to know because I was in 803
and got away from the fighters by flying
down the backstreets of Trondheim in
the mist.
I could not put this book down,
neiither, I suspect, will other old 'Ark
Royals' be able to. I had tlhe feeling it
may have been finished in a hurry,
perhaps to catch up uiith the current
television programme. Appendix 6 had
me puzzled as it seemed for a time to be
about the wrong ship, and it would have
been valuable to have included detailed
technical data of all four skips in a
separate appendix. A list of the captains
would have been of interest.
A good book for naval libraries
and historians, and a must for old
'Ark Royals', all of whom will be very
grateful to the author. Perhaps he will
write another book on just one of these
ships. I would suggest Ark Royal 3.
D.C.E.F.G.
FIGHTING FLOTILLA
H.M.S. Laforey and Her Sister Ships
By PETERC . SMITH
(William Kimber-£5.25)
Asked by the 'L' Class Survivors Asso-
ciation to write a history of the eight
'Laforeys' of the 19th D.F. in which they
fought with distinction during World War
11, this prolific author has completed his
task with all the enthusiasm and painstaking research with which readers of
his other books on similar subjects have
become familiar.
I t is an interesting and often exciting
story and the many well-chosen photographs are an evocative addition to the
tale. Conceived in 1937 as the rearmament programme was getting under
way, t'he 'L' class became the centrepiece
of a fundamental argument within the
Admiralty over the likely role of fleet
destroyers in the coming struggle, the
outcome of which resulted in half the
class being armed with Cinch HA/LA
t d n mountings whilst the other four
ships received the new 4.7-inch twin
mountings. The limited effectiveness of
the latter weapons against aircraft (they
could only elevate to fifty degrees) was
compensated for in the final outcome by
the fitting of a single 4-inch H A gun in
place of the after set of torpedo tubes.
Once a t sea the eight 'L's gave an
excellent account of themselves in many
major and minor actions. Almost all of
these were in the Mediterranean where
several successxs were achieved but
A e r e in the end all but one of
the gallant band were either sunk or
damaged beyond repair by enemy action.
Throughout these eventful years the
flotilla had the gaod fortune to be
commanded successively by two distinguished destroyer officers. The first of
these was Captain R.M.J. ('Tubby')
Hutton, and his widow has written a
modest and charming Foreword to the
book which helps to preserve the memory
of a fine sea officer. Hutton was succeeded by Captain H.T. ('Beaky')
Armstrong who went down with his ship
when the flotilla lead~er, Laforey, was
sunk by U-223 off Sicily in March 1944.
This brief outline of the story of the
19th D.F. reveals the combination of
BOOK ~ E V I E W S
detailed teclhnical study, action reports
and personal ~.emniniscences which the
author has employed in his task. It is by
no means an easy combination to mould
into a balanced histofical narrative and
it is unfortunate that Mr. Smith's
stalwart efforts have been adversely
affected by a slipshod style often relapsing into journalese, and by many minor
misprints and errors of grammar and
spelling. Whilst his proof readers must
surely bear some of the blame for the
latter, it is, nevertheless, hard to avoid
the conclusion that the book was written
in too much of a hurry.
Despite these s'hortcomings the author
has succeeded in giving us a fascinating
glimpse of the problems of naval weapons
and shipbuilding policies in the build-up
period prior to 1939 and how the solutions adopted worked out in the stress of
war. Three of the seven casualties of the
flotilla were caused by aircraft bombing
and all of these were from the group
armed with those dual purpose guns
which were supposed to give them a
better chance against air attack. The
answer is, surely, that the Btitish weapon
technology of the late thirties failed to
produce a truly effective anti-aircraft
defence for small surface warships.
M.G.C.
HISTORICAL SIMON'S TOWN
by B.B. and B. G . BROCK(Eds.)
(A.A. Balkema, Rotterdamapprox. £17.45)
Travellers passing through Simonstown
on their way to Cape Point or rounding
Cape m i n t by sea, on passage to this
small historic dockyard town, may well
be forgiven for thinking that tbey are
sedng the most southern point of Slouth
Africa.
That they are mistaken is, of course,
because False Bay, as its name implies,
gives a very false geograpb5cal impression of this beautiful point that rises so
majestically out of the sea.
All this is admirably described in the
first and to me, most interesting part of
383
this 'book Historical Simon's Town.
I t contains some excellent diagrams,
which illustrate the prevailing winds and
currents, the hazards and shelter which
the bay provides by its unique podition.
Simon's Town has, of course, a long
and happy tradition, now sadly ended,
as a base for the Royal Navy.
l 3 e next three parts of this book trace
the history of the Royal Navy's presence
in a series of articles, extracts, vignettes
and reminiscences, many of which are
excellent.
Tucked away in the second part of this
historical review is a shoft artide entitled
'Simon's Town's Part in Maritime
Strategy'. Tltis to my mind is an opportunity missed. If such a wide and important subject is t o have a @lace at all
in this history book, then it deserves
a chapter to itself. With Soviet Russia's
naval presence making itself increasingly
felt in the southern oceans of the world,
Simon's Town may well find itself
making greater history than ever before.
My other criticism of this otherwise
brave attempt to cover history, geography and architecture in one volume,
is in the way it is presented. I find the
gimmick of splitting the printed page
down the middle disconcerting. The
articles become fragmented to a degree
that makes concentration difficult.
But to finish on a word of praise.
The photographic reproducrions and
diagrams are generally excellent and I
entirely agree with Admiral Bierman
when he says in his foreword: 'As the
main base of the South African Navy,
it is well that officers and men of the
Navy should know as much as possible
of the place in which they work.'
I n common with many other officers
and men of the Royal Navy, I have very
happy memories of Simon's Town and
I wish the authors and publisher wlell in
their endeavour. But whether it will have
an appeal t o naval readers at E17.45 a
copy is debatable.
J.M.D.G.
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M. E. ...
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PUGH,D. W., DSC, MD, FRCP
SELL, A. E. ...
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STYLE,C . R. . . . . . .
TAYLOR,K. I. . . . . . .
TAYLOR,
W. R. de C. M., MA
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TILL, G. ...
WALLINGTON-SMITH,
A. M.
WELLSACOLE,
C. P. IN.
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Lieutenant
Lieutenant
Lieutenant RNR
Lieutenant
Commander
Midshipman
Lieut. Commander RANR
Sub-Lieut. (S) RNR
Commander
Sub Lieutenant
Lieutenant
Lieutenant
Lieutenant
Captain RNR
Captain
Lieut. Commr.
Sub-Lieut.
Surgeon Commr. RNR
Lieutenant RANR
Sub-Lieutenant
Major R.M.
Chaplain
Sen. Lecturer R.N.C.
Sub-Lieutenant
Lieut. Commr.
Prize membership for a period of two years has been awarded to:
CUNNINGHAM,
J. R.
HAWKINS,J. L. ...
LEWIS, T. A. W., BA
MCLAREN,N. ...
NICHOLLS,D. R.
RATTRAY,W. P.
ROWE, A.
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TENNANT,
M. S. ...
TROTT, P. A. . . . .
WARNETT,D. L.
WILLS, J. R. . . . .
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Sub-Lieut. (X) (Reg)
Sub-Lieut.
Lieutenant
Sub-Lieut. (M.S.)
Sub-Lieut.
Sub Lieut. (E) (ME)
Sub-Lieut.
Lieutenant
Sub-Lieut.
Sub-Lieut.
Sub-Lieut.
T W O NEW NAVAL BOOKS FROM A R M S & ARMOUR PRESS
British
Battleships
/
BRITISH BATTLESHIPS OF
WORLD WAR 2.
ALAN RAVEN AND JOHN ROBERTS.
1
The Development and technical history of the
Royal Navy's battleships and battle cruisers
from 1911 to 1946.
This large and lavishly-illustrated volume presents a comprchensivc account of the
design and construction of the Britis'h battleships that served in the Second World
War - from the Queen Elizabeth class to Vanguard. Much of the information
contained, in this bcok, which is the result of exhaustive research conducted over
many years, is published for the first time, for only recently have official documents
of the period been made available to the public. British Battleships o f World War Two
is therefore unique in making available the full story of the design and construction
of every battleship and battlecruiser class of the period as first built, together with
all details of the various refits and reconstructions that each vessel underwent during
its service life. The contents also include a comprehensive review of developments
in weapons, gunnery, fire-control, radar, protection and propulsion, taking in every
aspect of battleship design and usage; and there are sections devoted to the actions
involving British battleships during the Second World War, and to comparisons
between the Btitish battleships and their counterparts in other navies.
Complementing the text are some three hundred photographs, which in themselves constitute a history of the vessels. These are supplemented by numerous superb
specially-drawn sets of plans and elevations - fully detailed and based on the official
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ARMS 81 ARMOUR PRESS, 2-6 HAMPSTEAD HIGH ST., LONDON N.W.3.
PUBLISHERS OF MILITARY NAVAL AND AVIATION BOOKS
WARSHIPS OF THE IMPERIAL
JAPANESE NAVY 1869 to 1945
Hansgeorg Jentschura, Dietor Young, and
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This authoritative book is a detailed reference
guide to the ships of the Imperial Japanese
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The work of three distinguished German naval researchers and the result of
many years of original research, Warships of the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1869-194.5,
provides details of battleships, battlecruisers, cruisers, aircraft carriers, escort
carriers, gunboats, torpedo boats, submarines, combatant auxiliaries, mine-laying
craft, submarine chasers, landing ships, and support and transport ships of all types.
Illustrated throughout with nearly 400 general-arrangzment drawings, the book
also contains some two hundred photographs, many of which have never before been
published.
This translation is a revised and expanded edition of Die Japanischen
Kriegsschifle, 1869-1945, including additional material and drawings supplied by the
authors, as well as data from British and other sources provided by the translators,
both of whom are well-known naval historians and experts on naval matters. The
result is a major new naval reference work, which provides a unique and immensely
detailed ship encyclopaedia of one of the world's greatest navies.
E12.95
(+f 1 postage)
I)
AVAILABLE EARLY 1977
HOW TO OBTAIN.
ARMS Et ARMOUR PRESS BOOKS CAN BE OBTAINED FROM ALL GOOD
BOOKSELLERS INCLUDING W. H. SMITH and J. MENZIES, AND FROM
SPECIALIST BOOKSELLERS INCLUDING : A. J. SIMMONDS, BIVOVAC,
HERSANTS, GIEVES, THE NAVAL BOOK CO. I N CASE OF DIFFICULTY
PHONE 01 794 8821.
If ordering by mail include prices shown in brackets.
ARMS & ARMOUR PRESS, 2-6 HAMPSTEAD HIGH ST., LONDON N.W.3.

The Naval Review

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