here - SMTA

Transcription

here - SMTA

Counterfeit Prevention & Detection
Strategies:
When To Do It, How to Do It
Cheryl Tulkoff
[email protected]
SMTA Empire Chapter
June 18, 2013
1
9000 Virginia Manor Rd Ste 290, Beltsville MD 20705 | 301-474-0607 | www.dfrsolutions.com
Nathan Myhrvold
“I want you to remember that everything I am
saying may be wrong and I want you to
question everything that I’m saying.”
Counterfeit landscape changes rapidly!
2
Abstract
o
This workshop addresses the sources of counterfeit components and provides
insights into how they occur.
o
o
o
o
o
3
Counterfeit components are a rapidly growing area of concern. The
Department of Commerce has identified a 141% increase in the last three
years alone!
Counterfeit Parts are no longer an emerging threat: they’re real, and they’re
here to stay.
A counterfeit is any item that is not as it is represented with the intention to
deceive its’ buyer or user. The misrepresentation is often driven by the
known presence of defects or other inadequacies in regards to performance.
Whether it is used for a commercial, medical or military application, a
counterfeit component can cause catastrophic failure at a critical time.
Detection methodologies, such as visual inspection, mechanical robustness, XRay, XRF, C-SAM, electrical characterization, decapsulation, and marking
evaluations will be compared and contrasted.
Multiple examples of counterfeit parts identified using these techniques will
be highlighted.
Topics
o
State of Counterfeiting – Background, Facts & Statistics
o
Counterfeits Defined
o
Legislation, Standards & Databases
o
Establishing an Anti-Counterfeiting Program
o
Detection and Failure Analysis Techniques
o
Case Studies and Examples
o
Device Countermeasures
o
iNEMI Counterfeit Calculators
o
Summary
4
The State of Counterfeits
o
Increasing concern across all
electronics industries
o
Department of Commerce
measured 141% increase over
past three years
o
o
Recent DfR counterfeit activities
o
o
o
o
5
http://www.bis.doc.gov/defensein
dustrialbaseprograms/osies/defm
arketresearchrpts/final_counterfeit
_electronics_report.pdf
Military Communications
Internet Routers
Air Traffic Control
Consumer (Repair)
o
Flood of counterfeits in the US Defense supply chain
o
o
6
From 2009-2010, over 1800 suspect cases of counterfeit
electronic parts involving over 1 million parts!
Data consistently points to China as the epicenter
o
7
Electronic Component Counterfeit Incidents Continue Record Pace as the
US Department of Defense Set to Update Acquisition Rules
Number of High Risk Suppliers, Including
Counterfeiters, Surges by More than 60% from
2002 to 2011
8
Recent Military Case Studies
o US Navy SH-60B Helicopter
o
o
US Air Force C-130J and C27-J
o
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Counterfeit memory in L3 Displays
US Navy P8A Poseidon
o
9
Counterfeit EIFs installed in FLIR (thermal imaging) units from
Raytheon
Reworked parts in Boeing ice detection module
Top 5 Most Counterfeited Semiconductors in
2011
Rank
Commodity Type
#1
Analog IC
#2
Microprocessor IC
#3
Memory IC
#4
Programmable Logic IC
#5
Transistor
Source: IHS Parts Management 2012
10
% of Reported
Incidents
25.2%
13.4%
13.1%
8.3%
7.6%
Lucrative Economics of Counterfeiting
o
ICM7170 is a microprocessor-compatible real-time clock, manufactured by
Harris/Intersil
o
o
o
ICM7170IPG:
o
-40C to 85C Temperature Range
o
24-Lead Plastic Dual-In-Line Package (PDIP)
o
20uA Maximum Standby Current at 32kHz
ICM7170AIBG:
o
-40C to 85C Temperature Range
o
24-Pin Small Outline Plastic Package (SOIC)
o
5uA Maximum Standby Current at 32kHz
ICM7170IPG
o
o
o
Counterfeiter bought for $.02
Sold for $38.00 each as ICM7170AIBG’s
Built around 45k/month which equals a potential gross profit of $2,000,000 per
month!
DMSMS & Standardization 2011, http://www.dmsms2011.com
11
Counterfeit Parts Defined
What are they?
What is their impact?
Where do they come
from?
Identification
Industry
Countermeasures
Avoidance
Mitigation
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
12
What are counterfeit parts?
o
Any part or component that is not as represented
o
o
o
o
o
o
Parts being counterfeited include:
o
o
o
13
Duplication of another manufacturer’s product
Manufacturer’s product that failed test, inspection, or burn-in
or was an engineering sample
Empty package or wrong functionality
Salvaged or reworked parts
Trojans
Newest parts & components
Obsolete parts
Inexpensive parts as well as high value parts
Top 4 Types of Counterfeits
o
Used product marked as higher grade new product
o
o
o
o
o
Fake, non-working product
o
o
Inside sources
New product re-marked as higher grade product
o
14
Disguised parts
Defective Scrap
o
o
These types of counterfeits may work
Will not operate at the same level as the higher grade part
May fail under stress that would be expected under normal
conditions.
Electronics recycling or salvage sources
Like used product, re-marked new product will work, but not at
the desired level of functionality.
Types of Confirmed Counterfeits
o
Microcircuits
o
o
o
o
o
o
Microprocessors
Other Microcircuits
Memory
Radio Frequency/Wireless
Logic, Standard
Special Purpose Logic
o
Discretes
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
15
Electromechanical
Thyristors
Capacitors
Other Discretes
Circuit Protection/Fuses
Diodes
Resistors
Sensors & Actuators
Optoelectronics
Power Transistors
Rectifiers
Small Signal Transistors
Magnetics
Crystals/Oscillators
Generators of Counterfeit Parts
o
Inside Job
o
o
Competitors
o
o
Fraudulent: empty package or wrong chip
o Will fail immediately
Hackers
o
16
Unknown competitor may package and label the same as a
known company
o May function as a direct replacement (may not)
Money Makers
o
o
Failed parts off the production line
o May operate in benign environment
Trojans: malicious code
o Security threat
Primary Sources of Counterfeit Parts
o
o
o
o
Most counterfeit parts come from parts brokers that deal in
small and odd lots
Low volume of obsolete parts bought off the internet
Authorized parts distributors rarely have counterfeits
because they receive them directly from the original
component manufacturer (OCM)
Regions with highest counterfeit activity:
o
o
o
o
17
China
Middle East
Eastern Europe
But truly a global problem!
Counterfeit Origins
China & US dominate but true origin is hard to identify
18
Environmental Legislation Impact
o
Provides additional opportunities
o
o
19
Recycling
Need for obsolete SnPb parts
What is the Impact of Counterfeit Parts?
o
o
o
o
Cost
Reputation
Security
Failure
o
20
Risk and impact varies based on type of counterfeit and
operational environment
Cost Impacts of Counterfeiting to
Semiconductor Manufacturers
o
Visible Costs
o
o
o
o
Hidden Costs
o
o
o
21
Revenue Loss
Device level anti-counterfeiting measures
Personnel measures
Avoiding potentially lower cost manufacturing companies
or regions of the world
Reputation / Brand
Loss of Credibility to buyers
Anti-counterfeiting Personnel Costs
o
o
o
o
o
Training
Tracking
Inspection
Testing
Paperwork
o
o
o
22
Control
Analysis
Procedures
Equipment Producer Costs
o
Procurement training
o
o
o
Staff/operator training
Incoming product inspection
o
o
o
o
Time, tracking, test equipment
Control and testing of product sourced from non-approved or
infrequently used sources.
Loss of manufacturing time and output while re-sourcing device
if counterfeits are found or delivered
Costs if counterfeit gets into manufacturing process
o
23
Limiting potential sources and purchasing controls
Rework or scrap
End Component User Costs
o
o
o
o
o
o
24
Additional servicing and
spares
Premature equipment
failure
Equipment downtime
Defects or bugs causing
malfunction
Legal expenses: downtime,
damage, failure to
perform, injury, loss
Military & national security
Counterfeit Databases, Standards, and
Legislation
25
ERAI (Electronic Retailers Association
International)
Founded in 1995, ERAI is an information services
organization that monitors, investigates and reports issues
affecting the global hi-tech electronics supply chain.
ERAI provides tools to mitigate risks on substandard parts,
counterfeit parts, vendors and even customers.
Subscribers include OEMs, CMs, Distributors, OCMs,
government agencies and industry associations.
Founding participant in SAE International G-19 Counterfeit
www.erai.com
o
o
o
o
o
26
GIDEP
o
Government - Industry Data Exchange Program
(GIDEP) is a cooperative activity between government
and industry
o
o
o
27
Seeks to reduce/eliminate expenditures of resources by
sharing technical information.
Maintains suspect counterfeit database
www.gidep.org
IDEA, IACC
o
Independent Distributors of Electronics Association
(IDEA), www.idofea.org
o
o
o
Non-profit trade association representing distributors of
electronic components
IDEA-STD-1010-B: Acceptability of Electronic
Components Distributed in the Open Market
International Anti Counterfeiting Coalition
o
o
28
IACC is the world's largest non-profit organization
devoted solely to protecting intellectual property and
deterring counterfeiting
www.iacc.org
US Government Legislation
o
2012 U.S. National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA)
o
o
29
Added regulations for counterfeit part detection and
avoidance.
October 3, 2012 updates to the DFAR supplement
implemented portions of section 818 of NDAA that must add
definitions specific to counterfeit parts, define contractors'
responsibilities, and clarify the government's role.
Recent DoD Updates
o
o
o
o
May 16, 2013: Long-awaited proposed Defense Federal
Acquisition Regulation Supplement on detection and avoidance
of counterfeit parts was released for comment.
Required by Section 818 of the 2012 National Defense
Authorization Act, the DFARS was to have been in place by Sept.
27, 2012.
Instead, a “proposed rule” with comments due on or before July
15, 2013.
Little detail in the proposed rule.
o
o
o
30
The statute clearly directed the U.S. Department of Defense to
establish special requirements for contractor processes to avoid
counterfeit parts
Proposed rule largely avoids this
Folds counterfeit parts prevention into obligations that govern
contractor purchasing systems.
DoD Memorandum
o
“Overarching DoD Counterfeit Prevention Guidance.’”
o
o
31
In the memo, the department laid out an actionable
definition of counterfeit material and also emphasized
the importance of taking immediate action to apply
existing policy and procedures, prior to establishing new
DoD policy and procedures or waiting for forthcoming
changes to the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation
Supplement (DFARS).
http://www.dmsms2012.com/images/CounterfeitPrevention-Guidance.pdf
DoD Definition of Counterfeit
o
Under the proposed regulations, a counterfeit part is:
o
o
o
32
An unauthorized copy or substitute part that has been
identified, marked, and/or altered by a source other
than the part’s legally authorized source and has been
misrepresented to be from a legally authorized source;
An item misrepresented to be an authorized item of the
legally authorized source; or
A new, used, outdated, or expired item from a legally
authorized source that is misrepresented by any source
to the end-user as meeting the performance
requirements for the intended use.
Defense Logistics Agency (DLA)
o
Director’s policy memo dated 21 July 2011
o
o
o
33
Report suspect and confirmed counterfeits to the
Government-Industry Data Exchange Program (GIDEP)
as Agency Action Notices
Notification of criminal investigative organization,
identified users, & DLA’s Counterfeit Material Team
“It is an unacceptable practice to report a suspect
counterfeit item after a protracted period of time
trying to conclusively determine an item is suspect or
actually counterfeit”
34
SAE AS5553 – The Aerospace Standard
o
AS5553 “Counterfeit Electronic Parts; Avoidance, Detection,
Mitigation, and Disposition”
o
Provides 7 basic requirements for controlling counterfeit part
threat
o Control Plan, addressing
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
35
Obsolescence management
Purchasing Practices
Purchasing Documentation
Receiving Inspection
In process investigation
Material Control
Reporting
SAE: The Aerospace Standard Series
o
o
ARP 6178-2011, ‘‘Fraudulent/Counterfeit Parts; Tool for
Risk Assessment of Distributors’’
Number of Standards now under development
o
o
o
o
36
SAE AS 6081 ‘‘Counterfeit Electronic Parts; Avoidance
Protocol, Distributors’’
SAE AS 6174‘‘Counterfeit Materiel; Detection, Mitigation,
and Disposition’’,
SAE AS 6171 ‘‘Test Methods Standards; Counterfeit
Electronic Parts’’
SAE ARD 6884 ‘Terms and Definition –
Fraudulent/Counterfeit Electronic Parts’’.
SEMI AntiCounterfeiting
Standards
o
o
37
SEMI® is the global
industry association
serving the
manufacturing supply
chain for the microand nano-electronics
industries
www.semi.org
EIA/G-12 JEDEC
o
EIA/G-12 Recommendation
o
o
Procuring from OCM’s
o
o
o
Unrealistic for Military / Government programs
Volumes too low
Procuring from designated franchisees
o
38
“only procure from the Original Component Manufacturer (OCM)
that makes and warranties the part or material or their designated
franchisees.”
Component availability from designated franchisees is often
similar to that of OCM
EIA/G-12 Committee Strategy
o
TB-0003-2009: Counterfeit Parts & Materials Risk
Mitigation
Prevention
Detection
Mitigation
39
EIA/G-12 Statistical Analysis
o
o
40
A Destructive Physical Analysis (DPA) should be
conducted in accordance with MIL-STD-1580 on a
random sample with a minimum of a 90% confidence
level (i.e. 22 piece sample, C =0) at a program
approved laboratory. A sample (22 pieces) should be
selected from each lot / date code
EIA now rolled into JEDEC
Counterfeit Metrics: NAVSEA Example
o
Suspect Counterfeit Material Product Quality Deficiency
Reports (PQDRs):
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
41
Total Reported
Total Closed and Verified
Total Closed Other (i.e., final investigation showed they were
not counterfeit)
Federal Stock Code Identifier
Source of supply of counterfeit material
Location where suspect counterfeit material was detected
Criticality of Item (Safety of flight, SUBSAFE, etc.)
Action taken (e.g., stock screen, purge stock, suspend)
Counterfeit Reporting
o
For counterfeit or suspect counterfeits:
o
o
o
o
42
Do not return parts!
Segregate, quarantine, recall
Report to stakeholders and GIDEP, ERAI databases
Report to authorities
Establishing an Anti-Counterfeiting
Protection and Detection Program
43
Obstacles to a Successful Anti-Counterfeit
Program
o
Complacency
o
o
o
o
Not understanding or underestimating the threat
o
o
o
o
o
44
Won’t or can’t happen here
Hasn’t happened yet
Unclear ownership of issue
Only expensive parts are counterfeited
Buy from an “American” company
Parts use latest design
Distributor provides a Certificate of Conformance (C of C)
Receiving inspection or test process will catch fakes
Program
o
o
45
Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR)/ Defense (DFAR) issues
o
FAR/DFAR says use the lowest bidder
o
Need to meet Small Disadvantaged Business quota
o
If I restrict where I buy from, I will pay more money
Supply chain excuses or push back
o
Expensive: here’s the bill for it, $$$
o
“You want to know every time I buy a high risk part?”
o
Other customers don’t have the requirement
o
Liability
Program
o
o
o
o
46
Affordability is key
No one size fits all strategy
Mitigations must pass the cost versus outcome test
Counterfeit Parts are no longer an emerging threat.
They’re real, and they’re here to stay.
Cost-Effective Counterfeit Protection
Approach
o
o
o
o
47
Research
Carefully Select Sources
Implement Purchasing Best Practices
Perform Lot Validation Testing
Counterfeit Protection Strategies
o
48
Do Your Homework
o Contact Original Component Manufacturer (OCM) and
franchise distributers first
o Confirm product status
o Is the product end of life (EOL)?
o Check for authorized aftermarket sources
o Determine if/when the product went EOL
o Determine EOL production lot date codes
o Try to locate a known good device
o Check with industry sources like ERAI or GIDEP for
counterfeit activities of the product needed.
Counterfeit Protection Strategies Continued
o
Choose Sources Wisely
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
49
Don’t use cost as sole/primary criteria for purchase
o Quality Product is goal
Use industry sources to evaluate potential suppliers
Ask for accreditations, certifications & memberships like
ISO9011, AS9120, IDEA-1010, ERAI or IDEA Members
Audit sources
Purchase only from suppliers who have implemented and are
committed to counterfeit avoidance practices
Understand warranty and payment terms
Create a list of approved, trusted suppliers and use them
Purchasing Best Anti-Counterfeiting Protection
Practices
o
o
o
o
o
Clearly communicate objectives and needs
Create company policy on counterfeits
Look for product in stock, not just availability
Ask if the product is traceable back to the OCM
Don’t buy COD
o
o
50
Negotiate terms or use escrow services.
Allows time for authenticity checks & testing to be
performed before paying
Purchasing Best Anti-Counterfeiting Protection
Practices
o
Before buying, ask for photos and evidence
o
o
o
o
o
51
Images of component front and back
Compare date codes and EOL date for product
Compare marking with known-good product
Do research now as it will save money later
Understand the product warranty
o Anything less than 30 days is a RED flag
o If supplier does not have confidence in the product,
why would you?
Complex Supply Chains
μcircuit
design
Dist.
Test
Ass’y
• Multiple points of entry
• Porous return policies
Fab
Avionics
OEM
Lloyd Condra, Boeing
52
Broker 101
o
Broker or Independent Distributor Basics
o
o
o
o
o
53
Not all Brokers & Independent Distributors are the same
Many have minimal Quality Systems and no ESD, storage, or
handling controls.
Some have no experience with semiconductors
o The Internet has created virtual companies
Traceability back to the original OCM is unavailable
o Limited or no product warranty or support
Buying obsolete products requires more diligence, not less
Evaluate & Validate ALL broker material
o
Define Test Plan based on your level of risk
o
o
Define your test plan to meet risk mitigation needs
o
o
Put requirements in writing and be as detailed as
possible
Require documented reports of all validation tests
o
54
What is your application? Commercial? Military?
Copy of lot information detailing all tests performed and
results
o Die ID Photos, X-Ray Photos, etc.
Evaluate & Validate ALL broker material
o
Chose a reputable Test Lab/Partner based on
accreditations and capabilities, not on price alone.
o
o
If your supplier provides Lot Validation Testing in the
purchase price:
o
o
o
o
55
Ask for details of test plan prior to starting test
Provide your test requirements to your supplier
Compare their test plan against your risk mitigation
needs
Understand what you are paying for
Ask who will be performing the testing on your material
Designated Franchisees
Military / Government contractors
standardizing sourcing plans
o
o
o
Lists of approved sources
(Authorized Source Directory)
Other sources by exception and
with specific approvals
Approval process
o
o
o
o
Audit based on quality system
Risk assessment to the program
Development of an inspection /
test plan
http://www.authorizedcomponents.com/manufacturers.html
Use of Authorized Franchisees does not eliminate risk
56
Counterfeit Sources
o
Many unsafe part & supplier sources
o
o
o
o
These are counterfeit ports of entry
o
o
o
57
Online Broker Search Engines
Maverick procurement methods or spending limits
Google
Rapid access to millions of parts
Minimal membership requirements
Quick & easy access to a large audience of buyers
Trusted Supply Chain
o
Direct from the Factory (Original Component
Manufacturer, OCM)
o
o
o
o
o
ERAI Members
Qualified Sources of Supply
o
o
o
58
Approved Vendor / Manufacturer (AVL / AML)
Franchised and Authorized Sources
Approved Independent Distributors
Suppliers
Manufacturers
Parts (or alternates meeting the above criteria)
Qualified Supplier Resources
o
o
Use industry resources!
DSCC QSLD
o
o
o
o
59
Pre-qualified distributors
Semiconductors and Microcircuits
Distributors with demonstrated
quality assurance practices
http://www.dscc.dla.mil/downlo
ads/VQGeneral/QSLD_Booklet.
pdf
Decision Process
o
o
o
If prevention is not realistic, when to detect?
How to mitigate?
Entry for counterfeit components is cost
o
o
o
How to determine the appropriate cost to detect and
mitigate?
o
60
Cost to procure < cost of redesign (+ requal, etc.)
If cost to mitigate is too high, then redesign
Driven by probability / mission risk / volume matrix
Decision Matrix
Probability of
Counterfeit
61
Threat Evaluation
o
THREAT ASPECTS
o
o
o
o
o
62
Probability
Knowledge of Part
Timing of Effect
Where Part Can be
Found
Destructiveness
o
OBSERVABILITY
o
o
o
o
o
o
Measureable
Accessible
No damage
Intermittent
Unknown Latency
Provokable
Counterfeit Probability
o
Probability of counterfeit (per shipment) tends to display
order of magnitude dependence on component source
o
May vary based on supply chain and component technology
Known: Existing business relationship
Unknown: No existing business relationship (e.g., eBay)
63
Case Study
o
Telecom OEM procures one reel of capacitors from
known broker
o
o
o
End-of-life (EOL) product
Decision Matrix
Probability is 2%
Volume is 4000 parts
Mission Risk is $5M
Eight capacitors per CCA (500 CCAs)
$10K cost of quality ($5K COGS + $1K service + $4K loss of market)
DfR recommended that $10K to $100K should be
spent on counterfeit detection and mitigation
o
64
Industry ROI can be 1:1 to 10:1
Counterfeit Component Inspection &
Detection Techniques Explained
65
Detection of Counterfeits
o
o
Counterfeiters are increasingly
sophisticated
Use of actual parts at the start
and end of a reel
o
o
Challenges sampling techniques
Inspection and comparison of
known-good to possible
counterfeits
o
o
o
66
Markings
Internal structure
Performance measurement
Detection Techniques
Risk Mitigation Methods
Detection/Risk Mitigation Methods
Counterfeit Concern
Visual /
Marking
Inspection
Verificati
on of
Mater-ial
Manuf.
Seal Test
Analy-sis
LDC,
SNs, etc.
Radiographic
DPA
Minimal
Electrical
Test
Full
Electrical Test
(Ambient)
Test,
Burn-in
and QCI
No Die / Nonfunctional
No
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Material Content
P
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
Wrong Die
P
P
No
No
P
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
P
No
P
P
P
P
No
No
No
No
No
P
No
No
P
P
P
P
P
P
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
P
P
Yes
P
P
P
P
P
No
No
No
P
No
P
P
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
P
P
P
No
P
Yes
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
No
No
P
No
P
P
P
P
No
No
No
No
P
P
No
P
P
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
P
P
P
P
Yes
Yes
Counterfeit with
functional die
P
P
P
No
P
P
P
P
Yes
Yes
Yes
Temperature
Range
Upmarking
No
P
No
No
No
P
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Re-used /
Repaired /
Salvaged
Scrapped /
Reject
Mechanical
Damage
Mis-Handling /
Storage
Manufacturer
Change
Less Reliable
Parts
Reliability /
Quality Issue
ESD / EOS
Damage
Code:
No = Unlikely to Find
P = Possibly Find
Yes = Probably Find
Shading:
Green = Low Cost / Easily Accomplished
Yellow = Moderate Cost / Some time involved
Red = High Cost / Significant time to accomplish
Dotted Pattern = Will be found at first electrical test
This chart was developed from one created by Mark Marshall of Integra Technologies.
T. Apple 610-531-5484
67
Full
Electrical
Test &
Test (Hot
Burn-in
/ Cold Ambient)
5
Risk Mitigation Techniques
Selection Guide
Detection Techniques (cont.)
The more spent, the more time taken, the more confidence in reliability
Add QCI and other
lot acceptance
testing
Cost & Schedule
Add post burn-in full electrical
tests over temperature
on
i
t
c
ete
Add full electrical tests
over temperature
f
yo
ob
Add DPA
y
it
l
i
b
lia
e
R
C of C Only
Check Alerts
r
(P
)
Add burn-in
D
ilit
b
Add full ambient electrical tests
a
Add material check / seal test /
radio-graphic or do basic electrical
testing
Visual Inspection
Low cost / repairable
/ redundant systems
T. Apple 610-531-5484
[email protected]
68
Moderate cost / repairablereplaceable / non-mission critical
Item End-Use Requirements
High cost / non-repairable /
mission critical
3/27/2007
Commonly Requested Tests for Counterfeits
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
69
General product review
Paperwork Check
External visual inspection
Inspection for remarking/resurfacing
X-ray
Lead finish exam
Internal verification
Basic electrical testing
MDA Example Desired Inspection & Test
Requirements
Missile Defense Agency (MDA) Desired:
o Documentation check
o Visual Inspection
o Marking Permanency
o Surface Finish Permanency
o Aggressive Solvents Test (destructive)
o X-Ray Fluorescence
o X-Ray
o Die Verification (destructive)
70
Counterfeit Analysis Techniques
•
•
•
Analysis always starts with Non-Destructive Evaluation (NDE)
•
Designed to obtain maximum information with minimal risk of
damaging or destroying physical evidence
Emphasize the use of simplest tools first
Generally non-destructive techniques:
•
•
•
•
•
•
Destructive evaluation techniques
•
•
•
71
Visual Inspection
Electrical Characterization
Acoustic Microscopy
X-ray Microscopy
X-Ray Fluorescence
Decapsulation
Cross-sectioning
SEM/EDX
•
Parametric characterization
•
•
Curve tracer
•
•
•
•
Release and return of electrical signal along a given path
Measurement of phase shift of return signal indicates potential location of electrical open
Other characterization equipment
•
•
•
•
Applies alternating voltage; provides plot of voltage vs. current response
Valuable in characterizing diode, transistor, and resistance behavior
Time domain reflectometry (TDR)
•
•
Comparison of performance to datasheet specifications
Inductance/capacitance/resistance (LCR) meter
High resistance meter (leakage current < nA)
Low resistance meter (four wire; < milliohms)
Use of additional environmental stresses
•
Semiconductor-based devices
•
•
72
Temperature rise or temperature/humidity could trigger elevated leakage current
Passive components
72
Visual Inspection Cost & Benefit
o
o
Cost: $1K to $3K
What to look for:
o
o
o
o
o
o
73
Part marking, date codes
Color differences in parts
Marking imperfections, changes, blacktopping, “ghost”
images
Lead finish, plating variability, exposed copper, excess
solder, co-planarity of leads, bent leads
Residues & contamination
Package variation, thickness, radii
Visual Inspection
1
o
74
3
Which is counterfeit?
o
o
2
The one with markings? Or the two that seem to have none?
Two samples are non-functional and one functions
Visual Inspection
Capacitor Group 1,
Fluorescent Light Dark Brown
Capacitor Group 2,
Fluorescent Light Pink
Capacitor Group 3,
Fluorescent Light Greenish Gray
o
Capacitor Group 4,
Fluorescent Light Bluish Gray
75
Five different capacitor
types in one reel!
Capacitor Group 5,
Fluorescent Light Light Brown
Date Code Marking - Differences
2.22
3.18
Registration (mm)
12.00
12.00
Surface
Smooth Textured
Uneven
Even
Lettering
Uniform Uneven
depth
depth
76
Samsung Marking Information
(1) SAMSUNG logo : SAMSUNG or SEC
top marking
type
SAMSUNG
marking
mark criteria
package
>11.2mm
U-BGA,
W-BGA,
TBGA, FBGA
etc
(2) Year & Week
(3) Part Number : Refer to Part No. decoder page
(4) Lot Number
Country of origin not a standard Samsung marking feature
77
Visual Inspection
Identical part numbers different marking styles
78
Visual Inspection
Observed differences on lid corners. Part A has chamfer, and part B has
dimple
Real or Fake? The Counterfeit Chip Conundrum, Hal Rotchadl, Premier
Semiconductor Services, Tempe, AZ, USA, IPC Printed Circuit Expo, APEX &
Designer Summit Proceedings.
79
Visual Inspection
Observed side view differences. Left part has a thin lid and
right part has a thick lid
80
Blacktopping
Blacktopping is a counterfeiting technique where the
counterfeiter:
o
o
o
81
Takes components, usually real, but discarded
o Sands them to remove the original component marking
o Blacktops them in order to hide the original marking
o Prints them with fake markings.
Dissolve the blacktop with a solvent / acetone that reveals
the true identity of the components.
o But, methods used to blacktop sanded parts improve
daily so the acetone test is no longer reliable
Examples of Blacktopping
L01, remarked date code, VC36 changed to GC33
L011, hynix part
Just under top surface, date code mismatch and hynix part
82
Blacktopping & Acetone Wipe Test
Appearance After Acetone Wipe:
change in texture and finish
Evidence of Sanding: Visible after
blacktopping is removed
Photos courtesy of Oxygen Electronics
83
X-Ray Cost & Benefit
o
o
o
o
o
84
Cost: $1K to $3K
Verification of die and wire bonding pattern
Internal construction of component
Die bonding delamination issues
Die attach voiding
X-Ray Microscopy


Allows for internal inspection
Latest innovations




Digital detectors
Laminography (‘virtual’ crosssectioning)

Produces CT models for 3D
sample analysis, virtual
micro-sectioning and
internal dimensional
Nanofocus resolution
Oblique viewing
Agilent 5DX
Nordson Dage X-Ray with 3D m-CT
85
X-Ray Inspection
o
Inspect for:
o
o
o
o
o
86
Extra wire bonds
Wrong configuration of bond pads
Different die sizes
Extra heat capacity (large paddle)
Different lead frames
X-Ray Inspection
L01
Different die sizes
87
L011
X-Ray Inspection
Same part but a better remarking, same die sizes, Hynix mark visible
88
X-Ray Inspection
Same part
89
Case Study: Counterfeit FETS-X-Ray
o
o
o
Customer had an issue
with DC to DC
converter failures
Simulation models did
not predict the failures
X-ray inspection of the
failed units
Parallel FETS
90
X-Rays of Loose Parts
Z536
Z436, Z536
Z536
Differences noted in:
-Lead frame
-Wire bonding
-Molding
Z536
91
EZ609
X-Ray Technique: Automation?
o
ChipCheck Project, www.smartgroup.org
o
92
Move focus from sampling and problem to resolution
X-Ray Technique: Automation?
o
ChipCheck Project
o
o
93
Creation of an inspection system for automatic detection
of counterfeit components at incoming
Creation of counterfeit component detection software for
fast and automatic sentencing of components. A
component database storing details of known, good,
components for comparison included
Electrical Characterization Cost &
Benefit
o
Cost: $3K to $6K – passives, simple actives
o
o
Cost: $15K to $80K – characterization of complex IC,
fixturing, test equipment
o
o
94
One temperature for evaluation
Potential for circuit board design, layout and fabrication costs
to enable testing
COMMENT: You can’t afford the risk associated with
buying expensive ICs from unknown suppliers
o
Limitations of physical characteristic testing
o
o
o
No conclusive identification information on the die once
decapsulated
Therefore, some electrical analysis is helpful in determining
authenticity.
o
o
95
Parts may be re-manufactured or factory rejects in what
appears to be authentic packaging
Although full datasheet testing is highly recommended for
high reliability applications, a curve trace on each lead is a
very effective way to begin an electrical examination of the
parts.
A known good or reference component is required.
Case Study – Capacitor Electrical
Characterization
Suspect capacitor - group 2
1.0E-03
1.057E-09
9.0E-04
1.056E-09
8.0E-04
1.055E-09
Dissipation factor
Capacitance (F)
7.0E-04
1.054E-09
1.053E-09
1.052E-09
6.0E-04
o
5.0E-04
4.0E-04
Top
3.0E-04
1.051E-09
o
2.0E-04
Cap 4 - Bag 10
1.050E-09
limit 1
Cap 4 - Bag 10
1.0E-04
Within spec
limit 2
1.049E-09
0.0E+00
-60
-40
-20
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
-60
-40
-20
0
Temperature (°C)
20
40
60
80
100
120
Temperature (°C)
o
1.2E-03
9.820E-10
o
9.810E-10
1.0E-03
9.800E-10
Dissipation factor
Capacitance (F)
9.790E-10
9.780E-10
9.770E-10
9.760E-10
9.750E-10
9.740E-10
C7 SN2854 - 0632
8.0E-04
6.0E-04
4.0E-04
2.0E-04
limit 1
9.730E-10
C7 SN2854 - 0632
limit 2
9.720E-10
0.0E+00
-60
-40
-20
0
20
40
60
Temperature (°C)
96
Bottom
80
100
120
-60
-40
-20
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
Temperature (°C)
Out of spec
Electrical Characterization of Counterfeit
Diodes
Breakdown:
280V
250V
Breakdown:
50V
420V
97
Electrical Characterization of Counterfeit
Diodes
Recovery measurements
Acceptable Waveform
98
Counterfeit Waveform
This is not an authentic STS25NH3LL Part, does
not meet resistance specifications.
Its higher drain to source resistance will cause its
parallel FET partner to carry all the current.
FETs with large die have
similar resistances and
electrical performance,
regardless of lead frame
style
99
Mechanical Robustness - Cost & Benefit
o
o
100
Cost: $2K to $5K
Thermal cycling or other testing to verify component is
not counterfeit
Counterfeit Mechanical Risk
o
Thermal Shock Test
o
Visual Inspection (EIA-595 allows for 5 mil depth)
o
o
o
8 of 32 counterfeit capacitors had acceptable chip-outs
12 of 32 counterfeit capacitors had unacceptable chip-outs
8 of 32 Taiyo Yuden capacitors had acceptable chip-outs (very
small)
Pictures of chip-outs of counterfeit capacitors (left) and Taiyo Yuden
capacitors (right)
101
Destructive Physical Analysis (DPA)
o
o
o
102
Cost: $7 to $10K passives
Cost: $8 to $12K actives
Step by Step analytical approach to identifying
whether a device is counterfeit using all tools
available.
Decapsulation and Cross Sectioning
o
103
Allows direct inspection of circuits and identification of
o
Extra circuitry
o
Extra layers
o
Extra interconnects
Decapsulation
Wet Etch Tanks
o
Decapsulation is a very valuable
tool for determining authenticity
of difficult parts.
o
o
o
104
After performing non destructive
tests, the part may be opened for
die verification
Does not guarantee all of the
parts in the lot are the same
Typically cheaper than electrical
testing
Plasma Etcher
Decapsulated Parts Inspection
Observed internal differences on lids. Part on left has flat lid, and
part on right has a cavity lid
106
Decapsulated Parts Inspection
Chip capacitors are missing (bare pad site) on left part and
mounted on right part
107
Cross-Sectioning
o
o
Standard method for destructive
subsurface evaluation
Method:
o
o
o
o
o
o
108
Sawing to approximate area of interest
Potting in epoxy resins to aid polishing
Polishing medium dependent upon
materials: typically diamond, SiC, or
alumina suspensions & embedded
polishing cloths
Coarse to fine (600 grit to 0.05 um)
grinding sequence to eliminate damage
from previous step
Final etch often used for microstructural
relief
Optical/electron microscopy for
inspection
Images courtesy of
Buehler
1
o
o
o
109
2
3
Customer experienced two failures
Left: known good part; center and right: bad parts
Center part: no die; right part: cracked die
Higher Risk Non-Destructive Inspection
•
Important to understand that NDE equipment is not completely non-destructive
•
Acoustic microscopy
•
•
•
•
X-ray microscopy
•
•
Sensitivity allows for use of very low voltages; mostly non-destructive
Thermal imaging
•
110
Elevated exposure, especially with laminography, can induce damage in sensitive
components (EEPROM)
SQUID (Superconducting QUantum Interference Device) microscopy
•
•
Can remove residues/contaminants when product is submerged in water
Selection of bath fluid is key (distilled/deionized water; IPA; oil; etc.)
Issue for moisture sensitive components
Temperature rise can damage or mask fragile conductive filaments (joule
heating, thermal runaway, evaporation of retained moisture)
Acoustic Microscopy



Method for inspecting internal structures
through the application of high frequency
(>20 kHz) sound waves
Requires immersion in water (acoustic
signals reflected by air)

Allows for very accurate detection of
voids and delaminations
Options

Frequency

Transmission mode

Imaging
Transducer
H2O or other
fluids
Receiver
111
Acoustic Microscopy: Transducer Frequency
High frequency
Short focus
Low frequency
Long focus
1. Higher resolution
1. Lower resolution
2. Shorter focal lengths
2. Longer focal lengths
3. Less penetration
3. Greater penetration
(Thinner packages)
General rules:
• Ultra High Frequency (200+ MHz) for flip chips and wafers.
• High Frequency (50-75 MHz) for thin plastic packages. (110MHz-UHF) for
flip chips.
• Low Frequency (15-30 MHz) for thicker plastic packages.
112
(Thicker packages)
Acoustic Microscopy: Transmission Mode
Through Transmission
Pulse-Echo
Transmit
Transmit
&
Receive
Receive
Pulse-Echo: One Transducer
• Uses ultrasound reflected from the sample
• Can determine which interface is delaminated
• Requires scanning from both sides to inspect
all interfaces
• Provides images with high degree of spatial
detail
• Peak amplitude, time of flight (TOF), and phase
inversion measurement
113
Through Transmission: Two Transducers
• Uses ultrasound transmitted through the
sample
• One scan reveals delamination at all
interfaces
• No way to determine which interface is
delaminated
• Less spatial resolution than pulse-echo
• Commonly used to verify pulse-echo
results
Acoustic Microscopy




114
Missing die, missing bond wires and
different internal structure
Electrical shorting within the package
(delamination, electro-chemical
migration)
Electrical opens (delamination, wire
bond failure)
Insufficient thermal performance
detected (i.e. die attach, voids and
delamination)
X-Ray Fluorescence (XRF) Analysis
o
XRF widely used determine:
o
o
o
Elemental composition of components
Lead content for compliance to the RoHS directive.
A newer use for XRF:
o
o
115
Compare a known good component to a suspect component by
comparing the elements of the leads as well as the packaging.
Software developed to compare the two in order to assist in
authenticity verification.
X-Ray Fluorescence (XRF) Spectroscopy
116

X-ray emission signature from
x-ray source

Portable models available

Crystallographic analysis of
solid samples
Example of SAC part labeled SnPb
o
o
Use XRF gun to scan
incoming BGAs to
verify Pb or Pb-free
balls
Verify lead finish on
other parts
Pb-free Part failed to solder in Sn-Pb Process
117
Scanning Electron Microscopy


118
Sample rastered with an electron
beam
Emitted electrons sorted by delay
and quantity
Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS)
•
•
EDS scan of
elemental
copper
•
•
•
Monte Carlo
simulation of Si K-a
X-rays in an SiO2
matrix at 5 keV
(Vanderlinde, 2004)
119
Used with SEM
X-ray emission signature
from electron source
Elemental analysis of
solid samples
Identification based on
multiple emission lines (K,
L, M)
Can’t detect light
elements: H, He, Li, Be
EDS of Ceramic Capacitor
o
Materials
Characterization
o
o
o
o
o
120
Bismuth 7% to 23%
Palladium 4% to 9%
Silver 7% to 14%
Titanium 26% to 34%
Neodymium 29% to 46%
Suspect Counterfeits
o
o
o
Not all suspect counterfeits are counterfeits
Company changed the size of the chip without a
product change notice (PCN)
Original components that appear to be fake
Old
New
Both components have the same part number
121
Avoiding Counterfeits
Activity
Relative Cost
Custom fabrication
$$$$
Lifetime Buy
$$-$$$
Modernize/Rev
$$$$$$$$$
Screen Incoming
$$
Screen Outgoing
$-$$$
Buy from origin & verify
$
122
Testing & Reporting Recommendations
o
Choose an analysis lab carefully
o
o
o
o
123
No industry standards or accreditation for counterfeit
analysis
Rapidly changing counterfeit landscape
Wide variations noted among labs
Identify the information desired from analysis
Key Analysis Report Elements
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
124
Incoming information
Investigator & lab name
Datasheet information
Assessment Checklist
Analysis & test descriptions
& tools
Electrical test results
Overall Comments
Results
Summary
o
Image List – as needed
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
Packaging images
X-ray images
XRF images
EDS images
Acoustic microscopy images
Overall images of part
Observation images
Lead condition images
Solvent testing images
Internal images
Corner radius images
Device Countermeasures:
Design for Counterfeit Avoidance
125
Examples of Device Level Countermeasures
o
Encryption on a chip
o
o
o
o
Smart Marking
o
o
INK CONTAINING DNA OR OTHER BIOLOGIC MARKER FOR PREVENTION
OF COUNTERFEITING AND PRODUCT DIVERSION PERCEPTIBLE WITH
INFRARED LIGHT
RF tagging
o
o
o
Often cited as one of the answers to cybersecurity woes
Difficult for small components to handle
Intel announced a process that allows the random-number generator, which
is the basis for encryption, to be made with the same semiconducting
material and at the same feature size now used for modern processors.
Package Authentication - This method makes it extremely difficult to
counterfeit the data on RFID tags
Data acts as an electronic security marker to automatically authenticate
genuine product packaging.
Shipment tracking
126
Encryption on a Chip
o
Physically unclonable functions (PUFs) provide one way to tie a device to its mark of
authenticity.
o
o
o
o
With the necessary hardware in place, a secret key can be injected into the device at
wafer test.
o
o
o
Each IC is subtly different to its peers on wafer, even though all that make it through test
will operate in the same manner.
For example, internal srams have subtle biases such that, when they are first powered up,
they contain a pattern of 1s and 0s that is essentially random from die to die, but which is
consistent from power cycle to power cycle for that die. Repeatability can be as high as
80% under different test conditions.
This pattern can be used as an unclonable device 'fingerprint' that, together with a digital
certificate stored as part of the manufacturing and test process, guarantees authenticity
Followed by injection of a digital certificate bound to the secret key at the assembly and
binning stage.
Provides a certificate that has been securely signed by the OCM and which supports all
downstream anti counterfeiting measures.
Certificate, which can be interrogated at any point, provides traceability for suppliers
and end users, providing a way of guaranteeing a counterfeit free supply chain
downstream.
127
Government / Research Countermeasures
o
The U.S. Army Research Laboratory‘s (ARL), Army Research
Office‘s (ARO)
o
o
o
128
Exploring DNA as a tagging and tracking method
optical scanning technology that can identify counterfeit electronic
components
ChromoLogic developed a tag with a biomimetic barcode that
can be aligned in the proper order and decoded by an optical
reader, similar to how the sequence of a DNA molecule can be
read.
o http://chromologic.com/technologies-2/
o Discovered that the optical scanning technology developed to
decode the biomimetic tag is capable of mapping the intrinsic
surface of electronic components, providing a type of
fingerprint to distinguish authentic or counterfeit circuits.
Government / Research Countermeasures
o
ChromoLogic has developed this
surface-scanning technology into
the DTEK system, which provides
quantitative optical inspection of
integrated circuits
The DTEK system outputs
quantitative information
about the surface of
electronic components for
use in comparative analysis.
129
Manufacturers Countermeasures
o
o
o
o
o
130
Complex markings on the package
Ultra-violet ink in package marking
Symbols or identifiers etched in the die
Difficult to alter parts
Traceability
Countermeasures (cont.)
o
o
o
131
Latest technique involves
etch depth analysis
Use of digital light
processing (DLP) to
rapidly scan surfaces
for highly accurate
depth measurements
Compare to either
manufacturer’s spec or
known good part
Mitigating Effects of Counterfeits
o
Full performance screen
o
o
Test to detect fraudulent parts
o
o
o
o
132
Test to or beyond spec
I.e., empty packages or wrong functionality
Factory-failed parts
Competitors parts may prove to work
Will not detect parts with latent defects or those with
additional circuitry
Prevention
o
o
o
133
Comprehensive audit of the distributor based on their
quality system
Risk assessment to the program
Development of an inspection / test plan
Finished Product and Dangers of
Manufactured Counterfeits
o
The finished product can look like the original. Once
the components are complete they may undergo a
simple electrical test, such as a curve trace, but the
stresses from reclaiming and die harvesting can induce
severe damage causing;
o
o
o
o
o
134
Lower life expectancy
Curve trace irregularities
Out of specification
Continuity failures
Unknown reliability
iNEMI Counterfeit Risk Calculators
o
iNEMI White Paper: Development of a Methodology to
Determine Risk of Counterfeit Use
o
o
o
o
135
http://thor.inemi.org/webdownload/projects/Miniaturizatio
n/Counterfeit_Whitepaper.pdf
Risk of Counterfeit Use
Risk of Untrusted Sources
Counterfeit Loss & Total Cost Estimation
o
136
Counterfeit Loss & Cost
o
137
o
138
o
139
Risk of Counterfeit Use
Memberships and Accreditations
Rating
IDEA
GIDEP
ISO 9000
SEMI T20
AS 6081
In House
Testing
using AS
6171 (after
release of
standard)
Rating = 1
-
-
-
Certification as a trusted
vendor (on a white list,
such as ones required
under SEMI T20.2)
Accredited
Accredited
Certified
Set of infrastructure for
authentication via web
-
Not
Accredited
Serialization when
breaking down batches
-
Rating = 2
Member
Member
No
Member
Rating = 3
-
-
Rating = 4
-
No
Member
Rating = 5
-
-
o
Mitigation and Controls
Rating
Rating
Not
Certified
-
-
-
-
No Serialization
Not Accredited
-
Business Scale
Supplier History
Commodity Expertise
Annual revenue > 100
MUS$
No known Counterfeit
incidents
All Sales, Procurement,
Quality staff specializes
in this commodity only
Rating = 1
> 100
>4
Rating = 2
30 - 100
4
Annual revenue
10 -100 MUS$
Counterfeit supply
suspected
Range of Commodity
Specialists with
> 5 years experience
Rating = 3
11 - 29
3
Annual revenue
1 - 10 MUS$
1 counterfeit supply
confirmed
Some Commodity
Specialists with
< 5 years experience
Rating = 4
4 - 10
2
Annual revenue
0.1 - 1 MUS$
2 - 10 counterfeit
supplies confirmed
New Commodity Supplier
with commodity
specialists
Rating = 5
<4
1
Annual revenue
< 0.1 MUS$
> 10 counterfeit supplies
No Specialist Staff
confirmed
140
Inspection
Environmental
conditions for
handling, shipping,
storage
Insurance / Warranty
Policy in case of
counterfeit occurrence
Policy in case of
suspect parts but no
actual proof of
counterfeit
Well established controls
for adequate limits on
exposure to ESD,
moisture, dust and
mechanical stress
Full coverage of
consequential cost,
including field returns
Agreement with certified
destruction of batch,
refund and full disclosure
of source and history
Refund for returned
batch upon customer's
request
Refund and
Agreement with certified
reimbursement of rework destruction of counterfeit
cost
batch and refund
Refund for returned
batch upon suspicious
observations
More stringent than IDEA
Rating = 1
recommendations
Rating = 2
As in IDEA
recommendations or
equivalent
-
Rating = 3
Less stringent than IDEA
recommendations
Partial controls
Company Characteristics
Number of
Number of locations in
employees
different
countries
Risk of Untrusted
Sources
Rating = 4
Documents, shipment
packaging, labels only
-
Rating = 5
None (e.g. because of no
regular inspection)
No controls of ESD,
moisture, dust or
mechanical stress
Only refund for returned
suspect batches
No policy
No policy
Replacement of batch or Replacement of batch or Replacement of batch or
refund for returned
refund for returned
refund for returned
components only after
proven failures
proven failures
proven failures
No warranty
Refuses refund
Refuses refund
Conclusions
o
Counterfeits are a real threat and growing
o
o
Risk needs to be managed through a decision matrix
o
o
o
141
Complex supply chain provides multiple entry points
Probability / Mission Risk / Volumes
Helps provide clear boundaries and guidelines for
mitigation practices
Costs are not prohibitive and should be chosen as a function
of risk mitigation
Instructor Biography

Cheryl Tulkoff has over 22 years of experience in electronics manufacturing with an emphasis
on failure analysis and reliability. She has worked throughout the electronics manufacturing
life cycle beginning with semiconductor fabrication processes, into printed circuit board
fabrication and assembly, through functional and reliability testing, and culminating in the
analysis and evaluation of field returns. She has also managed no clean and RoHS-compliant
conversion programs and has developed and managed comprehensive reliability programs.

Cheryl earned her Bachelor of Mechanical Engineering degree from Georgia Tech. She is a
published author, experienced public speaker and trainer and a Senior member of both ASQ
and IEEE. She has held leadership positions in the IEEE Central Texas Chapter, IEEE WIE
(Women In Engineering), and IEEE ASTR (Accelerated Stress Testing and Reliability) sections.
She chaired the annual IEEE ASTR workshop for four years, is an ASQ Certified Reliability
Engineer, and a member of SMTA and iMAPS.

She has a strong passion for pre-college STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering, and Math)
outreach and volunteers with several organizations that specialize in encouraging pre-college
students to pursue careers in these fields.
142
Contact Information
•
Questions?
•
•
•
143
Contact Cheryl Tulkoff, [email protected],
512-913-8624
www.dfrsolutions.com
Connect with me in LinkedIn as well!

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