Political Islam and the Elections in Bangladesh

Transcription

POLITICAL ISLAM
& THE ELECTIONS
IN BANGLADESH
Frances Harrison
June 2013
POLITICAL ISLAM & THE ELECTIONS IN BANGLADESH
Copyright © Frances Harrison 2013
All Rights Reserved
No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form
or by any means, electronic or mechanical including photocopying,
recording or any information storage or retrieval systems,
without permission in writing from both the copyright
owner and the publisher of this publication.
ISBN 1 85845 .........
Published in 2013 by
New Millennium
34 South Molton Street
London W1K 5RG
Printed & bound in the UK for New Millennium
Acknowledgements
Many people helped with this report, inside and outside Bangladesh, but special thanks goes to Julfikar Ali Manik of
The Daily Star, Kamal Ahmed of Prothom Alo newspaper and Jannat Gulay (now at Transparency International
Bangladesh) for their hard work in compiling information for this report. A big thank you goes to The Daily Star and
its intrepid team of news photographers for use of its images, which you will see dotted throughout the report.
Several journalists, newspaper editors, academics and analysts spoke on condition of anonymity; others were happy
to be quoted by name but I am equally grateful to them all for their valuable time, hospitality and frankness. Former
BBC colleagues like Qurutul Ain Tahmina (Miti Apa) of Prothom Alo newspaper were invaluable guides and I am
grateful to her colleague, Tipu Sultan, for generously sharing his vast knowledge of militant groups in Bangladesh.
Many thanks to the staff of the Institute of Commonwealth Studies, especially Senior Fellow, Dr. William Crawley,
who kindly edited the text and offered guidance, as well as Alegria Perez for her patience and efficiency. However, the
ultimate responsibility for the range of views contained in this report lies solely with the author.
Postscript: After completing this report, Golam Azam the former leader of Jamaat-e-Islam, was sentenced to 90 years in prison
for crimes against humanity and the party, Jamaat-e-Islami, declared unconstitutional and barred from contesting elections.
POLITICAL
ISLAM
& THE ELECTIONS IN BANGLADESH
3
Introduction
This publication is intended as a briefing paper for visiting journalists, election observers and others. It focuses on
political Islam in Bangladesh in the run up to the tenth general elections.
It comes at a time when the world's third largest Muslim country is in crisis over its identity - should Bangladeshi
politics be steered predominately by Islam or Bengali secularism? Many describe this as a make-or-break struggle for
the heart of the nation, still to be resolved forty years on. The pending elections are adding an extra degree of urgency
to these debates. All agree this vote is of the utmost importance for the country's future. Recent months have seen the
opposing ideologies spilling on to the streets. Tens of thousands of teenage boys from Deobandi madrasa occupied
parts of the capital, in response to young secular Bangladeshis, in what's known as the Shahbagh movement, calling
for tougher action against war criminals and Islamists.
So uncertain and fluid is the situation that it's possible elections won't happen on time at the end of this year.
Much hinges on finding an alternative for the abolished caretaker government system. When I asked newspaper
editors, academics, and analysts if the polls would take place on schedule, they repeatedly called this "the million
dollar question". Asked what the percentage chances were of timely polls, one journalist thought for a while and then
just said it was between zero and one hundred.
Several Bangladeshis confided they had never been so worried about Islamists gaining ground because of the
confrontation between the two main political leaders.
"They are creating a Frankenstein's monster in the Islamic fundamentalists and they can see it but they are still
addicted," is how one observer described the power struggle between Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina and her rival,
the opposition leader, Khaleda Zia. Again and again, commentators repeated that both ladies would prefer the army
to come to power than their rival. However, nobody believed the military actually wanted to seize power.
The ongoing war crimes trial is adding extra pressure to the situation because it's come to be perceived by a significant section of Islamists as in conflict with their religion. Some liberal Bangladeshis believe the Awami League has
failed to articulate a counter-argument, despite the government's control of many mosques and the state media.
A key unknown is whether some of the convicted Jamaat-e-Islami war criminals will be hanged before the elections and what the impact might be on the already volatile political situation. One Jamaat-e-Islami member
described the current state as the lull before the storm. Executions could lead to a groundswell of popular support for
the Awami League among those Bangladeshis who feel those responsible for terrible crimes have never faced justice.
However it's a huge gamble because executions could push Jamaat-e-Islami to violent extremism and destabilise the
whole country. In March 2013 a police official confirmed large areas of the country were no-go areas for his men during the protests after the sentencing of one of the accused in the war crimes trial.
Many analysts see strong international pressure as the only way to force a compromise between the feuding political leaders. The possibility exists of deals between the governing party and potential breakaway factions of the various opposition parties because so much is at stake.
For all the discussion in this report of instability and violent attacks on women and minorities, it's also important
to remember the inherent tolerance at the heart of Bangladeshi culture and society, be it secularists or Islamists. It's
worth valuing the freedom that still exists, despite the many serious risks that journalists, human rights activists and
politicians face on a daily basis.
Frances Harrison
June 2013
London
POLITICAL
ISLAM
5
INDEX
Note on Hartal, Blockades and Sieges
9
Section 1:
Islamisation in Society
Education
Minorities
Women and the Islamists
Islamic Charity Work
15
16
27
31
38
Section 2:
Jamaat-e-Islami
41
Section 3:
Other Islamic parties & Militant groups
77
Section 4:
The Shahbagh Movement
91
Section 5:
The War Crimes Trial
109
Section 6:
Parliamentary Elections
119
Appendices
125
References
149
POLITICAL
ISLAM
7
Note on Hartal, Blockades and Sieges
Hartal - or strikes that violently enforce closure of urban areas - have unfortunately become the way all opposition
forces in Bangladesh demonstrate their political clout and disrupt governance in the hope of forcing change. The
Islamists are no exception.
Hartal over the years.
300
Hartal
225
150
75
0
1962- 1972- 1981- 1991- 1996- 2009- March1971 1975 1987 1996 2001 2012 May 13
It was the announcement of the verdicts in the war crimes trial that triggered a new phase of angry street protest,
bringing trade to a grinding halt and damaging infrastructure, not to mention the loss of human life. Every time I
arrived in Dhaka for the research for this report there was a hartal and I had to travel to my hotel under police escort.
It's not good for the country's image or attracting foreign investment. Hartal are so frequent that hotels print hartal
notices to distribute to every guest.
POLITICAL
ISLAM
9
The month-long violence, grisly terror and blood-letting, death and destruction unleashed by intermittent Hartal have now gathered full steam to explode into a dark spectre of full-blown cataclysmic
Armageddon… By all indications, the country is teetering on the brink of potential danger of a longrunning and bloody civil strife.1 The Daily Star, March 2013
However, hartal vary enormously in terms of levels of violence and some are relatively peaceful and just lead to a
reduction in traffic on the normally
congested and polluted streets of the
capital. In Dhaka people have developed coping strategies. They quickly
adjust to work at weekends instead
and many offices and factories
remain open if the staff live locally.
The British Council, for example, has
a "hartal policy" online for its examination schedules 2 , which also
applies "in the case of blockades or
sieges".
In t h e t h re e m o n t h s f ro m
February to April of 2013 there were
more hartal than in the previous
three years: 23 in total. Indeed until
February 2013 there had been relatively few strikes for some years in
Bangladesh.
Hartal in 2013:
February: 5 nationwide strikes
March: 9 nationwide strikes and six
regional ones.
April: 8 nationwide and 5.5 regional
strikes.
May: 6
Casualties (according to The Daily Star)4
Killed on a hartal day: 89
Injured on a hartal day: 1578
Killed in police violence: 192
Breakdown of 3400+ Injured in police
violence:
January: 565
February: 940
March: 1195
April: 514
May: 186
Hartal and street protests have been called by Jamaat-e-Islami in protest
over the sentencing of its leaders in the war crimes trial, but also by a
wider grouping of Islamists alarmed by what they see as growing threats to
Islam from secularists. The opposition Bangladesh Nationalist Party
has supported other strikes and also called its own strikes with its allies
to insist that a neutral caretaker government should oversee the next
elections.
Asked about the return of the hartal to the streets of Dhaka, the
Bangladeshi Foreign Minister, Dipu Moni, conceded in April 2013 that the
level of violence was worrying, but argued there had been many more
hartal5 between 1996 and 2001 when her party had last been in power.6
However, it's fair to point out when last in opposition the Awami League
also called a huge number of anti-government strikes.
VARIOUS HARTAL NUMBERS
1962-1971: 15 days of hartal in East Pakistan
1972-1975: 5 days of hartal
1981-1987:59 days of hartal
1991-1996: 266 days of hartal (80 according to UN chart FIG 2)
1996-2001: 215 days of hartal in the country.7 (56 up to 2000 according to UN chart FIG 2)
2001-2006: Awami League called 176 days of hartal
2009-2012: BNP called 17 hartal8
Economic Impact:
The economic damage to the country from frequent political strikes is significant. A former finance adviser to the caretaker government, A.B. Mirza Azizul Islam, said he believed the country's GDP would be reduced by 0.5 to 0.6% because
of political instability. "It hampers exports, it hampers production, it hampers transport,"9 he said.
The association representing the country's largest export industry, the readymade garment sector, the BGMEA, estimated factories were losing approximately £17 million10 daily in 2013 as a result of strikes.11 The garment sector is particularly vulnerable to unrest because of the time sensitivity of exports that need to feed modern supply chains.
10
POLITICAL
ISLAM
COURTESY THE DAILY STAR
Hartal also have longer term effects, discouraging foreign and local investment. Attempts have been made to estimate what the country's growth might have been if it weren't for the stoppages. Economists complain there appear
to be no proper record kept of hartal days to help them calculate their impact. It's also not clear if the cost of a hartal is
a full day of productivity, or less in practice, since some economic activity does always continue. Conversely the
long-term impact on the country's development could be much greater than one day's loss of trade.
The World Bank calculated that during the 1990s, 5% of GDP was lost annually to hartal12. A 2005 UNDP study
thought it might actually be less - around 3-4%. UNDP pointed out that regional and localised hartal occurred more
often and lasted longer than nationwide hartal. It observed that hartal tend to happen around periods connected to
regime change.
This cost of hartal chart is from the 2005 UNDP report.
TABLE 4.1 YEARLY COST OF HARTALS, MILLIONS TAKA
GDP
LOSS OF
HARTALS
GDP
LOSS
%
GDP
GDP/ DAY
HARTAL
DAY 2
90/91
1,325,226
4,477
1
4,477
0.3
91/92
1,392.01
4,703
5
23,514
1.6
92/93
1,455,680
4,918
7
34,425
0.2
93/94
1,515,139
5,119
13
66,543
4.4
94/95
1,589,762
5,371
27
145,012
9.1
95/96
1,663,241
5,619
28
157,334
9.5
96/97
1,762,847
5,956
7
41,689
2.4
97/98
1,844,436
6,231
8
49,850
2.7
98/99
1,934,370
6,535
28
182,981
9.5
99/2000
1,934,291
6,535
15
98,022
5.1
Average
1,,641,700
5,546
14
80,385
4.5
1
1. Constant market prices
2. National
NOTE: Half-day hartals are counted as full days
SOURCE: Own calculations based on BBS data (Statistical Yearbook 2000)
and hartal statistics (Figure 1)
Chart by Nasreen Khundker taken from March 2005 UNDP report,
“ Beyond Hartals: Towards Democratic Dialogue in Bangladesh'
POLITICAL
ISLAM
11
Hartal in February, March and April 2013.
FEBRUARY 2013
SUN
TUE
MON
THU
WED
SAT
FRI
1
2
Half-day strike
in Bogra
Jamaat
3
4
Half-day strike
in Rajshahi &
Rangpur division
BNP
5
7
8
13
14
15
Daylong countrywide strike
Jamaat
11
10
6
12
Half-day strike
in Greater
Chittagong
Jamaat
9
16
48-hours srike
in Cox's Bazar
Jamaat
17
48-hours srike
in Cox's Bazar
Jamaat
18
19
Daylong
countrywide strike
Jamaat
24
21
20
22
25
26
27
Daylong
Half-day strike in
countrywide strike Manikganj district
8-Islamist party
8-Islamist party
23
Half-day strike
in Pabna district
Jamaat
Half-day strike
in Rajshahi division
Jamaat
28
Daylong countrywide strike
Jamaat
MARCH 2013
SUN
TUE
MON
THU
WED
1
31
Strike in
Khulna
district BNP
Chapainawabganj
& Sirajganj district
BNP-Jamaat
4
3
5
11
10
12
19
13
24
12
POLITICAL
ISLAM
Strike in
Chittagong
district
Jamaat
25
9
Strike in
Narayanganj
Sangskritik Jote
14
15
16
21
22
23
28
29
30
Strike in
Noakhali &
Kurigram district
BNP
20
2
Strike in
Sylhet district
Jamaat
Countrywide strike
BNP-Jamaat
Strike in
Sylhet Division &
Jessore district
Jamaat
8
Countrywide
strike
BNP-Jamaat
Countrywide
strike
BNP-Jamaat
18
7
6
Countrywide
strike
BNP
Countrywide strike
Jamaat
17
SAT
FRI
26
27
Countrywide strike
BNP-Jamaat
APRIL 2013
SUN
TUE
MON
1
7
Half-day strike in
Rajshahi, Natore,
Chapainababganj
Jamaat
14
21
Daylong
strikein Rangpur,
Rajshahi division
BNP
28
Half day
strike in Rajshahi,
Barisal division
Jamaat
8
Countrywide
Daylong Hefazat
THU
WED
2
3
4
9
10
11
Countrywide
Half-day strike
BNP led 18-party
& Shibir
Countrywide 36-hrs strike
BNP led 18-party
SAT
FRI
5
6
12
13
Countrywide Daylong strike in
protest of Hefajat's long march
23 secular organizations
Countrywide
Daylong strike
Shibir
Half-day strike in
Joypurhat, Kulna
Jamaat-Shibir
15
16
17
18
19
20
22
23
24
25
26
27
29
29
30
Half-day
strike in
Countrywide 36-hours strike BNP led 18-party
Sirajganj
60-hours strike in Rajshahi, Chapainababganj # Shibir
BNP
POLITICAL
ISLAM
13
Section 1:
Islamisation in Society
The Islamic forces at play in Bangladeshi politics have a strength that goes beyond mere electoral achievement. They
are deeply rooted in parts of society and slowly increasing their influence. To gauge this spread, this section examines
four main issues: education, attitudes to women, attacks on non-Muslims and the charity sector.
The process of Islamisation is pronounced in the education sector, especially in the recent mushrooming of various types of madrasa. No reliable statistics exist on how many children attend madrasa in total, but we have collected
a range of numbers and estimates from official sources and present what we think is the best collation to date. This
suggests up to 4 million children are being educated in 19,000 madrasa in Bangladesh at present, most of them at a
primary level. The surprising aspect is that there are almost as many girls as boys in Bangladesh's madrasa.
This section notes Bangladesh's substantial progress in women's development and mentions the obstacles to
greater female political participation, before examining attitudes towards women's empowerment as articulated by
Islamists. It is significant that new Election Commission rules require all political parties to have 30% female representation in their National Executive Committees by 2020. This poses a potential problem for the Islamic parties.
Unfortunately attacks on religious minorities - Hindus, Ahmadiyya and Buddhists - are a litmus test of the spread
of a particular brand of religious intolerance and lawlessness. In 2013 we have charted a dramatic increase in attacks
on Hindus, after the verdicts in the war crimes trial, collating press reports from the Bengali and English press. It's
worth noting that most Muslims in Bangladesh are Sunni, so the country does not suffer from the sort of sectarian
violence that has plagued Pakistan and Iraq.
Tracing ideological bent in the vast NGO sector in Bangladesh is extremely difficult. We list some of the charities
reported to be pushing an Islamist agenda with their development work. To be fair, the Islamists would say the secular NGOs are also inherently political in their agenda.
It is not easy to pinpoint foreign involvement in the gradual Islamisation of society. Some Islamic NGOs and
madrasa have received funds from the Middle East, especially Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. The influence of the Afghan
war was clearly seen as Bangladeshi fighters returned home from jihad in the late eighties and some went on to form
militant groups. Today the spread of Internet and mobile phone technology in Bangladesh is playing a greater role in
connecting some individuals to radical Islamic ideology abroad.
POLITICAL
ISLAM
15
Education
It is important to examine the link between religious education and support for Islamic parties or militancy. The
assumption amongst many Bangladeshis is that Islamisation of the education system - both mainstream and informal - is part of a creeping cultural revolution gradually undermining secularism. Bangladesh has a mainstream education system where Islamic subjects have increased over recent years in the curriculum. It also has a parallel
madrasa education system that's been growing. One Awami League sympathiser complained democracy had failed
in Bangladesh and the country's education system was pushing Islam forward as the solution.
The role of madrasa is especially relevant after the street protests by Hefajate Islam (literally "The Defence of
Islam"). These protests relied on madrasa students to come out on to the streets of the capital in vast numbers to
defend Islam. To more secular middle-class Bengalis, especially women, these devout angry young men in skull caps
seemed like an alien invasion.
Madrasa in Bangladesh fall into two categories - those that are regulated by the state, known as alia madrasa and
those that are unregulated, known as quomi madrasa.
There is some crossover between the mainstream and madrasa educational systems, with madrasa-educated
children now appearing in greater numbers at state universities. Pivotal to this is the official recognition given to the
certificates awarded by the alia madrasa, which have been made equivalent to HSC school-leaving certificates. This
has resulted in increasing numbers of madrasa-educated children being admitted to the top universities. Indeed,
several university professors said it was much easier to score high grades from the alia madrasa and as a result easier
to be admitted to university, even though many had a poor command of English,13 which is the medium of instruction. This influx of madrasa students into universities primarily affects the social sciences and humanities because
the alia madrasa do not prioritise science.
Academics complained that as a result of a growing Islamisation, universities were becoming places where it was
difficult in class to discuss sensitive topics concerning Islam, such as Muslim family laws, for fear of being branded
anti-religion. Secular teachers also felt compelled not to discuss religion because they were ill equipped to hold their
own on the subject with their madrasa-educated students. Some argued though that it was not a good idea to relegate religion to being a private issue and, on the contrary, it would be better to discuss different interpretations
openly in public.
Professors said it was only a matter of time before madrasa-educated graduate students qualified as teaching staff
because the top scoring students each year are automatically offered university posts.14
16
POLITICAL
ISLAM
Mosques:
According to the government-run Islamic Foundation, there are 275,000 mosques spread throughout the country,
each with an Imam and muezzin.15 The Foundation tries to educate Imams (and then monitor them afterwards) in
science and technology and raise awareness of issues like women's rights, child marriage and domestic violence.16
Under the current Awami League government, the Islamic Foundation has also taken a strong stand in educating
Imams against militancy. Interestingly, the Foundation was set up by Sheikh Hasina's father, Sheikh Mujib; before
1971 when Bangladesh was part of Pakistan there was no such state-funded institution to promote religion. During
General Ershad's period state support to clerics was increased, with mosques and madrasa receiving free gas, water
and electricity supplies.
For the first time the Islamic Foundation has just conducted a survey of all madrasa, mosques, Quran schools
attached to shrines, Imams and muezzin. It is currently computerising the data.17
Growth in Madrasa Numbers:
There's been a recent mushrooming of madrasa in Bangladesh, with some reports estimating as many as 10 million
children now attend these institutions. The sources we gathered suggest nearly 4 million children may be enrolled in
19,000 madrasa - the majority of them at a primary level. Interestingly there has been an exponential growth of
madrasa for girls.
Some of this growth may be attributable to a growing religiosity at a grassroots level in Bangladeshi society, but
there are also economic reasons stemming from the failure of the state education system to meet the needs of the
rural poor.
There are frequent reports of impoverished families opting for madrasa because they cannot afford school uniforms, stationery and the informal fees. NGOs18 describe a high level of corruption in the state education system,
where teachers reportedly demand money as tuition fees to pass students in exams. One Dhaka University study
found three quarters of parents chose madrasa education because they couldn't afford mainstream education. By
contrast, food and lodging are free in the madrasa, as well as sometimes clothing.
Surprisingly, madrasa teachers often send their own children to mainstream schools, probably because they offer
better job opportunities.19 This indicates a madrasa education may not always be the first choice – but rather the only
choice.
Training Course for Bangladeshi Imams run by the Islamic Foundation.
There is also a strong religious appeal. Clerics go door to door telling parents their children will receive merit after
death if they attend a madrasa. In conservative areas, sending a girl to a female madrasa may be more socially acceptable than sending her to a government or NGO-run school. Madrasa ulema are extremely concerned about the
activities of Christian missionaries in Bangladesh; many of them believe foreign NGOs are funded by Christian missions to convert poor Bangladeshi Muslims – something the NGOs of course strenuously deny.
Pre-Primary Level Madrasa: the government-run Islamic Foundation says there are 38,000 of these establishments. They are very small and localised and do not come under any education board.
POLITICAL
ISLAM
17
Maktab: these are village-based centres for reading the Quran, attached to mosques. The director of the Islamic
Foundation said a century ago there were 80,000 maktab in East Bengal so today he thought it was possible the number today would reach 400,000.
Types of Primary and Secondary Level Madrasa:
Alia Madrasa
Alia Madrasa were formally established in 1780 by the British colonial government, which set up the Madrasa
Education Board of Bengal. After 1971, attempts were made to modernise them, making the study of Bengali,
Mathematics, English, Social Sciences, and General Science compulsory.20
Alia Madrasa are state-regulated and funded. They follow a nationally assigned syllabus over 16 years of education. The different levels are:
Ebtedaee: primary level: 5 years
Dakhil: secondary level: 5 years, equivalent to SSC.
Alim: higher secondary level: 2 years, equivalent to HSC.
Fazil: graduate level: 2 years or, with Honours, 3 years, equivalent to BA degreee.
Kamil: postgraduate level: 2 years or 3 years for the Honours course, equivalent to MA degree.21
Quomi Madrasa
The quomi madrasa system also dates back to British colonial times. Its theology stems from the Deoband School the institution started in 1866 in Northern India that some say inspired the Taliban movement in Afghanistan.
Students in the quomi madrasa have studied almost the same books for over a century, reading mostly the Quran,
Hadith, theology and law. Critics complain little attention is paid to Bengali because the emphasis is on Arabic,
Persian and Urdu.22 In some cases though it's reported the madrasa don't even teach the Bengali alphabet. In general, very few books on science or economics are found in the quomi madrasa.
Visitors to quomi madrasa say children, who are generally from poor families, are ill fed and have poor health.
From early morning they have to memorise the Quran for eight or nine hours a day. Teachers prefer to start with
children aged 4 or 5 because they can more easily be trained to recite by rote, normally out of fear.
Many madrasa are locally funded but when they reach saturation point, students from further afield start
attending. Some quomi madrasa are philanthropic ventures, set up by someone who has retired who wants to do
something worthwhile. They gather orphans and feed them and do welfare work. Others are controlled by various
quomi madrasa boards, whose members are also involved in the various small religious parties.
Madrasa are funded from zakat and grants, as well as Eid donations of cowhides, local charity and money acquired
during trips to Mecca. There are no publicly available accounts. Some madrasa are run as commercial ventures,
often by a husband and wife. In communities where everyone is poor, it appears impossible for madrasa to survive
off local donations and many suspect they receive "secret funds".23
Job opportunities for madrasa graduates are not good; they often work in mosques and madrasa as preachers and
teachers. Some find sponsors to build them a new mosque or madrasa while others get invited on a "religious visa" to
serve as the Imam of a mosque abroad.24
Quomi madrasa are independent of the state and do not require a license or registration. Consequently nobody
knows for sure exactly how many there are. This autonomy - and the fact that access can be difficult for outsiders has generated considerable suspicion among civil society groups, academia and the international community and
much negative media attention.
The media has tended to link quomi madrasa with militancy but academic Mumtaz Ahmad finds little evidence of
this. He says most Bangladeshi militants actually had alia madrasa or mainstream educations but had fought in
Afghanistan.25 He also found that quomi madrasa students and teachers appeared to be largely apolitical, but alia
madrasa were actively involved in party politics26 and perceived to be closer to the ideas of Jamaat-e-Islami. Support
for Jamaat-e-Islami in the quomi madrasa is low because of ideological differences between the Deobandi School
and the Jamaat founder, Maulana Mawdudi, whose books are banned in quomi madrasa. However, the leadership of
Islami Oikyo Jote, which runs many quomi madrasa, has also played down the differences with Jamaat-e-Islami as
minor, saying both parties were working towards the same goal of promoting Islam.27
18
POLITICAL
ISLAM
Spheres of Influence
ANTI-JAMAAT
SPHERE
JAMAAT SPHERE
OF INFUENCE
QUOMI MADRASA
Hostility from the Deoband School
toward the Jamaat founder, Maulana
Mawdudi, whose religious ideas they
deem unorthodox. The books written
by Maulana Mawdudi are said to be
banned in quomi madrasa.
ALIA MADRASA:
Students tend
to be pro-‐Jamaat
MADRASA RUN BY
PIRS & BARELVIS
(Sufi influenced)
AHL--‐E--‐HADITH
ORGANISATIONS
The Deobandi Islami Oikyo Jote
Alliance (running many quomi
madrasa) is a doctrinal rival of the
Ahl-e-Hadith movement.
Official Government Recognition:
"The main objective of this education is to earn the contentment of Allah and his Prophet."
Quomi Madrasa Education Commission Bangladesh.28
Ironically a Quomi Madrasa Education Commission Bangladesh was established in April 2012 by the most secular
of Bangladeshi political parties, the Awami League, to negotiate official government recognition for the certificates
given by quomi madrasa. Some suggest this could never happen under a government run by a BNP-Jamaat alliance
because, although it would have a more religious tone, the ideological animosity between Jamaat-e-Islami and the
Deobandis in the quomi madrasa would prevent such a move.
Official recognition could mean an influx of quomi madrasa graduates into the public university system, which
many secular Bangladeshis view as a potential disaster. It would however require all the madrasa to follow a uniform
curriculum and text books, though there are currently promises to prevent any government interference in the spirit
of these very orthodox and traditional institutions. The quomi madrasa have stressed that a condition of negotiations is their continued independence from government:
POLITICAL
ISLAM
19
Quomi Madrasa Education Commission Bangladesh, Conditions for approval
Some conditions are given so that quomi madrasa do not lose their uniqueness in future due to Bangladesh's socio-economic system and
unhealthy politics.It can be mentioned that these conditions are given to maintain the uniqueness and independence of quomi madrasa:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
There cannot be any interference in quomi madrasa's principles and methodology of teaching.
The Aqidah of Ahle Sunnat Wal Jamaat should be kept absolutely untarnished.
There cannot be any interference in the administraton of madrasa.
Quomi madrasa will never be brought under the government's Monthly Pay Order.
The government cannot interfere in the establishment of any madrasa.
The traditional quomi madrasa will be administered as per their respective Boards.
Official recognition of the quomi madrasa would be a major concession to Islamists. Many say the Awami League
is just offering it to gain some leverage over the ulema in the run up to elections. The underlying assumption is that
it's difficult for the Awami League to take on Jamaat-e-Islami as well as the Deobandi madrasa students. Exploiting
the ideological differences between the two Islamic camps may be the strategy.
The Quomi Madrasa Education Commission's proposal29 shows the priority is the teaching of Bengali, Arabic and
Urdu - not English. The proposed syllabus30 is also not clear as to whether any Bangladeshi or world history would be
taught, or for that matter literature. Music and art do not appear to be part of the curriculum.
The proposal also says women will have to be educated in full purdah even though they are to be taught in
segregated premises. Gender discrimination is apparent in the document's emphasis on educating women to be
good mothers:
Since the first school of every child is his/her mother's lap, if the mother is religiously inclined and morally
educated, she will be attract [sic] the interest of the child in that path. Besides, children learn from observation.
In this case the mother plays a huge role in building the next generation.31
Quomi Madrasa Education Commission Bangladesh, Chapter 8, Women's education system.
Main goals and objectives of women's education:
1. Creating religious awareness and conviction among women.
2. Inspiring her about religious education by convincing her of the importance of religious education for children.
3. Making arrangements for women's education under full purdah (veil). In this case, everything, including teaching and administration of
the madrasa,will be run by women.
4. Besides education,inspiring women towards creative activities.
5. Making arrangements for separate transportation so that female students do not face harassment while travelling safely to the
madrasa.
6. Making arrangements for safe accommodation for resident female students. Making sure that the food is healthy and the education
environment is proper.
7. Bringing poor and brilliant students under special scholarship programmes.
8. Not to take any steps that may create inequality while attaining primary, secondary and higher education.
9. Besides education,inspiring female students about the practice of Islam.
10. Creating conviction among female students to protect Islamic values in all spheres of life.
All students will be steered away from "social decadence", though that's not defined. There's a clause saying that
students will be endowed with "liberal human values against terrorism and militancy" so as not to bring the madrasa
system into disrepute. This document states that there should be at least one quomi madrasa in every village and a
pre-school class for 4-5 year olds attached to every mosque and madrasa in the country. Primary education is to be
free of charge. It also envisages a senior citizen's Islamic education programme.
It should be pointed out that official patronage of the Islamic education system has been going one for some time.
General Ershad was the first head of state to attend the madrasa teachers' conference and he became the chief
patron of the Bangladesh Jamiatul Mudarressin32, which was founded by one of his ministers. With subscriptions
from these madrasa, the newspaper Inquilab was created. Inquilab was the first to demand action against the so
called “atheist bloggers” in the Spring of 2013, a cause that was only then picked up by Amar Desh newspaper.
General Ershad's Jatiyo party has ranked third in terms of numbers of votes since 1990 and he still maintains close
links with Islamists, notably supporting Hefajate Islam before the BNP.
20
POLITICAL
ISLAM
The Rise of Female Madrasa:
There was an exponential rise in female enrolment in secondary schools between 1990 and 2000. This was triggered
by a government cash transfer scheme33 introduced in 1994. It gave stipends to girls, irrespective of household
wealth, if they enrolled in secondary education. Alia madrasa were included in this scheme. The share of female
students in madrasa rose dramatically, from 7.7% in 1990 to 52% in 2008.34
TRENDS IN THE SHARE OF FEMALE STUDENTS IN POST- PRIMARY
SCHOOL AND MADRASAS IN BANGLADESH, 1970-2008
Female students as a % of total enrolment
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2003 2008
School
Madrasa
Data Source: Bangladesh Bureau of Education and Information and Statistics (BANBEIS), Ministry of Education
The share of female students in mainstream secondary schools also rose as the graph shows. (from
1 Going to School in Purdah: Female Schooling, Mobility Norms and Madrasas in Bangladesh,
Mohammad Niaz Asadullah Zaki Wahhaj, December 2012, Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der
Arbeit, Institute for the Study of Labor, quoting Asadullah & Chaudhury, 2009).
One study argues that35 the growth of female madrasa has helped overcome social constraints on women's
mobility, particularly in more culturally conservative areas. In most alia madrasa, the burqa36 is the school uniform.
Ironically this restrictive uniform may have played an important role in increasing female madrasa enrolment in
Bangladesh. The study also found madrasa strictly enforced purdah even inside the classroom. Female students
being groomed for a traditional role as a mother, wife or daughter were described as "domestic angels".
Chart according to a study of Islamic dress in 322 rural schools and madrasa.
MADRASA STUDENTS
MAINSTREAM SCHOOLS
Wearing Burka
69%
1%
Wearing Niqab
10%
3%
The quality of secondary school madrasa education in Bangladesh (QSSMEB) study, World Bank 2010.
Alia madrasa graduates still have better job prospects. Many women become housewives and mothers but some
work as teachers in madrasa and schools or continue their education in the mainstream system. The Islamic banking
sector also offers employment to women in special "women's booths", where female alia madrasa graduates stand a
better chance of being employed.38
Mumtaz Ahmad's survey of madrasa ulema revealed that only 6% believed women could be equal to men in
intellect and judgment, no matter how highly educated they were. A large majority supported the idea that men and
women should get the same education but a quarter of madrasa ulema believed a woman was not equally qualified
to issue opinions and judgments on Sharia issues even if she had received the same religious education as a man in
the same institution and under the same scholar. Seventy percent of quomi (but only 17% alia) madrasa students
surveyed believed that women should not be allowed to work outside their homes.
POLITICAL
ISLAM
21
On the question of female political leadership, both quomi and alia madrasa students were found to be very
conservative. Only 26% thought a woman could become the Prime Minister in Bangladesh despite the fact that the
country has had two female prime ministers who've dominated recent politics for two decades.
Case Study:
A Female Quomi Madrasa, by Jannat Gulay
Jamiya Niyamotiya Quomi Mohila Madrasa
Barandipara in Jessore
Established 1980.
The first female quomi madrasa in Jessore.
Teachers: 22 (12 are women) Boarding Students: 238
Day Pupils: 200
Age at Admittance: 6 years
Offers: Mishkat (primary): 10 years and Daura (postgraduate): 12 years
Fee: 500 taka monthly
"The purpose of the Quomi Madrasa education system is totally different from the general
education system, or even the Alia madrasa. We do not think about the future. We just focus on the
spiritual. A graduate from a Quomi Madrasa has no future in the material world; we try to give
them the lessons of Sharia and guide women to observe purdah strictly."
The Madrasa Principal, Maolana Mouinuddin.
Curriculum: they follow texts published by the Bangladesh Quomi Madrasa Board. Pupils are taught Bengali,
English and Maths till Class 8 (age 14 yrs) but in Maths they do not learn how to calculate interest. Instead they teach
how to calculate Zakat (donation of wealth) and Fitra (alms). The main aim is to know the Quran and Hadiya
properly and capture all their principles in their daily life.
22
POLITICAL
ISLAM
"Women are like precious gems; they have to be locked up in a safe"
The girls are taught that women are forbidden to work with men in public. The teaching emphasises the spiritual
world and the only profession for a man is becoming an Imam or for a woman becoming a teacher in a female
madrasa.
Purdah: The uniform is black burqa, with black nikab, black
gloves and socks to cover the entire body. Girls observe
strict purdah and are not allowed to exercise outdoors at all.
The students and the female teachers are kept locked in the
building all the time. The girls are monitored by eight
teachers all the time, even when boarding overnight. They
have to be silent in front of outsiders and any male teachers.
At no time are the girls allowed to speak loudly, enforcing a
sort of segregation for their voices. If they go out of the
madrasa or talk to outsiders it is only with people appointed
by the school authorities or their parents. If they visit their
families they must be accompanied by a guardian or close
relative. The students believe any kind of photograph is
strictly forbidden in Islam.
"A woman is like a diamond. When we hold a
diamond in our fist, it will be safe and cannot
sparkle and attract attention. But when we open
our hand, it will shine alluringly. That's why
women have to observe purdah, covering all their
body, so they do not attract such attention."
Anonymous Teacher
Women are taught that their role in life is to be a virtuous
wife, mother and daughter. All believe a Madrasa education
will teach them everything they need to know to be an ideal
woman'. They remain indoors for fear of committing a sin
POLITICAL
ISLAM
23
and in order to win virtue for the after-life. As one teacher put it, '"The rate of violence against women has increased
because they answer back to their husbands and make them angry.' The madrasa teaches obedience for the benefit
of a quiet family life”.
Female Teacher: The girls who live here are virtuous because they are secure from the devil's eye of
society. They are not seen by unknown men except those close relatives allowed in Islam. They also
believe if any male glimpses them or any part of their body, then they or that particular part of the
body will go to Hell. By teaching this, the madrasa does not allow the girls to go out in public even
when at home or with their family members or relatives. When they go home, they observe the rules
of purdah."
If a male teacher takes a class he sits in this curtained area (see illustration) and the students are inside the room.
They communicate through with a microphone or through a small window in front of the teacher that is shaded so
he cannot see through. The male teachers are not allowed to hear the girls' voices except in an emergency.
24
POLITICAL
ISLAM
"As a woman, I have learnt everything at
this madrasa. Purdah is essential to
protect women from the devil and sins."
Fatema, (aged 20, Class 12)
"Today's world is not safe for women. In
this situation, if we observe purdah, we will
achieve moral excellence. If I observe
purdah, people cannot see me. Moreover, I
will benefit on the Day of Judgment."
Jinob
"I left my (co-educational) school
because...the students there didn't observe
purdah and had an immoral character.
They talked to each other in awful
language."
Risa (aged 9)
Corridors inside the madrasa are badly lit and gloomy.
"Women do not need to be more educated
They have to get married. We just sent our
daughter to a madrasa to learn religious
principles and follow purdah strictly so
nobody can see her. By doing this she can
get a dignified existence after her death."
Families: Most of the girls' brothers are studying in the mainstream education system or in state-run Alia Madrasa.
Parents consciously chose a different education for their daughters, confining them to the four walls of the madrasa
or home and ensuring they are told what to think. Some believe by doing this their daughters will pray for them after
their deaths.
Note: Access to conduct this research was not easy because the female researcher was initially told the other women
didn't want to talk to her even though she was wearing a burqa like them. It took an hour to be admitted and a teacher
took notes of every question asked of the students. While she was waiting, she noticed a 9-year-old girl watching her
through a small hole in the wall. Later she learnt that was how the students received their meals, through this hole.
POLITICAL
ISLAM
25
Cadet Madrasa
Modern general education has reached its peak through technological advancement but this system
has proved to be useless without moral teaching. On the other hand, madrasa education has long been
suffering from serious shortcomings because of the lack of scientific and technological knowledge.
Excerpt from cadet madrasa promotional literature.
Cadet madrasa are private fee-paying institutions that blend an Islamic education with military-style discipline.
They could be described as upmarket madrasa for the middle classes who care about inculcating strict moral values
into their children but also expect them to have good job opportunities. These establishments have tried to
modernise the traditional madrasa education by teaching science and technology. Cadet madrasa teach music
without using any instruments, because they believe Islam doesn't allow music. Boys are allowed to play football,
cricket and other sports but only wearing full-length trousers.
The Tanjimul Ummah Foundation introduced the first cadet madrasa to Bangladesh in the late 1990s.39 It now
operates 22 educational institutions.40 Most are classified as alia madrasa41, which means they are government
approved. Their promotional literature says they have educated students from the USA, UK, Sweden, Italy and Saudi
Arabia. Most graduates go to university; only 10% went on to higher madrasa education.
Interview with Habibullah Muhammad Iqbal, Chairman of the Tanjimul Ummah Foundation,
By Julfikar Ali Manik
"It was in the 1990s, when I was a student of Ta'amirul Millat Madrasa in Dhaka that I observed
some parents wanted to admit their children to the madrasa but didn't think its accommodation was
up to their standards. The families were relatively well-off and wanted separate rooms for their
children and better facilities, such as good food and a laundry service. That madrasa had to turn them
away.
The monthly fees used to be Tk 1,500 but those parents were willing to spend four times that sum.
Spotting this opportunity some of us students had the idea of setting up a madrasa with better
accommodation, strict discipline and good living conditions. We decided not to accept charitable
donations but to run it as a commercial venture.
We observed madrasa students had limited job opportunities in our society: most find careers in
Islamic studies, Arabic and religious teaching or in madrasa and mosques. So our idea was to educate
madrasa students so they could be entrepreneurs to provide jobs for other people and compete as
equals in any field. We wanted to modernise the madrasa education system. As part of our research we
visited military colleges to observe their management, discipline and style. We spoke to some army
officers and then appointed a retired army officer in each of our 22 branches. We called our students
"cadets" to boost their self-confidence. So far, we know ten of our former students are in the armed
forces up to the rank of captain but we have trained them in such a way that one day they could be the
Army Chief."
Cadet Madrasa Students:
Fahim Bin Hamid, aged16, the son of a businessman. He studied in an English-medium school before attending a
cadet madrasa. He says here a student can simultaneously become an alim (Islamic scholar) and a doctor. His plan
is to be a chemist and an Islamic scholar, so people will listen to him when he preaches Islam.
Raiyan Bin Noor, aged 15, the son of a professor of Islamic ethics in a private university. He believes mainstream
schools do not offer a proper Islamic education because they teach religion only from a small Islamiat textbook,
which is insufficient. On the other hand, alia and quomi madrasa do not offer science education. He wants to be a
marine engineer and an Islamic scholar when he grows up.
26
POLITICAL
ISLAM
Minorities
Hindus:
A new wave of disturbing attacks began against the Hindu minority on 28 February 2013 after the War Crimes
Tribunal sentenced the popular Jamaat leader, Delwar Hossain Sayedee, to death for crimes against humanity.
The scale of the attacks was huge - the worst outbreak since 2001.42
Police and political observers say a repeat of this violence could occur (a) if death sentences are carried out against
Jamaat leaders convicted of war crimes and (b) during the election period.
The incidents in the Spring of 2013 seemed to follow a pattern - often after Friday prayers a demonstration would
start and then head for the Hindu areas and attack. Many arson attacks on temples also occurred in the middle of the
night and in most cases the Hindu idols were smashed or vandalised. Since idols are regarded as contrary to Islam,
it's a fair assumption that some of the attacks were conducted by Islamic-minded people. Also the timing, just after
the death sentence, of this eruption of violence against Hindus suggests a Jamaat hand, especially as, unlike Middle
Eastern groups, the party's ideology is more anti-Hindu than it is anti-Western. Members of the party have
complained the Awami League has given Hindus a disproportionate role in the administration and view Hindus as
staunch Awami League supporters.
Jamaat and its student wing, Chhatra Shibir, however denied involvement in the attacks:
"They (the media) are airing false news connecting Jamaat-Shibir with attacks on houses of the
minority and arson as well as looting of the shops in various places. They long for a communal riot by
publishing such news. We like to dauntlessly declare that Jamaat and Shibir neither had in past nor
have now any connection with such vile actions."43
Many Bangladeshis opposed to Jamaat said there were also criminal and opportunist elements involved in these
attacks on Hindus, suggesting all political parties were involved.
India was relatively muted in its response to the attacks on Bangladeshi Hindus. "If they had occurred on this scale
under a BNP government there would have been much more outcry," pointed out one newspaper editor.
Number of Incidents:
In the period between 28 February 2013 and 8 April 2013, the NGO, Ain o Shalish Kendro, reported 162 Hindu
homes and 163 businesses, 96 temples attacked and 81 idols vandalised.
This report collates the Ain o Shalish Kendro list of incidents44 with others reported in the English-medium
newspapers and news agencies.
There appear to have been a total of 130 incidents in 70 days. These are listed in detail in the appendices.
A group of several NGOs has filed a petition before the High Court, which ordered the government to investigate
the communal attacks and submit a report by July 2013.45
PHOTO COURTESY OF THE DAILY STAR NEWSPAPER
POLITICAL
ISLAM
27
Buddhists
The first attacks on Buddhists in Cox's Bazaar and Chittagong were in September and October 2012. Amnesty
International said more than 20 temples and monasteries and scores of shops and homes were set on fire after
thousands protested against an image of a destroyed Quran on Facebook. It said: "The attacks are believed to be the
first to have taken place on such a large scale against minority places of worship in Bangladesh." There was a second
and less devastating series in late April 2013 in the Chittagong area. Temples and an associated orphanage were
looted, set on fire and vandalised.46
By Julfikar Ali Manik
Islamic fanatics launched unprecedented attacks on Bangladesh's Buddhist community on September 29, 2012.
Buddhist pagodas were the main targets of the orchestrated attack in Ramu in the southern district of Cox's Bazar, a
tourist hub of the country. The attacks came after a planned hate campaign against the Buddhist community, which
raged through Ramu, previously known for centuries of communal harmony.
None of the Buddhist community was hurt physically by the attackers. It was a very focused operation that only
targeted Buddhist pagodas, monasteries and homes. In Ramu twelve pagodas were fully burnt to ashes and six others
were vandalised. Some of those were centuries old. Many Buddhist artifacts preserved for decades in the monasteries
were destroyed in the mayhem.
"My civilisation is destroyed. A lifetime of worshipping has been in vain. I am a lost man and will continue to be lost",
said Venerable Satyapriya Mahathera when I spoke to him the day after the attacks. The second most senior priest of the
Buddhist community in Bangladesh, Venerable Mahathera is also in charge of one of the Shima Bihar pagoda, which
was destroyed.
Muslim zealots burnt down or vandalised eighteen pagodas and about 50 Buddhist homes in Ramu within just six
hours.
A small, run of the mill mobile phone repair shop in Fakirabazar market was the starting point of the communal
campaign against Buddhists. It began with claims that a picture insulting the Quran had been spotted on the
Facebook page of a Buddhist called Uttam Kumar Barua.
28
POLITICAL
ISLAM
The young shop owner, Omar Faruk, and his friend Abdul Moktadir claimed to have seen Uttam's Facebook page but
other than them nobody else could be found in Ramu who'd seen it. Later a journalistic investigation by Bangladesh's
largest circulation English newspaper, The Daily Star, found that the Facebook page had been photoshopped to add a
picture insulting Islam and this is what provoked the September 29 attacks.
A rumour was spread that the Buddist, Uttam, had placed his feet on the Quran. Correspondents later saw a picture
showing white feet wearing nail polish on the Quran. The picture circulated like wildfire from mobile to mobile using
Bluetooth or picture messaging. It was also copied by some demonstrators and shared on the evening of September 29.
Weeks after the attack, a police investigation committee found 205 people in Ramu responsible for the violence.
Among the accused was the Buddhist man, Uttam Kumar Barua. Later a judicial investigation report, submitted in
May 2013, found about 300 people in Ramu were involved and this time exempted the Buddhist boy Uttam,
exonerating him of responsibility for the trouble.
Agitated Muslims brought out processions and chanted slogans against the Buddhist community, including Islamic
chants such as "Naraye Takbir Allahu Akbar". Many of the attackers were transported from other places to the area
using different vehicles throughought the night of September 29.
The communal attacks in Ramu had a domino effect. The following day Muslim zealots also attacked and damaged
six pagodas in Ukhia sub-district and a pagoda in Teknaf. On the same day Muslims in Chittagong attacked and
damaged four Buddhist pagodas and two Hindu places of worship in Patia sub-district.
Police cases have been filed in connection with the attacks with the local police stations but a police investigation
has not yet been completed. Some local people were arrested in Ramu over the months following the attacks but were
then freed on bail because the police couldn't bring charges against them.
Justice is still pending in Ramu and other places where the Buddhists were attacked. And the longstanding
communal harmony in Ramu, which was disrupted on the night of September 29, has not been restored yet. Instead
misunderstanding, mistrust and fear still remain among the Buddhists of Ramu.
As Venerable Mahathera told me, "Please save our future generation! Please!"
POLITICAL
ISLAM
29
Ahmadiyya
"We are a low profile community…theology is our subject; politics is not." 47
Ahmadiyya believe Mirza Golam Ahmad of Qadian (1835–1908) in India was the Messiah promised by the Prophet
Mohammad – as well as Imam Mahdi. They see themselves as a revivalist movement within Islam, not as a new
religion. Their teachings incorporate Sufi mysticism and traditional Islamic teachings.
This is not accepted by the majority of Muslims, who believe Mirza Golam Ahmad declared himself a Prophet. This
is a vital issue because one of the key tenets of Islam is the belief in the finality of the Prophet Mohammad at the end
of a long line of Prophets including Moses, Abraham and Jesus. Ahmadiyya contend that Mirza Golam Ahmad was a
"subservient Prophet" sent as a subordinate to Prophet Mohammad to reform the Muslims and revive Islam.
Some refer to the community as Qadianis, which Ahmadiyya consider a derogative term as it is derived from the
name of the birthplace of their founder. As Human Rights Watch observed in 2005,48 and it holds true today, attacking
Ahmadiyya, ostensibly in order to preserve the faith, provides a fast track to political power.
The Ahmadiyya movement is now established in more than two hundred countries and has a large following
worldwide.49 During Pakistani rule, the Munir Commission Report of 1953 initially took a liberal approach to the
issue of Ahmadiyya, but in 1974, under Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the Constitution was amended to declare Ahmadiyya
non-Muslims.50
In Bangladesh, the sect officially began in 1913 and its followers are now represented by the Ahmadiyya Muslim
Jama'at, Bangladesh. The BBC reported in 2004 and HRW in 2005 that there were 100,000 Ahmadiyya in Bangladesh51
and in 2013 Ahmadiyya Muslim Jama'at Bangladesh estimated their numbers to be between 100,000-150,000, but
they've held no census recently to see how many people they've converted.52 The Ahmadiyya say they do not get
involved in politics.53
Since the mid-eighties there has been a trend of attacks on Ahmadiyya in Bangladesh, correlated with the
increasing Islamisation of politics. Sporadic attacks took place in the early 1990s but increased during the BNP
government of 1991-96 and intensified again from 2001 when the BNP came to power in alliance with Jamaat-eIslami and Islami Oikyo Jote.
The campaign against Ahmadiyya has been orchestrated since 1991 by the Khatme Nubuwat Andolon
Bangladesh54 – which literally means, 'Movement to preserve the finality of Prophet Mohammad'. This umbrella
movement of different Islamic groups calls for Ahmadiyya to be declared non-Muslims and their religious practices
banned in Bangladesh. It finds support among the students of the quomi madrasa and the political party, Islami
Oikyo Jote. It is also reported to have links with the BNP through its ally Jamaat-e-Islami.55 Jamaat-e-Islami also
believes Ahmadiyya are non-Muslims. Many madrasa teachers and students are involved in the Khatme Nabuwat
Andolon. A survey of madrasa ulema found 94% thought that the government should declare Ahmadiyya nonMuslims.56
Bangladeshi officials have sometimes actively supported and at other times turned a blind eye to the attacks and
discrimination against Ahmadiyya. Ahmadiyya leaders complain that in 2011 the Islamic Foundation, which is a
government organisation, produced a booklet in Bengali denouncing them, even though the Constitution
guarantees freedom of religion.
Between 2003-6, the Ahmadiyya Muslim Jama'at Bangladesh says there were 36 attacks in 26 months, all of them
declared in advance in the media.
In January 2004 the BNP government banned all Ahmadiyya publications in response to an upsurge in protests by
Islamist groups. In December the same year, the High Court temporarily suspended the order banning Ahmadiyya
publications in response to a legal challenge launched by human rights groups in the country. The case is still
pending.
Under the current Awami League government, the Ahmadiyya Muslim Jama'at Bangladesh says the number of
attacks has been curtailed but still continues. The community received an exam paper for Class 8 from a private
school in Chuadanga in which one of the questions was "Why are the Qadianis non-Muslims?" They've also twice
tried to construct a mosque in Tangail but every time it's been destroyed by their opponents. The Ahmadiyya say they
received no response from the government to these infringements of their right to practice their faith in freedom.
In 2013 the Ahmadiyya said propaganda against them was appearing on social media sites like Facebook, wrongly
accusing them of adding extra verses to the Quran.
Ahmadiyya leaders believe Bangladesh is the target of radicals who "exploit the innocence of the vast majority
who love Islam but aren't radical". They are very critical of the Awami League for failing to use the media to challenge
Islamic radicalism through logic and ideology, instead relying on politicking. They complain the Awami League is
trying to woo over maulvis to their side to win votes. "We call them 'Awami Muslim League' because their leaders are
so afraid of the clergy and keep mum about radicalisation," said one Ahmadiyya follower.57
30
POLITICAL
ISLAM
Women and the Islamists
Economic Development:
Over the last four decades in Bangladesh there have been some striking successes in terms of the economic
development of women, especially when the country's low starting point is considered:
-
Fertility levels declined from 7.3 children per woman in 1974 to 2.7 in 2007.
Maternal mortality more than halved over the period 1986-2001.
Girls now outnumber boys in both primary and secondary schools.
However, Bangladeshi women still lag behind their counterparts in India and Nepal in terms of development
indices.58
Girls' parity with boys in school enrolment has been achieved much faster than stipulated in its Millennium
Development Goals or in other comparable countries. It's thought this is due to the cash incentives system
introduced by the last BNP-Jamaat government. There are even concerns now that boys from the poorest
households may be left behind girls as a result of the success of the incentive programme.59
Greater numbers of women in urban areas are in paid employment – two million at any one time in the garment
factories during the last decade. More than eleven million women have benefited enormously from microcredit
programmes pioneered in Bangladesh. Others have found public sector jobs as teachers or health workers, or are in
self-employment. This is a shift away from agriculture to better paid jobs with longer hours. Those who've benefited
have mainly been the more affluent and educated.
Violence against
Women:
However, advancements in the
economic field have not necessarily
translated into greater empowerment
of women in the domestic arena.
Various studies suggest half of all
married Bangladeshi women have
suffered violence from their husbands –
and 18% have been raped within
marriage. 60 An ICDDR,B study on
Violence Against Women found four out
of ten women reported physical
violence by their husband, and an even
higher proportion - five out of ten reported sexual violence in general61.
Another study found 20–24% of women
had experienced sexual violence from
their husbands in the previous 12
months.62 One report commented that
it was common for husbands to assault
wives:
..for even minor mistakes, such as an
unsatisfactory meal, an untidy room, a
conversation with another man, or any
act of disagreement or disobedience.
Men have been socially conditioned to
genuinely believe in their own
superiority. From childhood they are
treated differently from their sisters.
They grow to believe that they are more
valuable and more deserving than
POLITICAL
ISLAM
31
women, and that their opinions and views should have more weight than any woman's. Furthermore, predominant
religious misinterpretations have further legitimised these feelings. These religious interpretations have also provided
men with the justification to chastise wives for disobedience and bring them back to the so-called correct path. In this
way, men are able to delude themselves into believing that abuse of their wives amounts to a religious duty and they are
completely justified in their actions.63
This is the backdrop against which religious education in villages stresses that it is a Muslim woman's religious
duty to obey her husband.
Women in Politics
The emphasis amongst donors in Bangladesh has been on empowerment of women through poverty alleviation, not
through direct participation in national politics. This is in spite of the fact that recent Bangladeshi politics has been
dominated by two women Prime Ministers.
Some academics suggest this could reflect a "somewhat misogynistic debate within Bangladeshi elite civil society
that elides governance failures with the gender of the political leadership (the so-called 'Begum problem')".64 Others
argue there is a pattern of Asian women being catapulted into high office after the death or detention of a close
relative who is a political leader. Daughters and widows appeal to "a very strong victimisation sentiment", which
they use to mobilise support.65 These women leaders, it's argued, "act more like tame kittens within a maledominated political establishment than roaring Tigresses".66 This means they may not be strong role models for
other women seeking to enter politics. Often in Bangladesh it's not just women leaders but most of the female
candidates in elections, who are also wives or relatives, acting as "proxies, contesting seats on behalf of disqualified
or jailed male family members".67
In their manifestos none of the parties, even those run by women, refers to inequality for women in the home.
Instead there is a widespread assumption that education and prosperity will automatically improve domestic or
social relations for women.
There is also little discussion in donor literature of the impact of a possible religious backlash against the advances
made by women. As our village level case study shows, religious preaching and outreach work inculcates very
conservative ideas about the role of women in the home and engenders opposition to women taking up microcredit,
which could improve their status.
Reserved Seats for Women:
Bangladesh has a system of 50 unelected reserved seats68 in parliament for women but aside from this arrangement,
few women are chosen by the parties to represent them. Women's groups would like the reserved seats directly
elected so the women are more accountable to the electorate. They would also like the number increased to 100. One
study looking at local bodies showed direct elections gave women more confidence to raise issues of importance.69
Most women's groups complain candidates appointed to reserved seats are "voiceless tools in the hands of the
major parties" because "it is impossible for women to gain power, authority and honour through indirect election. It
makes them dependent on male members of their party."70
Political parties have delayed introducing direct elections because they use these reserved seats as patronage and
bargaining chips in forming coalitions.
Male Domination of Politics:
Bangladesh has been governed by women Prime Ministers since 1991 but most of their advisers are men. "Male
politicians take it for granted that politics is a matter of black money and armed hooliganism, coupled with
pressuring voters to vote”, with the result that they prefer to nominate men with money and musclemen.71
In a society where a woman literally embodies a family's honour, the risk of physical violence puts off many
women. However, women with elite status are generally protected from sexual harassment.
Women leaders do not seem too bothered about the absence of other women in politics. In a televised debate in
2001, Sheikh Hasina commented that "women's capacity to run campaigns and win elections was inadequate" and
went on to imply that the system of reserved seats for women was better than nothing for women.72 Though women
may not be welcomed (even by other women) as politicians, all parties are very keen on mobilising them to gain power.
Political parties have women's branches but women tend to have relatively little power in the central executive
committees.
The 2008 election saw the highest number of women contesting and winning general seats in parliament to date but
Bangladesh still lags behind most other countries in Asia.73 No woman has ever been Election Commissioner or
32
POLITICAL
ISLAM
Deputy Election Commissioner. In 2008 only 3% of Returning Officers were women.74 International observer groups
reported that only between 0-2% of Presiding Officers at polling stations or booths were women.75
Women in the National Executive Committees of Political Parties
After the collapse of the election process in January 2007, the Election Commission embarked on a reform agenda
initiated by the caretaker government. All parties now have to register with the Election Commission, whereas before
this had been optional. Information on candidates' backgrounds was also made publicly available to encourage the
emergence of "clean" candidates. Also a rule said parties could not discriminate on grounds of religion, race, caste,
language or sex.76
To register, political parties have to amend their constitutions to promote internal democracy. All committee
members have to be elected, parliamentary candidates chosen based on the recommendations of committees at
grassroots level, and controversially they have to fill at least a third of all party committee seats with women by 2020.
The number of women in the National Executive Committees of the major political parties ranged between 2.89 to
11.6877 during the last election.
National Women's Development Policy
All the Islamic political parties opposed the policy, claiming that the 2011 version gave men and women equal
inheritance rights. They complained that the policy was "anti-Quran" and the government would fall if the
legislation were enacted. This has angered women activists, who say the intention is to keep women confined to the
home.1
The various versions of the policy have been gradually watered down:
1997 Version: Gave women equal rights over inheritance, as well as control over earnings, wealth, loans, land and
savings.
2004 Version: Women's groups complained changes were introduced "to deny women equal rights to property,
land and inheritance, to limit their access to employment opportunities, deprive older women of much needed
support, and undermine their participation in public decision making."78 The Islamic allies of the BNP were
suspected of being responsible for the changes, because the then Prime Minister, Khaleda Zia, was still stressing her
government's role in advancing women's rights.
2008: The Chief Advisor of the Caretaker Government announced they would revise the policy, watering it down
again. Three of the advisers openly courted the Islamists and conceded their demand to withdraw it altogether.
2011 Version: This version has no charter of rights and is silent on the issue of equal rights in marriage, divorce,
custody and guardianship.79 As one commentator put it, "By ignoring the personal, the policy has hesitated to move
towards substantive equality, perhaps to avoid confrontation with the religious right and to placate social
conservatism."80
The policy no longer allows for equal rights for women to inherit - it gives women control only over property they
might have already acquired and only if allowed by religious laws.
Implementing the 1997 version of the policy had been a manifesto promise of the Awami League in 2008. Under
pressure from Islamists, the Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina said she'd decided to remove portions of the policy that
contradicted the Quran.81
Some have described the "spiral of silence from all the political parties regarding women's equal right to property"
as part of the desire of a patriarchal society to keep wealth in the hands of men. They argue the policy has other
clauses that might contradict Islamic interpretations, but these haven't caused uproar like the inheritance issue.
Jamaat-e-Islami: Women
Jamaat does not believe in women's equality or empowerment. It says men and women have complementary roles.
The language it uses is often vague, referring to what is "appropriate" for women without defining this. It talks of
affording women their dignity through Islam and Islamic dress.
As scholars82 point out, Jamaat has focused on reproductive health and improving quality of service delivery, but
not women's rights. The party is also careful how it discusses female employment, given so many Bangladeshi
women are in the workplace. It says employment will be "based on merit", and doesn't discuss quotas for women.
Academics note that Jamaat incorporates "the dominant concepts and ideas on women's development issues
related to work and violence against women in the public and private spheres etc. without challenging the basic
tenets around the complementary role played by the sexes."83
A senior adviser to Jamaat84 stressed that the party had opened up on what he called "the gender question". He said
POLITICAL
ISLAM
33
they were keen to fight for gender rights like the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and "did not make any distinction
really". He said a quarter of Jamaat members were women and their share in the Majlis-e-Shura or Executive Council
was increasing.85
The same adviser's book stated that "Islam has prohibited free mixing of sexes and does not approve of dancing or
acting because they encourage indecency86". In spelling out the obligations of a married couple, the book said a
husband is obliged to maintain his wife only if she does not show "her hatred or defiance of her husband or her
attraction to another person". A wife "should be attentive to the comfort and well-being of her mate", who is the
head of the family in the Islamic system. Furthermore it is "the duty of the wife to obey the husband in all lawful
matters". On the issue of Islamic dress the same book says everything should be covered "except a woman's face and
forehead" and she must wear a "flowing outer garment".
Speaking anonymously because of the current crackdown, a female Jamaat member said she wasn't bothered that
women members didn't have top positions in the party. She said they could express their opinion through voting and
were still active. On the issue of equal inheritance, she said it contradicted Islam and anyway in a country like
Bangladesh women were generally supported by their husbands.
Hefajate Islam: Women
Their 13-point demands call for the segregation of men and women, as well as the scrapping of the National
Women's Development Policy. On 6 April 2013 at their rally in central Dhaka, Hefajat supporters allegedly beat up
a woman reporter and refused to allow female rubbish collectors to go near the rally area to perform their duties.
Hefajate Islam subsequently denied involvement.87
Women's groups protested that Hefajat's 13-point demands contradict Article 28 of the Constitution, which says:
The state shall not discriminate against any citizen on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth and
women shall have equal rights with men in all spheres of the state and of public life.
Keeping women at home is not practical in a country where the vast majority of garment factory workers are
female, as well as many of the migrant workers sending remittances from abroad.88 Newspapers quoted female
garment factory workers saying times had changed and there was no way they would obey Hefajate Islam's edicts
and sit at home, because their salary was needed to feed their families.89 Garment manufacturers also said it would be
impossible to remove their female workforce just because Hefajate Islam might like that.
The Bangladeshi Foreign Minister, Dipu Moni, who is one of the few Asian women to hold such a post, said she
found the Hefajate Islam demands "absolutely absurd" and expressed concern that a political party headed by a
woman (the BNP) should support a group with such retrogressive views.90
Islami Oikyo Jote: Women
A senior member of the party said there was no need to hold direct conversations with their women members.
Indeed he would not allow our researcher to meet any female member of the party, saying her answers would be the
same as his. He stressed that in Islam men and women could only inherit property in 2:1 shares but if a father gave
property away before he died, then he could give more to his daughter. He complained that "the so-called women's
movement" defines inheritance in a way that totally contradicts traditional religious beliefs.
34
POLITICAL
ISLAM
Footnotes for diagram.91
1935
or
1939
6
47
1996
June
2574
15
48
1991
9
1988
4
7
1986
1979
1973
7
2
0
19
15
3
Gana
Forum
2001
Jatiya
54
Independ
Women
Nominated
& validated
55
JEI
Constituencies
with Women
17
AL
Women
Won
1565
BNP
Total
candidates
2008
Women
Nominated
Election
WOMEN CANDIDATES IN NATIONAL ELECTIONS IN BANGLADESH
82
13
17
0
6
4
5
38
4
10
0
8
6
3
35
5
6
0
4
3
7
Case Study:
Village Women's Lives and Religion
By Jannat Gulay
In the villages of Salkuna, Shibobas and Bagachra in Jessore.
Jamaat has local women activists who go into villages to educate and canvass in advance of
elections. They hold what are known as boithok sessions. Women also take part in preaching circles
known as taleem, that are less overtly political. These are groups of women meeting regularly in
homes or in the local mosque to read the Quran and Hadith and be instructed in Islamic texts by
religious teachers. These sessions do not challenge patriarchal interpretations of Islam. They focus
on practice – what to do in particular situations. The movement is worldwide and nominally
apolitical but clearly has huge political potential. In Egypt for example, all such teachers must by law
undergo two years of training run by the Ministry of Religious Affairs to be licensed or face a fine and
imprisonment. In Bangladesh it is totally unregulated. Some argue this sort of education helps
women by giving them knowledge of Islam as "an alternative means of gaining respect and
authority within their households and immediate communities - an empowerment route most
have not had before". In Bangladesh it seems to be part of a growing Islamisation at grassroots level,
which NGOs report observing.
Changes
Villagers surveyed believe their lives are becoming more religious day by day but they don't credit this entirely to
Jamaat-e-Islami or other religious parties. They say the influences are:
•
•
•
•
•
Religion based parties; especially Jamaat-e-Islami.
Tablik, known as taleem at the local level, which is education and preaching.
Religious Leaders (Imam at the mosque).
Oajj92 and Islamic Gatherings.
Negative attitudes towards the ruling party (BNP or Awami League), which is viewed as non-Islamic.
In Salkuna and Shibobas they describe their village as well run, with a low level of corruption but this wasn't always
the case. They believe they've become more "civilised" because of the taleem sessions and the influence of the Imam.
In Bagachra they say that the changes appeared because of "women's boithok", which is the term for Jamaat-eIslami grassroots mobilisation among women.
POLITICAL
ISLAM
35
"We are trying to bring up our children according to the Quran and Sunna. It is said in the Quran
that those who obey their husband and parents will not face difficulties or conflict in their lives. This
is also same for those who say their prayers. By attending boithok, we come to understand that we
have to undertake the responsibilities of family and society."
Woman in Bagachra Village
Villagers confirm that more women than before are wearing a burqa when going out, even to visit their father's
house, and they observe purdah. They say the reason is Jamaat's religious mobilisation sessions, or boithok:
"Everyone would like to observe purdah but they don't know how to go about it. When they come to
boithok sessions, they learn how to do it and that's when the changes come. I've seen a lot of women
start observing purdah but then there are also many people who don't do it."
– Woman from Bagachra.
"Our standards of dress have improved. It doesn't matter what women wear inside the home but
when they go into public areas they must be pious, irrespective of how educated or uneducated they
are. They cover their head and body and I think that looks very beautiful."
– Farida from Shalkuna.
Women in the villages need permission from their father or husband to go outdoors, even to go into the public
areas of the village, and even if they are covered in Islamic dress. This appears to be a change.
"When I want to go outside, I have to take permission. The girls from our village hardly go outside for
their needs. If there's an emergency, they tell their brothers or fathers to bring the things they need.
Another important issue is our parents and villagers often think that it is an issue of prestige for
them, if their daughters and wives go outside. This is because they have a religious mindset."
– Farida, from Salkuna
Micro-Finance
It's estimated that there are some 21.2 million micro-finance borrowers in Bangladesh, the overwhelming majority
of them female. There are studies showing female access to micro-finance helps empower women in terms of their
bargaining power with their husbands. Jamaat has been critical of the credit revolution on the grounds of Islam
banning interest but also because they say its undue emphasis on women borrowers creates tension in the family.
In this village attitudes to taking loans and paying interest have changed. The religious education sessions have
made women unwilling to borrow because of being taught that Islam prohibits interest.
"When I came to understand that interest is strictly prohibited in Islam, I made up my mind that
I will not take or give any loans with interest. If I borrow 10,000 taka, then I have to pay 100 taka
per 1000 as interest. So I decided not to borrow money."
– Anowora, from Shalkuna
Women's Taleem
Taleem is a gathering where women learn and share Islamic knowledge with each other. Tablik/taleem is organised
in different houses of the village, mainly on Mondays or Wednesdays. The organisers believe they are inviting women
to share knowledge of Islam and to become more religious and lead a dignified, calm life. They discuss
•
How they lead their lives and manage their families
•
How to observe purdah
•
The Quran and Hadith
36
POLITICAL
ISLAM
"Taleem guides us and gives us a framework. It's to our benefit if we can mange some time to sit
together and discuss leading a more religious life. We even discuss the Quran and Hadith to acquire
religious knowledge. We realize that life is short and we have to return to the Almighty and show what
we have done. We need to recite prayers for the Prophet (PBUH) as well as Zikir and Namaz. Not only
this, we also have to learn how to run our family according to the teachings of Islam."
— Nasima Begum, a middle-aged woman of Salkuna
Women's Boithok
Those who are involved in the boithok sessions organised by Jamaat say that they are different from taleem sessions,
which only focus on personal issues. In boithok women also discuss social and political changes. The sessions stress
the need to acquire knowledge, practise Islam in their lives, preach religion to others and address their local
responsibilities in the community.
Women in Bagachra village didn't want to give their real names for this report because of the current political
instability but they believe eight or nine years of boithok sessions have brought about some change. Before the
boithok sessions many women didn't even know how to say their prayers, and had no knowledge of Islam, didn't
observe purdah and spent much of the time quarrelling with one another, they say.
"We didn't know about purdah properly but now we understand it. Before people didn't even pay
their zakat (Islamic tax) or know that it was mandatory for rich people. "
– Ayesha & Salma
Elections
When it comes to voting, women in the villages are torn between making their own judgment and following their
families. Several women say they choose their own candidate since they're the one voting. But others, like Anowara
from Salkuna Village, say they have to follow their husband's choice in order to be a good Muslim:
" I have to follow my husband. If he tells me to vote for a particular person, I have to do that. He is my
husband so I cannot do anything without his permission. He has standing and knows the affairs of
the village better than me. Besides, he tells me which party symbol I have to vote. I cannot follow the
laws of the Government; I must obey God's laws. At this moment, if I were to die and my husband
told the Almighty that I do not pay attention to his words, what would happen to me?"
Interestingly, many of the women in Awami League or BNP families in the village wanted to vote for the Islamic
parties because they're attending taleem or boithok sessions and are much more religiously minded. This can cause
serious friction within families.
The overwhelming demand was for a well organised, peaceful, secure environment with no corruption or murder.
Islam is seen by many as the route to this sort of society. Villagers said they definitely did not want a military
government but they were utterly frustrated with the fighting between the two main political parties.
Researcher's Observations
Women are still seen as a symbol of prestige and honour for the family, as well as society as a whole – and as such are
to be protected. But there is also an increased religiosity apparent in women's private lives, though not for men. The
shift can be seen in the changing clothing of women that has become more Islamic but these changes are not seen
among men. For men, religiosity is often measured by how well their women perform their assigned religious
identity. Islamic parties are trying to benefit from this increased religiosity among women.
POLITICAL
ISLAM
37
Islamic Charity Work
In response to the expansion of secular NGOs, Islamists of all shades have set up their own organisations to do microfinance, infrastructure development and education; they give out sewing machines, free health care, help widows
and orphans, the disabled and elderly and provide scholarships to needy students. Academic Mumtaz Ahmad says:
"Several Saudi, Kuwaiti and UAE-based official, semi-official and private charitable foundations have been pouring
huge amounts of funds into Bangladesh since the early 1980s to build mosques and madrasas, establish orphanages,
and help in relief operations during floods and cyclones."93 Islamic charities now have their own umbrella body, the
Association of Muslim Welfare Associations, Bangladesh or AMWAB, with more than 320 members.94 It claims to be
the largest Islamic micro-finance apex body in the world.
The quomi madrasa clerics, the pro-Jamaat groups and the Ahle Hadith groups all have charity outreach activities
of their own. Foreign funding has, according to Mumtaz Ahmad, dried up considerably since the August 2005
bombings in Bangladesh but is still forthcoming from international Islamic relief organisations and from
remittances from Bangladeshi workers in the Middle East. Along with physical assistance, Islamic values are
propagated.
Oversight by the NGO Bureau
NGOs directly receiving foreign funding must be registered with the government's NGO Bureau.95 These NGOs can
in turn fund local NGOs, which register with the Social Welfare Department. There are over 50,000 of the latter.
In an interview with the NGO Bureau director,96 he indicated he didn't have sufficient staff to monitor the activities
of the 2,198 organisations97 he oversees. His department has only one office in Dhaka and no field offices. In the civil
service, the District Commissioners and local executive officers at upazilla level are supposed to monitor NGO
activities in their respective areas but in practice they are far too busy.
The contrast between the office of this government body and the premises used by major international NGOs,
such as BRAC, is very stark. Some NGOs would have a budget at least a thousand times bigger than the department
meant to monitor them.
Women's groups complained how difficult it was to renew their registration with the NGO Bureau and said that
the Jamaat-e-Islami former farmer's wing was registered as an NGO, despite the fact that they distribute agricultural
equipment to potential voters. When questioned about this organisation, Chashi Kollyon Samity, the NGO Bureau
director, claimed not to know anything about its links to Jamaat-e-Islami despite media coverage of the issue in
200898 and 2010.99 He said it builds mosques, madrasa and orphanages and gives farmers shallow tube wells but
confirmed it is registered and receives funds from donors in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. That an organisation so closely
linked to a political party should be receiving foreign funding in an election year seemed to indicate the level of
monitoring was very low.
Kushi Kabir said her organisation, Nijera Kori, had its offices in Jamaat strongholds attacked by Chashi Kollyon
Samity members to stop them forming groups of landless peasants and women in the late eighties and early nineties.
Rickshaw pullers in the area were instructed not to take Nijera Kori workers to villages, though they didn't obey.
Mosque Imams were told to announce that any men working for Nijeri Kori were not allowed to say Friday prayers in
the mosque. According to Kushi Kabir, Chashi Kollyan Samity appeared to be well funded and gave farmers seeds
and arranged religious classes for women in villages.
Some well known Islamic NGOs connected to Bangladesh100:
The Daily Star reported in 2008 that there were 34 foreign-funded major Islamic NGOs registered in Bangladesh,
receiving money mainly from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates, as well as the US and UK..101
Below are some NGOs that have been covered in the press for their links to Islamic politics.
Rabita Al-Alam Al-Islam: According the director of the NGO Bureau, this is no longer functioning, with no
incoming funds or projects after 2007. Its country director was Mir Qassem Ali, from Jamaat-e-Islami, who is now
accused of war crimes. Rabita Al-Alam played a significant role after 1971 in helping to repatriate the “stranded
Pakistanis” to Punjab after the end of the Liberation War.102
Muslim Aid: Submitted project proposals for a vocational institute, sanitation and nutrition in Cox's Bazaar with
Rohinga refugees, which the NGO Bureau examined and referred to the relevant ministries and after they gave their
opinion it was registered, according to the Director of the NGO Bureau. The NGO has now stopped working in Cox's
Bazaar after the government withdrew permission for several NGOs there.
38
POLITICAL
ISLAM
One of the Trustees in the UK was Chowdhury Mueen-Uddin103. The chief investigator of the Bangladesh War
Crimes Tribunal has said, “There is prima facie evidence of Chowdhury Mueen-Uddin being involved in a series of
killings of intellectuals.”104 These are allegations Mr Mueen Uddin has denied. His lawyer, Tony Cadman, said, “The
comments by the Chief Investigator are highly improper and serves as a further basis for raising the question as to
whether a fair trial may be guaranteed before the International Crimes Tribunal in Bangladesh.”
The World Assembly of Muslim Youth: This is headquartered in Saudi Arabia; its Bangladesh website says it is
building mosques and Islamic centres. Islami Chhatra Shibir105 is said to be a member. It was registered with the NGO
Bureau until 2010; their website list106 doesn't make it clear if they're still registered.
Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation: Suspended in Bangladesh in 2003/4. It is banned in the USA.
International Islamic Relief Organisation (IIRO): Still registered in Bangladesh according to the NGO Bureau
website.
Servants of Suffering Humanity: Reported to have links to HUJI. Not clear if it's still functioning in Bangladesh.
Al-Markajul Islami: Al Markajul Islami is a service oriented NGO that mainly provides services for burial, and for
transporting dead bodies and patients in Bangladesh. Media reports alleged their offices were used for meetings in
the run up to the militant bomb blasts on an Awami League rally on 21 August 2004 and alleged they supplied one of
their ambulances as a get away vehicle. The acting chairman of the NGO denied this but the vice chairman was
detained for questioning.107
Kuwait Joint Relief Committee: This gives awards to students in Bangladesh from Darul Ihsan University.108
Revival of Islamic Heritage Society (RIHS): Reported to be running an office in Bangladesh in 2009, despite being
banned two years earlier.109 The US government also says it operated behind a front organisation after being
banned.110 According to the reports, Ahle Hadith Andolon chief, Asadullah Al Ghalib, had helped RIHS register in
November 1996. After the Bangladeshi government banned Al Haramain Foundation (now banned worldwide) in
2003, many Haramain staff, including five foreign nationals, joined RIHS. Four of the foreign nationals were later
withdrawn from the country following the August 17 serial bomb blasts. Executed JMB chief (Abdur Rahman) told
the media in 2004 that he used to get funds from the RIHS and Rabita-e Alam al Islami. RIHS has so far erected 1,000
mosques, madrasa and orphanages across the country. It is banned in Russia, the US and on the UN list for
bankrolling al Qaeda.111
POLITICAL
ISLAM
39
Section 2:
Jamaat-e-Islami
Timeline
1941: Jamaat-e-Islami is founded by Maulana Abul Ala Mawdudi. He is inspired by the Muslim Brotherhood in
Egypt. Jamaat is one of the oldest parties in the subcontinent.
1947: Jamaat-e-Islami do not support the Partition if India initially; then they come round to the idea of Pakistan.
1950s: Jamaat starts work in East Pakistan.
1962: Jamaat wins four seats in the National Assembly and two in the East Pakistan Provincial Assembly. It contests
all elections from this date onwards.
1970: In the general elections Jamaat do not win any seat in the National Assembly or East Pakistan, but emerge as
the second largest political party after the Awami League. In the Provincial Assembly election of 1970 Jamaat wins
one sat in the district of Bogra.
1971: Jamaat-e-Islami opposes the Liberation War in Bangladesh and the party's Bengali leaders flee to Pakistan.
1973: Golam Azam's citizenship is cancelled by the Bangladesh Government on 18 April.
1974: Maulana Abdur Rahim, a senior leader of the provincial party before 1971, returns to Dhaka.
1978: Legal bar on an Islamic party is lifted.
February 1978: The Jamaat Student wing, Islami Chhatra Shibir, is formed according to their Constitution in a
mosque of Dhaka University.
August 1978: Golam Azam returns to Bangladesh on a Pakistani passport on 11 August.
1979: Jamaat-e-Islami emerges as a party in Bangladesh. It contests elections under the name of Islamic
Democratic League (IDL) and wins six seats in Parliament with its leader Mawlana Abdur Rahim.
1981: Jamaat-e-Islami Bangladesh is formed according to their Constitution.
1986: Jamaat participates with the Awami League in the parliamentary election, held under martial law, and wins
10 seats.
1990: Jamaat joins the Awami League, BNP and leftists to topple the Ershad regime.
1991: BNP forms a government. After the elections both main parties woo Jamaat, which has 18 seats. Jamaat
decides to support the BNP.
Mid-1990s: Jamaat allies with the Awami League in street protests againsty the BNP government.
1996: Jamaat wins three seats in the elections.
2000: Golam Azam resigns as Ameer. Motiur Rahman Nizami takes over, amid protests over his role in 1971.
2001: Jamaat allies with BNP ahead of the parliamentary elections and wins 17 seats.
2001-6: Jamaat's Ameer, Motiur Rahman Nizami, holds the portfolios of Ministry of Agriculture and Ministry of
Industries and his deputy, Ali Ahsan Muhammad Mujahid, is Minister for Social Welfare. Both are very important and
influential ministries.
2008: Jamaat is granted registration as a political party by the Election Commission on November 4, having revised
its party Consititution but some questions remain.
2008: Jamaat wins two seats in parliament, as part of a four party alliance with BNP, Islami Oikyo Jote and
Bangladesh Jatiya Party.
2009: A writ petition is filed in the High Court on January 25 challenging the legality of the registration of Jamaat as
a political party on the grounds that, among other things, it has offices abroad and does not believe in the sovereignty
of Bangladesh.
POLITICAL
ISLAM
41
Jamaat-e-Islami Organisational Structure.
JAMAAT E ISLAMI
CENTRAL ORGANISATION
CENTRAL MEMBER (RUKON) CONVENTION
CENTRAL PRESIDENT (AMEER- E- JAMAAT) ELECTED FOR 3 YEARS
CENTRAL MAJLISH-E-SHURA
CENTRAL WORKING COMMITEE
CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COUNCIL
DISTRICT ORGANISATION
OR METROPOLITAN
DISTRICT MEMBER (RUKON) CONVENTION
DISTRICT PRESIDENT (AMBER) ELECTED FOR 2 YEARS
DISTRICT MAJLISH-E- SHURA
DISTRICT WORKING COUNCIL
THANA
OR UPAZILLA (BOROUGH)
UPAZILLA/THANA MEMBER (RUKON) CONVENTION
UPAZILLA/THANA PRESIDENT (AMBER) ELECTED FOR 1 YEARS
UPAZILLA/THANA MAJLISH - E- SHURA (IF CONDITIONS FULLFILLED)
UPAZILLA/THANA WORKING COUNCIL
UNION/POUROASHABHA ORGNISATION
FORMED IN BRANCHES WITH AT LEAST 3 MEMBERS (RUKON).
IF THERE ARE LESS THAN 3 THEN THEY WORK UNDER THE UPAZILLA/
THANA PRESIDENT OR DISTRICT PRESIDENT.
UNION/POURASHABHA PRESIDENT (AMEER) ELECTED FOR 1 YEAR BY MEMBERS ( RUKON)
UNION/POURASHABHA MAJKISH-E- SHURA
UNION/POURASHABHA WORKING COUNCIL
WARD
UNIT
OR UNION
MINIMUM 3 WORKERS & 3 ASSOCIATES
The Jamaat-e-Islami Constitution does not mention Ward and Unit level bodies but these were specified by
Jamaat leaders in an interview with the Author, Feb 2013.
42
POLITICAL
ISLAM
Jamaat-e-Islami Women's Wing.
CENTRAL WOMEN'S DIVISION
WOMEN'S MAJLISH--SHURA (ELECTED FOR 3 YEARS)
SECRETARY, WOMEN'S DIVISION OR WOMEN'S
DIVISIONAL SECRETARY
CENTRAL WOMEN'S WORKING COUNCIL
DISTRICT WOMEN'S DIVISION
DISTRICT WOMEN'S MAJLISH-E-SHURA (ELECTED FOR 2 YEARS)
SECRETARY OF WOMEN'S DIVISION
DISTRICT WOMEN'S WORKING COUNCIL
UPAZILLA / THANA WOMEN'S DIVISION
NAMUPAZAILLA /THANA WOMEN'S MAJLISH-E-SHURA
(ELECTED FOR 2 YEARS)
SECRETARY, WOMEN'S DIVISION
UPAZILLA / THANA WOMEN'S WORKING COUNCIL
Leadership Structure
AMEER-E-JAMAAT
CENTRAL PRESIDENT
MAJLEESH-E-SHURA
HIGHEST CONSULTATIVE BODY - SITS
EVERY 3 MONTHS
EVERY 50 RUKUN ELECT ONE
REPRESENTATIVE
WOMEN ALSO SIT IN THIS SHURA
WOMEN'S
MAJLEESH-ESHURA
NIRBAHI PARISHAD
KORMOPARISHAD
CENTRAL SECRETARIAT
HEADED BY SECRETARY GENERAL
WOMENS
KORMOPARISHAD
This structure is repeated at district, thana and ward level but not unit level.
POLITICAL
ISLAM
43
Politics
"Jamaat-e-Islami strives to turn Bangladesh into an Islamic welfare state."
Jamaat is the largest Islamic political party in Bangladesh and has the most numerous, active and dedicated
followers.112 It describes itself as "a moderate Islamic political party which believes in democracy, human rights and
is committed to upholding the rule of law".113 It has separate wings to work with students and women, as well as
organisations for teachers, doctors, businessmen, lawyers, farmers and workers.
"The importance (of a party) lies not in numbers of its members, but in the dependability of their
thoughts and actions." Maulana Mawdudi114
Jamaat says it had 30,000 fully-fledged members and between 750,000 to one million party workers.115 Police
officials agree that they have up to a million active supporters, including students and say they've identified some
5000 as troublemakers. In the 2008 election, the party polled 3,186,384 votes or 4.6% of the electorate.116 It has to be
assumed all its supporters voted for the party, so it's unlikely it has anywhere near the 10 million members claimed
by one Jamaat executive committee member.117 Jamaat itself has also claimed to have the support of 15% of the total
electorate118 but it has never polled that proportion, with 12.3% of voters being the most it achieved, in 1991 in a seat
sharing arrangement with the BNP.
Jamaat-e Islami membership structure.
RUKUN
KORMI
SHOHOJOGI
FULL MEMBER
30,000
WORKER
APPROX 10,000
ASSOCIATE/PRIMARY MEMBERS
SHODOHYO
It's extremely difficult to work your way up the Jamaat membership hierarchy to become a full member or Rukun
as it's called. It requires dedication, passing examinations on Islamic texts and observing a strict behaviour code that
involves being chaperoned when with members of the opposite sex and sticking to a strict no-smoking policy.
Recruits have to fill in a daily personal report card, recording how many times they prayed in the mosque, how much
of the Quran they read, and they must undergo Chinese-style self-criticism sessions.
44
POLITICAL
ISLAM
Jamaat Personal Report Card in Bengali
POLITICAL
ISLAM
45
Jamaat Personal Report Card Translated into English
46
POLITICAL
ISLAM
Jamaat Personal Report Card Translated into English
POLITICAL
ISLAM
47
Some younger members of Jamaat argue the party now needs to loosen up its strict membership requirements to
be more inclusive. They say they will never win a democratic election unless they present a more secular image like
Islamic political parties in other countries. They propose campaigning on issues of social equality, welfare and rule
of law that are consistent with secular politics. It's not clear if this argument is motivated by expediency because the
party is under unprecedented pressure or stems from a genuine impulse to reform.
Since 2008 non-Muslims have been allowed to join Jamaat but they are not allowed to be Rukan or full members.
One Jamaat representative claimed 100,000 non-Muslims were associate members.119 He said their policies were
"totally friendly" to religious minorities. Asked about allegations that Jamaat and Shibir were involved in recent antiHindu violence, he said it was against the party's policy and if there were a fair commission of inquiry it would
emerge that other parties were involved along with criminal elements in order to grab property.
Membership Structure of Jamaat-e-Islami
AMEER-E-JAMAAT
CENTRAL PRESIDENT
MAJLEESH-E-SHURA
HIGHEST CONSULTATIVE BODY - SITS
EVERY 3 MONTHS
EVERY 50 RUKUN ELECT ONE
REPRESENTATIVE
WOMEN ALSO SIT IN THIS SHURA
WOMEN'S
MAJLEESH-ESHURA
NIRBAHI PARISHAD
KORMOPARISHAD
CENTRAL SECRETARIAT
HEADED BY SECRETARY GENERAL
WOMENS
KORMOPARISHAD
This structure is repeated at district, thana and ward level but not unit level.
Maulana Sayyid Abu'l-A'la Mawdudi (1903-1979)
In Vali Nasr's seminal book on Jamaat-e-Islami,120 its founder Maulana Mawdudi is described as communalist in
outlook and keen to defend Muslim interests in the face of an imminent Hindu challenge in the run up to the
Independence of India. Mawdudi objected to the idea of Pakistan initially, not because he was opposed to the twonation theory but because he wanted to convert the whole of India to Islam and halt the rise of Hindu power. Later he
opposed the Muslim League because he felt Pakistan's founder, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, was too secular. Maulana
Mawdudi denounced nationalism and called secular politics a form of blasphemy.
His philosophy advocated obedience to a narrow definition of Islamic law and he strongly believed the flourishing
of religion required political power and an Islamic state. He created a revivalist ideology that rejected traditional
48
POLITICAL
ISLAM
Islam and called on Muslims to shed cultural accretion and non-Islamic traditions. Nasr's book describes
Mawdudi's thinking as not modern but purporting to be modern, in that it broke with Islamic tradition to create
something new.
He argues that the Jamaat founder used the word "revolution" (which was in the party's Constitution in
Bangladesh until 2008) to signify progressiveness and not in the way it's understood in the West. Nasr writes that,
"Mawdudi believed in incremental change rather than radical ruptures…and assumed that Islamic Revolution
would be heralded not by the masses but by the society's leaders."121 His is a top down, slow burning version of
revolution. To achieve his aim Mawdudi outlined four steps that were necessary: intellectual change in the people,
organising them into a movement, social work to reform society and then changing the leadership. These steps are
closely mirrored in Jamaat-e-Islami party literature and strategy today in Bangladesh.
Democratic Politics
"Jamaat is building people eligible to establish Islamic society through appropriate training…"122
In its party documents in Bangladesh, Jamaat says it believes in achieving an Islamic welfare state, through
democratic politics. It stresses this can only be done by committed Muslims. It adds that since it can't force Islamic
ideology on people, it will work inside the democratic system.123 Many of its critics fear this is only a tactical
commitment to the democratic process.
The Jamaat literature says it "hopes that a time must come when people shall elect Islamic leaders to the
parliament in a majority, paving the way for the formation of an Islamic government".124
For all its avowed commitment to democracy in its Constitution, Jamaat stresses that man must first follow "the
way of life given by Allah, instead of following and propagating man-made theories". Its Constitution also says a
member "will not accept anyone as King, Emperor or the owner of sovereign power, except Allah”. This has caused
controversy. In its defence, Jamaat says there is no equivalent concept to "sovereignty" in Islam, which stipulates
"absolute power" can only lie with God. Therefore they argue political power can lie with anyone, but not absolute
power.
Jamaat's literature stresses the need to build and train manpower: a cadre of "Islam-loving, conscious and
honest" activists and leaders ready to establish an Islamic government in Bangladesh; but it also emphasises
humanitarian and social service for the poor. In this sense it's similar to the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas. Critics
though say Jamaat's social work only extends to its own members and supporters. One sympathetic Bangladeshi
academic said he viewed Jamaat as a "regimented club" and a "small hearted party", which, unlike the Muslim
Brotherhood, only really assisted its own people, not the wider community.
The party emphasises its honesty and integrity with money. One of its demands on its members is to "make
collective efforts to replace dishonest and inefficient leaders by honest and efficient ones". This is a refrain
throughout its literature,125 which it has to be said, must have a certain appeal in Bangladesh, where corruption was
described by the UN Resident Coordinator as "a long-standing historical plague".126
Jamaat also makes much of its internal party elections, saying "Being a member of an influential family is not, at
all, a criterion to be elected to a responsible post." This contrasts sharply with the dynastic politics of other
Bangladeshi and South Asian parties.
Interestingly Jamaat has no myth of resistance to fall back on and it's not as overtly anti-Western as many Islamic
parties in the Middle East. Many of its students and leaders have been educated in Britain or have ties to the country,
which has a large Bangladeshi diaspora population. There are passing references to Muslims under attack in
Afghanistan, Palestine, Kashmir and Iraq but they are not common.127
Performance of Jamaat in Past Elections
It's worth examining Jamaat-e-Islami's election results before the creation of Bangladesh. Surprisingly, the party
won a greater percentage of votes (4.5%)118 in the provincial assembly elections of 1970 in East Pakistan than in any
other province of West Pakistan. Some argue the vote bank for Islamic parties like Jamaat is fairly static but that
doesn't mean support for them is not increasing.129 Many point out that with its tolerant and syncretic tradition
Bangladesh should have been inhospitable to Islamists. The acrimonious relationship between the two main
political parties and their lack of defining issues has undoubtedly benefited the Islamists, who can portray
themselves as untainted. Jamaat has also been adept at striking alliances, becoming a kingmaker in Bangladeshi
politics and exercising a disproportionate influence in relation to its votes.
POLITICAL
ISLAM
49
Jamaat Vote Proportions over time
Jamaat
1973
1979
1986
1988
1991
1996
1996
2001
2008
1st
2nd
3rd
4th
5th
6th
7th
8th
9th
Boycotted
18
3
17
2
12.13
8.6
4.28
4.6
221
300
31
38
Seats
Not
allowed
to contest
10
% Vote
0
4.6
Seats
Contested
IOJ
Won Seats
1991
1986
2001
2008
1
1
2
0
Contested
166
166
7
4
%
0.26
0.33
0.68
0
Party Constitution
The party's Constitution was amended in 2008 in order to comply with the electoral reforms introduced by the
military-backed caretaker regime. It is interesting to compare the two versions of the party's Constitution, previously
issued in 2006 and then reissued in 2008. The later version includes some significant changes, which are given here in
summary, but for the full version please see the Annexes:-
-
A new emphasis on nationalism, independence and sovereignty - added references to Bangladesh and its
"heroic freedom struggle".
More emphasis on Islam than on the party.
A new emphasis on democracy, human rights, social justice and opposition to terrorism.
Dropping a reference to "revolution" and replacing it with "a desire for reform".
A change in tone from "changing minds" and "training activists" to a softer approach involving educating
people.
Dropping references to opponents as "ignorant Jahiliats" (idolators from the pre-Islamic era or Age of
Ignorance).
Dropping a special section on the obligations of female party members, which said they were supposed to cheer
up and support the male activists in their family and teach the children. This is replaced with a declaration that
the party is open to all who agree with its ideas.
Instead of a section on how a member can be downgraded if he fails in his duties, the later version allows nonMuslims to become associate members of the party.
Challenge to Jamaat's Constitution
On 25 January 2009 a writ was filed in the High Court challenging the legality of the Election Commission's action in
2008 in registering Jamaat-e-Islami as a political party. The petitioners said the party had offices abroad130 (which is
illegal), was a religion-based party that believed only Allah could make laws and did not recognise the nation's
sovereignty and independence. This, they argued, put Jamaat in violation of the Bangladeshi Constitution and the
Representation of People Order (RPO) Ordinance 2008. If Jamaat loses this case it could be barred from contesting
elections 131.
In January 2010, the Election Commission wrote to Jamaat requesting a number of alterations to its party
Constitution and making the following points:
-
50
Jamaat's call for establishing the rule of Islam requires drastic amendments to the basic structure of the
country's Constitution, which are not allowed, even by parliament.
Jamaat's emphasis on Allah's laws implied a refusal to accept parliament's law-making power. Officials
POLITICAL
ISLAM
-
complained Jamaat had deleted a relevant clause from its provisional amended charter in order to get
registration but after the elections reinstated the clause in its ratified charter.
Jamaat should include in the main body of its Constitution a provision for reserving 33% of posts in all party
committees for women by 2020.
Jamaat was asked to remove the new clause allowing non-Muslims to become members on the grounds that
it was discriminatory in distinguishing at all.132
Members of the Shahbagh movement called for Jamaat to be banned. The government said it could do this if the
party was involved in instigating violence but it's also watching the outcome of the court proceedings, challenging
the legitimacy of Jamaat's Constitution, which could have the same outcome.
Liberation War Role & War Crimes Trial
Jamaat's role in opposing the Liberation struggle and siding with the Pakistani forces remains its Achilles heel four
decades later. The trial of almost all its top leaders for war crimes has plunged the party into an unprecedented crisis
and re-opened a huge rift in Bangladeshi society.
Perhaps not surprisingly, Jamaat's literature glosses over its role in 1971 by saying the party tries "to inspire the
people to strengthen the spirit of independence which is needed for the survival of the country" and to "safeguard
the independence, territorial sovereignty and Islamic values of Bangladesh which emerged as an independent state
in 1971 through a great war of liberation". Its 2008 Manifesto also referred to the "sacrifice and hardship of the
freedom fighters". During the 2008 election Jamaat floated a fake freedom fighter body and offered to strengthen the
Liberation War Ministry and the Freedom Fighters Welfare Trust and increase allowances for freedom fighters'
families.133
The top leaders of Jamaat - now in jail - did not seem to regard their role in 1971 as a threat – they appear to have
assumed people would forget. According to an academic introduced by Jamaat, some in the party had wanted the
top leadership to apologise for 1971 but Golam Azam and Motiur Rahman Nizami refused. He said influential power
brokers behind the scenes advised Golam Azam not to apologise, but younger members, who make up 70% of the
party, felt annoyed about being penalised for events in which they didn't participate. Born after the war, they didn't
want to be burdened with its legacy.
Some Jamaat members concede its wartime role is a serious liability for their party and will continue to damage it
for years. Groupings seem to be emerging within Jamaat, with some radicals pressing for violent street confrontation
and others supporting internal reform and a new image that moves away from its 1971 past. Officially though, there
are no factions within the party because members of the governing body have to swear an oath to "refrain from
forming independent groups inside Jamaat".
The reformists are more excited about the role of Islamic parties in Turkey and Tunisia than in Saudi Arabia, Iran or
Afghanistan. They're keen to refashion their party to make it more democratic and attractive to non-Muslims and
Muslims who don't want an Islamic state. As one put it, "Most Bangladeshis like an Islamic flavour but don't want
Islam as a main dish."
The reformists say if there were a majlis-e-shura meeting (for two and a half years the security crackdown by the
government has prevented a meeting) then they would bring a motion under the party's Constitution to discuss that
they call "a face lift" for Jamaat. This could include rethinking the relationship with Pakistan. Within the party these
figures now question why being pro-Islam automatically means being pro-Pakistan. They argue that in 1971 the
Liberation struggle was not about saving Islam, as the older generation of Jamaat leaders maintained, but rather
about justice for Bengalis.
Traditionally Jamaat has had strong ties with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, as well as the Muslim Brotherhood.134
However, one Jamaat figure said some in the party wanted to forge a new relationship with India and drop the close
ties to Pakistan. This group says they sent a letter, via the Indian High Commission in Dhaka, to Delhi offering talks,
but received no response. "Jamaat has made it abundantly clear it wants dialogue," they stressed.
A more moderate Jamaat would of course please both the Awami League and Western diplomats. But a deciding
factor will be whether there are executions of Jamaat leaders. Some observers believe that would be enough to drive
younger activists underground into militancy, though long term the shake-up could also be good for the party,
uniting it and helping it shed the 1971 stigma. It's worth noting at their height in the mid-2000s, militant groups like
HUJI and JMB did include some former Jamaat and Shibir members who found their party too moderate and
gravitated towards extremism. Even today there may be localised informal links and sympathies.
Some in Jamaat also warn that if the party is pushed too far, its leadership could lose control of grassroots activists.
This was echoed by a pro-BNP analyst who worried that, "In setting out to destroy Jamaat we've destroyed the
leadership who would have been able to control the party and now Chhatra Shibir is calling the shots and they're
more radical and talking openly of how the parliamentary system is not working. We've destroyed their capacity to be
reasonable." There's also the risk that executions could turn the older leaders into martyrs, as the trial is perceived by
Jamaat supporters as more about who these figures are today than what they did in 1971.
POLITICAL
ISLAM
51
Street Tactics
"The police as usual looked pathetic and one feels pity for them as they run away at the sight of an
angry Jamaati mob."135 Afsan Chowdhury, BRAC University.
In February 2013, when Jamaat called its first solo hartal without the BNP or other opposition parties to back it up,
some observers in Dhaka were shocked. They said it was unthinkable for Jamaat to pull off a strike alone. The success
of the strike showed the Bangladeshi public that Jamaat had its own political street power and wasn't just riding on
the back of the BNP, quite the reverse if anything.
Jamaat's tactics seem to be to storm the police, beat them in hit and run attacks and then disappear quickly before
being arrested. This may be one of the reasons why Jamaat cadres seem to have changed their image and dress, so as
to blend in better. Jamaat and youths from their student wing, Chhatra Shibir, no longer sport skull caps and beards
but instead wear jeans and T shirts.
There are questions about the commitment of the police force to tackle violent attacks by Jamaat. One senior BNP
leader said Jamaat had been giving its cadres training to fight on the streets and were willing to use suicide cadres or
self-immolation. He said the party was preparing to look after the families financially.
Infiltration Strategy
Jamaat has a strategy of infiltrating supporters into key positions in government and other institutions. Its aim is to
build a social base at elite and local levels over decades. Some say the plan is to "use the 'infiltrated' to attain state
power through a successful putsch when the time is right".136 Journalists believe thousands of Jamaat supporters are
now covertly active inside the civil service, helping the party. However it has to be said the whole civil service is
intensely politicised. Those who are Jamaat members are forced to resign from the party when they join government
service but often remain loyal supporters for life. During the period when Jamaat was in power with the BNP from
2001-6 they had two ministers in key positions - social welfare and agriculture -which helped extend their base.
Unrest & the Internet
There have been several newspaper articles detailing ways in which Jamaat has allegedly used doctored images on
the Internet, hacked opponents' websites, and generated misinformation online to muster support.137 One of the
most significant is the report that Delawar Hossain Sayedee's image had been sighted on the moon, which echoed
Iran during the early days of the Revolution when Khomeini supporters claimed to have seen his face in the moon. In
Bangladesh this was a photoshopped image reportedly circulated by Jamaat activists through mobile phones138 and
announcements made through mosque loudspeakers. Shahbagh bloggers jokingly responded by photoshopping a
picture of Sayedee as an astronomer, saying that's why his face was visible on the moon.
52
POLITICAL
ISLAM
The caption reads: "From late Friday night to early Saturday, people from Bangladesh to Saudi Arabia saw
Sayedee's face (in the moon). Such an image is God's sign that true devotees are honoured in different ways."
"In some areas they did destructive work to such a degree we couldn't believe it; it was beyond our
imagination.This large scale and degree we didn't see before, not since 1971."
Police Official, Dhaka, speaking about the first week of March 2013.
This one image caused significant unrest as Sayedee was sentenced to death on 28 February 2013. Sayedee is an
extremely well known orator and cleric, arguably much more popular than his role in Jamaat-e-Islami alone would
merit. The police say for about a week in early March 2013 they lost control of the BNP-Jamaat strongholds of Bogra,
Gaibanda, Rangpur, Dinajpur, Takurgaon, Rajshahi, Chittagong, Chapainawabganj, Cox's Bazaar, Feni and Satkhira.
These were also the areas where some of the attacks on Hindus took place.
Opposition activists were prepared for trouble, according to the police, and came armed with rifles, pistols,
revolvers and home made bombs in order to confront them. Most of the crowds, however, were ordinary people who
just followed the mob without being aware of its plans. Local police officials were the target of much of the violence
and were very scared. In some areas they deserted their posts. The police say at least three police stations were
burned down as well as some police posts. Jamaat figures also say that during the March unrest as many as thirty
districts had no government and the police in southern Chittagong District abandoned their posts.
Activists of the Awami League had to go into hiding because they were being targeted and the police were not able
to protect them for several days until they recaptured control. It was impossible to send reinforcements because the
protestors had blocked the highways with felled trees and disrupted rail lines and communications. In one district,
Chapainawabganj, a power station was burned and there was no electricity for a month.
This time Jamaat protestors put women and children at the front of their lines as human shields, making it very
difficult for the police to fight back. It was a new strategy.
Police officers say the photoshopped picture of Sayedee's face on the moon was extremely successful in
instigating his fans to protest; even lower ranking police constables were trying to see Sayedee's face on the moon.
Some even spread rumours that only those with pure souls and strong faith could see it, leading to reluctance to
admit it wasn't visible. The police themselves had to resort to photoshopping a local movie star's139 face on to the
moon and printing it out and hanging it on the walls of police stations to educate their staff about what was possible
with digital technology.
Officials report that they intercepted telephone calls to London during the unrest, where Jamaat supporters on the
ground explained what they were doing and promised to send photographs to London to be disseminated globally.
The police say there were also frequent direct mobile phone conversations with London during the actual fighting
but they do not know what was discussed.
POLITICAL
ISLAM
53
Other UK Links
Chowdhury Mueen-Uddin, who is under investigation for war crimes by the Bangladeshi authorities, lives in the
UK, helped set up the Muslim Council of Britain and is a trustee of the UK charity Muslim Aid and was their
Chairman. He was the Vice-Chair of the East London Mosque until 2010.140 Mr. Mueen-Uddin was also instrumental
in setting up the Islamic Forum of Europe, which some reports have described as Jamaat-e-Islami's European
wing.141 Mr. Mueen-Uddin has denied any kind of criminal conduct during the 1971 war and said he's happy to
defend himself in a fair trial but has little faith in the current process underway in Bangladesh.142
The Imam of the East London Mosque is related through marriage to the Jamaat-e-Islami chief, Motiur Rahman
Nizami.143
The Islamic Forum of Europe has held programmes advocating against the war crimes trial in Bangladesh and
initiated a “Free Sayedee Movement”.
An Imam from the Muslim Council of Britain, Imam Ajmal Mashroor, has been active in the media complaining
that the Bangladeshi government is persecuting Muslims, comparing the situation to Syria.144
As tension has risen in Bangladesh over the war crimes trial, there have been tense stand offs in East London
between pro and anti Jamaat supporters, with the police being called to keep the two sides apart.145
54
POLITICAL
ISLAM
Funding & Alleged Business Ties
Members' Contributions:
Jamaat's own documentation146 makes it clear its members must give monthly donations to the party, as well as pay
their annual Zakat and Ushr (an Islamic tax usually paid in kind) and make one-off donations.147 Given how
dedicated and regimented the membership of this party is, it's likely these funds are collected more efficiently than
most government revenue. The party says it also receives income from unspecified "subordinate organisations" and
from publications, such as magazines for members.
Jamaat sympathisers argue the party's funds for holding political meetings come from donations148 from
members, which can total 10 crore taka monthly.149 They deny that the political party receives foreign funds.
However, creating jobs and giving loans to Jamaat supporters indirectly fills the party coffers by increasing their
financial ability to make donations.
Jamaat Controlled Business Empire:
Jamaat-e-Islami has by all accounts built up a huge business empire since the early 1980s, including banks and
hospitals150. However, the party does not openly acknowledge its ownership or control of such establishments and
nobody knows the true extent of its expansion into the economic life of the country.
The aim seems to be to cater to the whole society and ensure members are not dependent on the mainstream
bodies.151 It's not overtly about state power but some believe about creating a state within a state.
Banner at Shahbagh Protest Citing Jamaat's Alleged Businesses
The Corporate Social Responsibility budgets or charitable foundations of commercial ventures linked to Jamaat
are available to be used for social work to reinforce the party's ideological aims. At another level, these Jamaat-linked
business ventures enable the party to provide jobs for supporters and members in a suitably Islamic environment.
Employees who are Jamaat members would be required by the party to donate a proportion of their salary. Those
who are shareholders of the Jamaat-related businesses would also profit from generous dividend payments, which
could be diverted to fund political activity. There is of course nothing illegal about this.
Jamaat sympathiser, S. A. Hannan, explained that "by and large recruits are Islamic minded" because there is a
screening process with an Islamic test on erudite subjects like Tawhid or "the unity of God", which an average
Bangladeshi might struggle to answer adequately. An Islami Bank study of training methods for staff152 revealed
something about the mindset of recruits. It found a fifth of the sample (of 123 people who were all male) had been at
POLITICAL
ISLAM
55
one time educated in a madrasa. The vast majority said they'd joined because they wanted an Islamic banking job as
opposed to less than 1% for whom it was about money. A similar proportion of recruits had graduated in Islamic
subjects as in finance related subjects.
Bankers say that it was S. A. Hannan, when deputy governor of Bangladesh Bank, who amended the Bank
Companies Act in 1995 to define Islamic banking concepts and legalise the existing functions of Islamic Banks.
Islamic banks now have a huge competitive advantage because their statutory liquidity reserve requirement is only
11.5% compared to 19% for other banks.153 This helps make Islamic banks more profitable and erodes safeguards for
customers.
Islami Bank Bangladesh
This bank was started in 1983 as the first interest-free bank in Bangladesh as well as in South Asia.154 It is a jointventure public limited company involved in commercial banking based on Sharia principles.
It was started by Jamaat-e-Islami figures such as Mir Qassem Ali, (Jamaat Executive Committee member, excountry director of the Saudi based NGO, Rabeta-al-alam-al-Islami, and currently on trial for war crimes) with the
first Saudi Ambassador155 to Bangladesh156 and Shah Abdul Hannan, among others. In those days the bank had a 70%
foreign shareholding.157 By 2013 that was reduced to a 58.03% foreign shareholding158. Today there is still a strong
Kuwait and Saudi shareholding.
The bank does not openly acknowledge its links to Jamaat, claiming, "Islami Bank does not belong to any political
party."159 Asked about the links, the bank's Deputy Managing Director, Shamsul Haque, complained nobody talked
about the political links of other major Bangladeshi banks close to the Awami League or BNP. "If business people
have a philosophy it's not a crime," he said, adding, "if Muslims own shares, if some Jamaat-e-Islami people own
shares, where is the crime?" Mr. Haque went on to say it was impossible to prove allegations that the bank funded
Jamaat but agreed one of two of the bank's directors belonged to Jamaat or were related to the party.
Thirty years on, it's a huge success story - the third biggest bank in the country and one of the biggest in South
Asia160. Rural banking is still a growing sector in Bangladesh because it wasn't served adequately until the advent of
microcredit. In 2012 alone Islami Bank signed up a record 190,000 new accounts. Islami Bank says it has 276
branches (a fifth of them in rural areas)161 and 30 SME branches with six million account holders - making it the
largest private network in the country. It's also recently started a mobile phone banking scheme called mCash.162
Remittances:
In 2012, about one third of Bangladesh's total remittance inflow was handled by Islami Bank, which takes credit for
encouraging migrant workers to use proper banking channels (rather than informal networks) for their
remittances.163 This helped the bank build relationships of trust with Bangladeshi migrant workers, many of whom
are in the Middle East, where they absorb more orthodox interpretations of Islam that they bring home with them.
The total foreign exchange business of the bank stood at £6.58 billion164 at the end of 2012165 and it had 116 foreign
exchange houses worldwide.
Micro-Finance
The stunning success of Grameen Bank in empowering women borrowers posed a potential challenge to Islamic
parties. Islami Bank was the first to introduce Islamic micro-financing to Bangladesh and it now has the biggest
private programme.
Islamic micro-finance is not only premised on the prohibition of interest (riba) but also on the fact that Sharia law
(i) does not recognise the time value of money and it's therefore not permissible to make money by lending it and (ii)
regards money as not an asset per se but only something that can increase in value if used productively with other
resources. "Money must be used to create real economic value in which the providers of the funds are not considered
creditors but investors or financiers who share rewards as well as risks with the individual seeking micro
financing…".166
Islami Bank started an Islamic version of group-based micro-financing under a programme called Rural
Development Schemes in 1995. Unusually, this was done without any external donor or government support. One
study described Islami Bank's programme as "styled after the Grameen Bank model except that the scheme used
Islamic modes of investment based on Sharia principles".167 By 2011 it had 608,703 beneficiaries (94% of them
women) according to UNDP and by 2010 the highest recovery rate as well as the highest growth rate of any microfinance institution. As of 2009, Islami Bank's credit scheme covered 61 out of 64 districts nationwide.
The Islamic mode of micro-finance is different from that of Grameen Bank in that though it lends mainly to women it
does not set out to empower them specifically, rather to benefit the whole family by ensuring husband and wife are
jointly liable for the money. To support this approach some studies have suggested that the way conventional
lenders target women can create tensions within households and even increase violence against women.168
56
POLITICAL
ISLAM
A study by academics from Chittagong University found Islami Bank's micro-finance scheme had enhanced
"moral, social and ethical values" but it recommended a greater market share could be achieved if the project was
more generous and selected people "not on religious basis". It commented that the programme not only provided
loans but also the "teachings of Islam".169
There is no doubt that the devout are more comfortable with Islamic financing. A survey cited by UNDP revealed
many rural women worried that borrowing from conventional credit organisations might exclude them from
observing purdah.
Business Support:
According to its managing director, Islami Bank has financed many major industrial conglomerates in Bangladesh.170
It's also been a major support for small businesses throughout Bangladesh, investing about £1.537 billion171 in
80,000 Small and Medium Enterprises. More than 45% of its total investment has been in industrial projects,
including 584 garments, 337 textiles, 203 steel and engineering, 36 pharmaceuticals and chemical, 157 printing and
packaging, 63 filling stations, 483 rice mills, 50 beverage, 9 cement industries, 8 electric power industries, 13 jute, and
161 chemical industries, and 100 other industries.172
Source of Tax Revenue & Employment:
Islami Bank is also the top tax paying financial institution to the government173, paying about £70 million in tax and
duties in 2011 and again in 2012. The bank claims to have created jobs indirectly for 2.5 million people through its
investment schemes, while more than 12,000 people are directly employed. It is said that 7% of total investment in
agriculture and agro-industries in Bangladesh has been made by Islami Bank, which alone reportedly imports about
65% of total private sector fertiliser in the country.174
Politics:
Today Islami Bank is so entrenched and powerful that many believe there's no way the government could take it over,
allow it to fail or close it down. Indeed it's not clear how heavily intertwined Islami Bank and Bangladesh Bank are
through the purchase of bonds.175
The continued link with influential Gulf investors also gives Islami Bank a strong degree of international
protection from state intervention.
There have been reports that calls by the Shahbagh protestors for investors to remove their deposits from Islami
Bank might have caused an unusual number of withdrawals. One newspaper report in February 2013 said hundreds
of customers had closed their accounts in one day in Netrokona.176 Islami Bank says deposits continued to grow but a
few small savers (maybe 10,000 they say) did withdraw their money. Overall in February and March 2013 the bank
says there were 200,000 new accounts opened, despite the agitation against them.
Some 10-15 (of a total of 276 nationwide) Islami Bank branches were attacked177 by mobs throwing stones and
breaking windows, according to Islami Bank, and one ATM booth was set on fire near Shahbagh Square and another
near the Sonargaon Hotel in Dhaka (out of a total of 300 Islami Bank machines and a wider joint network of 1200).
Jamaat sympathisers say neighbouring shopkeepers organised teams to defend the branches from attack.
There have also been reports that three Kuwaiti institutional investors178 (together accounting for 15% of stock)
were seeking to sell their shareholding in Islami Bank and had written to the Bangladeshi Foreign Ministry asking
about the procedures to be followed.179 The bank denied this and a week later a representative for all three Kuwaiti
investors was reported as saying he was "proud to be a shareholder of a leading bank that runs under Sharia law".180
In April 2013 the Bangladeshi media reported that foreign banks in the US and UK were not accepting export
documents from Islami Bank and that the main garment export body (BGMEA) had met the Central Bank to discuss
the issue because it was causing problems for its members.181 It wasn't clear if this was because of the 2012 US
Treasury report into HSBC (see below) or because of the Shahbagh protestors' call for action against Islami Bank over
its alleged connections with Jamaat-e-Islami. The reports said HSBC USA, CitiBank and Bank of America had
stopped transactions after the 2012 US Treasury Report came out.182 Deputy Managing Director of Islami Bank,
Shamsul Haque, said the problems with letters of credit might be to avoid by association any stigma of links to
terrorism, but dismissed such allegations as media propaganda.
Jamaat sympathisers say the Bangladeshi government should have done more to defend the country's biggest
private bank when it came under attack.
The common assumption amongst many in Bangladesh is that money from the bank is filtered directly to the
political party but bank officials quite rightly argue that they are audited by the Central Bank and have
responsibilities to their shareholders making this impossible. Islami Bank was put under the special scrutiny of the
POLITICAL
ISLAM
57
Bangladesh Bank (from 2010)183 as tension mounted between the Awami League government and Jamaat-e-Islami.
Some have questioned how effective central bank regulation is; economists say staff at the Bangladesh Bank have
failed to find anything incriminating and are scared of taking on a bank which has political links to a party that could
be back in government again one day.
In 2011 Bangladesh's State Minister for Home Affairs alleged that an intelligence report had found Islami Bank
spent 8% of its profit184 (from zakat funds) on financing militancy. Islami Bank denied the report and asked why the
government didn't close them down if it were true.185 Given the size of Islami Bank in the economy this would be
impossible in practice.
2012 US Treasury Report:
In July 2012 the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations issued a report entitled, "U.S. Vulnerabilities to Money
Laundering, Drugs, and Terrorist Financing: HSBC Case History". This examined vulnerability to money laundering
and terrorist financing risks when a global bank uses its US affiliate to offer US dollar services to other banks around
the world. It had sections focusing on Al Rajhi Bank in Saudi Arabia, Islami Bank Bangladesh and Social Islami Bank
in Bangladesh. There is no connection between Islami Bank and Social Islami Bank.
Islami Bank Diagram: Islami Bank Bangladesh and the US Treasury Report
37% of share owned by Al Rajhi Bank of Saudi Arabia says US Senate Report through their ownership of
Arabsas Travel & Tourist Agency, 9.999%; Janab Yousif Abdullah Abdul Aziz Al-Rajhi, 9.936%; Al-Rajhi
Company for Industry & Trade, 9.94%; Abdullah Abdul Aziz Al-Rajhi, 7.58%. This same family has major
controlling interest within Al-Rajhi bank.”
IBBL denies Al Rajhi Bank owns shares, saying together M/S Arabsas Travel and Tourist Agency, M/S Al
Rajhi Co. for Industry and Trade and 3 individuals having Al Rajhi title, hold about 28.72% of the shares in the
Bank.
2010 Bangladesh Bank appointed a
monitor to check its transactions.
April 2013 Media reports say
Bangladesh Bank opened a new wing to
strengthen its surveillance of Islamic
Banks.
Yousif Abdullah Al Rajhi
Vice Chairman, IBBL. 10%
owner of IBBL
according to US Senate Report.
IBBL says Yousif Abdullah Al
Rajhi, is not a shareholder of Al
Rajhi Bank.
Fines
INTERNATIONAL ISLAMIC RELIEF ORGANISATION (IRRO)
2006 US banned its Indonesian and Philippines offices as a
terrorist financer of Al Qaeeda & a senior official, Abd Al
Hamid Sulaiman Al-Mujil. Added to sanctions list for US
companies. Also on 2006 added to UN sanctions list. Named
in the 2002 lawsuit, on behalf of family members of victims
of the September 11, 2001attacks. The law suit failed.
Still Registered with the Bangladesh NGO Bureau
Founded by Abdullah Al Rajhi,
together with brothers Sulaiman,
Mohammed, and the late Saleh.
Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz Al -Rajhi
Foreign director IBBL
Director of Al Rajhi Banking and
Investment Corporation and The
Al Rajhi Bank.
ISLAMI BANK BANGLADESH LTD (IBBL)
Fined 3 times by Bangladesh Bank for
“covering up militant transactions”
says US Senate Report.
IBBL: Says only fined once for late
reporting.
Al Rajhi Bank
Two Accounts given to IIRO by
Islami Bank says US Senate
Report. The Bank froze the
(two) accounts of IIRO when
the organization was added
to the Uni ted Nat ions
sanction list in 2006. (Islami
Bank reply).
Sulaiman bin Abdul Aziz
Al Rajhi one of 4 brothers
who founded Al Rajhi Bank &
senior most executive.
Sulaiman owns 20% of shares of Al Rajhi
Bank and supported Osama bin Laden and
alleged to be an officer of IIRO says US
Senate Report, which adds:“His name
appeared on an internal al Qaeda list of
financial benefactors”.
Revival of
Islamic
Heritage
Society (RIHS)
“One RIHS account was with Islami Bank
Bangladesh and was suspended on requests
from the central bank and intelligence
agencies”.The story says “JMB chief
Rahman also told the media in 2004 that he
got funds from the RIHS”. (Daily Star, 28
March 2006, Kuwait based NGO Using Funds
Despite Gvt ban, Rajshahi).
NOTE: US Senate Report = Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations “U.S. Vulnerabilities to Money Laundering, Drugs, and Terrorist Financing: HSBC
58
POLITICAL
ISLAM
The US Treasury report alleged HSBC Bank USA (known as HBUS) had supplied U.S. dollars to Islami Bank
Bangladesh Ltd. and Social Islami Bank, despite evidence of links to terrorist financing. Both banks flatly denied this.
Islami Bank added that terrorism was "anti-Islamic, anti-state, hateful, immoral and subversive"186. In an interview,
Islami Bank Deputy Managing Director, Shamsul Haque, said HSBC was only one of more than 190 correspondent
banks worldwide. He said JP Morgan still held 3.61% shares in Islami Bank, indicating there was no problem.
The Treasury Report also alleged Al Rajhi Bank and some family members had possible links to terrorism and were
linked to both Bangladeshi banks187. This allegation, the report said, was based on "US government reports, criminal
and civil legal proceedings, and media reports". Al Rajhi Bank issued a statement that said the allegations were
"absolutely false"188 because they were committed to strict adherence to anti-money laundering and anti-terrorism
guidelines.
It's important to note the US Treasury report was not an investigation to substantiate media or other allegations
against Al Rajhi Bank, Islami Bank Bangladesh or Social Islami Bank but rather an inquiry into the practices at HSBC
for managing perceived risk, not actual risk.
Islami Bank reacted to the US report by threatening to file a formal complaint against the US Treasury.189 In May
2013, Islami Bank Deputy Managing Director, Shamsul Haque, said they still planned to engage lawyers to challenge
the US Senate Committee report.
Some of the specific allegations in the US report were:
1. Links of Islami Bank Bangladesh to Al Rajhi Bank of Saudi Arabia
The US Treasury alleged a 37% share of Islami Bank was held by Al Rajhi Bank of Saudi Arabia. This was through:
"…ownership within the following companies: Arabsas Travel & Tourist Agency, 9.999%; Janab
Yousif Abdullah Abdul Aziz Al-Rajhi, 9.936%; Al-Rajhi Company for Industry & Trade, 9.94%;
Abdullah Abdul Aziz Al-Rajhi, 7.58%. This same family has major controlling interest within AlRajhi bank."
This was denied by Islami Bank, which said: "Al-Rajhi Bank is neither a sponsor nor a shareholder of Islami Bank."
But then the statement went on to confirm exactly the same ownership companies the US Treasury report had cited,
but in somewhat lesser shares:
"Institutions and individuals named Al Rajhi Company for Industries and Trade, Arabsas Travels
and Tourist Agency, Abdullah Abdul Aziz Al Rajhi and Yousif Abdullah Al Rajhi of Al Rajhi group,
KSA holds [sic] 27.51 percent share of Islami Bank Bangladesh Limited."190
Strangely the Islami Bank statement goes on to say, "Yousif Abdullah Al Rajhi, Vice Chairman of Islami Bank is not a
shareholder of Al Rajhi Bank" after it's just stated that he holds part of the 27.51% shareholding. In any case he is
clearly closely tied to the bank as its Vice Chairman, whether or not he's a shareholder.
The Bank's denial statement also said, "Reporting Al Rajhi Bank as sponsor of Islami Bank Bangladesh Limited is
not based on facts." However Islami Bank has openly acknowledged that Abdullah Abdul Aziz Al Rajhi is their foreign
director and he is also Director of Al Rajhi Banking and Investment Corporation and the Al Rajhi Bank.191
Sulaiman bin Abdul Aziz Al Rajhi has no shares or post in Islami Bank Bangladesh but he is the senior-most
executive of Al Rajhi Bank. According to the US Treasury report, his name appeared on the 'Golden Chain' list of
wealthy investors. This list came to light in 2002 among seized documents from a raid on the Bosnian offices of the
Benevolence International Foundation - a Saudi based charity banned in the US for its terrorism links. Among the
documents was a scan of a handwritten list of 20 individuals identified as key financial contributors to al Qaeda.
Osama bin Laden reportedly referred to that group of individuals as the "Golden Chain", hence the name.
2. Militants Held Accounts at Islami Bank Bangladesh
The US Treasury report said that in March 2006 Abdur Rahman, chief of the militant group Jamaatul- Mujahideen
of Bangladesh (JMB), was found to have an account at Islami Bank.
On a number of occasions Islami Bank categorically denied that the JMB chief, Abdur Rahman, or his second-incommand, Bangla Bhai, held accounts at the bank. In 2006 they alleged that, "checkbooks [sic] of two other banks,
one in the government sector and the other in the private sector, were also found in the same house." The statement
said someone called Saidur Rahman had legally opened an account abiding by all banking procedures in 1999.192 A
total amount of 450,000 taka (less than £4000) was transferred to the account.193 Later Saidur Rahman's
chequebooks were found with the JMB leader, Abdur Rahman.194
Given the size and reach of Islami Bank it could be argued that it cannot be responsible for all its customers' illegal
behaviour. Shah Abdul Hannan complained of an orchestrated campaign against them and cited reports in the
newspaper Amar Desh195 reporting that seven other banks were under investigation by the Central Bank for terror
POLITICAL
ISLAM
59
financing. He also warned that it was dangerous "to weaken confidence in a bank that is one of the strongest of the
country."196 On behalf of Islami Bank, Shamsul Haque also complained that the JMB leader had been caught with
cheque books from other banks where he had accounts but the media had only focused on an Islami Bank book in his
custody which belonged to another verified individual.
3. Central Bank Action
The US Treasury report quoted HSBC information that an investigation by the Central Bank of Bangladesh had found
that two branches of Islami Bank were engaged in "suspicious transactions" and had therefore urged action against
20 Islami Bank employees. HSBC also believed the Bangladesh Central Bank had issued a "notice of cause" to Islami
Bank "to explain accounts owned by suspected Islamic Militants", and reportedly fined the bank for the third time in
this connection.
Islami Bank denied being fined three times by Bangladesh Bank - saying it was only fined once in 2006 for failure to
report in a timely fashion suspected transactions. It added that whenever Bangladesh Bank made inquiries about
suspected accounts, Islami Bank would follow through by closing them. Shamsul Haque of Islami Bank said these
penalties for lapses were routine and had been imposed more frequently on many other banks. He stressed Islami
Bank was not fined for terror financing but for non-reporting of suspicious transactions on time.
4. Accounts of Islamic Charities Banned in the US
The International Islamic Relief Organisation (IIRO) is a Saudi charity which in 2006 had its branches in Indonesia
and the Philippines and a high ranking official197 designated by the US as terrorist financiers and added to the list of
entities with which US persons are prohibited from doing business. This charity was also named in the 2002 lawsuit,
on behalf of family members of victims of the September 11 2001 attacks. This lawsuit failed. Osama bin Laden's
brother-in-law, Mohammed Jamal Khalifa, is said by HSBC internal reports to have headed the Philippine branch of
the IIRO in the 1990s.
Interestingly, IIRO is still registered with the NGO Bureau in Bangladesh as of 2013.
The US Treasury report cited HSBC internal communications from 2009 that indicated the IIRO had accounts at
Islami Bank. Islami Bank Bangladesh confirmed to the Subcommittee that IIRO had two accounts at the bank,
opened in 1993 and 1994, when IIRO was in good standing.After the IIRO was added to a UN sanctions list in 2006,198
Islami Bank says it froze the accounts and reported them to the Bangladesh Central Bank. In 2010 the Bangladesh
Bank reportedly told Islami Bank to unfreeze the accounts and transfer the accounts to a government owned bank,
BASIC Bank, which it says it did. Islami Bank says it cannot be responsible for auditing NGOs and alleges this charity
had accounts in other mainstream banks in the country but the media only focused on them.
Foundations & Trusts:
There are a range of connected social businesses and charitable trusts that oversee education and medical health
projects, with a strong Islamic tone. Some of the main ones are detailed below but central bankers say they believe
there are myriad smaller trusts with different sources of income that are very difficult to trace.
Islami Bank Foundation
The bank says it spent £21 million199 during the last 30 years on assisting 10 million people working in education,
health, environment, sports, industry, literature, cultural affairs and the relief sector.200.
The Central Bank found in 2009 that Islami Bank spent more (only about £1 million though)201 on Corporate Social
Responsibility than any other bank in the country. The report said Islami Bank had also been helping during natural
disasters, assisting the victims directly as well as giving to government funds. Islami Bank has a scholarship scheme
for students of the Banking & Finance Department of Dhaka University, Chittagong University and Manarat
International University.202 One trustee complained that the recipients were being harassed by the Awami League
government.
Islami Bank recently donated one crore203 taka to Bangladesh's Olympic Association204, which makes it difficult for
the Awami League government to question its generosity, since it is also a beneficiary. The Bank also advertises in
most mainstream newspapers that depend heavily on corporate advertising for their revenue. This may make them
reluctant to criticise Islami bank.
The Islami Bank Foundation runs 10 hospitals nationwide, half of which are large community hospitals and 90%
of the funds are generated internally. According to Shah Abdul Hannan, for the last two years Bangladesh Bank has
availed itself of a provision that allows it to appoint an officer to sit in on the Foundation's board meetings so that it
knows what decisions have been taken. This acts as a sort of protection for the Foundation, he says.
60
POLITICAL
ISLAM
Photo from website of Islami Bank Medical College, Rajshahi
The special projects undertaken by the Islami Bank Foundation include:
1. Islami Bank Hospital
2. Islami Bank Medical College, Rajshahi.205 Rules for students say: "Female students are to wear scarf on their
head" and "Smoking, addiction, gambling and other immoral activities are strictly prohibited".206
3. A Community Hospital.
4. Monoram: Islami Bank Crafts & Fashion
5. Service Centre
6 Islami Bank Institute of Technology
7. Islami Bank International School & College in Dhaka - an English-medium school207
8. Islami Bank Physiotherapy & Disabled Rehab Centre
9. Centre for Development Dialogue10. Bangladesh Sangskritic Kendra (Cultural Centre)
POLITICAL
ISLAM
61
Links Between Ibn Sina Trust and Manarat and Islami Bank
IBN SINA TRUST
IBN SINA TRUST
Mr. Advocate Mujibur Rahman:
Chairman of the Board of
Trustees. He is also the
chairman of the board of
directors of Ibn Sina
Pharmaceutical Industry Ltd.
Commodore (Retd.) Md. Ataur
Rahman: Member of the
Board of Trustees, Chairman
Manarat Trust, Chairman Faisal
Investment Foundation and
founder member of the board
of directors of Ibn Sina
Ex. Chairman of Islami Bank
Bangladesh Ltd.
Ibn Sina
Pharmaceuticals
Manarat Trust
& School and
College
Shah Abdul Hannan: Member
of the Board of Trustees,
Founder member of the board
of directors of Ibn Sina
Pharmaceutical Industry Ltd &
Manarat International School
& College. Ex. Chairman Islami
Bank Bangladesh Ltd.
Islami Bank
Bangladesh
Prof. Abu Naseer Mohammad
Abduz Zaher: Member Finance
of the Board of Trustees,
Chairman of Islami Bank
Bangladesh Ltd., Present
managing director of Ibn Sina
Pharmaceutical Industry Ltd.,
Founder Member of Manarat
62
POLITICAL
ISLAM
Mir Quasem Ali: Member
Admin of the Board of
Trustees, Founder Director of
Rabitat Al Alam Al Islami
Bangladesh. Ex. Vice Chairman
of Islami Bank Bangladesh
Ltd. Member of Islami Bank
Foundation, Founder
Chairman of Fuad Al Khatib
Foundation, Chairman of Agro Industrial Trust (AIT),
Member of the board of directors of Ibn Sina
Prof. Dr. Chowdhury Mahmud
Hasan: Member of the Board
of Trustees.
Prof. Dr. A. K. M. Sadrul Islam:
Member of the Board of
Trustees. Director of Islami
Bank Bangladesh Limited.
Member of the board of
directors of Ibn Sina
Kazi Harun-or-Rashid: Board
Member, Former Chairman
Islami Bank Bangladesh
Limited. Secretary General
Industrial & Business Welfare
Foundation. Member Islami
Bank foundation, Member
Islami Bank Medical College
Dr. Miah Mohammad Ayub: Board Member. Retired
Secretary of Bangladesh Government.
Hospitals and Clinics:
The Ibn Sina Trust
This was started by Mir Qasem Ali (Jamaat Executive Committee member, accused of war crimes) and the first Saudi
Ambassador to Bangladesh, the late208 Dr. Abdul Hameed Fouad al Khateeb.209
It started with only one diagnostic centre that developed into a clinic and later one of the best-known hospitals in
the country, with a Medical College for a thousand students.210 Some of the more profitable medical ventures, like a
fully-fledged imaging centre, help fund the charity work. The Ibn Sina Trust is required to spend 25% of its income on
charity. This involves exempting the poor from paying fees, offering scholarships, institutes to help widows and
income generating projects. S.A. Hannan, who is a trustee, said there was little government interference in this area.
Education:
Manarat Trust
This began in 1979 with the establishment of an English-medium Kindergarten School. The Trust's current
Chairman is Shah Abdul Hannan and it runs an English-medium school, college and university (established in 2001)
with 4000 students. The emphasis is on academic achievement but "in a moral environment" combined with Arabic
and Islamic Studies. The Trust is careful to recruit teachers who are "Islamic minded" and can "inculcate the right
sort of values into the children and protect them from immorality on the Internet, TV or through mobile
telecommunication", says S. A. Hannan. The Manarat International University states its mission is "the
advancement of knowledge with cosmic blend of Islam"[sic].211
The Bangladesh Institute of Islamic Thought
This has designed 50 university courses that stress Islamic values and prepared textbooks for teachers. These are not
sponsored by the Bangladesh government but teachers are free to use them as a resource. This was founded by Shah
Abdul Hannan.
University Links
Several Jamaat sympathisers also sit on the boards of major Bangladeshi universities:
University Boards of Trustees: Possible Links with Jamaat-e-Islami212
International Islamic University, Chittagong, 10-member board.
Chairperson is A. N. M. Shamsul Islam, Jamaat-e-Islami Ameer of Chittagong City and an MP, who is also an
adviser for a coaching centre for students run by Jamaat's student wing.
Board Member: Maulana Md. Abu Taheris, alleged to be close to Jamaat.
Manarat International University, 10-member board.
Chairman is Shah Abdul Hannan who is closely involved with Jamaat-e-Islami, Islami Bank etc.
Member: Professor A.N.M.A. Zaher, who is involved in Islami Bank and Ibn Sina Pharmaceuticals.
Islamic University (Syndicate), Government-run, 7-member board.
Member: Kamaluddin Abdullah Zafree is a Jamaat cleric and editor of their monthly magazine Medina.
Islami Bank Medical College Rajshahi, 12-member board.
Chairman: Professor A.N.M.A. Zaher, who is involved in Islami Bank and Ibn Sina Pharmaceuticals.
POLITICAL
ISLAM
63
Islamist Media Scene
By Kamal Ahmad
The National Press Club
Jamaat-e-Islami has a more organised presence in the media than any of the other parties, even those that have been
in government. Quite a few party activists have taken up journalism as their main profession. This has helped
Jamaat leaders get access to institutions like the National Press Club. Two top Jamaat leaders - Quader Mollah and
Kamruzzaman - now on trial for war crimes were members of the Press Club.213 This strong presence gave Jamaat
leverage. The party, for example, managed to get the pro-Awami League union leader, Iqbal Sobhan Chowdhury, to
support Golam Azam's citizenship in exchange for Jamaat votes for his leadership bid within the journalists' union.
Newspapers214
Daily Sangram: This is the oldest party newspaper, which has been in circulation since the Pakistan era with a break
for a few years after 1971 until the General Zia period, when Jamaat was revived as a political party. Sangram's
readership is largely party members and supporters. No reliable circulation figures are available. Sangram has its
own printing facility, which other dailies do not have.
Daily Naya Diganta: This was launched during the final years of the BNP-led alliance.215 Naya Diganta has a wider
readership base than Daily Sangram, which supports the idea of Bangladesh as an Islamic nation. According to
government statistics of 2011, Naya Diganta had a circulation of 115,000 and was among the top ten newspapers.216
Weekly Sonar Bangla: This weekly is largely an organisational newsletter of Jamaat and its sister organisations.
Children's magazines: There are several pro-Jamaat children's magazines, including Phulkurir Asor, Kishore
Kantho.
TV channels
Diganta TV: This satellite channel got its broadcasting licence during the BNP alliance government and came into
operation during the military-backed interim government. The main architect and majority shareholder of both
Diganta TV and Dainik Naya Diganta is Mir Qassem Ali, one of the accused in the war crimes trial. Mr Ali is also
heavily involved in other Jamaat businesses.
Islamic TV: The majority shareholder of this channel was Khaleda Zia's late brother, Sayeed Iskander, and some of
his batch-mates in the army, but its editorial leadership is in the hands of Jamaat. It has a very limited audience base.
Online
Jamaat has a very strong presence on the Internet, which indicates strategic thinking, advance planning and
meticulous execution. Both Jamaat and its student organisation Islami Chhatra Shibir have their own websites217,
which are constantly updated despite the fact that their offices have been no-go areas for about a year. They appear
to have deployed skilled IT people at a number of safe houses to run their clandestine web operations.
The style of language used in all the various platforms is popular and plain Bengali. In some instances where the
original content is in Arabic or English they provide a translation.
Jamaat activists also have several other websites for communicating amongst themselves and running publicity
campaigns. The "free Jamaat leaders" site218 for example gives news and campaign information to party loyalists
about the war crimes trial and reports on international support for their cause.
Blogosphere
Jamaat and Shibir supporters are extremely active, with several blogging sites. Some sites, especially those using
WordPress, are maintained abroad, including in the United Kingdom and Turkey.
Some Shahbagh bloggers have alleged that some of their fellow bloggers on prominent Bengali blogsites are
Jamaat supporters. Such allegations were levelled against the blogging platform "Somewhere in Blog", which caters
to everyone who accepts the spirit of the Liberation War. Some liberal bloggers who questioned the tactics of the
Shahbagh movement found themselves denounced as Jamaat supporters, as did the founder and editorial team of
"Somewhere in Blog". Staff from "Somewhere in Blog" held a news conference to deny these accusations.
64
POLITICAL
ISLAM
One of the most popular Jamaat blogs is "Basherkella". A screenshot of its Facebook page gives its address as 48/1
Purana Paltan, which is the Dhaka city office of Jamaat-e-Islami.
Basherkella Screenshot Showing Registration to Address of Jamaat-e-Islami Party Office
According to the traffic-auditing site, Socialbakers.com, Basherkella's219 Facebook Page attracts more than
123,000 fans and 90% of its traffic is from within Bangladesh. It's alleged that this site used doctored pictures and
screenshots from a bogus blogsite called "Nooranichanpa" in order to malign the assassinated blogger, Rajib Haider,
as an atheist and blasphemer.220 The authorities in Bangladesh closed down Basherkella, but it moved to Facebook
and even after its first Facebook page was closed down, it opened a second Facebook page called "New Basherkella".
Social Media Networks:
Jamaat and Shibir activists seem to be way ahead of other political parties in terms of exploiting the full potential of
social media networks. Most of the content is highly political, calling for the removal of the Awami League
government. However, they quickly adapt their message to the rapidly changing political scenario. For example, at
the beginning, their message was focused on the alleged victimisation of Jamaat leaders. After the BNP-led alliance
expressed its opposition to the Shahbag movement they have tried to broaden their political message. When
Hefajate Islam came to the forefront, these platforms started to emphasise the need to defend Islam without pushing
any particular political party.
There are dozens of Facebook groups - some closed and some open - and Facebook pages created by JamaatShibir activists.221 Some examples are given below:
NewBasherkella222 was started in January 2013 after the Bangladeshi regulators shut down the main Facebook site
Basherkella. Since then this site has become their main Facebook forum. It carries news updates almost
instantaneously from all over Bangladesh with video footage and pictures and has a huge following. It also has a
video channel on YouTube.223
MediaWatchBangladeshhas 74,567 likes.224
It was started in December 2012 and is run by Shibir supporters judging by its content. It's updated very speedily.
Typical is a post about the alleged torture of the Shibir president during police remand, posted on Sunday April 7,
2013. This claims that the police are administering injections to revive him because he has been fainting frequently
due to torture. The site also posts summaries from defence submissions at the war crimes trial, like one published
within hours of the hearing that quoted the defence lawyers saying not one allegation out of 23 against Golam Azam
had been proven in court.
Islamichhatrashibir225 This page seems to be Shibir's Facebook page and has its office address as 48/1-A Purana
Paltan, 1205 Dhaka, Bangladesh and a contact email of [email protected].
Sommilitoislamimanch226 Launched in February 2013, this promotes hatred of the leaders of the Shahbag
movement, showing some of them with nooses around their necks.
POLITICAL
ISLAM
65
Sommilitoislamimanch Site showing Shahbagh leaders with nooses around their necks.
Twitter
Despite the fact that Twitter is not used heavily by Bangladeshis, Jamaat and Shibir activists have not ignored its
impact, especially among potential audiences in North America and Europe. They have created linked accounts
with Facebook and their blogs. They have promoted Basherkella and Mediawatch, using hashtags such as
#FreeShibirLeader #savebangladesh and #BanglaSpring, though initially they used #shahbagh too.
One social networking analysis site found much of the anti-Shahbagh content seemed to be coming from London,
whereas the pro-Shahbagh material came from Bangladesh and the US. It also discovered that political opponents
on both sides of the divide were using Twitter to try and convince each other of their opinions.227 It found users were
extremely polarized into two camps but both sides referenced stories on Al Jazeera (the orange connecting line).
Visualisation of Twitter Comments, courtesy of Technology and Social Participation Blog.
66
POLITICAL
ISLAM
Chart Showing the hashtags being used by each camp, as of February 2013. Jihadi Sites Targeting Bangladesh
PRO-JAMAAT HASHTAGS
PRO-SHAHBAGH HASHTAGS
awamibrutality
awami
awamileague
syria
politicalpropaganda
they are also talking about different issues like
padma bridge, bdr, amnesty
jamaat
banjamaat
Bangladesh
taliban
shibir
warcriminals
thabababa
Islam
Terrorist
razakar
The pro-jamaat group has more members with a
.
large
twitter follower base
The top links they shared are the genocide archive
of Bangladesh, interactive timeline of Bangladesh
liberation war,and the news about the murder of the blogger.
Jihadi Sites
This appears to be a new development that global jihadi websites are now picking up on the political developments
in Bangladesh and covering stories relating to Jamaat-e-Islami. Surprisingly the most fanatical blog - qitaltube228 (qital literally means the Killer) is based in the United Kingdom. This one is the most extreme, and perhaps most
liable to prosecution under UK anti-terrorism laws. It also has hyperlinks to other blogsites - some of which are jihadi
but some that just preach Islam.
Interestingly the ban on YouTube in Bangladesh (because of the site's hosting of the film "The Innocence of
Muslims") seems to have had little effect because jihadi sites offer free unblocking software.
Three Screenshots from Qitaltube Site.
Interestingly the ban on YouTube in Bangladesh (because of the site's hosting of the film "The Innocence of
Muslims") seems to have had little effect because jihadi sites offer free unblocking software.
POLITICAL
ISLAM
67
There is no evidence of this site having a direct link to Islamic political parties such as Jamaat-e-Islami but it does
carry videos of police action against Jamaat supporters. There is also a great deal of propaganda material against the
Shahbagh bloggers and the Awami League government.
This has a call to the Bangladesh Army to remove the Prime Minister, Sheikh Hasina, from power
Caption Translation: ' Should we be begging endlessly to a government which is the agent of oppressive Jews and
Christians?'
68
POLITICAL
ISLAM
Another radical site is furqanmedia,228 which is described as relatively popular in Dhaka by Alexa's ratings.230 It has
instructions to Jamaat and Shibir activists on how to tackle atheists and the enemies of Islam who have slandered the
Prophet and it has pictures of leading secular intellectuals like Shahriar Kabir and Zafar Iqbal. One story231 calls for
the taking up of arms instead of calling hartal. Another has instructions for jihad against people who insult the
Prophet.232
Caption says "Punishment according to Sharia law for blasphemers against the Prophet Mohammad and Advice
for Shibir (Jamaat Student wing).
This screenshot says, "scrap all law and implement divine rules"
POLITICAL
ISLAM
69
Pro-Jamaat content is also being spread by some pan-Islamic blogsites like mujadideenmedia233 or "Voice of
Jihad" as it calls itself. This site is linked to Al-Qaeda through the American born Yemeni jihadi cleric, Anwar AlAwlaki, who spent two years in England during which he lectured at the East London mosque. The site includes
photos of jihadi fighters in Syria.234
This screenshot calls both the governments of Sheikh Hasina and Khaleda Zia anti-islamic. There is an audio link,
which has a sermon explaining their view of these two ladies. TRANSLATION: "Why are Hasina, Khaleda and other
democratic governments in this country tyrants?'235
Elsewhere the site has a section on military training,236 which links to a page on qitalmedia,237 where the banner
sports a picture of Osama bin Laden. Qitalmedia also has a section on Internet security,238 which has links to advice
on how to set up a hard disc partition.
Islameralo239 is another Jihadi site with a video compilation of police brutality against Jamaat supporters as well as
a Bengali version of Anwar al Awlaki's lectures.240
A video compilation of police brutality against Jamaat supporters, Islameralo Site.
70
POLITICAL
ISLAM
Dawahilallah241 appears to originate in Turkey but carries content in Bengali aimed at Bangladeshis. It calls for
Jihad and cites the Hadith on subjects such as what citizens should do when rulers defy Allah and religious edicts. It
also calls for the annihilation of the atheists of Shahbag.242
The alhittin.com243 site appears to be a pan-Islamic site with country-specific pages. Its content on Bangladesh
includes allegations that the murdered blogger Rajib created content that was against the Prophet and it translates
into English some of these alleged writings, which Rajib's friends and family say are not actually his but planted on
his blog after his death. According to the Alexa rating agency this site has an audience spread throughout Europe
with a good penetration in Sweden.244 In recent years there has been significant migration of young Bangladeshis to
Sweden.
POLITICAL
ISLAM
71
Chhatra Shibir - the Student Wing
The student wing of Jamaat has a separate structure and election system from the mainstream party, but is identical
in philosophy. Its five main activities are: proselytising, organising, training, addressing student problems and
establishing Islamic social values.245 According to Jamaat figures, Shibir has about 5000 rukan or full members and
about half a million workers. Shibir is not open to non-Muslim members like Jamaat-e-Islami.
The party acknowledges the frustration felt by many regarding Bangladesh's political instability and offers Islam
as the solution: "The root cause of all the unrest prevailing in the present day lies in the indifference of men to the
divine guidance, and the only means to remove this misery is that mankind live in accordance with the Islamic way of
life."246
The Central President of Shibir is Delawar Hossein, whose curriculum vitae includes a section called "Life in Jail"; he is
in jail at the time of writing247 on what he says are politically motivated charges brought against him by the Awami League
government.248 Interestingly he studied at Rajshahi University, while his Secretary General, Muhammad Abdul Zabbar,
studied at Chittagong University - the two big Shibir strongholds. Zabbar's earlier education was in an alia madrasa.
At Rajshahi University academics say not more than 15% of students are Chhatra Shibir members but they can
influence others and are very well organised. The Chhatra Dal (BNP) is the biggest student party on campus249 . Hundreds
of Shibir students are currently not able to enter the campus, so their studies are stalled and they are trying to enrol in
private universities with the help of their party. They can miss one year's studies but no more than that.
Chhatra Shibir Structure
CHHATRA SHIBIR STRUCTURE
CENTRAL PRESIDENT
Elected by members for 1 year term.
EXECUTIVE COUNCIL
CITIES/
DISTRICTS
Chaired by Central President and comprises
35-40 people. Term is 1 year and expires
31 Dec.
SECRETARIAT
UPAZILA
Run by Secretary General
MEMBERS
Countrywide approx 5000. A Branch has on average 50
members, minimim 2. The Unit President is elected
annually.
UNION
COUNCILS
WARD/
VILLAGES
72
ASSOCIATE MEMBERS
A Branch has on average 4000 Associates. President of
Associate Unit is elected annually.
If the Central President and the Council disagree
then the Council’s view prevails.
Each representative is elected by 110 members.
The Central President can if he wants nominate
up to 1/3 of the members as well as up to 2 from
the ex-members. Vacant seats must be filled
within 3 months. 2 general sessions must be
convened year. 1/3 quorum needed. Operates
by majority vote.
The Secretariat answers to the
Central President.
To become a member there is an oath of allegiance
(biyah) to participate actively & be loyal. And 75
books to study as well as personal report cards
to fill in.
An associate member has to pass an oral test on a list
of 50 booklets on the required reading list focusing on
Koran studies, Hadith and political economy.
WORKERS
To become a volunteer it’s necessary to attend meetings,
keep personal records on one’s religious activities, preach
Islam and make donations.
SUPPORTERS
A supporter merely has to state that
he will support Shibir.
POLITICAL
ISLAM
Exam Coaching Centres
These are centres that give students tips and tutoring to pass university entrance exams. Later they can assist
students applying for foreign study. Many of the top centres appear to be linked with Jamaat-e-Islami's student wing.
This would help their members do well in exams and also afford opportunities to recruit non-Jamaat students.
FOCUS Coaching Centre, Dhaka: The current chief adviser is Dr. Chowdhury Mahmud Hasan, the Vice Chancellor
of Manarat International University, which was started by Jamaat sympathisers.
RETINA Medical and Dental Admission Coaching, Dhaka: This was established by the former President of Chhatra
Shibir at Dhaka Medical College, Shorab Hossain.
CONCRETE Coaching Centre, Dhaka: Specialises in engineering admissions. Established by Chhatra Shibir
leaders in 2007 and now run by Bangladesh University of Engineering and Technology and Chittagong University of
Engineering and Technology Shibir units. Its prospectus says its director-general is the President of BUET Shibir
Unit, his deputy is the President of BUET Shibir Unit and the managing director is the General Secretary, BUET Shibir
Unit.
PROBAHO Coaching Centre: Specialises in public university admission. It is run by the ex office secretary of the
Chittagong City wing of Chhatra Shibir, Nazimuddin.
INDEX Coaching Centre: Specializes in admissions to Chittagong University. The President and General Secretary
of Chittagong University Chhatra Shibir Unit are the Chief Director and Assistant Director respectively. Jamaat-eIslami MP for Satkhania, Shamsul Islam, is an advisor.
OPTIMUM Coaching Centre: For Dhaka University of Engineering and Technology. Gazipur District President of
Chhatra Shibir, Abu Nayeem, runs it.
RADIUM Coaching Centre: One of the directors is the president of Sylhet Shahajalal University Chhatra Shibir
Unit and another is the General Secretary of the same Shibir Unit.
RADAR Coaching Centre: Mainly run by Jessore City Shibir President, Secretary and Publicity Secretary
CONTEST Coaching Centre: Established in 1988 in Rajshahi University by the local Shibir unit.
The following centres are also alleged to be run by Shibir: Radiant Centre in Khulna and Success Centre at the
Islami University.
Profile of a Shibir Activist:
Abul250 comes from a family that is devout but not connected to Jamaat e Islami. His father runs a business importing stationery; he's the eldest child, with one
brother and one sister.
The contact first starts when he's fifteen years old. An older boy befriends him during football and cricket games and takes him to pray in the local mosque. Abul
is invited to weekly Quran recitation classes, known as Study Circles.
The classes examine the economic, political and social system of Islam. One week might be devoted to the Prophet's sayings, or hadith, another might explain
how to preach to other students or collect charitable donations. They study books by each reading a chapter and then making a presentation on its contents to the
others in the group.
Gradually Abul understands that he has fallen in with Chhatra Shibir activists.
"When I first came to know that they are Shibir, my other friends warned me not to join them because they are radicals and terrorists. I was a bit afraid," he
admits.
Abul's parents are furious when they find out he's involved with Chhatra Shibir. "They even threatened to expel me from home, though I don't think they really
meant it," he says adding, "they didn't want me to risk my life by getting involved in politics." Abul decides to improve his school grades to win over his parents. He
also tries preaching, telling them how Islam is a complete code of life and must therefore shape politics too.
Gradually Abul wins round his mother, who begins to agree with his philosophy but still objects to her son being involved in Islamic politics. Abul's father
remains staunch in his opposition, convinced that Chhatra Shibir activists are merely seeking power. There are many family quarrels.
Abul can't be a full member while in school - the party's Constitution prohibits anyone under Class 10 taking part in processions or street protests. He tries hard to
recruit his younger brother but fails. His sister is more susceptible and they watch videos of Islamic lectures from preachers in Britain and America together.
Abul finishes school and joins college and isn't active in Shibir for a while. The people running the Study Circles don't know about him at first. When he starts at
Dhaka University he finds Chhatra Shibir and joins their research and propaganda wing. The organisation is careful not to jeopardise his studies and leaves him time
to prepare for exams. The BNP-Jamaat coalition is in power and Chhatra Shibir students are relatively free to operate.
When the government changes and the Awami League comes to power, there are constant threats and police raids of the Shibir hostels and offices. From 2010
their central office in Dhaka University is locked and cannot function because of the police presence nearby. Abul lives at home but in the halls of residence Shibir
activists cannot reveal their identity lest the Chhatra League (Awami League student wing) activists catch them and beat them. It becomes really hard to recruit
new members in this intimidating atmosphere – most who join have been previously affiliated with the movement.
Abul says the student party has stopped issuing paper documentation for fear of it being captured; instead they rely on online membership records that are
password protected and use email for communication. Members of the Shibir Central Committee (35- 40 people) and the University Committee (10 people) sleep in
different homes every night to avoid arrest.
POLITICAL
ISLAM
73
Constitutionally Shibir is independent of Jamaat-e-Islami and holds its own leadership elections though it shares the same ideology. Abul says thousands of
Shibir members have not gone on to join Jamaat-e-Islami because the mainstream party's recruitment procedures are inefficient. He believes the Jamaat structure
is too monolithic to accommodate so many people from different backgrounds.251
A Shibir member must leave the party two months after he has completed his or her final degree and ceases to be a student. Many former Shibir members
remain ideologically committed while going into mainstream jobs in academia, the media or business. They have no chain of command but a loose fraternity bound
by a similar outlook on life. They all vote for Jamaat in elections and help the party by providing logistical support and funds. Abul describes these former Shibir
cadres as the recruitment pool for future government secretaries and District Commissioners if Jamaat comes to power.
At Dhaka University Abul works hard for three years to become a full member of Shibir. He is required to keep personal records detailing how many verses of the
Quran he's recited, how many Hadith he's read, his reading of Islamic books, the number of times he went to pray in the mosque, his organisational activities and
academic studies. He fills in a structured report card and emails it to his superiors.
During this time Abul must meticulously observe Islamic precepts in his social life and personal behaviour, showing absolute commitment to prayer and fasting.
Members are tested for their leadership qualities, eloquence and influence over other students. Any kind of relationship with a girl is out of the question, as is
smoking cigarettes, which Chhatra Shibir views as addictive and therefore prohibited by Islam. Also proscribed are violations of Sharia law such as theft,
embezzlement or cheating, as well as any action that could bring the party into disrepute. A transgression is reported to the branch president, who informs the
Central Committee which is empowered to investigate and expel anyone found guilty.
An associate member takes an oath of loyalty to become a full member, swearing not to have any dealings with any organisation against the aims and objective
of Shibir. Only Chhatra Shibir insiders are allowed to be present at the oath taking ceremony. It's conducted by a Central Committee member and is religious in
nature, with participants undertaking ritual purification first, as if they were going to pray.
"I was overwhelmed with emotion at the oath taking; I burst out crying," says Abul. He recited a verse of the Quran which says, "Verily my life, my death, my
prayers, my ceremonial sacrifice are all for God."
The preamble to the Shibir Constitution says the mission is to spread Islam throughout the world, but Abul believes that as he's in Bangladesh his primary
objective is to spread it in his own country. He sees Shibir as the party closest to Islam and the middle path between the more radical militant Islamic groups and the
secular political parties. He stresses that Shibir, unlike the militant groups, accepts the democratic process.
Arrests
No precise numbers exist for how many Jamaat and Shibir activists have been arrested but it's clear there's been a
crackdown. Most of the central leaders of the student wing are in jail. This makes it very difficult to meet any party
members because they're either in jail or in hiding; only the pro-Jamaat lawyers involved in the war crimes trial are
considered safe from arrest and can safely meet journalists.
Jamaat sympathisers say between 2012 and May 2013, between 30-40,000 of their activists have been arrested but
of those 20,000 have been released. Many activists are re-arrested at the jail gate. What's upset Jamaat is that for the
first time its women leaders are also being arrested, including the wives of senior leaders.
Jamaat claims it's not paralysed by having its top leaders in jail on trial. They say there are 30-40 mid ranking
leaders who are running the movement while half in hiding. The top leaders have also been able to smuggle several
letters out of jail while on trial for war crimes.252 However, a senior police official described Jamaat and Shibir as "a
corporate organisation" that finds it difficult to replace its top leaders.
The case study below shows how the innocent can easily get caught up in the sweeping police operations against
Jamaat. It also reveals how meticulous Jamaat is as a party in caring for its detained cadres. The police say they try to
identify genuine Shibir activists but it can be difficult to get what they call "quality arrests".
Case Study
Hannan Sheikh, aged 16 years.
Male garment worker
I studied up to Class 6.253 I live in Dhaka city. I worked in a garment factory in Mirpur. I joined this
garment factory in 2011 as a 'helper.' Over the past years I have been promoted to assistant operator of
an embroidery machine. My current wage is Tk 5,000 per month. Every month I work on day shifts for
fifteen days and rest fifteen days and I work on night shift.
I had worked the night shift on 13 February 2013. I returned home from the factory after finishing
my work at 9am on February 14. I took a bath, ate my breakfast and went to sleep. I woke up and
decided to go for a walk as it was Valentine's Day. My mother asked me to stay at home and sleep some
more. I ignored her. I went out after 11am. First I went to my paternal aunt's home, which was close to
my factory. I spent an hour there.
74
POLITICAL
ISLAM
When I left my aunt's home I wanted to walk a bit on the road and thought about going to the
factory area to meet some colleagues. On my way there I met my friend Kalu. We were chatting on the
roadside. Suddenly a police van drove in and parked near us. A few other police vehicles also parked
behind the first police van. A policeman asked us, "What are you doing here?" We replied, "We are just
talking here." He said, "Don't you know there is a protest programme by Shibir today?" We replied, "No
sir, we are just standing here and talking as today is Valentine's Day." One policeman with a harsh
voice said, "You don't know about it, do you? You people are Shibir activists." At that time, some
policemen suddenly started beating us up with hard wooden sticks254 and hockey sticks. After beating
us for five to ten minutes they forced us into a police van.
There were other people in that place. There were vehicles moving on the road. The policemen
randomly picked up some more people from the same spot, labelling them Shibir men. There were
rickshaw pullers, students and ordinary people but the police picked them, calling them Shibir
activists. One policeman forced us to give our mobile phones to them and I handed it over. After
detaining as many people as possible from that spot, the police van took us to the police station at
Mirpur Section-2. We were all taken in front of the lock-up inside the police station. Some policemen
told us to go into the lock-up but the door of the lock-up was not open and we were stuck. The
policemen continuously told us to go inside and started beating us with wooden sticks and hockey
sticks.
In the meantime some policemen took down our names and fathers' names in a notebook. It was
late afternoon. After beating us for some time, a policeman opened the lock-up door and pushed us
inside. About two hours later, a policeman came and started to call the detainees by name one after
another and took them away. When my turn came, I was taken to a room where a police officer was
sitting. He asked me, "Are you an activist of Shibir?" I said, "No." I told them, "I am a garment worker."
But that officer did not believe me. He kept on asking the same question and also asked me to name
other Shibir activists and identify their locations. I kept on saying I wasn't a Shibir activist and didn't
have the slightest idea about Shibir, so the policeman sent me back to the lock-up. I was kept in the cell
at the police station for three days. They didn't beat me up any more but I couldn't contact my parents
as the policemen had taken away my mobile phone. Other detainees had the same problem.
But those detainees who promised to give large bribes to release them right away got the chance to
contact their family members using the mobile phone belonging to a policeman. Many of the
detainees called their families from the policeman's mobile phone and their relatives came to the
police station quickly and gave money to the police. Then police released those people. They said I
could contact my parents if they were willing to come with money. But I told them I was from a poor
family. My parents can't give money to buy my release. I saw other detainees bribing the police with
sums ranging from Tk 20,000 to Tk 50,000.
On the night of February 14 and even the following two days, the police brought many other people
to the police station as suspected Shibir men. So far as I can remember two students were brought on
one night from their mess, who admitted to me privately that they were involved with Shibir politics.
In the meantime, my father somehow came to know that I was in Mirpur police station, so he came to
see me on the night of February 16. He gave a small amount of money to the policemen to allow him to
see me. He brought me some food and clothes. He requested the police to release me but they refused,
saying I was implicated in a case of violence by Jamaat-Shibir men.
The police also told my father that their hands were tied as they were doing everything according to
instructions from high-ups of the government. But we know nothing about the "high-ups". On
February 17 I was produced before a Dhaka court along with 12 other people arrested as suspected
"Shibir men". The police asked the court to grant them remand to interrogate us. The court granted
them three days remand for me. They again took me to the police station and I was there for three days.
A police officer interrogated me and said, "Tell me the truth, are you a Shibir activist?" I said, "No." I
told them I am a garment worker and I have proof of that. They kept me in the lock-up for three days,
didn't ask anything else, and didn't beat me up. The police gave us food three times a day.
After three days in police remand we were again produced before the same court and at that time the
court sent me to jail as the police did not want to interrogate me further. I was sent to Dhaka Central
Jail. I was kept there for seven days and then I was sent to Kashimpur prison in Gazipur. I was in
Kashimpur jail for one month and eight days. In total I was in jail for one and a half months. During
this time I was produced before the court on several occasions.
My father somehow managed to find a lawyer to make representation in court to release me on bail.
But the bail request was refused initially. But after one and a half months I was released as the lawyer
POLITICAL
ISLAM
75
obtained bail from the court. My father produced evidence to prove that I was a garment worker and a
minor.
When I was taken to court on several occasions, the police kept us in the lock-up at the court
premises255 with many other arrested people who were brought from different police stations to be
produced before the court. I saw some Jamaat-e-Islami and Islami Chhatra Shibir leaders getting
round the security guys at the lock-up at the court premises to give packets of Biriyani to their arrested
party men. Jamaat and Shibir leaders were maintaining a log of their arrested party members and
which ones would be produced before the court on which date. Based on their log they distributed the
food packets. Every time I was in the court's custody I saw security men distributing packets of Biriyani
among the Jamaat-Shibir men there.
The security personnel received a list of recipients along with the food parcels given to them by
Jamaat-Shibir leaders. I saw them distributing more than 100 packets of Biriyani along with bottles of
drinking water, every time I was taken there. If I were a Shibir man, I would have received Biriyani
packets from them. But they never gave me a single packet of Biriyani. Rather, on the very first day in
court custody, when I showed interest in having a Biriyani packet, the distributors told me not to touch
these packets as these were only for Jamaat and Shibir men. When I was in Kashimpur jail, I was in a
cell with people accused of murder and robbery. There were some Jamaat and Shibir men there too. I
spoke to a few of them. They told me they were involved with Shibir. I asked them why do they do this
politics? They told me, "They are on the path of Allah. It does not matter if they lose their life."Some of
them also told me that their parents were also involved with Jamaat politics. I came to know from
them that their leaders visited them in jail frequently and brought them some food, giving each of the
party members in jail Tk 1,000 per month. If I were a Shibir activist I would have received this money
from them but I did not get anything.
Now I need to appear before the court at regular intervals. It's an unbearable harassment for me and
my poor family. I have returned to work at the same garment factory. But there is still a false case
against me as a suspected Shibir leader. I want to be freed from this false case forever but we do not have
money to spend to fight this case and to pay lawyers.
76
POLITICAL
ISLAM
POLITICAL
ISLAM
77
Hizb ut-Tahrir
Banned in Bangladesh on 22 October 2009 but not banned in the UK
Hizb ut-Tahrir believes in a global caliphate
and not in democracy. Its political agenda is
not only about Bangladesh – it is part of an
international Islamist movement based in
London. It started operating in Bangladesh in
2001. The Dhaka police say Hizb ut-Tahrir has
little support among ordinary people at
present but could represent a potential threat
for the future.
Chhatra Shibir members consider Hizb utTahrir radical and say they've been
approached to join on the grounds that
they're wrong to accept the democratic
process, a parliamentary system, capitalism
and a woman as the head of a political
alliance.
Hizb ut-Tahrir is active among wealthy
urban youth from the business and political
elites in Bangladesh. Their approach is to
convince the top layer of society in the hope
their ideology will filter down; by comparison
Jamaat believes it is a much more grassroots
organisation. Hizb ut-Tahrir is active in
distributing leaflets and posters outside the
private university campuses, despite being a
banned group. It still manages to hold
processions, Study Circles and meetings in
restaurants. Jamaat considers Hizb ut-Tahrir a
challenge to their urban power base.
Interestingly, they say Hizb ut-Tahrir's flag
was visible in the Hefajat protests in May. This
probably only shows how much of a rallying
point the protests became for Islamists of
different ideological shades.
The party is known to have a strong base in
North South University and Dhaka University,
including among female undergraduate
students and some of the teaching staff. Some
academics say Hizb ut-Tahrir has an
emotional appeal for idealistic students who
once would have joined leftist movements.
The party's key person in Bangladesh is a
university professor, Mohiuddin Ahmad, who
studied in Britain and is said to have close ties
to Birmingham.256 He was detained by the last
caretaker government and is still under
special watch.
78
POLITICAL
ISLAM
Hizb ut-Tahrir's comment on the Elections
Islami Oikyo Jote
This is an alliance of small madrasa based parties following the Deobandi School. Their name means "Islamic Unity
Front". It has contested elections as part of the BNP led alliance.
Islami Oikyo Jote Structure
MAJLIS E SHURA
36 members, all male
Policy making body
Elected every 3 years
Chairman & Secretary General lead it.
NATIONAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
Members chosen by Majlis e Shura
61 members (1 is a woman who was elected in
2001-6 and sat on the reserved seats for women in
parliament)
DISTRICT COMMITTEES
CITY COMMITTEE
Minimum 21 members
UPAZILLA OR THANA COUNCIL
MUNICIPALITY COUNCIL
Minimum 19 members
UNION LEVEL
UNION LEVEL
WARD
WARD
POLITICAL
ISLAM
79
Islami Oikyo Jote Component Parties
ISLAMI OIKYA JOTE ALLIANCE
The only IOJ to be registered as a political party. Anti-Awami League. Constitution of IOJ formulated
in consensus with 4 constituent parties who have equal say.
IOJ
IT IS CURRENTLY A 4 PARTY ALLIANCE.
Khilafat-e-Islami
Bangladesh
Bangladesh
Nizami Islami
Party
Farayezi
Andolon
Bangladesh
Jamiat-e-Ulema
Islama
Khelafat
Majlis
Ulema
Committee
Bangladesh
These two parties were part of the IOJ alliance but got registration from the Election Commission
as separate political parties so decided to contest alone. IOJ says it’s not the result of a split and the
6 parties will work together with each other and with the larger 18 party BNP-Jamaat electoral alliance.
IOJ
This is an Awami League creation to confuse. Not registered as a political
party.
Led by Mizbur Rahman, said not to be an Islamic scholar or alim.
Bangladesh
80
POLITICAL
ISLAM
Ahl–e-Hadith Movement
The Ahl-e-Hadith are a minority sect but they are strong in many northern districts of Bangladesh and are thought to
control up to 2000 madrasa.257 Their ideology is important because, though the majority of practitioners are peaceful,
their ideas have been used to underpin the militancy of banned groups like Jamaat ul Mujahideen Bangladesh
(JMB). All the Ahl-e-Hadith organisations, along with hundreds of Bangladeshi ulema, have disassociated
themselves from the violent tactics of the JMB. It's also worth noting both Jamaat and the Islami Oikyo Jote are
doctrinal rivals of the Ahl-e-Hadith movement.
Philosophy:
Followers of this puritanical religious reform movement reject the idea that a Muslim must follow one of the four
established schools of Islamic classical jurisprudence: Hanafi, Shafi'i, Maliki, and Hanbali. They do not regard these
interpretations as legally binding. Instead they believe most religious and legal matters can be prescribed by the
Quran and Hadith. If these texts do not give a clear indication, then they say Muslims should exercise ijtihad
(independent judgment), but guided by the Quran and Hadith. Hadith texts are literally taken as a source of law,
without regard to the context in which the Prophet did or said something. They also place huge emphasis on the
concept of Tawhid (the unity of God) and object strongly to worshipping saints and visiting shrines, regarding this as
idolatry. They deem Sufis un-Islamic.258
Ahl-e-Hadith followers have some distinctive religious practices that may seem minor but are important:
•
They must actually recite the Surah al-Fatiha prayer, whilst for other Muslims it's enough for the Imam to do
it on behalf of the congregation.
•
They raise their hands during the takbir in the ritual prayer, while the Hanafis do not.
•
Ahl-e-Hadith fold their hands on the chest during the standing posture of prayer, while the Hanafis fold their
hands under the navel.
•
Ahl-e-Hadith say "ameen" loudly after the imam recites Surah al-Fatiha, while the Hanafis say it softly.
•
Other differences relating to the "correct postures" during the ritual prayer and to the number of voluntary
units of prayer during Ramadan.
•
Also differences on what would require refreshing the ritual ablution (wadhu) before prayers.
Emergence:
1971: The Jamiyat-e-Ahl-e-Hadith East Pakistan did not take a pro-Pakistan position, though many ulema opposed
Liberation for fear it would damage Muslim unity. A few local Ahl-e-Hadith ulema did join pro-Pakistan militias among them Maulana Abdullah ibn Fazal, the father of the JMB founder, Sheikh Abdur Rahman.
After Liberation, the Ahl-e-Hadith ulema were concerned about secularism and any attempt to remove the
autonomy of the quomi madrasa. The movement remained aloof from party politics until the advent of Dr. Asadullah
Ghalib.
Dr. Ghalib was instrumental in seeing how other religious parties (Jamaat and the Islami Oikyo Jote) had become
power brokers in national politics and he decided not to be left behind. In 1978 he created the Ahl-e-Hadith Jubo
Sangha (AHJS) or youth movement as a power base. In 1994, he split from the Jamiyat-e-Ahl-e-Hadith and created
the Ahl-e-Hadith Andolan, Bangladesh.
Gradually Dr. Ghalib took over as the main representative of the sect in Bangladesh, building up a network of
mosques, madrasas, publishing houses, charities and other organisations funded by Ahl-e-Hadith businessmen. Dr.
Ghalib used his youth wing to mobilise madrasa and university students, whom he felt were being stolen away by
Chhatra Shibir.259 He sent many madrasa graduates to Medina for further studies.
On 23 February 2005 Dr. Ghalib was jailed on charges of involvement in militant activities – charges he denies –
and he was subsequently released in 2008. He is a Professor of Arabic in the University of Rajshahi.
An overwhelming majority of the movement's followers are peaceful and entertain no sympathy for militancy. But
Mumtaz Ahmad260 says Dr Ghalib told him Hafiz Ahmad Saeed of the Laskar-e-Taiba of Pakistan was "an honoured
guest" at the 1997 Ahl-e-Hadith Andolan Bangladesh conference in Rajshahi. Ahmad also says that Dr. Ghalib
collected funds from:
-
Rabita-al-'Alam al-Islami (the World Muslim League) in Saudi Arabia
Al-Harmain Foundation, a Saudi-based NGO, blacklisted by the US in 2004 for funding militancy.
Al-Jamiyat-ul-Ahyah-asaurah al-Islami (Revival of Islamic Heritage Society)261, which is Kuwaiti.
POLITICAL
ISLAM
81
-
82
Al-Jamiyat-ul-Ahya-assunnah (Society for the Revival of the Sunnah of the Prophet), also Kuwaiti.
Other Islamic organisations and NGOs.
Rich Saudi philanthropists.
Al-Tawhid Trust – Saudi and Kuwaiti funds – reportedly built 600 new mosques, five major madrasa and
several orphanages.
Hadith Foundation
POLITICAL
ISLAM
Jamaat ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB)
Banned
Sheikh Abdur Rahman
Born Jamalpur 1959.
Hanged 30 March 2007.
Timeline:
1995: Sheikh Abdur Rahman gains a Masters degree from Medina University, where he is introduced to Salafism.
Madrasa educated in Bangladesh, his father, Abdullah Ibne Fazal, is a well-known Ahl-e-Hadith preacher so he is
accepted easily on his return to Bangladesh. At first he works in import-export and also in the Saudi Embassy.
1996: He decides to pursue jihad inside Bangladesh for the creation of an Islamic state. He is pro-Taliban.
1997: Abdur Rahman visits Pakistan, probably to try and establish links with al Qaeda, but he fails.
1998: Sheikh Abdur Rahman founds the JMB in 1998. It has an office in Dhaka but is underground. He says his plan
initially is to create a strong base in the north of the country and then send delegates out to woo more supporters.
They operate out of mosques which have Ahl-e-Hadith communities based around them. They are not Ahl-e-Hadith
mosques as such, but local people know and they can be recognised from the way they say their prayers, standing
with their legs apart and feet touching the adjacent person.
2004, 1 April: JMB's first operation begins, using the name Jagrata Muslim Janata Bangladesh (JMJB) to confuse
people. They decide to target Naxalites (Sarbahara), who are more dacoit than political and are making local
people's lives hard. This is in three adjacent sub-districts (Baghmara, Raninagar, Noagar) in Rajshahi and close to
Natore. Sheikh Abdur Rahman meets with his party in Mymensingh and decides if they can wipe out the Naxalites
they will win support. However, he realises he needs backing from the party in power and the police, so approaches a
local BNP parliamentarian whose nephew has been killed by the Naxalites. The MP assembles other local politicians
to back the initiative. All of them are linked to the Ahl-e-Hadith movement.
JMB opens three detention camps in three sub-districts. They go to the villages, call a public meeting and
announce that they are there to wipe out extremists. Initially it is very popular and even local Awami League leaders
are supportive.
They read out a list of names and ask those people to surrender to them by a specified date. Some do and have their
weapons seized and are handed over to the police to be prosecuted but there are also vigilante mob killings of people
identified by villagers as Naxalites. The police are silent about this.262
At the end of April the Naxalite leaders have a secret meeting which JMB ffinds out about, so they attack them and
kill their leader, Abdul Quyum Badshah, and hang him head down from a tree to display the corpse.
This is the first time news reports appear naming this group. The Jamaat-e-Islami chief, Motiur Rahman Nizami then a Minister - initially claims that JMB's henchman, Bangla Bhai, is a creation of the media.263
Bangla Bhai (aka Siddiqur Rahman)
Khaleda Zia, visiting Rajshahi Police Academy, calls the three local politicians in tells them the
vigilante violence can't continue. They decide to stop it and send a message to the JMB to cease. The
JMB dismantle their camps, driving away in trucks and dispersing.
At this point the JMB is not banned but is still active underground. Now they start to identify
NGOs as a stumbling block to the Islamisation of the country because of issues such as women
without purdah, usury and pro-Western politics. Short of funds, they start hit and run operations on
the NGOs, stealing motorbikes and cash, looting and attacking their operations.
Feb 2005: JMB is banned.
Aug 2005: The JMB coordinatese 500 bombs in all but one district between 10:30am and 11:30am local time.
The JMB tries to distribute publicity leaflets twice to little avail, so they decide to stage a series of countrywide bomb
attacks. They use sound bombs that don't have nails or splinters in them, only leaflets covered in sawdust, so they
won't be damaged by the blast.264
POLITICAL
ISLAM
83
Attacks on the Legal System
"Aware of the command of Allah and following our obligations to the faith, the Jamaat-ul
Mujahideen Bangladesh rejects the existing judicial system. The Constitution, under which the
country is currently being ruled, is bound to conflict with the rules of Allah." JMB
JMB Insignia
The JMB espouses Sharia law as their main aim for Bangladesh and
preaches that the country's legal system needs dismantling. They
target the judiciary. They assume the government will be supportive
because of the help of the three local politicians previously but the
bombings have put the government under pressure and it starts
arresting JMB activists.
October 2005: The JMB decides to target its three former allies, the
local politicians. It attacks courts in Ghazipur, Chandpur, Chittagong
and Jhalokati.
Nov 2005: Two judges are killed by the JMB in Jhalakathi.
Jan 2006: This is the last known successful attack by the JMB.
March 2006: The JMB leaders are arrested and 520 members
charged.
Feb 2006: Maulana Saidur Rahman takes over as chief of the JMB.
March 30 2007: Sheikh Abdur Rahman and Bangla Bhai are executed along with four others for their role in the
killing of the judges.
26 July 2007: Aminul Haq, a former Rajshahi MP and telecommunications minister in the previous BNP-led
coalition government, is sentenced to 32 years in prison for aiding and abetting JMB.265
2008-9: The authorities launch a second crackdown on the JMB.
Indigenous Group
JMB still has its roots in Bangladeshi society, though all its founding leaders have been executed. It is a homegrown
group, thought to have few links abroad. Initially it was assumed JMB was just a Muslim group and not militant.
Today it has a stronger following than the other main militant group of the 2000s, Harkat-ul-Jihad-Al-Islami (HUJI).
The International Crisis Group (ICG) estimates that at its height JMB had 2000 members but, as of 2010, only about
250 members.
Crisis Group also says JMB has operational ties to Lashkar-e-Toyeba and to al-Muhajiroun, the groups whose
members took part in the London underground bombings of July 2005. There are also reports of some collaboration
between JMB and the Tamiruddin faction of HUJI. It's also believed Sheikh Abdur Rahman tried and failed to
connect with the Taliban in 1996/7, before he formed this party, and then again in 2001 on a second trip to Pakistan.
The assumption is al Qaeda didn't say yes or no.
Women
JMB had about 50 women's groups of about a total of 500 women, mostly wives and sisters, who were not into
militancy but lent support, spread the message and helped recruitment. Today the women's groups are disbanded.
The International Crisis Group reports that marriages to JMB women were a way of cementing ties among the top
leaders.
84
POLITICAL
ISLAM
Dec 2012: Five JMB leaders arrested in Dhaka
Funding
"Money is not a problem,"Ataur Rahman Sunny reported his brother, the JMB founder, telling him when asked how
to fund the 17 August 2005 bombings. Some media reports say JMB received funding from Middle Eastern NGOs
(such as The Revival for Islamic Heritage Society) but local journalists who report on militancy say the likelihood is
JMB doesn't need a lot of money as it doesn't conduct large operations and the explosives they use are mostly home
made bombs and local weapons. Some reports said the bombs they used in 2005 only cost the equivalent of $1 each.
One of the organisation's more bizarre features is a compulsory requirement that every member learn how to pull a
cycle rickshaw so he can earn his own living and learn humility. The International Crisis Group says JMB also
obtained funds from village crop donations, local taxes, donations from people working in the Middle East, and their
control of the hawela or informal money exchange system. Crisis Group says the strongest evidence of JMB's foreign
funding came in June 2005, when two British men of Bangladeshi origin who claimed to be from the organisation alMuhajiroun, paid JMB £10,000 for help in establishing bases for arms production in Bangladesh. Ataur Rahman
Sunny also told interrogators that the JMB leader received money from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Brunei, Sudan,
Pakistan and a variety of Islamic foundations but he could not name the sources.
Connections between JMB and Jamaat
Initial recruits to JMB had Afghan experience but after 2002 many reportedly came from an Ahl-e-Hadith
background, educated in alia madrasa and recruited through local mosques. Journalists covering militancy say
there are no links as such with Jamaat-e-Islami, but some former members of Chhatra Shibir joined JMB. Crisis
Group's 2010 report says Sheikh Abdur Rahman was a radical Shibir member who grew disillusioned with the party's
commitment to work within democratic politics. It's also thought some members were originally Jamaat hardliners
who left because they objected to Jamaat going into a coalition led by a woman.266 Crisis Group says Bangla Bhai was a
mid-level Shibir leader in Rajshahi University but became disillusioned in 1995 when Jamaat embraced democratic
politics and promoted females into the party's leadership. Ataur Rahman Sunny, the head of JMB's military wing,
was also a senior Shibir leader at Kushtia's Islamic University. However this drift of a handful of Jamaat members to
extremism does not imply official links.
In December 2012, the Rapid Action Battalion told the Daily Star that they had arrested five top JMB leaders who
were plotting to attack the country's war crimes trial and said the JMB was in contact with the war criminals.267
POLITICAL
ISLAM
85
Harkat-ul-Jihad-Al-Islami (HUJI)
The police say HUJI is currently in disarray but they may still have people who are lying low. All their main leaders
are in jail. This diagram explains the group's development over time:
HUJI
DEVELOPMENT OF HARKAT--‐UL--‐JIHAD--‐AL ISLAMI BANGLADESH (HUJI--‐B)
PHASE
ONE
PHASE
TWO
SPLIT
HUJI
HUJI
Tamiruddin
50-100 ppl
PHASE
THREE
Sachetan
Islami Janata
(Conscious
Islamic People)
formed
close ties
Cell
in HUJI
(close to LeT) SPLIT
10-15 ppl
Islamic
Gono Andolon
PROPOSED
NEW NAME
never happens
Huji/Harkat ul
Mujahedin
(Hannan Group)
100+ ppl
TIMELINE
1988/9
started by
Afghan war
veterans
30 April1992
officially
launched at
press club to
fight in Arakan
Founder in chief is
Maulana Abdus
Salam
Late 90’s: split because of divisions over whether to establish
Sharia in Bangladesh before Arakan.
Early 2000’s Internal Militant cell formed
Maulana Tajuddin
(escaped abroad in
2006)
Mufti Abdur
Rauf (arrested 2
Aug 2006;
currently on trial)
Mufti Abdul Hannan
close to Maulana Fazlur
Rahman in Pakistan.
Arrested 1 Oct 2005.
On trial currently
Islamic
Democratic
Party
NOT
REGISTERED
2006
2013
17 Oct 2005
Proscribed
2007: Maulana Abdus
Salam claims to have
5000 members. Arrested
23 March 2009 and
currently on trial.
2013: Almost all
leaders arrested.
Less than 2500
members overall.
Source: Tipu Sultan, Prothom Alo Newspaper
86
POLITICAL
ISLAM
Ansarullah Bangla
The Bangladeshi police say this is an emerging extremist group inside the country. Its headquarters is in Yemen and
its members are inspired by the American born Yemeni jihadi cleric, Anwar Al-Awlaki, considered the spiritual leader
of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula until he was killed by a CIA drone in late 2011. Reports say in 2010 Al Awlaki
founded the magazine Inspire, which was read by the Boston bombers.268 According to the Bangladeshi police at least
10 of their nationals were arrested in Yemen between 2009-10 for links with Al-Awlaki.
In 2011 a British Bangladeshi disciple of Al-Awlaki, Rajib Karim, was convicted in Woolwich Crown Court of
plotting to blow up a plane while working as a computer specialist with British Airways.269 Media reports say Awlaki
had emailed Karim asking if it were possible to get a package or person on a flight to the United States. In court the
prosecutor said Karim had links to Jamaat ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB). Press reports said Karim, his brother
Tehezib, and two others had travelled to Yemen to meet Al-Awlaki270 in December 2009. Bangladeshi police believe
Ansarullah Bangla started in 2005 under the umbrella of a hitherto unknown NGO called Research Cooperation
United Development (RCUD) and tried to recruit people for jihad. A Bangladeshi newspaper has reported that
RCUD was a religious research organisation run by Tehezib Karim's father-in-law.
In 2010 a British Bangladeshi woman, Roshonara Choudhry, tried to murder British MP Stephen Timms in
retaliation for his having voted in favour of the Iraq war. She bought two knives for the purpose and had downloaded
sermons by Anwar al-Awlaki.
In 2012 also inspired by Al Awlaki's sermons, a Bangladeshi man, Quazi Mohammad Rezwanul Ahsan Nafis, was
caught as he tried to plant what he thought was a bomb outside the Federal Reserve Bank in Manhattan.271
Various Bengali language jihadi sites, like qitalmedia, have Al-Awlaki's speeches translated but they're not
registered in Bangladesh. The Bangladeshi police say they are struggling because Facebook allegedly won't
cooperate with them if a page is registered outside the country, even though they've made approaches through
Interpol and their own Telecom regulator.
The Bangladeshi police believe Ansarullah Bangla has no organisational structure as such, but operates through
cells of six to seven people and uses the Internet as a manual for operations. They estimate the total number of
members to be around 200, based in Dhaka in the private universities and belonging to wealthy families. The group
is regarded as a potential threat since its members believe it's their individual duty to kill anyone against Islam and
the Prophet and wish to establish Islamic rule. The police say Ansarullah Bangla has prepared a hit list, with detailed
pictures and information about where their targets live. Internationally, the police believe the group's main enemy is
the United States, based on their interview of a suspect arrested in 2011. There are reportedly links between
Ansarullah Bangla and the JMB, according to the latter's arrested leader, Saidur Rahman. After his capture Saidur
Rahman is said to have confessed that he met Ansarullah Bangla and received financial assistance from them in
2008.
The Bangladeshi police also say this al-Qaeda inspired group was responsible for the murder of the blogger
Ahmed Rajib Haider, in Dhaka in February 2013. One of the suspected assailants was an ex-member of the Jamaat
student wing so it looked as if Shibir were involved, but the police say that was misleading. An official said the killers
used machetes for the murder, rather than firearms, because they have a belief that it's similar to using a sword and
therefore more Islamic.272 The assailants are reported to have planned the killing one month in advance, trying to
identify Rajib through Facebook but were initially only able to find a group photograph online which wasn't enough.
From the blogger's Facebook status they knew he was at the Shahbagh protests, say police, and this is how they
located him, following him home on more than one occasion. Rajib was killed outside his home, which was in a
relatively isolated spot. He was hacked in the head, jaw and shoulder before his throat was slit. The police believe the
same killers were involved in an attempt on the life of another blogger, Asif Mohiuddin, in January 2013 – an attack
that also involved machetes.
POLITICAL
ISLAM
87
Bomb Blast List
YEAR
1999
DATE
2002
2003
2004
88
LISTING
SOURCE
SUSPECT
6-Mar
Bomb Blast at Jessore organised by Udichi kills 10
and injures 100+
Ali Riaz list,
Appendix 2,
Islamist Militancy
in Bangladesh.,
Routledge 2008.
HUJI - 1 accused
Daily Star, 26 April 2011. Hui Hideout busted.
Accessed at
8-Oct
Bomb Blast at Ahmadiyya mosque in Khulna, 8
dead, 30 injured
Riaz List
HUJI
Daily Star , 8 Feb 2011, Ahmadiyya Mosque
Bmbing: Mufti Hannan produced in Khulna Court.
planted a 76 kilogram bomb at Sheikh Hasina's
rally venue at Kotalipara in Gopalganj
media
Huji - 1 accused
Daily Star, 26 April 2011. Hui Hideout busted.
20-Jan
Bomb attack on Community Party of Bangladesh
rally, 7 dead, 50 injured in Dhaka
Riaz list
HUJI - 3 men
The New Nation, 15 March 2010, 3 Huji Men held
for CPB Blast, Accessed at
http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P31982844461.html
14-Apr
Bomb attack on Bengali New year celebration in
park in Dhaka kils 10, injures 50
Riaz List
Huji 14 accused
MediaBangladesh.net, Hannan, 13 other Huji men
indicted for Ramna blasts, April 17, 2008,
Accessed at
http://www.mediabangladesh.net/news_details
.php?recordID=1645
3-Jun
Church bombed in Baniarchor in Gopalganj
Riaz list
Huji - 1 remanded
bdnews24, 18 July 2010, Huji Leader Remanded
over Church Bombing, Accessed at http://devbd.bdnews24.com/details.php?id=168277&
cid=3
16-Jun
explosion at Awami League office in Narayanganj,
22 killed.
Riaz List
Huji - 1 remanded
Daily Star, 13 Sept 2009, N'ganj AL Office Bomb
Attack Case Mufti Hannan placed on five-day
remand, Accessed at
http://archive.thedailystar.net/newDesign/newsdetails.php?nid=105622
23-Sep
Bomb attack on Awami League rally at Mollahat in
Bagerhat, 8 killed, 100+ injured
Riaz List
Huji - I remanded
but may be political
attack
Daily Star, 23 Aug 2010, Mufti Hannan remanded
in Bagerhat bomb attack case, Accessed at
26-Sep
Bomb near Awami League meeting in Sunamganj
in North kils 4.
Riaz List
Probabaly Huji
Tippo Sultan, Prothom Alo.
28-Sep
Series of bomb blasts at cinema and circus in
Satkhira, kills 3, wounds 100+
Riaz list
Probably JMB
ditto
6-Dec
mymensingh cinema bombs , kill 27, injured 200+
Riaz list
JMB - 3 men
charged in 2007, no
trial as of 2010
Daily Star, 9 Oct 2007, 3 JMB men charged with
Mymensingh cinema blast, Accessed at
17-Jan
Tangail bomb at village fair kills 7, 20 injured
Riaz list
Probably JMB
1-Mar
Bomb thrown at policeman in Khulna and he dies
Riaz list
not militants
6-Sep
Awami League leader killed in bomb attack in
Riaz list
not militants
15-Jan
Reporter for BBC killed in Khulna, Manik Saha
Riaz list
Maoists accused,
not Islamic militants
RSF, 8 April 2004, Thirteen Maoist militants
accused of murder of journalist Manik Saha,
Accessed
http://archives.rsf.org/print.php3?id_article=90
51
21-Aug
series of grenade attacks on AL rally in Dhaka, 23
killed. PM Sheikh Hasina sustains minor injuries.
Riaz list
Huji charged
Daily Star, 22 Aug 2011, Tarique okayed Huji plot,
Accessed at
5-Sep
Syhlet cinema bomb kills 2
Riaz list
Unknown Militant
Tippo Sultan, Prothom Alo. And Daily Star, 5 Aug
2009 reports no headway in investigations.
2000
2001
DETAILS OF BOMBING
POLITICAL
ISLAM
YEAR
2005
DATE
DETAILS OF BOMBING
LISTING
SOURCE
SUSPECT
12-Jan
Bomb blasts at two separate cultural events in
Sherpur and Jamalpur districts injured 25 and 10
respectively
UNB, 13 Jan 2005, JMB said to have
35 hurt in
claimed
Jamalpur, Sherpur responsibility
bomb blasts,
Accessed at
http://www.bangl
adeshweb.com/view.php
?hidRecord=
32340
Guide to Islamist Movements, Barry Rubin
15-Jan
Bombs at Jatra performances at Bogra and Natore
killed two and injured over 70 people
Daily Star,16 Jan
2005, 2 killed, 60
hurt in bomb
attacks on Jatra
shows
JMJB say police
Daily Star, 5 feb 2005, JMB attacked jatra, arrested
activist says.
27-Jan
Bomb near Syhlet in Laskapur kills SHAH Kibria
former Finance minister and 3 others
Riaz List
Under investigation
for 3rd time; first
chargesheet
included BNP,
second HUJI.
Bdnews24, 27 Jan 2013, Kibria murder probe
lingers on, Accessed at
http://bdnews24.com/bangladesh/2013/01/27/k
ibria-murder-probe-lingers-onand PriyoNews, 27
Jan 2013, Kibria’s 8th death anniv today, Accessed
at http://news.priyo.com/2013/01/27/politics66470.html
17-Aug
450 small bombs explode all over the country, 2
killed
Riaz List
JMB convicted & left
leaflets claiming
responsibility at the
time.
BBC, 15 Aug 2006, Death for Bangladesh Militants,
Accessed at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/47
94655.stm
3-Oct
5 bombs in 3 court buildings, 2 killed
JMB convicted
BBC, 15 Aug 2006, Death for Bangladesh Militants,
Accessed at
94655.stm and BBC, Bombs explode across
Bangladesh, 17 Aug 2005, Accessed at
58478.stm
14-Nov
2 judges killed when bomb thrown at their car in
Jhalakathi
JMB convicted
bdnews24, 28 Jan 2013, 2 to die for Shariatpur
bomb attacks, Accessed at
http://bdnews24.com/bangladesh/2013/01/28/2
-to-die-for-shariatpur-bomb-attacks
29-Nov
11 killed by suspected suicide bomber in Chtg
JMB alleged
BBC, 29 Nov 2013, Bangladesh's escalating
extremism
By Roland Buerk, Accessed at
82320.stm
1-Dec
suspected suicide bomber kills 2 near court in
Gazipur
JMB alleged
ditto
8-Dec
8 killed in suicide bomb attack in Netrokona
not suicide attack;
JMB convicted
Bangaldesh News, 19 Feb 2008, 3 JMB men to die
for Udichi bomb blast, Accessed at
http://www.independentbangladesh.com/200802192091/country/3-jmbmen-to-die-for-udichi-bomb-blast.html
Tippoo Sultan of Prothom Alo on not a suicide
bomb.
POLITICAL
ISLAM
89
Section 4:
The Shahbagh Movement
"Those who do not like Joy Bangla slogan should go to Pakistan,"273 Shahriar Kabir.
At one level, it's a classical Bengali thing: hyper emotional, politically charged, liberal left,
culturally decorated and resurrecting images and symbols that inspire them. Had the political
structure of Bangladesh given them any space, Shahbagh would not have happened but that is
exactly what Shahbagh is. It's a gut reaction of many to the exclusion from national politics, always
a private monopoly of the party in power.274
Afsan Chowdhury, BRAC University.
The Shahbagh movement is secular in nature, pro-Liberation War and intrinsically opposed to the growing power of
Islamists. Many liberal Bangladeshis see their country at a turning point in its struggle with political Islam. Several
newspapers and their staff openly took sides. Indeed as one Awami League sympathiser pointed out, civil society,
not the political parties, is at the forefront of the struggle against Islamists.
The protests caught most off guard but captured the imagination of a younger, educated urban generation who'd
never been involved in politics. Many described it as like the Arab Spring and the beginnings of a demand for change
on issues like corruption and political reform.
POLITICAL
ISLAM
91
The protests started on 5 Feb 2013 after one of the accused in the war crimes trial, Abdul Quader Mollah, was
convicted of five offences involving crimes against humanity, and sentenced to life imprisonment on two charges.
The gatherings were a challenge to the government, which had taken for granted the popularity it attracted for
holding a war crimes trial. Initially the protestors' main demand was the death sentence for Abdul Quader Mollah.
The justification for this demand was if life sentences were awarded, they could be overturned by the next
government, if it were a BNP-Jamaat alliance, or even the country's President. Surprisingly there were no questions
raised about the fairness of the trial process, merely a call for "hanging the war criminals". The crowd saw itself as
progressive defenders of human rights, but was calling for the use of the death penalty, which their equivalent in the
West abhors. One liberal commentator said, "One has to be Bengali to understand the spirit" of this demand, arguing
it was a different issue from the normal use of the death penalty for criminals. The protestors called for the separation
of politics and religion and a ban on Jamaat-e-Islami and a boycott of businesses allegedly connected with the party.
Bloggers and online activists were instrumental in mobilising tens of thousands people to come on the streets and
occupy Shahbagh square. It didn't spread throughout the country because "in picking 'secularism' as a cause, that
showed how naïve it was and if anything alienated from understanding the psychological framework of the ordinary
people".275 An unpublished opinon poll by Org-Quest Research Ltd reportedly found, "Whilst 43 per cent of those
questioned about the Mollah verdict supported Shahbagh's central demand for imposition of the death penalty
against Molla — 55 per cent did not."276 Some suggested the issue of justice for war criminals only has an urban
appeal because in villages revenge was taken at the time.
For the first week the Shahbagh protests were a genuinely spontaneous social movement. Some read this as a good
sign for society that the younger generation had not lost their political consciousness and were inspired by the spirit
of independence. Jamaat figures, though, question what young Bangladeshis really know about the War of
Liberation, arguing that the boundaries were a lot more blurred in 1971 and many families contained figures who
took opposing sides and then helped one another when in trouble.
The Shahbagh movement challenged the governing party, which quickly appropriated the initiative.277 They did
this by making concessions and allegedly supplying food and protection to the demonstrators. People appeared to
see this and withdrew.
Some argue the Shahbagh movement set a precedent for challenging the government and getting away with it.
Members of the public effectively took the issue of justice into their own hands, forcing the government to pass a new
law allowing the prosecution to appeal the sentence to increase it. They reason that, "By challenging the court
verdict, Shahbagh went beyond the legal and constitutional space and by doing so helped create a huge
battleground where just about anything goes… What Shahbagh and Hefajate Islam have in common is the rejection
of the rule of law."278 Some say it was a major blunder on the part of the government to pander to demonstrators and it
92
POLITICAL
ISLAM
would have been better to clear them from Shahbagh Square because that would have been a sufficient concession
to appease the Hefajate Islam protestors who came out to counter them.
Initially the BNP supported Jamaat but then its National Standing Committee issued a statement cautiously
backing the Shahbagh movement and suggesting protestors also call for an impartial caretaker government to
oversee elections, as has been the case four times in the past.279
Jamaat activists ran an aggressive online campaign against the Shahbagh organisers, showing blog posts
defaming Islam.280
Attacks on Journalists
From late February 2013 onwards there have been a series of clashes in which journalists have been injured, many
from gunfire from riot police. Journalists have been attacked by Islamists too and have received death threats and
warnings targeting themselves and their families. Some male journalists working for secular newspapers and TV
stations were being urged by their wives to consider emigrating for fear that a pro-Islamic regime might come to
power and want to take revenge.
On one day alone - 22 February 2013 - Reporters Without Borders said at least 23 journalists were injured.281 In
Chittagong several were hurt after Islamist demonstrators broke into the press club office and the headquarters of
the Chittagong Union of Journalists, after accusing reporters of supporting the Shahbagh movement.282In Dhaka
during clashes after a demonstration by Islamists at the Baitul Mukarram mosque, at least 10 journalists were
injured. Reporters Without Borders says the demonstrators deliberately targeted journalists.283 The same day the
website of the The Daily Star was hacked by Islamists who inserted large headlines favouring Jamaat-e-Islami.
On 24 February 2013, Khelafat Andolon threatened a boycott of the media and demanded that the government
arrest "atheist bloggers" for "blasphemy".
On 25 February 2013, a number of journalists and media organisations reported receiving telephone threats.
On 6 April 2013 during a Hefazat-e-Islam rally a woman reporter was badly physically attacked and another
severely harassed.
On 11 April 2013 the police arrested the acting editor of the pro-opposition Amar Desh, Mahmudur Rahman, for
sedition and unlawful publication of a conversation that led to the resignation of the top judge in the War Crimes
Tribunal. The same story was published in The Economist magazine. Amar Desh was also accused of inciting
violence and religious tension. The state minister for home affairs, Shamsul Haque Tuku, told journalists the Amar
Desh editor had been arrested to establish the rule of law.284 The Committee to Protect Journalists expressed concern
about the editor, whose paper had been critical of the Shahbagh movement.285 Members of the Shahbagh movement
considered Amar Desh pro-Jamaat-e-Islami and blamed the newspaper's campaign against the bloggers for the
death of Rajib. They demanded the paper should be closed within 24 hours and its editor arrested for inciting
communal violence.
On 13 April 2013 the police arrested 19 employees of Amar Desh who were attempting to print the paper (which
had not been banned) at the offices of Sangram, another pro-opposition daily affiliated with an Islamist party.286
Woman Journalists Attacked.
These are the accounts by two women journalists of their experience at the hands of Hefajate Islam during their rally
on 6 April 2013.
Nadia Sharmeen
Staff Reporter
Ekushey Television (ETV)
Age: 26
On that day we had another reporter to cover the main event – the rally of Hefajate Islam. I was there
standing in for the reporter who was doing supplementary stories – such as who supplied food and
water to the rally and if there was any signature campaign going on…My cameraman was filming,
when I was approached by a man, whom I thought belonged to Hefajate Islam. He came towards me
and said antagonistically: "You're a woman, why are you here? Get out of here right now!"
POLITICAL
ISLAM
93
I replied calmly, saying, "I am not here as a woman, I am here as a reporter, to cover your event."
By that time a group had gathered around us, mostly Hefajat supporters I thought – around fifteen
men. They started telling me, one by one, sometimes talking over each other, that we were agents287
from Shahbagh who manipulate and twist news to make those people look good and we are liars. And
they complained we don't give them live coverage. They also asked me, “Don't you know about our 13point demands? Why are you here, being a woman? Just get out of here!”
Some were wearing full-length white Arab style gowns (alkhallahs, Shalvar Kameez and skull caps),
whereas others were in shirts and trousers.
I had a feeling that things could get nasty and out of hand really rapidly. I was telling them that I was a
journalist and merely doing my job but that provoked them even more so I started to move away from
that place. People around me advised me to leave the area. There was a microbus belonging to the
Doctors' Association of Bangladesh and the doctors took me inside it. By then, the number of people
was increasing and they had started to throw things at the car and pound their fists on it. The doctors
asked me to wind up the glass of the window. But the attackers continued to strike the car with such
force that it seemed the vehicle would be totally destroyed – that they would smash it into pieces. I just
didn't know what to do, or how to escape. I was struggling to find a way out of the situation. At that
moment I called the central news desk at my office to inform them that I was being attacked. Then I
called my camera person, who was out there somewhere in the danger, to alert him.
Then someone tried to lead me away from the microbus and get me out of there – or so I thought at that
time. In retrospect, I think the person was a Hefajat man. As I was walking, they were throwing brick
chips, bottles, stones and pebbles – whatever they could get their hands on. I didn't look back so I
couldn't really see exactly what they were throwing. I could just feel things hitting my head, back, legs
and neck. There were other men beside me, and one of them was dragging me – he was holding my
hand, and telling me to "run". At that point, I didn't want to run because I thought that would provoke
the group even further and make them more violent. But I was forced to run by the person beside me
who was holding my hand.
At one point someone pushed me from behind, and I dropped one of my two cell phones on the ground.
A man coming from my front picked up my mobile phone and left the place after returning it to me.
Then that man, who appeared to be helping me and giving directions, told me to get on a motorcycle
that was on the other side of the road. He said give me both your phones, and get on that motorcycle. As
soon as he took my phone from my hand, he disappeared into the crowd, never to be seen again.
But by then, worse things were happening to me. They pushed me on the ground and had started to
beat me up violently. Along the way the number of men were 50-60 or more at that moment. They were
hitting me everywhere and I thought I was going to die. I was sure they would kill me. There was
nothing I could do to protect myself from all these men who were determined to kill me. Some fellow
journalists from Diganta TV saw me being attacked and tried to rescue me. They were mainly from
Diganta TV but some unknown people on the streets also tried to get me into the nearest building to
save me. They tried to get me into the CITY bank building but the gates were closed. The bank was
closed. They formed a cordon around me but even then the attackers were still trying to hit me. You can
see it in the TV footage. I couldn't stand up anymore, I was weak and injured, and I sat down, with
people still forming a barricade around me. I was beaten up by the attackers five to six times. During
this time the attackers tore a part of my shirt and were trying to tear my whole dress apart.
At this point some colleagues arrived and a police team. The attackers then tried to attack them as well.
As this was going on, the crew of ETV and Diganta TV put me into one of Diganta TV's cars. But the
attackers continued to hit the car with their hands and with brick chips and many more hard objects.
And they were berating me, using the filthiest language. I don't use slang, sorry, I can't repeat what they
said to me.
But from the beginning, they were saying things like, "Haven't you read our 13-point demands? Why
are you here? Don't you know women can't be here?" They didn't make any comment about my dress; if
you see the footage, you will see that my clothes couldn't have been more decent unless I wore a burqa;
that is what they meant. I was dressed in a salwar kamiz, whose length was below my knees, and it had
full sleeves and I had a dopatta. I also had a cap over my head. The way they were harassing me it
would have been dreadful otherwise. They were almost tearing my clothes off.
As I was being whisked away by my rescuers, I heard the police and some people say, cover your head.
Other than that, I don't remember anyone explicitly saying anything about my dress. But then again,
there was so much noise and people were shouting,
94
POLITICAL
ISLAM
Thankfully, the car managed to escape through an alley and took me to Dhaka Medical College
Hospital.
I am a crime reporter and I know that I might find myself in a difficult situation now and then. But this
wasn't anything I had ever experienced. They were like a bunch of hyenas, or wild dogs, not human. I
thought then, and I think now, that they wanted to kill me. They wanted to tear me apart, limb by limb.
Why else would they start beating me from Paltan all the way to Bijoynagar? They hit every
conceivable part of my body. I had to have two CT scans and ultrasonography to see if my abdomen
and some other parts inside my body were alright, four X-rays of my left knee joint, left shoulder, neck. I
am very lucky to be alright, not to have permanent damage, but doctors say they are still not sure,
especially about my head injury.
Obviously my family is very concerned. My mother is an ordinary woman and she was very scared
when she heard the news and saw the TV footage. But even though they were scared in the beginning,
they were by my side and supported me. They didn't ask me to give up journalism because they know
what it means to me.
Why would I give it up because of some cowards? Who are they if not cowards? When 50 - 60 or more of
them beat up one unarmed woman? Is that their way of showing respect to women? How can they
claim to be protectors of Islam when they treat women this way? How can they protect Islam if they
can't protect a woman journalist at their own event? I am a woman journalist. If I cannot stand there,
if I cannot work side by side with men, then how can the Prime Minister of this country, or the
opposition leader, be here? If they can't accept me, why are they negotiating with political leaders who
are also women, in what they claim is a man's world. I was wearing decent clothes – everyone can see
how I was dressed that day from the video footage. They were the ones who tried to tear my clothes off;
in fact, they even succeeded in tearing some parts of it, they were so violent.
To civil society, journalists and other concerned people, I want to say one thing: how are you sure that
the same thing that happened to me today won't happen to you as well? I used to work with victims of
violence; I never thought that something like this would happen to me. But it did. The same might
happen to you too. If you want to live in this country and remain alive, then you have to do something
about the changes that are going on.You have to resist these types of violence because no one can be safe
in such a situation.
Hefajat has expressed sadness at the event and apologised but said that other forces had infiltrated
their ranks and carried out the attacks. If their claims are true, then why don't they find those
responsible for these attacks? Why don't they strongly demand an investigation to find the culprits? If
their claims are true, then isn't it also in their best interest to set the record straight?
All in all, I want justice for what happened to me, and so should they. If they cannot protect women,
how can they protect Islam and the rest of humankind?
Woman Journalist Harassed
Jakia Ahmed
Senior Reporter
Banglanews24.com
(Online news portal)
Age: 30
I was outdoors from early morning and toured different spots of Dhaka to see what would happen that
day. In Shantinagar, in front of Karnafuli Garden City, I saw a huge procession coming from the
opposite direction. So I asked my office auto rickshaw to stop. I stood on a divider in the middle of the
road. I was writing down their slogans and what was on their placards. I don't know exactly how many
people there were but it was a huge procession.
A religious gentleman (hujur) dressed in traditional Muslim clothes and a skull cap, from the middle
of the procession, asked me very fiercely, "Hey, girl, where is your scarf? Why is your head not covered?"
Around him were some 14-15 year-old boys, who were clearly enjoying that I was being harassed. They
were laughing and commenting amongst themselves. They were saying things like, "Why do women
come out of the home? How dare she not only come out of the house, but also do journalism?" I was
paralysed and didn't reply. I felt that if I replied, they would hit me and assault me. At that moment, I
really believed that they were going to beat me up; they were so fierce and hostile. The hujur in
particular was so spiteful; he was looking at me as if I had committed the worst crime. I felt vulnerable
and scared. So I left immediately, and thankfully nothing else happened.
POLITICAL
ISLAM
95
That same morning, around 6.30 am, I was near the Malibagh rail gate. A small procession came my
way. I tried to talk to them. I asked: "Where are you going and why?" They replied that they were going
to the grand rally. One boy told me: "You are one of the journalists who cover Shahbagh. You see five
people protesting there and you report there are thousands of people. Let us first punish the atheists
and then we'll sort out all you reporters." Then they left with their procession.
They were saying all these anti-women things in the name of Islam, but as far as I know Islam talks
about equality between men and women. I think there is a need to understand what actually Islam
and all other religions say about women. How can an organisation like Hefajat, which appeared out of
nowhere, come to us with an elaborate agenda to suppress women in a democratic free country like
ours? Women participated in the Liberation War – some directly fought in the war while almost all
women took part in it in some way or another. Then consider the garments sector, which is our biggest
exporter. Its driving force is women. What if women are not allowed to work there? The garments sector
will have to shut down.
We are all contributing to the economy in our own ways. I am working as a journalist, you in your way.
Who are they to tell me what I should do? How can they make such claims? What is their ideological
position? Theirs are bogus explanations.Where in Islam does it say that women cannot come out of the
house? They won't be able to show it written anywhere? They want to suppress women and this just
reflects their patriarchal mindset. They want to turn this country into Afghanistan.
96
POLITICAL
ISLAM
Bloggers
The bloggers are a small group of urban educated middle class youths with access to the Internet.288 They've been
active for some years and were not propelled to prominence until the Islamists suddenly seized on them as an issue.
On 15 February 2013 thirty-year-old blogger, Ahmed Rajib Haider, was killed near his home in Dhaka, according to
police by the al-Qaeda style, Yemeni-inspired group, Ansarullah Bangla. Rajib was one of the organisers of the
Shahbagh movement. Reporters Without Borders said he was well known for criticising Islamic extremism on the
platform "Somewhereinblog.net".289 Islamist websites continued to criticize Rajib even after his death, complaining
of "state sponsored blasphemy" in Bangladesh.290 The local media reported that Rajib had attracted many death
threats and one was reportedly posted on Sonar Bangla, a pro-Jamaat blog.291 The French news agency AFP reported
that Rajib's brother believed he'd been targeted by the Jamaat student wing, Chhatra Shibir, for his writing.292 Jamaate-Islami, however, condemned the murder and denied involvement.
Immediately after Rajib's death, Islamists started branding him as an atheist and alleged he'd posted offensive
and blasphemous content on the Internet on a site called nuranichapa. However a relative of Rajib said someone
had hacked into his blog and posted controversial remarks after his murder. Other reports said there were 19
controversial entries posted between June and October 2012 on the site nuranichapa.wordpress.com but the first
visit to the site was only on the day Rajib was killed and after a Pakistani website alerted people to its existence.293 A list
of other bloggers deemed worthy of the death penalty was reportedly circulated using mobile phones.294
Hefajate Islam published half-page advertisements in three newspapers, alleging anti-islamic content had been
posted by bloggers. It stated the Shahbagh movement was against Islam. Jamaat-e-Islami echoed this, saying, "The
main objective of the Shahbag protesters is to root out Islam from the country. They are involved in different antisocial activities there."295
Under pressure, the Information Minister said the government would not spare those who offended religious
sentiments.296 The Telecoms regulator asked the host site, Somewhereinblog.net, to take down posts deemed
blasphemous, which it did. Reports said the regulator was scrutinising other sites to identify and erase more
"blasphemous blogs".297 In another concession to the Islamists, on 13 March 2013 the Home Ministry formed a 9member committee to "track bloggers and Facebook users who made derogatory remarks about Islam and the
Prophet Muhammad." The Bangladesh Telecommunication Regulatory Commission, which sat on the new
committee, requested information on a number of bloggers in an effort to ban writers deemed to have offended
Islam.298 The government then reportedly blocked about a dozen websites and blogs.299 A group of Muslim clerics also
submitted a list of 84 bloggers to the committee that they accused of atheism and criticising Islam.3
In their demonstrations, supporters of Hefajat-e-Islam had carried banners with the pictures of the four
bloggers301
POLITICAL
ISLAM
97
Asked if the Bangladeshi government wasn't making concessions to the Islamists that violated the right to free
speech, the Foreign Minister, Dipu Moni, said in April 2013 that the bloggers had allegedly hurt Muslims by
maligning religious sentiment and that was against the law in Bangladesh.
On April 2 and 3 the government arrested four bloggers. Their host website, AmraBlog, was shut down in protest.
An announcement on the homepage said the site would reopen only after the bloggers were released
unconditionally. Human rights groups expressed concern about the right to freedom of expression being violated by
the arrests.302 Reporters Without Borders said Bangladesh should "stop persecuting news providers"303 and
complained the Bangladesh government had given into pressure from Islamists.304
AmraBlog's announcement on its site as of April 2013
On 17 April the four bloggers were denied bail305 and charges were being prepared under the Information and
Communications Technology Act, 2006, which could carry up to 14 years' rigorous imprisonment or a fine of Tk 1
crore.306
Arrested Bloggers
98
POLITICAL
ISLAM
Shockingly after their arrests, the four bloggers were photographed by police as if they were criminals, with their
computers on display like a haul of captured weapons. Two of the bloggers, Shuvro and Parvez, were granted bail as
of May 2013.
Websites supporting the Islamists also produced posters and petitions in English with the aim of winning
international support against the secularists. This one is from:
http://shahbagexposed.blogspot.de/2013/02/blog-post_26.html
POLITICAL
ISLAM
99
The Four Arrested Bloggers:
1. Asif Mohiuddin
Aged 29 and an IT engineer, Mohiuddin described himself as a "militant atheist". The French newsagency AFP called
his blog307 one of the most visited webpages in Bangladesh. Its title page said God was "Almighty only in name but
impotent in reality". In July 2012, he ridiculed Muslims and the Quran in a satirical piece on "the mass conversion of
supermen to Islam". He won a Deutsche Welle sponsored 'Best of Blogs' award in 2012 and was active on different blogs
like "somewhereinblog", "dhormockery" and "amarblog".308 As of April 2013 his Facebook page had been suspended.309
After his arrest Mohiuddin told reporters 120 of his posts had been removed by the telecoms regulator from the
Internet.310 Some secular Bangladeshi journalists didn't feel the arrest was an affront to their freedom of expression
because they thought Mohiuddin had been unduly provocative and would actually be safer in jail.
In October 2011 the police had arrested Mohiuddin in connection with his blog posts, which they said had triggered
student protests against fee hikes. He was detained for 18 hours and told to stop writing. Mohiuddin alleged he'd been
blindfolded, starved, and kept awake and that the police had asked him to sign a statement promising not to blog
anymore.311
On 14 January 2013 Mohiuddin was attacked by three men wielding a machete near his office in Dhaka. He had to be
operated on for more than three hours after receiving six cuts. Doctors said the attack was an attempt on his life,
judging by the severity of the wounds.
2. Subrata Adhikari Shuvo
Shuvo (who is Hindu) was arrested on 1 Apr 2013. A Masters student studying Bengali at Dhaka University, friends said
he was picked up from in front of his dormitory in a white microbus. He wrote a blog312 hosted on the Amarblog.com
platform, using his own name. He's also said to have published stories under the nickname, Lalu Koshai.
3. Rasel Parvez.
Aged 36, he is a physicist and teacher in an English-medium school. He has two main blogs, hosted in
Somewherein.net platform and Amarblog.com. He's accused of publishing inflammatory stories under the
pseudonym Opobak.
Rasel Parvez was actively involved with the Shahbagh movement while Shuvo and Biplob were online activists of the
movement. Just before his arrest Parvez had attacked the Awami League for making too many concessions to the
Islamists.313
4. Mashiur Rahman Biplob
Aged 42, he blogged under the pseudonym Allama Shoytaan (Mullah Devil) on various sites, including
Somewherein.net.
100
POLITICAL
ISLAM
314
Hefajate Islam
TIMELINE
22 Feb 2013 Reports that Hefajate-Islam have attacked the press club in Chittagong; bombs explode there on
March 12 during the press conference of the Shahbagh movement.
25 Feb 2013 Hefajat threatens mass rallies in upazillas if the government doesn't stop the Shahbagh movement; it
calls for resignation of the Home Minister and the death penalty for Shahbagh organisers.
26 Feb 2013: The government sends SMS, according to the National News Agency BBS:
13 March 2013
Hefajat calls a hartal but this is the day the Shahbagh movement is to hold two rallies in Chittagong. The Shahbagh
movement postpones its programme "due to security reasons" and then Hefajat withdraws its strike.
13 March 2013
The Bangladeshi Home Ministry forms a 9-member committee to track bloggers and Facebook users who insult
Islam and the Prophet.
1 April 2013
Police arrest three "atheist bloggers" on the list of Hefajat on charges of hurting people's religious sentiments:
Subrata Adhikari Shuvo, Mashiur Rahman Biplob and Rasel Parvez (See profiles in Shahbagh section).
3 April 2013
Police arrest one more blogger, Asif Mohiuddin. In a statement Hefajat says those arrested were not well-known
bloggers. It calls for the finding and punishing of the "real culprits".
5 April 2013
Hefajat leaders reportedly asked the Prime Minister to root out Jamaat from the country, ban all books of Maulana
Mawdudi, punish "anti-Islam bloggers", and recognise all quomi madrasas and declare Ahmadiyya non-Muslim.
The Prime Minister said her government would act against anyone who defames Islam and the Prophet: "As a
Muslim I cannot accept any derogatory statement against Prophet Muhammad (pbuh)."315
6 April 2013
Hefajat calls for a ban on men and women mixing in public.316 Hefajate Islam held a rally at the capital's Motijheel
demanding punishment of the "atheist" bloggers of the Shahbagh who allegedly insulted Islam and Prophet
Mohammad. The BNP-led 18-party alliance also lends their support to the radical group.
Twenty five socio-cultural-professional organisations had called a 24-hour shutdown from 6pm the night before
to thwart the Hefajat programme and press for a ban on Jamaat. The Ganajagaran Mancha also enforce a 22-hour
nationwide transport blockade starting from the same time to resist Hefajat.
The Shahbagh movement calls this "a second war of independence".317 Attempts to prevent Hefajat supporters
entering the capital fail utterly. One commentator said, "This counter plan was so amateurish that it defies
understanding".318
7 April 2013
Hefajat calls nationwide hartal for this day, then says it will be a non-stop hartal if 27 pro-liberation organisations
do not call off their hartal (calling for a ban of Jamaat and protesting the anti-Islamic activity of Jamaat!) on April 6 –
the day Hefajat is holding its long march culminating in Dhaka.
POLITICAL
ISLAM
101
20 April 2013
Hefajat threatens to topple the government if its 13-point demands, including the hanging of "atheist" bloggers,
are not met by May 5. They make this announcement at a huge rally in Khulna presided over by Hazrat Mawlana
Mostak Ahmed, ameer of Khulna District Unit of Hefajat. They demand capital punishment for journalist Shahriar
Kabir, Prof Muntasir Mamun and Shahbagh spokesman Imran H Sarker along with the "atheist" bloggers. The BNPled 18-party opposition alliance expresses solidarity with the rally.319
5 May 2013
Hefajat holds its siege of Dhaka, occupying downtown areas like Mohtijeel. The government forcibly clears the
area, known as Shapla Chhatra, with an unknown number of people killed. Islamic TV stations, such as Islamic TV320
and pro-Jamaat Diganta TV,321 are stopped from broadcasting the authorities' actions. Critics of the TV stations say
they were openly encouraging people to come and join the protests in the teletext running at the base of their
images. Junaid Babunagari, the secretary general, is detained on 6 May and Maulana Shafi is escorted back to
Chittagong. More than 40,000-50,000322 unknown Hefajat and Jamaat activists are shown as the accused in 19 cases
but only 40 Hefajat activists are in detention.323
102
POLITICAL
ISLAM
The Hefajat Platform:
Based in Chittagong, this platform of traditional Islamists first came into existence in 2010 to oppose the Awami
League government's National Women's Development Policy.324
By 2013, energised by the emergence of the pro-secular Shahbagh movement, Hefajat burst onto the political
scene once again and became much more active, with mass rallies and marches. The general consensus is that
Jamaat-e-Islami cleverly managed to instigate Hefajate Islam by publicising the activities of the bloggers and
possibly even providing funds for the protests.
Hefajat leaders were able to bring a hundred thousand quomi madrasa students on to the streets of the capital –
many of them young teenagers. Some say the number was two or three times that figure. As one middle-class Dhaka
commentator put it, "If Hefajat seemed so alien to many, it's because we have no idea about the rural poor. The
quomi madrasa system is the recipient of those who have no future."325 He went on to comment that the middle
classes resisted by enthusiastically celebrating Bengali New Year in Mid-April as a symbol of cultural resistance to the
Islamists.326 Another observer described Hefajat as the real youth of the country, whose identity is primarily as
Muslims first and then as Bangladeshis second. The contrast with the Shahbagh youth, educated in English-medium
schools, couldn't be more stark. "For every Shahbagh guy there are ten in a madrasa - a new generation that's been
dormant till now," is how one commentator put it, "and now we've aroused them, politicised them."
Hefajat's appearance was quite sudden; in early February 2013 the name Hefajat-e-Islam simply did not come up
in Dhaka in a discussion of Islamic politics. A month later they'd shifted the political debate to Islamic issues and
their street politics had weakened confidence in the government's ability to control the situation. Shahbagh
protestors and the Awami League suddenly found themselves on the back foot, having to defend themselves against
charges of not being respectful of Islam.
The violent crackdown in May 2013 of Hefajat protests - and the suspension of broadcasts by two Islamic TV
channels - badly alienated the madrasa students. The death toll is still hotly disputed.327 "Dhaka looked like Beirut,"
said one newspaper editor, describing the situation on 6 May 2013. "We were all taken by surprise and this frightened
the West." Emotive images of bloodied corpses and elderly clerics being arrested circulated on the Internet.
Many also blame Jamaat and Shibir infiltrators for the violent destruction of property leading up to the police
action, arguing that the madrasa boys were disciplined and peaceful. After the dispersal of Hefajat's May siege of
Dhaka, its Secretary General, Junaid Babunagari, was detained. Interestingly he blamed Jamaat-e-Islami and its
student wing for the violence in Dhaka328 but then said Jamaat had funded the Hefajat protests.
The Bangladeshi police say the madrasa authorities are now under tremendous pressure from parents not to lead
their children into violence on the streets. In most cases, young boys were brought to the capital to protest without
the permission of their guardians.
Hefajat-e-Islam says it's not a political party but it issued a list of political demands to the government:
Translation of Hefajat-e-Islam's 13-point demands:
▪
Reinstate the phrase "Absolute trust and faith in the Almighty Allah" in the Constitution as one of the
fundamental principles of state policy.
▪
Pass a law keeping a provision of capital punishment for maligning Allah, Islam and Prophet Muhammad
and smear campaigns against Muslims.
▪
Punish the "atheist" leaders of Shahbagh, bloggers and anti-Islamists who make "derogatory comments"
about Prophet Muhammad (pbuh).
▪
Stop killing, attacking and shooting Islamic scholars and madrasa students.
▪
Free all the arrested Islamic scholars and madrasa students.
▪
Lift restrictions on mosques and remove obstacles to holding religious programmes.
▪
Declare Quadianis (Ahmadiyya) non-Muslim and stop their publicity and conspiracies.
▪
Ban all foreign culture including free mixing of men and women and candlelit vigil.
▪
Stop setting up sculptures329 at intersections, colleges and universities across the country.
▪
Make Islamic education mandatory from primary to higher secondary levels after scrapping women policy
and education policy.
▪
Stop threatening teachers and students of Qaumi madrasas, Islamic scholars, imams and khatibs.
▪
Stop creating hatred against Muslims among young generation by misrepresentation of Islamic culture in the
media.
▪
Stop anti-Islam activities by NGOs, evil attempts by Quadianis and conversion by Christian missionaries at
Chittagong Hill Tracts and elsewhere in the country.330
POLITICAL
ISLAM
103
To this they later added:
•
The arrest and trial of Shahriar Kabir, Nasir Uddin Yusuf Bachchu and Imran H Sarker for being 'atheists'.331
•
Removal of the Bangladesh Workers Party chief Rashed Khan Menon, the Information Minister Hasanul
Haque Inu and the Planning Minister AK Khandker from the Cabinet.332
Bengali Version of Hefajat's 13-point demands.
104
POLITICAL
ISLAM
Hefajate Islam Office Bearers:
Ameer (President): Shah Ahmad Shafi.
Senior Nayeb-e-Ameer: Mahibullah Babunagari
Nayeb-e-Ameer: Abdul Malek
Joint Secretary General: Mawlana Mainuddin Ruhi (Islami Oikyo Jote)
Joint Secretary General: Mufti Fayezullah (he said a group of 313 hardcore cadres will join suicide squads to defend
Islam)
Secretary General: Junaid Babunagari
The Ameer of Hefajate Islam, Shah Ahmad Shafi, is said to command an "intense following and respect in
Chittagong".333 As Chairman of the Bangladesh Quomi Madrasa Board, he is in charge of the clerics who run a large
proportion of the madrasa in Bangladesh that are unregulated by the state. It's these establishments that train the
majority of Imams and muezzin for the increasing number of Bangladeshi mosques.
Shah Ahmad Shafi is also extremely influential as head of the 117-year old Hathazari334 Madrasa (Al-Jamiatul Ahlia
Darul Ulum Muinul Islam). With 50,000 students, this is the biggest and oldest (Deobandi) quomi madrasa in
Bangladesh. It's said to be the second largest of its kind in South Asia, ranking in the top ten in the region in terms of
scholarly reputation. He is also Chairman of the Quomi Madrasa Education Commission Bangladesh, which is
negotiating with the government about official recognition for the quomi madrasa leaving certificates - to put them
on a par with HSC and SSC certificates. Many secular Bangladeshis believe recognition of the most retrogressive
madrasa education system would be nothing short of a disaster for the country and find it ironic that the Awami
League is considering this step.
In interviews in the past, Shah Ahmad Shafi has been keen to dispel the idea that his madrasa has been involved in
support for terrorism. He told one researcher he welcomed visitors to his establishment so they could see for
themselves there were no illegal activities. By 2008 he said Hathazari madrasa was receiving frequent visits from
"foreign diplomats, academics and journalists"335 from Britain and America, as well as visits from the Bangladeshi
intelligence agencies.
Interestingly quomi madrasa students are not supposed to be involved in party politics at all. Shah Ahmad Shafi's
students have to sign an undertaking (halaf nama) in Urdu when joining the Hathazari Madrasa promising not work
for any political organisation or even watch television or read any newspapers or magazines published by any other
outfit.
Undertaking by Madrasa Students
I do hereby make an oath that I will not take part in any political activities such as attending meetings and seminars,
becoming involved in student political work or forming political groups with my classmates while staying and
studying at Darul Uloom Mueen ul Islam, Hathazari, Chittagong. Moreover, I will not read any newspapers or any
books published by other institutions. I will also abstain from participating in any examinations held by any
organisation other than this madrasa.
While studying at this madrasa, I will abstain from reading magazines, watching television, or taking part in any
extra-curricular activities and games and sports.
I will pay due respect to my madrasa, its teachers and the other staff members working here.
I will strictly follow the Sunnah in my dress, manners and behavior. If I violate any of the aforementioned rules and
regulations, I will be willing to accept any penalty awarded to me by the madrasa authority and will not object to the
decision taken by my respected teachers.
I am signing this sworn statement consciously and with complete mental equipoise.
(Reproduced from Views from the Madrasa: Islamic Education in Bangladesh, by Mumtaz Ahmad)
However, Shah Ahmad Shafi has said, "To defend Islam and the Quran is a religious duty."336 In practice this has
meant "sending madrasa students on the streets to protest against Taslima Nasreen's writings, or to incite violence
against the Ahmadiyya minority (which) is considered 'halal' politics by the madrasa elders."337 Hefajat has also
campaigned to prevent the establishment of a uniform education policy, prevent equal rights of women, prevent the
restoration of the 1972 Constitution and prevent the abolition of quomi madrasa.
In April 2013, Shah Ahmad Shafi was reported to have administered the oath of martyrdom to 4000 people.338 At the
6 April 2013 rally of Hefajate Islam a booklet was distributed that said, "If alims and ulema can run Afghanistan, then
Bangladeshi alims can run this country with Allah's help."339
POLITICAL
ISLAM
105
Militant Links:
Further controversy was created by the presence of a former leader of the banned Islamist group, Harkat-ul Jihad alIslami (Huji) sitting on the stage at the 6 April 2013 rally of Hefajate Islam. This was Maulana Habibur Rahman from
Sylhet, who runs the party Bangladesh Khelafat Majlish. Habibur had once given an interview admitting that he
visited Taliban training camps and met Osama bin Laden. He was quoted at the time saying, "Only the establishment
of a Khilafat-based state following the Taliban ideology can change the lot of the nation."340 In 2006 the Awami League
had made a deal with him in return for electoral support, promising if they came to power to allow clerics to issue
fatwa and to recognise the degrees given by quomi madrasa. Local Awami League workers protested vigorously and
the 2007 elections were cancelled so the agreement lapsed. Habibur Rahman is said to be opposed to the concept of
female leadership, but nevertheless negotiated with a party headed by a woman.341
Women
Shah Ahmad Shafi believes women should be segregated. He said to a researcher in 2008, "Women are going out
without maintaining modesty. Co-education is corrupting the character of students. We are not opposed to female
education, but we want them to maintain their modesty. For this, they should be educated separately."342
Academic Mumtaz Ahmad notes that not all quomi madrasa clerics believe in higher education for women, even if
it's Islamic in nature and conducted inside a madrasa. Maulana Mufti Abdur Rahman is critical of anything beyond
elementary education for women; he believes they should only be taught to read and understand the Quran and
know the basic teachings of Islam. Mufti Abdur Rahman was educated at Hathazari Madrasa and Deoband and was
chairman of the Bangladesh Quomi Madrasa Education Board Federation and runs several madrasa.
Women journalists have been badly harassed and brutally physically attacked by Hefajat supporters, though the
party has now apologised and denied involvement. The attacks on women reporters in April 2013 were
unprecedented according to Bangladeshi journalists.
Ideological Differences Between Deobandis and Jamaat:
The clerics involved in Hefajate Islam are oriented towards Deoband in India and have a long-standing animosity
with the Jamaat-e-Islami ideologue, Maulana Mawdudi, whose vision of Islam they say is distorted. For example,
Fariduddin Masud, who is currently co-chairman of the Quomi Madrasa Education Commission Bangladesh, has
said Mawdudi's theories are more dangerous than those of the Ahmadiyya.343
Jamaat sympathisers say Maulana Mawdudi was the editor of the newspaper representing the Deoband School
before partition, so when he later attacked the leaders of Deoband it was taken as a betrayal. They say Maulana
Mawdudi's historical analysis of the Companions of the Prophet criticised them and this further widened the split.
According to Farududdin Masud, there was a split among Deobandi scholars at the time of the Partition of India
with some supporting the two-nation theory and moving to Pakistan in 1947, preaching a more political and extreme
interpretation of Islam. Those who remained in Deoband believed the breakaway group had digressed from the real
spirit of the school's teachings. According to Fariduddin, the group that went to Pakistan became the basis for the
Taliban's ideology and their ideas also spread to Bangladesh, where they inspired the militancy of the mid-2000s.
Fariduddin says the vast majority of quomi madrasa are followers of the Indian school of Deoband, which abhors
terror and militancy.
The Quomi Madrasa Education Commission:
There are 17 members of this commission. Reports suggest five of them disagreed with the Chairman, Shah Ahmad
Shafi, (who is the Hefajat leader) over whether it was appropriate for a secular government to give official recognition
to an Islamic education system. Shafi ignored them and prepared a draft policy document, which has now been
submitted to the Prime Minister, Sheikh Hasina, who has directed the Education Ministry to take further steps. The
five commission members who disagreed stopped attending meetings, saying they preferred to wait for a BNPJamaat government, which would be more Islamic in tone. The others countered that a government with Jamaat
support would never recognise them because of their mutual animosity.
It's also possible that the Quomi Madrasa Education Commission Co-Chairman, Fariduddin Masud, has struck
some sort of arrangement with the Awami League. In 2005 he was arrested after the bomb blasts by JMB and was
known for opposing Jamaat-e-Islami, then in power with the BNP. Recently he has publicly called for a ban of Jamaate-Islami and supported the war crimes trial and the Shahbagh movement, despite sharing the same ideological
outlook as the Hefajate Islam leaders. It appears that when the Awami League government formed the Quomi
Madrasa Education Commission in 2011 they may have reached an understanding with at least Fariduddin, if not
other members, to offer them limited support. This strategy makes sense given the quomi madrasa had been
106
POLITICAL
ISLAM
apolitical and shared the Awami League's antagonism to Jamaat-e-Islami. The Awami League seems to have realised
it couldn't take on all the Islamists at once so it tried to divide them by wooing the quomi madrasa leaders with the
prospect of official recognition of their educational certificates.
Relationship with Other Parties
Hefajat has received support from the BNP and the Jatiya Party of General Ershad for its anti-government rallies.
BNP leaders attended the April grand rally by Hefazat344 and one reportedly said that he was "surprised how an
'atheist' like the slain blogger Rajib could survive for so long".345
Some have described Hefajate Islam as "the B team of Jamaat", but when meeting the Prime Minister, the Hefajate
Islam delegation is reported to have asked her to root out Jamaat from the country and ban all books by Maulana
Mawdudi.
Jamaat supported Hefajat's long march programme and their 13-point demand.346 While reports say Hefajat
supporters chanted slogans in Chittagong demanding the release of the Jamaat leader Delwar Hossain Sayedee.
Most Bangladeshis believe
Jamaat cleverly exploited the faith
of Hefajat leaders to convince
them Islam was under attack,
offering the elderly clerics
assistance for their programmes
and steering events from behind
t h e s c e n e s. Eve n Ja m a a t
sympathisers and members
privately concede there was help
given from a distance.
Experts347 point out that despite
all the strategic and tactical
differences, Islamists share a
common aim of establishing an
Islamic state. However there is
c o m p e t i t i o n t o o. Ja m a a t ' s
success in gaining
disproportionate political
influence considering its size, has
led other Islamists to aspire to
impact politics.
Pro Government
Islamists
The government has clearly
tried to employ a counter strategy
of facing Islamists with Islamists.
"One immediate
consequence has been obvious
— the political discourse is now
dominated by the Islamists'
agenda.”348
The Bangladesh Sammilito
Islami Jote is one such proLiberation Islamic alliance.349 It
has alleged the Hefajat leader,
Sh a h A h m a d Sh a f i , w a s a
collaborator with the Pakistani
army in 1971 who helped form the
Mujahid Bahini force.350
POLITICAL
ISLAM
107
Section 5:
The War Crimes Trial
By David Bergman
Editor, Special Reports, The New Age, Bangladesh, and runs Bangladesh War Crimes Blog.
Background
“In March 2010, the Awami League government established a tribunal to allow for the prosecution of Bangladeshi
citizens alleged to have committed international crimes during the country's 1971 war of independence.
The 9-month war ending on 16 December with the surrender of the Pakistan military resulted in the deaths of tens
or hundreds of thousands of people351 – though the government claims that the figure was as high as three million –
most of whom were killed at the hands of the Pakistan army and those who supported it.
The tribunal was set up under the International Crimes (Tribunal) Act 1973, a law that had originally been enacted
to allow for the prosecution of 195 Pakistani army officers who were detained as prisoners of war in India
immediately after the war ended.
Although the new tribunal had the authority to investigate and prosecute Pakistani officers in in absentia trials,
the Bangladesh government took a policy decision that the tribunal should only focus on the crimes committed by
Bangladeshi citizens who collaborated with the Pakistan military.
Some Bangladeshi 'collaborators' had already been prosecuted in the years immediately after the war - both for
'political' collaboration as well as for violent crimes - under the Bangladesh Collaborators (Special Tribunals) Order
1972.352
All prosecutions under this 1972 Act however came to an end in November 1973 when Sheikh Mujibur Rahman,
the then Prime Minister of Bangladesh, passed a general amnesty for those convicted of political collaboration.
One group of alleged war criminals that the new Tribunal could not prosecute were those who committed crimes
when fighting in favor of Independence – for example in relation to the killings of hundreds, if not thousands, of
Biharis – as this was precluded by the Bangladesh National Liberation Struggle (Indemnity) Order, 1973.
In April 2012, the government set up an additional trial and together the two tribunals have issued arrest warrants
against 17 individuals – 13 of whom belong or belonged to the Jamaat-e-Islami party, a small but significant
opposition party in the country, but which in 1971 had supported the Pakistan military in the war. Three out of the
seventeen have or will be tried in absentia,353 and out of the remaining fourteen, one received bail.354
To date355, six trials have concluded – with four resulting in convictions and two awaiting judgment. Three out of
the four convictions have so resulted in the tribunal imposing a sentence of the death penalty – though these are
subject to appeal.
Adequacy of the Process
Right from the start, the process has been beset by questions about whether the accused would receive a fair trial.
Initially, the concerns were focused on the adequacy of the 1973 Act itself which, for example, precluded any
interlocutory appeals, allowed the trials to start three weeks after the accused was formally charged, and provided
POLITICAL
ISLAM
109
inadequate clarity on the elements of the offences with which the accused were being charged. Recommendations
made by Stephen Rapp, US Ambassador-At-Large for war crimes, were only partially adopted.356
When the trials started, attention then focused on the process and practice of the trials. The trial of Delwar Hossain
Sayedee – the first to start - raised significant concerns, including: restriction on the numbers of defence witnesses357
allowed, refusal to issue summons for defence witnesses358, the investigation and prosecution apparently lying to the
court about the absence of prosecution witnesses,359 and the apparent abduction of a defence witness from outside
the tribunal.360
In December 2012, the publication by the Economist magazine361 of extracts of Skype conversations and emails
between the chairman of Tribunal 1 – which at that time was dealing with four cases362 – and an expatriate
Bangladeshi lawyer, who was working closely with the prosecution team, strongly suggested unlawful collusion
between the government, the judge and the prosecutors. The publication resulted in the tribunal judge resigning,
but did not have any other impact upon 'the tribunals practice.363
The small number of defence witnesses permitted by the tribunals is reflected in all the other trials; for example,
Abdul Quader Mollah, who was convicted of seven offences of crimes against humanity, and Muhammad
Kamaruzzaman, who was convicted of five offences (and received the death penalty), were both only allowed to call
five defence witnesses.
It is though important to place this trial within the context of other similar proceedings within Bangladesh's
criminal justice system – and many in the country would argue that whatever deficiencies exist within these
tribunals, it is on a par with or better than the average trial in Bangladesh.
The tribunals operate, generally, in a quiet and professional manner in courts of their own, and the accused have
an opportunity to place their arguments in support of applications. Tribunal supporters also point out that the
tribunal has passed progressive orders concerning the jail welfare conditions of the accused, their rights during
questioning364, and permission to have privileged communications with their lawyers, which ordinary Bangladesh
courts have rarely done.
The tribunals operate in an unusual legal space. They are not compliant with international standards, yet at the
same time do not comply with national standards (i.e the Evidence Act, the Code of Criminal Procedure do not apply,
and accused cannot seek remedies from the High Court) - yet in some practices, as mentioned above, they do exceed
normal national standards.
The Issue of Politicisation
The decision by the government to hold tribunals was a popular initiative, particularly amongst the country's
urban civil society, and the promise of trials in the Awami League's manifesto is thought to have helped the party win
the 2009 election. The holding of trials of those alleged to have committed international crimes – and dealing with
claims of impunity – was welcomed by the international community.
Jamaat has argued that the tribunals are part of a political vendetta against it on the part of the Awami League
government. But pointing out, as the Jamaat does, that almost all the accused are from its party, does not in itself
suggest targeting on political grounds, since in 1971 the party supported the Pakistan military, and those currently
targeted by the tribunal have over the years been subject to the most serious allegations.
Nonetheless, it is clear that the government has a political interest in the weakening of Jamaat and that for many
Awami League politicians the tribunals provide an opportunity to destroy a party which is the most significant ally of
the opposition Bangladesh Nationalist Party. The politicisation is reflected in the government's decision to employ
prosecutors with partisan views about Jamaat and in the numerous statements made by ministers and other
politicians asserting the guilt of the accused, even before the trials started, placing great expectations upon the
tribunal to deliver convictions.
The Concluded Trials
Four trials have concluded. The first was the in absentia trial of Abul Kalam Azad, an Islamic cleric and former
Jamaat leader, who was convicted on 22 January 2013365 and sentenced to death for the commission of one offence of
genocide and six offences of crimes against humanity.
On 5 February, Abdul Quader Mollah, an assistant general secretary of Jamaat-e-Islami received a sentence of life
imprisonment following his conviction in seven crimes against humanity offences.366 The lack of a death penalty, and
the suspicion that the sentence of imprisonment came about due to a 'back-room deal' between the government
and Jamaat, resulted in large protests in Dhaka that continued for weeks. The government, in response, changed the
law to allow it to appeal the sentence.
The sentencing to death on 28 February of Delwar Hossain Sayedee, a Jamaat leader who has widespread religious
support beyond the party, provoked significant protests throughout the country (this time from those sympathetic
110
POLITICAL
ISLAM
to the accused), some of which turned violent. A hardline response by law enforcement personnel resulted in the
shooting dead of dozens of protestors.
After a space of two months, on 9 May 2013, Muhammad Kamaruzzaman, an assistant general secretary of Jamaat,
was also sentenced to death following conviction for seven offences.
Both Sayedee and Mollah have appealed to the appellate division of the high court against their convictions – and
it is expected that Kamaruzzaman will do the same. Azad remains on the run – and has lost his right to appeal.
In the case of Mollah, the prosecution has also counter appealed against the sentence of imprisonment – seeking
the appellate division to impose the death penalty. The case of Mollah is ongoing but the appeal of Sayedee has not
yet started. The appellate division does not appear to consider itself bound by a recent amendment to the 1973 Act
requiring appeal to be completed within 60 days.
Outstanding cases
Awaiting judgment: The trials of Golam Azam, the 91-year old former leader of Jamaat, and of Ali Ahsan
Mohammed Mujahid, the party's Secretary General, have been completed and are awaiting judgment.
Trials ongoing: The trials of Motiur Rahman Nizami (the current head of Jamaat) Salahuddin Quader Chowdhury
(a Bangladesh National Party MP), Abdul Alim (a former BNP leader) and Mobarek Hossain (former Jamaat, now
Awami League leader), are all continuing.
Awaiting formal charge: Hearings on whether the tribunal should 'frame charges' against (i.e. indict) Mir
Quasem Ali, (a member of the Jamaat's executive council) and Chowdhury Mueen-Uddin and Ashrafuzzaman Khan
(both of whom live outside Bangladesh, and whom prosecutors assert were members of Jamaat's student wing in
1971) are ongoing or due to start.
Investigation: Investigations are continuing into the cases of Abdus Subhan, AKM Yusuf (both Jamaat leaders),
and ATM Azharul Islam (acting Secretary General of the Jamaat) and of Syed Md. Qaisar (former Jatiya party leader).
A Very Personal War,
By Asif Munier.
Asif Munier is the youngest son of the well-known playwright and university professor, Munier
Chowdhury, who was abducted on 14 December 1971 and disappeared without trace. Asif is a theatre
activist and the Vice President of an organisation of children of martyrs of the Bangladesh Liberation
War, known as Projonmo 71.
I distinctly remember my feelings after the first verdict in the war crimes trial. Whatever the future holds for the
thirty million families affected by the 1971 war, that day will always remain a chilling moment and a turning point in
our lives.
It took nearly forty years for a trial. It had been our demand ever since Bangladesh was born. Twenty years ago a
mass movement for justice began, led by the mother of a martyr and supported by the children of the martyrs, in a
group called Projonmo 71367. Activists demonstrated on the streets, spoke out in the media, made demands of
successive governments and urged that a trial begin in a special court. It never seemed possible. Day by day, the
ideals of the war were eroded, history distorted and well-known traitors and murderers not only enjoyed impunity,
but were politically rehabilitated and even rewarded.
Even in 2010 when the special tribunal was set up, it was hard to fathom that something many of us had wanted for
a generation was finally happening. Even when well-known leaders and wartime collaborators were taken into
custody and the trial began, it didn't really sink in.
The leaked Skype conversation between the judge and an independent lawyer outside Bangladesh and the
subsequent resignation of the judge broke many of our hearts. It is only with the verdicts since January 2013 that the
reality of this process hit home. We knew for the first time that we were not dreaming and this was really happening.
You do pay for your crimes and sins not only in the afterlife, but also in your lifetime on this earth.
I know that the trial process has not been perfect. There have been narratives on both sides of the arguments, but I
won't go into them here. We live in an imperfect world, where justice is so often denied. I know many families who
had their dreams shattered, as I did, when the Father of the Nation was killed in 1975; he had promised to hold the
trials inside Bangladesh despite tremendous international pressure. Then over the years we watched as well-known
local collaborators were politically rehabilitated, to the point of even being appointed cabinet ministers. I felt
ashamed to be a martyr's son, even though I know I should be proud of my father, who was killed because of his belief
in Bengali nationalism and Independence.
POLITICAL
ISLAM
111
So the trial is like a dream come true. But we live in a harsh real world; there are a lot of “ifs and buts” about the
process and its outcome. Many alleged war criminals are still not in jail, either in Bangladesh or abroad. There is no
guarantee that all the key figures will be put on trial. There is also no certainty that the punishments will be carried
out against those already sentenced. The main opposition party is not sincere about the trials. Even the ruling
political party is a mixed bag containing unknown worms that can impede the process.
But you can never turn back the clock or re-write history. I was pleasantly surprised when young Bangladeshis
spontaneously came out on to the streets in February 2013 to express their dissatisfaction over one of the verdicts.
For two months, thousands of people occupied a place in Dhaka now lovingly called Projonmo Chottor or
Generation Square. In despair a few years ago I assumed our youth had been ruined with misinformation about the
war and there would be no turning back. But they proved me wrong. They showed how much they care about the
truth, how much they love my father and the millions who died. While I am still sceptical about the politicians'
commitment to see this process through, I don't see any other way forward than to continue the trials. The souls of
the martyrs will keep on turning in their graves wherever they may be and will not rest in peace until this is over. We,
the families of the victims, will never forgive the nation for not doing anything about this. It is 42 years late, but still
not too late.
I can say all this with conviction because my family is still paying the price for the crimes of others. My father, and
about 200 other intellectuals and civilians, were abducted and brutally killed - mostly by local collaborators of the
Pakistan Army just two weeks before Independence. It was because of their belief in an independent state. To grow
up, suddenly without a father, who just 'disappeared' one day has not been easy. The trauma never healed in my
family. While I became an activist demanding justice, there was hardly any discussion or healing process with my
siblings or mother. I know many families in different parts of the country who have had it much worse –
economically, socially and psychologically. Many have been unable to lead a normal life since 1971.
Accountability for both the local collaborators and foreign forces is an important part of the healing process.
Much of the unspoken sorrow of victims' families has been overlooked, while a culture of impunity grew. For all its
flaws, the trial and punishment of the convicted can bring us some closure. I will not get back my father, but I believe
his soul can finally rest in peace once this is over.
Profiles of Accused in War Crimes Trials
Below is profile information about the accused in the war crimes trials.
The charge sheets and some verdicts where applicable can be found in full in English in the Online Appendix.
1. Md. Abdul Alim - ON BAIL368
Profile:
1930, 1 November: Born in West Bengal.
1950-51: Migrated to Joypurhat in Rajshahi District in what was then East Pakistan. He
became a lawyer.
1958: Joined the Muslim League.
1962: Became divisional organising secretary of Muslim League.
1971: Was an influential leader of the Convention Muslim League and vice-chairman,
Bogra district council. Established an army camp, Peace Committee office and training
centre for Razakars, and housed a Pakistani, Major Afzal, by occupying the 'gadi ghar'
(trading office) of Shownlal Bajla, a significant jute trader of Joypurhat.
1978-1979: Was the cabinet Textiles minister of General Ziaur Rahman's cabinet.
1979: Joined the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and was elected Member of Parliament.
1979-82: Was Communication minister.
27 March 2011: Application for arrest of Abdul Alim.
Charges in summary:
1. Aiding and abetting deportation
2. Attacking Hindus and with accomplices involved in gunning down 370 people
3. Involved in the murder of 22 civilians in June 1971
4. Involved in ordering the murder of 19 civilians in May 1971
112
POLITICAL
ISLAM
5. Abetting and contributing to murder.
6. Abetting and contributing to the murder of civilians on 26 May 1971
7. Inciting violence against Hindus
8. Contributing to murder and torture
9. Contributing to the killing of 26 freedom fighters and was photographed with them when alive in detention
10. Involved in the murder of 26 people
11. Involved in the killing of 14 bullock cart drivers who had taken Hindus across the border to safety
12. Involved in the murder of Dr. Abul Kashem of Awami League
13. Abetting, inciting and contributing to the murder of 11 youths suspected to be freedom fighters
14. Involvement in the murder of Fazlul Karim in Oct 1971
15. Involved in the murder of 25 people in Joypurhat sugar mill
16 Involved in detaining more people in the sugar mill
17. Involved in murder of an East Pakistan Rifles defector.
The prosecution said the government issued a proclamation against Alim under the Collaborators Act, 1972, and
arrested him in March 1972. Documents from the defence say that in March 1972 Alim was arrested for co-operating
with Pakistan but he was released on bail in 1974.
2. Abul Kalam Azad (Fugitive. Convicted by the tribunal and awarded death sentence;
alias Bachchu).
Profile:
Accused of being a member of the Razakar force and a local commander of Al-Badar
Bahini in 1971, as well as at one time said to be a member of Jamaat-e-Islami.
1947: Born in Faridpur, madrasa educated and studied in Faridpur Rajendra College,
where he was close to Ali Ahsan Mohammad Mujahid, then President of East Pakistan
Islami Chatra Sangha.
1971: Became a member of the volunteer Razakar force in Faridpur and became chief of
Al-Badar force there.
Today he is the chairman of 'Masjid Council,' an NGO in Bangladesh.
Proven Charges:
1. Charged with physical participation in abduction, confinement and torture, and attacks on Hindus in June 1971.
3. :Charged with attacking Hindus on 14 May 1971 and killing one man, injuring his son.
4. Shot a man accused of providing help to freedom fighters on 16 May 1971 in Faridpur.
5. With accomplices, gang raped 2 Hindu women.
6. : Involved in killing and looting in Hindu houses in Faridpur on 3 June 1971.
7. Involved in planned attack upon the Hindu populated village of Hasamdia on17 May 1971, killing 9 people.
8. Charged with abduction, confinement and torture of an 18-year-old Hindu girl on 18 May 1971.
Charges Not Proven:
2. Charged with confining a man on 26 July 1971 - for one month and thirteen days - who witnessed torture and
atrocities committed on young girls.
3. Professor Golam Azam, erstwhile Jamaat-e-Islami leader369
Profile:
1922: Born in Brahmanbaria; studied at a madrasa.
1950: Obtained a Masters degree in Political Science from the University of Dhaka.
1950-5: Taught at Rangpur Carmichael College.
1954: Joined Jamaat-e-Islami.
1957-60: Secretary of Jamaat-e-Islami.
1969-1971: Ameer of Jamaat-e-Islami.
1971: Under his leadership Jamaat-e-Islami and its student wing, Islami Chatra Sangha,
opposed the liberation movement. He helped form the pro-Pakistan Shanti (Peace)
Committee and the Razakars, Al-Badar and Al-Shams forces.
1971: Elected uncontested as an MP from Tangail District.
22 Nov1971: Fled to Pakistan.
POLITICAL
ISLAM
113
16 Dec 1971: Formed a committee named 'Purbo Pakistan Punoruddhar Committee' (East Pakistan Restoration
Committee) and tried to create sentiments against Bangladesh in the Middle East, campaigning internationally
against recognising Bangladesh as an independent State.
Mid 1973: Went to London and set up the head office of the 'Purbo Pakistan Punoruddhar Committee' (East Pakistan
Revival Committee) there. Also published a weekly newspaper named 'Shonar Bangla' (Golden Bangla) in London,
which campaigned against Bangladesh.
18 April1973: Citizenship cancelled by the Bangladeshi Government.
March1975 : Visited Saudi Arabia to canvass against Bangladesh and collect money for building mosques.
11 Aug 1978: Returned to Bangladesh, travelling on a Pakistani passport.
1991: he was officially declared ameer of Jamaat-e-Islami.
1992: Shaheed Janani (symbolic 'mother of all martyrs') Jahanara Imam held an unprecedented People's Court as a
symbolic trial of Golam Azam. Thousands of people gathered and the court pronounced a verdict to the effect that
offences committed by him during the Liberation War deserved capital punishment.
1992: Golam Azam filed a case with the High Court to get Bangladeshi citizenship. The BNP government of the day
arrested him and put him in jail.
1994: Golam Azam acquired Bangladeshi citizenship through a court order; the government released him from
prison.
1998: BNP and Jamaat formed the four-party alliance and Golam Azam appeared at a grand public meeting with BNP
Chairperson Khaleda Zia.
2000: Golam Azam left Jamaat-e-Islami's top post and was succeeded by Motitur Rahman Nizami.
2012: International Crimes Tribunal sent him to jail on charges of crimes against humanity.
Charges:
1. That he conspired with top Pakistani military and political leaders (and the Jamaat ideologue Maulana Mawdudi)
to contain the resistance and also planned the killing of intellectuals.
2. That he formed the Peace Committees that were involved in committing crimes throughout Bangladesh.
3. He incited forces under his control to violence against Hindus and Awami League supporters.
4. He is accused of being complicit in crimes committed by the Pakistani army because he met top Generals
5. That under his direct order 38 people were killed.
4. Muhammad Kamaruzzaman--- CONVICTED AND AWARDED DEATH SENTENCE
AND IMPRISONMENT
Profile:
He is accused of being the chief organiser of Al-Badar Bahini as well as leader of Islami
Chhatra Sangha.
1952: born in Sherpur
1967: at Sherpur GKM Institution started student politics as a supporter of Islami
Chhatra Sangha. Became secretary, Jamalpur Ashek Mahmud Degree College hall unit.
1970: President of Greater Mymensingh Islami Chhatra Sangha, while Ali Ahsan
Mujahid was general secretary. Alleged to have helped form Al-Badar Bahini.
Proven Charges:
1. Involvement in torture and murder of a civilian on 29 June 1971.
2. Involvement in inhuman acts against a pro-Liberation intellectual, Syed Abdul Hannan, the then Principal of
Sherpur College, compelling him to walk through the town almost undressed and constantly whipping him.
3. Committing murder of 164 people on 25 July 1971 in the village of Sohagpur, as well as rape of a number of women.
The village is today known as 'Bidhoba Palli' (widows' village).
4. Involvement in the murder of detainees on 23 August 1971.
7. Involvement in an incident where 6 civilians were bayonetted to death on the side of a river; one escaped injured.
Charges not Proven:
5. Involvement in detention, torture and murder of 2 civilians.
6. Accused of torturing and murdering a man called Tunu in November 1971.
114
POLITICAL
ISLAM
5. Ali Ahsan Mohammad Mojaheed (in prison)
Profile:
Belongs to a political family - his late father was a Moulana who was a member of the
Pradeshik Parishad of East Pakistan. He himself contested parliamentary elections in
1986, 1991, 1996 and 2008 but without success. He was the Social Welfare Minister of the
BNP-Jamaat alliance government from 2001-2006.
He is accused of being the secretary of Islami Chatra Sangha in East Pakistan and
subsequently the head of Al Badar Bahini.
1948 born in Faridpur.
1964 Obtained SSC and studied in Faridpur Rajendra College when he joined the Islami
Chhatra Sangha.
1968-1970 President of Faridpur district Islami Chhatra Sangha.
1970 Department of Law, University of Dhaka; nominated the President of Dhaka district Islami Chhatra Sangha
and then made Secretary, East Pakistan Islami Chhatra Sangha. Became the Chief of Al-Badar Bahini.
Charges:
1. 10 Dec 1971: Charged with abduction and murder of prominent intellectual, Seraj Uddin Hossain.
2. In May 1971 charged with attacking Hindu villages and killing 50-60 people.
3. Charged with being involved in confinement and torture.
4. Charged with being involved in confinement and torture commencing 26 July 1971 in Faridpur.
5. Accused of murder and torture of 4 detainees.
6. Charged with planning genocide and the intellectual killings in Mohammadpur Physical Training Institute,
Dhaka.
7. Charged with the murder of 9 Hindus and the rape of a Hindu girl.
6. Motiur Rahman Nizami - Jamaat-e-Islami Ameer.
Profile:
1943 Born in Pabna. Educated in a madrasa.
1963 Received Kamil degree in Fiqh from Madrasha-e-Alia in Dhaka.
1967 Graduated from the University of Dhaka as a private student.
1971 President of Pakistan Islami Chhatra Shangha and chief of Al-Badar.
1978-82 Joined Jamaat-e-Islami and was Ameer of Dhaka city unit, as well as member of
central executive committee.
1983-88 Assistant Secretary General of Jamaat-e-Islami
1988 Secretary general of Jamaat-e-Islami.
1991 Member of Parliament in1991 and was the leader of parliamentary party of Jamaat-e-Islami till December 1994.
2000 Ameer of Jamaat-e-Islami - continues to hold the post.
2001 Elected a member of parliament.
2001-3 Minister of Agriculture.
2003-6 Minister of Industries.
Charges:
1. That in June 1971 he was involved in torture and murder.
2. Involvement in the planning of an attack in which 450 villagers were killed and 30-40 women raped.
3. Frequently visited a torture and detention centre in Mohammadpur, Dhaka and was involved in planning attacks.
4. Involvement in incident in Karamja village, where one person was killed for helping the freedom fighters in April
1971; on May 10 people were detained and shot at but one escaped. Three Muslim women were raped and houses
looted.
5. In April 1971 was involved in attacks on villagers and killing of 21 civilians.
6. Involved in incidents in Nov 1971 when the house of Dr Abdul Awal was raided and then 30 people shot while 22
others taken to a riverbank and bayonetted.
7. Involved in a 3 December incident in which a man was abducted, tortured and then killed in front of his wife and
children.
8. Before an amnesty set in, told the Pakistan army to kill 5 people - subsequently all but one were killed.
9. On Brishalikha village on 3 Dec 1971 killed about 70 Hindus and set on fire 72 houses.
10. Destroyed the house of a refugee returning from India - and other houses.
POLITICAL
ISLAM
115
11. Exploited religion and incitement by stating Pakistan was the House of Allah in a speech.
12. In August 1971, at a meeting to commemorate Al Madani, committed incitement.
13. Committed incitement in another speech.
14. September 1971 in Jessore committed incitement in a speech.
15. Complicit in offences committed by Razakars in Sathia.
16. Involvement of his organisation in the killing of Intellectuals on 14 Dec 1971, which amounts to genocide.
7. Abdul Quader Mollah (In prison. Convicted by tribunal: awarded life term)
Accused of forming Al-Badar force.
Profile:
1948: Born in Faridpur
1966: At Rajendra College, Faridpur, he joined Islami Chatra Sangha and was president
of the organisation. While at Dhaka University, he became the president of Islami
Chhatra Sangha of Shahidullah Hall unit.
Proven Charges:
1. As a prominent Islami Chhatra Sangha leader as well as Al-Badar leader, he was
convicted of substantially facilitating and contributing to the murder of a noncombatant civilian.
2. Contributed to the brutal murder of the pro-liberation poet Meherun Nesa, her mother and two brothers.
3. Attack and murder of an unarmed civilian
5. Actively participated in indiscriminate gunfire that caused the killing of 344 civilians.
6. Accomplices under your leadership and on your order shot and killed Hazrat Ali, his wife Amina and slaughtered
their two young daughters and their two-year-old son, who was killed by dashing him to the ground violently. Twelve
accomplices gang raped an eleven-year-old girl.
Charges Not Proven:
4. Murder by bayonet of two freedom fighters. Then attacked with indiscriminate gunfire two villages, causing the
death of hundreds of unarmed villagers (24 names given of dead).
8. Delwar Hussain Sayadee (death sentence awarded)
Profile:
Nayeb-e-Ameer (Vice President) of Jamaat-e-Islami
1940: born in Pirojpur; his father was a Maulana. Now he is married with four sons.
1957: graduated from Darns Sunnat Madrasa Sarsina; passed the Alim Examination in
1960 from Barroipara Madrasa. 1996 elected as an MP
1996: elected as MP
2001: elected as an MP
The prosecution has alleged that he's not legally entitled to use the title 'Maulana' or
'Allama' because he never obtained a higher degree of doctorate in a religious subject;
however, a profile from parliament said he obtained the fajil and kamil certification from Khulna Madrasa.
A writer of 40 books on Islamic subjects and orator by profession, during 1971 he ran a small grocery shop and was
not well off. The prosecution alleged he became rich through illegal means. His parliamentary profile says he has
served as an adviser to Rabeta-Alam Al Islami, was a member of the Trust Board of International Islamic University,
member of the Sharia Council of Islami Bank Bangladesh Ltd, chairman of the Khulna Darul Quran Kamil Madrasa,
advisor of Far-East Islami Insurance, chairman of Alilul Quran Trust, chairman of Tongi Jameya Diniya and chairman
of Jameya Kasemiya, Norsingdi. His profile says he set up almost 100 educational institutions, Islamic libraries,
hospitals and technical schools. He received a 'Grand Marshal' Award from the Islamic Circle of North America in
1992 and 'Allama' title from Muslim Ummah in America in 1993.
Convicted on these charges but in total there were 20 charges. On 28 February he was sentenced to death by
hanging.
1. May 7, 1971: looting Hindu shops.
2. 8 May 1971: - identifying two men as freedom fighters and handing them over to the Pakistan army.
3. Involved in abduction, torture and murder.
4. Men under his command burned 25 Hindu houses and killed one man.
5. Detained and tortured one man and looted his belongings.
116
POLITICAL
ISLAM
6. Attacked the Hindu-dominated neighbourhood of Hoglabunia in Pirojpur and failed to prevent his men from
raping women.
7. Led a team that abducted 3 women and handed them over to the Pakistani army, who raped them.
8. Forced 100-150 Hindus of Parerhat and other villages to convert to Islam.
9. Salauddin Quader Chowdhury
Profile:
Born in Chittagong in 1949. His father was Muslim League President, former speaker of
the Pakistan National Assembly and a former cabinet minister. Educated at school in
Pakistan, he later studied at Notre Dame college, Dhaka College and did a degree in
political science from Punjab University in Pakistan. He studied law at London
University but couldn't complete his studies because of his father's death. He is
described as an industrialist who has done social work. At 36, Chowdhury became the
youngest member of the cabinet. He served as the minister of Food and Rehabilitation,
Housing and Public Works, Health and Family Welfare. He was elected as an MP in the
general elections in 1979 as a candidate for the Muslim League, in 1986 as a candidate of
the Jatiya Party and in 1991 as a candidate for the N.D.P. In June 1996 he was elected as an
MP for the Bangladesh Nationalist Party. He was again elected as an MP in 2001 for the
Bangladesh Nationalist Party and served as an advisor to the Prime Minister.
Charges:
1. Complicit in crimes against humanity and genocide when 7 Hindus were taken to his house and 6 were tortured to
death, but one cut by a dagger was let off because he was so young.
2. Murder of unarmed Hindu civilians on 13 April, 1971.
3. Murder of Nutun Chandra Singh later on the same day.
4. Murder of 32 Hindus in another area on the same day.
5. With his father he is accused of leading the Pakistani army to Bonic para, where they opened fire upon unarmed
Hindu civilians.
6. On the same day he led the Pakistani army to Unsattar para where Hindus had been told to gather. The army fired at
civilians, killing 50 named people and 19 or 20 unknown people.
7. On 14 April 1971 he told the Pakistani army to kill Satish Chandra Palit of Rowjan Pourasava.
8. He is complicit in the murder and abduction of the founder of Chittagong Awami League, Sheikh Mozaffar Ahmed,
along with his family members on 17 April 1971.
9. Aided and abetted other killings of Hindus in April 1971 and the looting of houses.
10. Involvement in the looting of the house of Manik Dhar of Dabua village.
11. On 20 April 1971 the Pakistani army and Razakars, on the orders of Salahuddin Quader Chowhdury and his father,
attacked Sakhapura village and killed 76 people.
12 Led the Pakistani army to a village on 5 May 1971 where they killed 3 people.
13 Gave orders resulting in the killing of 6 people and the rape of 5 women and injury of 2 people on 10 May 1971.
14 Abduction, confinement, torture and murder of an Awami League man on 20 May 1971.
15. Involvement in the abduction, confinement and torture of a man in mid-May 1971.
16. Gave the order for the killing of Omar Faruk on 7 June, 1971.
17 On 5 July 1971 took 3 men to Goods Hill torture centre and then into the drawing room where his father was sitting.
The men were abused and, on his direction, beaten with rubber canes and then tortured and kept in the garage of the
house where they were also tortured.
18. The army kidnapped Md. Salahuddin and took him to the Goods Hill torture centre, where in the accused's
presence he was tortured until he lost consciousness. "He…fell in front of you and you asked in front of the Pakistani
military that no water came out from his eyes what type of torture has been done and then you tortured him and then
he was kept in a room where in other tortured people were also there and one of them told that he will be taken out
soon for murder and then you told that he will now get the result. Then you asked the Pakistani army to take him out
and kill him."[sic]
19. On 27 July 1971: murder, abduction, confinement and torture.
20. On 27/8 July 1971 a man was was taken to Goods Hill torture centre under the accused's control, where he was
tortured to death.
21. Torture of the union parishad chairman of Binajuri in August 1971; he died of his injuries later.
22. Abduction, confinement and torture of a man in August 1971.
23. In September 1971 the accused tortured a man who complained a Hindu employee had been tortured.
POLITICAL
ISLAM
117
Section 6:
Parliamentary Elections
-
The current parliament's tenure expires on 24 Jan 2014.
Elections must be called 90 days before the end of parliament's tenure.
24 Oct 2013 is the last date to announce the elections.
During the 90 days leading up to polls, parliament and the cabinet will remain in power. This is the first
time this has happened and is a result of the 15th Amendment, passed by the Awami League, thanks to its twothirds majority in parliament. After the poll, the newly elected MPs will not assume office until the term of the
outgoing parliament expires.370
Zero Sum Game
This term was used again and again by commentators to describe the highly confrontational nature of election
politics in Bangladesh. It is personality, not political agendas, that creates the polarisation.
After an attempt on her life in 2004, many say that the Prime Minister, Sheikh Hasina, genuinely believes the
opposition forces want to kill her. Some describe her as a zealot on a divine mission, who believes, like Louis XIV, that,
"L'Etat c'est moi". They say she's created a structure of patronage and vested interests among MPs, secretaries and
unelected advisors who need to keep her in power. Even party sympathisers say an Awami League victory would
mean a greater degree of corruption, misgovernance, nepotism and politicisation.
On the other hand the BNP fears that if the Awami League wins another term, their party will be obliterated
through a blend of coercion and bribery. If they win, the fear is they will seek to outdo their opponents in graft and
abuse of power. "We have to repeat what the Awami League did to us," said one opposition leader.
"This election is high stakes; it's very very dangerous," said an Awami League sympathiser.
Many believe the root cause of Bangladesh's problems lies in its Westminster-style, "winner takes all" electoral
system. In 2008 this meant the BNP won 33% of the vote but only captured 30 seats in parliament. Opposition parties
felt they didn't have much voice in parliament so they boycotted and tried to settle scores on the streets. Some argue
a caretaker system will not really solve Bangladesh's problems. Instead what's needed is a system of proportional
representation.
Interestingly the next election may be the start of a process of transferring power from one generation to the next.
Leaders from the 1940s and 1960s are still in power but may soon retire. The BNP succession is beginning, with
Khaleda Zia slowly transferring power to her son, Tarique. In the Awami League it's not clear which of Sheikh
Hasina's relatives, many of whom are dual nationals of other countries, might ultimately take over.371
POLITICAL
ISLAM
119
An Election Time Government
In June 2012, Parliament passed the 15th Amendment to the Constitution in the BNP's absence, abolishing the
caretaker system that had been in place for fifteen years. The BNP reacted by saying it will boycott elections unless
the caretaker system is reinstated372 but it's always possible parts of the party will be willing to negotiate a deal to
allow them to take part.
A May 2013 opinion poll by the newspaper Prothom Alo found 90% of people surveyed also wanted a caretaker
government.373
The Awami League's argument is a caretaker set up is inherently undemocratic and last time it remained in power
for two years. Sheikh Hasina wants the Election Commission to run the elections, possibly supervised by a multiparty committee of elected MPs. The Awami League needs at least some of the BNP and its allies to participate in
order to lend a semblance of legitimacy to any poll. Many believe the current cases pending against BNP leaders
could be used as leverage to induce them to participate in elections. Officially the BNP leaders are adamant they
won't participate unless there is a caretaker government: "Without us there will be no election," they say. However,
the BNP is said to have five internal factions, three of whom might join an election while the others boycotted.
Most commentators do not expect an election held under the current system, with the parliament and cabinet
remaining in place during campaigning, to be free and fair. The governing party is to hold elections under its own
terms. "Sheikh Hasina is only interested in an election that she wins," commented one newspaper editor. He went on
to suggest that the Prime Minister had deliberately stepped up the controversy so that a few months before polls she
could made a few concessions to the opposition over the procedures for holding elections and pass a 16th.
Amendment to the Constitution. An Awami Leaguer also suggested the new procedures for holding elections
without a caretaker government were essentially a distraction for the opposition parties, to keep them busy on the
streets.
An additional concern over the new system is if the governing party was unhappy with the election results, it could
legally call a meeting of the old parliament because it won't have been dissolved, pass a bill with their two-thirds
majority to say the polls were rigged, cancel the results and extend their term.
Key to stability, many argue, is for the two main parties to agree on an adequate election time administration. This
would be comprised of politicians - rather than technocrats as in a caretaker government. Important is who is in
charge of it; the thinking currently is that the BNP would not agree to Sheikh Hasina heading such an administration
but might consider another Awami Leaguer, such as the Speaker of Parliament. However, some commentators
expressed doubt about whether the Prime Minister would accept anybody else in her party being in charge of
elections.
One scenario is that the confrontation continues and it eventually comes to a stage where the army is reluctantly
compelled to step in to maintain law and order. Another more hopeful scenario is that the politicians will get to the
brink and then back off and strike a compromise on an election administration.
Many political analysts believe India, the US and the United Nations will play an important role in pressuring the
various political players into participating in elections. India, with strategic support from the United States, is
considered to be the kingmaker and the assumption is the Awami League still has Delhi's backing. "If it comes to a
crunch, India will stick with the Awami League," said one newspaper editor.
Military
The consensus seems to be that the Bangladeshi military has no interest in stepping into power again, unless its arm
is severely twisted and the security situation is totally out of control with rioting on the streets. The suggestion is if the
UN threatened Bangladesh's lucrative peacekeeping roles abroad that would be sufficient leverage to persuade the
army to take action.
Some argue there is more sympathy for Islamists in the military than the general population and stronger antiIndian and anti-Hindu sentiment. Others say the Islamists who joined the army between 1975-96 are now retiring
and parties like Jamaat have very little influence today. There is however no doubt there's great frustration on the
part of younger and mid-ranking officers over the failure of the two main parties.
Role of Election Commission
Transparency International thought the Election Commission could function independently but it would wholly
depend on the leadership of whatever political authority oversees the process. If there were a consensus
government, then the Election Commission would be able to do its job properly.
However the Election Commission doesn't hold an election alone. It needs the police and civil service, both of
which are extremely politically polarised. Transparency International thought it possible to deploy police and
administrators to minimise conflicts of interest - especially in marginal seats where the election will be decided.
120
POLITICAL
ISLAM
One former senior civil servant said that legally the Election Commission had unlimited powers but in reality they
were very limited. An election involves deploying at least half a million government employees throughout 80,000
villages but the very centralised Election Commission has no power to dismiss them. This former civil servant
estimated about 40% of the work was done by the Election Commission, 30% by the Returning Officer and his staff
(controlled by the government) and a further 30% by the law and order agencies (controlled by the government).
Without government support his conclusion was no Election Commission alone could hold a free and fair vote, even
if it's apolitical.
Some say the politicisation of the bureaucracy has become by far the worst in South Asia. One academic compared
Bangladesh to Pakistan, saying that there the recent elections had been run by the judiciary but that wouldn't be
possible in his country now because "the judiciary was even more politicised than the civil service". He could see no
solution, concluding the Bangladeshi system was irreparably broken.
Government servants dismissed by one regime have been reinstated by the next, with back pay and a promotion.
There might be 200 vacant posts in the bureaucracy but a government will promote 800 people, leaving 600 on the
payroll but without actual jobs. This leads to competition among the civil servants to please their masters in
government. Even those involved in previous caretaker governments say it was very difficult to control the civil
service when the political parties were urging officials not to do their bidding and offering incentives. They said the
last election was perhaps 40% free but without a caretaker government it would be 0% free.
The degree of politicisation of the civil service is apparent to anyone who chats to officials, many of whom will
almost certainly lose their jobs if there is a change of government. Some who've been championing secularism or
targeting militancy fear they could face reprisals if Jamaat-e-Islami come to power and the Islamists have more space
in which to operate. There is even talk of hit lists containing the names of journalists and police officials who have
been outspoken.
Corruption and Elections:
"Politics has become a profit-making enterprise" is how one watchdog described the situation. Money is required for
the muscle power required to win an election and once in office the politicians think it's within their rights to recoup
their costs. This attitude regards election expenses as an investment. Advocate Itrat Amin Kalimullah of the election
monitoring group, Janipop, said the Bangladeshi political system had become so eroded from within that an
ordinary young person could never hope to be Prime Minister because two families ran the show and "positions
were sold like in the Mughal period". He feared there was no room in such a regulated system for a third force to
emerge.
Increasing numbers of parliamentarians are involved in business now. Transparency International says in the
country's first parliament less than 18% of MPs declared their profession as business, while today it's 60%. One
political observer sympathetic to the Awami League said politicians had already started remitting black money
abroad to get it out of the country before the elections. He added that the governing party should have made more
political capital out of the corruption charges against Khaleda Zia's son but couldn't because they were corrupt
themselves.
Transparency says there are three main ways in which money is used:
(I) Visible election expenses are capped by law. In terms of rules on disclosure of campaign financing, Bangladesh
is ahead of other countries in the region; there is for example a cap of 1.5 million taka per candidate on expenses. The
problem is enforcement of the laws. Transparency looked at political parties' financing and found that although
there was a law saying any donation more than 20,000 taka must be made only by A/C payee cheque (and not cash),
in practice contributions to parties are never declared and no accounts are kept. Transparency International said
parties submitted audit reports but quite often these were bogus. After the last election it found, on average, political
parties took 2.5 years to declare their financial statements to the Election Commission and no action was taken
against those who filed fictitious statements because the administration did not want to antagonise the political
parties, irrespective of which one.
(II) Securing a party nomination is thought to require payments by the candidate but nobody in the party talks
openly about this murky area. Local political leaders spend their funds on the party but when it comes to
nominations they're asked for yet more. Instead a bureaucrat or ex-army officer comes in, with fewer roots in the
constituency, but more money. The price of a nomination is said to be between 5-10 crore taka depending on the
return on investment possible. Jamaat-e-Islami and the leftist parties are described as more disciplined and
transparent. In the last election an ordinance stated that the preferences of the local party leadership were supposed
to be reflected in the decision on candidates but very few parties complied with this rule. Subsequently, when the
ordinance was made law, this provision became non-mandatory. Transparency International says the Awami
League did hold a consultative exercise in 2008 but the BNP did not.
POLITICAL
ISLAM
121
(III) Vote Buying & Stuffing Boxes: this involves deploying agents to buy or capture votes by force. Transparency
says voters are getting smarter and sometimes even take money but vote for whoever they like. Corruption seems to
have spread even to those who are bribed. The average price for the vote of a villager is 500-1000 taka, according to
the election-watch NGO, Janipop. The price drops if it's being sold to someone with kinship ties or following the
same religious leader, such as pir. Janipop says ballot box stuffing or switching tends to happen at lunchtime when
voting is slow and it only takes five or six thugs about five minutes to destroy, add or steal ballot papers. They say it's
also easy to buy polling officials and observers, using a mix of coercion and threat, especially in remote areas with
makeshift polling booths. Mid-ranking military officials deployed to polling stations, they argue, can be influenced
by money and friendship – colleagues from cadet college and other clubs.
The BNP
Some say the influence of Khaleda Zia's son, Tarique, is growing within the party, especially among younger
members who are more radical. Many in the party hope he can return home if corruption charges (which he says are
politically motivated) are lifted. They hope he can act as a unifying factor for the party machinery. Tarique has
applied for political asylum in the UK and there is a Bangladeshi warrant for his arrest, which has been conveyed to
the British authorities.374 There's been criticism of some of Khaleda Zia's decisions, such as issuing a 48-hour
ultimatum in May during the Hefajate protests to the government to restore the caretaker system. Even her alliance
partners say it was a baffling demand.
One group within the BNP believes the Awami League is so unpopular that the BNP will win an election. These
people point to the way the Awami League has antagonised several parts of society: small shareholders, those
concerned about financial scandals, Hefajate Islam supporters in the madrasa and garment factory workers over
safety and minimum wage issues. This group will take heart from the fact candidates supported by the 18 party
opposition alliance did well in municipal polls in Syhlet, Barisal, Khulna and Rajshahi in June 2013.375
Another group is busy fighting off court cases and thinks the Awami League should be allowed to win power and
then they can launch a fresh movement against them. While a third faction believes the BNP should not participate
in polls at all.
Some in the party question the alliance with Jamaat. It began in 1995 when the BNP realised that if there were an
electoral alliance of anti-Awami League forces the votes would be transferable between the BNP and Jamaat in key
constituencies. Some say if the issue of an interim election administration was sorted, the party might consider
ditching Jamaat on the grounds that the anti-Awami League vote will be strong this time. They worry that anti-Awami
League voters don't support the BNP because of its alliance with Jamaat. The consensus in Bangladesh is that votes
for the BNP are anti-Awami League votes, not pro-BNP ones.
Within Jamaat today there's also quite a bit of unhappiness about allying with a party that is tainted by allegations
of corruption.
Hefajat Votes
BNP analysts say the Hefajat vote bank may be significant in certain constituencies in Chittagong and Sylhet,
comprising 20-30,000 votes. One academic estimated the Hefajate Islam vote block as 4-5% of the total. This
assumes it's not just the madrasa students and their families, but also village Imams trained in the Deobandi
madrasa, who may vote against the Awami League in protest at the violent dispersal of the Hefajat protestors in
Dhaka in May. It's not that voters relate to Hefajat's 13-point demands but they have an emotional and respectful
response to elderly clerics and a soft corner for religion, though not an Islamic state. Many Bangladeshis didn't know
who the bloggers were, but heard that the Prophet was insulted.
Jamaat estimates more than 70% of Imams and Muezzin in mosques were educated in quomi madrasa and have
spread the message that religious people were mistreated. It's not just mosques but also social media and mobile
phones (through Bluetooth and MMS, not especially the Internet) that are being used to spread photographs of the
violence against Hefajat. However it's not clear how many of the quomi madrasa people actually participate in
elections. Jamaat analysts describe Hefajat as a top down organisation, saying the leader, Shah Ahmad Shafi, would
need to instruct his followers to vote for a particular party to impact the elections.
Recently Jamaat sources say the quomi madrasa students have been allowed to read the pro-Jamaat newspaper
Naya Diganto for the first time, even though it had previously been banned for publishing pictures of women
without hijab. Mosque Imams have also started handing out leaflets against the bloggers with what looks like the
assistance of local Jamaat activists. Journalists suspect that Jamaat is helping Hefajat with much of its media
push, especially its English emailed press releases.376
122
POLITICAL
ISLAM
Impact of War Crimes Trial
The unknown factor is whether the government will carry out one or two death penalties before the elections. There
is still the appeals process but it's expected that could be completed in time. Some suggest executions might lead to a
surge of popular support, especially among a younger generation that takes pride in the trial and derives a sense of
national identity from it. It's even possible the government could carry out a few executions and then say vote for us if
you want to see the rest of the accused hanged. It's not clear what response this would receive from traditional
Islamists who perceive the ultra secularists close to the Awami League as a threat to Islam.
Jamaat activists of course warn there could be "total anarchy" if the death sentences are carried out. They say if the
threat of executions were taken off the table, the current level of violence would cease. Some even say a deal between
Jamaat and the Awami League might be possible now, especially as the government needs the opposition parties to
participate in elections. "The situation is quite desperate in the Jamaat camp," said one Jamaat figure, stressing that
anything could be negotiated if there was a promise not to execute their leaders.
Marginal Seats
Since 1991 the two main parties have alternated in power and there's an assumption there is always a swing against
the incumbent.
Generally it's assumed there is 10-15% of the vote that changes each election, going back and forth to the proAwami League or anti-Awami League forces. This swing can be enough to deliver a two-thirds majority for a party. If
support is static377 then Jamaat's 5-6% of the vote becomes crucial, especially in marginal seats. There are 40-50 seats
that are marginal and decided by a balance of less than 2000 votes, or as little as 1% of the vote. If Jamaat doesn't
contest in such a seat then the BNP will get their 5000 odd votes, which can make all the difference. So the
relationship with Jamaat is key for the BNP.
The election monitoring group, Janipop, believes in about 50 marginal constituencies there may be high levels of
violence that could result in voters remaining at home and allowing others to cast their votes.
According to research based on a National Democratic Institute data-set, the 1991 and 2001 Bangladesh election
results "could have been different given the razor-thin margins by which many seats were won, and the huge
number of minority voters that were prevented from voting in those very seats". Out of 300 constituencies, there
were 71 where minority voters were significant (ranging from 11% to 61%) and 50 where they were visible (5-10%).378
Minority constituencies are often subjected to election violence and worth watching given the level of attacks in
early 2013 as well as during the 2001 elections.
Some suggest 12-14% of the voters belong to civil society groups who could swing the outcome for the Awami
League. These are 5000 or more human rights, women's and professional organisations that work at village level and
represent social democrats, liberals and those who supported the War of Liberation, but are not pro-Awami League
as such. In the face of a perceived Islamist threat these groups may have no choice but to hold their noses and vote
Awami League, whatever their reservations over poor governance.
In conclusion some of the key areas to watch over the next six months will be:
-
the formation of an election time administration to oversee polls
death penalties being carried out for war crimes
violence against religious minorities, especially in marginal seats
a realignment and possible unifying of rival Islamist forces
legal procedures against Khaleda Zia's son, who is in the UK
POLITICAL
ISLAM
123
Appendices:
Appendix 1: Number of Madrasa
Appendix 2: List of Attacks on Hindus 2013
Appendix 3: List of Attacks on Ahmadiyya
Appendix 4: Comparison of 2006 and 2008 Jamaat-e-Islami Constitution
POLITICAL
ISLAM
125
Appendix 1: Numbers of Madrasa
There is no definitive figure for how many madrasa operate in Bangladesh. The statistics have to be gathered from
different madrasa boards, but there are also some institutions that fall outside the purview of any board. We have
tried to assemble information that's as accurate as possible from a variety of sources and collate it in a table below.
The information suggests a total number of approximately 19,000 madrasa (alia and quomi) with nearly 4
million students enrolled. The vast bulk of these are primary education establishments, where the number of girls is
surprisingly almost at parity with boys. Some have said Bangladesh has the most feminised madrasa system in the
world.379
In this table we chose to use the Befaqul Madarisil Arabia figure for the quomi madrasa on the advice of the
director of the government-run Islamic Foundation, who was adamant that other estimates were excessive.
However we also cite the larger estimates below.
Madrasa Estimated Numbers
ALIA
STUDENTS
Befaqul Madarisil Arabia
Alia Stand Alone Primary
4,416
676,398
Alia Primary attached to Secondary
9313
1,741.049
Only Dhakil to Kamil
17
13,746
2,907
2,420,354
Subtotal
QUOMI
STUDENTS
5,250
1,357,505
5,250
1,357,505
TOTAL
Total Madrasa Establishments
Total Madrasa
Total Madrasa Students
18,996
3,777,859
On average 171 students at each alia madrasa . Estimated student nos. are in red
The numbers shift considerably depending on how you count the primary alia madrasa that are attached to a
secondary madrasa. Are they one madrasa or two? We have counted them as one only. If you counted them
separately that would add approximately 9000 establishments to the total.
These statistics appear to suggest many of the estimates currently being used are far too high. Figures like 64,000
madrasa in Bangladesh have been cited by The International Crisis Group380, 54,130 derived from a Dhaka University
sample survey and 40,000 by the Bangladeshi Foreign Minister, Dipu Moni recently.381 The possible reasons for our
lower figure could be:
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)
(v)
The quomi madrasa authorities have exaggerated in the past to seem more powerful but now they are
discussing possible recognition by the government they are no longer doing this.
Post-9/11 an industry emerged of studies of madrasa in Pakistan and Bangladesh with donor money being
used to address the militancy threat and therefore there could have been a tendency to play up that threat in
terms of exaggerating the numbers.
Other studies double counted primary and secondary establishments on the same physical location.
Other studies included pre-primary madrasa in the total numbers.
Our available statistics may not have captured the full picture.
The number of 4 million students in madrasa is within a context of a total population of 16.5 million Bangladeshi
children of primary age plus about 30 million adolescents (according to UNICEF)382 or 42.4 million aged 5-17 years
(according to Save the Children Fund).383
This lower than expected number is in keeping with a 2009 World Bank report that found the number of quomi
madrasa was much lower than portrayed in the popular press. It said quomi madrasa accounted for only 1.9% of total
primary enrolment, compared to NGO schools at 8.2%. It did note however that the share of alia madrasa was
significant and accounted for 8.4% of primary enrolment. In terms of secondary education the study found quomi
madrasa made up 2.2% and alia madrasa almost 19% of enrolment.384
What's clear from the chart below is that roughly equal numbers of boys and girls are attending primary alia
madrasa in Bangladesh.
126
POLITICAL
ISLAM
Boys versus Girls in Alia Madrasa
PRIMARY MADRASA (ALIA)
GIRLS
BOYS
BOYS VERSUS GIRLS
600000
450000
300000
150000
GRADE O
GRADE 1
GRADE 2
GRADE 3
GRADE 4
0
GRADE 5
VARIOUS SOURCES OF INFORMATION
1. Alia Madrasa
A. Primary Level Madrasa
An attached Ebtadaee (primary level) madrasa is one that is attached to a senior school in the same or nearby
premises. An independent one operates without any secondary or higher level madrasa - so is purely primary level.
Alia Madrasa Primary Level Enrolment, including number of girls.
ALIA MADRASA PRIMARY LEVEL ENROLMENT, INCLUDING NUMBER OF GIRLS.
TYPE
OF
MADRASA
GRADE - 0
(PRE-PRIMARY)
GRADE -1
GRADE -2
GRADE -3
GRADE - 4
GRADE - 5
TOTAL
TOTAL
GIRLS
TOTAL
GIRLS
TOTAL
GIRLS
TOTAL
TOTAL
GIRLS
TOTAL
GIRLS
86723
40314
335689
161173 307340
146248
315306 149716 333026
166315
362965
191486 1741049 855252
Independent 46280
Ebtedaee
24288
191301
96710
71362
119497
48753
76308
39699
Attached
Ebtedaee
143873
GIRLS
60941
99139
TOTAL
676398
GIRLS
341753
INDEPENDENT EBTEDAEE DATA SOURCE: ESTIMATED FROM INDEPENDENT EBTEDAEE MADRASA SAMPLE SURVEY, 2010
POLITICAL
ISLAM
127
B. Secondary Level
Alia Madrasa Secondary Level Enrolment, including number of girls.
FIG 4 ALIA MADRASA SECONDARY LEVEL ENROLMENT, INCLUDING NUMBER OF GIRLS
KAMIL
FAZIL
ALIM
DAKHIL
YEAR
TOTAL
Total
Female
Total
Female
Total
Female
Total
Female
Total
Female
1995
4121
358
871
33
881
5
104
1
5977
397
1996
4687
383
949
33
899
4
115
1
6655
421
1997
4795
459
983
31
955
9
118
1
6851
500
1998
4868
520
998
42
970
13
120 (3)
1
6956 (3)
576
1999
4890
609
1074
59
1017
21
141 (3)
3
7122 (3)
692
2000
5015
628
1087
61
1029
23
148 (3)
4
7279 (3)
784
2001
5391
701
1087
61
1029
21
144
4
7651 (3)
784
2002
5536
733
1105
64
1032
23
147
4
7820 (3)
821
2003
5995
847
1220
80
1030
20
165
4
8410
951
2004
6315
926
1320
86
1012
22
172
6
8819
1040
2005
6685
1017
1315
91
1039
24
175 (3)
6
9214 (3)
1138
2006
6798
1034
1345
98
1040
24
178 (3)
7
9361 (3)
1163
2008
6779
1046
1401
107
1013
25
191 (3)
8
9384 (3)
1186
2009
6771
1058
1487
114
1022
24
195 (3)
8
9475 (3)
1204
2010
6660
1031
1486
114
1021
24
194 (3)
8
9361(3)
1177
2011
6669
1028
1401
107
1056
32
204 (3)
10
9330(3)
1177
SOURCE: BANBIES
NOTE: FIGURE IN THE PARENTHESES INDICATE PUBLIC MADRASA.
C. Growth of private educational institutions in Bangladesh since 1970
Growth of Madrasa 1970-2011
GROWTH OF MADRASA 1970-2011
EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS
1970
1980
1990
2000
2011
SCHOOL
5,645
8,310
10,153
15,403
19,070
MADRASA
1,515
2,681
5,871
7,276
9,330
COLLEGE
362
482
650
2,176
3,475
31,875
7,532
11,473
16,674
24,855
TOTAL
NOTE: THE INFORMATION COMES FROM BANBEIS.
THESE ARE ONLY PRIVATE SCHOOLS, COLLEGES AND MADRASA, NOT STATE FUNDED ONES.
128
POLITICAL
ISLAM
D. Summary of Different Types of Madrasa:
Source: BANBIES
Madrasa Broken Down by Level of Education
NUMBER
TYPE
TEACHERS
Female
3488
Independent Ebtedaye
(primary)
4416
ENROLMENT
Total
676398
Attached Ebtedaye
(Primary and Higher madrasa)
9313
1741049
855252
34040
3852
Only Dhakil to Kamil
17
No
Separate figure available
No
No
No
TOTAL
13,746
Girls
344580
[different from above]
Total
19210
This information can be depicted visually in this chart:
Graph Showing Growth of Madrasa
ALL
GIRLS
10000
7500
5000
2500
2011
2010
2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
2001
2000
1999
1998
1997
1996
1995
0
SECONDARY LEVEL ALIA MADRASA- GIRLS VERSUS BOY ENROLLMENT
POLITICAL
ISLAM
129
2. Quomi Madrasa
A. Number of Quomi Madrasa and students across Bangladesh (approximate estimate provided by Befaqul
Madarisil Arabia - Shafi).
LEVEL
NUMBER OF MADRASA
NUMBER OF STUDENTS (M/F)
Taqmil (Kamil, Hons)
400
16,000
Fazilat/FAzil (Fazil, Hons)
193
82, 755
SanabiaUlea (Alim, Hons)
283
91,350
Mutawassitah (lower secondary, Hons)
1530
119,700
Iblidaiyah (Primary, Hons)
752
5,77,000
Hifzul Quran
2092
470,700
TOTAL
5250
1,357, 505
B. Source: Member of Quomi Madrasa Education Commission (formed by the government) who wishes to remain
anonymous:
Befaqul Madarisil Arabia Bangladesh
(Bangladesh Qaomi Madrasa Education Board)
BefaqulMadarisilQuomi
Azad DeeneeEdara-e Ta’lim Bangladesh
Anjuman-e IttihadulMadaris
TanzimulMadaris
TOTAL
Dhaka
4500
Gopalganj
Sylhet
Patia, Chittagong
Bogra
800
950
1500
575
8325
There are additional quomi madrasa boards beyond the five cited above. Altogether this source estimated the total
number amounts to around 10,500 quomi madrasa. In addition there are some quomi madrasa not under any
supervision that operate totally independently.
C. The Bangladesh Quomi Madrasa Education Board (Bifalqul Madaress al Arabia Bangladesh)
This is the main board that regulates exams for Daura madrasa. These are quomi madrasa that offer the highest
qualification possible – a Daura degree, which is equivalent to an MA degree. The Board regulates 450 such madrasa.
In Dhaka City there are 70-75 Daura madrasa for men and 38 for women, but generally the majority elsewhere are
male. Overall they estimated one sixth of students at the highest level are women.
This information came from Islami Oikyo Jote, who indicated they used to cite much higher figures in the past.
QUOMI MADRASSA ACCORDING TO IOJ
MISHAKAT
NAHOMIR OR
MUTTAWASIT
SANIBI
NAYHALEE
DAURA
Primary Level
Secondary Level
Higher Secondary
Undergraduate
Postgraduate
Ages 6/7 to 12/13
12-14 yrs
14-16 yrs
16-19 yrs
19-20 yrs
No certificate
No certificate
No certificate
Certificate
Certificate
6 years
2 years
2 years
3 years
1 years
6000-7000 of them
- ie more than half
of all Quomi
Madrassa
IOJ says approximately 5000 madrassa in these categories
130
POLITICAL
ISLAM
600 madrassa offer this level
D. Dhaka University Sample Survey Projections:
A 2008 survey385 of sample locations and a study of 60 alia and 61 quomi madrasa by researchers from Dhaka
University and the Human Development Research Centre estimated the nationwide figure (including primary level
madrasa) to be:
ALIYA
QUOMI
TOTAL
MAINSTREAM EDUCATION
MOSQUE
14,518
39,612
54,130
103,618
191,986
This is much higher than other figures, especially for the quomi madrasa.
In addition the Dhaka University and HDRC researchers found:
Of these, 86% were rural and 13.6% urban.
Approximately 10 million students were enrolled.
Almost 70% of the quomi madrasa were primary level
Half of all madrasa were attached to a mosque.
In the last 60 years the overall number has increased more than 12 times but the population only 3 times.
Every year 10,000 madrasa are added.
Madrasa are growing faster than mainstream schools.
The expansion of madrasa was linked to periods of military rule.
Mainstream schools cannot keep up with the pace of demand for education.
On average 147 students enroll every year in each madrasa.
The researchers used this graph to represent the growth in madrasa and predict that their number could treble in the
next 40 years.
MADRASSA
600000
450000
300000
150000
0
1950
1960
1970
1980
1990
2000
2008
POLITICAL
ISLAM
131
Appendix 2: Attacks on Hindus
DATE
PLACE
DEAD
ATTACKS ON HINDUS 2013
ATTACK
SOURCE
WEBSITE
Chakra News
http://www.chakranews.co
m/muslims-torch-and-loot200-hindu-homes-in-westbengal/3645
FEB
2/18/2013
More than 200 Hindu homes torched and looted in four villages.
Almost two dozen Hindu shops fully damaged and looted in
Joynagar police station area. The headmaster of a local school
reportedly incited the mob, and soon Hindu homes began to be
attacked from the early hours of February 19. 2 police vehicles
destroyed & some policemen seriously injured.
Naliakhali, Herobhanga,
Gopalpur and Goladogra
in South 24 Parganas
District.
Chakra News
2/28/2013
Rajganj Bazar, Noakhali
Attackers set fire to 30 houses in which 76 families were living. They
also set fire to a Kali temple. And Bdnews 24 says Hindu temples at
Rajganj Bazar, Thakur Barhi and Bainnabarhi areas were vandalised
after Shibir/Jamaat procession. BBC said: Police reported that a
Hindu temple and houses belonging to Hindu families had been
attacked in Noakhali. AFP also reported attacks on Hindu homes.
2/28/2013
Dhoppara South, Jaldi,
Gunagari Banskhali,
Chittagong
Jamaat -Shibir Activists reported to have set fire to 30 residences, 40
shops looted and vandalised and 3 Temples, 15 people injured and 1
killed.
Ain o Shalish Kendro
quoting Protom Alo,
Samakal and
Sangbad
newspapers
2/28/2013
Chandragonj Bazar
Jamaat- Shibir activists reported to have atacked 1 house,
5 shops and 2 Temples.
quoting Bhorer Kagoj
Samakal
2/28/2013
Cox's Bazar
1
1
Attack on a police camp, killing one.
Two policemen were killed when Islamists stormed a police station.
"We have been virtually besieged. It's a horrible situation," station
officer Manzur Rahman told Reuters. BBC said 3 killed when 2000
Jamaat supporters went on the rampage in protest at the verdict
and attacked a police station. AFP quoted local police chief Monjur
Rahman saying “At least 10,000 Jamaat supporters attacked us with
weapons. We were forced to open fire,” Rahman said, adding two
protesters were shot dead NB not policemen.
Amnesty
International &
Reuters & BBC
Reuters
http://www.reuters.com/art
icle/2013/02/28/usbangladesh-tribunalidUSBRE91R0AN20130228
Reuters & BBC
http://www.reuters.com/ar
ticle/2013/02/28/usbangladesh-tribunalidUSBRE91R0AN20130228
and
http://www.bbc.co.uk/new
s/world-asia-21623170
2/28/2013
Sundarganj in Northern
Gaibandha
2/28/2013
Canshat
Chapainawbaganj
2/28/013
2/28/2013Bainbari,
Napitbari, Aladinnagar,
Kalirhat, Chayani
Shibir-Jamaat activists attacked around 2 pm after the verdict,
setting fire to 8 houses and vandalising and looting 46, vandaisin15
shops and 7 temples incuding arson and smshing idols, stole gold,
injured 50 people.
quoting Protom Alo,
and Ittefaq
newspapers
2/28/2013
Brahmanpara, Comilla
Temple attacked, 1 idol vandalised.
quoting Protom Alo
newspaper
2/28/2013
Moheshpur, Khansama,
Cirirbanda, Dinazpur
Sadar
Jamaat-Shibir men reportedly set fire at stalk of hay, 14 houses and
vandalised business establishments.
quoting Bhorer
Kagoj 4.3.13
Sangbad 4.3.13
Prothom Alo 24.3.13
2/28/2013
Gopalpur Chigrikhali,
Morelgonj, Bagerhat,
Jamaat-Shibir men reportedly attacked a Temple and vandalised. A
case has been filed.
quoting Prothom
Alo, Jugantor and
Samakal
Begumganj
Jamaat-Shibir activists reported to have vandalized and torched
several Hindu houses and a temple leaving six minor injured at
Begumganj upazila.
2/28/2013
132
POLITICAL
ISLAM
2 or 3
Attacks on 2 Temples and 1 Ashram.
http://www.reuters.com/art
icle/2013/02/28/usbangladesh-tribunalidUSBRE91R0AN20130228
Ai o Shalish Kendro
quoting Prothom Ali
of 24/3/13
Bangla News
http://www.banglanews24.
com/English/detailsnews.p
hp?nssl=8acb8082f029fa1a
362d7fbff1caaae5&nttl=03
03201365136
DATE
PLACE
DEAD
ATTACK
SOURCE
WEBSITE
bdnews 24
http://bdnews24.com/bang
ladesh/2013/03/02/bagerh
at-barisal-hindu-templesset-ablaze
MARCH
Ramchandrapur Union
Attackers vandalised a Hindu temple at Pingjour village at
Chingrekhali union.
Gazipur
Hindu statue vandalised in Kashimpur. Ai o Shalish Kendro says
recently temple authority set up the idols of Saraswati for one year
but some unidentified people vandalized the idol and damaged
shed.
3/1/2013
Bagherat
Dumuria Sharbajaneen temple in the Ramchandrapur Union set on
fire. Ain o Shalish Kendro says two houses were torched and a
worship pavilion and adds 1/2 March in Morelganj, Bagerhat a
temple was set on fire according to Ittefak 7.3.13.
bdnews24 & Ain o
Shalish Kendro
quoting Samakal on
3/3/13 and Prothom
Alo 3.3.13 Bhorer
Kagoj 4.3.13
3/1/2013
Charsita Municipality,
Ramgati, Laxmipur
Set fire to a house of Nitish Chandra Das and two Temples.
quoting Prothom Alo
Samakal 3..3.13
Prothom Alo 24.3.13
3/1/2013
Khewra Bazar, Kasba,
Brahmanbaria.
Miscreants torched 4 shops
quoting Prothom Alo
Samakal 3.3.13
3/1/2013
Purbodhola, Netrokona
2/28/2013
3/1/2013
3/1/2013
Barisal
Miscreants set fire to Hindu temples at midnight.
Reports from Barisal said attackers damaged and torched idols at
Sarbajanin Durga Mandir in Boradi-Garangal village of Nalchira
union under Gournadi upazila. Police said another Hindu temple at
Nalcira union at Gauranadi upazila of Barisal was set on fire in the
early hours. Mayor and lawmaker visited the area. Case has been
filed. 8 idols were vandalised and the temple set on fire.
http://archive.thedailystar.
net/newDesign/newsdetails.php?nid=271161
bdnews 24
quoting Prothom Alo
and Samakal 3..3.13.
New Age & Ain o
Shalish Kendro
quoting Samakal
(3/3/13), Ittefaq
(5/3/13) and
Prothom Alo
(24/3/13) .
Satkania near
Chittagong
100 young men holding banners in support of Jamaat looted and
damaged four shops in Satkania near Chittagong and vandalised a
Hindu temple in the village. Also Niti Media says mob set fire to a
Buddhist temple at Satkania upazila.
Amnesty
International
3/2/2013
Aliganj Bazar, Hizla,
Barisal.
Some unidentified people set fire after the prayer at around 3 am.
One temple was torched. A case has been filed.
quoting Prothom Alo
4.3.13.
3/2/2013
Chandragonj Bazar, Char
Ababil, Gaiyerchar
Raypur, Laxmipur
Activists set on fire a Temple using petrol and torch it.
quoting Prothom Alo
and Sangbad
Attack on temple vandalises idols
quoting Prothom Alo
6/3/13
Ittefak 6.3.13
Soaid, Singra, Natore
http://www.newagebd.co
m/detail.php?date=20130303&nid=41737#.UVyRU
799nwy
https://www.niticentral.co
m/2013/03/02/jamaatterrorises-bangladeshhindus-burn-6-temples51497.html and Daily Star
on Satkhania attack 5/3/13
http://www.thedailystar.ne
t/beta2/news/jamaatcontinues-attackinghindus/
3/2/2013
3/3/2013
http://devbd.bdnews24.com/details.
php?id=241410&cid=2
POLITICAL
ISLAM
133
DATE
PLACE
DEAD
ATTACK
SOURCE
3/3/2013
Enyatpur Betil
Halderpara, Rupsa
Kandapara, Gopinathpur,
Belkuchi,
Ullahpara,Sirajganj
quoting Ittefak
Jugantor 5.3.13
Prothom Alo 24.3.13
3/3/2013
Lakhirpar area of
Kotalipara
Six people including a Jamaat
leader were arrested on charges of
torching a temple in Lakhirpar area
of Kotalipara on March 3.
bdnews 24
3/3/2013
Rajchandrapur Bazar ,
Hajigonj,
Jamaat-Shibir men reportedly attacked 7 shops
quoting
Sangbad 3.3.13
3/3/2013
Kachua, Chandpur
Unidentified miscreants set fire to a arch which was built for a
religious programme.
quoting Sangbad
3.3.13
3/3/2013
Jaldhaka, Nilphamari
Attacks on houses of Hindu minority.
quoting Ittefak
5.3.13
3/4/2013
Shibganj,
Chapainawbgonj
Jamaat-Shibir men led attackon a Temple and vandalised. Think this
is the same attack reported by Ain o Shalish Kendro on Aliallanga
Mohalla, Chapainawabganj where miscreants torched puja mandop
and stole idols and attacked an ashram.
quoting Ittefak
5.3.13 Prothom Alo
24.3.13 and
Sangbad 5.3.13 and
Jugantor 5.3.13
3/3/2013
Haldia, Goalimadra,
Manipara, Lowhagonj,
Munshiganj
The miscreants vandalised the Kali mandir at around 10pm & set
fire. A case has been filed.
quoting Jugantor
5.3.13 Samakal
6.3.13
Prothom Alo 24.3.13
3/3/2013
Jhalkathi, Kesobpur,
Baufal.Patuakhali
Jamaat-Shibir men reportedly led attacked on Bijoy Das’s house. He
is under open sky with his family.
auoting Sangbad
5.3.13
3/4/2013
Madhapur Bazar Bawfal,
Putuakhali
Set fire to temple. Case filed.
quoting Prothom Alo
6.3.13
3/4/2013
Shalabari, Mirtiripara
and Shelnari Sirajgonj
Attacks on temples.
quoting Jugantor
5.3.13
3/4/2013
Munshiganj
Temple vandalised and torched. Janakantha report published on
5/3/13 said attackers vandalised and torched the Monipara Kali
Mandir at Goalimandra village of Louhajang upazila during hartal
hours.
Daily Star quoting
Jonokontho report
3/4/2013
Guthua, Uzirpur,
Banaripaga, Bislara
Temple set on fire.
quoting Prothom Alo
6/3/13
Ittefak 6.3.13
3/4/2013
Damodpur, Sadullahpur,
Gaibandha
Set fire to temple, later locals doused the blaze. Set fire to a house.
quoting Prothom Alo
Samakal 3.3.13
134
POLITICAL
ISLAM
WEBSITE
t/beta2/news/two-moretemples-vandalised/
t/beta2/news/temples-stillunder-attack/
DATE
PLACE
DEAD
ATTACK
WEBSITE
SOURCE
Pilangkathi Nalcira,
Gowrandi, Barisal
Set fire to Dulal Dutta’s temple.
quoting Ittefak
5.3.13
Satkania upazila,
Chittagong
In Chittagong, Hindu temple Sarbajaneen Magadeshwari Mandir
at East Rupkania of Satkania upazila was torched. Bdnews24 said
Khetrapal Temple set on fire around 3:30am and the idol vandalised
and money taken from donnation box.
Daily Star report on
6/3/13 7 Bdnews24
and Ain o Shalish
Kendro quoting
Prothom Alo 6.3.13
Sangbad
ladesh/2013/03/05/templetorched-in-ctg
3/5/2013
Khulna
(also on 19/3/13)
A woman and a young man were injured after a Jamaat/Shibir
procession headed for a Hindu areas and attacked houses. Police
arrested two Shibir activists from the area.“Two to three houses
were torched and looted and about eight shops were looted during
the attack,” said the OC of Koyra Police Station. Superintendent of
Khulna police said BNP and Jamaat-Shibir men had set fire to
thatched houses and a semi-concrete structure, and vandalised 8
shops belonging to local Hindus. Ain o Shalish Kendro reports that
in Amadi Bazar Kaira, Pabla, Banikpara,Dowlatpur, Khulna there
were attacks on Hindus and 10 houses, 20 shops and 3 temples
attacked. Two cases were filed and 2 people detained.
Daily Star & Ain o
Shalish Kendro
quoting Prothom Alo
6/3/13
Ittefak 6/3/13
Prothom Alo
24/3/13
ladesh/2013/03/05/templetorched-in-ctg
3/5/2013
Kuraltala, Hijla,
Chitalmari, Bagerhat.
Two temples set on fire.
quoting Ittefak
7.3.13
3/4/2013
Lakhirpar village under
Kotalipara upazila
in Gopalganj
Attackers set fire to a temple of goddess Kali on Monday around
7:45pm. The fire partially gutted the temple and destroyed four
idols of the goddess. The arson instantly drew protests in the area.
Ain o Shalish Kendro says a case has been filed.
Daily Star and Ain o
Shalish Kendro
quoting Prothom Alo
6/3/13 Ittefak 6.3.13
3/5/2013
Dhore Bangla,Sadar, Netrakhona
Attack on temple.
Ain o Shalish Kensro
quoting Janokotho
Samakal 7.3.13
3/5/2013
Baraipar, Atgharia,Panba.
Attacked from a procession of BNP and vandalised. Damge to a
Temple.
quoting Prothom Alo
6/3/13
3/5/2013
Natore
Temple.
Daily Star
3/5/2013
Madhainagor Bazar,
Kalai, Pachbibi Sadar,
Jaypurhat
Temple.
quoting Prothom Alo
and Bhorer Kagoj
3/5/2013
Uzirpur upazila of
Barisal district
Attackers tried to set fire to Guthia Sarbajaneen Kali Mandir
[temple] under Guthia union. President of the temple committee
said some miscreants had thrown burning torches of straw and tree
branches inside the temple and fled the scene. Ain o Shalish Kendro
says they set fire to Shitla Tala kali mandir and a house of an
expatriate
Daily Star and Ain o
Shalidh Kendro
quoting Ittefak
5.3.13
ditto
3/5/2013
Daudkandi village,
south-eastern Comilla
district
AHindu temple vandalised and burned down. 5 god statues
destroyed.
Amnesty
International &
bdnews24
t/beta2/news/templetorched-in-comilla/
3/5/2013
Sadar, 6 villages of
Sonagazi, Feni.
Jamaat-shibir cadres reportedly set fire to 3 villages, torching 3
houses.
quoting Jugantor
5.3.13
3/4/2013
3/4/2013
ditto
POLITICAL
ISLAM
135
DATE
3/5/2013
3/5/2013
PLACE
Borhanuddin, Bhola
Anwara,Chittagong
DEAD
ATTACK
SOURCE
Attack on 6 houses and 1 Temple
quoting Janokotho
Samakal 7.3.13
8 houses and 16 shops set on fire
quoting Samakal
7.3.13
Prothom Alo
24.3.13
WEBSITE
3/5/2013
Rotherpar village in
Aditmari upazila of
Lalmonirhat
Jamaat-Shibir men reported to have set fire to a temple of Shoair
village under Singra upazila and destroyed the Hori Protima [the
idol of god Hori].
UPI & Daily Star
http://www.upi.com/Top_N
ews/Special/2013/03/06/Re
cent-attacks-leadBangladesh-governmentto-consider-Jamaat-eIslami-ban/UPI63691362546420/ and also
3/6/2013
Faridpur
Police said the Ananda Ashram Mandir of Fulbaria village under the
Ballabhdi Union was set on fire early morning.
bdnews 24
ladesh/2013/03/06/templeset-on-fire-in-faridpur
3/6/2013
Comila
Some miscreants vandalized four idols of Hindu goddess in
Daudkandi upazila of the district early Wednesday. In Comilla,
miscreants vandalised a Hindu temple and set it ablaze at Chapatali
village of Mohammadpur East Union under Daudkandi upazila
early yesterday, said Abul Faysal, officer-in-charge of Daudkandi
Police Station.
Daily Star & Bangla
News, Ain o Shalish
Kendro quotes
Janokotho Samakal
7.3.13
http://www.banglanews24.
com/English/detailsnews.p
hp?nssl=9897e3714bc2115
2dc54740ec5f0007d&nttl=
0603201365306 and
t/beta2/news/attacks-on-3more-temples/
3/6/2013
Bhola
Attackers vandalised the idol of Hindu goddess Kali at a Hindu
temple at Pakkhiya union of Borhanuddin upazila.
Daily Star
t/beta2/news/attacks-on-3more-temples/
3/6/2013
Shailakupa Of Jhenaidah
Cocktails blasted at Sushil Karmaker house at Hindupara
quoting Ittefak
6.3.13
3/6/2013
Brahammnadi bazar
Ward no. 8, Arihazar,
Narayangonj
Three shops torched.
quoting Prothom Alo
Sangbad 8.3.13
3/6/2013
Chitalmari, Bakerganj,
Dadas Palli, Bagerhat.
Attack on Temple.
quoting Janokontho
8.3.13
3/6/2013
Hajigonj, Chandpur
Jamaat-Shibir reportedly attacked a Temple.
quoting Ittefak
6.3.13
3/7/2013
East Bejgram,
Hatibandha
Temple set on fire.
quoting Janokontho
8.3.13
Nishanbarir Hindupara
Dhakamoyia,
Chakamoia, Kalapara,
Putuakhali
Atttack with 8/10 people on Tarun Sikde's house. They physically
assaulted ,looted,vandalised. 5 people injured including children.
quoting Sangbad
9.3.13
136
POLITICAL
ISLAM
DATE
PLACE
DEAD
ATTACK
WEBSITE
SOURCE
Hatibandha upazila of
Lalmonirhat
Kalibari area at Chapatali village under the upazil: Sree Sree Kali
Mandir is in Bejgram village was torched and idols vandalised.
Daily Star
t/beta2/news/templevandalised-torched-inlalmonirhat/
NATIONWIDE
MORE THAN 40 TEMPLES VANDLISED.
AMNESTY
INTERNATIONAL
STATEMENT ONLINE
3/8/2013
Munshiganj
Hindu Temple vandalised; Locals found the idols, including that of
the goddess Kali, totally destroyed when they went to the temple
to worship.
Daily Star
t/beta2/news/moreattacks-on-hindu-temples/
3/8/2013
Charlaxmi, Kalma,
Lalmohan, Bhola
Miscreants set fire to a gold smith's house named Minar.
quoting Janokontho
8.3.13
3/8/2013
Paduar Andharmanik
Shilpara, Lohagara,
Chittagong
Attacks on 3 houses
quoting Janokotho
Samakal 7.3.13
Prothom Alo
24.3.13z
3/8/2013
N Laksham, Comila
Hindu expatriate set on fire and temple set on fire
quoting Samakal
10.3.13
3/8/2013
Charlaxmi, Lalmohon
Bhola.
Micreants set fire to a kitchen!
qquoting Samakal
10.3.13
3/8/2013
Banglabazar Talim pur,
Barlekha,
Moulvibazar
Three shops torched and a temple attacked; idols vandalised
quoting Samakal
10.3.13
Prothom Alo 24.3.13
"Hindu Temple set on fire; miscreants destroyed the idol of Sree
Radha Govinda before setting the temple on fire at Amashu-Kukrul
in Rangpur city in the early hours. And also 28/3/13 according to
Ain o Shalish Kendro which saysmMiscreants set fire to a library of
the temple. Attacked 5 business establishments. Mayor visited and
3 cases filed."
Daily Star &
BanglaNews. Ain o
Shalish Kendro
quoting Amardesh
9.3.13 Ittefak
10.3,13 Prothom Alo
24.3.13
Sansangaon Jainasar,
Sirajdikhan,Munshiganj
at night.
Jamaat-Shibir reportedly attacked a Kali mandir
quoting Janokontho
9.3.13
Ittefak 10.3.13
3/11/2013
Gopalganj
In Gopalganj, six idols were destroyed at Kafilabari Durga temple
in the district’s Kotalipara upazila. Officer-in-Charge of Kotalipara
Police Station Tuta Mia confirmed the incident.
bdnews 24 and Ain
o Shalish Kendro
quoting Samakal
13.3.13
3/12/2013
Moulavipara, Goalganj
Stealing from Temple
quoting
Samakal14.3..13
3/12/2013
Barisal City
Two houses of Hindus on New Vatikhana Road were set ablaze by
unknown criminals around 2:45am.
bdnews 24
3/6/2013
1-7
MARCH
3/8/2013
3/9/2013
Rangpur
ditto and
http://banglanews24.com/E
nglish/detailsnews.php?nssl
=aea7e72c4dcca4f89df00f4
53becd91a&nttl=08032013
65460
http://www.thedailystar.net
/beta2/news/two-moretemples-vandalised/
/beta2/news/two-moretemples-vandalised/
POLITICAL
ISLAM
137
DATE
PLACE
DEAD
ATTACK
SOURCE
Idols in Temple vandalised.
quoting Samakal
14.3,13
3/11/2013
Kaliganj upazila of
Jhenidah
23 idols of Hindu god Shiva at a temple vandalised.
bdnews 24 and Ain
o Shalish Kendro
quoting Samakal
13.3.13
3/12/2013
Mymensingh, Mukhi,
Gagorgaon
Attack on Temple at nmidnight; 20 idols vandalised. Case filed.
quoting Samakal
14.3.13
3/12/2013
Protapur,Lohalia Sadar
Putuakhali
Theft of goods used for worship from Temple
quoting Samakal
13.3.13
3/13/2013
Tangail, Salla,Kalihuti
Two temples attacked.
quoting Ittefak
15.3.13
3/15/2013
Madhabpur Mahalla,
Sherpur
Attacked on ancient Madhabpur Club Puja; idol vandalised. Police
visited.
quoting Ittefak 17.3.
3/17/2013 Mymensingh, Gaforgaon
Temple set on fire.
quoting Jugantor
19.3.13
3/18/2013 Sadar Netrokona
Temple attacked, 7 idols vandalised and valuables burned. Local
official visited.
quoting Ittefak
20.3.13
3/18/2013 Gazipur: Sripur
Temple attacked at night and vandalised.Case filed.
quoting Ittefak
20.3.13
3/18/2013 Khulna & other places
In Khulna, over 150 people equipped with iron rods and other
lethal weapons attacked Banikpara Pabla Sarbojonin Kalibari
Mandir around 9:00pm Monday. The rioters also attacked Gachtala
temple. Over 50 Hindu homes and shops adjacent to the two
temples were vandalised and torched. Netrakona, rioters vandalised Hari Mandir in Bobahala village under sadar upazila, damaging seven idols.Monday night, vandals damaged four idols of Hindu
goddesses at Kripamoyee Kali Mandir under Sripur upazila in
Gazipur.In Rangpur, the house of Nilkanta Roy in Itakumary union
of Pirgachha upazila was torched around 2:00am yesterday.
Daily Star
3/12/2013
Natore, Pakuria,Singra
3/19/2013
Shemnagar, Debhata
,Satkhira
Vandalised and set on fire a house and looted 13 shops. Also
attacked on 28/2/13
Ain o Shalish
quoting Prothom
Alo 24.3.13
3/19/2013
Amuabandar, Kathalia,
Jhalakathi
Attack on Temple. 4 arrested.
Ain o Shalish
Kendro quoting
Samakal 22.3.13
138
POLITICAL
ISLAM
WEBSITE
/beta2/news/23-shivaidols-vandalised-injhenidah/
DATE
PLACE
DEAD
ATTACK
WEBSITE
SOURCE
ladesh/2013/03/20/miscrea
nts-desecrate-idols-in-4bogra-temples
3/19/2013
Bogra
Gabtoli Police Station Officer in-Charge Ali Ahmed Hamshi said the
temples of Sabek para, Karmakar Para, Bamunia of Sonarai Union
and Kamarchatt of Rameswarpur Union were vandalised.
3/20/2013
Bagherhat: North
Gopalpur,
Dakhin Para, Kachu,
Two temples attacked and idols vandalised.
quoting Prothom Alo
21.3.13
3/20/2013
Rangpur: Choto Jhinia
Etakumari, Pirgacha
Set a villager's house on fire and possessions torched.
quoting Ittefak
20.3.13
Bogra
"20th and 21st - mobs attacked five temples and vandalized nine
statues of the Goddess. Hindus complain of police inaction. Ain o
Shalish Kendro says in Bamunia, Kamarpara, East Sabekpara,Sona
Ray (Modho para),Debonathpara,Ramesorpur, Gabtoli,Bogra on
3/3/13 and 20/3/13 BNP Jamaat men attacked 6 temples and
vandalised 11 idols. POlice visited and security given. 3 cases filed."
Swadesh Roy and
quoting Prothom Alo
21.3.13& 24.3.13
?
Noakhali
no details
Swadesh Roy & BBC
?
Sirejganj
no details
Swadesh Roy & BBC
3/19/2013
Netrokhona Sadar
Attackers have desecrated idols in four Hindu temples of Gabtoli
upazila in Bogra.
3/22/2013
Gobindapur Sadar
Netrokona
Hindu family attacked over land dispute. Police visited area.
Ain o Shalish
Kendro quoting
Sangbad 22.3.13
3/22/2013
Ramganj, Nilphamari
quoting Samakal
22.3.13
3/22/2013
Chowmohani, Naokhali
Attack on temple; goods looted and vandalised.
"Ain o Shalish Kendro
quoting Ittefak, The
Daily Star24.3.13"
3/22/2013
Kesturita,Modhapara,
Baria, Gazipur
Set fire to temple at night; vandalises 4 idols. Local official visits.
quoting Samakal
22.3.13
3/20/2013
3/22/2013
Gazipur, Lalmonirhat
Islamists vandalised four idols by setting fire to a temple in Sadar
upazila of Gazipur district. Also says that temple which was
torched was a Laxmimata temple in Sadar upazila and four idols
were damaged in the arson attack.
bdnews24
ladesh/2013/03/19/hindusattacked-in-khulnanetrokona
bdnews 24
Nitientral staff &
bdnews24
http://www.srilankaguardia
n.org/2013/04/attack-ontemples-everydayawful.html
http://www.niticentral.com
/2013/03/23/bangladeshlive-islamists-vandalisefour-more-hindu-idols-ingazipur-58441.html and
ladesh/2013/03/22/miscrea
nts-set-gazipur-temple-onfire
POLITICAL
ISLAM
139
DATE
PLACE
3/23/2013
Phulpadi, Madaripur
House set on fire while owner out catching fish at night. Valuables
burned.
Ain o Shalish
Kendro quoting J
ohnokontho
24.3.13
3/23/2013
Mymensingh:
Haluaghat
Kali Temple set on fire
quoting 25/3/13
Ittefak
3/23/2013
Nalgora,Shibchar,
Madaripur
A jubo league leader arrested as he gripped a house of hindu
community people. 4 people have been missing after the incident.
quoting Samakal
23.3.13"
3/23/2013
Tazumuddin,
Shambhupur, Bhola
Hindu Famiy attacked after kid plucks a bean from Veg field. Forced
to leave village.
quoting Jugantor
23.3.13
3/23/2013
Sundarganj,
Gaibandha
House set on fire.
quoting 25/3/13
Ittefak
3/23/2013
Companyganj,
Noakhali
Valuables were stolen from temple by breaking the lock. General
Dary entry made.
quoting Prothom Alo
25.3.13"
3/23/2013
Baralekha,
Moulvibazar
Idol stolen from temple.
quoting Samakal
25.3.13
3/23/2013
Beanibazar,
Sylhet
Attack on temple and vandalised idols
quoting 25/3/13
Ittefak
3/24/2013
Sylhet City
Jamaat-Shibir activists reportedly cut the tendon of leg of
Manindra Dey, a staff of Biswanath; police went to area.
quoting Jugantor
24.3.13
3/24/2013
Kutubdia, Cox's Bazaar
3 temples attacked
quoting
Prothom Alo 24.3.13
3/24/2013
Rajganj, Begumganj,
Noakhali
Two temples vandalised - at least one while reconstructing.
quoting Ittefak,
The Daily Star but
no dates given.
3/26/2013
Satkira: Bhurulia ,
Shamnagar
Armed 10 member-team attacked on a family members, were
sleeping at night. They kidnapped a youth of the family, who was
witness of a murder case filed in 2003. The case was filed after
killing a member of the same family in 2003
quoing Samakal
28.3.13
3/26/2013
Noakhali: Modhom
Jirtali, Jirtali,
Begumganj,
set fire to a house.
quoting Samakal
28.3.13
3/26/2013
Hatibandha,
Lalmanirhat,
Nilphamari
Attack on temple, 6 idols vandalised, 15 people injured
Ai o Shalish Kendro
quoting Daily Star,
25/3/13
3/28/2013
Naogaon: Ramnagar,
Manda
Temple attacked. 1 idol vandalised. Case filed.
quoting Prothom Alo
29.3.13
140
POLITICAL
ISLAM
DEAD
ATTACK
SOURCE
WEBSITE
DATE
PLACE
DEAD
ATTACK
WEBSITE
SOURCE
3/28/2013
Noakhali: Dakhin
Raja Marpur,
Mohammadpur
Senbagh
Temple attacked. 1 idol vandalised. Case filed.
Ain o Shalish quoting
Ittefak 31.3.13
3/28/2013
Alokchedi, Baliadangi,
Thakurgaon
one temple attacked; case filed
quoting Naya Diganta
29.3.13Í"
3/28/2013
Rangamati: Amtali,
Bazar, Baghaichari,
Attack on local Awami League leader's house over land dispute not clear if this is Hindu issue
quoting
Prothom Alo ,
Ittefak 29.3.13
3/29/2013
Padmanagar, Satmora,
Nabinagor,
Brahmonbaria
Set fire to a temple, 4 detained
quoting
Naya Diganta
31.3.13Í"
3/30/2013
Bogra: Garcaitonnopur
Sonatala
Hindu house set on fire
quoting Ittefak
1.4.13
4
ALL
MARCH
MARCH
24 DAYS
NATIONWIDE
Hindu-Buddhist-Christian Oikya Parishad says that four
Hindus have been murdered since February 28th, and 2,000
houses and 100 temples vandalised in 31 districts.
KHABAR S ASIA
http://khabarsouthasia.co
m/en_GB/articles/apwi/art
icles/features/2013/03/20/f
eature-01
Attacks on 71 temples, 152 shops and96 houses.
SWADESH ROY
http://www.srilankaguardian.
org/2013/04/attack-ontemples-everyday-awful.html
Bdnews24 and Ain o
Shalish Kendro
quoting Jano
Kantho Prothom Alo
3.4.13 Prothom
Alo7.4.13
APRIL
4/1/2013
Tangail
Attackers set on fire a temple of Hindu goddess Kali at Falda of
Tangail’s Bhuapur upazila. Case Filed.
4/1/2013
Putuakhali: Sutabaria,
Bikani Kandi,
Galachipa,
Attack on 250 yr old temple; idols vandalised. Police deployed.
quoting Prothom
Alo, Sangbad
2.4.13
Teligiti, Morelganj,
Bagherhat
Temple attacked. 5 idols vandalised. Case filed
quoting Prothom
Alo 5.4.13
4/2/2013
Badwalipara, 5 no Ward
no Municipality
attack on temple - idols vandalised
quoting Janokantho
3.4.13
4/3/2013
Kathalia, Jhalokathi
Hindu family temple torched. Police and local MP visit.
quoting Ittefak
5.4.13
4/5/2013
Radha Ballab
Attack on Temple
Ain o Shalish
quoting Prothom
Alo 3.4.13, 7.4.13
http://bdnews24.com/ban
gladesh/2013/04/02/miscr
eants-set-tangail-templeon-fire
POLITICAL
ISLAM
141
DATE
PLACE
DEAD
ATTACK
SOURCE
4/5/2013
Tangail: Pakulla,
Jamuki Mirzapur
3 temples attacked; case filed. In Poschimpara, Batabala,Shakhipur
Ain o Shalish
quoting Prothom
Alo 3.4.13, 7.3.13
4/6/2013
Shantahar, Bogra
Attacked on residences. Vandalised and looted and physically
assaulted the owner.
quoting Janokantho
6.4.13
4/6/2013
Fulpur, Mymensingh,
Kendua, Chakua
Temple attacked, 5 idols vandalised.
quoting Prothom
Alo 8.4.13
4/6/2013
Narayanganj Poschimpara,
Batabala,Shakhipur
Attacked on residences .Vandalized and looted.5 women injured.
General Diary entry.
Ain o Shalish
quoting Jugantor
6.4.13
Madaripur
Temple set on fire in middle of night.
Daily Star
4/19/2013
AIN O SHALISH KENDRO
(28 FEB-8 APRIL 2013)
BUSINESSES ATTACKED: 163
HOUSES ATTACKED: 162
IDOLS VANALISED: 81
TEMPLES ATTACK: 96
TOTAL:
130
INCIDENTS
142
POLITICAL
ISLAM
WEBSITE
t/beta2/news/hindutemple-torched-inmadaripur/
Appendix 3: LIST OF ATTACKS & HARASSMENT OF AHMADIYYA COMMUNITY IN BANGLADESH386
1991387
Khatme Nabuwwat conference calls for ban of Ahmadiyya.
1992
Noakhali District. A public protest calls for Ahmadiyya to be declared non-Muslims.
February 29. Khulna. Several hundred people attack an Ahmadiyya mosque and mission house on the Nirala
Housing Estate in the city.388 Eight alleged perpetrators are arrested - a move Jamaat-e-islami is said to have
condemned.
October 29. Dhaka. A procession of more than 1,200 people attacks the main Bakshibazar Ahmadiyya
headquarters in Dhaka. After ransacking rooms, burning hundreds of books, including many copies of the Qur'an,
and looting, the attackers detonate 35 crude bombs in the building and set it on fire. At least twenty Ahmadiyya are
injured. Police hold Islami Chhatra Shibir responsible for the attack.389 At the time the citizenship case of Jamaat
leader Golam Azam is being heard in the High Court and Ahmadiyya leaders believe the party needed a scapegoat,
though at the time they didn't dare blame Jamaat directly. They also now allege Pakistani Intelligence was behind the
attack.390
November 27. Rajshahi. A group of anti-Ahmadiyya protestors attack and demolish an Ahmadiyya mosque under
construction.
1993
December 24. Khatme Nabuwwat hold a conference in Dhaka to pressure the government to declare Ahmadiyya
non-Muslims, ban their publications, and remove them from senior government posts. Professor Golam Azam and
Maulana Matiur Rahman Nizami of Jamaat-e-Islami express their support for the conference.
1994
New anti-Ahmadiyya groups surface: Bangladesh Khilafat Andolon and Islami Shasantantra Andolon (ISA has
changed its name. New name is Islami Andolon Bangladesh). They hold a protest with Jamaat-e-Islami banners
denouncing Ahmadiyya as "kafirs" or unbelievers.
1995
Dhaka: a group of demonstrators attack an Ahmadiyya mosque.
1997
May 22. Dhaka. Khatme Nabuwwat holds large public meeting at the Children's Park, calling for a ban on the
burial of Ahmadiyya in Muslim graveyards, and a ban on all Ahmadiyya publications, including copies of the Qur'an.
July 7. Dhaka. Khatme Nabuwwat marches to the Parliament House to submit these demands.
1998
July 23. Jhinaigati. Members of Touhid Jonota, another anti-Ahmadiyya group, attack and destroy a new
Ahmadiyya office building. Three police officers are injured in the attacks.
1999
January 7. Khushtia. Jamaat-e-Islami members attack an Ahmadiyya mosque in the Koldiar-Majdiar village. Over
fifty Ahmadiyya are injured.
October 8. Khushtia. A bomb kills six Ahmadiyya and injures several others attending Friday prayers.
November. Natore. Sunni Muslims ransack an Ahmadiyya mosque. In subsequent clashes 35 people are injured.
2000
April 15. Villagers at Kodda and Basudev threaten to attack all Ahmadiyya homes in the area. Over 50 Ahmadiyya
evacuate their homes after some 35 Ahmadiyya homes are looted and vandalised.
April 25. Activists burn down several Ahmadiyya homes, destroy crops, and threaten the remaining Ahmadiyya in
the village. They take over the Ahmadiyya mosque in the area.
2001
June 24. Jamalpur. Members of Khatme Nabuwwat attack an Ahmadiyya mosque under construction and a house
next door.
2002
October 15. Gazipur. A brawl breaks out outside the courthouse where a case is being filed against members of the
Ahmadiyya community. Twelve Ahmadiyya are arrested for allegedly distorting verses of the Qur'an and Hadith.
Shortly after, a mob destroys an Ahmadiyya house in the area.
POLITICAL
ISLAM
143
2003
January. Dhaka. Khatme Nabuwwat holds an international conference at which speakers call for Ahmadiyya to be
excommunicated. Afterwards Bangladesh Khilafat Andolon organises a protest procession.
February 1. The newspaper Dainik Inqilab reports that, at a gathering in Comilla, an MP has declared Ahmadiyya
non-Muslims and called for a complete halt on all Ahmadiyya activities, describing them as "satanic".
October 21. Khushtia. In the village of Uttar Bhabanipur, Islamic leaders declare 17Ahmadiyya families
"excommunicated" and hold them virtual prisoner in their own village for 25 days. HRW reports that local BNP and
Jamaat-e-Islami leadersare involved. Ahmadiyya children are prevented from going to school.
October 31. Jessore. A large armed group attacks members of the Ahmadiyya community at Raghunathpur Bag
under Jhikargachha sub-district. The president and local Imam of the Ahmadiyya community dies from injuries he
receives. HRW writes a case study on this attack, showing local Jamaat-e-Islami involvement.
November. Dhaka. A Sunni Muslim group connected to Khatme Nabuwwat launches a campaign to pressure the
government to declare Ahmadiyya non-Muslim, attempting to seize an Ahmadiyya mosque in central Dhaka.
December 20. Dhaka. Five hundred men try to storm an Ahmadiyya mosque in Nakhalpara in Tejgaon Industrial
area. The following day391 there are two similar attacks and clashes with police, the second time with thousands of
people involved. Over the next ten days anti-Ahmadiyya protests occur all over the country and demonstrations
continue for months.
December 5. Dhaka. Under the banner of Khatme Nabuwwat Andolon Samannay Committee, 30,000
demonstrate in east Nakhalpara, Tejgaon and issue an ultimatum giving the government one-week to declare the
Ahmadiyya non-Muslims.
December 19. Dhaka. On this day 1,500 people take part in a demonstration organized jointly by Khatme
Nabuwwat and another Islamist group, Aamra Dhakabasi.
December 26. Dhaka. Islamist leaders tell 1,500 demonstrators in Dhaka that the government should declare the
Ahmadiyya non-Muslims.
2004
January 2. Dhaka. Three thousand members of Khatme Nabuwwat take part in a demonstration in Dhaka to
gather support.
January 8. Government bans all publications of the Ahmadiyya community, one day prior to the deadline given by
the IOJ and Khatme Nabuwwat, to declare the Ahmadiyya non-Muslims. The ban violates the requirement to
uphold the right to freedom of religion and expression enshrined in the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, which Bangladesh has signed.
March 20. Ahmadiyya publications are listed as banned in an official circular.
April 16. Dhaka. Two thousand Khatme Nabuwwat demonstrators protest outside the Nakhalpara Ahmadiyya
mosque and police enter to confiscate banned publications.
December 21. A temporary suspension of the ban on Ahmadiyya publications comes into force.
March 14 onwards. Barguna's Amtoli sub-district. A campaign starts affecting over 1000 Ahmadiyya in the
villages of Khakdan, Krishnanagar, and Kukua. On March 14 and 15, Khatme Nabuwwat organizes a religious
gathering at the Kukua Hat High School and leaflets are distributed. March 26: a local group enters the land of the
Ahmadiyya unofficial Imam, shouting slogans and attacking religious property. Human Rights Watch says the
Imam was building a mosque on the land.
May 6. Barisal. Khatme Nabuwwat members declare that 27,000 Ahmadiyya in the Barisal and Patuakhali
districts will be forcibly evicted by May 12, and those in Chittagong by May 28.
August 27. Dhaka. Police stop an attempt by Khatme Nabuwwat to take over the Ahmadiyya headquarters in
Bakshibazar.
October 29. Brahmanbaria. Three hundred Khatme Nabuwwat supporters attack an Ahmadiyya mosque with
axes, breaking down the doors and attacking worshippers. Eleven Ahmadiyya are seriously injured in the attack.
2005
March 11. Bogra. Anti-Ahmadiyya protestors, backed by police, hang a signboard saying, "A place of worship of
the Qadianis in Bogra Town; no Muslim should be deceived into considering it a mosque." on an Ahmadiyya
mosque at Seuzgari Lane.
April 17. Satkhira. Khatme Nabuwwat supporters in Jatindra Nagar attack the Ahmadiyya community, injuring at
least 25 people. Witnesses see thousands of attackers brandishing sticks, machetes, and darts. Again they try to hang
a sign on the Ahmadiyya mosque saying, "This is a place of worship for Kadianis, no Muslim should mistake it for a
mosque." Khatme Nabuwwat supporters attack and loot many Ahmadiyya homes afterwards, beating many,
including women.392
144
POLITICAL
ISLAM
2010
June,393 August394 and October395. Chand Tara, Tangail. There are repeated attacks on Ahmadiyya who are beaten,
including some women. There is looting of houses and livestock and vandalizing of property. A YouTube Video396
shows bloodied patients going to hospital (warning: graphic images of injuries). Ahmadiyya start constructing a
mosque.397 Local leaders of Islami Andolan Bangladesh speak at rally before the attack. Local Ahmadiyya leaders
allege that although the August demonstration had been announced over loudspeaker for two days, the local
administration did not take any preventive measures.
2011398
February. The 87th Annual Convention of Ahmadiyya is cancelled because the government withdraws permission
at the last minute and invokes Section 144, which doesn't allow any public gathering.399 Ten thousand devotees have
already gathered for the event in a remote location precisely to avoid problems. Ahmadiyya allege some senior local
police officials were involved, appearing in public in uniform to lecture against the Ahmadiyya faith, and acting with
total impunity. They say the bureaucracy is now compromised because one of the police officials was promoted
afterwards. "We informed the government that he was a problem and now that guy has been told to deal with the
problem," said one representative. When Ahmadiyya leaders complaine to the Prime Minister they say she told them
there was nothing she could do because thousands might come out to attack Ahmadiyya if the event went ahead.
Ahmadiyya leaders say thereare only a handful of clerics who went to the local authorities and threatened to cause
trouble if the event was allowed to go ahead.400 In a statement the Asian Human Rights Council call it, "a complete
failure of the government to protect the freedom of religion and assembly without any substantial reason".401
Local Brahmanbaria Jalsa is stopped.
March. The Islamic Foundation publishes an anti-Ahmadiyya booklet.
The azaan or call to prayer from an Ahmadiyya mosque is banned by police in Khudro Brahmanbaria.
An exam paper containing anti-Ahmadiyya material and questions is found in BD Government High School,
Damurhuda, Chuadanga.
October. Four Ahmadiyya visiting an area near Banshkhali Police Station are detained by police and jailed for three
days.
There is a similar incident in Daulatpur Police Station in Kushtia District.
16 October. Ahmadiyya write to Home Minister and Education Minister protesting over exam papers in a Dhaka
school, which asked children to explain why Ahmadiyya are non-Muslims.
2012402
Annual Convention – Ahmadiyya halve the size of their event to 6000 people and hold it in their Dhaka
headquarters to avoid a repeat of the cancellation in 2011.403
Nakhalpara, Tejgaon, Dhaka. An Ahmadiyya man who died is not allowed to be buried in the general Muslim
graveyard. The media reports that members of the Khatme Nabuwat Movement tried to exhume the dead man's
body once he was eventually buried in another graveyard.404
5 October. Efforts are made to prevent an Ahmadiyya Mosque being constructed in Kisamat Menanagar in
Taraganj, Rangpur. In the same area on 25 October there is an anti-Ahmadiyya rally and stones are thrown at
Ahmadiyya houses, telling people to leave by 5 November or the houses will be burned down.
27 October, date of Eid ul Adha, an Ahmadiyya house is attacked and a sacrificial cow stolen.
November 7. Ahmadiyya houses and the mosque under construction are attacked, looted, vandalized and
torched. Ahmadiyya and a journalist are beaten up and badly injured.
November 8. Protestors against Ahmadiyya block the Syedpur–Rangpur Highway for several hours. Ahmadiyya
have not been allowed to reconstruct their mosque.405
October 16. An Ahmadiyya missionary is harassed and accused of being a terrorist and handed over to police.
October 16. Madhabpur, Habibganj. Two Ahmadiyya are caught by local people and falsely accused of carrying
material that defames the Prophet Mohammad. They are handed over to the police and one is released; another has a
case filed against him.
2013
February 7. A mob attacks the Ahmadiyya site for their annual national convention, which this year marks the
centenary of their official establishment in Bangladesh. One report says the mob number 20,000.406 Subsequently
Ahmadiyya move the venue from Gazipur to Bakshibazar.407
April 19-24. Four Ahmadiyya children, boy and girls, are prohibited from attending school in Umedpur, Jamalganj,
Sunamganj. The school does not yield to the repeated requests of the Ahmadiyya families and even of the local
officials. The matter is resolved only after repeated interference from high officials at Dhaka after several days.
The sudden rise of the Islamic group Hefajat-e-Islam has worried Ahmadiyya and made them feel more
vulnerable. Hefajat has held two grand rallies in Dhaka so far, on 6 April and 5May 2013, and they have put forward a
list of 13-point demands, one of which is to declare Ahmadiyya non-Muslims.
POLITICAL
ISLAM
145
Appendix 4
Comparison Constitutions
DESCRIPTION OF SECTION
2006 CONSTITUTION
AMENDED 2008 CONSTITUTION
Preamble
Bismillahir Rahmanir Rahim----in Arabic language.
This is translated into Bengali.
Party Name
Jamaat-e-Islami Bangladesh
Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami
Added Paragraph in
later version.
One of the party’s activities is:
“Whereas independent Bangladesh is the
third largest Muslim country of the world
and it achieved the status of independent
and sovereign nation state in the world
map by the heroic struggle of the people
and the freedom fighters of Bangladesh”.
The fundamental akida (belief) of this organisation
The fundamental akida (belief) of Islam
Explanation: In the eyes of Jamaat-e-Islami Bangladesh, Deen and Islami life-style
have the same meaning in technical terminology. So, the technical word Ikamate
Deen being used in holy Quran shows the actual meaning of establishing Islami lifestyle.The meaning of establishing Allah's deen is establishing complete deen, not
part of it. Islam constitutes Namaz (prayers), Roza (fasting), Hajj and Jakat, economy,
social-affairs, Tamaddun, politics and spiritualism, etc. The task of a mumin (believer)
is to try and contemplate the establishment of those (elements) completely, not to
divide complete Islam into different parts or leaving behind any part of it.
Dropped this Paragraph
To make efforts to protect the country's independence and sovereignty from all
kinds of domestic and international threats and chaos through the revival of Islamic
values and unity.
To make efforts to protect
Bangladesh'sindependence and the
state'ssovereignty from all kinds of
domestic and international threats and
chaos through the revival of Islami values
and national unity.
Paragraph added
in later version.
To make utmost efforts to build a
Bangladesh free from exploitation,
corruption, and terrorism through keeping
full faith and belief inAlmighty Allah;
uplifting the ideals of democracy, economic and social justice; and ensuring
fundamental human rights and independence irrespective of religion, race,
community; and ensuring food, clothing,
shelter, education, medical care and
security of life and materials; equal
distribution of asset, national income and
increase of production, and improving
people's standard of living.
Jamaat’s work policy:
Jamaat will maintain its systematic methods for executing its desired corrections and revolution.It means that Jamaat will correct people's mind & brain
and character through organising and training and expanding invitation
(dawat), and therefore form public opinion in Jamaat's favour.
Jamaat will maintain its systematic
methods for its desired amendments and
executing reforms. It means that
Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami will form
public opinion in its favour for turning
Bangladesh into a welfare state and will
correct people's humane and moral
characteristics though expanding invitation (dawat) of Islam, organisation and
educational activities.
Dawat = invitation to join
(recruitment)
NB: The dawat which will be presented on behalf of the Jamaat will be towards
Jamaat's Akida (belief) and towards its goals and aims not towards the
Ameer's personality or towards his post (Amarat).
NB: The dawat which will be offered on
behalf of the Jamaat will be towards
Islam's Akida and towards the purpose
and aim of Bangladesh Jamaat-eIslami not towards Ameer's personality
or towards his post (Amarat).
146
POLITICAL
ISLAM
DESCRIPTION OF SECTION
2006 CONSTITUTION
AMENDED 2008 CONSTITUTION
Jamaat’s permanent
programme will be:
1. To awaken the feelings among people of all classes the necessity of establishing
Islam and following Islam in every sphere of life by explaining the real essence of
Islam and purifying their intellects
2. To organise interested and honest people in the struggle of establishing Islam
in every sphere of life and train them up with the view to building efficient
activists to establish Islam and prove the greatness of Islam to combat against all
challenges of the ignorant Jahiliats (the age of ignorance).
1.To awaken the feelings among all
citizens of Bangladesh about the
necessity of establishing Islam and
following Islam in every sphere of life by
explaining the real essence of Islam and
purifying their intellects.
2. To organise interested and honest
people in the struggle of establishing
Islam in every sphere of life and teach
them with the aim to making them
eligible in establishing Islam.
Duties of Members
Added later
9. Be ready to make supreme sacrifice for
country's independence-sovereignty.
Paragraph Dropped
in Later Version
NB: Though such changes will not happen to all Rukun (members) equally and
simultaneously, but every Rukun (member) will have to have relentless effort to
achieve completeness in this regard. Because the standard of these changes will
determine the dignity of every Rukun (member) of Jamaat-e-Islami.
All references to a proscribed
view of the role of women as
supporting their families
is dropped:
Duties and responsibilities ofwomen Rukun (members)
Section-10
Jamaat-e-Islami's woman Rukun (members) will have to carry out the duties
and responsibilities in their own work field mentioned in section-9. They will have
to pay careful attention to the duties as follows:
1. Present Jamaat's Akida, purpose and aim before their husband, parents,
siblings, and other familiar and unfamiliar women, and urge them to accept
those.
2. Enlighten the light of iman in the mind of their won children and try to
make them followers of Islam.
3. If her husband, son, father and brother have amalgamated Jamaat, make
them brave and optimistic with sincerity. Help them as much as possible in the
work of Jamaat and be patent and firm if any danger comes in this way.
4. If her husband and seniors are drowned in Jahiliat (ignorance), earn money
in forbidden ways or involve with sinning tasks, then try to correct them with
patience. Keep trying to restrain yourself from the forbidden earning and their
darkness and reject to obey if they order to work such work that disobeys Allah
and Rasul and make them understand calmly about your inability saying in fear
of punishment in Akhirat (hereafter).
Section-10
Any citizen of Bangladesh can be the
associate member of Jamaat if the
citizen agrees with Bangladesh Jamaate-Islami's purpose-aim and
programmes.
Later Version opens the
Party up to non-Muslims.
Section-11
If any person fails to carry out duties as Rukun (member) despite showing
unanimity with the Akida, purpose and aim, work policy, programme, and
organisational method as described in this constitution, then they can work
as Jamaat's associate member with the view to participate in the struggle for
establishing Deen Islam.]
Section-11
1. Any non-muslim citizen of
Bangladesh can be the association
member of it (Jamaat) if the citizen
agrees with Bangladesh Jamaat-eIslami's politics and economic
programmes.
2. Any non-muslim citizen can be the
member of Jammat by following the
condition as follows:
(Ka) Will obey Jamaat's rules and
disciplines or decisions with sincerity.
(Kha) Will give highest priority in
executing Jamaat's decision.
(Ga) Will play diligent role for preserving independence-sovereignty of
Bangladesh.
Bold sections are added
by Author.
POLITICAL
ISLAM
147
The following translated documents can be found in English online
(at http://commonwealth.sas.ac.uk/research/islamic-parties-and-elections-bangladesh):
Jamaat-e-Islami :
1.
Jamaat-e-Islami 2008 Constitution
2.
Jamaat-e-Islami 2006 Constitution
3.
Jamaat-e-Islami Oaths of Office
4.
Jamaat-e-Islami Treasury Documents
5.
Shibir Linked Coaching Centres
6.
Trustees of Universities with Jamaat-e-Islami Links
7.
Islami Bank Bangladesh list of shareholders as of May 2012.
8.
Jamaat-e-Islami Personal Record Book
9.
Jamaat-e-Islami Personal Report Card in English and Bengali
10.
Ibn Sina Pharmaceuticals Directors etc.
11.
Directors Islami Bank Community Hospital
12.
Olama Mazhaek Leaflet
Education:
1.
Nineteen Quomi Madrasa Boards
2.
Composition of the Alia Madrasa Education Board
3.
Quomi Madrasa Education Commission Bangladesh
4.
Proposed Quomi Madrasa Education Syllabus
5.
Female Enrolment in Different Types of Madrasa
War crimes:
1.
148
War Crimes Chargesheets & Verdicts
POLITICAL
ISLAM
References
1
No more crying wolf: It is real now, Abdul Hannan, The Daily Star, 5 April 2013.
Accessed at (10/4/13) http://www.thedailystar.net/beta2/news/no-more-crying-wolf-it-is-real-now/
2
Hartal Policy, The British Council, Dhaka. Accessed at (on 1/6/13) http://www.britishcouncil.org/bangladeshexams-information-for-candidates-hartal-policy.htm
3
The Daily Star reported 9 hartal in April, on 26/5/13, print edition front page infographic.
4
26/5/13 print edition, front page infographic.
5
300 she said.
6
Briefing by Dipu Moni to the Commonwealth Journalists Association in London, 26/4/13. Author's notes.
7
So many Hartal? by Ariful Islam Mithu, bdnews24 blog, 16 June 2011. Accessed at (on 10/5/13)
http://ns.bdnews24.com/blog/en/index.php/ariful-islam-mithu/644 quoting an article researched by two
Chittagong University professors.
8
Bangladeshis Have Had Enough of Hartal, 7 May 2012, by Syed Zain Al-Mahmood, The Wall St Journal. Accessed at
(on 23/4/13) http://blogs.wsj.com/indiarealtime/2012/05/07/bangladeshis-have-had-enough-of-Hartal/
9
Political unrest eroding growth, bdnews24, 18/4/13.
Accessed at (on 28/4/13) http://bdnews24.com/economy/2013/04/18/political-unrest-eroding-growth
10
UNDP commented that BGMEA estimated a $17million loss per day in 2005 and said it was possible this figure was
slightly exaggerated because exporters had coping mechanisms. Beyond Hartal: Towards Democratic Dialogue in
Bangladesh, UNDP, March 2005.
Accessed at (on 23/4/13) http://www.un-bd.org/pub/unpubs/Beyond%20Hartal.pdf
11
Hartal Impact on RMG Sector, Tk 200cr production loss a day, The Daily Star, 23 April 2013. Accessed at (on 23/4/13)
http://www.thedailystar.net/beta2/news/rmg-sector-incurs-tk-200cr-production-loss-a-day/
12
Periodic Economic Update, April 2001: 13.
13
This is disputed by bloggers who say it's discrimination. See BDINN Admission results and madrasa students' entry
into Dhaka University, 12 Nov 2010. Accessed at (on 16/4/13) http://bdinn.com/articles/admission-resultsand-madrasa-students'-entry-into-dhaka-university/. Interestingly the US Embassy in Dhaka has been offering
two-year English language courses to madrasa students. See embassy website, accessed (on 16/4/13) at:
http://dhaka.usembassy.gov/ac_pastevents_accessalumni.html
14
One newspaper report quoted an unsourced figure of 32% of Bangladeshi university teachers in the
humanities and social sciences being graduates of alia madrasa but we could not confirm this. An education:
Inside Bangladesh's madrasa, Tahmima Anam, The Guardian, 21 May 2011. Accessed at (on 6/6/13)
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/may/21/inside-madrasa-for-girls-bangladesh-tahmima-anam
15
This amounts to one mosque for approximately every 500 people. The Foundation also prints 300,000 copies of the
Quran a year in Arabic and Bengali and is the largest publishing house in Bangladesh, employing 42,000 staff. Since
1978 they've published 3300 religious texts.
16
Some 70,000 Imams have received training of 45 days since 1979; a further 14,000 went on a short 5- day refresher
course, according to The Islamic Foundation in interviews with the Author, Dhaka, May 2013.
17
Unfortunately the Foundation did not count the number of students attending these establishments, as their remit
is only to deal with those who run them.
18
Interview by Author with Kushi Kabir, Nijera Kori, Dhaka, Feb 2013.
19
Interview by Author with Rowshan Ara, Feb 2013, Dhaka. She was one of the authors of the Dhaka University Study.
20
In 1978 the Madrasa Education Board was formed under the Ordinance for the Modernisation of Madrasa
Education. For a general explanation of the various reform efforts and problems of corruption see Madrasa
Education: An Observation, Muzib Mehdy, 2003, Bangladesh Nari Progati Sangha.
Accessed at (on 2/5/13) http://bnps.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/03/madrasa-education-an-observation.pdf
POLITICAL
ISLAM
149
21
About Bangladesh Madrasa Education Board Dhaka
Accessed at (on 5/1/13) http://www.bmeb.gov.bd/about_us.php?id=2
22
However, one study in Bangladesh found Urdu had been phased out and replaced with Bengali after 1971. It
discovered Urdu was only taught as a second language even in the largest and most prestigious Hathazari Madrasa
in Chittagong (which is run by the leader of Hefajate Islam) and elsewhere smaller madrasa had problems finding
Urdu teachers. Source: Engaging madrasa to meet the EFA targets: Evidence from South Asia, Dr Masooda Bano,
Eighth International Conference on Islamic Economics and Finance. Accessed at (on 17/4/13)
http://www.iefpedia.com/english/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/Masooda-Bano.pdf
23
Political Economy of Madrasa Education in Bangladesh: Genesis, Growth and Impact, by Abul Barkat, Rowshan Ara,
M. Taheruddin, Farid M Zahid, Md. Badduruzzaman, Ramon Publishers, Dhaka, 2011.
24
Academic Mumtaz Ahmad's 2009 study of quomi madrasa, found most graduates seemed to have internalised the
dichotomisation between deen (religious life) and duniya (the material life) and so were less worried about money
and career prospects. Views from the Madrasa: Islamic Education in Bangladesh, by Mumtaz Ahmad, The National
Bureau of Asian Research project report, April 2009.
25
This study found "those linked with the militant activities of the JMB and its affiliates primarily had Alia madrasa
and mainstream education backgrounds. Among those arrested and indicted for terrorist activities during 20052007, only fifteen were reported to have attended quomi madrasa, and nine of them had attended madrasa affiliated
with the Ahl-e-Hadith. But even here, the common denominator was the experience of the Afghan jihad, and not
madrasa education". Views from the Madrasa: Islamic Education in Bangladesh, by Mumtaz Ahmad, The National
Bureau of Asian Research project report, April 2009. Accessed at (on 17/4/13) http://www.iiu.edu.pk/wpcontent/uploads/downloads/ird/downloads/Islamic-Education-in-Bangladesh-Third-Year-Report.pdf
26
Ibid.
27
Interview with Author, Dhaka, February 2013.
28
Chapter1, Objective and Goals of Quomi Madrasa Education..Translated version available online as an adjunct to
this document.
29
Translated in the Online Appendix.
30
Translated in the Online Appendix.
31
Quomi Madrasa Education Commission Bangladesh, in the Online Appendix.
32
Their website is at (accessed on 19/6/13) http://bjm.org.bd/about-jamiat/establishment-history.html
33
The Female Secondary School Assistance Programme (FSSAP)
34
Going to School in Purdah: Female Schooling, Mobility Norms and Madrasa in Bangladesh, Mohammad Niaz
Asadullah Zaki Wahhaj, December 2012, Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit, Institute for the Study of Labor.
35
Ibid.
36
Traditionally the burqa has been a means for women safely to venture out into public without a male chaperon.
37
The quality of secondary school madrasa education in Bangladesh (QSSMEB) study, World Bank 2010.
38
Views from the Madrasa: Islamic Education in Bangladesh, by Mumtaz Ahmad.
The National Bureau of Asian Research project report, April 2009
Accessed at (on 17/4/13) http://www.iiu.edu.pk/wp-content/uploads/downloads/ird/downloads/IslamicEducation-in-Bangladesh-Third-Year-Report.pdf
39
Tanjimul Ummah Cadet Madrasa are the only government-approved cadet madrasa. A government circular has
prohibited the use of the word "cadet" for any other madrasa but there are 250 to 300 madrasa in Bangladesh, which
are cadet style and many of them use the name.
40
Education level
Total Number of Students
Female
1 to 5
2000
300
6 to 8 (Junior Dakhil)
1200
200
Dakhil (9 &10)
1000
100
Alim (11 & 12)
100
25
Total
5700
775
Note: Total number of students includes female students. This is from the Chairman of the Tanjimul Foundation, who
said it was a rough estimate.
150
POLITICAL
ISLAM
41
Tanjimul Ummah Foundation also operates Hifz madrasa, which are part of the quomi madrasa system. In the
cadet version of the Hifz madrasa, it is only a 3-year course (instead of 5 years) but Bengali, English, Mathematics and
Computer Studies are also taught. 1500 students attend their Hifz madrasa, including 150 female students.
42
Both the Awami League and the BNP blamed General Ershad for failing to curb anti-Hindu violence in the
aftermath of the destruction of the Babri Masjid in Ayodhya in India.
43
Central President's Speech, Shibir President's Address to the Students and the Nation, Bangladesh Islami
Chhatrashibir website. No date given.
Accessed at (on 18/4/13) http://english.shibir.org.bd/news/category/17/687
44
Translated from Bengali into English and available in the Online Appendix.
45
March saw 94 attacks: Govt yet to respond to HC rule. By Ashutosh Sarkar, The Daily Star, 20 April 2013.Accessed at
(on 20/4/13) http://www.thedailystar.net/beta2/news/march-saw-94-attacks/
46
Two Buddhist temples attacked, The Daily Star, 23 April 2013.
Accessed at (on 3/5/13) http://www.thedailystar.net/beta2/news/2-buddhist-temples-attacked/
47
Interview with Abdul Awwal Khan Chowdhury, Missionary in Charge, Ahmadiyya Muslim Jama'at Bangladesh,
Dhaka Feb 2013.
48
Breach of Faith, Persecution of the Ahmadiyya Community in Bangladesh, HRW report, June 2005 Vol. 17, No. 6(C).
49
HRW estimates 20 million is possible, with concentrations in in India, Pakistan, Ghana, Burkina Faso, and Gambia.
50
A leaf from history: The Ahmadi issue, By Shaikh Aziz, 27 March 2013, Dawn Newspaper, Accessed at (on 17/6/13)
http://beta.dawn.com/news/788358/a-leaf-from-history-the-ahmadi-issue
51
Bangladesh Bans Islam sect Books, 9 January 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/3382931.stm
52
Interview with Abdul Awwal Khan Chowdhury. Author, Dhaka, Feb 2013.
53
"We don't see the requirement for political power to preach or practice religion. This is mere exploitation of
religion." Abdul Awwal Khan Chowdhury, Interview with Author, Feb. 2013.
54
The Ahmadiyya say it was established in 1987. In Pakistan the Tehreek-e-Khatme Nabuwwat was formed in the
1950s.
55
Breach of Faith: Persecution of the Ahmadiyya Community in Bangladesh, HRW report, June 2005 Vol. 17, No. 6(C).
56
Views from the Madrasa: Islamic Education in Bangladesh by Mumtaz Ahmad, The National Bureau of Asian
Research project report, April 2009.
57
Interview with Author, Dhaka, Feb 2013
58
Specifically the gender related development index section of the UNDP's Human Development Index.
59
"On the whole, boys from poor households appear to be getting left behind in the gains that the country has
made in educational attainment, compared to girls in poor households and boys in better-off households."
Poverty Assessment for Bangladesh: Creating Opportunities and Bridging the East-West Divide, Para 41,
B a n g l a d e s h D e v e l o p m e n t S e r i e s Pa p e r No. 2 6 , Wo r l d B a n k ( 2 0 0 8 ) . Av a i l a b l e O n l i n e a t
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/BANGLADESHEXTN/Resources/295759-1240185591585/BanglaPD.pdf
60
IDA report quoting (NIPORT et al. 2009: 201).
61
ICDDR,B website, Gender, Health, Human Rights and Violence against Women (Accessed 31 March 2013)
http://www.icddrb.org/what-we-do/health-programmes/gender-health-human-rights-and-violence-againstwomen
62
Men's perpetration of sexual violence against women in Bangladesh: Magnitude, correlates, motivations and men's
reactions, Ruchira Tabassum Naved, PhD Hamidul Huque Subrina Farah, ICDDR, B quoting (WHO, 2005).
63
Violence against Women: A statistical overview, challenges and gaps in data collection and methodology and
approaches for overcoming them, expert paper prepared by Sharmeen A. Farouk, Bangladesh National Women
Lawyers Association (BNWLA).
64
National Discourses on Women's Empowerment in Bangladesh: Continuities and Change,
Sohela Nazneen, Naomi Hossain and Maheen Sultan, July 2011, IDS working Paper, Volume 2011, Number 368.
65
Ibid.
66
Asia's Women Politicians at the Top: Roaring Tigresses or Tame Kittens? by Andrea Fleschenberg, in Women's
Political Participation and Representation in Asia.
POLITICAL
ISLAM
151
67
68
After 2004 this rose from 30 to 45 seats of the total of 345 and then in 2011 to 50 out of 350 total.
69
Case Study: Women and Politics in Bangladesh, Pathways of Empowerment, Viewed (31 march 2013) online at
http://www.pathwaysofempowerment.org/Women_and_Politics_in_Bangladesh_case_study.pdf
70
Bangladesh Women in politics: What should be the focus? by Aisha Siddika, M. Mizanur Rahman, 28 November 2010,
Viewed (31/3/13) at http://www.sacw.net/article1725.html
71
Women and Politics in Bangladesh by Kamal Uddin Ahmed. Viewed (12/4/13) at
http://www.asiaticsociety.org.bd/journals/Golden_jubilee_vol/articles/H_446%20(Kamal%20Uddin).htm#_ftnre
f20
72
Bangladesh Political Party Discourses and Women's Empowerment, Dr Sohela Nazneen, South Asian Journal.
Supplied by Author.
73
Behind India, Indonesia, Nepal, Pakistan and Vietnam. See Figure 2/1 Proportion of seats held by women in
national parliament, 1990–2009, p. 13 in IDA report cited above in footnote 4. In 2001 the Inter-Parliamentary Union
ranked Bangladesh 122 globally out of 184 countries with only 2% of women members in the national parliament.
74
Report on Women's Status in Electoral Process National Parliamentary Election 2008, by Rezaul Karim Hashmi,
edited by Salahuddin M. Aminuzzaman. Viewed (30/3/13) at http://bnps.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/12/studyon-electoral-process.pdf
75
Elections in Bangladesh 2006-2009: Transforming Failure into Success by Peter Eicher, Dr Zahurul Alam, Jeremy
Eckstein, UNDP. Accessed (on 12/4/13) at http://www.undp.org.bd/info/pub/Elections_in_Bangladesh.pdf
76
Ibid.
77
Report on Women's Status in Electoral Process National Parliamentary Election 2008 by Rezaul Karim Hashmi,
edited by Salahuddin M. Aminuzzaman. Viewed (30/3/13) at http://bnps.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/12/studyon-electoral-process.pdf
78
These appeared in the Ministry of Women and Children's Affairs publication, Jatiyo Nari Unnayan Niti 2004, in
which Articles 7, 8, 9 and 12 of the 1997 policy document were amended, according to: Bangladesh: Women's
development policy - Pushing the boundaries, by Hameeda Hossain, 17 May 2011, Viewed (on 30/3/13) at
http://www.sacw.net/article2093.html
79
And yet equal rights for all men and women in every sphere of life have been guaranteed in clauses 10, 19 (1,2), 27,
28 (1,2,3,4), 29 (1, 2, 3-A) of the Constitution of Bangladesh.
80
Resist fundamentalist opposition and implement women's development policy in Bangladesh - reports and
commentary, Dr. Kaberi Gayen, 16 May 2011. Viewed (30/3/13) at http://www.sacw.net/article2091.html
81
Women policy not anti-religion PM tells pro-AL religious group, The Daily Star, April 21, 2011. Accessed (on 12/4/13)
at http://archive.thedailystar.net/newDesign/news-details.php?nid=182487
82
83
Ibid.
84
Shah Abdul Hannan. Interview with Author, February 2013. He was introduced by the political party as a
representative to speak on their behalf though he stressed he was a staunch sympathiser and adviser, not a member.
85
This positive spin on women's rights may have been partly because he was addressing a woman author.
86
Social Laws of Islam by Shah Abdul Hannan, Bangladesh Institute of Islamic Thought, 2010.
87
Outraged, The Daily Star, Monday, April 08, 2013.
88
Women denied entry to Hifazat rally area, Reazul Bashar, Moinul Hoque Chowdhury, Golam Mujtaba and Faizul
Siddiqui, bdnews24.com, 6/4/13.
Accesssed at (on 7/4/13) at http://bdnews24.com/bangladesh/2013/04/06/women-denied-entry-to-hifazat-rallyarea
89
"There are so many women everywhere – NGOs, garment factories, school and colleges. It's not possible that all will
be sitting at home," Meem quoted in Huzurs won't feed us, say women workers, Mamunur Rashid and Quazi
Shahreen Haq, bdnews24, Published: 2013-04-08
90
Dipu Moni speaking to Commonwealth Journaliists Association, London, 26/4/13, Author's notes.
152
POLITICAL
ISLAM
91
Sources for the data used here are:
http://www.thaindian.com/newsportal/politics/only-55-women-contesting-bangladesh-poll_100130541.html
and http://www.theresearchers.org/Publications/EleObser_MonReport/Bangladesh_Election_Report.pdf but
their figures don't match.
http://bnps.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/12/study-on-electoral-process.pdf says 52 women candidates
competed in 57 constituencies and 19 women candidates got elected in 2008. But it was 57 according to Report on
Women's Status in Electoral Process National Parliamentary Election 2008. Prepared by Rezaul Karim Hashmi,
edited by Salahuddin M. Aminuzzaman. Viewed 30/3/13 at http://bnps.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/12/studyon-electoral-process.pdf. However
http://www.undp.org.bd/info/pub/Elections_in_Bangladesh.pdf says 18 women were elected in 2008. The
Bangladesh Election Commission gives different figures in different places
(http://www.ecs.gov.bd/English/ElectionResultFact.php?&electionid=8&electionName=Parliament%20Election
%202001), Bangladesh Election Commission website. But
f21 says more than 56 women candidates were fielded. This last source has some of the earlier election data for
women candidates:
f21.
92
A gathering of people to listen to lessons on religion and spirituality.
93
Views from the Madrasa: Islamic Education in Bangladesh, Mumtaz Ahmad, The National Bureau of Asian Research
NBR project report, April 2009.
94
Website Accessed at (on 1/5/13) http://www.amwab.org
95
A list of such organisations can be found here: http://www.ngoab.gov.bd/Files/NGO_LIST.pdf/
96
February 2013, Dhaka, by Author.
97
Of which 215 were foreign organisations, according to the Director.
98
Rejoinder, our reply, The Daily Star, 15 July 2008. Accessed at (on 1/5/13)
http://archive.thedailystar.net/newDesign/news-details.php?nid=45828 This story stated: "Jamaat's link with
BCKS is clearly evident as acting Jamaat Ameer Maulana Abul Kalam Muhammad Yousuf is its head since Liberation
War period while local Jamaat unit presidents are regularly made BCKS advisers. BCKS presidents at branch levels
are almost always chosen from high level Jamaat members (Rokon)."
99
Depositors protest shut down of Puthia NGO, demand money back, The Daily Star, 11 March 2010, Accessed at
(on1/5/13) http://archive.thedailystar.net/newDesign/news-details.php?nid=129649
100
Most of the names come from Ali Riaz's Book, Islamist Militancy in Bangladesh: a Complex Web, Routledge, 2010.
He includes Ishlahul Muslimin, Al Forkan Foundations, Jamia Toras Islami, Ishra Islamic Foundation.
101
Swindling by fake NGOs, A.N.M. Nurul Haque, 15 March 2008, The Daily Star.
Accessed at (on1/5/13) http://archive.thedailystar.net/newDesign/news-details.php?nid=27727
102
For example, as this website explains: (accessed 17/6/13)
http://www.statelesspeopleinbangladesh.net/rabita_trust_deed.php
103
From 2011 this website: http://www.muslimaid.org/index.php/media-centre/press-releases/713-muslim-aidday-28th-october-2011- (accessed 1/5/13)
104
Chowdhury Mueen-Uddin to be charged with war crimes, Andrew Gilligan, The Telepgraph, 16 April 2013.
Accessed at (on 18/6/13) http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/news/andrewgilligan/100151195/chowdhury-mueenuddin-to-be-charged-with-war-crimes-5/
105
500 'jihadi' books seized from Shibir-controlled room at RU hall, The Daily Star, 28 Dec 2008.
Accessed at (on 1/5/13) http://archive.thedailystar.net/newDesign/news-details.php?nid=119598
106
List of NGOs as of 31 March, 2013.
Accessed at (on 10/5/13) http://www.ngoab.gov.bd/Files/NGO_LIST.pdf
107
Grenade attackers fled by Al Markajul ambulance: Top man of Islamic NGO tells police about Aug 21, Kailash Sarkar,
10 May 2011. Accessed at (on 1/5/13) http://archive.thedailystar.net/newDesign/news-details.php?nid=185033
108
Darul Ihsan University website.
Accessed at (on 1/5/13) http://diubd.edu.bd/index.php-file_name=shocharship.htm
POLITICAL
ISLAM
153
109
Banned Kuwait-based NGO runs covertly, Anwar Ali, The Daily Star, 31 March 2009.
110
“After the Government of Bangladesh closed RIHS offices, RIHS-HQ funneled money into Bangladesh through
another organisation to continue RIHS activities and to help shield it from scrutiny there.” Kuwaiti Charity
Designated for Bankrolling al Qaeda Network, 6/13/2008, US Department of the Treasury, Accessed at (on 6/6/13)
http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/hp1023.aspx
111
Ibid.
112
It's not the largest Islamic movement in the country though - Tabligh Jamaat, a socio-religious and strictly
apolitical organisation, has far more followers and nobody knows for sure how many millions of children attend the
Deobandi-inspired quomi madrasa.
113
Source: Copy of a writ petition filed by Jamaat's secretary general Ali Ahsan Mohammad Mujahid with a High Court
bench in 2008 (during caretaker regime) challenging amendment of the Representation of the People Order (RPO)
1972 that introduced provision of reserving 33% of all committee positions for women. Original is in English.
114
Quoted in The Vanguard of the Islamic Revolution, Seyyid Vali Reza Nasr, I B Tauris, 1994, London
115
No figures for associate members were forthcoming.
116
Interestingly the same % of the vote as in 1970 before Independence.
117
A Jamaat Shura member, Shafiqul Islam Masud, claimed to The Wall St Journal that the party had 10 million
members. Bangladesh War Crimes Court Sentences Islamist Leader to Life, SYED ZAIN AL-MAHMOO, 5 Feb 2013,
The Wall St Journal, Accessed at (on 18/4/13)
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324445904578285253762636258.html
118
Copy of a writ petition filed by Jamaat's Secretary General Ali Ahsan Mohammad Mujahid with a High Court bench
in 2008, challenging amendment of the Representation of the People Order (RPO) 1972. Original is in English.
119
Shah Abdul Hannan, Interview with the Author, February 2013, Dhaka.
120
The Vanguard of the Islamic Revolution, Seyyid Vali Reza Nasr, I B Tauris, 1994, London
121
Ibid.
122
Jamaat-e-Islami website.
123
Jamaat-e-Islami website, About Us section.
Accessed at (on 10/5/13) http://www.jamaat-e-islami.org/en/aboutus.php
124
Jamaat charter still not proper, EC informs HC; hearing of writ petition today, SHAKHAWAT LITON, Daily Star, 9
April 2013. Accessed (on 9 /4/13) at http://www.thedailystar.net/beta2/news/jamaat-charter-still-not-proper/
125
For example, Jamaat-e-Islami website,
islami.org/en/aboutus.php
About Us section. Accessed at (on10/5/13) http://www.jamaat-e-
126
Political unrest eroding growth, bdnews24, 18/4/13. Accessed at (on 28/4/13)
http://bdnews24.com/economy/2013/04/18/political-unrest-eroding-growth
127
For example: "The blood of Muslims is being shed in different parts of the world including Afghanistan, Palestine
and Kashmir etc by the Islam-hostile folks. Severe cruelty and sheer injustice are being administered to the Iraqi
Muslims by the anti-Islam global quarters headed by the Yankees enthused with Zionism." From A Brief Introduction
to Islami Chhatra Shibir.
Accessed at (on 30/4/13) http://english.shibir.org.bd/
128
The Vanguard of the Islamic Revolution, Vali Nasr, 1994, IB Tauris, London
129
Kushi Kabir, Nijera Kori, Interview Dhaka Feb 2013 with Author.
130
In fact Jamaat is a separate party operating in other countries, such as Pakistan, India and Sri Lanka.
131
Was amended in 2009 and can be accessed in English at:
https://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&q=cache:qdyV8d29lMkJ:www.ecs.gov.bd/MenuExternalFilesEng/154.pdf+
&hl=en&gl=uk&pid=bl&srcid=ADGEESgFRrWMiLpbMGOHxQ_KqI8Ne1fhj9oacrNkho5dT2ABTqHHZvYdJCQa2wYhQpTFtX9U0bQmGbziEpmlxMgMP3TA_4zzFz0WGsz9GswCRnoEzqbthVcvCtMW377MMY4iUExocK&sig=AHIEtbRy0k46LJc7
5sJNKNZiwLTef-3_3w
132
Jamaat's goals still against Constitution, Daily Star, by Shakhawat Liton, 26 Jan 2010.
154
POLITICAL
ISLAM
133
'Democracy' Makes a Comeback after Elections in Bangladesh, Anand Kumar, Dialogue, January - March, 2009,
Volume 10, No. 3 Accessed at (on 10/5/13) http://www.asthabharati.org/Dia_Jan%2009/Anand.htm
134
Which issued a supportive statement regarding the war crimes trial, calling it politicised and unfair. Muslim
Brotherhood Statement on Unjust Trials for Leaders of Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami, 8 Feb 2013, Ikhwanweb,
Accessed at (on 2/5/13) http://www.ikhwanweb.com/article.php?id=30637
135
Why wasn't Quader Mollah hanged? by Afsan Chowdhury, bdnews24, 7 Feb 2013. Accessed at (on 21/4/13)
http://opinion.bdnews24.com/2013/02/07/why-was-not-quader-mollah-hanged/
136
The Jamaat factor in Bangladesh politics, Jyoti Rehman, 13 March 2013. Accessed at (on 10/5/13)
http://kafila.org/2013/03/13/the-jamaat-factor-in-bangladesh-politics-jyoti-rehman/
137
The Dirty Tricks of JamaatShibir, 11 March 2013. Accessed at (on 21/4/13)
http://mygoldenbengal.wordpress.com/2013/03/11/the-dirty-tricks-of-jamaat-shibir/ and Where LIES reign
supreme, The Daily Star, by Julfikar Ali Manik, 17 March 2013.
Accessed at (on 18/3/13) http://www.thedailystar.net/beta2/news/where-lies-reign-supreme/
138
Photoshopped image used to instigate violence in B'desh, The Daily Star, 4 March 2013. Accessed at (on 21/4/13)
http://www.asianewsnet.net/Photoshopped-image-used-to-instigate-violence-in-B-43511.html
139
Ananta Jalil is the movie star who received such free publicity.
140
NHS boss faces death penalty over charges of torture and 18 murders in Bangladesh, The Daily Mail online, Abul
Taher, 14 April 2013. Accessed at (on 1/5/13) http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2308788/ChowdhuryMueen-Uddin-Extradition-row-fear-NHS-chaplain-18-murder-charges.html#ixzz2S2k0hePf
141
Ibid.
142
War crimes-accused Chowdhury Mueen-Uddin 'will clear name', Divya Talwar, BBC Asian Network, 19 June 2013.
Accessed at (on 19/6/13) http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-london-22959927
143
According to an editor of a Bengali newspaper published in East London, Nizami's son married Imam Abdul
Qayum's daughter.
144
Damaged Packaging, Kamal Ahmad, Prothom Alo, 9 March 2013. Accessed at (on 19/6/13) http://prothomalo.com/detail/date/2013-03-09/news/335000
145
Bangladeshi journalists and The agonies of Bangladesh come to London, Nick Cohen, the Observer, 17 Feb 2013.
Accessed at (on 19/6/13) http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2013/feb/17/bagladeshi-protests-reflectedlondons-east-end?INTCMP=SRCH
146
Available in the Online Appendix.
147
The relevant section is:
“Sources of Revenue of Baitulmal, Section -59
The following will be the sources of revenue of Jamaat's Bait-ul-Maal:
1.Receipts from Jamaat members (Rukun), workers and well-wishers:
a. Monthly Inayat (regular monthly help/ blessing/contribution)
b. Zakat (a proportion of wealth that an individual is obliged to donate each year to charitable causes) and Ushr (a tax
usually paid in kind). [The money received from Zakat and Ushr will be deposited in Jamaat's Welfare Fund and will be
spent according to Shariat (Islamic Law)]
c. One off donations
2. Specific monthly income from subordinate organisations
3.Profit from Jamaat's own publications.”
148
Known locally as chanda.
149
Approximately £835,000. This information was given by Shah Abdul Hannan to the Author in an interview in
February 2013, Dhaka.
150
This was confirmed by a senior BNP leader, Feb 2013, Dhaka.
151
Interestingly, when Hefajat supporters were injured on May 6 2013 in the police crackdown, they chose to go to
Islamic clinics and hospitals rather than state hospitals.
152
Human Characters of Foundation Trainees of Islami Bank Bangladesh Limited and Its Impact on their
Performance, Islami Bank authors are M. Mizanur Rahman & A.N.M Tawhidul Islam. Accessed at (on 24/4/13)
http://ibtra.com/pdf/journal/v8_n1_article1.pdf
153
"In Bangladesh according to the Bangladesh Bank direction the scheduled banks have to maintain the Cash
balance with Bangladesh Bank of 6% of the deposits (Total of Demand and Time Deposits) as Cash Reserve
Requirement (CRR) and also have to maintain (except specialised and Islamic banks) the liquid assets to total assets
POLITICAL
ISLAM
155
of 19% of the deposits amount as Statutory Liquidity Reserve (SLR), but for the Islamic banks this ratio is only 11.5%."
Liquidity and Profitability Study of State Owned Commercial Banks, Private Commercial Banks and Foreign
Commercial Banks – Bangladesh Perspective, Mohammad Mokter Hossain, Asian Institute of Technology School of
Management, Thailand, May 2012. Accessed at (on 4/6/13)
http://www.pmbf.ait.ac.th/www/images/pmbfdoc/research/report_mokterhossain.pdf
154
There are now 5 Islamic banks in Bangladesh: Islami Bank Bangladesh Limited (IBBL), Al Baraka Bank Bangladesh
Limited (Al-Baraka), Al-Arafah Islami Bank Limited (Al-Arafah) , Social Investment Bank Limited (SIBL), Faysal
Islamic Bank of Bahrain EC (FIBB)
155
Said by the NGO Janipop to be of Egyptian origin, with ties to the Muslim Brotherhood.
156
UNDP's report says 63.92% of equity was contributed by the Islamic Development Bank.
157
And 5% for the government, 15% for local sponsors and 10% for general shareholders, according to Islami Bank
denies terror finance link, 30 March 2009, The Daily Star. Accessed at (on 24/4/13)
http://www.thedailystar.net/beta2/news/islami-bank-denies-terror-finance-link/
158
Islami Bank Bangladesh emerges as leading private commercial bank, The Independent, 7 March 2013. Accessed
at (on 23/4/13)
http://www.theindependentbd.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=158801:islami-bankbangladesh-emerges-as-leading-private-commercial-bank&catid=107:business-banking&Itemid=154.
Shareholding documents for Islami Bank are available in the Online Appendix.
159
Islami Bank denies terror finance link, 30 March 2009, The Daily Star, Accessed at (on24/4/13)
160
Or in terms of market capitalisation the second biggest bank in the country according to What should Bangladesh
Bank do about Islami Bank? by Nofel Whaid, 4 March 2013, bdnews24. Accessed at (on 10/5/13)
http://opinion.bdnews24.com/2013/03/04/what-should-bangladesh-bank-do-about-islami-bank/ (BRAC EPL
2011).
161
Islami Bank contributes Tk 40b to exchequer so far, The News Today. Accessed at (on 24/4/13)
http://www.newstoday.com.bd/?option=details&news_id=2339242&date=2013-03-11
162
IBBL launches mobile banking service, 28 Dec 2012, The Financial Express. Accessed at (on 24/4/13)
http://www.thefinancialexpress-bd.com/index.php?ref=MjBfMTJfMjhfMTJfMV84OV8xNTQ2NjY=
163
Through this programme Islami Bank has allocated about half a billion pounds (taka 63,285 million) among nearly
half a million people in 15,691 villages from 1995 to 2012. According to Islami Bank Bangladesh emerges as leading
private commercial bank, The Independent, 7 March 2013. Accessed at (on 23/4/13)
164
Tk 782,597 million
165
According to the Islami Bank managing director, quoted in Islami Bank Bangladesh emerges as leading private
commercial bank, The Independent, 7 March 2013. Accessed at (on 23/4/13)
166
For a general explanation of the difference between Islamic and mainstream micro-financing see - Scaling up
Islamic Microfinance in Bangladesh through the Private Sector: Experience of Islami Bank Bangladesh Limited
(IBBL): UNDP, Nov 2012. Accessed at (on 24/4/13)
http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/Poverty%20Reduction/Participatory%20Local%20Developme
nt/Bangladesh_D10_web.pdf
167
Performance Analysis of Islamic Bank Microcredit Scheme in Bangladesh, Abul Bashar Bhuiyan, Abdul Ghafar
Ismail, Mamunur Rashid, PERKEM2011-1-1A5.pdf PROSIDING PERKEM VI, JILID 1 (2011) 61 – 72 ISSN: 2231-962X,
Accessed at (on23/4/13) http://www.ukm.my/fep/perkem/pdf/perkemVI/
168
Scaling up Islamic Microfinance in Bangladesh through the Private Sector: Experience of Islami Bank Bangladesh
Limited (IBBL) UNDP, Nov 2012. Accessed at (on 24/4/13)
http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/Poverty%20Reduction/Participatory%20Local%20Developme
nt/Bangladesh_D10_web.pdf
169
Rural development scheme of Islami Bank Bangladesh Limited - A study on its growth, effectiveness and prospect in
Bangladesh, by Professor Mohammad Saleh JAHUR, Associate professor S. M. Nasrul QUADIR, published in
Economia. Seria Management Vol.13, Nr. 2/2010
Accessed at (on 24/4/13) http://www.management.ase.ro/reveconomia/2010-2/6.pdf
156
POLITICAL
ISLAM
170
Such as Akij Group, Noman Group, S Alam Group, BRB Group, Abul Khair Group, Shamoly Paribahan, Pacific
Pharmaceuticals. According to: Islami Bank Bangladesh emerges as leading private commercial bank, The
Independent, 7 March 2013. Accessed at (on 23/4/13)
171
Tk 1,82,754 million.
172
Ibid, as in footnote 2.
173
Reports say it's paid about Tk 40 billion as tax to the government exchequer.
Islami Bank contributes Tk 40b to exchequer so far, The News Today. Accessed at (on 24/4/13)
http://www.newstoday.com.bd/?option=details&news_id=2339242&date=2013-03-11
174
Ibid
175
Since regular bonds carry interest, they have devised a system of Islami bonds. Islami Bank buys the bonds from
the government but the funds are then returned to Islami Bank to invest for them under Islamic principles. This was
explained by Jamaat sympathiser, Shah Abdul Hannan, who was former Bangladesh Bank deputy director and said
he devised this arrangement.
176
Netrokona hundreds leave Islami Bank, 19 Feb 2013. Accessed at (on 24/4/13)
http://bdnews24.com/bangladesh/2013/02/19/netrokona-hundreds-leave-islami-bank
177
In Bagherhat, Rajshai and Satkhira, Mysemsingh and Chittagong, according to Islami Bank.
178
The Public Institute of Social Security, Kuwait Awqaf Public Foundation and Kuwait Finance House.
179
Kuwaitis want to sell off Islami Bank shares by Shahriar.Asif, 25/03/2013, Priyo News. Accessed at (on 24/4/13)
http://news.priyo.com/2013/03/25/kuwaitis-want-offload-islami-bank-shares-70098.html
180
Islami Bank denies terror finance link, 30 March 2009, Daily Star. Accessed at (on 24/4/13)
181
US, UK banks refusing Islami Bank, bdnews24, 11 April 2013, Accessed at (on 24/4/13)
http://bdnews24.com/bangladesh/2013/04/11/us-uk-banks-refusing-islami-bank
182
US, UK banks refusing Islami Bank, bdnews24.com 2013-04-11, Accessed at (on 23/4/13)
http://bdnews24.com/bangladesh/2013/04/11/us-uk-banks-refusing-islami-bank
183
General Manager of Forex Reserve and Treasury Management Department Kazi Saidur Rahman is the Observer for
the central bank.
184
Of approximately £30 million in the first 9 months of 2010.
185
Islami Bank spends 8pc profit on militancy, Says Tuku; bank bins claim, 1 March 2011, Daily Star. Accessed at (on
24/4/13)no source given.
186
SIBL, Islami Bank clarify their positions, 19 July 2012, Daily Star. Accessed at (on 24/4/13)
http://archive.thedailystar.net/newDesign/news-details.php?nid=242706
187
The report said: "The alleged links include that some Al Rajhi family members were major donors to al Qaeda or
Islamic charities suspected of funding terrorism, established their own nonprofit organisations in the United States
that sent funds to terrorist organisations, or used Al Rajhi Bank itself to facilitate financial transactions for
individuals or nonprofit organisations associated with terrorism."
188
Al Rajhi Bank Statement, 25 July 2012. Accessed at (on 25/4/13) http://www.alrajhibank.com.sa/en/mediacentre/news/pages/al-rajhi-bank-statement.aspx
189
Islami Bank vows to battle it out, 20 July 2010, Daily Star. Accessed at (on 24/4/13)
http://archive.thedailystar.net/newDesign/news-details.php?nid=242850
190
Views of Islami Bank on the news relating to
HSBC implicating with Islami Bank Bangladesh Limited, bank website, Accessed at (on 24/3/13)
http://www.islamibankbd.com/news.php?ID=93
191
The bank's website says: "Abdullah Abdul Aziz Al-Rajhi is a foreign director of the Islami Bank Bangladesh Limited.
He was elected as a director of the Bank on 15.05.2012. He is a Saudi National and concerned with different renowned
business organisation. " Accessed at (on 24/4/13)
http://www.islamibankbd.com/abtIBBL/abtIBBLBOD_dtls.php?BODID=154
Also http://www.alrajhibank.com.sa/en/about-us/pages/board-of-directors.aspx
192
At Laldighirpar Branch of IBBL on Feb. 27.
POLITICAL
ISLAM
157
193
With 8 different telex transfers from the Gazipur and Savar branches of the bank.
194
Campaign Against Islami Bank; What's Behind it? by Shah Abdul Hannan, Arab News, 23 April 2006. Accessed at
(on 25/4/13) http://www.arabnews.com/node/283678.
195
March 29, 2006. The editor of this newspaper has been arrested by the Awami League government at the time of
writing.
196
Campaign Against Islami Bank; What's Behind it? byShah Abdul Hannan, Arab News, 23 April 2006. Accessed at (on
25/4/13) http://www.arabnews.com/node/283678.
197
Abd al Hamid Sulaiman Al-Mujil.
198
See QI.A.225.06. Abd Al Hamid Sulaiman Muhammed al-Mujil Accessed at (on 25/4/13)
http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/NSQI22506E.shtml
199
Tk. 2520 million.
200
Islami Bank Bangladesh emerges as leading private commercial bank, The Independent, 7 March 2013.Accessed
at (on 23/4/13)
201
Tk. 116,270,000
202
Review of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) Initiatives in Banks (2008 & 2009), Bangladesh Bank, April 2010.
Accessed at (on 24/4/13) http://www.bangladesh-bank.org/pub/annual/csr/csr0809.pdf
203
£83,000.
204
Islami Bank Bangladesh donated Tk. One Crore to Bangladesh Olympic Association, Islami Bank wesbsite.
Accessed at (on 10/5/13) http://www.islamibankbd.com/news.php?ID=135
205
Documentation regarding this hospital available in Online Appendix .
206
College website. Accessed at (on 1/5/13) http://www.ibmcr.com/index.php?s=2&page_id=14
207
Website: http://ibiscdhaka.com/index.php (accessed on 1/5/13).
208
Dr. Khateeb died in 1995.
209
The Hospital Diagnostic Centre is named after Dr. Fouad al Khateeb.
210
Several different dates are given for when the trust began in the late seventies or early eighties.
211
Manarat International University website, Mission Section. Accessed at (on 1/5/13)
http://www.manarat.ac.bd/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=50&Itemid=58
212
The names come from the University Grants Commission. The full documents showing the trustees are available
online.
213
The two Jamaat leaders were stripped of the Press Club membership in February 2013. Mollah, Kamaruzzaman
stripped of Press Club membership, 13 Feb 2013, bdnews24, Accessed at (on19/4/13)
http://bdnews24.com/bangladesh/2013/02/13/molla-kamaruzzaman-stripped-of-press-club-membership
214
Mumtaz Ahmad says there are 35 Islamic weekly and monthly magazines published in Bangladesh now.
215
Initiated by Shah Abdul Hannan, Mir Qassem Ali and Commodore (retd.) Md. Ataur Rahman, according to Jamaat
sources.
216
Bangladeshi Newspaper Circulation, 28 March 2011, Blog quoting parliament. Accessed at (on19/4/13)
http://tahasin13.blogspot.co.uk/2011/03/bangladeshi-newspaper-circulation.html
217
For example: http://jamaat-e-islami.org/, http://www.jamaat-e-islami.org/en/, http://shibir.org.bd/
218
http://www.freejamatleaders.com/bangla/
219
http://basherkella.wordpress.com/
220
'Nurani Chapa' not Rajib's, by Ahasan Lenin, bdnews24.com, 2013-02-25, Accessed at (on 19/4/13)
http://bdnews24.com/bangladesh/2013/02/25/nurani-chapa-not-rajibs
221
https://www.facebook.com/ics.du and this one gives updates about Jamaat & Shibir. It says its location is in
London so, probably, it's maintained by Shibir supporters living in London to share updates about their
organisational activities back home. https://www.facebook.com/toprealbreaking24?fref=pb
222
https://www.facebook.com/newbasherkella?ref=ts&fref=ts
158
POLITICAL
ISLAM
223
http://www.youtube.com/user/basherkella
224
https://www.facebook.com/MediaWatchBangladesh?ref=ts&fref=ts
225
https://www.facebook.com/bangladeshislamichhatrashibir
226
https://www.facebook.com/sommilitoislamimanch
227
Analyzing #Shahbag, from Twitter data: Part 5, Analysing Social Network, 20 Feb 2013, Accessed at (on 21/4/13)
http://technologyandsocialparticipation.blogspot.co.uk
228
http://www.qitaltube.blogspot.co.uk/
229
http://furqanmedia.wordpress.com/ The posts on the site bear the name of an Islamic Scholar called Mufti
Muhammad Jaseemuddin Rahmani , Director, Markajul Ulum Al Islami of Metro Housing, Basila Road,
Mohammadpur, Dhaka.
230
"The site is relatively popular among users in the city of Dhaka (where it is ranked #15,129. Roughly 76% of
Furqanmedia.wordpress.com's visitors are in Bangladesh, where it has attained a traffic rank of 18,873".
231
Posted on the 22nd March, 2013.
232
Posted on 27 Feb, 2013.
233
http://mujahideenmedia.wordpress.com/
234
http://mujahideenmedia.wordpress.com/mujahideen-worldwide/
235
The Arabic word used is the Arabic word ' Tahgut' which refers to a tyrant or an opponent of the Prophet. This is the
word used by Islamic revolutionaries for the Shah of Iran.
236
http://qitalmedia.wordpress.com/training/
237
http://qitalmedia.wordpress.com
238
http://qitalmedia.wordpress.com/software/
239
http://islameralo.wordpress.com/2013/03/25/murtaddin-government-torturing-the-ulamaye-kiram-muslimjanta-of-bd/
240
Posted on 23 Nov 2012. Accessed at (on 19/4/13) http://islameralo.wordpress.com/2012/11/23/hereafter-seriesof-sheikh-anwar-al-awlaki/
241
http://dawahilallah.tk/
242
And has audio of a sermon from someone called Shaikhul Hadis Abu Imran.
243
http://alhittin.com/2013/02/23/bangladesh-audacious-islamophobic-culture-amongst-bloggers-part-1/
244
Alexa traffic rankings say this site has a relatively good traffic rank in the city of Lidköping in Sweden.
245
A Brief Introduction to Islami Chhatra Shibir, Accessed at (on 30/4/13) http://english.shibir.org.bd/
246
Islami Chhatra Shibir's Party Constitution available in English at http://english.shibir.org.bd/page/content/7
(accessed 30/4/13)
247
Shibir chief held; hartal Tuesday, 31 March 2013, Daily Star, Accessed at (on 30/4/13)
http://www.thedailystar.net/beta2/news/shibir-chief-held/ and Police seek Delawar's fresh remand, 21 April 2013,
banglanews24.com Accessed at (on 30/4/13)
http://www.banglanews24.com/English/detailsnews.php?nssl=091074f44de1321aecb08696ec4bcd67&nttl=2013
042107302968294
248
Central President, Islami Chhatra Shibir website, Accessed at (on 30/4/13)
http://english.shibir.org.bd/page/content/16
249
One academic put their strength on campus at 1000+.
250
Not his real name.
251
Others believe it's likely most Shibir activists do go on to join Jamaat because it's the obvious party open to them
and would be keen to absorb dedicated activists and receive their financial contributions.
252
Interview with Barrister Abdul Razzak, Feb 2013, Dhaka
253
Age 11.
254
'Gajarir lathi'.
POLITICAL
ISLAM
159
255
Court Hajat.
256
Bangladesh Islamist Group Banned, BBC online, 23 Oct 2009. Accessed at (on 19/6/13)
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/8321329.stm . Professor Ahmad can be seen making a speech in this YouTube video
accessed at (on19/6/13) http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Vs1P70HRhDI.
257
According to Mumtaz Ahmad.
258
For a full explanation of Ahl-e-Hadith doctrine, its links to the Faraizi Movement & its C19th roots in Bengali
Muslim peasant armed movements against British colonialism and Hindu landlords, see Ahl-e-Hadith Movement in
Bangladesh: History, Religion, Politics and Militancy by Mumtaz Ahmad, May 2006, Iqbal International Institute for
Research and Dialogue.
259
I Ahl-e-Hadith Movement in Bangladesh: History, Religion, Politics and Militancy by Mumtaz Ahmad, May 2006,
Iqbal International Institute for Research and Dialogue.
260
Ibid
261
In an interview with Mumtaz Ahmad in 2000, Dr. Ghalib "acknowledged receiving 'several lakhs of Takas' from the
Revival of Islamic Heritage Society, Society for the Revival of the Sunnah of the Prophet, Al-Harmain Islamic
Foundation and the Ministry of Islamic Affairs of Saudi Arabia, but maintained that these funds were intended for
building dorms and providing meals to the orphans studying in his various madrassas ".(Interview with Dr. Ghalib,
Rajshahi, 22 June, 2000).
262
Jamat-i-Islami of Bangladesh and the Regional Jihadi Networks by Shahriar Kabir. Accessed at (on 9/6/13)
http://www.secularvoiceofbangladesh.org/Jamat-iIslami%20of%20Bangladesh%20by%20Shahriar%20Kabir.htm
263
Excessive media coverage helps rise of militancy, says Nizami, The Daily Star, 26/11/2005. Accessed at (on 9/6/13)
http://www.international.ucla.edu/africa/article.asp?parentid=34294
264
Much of this information comes from Intelligence Ministry interrogations after his arrest. Source: Tippu Sultan,
Prothom Alo Newspaper & The International Crisis Group report.
265
Aminul sent to jail on surrender, The Daily Star, 8 July 2009.
266
Mumtaz Ahmad writes: "The ICS (Islami Chhatra Shibir) leadership, especially since the country-wide bombing of
August 2005, has denounced terrorism and has disassociated itself from what it describes as 'some renegade and
disgruntled ICS elements' who had long been formally expelled from the organisation for 'indiscipline'." (Interview
with Shamsher Munir, President of the Dhaka University ICS, Dhaka, 7 January, 2006).
267
JMB back! The Daily Star, 3 Dec 2012.
268
Al Qaeda's Inspire Magazine Praises Boston Bombings, Takes Credit For Inspiring Suspects, The Huffington Post , by
Alexandra Schuster, 05/31/2013.
Accessed at (on 4/6/13) http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/05/31/al-qaeda-inspire-magazine-bostonbombings_n_3367314.html
269
British Airways worker Rajib Karim convicted of terrorist plot, Vikram Dodd, The Guardian, 28/2/11. Accessed at
(on 4/6/13) http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2011/feb/28/british-airways-bomb-guilty-karim
270
Al-Awlaki Recruits Bangladeshi Militants for Strike on the United States, Terrorism Monitor Volume: 9 Issue: 7
February 17, 2011. Accessed at (on4/6/13)
http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=37528#.Ua2q15VRnzI
271
New York Federal Reserve plot: bomber 'inspired by Anwar al-Awlaki', Mark Hughes, The Daily Telegraph, 18 Oct
2011, Accessed at (on4/6/13) http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/9616613/NewYork-Federal-Reserve-plot-bomber-inspired-by-Anwar-al-Awlaki.html
272
This may be the thinking behind the use of machetes in the killing of Drummer Lee Rigby in London in May 2013.
273
Hifazat attacked to kill: Kabir, bdnews24, 6/4/13.
Accessed at (on 6/4/13) http://bdnews24.com/bangladesh/2013/04/06/hifazat-attacked-to-kill-kabir
274
What led to Rajib's Shahbagh? byAfsan Chowdhury, bdnews24, February 16, 2013.
Accessed at (on19/4/13) http://opinion.bdnews24.com/2013/02/16/what-led-to-rajibs-shahbagh/
275
Shahbagh and bloggers: From allies to enemies? by Afsan Chowdhury, bdnews24, April 3, 2013.
Accessed at (on 19/4/13) http://opinion.bdnews24.com/2013/04/03/shahbagh-and-bloggers-from-allies-toenemies/
160
POLITICAL
ISLAM
276
"The 55 per cent of people who were not in favour of the death penalty were divided between 40 per cent who were
satisfied with the life-term imprisonment, 9 per cent who thought Molla should have been acquitted, and 6 per cent
who thought that he should have received a sentence which was less than a life term." SHAHBAGH VS HEFAJAT:
Where does the soul of Bangladesh lie? 21 April, 2013, David Bergman, Reproduced on Jamaat-e-Islami's website.
Accessed at (on2/5/13) http://www.jamaat-e-islami.org/en/newsdetails.php?nid=ODEw#.UXXwg8B0Rdc.twitter
277
Bangladesh Arrests 'Atheist Bloggers,' Cracking Down On Critics, Emran Hossain, Huffington Post, 3 April 2013.
Accessed at (on18/4/13) http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/04/03/bangladesh-bloggers_n_3009137.html
278
We are plunged into a deep crisis no matter what, Afsan Chowdury, bdnews24,
April 6, 2013. Accessed at (on18/4/13) http://opinion.bdnews24.com/2013/04/06/we-are-plunged-into-a-deepcrisis-no-matter-what/
279
BNP cautiously welcomes Shahbag protests, 13 Feb 2013, bdnews24.
http://ns.bdnews24.com/details.php?id=240576&cid=2
Accessed at (on 17/4/13)
280
One video showed a cleric openly threatening Hindus and Awami Leaguers: "Who will talk about keeping Islam
out of politics, who will insult us, then we will burn down your parliament. Not only you Awami League, Hindus,
whoever is left we will burn them alive.…", Declaration of Slaughtering Shahbag bloggers in Public.mp4, YouTube, 22
Feb 2013. Accessed at (on 17/4/13)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=ngtkv6UWE1k
281
Article 19 put the number at 26. Journalists and protesters injured in Bangladesh demonstrations, Article 19, 22 Feb
2013.
Accessed at (17/4/13) http://www.ifex.org/bangladesh/2013/02/22/hundreds_injured_in_clashes/
282
According to RSF, Journalists Endangered by Islamists and Authorities, 26 Feb 2013,
Accessed at (on 17/4/13) http://en.rsf.org/bangladesh-journalists-endangered-by-26-02-2013,44128.html:
photographers Kutub Uddin Chowdhury of Dainik Inquilab, Rajesh Chakrabarty of Dainik Jugantor and Miah Altaf
of Dainik Purbakone were injured in the attack. Also Farid Uddin and Amit Das, reporters for the ATN Bangla
television network, and Sanjeeb Babu and Rabiul Hossain Tipu, journalists with Machranga Television.
283
RSF says Abdullah Tuhin, a correspondent for Machranga Television; Imran Tuhin, a reporter for ATN Bangla;
Ferdous, a reporter for ATN News; and Mir Ahmed Miru, a photographer with Dainik Azmar Desh, were dragged into
the mosque and attacked. Police eventually intervened and took the journalists to hospital. Masadur Rahman,
reporter for Gazi TV, Nurul Islam of the Independent Television network and Bangladesh Television (BTV), the state
network; Arifuzzaman Pias of Ekattor TV; and Sayeed Bablu of Dainik Sangbad were wounded by gunfire. Aminul
Islam Bhuiyan, elected member of the executive committee of Dhaka Reporters Unity (DRU), was hospitalized after
suffering a rubber bullet wound to the leg. In the north-eastern city of Sylhet, Shafiq Ahmed Sofi of Channel 24;
Shihabuddin Shihab, a reporter for Boishaki Television; Alauddin of Channel S; Nurul Islam, a photographer for
Dainik Uttorporbo; and Sohar Ahmad of Machranga Television were hospitalized with injuries. Islamist militants
also attacked press photographers Nazmul Kabir Pavel of Bangladesh Pratidin and Sheikh Abdul Majid of Sylhet
Sanglap. They were rescued by activists of an anti-Islamist party.
284
Bangladesh opposition editor Mahmudur Rahman arrested, BBC News Online, 11 April 2013.
Accessed at (on 23/4/13) http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-22110132
285
Editor of pro-opposition daily arrested in Bangladesh, CPJ, 12 April 2013. Accessed at (on 23/4/13)
http://www.cpj.org/2013/04/editor-of-pro-opposition-daily-arrested-in-banglad.php
286
Bangladesh harasses staff, press affiliated with Amar Desh, CPJ, 16/4/13.
Accessed at (on23/4/13) at http://www.cpj.org/2013/04/bangladesh-harasses-staff-press-affiliated-with-am.php
287
Dalal in Bengali
288
According to Bangladesh Telecommunication Regulatory Commission there are 30 million Internet subscribers
and 3.2 million Facebook users in Bangladesh. Other studies put the number of Internet subscribers much lower at
half a million and Internet users at 10 million (or 7%) at the start of 2013 (Bangladesh - Internet Market and Forecasts,
2013. Accessed at (on 17/4/13) http://www.budde.com.au/Research/Bangladesh-Internet-Market-andForecasts.html).
Mobile phones have become cheap and widely available to all. It's not surprising therefore that they are used for
political mobilisation and spreading information and misinformation virally. Subscriptions reached almost 100
million by the end of 2012. GrameenPhone continued to lead the field with 41% of the market (Bangladesh - Telecoms,
Mo b i l e , Bro a d b a n d a n d Fo re c a s t s , Pe t e r Eva n s, Fe b 2 0 1 3 .
Accessed at (on17/4/13)
http://www.budde.com.au/Research/Bangladesh-Telecoms-Mobile-Broadband-and-Forecasts.html). This is in a
country with one of the most underdeveloped telecommunications infrastructures in the world, where 95% of
homes lack a fixed line telephone.
289
Well Known Blogger Hacked to Death on Dhaka Street, RSF, 19 Feb 2013. Accessed at (on 17/4/13)
http://en.rsf.org/bangladesh-well-know-blogger-hacked-to-death-18-02-2013,44093.html
POLITICAL
ISLAM
161
290
For example: Shahbag Ringleaders Exposed. Accessed at (on 17/4/13) http://shahbagexposed.blogspot.de. This
is registered to an IP server address in the USA, as is sonarbangla blog.
291
Killers hacked Rajib first, then slit his throat: police, bdnews24, 16 Feb 2013. Accessed at (on 17/4/13)
http://bdnews24.com/bangladesh/2013/02/16/killers-hacked-rajib-first-then-slit-his-throat-police
292
Bangladesh cracks down on anti-Islam blogs, AFP, 21 Feb 2013. Accessed at (on 17/4/13)
http://dawn.com/2013/02/21/bangladesh-cracks-down-on-anti-islam-blogs/
293
'Nurani Chapa' not Rajib's, Ahasan Lenin, bdnews24.com
Accessed at (on 28/4/13) http://bdnews24.com/bangladesh/2013/02/25/nurani-chapa-not-rajibs
294
Restriction imposed on Shahbag Movement with new tricks, twists, and tales, Submitted by Shakera Jahan, Priyo
News, 20/02/2013. Accessed at (on17/4/13) at http://news.priyo.com/2013/02/20/jamaat-restrict-shahbagmovement-67602.html
295
Ibid.
296
Ibid.
297
Bangladesh widens crackdown on atheist bloggers, AFP, 27 Mar 2013. Accessed at (on 17/4/13)
http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5jtQXkbf0owXrPc7yxGOAgZfCbtBw?docId=CNG.050a0b
0564c620ba5c22d568a1119301.2e1
298
Ibid.
299
Bangladesh widens crackdown on atheist bloggers, AFP, 27 Mar 2013. Accessed at (on 17/4/13)
0564c620ba5c22d568a1119301.2e1 (Remove this identical ref. /insert Ibid.)
300
Netizen Report: Bloggers Under Threat in Bangladesh and Beyond, Global Voices Advocacy, 3 April 2013. Accessed
at (on 20/5/13) http://advocacy.globalvoicesonline.org/2013/04/03/netizen-report-bloggers-under-threatbangladesh/
301
Journalists Endangered by Islamists and Authorities, Reporters Without Borders, 16 Feb 13.
Accessed at (28/2/13) http://en.rsf.org/bangladesh-journalists-endangered-by-26-02-2013,44128.html
302
Our bloggers arrested amid crackdown in Bangladesh , 4 April 2013, Committee to Protect Journalists Accessed at
(on 5/4/13), http://www.cpj.org/2013/04/four-bloggers-arrested-amid-crackdown-in-banglades.php#more
303
First Arrests of Bloggers after Creation of Anti-Blasphemy Committee, RSF, 2 APRIL 2013. Accessed at (on17/4/13)
http://en.rsf.org/bangladesh-first-arrests-of-bloggers-after-02-04-2013,44289.html
304
Targeted by Islamists and Officials, Bloggers Interrogated and Censored, RSF, 26 MARCH 2013. Accessed at
(on17/4/13) http://en.rsf.org/bangladesh-targeted-by-islamists-and-26-03-2013,44261.html
305
Four bloggers denied bail, Priyo News, Submitted by Shahriar.Asif, 17/04/2013.
Accessed at (on17/4/13) http://news.priyo.com/2013/04/17/four-bloggers-denied-bail-72890.html
306
Probe reports on 4 bloggers submitted, Daily Star, 18/4/13. Accessed at (on 18/4/13)
http://www.thedailystar.net/beta2/news/probe-reports-on-4-bloggers-submitted/
307
http://www.somewhereinblog.net/blog/realAsifM
308
Blogger Asif placed on 3-day remand, Star Online Report, 4 April 2013. Accessed (on 4/4/13) at
http://www.thedailystar.net/beta2/news/blogger-asif-placed-on-3-day-remand/
309
Accessed at (on 17/4/13) https://www.facebook.com/atheist.asif
310
Bangladesh widens crackdown on atheist bloggers, AFP, 27 Mar 2013. Accessed at (on17/4/13)
0564c620ba5c22d568a1119301.2e1
311
Bangladeshi blogger hospitalized after being stabbed, CPJ, 15 Jan 2013, New York.
http://www.cpj.org/2013/01/bangladeshi-blogger-hospitalized-after-being-stabb.php#more
312
http://mukto-mona.com/bangla_blog/?author=345
313
"What do our partisan intellectuals opine about Sheikh Hasina being a believer?" he blogged, cited in: Bangladesh
Arrests 'Atheist Bloggers', Cracking Down On Critics, Emran Hossain, Huffington Post, 3 April 2013. Accessed at (on
18/4/13) http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/04/03/bangladesh-bloggers_n_3009137.html
314
Hefajat-e-Islam - is the official spelling we have been told by the group themselves.
162
POLITICAL
ISLAM
315
No ban, yet virtual ban, Daily Star, 6 April 2013.
Accessed at (on 17/4/13) http://www.thedailystar.net/beta2/news/no-ban-yet-virtual-ban/
316
Hifazat wants public mingling of sexes banned, Bdnews24, Dhaka, 6 April 2012. Accessed (on 6/4/13) at
http://bdnews24.com/bangladesh/2013/04/06/hifazat-wants-public-mingling-of-sexes-banned
317
Hifazat men move towards Shahbagh, chased, bdnews24, 6/4/13. Accessed (on 6/4/13) at
http://bdnews24.com/bangladesh/2013/04/06/hifazat-men-move-towards-shahbagh-chased
318
We are plunged into a deep crisis no matter what, Afsan Chowdury, bdnews24, April 6, 2013. Accessed at
(on18/4/13) http://opinion.bdnews24.com/2013/04/06/we-are-plunged-into-a-deep-crisis-no-matter-what/
319
Hefajat threatens to topple govt, The Daily Star, 20/4/13.
Accessed at (on 20/4/13) http://www.thedailystar.net/beta2/news/hefajat-threatens-to-topple-govt/
320
BNP Chairperson Khaleda Zia's younger brother, the late Sayeed Eskander, was the founding Chairman of the
station.
321
A senior Jamaat leader, Mir Quasem Ali, is the Chairman of the Diganta Media Corporation, which owns and
operates The Daily Naya Diganta newspaper and Diganta TV. Diganta, Islamic TV taken off air, bdnews24.com, 6
May 2013. Accessed at (on 8/5/13)
http://bdnews24.com/bangladesh/2013/05/06/diganta-islamic-tv-taken-off-air
322
BNP leaders accused in cases over mayhem, Staff Correspondent, bdnews24.com, 2013-05-07. Accessed at (on
8/5/13) http://bdnews24.com/politics/2013/05/07/bnp-leaders-accused-in-cases-over-mayhem. Website says
40,000 while The Daily Star says 50,000 accused.
323
Held Hefajat leader blames Jamaat, 50,000 sued for violence, The Daily Star, 8 May 2013.
Accessed at (on 8/5/13) http://www.thedailystar.net/beta2/news/held-hefajat-leader-blames-jamaat/
324
Unpacking the Islamist Agenda, 1 April 2013, by Ali Riaz, The Daily Star, Dhaka.
325
Pahela Baishakh, Hefazet-e Islam and us Bengalis, Afsan Chowdhury, bdnews24, 13 April 2013. Accessed at
(on18/4/13) http://opinion.bdnews24.com/2013/04/13/pahela-baishakh-hefazet-e-islam-and-us-bengalis/
326
This is very similar to secular Iranians who celebrate the Persian New Year more enthusiastically than Muslim
holidays like Eid ul Fitr.
327
Prothom Alo newspaper reported 70 people were still missing, while human rights actvisists thought around 50
may have been killed. The Daily Star said 18, the Police said 11 and the Islamists said thousands.
328
Held Hefajat leader blames Jamaat, 50,000 sued for violence, The Daily Star, 8 May 2013.
Accessed at (on 8/5/13) http://www.thedailystar.net/beta2/news/held-hefajat-leader-blames-jamaat/
329
Presumably the main concern is an Islamic prohibition on representations of living creatures but it also could be
that in Dhaka many sculptures honour Liberation War heroes and Hefajat may see them as promoting the Awami
League.
330
Hefajat Demands, The Daily Star, 6 April 2013.
Accessed at (on10/6/13) http://www.thedailystar.net/beta2/news/hefajat-demands/
331
Hifazat wants 'atheist' ministers removed, 6/4/13, bdnews24.
Accessed (on 6/4/13) at http://bdnews24.com/bangladesh/2013/04/06/hifazat-wants-atheist-ministers-removed
332
Ibid.
333
When Shahbag meets Boro Huzur March 13, 2013 Alal o Dulal.
334
It's in the heart of Hathazari town, Chittagong, hence the name.
335
Views from the Madrasa: Islamic Education in Bangladesh, by Mumtaz Ahmad, The National Bureau of Asian
Research NBR project report, April 2009. Accessed at (on 17/4/13) http://www.iiu.edu.pk/wpcontent/uploads/downloads/ird/downloads/Islamic-Education-in-Bangladesh-Third-Year-Report.pdf
336
"imaani dayitya".
337
338
Islamists' 'long march' may take a militant turn, Haroon Habib, The Hindu. Accessed (on 16/4/13) at
h t t p : / / w w w. t h e h i n d u . c o m / n e w s / i n t e r n a t i o n a l / i s l a m i s t s - l o n g - m a rc h - m a y- t a k e - a - m i l i t a n t turn/article4574036.ece Also The Daily Star, Hefajat sounds ominous, 2 April 2013.
POLITICAL
ISLAM
163
339
Target Taliban rule. Key organiser of Hefajat long march Habibur working for an Afghan-style Bangladesh, by
Julfikar Ali Manik, The Daily Star, 7 April 2013.
Accessed at (on 17/4/13) http://www.thedailystar.net/beta2/news/target-taliban-rule/
340
Ibid.
341
Grand Alliance Choice for Sylhet-6, AL men refuse to work for 'militant' candidate, by Julfikar Ali Manik, The Daily
Star, 31 Dec 2006.
Accessed (on17/4/13) at http://dir.groups.yahoo.com/group/MuktoChinta/message/17568
342
343
Interview with Julfikar Ali Manik, Dhaka, 2013.
344
BNP leaders join Hifazat rally, bdnews24, 6/4/13. Accessed (on 6/4/13) at
http://bdnews24.com/politics/2013/04/06/bnp-leaders-join-hifazat-rally
345
Sayedee sentence: The verdict people wanted, by Afsan Chowdhury, bdnews24,February 28, 2013. Accessed at (on
19/4/13) http://opinion.bdnews24.com/2013/02/28/sayedee-sentence-the-verdict-people-wanted/
346
Jamaat extends support to Hefajate Islam's long march, Daily Prime News, 4 April 2013. Accessed (on 4/4/13) at
http://www.dailyprimenews.com/details.php?id=8610 and “BNP leaders Dr Khandker Mosharraf Hossain and
Sadek Hossain Khoka, and Jatiya Party leader Kazi Jafar Ahmed appeared on the stage, briefly, to express solidarity"
says Hefajat massive rally issues ultimatum to govt, The Independent, 7 April 2013. Accessed at (on 19/4/13)
http://theindependentbd.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=163599:Hefajat-massive-rallyissues-ultimatum-to-govt&catid=129:frontpage&Itemid=121
347
Ali Riaz, as above.
348
Unpacking the Islamist Agenda, Ali Riaz, The Daily Star, 1 April 2013. Accessed at (on 15/4/13)
http://www.thedailystar.net/beta2/news/unpacking-the-islamist-agenda/
349
Comprising the Tarikat Federation, Bangladesh Islami Front, Bangladesh Sammilito Islami Jote and Gono Front it
was formed in 2012.
350
Hifazat chief implementing Jamaat agenda, bdnews24, 4 April 2013. Accessed at (on 17/4/13)
http://bdnews24.com/bangladesh/2013/04/04/hifazat-chief-implementing-jamaat-agenda
351
http://bangladeshwarcrimes.blogspot.com/2011/11/sayedee-indictment-analysis-1971-death.html
352
http://bangladeshwarcrimes.blogspot.com/2011/11/sayedee-indictment-tribunal-history.html
353
Abul Kalam Azad (convicted and sentenced to death in January 2013); Chowdhury Mueeuddin and
Ashrafuzzaman Khan who live in the UK and US respectively.
354
Abdul Alim
355
June 2013
356
http://bangladeshwarcrimes.blogspot.com/2011/12/implementation-of-rapps-suggestions_26.html
357
http://bangladeshwarcrimes.blogspot.com/2012/11/sayedee-trial-analysis-limiting-defense.html
358
http://bangladeshwarcrimes.blogspot.com/2012/12/sayedee-trial-analysis-witness-summons.html
359
http://bangladeshwarcrimes.blogspot.com/2012/12/sayedee-trial-analysis-safe-house.html
360
http://bangladeshwarcrimes.blogspot.com/2013/05/tribunal-witness-confirms-police.html
361
http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21568349-week-chairman-bangladeshs-international-crimestribunal-resigned-we-explain
362
Delwar Hossain Sayedee; Gholam Azam; Motiur Rahman Nizami; Salauddin Quader Chowdhury
363
http://bangladeshwarcrimes.blogspot.com/2013/03/3-jan-2013-tribunal-skype-order.html
364
In relation to questioning, the tribunal passed orders allowing a doctor and lawyer to be present in an adjacent
room to the accused during questioning.
365
http://bangladeshwarcrimes.blogspot.com/2013/01/abul-kamal-azad-trial-index-of-posts.html
366
http://bangladeshwarcrimes.blogspot.com/2013/02/abdul-quader-mollah-trial-proceeding.html
367
Literally meaning “Generation 71”.
164
POLITICAL
ISLAM
368
Source: Profiles of the persons from 1 to 8 from the charge framing documents of Tribunal 9 (in English). A
publication on life sketches of parliament members of 8th parliament in 2001 was translated and used for Nizami (6)
and Sayaedee (8) because they were MPs. Salauddin Quader Chowdhury's profile comes from a parliament
publication.
369
Also spelt Ghulam.
370
Caretaker System Abolished, 1 July 2011, The Daily Star
371
One politician said more than 30 MPs were dual citizens of other countries.
372
http://blogs.wsj.com/indiarealtime/2012/05/07/bangladeshis-have-had-enough-of-Hartal/
373
Academics however urge caution about the reliability of opinion polls based on small sample surveys in a country
of up to 160 million people. They say what is needed is disaggregated data at a constituency level, not national level
data.
374
Diplomatic sources and Tarique Rahman gets political asylum in UK, 4 Oct 2012, Daily Prime News Accessed at (on
4/6/13) http://www.dailyprimenews.com/details.php?id=1244
375
A political tsunami, Ifti Rashid, Dhaka Tribune, 17 June 2013
Accessed at (on 19/6/13) http://www.dhakatribune.com/op-ed/2013/jun/17/political-tsunami
376
From Hefajat-e-Islam Foreign Affairs: [email protected]
377
Certain areas of the country are known as safe seats - Gopalganj as the heartland for the Awami League, Bogra for
the BNP and Rangpur for General Ershad's Jatiyo Party.
378
Election 2008: Defenders of the minority vote, 16 Dec 2008, The Daily Star.
Accessed at (10/5/13) http://archive.thedailystar.net/newDesign/news-details.php?nid=67244
379
Madrasa Education: The Bangladeshi Experience, slide show by Mohammad Niaz Asadullah, Oct 2007 Accessed at
(on1/5/13) http://www.slideserve.com/noleta/madrasa-education-the-bangladeshi-experience
380
ICG also said this was a sharp rise from 1986 when there were 4100 madrasa in Bangladesh. It commented that
there was little government oversight of these establishments. Testimony of Samina Ahmed to U.S. Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, ICG, 19 Apr 2005. Accessed (on 16.4.13) at http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/publicationtype/speeches/2005/testimony-of-samina-ahmed-to-us-senate-foreign-relations-committee.aspx
381
Commonwealth Journalists Association meeting in London, 27/4/13.
382
UNICEF Report. Accessed at (on 5/1/13) http://www.unicef.org/bangladesh/children_4861.htm
383
Children's Situation in Bangladesh, SCF. Accessed at (on 1/5/13)
http://sca.savethechildren.se/sca/Countries/Bangladesh/Childrens-situation-in-Bangladesh/.
384
Secondary School Madrasa in Bangladesh: Incidence, Quality, and Implications for Reform, Mohammad Niaz
Asadullah, Nazmul Chaudhury, Syed Rashed Al-Zayed Josh, The World Bank, Draft: March 15, 2009, Accessed online
at (on 4/6/13):
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTDEVDIALOGUE/Resources/BangladeshMadrasaReportFinal.pdf
385
Political Economy of Madrasa Education in Bangladesh: Genesis, Growth and Impact, by Abul Barkat, Rowshan Ara,
M. Taheruddin, Farid M Zahid, Md. Badduruzzaman, Ramon Publishers, Dhaka, 2011.
386
Information supplied by Ahmadiyya Muslim Jama'at Bangladesh.
387
Breach of Faith, Persecution of the Ahmadiyya Community in Bangladesh, HRW report, June 2005 Vol. 17, No. 6(C) is
the source for all information till 2005 end.
388
HRW 2005 report (ibid), quoting "Attack on the Qadianis in Kulna," Daily Sangbad (National Daily), March 1, 1992.
389
HRW 2005 report (ibid), quoting "Six Held For Resorting To Violence in City," The Daily Tribune (Khulna), March 1,
1992.
390
Interview with Author, Dhaka, Feb 2013.
391
Controversy over Kadianis, 150 hurt as police, musallies clash, The New Nation, 22 Nov 2003
Accessed at (on 5/6/13) http://www.thepersecution.org/world/bangladesh/2003/nn031122.html
392
HRW report, 2005.
393
Ahmaddiyas in Tangail Attacked, 19 June 2013, Daily Star,
Accessed (on 15/4/13) at http://www.thepersecution.org/world/bangladesh/10/06/ds19.html
POLITICAL
ISLAM
165
394
Mosque Attacks, The Daily Star, 8 August, 2010.
Accessed (on 15/4/13) at http://www.persecutionofahmadis.org/10-hurt-in-attack-on-ahmadiyyas/
395
Bangladesh: Fresh attack on Ahmadiyyas - 4 houses vandalised in Tangail, from Ahmadiyya Times quoting The
Daily Star, October 20, 2010. Accessed (on 15/4/13) at
http://ahmadiyyatimes.blogspot.co.uk/2010/10/bangladesh-fresh-attack-on-ahmadiyyas-4.html
396
Chantara further Attack on Ahmadis18.10.2010.wmv, YouTube Video, 18 June 2010, Accessed (on 15/4/13) at
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zWNLC-Ml38A
397
Ten hurt in attack on Ahmadiyyas, The Daily Star, 8 August 2010.
Accessed (on 15/4/13) at http://www.persecutionofahmadis.org/10-hurt-in-attack-on-ahmadiyyas/
398
These are all from a list supplied by Ahmadiyya Muslim Jama'at Bangladesh.
399
Bigots foil Ahmadiyya convention, 7 February 2011, The Daily Star story.
Accessed (on 15/4/13) at http://www.persecutionofahmadis.org/bigots-foil-ahmadiyya-convention/
400
According to Ahmadiyya leaders. Interview with Author, Feb 2013, Dhaka.
401
Bangladesh: Government fails to protect freedom of religion and assembly of Ahmadiyya community, February 22,
2011, The Asian Human Rights Council, Accessed (on 12/3/13) at http://www.humanrights.asia/news/urgentappeals/AHRC-UAC-042-2011
402
These are from a list supplied by Ahmadiyya Muslim Jama'at Bangladesh.
403
According to Ahmadiyya leaders, Interview with Author, Feb 2013, Dhaka.
404
Bigots obstruct Ahmadiyya burial, 21 July 2011, The New Age. Accessed (on 15/4/13) at
http://www.newagebd.com/detail.php?date=2012-07-21&nid=17918#.UWvb-b99nwx
405
Bangladesh – Press Release November 2012: Peace Loving Muslim Community Attacked in Bangladesh, Accessed
(on 15/4/13) at http://www.persecutionofahmadis.org/bangladesh-press-release-november-2012/
406
Bangladesh mob torches Ahmadi festival site, 7 February 2013, Dawn newspaper carrying an AFP report. Accessed
(on 15/4/13) at http://dawn.com/2013/02/07/bangladesh-mob-torches-ahmadi-festival-site/
407
Ahmadiyya convention begins, bdnews24, 8 February 2013. Accessed (on 15/4/13) at
http://bdnews24.com/bangladesh/2013/02/08/ahmadiyya-convention-begins
166
POLITICAL
ISLAM

Political Islam and the Elections in Bangladesh

Transcription

Similar documents

Salahuddin Kasem Khan, President, Bangladesh Employers

Implementation of effective e-government applications: Challenges

Rehena - The Chars Livelihoods Programme

Drishtipat Writers` Collective

MD. MOHSAN KHUDRI - ELK Asia Pacific Journals

Total copy

Tablighi Jamaat

Current Status Of IT

Islamic Finance

Carsten Hellpap, Program Manager, EnDev, GIZ