Intervener Attorney-General-of
Transcription
Intervener Attorney-General-of
Publication Ban Interdiction de publication Court File Nos. 35977 and 36064 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA (ON APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEAL OF ALBERTA) BETWEEN: DONALD JERRY BARABASH Appellant AND: HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN Respondent AND: ATTORNEYGENERALOFCANADA ATTORNEY GENERAL OF ONTARlO CANADIAN CIVIL LIBERTIES ASSOCIATION AND BEYOND BORDERS AND THE CANADIAN CENTRE FOR CHILD PROTECTION INC. Interveners AND BETWEEN: SHANE GORDON ROLLISON Appellant AND: HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN Respondent AND: ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA ATTORNEY GENERAL OF ONTARlO CANADIAN CIVIL LIBERTIES ASSOCIATION AND BEYOND BORDERS AND THE CANADIAN CENTRE FOR CHILD PROTECTION INC. Interveners FACTUM OF THE INTERVENER THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA (Rules 37 and 42 oftheRules ofthe Supreme Court ofCanada) Jeffrey G. Johnston William F. Pentney, Q.C. 2127 - 284 Wellington Street Ottawa, Ontario KlA OH8 Deputy Attorney General of Canada 50 O'Connor Street, 5th Floor, Room 556 Ottawa>Ontario KlAOH8 Per: Robert J. Frater, Q.C. Tel: (613) 941-3528 Fax: (613) 957-8412 Tel: (613) 670-6289 Fax: (613) 954-1920 Email: [email protected] Email: robert. [email protected] Counsel for the Intervener, the Attorney General of Canada Solicitors for Counsel for the Intervener, the Attorney General of Canada Publication Ban Interdiction de publication Peter J. Royal, Q.C. Marie-France Major Royal Teskey 9636 - 102A Avenue, Suite 200 Edmonton, Alberta T5H OG5 Tel: (780) 432-0919 Fax: (780) 439-6562 Email: [email protected] Eugene Meehan, Q.C. Supreme Advocacy LLP 100 - 340 Gilmour Street Ottawa, Ontario K2P OR3 Tel: (613) 695-8855 ext. 101 Fax: (613) 695-8580 Email: [email protected] Counsel for the Appellant, Donald Jerry Barabash Ottawa Agent for the Appellant, Donald Jerry Barabash Diana C. Goldie Legal Aid Society of Alberta 300 Revillon Building 10320 102 Avenue Edmonton, Alberta T5J 4Al Tel: (780) 232-4625 Fax: (780) 422-3757 Email: [email protected] Supreme Advocacy LLP 100 - 340 Gilmour Street Ottawa, Ontario K2P OR3 Tel: (613) 695-8855 ext. 101 Fax: (613) 695-8580 Email: [email protected] Counsel for the Appellant, Shane Gordon Rollison Ottawa Agent for the Appellant, Shane Gordon Rollison Jolaine Antonio Julie Morgan Attorney General of Alberta Justice and Solicitor General Arfpeals, Education & Prosecution Policy Branch 3 Floor, Centrium Place 300,332 - 6 Avenue S.W. Calgary, Alberta T2P OB2 Tel: (403) 297-6005 Fax: (403) 297-3453 Email: [email protected] [email protected] D. Lynne Watt Gowling Lafleur Henderson LLP Barristers & Solicitors 160 Elgin Street, Suite 2600 Ottawa, Ontario KIP 1C3 Tel: (613) 786-8695 Fax: (613) 788-3509 Email: [email protected] Counsel for the Respondent, the Attorney General of Alberta Eugene Meehan, Q.C. Ottawa Agent for the Respondent, the Attorney General of Alberta Publication Ban Interdiction de publication Christine Bartlett-Hughes Ministry of the Attorney General Crown Law Office - Criminal 1O'b Floor, 720 Bay Street Toronto, Ontario M5G2K1 Tel: (416) 326-2351 Fax: (416) 326-4656 Email: [email protected] Robert E. Houston, Q.C. Burke-Robertson 41 J MacLaren Street, Suite 200 Ottawa, Ontario K2P2H3 Tel: (613) 236-9665 Fax: (613) 235-4430 Emrul: [email protected] Counsel for the Intervener, the Attorney General for Ontario Ottawa Agent for the Intervener, the Attorney General for Ontario Ale xi N. Wood Kate Southwell Davis LLP 1 First Canadjan Place, Suite 6000 P.O. Box 367, 100 King Street West Toronto, Ontario M5X 1E2 Tel: (416) 941-5403 Fax: (41 6) 369-5248 Email: [email protected] Colin S. Baxter Conway Baxter Wilson LLP 1111 Prince of Wales, Suite 401 Ottawa, Ontario K2C3T2 Tel: (613) 780-2012 Fax: (613) 688-0271 Email: [email protected] Counsel for the Intervener, the Canadian Civil Liberties Association Ottawa Agent for the Intervener, the Canadian Civil Liberties Association David Matas Barrister & Solicitor 602 - 225 Vaughan Street Winnipeg, Manjtoba R3C 1T7 Tel: (204) 944-1831 Fax: (204) 942- 1494 Email: [email protected] Counsel for the Intervener, Beyond Borders and the Canadian Centre for Child Protection Inc. D. Lynne Watt Gowling Lafleur Henderson LLP Barristers & Solicitors 160 Elgin Street, Suite 2600 Ottawa, Ontario KIP 1C3 Tel: (613) 786-8695 Fax: (613) 788-3509 Email: [email protected] Ottawa Agent for the Intervener, Beyond Borders and the Canadian Centre for Child Protection Inc. Publication Ban Interdiction de publication TABLE OF CONTENTS Page No. PART I - OVERVIEW AND STATEMENT OFFACTS .................................................... l A. Overview .......................................................................................................................... 1 B. Facts ................................................................................................................................. 1 PART TI- RESPONSE TO THE QUESTION IN ISSYE .................................................... ! PART m- ARGUMENT ........................................................................................................ 2 A. The "Private Use Exception" to Making and Possessing Child Pomography ................. 2 B. The Absence of Exploitation or Abuse as a Requirement of the "Private Use Exception" is Consistent with Parliamentary Intent ....................................................... 3 C. The "Private Use Exception" Does Not Apply to Child Pornography Which Poses a Reasoned Risk of Hann to Children ............................................................................... 6 D. The Vulnerability of Children is Relevant to the Interpretation of the "Private Use Exception" ....................................................................................................................... 6 E. The "Private Use Exception" Should be Interpreted as Part of the Statutory Regime Governing Sexual Offences Involving Children ............................................................. 9 PART IV - COSTS ................................................................................................................. 10 PART V- ORDER SOUGHT ............................................................................................... ! 0 PART VI - LIST OF AUTHORITIES ................................................................................. 11 PART VII -STATUTES AND REGULATIONS ............................................................... 13 Publication Ban Interdiction de publication PART I-OVERVIEW AND STATEMENT OF FACTS A. Overview 1. The "private use exception" to making or possessing child pornography is premised on the absence of exploitation or abuse in its production. This exception was never intended to permit the making of child pornography involving exploitation or abuse or circumstances which otherwise pose a reasoned risk of harm to children. Such an interpretation would defeat Parliament's objectives of protecting children from exploitation and abuse and ensuring that any defences afforded an accused to child pornography offences do not pose an undue risk of harm to children. This interpretation is also contrary to Canada's international obligations and is inconsistent with the "private use exception" itself as articulated by this Court in R. v. Sharpe. 1 2. Children, on account of their age, are inherently vulnerable to sexual exploitation and abuse. Because of this, the law affords them heightened protections from sexual offences, including child pornography. Holding that the consent of a child to recorded sexual activity is sufficient to engage the "private use exception" without requiring independent evidence that consent was not vitiated by factors such as exploitation or abuse would render s. 163.1 of the Criminal Codi virtually ineffectual in protecting children from the harms associated with making child pornography. B. Facts 3. The Attorney General of Canada accepts the facts as stated by the parties. PART II- RESPONSE TO THE QUESTION IN ISSUE 4. The "private use exception" to making and possessing child pornography contrary to ss. 163.1(2) and 163.1(4) of the Criminal Code should be interpreted as having four requirements: (i) The recorded sexual activity is itselflawful; (ii) The recording is held exclusively for private use; (iii)The participants must have consented to the sexual activity in question; and (iv)The consent of any child participants who have attained the age of consent must not be precluded by exploitation or abuse or other circumstances which pose a reasoned risk of harm to children. 1 2 (2001) 1 S.C.R. 45, 2001 SCC2 ("Sharpe"). R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. Publication Ban 2 Interdiction de publication PART ill- ARGUMENT A. The "Private Use Exception" to Making and Possessing Child Pornography 5. The interpretation of the '1>rivate use exception" requires an explanation of why tlris Court in Sharpe held that this exception had to be read in to the offences of making and possessing child pornography in order to render these provisions constitutional. 6. The Court in Sharpe recognized that Parliament's intent in enacting the child pornography provisions was to protect children from harm in the production of child pornography which poses a reasoned risk of harm to children.3 The Court had no difficulty in concluding that child 4 pornography produced in circumstances involving exploitation or abuse meets this harm threshold and that preventing harm of this magnitude must prevail over freedom of expression where the two sets of interests collide.5 7. The Court found that the provisions went too far in catchlng child pornography produced in circumstances which pose Jess than a reasoned risk of harm to children.6 The Court concluded that child pornography made or possessed for '1>rivate use" was not an offence, provided: (i) the recorded sexual activity is lawful; (ii) is held exclusively for private use; and (iii) the participants depicted in the recording consented to the sexual activity. 7 Unless all three conditions are met, the recorded sexual activity would be unlawful. In effect, "private use" operates as a defence. 8. Sections 163.1(2) and (4) create the offences of making and possessing child pornography. The narrow question to be decided in this case is whether, to qualify for the "private use exception", an accused charged with either of these offences must demonstrate that the consent of any child participants to recorded sexual activity was obtained in the absence of exploitation or abuse. The detennination of this issue turns on whether, in addition to showing evidence of consent, the accused has to point to facts capable of showing that the consent of any child participants was not obtained in circwnstances involving explpitation or abuse. While the majority of the Alberta Court of Appeal answered this question in the affinnative, the trial judge and the dissenting judge in the Courts below rejected this as a requirement. 9. This approach is flawed for three reasons. First, this Court in Sharpe never envisaged the '1>rivate use exception" applying to child pornography produced in circumstances which pose a reasoned risk of harm to children. Viewing the consent requirement as providing a full answer to 3 Sharpe at paras. 34, 72, 82 and 122. Ibid. at paras. 72 and 122. 5 Ibid. at para. 30. 6 Ibid. at paras. 75-76. 7 Ibid. at paras. 115-116 and 128. 4 Publication Ban Interdiction de publication 3 the absence of factors capable of vitiating consent in the case of children allows for this situation. This outcome is also at odds with Parliament's intent in enacting the child pornography provisions of protecting children from exploitation and abuse. 10. Second, this approach is not supported by principles of statutory interpretation or this Court's approach to defences. It detracts from truth-finding in supporting the fiction that the consent of child participants to recorded sexual activity was genuine. It is also not consistent with the Criminal Code scheme governing sexual offences against children as a whole which mandate that these offences, including those pertaining to child pornography, are made out where the offending conduct poses an undue risk of harm to children. 11. Finally, interpreting the ''private use exception" without regard to indicia of exploitation or abuse or other circumstances which pose a reasoned risk of harm fails to take into account the inherent vulnerability of children to exploitation and abuse and other factors which stand to render their purported consent to sexual activity neither voluntary nor meaningful. The law affords child~en heightened protections from sexual offences in recognition of this vulnerability. B. The Absence of Exploitation or Abuse as a Requirement of the "Private Use Exception" is Consistent with Parliamentary Intent 12. A statute must be interpreted in light of the problem it was intended to address. 8 This principle extends to the interpretation of defences. Any defences to the child pornography offences must not be interpreted in a manner which undermines Parliament's objective of protecting children from exploitation and abuse.9 13. Defences must not permit outcomes which are contrary to the rationale for their existence. 10 Thus, to the extent that a defence is capable of more than one interpretation, it should not be interpreted in a way which would produce absurd results by allowing the mischief the legislation was designed to prevent. 11 The "private use exception" ''must...be strictly controlled and scrupulously limited to situations that correspond to its underlying rationale." 12 14. "True" defences promote truth-findingY The objectives of trial fairness are to get at the truth while preserving procedural fairness. 14 One of the main goals of adapting rules of evidence 8 Canada 3000 Inc., Re; Inter-Canadian (1991) Inc. (I'rustee of), [2006) 1 S.C.R. 865, 2006 SCC 24 at para. 36. R. v. Katigbak, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 326, 2011 SCC 48 (''Katigbalf') at para. 38. 10 R. v. Jobidon, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 714 at pp. 762-766; and R. v. Bouchard-Lebrun, (2011) 3 S.C.R. 575, 2011 SCC 58 at para. 86. 11 R. v. Mcintosh, [1995] 1 S.C.R. 686 at paras. 35-36. 12 Perka v. The Queen, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 232 at p. 250. 13 R. v. Chaulk, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1303 atp. 1401. 14 R. v. Harrer, [1995] 3 S.C.R. 562 at para. 45. 9 Publication Ban 4 Interdiction de publication is to remove barriers to truth-finding. 15 An accused cannot claim a vested right in a rule of evidence enabling a "defence" which distorts truth-finding. 16 15. These principles dictate that the "private use exception" should not be interpreted in a way which perpetuates the fiction that consent by child participants is valid where it was obtained in exploitative or abusive circumstances. Interpreting the exception as including the requirement of an absence of exploitation or abuse or other circumstances which pose a reasoned risk of hann to children ensures that the exception is limited to situations where there is true consent 16. The history of the child pornography provisions demonstrate that the child pornography offences are aimed at addressing the sexual exploitation and abuse of children. 17. The provisions can be traced to the Badg]ey and Fraser Reports which recognized that criminalizing the making and distribution of child pornography is necessary to prevent sexual exploitation and abuse of children. The Badgley Report concluded, "(c]hild pornography is a direct product of child sexual abuse. It comes into existence... through the base and coldly premeditated exploitation of a young person's sexual vulnerability." 17 The Fraser Report similarly found that "the harms wrucb have to be demonstrated in order to justify intervention by the state are different for children in comparison with adults. Precisely because of their status as children, they are entitled to protection over a wider range of activities than are adults." 18. 18 The 1993 amendments to the Criminal Code responded to Canada's obligations under the Convention on the Rights of the Child19 which required Canada to take measures to protect 20 children under eighteen years of age from "all forms of sexual exploitation and sexual abuse" 21 and, specifically, "exploitative use of children in pornographic performances and materials." 19. In Sharpe, this Court recognized that the child pornography provisions further the objective of preventing harm to children by protecting them from exploitation and abuse in prohibiting material that poses a reasoned risk of harm to children. 22 The Court identified four harms associated with possessing child pornography: (i) it promotes cogrutive distortions that IS R. 16 17 v. Levogiannis, [1993] 4 S.C.R 475 at p. 487; and Mitchell V. M.N.R., [200 1] 1 S.C.R 911,2001 sec 33 at para. 30. R. v. Darrach. [2000] 2 S.C.R 443, 2000 SCC 46 at paras. 24 and 37; and R. v. Mills. [1999] 3 S.C.R 668 at para. 74. Canada, Committee on Sexual Offences Against Children and Youths, Sexual Offences Against Children: Summary ofthe Repon ofthe Committee on Sexual Offences Against Children and Youths (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1984) (the "Badgley Report") at p. 58. 18 Canada, Special Committee on Pornography and Prostitution, Pornography and Prostitution in Canada: Repon of the Special Commitlee on Pornography and Prostitution (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1985) (the ''Fraser Report"), Vol. 2 at p. 571. 19 Can. T.S. 1992 No.3. 20 Ibid. , Article 34. 21 Ibid., Article 34(c). 22 Sharpe at para. 93. Publication Ban 5 Interdiction de publication risk normalizing sexual relations with children; (ii) it fuels sexual fantasies that may incite offenc.es against children; (iii) it can be used for the grooming and seduction of child victims; and (iv) it encourages the abuse of children to produce child pomography?3 20. In March 2001, shortly after the Sharpe decision, Parliament created new offences related to 4 child pornography, including the Internet luring provisions considered in R. v. Legari , as well as offences related to accessing, transmitting and making available child pornography via the Internet and exporting child pomography?5 These amendments were also intended to protect children as vulnerable members of Canadian society: "The amendments... respond to serious crimes against children....The provisions ... ensure that children are protected from those who would prey upon their 26 vulnerability'' and "better protect... children against sexual exploitation."27 21. The 2001 amendments coincided with Canada's signing of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornograph/8 aimed at combating child exploitation through child pornography. The Protocol states that children, particularly girls, are vulnerable to sexual exploitation and calls on state parties to take action to address the exploitation of children caused by child pornography?9 22. In sum, the child pornography offences, both now and at the time of their inception, are driven by the underlying policy concern that children, on account of their age, are vulnerable and this vulnerability requires heightened safeguards to protect them from sexual offences. This vulnerability is particularly acute in the context of sexual activity where adults are involved and children are susceptible to exploitation and abuse and other factors which can lead to their victimization. As explained by Professor Andrea Slane, "criminalizing child pornography is mainly justified by a legal system's obligation to protect minors from sexual exploitation, based on the belief that youth are more vulnerable to exploitation because of their still-developing reasoning capacity, lower financial and social independence, and lack of life experience."30 23 Ibid. at paras. 86-94. [2009] 3 s.c.R. 551 , 2009 sec 5. 25 The Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1001, S.C. 2002, c. 13. 26 The Honourable Anne McLellan, MiniSter of Justice and Attorney General of Canada, Canada, House of Commons, Commons Debates, May 3, 2001 at p. 3581. 27 The Honourable Anne McLellan, Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada. Canada, Senate, Proceedings ofthe Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, Issue 20- Evidence, December 5, 2001 at p. 2. 28 A/RES/54/263 (2000), Annex ll. 29 Ibid., Preamble. 30 Andrea Slane, "From Scanning to Sexting: The Scope of Protection of Dignity-Based Privacy in.Canadian Child Pornography Law", 48 Osgoode Hall L.J. 543 2010 at pp. 566-567. 14 Publication Ban Interdiction de publication 6 C. The "Private Use Exception" Does Not Apply to Child Pornography Which Poses a Reasoned Risk of Harm to Children 23. The availability of the "private use exception" is subject to an important caveat. Sharpe held that the ''private use" of recorded lawful sexual activity involving child participants poses "little or no", a "negligible", "nomina]" or "relatively remote" risk ofhann to children with any risk being "small", "incidental" and ''tenuous."31 Thus, if the making or possession of child pornography poses a reasoned risk ofhann to children the "private use exception" is not available.32 In applying and interpreting the exception the focus should invariably be on whether the child pornography poses a reasoned apprehension ofhann to children as compared to a minimal risk. 33 24. In creating the "private use exception", the Court in Sharpe did not recognize an exception to the offences of making or possessing child pornography resulting from exploitation or abuse. To the contrary, the Court stated that the level of harm posed by the private use of child pornography constituted an unreasonable limit on freedom of expression precisely because no exploitation or abuse was involved in making the child pornography which did not pose a reasoned risk ofharm to children with the result that recognizing this exception would not subvert Parliament's objective.34 25. Accordingly, to interpret the ''private use exception" as including a requirement that consent by child participants to recorded sexual activity was obtained in circumstances precluding exploitation or abuse not only ensures that Parliament's intention is respected, it is also entirely in keeping with what this Court intended in Sharpe, namely, that the exception does not apply to child pornography produced in circumstances which pose a reasoned risk ofhann to children. D. The Vulnerability of Children is Relevant to the Interpretation of the "Private Use Exception" 26. Just as the contextual approach to s. 1 of the Charter treats as a relevant consideyation the vulnerability of the group which the legislator seeks to protecf5, so too should this consideration inform the interpretation of the child pornography offences and the "private use exception." 27. Viewing the "private use exception" as not taking into account indicia of exploitation or abuse or other factors which can vitiat~ consent has the effect of treating the consent of children to sexual activity as the same as that of adults. Not making this distinction ignores the inherent vulnerability of children vis-a-vis adults which make them especially susceptible to circumstances which call into question whether any consent to sexual activity was truly voluntary and meaningful. 31 Sharpe at paras. 75, 77, 95, 99, 100, 105, I20, 122 and 125. R. v. Bono, (2008) O.J. No 3928 (S.C.J.) at para. 26. 33 Sharpe at para. I23; and Katigbak at para. 38. 34 Ibid. Sharpe at paras. I 00, I 05 and 122. 35 Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927 at p. 993; Ross v. New Brunswick School District No. 15, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 825 at paras. 86- 88; and Sharpe at para. 157. 32 Publication Ban 7 Interdiction de publication 28. Children are seen as needing heightened legal protections on account of their age36 : "[r]ecognition of the inherent vulnerability of children has consistent and deep roots in Canadian law ... .The law attributes the heightened vulnerability based on chronology, not temperament."37 Where the issue of decision-making like that involved in deciding whether to participate in sexual activity is concerned, children are not the same as adults and for this reason are treated differently. There is a compelling state interest in protecting children in this situation as a vulnerable group that are ''hampered in making informed choices."38 29. As McLachlin C.J. stated in A. C. v. Manitoba (Director of Child and Family Services/ 9 in relation to children consenting to medical treatment, "[t]he legislative decision to vest treatment authority regarding under-16 minors in the courts is a legitimate response ...to heightened concerns about younger adolescents' maturity and vulnerability to subtle and overt coercion and 40 influence." Justice Fish made the same observation in R. v. L.T.H 41 in relation to the protections afforded young persons under the Youth Criminal Justice Act42 : ''young persons... are presumed on account of their age and relative unsophistication to be more vulnerable than adults· to suggestion, pressure and influence.'.43 Indeed, we have a separate legal regime for young people since, "because of their age, young people have heightened vulnerability, less maturity and a reduced capacity for moral judgment.,,44 30. The same is true of the child pornography offences. Thus, "[t]he protection afforded by the legislation extends to all children under 18, no matter their age, and rightly so. Society has recognized the legitimate need to safeguard all children in this category from exploitative conduct. Children are not adults and cannot be expected to exercise judgment as if they were.'.45 31. In determining whether consent is voluntary and meaningful, regard must be had to the vulnerabilities of the person purportedly consenting and the need to protect this person owing to these vulnerabilities. As this Court stated in R. v. Audel6, "[t]he relative positions of the parties have always been relevant to the validity of consent under Canadian criminal law. The common law has long recognized that exploitation by one person of another person's vulnerability. .. can have Ibid. Sharpe at para. 170. A.B. v. Bragg Communications Inc. , [2012] 2 S.C.R. 567, 2012 SCC 46 ("Bragg") at para. 17. 38 R. v. Keegstra, [1990) 3 S.C.R. 697 at p. 761. 39 [2009) 2 s.c.R. 181 , 2oo9 sec 30 ("A. C."). 40 Ibid. at para. 143. 41 [2008) 2 s.c.R. 739, 2oo8 sec 49 ("L.T.H"). 42 S.C. 2002, c. 1 ("YCIA"). 43 L.T.H. at para. 3. 44 R. V. D. B.' [2008] 2 S.C.R. 3, 2008 sec 25 at para 41. 45 R. v. Hewlett (2002), 167 C.C.C. (3d) 425 (Alta. C.A.), 2002 ABCA 179 at para. 24. 46 [1996] 2 S.C.R. 171. 3(i 37 Publication Ban Interdiction de publication 8 an impact on the validity of consent."47 As McLachlin J., as she then was, stated in Jacobi v. 48 Gri.ffiths 32. , "children are vulnerable as potential victims of... sexual abuse.'"'9 The vulnerability of children rests on the innate power imbalance that exists between adults and children based on age. The Court in Sharpe identified this dynamic as both explaining the high incidence of sexual violence and exploitation of children and as necessitating enhanced measures to protect children from sexual offences. 5° 33. The approach of the trial judge and the dissenting judge in the Courts below and that proposed by the Appellants fails to recognize the vulnerability of children and the need to protect them in omitting the relationship between age, vulnerability and exploitation and abuse from the consent of child participants to recorded sexual activity under the "private use exception." 34. To interpret the ''private use exception" as only requiring evidence of bare consent supports the fiction that de facto or ostensible corisent is synonymous with the absence of exploitation or abuse or other factors capable of vitiating consent in the case of children. 51 35. The case at bar illustrates the fallacy of equating evidence of consent with the absence of exploitation or abuse in obtaining consent. The trial judge treated the complainants' control over the recorded sexual activity and their behavior in the recordings coupled with the absence of coercion, violence or inducements as all indicative of consent. 52 This analysis obscures completely the way in which age disparity or other factors can impact on consent, particularly where the complainants were drug-dependent teenage runaways and the much older Appellants were providing them with shelter and drugs. 53 While all children are vulnerable, troubled adolescent children are more vulnerable than most. 54 36. To interpret the consent aspect of the "private use exception" based on the viewing of the recorded sexual activity without also requiring evidence that valid consent was not vitiated by factors such as exploitation or abuse fails to treat children as children. It is no more appropriate than concluding that a child's smiling appearance in pornographic images means that the child was a willing participant who was not negatively affected by the experience.55 It also verges on treating 47 Ibid. at para. 20. [1999] 2 S.C.R. 570 ("Jacobi") . 49 Ibid. at para. 19. so Sharpe at para. 170. 51 R. v. Cocke//, (2013), 299 C.C.C. (3d) 221 (Alta. C.A.), 2013 ABCA 11 2, application for leave to appeal dismissed, [2013) S.C.C.A. No. 309 ("Cockelf1 at paras. 37-38. 52 R. v. Barabash, 2012 ABQB 99 at paras. 92-95, 100 and 171-172. 53 Ibid. at paras. 44 and 213; and R. v. Barabash, 2014 ABCA 126 at paras. 2 and 36. 54 Jacobi at para. 19. ss R. v. D.C., 2009 NBCA 59 at para. 2 1. 48 Publication Ban Interdiction de 9 publication the vulnerability of children as a question of temperament56 This outcome is not supported by the ')Jrivate use exception" as conceived in Sharpe and runs counter to the directive in Katigbak cautioning against an overly broad construction of defences to child pornography offences. 57 E. The "Private Use Exception" Should be Interpreted as Part of the Statutory Regime Governing Sexual Offences Involving Children 37. Section 163.1 does not exist in isolation. As this Court stated in Sharpe, "s. 163.1(4) is part of a broader scheme of Criminal Code offences which recognize the vulnerability of children and attempt to protect them from exploitation. ,,ss As the legislature is presumed to have created a coherent, consistent and harmonious statutory scheme, the offence provisions in s. 163 .l , including any available defences, should be interpreted in a manner that is both informed by and consistent with related provisions targeting the sexual exploitation and abuse of children, including ss. 153 and 163.1(6) of the Code. 59 38. The provisions of a statute are ')Jresumed to work together dynamically, each contributing something toward accomplishing the intended goal.',60 The sexual offence provisions of the Criminal Code aimed at children should therefore be construed in a harmonious fashion to promote the common goal of providing heightened protections to young persons in the interests of protecting them from sexual exploitation and abuse owing to their vulnerability. 39. 61 Section 153 makes it an offence for a person who is in a position of trust or authority towards a young person, a relationship of dependency or an exploitative relationship to engage in sexual activity with the young person. Significantly, s. 153(1.2) permits an exploitative relationship to be inferred from the nature an.d circumstances of the relationship, including based on specific factors. This provision has been interpreted as allowing an inference of an exploitative relationship to be drawn as a result of a power imbalance between the person and the young person which renders the latter vulnerable to the actions and conduct of the former. 62 40. The nature of the adult-child relationstrip should also inform the "private use exception." This consideration should require that, for the consent of child participants to recorded sexual activity to be valid, it is not enough to point to evidence of de facto or ostensible consent. An accused should be required to go further and demonstrate that any purported consent was not 56 Bragg at para. 17. Katigbak at para. 38. 58 Sharpe at para. 172. 59 R. V. Summers, (2014] 1 S.C.R. 575, 2014 sec 26 at para. 59. 60 Ruth Sullivan, Sullivan and Driedger on the Construction ofStatutes, 4th ed. (Markham, Ont.: Butterworths, 2002) at p. 168. 61 L.T.H. at para. 47. 62 R. v. Anderson (2009), 241 C.C.C. (3d) 432 (P .E.I. C.A.), 2009 PECA 4 at para. 74. 57 Publication Ban Interdiction de publication 10 obtained in the context of an exploitative or abusive relationship or based on factors like those listed ins. 153(1.2) capable of rendering consent neither voluntary nor meaningful. For example, the age disparity between the victim and the accused and the evolution of their relationship may support the finding that the victim was exploited by the accused into making child pornography.63 41. To hold otherwise is to remove the child aspect from the child pornography equation altogether and to treat decision-making and the notion of consent by children to sexual activity as the equivalent to that of adults.64 This interpretation of the "private use exception" discounts entirely the inherent vulnerability of children based on their age which put them at increased risk of sexual exploitation and abuse and which, depending on the nature and circumstances of the relationship, can render de facto or ostensible consent to recorded sexual activity no consent at all. 65 42. Section 163.1(6) is also relevant to the interpretation of the "private use exception." The exception should likewise be limited to private uses that do not pose an "undue risk of harm to persons under the age of eighteen years." This would ensure that the exception is both consistent with Parliament's objective in legislating defences and with Sharpe which never intended that the exception would apply to private uses that pose a reasoned risk or apprehension of harm to children. PART IV - COSTS 43. The Attorney General of Canada does not seek costs and submits that the ordinary rule that costs are not awarded against interveners should apply. PART V- ORDER SOUGHT 44. The Attorney General of Canada asks that the appeals be disposed of in accordance with the foregoing submissions and requests permission to make oral argument at the hearing of the appeals. ALL OF WHICH IS RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED. Dated at the City of Ottawa, in the Province of Ontario, this 5th day of January, 2015. Jcl:il:~ ~t-of Counsel for the Intervener, the Attorney General of Canada 63 Cocke// at paras. 43-44. A.C. at para. 116. 65 R. v. J.A., [20 II] 2 S.C.R. 440, 201 1 SCC 28 at para. 60. 64 Publication Ban Interdiction de publication 11 PART VI - LIST OF AUTHORITIES Cases Cited A.B. V. Bragg Communications Inc., [2012] 2 S.C.R. 567,2012 sec 46 A. C. v. Manitoba (Director of Child and Family Services), [2009] 2 s.c.R. 181 , 20o9 sec 30 Para. No(s). 28,36 29,41 Canada 3000 Inc., Re; Inter-Canadian {1991) Inc. (Trustee of), [2006] 1 s.c.R. 865, 20o6 sec 24 12 Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927 26 Jacobi v. Grijjlths, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 570 31,35 Mitchell v. MN.R., [2001) 1 s.c.R. 911 , 2001 sec 33 14 Perka v. 'fl1e Queen, [ 1984] 2 S.C.R 232 13 R. v. Anderson (2009), 241 C.C.C. (3d) 432 (P.E.I. C.A.), 2009 PECA 4 39 R. v. Audet, [ 1996] 2 S.C.R. 171 31 R. v. Bono, [2008] O.J. No 3928 (S.C.J.) 23 R. V. Bouchard-Lebnm, [201 1] 3 S.C.R. 575, 2011 sec 58 13 R. v. Chaulk, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1303 14 R. v. Cockell, (2013), 299 C.C.C. (3d) 221 (Alta. C.A.), 2013 ABCA I 12, appli cation for leave to appeal dismissed, [2013] S.C.C.A. No. 309 34, 40 R. v. D.B., [2008] 2 S.C.R. 3, 2008 SCC 25 29 R. v. D.C., 2009 NBCA 59 36 R. V. Darrach, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 443, 2000 sec 46 14 R. v. Harrer, [1995] 3 S.C.R. 562 14 R. v. Hewlett (2002), 167 C.C.C. (3d) 425 (Alta. C.A.), 2002 ABCA 179 30 R. v. J.A., [2011] 2 S.C.R. 440,2011 SCC 28 41 R. v. Jobidon, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 714 13 R. v. Katigbak, [2011] 3 s.c.R. 326, 201 1 sec 48 12, 23, 36 Publication Ban Interdiction de publication 12 R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697 28 R. v. L.TH, (2008J 2 s.c.R. 739, 2oos sec 49 29,38 R. v. Legare, [2009] 3 S.C.R. 551,2009 SCC 5 20 R. v. Levogiannis, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 475 14 R. v. Mcintosh, [1995] 1 S.C.R. 686 13 R. v. Mills, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 668 14 R. v. Sharpe, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 45,2001 SCC 2 R. V. Summers, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 575, 2014 sec 26 Ross v. New Brunswick School District No. 15, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 825 Authors and Secondary Sources Cited Canada, Committee on Sexual Offences Against Children and Youths, 1, 5-7, 9, 19, 23, 24, 26,28,32,36,37 37 26 Para. No(s). 17 Sexual Offences Against Children: Summary of the Report ofthe Committee on Sexual Offences Against Children and Youths (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1984) Canada, House of Commons, Commons Debates, May 3, 2001 20 Canada, Senate, Proceedings ofthe Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, Issue 20- Evidence, December 5, 2001 20 Canada, Special Committee on Pornography and Prostitution, 17 Pornography and Prostitution in Canada: Report ofthe Special Committee on Pornography and Prostitution (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1985) Andrea Slane, "From Scanning to Sexting: The Scope of Protection of Dignity-Based Privacy in Canadian Child Pornography Law", 48 Osgoode Hall L.J 543 2010 22 Ruth Sullivan, Sullivan and Driedger on the Construction ofStatutes, 4th ed. (Markham, Ont.: Butterworths, 2002) 38 Publication Ban 13 Interdiction de publication PART Vll- STATUTES AND REGULATIONS Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 163.1 Definition of "child pornography" Definition de « pornographie juvenile » 163.1 (1) In this section, "child pornography" means 163.1 (1) Au present article, « pomographie juvenile» s'entend, seton le cas : (a) a photographic, film, video or other visual representation, whether or not it was made by electronic or mechanical means, (a) de toute representation photographique, filmee, video ou autre, realisee ou non par des moyens mecaniques ou electroniques : (i) that shows a person who is or is depicted as being under the age of eighteen years and is engaged in or is depicted as engaged in explicit sexual activity, or (i) soit oil figure une personne agee de moins de dix-huit ans ou presentee comme telle et se livrant ou presentee comme se livrant a une activite sexueUe explicite, (ii) the dominant characteristic of which is the depiction, for a sexual purpose, of a sexual organ or the anal region of a person under the age of eighteen years; (ii) soit dont Ia caracteristique dominante est la representation, dans un but sexuel, d'organes sexuels ou de la region anale d'une personne agee de moins de dix-huit ans; (b) any written material, visual representation or audio recording that advocates or counsels sexual activity with a person under the age of eighteen years that would be an offence under this Act; (c) any written material whose dominant characteristic is the description, for a sexual purpose, of sexual activity with a person under the age of eighteen years that would be an offence under this Act; or (d) any audio recording that has as its dominant characteristic the description, presentation or representation, for a sexual purpose, of sexual activity with a person under the age of eighteen years that would be an offence under this Act (b) de tout ecrit, de toute representation ou de tout enregistrement sonore qui preconise ou conseille une activite sexuelle avec une personne agee de moins de dix-huit ans qui constituerait une infraction a Ia presente Joi; (c) de tout ecrit dont la caracteristique dominante est la description, dans un but sexuel, d'une activite sexuelle avec une personne agee de moins de dix-huit ans qui constituerait une infraction a Ia presente loi; (d) de tout enregistrement sonore dont Ia caractenstique dominante est la description, la presentation ou la simulation, dans un but sexuel, d'une activite sexueUe avec une personne agee de moins de dix-huit ans qui constituerait une infraction ala presente loi. Publication Ban Interdiction de publication Making child pornography (2) Every person who makes, prints, publishes or possesses for the purpose of publication any child pornography is guilty of 14 Production de pornographie juvenile (2) Quiconque produit, imprime ou publie, ou a en sa possession en vue de la publication, de la pomographie juvenile est coupable : (a) an indictable offence and liable to (a) soit d'un acte criminel passible d'un imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten years and to a minimum punishment of imprisonment for a term of one year; or emprisonnement maximal de dix ans, la peine minimale etant de un an; (b) soit d' une infraction punissable sur (b) an offence punishable on summary conviction and is liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years less a day and to a minimum punishment of imprisonment for a term of six months. declaration de culpabilite par procedure sommaire et passible d'un emprisonnement maximal de deux ans moins un jour, la peine minimale etant de six mois. Distribution, etc. ofchild pornography Distribution de pornographie juvenile (3) Every person who transmits, makes available, distributes, sells, advertises, imports, exports or possesses for the purpose of transmission, making available, distribution, sale, advertising or exportation any child pornography is guilty of (3) Quiconque transmet, rend accessible, distribue, vend, importe ou exporte de la pomographie juvenile ou en fait la publicite, ou en a en sa possession en vue de Ia transmettre, de la rendre accessible, de la distribuer, de la vendre, de 1'exporter ou d' en faire la publicite, est coupable : (a) an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten years and to a minimum punishment of imprisonment for a term of one year; or (a) soit d'un acte criminel passible d' un (b) an offence punishable on summary (b) soit d'une infraction punissable sur declaration de culpabilite par procedure sommaire et passible d'un emprisonnement maximal de deux ans moins un jour, la peine minimale etant de six mois. conviction and is liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years less a day and to a minimum punishment of imprisonment for a term of six months. emprisonnement maximal de dix ans, la peine minimale etant de un an; Possession ofchild pornography Possession de pornographie juvenile (4) Every person who possesses any child pornography is guilty of (4) Quiconque a en sa possession de la pomographie juvenile est coupable : (a) an indictable offence and is liable to (a) soit d'un acte criminel passible d'un imprisonment for a term of not more than five years and to a minimum punishment of imprisonment for a term of six months; or emprisonoement maximal de cinq ans, la peine minimale etant de six mois; Publication Ban Interdiction de publication (b) an offence punishable on summary conviction and is liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than 18 months and to a minimum punishment of imprisonment for a term of 90 days. 15 (b) soit d'une infraction punissable sur declaration de culpabilite par procedure sommaire et passible d'un emprisonnement maximal de dix-huit mois, la peine minimale etant de quatre-vingt-dix jours. Accessing child pornography Acces a Ia pornographie juvenile (4.1) Every person who accesses any child pornography is guilty of (4.1) Quiconque accede ade la pornographie juvenile est coupable : (a) an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than five years and to a minimum punishment of imprisonment for a term of six months; or (a) soit d'un acte criminel passible d'un emprisonnement maximal de cinq ans, la peine minimale etant de six mois; (b) soit d'une infraction punissable sur (b) an offence punishable on summary conviction and is liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than 18 months and to a minimum punishment of imprisonment for a term of90 days. declaration de culpabilite par procedure sommaire et passible d'un emprisonnement maximal de dix-huit mois, la peine minimale etant de quatre-vingt-dix jours. Interpretation Interpretation (4.2) For the purposes of subsection (4.1), a person accesses child pornography who knowingly causes child pornography to be viewed by, or transmitted to, himself or herself (4.2) Pour !'application du paragraphe (4.1 ), accede ade la pomographie juvenile quiconque, sciemment, agit de maniere aen regarder ou fait en sorte que lui en soit transmise. Aggravating factor Circonstance aggravante (4.3) If a person is convicted of an offence under this section, the court that imposes the sentence shall consider as an aggravating factor the fact that the person committed the offence with intent to make a profit. (4.3) Le tribunal qui determine la peine a infliger aune personne declaree coupable d'infraction au present article est tenu de considerer comme circonstance aggravante le fait que cette personne a commis I 'infraction dans le dessein de realiser un profit. Defence Moyen de defense (5) It is not a defence to a charge under subsection (2) in respect of a visual representation that the accused believed that a person shown in the representation that is alleged to constitute child pornography was or was depicted as being eighteen years of age or more unless the accused took all reasonable (5) Le fait pour !'accuse de croire qu'une personne figurant dans une representation qui constituerait de la pornographie juvenile etait agee d'au moins dix-huit ans ou etait presentee comme telle ne constitue un moyen de defense contre une accusation portee sous le regime du paragraphe (2) que s'il a pris toutes les mesures Publication Ban Interdiction de 16 publication steps to ascertain the age of that person and took raisonnables, d'une part, pour s'assurer qu'elle avait bien cet age et, d'autre part, pour veiller a all reasonable steps to ensure that, where the person was eighteen years of age or more, the ce qu'elle ne soit pas presentee comme une representation did not depict that person as being personne de moins de dix-huit ans. under the age of eighteen years. Defence Moyen de defense (6) No person shall be convicted of an offence under this section if the act that is alleged to constitute the offence (6) Nul ne peut etre declare coupable d'une infraction au present article si les actes qui constitueraient 1'infraction : (a) has a legitimate purpose related to the administration of justice or to science, medicine, education or art; and (b) does nol pose an undue risk ofharm to persons under the age of eighteen years. (a) ont un but legitime lie a }'administration de la justice, a Ia science, a la medecine, a 1'education ou aux arts; (b) ne posent pas de risque indu pour les personnes agees de moins de dix-huit ans. Question of law Question de droit (7) For greater certainty, for the purposes of this section, it is a question of law whether any written material, visual representation or audio recording advocates or counsels sexual activity with a person under the age of eighteen years that would be an offence under this Act. (7) II est entendu, pour I' application du present article, que la question de savoir si un ecrit, une representation ou un enregistrement sonore preconise ou conseille une activite sexuelle avec une personne agee de moins de dix-huit ans qui constituerait une infraction a la presente loi constitue une question de droit. Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 153 Sexual exploitation Exploitation sexuelle 153. (1) Every person commits an offence who is in a position of trust or authority towards a young person, who is a person with whom the young person is in a relationship of dependency or who is in a relationship with a young person that is exploitative of the young person, and who 153. (1) Commet une infraction toute personne qui est en situation d'autorite ou de confiance vis-a-vis d'un adolescent, a l'egard de laquelle !'adolescent est en situation de dependance ou qui est dans une relation ou elle exploite }'adolescent et qui, selon le cas: (a) for a sexual purpose, touches, directly or (a) a des fins d'ordre sexuel, touche, indirectly, with a part of the body or with an object, any part of the body of the young person; or directement ou indirectement, avec une partie de son corps ou avec un objet, une partie du corps de }'adolescent; (b) for a sexual purpose, invites, counsels or (b) ades fins d 'ordre sexuel, invite, engage ou incite un adolescent a la toucher, a se toucher ou a toucher un tiers, directement ou indirectement, avec une partie du corps ou incites a young person to touch, directly or indirectly, with a part ofthe body or with an object, the body of any person, including the Publication Ban 17 Interdiction de publication body of the person who so invites, counsels or incites and the body of the young person. avec un objet. Punishment Peine (1.1) Every person who commits an offence under subsection ( 1) ( 1.1) Quiconque commet 1'infraction visee au paragraphe (1) est coupable: (a) is guilty of an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than 10 years and to a minimum punishment of imprisonment for a term of one year; or (b) is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction and is liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than 18 months and to a minimum punishment of imprisonment for a term of 90 days. (a) soit d'un acte criminel passible d'un emprisonnernent maximal de dix ans, la peine minimale etant de un an; (b) soit d'une infraction punissable sur declaration de culpabilite par procedure sornmaire et passible d'un emprisonnement maximal de dix-huit mois, la peine minimale etant de quatre-vingt-dix jours. Deduction Inference ofsexual exploitation (1.2) A judge may infer that a person is in a relationship with a young person that is exploitative of the young person from the nature and circumstances of the relationship, including (1.2) Le juge peut deduire de la nature de la relation entre la personne et !'adolescent et des circonstances qui l'entourent, notamment des elements ci-apres, que celle-ci est dans une relation ou elle exploite !'adolescent: (a) the age of the young person; (a) I' age de I' adolescent; (b) the age difference between the person and the young person; (b) la difference d'age entre Ia personne et l' adolescent; (c) the evolution of the relationship; and (c) }'evolution de leur relation; (d) the degree of control or influence by the person over the young person. (d) l'emprise ou l'influence de Ia personne sur !'adolescent. Definition of "young person" Definition de « adolescent» (2) In this section, "young person, means a person 16 years of age or more but under the age of eighteen years. (2) Pour !'application du present article,« adolescent)) s'entend d'une personne agee de seize ans au moins mais de moins de dix-huit ans. Publication Ban Interdiction de publication 18 Conve11tion on the Rights of the Child, Can. T.S. 1992 No.3 Article 34 States Parties undertake to protect the child from all forms of sexual exploitation and sexual abuse. For these purposes, States Parties shall in particular take all appropriate national, bilateral and multilateral measures to prevent: (a) The inducement or coercion of a child to engage in any unlawful sexual activity; (b) The exploitative use of children in prostitution or other unlawful sexual practices; (c) The exploitative use of children in pornographic performances and materials. Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography, AIRES/54/263 (2000), Annex D [ ... ] Considering that, in order further to achieve the purposes of the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the implementation of its provisions, especially articles 1, I 1, 21 , 32, 33, 34,35 and 36, it would be appropriate to extend the measures that States Parties should undertake in order to guarantee the protection of the child from the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography, Considering also that the Convention on the Rights of the Child recognizes the right of the child to be protected from economic exploitation and from performing any work that is likely to be hazardous or to interfere with the child's education, or to be harmful to the child's health or physical, mental, spiritual, moral or social development, Gravely concerned at the significant and increasing intemational traffic in children for the purpose of the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography, Deeply concerned at the widespread and continuing practice of sex touris~ to which children are especially vulnerable, as it directly promotes the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography, Recognizing that a number of particularly vulnerable groups, incJuding girl children, are at greater risk of sexual exploitation and that girl children are disproportionately represented among the sexually exploited, Concerned about the growing availability of child pornography on the Internet and other evolving technologies, and recalling the International Conference on Combating Child Pornography on the lntemet, held in Vienna in 1999, in particular its conclusion calling for the worldwide criminalization of the production, distribution, exportation, transmission, importation, intentional possession and advertising of child pornography, and stressing the importance of closer cooperation and partnership between Governments and the Internet industry, Believing that the elimination of the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography will be facilitated by adopting a holistic approach, addressing the contributing factors, including underdevelopment, poverty, economic disparities, inequitable socio-economic structure, Publication Ban Interdiction de 19 publication dysfunctioning families, Jack of education, urban-rural migration, gender discrimination, irresponsible adult sexual behaviour, harmful traditional practices, armed conflicts and trafficking in children, Believing also that efforts to raise public awareness are needed to reduce consumer demand for the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography, and believing further in the importance of strengthening global partnership among all actors and of improving law enforcement at the national level, Noting the provisions of international legal instruments relevant to the protection of children, including the Hague Convention on Protection of Children and Cooperation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption, the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, the Hague Convention on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, Recognition, Enforcement and Cooperation in Respect of Parental Responsibility and Measures for the Protection of Children, and International Labour Organization Convention No. 182 on the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour, Encouraged by the overwhelming support for the Convention on the Rights of the Child, demonstrating the widespread commitment that exists for the promotion and protection of the rights of the child, Recognizing the importance of the implementation of the provisions of the Programme of Action for the Prevention of the Sale of Cluldren, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography and the Declaration and Agenda for Action adopted at the World Congress against Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Children, held in Stockholm from 27 to 31 August 1996, and the other relevant decisions and recommendations of pertinent international bodies, Taking due account of the importance of the traditions and cultural values of each people for the protection and harmonious development of the child, Have agreed as follows [ ... ]