Heavy lifting - China Economic Review
Transcription
Heavy lifting - China Economic Review
Steve Dickinson october 2011 Vol. 22, No. 10 www.chinaeconomicreview.com Foreign control of Chinese internet firms is winding down Heavy lifting China’s economy in a weak world COMPANIES & SECTORS Property developers mind their hedges FOCUS: RESIDENTIAL REAL ESTATE contents Published monthly since 1990 32 SPECIAL REPORT: ECONOMICS & TRADE Trading partners hope Chinese demand will start carrying more weight, but Beijing has different priorities Publisher China Economic Review Publishing Editor Pete Sweeney Contributing Editors Ana Swanson, Christopher Beddor Research Manager Ada Liu Researchers Juliet Zhu, Sarah Chen Contributors Paul French, Steve Dickinson, John G. Whitesides Art Director Frank Zheng Art Editor Daisy Fang Editor at Large Graham Earnshaw Associate Publisher Gareth Powell Director of Operations Caroline Fontaine CHINA ECONOMIC REVIEW (ISSN: 1350-6390) is published by China Economic Review Publishing Enquiries [email protected] Subscriptions [email protected] Addresses The Plaza Building, 102 Lee High Road London, SE13 5PT, England Room 1801, 18F, Public Bank Centre, 1 20 Des Voeux Road Central, Hong Kong CHINA ECONOMIC REVIEW welcomes letters. Please write to the Editor at: [email protected] Advertising inquiries [email protected] Hong Kong: +852 3755 6729 Shanghai: +8621 5187 9633 ext 811 HKABC membership membership approved approved and and certified certified HKABC COVER by Fu Chunqiang : Find the Beijing-based illustrator at edge.neocha.com The house view 6 opinion A new tax on foreign employees will hurt Chinese firms’ overseas expansion; Beijing’s flounders in Libya show the need for a doctrinal revision month in review 8 briefing While Chinese IPOs overseas wait on foreign markets to calm down, domestic listings heat up 10 sector news 10 china by numbers 11 china buzz “Paying bribes was the old way, but now we’re in China 2.0” 12 best of the web 12 second thoughts More stock scandals; Wen Jiabao plays hardball in Europe; who cares about bank balance sheets? 14 paul french’s diary A coffee down under; are mining companies running Australian foreign policy? 15 punditry Nigeria ups renminbi reserves; business confidence survey; interpreting the export figures snapshot 16 question of the month Are Chinese small- and medium-sized business really going bankrupt? And is it the government’s fault? 18 LOCAL VOICES Chinese SMEs talk about the credit crunch, private banking and coping with a labor shortage 20 companies: real estate Diversification will save the big players, but small developers will have a rough fall 22 PORTFOLIO Soufun, Evergrande Real Estate talking points 24 steve dickinson Foreign investment in Chinese dot-com companies runs into a regulatory wall 26 fat dragon China’s infamous ghost cities will get filled up soon enough 28 John G. whitesides China is using scientific exchanges as a diplomatic tool 30 question & answer: zhang kun, pptv The vice president for corporate development at online sports video site PPTV talks about piracy spotlight: united kingdom 39 return on history Beijing has locked UK banks in China out of increasing their market share, but there are worse places to be trapped than the premium niche after the close 44 company index 44 expos & conferences 45 listings 48 economic indicators 50 book review Understanding China’s Economic Indicators: Tom Orlik of the Wall Street Journal offers a handy reference work on lies, damned lies and Chinese employment statistics China Economic Review • October 2011 5 the house view Embrace the strange F ear of the unfamiliar is a pan-human survival instinct, and Chinese people are no exception. Indeed, Confucianism is almost entirely uninterested in foreign ideas or foreign peoples, focusing rather on the perfection of a Chinese social order derived from the past. Even invaders were incorporated into the Confucian cultural structure and converted, post-invasion, into “Chinese” dynasties. Even in the face of demonstrated Western technological and economic superiority during the Qing dynasty, the reformers of that era nevertheless attempted to preserve an exceptional, and superior, space for Chinese culture: “Use the West for technology, but China for the essence.” Chinese leaders still play on this sentiment today, but it is a tricky balancing act. China cannot allow its xenophobes to dictate policy so long as the economy booms. But if China experiences an economic correction – as it eventually must – the extremists will gain more leverage; thus the leadership has carved out a fallback position in the hills of ethnic nationalism. Thus even as China’s economy integrates with the global system, some Chinese politicians still feel it necessary to take occasional, rhetorical swipes at foreign-ness, repeating the canard that China can adopt foreign technology while ignoring the ideas that built it. Nevertheless, despite accusations to the contrary, the central government has so far done a relatively good job of allowing foreigners to conduct their business here. To attract foreign investment, the government created a de-facto tax haven for foreign companies and their foreign employees. This was self-interested, of course: Without tax Imaginechina The new tax on foreign employees will penalize the overseas expansion of Chinese companies expat package: Barriers for foreigners are getting higher breaks, the foreigners would not have come, and neither would their money or their intellectual property. Penalty tax But things are changing. In 2008, China eliminated most of the tax breaks for foreign firms. Now Beijing is targeting the paychecks of foreign workers. On October 15, companies will be required to deduct an additional 11% from foreign employee’s salaries; employers will have to kick in another 37%. In exchange, foreign employees will get pension, unemployment and health insurance benefits that the majority of them are unlikely to use. The government also added (at the last minute) an exemption for employees from Hong Kong and Taiwan, sabotaging the government’s spin that the tax is intended to benefit, not penalize, foreign employees. It must be noted that taxing people for services they don’t use is not unusual. The US and many Running interference: China must revise its approach to Africa China’s strategy in Africa has drawn a lot of criticism in the West. Those critics are now having their day in the sun. First, China saw its alliance with Sudan’s Al Bashir rendered useless by the partition of that state. The new nation of South Sudan owes no particular debt to China, and in fact has some cause to resent Beijing’s unstinting support for the regime that once oppressed its people. But the attraction between oil and money is constant; South Sudan and China will manage to get along. The mess in Libya, however, is of a slightly different magnitude. The experience in Sudan should have taught Beijing that power does change hands, and there’s a value to staying 6 China Economic Review • October 2011 Beijing later admitted that Chinese weapons manufacturers had met with Qaddafi’s government in the midst of the insurrection in with the outs. But even after a protracted Arab Spring that resulting in the high-profile toppling of Mubarak in Egypt, Beijing still seemed to be caught off balance by the Libyan civil war. It sat out on military intervention but endorsed sanctions: The former is consistent with its ideology of non-interference, the latter is contradictory. In the early stages of the Libyan conflict, China made statements about “stability” that many interpreted as a coded call for Qaddafi to crack down. Worse, Beijing later admitted that Chinese weapons manufacturers had met with Qaddafi’s government in the midst of the insurrection. At best this meeting was European countries do Foreign multinationals it too. But in China, this tax is likely to proin China have been duce unwanted results. the percentages relentlessly localizing While for Chinese and foreign their workforces workers are roughly the same, foreigners without any here tend to earn much encouragement from more than their local peers; meaning the cost Beijing increase to employers will be higher. If the rule is meant as a form of affirmative action to encourage companies to prefer local Chinese workers, it is completely unnecessary. Most multinational firms prefer to hire local residents anyway. They are cheaper, they are fluent in Chinese, and they are familiar with the culture; multinationals in China have been relentlessly localizing their workforces without any encouragement from Beijing. Those foreigners who are still employed here earn a premium compared to their Chinese coworkers for a reason; they have skills the local market cannot provide. Conversely, foreign college graduates with no experience or particular skills are discovering that their market value has plummeted thanks to competition from bilingual locals. Going outward Given the need for Chinese firms to expand into overseas markets, now is the worst time to encourage local firms to keep their headcounts parochial. Foreign employees (including returnees with foreign passports) can make a critical difference as domestic companies navigate foreign cultures, attract foreign consumers and manage overseas subsidiaries. The same goes for foreign consultancies and law firms. The last thing outward-looking Chinese private firms like Alibaba, Huawei, and Suntech need is encouragement to run multinational ventures from parochial headquarters. Chinese labor markets are working just fine; Chinese “essence” does not need policy protection; it’s time to embrace the strange. bad judgment and atrociously timed; if it happened behind the government’s back, it demonstrates a serious shortage of civilian control over China’s weapons industry. Finally, China waited until almost the bitter end to recognize the rebels, acknowledging the rebel leaders’ authority even while Qaddafi was still in the country. This may have been pure pragmatism on Beijing’s part – the writing was certainly on the wall, and rebels had already threatened to cut China out of future oil contracts – but the decision sabotages China’s claim that its non-interference policy is about more than self-interest. Absolute non-interference is an impossible doctrine for countries that engage in global trade; money is influence, and influence interferes. But there’s plenty of room to “interfere” without sanctioning air strikes. China needs to reframe its diplomatic approach to reflect the reality of its wider interests. If it wants to claim the moral high ground, however, taking a position against weapons sales to developing economies would be an excellent place to start. China Economic Review • October 2011 7 month in rev iew • BRIEFIN G monthinreview $34,500: Price of 500 kg of panda excrement tea Also in this section SECTOR NEWS, p10 china by numbers, P10 china buzz, P11 ‘A foreign tycoon wants to buy 300 sq km of Icelandic land. This has to be discussed’ best of the web, P12 second thoughts, P12 More scandals on stock markets; Wen and the EU paul french, P14 editor’s inbox, P15 8 China Economic Review • October 2011 Imaginechina DreamWorks opens, Gaopeng closes, CIC reorganizes briefing Carrying the torch Hostile markets are deterring new listings around the world. In China, however, the IPO machine still roars I t was mid-September, and Chinese automaker Great Wall Motors was courting institutional investors for its initial public offering (IPO) on the Shanghai Exchange. Though the fall of 2011 would hardly seem to be the time for aggressive fundraising, the company would not back down on its price. It announced plans to raise up to US$1.05 billion in what would be one of the country’s largest offerings of the year. Great Wall’s enthusiasm shows just how sharply the mood in China’s IPO markets contrasts with that of the rest of the world. New listings have lumbered nearly to a halt in most places since the end of July, when gut- wrenching volatility deterred even the most hardened equities investors. China is not entirely insulated from global woes: The Shanghai Composite Index has lost roughly 10% of its value since January, and the number of IPOs in Shanghai and Shenzhen is down from the previous year. Comparatively, however, the country remains an incongruous bright spot. The strength of this market stems in part from the mainland’s pent-up liquidity, said Joseph Schuster, the managing director of IPOX Schuster: It’s almost as hard for Chinese to get their money out of the country as for foreigners to get their money in. In addition, Chinese investors have grown accustomed to some of the most spectacular day-one increases, month in rev iew • sec tor new s POP! IPOs on ChiNext are heating up or “pops,” in the share price of newly listed companies. “You see companies being underpriced, and the average IPO pops 20-30%,” said Schuster. “That just incentivizes people to participate again and again … For investors who buy at the IPO price, the returns are actually quite substantial.” Increasingly, many of these offerings are taking place outside of Shanghai: Twice as much equity capital has been raised on Shenzhen’s smaller market this year. That’s because Shenzhen is home to the ChiNext, a NASDAQ-type exchange for high-tech start-ups that was launched in late 2009. As elsewhere in the world, much new financing in China is going into technology and internet companies. There’s likely to be plenty of demand for mainland markets in the months to come; surveys show seven out of 10 Chinese companies would prefer to list in their own country. In other markets, activity will probably be slow for at least the rest of the year, said Nick Einhorn, an analyst at IPO investment firm Renaissance Capital. “That said, sentiment of US investors toward Chinese companies has traditionally been very quick to change.” One thing is certain: Chinese companies seeking capital abroad must price their offerings modestly. Bargains are the only way to tempt long-term investors back to market. Economics and trade Annual growth in the Consumer Price Index slowed to 6.2% year-on-year in August from 6.5% in July, signaling that government measures to curb inflation are finally taking effect. China’s trade surplus shrank to US$17.8 billion in August from US$31.5 billion in July as a sharp increase in imports outpaced continued growth in exports. Foreign direct investment rose 11.1% year-onyear in August, down from 19.8% growth in July. The Purchasing Manager’s Index, a gauge of industrial activity, rose to 50.9 in August after the reading hit a two-year low of 50.7 in July. Consumer DreamWorks Animation plans to open a new operation in Shanghai to target China’s booming film market. Swedish furniture retailer IKEA said it plans to spend US$626 million to build a fourth location in Shanghai. It will open its second retail outlet in Wuhan in 2014 and its third in Beijing in 2015. Starbucks said it plans to open 1,500 new retail locations in China by 2015, up from a current 470. Imaginechina Imaginechina sectornews Investment Beijing modified regulations governing foreign investment in Chinese internet firms, closing a loophole that has allowed foreign firms to invest in mainland dot-com companies, putting mergers and acquisitions in the online space under greater regulatory scrutiny. chinabynumbers Price of 500g of panda excrement tea China Economic Review • October 2011 China-focused private equity funds raised US$10.3 billion in the first half of 2011, representing 45% of global fundraising. Banking, finance & markets Beijing announced plans to restructure its US$300 billion sovereign wealth fund, China Investment Corporation (CIC), by spinning off the accounts belonging to Central Huijin Asset Management, its domestic investment arm, and creating a new entity, CIC International, to handle investments overseas. The Hong Kong Exchange announced new guidelines for the more than 1,400 companies listed on its bourse to raise renminbi through share placements and rights issues. A senior Shanghai official underscored the difficulties of launching Shanghai’s international board, contradicting earlier reports that the first foreign firms may be allowed to float shares before the end of the year. tech, media & telecom Gaopeng.com, a joint venture between mainland web portal Tencent and USbased group buying site Groupon, said it would reduce staff by up to onethird to 2000 and close the majority of its China offices due to a shortage of 1.11m $34,500 10 hiii-yaaaa! DreamWorks will launch operations in Shanghai Number of millionaires in China in 2010 China’s 2010 investment in HIV research $18m month in re view • B uzz chinabuzz Imaginechina Wang Jinlong, Starbucks’ Asia Pacific president, on China and coffee: “The problem with China is that the country just isn’t caffeinated enough.” free cash and lack of investment from Tencent. Google added a new program, dubbed “Shihui,” to its China site to aggregate group-purchase deals in the mainland. At its annual customer convention, e-commerce giant Alibaba Group announced plans to increase the combined transaction volume on its Taobao Marketplace and Taobao Mall to US$157 billion in 2012 from US$62.8 billion last year. An unnamed Chinese government official on graft: “Paying bribes was the old way, but now we’re in China 2.0. Helping a government official meet his social target is what brings him promotion, so anything that helps him to do that is a means to an end.” Fu Ying, China’s vice foreign minister, on political unrest: “When Western governments suffer economic crises, do you worry about your own political system? So why should we have such worries?” Zhang Yungping, a Kunming furniture store worker, on IKEA’s accusations of copyright theft: “If two people are wearing the same clothes, you are bound to say that one copied the other.” Francois Curiel, president of Christie’s Asia, on art in China: “They see works of art on their [peers’] walls and think, ‘If I want to be not just a millionaire but someone who plays with the big boys, I’d better be someone who collects art.’” Wu Fang, a migrant worker in Beijing, on her status: “If they want us to go to school, we’ll go. If they say we can’t, we won’t .. We have no power, no status and no rights.” Ogmundur Jonasson, Iceland’s interior minister, on a Chinese business tycoon’s plans to buy 0.3% of Iceland: “A foreign tycoon wants to buy 300 sq km of Icelandic land. This has to be discussed and not swallowed without chewing.” EIPM EXECUTIVE MBA PURCHASING & SUPPLY MANAGEMENT European Institute of Purchasing Management PART TIME EMBA PROGRAMME • • • • JOIN US NOW The only executive purchasing MBA in the world Flexible modular programme designed for professionals International experience as modules can be taken in Geneva or Shanghai 100% english language with faculty from top ranking universities and international practioners EIPM Executive MBA Specialised in Purchasing & Supply Managment For more information, contact us www.eipm-china.com / www.eipm.org Tel : 0086 21 22119628 Contact : [email protected] China Economic Review • October 2011 11 month in rev iew • SECON D THOUGHTS BEstoftheWEB Unsubtle points Reactions to the recent amendment to China’s marriage law, which excluded some property from divorce settlements, Chinasmack.com More scandals on the stock markets; Wen Jiabao wants quid-pro-quo for supporting the euro “The balance has been upset ... What men were originally supposed to provide in a marriage they can now perfectly legitimately not provide.” onths ago we said that the drama of sordid scams and unscrupulous auditors emerging from Chinese companies listed on foreign exchanges would wind down soon. Wrong, wrong, wrong. Graft is apparently the gift that keeps on stealing. This week we had AutoChina, an outfit our Company Reports team was already flogging on the basis of its stated financials, trying to get away with not stating financials. Exchange regulators laughed off the company’s request to delay reporting on 2010’s performance until the very end of 2011, and instead told the company it would be delisted as of September 19 unless it appealed. It appealed, and the story goes on. Next, there was yet another attack by short-seller Muddy Waters (in cooperation with shortselling Borg collective “Alfred Little”) on Chinese miner Silvercorp. Silvercorp stands accused of falsifying its financials – the Torontolisted company reported a profit in Canada and a loss in China for the same period – and fabricating customers. Particularly suspicious is the “National High-Payin’ SilverBuyin’ Win-Win Take Innovation as Key Link Corporation,” headquartered on the forest moon of Endor. The icing on the cake is the fact that Silvercorp is the subject of two separate investigations, one by the British Columbia Securities Commission and another by the Royal Mounted Police! Has Silvercorp been smuggling whiskey “What’s wrong with China’s women, where even having a child is a bargaining chip in a transaction with men? Truly very sad.” “It looks like a law protecting male citizens, but actually it is pushing us male comrades into the abyss.” “If you guys truly love each other, would you really be afraid of the Marriage Law not being fair?” “If we don’t depend on the law and only depend on morality, just how many people are actually that dependable?” “Why not also bring [our laws governing] infidelity in marriage or divorce in line with foreign standards by giving us alimony! Are all the men who drew up and enacted this law keeping mistresses?” Imaginechina “Of those who made this law, which one of them doesn’t have several houses? They are simply protecting their own assets.” M chinabynumbers Percentage of Chinese PC users using illegal software 86 12 60k Number of pornographic websites shut down in China in 2010 China Economic Review • October 2011 Provinces that have raised the minimum wage by over 20% this year 13 When it comes to EU bonds, who can blame Beijing for being a bit skeptical? into US speakeasies? Finally, and tangentially, we have another variation on the “let’s assume foreign regulators are drooling morons” strategy: Three senior executives of Chinese resource investor Hanlong Mining were detained in Australia for apparently investing in the stock of a company Hanlong intended to buy shares of just before the sale was announced. Subtle as a car bomb. Perhaps they will be exchanged for Stern Hu. Help yourself! In other news, the EU continued its steady march into the abyss – the good news being that, with discussions of a Greek default metastasizing through the opinion-sphere, the crisis may be nearing some kind of resolution. On Tuesday, markets were bolstered by reports that China and Italy were holding secrets talks over bond purchases. But Grandpa Wen, lovable as he may be, shattered those hopes on Thursday when he told the World Economic Forum in Dalian that China wasn’t ready for a long-term commitment. Europe has some issues to deal with – like cutting its deficits 32 Arrests made in China’s crackdown on “gutter” cooking oil Number of pop songs on China’s new internet blacklist 100 month in re view • Secon d Thoughts and opening its markets – before China would be willing to take the plunge, he said. Then Wen really stunned the crowds by going for the shake-down: If the EU wanted to, let’s say, give China market economy status, then the money tap might flow. Wen’s attitude, however warranted, represented a sharp shift in rhetoric. It was only June when he toured Europe speaking of pandas, sunshine and jingji hezuo. Since then, China has not really put its money where its mouth is; analysts suggest that it has bought only limited amounts of EU sovereign debt. But China’s cooperation with the EU has always been in its commercial interests, and not an act of generosity. When it comes to EU bonds, who can blame Beijing for being a bit skeptical? As the Financial Times has pointed out, many Chinese think it’s ludicrous to bail out decadent Europeans only a few generations after their colonies were pushed out of the country. Unless, of course, the bonds would be a good investment. At this point, however, the good ship Europe is not looking particularly seaworthy. BESTOFCHinaeconomicreview.com From “Chinese banks: The metrics don’t matter,” Christopher Beddor, August 31 It’s that time again: first half financials by China’s big four banks.“We continue to see decent results,“ said an analyst who wished not to be named. “But the numbers will not convince the bears that there isn’t a problem with non-performing loans.” Plenty of financial analysts bemoan how investors are unnecessarily bearish on Chinese bank debt. They say: Have you seen the loan-to-deposit ratio/capital buffers/loan-loss coverage ratio? What does that have to do with anything? I won’t even begin to poke holes in these metrics (Tsinghua University professor and CER contributor Patrick Chovanec does that very nicely). My point is more macro: These aren’t real banks, so investors shouldn’t price their equity like real banks. Yes, investors should still price their equity at the discounted present value of anticipated future dividends. But whereas the value of future dividends in Western banks depends on their ability to efficiently allocate resources to maximize future profitability, the value of future dividends in Chinese banks depends to an overwhelming degree on government policy. Chinese government policy is, in turn, dictated by a plethora of factors, the most important being to keep the economy humming along. With inflation at over 6%, lots of murky debt outstanding, the odds of another US recession at 40% and the eurozone in turmoil, is it so crazy to discount the future profitability of Chinese banks this year? This week’s earnings announcements still haven’t shifted market sentiment, because investors didn’t buy into a Chinese company. They bought into Chinese policy. ONLY globa event focu lly that and p ses on risk analy erforman ce sis i invest n China’s mana ment gem mark ent et • Main Conference: 30 November & 01 December 2011 • Post Conference Workshops: 02 December 2011 • Venue: Renaissance Shanghai Pudong Hotel, China • 主会议:2011年11月30日至12月1日 • 会后研讨会:2011年12月2日 • 地点:中国, 上海淳大万丽酒店 Developing Effective Performance and Risk Management Strategies to Facilitate the Rapidly Growing Chinese Investment Management Market 发展高效的绩效评估与风险管理策略以适中国高速发展的投资管理市场 Wanying Bi Chief Risk Officer Harvest Fund Management 毕万英, 首席风险官 嘉实基金管理有限公司 Yizhi He Director Risk Management Hua An Fund Management 何移直, 风险管理部总经理 华安基金管理有限公司 WHO WILL YOU MEET: Job Breakdown / 职务构成: Geographical Breakdown / 地理构成: nChief Risk Officers/Head of Risk Management 首席风险官/风险管理总监 n Head of Performance Measurement/ Head of Performance Management 业绩评估总监/业绩管理总监 Lihui Zheng Head of Risk Management Department Huatai-PB Fund Management 郑立辉, 风险管理部总监 华泰柏瑞基金管理有限公司 Bin Zhu Deputy General Manager Nan Hua Futures 朱斌, 副总裁 南华期货 n Head of Financial Engineering 金融工程总监 n Head of Compliance / 合规部负责人 n CEO / Managing Director 首席执行官/常务董事 n CIO / Director of Investments 首席财务官/投资主管 n Head of Quantitative Investment 量化投资总监 n Head of R&D / 产品研发总监 n Head of Portfolio Management 投资经理 n Others / 其他 Sponsors: Endorsers: Supporting Medias: nChina Mainland / 中国大陆 n Hong Kong / 香港 n Taiwan / 台湾 n Other parts of the world 全球其他地区 Researched and Developed by: REGISTER BY: PHONE: +65 6722 9388 • FAX: +65 6720 3804 • EMAIL: [email protected] • WEB: www.iparmchina.com China Economic Review • October 2011 13 month in rev iew • diary Selling tea to China Chinese coffee, shoppers in Australia; Miners as nation states S ometimes in this diary I like to get out and about beyond China. Recently I spent some time down under in Australia but as the Godfather used to say, “Just when I thought I was out … they pull me back in.” T he top end of Melbourne’s Collins Street is rather ritzy with some nice European-style architecture, known as “Little Paris” to some. No surprise then that this is home to those ubiquitous brands almost as prevalent in China as Ten Ren’s Tea! I refer of course to Louis Vuitton, Prada, Gucci, and Bally. These stores are all elbourne is most definitely packed with Chinese shoppers. I have a coffee town. Long Blacks, THE DIARY yet to see a blue-eyed, blonde-haired Short Whites – they take their coffee Paul French is chief China Aussie surfer-type emerge from one very seriously in this burg, and there’s representative of Access Asia of these shops - it’s all Asian, all the nary a Starbucks or Costa in sight. The vast majority of stores are lovely little inde- time - more “nihao” than “g’day.” And that increaspendents where they take the coffee more seriously ingly applies to the employees. No luxury shop on Collins is complete without a Mandarin-speaking than the corporate profit margins. This converted even a confirmed drinker of staff member. And even the incredibly strong Aus“English Breakfast Tea” like myself a bit of a cof- sie dollar doesn’t deter those looking to arbitrage their sale and avoid those pernifee aficionado. But wherever there cious mainland taxes. are dominant trends so too there must be a backlash and an alterna- My sense is that tive. And in Melbourne the good y sense is that there’s about fight for tea drinking is being led there’s about to to be a rumble in the outby none other than Ten Ren’s Tea, be a rumble in the back over the mining industry’s toa well-known Chinese chain. These tal domination of the whole China guys are ladling out the green, jas- outback over the debate in Australia. Most people I mine, Oolong, ginseng and pu’er to mining industry’s talked to who have an interest in Chinese Melburnians and any other China were pretty angry that AusAussies looking to get the coffee- total domination tralia’s entire China strategy seems addiction monkey off their back! to be run by the two giant mining And it seems they are doing pretty of the China companies down under. When it well at it. comes to prices and terms, Beijing debate talks to them, not Canberra, as if they were independent nation s are another chain called Oriental Tea House, who have decided to states. The mining companies’ representatives in sex-up the whole tea and yum cha concept with China appear to be more important and influsome really neat stores, great decor and advertising ential than Australia’s official diplomats. Back in harking back to pre-1949 graphic design. Indeed, Oz there are a number of parasitical types – the a bit of the old chinoiserie is “in” in Melbourne at lawyers, consultants and “advisers” – who hang on the moment, it seems. Coffee and sandwiches cafe to the coattails of the miners and relentlessly push chain Villa & Hut Kafe has not only launched the the argument that anyone criticizing China is “Shanghai Chai” in Australia but has opened their threatening Australian people’s incomes. This is a first overseas branch in Pudong (though in the bad state of affairs for a democracy and my feeling decidedly un-chinois China Merchants Tower!) is that tempers are reaching a boiling point among bringing Shanghai Chai from South Yarra to, errr, many who want the elected government to take back control. Shanghai. Paul French M M A chinabynumbers 87 Year-on-year growth of China’s online shopping industry in 2010 14 Number of Chinese people short of drinking water in China this summer 14m China Economic Review • October 2011 31m China’s projected annual automotive manufacturing capacity by 2013 Percentage of birth defects in China 14 2 Percentage of Chinese colleges that passed recent tobacco-control checks month in rev iew • editor ’s inbox “The Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) intends to diversify its foreign exchange reserves, eventually switching as much as 5-10% of current FX reserves into Chinese yuan (CNY). Given the lack of CNY convertibility, the move at this stage is largely symbolic. Nonetheless, it may serve as an important precursor to eventual FX reserves diversification by other African countries, as well as wider adoption of the CNY for trade settlement, signaling the beginnings of an important new phase in Chinese-African economic engagement. While Nigeria hopes to boost the returns it currently earns on its FX reserves, benefiting from higher nominal yields and expectations of CNY appreciation, for the moment the amounts to be transacted remain small. Existing constraints on diversification suggest that Nigeria’s FX reserves will remain dominated by the US dollar (USD). Currently, the USD accounts for an estimated 79% of its FX reserves, with the Swiss franc, British pound and euro thought to make up the rest. Policy makers have hinted that they might reduce EUR holdings to make way for more CNY. Nigeria’s intent to diversify its reserves has a broader significance. As an oil producer obtaining most of its FX receipts in USD, with relatively little Chinese involvement in the country’s hydrocarbons sector, Nigeria is not the most obvious African candidate for CNY “reserve-ification.” However, the country’s large population and the strength of its import demand mean that it already ranks among China’s top five trading partners in Africa, despite the absence of more significant Chinese involvement in Nigeria’s oil sector. The size of its FX reserves grants Nigeria policy options that may not be open to other African countries. While smaller economies with fewer external reserves are likely to find the non-convertibility of the CNY more of a binding constraint, Africa’s oil producers – with larger external resources – are in a different position. They are more likely to deploy a small proportion of reserves in a non-convertible currency. There has been some talk of Nigeria eventually invoicing for oil in CNY – a move that might open the way for the trade settlement of other commodities in CNY. This could conceivably lead to other African sovereigns increasing the levels of CNY held in their FX reserves. For China, encouraging the use of CNY for trade invoicing and settlement is likely to be a more immediate policy aim than promoting the CNY as a reserve asset. In Africa, the sequencing of events, dictated by the small amount of global external reserves held in the region, suggests that more widespread trade settlement in CNY is likely to precede the adoption of the CNY as a reserve asset. For most sub-Saharan economies, ensuring the convertibility of FX reserves is more important at present than investing for a higher return.“ Imaginechina From “Nigeria – CNY reserves diversification,” Wing Lo, Razia Khan, Standard Chartered Global Research, September 15 From “Reuters News Asia Corporate Sentiment Survey,” September 14: “Business sentiment at Asia’s top companies fell in the third quarter to its lowest since the fourth quarter of 2009, weighed down by growing doubts over the strength of the global economy. The Reuters Asia Corporate Sentiment Index fell to 63 from 71 in the second quarter of 2011. Weak US economic data and worries about defaults in the euro zone have clouded the outlook for the global economy, weighing on sentiment across the board. China remains one of the most optimistic countries in Asia with 12 of 16 companies responding saying they maintained a positive outlook. Indian companies remain concerned about government policies. Japan was markedly gloomier than China with 19 of 26 companies responding maintaining a neutral outlook, with many exporters being hammered by a strong yen. The auto sector was bullish, a marked improvement over the second quarter when Japanese automakers were suffering from supply problems as a result of the March earthquake. Eight of 18 companies responding from the tech sector were neutral while seven were positive, roughly in line with the second quarter.” From “ANZ China Data Alert, August Trade Data,” Liu Li-Gang and Zhou Hao, September 10: “Both China’s exports and imports remain generally healthy in August, suggesting the economy is staying on track despite the global slowdown. Notably, imports accelerated, led by iron ore (+32.4% y/y), indicating that China’s domestic demand maintained a strong momentum. The trade statistics are consistent with other real activity indicators released on last Friday. As such, the risk of a hard landing has decreased significantly. The first two months of Q3 have registered an average monthly trade surplus of US$24.7 billion, indicating strong capital inflows. This will be translated into higher domestic monetary aggregates and an increase in inflationary pressures, should the PBoC not fully sterilise the inflows. This continued pressure on liquidity and inflation will somewhat offset the PBoC’s tightening efforts. It is unlikely for the PBoC to lower the reserve requirement ratio any time soon. As trade performance remains robust, RMB will continue its gradual appreciation in the foreseeable future. We maintain our forecast that RMB will strengthen by 5-6% versus USD this year, leading to a year-end rate of 6.28-6.30. US$/RMB trading band could be widened as well.” China Economic Review • October 2011 15 SNAPSHOT • q ue stion of the mont h snapshot Imaginechina ‘Real estate, love it or hate it, is a very effective way to generate wealth’ Grasp the small Also in this section local voices, p18 Chinese SMEs sound off on the credit crunch companies, P20 Real estate markets are cooling off fast portfolio, P22 Soufun, Evergrande 16 China Economic Review • October 2011 Chinese small- and medium-sized enterprises are short on credit and facing bankruptcy. What else is new? T he plight of Chinese small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) may be old news, but recently their prospects have worsened. Their already-thin margins are being crushed by intensifying competition, high commodity prices and skyrocketing wages. Now the central government’s attempts to slow down the economy by restricting credit growth are making it even more difficult to get loans to keep operations afloat. These factors, combined with downward trends in the export sector, have lead many pundits to forecast a “wave of bankruptcies” for Chinese SMEs. In fact, some say the wave is already underway. Zhou Dewen, head of the trade association for SMEs in the famed entrepreneurial hothouse of Wenzhou, made headlines when he claimed that nearly one-fifth of the city’s SMEs were at risk of going bankrupt. Zhou expects that figure to increase to 40% by the next Chinese New Year. Outsize influence A crisis among SMEs would have serious macroeconomic implications; they generate about 60% of GDP and employ two-thirds of Chinese workers. But it remains difficult to verify Zhou’s figures, or anyone else’s. While various ministries have produced statistics that show SMEs are doing fine, Victor Shih, a political economist at Northwestern University, pointed out that the National Bureau of Statistics’ definition for “large enterprises” was recently revised upward from RMB5 million in revenue per year to RMB20 million, banishing untold numbers of Chinese compa- nies from many statistical surveys: “We cannot rely on the statistics any more. Anecdotally, SMEs are suffering, and I tend to believe it,” he said in a written response to questions. Put in context, of course, SMEs are always suffering. In the US, about half of small businesses vanish within the first five years of being founded, many due to bankruptcy. “Small private companies go bankrupt all the time, in China as in other markets,” said Andy Rothman, chief China macro strategist at CLSA. He said CLSA regularly surveys a group of SMEs across the country, and only around 6% of them said that more SMEs had gone bankrupt in their area than usual. Under-leveraged While the general understanding of the health of China’s SMEs remains murky, it is undeniable that access to credit is a challenge for most Chinese private firms – and not just the small ones. “For [Chinese] public sector firms, the leverage ratio is eight to one. For private listed firms, it’s four to one,” said Frank Yu, professor of finance at China Europe International Business School (CEIBS). “That’s pretty constrained.” “The companies we invest in definitely need more money, and they need the lowest cost of capital possible,” said Chauncey Shey, executive managing director at SB China Venture Capital. Yu of CEIBS also noted that better access to credit can encourage stateowned enterprises (SOEs) to enter new markets and crowd out the private sector: “If [SMEs] have access to loans maybe they can go out and expand, but if they don’t, the state-owned firms can step in.” Some argue that this crowding-out effect is, in fact, a tacit policy goal. After all, this is a communist government, and Party leadership has repeatedly and clearly stated that it intends to preserve an economic leadership role for the state, and by extension state firms. But Beijing does not want to destroy the private sector, and politicians certainly don’t want to be blamed for a policy-induced “wave of bankruptcies.” Even so, helping SMEs is tricky. Like the small farmer, the small businessman is a sentimentally popular figure. But he is also a risky man to lend to. His business is unstable, he lacks collateral, and his reputation for innovation – if one excludes inventing schemes to evade In the US, about half of small businesses vanish within the first five years of being founded, many due to bankruptcy regulations – is almost certainly exaggerated. Thus state-owned banks have been reluctant to lend to SMEs, despite frequent urging from the central government. Meanwhile, policy-backed support for SMEs like micro-loans and subsidies – neither of which has been a panacea in other economies – have proven clunky to implement here. What has worked best in China so far has been the country’s trillion-dollar “back-alley” banking system, with channels ranging from the semi-legal to the criminal: friends and family, loan sharks, domestic private equity funds, and illicit loans from cash-sodden SOEs looking to get a higher return on their savings. Since many of these ventures are semi-legal at best, they have come under fire from Beijing. Vice Premier Wang Qishan recently called for a crackdown on “illegal financial activities,” which some read as targeting back-alley banks. But while shutting down loan sharks is politically popular, such parasites stay in business because they meet a genuine demand. Such a campaign, however morally satisfying, threatens to damage a critical, if expensive, funding mechanism for high-risk enterprises. There is one solution. Business demand for hybrid products like the Alibaba Group’s AliLoan program, which doled out around US$3.75 billion in credit to small businesses (in cooperation with partner banks) last year, has boomed in this environment. There is plenty of innovation in the works. “We are seeing a major surge [in lending] from the private sector,” said Shey of SB China Venture Capital. “Private capital is enough to tackle the problem in Wenzhou,” said Hu Minghuan, a manager at Wenzhou HEC Fashion International. “Wenzhou companies have accumulated lots of it.” The best policy, perhaps, would be to cut back on loans to the inefficient but well-connected state champions and leave the SMEs to fend for themselves. China Economic Review • October 2011 17 SNAPSHOT • Local Voices Man in the middle G iven widespread reports that Chinese small- and medium-sized enterprises are facing bankruptcy due to credit tightening, China Economic Review informally surveyed a selection of SME managers in Dongguan in Guangdong, Wenzhou and Hangzhou in Zhejiang, and two in cities in the interior: Wuhan in Hubei and Xi’an in Shaanxi. Jason Long, owner and general manager of Bright Star Manufacturing, which makes components for the auto and telecom sectors with a sideline in pharmaceuticals Our small companies are in urgent need of money for new product development and production expansion. Most firms opt for inter-company funding, borrow from relatives and friends, or use property to obtain a mortgage. Only a few choose to borrow from a guarantee company [a class of private lender] due to their high interest rates, which are typically 15-20% or higher. Although the government has said it will help SMEs, there are few practical policies to support us. Companies that have been relying on bank lending for a long time may face the risk of closure. The companies which have adapted to growth without borrowing from banks will be fine. The Chamber of Commerce in Dongguan has not been as successful in helping its member companies get funds as those in Zhejiang and Fujian provinces. I would only opt for bank lending if the risk is low. I estimate that less than 50% of SMEs in Dongguan lack money. A labor shortage has forced around 30% of all companies in Dongguan to operate at half capacity. Owner of a bathroom cabinet manufacturing company with 55 employees based in Hangzhou I get funding through relatives and friends. I also borrow money from banks for production and operation. SMEs in the bathroom product sector in Hangzhou often borrow a small amount of money through mortgage loans. The average interest rate is around 10%. Private lending in the city is not common. I am not worried that tight credit will cause our company to shut down but it will slow our development. Strict loan guarantee conditions are the toughest issue we have to face now. Bank lending is getting tighter. However, bank lending is not the only reason SMEs are struggling with development. Banks are profit-oriented and they choose the companies which have potential. Since there is a high risk that banks won’t profit much from lending to SMEs, it is natural that SMEs 18 China Economic Review • October 2011 Imaginechina Chinese SME managers vent about credit, labor markets and back-alley lending ‘Bank lending is not the only reason SMEs are struggling with development. Banks are profitoriented and they choose the companies which have potential. There is a high risk that banks won’t profit much from lending to SMEs’ anonymous Bathroom fixture manufacturer, Hangzhou have problems with borrowing. Hangzhou Enterprise Guarantee, a state-owned company, helps some companies with patents and financing by lowering mortgage requirements, but our industry does not enjoy any such privileges here. And I think only a few companies can meet the standards. Yang Bo, general manager at CIIC Education International Xi’an, with 40 employees Because we provide overseas education services, customers pay in advance and we use this money to maintain business operations. At present, 80% of companies operate with debt. Though we do not need to borrow money, many SMEs face tough funding problems, mainly because they are not able to obtain mortgages. Some seek help from friends and relatives but the amount they are able to borrow is usually less than RMB10,000. Others ask their local chamber of commerce or other organizations for funding. The amounts lent can be between RMB5 million and RMB10 million. Although the Chinese bank lending model is not mature, I still prefer to apply for bank funding because the interest rate is around 9%, while at other organizations it is above 10% and the risk is higher. Mr Wang, managing director at Wuhan Roafe Sanitary Wares, with 50 employees I prefer bank funding, which is safer, or guarantee company loans, which are issued in cooperation with banks. Traditionally, however, we have higher trust in banks. If I need less than RMB100,000, I ask relatives or friends for help. The interest rate in banks is around 7.6% in Wuhan while at guarantee companies it is higher. I borrow money to open more stores, buy more inventory and launch more commercial events. Our company is at risk of stagnating development due to bank lending difficulties. For instance, capital flows will be lower, inventory is likely to decrease and I may not be able to launch more promotional activities or open more stores. I think many SMEs, especially those who are not familiar with alternative ways of capital management, will be forced to shut down. Wuhan currently does not have an association to cooperate with banking institutions to help SMEs. However, I heard the Qianzhou Chamber of Com- ‘Many SMEs, especially those who are not familiar with alternative ways of capital management, will be forced to shut down’ Yang Bo, CIIC Education International merce in Hubei was planning to borrow RMB100-200 million from the Agricultural Bank of China, but it seems the two parties did not reach an agreement. The main issue is that there is no clear and standardized audit mechanism yet. Hu Minghuan, information manager at Wenzhou HEC Fashion International We have enough money so we use our own capital and put property up as collateral. The money is used for trading, manufacturing, buying land and building new factories. I think a few inefficient companies with insufficient capital and high operational costs will go bankrupt in the face of tight credit. In Wenzhou, corporate funding often comes from banks, but money for personal investment often comes from relatives and friends, with the maximum amount borrowed around RMB10,000. The worst solution is to borrow from a guarantee company because the interest rate is very high. The stricter guarantee standard is currently the main difficulty in terms of bank lending. Because of tough bank regulations we would likely lose orders, delay factory expansion, or have to cut staff salaries. Fortunately, there are large amounts of private capital flows in the city as well. In my opinion, the most effective way of financing is borrowing from friends or relatives. Cooperation between associations and banking institutions is still new in Wenzhou – it appeared two years ago. I think tight credit is not the reason why 50% of all companies in Zhejiang are operating at half capacity. The main reasons are decreased orders and higher costs. 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PREMIUM LOCATIONS IN LONDON | NEW YORK | PARIS | SYDNEY | BEIJING | SHANGHAI | HANGZHOU | CHENGDU | GUANGZHOU (OPEN IN FALL) China Economic Review • October 2011 19 SNAPSHOT • Companies & Sectors Second course In the property market, tightening measures are kicking in; diversification will be key in coming months F or all the central government’s attempts to cool the property sector, monetary tightening and loan restrictions couldn’t keep the big boys down. China Vanke, the country’s largest property developer by market value, announced in August that profits for the first half of 2011 were up 5.9%. But compared with competitors, Vanke’s earnings were relatively unimpressive. Country Garden’s profits surged 63% in the same period. Evergrande beat expectations with a whopping 147.9% year-on-year rise in core business profits. Among the 65 Chinese listed property developers who had reported first-half results by the end of August, average revenues surged 11.75% and profits increased 19.92%. Beijing’s crackdown on real estate speculation does not appear to have hurt developers’ bottom lines so far. Down-market strategy Part of the explanation for continued growth is that Beijing did not extend targeted property investment barriers to lower-tier cities; nimble developers with nationwide networks therefore followed equally buyers into those areas. Sam Crispin, director at PwC, said diversification has spared margins for many developers. “It’s not developers finding loopholes; they’re developing nationwide markets. Those developers posting higher results are those that have successfully diversified geographically and moved into commercial developments.” Yet even as realtors prepare for “golden” September and “silver” October, the traditional high season in Chinese residential markets, the smell of dead leaves is in the air. The first harbingers of winter are the restless markets. The TAO, AlphaShares’ China Real Estate ETF that tracks 47 Chinese real estate firms on the New York Stock Exchange, is down nearly 17% year-to date, compared to a 5% decline in the Dow Jones Industrial Average. Bond markets are also starting to look queasy. Evergrande’s dollar-denominated bonds, for example, have lost popularity 20 China Economic Review • October 2011 even on the back of its rising profits. According to data from the US Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, yields on the company’s 13% notes due January 2015 climbed 3.17 percentage points to 14.92%, indicating increased skepticism. The skepticism is based on a collection of headlines. Beijing’s efforts to slow lending and property price growth this year (including three consecutive reserve-requirement ratio hikes and two deposit and loan interest rate hikes) are already having some effect on residential property prices in first-tier markets, and will continue to apply downward pressure to lending for the rest of 2011. That’s bad news for smaller developers that have failed to diversify. Of the 26 out of 65 listed Chinese developers that reported a decline in profits in H1, ironically most were smaller players in lower-tier cities, who appeared unable to compete with nationwide developers. The central government is now saying it plans to extend existing loan restrictions into lower-tier cities; at the same time, it plans to create a nationwide home ownership database to prevent speculators from evading mortgage restrictions by buying second and third (and eighth and twelfth) homes in disconnected markets. Financial regulators are also increasing their supervision of banks to crack down on new innovative financing channels – such as Banker’s Acceptance notes – that have been used to skirt reserve requirements. Some of these loans have presumably found their way into property markets. There are other worrying signs: The Way of the TAO AlphaShares China Real Estate ETF (TAO) $25 1,200,000 $20 1,000,000 800,000 $15 600,000 $10 400,000 $5 $0 200,000 Sep 10 Oct 10 Nov 10 Dec10 Jan 11 Feb 11 Mar 11 Apr 11 May 11 Jun 11 Jul 11 Aug 11 Close Volume Source: NYSE 0 Among listed developers, inventory increased nearly 40% in the first half of the year. According to data from Knight Frank, the residential land bank among developers is expected to grow by 51% to 140,000 hectares by the end of 2011. Such an overhang will take between five and 10 years to profitably digest. “The golden month will not be that booming,” said Regina Yang, director of research at property consultancy Knight Frank. She predicted that while transaction volumes may increase month-onmonth due to the seasonal effect, they will likely decrease year-on-year. Not an emergency But developers’ prospects – big developers, that is – may be better than they appear. The last time the central government slammed the brakes on the property markets in 2007, it overcorrected, with a negative effect on wider economic performance. As frothy as the China market may be, Beijing knows that pushing prices too far down would be a mistake. “A 15% correction is desirable, 30-50% is not,” said Crispin of PwC. This time policy-makers appear to be proceeding more carefully, and the recent slowdown in inflation and soft- Imaginechina ening in export markets will only make them more cautious. In fact, despite all the noise, Beijing may not get around to enforcing new restrictions in lower-tier cities if the wider macroeconomic picture remains volatile. Meanwhile, consumer demand is still strong. A report from CLSA claims that 90% of Chinese homebuyers are not, in fact, speculators, but are buying a place they plan to live in – many are likely upgrading from smaller, cheaper apartments, a far more sustainable source of demand. And part of the price increases is no doubt due to improvements in the quality of housing being sold today – better bathrooms, higher water pressure and parking spaces. CLSA reports that onethird of buyers pay with cash. Buy to sell Most of the large developers are also sitting on plenty of cash, and the smart ones are moving it into commercial real estate. Michael Klibaner of real estate consultancy Jones Lang Lasalle noted that demand for top-shelf office space in China is particularly strong these days – but he also said that credit shortages are slowing new investment. Other parts of the commercial property sector are even more attractive, in particular those that offer exposure to the China consumption story. “If you can get a good tenant mix, I believe retail is the best asset you can have,” said Yang of Knight Frank. “Even in the second- and third-tier cities, where office rents may be only RMB4-5 per square meter per day, retail rent rates may be as high as RMB20-30 per sqm per day.” She said companies like Dalian Wanda are building mixed-use residential/commercial complexes, selling off the condos and keeping the stores. Despite a lingering chill in the air from government restrictions, property developers appear equipped to outlast the winter. Profits from residential may slow for the rest of the year, but the wellhedged will endure it. The secret to their success is the Chinese fondness (madness?) for property; until there’s something better to do with their money, Chinese will endure big penalties to keep buying in. “Real estate, love it or hate it, is a very effective way to generate wealth,” said Crispin of PwC. China Economic Review • October 2011 21 PORTFOLIO • soufu n, evergra nde Soufun (SFUN.NASDAQ) Being a bellwether for the property industry can only be bad news tions on property have spooked would-be investors. Some argue that Soufun is more insulated to the downturn than your average property developer. Chen Jie, a professor with the Center for Housing Policy Studies at Fudan University, has said that Soufun faces lower risks from regulation because it provides information, rather than buying and selling property. But a closer look at Soufun’s business suggests its risks are just as high, if not Out in the cold Closing price and trading volume, Sep 2010 - Sep 2011 4000 30 3500 2500 20 2000 15 1500 10 1000 5 500 0 US$ 25 3000 ‘000 L ast year, Soufun conducted one of the most successful IPOs by a Chinese business in the US. The company, whose real estate website drew more mainland visitors than any other in 2010, saw its shares surge 73% on its first day of trading as bankers touted its combined exposure to China’s fast-growing internet story and the property sector. Since then, however, the stock has born little resemblance to other Chinese internet companies whose valuations have been lifted by a wave of investor enthusiasm. Soufun’s stock price has swung between highs and lows in a classic “head and shoulders” pattern – its price slowly building, leveling out, soaring to new highs, and then retreating again in stages, before repeating the process again. The stock’s volatility stems from the company’s connection with an increasingly unloved segment: the property sector, where Beijing’s tough restric- 0 5-Oct-10 1-Dec-10 28-Jan-11 28-Mar-11 24-May-11 21-Jul-11 16-Sep-11 higher. The company makes most of its revenues (74.7% in 2010) by selling ad space on its website to property developers, agencies and home furnishings companies. That makes Soufun vulnerable: When companies meet hard times, ad spending is one of the first things to go. Property developers may be cash-rich, but they are still likely to scale back on advertising in what is universally perceived to be a slow sales period. Rumblings among ad agencies support this outlook. Many industry professionals expect weak spending in 2012 from both real estate and auto advertisers, typically the two biggest customers for online advertising. Soufun has posted strong revenue growth – in the second quarter, its revenues nearly doubled year-on-year to US$80.6 million, while its profits jumped to US$22.9 million from US$2.9 million the previous year – but that clip will be hard to maintain in a downturn. Evergrande (3333.HKG): Well-positioned to weather the storm Evergrande Real Estate, China’s secondlargest property developer by sales, stunned analysts this summer with its first-half results. In a period of artificially restricted demand, the company doubled its sales volume year-on-year to RMB42.32 billion (US$6.71 billion), while its underlying profit rose 147.9% annually to RMB4.81 billion. The secret to Evergrande’s success was its diversification: All told, the Guangzhou-based developer has a presence in 101 cities, including the new economic centers of the country’s west, like Chongqing, Wuhan and Hefei. Unrestricted Restrictions on property purchases and mortgages have succeeded at reining in price growth in first-tier cities, especially Shanghai and Beijing. However, property markets in less regulated lower-tier cities have actually heated up, as investors stymied in the first-tier cities snap up houses in smaller urban centers. 22 China Economic Review • October 2011 This trend has not escaped the notice of regulators, who have recently begun discussing plans to extend restrictions to smaller cities. Any such move, when it occurs, would present a risk to Evergrande’s business. That’s one reason why investors are jumping ship on the company’s Stock snapshot Stock price 52-week range Outstanding shares Market cap Average volume (3m) Earnings per share* As of September 19 HK$3.79 US$2.52-US$6.27 14.89b HK$56.3b 97.9m HK$0.60 Price/earnings ratio* 6.36 Mean analyst recommendation** 1.28 Analyst 1-yr target estimate HK$5.40 * Trailing twelve months ** 1.0 = strong buy, 5.0 = sell stock, reducing its value by nearly 40% between mid-July and mid-September. That decline is unwarranted, and presents a buying opportunity. Even if regulations are extended, Evergrande will remain better-positioned than its competitors, many of whom own much of their property in the vicinity of their headquarters. The company has plenty of projects – 62 in all – ready for launch in the second half, mostly in the fourth quarter. Evergrande’s continued expansion has pushed up its net debt ratio from 53% at the end of 2010 to 73% within the last six months, but its cash also expanded 44%, helping to secure its financial position. In addition, management has promised to slow expansion and start selling, after Evergreen added 49 million square meters to its land bank in the first half. It now has a land bank of 135 million square meters with 181 projects – meaning that its stock is trading at a hefty discount to its net asset value. Talking P oints talkingpoints “We have a contract to show NFL American football games, starting this season” Dot-not anymore The era of indirect foreign ownership of Chinese internet companies is coming to an end C Also in this section faT DRAGON, p26 China’s “ghost cities” will soon be full john g. whitesides, P28 Science as a tool of Chinese diplomacy Q&A, p34 Kun Zhang, VP of video site PPLive, on online sports 24 China Economic Review • October 2011 hina continues to bar foreigners from ownership in many sectors of the economy that are considered particularly sensitive from the standpoint of national security. The internet is one such sector where direct foreign ownership is prohibited. Yet it is well known that virtually the entire internet sector has been funded by initial public offerings (IPOs) in overseas markets, making foreign investors the owners of many companies in this sensitive sector – in direct violation of the clear provisions of the law. New regulations recently promulgated by the Ministry of Commerce (MofCom) suggest that this unusual situation has reached its end. This trick was managed by use of what is known in the US as a Variable Interest Entity (VIE). Under a VIE structure, a Chinese internet provider is effectively owned by a foreign entity through the use of a complex set of contractual arrangements rather than through ownership of stock. The control is so total and complete that the arrangement is considered the equivalent of ownership under US accounting rules. New internet order On September 1, the Regulation of the Ministry of Commerce on the National Security Review System for Mergers and Acquisitions of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors (the Regulations) became effective. The regulations provide the long-awaited procedures for national security review for foreign-related merger and acquisition activity that is required under the recently promulgated PRC AntiMonopoly Law. To the surprise of many, the Regulations also took direct aim at the VIE procedure. The provisions are deceptively simple. Article 9 of the Regulations provides that it is not The clarity of the regulations means that there is no longer any place to hide by claiming that the Chinese law on these issues is ambiguous or unclear permitted to make use of “contractual controls” to evade the requirements of Chinese law that would otherwise restrict or prohibit foreign investment in a sensitive sector. This is a clear prohibition against the use of VIE structures. Since the whole goal of VIEs here is to hide foreign investment from Chinese regulators, it is likely that such structures will not be caught by national security review at the outset of the investment. To deal with this issue, Article 10 of the Regulations provides that where such contractual controls are used but not reported to the Chinese regulators, the parties involved have the independent duty to immediately terminate the offending conduct. If the par- Steve Dickinson is a partner with Harris & Moure PLLC in Seattle, Washington and Qingdao, China Sudden impact The immediate impacts are numerous and serious. First, IPOs in the internet sector that explicitly rely on a VIE structure are clearly under a cloud and are quite properly being delayed or cancelled. Many investors have proposed expanding the VIE structure for foreign IPOs in other restricted sectors of the Chinese economy, such as telecom and medical services. It is now clear that this expanded use of the VIE structure in China will not succeed. The Regulations show that existing foreign investment in the internet sector is built on a shaky foundation. It is Istock ties do not take action on their own, the regulators have the authority to order the immediate termination of the offending investment by whatever means necessary. What does this mean for foreign investors in China? Many investors persist in the belief that existing VIE structures are sound and that such arrangements can still safely be used in the future. This has always been a mistaken analysis of Chinese law, and the new regulations make that clear. clear that Chinese regulators have the legal authority to step in and order that all of these investments be terminated. Even if this drastic step is not taken, it is equally clear that existing contractual arrangements are in violation of Chinese law. This renders the contracts unenforceable and VIE structures essentially meaningless. None of this is actually new; these risks have long been known. However, the clarity of the Regulations means that there is no longer any place to hide by claiming that Chinese law on these issues is ambiguous or unclear. Where Chinese law says that ownership by foreigners is restricted or prohibited, the law means what it says. Foreigners who invest in violation of the law are making a bet that the violation will be ignored. In today’s China, this is extremely unlikely. 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Just go to any Chinese city and the evidence is apparent in thousands of empty apartment blocks and ill-conceived government megaprojects. The ultimate symbols of investment gone mad are China’s “ghost towns” – gleaming new cities without inhabitants. Nouriel Roubini, the gloomy critic of excessive consumption and dodgy lending practices in the West, recently cited the proliferation of empty cities as evidence that China was heading for its own financial crisis and years of anemic, Japan-style growth. The trouble with this analysis is that it ignores the reality on the ground. Urbanization pressures, housing demand, and prior experience suggest that China’s so-called “ghost towns” will not remain empty for long. Sure, there are plenty of problems with China’s investment model – but building ahead to satisfy future demand for millions of new homes is not one of them. The poster child for critics who argue that China’s building boom has become unmoored from reality is Ordos, a municipality in Inner Mongolia where local officials have built an empty city in the middle of the Gobi Desert. Almost all the 100,000 apartments have been snapped up by local investors, but 90% remain empty. Ordos appears to be a classic example of investment racing far ahead of demand. Yet Ordos, which claims to sit on one-sixth of the nation’s coal deposits, is anything but representative. Flush with coal money, Ordos can afford to flash its cash on risky investment projects. If its gamble fails, developers and investors will lick their wounds and move on; any impact on China’s property market will be miniscule. Meeting real needs The vast majority of China’s “ghost towns” are new districts built on the edges of expanding cities, not mini-Dubais in the desert. And these new suburbs are prepared to serve multiple sources of new demand; both providing much-needed housing for people relocating from older, smaller homes in the city center, and housing rural migrants looking for cheap housing closer to the industrial zones on the urban outskirts. In larger cities, they also provide space for new campuses to house China’s exploding university population. Take Zhengzhou, the capital of Henan province, which has been criticized for building a huge new district on its eastern edge. Zhengzhou’s student population quadrupled to more than 600,000 over the past decade, and its new urban district will soon house 250,000 students and China Economic Review • October 2011 Imaginechina China has built massive, empty cities with stimulus money. Not a problem, writes Fat Dragon Living room: Ordos, a ghost town financed by Inner Mongolia mines Almost every major city in China contains a thriving neighborhood that was once empty. China’s cities must build ahead to accommodate millions of new urbanites teachers in 15 new campuses. Inevitably, new urban districts will not fill up immediately after they are built. It takes time to attract a critical mass of inhabitants. But China’s cities need to absorb 20 million new urbanites every year in a country that already has an estimated shortfall of 75 million housing units. Most “ghost towns” are merely new suburbs that people have not moved into yet. Pointing at a handful of empty urban districts as evidence of a giant property bubble ignores the reality that China has a huge and growing demand for new housing. Almost every major city in China contains a thriving neighborhood that was once empty. China’s cities must build ahead to accommodate millions of new urbanites, and it makes sense to house them in new districts, rather than hope that congested old neighborhoods can bear the strain. Of course, plenty of ill-conceived projects will fail along the way, and some developers and investors will lose money. China’s urbanization process is riddled with inefficiency and waste. But, in time, The country’s empty cities will fill up – just as Shanghai’s Pudong district, once the biggest ghost town of them all, filled up over the past decade. Talking P oints Better diplomacy, better science China is using scientific cooperation agreements as an effective diplomatic tool; writes John G. Whitesides Professor John G. Whitesides, PhD, is the director of the International Studies Program at the University of Colorado, Denver. He is currently working on a book on science and American foreign policy 28 S peaking to the American journal Science in 2008, Chinese Premier Hu Jintao admitted that China’s science and technology research efforts need to be “more integrated with those of the world.” Such integration, so appropriate today given China’s global position, was not always possible. Thanks to internal instability and the Cold War, Chinese science and technology remained locked out of collaborative relationships for decades, causing the country’s scientific community to fall far behind its European, American and Japanese counterparts. However, as détente shifted global relationships in the 1970s, scientific exchanges quickly became one of the most successful components of China’s opening. Within a decade, China was America’s largest bilateral scientific partner – a position the country has retained ever since. Today, China maintains scientific agreements with over 150 countries, and those agreements are being used not only to further the advance of human knowledge but also as a means of political influence and diplomatic negotiation. Cooperative carrots Science and technology have long been a part of Chinese diplomacy. The Shanghai Communiqué of 1972 proposed scientific exchanges years before the existence of formal US/China relations; similar exchanges occurred with France and West Germany. Throughout the 1970s the US provided China numerous scientific “carrots” to increase America’s political and commercial influence, including providing launch services for a geosynchronous telecommunications satellite, germ plasm for recombinant DNA, seismic survey ships from US oil firms, a Landsat groundstation, and the fabrication of a synchrotron for high-energy physics. Indeed, by 1985, President Reagan could proudly note that “maturing science and technology cooperation with China, a cornerstone of our expanding relationship, is now in its eighth year and is our largest government-to-government program ... we credit the doors opened by our successful science and technology program with contributing positively to the recent reforms made by the Chinese.” The past two decades witnessed the maturation of Chinese science and technology at home and abroad. At home, the “wu ke” – namely the Ministry of Science and Technology, the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS), China Association for Science and Technology, the Chinese Academy of Engineering Sciences and the National Science Foundation of China – actively direct Chinese R&D, with the Ministry of Science and Technology the primary funder of international science China Economic Review • October 2011 While Chinese scientific output may have little to offer established scientific powerhouses, to developing nations, cooperation with the Chinese science establishment represents opportunity collaboration (its 2005 budget included US$200 million for such activities). Abroad, China looks to international scientific collaboration to provide it with both prestige and access to cutting-edge research. For example, China completed about 1% of the International Human Genome Project and agreed in 2007 to pay around 10% of the costs of the ongoing International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor project. However, although China invests heavily in R&D and maintains a high annual R&D growth rate (around 18% between 2002-2007) as well as being a prime recipient of global venture capital, its role in international science remains limited. International collaboration is concentrated on five nations - the United States, Japan, Germany, the UK and Canada, which together account for nearly three-quarters of internationally co-authored Chinese papers. Chinese scientific output as such may have little to offer established scientific powerhouses. To developing nations, however, cooperation with the Chinese science establishment represents opportunity. For example, perhaps borrowing from its experience with the West, China currently uses its own science and technology to gain influence, resources and market access in Africa. The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), established in 2000, is the primary Chinese vehicle for such ventures. Contracted through the state-owned China International Trust and Investment Company (CITIC), Beijing funds significant science and technology projects, including investing US$600 million for hydroelectric power in Ghana and US$938 million for an aluminum smelter in Egypt. As Sino-African trade grew to US$100 billion annually, FOCAC launched new initiatives in 2009 in 49 different countries. The 100-plus demonstration projects funded by FOCAC included a research hospital in Nairobi, Kenya; an S&T center in Thyolo, Malawi; and the “Africa Technologi- No alternative This Chinese alternative to Bretton Woods-style development worries critics, who emphasize the poor quality of Chinese assistance, the lack of local participation, and the state-centered approach to modernization. Nonetheless, many African countries consider China a useful partner; even a World Bank report concluded in 2008 that “China’s investments ease Africa’s poverty.” Science and technology will play an ever-larger role in future Chinese foreign Imaginechina cal City” near Khartoum. Funded by cheap Chinese loans, such projects are naturally packaged as a “winwin” for both sides, offering China access and investments while benefiting local African societies. Vasco Lino, research and innovation director for Mozambique’s Science and Technology Ministry explained in an article in Nature magazine: “They bring everything, they set everything in place; infrastructure, expert assistance. We never see the money, everything is handled by them. It’s very easy and fast. In one year, they finished everything.” relations. For example, during the First Trilateral Korea-Japan-China Ministerial Meeting on Science and Technology Cooperation, which took place in Seoul in 2007, the three regional powers agreed to create a bioinformatics network to share findings in the life sciences, increase regional corporate R&D investments, and collaborate on natural disaster prevention and mitigation. The Chinese Academy of Science’s Roadmap to 2050 imagines the country as the world’s “science center.” Whether this is achievable and in what time frame is an open question – the domestic research system still suffers from institutional development challenges – but internal weakness means scientific cooperation is even more critical to China’s rise as a global power. Cooperation provides China with access to cutting-edge research, and such exchanges provide a friendly basis for regional partnerships. Chinese science already operates as a diplomatic and economic tool in the developing world, and will likely play an even greater role in the future. China Economic Review • October 2011 29 Talking P oints • Que stion & Answer Sporting good Zhang Kun, vice president of corporate development at online sports video site PPTV, on football, Wimbledon and piracy P PTV (also known as PPLive) is one of China’s online video success stories, due in part to its focus on one particular kind of content: sports. Founded in 2004, the website offers a wide variety of video programming – most of it sports-related – over streaming video servers that operate according to a distributed peer-to-peer model that reduces costs by reducing bandwidth expenses. In addition, PPTV viewers tend to watch for relatively longer periods of time: Football games are longer than cat videos. This makes it popular with advertisers. Zhang Kun, PPTV’s new vice president of corporate development, spoke with China Economic Review about the company’s business model and growing out of a dependence on content piracy. Q : Can you talk a bit more specifically about hosting sports videos online as opposed to other kinds of content? It seems like there is an advantage there; people prefer to watch sports live. A : Yeah, there’s no point of watching a DVD. Sports were what the company started with, and it seems like we have really gotten into people’s minds. When people think of watching sports, they come to PPTV. We do spend a lot of money in this particular area, especially for acquiring rights like those for the World Cup and Wimbledon. Q : What about import barriers? There are restrictions on foreign movies and such in China. Are there any restrictions on sports content? A Q A : The whole industry in China has seen these kind of issues in differing degrees. I would say that before 2009, the majority of the content came from [pirated] sources. But since 2009 it has been getting better. Look at the cost of content. before 2009, online media rights for a TV series were probably sold for RMB2,000 [US$310] per episode or less. Now it is easily RMB100,000, or sometimes even RMB200,000 per episode – and we are talking about nonexclusive rights. Piracy is now considered a crime, not just an “issue.” Q A : Do you have a license to show NBA basketball games? What other kinds of sporting events are you licensing here? A : We have a contract to show NFL American football games; starting this season, we are showing three games : So how does this play out with PPTV and sports? : You know sports has an advantage in that area. As I mentioned earlier, no one buys a sports DVD. Most people watch it live. That’s the nature of that sort of programming. You can buy a movie DVD on the street and upload it. But for sports licensing and content, you have to get it through an accredited source. You can’t just get the signal from anywhere and then show it. Q A China Economic Review • October 2011 per week. For the NBA, I am not sure. : Some have accused your website of hosting a large amount of pirated content. : None that I am aware of. It just depends on user demand for a given sport. NBA basketball is very popular. Hockey? Many Chinese people don’t know what this sport is. Q 30 It just depends on user demand. NBA basketball is very popular. Hockey? Many Chinese people don’t know what this sport is : You can’t? When people are complaining about pirated content on your website, aren’t they complaining about live sports? : I think they are complaining more about video-on-demand content like dramas and movies uploaded to our site. If you are a content owner, if you find a problem, let us know. That’s the proper way to address the issue. China Investment Conference 2011: Chengdu and Shenyang The Must-Attend Conference of the Year Chengdu - October 13 / Shenyang - October 25 China has thousands of high-growth, profitable private enterprises in the market that are seeking financing. Today, Chinese companies face more choices for raising capital than ever before, including listing on US, Hong Kong, German and other exchanges, or receiving investment by private equity or venture capital firms. China Economic Review invites you to attend an investment conference in two of China’s fastest-growing second-tier cities, Chengdu and Shenyang. This conference is targeted at companies which are interested in raising capital and the industry experts who can advise them. The conference will both provide the management of local companies with information and perspectives from top industry advisors on the best strategies for raising capital, and introduce industry experts to successful private Chinese companies which are seeking financing Shenyang Chengdu Sponsors: Who should attend? • High level management of Chinese companies seeking financing • Investment banks • Law firms • Accounting firms • Investor relations firms Media partner: Sponsorship opportunities are available. Please contact: Caroline Fontaine E-mail: [email protected] Tel: +86 21 5385 9061 Organizers: The Financial Service Office of Shenyang The SME Service Center of Chengdu The SME Service Alliance of Chengdu Co- organizer: China Economic Review special report • econ omic growth Before the storm An economic winter looms in the West, but the real threat to China’s economy is internal Also in this section bears vs. bulls, p36 Skeptics and supporters of the China growth story face off W ith the prospect of a further recession looming in much of the developed world, China appears to be a safe haven. Clashes over bailouts for debt-ridden economies threaten to unravel the EU; in the US, stock markets swing wildly and unemployment remains near record highs. Economists who foresaw a quick recovery several years ago now warn that any global resurgence is a long way off. Meanwhile, China’s economy continues to grow at a clip of more than 9% annually, which has some commentators openly speculating whether an apparently vigorous China will help shoulder the recovery of the world economy. But skeptics believe that China’s outward strength conceals internal illness. The country’s economic model, they say, continues to systematically misallocate – and sometimes waste outright – the nation’s wealth. The system leverages China’s high household savings rate to provide cheap capital to local governments and stateowned enterprises, which then invest in assets and infrastructure. As a means to rapidly bootstrap China out of poverty, the strategy worked well, but critics claim it is now time to set it aside: It produces too much debt and too much waste, and it delays the arrival of a more sustainable form of growth in which consumers would play a larger role. Adrenaline shot How the country will continue to grow, and by extension how and where it will drive the global economy, hinges largely on its internal policies. Those policies will be tested again in upcoming months as China looks to navigate a minefield of risks: softening markets for its exports, 32 China Economic Review • October 2011 persistent consumer price inflation, overcapacity among manufacturers and froth in its property market. If past performance indicates future results, the record of China’s economic planners does justify a degree of optimism. Over the past few years, Beijing has maneuvered quickly and effectively to sustain the country’s growth. As stock markets around the world plummeted in late 2008, the government swooped in with a US$586 billion stimulus package that dwarfed most policy responses in the West. While an unknown amount of this spending was actually rolled over from previous projects, the huge price tag had its intended effect: Banks opened the floodgates to borrowers, and consumer Boom times Contribution to GDP growth 16 14 12 10 8 6 4 2 0 -2 -4 2001 Source: CEIC 2002 2003 Net exports 2004 2005 2006 2007 Gross capital formation 2008 2009 2010 Imaginechina LEFT BEHIND: Critics say China’s economic system unfairly suppresses consumption confidence remained high. The plan was arguably better at boosting investment, especially in infrastructure and clean technology, than in spurring consumption, although it also included subsidies for cars and appliances. But then again, building infrastructure to better bind the nation’s interior to its more-developed coastline was unquestionably necessary. The surge in spending helped to cushion the economic decline both within China and around the world. The InterAmerican Development Bank estimates that the stimulus added 2.6 and 0.6 percentage points to China’s GDP growth in 2009 and 2010, respectively. The pick-up in construction and consumption also benefited countries like the US, Australia, Japan and Korea that export the products which China demands: high-valueadded products, industrial commodities and agricultural goods. This outpouring of liquidity had obvious benefits, but it also fueled inflation and sharply increased debt. Total government debt rose from just above 40% in 2008 to more than 50% of GDP in 2009 and 2010, according to official data – which many analysts believe signifi- China Economic Review • October 2011 33 special report • econ omic growth Imaginechina would such [additional stimulus] be given serious consideration,” said Roach of Morgan Stanley. “In the event of a further global slowing, which is expected to stop short of recession, I would expect a more passive response from Chinese policy makers – namely, slowing the rate of renminbi appreciation and limiting any further hikes in policy interest rates.” ‘The biggest misconception people have about China is that it’s an export-led economy’ ANDY ROTHMAN, CLSA cantly underestimates the real volume of debt in the system. Sea change But both those critics and fans of the 2008 stimulus package agree in one respect: China should not repeat the exercise. Some say another burst of stimulus would send both inflation and nonperforming loans to unsustainable levels. Stephen Roach, a board member of Morgan Stanley Asia who formerly served as the bank’s chief economist, believes a further round of fiscal or monetary stimulus is unlikely, given the continued need to tame inflation. Andy Rothman, China macro strategist at CLSA, says stimulus is unnecessary regardless: China is already insulated against a slowdown 34 China Economic Review • October 2011 in developed markets, partly because it is less dependent on exports than it was three years ago. “The biggest misconception people have about China is that it’s an exportled economy,” said Rothman. “It’s not. Exports right now are a trivial driver of GDP growth. Disproportionately important to employment, sure – I’m not saying exports don’t matter – but they’re not nearly as important as domestic consumption and domestic investment.” It’s true that many of the world’s products are assembled in China’s factories, but the total value added to the products is usually just a fraction (often 5% or less) of the finished product price. In 2010, exports fueled just 9% of the country’s GDP growth, compared with 37% for consumption and 54% for investment. Export industries remain an important source of jobs, but that is also changing. In 2008, factory layoffs in China’s export coastal hubs incited riots. In 2011, those same factories are having trouble finding enough workers to run at capacity. Because exports make up a minor part of the economy, China’s policy response to further weakness in the West is likely to be muted. “Only in the unlikely event that the world tips back into recession, Off-balance But that doesn’t mean Beijing can rest on its laurels. Skeptics argue that the stimulus package was only superficially a success – and that it may have even been counterproductive. By encouraging further investment growth, they say, China’s quick fix has actually exacerbated economic distortions that could encumber future growth. At the heart of this debate lies a much-publicized initiative that China’s leaders have christened “rebalancing.” Rebalancing refers to a long-term shift in economic growth from a model that relies on investment and lower-end manufacturing toward one that is driven by domestic consumers and service industries. President Hu Jintao often speaks about making growth more “inclusive,” a catchphrase for more moderate growth that will deliver more benefits to the lower and middle classes. Premier Wen Jiabao, meanwhile, has been an advocate for rebalancing since 2007, when he called the Chinese economy “unstable, unbalanced, uncoordinated and ultimately unsustainable.” The 12th Five-Year Plan lays out initiatives for rebalancing investment-driven excesses, such as boosting the contribution of the services sector to GDP by four percentage points to 47% by 2015. This is a critical transformation for China’s model. Compared with manufacturing, the services sector typically pollutes less, consumes less resources, pays its workers more, and employs about 25% more people per unit of GDP created. The plan also includes steps to expand welfare services like pensions, healthcare, education and subsidized housing. These programs not only return wealth to lower-income people, but also encourage them to consume by relieving them of the need to save heavily in case of emergency. Unfortunately, the stimulus package, which prioritized infrastructure, actually tipped China’s economy even further away from consumption – the very opposite of rebalancing. Since 2007, consumption has fallen as a share of GDP, as has labor’s share of GDP compared to that of capital. If regulators slow currency appreciation and limit interest rate hikes to steady the economy in the coming months, as Roach of Morgan Stanley predicts, rebalancing will be further delayed. So much for Robin Hood Rebalancing is necessary, critics say, because China’s current economic model channels vast amounts of capital from households to governments and stateowned enterprises – effectively taking from the poor and giving to the rich. Michael Pettis, a professor of finance at Peking University, argues that three main factors direct this flow of capital: wage levels, the value of the currency and interest rates, all of which have been held at artificially low levels. Until last year, for example, wages were growing more slowly than productivity; good for business, because the cost of labor has dropped, but bad for worker consumption. An undervalued currency, meanwhile, similarly acts a consumption tax, by making the value of goods Chinese Over-invested? Share of GDP growth 100% 80% 60% 40% 20% 0% -20% -40% -60% 2001 2002 2003 Final consumption 2004 2005 2006 2007 Gross capital formation 2008 2009 2010 Net exports Source: CEIC people buy relatively expensive compared to the goods they produce. Finally, suppressed interest rates ensure a steady flow of cheap money to businesses and other borrowers. Banks are now required to maintain a floor of 6.56% on lending rates and a ceiling of 3.5% on deposit rates. The system guarantees them a profit of 3% on their loans, which in turn gives them motivation to lend readily. But this cheap capital comes at the expense of households, who are limited to a nominal return of 3.5% on their saved wages. That’s far lower than the current inflation rate of 6% – meaning that most households are paying interest of 2.5% annually just for the privilege of lending their wealth to the bank. All these factors mean households consume less. Worse, artificially low interest rates also encourage an unknown amount of bad investments. While interest rates are very low, non-performing loans are not immediately troubling – and inflation effectively drives down the real value of debt. However, the wealth such loans destroy will someday need to be subtracted from GDP numbers. Pettis explained: “Let’s say I have two investments. In both cases I borrow US$100 and invest them, and in one case I create US$105 of value and in the other one I create US$95 of value. Both of those things will show up the same way in the GDP numbers, but in the first case I’m actually getting richer, and in the second case I’m actually getting poorer.” As soon as capital becomes more expensive, GDP growth will decrease – although by how much, no one knows. A matter of timing The implication is clear: Rebalancing must take place at some point, both to avoid a dangerous misallocation of loans and to reward Chinese people for their China Economic Review • October 2011 35 special report • econ omic growth sacrifices. But economists are fiercely divided over the proper pace of reform. Raising wages, appreciating the renminbi, and hiking interest rates, if handled improperly, could push businesses into default or bankruptcy, causing a disastrous spike in unemployment. “The risk is, if you adjust too quickly, you adjust via rising unemployment and negative growth, and of course that’s the one thing everyone wants to avoid,” said Pettis of Peking University. Rebalancing too slowly, however, would also be destructive, he said. “Any distortions that exist in the economy are going to keep growing, and the most dangerous distortion is an unsustainable increase in debt.” In Pettis’ view, it may already be too late: He forecasts that GDP growth may decline as early as 2013 as non-performing loans begin to surface, and then slow to the low-single digits by the end of the decade. More bullish commentators, however, see the system as sustainable, and argue that rebalancing can happen gradually. They expect growth to moderate in the coming years in line with central targets, but think further infrastructure investment and a roaring consumer economy can keep growth in the high single digits for years to come. “I think the rebalancing part is just going to happen automatically as we go through the next phase in development,” said Rothman of CLSA. “Once infrastructure is largely built out, which is just about where we are now, the growth rate in that spending will slow down, and by default consumption will be a larger share of the economy.” He disagrees with the idea that the consumer economy is suppressed, pointing out that retail sales are already growing rapidly. “How do you get retail sales to go faster than 17% year-on-year? Do you give out money on the street corner? Do you hand farmers credit cards? … This is already the world’s best consumption story.” Zhang Jun, a professor of economics at Shanghai’s Fudan University, argued that infrastructure spending can continue to sustain the economy for years to come. The country has embarked on a massive urbanization plan that involves moving another 300 million rural residents to cities by 2025, and the country will need far more capital and infrastructure to accommodate that migration. That is undoubtedly true, but it’s far from the full story, countered Damien 36 China Economic Review • October 2011 Two to tango The financial crisis has seemed to be one long and painful lesson in our inability to predict the future. But there’s still much at stake in trying. Economists’ views differ wildly on the sustainability of China’s current growth model, as well as the ability of the government to shift to a consumption-driven form of growth. The bulls Compared to the stagnant West, the China growth story is often an easy sell. Bullish analysts typically believe that the country’s economic growth will slow in coming years, but only gradually and in line with central government targets. Stephen Roach Morgan Stanley’s former chief economist argues that rebalancing is an urgent task. However, past feats by the country’s economic planners have given Roach faith in Beijing’s ability to carry out this dramatic reform. “I am confident that China can rise to this aspect of its challenge as well,” he said. Lu Ting The China economist at Bank of America – Merrill Lynch firmly believes that China is headed for a soft landing. Recent data has shown the country’s economy to be quite resilient, Lu said, leading her firm to maintain a forecast for 9.3% GDP growth in 2011. The World Bank In a recent study entitled “Multipolarity: The New Global Economy,” the World Bank forecast that China would account for one-third of global growth by 2025, by far the world’s biggest driver. However, the assumptions for the bank’s base case were big ones, like the reform of institutions and the emergence of a strong domestic market for consumer goods. The bears Commentators who see rebalancing as both urgent and unlikely would counsel companies and countries against tying their success to the Middle Kingdom’s continued growth. Naturally, there are no investment bankers in this group. Michael Pettis A professor of finance at Peking University, Pettis argues that China is currently the beneficiary of a global increase in underlying liquidity – just one of many such surges in the past century. “Every single one of them has ended,” he said. Victor Shih This Northwestern University professor rose to bullish fame by arguing that official figures grossly underestimate debt. Due to this leverage, he argues the biggest risk to the economy is capital flight; that by moving just part of their wealth overseas, the country’s rich could destabilize the financial system, triggering a plunge in growth as early as 2013. Nouriel Roubini ‘Finance’s Prince of Darkness’ founded a research company after successfully predicting the financial crisis. He has long been bearish on China’s prospects, especially decrying excess construction. “There is no rationale for a country at [China’s] level of economic development to have not just duplication but triplication of those infrastructure projects,” Roubini has said. Ma, an analyst at the Eurasia Group. “The point is not that more infrastructure spending is not good, it’s to make sure that each dollar is efficiently allocated, so you get more bang for your buck. The problem is if you’re just spending without concern for adequate returns because it’s easy, cheap money.” Slow going There are points of relative consensus. For one, most agree that China is not nearly as dependent on exports as popular wisdom would suggest, and therefore economic weakness in the West won’t derail China in and of itself. Second, not even the most bullish of the bulls argues that the current growth model is sustainable indefinitely. Some sort of rebalancing must take place. But the question is when that will happen, and how painful it will be. Regardless of their necessity, substantial changes seem unlikely in the near future. First, by discouraging investment, rebalancing threatens to trigger a sharp decline in growth. China’s economic planners are notoriously cautious, and seem unlikely to disturb domestic demand at a time when exports offer no growth alternative. ‘If investment is being misallocated, then by definition debt is rising at an unsustainable pace’ MICHAEL PETTIS, PEKING UNIVERSITY Secondly, rebalancing goes against the interest of some powerful factions that have gained wealth and power through the current system, including banks, property developers and manufacturers, as well as the ministries with ties to these industries. These groups are sure to oppose rebalancing, and there is no evidence as yet that Beijing is willing to sacrifice their interests. “Of course the elites who have made their money over the past years are going to fight tooth and nail. They don’t want to give their money away, why should they?” said Ma of Eurasia Group. This means that the Chinese consumer is unlikely to ride to the rescue of the global economy anytime soon – although the country will likely continue generating strong profits for consumer product companies with good strategies. “China cannot save the world, from an economic standpoint,” said Shaun Rein, managing director of China Market Research. “However, the Chinese consumer can save consumer product companies.” Of course, not all of China’s trading partners mind its investment-heavy model. Resource-exporting countries around the world continue to benefit from it. But countries like Australia and Canada must prepare for the day when China’s resource demand begins to dry up. Despite government rhetoric, economists say the numbers show no sign that China has made a substantial movement toward rebalancing yet. But if the task is as urgent as Beijing has said it is, then reforms will have to begin soon – whether leaders and businesses like it or not. “If investment is being misallocated, then by definition debt is rising at an unsustainable pace,” said Pettis. “And as some economist or the other said [it was Herb Stein], if something is unsustainable, it will stop.” China Economic Review • October 2011 37 SINOMEDIA BUSINESS DIRECTORIES ONLINE DIRECTORIES AVAILABLE FOR SALE NOW + NEW TITLES China IT Directory 2011 The most comprehensive directory covering all the top IT companies with offices in Mainland China. Containing contact details for more than 1,950 firms. Price: $250 China MICE Guide 2011-2012 China MICE Guide 2011 - 2012 is the most comprehensive hotel listing and event planning resource in China with listings for thousands of four- and five-star hotels in China, in hundreds of cities across the country. 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Staff are attentive, the carpet is plush, and the coffee machines are well-stocked with premium roast. The reason for all this top-shelf treatment? Foreign banks in China are unusually oriented towards wealthy clients. All of their customers are either foreigners or members of China’s upper-middle or upper classes. The minimum deposit for an account at UK-based HSBC’s China branches is RMB100,000 (US$15,654) – compared with a paltry GBP1 (US$1.6) at the bank’s branches in the UK. Historical happenstance has allowed British banks in China to punch far above their weight globally. Of the top three foreign banks in terms of branch network and assets in the mainland, two are British: HSBC and Standard Chartered. But foreign banking in China is not as easy as it looks. The tightly regulated environment starves banks of liquidity, and the chaos of an emerging market often renders their sophisticated credit models useless. However, the market is slowly but surely becoming more orderly, and there are reasons to expect the market share of foreign banks already established here will grow. At the same time, thanks to the unintended consequences of regulation, barriers to new entrants are about to be raised again, leaving British banks to reap China Economic Review • October 2011 39 the rewards of an odd form of protectionism. False start Along with the telecommunications industry, banking was among the last of China’s major industries to be opened to foreign competition. Regulators did not crack open the sector until forced to, as part of China’s accession into the World Trade Organization (WTO). Only in late 2006 and early 2007 were foreign banks allowed to incorporate locally and provide renminbi banking services to domestic clients for the first time. At that time, foreign banks held around 2.4% of total banking assets in China. And expectations for future growth ran high: In a PwC survey of foreign banks in China conducted in the first half of 2008, 85% of respondents said that they expected that market share would increase by 2.3% over the next few years. Such hopes were dashed during the global economic downturn. Beijing channeled its impressive stimulus program solely through domestic banks, pumping up both domestic bank assets and lending, and thereby reducing the overall market share of foreign banks. Since then, the market share of foreign banks has rebounded slightly from 1.7% in 2009 to 1.83% in 2010, according to the latest figures from the China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC), the country’s banking regulator. Still, it’s hard to escape the fact that the market share of foreign banks in China has basically not budged in the almost five years since the system’s liberalization. “There’s no doubt they were expected to have gotten a lot bigger,” said Chak Wong, finance professor at the Chinese University of Hong Kong (CUHK). Risky business As many commentators pointed out in 2007, foreign banks have significant advantages over their mainland competitors, beginning with their ability to evaluate creditworthiness. “The most important edge is that [foreign banks] have the concept of credit, which Chinese banks don’t,” said Wong. “Chinese banks just have no idea how to evaluate the creditworthiness of a company.” For example, if a Chinese construction company wants to obtain a loan to build 40 China Economic Review • October 2011 ‘It’s the wild, wild west in terms of credit. Foreign banks haven’t adapted to this kind of environment yet’ CHAK WONG, FINANCE PROFESSOR AT THE CHINESE UNIVERSITY OF HONG KONG a high-speed rail project, it will first go for approval to the National Reform and Development Commission (NDRC), the country’s economic planner. After it gets the NRDC’s go-ahead, the company will then apply for a loan at a Chinese bank, which is unofficially required to approve the loan request. This means that domestic banks have little experience actually gauging the risk of a borrower default, or pricing loans to correctly reflect that risk. By contrast, foreign banks often have decades’ worth of experience refining their business practice and models to correctly measure and price risk. In theory, this competitive edge should allow foreign banks to thrive by maximizing risk-adjusted returns. In practice, said Wong, it’s much trickier. If Chinese banks mis-price risk, it usually means they under-price it, by offering loans that are much too cheap for the risk involved. While this could prove lethal to the economy in the long term, in the here-and-now it means that borrowers will pass up expensive loans offered by foreign banks to take (unsustainably) cheap loans from Chinese lenders. An exception is small- and mediumsized enterprises (SMEs). Due to Beijing’s loan quotas, SMEs often can’t get loans from domestic banks at any price. In Gaining little ground Foreign banks market share in China 2.5 % market share spotlight spotlight • unit e d k ingdom 2 1.5 1 0.5 0 2003 Source: CBRC 2004 2005 2006 2007 2006 2007 2008 200820092009 2010 2010 Net exports theory, foreign banks are capable of meeting this need, but unfortunately most of these companies and entrepreneurs are relatively new start-ups, and the country lacks a central credit record system that banks can use in their analysis. “It’s the wild, wild west in terms of credit,” said Wong. “[Foreign banks] haven’t adapted to this kind of environment yet. For some strange reason they think they can just send a whole bunch of expatriates to China, do the same thing they did back home, and expect it to work. It doesn’t.” Liquidity freeze Another problem is that foreign banks just can’t lend out that much money, period. “A key challenge for foreign banks in China is liquidity, stemming from the difficulty in getting deposits,” said Jason Bedford, a Beijing-based manager at KPMG and author of a recent report on banking in China. Thanks to regulations introduced in 2007, foreign banks in China must have a loan-to-deposit ratio of 75% or less – meaning that they can lend out just threequarters of all the deposits they collect. Because most banks were well above that limit when the rule was introduced – the average ratio for foreign banks in 2009 was about 150%, and in 2010 around 100% – the CBRC gave banks a five-year grace period, ending this year. Add in the high ratio of reserves banks in China must set aside – 21.5% of total deposits, compared to 10% in the US – and it’s easy to understand why banks are scrambling to attract deposits. In less regulated markets, they could simply entice customers with higher interest rates. But Beijing has a cap on deposit rates, so banks must compete by other means. One strategy is to expand branch networks, because steep ATM and competitor bank fees encourage customers to choose banks with a wide presence. Not surprisingly, therefore, this is how regulators indirectly manipulate the market share of foreign banks. They must apply for approval to open a new branch with the CBRC, and the regulator has unofficial quotas in place – usually no more than one or two per year. “If the biggest challenge for foreign banks is regulation, then the most important regulation is the limit on branches,” said Hua Zhang, a Beijing-based banking, securities and investment analyst at Celent, a research firm that tracks foreign banks in China. “No branches, no deposits. No deposits, no loans. No loans, no profit.” It’s also the reason why British banks – HSBC and Standard Chartered in particular – are leading the pack. Xi Junyang, a finance professor at Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, points out that the two banks are much more likely to garner regulatory approval for new branches because they have been in the country for far longer than other foreign banks. The earliest banks in China came with the former British Empire. HSBC was established in Hong Kong and Shanghai in 1865 (hence the bank’s full name, Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation), and Standard Chartered founded its first branch in Shanghai in 1858. Many industry insiders say it’s no coincidence that they – along with the Hong Kong-based Bank of East Asia – have also been granted the most extensive branch networks. Taking it to the rich Still, the branch networks of these companies remain tiny when compared with their local competitors. Many foreign banks have therefore opted for a strategy of quality over quantity. About 98% of retail deposits in China’s foreign banks are from customers with over RMB250,000 (US$39,000) in their accounts. By going for a select few wealthy clients, the banks can maximize the impact of what limited network resources they have. Wealthy customers are also the most likely to benefit from other advantages offered by foreign banks, among them quality of service. “The service at foreign banks is a lot better,” said Wong of CUHK. “Service at Chinese banks is pretty horrible.” It also ties into another advantage: Foreign banks have superior products for both retail and corporate clients. “Foreign banks have innovative products,” said William Yung, a Shanghai-based partner at PwC, adding that this is particularly true of structured products and offshore renminbi services. For example, foreign banks have a natural advantage for products that cross borders. That includes facilitating old-fashioned cross-border corporate services, as well as the growing market for renminbi trade settlement. Zhang of Celent adds that Chinese insurance 42 China Economic Review • October 2011 China Foto Press spotlight spotlight • unit e d k ingdom in the vault: China’s central bank companies have almost no choice but to use foreign banks for derivatives products that hedge their international risk. On the retail side, it’s all about privacy: Many Chinese customers believe foreign private banks will maintain client confidentiality about assets held abroad from Beijing better than the (often stateowned) Chinese banks. “Put it this way: ICBC now does private banking in Hong Kong,” said one banking analyst, who asked not to be named. “Who’s going to use them?” The result is that while foreign banks make up only about 2% of the market share, their slice of the wealth management pie is double, at around 4%. First-mover advantage Wealth management services and fees are part of banks’ non-interest income, which as a proportion of total revenue is roughly twice as high in foreign banks as their Chinese peers, according to a KPMG report. That’s a good thing because it makes them less reliant on interest spreads, which rise and fall at Beijing’s command and which have hobbled profitability in the past. Industry insiders also say that the CBRC has become more comfortable with the presence of foreign banks. Unofficially, some say the CBRC could now be comfortable with foreign banks taking a 5% share of the market – more than double the current level. The winners of both increasing sophistication and freedom of movement will be existing banks. Breaking into any new retail or corporate banking market requires tremendous up-front investment, particularly for branding. The British banks – HSBC and Standard Chartered – are on top in part thanks to this brand equity. These leading banks “have been here longer, and they’ve been committing in terms of capital resources, relationships, customer connectivity, and so on,” said Shirley Xie, a Hong Kong-based partner at PwC. And as Bedford of KPMG points out, the end of the 75% ratio grace period is fast approaching. Any new locally incorporated bank will be forced to invest in branding and a branch network, attract massive deposits, lend minimal amounts, and yet stay in business – a very difficult feat. “I expect the current lineup of foreign banks to remain the same for quite some time,” said Bedford. That’s good news for British bankers in China, and it’s all thanks to Beijing. CONF ERENCES & EXPOS Company index Alfredlittle.com 12 Alibaba Group 11, 17 AutoChina 12 Bally 14 Bank of America-Merrill Lynch 36 Bank of East Asia 42 Bright Star Manufacturing 18 Celent 40, 42 China International Trust and Investment Company (CITIC) 28 China Investment Corporation 10 China Market Research 37 China Vanke 20 Christie 11 CIIC Education International 18 CLSA 17, 21, 34, 36 Costa 14 Country Garden 20 Dalian Wanda 21 DreamWorks Animation 10 Eurasia Group 37 Evergrande 20, 22 Gaopeng.com 10 Google 11 Great Wall Motors 8 Groupon 10 Gucci 14 Hangzhou Enterprise Guarantee 18 Hanlong Mining 12 HSBC 39, 42 Huawei 7 Huijin Asset Management 10 Agriculture October 12-15 The 2nd China Int’l Electric Vehicle Charging Station Construction Exhibition Beijing China Int’l Exhibition Center www.chinanacs.com October 20-22 AgrochemExpo 2011 Shanghai Shanghai Everbright Convention & Exhibition Center www.agrochemex.net October 20-22 Fruveg Expo 2011 Shanghai Shanghai Everbright Convention & Exhibition Center www.fruvegexpo.com Consumer October 10-12 2011 Shanghai Int’l Meat Exhibition Shanghai Shanghai Everbright Convention & Exhibition Center www.meatexpo.com.cn October 24-26 Cashmere World 2011 Beijing China National Convention Center www.cashmereworldfair.com October 25-27 The 8th China (Beijing) Int’l Glass Industry Expo Beijing 44 China Economic Review • October 2011 China Int’l Exhibition Center www.bcige.com October 12-15 China Int’l Trade Fair for Household Products and Accessories Shanghai Shanghai Exhibition Center www.il-china.com October 14-17 Guangzhou Hardware Home Appliances Auto Parts Sourcing Fair Guangzhou Poly World Trade Center www.gzsourcingfair.com October 12-14 The 10th Int’l Trade Fair for Toys and Hobby Shanghai Shanghai New Int’l Expo Center www.china-toy-expo.com October 12-14 China Int’l Baby Carriers & Baby Articles Fair Shanghai Shanghai New Int’l Expo Center www.china-kids-expo.com Economic & Trade October 21-26 The 8th China-ASEAN Expo Nanning Nanning Int’l Convention & Exhibition Center www.caexpo.org Health Care October 8-10 ICBC IKEA Inter-American Development Bank IPOX Schuster KPMG Louis Vuitton Morgan Stanley Muddy Waters NASDAQ Oriental Tea House PPTV Prada PwC Renaissance Capital SB China Venture Capital Silvercorp Soufun Standard Chartered Starbucks Suntech TCL Ten Ren Tencent Villa & Hut Kafe Wenzhou HEC Fashion International Wuhan Roafe Sanitary Wares Chinese Medicine Expo 2011 Guangzhou Guangzhou Jinhan Exhibition Center www.zycexpo.com October 26-28 The 16th China Int’l Pharmaceutical Industry Exhibition Shanghai Shanghai New Int’l Expo Center www.chinapharmex.com Manufacturing October 13-15 The 2nd Suzhou Int’l Metalworking and CNC Machine Tool Exhibition Suzhou Suzhou Int’l Expo Center www.metaltechexpo.com October 19-21 The 15th Int’l Exhibition on Heat Treatment Beijing Beijing Beijing Exhibition Center www.ht-event.cn October 21-23 2011 China (Wenzhou) Mechanical Equipment Exhibition Wenzhou Wenzhou Int’l Convention and Exhibition Center www.cwmee.cn October 26-29 Int’l Conference on Pipelines and Trenchless Technology, Beijing 2011 (ICPTT 2011) Beijing Beijing Int’l Convention Center www.icptt.org 42 10, 11 33 8 40, 42 14 34, 35, 36 12 10 14 30 14 20, 21, 40, 42 10 17 12 16, 22 39, 42 11, 14 7 7 14 10, 11 14 17, 19 18 October 10-12 The 11th China Int’l Fluid Machinery Exhibition Shanghai Shanghai Mart www.fluid-sh.com October 12-14 China Machine Tool Exhibition 2011 Nanjing Nanjing Int’l Exhibition Center www.cmte.cn Transport & Logistics October 14-16 China Int’l General Aviation Convention Xi’an Xi’an Greenland Pico Int’l Convention & Exhibition Center www.chinagacity.com October 25-28 The PTC ASIA and CeMAT ASIA 2011 Shanghai Shanghai New Int’l Expo Center www.cemat-asia.com Travel & Leisure October 11-14 2011 Music China Shanghai Shanghai New Int’l Expo Center www.musicchina-expo.com October 13-15 China Int’l Professional Horse Sports & Leisure Industries Exhibition Beijing China Int’l Exhibition Center www.chinahorsefair.com.cn Co mpan y ListingS Accounting Firms LehmanBrown International Accountants www.lehmanbrown.com Beijing 6/F, Dongwai Diplomatic Building, 23 Dongzhimenwai Avenue Tel: +86 10 8532 1720 [email protected] Shanghai 1501 & 1504 Wantai International Building, 480 Wulumuqi Road North Tel: +86 21 6249 0055 [email protected] Guangzhou Unit 3317, China Shine Plaza, 9 Linhe Road West Tel: +86 20 2205 7883 [email protected] Tianjin Unit 2901-104, The Exchange Tower 2, 189 Nanjing Road, Heping Tel: +86 22 2318 5056 [email protected] Shenzhen 3206, News Building 2, Shennan Road Central Tel: +86 755 8209 1244 [email protected] Hong Kong Unit 1902, 19/F, Asia Orient Tower, 33 Lockhart Road, Wan Chai Tel: +852 2426 6426 [email protected] Macau 16, A & B Keng Ou Commercial Building, 367 Avenida da Praia Grande Tel: +853 2835 5015 [email protected] Airlines Air France - Shanghai Office www.airfrance.com.cn 3901B Ciro’s Plaza, 388 Nanjing Road West Tel: +86 21 6334 5702 [email protected] International Schools Beijing Beanstalk International Bilingual School (BIBS) 6 Dongsihuanbei Road, Chaoyang Tel: +86 10 5130 7951 Beanstalk International Kindergarten (BIK) 1/F, Building B, 40 Liangmaqiao Road, Chaoyang Tel: +86 10 6466 9255 Beanstalk International Kindergarten - Wanda Plaza Building No. 7 Jianguo Road No.93 Chaoyang Tel: +86 10 5960 3997 Beanstalk International Middle/ High School 38 Nanshiliju Chaoyang Tel: +86 10 8456 6019 International School of Beijing www.isb.bj.edu.cn 10 Anhua Street Shunyi Tel: +86 10 8149 2345 including: • Long-term leasing • Short-term car rental • Airport pick-up / drop-off • Business travel service • Exhibition & Conference service • Tourism trip service B18, 3/F, 535 Hongzhong Road, Shanghai Tel: +86 21 5447 8361 Tel: +86 21 5447 8362 Fax: +86 21 5447 8369 [email protected] Anji Car Rental & Leasing www.avischina.com 1387 Changning Road, Shanghai Tel: +86 21 6229 1119 [email protected] Health Care Hotels Business Schools Manchester Business School, China Centre www.mbs.ac.uk Suite 628, West Tower, Shanghai centre, 1376 Nanjing Rd.(W), JingAn District, Shanghai Tel: +86 21 6279 8660 Fax: +86 21 6279 5685 E-mail: [email protected] China Europe Int’l Business School (CEIBS) MBA www.ceibs.edu Tel: +86 21 2890 5555 Fax: +86 21 2890 5200 [email protected] Euromed Management www.euromed-management.com Tel: +86 21 5230 1653 Fax: +86 21 5230 3357 Car Rental Rising Shanghai Car Rental www.risingsh.com Provides professional service HR/Recruitment Beijing Beijing Foreign Enterprise Human Resources Service www.fesco.com.cn FESCO Building, 14 Chaoyangmennan Avenue, Chaoyang Tel: +86 10 8561 8888 DoWellJoin www.dowelljoin.com 2505, Building 3, Wanda Plaza, 93 Jianguo Road, Chaoyang Tel: +86 10 5128 8580 Shanghai China Team www.chinateam.com 6008 Novel Building, 887 Huaihai Road Central Tel: +86 21 6474 7064 [email protected] Heidrick & Struggles www.heidrick.com Shanghai Parkway Health Medical Centers 24 Hour Appointments and Information Hotline Tel: +86 21 6445 5999 www.parkwayhealth.cn [email protected] Gleneagles Medical and Surgical Center 4/F, 389 Nanjing Road West Shanghai Centre Medical and Dental Centers 203-4 West Retail Plaza, 1376 Nanjing Road West Specialty and Inpatient Center 2-3/F, 170 Danshui Road Hong Qiao Medical Center 2258 Hongqiao Road Jin Qiao Medical and Dental Center 51 Hongfeng Road, Jinqiao, Pudong Mandarine City Medical Center Mandarine City, Unit 30, 788 Hongxu Road Jin Mao Tower Medical Center J-Life, 1N01, Jin Mao Tower, 88 Century Avenue, Pudong Courtyard by Marriott Beijing www.courtyardbeijingnortheast.com 101 Jingshun Road, Chaoyang Tel: +86 10 5907 6666 Tel: +86 400 888 5551 [email protected] Crowne Plaza Beijing www.crowneplaza.com/beijingchn 48 Wangfujing Avenue, Dongcheng Tel: +86 10 5911 9999 [email protected] Hotel New Otani Chang Fu Gong www.cfgbj.com 26 Jianguomenwai Avenue Tel: +86 10 6512 5555 [email protected] Sofitel Shanghai Hyland www.sofitel.com 505 Nanjing Road East Tel: +86 21 6351 5888/4088 [email protected] Okura Garden Hotel Shanghai www.gardenhotelshanghai.com 58 Maoming Road South Tel: +86 21 6415 1111 [email protected] The Westin Bund Center Shanghai www.westin.com/shanghai 88 Henan Road Central Tel: +86 21 6335 1888 [email protected] Language Schools Ambassador Mandarin Tel: +86 10 8449 2344 www.ambassadormandarin.com China Economic Review • October 2011 45 Co mpan y ListingS [email protected] Beijing CBD Office Unit 505, The Spaces International Center, 8 Dongdaqiao Road,Chaoyang Sanyuanqiao Office Jingxin Mansion 222, 2A Dongsanhuanbei Road, Chaoyang New Concept Mandarin www.newconceptmandarin.com 1903, Tower B, Ocean Express, Yard 66, Xiaguangli, Sanyuanqiao, Chaoyang Tel: +86 10 8446 6455 [email protected] Dongguan 3/F, 15 Begonia Road, New World Garden, Dongcheng Tel: +86 769 2248 9240 [email protected] Guangzhou Unit 2001, Tower D Phase 2 Tianyu Garden, 138 Linhe Road Central, Tianhe Tel: +86 20 3893 4200 guangzhou@newconceptmandarin. com Shanghai 9H, Ladoll International Building, 831 Xinzha Road, Jing’an Tel: +86 21 5228 2950 [email protected] TLI-IYU www.bjtli.cn 40 Liangmaqiao Road, Chaoyang, Beijing Tel: +86 10 6461 2973 Tel: +86 10 6468 3311 ext. 3509 Economic and Tech. 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Zone Tel: +86 10 6789 2800 Fax: +86 10 6789 2900 [email protected] Guangdong 8 Qiufuilu District, Fumin Industrial Park, Dalang Town, Dongguan Tel: +86 769 8222 9922 Fax: +86 769 8222 9900 [email protected] Qingdao 1 Banghai Road South, Sifang District Tel: +86 532 8093 2200 Fax: +86 532 8093 2211 [email protected] Real Estate/ Serviced Apartments Modena Putuo Shanghai www.modenaresidence.com No.1 Lane 58, Tongchuan Road, Putuo District, Shanghai 200333 Tel: +86 21 6147 8888 sales.putuoshanghai@ modenaresidence.com Real Estate Agents GVA www.gvacurzon.cn Unit 1003-1004, ASA Building, 188 Jiangning Road, Jing’An, Shanghai Tel: +86 21 3252 0685 Fax: +86 21 3252 0689 [email protected] Serviced Offices PR Agencies Ketchum Newscan Public Relations Shanghai 218 Tianmu Road West Tel: +86 21 6353 2288 Beijing A6, Chaoyangmenwai Avenue, Chaoyang Tel: +86 10 5907 0055 Service Providers GRM: Document Storage Media Vault Storage Certified Destruction www.grmchina.com Shanghai Unit 2, Lane 271, Qianyang Road Tel: +86 21 5270 3311 Fax: +86 21 5270 6631 [email protected] Beijing 6 Shuangyang Road, Beijing 46 China Economic Review • October 2011 The Executive Centre www.executivecentre.com International Finance Center, 8 Century Avenue Xintiandi, 159 Madang Road CITIC Square, 1168 Nanjing Road West The Center, 989 Changle Road Chong Hing Finance Center, 288 Nanjing Road West Tel: +86 21 5116 9191 [email protected] Regus Business Centre Tel: +86 400 120 1205 [email protected] www.regus.cn Shanghai Regus Aurora Plaza 11/F Aurora Plaza 99 Fucheng Road, Lujiazui Pudong New Area Regus Jin Mao Tower 31/F Jin Mao Tower 88 Shiji Avenue, Lujiazui Pudong New Area Regus Standard Chartered Lujiazui 5/F Standard Chartered Tower 201 Shiji Avenue, Lujiazui Pudong New Area Regus Bund Centre 18/F Bund Centre 222 Yan’An Road East Huangpu District Regus Bea Finance Tower [New] 15/F BEA Finance Tower 66 Hua Yuan Shi Qiao Road Pudong New Area Regus Raffles City [New] 51/F Raffles City 268 Xizang 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10/F, IFC East Tower 8 Jianguomenwai Avenue Chaoyang District Regus Kerry Centre 11/F Kerry Centre, North Tower 1 Guanghua Road Chaoyang District Regus Lufthansa Center C203 Lufthansa Center 50 Liangmaqiao Road Chaoyang District Regus NCI Tower 15/F NCI Tower 12 A Jianguomenwai Avenue Chaoyang District Regus Pacific Century Place 14/F IBM Tower, PCP 2A Workers Stadium Road North Chaoyang District Regus Prosper Center [New] 6/F Tower 2, Prosper Center No.5 Guang Hua Road Chaoyang District Regus Financial Street Excel Centre 12/F Financial Street Excel Centre 6 Wudinghou Street Xicheng District Regus Zhongguancun Metropolis Tower 7/F Metropolis Tower 2 Dongsan Street, Zhongguancun Xi Zone Haidian District Chengdu Regus Times Plaza 26/F Building A, Times Plaza 2 Zongfu Road Jinjiang District Chongqing Regus Yangtze River International Plaza [coming soon] 33/F Yangtze River International Plaza 22 Nanbin Road Nanan District Dalian Regus World Trade Center 12/F World Trade Center 25 Tongxing Street Zhongshan District Guangzhou Regus Center Plaza Tower A, 23/F Center Plaza 161 Linhe Road West Tianhe District Regus Teem Tower 13/F Teem Tower 208 Tianhe Road Hangzhou Regus Euro America Center 4/F Euro America Center 18 Jiaogong Road Xihu District Regus Foreign Economy & Trade Plaza 8/F Tower B, Zhejiang FET 468 Yan’an Road Xiacheng District Shenzhen Regus Futian Anlian 26/F Shenzhen Futian Anlian 4018 Jintian Road Futian District Regus New Times Plaza [coming soon] 3/F Shenzhen New Times Plaza 1 Taizi Road Nanshan District Regus Panglin Plaza [new] 35/F Panglin Plaza 2002 Jiabin Road Luohu District Hong Kong Regus Entertainment Building [new] 30/F & 31/F Entertainment Building 30 Queen’s Road Central Central Regus One International Finance Centre 20/F One IFC 1 Harbour View Street Central Regus The Center 62/F & 66/F The Center 99 Queen’s Road Central Central Regus 100 Queen’s Road Central 6/F, 12/F & 15/F 100 QRC 100 Queen’s Road Central Central Regus The Lee Gardens 45/F The Lee Gardens 33 Hysan Avenue Causeway Bay Regus Times Square [new] 31/F, Tower One Times Square, 1 Matheson Street Causeway Bay Regus Central Plaza 35/F Central Plaza 18 Harbour Road Wanchai Regus Hopewell Centre 51/F Hopewell Centre 183 Queen’s Road East Wanchai Regus Shui On Centre 2/F Shui On Centre 6-8 Harbour Road Wanchai Regus International Commerce Centre 12/F ICC 1 Austin Road West Kowloon Regus Millennium City 1 32/F Tower 1, MC1 388 Kwun Tong Road Kowloon Regus Miramar Tsim Sha Tsui [new] 10/F, Miramar Tower 132 Nathan Road, Tsim sha tsui, Kowloon, Hong Kong Macau Regus Macau No.39 17/F Central Plaza 61 Avenida Almeida Ribeiro Taipei Regus Taipei Manhattan 14/F Shin Kong Manhattan Building Section 5, No.8 Xin Yi Road Regus Walsin Xinyi [coming soon] 11/F Walsin Xinyi Building 1 Songzhi Road, Taipei To have your company featured in these pages, please contact one of our representatives at +86 21 5385 9061. China Economic Review • October 2011 47 Econom ic indicators Market indexes Top overseas listings Ticker Listing Date Price Offering Amount Media TUDO Aug 17 US$29.00 US$174m Lead Underwriter Auditor Revenue Growth (y/y) Gross Margin Credit Suisse; LLC; Deutsche Bank PwC Zhongtian US$14.00m 227% 21% Halter USX China vs DJIA vs NASDAQ 8% 4% Change Tudou Industry 0% -4% -8% Tudou (TUDO.NASDAQ) is a leading online video company in China. Tudou.com was the first usergenerated content and video-sharing site launched in China. As of August 2011, Tudou hosted over 50 million video clips for over 90 million registered users. The company’s key rivals are Youku.com (YOKU.NYSE), Sina (SINA.NASDAQ), Sohu.com (SOHU.NASDAQ) and NetEase.com (NTES.NASDAQ). -12% Aug 16 Aug 22 Aug 26 Sep 01 Sep 07 DJIA Halter USX China Sep 14 Nasdaq Source: Halter USX China, Dow Jones Indexes and NASDAQ Composite Top Domestic Listings Sep 08 RMB42.00 Offering Amount RMB2.52b Lead Underwriter Auditor Revenue Growth (y/y) Gross Margin CITIC Reanda RMB1.14b 139% 43% Beijing Jingyuntong Technology produces vacuum crystal-growing equipment, such as flexible mono-crystal furnaces, poly-silicon directional solidification growers, float-zone crystal growers, poly-silicon reactors and photovoltaic equipment. JYT‘s main competitors are Jinggong Science & Tech (002006.SZ), GT Solar (SOLR.NYSE), Ferro Technology, ALD and China Electronics Technology. Kaishan Compressor Industry Ticker Listing Date Price Offering Amount Technology 300257 Aug 19 RMB63.00 RMB2.27b Lead Underwriter Auditor Revenue Growth (y/y) Gross Margin CITIC HPTJ RMB1.63b 71% 23% Kaishan Compressor, a subsidiary of the Kaishan Group, is the domestic market leader in gas compressor technology. The company has forged a relationship with Xi'an Jiaotong University. Atlas (ACOA.FWB), Fusheng and Sullair are the firm's key competitors. Industry Jangho Curtain Wall Ticker Listing Date Price Offering Amount Service 601886 Aug 18 RMB20.00 RMB2.20b Lead Underwriter Ping An Auditor Revenue Growth (y/y) Gross Margin HPTJ RMB5.18b 24% 23% Industry Ticker Listing Date Price Offering Amount Consumer Goods 002612 Aug 30 RMB35.00 RMB1.75b Lead Underwriter Auditor Revenue Growth (y/y) Gross Margin Ping An Grant Thornton RMB559.00m 81% 57% Lancy is a fashion design, apparel and sales company located in Beijing. It was founded in 2006. Lancy From 25, Mojo. S. Phine and Lime Flare are its major brands. The main competitors are Ports (00589.HK), Marisfrolg (600693.SZ) and Moiselle (00130.HK). Industry Xiamen Comfort Science & Technology Group Ticker Listing Date Price Offering Amount Manufacturing 002614 Sep 09 RMB52.00 RMB1.56b Lead Underwriter Auditor Revenue Growth (y/y) Gross Margin Guangfa Shu Lun Pan CPA RMB1.14b 67% 20% Xiamen Comfort Science & Technology Group makes and sells massage appliances and products in domestic and overseas markets. Date: Aug 16 - Sep 14 48 11,100 20,500 10,800 20,000 10,500 19,500 10,200 19,000 9,900 18,500 9,600 18,000 9,300 Aug 16 Aug 22 Aug 26 Hang Seng Sep 14 Sep 01 Sep 07 Hang Seng China Enterprises Source: Hong Kong Stock Exchange Shanghai Composite vs CSI 300 vs Shenzhen Component 11,900 3,200 3,100 3,000 2,900 2,800 2,700 2,600 2,500 2,400 2,300 11,700 11,500 11,300 11,100 10,900 10,700 10,500 Aug 16 Aug 22 Aug 26 Shanghai Composite Sep 01 CSI 300 Sep 14 Sep 07 Shenzhen Component Source: Shanghai Stock Exchange, Shenzhen Stock Exchange and China Securities Index Beijing Jangho Curtain Wall is a provider of high-tech curtain walls that integrate R&D, engineering and design expertise. The company exports to the US, India, Brazil and Russia. Its main domestic competitors are Yuanda China Holdings (2789.HK), Meite Curtain Wall System and Sanxin Spl. Glass Tech (002163.SZ), while its global competitors are Parmasteelisa and Schuco. Lancy Co Ltd 21,000 HSCI 601908 Price SZ Industrial Goods Listing Date Hang Seng Beijing Jingyuntong Technology Ticker SH&CSI 300 Industry Hang Seng vs Hang Seng China Enterprises China Economic Review • October 2011 Commodities Energy Light sweet crude oil (NYMEX) Newcastle coal index (globalCOAL) Qinhuangdao coal* Contract Date Close(US$) Change(%) Oct 11 Sep 14 88.91 -1.30 Sep 9 Sep 2 Aug 26 Aug 19 124.32 122.46 121.47 121.36 Date Price for this week (US$) Price for last week (US$) Same Period Last Year (US$) Sep 14 825 - 835 825 - 835 715-725 * 5,500 kcal/kg thermal coal Metals Contract Date Close(US$) Change(%) Sep 11 Sep 14 388.50 -7.10 GC Gold (COMEX) Oct 11 Sep 14 1,824.20 -3.30 SI Silver (COMEX) Sep 11 Sep 14 4,046.90 -65.40 HG Copper (COMEX) To receive weekly updates on initial public offerings by Chinese firms, sign up for CER’s China IPO update by emailing [email protected] Key indicators RMB exchange rates Aug 2011 Jul 2011 2010 (full year) Consumer price index (y/y % change) 6.2 6.5 3.3 Producer price index (y/y % change) 7.3 7.5 5.5 Retail sales (US$b) 230.0 225.5 2,345.9 Retail sales growth (y/y % change) 17.0 17.2 18.4 Industrial output growth (y/y % change) 13.5 14.0 15.7 Exports (US$b) 173.3 175.1 1,577.9 Exports (y/y % change) 20.7 20.4 31.3 Imports (US$b) 155.6 143.6 1,394.8 Imports (y/y % change) Foreign reserves (US$b) Foreign reserves (y/y % change) 25.1 22.9 38.7 - - 2,847.3 - - 18.7 New bank lending (US$b) 85.8 77.1 1,206.7 New bank lending (y/y % change) 16.4 16.6 -17.2 Urban fixed-asset investment (y/y % change) 25.0 25.4 24.5 Actual FDI inflows YTD (US$b) 8.5 8.3 105.7 Quarterly GDP GDP [US$b] GDP growth [y/y % change] Q2 11 Q1 11 Q4 10 Q3 10 1,605.1 1,475.1 1,930.0 976.2 9.5 9.7 9.8 9.6 Sep 15 2011 Aug 15 2011 Change (%) USD 6.388 6.395 -0.11 JPY 0.0832 0.0831 0.20 EUR 8.777 9.146 -4.03 GBP 10.068 10.419 -3.37 FTSE/Xinhua China 25 Index Highest performers for the month to September 15, 2011 Name Price (HK$) Change (%) China Unicom 17.26 18.22 China Petroleum & Chemical 7.46 10.19 China Telecom 5.17 8.84 China Mobile 79.90 6.75 Top investment deals Target Target sector Acquirer Value (US$m) Aug 31 China Three-First Batch Asts Energy China Yangtze Power 1,196.8 Aug 19 Speedy Hill Investments Real Estate China Resources Land 934.5 Aug 29 Top Globe Autos China ZhengTong Auto Svcs 861.9 Sep 7 Shengjing Bank Financials Founder Securities 234.7 Date Domestic M&A Source: National Bureau of Statistics, The People's Bank of China Purchasing managers’ index PMI manufacturing Aug 11 Jul 11 PMI manufacturing [overall] 50.9 50.7 New orders 51.1 51.1 Production 52.3 52.1 Employment 50.4 50.5 Supplier delivery 49.9 50.3 Raw material inventory 48.8 47.6 New export orders 48.3 50.4 Purchases 51.2 52.0 Finished goods inventory 48.9 49.2 Buy-up prices 57.2 56.3 Imports 49.7 49.1 Overstock orders 47.6 46.5 PMI non-manufacturing Business activity 57.6 59.6 New business 54.1 55.6 New export orders 54.1 56.5 Business expectation 66.0 67.0 Input price 60.2 63.1 Inbound M&A Aug 18 Ever Bliss International Energy Investor Grp (CA) 263.2 Aug 25 Chongqing Kehua Hldg Grp Manufacturing TCC Int'l Holdings (HK) 250.4 Aug 31 Shandong Ruyi Science & Tech Consumer ITOCHU (JP) 200.0 Sep 4 Beijing Jiahua Xinguang Media China Oriental Culture Grp (HK) 194.1 Outbound M&A Sep 1 CBMM (BR) Mining China Niobium Investment 1,950.0 Aug 15 Manassen Foods Australia (AU) Consumer Bright Food Grp 416.0 Aug 20 Austria ATB Drive Tech (AT) Manufacturing Zhejiang Wolong Shunyu Invest 144.7 Aug 25 Proserpine Coop Sugar Milling (AU) Consumer Tully Sugar 125.6 Date: Aug 15-Sep 13, 2011 Source: Thomson Reuters Source: China Federation of Logistics & Purchasing China Economic Review • October 2011 49 book review • Unders tanding China’s Economi c Indi cat ors Number cruncher Tom Orlik of the Wall Street Journal provides a handy reference for Chinese statistics R Understanding China’s Economic Indicators: Translating the Data Into Investment Opportunities BFT Press, 2011 US$37.39 eading through any Chinese investment prospectus, one is inevitably treated to at least 15 pages of macroeconomic data detailing astonishing historical growth, graphs with upward-pointing arrows, and myriad bigpicture theses for selling the farm and buying China. But those claims to economic fame and fortune can be just as quickly dispelled by China bears, who argue that these economic figures are manipulated by politically-motivated numbercrunching goons. Statisticians are simply painting a pretty picture of consistently improving lives among the rosy-cheeked Chinese laobaixing, they say. At one point in history, those accusations would undoubtedly have been true. During the Great Leap Forward, for example, officials engaged in rampant falsification of data, reporting grain outputs that were 10 times the optimal yields. But the country has changed dramatically, and, as Wall Street Journal correspondent Thomas Orlik’s “Understanding China’s Economic Indicators – Translating the Data into Investment Opportunities” illustrates, the truth behind the numbers is now far more nuanced. The proof is in the pudding Organized as an instruction manual for any would-be China economy wonk, Orlick’s book sorts one-by-one through a laundry list of indicators and publicly available data. Around 50 indicators are covered; biggies such as GDP, trade data, the Consumer Price Index, government revenues, industrial value added, and money supply are of course discussed in detail. However, the book also touches upon less visible but potentially useful tidbits, like the Market News International China Business Survey. Readers learn where and when data is published, the significance of the information in context of the broader economy and financial markets, and what is known – not always comprehensive – 50 China Economic Review • October 2011 about the data compilation methodology. There is no shortage of Orlik’s own well-reasoned analysis, supported with plenty of examples and illustrative charts. In the process of presenting the structure of the data, broader exposition on the Chinese economy flows naturally and keeps the text engaging. The author (thankfully) is not a statistician, and aside from the occasional flat joke, he does an excellent job of maintaining a lively tone in what could have been an otherwise dense 224 pages. An inexact science Orlik is clear about where the data is flawed and to what extent one should exercise caution. In his discussion of labor markets, he quips, “The first point to understand about China’s unemployment data is that it is wrong.” By and large, however, the story told is that of an increasingly sophisticated and transparent National Bureau of Statistics attempting to pin down and measure the slippery eel that is the Chinese economy. After all, political pressure, hot money, shadow banking, tax evasion, cottage industry, and a massive migrant labor force are messy complicating factors for anyone calculating to the decimal point. In some areas – for example, real estate prices – the author concludes that the private sector is doing a better job in policing the data than the appointed ministry. In others, the combined efforts of roughly 80,000 NBS statisticians appear to be tallying in good faith, at least to the extent that they are able. In any case, the reader is left in a much better position to judge the known unknowns of each indicator and draw his or her own conclusions. For better or worse, “Understanding China’s Economic Indicators” focuses more on Orlik’s area of expertise – drivers in the fixed-income market. There is a detailed and excellent 40 pages of analysis on the external sector where anyone interested in FX reserves should get their fill. On the other hand, retail sales are covered in a mere five pages. That is an unfortunate oversight, especially when one considers the book’s subtitle. Retail sales are an often misused data point, critical to what could be the investment thesis of the decade: the Chinese consumer. With Chinese statistics bandied about in media headlines more every day, there was a forehead-slappingly obvious need for this book. Orlik has risen to the occasion with a practical and accessible reference guide that should be on the desk of anyone interested in understanding the Chinese economy. Taylor Price