LRRP Conference 1968 Part 1

Transcription

14I
LIBRARY
COCEC FT ORO CALIF
LONG RANGE,
PATROL.
..,.
SFP ? (1968
13504
No., _ _ _ __
/
AD
CONFERENCE;
S'U
ARY
CGUSACD1J,_1 0 AUG 1968
BY
SUBJECT TO GENERAL
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED AT TWO
YEAR· INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED ON 31 DECEMBER
I9.
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.HEADQUARTERS. UNITED SUITES ARMY VIETNAM
APO SAN FRANCISCO 1163715
AVHGB-P
SUBJECT: USARV Long Range Patrol Conference
SEE DISTRIBUTION
1. A USARV conference on Long Range Patrolling was held at the MACV
Recondo School, Nha Trang, 9 !lnd 10 August 1968. The purpose of the
conference was to exchange ideas and lessons learned in order to improve
the tactics, techniques and utilization of Long Range Patrols throughout
the command.
2. Designated units presented prepared briefings, each of which was
followed by a question and answer period. A summary of the briefings
to include main points brought out during the question and answer periods
is appended.
FOR THE COMMANDER:
3 Incls
1. List of Attendees (U)
2. Agenda (U)
3. Summary of Briefings (C)
..............
FRANK H. LINNELL
Brigadier General, US Army
Acting Chief of Staff
Regraded UNCLASSIFIED when
separated from CLASSIFIED
.iJlclosure
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SUBJECT: USARV Long Range Patrol Conference
DISTRIB UTION:
COMUSMACV (10)
CG, I FFORCEV (10)
CG, II FFORCEV (10)
CG, XXIV Corps V (5)
CG, III MAF (5)
SA, IV Corps (5)
CG, 1st Inf Div (16)
CG, 1st Cay Div (AM) (16)
CG, 4th Inf Div (16)
CG, 9th lnf Div (16)
CG, America1 Div (16)
CG, 25th Inf Div (16)
CG, lOlst Abn Div (AM) (16)
CG, 1st MAR Div (5)
CG, 3rd MAR Div (5)
CG, 1st Bde, 5th Mech Div (7)
CG, 3rd Bde, 82nd Abn Div (7)
CG, 173rd Abn Bde (7)
CG, 199th Lt lnf Bde (Sep) (7)
CO, 5th SFG (16)
CO, 11th ACR (5)
CO, 2nd SAS SQN (Aust) (5)
USARV Gl (2)
USARV G2 (5)
USARV G3 (5)
USARV G4 (5)
USARV C-E (5)
ACTIV (5)
CDC LNO (5)
USARV Science Advisor (5)
EUSA 02 (5)
ECOM Rep (2)
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Roster of Attendees
USAR V Long Range Patrol Conference
9 - 10 August 1968
LTG William R. Peers
COL Charles W. Allen
COL Harold R. Aaron
COL Lloyd W. Brown
LTC Arthur
Winn
LTC Alfred W. Matthews
LTC Donald L. Green
MAJ James S. Hanke
MAJ Donald A. Mattson
MAJ Robert L. Stevens
MAJ Robert G. Lunday
MAJ Charles W. Judge
MAJ William O'Connor
MAJ William A. Suhanin
MAJ John F. Pipia
MAJ Paul F. Keefe
MAJ Thomas A. Koentop
MAJ Robert H. Grassi
MAJ Brian Wade
MAJ T. A. Simcox
MAJ John H. Dorf
MAJ Randolph E. Sahle
CPT Joseph S. Parker
CPT Joseph K. Kukea
CPT Frank L •. Alverson
CPT Raymond C. Hinde
CPT John B. Hendricks
CPT Carl R. Ariola
CPT Richard M. Stacy
CPT Reuben H. Siverling
CPT Robert Yearout
CPT Ralph C. Clarke
CPT Ruben D. Quinones
CPT Raymond C. Dawson
CPT J. Buczacki
CPT Richard W. Jordan
CG,IFFORCEV
ACofS, GZ, USAR V
CO, 5th SFG (Abn)
Ch, Intel Ops Div, JZ MACV
Chief, P&tP Div, GZ USARV
Ch, Programs Br, P&tP Div, GZ USARV
CDC Liaison Officer to I FFORCEV
Programs Br, P&tP Div, GZ USARV
Ground Recon Off FAB, JZ MACV
Aut Comdt, Recondo School
CO, 36th MsFC
CO, ZOth MSFC
Co E, .ZOth In! (LRP), I FFORCEV
Hq, I FFORCEV
GZ, 4th Inf Div
GZ, Hq I FFORCEV
GZ, Hq II FFORCEV
G3, Hq 11 FFORG:EV
2 SAS SQN (Aust)
Co C, 5th SFG (Abn)
G2, America1 Div
Aero Scout Co, America1 Div
Co F, 20th Inf (LRP), I FFORCEV
Co E. 5Znd Inf (LRP). 1st Cav Div (AM)
Hq Trp, 1/9 Cav. 1st Cav Div (AM)
AATTV - II Corps Mike Force (Aust)
1st Recon Bn, 1st Mar Div (USMC)
3rd Recon Bn, 3rd M;ar Div (USMC)
III MAF, USMC
Co, 58th Inf (LRP), 4th Inf Div
GZ Ops. 9th Inf Div
Co E. 51st Inf (LRP). Americal Div
Hq 25th Inf Div
Co F, 50th Inf (LRP). 25th Inf Div
74th Inf Det (LRP), 173rd Abn Bde
.20th MSFC
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Roster of Attendees
CPT Lawrence Dover
CPT James Leidy
CPT William C. Graham
lLT Albert J. Snyder
lLT William E. Jonea
lLT George Davis
lLT Owen D. Williams
lLT J. E. Marshall
CW2 Ashley Urquhart
Mr. W. G. Nance
Mr. William Marroletti
MSG Paul Tracy
SFC John Fernandez
SFC Jason Woodworth
SFC Darol Walker
SFC George W. Hunt
SSG Roy H.Powell. Jr.
SSG Gordon W. Dewey
MACV Recondo School
MACV Recondo School
MACV Recondo School
Co F. 51st Inf (LRP). II FFORCEV
HHC. 3/82 LRP Platoon
G2. XXIV Corps V
Co F. 58th Inf (LRP). lOlst Abn biv (AM)
Co E. 50thInf (LRP). 9th In! Div
20th MSFC
MACSA
USAR V Science Advisor
MACV Recondo School
MACV Recondo School
MACV Recondo School
Co F. 58th Inf (LRP); lOlst Abn Div (AM)
FOB /12. CirC Det
HHC. 3/82 LRP Platoon
HHC. 3/82 S·2
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AGENDA
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USARV Long Range Patrol Conference
9 - 10 August 1968
1.
9 August 1968
TIME
SPEAKER
UNIT
0900-0930
. LTG Peers
0930-0945
COL Aaron
CO, 5th SFG (Abn)
0945-1015
MAJ Stevens
MACV Recondo School
1015-1030
BREAK
1030-1045
MAJ Keene
IFFORCEV
1045-1l15
MAJ Koentop, LT Snyder
11 FFORCEV
1115-1130
MAJ Wade
2 SAS SQN (Aust)
1130-1330
LUNCH
1330-1345
CPT Kukea
1st .Cav Div (AM)
1345-1400
MAJ Pipia
4th Inf Div
1400-1415
CPT Yearout, LT Marshall
9th Inf Div
1415-1430
CPT Clark
America1 Div
1430-1445
CPT Dawson
25th Inf Div
1445-1500
BREAK
1500-1515
LT Williams
101st Abn Div (AM)
1515 -1530
CPT Buczacki
173rd Abn Bde
1530-1545
MAJ Lunday
36th MSFC
1545-1615
CPT Stacy. CPT Hendricks
111 MAF. USMC
CG,IFFORCEV
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• Agenda
)615-1630
MAJ Hanke
G2 USARV
1630-1645
MAJ Mattson
J2 MACV
1645-1700
MAJ Hanke
G2 USARV
2.
10 August 1968
TIME
SUBJECT
SPEAKER
UNIT
0800-0830
Recondo School Graduation
COL Allen
G2 USARV
MAJ Stevens
Recondo School
LTC Matthews
G2 USARV
0830-0845
Organize into Discussion
Groups
0945-1000
BREAK
1000-1015
Air Assets
MAJ Dod
Americal Div
1015-1030
MTOE Changes
MAJ 0' Connor
I FFORCEV
1030-1045
Reduction in Size of LRP
Units
CPT Clark
Americal Div
1045-1100
Training Requirements for
New Members
MAJ Lunday
36th MSFC
1l00-1ll5
Employment
MAJ Stevens
Recondo School
11l5-ll30
Summary
LTC Matthews
G2 USARV
1130-1140
Send Off
COL Allen
G2 USARV
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PRESENTATION OF LTG PEERS
Rather than talk of high level planning and coordinations of LRPs I will
talk basically about what I consider the fundamentals of the Long Range
Reconnaissance Patrol Program. My remarks are based on my experience
during World War II and on my experience here in Vietnam with the
4th Infantry Division, The first thing that you must look at is the people
that make up the overall program, that make up the individual Long Range
Patrols. In my judgment, not every soldier, not every combat soldier
is qualified for LRP duties for several reasons.
The first reason is that an individual must be qualified both physically
and psychologically. I would insist upon this. Physically, because LRP
duties are very, very arduous and you never know when you are going to
have to cover 10 to 15 kilometers on the ground in very short order. You must
have the kind of people that are capable of doing this. I see too many of
what I would call fat people in the LRPs, and I know very well that they cannot
do this. If you think about it, this may be one of the reasonswhy on many
occasions, LRPs get into difficulty and want to get extracted. Instead of
evading they want to extract.
The psychological qualifications to be a member of a LRP are extremely
difficult. You need somebody out there who has nerves
of steel, who can
stay in there along the side of a trail, can sit there and watch that trail with
a large enemy formation going by and not have the slightest inclination to
stand up and fire a rifle or even move. He goes out to do a specific job. To
do this, he has to be qualified mentally and physically. I also think from
my own point of view that the size of an individual is a factor to consider.
I've maintained and I will still maintain that a LRP member should not be a
big individual.
Why? In the first place, if he is operating properly he is operating in the
bush. You just think about getting a 220 or 240 pound monster out there
charging around and pushing his way through the bush with about an 80 pound
pack. He probably would have an 80 pound pack because he would have to
take that much food along to feed himself. So you get all this pushing and
pulling going on, and he makes himself known, which is exactly what you
don't want.
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Presentation of LTG Peers
Furthermore, in a situation like this, I don't think that the big fellow has
the endurance to do the job. Stop to think about how many big people you find
that are long distance runners in this category? You don't find any. Your
big men do the spurt jobs like playing football. Well, I can tell you being
a LRP member is not playing football. It might be advantageous to weigh
250 pounds to be a shot-putter but we are not putting the shot in this LRP
business. In my opinion, you need somebody small who can get around
quietly through the jungle unobserved and who has the endurance to do the job.
Those are my views. You don't have to agree with them, but I've seen this
go on for quite a time. When I say size, I've seen some six footers who have
been some real good LRPs, but they don't have excess fat hanging on them.
Of the six footers, the best ones weigh about 150 to 155 pounds. Generally
speaking, I think you will find that many of these are the old Kentucky boys
that know the woods.
I would like to mention just briefly what I consider the number of people
that should compose a LRP. I think the first thing you have to do is figure
out what this LRP is going out to do. If the LRP is going on a surveillance
miss ion, the job can actually be done by one man. Perhaps he is going to
have to communicate, so it might be advisable to have a second man. Frankly,
when I was in Burma the best patrols that I had consisted of two people.
Being soldiers, our people are accustomed to be a little more gregarious,
so I think that four or five people, a maximum of six, should make up a LRP.
I would try to hold it down to something less than that if it were at all possible,
depending upon the individuals making up the team. There is nothing magic
about saying a team is six people. A team depends on the capability of its
members and it should be tailored that way, for each trip, each mission.
Suppose the team runs into a large enemy formation. They are supposed to
be trained in evasion, and they should be able to evade. Furthermore, they
shouldn't be running into a large enemy formation. A large enemy formation
is going to be corning down the trail. Very seldom will the VC or the NVA,
the NVA in particular, beat their way through the jungle. They use trails that
are already established. Our LRPs shouldn't be operating on the trails. They
should be operating out in the jungle away from the trail where they can
observe the trail, and they should not encounter these VC/NVA formations.
If a unit is going out on ambush or a hunter /killer type of operation, it should
be small, because the LRP is not going to go out and try to ambush a battalion.
They are going to ambush the enemy's small recon units. The object is to hit
them and move out of the area rapidly.
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In this regard, I think the most important thing on a LRP is the actual
integrity of the team itself. Much of this depends upon the leaders you
have, the working leaders who know the capabilities of every single man
on that team. The leader knows their strengths and he knows their
weaknesses. Every man on that team has to rely on every other man of
that team so that one thing you never want to do is to take out a weak man
or one that is questionable. Why? Because you are endangering the rest
of the team. Remember that any time you add another man to that team, the
greater your chances are of being discovered. If you have anybody that has
a tendency to smoke, to talk, and to. do these things which would cause the
team to be discovered, this is the individual you better leave home, and get
him out of the program because he's not fit for this kind of work. I would
say that you would have to be brutal in this. I would as soon have a few
really well qualified LRPs than to say I had a LRP program just because I
had large groups of people.
I have found here in this environment that it is very advantageous to utilize
one or two indigenous personnel with each of the LRP teams. The reason
for this is that they are natives of these areas and know the patterns, the
markings, the life within the jungle. They can see and hear things that the
ordinary American ear or eye is not accustomed to seeing or hearing. They
have proved most satisfactory.
On the matter of equipment: It is my view that most of our LRPs go in too
heavy. They've got every thing but the kitchen sink hung on them. The
mission that these people have to perform should determine the equipment
that they take along. There are a few basic items and anything beyond that
is pure impedimenta. First is the man himself: of course, he must take
along food, but he should not have to take along water. In dry areas during
certain seasons; maybe yes, because it may be a tremendous inconvenience
and dangerous to go back and forth to a water hole. So he should take along
food, possibly water. He needs his weapon. He needs ammunition, and he
perhaps needs a poncho. That's all he needs to perform his mis sion. But if
you look at some of these LRPs, they have everything that you can possibly
imagine. They look like a dime store when they get all the stuff hung on them,
and then they slip a 70 or 80 pound pack on their back. You would think they
want to eat in the Waldorf Astoria because of the amount of food they take
along with thenl. Well you can't do it. There are certain items on these
special missions that you must have. In our environment we operate with
the radio, so a radio has to go along. If they are going out on a surveillance
mission, it would be ".dvantageous to take along a pair of binoculars.
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Pr e s entation of
I would advocate that in
of taking additional people, take claymores.
Why? Your people in themselves provide a possible warning system for
the enemy by talking, smoking, banging equipment and this and that among
other things. But the claymore doesn't make a bit of noise. One of the
most effective ambushes you can have is one man with about six claymores.
Let him take care of the enemy columns. I would recommend to all of you
that you cut down to the minimum what these men will take to the field.
Don't let them take any extraneous material along with them. Sure it would
be a lot nicer to have all these things, but it will slow them down in the
jungle.
Now I would like to mention just a few things on operations. Even in II Corps
where I think we have some pretty good LRPs, I read reports every day that
say a LRP on a surveillance mission was discovered. Well, I maintain that
a LRP on a surveillance mission that is discovered is not doing its job
properly. The individual member should not be in a position or location where
he can be discovered. He's done something wrong. He has walked up a
trail like a big bird or left his foot marks on the trail, or he's done something to cause the enemy to suspect his presence. He may have fired at the
enemy. But a LRP should not be discovered if it is on a surveillance mission.
Another point has to do with extractions. I see this all the time too, but I
must say that we are reversing the trend. That is, every time a LRP sees
an enemy or knocks off one enemy, they want to be extracted. Well, I don't
believe in this. The theory seems to be that they are compromised. A
LRP is not compromised if it's hidden properly and observing. The enemy
is not supposed to see it. On the other hand, if there are one or two enemy
walking down the trail, the LRP should be able to ambush them properly.
There should not be anybody else to bother the LRP in the immediate area, and
it is not necessarily compromised. If it does run across a larger group,
instead of having that LRP extracted, I personally believe in building upon
it. That is, putting in a reaction force.
The most difficult thing in all of South Vietnam is to find the enemy. We've
got to find him, then we have to fix him, then we have to defeat him. But
the most important job is finding him. If the LRPs get out there and find
somebody and then we extract them, this isn't doing us one bit of good. If
we can find him and build on it so we can fix him and then defeat him, we'll
be doing our job that much better. So you can write it down for me, that I
am definitely opposed to all this extraction business that goes on.
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Part of the LRP business when they get to what I call the hostile or
hunter /killer business is the ambush. I tell you that I am a little disenchanted
with the way I see some people conduct ambushes. Going out and digging
foxholes along side of a trail, debris all around the place, sometimes putting
the ambush in the same place it has been day after day. Even when they do
get an ambush put in properly, when they go in after dark, go into position
where they can cover areas with fire and get proper cover, they'll open
fire at a 100 or 200 yards. That is no ambush. All you are doing is scaring
him.
Another thing I've seen happen is one or two people come down the trail and
instead of letting the enemy come into the killing zone, the LRP calls artillery
on them. How stupid can you get? All this means to me is that we've got
a lot of scared people out there who should never have been in this business.
Those are the kind of people you want to eliminate. This is what I mean by
psychologically tough, to be able to hang in there and hold them until you do
get the enemy in the kill zone and get all of them in there so no one comes
out alive. Then you will have some successful ambushes. But you cannot do
it when you get one yokel that fires or rattles his gear or puffs on a cigarette.
You might as well have stayed at home. We have to teach our people how to
set up an ambush properly and when to set it up.
Looking at it from a commander's point of view; my point of view as
Commander of I Field ForceV or as a division commander or as a brigade
commander, the LRPs are expensive and don't forget it. Why are they
expensive? You want to remember that you are dealing with select people.
Where do you get select people? You get them from the units and when you
take 200 select people from the combat elements of an infantry division, you
have taken 200 potential fire team and squad leaders. Believe me, that hurts
a division. So that is one item of expense, and it's a critical one.
The other item of expense is helicopter support. You must have helicopters
to put these people in, not only slicks but you also need gunships. In the
event some of these people do get into serious difficulty and need gunship
support, or if extraction becomes absolutely necessary, the slicks and the
gunships that help get them out or that lift your reaction force must be
available. Any time you get about five or six LRPs out you have to keep
about two gunships, sometimes four gunships depending upon the situation,
and two to four slicks setting aside that you cannot use for anything else. So
helicopter support is another item of expense. In I and II CTZs it is a very
critical item because we don't have enough helicopters to do the things we
have to do. So we have to budget them very closely and very carefully.
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Remember that anything you give to the LRPs, you are taking away from
someone else. Therefore, you want the best people you can get your hands
on, you want to have people you know can do the job; you want to make sure
that they are being used properly and efficiently, or you are costing the
unit and the government unnecessarily. This is above and beyond the time
that is involved in the planning, the development, the training and the other
things that go into making up a LRP program.
Some of the things that I have indicated, you might think are on the negative
side. This is not correct, because if there is anybody in this theater who
believes in the LRPs, I think you are looking at him. I do believe in them,
but I insist that they be the proper people, and they be operated properly.
In 1967, before we had any form of surveillance unit such as the people
sniffer and the Air Cav with the scout unit, every major battle that the
4th Infantry Division got itself into was initiated by the action of a LRP.
Every single one of them. That include the battle of Dak To for the LRPs
completely uncovered the enemy movement. We knew exactly where he was
coming from through our LRP action. So, I am a great believer in LRPs
but I am also insistent that they be the proper people, they be organized
properly and that they be utilized properly.
We should try to select these proper people, qualified people or those who
can be developed into qualified people. And then they can become precious
assets to you. You have to handle them and use them properly. In the same
sense, you must have a really well qualified individual to run your LRP
platoon or your LRP company. I've seen too many cases where it's a case
of "old Joe" can run this. When you get down to it, checking the qualifications,
"old Joe" doesn't have too much. "Old Joe" might be a fine officer, but he
doesn't have too much background. He may develop into something six or eight
months from now, but you need someone right now who can operate this kind
of thing. As a consequence, you must take, whether you want to or not, the
best officer you have to run this program. He must be qualified for this
particular job, not only a good officer, but he must have the stuff to run this
particular kind of job. He should have had this kind of training and operated
on some of these patrols. He is a key individual, and you must be extremely
careful in selecting him.
The people above him at brigade and at division level must also understand
this whole business. It isn't something you get by osmosis; you have to make
a business of it. Study Long Hange Patrolling and go into detail. Most of
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our commanders have not had the background and experience. They must
be encouraged to learn and understand the limitations' and capabilities of
LRPs, how and under what conditions they operate. This includes the brigade
commander and the entire brigade staff because if you think about it, you're
talking about personnel, you're talking about intelligence, you're talking
about operations and you're tal'.<hg about supply. So all those people are
intimately involved.
The same thing is true at division level. In II CTZ we think so highly of
the capabilities of LRPs that we are doing everything within our power to
develop a comparable capability within the ARVN organization. I am sure
you know that in a recent change by JGS each of the AR VN divisions is
authorized six LRP teams, each of the regiments is authorized six LRP teams,
and each of the battalions is authorized three LRP teams. We are training
people for the 22nd and 23rd Divisions and the 24th Special Tactical Zone.
We are about half way through the program. In some cases we are down to
the battalion level. Here we are not going to train them as LRPs. We are
going to train them in what we call MRPs. Instead of being Long Range
patrols, they will be Medium Range Patrols, so they do not have to operate
with PRC-25s. If they need a radio, they can get along with an AN/PRC-lO.
I am sure that many of them can get along without a radio. We are just about
at the point where we will be revising our program to accommodate this level
of per sonnel.
We even have gone one step further in some areas, and we will expand later.
In two or three of the provinces we have LRPs that are training with the
Regional Force and Popular Force. Some of them are also serving on our
US teams, and having had this experience, they will go back and develop
more within the RF and PF. I would expect these would not be the Long
Range type either, but will be short range. I expect that we will develop
some highly effective personnel in this sort of business.
Gentlemen, I am very appreciative of this opportunity to address you while
you are in this conference and are exchanging ideas. I think it is through
these conferences that we can really improve the operation of what I call a
very valuable source of information, and a unit with high potential of
inflicting severe damage upon the enemy through ambushes. Thank you
very much.
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PRESENTA TION OF COL AARON
Gentlemen, I am a great believer in LRP and reconnaissance techniques.
Our main focus right now is to get prisoners to find out just where the
enemy base areas and supply routes are located. I like to look on the 5th
Special Forces Group participation as being a strategic reconnaissance
screen with the bigger elements of the Free World Forces finding Charlie
and bringing him back. We provide the direction from which he may be
coming and perhaps the time. So in the capacity as Commanding Officer,
5th SFG. I'm very much interested in reconnaissance.
As the Commandant of the MACV Recondo School, I must confess to you
that I have been perturbed ever since I have been here about the caliber
of personnel we have been getting. As you know, we send down a report
on each class as to how many come, how many are graduating, and why
the others didn't make it. I've already talked to General Mildren about
this. I am perturbed by the large number that are washed out of this school
because of academics. If I were a division commander. a recipient of a
message which reports those who fail the course - and 60 percent of the
input fail this courSe - I would begin to wonder what the story was.
You consistently will find that some units will send six students who will
be very good and all six will graduate. Other divisions or separate brigades
will send four to six and be lucky to end up with one graduating. We looked
into this. Why do we have such a ratio?
The reason is because of improper selection, which bears out exactly what
General Peers said. Fir st, they are physically unfit to do the jOb. The
second thing is attitude and performance. You take a man out of the pipeline
and as soon as he arrives at Cam Ranh Bay he goes to your replacement
company. You say, okay, you go to the Recondo School and fill the quota.
He may be a truck driver. He doesn't have any desire to be a LRP. As
General Peers said, ·He doesn't have those nerves
of steel.
He has
had no experience in-country and doesn't even know what Charlie is like. He
probably has a healthy respect for him.
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Presentation of Col
Right now this school is putting out about 60 percent of the input and I
think it should reach 95 percent without any difficulty. When you go back to
your unit the one thing I wruld like to get your support on is an increased
participation by those people responsible for reconnaissance in the selection
of Recondo School personnel. Ta.ke a look at it and see how effective you
are, what you put in, what you get back and what your percentage is.
I am also interested in the reconnaissance aspect for another reason. And
this is more from a theoretical standpoint. You know since World War II
reconnaissance measures to find potential enemy and determine his
activities have mac.e a quantum jump. Our expanding technology has given
us the employment of satellites for reconnaissance, specially designed
aircraft, sophisticated infrared techniques and many others. While these
are important, the man on the ground, well trained and alert, still remains
an important element in our reconnaissance structure. Only he can go places
where the infrared or the aerial camera cannot go.
Between this man and our sophisticated array of reconnaissance technology,
there continues to be a gap. A recon gap if you wish to call it. This gap
includes doctrine to match the technology in a broader sense, but also
doctrine which is the synthesis of our experience in this war. Despite our
experience, the debate continues as to the best LRP organization and where
it should be located in the field army. One consideration, under study at
Ft. Bragg, is the establishment of two LRP battalions in a new Special
Forces group organization.
Without a doubt, you people represent the most advanced thinking in long
range patrolling techniques that has ever been gathered under one roof.
Your combined and integrated efforts here should provide a focus on our
manifold problems. For example, why is it that we have been engaged in
reconnaissance for over three to four years in this country and you still
find that people going on visual reconnaissance for landing zones still feel they
have to hover over an LZ for 45 minutes. Then they are suddenly surprised
when they go into the LZ and find it's hot. It seems to me that we should
have learned that experience at the very outset or just know it from pure
basic doctrine.
We find there is a gap between the lesson that has been learned and what
has been passed on time and time again to new people as they corne in. Yet
three years later we find that we are still making the same stupid mistakes.
I hope you will look at some of these problems and produce worthwhile
recommendations for a more efficient LRP program in Vietnam, not only for
Vietnam but for the Army.
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SYNOPSIS OF PRESENTATION OF I FIELD FORCE, VIETNAM
Major Keefe, I FFORCEV:
Company E, 20th Infantry, is OPCON to
Company B, 5th Special Forces Group. However, three of the four LRP
platoons have been placed OPCON to other units in II Corps Tactical
Zone. The 1st Platoon is OPCON to the 4/503rd Infantry at Phu Hiep. The
2nd Platoon remains OPCON to Company B, 5th Special Forces. This
platoon is now located at An Khe. The 3rd Platoon is OPCON to the 3/503rd
Infantry at Bao Loc, and the 4th Platoon is OPCON to the 3/506th Infantry
at Phan Thiet. The extreme northern and northwestern areas of the corps
zone are covered by 4th Infantry Division and 173rd Brigade LRPs. This distribution of I FFORCEV LRP assets has resulted in variations in the platoon
operations.
The platoon at An Khe, for example, is part of a LRP /MSF package. The
concept is to employ the Mobile Strike Force (MSF) as a reaction force to
exploit LRP
This package provides the most desirable LRP
support available in II Corps. Aviation assets are available to the MSF units,
primarily to support LRP operations. Therefore, LRP teams can expect full
aviation coverage once the MSF heliborne deployment is completed. The other
LRP platoons do not receive aviation support as consistently as those with
the MSF. The platoons with US units are OPCON to battalions or task force
control headquarters. The limited
assets frequently delay or modify
LRP operations since other priority tactical requirements must be satisfied.
An example of aviation assets which might be available to a battalion would be
eight slicks and a gun platoon. Since LRP infiltration/exfiltration normally
requires half of these assets, the deployment of organic battalion elements is
considerably curtailed. Obviously if an urgent tactical situation arises during
LRP operations, aviation support must be diverted to the main forces of the
battalions. Such situations frequently preempt plarmed deployment of LRPs
though they are seldom cause for exfiltrating elements already in the field.
Although the field force LRP company is widely dispersed, we feel that the
present distribution of assets provides optimum effectiveness within this
corps area. Basically, J:"iendly forces in II Corps are in an economy of
force role. Reconnaissance efforts have been intensified while aviation
:
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AVHGB-P
Synopsis of Presentation of I Field Force, Vietnam
support has been reduced. In order to maintain an offensive posture the
management of combat and combat support assets has become a key consideration. The LRP company has decentralized its assets down to the
OPCON units. In this way a larger land area can be kept under surveillance
while aviation support provided to the OPCON units is employed both for
battalion and LRP operations. Under less stringent limitations it would be
desirable to provide aviation assets in direct support of the LRP unit. However, LRP teams now share these assets with the OPCON unit.
Another aspect of the distribution of the four LRP platoons is that in each
case these platoons provide a LRP capability to those units not authorized
organic LRP assets. It should be noted, however, that the 3/506th Infantry
has provisionally trained, organized and deployed its reconnaissance platoon
as a LRP platoon.
Company B is the Special Forces unit OPCON to I FFORCEV. It controls
CIDG operations within II CT Z. To provide the numerous camp and mobile
strike force units with adequate Air Force FAC coverage, the Air Liaison
Officer (ALO) at 5th SF Group in Nha Trang monitors the requirements for
Special Forces throughout the corps area. Based on his recommendations
forward air controllers (FACs) are allocated to meet tactical requirements.
With the establishment of a LRP/MSF package several months ago, the group
ALO determined that LRP operations required FAC coverage in direct support
of the LRP platoon. The Special Forces Group ALO allocated two FAGs to
support the two IJRP platoons then OPCON to Company B. These FACs were
placed under control of the LRP company commander for further allocation as
he saw fit.
The original arrangement provided FAC coverage for LRP platoons operating
without other US support. These FACs were responsive to the LRP unit, not
to the Special Forces unit. As the distribution of LRP platoons evolved, both
FAGs remained in direct support of the LRP company. One FAC is always
assigned to the LRP platoon operating with the MSF. The other FAC is
allocated as the LRP company cOInmander desires. In those cases where an
operation is supported by FACs from more than one unit, arrangements are
made to pool all the FAC assets to support the entire operation. This does
not Inean that LRP platoons receive full coverage froIn FACs supporting local
operations, however, local FACs do provide assistance as required by the
LRPs in emergency situations.
18
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AVHGB-P
The point illustrated can be summarized by stating that through an excellent
working relationship, the 5th SF Group ALO provides timely, adequate FAC
coverage for Field Force LRPs deployed in II CTZ. Through coordination
with DASC A, Headquarters 7th Air Force, and local ground units, a flexible,
effective support system has been developed. These procedures enable the
LRP company to have responsive means for obtaining tactical air support.
Minor operational problems persist.
in Company E operations.
Three unrelated points are noteworthy
Ground-to-Air Communications Failures:
Experience has shown that exceptional team leaders will pursue their
mission regardless of the status of communications. Unfortunately, som.e
team leaders will terminate further reconnaissance in areas in which
communication is lost or broken. The stronger team leaders will continue
the mission without becoming overly concerned :if communications is disrupted.
In one case the team leader continued his mission for 18 hours without seeking
high ground to reestablish communications. Had a serious situation developed
the team leader would have been compelled to rely only on evasion techniques
until communications could be reestablished. This kind of leader typifies
the caliber NCO which is desired for LRP operations. By citing their actions,
as examples, we hope to develop greater confidence in those team leaders
who are currently overly concerned with the need for continuous
communications.
Equipment Limitations on Patrol:
Many team members occasionally attempt to carry more amrnunition or
equipment than is necessary. Team leaders have been instructed to be
alert for excess equipment during final inspections. Excess weight can be
a liability to a patrol by inhibiting mobility. Only those items which are
mission essential should be carried on patrol.
Water Shortages:
In the drier area in II Corps - around Phan Thiet for example - the lack of
water sources has become a problem. This has been partially reduced by
supplementing LRP rations with C ration wet units and by free dropping
three-gallon water bags to patrols in need of water in certain circumstances.
19
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AVHGB-P
I FFORCEV has established an ARVN/US LRP integration and training
program. This program has three major objectives:
(1) Intensification of Long Range Patrol activities in II CT Z by providing
more ARVN personnel trained in LRP operations.
(2) Integration of US and ARVN operations at the lowest level of
engagement with the enemy.
(3) Improvement of ARVN capability for unilateral, patrol training and
operations.
There are three mobile training sites in the corps zone - one at each AR VN
division or STZ. To date over 300 ARVN LRPs have entered this training
course and 150 of these have been graduated by the US cadre. In addition,
84 ARVN LRP personnel have been integrated with US/LRP teams with
exceptional results. Frequently the AR VN LRPs have contributed
significantly to the success of the mission.
The language barrier has proven to be a difficult problem. Although the
ARVN LRPs have demonstrated excellent ability in the field, they have not
been successful in academic examinations. AR VN has imposed a requirement that all LRPs be tested at Duc My Ranger Training Center to become
LRP qualified. Because of a high rate of failure experienced in written
examinations most of the last group tested will have to be retested. This
does not reflect on the value of the training program. Previously, lesson
plans in Vietnamese and specific test requirements were not available so
that the students and interpreters could be adequately prepared. The Ranger
Training Center will provide these items in the future.
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SYNOPSIS OF PRESENTATION OF II FIELD FORCE, VIETNAM
Major Koentop, First Lieutenant Snyder, II FFORCEV: Company F, 51st
Infantry LRP, works as a complete unit. When a requirement is justified,
the entire company will be placed OPCON to a major unit within III CT Z.
In the past the company has been OPCON to the 199th Light Infantry Brigade,
the 25th Infantry Division and directly to II Field ForceV Headquarters. In
a case such as the latter the company will normally have a brigade-sized AO.
Company F, 51st Infantry LRP, has also had the mission of protecting Long
Binh Post. To do this, F and D Troops of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, the 36th Ranger Battalion and the 136th MSF Battalion were placed
OPCON. The AO was covered by assigning individual AOs to the units and
employing the LRPs on the periphery.
The tactic used is saturation patrolling. That is the reason for emphasizing
employing the company as a whole. Normally 10 to 14 teams will be on the
ground at all times. Initially these teams are five to six-man reconnaissance
teams. They determine routes of movement, supply routes, feeder routes,
and base camp areas. After this phase, "heavy" teams of 10 to 12 men are
inserted to get more detailed information in the form of prisoners for
interrogation and documents. This is done by arnbushing small enemy elements.
The third phase is interdiction, done with "heavy" teams and various
available conventional forces. Artillery is used to the maximum. This has
proven successful, and has caused the enemy to change his route of march
and move his base areas.
An 0-1 aircraft is used as an aerial relay for six hours a day. The teams
normally move during this time period using the short antenna with the
AN/PRC-25. The jungle antenna is used when the 0-1 is not available. When
a significant sighting is made, this aircraft will overfly the area and help the
teams adjust artillery. The enemy shoots at him because they think he is
adjusting the artillery and many times expose themselves to the team on the
ground.
21
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AVHGB-P
Synopsis of Presentation of II Field Force, Vietnam
Equipment carried by the patrol includes as little food and water as possible,
M-16s, a Light Antitank Weapon (LAW), an M-79, and an M-60 MG with 700
rounds. The patrols remain in the area for five days and are extracted
only if they have wounded personnel. If the wounds are slight, they will be
treated and then reinserted.
Harassing and interdictory (H&I) fire continues in the AO even while teams
are being inserted or on the ground. To stop the fire signals the enemy
something is happening. The teams move between the fires. The fires
are plotted 800 meters from the team, except at night when defensive
concentrations are as close as 300 meters or closer if desired.
In the III CTZ operation areas where shots are heard in the jungle aU day,
the teams snipe at close ranges. A noise suppressor would be beneficial
to assist the sniping.
Another tactic especially effective at night is to set up a trip flare behind
a team that is being pursued. If gunships are on the scene, they can fire
at the trip flare when the enemy trips it.
The teams use the starlight scope and have found it effective. The LAW
is used mainly as a psychological weapon to make the enemy think twice
before assaulting a team. The weapon deceives the enemy as to the size of
the team. Time pencils and fragmentation grenades are used, especially
at night to mislead him On the location of the team. Claymores are used
extensively. Wrist compasses are used also. .It saves the man from fiddling
with the lensatic and getting it caught in the brush.
The Kit Carson Scout has proved very effective in operations. They are
trusted and integrated into the patrols. They are given English lessons
four hours per day by the interpreters while in base camp.
Problems:
A shortage of comrrlUnications trained personnel to repair the radios.
Survival knives are on the MTOE but extremely hard to obtain. The M-l6,
while a good weapon, is not as suitable to LRP operations as the CAR 15
because it is too long and catches in the brush. The present camouflage
uniform tears easily and mosquitoes bite through the material. The CrDG
tiger suit is better.
...
22
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AVHGB-P
Synopsis of Presentation of II Field Force, Vietnam
The company has been short on personnel. Because it needs a full 28 teams
to accomplish its mission, it maintains this number by cutting down on the
number of people in each patrol from six to five, sometimes to four. A
limiting factor is turn around time. This has been as low as 36 hours per
five-day patrol. It is not desirable to cut the turn around time that much,
especially with the influx of untrained personnel directly out of the replacement pipeline.
A LRP operation requires trained, experienced people, but theae replacements
have been assigned directly to BCT, AlT, airborne school, then directly
assigned to the Long Range Patrol unit. They do not even know squad tactics
much less LRP tactics. Previously, every incoming individual had a training
period of three months; now due to operational press)1re, they have to learn
in the field.
II FFORCEV provides the support for the company. Air assets of one C&C,
three slicks and three to four gunships are provided for exclusive use of the
company. These are deemed essential. The H model UH-l is better than
older helicopters such as the D model, which will not rise straight up 100 to
200 feet to clear the trees with a team on board. Artillery is on call but is
general support rather than direct support. The reaction force, Delta Troop.
3/17 Air Cavalry, is OPCON. This is an operational necessity as in the
past many good opportunities have been lost by not being able to reinforce.
23
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SYNOPSIS OF PRESENTATION OF THE SPECIAL AIR SERVICE
Major Wade, SAS: SAS means Special Air Service. It is an airborne unit,
but here in Vietnam jump for pay only. SAS was started in June 1957. It
started as a company and was expanded to a regiment based at Perth,
Australia. Currently, three squadrons rotates duties in Vietnam.
mission of SAS is Long Range Reconnaissance.
The squadron consists basically of 15 patrols, organized into three troops,
commanded by a Lieutenant. The normal operating level is five or six
patrols in the field at one time. The allocation of BAS within the Australian
Army is one squadron per division. In Vietnam it is allocated as part of
the task force.
The unit trains as a unit in Australia prior to employment in Vietnam. They
also select new personnel at this time. The procedure is: the individual
volunteering goes before a selection board. After selection, he attends a sixweek patrol course. The standard of physical conditioning is nine miles in
90 minutes with full battle order. Subjects taught are communications,
medical, explosives, demolitions, pioneering, small craft handling and others.
All this training is completed 12 months before coming over here. The
remaining 12 months is spent in team training, culminating in a two-month
exercise in New Guinea. It is extremely rough country and quite a sorting
out process. What this means is that a squadron is a fully trained organization
when it gets here. All reinforcements come frorn the regiment in Perth.
The method of operation is basically the same as US operations with some
minor differences. The basic communications means is the AN /PR C-64
and Morse code with the AN/PRC-25 to improve ground-to-air communications. The LZ is photographed on the prior reconnaissance before every
mission.
This enables all the pilots and team members to be thoroughly
familiar with the point where the team is to be inserted.
Stay behind patrols were used on two occasions after fire support bases were
closed. VC were killed while digging in the garbage pit.
24
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AVHGB-P
Synopsis of Presentation of the Special Air Service
Since 10 July 1966, 498 patrols have been inserted; 418 five-man patrols,
39 ten-man, and a few 3, IS, 20-man patrols. Four hundred and nine
were air insertions, 89 were ground insertions, either walk-ins or using
an APC. Extractions were by air 432 times and 66 times by foot. Total
contacts were 124; our patrol fired first 112 times, the VC 12 time s. Total
kills were 219 with 35 more possible. The regiment has a kill ratio of
219 to one; the squadron, 87 to zero for the last five months.
A nine-week school to train Vietnamese in long range patrol techniques
is conducted here in Vietnam. The first six weeks are training, the last
three are operations, which consists of two patrols. The course started
with 40 Vietnamese of very high quality.
The XM 148 is used extensively by the Australians. The trigger arrangement
is dangerous as issued--it catches on vines and fires unexpectedly--so it is
cut off and the sear is used to fire the weapon. The sights are removed
also. Since contact range is normally five to ten meters, the sights are not
needed. One XM 148 is carried per patrol.
Another piece of equipment is an anchor device for the McGuire rig or for
rappelling ropes. It can be fitted to the UH-l series helicopter in about
five minutes and deploys six ropes, three on each side. A pull of a lever
releases the rope in an emergency. The UH-IH can extract a six-man patrol
with full equipment using this rig. The present McGuire rig lifts only three
people and cannot be cut· away in an emergency.
25
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SYNOPSIS OF THE PRESENTATION OF THE 1st CAVALRY DIVISION (AM)
Captain Kukea, 1st Cavalry Division (AM): Company E, 52nd Infantry, LRp,
is currently in general support of the division and direct support of the
three brigades. To respond to this situation, the company is split into two
locations. A Company minus is at the division base camp with six
operational patrols and the administration personnel. With the brigade
farthest from the base camp is a platoon - three teams run by the platoon
leader. The company intelligence sergeant assists this lieutenant.
Missions are theoretically requested from the brigades to the G2, who sends
them to the LRP CO. In actuality, the mission" come from the brigade
directly to the control group supporting the brigade. If a conflict arises,
the G2 resolves it.
Support for the LRP operations comes out of brigade assets. When a mission
is requested, the LRP control gives support requirements. If they are not
supplied, the mission is canceled. For artillery support, direct coordination
is made with the direct support battalion. For reaction, direct coordination
is made with the 1st of the 9th Air Cavalry troop supporting that brigade. The
Air Cav Troop consists of scout ships, gunships and an infantry
platoon with its own organic lift capability. This gives a ten-minute reaction
capability. The reporting procedures are from the team to the LRP control
through a liaison team to the brigade. This liaison team consists of an injured
or "short" team leader and a Radio Telegraph Operator (R TO).
All missions at the present time are reconnaissance; it is up to the brigade
to act on reports. A five to six-man team is employed on a six to ten-day
mission. This extended time period is due to few LZs in the AO. When a
team gets in, they have to be exploited to the utmost. After some initial
resistance, this extended mission concept has worked well.
26
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AVHGB-P
Synopsis of Presentation of the 1st Ca.valry Division (AM)
Presently, insertion takes place at EENT with the normal three slicks and
a LFT. However, in cases of areas that have been worked many times, the
number of aircraft is modified to avoi.d recognition. Also, fake air assaults
into a LZ with a LRP being inserted simultaneously on another LZ has worked
well. The saturation insertion of four low flying helicopters with only one
making the actual insertion is used also, as well as the stay behind and walkin from the fire bases.
In the future, insertion by rappelling in thick canopy areas will be tried.
Six people can exit a helicopter in one minute using a rappel ring - a solid
ring already on the rope. The rappeller only has to hook his snaplink to the
ring and he is ready to exit the helicopter.
Many extractions lately have been through the use of the McGuire rig due
to the canopy and mountainous terrain. A modification of the rig has been
made consisting of a sling rope around the chest snapped to an eight-foot
endless sling.
Water is a problem in the mountains because when the patrols go down into
areas where the water is, they lose com.munications. Therefore, the teams
carry eight quarts of water.
The teams carry CS or WP for breaking contact and a small riot mask. There
seems to be no replacements or parts for these masks. One ration per day is
carried for up to six days and after that, a ra.tion and a half. Each man
carries half a poncho liner but no poncho. The rest is standard equipment,
except for special missions when a starlight scope, spotter scope or sniper
rifle may be carried.
The bigger problem is the idea of selling each brigade on how the LRPs should
be used. Many times they try to employ the LRPs as a maneuver unit with a
very small AO. Another problem is employing the LRPs too close to friendly
troops. The enemy knows where our troops are and are more alert. The most
successful missions are out of 105 howitzer range, just on the edge of 155
range within eight-inch range.
Lately there has been a lack of trained team leaders as most of the present
team leaders are rotating in August. To get the new NCOs and potential team
leaders more experienced, team integrity is being broken in an effort to get
these people as much experience as pos sible in the field before the others
rotate.
27
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AVHGB-P
Synopsis of Presentation of the 1st Cavalry Division (AM)
The company has the AN/PRC-64, which the Australians use, but not
enough trained people to operate it. It may ease the communications
problem if this can be resolved.
Presently, there is a plan to employ the LRPs at division level, but it is
going to have to be approved by the incoming Commanding General.
Z8
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SYNOPSIS OF PRESENTATION OF THE 4th INFANTRY DIVISION
Major Pipia, 4th Infantry Division: The 4th Infantry Division presented a
comprehensive briefing at the 28 Much 1968 LRP Conference; therefore,
at the present conference their talk
devoted to the integration of US and
ARVN LRPe and the training of the ARV"N personnel.
Thirty AR VN LRP students from the 42nd AR VN Regiment of the 24th Special
Tactical Zone received centralized tJraining at Camp Enari, followed by
decentralized operational OJT deployment to US LRP platoons in the field. It
was run by a training detachment wh:lch conducts a .regular pre-recondo course.
Some problems occurred during this course. The PT was too ambitious and
resulted in considerable soreness during the first week. This PT is the same
given to US personnel at the pre-recondo school. The ARVN had conducted
no preliminary PT prior to the start of training. Some of the students were
not physically qualified, as an example, one student had an acute case of
myopia and did not have glasses. HE' could not participate in field operations.
The language barrier was a problem, especially with four Montagnards who
could not read or write. The ARVNe had no previous orientation and did not
know what to expect, which caused friction to develop. As a result, only Z2
of the 30 participants graduated from this phase.
Certain recommendations were derived from this experience. With any
nationality, all persons involved with LRPs should be volunteers and screened
by their parent unit for motivation ar.,d fitness. They shoUld be oriented to
what the program consists of and what to expect. A physical training program
should be instituted before any LRP training and personnel not up to physical
standards required should be elimina,ted from the program. An examination
by a doctor should eliminate the physically unfit. If possible, the same
interpreters should accompany each course.
During the second phase, the ARVN IItudents were deployed to the US LRP
platoons in the field and fully integrated into the LRP teams. They were
issued equipment and inserted on millsions as a member of the teams. Each
student participated in three to five long range patrols, except for five individuals.
29
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AVHGB-P
Synopsis of Presentation of the 4th Infnntry Division
The language problem again was encountered. It was overcome by using
signals. pigeon English and Vietnamese and using Rhade Montagnards who
normally worked with the US elements and could translate. A pay problem
arose and a man was finally sent back to get it for all unit members. The
interpreters did not want to go on operations but the ARVN commander clearly
established they were students and would participate.
There were no disciplinary problems with the AR VN students in the field or
between the Vietnamese and Montagnal'ds. The students proved adept and
capable. especially stealthy and quiet. It was felt the students were capable
of independent LRP operations. The Held deployment phase ended with an
AR VN conducted patrol with only a US' radio operator along to arrange
liaison between friendly US units and air assets. The ARVN and US worked
very well together •.
It was recommended the program conHnue as a two-phase operation.
(There
is an after action report available on this training that was submitted to
II CTZ Senior Advisor and I FFORCEV.)
30
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Captain Yearout, First Lieutenant Ma:rshall, 9th Infantry Oivision: The 9th
Infantry Division moved last month to the Mekong Delta. There are problems
in this area not encountered elsewherE', There is no cover and concealment
except in the treelines. and that ie
the people live. The population
density is great •.
The rest of the terrain is open rice paddies. This dictates that a patrol
moves between 2400 and 0600 hours to avoid detection, The canals in the
area range from two feet wide to 50 meters and even up t6 several kilometers
wide. This terrain makes helicopter insertion almost imp6ssible as the
helicopter can be seen ten kilometers away. It is assumed that anybody seeing
the insertion is hostile, which will cause an ambush or cessation of enemy
activity in an area. False insertions do not seem to assiet but merely
alert a larger area. Foot inserti6n m,eets with the same problem: the terrain
is too open and a patrol can be spotted easily. The population density
makes it difficult to move in without bEling seen, and they must be assumed
hostile.
A night airborne insertion is being considered and has not been ruled out, but
the most common means of insertion lright now is the Patrol Boat River
(PBIt). The boats are 31 feet long, capable of 30 knots, have a twin 50
caliber MG forward and aft. a Mark 18 Honewell grenade launcher and two
M-60s aft also.
The boats work in pairs: four men to a boat.
the eight-man teams work best.
In the Delta, it has been found
In the operation, one boat will cover the other while it moves to the bank.
The team disembarks the inboard bow 1ander cover of the 50-caliber Mas.
In case of a contact, the team can get right back on the boat.
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AVHGB-P
Synopsis cif Presentation of the 9th Infantry Division
Another method, picked up from the SEAL teams, is the underway insertion.
The boat does not stop but swings clclse to the bank and the team rolla off the
side. This is especially effective in a.reas where the population is accustomed
to the boats and would notice a change in RPM of the engine. However,
this is extremely hazardous and the tElame must wear life vests since the
depth of the water is unknown in those areas where the boats do not usually
go.
The time of insertion is dependent on the tides since only high tide is suitable
for insertion. The water drops up to 16 feet and the boats cannot operate
at low tide, even to reinforce. In addItion, at low tide the banks on the side
of the canals are high and the 50s eanllot get grazing fire.
The patrols are primarily one-night m.issions, sometimes longer.
primarily ambushes, recon or "body Imatch".
They are
The ambushes are normally on a canal to ambush sampans, the vehicle the
enemy uses to transport his equipment and supplies. Other ambushes are
set onltnown infiltration routes where the enemy moves in squad size or
smaller elements. If intelligence 1s received on the whereabouts of a known
ve, a team will be inserted to search a village. This has proven quite
effective but it is neceseary to have n local national along to interpret.
The Army' Marksmanship Team is aSl!igned to
9th Infantry Divislon and
teaches sniping to the LRPs. This is being used to shoot from one treeline to
the next. sometimes a distance of 800 meters.
Brigades recommend targets for any type of LRP operation. These targets
are screened by the G2 and G3.
by the Commanding General and
implemented as Boon a8 possible. Th.e LRPs generally know well in advance
where they are going and why.
- - - - - - - . - - - . - - - - - - . -_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ----l-_ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
tONFtMR riAL
•
SYNOPSIS OF PRESENTATION OF THE AMERICAL DIVISION
Captain Clark, Americal Division: In the Americal Division the LRP
teams are OPCON to the three brigades because of the lack of helicopter
support at division level. Division c:ontrols the employment of these teams
by requiring that each LRP mission hav'e the Commanding Generalis
approval prior to execution.
The teams are employed on an individual-type basis with the mission of
area reconnaissance. The AO is ab')ut nine square kilometers per team,
or the team sets up a stationary OP. These are normally reconnaissance
missions.
Insertion is made by helicopter
but stay behind has been used with success.
The LRP company at Chu Lai servell as an administrative and logistical base
and provides training for newly assigned personnel. These personnel are
volunteers from the division in-country orientation course or are volunteers
from line units in the field. The training given is a division Recondo course
of ten-<1ays duration. Upon complef;ion they are integrated into teams for
two or three weeks. If their performance proves satisfactory, they are sent
to the MACV Recondo School for their final training.
In the past, AR VN recon elements Olr the 2nd AR VN Division have been
trained and integrated into operations. A small Mobile Training Team (MTT)
is going to the 2nd AR VN Division Headquarter!! to as slat at ,that location.
The biggest problem is lack of helic1)pter support. On one occasion the LRPs
operated with an air cavalry troop, which proved extremely successful.
Adequate helicopter support was available and did not interfere with the
aeroscout mission of the Air Cavalry.
33
15ifID'HTIlL ·
'--._- --------._________J
-------------------------------------Ir-----'
._---------------- ------'----------
Captain Dawson, 25th Infantry Division: Mission aseignxnent in the 25th
Infantry Division is done by the 02. When the company receives the mission,
coordination is made with D Troop, 3/4 Cavalry. After the mission is Bet
up and coordinated, the patrols involved are then placed OPCON to the brigade
which controls the target area. this brigade provides support for the operation. Normally, three teams per mission are assigned. The company can
support two of these missions simultaneously.
Insertion by walk-in and stay behind have been used successfully. Helicopter
insertion is used also, normally in early morning operations. It can be
performed without detection due to low clouds continually in the area. Also,
the teams have time for reinforcements or extraction in an emergency.
The insertion should be planned at least 24 hours in advance and the helicopter pilots should be included in the prior air recon of the LZ. In the
"Crescent" area, the teams have beer, continually discovered and attacked
even though every type of insertion has been tried. Early morning insertion
has proved the least compromising.
Moving is done in the pre-dawn hours" in the late afternoon or at night.
Movement should be reduced during hours of reduced visibility. During the
noon hours, movement is dangerous because the enemy is relaxing in one
spot and is still alert to movement. Emphasis is placed on quiet, careful
movement while patrolling.
CS or WP grenades have been found v,ery useful in breaking contact. When
gunships are in the area, they can be used with smoke to indicate enemy
locations.
When evading the enemy while returning to an LZ, the claymore with a time
pencil is useful. They are set for om, or two minutes. The team is extracted,
the enemy moves in and the claymore goes off with the desired results. These
34
,
.
- - - - - - , - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ---' ----'------------
AVHGB-P
Synopsis of Presentation of the 25th Infantry Division
claymores are set up waist high on tree or bush sO the dense underbrush
does not disturb the working of the device.
A recent mission was performed on Nui Ba Den Mountain near Tay Ninh.
The company was to locate base camps, supply routes, and water points
on the mountain.
The plan was to move as a companyll.nd then cloverleaf the patrols. but
it was detected the first night and resulted in a fire fight. It was decided
to lend three teams from the top to t:he bottom in sectors, 200 to 400 meters
apart. In this way they could
each other in case of trouble. A
ruction force was not readily aVailable, and the helicopters could not be
relied on due to the steep terrain and downdrafts in the area.
Two teams arrived at the bottom. They successfully located a large VC/NVA
base camp, inclUding the water points, and observed enemy personnel with
AK.47e and machinegun8. A third hlam was restricted by a canyon and ran
directly into the enemy base camp. They could not move. The first two
teams attempted to go to their aid but: were detected, engaged and finally
extracted under fire.
The next day, a strong pOint was set up in a pagoda, which was detected and
attacked. D 'troop, 3/4 Cavalry, ructed and provided suppressive fire.
There were .e'leral wounded, but thel medevac helicopter could not come in
due to enemy fire. An air .trike WAIl put in at this time. The team in tr cuble
was finally extracted using an l.OH which put one skid on a ledge of rock.
The point is that close cooperation b'ltween air and gr011nd is essential to the
LltP operation.
Many times normal brigade assets will not have a working knowledge of the
long range patrol operation and cannot adequately support it. An arrangement
should be made to use the same assets repeatedly. if p08sibl,e.
The old AR belt is a very useful item of equipment. It has numerous pouches
for ammunition or grenades, which distributes the weight and does not have to
be taped. The wrist compass could replace the lensatic if it had a sighting
device on it. It is accurate and handy, and is immediately available not in
a pocket. Light weight web gear made from CS cannisters i8 being experimented with at the present time and lLiao the M-16 noise suppressors. The
new face camouflage made by Elizabnth Arden that is used by the SEAl.s
seems better than our issue camoufhLge. The time pencils are very useful
but hard to get.
35
uP
, I
,
"--
---------------_._-------'-_._------
: ClUff ro f BII A{
- - - - . - - - . -_ _....J
AVHGB-P
Synopsis of Presentation of the 25th lnfantry Division
Very often S2s or S3s have their own ideas of how LRP operations should be
conducted and cause unsuccessful operations. A USARV or MACV seminar
involving these people might ease this problem. Also an individual at the
division level who can directly reprMent the LRPs would assist in this
problem of misutilization and lack of support at lower echelons.
36
LtORFIDEI}JAL
-----1-·-
-----'---
SYNOPSIS OF PRESENTATION OF THE Wist AIRBORNE DIVISION (AM)
Lieutenant Williams. Wist Airborne Division (AM.ll The LRP company receives
its mission directly from the division GZ, the Commanding General authorizes
each mission, and G3 provides the assets. The six-man team is used and
inserted by helicopter. The three-day mission is preferred as indications
show there is a drop in personal efficiency toward the end of the five-day
patrol. Some ten-day missions are presently being planned. All the
reconnaissance missions have a secolldary mission of taking prisoners.
A LRP platoon from the 1st AR VN DiV'ision hall been integrated into LRP
activities. A nine-day training course was given and then they were integrated
into teams, four US and two ARVN. 'rhis proved highly successful. Some of
the AR VN individuals had been' workIng in reconnaissance lor up to eight
years and were highly proficient. 1'he end result of this program is hoped to
be all AR VN teams using US air support and other assets.
The use of CS dropped by helicopters has proven successful but required the
team to take a gas mask along. This is deemed worth the extra effort.
Air support is preferred to artillery in the AO due to triple canopy vegetation.
It is difficult to observe and adjust ar tillery and a LF1' can respond in 10
to 15 minutes.
The first light insertion is utilized most frequently. It allows reaction in
case of contact on or near the LZ and an air relay, a U-lA Otter from Phu
Bai. can standby during insertion or until the team establishes communication with the base camp or ground rel.ay station. The teams do not move
during the noon period or when another team is in contact because a team is
less likely to be discovered when it is stationary.
The standard 65-foot Chinook suspension ladder cut in half and strung through
a UH-l model helicopter so that about 1Z feet hangs down On each side is
effective for insertion and extraction in stumpy areas, thickly vegetated areas,
over uneven ground or where rotary clearance is needed. Rappelling is used
also but its use makes McGuire rig extraction required, and this is avoided
37
r
8aHFlSEN
:
1----1--
-----------------------------'----_._-
AVHGB-P
Synopsis of Presentation of the lOlst Airborne Division (AM)
when possible. However, one McGuire rig wHh handcuffs on the riser is
used to extract prisoners.
The company has three British Sten glms with silencers which are extremely
quiet. They have not been fired in the course of an operation although they
were taken along.
The air support for operations is OPCON to and collocated with the LRP
company. This provides immediate response to every need: insertion/
extraction, overflights and contacts. During insertion, a FAC supports the
company providing TAC air support. A reaction company is designated
for every operation. When a reaction force is committed, its commander
takes command of the LRP team in tho area. Preplanned artillery and on
call artillery is arranged but artillery adjustment training is difficult to
get; therefore,
of the personnel in the company hesitate to use it.
Ground communication relays are set up in fire bases nearest the AO. The
company can put out up to four of thes e relays.
-1----·
-----'-_.-_._----
SYNOPSIS OF PRESENTATION OF THE
l73rd AIRBORNE BRIGADE (SEPARATE)
Captain Buczacki, l73rd Airborne Brigade: The only way to find the enemy
when he is evading is through the use of a LRP team. Battalion sweeps
are easily avoided SO the best way is for the LRP team to find them, then
fix and destroy them with a reaction f4)rce.
The LRP must be a highly trained, motivated soldier. To mold a soldier
into a LRP member takes a training and application stage which lasts about
I liZ months. All the l73rd Airborne Brigade LRP members are volunteers
who have been in a rifle company at least three months, pass a selection
board, receive a week of training and then are integrated into an operational
team. After a period of time, he
the MAGV Rem ndo School and if he
graduates, is again integrated in the unit or if he fails, is reassigned to
another unit.
The detachment receives all missions from the brigade SZ. On occasion
the team has been OPCON to a battalion but it was found to be undesirable
due to lack of understanding of the LRP mission a.nd resources.
The detachment uses Navy Swift boats and three-man rubber rafts as an
insertion means. They are highly desirable in that they are noiseless and
difficult to detect at night. Helicopter insertions are made at least 1,000
meters from the objective area to enable the team to adjust to the terrain.
False insertions are made and have pI' oven helpful. The doors on the
helicopter are kept closed before and
insertion. Stay behinds have been
used, but this mission is a waste of talent as a rifle squad could perform
the same mission.
A ground radio relay site,' not neceasa.rily in a fire base, is used when
necessary. It is another team that pr4)vides a link between the reconnaissance
teams and the base camp and performll a surveillance mission of its own.
Also a balloon is used at the base station to extend the radio contact range.
39
I
:.COIFIBERTllL-I-AVHGB-P
Synopsis of Presentation of the 173rd Airborne Brigade (Separate)
The teams will normally have a PW sIlatch miuion in addition to the
primary reconnaissance mission. It would perhaps be better to have two
or three specially trained teams for this mi88ion.
Many tinl.es insertion/extraction is delayed an hour or nl.ore due to the
unavailability of aircraft. The teams 'b.aveto wait during this time period
and the pilote are unfamiliar with the J:"Z and LRP procedures. This can
be solved by attaching helicopters to the LRP unit or by putting an experienced
man in the insertion ship who can dire,et the pilot to the correct point.
'
Two groups of Alt VN Lll.Ps have been :lntegrated into the l73rd LRPs. In
April, this consisted of 14 All. VNe and in June, a TOE recon platoon from
the 2Znd All. VN Division. The All.VN tum members can help the US racon
teams. They can understand the enemy speech and react to it. They are
more familiar with 'the terrain and can piek up signs more readily. Language
is a problem, The teams must have hltegrated c1auel using talk cards and
hand signals. If thi. integrated operation i8 hereto stay, more language
training ia needed, 8Ipecially basic ml,litary words and phrases. Alao. with
their own leaders present, a. with the TOE reconri&iesance platoon, the
AltVNs seem more effective.
The unit is trying to obtain 80me of the, new leven pound, breath.inflated,
four.man .rafts. The present three-mnn recon raft must be hidden well or
destroyed on each miuion.
40
."
-----1---
------------------------------'----_._--I
!
'j
,
L
SYNOPSIS OF PRES1:NTATION OF THE
36th MOBILE STRIKE FORCE COMMAND
Major Lunday, 36th Mobile Strike FONe Command: The 36th Mobile
Strike Force Command is a newly formed unit in III CTZ. It consists
of four battalions of mobile strike force commanded by USSF and
staffed mostly with Cambodians and a
company of Special
Forces troops and Cambodians augmented by LRP personnel from the
1st Infantry Division, 9th Infantry Divi:!ion. 199th Light Infantry Brigade
and the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment. During operations when the enemy
situation is vague or unknown, a concept of combining reconnaissance
teams and mobile strike force battalion is used: the reconnaissance teams
are utilized to find the enemy so they may be engaged by the MSF battalions.
An intermediate sized unit, the specia:: ac tion platoon, is employed to collect
intelligence, reinforce or aid in extrac:tion of the reconnaissance team. It
can also attack small targets, develop a situation, and fix an enemy to allow
the employment of larger reaction and exploitatiorl forces. The MSF battalions
are the reaction and exploitation forceli and possess the a.saets necessary
to inflict maximum casualties on the enemy. These battalions are also
utilized as a corps reserve unit by Company A, 5th Special Forces Group
(Air bor ne).
Before an operation a prospective operational area is overflown. but only
b1'iefly to avoid compromise. In case a. more detailed reconnaissance is
required, the leader of the team to be lnserted will fly in the radio relay
ai1'craft which orbits a general area
about six hours. When a battalion
is operating, any useable landing zonell that can be used by the 1'econ teams
in case of an emergency are reported hY' the battalion commander.
The patrols carry one AN /PRC-25 radlo with two headsets per patrol (the
headset has proven to be the most likely part of
system to fail). Their
base station has an R TT capability and single side band in addition to the
AN/GRC-46 radios. The Americans a.re armed wi.th the CAR-IS and the
Cambodians carry the M-16. There are Sten guns and two pistols, all with
silencers, available in the unit. Three of the American members carry
the Swedish K submachinegun.
41
r------1---·
'E':i:-
IL__08N
fI n[HTIA
...... _ __
- - - - - - - - - - . - - - - - - - -_ _ ---.1- _ _
AVHGB-P
Synopsis of Presentation of the 36th Mobile Strike l'orce Command
The MSl' are well trained and experie,nced troops: all are graduates of
the airborne school at Dong :Sa Thin. The airborne qualification has
two advantages: it increases their esprit de corps and provides the
capability of rapid employment by parachute to act as a part ofa sweep
or blocking force. The units use the operational'SOP developed at the
MACV Recondo School. It has been tosted time after time in combat
situations and has proven its worth. Found especially uuful is the
establishment of a uniform place for oach item of equipment allowing a
patrol member to quickly loeate equip,ment in an emergeney. This iI
particularly helpful in finding materiill oil. a wounded or dead team mate.
Attesting to their expei'ienee, tUining. and ability is the fact they have
participated in many pitched battles in III CTZ that have ended with the
enemy suffering an extremely high nu:rnber of casualties.
.
---'---------
SYNOPSIS OF PRESENTATION 0]' III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE
Captain Stacey, Captain Hendricks, III Marine Amphibious Force: Patrolling
in I Corps is conducted within the guidelines established by a letter called
"Policy Guidance for Long Range Reconnaissance Patrols", published
June 1967. In the letter General Cushman states the mission of LRPs is to
gather information, prevent surprise, and destroy the enemy when required.
Two types of patrols are employed, the Sting Ray.and Clandestine.
The Sting Ray is a patrol when the mi.ssion includes engaging targets of
opportunity by artillery. naval gun
and tactical air. The Clandestine
patrol conducts pure reconnaissance, collects information on the enemy
and reports this information.
There are two types of recon units: a Force Reconnaissance Company
organic to Force Troops, Fleet Mari:<le Force, and the Reconnaissance
Battalion organic to the Marine Divis:lon. The two Force Reconnaissance
companies are attached to the Division Reconnaissance Battalions here in
Vietnam. The battalion works directly for the division G2 and has priority
on helicopter assets second only to medevacs. The total strength of the
package is 700 men per company and battalion. They are divided into 88 .
patrols and overhead. Fifty percent
kept in the field at all times.
The basic size of the patrol is four men, but it is augmented with special
skill personnel such as medics. The members of the unit are trained as
surface swimmers, inflatable boat handlers, parachUtists and SCUBA
divers.
Using Sting Ray techniques, the 1st R,lconnaissance Battalion has inflicted
3, 922 KIA while having only 111 friendly KIA. The enemy KIA have to be
verified from two sources.
The size of the teams are from six to 25 men depending on the area and
enemy situation. Pure reconnaissanc e patrols are four to six men. The
Sting Ray patrols are heavily armed because the team must remain in
place while employing supporting fires and the enemy will locate the team
almost every time the indirect fire starts.
,,,.,..,,,,,!'
I
I
43
•
-----1--
--- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- '-- _.-
AL
AVHG B-P
Syno psis of Prese ntatio n of III Marin& Amph ibiou s Forc e
One way of using CS is to empl oy it by fixed wing. A
place d in the napal m tanks with sand to get it throu gh
It can satur ate 4,000 squar e Ihete rs :in five minu tes.
for takin g priso ners but an extra gl.s mask must be
priso ner or he will die.
ton of it can be
the jungl e canop y.
It is a 'good techn ique
taken along for the
The Sting Ray patro l i. less effec tive near friend ly troop s beca
u.e the
enem y is more wary and on guard . It is mo.t effec tive in what
the
consi ders a secur e area. It has a gr,&ater psych ologi cal effec
t and gives more
oppo rtuni tie. to emplo y the .uppo rtin.g fire. It i. e.pec ially
effec tive in
areas not usual ly cover ed by artill err or indir ect weap ons.
'--
1coiil8ENTIAt \
44
L
SYNOPSIS OF THE PRESENTATION OF THE
ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF. G2; USARV
Major Hanke. G2 USARV: At USARY. the G2 is the primary staff section
responsible for the Long Range Patrol. Staff actions on concepts and
techniques of Long Range Patrols aro initiated here and staff actions from
other sections on LRP must be submitted to the G2 for review. Contact is
made with the 'individual LRP units through conferences, trip. to the units
and the monthly LRP report. A recc,rd of their activitie. is maintained.
There are many differences in terrain. population and enemy situation which
affect the statistics of each unit. Generally, the mountains and jungle,
combined.with lesser population pressure enable units in I and II CTZ to
employ longer patrols timewise. There are more manhours spent in longer
patrols but it takes more assets to keep up a high number of shorter time
length patrols. The reaction to an ellemy target used most frequently i.
artillery, There is some sort of rea,ction, i. e., ground, air or artillery,
to 56 percent of all enemy sightings.
The correct address for the LRP report is "Long Range Patrol Report (RCS-AVHGB-5), ATTN: AVHGB·P," Paragraph "r" of the report is
remarks, lessons learned and general description of what is currently
happening within the unit. Some units have not been using this paragraph.
It will assist GZ USARV if the units \l,tilize this paragraph and may result
in publication of the information obtained from these remarks so others
will benefit from your experiences.
New light weight equipment is presently being manufactured for future use
in Vietnam. An attempt is being made to get advance shipments of this
eqUipment.
ARVN or
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -_ _ _ _ _ . _--L _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
L
AVHOB-P
Synopsis of the Presentation of the Allsistant Chief of Staff, 02, USARV
reconnaissance teams. There is no
why your unit cannot take
their lead and utilize these personnel also.
There has been a noticeable improvement within the USARV units since
the last conference- in operations and technique. But one area that has been
neglected is educating staff officers i.nd commanders on LRP capabilities
and employment techniques. This must be done in order to obtain the
command emphasis required to utilize the LRP properly and tomake sure
this emphasis is rewarded with solid intelligence data.
,
SYNOPSIS OF THE PRESENTATION OF THE
ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, J2, MACV
Major Mattson, J2 MACV: Since
mission of Long Range Patrols is
the collection of information, J2 rather than J3 has been designated to
assume staff monitorship of units and activities of US, Vietnamese and
FWMAF that conduct LRP operation!!. The object of the monitoring is
to facilitate the exchange of informal:ion and ideas while assisting the
LRP and reconnaissance programs in Vietnam. Also, the surface
reconnaissance and ground surveillance section advises the J2 MACV on
matters pertaining to related activiti,es. The monitoring of the program
includes the USARV Long Range
Report. It is requested the units
supply an information copy to MACV, ATTN: MACJ212. The information
in the reports is presented to COMUSMACV on a monthly basis and to
CINCPAC on a quarterly basis. Paragraph "r" is of special interest.
As the use of Kit Carson Scouts is
more widespread, and their
use is encouraged, LRP commanders should be aware of possible
tion of the program by the enemy.
In monitoring research and development programs that affect surface
reconnaissance, our office notifies USARV and III MAF of new items
is prepared to assist with the pUblicity and distribution of the items.
and
Specialized training, of a classified nature, is available to US LRP members
and teams. Further information on I:his subject is available from the Plans
and Programs Division, ACofS, 02, USARV. and J212 MACV. This training
has been widely discussed with indiv:idual units.
Presently the surface
and ground surveillance branch is
conducting a study for the purpose of determining the utilization of
reconnaissance elements operating ill RVN. The study covers capabilities,
concept of employment, intelligence obtained, equipment and personnel
problems, and trends. The study will be completed about 1 September 1968.
It is anticipated the study will be of definite future value to MACV and all
elements supervising and conducting Long Range patrols.
______
,----
SYNOPSIS OF PRESENTATION OF THE MACV RECONDO SCHOOL
Major Stevens, MACV Recondo School: In September 1965, Detachment
B-52, 5th Special Forces Group (Ai:rborne), 1st Special Forces, began a
unit training program on long range reconnaissance patrol techniques to
train their replacement personnel. The conventional units throughout the
country learned of this program and requested they be permitted to send
selected personnel to these courses" General Westmoreland directed
that a study be made of long range reconnaissance patrol capabilities of
US units in Vietnam and as a resull; of this study, he directed that a threeweek course of instruction in long rimge reconnaiBSance patrolling be
condu,cted. The Commanding Officer of the 5th BFG (Abn), 1st Special
Forces, was tasked to organize and conduct the school and was designated
as the Commandant. The school was officially opened by General Westmoreland on 15 September 1966.
The word "RECONDO" was coined by General Westmoreland and is a
derivative of three well known term" long aBSociated with soldiering ":Reconnaissance". "Commando". aad "Doughboy". The mission of the
school is to train selected personnel. from US/FWMAF units in specialized
techniques and skills necessary to conduct successfuliong range reconnaissance operations in South Vietna,m. The program of instruction lasts
20 days and consists of 286 hours of instruction and practical work. The
course consists of two weeks of clas:sroom instruction intended to make the
individual student proficient in every aspect of Long Range Patrolling, including such subjects as detailed map rE:ading, first aid, weapons, tactics,
signal subjects, photography, survival, artillery adjustment, infiltration/
exiiltration methods and many others. The third week is an actual combat
operation with ,8. Recondo School Insl:ructor accompanying the inserted team.
Insertion is ruade by helicopters OPCON to the Recondo School into an
enemy controlled area. Thus the eI:lemy acts as a training aid. the most
realistic one available. Various types of reaction to a sighting are available,
including gunships, a reaction force and/or artl.llery. The individua.l students
are observed during the exercise to determine if the previous instruction
has been assimilated to the point where the student can proficiently perform
duties as a Long Range Patrol member and leader. A new course of 65
----'--
AVHGB-P
Synopsis of Presentation of the MAC" Recondo School
students starts every two weeks. The operations conducted by the Recondo
School are of a type that is most gene1rally applicable for every type of
terrain and situation. They are meant as examples, and it is understood
that individual units will have to modlfy the operation somewhat. The SOP
of individual equipment placement is a.lso in this category. It designates
a specific, uniform location for each item of individual equipment so that
in event of injury, other patrol members will know exactly where to find
items of equipment to help him. Th., Recondo School
developed this
SOP to have the widest applicability. but it may have to be changed because
of special equipment carried by certain units or in special terrain situations.
Some units consistently have a high n1.unber of people lIIucc.eufully completing
the course, while other units consistttntly have a low number of gradUates.
Emphasil at the unit level must be ghren to enforcing selection standards
to eliminate the high failure rates .. The selectiQ:I1 criteria are published in
USARV Regulation 350-2. U the stud<ent fails to meet these qualifications,
he will eltperience difficulty in compl<eting the course and is wasting valuable
time and effort of both the .chool and the Army, It is recommended that
individual units conduct a course for
who will attend the .chool,
in an effort to prepare and familiariz.e the lltudent with the type of training
he will be undertaking. This will assist the Recondo School in lowering the
number of individuals· not graduating due to attitude problems.
Personal appearance is deemed
by the Ichool.
While a student
is at school, the individual is required to maintain a high standard of personal
hygiene and· appearance. Mustaches must be nearly trimmed, haircuts must
be short, and the normal appearance ·of an elite l.RP trooper does not include
rings in ears Qr bracelets. The scho'Dl i. a MACV Bchool and these standards
must be maintained.
The arriving students should have an 'ldequate amount of money to defray
expenses at the school. The minimUJlIl is $25, which does not provide any
of the niceties of life. The money is lJsed to provide facilities such as maid
service, ,haircuts, mess hall personn,el and to provide each graduate with
six B.econdo patches and. a diploma.
honor graduate receives a
special knife purchased from the fund"
USAB.V Regulation 350-2 contains a lilit of equipment that the individual should
bring to the school with him. Many sl;udents do not realize this and the
school does not have enough facilities to provide this equipment for every
student. Critical items are camouflage faUques and M-16 magazines. Failure
to comply with the regulations may result in not accepting the student.

LRRP Conference 1968 Part 1

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VSCCA 2016 Newsletter Issue 1

Ramos, Richard J

Rheinard triumphs in Budapest

Brussels South Charleroi Airport

OCTOBER 7-9— OKTOBERFEST @ TEMPE BEACH PARK

Lichen Ruber Planus of the Mucous Membrane of Oral Cavity

XRC Specs