The power of drug money in Mali

Transcription

The power of drug
money in Mali
Christian Aid Occasional Paper
Christina Anderson
October 2015
The power of drug money in Mali Contents 1
Contents
PREFACE
INTRODUCTION: COCAINEBOUGOU AND ITS CASTLES IN THE SAND
Armed groups in northern Mali and the Sahara
PART 1: SMUGGLING IN WEST AFRICA AND MALI
Hal ! l and har ! m smuggling
Drugs smuggling in West Africa
Drugs smuggling in Mali
New trafficking routes
Key players and beneficiaries in the drug trade
The money: Who spends it and what on?
Conclusion
PART 2: CRIMINALS, TERRORISTS AND THE CORROSION OF DEMOCRACY
Why did Mali’s government crumble so quickly?
Government toleration of drug smuggling
Religion-inspired militants, criminals, or both?
How AQIM and MUJAO embed themselves in communities
Joining the dots: government, drugs, terrorists and instability
Conclusion
PART 3: TACKLING THE GOVERNANCE CHALLENGES
A culture of corruption
The fight against corruption
The rise and fall of Touré
PART 4: CONCLUSION: REASON FOR HOPE
APPENDIX: INITIATIVES THAT DEAL WITH THE WEST AFRICAN DRUGS TRADE
REFERENCES
ENDNOTES
Acknowledgements:
Christina A nderson is a research and com munications consultant, based in G eneva, S w itzerland. She has w orked for international aid
organisations in Latin A m erica, Europe and southern Africa for over 15 years.
This case study w as independently com missioned by the Joliba Trust as a policy and advocacy paper for its o w n use, but subsequently
contributed to Christian Aid’s research.
Joliba Trust supports grassroots developm ent w ork w ith farming and cattle-raising com munities in central M ali. Its focus is on projects to
help w om en and environm ental w ork to sustain rural livelihoods in marginal areas affected by desertification.
Disclaimer:
O Ps are published in the nam e of the author(s). Their vie w s do not necessarily reflect those of Christian Aid and should not be so attributed.
Christian Aid’s O ccasional Paper (O P) series reflects w ork carried out by Christian Aid staff and others on a range of developm ent topics.
Although O Ps are addressed to an audience that includes policy makers, acade mics, the m edia, other non-governm ental organisations and
the general public, som e prior kno w ledge of the topic may be ne eded to understand fully som e of the papers.
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The power of drug money in Mali Preface 2
Preface
In the 18th century, according to historian Thomas Gallant,
there w ere pirate lairs and enclaves in different parts of the
world that gre w to becom e regional market centres and
entrepôts in their ow n right.1 From tow ns and settle m ents
in the Indian O cean to pirate territories in the Caribbean,
these centres becam e established as suppliers of various
illicit products and gains – from stolen gold, silver and
porcelain; to tobacco, alcohol, opium and arms; to slaves
and associated criminal services. In tim e, pirates from the
Caribbean becam e a ‘major economic force supplying urban
markets in North A m erica’.
In the Indian O cean, continues Gallant, so vital w ere pirates
to trade that their com m erce in the region w as called ‘arm ed
trading’, at par or comparable to regular trade on the seas.
Their activity helped connect their enclaves in rural villages
or re mote coastal hide-outs with outside markets. This
m eans, for example, that they created direct and indirect
e mploym ent opportunities for far-flung com munities that
would other wise have nothing to rely on. They becam e niche
suppliers of products and services that normal, legitimate
businesses won’t touch, but w hich w ere in de mand from
pow erful custom ers located in major capitals. They created
business for bankers w ho took their gold, shipbuilders w ho
built and repaired their corsairs, and m erchants w ho sold
the m cannons, gunpowder or information. Thus, Gallant
concludes, although they w ere outlaw s hunted by law
enforcers, pirates played a key role – w hether for good or
bad – in the global economy.
This case study reveals similar patterns, but instead of
pirates on the high seas, it examines the cam el-riding or
4x4-driving inhabitants of the Sahara. These conte mporary
groups have turned other wise isolated settle m ents and
mobile trading caravans in the desert into bazaars for
smuggled goods – from ‘soft goods’ such as sugar, fuel and
staples, to ‘harder’ com modities such as cigarettes, mobile
phones and Viagra. But the bazaars are often also bases for
hiding and for w arding illicit m erchandise – such as w eapons,
am munition and narcotic drugs, mainly cocaine and cannabis
resin.
So vital are these modern-day ‘pirates’ to trade in the desert,
that their com m erce can also be called ‘arm ed trading’.
And the treasures they bring are no longer that hidden
– until the 2012 insurgency in northern M ali they w ere
e mbodied and symbolised in luxury-mansion districts such
as ‘Cocainebougou’, or Cocaine Tow n, w hich have sprouted
in the desert. In recent years they had becom e increasingly
adept at converting stolen or smuggled goods into other
forms of w ealth, w hich add real value to the
local economy.
The power of drug money in Mali Introduction 3
Introduction:
Cocainebougou and
its castles in the sand
M uch still ne eds to be learned about these modern-day
brigands. This report m erely provides one explanation for
their e m ergence and an introduction to the contexts in w hich
they operate. It also helps to explain the relationships of
competition, collaboration or corruption bet w e en smugglers
and the state, smugglers and local com munities, and
smugglers and the assortm ent of arm ed groups in the
desert. In northern M ali one can find evidence of these
complex relationships: not only agents of the state behaving
like criminals, but also criminals behaving like the state.
There are not only criminals taking up the mantle of militancy
and fundam entalism and trying to be ‘political’, but also
political terrorists engaging in illicit enterprise and trying to
be criminal, often with great success.
W hat, then, can developm ent agencies do about such
underlying politics? How can they ‘straighten the crooked’,
so to speak? A first step is to acknowledge the existence
of a peculiar form of politics and set of relationships,
w hich drove much of the conflict in northern M ali. Useful
questions could then be asked w hen designing governance
interventions. For example, how is the highly lucrative
cocaine economy reshaping social and political relationships
in the country? W hat informal or hidden structures and
relationships of pow er ne ed to be examined? Do the usual
conflict analyses and conflict-sensitive program ming apply
as much for situations with a high incidence of organised
criminality and corruption? How does one engage with
institutions that are probably built on foundations of illegal
activity and illicit behaviour? W hat could be done about
criminal markets else w here in the world that create the
de mand for the services of smugglers in the Sahara?
Until all-out conflict erupted in early 2012, tourism had be en
a mainstay of northern M ali’s economy, creating jobs and
generating significant incom e. 2 A popular stop on the tourist
trail w as the ancient tow n of Gao, know n not just for the
famous Askia tombs and the Pink Dune, but for a district
on the edge of the tow n nicknam ed ‘Cocainebougou’, or
Cocaine Tow n, after the source of its w ealth. H ere, fourstorey mansions, surrounded by ornam ental fences, and
graced with fake marble pillars and huge bronze friezes,
stood in marked contrast to the desert that surrounds the m. 3
Cocainebougou is not unique. Timbuktu, another ancient
tow n about 320km east from Gao, had a similar district,
w here ostentatious displays of w ealth, widely assum ed to
have be en earned from drugs trafficking, w ere com mon.
B efore the conflict, a smuggler told journalist Afua Hirsch
that the presence of drug chiefs in Timbuktu ‘is an open
secret’, and that they w ere the ones w ho provided visiting
senior officials of the previous governm ent with 36 brand
ne w 4x4 vehicles. 4 And 2,000km along the truck trade route
north from Gao, in the Algerian border tow n of Tamanrasset,
is the district of Sersou F erraille. Five or six years ago,
the ow ners of the large houses there, w hich sit behind
heavy m etal gates, had nothing. They w ere able to acquire
gleaming mansions, with w alls covered in imported tiles,
columns and marble flooring, crystal chandeliers, and the
latest air conditioning and furniture from Europe. 5 It is widely
acknowledged that many houses in these districts w ere
built on the proce eds of trafficking in narcotics. Along with
kidnapping-for-ransom, it w as considered the most lucrative
business in the region and reportedly still is.
The fortunes of drug smugglers in the deserts of northern
M ali are often associated with instability – that it is instability
w hich allow s the m to engage in their profitable trade. But
instability could be bad for the smugglers too. For example,
w hen the tide turned against the insurgents in northern
M ali shortly before French and Chadian troops retook Gao
in late January 2013, Arab businessm en and drug traffickers
associated with the insurgents fled in fear for their lives and
their mansions w ere ransacked and looted. The mansions
of Cocainebougou w ere, literally and figuratively, castles in
the sand that could easily be sw ept aw ay. Yet their ow ners
re mained far more resilient. Just t wo w e eks after the French
arrived, Gao’s mayor, Sadou Diallo, according to a widely
quoted report, allow ed t wo alleged drug smugglers to stay in
his hom e. 6
O utsiders, and developm ent agencies in particular, are
still largely ignorant of the unprecedented expansion
of drugs trafficking in W est Africa. So far, it is mainly
security specialists and acade mics w ho are analysing it.
Examining the e m ergence of luxury mansion districts, such
as Cocainebougou and its counterparts in Timbuktu and
Armed groups in northern Mali and the Sahara
This case study does not provide full answ ers, not only
because these questions are difficult, but also because they
ought to be answ ered by the developm ent agencies that
se ek to eradicate poverty in the Sahel. Hopefully in this case
study, a contribution by the Joliba Trust and Christian Aid to
the discussions, doors will be opened to those answ ers.
AQIM – Al- Q aida in the Islamic M aghreb and its offshoots are considered the primary transnational terror
threats in North and W est Africa. It traces its origins to the
guerrilla Islamist move m ent in Algeria in the 1990s w hich
splintered but regrouped in the early 2000s and aligned
itself with al- Q aida.
Although organised criminality has e m erged to be today’s
principal governance challenge, it is not cast in stone.
It is constantly contested and renegotiated, and adapts
continually to changing conditions, as the story in northern
M ali over the past t wo years show s.
MUJAO – French acronym for ‘ M ove m ent for Unity and
Jihad in W est Africa’, an offshoot of A QIM . Its leadership
is mostly black Africans, in contrast to the largely northern
Arab leadership of A QIM . M UJA O m e mbers are know n to
be directly engaged in smuggling and illicit activities.
D evelopm ent agencies have an increasingly urgent role
to play in contexts like northern M ali. This case study
challenges the m to take the first steps.
Ansar Eddine – or ‘D efenders of the Faith’, is another
A QIM off-shoot, founded in 2011 by the M alian Tuareg
Iyad Ag Ghali. The group w as set up as a hom e-grow n
jihadist organisation in northern M ali.
Al Murabitun – or ‘The Sentinels’, the nam e adopted
by the 2013 m erger of Gao-based groups M UJA O and
the Signed in Blood Battalion associated with M okhtar
B elmokhtar.
MNLA – French acronym for ‘National M ove m ent for the
Liberation of A zaw ad’. M NL A is the main group espousing
secession from M ali and establishing the ne w nation-state
of A zaw ad, and is dominated by Tuaregs.
Front Islamique Arabe de l’Azawad – a group that
e m erged in the 1990s espousing a secessionist agenda
and is draw n mainly from the Hassani Arab minority.
Tamanrasset, is a useful first step to decode and interpret
w hat is going on.
These ‘castles in the sand’ are symbolic of many things.
In the eyes of many locals they loom as proof that big and
quick money, even if risky, can be made outside traditional
employment and ‘slow-grow th development’. The drugs trade
and its profits may be har!m or forbidden, but over time they
can become their ow n justification, especially when they
develop to be the major source of income and employment
in impoverished communities. It also demonstrates how
illicit money can link otherwise isolated local communities in
the desert to the global economy: paying for goods ranging
from traditional staples for survival such as pasta, semolina,
powdered milk and petrol, to the more ‘globalised’ products
such as mobile phones, satellite T V and 4x4 vehicles. Perhaps
most importantly, Cocainebougou shows the pow er of
drug money – how governance is bent to accommodate
the interests of traffickers and how corruption grows in the
distribution of the spoils.
The reasons behind the grow th of drug trafficking may be
the key to understanding poverty and governance challenges
in the Sahel region. H ere are thre e possible reasons – an
economic, a social and a political reason – for the grow th of
drugs trafficking in M ali and W est Africa, w hich developm ent
agencies ne ed to consider.
1. The benefits of illicit trading, though risky
and often morally frowned upon, have
become widely perceived as far outweighing
the benefits of slow-change traditional
development or income-generating activities.
The benefits of illicit trade are not just the obvious and
conspicuous face-value gains, such as the castles in the
sand of Cocainebougou. They also include unprecedented
social mobility, higher standing within social hierarchies, and
long-term security for the individuals and com munities both
directly and indirectly involved.
LIBYA
EGYPT
MALI
NIGER
COCAINE FROM
SOUTH AMERICA
AQIM and allies
NIGERIA
CHAD
SUDAN
ETHIOPIA
Boko Haram
Al-Shabab
Trafficking routes
HEROIN
FROM ASIA
Drug smuggling may be considered by local com munities
as har !m (illicit or sinful) and inherently destructive both
to society and the traders w ho engage in it. But w hen
even notorious drug smugglers invest their gains in widely
recognised symbols of legitimacy, such as marriage with
‘good families’, or in gardens and livestock, or in legitimate
enterprises that create e mploym ent, then har !m activities
begin to be justified as a necessary m eans to live a moral
life and gain higher social standing.7 There appears to be
tacit acceptance, too, that the dire economic situation in M ali
m eans al-fr!d al-har !m (illicit smuggling) is the only w ay to
get the funds ne eded to live a truly moral lifestyle. So w hile
the drugs trade is regarded as sinful, the fruit that it brings is
not; drugs money may be illegal, but not everything that is
illegal is alw ays se en as wrong. 8
W hatever benefits are gained and w hatever justifications
are made, smuggling would still not be possible without the
collusion of, or at least the toleration by state and political
authorities. And the suspicions go all the w ay to the top. A
report by com m entator Cheikh Ba, published by the w ebsite
M aliactu, claim ed that form er President A madou Toumani
Touré had personally intervened for the release of drug
barons. O ne of the alleged drugs traffickers w ho had be en
arrested for w hat is now know n as the Air Cocaine incident
(discussed later), w as said to have be en fre ed because the
president w as relying on him to raise militias to contain the
advance of secessionist rebels in the north. The alleged
drugs trafficker, how ever, w as reported to have joined the
M UJA O Islamists instead, w ho are know n to be directly
involved in drug smuggling. 9
MOROCCO
MAURITANIA
2. Common public conceptions of right and
wrong, especially concerning drug
smuggling, have become blurred.
3. State and public authorities have begun
participating in the drugs trade.
Islamist militant groups and their areas of influence in Africa
ALGERIA
CAMEROON
KENYA
SOMALIA
The Cocainebougous of M ali and the Sahel signify how
patterns of developm ent and economic grow th are being
shaped by an illicit enterprise. They also represent changing
norms about w hat is acceptable or not in terms of making
money in an extre m ely resource-poor and chronically
unstable region. But perhaps most importantly, such castles
in the sand symbolise growing corruption and how forms of
governance and state-building are changing.
They ne ed to be analysed in terms of the trading and social
net works in w hich they are nestled, as w ell as their interconnectedness with the outside world. That, how ever, is a
larger research agenda, w hich is beyond the scope of this
present case study. The goal here is mainly an introduction
– to provide som e evidence that these patterns are inde ed
happening and worth investigating. It is an atte mpt to open
the doors for developm ent agencies to get involved in the
discussions.
The research for this case study started in early 2013 – one
year after the outbreak of the conflict in M ali. It centred
on the question: ‘ W hat are the causal links bet w e en the
cocaine trade and instability in M ali?’ It atte mpted to throw
light on how terrorist insurgents, drug traffickers, and
elected and appointed officials are linked to and affect each
other. In answ ering these questions, this case study looks
at how drugs money ends up being spent locally, and the
significance of this spending.
The trafficking in narcotics is conventionally treated as
a criminal proble m, for w hich the sole solution is often
tough law enforce m ent. This case study argues that the
‘drug proble m’ in places like M ali is rooted in economic
and political realities, and therefore requires economic and
political – or developm ental – solutions. Simply atte mpting,
for example, to disrupt the illicit drugs market, without
any understanding of the underlying social and political
relationships that enable it to thrive, may w ell be too blunt an
instrum ent, that leads to unintended and counter-productive
consequences.
So in this case study:
Part 1 will describe the W est African drugs context and
M ali’s role in it: w ho does the smuggling and w hat and how
they smuggle?
Part 2 will explore how narcotics smuggling is linked with
instability in M ali, and in particular how it is connected
with groups including jihadist organisations such as A QIM ,
M UJA O and Ansar Eddine; as w ell as with the governm ent.
Part 3 looks at the broader issues of governance, particularly
misappropriation of aid, to strengthen the argum ent that
reforms are ne eded to tackle the proble m of drugs and
address, by extension, the challenges of insecurity.
Part 4, by w ay of conclusion, is designed m erely to provide a
starting point for participative stakeholder workshops on the
issue.
The power of drug money in Mali Part 1: Smuggling in West Africa and Mali 6
Part 1:
Smuggling in
West Africa and Mali
For centuries, nomadic and se mi-nomadic people have
used the trade routes that crisscross the Sahel-Sahara
belt. These declined at the end of the 19th century, but
w ere reinvigorated after decolonisation in 1960 and the
establishm ent of present-day national borders. Tradesm en
w ho traversed the desert to smuggle consum er goods, such
as foodstuffs and fuel from Libya and Algeria to W est Africa,
made the ancient trading routes fully operational again by the
1960s and 1970s. Transnational net works becam e more
significant: smuggling counterfeit and black-market
cigarettes in the 1980s; small arms in the 1990s; and drugs
from around the year 2000.10
The black market across North Africa is currently
experiencing som ething of a boom. As reported in the
Economist, everything from fuel, eggs and powdered milk,
to Viagra and counterfeit prescription drugs, to cocaine,
hashish, cigarettes and arms stocks from Libya are smuggled
and sold.11 Illicit drugs – notably cocaine, but also cannabis
resin for the North African market – are the most profitable
of the high-value com modities being trafficked.
Halal and haram smuggling
To put drugs trafficking in M ali’s desert areas into context, it
is necessary to first clarify the difference bet w e en hal !l
(allow ed) and har !m (forbidden or socially unacceptable)
forms of smuggling – distinctions that are normally invisible
to outsiders.
Both licit and illicit goods are smuggled by net works of
people w ho traditionally exchanged and traded to make a
living. This trade is se en as noble: not only as a w ay to
survive in a harsh environm ent, but also an affirmation of
independence and autonomy. The family and kinship
net works involved in this smuggling date from precolonial
tim es are often extended and ce m ented by marriage.12 They
facilitate the transit of goods across borders by providing
labour, transport, accom modation, food, w ater, credit and
information. These social net works provide security and
reciprocity in a space that is usually ungoverned by formal
politics or official controls. This is hal! l smuggling.
Smuggling is usually hal !l w hen it involves big lorries, often
moving in convoys, w hich act as travelling markets,
delivering and selling goods from tow n to tow n. The lorries
also double up as buses, postal or m edical couriers, or
re mittance agents, thereby providing further services to
com munities. The drivers and their assistants
rely on the hospitality of tow ns and villages along the w ay.
Hal !l smuggling relies on the net works of kinship for their
labour ne eds.
arms, drugs and human trafficking, estimated to generate
$3.8 billion annually’.16
In contrast, how ever, much of the drugs smuggling in W est
Africa is organised by large-scale and more centralised
organisations, often with corporation-style structures. This
form of smuggling is al-fr!d al har!m. It involves 4x4s
travelling at spe ed through the region, barely stopping at
tow ns or com munities they pass en route to their
destination, and refuelling with diesel at hidden pre-stocked
points in the desert. It is typically conducted by mafias that
recruit smugglers on an ad hoc, individual basis, without
considering family or tribe origins, and bypassing elders or
traditional gateke epers in the local com munities.
W ithin W est Africa, there have be en thre e identifiable hubs
for drugs trafficking that have e m erged: northern (GuineaBissau, Guinea, the Gambia and Senegal), southern (Nigeria,
B enin, Togo and Ghana), and eastern (M ali and parts of
M auritania, w here shipm ents arrive by air). O nce the bulk
deliveries arrive, they are transported onw ards to Europe via
a number of m ethods and routes: overland across the
Sahara, by sea and by air.17 According to the U N O D C, the
m ethods for moving cocaine consignm ents onw ards are
num erous, often low-key, and evolve and adapt constantly in
response to drug law-enforce m ent efforts. The amounts
involved are relatively small, usually no more than 100200kg.18 These factors combine to make smuggling difficult
for the authorities to detect.
H erein lies the moral distinction. In simplistic terms,
smuggling can be har!m or hal !l, depending on the w ay it is
carried out – the degre e to w hich it is connected to the
com munities through w hich it passes is more important in
judging its morality than the goods smuggled the mselves.
So there is ‘smuggling’ that is a traditional m eans of
surviving and making a living in the desert. And there is
‘smuggling’ that is considered sinful and socially
unacceptable. How these are understood, used or respected
by illicit actors could spell the difference bet w e en w ho
succe eds or fails, w ho is exposed to greater risks than
others, or how a smuggler becom es better connected than
competitors.
Drugs smuggling in West Africa
Since around 2003, W est Africa has be en steadily
transforming into a major hub for smuggling Latin A m erican
cocaine into Europe.13 It has also becom e a centre for
logistics, com mand and control for Latin A m erican drug
cartels.14 According to the UK’s National Crim e Agency
(formally the Serious Organised Crim e Agency), the region
received and redistributed som e of the 25-30 m etric tons of
cocaine imported into the UK each year, with an estimated
value for w holesale dealers of over £200m.15 D espite the
dispersal of jihadist, secessionist, and criminal groups
following the French intervention in 2013, both U N and
French forces, reports the International Crisis Group (IC G),
struggled to consolidate security gains. Continuing insecurity
has prevented the restoration of state authority, or the
delivery of humanitarian aid. A June 2015 IC G report states
that the C entral Sahel is turning into a ‘perfect storm’ of
actual and potential instability, characterised by ‘growing
numbers of jihadi extre mists and illicit activities, including
In a 2011 report, the International Institute for Strategic
Studies identified the m ethods of transport: lorry, bus, car,
motorcycle and even bike. Galician fisherm en frequently
transport consignm ents from North Africa into Europe.
Drugs are often concealed in human mules, and have be en
found in African crafts, cosm etics and even pineapples.19
Shipm ents also enter Europe in small propeller-driven aircraft
via airports in the Sahel. There is even evidence of drug
smugglers using Boeing 727s, w hich show s their
sophistication and boldness. In w hat the m edia called the
‘Air Cocaine’ incident, for example, the charred fuselage of a
Boeing 727 from Venezuela w as found near Tarkint, northern
M ali. Experts believe that the plane w as delivering a cargo of
up to 10 tons of cocaine. But after unloading, the plane failed
to take off w hen one of its w he els got stuck in the sand and
it w as set alight to destroy the evidence. The cargo, with an
estimated stre et value of more than $300m, w as never
recovered by Interpol or the national authorities w ho
investigated the incident.
According to the U N O D C report, 18 tons of pure cocaine
w as transported across W est Africa in 2010 – a fall from a
peak of 47 tons in 2007. 20 As the overall cocaine supply to
Europe has re mained about the sam e, this drop could reflect
a number of things:
• the inherent nimbleness of traffickers
• the creation of ne w routes to avoid detection 21
• a return to more traditional routes by Latin A m erican
grow ers
• and/or a severing of relations bet w e en Latin A m erican
grow ers and corrupt officials in W est Africa after
large-scale seizures of drugs subsequently disappeared. 22
Drugs smuggling in Mali
B efore and during the colonial period, M ali and surrounding
Saharan territories w ere subject to ende mic violence. As
M alian professor Dalla Konaté explained in a lecture in 2009:
‘In periods of absence of strong central pow ers, social
violence w as composed essentially of raids (razzias) that
Tuareg tribes conducted on civilian populations and against
trading caravans.’ 23 Konaté said that the short First Régim e
in M ali (1960-68) could not pacify the north because of
resistance by traditional leaders. As a result, the area
returned to a culture of violence and sporadic banditry,
providing foreign traffickers and Islamic extre mists with
fertile ground to establish bases.
M ali becam e increasingly prominent as a transit point for
drugs on their w ay from W est Africa to Europe in the
mid-2000s, w hen couriers began to use regular com m ercial
flights. In O ctober 2007, 22 human mules w ere arrested on
arrival in A msterdam on a flight from M ali’s capital Bamako.
M alian customs officers also seized 116kg and 35kg of pure
cocaine (about £2.32m and £0.7m at w holesale stre et value,
respectively) at Koure male, near the Guinea border, in t wo
separate incidents in 2007. 24 B et w e en 2006 and 2008,
254kg of cocaine w ere seized in Europe from flights coming
from M ali. 25
Since 2009 there has be en a marked reduction in the use
of cocaine couriers on flights from W est Africa. 26 There is
enough reason to suggest that M ali, until the events of 2012,
re mained a key stopping-off point on the route to Europe.
Prior to the 2012 uprising, the most serious incidents of note
included the Air Cocaine crash in 2009; the 2010 conviction
of a police com missioner for collaborating in the construction
of a concealed landing strip in the desert; and the January
2010 landing near the M auritanian border of a B e echcraft
B E300 from Venezuela, w here its consignm ent w as loaded
onto 4x4s before disappearing off the authorities’ radar. 27 In
any case, the 2012 conflict would have only served to
reconfigure the drug trafficking routes. Drug trafficking in the
desert is know n to be highly flexible and extre m ely
adaptable. B ecause the area is huge and sparsely populated,
with porous borders, and w here governm ent reach is
extre m ely limited, routes can be quickly redirected to avoid
trouble spots or concentrations of governm ent or U N forces.
Drug traffickers are know n to maintain hidden fuel and
supplies depots in the desert that are located using hand-
held satellite navigation devices, making redirection of routes
by a fe w hundred miles only a matter of inconvenience.
Today drug use in cities such as Bamako and Kidal is
increasing, w hich indicates that drugs are still being
transported through M ali. 28 In D ece mber 2013, a Bolivian
travelling via Brazil, Togo and Burkina Faso w as caught with
5kg of cocaine hidden in his suitcase lining w hile in
Bamako. 29 A fe w days earlier, a smaller consignm ent of
cocaine and amphetamines w as seized at Bamako airport
in a package that follow ed the sam e route. Journalists have
be en told there are fe w such arrests because officials do
not receive financial incentives. There is also only one
official laboratory authorised to identify narcotics for the
w hole country.
!"#$%&'()*+,-.$&/0%"1
W hen conflict erupted in 2012 it disrupted the northern
trafficking routes. Analysis is only just starting to e m erge on
how they have reconfigured. Trafficking routes are flexible
and adapt to law-enforce m ent efforts and the changing
political environm ent. A number of unprecedented drugs
seizures in previously unused routes and transit points
indicated old routes w ere being avoided and ne w routes
opened up. In A pril 2013, a huge seizure w as made in
M auritania, indicating that perhaps because of the
uncertainty caused by the conflicts in M ali, traffickers w ere
moving operations to the neighbouring country. 30 In 2012,
Algeria seized 73 tons of cannabis (almost t wice as much as
in 2008) and then 50 tons in the first half of 2013. 31 The
Niger tow ns of Agadez and Arlit on the N25 road north
tow ards Algeria, as w ell as the northern Passe de Salvador
near the border with Libya and Algeria, are also apparently
becoming more important as drug-trafficking routes. 32
According to French criminologist Xavier Raufer: ‘Since the
first rumours of battle in M ali, drug logisticians have be en
thinking about ne w routes, and have modified their journeys
through the north of the country. N e w routes are already
opening up in Angola, DRC [the D e mocratic Republic of
Congo], the Great Lakes and Libya. The profits linked to
cocaine trafficking are so big that longer routes and higher
transport prices are not a proble m.’ 33
2"3$45'3"&1$'-6$7"-")*,'&,"1$,-$%8"$
drug trade
There are many beneficiaries in the W est African drugsmuggling ‘food chain’.
Mafia drug barons are at the top, and located in the capital
cities of W est Africa, Brazil and Colombia. They work with
local drug bosses, w ho manage the business on the ground.
In M ali, many of the these bosses are w ell-know n local
businessm en from Kidal, w here smuggling is dominated by
mountain-based Ifoghas Tuareg; Gao, w here smuggling is
dominated by Tile msi Arabs; and Timbuktu, w here
smuggling is dominated by B erabiche Arabs. 34 These groups
dominate different ele m ents of the trade, but have competed
regularly and violently with each other over ‘turf’.
Young people can be easily attracted by the promise of
quick money and adventure. They are involved in the drugs
trade, both as key players in the transport of narcotics across
Africa to Europe, and as end users. Young m en are e mployed
as drivers, moving drugs consignm ents in 4x4s across the
desert to specific locations. The work is dangerous, and
many end up killed or maim ed in accidents or confrontations
with border officials or bandits.
M any of these young people ultimately w ant to give up
driving drugs consignm ents through the desert. Just like
their bosses, they w ant to invest their profits into a life that is
al-hal !l, either using their fle et of vehicles to set up a
smuggling interest in licit goods, or start a legitimate
business aw ay from the smuggling scene altogether.
The drugs trade and the high profits it can generate make it
difficult for developm ent program m es in northern M ali to
promote traditional types of e mploym ent for young people.
M oham ed, a young Tuareg from Timbuktu used to smuggle
subsidised fuel from Algeria, before he switched to cocaine.
H e claims that drug consignm ents w ere dropped in the
desert, and he would be paid $3,000 to ferry the m to a given
location. After several successful trips, he w as given the
vehicle. ‘ W ith this money I w as able to organise thre e
w edding cere monies – how could I have done this with the
other job?’ 35
A similar story w as reported by Ashua Hirsh in M ay 2013 in
the Guardian. ‘ W hen w e transported cigarettes, I would be
paid around 100,000 C FA francs [about $200] for each trip.
W ith cocaine, I earned 1 million [$2,000],’ M oham ed
explained. ‘ W e would drive through the desert in convoys,
and each car would earn roughly 18m C FA [$36,000] – the
driver, security man and I would all be paid a fe e, and my
boss would ke ep the rest.’ 36
Regional criminal-terrorist organisations are heavily
enm eshed in the drugs trade. They include M UJA O, w hich
has now m erged with the Signed in Blood Battalion to form
Al- M urabitun; A QIM; and Ansar Eddine. Reports reveal that
w hile m e mbers of M UJA O are involved directly in
smuggling, A QIM plays a different role, primarily charging
‘transit taxes’ or providing protection.
Elected and civil officials are also de eply involved in drug
trafficking. In M ali, one of the more pernicious repercussions
of having political elites with a vested interest in the drugs
trade is the creation of a complex w eb of alliances bet w e en
governm ent, criminal and terrorist groups. These alliances
contributed to the rapid takeover of northern M ali by a de
facto coalition of criminal, terrorist and secessionist rebels in
early 2012. The rebels, with a mostly Tuareg leadership,
belonged mainly to the M NL A . They proce eded to declare
the short-lived Republic of A zaw ad. 37
Communities through w hich drugs money passes or from
w hich m e mbers of criminal net works hail are also
stakeholders in the drugs trade. Not only do they receive
windfall injections of cash, they also receive forms of
protection that increase their security and social standing. 38
Som e com munities give the drugs trade their tacit approval,
but those that do not – particularly those based along
regional frontiers – have increasingly little choice in the
matter. Such com munities have becom e more dependent
on drugs revenue as legitimate businesses and investm ent
stay aw ay. 39
The money: Who spends it and what on?
W hat primarily draw s all of these groups to the drugs trade is
significant profits. In 2010 it is estimated that 18 tons of
cocaine w as trafficked through W est Africa. Typically,
1kg of cocaine at w holesale purity of around 65% costs
about $53,000, w hich m eans that 18 tons is worth $1.25bn
at stre et or retail value. 40 This is not net profit, and no one
know s the actual amount that ends up in the pockets of
W est African criminals or the w ar chests of terrorist
insurgents. That said, the U N O D C calculated that in 2012,
around $500m from the cocaine trade w as either laundered
or spent in W est Africa. 40 This gives at least an idea of the
sort of figures (and, critically, the purchasing pow er) that law
enforcers are dealing with.
But the key question is not about gross sums, but rather w hat
can be done with the money that is acquired. Crucially, could
the cocaine money thought to be spent in the region be
enough to potentially cause destabilisation? A comparison
bet w e en the illicit drug revenues estimated by the U N O D C
on one hand, and military expenditure in the region on the
other, might provide a clue. According to the Stockholm
International Peace Research Institute, the $500m of cocaine
money laundered or spent in W est Africa in 2012 was more
than the total military expenditure of many of the W est
African states through w hich drugs transit (se e table below).
In addition, it is more than the $455.5m promised by donors
for the African-led International Support Mission in M ali
(A FIS M A). 42 Inferences could therefore be draw n that
because drug money is at such a degre e comparable to the
size of military spending, it must be fuelling instability in
the region. The involvement of the insurgent groups and
terrorist net works in northern M ali in drugs trafficking already
demonstrates that drug money is already making that impact.
It will be easy for drugs traffickers aw ash with cash to build
up their arsenals. In the Middle East and Africa a Kalashnikov
sells for an average price of $267, but can be available for as
little as $12 ( World Bank supplied average figures). 4 3
Conflicts in W est Africa and the Sahel-Sahara region have
led to a type of arms trafficking akin to recycling. 4 4 M ost
recently, large amounts of small arms w ere reportedly
brought into M ali from Libya. In an unexpected consequence
of the Arab Spring, A QIM and the Tuaregs gained access to
Country
Total military expenditure (2012)
Share of GDP
M ali
$149m
1.6%
Burkina Faso
$146m
1.5%
M auritania
$120m (2009)
3.8% (2009)
Niger
$69.8m
1.0%
Guinea Bissau
$16.6m
2.0%
Côte d’Ivoire
$407m (estimated)
1.8%
Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, M ilitary expenditure database, 1998-2012 45
The power of drug money in Mali Part 2: Criminals, terrorists and the corrosion of democracy 11
Part 2:
Criminals, terrorists and
the corrosion of democracy
form er Libyan leader Colonel M uam mar Gaddafi’s arsenals. 46
Failure to secure these w eapons w as an oversight by the
W est, w hich, in the words of the presidents of Chad and
Niger, Idriss D éby and M ahamadou Issoufou, did not offer
the ‘after sales service’ ne eded to contain the impact on
W est Africa. 47
Research in 2007 indicates that there w ere at least 81,000
Kalashnikovs circulating in the Sahel region. 48 The number
today is likely to be far higher. In M ali, significant arsenals
comprising w eapons of all calibres, am munition, explosive
devices and detonating syste ms w ere found by O peration
Serval forces. 49 These arms caches w ere not just uncovered
in A QIM ’s mountainous stronghold in the north, but w ere
also in urban areas, including a ce m etery in Timbuktu. 50
It is no surprise that after the collapse of Gaddafi’s regim e,
there w ere reports of A QIM buying up the vast stockpiles
of w eaponry. 51 Though it is impossible to say how much
the w eaponry cost, basic economics will say that a supply
glut will force dow n prices, leading to a greater quantity
being purchased. The easy availability of small arms is a key
reason that turns criminal enterprise into a governance and
security threat.
The impact of the illicit drugs trade is obviously not just from
how its profits can fuel instability. Another significant
consequence is the rising levels of drug use in the region.
Drug abuse among young people in W est Africa is on the
rise, and with it the associated proble ms of addiction. In
2008, a Situation Analysis of M alian Youth and HIV/AIDS
(unpublished because it is still under governm ent e mbargo)
worked with groups of young researchers in four regions of
M ali. They reported specific locations w here drugs w ere
available – for example, at the regional hospital in Gao.
The study w as presented to stakeholders, including police
and military officials, for validation. Its details w ere not
challenged, but because it implicated security and
governm ent services, it w as put under an indefinite
e mbargo. 52
The U N O D C reported in 2012 that there w ere perhaps
2.3 million cocaine users in W est and C entral Africa. It raised
concerns that the region’s role – particularly in processing
cocaine – ‘may be growing as evidenced by seizures of
processing equipm ent for cocaine, ecstasy and
m ethamphetamine’. 53 There are no figures on drug use in
M ali, but anecdotal evidence suggests that more young
people are becoming users, as w ell as getting involved in
trafficking, and this can pose a serious public health proble m
in the future. 5 4 As form er U N Secretary- G eneral Kofi Annan
said: ‘ W est Africa initially w as se en as a transit point, but no
country re mains a transit point for long. The population
begins to use it.’ 55
D e eper analysis on the impact of the drugs trade on young
people is required, but is outside the scope of this report.
Conclusion
Any effort to tackle smuggling in illicit goods has to take into
account that smuggling (al-fr!d) has be en part of the
economic landscape of the Sahel-Sahara belt for centuries.
It provides com munities with a m eans for survival. D e eper
analysis of how different groups gain from the trade and the
‘push’ factors for their engage m ent will also be necessary,
as will engage m ent of private firms and businesses that play
roles in facilitating the drugs trade, even if they are not
directly involved in the illicit enterprise the mselves.
The impact on young people ne eds to be examined in
greater depth, too, with a vie w to developing better
strategies to protect the m. This could include improving their
access to public health services or strengthening com munity
organisations in areas w here young people are vulnerable
both to drug use and being recruited to transport drugs.
M ost importantly, significant investm ent is ne eded in the
north of the country to provide a viable alternative to
involve m ent in drugs trafficking. The ne wly form ed
governm ent ne eds to com e up with a credible plan in
collaboration with com munity groups based in the north.
If investm ent focuses on Bamako and the south, and the
marginalisation of the north is not addressed, the security
situation will re main precarious.
‘For West African states, one of the most serious challenges to state
!"#$%$&'(%!()*+(%,-".(/0(,&#1/)%1!(&,2()*+%#(%34&1)(/,(4"5'%16(4#%$&)+(
sector, and community institutions. The emerging culture of quick and
easy acquisition of money threatens democracy – drug cartels have
5/"7*)(0#%+,2!(%,(*%7*(4'&1+!(%,(8+!)(90#%1&:(;*+(!1&'+(/0()*+(4#/5'+3(
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B<=>@AC(!)&)+!D(E;*%!(%!(3/#+()*&,(&(2#"7!(4#/5'+3:(F)(%!(&(!+#%/"!(
security threat”.’56
Kwesi Aning, 2009
A growing number of experts fear that huge parts of W est
Africa could becom e a serious security threat – ie, a haven
for terrorists, criminals and rebels – as a result of the
re markable expansion of the narcotics trade. M ali itself is the
best illustration.
B efore the events of 2012, M ali enjoyed a reputation for
relative stability and good governance. It preceded the Arab
Spring countries by more than 20 years, w hen, in 1991, its
popular protests saw the overthrow of a dictator. Relatively
de mocratic elections with a smooth handover of pow er
follow ed soon after. From 1995 to 2005, the country posted
an impressive economic grow th rate of 5.8%, far outpacing
most other African countries. Yet within the span of a fe w
short w e eks in 2012, state control crumbled in the north;
restive soldiers staged a coup in the capital; the central
governm ent collapsed; and an odd assortm ent of separatist
rebels, terrorist groups and criminals engine ered a breakaw ay
republic in the north. 57
Christian Aid’s country director for M ali, Yacouba Kone,
asked how state control could break dow n so quickly, w hen
decentralisation should have already be en working in the
northern regions. ‘How can apparently stable institutions –
particularly a de mocratically elected governm ent respected
throughout Africa and beyond, and w hich w as in any case
due to step dow n in A pril 2012 – collapse and com e to ruin
so quickly?’ Even more importantly, Kone asks: ‘ W hy did the
majority of M alians not bother to take a stand and defend
their de mocratic institutions?’ 58
Why did Mali’s government crumble
1/$90,*+53:
H ere is one quick answ er to Kone’s questions: the illicit
drugs trade, without many people noticing, had seriously
corroded M ali’s institutions and sapped the civic spirit. Kw esi
Aning, a security researcher at the Kofi Annan International
Peaceke eping Training C entre, believes drug cartels have
bought friends in high places, and this is particularly evident
in M ali. In w hat could be a straightfor w ard case of gre ed or
w eakness in the face of vast sums of easy money, officials
within governm ent and the security sector have sought
personal gain and political alliances from active involve m ent
in the drugs trade. As Chatham House fellow Paul M elly
observed in the article ‘The sad decline of M ali’: ‘Drugs
money, corruption and jihadists have pushed one of Africa’s
most admired de mocracies into crisis’. 59
H ere are a fe w examples that illustrate how and w hy
governance institutions had becom e so brittle and thus
crumbled so quickly in northern M ali:
• A 31 August 2007 confidential cable, apparently written
by US A mbassador Terrence M cCulley and published
by W ikileaks, 60 identified the late Com mandant (M ajor)
O uld Bou Lamana as having brokered the return of a
seized cocaine shipm ent to a Tuareg drug smuggler, in
exchange for $450,000. This w as also an ‘advance tax for
future trips’. Lamana w as an ethnic B erabiche Arab and
ranking intelligence officer in the M alian Director- G eneral
for State Security (D GSE). H e w as also a form er m e mber
of the Front Islamique Arabe de l’A zaw ad, an Arab rebel
move m ent in northern M ali. The cable said: ‘Lamana has
fed information to criminal and terrorist organisations in
the past, and his exact role within state security re mains
a mystery.’ It also claim ed that a m e mber of President
Touré’s staff w as overheard complaining about Lamana’s
involve m ent in a phone call to D GSE Director- G eneral
Colonel M amy Coulibaly.
• A senior local governm ent official in north M ali, w ho
President Toure once called Mon Bandite, and is
suspected of having close ties with terrorists, w as
accused of being involved in the 2009 Air Cocaine
incident. In 2008, he negotiated the release of Canadian
U N diplomats kidnapped by the ‘one-eyed bandit’
M okhtar B elmokhtar. 61 O n 24 M arch 2011, Reuters
reported that four people had be en arrested in connection
with the Air Cocaine investigation. 62 How ever, the
governm ent later released the m without charge 63 and
reportedly on the orders of the president himself.
• Prior to the 2012 insurgency, there w ere reports of other
cocaine flights. Algeria Watch, a human rights agency,
reported that on 6 F ebruary 2010 a plane carrying four
tons of cocaine landed in the tow n of Kayes in w estern
M ali. The report stated that the plane w as w elcom ed
by a group of local notables. Soldiers from the Nampula
barracks in the Segou region w ere also reportedly
involved, marking the ground to help the plane land. 6 4
The sam e report m entions that thre e days later, the sam e
notables received another plane that landed in Ain In
Esseri, southeast of Tinzaouatin near the Niger border.
• In Septe mber 2011, a judge at the O uargla M agistrates’
Court in Algeria asked the National Asse mbly of M ali to lift
the parliam entary im munity for a M e mber of Parliam ent
from northern M ali, so he could be investigated on
suspicion of being part of a drugs trafficking net work
involved in the acquisition and sale of 500kg of cannabis
in Algeria, M ali and Niger. 63
• A 20 M arch 2013 report authored by Cheikh Ba and
published by M aliactu claim ed that form er President
A madou Toumani Touré had intervened himself for
the release of alleged drug barons. O ne, arrested for
the Air Cocaine incident, w as said to have be en fre ed
because the president w as relying on him to raise
militias to contain the advance of M NL A rebels in the
north. How ever he w as reported to have joined M UJA O
Islamists instead, w ho are know n to be directly involved in
drug smuggling. 66
• After French intervention in early 2013 w hich largely
ended the conflict, a ne w M ali governm ent issued a list
of six alleged ‘narco-traffickers’ – all of the m figures of
note in northern M ali. How ever, at the tim e of writing this
report, no action appeared to have be en taken against any
of the m. In M ali, it is widely believed that they have be en
effectively cleared in the interests of the peace process. 67
• In a F ebruary 2013 intervie w with Times correspondent
Jerom e Starkey, Gao mayor Sadou Diallo admitted hosting
t wo of the m en on the governm ent’s narco-trafficker
list, just t wo w e eks after the French routed rebels from
the north of the country. They reportedly left Gao t wo
days before w arrants for their arrests w ere issued. Diallo
claim ed he is ‘just a little African mayor and a selfmade man. I don’t even know the colour of cocaine.’
H e revealed himself to be the ow ner of 30 houses, nine
hotels and thre e night clubs, saying that he made most of
his incom e by leasing rooms to A m erican special forces
w ho w ere training the M alian army before the 2012 coup.
H e also said he had purchased his four pick-up trucks, a
Hum m er, thre e Land Cruisers and t wo Je eps from drug
mules w ho w ere given these vehicles by drugs traffickers
as paym ent. Diallo added: ‘I can tell you that the world is
built with the money of trafficking. W e are fighting against
terrorism, but even the most pow erful army cannot fight
against drugs.’ 68
• A M arch 2013 report by the Institute of Security Studies
cited how the M alian leadership had long exploited
ethnic tensions to try to ke ep the north under control.
It gave ethnic militia access to certain illegal markets
as a re w ard for their support. Thus, the report said,
‘increasingly the political syste m in M ali becam e reliant
on criminal proce eds.’ How ever, the exponential grow th
in profits m eant increased violent competition over the
lucrative smuggling routes. Arm ed groups and militias
form ed along clan lines and ‘becam e better arm ed, more
violent and more professional’. Drug bosses w ere soon
lobbying the governm ent for administrative control over
specific ethnic groupings, such as the Lamhar in the Gao
region, and the B erabiche in Timbuktu. ‘Clashes related
to cocaine smuggling played out throughout 2007-2008,
som etim es with the direct intervention of state officials.’ 69
Government toleration of drug
smuggling
According to historian Stephen Ellis of the African Studies
C entre, W est Africa has a political and social environm ent
suitable for the drug trade because ‘smuggling is widely
tolerated, law enforce m ent is fitful and inefficient, and
politicians are easily bribed or even involved in the drug trade
the mselves. A pliable sovereign state is the ideal cover for
the drug trafficker.’ 70
Som e international law experts, like the UK-based
International Institute of Security Studies, fear the region will
becom e ‘another M exico’ if the proble m of organised crim e
is not dealt with effectively. W hile gang culture in M exico is
based more on life-long com mitm ents in a context of social
and family ties, and alliances bet w e en smuggling groups in
W est Africa tend to be te mporary and opportunistic, there
are som e similarities.71 For example, both have territories
w here the central governm ent has little or no control; both
have governm ent officials involved in the drugs trade and
vulnerable to corruption; both have judicial syste ms that have
be en corrupted.
M any political com m entators have suggested that the
north of M ali is the country’s main corridor for the transit
of drugs. Since the outbreak of the conflict in 2012 and the
subsequent French military intervention, how ever, evidence
has e m erged that the narcotics trade is being rerouted
through the Kayes region, w hich is close to M auritania and
has be en firmly under governm ent control. This suggests
the trade is being moved to w here governm ent or military
officials could more easily protect it. The renaming of som e
districts in Bamako after know n drug traffickers is another
indication that narcotics smuggling is not a preserve of the
north. Drug use in Bamako is also on the increase.72
It is hard to imagine drug smuggling happening without
governm ent acquiescence. As the U N O D C report says,
‘Smuggling is often accomplished not by stealth, but by
corruption. The profits gained in som e trafficking flow s are
sufficient to buy cooperation from high levels of governm ent
[…] thus undermining governance.’ 73
Religion-inspired militants, criminals,
or both?
But it is not just public officials and institutions that are
involved in the illicit drugs trade. Even Islamic extre mists –
w ho follow and impose their strict interpretation of religious
doctrines and consider narcotics as evil – appear more
pragmatic w hen it com es to the profits to be made from the
drugs trade.
Several press and special reports illustrate this point:
• The Sunday Mirror in the UK reported that A QIM earned
£168m from cocaine trafficking and flooding Britain with
drugs.74
• The Nor w egian Peacebuilding Resource C entre reported
that during the 2012 rebel occupation of Tessalit in the
Kidal region, at least thre e small aircraft landed, allegedly
carrying cocaine. Jihadist occupiers supervised the
operation.75
• A M alian ne w spaper and w ebsite reported that in midA pril 2012, a cargo plane carrying arms and drugs landed
in Gao, in an incident similar to Air Cocaine. The cargo
w as unloaded onto more than a dozen pick-up trucks, and
collected by the m en of Iyad ag Ghaly, a form er M alian
diplomat in Saudi Arabia, and the e mir of the jihadist
group Ansar Eddine.76
• A docum ent reportedly circulating among diplomats in
early 2013 claim ed drugs smuggler A mhada Ag M ama,
alias A bdou Karim Targui, had joined forces with Ansar
Eddine.77 In M ay 2015 it w as reported that Ag M ama had
be en killed by French special forces. H e w as suspected
of the kidnapping and murder of t wo French journalists
in 2013, and also said to be involved in the death of an
aid worker and the abduction of four French nationals in
Niger, both in 2010.
• In 2009, there w as widespread coverage in the US
press about ‘narcoterrorism’ and M ali. It follow ed a sting
operation by US drugs enforce m ent agents posing as
Colombian guerrillas, w hich led to charges being filed
against thre e W est Africans arrested in Ghana. During the
operation, M alians boasted about how they could arrange
protection from A QIM for a drugs consignm ent to cross
the Sahara.78
• According to Colonel Didier Dacko, a military com mander
in northern M ali: ‘They [the jihadists] get som e money
from kidnapping W esterners, but nothing like w hat they
get from the drugs… it’s their lifeblood.’ 79
It is important to note that the reports above could not
be independently verified. Also, the opinion of a M alian
army com mander must be read in the context of the battle
to regain the north. As Wolfram Lacher 80 and Andre w
Lebovich 81 have argued, there is a marked absence of
terrorist groups from the reported clashes bet w e en drug
smugglers in the region, w hich indicates their involve m ent is
not as great as these reports suggest.
The involve m ent of terrorist groups in narcotics smuggling
takes different forms. Som etim es, individuals within these
terrorist net works, rather than the net works the mselves, are
involved. Their involve m ent is often indirect: in the sam e w ay
that the governm ent in Bamako used access to lucrative illicit
markets to re w ard local militias for their cooperation, terrorist
net works tolerate the ‘incom e-generating’ activities of the
local com manders they rely on.
The best example of an individual inside terrorist net works
acting on his ow n is M okhtar B elmokhtar, a smuggler in the
region w ho allied himself with jihadist causes. B elmokhtar
linked up with A QIM and continued making money w hile
fighting for the m. But he soon had prolonged disagre e m ents
with their leadership, de monstrated by a ‘scathing’ letter to
B elmokhtar from A QIM ’s Shura Council, found in Timbuktu
by the Associated Press after militants w ere ousted from
the tow n. 82 B elmokhtar broke ties with A QIM and form ed
the Signed in Blood Battalion in D ece mber 2012, w hich later
linked with M UJA O to form the Al- M urabitun (The Sentinels)
in August 2013. In January 2013, B elmokhtar is believed to
have led the attack on the A m enas gas plant in southern
Algeria, w here hundreds of local and foreign hostages w ere
held for several days. W hen the plant w as retaken, 38 of
the hostages w ere killed, including six Britons. In June 2015
there w ere reports B elmokhtar had be en killed by a US air
strike in Libya, but this w as later denied by A QIM .
A top Islamic militant said to have links with drug traffickers
w as A bou Zeid. H e had a reputation as A QIM ’s most
violent com mander before he w as killed in F ebruary 2013. 8 3
Originally from Algeria, A bou Zeid w as know n for his links
with a group of drug traffickers of B erabiche origin from the
Timbuktu area w ho are called ‘the Colombians’.
A QIM ’s involve m ent in narcotics trafficking also includes
soliciting transit fe es from traffickers and offering arm ed
escorts to drug convoys as they crisscross the north. 8 4
According to som e sources, A QIM charges bet w e en
10-15% of the value of cocaine (or up to $4,200 per kg of
cocaine). 85 In 2011, hashish traffickers arrested in M auritania
claim ed to have paid a $50,000 levy to pass through A QIM controlled territory. 86 As U N O D C expert Alexandre Schmidt
said in 2011: ‘The terrorists are facilitating the passage of the
traffickers… and they receive a paym ent, either in cash or
kind. But w e don’t have any proof that the terrorist groups
are organising the drug trafficking the mselves.’ 87
Som etim es the Islamists’ involve m ent is direct and open.
This is true of M UJA O, an A QIM splinter group set up
in mid-2011. It aim ed to spread jihad to W est Africa,
and m erged with the Signed in Blood Battalion in 2013.
According to analyst Lacher, a M UJA O founder, Sultan
O uld Badi, and t wo other Tile msi Arab businessm en from
Gao linked with drug smuggling are consistently nam ed by
local sources as financiers of M UJA O. 88 Another w ealthy
businessman w ho w as on the governm ent list of ‘narcotraffickers’, reportedly joined M UJA O in 2012 on his release
from prison.
Bilal Hicham, one of M UJA O’s key black com manders, w ho
led a katiba (combat unit) in Gao, quit in Nove mber 2012 and
returned to his native Niger, complaining to visiting reporters
that: ‘These madm en from M UJA O are not children of God,
they are drug traffickers. They do everything w hich goes
against Islam, and to their minds, blacks are inferior to Arabs
or w hites. M y brigade and I stopped a cargo of drugs but the
leaders of M UJA O said w e must let it go.’ 89
It is unclear how de ep the ideological motivations run in
M UJA O, or at least in factions within it. They have be en
labelled just a front for drug smugglers and money-making
ventures, such as w hen they earned an alleged $18m for
the release of thre e aid workers they kidnapped in Algeria in
O ctober 2011. 9 0 They have also com mitted various atrocities
in imple m enting Shari’ah law in Gao. 91
It is impossible to say with certainty the extent to w hich
A QIM or M UJA O are involved in drug trafficking – are they
religion-inspired militants, criminal entrepreneurs, or both?
The rerouting of trafficking routes through Libya may w ell
bring A QIM into greater collaborative contact with drugs
net works, for example. It is also possible to imagine that
A QIM could becom e more involved in the drugs trade if
other sources of incom e, notably kidnapping-for-ransom,
becom e less viable.
How AQIM and MUJAO embed
themselves in communities
A QIM and M UJA O created bases in Northern M ali, w hich
covers almost 70% of the country’s territory but hom e
to only 10% of the population, w hich is also the poorest.
Northern M alians have historically be en marginalised from
the political pow er and economic developm ent enjoyed by
the South. Soil fertility is poor, rainfall is low, w ater access is
limited and the region is prone to drought. Agricultural G DP
per capita is the low est in Africa. 92
D espite increased investm ent in the 1990s (som e from
governm ent, but mostly from private, N G O and religious
groups), the north lags behind the south in terms of
education, w ater and sanitation syste ms, roads and
healthcare. M any livelihoods depended on tourism, 93 w hich
has collapsed since the outbreak of conflict. This is w here
A QIM steps in. W ith money raised from illicit activities,
the group provides som e services normally offered by the
state, thus portraying itself to the local com munity as an ally,
rather than an invader. A QIM ’s harsh imposition of Shari’ah
law in 2012 may have turned many previously supportive
com munities against the m, but it has still had som e success
at e mbedding itself in the area. As w ell as services, it
provided e mploym ent and becam e part of normal economic
life, buying goods in the markets and renting properties. 94
As the mayor of a tow n near Timbuktu said:
total number of child soldiers is unknow n, but believed to
be som e w here bet w e en a fe w hundred and a thousand.
For these poor households, w ho may not subscribe to
the jihadist cause, complicity with A QIM is a route out of
poverty. 97
There have also be en reports of A QIM offering young m en
e mploym ent, for about $20 a day, to clear rocks and debris,
and build trenches in their camps. 98
It is no surprise that A QIM and its offshoots w ere able to
build bases in the north, given how marginalised the region
has be en. Though people may be ideologically opposed to
the presence of terrorist occupiers, they are caught bet w e en
a rock and a hard place. Their ne eds are acute and fe w other
incom e-generating options are available.
GH+#+(9IFJ(%!(,/)(&(K&1L&'()*&)(%!(&5/")()/(
Joining the dots: Government, drugs,
2+$/"#()*+(,/3&2!M(*+#2!:(9IFJ(2/+!(,/)(4/!+( terrorists and instability
&()*#+&)()/()*+(4/4"'&)%/,(&,2(%)(*&!(5+1/3+(&(
3&K/#(0/#1+(%,()*+(#+7%/,:(F)!(4+/4'+(*&$+(3+&,!:( The indirect role that drugs played in the instability that
;*+N(7+)(%,$/'$+2(/,(5+*&'0(/0()*+(4/4"'&)%/,(%,( rocked the country in 2012 is perhaps more significant for its
longer-term implications for de mocracy and erosion of public
4#/K+1)!(!"1*(&!(5"%'2%,7(O+''!(&,2(4#/$%2%,7(
trust in governm ent.
health care for nomads in the region. Many
,/3&2!()*%,L()*&)(9IFJ(&,2(0#&"2(&#+('+7&'(
The governm ent is implicated in the drugs trade through the
activities.’95
links of form er President A madou Toumani Touré to pow erful
M UJA O’s story in the very early days of the conflict is
similar. After the M NL A com mitted atrocities in Gao, it
w as M UJA O that moved in to oust the m, not the M alian
army. M UJA O cam e, offering food, money and teams to
clean up the tow n. Ibrahima Touré, a m e mber of a Gao
youth organisation, said in an intervie w with journalist Serge
Daniel: ‘Look at this gutter, since it w as built 15 years ago,
this is the first tim e it has be en cleaned, and it w as the
M ujahide en w ho took the initiative. W hat is the M alian
governm ent doing? Are w e still M alian? In Bamako they
are fighting like cat and dog w hile w e suffer here.’ Another
young person, Issa Traore, said: ‘O ur soldiers fled Gao.
Today it is the governm ent w hich has fled its responsibilities
and forgotten us completely. It w as the Islamists w ho fre ed
us from the M NL A w hich w as com mitting atrocities here.’ 9 6
An 11 O ctober 2012 press briefing by the U N Assistant
Secretary- G eneral on M ali revealed how A QIM built
relationships with local households as it recruited child
soldiers. M ali’s average annual per capita G DP is $1,100
– and it is much low er in the north. A QIM paid families
almost $600 to allow the m to enlist a child, som e as young
as nine, follow ed by $400 a month in ‘rent’ or w ages. The
Arab and Tuareg businessm en-smugglers in the north.
Bamako turned a blind eye to their lucrative illicit activities,
in return for the governm ent’s use of the businessm en’s
private militias, w hich w ere created to protect smuggling
routes and bases. In w hat the International Crisis Group calls
‘re mote-control governance through dubious criminal and
mafia interm ediaries’, Touré’s governm ent ‘borrow ed’ Arab
and Imghad militias to combat separatist Tuareg insurgencies
on behalf of or alongside M alian governm ent troops. 99
Som e of these militias took on a life of their ow n. For
example, a Tuareg-Imghad militia based in Kidal w as
e mployed by the M alian governm ent to counter a Tuareg
rebellion from 2007 to 2009. It w as later integrated into the
M alian army, and defended the strategic site of Tessalit in
2012. W hen the tide turned in favour of the rebellion, they
feigned defection to M NL A , before withdrawing to Niger to
regroup and take part in O peration Serval against M UJA O,
Ansar Eddine and A QIM .
Another Arab militia, headed by army Colonel A bderamane
O uld M eydou, w as form ed by thre e B erabiche Arab
businessm en w ho operated out of Timbuktu: They w ere also
e mployed by the governm ent to quash the 2007-09 Tuareg
The power of drug money in Mali$;'&%$<=$>'*+5,-.$%8"$./?"&-'-*"$*8'55"-."1 17
Part 3:
Tackling the
governance challenges
rebellion, led by Ibrahim Ag Bahanga. Ag Bahanga w as
w anted as much by the governm ent as by the businessm en
on w hose drug smuggling turf he w as encroaching.10 0
The businessm en, how ever, could not be totally controlled
by the governm ent. They w ere independent and loyal to
nothing but their ow n interests. They form ed alliances with
terrorist groups, too, over shared interests in the drugs trade
and kidnap-for-ransom.101 In return, A QIM and M UJA O w ere
able to use these links to operate in an alien political and
physical space, w hich they eventually made their hom e.
Som e Arab militias also pursued their ow n agendas. M any
of the m turned their back on their governm ent e mployers
to form the M NL A in Timbuktu, w hich paved the w ay for
A QIM ’s occupation.102 And as already discussed, one of
the governm ent nam ed ‘narco-traffickers’, a businessman
indicted for his role in the Air Cocaine incident, w as released
from jail in 2012 at the express com mand of Touré, w ho
expected him to mobilise his militias to fight against the
M NL A . Instead, he reportedly joined M UJA O.103
No wonder, then, that w hen Touré announced a ‘total
and relentless w ar’ against rebels and Islamist groups in
the North in 2012, many M alians doubted his sincerity. In
2011, the US gave M ali $138m in military and developm ent
aid, with sums earmarked specifically for the w ar against
A QIM ,104 having identified M ali as a priority country for
military support.105 Up to that point, the governm ent had
done nothing, claiming the military w as too ill-equipped and
ill-trained to deal resolutely with A QIM .
Everyone kne w governm ent rule in the north had depended
on indirect collaboration with the terrorists, and direct
collaboration with militia groups – groups that becam e better
arm ed, more organised and more pow erful, and eventually
bit the hand that had fed the m.
Touré’s strategy failed. The country is a shambles. Touré has
be en ousted and placed under investigation for high treason.
(Se e box on page 19.)
Conclusion
D eliberate as w ell as unintended governm ent complicity in
narcotics smuggling underscores the ne ed for a political and
economic assessm ent of the drugs crisis in W est Africa.
A study of the compromises involved should be the starting
point for reflection.
Corruption-proofing the ne w governm ent and trying to
unpack the factors that led governm ent officials into unholy
alliances with illicit groups must be the focus now. This is
obviously easier said than done, given the ties that many
elected representatives have to their com munities.
A QIM and its offshoots have no compunction about making
money from criminal enterprise, such as drugs smuggling
and kidnapping-for-ransom.
This report has show n that there have be en num erous
governance failures in M ali, w hich ne ed to be tackled more
syste matically. As Yacouba Kone, Christian Aid’s M ali
country manager, noted in his analysis, M ali may have be en
a de mocracy admired in the region and beyond, but it w as
‘a de mocracy that did not work for the poor’. W hat e m erged
instead ‘w as the entrenchm ent of a narrow elite that based
its pow er more on patronage and less on popular support, in
a bid to control the central governm ent and the economy –
both licit and illicit’.10 6
corruption is widespread and ende mic at all levels of M alian
society.109 In the 2012 World Economic Forum report,
corruption w as listed as the second biggest proble m for
M alians doing business in M ali, behind only the issue of
access to financing. During the presidential elections in
2013, called to bring an end to a period of upheaval and
uncertainty, participation w as unusually high at 48.98%.
But this quickly slumped in parliam entary elections only t wo
months later to 37%, with an all-tim e low in the capital of
barely 30%.110
Form er President Touré’s ‘consensus’ style of leadership
has be en particularly criticised. Originally developed as a
w ay to be more inclusive, to resolve disputes, and to ensure
that different factions have a voice in decision making,
Touré’s approach ended up strengthening the gateke epers
w ho decide on w ho gets to be called around the table. In
effect, Touré ‘strengthened himself and his inner circle,
rather than the state that all ethnic groups shared.’107 This
approach ‘w as not appropriate for undertaking the structural
changes ne eded to address the country’s key challenges’
because it led to the ‘syste matic disabling of the opposition
in parliam ent’ – most, if not all, w ere co-opted to join the
‘consensus’. O ver tim e, accountability disappeared and
impunity increased. As Kone argues, ‘consensus’ leadership
‘w as not de mocracy at all. Rather, it w as a syste m of
patronage to co-opt the leadership of the various parties and
muzzle any opposition.’
Public satisfaction with de mocracy is falling (59% in 2000
to 31% in 2012), and fe w er people believing that M ali is
a full de mocracy (24% in 2000 to 12% in 2012). But an
Afrobarom eter briefing reports that de mocracy is still the
preferred form of governm ent in M ali (60% in 2000 to 62%
in 2012), as are elections as a syste m to choose leaders
(82% in both 2000 and 2012).111
This section focuses on w hat could be done to tackle the
governance challenges.
Q uite a fe w indicators now show a growing disaffection
with the governm ent. Popular alienation from the political
process appears to be setting in – and this in a country
w here the people could lay claim to being pione ers of the
Arab Spring. Research by the political think-tank Friedrich
Ebert Stiftung (F ES) in 2013 into low voter turnout indicated
that: ‘An over w helming majority of respondents fe el that the
country’s political parties pursue only selfish interests, and
more than thre e-quarters cannot nam e their parliam entarian
(the figure for fe male respondents is 85%.’ W hen asked w hy
more M alians don’t vote, ‘the most com mon response is a
lack of trust worthy candidates.’ How ever, there w as also a
surprising finding: ‘Around 60% of respondents actually trust
their interim president and prim e minister.’108
The F ES survey correlates with patterns from other
sources. From 2003 to 2011, the World Bank’s indicators
on governm ent effectiveness, rule of law and control of
corruption in M ali show a dow nw ard trajectory, suggesting
A culture of corruption
M any of the governance challenges have be en captured in
an interesting online debate in English, via anthropologist
Bruce W hitehouse’s blog.112 The proble m of corruption,
argue som e, is more widespread than has so far be en
acknowledged – it is not restricted to the country’s political
elite; even ordinary people are involved. As one of the
com m ents on the blog said, w hen doctors’ first concern is
to treat the better off among the wounded; w hen nurses
try to sell m edicines taken from other sick patients; or w hen
electricity workers take a bribe to reconnect som eone w ho
has never paid his bills, it is clear that the everyday petty
corruption of ordinary people can be equally as destructive
as high-level political corruption. O ne voice in the debate
criticised as dishonest com m ents that attacked only
politicians, ‘as if they are the only thieves in the country’.
O thers maintained, how ever, that corruption could not be
reduced to a simple good guys-bad guys dichotomy. If
money could not be made in a law ful w ay, argued som e,
then ‘people will find other w ays to support the mselves’.
W hat happens w hen opportunities to make a decent, honest
living are not plentiful? ‘People every w here make projections
about how things will work out and act accordingly.’ An
entrepreneur lam ented the absence of informal incentives
and formal regulations that would encourage businesses
to make profits legally. Therefore, he asks: ‘ W ho is corrupt
– ordinary M alians, local and foreign investors, or the state
syste m?’
W hoever is to blam e for corruption in M ali, it is a serious
proble m. A 2010-12 audit, published in D ece mber 2013,
reported that C FA 49.49bn (about £59m) w as lost to
corruption in M ali, of w hich 15% w as categorised as fraud
and 85% attributed to mismanage m ent.113
>8"$).8%$'.',-1%$*/&&04%,/There is, though, an increasing determination to fight back.
An independent Auditor- G eneral’s office w as set up in
2004. It is w ell-regarded by the public and feared by those it
targets. How ever, there still are no clear procedures on how
it could prosecute offenders through the administrative or
civil courts.114
In 2012, in another strong state m ent of the governm ent’s
desire to tackle corruption, a reform er, M alick Coulibaly, w as
appointed as transitional Minister of Justice. There w ere high
hopes that he would tackle corruption head on. Coulibaly
drafted a robust ne w anti-corruption law that M ali w as due
to adopt before the presidential elections in July 2013.115
Unfortunately, the law w as delayed as the Parliam ent sat
on it. It will be hard to reinvigorate now, especially since
Coulibaly w as not appointed to the ne w governm ent.
How ever, Daniel A Tessouge, the official w ho issued the
arrest w arrants in 2013 for the arrest of six notables accused
by the governm ent of being ‘narco-traffickers’, has be en
appointed Attorney- G eneral.
But perhaps most significantly, President Ibrahim Boubacar
Keita – form er Prim e Minister and President of the National
Asse mbly during Touré’s first term in office – declared that
2014 would be the ‘year of the fight against corruption’.116
In this fight, M ali urgently ne eds to deliver results in t wo key
areas: decentralisation and aid transparency.
Decentralisation
The country’s syste m of administrative decentralisation to
local authorities w as devised during the administration of the
first elected president, Konaré (1992-2002). This w as at the
behest of the World Bank and the International M onetary
Fund. It did not have the desired effect. Rather than radically
improving administrative efficiency, decentralisation
instead triggered a redistribution of corruption – from the
centre to the local villages. O ne report detailed how local
elites competed with each other for contracts aw arded
according to a syste m of patronage by those w ho held the
purse strings.117 The sale of land – w hether fraudulent or
legitimate – and the spe ed of urbanisation created many
opportunities for corruption in the aw arding of contracts
for buildings, land use and other infrastructure projects.118
Som etim es, the decentralisation process becam e a tool to
attract contributions or loans from international donors – by
couching projects in terms of ‘decentralisation’ it can be
used to pitch for more aid or loans.
Aid transparency
Aid has be en a cornerstone of M ali’s economy. In 2011, it
received around $1bn,119 representing roughly 50% of its
public expenditure that year,120 and about 12% of its gross
national incom e.121 Aid has provided a significant source of
incom e for corrupt officials.
In 2010, for example, the Global Fund to Fight Aids,
Tuberculosis and M alaria suspended t wo malaria grants
(worth $18.1m) and terminated a third grant for tuberculosis
(worth $4.5m), after it found evidence of misappropriation
and unjustified expenditure of approximately $4m.122 Then
in M arch 2011, it suspended a $13.91m HIV/AIDS grant
to M ali after further evidence of misuse of funds w as
uncovered.123 As has be en widely observed, in a country
w here corruption is de e m ed rampant but fe w prosecutions
take place, the most unusual ele m ent of this fraud w as not
that it happened, but that 14 people have be en charged and
actually imprisoned for ‘crim es of undermining the public
good, e mbezzling public funds, fraud and using forged
docum ents, favouritism and complicity in favouritism.’ The
form er Minister of H ealth, Ibrahim O umar Touré (not related
to President Touré), w as re manded in custody before a trial
that led to his release.
But the Global Fund w as not the only pot Touré’s
administration w as dipping into. Under the Poverty
Reduction Strategy Paper, the governm ent developed
national education and health program m es, w hich w ere
funded by the World Bank and other donors – funding
that depended on making de monstrable progress
tow ards set goals.124 To ke ep receiving this aid, the
governm ent increased primary school enrolm ent, but did
not com m ensurately increase spending on infrastructure,
equipm ent or staffing. O nly 12% of high-school students
passed leaving exams in 2012, the low est rate ever recorded
in the country.125 The primary education completion rate in
2010 w as only 58.1% compared to a sub-Saharan average of
about 70%.126
Figures in the agriculture sector w ere fiddled. For example,
to ke ep funds flowing, the governm ent artificially inflated
cereal output numbers, and subsidised fertiliser w as most
likely pilfered as it failed to reach many of the village farm ers
for w hom it w as intended.127
The net result of aid mismanage m ent w as less funding for
badly ne eded public services. During the course of Touré’s
rule, genuine investm ent in already w eak public services
deteriorated markedly – for example, M ali is not expected
to achieve any of its Millennium D evelopm ent Goals by the
2015 deadline.128
Another important ele m ent of this aid mismanage m ent
is that it has arguably actually increased M ali’s economic
and social north-south divide. M ost program m es that w ere
carried out w ere oriented more tow ards the populous urban
centres of southern M ali.129 This should provide food for
thought for m e mbers of the donor com munity as w ell – have
they inadvertently contributed to the north-south divide too?
Peace activist Ag Youssouf contends that if aid does not
have a corresponding governance capacity, it is ‘going to be
a cursed resource… that is going to be part of the proble m
rather than the solution’.130
The international com munity has com mitted som e €3.25bn
to help rebuild M ali. O f this, €1.35bn will com e from the
European Union.131 Building ‘the ne w M ali together’ (as the
international donors’ conference w as called) will only happen
if the culture of corruption – that is ende mic throughout the
governm ent and w as a major cause of the collapse of the
state in 2012 – is exposed and eliminated. Institutions and
their leaders must prove that they can act with integrity,
transparency and accountability.
The rise and fall of Touré
F e w w ere sorry to se e the back of A madou Tomani
Touré in 2012. It w as a sad end to w hat had be en
such a promising ascent. Touré had be en a w ell-loved
and respected form er army colonel. H e becam e a
hero of M ali’s Arab Spring of 1991, w hen he famously
disobeyed the orders of a dictatorial president to
shoot protesting students and instead arrested the
dictator himself. Touré presided over the transition
from autocracy to de mocracy, organised a National
Conference that dre w up a ne w constitution, and
handed pow er a year later to Alpha O umar Konare,
M ali’s first de mocratically elected president. Touré
rejoined politics 10 years later and w as elected
president in 2002, until being ousted in 2012.
Since 2013, he is reportedly living in exile in Dakar,
Senegal. In early 2014, the M ali National Asse mbly
swore in a ne w High Court of Justice to hear a case of
treason against Touré in relation to events leading to
the 2012 conflict.
The power of drug money in Mali Part 4: Conclusion: Reason for hope 20
The power of drug money in Mali Appendix 21
Part 4:
Conclusion: Reason for hope
Appendix: Initiatives that
deal with the West African
drugs trade
W here governance and de mocracy are w eak, criminal
and terrorist net works flourish. M ali w as the first SahelSaharan country to be convulsed by this proble m and se e its
governm ent collapse. O ther countries share similar proble ms
– a vast ungovernable territory, corruption and the trafficking
of illicit goods. They could follow suit. To avoid simply
displacing proble ms from one country to another,
any solutions ne ed to adopt a regional approach.
Governm ents or their representatives, com munities and
the private sector, must be insulated from involve m ent in
organised criminal activity.
African Union/ECOWAS initiatives
M ali does offer reason for cautious hope. Civil society
engage m ent and debate on corruption and justice is buoyant.
Civil society groups are conscious of the ne ed for judicial
reform and ne w anti-corruption law s – Coulibaly and his draft
law re main strong anti-corruption references. N e wly elected
M Ps and returning refuge es, eager to secure their hom e
areas, are also involved. Such widespread engage m ent is
encouraging. The anti-corruption move m ent will ne ed to
muster all its energy and stamina to construct ne w legitimate
de mocratic processes and bring an end to the culture of
political involve m ent in organised crim e.
Since the 1990s, there have be en many initiatives e m erging
from Africa to address the proble m of the narcotics trade.
In 2013, the African Union (AU) developed a Plan of Action
on Drug Control (2013-2017), the fourth revised plan of its
kind. It se eks to strengthen continental and international
cooperation, and further integrate drug control issues into
national legal and institutional fram e works.132
In 1998, the Economic Community of West African
States (ECOWAS) Authority of H eads of State and
Governm ent Sum mit issued a declaration: Community
Flame Ceremony – the Fight Against Drugs. In the sam e
year, it also set up the Regional Fund for Financing of
Drug Control Activities in W est Africa and the D ecisions
on the Establishm ent of the Inter- Governm ental Action
Group against M oney Laundering in W est Africa. In 2008,
it adopted a follow-up plan: a Regional Action Plan against
Drug A buse, Trafficking and Organized Crim e, w hich aims to
address the drug proble m in an integrated manner.133
In 2008, E C O W AS adopted the Praia Political Declaration
and Regional Plan of Action to address the security
threats posed by drug trafficking in the sub-region. O ut
of this m e eting, the U N O D C, with input from bodies
such as Interpol and the EU, led the process of creating
an E C O W AS Imple m entation Plan and a M onitoring and
Evaluation M echanism to help E C O W AS states translate the
D eclaration and Plan of Action into concrete program m es.134
Almost all E C O W AS states have adopted National
Integrated Programmes. M any have am ended their drug
trafficking and consumption legislation, e mpow ered their
judicial authorities, established ne w drug-enforce m ent
agencies and imposed stiffer penalties for offenders.
In 2009, the West Africa Coastal Initiative w as launched
as an initiative of the U N O ffice for W est Africa, the
D epartm ent for Peaceke eping O perations, Interpol and the
U N O D C. It is designed to support the E C O W AS regional
action plan on drug trafficking. It aims to mitigate the
impact of organised crim e along the W est Africa coast,
through a program m e of capacity building, law-enforce m ent
cooperation and the strengthening of the criminal justice
syste m in Ivory Coast, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia and Sierra
Leone. It has led to the establishm ent of transnational crim e
units in each of these countries.135
The UNODC has also developed the Airport Com munication
Project, in cooperation with Interpol, and in line with
the E C O W AS regional action plan. This aims to promote
intelligence sharing at airport and police level bet w e en Brazil
and seven W est African states, nam ely Nigeria, Togo, Cape
Verde, Ghana, M ali, Ivory Coast and Senegal.
There is a lot of reflection about w hy, overall, the initiatives
have failed to deliver significant results on the w ar on drugs.
Reasons cited include:
• lack of political will by m e mber states136,137
• lack of involve m ent by a strong civil society138
• complicity of corrupt officials in the drugs trade
• lack of coordination resulting in the ‘balloon effect’,
in w hich the proble m is simply displaced from one
country to another.139
Perhaps in response to this proble m, the Kofi Annan
Foundation launched the West African Commission
on Drugs in 2013. This Com mission, chaired by form er
President of Nigeria O lusegun O basanjo, brings together
experts from the world of politics, civil society, health,
security and the judiciary. It aims to ‘analyse the proble ms of
trafficking and dependency in order to deliver an authoritative
report and comprehensive policy recom m endations to tackle
the proble m holistically, looking not only at law enforce m ent,
but also at governance, developm ent and public health.’140
G8
In M ay 2011, the G8 launched the Action Plan on
Transatlantic Drugs Trafficking to slow the transatlantic
cocaine trade, with a particular focus on W est African routes.
European Union
The EU is developing a ne w law-enforce m ent policy cycle
(2014-17). It will define w hat the main security threats are
and establish som e clear operational goals and special tasks.
Drugs and cigarettes smuggling are among its nine priority
areas.
The power of drug money in Mali Appendix 22
The power of drug money in Mali References 23
References
UK Government
The Serious Organised Crim e Agency (S O C A) aims to
prevent the trafficking of drugs into the UK (via W est Africa
and other regions). W ithin D FID, the issue of organised crim e
is allegedly moving from the team working on governance to
the team working on conflict/security. This would suggest
that D FID is less interested in the issue of drugs trade as a
governance issue affecting African governm ents.
Research institutes/ NGOs
There are many institutes in Africa, Europe and the A m ericas
that are working on the issue of the W est African drugs
trade and w hose research could be used to create the policy
backbone of a drugs campaign. M any of these are cited as
sources in this docum ent (both research and intervie w s).
Wom en in Law and D evelopm ent and the Groupe de
Suivi Bugetaire are t wo groups that are active on issues of
corruption within M ali and would be worth forging links with,
if a campaign on drugs w ere to go ahead.
The only large UK-based international N G O working on
the issue of drugs and governance is Christian Aid. In the
run up to the U N G eneral Asse mbly Special Session on
Drugs in 2016, it will be providing input, attending strategic
workshops and doing advocacy work with the EU/O AS.
There is a large (and growing) body of smaller research
institutes and N G O s w ho are calling for the decriminalisation
of cocaine, believing it to be the most effective w ay to
address the proble m.
At the EU’s Cocaine Route Conference in Rom e, M ay
2013, a Global Initiative on Transnational Organised Crim e
w as launched that brings together civil society, N G O s
and researchers with the aim of trying to fill voids in the
program m es and strategies of law enforce m ent. It is too
early to evaluate how this is going, but it is worth ke eping an
eye on.
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10 March 2013, www.jeuneafrique.com/Article/DEPAFP20130310112035/
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Mali’, 18 July 2012, Middle East Online, www.middle-east-online.com/
english/?id=53459
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2011.
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stem the illegal flow of arms and drugs’, 17 August 2013, www.economist.
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Re gio n , Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2012, http://
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19 March 2013, www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/03/15/mali_s_bad_trip
Lewis D, Diarra A, ‘In Mali, land of “gangster-jihadists”, ransoms help fuel
the movement’, Reuters, 27 October 2012, http://investigations.nbcnews.
com/_news/2012/10/27/14703406-in-mali-land-of-gangster-jihadistsransoms-help-fuel-the-movement
Maïga AK, ‘Blanchiment d’argent du terrorisme, de la drogue et de la
contrebande’, L’O rie nt-Le-Jo ur, 13 October 2010, www.diasporaction.com/
component/content/article?id=1156
The power of drug money in Mali References 24
The power of drug money in Mali Endnotes 25
Endnotes
Marchal R, Is a M ilitary Interve ntio n in M ali U n avoid a ble?, NOREF, 2012,
www.peacebuilding.no/eng/Regions/Africa/Mali/Publications/Is-a-militaryintervention-in-Mali-unavoidable
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Military Expenditure
Database, 2013, http://milexdata.sipri.org/files/?file=SIPRI+military+expend
iture+database+1988-2012.xlsx
Maru MT, ‘AFISMA: Military ahead of politics’, Al Jazeera Centre
for Studies, 13 February 2013, http://studies.aljazeera.net/en/
reports/2013/02/20132148940690455.htm
Tamoudre, ‘Un avion cargo contenant des stupéfiants et des armes atterrit
à Gao’, Tamoudre, 18 April 2012, www.tamoudre.org/un-avion-cargocontenant-des-stupefiants-et-des-armes-atterrit-a-gao/geostrategie/
resistance/rebellions/
McElroy D, ‘Al-Qaeda’s scathing letter to troublesome employee Mokhtar
Belmokhtar reveals inner workings of terrorist group’, the Tele gra p h, 29
May 2013, www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/al-qaeda/10085716/
Al-Qaedas-scathing-letter-to-troublesome-employee-Mokhtar-Belmokhtarreveals-inner-workings-of-terrorist-group.html
Melly P, ‘The sad decline of Mali’, Th e W orld To d ay, Chatham House, Royal
Institute of International Affairs, August 2012, www.chathamhouse.org/
publications/twt/archive/view/185099
Tlemçani C, ‘Au Sahel, narcotrafiquants et terroristes se partagent le
terrain’, Algeria-Watch, 1 November 2010, www.algeria-watch.org/fr/
article/pol/geopolitique/narcotraficants_terroristes.htm
UNODC, Tra nsn atio n al O rg a nise d Cri m e in W est A frica: A Thre at
A ssess m e nt, UNODC, 2013, www.unodc.org/documents/data-andanalysis/tocta/West_Africa_TOCTA_2013_EN.pdf
Musilli P, Smith P, Th e La w less Ro a ds: A n O vervie w of Turb ule nce A cross
th e S a h el, NOREF, 2013, www.peacebuilding.no/var/ezflow_site/storage/
original/application/e2cc78a2ce149944b9a35b4ce42759b9.pdf
van de Walle N, Foreig n A id in D a n g ero us Places: Th e D o n ors a n d M ali’s
D e m ocracy, UNU-WIDER, 2012, www.wider.unu.edu/publications/workingpapers/2012/en_GB/wp2012-061/
News24, ‘Mali makes record coke seizure’, 29 December 2007, www.
news24.com/Africa/News/Mali-makes-record-coke-seizure-20071229
van Vliet M, ‘The Challenges of Retaking Northern Mali’, CTC S e ntin el,
2012, 5(11-12), pp1-4, www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/the-challenges-of-retakingnorthern-mali
NigerDiaspora, ‘Agadez : plus de 313,645 kg de chanvre indien, 58 kg
de cocaïne, 45.344 comprimés de tramadol et de diazépam incinérés, 1
July 2013, www.nigerdiaspora.info/index.php/les-infos-du-pays/societe/
item/64427-agadez--plus-de-313645-kg-de-chanvre-indien-58-kg-decocaïne-45344-comprimés-de-tramadol-et-de-diazépam-incinérés
OECD, ‘Northern Mali at a Glance’, OECD Sahel and West Africa Club, 2010,
www.oecd.org/swac/northernmaliataglance.htm
2.
3.
UNODC, U N O D C Re gio n al Pro gra m m e for W est A frica, 2010–2014,
UNODC, 2012, www.unodc.org/documents/westandcentralafrica//FINAL_
CONSOLIDATED_nov22.pdf
Morgan A, ‘The causes of the uprising in northern Mali’, Think Africa Press,
6 February 2012.
N’guessan P, ‘Bamako: Dans l’univers de la drogue’, 10 March 2012, www.
maliweb.net/societe/banditismeinsecurite/bamako-dans-lunivers-de-ladrogue-53771.html
1.
4.
5.
Abdoul Karim Maïga, ‘Blanchiment d’argent
du terrorisme, de la drogue et de la
contrebande’, October 2010.
These are findings from anthropological
research, as discussed in J Scheele,
S m ug glers an d Saints of the Sahara ,
Cambridge University Press, 2012, p96. See
also note 5: ‘[Saad, the interpreter] served as
chauffeur to a smuggler who once became
very rich, moved to Oran where he opened
an import company. Saad said of the
smuggler: “The money he has made here
through fraud allows him to live and support
his children over several generations. He
even trafficked arms and drugs. Today, he
has become a hajj and commands much
devotion and much respect in Oran.”’
Wood D, ‘Libyan weapons arming Al Qaeda militias across North Africa,
officials say’, Huffington Post, 20 February 2013, www.huffingtonpost.
com/2013/02/20/libyan-weapons-al-qaeda-north-africa_n_2727326.html
8.
Scheele J, S m u g glers a n d S aints of th e S a h ara: Re gio n al C o n n ectivity in
th e Tw e ntieth C e ntury, Cambridge University Press, 2012.
Shaw M, Le a d ership Re q uire d: Dru g Traffickin g a n d th e Crisis of State h o o d
in W est A frica, Institute for Security Studies Policy Brief 37, 2012, www.
issafrica.org/uploads/No37Oct2012Drugs.pdf
Starkey J, ‘Mayor Accused of Sheltering Two of Mali’s Most Wanted’, the
Ti m es, 16 February 2013, www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/news/world/africa/
article3687438.ece
Afua Hirsch, ‘Cocaine flows through Sahara
as al-Qaida cashes in on lawlessness’, the
G uardian , 2 May 2013, www.theguardian.
com/world/2013/may/02/cocaine-flowsthrough-sahara-al-qaida
7.
Ouazani C, ‘Mali : «Tessalit connection» avec Deity Ag Sidimou’, Jeune
Afrique, 17 October 2011, www.jeuneafrique.com/189772/politique/malitessalit-connection-avec-deity-ag-sidimou
Sidibé K, S ecurity M a n a g e m e nt in N orth ern M ali: Cri m in al N et w orks
a n d C o nflict Resolutio n M ech a nis m s, Institute of Development Studies,
Research Report 77, 2012, www.ids.ac.uk/files/dmfile/RR77.pdf
As described in two reports in Foreig n
Policy : Andrew Lebovich, ‘Mali’s bad trip:
field notes from the West African drug
trade’, 19 March 2013, www.foreignpolicy.
com/articles/2013/03/15/mali_s_bad_
trip; and Yochi Dreazen, ‘Welcome to
Cocainebougou’, 27 March 2013, www.
foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/03/27/
welcome_to_cocainebougou_mali
See note 3, Lebovich; and Diallo’s interview
with Tim es correspondent Jerome Starkey,
‘Mayor Accused of Sheltering Two of Mali’s
Most Wanted’, the Ti m es , 16 February 2013,
www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/news/world/africa/
article3687438.ece
OECD, Th e S ecurity-D e velo p m e nt N e xus: Re gio n al C h alle n g es, 2012, www.
oecd.org/swac/events/colloque_EN.pdf
Reitano T, Shaw M, C h eck Yo ur Blin d S p ot: C o nfro ntin g Cri m in al S p oilers
in th e S a h el, Institute for Security Studies Policy Brief 39, 2013, www.
issafrica.org/uploads/No39Sahel_14Mar2013V2.pdf
OECD, ‘Northern Mali at a Glance’, OECD
Sahel and West Africa Club, 2010, www.
oecd.org/swac/northernmaliataglance.htm
6.
Walt V, ‘Conflicting priorities imperil efforts to gather Gaddafi’s discarded
arms’, Ti m e , 15 November 2011, http://content.time.com/time/world/
article/0,8599,2099549,00.html
Whitehouse B, ‘Mali’s coup, one year on’, Bridges from Bamako, 22 March
2013, http://bridgesfrombamako.com/2013/03/22/malis-coup-one-year-on/
Thomas W Gallant, ‘Brigandage, piracy,
capitalism and state-formations:
transnational crime from a historical worldsystems perspective’, in J Heyman, ed,
States an d Ille gal Practices , Berg, 1999, p38.
9.
The notion that ‘not all that is illegal is
wrong’ has a long history and is something
repeated in many societies. For example,
while it is illegal under English law to sleep
under bridges, it is not wrong for homeless
rough sleepers to sleep under bridges, even
if they are arrested for doing it. Laws that
define illegality reflect what the powerful
prescribe to be right or wrong. There
are times when those definitions can be
challenged.
Cheikh Ba, ‘Guerre au Mali et drogue :
ATT avait libéré beaucoup trop de barons’,
Maliactu, 20 March 2013, http://maliactu.
info/crise-malienne/guerre-au-mali-etdrogue-att-avait-libere-beaucoup-trop-debarons
10. See note 3, Lebovich; and Martin van Vliet,
‘The Challenges of Retaking Northern Mali’,
CTC S e ntin el , 2012, 5(11-12), pp1-4.
11. ‘Boom, boom: North African governments
struggle to stem the illegal flow of arms and
drugs’, the Econ o m ist , 17 August 2013.
12. See note 7, Scheele, pp95-124. A pertinent
example of this is cigarette and drug
smuggler Mokthar Belmokhtar, an Algerian
Arab who has married into both the
Berabiche Arabs near Timbuktu and a
nomadic Tuareg clan in the north.
13. OECD, The S ecurity-D evelo p m e nt N exus:
Re gional C halle ng es , 2012, www.oecd.org/
swac/events/colloque_EN.pdf
14. Andrew Cuming, ‘Drug Smuggling’, in
International O rganize d Crim e: the African
Exp erie nce , ISPAC, 2010.
15. National Crime Agency, ‘Drugs’, www.
nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/crime-threats/
drugs. The value of £200m is calculated
based on figures in Nigel Inkster and
Virginia Comolli, Drugs, Insecurity an d
Faile d States , Routledge, 2012. Inskter was
once head of operations for MI6, the British
Secret Intelligence Service.
16. International Crisis Group, ‘Mali: Reform
or Relapse’, Africa Report 210, 2014; and
International Crisis Group, ‘The Central
Sahel: A Perfect Sandstorm’, Africa Report
227, 2015.
17. UNODC, Transnational O rganise d Crim e in
W est Africa: A Thre at A ssess m e nt , UNODC,
2013, p11.
18. Ibid.
19. International Institute for Strategic Studies,
‘West Africa’s “cocaine coast”’, Strate gic
C o m m e nts , 2011.
20. See note 17, p17-18.
21. As suggested by Yury Fedotov, UNODC
chief, in ‘Executive Director: West Africa
challenged by rapidly evolving transnational
threats’, 22 February 2012, www.unodc.
org/unodc/en/frontpage/2012/February/
executive-director_-west-africa-challengedby-rapidly-evolving-transnational-threats.
html
22. See note 17, pp10-11.
23. From a lecture by Professor Dalla Konaté
in March 2009 entitled, ‘The situation in
northern Mali: seeking to understand paths
to a solution’. The case study writer was a
participant in the lecture.
24. News24, ‘Mali makes record coke seizure’,
29 December 2007.
25. Georges Berghezan, Pan ora m a d u Trafic d e
C ocaïn e e n Afriq ue d e L’O uest , Groupe de
Recherche et d’information sur la paix et la
Sécurité, 2012.
26. See note 17, p14.
27. See note 17, p13.
28. Paul N’guessan, ‘Bamako: Dans l’univers de
la drogue’, 10 March 2012, www.maliweb.
net/societe/banditismeinsecurite/bamakodans-lunivers-de-la-drogue-53771.html
29. A Diarra, ‘Drogue : 5 Kg de coke dans uns
sac de couchage pour bebe’, 31 December
2013, http://maliactu.net/drogue-5-kg-decoke-dans-un-sac-de-couchage-pour-bebe/
30. Djamila Ould Khettab, ‘La Mauritanie saisit
une tonne de drogue à la frontière avec
l’Algérie’, 29 April 213, www.algerie-focus.
com/blog/2013/04/la-mauritanie-saisitune-tonne-de-drogue-a-la-frontiere-avecalgerie/
31. See note 11.
32. NigerDiaspora, ‘Agadez : plus de 313,645 kg
de chanvre indien, 58 kg de cocaïne, 45.344
comprimés de tramadol et de diazépam
incinérés, 1 July 2013; and Foreign and
Commonwealth Office, Traffickers an d
Terrorists: Drugs an d Viole nt Jiha d in M ali
an d the Wid er Sahel , 2013, paragraph 25.
33. Jeune Afrique, ‘Le conflit malien perturbe
le trafic de cocaïne vers l’Europe’, 10 March
2013.
34. Pietro Musilli and Patrick Smith, The
La w less Roa ds: A n O vervie w of Turb ule nce
A cross the Sahel , NOREF, 2013; and Tuesday
Reitano and Mark Shaw, C heck Yo ur Blin d
S p ot: C onfrontin g Criminal S p oilers in the
Sahel , Institute for Security Studies Policy
Brief 39, 2013.
35. David Lewis and Adama Diarra, ‘In Mali,
land of “gangster-jihadists”, ransoms help
fuel the movement’, Reuters, 27 October
2012.
36. See note 4.
37. Former Mali president, Amadou Toumani
Touré, often called ATT, is currently in a high
treason probe for offering no resistance to
the presence of ‘foreign invaders’, which
led to the outbreak of conflict in 2012. The
reason offered for his lack of resistance was
the demoralisation of the army because
of poor appointments. However, it is
certainly feasible that government officials
themselves are linked to these invaders.
They have long-standing ties with Arab
businessmen in the region, many of whom
are known as hard-nosed entrepreneurs
and smugglers.
38. For a neat summary of the role of ‘social
capital’ in the growth of the drugs trade,
its success in outwitting the law, and
political duality of the West African state,
see Kwesi Aning, ‘Review: Africa an d
the W ar on Drugs ’, http://sites.tufts.edu/
reinventingpeace/2013/02/05/reviewafrican-and-the-war-on-drugs/
39. See note 34.
40. See note 17, p1.
41. See note 3, Lebovich.
42. Mehari Taddele Maru, ‘AFISMA: Military
ahead of politics’, Al Jazeera Centre for
Studies, 13 February 2013.
43. These are average figures from 1986-2005,
as cited in Phillip Killicoat, W e a p on o mics:
The G lo b al M arket for A ssa ult Rifles,
World Bank Policy Research Working
Paper, www-wds.worldbank.org/servlet/
WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2007/04/13/0
00016406_20070413145045/Rendered/PDF/
wps4202.pdf
44. Kalilou Sidibé, S ecurity M ana g e m e nt in
N orthern M ali: Criminal N et w orks an d
C onflict Resolution M echanis m s , IDS, 2012.
45. SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, http://
milexdata.sipri.org/files/?file=SIPRI+military
+expenditure+database+1988-2012.xlsx
trafic-de-drogue-au-mali-un-fleau-protegeet-une-mafia-au-sommet-47976.html; and
Stéphanie Plasse, ‘Pr Baba Koumaré : au
Mali, « la consommation de drogues est
facilitée par le narcotrafic »’, Jeune Afrique,
27 November 2013, www.jeuneafrique.
com/167136/societe/pr-baba-koumar-aumali-la-consommation-de-drogues-estfacilit-e-par-le-narcotrafic/
55. ‘Mali a “wake-up call” for drug trafficking,
says think tank’, www.irinnews.org/
Report/97412/Mali-a-wake-up-call-for-drugtrafficking-says-think-tank
56. Kwesi Aning, O rg a nise d Cri m e in W est
A frica: O ptio ns for E U En g a g e m e nt ,
International Institute for Democracy
and Electoral Assistance, 2009.
www.idea.int/resources/analysis/
loader.cfm?csmodule=security/
getfile&pageid=37849
57. Yacouba Kone, Lessons fro m M ali’s Ara b
S prin g: W hy D e m ocracy M ust W ork for the
Po or, Occasional Paper, Christian Aid, 2012.
58. Ibid, pp2-3.
59. See note 47.
60. Wikileaks, ‘Tuaregs and Arabs clash
over drugs and cash in northern
Mali’, www.wikileaks.org/plusd/
cables/07BAMAKO960_a.html
46. Vivienne Walt, ‘Conflicting priorities imperil
efforts to gather Gaddafi’s discarded arms’,
Tim e , 15 November 2011.
62. Tiemoko Diallo, ‘Four arrested in “Air
Cocaine” investigation’, Reuters, 24 March
2011.
47. Paul Melly, ‘The sad decline of Mali’, The
W orld To d ay, Chatham House, Royal
Institute of International Affairs, August
2012.
63. Andy Morgan, ‘The causes of the uprising
in northern Mali’, Think Africa Press, 6
February 2012.
48. Mouna Izdinne, cited in note 44, p27.
49. Operation Serval was the name of the
French military operation to oust Islamic
and secessionist militants in the north of
Mali, which started in December 2012 and
officially ended in July 2014.
50. Nicole Ameline, A Cresce nt of Crisis on
Euro p e’s D o orste p: A N e w N orth-S o uth
Strate gic Partn ership for the Sahel , Draft
Report, NATO Parliamentary Assembly,
Defence and Security Committee, 2013.
51. David Wood, ‘Libyan weapons arming Al
Qaeda militias across North Africa, officials
say’, Huffington Post, 20 February 2013.
52. Private email communication with Violet
Diallo, who was present at the validation
meeting.
53. UNODC, U N O D C Re gional Pro gra m m e for
W est Africa, 2010–2014 , UNODC, 2012, p3.
54. ‘Trafic de drogue au Mali : Un fléau protégé
et une mafia au sommet’, Maliweb, 15
February 2012, www.maliweb.net/societe/
64. Salima Tlemçani, ‘Au Sahel,
narcotrafiquants et terroristes se partagent
le terrain’, Algeria-Watch, 1 November
2010, www.algeria-watch.org/fr/article/pol/
geopolitique/narcotraficants_terroristes.
htm
65. Cherif Ouazani, ‘Mali : «Tessalit connection»
avec Deity Ag Sidimou’, Jeune Afrique, 17
October 2011.
66. Chiekh Ba, ‘Guerre au Mali et drogue :
ATT avait libéré beaucoup trop de barons’,
Maliactu, http://maliactu.info/crisemalienne/guerre-au-mali-et-drogue-attavait-libere-beaucoup-trop-de-barons. Ba’s
report suggests this wasn’t the first time
that President Touré had intervened for the
release of drug barons.
67. Ibid.
68. See note 6, Starkey.
69. See note 34, Reitano and Shaw.
70. Stephen Ellis, ‘West Africa’s international
drug trade’, African Affairs , 2009, 108(431),
p173 and p194.
71. See note 19.
72. For example, see note 54, Plasse. In this
interview, Professor Baba Koumaré, chief
psychiatrist at Bamako’s Point G hospital,
states that drug-related psychiatric illnesses
are increasing commensurate to the
increase in the use of cannabis, cocaine and
crack cocaine.
73. See note 17, p5.
74. Bill Bond and Patrick Hill, ‘Al Qaeda’s
£168million cocaine smugglers: terror group
flooding Britain with drugs’, S un d ay M irror,
28 April 2013.
75. See note 34, Musilli and Smith, p5.
76. ‘Un avion cargo contenant des stupéfiants
et des armes atterrit à Gao’, Tamoudre,
18 April 2012, www.tamoudre.org/unavion-cargo-contenant-des-stupefiantset-des-armes-atterrit-a-gao/geostrategie/
resistance/rebellions/
77. See note 66.
78. DEA, ‘Three al Qaeda associates arrested
on drug and terrorism charges’, DEA,
18 December 2009, www.dea.gov/pubs/
pressrel/pr121809.html
79. See note 3, Dreazen.
81. Wolfram Lacher, O rganise d Crim e an d
C onflict in the Sa hara-Sahel Re gion ,
Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, 2012.
82. Damien McElroy, ‘Al-Qaeda’s scathing
letter to troublesome employee Mokhtar
Belmokhtar reveals inner workings of
terrorist group’, the Tele gra p h , 29 May 2013.
83. ‘Chad President Deby: Al-Qaeda’s
Abou Zeid killed in Mali’, BBC, 2 March
2013, www.bbc.co.uk/news/worldafrica-21637829
84. Rukmini Callimachi and Baba Ahmed, ‘Al
Qaeda fighters carve out own country in
Mali’, Associated Press, 15 January 2013.
released under pressure by the Spanish
government in a kidnap exchange packaged
by the Malian government. In 2013, Malian
prosecutors issued an arrest warrant for
Rouji and Ould Taher on drug smuggling
charges.
89. Bakari Gueye, ‘MUJAO commander quits
Mali terror group’, Maghrebia, 12 November
2012.
90. ‘Mali hostages “were released in exchange
for prisoners”’, BBC, 19 July 2012, www.
bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-18917078
91. Amnesty International, M ali: Five M onths of
Crisis, Arm e d Re b ellion an d M ilitary C o up,
2012.
92. See note 10, van Vliet.
93. In 2004, jobs directly and indirectly linked
to tourism were estimated at 13,000 and
contributed to the livelihoods of more than
60,000 people. Between 2004 and 2010,
Mali’s tourism revenues doubled. In 2010,
tourists spent €240m in Mali, and figures
were expected to grow. See note 13, p14.
94. See note 84.
95. From Naffet Keita’s report, cited in note 13,
p4.
96. Serge Daniel, ‘Scores of new African
recruits swell Qaeda offshoot’s ranks
in Mali’, 18 July 2012, Middle East
Online, www.middle-east-online.com/
english/?id=53459
97. For full text of the UN press briefing, see
www.un.org/press/en/2012/121010_Guest.
doc.htm
98. See note 84.
99. International Crisis Group, ‘Mali: Avoiding
Escalation’, Africa Report 189, 2012.
100. From the US Embassy Bamako cables, as
reported by Wikileaks, and cited in note 81,
p6. Ag Bahanga was killed in a car crash in
August 2011.
101. For more on the KFR business and the
millions AQIM earns, see the briefing ‘Killing
the Cash Cow’ at www.jolibatrust.org; and
Roland Marchal, Is a M ilitary Interve ntion in
M ali U navoid a ble?, NOREF, 2012.
108. A discussion in English on the findings of
the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung survey can be
found on Bruce Whitehouse’s blog: ‘Mali’s
coup, one year on’, Bridges from Bamako,
22 March 2013, http://bridgesfrombamako.
com/2013/03/22/malis-coup-one-year-on/
119. AidData, http://aiddata.org
109. World Bank, http://databank.worldbank.org;
and CPIA Transparency, Accountability and
Corruption in the Public Sector database,
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IQ.CPA.
TRAN.XQ
121. Nicolas van de Walle, Foreig n A id in
D an g ero us Places: The D on ors an d M ali’s
D e m ocracy, UNU-WIDER, 2012, www.wider.
unu.edu/publications/working-papers/2012/
en_GB/wp2012-061/
110. All figures sourced from http://
www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_
GlobalCompetitivenessReport_2012-13.
pdf (p248) and the UN Secretary-General’s
report on the elections.
122. Bruce Whitehouse, ‘What went wrong
in Mali?’ Lon d on Revie w of B o oks , 2012,
34(16), 17-18, www.lrb.co.uk/v34/n16/brucewhitehouse/what-went-wrong-in-mali
111. Massa Coulibaly and Michael Bratton,
‘Crisis in Mali: Ambivalent popular attitudes
on the way forward’, Sta bility, 2013, 2(2),
pp1-10. Coulibaly and Bratton called this
‘ambivalent popular attitudes’. The view
of this paper, however, is that this is not
ambivalence, but rather an affirmation of
a preference for democracy despite how it
has been hijacked or given its present form
by current rulers.
112. All quotes in this and the next paragraph
were sourced from: ‘Corruption
is for everyone! (Part 2)’, http://
bridgesfrombamako.com/2013/02/28/
corruption-is-for-everyone-part-2/
126. World Bank, Mali, www.worldbank.org/en/
country/mali/overview
127. See note 47.
128. See note 126.
129. See note 121.
132. A U Plan of A ction on Drug C ontrol (20132017), http://sa.au.int/en/sites/default/
files/AUPA%20on%20DC%20%2820132017%29%20-%20English.pdf
115. Soumaila T Diarra, ‘Mali to adopt a new
anti-corruption law’, 12 June 2013, www.
trust.org/item/20130612082953-psf9m
102. See note 81.
103. See note 66.
104. Monica Mark, ‘US suspends Mali’s military
aid after coup’, 26 March 2012, www.
guardian.co.uk/world/2012/mar/26/uspauses-mali-military-aid-coup
117. Oxfam, M ali : un n o uve a u contrat p o ur le
d évelo p p e m e nt , Oxfam, 2013, www.oxfam.
org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/bn-malinew-development-contract-150513-fr.pdf
105. John Norris and Connie Veillette,
En ga g e m e nt A mid A usterity, Center
for American Progress, 2012, www.
americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/
issues/2012/05/pdf/foreign_aid.pdf
118. ‘Grand procès anti-corruption en novembre
2014 : Pour la justice du peuple ou celle
du vainqueur ?’, http://depechesdumali.
com/8-a-la-une/3601-lutte-contre-lacorruption-l-ancien-prefet-de-kati-et-descadres-des-domaines-bientot-devant-leprocureur-de-la-commune-iii.html
107. See note 57, p5 .
125. See note 122.
114. In 2008, for example, there was open
conflict between the VEGAL Sidi Sosso
Diarra and the judiciary that required the
intervention of President Touré. Mr Diarra
went on to complete his term of office.
86. See note 35
106. See note 57, p3 .
124. P Bender et al, Evaluation of the World Bank
Assistance to Primary Education in Mali,
World Bank, 2007, http://ieg.worldbank.org/
Data/reports/mali_education.pdf
130. Interview with Youssouf
116. Lassina Niangaly, ‘2014, année de lutte
contre la corruption: Après l’espoir, l’heure
des interrogations’, Maliactu. 4 July 2014,
http://maliactu.net/2014-annee-de-luttecontre-la-corruption-apres-lespoir-lheuredes-interrogations/
88. See note 81. Lacher carried out interviews
with prominent members of Tuareg and
Arab communities from Gao and Timbuktu
during 2012. Lacher also documents how
Rouji was charged with drug smuggling
in Mauritania, extradited to Mali in 2010,
123. Rizza Leonzon, ‘Global Fund halts AIDS
funding for Mali’, 3 March 2011, www.devex.
com/en/news/blogs/global-fund-halts-aidsfunding-for-mali
113. ‘Corruption au Mali: La remise du rapport
2012 du Vérificateur Général au président de
la République’, Bamako.com, 26 November
2013, http://news.abamako.com/h/32824.
html
85. See note 3, Dreazen; see note 33; and ‘Feds
look into al-Qaeda african drug connection’,
21 December 2009, http://newsone.
com/390297/feds-look-into-al-qaedaafrican-drug-connection/
87. Quoted in David Lewis, ‘West Africa drugs
trade going the way of Mexico – UN’,
Reuters, 20 June 2011, www.reuters.
com/article/2011/06/20/africa-drugs-unidAFLDE75J1YC20110620
120. J Glennie, ‘Can Mali be weaned off aid?’,
G uardian , 17 February 2011, www.
guardian.co.uk/global-development/
poverty-matters/2011/feb/17/mali-end-aiddependence
131. EC, ‘€3.25 billion mobilised by international
community to rebuild Mali’, press release,
15 May 2013, http://europa.eu/rapid/pressrelease_IP-13-429_en.htm
133. ECOWAS, http://news.
ecowas.int/presseshow.
php?nb=108&lang=en&annee=2011
134. UNODC, www.unodc.org/unodc/en/drugtrafficking/west-and-central-africa.html
135. UNOWA, http://unowa.unmissions.org/
Default.aspx?tabid=841
136. Conversation with Jerome Spinoza, EEASS.
137. Mark Shaw, Le a d ership Re q uire d: Drug
Traffickin g an d the Crisis of State h o o d in
W est Africa, Institute for Security Studies
Policy Brief 37, 2012.
138. Afia Kyei Asare, Fin din g a Fix, 2012.
139. See note 19. Also author interview with Ivan
Briscoe, Clingandael Institute, Netherlands,
who calls it the ‘waterbed’ effect.
140. Kofi Annan Foundation, http://
kofiannanfoundation.org; and West
Africa Commission on Drugs, www.
wacommissionondrugs.org
UK registered charity no. 1105851 Company no. 5171525 Scot charity no. SC039150 Christian Aid Ireland:
NI charity no. NIC101631 Company no. NI059154 and ROI charity no. 20014162 Company no. 426928. The
Christian Aid name and logo are trademarks of Christian Aid. Christian Aid is a key member of ACT Alliance.
© Christian Aid October 2015 J4400

The power of drug money in Mali

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