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Kalutara SriLanka (Image courtesy of DigitalGlobe, Inc.)
Use of Geographic Information in
Response to the Sumatra-Andaman
Earthquake and Indian Ocean
Tsunami of December 26, 2004
by John A. Kelmelis, Lee Schwartz, Carol Christian, Melba Crawford, and Dennis King*
The Sumatra-Andaman earthquake, estimated to be the fourth largest
earthquake in the world since 1900, took place in the Indian Ocean on December 26, 2004 (USGS, 2005a). The magnitude 9.0+ earthquake triggered
a tsunami that claimed approximately 283,000 lives in numerous countries
(IFRC, 2005a). The northwest end of the island of Sumatra in Indonesia was
the hardest hit, although coastal areas of other countries also suffered many
deaths, dislocations, and devastating property losses. More than 1 million
people were left homeless. Many types of geospatial data and information
were needed to respond to this disaster. The international remote sensing
community acquired an enormous amount of data, seeking to provide information for reconnaissance level planning, disaster assessments, and response
activities. Maps were developed at various scales to assist responders and
aid workers in the field as well as to support planners and policy makers
in assessing conditions and planning for massive international assistance
efforts. The international response crossed all sectors of society with contributions from government, intergovernmental organizations, academia,
civil society, and private industry. Despite these efforts, there were serious
problems in the effective delivery of information to decision makers. While
such a massive disaster requires a long-term commitment of resources and
support, the experiences during the immediate response phase have taught
lessons useful to the community of geographers, remote sensing scientists,
cartographers, and related scientists and practitioners.
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August Layout.indd 862
Int roduct
rodu ctio
ion
n
The December 26, 2004, tsunami that devastated
the coastal regions of the Indian Ocean from Somalia
to Indonesia may not have been unprecedented in
magnitude. The Indian Ocean has experienced major
earthquakes and tsunamis in the past. Seih et al. (2004)
note there was a sequence of strong earthquakes that
struck the outer-arc islands of western Sumatra in
1797, 1833, and 1861. All were large enough to cause
tsunamis. Other tsunamis occurred in the region in
1843, 1881, 1883, and 1941 (CIRES, 2005; ICMMG,
2005; IRI, 2005; Newcomb and McCann, 1987; Oritz
and Bilham, 2003; Seih et al., 2004; USGS 2005a).
Given that background, we recognize that large seismic events and attendant tsunamis can be expected
in the future. In fact, soon after the December 2004
disaster, risk of another major earthquake was calculated (McCloskey et al., 2005) for the Great Sumatra
*Note: Authors are part of the team that coordinated
the U.S.A. geospatial response to the Sumatra-Andaman earthquake and Indian Ocean tsunami during
response and recovery.
PHOTOGRAMMETRIC ENGINEERING & REMOTE SENSING
7/14/2006 12:22:31 PM
strike-slip fault and the subduction zone thrust. While the exact
timing of the earthquake was not predicted, one occurred on the
subduction thrust near Nias on March 28, 2005. Bilham (2005) has
further suggested that seismologists should consider revising the
projected incidence of major earthquakes upward, on the basis of
analysis and modeling of the Sumatra-Andaman event.
The December 26, 2004, earthquake and our response to it
can provide useful information to plan for and respond to future
disaster events, both in South Asia and throughout the rest of the
world. At least 16 United Nations agencies and related organizations (Relief Web, 2005), numerous nations, and countless nongovernment organizations, private corporations, and academic
institutions responded in some way. Not unlike other sectors, the
geospatial and related sciences community made a heroic effort to
assist the countries and peoples directly affected by the earthquake
and tsunami and the governments planning to provide resources
to aid in response and recovery.
“By one estimate the total energy released
by the earthquake was 4.3 x 1018 Joules,
It is the largest recorded earthquake since the advent of GPS and
broadband seismic instruments used as part of seismic recording.
Disparity in estimates arise because of the difficulty in assessing
the magnitude of very large earthquakes due to the frequency of the
bands of seismic waves associated with such cataclysmic events, as
well as the sensitivity of the sensors used to compute the estimates.
Estimates of the earthquake’s magnitude were also complicated
by the nature of the earthquake, which had varying amounts and
velocities of displacement along 1200 to 1300 kilometers of the fault
with at least three major energy bursts during the propagation of the
rupture (50 to 150 seconds, 280 to 340 seconds, and 450 to 500
seconds) (Ammon et al., 2005). Imaging of rupture propagation by
the Japanese Hi-Net seismic array indicates that the initial break in
the fault proceeded from south to north at a speed of roughly 2.8
km/sec for a total of 8 minutes (Ishii et al., 2005). By one estimate
the total energy released by the earthquake was 4.3 x 1018 Joules, or
the equivalent of a 100-gigaton bomb, making it the second largest
earthquake on the instrumental record (Bilham, 2005).
Energy released by the earthquake radiated in the form of
seismic waves from the fault rupture and moved through the
or the equivalent of a 100-gigaton bomb,
making it the second largest earthquake on
the instrumental record”
Here we briefly review the event; describe the disaster cycle;
document a sampling of the ways the geospatial and related sciences community responded to the disaster; make brief mention of
geospatial activities and requirements for other post-disaster phases;
report some of the lessons learned; and conclude with some broad
suggestions that would be useful in planning for and responding to
future events. Some sections of this article were adapted from USA
Cartographic Response to the Indian Ocean Tsunami of December
26, 2004, Preliminary Report (Kelmelis et al., 2005).
T he S
Su
u matr
ma tr a-A
a- An
n daman I s lands
l an ds
E arr t hq u ake an
Ea
a nd
d IIn
n dian
d ian Ocean
Ocea n
Ts u na mi
At 7:58:53 a.m. local time (00:58:53 GMT) on December 26, 2004,
an earthquake with a preliminary magnitude between 9.0 and 9.3
at the epicenter (USGS, 2005a; Lay et al., 2005; Stein and Okal,
2005) and a more refined magnitude of 9.15 (Banerjee et al., 2005)
occurred at 3.307 degrees north latitude and 95.947 degrees east
longitude. The epicenter was in the zone where the India tectonic
plate (part of the Indo-Australian plate) is being subducted under the
Burma tectonic subplate (part of the Eurasian plate).
The Indo-Australian plate is moving approximately 40 to 50
mm per year to the northeast, and the earthquake ruptured at the
subduction zone boundary or interplate thrust boundary (Lay et al.,
2005). On the fault the earthquake had a maximum slip of approximately 15 (Ammon et al., 2005; Lay et al., 2005) to 20 meters
(USGS, 2005a) with an average slip of >5 meters along the full
length of the rupture (Banerjee et al., 2005). The sea floor overlying
the thrust fault would have been raised by several meters (Ammon
et al., 2005; USGS, 2005a). Estimated magnitudes place it between
the fourth largest and the second largest earthquake ever recorded
after the 1960 magnitude 9.5 earthquake off the coast of Chile.
Figure 1. The epicenter of the Sumatra-Andaman Earthquake, the faults
in the area, the length and location of slippage, and the epicenter of
the March 28, 2005 earthquake. (Courtesy of USGS).
solid earth in all directions. The rupture caused static shifts of the
seafloor, causing a massive instability of the water column, which
was the origin of the tsunami. This tsunami radiated from its source
with wave heights and paths controlled by the energy of the earthquake, orientation of the rupture zone and distribution of the slip,
the ocean bottom depth and topography, and the location and size
of land masses in its path. In the open ocean the wave was barely
perceptible except by satellite altimetry measurements (Jason-1
and Topex-Poseidon); as the wave energy moved into shallow
water, however, it became more concentrated, with waves increasing in height as troughs increased in depth. In very shallow waters
near the earthquake epicenter, in some locations of Banda Aceh,
for instance, wave heights of more than 30 meters were reported
(Gibbons and Gelfenbaum, 2005; Tsuji et al., 2005).
When a large earthquake occurs, the Earth rings like a bell. If
the earthquake is sufficiently large, it can alter topography, move
islands, and even alter the Earth’s rotation. In fact, the 2004
earthquake caused a change in the Earth’s rotation, position of the
geographic pole, and Earth oblateness (Chao and Gross, 2005). The
oscillations from this earthquake were observable for weeks after
the event (Park et al., 2005). Physical changes took place globally at
the centimeter scale as well. In the region of the earthquake and
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continued from page 863
ture, including Nicobar, Andaman, et al., and in many locations in
Sumatra. There was no damage caused by ground shaking outside
the rupture zone. The damage from ground shaking, however, was
soon greatly exceeded in coastal regions by the direct impact of
the tsunami. In some locations of Banda Aceh, the tsunami surged
6 kilometers inland. Likewise, the surge extent in some parts of
Thailand was as much as 3 kilometers.
Inland surge is controlled by topography, obstructions, the angle
at which the energy is moving relative to the land mass, and the
energy of the tsunami itself in the area of its encounter with the
land. The tsunami propagated by the earthquake struck various locations throughout the Indian Ocean region at different times with
different wave amplitudes (Figure. 2).
In addition to the human death toll and psychological trauma,
the losses caused by the tsunami included devastation of the engineered and natural environment, social institutions, families’ physical belongings, and individual livelihoods. Geospatial and related
tsunami, the ocean bottom, coastlines, and inland areas all changed
due to vertical and horizontal movement of the plates, ground shaking, submerged ocean landslides, and the impact of the tsunami.
The tsunami generated by such a large earthquake can have
widespread impacts. On December 26, 2004, changes in water elevation were measured globally, although extremely small at great
distances (Titov et al., 2005). Major tsunami effects, however, were
contained within the Indian Ocean region, with deadly impact in
Indonesia, Sri Lanka, India, Thailand, Somalia, Burma, Malaysia,
Maldives, Seychelles, Tanzania, Bangladesh, Kenya, and Madagascar. In each category (deaths, injuries, missing, and displaced
persons) Indonesia exceeded all other nations combined (See Table
1). Sri Lanka and Thailand also experienced losses more devastating than any other single event in memory.
The ground shaking caused by the earthquake resulted in immediate devastation on numerous Indian Ocean islands near the rup-
Table 1. Human toll of December 29, 2004, earthquake and tsunami. This summary of the human toll caused by the
earthquake and tsunami is as of February 23, 2005 (IFRC 2005b)
Nation
Dead
Missing
Displaced
Homeless
Indonesia*
232,732
-
417,000
n/a
Sri Lanka
30,974
4,698
553,278
480,000
India
16,389
n/a
647,599
20,000
Maldives
82
26
21,663
n/a
Thailand
5,395
2,995
n/a
n/a
Myanmar
90
10
n/a
3,200
Malaysia
68
12
n/a
4,296
East Africa**
312
158
2,320
n/a
Total
286,042
7,899
>1,641,869
>507,496
*Only in Indonesia, the number of missing have been included in the number of dead.
**The counts in East Africa include the nations affected by the tsunami (Kenya, Madagascar, Seychelles, Somalia, and
Tanzania).
n/a, not available
Figure 2. Map showing the time of travel and size of the wave on different coasts.
(Courtesy of NOAA. Previously published in Science Express, 8/25/05 and in Science, 9/23/05)
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“When a large earthquake occurs, the Earth
rings like a bell. If the earthquake is sufficiently large, it can alter topography, move
islands, and even alter the Earth’s rotation.”
sciences information has and is being used to help response and
recovery in all these categories.
Still, long-term effects of the tsunami will require support for many
years. Because the response to the tsunami was the most generous disaster relief ever and relief and aid organizations have made
commitments to long-term rehabilitation (Inderfurth et al., 2005), we
can expect the effort to continue. Changes in development patterns,
construction practices, employment opportunities, and some life style
activities are required to increase resilience to future hazards.
In some places where people began rebuilding quickly using only the tools, techniques, and materials they know, they
have left themselves vulnerable to a repeat of the devastation
they experienced previously. Still, some pre-tsunami buildings
were constructed suitably to survive the earthquake, though not
the tsunami. Aid organizations must use the best reconstruction
techniques and the most suitable locations to minimize future risk.
Along with early warning mechanisms, adequate mapping of the
new physical situation and hazards should be accomplished as
soon as possible to aid in planning appropriate redevelopment and
rehabilitation and to help avoid recurrent tragedies and to help
ensure the rehabilitated communities are sustainable.
D iiss a s t er C
Cyc
yc l e
We adopt a general view of disasters based on the pre-disaster/
post-disaster model of a disaster cycle. Although this model separates overlapping phases, it has been demonstrated to be a useful
organizing structure over many years of application. As generally
viewed, pre-disaster activities include risk assessment, mitigation and
prevention, and preparedness. Warning and evacuation spans the
pre- and post-disaster phases at the time of the event. Post-disaster
activities include response, assistance, damage assessment, recovery,
rehabilitation and reconstruction, and redevelopment. Incorporating
the concept of sustainability into managing the disaster cycle can help
ensure the long term safety and viability of the community.
Traditionally, sustainability is primarily considered in the rehabilitation, reconstruction, redevelopment, and mitigation phases.
For sustainability to be
effectively incorporated
into the disaster cycle
(1) the pre-disaster
phases must be considered when planning and
conducting post disaster
activities and, (2) postdisaster conditions must
be considered when
conducting the predisaster phases of the
Figure 3. Highly generalized view of the
disaster management
disaster cycle. The phases overlap and
cycle (Figure 3).
each phase affects those that follow.
The phases associated with very large disasters are protracted
and overlap greatly. For the December 26 tsunami, the cycle will
continue for years to come. The immediate response phase was essentially completed within the first 2 months of the event, although
many assistance activities usually associated with response, such as
provision of food, water, shelter, and fuel continue because of the
magnitude of the event.
During each phase of the cycle, strategic and tactical management must be accommodated. Both levels of management require
geospatial products and information that can be derived from or
incorporate geospatial data. Generally, strategic needs, such as a
general regional response plan, require coarse and medium scale
imagery and vector data, while tactical activities require finer scales
(1:thousands), higher resolution imagery, and more site-specific
information and imagery analysis. Geographic Information Systems provide extremely useful capabilities for analysis of multiple
sources of data at a variety of scales.
The
Th
e G eospat
eos pat ial an
and
d R
Rela
el ate
ted
d
S ciences
cienc es Response
Respo nse
The tsunami made landfall at locations near the epicenter of the
earthquake within 16 minutes of the onset of the earthquake. For
these locations there was insufficient time to provide adequate
warning based on currently deployed systems and technology.
Within ten minutes of the earthquake’s occurrence, the U.S.
Geological Survey (USGS) National Earthquake Information Center
(NEIC) sounded alarms that a large earthquake had taken place
south of Sumatra. Within the first 15 minutes, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) issued a tsunami
warning to coastal areas in the Pacific basin stating there was no
danger of a tsunami in that region. This was correct. However, the
tsunami was not detected in the Indian Ocean because there were
no real-time sea-level gages or buoys there. Still, fearing a tsunami
resulted from the earthquake, NOAA attempted to contact nations
in the region (Johnson, 2005; NOAA, 2005). One minute later the
tsunami struck the coast of Indonesia. At that early time, all the
seismic waves and other required data had not been recorded
or registered, so accurate analysis could not be accomplished.
Preliminary estimates thus ranged from a magnitude of 6.5 to 8.2.
It was not until 1 hour and 17 minutes after the event that the
earthquake’s magnitude was estimated by NEIC to be 8.5, a dangerously large earthquake. Two minutes later, NEIC prepared event
notification messages and distributed them electronically by fax
and e-mail to the 27,000 worldwide subscribers to the “bigquake”
subscription list. A minute after that, the reviewed solution message was received by Incorporated Research Institutions for
Seismology (IRIS). This all occurred as soon as sufficient surface
wave data were available from seismic stations near the region of
the earthquake to perform the analysis.
“Incorporating the concept of sustainability
into managing the disaster cycle can help
ensure the long term safety and viability of
the community.”
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Had more monitoring stations for both the earthquake and
ocean level information been in place, it is likely a more accurate
estimate of the magnitude of the earthquake and the resultant
tsunami would have been achieved earlier. Still, in less than an
hour and a half after the initial event, text messages were sent by
fax and e-mail to “general,” “science,” and “embassy” recipients.
Call-down procedures were initiated 1 hour and 29 minutes after
the onset of the earthquake to such recipients as the White House
Situation Room, U.S. Department of State, Federal Emergency
Management Agency operations center, and others. The notifications were designed to activate urgent response organizations
both within and outside the affected governments, but the magnitude and extent of the unfolding disaster were not yet clear.
Data continued to become available for analysis, and as the estimate of the magnitude of the earthquake improved, the understanding of the devastation caused by the tsunami became more
apparent. Increasingly alarming reports from the region, though
limited because much of the communication and transportation
infrastructure had been destroyed, helped mobilize the international
community. Less than 20.5 hours after the event, its magnitude
was estimated to be 9.0 by Harvard University Centroid-Moment
Tensor Project. This estimate is a remarkable accomplishment in itself
because of the difficulty in estimating large magnitude earthquakes.
Tide gage information available from around the world was monitored and used to estimate the size of the resultant tsunami, including
areas where communications had been destroyed. However, even
with the available information, it took nearly a day to obtain accurate
estimates of the actual magnitude of the earthquake and tsunami.
A more dense seismic and gaging station network and improved communications would have reduced the time needed to
make more accurate estimates of the magnitude of the earthquake
and tsunami. Regardless, there would not have been sufficient
time to warn people in the areas closest to the epicenter of the
earthquake. Further, the in-place early warning capabilities were
either nonexistent or inadequate to communicate the required
information to people in other regions that were impacted hours
later by the arrival of the tsunami. Even where people saw physical evidence of the impending tsunami, such as the large rapid
receding of water near the shore leaving the seafloor exposed, the
response was typically uninformed and often inappropriate. This
clearly indicated the need for improved education, training, and
communications. Without them, an improved warning system will
not be adequate to reduce risk.
As soon as information became available, national government
agencies in the United States and elsewhere began planning a
response. Clearly, maps and information derived from imagery
would be needed for immediate response and long-term sustainable recovery.
Geo
oss p atial
a tial D
Data
ata ffo
orr Re
Ressp
ponse
ons e
The response of the geospatial community was both immediate
and immense. Data were acquired and made available beginning
the day after the tsunami. A mere 12 years earlier, the same level
of response to the flooding in the Upper Mississippi River Basin
of the United States required months (SAST, 1994) because the
technology and organizational capacities were not available. In
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Au g u s t 2 006
response to Hurricane Mitch (1998) 5 years later, several weeks
were needed to provide the quantity of geospatial data that were
available within days of the tsunami. However, even with the
rapid response from geospatial data providers for the 2004 Indian
Ocean tsunami, considerable problems occurred. Because of the
vast numbers of activities in response to the tsunami, we will only
attempt to address selected response activities initiated within
the U.S. Other governments, international agencies, scientific
and academic research institutions, and NGOs initiated their own
response activities and analyses as well. Nonetheless, the United
States participated in and/or led many international response efforts including geographic information response.
Immediately upon notification of the earthquake and tsunami a
number of actions were set into motion by the U.S. Government,
including diverting resources and scientists the day the earthquake
occurred.
“Immediately upon notification of the earthquake and tsunami a number of actions
were set into motion by the U.S. Government, including diverting resources and scientists the day the earthquake occurred.”
Th e First
The
F irst Week
We ek Aft er tthe
he D isa
i sasster:
te r:
December 27, 2004
z
USGS Center for Earth Resources Observation and Science
(EROS), with partial support from the U.S. Department of
Agriculture (USDA), tasked acquisitions of Landsat, ASTER,
ALI, and Hyperion data, and acquired satellite data from
international sources where possible, over the affected
area. As soon as they became available, these data were
analyzed to identify the coastal locations most devastated
by the tsunami. Figure 4 is an example of Landsat data analyzed to show an area heavily impacted by the tsunami.
z NOAA prepared a digital model of the propagation of
the tsunami and posted a visualization of the simulated
event on the World Wide Web.
z USGS geologists and seismologists began developing
ShakeMaps to identify locations of earthquake damage and
used an experimental program called Prompt Assessment
of Global Earthquakes for Response (PAGER) to overlay
ShakeMap information on population density maps to help
estimate damage and prioritize rescue operations.
z An ad-hoc Internet-based working group of Federal agency
scientists and disaster response practitioners, in concert
with USGS geography, tsunami, earthquake, and remote
sensing experts, began to organize and share data, reports,
and requests from the field internally and with any other
users who required such information. The National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), the Department
of State (DOS), U.S. Agency for International Development
(USAID), and the Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA) joined the group within 24 hours. The National
7/11/2006 12:32:25 PM
Figure 5. Image obtained during a P-3 reconnaissance flight over
Banda Aceh on January 1, 2005. (Courtesy of the United States Navy).
other tasks to work on tsunami and earthquake related issues both in the United States and in South Asia. This would
continue both as information about the disaster increased and
as requests for assistance were made by affected nations.
z The U.S. Navy began acquiring reconnaissance aerial photography using P-3 aircraft and helicopters stationed on
nearby aircraft carriers (Figure 5). The Department of State’s
Geographic Information Unit and Humanitarian Information
Unit (HIU) produced regional maps summarizing policyrelated situational and sector-specific data for use by the
State Department’s Tsunami Task Force and a number of
its senior decision makers in both the regional and functional bureaus (Figure 6.). These maps were updated and
enhanced as more data became available, and shared with
the UN and other organizations and agencies that were
beginning to plan their response activities.
December 28, 2004
z
Figure 4. These Landsat 7 scenes show the northern extent of Sumatra
prior to the tsunami (top) and shortly after the tsunami struck (bottom).
The post-tsunami image shows extensive destruction near the coastal
city of Banda Aceh. This image was used to delineate damaged area
polygons in the region. These data were provided to the Office of
Foreign Assistance (OFDA), in a geographic information system (GIS)
format, for use with other data layers. (Courtesy of USGS)
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), the United Nations, the
Pacific Disaster Center, and a number of NGOs were participating by the following day. On January 4 the ad hoc interagency
geospatial working group was formalized into the Tsunami
Humanitarian Information Sharing (THIS) working group. THIS
solicited requirements from first responders, planners, and other
assistance providers and helped organize them so duplication
of effort within the government was reduced. THIS set up collaborative internet tools to coordinate requests from the field
and track geospatial data response efforts.
z Additional U.S. Government scientists were diverted from
Sites were set up at USGS/EROS in Sioux Falls, SD, and the
Pacific Disaster Center (PDC) in Maui, Hawaii, to disseminate
public domain information, remote sensing and geospatial
data, and derived products by ftp download. NGA initiated
the purchase, and licensing, of commercial satellite imagery.
However, it took approximately 2 weeks for the data to be
sent to EROS, where it was converted from NITF to GeoTIFF
format for distribution to the civilian user community.
z NGA began producing imagery-derived analyses from all
sources including commercial imagery (Figure 7) in conjunction with FEMA and USAID. These analyses showed
the detailed devastation over urban areas in Banda Aceh.
December 29, 2004
z
NEIC completed the ShakeMaps and PAGER analysis and
made them generally available.
z Preparations were underway by the UN’s Office of the
Coordinator for Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) to establish a
UN Humanitarian Information Center (HIC) in Banda Aceh.
The HIC was funded in a large part by USAID’s Office of Forcontinued on page 868
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7/11/2006 12:32:25 PM
Figure 6. Small-scale policy graphic. Maps like this were produced by the State Department’s Office of the Geographer and Global Issues,
updated on a daily basis, and provided to an international team representing donor nations as they planned response activities. This map
was produced from information available the day after the earthquake and tsunami struck. Maps like this included information about the
disaster’s consequences as well as information about needs and nations’ commitments. As time progressed and needs and commitments
changed, the maps were updated accordingly. Some maps also showed what resources were delivered and what were in place, as well as
“Common Operational Picture” maps devoted to different sectors of needs and responses. (Courtesy of U.S. Department of State.).
Figure 7. Imagery derived assessments are made by plotting interpretations from high resolution satellite imagery on maps. (Courtesy of
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency).
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7/11/2006 12:32:27 PM
eign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), along with Great Britain’s
Department for International Development. By January 5
the HIC was established and servicing a steady stream of
UN, government, and NGO customers.
z UNOSAT, a United Nations initiative to supply satellite
imagery and GIS services for humanitarian purposes,
began serving satellite images and derived maps to the
international community (UNOSAT, 2005).
December 30, 2004
z
NGA negotiated with vendors to alter the license agreement
for access to commercial imagery of the tsunami-affected areas to allow broad distribution of the image data to persons
and organizations engaged in tsunami-related activities.
z NGA approved the release of imagery-derived analyses
based on data that are normally restricted or limited in
their distribution.
z NGA produced a data “brick” (a portable external hard
drive loaded with numerous layers of geospatial data
and files of other types of relevant data) of NGA, USGS,
NOAA, NASA, licensed commercial, and other relevant
data for use by the HIC on site in Banda Aceh.
z Scientists from USGS and other agencies, NGOs, universities, and institutes began traveling to the affected area
to provide assistance in assessing and mapping damage,
evaluating water quality, determining safe boundaries for
reconstruction, etc.
The U.S. Government geospatial activities expanded throughout the following weeks, and as time progressed numerous response, recovery, and scientific activities both produced and used
geospatial information. To assist with access to the vast amount
of information being produced, the U.S. Government Web site,
Geospatial One-Stop (http://gos2.geodata. gov/wps/portal/gos),
devoted an area for data pertinent to the disaster. The geospatial
work continued throughout the response phase and will continue
throughout the recovery and reconstruction phases.
International Cooperation. International partner governments
and agencies scheduled acquisitions of SPOT, IRS, and radar data and
developed products based on imagery, digital elevation data, and
other geospatial information. The International Charter: Space and
Major Disasters was activated three times for the tsunami response.
The Charter members supplied more than 80 new and archived images free of charge to responding agencies. The UNOSAT and the
German Space Agency, Deutschen Zentrum für Luft- und Raumfahrt
(DLR) Web portals hosted data and products including compressed
imagery, inundation maps, destroyed infrastructure along the coast
of Sumatra, and distribution of affected populations over the region.
The international earthquake science community formed and dispatched teams of government and university experts to conduct
assessments across the Indian Ocean region.
Many United Nations agencies (e.g., World Food Program (WFP),
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the United Nations
Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees (UNHCR), the World Health Organization (WHO), and
others) utilized data provided by both the U.S. and the international
partners to plan food and medical distribution, prepare sites for
displaced persons, and design emergency logistics strategies.
U.S. Academic. Several universities downloaded and rapidly initiated analysis of remotely sensed data as they became available. For
example, the Center for Global Change and Earth Observations at
Michigan State University analyzed archival and post-disaster Landsat
data acquired on December 29, 2004, and posted results on December. 30. At the request of the Indonesian Agency for Technology
Assessment, the University of Maryland’s Global Land Cover Facility
analyzed and posted satellite imagery. Products were also posted by
Columbia University, Mississippi State University, Dartmouth Flood
Observatory, and George Mason University, to name a few.
Funded by NSF through the International Geospatial Engineering
Earthquake Reconnaissance (GEER) program, tsunami experts from
Oregon State University, Cornell, University of Southern California,
and several other universities participated with U.S. Government
agencies and scientists from many nations in the international tsunami
assessment effort focusing on Sri Lanka and India. The University of
Texas at Austin provided reconnaissance maps for planning, based
on Landsat-derived data provided by EarthSat Corporation and
SRTM. Its Engineering Earthquake Research Institute hosts a virtual
clearinghouse for data and technical reports related to the event.
Population data, such as those produced by the Center for International Earth Science Information Network (CIESIN), at Columbia
University, LandScan produced by Oak Ridge National Laboratory,
and data from other organizations were used in a variety of reconnaissance scale assessments immediately after the event. These
were superseded by data collected in the field as soon as response
personnel could access the affected areas.
Private Industry. Commercial satellite companies initiated acquisitions of high resolution data over the affected region immediately after
the event, acquiring virtually all possible data over the tsunami-affected area that is perennially covered by clouds. The effort continued
throughout January with tasking provided by the U.S. Government.
Many private sector firms specializing in geospatial data products
were also involved in tsunami recovery efforts ranging from deployment of field support teams to product development and posting.
EarthSat Corporation provided its NaturalVue enhanced Landsat product
to government agencies for baseline mapping over the tsunami-affected region. ESRI supported a number of organizations deploying
map and imagery services for analysis of damage (Gadsden, 2005).
Public/private partnerships also contributed to the effort. For
example, DM Solutions and the University of Ottawa created a
Tsunami Disaster Mapping Portal (DMapP) to assist aid workers in
coordinating their work during the humanitarian crisis. It contained
historical and up-to-date information including data from universities
in Thailand and Japan.
Civil Society. Hundreds of non-governmental, non-profit-making
organizations, networks and voluntary associations, in particular
humanitarian NGOs, participated in the response to the tsunami.
These included NGOs from the affected areas as well as from the
international community. Though most were consumers of geospatial information, some, like Mercy Corps, operating from the United
States, participated in the preparation of information using image
processing software and geographic information systems. MercyCorps relied on hardware and software received as donations from
private industry and government, used commercial and government
data and in kind support, and formed a team of volunteer analysts
with significant technical experience gained in private industry,
Au g u s t 2 0 0 6
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government, and academia. Other NGOs also participated in collection, analysis, and dissemination of critical geospatial information
during both the response and recovery aspects of the tsunami. Many
cooperated with the HIC, and, notably, collected useful information
in the field. For instance, the NGO Concern used GPS to gather
coordinates of critical infrastructure as they helped reestablish water
and sanitation capabilities. They and other NGOs also helped gather
location information on spontaneous settlements. There was a high
level of use of HIC information by the NGOs and a willingness of
NGOs to provide geographically referenced information during and
after the response phase.
To underscore that volunteers with expertise in geospatial technology
are becoming increasingly available, we draw from subsequent disasters. For instance, nine months after the tsunami, during the response
to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, experienced volunteers participated
in GISCorps under the auspices of the Urban and Regional Information Systems Association (URISA) (Luccio, 2005a and b). GISCorps,
established in 2003 by URISA to provide a vehicle for voluntary use of
geospatial expertise during times of emergency, assisted in mapping
the devastation along the U.S. coast of the Gulf of Mexico.
“The response to the earthquake/tsunami
was probably unprecedented in terms of international collaboration and data sharing.”
Applications of Remote Sensing Data
Civilian data sets, including Landsat, SPOT and other image data,
were made available in various forms through the USGS, NGA,
PDC, UNOSAT, DLR, International Charter, and other organizations.
The greater spatial coverage and widespread availability of medium
resolution Landsat and SPOT data complemented the higher spatial
resolution commercial imagery and the military space-based and
airborne imagery acquired over small, focused areas. The extensive
historical archives of data from these medium resolution sensors
also provided superior capability for change detection.
Initially, USGS services at the EROS data center concentrated on
posting noncommercial data, while PDC developed a site to post
GIS-ready compressed data products derived from commercial data
and military acquisitions. Commercial data were purchased by NGA
and later provided to the geospatial community. EROS data center
hosted the commercial data archive in GeoTIFF format and provided
the increased capacity required for compression and staging the
original and compressed commercial data, as well as Landsat-based
damage polygons produced for OFDA, and other data products.
NGA and FEMA, under the auspices of USAID, produced imageryderived assessments depicting the extent of devastation in a number
of identified locations and made the products available through PDC.
Satellite imagery was used during the response
phase for:
z
Rapid response for geospatial data
Reconnaissance
z Diplomatic coordination
z Damage assessments
z
870
Au g u s t 2006
z
Logistical planning
Situational awareness
z Base and thematic mapping
z
G eospat
eo spat ial Info
Informat
rmat ion in The F ield
ie l d::
Cha llen ges And
Challenges
An d O
Ob
bst
sta
acles
cle s
“The response to the earthquake/tsunami was probably unprecedented in terms of international collaboration and data sharing.”
(Miner, K., U.S. Department of State, personal commun. 2005). A
large quantity of geospatial information was made available rapidly
for use by strategic planners in offices of major organizations in
many countries and tactical operations in the field. The fact that the
tsunami affected so many countries simultaneously and received
instantaneous press coverage throughout the world stimulated a
level of cooperation that is often not existent in complex humanitarian emergencies with political overtones and funding shortfalls.
Although the available data and geospatial technology dedicated to the effort were unprecedented, several problems occurred
in the access and utilization of this information by the first responders and other end users for whom it was acquired. In addition to
problems accessing and utilizing remotely collected information,
on-the-ground data collection and analysis activities throughout
the affected area were also subject to myriad difficulties. The most
effective organizations had extensive experience, well trained participants, and the capacity to provide their own logistical support.
Technical capabilities and standards varied greatly from group to
group and from task to task. We distilled some general comments
from discussions with people who participated in field operations
and activities supporting them. We found that many of the problems encountered in the initial response phase to the tsunami are
typical of obstacles to effective information sharing often encountered during humanitarian response operations.
z Data organization and dissemination. There was no common documented repository for data, geospatial products,
and information. Searches for appropriate data were time
consuming and cumbersome, and much of the useful information did not always reach those who needed it in a timely
manner. In much of the disaster area there was no access to
the Internet, so data posted on the World Wide Web were not
necessarily accessible by those most in need. Shipping data
on storage devices was sometimes possible but resulted in
delays during critical periods. Because of problems related to
both technology and access, therefore, high quality data and
information were often never made available to end users,
who then had to rely on lower quality information. Similarly,
field assessments could not be readily ingested into a common system and shared.
z Base data. Although base data such as transportation and
“Because of problems related to both technology and access, therefore, high quality data and information were often never
made available to end users, who then had
to rely on lower quality information. “
7/14/2006 12:22:38 PM
z
z
z
z
z
z
z
other critical infrastructure, topography, hydrography, boundary, place name, and land cover exist for many locations, they
are often controlled by government or private organizations
and can take time to be accessed. For instance, geospatial
data owned by Indonesia were not immediately released.
When they were released to an NGO, it took several days for
those data to be made available for more general distribution.
The base data would have helped responders in early phases
as well as later phases. In addition, there are many places
where the data did not exist, making response more difficult
than it should have been.
Communications. No common communications architecture
existed, which greatly impeded communications among military, civilian government, and civil society organizations.
Intergovernmental cooperation. Nations unaffected by
the tsunami were generous with their donations of money,
resources, and expertise from the outset. Nations affected
by the earthquakes and tsunami were accepting of assistance
and requested specific scientific and geospatial expertise and
products to meet their needs. However, in the confusion there
were some problems. For instance, delays in receipt of equipment and data imposed by customs officials in some places
impacted responders during the initial critical response phase.
Data collection standards. The number of people devoted
to data compilation efforts in the field was inadequate. This
is typically the case when the priority is on providing critical
relief to victims of disasters. Still, no standards for content
requirements, collection, and storage were established.
Data quantity. Vast amounts of data were made available by
governments, private industry, universities, and NGOs. The
quantity of data was overwhelming and often choked systems.
This is in contrast to disasters in prior years when often few
data were available. This was also a problem in the response
to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita (Luccio, 2005b).
Data quality. The data were of variable quality. No authority was established by local or national governments, UN, or
private organizations to adjudicate the quality of information
provided to the field, thereby necessitating that responders
divert time and effort to this activity.
Data environment. During the initial response to the tsunami,
georeferenced data and maps based on historical imagery and
newly acquired data were useful for depicting a commonoperational picture. Information from the field was constantly
needed by policy makers. Field expertise and trained assessment personnel were is short supply, so their efforts were
often inadequate to meet the needs of the humanitarian
community and data collection process. Active, coordinated
data collection and high speed connectivity, when available,
assisted support. The need for standardized products and
information sharing across organizational boundaries was
emphasized by the event. Also, a lack of field data depicting
the status of health centers, schools, and other infrastructure
inhibited critical response.
Resource limitations. The Sumatra HIC worked within resource limitations to meet the growing demand for geospatial
information.
Recovery
Reco
very , Rehabilit
Rehabi li ta
attion
ion ,
Reco ns truc
Reconst
ructtion,
ion, a
and
nd Rede
Redevelo
vel op
p me
m ent
nt
International response efforts included providing food, water, shelter,
medical aid, clean up, cash for work programs to reestablish economic activity, trauma counseling, child protection, and numerous
other activities. In a few communities, reconstruction activities began
within weeks, although in most places major reconstruction efforts
began months later. In places where the reconstruction process began
quickly, traditional construction methods and materials were used to
replace buildings on the original sites. While this was expedient, it
resulted in structures at a risk level similar to pre-disaster conditions.
Some of the pre-disaster buildings approached or equaled modern
seismic standards but many did not. Reconstruction that was started
later was often accomplished with improved standards.
Some governments requested that donors provide scientific
analysis and geospatial information to help with determining water
quality of both surface and groundwater resources, location of fresh
water, hazard zones, etc. Some of these assessment and mapping
activities began within 2 weeks of the tsunami. The more specific
the request for such information, the better are the chances for
an effective response. Many types of geospatial information are
needed to ensure sustainable post-disaster activities including:
z Hazard zone mapping. The maps should show areas of potential inundation due to the tsunami, shaking from earthquakes,
landslides as secondary disasters, and other hazards. Such
maps are useful for reconstruction planning. These will also
help identify locations where more costly disaster mitigation
techniques are required and where they are not necessary.
Also, the converse would be valuable, that is, maps of safe
areas to identify accessible locations for people to go in case
of future disasters. Remotely sensed imagery is also needed to
provide ground truth information to verify tsunami, flood, and
other hazard and disaster models. These models are critical to
identify and define hazard zones.
z Forest mapping to show forest condition and areas suitable
for sustainable timber harvest. The reconstruction demand
for tropical hardwood timber will exceed the normal high
demand, placing forests in jeopardy if adequate maps are not
available for use by forest managers and government officials
when planning to help meet this increased demand. Also,
vegetation can be effective to help reduce the effects of some
tsunamis, floods, and landslides. Mapping existing vegetation can help identify what should be preserved, and mapping
hazard zones and environmental conditions can help identify
locations that should be afforested to help reduce hazards.
z Water resource mapping to identify adequate quality and
quantity of water to meet drinking, sanitation, agricultural,
industrial, and power needs. This includes locations of salt
water intrusion caused by the tsunami or freshwater extraction
in coastal areas.
“No common communications architecture
existed, which greatly impeded communications among military, civilian government,
and civil society organizations.”
Au g u s t 2 0 0 6
871
7/11/2006 12:32:28 PM
z
Renewable and nonrenewable resource mapping to provide
information useful to help expedite recovery of the economies of the area.
z Critical infrastructure mapping to be used with future disaster
response planning.
z Coastal and bathymetric mapping to identify tsunami-induced
changes. These can be useful for reestablishing the local
fishing industry and aid in developing fishing rules to ensure
sustainability of the resource. These maps would also be useful for navigation and tsunami-inundation modeling.
z Mapping of marine resources, including coral reefs, to identify
valuable fishing areas and important areas to protect to ensure continued viability of the resource.
An
A
n A f t er
e rss h o cck
k
At 16:09:36 Greenwich Mean Time (11:09:36 p.m. local time)
on March 28, 2005, a magnitude 8.7 earthquake with an epicenter at 97.013o E. long, 2.074o N. lat, 30 km (18.6 mi.) depth
shook Northern Sumatra, Indonesia, and, to a lesser extent, areas
throughout the South Asia region. The earthquake took place
approximately 300 km southeast of the December 26, 2004, earthquake on the same fault (USGS, 2005b). In Banda Aceh and other
locations that had seen devastation from the previous tsunami,
thousands of people, fearing the worst, ran for higher ground.
However, for most locations the devastation was much less than
during the December 26. In western Sumatra the local tsunami
that resulted was 4 meters high, and the transoceanic tsunami was
deflected to the southwest, away from nearby land masses. Still,
the ground shaking devastated many communities.
This earthquake caused massive devastation on the island of
Nias, major damage on Simuelue island, and damage on other
islands in the area. The tsunami, though much smaller than that
of December 26, affected coastal areas throughout the region. Estimates of dead range from around 700 to more than 2,500 (USAID,
2005; USGS, 2005b; UKDFID, 2005). Thousands of people were
injured and tens of thousands of people were displaced. There was
considerable damage to building stock, mostly to non-engineered
structures (EERI, 2005).
Following normal procedures after a major earthquake, the
NEIC, using geophysical modeling and regional geological information, produced ShakeMaps (Figure 8) of the region within
2 hours of the event. Fortunately, many responders were still in
place in South Asia after the December 26 tsunami. Communication through the USGS representative at the Department of State,
HIU, and the Humanitarian Information Center in Banda Aceh
enabled the digital maps to be transmitted by the Internet to the
HIC, already established on Indonesia, within 3 hours of the event.
Although the event took place in the middle of the night local
time, the ShakeMaps reached responders soon enough for them to
prepare flight maps to assist helicopter pilots, whose first opportunity was to fly at dawn, to begin their search and rescue efforts
in the locations with greatest need. Without this rapid response of
geospatial data, hours to days could have been used inefficiently,
resulting in an even greater loss of life than what occurred.
This rapid response was facilitated by the infrastructure and
capability that had been developed in the previous weeks. The
872
Au g u s t 2006
Figure 8. ShakeMap. (Courtesy of USGS).
geologic knowledge and computer models already existed. The
monitoring system was in place to detect the earthquake. The standard operating procedures of the NEIC and their dedicated staff
ensured the rapid production of ShakeMaps. Knowledge of the
event was rapidly transmitted throughout the information chain.
Points of contact existed who knew of the availability of the ShakeMaps, the locations of first responders in Banda Aceh, and the
local capacity to respond was in place. A telecommunications link
existed to transmit the information. The first responders had both
the capability and capacity to use the ShakeMaps and produce
the flight maps for the helicopter pilots. If any link in this complex
chain of variables was not available, one of the most effective and
timely responses to an earthquake in history would not have taken
place. In this case, such links were only available because of the
infrastructure put into place to respond to the December 26 tsunami. To ensure such rapid response, this chain of variables must
be systematized. Still, with all that in place, there was considerable
death, harm, and destruction.
Wh at Have
What
H ave we Learned?
Lea rned?
We have learned several important lessons from the Indian Ocean
tsunami response. Heeding them could improve response time
and effectiveness during future events, in the Indian Ocean region
and elsewhere.
Information Availability
z
Observations. As the Subcommittee on Disaster Reduction
(SDR, 2005) points out, “developing and improving observation tools is essential to provide pertinent, comprehensive and
timely information for planning and response.” In this instance
improved seismic and tsunami monitoring would have proved
valuable in quickly obtaining accurate estimates of the magnitude of the earthquake. This may have helped save lives, particularly if linked to a more effective regional warning system.
7/14/2006 12:22:38 PM
z
z
z
z
z
z
z
Remote sensing. Although an incredible amount of remotely
sensed data were available, the existing satellite observation
systems are not optimized for disaster response. A future
system could be more nearly optimized for disaster response
while still meeting other operational and research needs.
Data volume. There were more raw and analyzed remote
sensing data than could be ingested and adequately used.
Unfortunately, not all data were accurate or useful. A method
must be developed to filter out unnecessary data while
streamlining access to relevant data.
Data content. Base-line data should be acquired in areas
prone to disasters. Among these data sets are:
Fundamental data layers including transportation (roads,
railroads, pipelines, powerlines, airports, docks, shipping
facilities, etc.), elevation (at the accuracy and resolution of
the Shuttle Radar Topography Mission or better), hydrography (lakes, rivers, coastlines), political boundaries,
geographic names, landmark structures, and land use and
land cover maps.
Population data registered with fundamental data layers.
Attributes useful for disaster response include age distribution, language, and cultural variables.
Critical buildings including hospitals, schools, police stations and other government facilities, power production
and distribution facilities, water distribution facilities, sanitation facilities, communication facilities, etc. This information should be current and updated regularly
Scale. Appropriate scale data must be made available. In general, large-scale data are more valuable than small-scale data
for disaster response, recovery, reconstruction, and planning
for future disasters. Intermediate scale data (1:100,000-scale
or larger, 15 meter to 30 meter resolution) are needed for
reconnaissance and making regional estimates. Small and very
small-scale data are useful for illustration, briefings, and high
level planning. For many response activities page size maps
are most practical.
Timeliness. Capacity must exist to rapidly acquire, process,
and widely disseminate the remote sensing data. Though
valuable, the higher resolution data would have been even
more beneficial if it had been more rapidly assessed and reformatted to meet such needs as delineating breaches in physical
infrastructure, bolstering damage estimates, and locating staging areas for relief support.
Historic data. A historic baseline of satellite imagery must
be available so comparisons can be made with postdisaster
imagery to identify impacted areas.
Training. Technically trained people should participate with
the first responders to acquire ground data to share with other
organizations so an efficient use of resources could take place.
Information Access
z
Timeliness. Timely access to all sources of data (government,
NGO, commercial, military, etc.) must be improved.
z Information infrastructure. Following the best practices and
principles of the Global Spatial Data Infrastructure will improve
responders’ ability to access and use the information that is
available.
z
Disaster information lifecycle. Access to data is critical
throughout the disaster cycle. Access should be made as easy
and inexpensive as possible. Some minimum agreed upon
standards for access and “look and feel” of portals should be
established to simplify access and move data into the hands of
the users quickly.
z Multiple media. Expect destroyed infrastructure in disaster
areas and expect logistical complications. Due to the highly
variable nature of both the disaster areas and the responders’
capabilities, multiple methods of obtaining, accessing, and distributing information must be established. This should include
hard copy, a variety of digital media, and on-line. Often, as
was the case with this tsunami, high-speed Internet links are
not available in disaster-stricken areas.
z Data sharing. Where agreements are in place in advance, the
sharing of data goes much more smoothly.
Information Application
z
Field data collection procedures. Common operating procedures for data collection in the field must be developed.
z Applications and updating. While geospatial information
is being used in the response and other disaster management phases, the conditions that information represents will
change. These changes should be recorded and incorporated
into new versions of the data. Seldom do responders have the
training or time to record the information, so trained geospatial specialists should be available to assist them in obtaining
location (GPS), geographic relationships, and attribute information.
z Data formats and structures. Remotely sensed, geographic,
and cartographic data should be provided in readily usable
formats and structures. Where data are to be provided in
unique formats, provision for conversion to standard formats
should be arranged. For example, some data were made available in a military format during the tsunami response. It took
considerable time to transform the data to generally usable
formats. There was neither capability nor capacity to transform
the data in the disaster area, so they had to be transformed
elsewhere at considerable cost and delay.
z Detailed assessments of damage. Maps derived from highresolution imagery showing damage polygons are particularly
valuable to responders.
Overall Response Issues
z
Effective regional warning system. Warning systems that are
suitable for all disasters yet provide the needed information to
respond to the particular disaster must be developed.
z Areal extent of disasters. Disasters can occur at many scales.
Response plans should take this into consideration. Although
“Vast amounts of data were made available
by governments, private industry, universities, and NGOs. The quantity of data was
overwhelming and often choked systems. “
Au g u s t 2 0 0 6
873
7/11/2006 12:32:29 PM
z
z
z
z
z
z
z
most plans are local in scope, there must be planning and training for disasters that can occur over extremely large areas.
Education for the general population. Education must be
conducted on the nature of the disasters, the warning system,
appropriate response actions, and the use of geospatial information to aid in their response.
Responder training. Training must be improved for international, national, and local responders. This should include
understanding disasters, their warnings, and the use of geospatial information to aid in preparation, response, recovery,
and postrecovery activities.
Coordination. Coordination must be improved among Federal
agencies, nations, and the various sectors of society (government, private industry, civil society, and academia). There
is also a need for better information flow among military
response efforts and the civil and nongovernmental entities.
Geospatial skills for disaster response. Changing skill mixes
must be recognized. For instance, as more people gain GIS
and other geospatial skills, a larger number of them will be
available to participate in organizational and volunteer efforts.
Better ways to integrate this expanding resource into the activities of the disaster management cycle will greatly improve
planning and operations.
Perishable information. The disaster provides valuable information on earth processes, cultural, and individual and group
psychology. Understanding these aids in developing disaster
reduction measures. Scientific, environmental, and social
assessments must be conducted as soon as possible after
the event, before the evidence is removed by post-disaster
clean-up activities, natural processes, or rehabilitation efforts.
Early scientific and environmental assessments are critical to
planning for sustainable redevelopment and rehabilitation.
However, response activities should not be delayed to allow
time for these types of assessments.
Variable conditions. Expect conditions to vary widely over
an affected area, particularly if the area crosses jurisdictional,
cultural, or physiographic boundaries. This applies to physical,
social, and technological conditions.
Social dynamics. Plans must be revisited and updated to account for changes in populations, education levels, demographics, economics, social norms, etc. These can affect many
factors in the disaster management cycle. Some of these
variables are mapable and continually updating the map of
social variables is an important part of keeping plans current.
C on
Co
ncl
cl u
uss io n
The lessons learned in response to the Sumatra-Andaman earthquake
and Indian Ocean tsunami of December 26, 2005, are relevant to
rapid-onset disasters. Many of them are also relevant to slow onset
disasters such as drought and famine and to complex humanitarian emergencies. Thus, they inform a broad spectrum of planning,
preparation, and response activities. As technology and skills have improved, we have experienced a rapid increase in available geospatial
data. We can expect that to continue, particularly if existing systems
are maintained or improved upon. However, when an emergency
occurs there is no time to develop comprehensive solutions.
874
Au g u s t 2 006
Planning must take place in advance to overcome problems that
can be anticipated. This planning will also help reduce the impact of
unanticipated problems. Because natural disasters, particularly large
ones, do not respect borders, many have significant international
components, either because of the aerial extent of the disaster or the
need for an international response.
Even if a disaster falls within one nation’s borders, an international
response is often required because few nations have the capacity
to deal with the immediate high cost in resources and response
personnel during, and in the aftermath of, a major disaster. Planning
for geospatial information should be, by necessity, an international
effort. After all, no one nation has all the geospatial resources needed
for disaster response. Thus, the organizations with assets useful for
disaster response should work together to develop plans and to help
eliminate the bottlenecks identified by major disasters such as the
earthquake and tsunami of December 26, 2004.
As civil society becomes more geospatially sophisticated, there is
an increasing need to include it in the planning for disaster response.
Most civil society organizations have their independent missions and
often do not work in an interorganizational environment until an event
occurs, at which time they expect certain support from governments
or the United Nations. Including them in planning will help even if it
is merely to set realistic expectations of all partners’ contributions to
multi-organizational efforts. There will always be gaps and deficiencies that create problems and obstacles for cooperation among the
different sectors of society. Advanced cooperation and planning can
help minimize potential problems. Still, incorporating geographic
information into planning should be part of the overall strategy. Integrated planning for the entire disaster management cycle will lead
to more sustainable communities, particularly when the principles of
adaptive management are used.
Ack nowledgment
nowled gmentss
The authors acknowledge P. Patrick Leahy, Brenda Jones, Kathleen
Miner, Douglas Nash, Paolo Palmero, Reid Daugherity, Alan Huguley,
Eric Geist, David Wald, Frank Gonzalez and Vasily Titov for figures
and valuable insight and comments on earlier drafts of this paper. We
also acknowledge John Watson for editorial assistance, and unnamed
reviewers provided by Photogrammetric Engineering and Remote
Sensing. Any errors are the responsibility of the authors.
D isclaimer
isc la im er
The views and conclusions contained in this paper are those of the
authors and do not necessarily reflect the policies of the United States
Government. Any use of trade, product, or firm names in this paper
is for descriptive purposes only and does not imply endorsement by
the U.S. Government.
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Au
A
utt hor
ho r s
John A. Kelmelis, Senior Science Advisor for International Policy
U.S. Geological Survey
[email protected]
and Senior Counselor for Earth Science
U.S. Department of State
[email protected]
Lee Schwartz, Director
Office of the Geographer and Global Issues
[email protected]
Carol Christian, Scientist
Space Telescope Science Institute
and Science and Technology Policy Fellow
[email protected]
Melba Crawford, Professor and Director of Laboratory for Applications of Remote Sensing
Purdue University
[email protected]
Dennis King, Analyst
Humanitarian Information Unit
[email protected]
Ô
876
Au g u s t 2006
7/14/2006 1:02:47 PM

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