Diversity and the European Public Sphere

Transcription

EUROSPHERE
COUNTRY REPORTS
Online Country Report No. 14, 2010
Diversity and the European Public Sphere
The Case of Hungary
Andras Bozoki
Robert Sata
Anna Selmczi
Beata Huszka
This paper can be downloaded without charge from:
http://eurosphere.uib.no/knowledgebase/workingpapers.htm
ISSN 1890-5986
EUROSPHERE COUNTRY REPORTS
Title: Diversity and the European Public Sphere: The Case of Hungary
Author(s): Andras Bozoki, Robert Sata, Anna Selmeczi, Beata Huszka
Country Report No. 14
This version: March 2010
Webpage: http://www.eurosphere.uib.no/knowledgebase/workingpapers.htm
© 2010, EUROSPHERE and Authors
http://www.eurosphere.uib.no
All rights reserved.
Short sections of text, not to exceed
two paragraphs, may be quoted without
explicit permission provided that full credit,
including notice, is given to the source.
The views expressed in this paper do not
necessarily reflect those of the EUROSPHERE
Project.
The statement of purpose for the
EUROSPHERE Online Working Paper Series
is available from the EUROSPHERE working papers website,
http://www.eurosphere.uib.no/knowledgebase/workingpapers.htm
Contact:
Andras Bozoki
Central European University
[email protected]
ISSN 1890-5986 (online)
Partner
Institution
Central European University
Principal
Investigator
Andras Bozoki
Researchers
Robert Sata, Anna Selmeczi, Beata Huszka
EUROSPHERE Country Report HUNGARY
BOZOKI
SELECTED
ORGANIZATIONS
POLITICAL
PARTIES
SMOs/NGOs
THINK
TANKS
Magyar Szocialista Párt (MSZP)
http://www.mszp.hu
FIDESZ Magyar Polgári Szövetség
(FIDESZ)
http://www.fidesz.hu
Magyar Kommunista Munkáspárt
(MKMP)
http://www.munkaspart.hu
Magyarországi Cigányszervezetek
Fóruma (MCF)
http://www.oco.hu
http://romaosszefogas.blogspot.com/
Nık a Nıkért Együtt az Erıszak
Ellen (NANE)
http://www.nane.hu
Védegylet
http://www.vedegylet.hu
Századvég Foundation (Századvég)
http://www.szazadveg.hu
Political Capital Institute (PC)
http://www.politicalcapital.hu
Eötvös Károly Institute (EKI)
http://www.ekint.org
Institute for World Economics
(IWE)
http://www.vki.hu
Népszabadság
http://www.nepszabadsag.hu
PRINT MEDIA Magyar Nemzet (MN)
BROADCAST
MEDIA
LINKS
http://www.mno.hu
Blikk
http://www.blikk.hu
MTV 1
http://www.mtv.hu
HírTv
http://www.hirtv.hu
BOZOKI
Foreword
Hakan G. Sicakkan
The present report is one of the sixteen country studies that have been produced by the
EUROSPHERE Consortium. EUROSPHERE is an integrated project which is funded by the
European Commission within the EU’s 6th Framework Programme. The EUROSPHERE
Consortium comprises seventeen European universities and research institutes and
approximately 100 researchers work in the project's different parts and phases. Two of our
partners have now left the Consortium after having successfully completed their tasks in the
project. The project is coordinated by this author on behalf of the University of Bergen.
EUROSPHERE was launched in February 2007 and will go on until March 2012.
The main objective of EUROSPHERE is to create innovative perspectives on the
European public spheres and to identify the conditions that enable or undermine the
articulation of democratic and inclusive European public spheres. The focus is on how
participation of different kinds of social and political actors in the public debates – political
parties, social movement and non-governmental organizations, think tanks and research
institutes, and newspapers and TV broadcasters – shape the articulation and structuring of the
emerging public European public sphere. The research plan of the project comprises
synchronized data collection and analysis activities in sixteen countries as well as creation of
a EUROSPHERE Knowledgebase on the European organizations that are participating in
public debates at local, national and European levels. In addition to regular research and
academic dissemination activities, EUROSPHERE organizes four large-scale international
conferences, two European Forums, and four researcher training and PhD courses.
The EUROSPHERE Country Reports Series represents the finalization of the very first
step of a comprehensive comparative research programme. The aim of this series is to provide
a brief summary of a huge data material collected by the project researchers. Along with the
EUROSPHERE Knowledgebase that we created, these reports will be a basis and data search
guide for the forthcoming comparative studies of sixteen countries. Therefore, the primary
readership target of these reports is the EUROSPHERE researchers who are to conduct twelve
inter-related comparative studies of different aspects of the European public spheres. This
primary function of the report series necessitated prioritization of a descriptive approach at
this stage of our research. Explanations of the findings and applications of theory are
identified in our plans as the task of the work groups who will do the comparative analyses, as
we believe cross-contextual comparisons and understanding of the particularities of specific
contexts should go together in order to obtain a more enhanced picture of reality.
More information about EUROSPHERE can be found in our frequently visited webpage.
My task in this foreword is to give the background of the EUROSPHERE Country Report
Series. In the following, I will briefly present the logic behind the project and the
methodological approaches in selection of the cases – that is, organizations and respondents.
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EUROSPHERE in a Nutshell
Earlier research on the European Public Sphere (EPS) has made crucial contributions to our
understanding of the making of today’s Europe. It has shown us that, under current
conditions, it is difficult to realize a common EPS in the foreseeable future, but that there are
traces of a EPS in the making on some policy issues. Most importantly, it has drawn our
attention to the integrative, democratizing, legitimizing, and meaning-creating roles of the
public sphere. The focus on EPS as a means of achieving democratic legitimacy at the
European level can easily be justified normatively, but, has not been substantiated
empirically, and earlier research teaches us little about how public sphere can be inclusive in
the European context of deep and complex diversities. Existence of a near-perfect procedural
or deliberative democracy, including a public sphere where citizens freely exercise their rights
of free speech, assembly, critique, deliberation, opposition, etc in order to form the public will
is a necessary but not sufficient condition for democracy. If we accept that any notion of state
legitimacy produces a corresponding notion of legitimacy of individuals, it is important to
inquire into what forms of public sphere include/exclude which groups, to what degree, and
on which matters.
In this sense, the EUROSPHERE project takes a complementary normative starting point
with a focus on inclusion/exclusion in and at the boundaries of public spheres. It is urgent to
investigate whether the existing focus on democratic legitimacy in EPS studies has
inadvertently led to emergence of new criteria for defining who the legitimate participants of
the public sphere are or should be. Indeed, it has been empirically shown in numerous
sociological and social anthropological studies of national public spaces that, in contexts of
diversity, such standards can be discriminatory, marginalizing, and excluding.1 As a
supplement to the contributions made by the democratic legitimacy debate in empirical EPS
studies, EUROSPHERE conceptualizes the European Public Sphere as a means of inclusion
for democracy. Thereby, the project both contests and complements the existing academic
work on the EPS with the following overall research question:
Are inclusive European public spheres (EPS) possible under conditions of complex diversity;
national path dependencies of polity forms, institutions and policies; multilevel governance;
and shifting boundaries within and of the EU?
The word “inclusive”, combined with the project’s sub-title “towards a citizens’ Europe” is a
manifestation of our overall normative orientation towards inclusion and accommodation of
diversity in the public spheres of liberal democracies. At the same time, this is also an
empirical research orientation posited against the tendency of earlier European research to
focus primarily on the procedures, mechanisms, and legitimizing and democratizing functions
of public spheres. This focus has left the substantial question of “what kind of diversity and
openness are allowed in public spheres” – i.e., the main normative question posed to earlier
public sphere research by many diversity, gender, minority, race, sexuality, disability, and
marginalization researchers – mostly unanswered in the existing research on a EPS.
EUROSPHERE is thus an attempt to remedy this.
1
In general, a huge body of contemporary race, ethnicity, minority and migrant integration research; gender and
gay studies; research on the disabled; and on other marginalized groups strengthen the view that universalistic
discourses and rules of participation/communication in public debates result in exclusion of some groups. For
examples of theoretical discussions about these, see, among many others: Bader (1995), Fraser (1992, 2007),
Sandel (1998), Sicakkan (2004, 2005, 2008), Taylor (2001, et al 1994), Walzer (1983), Young (1990, 1995,
1998).
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This overall research question brings into focus the different approaches to inclusion and
diversity, which also impinge upon how one envisions public sphere, politics, society, and the
state. Specifically, it is possible to view inclusion as assimilation, integration, institutional
segregation in a shared polity, or simply as co-existence under a minimal state. Likewise, it is
possible to view diversity in terms of collective or individual identities and belongings;
essentialized collective identities like ethnicity, race, sex, religion, nation; or in terms of
constructed group or individual identities. This all depends on the ontological beliefs of the
viewer, and not necessarily on reality. Needless to say, each of these ontological priorities
includes certain groups and individuals as the prime and relevant components of society, on
which public sphere and political institutions are to be based, and, also, which policymaking
should address. While determining the relevancy or primacy of groups, individuals, and
issues/problems, each of these approaches consequently excludes certain groups, individuals,
and themes based on their ontological priorities.2
Ontologies and normative visions derived thereof have – through their exclusions and
inclusions – direct consequences for, among other things, notions of politics, society, polity,
and citizenship.3 These different ontological points of departure and their normative
exhortations have serious consequences for the definition of the European public sphere,
European diversity, European Polity, and designs of empirical research on these phenomena.
After choosing any one of these approaches, the resulting research design will undoubtedly
reinforce certain visions of society, polity, and public sphere, and reproduce and justify
certain inclusions/ exclusions from the public sphere. If research ought to be committed to
nourishing our restless wonder about how society and politics is possible (as opposed to how
a certain vision of society and politics can be realized), it is of utmost importance to assess
which models of a EPS are more inclusive than others in a given context.
Although mainstream approaches state that the public sphere is a space located between
the state and civil society, they hold that public spheres are not limited to countries’ borders.
Participation in the public sphere is not membership based, and everybody can freely take part
in it. However, if the public sphere is a space between the state and civil society, between
citizens and political institutions, its external boundaries are drawn by its very definition: it
must have external boundaries in terms of who inhabits it and who speaks in it. In reality,
“outsiders” are not expected to take party or “intervene” in “our own” matters; it is the right
of those who are directly affected by state actions to speak in the public sphere. Earlier
research on EPS shows that there is little “foreign” appearance in national public spheres on
themes of internal relevance compared to the appearances of national actors.4 External
boundaries of the public spheres must, then, be expected to follow polities’ borders,
expansions of states’ territories (unifications, secessions, enlargements, invasions), and the
movements of people (transnational and global politics emerging from migration and other
sorts of mobility) – because it is these phenomena that affect the composition of the
participants in a public sphere. Therefore, polity borders have to be taken as a relevant
dimension of the public sphere’s external boundaries. However, by polity borders, one should
understand the zone of a state’s power and influence in and beyond physical borders. Indeed,
this is presently taking place in the European Union: boundaries of national public spheres are
gradually changing, as the EU’s political institutions become relevant as a new political center
and increase their influence on citizens’ lives. Earlier findings indicating the EPS’ presence
2
I do not have enough space here to give an overview of the details of relevant ontological approaches, nor to
list what each ontology excludes. However, I did this in my earlier work (cf. Sicakkan 2004, 2005, 20006, 2008).
3
It is also a fact that some “rival” normative theories have ended up with similar policy proposals concerning
e.g. citizenship, migration and asylum policy, etc. Although this is true at the policy level, the disagreements
about models remain strong and still have consequences for which trade-offs are possible.
4
Peters 2006
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on certain themes, and not on others, can be explained by EU’s differing influence on the
respective themes.5 Therefore, one should expect to observe a more clearly present EPS on,
say, enlargement and EU constitution issues than on policy issues concerning citizenship and
internal diversity – because the EU has attempted to exert central influence concerning the
former.
Secondly, if the public sphere is a space inhabited by state institutions, individuals,
groups, civil society organizations, etc, then, processes of internal inclusion, marginalization
and exclusion that are in place in all human interactions must be expected to be in full force
also in the public sphere. Issues of inclusion, marginalization, and exclusion are about internal
power relations between the groups constituting the citizen body in a state, and they shape the
social and political cleavage structures on which the political system and politics in a country
is based. These power relations have historical roots in the initial geopolitical conditions at
the onset of a country’s state formation and nation building process. Indeed, state forms and
regimes are based on such initial conditions prior to state formation processes.6 It is largely
these cleavage structures entrenched in diversity and power (defined in different ways in
different historical contexts) that determine which inclusions/ exclusions and which notions of
diversity are legitimate and relevant in the public sphere and in policymaking. Union states
(e.g., UK), federal/confederal states (e.g., Germany, Switzerland), and unitary states (e.g.,
France, the Scandinavian countries) in Europe came into being as a result of the power
relations between the groups in the diverse societies inhabiting the territory and public sphere
of a political center that attempted to consolidate that territory.
This historical fact about the variation in the formation of the European states and their
politics is the biggest challenge awaiting the Europeanists longing for a common EPS. If
polity boundaries are relevant for the boundaries of a public sphere, then internal territorial
power structures of a state should be expected to be reflected on the structure of its public
sphere: in federal state forms with strong local governments, for example, the public sphere
should be expected to be more segmented than in unitary states with a strong degree of
centralization. If a public sphere is about politics between the rulers and the ruled, then a
segmented political rule will simply result in a segmented public sphere. Indeed, observed
rhetoric about, and practice regarding diversity in the European Union implies that national
diversity is the only form of relevant diversity at European level politics.7 European level
politics simply does not relate to member states’ internal diversity beyond passively accepting
the normative approaches about the minority definition and minority rights developed by the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). When it comes to diversity
issues, the balance of power between member states and European level institutions favors the
member states, and if there is a European public sphere, it should be expected to be
segmented along national boundaries with trans-Europeanization tendencies on certain
themes. However, the variety of approaches to internal diversity in member states and the
emerging complex trans-European multilevel governance system in Europe, which makes
some decision-making levels redundant on certain policy issues, should be expected to make
this depiction foggier than what the previous statement suggests. The question of which
diversities are legitimate in the public sphere and considered relevant for policymaking in
national and European public debates is, therefore, a key indicator of the prospects for a
common European public sphere. EUROSPHERE thus aims to identify the variations, as well
as alignments and misalignments, between European and national level public debates,
5
Latzer and Saurwein 2006
Rokkan (1975), Sicakkan (2005, 2008).
7
This does not mean that the EU ignores the internal diversity in its member states. However, the fact that the
EU does not have a common definition of a national minority, leaves this question to its member states, and
moreover bases its decision making systems primarily on nation states, justifies this view.
6
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concerning which diversities are relevant for policymaking. Such a research effort also serves
as an inquiry into the initial conditions of the EU-polity formation processes.
This (dangerously) brief discussion aimed to show the importance of identifying how
polity, diversity, and public sphere constitute each other differently in different contexts.
These three political phenomena subsist in each other and exist in symbiosis. This symbiotic
co-existence is the biggest challenge for research attempting to identify the presence of an
EPS in the present context of unpredictability about the direction of political development in
the EU. In such attempts, it is thus reasonable to base research on multiple scenarios of
political change.8
The empirical research programme of EUROSPHERE aims to explore whether it is
possible to develop an inclusive public sphere in the European Union. Based on different
scenarios and alternative combinations of different approaches to diversity, polity, and the
public sphere, EUROSPHERE aims to identify the notions, discourses, and objectives that are
in the process of becoming dominant in key European actors and political spaces, how these
notions and objectives are spread and made relevant in different political contexts as well as
in the context of the European Union politics, and what contestations and conflicts they create
in policymaking. Therefore, the overall research question will be answered with a focus on
the impact of two specific building blocks of European society, which are seen to be amongst
the crucial factors impinging upon the shaping of a public sphere:
• The roles of different types of social and political actors in the articulation of an inclusive
EPS – whether or how different types of social and political actors contribute to or impede
the formation of a certain model of an EPS?
o
o
o
o
o
Individual citizens
Policy research institutes and think tanks
Political parties
Social movement / non-governmental organizations – SMOs/NGOs
Print and broadcast media
• The impacts of different social and political communicative spaces on the articulation of
an inclusive EPS – whether or how different types of social and political spaces facilitate
or impede the emergence of a certain model of an EPS?
o
o
o
o
o
Essentializing (ethnic/minority) spaces
Nationalizing spaces
Transnationalizing spaces
Eurospaces
Gendering spaces
These choices are not arbitrary: A focus on public sphere has to include citizens’, institutional
civil society actors’, and mass media’s framings of issues. Concerning institutions, one has to
focus on key civil society actors operating and maneuvering in the public sphere.
Furthermore, both citizens and civil society organizations still relate to and operate within the
different types of public spaces that developed historically as components of the existing
national public spheres, which will also have to remain as components of an emerging
European public sphere for a long time and constitute the contexts in which a European public
sphere can develop. It is therefore crucial to assess the impacts of different actors and public
spaces and inquire into how they relate to the emergence of different types of European public
sphere.
8
For more information about the scenarios being deployed in EUROSPHERE, see the project webpage.
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EUROSPHERE’s Approach to European Public Spheres
As illustrated in the above figure, the European public sphere is inhabited by:
•
a set of historically-developed and already existing communicative public spaces
(essentializing/minority, nationalizing, transnationalizing, Europeanizing and
gendering spaces)
•
a set of trans-European networks of organizations (we chose to look at party
federations, networks of nongovernmental and social movement organizations,
networks of think tanks)
•
a set of national and sub-national level social and political actors (we chose to look at
political parties, SMOs/NGOs, think tanks, media actors) that operate within, from
and across the above mentioned communicative public spaces and trans-European
networks of organizations
•
individual citizens that operate within, from and across the above mentioned communicative
public spaces and trans-European networks of organizations
For purposes of empirical research, the European public sphere is conceptualized in four
different ways:
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(1) as a set of already existing communicative / discursive public spaces that are increasingly more
interconnected and overlapping with each other (horizontal and vertical interconnectedness
between sub-national, national and transnational communicative public spaces)
(2) as a separate, emerging trans-European communicative / discursive space that comes in addition
to, and complements and/or competes with, the historically developed existing communicative
public spaces
(3) as a set of collective social and political actors (organizations) that are increasingly more
interlinked and collaborate with each other beyond the existing national boundaries
(4) as a separate set of social and political actors that create European-level networks that come in
addition to, and compete with, the already existing trans-European networks
In the current chaotic picture of citizens, organizations, communicative public spaces, and
political institutions that interact, interconnect, and interlink with each other, social and
political actors are facilitating or inhibiting the emergence of an inclusive European public
sphere in different ways. In EUROSPHERE, citizens and organizations’ roles in and
contributions to the formation of a European public sphere are understood in terms of:
the inter-linkages, inter-connectedness, and overlaps that they create or deter between the
existing Europeanized and non-Europeanized communicative / discursive public spaces
(essentializing/minority, nationalizing, transnationalizing, Europeanizing and gendering spaces)
the new trans-European communicative / discursive spaces that they create or participate in or
work against
the vertical and horizontal trans-European networks of organizations that they create or
participate in or work against
the discourses about the European polity, diversity (including exclusion and inclusion,
citizenship, minorities, mobility, migration, asylum, gender, etc) and the European public sphere
that they bring into these networks and interconnected spaces
Indeed, all of the above processes of inter-connections, inter-linkages, and overlaps between
communicative spaces and networks of organizations as well as a variety of discourses about
Europe, the EU polity, and diversity are in place in today’s Europe to some degree.
Interconnectedness of existing communicative public spaces and inter-linkages between
organizations (collective actors) beyond a variety of borders and boundaries constitute each
other. It is the social and political actors’ transgression of boundaries that create
interconnectedness between Europe’s communicative public spaces. On the other hand, it is
the different degrees of openness / closure of the existing communicative public spaces that
facilitate or obstruct such transgression. Hence, to understand the European public sphere,
interconnectedness of spaces and networks of organizations are analyzed in one common
research frame. One research challenge is thus to assess whether these can be viewed as parts
and parcels of a European public sphere in the making. If so, how are these processes
structuring the emerging European public sphere? Which types of inclusions and exclusions
will a resulting public sphere form and what dominant discourses may it result in? Most
importantly, in the normative framework of EUROSPHERE, which notions of a European
public sphere are more democratic and inclusive than others?
Our interview questions and the format of the sixteen reports have been devised as a step
towards answering these bigger questions. The readers of these reports will notice that each
country report has three main sections addressing: (1) notions of diversity and ethno-national
diversity policies, including also the themes of citizenship, international migration and
political asylum, (2) visions about the political development of the EU and European
integration, and (3) data about and views about the extent to which the selected organizations
take part in the national and European level public debates.
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EUROSPHERE Data
EUROSPHERE collects/deploys relevant data about the features of communicative public
spaces, of social/political actors, and of individuals, whose effects on the articulation of a
European public sphere are to be assessed at a later stage in the project. The scope and depth
of data collection has naturally been determined by our research question and the available
resources. Concerning data-collection about social/political actors, at least three
social/political actors were selected in each category (i.e., 3 think tanks, 3 political parties, 3
social movements, 3 newspapers and 2 TV channels) in each country according to standard
selection criteria. Leaders of these organizations as well as their other important members
were interviewed.
Concerning data collection about communicative public spaces, also here the units of
observation are social/political actors; however, this time they are treated as sub-spaces of the
communicative public spaces. Here, the key data collection activity focuses on the
interrelationships and patterns/substance of interactions between the different types of
social/political actors claiming to belong to or to be speaking on behalf of the same
communicative public space (e.g., the substance/patterns of interaction between a political
party, a social movement, a media actor, and a think tank). We also collect data about the
discourses of public spheres, citizenship, involvement, etc. of which social/political actors are
a part of as well as data about the features of openness/closure in these communicative public
spaces.
Further, existing survey data about the features of individuals who are associated with the
five types of communicative public spaces through their engagement/involvement with
different social/political actors are being taken from previous European surveys such as ESS,
EVS, and Eurobarometer as well as other international sources like IPSS. The survey data,
which will not be presented in these reports, concerns individuals’ involvement in political
processes, their levels of co-otherness, patterns of multiple belonging, mobility patterns,
patterns of multiple orientations to public spaces as well as the individuals’ relevant
background.
At the national level, we are analyzing how and why political parties, social movement and
non-governmental organizations, think tanks, and media actors (newspapers and TVchannels) are forming or joining networks and channels for influencing the public debates at
sub-national, national, and European levels. At the trans-European level, we are focusing on
several European party federations, several trans-European networks of movements and
NGOs, and several trans-European networks of think tanks, and how and why different
organizations operate in these trans-European networks and channels. Further, we are
investigating the modes, methods, and issues of collaboration between the national and transnational levels. On both levels, we are collecting data about the institutional features of these
organizations as well as data from interviews with their formal, informal, and oppositional
leaders in order to understand how, and on which policy issues, they contribute to public
debates at which levels (national or European); which arenas, networks, channels, and
resources they are using to influence the public debates; and their political objectives
concerning diversity, EU-polity, and the articulation of public spheres in Europe.
Criteria for Selection of Organizations
Interviews and institutional data collection was conducted in the period between February
2008 and July 2009. More than 70 researchers were involved in data collection.
EUROSPHERE’s data collection activities have been divided into four components with
respect to the types of social political actors. In the forthcoming 18 months, we will collect
100% of the data needed.
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The selection of the organizations to be interviewed was largely completed by the end of
February 2008. The procedure for selection of social/political actors is outlined below. As
stated earlier, EUROSPHERE focuses on political parties, think tanks, social movements and
media actors. The idea is to map how these actors represent and confront different visions of
polity, diversity, and public sphere and why they do so as well as their ways of participating
in national and European public spaces. We selected only relevant organizations and their
organizational and opinion leaders as well as important opposition leaders in these
organizations. Social and political actors in each country were selected with respect to the
concern that the broad spectrum of the variation in actors’ approaches to diversity should be
represented.
The following procedure was followed while selecting of social/political actors to be focused
on in EUROSPHERE:
1- The aim is to include and represent in our sample all the different views and visions in
a country about diversity, EU polity and public sphere.
2- At least 3 political parties, 3 social movements or non-governmental organization, 3
think tanks, and 5 media actors (3 daily newspapers and 2 TV-news programmes) in
each country.
3- However, some exemptions from the above rule were allowed, in following ways:
Each partner had to select 14 organizations at minimum for data collection. Based
on the contextual particularities in the countries that they collected data in, the partners
could choose 2 think tanks instead of three and/or 4 media actors (2 newspapers and 2
broadcast media) instead of 5. Such a procedure was followed by some partners when
they found that the proposed division of actor types would prevent them from
including some important approaches to the phenomena we are researching. In such
cases, these partners increased either the number of political parties or of social
movement organizations from 3 to 4, or both. This choice was justified with reference
to the particular situation in the respective country (e.g., the impact of the pillars as in
Netherlands, the importance of the regional level in certain countries which may
require more SMOs and/or political parties, etc).
4- Each project partner proposed a larger number of actors in each category – at least 5
political parties, 7 social movements, 8 think tanks, and 9 media actors/channels from
the country where their institutions are based.
5- From the proposed actors, the EUROSPHERE Steering Committee prepared a
proposal for the final list of actors to be focused on.
6- Partners justified each of their suggestions, added brief information about the actors’
views on diversity and the EU, and specified and their own priorities concerning the
selection of actors. For this purpose, the guide given in subsequent tables below for
each type of actor was used.
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Political parties
The project focuses on the two largest political parties plus the largest Maverick party in each
country. Partners were requested to propose at least 3 large political parties and 2 Maverick
parties amongst the total of three parties that were selected for analysis in each country. The
final selection was based on a concern for representing the largest possible variation of
political party approaches to the EU-polity and diversity at the European level as well as
representation in the European Parliament. The partners were advised to base their proposals
on party manifestos, party web sites, and literature on political parties.
Political Party selection guide
Political Party
Type
Mainstream
Parties
(mass/catchall parties)
Maverick
Parties
Specifications
* Representing the
national mainstream
views/ideologies
* The largest
government party
* The two largest
opposition parties
* Sharply different
views on the EU and
diversity from the
mainstream
* Can be outside the
parliament
* System-critical,
semi-system loyal
*The two largest
amongst those that
satisfy the above
criteria
Party names
Short information
about the political
party
Justification
The first largest
government party
(in terms of vote
percentage)
The first largest
opposition party
(in terms of vote
percentage)
The second
largest opposition
party (in terms of
vote percentage)
Two Maverick
Parties – semisystem loyal
Please mention
briefly the
following:
* place on the
right/left spectrum
if applicable
* views on the EUpolity
* views about
diversity
* the two most
important
views/issues that
each party
otherwise advocates
Partners’ shortly-stated
opinions about why
and how the selection
of each party should
enrich our project?
Social Movements/Citizens’ Initiatives (SMOS/NGOs)
The project focuses on three social movement organizations (SMO) in each country. One
focusing on the tension between the national and the European&the global, one focusing on
the tension between the national and the minority rights, and one focusing on transnational
minority collaboration in Europe were to be selected in the end of the process. Each partner
was requested to propose at least 3 nationally oriented and 4 transnationally/globally oriented
social movement organizations. At least two of the transnationally oriented organizations in
this category would be selected from amongst the member organizations of the Platform of
European Social NGOs. Concerning SMOs and NGO's, it was important to represent in our
selection of organizations that are constituted and run by (1) majority population members,
(2) national minorities/national minorities in border regions, (3) indigenous populations, (4)
immigrant groups. This was determined by each partner with respect to relevance and
importance of these categories in each country.
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Social movement / NGO selection guide
Social Movement Type
Specifications
Movement names
Nationally-oriented
SMOs/NGOs
*Focusing on
nationwide issues
*national-oriented
ideology/ world
view/horizon of action
*The three most
visible/public in the
country
*Issues of focus are
context-dependent
*Ethnic&religious
organizations can be
included if applicable
and justifiable
*Totally three nationally
oriented SMOs are to be
nominated
The three
citizens’
initiatives/SMOs
that are known to
have high
publicity.
Transnationally/globallyoriented movements
*Focusing on
transnational/global
issues or having a
horizon of action beyond
the nation state
*At least two SMOs that
are members of the
European Social
Platform will be
suggested.
*The two most
visible/public
movements in each
category specified on the
right
* totally four
transnationally oriented
movements to be
nominated
*Main focus of these
organizations may be on
ethnicity, migration,
human rights.
Short
Information
about the
movement
Justification
Please mention
briefly the
following:
1. One main
initiative with
pro-European
views (this
doesn’t need to
be the main focus
of the
organization)
2. One main
initiative with
anti-European
views (this
doesn’t need to
be the main focus
of the
organization)
* place on the
right/left
spectrum if
applicable
* views on the
EU-polity
* views about
diversity
* the two most
important
views/issues
that each
movement
otherwise
advocates
Partners’
shortly-stated
opinions about
why and how the
selection of each
social movement
should enrich
our project?
1. The main promigration
organization
2. The main antimigration
organization
The final selection was based on a concern for representing the largest possible variation of
social movement/NGO approaches to the EU-polity and diversity at the European level as
well as transnational collaboration in the European Public Sphere (here, at least one SMO that
is a member of the European Social Platform of NGOs was included in the project). The
partners were advised to base their proposals on organizational manifestos, web sites, and
literature on social movements and NGOs.
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Think Tanks
The project focuses on three think tanks in each country. Each partner was requested to
nominate 8 think tanks, at least two of which have done projects about the European Union if
such exists. The think tank categories in the below table were used as a rough, flexible guide,
as not all European countries have all sorts of think tanks. Partners were requested to propose
at least 2 or 3 “advocacy think tanks”, 2 “Universities without students” and 2 or 3 contract
research institutes. At least one of the proposed think tanks should be a member organization
of TEPSA (The Trans-European Policy Studies Association). The Consortium’s final
selection of three think tanks in each country was based on a concern for representing the
largest possible variation of think tank types and their approaches to the EU-polity/diversity at
the European level as well as transnational collaboration in the European public sphere.
Partners were advised to base their proposals on think tank manifestos, organizational
objectives, web sites, and literature on think tanks.
Think tank selection guide
Think Tank Type
Advocacy think tanks
(ATT)
Universities without
students (UTT)
Contract research
organizations
(CTT)
Specifications
Think tanks
advocating certain
views on issues
relevant to the EUpolity and social
diversity.
Think tanks
claiming to conduct
independent
research
Think tanks doing
research based on
contracts with
political institutions
and organizations
Think tank
names
Short Information
about the think
tank
Justification
2 ATT based
in the
respective
country
1 ATT that is
member of
TEPSA (if
applicable)
1 UTT based
in the
respective
country
1 UTT that is
member of
TEPSA (if
applicable)
2 CTT based
in the
respective
country
1 CTT that is
member of
TEPSA (if
applicable)
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Please mention
briefly the
following:
* Proposed think
tanks should have
previously
conducted projects
related with
European issues
* place on the
national–global
ideology
continuum if
applicable
* work on the EUpolity
* work about
diversity
* the two most
important
views/issues that
each think tanks
otherwise
specialize on.
Partners’ shortlystated opinions
about why and how
the selection of each
think tank should
enrich our project?
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Media Actors
Five media actors are researched on in each country – 3 print media actors and 2 broadcast
media actors. Each partner was expected to identify and nominate the three main players in
print media in their respective countries and two (small) print media actors
representing/voicing the colours. Concerning broadcast media, each partner will nominate
two public service news programmes and two commercial news programmes. That is, a total
of 9 media actors are to be nominated/selected in each country. For each country, we will
finally choose 5 media actors. The General Assembly’s selection will be based on a concern
for representing the largest possible variation of media types and their approaches to the EUpolity/diversity at the European level as well as transnational collaboration in the European
Public Sphere. We advise our partners to base their nominations on media web sites and
secondary literature on media’s framing of diversity and EU-polity.
Media actor selection guide
Media
Type
Specifications
Print media
(PM)
*Daily
press/newspapers
*The print
versions will be
used in the data
collection
Broadcast
media
(BM)
*TV-broadcast
channels
*Requires
recording of
news/programmes
on tape for
analysis.
Media actor names
Short Information about the
media actor
Justification
Three main player
print media actors
Please mention briefly the
following:
* place on the national–
global ideology continuum if
applicable
* framing of the EU-polity
* framing of diversity
* the two most important
views/issues that each media
actor otherwise likes to
focus specifically on in the
recent years.
*please indicate the
programme of interest in
connection with each
broadcast media actor
Two small print
media actors
voicing colours
Two main player
public service
broadcast media
actors (only one
programme to be
selected for
analysis)
Partners’ shortly-stated
opinions about why and
how the selection of
each media actor should
enrich our project?
Two commercially
driven broadcast
media actors (only
one programme to
be selected for
analysis)
Based on these general guidelines, each partner team sent their justified proposals to the
Steering Committee, the Steering Committee made a long list of the proposed organizations,
and chose the organizations that were seen as the most relevant for answering
EUROSPHERE’s research questions. The Steering Committee’s selections of actors were
approved by each partner university with minor changes.
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Institutional Data and Sources
The data collection activity started with the gathering of detailed information about the
selected social and political actors’ general features through web-surfing of their internet
pages, preliminary analyses of their publications/reports, programme declarations, public
debates, daily press/broadcast news, secondary academic literature, and other printed and
electronically published material. The dimensions of data collection about actors’ general
features are:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
officially stated norms, principles, and objectives
the means of dissemination they use to influence
the strategies for promoting their preferences
the channels of influence they use
profile of membership, membership policy
financial resources and priorities
organizational structure and names of leaders
other organizations they prefer to collaborate with
channels, forms, discourses, and levels of involvement that they make available for
their members as well as other citizens/residents
10. main topic of interest in the last 3 years
Concerning the last point the following topics were of particular interest in a EUROSPHERE
context: (a) the European polity and its institutions and policies, (b) the European public
spheres, (c) diversity – as this unfolds along the dimensions of European enlargement,
citizenship, and mobility/migration/asylum. The University of Bergen and the Norwegian
Social Science Data Services devised an online data register system for this type of data. This
preliminary data collection about the organizations was completed before we interviewed the
elites in the organizations.
Criteria for Selection of Respondents
In the second stage, we identified and selected leaders or elites of these social/political actors
as our potential interviewees. These individuals are representative of the institutions that they
belong to – that is, organizational, opinion, and internal group leaders were selected. We
selected leaders from different categories in each type of social political actor. The following
considerations were relevant for our research while selecting the respondents:
i)
For each type of social and political actor, it was an important aim to represent
both the dominant group and the internal opposition and dissenters.
ii)
For political parties and SMO/NGO, it was one of our most important targets to
represent also the minorities within minorities in our analyses; e.g. for ethnic,
religious, and national minorities: class- and elite-positions and usually also along
sex/gender lines and age lines: vulnerable minorities such as women, minors
iii)
The gender balance concern determined by our gender action plan was applied
when selecting respondents.
The following operative categories were advised to partners when selecting the interviewees
from each organization type:
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Respondents from Political Parties
Political party
Organizational Leader
Opinion Leader
1
1
Internal
Opposition
Leader
2
Internal
“group” Total
Leader
3
7
Organizational leader: The formally/officially appointed leader with full mandate to speak
and act on behalf of a political party. This may include also the individuals who are members
of the central steering committee of a political party.
Opinion leader: Individuals who may or may not have formal/official leadership position, but
who are known to be the ideologues and opinion-leaders in a political party.
Internal opposition leader: Potential interviewees who have views on diversity or EU-related
issues that are distinct from the present formal/opinion leadership.
Internal group leader: This category includes (a) the leader of organized women’s factions
(if such exists, at least 1 woman leader should be selected) and (b) leading representatives of
'ethnic, national, immigrant minorities' within parties (if such exists, at least 1 ethno-national
minority group leader and 1 immigrant minority group leader should be selected).
Respondents from SMOs/NGOs
SMO/NGO
Organizational
Leader
Opinion Leader
Internal Opposition
Leader
1
1
1
Internal
“minority”
Leader
2
Total
5
Organizational leader: The formally/officially appointed leaders with full mandate to speak
and act on behalf of a SMO/NGO. This may include also individuals who are members of the
central steering committee.
Opinion leader: Individuals who may or may not have formal/official leadership position, but
who are known to be the ideologues and opinion-leaders in a political party.
Internal opposition leader: Potential interviewees who have views on diversity or EU-related
issues that are distinct from the present formal/opinion leadership.
Internal “minority” leader: This category includes (a) the leaders of organized women’s
faction inside organizations (if such exists, at least 1 (female) leader should be selected) and
(b.1) for SMOs/NGOs primarily constituted and run by members of the majority population:
leading representatives of 'ethnic, national, immigrant minorities' within organizations (if such
exists, at least 1 ethno-national minority group leader and/or 1 immigrant minority group
leader should be selected – according to relevance in different country contexts); (b.2) for
organizations constituted and run by members of national/indigenous/immigrant minority
populations:
Respondents from Think Tanks
Think tank
Organizational Leader
1
Research Leader
1
Prominent Researcher
1
Total
3
Organizational leader: The formally/officially appointed leaders with full mandate to speak
and act on behalf of a SMO/NGO. This may include also individuals who are members of the
central steering committee.
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Research leader: Individuals who are known to be leading the organizations’ research policy
and thematic priorities, especially in the area of ethno-national diversity and EU-research.
Prominent researcher: Researchers/authors in the organization who have done the most
relevant research on the themes in which EUROSPHERE is specifically interested (ethnonational diversity and EU).
Respondents from Print Media
Print media
Editor General’s Office
1 (or 0)
News Section Editor
1
News Section Journalist
1 (or 2)
Total
3
Editor General’s office: If possible, the newspaper’s editor general should be interviewed. If
not, people closely working with the editor general who daily interact with him in the daily
work of determining the editorial policy (e.g., member of editorial board).
News section editor: Where possible, the news editor of each selected newspaper should be
interviewed. If not, a journalist collaborating closely with the news editor on selection of
news items should be selected.
News section journalist: A journalist/reporter who is specializing in or who has proven to
have an interest in making news about ethno-national diversity and/or relevant EU-policies
and institutions.
EUROSPHERE Knowledgebase
The aforementioned institutional and interview data were registered by the data collectors into
a central database that was designed and set up by the Norwegian Social Science Data
Services and the University of Bergen. Data registration was done according to standard
coding rules. In this database, we have organized the institutional and interview data in a
format that summarizes each interview by variables. Therefore, the project researchers also
have the option of quantifying the interview data. In addition to the institutional and interview
databases, EUROSPHERE also collected media content data in order to observe the extent to
which what we observe at the organization and elite levels are reflected in the media space. It
is also worth noting that some of our interview questions correspond to some items used in
Eurobarometer and European Social Survey. Thus, at later stages of our research, the
EUROSPHERE researchers will be able to compare views and approaches at individual, elite,
organizational, and media space levels in order to see a more complete picture of the
European public sphere.
The majority of the EUROSPHERE partners were able to follow these guidelines. When
they could not, this was due to the inaccessibility of either the interviewees or the
organizations. However, except for the University of Amsterdam, which selected far too
many organizations because they saw it as necessary to represent the broader diversity of
views, deviations from case and respondent selection rules are minor. The partners who had to
deviate from the general guidelines explicitly state this in their reports.
Finally, on behalf of the EUROSPHERE Consortium, I would like thank to Aurora
Alvarez-Veinguer and Martina Klicperova-Baker for coordinating the writing of the
EUROSPHERE Country Reports Series. The EUROSPHERE Country Report Series is the
result of the enormous synchronized data collection and systematization efforts of more than
100 European researchers in sixteen countries. Despite some weaknesses that arise from the
collaborative nature of comparative international projects, I have great hopes for its
contribution of new knowledge to the already rich body of literature about the European
public sphere.
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Preface
Aurora Alvarez and Martina Klicperova-Baker
EUROSPHERE, Diversity and the European Public Sphere. Towards a citizen’s Europe, is a
EU funded project in which sixteen European countries9 collaborate. As they investigate the
different perspectives on (ethno-national) diversity, migration, citizenship, enlargement,
gender policy and European integration, they look for signs of existence of the European
public sphere, and conditions that enable or undermine the articulation of inclusive European
Public Sphere(s) (EPS). Towards these objectives the project focuses on the role played by
certain social and political actors in the formation of EPS and the features of existing
communicative public spaces which affect the formation of EPS.10
This Country Report is the result of Workpackage 3, the largest of all EUROSPHERE
activities. All the 16 partners have carried out single case studies that date back to May 2008.
They performed media content analysis, institutional data collection and interviews), data
documentation and summary. Although the report does form the basis for further analyses
during a later stage of the EUROSPHERE-project, it is also intended as a publication that can
be read independently. In it we attempt to answer the following questions:
• What is the meaning of diversity for the interviewees and their organizations?
• Do social and political actors (organizations) engage in sub-national, national, and/or
trans-European collaboration and communication?
• Do some interviewees believe it is important to have a more or less fragmented /
segmented European Polity and European Public Sphere and why?
• Do the interviewees’ and their organizations’ notions of public sphere, the European
Polity, and Diversity differ from the general public opinion in their countries and
why?
• Are these variables or opinions related?
9
Coordinating, University of Bergen, Norway; Partners: Austrian Academy of Science, Austria; University of
Amsterdam, The Netherlands; Sabanci University, Turkey; Aalborg University, Denmark; University of
Helsinki, Finland; Institute of Psychology of Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic, Czech Republic;
University of Osnabrueck, Germany; Tallinn University, Estonia; Université Libre de Bruxelles, Belgium;
Granada University, Spain; Institute of Psychology, Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, Bulgaria; Trento
University, Italy; Central European University, Hungary; online databases and programming by the Norwegian
Social Science Data Services, Norway; Fondation Maison des Sciences de l'Homme, France; Cardiff University,
United Kingdom
10
We have a point of departure in an analytical distinction between communicative public spaces and public
spheres. The former is a space of interaction and deliberation that is relatively separate from the state. It is a
social and political space in which individuals, groups, and other social/political actors with a certain level of ingroup feeling form and formulate interests and views to be explicated outwards. These public spaces are also
arenas where persons’ belongings and identities are mediated, confirmed, shaped, and re-shaped. The public
sphere, on the other hand, is an arena where views articulated in communicative public spaces confront and are
confronted by state actors. Seen from the side of the citizens, the challenge is to make citizens’ views, concerns,
and interests relevant for the politics and institutions at the European level.
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Some theoretical approaches have been included but will be developed in a greater depth in
the subsequent comparative analyses in WP4, 5, 6 and 7. Instead, the reports will focus on the
explanations / reasons found or given in the mentioned collected institutional, interview, and
media data material.
EUROSPHERE will assess the possibility of increasing interaction between and across
various communicative public spaces on selected European policy issues. It will inquire into
how citizens’ involvement in European issues can happen at multiple levels across various
types of communicative public spaces.
This report constitutes a basis for comparative studies to be conducted by research topic
groups in future stages. That is, in a later phase of the project, EUROSPHERE research teams
will use these data for comparative analyses that encompass different approaches and/or fields
• WP4 examines the Impact of Citizens on the Articulation of EPS;
• WP5 the Role of Social and Political Actors on the Articulation of EPS;
• WP6 the Impact of Communicative Public Spaces on the Articulation of EPS
• WP7 studies Gender, Intersectionality and the Public Sphere.
All partners of the EUROSPHERE project have started their empirical data collection using
the same topics and questionnaire as starting points, according to the guidelines that were
provided by the EUROSPHERE-Consortium. This specific document is based on (1) data
collection activities (teams have gathered relevant data about the characteristics of
communicative public spaces and the official discourses of social/political organizations
regarding the EU and the public sphere)11; and (2) the opinions of prominent people within
political parties, think tanks, social movement and media organizations on EUROSPHERE
themes12 - in doing so, the report is intended to recall whether there are differences between
the official standpoints, rivaling strands and prominent individuals of each organisation.
The information expressed during the interviews can only be thoroughly understood if
presented in the specific contexts. Therefore, country reports provide a general introduction to
the policy fields relevant to EUROSPHERE and short introductions about the organizations;
followed by the body of the document which describes and to some extent analyses, the
opinions of these organisation members regarding diversity, the EU, citizenship and the
European public sphere.
11
Secondary data includes: information on websites, (party) constitutions, manifestos, (election) programs,
reports, press releases, newspaper articles, and other sources that are of relevance. In addition we used secondary
(scientific) literature. The amount of data collected differs per organization and country: there are respondents
who tend to be more open about their standpoints, whereas others are more reluctant to participate or do not have
so much secondary data available. When possible, researchers were not meant to rely on the official position of
the organizations exclusively, but also searched for diversity within the organization.
12 Concerning data-collection about social/political actors, at least three social/political actors were selected in
each category (i.e., 3 think tanks, 3 political parties, 3 social movements, 3 media actors) in each of the sixteen
countries. These social/political actors were selected with respect to their orientations to different types of public
spaces – i.e., each of the three selected social movements, for example, must be known to be part of a specific
communicative public space type. Each country was meant to carry out a total of at least 54 interviews; however
interviewees’ busy agendas, lack of collaboration and other technical difficulties, as well as the need to include
more relevant organizations, have made this number vary from country toh country.
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Table of Contents
FOREWORD..........................................................................................................................................................I
PREFACE........................................................................................................................................................XVII
TABLE OF CONTENTS................................................................................................................................. XIX
1 INTRODUCTION.............................................................................................................................................. 1
1.1HUNGARIAN POLITICS AND POLITICAL ACTORS............................................................................................. 1
1.1.1 The Hungarian Party System................................................................................................................ 2
1.1.2 Political Actors..................................................................................................................................... 4
1.2 HUNGARIAN NGOS AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS ............................................................................................. 5
1.2.1 The Hungarian NGO Sector ................................................................................................................. 5
1.2.2 NGO Actors .......................................................................................................................................... 7
1.3 HUNGARIAN THINK-TANKS......................................................................................................................... 12
1.3.1 Historical development of the Hungarian think tank sector ............................................................... 13
1.3.2 Definitional problems ......................................................................................................................... 14
1.3.3 Think tank actors ................................................................................................................................ 16
1.4 HUNGARIAN MEDIA .................................................................................................................................... 17
1.4.1 Hungarian Media Market ................................................................................................................... 17
1.4.2 Media Actors ...................................................................................................................................... 20
1.4.3 Important Events ................................................................................................................................ 23
2 VIEWS ON DIVERSITY ............................................................................................................................... 25
2.1 POLITICAL PARTIES’ GENERAL VIEWS ON DIVERSITY ................................................................................ 25
2.1.1 Common views.................................................................................................................................... 30
2.2 NGOS’ GENERAL VIEWS ON DIVERSITY ..................................................................................................... 31
2.2.1 Common views.................................................................................................................................... 34
2.3 THINK TANKS’ GENERAL VIEWS ON DIVERSITY ......................................................................................... 35
2.3.1 Common views.................................................................................................................................... 39
2.4 MEDIA’S GENERAL VIEWS ON DIVERSITY................................................................................................... 39
2.4.1 Common views.................................................................................................................................... 44
3 VIEWS ON EU POLITY AND POLICIES ................................................................................................... 45
3.1 POLITICAL PARTIES’ VIEWS ON THE EU POLITY AND POLICIES .................................................................. 45
3.1.1 Political rights .................................................................................................................................... 48
3.1.2 Citizenship .......................................................................................................................................... 49
3.1.3 Free Movement................................................................................................................................... 51
3.1.4 Enlargement ....................................................................................................................................... 54
3.1.5 Common Views ................................................................................................................................... 56
3.2 NGOS’ VIEWS ON THE EU POLITY AND POLICIES ....................................................................................... 57
3.2.2 Citizenship .......................................................................................................................................... 59
3.2.3 Free Movement................................................................................................................................... 61
3.2.4 Enlargement ....................................................................................................................................... 64
3.2.5 Common views.................................................................................................................................... 65
3.3 THINK TANKS’ VIEWS ON THE EU POLITY AND POLICIES ........................................................................... 66
3.3.2 Citizenship .......................................................................................................................................... 70
3.3.3 Free movement ................................................................................................................................... 72
3.3.4 Enlargement ....................................................................................................................................... 74
3.3.5 Common views.................................................................................................................................... 75
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3.4 MEDIA VIEWS ON THE EU POLITY AND POLICIES........................................................................................ 76
3.4.2 Citizenship .......................................................................................................................................... 80
3.4.3 Free movement ................................................................................................................................... 82
3.4.4 Enlargement ....................................................................................................................................... 83
3.4.5 Common views.................................................................................................................................... 85
4 VIEWS ON THE EUROPEAN PUBLIC SPHERE...................................................................................... 86
4.1 POLITICAL PARTIES’ VIEWS ON THE EPS .................................................................................................... 86
4.1.1 Common Views ................................................................................................................................... 89
4.2 NGOS’ VIEWS ON THE EPS.................................................................................................................... 90
4.2.1 Common Views ................................................................................................................................... 92
4.3 THINK TANKS’ VIEWS ON THE EPS............................................................................................................. 92
4.3.1 Common views.................................................................................................................................... 95
4.4 MEDIA VIEWS ON THE EPS ......................................................................................................................... 95
4.4.1 Common views.................................................................................................................................... 97
5 CONCLUSIONS .............................................................................................................................................. 97
REFERENCES.................................................................................................................................................. 103
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1 INTRODUCTION
This report aims to examine current developments in the European Union and consider how
European domestic societies respond to the challenges of EU integration. The goal of the
report is to identify the factors which determine how new member states, such as Hungary,
respond to questions of migration, citizenship, and diversity inherent in Europeanization. The
main hypothesis of the paper is that attitudes towards cultural diversity (understood very
broadly) and political institutions present in Hungarian society will affect the Europeanization
of public spheres as well as societal attitudes towards Europeanization.
The report endeavors to identify elements of openness in various kinds of public spaces
towards the idea of Europeanization. The report will assess the features of social/political
actors and of sub-European communicative public spaces that promote or hinder the
development of various types of European belongings and citizens’ involvement (through
different associations) in European policy making. In order to achieve this, the report will
inquire into how civic interaction and aggregation of interests on European issues can happen
at multiple levels of society. The report is based on a very broad understanding of societal
actors that comprises political parties next to the more traditional ‘civil society’ actors such as
NGOs, think tanks, or the media and will treat these as components of communicative public
spaces and assesses their role in and contribution to the articulation of Hungarian society’s
response to Europeanization.
In order to be able to assess attitudes towards Europeanization, the report will analyze the
following four European policy issues that are most relevant for Europeanization: the
European Constitution; European citizenship; mobility, migration, and asylum policy; and
European enlargement. In order to achieve its proposed goals, the report relies on qualitative
data by selecting three actors for each category in Hungary. The critical analysis of the
empirical data gathered from content analysis, personal interviews and available sources will
enable us to assess the internal integration and cohesion of society and the boundaries of the
public sphere (with special focus on Europeanization) and of the demos that it accommodates.
We will also identify what social/political actors play an important role in determining
Hungarian society’s response to Europeanization.
Our report is structured in three parts. The first part will start with a brief overview of the
political landscape in Hungary to be followed by overviews of the main characteristics of
Hungarian NGOs, think-tanks, and media. Having described the characteristics of each of
these fields, the report continues with brief introductions of the selected individual actors in
each field in order to highlight similarities and differences among these. Having identified the
actors, the second part of the report examines first the general views on diversity trying to
highlight what is agreed upon by all societal actors and what are the differences among these.
This is followed by a presentation on the views regarding the different policy fields of the EU
polity. The concluding part of the report examines the different views present with regards to
the common European communication and collaboration. The report will conclude with a
brief summary of the presented views and how these views obstruct or contribute to the
appearance of a common European public sphere.
1.1 Hungarian Politics and Political Actors
In the following pages we will demonstrate through a narrative case study the impact of party
competition on the challenges of EU integration in Hungary. In the first part of the
introduction, we will concentrate on how the pattern of party competition developed in
Hungary, and how this may influence integration into European frameworks of reference. We
will present the process of crystallization of the Hungarian cleavages, and the power and the
limits of the role of political parties, and how the pattern of party competition may influence
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European integration. In the second part, we will concentrate on the chosen actors for our
EUROSPHERE research, and present their individual characteristics as well as their path of
development since the regime change in Hungary. Our overview will be concentrated on the
two largest Hungarian parties, the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP) and FIDESZ –
Hungarian Civic Union (FIDESZ), complemented by a maverick party, the Hungarian
Communist Workers Party (MKMP), which was specifically selected for the analysis in order
to include the views of political parties that are on the extremes of the Hungarian political
spectrum.
1.1.1 The Hungarian Party System
Political parties are the central agents of democratic representation, and thus the influence of
parties and party systems on the quality of democracy or the nature of society can hardly be
overstated. The type of the political system and the shape of political parties therefore
determine the nature of democracy, or the nature of society itself. In other words, political
parties and party systems are essential for making responsiveness and accountability visible,
credible and real.13 It is commonly argued that cohesive parties and a relatively stable party
system are essential in making governance transparent and accountable as it is parties’ ability
to structure the choices offered in elections and keep office-holders accountable for their
deeds. Nevertheless, the functional centrality of parties to mass democracy does not
automatically assure particularly strong attachment to parties among citizens.14
The history of Hungarian party competition between 1990 and 2009 can be characterized
as one dominated by the role of institutions. At the beginning of the transition period a
relatively fragmented party system evolved based on a number of cross-cutting or just weakly
correlated cleavage dimensions. While decline of newly founded parties characterized
Hungarian politics in the first decade after transition more than it did Western Europe,
institutional variables favored a gradual return to a bipolar system of party alliances.
Whereas, as we will see bellow, Hungarian politics lacks deep cleavages cross-cutting each
other, the concentration of executive power favored parties that could present a clear
alternative to the government of the day, and strengthened the winner-takes-all logic of party
competition.
For Hungarian voters, personal economic standing and its expected development matter
much more than the assessment of political parties,15 and thus parties themselves are often
held electorally accountable for the gap between their electoral promises and government
deeds. In post-communist Hungary, all but the last elections brought a straight alternation of
government and opposition parties, and a few issue domains divide the major party
alternatives consistently and predictably. No coalition, as yet, bridged the left-right divide. By
the end of the transition period, the Hungarian political scene evolved into something very
close to a two-party system, where the multiple cleavages that characterized the immediate
post-1990 politics were absorbed into the opposition of the two major parties.16
In the first elections of 1990, the anti-communism factor was the main dividing line
between contenders, and the divide between the pro-market and the social protectionist
parties ran mostly parallel to this first dimension. Economic and social welfare issues did
13
Richard S Katz, Democracy and Elections. (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1997)
Gabor Toka, “Political Parties and Democratic Consolidation in East Central Europe.” Studies in Public Policy
No. 279. Glasgow: Centre for the Study of Public Policy, University of Strathclyde. 1997.
15
Gabor Toka, “Political Parties and Democratic Consolidation in East Central Europe.” Studies in Public Policy
No. 279. Glasgow: Centre for the Study of Public Policy, University of Strathclyde. 1997.
16
Gabor Toka, “Hungary.” in Handbook of Political Change in Eastern Europe, 2nd revised and updated
edition, ed. by Sten Berglund, Joakim Ekman, and Frank H. Aarebrot. (Cheltenham: Edgar Elgar, 2004): 289336.
14
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appear on the political agenda between 1994 and 1998, but while some of the main issues on
the agenda had changed, the major divisions remained rooted in the conflicting cultural
dimensions between technocratic (often heavily neo-liberal) pragmatism on the part of,
ironically, the Socialist Party and the Christian-nationalist ideology.17 Unlike in Poland and
the Czech Republic, where economic issues played a much greater role, economic conditions
had only moderate impact on the popularity of governmental parties, but performance
evaluations remained unrelated to preferences with respect to policy issues and social group
identities.18 This trend continued and by the new millennia, it led to a simplification of
relevant ideological divisions into a single left-right dimension, where elite consensus
excluded economic left-right issues from being persistently linked to this emerging divide.
Differences within the emerging two blocs of parties were harder to interpret in ideological
terms due to increasing attitudinal similarity on both sides.19 As a result, clear policy
commitments are rare in the Hungarian political scene, although the rival sides often justify
their positions in highly ideological language, routinely declaring their opposition antidemocratic and/or enemies of the nation.
Hungarian parties are autonomous, they are not related to some pre-existing social group
or organization. Traditional party sponsors, such as the trade unions for the Socialist or the
Catholic Church in the case of Christian Democrats, were unable to alter the party direction
or to keep the parties under control. Cultural, professional associations, civic organizations or
pressure groups have little impact, and the phenomenon of collective membership is entirely
missing from the Hungarian party statutes. This autonomy is further underlined by the fact
that party leaders emerge within the party organization. Centralization characterized every
Hungarian party, and party leaders have a high degree of control over all internal factions
within the party.20 While parties depend on the state for funding, this dependence does not
have any impact on their behavior.
The strong grip of parties over political developments could in theory be weakened as
social movements and interest groups do have the ability, granted by the constitution, to
initiate referendums on policies of their interest, but so far they have not managed to reduce
the primary role played by the parties. The preference for parties vis-à-vis social movements
was enhanced further in 1997 by increasing the number of signatures required to call a
referendum to 200,000. While this limit was successfully passed only by the 2004 referendum
on extending citizenship rights to Hungarian co-ethnics in neighboring countries, even this
referendum remained legally non-binding due to the low turnout. The most important lesson
of the past two decades of Hungarian politics is that parties can restructure social and
attitudinal characteristics, and the transformation of the Hungarian political scene can be
attributed to elite interactions and rational calculations. Hungarian politics is characterized by
strong competition between the two major parties, whose electoral base is not very different
from one another when it comes to socio-demographic composition and public preferences.
Hungarian party politics emphasize cultural issues, and parties reassert the primacy of these
issues by their preferences.
One cannot blame the Hungarian electoral system as solely responsible for the great
conflict between the two main parties. One must note that the closest approximations of the
17
Gabor Toka, “Hungary.” in Handbook of Political Change in Eastern Europe, 2nd revised and updated
edition, ed. by Sten Berglund, Joakim Ekman, and Frank H. Aarebrot. (Cheltenham: Edgar Elgar, 2004): 289336.
18
Radoslaw Markowski and Gabor Toka "Left Turn in Hungary and Poland Five Years After the Collapse of
Communism." Sisyphus: Social Studies 1 IX 1993. 1995: 75-100.
19
Zsolt Enyedi, “The Role of Agency in Cleavage Formation” European Journal of Political Research 44, 2005:
697–720.
20
Zsolt Enyedi and Gabor Toka."The Only Game in Town: Party Politics in Hungary." in Party Politics in New
Democracies, edited by Paul Webb and Stephen White. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007): 147-178.
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BOZOKI
formula employed in Hungarian single-member electoral districts – majoritarian runoff and
alternative vote systems – tend to produce a more fragmented party system than the one
emerged in Hungary. The adoption of the constructive vote of no-confidence creates a
situation where the leader of the largest parliamentary party is likely to end up as an
omnipotent prime minister who is nearly impossible to remove. Casting a vote in Hungarian
elections predominantly depends on personal opinions based on a leader-centric, party-based
view of the world and has little to do with ideology or government performance evaluation.
The high degree of political polarization and minor differences between contenders on major
socio-economic issues result in a general war between left and right. As such the dynamics of
political institutions may be stronger determinants of party systems and cleavage structures
than the features of the electoral system design.21
1.1.2 Political Actors
Let us know turn in more detail to our selected actors for the EUROSPHERE research. The
following section will briefly outline each of our selected political actors, namely the
Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP), FIDESZ-The Hungarian Civic Union (FIDESZ), and the
Hungarian Communist Workers’ Party (MKMP).
The Hungarian Socialist Party (Magyar Szocialista Párt – MSZP) is a left-wing political
party. MSZP is only the partial successor of the former communist party and the party
concentrates on creating an independent position from all other parties under the official
banner of social democracy. The notions of ‘modernization’ and ‘Europeanizations’ became
catchwords for the Socialists, and MSZP became a modernizing-privatizing “managerial
capitalist” party by the mid 1990s.22 Ironically, on economic issues, the Socialists have often
been greater advocates of liberal and free market policies than the conservative opposition.
Besides a more liberal approach to the economy overall, MSZP’s more recent focus is on
transforming state social policy from a collection of measures that benefit the entire
population to one based on financial and social need. This indicates an effort by the party to
return to more traditionally “socialist” values. It is important to remember that the party
campaigned against extending Hungarian citizenship to ethnic Hungarians living in
neighboring countries in a December 5, 2004 referendum. MSZP differentiates itself from its
conservative opponents mainly in its rejection of nationalism and its support for diversity.
The party is a member of the Socialist International and the Party of European Socialists, and
it holds a chairmanship and several vice-chairmanships in committees at the European
Parliament.
FIDESZ was founded by thirty-seven university students and young intellectuals at the
István Bibó University Campus on the brink of regime change. The party started out having a
liberal program and the party's philosophy was summed up as ’liberal, radical and
alternative.’ Nevertheless, poor electoral performance in the first two democratic elections
forced the party to rethink its program, and FIDESZ changed its political orientation to
conservative, though this caused a severe split among FIDESZ founding members. FIDESZ
was a committed supporter of Hungary's integration into NATO and membership of the
European Union. By November 2000, FIDESZ became a member of the European People's
Party (EPP) and its membership in the Liberal International was subsequently terminated.
Faced with electoral defeat in 2002, the party also established what it calls the civic circles to
strengthen the party position within the electorate. Unconditional loyalty to the party leader
became a fundamental norm, and although FIDESZ introduced party ballots into its statue in
21
Max Kaase, “Is there Personalization of Politics? Candidates and Voting Behavior in Germany” International
Political Science Review 15 (1994): 211-230.
22
Andras Bozoki and John Ishiyama, Communist Successor Parties of Central and Eastern Europe (Armonk
New York: ME Sharpe, 2002).
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2002 to provide for a measure of direct democracy (their members can be balloted on nonfinancial issues), the party presidium still retains the right of ultimate decision.23
MKMP was founded in 1989, as a re-organized form of the Hungarian Socialist Workers'
Party (MSZMP) that ruled Hungary prior to regime change. The party defines itself as a
workers’ communist party, with a Marxist ideology, in support of the leftist social-democratic
values.24 Other political actors and the Hungarian press portray MKMP as an antidemocratic,
outdated, and anti-European party that has to be isolated in Hungarian politics. MKMP never
made it into the parliament and its support in the electorate diminished from 3% in the early
90s to below 1% by 2006. MKMP has declared a radical fight against neo-liberal policy and
its primary interest is to fight against capitalist exploitation. Among others, the party
successfully initiated a referendum against the privatization of hospitals. There is no place for
internal opposition as everything is decided by the party president. The party opposed
Hungary’s joining the NATO but supported Hungary’s membership in the European Union,
though it emphasized Hungarian people were to lose if government did not do all that was
possible to save them.25 MKMP is a member of the European Party of the Left.
1.2 Hungarian NGOs and Social Movements
Our second category of selected societal actors for the EUROSPHERE research is NGOs and
social movements. The next pages will describe the Hungarian NGO sector, its development
since regime change, as well as the three NGOs that were interviewed during data gathering.
1.2.1 The Hungarian NGO Sector
Even though several quasi associations or societal organizations existed during the socialist
regime, they were state-controlled and provided only limited and non-autonomous
possibilities for collective action, as voluntary civic activism had been regarded as anti-state
organizing.26 After 40 years of socialist rupture in civil society development, at the end of the
80s a newly emerging nonprofit sector characterized Hungary. This was an exciting era, when
several non-profit organizations dealing with environmental issues, community development
and civil rights were created in order to draw citizens’ attention to problems that gained
limited publicity earlier. Civil organizations have provided forums for social dialogue and
opportunities for alternative thinking. After 1987, when the Hungarian civic law allowed the
establishment of foundations, political parties, professional and advocacy organizations as
well as associations grew out of these civil organizations.
The establishment of non-profit organizations (such as charities, associations and
foundations, non-profit co-operatives) was completely legalized after 1990, which resulted in
a boom of the establishment of organizations; from 1989 to 1990 there was a 45% increase in
the number of nonprofit organizations. This steady growth produced 47,144 nonprofit
organizations in 2000, the highest number in the Visegrad region despite Hungary’s small
geographical size and population.27 Since there was no significant institutional legacy to be
inherited from the communist past, there was a rupture in legacy, legitimacy non-profit
practices caused by the years of state-centered practices. The growth of the non-profit sector
23
Zsolt Enyedi and Gabor Toka."The Only Game in Town: Party Politics in Hungary." in Party Politics in New
Democracies, edited by Paul Webb and Stephen White. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007): 147-178.
24
http://www.munkaspart.hu/5fejezet.htm
25
http://www.munkaspart.hu/english/informationabouthcwp.htm
26
Anheier, Helmut and Wolfgang Seibel. 1998. "The Non-Profit Sector and the Transformation of Societies: A
Comparative Analysis of East Germany, Poland and Hungary." Private Action and the Public Good, eds. Walter
W. Powell and Elisabeth S. Clemens. New Haven, CT: Yale University.
27
Bocz, János, Judit Cseh, Éva Kuti, Geyza Mészáros, and István Sebestény. 2002. Nonprofit Szervezetek
Magyarországon, 2000 . Budapest: Központi Statisztikai Hivatal, Társadalomstatisztikai Közlemények
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in the post socialist era had been therefore rather rapid with immediate tasks to handle.
Hungarian non-profit organizations had a lot to learn from the more well-established
voluntary organizations in Western Europe and USA. Both terms civil society and nonprofit
sector are Western imports in Hungary, and their emergence was greatly advocated by
Western actors.28
In 1992 the Research Project on Nonprofit Organizations together with the largest
nonprofit organizations have formed the Consultative Council, a forum to discuss problems in
the nonprofit sector. This body found that there was a strong contradiction between the
democratic goals of civic groups and the authoritarian and inefficient operation of the
nonprofit organizations.29 A year later the Nonprofit Information and Training Center
Foundation (NIOK) was established with the aim of helping the development of civil society
and became the engine of the Hungarian non-profit sector’s development.30
After the regime change, the sector has been characterized primarily by quantitative
development, with the largest boost in the first half of the 1990s. In December 1996, the
Hungarian Parliament provided a new avenue to strengthen civil society by enabling
taxpayers to directly support a nonprofit organization with one percent of their personal
income tax. The Civil Office of the Hungarian National Assembly was established in
September 2002 in order to evolve the institutionalization of communication and co-operation
between the non-governmental sector and the National Assembly.31 The government
introduced in 2003 the National Civil Fund,32 which is financed from the 1% of citizens’
personal income tax not donated directly to non-profit organizations, as well as other
revenues. The Fund allocates support grants and although this amount is not enough to fulfill
all NGO claims, it facilitated the development of the NGO sector.
By 2005 the number of non-profit organizations in Hungary grew to 56 694. NGOs
mainly focus on education (32%), social services (15%) and culture (13%). The income of the
non-profit sector had been over 854 billion HUF in 2005, which is a 73% increase compared
495 billion HUF in 2000. According to Hungarian Central Statistical Office (KSH) the
following non-profit organizations operated in 2006:33
Type of
organization
Classical NGO
Self government
Other nonprofit
Total
Has
income,
expenses
44 151
3 519
3 085
50 755
Collects
money, no
expenses
2 575
165
54
2 794
Lives from
its savings,
no income
943
36
101
1 080
Operates
without
money
3 221
329
63
3 613
Total
50
4
3
58
890
049
303
242
Over the past ten years the Hungarian non-profit sector has evolved and became extremely
diverse. It includes service providing non-profit organizations; organizations, clubs and
groupings carrying out independent activities; organizations involved in interest
representation and protection; fundraising and grant-making organizations; as well as
28
Fazekas, Erzsébet. Scripting Nonprofit Sectoral Development in Hungary. American Sociological Association
Annual Meeting, Section on Political Sociology Paper Session, Atlanta, GA, August 17, 2003. Downloadable
from: www.columbia.edu/~ef305/FazekasCV.pdf
29
Nonprofit Information and Training Center Foundation (NIOK). 1995. The Voluntary Sector in Hungary:
Support and Service Organizations.
30
Kuti, Éva. 1996. The Nonprofit Sector in Hungary. Manchester University Press.
31
http://www.parlament.hu/civil/angol/a_index.htm
32
http://www.nca.hu/?page=webtext/show&wte_code=english
33
http://portal.ksh.hu/pls/ksh/docs/hun/xtabla/nonprofit/tablnpr06.html.
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alliances and umbrella organizations. According to a government strategy paper,34 besides the
positive tendencies, the sector is struggling with several tensions. These are the following:
most organizations are economically weak and fragile; many operate without consistent
principles of transparency, the principle of “state dominance” has played a role in government
relations with the non-profit sector, which has contributed to division, a lack of solidarity and
paternalistic expectations within the sector, organizational management regulations are
lacking, and the sector is divided, and dominated by rivalry rather than collaboration.
1.2.2 NGO Actors
One of our selected NGOs for the EUROSPHERE research, the Magyarországi
Cigányszervezetek Fóruma [Forum Hungarian Roma Organizations] (MCF), is a Roma
organization. The Roma make up over 5 percent of the total population, they are Hungary’s
largest as well as most socio-economically disadvantaged minority, and historically the most
firmly entrenched within the political margins of mainstream Hungarian society. The Roma
are the central actors in Hungary, while in the neighboring Austria, Middle-Eastern, African,
and Balkan immigrants play a similar role. The other national minorities – there are 12 ethnonational minorities in Hungary including the Roma – and immigrants are hardly represented
in the public sphere. The Roma have gained political voice since the early 90es and the
Hungarian government came to realize that minority communities cannot be ruled out of the
political process. While Roma leaders are content with their experiences, many more
complain bitterly about growing aggression against them, threats by the neo-Nazi Hungarian
Guard, aloofness if not hostility from the mainstream society, exclusion and worsening social
and economic conditions.35
The Roma community has a broad scale self-minority governance structure as well as
several non-profit alliances and a network of foundations. The Roma minority’s institutions
of self-governance had been set up when the Hungarian Parliament approved the Law
LXXVII on the Rights of National and Ethnic Minorities in 1993. The Hungarian Roma
Forum (MCF), one of the two largest Roma organizations (besides Lungo Drom, which is its
counter-part) had the chance to form the Roma Minority Self-Government (OCKÖ/OCÖ36)
several times. OCKÖ/OCÖ had been considered by the government several times as the most
legitimate partner among the Roma organizations in issues related to the Roma minority.
Thus, MCF had been a significant actor in the public discourse since 2005, since it is the first
Roma political party in Hungary.
MCF was founded in 2005 in order to represent Roma rights in national politics. When
gaining power at OCÖ the MCF has formed 12 professional committees that coordinate their
work with the governmental ministries. They have formed the Round Table of Roma
Intellectuals and established a committee of local representatives. OCÖ has 1 chair, 2 deputy
chairs and 14 vice-chairs, all nominated by MCF. MCF also has a monthly paper37 and a
television studio that produces news with editorial staff – this is its main means of contact to
its membership.
34
Strategy paper of the Government of Hungary on Civil Society. 22, October 2002. (Unofficial working
translation commissioned by the Nonprofit Information and Training Centre (NIOK) Foundation). Download
available: http://www.nonprofit.hu/files/6/6/9/669_Hungariangovernmentstrategy2002.doc
35
Molnár, Emilia - Kai A., Schafft. 2003. Preserving ‘Cultural Autonomy’ or Confronting Social Crisis? The
Activities and Aims of Roma Local Minority Self-Governments 2000-2001. Review of Sociology 9(1):27-42
36
Earlier named as Roma Minority’s Self-Government, Országos Cigány Kisebbségi Önkormányzat, OCKÖ –
had been renamed as Roma Self-Government, Országos Cigány Önkormányzat, OCÖ
37
http://www.vilagossag.hu
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MCF has received most state support during the time of the Socialist-government.38 In
1997 the first Governmental Roma Program had been created and the same year the first large
PHARE program had been launched by the EU. At this time the Roma programs were
allocated from the central budget to ministries. Since 1999 each ministry has a separate
budget to support the Roma. MCF had been active at the Roma Integration Council in order
to coordinate the budgets of ministries as well as the implementation of the National
Development Agency (including EU Development, Structural, Cohesion and Cooperation
funds) as well the Decade of the Roma Inclusion39 (2005-2010) that is the largest cooperation
so far initiated by Central and Southeastern European governments to improve the socioeconomic status and social inclusion of Roma within a regional framework. Recently MCF
had been a primary recipient of the Community Program for Employment and Social
Solidarity (PROGRESS)40 between 2007 and 2013, its goal is to support the Lisbon strategic
goals on the field of employment and social affairs. Nevertheless, as most funds have been
transmitted to OCKÖ/OCÖ through individual contracts, they have not been present in the
central budget, thus it is extremely difficult to review the financing structure of the
organization.41
The organization’s program states that the most important tasks of MCF are: providing
employment for the Roma, integrating the Roma in international development projects;
improving professional training, adult education; rehabilitation of Roma habitat, elimination
of Roma ghettos; reducing disadvantages of Roma children and youth; improving health
conditions for the Roma as well as life expectancy even in disadvantaged regions; cultural
institutions maintaining Roma identity; improving the representation of the Roma in the
media; fighting discrimination and racism against the Roma; and providing a dignified life for
all EU citizens in the European Union.
MCF provides its members support for improving Roma legal representation and
participation at two levels: municipal minority self-governance as well as minority
government at the national level. MCF serves as a liaison between the municipal minority
governments and the Hungarian Parliament. As members of minority self-governments,
MCF’s membership participates in the work of local governments mainly on a consultative
basis, or act as a liaison between the Roma community and the local government.
Nevertheless, as one researcher notes the national Roma self-government does not have a
grass-roots legitimation since membership does not know what leadership is up to, thus can
not be considered a multi-level, representative, democratic organization.42
The real strength of MCF lays in its outstanding capacity to build networks and gain
leadership position in them. MCF is present at each level from counties and municipalities
through national to European and trans-European level. As the leader of OCKÖ/OCÖ since
2004 MCF created and later supervised a very impressive institutional network. Ever since
then, MCF regularly participates in the work of governmental coordinating bodies as
implementing partner of EU programs. It is almost impossible to map the entire network of
MCF due to the mobility of the sector, but also because MCF has numerous member
organizations that also developed their own networks. Regarding political networks, MCF has
joined the Socialist party in a coalition at the 2002 and 2006 parliamentary elections, but on
38
Wizner, Balázs (May 8, 2006.) Roma/cigány1 programok támogatásának politikája Magyarországon a
rendszerváltást követo en. Available online at: www.europeum.org.hu/wp-files/romfinanszvegsoujra_04.pdf.
39
http://www.romadecade.org
40 ec.europa.eu/employment_social/progress/index_en.html
41
Wizner, Balázs (May 8, 2006.) Roma/cigány1 programok támogatásának politikája Magyarországon a
rendszerváltást követo en. Available online at: www.europeum.org.hu/wp-files/romfinanszvegsoujra_04.pdf.
42
Molnár, Emilia - Kai A., Schafft. 2003. Preserving ‘Cultural Autonomy’ or Confronting Social Crisis? The
Activities and Aims of Roma Local Minority Self-Governments 2000-2001. Review of Sociology 9(1):27-42.
8
BOZOKI
the later one it ran as a political party in its own merit – though it did not make it to
Parliament.
Yet, MCF is one of the most influential Roma organizations in Hungary. It also plays a
significant part in achieving ethno-national diversity in Hungary as well as in broadening
institutional diversity. European Union-related issues are among MCF’s primary fields of
interest, MCF takes a pro-enlargement, pro-diversity and pro-mobility/freedom of movement
stance. Besides framing issues from the perspective of the Roma minority, from an ethnonational point-of-view, MCF often openly has a left-wing political perspective. Concerning
European issues, the adopted perspective of MCF is of the European society (sharing
Europe’s basic cultural values).
MCF has several leaders including Orbán Kolompár, József Balog or János Bogdán
junior. Kolompár became president of a local Roma self-government, later became a
representative in his native Kiskunmajsa city municipality and has found the Roma
Employment organization in Bács-Kiskun county.43, He became the president of OCÖ in
2003. Kolompár had been charged in a criminal case for corruption related to EU funds in
2008, which is still under investigation. There is direct rivalry between Kolompár and Flórián
Farkas, the leader of Lungo Drom (the rival Roma organization). Relations between the two
Roma organizations are tense. János Bogdán, a former vice-president of Lungo Drom joined
MCF in 2006 and soon became one of its vice-presidents. Internal opposition is not visible
within MCF, however women have an increasingly strong voice and their role is more and
more acknowledged
Nık a Nıkért Együtt az Erıszak Ellen (NANE) [NANE Women's Rights Association]
had been a pioneer of democratic, grass-roots women organizations in Hungary, founded in
1994. Its mission, violence against women is a core women’s rights topic. There is a
consensus among women’s NGOs in Hungary that violence against women is the most
important area related to gender equality. According to its website, NANE was founded as a
non-profit, non-governmental charity organization. It achieved the legal status of Important
Charity Organization for the Public Good in 1999. The association has democratic principles
and left-orientation. NANE’s primary mission according to its website is “to operate a helpline and provide assistance for the victims of domestic violence”. NANE is still the only NGO
running a hotline for battered women and children in Hungary. Since their beginnings the
range of their activities has grown considerably.
None its 11 founders, including Antonia Burroughs or Zsuzsa Béres, are active in the
current organization; recent members have a hard time even recalling their names. According
to Judit Wirth, a strong opinion-leader within NANE, the reason is that the organization is
heavily under-funded and most of its members eventually burn out. The last split in
membership occurred this year, when all the internal opposition has left NANE and founded
another NGO. While Judit Wirth had been the former president of the organization, when she
left for 6 month to work for the European Women’s Lobby44 (EWL) in Brussels at the Policy
Action Centre on Violence Against Women, Györgyi Tóth became the leader in 2004.
The organization has a regular assembly where the president and two vice-presidents are
democratically chosen. Due to sporadic funds, most of their employees, like Julia Sproncz,
are also active in other organizations, such as Patent Association for human rights. The
challenge in fundraising is however that most of the support they receive cannot be used as
core funding. NANE tries to cover its office and personnel costs from the funds it receives for
programming, which does not provide the NGO with a continuous stream of income. NANE
has difficulties maintaining its regular programs, such as trainings, publications, public
43
Bács-Kiskun Megyei Cigány Érdekképviseleti Szervezeten belül "A Cigányság Foglalkoztatásáért" Közhasznú
Társaság
44
http://www.womenlobby.org
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BOZOKI
education, hot line for victims, because often grants are announced in different topics. NANE
is eligible for European Union funding; still its funding revenues are narrowing as many
grants require that part of the sum to be contributed by the organization in advance, which the
organization cannot afford at this point.
NANE’s officially stated objectives are identical to its official program declarations. That
state:
Since its establishment, the association operates a hotline for victims – women and
children – of domestic violence; its second objective is to disseminate information about
violence against women through leaflets, billboards and media campaign. NANE has also
initiated several reform proposals in the legislation targeting women and child abuse and
plays major role in the social debate of almost all policy documents targeting women (e.g.
2002 and 2007 CEDAW Shadow report45, 2003 Equal Opportunity Act46).
NANE is primarily dedicated to ending the human rights violations and the threat of
violence against women and children through advocacy, personal support services and public
education. NANE is based on the principles voiced in the international human rights and
women's rights treaties, such as the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW)47, the New York Convention for the Suppression
of the Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others48, the Beijing
Platform of Action49 and the 1993 UN General Assembly Resolution on the Declaration on
the Elimination of Violence Against Women.50 EWL is the main trans-European partner of
NANE.
NANE has 3 full-time and 1 part-time employees and some, who join them occasionally
for certain projects, such as editing a manual. NANE is a small organization, currently with
10-15 active volunteer members, thus it does not have any sub-committees, and neither does
it have any male members. Although its paid staff is very small and eventually seems to
overlap with lay-leadership, NANE is very active and maintains good connections with
former members even after their roads part. Herta Tóth, a former member of NANE for
example currently is the Secretary of the HWL, the first democratic umbrella organization
founded by women’s NGOs to promote gender issues in the European Union. It is important
to note that Judit Wirth had been previously the President of HWL.
According to the internal rules of the organization, association membership has to be
renewed yearly. It is not easy to become a member of NANE: one has to be determined
enough to take an 80 hours-long help-line training course that provides theoretical and
practical information necessary for hotline work, and 24 hours long practice on the hotline.
After the training those could become full members, who according to the written agreement
would answer calls at the hot line for at least a year regularly (at least once a month) or do at
least 4 hours a month volunteer work for the association. Members do not seem to have a
large involvement in the organization’s representation towards the larger public as their
45
NANE Association and the Habeas Corpus Working Group (HCWG). Shadow report of of the Women Against
Violence on the realization of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women in Hungary incorporated with the critical examination of the report of the Hungarian government
presented at the 2002 August session of the CEDAW Committee of the UN. August 4, 2002.
http://habeascorpus.hu/allaspont/report/cedaw.shadow.report.pdf
46
Act CXXV of 2003. on Equal Treatment and Promotion of Equal Opportunities.
http://www.egyenlobanasmod.hu/data/SZMM094B.pdf
47
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw
48
Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others
(Lake Success, New York, 21 March 1950) http://www.untreaty.un.org/english/treatyevent2003/Treaty_8.htm
49
IVth World Conference on Women, Beijing, 1995. www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/beijing/platform/
50 Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women. General Assembly resolution 48/104 of 20
December 1993. http://www.unhchr.ch/huridocda/ huridoca.nsf/(Symbol)/A.RES.48.104.En
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volunteer work requires anonymity towards the victims. NANE has undefined number of
inactive members who participate at their calls for action or protests occasionally. NANE also
has supporting members, who can be men as well.
NANE has a number of ‘partner organizations’ and actively encourages members to
participate in their joint projects, in which NANE usually plays a leadership role. Their
partners include Habeas Corpus Workgroup, Amnesty International Hungary, Center for
Reproductive Rights (CRR), among many others. Partnerships root back to as early as 1994
when the first help-line volunteers were trained by a training team of American and Croatian
volunteers. Recently the training course is held by NANE’s own trainers twice a year. NANE
encourages its members and employees to participate in other organizations’ activities,
especially its Hungarian networking partner, Hungarian Women’s Lobby (Nıi Érdek) and it’s
international networking partner, Women Against Violence Europe (WAVE) that they have
regular project and cooperation with as NANE is the national focal point for WAVE in
Hungary.
The EU’s Daphne grant had been a turning point for NANE in international partnerships.
It encourages NGOs to set up or reinforce European networks and helps them implement
innovative projects, both in which NANE excelled. NANE had been quite visible in politics,
especially a few years preceding Hungary’s European Union accession in 2004, when NANE
organized its most far-reaching campaign targeting the legislative and law-enforcement
bodies. This had been a key period, when political leadership was extremely keen on issuing
better legislation related to gender equality.
NANE has permanent involvement in several corporative political decision-making
bodies such as 3 committees within the Ministry of Social Affairs Labor including the
Women’s Council (Nıtanács), the Violence against Women Work Committee and the Gender
Equality Work Committee. NANE also has extended, direct involvement in advisory bodies in
the last three years: Judit Wirth served on the European Observatory on Violence Against
Women of EWL; she also serves on the advisory committee of Vital Voices Global
Leadership for Women; as well as the Amnesty International, Hungarian Committee on
VAW. NANE has always participated in violence against women-related issues at all possible
forums and had been successful in actively promoting itself.
The visibility of the organization has increased in 2002, when Judit Wirth received the
prestigious Order of Merit Knights Cross award of the Hungarian Republic. In 2008 Györgyi
Tóth has received the International Women Of Courage Award from April Foley, U.S.
Ambassador to Hungary in 200851. Visibility is helped by the fact that NANE leadership is
regularly elected in the HWL, the national level women’s umbrella organization as well into
leadership positions. Regarding current policy issues, NANE has been especially interested in
the implementation of the CEDAW Convention and its Optional Protocol in Hungary in light
of the VI. Hungarian National Government Report for the 39th CEDAW Session in 2007.
NANE had written Shadow Reports since 2000 and a shadow letter for the UN Human Rights
Committee in 2002. NANE claims that the government’s actions are scarce and ad hoc in
nature, measures taken are formal and only serve the purpose of facade.
Védegylet was founded in 2000, when the cyanide poisoning of the Tisza River by a
Romanian mining company caused a major outrage in Hungary. The organization is primarily
concerned with environmental issues, but since its founding the scope of its activities has
been increasing constantly – Védegylet is now active in social, economic, and political
affairs. One of the major goals of the organization to represent the interests of future
generations. It aims to secure livable cities for the generations to come, and preserve the
natural resources of the planet. The organization tries to support local communities in
51
http://hungary.usembassy.gov/foley_iwc.html
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preserving their natural as well as cultural heritage, and it fights for the right of local
communities to be informed and let their voice heard in issues that concern their everyday
living.52
Védegylet states its main activity is to represent the interests of future generations. It was
on Védegylet’s initiative that the institution of the Ombudsman of Future Generations was
created and is now part of the Hungarian institutional setup. This is a unique institution as
actual institutions specifically devoted to protecting the interests of future generations are
very rare. What is striking about the Hungarian version is the relatively wide extent of the
new ombudsman’s powers. For example, he is entitled to call upon private actors “to cease
any activities that unlawfully harm the environment.” He can issue recommendations to
public and private entities, whereupon the recipient has “to answer substantively in 30 days.”
He may also “initiate supervisory procedures regarding decisions of public administrative
bodies… initiate the suspension of execution, and may take part in court procedures.”53
Védegylet is very active in caring about the environmental standing of Budapest and its
surrounding and cooperates with a number of local governments to attain its goals. Védegylet
also makes public its opinion on a number of political issues, always claiming to represent a
view that is indispensible for sustainable development. The organization uses its regular
media appearance in order to attract public opinion on the need to protect the environment
and to promote sustainable development.54
Nevertheless, Védegylet admits openly that it aims to be more than the environmental
NGO it was founded. It does not only want to represent the interest of the next generations,
but it wants to inform public opinion, and convince decision makers to act on these issues.
Védegylet steps beyond eco-politics, it also raises issues related to international trade,
sustainable agriculture, or even healthcare as it wants to ensure that democracy does not exist
only on paper in Hungary. Védegylet believes that politics should not stop at the parties, but it
should be about the involvement of citizens, and it hopes that environmentally friendly
attitude and sustainability should be basic criteria of government action. The organization is
also an active publisher of ’green’ literature and regularly organizes seminars and conferences
on environmental issues.
Védegylet has been growing into a more and more influential NGO over the years. The
biggest success of the organization was when one of its founding members became the
present Hungarian President. The organization is often present in the media but also organizes
conferences, lecture or training series but street demonstrations as well. The organization is
led by an Organizational Committee joined by a Supervisory Board as well as an Advisory
Board. The organization only has very few employees, most of its members do work on a
voluntary basis. Important members that are the opinion leaders of the organization are: Zsolt
Boda, Viktor Vida, and András Takács-Sánta.
1.3 Hungarian Think-Tanks
Let us now turn our attention to our third category of societal actors that were subject to the
EUROSPHERE questionnaire, the Hungarian think tanks. The following pages will first
describe the general characteristics of the Hungarian research environment and present the
historical development of the Hungarian think tank sector. We shall conclude this section by
briefly presenting the selected organizations from this sector.
52
http://www.vedegyelte.hu
http://www.vedegylet.hu/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=926
54
http://www.vedegylet.hu/modules.php?name=Content&pa=showpage&pid=2
53
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1.3.1 Historical development of the Hungarian think tank sector
Despite the almost two decades that have passed since the 1989-1990 regime change and the
fairly stable democratic political system operating in Hungary, independent policy research
institutions, that is, think tanks are still only slightly more than marginal actors in the
processes of policymaking or agenda-setting. This does not mean think tanks are nonexistent: on the contrary, according to the Freedom House Directory of 1997, Hungary had
the most (twenty-two) think tanks in the region.55 Furthermore, there are several institutions
that gained a rather convincing reputation as reliable research institutions. Yet it is unclear to
what extent think tanks have an ability to shape or have an active role in the Hungarian and
the wider European public sphere.
The socialist past had a major impact on the development of research institutes in the
region as the hierarchical structure of the scientific institutions in the socialist era have
fundamentally determined the evolution of think tank-like institutions after democratization.56
The multilayered structure – that was almost identically reproduced in the Soviet block –
comprised institutions of the National Academies of Science and universities on the first
level, institutions serving the informational needs of particular ministries on the second, and
finally research bodies within the communist parties themselves. Two major (and related)
implications for the later evolution of think tanks have to be mentioned here. The different
levels contained varying degrees of intellectual freedom and political influence.57 While
party-bound institutions –“the nomenclatura ‘paradises’” – had the largest political influence,
there was no intellectual freedom here. With their theoretical research having the weakest
policy implication, on the other end of the scale, academic institutions and universities
enjoyed the greatest degree of intellectual freedom possible in the era. Of course, while a
similar scale could be found in all countries of the block, effective degrees of freedom varied
significantly. Importantly, alongside Poland, Hungary allowed the most academic freedom to
researchers of the highest level.58
Loosening control over the academic research institutions and the openness of the
political elite for economic reforms in Hungary made possible to conduct empirical research
projects reflecting on economic inequality and the operation of the second economy – topics
that were taboo in earlier periods and in other countries. As a result of the receptiveness of the
political elite for possible policy alternatives and the broadening space for academic research,
close relations developed between academic researchers and the decision-makers; two groups
of people who often had the same educational background to start with: younger politicians
(the “technocrats”) and academic researchers were both graduates of the Karl Marx
University of Economics.59
It was these factors that led to the wider involvement of the academic research
institutions in the policymaking process, and, importantly, allowed for the greatest degree of
continuity in the region between the communist and the post-communist eras of Hungarian
55
Jonathan D. Kimball, “From Dependency to the market: The Uncertain Future of Think Tanks in Central and
Eastern Europe”, in James J. McGann and R. Kent Weaver (eds), Think Tanks and Civil Societies: Catalysts for
Ideas and Action (New Brunswick and London: Transactions, 2000), p. 254.
56
Ivan Krastev, “The Liberal Estate: Reflections on the Politics of Think Tanks in Central and Eastern Europe”,
in James J. McGann and R. Kent Weaver (eds), Think Tanks and Civil Societies: Catalysts for Ideas and Action
(New Brunswick and London: Transactions, 2000), pp. 273-291; Mark Sandle, “Think Tanks, Post-communism
and Democracy in Russia and Central and Eastern Europe”, in Diane Stone and Andrew Denham (eds), Think
Tank Traditions: Policy Research and the Politics of Ideas (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004),
pp. 121–137; Raymond J. Struyk, Reconstructive Critics: Think Tanks in Post-Soviet Bloc Democracies
(Washington D. C.: The Urban Institute Press, 1998).
57
Krastev, “The Liberal Estate”, p. 280.
58
Sandle, “Think Tanks, Post-communism and Democracy”, p. 124.
59
Struyk, Reconstructive Critics.
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research institutes. Many of the current institutes emerged out of the Hungarian Academy of
Sciences or former ministries of the Hungarian government.60 One has to note the persistent
connections between the reformist elite and the academic community in the democratic
regime: “The fact that many of Hungary’s most influential reformers were part of [the]
previously state-run think tanks stifled the stigma associated with state actors that exists in
most other countries in the region.”61 In more concrete terms, the lack of stigmatization
manifested itself in the inherited institutional infrastructure of the Academy suffering vast
budget cuts after the regime change and the significant amount of government funding
received by the old-new think tanks, such as the Institute for World Economics.
1.3.2 Definitional problems
Definitions of think thanks are tailored for studying Western and especially US research
institutions and are difficult to apply to institutions in Central and Eastern Europe. The
definition of think tanks as “policy research organizations that: (1) are independent of
government and universities;62 and (2) operate on a nonprofit bases” is hardly applicable in
contexts other than the Anglo-American.63 In case of Hungary, as we have seen above, the
first point immediately seems inadequate because of the continuity between new think tanks
and former state research institutions or universities; and the remaining channels of
government funding (beyond the contracts mostly secured by the relations between
academics and the reformist/regime-changing elite) that are fundamental within this evolving
sector. With regards to the second point, Hungarian think tanks are not easy to classify as
operating on a nonprofit or not-for-profit basis. Only few of the best and brightest researchers
left the academic institutes because of the persistence of the state-funded academic
framework in Hungary. Those who did, however, joined for-profit organizations. “In fact,
most Hungarian think tanks not associated with government institutions have some form of
for-profit consulting activities.”64
Kimball explains this characteristic with three factors: on the one hand, the environment
in which Hungarian think tanks operate lacks the culture of philanthropy, that is, without
state-funds or foreign donations, research organizations are forced onto the market. (Authors
in general often mention philanthropic giving’s being undeveloped in this region as one of the
largest differences of the Central and Eastern European think tank sector from that of the
United States, where a sophisticated system of tax-exemptions and deductions foster citizens’
and business corporations’ willingness to donate to independent research institutes and other
civil society actors.)65 Furthermore, by the mid-90s, the Hungarian economy has reached a
level of progression where domestic business actors could make use of the skills and services
offered by economic think tanks but even more so did foreign investors, of which Hungary
attracted the most within the region.
60
Sandle, “Think Tanks, Post-communism and Democracy”, p. 134. See also Kimball, “From Dependency to the
Market”, p. 261: “Hungary’s think tanks emerged from within the former government’s political structures.
Professional and competent researchers have chosen, to a large extent, to engage in consulting activities or stay
in state-funded institutions”.
61
Kimball, “From Dependency to the Market”, p. 263.
62
Diane Stone and Mark Garnett, “Introduction: Think Tanks, Policy Advice and Governance”, in Diane Stone,
Andrew Denham, and Mark Garnett (eds), Think Tanks across Nations: A Comparative Approach, (Manchester:
Manchester University Press, 1998) pp. 1–20.
63
James G. McGann and R. Kent Weaver, “Think Tanks and Civil Societies in a Time of Change, in James J.
McGann and R. Kent Weaver (eds), Think Tanks and Civil Societies: Catalysts for Ideas and Action (New
Brunswick and London: Transactions, 2000), p. 4.
64
Kimball, “From Dependency to the Market”, p. 264.
65
See e.g. Struyk, Reconstructive Critics, pp. 41-42.
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On the other hand, one would be mistaken to overlook the development of the non-profit
sector that, naturally, affected the think tank scene as well. Besides the state-supported (quasi) academic institutes (e.g. Institute for World Economics) and those which operated based on
the market from their very foundation (e.g. GKI Economic Research Company), a third pole
aimed to remain independent from government while it also refrained from engaging in
market competition and took up the task of creating the sector of civil society organizations
itself.66 Therefore, István Stumpf’s case as simultaneously being the director of (the
nonprofit) Századvég Foundation and the chairman of the Nonprofit Information and
Education Center (NIOK) that is the prominent resource center for NGOs in the country, is
not exceptional.67
Interlinked with the proliferation of the NGO-sector in Hungary, the legal framework
regulating their operation also evolved. Beyond the 1987 modification of the Civil Code
creating the possibility to form foundations (already foreshadowing the democratic changes)
and the constitutional milestone of the 1989/II. Law that guaranteed the right of association,
in the nineteen-nineties several major steps of codification completed the regulation of the
nonprofit sector. The first one was the 1993 reform of the Civil Code that introduced three
new legal forms of not-for-profit organizations: pubic law foundations, public benefit
companies, and public law associations. This was followed by the 1996 legislation that
granted NGO’s the opportunity to receive one percent of the personal income tax on the bases
of the taxpayer’s declaration, and the 1997 Act on Public Benefit Organizations. This latter
act introduces a further legal form of nongovernmental organizations (public benefit
organizations) and endows them with tax preferences previously enjoyed only by
foundations.68 These benefits are tied to procedural and substantive requirements (e.g.
registration and the obligation to publish yearly reports) that have the advantage to – at least
in principle – guarantee the transparent operation of those organizations that register for
public benefit status. To sum up, the regulatory framework necessary for and supportive of
the NGO-sector in Hungary was in place by the second half of the nineties. Thus, at least in
the legal respect, there was no major obstacle preventing the blossom of an independent
nonprofit sector.
Nevertheless, while the previously mentioned laws aimed at promoting independent
status for the think tanks, the Act on Party Foundations, moved away Hungary from the
Anglo-American idea of independent think tanks, as this law guarantees a significant amount
of funding from the central budget to the parliamentary parties to form and sustain their own
research institutions.69 While this regulation has the advantage of somewhat institutionalizing
the previously rather unprivileged status of those working in the background of each party as
policy-experts, it has the disadvantage of positively discriminating the parties already in
parliament, so potentially freezing the present party constellation.70 However, as long as the
academic independence of the researcher is guaranteed within the framework, even this
66
Kimball, “From Dependency to the Market”
Kimball (Ibid, p. 253) mentions the Bulgarian Krassen Stanchev and Ivan Krastev who served in the advisory
committee of the Democracy Network Program while occupying key positions in the Institute for Market
Economics and the Institute for Liberal Strategies respectively.
68
Dániel Csanády, “Improving Civil Society in Hungary”. International Center for Not-for-profit Law Vol. 1,
No. 2 (1999), online at www.icnl.org/journal/vol1iss2/hungary.html.
69
A sum of approximately one billion forints (~4,000,000 EUR) allocated in proportion to the size of the parties’
parliamentary groups
70
For this and other seemingly problematic points several think tanks and NGOs (among them the Eötvös
Károly Institute to be discussed below) initiated the constitutional review of the law. Most of their arguments
were justified by the Constitutional Court in its April 29th 2008 resolution that judged unconstitutional the
provision according to which in order to be eligible for the party foundation funding, a party has to form a
parliamentary fraction in two consecutive periods. (Cf. in Hungarian the summary of the resolution at:
www.mkab.hu/content/hu/hirlevel/hl_96.pdf).
67
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imperfect development is benign, due to the insufficient funding of political science research
in Hungary.71
To return to the definitional problem, Hungarian think tanks seem to be able to achieve
scholarly independence72 even within such legally and financially dependent research
institutions as those funded by parliamentary parties.73 On the other hand, not even financial
independence can necessarily secure complete scholarly independence because often funding
(even Western funds) is allocated on condition of endorsing certain agendas. Based on all the
features of the Hungarian think tank sector, McGann and Weaver’s “middle course”
definition of think tanks can once again be reinforced.74 They warn that “autonomy is a
relative rather than an absolute term”, Hungarian think tanks can be said to conform to the
description “policy research organizations that have significant autonomy from government
and from societal interests such as firms, interest groups, and political parties”.75
With respect to categorization: Hungarian think tanks can possibly be sorted according to
the three types outlined by Struyk as universities without students (Institute for World
Economics), contract research organizations (Századvég Foundation, Political Capital
Institute), and advocacy think tanks (Eötvös Károly Institute).76 Considering nevertheless the
often blurry distinctions between the functions grounding these categories (as in case of the
Institute for World Economics and the Eötvös Károly Institute that could be defined both as
advocacy tanks and universities without students), we find Kimball’s bipolar scheme
distinguishing between those institutions formerly associated to an academic institute or a
university and those that represent a mixed form of advocacy think tanks and contract
research organizations more adequate for the Hungarian context.77
1.3.3 Think tank actors
Enumerating the most important features of the think tanks selected for the Eurosphere
research will show that while the think tank sector is not yet the most visible segment of the
Hungarian public sphere, there certainly are research institutions of every (flexibly
interpreted) type defined by the literature. Although the primary aspect of selection was to
represent all relevant types of think tanks, the final list of policy research organizations shows
a much more diverse picture when placed into the context of the Hungarian think tank sector.
Beyond featuring as an example of universities without students (or, alternatively, advocacy
think tanks), the Institute for World Economics is representative of the scene also because it
71
“Törvény a pártalapítványokról: Minden szentnek a keze” (Law on Party Foundations: Every Saint’s Hand”,
Magyar Narancs, June 26, 2003.
The party foundations are the following (in parentheses the name of the founding party and the amount of
funding received [million Ft] between the year of their foundation [2003] and 2008): Táncsis Mihály Foundation
(Hungarian Socialist Party – MSZP; 2545), Foundation for a Civic Hungary (Fidesz – Hungarian Civic Party;
2117), Szabó Miklós Foundation (Alliance of Free Democrats – SZDSZ; 544), Antall József Foundation
(Hungarian Democratic Forum – MDF; 532), Barankovics István Foundation (Christian Democratic Party –
KDNP; 388) (Source: Védegylet, http://www.vedegylet.hu/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=881).
72
Diane Stone, “Introduction: Think Tanks, Policy Advice and Governance”, in Diane Stone and Andrew
Denham (eds), Think Tank Traditions: Policy Research and the Politics of Ideas, (Manchester: Manchester
University Press, 2004) pp. 1–16.
73
“Törvény a pártalapítványokról: Minden szentnek a keze” (Law on Party Foundations: Every Saint’s Hand”,
Magyar Narancs, June 26, 2003.
74
James G. McGann and R. Kent Weaver, “Think Tanks and Civil Societies in a Time of Change”, p.5.
75
This is also the approach of the editor of Freedom House’s Think Tanks in Central Europe and Eurasia: A
Selective Directory (Roland Kovats, “Think Tanks: A Cornerstone of Democracy”, in Roland Kováts (ed), Think
Tanks in Central Europe and Eurasia: A Selective Directory, (Budapest: Freedom House Europe, 2006) pp. 1–
13).
76
Struyk, Reconstructive Critics.
77
Kimball, “From Dependency to the Market”, pp. 255-256.
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functions as a research institute of the National Academy of Sciences – a type that, proving
the continuity between socialist and post-socialist think tanks, is crucial for understanding the
development of the Hungarian think tank sector. Századvég Foundation can be thought of as
the exact opposite – even if its leader’s good relations with the reformist political elite were
essential in the initial years of the foundation – it rather represents the type of independent
institutions that later became active in shaping the evolution of the nonprofit sector itself.
Political Capital Institute, the most prominent contract research organization of the country
represents the kind of for-profit think tank whose primary activity is consultancy for
economic actors – although occasionally it functions as an advocacy think tank promoting
basic rights and public debate on the issue of gender diversity. Finally, the Eötvös Károly
Institute, beyond gaining a very good reputation as an independent and reliable think tank in a
relatively short period, is representative of the region and the era as a think tank founded by
the Soros Foundation – a major actor of post-communist Hungarian civil society.78
1.4 Hungarian Media
1.4.1 Hungarian Media Market
Structure of the broadcast media market
Hungarian media can be characterized by the dominance of commercial broadcasters,
increasing influence of tabloid papers coupled with a weakening presence of political media,
a strong position of foreign capital in the overall ownership structure, a very weak public
media sector and a journalist community deeply divided along political lines.79 Television is
by far the most important media type in Hungary as the main information source is television:
80% of all media consumers in Hungary follow events of the world through broadcast media.
In this respect, any other kind of media can be considered quite insignificant as compared to
television, since radio was the most important information source only for 8% of the people,
while print media for even less, 4%.80 Yet, it should be added that differences in media
consumption patterns are present: some specific age and social groups gather information
from different sources than the majority of the population. For instance, internet is an
important source for teenagers, people in their thirties, and for those with relatively high
income and good educational background. At the same time, the age group between 50-60,
and those in support of the government are the most prone to follow events from television.
Commercial media dominate the television scene through two commercial channels, RTL
Klub and TV2 that have the biggest influence on informing the public. These provide the most
popular news programs, RTL Klub with the highest rating (43%), followed by TV2 (27%)
while the evening news show of the public channel MTV1 had an 18% rating. The two
commercial channels also dominate the advertising market.81 The themes presented by the
78
Soros Foundation was an important aid of the democratization from the 1980’s on. With the aim of creating an
‘open society’ it supported the democratic opposition through funding its media, providing scholarships, and
other means, thus it significantly contributed to the development of civil society in Hungary. After the regime
change it continued its activities with funding Roma programs and all sorts of cultural and societal projects.
From 2004 on, according to the intention of George Soros, the Foundation gradually decreased its activities, and
ultimately stopped its operation in Hungary in 2007. (C.f.: http://www.soros.org/about/foundations/hungary.)
79
Gálik, Mihály, “A médiatulajdon hatása a média függetlenségére és pluralizmusára Magyarországon,” (The
influence of media ownership on the independence and pluralism of the media in Hungary), Médiakutató, 2004
ısz, 1, www.mediakutato.hu.
80 “A médiafogyasztás jellemzıi és a hírmősorok általános megítélése Magyarországon (January 2007),”
(Characteristics of media consumption and general opinion about news programs in Hungary), National Radio
and Television Commission’s official website, www.ortt.hu, 9-10.
81
Data from AGB Nielsen Media Research, http://cs.agbnmr.com/Uploads/Hungary/stat_shr_negyedeves.pdf.
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television news programs during the research period focused mostly on the health care
system, problems of Hungarian political parties, inflation and the general economic situation.
This selection of issues overall matched the interest of the public, with the slight distinction
that teenagers were most interested in political parties, the Roma minority and
unemployment, while people above 50 years cared most about inflation, economic issues and
the health care system. Topics related to the EU featured relatively low in broadcast media,
they represented only 13% of the overall program stock, which still surpassed the level of
viewers’ interest in this issue. Themes concerning the Roma minority were even less present
on television, contributed to a mere 7% of the program structure. Other potential topics
related to diversity were not measurable, which means that their representation was very
marginal.82
Structure of the print media market
Similar trends to that of the broadcast media have characterized the print media scene.
Political newspapers have been gradually loosing ground while tabloid papers have increased
their popularity in Hungary. A partnership between the tabloid press and the two biggest
commercial television channels bolstered this tendency.83 Regional political newspapers and
tabloid print media broadsheets are the most popular in Hungary, thus these are the most
significant information sources within the print media market. The market of nationwide
political dailies is constrained to four outlets, out of which only two – the leftist/liberal
Népszabadság and the conservative Magyar Nemzet – have a considerable readership, while
the other two, Magyar Hírlap and Népszava are hardly surviving.84 The three most significant
dailies are Metro, Blikk and Népszabadság according to their circulation numbers. Although
Metro has the highest distribution, it is a free newspaper, therefore Blikk, a tabloid daily, can
be considered the single most popular paid newspaper in Hungary, with a circulation number
over 230 000. Népszabadság is the biggest political newspaper with around 116 000 issues
sold daily, which also means that 60% of all subscribers to political dailies choose
Népszabadság.85
Regional papers have a very strong position in Hungary.86 Some regional newspapers
such as Kisalföld, have a bigger readership in their own county than the second biggest
national political daily Magyar Nemzet in the whole country.87 The regional dailies market is
highly concentrated as major county dailies enjoy basically a monopoly position in all but one
of Hungary’s 19 counties. Moreover, their ownership structure is also concentrated, as they
are owned by four foreign companies: German Axel Springer, WAZ, Bertelsman and British
Associated Newspaper.88
When it comes to print media consumption among the population above 14 years of age,
25% read local/regional newspapers on a daily bases, and an additional 17% more times a
week. The level of consumption of tabloid newspapers is even higher than that of
regional/local papers, around 65% of the surveyed population reads Blikk at a varying
regularity although 30% only once a week. The audience of other papers representing the
tabloid press, such as Metro or Színes Bulvár Lap is also larger than that of political dailies.
The two most significant countrywide political newspapers attract only a minor share of the
readers of newspapers, Népszabadság 5%, while Magyar Nemzet only 3%. People generally
82
“A médiafogyasztás jellemzıi és a hírmősorok általános megítélése Magyarországon”, 8-9.
Gálik, Mihály, “A médiatulajdon hatása a média függetlenségére és pluralizmusára Magyarországon,” 8.
84
Bajomi-Lázár, Péter, “Freedom of Media in Hungary, 1990-2002,” PhD thesis, Political Science Department
at the Central European University, Budapest, June 2003, 135-36.
85
http://www.nol.hu/cikk/93/.
86
Ibid, 9.
87
Urbán, Ágnes, “Rádió és Televízió,” 127, Bajomi-Lázár, Péter, Magyar Médiatörténet a késı Kádár-kortól az
ezredfordulóig, Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest, 2005.
88
Bajomi-Lázár, Péter, “Freedom of Media in Hungary, 1990-2002,” 137.
83
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prefer local/regional papers to national ones, and regional weeklies are also more popular
than their national counterparts. National weeklies attract a very small share of the print
media market audience since more than 80% of the population above 14 years does not read
them at all.
Hungarian media trapped by politics
Due to the weak advertising market and poor performance of the Hungarian economy, quality
newspapers could not sustain themselves solely from sales and advertising and often had to
rely on direct of indirect state subsidies. This automatically made them politically vulnerable,
as they had to show loyalty towards their supporters which prevented the true diversity of
views to be represented in the daily press. The weak institutional system of media regulation
in Hungary greatly reduced media freedom and facilitated ways of political pressure on the
media.89 The set up of ORTT, the National Radio and Television Commission in 1996 was
too late and its regulatory mechanisms to guarantee editorial and financial autonomy were
inadequate. In addition, in the absence of a regulated press subsidies scheme, daily press
became financially dependent on the parties through informal and formal means. Thus, the
belated establishment of media regulatory institutions and their weak design allowed political
parties to exert serious political pressure on both print and broadcast media in Hungary ever
since the end of communism.90
Control over the electronic media became one of the main battlefields of politicians after
transition in Hungary. For this reason, the literature talks about media wars, which began in
1990 and lasted for more than a decade, until 2002.91 According to the conservative critique
of Hungarian media, at the beginning of transition leftist/liberal groups came to dominate
dailies. As a response, right wing governments repeatedly tried to intervene into the print
media market through financially supporting conservative outlets, such as the political daily
Magyar Nemzet and the weekly Heti Válasz.92 In fact, right after transition the first
conservative government faced a mostly liberal journalist community, which did not want to
give up its professional autonomy.93 This prompted the first media war launched by the
conservative government of Antall-Boross (1990-1994) by its attempt to replace the
leadership of the Hungarian state television and radio. The subsequent socialist government
of Gyula Horn (1994-1998) took revenge and restructured the broadcast and print media
market. The second media war happened under Viktor Orbán’s right wing government (19982002) characterized by a conservative backlash on the media scene triggered by the
government. Although the 2002 elections brought back a socialist government, the media war
did not continue, probably because it became somewhat overshadowed by the “hysteric”
election campaign of 2002. It can also be mentioned that by this time new commercial
channels appeared on the scene representing leftist and right-wing political camps such as
ATV and Hír Tv respectively, somewhat easing the political pressure on public television.94
Owing to frequent political interferences, electronic public media, Hungarian Television
and Radio had had a strong pro-government bias during the entire period, even if with a
varying intensity. Although in 2002 the media wars came to an end, the practice of exerting
political pressure on the media did not disappear but remained an important media policy
tool. The various governments exerted their political influence through interfering into the
media ownership structure, through the distribution of media resources and through the
89
91
Monori, Áron, “Médiaháborúk,” 259., Bajomi-Lázár, Péter, Magyar Médiatörténet a késı Kádár-kortól az
ezredfordulóig, Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest, 2005.
92
Médiaszabályozás, 426.
93
Monori, Áron, “Médiaháborúk,” 261.
94
90
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BOZOKI
removal and nomination of chief editors and managers, thereby seriously infringing upon
media freedom.95
Conflicts around the media reflect deeper social/political/ideological divides within
Hungarian society splitting the population along urban-rural, liberal-conservative, nationalistcosmopolitan lines. Thus, the media wars were manifestations of these deeper ideological
divisions and represented cultural wars between these two conflicting value systems.96
1.4.2 Media Actors
Let us now turn to our selected media actors and briefly present their characteristics.
MTV1
Hungarian Television is a national public-service television, which was established pursuant
to the Hungarian Parliament Act I of 1996 on radio and television broadcasting. The slogan of
the channel says “Bringing you quality”, thus the channel positions itself as a broadcaster of
high cultural and public content. Previous research demonstrates that since 1990 Hungarian
public television has been characterized by a pro-government bias, even if to varying degrees
during different periods depending on the kind of government in office.97 In light of the
previous studies, a more recent research covering the news content of April in 2007 came to a
surprising conclusion, according to which the evening news program of the public television
was mostly politically neutral, and only a minor portion of its programs showed the
government in a favorable light.98 Another study showed similar results demonstrating that
our broadcast actors (HírTV and MTV) were more critical towards the government than not,
and both had a more negative attitude towards the government than towards the opposition.
HírTV was the most critical; MTV could be regarded as moderately critical.99
MTV1 has a 31% overall rating with a daily ratio varying between 1.5 and 2 million
viewers. For the sake of comparison, TV2’s daily rating is somewhat below 2.5 million, while
RTL Klub’s fluctuates between 2.2 and 2.7 million viewers.100 MTV1 evening news program
have a 17.4% rating meaning around 570,000 viewers.101
According to its profile, MTV1’s evening news program has a strong public-political
orientation represented by around 60% of its news content, 30% covering domestic and
foreign political events and 30% dealing with protests, demonstrations, economic issues, and
news pieces about armed conflicts in the world. The remaining part focuses on more popular
subjects, such as crime stories, accidents and other curiosities. The share of foreign policy
95
Bajomi-Lázár, Péter, 95-104.
97
Terestyéni, Tamás ([1994] 1998) Manipuláció az érzelmekkel és az értékekkel, In: Argejó, Éva (ed.) Jelentések
könyve, Budapest: Új Mandátum.; Beck, László ([1996] 1998), Három március hírei a képernyın, In: Argejó,
Éva (ed.) Jelentések könyve; Gayer, Zoltán & Molnár, Péter (1996), A „kormánypártiság” és az „ellenzékiség”
arányai, Magyar Nemzet, 2 October.; Mádl, András & Szabó, Dávid (1999b), “A kormányok mennek, a média
marad”, Jel-Kép, no. 1.; Mádl, András & Szabó, Dávid (2000), “A hírmősorok tájékoztatási gyakorlata 1999ben”, Jel-Kép, no. 1.; Nyilas, György (2000), “Összehasonlító elemzés az MTV1 és a tv2 esti, fımősoridıs
híradóiról”, Jel-Kép, no. 4.; Plauschin, András (2004), “A politikai hírmősorok tájékoztatási gyakorlata 2003ban”, Jel-Kép, no. 1.; ORTT (2006), Beszámoló az Országos Rádió és Televízió Testület 2005. évi
tevékenységérıl, Budapest: ORTT; ORTT (2007), Beszámoló az Országos Rádió és Televízió Testület 2006. évi
tevékenységérıl, Budapest: ORTT.
98
Terestyéni, Tamás, “Televíziós híradómősorok összehasonlító vizsgálata,” Médiakutató, 2007 tél; BajomiLázár, Péter és Monori, Áron, “Esti fımősoridıs híradók a magyarországi televíziókban,” Médiakutató, 2007.
ısz.
99
Terestyéni, Tamás, “Televíziós híradómősorok összehasonlító vizsgálata,” Médiakutató, 2007 tél, 12.
100
These statistics were measured among the age group between 18-59. Source: AGB Nielsen Médiakutató Ltd.,
22-28. 05. 2006., http://english.mtv-sales.hu/repository/files/23146.__2006%2021%20hét-eng.pdf.
101
Data from in the last week of June 2008. Source: the website of MTV,
http://www.hirado.hu/download/brand/nezettseg_2008_26.xls.
96
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events is rather low in its coverage, making up only a quarter of the program. Yet, share of
reports on foreign location was still the highest in MTV1’s evening news program, as
compared to that of RTL Klub and TV2.102 MTV1 news has permanently based journalists in
five foreign locations, in New York, Brussels, Vienna, Basel and Rijeka.103 Compared to
news programs of other channels, MTV1 presents news about conflicts the least, including
armed violence and wars of the world and domestic political fights. It distinguishes itself
from other news programs with its special attention to business and economic topics, and to
cultural themes and events.
HírTV
This private channel was founded at the end of 2002. The channel can be seen as a response
of the right wing political elite to keep its voice represented, after the conservative
government lost the elections and thus its influence over electronic public media.104 Since the
president of HírTV is at the same time the chief editor of Magyar Nemzet, the editorial profile
and preferences of HírTV are very similar to that of Magyar Nemzet. According to data from
2006, 1.55-1.8 million people watch the channel daily, and three million switch it on at least
once a week, meaning the channel has on average a 9.6% market share (SHR%).105
HírTV tries to cultivate the image of objective reporting. According to the channel’s
website, their programs are followed by people with all kinds of political orientation, yet,
clearly they communicate a right wing perspective on issues and events.106 The channel has
been “extremely”107 critical of the incumbent (socialist) government, showing detailed
coverage about domestic issues that cause a lot of tensions in society (the health care reform,
public education, etc.). According to analysts, the channel’s criticism of the government
shows negative bias and exhibits populist tendencies. Hír TV was the only television that
covered live the attack on the public television’s headquarters in October 2006, which was
then borrowed by other Hungarian and foreign television channels, such as CNN, BBC and
others. However, the tone of the commentary during the broadcast caused a lot of controversy
since the reporter sympathized with the violent mob.108 HírTV journalists were banned from
the national television building and the liberal party, SZDSZ, announced that its politicians
would not give interviews to HírTV in the future.109
In addition, HírTV’s evening news program has been very much preoccupied with the
presentation of conflict, mostly of domestic political nature, but it has been also more
interested in international conflicts than other channels.110 Compared to other evening news
shows, the channel’s news program has a relatively high public-political content as 70% of
the news pieces focus on foreign conflicts, wars, domestic demonstrations and protests. It has
a higher coverage of foreign policy events (30%) than the other channels, whereas it focuses
less on crimes, natural disasters and curiosities. This program is the least prone to yellow
journalism. 111
Print media scene
102
Based on a research of Századvég Alapítvány, Mértékadóak az M1 júniusi hírmősorai, June 2007,
http://www.szazadveg.hu/kutatas/alap.php?id=1046.
103
“MTV: Kezdıdnek a horvátországi tudósítások,” 13. 06. 2008, www.orientpress.hu.
104
105
Data from AGB Nielsen Mediaresearch Company, “AGB: kiemelkedı nézettség a hírTV-n,” www.hirtv.hu.,
27. 09. 2006.
106
www.hirtv.hu.
107
The author of the cited study characterized the program as such.
108
“Vizsgálják az ostrom tévés közvetítését,” Origo.hu, 20. 09. 2006.
109
“Rudi Zoltán a HírTV stábjának: szégyelljétek magatokat,” Népszabadság, 19. 09. 2006.
110
Terestyéni Tamás “Televíziós híradómősorok összehasonlító vizsgálata,” Médiakutató, 2007 tél, 8.
111
Terestyéni, Tamás, “Televíziós híradómősorok összehasonlító vizsgálata,” Médiakutató, 2007 tél, 5.
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As we noted, the political dailies market is basically dominated by two newspapers,
Népszabadság and Magyar Nemzet. Népszabadság is center-left leaning, having a socialist
political orientation;112 (according to some it should be rather characterized as left/liberal113).
It is more than twice as popular as the conservative Magyar Nemzet, which is the biggest
circulation conservative newspaper with 60,000 daily sales. Although according to its style,
Magyar Nemzet is more radical in a political sense than Népszabadság, it can be still placed
in the political center if it is compared to some other right-wing newspapers, such as Magyar
Fórum or Demokrata (although the latter are weeklies).114 Besides Népszabadság and
Magyar Nemzet, there are two more national political dailies published in Hungary, Népszava
and Magyar Hírlap. It should be stressed, however, that the latter two papers can be
considered as less significant due to their law circulation numbers. Whereas Népszabadság
sold 116,000 issues a day in 2007 on average, Népszava a central left newspaper only 23,000,
while Magyar Hírlap, a right wing daily, even less. Blikk is the most popular newspaper in
Hungary. It sells more issues than Népszabadság and Magyar Nemzet together. Blikk is
apolitical as a tabloid media outlet. Bors is the second biggest tabloid news paper, although
its circulation number is only a fourth of that of Blikk (77,000). In appearance it closely
resembles Blikk, and, similarly to Blikk, it does not have any political or ideological leaning.
Magyar Nemzet calls itself the “civic daily” on its front page, which is a hint at the
newspaper’s conservative profile and an indication of its common political ground with
FIDESZ, the biggest right wing opposition party. FIDESZ monopolized the term “civic” as it
frequently stresses “civic values” and even has the term “civic” in its name (FIDESZ
Hungarian Civic Party).115 The newpaper’s name Magyar Nemzet means Hungarian Nation.
Magyar Nemzet’s main target audience is middle aged, conservative, middle class people,
mostly from Budapest and the surrounding area.116 It has strong ties with the right wing
private broadcaster Hír TV, since the owner and chief editor of the newspaper and the director
of the TV broadcaster is the same person, Gábor Liszkay.117 It also cooperates with Duna
Television and Lánchíd Radio.
The newspaper tends to take a highly confrontative attitude towards the current socialist
government. Although its critical stance could be regarded as a positive value in a democratic
society, its credibility is often undermined by its approach, characterized by its inclination to
assume a conspiracy behind each and every political step and social-economic phenomenon
somehow associated with the left-liberal political side.118 The newspaper laments the
demographic and moral decline of the nation, promotes religious values, the preservation of
historic and traditional Hungarian culture, and shows great sensitivity towards Hungarian
farmers. Based on a general overview of the content of the newspaper, Magyar Nemzet has a
strong anti-communist attitude, which manifests in articles recalling and condemning the
communist times. At the same time, it presents the pre-WWII Horthy era (that lead Hungary
into alliance with the Nazis) with sympathy. It has an opposing stand to cultural and
economic globalization, generally condemns US-Israeli military activities, and supports
Palestinian self-determination. The newspaper is also accused of latent anti-Semitism due to
its general criticism of Israel.
112
Gálik, Mihály, “A médiatulajdon hatása a média függetlenségére és pluralizmusára Magyarországon,”
Médiakutató, 2004 ısz, 7.
113
Bajomi Lázár, Péter, “Press Freedom in Hungary, 1998-2002,” 86., Sükösd, Miklós and Bajomi Lázár, Péter
(ed.), Reinventing Media, CEU Press 2003.
114
Circulation numbers in this section were gathered from the website of MATESZ, covering the first quarter of
2008. www.matesz.hu.
115
Website of Magyar Nemzet, www.mno.hu.
116
http://www.mno.hu/portal/forum.
117
Juhász, Gábor, “Nyomtatott Sajtó,” 130.
118
Ligeti, György, “Kisebbségek és bevándorlók a médiában,” Médiakutató, 2007 ısz, 6.
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Népszabadság, the second daily in our sample, is leftist-liberal in its value-orientation,
and is committed to the nation as a cultural community, as its chief editor described the
newspaper.119 The newspaper is proud of its objective, critical, up to date and open-minded
way of informing the public. It claims to be politically independent and guided by the
principles of media freedom. Its self-proclaimed aim is to provide credible information,
balanced opinions, and to represent free market values and social justice at the same time.
The newspaper also states on its website that the promotion of Hungarian culture and identity
belongs to its mission.120 Although in principle it targets the general public, it still represents
the voice of the left-liberal political group. It should be also noted that the Free Press
Foundation affiliated with the Hungarian Socialist Party is a minority owner of the
newspaper, which raises questions about the newspaper’s political independence and its
ability to stay without any political bias.
Blikk, the third newspaper in our selection, is a market leader not only in the tabloid press
but also on the Hungarian dailies’ market. As a tabloid newspaper its main profile is
entertainment, thus it focuses mostly on celebrities, scandals, tragedies, curiosities and sports.
Its best sales results can be associated with certain events that attracted a lot of attention in
Hungary, such as the death of Jimmy Zambo, a Hungarian pop singer in 2001, and the launch
of reality shows in 2002, which Blikk followed closely. Visual elements dominate the layout
of the newspaper: big colored photos and info graphics; Blikk was the first daily to publish
naked women on its front page. Its rather brief and superficial political news coverage is
without any political bias. Blikk aspires to be politically neutral as was revealed from the
interviews.121
1.4.3 Important Events
Last but not least, let us briefly present in this very last section of the first part of the country
report a few important events that took place during data gathering that might have an impact
on the responses that we received on our structured interview questionnaires. There are three
events that we think should be noted: the idea of linking social subsidies to public work that
became popular at this time, the gay parade that always heats up controversy, and the
unfortunate events that resulted in the killing of several Roma people. Let us now elaborate
these.
Subsidy for work
In May 2008 the mayor of a village in Borsod county entered the national media with his
suggestion of linking social subsidies to public work. According to his plan, only those
should be entitled to social subsidies who carry out public work at least ten days per month.
Soon after the first statements the local government voted for this regulation even though they
were aware of the fact that it is contradictory with laws regulating the system of social
subsidizing. As the mayor said, the discrepancy is justified (and should eventually lead to the
119
Interview with Vörös T., Károly, chief editor by Hudecz, Bálint and Erdélyi, Flóra 2 November 2007.
www.nol.hu.
121
Interview with Blikk1. Personal interviews were conducted with the representatives of the selected actors in
the period between September 2008 and July 2009, using a structured questionnaire. For the questionnaire please
see the appendix. Seven interviews were conducted with MSZP and six each with FIDESZ and MKMP, three
with each of the media actors and selected think tanks. In order to protect the privacy of the interviewees, all
respondents’ names are replaced by codes that stand for their affiliation. Thus MSZP respondents are coded
MSZP1, MSZP2, MSZP3, … and the same applies for FIDESZi and MKMPi, where i stands for the respondent
index. NGO actors are coded MCFi for Magyarországi Cigányszervezetek Fóruma, NANEi for Nık a Nıkért
Együtt az Erıszak Ellen, and VEDi for Védegylet. Media actors are coded as NSZi for Népszabadság, MNi
Magyar Nemzet, Blikki for Blikk respondents. Think tanks are coded as follows: Political Capital is PCi,
Századvég Foundation is Szvi, Eötvös Károly Institute is EKIi, and the Institute for World Economics as VKIi
120
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BOZOKI
transformation of national norms) because: “the patience of the village reached its limit”.122 It
did not take long until several other villages decided to apply the “Monok model” that, quite
evidently, was implicitly an anti-Roma measure as the arguments in favor of it
demonstrate.123 This is exactly the grounds on which Ernı Kállay, the Ombudsman for Ethnic
and National Minorities opposed the initiative.124
Interestingly, governing party MSZP did not seem to completely oppose the plans of the
villages, although it did express its concern in terms of its constitutionality. What is more,
MSZP set out to restructure and aggravate the legal framework of social aids.125 According to
some, it was actually prime minister Gyurcsány who could have inspired the wave of
measures with his program speech “Path to Labor”.126 Since then, the initiative developed
into a system of the “social card” wherein those entitled receive the sixty percent of social
subsidies on a debit card that they are able to use only at specific stores, so that they do not
“misuse” aid. An interesting piece of additional information could be that it was the same
mayor of Monok who suggested amending criminal law so that it protects private property
more firmly. This initiative was a reaction to the court case of the elderly man who led high
voltage electricity into his fence to prevent thieves stealing the vegetable he grows, resulting
in the death of one and the injury of two other Roma men climbing into the garden.
Gay parade
In June 2008 Gay Pride Day was organized in Budapest in the form of a parade which took
place on one of the boulevards in the center of the city. The parade was attacked by counterdemonstrators composed of radical right wing groups. Despite the relatively strong police
presence – according to some, there was as many police as pride participant, the parade could
not be properly protected. Extreme right wing protestors began throwing eggs at the parade,
burnt cars, and beat up some people among them two politicians who participated at the
event. At the end, the police had to rescue the participants through the metro and sealing the
square which was the final station of the parade. Reactions to the events were much divided.
While the left wing and the tabloid media condemned those that attacked the parade, the right
wing media suggested that the participants provoked the attacks by their indecent behavior.127
Serial killing of Roma
Over a year, starting on August 8th, 2008, four deadly attacks were carried out by an
allegedly extreme racist group in small villages all over the country.128 The attacks demanded
altogether six lives, on one occasion of a 5 year-old child. While all different scenarios and
interpretations took shape in the public discourse – even including full-fledged conspiracy
theories in extreme rightwing media129 – the anti-Roma motivation of the killings seemed to
be the most probable from quite early on. After capturing three of the alleged perpetrators,
this assumption was justified. The whole series of events could be read as a turning-point in
the history of post-regime change Hungarian racism, as homicide motivated by racist or
xenophobic sentiments was almost unimaginable before last August or the point from which
on this case began to be viewed as anti-Roma violence. Occupying a primary position in the
122
http://www.hirszerzo.hu/cikk.szigoru_szabalyok_csak_az_kaphat_segelyt_aki.66970.html
http://beszelo.c3.hu/cikkek/segelyt-csak-munkaert and http://beszelo.c3.hu/cikkek/a-szerencsi-kistersegtizennyolc-onkormanyzatanak-nyilatkozata
124
See coding sheets for items nr. 39 and 62.
125
http://www.hirszerzo.hu/cikk.segelyt_csak_munkaert_-_osszel_indulhat_a_monoki_modell.68474.html
126
http://beszelo.c3.hu/cikkek/milyen-ut-a-munkahoz and http://beszelo.c3.hu/cikkek/segelyt-csak-munkaert
127
“Melegfelvonulás
könnygázzal
események
percrıl-percre”,
05-07-2008,
http://www.origo.hu/itthon/20080705-budapest-indul-a-meleg-meltosag-menete-es-az-ellentuntetesek.html.
128
http://www.hvg.hu/print/20090809_romak_elleni_tamadasok_kriminologus.aspx
129
http://www.hirszerzo.hu/cikk.jobbik_demonstracio_az_eroszak_ellen.124603.html
123
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public discourse for months, it had the effect of directing attention to wider aspects of the
situation of the Roma within the Hungarian society.
2 VIEWS ON DIVERSITY
Let us now continue by presenting the views of our different actors on diversity and the EU
Polity. We shall first discuss general views on diversity as expressed by political parties,
NGOs, think tanks and media actors. Next, we will present views on the EU Polity, more
specifically what actors think, who should have competence of different policy areas such as
citizenship, migration, minority rights, political rights, etc. or how actors thinks of EU
enlargement and its effects on domestic society.
2.1 Political Parties’ General Views on Diversity
In trying to define which groups are relevant today for defining a diverse society, the party
program and all MSZP politicians indentify as most important ethno-national belonging,
especially the Roma; religious groups, gender groups, disability groups, and sexuality groups.
This is justified by their belief that ethnicity is the most important identifier for the individual.
It is also assumed that in questions of diversity the role of politics is one of equalizing, and
politics cannot be prejudiced. Socialists strongly believe that the state should not interfere in
issues of religion. Yet, while the claim is made that the state should not differentiate among
the claims of different groups, most would give priority to treating ethno-national groups
preferentially. This can be attributed to the historical legacy of Hungary since the country
always tried to provide a best example for the treatment of minorities to its neighbors who
host considerable Hungarian diasporas. For societal diversity, MSZP claims gender is
important, and more protection for women should be available to ensure gender equality, and
in general party politicians agree that Hungarian society should redress its views regarding
disability and sexuality groups.
The party’s view of diversity can be summed up as one that sees diversity as a value for
society. This Romantic conception of diversity centers on the belief that different cultures and
traditions enrich the society. Yet, most socialist interviewees agreed that times of crisis can
bring a radicalization of society against minority groups that could threaten social cohesion.
The general attitude is that everybody has the right to be different and all people have the
right to organize according to their interests/identification, and the state should respect this
choice. The party argues that the constitution can guarantee diversity as long as equality
before the law and some collective rights for minorities is assured. Having a pro-minority
standing, MSZP also underlines the need for the acceptance of democratic rules of the game
by all minority groups so that basic human rights are guaranteed for all members of groups.
MSZP has a pro diversity stance, as it argues that there are no cultural aspects of Hungarian
life other than the legal framework different communities should adapt to, and the party
supports that institutions of ethno-national groups should be subsidized by the state.130 Some
even go as far as to grant exemption rights to minorities. Yet again, while the party program
does not differentiate among traditional and new minorities, some party members agreed that
historical minorities can be positively discriminated as compared to new minorities.
When it comes to political rights for ethno-national groups, MSZP would favor all ethnonational groups to be allowed to have their own collective interest associations. The party
supports these groups to be allowed to have their own local, regional parliaments if they are
concentrated territorially, and would support some resolution to parliamentary representation
of minorities as Hungary has not yet formulated these laws due for the past 20 years.
Notwithstanding this supportive attitude towards political rights of ethno-national groups,
130
Interview with MSZP4
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MSZP is opposed to minority groups forming their own political parties, and would favor
minority representation to take form within the already existing party lines. As one
respondent noted, there are already minority representatives sitting in parliament, but these do
not act according to the interest of their respective group but vote instead according to the
party line they are associated with.131
MSZP is also claiming that while public institutions should be adapted to meet the
requirements of ethno-national minorities, this institutional adaptation is not such a problem
that it would require immediate change.132 The perceived need for change amounts to nothing
more than native language usage should be ensured on a wider scale, as well as the cultural
survival of the groups guaranteed by supporting educational and cultural institutions, or, as a
few respondents noted, the need to make institutions more accessible to disability groups.133
The party claims the minority representation system in local governments is already in line
with most generous minority accommodation frameworks in the world, and the Hungarian
ombudsman system is also adequate for protecting additional rights of minorities.134
The MSZP respondents claimed their views on diversity are largely in line with those of
mainstream society, though they agreed that extremists are present in society, and lately it
seems that there is a radicalization of society. It was also pointed out that survey data showed
that most Hungarians expressed prejudice when asked about their opinion regarding a nonexistent, imaginary ethnic group, which is a major problem that needs to be tackled by more
pro-diversity education.135
The FIDESZ program concentrates on ethno-national groups as significant members of
Hungarian society. Respondents from the party also enlisted religious groups, gender groups,
generational groups, sexuality groups, and disability groups when asked what diversity meant
for them. Some even argued that all people are different and this is the source of diversity.136
Nevertheless there was little agreement as to whether the state should give priority to claims
of some groups over others, some respondents claimed that ethno-national groups deserved
special attention because of the importance of ethnic belonging,137 while others argued that no
priority should be given to any group, but the state should rather think of individual
citizens.138 Yet others claimed it is not the groups, but the social standing of the members of
these different groups that would warrant special state attention.139 Issues such as the Roma
and gender equality or the conditions of the poor need urgent attention.
While the party program declares that diversity is invaluable for Hungarian society,
actual responses from the party members varied in how they see diversity. Many agreed that
diversity can be seen as both as a value in itself and something bad if diversity does not go
hand in hand with integration as this can threaten public life and stability of the country.
Others claimed that diversity is a fact of life, everybody has to relate to it, and it is important
to solve differences between the different groups.140 Some supported a more Romantic ideal
that diversity is a value as people can learn from each other cultures,141 while others argued
pragmatically that diversity properly understood can contribute to societal tolerance.142 One
131
133
134
135
136
Interview with FIDESZ6
137
138
139
140
141
142
132
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respondent emphasized that Hungarian society is still mainly patriarchal, and many aspects of
life still discriminate against women.143 Notwithstanding these differences, it was commonly
argued that diversity can become a challenge to social cohesion especially in times of crisis,
and only proper education can prevent radicalization against the different minorities.144
Diversity can become a real danger for society only when groups form rigid identities and
they try to dominate the state.
The FIDESZ party program calls for direct state involvement in protecting diversity and
ensure respect for all cultures and identities. Respondents also called for a role of the state in
dealing with diversity, but they also emphasized that the state alone cannot deal with this
issue, civil initiatives and support of the people are also needed. All responses noted that
groups and individuals within society should be allowed to organize according to their
interests/identifications and the different institutions of ethno-national groups should be
subsidized by the state, while the political system should guide these minority institutions to
adapt to Hungarian laws, i.e. respect human rights and liberty for all that would ensure that
minorities within minorities are protected by democratic rules.145
Paradoxically, while all respondents claimed that no distinction can be legitimate
between the different minorities, many said that they would give preference to the traditional
national minorities. Some claimed that immigration is insignificant in its size in Hungary,146
while others considered it natural to positively discriminate traditional minorities over
immigrants claiming that the long history of living together would justify such action.147 All
respondents agreed that all the different minorities should have political rights, and it was
noted that the Hungarian constitution grants both individual rights and collective rights to
national minorities. Besides these, Hungarian legislation grants cultural autonomy and self
government rights to minorities and it is only parliamentary representation – the Hungarian
constitution assures the representation of minorities – that is not solved yet, since the
technical details are missing. All agreed on positive discrimination for the minorities but no
respondent favored exception rights for minorities, as this is counter to equality before the
law. No respondent considered forming political parties along ethnic lines as something that
would solve minority problems and therefore they were against these.
Asked whether public institutions should be adapted to better suit the requirements of
ethno-national minorities, FIDESZ respondents mostly agreed that these need to change.
Nevertheless, all respondents saw self-government rights that are available in Hungary for
ethno-national minorities as the proper institutional framework for responding to needs of
minorities. It was common for all respondents to stress the importance of more integrative
education for all.148 Yet others stressed that institutional adaptation should be a careful
process because if it only happens mechanically, no effect will be noticeable. Other aspects of
diversity remained unmentioned, only one respondent said there was a need for easy access to
all institutions for the disabled people. He also argued that the use of native languages should
be encouraged as far as the financial resources permit, and this is not more than a technical
problem.149
It was also commonly believed that immigrants must accommodate the “unwritten rules”
of everyday life of Hungarian society. What respondents argued was that traditional
minorities accept these as they have lived together with the other groups for centuries, and
143
145
146
147
148
149
144
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new immigrants must adapt to these if they are willing to come to Hungary. All respondents
claimed that immigrants have to accept Hungarian laws, and norms of living together should
be followed, which translates into respect for some basic features of Hungarian culture, some
fundamental principles. Yet no immigrant is expected to assimilate into the Hungarian nation;
they can live according to their own culture as long as they can follow the everyday practices
of society.150
FIDESZ respondents did not agree on how close their personal opinion was to the general
public opinion. While a minority of the respondents claimed that Hungarian general opinion
is more prejudiced than their views,151 other respondents felt that their views correspond
largely with the general public opinion and claimed these are usually reconfirmed when they
meet people.152 All respondents noted though that there is an extremist segment in society
that would oppose these views, and some claimed that extreme views are becoming more and
more fashionable.153
MKMP is considered by many analysts a party on the far-left and the party was openly
against joining NATO and questioned EU accession as well. The party claims in its program
that its primary goal is to defend the national interest, which seems to correspond to the
interest of the Hungarian working class. Asked what contributes to social diversity, party
respondents confirmed the official party line claiming that social status was one of the
fundamental determinants of diversity. Other groups mentioned were ethno-national
minorities, generational groups, and gender groups. It is interesting to note that although
MKMP is a far-left communist party, half of the respondents claimed that religion and
religious groups do contribute to social diversity.
MKMP’s preoccupation with the working class was confirmed by one of the respondents
who claimed that the majority of the society was formed by workers and the will of the
majority must prevail against the minority.154 Others emphasized the importance of
generational groups claiming the worsening economic situation of elderly people should be a
top priority for politics.155 The preoccupation with elderly groups can also be attributed to the
fact that the party relies heavily on older people to gain votes in elections. Two of the
respondents declared that claims of ethno-national minorities should have priority in politics
as ethno-national minorities are the most significant in Hungarian society. One respondent
claimed that even if people do not confess to it, there is discrimination against Jewish and
Roma people.
Communist party members have a varied view on diversity, some respondents saw
diversity as a value in itself,156 others claimed it only had an instrumental value because
diversity contributed to a more dynamic society,157 while yet others saw diversity as a fact of
life, something that we all had to live with.158 One respondent argued that social diversity was
desirable but for present Hungary diversity was not advantageous because over the past years
some groups were positively discriminated, and this was against the overall goals of society
and the common values. This respondent argued that rights and interests of the specific
groups had to be in balance with the interest of society at large.159 While other forms of
150
Interview with FIDESZ4, Interview with FIDESZ2
152
Interview with FIDESZ4, Interview with FIDESZ2, Interview with FIDESZ3, Interview with FIDESZ1,
153
154
Interview with MKMP2
155
Interview with MKMP4, Interview with MKMP1
156
157
158
159
151
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societal difference were not mentioned, respondents also found important to stress that gender
equality must be achieved.160
Although most respondents saw the value of diversity in contributing to a more dynamic
society with less rigid identity ascriptions, all respondents emphasized that the real question
was how to ensure social cohesion and to what extent diversity should be supported. It was
noted that some societies manage diversity better than others. The main challenge of diversity
was seen as the possibility of artificial conflicts to be created among the different groups as
diversity can result in nationalist views becoming more prominent. As one respondent noted,
from the moment a group was in a position to dominate the others, this would be harmful for
society overall.161 Most respondents agreed that balancing between the different ethnonational groups was a very sensitive question and therefore a true balance of society hardly
ever existed. One respondent claimed that diversity made it harder to create social and
national identity.162
MKMP argued unanimously that state regulation was necessary to deal with issues of
diversity. All respondents emphasized that the state should provide equality before the law for
all citizens and polices of diversity should treat all groups as equals, without making any
exemptions. There was a disagreement among the respondents as to whether collective rights
should be provided for ethno-national groups, and while the majority of the party members
claimed that individual rights were not enough and collective rights should be provided, the
party president claimed that individual rights should give proper protection to minorities and
collective rights were not needed.163 All the respondents agreed that while there might be
differences between historical and new minorities this did not mean necessarily that the
former should have exceptional rights, but policies and rights should only depend on the
actual size of the minority.164
Although many analysts assume that MKMP has an anti-diversity attitude, all of the
respondents claimed that groups should have rights to organize according to their identity and
interest without making any difference whether these groups were traditional or new
minorities. They also agreed that the state should support minority cultural institutions.
Nevertheless, all respondents but one claimed that they would not welcome the organization
of political parties along ethnic lines, individuals should instead form parties according to
their social class interests. Most respondents did not object to minority local government
rights, but one respondent claimed that local government rights for minorities were useless
and were often abused making hard to achieve effective operation.165 One respondent warned
that the political rights of the ethno-national minorities were provided in the Hungarian
constitution, and the respondents considered important that rights of minorities within
minorities were respected.166
Confronted with the question whether public institutions should be adapted to better suit
the interest of minority groups, most respondents claimed that Hungarian institutions were in
general open to these groups. Respondents agreed that the use of minority languages in
education and public life was legitimate and had to be supported by the state. One respondent
emphasized that if there was no institutional support for the rights of the minorities, these
rights would remain ineffective as minorities would be unable to exercise them.167 Parallel to
their stated belief that the protection of minority languages was important, about half of the
160
162
163
164
165
166
167
161
29
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respondents claimed that all minorities should learn Hungarian, and one respondent went on
to argue that Hungarian citizens should use Hungarian language in public institutions even
though they belong to ethno-national minorities.168 All respondents agreed that they would
support change that would ensure the parliamentary representation of ethno-national
minorities.
MKMP’s real stance on diversity was revealed when party members declared that they
expected all immigrants, irrespective of where they come from, to respect Hungarian laws,
learn the Hungarian language, and know the history, culture, and traditions of Hungary. Only
one respondent had a more open view claiming that although some integration was necessary,
immigrants did not have to learn the language or the culture, and majoritarian society should
also show tolerance and empathy towards the immigrants’ cultural background.169
Most of the MKMP respondents claim their views do not correspond with the general
public opinion, only one respondent saw that his views were largely in line with views in
society. Interestingly enough, while one respondent claimed that his views are more liberal
and more supportive of diversity than those of society,170 another respondent emphasized that
he does not share the current liberal or human rights point of view as these do not provide
answers for dealing with issues of diversity.171 He went on to claim that in present Hungary
one could not speak freely because if one would challenge the liberal discourse, he or she
would be immediately called prejudiced against foreigners or the Roma; a xenophobe.
2.1.1 Common views
All of the Hungarian parties noted that diversity was a significant determinant of society. We
have seen that the two main parties, MSZP and FIDESZ have a pro-diversity attitude, and
most of their members claimed that diversity was a value in itself or it contributed to the wellbeing of individuals. Compared to this, the MKMP saw diversity more as a fact of life that
everybody had to relate to. What is common for the entire Hungarian political scene is a
preoccupation with the Hungarian co-ethnics living in countries surrounding Hungary. Many
references on how ethno-cultural groups should be treated within Hungarian society were
made with having Hungarian diasporas in mind, rather than reflecting ethno-cultural
minorities within the country. The only exception seemed to be the Roma, which most
respondents identified as the most significant ethno-cultural minority in Hungary. Other
sources of diversity received much less attention in general, most commonly respondents
talked about disability, sexuality, and religious groups. It was only MKMP that stressed social
status and social class membership as important for societal diversity. Respondents from the
two mainstream parties agreed on the importance of achieving gender equality, while MKMP
had an ambiguous stance on the issue. When it comes to other types of diversity, most of the
respondents have only superficial views on the subject, though the majority argues that these
groups should also enjoy some protection.
All political parties argued that state legislation in the issues of diversity was needed but
at the same time they emphasized the need for societal involvement too. Positions varied only
on what rights different groups of society should enjoy, and while no party questioned
everybody’s right to organize according to his/her identity or interest, it was only the two
mainstream parties that argued convincingly for collective rights for minority groups. MSZP
and FIDESZ were more willing to grant political rights such as local government rights to
minorities while the MKMP would rather only support language usage and cultural rights for
the different communities. None of the parties welcomed the idea of forming parties on ethnic
168
170
171
169
30
BOZOKI
lines, though all claimed that minority representation in parliament would be important. The
two main parties also had more inclusive views on accepting immigrants as their respondents
argued that no one was expected to assimilate into Hungarian culture. Contrary to this,
MKMP claimed that all immigrants should learn the language and be aware of Hungarian
culture if they were to live in Hungary.
Irrespective of their party belonging, most respondents found that Hungarian public
institutions were able to address minority claims properly and the Hungarian institutional
setup was generous in providing for the interest of ethno-national communities. While almost
all respondents agreed that some adaptation of these institutions was needed, most thought
only superficial changes were necessary, and that these were not urgent. Yet again, gender
equality received almost no attention, and other types of diversity were mentioned only in
connection with disability and sexuality groups. Solely MSZP respondents found that their
views are those of the general public opinion. FIDESZ on the other hand claimed that while
its expressed views are close to the general public opinion, there were important segments in
society that had less inclusive views on diversity. MKMP also claimed its views are
marginalized and it also pointed out that its views are often considered extreme by the
country’s elite.
2.2 NGOs’ General Views on Diversity
Let us now turn our attention from political parties to NGOs, which constitute the second
important category that was selected for the EUROSPHERE research. As mentioned earlier,
three organizations were selected. The pages below will describe their general views on
diversity.
Respondents from the Roma organization MCF all confirmed that ethno-national groups
are the most important when it comes to diversity. Other groups that contribute to diversity
that were mentioned were religious groups, gender groups, disability groups, and sexuality
groups. Three out of the five respondents claimed that claims of the Roma should be given
priority over other claims because of the discrimination they faced in society.172 It is
interesting to note that the other two respondents considered that no group should be given
priority.173
Respondents agreed that diversity was a value in itself, and only one respondent claimed
that diversity was an inescapable fact of life.174 Most of the respondents agreed that diversity
was an advantage to society because it enabled people to learn about each-other’s culture, but
the same respondent claimed that diversity was not an advantage for society. This respondent
claimed that diversity could challenge the political unity of the state.175 Yet, other
respondents were less pessimistic, and while most agreed that diversity could challenge social
cohesion and bring friction among the different culture, one of the respondents claimed there
was no disadvantage due to diversity.176 All of the respondents agreed that it was the duty of
the state to ensure equal rights to all of its citizens, and these should include both individual
and collective rights.
Only one respondent said that historical minorities should have more rights than
immigrant minorities,177 the rest of the respondents did not make any differentiation between
these groups. Yet, asked about whether minorities should have the right to their political
institutions, the majority of the respondents – including the president of MCF – said that only
172
Interview with MCF1, Interview with MCF2, Interview with MCF5
Interview with MCF1
174
Interview with MCF3
175
Interview with MCF3
176
Interview with MCF1
177
Interview with MCF4
173
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BOZOKI
historical minorities should have these rights,178 and only two respondents claimed that all
groups should have political institutions.179 All respondents claimed that Hungarian public
institutions had to be adapted to better suit the needs of minorities. All of the responses
underlined the importance of the use of native languages in public institutions and in
education, but some would go as far as to grant privileges to ethno-national minorities within
the electoral system.180
Asked whether immigrants to Hungary had to adapt to a Hungarian lifestyle, received
responses were mixed: two claimed that there was no specific Hungarian tradition to be
adopted by immigrants,181 another claimed that those out of Europe should become familiar
with European values182, while another two respondents would expect immigrants to adapt
Hungarian everyday culture.183 Nevertheless, all respondents agreed that immigrants had to
accept the country’s legal norms, but this did not mean that they had to give up their original
identity.
All of the respondents shared the view that their expressed opinions were different from
that of the majority population. They claimed that general opinion was prejudiced against the
Roma, and racism was on the rise in Hungary. The respondents also agreed that when
expressing their views they faced more opposition and rejection than support for these, and
some claimed that they witnessed racist reactions regularly.184
Respondents from the women organization NANE identified the following groups as
most relevant for diversity: ethno-national groups, sexuality groups, gender groups, and
disability groups. One respondent claimed she could not differentiate between different
minorities; people should be who they were.185 It is interesting that while only two
respondents identified gender groups as relevant,186 sexuality groups were mentioned by all
the remaining respondents.187 In a similar manner, while all the respondents agreed that it was
a state duty to help people overcome disadvantages originating from their status, two of the
respondents claimed ethno-national minority claims should be given priority by the state,
while only two respondents said that inequalities (based on gender or age) should be
addressed first.
All the respondents thought that ethno-nationally diverse society was an ontological
matter, and only three respondents saw diversity as a value in itself.188 All agreed that
diversity had the advantage to foster equal opportunities by making identities more flexible.
Only one respondent claimed that a diverse society was more just in terms of gender
equality.189 While diversity was thought of to have more advantages than disadvantages, three
respondents claimed that diversity could threaten social cohesion and solidarity and thus was
a source of exclusion for weaker groups.190 All respondents agreed that the state had an
important role in regulating questions of diversity, and both individual and collective rights
should be provided in order to fight discrimination based on ethno-national, gender, or any
other type of belonging. Respondents claimed no differentiation among different minority
178
Interview with MCF1, Interview with MCF4. Interview with MCF5
Interview with MCF2, Interview with MCF3
180
181
182
Interview with MCF1
183
184
Interview with MCF1
185
Interview with NANE5
186
Interview with NANE2, Interview with NANE3
187
Interview with NANE1, Interview with NANE2, Interview with NANE3, Interview with NANE4
188
Interview with NANE2, Interview with NANE,3 Interview with NANE5
189
190
Interview with NANE1, Interview with NANE2, Interview with NANE3
179
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BOZOKI
groups was justified as everybody had a right to exercise his/her human rights, only one
respondent mentioned that EU citizens could have a special privileged status compared to
others.191
The respondents also agreed that minority groups should have rights to their own
political institutions, though they emphasized that minorities within minorities should also be
protected. No respondent was willing to differentiate among different groups in granting this
right. None of the responses claimed that immigrants should adapt to any aspect of Hungarian
life, as long as they respected the legal democratic norms. All agreed that Hungarian public
institutions needed to be adapted to meet the expectations of different minority groups. Every
respondent claimed that Hungarian public institutions still reflected the domination of males,
and women were often discriminated against, a situation that needed to be changed urgently
in order to achieve gender equality.192
Asked whether their individual opinion corresponded to general public opinion,
respondents from NANE were divided: all but one193 thought that their opinion was a minority
opinion. Nevertheless, even this respondent agreed with the others that they met resistance to
their views when these were expressed publicly. One respondent claimed that as she often
expressed her views in the public, she occasionally received threatening and hate letters from
people that disagreed with her opinion.194
Although Védegylet is an NGO mainly concerned with environmental issues and their
impact on different aspects of society, only one respondent identified groups with an
environmentally-friendly attitude as relevant for societal diversity.195 The other respondents
mentioned ethnic groups, sexuality groups, disability groups, and gender groups. Only one
respondent claimed that no group claim should be given priority, others argued that ethnic
groups are most important, followed by gender groups, sexuality groups, and disability
groups.196 Two of the respondents singled out claims of the Roma and the Jewish community
as most important to address, claiming these groups faced severe discrimination in Hungarian
society.197
Respondents were equally divided whether diversity itself was a goal to strife for: two of
the respondents claimed that diversity was itself a value for which societies should fight
for,198 while the other two respondents said that diversity was rather a fact of life of modern
societies.199 Notwithstanding these differences in opinion, all respondents agreed that
diversity was an advantage for society because it helped create a society with less rigid
identities, and members of society could enjoy the benefits of encountering different cultures.
Similarly, all pointed out that diversity could be a challenge as well, as people had to learn
how to accept other cultures than their own, otherwise diversity would lead to intolerance that
could threaten social cohesion and solidarity.
All of the respondents agreed that questions of diversity should be regulated by the state,
but each of them also pointed out that the state alone was not enough; society itself had a duty
to accept diversity. None of the respondents was willing to differentiate between traditional
minorities and immigrant communities; they all claimed that these should be entitled to the
same rights, the same institutions, and the same support from the state. Most of the
191
Interview with NANE1, Interview with NANE2, Interview with NANE3, Interview with NANE4, Interview
with NANE5
193
194
195
Interview with VED1
196
Interview with VED2, Interview with VED3, Interview with VED4
197
Interview with VED2, Interview with VED4
198
199
192
33
BOZOKI
respondents claimed that Hungarian public institutions should be adapted to better serve the
needs of ethnic minorities, only one respondent claimed that present institutions were
addressing properly these claims.200 The others emphasized the need to strengthen the use of
minority languages, and the need to secure some kind of preferential representation for
minority groups.
Respondents claimed that immigrant groups did not need to adapt to any aspect of
Hungarian culture, what was instead required was that all accepted the legal and democratic
rules of Hungary. All respondents claimed that all cultures had to respect basic human rights.
Nevertheless, three of the respondents claimed that while it was not obligatory, learning the
local language could be advantageous for immigrants.201 Respondents also claimed that their
opinion largely corresponded to general public opinion, though two of the respondents
claimed that their views on the Roma were more tolerant than those found in the general
public.202
2.2.1 Common views
Overlooking the responses of the three selected NGOs one can notice some interesting
similarities and differences among the views expressed by these. Although only one of the
selected NGOs was an ethnic minority NGO (MCF), while the other two were concerned
with gender (NANE) or environmental issues (Védegylet), the majority of NGO respondents
claimed that ethno-national groups were most important for societal diversity. It is interesting
to note that even within the gender NGO, ethno-national groups were more considered more
important than gender groups; not to speak of the environmental NGO were all respondents
mentioned ethno-national groups.
Nevertheless, the NGOs had a different view about diversity: while the Roma NGO
found diversity to constitute a value in itself, the women NGO respondents thought of
diversity more as a fact of life, while the environmental NGO respondents were half in
support for diversity as a value and half for diversity as ontological matter. Notwithstanding
these differences, all NGO respondents claimed that questions of diversity had to be regulated
by the state and had to involve the society as well. In general respondents thought diversity
was an advantage for society because it helped create a society with less rigid identities, but it
was also pointed out that diversity could threaten social cohesion and solidarity and thus was
a source of exclusion for weaker groups.
The majority of respondents supported both individual and collective rights for the
different minorities. Most of the respondents claimed that no distinction between the different
groups could be justified in granting these rights, it was only the Roma respondents that
claimed traditional minorities had more rights to political institutions than immigrant groups.
This is an interesting result, as one would expect that a minority NGO would have a more
inclusive view on the political rights of immigrants, similar to one of a gender or and
environmental NGO, which was confirmed by the responses we have received.
No NGO respondent claimed that immigrant groups had to adapt to any aspect of
Hungarian life, thus we could argue that the entire Hungarian NGO sector proved to be
inclusive. All respondents found important only that immigrant communities accept the
democratic norms and laws of the country, and yet again, it was only within the Roma NGO
that some respondents found important to say that immigrants should accustom with everyday
Hungarian life.
All of the NGO respondents agreed that Hungarian public institutions had to be adapted
to better suit the interests of different minorities. One could observe a difference here: while
200
Interview with VED4
202
201
34
BOZOKI
the Roma NGO people (together with respondents from Védegylet) argued for the importance
of strengthening the use of minority languages, and the need to secure some kind of
preferential representation for minorities; the women NGO claimed that public institutions
had to become less male-dominated and more inclusive towards women as in the present they
still discriminated along gender lines.
Last but not least, NGO respondents also converged on stating that their expressed
opinions were different from the general public opinion, and they often faced opposition to
their views from the general public. The outlier case here is Védegylet, its members arguing
that their opinion largely corresponded to that of the general public. One possible explanation
for this difference could be the fact that Védegylet is one of the most influential NGOs in
Hungary, thus their members might have experienced more support for their views than
members of the other two NGOs. Another reason could be that while MCF and NANE are
concerned with highly controversial issues such as the situation of the Roma or violence
against women, Védegylet raises less controversial issues. This seems to be confirmed by the
fact that even at Védegylet, two of the respondents pointed out that their views on the Roma
were more inclussive than those of the general public.
2.3 Think Tanks’ General Views on Diversity
As opposed to the relatively clear divisions within the Hungarian political scene or the media
sector (discussed below), views of think tank representatives do not display such definite
fractures. Opinions of individual researchers often vary significantly within institutions, thus
it is generally hard to retrieve an “institutional view” for any actor. One would be mistaken
however to completely dismiss the role of political preferences and attitudes as when it comes
to certain specific questions about minority rights and citizenship, the same liberalconservative/left-right distribution becomes graspable, although in different proportions. An
interesting difference between the parties or media and the think tank sectors seems to be that
leftist agendas are almost completely absent from the latter and so the scale along which the
actors can be located is that of liberal-conservative. This might be due to generational
differences and personal trajectories of respondents: for the generation growing up during the
early years of Hungarian democracy leftist ideologies did not represent a legitimate
alternative. Among the seven think tank respondents representing this generation, five
identify with liberal political values, while two of them are conservative. On these terms thus,
Political Capital and Eötvös Károly Institute are both unanimously liberal, Századvég is
conservative, while IWE as an institute cannot be clustered. As we will see below, however,
the significance of this classification varies according to the issues addressed in the
interviews.
Among the chosen think tanks, Institute for World Economy (IWE) has the strongest
commitment to EU research—although mostly from the perspective of economic processes.
Diversity and issues of citizenship are completely missing from the institute’s research focus,
while migration and free movement are only sporadically treated questions. Thus, an
institutional opinion is hard to retrieve, also due to the fact that IWE cannot be located on the
liberal-conservative scale outlined above.
Although IWE respondents approached the question of diversity differently, with only
one researcher willing to name specific groups that are relevant for a diverse society,203 they
seemed to agree on the prominence of the ethnic divisions and the urgency of the problems of
Roma minorities. IWE researchers were generally sympathetic to the problems of Roma in
Hungary, and were on the opinion that the government has to take a more effective
responsibility in improving their situation. Their views on the way the state should take a
203
Interview with VKI3.
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BOZOKI
more active role, however, varied. While in principle all of the IWE researchers rejected the
idea of positive discrimination, one of them still said that temporarily, and targeting the Roma
minority, such policies could be introduced.204 In general, respondents do not think that the
legal framework should be modified in favor of the minorities: collective rights for example
are not supported.205 Instead, certain policy areas should be adapted to the needs of
minorities, especially the Roma minority (e.g. education, employment). When approached
from an abstract perspective, IWE researchers viewed diversity as more beneficial than
problematic, with one of them seeing it as an “enormous value” that, when working, could
render society more just and more stable.206 Nevertheless, none of them thought that diversity
could or should be fostered or maintained artificially by regulatory means. In relation to the
political rights of minorities, all IWE respondents were rather permissive: they all thought
everyone should have the right to organize the way they prefer to, although one researcher
noted that minority parties would not solve their problems.207 Language was the only factor
they mentioned in relation to the adaptation of institutions to the needs of minorities: while
two of them thought institutions should be able to provide services in the mother tongue of
minorities, the third respondent said all minorities should be able to speak the official
language of the country to an extent that is necessary for using the services of the institutions
they had to deal with.208
Issues of gender equality are approached rather heterogeneously within the IWE. One
of the respondents approached this question – as many others – from a universal perspective
and argued that the EU had no impact on gender equality as an autonomous actor, as
whatever it prescribed existed in the context of international agreements on the issue. Another
interviewee recognized gender equality as a declared aim of the EU (he mentioned the
demand for “equal salary for equal work” as an example) but noted that this ambition only
existed on the level of declarations as of yet, however, he hoped this would improve in the
future. Accordingly, he would support structures and policies that would foster gender
equality in the old and new member states.209 The third respondent – the only female
researcher among all the think tanker respondents – reflected on the tendencies that damaged
the traditional family model and stated that a child needed to grow up in a family.
Nevertheless, she was sympathetic to women’s career ambitions and said that labor
regulations or other means should secure that women’s career did not disadvantage their
family.210
As opposed to the IWE, Eötvös Károly Institute only marginally deals with questions of
the European Union through its main activities and places the majority of its research efforts
on issues of constitutional democracy and individual rights. Most of its researchers’ views
were consistent with this commitment and liberal political values in general, and thus more
consistency appears also within the institute.211 Interestingly, this consistency is lacking as far
as the abstract notion of ethno-national diversity is concerned. Whereas one of the
204
206
207
Ibid.
208
209
Ibid.
210
211
Unfortunately only two interviews could be conducted at the EKI due to the permanent leave of its founding
director, former Data Protection and Freedom of Information ombudsman László Majtényi, who now serves as
the president of the National Radio and Television Commission. Despite this, we have tried to set up an
interview appointment, but after the first email exchange, my attempts were futile. The institute is so small that
its research director could not suggest any other person to be interviewed.
205
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respondents sees diversity as a value in itself that has to be protected and supported,212 the
other approaches it as a fact of life that does not entail moral obligations for neither the state
nor its individual citizens.213 The same normative versus existential approach is reflected in
their opinion on the challenges of ethno-national diversity: while for the respondent who sees
diversity as a value in itself the main challenge is to impede the emergence of discrimination
from the irritation the minority potentially causes in the majority; the researcher for whom
diversity is a fact of life sees the biggest challenge in creating such institutional systems
within which none of the ethno-national groups face obstacles to political participation due to
e.g. linguistic reasons. With respect to the state’s regulative role in issues of diversity, the two
EKI respondents agree: neither of them supports collective rights and prefers a limited role
for the state. But, while one of them warns that diversity is a political and social project that
cannot be realized by legal means,214 the other is slightly more flexible and can imagine that
the state regulates the most fundamental policy areas, such as schooling, nevertheless the
realization must be left to the local levels, as they know local circumstances the best.215
With regard to gender issues, the respondents are slightly skeptic towards EU-level
regulation, and both of them warn that the method of formulating norms on the European
level could possibly lower the threshold in those countries where originally these norms of
gender equality were set higher than what the EU could agree upon. Neither respondent
supports positive discrimination, but one of them thinks that in the particular case of
Hungary, where only very few discrimination cases get to the court, EU-incentives would
have room.216
Of all the think tanks selected for Eurosphere research, Századvég Foundation showed
the strongest intra-institutional consistency. Determined by conservative politicophilosophical principles and values, Századvég interviewees responses about questions of
diversity, minorities, and enlargement are thus significantly different from those of the above
discussed IWE or EKI. An interesting illustration of this difference is already visible in the
objectives set out by EKI and Századvég respectively: whereas EKI promotes individual
rights almost exclusively, Századvég states that one of its objectives is “helping the selforganization and effective representation of civic society, of minority groups, and of social
groups in disadvantageous situation”.217 Századvég respondents’ views expressed during the
interviews largely underline this stance.
While not all of the respondents started their list of the groups relevant for diversity with
ethno-national groups, they all agreed that this type of rights claims should be prioritized.
One of the respondents noted though that it had to be clarified whether the Roma problem
really existed, or it was just a virtual issue.218 Interestingly enough, except this comment,
none of the Századvég respondents mentioned the Roma minority when referring to ethnonational diversity. In contrast, all of them thought sexual identity was relevant for a diverse
society, and equally all of them argued that Hungarian society was not yet prepared for this
type of diversity. An interesting contradiction seems to be that while all of them stated that
diversity was not an objective a society had to strive for when asked in principle, they all
agreed that governments had a role in helping ethnic groups preserve their traditions and
identity; and two of them said the advantage of ethno-national diversity was that it facilitated
the survival of traditional identities.219 Not surprisingly then, all three of them would support
212
Interview with EKI1.
214
215
216
217
Kováts, Freedom House Directory, p. 170.
218
Interview with Szv1.
219
Interview with Szv1; Interview with Szv3.
213
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BOZOKI
collective rights and thought the state has an active role to play in keeping the possible
tensions emerging from ethno-national diversity at bay. Beyond the task of shaping people’s
consciousness about diversity and tolerance, one of them mentioned that the state should also
secure the political representation of ethnic minorities, possibly in the form of a second house
of the Parliament.220
Questions on gender issues were mostly answered with reference to cultural differences:
while all Századvég researchers were aware that gender equality is undermined in certain
cultures, only one of them thought European integration has some impact on gender equality
in member states and that it would be important to develop a more equitable norm system, not
by means of positive discrimination or quotas, however.221
With respect to their political-ideological views, researchers of Political Capital Institute
(PC) are almost as close to each other as those of Századvég, however, they are located on the
other pole of the ideological scale: PC as an institute and the individual researchers/leaders
selected are also coherently liberal.
As almost all think tank interviewees, researchers of PC also stated that, if ranked
according to the urgency of the problem, ethnic minority-claims should be in the forefront.
All of them mentioned the Roma minority as the group whose claims must be attended to,
and were on the view that traditional historical minorities had no real relevance in Hungary
today. Although all of them mentioned sexual identity as relevant for a diverse society, none
of them expressed a view about any societal tensions about the issue of homosexuality.
Interestingly, it was only at PC that disability groups were mentioned: two researchers argued
that their claims were the most important222 or the second most important claims.223 When
approached more abstractly, two respondents said diversity is not an aim in itself, while one
of them argued it was, as Hungary was currently too homogeneous and it would be very
beneficial for the country if this would change.224 With respect to the state’s role in regulating
issues of diversity, they emphasized that the state had to provide the legal framework where
individual rights were protected, some kind of representation was guaranteed, and
discrimination was harshly sanctioned,225 however – except in the case of disability groups
where the state has clear-cut practical obligations – civil society has to contribute to the
improvement of dealing with conflicts possibly inherent to diversity, e.g. through showing
role models.226 None of them finds positive discrimination or collective rights acceptable,
although one respondent notes that some questions may arise in the context of labor rights.227
Gender questions were sympathetically approached by PC researchers, although none of
them supported positive discrimination in order to strengthen gender equality. As noted
above, domestic violence was explicitly mentioned and condemned by one of the
respondents, while another one was critical of the EU’s gender policy from a feminist
perspective, doubting that EU directives and quotas could really benefit women in member
states. According to two PC respondents, positive discrimination preserves differences –
formulating a law about a certain group can only further discrimination.
220
Ibid.
222
Interview with PC3.
223
Interview with PC1.
224
Interview with PC3.
225
Ibid.
226
Ibid.
227
Interview with PC2
221
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2.3.1 Common views
Similarly to media actors, explicitly or implicitly reflecting on the prominence of the issue of
diversity in present day Hungary, an overwhelming majority of the interviewed think tank
representatives designated ethnic (and national) groups as the most relevant for a diverse
society. Most of the respondents mentioned the Roma minority within this category, while a
smaller proportion of them said equally or almost as important were Hungarian diasporas
abroad. As discussed under Századvég’s views, this think tank was an exception: here two
researchers did not mention the Roma minority at all, and the third one thought it should be
explored by the government whether the Roma problem was real or only virtual. Generally,
however, even those who did not name specific groups that were relevant or stated that ethnic
groups were not really relevant, either claimed that the rights claims of the minorities
(especially the Roma minority) should be a primary problem for the political elite,228 or
referred to the Roma problem as prominent in other contexts.229 Other types of diversity were
much less present, individual researchers had relatively different views, showing no
significant patterns on the institutional or the more general ideological level. Here again, the
conservative Századvég was an outlier, as all three leading researchers said homosexuals were
a relevant group for diverse societies, but the issue of thematizing sexual identity was
something the Hungarian society was not prepared for.
Hungarian diasporas were an important issue for almost all respondents; in every
institution there was at least one researcher who supported some (smaller or greater)
preferential treatment for these, even those who otherwise did not find any kind of ethnicitybased distinction acceptable. To be sure, if one would try to convey institutional views for the
selected think tank actors, the liberal-conservative divide would still be apparent, just like in
the political or the media sector, with Századvég favoring the most and EKI favoring the least
preferences for ethnic Hungarians living outside the borders of Hungary.
2.4 Media’s General Views on Diversity
The ideas Hungarian media actors advocate on diversity and the EU are mostly determined by
their general position within the wider Hungarian political spectrum structured along the left
and right continuum. The organizations’ political stance shapes fundamentally the way they
frame issues related to diversity and the EU. Thus the Hungarian media reflects the highly
polarized political realities of Hungary, Népszabadság being on the left, Magyar Nemzet and
HírTV on the right, while Blikk and to a large extent MTV1 are carrying a politically neutral
line. The question of diversity is mostly constrained in Hungarian media to ethno-cultural
diversity, which has an external dimension meaning Hungarian minorities abroad, and an
internal dimension, which includes the Roma. In addition, gender and sexual minority issues
also receive some media attention; however, their coverage is negligible as compared to the
topics of ethno-national diversity.
MTV’s public orientation means placing an emphasis on the representation of religious,
national, ethnic and minority cultures, thus it has a special focus on ethno-national
diversity.230 MTV’s goal is to provide a value-centered public-service television. In order to
fulfill its mission as a public broadcaster founded on the basis of the 1996 media law, it tries
to address the needs of smaller social and demographic groups of Hungarian society. Thus, it
aims at serving the needs of religious people, children, people interested in Hungarian culture
and arts, minorities, and Hungarians living abroad.
228
Interview with VKI1; Interview with PC1.
230
Information retrieved from the television’s website, www.mtv.hu.
229
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Accordingly, the MTV’s image combines elements of Hungarian folklore and modern art,
which stresses the television’s focus on historical and traditional values. The channel has a
special focus on ethno-national diversity as it aims to serve the needs of both minorities in
Hungary and Hungarian minorities living abroad. Since 1999, MTV regularly follows the
activities of historical churches and represents their voice. It offers weekly programs for
Hungarian minorities in their own language, thus has broadcast programs in Croatian,
German, Roma, Romanian, Serbian and Slovak, and, less frequently, also in some other
languages. Special daily programs targeting Hungarian minorities abroad focus on political,
cultural, and economic events from the Central-Eastern European region. MTV broadcasts
more programs of cultural, scientific and educational content than any other TV channel in
Hungary. Although other issues of diversity, such as rights of sexual minorities are not at the
center of interest of the television, it might be noteworthy that MTV reported about the gay
parade in Budapest that was attacked by ultra-nationalist groups, portraying this occasion as a
scandalous and worrying issue for entire society.
HírTV’s views on diversity can be best captured through its way of presenting radical
right-wing groups known for their anti-Roma, anti-Semitic and homophobic attitudes. HírTV
tends to portray with sympathy radical right wing organizations such as the Hungarian Guard
and Gój Motorosok (a right wing motor gang) known for their anti-Roma attitude and actions
that they carry out in the name of law and order. The channel often gives them a voice during
footages. At the same time, without being openly racist, the channel is eager to broadcast
about scandals and crime (presumably) related to the Roma minority, thus tends to present the
Roma in an unfavorable light.231 Hungarian minorities abroad, however, are presented with
great sympathy by the channel. According to ORTT’s content analysis, HírTV’s evening
news program, Híradó21 did not devote too much attention to Hungarian minorities abroad
(only 2 news units from 496) as compared to other TV channels, such as Duna TV, which had
an outstanding focus on this issue area (81 news units from 627).232
Magyar Nemzet focuses a lot on diversity issues and also has clear preferences on the
topic. Hungarian minorities abroad, Roma, sexual minorities and large families are the most
relevant groups defining diversity in Hungary according to the newspaper. As one the
journalists interviewed by Eurosphere argued, large families represent an important group
within the Hungarian society that does not receive sufficient attention and care from the state.
While some minorities enjoy strong legal protection (for instance groups defined by their
sexual orientation), large families are neglected by the state.233 The newspaper shows a great
interest in Hungarian minorities abroad, reflected by a high frequency of articles published
about them and by voicing their perspective on various issues. The newspaper often reports
on what it sees as injustices these minorities have to suffer in their home countries
emphasizing the violation of their minority rights.
Therefore, the theme of diversity institutions emerges usually in connection to
Hungarian minorities abroad, as the newspaper often gives voice to their demands for
autonomy, language and educational rights. Magyar Nemzet is also in favor of granting
collective rights to minorities. According to the newspaper, minorities are entitled to cultural
and political institutions and political representation, and they should be allowed to form their
own parties if they wish to do so.234 The journalists expressed their disapproval over the
present situation in Hungary, where parliamentary representation of minorities remains
231
Such as leaking a story about the Hungarian Socialist Party allegedly buying the votes of Roma in Nyírbátor.
“Nyírségi voksvásárlás: A HírTV viszontvádjai,” HVG, 24. 02. 2008.
232
ORTT, “Content analysis of new programs,” January 2008, www.ortt.hu.
233
Interview with Mn1; Interview with Mn2.
234
Interview with Mn1; Interview with Mn2, Budapest; Interview with Mn3.
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unresolved as of today.235 Although gender issues hardly appear on the newspaper’s pages,
the journalists interviewed emphasized the importance of empowering women. They regarded
the present system in Hungary discriminatory towards women, and voiced the need to
improve women’s representation in leadership positions.236
While Magyar Nemzet can be regarded as pro-diversity when it comes to Hungarian
minorities abroad, this is not so much the case if the Roma, Jewish or sexual minorities are
the subject of discussion. The newspaper tends to present the Roma in a negative light,
occasionally publishing quite extreme opinions about them, drawing attention to their alleged
civilizational and cultural deficit.237 The Roma are usually portrayed as instigators of crime
and social tensions. In addition, the initiative of three local mayors to condition social aid on
participation in public work (which is against constitutional provisions) was also presented by
the newspaper in a favorable light. This initiative clearly had an anti-Roma dimension as
Roma are disproportionately represented among those that receive social aid and are
unemployed. Consequently, the ombudsman for minorities protested against the initiative and
called it an example of “salon-racism”. However, at other times the paper can treat the subject
with great understanding, especially if this provides an opportunity to bash the present leftwing government. For instance, Magyar Nemzet portrayed the mass emigration of Hungarian
Roma families to Sweden with a lot of empathy, blaming the government for its failed social
policy.238
The newspaper’s critical stand towards domestic diversity can be captured by its obvious
sympathy for radical organizations that have an anti-Roma, anti-Semitic profile such as
Hungarian Guard and Goy Motorgang (Gój Motorosok). The Hungarian Guard has an
intimidating effect on minorities due to its militaristic and extreme right image, as it uses
symbols resembling those used by the Hungarian Nazis. Yet, Magyar Nemzet usually presents
the Hungarian Guard as a defender of public order and Hungarian values.239
Interestingly, the newspaper’s views revealed about the Roma during the interviews did
not fall in line with the opinions drawn from the content analysis. Whenever the Roma are
discussed in an article, they are almost always presented in negative light. Yet, the journalists
interviewed within the frames of Eurosphere research showed great sensitivity towards
problems of the Roma (Gypsies was the term they used). They stressed that the Roma pose a
very pressing social problem in today’s Hungary, receiving only superficial treatment instead
of a real cure from the political establishment.240 A leading journalist of Magyar Nemzet,
interviewed by Eurosphere was not pleased with the newspaper’s general presentation of
minority issues. According to him, at present Roma issues receive too much emphasis
overshadowing all other topics related to diversity.241
The newspaper’s way of presenting events surrounding the 2008 gay parade in Budapest
that was attacked by radical rightwing groups was also indicative of the newspaper’s antidiversity attitude. Magyar Nemzet was in a difficult position, since it had to condemn the
violence committed by people it usually sympathizes with, that is, radical right wing groups.
At the same time, since homosexuality goes against the conservative-Christian values of
Magyar Nemzet, it had to denounce the violence without presenting gay victims too
favorably, and without condemning the extremist right wing movement on the whole.
Although the broadsheet did not show right wing gangs in a positive light at all, at the same
235
Interview with Mn1.
237
238
239
For instance see: “Együttélési szabályzat Faddon,” Magyar Nemzet, 23. 06. 2008.
240
Interview with Mn1.
241
Interview with Mn1.
236
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time it emphasized the obscene and anti-Christian character of the parade. The reports about
the parade thus implicitly suggested that the participants themselves were responsible for the
violence since they provoked it. The newspaper stressed the “tasteless”, provocative style of
the gay parade, and regarded it being fundamentally a show and a demonstration against the
political right and the church.242 Moreover, it essentially put the blame on the government
which allegedly created the climate of violence in October 2006 when the police attacked
innocent rightwing protestors.243
As was told during the interviews, the journalists think that the newspaper has a strong
influence on public debates. Even if many people do not agree with the newspaper’s position
they take notice of it.244 In their opinion, the views shared by this newspaper do not fall in
line with that of the majority. According to Magyar Nemzet, national identity and the family
are important values while the dominant media in Hungary does not endorse these
conservative principles but is openly anti-marriage and subtly anti-family.245
Népszabadság focuses a lot on the subject of diversity as well. The most frequent stories
related to diversity concern the Roma minority and Hungarian minorities abroad. The
newspaper treats Roma issues with high sensitivity, often voicing Roma perspectives and is
very critical about anti-Roma initiatives and organizations.
Regarding the state’s involvement in regulating questions related to ethnic diversity, the
chief editor of this newspaper argued that the general rule should be non-interference since
every Hungarian citizen should be entitled to the same rights regardless of his/her ethnicity.
At the same time, he admitted that ethnic groups should be allowed to form associations, to
cultivate their culture, and should receive funds from the state for cultural purposes, thus
implicitly endorsing collective rights. Népszabadság respondents regarded the idea of
creating a Roma political party also pointless, yet considered the existence of the National
Gypsy Self-Government beneficial.246
However, one editor of this newspaper explicitly said that collective rights were
necessary since without such rights there was no minority education for instance. He
emphasized that some issues cannot be approached from the aspect of individual rights,
which is true, even if in respondent’s mind liberals usually try to avoid the question of
collective rights. Rights should be granted in the fields of education or the use of language,
depending on the particular needs of certain communities.247 The interviewees did not want to
differentiate between historical and immigrant minorities in terms of group rights, since all
minorities over a considerable size should enjoy the same rights.248 It should be also
mentioned here that the newspaper writes very supportively about the aspirations of
Hungarian minorities abroad to have access to diversity institutions, such as minority
language education. At the same time, Népszabadság is very skeptical about the usefulness of
state policies aiming to ensure gender equality.249 The respondents were uncertain whether it
was necessary to deal with gender equality at all. However, if such policies or structures were
needed at all, these should adopted at a lower level than that of the European. They thought
that although women truly had a lot of problems, these should not be addressed through
242
“Nem tiltják az obszcén viselkedést,” Magyar Nemzet, 02. 07. 2008.
Krisztina Morvai, “Vajon ki a felelıs?”, Magyar Nemzet, 07. 08. 2008. It is true that violent protests started in
Hungary only in September 2006, when right wing groups raided the building of Hungarian Television and set
cars on fire. That time the police failed to react as it was probably unprepared for such turn of events, which
never happened in Hungary before.
244
245
246
Interview with NSZ1.
247
248
249
Interview with NSZ1; Interview with NSZ2.
243
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institutional means introduced by the state.250 According to the opinion of the newspaper’s
editors, EU policies are not necessary to deal with gender equality since the situation in this
regard will hardly change as a result of some laws enacted in Brussels. Society has to change
mentally in order to achieve more equal gender relations. At the same time, full equality
cannot be reached due to some objective differences between men and women, such as only
women are capable of giving birth to children and this fact in itself has some practical
consequences.251
Matching its quite subtle language and style, Népszabadság hardly takes strong positions
while presenting delicate stories related to the Roma or gay people, yet its point of view can
be usually indirectly inferred. Népszabadság devoted much more newspaper space to the
violence at the gay parade than Magyar Nemzet for instance. Népszabadság clearly spoke up
on behalf of gay people and in favor of gay rights, and called the parade a shameful day of
Budapest.
Népszabadság focuses a lot on ethno-national diversity because the Hungarian public is
very sensitive about it. According to opinions revealed during the interviews, while the
Hungarian audience gets a lot of information about Hungarian minorities abroad, people
hardly know anything about the countries where those minorities live. Thus it would be
preferable to have a more complex approach to diversity. In addition, views on the Roma
question are much indoctrinated.252 The journalists of Népszabadság think they are more
liberal and tolerant in general, and more open and understanding towards diversity than the
average population is in Hungary.253
Blikk discusses the subject of diversity only sporadically. Stories about the Roma and
sexual minorities appear from time to time. The newspaper can be considered pro-diversity
even if it typically picks up Roma or sexual minority stories in connection to sensational
events and celebrities. While different minorities do appear on its pages occasionally, Blikk
does not explicitly portray stories involving minorities as issues of diversity. The newspaper
avoids discussing minority issues explicitly, as it is trying to present everything in a neutral
way. As a tabloid paper, it targets the majority, thus it does not aim to fight for minority
rights or minority representation in any way.254
For instance, when Blikk reported about the Gay Parade in 2008 in Budapest, it
underplayed the gay aspect of the events while emphasized the human rights violations
committed against the participants. Thus, Blikk was trying to show that some groups were
unable to assert their right to freedom of opinion because other groups prevented them from
doing so. According to the interviews with Blikk journalists, anyone whose rights are being
violated deserves attention from the state.255 Fundamentally no one should be given
preferential treatment by the state just based on belonging to an ethnic or minority group,
rather the most current problems need to be addressed.256
The newspaper shows a negative picture about anti-Roma, rightwing groups such as
Magyar Gárda or Gój Motorosok. A Blikk article described the latter as being “famous for
their extremist views”, and presented them very unfavorably.257 It also carried a detailed
report with expressive pictures about the boys who beat up a Roma mother with her daughter,
implicitly emphasizing the awfulness of the crime and condemning the ideology that was
250
252
253
254
Interview with Blikk3.
255
256
257 “Gypsy blood will flow if any of the eight murderers will be released.” Szabolcs Koós, “Így ölték meg Szögi
Lajost”, www.blikk.hu., 03. 07. 2008.
251
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behind it.258 Moreover, Blikk presented a controversial advertisement of the 2008 Gay Parade
with much sympathy towards the organizers. The advertisement that was meant to publicize
the parade caused a public outrage, because three little children featured on the poster with a
message that everybody has the right to stand up for him/herself. The journalist interviewed
the mother of the children who voiced her pro-gay and pro-Roma opinions and argued that
everybody has the right to be different.259 Likewise, while reporting about the violence at the
festival, the newspaper clearly sympathized with the gay victims and portrayed the attackers
as fascists and extremists, condemning what they stood for.
In line with Blikk’s editorial policy, its journalists write about issues of diversity if there
is an event that is interesting to people. In practice they devote a lot of attention to questions
related to minorities, mostly because these interest the Hungarian public.260
Blikk does not have a clear preference on gender issues. While its male editor did not
think the situation of women in Hungary was problematic at all, a female journalist assigned
great importance to the empowerment of women.261 According to the newspaper’s editor,
there is not too much discrimination against women, at least in his own profession of
journalism it is not really the case. The time will come when more women will be members
of parliament, yet it will be the result of social development and not of legal pressure or
inference of the EU.262
2.4.1 Common views
Hungarian media actors cannot be classified as pro- or anti-diversity in a straightforward way.
The right wing newspaper Magyar Nemzet and the right wing television channel HírTV
dictated by their conservative/right wing agenda vocally support the cause of Hungarian
minorities abroad and are highly sensitive to the situation of national minorities elsewhere.
Yet, at the same time, they tend to convey a negative tone about the Roma, which is the
largest minority in Hungary, and present other groups, such as sexual minorities in a negative
light. By contrast, Népszabadság, the left leaning political daily and MTV1 follow the most
politically correct line, presenting the Roma and sexual minorities with great sensitivity,
while also expressing interest in Hungarian minorities abroad. Thus, Népszabadság has an
opposing stance on diversity to Magyar Nemzet when it comes to homosexuals or the Roma,
since it presents groups representing domestic diversity – Roma and sexual minorities – with
much sympathy.
Blikk is a tabloid newspaper that is characterized by its aspiration to be politically
neutral. Although the broadsheet is pro-diversity when it comes to Roma or homosexual
issues, its excessive ambition for political neutrality often prevents it from taking a clear
stance in the news stories it publishes when racism is manifested. Dictated by its aspiration to
remain politically neutral Blikk tries to discuss problems related to minorities without
presenting the stories’ minority aspect.263 As a result, its pro-diversity attitude is more often
than not implicit rather than explicit. Altogether, Hungarian media, regardless of the
particular actors’ specific political preferences, show a lot of interest in diversity issues,
especially to their ethnic and national minority aspect. This can be explained by the
Hungarian public’s high sensitivity to this issue area owing to Hungary’s special historical
legacy – Hungary due to its territorial losses after WWI has 2.5 million co-ethnics living in
the surrounding countries. Hungarian citizens are naturally interested in the situation of these
258
“Kiengedték a romaverı fiatalokat,” www.blikk.hu., 09. 07. 2008.
“İk reklámozzák a melegfesztivált,” www.blikk.hu., 07. 06. 2008.
260
261
262
263
259
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minorities not only due to personal ties but also because ethnic Hungarians at certain times
faced repression from the neighbor countries’ governments. Moreover, relations between the
Hungarian minority and the majority in the neighbor countries are often marked by serious
tensions. For this reason, Hungarians are interested in minority issues, not only in the
neighborhood, but also in general, which is matched by great media attention to the subject.
The two right wing media actors, Magyar Nemzet and HírTV, however, are the most
concerned about the survival of the nation and national identity in general.
Although all media actors focus a lot on Hungarian minorities abroad, and are on the
whole sympathetic to their demands, their particular preferences related to Hungarian
minorities abroad differ greatly as reflected by their different views on citizenship, free
movement, and political rights, which will be discussed later on. Except for Blikk, all the
selected media actors seemed to agree that minorities should enjoy collective rights in the
sphere of education, language use etc. Moreover, the community’s size and not its status of
being a historical or an immigrant minority – coming from or outside of the EU – should
determine fundamentally whether its members should be entitled for such rights or not.
3 VIEWS ON EU POLITY AND POLICIES
3.1 Political Parties’ Views on the EU Polity and Policies
Let us now turn our attention to more specific views about the EU Polity of our selected
institutional actors. We will review questions related to EU enlargement, more or less
centralization, citizenship or asylum policy, free movement within the Union, or policy
making on the supranational level. We shall first review what each of our selected political
parties has to say about these issues and we will try to conclude our section in what appears to
be commonly shared by all.
When it comes to the future of the EU, MSZP is a supporter of more centralization and
integration. This is justified by the belief that centralization is the only solution because
nation states cannot cope with globalization by themselves. While some difference exists
among the respondents, all agree that there is a need to strengthen the influence of the EU in
the policies of member states and that the adoption of the new constitution would have meant
more centralization and integration, as well as the EU becoming more active in new policy
fields.264 The party is also critical of the current EU bureaucracy and claims that the EU
should also speed up its bureaucratic procedures and make them more flexible in order to
enable more immediate intervention. The party sees the need for a more unified Europe, but it
thinks a United States of Europe is impossible and would rather see member states give up
their protectionism. Only one respondent claimed that he would prefer a more localized
Europe when it comes to issues of healthcare, social protection, educational cultural policy,265
otherwise the MSZP is a strong supporter of unified action on the part of the EU.
MSZP also views integration as neither weakening nor strengthening national identities,
but having a positive impact on the tolerance of the people. It was commonly agreed upon by
respondents that one could be a very proud national and still be in support of integration,
since while in the past globalization weakened national identities, identities became
fashionable in the past few years, and they seemed to gain strength now. Thus, integration
only strengthens the identities of the different groups, makes us familiar with diversity, and
can portray diversity as a value. Respondents also noted there was no sense of a European
264
265
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identity in Hungary, and this was a fault of the EU, because EU membership did not translate
into people’s European identification, into being proud of the EU.266
MSZP also underlines the importance of gender equality. In Hungary, during state
socialism the assurance of equality between the genders was one of the main political aims
(although there was no proper quality between the sexes before 1989) and this is an important
goal for the party today as well. While respondents agreed that integration and EU
membership had positive effects on gender equality because of the spillover effects of EU
norms in Hungary,267 it was generally claimed that general practice still lagged behind policy,
and one respondent argued that he thought Hungary made regress on gender issues.268 MSZP
politicians believe that gender equality can be affected primarily by government policy, but as
the EU is a multi-player institution, all types of problems can be brought up, and having
multiple interests represented in the EU bodies helps to formulate adequate policy.
Although it did not receive much attention in the party program or within the interviews,
other types of societal diversity are believed to be strengthened by European integration, too.
Tolerance promoted by integration is beneficial for all types of minority groups and while
differences between the member states exist, the EU has strengthened the identity of other
type minorities because the EU provides a set of good examples of how problems of these
groups can be solved. As such, as one MSZP politician claimed, the EU was a good reference
point for these groups when they formulated their claims.269
Although FIDESZ is a declared supporter of EU integration, the party has always had an
ambivalent position regarding the EU. Even at the time of Hungary’s accession, FIDESZ’s
official statements were in support of membership, yet it claimed that accession at all costs
was something unacceptable to Hungary. This ambivalence is once again apparent in the
responses of the party members as some respondents would support further integration,270
while others would strengthen the autonomy of the member states.271 Yet others would
welcome more centralization in specific policy fields such as the protection of human rights
and minority rights but would claim more autonomy for member states to deal with issues of
cultural autonomy.272 One respondent favored a federalist view of the EU claiming that only
such an arrangement would guarantee that the diversity within the EU would survive the
assimilatory pressures of integration.273 What seemed to be agreed upon is that the EU could
be more centralized in its foreign policy or economic relations with the rest of the world, and
that all member states should be treated as equals when deciding about common issues. All
agreed that it was a priority to make the EU more effective, which would mean that the EU
has to diminish and fasten its bureaucracy.
The same ambiguity can be noticed when it comes to evaluating the effects of EU
integration on diversity: some believed integration had positive effects, others claimed it
weakened national identity, while yet others claimed that its effects were yet to be seen. Even
the respondent who claimed integration had positive effects on diversity noted that some
groups might get more homogenized because of integration. Yet, while this homogenizing
pressure was a problem, he believed that national identity was becoming more conscious.274
Another respondent similarly argued that integration weakened national identity, yet national
266
268
269
270
271
272
273
274
267
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identity would remain important forever and would remain significant forever.275 As one
respondent argued, effects of integration could be seen as a two step process: one would be
the spontaneous processes that changed people's mentality, and second would be the political
response given to integration. As such, integration is a challenge for diversity because
integration can diminish diversity, but it is also an opportunity because the EU supports the
preservation of identities.276
Respondents agreed that diversity within the member states was strengthened by
integration and minorities spread over many countries also enjoyed these benefits. Integration
has a positive effect on the social acceptance of people with disabilities, (one of EP members
from FIDESZ is a disabled person) and has important positive effects on protecting gender
equality or the wider acceptance of other types of societal diversity though this phenomenon
might not happen only because of the EU, but because of the globalization process as well.277
MKMP was never in support for unconditional EU membership and integration. This was
largely confirmed by the respondents that all had a preference for strengthening the autonomy
of the member states in the future development of the EU. All respondents claimed that they
were unsatisfied with the current EU system because inequalities among the member states
were significant and small states like Hungary always lost out in the face of large countries’
interest. Small countries should be provided with additional means in order to catch up with
the more successful EU members. One respondent claimed that the EU was nothing but
concentrated capital to exploit the workers and as such it was unacceptable.278 Another
argued that creating centralized bodies was not useful, as problems could be best addressed
on the local level.279 Yet another argued that the EU should be entirely rethought because the
present centralization harmed the self-determination of some countries. As such, the present
system should be terminated and a block of independent nations with more autonomy for the
members should be built on the will of these nations in some form of federation.280
Respondents also had a skeptic view on the relationship between EU enlargement and
diversity, claiming that diversity was strengthened where it was in the interest in the EU, and
it weakened where the EU wanted to weaken it.281 There was a general agreement between
respondents that EU enlargement weakened national identity because the union enabled those
who wanted to leave to do so more easily. One respondent went on to argue that integration in
fact would destroy smaller nations as they would be unable to resist the pressure of the
Bologna process to blur everything that is in Europe and porous borders would lead to a loss
of identity.282 Yet others argued that although the EU’s proclaimed goal was to protect ethnocultural diversity, since the EU was principally an economic union, integration would weaken
national identity. Only one respondent expressed a more moderate view claiming that
enlargement was bad for nation-states but good for ethnic and national diversity.283
The same pessimistic views were expressed regarding the effect of EU enlargement on
gender equality. Most of the respondents claimed that EU membership was irrelevant for
gender equality in Hungary as women were still dominated by men in society. Opinions
among respondents also conflicted, some argued that EU enlargement might have a positive
impact on gender equality by offering women more opportunity,284 while others saw the
275
277
278
279
280
281
282
283
284
276
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difference between the sexes was strengthening due to the difficulties of employment.285 One
respondent actually thought that EU enlargement brought women into an artificially
dominating role and thus gender equality was threatened (from a male perspective), while in
reality the issue of gender was not that important because it was not gender but other social
categories that are responsible for discrimination.286
Respondents claimed that EU enlargement had a mixed effect on other forms of societal
diversity. Some claimed that other type minorities were affected differently by integration.
Some groups, like generational groups, remained unaffected; there were places where for
example religious or sexuality groups strengthened, in other places these weakened. One
respondent declared that there was no reason to expect that other types of diversity would
benefit from EU enlargement in the foreseeable future, while yet another claimed that it was
only the multinational companies and the capitalists that benefited from the EU and all other
groups were worse off.287
3.1.1 Political rights
MSZP has been a strong supporter of EU minority rights, and it was the MSZP-led
government that tried to push the other members to incorporate minority rights provisions in
the new European constitution. The party agrees to financial support of minority cultures and
the usage of languages, and other minority rights because these are considered especially
useful for the Hungarian diasporas in countries neighboring Hungary. Respondents confirmed
the official party line in support for EU level minority rights, and there was only a minor
disagreement in relation to the exact rights to be granted by the EU: some would include
political representation rights while others remained at the level of antidiscrimination,
cultural, and educational rights.288 All agreed that there was a need for at least some EU
guidelines on minority rights that all member states should adhere to; it was only one
respondent that claimed observance of human rights would be enough for the protection of
minorities.289 All other respondents noted that the EU should grant minority rights, although
there was reluctance to do so on the part of the member states even though a number of
agreements and guidelines already existed today, but it would be of a great help to the
minorities if EU laws would be formulated in this respect.
All MSZP members argued that political rights were linked with citizenship and should
remain so. Most stressed that all non-citizens are entitled to cultural rights but voting rights
should be restricted – as it was provided by the current legislation that enabled only residing
EU nationals to vote in European elections and granted local government voting rights to
those non-nationals that had a valid long term residence permit. All respondents stressed that
voting rights should be coupled with duties such as paying taxes in the same country. As such
voting rights should be given only to people that lived in the country.290 As one respondent
argued, voting rights should be connected to acquiring citizenship and this should be
acceptable to all non-citizens because if someone lived in the country long enough, he would
eventually get citizenship and thus gained voting rights.
FIDESZ’s ambiguous standing vis-à-vis the EU can also be noted when it comes to the
question whether the EU should provide EU minority rights that member state could not
overrule. Respondents were mainly skeptical and most of them claimed that the EU should
not provide such rights as all central decisions might have traps, and in the end they might
285
287
288
289
290
286
48
BOZOKI
simply fail. Yet most of the respondents would also welcome such rights with respect to
ethno-national minorities because of their interest in the Hungarian co-ethnics living in other
EU countries. Even supporters of EU minority rights limited their preference to the use of
minority languages and cultural autonomy but not voting and representation rights.291
FIDESZ would have preference thus for EU minority rights that were cultural, but would
leave substantive political rights in the competence of the member states. The party would
also welcome legislation that would mandate state support for minority institutions and the
exercise of their cultural rights. It was only one respondent that claimed the EU already had
minority rights legislation for ethno-national minorities; although he noted that some
member-states have not yet ratified these.292
All of FIDESZ supported political rights for non-citizens and respondents pointed to the
current legislation that granted participation rights in local and European elections to all those
who has a legal residence. Nevertheless, respondents also unanimously rejected the idea that
non-citizens would have any right to participate in national elections, claiming that only
citizens should have this right. Respondents from FIDESZ would not differentiate among the
different immigrants when it comes to local elections, it should not matter whether
immigrants come from the EU or not. Having supported dual citizenship, respondents also
argued that in cases of dual citizenship, people should be able to exercise their political rights
in both states; there was no need to resign this right in one of the countries. Only one
respondent went as far as to argue that immigrants should be able form their own political
parties if they decided so.293
MKMP members were also against empowering the EU to mandate minority rights that
member states could not overrule. Only two respondents claimed that EU rights on public
funding for the development of minority cultures and languages could be acceptable.294 Most
of the respondents claimed that centralized regulation could not be used for all minorities, and
emphasized that central bodies would not be able to provide adequate solution for protection
of ethno-cultural minorities, gender equality or other types of diversity. MKMP would rather
support that these issues remained in the competence of the member states. Only one
respondent welcomed the idea of EU minority rights that could include the use of native
languages, cultural rights, and autonomy rights for the minorities.295
MKMP people were reluctant to grant political rights to non-citizens, claiming that
political rights were connected to citizenship. Respondents argued that if non-citizens desired
to have political rights they had to apply for citizenship. MKMP members also emphasized
that people should only have voting rights in the country that they lived in and paid taxes to.
Most respondents did not object to non-citizens forming associations, but it was only two
respondents that recognized that in the present Hungarian system non-citizens could vote in
local elections and/or European elections, while the others seemed to be unaware of this legal
provision.296 The respondents also insisted that the issue of granting political rights to noncitizens was an issue that should be decided solely by the nation-state.
3.1.2 Citizenship
When it comes to granting citizenship, MSZP supported the current Hungarian legislation that
prescribed long term residence, as well as passing of a language and an adaptation test for
would-be citizens. It was commonly accepted that everybody who wanted to gain citizenship
291
293
294
295
296
292
49
BOZOKI
should be able to do so and no group should be excluded for any reason. Thus, MSZP would
not differentiate among future applicants based on where they came from, what their religion
was, etc. but all respondents agreed that they would further ease acquiring citizenship for
Hungarian co-ethnics from neighboring countries. It is interesting to note that while MSZP
campaigned against the citizenship for Hungarian co-ethnics in neighboring countries in the
2004 referendum, all but one of the respondents297 claimed that they supported the institution
of dual citizenship, but as the party president put it, the party thought that granting citizenship
to anybody was an individual decision and not an automatic right based on common
ethnicity.298 Nevertheless, party members believed that the importance of origins should be
recognized as Hungarian diaspora members had a lot in common with Hungary. They also
argued that granting only long-term residence but not citizenship for Hungarians from
neighboring countries would translate into the state declaring that these people would not
belong to Hungary.299 Some believed that EU integration could make this question irrelevant
as sooner or later all the members of the Hungarian diaspora would become EU citizens.300
Somewhat opposed to this, MSZP considered citizenship policy as something that should
remain the competence of the member states. While socialist respondents agreed that
becoming an EU citizen should be a possibility given to everyone, they found acceptable no
more centralization than the creation of some flexible framework of citizenship rights that
member states could individually adapt to.301 Many claimed that a regime of direct EU
citizenship was unreal, and such regulation could not be made as member states faced
different problems and individual member state policy was very divergent at the moment.
FIDESZ was one of the initiators of the 2004 referendum about granting Hungarian
citizenship to the Hungarian co-ethnics living outside of Hungary; therefore, it was little
surprise that all representatives of the party had strong support for dual citizenship, one going
as far as claiming that dual citizenship was a basic human right.302 Otherwise the party was
content with the current Hungarian legislation that mandated long-term residence and the
passing of a language test and an adaptation test for would be citizens. Respondents
confirmed this position claiming that the current Hungarian law on citizenship treated fairly
the conditions of gaining citizenship – even if one respondent pointed out that Hungarian
citizens themselves might have problems passing the adaptation test.303 Respondents agreed
that no one should be prevented from gaining citizenship if one decided he/she would like to
come to Hungary. All respondents claimed restricting migration would be unacceptable yet
all would prefer immigrants that know Hungary's culture and language.
When confronted with the possibility for immigrants to gain EU citizenship without first
becoming a citizen of a member state, all but one respondent argued that only citizens of
member states should be able to claim EU citizenship. They argued that European citizenship
did not exist and citizenship policy should be left in the competence of member states and
policy in this regard should not be centralized. On the other hand, one respondent claimed
that he would welcome such a possibility for direct EU citizenship for immigrants and he
thought having a centralized regulation to deal with this issue could be a solution for all
member states.304
MKMP respondents were satisfied with the current Hungarian legislation on granting
citizenship, and all agreed that long term residence was a condition of citizenship, as well as
297
299
300
301
Interview with MSZP3, Interview with MSZP5, Interview with MSZP4
302
303
304
298
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BOZOKI
learning the language and passing an adaptation test. No automatic right to citizenship was
mentioned by any respondent. Respondents claimed that the same regulation should apply to
all immigrants; the only exception from the rule should be for Hungarian co-ethnics from
neighboring countries. It was also commonly stressed that those applying for citizenship
should have a secure and legal living, and all would-be citizens should follow the Hungarian
laws and the constitution.
Although all of the respondents would ease the citizenship application of Hungarian coethnics, some of them were undecided about the question of dual citizenship.305 Half of the
respondents claimed that they would support dual citizenship to Hungarians living abroad,
but one respondent emphasized that dual citizenship should not mean extending franchise to
those that do not live in Hungary. Accordingly, those who received dual citizenship should
decide in which country they wished to live, to which country's economy they wished to
contribute and as nobody wanted to pay double taxes he/she should not get voting rights in
both countries.306
Asked whether EU citizenship should be available without first obtaining the citizenship
of one of the member states, MKMP respondents unanimously declared that only citizens of
member states should be able to become EU-citizens. They claimed all citizenship policies
should remain in the competence of nation states, without any central interference. One
respondent argued that once member-state citizenship was granted everybody could enjoy the
EU because borders were freely crossable within the Union,307 while others claimed that
although some Europe wide norms could be applied, EU was still a conglomeration of the
nation states.308
3.1.3 Free Movement
All socialists respondents agreed that free movement rights within the EU are to be enjoyed
by everybody who legally entered the EU or had a valid residence there, not only EU citizens.
MSZP also opposed any restriction of these rights with regard to employment, though some
restrictions of these rights for third country nationals could be maintained.309 All respondents
agreed that it was detrimental to the country’s image if the Roma sought asylum in large
numbers in other EU countries, and while all agreed that there were multiple problems that
the Roma must face in Hungary, this would not amount to persecution thus their claims for
asylum would be unjustified and illegitimate.310
MSZP did not see the flow of asylum seekers as a problem for Hungary, respondents
argued that asylum was at a low level and could be handled. Some respondents pointed out
that in the future Hungary would most likely shift from being a transit country to being a
target country and this would put pressure on the receiving institutional system. If large
number of asylum seekers would have to be accommodated that would put cultural and
economic stress on the country. This was especially true because of the closeness of the
Balkans, and as one respondent claimed, Hungary already experienced such influxes
previously.311
MSZP would welcome some centralization and deepened integration on the questions of
migration, free movement, or asylum seeking, including the granting of political rights to the
immigrants, but respondents claimed that while some issues should be regulated on the EU
305
307
308
309
310
311
306
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BOZOKI
level, what was needed for the present was that questions of free mobility, migration
(including the political rights of migrants), asylum seekers and illegal migration were decided
on a national level but within an EU framework. Thus, MSZP would welcome an EU
legislation that remained a flexible prescription that would give chance for individual member
state response in policy making. The rationale put forward was that the situation of the
country, how prepared it was economically, socially, and politically might also affect policy
implementation. Respondents also stressed that having some levy at the national level would
enable Hungary to protect the Hungarian diaspora in surrounding countries.312
FIDESZ has been a vocal critic of restrictions of the right of free movement within the
EU and this was confirmed by the respondents who all agreed that those persons that had a
legal residence or a legal entry to a member state should be free to move within the EU. It
was only one respondent that claimed some restrictions of free movement should exist
because the member states should be able to control migration processes associated with the
free movement of resources and economic interests associated with integration and
globalization.313 Another noted that movement rights for people outside of the EU should be
decided by the individual member states because Portugal might have affinity to some
immigrants, while Sweden might have totally different preferences.314 All respondents found
migration of ó poor people or prostitutes within the EU to be part of the reality and as such
they would not control it. However all respondents made a strong claim against the Roma that
seek asylum in another EU country claiming this would be at least awkward but often
illegitimate as Roma claims for prosecution would be unfounded and illegitimate.
The respondents from FIDESZ were also cautious regarding the effects of international
migration, and claimed that while it could have advantages such as solving employment
needs or bringing young people to an aging society, it could mean further stress for the social
security system of the host country or raised chances of conflict between the majority and the
minority. Only one respondent was entirely open to immigration claiming that in the late 50s,
when Hungarians emigrated from the country they were unreservedly accepted in the West,
and Hungary should follow this example and should accept incoming migrants in the same
way.315 Some considered large scale migration could threaten national communities,
especially if the host country was a smaller one like Hungary.316 They claimed that although
there was nothing to legally object to regarding migration, in the long term migration could
be dangerous as it would make some regions of the world to gradually lose their people,
while others, more advanced ones, would become more and more overcrowded if people
could freely move.
One respondent was against accepting labor migrants from third countries, poor
migrants, and migrants with health problems,317 while the majority of respondents claimed
they would not differentiate among immigrants and would not exclude anybody
automatically. Most of the respondents found it important to emphasize once again that they
would extend preferential treatment to co-ethnic migrants. For the same reason, all
respondents claimed that migration policy, including the political rights of migrants, should
treat preferentially not only EU nationals, but also countries where Hungarian diasporas live.
All respondents agreed that in the case of illegal migration each case should be evaluated
individually, and all argued that immigration policy was to remain in the competence of the
nation states in order to enable the state to filter immigration according to its needs.
312
314
315
316
317
313
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BOZOKI
Most of the respondents claimed that asylum seekers were not a problem for Hungary
because their numbers was low. One interviewee argued that there would be too many asylum
seekers if there were no checks in place. Another argued that the flow of refugees was not a
heavy problem for Hungary yet, but it would be a growing issue. Yet another claimed asylum
flows were a problem for any country because a new situation within society could emerge,
with new problems.318 Most of the respondents agreed that working on establishing safe
zones close to places where asylum seekers came from was important because everybody had
the right to a decent life in his home country.319
For all these reasons members of FIDESZ had a strong preference for laws on
immigration and free movement to be formulated on the national level. Some of the
respondents were open to some EU legislation on the subject, but they claimed this should
only be some general EU guidelines or prescriptions, a flexible framework at the
supranational level that would give options for the member states for a flexible adaptation of
this framework. It was only one respondent who thought regulations should be made on the
EU level but even this respondent saw EU policy as a result of a set of compromises between
the member states, underlying the importance of individual member state interest.
A great disparity among the views on the right of free movement within the EU of the
MKMP respondents can be identified. Some argued that all those that reside or enter the EU
legally should have the same free movement rights, and there should be no restriction on
these rights,320 while others claimed that free movement is not right, migration is to be
opposed,321 and yet others claimed that some restrictions of these rights such as applying for
residence after a 90 days stay make sense.322 One respondent would prefer preferential
policies on free movement for Hungarian co-ethnics. All the respondents agreed that
migration is due to mainly economic reasons, and they found that there should be controls
against Roma seeking asylum in another EU country because such claims would not be
justified.
Most of the respondents were wary of international migration. One respondent claimed
that migration was nothing but a result of exploitation, a product of the capitalist world
order.323 In line with this argument most of the respondents feared that immigrants would
take away jobs from Hungarians, therefore they would call upon policies to prevent cheap
labor migration.324 Many respondents found important that migration should be regulated
according to the needs of the host country.325 They also pointed out that migration would
bring new problems to the host society as integration of immigrants could be difficult.326
Almost all respondents claimed that illegal migrants could not be accepted, and there was
only one respondent who claimed that he would not impose limits on migration.327 Yet again,
some respondents would ease immigration of Hungarian co-ethnics from neighboring
countries,328 others would object to such preferential treatment arguing that the Hungarian
diasporas would disappear if everybody could easily come to Hungary.329
318
320
Interview with MKMP5, Interview with MKMP6, Interview with MKMP3
321
322
323
324
325
326
327
328
329
319
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BOZOKI
MKMP does not really have a clear stance on asylum. Most of the respondents claimed
they did not know much about the issue, and they argued that some kind of checks on asylum
should be in place because refugees could be a financial burden on Hungary and could take
away jobs from Hungarians. Respondents all agreed that while asylum seeker flows did not
seem to be a problem at present, these could become more serious in the future. Some
respondents claimed that people belonging to groups that had difficulties with integration or
those considered problematic should not be accepted,330 while one interviewee claimed that
everybody who respected human rights should be accepted into Hungary.331 Notwithstanding
these differences, it was commonly agreed that asylum claims should be evaluated on a caseby-base basis and only those cases that were legitimate should be accepted.
Respondents did not agree whether regulations on the free movement of people
(including the political rights of non-citizens) should be formulated on the European level or
at the national one. About half of the respondents expressed their skepticism towards the EU
and claimed these policies should remain in the competence of nation-states.332 On the one
hand, some expressed concerns that if every country formulated its own policies, no unified
Europe would exist; while on the other hand, if Europe constructed policy that might just not
work locally. These respondents argued that some kind of norms and rules should exist at the
European level to guide member state policy, but these should be constructed bottom-up.333
Demonstrating well how diverse the views within the party were on this issue, one of the
respondents declared that clear central decision should be made on all questions related to
migration and free movement on the EU level except for political rights.334
3.1.4 Enlargement
MSZP considered that all candidates for EU membership should fulfill the Copenhagen
criteria, i.e. be economically developed and have a democratic record. No respondent made
any reference whether candidates were expected to respect diversity. While respondents
stressed that the same application criteria should apply to all candidates, their opinion ranged
widely on what should be the limits of European enlargement, though the general norm was
to limit the enlargement to the European continent. Some argued that European countries,
including Turkey, could become members if they fulfilled accession criteria,335 while others
believed that the EU had already reached its Eastern border. As one respondent claimed, the
EU had both a cultural border and a physical border, thus North Africa was a different
continent and should not be a member. Accordingly, the accession of Romania and Bulgaria
had already expanded the cultural border of the EU since these countries reflected a different
religion than the rest of Europe, but Turkey had a different civilizational background although
it was a NATO member therefore it should not become a member.336
MSZP viewed enlargement as fundamentally increasing the diversity within the EU and it
argued that integration had positive effects on diversity. Some respondents claimed that even
more could have been done, and the EU could function as an important reference point for
other type minorities or for gender equality.337 Respondents declared that if diversity was a
basic value of European community then support programs and different incentives were
welcome and legitimate. Most respondents would welcome further EU legislation to deal
330
332
Interview with MKMP2, Interview with MKMP5, Interview with MKMP3.
333
334
335
Interview with MSZP5, Interview with MSZP4
336
337
331
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BOZOKI
with issues of ethno-national diversity, gender equality or other type minorities. Most
considered important that the development of EU policy should become more rigid gradually,
and claimed that support programs and incentives were very important in creating better
opportunities and opening up cultural relations.338 One respondent pointed out that having
strict legislation might not lead to results, but EU incentives and funds were necessary to
change mentalities first. Most of the party members were inclined to support more rigid EU
laws for achieving gender equality than they would do so in the case of protecting diversity.
When it came to the conditions of accepting new members to the EU, FIDESZ
respondents claimed that Copenhagen criteria must be fulfilled. All of the party members
found important to add that candidates should respect ethno-national diversity and gender
equality. Opinions varied though regarding who could become future members of the EU.
Although FIDESZ is a conservative party on the right, about half of the respondents were
open to accession by virtually any country, claiming that admission to the EU should not
mean that candidates should accept the Christian cultural background of being European. The
remaining respondents confirmed a more conservative standing when they claimed it was
important how compatible the candidate country's culture was with Europe, and countries that
fell out of the European community values, which rested on Christianity should not become
members, therefore Turkey, North Africa and the Caucasus countries as well as Russia should
only have a special status arrangement with the EU.
Most of the FIDESZ respondents noted that enlargement had increased ethno-national
diversity of the EU. More importantly, most of the respondents considered enlargement was
positive for Hungarian minorities, and was especially good for the Hungarian diaspora in
other EU countries. One respondent argued that the effects of enlargement on diversity
remained to be discovered in the future; integration was both a challenge and an opportunity.
It was a challenge because integration could diminish diversity, and it was an opportunity
because the EU supported the preservation of identities. Some expressed more critical views
arguing that enlargement was not thought through properly and, as such, did not solve many
problems of diversity, e.g. the Hungarian diaspora's problems remain unresolved although it
was undeniable that the means available to Hungarian minorities had multiplied due to
enlargement.
Given that most of the FIDESZ respondents seemed to be wary of transferring policy
making to a centralized EU level, it was a surprise that all of the respondents agreed that a
more rigid EU legislation was needed for the protection of ethno-national minorities as the
present incentives and programs were insufficient. It was argued that national policies on
ethno- national diversity and disability groups or gender equality should be backed up by EU
legislation, and member states should voluntary ratify existing EU legal norms.
Most of the respondents from MKMP believed that EU enlargement was not conditional
on some objective criteria but was always made on the basis of political interest. All
respondents stressed that all candidate countries should be evaluated against the same criteria.
Some of the mentioned criteria were democratic rule, and respect for human rights as well as
ethno-national diversity.339 Opposed to this, one respondent declared that there is nothing to
be gained by membership and countries should not join the EU.340 The rest of the respondents
argued that the limits of enlargement should be the geographic borders of Europe, thus
Caucasus countries or the North African region should be excluded from membership.341 Yet
others stressed that Turkey’s accession would be highly debatable.342
338
340
341
342
339
55
BOZOKI
The general confusion among MKMP members was once again noticeable when they
were asked to evaluate the relationship between enlargement and diversity. There was no
consensus, as some respondents claimed that enlargement was bad for ethno-cultural
diversity, gender equality, and other types of diversity;343 while others saw it as having
positive effects on diversity.344 One respondent emphasized that the relationship between the
sexes was now in imbalance because the EU put women in a dominating position, which was
totally artificial.345 Respondents could only agree upon the fact that the only winners of
enlargement were large transnational corporations while the working class only lost due to
integration.
To counter the negative developments that were associated with enlargement, all
respondents found important that the EU should offer financial support for different
incentives and support programs on these issues. Nevertheless, respondents claimed that they
would not accept EU regulations on these issues, and even if there were some EU norms or
rules to guide individual member state response, these regulation should be built from the
bottom up. Yet again, one of the respondents was more supportive than the rest of MKMP and
declared that regulations on the EU level are needed to maintain ethno-national diversity and
strengthen gender equality in the member-states; and in case of other types of diversity the
existing policies and structures should be strengthened and further programs launched.346
3.1.5 Common Views
A wide array of opinions on the EU polity could be discerned from the responses received
and there seems to be little that all parties agree to. The entire spectrum from full support to
no support of EU centralization was represented, MSZP being most in favor of centralization
and MKMP standing for strengthening the individual member states. MSZP is a strong
supporter of EU centralization and integration, welcomes EU legislation in many policy
fields, and would especially support EU minority rights. Although FIDESZ is a declared
supporter of the EU, the party has an ambivalent standing towards centralization and
integration. Some of its respondents would support further integration, while others would
strengthen the autonomy of the member states. FIDESZ would have preference thus for EU
minority rights of a cultural content, but would leave substantive political rights in the
competence of the member states. MKMP, as expected, would prefer the strengthening of
member state sovereignty and would stop centralization of the EU, and would not welcome
EU level minority rights.
All parties claim that citizenship policy is something that should remain the competence
of the member states, and it is only the MSZP that welcomes some kind of flexible
prescriptive framework at the EU level on this issue. MSZP would also welcome
centralization on issues of migration, while FIDESZ and MKMP thought migration questions
should be decided domestically. While the socialists were most willing to accept all
immigrants, FIDESZ had a more cautious view saying that some filtering of migration was
necessary. MKMP respondents argued that migration should be limited in several aspects.
None of the parties considered asylum seeker flows to be a problem for the country.
MSZP respondents thought that enlargement had positive effects on diversity within the
EU and claimed it also helped gender equality and strengthening other types of diversity.
FIDESZ argued that integration is both a challenge for diversity because integration can
diminish diversity and an opportunity because the EU supports the preservation of identities.
MKMP had a more pessimistic understanding of EU integration claiming it was weakening
343
345
346
344
56
BOZOKI
and endangering national identities. Both MSZP and FIDESZ claimed that the Copenhagen
criteria should apply to all future members of the EU. MSZP seemed more open to enlarging
the EU beyond Europe’s geographic border, while some FIDESZ respondents argued in line
with the conservative stance of the party that the values of Christianity delimit enlargement.
MKMP argued similarly, though some party members claimed that no country should be
interested in joining the present EU as there is nothing to gain from accession.
3.2 NGOs’ Views on the EU Polity and Policies
Only two of the MCF respondents argued that the future development of the EU should be
towards strengthening the autonomy of the member states and the EU should only provide
guidelines to these regarding different policy issues.347 Two of the respondents were
undecided whether more or less centralization of the EU should be pursued,348 while another
respondent preferred to see other forms of change for the EU: better minority representation
on all levels, and strengthened institutions on all: local, regional, and the EU level.349
Opinions were also divided with regard to whether the EU enlargement had a positive or
negative impact on diversity. Two of the respondents had no opinion or argued the
enlargement had no effects on diversity,350 while another two respondents claimed that
enlargement affected negatively diversity as it contributed to the weakening of ethno-national
minorities, and especially the situation of the Roma was not addressed properly in the latest
cases of accession.351 Nevertheless, the last MCF respondent had a positive view of EU
enlargement, claiming integration had a positive influence on ethno-national diversity:
language, culture, traditions, customs all became more diverse.352 The same respondent also
felt that EU integration had strengthened gender equality and offered more opportunities to
other type of minorities. Only another respondent had a similar view of enlargement,353 in
contrast, while one respondent had no opinion on these issues,354 two respondents claimed
that EU integration had no affect on gender equality or other type of minorities.355
Similarly, Respondents from NANE could not agree in which direction the EU should
develop in the future. Two of the respondents preferred federalization,356 while another two
respondents claimed that the EU needed to become more centralized.357 The last respondent
was also in favor of centralization, but she claimed centralization was needed only in specific
policy fields.358 Opinions differed with regards to the impact of integration on diversity as
well, two respondents declared that they thought integration had no impact on diversity,359
while the remaining respondents said that due to integration diversity within member-states
and ethnic/national minorities spread over several member states also strengthened. Only one
respondent claimed that national identities and national cultures weakened due to
integration.360
347
349
Interview with MCF3
350
351
352
Interview with MCF3
353
Interview with MCF4
354
Interview with MCF2
355
356
357
358
359
360
348
57
BOZOKI
Interestingly enough, respondents did not agree whether EU integration had a positive or
a negative effect on gender equality. It was only three respondents that said integration had a
positive effect.361 In contrast, one respondent declared that she did not expect any impact of
European integration on gender equality,362 while yet another respondent claimed that the EU
was only doing ‘lip service’ to gender equality, but the effects of integration on gender
equality were missing.363 This dissatisfaction with the EU’s performance on gender equality
was also shared by another respondent, who claimed earlier that integration did have a
positive effect, but she claimed this was only on the discourse and not the practice of gender
equality.364 Similarly, only two respondents claimed that integration affected positively other
types of minorities.365
Asked about which direction the EU should develop in the future, Védegylet respondents
were largely in support for further centralization within the EU, only one respondent favoring
more a move towards more federalization at large.366 Only one respondent claimed that EU
integration was neutral to questions of diversity,367 but even this respondent said that diversity
within member-states should increase, and minorities spread over several states should be in a
better position thanks to integration. The rest of the respondents agreed that integration could
strengthen diversity, and all of the respondents claimed that other type minority groups and
gender equality benefited from integration and expected these types of diversity would
strengthen on a European arena.
To underline the confusion of opinions among MCF respondents we have to underline the
fact that all respondents claimed that the EU should be able to grant rights to minorities that
member states cannot overrule, independent whether they argued earlier in favor of
strengthening of member-state sovereignty vis-à-vis the EU. Respondents were in support of
supra-national rights that apply to all minorities, only two respondents found important to
underline the situation of the Roma,368 which was a surprising result for a Roma organization.
Respondents found important that anti-discrimination measures, public funding for minority
languages and cultures, representation rights as well as mobility rights were decided on the
EU level.
Asked whether they would grant political rights to non-citizens, MCF respondents
proved to be divided again. Three of the respondents claimed that political rights were due
exclusively to citizens,369 while the remaining two respondents said that non-citizens also had
political rights.370 Out of those opposing political rights to non-citizens, in fact one
respondent claimed that citizens of EU member states could have political rights,371 the others
opposed granting rights to these as well. From those who favored political rights for noncitizens, one respondents would grant voting rights to EU citizens for EU elections only,372
while the other respondent claimed that immigrants with valid residence permits should have
361
363
364
365
366
Interview with VED3
367
Interview with VED1
368
369
370
371
Interview with MCF5
372
Interview with MCF3
362
58
BOZOKI
political rights at all levels (national, regional and European), both active and passive, both in
their country of residence as well as the sending country.373
All of the NANE respondents supported that the EU should have powers to grant minority
rights that the member states could not overrule. Furthermore, each of the respondents
claimed that no distinction between the different groups should be made in this regard, but all
groups should be subject to EU policy. This was justified by the respondents’ belief that EU
policy could be trusted more than national one.374 Though some of the respondents did not
specify in detail, all of the respondents meant far reaching EU rights for minority groups;
those that went into the details argued for EU minority rights that included stricter antidiscrimination measures, public funding the development of minority cultures and languages,
voting/suffrage rights, representation rights, and mobility rights.375
All but one of the respondents said that political rights should be given to non-citizen
residents. The respondent who opposed granting political rights claimed that non-citizens
should have political rights in their country of origin until they gain citizenship in their host
country.376 The same respondent was the only one among the NANE respondents who
claimed that she would differentiate in granting political rights between EU and non-EU
citizens. The rest of the respondents argued that as long as someone was living in the country
and was paying taxes here, she or he had a right to say in what was happening, therefore she
or he should be granted both active and passive political rights.
Védegylet respondents were also all in support of the EU being able to grant minority
rights based on ethno-national belonging that could not be revised by the member states.
While all respondents supported vesting legislative power on the EU regarding minority
rights, two respondents found important to underline that if EU laws were impossible to
formulate they would still argue for the need of some principles how member states should
act upon when granting minority rights in order to have national legislatives regulations and
programs conform with each other.377
The majority of the respondents also said that political rights were to be extended to noncitizens as well, yet one respondent claimed that political rights were connected to
citizenship, therefore he was against extending these to non-citizens. Nevertheless, even this
respondent claimed later that non-citizens, residing for a longer time within the country could
have some restricted political rights, such as voting in local elections.378 While respondents
did not differentiate between the different categories of political rights, all were in supported
of EU citizens participating in EU and local elections, as well as long term-residents having
voting rights in local elections. One respondent claimed that he was willing to support voting
rights for EU citizens in legislative elections too, as long as these paid their taxes to the hostcountry and gave up their voting rights in their home country.379 All respondents found
important to mention that granting rights should also mean a set of obligations for those
receiving these.
3.2.2 Citizenship
Asked about granting Hungarian citizenship to immigrants, all MCF respondents underlined
the importance of long-time residence in the country as basic criteria for gaining citizenship.
While two of the respondents did not differentiate among would-be applicants, three
373
Interview with MCF2
375
376
377
378
Interview with VED1
379
Interview with VED3
374
59
BOZOKI
respondents claimed that origins as well as being born in the country should be recognized by
citizenship policy, and these respondents claimed that Hungarian diaspora members should
enjoy preferential treatment in gaining citizenship.380 One respondent underlined that
refugees should be able to gain citizenship easily.381 Respondents did not specify any
additional requirement immigrants should pass in order to gain citizenship, except one
respondent who would require a criminality record as well as passing of an adaptation test.382
Only one respondent claimed that he would distinguish between non-EU and EU applicants,
claiming the latter could gain citizenship easier.383
Asked about dual citizenship one MCF respondent was neutral,384 while three
respondents claimed that it was better if one renounced its previous citizenship. Two
respondents claimed that dual citizenship was not something to be valued,385 while the third
respondent justified his stand against dual citizenship with the economic consequences of the
influx of new citizens to the country.386 The last respondent from MCF claimed that granting
dual citizenship could be justified based on historic injustice, meaning Hungarian diaspora
members had a right to gain Hungarian citizenship.387 All respondents claimed that
immigrants should only be able to receive EU citizenship upon gaining the citizenship of a
member-state, and two respondents found important to underline that member-states should
be responsible solely for the formation of citizenship policies without any EU interference.388
Respondents from NANE had a varied view of who should receive citizenship, though all
agreed that citizenship should be open to all immigrants, irrespective of their origin or status.
The majority of the respondents said that the length of residence within the country should be
the most important criteria,389 while two of the respondents also claimed that would-be
citizens should also contribute to the country.390 None of the respondents mentioned specific
requirements for granting citizenship to immigrants, and while the majority of the
respondents said that citizenship policy should treat all applicants in the same manner, two
respondents would support preferential treatment for those that had similar cultural, ethnic, or
religious origins.391 All of the respondents were in support of dual citizenship as well.
Asked whether residents from non-EU-countries should have direct access to EU
citizenship or should EU citizenship only be derived from national citizenship in one of the
member-states, the majority of respondents answered that they preferred direct access to EU
citizenship.392 Nevertheless, one respondent considered that EU citizenship should only be
derived from national citizenship, though she argued member-states should coordinate their
citizenship policies.393 The last respondent said that direct EU citizenship could only work if
the EU functioned as a federation, but since this was not the case, the question was not
answerable.394
Védegylet respondents said that Hungary should be solely responsible for its citizenship
policy. While all the respondents claimed that everybody had a right to apply to citizenship,
380
Interview with MCF5
382
Interview with MCF1
383
Interview with MCF4
384
Interview with MCF2
385
386
Interview with MCF5
387
Interview with MCF3
388
389
Interview with NANE1, Interview with NANE2, Interview with NANE3, Interview with NANE4
390
391
392
393
394
381
60
BOZOKI
they said that having a preferential treatment, thus making the acquisition of citizenship easier
for Hungarian co-ethnics from abroad or for other EU citizens within this policy was
justified. All of the respondents were satisfied with the current Hungarian legislation that
called for an adaptation test and a language test besides the long term residency as condition
for applying for Hungarian citizenship. Respondents differed only with regard to their views
on dual citizenship, only one respondent was in support of dual citizenship in general,395 two
claimed that dual citizenship should be an individual choice,396 while the last respondent was
undecided on the issue.397
Asked whether residents from non-EU-countries should have direct access to EU
citizenship or EU citizenship should only be derived from national citizenship in one of the
member states, all respondents agreed that time had not yet come for this question.
Respondents said that granting citizenship was a decision that had to be made by the member
states, though discussions on the issue should be opened on the European level. Even if this
option was a reality, most of the respondents said they could only imagine acquiring
citizenship of a member state before gaining access to EU citizenship. Contrary to this view,
one respondent claimed that he was against a federalist model of the EU that such an EU
citizenship would presume.398
3.2.3 Free Movement
Respondents from MCF supported that every citizen and legal resident of the EU and non-EU
countries should be granted free movement within the EU. Two respondents claimed that the
way the Italian government treated the Romanian Roma that lived in Italy was unjust.399 The
other three respondents claimed that Roma asylum seekers should be accepted easier, as the
present practice only showed that they were treated as secondary citizens.400 Only one
respondent claimed that Roma asylum seekers should not be accepted automatically but
examined individually, and decision should be based on the behavior of the applicants.401
MCF respondents saw international migration as part of everyday life, and claimed that it
had advantages for the sending country such as decreasing unemployment or the income sent
home, while the receiving country could profit from skilled labor force and new cultural
influences. They identified disadvantages such as brain drain for the sending country, and
possible increased demand on the welfare system of the receiving country or hardship in
integrating the new immigrants. Most of the respondents would not put any restriction on
what immigrants they would let into the country; it was only one respondent that claimed he
would exclude economic migrants.402 Similarly, most of the respondents claimed that
immigration policies should treat all groups in the same way, and there should be no
exception. Only two respondents claimed that specific policies for immigration should be in
place for EU citizens,403 and citizens of countries that Hungary had historic ties with.404
No respondent found that asylum seekers posed any problem for Hungary, though one
respondent claimed that asylum seeker flows were a problem back in the early 90s, when
395
Interview with VED1
397
Interview with VED4
398
Interview with VED1
399
400
Interview with MCF3
401
Interview with MCF1
402
Interview with MCF5
403
Interview with MCF4
404
Interview with MCF5
396
61
BOZOKI
Hungary saw a large influx of asylum seekers, but he claimed the problem originated from
over-bureaucratic procedures, and this problem had been eliminated by now.405
Two respondents claimed that no EU-level regulation regarding free mobility of EU
citizens, gender equality, immigration, rights of native national minorities, citizenship,
political asylum, mobility, political rights of non-EU immigrants was needed but member
states should deal with these policies individually.406 The other three respondents argued that
the EU should only provide flexible prescriptions regarding these policy issues so member
states had some levy in applying these. Still, one respondent claimed that member-states
should have no option to opt out of EU directives,407 while the other claimed that member
states should have the right to refuse or flexibly join these.408
All of the NANE respondents claimed that residents from EU-countries and non-EUcountries should be granted free movement within the whole EU on an equal basis. Only one
respondent claimed that limitations of this right could be politically justifiable, though even
she argued that transition periods for new member-states with regard to freedom of
employment were in fact discrimination and irrelevant as only two percent of the EU
population worked abroad.409 Respondents claimed no limitation of the right to free
movement should be accepted, the Roma, the poor, or even prostitutes should be able to move
freely. Illegal migrants should never be sent back automatically to their country of origin, but
their cases should be investigated.
All of the respondents had a positive view of international migration; they argued that it
was beneficial since it contributed both to the sending and the host country. Respondents
were aware that migration could lead to brain-drain or large groups of people becoming
alienated from their country, or the integration of large number of foreigners into any country
can be challenging, but they argued that at the same time global injustice could be corrected;
democratic political values and positive practices could be spread. One respondent said that
international migration was good for the individual and the family, but not necessarily the
best for the nation or the state – on the one hand the state could lose its population, on the
other the host-state might run into problems with integrating immigrants.410
Similarly, every respondent supported the idea that all immigrants should be let into the
country, and the state should not discriminate among these based on origins or status. It was
only one respondent that claimed she was willing to treat members of the Hungarian diaspora
in a preferential way,411 while all the other respondents favored a uniform policy, one
respondent even specifying that she would not give any preference to Hungarian origin
immigrants.412 No respondent thought that flows of asylum seekers constituted any problem
for Hungary, in fact the majority argued that the state was granting too few asylum
applications.
The majority of respondents preferred a clear-cut solution on the EU level with regards to
whether laws on free mobility, minority rights, citizenship and political rights should be
decided on an EU or a member-state level.413 Another respondent also supported an EU level
solution, but she claimed that member states should have the right to refuse EU-level
regulation and flexibly join in as well as discuss options with other member states.414 The last
405
Interview with MCF3
407
Interview with MCF3
408
Interview with MCF4
409
410
411
412
413
414
406
62
BOZOKI
respondent was even less supportive of the EU, claiming that on these issues the EU should
only provide flexible prescriptions on the EU level and member-states should deal with these
issues individually.415
All Védegylet respondents said that they supported the same mobility rights to all citizens
of the EU member states and those with legal status within the EU. None of the respondents
would accept differentiation regarding these policies on European mobility. No respondent
was willing to limit the mobility rights of the Roma, the poor, or prostitutes; and each claimed
that the same rights should apply to EU citizens and to those that have legal papers to be
within the EU. The majority of the respondents was not willing to accept any limitation on
mobility rights, only one respondent said that limitation regarding employment should be
understandable.416
All of the respondents had a positive view of international migration, though each had
recognized its advantages and drawbacks. Respondents mentioned the economic effects of
migration that can be positive for both host and sending country, as well as the cultural
diversity brought by free movement. Nevertheless, respondents also recognized that
migration could lead to political, economical, and social problems, but the benefits of free
movement were thought to outweigh its drawbacks. Similarly, no respondent wanted to put
limits on migration into the country, they said no differentiation based on territorial origin,
social status, or any other category should be done with regard to would-be immigrants.
Nevertheless, one respondent claimed that economic migrants should only be let in when
there is a need for them.417 All agreed that illegal migration should be regulated, and cases
dealt with on an individual basis.
Asked whether they would apply preferential treatment to any group within migration
policy, while one respondent was undecided about the issue due to the lack of proper
knowledge of the subject, half of the respondents said that they thought having advantages for
EU citizens and members of the Hungarian diaspora was justified.418 The last remaining
respondent claimed that while it was reasonable to have more favorable treatment of
settlement permit policies for EU citizens, no other differentiation was to be made.419 All of
the respondents agreed that the flow of asylum seekers did not constitute a problem for
Hungary because of the very low number of asylum seekers. Nevertheless, one respondent
declared that he would exclude problematic asylum seekers, though he did not mention who
would be these.420
Asked whether laws on free mobility, minority rights, citizenship and political right
should be decided on an EU or a member-state level, most of the respondents declared that
they believed these were in the competence of member-states but the EU had an important
role in influencing these, expressing its common opinion, and stating guiding principles
providing some flexible prescriptions that allowed for flexible integration of the member
states. One respondent claimed that over time these prescriptions could be turned into EU
regulation.421 The remaining respondent claimed that he preferred definitive regulation on the
EU level to flexible prescriptions on these issues, unlike all the other respondents.422
415
Interview with VED1
417
Interview with VED2
418
419
Interview with VED4
420
Interview with VED2
421
Interview with VED3
422
Interview with VED4
416
63
BOZOKI
3.2.4 Enlargement
All of the MCF respondents agreed that the same accession criteria should apply to all
candidates and claimed that future EU members should respect diversity in order to become
part of the EU. Only two out of five claimed that respect for gender equality should also be a
fundamental criterion for successful accession.423 Only two respondents claimed that any
country should be able to apply for EU membership,424 while one respondent would exclude
Turkey as a future member because it did not respect gender rights;425 another would limit
enlargement to the European continent, but would include Turkey;426 while yet another would
exclude all countries that are not economically developed.427
MCF respondents were equally divided with regards to assessing the Eastern
enlargement with regard to ethno-national diversity: two claimed that while enlargement
increased diversity it put minorities into a more disadvantaged situation,428 while the other
two respondents said that enlargement was good for the minorities, especially the Roma and
women.429 The remaining respondent could not answer the question. Nevertheless, all
respondents agreed that there should be more support programs, incentives for national
adaptations by the EU, and a more rigid EU legislation on gender equality would be
welcomed.
With regards to EU enlargement, all of the NANE respondents argued that the same rules
and procedures of accession to membership should apply to all candidate states without
exception. It was also commonly believed that candidate states that did not fulfill the
Copenhagen criteria, did not have a proper democracy and human rights record, or did not
comply with EU legislation on ethno-national diversity or gender policy should not be
accepted as members. Two of the respondents went even further claiming that these criteria
should not apply only to would-be members, but should also be applied to member-states and
those that failed on any of these criteria should be excluded from the EU.430
Asked what should be the limits of EU enlargement, NANE respondents had different
views: one respondent claimed she did not know the answer,431 while another said that there
should be no limit, in fact anyone could become a member.432 Two respondents agreed that
the members of the European Council should become members.433 Yet the last respondent
was against including members of the European Council claiming it would make the borders
of the EU insecure. The same respondent claimed that the EU was large enough and no other
members but Iceland, Norway, and Switzerland should become members. She continued that
the Caucasus countries were too prone to conflict to be included in the EU, and she was
against Turkey becoming a member as she felt alienated by the fact that church and state were
not separated and minority rights were not respected there.434
All of the respondents agreed that the Eastern enlargement round had substantially
increased ethno-national diversity in the EU. Similarly, they also argued that enlargement had
positively influenced gender equality and minority rights in general, with regards to other
type of minorities. Nevertheless, all believed that support programs, incentives for national
423
425
Interview with MCF3
426
Interview with MCF4
427
Interview with MCF5
428
429
430
431
432
433
434
424
64
BOZOKI
adaptations by the EU, and a more rigid EU legislation were needed to maintain not only
ethno-national diversity, but also gender equality in both new and old member-states.
All of the Védegylet respondents claimed that countries could be denied EU membership
if they failed to meet the Copenhagen criteria or had an insufficient democracy and human
rights record. They also agreed that all applicants for EU membership should be weighted
against the same criteria, and no exceptions or variation in the accession conditions was
acceptable. Surprisingly for a pro-diversity NGO such as Védegylet, two respondents said that
countries without Christian cultural background should not be accepted.435 None of the
respondents was willing to draw the geographic limits of EU enlargement; they rather
emphasized political and economic conditions to be met by future members. As such, even
countries such as Russia or Turkey could eventually become members of the EU in the eyes
of the respondents, only the Maghreb countries were excluded by two of the respondents.436
Asked about their assessment of the Eastern enlargement of the EU, most of the
respondents claimed that Eastern enlargement has had a positive effect with regard to ethnonational diversity; all Central Eastern European cultures joined the EU and thus raised the
ethno-national diversity of the Community. It was only one respondent that claimed that
acceptance of Romania and Bulgaria was too hastily done, therefore the situation of ethnic
minorities there could have been better improved.437 Another respondent also pointed out that
the enlargement has created a difficult economic situation for many groups including
minority groups.438
Védegylet respondents were divided over whether EU policies or structures were
necessary to deal with diversity issues in the new and old member-states: half of the
respondents said that only support programs, incentives for national adaptations by the EU
were needed,439 while the other half campaigned for central, unified EU regulations and
common policies on these issues.440 Nevertheless, three of the four respondents agreed that on
issues of gender equality and the situation of other type minorities, such as sexuality groups, a
more rigid EU regulation was needed in both new and old member-states.441
3.2.5 Common views
The selected NGOs proved again that they had both similar and different views with regard to
the EU polity or its specific policy fields. For example, it was only within the Roma NGO
that respondents said they preferred strengthening the autonomy of member-states, all other
NGO supporter were in favor of either more centralization of the EU (the majority), or
federalization. Similarly, it was only within Védegylet that respondents claimed that
enlargement affected diversity as well as gender equality and other types of minorities
positively, while half of the respondents from the other NGOs was not sure integration had
any effect. Furthermore, NANE was more reserved in how much the EU achieved in gender
equality, while two MCF respondents said integration was bad for ethno-national minorities.
Interestingly enough, all of the respondents agreed that the EU should have the power to
grant minority rights that could not be overruled by a member-state. This was supported even
by those Roma respondents that argued earlier for strengthening member state autonomy.
Another interesting difference is that while the majority of the Roma respondents said that no
435
437
Interview with VED2
438
Interview with VED4
439
440
441
436
65
BOZOKI
political rights should be granted to non-citizens, virtually all other NGO members said that
these rights had to be granted to everybody.
A bit more coherence in the responses received from different NGOs could be noted
when it comes to specific policy fields. All NGO respondents supported citizenship to be
open to any applicant, and no one made any additional requirement for granting citizenship.
While everybody supported a citizenship policy that treated all applicants equally, members
of MCF and Védegylet also supported that immigrants with similar ethno-national or cultural
background – meaning the members of the Hungarian diaspora – should gain citizenship
easier. No common ground can be discerned with regards to dual citizenship: MCF
respondents were mainly against it, while NANE supported it, and Védegylet respondents said
it should be an individual choice. Similarly, NANE preferred direct access to EU citizenship,
while the other two NGOs claimed EU citizenship should be conditional to member-state
citizenship.
All of the NGOs said that everybody within the EU with a legal status should have the
same right to free movement. All of the respondents had a positive view of international
migration, though each had recognized its advantages and drawbacks. Similarly, all NGO
respondents claimed that all immigrants should be let into the country, and it was only
Védegylet respondents who would advantage EU citizens and members of the Hungarian
diaspora. No common ground could be discerned with regard to the effects of EU
enlargement, some respondents claimed enlargement was good for ethno-national minorities,
gender equality, or other type of minorities, while other thought the opposite, while yet others
were undecided. NGO respondents could not agree on the limits of EU enlargement either,
though a considerable number of respondents, irrespective of their affiliation claimed that any
country should be able to become a member. All accepted that countries that did not fulfill
the Copenhagen criteria and did not have a proper democracy and human rights record should
not be considered.
Differences could also be noted among the NGOs with regard to what solution they
preferred on these issues. On the one side, the majority of MCF respondents favored flexible
prescriptions on the EU level that allowed for flexible integration of the member states. On
the other side, NANE was in favor of a more rigid EU legislation, while Védegylet constituted
the middle ground, half of its members supporting prescription the other half preferring EU
legislation. Notwithstanding these differences, all three NGOs agreed that there should be
more support programs, incentives for national adaptations.
3.3 Think Tanks’ Views on the EU Polity and Policies
Out of the four selected Hungarian think tanks, only IWE conducts research on the European
Union on a constant basis. Századvég Foundation, as a part of the European Ideas Network,
did, in the past research EU-themes; Eötvös Károly Institute addressed the consequences of
accession on the Hungarian constitutional system, thus dealing with questions of the EU
polity marginally, while such questions were never in the focus of Political Capital. This
variation however did not significantly influence the elaborateness or the coherence of the
researchers’ views, as they all approached the European Union as the immediate context of
the Hungarian polity. Thus, as opposed to the media sector, which tends to display the EU as
something external to Hungary, the common attitude of think tanks was much more of
insiders. There was no institute that could be categorized as EU-skeptic, and occasional
skepticism of individual researchers was not correlated to their political or philosophical
views. Interestingly perhaps, this relatively accommodative attitude was not generally
combined with optimism where the influence of integration is concerned. Furthermore, few of
the researchers displayed an understanding of the EU as a value-community; pragmatic
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approaches emphasizing the economic and geopolitical rationale of integration were more
common.
As it was the case with regard to the notion of diversity, the Institute for World Economy
(IWE), that is, the research institute with the firmest background in EU-research seems to be
the hardest to cluster with respect to its researchers’ views on the EU polity, too. One of the
respondents had an external perspective on the EU, while the other two respondents showed
much more commitment to the EU as the object of their research and as their larger polity
context. As such, an institutional view on the desirable direction of the EU polity’s
development is impossible to retrieve. For one of the respondents, the most important task for
the EU would be the development of an ability to harmonize its member states’ interests; and
in this respect the union performs very poorly.442 The middle ground of the IWE is
represented by the respondent who thinks there are a lot of weak points of the EU polity (e.g.
its being over-bureaucratized), nevertheless, the EU is a very good control over national
polities with even worse weaknesses, and so a combination of centralization and
federalization is necessary.443 With even more confidence in integration, the third respondent
was a strong supporter of federalization, and said that the EU should function as a federal
state where interstate relations would flow as they do among two neighboring counties.444
With respect the impact of integration on ethno-national diversity, two of the respondents
said it had positive effects: as borders became permeable and people were more exposed to
encountering all kinds of differences, and so their attitudes toward these changed to their
benefit.445 On gender issues, however, the positive effect was not this direct. According to
one of the respondents, the EU’s commitment to furthering gender equality existed, at the
moment, only on the level of declarations, while another respondent argued that the
tendencies corroding families were not yet remedied by the proper means neither on the EU,
nor on the national levels. The third respondent did not think the EU would have an
autonomous impact in gender relations, as whatever it represented was determined by
agreements arrived at levels beyond the EU. The same respondent stated that the EU should
not grant minority rights that were not revisable by the member states to any group; it should
only observe the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.446 Another researcher thought this
question was not necessarily relevant as any decision on such powers were conditioned upon
the previous consent of the member states, while the third respondent was absolutely in favor
of attributing the EU with such capacity.
When asked about the need to implement EU policies or structures dealing with issues of
diversity or gender equality, one of the respondents was absolutely positive, saying that
existing diversity should not be let to fade away and anything that pushed gender equality
further should be promoted.447 Here again, there was a completely negative viewpoint, too:
according to one respondent such policies or structures were either impossible to formulate or
useless.448
The two representatives of EKI voiced similarly divergent views in matters related to the
EU-polity. While one of them objected further centralization based on the argument that the
EU was not democratic,449 the other respondent thought centralization was necessary and
needed, also in the most difficult areas: foreign policy and security. He also said that,
442
444
445
Interview with VKI1; Interview with VKI3.
446
447
448
449
443
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corresponding to the process of centralization, the role of the EP should be increased.450 They
agreed however on the effects of integration on diversity and gender equality: integration
positively effected diversity through increasing encounters with otherness, gender equality
did not necessarily improve as the standards set by the EU always represented the smallest
common denominator, and this occasionally could be lower than that of individual states.
Showing a striking opposition again, one of the respondents said the EU should not grant any
minority rights as this was a question of national sovereignty,451 while the other was on the
opinion that where individual rights of minority members were not sufficiently regulated, the
EU should be able to compensate, but never in the form of collective rights.452 Similarly
contrasting were their responses on the necessity of EU policies or structures dealing with
diversity and gender equality: one thought there were room for these, however, the EU level
does not have to be emphatic, while the other said these issues should be dealt with at the
national level.
The coherence that characterized Századvég researchers’ views on issues of diversity and
migration disappeared when they were asked about the EU-polity. In general, none of them
was in favor of more centralization, either due to the democratic deficit of the EU,453 or based
on the consideration that the commonality of economic interests should not be extended to the
political institutional system.454 On a more detailed picture, nevertheless, opinions of the
respondents were not necessarily so gloomy: one of them said more centralization would
render the EU more powerful in the globalizing world,455 while another thought deepening
integration could eliminate the democratic deficit.456 Effects of integration were subject to
similarly heterogeneous judgments, but they generally agreed that diversity was affected
positively, while gender issues were impacted only indirectly. The EU’s power to grant
minority rights that member states could not revise was not supported among Századvég
respondents. Finally, in relation to the implementation of EU policies or structures dealing
with diversity and gender issues one respondent was relatively open and saw room for EU
directives in both areas,457 the other two respondents however almost completely rejected
their necessity and usefulness.
Political Capital showed more consistency in responses concerning the direction the EUpolity’s development should take. Respondents were generally in favor of federalization, but
most of them thought the actual direction taken should be determined by the requirements of
the policy areas in question and in some cases more centralization would be adequate. With
respect to the effect of integration on diversity, they either said it had no effect,458 or
welcomed its potential for opening up people’s worldviews either through direct
encounters,459 or through the elites’ mediating role.460 On issues of gender equality, none of
them thought integration had any impact. Both of the respondents who mentioned disability
groups as relevant for diverse societies argued that in this area integration could typically
have a positive effect.461 Their views on the necessity of EU policies and structures targeting
diversity and gender equality largely corresponded to their opinion on the effect of integration
450
452
453
454
455
456
457
458
Interview with PC2
459
Interview with PC3.
460
Interview with PC1.
461
Interview with PC1; Interview with PC3.
451
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on these issue areas, that is, they did not think the EU-level should and could achieve much
progress in these questions.
In relation to the political rights of minorities, all IWE respondents were rather permissive:
they all thought everyone should have the right to organize the way they prefer to, although
one researcher noted that minority parties would not solve their problems.462 Language was
the factor they mentioned in relation to the adaptation of institutions to the needs of
minorities. While two of them thought institutions should be able to provide services in the
mother tongue of minorities, the third respondent said all minorities should be able to speak
the official language of the country to an extent that is necessary for using the services of the
institutions they have to deal with.463
EKI respondents also agreed that minority members, just like every other member of the
society should have the right to their own political institutions, nevertheless, respondents did
not think that, in general at least, minority’s claims were best achieved through ethnic parties.
Nevertheless, one of the researchers said that for the Roma minority in Hungary it would be
essential to form a party, as this seemed to be the only way to lend more political weight to
enable the improvement of their situation.464 Neither of them thought major institutional
transformation was necessary in order to better adapt to the needs of minorities, rather, the
better operation and the wider usage of the existing institutions was necessary. On the other
side of this coin: neither of the respondents thought there were definite customs or a typical
Hungarian way of life that immigrants have to adapt to, but said that it makes their integration
easier if they gained some basic knowledge of the customs and the language.
According to one of the interviewees, immigration into a community necessarily implied
that one had to let go of some of one’s original traditions; the extent of this varied according
to where the immigrant comes from.465 Both of the respondents agreed that immigrants had to
adapt to the legal system of the country, and if their traditions contradicted Hungarian laws,
the latter should prevail. According to one of the respondents, it had to be forbidden for
certain groups to impose stricter norms on their members than those of the society (e.g.
situation of women in certain religious groups).
With respect to the political rights of minorities in general, none of the Századvég
respondents excluded the possibility of parliamentary representation, however, two of them
said the current system of local representation was more than adequate for minority
representation. Both of these researchers mentioned ambitions for territorial autonomy as a
possible question in relation to the political rights of minorities, but neither of them thought
this is timely or necessary for present Hungary.466 According to one respondent, national
representation should be tied to sufficient support, thus positive discrimination facilitating
representation was not supported.467
As for the adaptation of public institutions to the needs of minorities, language emerged
as a relevant factor in all three interviewees’ responses. Two of the respondents thought this
issue was not fundamental, and could be appropriately addressed on the local or the specific
policy level, while the third one said the issue of institutional adaptation could not be treated
separately from the question of governance in general. When asked about Hungarian customs
or institutions to which immigrants should adapt to, respondents emphasized the natural need
462
Ibid.
464
Ibid.
465
466
467
463
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of adaptation to the majority’s way of life, but – beyond the requirement of the respect for the
legal norms of the country – they did not specify the content of this adaptation. One
respondent approached the knowledge of the official language as an obligation of all citizens,
while the other two explicitly mentioned that the process should not be forced, thus
adaptation in the narrower sense was supported as opposed to assimilation.468 Interestingly,
their views diverged on the openness of the Hungarian society: while one of them said the
threshold of tolerance was quite high in Hungary, that is, it tolerates otherness quite well,469
another said Hungarian people did not tolerate otherness very well due to their own
immobility.470
Minorities, just like any other member of the Hungarian society, should have political
rights according to all Political Capital Institute (PC) researchers. Beyond this general stance
however, respondents’ views diverged. While one of them thought that the Hungarian
Republic had a debt towards minorities as it failed to fulfill the constitutional obligation to
organize minority representation on the national level,471 another argued that no artificial
institutional structure should be maintained: the existing minority self-governance was a good
illustration of a dysfunctional and corrupt system.472 A new element in relation to the
adaptation of the public institutions to minority needs was a suggestion that all institutions
should be cleaned of all traces of prejudices and discrimination. If, for instance, a teacher was
known to have discriminated against a child, s/he should never be allowed to teach again.473
Other respondents thought institutions should be able to handle the linguistic disadvantages of
minorities. All of them agreed that it was primarily the legal system that an immigrant had to
adapt to, and all favored integration or adaptation as opposed to assimilation. Nevertheless,
one of the respondents found it very important to underline that religious groups’ restrictions
going beyond the general legal framework or violence against women must not be tolerated
(neither should they be among the Hungarian population within which, as he noted, domestic
violence is a national tradition).474
3.3.2 Citizenship
On questions of citizenship there was an agreement within IWE that long term/permanent
residence should be the main criteria of granting citizenship. Two of the respondents thought
acquiring citizenship should in general be made easier (e.g. for economic and demographic
reasons)475 and two of them would provide preferential treatment to Hungarians abroad,
although in principle neither of them supported any kind of distinction on ethnic grounds.
Most of them found the current regulation of political rights adequate, that is, non-citizen
residents (of any origin) should only vote and run as representatives on local elections. It is
important however that – as two of them would make it easier for immigrants to acquire
citizenship – they would support granting the full range of political rights to non ethnic
Hungarians, in case they practice there political rights in only one state, i.e., where they
actually live. The same approach characterized their responses to the question on dual
citizenship: the conflict of rights had to be avoided. On the other hand – reflecting on the
double meaning this notion had in the Hungarian context due to the political quarrel about the
dual citizenship of Hungarian diasporas476 and other emotional attachments477 – they
468
470
471
Ibid.
472
Interview with PC3.
473
Ibid.
474
Ibid.
475
476
469
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accepted the desire of being a Hungarian citizen alongside another national citizenship as
legitimate in individual cases. They all agreed that at the current level of integration EUcitizenship should only be granted alongside member-state citizenship.
EKI researchers agreed that the current regulation that tied granting citizenship to
long-term residence was appropriate, but while one of them would support somewhat more
permissive conditions (e.g. shorter period of residence),478 the other thought the period
required could be adapted time-to-time to the receiving capacities of the country. The
respondent claimed this was not too strict because citizenship should not be the condition of
living and working in Hungary, non-citizens should not be disenfranchised.479 Neither
respondent would differentiate between applicants. In contrast, they differed on the question
of dual citizenship: while one of them thought it was a value and not something to be
eliminated, the other saw it as an anomaly, however, an anomaly that could be accepted.
Reflecting on the special issue emerging in the context of Hungary and its Hungarian
diasporas, this respondent emphasized that if dual citizenship included political rights, than it
should be tied to residence.480
With regard to the question of political rights, one of the respondents separated local and
national elections, and argued that on the latter, where issues of popular sovereignty are at
stake, only citizens should have the right to participate.481 In the opinion of the EKI
researchers, EU-citizenship should not be granted autonomously of national citizenships.
Also in agreement, both respondents thought of free movement within the EU as one of the
great advantages of integration that should not be restricted in any way.
At Századvég, two of the respondents would support a system of differentiations in
granting Hungarian citizenship; both of them would provide preferential treatment to coethnics. One of them added that with view of a “healthy protection of national interests” even
restrictions were acceptable.482 The third respondent, while stating that citizenship should be
granted to those born Hungarian (“in the narrower or wider Hungary”), was not explicitly in
favor of differentiation and defined the conditions of citizenship as the knowledge of
Hungarian language and basic constitutional norms.483 All three respondents supported the
idea of dual citizenship of co-ethnics and did not reject other instances of dual citizenship
either. None of them would grant EU-citizenship autonomously of national citizenship.
PC respondents voiced interestingly opposing views with regard to citizenship: while
one of them thought conditions of acquiring citizenship should be more permissive,484
another one said they should be kept strict, with the exception of Hungarian co-ethnics,
towards whom the country should display some courtesy; their emotional need for some kind
proof of their belonging should be respected. Otherwise, this respondent’s preference for
strict conditions was justified by the fact that presently non-citizens enjoyed almost the same
rights in Hungary as citizens did.485 Dual citizenship in the common sense was completely
irrelevant for this respondent, the other two thought of it as a personal issue that should be
approached as such. All of them agreed that EU-citizenship should only be granted to citizens
of member states.
477
479
480
481
482
483
Interview with Szv3
484
Interview with PC2
485
Interview with PC3.
478
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3.3.3 Free movement
None of the respondents at IWE could name specific customs and institutions of the
Hungarian way of life that immigrants should adapt to. Two of them mentioned that it made
integration easier if immigrants tried to get some knowledge of the basic everyday customs in
Hungary. The legal and institutional system of the country should be respected by all groups,
i.e. customs that would violate laws of the country should not be tolerated.486
All interviewees thought about international migration that it was a fact of global life
that would be more and more prominent as globalization progressed. Among its effects
mentioned were brain-drain as negative and remittances as positive effects for the sending
country, while for the receiving country the most often mentioned problems were those
emerging from difficulties of integration, with beneficial effects on the labor market and the
wider economy on the positive side. With respect to immigrant groups to be allowed into the
country, all of the respondents mentioned refugees and asylum seekers, and none of them
would introduce restrictions on entry of any kind: whoever wanted to settle down here and
could make a living should be permitted to do so. Interestingly, two of the respondents would
actually codify the second condition, that is, residence should be granted to those who – in a
certain period of time – became able to support themselves and their family. The third
respondent noted that co-ethnics as a group – due to historical obligations – should be let into
the country, but was not in favor of distinctions either.487
Analogously permissive views were voiced in relation to free movement within the EU:
two of the respondents strongly rejected any kind of differentiation among EU and third
country citizens within the Schengen borders, while the third researcher approached the
question from a more universalistic point of view, stating that according to the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, all people should be granted the right of free movement.488
There was a similar agreement on the question of refugees’ and asylum seekers’ flows: none
of the respondents thought this would be a problem for Hungary at present but one of them
recalled the years of the South-Slav wars when it was: the receiving system was incapable of
handling the pressures then.489 Another researcher said it would be a problem in the future
when huge flows of refugees would arrive in Europe; that would put a pressure on Hungary
as well.490 Regulation of free movement, migration, asylum, and illegal immigration should
be regulated on the European level according to one of the respondents. Approaching the
question from a more pragmatic perspective, another researcher said these issues will sooner
or later be regulated on the European level, while the third IWE-respondent argued
competencies of regulation should be distributed between the national and the EU-levels
according to the third.
EKI leaders’ emphasized slightly different views in relation to international migration:
while one of them claimed that the effects on the receiving country were mostly beneficial
and it was mostly the sending country that was disadvantaged (mostly through brain-drain),
the other mentioned the emergence of conflicts in the receiving country as one of the major
effects of migration. This difference was also visible in their response to the question on the
groups to be allowed into the country: while one of them would reject any kind of
differentiation, the other could imagine some kind of constraints on economic migration from
third countries, as the EU cannot take responsibility for all the poor of the world.
Nevertheless, the respondent found important to note that refugees and asylum seekers should
486
488
489
490
487
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doubtlessly be let to enter.491 In relation to the formulation of entry, work, and settlement
policy of the country, one of the respondents outlined a gradual process, the end stage of
which would be the lack of differentiation (while providing some preferential treatment for
EU-citizens in the beginning),492 the other would not differentiate at all. Both respondents
said that refugees’ and asylum seekers’ flows did not represent a problem for Hungary as it
was not a target country, but one of them added that asylum represented a moral problem, as
the country treated refugees rudely: it took too long to acquire refugee status and the
regulations on this issue were very underdeveloped.493 Both EKI researchers thought it could
be beneficial to regulate matters of free movement, immigration, and asylum on the European
level.
As opposed to the liberal approach of EKI, at Századvég two of the respondents thought
differentiations in terms of free movement were acceptable and only EU-citizens should be
granted the right of free movement without any restrictions. The third respondent said it
would be awkward to differentiate once the border control was eliminated within the
Schengen area, however, he, along with another respondent mentioned the threat of terrorism
as a risk of free movement.494
Századvég researchers’ views largely corresponded on the issue of international
migration: they mentioned remittances as positive and brain-drain as negative effects on
sending countries. For the receiving countries, international migration was positive in its
effects on the demographic structure and the labor market. All of the respondents mentioned
the emergence of related tensions as negative effects as well: cheap labor force can trigger
racism,495 and one of them said that that the “cast-system” that gained shape as immigrants
fulfilled occupations nationals would not want to, could lead to the increase in the
blackmailing potential of immigrant minorities, which could eventually paralyze the country
(e.g. Turkish immigrants in Germany and the waste-scandal in Naples, Italy).496
Századvég opinions were more divergent on the question about the immigrant groups to
be allowed to enter the country: one of the respondents rejected to answer as he deemed the
question fascistic.497 Another respondent similarly noted that this question was incompatible
with the notion of human rights but, beyond refugees and asylum seekers, mentioned coethnics as groups who doubtlessly have to be let in.498 The third respondent also emphasized
the need to provide preferential treatment for co-ethnics.499 Similar views were expressed in
relation to the Hungarian policy of entry, work, and settlement of immigrants. They all agreed
that flows of refugees and asylum seekers were currently not a problem for Hungary although
recognized that the living conditions of the few who did arrive were not satisfactory.
Regulation of free movement, migration, and asylum should remain primarily the competence
of nation states in their view, nevertheless, they would not exclude the directive role of the
EU.
Free movement should not be restricted in any ways according to two PC
interviewees. The third respondent said that in principle there should be no restrictions
(although he warned of the danger of terrorists’ free movement), but in relation to the free
movement of poor people’s migration he said restrictions were necessary: immigrants from
491
Ibid.
493
Ibid.
494
495
496
497
498
499
492
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third countries should stay in the country where they entered the Schengen-area.500 With
respect to political rights of non-citizens, all respondents agreed that the current regulation
was adequate: non-citizens should only vote on local elections or, alternatively, where they
paid taxes.
With slight differences, all PC respondents emphasized the beneficial effects of
international migration for both the sending and the receiving countries. While one of them
said it was a natural process that could not be regulated, another approached it very
positively, stating that it was a very healthy and necessary process.501 It was only this latter
respondent that mentioned a group: religious fundamentalists, whose entry into the country
should be restricted – he added that he had prejudices against all kinds of religious
fundamentalisms. The other two researchers would not make any distinctions.
With regard to the Hungarian policy of entry, work, and settlement issues, PC
respondents’ general view was that EU-citizens should enjoy the advantages the EU provides
ab ovo. One of the respondents added that he would introduce economic considerations in
relation to those coming from third countries.502 According to PC leaders, asylum seekers’
and refugees flows were problematic in the sense that the country was not prepared and
because their presence possibly generated tensions as the Hungarian society had negative
preconceptions towards them.503 All of the respondents agreed that issues related to free
movement, asylum, and immigration should be regulated on the EU-level.
3.3.4 Enlargement
While not contradicted, the pro-membership, pro-integration, and pro-enlargement stance of
the institute derived from the institutional data collection was somewhat nuanced through the
interviews. With respect to the conditions of EU-membership, all three of the IWE
researchers mentioned the importance of economic requirements: beyond political conditions
(respect of human rights, democratic institutions) that a state had to comply with in any case,
further integration should also be adjusted to the financing capacities of the EU itself. Only
one of them referred explicitly to the Copenhagen Criteria,504 and two of them mentioned
possible cultural incompatibilities.505 Importantly, all three of them emphasized that a major
obstacle of further enlargement was the EU’s incapability to integrate new member states.
Limits of enlargement were also assessed with view to sustainability. One respondent would
stop enlargement after the accession of Croatia so that in the coming decades the EU could
concentrate solely on deepening integration,506 while the other would integrate the Balkan
countries but would not go beyond the geographical borders of Europe.507
The most important criteria aspiring members of the EU should fulfill according to EKI
respondents, is that of effective democratic institutions and economic preparedness. EKI
respondents disagree however when cultural attributes are considered: while one of them
thinks cultural differences should not be obstacles of accession (and notes that Turkey seems
much easier to integrate than Ukraine),508 the other notes that countries that are “socially not
European” (such as Turkey), should not be integrated.509 In line with this disagreement, they
also differ on the limits of enlargement: while the first respondent sees no theoretical
500
Ibid.
Ibid.
502
Ibid.
503
Interview with PC1; Interview with PC3.
504
505
506
507
508
Ibid.
509
501
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impossibility in integrating the Maghreb countries on the long term, the second would set the
limits in the geographical borders of Europe. As for the impact of the Eastern enlargement,
one of them thinks tensions within the countries have increased since accession but he does
not attribute this effect to the EU. According to the other researcher however, the EU
benefited from this round of enlargement through integrating slightly different but still
European cultures. In the operation of the EKI, none of them said the enlargement brought
about changes.
In relation to Századvég researchers’ views on enlargement, it is interesting to note that
as part of the European Ideas Network, Századvég coordinated a taskforce entitled “Common
Values and Civil Society”, the executive summary of which displays a definite stance on
further enlargement:
As a result of our reflection on European values and identity we cannot any longer ignore
the true political finality of the European Integration Process; nor can we remain aloof from
contributing to Europe and the wider world in order to orientate and civilize globalization.510
This opinion was more or less reflected in the researchers’ responses during the
interviews, although with more flexibility. While all respondents mentioned that some extent
of cultural compatibility was a necessary condition of membership, one of them approached
the question slightly more pragmatically and emphasized more the geopolitical and rational
obstacles to further integration.511 The other two posed the same dilemma, according to which
the primary question had to be what the EU stood for. If the answer to this question was a
civilizational union that went beyond the economic rationale, then Christianity had to be a
determining factor.512 Respondents also voiced the more common opinion that the aspiring
members’ political and economic system had to be compatible with that of the EU.
Respondents at Századvég limited enlargement to the geographical borders of the EU and
Turkey’s membership was not supported. Their views varied on the Eastern enlargement:
while one of them said the differences were not striking,513 another said the ethno-national
“situation” in the new member states represented a difficult problem for the EU.514
Except one respondent, who said that – beyond the existing requirements – enlargement
had to be conditioned upon the member states’ consensus about integrating a given country,
PC researchers largely accepted the present conditions of accession. With respect to the limits
of enlargement, two respondents mentioned the EU’s capacity to manage further enlargement
as a factor to be carefully considered. They agreed that the Balkan countries should be
integrated, but were on the view that enlargement should not go much further, i.e. over the
borders of the European continent. According to one of the respondents, Eastern enlargement
did not impact ethno-national diversity, while the other two saw it as positive in this respect
and generally as well.
3.3.5 Common views
With the exception of one or two generally skeptic respondents, think tank researchers and
leaders mostly supported the federalization of the EU-polity, and many thought in some
policy areas (market, monetary policy, foreign and security policy) more centralization was
even more adequate. The impact of integration on diversity was generally seen as beneficial,
510
European Ideas Network, “European Values and Identity: A Reflection for an Indispensable Discussion”
(Budapest: Századvég, 2005), p. iv. Available online at
http://tt.europeanideasnetwork.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=8&Itemid=10.
511
512
513
514
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as it facilitated encounters with otherness and so it contributed to decreasing the distance
between ethno-national groups. Impact on gender equality was assessed less optimistically.
With a few exceptions, respondents did not support the EU to gain power to grant minority
rights member state could not revise, and almost always dismissed the idea of implementing
EU policies and structures aiming to handle issues of diversity and gender equality.
There was no great variation on the theme of citizenship: most interviewees thought the
current Hungarian regulation was appropriate. A common liberal view was that as noncitizens had almost the same rights as citizens, there was no need to loosen the conditions.
Both immigration and asylum seekers’ flows to Hungary were generally thought to be
moderate in extent, but most researchers noted the potential for emerging tensions. What
varied was the view about the rationality of these tensions: while liberal institutes’
respondents tended to refer to the possibly emerging conflicts between majority and
minorities as based on misconceptions, on the conservative side fears of the majority were not
automatically condemned as unrealistic (there were, however, exceptions here as well).515
The unrestricted right to free movement can be seen as an issue of overall consent among the
institutes, regardless of ideological preferences.
No one among think tank researchers said that EU-citizenship should be granted without
having citizenship in a member state. Enlargement was generally thought to be reaching its
limits at the borders of Europe, with one exception.516 Most of the respondets had
reservations with regard to the integration of Turkey, but mostly agreed with the integration
of the Balkans. Their most common arguments against a country’s membership were
political-institutional and economic, although civilizational arguments also appeared, and not
only among conservative researchers, as it could have been expected.
3.4 Media Views on the EU Polity and Policies
As we already mentioned, Hungarian media’s stance on the EU Polity seems to be
determined by the political affiliation of the given media outlet. Let us now turn our attention
to more specific views about the EU Polity of our selected media actors. We will review
questions related to EU centralization, citizenship or asylum policy, free movement within the
Union, enlargement, and policy making on the supranational level.
While diversity issues feature high in MTV1’s profile, European policies do not receive
such an attention. It can be stated that the channel’s primary focus is domestic issues and
politics, which is also apparent from its website. News related to EU-institutions, European
enlargement, EU-membership, and integration are presented as part of foreign news or in
some issue specific program such as business/economics; the channel has no separate section
for European issues. The television channel does not have clear preferences on the topics of
EU polity, citizenship, minority policies, gender equality, migration/asylum, free movement,
political rights, and EU enlargement.
Similarly, almost none of HírTV’s thematic programs is focused explicitly on issues
related to the EU polity. Likewise, the television’s views on EU polity are difficult to
establish based on the media content analysis and in the absence of interviews. However,
HírTV shows a strong interest in the EU, indicated by the fact that one of its regular news
programs is specialized in news about the EU (Európai Híradó – European News). This
program, which covers issues related to EU institutions, European enlargement and EU
membership/integration borrows footages from Reuters, Deutsche Welle, and EBS. The main
goal of the program is to report about the most important news of European politics, among
which issues of EU membership/integration, European enlargement and EU institutions seem
515
516
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to be the most prominent. Its aim is to shed light on what interests lie behind EU decisions,
how effectively Hungary represents its national interests in European institutions and where
Europe and those outside of it are heading.517
When it comes to the print media, although Magyar Nemzet pays considerable attention
to the EU polity and institutions, the particular preferences of the paper concerning the EU
are less clear. Issues connected to the EU mostly appear in the international news section of
newspaper, where key political events such as the Irish rejection of the Lisbon Treaty and its
repercussions were reported about. Yet, the newspaper portrays news about EU institutions
and the reform treaty mostly as foreign policy news, usually without offering a Hungarian
perspective or portraying the events as intrinsic to Hungary. Only agricultural policy and EU
funds are those EU-related subjects that the newspaper presents from a member-state
perspective.
Yet, the interviews with Magyar Nemzet revealed clearly that the newspaper prefers a
less centralized federal EU that guarantees the sovereignty of member states and allows for a
more effective assertion of national interests.518 According to the respondents, the EU should
develop further in a federal direction since at the moment it is overregulated and overbureaucratic. Only some issue areas such as the protection of human and minority rights,
certain traffic rules and administrative standards should be regulated at the EU level, and also
foreign policy.519 As one of the respondents suggested, the EU should be viewed as a
possibility to be approached in the Polish way meaning that Hungary should more effectively
assert its interests in the EU, similarly to Poland.520
In the opinion of the journalists of Magyar Nemzet, European integration had mixed
effects on diversity. Although the situation of minorities has become better, however, the
example of Slovakia shows that the EU is not strong enough to handle conflicts between
states that concern minorities. At the same time, the accession process forced the candidate
countries to meet certain standards, and the Schengen Agreement had also good effects,
which were both to the benefit of minorities. The borders opened, which is an advantage
directly affecting people. In addition, EU integration has a positive influence on Hungary’s
neighbors, which now are under external pressure and have to measure up to EU norms.521
Moreover, European integration has enabled Hungarian minorities abroad to better assert
their interests such as through being present in the European Parliament. Besides, the
representation of the Roma community has also improved due to EU pressure.522
Magyar Nemzet usually does not show the EU in a bad light. Even if it is critical of an
EU policy, it generally blames the Hungarian government for having failed to implement the
necessary measures to prevent the bad effects of this policy.523 It should be mentioned,
however, that radical anti-EU views can also appear on the broadsheet’s pages. An opinion
piece written by a well known rightwing journalist for instance compared the EU to the
Soviet Gulag system, arguing that both were built on lies and the deception of people.524
Another editorial expressed sympathy with Irish voters who understandably said no to an
over-bureaucratized, overcomplicated and inhuman creature (the EU), which incidentally
517
Website of HírTV, www.hirtv.hu.
Interview with Mn1; Interview with Mn2; Interview with Mn3.
519
Interview with Mn2.
520
Interview with Mn1.
521
522
Interview with Mn1.
523
For instance, an article that argued that since Hungary’s EU accession, food-safety has sharply deteriorated
blamed the government for non-action in this area and not the relatively lax EU regulation. Magyar Nemzet, 27.
06. 2008.
524
Lovas, István, “Az írországi nem szavazat tanulságai”, Magyar Nemzet, 18. 06. 2008.
518
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would become even more hateful after the reform process.525 Such emotionally loaded and
radical Euroskepticism would hardly be tolerated even in an opinion piece by Népszabadság
that, on occasion, also gives voice to Euroskeptic and Europessimistic views.
Similarly to any Hungarian daily, domestic politics is the main focus of Népszabadság as
well, yet the EU and its member states, the US, the Middle East and neighboring countries are
also subjects of its interest. The newspaper has a separate foreign news section in the second
half of the paper starting on the eighth page, which is where stories related to the European
Union are being presented as well. On the website there is a separate section devoted to
European affairs where the hottest issues EU-wide such as the political follow-up on the Irish
rejection of the Lisbon Treaty were discussed at great length. The printed version of the
broadsheet publishes a separate page with news from the European Union every Monday.
This special Monday section focuses less on issues related to EU polity and institutions
which appear in the international news section, but on topics that can be of personal concern
for citizens, such as pension rights of European workers, anti-discrimination legislation
initiated by Brussels, etc. Yet, most EU-related news, especially those that focus on EUpolity or institutions are written from a foreign policy perspective, hardly offering a
Hungarian point of view. The newspaper treats issues related to citizenship, minority policies,
gender equality, migration/asylum, free movement, political rights, and EU enlargement very
sporadically.
Népszabadság does not have clear preferences on the EU polity, yet would favor a
strong, unified Common Foreign and Security Policy.526 As it was revealed from the
interviews, journalists at Népszabadság believed if the EU wants to remain an important
player on the world stage it should move towards more centralization. However, this will be
difficult to digest for the member states, which is why the EU will never be as unified as the
United States. The journalists interviewed seemed to agree that as a result of European
integration, national identity has not weakened. Although states had to give up part of their
sovereignty, such as full control over taxation, yet this hurt only the interests of parts of the
national elite, and had nothing to do with national identity. Besides, European integration
impacted ethno-national diversity in a positive way since separatism does not make much
sense any more within the frames of the EU.527 Minorities started to have different aspirations
than before, as they often have their own budgets now, whereas other areas of sovereignty
they used to fight for fell out of national jurisdiction as well, such as monetary policy,
military, etc. European integration has a good effect on traditional minority related problems
also because it allows for the free movement of people through borders. The life of cultural
minorities that are not tied to a certain place and the practice of religion became easier.528 In
addition, European integration accelerated the mixing of the European population in a natural
way, for instance within the frames of the Erasmus program 1.5 million students have studied
and lived in different European countries.529
European enlargement towards the Western Balkans, mobility/free movement especially
with regards to European workers rights and common energy policy are those EU-related
topics which the newspaper presents also from a Hungarian perspective. This does not mean,
however, that the newspaper’s preferences would be clear on these subjects; the only
difference is that Hungary appears as a concerned party not as an outside observer when
discussing these subjects. The newspaper can be considered as pro-European, yet,
occasionally it can be also Euroskeptic. For instance, it published an article highly critical of
525
Sebeık, János, “Európa meglincselése,” Magyar Nemzet, 19. 06. 2008.
Interview with NSZ3; Interview with NSZ1; Interview with NSZ2.
527
528
529
526
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the EU about the initiative of the Social Charta that called for an all-European referendum
about a Lisbon Treaty. Members of the Charta, mostly prominent leftist intellectuals,
criticized the treaty for representing a neo-liberal and neoconservative agenda that, according
to them, would be rejected by most Europeans, thus a referendum would be necessary.530
Europessimistic views frequently appear in the broadsheet such as a recent headline stating
“EU money does not work well enough.”531 This attitude reflects the mood of the general
population, which can be summarized as “nothing has changed since our accession.”532
The EU hardly features as a topic on Blikk’s pages. Blikk places the greatest weight on
domestic issues, reflected also by its structure. Whereas it has separate sections for stories
from Hungary and Budapest, it does not have any international or European segments. Its
indifference toward European issues was also indicated by the fact that it did not publish any
report about the events and reactions that followed the Irish rejection of the Lisbon Treaty.
The topic of the Slovak introduction of the Euro, stories related to European workers emerge
once in a while but usually from a narrowly Hungarian perspective. Free movement and
mobility is a theme which the newspaper touches upon occasionally within the European
issue area, even if very sporadically. Therefore, the newspaper’s views about the EU can be
best established based on the interviews. According to Blikk journalists, it would be desirable
having a common European constitution, which would reinforce the common feeling that we
belong to a single big unit. Yet, the EU should be governed in a decentralized way due to its
high degree of diversity.533 The journalists of Blikk saw mostly the positive effects of
European integration on ethnic diversity. One of the respondents argued that as all territories
inhabited by ethnic Hungarians gradually become parts of the EU, all previous divisions and
isolations will come to an end and all ethnic Hungarians will be able to move freely across
the borders regardless of which country they are coming from.534
Blikk’s views on citizenship, minority policies, gender equality, migration/asylum, free
movement, political rights, and EU enlargement cannot be inferred from its articles.
Moreover, the journalists interviewed within the frames of Eurosphere research held very
different ideas about these topics, unlike at Népszabadság or Magyar Nemzet. This suggests
that these issues are quite irrelevant for the newspaper as it causes no problem if its leading
journalists hold conflicting ideas about them.
Ultimately, the agenda of reuniting the Hungarian nation torn apart by the world wars defines
the preferences of Magyar Nemzet and HírTV on citizenship, political rights and free
movement of people. They view EU integration and enlargement positively partially because
Hungary’s neighbors are now under pressure to meet EU standards concerning their treatment
of (Hungarian) minorities. In addition, European integration has enabled Hungarian
minorities abroad to better assert their interests internationally, and they have new means
such as being present in the European Parliament to voice their claims. During the
Eurosphere interviews the journalists of Magyar Nemzet expressed their preference for a clear
and strict EU regulation in the area of minority rights. In their view, if a minority reaches a
certain size it should receive collective rights from the state.535 They were very supportive of
the protection of women’s rights, also at the European level.536
530
“Összeurópai Népszavazást akar a magyar Szolciális Charta is”, Népszabadság, 02. 08. 2008.
Népszabadság, 05. 03. 2008.
532
István Hegedős, 29.
533
534
535
536
531
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At the same time, the journalists interviewed by Eurosphere held very different opinions
about political rights. One of them reasoned that every EU citizen who lives in Hungary
should be granted all political rights including the right to run for parliament while
immigrants coming from outside of the EU should not be given any political rights.537 By
contrast, another one argued that the present practice is good i.e. residents including both EU
and non-EU citizens should be allowed to vote in local but not in parliamentary elections,
while according to the third journalist foreigners should not be granted any political rights at
all.538
Although the interviewees at Népszabadság agreed that as any citizen, members of
minorities also have the right to set up political parties, they argued that organizing political
parties based on ethnicity would not be advisable. Establishing ethnically based parties would
be senseless because the Hungarian society is not ethnically defined. On the contrary, due to
the ethnically mixed nature of the population, it is a society of Hungarian citizens and not of
ethnic Hungarians. Moreover, setting up a Roma political party would not be advisable as it
would not improve the situation of the Roma in any way but would probably provoke
negative reactions from the majority population.539 Parties should be organized along
ideological not ethnic lines.
According to Népszabadság, the EU might set some norms and guidelines in the area of
minority rights but more than that would be counterproductive. The EU should grant the
minimum level of rights such as basic human rights and prohibit discrimination, a
requirement which is already fulfilled according to the respondents. Unlike the two
conservative media actors, Népszabadság opposes prescribing specific minority rights at the
EU level. Respondents claim that EU legislation might lead to over-regulation as the situation
of minorities is specific to each country, thus has to be regulated at the national level
fundamentally. In the opinion of the journalists of Népszabadság, only national citizens
should be granted the right to participate at national elections. At local elections, however,
everyone who has a residence in that locality should be able to vote, and in this regard there is
no need to differentiate between EU and non-EU citizens. The EU should interfere into the
regulation of political rights of EU-citizens and non-citizen residents by setting some general
guidelines that contain the most basic requirements.540
Blikk similarly opposes clear cut EU policies in their area of minority protection. In
addition, according to Blikk journalists, only citizens should be entitled to any kind of
political rights.541
3.4.2 Citizenship
Magyar Nemzet and HírTV view Hungarian minorities living abroad as members of the
Hungarian nation, thus define the nation as an ethnic community of all Hungarians. Their
preferred view on citizenship reflects this attitude as well, since based on this definition, all
ethnic Hungarians should be granted Hungarian citizenship.542 This special attitude towards
Hungarian minorities dictates the preferences of Magyar Nemzet and HírTV also on political
rights and immigration. Since Hungarian minorities are part of the nation, they should receive
preferential treatment while requesting citizenship or trying to immigrate to Hungary.543 As
537
Interview with Mn1.
Interview with Mn4.
539
540
541
Interview with Blikk1; Blikk2.
542
Sütı-Nagy, Zsolt, “Újra együtt: magyar állampolgárságot minden magyarnak!”, Magyar Nemzet, 25. 11.
2004; Interview with Mn1; Interview with Mn2.
543
538
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was revealed from the interviews, according to Magyar Nemzet, people who can prove their
Hungarian origin should be granted citizenship.544 Those applicants for citizenship that do not
have Hungarian roots should be able to demonstrate that they have a real motivation to live
here, such as having a job, family ties etc. Besides, the knowledge of Hungarian language
should be an additional requirement or at least the demonstrated aspiration to learn the
language and immigrants should have respect for cultural values.545
Magyar Nemzet and HírTV are in favor of dual citizenship for the same reason, which in
the Hungarian context would primarily mean giving citizenship to ethnic Hungarians. The
journalists interviewed supported the idea of double citizenship precisely because it would be
very important for Hungarian minorities, as it would provide a kind of protection for them
and would help the communities to preserve their Hungarian identity. At the same time, they
also argued that dual citizenship would not pose a risk to Hungary since mass immigration of
Hungarian minorities is not a danger anymore, since those that wanted to immigrate have
done so already.546 Moreover, from the logic that Hungary should be able to grant preferential
treatment to ethnic Hungarians on an ethnic basis it also follows that citizenship regimes
should remain fundamentally in national jurisdiction.547
Népszabadság has an opposing view to Magyar Nemzet on the nation which it perceives
as a collective of citizens not of co-ethnics. This approach to the national community
influences the newspaper’s preferences on citizenship as well. During the 2004 referendum
on the question of dual citizenship, Népszabadság did not support granting citizenship to
ethnic Hungarians living outside of Hungary. Interestingly, however, the editors interviewed
by Eurosphere claimed that they had nothing against dual citizenship. Moreover, as one of
them reasoned, dual citizenship has a particular significance for Hungary, since it could solve
the problem of Hungarian minorities in the neighboring countries.548 This reasoning strongly
resembles the opinion of Magyar Nemzet’s journalists.
In addition, whereas none of the respondents at Népszabadság supported the idea of
direct EU citizenship, yet they had opposing views on an EU level citizenship regime. One
journalist argued that it would be desirable if citizenship was regulated at the EU level, since
then every citizen of the EU had the same rights.549 However, in his opinion this was realistic
only in the long run. At the same time, another respondent thought that citizenship should not
be harmonized among the member states, as in a lot of countries it would be seen as an attack
on sovereignty thus would be viewed as an irritation, while would not bring about any
benefits.550
In line with the newspaper’s liberal views, the chief editor claimed that anyone who
wishes to be a Hungarian citizen should have the right to do so regardless of descent, birth,
residence and others. The only precondition of citizenship should be that applicants respect
the laws of the country and show willingness to get to know Hungarian culture and
language.551 Contrary to this opinion, according to another editor of the newspaper, however,
ethnic Hungarians should enjoy privileges in this area. Everyone who considers him/herself a
Hungarian and/or speaks good Hungarian should receive Hungarian citizenship in an easy
way. The respondent emphasized that at the moment the state makes it very difficult for
ethnic Hungarians to settle in Hungary, while Hungary would actually need them to
counterbalance the decreasing population trend. In addition, he also held that citizens of other
544
Interview with Mn2.
Interview with Mn1.
546
Interview with Mn3.
547
Interview with Mn1.
548
549
550
551
545
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EU member states should be granted Hungarian citizenship automatically if they requested
it.552 The interviews indicated that leading journalists of Népszabadság did not share the same
idea of how membership in the nation should be defined, as some thought the ethnic factor
was more important than others.
Blikk journalists would not differentiate among people on ethnic basis thus would not
deal with ethnic Hungarians favorably while granting citizenship. According to journalists of
Blikk, long term residence and certain level of knowledge of the constitution and Hungarian
culture should be the main requirements. A respondent argued that as enlargement proceeds
further, the question of dual citizenship will be irrelevant. What will matter is that everybody
would be able to travel and work freely. They also agreed that citizenship in the EU should be
derived from citizenship in the member states.553
3.4.3 Free movement
Immigration is not supported by Magyar Nemzet, as it can endanger Hungarian culture.
Shortages in the labor market and problems deriving from the decreasing population should
be handled through policy instruments helping families with more children.554 According to
Magyar Nemzet and HírTV, each member state should have the right to decide to what extent
and how it grants mobility rights to third country nationals, which is important because of
those Hungarian minorities who still live outside of the EU, i.e. in Serbia, Croatia and the
Ukraine.555 For the same reason, in the fields of migration, asylum and political rights, it is
important that the member states retain the right to carry out national policies, even if there
are some general EU standards in effect. Having some degree of national discretion in these
policy areas is important so that the Hungarian state can privilege Hungarian minorities.556 In
the respondents’ opinion, EU citizens should enjoy all the rights of free movement on the
territory of the EU including rights to settle and work anywhere they wish, yet some degree
of national discretion should remain in this area especially regarding third country nationals.
While Magyar Nemzet journalists were rather skeptical about the benefits of international
migration, respondents at Blikk and Népszabadság stressed its positive aspects. A Blikk
journalist enthusiastically explained that international migration had enormous advantages as
people can learn new methods, norms and get to know other societies. Yet, the same
journalist also added that the greatest disadvantage of international migration was not only
brain drain but also the practice, according to which more developed countries hire people
from poorer countries for unskilled job positions, which generates cultural tensions.
Népszabadság presented international migration within the EU as the most natural
consequence of EU integration, which was very beneficial especially from the perspective of
the individual. People can work wherever they want to; they can go to doctor where they
prefer, etc. Migration can solve local problems, as people have the possibility to look for jobs
in other countries where they hope to find better conditions for their living.557
Népszabadság would favor delegating the policy areas of free movement, migration
(including political rights of immigrants), political asylum, and illegal migration to the
European level.558 However, European regulation concerning immigration should be more of
a flexible framework because it matters for individual countries where immigrants are coming
552
Interview with Blikk1; Interview with Blikk2.
554
Interview with Mn1.
555
Interview with Mn1, Interview with Mn2.
556
557
558
553
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from.559 Two respondents argued that Hungary should treat all people equally in terms of
entry, work and settlement policies and should not be favorable towards citizens of specific
countries, and towards certain ethnic groups such as ethnic Hungarians.560 However, the third
respondent expressed an opposing view on this matter, since according to him first of all
ethnic Hungarians and Hungarian speaking people should be allowed to immigrate to
Hungary. In addition, citizens of the neighbor countries should receive preferential treatment.
He also argued that besides this ethnic criterion economic factors are the most important from
the aspect of supporting immigration, yet the market selects people automatically without
interference of the state. 561
Blikk would not differentiate among immigrants based on ethnicity, thus, would not treat
ethnic Hungarians favorably. The general rule should be that groups that cannot adopt the
norms of the country should not be accepted. In general, immigrants should be selected
according to Hungary's special employment needs.562 According to Blikk, although some EU
level regulation would be desirable in the areas of immigration, political rights of immigrants,
asylum, and illegal migration, the special preferences of the border countries should be also
taken into consideration, as these states need supplementary local regulation that is in
harmony with EU law.563
3.4.4 Enlargement
HírTV does not show strong preferences on issues of EU integration or enlargement either. At
the same time, the television is generally in favor of Hungary's EU membership and
welcomed Hungary's joining the Schengen Area. It supports further enlargement especially to
neighboring countries, since this would allow for the re-unification of ethnic Hungarians in
the region.564
The preferences of Magyar Nemzet on EU-membership/integration and EU enlargement
can be inferred from interviews as the topic is neither visible on the newspaper's website, nor
enjoys much attention within the newspaper itself. The journalists of Magyar Nemzet
interviewed by Eurosphere had a clearly articulated, unified view on enlargement,
specifically concerning what the conditions and borders of enlargement should be.
Theoretically, the limits of enlargement should be the borders of Western Christianity. Thus
accepting Turkey should not be considered. Yet, Serbia which does not have a Western
Christian legacy, could also join if it fulfilled some basic civilizational norms, such as
respecting human and minority rights.565 A country should not be allowed to join the EU if its
development level does not reach a sufficient level, if it does not respect human rights,
mistreats its minorities, if its religious and social system is seriously incompatible with that of
the EU, such as in the case of Turkey. Turkey should not become a member also because it is
essentially an Asian country. If a country’s laws do not fit the EU’s values, if it does not have
a democratic system, such as Belorussia or Ukraine, if its economic structure and political
culture is very different from that of the EU then should not be accepted as an EU member.566
The former Yugoslav republics should be allowed to join, also Switzerland and Norway,
which would cause no problems. Yet, Ukraine should not be admitted since this would make
559
561
Interview with Mn2.
562
Interview with Blikk1; Interview with Blikk2; Interview with Blikk3.
563
564
“Sólyom: Sorsdöntı az EU-bıvítés,” 17. 01. 2006, www.hirtv.hu.
565
Interview with Mn1.
566
Interview with Mn2.
560
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the EU more vulnerable to Russia due to the presence of the Russian minority in the
Ukraine.567
Magyar Nemzet on the whole has a very positive opinion about the effects of
enlargement on diversity and specifically on the situation of national minorities. As a
consequence of the Schengen process, the borders that used to divide Hungarian minorities
from the mother country are evaporating. The neighboring countries came under European
pressure to adopt certain norms and standards in the area of minority rights and Hungarian
minorities began to enjoy more possibilities to assert their interests in European forums.568
According to Népszabadság, countries that do not separate the church and the state,
which do not respect basic human rights, freedom of speech and opinion, which apply the
death penalty or discriminate against ethnic minorities or homosexuals, should not be allowed
to join the EU.569 In addition, if accepting a country would not be beneficial for the EU from
a practical point of view and with that particular member the EU would be worse off than
before then that country should not be accepted. One such reason could be economic
differences, such as was the case with Romania and Bulgaria before their membership as they
were way behind the EU economically.570
The EU should accept the application of the Western Balkan states and Turkey. The first
group should become part of the EU due to historical reasons and because the EU practically
surrounds this region. Admitting Turkey would be the biggest achievement of the EU, which
would prove that the EU is not a Christian club. In addition, people in the EU should not be
afraid of accepting a Muslim country since Albania, Macedonia and Bosnia are also partially
Muslim. The only fear concerning Turkey that has to be attended to is that Turkey has a huge
population thus would have too much political influence in the EU’s institutions.571 Yet,
Turkey has made a big effort to meet the EU’s requirements, millions of Turkish citizens
work currently in the EU, and Turkey is a secular state. Moreover, accepting Turkey is a
strategic interest of the EU due to military defense and economic reasons.572 While the two
editors supported Turkish accession, the third journalist did not approve of it as according to
him, due to geographic and cultural reasons Turkey cannot be regarded as a European
country. At the same time, he also argued that since the EU gave the candidate status to
Turkey thus promised membership, Turkey has to be allowed to join the EU. With regards to
the Ukraine on the long run membership could be granted, yet at the moment it is not a
political reality.573
According to journalists of Népszabadság, enlargement can be regarded a positive
development from the point of view of ethnic minorities living in the new member states,
since the accession process contributed to the spreading of European values in Eastern
Europe.574 Eastern enlargement affected ethno-national diversity in a positive way since
membership in the EU helps the new countries to adopt different standards, to internalize
European norms, which is good for minorities living there. Moreover, from a Hungarian point
of view the borders disappeared between Hungary and Hungarian minorities thus the
territories where those minorities live were rejoined to the mother country. Eastern
enlargement, however, did not affect the situation of the Roma in any specific way; it brought
as many benefits for the Roma minority as for the rest of the country.575
567
Interview with Mn3.
Interview with Mn1.
569
570
571
572
573
574
575
568
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According to Blikk’s position on enlargement, the EU should not admit those countries,
which are not developed enough in an economic sense and those that do not have proper
democratic and legal institutions, and do not respect human rights. There is a reasonable, final
border of Europe in a cultural and geographic sense, within which Ukraine would, while
Turkey would not, fit.576 The EU should not take Turkey as a member since Turkish
democracy has a lot of weaknesses, especially in the area of respecting minority rights
illustrated by the way Turkey treats its Kurdish minority. It would be very embarrassing for
the EU if Turkey carried out human rights violations against the Kurdish minority as an EU
member state.577 Enlargement had a positive effect on diversity in the EU especially from the
point of view of Hungarian minorities since most of Hungary’s neighbors became EU
members as well.578 Another journalist pointed out, however, that while in principle
enlargement should have changed the life of minorities for the better in the EU, yet in
practice this has often not been the case, such as with regards to the Hungarians in
Slovakia.579
3.4.5 Common views
The five media actors differ in their approach towards the EU in line with their political
position. Magyar Nemzet, representing a right wing political platform is the most
Euroskeptic, favoring federalization and an EU polity where the member states keep a high
degree of sovereignty. Reflecting the Hungarian political right’s value system, Hír TV has a
similarly skeptical approach to the EU. The TV initially supported the EU constitution, yet it
became increasingly critical of it after references to Europe's Christian roots were removed
from the text, and no regulations related to minority rights were included.580 Népszabadság is
the most sympathetic to the EU media outlet. This newspaper is the most in favor of bringing
more policies under EU jurisdiction. Blikk journalists did not have a very clear opinion on the
EU, which reflects the newspaper’s lack of interest in the subject indicated also by the fact
that it hardly publishes articles related to EU issues. MTV does not have a distinctive position
on the European polity either.
What is common to all the selected media actors is that each presents the EU as
something external to Hungary, whether in a positive or a negative light. This finding, based
on the media content analysis, confirms the answers received during the interviews. In
addition, preferences of the Hungarian media on the EU polity are generally not very
articulated except for Magyar Nemzet, which obviously favors a federal EU with a high
degree of member state sovereignty consistent with its right wing political agenda.
While evaluating the merits of Hungary’s European integration and of European
enlargement, an important consideration for every media actor was how European integration
affected Hungarian minorities abroad. According to the general opinion of the Hungarian
media, European integration and enlargement had a very positive effect on ethnic diversity,
since territories inhabited by ethnic Hungarian minorities became part of the EU. As a result,
all previous divisions and isolations will gradually come to an end and all ethnic Hungarians
will be able to move freely across the borders regardless of which country they were coming
from.581
Magyar Nemzet and HírTV view the issues of European integration, enlargement, free
movement, immigration, and political rights through the lenses of national identity. As was
576
578
579
580
“Nincs szó unios alkotmányról a Berlini Nyilatkozatban,” 25. 03. 2007, www.hirtv.hu.
581
Interview with Blikk1; Interview with Blikk2.
577
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noted by one of the interviewees, “Schengen is the only possibility to demolish Trianon.”582
The removal of borders and the Schengen process is regarded as one of the greatest
achievements of European integration because, as a result, Hungarian minorities have
practically been reconnected to the motherland. Since the nation was ripped apart by the
Trianon Treaty in 1920, the most important national goal has been to reunite with the lost
territories. For Magyar Nemzet and HírTV, the main question is to what extent EU
enlargement and EU integration helps to fulfill this aspiration. It also follows that Magyar
Nemzet would prefer maintaining a considerable degree of national discretion in the area of
citizenship, migration, and free movement so that the Hungarian state can introduce special
policies targeting ethnic Hungarians.
Népszabadság and Blikk treat the subject of Hungarian minorities with more distance
than Magyar Nemzet or HírTV, as their views on double citizenship and minority policy
indicate. MTV1 does not show any clear preferences on these issues. Népszabadság’s liberal
value system, which gives preference to the individual over the collective, influences the
newspaper’s approach towards minority policies and citizenship. Népszabadság upholds the
civic concept of citizenship thus it does not support the idea of granting citizenship to
Hungarian minorities based on ethnicity. Likewise, Blikk would not treat ethnic Hungarians
favorably either with regard to immigration and citizenship policy or political rights. These
two newspapers would grant the EU a high influence in the area of free movement and
migration policy. All media actors support enlargement to the Western Balkans while they are
divided over the accession of Turkey and the Ukraine.
4 Views on the European Public Sphere
Let us now turn our attention to the general views on the European Public Sphere (EPS) that
were expressed during our interviews. We shall follow the same logic of presentation,
namely, we will first discuss political parties, followed by social movement actors, think
tanks and the media actors.
4.1 Political Parties’ Views on the EPS
Let us now turn our attention how our selected societal actors think about a common
European public sphere (EPS). Asked whether they could identify a common European
public sphere, MSZP politicians claimed that there is no single communication space but
several communication spaces exist. Some pointed out political parties, foreign policy issues,
or communication of experts and academics that constitute these communication spaces.
However, since the average citizen's knowledge on EU is minimal, a common communication
space does not function on the level of the citizens of the EU.583 Some respondents went
further to claim that until a common language, common goals, or a common currency
becomes reality, we cannot speak of a common European communication space,584 while
others were more optimistic, claiming the European communication space is becoming a
reality for more and more citizens.585 Nevertheless, all respondents agreed that European
communication should be more genuine as at present the European dimension only appears
when the self-interest of participants demands so, and because the lack of communication is
the primary source of Euroskepticism. In contrast, Hungarian public sphere functions well
and communicates with European institutions without a problem. Respondents claim the
582
Interview with Mn1.
Interview with MSZP2, Interview with MSZP3.
584
585
583
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problem is that this is only true for the public servants who deal with Europe, while the
citizens have no access to the EU. As such, there is no connection between national
communication spheres and the European public sphere, and the European public sphere will
only appear if European citizens would find this in their interest.
MSZP respondents argued that the European public sphere should be conceived as a
collection of several communication spaces with multi-level communication, where European
national and sub-national levels should overlap to strengthen cooperation among the member
states.586 These multiple interconnected communication spaces could form a loose network,
and because these spaces are multi-leveled, the European level appears in these. All agreed
that the present communication strategies need to be reorganized in order to empower
citizens, to bring the EU closer to the people, and to start building some identification with
the EU that in the present is lacking.587
Interestingly enough, while all MSZP members argued that enlargement has significantly
altered the work of the party because it brought up new issues, and opened new possibilities
for collaboration and cooperation, none mentioned trans-European networks that the party is
member of other than the European Socialist Party. While all respondents claimed the party
has good international contacts and communicates regularly with its partners, these were
identified only as other parties of the EU, and civil and social organizations that share some
of the goals of the party. Even more revealing was the fact that all respondents said national
media had on overarching primacy over international or European media, which confirmed
that MSZP’s primary interest still concerns domestic politics. Respondents all confirmed that
as one of the major parties, MSZP had a considerable impact on public debate, yet once again
the primacy of the domestic sphere was confirmed when respondents always brought up
domestic examples to support how influential the party was.
Enlargement affected substantially the work of FIDESZ as European issues are now part
of the daily routine, and many other aspects of the work of the party have to be rethought in a
wider, international context. Yet most of the respondents confirmed that the party's main
interest remains winning the elections and as such is primarily concerned with domestic
issues. As one respondent noted, it remained an open question within the party how to link up
domestic and European work into something coherent.588 Nevertheless, all respondents
argued that EU membership is a new channel of information for the members of the party.
The party also found new collaborators and is part now of European networks.
Most of the respondents felt that no common European public sphere exists but other
community spaces on the political level between parties and the economic level or based on
occupation, religion, ethnic, economic, and cultural belonging exist. One respondent claimed
that a common European sphere already exists; another claimed that it is in the making.589
What seemed to be agreed upon is that communication spheres of different social groups exist
and these should be strengthened. In general, nobody claimed that any groups would be
excluded from communications spheres but it was noted that women were underrepresented
and the poor had less access to these.
Asked how existing communication should be restructured, FIDESZ had a preference of
linking up together already existing communication fields. They envision a European
communication space that comprises several different spaces that are multi-leveled and
strongly interconnected, containing the European dimension and trans-European interaction
among the different actors. One respondent claimed it was important that communication
between these levels should be genuine and not artificially imposed, especially when it came
586
588
589
587
87
BOZOKI
to European level communication. Only one respondent saw the need for the current,
overlapping smaller communication spheres to be organized into a single sphere, a unified
communication space which should not be divided into separate levels but should unify all
levels into one common space.590
Respondents claimed that in order to facilitate the appearance of the European
communication space, the member states’ political institutions, their majority populations,
ethno-national groups, including both native and immigrant groups, altogether should adapt
to the imperatives of a single European Public Sphere and a common European identity.
Respondents argued that communication spaces should lead to a common, well-functioning
political system of the EU, and more communication will enable us to solve differences and
resolve possible conflicts, would bring Europe closer to the different groups of people, as
well as the individual citizens. As one respondent argued, developing a close common
connection to Europe, a feeling of belonging was the real meaning of integration.591 Emphasis
was placed on European level communication that should be made possible without
intermediaries, and all efforts should be guided by a conscious aim for European identity, and
the way to do this is to enable the different institutions to connect to the idea of Europe with
many different ties
FIDESZ respondents claimed that the party had wide-ranging contacts, and collaboration
helped the party lobby for its interests and have access to better information and more
knowledge. The party targets different actors at the different levels, but for example on the
European level, respondents mentioned exclusively the European People’s Party as their main
target. FIDESZ claims to have collaboration with other parties of the EU and on the local
level it interacts with many civil and social organizations with which they share information,
exchange experiences and knowledge, and that they collaborate for common goals. All of the
party members were convinced that the party has influence over the outcome of public
debates, but as one respondent noted, they have little impact on the international level.592
Most of the party members also claimed that the party’s primary interest was to win in
elections: a fact that seems to be confirmed by all respondents giving priority to national and
local media rather than European and international media.
Most of the MKMP respondents declared that EU enlargement only marginally affected
the work of the party, and the party is still what it used to be – a communist workers’ party.
Some of the changes noted were that since Hungary became a member, the party had an
insider view of how the Union functioned and enlargement brought new cooperation
opportunities. MKMP became a member of the European Party of the Left and it was running
in European elections, too. Yet, as one of the respondents noted, the Hungarian public seemed
not be concerned with European issues but only with internal domestic issues.
All of the respondents agreed that a common European communication space did not
exist. Some claimed that such European communication spheres existed on the level of
political parties or the media, but this was not available on the level of the average citizen
because travelling and internet was expensive, thus individuals had little chance to experience
European common communication.593 Most of the respondents would welcome further
opportunities for communication and collaboration and they stressed that the voices of small
countries such as Hungary must be heard on the European level; yet two of the respondents
declared that such hopes were unrealistic because they thought true equality within the EU
was impossible to achieve.594
590
Interview with FIDESZ1.
592
593
594
591
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BOZOKI
Those MKMP members, who wanted more opportunities for communication, argued that
European public spheres should be multi-leveled and the several different public spheres
should be interconnected. One respondent claimed that the starting point should be to provide
people with real and reliable information.595 Another emphasized that he believed national
spheres were going to persist, one could not expect that EU could formalize communication
into a single sphere.596 The more communication spaces will be available, the more effective
communications will be and it will be easier to draw people into communication channels and
push for cooperation. Such organization of communication would make the chances of
creating a true European public space better, would empower groups and help the citizens to
get to know each others’ cultural values.
MKMP claimed that although it was a small party it had good international contacts.
Nevertheless party members could only identify the European Party of the Left as one of their
main targets and partners in European politics, although they also pointed out that they
collaborate with other Marxist parties of the EU. On the national level, MKMP claims to
cooperate with civil and social organizations as well as trade unions, but the main target
group of party activities is the working class. The party is open to collaboration with all
organizations that share its ideology or fight for the same social goals. MKMP members also
acknowledged that the party had little influence on public opinion because, as party members
claimed, the MKMP was effectively banned from Hungarian media. Yet most MKMP
politicians were optimistic claiming that they have better and better impact as economic
hardship was hitting more and more people in Hungary. The party claimed that any media
coverage was welcome, though they would prefer the national media to international or
European media.
4.1.1 Common Views
The two major parties confirmed that EU enlargement has substantially changed their work as
new possibilities for communication and cooperation opened. As opposed to this, MKMP
respondents declared that EU enlargement only marginally affected the operation of the party,
but this is understandable if one considers how marginalized MKMP is in Hungarian politics.
The general opinion of party respondents, irrespective of their political belonging, was that no
common European public sphere existed, but most agreed that several different
communication spaces existed on the political level between parties, the media, or the
economic level. In general, nobody claimed that any groups would be excluded from
European communications spheres but it was noted that women were underrepresented and
the poor had less access to these.
There was agreement between MSZP and FIDESZ on how European communication
spheres should be restructured as both argued that the European public spheres should be
conceived as a collection of several communication spaces with multi-level communication,
where European national and sub-national levels should overlap to strengthen cooperation
among the member states and trans-European interaction among the different actors. Once
again, MKMP had a different view, saying that national public spheres would persist;
therefore European public spheres should be multi-leveled and segmented among the member
states. Notwithstanding these differences, all parties agreed that European communication
should be more genuine than it was in the present; the European dimension only appeared
when it was in the self-interest of participants. The respondents claimed communication
strategies needed to be reorganized in order to empower citizens, to bring the EU closer to the
people, and to start building some identification with the EU that in the present was lacking.
595
596
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BOZOKI
4.2 NGOS’ VIEWS ON THE EPS
All MCF respondents claimed that no common European Public Sphere existed. Only two
respondents claimed that European public spheres of experts, political parties, social
movements, or European media existed,597 and one respondent claimed that the Roma had a
joint public sphere: the European Roma Forum,598 but the same respondent said that only the
elite participated in the European public sphere, the majority of citizens were excluded
because they did not understand it. Furthermore, only three out of five respondents claimed
that they would welcome further possibilities for European communication and collaboration;
the other two respondents claimed such possibility was not needed;599 one claiming all
European communication should be organized on the national level.
Those that welcomed more European-level collaboration said that a multifaceted, multileveled, joint communications space was needed;600 only one respondent claiming that the
European Public Sphere should be organized as a single, unified communication space
without any national or other internal boundaries.601 Notwithstanding the differences of how
they would organize the European Public Sphere, respondents agreed that such a space would
give better opportunities for the empowerment of groups, and contribute to a common, wellfunctioning political system of the EU. Only one respondent went into the details of how
existing publics should adapt to the imperative of the European Public Sphere, saying that
cooperation on multiple levels should be joined together.602
Only one MCF respondent claimed that there was no change in the work of the
organization due to enlargement.603 All the others agreed that enlargement had an impact on
MCF as an organization, though they identified different aspects: two respondents found
important the new networks and the new possibilities for collaboration that opened with
enlargement,604 while the other two claimed that it was the content of the work that had been
most affected: one claimed new financial resources became available,605 while the other
pointed to monitoring activities of the different EU policies that MCF was involved with.606
There was no clear answer from respondents whether future enlargement would affect MCF
in any way.
NANE respondents all agreed in that no common European communication space existed.
Two of the respondents claimed that the internet was a common European communication
space,607 while another respondent claimed that a common European communication space of
experts was available.608 Two respondents also said that those that are not familiar with
English or French are excluded from the European public sphere, as well as the poor.609
Another respondent believed that the European communication space was dominated by
Western countries and therefore Eastern members of the EU were excluded.610
All of the respondents would nevertheless welcome more possibilities for trans-European
communication and collaboration because it would provide more opportunities to the citizens
597
Interview with MCF5
599
600
601
Interview with MCF4
602
Interview with MCF3
603
Interview with MCF2
604
605
Interview with MCF5
606
Interview with MCF4
607
608
609
610
598
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to learn about Europe. While one respondent could not say how the European communication
space should be organized,611 the others had similar, yet different views: two respondents said
that the European Public Sphere should be organized at multiple levels which are openended;612 another claimed it should be organized at several separate levels;613 while yet
another said that it should be organized as a single, unified communication space without any
national or other internal boundaries.614
Notwithstanding the differences of the solutions they preferred, two of the respondents
claimed that their preference would give better opportunities for the empowerment of groups,
such as ethno-national minorities, gender groups, transnational groups, or individual citizens
and also give better opportunities to develop a common, well-functioning political system of
the EU;615 while the other two were divided among these two reasons: one said her solution
would empower groups,616 while the other claimed that it was important to develop a
common, well-functioning political system of the EU.617 The majority of the respondents had
no answer whether existing publics should adapt to the European Public Sphere. From those
that replied, one respondent explicitly said that these should not adapt,618 another thought that
national public spheres and/or political institutions had be modified so as to facilitate the
development of a European public sphere with many interacting publics without a common
European identity.619
Asked whether the EU enlargement had any impact on their organization, most of the
NANE respondents highlighted that since Hungary became a member, NANE had more
sources of funding to apply to. One respondent denied that enlargement had any effect on the
work of NANE,620 while another two claimed that nothing but funding had changed.621 Only
two respondents mentioned that NANE became the member of new networks of collaboration
due to enlargement.622 No respondent expected any substantial change from future
enlargement of the EU.
None of the Védegylet respondents believed that a common European communication
space existed yet. Nevertheless, all agreed that parts of a common public sphere existed, such
as a communication space of social movements, or that of experts, or the media. Two of the
respondents also commented that existing European communication spaces were elite
dominated, and excluded the average citizen, thus offering a very limited publicity to these
communicative arenas.623 All respondents argued that there should be more possibilities for
trans-European communication and collaboration.
Asked about how trans-European communication should be organized, all but one of the
respondents claimed that the European Public Sphere should be organized at multiple levels
which are open-ended, as many overlapping European, transnational, national, sub-national
spheres since both horizontal and vertical cooperation was important.624 One respondent
argued in favor of the European Public Sphere organized at several separate levels, as
611
613
614
615
616
617
618
619
620
621
622
623
624
612
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BOZOKI
segmented sub-national, national, and European public spheres that met at the top,625
claiming the goal should be to establish one common sphere with more levels, where the
national spheres were complemented by European ones.
The large majority of respondents that saw the European Public Sphere as open-ended
multi-level space argued in a similar manner that having organized it in this specific way was
beneficial because it would give better opportunities for the empowerment of the different
groups. On turn, the respondent who favored the segmented organization of the European
Public Sphere claimed that this structuring would give better opportunities to develop a
common, well-functioning political system of the EU since a single, multi level European
public sphere could be the basis of a more centralized EU. Only two of the respondents
commented on how existing publics should be adapted, claiming these should adapt to the
imperatives of a single European Public Sphere and a common European identity.626
All of the respondents agreed that Eastern enlargement affected the work of their
organization as new opportunities for networking and collaboration opened to Védegylet. One
respondent said that the content of their work had changed as early as the accession talks
began.627 Almost all respondents argued that access to EU funds was becoming more and
more important for NGOs and thus for Védegylet,628 while one respondent said that some
NGOs were not large enough to be able to reach out to these European possibilities. None but
one of the respondents was available to comment on the possible effects of further
enlargement of the EU, who said that he expected further enlargement would raise the
possibilities for cooperation on the European level.629
4.2.1 Common Views
No Hungarian NGO believed that a common European Public Sphere existed, yet the
majority of the respondents claimed that sub-spheres or specific communicative and
collaborative spaces of experts, the media, or the Roma were in place. It was only two MCF
respondents that claimed there was no need for further opportunities of European
communication and collaboration, the rest of the respondents would welcome such option.
Most of the respondents did not answer whether they saw any groups being excluded from
the European Public Sphere, but those that did, either claimed that the public sphere was elite
dominated and thus excluded the average citizen or argued that people with no language skills
or the poor were excluded from European communication.
NGO respondents had different ideas of how the European communication space should
be organized, and while opinions differed, the large majority would like to organize the
public sphere as open-ended multi-level space rather than a segmented or a unified space.
Respondents argued that such organization would give better opportunities for the
empowerment of groups, such as ethno-national minorities, gender groups, transnational
groups, or individual citizens and also give better opportunities to develop a common, wellfunctioning political system of the EU.
4.3 Think Tanks’ Views on the EPS
As opposed to their views on the previous two themes, with regard to the European public
sphere, the think tank sector was almost as pessimistic as the media sector (see below). Only
a minority of researchers thought a common European communication space existed.
Whether they collaborate with international or trans-European organizations does not seem to
625
Interview with VED4
627
Interview with VED4
628
629
Interview with VED4
626
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BOZOKI
correlate with their opinion on the existence of the EPS; individual conceptions of
communication and public sphere seem more determining. Collaboration with European or
international thinks tanks is generally not a crucial element in their operation; only IWE
seems to have constant and active partnerships on these levels. Századvég is also member of a
few European networks but the effective weight of these collaborative projects seems to be
smaller in recent years. The two liberal think tanks, EKI and Political Capital are not
seriously motivated to establish such partnerships, as the focus of their work is primarily the
domestic political sphere.
As one of its researchers said, IWE as an academic institute has the situational advantage
of being more able to establish partnerships: with other national academic institutes.630
Interestingly, two of the three respondents said there was, at least in an embryo form,
something like a European Public Sphere, thus, the experience of cooperation might after all
have an impact on their perspective. One of the respondents was – as about many issues
touched upon throughout the interview – very skeptic: he rejected that an EPS existed and
was not willing to consider whether it was operative in certain communities or types of
organizations.631 The other two respondents were more positive, but neither said that the EPS
existed in a completely developed form. Only one of them thought it was interesting to think
about the structure of this initial communication space, or rather the way it should be
organized: he visualized a structure, the units of which were regions and also sub-regional
entities with the hierarchy being not strict – it should allow for mobility between the levels.632
Both of these researchers added that a public sphere of experts certainly existed, and thought
that citizens in general were excluded from it due to the language barrier, their inability to
comprehend the EU as a whole, and their consequent disinterestedness.633
The Institute for World Economics is involved in joint projects and networks of multiple
sorts on various levels. Among the most important trans-European networks, primarily the
TEPSA-membership has to be mentioned. Further European networks in which IWE
participates are such as EU-Consent – Constructing Europe Network coordinated by the
European Institute of Public Administration (Maastricht) and the NEWGOV – New Forms of
Governance in Europe project coordinated by the European University Institute (Florence).
IWE also takes part in supranational research networks: it regularly participates in projects of
the United Nations’ Division for Social Policy and Development. Among the many national
institutes the IWE cooperates with, there are such as the Vienna Institute for International
Economic Studies, the Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies, the German Marshall
Fund and the Economic Policy Institute in Sofia, and the Seoul European Institute at the
Konkuk University. In all these networks and projects, IWE participates as a member institute
with full rights.634
None of the respondents at IWE assumed they had the capacity to directly influence
public debates, but this is not their goal either. Their direct contact with the general public is
limited to such events as the yearly organized science day. While one of the respondents said
she hoped they would be catchier in the governmental sphere, another said their influence in
this sector has improved in recent years.635
The two respondents of EKI based their answers about the existence of a European public
sphere on different interpretations of the notion. One of them associated communication
630
632
633
634
For a complete list of projects in international cooperation in a given year, see IWE’s yearly reports (at
www.vki.hu).
635
631
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BOZOKI
space with the practice of power and the transparency this should imply, and said that in this
regard there were problems in the EU. He thinks the EU is not transparent and
comprehensible for the citizens and consequently they largely ignore it.636 The other
researcher attached the notion of communication space to media and said that an EPS only
exists in an embryo form, as there is no privileged European medium, around which such a
space could emerge. About social movements he said he was not sure they formed a common
European space at present, but he had a presumption about which issue areas might trigger
the emergence of such field: migration and environment – these problems were the most
transnational. This respondent suggested exclusion from the (embryonic) EPS happened
through the lack of linguistic skills but he said this effect was inevitable.637 Both of the
respondents thought it would be good if more opportunities for European communication and
collaboration existed.
As opposed to IWE, EKI only collaborates with Hungarian organizations and they do not
maintain constant partnerships with any of these; cooperation is mostly ad hoc. With respect
to their influence on public debates, both respondents said that compared to the age and the
size of the institute, their ability to place and keep certain issues (e.g. data protection and
campaign financing) on the public agenda was quite good.638 Institutional data collection
confirms this opinion.
Századvég also showed a mixed picture with respect to its researchers’ views on the
existence of the EPS. One of the respondents said such space did not exist because whereas
he understood communication as something more then speech, as something that had a
message, he did not think the EU had a message.639 Another respondent, in contrast, said the
EPS was in the phase of taking shape. He thought it was unfortunate that citizens were not
part of it yet, as currently it was a top-down structure of Euro-bureaucrats. Instead, he thinks,
the EPS should be made up of horizontally connecting public spheres, so that they are able to
represent/mediate diversity. 640
While their partnerships are not as active as those of the IWE, Századvég is part of
several networks on different levels. On the regional/national level Századvég cooperates with
Hungarian minority youth organizations of the neighboring countries: Youth Organization of
the Sub-Carpathian Hungarian Cultural Association (Ukraine), Youth Forum of Vojvodina
(Serbia), and the Youth Association of Lendava (Slovenia). On the national level, Századvég
Foundation cooperates with Austrian institutions within the program: Hunyadi Centre for
European and Security Policy. On the transnational level, Századvég takes part in the
Network of Institutes and Schools of Public Administration in Central and Eastern Europe
(NISPAcee). Finally, on the trans-European level, Századvég is a full member of the
European Ideas Network.641
Respondents at Századvég said they were among the few similar organizations that were
able to influence policy-making domestically and were also relatively well known for the
wider public; for the latter especially through the opinion polls they regularly published.642
One of them mentioned that this influence was ambiguously affected by the common
assumption that they were closely tied to the largest rightwing party – which they were not, as
two respondents underlined.643 (As mentioned above, the common view about their
attachment to FIDESZ might not be fully without grounds.)
636
638
Interview with EKI1; Interview with EKI2.
639
640
641
For further details, see the foundation’s website (http://www.szazadveg.hu/kulkapcsolatok/).
642
643
637
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BOZOKI
The only respondent out of all the think tank representatives interviewed who said there
was a common European communication space was one of the leaders of Political Capital
Institute. Not only did he respond with an affirmative yes, but he immediately outlined its
organizational structure.644 Accordingly, the EPS is the correlate of several institutions on the
European level (judiciary system, EP) and the ambition to formulate a common European
stance on different issues. He assumes that there also exists a communication space of social
movements, especially of environmental movements. The respondent thinks the European
communication space is organized on multiple levels that are open-ended, as many
overlapping European, transnational, national, sub-national spheres. He adds that the vertical
dimension is also very important, due to the top-down directedness of the public sphere. His
views were not shared by the two other PC respondents who said there was no such thing as
the EPS. They both affirmed nevertheless that on the level of specific communities (such as
experts), communication spaces did exist. Correspondingly, according to one respondent,
these public spheres are organized horizontally, in complete independence of the EU
polity.645
Just like EKI, Political Capital Institute collaborates only with Hungarian organizations,
and only on ad hoc basis. One of the respondents mentioned that once they collaborated with
Századvég Foundation, and according to institutional data collection, they also collaborated
with EKI on the issue of campaign financing. With respect to their capacity to influence
public opinion, respondents agreed that although their main activities were market based,
when they address issues of public interest they succeed relatively well. One of them said PC
was absolutely an opinion-forming actor of the Hungarian public sphere.646
4.3.1 Common views
Think tanks views on the existence of the EPS were very heterogeneous not only among but
within institutions, too. The majority of respondents were on the view that something like a
European public space was taking shape currently but, in its present, form excluded citizens.
Many noted that the EU remained distant and incomprehensible for most of the people, and
similarly many of the respondents said exclusion from this initial form of the European public
sphere happened through language barriers, lack of knowledge and, as a consequence of these
two, the lack of interest on the citizen’s part. Despite this relatively negative opinion, most of
the respondents thought it would be good if more opportunities for European communication
and collaboration existed.
Hungarian think tanks’ activity in European and other networks also varies, with two of
them being member in several partnerships on regional, trans-European, and international
levels, the other two only cooperating with Hungarian organizations and even these
partnerships are only occasional. Interviewees were quite realistic in assessing their influence
on the public opinion. While IWE is not really visible for the wider public, leaders of
Századvég, EKI, and Political Capital rightly said that their institute was able to set the public
agenda when it aimed to do so.
4.4 Media Views on the EPS
A leading journalist of Magyar Nemzet was very dissatisfied with the way the newspaper
informed the public about EU issues, which in his opinion was very ad hoc, as neither the
editorial board nor the audience was interested.647 Interestingly, he was the only person
interviewed who thought a European communication sphere existed, and thought the EPS
644
Interview with PC1.
Interview with PC3.
646
Interview with PC2
647
Interview with Mn1.
645
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was something important that Hungarian media should be a part of. Yet, he also argued that
in Hungary hardly anyone was connected to the EPS. In his opinion, having an EPS would be
desirable as it could contribute to the creation of a stronger European identity. He suggested
that in order to join the EPS, Hungarian civil society should get involved in Europe wide
social debates. The connection and cooperation between civil society and the EU, interest
groups, churches and Brussels should be improved. Thus, more communication spaces should
exits that should be connected to each other. This could also provide for a better
representation and assertion of citizens’ interests at the EU level, if for instance, Hungarian
peasants formed a coalition with their Spanish counterparts.648 EU programs could be
initiated which would aim at influencing public opinion in other EU member states.
Journalists could visit newspapers in other countries and communicate their national
viewpoints to foreign audiences. This would help to create a European public sphere. In the
present, only big events entered the European communication channel, such as news about
the French presidency, while more communication would be needed about simple, daily
issues in countries of a similar size as of Hungary.649
Journalists of Népszabadság see it as their duty to inform their audience about EU
politics; however, in their view people are interested mostly in national politics. According to
the journalist specialized in EU issues, it would be desirable to publish more about the EU,
yet due to the editors’ and the audience’s lack of interest they do not cover it sufficiently.650
According to Népszabadság, an EPS does not exist, and there is no need to create more
possibilities for trans-European communication. As its journalists reasoned, there are very
few topics which attract the attention of the whole European public, such as the Lisbon Treaty
or the Euro. However, even the so called European topics appear in their national dimension
in the media, reflecting the interests of the national public. European issues appear in national
communication spaces naturally through their national interpretation, thus are presented from
a national viewpoint.651 The Financial Times could be an example of a European
communication space; however its audience is very narrow, constrained to financial experts.
This special communication space came into being with the introduction of the Euro, which
created a common field of interest. Thus, European communication spaces will evolve
spontaneously if there will be need for them, their creation cannot be pushed by bureaucratic
means. If there will be a need for European communication dictated by the business world or
other communities, this will develop naturally.652
Therefore, it is doubtful whether a trans-European communication space could be and
should be artificially created. If the EU makes some efforts to set up the EPS, it should do so
very cautiously, because such initiatives can turn into empty formalized shells. The
journalists also mentioned the language barrier as an important obstacle of creating a
common European communication space, as naturally most people are unable to read
newspapers of other countries.653
Blikk sees as its duty to inform its audience about EU related issues as much as these
issues directly affect people. As Blikk’s main profile is entertainment, they write about
Hungary and issues that are close to their readers. They write about Hungarian politics,
domestic problems in Hungarian to Hungarian people.654 According to their editorial policy,
events, which might be interesting for the readers should be reported about. Blikk does not
648
Interview with Mn1.
Interview with Mn2.
650
651
652
653
654
649
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aim to influence public opinion necessarily. They see it as their duty to inform and to
entertain. “We can have an influence on people as a soap opera which tries to change
people’s way of thinking about social issues through simple messages.”655
In Blikk’s views, the EPS does not exist either. Moreover, there is no need to create an
EPS. An EPS should come into being spontaneously; otherwise it would be overregulated and
non-enjoyable. Its establishment should not be forced. Blikk’s journalists gave voice to the
view widely shared in Hungary, according to which whatever happens in Brussels is really
irrelevant. Brussels is far away and the effects of the EU are felt here in a very indirect way.
Readers of the tabloid press cannot be moved by EU issues that are in general irrelevant for
them. As one journalist explained, Hungarian readers do not follow European issues such as
the Lisbon Treaty, which is why an average reader would feel insulted if someone asked her
about such questions.656
4.4.1 Common views
With the exception of one interviewee, every respondent claimed the EPS did not exist.
Moreover, most of the media respondents were skeptical about whether a common European
communication space should be created. This implies that none of them thinks within the
frames of the EPS nor do they view themselves as being part of the EPS. Moreover, none of
the actors had significant international or EU level partnership or collaboration with other
media actors. Most of them cooperate with participants within their own media group
belonging to the same owner. Their EU level cooperation is mostly limited to visiting
conferences.
Most interviewees thought it was important to inform their public about European
policies and diversity issues. Yet, most of them admitted that while the theme of diversity
received a lot of attention, Hungarian media does not cover the EU sufficiently. Many of the
respondents pointed out that the EU was distant and something often hard to comprehend
even for them, not to mention their audience. Since very few people understand how the EU
functions or the significance of certain issues, such as of the new constitution or the Lisbon
treaty, the readers and the editors are not too keen to write and read about EU related topics.
Most of them thought the EPS was non-existent and its future evolution should be
spontaneous, not generated by the European bureaucracy.
5 CONCLUSIONS
With regards to Hungarian society’s stand on diversity, we can claim that Hungary is an
inclusive society as the major actors, can be characterized as being pro-diversity – although
variation do exist with regards to what extent they favor diversity. Nevertheless, it is
important to note that right-wing media seems to be the least welcoming diversity, but even
the MKMP, which is on the extreme left, claims that all people have a right to organize
according to their identity and interest. The two mainstream parties see diversity as a value
for society, and our maverick party was not openly opposed to diversity either. This important
distinction between mainstream parties and the Communists becomes more visible with
regards to the issue of immigration, where the latter have a more exclusivist view of who and
how should be accepted into the country.
The issue of minority rights is similar, as mainstream parties would support political
rights on the local level, while MKMP ties all political rights to citizenship. Yet again, all
political actors support cultural rights for different groups, but all would oppose organizing
655
656
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parties according to ethnic lines, a belief that is shared by all the other societal actors.
Unfortunately most of the diversity discourse is dominated by ethno-national groups, other
forms of diversity or the issue of gender equality receives much less attention irrespective of
whether we talk about political parties, media agents, or think-tanks. There is no clear
agreement on what the best way for EU development would be, and what matters is where a
political actor is located on the left-right continuum. Mainstream parties are declared
supporters of integration, yet the conservative FIDESZ would oppose the advancement of EU
legislation in many different policy fields, while MKMP is the most Euroskeptic of all. MSZP
is the strongest supporter of integration, and party members see enlargement as having
positive effects on societal diversity as well as gender equality.
Similarly, all of our selected NGOs were welcoming toward diversity, though we could
observe that there were variations in whether respondents attributed value to diversity or
whether they thought of it as an inescapable part of life. What is interesting to note is that
most of the NGO respondents thought they represented a minority opinion, the general public
was less welcoming to diversity. Another important note is that the ethno-national NGO, the
Roma organization seemed to have the least inclusionist view among the NGOs, though one
would expect that Roma respondents would be on the top of the list.
Yet again, when it came to the discussion of minority rights, the responses we received
were mostly concerned with ethno-national groups. This is an unexpected result, especially
for the women NGO, where some respondents would still prioritize these claims over other –
such as gender – claims. Nevertheless, gender equality received much more attention – not
only from the women NGO – from the NGOs than the other institutional actors, and the same
is true about other type of minorities. NGOs seemed to be the most welcoming to the idea of
further strengthening of EU integration, and they were the strongest supporters of EU-level
rights.
As mentioned above, the cleavages characterizing the Hungarian society and,
interrelated, the party system and the media, are much less visibly present in the think tank
sector as represented by the four interviewed institutes. Although – with the exception of the
IWE – the studied think tanks could be positioned on a liberal vs. conservative scale, with
Eötvös Károly Institute and Political Capital Institute occupying the liberal, and Századvég
Foundation inhabiting the conservative poles, preferences on the EUROSPHERE themes did
not correlate with these political or politico-philosophical attitudes than it is the case in the
media sector. This, presumably, is due to the position of the speakers as social scientific
researchers, who value their independence and objectivity.657 On the other hand, the assumed
consistency of a set of values and preferences that are determined by a political or an
ideological stance represented by a party or a media outlet did not seem to constrain think
tank researchers to the same extent – this probably explains the higher intra-institutional
variation and the cross-cutting preferences (e.g. views on the preferential treatment of
Hungarian co-ethnics). In turn, this also means that fewer correlations can be found between
the researchers’ views on diversity, the public sphere, and the European polity.
For instance, in individual researchers’ responses, skepticism towards EU-level
regulation of diversity or gender issues, or the EU-polity as a whole does not exclude viewing
diversity of every kind as a value in itself that has to be aimed at.658 Most often the source of
skepticism towards the EU and its policies for diversity and gender equality issues was a
more pro-diversity, pro-equality approach: many view positive discrimination and quotarequirements as discriminative and non-feminist.659 Moreover, the charge that the EU is not
657
One exception was a PC leader who explicitly referred to his position as a researcher who does not usually
formulate normative statements. (Interview with PC2)
658
659
Interview with PC1.
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democratic enough also emerged. The argument that opposes the increase in the regulative
powers of the EU because it is against national interests – a claim that is more frequent in the
media sector, as we have seen above – occurred only once, at the conservative Századvég. On
the other hand, the concept of nation state sovereignty in terms of regulating issues such as
citizenship or minority rights emerged in the responses of liberal institute’s leader who sees
diversity as a goal a society should strive for. Thus, patterns in the interplay of views on
diversity, the EU-polity and the public sphere are very hard to trace in the studied segment of
the think tank sector.
Whereas there was some variation in the emphasis placed on the potential or already
existing tensions stemming from diversity – with liberal institutes stressing this danger less
than the conservative Századvég – only one institute (Századvég) voiced anti-diversity views;
in relation to homosexuals. Nor did the researchers express anti-integration or antienlargement opinions. Cultural difference as an obstacle to membership (mostly with
reference to Turkey) did not only occur in responses of the conservative think tank.660
Nevertheless, the most often mentioned obstacle to further enlargement was the EU itself,
that is, its capacity to integrate and support new member states as it should.
Our selected media actors’ view on diversity and the EU is greatly determined by their
general political position taken in Hungary’s very polarized political scene. As we have seen
in the case of political parties, the political stance of the media outlet shapes fundamentally
the way it frames issues related to diversity and the EU, often locking it into particular
discursive patterns, which can hardly be broken. As the EU is setting a clear political agenda
advocating equal chances for the Roma, sexual minorities, the disabled and other vulnerable
groups, attitudes towards the EU influence the individual media actors’ normative approach
to diversity. Similarly, the mode of action works the other way around as well, as attitudes on
social and ethnic differences influence to what extent values associated with the EU are
shared and accepted.
As we have shown, the most relevant topics of diversity are Hungarian minorities abroad,
and domestic minorities i.e. the Roma and sexual minorities. The rightwing media
represented by Magyar Nemzet and HírTV are very supportive of diversity when it comes to
Hungarian minorities abroad, yet are anti-diversity when the Roma and homosexuals are at
issue. The conservative media shares less the values propagated by the EU than
Népszabadság or MTV1, as the EU at least on the rhetorical level emphasizes nondiscrimination against homosexuals and the Roma, while is less supportive of minority rights
of Hungarian minorities.
Views on almost any issue area of the conservative media are dictated by its preferences
on national identity, characterized by the aspiration to connect virtually Hungarian inhabited
lands, and to defend national interests in EU institutions. Thus HírTV and Magyar Nemzet are
more skeptical of the EU than the other media actors. They prefer a federal EU with relatively
little centralization which would enable Hungary to defend its national interests including
granting preferential treatment to Hungarian minorities abroad in various policy fields. The
conservative media – out of its great concern about Hungarian minorities abroad – favors less
EU level interference in the area of citizenship and immigration, so that Hungary can retain
practices which treat Hungarian minorities favorably as opposed to other foreigners. At the
same time, it would prefer strong EU legislation in the area of minority rights, which it sees
as the best guarantee for the protection of Hungarian minorities abroad.
At the same time, left wing or tabloid press are much more reserved when it comes to
issues of national identity. They are supportive of Hungarian minorities as well, even if in a
more moderate way, while being sympathetic to the Roma and homosexuals. Their views on
660
Interview with Szv1; Interview with VKI1; Interview with EKI1.
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diversity influence their stance on specific policy areas. Accordingly, Népszabadság shows
more enthusiasm towards the EU than Magyar Nemzet as it is less concerned with the need to
protect national interests in the EU, while the preferences of MTV1 and Blikk are hard to
detect due to the latter two actors’ political neutrality and lack of interest in the topic.
According to the notion of diversity endorsed by Népszabadság and Blikk, the nation is
not an ethnic but a civic concept. Therefore, rights should be granted above all to the
individual as opposed to the collective, based on citizenship and not on ethnic origin. In line
with this logic, according to these two media actors, Hungarian minorities abroad should not
be granted Hungarian citizenship owing to their ethnic origin. Due to being less concerned
about retaining national discretion which could allow for the continuation of preferential
treatment of Hungarian minorities abroad, these two newspapers would welcome more EU
regulation in the areas of free movement, political rights, asylum and illegal migration.
Reflecting their more reserved attitude towards Hungarian minorities abroad, they were also
less in favor of a strict EU legislation in the area of minority rights.
To summarize, we can argue that Hungarian society seems to welcome diversity,
although important differences exist among the different actors. What seems to be agreed
upon by all is that some basic inclusiveness of society is needed as all individuals have the
right to organize according to their identity. Individual actors differ on how they view
diversity depending on where they can be located on the left-right divide that seems to be the
underlying cleavage not only for Hungarian politics but also media and the think tank sector.
It seems that mainstream parties that are in the center value diversity, though conservatives
have a less inclusionist view, while actors on the political extreme are more likely to be
exclusionist and thus hinder the European ideal. What is an undisputed common theme is that
Hungarian diasporas in neighboring countries should be taken care of, and their status is more
than a legitimate interest of the Hungarian state.
The left-right divide is the single most important determinant of how actors think about
the EU polity. We find a direct relationship between their stance on diversity and their views
of the EU polity: actors on the left seem to be the most pro-diversity and pro-EU, they are the
ones that would welcome more EU centralization and more involvement of the EU in
different policy fields such as immigration, citizenship, or free movement rights;
conservatives are less enthusiastic but still supportive of both diversity and the EU polity;
while once again, the actors on the political extreme are those that are most Euroskeptic.
Once again the only exception is EU level minority rights that most of the societal actors
would welcome as it would be beneficial for the Hungarian diasporas.
A mixed picture appears in regards of the views about the common European public
sphere, and how Hungarian societal actors relate to it. As we have shown, the two main
parties believe that different common communication spaces already exist and that these
should be restructured and interconnected on multiple levels in order to empower their
participants and achieve a truly common European public sphere. The Euroskeptic MKMP in
contrast sees no chance for the common European public sphere as it claims that national
communication spaces will persist in the foreseeable future. This can partly be attributed to
the fact that MKMP seems to have the smallest role in European and international
communication networks as the party is marginalized while its bigger counterparts are well
established both in European and international channels of collaboration.
Although one could expect more positive responses from the NGOs, the majority of our
respondents believed there was no such thing as a common European Public Sphere. On a
positive note, it was only the Roma respondents that were somewhat reserved about further
opportunities for cooperation and collaboration; all other NGO members were supportive of
these. Most believed that the average citizen has to be involved more; therefore they claimed
that the EPS should be organized as a multi-level, open-ended communication space that
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could both empower the different groups and bring a better functioning political system to the
EU. All of the NGOs were involved in international collaborative networks, and as such all
could be characterized as facilitators of the EPS.
Similarly, only few of the think tank representatives think that a common European
communication sphere already exists: the most common view is that it is just taking shape
and in its current form is not accessible for the average citizen. Independently of their sober
assessment of the present state of the EPS, most of the respondents say it would be good if
more opportunities existed for European communication and collaboration. It is most
probably (at least indirectly) related to their approach to the EPS as premature, that think tank
respondents most often said integration had no impact on diversity or gender equality and this
has to do with the underdeveloped state of the EPS. Expressed views about the role and the
potential of the pubic sphere in dealing with possible or real tensions of diversity within
member states underline the common belief among researchers in the importance of the
public sphere. With more state role preferred by conservative respondents and more civil
society activity favored by liberal researchers, think tanks generally do think the public
sphere has to address problems of diversity, but they do not see this effectively happening on
the European level yet.
It can however be stated that these institutions are not the impediments to the articulation
of the EPS. Two of them actively participate in European networks, and those which do not,
explain this with their domestically positioned research focus. While these institutes could be
clustered as neutral in this respect, their (most frequent) preference for more European
communication and collaboration, and their approach to the Hungarian public sphere (within
which three out of four is a largely visible actor) suggest that think tanks would rather
facilitate than obstruct the articulation of the EPS.
Our interviews prove that the Hungarian media neither believes in the existence of nor
does it see itself as part of the European public sphere. This view is voiced almost
unanimously by the respondents and is supported by media content analysis, which reveals
that EU issues are presented mostly as foreign policy news or from a narrow perspective of
Hungarian national interests. Moreover, media actors have a very low level of contact and
interaction with other participants of the European media. No media actor thinks within the
frames of belonging to a common European public sphere. Most of them however, thought it
would be desirable to have more possibilities for European level communication, yet they just
did not seem to know how an EPS could be cleverly facilitated. Blikk was the only media
actor, which did not have any interest in the EPS.
To conclude, the same ambiguous standing towards the common European public sphere
can be identified that was visible with regards to diversity or views about the EU polity, and
which seems to be determined by political affiliation of the given actor. The majority of
Hungarian actors do not see the common European public sphere as a reality, but most would
welcome more collaboration and communication. What is striking is the view of the
Hungarian media actors that does not consider a European public sphere important and would
rather continue to concentrate on national publics. This view is only shared by the
Euroskeptic MKMP. As we have seen, media actors have little contact with other member
state media actors, and they are not part of European networks of collaboration, while MKMP
also has limited access to both domestic and international actors. As such, both media actors
and Euroskeptics hinder the appearance of a common European public space. This is
especially important as media would naturally constitute one of the primary areas where
European publics could interact. In contrast, think tanks are important contributors to the
articulation of the European public sphere as they actively participate in European networks
and have an important role in structuring the Hungarian public sphere.
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Nevertheless, what seems most important is the role played by the two main parties in
structuring public debate in Hungary. As we have seen the left-right cleavage is omnipresent
in all sectors of Hungarian society and the adopted views of the two parties will reverberate
into all other segments of society. Both of the Hungarian main parties are well established
within European networks and are active on many levels, therefore they contribute to the
advancement of a common European public sphere. Yet we have seen that an important
distinction can be drawn again as the socialist are more open to the ideals of a common
European sphere than the conservatives who would restrict integration to specific policy
fields. Notwithstanding these differences, both main parties have clear ideas on how to
advance the idea of the common European public sphere that they see as a combination of
many overlaying multilevel public spheres in order to empower the societal groups and the
citizens.
Most of our respondents point to the lack of citizens’ involvement in the public sphere as
a major obstacle for the development of a common European public sphere as solutions must
be found for expanding the communication among different elites to include the average
citizen. Only few have noted language as a barrier to transnational collaboration, but almost
all argue that national public spheres and national publics are unwilling or unable at the
present to be more open to transnationalization efforts. This is why national collective
identities, loyalties and commitments still prevail, which in turn only leads to the
fragmentation of European public spheres. While most Hungarian respondents seem to
welcome further integration, it is clear that until more conscious efforts are taken in order to
stop reproducing social practices and institutional structures of national public spheres, no
European demos – no European Public Sphere and no European public – is possible.
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Diversity and the European Public Sphere

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