291-page transcript - The Hague Institute for Global Justice

Transcription

InternationalDecisionMakingintheAgeofGenocide:Srebrenica1993-1995
June28–July1,2015
TheHague
EditedTranscript
Session1:Creatingthe“SafeAreas”
MeetingroominTheHague
TOMBLANTON:Goodmorning.Thankyouverymuchforcomingtothetable.A
reminderaboutourmethodology:everythingsaidatthistableisonbackgroundfor
nowbutwearerecordingthesessionandwillproduceatranscript.1Youwillhave
theopportunitytocorrectyourremarksbeforewereleasethetranscript.Oneofour
goalsistoexpandthehistoricalrecordonSrebrenica.
Ifyouturntoyourbriefingbooks,youwillfindasummaryofkeypointsthat
weplantoaddressineachofthefoursessions.2Thismorningwewanttostartwith
theeyewitnessesonthegroundinthespringof1993.Weknowthisisanarbitrary
date.ThereisanargumenttobemadethatthesinsthatledtoSrebrenicagobackto
1
Thistranscriptwasannotatedandeditedforclaritybyconferencestaffandparticipantsinaccordance
withconferencegroundrules.
2
USHMM,“ConferenceAgenda,”June28,2015.
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thediplomaticrecognitionprocess[in1990-1992],thelackofprotectionforethnic
minoritiesduringthatearlyperiod,thearmsembargo,orthefamousJimBaker
comment,"Wedon'thaveadoginthatfight"whentheAmericanswentmissing.3
ButforthepurposesofthisconferenceandourfocusonSrebrenica,wewant
tobeginwithGeneralMorillon'svisittoSrebrenicainMarch1993.4MichaelDobbs,
willyouleadusoffwithafewawkwardquestions?
MICHAELDOBBS:Thankyou,Tom.Thisisthesecondinaseriesofconferencesthat
weareorganizingunderthetitle"InternationalDecisionMakingintheAgeof
Genocide,"lookingatthebigcrisesofthepost-ColdWarperiod.5Lastyear,wehada
conferenceonRwandawithasimilarsetuparoundthetable.Wehadmembersof
theUNSecurityCouncilontheleft,GeneralDallaireandtheotherUNpeacekeepers
inthemiddle,andthepeoplewhonegotiatedtheArushaAccordsontheright.I
thinkthat[formerUKrepresentativeontheUNSecurityCouncil]DavidHannayis
sittinginexactlythesamechairthatyouoccupiedforourRwandaconference.You
provideathreadofcontinuitybetweenthetwoconferences,asdoes[formerUS
AssistantSecretaryofStateforHumanRights]JohnShattuck.
ManyoftheofficialswhowereinvolvedinRwandadecision-makingwere
alsoinvolvedinBosnia.Therearesimilaritiesanddifferencesbetweenthosetwo
events.Oneofthesimilaritiesisthegapinperceptionsbetweenthepeopleonthe
groundandthepeopleinNewYorkandthenationalcapitals.InthecaseofRwanda,
itwasasifthedebatesweretakingplaceonthreedifferentplanets.Therewerethe
peoplewhonegotiatedtheArushaAgreements,thepeacekeeperswhoimplemented
theagreements,andtheUNofficialsinNewYorkwhosupervisedtheentireprocess.
Therewasimperfectcommunicationbetweenthesethreegroupsofactors.We
discoveredthattherewasimperfectcommunicationwithinthesameinstitution:at
3
SecretaryofStateJamesA.BakervisitedBelgradeonJune21,1991,meetingwithawiderangeof
Yugoslavleaders,fivedaysbeforetheoutbreakofwarbetweenSerbiaandSlovenia.Hiscomment“we
don’thaveadoginthatfight”wasreportedlaterbyNationalSecurityAdvisorBrentScowcroft.
4
GeneralPhilippeMorillonvisitedSrebrenicafromMarch10to13,1993,attheheadofaUN
humanitarianaidconvoywhilethetownwasundersiegebyBosnianSerbforces.
5
MoreinformationontheInternationalDecisionMakingprojectcanbefoundontheUSHolocaust
MemorialMuseumwebsite.
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theUnitedNations,forexample,betweentheSecretariatandtheSecretary-General,
orbetweentheSecretariatandtheSecurityCouncil.Isuspectthatwewillfind
similardisconnectsinthecaseofBosnia.
Tosetthestageforourdiscussiontoday,IreadRupertSmith'sexcellent
chapteronBosniainTheUtilityofForceinwhichhewritesthattheseedsforthe
Srebrenicadisasterwere“sownwiththedecisionsmadeinthespringof1993:
decisionstothreatenwithnointentiontoact,todeployforceswithnointentionto
employtheirforce,decisionsmadeinnopoliticalcontextexceptfearofthe
consequencesofactiontotheforce.”6Healsocommentsonthelackofany
overarchingstrategy.Hesaystherewasnostrategicdirection,noachievable
militarygoals,nomilitarycampaign,notheaterlevelmilitaryobjectives,only
incoherence.Hetalksabout“theimperativetodosomethingandthescrambleto
createapolicy.”WemaynotagreewithGeneralSmith’sassessment,butwewill
certainlyhavetograpplewithhiscritiqueoverthenextcoupleofdays.
Thismorning,wewilllookattheperiodfromMarch1993,whenGeneral
MorillonarrivesinSrebrenicatoaccompanyahumanitarianconvoy,throughthe
threeUNSecurityCouncilresolutionsthatestablishedtheSafeAreasandsetthe
parametersfortheirprotection.7TheeventsofJuly1995areshapedbythe
decisionstakenin1993.
Afewquestionsforustoconsider:whatwasthenatureofthecommitments
containedinthesethreeUNresolutions?Didthepeoplearoundthistable—UN
ambassadors,membersoftheUNSecretariat,thepeacekeepers—haveaclearidea
ofthepolicythatyouformulatedbackin1993?Howweretheresolutionsmeantto
beimplemented?WhatwastheproperroleofUNPROFOR?Wasitaclassic
peacekeepingmissionorwasitapeaceenforcementmission?DuringourRwanda
conference,therewasalotofdiscussionabouttherulesofengagement,authorized
underChapterVIoftheUNCharter.IntheBosnia“SafeArea”resolutions,youwill
6
RupertSmith,TheUtilityofForce:TheArtofWarintheModernWorld,150.
TheUNSecurityCounciladoptedResolution819onApril16,1993,callingonthewarringpartiestotreat
Srebrenicaas“asafearea”.UNSCResolution824ofMay4addedfivemore“safeareas”:Sarajevo,Tuzla,
Žepa,Goražde,andBihać.OnJune4,UNSCResolution836extendedUNPROFOR’smandate“todeter
attacksagainstthesafeareas.”
7
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findreferencestoChapterVII[e.g.in819and836]oftheUNCharter,butitis
unclearwhetherthiswasmeanttobeaChapterVIImissionoraChapterVImission.
Whatwastheproperroleofpeacekeepers?Shouldtheybestrictlyneutral,or
shouldtheytakesidesintheconflict?[TurnstoDavidHarland,authorofthe1999
UNreportonSrebrenica].InyourreportonSrebrenica,youconcludeattheendthat
peacekeeperscannotbeimpartialwhenconfrontedwith"attemptedgenocide."8We
shouldtalkaboutthat.Underwhatcircumstanceswasairpowermeanttobeused
todefendtheenclaves?Weretherealternativestotheestablishmentof“Safe
Areas”?WastheVance-Owenpeaceplanapossiblealternative?Wastherea
strategyforendingthewarinBosnia,manystrategies,ornostrategyatall?Weare
alsointerestedintherelationshipbetweenthehumanitariangoalsofUNPROFOR
andthestrategicgoals.Istherealinkbetweenthetwo?Shouldoneservetheother,
oraretheyentirelyseparate?
SHASHITHAROOR:BeforewestartatMarch1993,surelywehavetounderstand
whatUNPROFORwasdoingthereinthefirstplace:whyitwasdeployed,whatthe
logicofitwas,whyitevenhadthenameitdidandeverythingelse.Morillon'svisit
didnothappeninavacuum.TherewasayearandahalfofUNPROFORbeforethat.
EverythingRupertSmithsaysinthatextractyoureadisabsolutelyaccurate,but
thatispreciselybecauseofthewayinwhichthisoperationhadevolveduptothat
point.
DAVIDHANNAY:Ithinkitisworthspendinghalfanhourorsoonthecontext.The
documents[inthebriefingbook]arefascinating,theyrecallmuchtome,butthey
aretotallycontext-less.Youwouldnotknowfromthesepapers,forexample,that
theSecurityCouncilandmemberstatesweregrapplingwiththebiggestsplitin
NATOinlivingmemoryover“liftandstrike.”9YouwouldnotknowthattheSecurity
8
UnitedNationsGeneralAssembly,“ThefallofSrebrenica,”A/54/549,November15,1999,henceforth
“1999UNSrebrenicareport.”
9
“LiftandStrike”referredtoaU.S.proposaltoliftthearmsembargoimposedontheBosnian
government(andotherYugoslavrepublics)inSeptember1991anduseairstrikestoforcetheBosnian
Serbstothenegotiatingtable.ThestrategywasadoptedbyBillClintonduringthe1992presidential
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Councilwassettingupitsfirstwarcrimestribunal.10Youwouldnotknowthatthe
SecurityCouncilwasimposingonSerbiathebiggestpackageofeconomicsanctions
thathadeverbeenimposed.11So,thereisalotmissingfromthecontext,whichdoes
notchangetheviewthatRuperthasrightlyexpressed,thattheSrebrenicadecision
andtheSafeAreasdecisionweretakenwithoutproperconsiderationoftheir
possibleconsequences,butrelatetothequestionofwhethertherewasastrategy.
Therewasastrategy.Itwasabadstrategy,butitwasastrategy.Thestrategywas
nottodoliftandstrike,nottodotheVance-Owenpeaceprocess,tosetupacriminal
tribunal,toimposesanctionsonSerbia,andhopeforthebest.
SHASHITHAROOR:Weneedtotalkaboutthebackground.WhydidMorillongoto
Srebrenica?Whatsortofmissionwashedeployedon?Youcannotstartoffwiththe
missionwithoutunderstandingwhathewasdoingthere.IwillbeasbriefasIcan,
butunfortunatelyIamthepersonherewiththelongestUNinvolvementinthis
issue.IwentoutontheveryfirstmissioninOctober1991that[UNUnderSecretary-General]MarrackGouldingundertookwhentheEuropeanCommunity
wasanxioustohandthisparticularhotpotatototheUN.Youmayrememberthe
Europeanpeacemonitorsbeingcalled"icecreamsalesmen"afewmonthsbefore
that.12TherewereEuropeanCommunitymonitorsinCroatiaandBosnia.Ourgoal
wastoseewhetherapeacekeepingoperationwasviableforCroatia.Therewas
enormouspoliticalpressureonusfromEuropetotakethison.Gouldingwas
relativelynewtopeacekeeping,buthadbeenverythoroughlyschooledintheDag
Hammarskjöldcatechismofpeacekeeping:thedoctrineofcompleteneutrality,not
takingsidesintheconflict,deployinginhighlyvisibleconfigurations,vehicles
campaign,andadoptedasofficialU.S.policyinMay1993,butabandonedbecauseofoppositionfrom
U.S.allies.See“DecisionsofPrincipalsCommitteeMeetingonBosnia,"May17,1993.
10
TheInternationalCriminalTribunalfortheformerYugoslaviawasestablishedunderUNSecurityCouncil
resolution827ofMay25,1993.
11
TheUNSecurityCouncilpassedResolution820onApril17,1993,restrictingimportsandexportsfrom
SerbiaandMontenegro.Previousresolutionsincluded713(1991),724(1991),757(1992)and787(1992).
12
SeveralhundredEuropeanobserversweredeployedtoCroatiaaspartoftheEuropeanCommunity
MonitoringMissioninJuly1991.Croatsdubbedthem“icecreamsalesmen”becauseoftheiruniformof
whitesuitsandwhiteshoes,whichweredesignedtogivethemprotection.See,forexample,Ray
Moseley,“EuropeanPeaceTalksOfferLittleHopeofYugoslavSettlement,”ChicagoTribune,September
25,1991.
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paintedwhiteandallthatstuff.Thiswasthelogicwithwhichweapproachedthe
entireconcept.
UNPROFORwassetup[underUNSecurityCouncilResolution743of
February21,1992]forpoliticalreasonseventhoughwementionedinourinitial
reporttotheSecurityCouncilthattherewasnoreallyviableconceptof
peacekeepingthatallsidesagreedupon.13Wecalledthepeacekeepingforce
UNPROFOR,meaningUnitedNationsProtectionForce,whichreflectedGoulding's
optimism.Wewerereallynotinthebusinessofprotectinganybodysignificantly.
Wehadobserverstobeginwithandlateravery,verysmallmilitarydeployment.
WhenthetroublesbeganinBosnia,intheearlyspringof1992,Europeanmembers
oftheSecurityCouncilasked[UNSecretary-GeneralBoutros]Boutros-Ghalito
extendUNPROFORtoBosnia.Itisoftenoverlookedthatthe[April24,1992]report
submittedbytheSecretary-Generalexplicitlysaid,"…inthelightofallthefactors
bearingonthecurrentsituationinBosnia-Herzegovina,thedeploymentofapeacekeepingforcetherewasnotfeasible."14Itisthereinblackandwhite,apublic
document.
Manyofyouarenottooyoungtorememberthewonderfuloldsong,"Ifyou
can'tbewiththeoneyoulove,lovetheoneyou'rewith."Sincetheycouldnotfind
anyotherresponsetothiscrisisintheSecurityCouncil,theytooktheoneavailable
mechanism,namelyUNpeacekeeping,andappliedittoasituationforwhichitwas
manifestlynotsuited,astheSecretary-Generalhimselfsaidinblackandwhite.That
ishowUNPROFORbackedintopeacekeepinginBosnia.
Thecabletrafficthroughout1992fromthefield,uptotheMorillonvisitto
SrebrenicainMarch1993,showsthemountingcontradictionsinsuchamandate.
Youhaveapeacekeepingoperationwherethereisnopeacetokeep,withamandate
designedtoprotectSerbianciviliansinCroatia,andCroatiancivilianscaughtupin
thewar.ThatwastheoriginalmandateofUNPROFOR.ItwasinBosniaessentiallyto
beablereportbacktotheCouncilthatitwasdoingsomething.WhenSarajevo
13
Boutros-Ghali,“ReportoftheSecretary-GeneralPursuanttoSecurityCouncilResolution721(1991),”
S/23280,December11,1991.
14
S/23836,April24,1992.
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airportfelltotheSerbs,UNPROFORbecamethemechanismtoprizetheairport
awayfromthem[inJune1992]andhanditovertointernationalsupervision.15In
theabsenceofacoherentvision,UNPROFORwasexpectedtotakeallthison.Itis
againstthisbackground,withoutanyverycoherentoragreedconceptorplanof
operationsthatMorillongoestoSrebrenicainMarch1993.Thatisaveryshort
summaryofsomethingfarmorecomplicatedandmessy,butprovidesthe
DepartmentofPeacekeepingOperationsperspectiveatthetimethisSrebrenica
adventurebegins.
DAVIDHARLAND:Iagreewiththepointthatyoucannotunderstandthefallofthe
SafeAreasuntilyouunderstandhowUNPROFORgotintoBosniainthefirstplace.
WeshouldalsorememberthattheideaofSafeAreaswasextensivelydiscussedin
1992longbefore“Srebrenica.”ItwasraisedbyAustriaandHungaryinparticular.
Thereisaveryinteresting,andIthinkprofound,correspondencerelatingtothe
establishmentofSafeAreas.16Theideaactuallycomesupinamessagefrom
[AustrianforeignministerAlois]Mockto[InternationalCommitteeoftheRedCross
PresidentCornelio]Sommarugaaskingabout“safetyzones”astheyarereferredto
intheGenevaConventions.17Sommarugathenrepliessayingthattheyhavecertain
characteristics:theyareabsolutelyunarmed,theyarefortheprotectionofhospitals
andsoon.HeaskswhetherornottheUNSecretariathasbeenconsulted.Thenthere
isanotherletterto[UnitedNationsHighCommissionerforRefugeesSadako]Ogata.
Ogatarepliesfirmlyontherecordthatthisisanabsolutelyterribleideawhich,if
everused,shouldbelimitedtosimplyprotectinghospitalsbyagreement.The
reasonIraisethisisbecauseitshowshowinternationaldecisionsaresometimes
made.Anideaentersintoplayandisshapedandchanged.Thefactthatitentered
intoplayasanideatobediscountedissomethingthatsometimesgetsforgottenas
timegoesby.
15
UNSC,“Resolution758(1992),”June8,1992.
ForbackgroundondiscussionofUNSafeAreas,seeparagraphs45-51,of1999UNreportonSrebrenica,
A/54/549.
17
AnnantoStoltenberg,“Safeareas,”UNDPKO,MSC-870,May28,1993.
16
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MICHAELDOBBS:WewillcertainlylookattheoriginsoftheSafeAreasconcept,and
thedifferencesbetweenthewayinwhichitwasappliedinplaceslikeKurdistanand
Bosnia,butletusgotoLarryHollingworthnow.Larry,youaccompaniedGeneral
MorillontoSrebrenicainMarch1993.Canyoudescribethecircumstancesofthis
visitandwhatyourememberfromthevisit?
LARRYHOLLINGWORTH:IwasinBosnia[withtheUnitedNationsHigh
CommissionforRefugees]primarilytodeliverhumanitarianaid.Iworkedprimarily
inSarajevo,butwewerealwaysremindedthattherewerethese[Muslim-inhabited]
enclaves[inSerbian-controlledterritory],andthatweshoulddosomethingabout
theseenclaves.18IhadmanagedtogetintoGoraždeandŽepa.Wetriedtogetinto
Cerska,butwerekeptout.Wehadthreehumanitarianreliefconvoysdottedaround
Bosnia.Wecouldnotmoveanyofthem.WespentthreedaysoutsideZvornik.
Finally,MadameOgatasaid“enoughisenough”andpulledusallback.Thiswasthe
veryfirsttimethatIfeltthatGeneralMorillonwasinterestedintheconvoys.Hegot
agooddebrieffrommeandsaid,"Okay,weshoulddefinitelytrytogetbackinto
Cerska."WhileIwaswaitinginthefirstconvoy[outsideZvornik]forthreedays,
Kamenicafell.Morillonrangmeupandsaid,“Look,weshoulddefinitelytrytoget
intoCerskaagainbutweshouldfirstofalldoanassessment.”Hesaid,“I'dlikeyou
tocomewithme,bringa[WorldHealthOrganization]doctorwithyou.Ihave
approvalandwewillgetintoCerska.WefirstofallflewtoZvornik.InZvornikwe
pickedupanarmoredcarfromtheBritish.WetriedtogetthenintoCerskabutwe
wereregularlystoppedintheforest.Idon'tknowwhetheritwastheBosnianside
ortheSerbside,buttheycutdownlotsoftreesanditwasverydifficulttomove.
WhenwegottotheoutskirtsofCerska,weweremetbythesoldiersofNaser
Orić[commanderoftheArmyofRepublicofBosniaandHerzegovina28thDivision],
whosaid,“You'retoolate,Cerskahasfallen.”Thiswasagreatblowforus.General
Morillon,whowaswithus,said,“Okaylet'smoveonnow.WewillgotoKonjević
Polje.”WhenwegotintoKonjevićPolje,theGeneraldecidedthathewouldgoback
toZvornikandmeetupwithGeneralMladićandseeifwecouldmakefurther
18
“Bosnia:AreasofControl,”September1994.
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progresstotryandgetintoSrebrenica….Tocutalongstoryshort,thedoctor,Simon
Mardel,walkedtoSrebrenica,theGeneralwenttoZvornik,andIreturnedto
Sarajevo.ThegeneralthendecidedthatwehadtotakeaconvoyintoSrebrenica.He
gotapproval[fromUNPROFORcommander]GeneralWahlgrenandfromKaradzić
andMladić.
Sooffwewent,withaverysmallconvoy.TherewasanUNMilitaryObserver
vehicle,therewasaCanadianarmoredpersonnelcarrier,therewasasmallvehicle
withMèdecinsSansFrontiéresinit,andtherewasmyself,withtwovehicles.That
wasit.WeweregoingtoenteroverthebridgeatBratunac,buttheSerbstoldusthe
bridgewasdownandwehadtogoonasideroad,whichhadnotbeenusedfora
longtime.Weweretoldveryclearlythatitwasminedandwasunderameterof
snow.SowemovedoffwiththeGeneral,whowasintheAPC.Weweregoingtoo
slowlysohezoomedaheadofustogetintoSrebrenica.Iwasthenrunningthe
convoy.Thefirstofourtruckshitamineandwasblownup.Unfortunatelythat
meantthatthevehiclebehinditcouldnotmoveeithersincetheroadwasonlywide
enoughforonevehicle.Alittlebitfurther,welosttheMSFvehicle,whichgotstuck
inthesnow.EventuallywelimpedintoSrebrenica,lateatnight[March11,1993].
GeneralMorillonwaswaitingattheoutercheckpointofSrebrenica.Weallwent
togetherintoSrebrenicalateatnight.Wewenttothereceptioncommittee,Ithink
Muhamed[Duraković]wasthere,intheroomatthetime.Wehadasmallbriefing
andthenIspentabouttwohoursoutonthestreetswanderingaround.Itwasminus
threedegreesatthetime,andthousandsofpeoplewereoutonthestreets.
Thefollowingday[March12,1993]wemetwiththemayorandwithOrić.All
seemedtobegoingwell.WehadtwoAmericanswithuswhoweredoing
communicationsforus.Afterdoingtherecces,theGeneraldecidedwewouldgo
backhome.Weallgotinourvehiclestosetoffandthoughtitwasrathernicethat
theentiretowncameoutforus.Wethoughttheywerewavingusoff,buttheywere
notwavingusoffatall.Theywerestoppingusfromleaving.Thegeneralsaid“Okay
that'sit,wecan'tmove.”Wehadpeoplesaying,“Ifwecan'tgetout,youcan'tget
out.”Thatwasthemessagethatwasgiventous.IthinkInowknowthebackground
toit.WewenttothePTTbuilding.Thegeneralwasobviouslyworried.Hisgreatest
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fearwasthathewouldbetakenhostageandherehewas,atleast"detained,"in
Srebrenica.
Weonlyhadonevehiclewithcommunications.CommunicationsintheAPC
didnotworksomylittlevehiclebecameakindofheadquarters.Irememberthe
general’schiefofstaff,PiersTucker,explainingwhathadhappenedtoBosniaHerzegovinaCommand.Thevoiceontheotherendsaid,"So,youareprisoners?
You'vebeentakenhostage."PiersTuckersaid,"No,no,no,we'vejustbeendetained,
we'rejustnotallowedtoleave.”Ithoughtitwasalittlesubtlewayofputtingit.
Thenextday,GeneralMorillonkepttohimself.Hecameupwithaplantoget
upat2:00inthemorningandwalkawayfromthebuilding.PiersTuckerandhis
bodyguardwouldpickhimupintheAPC,usingtheexcusethatwehadtomovethe
vehiclebecausewecouldnotgetgoodradioreception.Theplanfellapartbecause
peoplestoppedthemfrommovingthevehicle.Thegeneralhadtosneakbackinto
thePTTbuilding.Hehidintheroom,whichgavetheimpressionthatperhapshe
hadleft.Iwouldliketoaskyou[directsquestiontoMuhamedDuraković]whether
youthoughthehadleft,orwhetheryoudidnotknowwhetherhehadleft.Inany
case,fortwenty-fourhours,nobodycouldseehim.
Hefinallycameoutandsaid,“Lar-ry…[ImitatesFrenchaccent,withrolling
Rs]Ihaveaplan."HewassmokingDavidoffcigars[makesinhalingsound].
“Lar-ry,you‘avaflag?"Isaid,"Yes,General."Hesaid,"AUNflag?"[Makes
inhalingnoise]"Yes,General."Thenhesaid,"Lar-ry,you‘avatannoy?"Isaid,"I
thinksoGeneral,yesIthinkso."Andhesaid,"Good."Hesaid,"Getmethemayor."
SowegotthemayorandhetoldthemayorthathewantedeverybodyinSrebrenica
tobeoutsidethebuilding.Sosureenough,anenormouscrowdofpeopleappeared.
Hethensaidtome,"Lar-ry,whenInodmyhead,youputtheflagoutthewindow."I
said,"Okay."
Sowestoodonthisbalcony.Ihadnoideawhathewasgoingtosay,noidea
atall.Hestoodupandhesaidtothepeople,"Icame‘ere[inhales]voluntarily,"he
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said,"Icame‘ereto‘elpyou."Hesaid,"Iamnowputtingyouundertheprotectionof
theUnitedNations."Henoddedhishead.Flagout.19[Laughter]
Therewasthisenormouscheerfrombelow.Peoplewereclappingand
cheeringandshoutingandIthoughttomyself,“There’sonlyeightofushere.”I
rememberaCanadiansoldiersaidtome,"Doesthatmean,sirthatwecangoout
andwalkaroundthetown?"Isaidtohim,"Noitmeanswecangetoutofhereand
protectthetown."
ThenextincidentwasthatwehadtoinformBHCommand,whichwasfun.I
wentdownwiththeGeneralandwesatinthevehicle.Heexplainedwhatwas
happeningtoBrigadierRoddyCordy-Simpson,andexplainedthathehadput
SrebrenicaundertheprotectionoftheUnitedNations.IcouldhearBrigadierCordySimpsonsuckinginhisbreath.Theydecidedtotalkagainfourhourslater.The
generalsaidtoCordy-Simpson,"Roddy,I‘aveaplan,Iwantthehelicopters‘erefor
theevacuationtomorrow."AndCordy-Simpsonsaidtohim,"Umthatisnot
consideredtobeagoodidea,sir."Morillonsaid,"Bywhom?"Cordy-Simpsonsaid,
"ByBHCommand,sir.""Roddy,”theGeneralsaid,"IamBHCommand."
Thefollowingdaytherewerenohelicopters.Wespentaboutthreedays
tryingtobringaconvoyin.Mytaskwastofindoutwheretoputthefood.Wehad
200tonsoffoodcominginandapopulationofmaybe30,000veryhungrypeople.
Whereareyougoingtoputthiswarehouse?Howareyougoingtoprotectit?How
areyougoingtohandoutthefood?Wealsohadthetaskoftryingtoevacuatethe
peopleinthehospitalwhichwastheworstthatanybodyhadeverseen.
TheGeneralmanagedtogetapprovalforhimselftogooutandorganize
anotherconvoytocomein.Whentheconvoyarrived,theyunloadedtheaidbutit
wasalsoagreedthattheywouldtakeoutwomenandchildrenandmalesover60.
MICHAELDOBBS:Letusreturntotheevacuationquestion,andwhetherthepeople
wouldbeevacuatedorprotectedinplace,alittlelater.Ialsowanttoaskyouabout
themediacoveragewhichwasveryimportant.Beforewedothat,wewouldliketo
19
FootageavailableinclipofBBCDocumentary,TheDeathofYugoslavia,Part5(YouTube).
1-11
hearfromMuhamed[Duraković],whowasinsidethetown.Couldyoudescribethe
situationinsideSrebrenicaatthistimeandtheimpactoftheMorillonvisitandthose
wordsofMorillon?Howdidyouinterpretthem?
MuhamedDurakovic,R,withLarryHollingworth
MUHAMEDDURAKOVIĆ:Thankyouverymuch.Itisanhonorandaprivilegetosee
facesthatIhavenotseenfortwentyplusyears.WehavetoputGeneralMorillon’s
visitinthecontextofhowthepopulationinSrebrenicawassurvivingatthattime.
Thewinterof1992to1993wasthemostdifficultone.Manypeoplenotnativeto
Srebrenica,whomanagedtosurvivetheonslaughtandethniccleansingintheDrina
Valley,hadmovedintotheenclave.20Themostdifficultthingforuswasbeing
unabletocommunicateoursituationtothoseoutsideSrebrenica.Peoplelivingin
SarajevoortheBihaćpocket,andotherplacesaroundBosnia-Herzegovina,were
alsoinaverydifficultsituation,butwefeltlikewewereinhabitingthislonelyisland
inthemiddleofmurkywaters.Wehadverylittletohopefor.Thefirstsignthat
someonewasthinkingaboutthepopulationofSrebrenicaandtryingtoassistus
20
AccordingtoaJanuary1994surveyconductedbytheSrebrenicamunicipality,morethan16,000people
fromothermunicipalitieshadfledtoSrebrenica,bringingthetotalpopulationto37,000.Seealso“Report
oftheSecurityCouncilMissionEstablishedPursuanttoResolution819(1993),”S/25700,April30,1993.
1-12
camewiththeairdropsinFebruary1993.21IalwaysmentionLarryinmy
presentationsonSrebrenica.
Iwasseventeenyearsoldandinhighschoolwhenthewarstartedin1992.I
wouldwalkawayfromSrebrenicaupintothemountains,hopingthatIwouldbethe
luckyonetoseetheseairdrops.Thestrategywastodispersethefoodinmany
differentlocationssothatitwouldnotendupontheblackmarket,sothatmany
peoplewouldgetaccesstoit.Forthesafetyoftheaircraftandthepilots,thefood
wasusuallydroppedfromveryhighaltitudes.Wewouldlookupintotheskyand
heartheplanes,butnotbeabletoseethem.Wewouldstandinthemiddleofthe
forestincompletedarknessat2:00inthemorning.Thenwewouldsuddenlyhear
the"poof,poof,poof,"[makessuccessionofpoppingnoises]ofparachutesopening.
Theskywouldlightupwithbrightcolors,yellowishandgreenish.Theseweresmall
flareshangingonthecornersoftheseparachutes.ItwasasifChristmashad
returnedtoSrebrenica.ActuallyitlookedlikealargeChristmastreefallingfromthe
sky.MyimpressionwasconfirmedwhenImetMr.SantaClaushere[referringto
LarryHollingworth,photoabove]whenhecametoSrebrenica.
ThiswasthefirsttimeinmylifethatIhadmetforeigners.Iwasyoung,I
livedinaverysmall,isolatedcommunity,andIwasnotverywelltraveled.Itwasan
extraordinaryexperience.Herewerepeoplewillingtorisktheirlivestotravelto
Srebrenicaunderverydifficultcircumstances.Youmayhavegottheimpressionthat
youwerebeingdetained,butIthinkthelocalpopulationneverfeltlikeyouwere
beingdetained.YouwerealwaysverywelcometocometoSrebrenica.Toexplain
ourperspective,however,welearnedthroughthegrapevinethattheinternationals
hadmovedtoCerska,andCerskafalls.ThentheyareinKonjevićPoljeandKonjević
Poljeisquicklyrunover.WhentheyfinallycametoSrebrenica,thisseemedlikea
verybadpattern.Thelessonwetookfromthiswas:iftheygo,wewillalldie.There
weresomeattempts,asyoumentioned,topreventtheUNfromleaving,butitwas
notreallyorganized.Itwaspurelyaccidental.
21
LaketoClinton,“PresidentialDecisionforHumanitarianAirDropsforBosnia,”TheWhiteHouse,
February19,1993.
1-13
BythetimeyouarrivedfromKonjevićPolje[addressesHollingworth],
peoplewhosurvivedtheCerskaandtheKonjevićPoljeonslaughtswerearrivingon
footfromKonjevićPolje.IttakesatleastoneortwodaystowalkfromKonjević
PoljetoSrebrenica.Bythetimeyouweregettingreadytoleave,thesepeoplewere
comingintothetown.Theyhadnoplacetostay,sotheysatdownonthestreetsof
Srebrenica.Itwasverycold,itwassnowing.Therewerewomenandchildren
makingfiresinthemiddleoftheroad.Itmayhaveappearedtoyouthatsomeone
wastryingtoblockyou,butinreality,thesepeoplehadnoplacetogo,theydidnot
knowanyoneinSrebrenica.
Ofcourse,whenfinallyGeneralMorillonmadethatfamousstatementfrom
thePTTbuilding,wecitizensofSrebrenicafeltthatwehadsurvived.Wereally
thoughtthiswastheendofoursuffering,wehaveagainbecomepartofthecivilized
world,andwewillsurvivetheatrocitiestowhichwehavebeenexposedduringthe
previousyear.
MICHAELDOBBS:BeforeweaskhowthisinformationwasreceivedattheUN,could
Larrytellushowthenewsgotout.IfMorillonhadmadethatdeclarationwith
nobodytohearitexceptforthepeopleofSrebrenica,thatwouldhavehadacertain
impact.Buttherewerejournalistspresent.Thatchangedthenatureoftheevent,
right?
LARRYHOLLINGWORTH:ThereweretwojournalistsinsideSrebrenica,whohad
madetheirownwayin.OnewasaGermanphotographer,Phillippvon
Recklinghausen,andtheotherwasacameramancalledTonyBirtley,whowas
freelancingforABC.22Bothofthemweretherebeforewegotin.Theyhadtaken
someverygoodfilm,buthadneverbeenabletogetitout.Theyfilmedtheepisode
oftheflagcomingoutofthewindowandwhateverelse.Iwasleavingwiththe
convoy,becausemyfinaltaskwastogetpeopleontheconvoywhichwasan
absolutenightmarebecausethousandsofpeoplewentonthetrucks.AsIwasgoing
22
VonRecklinghausenarrivedinSrebrenicaonFebruary8-9,1993,andwaswoundedinthearm,whenhe
steppedonamine.Birtleyarrivedaroundthesametime.Bothjournalistswereevacuatedfrom
Srebrenicabyhelicopter.
1-14
out,TonyBirtleysaidtome,“Willyoutakeoutallofmyfilm?”Itwasagamble
becauseIcouldhavebeensearchedandIcouldhavelostthem.ItoldhimthatI
wouldtakethemoutifhewaspreparedtotaketherisk.Itookthemandgavethem
toABC.Theywerearoundtheworldandineverynewspaperwithinhoursof
usgettingout.
MICHAELDOBBS:HowlongbetweentheMorillonspeech[declaringSrebrenicato
beundertheprotectionoftheUN]andthefilmappearingonthenews?
LARRYHOLLINGWORTH:Ithinkaboutfourdays.23
MICHAELDOBBS:Itwouldbealmostinstantaneoustoday.Inthiscase,ittookfour
daysandthefilmhadtobesmuggledout.
LARRYHOLLINGWORTH:ItwasasadstoryforVonRecklinghausen.Hegavehis
filmstosomebodywholostthem.Heshotabouttwelveweeks’worthoffilmwith
littletoshowforit.
VEREHAYES:Iwasat[UNPROFORBHCommand]atKiseljakonareccetotakeover
fromCordy-Simpsonwhenallofthiswasgoingon.Hewasextremelyconcernedby
whatwashappening.NotonlydidhehavetogetintouchwithNewYorkandthe
UN,butinthenextdoorofficeFrenchSpecialForceswereplanninganindependent
nationalcovertoperationtogoinandgetGeneralMorillonout.Idon'tknowhow
widelyknownthatis,butitwascertainlytakenprettyseriouslyatthetime.
TOMBLANTON:Ithinkatonepointyoudescribethesmokeofcigarettesleaking
underthedooroftheofficetheywereusing.
VEREHAYES:Yes,thedoorwaslocked.TherewerealotofGauloisesbeingsmoked,
alotofcoffeegoingin.Itcertainlyfilteredaroundtheheadquarters.
TOMBLANTON:MinisterMuratović.
23
ThefootageairedonABC’sWorldNewsTonightwithPeterJenningsonMarch16,1993.
1-15
HASANMURATOVIĆ:WeheardthatthearrivalofMorillonchangedthingsin
SrebrenicabutIwouldliketoexplainwhyMorillonwenttoSrebrenica.Hewas
responsiblefortheSarajevosector.HewenttotheTuzlasectorbyhisowndecision,
withoutaskinganybody’sapprovalorevenopinion.Ourdeputyprimeminister,
HakijaTurajlić,hadbeenkilledonJanuary8inaFrenchAPC.TheAPCstoppedata
checkpointneartheairport,whereallnegotiationstookplaceandstayedtherefor
twohourswiththeSerbs.The[Frenchpeacekeepers]didnotaskforanysupportin
accordancewiththerules.Aftertwohourstheyopenedthedoorandthedeputy
primeministerwaskilled[bytheSerbs].
Laterintheevening,around1a.m.,wehadagovernmentmeetingto
organizetheburialanddiscussthewholematter.GeneralMorillonappearedatthis
meeting,eventhoughhehadnotbeeninvited.Hecameandsatontheside.Heasked
ifhecouldcontributesomethingtotheburialorarrangeformoresecurityforthe
burial.RusmirMahmutćehajić,theministerwhochairedthemeeting,accused
Morillonofresponsibilityforthedeathofourdeputyprimeminister.Hesaid,"We
suspectyouofhavingapartinit."Initially,Morillondidnotreact,butlatersaidit
wasuntrue,andtriedtoproveitwasuntrue.Mahmutćehajićthenaskedhimto
leavethemeetingandsaidthatwedidnotwanttodobusinesswithhimanymore.
Weneverpublicizedoursuspicions,anddidnothaveanyevidenceabout
Morillon’sinvolvement.24Butheprobablywantedtodosomethinggoodandprove
thathewasnotinanywayinvolvedinthecase.HewenttoSrebrenicaallofa
sudden,andthenwenttoBelgradeforseveraldaystonegotiatewithMilošević.This
wasoutsidehisareaofresponsibilityattheUN.Hesucceededinnegotiationswith
theSerbsandgothumanitarianconvoysintoSrebrenica,whichhadnotbeen
allowedtopassforseveralmonths.Inouropinion,thiswasarewardbytheSerbs
forhispartintheexecutionofHakijaTurajlić.
24
SeeJohnBurns,“BosnianMuslimsCriticizeU.N.OverOfficial’sKilling,”NewYorkTimes,January10,
1993.ABosniangovernmentstatementissuedonJanuary9,1993,accusedMorillonoffailingtoprotect
Turajlićandcoveringupeventsthatledtothekilling.Morilloncalledtheincident“atragedyoferrors”
andthe“theworstblowofmycareer.”MuratovićsaidthattheBosniangovernmentsuspectedthat
MorillonwasinvolvedintheTurajlićexecutionandwenttoSrebrenicatogetawayfromSarajevo.
1-16
TOMBLANTON:Thankyouverymuch.LetmeaskShashitodescribethereactionin
DPKOtotheMorillon"declaration”placingthepeopleofSrebrenica“underUN
protection.”
SHASHITHAROOR:AsIsaid,wehadanunclearmandate.The“protection”partof
UNPROFOR,asfarasBosniawasconcerned,essentiallymeantprotectionof
humanitarianconvoys.Fromourpointofview,thehumanitarianmissionwas
obviouslyextremelyimportant.Atthesametime,andthiswasverymuchGeneral
Wahlgren’sviewasthecommanderontheground,wewereanxiousnottobe
drawnintotheconflict.Wewerethereasapeacekeepingforce.Ourapproachwas
basedonacomplicatedsetofpremises.Weneededtoprotecthumanitarianaid
deliveriestoallsides.WeneededtoprotecttheUNpersonneldispersingthataid.
Wealsoneededtoensurethataiddeliverieswerenotusedbyonesideinthe
conflicttomakeusapartytotheconflict.
NoneofushadaproblemwiththeideaoftheUNsteppingasideandallowing
Westerngovernments,iftheywanted,totakesidesandendthewar,buttherewas
absolutelynoindicationofthenecessarypoliticalwillintheWesttodothat.
ThebandaidapproachthattheSecurityCouncilwaspushingwasinfacta
reflectionoftheabsenceofpoliticalwillforadefinitiveconclusionoftheconflict.
Wethereforefoundourselvesmanagingapeacekeepingoperationundertherules
ofpeacekeepingwithalltheusualconfigurationpatterns,includingwhitevehicles,
liaisonwithallpartiesandsoon.ThiswasatatimewhentheSerbswerereluctant
tolethumanitarianaidthroughbecausetheythoughtitbolsteredthemilitary
strengthoftheiropponents.TheBosnianshopedthatattacksonhumanitarian
convoyswouldirresistiblydragtheUNintotheconflictontheirside.Wewere
caughtinthemiddle.
ObviouslywehadnoproblemwiththeUNgoingtoSrebrenicaanddelivering
aid.ThatiswhattheUNwassupposedtobedoing.However,weweresomewhat
takenabackbythedramaticdeclarationbyMorillon.Wedidnotdisavowhimatany
pointbecausewealsorecognizedthatsignificantvoicesontheSecurityCouncil
welcomedhisstatement.Wewantedtoseehowwecouldinterpretthatinaway
1-17
thatwouldkeepusviableasapeacekeepingforcewhichiswhattheCouncilwanted
ustoremain.Iamsorrythatisnotaverycoherentreplybutnothingaboutthis
affairwascoherentatthetime.Thiswasthesetofballswithwhichwewere
jugglingaswetriedtodealwiththesituation.
TotakeupDavidHarland'spointabouttheearlierdiscussionsonSafeAreas:
thesediscussionswererelatedtoveryspecificideasofsafehavenswhichrequireda
numberofelementstobeviableininternationallaw.TheICRCconceptwasbased
ondemilitarization.Wewerehappytodothis,buthowdoyoudemilitarize
SrebrenicawhentheBosnianarmysaysitisdefendingitsownpeoplethere?You
don'tdemilitarize.Whentheyfireoutfromthisareaandarefiredbackupon,what
istheroleoftheUN?ArewejoiningtheBosnianArmy?Theseweresomeofthe
fundamentaldilemmasthatwefacedbecauseofthepeacekeepingnatureofour
mandate.
TOMBLANTON:AmbassadorWalker.
JENONNEWALKER:Ithinkseveralthemesareemerginghere.Thefirst,obviously,is
thefollyofcallingsomethinga“protectionforce,”orevena“peacekeepingforce,”
whenhasnointentionofprotectinganyone.Itisa“violationobservingforce”rather
thanapeacekeepingforce.Thenotionofbeingneutralbetweentheattackerandthe
victimoftheattackerputstheUNandparticipatingcountriesinanimpossible
position.Iamalsostruckbythenumberofthingsthatweredonetolookasifwe
weredoingsomethingwhen,infact,wewerenotwillingtodoanythingserious.
ThisverymuchincludesthegovernmentforwhichIworked.IwasintheClinton
administrationthefirstnineteenmonthsorso[from1993tomid-1994].We
believedverymuch—notthroughoutthegovernment,butatleastintheWhite
House—thattheWestoughttodothekindofthingsRupertSmithtalksaboutinThe
UtilityofForce,butwewerenotwillingtoparticipateinsuchaneffortourselves.
WethoughtourEuropeanalliesoughttobetakingalotmoreriskthanwe
werepreparedtoassumeourselves.Wethereforedidvariousperipheralthingsto
makeusfeelthatwewereorasifweweredoingsomethingandmakeitappearto
1-18
theoutsideworldthatweweredoingsomething.Iamgratifiedtohearthatyou
thoughtthefooddropswereuseful.Itoothinktheywereuseful.Itwasthefirst
initiativewetookbutitwasperipheraltothebasicproblem.Itwasameliatory
ratherthantryingtosolvetheproblem.OurattitudetowardthecreationoftheSafe
Areaswasexactlythesame.WethoughtitwasfollytocallsomethingaSafeArea
thatwehadnomeansorintentofkeepingsafe.Butwehadzeropoliticalormoral
credibilitybecausewewerenotwillingtoparticipateourselves.Afteryearsof
blatheringinNATOaboutsharingrisksandresponsibilities,wewerenotwillingto
participate.
MICHAELDOBBS:Tofollowuponthat.PresidentClintontookofficeinJanuary
1993aftercriticizingthepreviousBushadministrationforditheringonBosnia.He
promisedamoreenergeticapproach.Soyoucomeintoofficeandthe“tarbaby,”as
SenatorMcCaincalledit,ishandedtoyou.25Whydidyounottakeamoreenergetic
approach,aswasadvocatedduringthecampaign?
JENONNEWALKER:Avarietyofunsatisfactoryreasons.PresidentClinton's
majoradvisersweredeeplydivided.[ChairmanoftheJointChiefsofStaff]
ColinPowell,whospokewithgreatauthority,didnotwantusengagedatall.None
ofusfullyappreciatedtheimportanceofPresidentClinton'sdraftevasion.Colin
wouldhavetoldsomefavoritereporterthatthisdraft-dodgingPresidentwasrashly
riskingAmericanlives.Almostalltheprincipalschangedtheirminds,noonemore
oftenthan[SecretaryofState]WarrenChristopher.[NationalSecurityAdvisor]
TonyLakeconsistentlywantedamorerobustAmericanengagement.Buthedidnot
wanttoputthepresidentinthepositionofchoosingbetweenhisadvisers.Clinton
wasevenmoreneuroticthanmostpoliticiansaboutwantingtobelovedby
everybody.Sowedrifted.
Wedidsomeusefulperipheralthings.WedeliveredBosnianagreement
toVance-Owen,whichtheworldforgets.Wedidsobygettingridofaprovisionthat
25
SeeMichaelWines,“ConflictintheBalkans;SenatorWhoSawWarUpCloseDoesn’tWanttoSee
Another,”NewYorkTimes,May5,1993.
1-19
wouldhavemeantthedissolutionofBosniaunlesstheSerbsagreedotherwise.26
Butallofthesethingswereperipheraltothebasicproblem.“Liftandstrike”was
ourfirstseriousproposal.ThedebateinWashingtonduringthoseearlymonthswas
betweenanairstrikecommitmentonlyandairstrikeslinkedtoliftingthearms
embargo.27
Thereason“liftandstrike”waschosenwasbecausewebelieveditwould
giveusanendpointofthestrikecommitment.Wewouldhaveacertainnumberof
monthsduringwhichwewouldhelparmandtraintheBosnians.Theywouldthen
beontheirown.Ofcourse,thiswasnonsense:oncewehadgonethatfarin
supportingtheBosnians,wewouldhavebeencommittedtotheirdefenseifthey
continuedtobeattacked.Thiswasacarryoverfromthe“Vietnamsyndrome”:there
hadtobeanexitpoint.
WedidnotgetreallyseriousuntilAugust1993,whenweproposedtoNATO
aseriousairstrikethreatwithseriousintenttocarryitout.28Wegotboggeddown
inthe“dualkey”issue,whichwasanothermess.Weslowlygotmoreseriousastime
wenton,butalotofpeoplediedwhileweweredelaying.Thatisnotasatisfactory
answerbutit'sthebestonewehave.
SHASHITHAROOR:AmbassadorWalkermentionedtheVance-Owenplan.29Ithink
itisimportanttounderstandthatthiswasthelinchpinoftheinternational
community'sstrategyatthetime.Weshouldhavementionedthisearlier.TheUN
26
TheVance-OwenPeacePlan[VOPP)dividedBosniainto10cantons,orsemi-autonomousregions,each
dominatedbyaseparateethnicgroup.TheplancalledforSarajevotobeadministeredjointly,under
internationalauthority.BosnianPresidentIzetbegovićagreedtothepeaceplaninaceremonyintheUN
buildinginNewYorkonMarch25,1993,onconditionthattheSerbsalsosign.BosnianSerbleader
RadovanKaradzićoriginallyagreedtotheplanonApril30,butitwasrejectedbytheRepublikaSrpska
nationalassemblyonMay6.Inhisbook,BalkanOdyssey,OwenacknowledgesthatUSenvoyReginald
Bartholomewwas“helpfulinnursingtheBosnia-Herzegovinagovernmentoverthefinalhurdle.”The
Bosniangovernmentobjectedtotheplanonthegroundsthatthecentralgovernmentwouldlikelyhave
beentooweaktoruleovertheethnicallydividedcountry.
27The“liftandstrike”policyenvisagedliftingthearmsembargoagainstBosnianMuslimsandCroats
accompaniedbythethreatofairstrikesagainstBosnianSerbforcesiftheycontinuedshellingcivilians.
28
RogerGeorge&GeorgeKolttoDirectorofCentralIntelligence,“LikelyAlliedReactionstoUnilateralUS
ActionsinBosnia,”NIC1046/93,August5,1993.
29
SeeBoutros-Ghali,“ReportoftheSecretary-GeneralontheActivitiesoftheICFY:PeaceTalksonBosnia
andHerzegovina,”S/25479,March26,1993,foradetaileddescriptionofVance-Owenandthepositions
ofthewarringparties.
1-20
wastryingtopush--andtheUSwasonboardatthetime--apeacesettlementthat
wouldhavebeendestroyedhadwebeenobligedtotakesideswithoneofthethree
parties.ThechancesofVance-Owenhappeningwouldhavebeenunderminedifwe
hadfoundourselvestakingthesideoftheBosnianarmy.WhiletheUSmayhave
beencaughtupinitsowninternaldeliberations,theUSbackedVance-Owenand
broughttheBosniangovernmentonboard,asAmbassadorWalkerhasmentioned.
JENONNEWALKER:Ourofficialpositionwasthatwewouldnotendorseanything
thatallthepartieshadnotacceptedbutquietlyRegBartholomew[Clinton’sspecial
envoyonBosnia]gottheBosnianagreement.I'mnotgoingtopretendthatthere
wasanythingcoherentaboutourpolicy.
DIEGOARRIA:TheSecurityCouncil’sconcernaboutthesituationinSrebrenicawas
promptedbythevideosHollingworthhastalkedaboutthatwereshownonTV[on
March16,1993].TherewasaTVscreenoutsidetheroomwhereinformalsessions
oftheSecurityCouncilwereheld.WesawvideoofeventsinSrebrenicathathadnot
beenbroughttoourattentionbytheUNSecretariatorbytheUNPROFORmedia
personnel,andevenlessbytheUKandFrancewhobothhadasignificantmilitary
presenceinBosnia.ThispromptedmetoconveneanurgentmeetingofthenonalignedmembersoftheUNSC:Pakistan,Morocco,CapeVerdeandVenezuela.We
tookadvantageofthefactthatthePakistanrepresentative,JamsheedMarker,was
presidingovertheCouncilatthistime.Acouncilmeetingwasheldthateveningat
ourrequest.ThatwashowSrebrenicaenteredtheagendaoftheSecurityCouncil:
viaajournalist’svideo,andnotbytheUNSecretary-Generalasshouldhavebeenthe
case.
IneverbelongedtoalesswellinformedgroupthantheUNSecurityCouncil.I
saythisnotasajoke.Itisatruefact,anditwasdonenotbyignorancebutbydesign.
Onlythepermanentmembersarefullyinformedaboutwhatishappeningonthe
ground.TheUNSecretariataccommodatesthesepowersbyhidinginformation,or
aswesawlater,evenbyhelpingtocoverupoperations,aswiththecaseofthe“slow
motiongenocide”thatoccurredbeforetheireyesinSrebrenica.Sucharealityhelps
1-21
toexplainsomeofthepositionsoftheCouncilnotonlyinBosniabutlaterin
Rwanda.ThesamebehaviorappliestotheP5membersoftheCouncilwhichdonot
shareenoughinformationtotheothernon-permanentmembers.Theyputaside
theirobligationundertheChartertopreservepeaceandsecuritytoaccommodate
theirnationalinterest.
Acaseinpoint:thekillingofHakijaTurajlićinJanuary1993whileenrouteto
SarajevoairportinanUNPROFORAPC.Ipersonallytooktheinitiativetoinvestigate
hismurder.TheSerbsshothimafteraFrenchcolonel[PatriceSartre]openedthe
door.TheFrenchtroopsneitherreturnedfire,norcalledforreinforcements.
UNPROFOR,aswellastheUNSecretariat,carriedonaverymediocreevaluationof
thecase.Atthetime,Ievenrequestedtheadviceofaformerattorneygeneralin
CanadaaswellasanAmericanprosecutor.Theybothdeclaredthatjusticehadnot
beenservedinthecase.IfheSerbscouldmurdertheDeputyPrimeMinisterof
BosniawhileunderUNprotection,thatshowedtheycouldliterallygetawaywith
murder.
ColonelSartrewaslaterpromotedanddecoratedinFranceforhis“bravery.”
FormonthsIkeptaskingforareviewofthecase,butthisneverhappened.Itwasa
monumentalcrimethatwasshamefullycoveredupbyallparties.
DAVIDHANNAY:AlittlefromtheBritishpointofviewaboutthebackgroundtoall
this.BritishinvolvementinBosniawastransformedbackinAugust1992asaresult
oftheLondonConference.30Havinghadpracticallynomilitaryontheground,we
actuallysentasubstantialnumberforahumanitarianprotectionoperationthrough
theterriblewinterof1992-1993.31Intheautumnof1992,CyVancehadwarned
thattherecouldbemillionsofpeopledeadinBosniathatwinterunlesssomething
wasdone.32TheBritishgovernmentwasthereforeinthisuptoitsneck.
30
TheUnitedNationsandtheEuropeanCommunityconvenedameetinginLondononAugust26-27,
1992,thatchargedtheInternationalConferenceontheFormerYugoslavia[ICFY]withnegotiatingapeace
settlement.
31
AccordingtodatacollectedbytheUnitedNationsPeacekeepingwebsite,therewere2,874UKtroopsin
UNPROFORasofDecember31,1992.
32
See,forexample,“VancetoUN:TroopsareneededinBosnia,”ChicagoTribune,October15,1992.
1-22
WehadalotoftroopsdeployedbyMarch1993,buttheywereneither
deployednorequippedtofightawar.ShortlybeforeClintontookoffice[onJanuary
20,1993],JohnMajor,whowasthenprimeminister,goteverybodytogetherin
DowningStreet,includingalotofministers,military,andmyselfbackfromNew
York.Heasked,"Whatarewegoingtodo?"Theviewofthatgatheringwaswemust
telltheAmericansthatwemustdowhateverwedotogetherbecauseotherwiseit
wasnotgoingtowork.Thatmessagemayhavebeenpassed,butitcertainlydidnot
resonate.
MICHAELDOBBS:Whatdatewasthat?
DAVIDHANNAY:ItwouldhavebeenthefirstweekofJanuary1993,beforethe
presidenttookover.AfterthetransferofpowerintheUS,thefirstthingthat
emergedoutofwhatseemedtousfairlyconfuseddiscussionswas"LiftandStrike."
LiftandStrikewasanightmareforanyonewhohadtroopsonthegroundinBosnia.
Hadthatpolicybeenaccepted,thefirstthingyouwouldhavehadtodowasto
extractyourtroops.NoneoftheEuropeanswantedtodothatbuttheyalsodidnot
wanttobeputintoapositionwheretheSerbswouldconsidertheirtroopsthe
enemy.Thisiswhatpreoccupiedeveryoneduringthosethreeorfourmonthsatthe
beginningof1993.ItwastearingNATOapartuntiltheUnitedStatesdroppedthe
policywhichcausedacertainloweringoftension.
AtthesametimetherewasnorealalternativepolicytotheVance-Owen
peaceprocess.IagreeverymuchwithwhatJenonnesaid.TheUnitedStatesdid,
betweenclenchedteeth,givesomesupporttoitintheearlyweeks.Reg
BartholomewcertainlygottheBosniangovernmenttoagreetoit.33Butwhenwe
weredraftingoneoftheseresolutions[UNSC820]inApril,wetriedtogetthe
SecurityCounciltotelltheBosnianSerbsthattheinternationalcommunitywould
sticktotheVance-Owenplanuntilhellfrozeoverandtheyhadbetterrealizethat.
Thatwastherightdiplomaticmovetomake.AfteragreatdealofdebateinNew
Yorkwhich,alas,allcameoutinthepublicdomain,theUnitedStatesrefusedtoput
33
SeeMarkTran,“IzetbegovicagreestodivideBosnia,”TheGuardian,March26,1993.
1-23
theword"endorse"intoaresolution.Afteralotoftoingandfroingwith
Washington,weweretoldthatthefurthestSecretaryofStateWarrenChristopher
wouldgowastoputtheword"commend"in.34ThatwastheendofVance-Owen.
Thepeaceplanwasdead.AsShashisaid,thiswasthebiggamethateveryonewas
playing.TheVance-Owenpeaceplanwasthestrategy,butitwaskilledinthemiddle
oftheaction.Srebrenica,ofcourse,wasgoingonallthistime.
JORISVOORHOEVE:Irememberthattheliftandstrikepolicy,evenwhenitwasn't
supportedanymorebytheUSadministration,lingeredoninCongressuntilthe
springof1995.IhadquiteanargumentatthetimewithSenatorMcCainwho
advocatedliftandstrike.ItwasalsostrikingattheMunichconference,inFebruary
1995thattheentireAmericandelegationwasstilltalkingaboutliftandstrike,
whichweinEuropethoughtwasthewrongpolicy.
MICHAELDOBBS:WeshouldexaminesomeofthesespecificUNResolutions.Let’s
beginwiththefirstone,UNSC819,adoptedonApril16,1993.35Itwasfollowedby
theSecurityCouncilvisittoSrebrenica,ledbyDiegoArria,onApril25.Howwasthis
resolutionpassed?Whatdiditactuallysay?Howwasitmeanttobeimplemented?
WehaveaninterestingdynamicaroundthetablebetweentheSecurityCouncil
memberswhopassedtheresolutionandthepeacekeepersonthegroundwhotried
toimplementtheresolutionasbestastheycould.PerhapsDiegoArriacouldtellus
whattheresolutionwasmeanttoachieve.ThenwewillaskGeneralHayesto
describehowUNPROFORattemptedtoimplementtheresolution.
34
UNSC,“Resolution820(1993),”S/RES/820,April17,1993.U.S.policy-makersopposedtheVance-Owen
peaceplanonbothmoralandpragmaticgrounds.DuringaFebruary24,1993pressconference,Albright
statedthatVance-Owenplanamountedto“rewardingaggressionandpunishingthevictims.”Christopher
earlierpubliclyexpresseddoubtsaboutthe“feasibility”and“practicality”oftheVance-Owenformula,
tellingtheSenateForeignRelationsCommitteethattheUSshould“investigateotheroptions.”(SeeJohn
GoshkoandJuliaPreston,“U.S.officialsresistpressuretoendorseBosniaPeacePlan,”WashingtonPost,
February4,1993.)
35
UNSC,“Resolution819(1993),”S/RES/819,April16,1993.
1-24
DIEGOARRIA:TheSecurityCouncilapprovedamissiontoBosniaandSrebrenica,
[April23-26,1993],thatIhadtheprivilegetolead.36Tomysurprise,itwasthefirst
missioneversentbytheUnitedNationsSecurityCounciltothetheaterofconflict.
AssoonaswelandedinSarajevoIfoundoutwhythiswasthecase.Therewasa
policyofkeepingnon-PermanentmembersoftheSecurityCounciluninformed.We
landedinSarajevothinkingweweregoingtonegotiatesomething,butitwas
alreadyfinished.Ademilitarizationagreementhadalreadybeensignedbythe
partiesonApril18,withtheassistanceofGeneralHayes.37
Wethoughtitwasveryimportant,andevenBoutros-Ghaliagreed,thatwe
shouldtakeacontingentofinternationaljournaliststoSrebrenicatoreinforcethe
resolution.ThejournalistswhotraveledwithusfromNewYorkwereprevented,by
UNPROFOR,fromtravelingwithustoSrebrenica.Eventhedelegationmembers
werealmostpreventedfromenteringSrebrenica.GeneralHayeswillrememberthat
therewerediscussionsthatmorninginZvornik,andthattheyalmostdidnotallow
theSecurityCouncilmemberstotraveltoSrebrenica.AndréErdöswasalsothere.
Youcanimagineourreactiontothesituation.
Intheend,weforcedourwaythrough.IwentwithGeneralHayesinoneof
thehelicopters.MycolleagueshadtowaitinZvornikwithaSerbcoloneluntilwe
gottotheotherside.UNPROFORevencooperatedindisarmingthemembersofthe
delegationofourcamerasduringthevisit.Irefusedtogiveupmycameraandtook
theonlyphotoswhichwerelaterusedbyReuters.UNPROFORhadaladyfilmingthe
wholethingbutIhaveneverbeenabletoseethatvideo.
MICHAELDOBBS:LetusrecallthelanguageofUNSC819,whichsays,"...acting
underChapterVIIoftheCharteroftheUnitedNations,"i.e.thepeaceenforcement
provision,theSecurityCouncil"demandsthatallpartiesandothersconcernedtreat
SrebrenicaanditssurroundingsasaSafeAreawhichshouldbefreefromanyarmed
attackoranyotherhostileact."Howdidyouthinkthatresolutionwouldbe
enforced?
36
UNSC,“ReportoftheSecurityCouncilMissionEstablishedPursuanttoResolution819(1993),”S/25700,
April30,1993.
37SefirHalilović&RatkoMladić,“AgreementfortheDemilitarizationofSrebrenica,”April18,1993.
1-25
DIEGOARRIA:Wedidnothaveanyhopeofthathappening.Wewereaddressing
internationalpublicopinionratherthantheCouncilitself,describingthe
devastationofthepeopleofSrebrenica.ItwasnotdifficultfortheCounciltoagree
ontheresolution,becausetherewerenocommitmentsonthepartofanybody.It
waspourlagalerie[“forthepublicgallery”],astheFrenchwouldsay.Itwasa
resolutionwithoutanycostorconsequencesexcepttoaccommodatetheSerbs.
MICHAELDOBBS:Whenyoupassedthatresolution,didyouthinkthatUNPROFOR
hadthedutytoenforceitbyitself,orthatitshouldreachagreementwiththeparties
onhowtoenforceit?Howwastheresolutionmeanttobeenforced,inyourview?
DIEGOARRIA:WewerenotverywellinformedabouttherealitiesofUNPROFOR,
whichbythewayisamisnomer.Withsuchagrandiosename,UnitedNations
“ProtectionForce,”wethoughtsomethingwouldbedone.Afewdayslater,of
course,wediscoveredthatthiswasnotthecase.
Inproposingthetextoftheresolution,IhadwritteninSpanish,“Areas
Protegidas,”or“ProtectedAreas.”TheUSandUKtranslatedthisas“SafeAreas”and
theFrenchas“ZonesdeSecurité.”Thiswasmorethanjustsemantics.“Protected”
wouldhavemeantreallyenforcingtheresolution.“Safe”meantnothing,asweall
foundoutveryquickly.Therewerenoobligationsunderthe“SafeArea”concept.
SHASHITHAROOR:IfyoureadUNSC819carefully,youwillseethatitcallsonthe
partiestotreatSrebrenicaassafe.Itenjoinsnonewresponsibilitiesonthe
internationalcommunity,ifthepartiesfailtotreatSrebrenicaassafe,UNPROFOR
hastheresponsibilitytoactinself-defense.Oneofthefundamentalproblemswe
hadthroughoutthisoperationisthatdiplomaticdraftingconductedwith
greatfinesseandaplombbyveryskilleddiplomatsservedasanendinitself.Itwas
notlinkedtooperationalrealitiesontheground.
WhileweweretalkingintheSecurityCouncilaboutUNSC819,ontheground
unknowntous,GeneralWahlgren,GeneralHalilović(theBosniancommander),and
GeneralMladićhadnegotiatedandsignedademilitarizationagreementthatwasnot
1-26
explicitlycalledforin819.38Wehadnotaskedforitbecauseitwouldlookasifwe
weretakingsidesagainsttheBosnians.Wehadnotaskedforitbecausewedidn't
thinkforGod'ssakethatitcouldbeviablyimplementedbyus.
IwanttodrawyourattentiontotheAnnancableofApril23,1993whichI
confessIwrote.39TheseareourinstructionstoWahlgrenfollowingaphonecallI
hadwithhimearlier.Withoneortwoexceptions,mostofthecablessignedbyKofi
Annanweredraftedbyme.InthiscablewetellWahlgrenthat"...the
demilitarizationofSrebrenicawasastepagreedbytheparties,notoneproposedby
theUnitedNations."WetellWahlgrenthatUNPROFORismerely"lendingitsgood
officestohelpbothpartiesfulfillthecommitmentstheyhavemadetoeachother."
Wewereextremelyconsciousthroughoutofthesevereoperationallimitations.
Ialsohaveasentenceheresaying,"...however,UNPROFORtakesonamoral
responsibilityforthesafetyofthedisarmedthatitclearlydoesnothavethemilitary
resourcestohonourbeyondapoint."Iwrotethesewordsinsomedistressbecause
thiswasnotanactionweinheadquartershadauthorizedorrecommended.
UNPROFORhadtakeniton.Ofcourse,theSerbsweregoingtousethisasawayto
disarmtheirrivals.40But,equallynow,itgotembeddedintotheconcept.Ifthe
BosnianMuslims,ortheBosnianArmyofficially,hadnotbeendisarmed,and
thereforecouldcontinuetofightoutofthepocket,didthepocketsuddenlystop
beingaSafeAreaintermsofwhattheCouncilintendedin819?
Ikeepharpingbacktothecentraldilemma:whatwasourrole?Thebestthing
wouldhavebeeniftheUShadmadeuptheirmindsearlyenough,talkedtotheBrits
andtheFrenchandsaid,“PulltheUNoutandlet'sgotowar.”Thatwouldhavebeen
thesimplest,clearestthing,buttheywerenotdoingthat.TheyhadtheUNdeployed
there,makingpeaceasanoperation,tryingtobeneutralamongtheparties,trying
toensurethattheUNpresencedidnotbecomeamilitaryadvantagetoanyoneof
theparties,whileatthesametimeallthiswasgoingoninthecapitals,withoutany
coherentconclusions.IwouldcommendthiscablenotbecauseIwroteitbut
38
“AgreementfortheDemilitarizationofSrebrenica,”April18,1993.
AnnantoWahlgren,“Srebrenica,”UNDPKO,MSC676,April23,1993.
40
ThecableaddedthatDPKOsaw“noneedforUNPROFORtoparticipateinhouse-to-searchesfor
weapons”givenWahlgren’spublicstatementsthatSrebrenicawas“fullydemilitarized.”
39
1-27
becauseitencapsulatessomeoftheoperationaldilemmasthat819gaveusandthat
franklyweforesaw.David[Hannay]willprobablyrememberthatwehadalittle
meetingintheofficeofthePresidentoftheSecurityCouncilwhereIreadout
Wahlgren'scableadvisingagainsttheadoptionofsucharesolution.TheEuropeans
wereveryclearinanycasethattheyweregoingtogoaheadwiththis,andwedidgo
aheadwithit.Thiscablesummarizestheoperationalconsequencesthatwewere
tryingtoclarifytoUNPROFORwhichmeanwhilehadtakenonestepbeyondwhat
eithertheCouncilorweinDPKOhadanticipatedinactuallysigninga
demilitarizationagreement.
MICHAELDOBBS:LetusgotoGeneralHayes.YoureceivedUNSC819andhadthe
taskofimplementingit,togetherwithGeneralWahlgren.Canyoudescribehowyou
wentabouttryingtoputfleshontotheresolutionandapplyittowhatwasactually
happeningonthegroundinBosnia.
VEREHAYES:Yes,certainly.BeforeIdo,canIjustcomebacktosomethingthat
AmbassadorArriasaidaboutUNPROFORpreventinghimfromgettinginto
Srebrenica.Thatisactuallytotallyincorrectfrommypointofview.Wedid
everythingwecouldtogetyouin.Theproblemwasthatwecouldnotgetthe
journalistsin.SinceIknewthatwasgoingtohappen,Ihadtodecidewhetherwe
tookyouandothermembersofthedelegationinsothatyoucouldseetheplaceor
nobodywouldgetinatall.IalsofinditslightlystrangethatmembersoftheSecurity
CouncilthoughtthatwewereoperatingunderaChapterVII,asopposedtoa
ChapterVI,mandate.Iwouldhavethoughtthatwouldhavebeenobvious.
MICHAELDOBBS:Soyourunderstandingwasthatyouwereoperatingunder
ChapterVIoftheUNCharter,andthiswasnotaChapterVIIoperationatall?
VEREHAYES:WewereoperatingunderChapterVI.Forus,ChapterVIwasa“cook
andlook”operation,aswerathercheekilydescribedit.That'sallyoucoulddo,
“cookandlook.”ThewayChapterVIIwentwasthattheUNissuedthewarrantsand
theUnitedStatesmadethearrests.
1-28
Tocomebacktowhatwashappening.TherewasameetingatSarajevoairport
onApril17-18,1993.AnagreementwassignedbetweenMladićandHalilović.41The
negotiationstartedatnoononSaturday,April17,andlasteduntil2a.m.onSunday,
April18.Thequestionarose,whowasgoingtoberesponsibleforthedetails?I
lookeddownthetableatGeneralsWahlgrenandMorillon,wholookedbackdown
thetableatme,andItookiton.Weneededtogetsomeclarificationonthephrase,
"allparties…treatSrebrenicaanditssurroundingsasaSafeArea."42Obviously,that
phrasemeantdifferentthingstodifferentparties.
Tocutalongstoryshort,wenegotiatedalldaySundayandalldayMonday.
Wehadseventy-twohoursinwhichtogettheagreementimplemented.43Otherwise
itwouldhavefallenapart.WealsohadtogetorderstotheCanadians,whohad
movedintoSrebrenica,onwhattheyweremeanttodo.Asacommanderonthe
ground,youlooktoyourhigherheadquarterstotellyouwhattodo.Youdonottry
tomakeitupasyougoalong.Wehadtogivethe145-manCanadiancontingentled
byLt.ColTomGeburtsomeorders,sohecouldactuallydosomething.44Ieventually
decidedonmyowninitiativethattheSrebrenica"SafeArea"hadtobeextendedout
fromthetownitself.Welookedatthemapsanddidaquicksurveyofthehigh
pointsaroundthetown.Thereisamaphere.45WewentanddrewtheSafeAreaon
themap,extendingouttothepointsfromwhichyouhadadirectlineofsight,with
theabilityfordirectfireintothetownitself.Thatwaswherewedrewtheareatobe
definedasaSafeArea.Itwasverysmall,about4.5kilometersbyabout1.5
kilometers.Tome,itwasthekernelofanutwhichwouldbeextended.
WedidnotdisarmtheBosniansinthepocket.Weaskedthemeithertoleave
theareawehaddesignatedtobedemilitarizedastheSafeAreaor,iftheywere
41
SefirHalilović&RatkoMladić,“AgreementfortheDemilitarizationofSrebrenica,”April18,1993.
43
TheagreementsignedatSarajevoairportbetweenMladićandHalilović(Point4)specifiedthat“the
demilitarizationofSrebrenicawillbecompletewithin72hoursofthearrivaloftheUNPROFORCompany
inSrebrenica.”Theagreementalsoprovidedfortheevacuationof500seriouslywoundedandsick
civilians.
44
AnApril22,1993NYTarticlebyJohnBurnsreportedthatUNPROFORhad“nocontingencyplans”inthe
eventofaSerbattackonSrebrenica.ColonelTomGeburt,oftheRoyalCanadianRegiment,wasreported
tobe“tearingouthishair”attheprospectofhavingtodefendthecity,orevenhisownmen.Therulesof
engagementwereunclear.
45
HayestoUNPF-HQ,“ReportontheDemilitarizationofSrebrenica,”HQBHCommand,April21,1993.
42
1-29
goingtostay,handtheirweaponsin.ThisbecameadebatewiththeSerbswhen
theywerecominginwithadelegationtosigntheagreementandhadtoleavetheir
weaponsbehind.ItalsobecameadebatewithNaserOrić,whowasintheareawith
hisbodyguardscarryinghisweapons.WhenIgotinthere[onApril21,1993]with
theBosniangovernmentandBosnianSerbdelegations,wegotoutatthecompound
wheretheweaponshadbeengathered.NaserOrićwasstandingthere.Ihadtosay
tohim,"You'rearmedinthisarea.It'snotintheagreement."Hesaidthatnobody
hadtoldhimverymuchabouttheagreement,andhedidnotknowwhatwasgoing
on.Isaid,"You'renotmeanttobeinthisareawithaweapon.I'mgoingtogetthe
delegationsoutofthevehicle.WhenIturnaround,ifyou'restillherearmedinthe
area,Iwillhavetoarrestyou."I'mnotsurewewouldhavehadmuchsuccess
arrestingNaserOrićbutwhenweturnedaroundhehadgone.
Wethenputthetwopartiestogetherinvehiclesanddrovearoundthearea.
Wehadagreedthattheareahadtobemarkedonthemapwhichthenhadtobe
confirmedandmarkedontheground.Soyouactuallyhadmapandground
markingssoyouknewwheretheareawas.Wewentaroundthatarea,cameback
andsignedanagreement.Neithersidewasparticularlyhappywithit.Ourintention
wasthattherewouldbeabufferzone,controlledbytheBosnians,extendingout
fromtheareadecreedtobesafetothefrontlines,whichwerealotfurtheroutat
thattime.Wewentbackseveraltimestotryandextendtheareabutwerenever
abletodoso.Neithersidewaspreparedtomakeanyconcessions.Thatishowit
endedup,asjustthatverysmallareaaroundthetownitself.
WhenAmbassadorArriacamewithhisdelegation,Imadeanerrorwitha
journalistforwhichIapologize.IhadheardtheAmbassadortalkingonBBCRadio4
abouttheUNdisarmingBosnians[inSrebrenica].Inowthinkhewasunawarewhat
washappeningontheground.ImadethemistakeofsayingthatIwasn'tquitesure
thattheAmbassadorknewwhathewastalkingaboutwhichcauseda
furorunderstandablywiththeAmbassador.Thatcoloredour
subsequentdiscussions.[Laughter]
IfwehadnotleftthejournalistsbehindinZvornik,you,Ambassador,would
nothavebeenabletogetintoSrebrenicaandseeit,eveninthelimitedwaythatyou
1-30
didseeit.Atthetime,asfarastheSerbsonthegroundwereconcerned,theUNand
yourdelegationactuallyhadnoauthoritytogoinwithouttheirpermission.There
wasnothingwecoulddoaboutit.
DIEGOARRIA:ThesmallercountriesintheSecurityCouncildonothavearmies.My
friendDavid[Hannay]onceremarkedthattheAmbassadorfromVenezuelawasnot
goingtomarchintoSrebrenicawithVenezuelansoldiers.Isaid“Heisright,butwe
donothavetheprivilegeofsittingpermanentlyintheSecurityCouncil,either.”
Publicopinionwasfundamentalinthisissue.Weknewtheimportanceofbringing
thejournalists.General[Hayes],yousaidsomethingatthetimeaboutUnited
NationsSecurityCouncilResolutionsbeing“woolly-headed.”46Thiswasthefirst
timeIheardthatexpression.Isaid,“Howcanageneralwhoisnottheforce
commanderaddresstheSecurityCouncilinthatway?”Thesearepoliticalmatters.I
thoughtthatyouweregettinginvolvedinpoliticalnegotiations.Youtalkedjustnow
aboutwantingtoarresttheBosniancommanderinSrebrenica[NaserOrić].Ithink
thatwouldhavebeenanabuseofpowerwhichwouldhavehadconsequences.
VEREHAYES:Idonotthinkitwouldhavebeenanabuseofpowerbecausethe
agreementbetweenthetwopartiessaidthattherewouldbenoarmedpeoplein
thatarea.Itwouldsimplyhavebeenimplementinganagreementthathadbeen
madebetweentheparties.
ANDRÉERDÖS:InHungary,wewerelookingtotheUnitedStatestoplayan
importantrole.InJanuary1993,wereceivedinformationfromUSsources,whichis
notincludedinthisbooklet.USofficialsmetwithnon-permanentmembersofthe
SecurityCouncil,andsaidthattheUSwasreadyformoreradicalsteps,includinga
moreactivemilitaryrole.Itseemstheywereunabletotakethesestepsbecauseof
oppositionfromtheUnitedKingdom,FranceandRussia.Theyaddedthattheyalso
hadtotakeintoconsiderationYeltsin’sinternalpoliticalproblems.InMay1993,we
46
SeeJohnPomfret,“UNdelegationvisitsshell-scarredBosnianEnclave,”WashingtonPost,April26,1993
quotedanonymousUNpeacekeeperscallingrecentSecurityCouncilresolutionsonBosniaas“woollyheaded”and“sovaguetheywerealmostimpossibletoenforce.”
1-31
heardthesamething.USdelegationsourcessaidthattheUnitedStateswasreadyto
conductairstrikesaslongastheywerenotopposedbythemajoralliesandthe
SecurityCouncil.Thisshowsthat,quiteapartfromalltheinternalYugoslav
problems,suchasnationalismandsoon,amajorprobleminvolvedrelations
betweenwesterncountries.Thiswasoneofthereasonswhythewardraggedon
until1995.
OBRADKESIC:TheGenevaConventionsdiscusstheprotectionofciviliansandthe
organizationofsafeareas.47AsfarasSafeAreasareconcerned,therearetwo
elementsthatareequallyimportant.Thefirstisthattheydependonthewillofthe
belligerents.Combatantforcesmusthavethewilltoconcludeanagreementand
defineaSafeArea.Thesecondpartisdemilitarization.Wasthiswhatwasinthe
mindofthepeopledraftingtheUNSecurityCouncilResolutionorwasitmorea
case,asAmbassadorWalkersuggested,creatingtheperceptionof“doing
something”withoutactuallyunderstandingwhatyouweredoing?
MICHAELDOBBS:Justtoaddtothat,therewasnomentionof“demilitarization”in
theUNSecurityCouncilResolution.Itwassomethingthatwasaddedbythepeople
ontheground.ShashimentionedhisApril23cablewhichstatesexplicitlythat“we
seenoneedforUNPROFORtoparticipateinhouse-to-housesearchesforweapons.”
Inotherwords,DPKOwasbackingoffsomeofthecommitmentsthathadbeen
madeontheground.
SHASHITHAROOR:Yes,wewerecaughtinacleftstick.Wehadnotproposedthis
thingtobeginwith.Wedidnotthinkwehadthecapacitytoenforceitand
implementit.Atthesametimewewereunderthetremendousmoralpressurein
theSecurityCouncilandinthemediathatweweregivingaidandcomforttoethnic
47
“Safetyzones”werecreatedundertheGenevaConventionsinMadridin1936duringtheSpanishCivil
WarandinShanghaiin1937duringtheJapanesebombardment.Article15oftheFourthGeneva
Convention(1949)on“TheProtectionofCivilianPersonsinTimeofWar”providesfor“neutralizedzones”
intendedtoshelter“woundedandsickcombatantsornon-combatants”and“civilianpersonswhotakeno
partinhostilities.”Protocol1Article60on“Demilitarizedzones”prohibitswarringpartiesfromextending
militaryoperationstodemilitarizedzones.
1-32
cleansersandkillersandsoon.Thelastthingwewantedwastobeseenasaiding
andabettingtheSerbs.WecouldnotaffordtotaketheBosnianside"militarily,"but
wecouldmorally.WedidhaveaproblemtakingtheSerbsidesincetheywere
besiegingatownwithcivilians.Itwascomplicatedbythefactthatthisagreement
hadalreadybeensignedbyallpartiesincludingtheBosnianArmy.Sowesaid,“Let
thepartiesfulfilltheirobligationstoeachotherbutdon'tgoaroundbeingthe
enforcersofthisagreement.”Thatwasourguidance.
TOMBLANTON:YouhaveasentenceinyourApril23cable,mentioningthe
"...strongfeelingamongstseveralMemberStatesthatUNPROFORshouldnot
participatetooactivelyin'disarmingthevictims.'"48
SHASHITHAROOR:Thatisright.IknewthatpeoplelikeDiegoArriaandAndré
ErdöswerecertainlysayingthatsortofthingintheCouncil,aswerethePakistanis
andothers.Therewerealotofverystrongvoicesonthissubject.Iwouldsaythe
principalauthorsofUNSC819weretheBrits.DavidHannaycanspeaktothe
thinkingbehindit.Atthetime,Davidassuredusthatthepartieswerebeing
enjoinedtotreattheSafeAreaassafeandtherewerenonewobligationsfor
UNPROFOR.Thedemilitarizationagreementlookedverymuchlikeanewobligation
whichiswhywe[inDPKO]triedtopushitbackandsay,“Don'tdomorethanyou
absolutelyhaveto.”Letthemkeeptheirwordtoeachother.
VEREHAYES:Tobeclearonthedemilitarization,whatweweresayingwas,“you
eitherhandinyourweaponsandstayintheareaoryouleavethearea.“Those
peoplewhowantedtostayintheareaweredisarmedbyvoluntarilyhandingin
theirweapons.Iftheydidnotwanttohandintheirweapons,theyhadtomoveout
oftheSafeArea.We,theUN,didnotactuallydisarmanybody.
SHASHITHAROOR:Thatisright.Ourguidancefittedinverymuchwiththewayyou
sawit.IhaveasentencetheretellingGeneralWahlgren,"...givenyourownpublic
statementsthatSrebrenicaisfullydemilitarized..."Frankly,wetookthiswith
48
AnnantoWahlgren,“Srebrenica,”UNDPKO,MSC676,April23,1993.
1-33
severalpinchesofsalt,butthatiswhatWahlgrenwassayingofficially,inpublic.
Thatwasanotherreasonwhyweshouldnotgoarounddoinghousetohouse
searches.Iseefromaseparatedocumentthat[onApril8]30,000roundsof
ammunitionwerefoundinSrebrenicasoitwasnotinfactdemilitarized.49
VEREHAYES:ThatammunitionwasfoundinaUNHCRconvoygoingtoSarajevo
acrosstheairport.IthadnothingtodowithSrebrenica.Thatwasbeforeanything
happenedwiththeSrebrenicaagreementandwasoneofthereasonswhytheSerbs
becamesoinsistentonsearchingUNHCRconvoys.50
ZlatkoLagumdžija,left,withHasanMuratović
ZLATKOLAGUMDŽIJA:Ifeellikeaguineapigwhosurvivedanexperiment.Iam
honoredtobeherewiththescientistswho,let'ssay,“helpedussurvive.”Ithinkthat
HasanMuratovićmadeanimportantpoint.ThekillingofDeputyPrimeMinister
HakijaTurajlićwasaclearsignalthatyoucandoanythingyouwantandnotbe
49
WahlgrentoAnnan,“High-LevelMilitaryMeetinginBelgradeof9April1993,”UNPF-HQ,Z-495,April
11,1993.ThedocumentsupportsHayes’memorythattheammunitionwasdiscoveredinaUNHCR
convoyinSarajevo.
50
ForMladic’saccountofhistalkswithWahlgrenandMorilloninBelgrade,seehisdiaryentry,“Meeting
withGeneralsWalgren(sic)andMorillon,”April9,1993.
1-34
punished.Afewweeksafterhismurder,Iwasresponsibleforthenegotiationswith
MorillonandSadakoOgataonhumanitarianactivitiesasactingprimeminister.We
triedforweekstoevacuatewoundedkidsfromSarajevoontheemptyplanesthat
weredeliveringthefood.Itprovedimpossible.Theytoldusthatthepeoplewho
killedTurajlićwouldnotallowit.
Atonepointthingsgotsodesperatethatwerefusedtoacceptfoodin
Sarajevountilfoodwasdeliveredtotheenclaves,firstwithparachutes(those
“Christmastrees”)andthenwithconvoys.WegreetedUNSCResolution819with
enthusiasm,notbecauseoftheresolutionbutbecauseofthementionofChapterVII
oftheUNCharter.51
Weheardmanytimes,andagaintoday,thatUNPROFORdidnotwanttobe
draggedintotheconflict.IdebatedthisquestionmanytimeswithLarry
Hollingworth,bothbeforeandafterIwasseriouslywoundedonMay22,1993.What
does“beingneutral”mean?Doesitmeanoccupyingthemiddlegroundbetweentwo
warringsides?Isitgeometric?Oristheresomeotherlogictoit?Ifyoudemonstrate
neutralitybytakingthemiddlegroundbetweenakillerandhisvictim,thenyou
betrayyourownvalues,inwhichcaseweshouldrethinkeverythingwearedoing.
DAVIDHANNAY:ItisperfectlyclearfromwhatLarryHollingworthsaidthat
MorillonactedonhisownwhenhemadehisspeechfromthebalconyofthePTT
buildinginSrebrenicawiththeflag.Oncethatbecamepublic,thechoice[wefacedin
theSecurityCouncil]waswhethertodisownhimortosupporthim.Itwasassimple
asthat.YouaskedhowUNSC819cametobewritten.Themainpeoplebehindthe
resolutionweretheEuropeans,whowerenotpreparedtodropMorillondespitethe
factthathehadactedwithoutanyauthoritywhatsoever.Therewasabsolutelyzero
enthusiasmfortheSafeArea,asdescribedinUNSC819,certainlyinmygovernment.
OurviewwasmuchclosertotheviewsofMrs.OgataandtheICRCaboutSafeAreas
thanitwastothosewhowantedamilitarizedSafeArea.IneversawfromLondon
anycriticismoftheSafeAreaagreement,asitwasnegotiatedbyUNPROFOR
betweentheBosniansandtheBosnianSerbs.Ithinktherewasafeelingthatitwas
51
1-35
notideal,toputitmildly,buttheagreementmadeitslightlymoresustainable.The
stormofprotestthateruptedovertheagreementmeantthatitwasneverrepeated
inanyoftheotherSafeAreas.
[BREAK]
TOMBLANTON:Oneofthepolicyquestionsthatwehavenotyetdiscussedisthe
dilemmaoverwhethertoprotectrefugeesinplace,intheSrebrenicaSafeArea,or
evacuatethem.Ifyouorganizedevacuations,youcouldbeaccusedofsanctioning
ethniccleansing.Butwealsoknowthattheword“protection”inthetitleof
UNPROFORwasanaspiration,notareality.Larry,canyouaddressthechallenge
youfaced?
LARRYHOLLINGWORTH:Thefirstpointistoask,whatdothelocalpeoplewant?
Whataretheirwishes?Iftheywanttoleave,areyouimprisoningthembykeeping
themin?Itisagreatdilemma.Wedidnotwanttoaidethniccleansing,butwealso
didnotwanttokeepthemasprisoners.Myopinionalwaysis,whatistheviewof
thepeoplethemselves?Ifpeoplegenuinelywanttoleave,weshouldletthemgo.
MICHAELDOBBS:Thefirstevacuationswerelimitedtothesickandtheveryelderly.
AnumberofevacuationconvoyswereorganizedbutatacertainpointtheBosnian
governmentcalledahalt.Whatwasyourperceptionofwhatthelocalpopulationin
Srebrenicawantedtodo?
LARRYHOLLINGWORTH:Thepeoplewereinthemostdirestraitsyoucanimagine.
Therewasnowayintheworldthatwewereabletosustainthemtoanythinglikea
minimumstandard.Iamnotsurprisedthattheywantedtogo.Theyknewfullwell
thatwiththeconditionsthatwereimposedonus,theywerenevergoingtobe
sustained.Iamnotsurprisedthateverysinglepersonwantedtogo.
Theywereallfrightenedthattheirfamilieswouldbeseparated.Thewomen
andchildrenthoughtthat,iftheygotout,theSerbswouldshellthecitywithallthe
meninsideit.
1-36
MICHAELDOBBS:Whatdidyourfriendswanttodo,Muhamed?
MUHAMEDDURAKOVIĆ:InSrebrenicain1993,itwasobviousthatstayinginareas
thatweremeanttobeethnicallycleansedmeantcertaindeath.Everyonewastrying
tosustainlifeasmuchaspossible.Themenwantedtoatleastgettheirwivesand
childrenoutassoonaspossibletogivethemachanceofsurvival.Mostciviliansin
Srebrenicawantedtogetoutassoonaspossible.I'mtalkingfrommyownpersonal,
privateexperience.Yourmainobjective—today,too,incertainpartsoftheworld—
isthepreservationoflife.Youhavetosavethosewhoarecaughtinthemiddle
betweentwowarringpartiesandaredirectvictimsoftheatrocities.Thatdidnot
reflecttheview,perhaps,ofthepoliticalstructureofSrebrenica.Theyfeltthat
ifthewomenandchildrenleftSrebrenica,itwouldbecomeamucheasierterritory
tooccupy.
Ifyouhaveonlyonebulletinyourgun,andyouknowthatyourwifeandkids
areamileawaybehindyoufacingcertaindeath,youwillstandyourgroundno
matterwhat.Youwillfighttothelastdropofyourblood.Butifyourwifeandkids
arenolongerinSrebrenica,thenyouwilldowhateveryoucantojointhem,evenif
thatmeansthatfightingyourwayoutthroughalmostonehundredmilesofNo
Man’sLand.FromthepointofviewoftheBosnianmilitaryleadership,evacuating
civiliansfromSrebrenicameantweakeningthemoraleofthefightingforcein
Srebrenica.Theydidnotrepresentthefeelingofthemajorityofthepeoplewhoonly
wantedtosurvive,tolivesomewhereelseifSrebrenicawasnolongeraviable
option.
AsfarasthedemilitarizationofSrebrenicaisconcerned,mypersonalview
andtheviewoftheBosnianauthoritiesatthatparticulartimewasthattheCanadian
troopswerehighlyprofessional.Theycameinanderectedcheckpoints.One
ofthecheckpoints,onthesouthsideofthetown,wasonehundredmetersaway
frommyhouse.Iwasabletoaidthesecheckpointsasamemberofthelocalpolice.
Wewouldsearchanyoneenteringorleavingtheenclave.Thiswasajointeffortby
UNPROFORandthelocalpolicewhoweretheretoensurethattheagreementwas
followed.
1-37
IfthelocalpoliceorUNPROFORfoundanyonewithweaponsatthese
checkpoints,theweaponswereseizedanddestroyedonthespot.Ifsomeonewas
foundcarryingaconcealedhandgun,thepeacekeeperwouldtakethemagazineout
ofthepistolanddestroythepistolbythrowingitunderanAPC.Thiswasatthe
beginningwhenthedemilitarizedzonewasconfinedtoSrebrenicaanditssuburbs.
LateronthiswasextendedsouthwardstoOP[ObservationPost]Echo,OPFoxtrot
andtheotherobservationpoints.
LARRYHOLLINGWORTH:Wemustrememberthatatleast50percent,ifnotmore,
ofthepopulationofSrebrenicawerefromoutsideSrebrenica.Theyhadfledtheir
ownvillagesforwhattheythoughtwasabetterplace.Whentheyfoundthatitwas
actuallytheworstplaceonGod'searth,it'snotsurprisingthattheywantedtoleave.
MUHAMEDDURAKOVIĆ:Iagree.
HASANMURATOVIĆ:Whethertoleaveorbeprotectedinsideasafezoneisan
immoraldilemma.Whenthe[Srebrenica]safezonewascreated,therewasno
clearlydefinedfinalgoal.Whatwasthefinalintentionwiththissafezone?Howlong
wasitmeanttostayinplace?Whathadtobedonetoenablepeopletoleavethe
areaortodefendthemselves?Wasthereanyothersolution?Wesawwhatthe
bettersolutionwas,bothinBosniaandlaterinKosovo:equipanarmytoprotectthe
place,withtheassistanceofairstrikes.Letthearmyfight,andgivesupportfromthe
air.Orevenreprimandseriously.WhentheSerbswereorderedtosurrender
weaponsinSarajevo,theysurrenderedtheirweaponsbecauseitwasanultimatum.
ButtheywerenotreprimandedseriouslyinSrebrenica.Instead,therewere
negotiationswiththem.
EverypeacekeepingforceinBosniaandevery[foreign]civilianorganization
wassupposedtofollowtheoveralllineoftheUN,buttheyalsoworkedandfollowed
thelineoftheirowngovernments.DeploymentsofUNpeacekeepersreflected
politicalinterestsofdifferentcountriesfromwhichtheycome:TurksandEgyptians
inSarajevo,FrenchbetweenPaleandSarajevo,andbetweenBanjaLukaandBihać,
theSpanishinMostar.
1-38
Wemustbearinmindthesedualroleswhenexaminethedecisionsthatwere
taken.TherewasnoconsensusbetweenEuropeancountriesonwhattodo.There
weredifferentpoliciesanddifferentviews.ThecreationoftheSafeArea,asMadam
Ogatasaid,wasdubiousfromallpointsofview.52Youcanprotectahospital,youcan
protectthepopulation,onlyifyouhelpthemtodefendthemselvesandhavean
overallgoalinmind.TheUNmissionneverhadclearlydefinedgoalsinBosnia.They
livedfromtodaytotomorrow,attemptingtosolveday-to-dayproblems.
CARLBILDT:IwasnotaroundatthetimebutIwasinvolvedinasimilarsituationin
Žepain1995.Thequestionis:ifyouassistinbringingpeopleoutofadifficult
situation,areyouanaccompliceinethniccleansingorgenocide,ornot?Thisisboth
amoralandpoliticaldilemmaforinternationalorganizations,whenfacedwith
situationslikethis.Thewarcrimestribunal,ICTY,dealtwiththisintheZdravko
Tolimircasebutwasunabletomakeupitsmind.Firstthetribunalsaid:yes,youare
anaccompliceinacrime.Thentheychangedtheirpositionandsaid:no,youcannot
reallysaythat.53Thefactthattheygobackandforthonthisissueillustrateshow
difficultthisis.Ofcourse,ithasvastimplicationsforotheroperationsaroundthe
world.
MICHAELDOBBS:Whatisyourpersonalview?
CARLBILDT:Myviewisthatyouhavetolookateachsituationasitis.Itis
difficulttohaveanoverridingprinciple.Youarenormallyinterestedinsavinglives.
Thehumanitarianimperativeisoftenwhatdrivespeopleinsituationslikethis.
52See,forexample,HannaytoFCO,“Bosnia:MrsOgata’sviewsonSafeAreas,”Telno1903,May29,
1993.Ogatawarnedthatsafeareascouldturninto“largescalerefugeecamps…closedinbythe
surroundingmilitaryforces.”
53ThisissuerelatestoArticle42(b)oftheICTYStatute,whichgivesthetribunalauthorityto
prosecutethecrimeofgenocide,specifically“causingseriousbodilyormentalharm”with“intentto
destroy,inwholeorinpart,anational,ethnical,racial,orreligiousgroup.”TheICTYAppeals
ChamberruledinApril2015thattheTrialChamberhadfailedtoestablishthattheMuslimsexpelled
fromŽepa(incontrasttotheMuslimsexpelledfromSrebrenica)hadsuffered“seriousmentalharm”
risingtothelevelofgenocide.Seeparagraphs216-217,AppealJudgment.Thisreversedthefinding
containedinParagraph758ofthe2012TrialChamberjudgment.
1-39
JORISVOORHOEVE:Ientirelyagreewiththeoverridingprincipleofsavinglives.
Thattakespriorityovernotcooperatingwithethniccleansing.
IwouldputSecurityCouncilResolution819,whichwediscussedthis
morning,inthecategoryof"fake"actions.Fakeactionscreatetheimpressionthat
somethinghasbeendecidedandisbeingdonewheninactualfactnothingwas
decidedordone.TheonlyoperationalpartoftheresolutionwasthattheSecretaryGeneralshould"increasethepresenceofUNPROFOR."54Theresolutiondoesnotsay
whatUNPROFORshoulddo.ThereismentionofChapterVII,butthatismeaningless
becauseitdoesnotsaywhatpartisunderChapterVII.MembersoftheSecurity
Councilwoulddobetternottovoteforsuchfakeresolutions.Thereareother
resolutionsthatweremuchstronger:forexample,UNSCresolution836,whichalso
invokedChapterVIIandallowedtheSecretary-Generaltouse"airpowerinand
aroundthesafeareas...tosupportUNPROFORintheperformanceofitsmandate."55
ThatwasaverysignificantresolutionthatmadeuseofChapterVII.
ThesecondpointIwanttomakeisverysimilartotheoneraisedbyMr.Bildt.
IdrawattentiontotheproposalsmadebyMrs.Ogatain1992.Shefavored
evacuationofthepopulationofSrebrenicaandnegotiationsbetweentheBosnian
governmentandtheBosnianSerbs[onalandswap].56TheBosnianswouldhave
receivedapieceoflandnearSarajevothatwouldhaveimprovedthedefensibilityof
SarajevoandmadeitpossibletorelocatethepopulationofSrebrenicapreventively.
IunderstandthedilemmafacedbytheBosniangovernment.Iknowtherewere
discussionsintheBosniangovernmentonapreventiveevacuation.Therewere
ministersinfavorofpreventiveevacuation,butintheendtheydecidedagainst.
Politicalandethicalquestionswereconfused,notonlyintheUnitedNations,but
alsoinBosnia.
TOMBLANTON:LetmeaskDavidHannaytorespond.Ithinkthatyouhaveargued
thattheso-called“fakeresolution,”819,didactuallyachievesomething,namely
54
UNSC,“Resolution836(1993),”S/RES/836,June4,1993.
56
SadakoOgata,“StatementtotheInternationalMeetingonHumanitarianAidforVictimsoftheConflict
intheformerYugoslavia,”July29,1992.
55
1-40
headingoffaSerbianoffensiveagainstSrebrenica.HadtheVance-Owenplan
actuallybeenadopted,wemightbelookingbackattheestablishmentoftheseSafe
Areasasatriumphforinternationaldiplomacy.Isthatanaccuratereflectionofyour
view?
DAVIDHANNAY:TheseSafeAreasresolutions—819inthecaseofSrebrenica,and
836settingouttheoverallpolicy—wereneverdesignedasanythingotherthana
shorttermexpedient.Theyhadtobefittedintoawiderpoliticalstrategywhichhad
toinvolvepeacenegotiationsandasettlement.ThedestructionofVance-Owenin
thespringof1993wasdisastrousbecauseitknockedawaythatoption.Ittookthree
yearstoreconstructthe[peacenegotiation]optionwhichcametobeknownas
Dayton.TheSafeAreasshouldneverhavebeenseenasalong-termsolutionto
anything.Theywereashort-termexpedientthatneededtobefittedintoaproper
politicalandmilitarystrategybutneverwas.
As1993and1994woreon,theexpedientbecamemoreandmore
threadbare,aswewillseewhenwetalkaboutGoraždeandBihać.Bythetimeofthe
Srebrenicamassacre,itwascompletelyworthless.Thereasonitwasworthlesswas
becausenoonedidanythingaboutthepoliticalframework.Tomymind,the
destructionofVance-Owenwasadisaster.IfyoureadtheJointActionProgram,you
canseewhatthesignatoriesthoughtaboutpreservingVance-Owen.Theymakea
vaguereferenceto“buildingontheVance-Owenprocess,”butitwasbasically
dead.57Thatwasarealdisaster.TheSafeAreaswereanexpedientthatbecamea
policy.
TOMBLANTON:Jenonne,canyouaddressthat?
JENONNEWALKER:IagreewithmostofwhatDavidhassaid.Iplaceless
importancethanhedoesonVance-Owen.Obviouslyifthereisapeaceagreement,
thereisapeaceagreement,whetherit'stheVance-Owenplanoranyother.What
waslackinginalltheUNResolutions,andcertainlyinAmericanpolicyandinthe
57
PermanentRepresentativesofFrance,Spain,theRussianFederation,theUnitedKingdom,andthe
UnitedStates,“Jointactionprogramme,”S/25829,May24,1993.
1-41
JointActionProgram,wasanywillingnesstomaketheSerbsstoptheiraggression.
ThefirstseriousthingthatwasdoneintheWestwastheNATOdecisioninAugust
1993totakeseriousmilitaryaction,airaction,againstanyonewhocontinued
shellingciviliansettlements,whichofcoursemeanttheBosnianSerbsandtheir
Serbbackers.58ItworkedinFebruary1994,thefirsttimeitwastested,whenwe
issuedanultimatumtotheSerbsaboutpullingtheirweapons20kilometersbeyond
Sarajevo.59Atthelastminute,withRussianhelp,theycompliedbecausetheyreally
believedNATOairstrikeswerecoming.Hadthatpolicybeencontinued,things
mighthavebeenbettersooner.
TheJointActionProgramtookmostofusinWashingtonbysurprise.Icannot
rememberwhytheseniorEuropeanofficialswereintown.Therehadbeensome
otherevent.Thenextday,Igotaphonecallfromsomeonequiteseniorinthe
DefenseDepartmentsaying,issomethinghappeningattheStateDepartmentthat
wearebeingcutoutof?Isaid,noofcoursenot,Iwouldknowaboutit.Allofuswere
takenbysurprisewhenWarrenChristopherandhiscolleaguescameoutwiththe
JointActionProgram,whichwasfakepolicy.Itgavenobonestoanything.Ihaveno
ideawhyChrisandhiscolleaguessigneduptothat.Mostofusthoughtitwasan
embarrassment.IaskedTonyLakeafterwardifhehadknownthiswasgoingon.He
wasevasive.ItwasmaybetheonlytimeIfailedtogetastraightanswerfromTony.I
don'tknowifhewasalsotakenbysurprise.Itwasonlythewillingnesstomove
fromneutralitytousingforcetostopaggressionthatmadeitpossibletoimplement
Vance-Owen,Dayton,oranyotherpeaceplan.
Washingtonfinallycametoawillingnesstoseriouslygetbehindapeaceplan
inthespringandearlysummerof1994.WeagreedthenwiththeWestEuropeans,
theEU,thatwewouldjointheminendorsingaplan,includingamap,iftheywould
agreethatanyonewhodidnotaccepttheplanwithinacertainperiodoftimewould
58
Secretary-GeneralofNATO,“PressStatementbytheSecretary-General,”August2,1993.
“DecisionstakenattheMeetingoftheNorthAtlanticCouncilinPermanentSession,”February9,1994.
“SummaryofConclusionsofPrincipalsCommitteeMeetingonBosnia,”USNationalSecurityCouncil,
February18,1994.
59
1-42
faceseriousNATOairstrikes.60Afterthat,therewasaperiodofpinprickairstrikes
untilthingsfinallybecamesobadthatWashingtonsaiditwouldactaloneif
necessary.Itwastheenforcementthatmattered,nottheVance-Owenmaporthe
Daytonmaporanyothermap.
TOMBLANTON:Peter,youhadjustarrivedinCroatiainJune1993,andinheriteda
SafeAreaortwo?
PETERGALBRAITH:I'mstruckbythedisconnectbetweentheincoherentpolicyin
Washingtonandthingsactuallygoingontheground,eventhoughtheywerewell
reportedatthetime.FirstawordabouttheVance-Owenpeaceplan.Ifyoulookatit,
youwillseealotofblue.
Farfrombeingapeaceplan,thatmapacceleratedtheconflictbetween
BosniaksandBosnianCroatsastheBosnianCroatstriedtoseizetheterritory
offeredthembythemap.61Bythesummerof1993,therewaslittletheClinton
administrationcoulddotofollowthroughonthepresident’scampaignpledgesto
helptheBosniangovernment.ThiswasbecauseofthewarbetweentheMuslims
andtheCroats.Ifyoulookatthemap,youseeCroatiatothewestofBosniaand
Serbiatotheeast.TherewasnoaccesstotheBosniangovernmentareasaslongas
theMuslim-Croatwarwasgoingon.
WithoutmuchpolicyguidancefromWashington,theUSembassyinZagreb
inthesummerof1993beganpressuringtheCroatiangovernmenttoendthe
atrocitiestheBosnianCroatswerecommittinginBosnia.62ThroughForeign
MinisterMateGranicandDefenseMinisterGojkoSusak,Igotembassyofficersinto
theheliportnearMostarwherethousandsofBosnianswerebeingheldinappalling
conditions.InJuly,IhadaverycontentiousmeetingwithMateBobaninwhichI
60
InJuly1994,aContactGroupmadeupoftheUnitedStates,Russia,Britain,France,andGermany
proposedamapwitha51/49percentterritorialcompromisebetweentheMuslim-CroatFederationand
theBosnianSerbs.ThebasicprinciplesoftheContactGroupproposalwereacceptedatDayton.ForU.S.
strategyduringthisperiod,seeLaketoClinton,“Bosnia–NextSteps,”TheWhiteHouse,July19,1994.
61
FightingflaredbetweenBosnianCroatsandMuslimsaftertheCroatianDefenseCouncilgavethe
BosnianarmyadeadlineofApril15,1993towithdrawfromareasdesignatedasCroat-dominatedcantons
undertheVance-OwenPeacePlan.
62
“DecisionsofPrincipalsCommitteeMeetingonBosnia,”May17,1993.
1-43
pressedhimtoreleasethedetainees.Bytheendofthesummer,wesecuredthe
releaseofabout5,000Bosniakprisoners.Wegotaccesstotheheliportinspiteof
theoppositionoftheUSambassadortoBosnia[VictorJackovich]whowasbasedin
Vienna.Butthat’sanotherstory.
ProposedVance-Owenpeaceplan,1993
TOMBLANTON:SothereweredivisionsevenwithintheStateDepartmentandeven
betweenUSambassadors?
1-44
PETERGALBRAITH:Evenwithinthebureaus.IusedtorefertotheEuropean
BureauunderSteveOxmanasthe“HomeAlone”Bureau.63
JENONNEWALKER:Don'tgetintoit.
PETERGALBRAITH:Whynot?It'stwenty-twoyearslater.
Anyhow,inthefallof1993webegantoputpressureonTudjman,Šušakand
Granićtochangethe[BosnianCroat]leadership.TheygotridofBosnianCroat
leaderMateBobanbytheendoftheyear.Thatsetthestageforthealliancebetween
theMuslimsandCroatsthatwasexpressedintheFederationofBosnia-Herzegovina
[establishedbytheWashingtonAgreementofMarch1994].64Thiswasadifferent
constructfromVance-Owen.ItdidnotofferallthisterritorytotheBosnianCroats
andwasasignalthattheUSstronglydiscouragedTudjmanfromdoingwhathe
wantedtodo,whichwastograbagoodpartofBosnia.Thatalliancethensetthe
stageforustotelltheCroatiansthatweweregoingtolooktheotherwayasarms
wentthroughCroatiatoBosnia.Wedidnotneedtodotheliftpart[oflifeandstrike]
becausearmsdeliveriesweretakingplace.Thischangedthemilitarybalance.
Beforehedied,IzetbegovićtoldmethatmymessagetoTudjmanthattheUSdidnot
objecttoarmstransitingCroatiaforBosniawasthesinglemostimportantthingthat
theUnitedStatesdidforBosnia.Thisisadifferentperspectiveonhowthisevolved
thantheNewYork,andperhapstheNSC,perspective.
ZLATKOLAGUMDŽIJA:SeveralspeakersmentionedtheVance-Owenplan.Justto
remindyouaboutthemeetingbetweenIzetbegovićandVicePresidentGoreon
March26,1993[thedayafterIzetbegovićsignedtheVance-Owenplan.]65US
63
StephenA.OxmanwasAssistantSecretaryofStateforEuropeanandCanadianAffairsbetweenApril
1993andAugust1994whenhewassucceededbyRichardHolbrooke.AWashingtonPostarticleonMay
21,1996byJohnPomfretandDavidOttaway(“U.S.Envoy’sBalkanRoleCriticizedonCapitolHill”)noted
frictionbetweenGalbraithandotherUSenvoysintheregion.
64
TheWashingtonagreementreducedtheamountofBosnianterritorycontrolledbyBosnianCroatsfrom
around20percentto10percent,moreinlinewithpre-warethnicdivisions.
65
FuerthtoLake,“MeetingbetweenVicePresidentGoreandPresidentAlijaIzetbegovićofBosniaand
Herzegovina,”OfficeoftheVicePresident,April14,1993.GorereceivedIzetbegovićinWashingtonthe
dayafterIzetbegovićsignedtheVance-OwenpeaceplanattheUnitedNationsheadquartersinNewYork.
1-45
officialstoldIzetbegovićthattheUSwouldconsiderliftingthearmsembargoif
Serbsrefusedtosign.WeheldaparliamentsessioninthebesiegedcityofSarajevo
atwhichthemajorityadoptedtheVance-OwenplanafteritwassignedinAthens
[onMay3,1993]byIzetbegovićandKaradzić.Weacceptedthatplan.Itwasavery
toughdecision.Thiswasoneofthosedecisionswhenthepresidentisaskingyou,
whatismoreimportant,thepeopleorthecountry.
TheBosnianSerbsrejectedtheVance-OwenplanonMay6[atameetingof
theRepublikaSrpskaassemblyinPale].TheVance-Owenplanwasnotadream
scenario,butwhenyoucomparetheVance-OwenmapwiththeDaytonmap
BosniaafterDayton
1-46
[below],itisDisneyland.ThereisnoRepublikaSrpska,therearenoethnically
definedterritories.
IntheVance-Owenmap[seepage1-44oftranscript]thereisayellowline
representingtheDaytonpeaceagreementboundarybetweenRepublikaSrpskaand
theFederation.HadtheVance-Owenplanbeenadopted,notonlywouldthewar
havebeenstopped,butwewouldbeamorefunctioningcountrythanwearetoday.
Weacceptedtheplanbecauseweweretoldthattheinternationalcommunitywas
fullybehindit.IfKaradzićacceptedit,wewouldproceedwithpeace
implementation.IfweacceptedandtheSerbsrefused,thearmsembargowouldbe
lifted.Thatwasaclearunderstanding.Whathappenedwas:weaccepted,Karadzić
refused,andthearmsembargoremained.TheBosnianSerbswereafraidofthe
armsembargobeinglifted,buttheyknewthatthiswasafalsethreatbythe
internationalcommunity.MypointisthatwhathappenedinJuly1995wasthe
consequenceoftheinternationalcommunitynotcarryingthroughonitsthreatsand
commitments.
TOMBLANTON:CanIaskJohnShattucktospeaktoapointthatJenonnewas
makingabouttheJointActionProgramandSecretaryChristopher.Whatwas
SecretaryChristopherthinking,ifthisoccursreallyoutsideofaprocessthattheNSC
andothersknew,andmaybeLakeknew,butwhathappened?Whatwasthat
dynamiclikeinsidetheClintonadministration?
JOHNSHATTUCK:SecretaryChristopherwentonatourofEuropeancapitalsinMay
1993.66Theexpectationwasthathewouldarrivewithsomenewpoliciesandthere
wouldbeanopportunityfordiscussion.Infact,itwasasortof"listeningtour."Not
onlywastherenodialoguebuttherewasreallynotmuchspeech.Thisreflectedthe
completedisarrayinsidetheUSGovernmentwithrespecttoformulatingapolicy
implementingClinton'scampaignpromises.
Myjob[asAssistantSecretaryofStateforHumanRights]wastogather
humanrightsinformation.Wewereconstantlysidetracked.Wewouldbebroughtin
66
SeeElaineSciolino,“ChristopherFailstoWinConsensus,”NewYorkTimes,May7,1993.
1-47
fromtimetotime,andthenpushedbackwhenitwasfeltthatwhatmybureauwas
spotlightingwasnotgoingtobehelpfultothepoliticalnegotiations.Iremember
goingwithPeterGalbraithandMadeleineAlbrighttoVukovarinJanuary1994toa
massgravesite[believedtocontainthebodiesofsome200Croatpatientswhohad
disappearedfromVukovarhospitalonNovember20,1991.]Ourvisitwasseenas
toohighprofileforWashingtonsoIwasthenbasicallyputunderwrapsandnot
allowedtotravelbacktoBosniauntilJuly1995[followingtheSrebrenicamassacre].
Igivethisasanexampleofthehighdegreeofbothconfusionandhesitancyonthe
partoftheUnitedStatestodothekindofspotlightingthatneededtobedonein
ordertochangethepolicy.
JENONNEWALKER:Iwasonthe“liftandstrike”salestrip,duringthefirstweekof
May1993.WarrenChristopherhadsupportedthatpolicywithintheadministration
asopposedto“strikeonly.”Ithinkhereallybelievedinit.Hispresentationmight
haveconvincedajudgebuttherewasnopolitical“umph”toitatall.Incapitalafter
capital,lookingathisbriefingbookandnevermakingeyecontactwithanyone,he
wouldgothroughalltheotheroptionswehadconsideredandexplainwhywehad
rejectedthem.Finally,wheneveryonewassoundasleepordaydreaming,hewould
getto“liftandstrike”andexplainwhythatwastheleastbadoftheavailable
options.Idon'tunderstandwhetherhechangedhismind.Whenwegotoffthe
airplaneinLondon,ourfirststop,onSunday,May2,weweregreetedwithahuge
headlineintheSundayTimessaying,"BritainwillvetoUSplantoarmBosnian
Muslims,"beforetheconversationshadevenbegan.67Thatdidn'thelpthe
atmosphere.ItwasadisasterofAmericandiplomacy.Weneveractuallydropped
thepolicybutwedidn'tdoanythingtopushitafterthat.Itwaspartofourgradual,
muchtooslow,movementtobeingwillingtotakemoreseriousaction.
Wewerekeenlyawarethatourallieswereonthegroundtakingrisksthat
wewerenotsharing.IfwereallystooduptoSerbianaggression,their
peacekeepers,the"peaceobservers"or"violenceobservers,"wouldbeputin
67
SeeJamesAdams&AndrewGrice,“BritainwillvetoUSplantoarmBosnianMuslims,”SundayTimes
(UK),May2,1993.
1-48
seriousdangerthatwewerenotpreparedtoshare.Wewereverydeferentialto
theirviewsforalongtime.WethoughtinAugust1993thatwehadanagreementon
aseriousNATOairthreat.Thatfellapartwiththedualkeyarrangement.Thefirst
testwasinSarajevoafterthemarketplacebombinginFebruary1994whichshowed
thatthecrediblethreatofforcewouldmakeadifference.Bythespring,orearly
summerof1994,wewerewillingtoendorseapeaceplaninreturnforEuropeans’
commitmenttoseriousairstrikes.IrememberTonyLake’sworkinghardtogeta
consensusamongClinton'stopadvisers.Hekeptsayingtome,"Justtrustme,I'llget
usthere."Meanwhile,lotsofpeopleweredying.LakefinallygotClinton'sagreement
toaplanbeforesurfacingittoothermembersofthePrincipalsCommittee.
TOMBLANTON:Let'sgobacktoUNSCResolution836ofJune4,1993.68Joris
Voorhoeve,amongothers,compared836favorablywith819.Thedocuments,
however,recordseverecriticismfromtheSecretariatandahugegapbetweenthe
toughlanguageoftheresolutionandwhatwashappeningontheground.Thereisa
wonderfulexchangebetweentheSecretariatworkingpaperofMay28andaDavid
HannaycablebacktoLondonthefollowingdaythatillustratesthisdifferenceof
opinion.69Hannaycomplainsabout"thescandalouslyslantedSecretariatpaper”
thatwas“almostcertainlytheworkofTharoor.”David,youseemtobeconcerned
thattheworkingpaperisadvocatingaheavyoptionrequiringatleast15,000more
troopswhileyouarearguingfora"light"option.70Willyouexplainthisdebatefor
us?
68
AnnantoStoltenberg,“Safeareas,”UNDPKO,MSC-870,May28,1993.HannytoFCO,“MyTelno1881:
Bosnia:SafeAreasResolution,”UKMissiontotheUN,Telno1911,May29,1993.
70
TheMay28WorkingPapercoveredtheproposedsafeareasofSarajevo,Bihac,Tuzla,Goražde,
Srebrenica,andŽepa.TheSecretariatinitiallybelievedthat15,000extratroopswouldbeneededtodeter
possibleaggressionagainstthesafeareas,butlaterincreaseditsestimateto“32,000additionalground
troops.”[SeeUNSrebrenicareport,paragraph94].AJune14reportbytheUNSecretaryGeneral
[S/25939]quotedGeneralWahlgrenassayingthathewouldneed34,000additionaltroops,inadditionto
the24,000alreadyintheater,inorder“toobtaindeterrencethroughstrength.”Wahlgrenstated,
however,thatitwouldbepossibleto“startimplementing”UNSCResolution836witha“lightoption”of
around7,600moretroops,relyingprimarily“onthethreatofairaction”todeterattacksonthesafe
areas.[Seealso:UNSrebrenicareport,paragraph96].The7,600extratroopswereauthorizedbyUNSC
69
1-49
DAVIDHANNAY:ByMay1993,IandothermembersoftheSecurityCouncil
(principallyFrance,theRussianFederation,Spain,theUnitedKingdomandthe
UnitedStatesofAmerica,i.e.asignificantportion),wereoperatingonthebasisof
theJointActionProgram.Personally,IthoughttheJointActionProgramwas
anappallingidea,butyouarepaidtocarryouttheinstructionsofyourgovernment.
ThegovernmentshadsigneduptotheJointActionProgram.TheJointAction
Programsaid[inParagraph4]that“wewillworktosecureearlyadoptionofthe
newUnitedNationsSecurityCouncilResolutionnowunderdiscussion.”71The
reasonwhywereactedverynegativelytotheSecretariatpaperwasbecauseitwas
quiteclearlydesignedtofrustratethat.Ithinkhistorywillbequitekindtothe
UnitedNationsSecretariatwhentheysaid,“It'snotgoingtowork.”Butthatisnot
wherewewerethen,andthatwaswhywecouldnotaccepttheworkingpaper.
Onthedifferencebetweenthelightandtheheavyoptions.Tobehonest,the
heavyoptionwasajoke.Theheavyoptionwaswhatwecallinthejargon:"Giveme
halfamillionmenandIwillmarchtoMoscow."Absolutely,halfamillionmen,
marchtoMoscow.That'sprobablynotaverygoodidea,butOK.Thelightoption
wasarealisticallyfeasibleone.72Itwasconceivablethatwecouldget7,600more
troops.ItwasconceivablethattheycouldprotecttheSafeAreasforaperiodoftime.
Thatiswhywefavoredthatoption,alongwithalltheothersignatoriesoftheJoint
ActionProgram.
TOMBLANTON:Shashi?
SHASHITHAROOR:Thisallhappenedin"ahundredhurries,"whichwasalltoo
oftenthecaseatthistime.TheSecurityCouncilaskedforapaper.IthinkDavid,in
allfairness,wasplayingaverycomplicatedgame.Ontheonehand,hehadtoward
offdemandsfromDiegoandthenon-aligned,whowerecallingformuchmore
resolution844ofJune18,1993,butittookmorethanayeartodeploythemtoBosnia.[S/1994/1389].
Fewerthan3,000hadarrivedintheatrebyJanuary1994.[A/48/847].
71
PermanentRepresentativesofFrance,Spain,theRussianFederation,theUnitedKingdom,andthe
UnitedStates,“Jointactionprogramme,”S/25829,May24,1993.
72
S/25939,June14,1993.
1-50
explicitlypro-Bosniakaction.Ontheotherhand,therewasbackgroundpressure
fromtheAmericanstopreserveanappearanceofactionwhilemaintainingthe
viabilityofUNPROFOR.TheBritishandFrench,meanwhile,werefartoodeeply
committedonthegroundtosuddenlychangetheentirestrategyonadime.Wein
theSecretariathadtheimpossibletaskofbeingaskedtoproduceapaperatless
thantwenty-fourhours’notice.Ithinkwewentonuntil4a.m.puttingthisblessed
thingtogether.Asisprobablyapparentfromthequalityofthewriting,itwasa
productofmanyhandsandmanyheads.Icertainlybearresponsibilityforitasthe
leaderoftheteam.AsIunkindlypointedouttoDavidwhenhegotangrywithme,
themilitaryinputactuallycamefromaBritishofficer,MajorAdrianFoster,whohad
beendetailedtomefromtheBritishArmy.Thepoorfellowgotpulledout[oftheUN
Secretariat]forhiscontributiontothispaper.73
Itistruethat34,000wasanunrealisticfigure.Wehadnoexpectationofever
gettingthosenumbers.Thereasonwhywegavethosenumbers,whichcamefrom
seriousmilitaryplanners,wastolettheSecurityCouncilknowthatthiswasthe
kindofnumbertheyneededtobetalkingaboutthatiftheywantedtohaveSafe
Areasthatweredefendable.Ifnot,theyoughttoaltertheirmandateaccordingly.
Thatwasthepurposeofprovidingthemtheheavyoption.WeinDPKOcameunder
veryheavypressure,rightfromBoutros'office,toalsoprovidealightoption.We
hadnointentionofcomingupwithalightoptiononourown.Itwasdonebecauseof
politicalpressurefromkeygovernmentswholearnedearlyonthatthiswasgoingto
beaveryheavything,perhapsfromtheirownpeopleonourteam.
IhadtwopeoplewhowerefulltimeUNofficialsonmyteam.Everybodyelse
wassecondedfromgovernments:themilitarypeople,thepolice,andthewholelot.
Again,thisisnormal.IalwaysusedtojoketotheUSMissionthatIhadmorepeople
followingmyworkthanIhadtodoit.Thatwaschronicallythecase.Theycertainly
hadtheirownsourcesofinformation.Whilewewerestillputtingtogetherthis
blessedthingintwenty-fourhours,wordcamethatwehadtoproducea“light
73InanAugust15,2015emailcommunicationtotheorganizers,retiredGeneralAdrianFoster
disputedTharoor’srecollectionofevents.Hesaidhe“completed”afulltourinNewYorkanddenied
being“pulledout”byLondon.
1-51
option.”Sowecameupveryreluctantlywithalightoption.Asyoucanseefromthe
May28cable,IcouldonlysendthepapertoGeneralWahlgreninthefieldafterwe
hadsubmittedittotheCouncil.74Wehadnotime.Therewassimplynoquestionof
beingabletoconsult.Sowesentitoffandindeeditgotaveryfrostyreception.
Davidshoutedatmeafewtimes.Iflookscouldkill,Iwouldnotbeheretoday.Atthe
endofit,theCouncilwasdeterminedtogoaheadwitharesolution.
Inadditiontotheworkingpaper,wealsosentacabletoWahlgrenonJune2,
askingforhiscomments.75Atthispoint,someofthekeyquestionshavealready
comeupveryclearly.Davidtalkedaboutwhathewaspaidtodo.Weinthe
Secretariatwerepaidtoupholdourmandatesandprinciples,oneofwhichis
outlinedinparagraph3,"...aSafeAreacannotbe'safe'ifonepartywithinitremains
armedandabletoattackthoseoutsideit.Thereshouldthereforebeanobligation
fortheBHArmyalsototreattheSafeAreasassafe,thatis,todesistfromanyhostile
activitytherein,eventhoughtheCouncilresolutiondoesnotrequireittodisarmor
withdraw."76Thiswasanimpossiblecontradictiontosquaresincethenon-aligned
wantedustotakethesideoftheBosniaks.TheBritishandtheFrenchdidnot
becausetheirowntroopswereontheground.Theywantedtogivetheappearance
ofrespondingtoallthemoraloutrageontelevisionandcomingoutofWashington.
Wehadtoconcoctanoperationalmandatethatmadesenseoutofallthisand
workedontheground,whichwasimpossible.Igooninthenextparagraphtotalk
aboutthequestionofSerbcooperationwiththesearrangements.TheFrenchhad
toldus,I'mquotinghere,"...France(onbehalfofthesponsors)hasstated,in
informalconsultationsoftheSecurityCouncil,thatthedraftresolutionassumesthe
consentandco-operationofthepartiesbutthatnon-cooperationwouldinvolve
consequencesunderchapterVII."77TheassumptionhereisthattheSerbsagreeto
bebombedbyNATOiftheBosniaksshootandtheyshootback.Imean,comeon.
Obviouslythishascertainimplicationsforthemission.Iputtheonusonthe
74
75AnnantoStoltenberg/Wahlgren,“SecurityCouncilDeliberationson“safeareas,”MSC-896,June2,
1993.
76Seeparagraph3,MSC-896,op.cit.
77Seeparagraph4,MSC-896,op.cit.
1-52
Generalsbysayingthereportcalledforinparagraphtwelve[ofUNSCresolution
836]wouldhavetocomeverylargelyfromUNPROFOR.78Wewerenotgoingtosit
anddoarepetitionoftheworkingpaperexercise,havingbeenburnedbyit.We
said,“Youchaps[UNPROFORcommanders]tellushowyouwanttooperationalize
this.”Itwasnotjustpassingthebuck,itwasbeingrealistic.Theyweretheoneswho
wouldhavetoimplementitontheground.Letthemcomeupwiththeoperational
concept.Theyweren'thappy,asyoucanseefromsubsequentcontext.Thereis
anothercableonJune3[Z-703],wherewespelloutcertainspecificchallenges.79
Thentheresolutionisadopted.Sothemandatewasbecomingmoreandmore
operationallyimpossibletodefine.
Bytheway,Jenonne,theAmericanpressureonairstrikeswasnothelpful.
ProfessorEliotCohencameupwithawonderfullineaboutairpowerbeingan
“unusuallyseductiveformofmilitarystrength”inWashington.Hewrotethatair
power,“likemoderncourtship…appearstooffergratificationwithout
commitment."80ThatispreciselywhattheAmericansseemedtobewantingtodo.
Theyweregoingtobeflyingfromagreatheight,dropbombs,andflyaway,while
therestofuswouldwakeuponthegroundthenextmorningandlivewiththe
consequences.Thiswasthefundamentaldilemmathatboththetroopcontributors
andtheSecretariatweregrapplingwith.
HASANMURATOVIĆ:Inmyview,UNSCResolution836wasagoodresolution.It
providedthegroundsforcallinginairstrikes,andforNATOtoact.Itwasuptothe
decision-makerslatertodecidewhethertheywantedtostrikeornot,toprevent
attacksanddisaster.Thereisnothingintheresolutionthatsays,“Don’tactinthis
case,orthatcase.”
MICHAELDOBBS:WedonothaveGeneralWahlgrenwithusasheisnolongeralive,
butwedohavehisJune3cablereactingtowhatwashappeninginNewYork.He
78
UNSC,“Resolution836(1993),”S/RES/836,June4,1993,paragraph12.
WahlgrentoAnnan,“SecurityCouncilDeliberationson‘SafeArea’,”UNPF-HQ,Z-703,June3,1993.
80
SeeEliotA.Cohen,“TheMystiqueofU.S.AirPower”,ForeignPolicy,January/February1994,argues
thatUSmilitarystrategistsintheBalkansdrewthewrongconclusionsfromtheJanuary1991bombingof
IraqatthestartofthePersianGulfWar.
79
1-53
statesveryclearlyhisoppositiontoairstrikes.Inparagraphfive,hestates"Wehave
indicatedinourcorrespondenceoverthemonthsthatairstrikeswouldsimply
bringUNPROFORandUNHCRoperationstoanend."Inparagrapheight,hegoeson:
"Inconclusion,IdoubtifthecurrentTroopContributingNationswouldagreeto
leavetheircontingentsinUNPROFORundertheproposedmandate.Onesimply
cannotmakepeaceandwaratthesametime."81InWahlgren’sabsence,perhaps
RupertSmithcouldgiveushistakeonWahlgren’scritiqueandtheextenttowhich
heandotherssharedit.Rupert,youwerecoordinatingUKpolicyattheMinistryof
DefenseastheAssistantChiefofDefenseOperationsatthetime?
RUPERTSMITH:IwasattheMinistryofDefense,butIhadnosenseofcoordinating
anything.Itwasaveryconfusedperiodforallthereasonsthathavebeenexplained.
Idon'trememberthisdocument.Iwouldliketomakeapointabouttheforce
numbersbeingquoted,whichgoesbacktotherelationshipbetweenmilitaryadvice
andmilitaryactionandpoliticaldirection.Irememberthosenumbersbeing
bandiedabout.MajorFosterwascertainlycommunicatingbacktoLondon,asking
questionsaboutwhatwethoughtandwhatwaspossible.Thequestionwekept
askingwas:arewetodefendthisterritoryasapieceofground?Orarewetodefeat
anddestroythoseattackingthisterritory?Itcompletelyaltersthemethodandthe
numbersinvolved.
WeeventuallyweretoldbytheothersideofWhitehall[referencetothe
ForeignOffice]:youaredefendingterritory.Themomentyousaythattheseblobs
onthemaparetobedefended,yougetthesehighnumbers.Youhavetoputmenon
theground,feedthem,andsoon.Therewasnodesiretoconsidertheideaof
destroyingordefeatingtheattacker.Youarenottobeoffensiveatall.That,Ithink,
reflectsthegeneralatmosphereoftheUNforceasawhole.Iwasnotpartofthat,but
IthinkIcouldeasilyhavewrittensomethinglikeWahlgren'smemoifIwassittingin
hischairatthattime.
TOMBLANTON:DavidHarland.
81
1-54
DAVIDHARLAND:Mycommentisaveryancientonefromanhourago.On
evacuationversusethniccleansing,Ithinkthisgoestotheheartofhowthewarwas
fought.IputthisquestiontoPresidentIzetbegovićwhenIwaswritingtheUN
Srebrenicareport.IsaidthattheSerbshadaccusedhimofblockingevacuations
withUNassistancefromSrebrenicaandinSarajevoandwagingwarbyusing
civiliansasshields.Hetoldme,"Wehaveachoice,sometimes,betweenaterritory
andthepeople.Ofcourse,bothareimportant,butwewillnotallowtheBosniak
peopletobeputintoghettos."Inotherwords,thepolicywas:humanshields.The
policywastophysicallyblockpeoplefromtryingtoescapeembattledareasand
thereforemakeitharderfortheenemytoattackwithoutinflictingcivilian
casualties.
DavidHarland,center,nexttoMuhamedDurakovicandLarryHollingworth
[TurnstothedebateaboutUNSC836].Thoseofuswhowereonthe
receivingendofallthisguidance,includingtheguidancefromUNPROFOR
Headquarters,feltadeepfrustration.IwasinPaleeverydaywiththeBosnian
leadershipandwasoftenatSarajevoairportwithHasanMuratović.AsHasansays,
theSerbswerevery,veryresponsivetotheperceivedlevelofthreatcomingfrom
1-55
NATO,andlaterfromtheRapidReactionForce.Wheneveritseemedtothemthat
themandatewasnotclearenoughtoallowanyseriousthreattobeusedagainst
them,theywouldprobefurther.Itistruethattherewerepoliticalcompromises
involved[indraftingUNresolutions]anditwasuglyandmuddledandmorally
wrongandabsentinstrategy.Nevertheless,asHasansaid,thoseofusonthe
receivingendfelttherewasplentyoflanguage,particularlyinResolution836,that
wouldhaveallowedfortheapplicationofforce.Itwasfrustratingafterthese
debatestookplace[inNewYork]toreceiveguidancesayingyoushoulddoevenless
thantheresolutionsays.
ZLATKOLAGUMDŽIJA:YoumentionedWahlgren’scableofJune3,1993,inwhichhe
says“Onesimplycannotmakepeaceandwaratthesametime.”82Endofcable.I
thinkthisgoestothecoreofthemisunderstanding[overthenatureof
peacekeeping].InOctober1991,PresidentIzetbegovićmadeaveryfamouspublic
statementsaying,"Sleeppeacefully,thereisnoneedtofear,becauseittakestwoto
tango."83Actually,forwar,youneedone.Whenyouhavetwo,thereisnowar.
Someonedecidestogotowarifhefeelsheisinastrongerposition.Thatiswhen
youhaveawar.Atthesametime,youcannotmakepeace,especiallyunderChapter
VIIoftheUNCharterwithoutbeingreadytogotowar.Otherwiseyouendup
sendingalotofreligiousleadersoverthere.Thisisthefundamental
misunderstandingbetweenus.
JORISVOORHOEVE:SecurityCouncilResolution836isanexampleofclarity.It's
verygood.ItsaysthatMemberStatesmaytake“allnecessarymeasures,throughthe
useofairpower”to“supportUNPROFORintheperformanceofitsmandate.”84The
problemisnotthelightorheavyoption,butthefactthatthisresolutionwasnot
used.Therewasanenormousgapbetweenthelanguageoftheresolutionandthe
actualapplicationupuntilAugust1995.AfterthefallofSrebrenica,thisresolution
82
SeeStevenBurg&PaulShoup,EthnicConflictandInternationalIntervention:CrisisinBosniaHerzegovina,1990-93,page78.
84
83
1-56
becamethelegalbasisfortheuseofairpoweranddeterrence.Whatisoften
forgotteninthediscussionintheUnitedNationsandthememberstates,becauseof
theconfusionwetalkedabout,isthetremendousimportanceofdeterrence.Youtell
awarringparty,"Ifyoudothis,therewillbeveryseriousconsequences.Wehave
escalationdominanceandyoucannotchallengeus."Therewasnoescalation
dominancein1993forthereasonsthatJenonneWalkerandJohnShattuck
explained.TherewasconfusioninWashingtonaboutwhattodointhisterrible
situation.
AfterthefallofSrebrenica,everythingbecameclear.Airpowerwasusedina
veryadequatefashion.Iwouldliketodrawattentiontothisbecausetheuseof
deterrencewasdiscreditedaftertheendoftheColdWar.Itwasseenassomething
relatedtonuclearweapons,butitisanageoldprincipleofusingmilitarypower.
Youshowbeforehandthatiftheoppositesidegoestoofar,therewillbeveryserious
consequences.TheSerbsunderstoodthismessage.Thiswasthemessagethatwas
deliveredattheLondonConferenceonJuly21,1995.85Iwish,ofcourse,thatthis
changeofcoursehadtakenplaceseveralweeksearlier,inwhichcaseitwouldhave
savedthelivesof8,000peopleinSrebrenica.
JOHNSHATTUCK:ApartfromtheorganizersandDavidHannay,Iamtheonly
personaroundthetablewhoattendedtheRwandaconferenceayearago.86Inboth
BosniaandRwanda,youhaveaverycomplexsetofmessages,whichessentially
serveasgreenlightstoaggressors.EventsinRwandawereshapedinpartby
decisionstakeninSomalia,asaresultoftheBlackhawkDownincident[October3-4,
1993]when18USRangerslosttheirlives.87ThedecisiontowithdrawthewholeUS
forceinSomalia[inMarch1994]served,insomerespects,asagreenlightforwhat
85
SeeJohnDarnton,“AccordinLondon,”NewYorkTimes,July22,1995.TheLondonconferenceof16
countriesinvolvedintheBosniawar,includingtheUnitedStates,Britain,andFrance,threatenedthe
BosnianSerbswiththeuseof“substantialanddecisiveairpower”intheeventofanattackonthe
Goraždeandothersafeareas.NATObeganlarge-scalebombingofBosnianSerbtargetsonAugust30,two
daysaftertheshellingoftheMarkalemarketplaceinSarajevo,killing37people.
86
“InternationalDecision-MakingintheAgeofGenocide:Rwanda1990-1994,”Rapporteur’sReport,April
6,2015.
87
ColinKeatingtoWellington,“SecurityCouncil:Rwanda,”NewZealandMissiontotheUN,C04408/NYK,
May3,1994.
1-57
happenedlaterinRwanda.ThereweremanyelementstotheRwandangenocide,
butunderneathitallitwasthedangerthattheinternationalcommunitywas
essentiallysendingagreenlighttotheaggressors.Ithinkweseeasimilardynamic
inBosniawithrespecttotheseeventsin1993and1994.
Bytheway,alltheseeventsaretakingplaceinthesametimeframe.The
RwandagenocidebeganinApril1994(followingtheassassinationofRwandan
presidentJuvenalHabyarimanaonApril6).Weareinthissamepost-ColdWar
framework.Deterrenceisnolongeronthetableandnegotiationanddiscussion
appeartobethemoreappropriatetoolsfordealingwiththesecasesofsmallfire
aggressionoccurringinplaceswheretheworldisfallingapartaftertheendofthe
ColdWar.Itisnotuntillaterthatweadopttheconceptofdiplomacybackedby
force.Therecognitionthatacrediblethreatofforce,orsometimestheactualuseof
force,isnecessarytoachievediplomaticobjectivesunderpinsthewholeDayton
process.Duringthis1993-1994period,Idonotthinkthethreatofforcewas
credible.GeneralSmithhasmadethatpointveryeloquently,butIwantedtoaddthe
comparativeelement.Wearedealingwithalargergeopoliticalframework
characterizedbyfailedstates,massatrocities,andevengenocide.
Theonlywaytoengageontheseissuesistoputaspotlightonthemby
gatheringtheevidencethatisneededforpeopletounderstandwhatisgoingon.I
thoughtitwasabigmistakefortheUStosidetrackitshumanrightsreportingprior
tothehorrificeventsofJuly1995.Ourembassies,particularlytheembassyin
Croatia,certainlykeptthespotlighton[humanrightsviolations],butwithalldue
respectitwasnotsufficient.USpolicymakingwasnotunderpinnedbythedaily
reportingofwhatwasactuallyhappeningonthegroundthatwouldhavebeen
neededtomobilizepublicopinionaroundtheconceptofdiplomacybackedby
force.
DIEGOARRIA:UNSCResolution836wasoneofthemostdebated.Itwasvery
controversial.AstherepresentativeofVenezuela,Iabstainedtogetherwith
1-58
Pakistan.88Thenon-alignedgrouphadbeenthemoreenthusiasticsupportersofthe
SafeAreaconcept,butthisresolutiondidnotrespondatalltotheneedsofthe
situation.IbelievedthatwewouldhaveachievedmorebyarmingtheBosniansthan
byexpectingtheUnitedNationstodosomethingfortheBosnians.Ireadtoday
PresidentClinton’sconversationwithFrenchPresidentChirac[onJuly13,1995,
afterSrebrenicafell]inwhichheharshlycriticizestheBosniansforleaving
Srebrenicawithout“puttingupafight.”89Atthesametime,hesayswecannotarm
theBosnians.Thisexplainswhywewereagainsttheresolution.IrememberIhad
theBritishambassadorandtheFrenchambassadorinVenezuelapressingmy
ForeignMinistertoaskmetochangemyvote.Ididnotpickupthephone.Whenit
cametothevoteon836,Iabstained.
HadtheSecretariatWorkingpaperbeenadopted,weprobablywouldnot
havehadtheoutcomewedidinSrebrenica.90Thatpaperwasexactlywhatwe
wanted.IrememberenteringtheSecurityCouncilreadingthepaperandsaying,“My
god,finallywehavesomethingofsomesubstanceandimportance.”Then,allofa
sudden,itdisappeared.IthinkthatDavidHannayorJean-BernardMériméemust
havecalledBoutros-Ghaliandgothimtowithdrawthedocument,becauseit
suddenlyvanishedfromthetable.IhadalsopersonallywrittentoMadamOgata,
askinghertooutlinetherequirementsofarealSafeArea.Sheproducedadocument
alongthesamelinesastheSecretariat.Unfortunatelythiscourseofactionwasnot
adopted,whichiswhyweabstainedontheresolution.
ANDRÉERDÖS:WhenaCouncilresolutionispassedunderChapterVII,with
wordinglike"takeallnecessarymeasures,"thatwastheequivalentofthenuclear
option.Itgivesagreenlighttostrong,concreteenforcementmeasures.Wedonot
88
UNGA,“ThefallofSrebrenica,”A/54/549,November15,1999.UNSCUNSCresolution836wasadopted
onJune4,1993,by13votestonone,withabstentionsfromPakistanandVenezuela.Arriaexplainedhis
abstentionbypointingtoalackof“necessarymeansandresources”forimplementingtheresolutionand
lackofclarityabouttheuseofforce.Hesaidthatuntilthesequestionsweresatisfactorilyanswered“the
safeareaswouldnotbesafeatall.”
89
AnthonyGardner&AlexanderVershbow,“TelconwithFrenchPresidentJacquesChirac,”TheWhite
House,July13,1995.
90
1-59
alwayshavethislanguageinCouncilresolutions.Thefactthatwedidnotfollowup
onthislanguageunderminedtheimageoftheUnitedNations.
Iwasrepresentinganon-permanentmembercountry.Wewerenotevena
non-alignedcountry.Wehadjustexperiencedatransitiontowardsdemocracy,and
wereknockingonthedoorsoftheEuropeanUnionandNATO.Wewerelookingat
theseguysasourfriendsandfutureallies.Wewereinaverydifficultsituation
becauseweweretheonlycountryontheCouncil[in1993]thatreallyunderstood
Yugoslavia.LookatthemapandyouwillseehowfarHungaryisfromBosnia.We
wereveryclosetotheAustrianposition,whowerealsoontheCouncilin1992,as
partofthewesterngroup.OtherCouncilmembersreferredusas“theHapsburgs.”It
wasveryfunny.WecouldhaveimaginedtheemperorFranzJosefsaying,“Mysons,
thisiswonderful,butwhydoyouneedtwoambassadors?“
IwasfrustratedbythelackofknowledgeaboutYugoslavia,notsomuchon
thepartofVenezuela,CapeVerdeorMorocco,butonthepartofthepermanent
members.Oneofthepermanentrepresentativestoldmeinaprivateconversation
thatBosniawasa“Titoistinvention.”Another,ratherdramaticexample:In2000,
Newsweekmagazinepublishedachronologyofimportant20thcenturyevents.The
entryfor1914wasasfollows:"YugoslavarchdukeFranzFerdinandassassinatedin
Sarajevo."WeweretheonlycountryontheCouncil—Isaythisinallmodesty—who
knewwhatBosniawas,geographicallyandhistorically.91
WhentheAustro-HungarianmonarchyoccupiedandlaterannexedBosnia,it
waspartofthemonarchy.TherewerethreegovernorgeneralsinBosnia,twoof
whomwereHungarians.WhenIwenttoSrebrenicainApril1993[aspartofthe
Arriadelegation],therewasanimmediatereactionfromtherefugeeswhenIsaidI
wasfromHungary.TheyknewwhatHungarywas.Forme,itwasagiftoflifethat
91
BosniaandHerzegovinabecameaProtectorateofAustria-HungaryattheCongressofBerlininJuly
1878followingtheRusso-Turkishwar.IthadpreviouslybeenunderOttomanruleformorethan300
years,since1463,andremainedtechnicallyundertheadministrationoftheSultan.Austria-Hungary
annexedtheterritoryoutrightin1908,enragingpan-Slavicnationalists.AfterAustria-Hungary’sdefeatin
WorldWarI,BosniajoinedtheSouthSlavKingdomofSerbs,Croats,andSlovenes,whichwaslaternamed
Yugoslavia.AfterthevictoryofMarshalTito’sCommunistPartisansinWorldWarII,Bosniaand
HerzegovinabecameoneofsixrepublicsofSocialistFederalRepublicofYugoslavia.
1-60
wehappenedtobeontheSecurityCouncilwhenwehadthisnumberoneissueof
Yugoslaviaaroundournecks.
Thewholeissueofforciblepopulationtransfers,andtheestablishmentof
ethnicallypurehomogeneouscountries,isalethaloneforcentralandEastern
Europeeventoday,despitethefactthattwodecadeshavepassedsincethese
events.ItisapoisonousPandora’sbox.Wewerefollowingwhatwashappeningand
wereafraidoftheimplications,whichwentwaybeyondtheunfortunatecountryof
BosniatotheentireareafromtheBalticstotheMediterranean.Wecommitteda
graveerrorinnottakingtheappropriatepreventivemeasures,withthenecessary
mandatesandfinancialresources.
Atthesametime,wewerenotabigplayer.Wewerenotapermanent
memberoftheSecurityCouncil,andhadnobluehelmetsontheground,unlikethe
British,theFrench,andothers.Wedidn'twanttogointoaneighboringcountry.
Thisdidnotpreventusfromexpressingourcriticismsoutloudastothe
mismanagementoftheconflict.Wewerenotalwaysprivytothebehindthedoor
consultations.
ObradKesic,right,withDavidRohde
1-61
OBRADKESIC:Somebodymentionedtheeffectivenessofthethreatofairstrikeson
theSerbleadershipinPale.Aswitheveryissuethatwearediscussing,thisisvery
complex.Itplayedoutindifferentwayswiththepoliticalleadershipandthe
militaryleadership.Thepoliticalleadershipwasconvincedthatthewarwouldend
throughnegotiations.Theythoughtthatany[foreign]interventionwouldupset
whattheysawasprogresstowardsasettlementtotheconflict.Asettlementof
courseinlinewithwhattheyweretryingtoachieve.
Themilitaryleadership,ontheotherhand,sawpossibleairstrikesasa
threattotheirabilitytoconductthewarsuccessfully.Theywouldtellthepolitical
leadership,“Yourindecisivenessisthreateningourtroopsandourabilitytohold
thisterritory.Weneedtotakeaction.”Thisculminateswhenthemilitary,andRatko
Mladić,askforadeclarationofwar.Theytriedtodothatseveraltimes.Thepolitical
leadershipalwaysturnedthemdown.
WespeculateabouttheBosnianarmysuccessfullylaunchingmilitary
operations[asaconsequenceofa“liftandstrike”policy],butthatisnotnecessarily
thecase.Thereisadisconnectbetweenadecisiontoarmoneofthepartiesand
theirabilitytousetheweapons.Firstofall,youwouldhaveupsethumanitarian
operations:youwouldnotbefeedingpeople.Second,theothersideisnotgoingto
passivelysitandwatchtheirenemiesbeingarmed.Suchastepwouldhaveforced
theRepublikaSrpskaleadershiptotakedecisivemilitaryaction.Itwouldhavealso
putpressureonSerbiatotakeactionaswell.“Liftandstrike”wasalittlebitofared
herring.Intheendtheonlydecisivechangetothemilitarybalanceofpowerwas
directinterventionbyNATOonthesideoftheBosnians.Nothingshortofthatwould
havechangedthemilitarybalance.Itcouldactuallyhaveledtosomethingtotally
differentthanpeoplehereareassuming.
CARLBILDT:IwasPrimeMinisterofSwedenin1993.Swedenwasnotheavily
involvedinthepoliticsofthewarinYugoslavia,butweweredeeplyaffected.We
tookroughly3,000refugeesaweekattheheightofthewar,roughlytheperiodthat
1-62
wearespeakingaboutatthemoment.92Wehadadeepinterestinsavingpeople
downtherebecauseweknewthatwewouldhavetohelpthemelsewhere.Itwasus
andtheAustriansandtheSwiss,andtosomeextenttheGermans,thatborethe
bruntoftherefugeeinflux.Thatwasoneofthereasonswhywedecidedtocommita
mechanizedbattalion.93
WehadatraditionofUNpeacekeeping,butwehadnotbeeninsucha
complicatedsituationsincetheCongo.Wesentinamechanizedbattaliontogether
withtheDanesandNorwegians,includingLeopardtanks,whichwasvery
controversialatthetime.WeendedupinthemiddleoftheCroat-Muslimfight[in
centralBosnia]theautumnof1993.Wewereappalledbytheabsenceofany
politicalstrategy,butwefeltahumanitarianimperativedriventoacertainextentby
pressurehometodowhateverwecouldabouttherefugeesituation.
TherehassubsequentlybeenadiscussioninSweden:didwedoanygood?I
thinkwedidanawfulamountofgoodinthesensethatwesaved"x"numberof
people.Whetherwecontributedtoapoliticalsolutionisdebatablebecausethatwas
wellaboveus.Welostlivesdownthereandsavedquitealotofpeople.Wehelpedto
stabilizeTuzlaregionforthedurationofthewar.
PETERGALBRAITH:WhatObraddescribedismoreorlessmyunderstandingof
whatactuallyhappened.Bythesummerof1995,thebalanceofpowerwasshifting.
AllowingarmstogettoBosniaviaCroatiawasabetteroptionthanhavingtheUS
unilaterallylifttheembargo.IftheUShaditselfliftedtheembargoUNPROFOR
wouldhavewithdrawn.InsteadofAmericanarms,theBosniansgotRussian
weapons,whichwereweaponstheyalreadyknewhowtouse.WhiletheRussian
governmentopposedliftingthearmsembargo,thefreemarketsystemmade
RussianweaponsreadilyavailabletoBosnians.However,BosnianSerbssawtheUS
Congressmovingtowardliftingthearmsembargo.Itwasatthatpointthatthey
decidedtheyneededcleanuptheirinternallines,eliminatetheenclaves,Srebrenica,
92
See“Generosityof‘BigHearted’DanesisTestedbyInfluxofRefugees,”ChristianScienceMonitor,May
18,1993.
93
Boutros-Ghali,“ReportoftheSecretary-GeneralPursuanttoResolution871(1993),”S/1994/300,
March16,1994,page21.
1-63
Žepa,GoraždeandBihać.Obradisrightthatthewaywarendedwasthroughdirect
militaryintervention,butitwasinterventionbyCroatia,notbyNATO.
DAVIDHANNAY:BeforeweendthediscussionofUNSC836,Iwantedtoecho
MinisterMuratovićinsayingthatitwasverycomprehensive.Itprovidedthelegal
basisforBoutros-GhalitoaskNATOtoissueasuccessfulultimatumoverSarajevoin
February1994.ItwasalsothebasisforthemilitaryactionagainsttheBosnian
SerbsinAugustandSeptember1995afterSrebrenicafell.Therewasneveranew
mandate.Thereneverneededtobeanewmandate.The836mandatecoveredboth
thosemilitaryoptions.Therealquestionisnotwhatwaswrongwiththe836
mandatebutwhythemandatewasnotappliedmoreforcefullyandeffectively.
Therewasnothingwrongwiththemandate.
[EndofSession1]
1-64

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