- IUCCommonsProject

State Intervention and Abuse of the Commons: Fisheries Development in Baja California Sur,
Mexico
Author(s): Emily Young
Source: Annals of the Association of American Geographers, Vol. 91, No. 2 (Jun., 2001), pp.
283-306
Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd. on behalf of the Association of American Geographers
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3651261
Accessed: 21/10/2010 13:49
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless
you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you
may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.
Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at
http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=taylorfrancis.
Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed
page of such transmission.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].
Association of American Geographers and Taylor & Francis, Ltd. are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize,
preserve and extend access to Annals of the Association of American Geographers.
http://www.jstor.org
State
Commons:
of the
Intervention and
Abuse
Fisheries
Developmentin
Mexico
California
Baja
Sur,
EmilyYoung
Environment
Program,TheSanDiegoFoundation
In manycountriesworldwide,the logic of the tragedyof the commonsmodel underliespolicies concerningthe developmentandconservationof naturalresources.In this paper,I use the case of fisheriesin BajaCaliforniaSur,Mexico to critiquethe tragedyof the commonsmodel as a metaphorfor understandingincreasinglyabusivepatternsof
marineresourceuse. I showhow pastfisherypolicieshave fomenteda tragedyof incursionin two key fishinggrounds
in Baja California Sur, LagunaSan Ignacio and Bahia Magdalena,by encouragingoutside encroachment and
increasinglywidespreadresourcepoaching.Although contemporaryeffortsto encouragegreaterprivatesector involvement in fisherydevelopmenthave exacerbatedproblemsof outsideencroachment,they have also opened up
new opportunitiesfor inshore fishing communities to reassertcontrol over local resourcesand promote marine
stewardship. Key Words:coastalmarineenvironments,commons,fisheries,fisheriespolicy,LatinAmerica,Mexico,
resourcepoaching,tragedyof thecommons.
s the twentieth centurycomes to a close, there are
widespreadconcerns over the pace and scale of
humaninducedenvironmentalchange.Worldwide, common propertyresources(e.g., fisheries,forests,
rangelands,water,and air) areparticularlyvulnerableto
induceddegradation.The "tragedyof the commons"has
provento be one of the most enduring,popularexplanations for this vulnerability,the idea being that resources
that are physicallyand legallyaccessibleto all will inevitablybe degradedas varioususerscompetewith one another to take what they can beforeothersdo.
In orderto safeguardcommon propertyresourcesfor
the publicgood and therebyavoid this so-calledtragedy,
naturalresourcesare often placedundernational ownership. However,centralizedenvironmentalmanagement
by the state is inherentlyparadoxical,given the potential
friction between the state'sroles as both developerand
protector of natural resources(Walker 1989, 32). Because the primaryfunction of the state is often interpretedas promotingeconomic growth,especiallyby way
of short-termcapital accumulation,the managementof
public goods for the long term is often relegatedto second place, even when ecological deteriorationis recognizedas problematic.'
Mexico providesan excellent case study of how this
paradoxplays out in the abuse of common propertyresources.As environmentalmanager,the Mexican government has historically acted as both benefactor to
local communities,throughthe allocation of collective
accessrightsto key resources,and extractorof economic
surplusfromsmall-scaleproducersin the primarysector
to satisfynational economic priorities.This dualrole has
broughtabout unintended adverseconsequencesin the
formof communityimpoverishment,environmentaldegradation,and conflicts over local resources(Barkinand
Suarez 1985; McGoodwin 1987; Leddy 1995; BartonBrayand Wexler 1996).
Recent policy reformsaimed at economic liberalization and governmentaldecentralizationhave been enactedpartlyin responseto these adverseconsequencesof
pastpolicies (see, for example,Cornelius,Craig,and Fox
1994; Gledhill 1995; Aitkin et al. 1996; Randall 1996a,
1996b;Mummeand Korzetz1997;Corneliusand Myhre
1998). Ostensibly,such reformswill promote more sustainableresourceuse and improvehumanwelfarein rural
areasby spurringprivate investment and capitalization
to stimulateproductionand productivity(Aguilar-Ibarra
1996, 5; Barton-Bray1996, 218; Buras1996, 234-35).
Becausethe processof economic andpolitical restructuring in Mexico is still unfolding,however,the questionremains open of whether such reformsdo indeed encourage resource development that is both economically
beneficialand ecologicallysound for local communities
who depend upon common propertyresourcesfor their
livelihoods.The primarythrustof this articleis to examine the impactof changingstate policies on the management and exploitation of marine commons in Mexico,
specificallyinshore commercialfisheriesin one of the
country's prime fishing regions: the Pacific Coast of
the northwesternstateof BajaCaliforniaSur.
Annalsof theAssociationof AmericanGeographers,
91(2), 2001, p. 283-306
? 2001 by Association of American Geographers
Publishedby BlackwellPublishers,350 Main Street, Maiden, MA 02148, and 108 Cowley Road, Oxford, OX4 1JF,UK.
284
Young
Geographershave long been interestedin human use
and transformationof the environment.However,they
have devoted surprisinglylittle attention to the role of
the commonsand their managementin longstandingdebates about the causes and consequencesof ecological
degradationin Mexico and elsewhere. The relatively
small body of geographical literature on the subject
nonethelesshighlightsthe significantinsightsthat geographerslend to the questionof the commonsin termsof
both theoryand empiricalfindings.Forinstance,Blaikie
and Brookfield(1987) and Grima and Berkes (1989)
criticallyexamine the definitionof commonpropertyresourcesand theorizeaboutcontextualfactors(e.g., communal arrangements,state policies, and markets) that
contributeeither to the degradationor conservationof
natural resources.Roberts and Emel (1992) and Emel
and Roberts (1995) use rich case study material on
groundwaterdevelopmentin the southernhigh plainsof
the U.S. to illustratehow regionalmanagementinstitutions and the expansionof capitalistproductionsystems
have mediated environmental transformationof common propertyresources.Ruddle (1989), Miller (1989),
and Millar (1996) highlight the beneficial role of
community-basedinstitutions in promotinglocal stewardshipof common-propertyresourcesin coastalareasof
the Pacific,North Atlantic, and Caribbean.In Nigeria's
floodplainwetlands,Thomas (1996) shows how flexible
accessrightsto a geographicalarrayof fisheriescan help
to offset livelihood risk in commons where the relative
abundanceof resourcesis subjectto extreme spatialand
temporal variation. Finally, Freudenberger,Carney,
and Lebbie(1997) arguethat local institutionalarrangements to managecommon-poolresourcesin West African ruralcommunitiesare farmoreresilient and flexible
than is often assumed,and could serveas the basisfor an
alternativeapproachto environmentalconservation.
This article expands geographic inquiry into interrelated problemsof poverty,resourceabuse, and social
conflict in the commons by examining the impacts of
state intervention in and withdrawalfrom the development of inshore commercialfisheriesin Mexico. More
specifically,I examinethe roleof changingstatepoliciesin
fomentingnot so mucha tragedyof the commonsas what
McCayand Acheson (1987, 29) call a "tragedyof incursion." In the case of BajaCaliforniaSur,this tragedyof
incursionderives from state-inducedoutside encroachment on local fishinggrounds,resultingin the growing
abuseof inshorefishingareasthroughresourcepoaching.
Problems of state intervention in and withdrawal
from the managementof the commons shed light onto
another concern that is of central interest to geographers:the role of state-societyrelationsin regionaleco-
nomic and environmentalchange (Watts 1983; Hecht
1985; Blaikie and Brookfield1987; Bassett 1988; Browder 1988; Hecht and Cockbur 1989; Muldavin 1996,
1997; Robbins 1998; Young 1999, 2000; Dedina 2000).
Within political ecology,recent workhas focusedon the
interrelationshipsbetween state-leddevelopment,environmentalchange, and social movements in less developed regions(see Peet and Watts 1993,1996). Forexample, Bebbington(1996) examinescollective resistanceto
agriculturalmodernizationin the EcuadorianAndes by
way of indigenousrevalorizationof ethnic identity and
selective incorporationof modem technologies (see also
Bebbington and Thiele 1993). In the context of Baja
California Sur's inshore coastal fisheries, I draw from
McGuireandLangworthy
(1991) andVasquezL. (1994) to
examine common-pool resource poaching as a local
strategyused by inshore fishersto resist excessive state
interventionin the developmentof marineresourcesfor
commercial export. I broaden the argumentmade by
Jones (1996) that contemporaryreforms in Mexico
should not be narrowlyviewed as the privatizationof
communallyheld resourcesbut instead as a much more
dynamic and complex processof changing state-society
relationsthat has given rise to new sets of opportunities
and constraints for state intervention in the management of publicgoods.I alsouse insightsfromworkby Fox
(1994, 1996) on governmentalrestructuringand civil society in Mexico to show how recentpolicy shiftsmayencouragethe formationof social capital- "normsof reciprocity and networks of civic engagement" (Putnam
1993, 167)-in a way that facilitateslocal effortsto reclaim control over inshorefishinggroundsand promote
stewardshipof marineresources.
Concerns about resourcedevelopmentand conservation in the commons also lend insights into structureagencydebateswithin geographyabout the role of local
communitiesin shapingthe outcome of national and interational environmentalstruggles,particularlyin the
context of globalization. Zimmerer (1991), Carney
(1993,1996), andMoore(1993,1996) examinehow rural
producerschallenge structures(e.g., state development
andconservationpolicies,inequitableresourcedistribution,
and market-drivencommodificationof local resources)in
order to sustain rural livelihoods. In this context,
small-scale ruralproducersare conceivedas "... 'agents'
'situated'within cultural,economic, agro-ecological,and
sociopolitical contexts that are productsof both local
and non-local processes"(Bebbington1996, 104). In my
case study,I look at how resourcepoachingcan be more
broadlyunderstoodas a localstrategyby which small-scale
fisherscope with changesin regionaleconomic and environmentalconditions. I also examine how state policies
State Interventionand Abuse of the Commons
have producedspatiallyuneven processesof inshorefishery developmentthat have locally specificconsequences
for the ways in which marine-dependentcommunities
respondto recent policy reformsin fishing.
The findings presentedhere are based on fieldwork
undertakenin two majorfishinggroundsof BajaCalifornia Sur,LagunaSan Ignacioand Bahia Magdalena,during 1993 and 1994, as well as follow-up visits to these
areasin 1995, 1997, and 1999. A comparativecase study
of the two sites enabled me to assess the impacts of
changing state policies on inshore fisheriesat both regional and local scales.The identificationof key similarities between the studysites in termsof shiftingpatterns
of settlement and social relationsin the exploitation of
inshore fisherieshelped to illuminate the broader,regionalimpactsof changingstatepolicieson management
and use of marinecommons.Site-specificdifferencesbetween LagunaSan Ignacio and Bahia Magdalenaillustratedthe locally distinctive impactsof state fisherypolicies on fishingcommunities,which wereassociatedwith
the unequalspatialdistributionof state resourcesfor inshore fisherydevelopment.To carryout the study,I employed two techniques that are frequentlyemployed in
the field: participant observation and field interviews
(Singleton, Straits,and Straits1993; Babbie1995).
Participantobservationinvolvedboth passiveobservation (e.g.,of differenttypesof fishingactivities,interactions
amongfishers,and meetingsamongareainhabitantsand
governmentactors)and active participation(e.g., in the
harvestand preparationof fish and shellfish,local social
gatherings,and meetings among area inhabitants,governmentalactors,andenvironmentalgroups).This technique allowedme to gain a directunderstandingof daily
life, social relations,and the organizationof local fishing
activities in the study sites that provided the basis for
developing themes around which to structurethe interviews.Participationin variousactivities also made it
possiblefor me to establishrelationshipswith areainhabitants who subsequentlypartook in interviews. Once
interviewswere underway,this techniqueallowedme to
corroborateinformationgatheredduringinterviewsand
determine the degree to which ideas and attitudesexpressedduringthe interviewswerereflectedin humanactivitiesin local marineenvironments(Young2000).
At each study site I conducted thirty-threein-depth
interviews with area residentswho derive their livelihoods fromlocal fishingactivities,for a total of sixty-six
interviews.2Given the relative paucity of publishedinformationconcerning the development of the region's
inshore commercialfisheries,interviewswith area residents provedinvaluableas a meansto acquirean historic
understandingof local settlement and resourceuse as
285
well as to provideinsightsinto how contemporaryfishers
view and are responding to broaderpolicy reformsin
the managementof inshoremarineresources.Informal,
semistructuredinterviewsweremost conduciveto eliciting information,as intervieweestended to be moreopen
and communicative in a conversationalformat,which
could be directedinto particularareasof my research.33
I complemented interview data from the field sites
with that obtainedfromnonlocal sources,includinggovernmental officials based elsewhere in Baja California
Sur and in Mexico City who were chargedwith regulating regionalfishingactivitiesand executivesfromfishing
and salt-productionindustriesoperatingin these areas.I
also used primarydata from state and federal censuses
to analyze regional socioeconomic and demographic
changes as comparedto local inhabitants'estimationsof
the same.Finally,I examinedregionalnewspapercoverage
of fishing issues to verify events, dates, and times mentioned during interviewsand gain a sense of how local
marineresourceissuesarepublicized.
The Tragedyof the Commonsas a Metaphor
to GuideMexico'sNaturalResourcePolicies
The tragedyof the commons, made popularby Hardin's (1968) seminal article in Science,has provided a
widely influentialmodel for explainingproblemsof natural resourceuse and management.Common-property
or common-poolresourcesare defined as "a class of resourcesfor which exclusion is difficultand joint use involves subtractability"(Berkeset al. 1989, 91; see also
McCay and Acheson 1987; Ostrom 1990). The "common property condition" of such resourceshas been
blamedfor a variety of environmentaland social problems, includingthe wastefuluse and depletion of natural
resourcesas well as conflict and impoverishmentamong
resourceusers(Ciriacy-Wantrupand Bishop 1975, 713).
The solution that is typicallyprescribedto avoid the
so-calledtragedyis to abdicatecontrolovercommon-pool
resourcesto one of two agents,governmentor privateinterests.What makesthis model problematicis that it is
often applieduncriticallyas a metaphorto guidenatural
resourcepolicies, with little attention to the underlying
assumptionsof the model and whether they apply to a
particularempiricalsetting (Ostrom1990, 8). Three key
assumptionsare made:(1) that common propertystatus
is the equivalent of open access; (2) that all resource
usersaremotivatedby selfishinterestfor short-termgain
and are thus unable and/orunwilling to act collectively
to ensurethe long-termproductivityof the resource;and
(3) that resourceuse is so intensivethat overexploitation
286
Young
and degradation are possible (McCay and Acheson
1987, 7). However, there are numerous examples of
sharednormsof behaviorand managementpracticesemployedby local communitiesto restrictaccessto and use
of common-pool resourcesand promote conservation
(Feeny et al. 1990; see, for example, Netting 1976;
Acheson 1979; Hames 1991). Furthermore,by attributing environmental ruin and human impoverishment
solely to the common-propertystatusof a resource,one
overlooksthe impact of broaderpolitical and socioeconomic factors, such as governmental policies and the
expansion of global capitalism, on local resource use
(Vayda 1983; Buck-Cox 1985; Schmink and Wood
1987). The case of BajaCaliforniaSur'sfisheriessupports
these critiques.There is strongevidence to suggestthat
none of the above-outlinedconditions of open access,
selfishbehavior,and destructiveresourcepressureswere
presentpriorto state-ledcommercializationof fisheries.
If the underlyingassumptionsof the so-calledtragedy
are problematic,so is the proposedsolution. Effortsby
states to assert exclusive jurisdictionover communally
held resources have produced destructive outcomes,
wherenationalizationtransforms
previouslylimited-access
common-poolresourcesinto open-accessresourceswith
few restrictionson theiruse (Ostrom1990, 23). Likewise,
the substitutionof privateownershipfor common property has been environmentallyand socially deleterious,
where privatizationhas meant the loss of accessto critical resourcesby local populationsand privateentrepreneursaremotivatedsolely by short-termprofit,discounting the future value of the resource(Ciriacy-Wantrup
and Bishop 1975). In a varietyof coastal settingsworldwide, these changes in property rights have abraded
community-basedaccessrightsto inshorefishinggrounds,
precipitatingconflictsover use and control of marineresourcesaswell asdestructivepatternsof fisheryexploitation
(Platteau1989a, 1989b;Sinclair 1990;Creanand Symes
1996;Iudicello,Weber,and Wieland 1999).
Notwithstanding its numerouslimitations, the logic
of the tragedyof the commonsmodel underliespast and
present Mexican policies concerning development and
conservationof naturalresources.Enshrinedin Article
27 of the 1917 Constitutionwas the notion that natural
resourcesare part of the public wealth and state intervention is necessaryto ensurethat such wealth is equitably distributedand adequatelysafeguardedfor conservation (Simonian 1995, 79). This constitutionalmandate
servedas the basisfor the state'shistoricallycentralrole
in the management of local productive activities for
much of this century.The amendmentof Article 27 to
encourageprivatizationis predicatedon the argument
that poor, small-scale producersare to blame for low
productivityand unsustainableuse of naturalresources
(Toledo 1996).
The case of BajaCaliforniaSur fisheriesalso demonstratesthat, historically,state-led development policies
have been largely responsiblefor abuse of the marine
commons by encouragingboth outside encroachment
and resourcepoaching.Particularlyduringthe 1970sand
1980s,governmentprogramsto promoteexport-oriented
fisheriesfueled large-scaleimmigrationfrom mainland
Mexico to the fishinggroundsof LagunaSan Ignacioand
BahiaMagdalenaand gave riseto increasinglywidespread
patternsof illicit fishingpracticesin these areas.Recent
policy shiftsto dismantlestate functionsin favorof open
marketshave merelyexacerbatedproblemsof outsideencroachment and destructiveresourceuse by increasing
the degree of spatial separationbetween producersand
consumers(Bunker1985;EmelandBridge1995) andmaking it even more difficultfor local fishersto resist the
seemingly inexhaustibledemand of distant marketsfor
theirproductsand aggravatingexistingpatternsof marine
resourceabuse.The followingsectionsprovidean overview
of changing fisherypolicies in Mexico-from interventionist to market-based-and their impactson production and resourceuse among small-scalefishersin Baja
CaliforniaSur.
State Interventionism and the Development
of Commercial Fisheries in Mexico
duringthe past half century,the state has
Particularly
a
played pivotal role in promotingthe rapidgrowth of
Mexico's inshorecommercialfisheries.Article 27 of the
Constitutionplacedinshorefisheriesunderfederaljurisdiction (SEPESCA 1992, 27). Consequently,the national
governmenthas directauthorityoverall mattersrelatedto
the formulation,implementation,andenforcementof fisheriespoliciesat the local and regionallevels. Formuch of
the twentiethcentury,such policieshave been steepedin
the revolutionaryrhetoricof Mexico'sruling party,the
PartidoRevolucionarioInstitucional(Partyof the InstitutionalizedRevolutionor PRI)(McGoodwin1989,178).
Fromthe early1930sonward,the statepursueda set of
fisheriespolicies gearedtowardsocial sector investment
to supportsmall-scale producerson the one hand and
export-led development for aggregate national economic growth on the other (VasquezL. 1994). These
dual policy prioritiesinitially derivedfrom the need to
reduce agriculturalpressuresin the Mexican interior
(Simonian 1995, 104) by raisingthe standardof living
amongruralfishermenand increasingnationalfood supplies (McGuire1983, 132), as well as to generatefederal
State Interventionand Abuse of the Commons
revenuesfor reconstructioneffortsafter the Revolution
(McGoodwin 1989, 179). At the local level, inherent
contradictionswithin such policies, ratherthan the innate characteristicsof inshorefisheriesas common-pool
resources,createdincentives for illicit and uncontrolled
harvestingpracticesand set the stagefor conflictsamong
differentresourceusersover marineaccessrights.
One such contradictionstemmedfromthe state policies governinginshorefishingrightsand responsibilities
for the social sector.Under federallaw, there were two
categories of small-scalefishers:pescadoreslibres("free
fishers") and cooperativistas("cooperative members").
libresheld accessrightsto local fishinggrounds
Pescadores
for subsistenceproduction,while cooperativemembers
were granted exclusive concessions to commercially
valuable species, including abalone, lobster, and sea
turtle.4In exchangefor exclusivefishingzones,cooperative memberswere legally requiredto workcollectively,
pay dues, and assist governmentalauthoritiesin monitoring access to and use of their concessions (Fondo de
CulturaEconomica 1952, 26; Avila P. 1985, 48; Zuniga
A. 1993, 17-21; Villa A. 1996, 15-16, 39).
The creation of these two categoriesof fishingrights
was inherentlyproblematic,as it establishedoverlapping
accessrightsby differentusergroupsto marineresources
(McGoodwin 1987). While cooperativeshad exclusive
rightsto exploit reservedspecies in their concessionsfor
commercialpurposes,pescadoreslibreswere also permitted to harvestfromthese areasas long as they did so for
household consumption. Furthermore,pescadoreslibres
could also be employedto fish for permisionarios
(i.e., individualsor corporateentities with permitsto catch and
sell fish and shellfish species not reservedfor cooperatives). Given the logisticaldifficultiesof policing fishers
and aquaticresourcesthat are mobile by natureand the
high costsof enforcement,few governmentalresourcesin
Mexico have been devoted to monitoring and enforcement of open/closed fishing seasons, catch quotas,
equipment restrictions, and other fishing regulations
(McGuireand Langworthy1991;VasquezL. 1994). The
combination of overlappingaccess rights and low governmental enforcementcreated a situation of de facto
open accessin which manycooperativeswereunwillingor
unableto effectivelypolice their own concessionsto prevent poaching by pescadoreslibres(MendozaM. 1985;
McGuireand Langworthy1991; VasquezL. 1994). This
situationsometimesled to conflictsamong cooperatives
andpescadoreslibres(McGoodwin1979a, 1979b, 1987).5
Another contradictionderived from the corporatist
structure of state-led fishery development.6 Unlike
who were permittedto sell their products
permisionarios,
on the open market,cooperativeswere mandatedto sell
287
their productsto a state-operatedmarketingfirm at a
fixed price. Cooperativeswould firstturn their product
over to the regional federation of cooperatives,which
oversaw product processing by cooperative-run,parastatal, or privateplants. The federationwould then sell
most of the finishedproductsto a state-operated,exportmarketingfirm,Ocean Garden Products(Zuniga 1993,
21; see also Anda L. 1987). Finally,the federationwould
remunerate the cooperatives for their products, discounting the costs of processingand a 7.5 percent sales
commission charged by the marketingfirm (Chenaut
1985, 100; Ramirez,1998). The assumptionunderlying
monopsonycontrol over exportmarketingby a state firm
was that the governmentwould be better equippedto
centralizemarketinginformationas well as to sell cooperatives'productsas a consolidatedgroup, and thereby
obtain the best price for the productsin the global marketplace (VasquezL. 1993, 46).
However,the state-institutedmarketingsystemcreated
an "artificial economy" in which cooperatives were
dissociated fromthe profitsof production(McGoodwin
1987, 222, 226). The state firmpassed on the costs of
marketingto the producers,giving cooperativesa controlled price for their catch that was much lower than
they wouldreceive on the open market.This provideda
powerfulincentive for cooperativesto violate marketing
restrictionsand seek informalmarketoutlets where they
could sell their productsfor a higherprice (McGuireand
Langworthy1991). Consequently,a numberof cooperatives resortedto sellingpartof theirproducton the black
market,where they could fetch a higher price to recoup
a greaterproportionof the costsof production(McGoodwin
1987; VasquezL. 1993, 46; 1994). Participationin the
blackmarketcreateddisincentivesforself-restraint
among
resourceusers,whereremunerationfor covertharvesting
was high. Corruptfishing inspectorsand higher-upauthoritiesalso stood to benefitfromlucrativebribesin exchange for turninga blind eye to such activities (MendozaMartinez1985).
Partial Withdrawal of the State from
Development of Commercial
Fisheries in Mexico
Duringthe 1980s,the dropin globaloil pricesandMexico'sensuingdebtcrisisimpelledthe stateto withdrawfrom
its formerinterventionistrole in the economy (Loaeza
1996, 6; see also Dresser1991;Cornelius,Craig,and Fox
1994;Randall1996a,1996b).In the midstof trenchantfinancialcrisisand deepeningeconomicrecession,Mexico
could no longeraffordbroad-based
spendingin the social
288
Young
sector(MansellCarstens1995, 17). In the primarysector,
small-scaleproducerswereblamedforlow productivityand
useof naturalresources(Toledo1996).
unsustainable
Consequently,startingin the early1980sandaccelerating in the 1990s, Mexico pursuedopen-market-oriented
developmentpolicies aimed at encouragingprivate investment, tradeliberalization,and the reductionof government involvement in the economy in orderto boost
productivityand promote more sustainablenatural resourceuse in the primarysector (Aguilar-Ibarra1996,
5; Barton-Bray1996, 218; Buras1996, 234-35; Klooster
1997). These neoliberaleconomic reformshad profound
implicationsforboth the provisionsof accessrightsto fishinggroundsandthe corporatistfishingstructurein Mexico.
First,in orderto encouragegreaterprivateinvestment
in the fishingsector,the legalframeworkfor fisherieswas
modified to eliminate cooperatives' exclusive access
privilegesto particularspecies.Currentlaw allowsany licensed individualor corporateentity to obtain a permit
forconcessionsto harvestthose speciesformerlyreserved
for exploitation by cooperatives.Consequently,fishing
cooperativesmust now compete with the privatesector
for formalaccess rightsto particularcommercialspecies
(SEPESCA1992, 11-12; Aguilar-Ibarra
1996,5; VillaA.
1996, 63; Aguilar-Ibarra,
Reid, andThorpe 1998).7
Second, the state sought to reduce public expendituresby divestingfromstate-ownedenterprises,reducing
subsidiesto productiveenterprisesin the social sector,
and opening formerlyclosed markets.In the fishingsector, state divestituremeant dismantlingthe corporatist
fishingstructurethroughthe sale of both parastatalprocessing plants and the export marketingfirm, Ocean
GardenProducts,to the privatesector (CasasM., 1994;
Chavez A., 1994; Pintado, 1997; Aguilar-Ibarra,Reid,
and Thorpe 1998). In 1997, one of Mexico's largest
banks, Bancomex, acquired Ocean Garden Products
1998).
(Aguilar-Ibarra,
Third, entry into the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) was viewed as importantfor ensuring future growth in the Mexican fishing industry
(CIAD and SEPESCA 1994). Between 1982 and 1994,
940 of the 1,155 businessesheld in the publicsectorwere
either privatized,liquidated, or merged (Gould 1996,
27). The Mexican governmentpromotedNAFTA as a
meansto assureaccessto U.S. investorsand markets,the
latter of which absorbed60-70 percent of Mexican exports(Weintraub1996, 51). NAFTA wasalso toutedas a
way to encouragegreaterforeigninvestment in the fishing sector,which would take up the slack from reduced
state involvement in this sector.Freertradewould also
enable Mexican fishersto tap new marketsin the U.S.
and Canadafor the exportof marineproducts.
In BajaCaliforniaSur,pastand presentfisherypolicies
have transformedthe social relations of productionin
small-scalefishingcommunitiesby encouragingcollective
abuse of the marine commons and fomenting conflicts
over access among different resourceusers. Until the
1980s, this transformationcame about through everincreasinggovernmentalinterventionin the production
process and state-inducedoutside encroachment upon
inshorefishinggrounds,fueling destructiveresourceexploitation and rising social tensions at the local level.
Since the late 1980s,neoliberalreformshave encouraged
greaterflowsof foreignprivatecapitalinto Mexico'sfishing sectorand opened new exportmarkets.By and large,
this infusionof foreigncapitaland the expandedaccessto
export marketshave simply intensifiedextractive pressuresupon local fishinggroundsand aggravatedconflicts
amongareafishersover accessto the same.I will now examine moreclosely these local impactsof changingstate
policiesin LagunaSan Ignacioand BahfaMagdalena.
Background to the Local Case Study:
Laguna San Ignacio and Bahfa Magdalena
With more than 2,200 km, or 23 percent, of the nation'scoastlineand morethan 2,000 marinespecies,Baja
California Sur is one of the richest fishing regions in
Mexico (Avila P. 1985, 96; VillarealG. 1987, 59). Approximately95 percent of fishing activities in the state
occursinshore,conductedprimarilyby small-scalefishers
who use seven-meter skiffs with outboard motors,
monofilamentnets, and diving equipmentto harvestfish
andshellfish(Avila P. 1985, 116). Along the Pacificcoast
of the state, LagunaSan Ignacio and Bahfa Magdalena
serve as importantnurseriesand feeding groundsfor a
numberof commerciallyvaluablemarinespecies,including
abalone (Haliotusspp.), black turtle (Cheloniamydas),
lobster(Panulirusspp.), Pacificcalico scallop (Argopecten
circularis),
pismo clams (Tivelastultorum),shark(Squalus
spp.),shrimp(Penaeusspp.),andvariousotherfishspecies
(DedinaandYoung1995, 7; FundacionMexicanaparala
Educacion Ambiental, Sociedad de Historia Natural
Niiparaja,y UniversidadAutonoma de Baja California
Sur 1998, 279-84).
LagunaSan Ignacio(Figure1) is home to an estimated
502 permanentinhabitantswho live in seven scattered
settlements around the southern shores of the lagoon
(INEGI 1995). The lagoon is relatively isolated, connectedto the nearesttown,San Ignacio,by a 60-kilometer
dirtroad.Lagoonresidentshave no accessto basicservices
suchas runningwater,sewage,or electricity.The lagoonis
a UNESCO WorldHeritageSite andformspartof the re-
State Intervention and Abuse of the Commons
289
Figure 1. Laguna San Ignacio. (Map by Dan Brady.)
cently created El Vizcafno Biosphere Reserve. The status
of the lagoon as a protected area has thus far had little impact on the management of fishing grounds in Laguna San
Ignacio (Dedina 1996; Young 1995, 2000).
Bahia Magdalena (Figure2) lies approximately200 kilometers south of Laguna San Ignacio. Unlike Laguna San
Ignacio, Bahia Magdalena has a more extensive infrastructure of roads, a port, and basic services, including a newly
erected thermoelectric plant that suppliespower to arearesidents as well as to large-scale agriculture in the nearby
Santo Domingo Valley. The small fishing town of Puerto
Adolfo Lopez Mateos, which is the focus of this study,contains an estimated population of 2,391 who derive a living
fromfishing and fish processingfrom the bay (INEGI 1995).
Commercial fisheries developed fairly recently in
both areas. While local fishing communities were ini-
290
Young
Figure 2. Bahia Magdalena.(Map by Dan Brady.)
tially small, they have grown dramaticallyduring the
past few decades in response to state-led development
policies. As will be explained in the next section, the
commercialexpansion of regionalfisheriesresultedin a
rapidinflux of fishersinto these areasand the concomitant intensification of local fishing activities, giving
rise to a tragedyof incursion.
State Intervention and the Tragedy of
Incursion in Baja's Coastal Fisheries
McCay and Acheson (1987, 29) argue that in many
settings, while the state holds legal jurisdiction over the
use and allocation of common-pool resources, local communities of users often claim informal rights to these re-
State Interventionand Abuse of the Commons
sources.Among those rights is that of excluding or restrictingoutside access to local resources.State policies
to promotenaturalresourcedevelopmentoften come in
conflict with these informalarrangements,wherebythe
access rightsof less powerfuland less intensive local resourceusersarefrequentlyusurpedby morepowerfuland
intensive outside-basedinterest groups (Hecht 1985;
Little and Horowitz 1987; Schmink and Wood 1987;
Stonich 1989;Peluso1992). In somecases,local resource
usershave collectively resistedcentralizedmanagement
and outsideencroachmentby assertingcommunalrights
to co-managethe commons with the state, in order to
promotemoresustainableresourceexploitation(Acheson
1989; Hecht and Cockburn 1989; Pinkerton 1987;
Nietschmann 1997). Similar to what McGuire and
Langworthy(1991) and VasquezL. (1994) found with
the shrimpfisheryin Mexico'sSea of Cortez,local fishing
populationsin LagunaSan Ignacioand BahfaMagdalena
have increasinglydefiedstate effortsto managelocal productiveactivities,but in a waythathas exacerbatedrather
than amelioratedresourceabusesassociatedwith outside
encroachment.Rather than mobilizingto exclude outsidersandpromotecommunity-based
resourcestewardship,
residentfishershave becomecomplicitin collectivelydestructivebehaviorthroughtheir participationin the region'sblackmarketforillegallyharvestedmarineproducts.
Throughout the Baja California peninsula, inshore
fishingcommunitiesarerelativelynew.Aboriginalpopulations that once exploited inshore waterswere devastated by diseasesintroducedthrough Europeancontact
and colonization (Aschmann 1959; Martinez1991). In
LagunaSan Ignacio and BahfaMagdalena,pioneer settlers initially migratedon a seasonalbasisfromdroughtriddenranchesand towns along the interiorof the peninsulato the PacificCoast duringthe 1920s and 1930s in
the hopes of securinga better life in fishingfromthe sea.
In addition to fishingfor household consumption,early
settlersharvestedsea turtles,lobster,and sharkforsale to
merchantships fromthe U.S. and to barterwith inland
agriculturalcommunities (Chenaut 1985, 48; Gatti
1986,31; ZabalzaN. 1988, 56-57). As one of the earliest
settlersof LagunaSan Ignaciorecalls:
We used to catch black sea turtle with harpoons. . . We
would salt and dry it for sale [to merchant marines]. . .
Some people would come by burro[fromranches]to exchange fruit and vegetablesfor sea turtle. Burroswere the
only way to transportgoodsback then.
The first colonist of what is now the town of Puerto
Adolfo LopezMateossimilarlyrecollects:
We taught ourselvesto fish. It was desolate here, nothing
but sand dunes. We had to use barrelstied to burros[to
fetch waterfromwells at nearbyranches]. . . No one sold
291
fish [in the bay] back then ... You had to cross over the
sierrasto reach [fishmarketsin the largesturbancenter of]
La Paz.It was a twelve-daytrip.
In both Laguna San Ignacio and Bahfa Magdalena,
temporary camps gradually grew into small permanent
settlements of families that lived by fishing from these
areas year-round. Long-time residents of these areas recount how fishers were few and far between and harvests
were relatively abundant. As one such resident of Puerto
Adolfo Lopez Mateos put it:
It waspristineback then ... my uncle usedto catch big fish
... Youdidn'teven need to dive forshellfish.Whereveryou
looked there weremoundsof them.8
Given the relatively recent formation of fishing communities in these areas, no formalized set of community-based
resource use practices evolved for collective management
of local fishing activities (Young 1995). Nonetheless,
early settlers were bound together by extensive blood
and kinship ties forged by their predecessors over several
generations of ranching along the interior of the peninsula
(Chenaut 1985; Zuniga A. 1993).
It was not unusual for the father and sons of one family
to be members of different cooperatives and/or work as
free fishers. In fact, fishers in both areas often switched
membership from one cooperative to another, as well as
moving freely between work as cooperativistasand pescadores libresfrom one season to the next. The combination of small fishing populations, the vast family ties
among them, and the relative fluidity of a fisher's status
(i.e., as a cooperativistaor a pescadorlibre)served as de facto
mechanisms to minimize extractive pressures as well as
conflicts over access rights in local fishing grounds.
Although the Mexican government granted concessions to the first fishing cooperatives along the Baja California peninsula in the late 1930s, the lucrative shrimp
industry in mainland Mexico was the primary focus of
state-led development efforts (McGoodwin 1979a,
1979b, 1987,1989; McGuire 1983; McGuire and Greenberg 1993). Not until the 1970s, when the government
expanded its efforts in Baja California Sur to encourage
the formation of new fishing cooperatives and assumed
greater control over fish processing through the purchase
of private canneries, did inshore commercial fisheries
grow rapidly throughout the state (Sierra and Zepeda
1977; Rojas C. 1982; Avila P. 1985, 87; Peon 1996). As a
result of this growth, Baja California Sur absorbed a
growing influx of immigrants from mainland Mexico
who came to the region seeking greater economic opportunities in fishing. From 1970 to 1980, the state population grew by 68 percent, from 128,019 to 215,139 persons (Direccion General de Estadistica 1971, 47; INEGI
292
Young
1982, 1). By 1990, this populationhad grownagainby 47
percent to 317,764 (INEGI 1991, 7). Statewide census
dataavailableforthe fishingsectorin BajaCaliforniaSur
indicatea nearlyfive-foldincreasein the fishingpopulations of Baja California Sur between 1980 and 1992,
from 2,497 to 11,396 (Estado de Baja California Sur
1987, 145; INEGI 1993, 201).
In mainland Mexico, the Pacific coastal state of Sinaloa was the primarysending area,contributingnearly
14 percentof the immigrantsto BajaCaliforniaSurduring the 1970sand approximately12 percentin the 1980s
(INEGI 1983, 47; 1991, 12). In light of governmental
policies that fueled overcapitalizationand overexploitation of the shrimpfisheryin Sinaloaduringthe sameperiod (McGuire and Greenberg 1993; VasquezL. and
McGuire1993), inshorefishinggroundsof BajaCalifornia Sur served,in part,as a safetyvalve to alleviate fishing pressuresin that state.
With the expansion of commercialfisheriesand the
rapidgrowthin the region'sfishingpopulation,the tragedy of incursionsoon followedin both LagunaSan Ignacio and BahiaMagdalena,with attendantproblemsof increasinglyunconstrainedharvestingof marineresources
and pescadoand growingconflictsamongcooperativistas
res libresover access to inshore fisheries.The tragedy
playedout differentlyin each locality.In LagunaSan Ignacio, it stemmed primarilyfrom the influx of mobile,
transientfishingpopulationsfrom elsewhere,who were
who came to
employed by outside-basedpermisionarios
control the lucrativescallopfishery.While this also happened with the scallopfisheryin BahiaMagdalena,most
residentsof PuertoAdolfo LopezMateos workedin the
parastatalcannery,and thus immigrantfishersdid not
pose an immediatethreat to their livelihoods. Because
the local circumstancesthat gave rise to abusesof the
commons are unique, the cases of LagunaSan Ignacio
and BahiaMagdalenaare treatedseparately.
LagunaSan Ignacio: Incursion as
a Social Safety Valve from Without
In Laguna San Ignacio, the first (and only) four
fishing cooperatives in the areawere established in the
1970s (Peon 1996). By the time these cooperatives
were established, however, other long-established cooperatives located further north along the coast already controlled concessions to the most productive
and lucrative abalone and lobster groundsin the area,
located immediately north of the lagoon. Consequently, the lagoon cooperatives were only able to obtain concessions to less valuable commercial species,
mainly pismo clams.
The monopsonymarketingstructurealso proveddisadvantageousin terms of productremuneration,given
the relativelyhigh productioncosts for local fishingcooperatives.Throughout the state, fishing cooperatives
have historically experienced difficulties in obtaining
loans fromboth publicand privatebanks(Avila P. 1985,
120; VillarealG. 1987, 183). With insufficientfinancial
resources,fewcooperativeshave been ableto substantially
invest in equipment purchasesand maintenance (e.g.,
skiffs,outboardmotors,anddivingequipment)on a regular
basis. This meant that most cooperativesworked with
frequently dilapidated equipment, eroding productive
efficiencyover time (Avila P. 1985, 118;ZunigaA. 1993,
95-101).
Given their relativelyrecent formation,low product
remuneration,and low productiveefficiency,the fishing
cooperativesof LagunaSan Ignaciowerefinanciallyand
politically weak. Consequently,they were poorly positioned to compete with outside-based,economicallyand
over harvestingrights
politically powerfulpermisionarios
to species that were more commerciallyvaluable than
pismoclams.Localfishingcooperatives'competitivediswas thrown
advantage vis-a-vis outside permisionarios
of
the
into starkreliefwith the emergence
scallopfishery
in the late 1970s, in responseto the growingdemandin
Mexico City and the U.S. for Pacific calico scallops
(Montano A. 1988, 16-20). Outside permisionarios
basedin the state capitalof LaPazusedtheirpoliticalties
to gain near-exclusiveaccessto the lucrativescallopfisherythroughoutthe state.They exploitedmultiplefishing
groundsfor scallopsby employinga mobile workforceof
resourceextractors,comprisedlargely of recent immigrantsfromthe mainland,to harvestscallopsthroughout
BajaCaliforniaSurduringthe 1980s(HernandezV, Angel,
and AguilarC. 1990).
The emergenceof the scallopfisherymarkeda turning
point in patternsof marineresourceexploitationand the
social relationsof productionin LagunaSan Ignacio.A
commonstoryabouta tragedyof incursionemergedfrom
field interviews,a storyinvolving outsideencroachment,
the growingcontrol of local commons rightsby outside
interests,and the concomitantriseof guaterismo
(poaching and illegal sale of marine productsin the regional
black market).One arearesidentrecountedhow, during
the late 1970s and 1980s, as many as 1,000 people at a
time came to harvestscallopsforoutside-basedpermisionarios,workingin round-the-clockshiftsaroundthe northern shorelineduringthe scallopseason.He reflected:
Youshouldhave seen it herewhenthey weretakingout
[Pacificcalicoscallops]... Theentirelagoonwasfilledwith
people. It was like a giant city-people workingall dayand
night,shuckingscallops... Everyonetookoutthreetimes
State Interventionand Abuse of the Commons
what they reported.Most of it was sold illegallyand people
got veryrich.
Many longtime inhabitants of the lagoon noted that the
scallop fishery also brought a rising number of settlers
into the area, as many mobile fishers ended up staying in
the lagoon to take up fishing year round. Census data
document this rapid population growth. While the lagoon's population rose by 12 percent (from 26 to 29 individuals) from 1970 to 1980, it increased roughly ten-fold
(to 307 individuals) during the following decade (Direccion General de Estadistica 1971, 58; INEGI 1982, 6-7;
1991, 24; see Table 1).
Villareal G. (1987, 123) notes that Pacific calico scallops were particularly vulnerable to overexploitation as
they are relatively easy to exploit, congregating in shallow waters and requiring no specialized equipment to
harvest. Between 1977 (the first year for which national
fisheries statistics are broken down by state) and 1980,
the volume of production in Baja California Sur for various species of scallops and clams (i.e., Argopectencircularis, Megapitariasp., Spondylussp., and Tivela stultorum)
rose by 1,000 percent, from 526 to 5,875 tons (Direccion
General de Estadistica 1978; Departamento de Pesca
1981). By 1990, production had increased, albeit by a
less substantial proportion-52 percent, to 8,915 tons
(Goberador Constitucional del Estado de Baja California Sur 1991, 22). This precipitous rise in statewide production masked local problems of overexploitation in
natural banks of Pacific calico scallops, which were harvested to the point of commercial extinction in some
areas (Villareal G. 1987, 121; Maeda-Martinez 1990, 10;
Reyes-Sosa 1990, 25).
While outsiders were largely responsible for the depredation of the local scallop fishery in the 1980s, corrupt
governmental officials were to blame for the erosion of
local commons rights and growing resource abuses. Some
officials sold permits to the highest bidder and turned a
blind eye to poaching. A former municipal representative of Laguna San Ignacio put it this way:
Whathappenedherein the lagoonis thatthe interestsof powfrom [elsewhere]won out over rational
erfulpermisionarios
Table 1. Local and State Level PopulationData,
1970-1995
%
1970
1980
1990
Change
1995 1970-95
26
29
SanIgnacio
502 1,831
307
Laguna
PuertoLopezMateos
1,283 2,266 2,386 2,391 86
BajaCaliforniaSur 128,019215,139319,764 375,494 193
293
exploitation of fisheries.The resulthas been the heaps of
shellsthat you see aroundthe lagoonand the ... scarcityof
[variousmarine]species . . . Governmentinspectorswho
should have been regulating what was happening took
bribes...
The growing abuse of marine commons and the decline of
the local scallop fishery from the 1970s onward were thus
externally induced by corrupt governmental officials and
outside interests, with guaterismoas the inevitable consequence. The contradictions in the existence of dual policies to support small-scale fisherswhile promoting the expansion of export fisheries created the conditions for a
tragedy of incursion. Governmental corruption in permitting and vigilance encouraged encroachment upon
inshore fishing grounds by outside-based permisionarios
and the pescadoreslibresthey employed, with the consequent erosion of commons rights held by local cooperatives and spread of marine resource poaching.
Bahia Magdalena:Attraction of a CompanyTown
and "Pristine"Fishing Grounds
During the 1970s, Productos Pesqueros de Matancitas,
S.A. de C.V., became the largest and most important
government-ownedprocessingplant in the state of Baja
CaliforniaSur (VillarealG. 1987, 97).9 It rankedfifth
among the nation's twenty-nine canneries in terms of
volume and value of production(Direccion General de
Informaticay Estadistica1978). Locatedon the northern
end of Bahia Magdalena,the plant processedsardines
from its own fishing boats as well as shellfish from local
cooperatives and tuna from private offshore boats
(Chavez A., 1994). The town of Puerto Adolfo Lopez
Mateos was established to house workersfor the plant. In
orderto attractworkers,the plant offeredgenerous benefits,
includingfree housing, basic services,and medicalcare.
Between 1970 and 1980, the populationof PuertoAdolfo
LopezMateosgrewby 77 percent,from1,283to 2,266 (DireccionGeneralde Estadistica1971,47; INEGI1982, 1).
As in the case of LagunaSan Ignacio,arearesidentsof
Bahia Magdalena recollected during interviews how
governmental policies and increasing outside control
over key local fisherieschanged the social relations of
production when destructiveresourceexploitation and
conflicts over local marine resources became increasingly widespread. These changes were tied to the opening of the scallop fishery in Laguna San Ignacio; in Bahia
Magdalenathey were linked to the developmentof both
the parastatalcanneryand the shrimpfishery.
Many study informants recounted the "good old days"
during the 1970s and early 1980s, when the town was
flush with government revenues. The cannery was the
294
Young
mainstayof the local economy in PuertoAdolfo Lopez
Mateos.There were only a few householdswhose membersworkedas freefishersin the bay,alongwith one local
fishing cooperative.This situation began to change in
the early 1980s, when a growingnumberof immigrants
arrived,many from Sinaloa. Previouslyunexploitedfor
commercialuse in the bay,shrimpwasparticularlyattractive to Sinaloan fisherswho had previousexperiencein
shrimpingon the mainland.One suchfisherrecallsthat:
[I left Sinaloa when] the governmenttook away [shrimp]
cooperatives'subsidies.. . There was a lot of shrimp in
[Bahia Magdalena].Many of us came over from Sinaloa.
We startedworkinghere and realizedthat this place was
pristine.
Another recollects how many Sinaloans were encouragedto come to the bayby otherswho came there before
them: "Weformeda chain [of immigrantsfromSinaloa]
until there were a lot of people [from Sinaloa in the
bay]."The influx of Sinaloan fishershelped give rise to
the formationof two new fishingcooperativesin 1985, to
exploit shrimp,Pacific calico scallops, and other commerciallylucrativeshellfishand fish.
A commonrefrainin interviewsof both oldtimersand
newcomerswas that the formerput up little resistanceto
the entryof a growingnumberof fishersfromelsewhere,
as they were unaccustomedto assertingand defending
territorialrights in local fishing grounds.One oldtimer
put it this way:
Sinaloans started coming [here in the mid-1980s]. They
saw how fishershere never want trouble . . People here
are too nice. Sinaloans come to ... harvest shrimp.And
you can't do anything about it because it is a sure fight
[i.e., with Sinaloans over access rights to local fishing
grounds].
Complaints in Bahia Magdalena about outside encroachment, governmental corruption, and the rise of
guaterismoechoed those of Laguna San Ignacio residents.
During interviews, cooperative members noted that it
became commonplace for cooperatives to turn a blind
eye to resource poaching in their concessions. As one
member put it: "Un compromisotrae otro," or "quid pro
quo."
Starting in the late 1980s, neoliberal policy reforms
would have significant implications for the exploitation
of inshore fisheries in Baja California Sur. However, contrary to the stated intent of such reforms-to promote
more sustainable resource use-uncontrolled
coastal
fishing activities in Laguna San Ignacio and Bahia
Magdalena have continued, with deleterious social and
environmental consequences.
fromBaja'sFisheries:
StateWithdrawal
HastenedIncursionandNascentResistance
Given that policies to eliminateexclusivecooperative
concessions to key fisheries,privatizeparastatalenterprises,and liberalizetrade are relativelyrecent, the impactsof these policy shiftsarestill unfolding.In the short
term, however,fourregionaltrendshave emerged.First,
as was the case in the mainland shrimp fisheryin the
1970s and 1980s (McGoodwin 1979a, 1979b, 1987;
MendozaMartinez1985), guaterismohas become more
entrenched, fomenting increasingly volatile conflicts
amonglocal resourceusers.Second, the growingentryof
private capital and the expanded linkages between increasinglydistant consumersand local producershave
done more to exacerbatedestructivefishingactivities by
intensifyingthe tragedyof incursionthan to providenew
avenues for more sustainablemarineresourceuse. This
situation is not unlike what happenedduringthe 1970s
in the Sea of Cortez.There, risingprivatesector investment in the shrimp fisheryled to the displacement of
local fishingcooperativesby outside-basedproducers,as
well as to the overexploitationof shrimp(McGuireand
Greenberg1993; VasquezL. and McGuire 1993; Leddy
1995). Third, parallelto what Jones (1996) found with
the privatizationof state-supportedcommunallands in
mainlandMexico, policy reformshave closed certainavenues for governmentalintervention in coastal fisheries
(i.e., throughstate-leddevelopmentefforts),while opening othersfor the same (i.e., throughpublic-privatealliances for new formsof development).
Finally,Mexico'sretreatfrom"ubiquitousgovernmental intervention"(Dresser1991, 7) in the development
of commercialfisherieshas creatednew spacesin which
marine-dependentcommunitiescan mobilizeto contest
policies that erode local resourceaccessrights.In his researchon neoliberalreformsand changing state-society
relations in Mexico, Fox (1994, 1996) emphasizesthe
pivotal role of social capital in enhancing the effectiveness of state policies and programsto improvesocial welfare in ruralareas.10In Baja'sinshore fishing communities, new alliances between local cooperatives and
nongovernmentalorganizations(NGOs) may help to
createsocial capitalto facilitatefutureeffortsto promote
greaterlocal controlover inshorefishinggroundsand the
stewardshipof marineresources.
These regional trendshave producedlocally specific
outcomes that partly reflect the variable manner in
which different coastal communities were integrated
into Mexico's corporatistfishing structureprior to the
late 1980s. For instance, while area residentsof Laguna
San Ignaciowerelargelyexcludedfromgovernmentalef-
State Interventionand Abuse of the Commons
forts to promote inshore fisherydevelopment, inhabitants of PuertoAdolfo LopezMateosin BahiaMagdalena
benefitedfromgenerousfederalsubsidiesforfishprocessing and port facilities. Consequently,the reduction of
state subsidiesfor fishinghad a much moreprofoundimpact upon BahiaMagdalenathan upon LagunaSan Ignacio. Many canneryworkerswho were laid off when the
cannerywasprivatizedsubsequentlybecamefishers.As a
result,BahiaMagdalenaexperienceda secondaryformof
encroachment from within the community of Puerto
Adolfo Lopez Mateos. The particularsof each locality
meritseparatediscussion.
LagunaSan Ignacio: ChangingForms of
State Intervention and the Entry of NGOs
To date, policy reforms have done little to arrest
guaterismoin LagunaSan Ignacio. In the era of state
downsizing, increasedgovernmentalvigilance of local
fishing grounds has not been forthcoming. Hernan
Ponce D., the DeputySecretaryof Fisheriesfor the state
of Baja California Sur, explained during an interview
(1994) that the high costs of enforcementcontinue to far
exceed the socioeconomic returnson such efforts. He
also arguedthat policies that favor open access to local
fishinggroundsarethe only wayto ensurethatcoastalfisheriesaremanagedfor the publicgood.Consequently,mobile fishersstill criss-crossthe peninsulato exploit multiple fishingareasfora varietyof fishandshellfishspecies.
The pressregularlyreportson illicit fishingactivities
throughoutthe state of BajaCaliforniaSur (see, for ex1994,
ample,AlcantarL. 1993, 1998a;El Sudcaliforniano
1995, 1997a, 1997b;Corona and Chavez 1995; Sarabia
P. 1995; Gonzalez 1998a, 1998b; Martinez1998). One
case of resourcepoaching publicizedby the newspaper
Zetainvolved a well-organizednetworkof sea turtletraffickerswho usedLagunaSan Ignacioas one of their principal supplyareas(CruzA. 1993). Officialsand bureaucrats from five different governmental agencies,
includingthe state-leveljudicialpolice, were implicated
in the case. Over a six-monthperiod,harvesterssupplied
as much as thirtytons of sea turtlesto governmentfunctionaries,who oversawtheir transportand sale to restaurantsand individualclients in the northernbordercities
of Tijuanaand Mexicali. Area residentswho spoke with
me duringinitial and follow-upfield visits assertedthat
this type of highly organizedcontrabandin these endangeredreptileshas continued unabated.In such a setting,
in which governmentalcorruptionis rampantand the
influx of transient fishing populations is ongoing, area
residentshave little incentive to restraintheir own fishing activities. As illegal fishing activities have become
295
moreentrenched,they have fosteredlocal complicity,as
some arearesidentsnow participatein the black market
for marinespecies.Thus, as one local fisherput it: "The
lagoon is a nest for contraband."
McGuire and Langworthy(1991) and Vasquez L.
(1994) have arguedthat guaterismoamong small-scale
shrimpersin the Sea of Cortez representsan avoidance
strategyusedby fishersto circumventgovernmentalregulations that they believe are unjust and unwarranted.
Participationamong area residentsin black-marketactivities in LagunaSan Ignacio can be read in a similar
manner,as a local strategyto resistgovernmentalpolicies
that favor outside interests over local ones. The sense
that poaching is an act of defiance is capturedin the
wordsof one long-timeresidentof the lagoonwhosefamily has taken to harvestingPacificcalico scallopsfor sale
on the blackmarket:"WhyshouldI leave the young [fish
and shellfish]to matureand reproduceif harvestersfrom
the outside will be the only ones to reap the benefits?"
This statement illustrateshow the tragedyof incursion
plays out. Local sentiments about outside invasion provide a powerfulrationalefor local collaborationin the
depredationof marineresources,in spite of the ramifications for futurefishingin the area.
Both long-time residents and newcomers alike
claimedduringinterviewsthat fishingis not what it once
was;there arefewerfishto harvestby morefishers.However, while levels of productionhave fallen off in recent
yearsfor manykey species (includingabalone,clamsand
scallops,and lobster) the long-termimpactsof such intensive harvestingremainpoorlyunderstood,given the
lack of in-depthor ongoing studiesof the populationdynamicsof marinespeciesthat areexploited in the region
(FundacionMexicanaparala EducacionAmbiental,Sociedad de Historia Natural Niiparaja,and Universidad
Autonoma de Baja CaliforniaSur 1998). Many fishers
who were interviewedwere quick to emphasizethe unpredictablenatureof fishingand the difficultiesof distinchanges
guishingbetweenhuman-and naturally-induced
in differentfish and shellfishstocks.
Although the environmental consequences of increasinglyunconstrainedand intensive fishingactivities
remainpoorlyunderstoodin termsof populationdynamics and resilienceof differentmarinespecies, the human
consequences of the increasing abuse of marine commons are more immediatelyevident. As guaterismohas
becomemorepervasive,it has also becomemorecontentious, sparkingoccasionally volatile social tensions at
the local level. For instance, in the summerof 1997,
poachers in LagunaSan Ignaciowho were stealing abalone fromone of the fishingcooperativesbasedjustnorth
of the lagoon had a fatal confrontationwith cooperativis-
296
Young
taswho werepolicing the abalonebeds.After the poachers failed to heed repeatedwarningsby the cooperative
to ceaseand desistfromtheiractivities,cooperativistas
shot
andkilledone of the poachers.The Mexicanarmywassubsequentlycalled in to detain a growingrashof arsonsthat
ensued,apparentlyin retaliationforthe pirate'sdeath.1'
While recent policy shiftshave failed to addresscontinued problemsof resourcepoaching,they have created
new sets of opportunitiesin and constraintson natural
resourceuse that have importantimplicationsfor fishers
and marine resourcesin LagunaSan Ignacio. This dimension of neoliberalreformsis best illustratedby the
proposedexpansion of a parastatalsalt worksin the lagoon, Compania Exportadorade Sal (ES), based just
north of the lagoon in the town of GuerreroNegro.
Under joint ownershipby the Mexican government(51
percent) and the MitsubishiCorporationof Japan (49
of saltworldwide,
percent),ES is the leadingmanufacturer
six
million
tons annually.The proposedfacilproducing
ity in LagunaSan Ignaciowouldhave enabledthe companyto morethan doubleits output,by producingan additional seven million tons of salt each year (Bremer
1994;see Figure3). If approvedby the National Environmental Ministry(the agencyin chargeof grantingor denying permissionfor the proposeddevelopmentproject),
the project would have included the constructionof a
52,150 ha saltproductionfacilityin the lagoonanda neighboring estuary,as well as the construction of service
roads,a loadingpier for salt barges,and new population
settlements(CIB 1994;Dedina and Young1995, 30). As
is alreadythe casein GuerreroNegro,the projectexpansion
might also have involved the transferto the companyof
control over all local fishingconcessions, in orderto facilitatethe company'soperationof the saltworksin the lagoon (Ramirez1998). Fromthe mid-1990s onward,the
proposedsalt works became the subject of increasingly
polarizeddebatewithin and outsideMexico over the fate
of the lagoon.The debatewas abruptlycut off on March
2, 2000, when Mexican PresidentEresto Zedillo cancelled the project, citing concerns that the salt works
that El VizcainoBiosphereRemight"alterthe landscape"
was
serve meantto protect(NewYorkTimes2000,A4).
This cancellation maybe indicative of another trend
brought about by neoliberal reforms: local alliances
with outside NGOs to strengthen community control
over natural resources and promote conservation. In
this case,these allianceswereforgedamida growingpublic controversy surrounding the project, which attractedextensive presscoverage (see, for example, Darling 1995; EstradaObregon 1995; Jimenez1995; Masao
1995; MercadoR. 1995; The News 1995; Kennedy and
Reynolds 1998).
The controversystemmedfromtwo main issues.First,
the projectposed potential threatsto marineand terrestrial habitats for commercial fishers, migratory gray
whales,and regionallyendangeredpronghornantelopes,
from noise pollution, oil spills, industrialwaste, road
construction,and new populationsettlements. Second,
the projectpresentedprospectiveadverseeconomic impacts associatedwith financiallosses in commercialfisheries and ecotourism(e.g., if lagoon habitatsfor marine
life were imperileddue to salt production).12After the
projectbecamepublicin 1995, a numberof environmental NGOs, both nationaland international,joined forces
to halt the proposedexpansion.The firstenvironmental
organizationto become involved was Mexico'sGrupode
los Cien (Groupof 1000), which pressuredthe National
Institutefor Ecology(known in Mexico by the acronym
of INE and chargedwith implementingthe country'senvironmentallegislation)to rejectthe proposedprojectas
incompatiblewith environmentalprotectionin the biosphere reserve that encompassesLaguna San Ignacio.
Four other NGOs-the U.S.-based Natural Resources
Defense Council (NRDC) and InternationalFoundation for Animal Welfare(IFAW)and the Mexico-based
Pro Esterosand World Wildlife Fund (WWF)-subsequently became engaged in a campaignto raise awareness amonglagoon residentsand the internationalcommunityof the projectas well as of the newly established
biospherereserve.
In late 1995, in responseto intense political pressure
by environmentalgroupsand the publiccontroversysurrounding the proposed salt works expansion, INE rejected the initial project proposaland ES submitted a
revisedproposalfor consideration(Dedina2000, 88-91).
Fromthat point onward,an increasingnumberof fishing
cooperatives,basedboth in LagunaSan Ignacioand just
north of the lagoon, expressedtheir opposition to the
proposedsalt works in meetings with Mexican government officialsandNGOs (forpresscoverage,see Soto M.
1995; Camposeco and Bruggers 1997; Contra Costa
Times and Hot CoCo News 1997; Aridjis and Dedina
1999). In October 1999, leadersof a fishingcooperative
fromLagunaSan Ignaciowent to Mexico City to voice
theiroppositionto the projectbeforefederalgovernment
officialsand membersof the UNESCO WorldHeritage
Site Committee, who were charged with deciding
whetherthe salt workswouldaffectthe lagoon'sstatusas
a World Heritage Site. Shortly thereafter,the government decidedto halt the project.
The risingtide of local oppositionto the projectis indicative of incipient collective action to resist further
loss of access rights to marineresources.Ongoing interaction between outsideNGOs and local fishersmaypro-
State Intervention and Abuse of the Commons
vide the basis for future initiatives to encourage the conservation, rather than the destruction, of marine
resources in and around Laguna San Ignacio. Pro Esteros,
NRDC, and more recently, the World Wildlife Fund and
Wildcoast have developed plans to promote community-based projects for marine conservation (Martinez
1999; Scherr 1999; WWF 1999). Whether these budding efforts promote the formation of social capital in the
297
form of autonomous societal organizations that mobilize
around local interests remains to be seen.
Bahia Magdalena: Loss of Governmental Subsidies
and Incursion from Within
The most profound impact of recent policy reforms in
Bahia Magdalena has been the sale of the state-owned
Figure 3. Proposed salt works expansion in Laguna San Ignacio.
298
Young
and -operatedcanneryin PuertoAdolfo LopezMateosto
the MaredenCompanyin 1987. Accordingto the managerof the plant, Hector Chavez Ayala (1994), productivity rose dramaticallyunder private ownership. Between 1987 and 1993, per capita productionin volume
increasednearlyfive-fold,from 236 boxes per person in
1987 to 1,160 boxes per person in 1994. However,such
gainsin productiveefficiencycame aboutat a substantial
social cost: the reductionof the workforceby nearly 50
percentduringthat period,from778 to 377 workers,due
to parent-companyfinancial problems. By March of
1995, one hundredtemporaryworkershad been laid off
and only forty-fourpermanentworkers-5.6 percent of
the originalworkforce-remainedemployedby the plant
(RodriguezC. 1995). Accordingto the mostrecentMexican census (INEGI 1991), PuertoAdolfo LopezMateos
had an economically active populationof 751 persons,
meaning that, immediatelyprior to its privatizationin
1987, the plant provided more than full employment
(104 percent) for the town. A comparisonof the economicallyactive populationfromthe 1990 censusto the
most recent employment figuresindicates a rapid and
massive94 percentrisein unemploymentstemmingfrom
the plant layoffs.
With the severancepay from the plant, many former
employeesturnedto fishingin the bay, investing in the
purchaseof skiffs with outboardmotors and nets and
formingthree new fishingcooperatives.In 1993-94 and
1997, when field researchfor this studywas undertaken,
however, concessions in the bay were highly contested
among these and thirteen other fishingcooperativesin
the bay,ten of which had been formedduringthe 1980s
and early1990s.Politicalofficialshave shownlittle inclination to resolve the situation, best evidenced by the
fact that only one of the sixteen cooperativeshas a formallydemarcatedconcession.
The elimination of both exclusive cooperative concessions and trade liberalizationpolicies has resultedin
the growingpenetrationof privatecapital in the exploitation of bayresources.Particularlyin the shrimpfishery,
private interestshave increasinglygained control over
harvesting rights vis-a-vis local fishing cooperatives.
Many area residentscomplainedduringinterviewsand
informalconversationsthat-similar to the case of Pacific calico scallops in LagunaSan Ignacio-powerful,
outside-basedpermisionarios
were given preferenceover
local fishers in the governmental provision of access
rights to shrimp.Furthermore,there has been growing
public criticism in the press of increasinglyorganized
bandsof resourceextractorsfromelsewherewho workin
collusion with corruptgovernmentalofficials to pirate
the resource(Figure4). Growingdiscontent amongarea
inhabitantsover this situationcame to a head in the fall
of 1997, when local fishers blockaded the main road
leading into the bay in order to stop all outside-based
shrimp exploiters (McCready 1997). Currently,these
conflicts over the shrimp fisheryremainedunresolved.
Nonetheless, the organizedblockade representsa new
local strategy for coping with outside encroachment.
Ratherthan acting as mere co-conspiratorsin poaching
somefishersaremoactivitieswith mobileappropriators,
local
to
fishing groundsfrom depredabilizing protect
tions by outsideusers.
Foreigncapital has also become increasinglyvisible,
particularlythat of Asian entrepreneursthat both buy
and process previously unexploited marine products,
such as sea urchinsand giant squid.By the earlysummer
of 1998, a new set of problemsbegan to emergearound
the squid fishery,problemswhich may be indicative of
broadertrendsthroughoutthe region.Mobilesquidfishers
e4
E lo
Figure 4. Cartoon from major newspaper for Baja California
Sur, El Sudcaliforniano,depicting corruption in fisheries management. Middle figure(BajaCaliforniaSur fishers)says:"Explainhow
fishermenfrom Sinaloa have the right to kick us out of work and
take all the fishthey want in BajaCalifomaSur."Leftfigure(Sinaloan
fishers) says: "They invited me." Right figure (Government Official from the Secretariatof Fisheries)says:"Idon't know anything."
(FromLoy 1995, reprintedwith permissionof the illustrator.)
State Interventionand Abuse of the Commons
who once basedtheir activities in the Sea of Cortezhave
recently set up campsin Bahia Magdalenaas well in order to harvestgiant squidfromthe nearshorewatersoutside the bay (DiarioPeninsular1998; Lopez 1998). By
June of 1998, the numberof squidfishersin the bay had
reachedapproximately3,000, and a growingnumberof
arearesidentsand governmentalofficialsexpressedalarm
over the adverseeffects on local fishing groundsof the
rapidaccumulationof squidremainsandhumanrefusein
the nearshore waters of the bay (Alcantar L. 1998b,
1998c; Gonzalez 1998b). Furthermore,in responseto a
regional glut in the market for squid, Korean buyers
halved the priceperkilo they wereofferingfor the prodand
uct, promptinga protest among both permisionarios
the regional federation of fishing cooperatives, who
called for governmentalinterventionto resolvethe matter throughprice controls and monitoringof squidharvesting activities throughoutthe bay (Gonzalez 1998a;
Suarez1998a, 1998b).
The outcome of the squid controversy is unclear.
Nonetheless, it remainsa powerfulexample of some of
the most immediatelocal impactsof tradeliberalization
in the context of globalization,on fish and fishersalike.
First,decentralizationand marketopeninghas fueledthe
growingspatial separationbetween producersand consumers(Bunker1985;Emeland Bridge1995), as increasingly distant marketstap into inshorefishinggroundsof
BajaCaliforniaSur. Patternsof mobile resourceextraction may become furtherentrenchedas a growingnumberof transientfisherscriss-crossthe peninsulato exploit
differentfisheriesin responseto global demandsfor an
increasinglydiversearrayof species. Second, open markets may prove even less advantageousto cooperatives
than the state-controlledsystemof export marketing,as
cooperativesno longer sell their productsas a consortium and consequentlymay obtain even less favorable
priceson the globalmarket.
Conclusion
In Mexico, as in many countriesworldwide,the logic
of the tragedyof the commons model is implicit in past
and present state policies concerning the development
and conservationof naturalresources.This logic underlies policiesforcentralizedcontrolover suchresourcesby
state or privateownershipof the same.However,in Baja
California Sur, the cases of Laguna San Ignacio and
BahiaMagdalenaillustratethat, ratherthan avertingenvironmental and social problems associated with the
common-propertycondition, historicpolicies of centralizedresourcecontrolhave encouragedoutsideencroach-
299
ment upon local fishinggrounds,unleashinga patternof
abusive marine resourceexploitation through increasingly widespreadpoaching.Contemporaryeffortsto encouragegreaterprivatesector involvement in fisherydevelopment have in some ways merely exacerbated
problemsof outside encroachmentand poaching, while
in others they have providednew opportunitiesfor resident populationsto reassertcontrol over local resources
and promoteresourcestewardship.
Initially,marineresourceuse among small-scalefishing communitieswas not intensive enough to result in
the overexploitationand degradationof inshorefisheries
in Baja California Sur. Until the early 1970s, inshore
fisherieswere exploited by relativelysmall fishingpopulations with minimalresourcepressuresor social conflict
surroundingresourceaccess and use. Over the last few
decades,however, the region'scoastal marineresources
have increasinglysufferedfromwhatMcCayandAcheson
(1987) referto as a tragedyof incursion,inducedmoreby
state policiesfor the commercialdevelopmentof inshore
fisheriesthan by the inherent condition of the same as a
common-poolresource.State policies enlargedthe orbit
of access to local fishinggroundsduringthe late 1970s
and 1980sby encouragingthe entryof outside-basedpermisionarios.The region consequentlycame to serve as a
safetyvalve for resourcepressureselsewherein Mexico,
attractingimmigrant,often transient,populationsthat
and had little vested inworkedfor these permisionarios
terest in the long-term productivity of local fishing
grounds.In the absenceof governmentalvigilance with
de facto
regardto localfishingactivities,community-based
mechanismsthat once promotedmoreor less sustainable
harvesting activities were overwhelmed by the influx
of fishersfromelsewhereand the attendantproliferation
of blackmarketactivities in fishing.
Spatially uneven processesof state-led fisherydevelopment also produced site-specific differences in the
way the tragedy of incursion played out at the local
level. While LagunaSan Ignacio was largelyexcluded
fromgovernmentalinitiatives to promotethe growthof
commercial fisheries,Bahfa Magdalenaenjoyed lavish
federal subsidiesfor fishing, through a parastatalcannery and the construction of port facilities. As a result,
outside encroachmenton local fishing groundsposed a
moreimmediatethreatto residentsof LagunaSan Ignacio,
whose livelihoods were directlyaffectedby the influxof
immigrant fishers. In contrast, because the cannery
served as the primarysource of employmentfor inhabitants of Puerto Adolfo Lopez Mateos in Bahia
Magdalena, their prospects for income-generation in
the fishingsectorwerenot initiallyjeopardizedby outside
encroachment.
300
Young
Neoliberal reformsaimed at reducingthe role of the
state and encouraginggreaterprivate investment in the
fishing sector have creatednew sets of both constraints
on and opportunitiesfor marineresourcedevelopment,
which have mixed implicationsfor local fishersand the
marineenvironmentsuponwhich they depend.In an era
of state downsizing,when greatergovernmentaloversight of inshorefishingactivities is not forthcoming,official corruptionand marineresourcepoaching have become more entrenched and socially conflicted. The
growingpenetrationof privatecapitalhas aggravateddestructivefishingactivities by intensifyingthe tragedyof
incursionrather than providingnew avenues for more
sustainablemarineresourceuse. At the sametime, as the
state retreatsfromits broad-basedsocial commitmentsin
fishing, it is leaning towardnew alliances with the private sector to promoteeconomic growth.These new alliances may come at a high social and environmental
cost that againhas locally specificconsequences.For instance, many canneryworkerswho lost their jobs once
the plant in PuertoAdolfo LopezMateoswas privatized
took up fishing,therebybringingabouta new wave of incursionon the bayandfurtherintensifyinglocal harvesting pressures.
If the long-term livelihood prospectsfor small-scale
fishersin both LagunaSan Ignacioand BahiaMagdalena
appeargrim,there aresome indicationsof local and outside effortsto promotemarineresourceuse that is both
economicallyviable and ecologicallysoundfor arearesidents. The downsizedrole of the Mexican state in commercialfisherydevelopmenthas also opened new spaces
for the productionof social capital, aimed at collective
mobilizationaroundgreaterlocal control over and stewardshipof marineresources.
This case offers importantinsights into problemsof
natural resource degradationand conservation in the
commons. Ostrom's(1990) observationthat state ownershipcreatesa circumstanceof unfetteredopen accessis
certainlyevident in BajaCaliforniaSur'sfishinggrounds.
However,the case of BajaCaliforniaSur also showshow
state-mandatedopen access to common-pool resources
can encourage the formation of groups of mobile resourceappropriators.
Governmentalcorruptionin natural resourcemanagement,where the state may be perceived as a gatekeeperof such resourcesnot so much for
the publicgood as for the selfishinterestsof a few,further
erodeslocal incentives for resourcestewardship.
This case also broadensunderstandingof the interrelationshipsbetween state-led development, environmental change, and local resistance in the South. In
Mexico and other lesser-developedregions where the
primarysector forms the basis for economic growth,
the state'sconflictingrole as both developerand protector of the commons is especially pronounced. Unrestricted,open accessto the commonsmay be justifiedin
economic terms as serving the public good, but the
open-accesscondition inevitablycontributesto the degradation of the commons, transformingcommunity
propertyinto nobody'sproperty.Where the tragedyof incursion is severe and community organizationis weak,
the most immediateformof resistanceavailableto local
resourceusers may be in the form of avoidance behavior (McGuireand Langworthy1991; VasquezL. 1994),
such as resourcepoaching in the commons, in orderto
defy governmentalpolicies that usurplocal rightsto the
commons.In the context of acceleratedglobaleconomic
integration, the spatial separation between producers
and consumersis expanding (Bunker 1985; Emel and
Bridge1995). Policies that mandateopen accessto commons may prove untenable,as the cumulativeimpactof
resourceuse pressuresand conflictssurroundingresource
access threaten regional economic and social stability.
Furthermore,the continued growthof the international
environmentalmovement may sparknew alliances between outsideactorsand local groupsto safeguardnatural
resourcesfor the use of presentand futuregenerations.
Acknowledgments
Supportforfieldresearchwasprovidedby the Association of AmericanGeographers,the AmericanCetacean
Society-Los Angeles Chapter, the California Coastal
Conservancy,Cetacean Society International,Pro Esteros,the SouthwestWetlandsInterpretativeAssociation,
a Fulbright-HayesDissertationResearchFellowship,the
Universityof Arizona'sLatinAmericanArea Centerand
Officeof the Vice Presidentfor Research,the University
of TexasGraduateFellowsProgramand Instituteof Latin
AmericanStudies,WallaceResearchFoundation,andthe
U.S. MarineMammalCommission.Manythanksto Serge
Dedina, William E. Doolittle, Diana Liverman,Sallie
Marston, M. CrawfordYoung, Louise Young, Rebecca
Young,and the three anonymousreviewersfor their insightfulcommentsand suggestionson the manuscript.
Notes
1. See also Walkerand Storper(1978),O'Riordan(1981),
Rees(1985),andHechtandCockbum(1989).
2. I useda purposive
techniqueto selectinformants
sampling
withinthe fishingcommuwhorepresented
keydifferences
nitiesat eachof the studysites(in termsof placeof origin,
age,andgender).I alsousedthe snowlengthof residence,
to identifyother
balltechniqueof askinginitialinformants
State Intervention and Abuse of the Commons
individualswho would be pertinent to the study (Young
1999b). Field researchthat involves participantobservation, purposiveand snowballsampling,and interviewsis
often time-consumingin a way that limits the quantityof
possible interviews that can be conducted (Singleton,
Straits,andStraits1993,328). Ineachstudysite,I interviewed
33 individualsin orderto obtaina standardminimumsample
sizeof 30 that wouldapproximatethe variationwithin the
local population.Forfurtherdiscussionof sampling,see Clark
andHosking(1986,174) andSilk(1979, 153-66).
formatof open3. The interviewsfolloweda semistructured
endedquestionsto enableintervieweesto explaintheir answersin their own wordsand providethe opportunityfor
follow-upquestionsaboutparticularinsightsthat wererelevant to the study(Babbie1995). I tailoredthe waythe questionswereposedandthe directionof each interviewaccording to each informant'spersonalhistoryand experiencein
fishing.In orderto obtainuniformityamonginterviewsfor
future comparison,I structuredthem around four core
themes: (1) demographicshifts and changing social relations within fishing communitiesat each study site; (2)
changesin localpatternsof marineresourceuseandthe productivityof local fishinggrounds;(3) local impactsof and
responsesto governmentalpoliciesto developand manage
fisheries;and (4) concerns about the futuredevelopment
and managementof local fishinggrounds.
The resultsof the interviewswereanalyzedusingqualitative techniques (see Singleton, Straits, and Straits 1993,
346-49; Kitchenand Tate 2000). Interviewswere initially
classifiedinto sets of respondentsaccordingwith similar
characteristics(e.g., by place of origin,length of residence,
age, etc.). The content of the interviewswas then categorizedby groupingrespondents'answersto specificquestions.
These answerswere then coded to develop mastercategoriesof responsesto each question.The mastercategoriesof
responseswere then tabulatedaccordingto responsefrequencyin orderto interpretthe interviewdatain relationto
the study'soverallfocuson statepolicyand local use of marinecommons.While the findingsarenot statisticallysignifof localperspectives.Quoicant,they arestill representative
tations from interviewsthat appearin this paperare used
to illustrate the significant findingsfrom analysis of the
interviews.
4. Sea turtleharvestingis now illegalin Mexico. Due to their
worldwidevulnerabilityto humanpredation,all sea turtles
arelisted in the Conventionon InternationalTradein EndangeredSpeciesof Wild Faunaand Flora(CITES),which
Mexico signed in 1991. Black sea turtles (Cheloniamydas
agassizi)and loggerheadsea turtles (Carettacaretta),the
mostcommonsea turtlesfoundin both LagunaSan Ignacio
and Bahia MagdalenaBay (Olguin M. 1990), are respectively registeredas endangeredand vulnerableunder the
IUCN Red Listof ThreatenedAnimals(Norse 1994, 322).
5. In the northern Mexican state of Sinaloa, McGoodwin
(1979b,222) foundthat, priorto WorldWarII,cooperativislibres
tas did not considerthe mandateto allowpescadores
accessrightsforsubsistencefishingof shrimpin cooperative
concessionsto be problematic.However,with ruralpopulation growthin coastalfishingareasfromthe 1950sonward,
cooperativesincreasinglyassertedthat their concessions
libres.
werenot open to subsistenceharvestingbypescadores
The federalgovernmentwasaverseto any typeof intervention amongdifferentgroupsof fishersduringthis periodbe-
301
causeof broaderproblemsof politicalinstabilitythroughout
ruralSinaloa.Consequently,conflictsbetweencooperativislibresbecame increasinglyviolent; some
tas and pescadores
themselveswith knives, machetes,
libres
armed
pescadores
who attempted
and firearmsand threatenedcooperativistas
to detainthem fromshrimpingin theirconcessions.
6. The corporatiststructurein Mexicanfisherieswas initially
establishedthrougha seriesof decreesandlawsin the 1930s
governingthe allocationof fishingconcessionsand the establishmentof fishingcooperatives.Duringthe 1950s, the
Mexican governmentpromotedcommercialexpansionof
the fishingsectorthroughits Marchaal Mar (Marchto the
Sea) program,whichincludedthe constructionof portfacilities.The 1970susheredin anotherroundof policyandprograminitiativesto raiseproductivityand encouragecommercialexpansionin the fishingsector.ProductosPesqueros
Mexicanosand its internationalaffiliate,Ocean Gardens,
were establishedearly in the decadeto centralizethe processingand marketingof cooperativeproductsin a waythat
theoreticallywouldassurea fairpriceto both the producer
and the consumer.With the creationof the 200-nauticalmile ExclusiveEconomicZone in 1976, Mexicofurtherintensifiedeffortsto promotethe inshorefisherydevelopment
(Sierraand Zepeda1977;GonzalezM. 1985).
7. In additionto openingup cooperativeconcessionsto naturallyoccurringspecies,aquaculturewas also promotedas a
meansto encouragemoresustainablefisherydevelopment.
Forfurtherdiscussionof neoliberalreformsandaquaculture,
see DeWalt(1998)
8. The southernend of Bahia Magdalenais also known as
BahiaAlmejas,or Clam Bay,perhapsin recognitionof the
profusionof clamsonce foundthere.
9. Accordingto the managerof the plant, HumbertoChavez
A. (2000),the plantwasestablishedbya Spanishcompanyin
1960 and sold to the Mexicangovernmentin 1970.
10. For exampleselsewherein Latin America,see Hirschman
(1988), Bebbingtonand Thiele (1993), and Nietschmann
(1997).
11. Violent conflictsover marineresourceshave also occurred
in the Sea of Cortez.For instance, the Seri Indianshave
used firearmsto defend their territorialwatersin the Isla
Tiburonregionagainstincursionsfromshrimptrawlers.
12. A handfulof fisherswho live in LagunaSan Ignaciohire
their boatsout to touristswho come to see whalesbetween
Januaryand March.For more extensive treatmentof this
subject,see DedinaandYoung(1995) andYoung(1995).
References
in traditionalinshorefishingrights
Acheson,J.M. 1979.Variations
in Mainelobsteringcommunities.In NorthAtlanticmaritime
edited
cultures:
adaptations,
essayson changing
Anthropological
byRaoulAndersen.The Hague:MoutonPublishers.
.1989. Wherehave all the exploitersgone?Co-managerement of the Mainelobsterindustry.In Commonproperty
sustainabledevelopsources:Ecologyand community-based
ment,editedby F Berkes.London:BelhavenPress.
tradeundertheNorthAmerican
A. 1996. Fisheries
Aguilar-Ibarra,
with the European
FreeTradeAgreementand a comparison
Union.MexicoCity:InstitutoNacionalde la Pesca.http://
www2.planeta.com/mader/ecotravel/search/chron2.html
(last accessed1 December1996)
302
Young
. 1998.Personalcommunication
withauthor.11November.
A., C. Reid,andA. Thorpe.1998.Neo-liberalism
Aguilar-Ibarra,
in
and the Latin "BlueRevolution":Fisheriesdevelopment
Chile, Mexico,and Peru. Centre for the Economicsand
Managementof Aquatic Resources(CEMARE)Research
Paperno. 139. Portsmouth,NH: Universityof Portsmouth.
Aitken, R., N. Craske,G. A. Jones,and D. V. Stanfield.1996.
Dismantlingthe Mexicanstate? New York:St. Martin's
Press.
AlcantarL., A. 1993. Se declaraimpotentese pesca,parafrenar
lA.
a los guateros.El Sudcaliforiano26 February:
.1998a.Anarquiaen el sectorpesquero.DiarioPeninsular
17 July:1, 9.
. 1998b. BarcosJaponesescapturancalamaren Bahia
14 June:1, 8.
Magdalena.DiarioPeninsular
. 1998c. Continuacapturade calamargiganteen Bahia
23 June:3.
Magdalena.DiarioPeninsular
Anda L., E. de. 1987. Cooperativismopesquero:Situacionactual y perspectivas.DesarrolloPesqueroMexicano,19861987. Vol. 3. MexicoCity:Secretariade Pesca.
Aridjis,H., and S. Dedina. 1999. How savingwhalesadvances
democracy.LosAngelesTimes25 November:B9.
Aschmann,H. 1959.Thecentraldesertof BajaCalifornia:
Demog42. Berkeley:University
raphyandecology.Iberoamericana
of CaliforniaPress.
Avila P., R. 1985. El cooperativismoen Baja CaliforniaSur.
Bachelor'sthesis,UniversidadAutonomade BajaCalifornia Sur.
Babbie,E. 1995.Thepracticeof socialresearch.7th ed. New York:
Wadsworth.
alimenBarkin,D., andB. Suarez.1985.Elfin delaautosuficiencia
taria. Mexico City: Centro de Ecodesarrollo,Ediciones
Oceano.
D. 1996. Of land tenure,forests,and water:The
Barton-Bray,
impactof the reformsto Article 27 on the Mexicanenvironment.In Reforming
Mexico'sagrarian
reform,editedby L.
Randall.Armonk,NY:M. E. Sharpe.
D., andM. B. Wexler.1996.Forestpoliciesin MexBarton-Bray,
ico. In Changing
structure
of Mexico:Political,social,andeconomicprospects,
editedby L. Randall.Armonk,NY:M. E.
Sharpe.
Bassett,T. 1988. The political ecology of peasant-herderconflictsin the northernIvoryCoast.Annalsof theAssociation
78:453-72.
of AmericanGeographers
and marBebbington,A. J. 1996. Movements,modernizations,
kets: Indigenousorganizationsand agrarianstrategiesin
Ecuador.In Liberation
ecologies:Environment,
development,
andsocialmovements,
editedby R. Peet and M. Watts.London:Routledge.
Bebbington,A. J., and G. Thiele. 1993. NGOs and thestatein
rolesin sustainable
LatinAmerica:Rethinking
deagricultural
London:Routledge.
velopment.
Berkes,E, D. Feeny,B. J. McCay,andJ. M. Acheson. 1989.The
benefitsof the commons.Nature340:91-93.
andsociety.
Blaikie,P.,andH. Brookfield.1987.Landdegradation
London:Methuen.
Bremer,J. 1. 1994. Personalcommunicationby authorwith Juan
Ignacio Bremer,Directorof Exportadorade Sal, S.A. de
C.V.,Guerrero
Negro,BajaCaliforniaSur,Mexico.26 April.
Browder,J. 0. 1988. Publicpolicyand deforestationin the BrazilianAmazon.In Publicpoliciesand themisuseof forestresources,edited by R. Repetto and M. Gillis. Cambridge:
CambridgeUniversityPress.
Brown, P. 1997. Institutions,inequalities,and the impact of
agrarianreformon ruralMexican communities.Human
56 (1): 102-10.
Organization
Buck-Cox,S. J. 1985.No tragedyon the commons.EnvironmentalEthics7:49-61.
the Amazon:Extraction,unBunker,S. 1985. Underdeveloping
and
the
failureof themodemstate.Urbana:
equalexchange,
Universityof IllinoisPress.
Buras,N. 1996.The waterresourcesof Mexico:Theirutilization
structure
and management.In Changing
of Mexico:Political,
social, and economicprospects,edited by L. Randall.Armonk,NY:M. E. Sharpe.
Camposeco,M. E., andJ. Bruggers.1997. Whalesin Baja:How
the peoplesee it. ContraCostaTimesand Hot CoCoNews,
13 March.http://www.hotcoco.com/news/index.htm
(last
accessed14 March1997)
Carney,J. A. 1993. Convertingthe wetlands,engenderingthe
environment:The intersection of gender with agrarian
69 (4): 329-48.
changein Gambia.EconomicGeography
. 1996. Convertingthe wetlands,engenderingthe environment:The intersectionof genderwith agrarianchange
in Gambia. In Liberationecologies:Environment,developeditedby R. Peet andM. Watts.
ment,andsocialmovements,
London:Routledge.
CasasM., H. 1994. Personalcommunicationwith HectorCasas
M., OperationsManager,Ocean GardenProducts,Inc., La
Paz,BajaCaliforniaSur,Mexico, 28 June.
ChavezA., H. 1994. Personalcommunicationwith Ing. Humberto Chavez A., Quality Control Manager,Productos
Pesquerosde Matancitas,Mareden,PuertoAdolfo Lopez
Mateos,BajaCaliforniaSur,Mexico,April.
de BajaCalifornia(Costadel
Chenaut, V. 1985. Los pescadores
Mexico
de
Mar
Cortes).
City:Centrode InvestiPacificoy
gacionesy EstudiosSuperioresen AntropologiaSocial.
Mexicanaante
CIAD and SEPESCA.1994.Laindustria
pesquera
Mexico City:
el tratadode LibreComerciode Norteamerica.
CIAD.
modalidad
intermedeimpactoambiental
CIB. 1994.Manifestacion
dia. ProjectoSalitralesde San Ignacio.La Paz:Centro de
InvestigacionesBiologicasde BajaCaliforniaSur.
Ciriacy-Wantrup,S. V., and R. C. Bishop. 1975. "Common
property"as a concept in naturalresourcespolicy.Natural
Resources
Journal15:713-27.
methods
for
Clark,W. A. W., and P. L. Hosking.1986. Statistical
New York:JohnWiley and Sons.
geographers.
ContraCostaTimesand HotCoCoNews. 1997. Whalesin Baja:
Tempestover a lagoon.ContraCostaTimesand Hot CoCo
News,March12.http://www.hotcoco.com/news/index.htm
(last accessed14 March1997)
Cornelius,W. A. 1992.The politicsand economicsof reforming
the ejidosectorin Mexico:An overviewandresearchagenda.
Forum23 (3): 1-10.
StudiesAssociation
LatinAmerican
L.
and
A.
W.
Cornelius, A.,
J. Fox. 1994. Transforming
Craig,
stratrelationsin Mexico:Thenationalsolidarity
state-society
egy.San Diego:Centerfor U.S.-MexicanStudies,University of California.
Cornelius,W. A., and D. Myhre,eds. 1998. The transformation
of ruralMexico:Reformingthe ejido sector.La Jolla, CA:
Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, University of California, San Diego.
Corona,A., andJ. Chavez.1995. Siete barcoscamaronerosfue10
ron expulsadosde la Bahia de Loreto.Sudcaliforniano
January:6A, 8A.
State Intervention and Abuse of the Commons
in crisis.
Crean, K., and D. Symes. 1996. Fisheriesmanagement
Cambridge,MA: BlackwellScience.
CruzA., J. 1993. 15 pescadoresen BC comercializancon la tortuga.Zeta19-25 March:24B-25B.
Darling,J. 1995. Ecologistsfear Bajasalt mine wouldthreaten
graywhales.LosAngelesTimes6 March:A1,A6.
Dedina,S. L. 1996. The productionof graywhaleconservation
in BajaCaliforniaSur,Mexico.Ph.D. diss.,Departmentof
Geography,The Universityof Texasat Austin.
. 2000. Savingthegreywhale.Tucson:Universityof ArizonaPress.
in
anddevelopment
Dedina,S., and E. Young.1995.Conservation
thegraywhalelagoonsof BajaCaliforniaSur,Mexico.Final
reportto the U.S. MarineMammalCommission,Contract
T10155592. Washington, DC: U.S. Marine Mammal
Commission.
pesquero1980.
Departamentode Pesca.1981.Anuarioestadistico
DireccionGeneralde Planeacion,Informacion,y Estadistica, MexicoCity.
DeWalt, B. R. 1998. The ejido reformsand mexican coastal
communities:Fomentinga blue revolution?Pp. 357-379
in The Transformation
theEjido
of RuralMexico:Reforming
Sector,editedby W. A. Corneliusand D. Myhre,.LaJolla,
CA: CenterforU.S.-MexicanStudies,Universityof California,San Diego.
DiarioPeninsular.1998. Fuertemigracionpor falta de calamar.
2 June:15.
DiarioPeninsular
Direccion General de Estadistica. 1971. IX censo generalde
poblacion,1970. Territoriode Baja California. Mexico
City: Direccion General de Planeacion, Informaticay
Estadistica.
. 1978. Estadisticas
pesqueras1977. Mexico City: Direccion Generalde Estadistica.
Dresser,D. 1991. Neopopulistsolutionsto neoliberalproblems:
Mexico'snationalsolidarity
program.CurrentIssueBriefno.
3. San Diego:CenterforU.S.-MexicanStudies,University
of California.
Emel,J., and G. Bridge.1995. The earthas input:Resources.In
theworldin thelate
of globalchange:Remapping
Geographies
twentiethcentury,edited by R. J. Johnston,P.J. Taylor,and
J. J. Watts.Oxford:BlackwellPublishers.
Emel,J., and R. Roberts.1995. Institutionalformand its effect
on environmentalchange:The case of groundwaterin the
southernHigh Plains.Annalsof theAssociation
of American
85
664-83.
(4):
Geographers
Estadode BajaCaliforniaSur. 1987. Lineamientosde accion
1987-1993. Estadode BajaCaliforniaSur,La Paz.Estado
de BajaCaliforniaSur.
EstradaObregon,A. 1995. RojasAguilardece ojalasean argumentos cientificoslos originaronla negativadel projecto
19 March:3A.
salinero.El Sudcaliforniano
Feeny,D., F. Berkes,B. J. McCay,and J. Acheson. 1990. The
tragedyof the commons:Twenty-twoyearslater.Human
Ecology18 (1): 1-19.
Fondo de CulturaEconomica. 1952. La pesca. Mexico City:
Fondode CulturaEconomica.
Fox,J. 1994.The difficulttransitionfromclientelismto citizenship.WorldPolitics46:151-84.
. 1996. How does civil society thicken?The political
constructionof socialcapitalin ruralMexico.WorldDevelopment24 (6): 1089-103.
M. S., J. A. Carney,and A. R. Lebbie.1997.ReFreudenberger,
siliencyand change in commonpropertyregimesin West
303
Africa:The case of the Tongoin the Gambia,Guinea,and
10 (4): 383-402.
SierraLeone.SocietyandNaturalResources
FundacionMexicanaparala EducacionAmbiental,Sociedadde
HistoriaNaturalNiiparaja,andUniversidadAutonomade
deBaja
ambiental
BajaCaliforniaSur,eds. 1998.Diagnostico
Sur.LaPaz:UniversidadAutonomade BajaCalCalifornia
iforia Sur,Mexico.
deMexico.
Gatti, L. M., ed. 1986.Obrerosdelmar:Lospescadores
MexicoCity:MuseoNacionalde CulturasPopulares.
and rural
transnationalization,
Gledhill, J. 1995. Neoliberalism,
poverty.Boulder,CO: WestviewPress.
Goberador Constitucionaldel Estadode BajaCaliforniaSur.
1991. Cuartoinformede gobierno1990-1991, anexotecnico
2. LaPaz,BajaCaliforniaSur:GobemadorConstitucional
del Estadode BajaCaliforniaSur.
Gonzalez,A. G. 1998a.Alto a la capturade calamar.DiarioPeninsular22 June:3.
. 1998b.Buscanresolverel problemade los desechosde
23 June:7.
calamaren P.San Carlos.DiarioPeninsular
. 1998c. Loscooperativistasinteresadosen que se aclare
7 July:5.
el traficode abulon.DiarioPeninsular
. 1998d.Desordenen la pescaconviene a muchos:JSC.
22 June:5.
DiarioPeninsular
Gonzalez, M., H. E. 1985. Desarrollo Pesquero Mexicano.
Primerode diciembre.1982-1985. MexicoCity:Secretaria
de Pesca.
Gould, D. M. 1996. Mexico'scrisis:Lookingback to assessthe
future.In Changingstructure
of Mexico:Political,social,and
editedby L. Randall.Armonk,NY:M .E.
economic
prospects,
Sharpe.
Graham,C. 1994. Mexico'ssolidarityprogramin comparative
context: Demand-basedpoverty alleviation programsin
LatinAmerica,Africa,andEasternEurope.In Transforming
stratrelationsin Mexico:Thenationalsolidarity
state-society
egy,editedby W. A. Cornelius,A. L. Craig,andJ. Fox.San
Diego: Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, University of
California.
Grima,A. P., and F Berkes.1989. Naturalresources:Access,
rights-to-useand management.In Commonpropertyresustainabledevelopsources:Ecologyand community-based
ment,editedby E Berkes.London:BelhavenPress.
Hames,R. 1991.Wildlifeconservationin tribalsocieties.In Biodiedited
versity:Culture,conservation,and ecodevelopment,
CO:
Westview
B.
Alcom.
and
L.
M.
Oldfield
Boulder,
J.
by
Press.
Hardin,Garrett. 1968. The tragedyof the commons.Science
162: 1243-48.
Hecht, S. B. 1985. Environment,development,and politics:
Capital accumulationand the livestock sector in eastern
13:663-684.
Amazonia.WorldDevelopment
Hecht, S. B., and A. Cockburn.1989. Thefate of theforest:DeLondon:Verso.
anddevelopers.
fenders,destroyers,
HernandezV., M. A., M. Angel, andM. AguilarC. 1990.Imporde la pesqueriade Almeja
tancia,evolucion,y caracteristicas
Catarinaen BajaCaliforniaSur. La Paz:UniversidadAutonomade BajaCaliforniaSur.
Hirschman,A. 0. 1988.The principleof conservationand mudeveltationof socialenergy.In Directtothepoor:Grassroots
P.
Hakim.
and
Annis
S.
edited
in
Latin
America,
by
opment
Boulder,CO: LynneReinnerPublishers.
INEGI.1982. X censogeneraldepoblaciony vivienda,1980. Vol.
1, tomo 3, BajaCaliforniaSur.Mexico City: InstitutoNacional de Estadistica,Geografia,e Informatica.
304
Young
. 1983.X censogeneraldepoblacion
y vivienda,1980. Vol.
Sur.MexicoCity:Insti2, tomo3, EstadodeBajaCalifornia
tuto Nacionalde Estadistica,Geografia,e Informatica.
.1991. XI censogeneraldepoblacion
y vivienda,1990. Baja
basicos.Mexdefinitivos,tabulados
CaliforniaSur,resultados
ico City: Instituto Nacional de Estadistica,Geografia,e
Informatica.
. 1993.Anuarioestadisticodel Estadode BajaCalifornia
Sur. Mexico City: Instituto Nacional de Estadistica,
Geografia,e Informatica.
. 1995. Anuarioestadisticodel Estadode BajaCalifornia
Sur. Mexico City: Instituto Nacional de Estadistica,
Geografia,e Informatica.
Iudicello,S., M. Weber,and R. Wieland. 1999. Fish,markets,
and fishermen:The economicsof overfishing.
Washington,
DC: IslandPress.
Jimenez,D. 1995.Analizainvestigadorde la UABCS que las instalacionesde la salineraafectarael "Santuariode la Ballena."El Sudcaliforniano
20 January:1A,10C.
Jones,G. A. 1996. Dismantlingthe ejido:A lessonin controlled
the Mexicanstate?,edited by R.
pluralism.In Dismantling
Aitken, N. Craske,G. A. Jones,and D. E. Stanfield.New
York:St. Martin'sPress.
Jones,G. A., andP.M. Ward.Forthcoming.Privatizingthe commons:Reformingthe ejidoandurbandevelopmentin Mexico. International
Journalof UrbanandRegionalResearch.
Kennedy,J. E, Jr.,andJ.Reynolds.1998.Miningvs. whales.The
Post13 June:A21.
Washington
in
research
Kitchin,Rob, andNicholasJ. Tate.2000. Conducting
and practice.New
humangeography:
Theory,methodology
York:PrenticeHall.
Klooster,J. 1997. Conflict in the commons:Scientificforestry
and conservationin Mexicanagrariancommunities.Paper
preparedfor The Association of American Geographers
93rdAnnual Meeting,1-5 April,FortWorth,TX.
Leddy,G. S. 1995. Catches, commerce,and crises:Fisheries,
government,and tradein the Mexican port of Guaymas,
Sonora.Ph.D. diss.,Departmentof Geography,University
of California,Berkeley.
Little, P.D., and M. M. Horowitz,eds. 1987. Landsat riskin the
ThirdWorld:Local-levelperspectives.
Boulder,CO: Westview Press.
Loaeza,S. 1996. Contextsof Mexicanpolicy.In ChangingstructureofMexico:Political,social,andeconomic
edited
prospects,
by L. Randall.Armonk,NY:M. E. Sharpe.
Lopez,E A. 1998. La talacha:Los coreanos,malpaganel calamar.Trataronde comprara lideres de pescadores.El
2 June:5.
juevespodriahaberprotestas.DiarioPeninsular
Loy,Jorge.1995.Cartoon.El Sudcaliforiano22 March:1A.
A. 1990. Problemasy perspectivasdel cultivo
Maeda-Martinez,
de moluscosen el PacificoMexicano.SerieCientifica,no.
esp. 1 AMAC:7-12. La Paz:UniversidadAutonoma de
BajaCaliforniaSur,Mexico.
Mansell Carstens,Catherine. 1995. Las finanzaspopularesen
de un sistemafinanciero
Mexico:El redescubrimiento
olvidado.
MexicoCity:EditorialMilenio.
Martinez,P. L. 1991. Historiade la BajaCalifornia.La Paz:Patronatodel EstudianteSudcalifomiano.
Martinez,V. J. 1998. "Eluniversochoyero"guaterosdepreda2 June:2.
doresde los mares.El Sudcalifomiano
MartinezR., P. 1999. Personalcommunicationwith Patricia
MartinezR., co-chair,ProEsteros,Ensenada,BajaCalifornia, Mexico.30 September.
Masao,A. 1995. Interesesinteracionales pretendenfrenarel
ProjectoSalinero.La ampliacionde la exportadora,es fac18 April:1,6C.
tible:CIBNOR.El Sudcaliforniano
Human
Acheson.
1987.
B.
and
J.
ecologyof the comMcCay, J.,
mons. In Thequestionof thecommons:Thecultureandecology of communalresources,edited by B. J. McCay and J.
Acheson.Tucson:Universityof ArizonaPress.
McCready,R. 1997. Personal communication with Robert
McCready,Director of the Center for Wetland Studies,
Puerto San Carlos, Baja California Sur, Mexico, 18
December.
McGoodwin,J.R. 1979a. The decline of Mexico'sPacific inshorefisheries.Oceanus22 (2): 52-59.
. 1979b. Fisheriespolicy and the underdevelopmentof
inshorePacificMexico.WoodsHole OceanographicInstitution technical reportWHPI-79-44.Woods Hole, MA:
WoodsHole OceanographicInstitution.
. 1987. Mexico's conflictual inshore Pacific fisheries:
HumanOrProblemanalysisandpolicyrecommendations.
46:221-32.
ganization
. 1989.Conflictsover shrimprightsin a Mexicanfishery.
In A seaof smallboats,editedbyJ.Cordell.CulturalSurvival
Reportno. 26. Cambridge,MA:CulturalSurvival,Inc.
McGuire,T. R. 1983. Political economy of shrimpingin the
42 (2): 132-45.
Gulf of California.HumanOrganization
McGuire,T. R., andJ. B. Greenberg.1993.Maritimecommunity
reserve:Crisisandresponsein theupperGulfof
andbiosphere
California.OccasionalPaperno. 2, Bureauof AppliedResearchin Anthropology.Tucson:Universityof Arizona.
McGuire,T. R., andM. Langworthy.1991.Behavioralandorganizationalmodificationsof enforcement/avoidancetheories:The fisheriescase.Paperpresentedat the Workshopin
PoliticalTheory and Policy Analysis,Universityof Indiana, Bloomington,IN, 14 October.
MendozaM., S. 1985. Narracionescriticasy SOS a la industria
pesquera.MexicoCity:Costa-AmicEditores,S. A.
MercadoR., G. 1995. No atenta el plan salinerocontrala ballena gris,dice MercadoRomero.LaJorada 8 April:2.
Millar,C. 1996. The Shetlandway:Moralityin a resourcere24:195-216.
gime.CoastalManagement
Miller,D. L. 1989. The evolution of Mexico'sCaribbeanspiny
lobsterfishery.In Commonpropertyresources:Ecologyand
sustainabledevelopment,edited by E
community-based
Berkes.London:BelhavenPress.
MontanoA., M. A. 1988. Projectode inversion
parala instalacion
de mariscosen SanIgde unaplantaprocesadora
y enlatadora
nacio, BajaCaliforniaSur. Bachelor'sthesis, Universidad
Autonomade BajaCaliforniaSur.
Moore, D. S. 1993. Contesting terrainin Zimbabwe'seastern
highlands:Politicalecology,ethnography,and peasantre69 (4): 380-401.
sourcestruggles.EconomicGeography
. 1996.Marxism,culture,andpoliticalecology:Environeasternhighlands.In Libermentalstrugglesin Zimbabwe's
and socialmoveationecologies:Environment,
development,
ments,editedby R. Peet andM. Watts.London:Routledge.
Muldavin,J. S. S. 1996.The politicalecologyof agrarianreform
in China. In Liberation
development,
ecologies:Environment,
editedby R. Peet and M. Watts.Lonandsocialmovements,
don:Routledge.
.1997. Environmentaldegradationin Heilongjiang:Policy reformand agrariandynamicsin China'snew hybrid
of AmericanGeographers
economy.Annalsof theAssociation
87 (4): 579-613.
State Intervention and Abuse of the Commons
Mumme,S. P.,and E. Korzetz.1997. Democratization,politics,
and environmentalreform in Latin America. In Latin
edAmericanenvironmental
perspective,
policyin international
ited by G. J. MacDonald,D. L. Nielson, and M. A. Stem.
Boulder,CO: WestviewPress.
Netting, R. 1976. What Alpine peasantshave in common:Observationson communaltenurein a Swissvillage.Human
Ecology4 (2): 135-46.
New YorkTimes.2000. Plans for Mexican salt plant are cancelled.3 March:A4.
TheNews. 1995. Environmentalists
step up attackon Bajasalt
project.7 April:1.
Nietschmann,B. 1997.Protectingindigenouscoralreefsandsea
territories,MiskitoCoast,RAAN, Nicaragua.In Conservationthrough
culturalsurvival:Indigenous
peoplesandprotected
areas,editedby S. Stevens.Washington,DC: IslandPress.
A stratNorse, E. A., ed. 1994. Globalmarinebiological
diversity:
intodecisionmaking.Washingegyfor buildingconservation
ton, DC: IslandPress.
OlguinM., M. 1990. Lastortugasmarinasen la CostaOriental
de BajaCaliforniay Costa Occidentalde BajaCalifornia
Sur, Mexico. Undergraduatethesis, Universidad Autonomade BajaCaliforniaSur.
2nd ed. London:Pion.
O'Riordan,T. 1981.Environmentalism.
thecommons:Theevolutionof instituOstrom,E. 1990.Governing
tionsforcollective
action.Cambridge,U.K.:CambridgeUniPress.
versity
Peet, R., and M. Watts. 1993. Introduction:Developmenttheory and environmentin an age of markettransformation.
69 (3): 227-53.
EconomicGeography
. 1996. Liberationecology:Development,sustainability,
andenvironmentin an ageof markettriumphalism.In Libandsocialmoveerationecologies:
Environment,
development,
ments,editedby R. Peet andM. Watts.London:Routledge.
Peluso,N. L. 1992. Richforests,poorpeople:Resourcecontroland
inJava.Berkeley:Universityof CaliforniaPress.
resistance
Peon,J. 1996.Diagnosticosocioeconomicode la Lagunade San
Ignacioy Esterodel Datil. Unpublishedmanuscript.
Pinkerton,E. 1987.Interceptingthe state:Dramaticprocessesin
the assertionof local co-managementrights.In Thequesretionof thecommons:Thecultureandecologyof communal
sources,edited by B. J. McCay and J. Acheson. Tucson:
Universityof ArizonaPress.
Pintado,F 1997. Telephoneinterviewwith FernandoPintado,
Vice Presidentof Operationsfor Ocean GardenProducts,
San Diego,California,23 December.
Platteau,J. P. 1989a.Dynamicsof fisheriesdevelopmentin deand
veloping countries:A generaloverview.Development
Change20:565-97.
. 1989b. Penetrationof capitalismand persistenceof
small-scaleorganizationalformsin Third Worldfisheries.
andChange20:621-51.
Development
Ponce D., H. 1994. Personal communicationwith Hernan
Ponce Diaz, SubdelegadoFederalde Pesca, La Paz, Baja
CaliforniaSur,Mexico, 23 May.
Putnam,R. 1993. The prosperouscommunity:Social capital
andpubliclife. TheAmericanProspect13:35-42.
Ramirez,Hernan.1998. Personalcommunicationwith Hernan
Ramirez, Professor of Economics, University of Baja
CaliforniaSur, La Paz, Baja CaliforniaSur, Mexico, 29
May.
structure
Randall,L., ed. 1996a.Changing
of Mexico:Political,soArmonk,NY:M. E. Sharpe.
cial,andeconomicprospects.
305
. 1996b. ReformingMexico'sagrarianreform.Armonk,
NY:M. E. Sharpe.
Allocation,economics,andpolicy.
Rees,J. 1985.Naturalresources:
London:Methuen.
Reyes, C. 1997. Personalcommunicationwith Carlos Reyes,
Local Production Manager, Sol Azul Oyster Culture
Project,LagunaSan Ignacio,BajaCaliforniaSur,Mexico.
4 June.
Reyes-Sosa,C. 1990. El cultivo de pectinidosen Mexico. Serie
Cientifica,no. esp. 1 AMAC:25-9. La Paz:Universidad
Autonomade BajaCaliforniaSur,Mexico.
Roberts,R. S., andJ. Emel.1992.Uneven developmentand the
tragedyof the commons:Competing imagesfor nature68 (3): 249-72.
society analysis.EconomicGeography
Institutional
environment:
and
1998.
P.
Robbins,
Authority
landscapesin Rajasthan,India.Annalsof theAssociationof
88 (3): 410-35.
AmericanGeographers
B.
Mas
de cien empleadoseventualesfueron
1995.
RodriguezC.,
9
despedidospor "pesqueramatancitas."El Sudcaliforniano
March.
Mexicano.Mexico
RojasC., R. 1982.. Tratadode cooperativismo
City:Fondode CulturaEconomica.
Ruddle, K. 1989. Solving the common-propertydilemma:
Village fisheries rights in Japanese coastal waters. In
Commonpropertyresources:Ecologyandcommunity-based
edited by F Berkes.London:Belsustainabledevelopment,
haven Press.
SarabiaP.,P. 1995. RematoSEPESCA1,612 kilogramosde ca12 JanEl Sudcalifomiano
maronaseguradoa los "guateros."
uary:1A, 7A.
Scherr,J. 1999. Personalcommunicationwith JacobScherr,InternationalDirector,NaturalResourcesDefenseCouncil,
Washington,DC, 30 September.
Schmink,M., and C. Wood. 1987. The "politicalecology"of
Amazonia.In Landsat riskin theThirdWorld,editedby P.D.
Little, M. M. Horowitz,and A. E. Nyerges.Boulder,CO:
WestviewPress.
SEPESCA. 1992. Legalframeworkfor fisheries1992. Mexico
City:Secretariade Pesca.
delapescaen
Sierra,C. J., andJ. S. Zepeda.1977.Resenahistorica
Mexico(1821-1977). 2nd ed. MexicoCity:Departamento
de Pesca.
London:Allen and
Silk,J. 1979.Statistical
conceptsin geography.
Unwin.
Simonian,L. 1995. Defendingthelandof thejaguar:A historyof
in Mexico.Austin:Universityof TexasPress.
conservation
Sinclair,P.R. 1990. Fisheriesmanagementand problemsof social justice.MAST3 (1): 30-47.
Singleton,R. A., Jr.,C. Straits,and M. MillerStraits.1993.Approachesto socialresearch.2nd ed. Oxford:OxfordUniversity Press.
Soto M., J. 1995. El granlengua:Ecodesarrolloen Vizcaino.El
22 April:5A,10A.
Sudcaliforniano
Stanford,L. 1994.The privatizationof Mexico'sejidalsector:Examining local impacts,strategies,and ideologies.Urban
23: 2-3, 97-119.
Anthropology
Stonich, S. C. 1989. The dynamicsof socialprocessesand environmentaldestruction:A Central American case study.
Review15 (2): 269-96.
andDevelopment
Population
Suarez,G. S. 1998a. Buscan mecanismospara no afectaral
22 June:14, 16.
pescador.DiarioPeninsular
. 1998b.Pidena semarap vigilarcapturade calamar.Di20 June:8.
arioPeninsular
306
Young
El Sudcalifomiano.
1994. El guaterismoacabo con la langosta:
PlacidoRodrigruez.19 November:1.
. 1995.AtrapaPJEa tresguateroscon abulonen guerrero
negro.6 Febrero:9A.
. 1997a.Candidatodel PRD:La marinadebe colaborar
mas en el freno del saqueo de especies marinas. 2
June:1A,2C.
. 1997b. Decomisan langostas a un guatero. 2
June:12A.
Thomas,D. H. L. 1996.Fisheriestenurein an Africanfloodplain
villageand the implicationsformanagement.HumanEcology24 (3): 287-313.
Toledo,V. M. 1996. The ecologicalconsequencesof the 1992
Mexico'sagrarianreagrarianlaw of Mexico. In Reforming
form,editedby L. Randall.Armonk,NY:M. E. Sharpe.
TovarV., J. U. 1997. Diagnosticosocioeconomicode las localidadesde PuertoChale, AdolfoLopezMateosy PuertoSan
Carlos,involucradasen el manejodel recursoballenagris
en Bahia Magdalena.Technical reportpreparedfor Pronatura,A.C., LaPaz,BajaCaliforniaSur,Mexico.
VasquezL., M. 1993. The political organizationof fishing.In
Maritimecommunityand biospherereserve:Crisisand response in the upperGulf of California,edited by T. R.
McGuireand J. Greenberg.OccasionalPaperno. 2, Bureauof Applied Researchin Anthropology.Tucson:Universityof Arizona.
. 1994. Avoidancestrategiesand governmentalrigidity:
The case of the small-scaleshrimpfisheryin two Mexican
communities.Journalof PoliticalEcology1:67-81.
privadain the
VasquezL., M., andT. McGuire.1993.Lainiciativa
Mexican shrimpindustry:Politics of efficiency.Maritime
Studies1/2:59-73.
Anthropological
Vayda,A. P. 1983. Progressivecontextualization:Methodsfor
researchin humanecology.HumanEcology11 (3): 265-81.
Villa A., Alejandro.1996. A reviewof recent changesin Mexico's fishing policy. Master'sthesis, College of Marine
Studies,Universityof Delaware.
VillarealG., Mariadel Pilar.1987. La pescaen BajaCalifornia
Sur: Mito o realidad?Bachelor'sthesis, UniversidadAutonomade BajaCaliforniaSur.
Walker,K. J. 1989. The state in environmentalmanagement:
The ecologicaldimension.PoliticalStudies37:25-38.
Walker,R., and R. Storper.1978. Erosionof the Clean Air Act
of 1970: A studyof the failureof governmentregulation
Affairs7:189-257.
planning.Environmental
Watts, M. 1983. Silentviolence:Food,famine,and peasantryin
Northern
Nigeria.Berkeley:Universityof CaliforniaPress.
Weintraub,S. 1996.Mexico'sforeigneconomicpolicy:Fromadmirationto disappointment.In Changingstructureof Mexeditedby L.Ranico:Political,social,andeconomic
prospects,
dall. Armonk,NY:M. E. Sharpe.
Wexler, M. B., and D. BartonBray.1996. Reformingforests:
Fromcommunityforeststo corporateforestryin Mexico.In
Mexico'sagrarianreform,edited by L. Randall.
Reforming
Armonk,NY:M. E. Sharpe.
Whiteford,S., and F A. Beral. 1996. Campesinos,water,and
In Reforming
the state: Differentviews of la transferencia.
Mexico'sagrarian
reform,editedby L.Randall.Armonk,NY:
M. E. Sharpe.
WorldWildlifeFund(WWF). 1999. San Ignacio:Un faroen el
futurode la conservacion.Draftdocumentpreparedby the
MexicanProgramOfficeof WWF,MexicoCity,Mexico.
Young,E. 1995. ElusiveEdens:Linkinglocal needs to nature
protection in the coastal lagoons of Baja CaliforniaSur,
Mexico. Ph.D. diss., Departmentof Geography,The Universityof Texasat Austin.
. 1999. Balancingdevelopment with conservationin
small-scalefisheries?HumanEcology27 (4): 581-620.
.2000. Localpeopleandconservationin ElVizcainobioReview89 (3): 364-90.
spherereserve.TheGeographical
de PuntaPrieta,
ZabalzaN., V. 1988. Brevesapuntesmonograficos
B.C.S. La Paz,BajaCaliforniaSur:ServiciosCoordinados
de EducacionPublicaen BajaCaliforniaSur.
K. 1991. Wetlandproductionand smallholderpersisZimmerer,
tence:Agricultural
changein a highlandPeruvianregion.An81 (3): 443-63.
nalsof theAssociation
Geographers
ofAmerican
en B.C.S. El casode
pesquero
ZunigaA., F 1993. Cooperativismo
la cooperativade produccionpesquera"PuntaAbreojos."
Bachelor'sthesis,UniversidadAutonomade BajaCalifornia Sur,La Paz.
The San Diego Foundation, 1420 KettnerBlvd., Suite 500, San Diego, CA 02543, e-mail: [email protected]
Correspondence: