LRRP Conference 1968 part II Recondo School

AVHOB-P
Synopsis of Presentation of the MACV Recondo School
Command emphasis is needed to inSU1'e proper student. are selected for
training and arrive prepared to fully participate in the course of instruction,
The Recondo School offers a practical. means of upgrading the training of
the LRP member and leader who will return him to tbe unit a definite auet
to the team,
Many of the unit. bave new ideas for I!quipment and tactics, but do not have
adequate facilities to test them. The Recondo School bas the facilities and
expertise available and would welcome the chance to evaluate these iternl.
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PART II OF CONFE!tENCE, 10 AUG 68
1.
Discussion of Current Problems:
The second day consisted of group dis.cussions lasting approximately
one hour. Each group was assigned a. subject (organization, employment,
utilization of assets, equipment and related subjects) to analyze in an
attempt to provide solutions to specifi,(: problems. At the end of the period
one member made a 10 to 15 minute presentation detailing these solutions.
The questions and conclusions will be covered in the following paragraphs.
2. What is the best method of employing our assets? What is the optimum
number of patrols supported by a basic package of three slicks and LFT?
The group came to no consensus as to> the best method of employing our
assets. Terrain and the enemy vary in each AO and so does the employment
of the helicopters. They did agree on. one significant point: it is a waste
of assets, except in special and sensitive operations, to keep an aircraft on
strip alert.
The group did feel the ideal unit for S'Llpporting LRPs is the aerial scout troop
or a portion of it. While it supports the LRP, it can also perform visual
reconnaissance and fire missions in the area. (GZ comment: This employment
offers economy of force but there must be close coordination to insure the
LRP is not mistaken for an enemy unit and fired upon.) If the LRP does
become compromised and engaged, the proximity of the aerial scout group
enables it to act quickly against the enemy.
One fact became evident, all particip<Lnts in the conference were aware of
the shortage of helicopters and recognized the problems the commanders face
in determining proper allocation of th,ese assets. Everyone realized the
importance of getting the most utilizaUon out of the available assets and
stressed the importance of continued ,study of the problem. When discussing
the optimum number of patrols supported by three slicks and a LFT, the
group was able to agree on several points. The limiting factor doesn't
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Part 11 of Conference, 10 Aug 68
appear to be the number of slicks but the number of fire teams available.
The aviators in the group emphasiZ<ed the fact that you do not break up the·
LFT but must employ the gunships together.
3. What modifications to the preSeltlt MTOE would enable the LRP units
to bettl!lr perform their mis sions?
Within the discuuion group were r«'presentatiVE!s of aU three different sized
units: field force, division and se:parate brigade. These were the
recommendations:
a. At field force and division, the LRP Company Operations Officer
should have MOS 2162 (operations) rather than .MOS 1542 to more accurately
reflect hi. duties.
b. The .patrolleaders should be 11B Light Wilapon. Infantrymen in.tead
of llF Operations and Intelligence Sergeant. The. latter MOSincorrectly
puts him in a category where he willl not have the requisite knowledge
required for promotion to the next grade •
. c. The present 05B Radio OperlLtions job can be done by a 11B Infantryman,
as little or no code is used. -Also, the 11B can be awarded the CIB while
the OSB cannot recieve the award.
d. The number of AN/PRC-25 radios is inadequate. The present MTOE
does not take into consideration required radio relays, carc ship radios
and remote for the TOC radio, if r,equired. At field force a minimum of
eight are neededj at division, four; and separate. brigade, four.
e. The number of 292 antennas is not sufficient. At field force. operations
are many times split in four or fiv.! locations. The present allocation is
five for field force and 12 are needed. The divisions and separate brigades
require six more than furnished.
Weapons - The type of enemy positions, type of operation planned and
the AO requires a supply of varied weapons. Most of the time a major
commander will make weapons available regardless of the MTOE. However.
to solve the problem. a weapons petol at the company or detachment headquarters with some of each type of weapon should be created. This would
include such items as the M-79 gnnade launchers. M-l6 machineguns.
silenced pistols and rifles and other special purpose weapons. The CAR-l5
appears to be a popular and desirable weapon and should be available.
However. it is questionable as whether every man should have one. Much
f.
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Part II of Conference. 10 Aug 68
of ita popularity is due to its newness and novelty. The point man and
radio operator should have them to rl!duce the welight they must carry and
because of the convenience offered by their shorter length. Sometimes
the accuracy at long ranges of the M-16 is needed and the M.16 rarely
malfunctions; therefore, it must also be available.
g. There was some question as to whether additional personnel were
required to as sid in the arms room; a TO]; medic to sign for morphine;
to assist with administration; and to provide maintenance for vehicles and
equipment. In some areas of Vietnam it would appear these added personnel
are required, but not as a general ov,erall MTOE change. The commander
must be sympathetic to the individual needs of his LRP unit and provide
this sort of exception. Also, the LRP unit should realize the space problem
and attempt to be austere and reasoruLble in its r.equests.
4. Co.uld .the LRP units be reduced
size and sUll accomplish their present
mi.ssion to the same degree of profici!mcy? Reduced to what strength?
The discussion group concluded the p:resent size of the LRP units is necessary
in order to field the number of teams required in division and separate brigade
operations. The consensus was that
lack of helicopter assets prevented
the effective utilization of all 16 patrols: newly assigned personnel are
undergoing training prior to employmemt; a certa.in number of men are
attending Recondo School; men are on. leave and R&tR: men are ill or in the
. hospital: and there is always a group con stand-down. 1n addition, some units
are charged with training ARVN in LltP techniques. another time consuming
task that reduces available manpower. The consensus was there should be
no reduction in the size of LRPs.
Even though not a part of the basiC qlllMtion, the subject of stand-down time
was discussed. All felt the reasons Sil;and-down is required are obvious.
Men required a certain amount of time, after they leave the bush for refitting
and rest. 'the discussion centered aI'ound the length of time allowed for
stand.down, Most agreed you could
by with periods of 24 to 36 hours
but not for prolonged periods of time. It soon becomes evident that efficiency
begins to drop off rapidly without more of a pericld between patrols. The
general gUideline seems to be a two-day stand-dclwn for a five-day mission.
'this, of course, depends on the situation and the area the individuals are
operating in, In anllwer to a question. the term stand-downwas defined as
time free of all activities - to allow t:lme for resl:, writing letters and
recovery. The actual time between extraction and insertion works out to
be about four days with the two days dter stand-down being used £01' reconnaissance, overflights and planning. It was emphasized that four days is
. considered an absolute minimum between
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Part II of Conference, 10 Aug 68
The ideal number appeared to be between four to six patrols supported by
three slicks and a LFT although tMs figure must be adjusted based upon
the concentration of enemy in the AO. The greater the number of patrols
active in an area the greater the chance of simultaneous contact. The
ideal situation would be one LFT for each patrol in contact. A working
solution appears to be having a LFT available for up to six patrols assuming
if more than one patrol comes under fire, some will be in a position to hold
out while the LF'T support. the othel'S.
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5. What training is required for ne,v members of the unit before operational
use. Is airborne qualification
The group felt the LRP business had grown to such an extent there should be
a stateside school or schools established. They felt the course, more of
a Ranger course, should place emphasis on the practical application of
map reading and on movement through the jungle using a compass. Artillery
adjustment should be covered in deta.n and actual experience given on
adjusting fires. Additional medical training is tteeded Bince when a man is
hit while on a LRP mission there ma.y be a delay until he can be extracted.
At any rate the tea:m has to break cO.ntact before they can even hope to move
to an LZ for a dust-off. They must be completely familiar with the
i:mmediate life saving steps to save that team member until help comes.
Other courses should inc:lude air ope,rations, knowing the capabilities and
limitations of the helicopter and othe,r supporting aircraft.
Air operationsshollid include gunship control and practice at directing an
aircraft to an area. This is a simple thing but it can become difficult if
the team membllr does not know what he is doing. Also to be stressed is
the loading and unloading of the helic C)ptllr.
LZ selection should be covered. Anyone can do it i£ you sit up and orbit
all. area at 800 to 1,000 feet for a lonig period of time. To fly over once
and select a proper LZ takes a lot of skill and practice. Even if .such a school
was established in CONUS there would still be a requirement for a short
in-country orientation for team members. One suggestion was a LRP unit
at field force level in a reasonably
area to which the new members
could be assigned for a short period to actually participate in operations
under an experienced leader. The Recondo course is important and is doing
an outstanding job for the team leaders but space limitations preclude attendance by the majority of the team members who need additional training,
especially whlln first arriving in-country.
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Pa.1 11 or Co..t.re.nc •• 10 Ao. "
n •••oup ..........ftimOll.
III 010.1.111, al.bo."It '1".IIII".UolI. Flut of dl
th.y f.lt LRP. had to "'" cOllold.,.d 011.11 A.my .. 101. 1>&.10 .ad .. ot j ... 1 011
op.utloo. III Vlltia&rn. n.y f.lt WILli \J), E .... Op ....... 101 bit hl .. dend If thto
c.pt.blllty .... tak ....... y. A•• bo",,. lb. , ...... p cont.nd.d tbe .I.born.
'1 ..... Uf!c.Uo .. iI•., ••••••• m.o' •• billty.nd colllld ... c •• It to 1101 Ib.t b.iD,
• Jumpt.. I •• 0 hnpo.tant; It I. lb. m . . . fa"l that ........... p'o"... to
hhn ..U that hit C&II,O Ib ...... b lb. n.l..u., aDd ...... com•• aaN..al l .. " tIM
fur of lo.ru, &II .I.cuft. H. ha ••cc""'plt.b..:l ....... lhl.... that b. had
p.obably f.lt .... beyo",", M. c.po.bUlty. H • •1.0 loa. 1......01 10 pt.y .U... UOII
to d.tall. '1 .... ha'O'. to ......... jumper 0. a halo j .....p .. "hKk M •
• '1" ,"",,"ot to .u .It.oli.... 10 d.tall.
A LRP t.am "'1..1... tbl. m.Uculou,"." I" p ..pt..iq tul ..... po ....nd
.'1"lpm.lIl, I .. plltD4ln,lo, tb. panol, and I .. 1111.111....". "oll."tl.., .nd
•• porth.,. In lb. CillO pro,n,m.1I of lb. MlKE fo.c .. , Woblle Strlk.
Fo.c .. &.l1l:I •• COA I1Ilit . . . . "lit 1b.0Ulb jump tnllll..,. Tb. m&ll ..bo to
cocky ........ b to jump _t of .... hpl ......ill probably bit mo....IW", to
_ ... \AIO that bollt I .....my t ... lto.,. S ...... l.1t WI .,.d.. al;OIl from
1hc","",0 Scbool .bould bit • p... eq,uldl. fo, .hbo .... pay ""t Ibe majority
...... 1Ip""".d to lhl.. Ilac. th., . . . . only a Um.lt.d ....... b ... 01. .pac . . .1 th.
a.co..!o 5ch....l.
Tb. "pup co"ered m.ny f.c.u ol LaP t.chfliqu ...nOI c ....... d b, otber ' ..... pl
001.01 0 .. th. Co .........1O of .om. of the p"",,,,, •• pukltu.
an<!."
• ..... 01100 ...... mad. to 10l.,ut. Aa VN. }<;It C.uo .. SC .... t .... 01 Wo .. ' ....... d •
.... LaPI. Tbl. hal the .01".",••• of p.o"ldl.., th..., .ddIUo...1 t,.I.I..,
·pUI.. for tb. ".y th.y m".1 t •.klt over mo •• of tI•• fI,btLII,; It c"u
." ,b. _ber of US "OOPI rIO'Iu,,,"d; ."" if tb.y ... f.om !hit •••• I ..
.. !hOI LRJ> oper.t ... tb.y p.ovld. 'O'o.1u.bl. knowl.d,. 011 ternln. Aloo
I.RP :'udu by .cc.pd.., th. . . pltopllt In bh ulILt b ••• t.lki .. , point
btl commander. H. ".11 point o"t he h •• 'ltduced tbe qu ... tlty of US '.oop.
ed ..... , ,b•• ...,.Lnln. troop. ouded mUA\ b. of tb. hI,bul qu.Uty 10
malntalnl.., ,e'lul •• d .t....... d ••
. . . . . . . hOA . . . . to I"un I•• ,,.. "",I. ;11 tbe ....... m.nII,.. •• the
Th. VC p.obabl, b ..... bite .......cel.. tom.d to our m.thod of ".Inl
th... are u.c •• uLnl •• porte of c _ e r pIotrol .e""i'y 0 .. lb.L.
lIurtl ... lar,u ,.oup. a, u"",,om 101•• v.L •• b. can bit k.pl olJ
hi. 'ltdml'l"" b .. b..... mploy.-d .. lib I"""'" by unlll t,om Ibe
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Part 11 of Conference, 10 Aug 68
Some members of the group recommended u8ing the LltPs to make contact
with the enemy, engaging him and then bringing in large supporting groups
employing a pile on technique. The reaction to this was varied many feeling
this defeated the entire idea of the LRP while others felt it was one method
of engaging an increasingly deceptive enemy.
The majority of the conferees felt responsibility for employment of the LRP8
.hou1d 'rest with the S2/02 shop. They felt they best understood the patrols I
advantages and limitation. and gained more productive results from the, '
effort.. The majority preferred to work for the 02 at dividon rather than
.being employed at the brigade level;
There wa. quite 11 bit of dilcuuion on the ule of a clre lhip on LRP operation••
A portion of the group felt the LRP commander .hould run the patrol aince
he wa. the man on the ground. It was hh rupon.ibilityto call tor gun. hlp.
and artlllery and control their tire. Another group recommended conducting
the operation from a clre .hip lince the commander in that ahip had a better
g:&'a'P o,f the ovenll .ituation. There wa. no agreement on thil problem.
One problem on which all agreed was that the UP commander wa. the be.t
one to determine the size of the LRP, the length of time they .tay hl an
and the length of time they are on stand.down. They allo felt many
placed too much empha.b on kill ratio forgetting the primary mi.
LRP i. to obtain information on the enemy and avoid contact. Some
. 'an effort 'to ke'ep the men a1e'rt and to keep them le.11ng they are
to the fight allow them to make contact on the fb'ill day. 'rhi.
the form of an ambu8h during the last houl'l of thew •• ion. It
a. a tolilie on the mambflu .&I1d appeul . "to l',aI.'etheil' morale.
To reiniol'ce previous speakers the group endol'led the
Recondo.type Ichool in CONUS to train men for LRP duty.
of such training were covered in paragraph 5.
Finally the group pointed out the LRP represents an effective group
economy of force miuion.. 'rhey can effectively monitor many of
remote portions of the country and provide a definite asset.
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