Sovereign Default and Recovery Rates, 1983-2010

Transcription

GLOBAL CREDIT POLICY
MAY 10, 2011
Sovereign Default and Recovery Rates,
1983-2010
SPECIAL COMMENT
Table of Contents:
INTRODUCTION
DATA AND METHODOLOGY
TRENDS IN CREDIT QUALITY: THE
DISTRIBUTION OF SOVEREIGN
RATINGS
TRENDS IN CREDIT QUALITY: RATING
ACTIONS AND MIGRATION RATES
HISTORICAL SOVEREIGN DEFAULTS
SOVEREIGN CUMULATIVE DEFAULT
RATES
RECOVERY RATES OF DEFAULTED
SOVEREIGN ISSUERS
RATING PERFORMANCE MEASURES
MOODY’S RELATED RESEARCH
APPENDIX I – CIRCUMSTANCES
SURROUNDING INDIVIDUAL
SOVEREIGN BOND DEFAULTS
APPENDIX II – PRICES OF DEFAULTED
SOVEREIGN BONDS
APPENDIX III – SOVEREIGN BOND
RATING HISTORIES
2
3
This is Moody’s seventh annual report of sovereign bond issuers’ default and rating
experience. Our findings are as follows:
»
From among more than 100 Moody’s-rated sovereigns, Jamaica was the only one to
default in 2010 as the country underwent a debt exchange in order to reduce the fiscal
burden of its domestic debt. Jamaica is the fourth sovereign default in the past six years
and the 14th since 1983.
»
The recovery rate on Jamaica’s bonds was 90%, substantially higher than the historical
average recovery rate on sovereign bonds of 53% on an issuer-weighted basis and 31%
on a value-weighted basis.
»
Sovereign upgrades in 2010 exceeded downgrades, reversing the trend of the past couple
of years. At the issuer level, there were twice as many upgrades as downgrades, returning
the downgrade-to-upgrade ratio – which peaked during the height of the global financial
crisis – back towards the average level reached between the mid-1990s and the start of
the crisis. However, corporate downgrades still exceeded corporate upgrades in 2010.
5
6
9
12
13
15
16
17
29
Sovereign and Corporate Drift
31
30
Sovereign drift
Corporate drift
20
10
Analyst Contacts:
NEW YORK
0
1.212.553.1653
Merxe Tudela
1.212.553.7716
Vice President
[email protected]
Elena Duggar
1.212.553.1911
Group Credit Officer-Sovereign Risk
[email protected]
Albert Metz
1.212.553.4867
Managing Director-Credit Policy Research
[email protected]
Bart Oosterveld
1.212.553.7914
Managing Director-Sovereign Risk Group
[email protected]
-10
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-30
-40
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
»
In 1983, all 12 rated sovereign issuers were investment grade. Since then the sovereign rating mix has
gradually drifted downwards, so that by the end of 1999 only 58% of sovereign issuers had
investment-grade ratings. Over the period 2000-06, that share climbed back up modestly to 64%,
falling back to 61% during the recent global financial crisis.
»
Sovereigns rated Caa-C have experienced a larger number of upgrades than have similarly rated
corporates. This is because, once their defaults are cured, most sovereigns are eventually upgraded.
»
A comparison between sovereign and corporate default rates shows that sovereign default rates have
been, on average, modestly lower than those for corporates, overall and in terms of like-for-like rating
symbols. However, the differences are not significant because the overall size of the sovereign sample
is small and as default risk has been highly correlated across emerging market sovereign issuers.
Introduction
This year’s sovereign default study examines the rating histories and default experience of 108 Moody’srated governments issuing local and/or foreign currency bonds. This is an increase of four sovereigns
compared with the 2009 study (Exhibit 1). As has been the case during the last decade, the initial ratings
assigned to these sovereign issuers were in the middle/upper range of the speculative-grade category, thus
contributing to the downward drift in the sovereign rating mix since Moody’s started rating sovereigns.
EXHIBIT 1
Coverage of Moody’s-Rated Sovereign Issuers Included in the Study, Rating Withdrawals in
Parenthesis
2
MAY 10, 2011
Initial Rating
Date
Number Of
Rated
Issuer
Issuers
1949-1985
12
United States, Panama, Australia, New Zealand, Denmark, Canada, Venezuela, Austria, Finland,
Sweden, Norway, United Kingdom, Japan, Switzerland, (Panama, Venezuela)
1986
19
Argentina, Brazil, Germany, Italy, Malaysia, Netherlands, Portugal
1987
21
Ireland, Venezuela
1988
26
Belgium, China, France, Hong Kong, Spain
1989
29
Iceland, Luxembourg, Thailand
1990
31
Mexico, Micronesia
1991
31
1992
32
Turkey
1993
37
Colombia, Czech Republic, Philippines, Trinidad & Tobago, Uruguay
1994
44
Barbados, Bermuda, Greece, Indonesia, Malta, Pakistan, South Africa
1995
46
Israel, Poland
1996
58
Bahrain, Bulgaria, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Lithuania, Mauritius, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Slovenia,
United Arab Emirates, Panama
1997
70
Bahamas, Costa Rica, Croatia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Lebanon, Macao, Moldova, Oman,
Romania, Turkmenistan
1998
86
Bolivia, Cyprus, Dominican Republic, Honduras, Hungary, India, Jamaica, Korea, Nicaragua, Papau
New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Singapore, Slovakia, Taiwan, Ukraine
1999
96
Belize, Chile, Egypt, Estonia, Fiji Islands, Iran, Latvia, Morocco, Qatar, Tunisia
2000
96
SPECIAL COMMENT: SOVEREIGN DEFAULT AND RECOVERY RATES, 1983-2010
EXHIBIT 1
Coverage of Moody’s-Rated Sovereign Issuers Included in the Study, Rating Withdrawals in
Parenthesis
2001
96
2002
96
Botswana, (Iran)
2003
95
(Micronesia)
2004
97
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Suriname
2005
99
Mongolia, Vietnam
2006
101
Armenia, Azerbaijan
2007
105
Albania, Belarus, Cambodia, St. Vincent & the Grenadines
2008
106
Montenegro
2009
105
(Moldova)
2010
108
Angola, Bangladesh, Georgia, Sri Lanka, Moldova, (Turkmenistan)
Exhibit 2 shows the geographical coverage of Moody’s sovereign bond ratings. The share of developing
and emerging market countries has been increasing from around 20% in the mid-1980s to more than
75% today. The Americas comprised 25% of Moody’s rated sovereign issuers in 2010, which also
accounts for 35% of all outstanding general government debt in 2010; Europe represented 41% (and
30% in terms of government debt outstanding), the Middle East & Africa 14% (1% of government debt),
and Asia Pacific 20% (34% of government debt).
EXHIBIT 2
Regional Distribution of Moody’s-Rated Sovereign Issuers in 2010
Sub-Saharan Africa
4%
MENA
10%
South Pacific
4%
North America
2%
Caribbean
7%
Latin America
16%
South Asia
4%
Southeast Asia
6%
Western Europe
17%
Northeast Asia
6%
CIS
7%
Central & Eastern Europe
17%
Data and Methodology
While Moody's assigns a variety of sovereign ratings, this study focuses on sovereign bond ratings, as
represented by either the sovereign’s foreign currency (FC) bond rating or local currency (LC) bond
rating, whichever is lower. 1 Similarly, we consider whether a sovereign defaults on any of its bond
obligations, regardless of currency.
1
3
Specifically, we construct the sovereign’s rating history by tracking its minimum outstanding bond rating, regardless of which currency it references.
MAY 10, 2011
Historically, Moody’s has often distinguished between a government’s LC and FC bond rating, with any
gap usually in favor of the local currency rating. 2 However, this practice has gradually changed over time
and today such rating gaps are infrequent. The evolution of this approach reflects global economic and
market developments. As both current and capital account mobility have increased, as currency markets
have deepened, and as the investor base has broadened, the justifications for distinguishing between local
and foreign currency government bond ratings have weakened. Crucially, it is far more likely than it used
to be that a problem servicing debt in one currency will spill over and affect a government’s ability to
service its debt in another. As discussed below, a number of rated sovereigns have cured defaults within a
grace period, but with one exception (Peru), they all default without cure shortly thereafter.
Sovereign ratings are withdrawn very rarely: since 1983 Moody’s has only withdrawn ratings six times.
Both FC and LC ratings are maintained even when there is no outstanding debt. Unlike corporates,
countries do not merge, shift from public to private sources of capital, or go bankrupt.
Moody's definition of sovereign default includes the following types of default events:
1. A missed or delayed disbursement of a contractually obligated interest or principal payment
(excluding missed payments cured within a contractually allowed grace period), as defined in credit
agreements and indentures.
2. A distressed exchange whereby:
i) the issuer offers creditors a new or restructured debt, or a new package of securities, cash or assets,
that amount to a diminished financial obligation relative to the original obligation; and
ii) the exchange has the effect of allowing the obligor to avoid a payment default in the future.
This definition is intended to capture events that change the relationship between the debt holder and
debt issuer from the relationship that was originally contracted, and which subjects the debt holder to an
economic loss. 3
Although rare in practice, certain government actions which change the originally contracted relationship
between the government and its creditors and which impose an economic loss on the creditor could also
constitute a default. For example, unlike a general tax on financial wealth, the imposition of a tax by a
sovereign on the coupon or principal payment on a specific class of government debt instruments (even if
retroactive) would represent a default. 4 Unilateral removal of inflation indexation on inflation-indexed
bonds and forced maturity extensions would also represent defaults. Likewise, a forced redenomination of
debt instruments imposing an economic loss on creditors would also represent a default. In some of these
atypical cases, government actions might be motivated by fairness or other considerations rather than
inability or unwillingness to pay.
2
3
4
4
In most cases the LC bond rating was the same or higher than the sovereign's FC bond rating due to the fact that a government could generally "print" money if necessary to
service LC debts and avoid default, but could find it very difficult, at times, to obtain sufficient foreign exchange to service FC debt. Currently, only India has FC bonds
which are rated higher than its LC bonds. For more details, see Moody’s Sovereign Methodology Update, “Narrowing the Gap – a Clarification of Moody’s Approach to
Local vs. Foreign Currency Government Bond Ratings”, February 2010.
We do not consider a general inflation to be a default event.
The credit event in Turkey in 1999, detailed in Appendix I, although unrated by Moody’s at the time, is an example of such an atypical default.
MAY 10, 2011
For the purpose of calculating issuer-based default rates, we define a sovereign default to have occurred
whenever a country defaults on any of its bonds. Moody’s does not consider missed interest payments
that are fully cured within contractually specified grace periods to be defaults. 5
Trends in Credit Quality: The Distribution of Sovereign Ratings
As shown in Exhibit 3, by the end of 2010, the share of investment-grade sovereign issuers had declined
to little over 60%. While all rated sovereign issuers in 1983 were investment grade, over the years riskier
emerging market countries gained access to debt markets. As more sovereign issuers obtained Moody’s
ratings, the share of speculative-grade ratings rose.
EXHIBIT 3
Rating Distribution of Sovereign Issuers on Selected Dates
1983
1990
1995
2000
2005
2010
Aaa
75%
40%
20%
14%
20%
15%
Aa
25%
30%
26%
14%
5%
15%
A
0%
17%
20%
13%
24%
13%
Baa
0%
3%
13%
21%
14%
19%
Ba
0%
7%
15%
17%
15%
16%
B
0%
3%
7%
16%
16%
22%
Caa-C
0%
0%
0%
5%
5%
1%
Investment-Grade
100%
90%
78%
62%
64%
61%
Speculative-Grade
0%
10%
22%
38%
36%
39%
More recently, the sovereign rating mix drifted upward between 2001 and 2006. The share of sovereigns
in the Aaa to single-A categories climbed back to about 50% by the end of 2006, that is, to about the
same levels seen in the mid-1990s. However, the 2007-09 global financial crisis has eroded those gains.
It has also changed the distribution within the investment-grade category: the proportion of sovereigns
rated Aa has increased, both because some advanced economies were downgraded from Aaa and because
of upgrades into the Aa category for emerging market economies.
The rating distributions of sovereign and corporate bond issuers as of year-end 2010 are compared in
Exhibit 4. The share of issuers rated Aaa is substantially larger for sovereigns than it is for corporates,
while the proportion of sovereigns rated A and Caa-C is smaller. On average, however, sovereign issuers
have higher ratings.
5
5
A cured grace-period default is often shortly followed by a debt restructuring with most of the loss to investors borne at this stage by means of a lengthening of maturity
and/or a lowering of the coupon. However, as in the case of Peru, a fully cured default within its grace period yields virtually no losses to investors when it is not followed by
another default event shortly afterwards. In other words, the presence of a grace-period default often signals the materialization of a future loss, but is not a necessary
condition on its own.
MAY 10, 2011
EXHIBIT 4
Rating Distribution of Sovereign and Corporate Issuers at the End of 2010
Sovereign
Corporate
30%
25%
20%
15%
10%
5%
0%
Aaa
Aa
A
Baa
Ba
B
Caa-C
Trends in Credit Quality: Rating Actions and Migration Rates
Changes in the distribution of ratings over time can occur either because of ratings drift or because of the
entry or exit of issuers. This section focuses exclusively on rating changes.
There were as many rating actions in 2010 as there were in 2009 and twice as many as occurred in 2008,
impacting 25% of all rated sovereigns (Exhibit 5). The rating volatility (defined as the sum of upgrades
and downgrades over a 12-month period relative to the total number of sovereign issuers at the beginning
of the period) increased rapidly from the start of 2009 and has remained high through 2010.
EXHIBIT 5
Sovereign Rating Drift and Volatility
Drift
Volatility
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0.0
-0.1
-0.2
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010
While the increase in rating volatility in 2009 was coupled with a gradual downward rating drift overall
(net percentage of upgrades relative to downgrades), the increase in the volatility in 2010 came with a
shift towards a more positive, upward drift (Exhibit 5). In other words, in 2010 the number of upgrades
exceeded the number of downgrades – indeed, at the issuer level there were twice as many upgrades as
downgrades. The downgrades-to-upgrades ratio, which had peaked by mid-2009 at above 2, has now
6
MAY 10, 2011
returned to more normal levels (about 0.7 on average), aided by both fewer downgrades and more
upgrades. The same pattern was seen among corporate issuers.
However, this increase in credit quality was not uniformly distributed across regions (Exhibit 6). The vast
majority (70%) of downgrades occurred in Europe, 6 while 56% of upgrades were implemented among
sovereigns in the Americas region and a further 39% among sovereigns in both Asia-Pacific and the
Middle East and Africa regions. 7 This meant that the median rating for Europe at the end of 2010 was
closer to A2, slightly lower than the A1 median we recorded for the previous nine years. In contrast, the
median rating for the Americas region rose by one notch to Ba1 for the first time since the end of 1998.
EXHIBIT 6
Regional Distribution of Upgrades and Downgrades of Sovereign Issuers in 2010
America
Europe
Middle East & Africa
Asia Pacific
20
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
Upgrades
Downgrades
In the 2009 sovereign default study, we explained how ratings in Latin America, Asia-Pacific, the Middle
East and Africa proved resilient to the 2007-09 global financial crisis. Indeed, the sovereign upgrades in
2010 were driven by prospects for sustained economic growth and resilience of the financial sector. In the
Arabian Gulf, buoyant oil prices and accumulated financial assets enabled most Gulf states to maintain a
degree of fiscal stimulus in 2010 without weakening their fiscal position. These countries’ banking sectors
also experienced less of a credit shock during the crisis, and the volatility in the European financial
markets in 2010 did not have a significant effect on the average cost of funding in the Middle East. In
both Asia-Pacific and Latin America, sovereign upgrades were also driven by prudent fiscal and monetary
policies as well as by structural reforms across several countries. In Asia, economic growth was supported
by spillover effects from China’s growth, while countries in Latin America enjoyed spillover effects from
Brazil’s economic strength. International debt forgiveness, 8 on the other hand, helped Nicaragua and
Bolivia to improve their key debt metrics. The sovereign upgrade of the Dominican Republic was
additionally driven by favorable developments in the country’s institutional framework (e.g. strengthened
bank supervision and effective enforcement of prudent regulations) and official efforts that were effective
in developing a domestic market for government bonds.
The 2009 sovereign study explained that, although the US was the epicentre of the global crisis, Europe
was more deeply affected as a result of its economic openness, mutual trade and financial
interdependence, and relatively higher reliance on banks than capital markets as the source of credit. As a
6
7
8
7
Greece (twice), Hungary, Ireland (twice), Portugal and Spain, in Europe and Bahrain, Jamaica and Vietnam, elsewhere, were downgraded in 2010.
Bolivia, Chile, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Jamaica, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay and Uruguay in the Americas; China, Hong Kong, India and Korea in
Asia-Pacific; Lebanon, Oman and Saudi Arabia in the Middle East; and Turkey in Europe, had their sovereign bond ratings upgraded in 2010.
As part of the IMF/World Bank Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative and the G8 Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI).
MAY 10, 2011
result, Europe was the main focus of sovereign downgrades in 2009, as had been the case in 2008. Further
downgrades to several European sovereigns in 2010 reflected (a) their relatively weak potential growth
prospects over the next three to five years, as they transition away from their focus on sectors that had
been the engines of growth in the years preceding the financial crisis (i.e. banking, construction and real
estate sectors); and (b) the expectation that interest rates will rise from their historically low levels as a
result of concerns about inflation and credit risk.
Other factors also contributed to the renewed downgrades in Europe in 2010. For example, Greece was
downgraded twice by a total of five notches in 2010 to the top of the speculative-grade category because
the risk of default was considered to be inconsistent with an investment-grade rating. In spite of the
IMF/euro area support program, which substantially reduced the risk of a liquidity-driven default over the
next few years, the adjustments needed to stabilize debt metrics were unprecedented and the risks of the
program implementation substantial. 9
Ireland was the other European country that suffered a sizeable multi-notch downgrade, although it
remained within the investment-grade category at Baa1. In addition to the reasons already mentioned
and common to other European countries, Ireland’s six-notch downgrade was driven in part by the
repeated crystallization of bank-related contingent liabilities on the government balance sheet; the
continued severe downturn in the financial services and real estate sectors; the ongoing contraction in
private sector credit; the required fiscal austerity program, which was likely to weigh on domestic demand;
and the significant deterioration of the government’s financial strength. 10
Jamaica was the only default in 2010 and the fourth sovereign default over the past six years. Moody’s
considered Jamaica’s debt exchange, which was completed in February 2010, as an event of default (see
next section for a more detail explanation of the circumstances surrounding the default).
Separately, in 2010, we also withdrew all ratings on the government of the Republic of Turkmenistan due
to insufficient or otherwise inadequate information to allow us to maintain a credit rating. We first rated
the government of Turkmenistan in January 2002 when we assigned a B2 issuer rating to its local
currency obligations.
However, in 2010, we also assigned first-time sovereign ratings of B1 to both Angola and Sri Lanka and
Ba3 to Bangladesh and Georgia. Additionally, Moody’s re-assigned a B3 rating to Moldova after having
previously withdrawn all its ratings and country ceilings in 2009 due to lack of adequate information.
Rating migration matrices offer a more complete picture of changes in credit quality over time. Exhibit 7
shows average 12-month migration rates by rating category since 1983. Each cell in the matrix shows the
average fraction of issuers that held a given row's rating at the beginning of the measurement period and
the column rating at the end of the period, including defaults and withdrawn ratings.
The largest values in the transition matrix are along the diagonal, as the most likely rating for an issuer at
the end of a given 12-month period during the 1983-2010 is the rating with which the issuer began that
period. By contrast, those elements that are off the diagonal reflect transitions to higher (the triangle
below the diagonal) or lower (the triangle above the diagonal) rating categories within a 12-month period.
The further one moves away from the diagonal, the smaller the migration rates, reflecting a relatively low
9
10
8
For more information on the drivers of Greece’s downgrade, please refer to the Special Comment: “Key Drivers of Greece’s Downgrade to Ba1”.
For more information please refer to: “Key Drivers of Moody’s Decision to Downgrade Ireland to Baa1 from Aa2”.
MAY 10, 2011
historical frequency of issuers moving across more than one rating category during the course of 12
months.
As shown in Exhibit 7, rating changes have on average been somewhat less frequent for sovereign issuers
than they have for corporate issuers. For example, on average, only 3.2% of Aaa-rated sovereign issuers
have been downgraded in any given 12 months compared to 9.8% (or 13.8% if we also count
withdrawals) for Aaa-rated corporate issuers. Moreover, sovereign ratings also appear more stable than
corporate ratings in the other investment-grade rating categories, with the differences marginally
narrowing as we approach the Baa category. The average stability of sovereign ratings derives from an
overwhelmingly lower historical probability of being downgraded within a 12-month period relative to
corporate issuers.
EXHIBIT 7
Average 12-Month Rating Migration Rates (1983-2010)
RATING FROM:
Sovereign Issuers
Aaa
Aa
A
Baa
Ba
B
Caa-C
Corporate Issuers
Aaa
Aa
A
Baa
Ba
B
Caa-C
RATING TO:
Aaa
Aa
A
Baa
Ba
B
Caa-C
Default Withdrawn
96.78%
5.02%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
3.04%
92.85%
4.75%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.05%
1.05%
91.41%
8.56%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.12%
0.21%
2.94%
86.76%
7.51%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.53%
2.63%
86.04%
5.37%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.76%
5.04%
87.28%
29.55%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.23%
3.13%
46.82%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.77%
3.37%
23.64%
0.02%
0.87%
0.37%
1.29%
0.40%
0.85%
0.00%
86.24%
0.89%
0.06%
0.04%
0.01%
0.01%
0.00%
9.29%
84.95%
2.73%
0.20%
0.06%
0.04%
0.02%
0.45%
8.23%
85.82%
4.64%
0.38%
0.13%
0.02%
0.01%
0.39%
5.54%
83.72%
5.72%
0.34%
0.13%
0.03%
0.04%
0.53%
4.09%
73.88%
4.73%
0.43%
0.00%
0.02%
0.13%
0.90%
7.94%
73.24%
7.67%
0.00%
0.01%
0.04%
0.23%
0.71%
6.58%
62.03%
0.00%
0.02%
0.06%
0.20%
1.14%
4.23%
16.87%
3.97%
5.45%
5.09%
5.99%
10.17%
10.72%
12.83%
Among speculative-grade issuers, sovereign issuers rated Caa-C have experienced a larger number of
upgrades than have similarly rated corporates. 11 The higher rate of upgrade among the lowest-rated
sovereigns reflects the different dynamics of sovereign and corporate ratings: once their defaults have been
cured, most sovereigns are eventually upgraded. In contrast, many corporations that are downgraded to
Caa or below ultimately restructure in bankruptcy and have their ratings withdrawn.
10F
Historical Sovereign Defaults
Jamaica’s debt exchange, completed in February 2010, represented an event of default. This was the only
default event in 2010 and just the fourth sovereign default in the past six years.
Over the previous years, attempts to place Jamaica’s public debt on a more sustainable path had proved
unsuccessful. The ratio of public debt to GDP had remained above 100% over the past decade and the
11
9
A smaller sample size can magnify such rating changes.
MAY 10, 2011
debt-to-revenue ratio stood at around 400%. The cost of servicing Jamaica’s debt was estimated at over
55% of central government revenues and 16% of GDP. Jamaica’s government had never defaulted
before. Instead it was trying to run primary surpluses in recent years, some on the order of 10% of GDP,
but at the cost of slashing public investment and contributing to the very low economic growth. GDP
growth averaged barely 1% annually prior to the default.
The debt exchange did not involve external debt, but it included the entire stock of marketable domestic
debt, worth around 60% of GDP or 700 billion Jamaican dollars. The exchange proceeded in an orderly
fashion with 99% participation. Jamaica’s government bond ratings had been lowered to Caa1 at the end
of 2009 in expectation of a possible debt restructuring. At the announcement of the debt exchange in
January 2010, the local currency bond rating was placed at Caa2 to reflect the 20% loss implied by the
terms of the debt exchange.
Indeed, the debt exchange provided for zero reduction in principal, a cut of the average coupon to 11%
from 17%, and an extension of the average debt maturity to five years from two. It caused relatively little
dislocation to the economy and the financial sector due to the majority of the debt being held by a few
local financial institutions and the exchange being designed to strike a balance between a meaningful cash
flow alleviation and preserving the health of the banking system.
On March 2010, Moody’s upgraded Jamaica’s government bond ratings to B3, balancing the fiscal relief
following the debt exchange and the economic and financial vulnerabilities. Jamaica’s overall debt burden
is still relatively high – the debt-to-GDP ratio remains at 113% and interest payments represent 42% of
government revenues in 2011.
As for previous defaults, Exhibit 8 provides a chronological summary of historical Moody’s-rated
sovereign defaults, the bond-default volumes associated with these defaults, and the circumstances
surrounding the defaults.
EXHIBIT 8
Moody’s-Rated Sovereign Bond Defaults since 1983
Default
Date
Country
Jul-98
Venezuela
Aug-98 Russia
MAY 10, 2011
Rating at
Default Comments
$270
Ba2
Defaulted on domestic currency bonds in 1998, although the default was cured
within a short period of time.
$72,709
Caa1
Missed payments first on local currency Treasury obligations. Later a debt service
moratorium was extended to foreign currency obligations issued in Russia but
mostly held by foreign investors. Subsequently, failed to pay principal on MINFIN
III foreign currency bonds. Debts were restructured in Aug 1999 and Feb 2000.
Sep-98 Ukraine
$1,271
B3
Jul-99
Pakistan
$1,627
Caa1
Aug-99 Ecuador
$6,604
B1
Missed payment was followed by a distressed exchange; over 90% of bonds were
restructured.
Jan-00
$1,064
Caa3
Defaulted on DM-denominated Eurobonds in Feb 2000 and defaulted on USDdenominated bonds in Jan 2000. Offered to exchange bonds with longer-term and
lower coupon. The conversion was accepted by a majority of bondholders.
$4,870
Ba3
Peru missed payment on its Brady Bonds but subsequently paid approximately $80
Ukraine
Sep-00 Peru
10
Total
Defaulted
Debt
($ Millions)
Moratorium on debt service for bearer bonds owned by anonymous entities. Only
those entities willing to identify themselves and convert to local currency accounts
were eligible for debt repayments, which amounted to a distressed exchange.
Pakistan missed an interest payment in Nov 1998 but cured the default
subsequently within the grace period (within 4 days). Shortly, thereafter, it
defaulted again and resolved that default via a distressed exchange which was
completed in 1999.
EXHIBIT 8
Moody’s-Rated Sovereign Bond Defaults since 1983
Default
Date
Country
Total
Defaulted
Debt
($ Millions)
Rating at
Default Comments
million in interest payments to cure the default, within the 30-day grace
period.
Nov-01 Argentina
$82,268
Caa3
Declared it would miss payment on foreign debt in November 2001. Actual
payment missed on Jan 3, 2002. Debt was restructured through a distressed
exchange offering where the bondholders received haircuts of approximately 70%.
Jun-02
Moldova
$145
Caa1
Missed payment on the bond in June 2001 but cured default shortly thereafter.
Afterwards, it began gradually buying back its bonds, but in June 2002, after having
bought back about 50% of its bonds, it defaulted again on the remaining $70
million of its outstanding issue.
Jul-03
Nicaragua
$320
Caa1
In July 2003, Nicaragua completed a distressed exchange of CENI bonds (which
were initially issued as Central Bank recapitalization bonds in the 2000 banking
crisis and which were denominated in US dollars and payable in local currency)
held by a few domestic banks. The exchange reduced the interest rate paid on the
bonds from 15.3%-21.0% to 8.3-10.0% and extended the maturity from five to
ten years. Another debt exchange of the same bonds (face value US$295.7mn at
that time, held by two domestic banks) followed in June 2008, when the maturity
was extended further from ten to twenty years and the interest rate was reduced
to about 5%. The 2008 exchange involved 12.5% of the total debt and a 50% NPV
loss.
May-03 Uruguay
$5,744
B3
Contagion from Argentina debt crisis in 2001 led to a currency crisis in Uruguay. To
restore debt-sustainability, Uruguay completed a distressed exchange with
bondholders that led to extension of maturity by five years.
Apr-05 Dominican
Republic
$1,622
B3
After several grace period defaults (missed payments cured within the grace
period), the country executed an exchange offer in which old bonds were swapped
for new bonds with a five-year maturity extension, but the same coupon and
principal.
$242
Caa3
Belize announced a distressed exchange of its external bonds for new bonds due in
2029 with a face value of U.S.$ 546.8. The new bonds are denominated in U.S.
dollars and provide for step-up coupons that have been set at 4.25% per annum
for the first three years after issuance. When the collective action clause in one of
Belize's existing bonds is taken into account, the total amount covered by this
financial restructuring represents 98.1% of the eligible claims.
Dec-08 Ecuador
$3,210
Caa1
In November 2008, Ecuador missed an interest payment of $30.6 million on its
$510 million of 12% global bonds due in 2012. Additionally, a $135 million interest
payment on the 2030 global bonds ($2.7 billion) was missed in February 2009. The
authorities announced that the 2012 and the 2030 securities are “illegal” and
“illegitimate.” The restructuring plan announced in May 2009 included a 65%
haircut on the face value of the bonds and Ecuador bought back 91% of the
defaulted foreign bonds.
Feb-10
$7,900
Caa1
In February 2010, Jamaica completed a debt exchange for its entire stock of
marketable domestic debt, including J$234.9bn of fixed-rate bonds, J$375.9bn of
variable rate bonds, and J$90.6bn of US dollar-indexed domestic bonds, issued
prior to 31 December 2009. The exchange replaced 350 old bonds with 23 new
benchmark bonds (9 fixed-rate bonds, 9 variable rate, 3 US dollar bonds and 2 CPIlinked bonds). The terms of the exchange provided for zero reduction in principal, a
cut of the average coupon to around 11% from 17%, and an extension of the
average debt maturity to about five years from two. The exchange entailed about
20% NPV loss. Participation was 99%.
Dec-06 Belize
Jamaica
Note: The case of Peru represents a grace-period default and is shown in the table for completeness but does not enter the default rate calculations.
Although our sample begins in 1983, there were no Moody’s-rated sovereign bond defaults until 1998. A
mixture of cooling global economic conditions, unfavorable market sentiment after the Asian crisis, and
external shocks, as well as an increase in the share of speculative-grade sovereign bond issuers in the mid1990s produced five Moody's-rated sovereign bond defaults in 1998-1999: Russia, Pakistan, Ukraine,
11
MAY 10, 2011
Venezuela and Ecuador. Interestingly, even though many countries were battered by the currency crisis of
1998, not one Asian country actually defaulted on its government bonds. 12 The largest default of 1998
was that of Russia as the country suffered a currency, banking and fiscal crisis, following weak oil and
non-ferrous metals prices, unfavorable market sentiment after the Asian crisis, and unsustainable
government budget policies.
During 2000-2009, there have been seven additional defaults, led by Argentina's US$82 billion default in
2001 which spilled over into Uruguay two years later. Ecuador’s default in 2008 represented more a
problem of “willingness to pay” than “capacity to pay” as the government’s decision to default was based
on ideological and political grounds and was not related to immediate liquidity and solvency issues.
Appendix I provides more details on events leading to the defaults listed in Exhibit 8, as well as their
eventual resolutions. 13 Appendix I also provides details on recent unrated defaults, such as the default of
the Seychelles during 2008.
Sovereign Cumulative Default Rates
EXHIBIT 9
Issuer-Weighted Cumulative Default Rates (1983-2010)
Year 1
Year 2
Year 3
Year 4
Year 5
Year 6
Year 7
Year 8
Year 9
Year 10
Sovereign Issuers
Aaa
Aa
A
Baa
Ba
B
Caa-C
Investment-Grade
Speculative-Grade
All
0.000%
0.000%
0.000%
0.000%
0.769%
3.391%
23.636%
0.000%
2.793%
0.844%
0.000%
0.000%
0.000%
0.476%
1.746%
7.039%
27.727%
0.098%
5.035%
1.581%
0.000%
0.000%
0.000%
0.997%
3.433%
9.204%
32.823%
0.204%
7.077%
2.253%
0.000%
0.000%
0.000%
1.570%
5.349%
12.110%
32.823%
0.318%
9.305%
2.977%
0.000%
0.000%
0.000%
2.207%
7.435%
15.096%
32.823%
0.442%
11.651%
3.736%
0.000%
0.000%
0.000%
2.855%
8.949%
17.986%
32.823%
0.566%
13.625%
4.380%
0.000%
0.000%
0.000%
2.855%
11.118%
20.095%
32.823%
0.566%
15.674%
4.946%
0.000%
0.000%
0.000%
2.855%
13.951%
21.277%
32.823%
0.566%
17.780%
5.515%
0.000%
0.000%
0.000%
2.855%
16.416%
22.735%
32.823%
0.566%
19.778%
6.029%
0.000%
0.000%
0.000%
2.855%
18.882%
24.590%
32.823%
0.566%
21.924%
6.549%
Corporate Issuers
Aaa
Aa
A
Baa
Ba
B
Caa-C
Investment-Grade
Speculative-Grade
All
0.000%
0.023%
0.062%
0.202%
1.197%
4.466%
18.030%
0.095%
4.944%
1.819%
0.016%
0.066%
0.200%
0.561%
3.437%
10.524%
30.037%
0.274%
10.195%
3.717%
0.016%
0.116%
0.414%
0.998%
6.183%
16.526%
39.612%
0.508%
15.233%
5.485%
0.048%
0.202%
0.623%
1.501%
9.067%
21.774%
47.373%
0.769%
19.671%
6.988%
0.086%
0.291%
0.853%
2.060%
11.510%
26.524%
53.882%
1.054%
23.477%
8.241%
0.132%
0.351%
1.099%
2.636%
13.757%
31.034%
58.064%
1.343%
26.820%
9.303%
0.182%
0.388%
1.371%
3.175%
15.760%
35.301%
60.978%
1.622%
29.790%
10.212%
0.186%
0.419%
1.677%
3.710%
17.679%
39.032%
64.428%
1.907%
32.433%
11.006%
0.186%
0.447%
1.969%
4.260%
19.526%
42.312%
68.464%
2.185%
34.804%
11.706%
0.186%
0.501%
2.216%
4.890%
21.337%
45.194%
73.646%
2.467%
36.967%
12.344%
Exhibit 9 presents one-year through ten-year issuer-weighted average cumulative default rates for
sovereign and corporate issuers. As in our other default studies, cumulative default rates are calculated by
12
13
12
Indonesia came closest to default as it restructured its syndicated London Club bank debt in line with Paris Club comparability of treatment requirements, but its bonds
continued to be serviced.
For the sake of completeness, both Exhibit 9 and Appendix I include the default of Peru which was fully cured within its grace period, but the event does not enter any of the
subsequent default calculations.
MAY 10, 2011
averaging the experiences of issuer cohorts formed at monthly frequencies. 14 By forming and tracking
such cohorts of all Moody’s-rated issuers at the beginning of every month, we replicate the experience of a
portfolio of both seasoned and new-issue bonds purchased in any given month.
Importantly, the historical default rates in Exhibit 9 show that Moody’s ratings clearly rank-order default
risk at any given horizon for both sovereigns and corporates, as the probability of default rises with lower
ratings. The highest rating held 12 months before the default for all 14 sovereign defaults since 1983 was
Ba2 while the median rating was as low as B1 12 months prior to default or even B3 if we look 11 months
before default.
A comparison between sovereign and corporate default rates shows that sovereign default rates have been,
on average, modestly lower than those for their corporate counterparts, except for Caa-C rated issuers at
one-year horizons and Baa-rated issuers at four- to six-year horizons.
Recovery Rates of Defaulted Sovereign Issuers
Moody’s ratings are statements about the probability of default and the expected loss severity rate (i.e. one
minus the expected recovery rate) in case of default. As such, expectations of potential losses in the event
of default are an important discriminating factor when comparing similarly rated sovereigns, particularly
at the lower end of the rating scale.
Exhibit 10 presents two types of estimates of recovery rates on defaulted sovereign bonds. The first
method reports the average issuer-weighted trading price on a sovereign's bonds 30 days after its initial
missed interest payment. In cases of distressed exchange, we report the average price one day before the
closing of the distressed exchange. Appendix II provides more detail on the sovereign bond prices used to
estimate the recovery rates.
EXHIBIT 10
Recovery Rates on Defaulted Sovereign Bond Issuers
14
13
Average Trading Price**
(% Of PAR)
PV Ratio Of Cash Flows***
(Ratio In %)
Russia
18
50
Pakistan
52
65
1999
Ecuador
44
60
2000
Ukraine
69
60
2000
Ivory Coast*
18
NA
2001
Argentina
27
30
2002
Moldova
60
95
2003
Uruguay
66
85
2003
Nicaragua
NA
50
2004
Grenada*
65
NA
2005
Dominican Republic
95
95
2006
Belize
76
NA
2008
Seychelles*
30
NA
2008
Ecuador
28
NA
Year Of Default
Defaulting Country
1998
1999
Monthly cohorts have the advantage of capturing rating changes that occur within a calendar year. The default rates are calculated based on cohorts of all issuers holding a
given rating at the start of a given month. The cohorts are dynamic in that they change based on whether these issuers leave the cohort due to default or non-credit-related
reasons. While the cohort frequency is monthly, the accumulation periodicity remains 12 months, so that we track default rates over horizons of one year, two years, etc.
MAY 10, 2011
EXHIBIT 10
Recovery Rates on Defaulted Sovereign Bond Issuers
Year Of Default
Defaulting Country
2010
Jamaica
Average Trading Price**
(% Of PAR)
PV Ratio Of Cash Flows***
(Ratio In %)
90
80
Issuer-Weighted Recovery Rates
53
67
Value-Weighted Recovery Rates
31
36
*
Not rated by Moody’s at the time of default. Pricing information is not available for three other recent unrated sovereign defaults on local currency
bonds - Turkey 1999, Dominica 2003, and Cameroon 2004. The PV ratio for Nicaragua is for the 2008 exchange. Appendix I describes more details.
** 30-day post-default price or pre-distressed exchange trading price.
*** Ratio of the present value of cash flows received as a result of the distressed exchange versus those initially promised, discounted using yield to
maturity immediately prior to default (Source: Bank of England (2005)).
The second method is based on the ratio of the value of the old securities to the value of the new securities
received in exchange, obtained by discounting the promised cash flows using the yield to maturity implicit
in the old securities at the time of the announcement of the exchange offer. 15 Additionally, we present the
average value-weighted recovery rates for the sovereign sample of both methods.
The sample presents recovery estimates for all rated bond defaulters, except Venezuela and Nicaragua as
market quotes on their defaulted domestic bonds are not available. The sample also includes estimated
recovery rates on three defaulting issuers – Grenada, Ivory Coast and the Seychelles – whose bonds were
not rated by Moody's.
The two highest recovery rates, outside Jamaica, in our sample follow the Dominican Republic and Belize
defaults in 2005 and 2006, respectively, when corporate recovery rates were generally high and corporate
default rates were low. 16 The recovery rates on the 2008 defaults of the Seychelles and Ecuador were low,
at 30% and 28% respectively, and below the average historical sovereign recovery rate of 52% during the
1983-2010 period. The 2008 sovereign recovery rates were similar to the 33.9% average corporate
recovery rates observed in 2008 and reflected the challenging economic environment in 2008 and the
negative correlation between rising corporate default rates and the observed drop in recovery rates.
The value-weighted recovery rate estimate is significantly lower than the issuer-weighted recovery rate due
to the large Argentinean and Russian defaults that garnered low recovery rates.
While there are some cases where the differences between the two recovery-rate methods (30-day post
default price and the PV of cash flows) are significant, the two approaches to estimating recovery values
generally produce similar estimates. The material differences in the estimates of recovery rates, wherever
present, are mainly caused by the timing of the recovery estimate. For example, in Russia's case, Moody's
recorded the default when the payment was missed, whereas the distressed exchange was announced more
than a year later, when the yield on the existing bonds was used to estimate net present value
reduction. With the announcement of an exchange offer, some uncertainty is resolved and the yield
on existing instruments may change, which will affect the present value of the new instruments. Another
difference arises because the present value method makes the implicit assumption that the yield curve
facing the sovereign is flat (it will have a constant discount rate); whereas, the trading price at default may
reflect different expectations.
15
16
14
The method of estimated recovery rates is discussed in "Resolving Sovereign Debt Crises: The Market-based Approach and the Role of the IMF," Financial Stability Review,
Bank of England, June 2005. Other methods are also discussed in Stuzenneger, F. and J. Zettelmeyer (2005), "Haircuts: Estimating Investor Losses in Sovereign Debt
Restructurings, 1998-2005", IMF Working Paper (WP/05/137).
Please see Moody's Special Comment, "Corporate Default and Recovery Rates, 1920-2010”, February 2011 for a summary of corporate recovery rates.
MAY 10, 2011
Rating Performance Measures
One of the desirable properties of an effective rating system is its ability to separate low risk from high
credit risk issuers. In other words, an effective rating system should not only assign low ratings to issuers
that ultimately default but also assign high ratings to those that are remote from default.
A key metric commonly used to measure the relative accuracy of a rating system, or default model more
generally, is the cumulative accuracy profile (CAP) or power curve. A CAP is constructed by first ranking
all issuers from the riskiest to the less risky according to the model along the horizontal axis. Then
starting with the riskiest issuers by plotting on the vertical axis the cumulative proportion of defaults
picked up by the model. Thus, for a sample in which 1% of issuers default, a perfect model would
include all the defaults within the riskiest percentile. By contrast, in a random model the first percentile
would tend to include only 1% of the defaults and its CAP would be represented by the 45 degree line.
The better the model at ranking issuers, the more bowed towards the upper-left corner its CAP will be.
The CAP is sample-dependent in that its shape is dependent on the proportion of issuers in the sample
that default.
EXHIBIT 11
Twelve-Month Cumulative Accuracy Profiles (1983-2010)
B1
Ba3
B1
B2
Corporates
Aaa
Ba3
80%
B2
B3
70%
B3
60%
50%
Caa1
Caa1
Caa2
Caa3
Ca
C
40%
Caa2
30%
20%
Caa3
10%
Ca
C
0%
100%
90%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
Cumulative Proportion of Defaulters
Sovereign
Ba2
100%
Cumulative Proportion of Issuers
Exhibit 11 presents the 12-month-ahead horizon CAP curves for sovereign and corporate ratings observed
between 1983 and 2010, as described above. The CAP plot reveals that historically sovereign ratings have
done a good job rank-ordering one-year default risk. For example, all sovereign defaulters had ratings of
Ba2 or lower within one year of default. More generally, 24% of the lowest-rated sovereign issuers
accounted for 100% of the defaults, while 24% of the riskiest corporates comprised 96% of defaults.
A summary measure of rating accuracy that compresses the information depicted in the CAP curve into a
single summary statistic is the accuracy ratio (AR). The AR is the ratio of the area between the CAP curve
and the 45-degree line (i.e. the CAP curve of the random model) to the area between the CAP curves of
the perfect and random models, divided by survival rate (i.e. 1 - default rate). Based on ARs, Moody's
sovereign ratings have had modestly higher accuracy ratios than their corporate counterparts. Although
the small sample of sovereign defaults limits the statistical significance of the finding, the historical average
one-year accuracy ratio for the sovereign ratings is 89.2% for the 1983-2010 period, compared to 81.5%
for corporate ratings during the same period.
15
MAY 10, 2011
Moody’s Related Research
Default Research:
»
Corporate Default and Recovery Rates, 1920-2010, February 2011 (131388)
»
U.S. Municipal Bond Defaults and Recoveries, 1970-2009, February 2010 (122579)
»
Corporate Default and Recovery Rates, 920-2009, February 2010 (123042)
»
Default and Recovery Rates for Asia-Pacific Corporate Bond and Loan Issuers, Excluding Japan,
1990-H12009, August 2009 (119158)
»
Latin American Corporate Default and Recovery Rates, 1990-H12010, September 2010 (127140)
European Corporate Default and Recovery Rates, 1985-2009, April 2010 (123911)
»
U
U
Emerging Market Corporate and Sub-Sovereign Defaults and Sovereign Crises: Perspectives on
Country Risk, February 2009 (113931)
»
U
U
»
Rating Migration and Default Rates of Non-U.S. Sub-Sovereign Debt Issuers,
1983-2007, September 2008 (110252)
U
U
Sovereign Methodology and Analytics:
Narrowing the Gap – a Clarification of Moody’s Approach to Local Vs. Foreign
Currency Government Bond Ratings, Sovereign Methodology Update, February 2010 (118820)
»
U
U
Sovereign Bond Ratings, Rating Methodology, September 2008 (109490)
»
U
U
Sovereign Defaults and Interference: Perspectives on Government Risks, August 2008 (110114)
»
U
U
Other Special Comments:
Strong Loan Issuance in Recent Years Signals Low Recovery Prospects for Loans and Bonds of
Defaulted U.S. Corporate Issuers, June 2008 (109457).
»
U
U
Market Use of Sovereign Ratings, September 2010 (127353)
»
U
U
The Causes of Sovereign Defaults: Ability to Manage Crises Not Merely Determined by Debt Levels,
November 2010 (127952)
»
U
U
Measuring Corporate Default Rates, November 2006 (100779)
»
»
U
U
Guide to Moody's Default Research: January 2011 Update, January 2011 (129977)
U
U
To access any of these reports, click on the entry above. Note that these references are current as of the date of publication of this
report and that more recent reports may be available. All research may not be available to all clients.
16
MAY 10, 2011
Appendix I – Circumstances Surrounding Individual Sovereign Bond Defaults
Venezuela 1998
In the first week of July 1998, the government of Venezuela did not pay the coupon on local currency
bonds that were held by local residents. The payments were made a week later. Since these bonds had no
grace period, this delay in payment amounted to a default.
The government claimed that the person who was supposed to sign the checks was unavailable at the time
but that the checks were later issued from the appropriate office. It was the type of episode that seems to
have happened more than once in Venezuela, where the government did not pay the coupon on local
currency bonds on time. However, the government has always claimed that there was no "intentional"
delay.
After this default, Venezuela installed state-of-the-art payment machinery that reduced or eliminated the
need for human intervention in the payment processes.
In July 1998, Moody's changed Venezuela’s foreign currency issuer rating to B1 from Ba2 and assigned a
first-time local currency rating of B3. The B3 local currency rating reflected the recurrent temporary
delays in the payment of interest and principal on local-currency denominated instruments. In September
1998, the ratings were further lowered to B2 for foreign currency and Caa1 for local currency government
bonds due to the effects of the oil shock and deteriorating economic and fiscal conditions.
Russia 1998
A significant drop in oil prices in late 1997 and early 1998 led to a serious shortfall in exports. This
decline significantly reduced federal budget revenues even in nominal terms in the spring of 1998, while
the stock of short-term Russian T-bills (GKOs) grew rapidly. Faced with the high cost of domestic debt
service (almost 5% of GDP in 1996), the government sped up liberalization of the T-bill market.
Restrictions on non-residents' participation were gradually reduced and then eliminated at the beginning
of 1998. The Russian market benefited from the inflow in 1997, with the interest rate on short-term
debt (GKOs) reaching its historic floor of 13% in August 1997, a time when consumer price inflation was
at an annual 15%.
With East Asian economies in crisis, non-resident investors decided to pull out money from the Russian
T-Bill market as evidenced by a reduction of almost US$1 billion in foreign exchange reserves per week.
The uncertainty over the July 1998 emergency loan from the IMF also resulted in large swings in foreign
flows to the T-bill market. The IMF loan was intended to boost confidence among foreigners and, for a
while, it had the intended effect. However, Russia stopped payments first on local currency Treasury
obligations and later defaulted on its foreign currency obligations that were issued locally but held mostly
by foreign investors. Subsequently, it also failed to pay principal on MINFIN III foreign currency bonds.
Debts were restructured in August 1999 and February 2000.
Russia’s government ratings had been gradually downgraded leading up to the default as its
vulnerability increased during the crisis. In May 1998, the foreign currency government issuer rating was
17
MAY 10, 2011
downgraded to B1 from Ba3 and a new local currency government issuer rating was assigned at B2. In
August 1998, the foreign and local currency issuer ratings were downgraded to B2 and Caa1 respectively.
Later in August 1998, the foreign and local currency issuer ratings were downgraded to B3 and Ca
respectively. In addition, the rating on the government’s MinFin domestic foreign currency bonds were
downgraded to Caa1 in August 1998 and to Ca in September 1998, reflecting the enhanced risk of
low recovery rates.
Ukraine 1998, 2000
Ukraine’s debt restructuring took place in four stages over the 1998-2000 period, covering US$2.5 billion
of external (Eurobond) debt and US$0.3 billion of domestic debt, representing overall about 9% of GDP.
Of this amount, about 1.3% of GDP was held by domestic banks. A large part (50-60%) of the
Eurobonds was held by retail investors. A selective restructuring of domestic debt held by banks in August
1998 was followed by the restructuring of two bond-like instruments held by non-residents in September
and October 1998, and a further restructuring in June 1999. After these piecemeal arrangements, the debt
exchange in April 2000 tried to deal more comprehensively with the short maturity of Ukraine’s bonded
debt.
In 1998, the Government of Ukraine declared a moratorium on debt service for bearer bonds owned by
anonymous entities. Only those entities willing to identify themselves and convert to local currency
accounts were eligible for debt repayments, which amounted to a distressed exchange.
Since independence, Ukraine has remained dependent upon imported energy and foreign loans.
Approximately, US$3 billion of these foreign loans came due in 2000. The IMF's US$ 2.6 billion
extended fund facility (EFF) was suspended in September 1999, and the World Bank postponed all its
lending to Ukraine in October 1999.
On 28 February 2000, Ukraine's Finance Ministry confirmed that it had missed the scheduled coupon
repayment for its 16% DM-nominated Eurobonds, which were to mature in 2001. With over US$13
billion in foreign debt, Ukraine had already announced in January 2000 that it would miss the scheduled
repayment for dollar-nominated 16.75% bonds and offered to include them in an exchange proposal.
Bondholders were offered seven-year coupon amortization bonds which would be issued by Ukraine and
nominated in the euro or U.S. dollar. In euro, the bond coupon amounted to 10%, while in U.S.
dollars the coupon represented 11% with no grace period.
The bulk of the debt was amortized in the new euro bonds every six months, with the first six months as a
grace period. The average term of the bonds was 4.5 years. While exchanging, investors were able to
choose the currency in which the bonds would be denominated.
By the end of March 2000, over 90% of holders of Ukrainian government bonds had agreed to the
restructuring and accepted new bonds with a face value of approximately 50% of the debt they replaced.
Ukraine’s foreign currency rating was downgraded to B3 from B2 in September 1998, and further to
Caa1 in January 2000 after Ukraine announced that it was to restructure its foreign currency debt during
the first quarter of 2000. A first-time local currency rating was assigned at Ca in February 1999. The local
currency rating was moved to Caa3 in January 2000 following the completed restructuring of much of
local currency debt into foreign currency debt instruments.
18
MAY 10, 2011
Pakistan 1999
A serious balance of payments crisis in 1998 was exacerbated as international sanctions were tightened
following the government’s detonation of a nuclear device (Pakistan has to this day not signed the
Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty). Pakistan sought a new IMF agreement and then a restructuring of its
bilateral debt obligations with the Paris Club of lenders but, even in the midst of these negotiations, the
government was intermittently late in making payments on commercial, bilateral and some multilateral
debt. In this situation, the possibility increased that payments would eventually be missed on the
country's Eurobonds and euro notes.
In an attempt to "bail in" private lenders, Pakistan's official bilateral creditors imposed unprecedented
conditions on the country before they would grant a Paris Club restructuring. Namely, they required that
Pakistan obtain a multi-year debt refinancing from private creditors, including bondholders. Upon
agreeing to these conditions, the Paris Club rescheduled in March 1999 some US$3.25 billion of
Pakistan's bilateral obligations (including arrears) over 18 years with three years' grace. In December
1999, bondholders received a new Eurobond, with a coupon of 10% and maturity of six years with three
years' grace, in exchange for US$608 million in existing bonds and notes carrying coupons of 6%, 11.5%,
and LIBOR plus 3.95% with original maturity dates between December 1999 and February 2002.
The 1999 Paris Club agreement was not fully implemented because Pakistan failed to comply with the
terms of its concurrent IMF agreement. However, subsequent IMF programs - a stand-by agreement and
a Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility - have achieved better results. A new Paris Club agreement was
reached in January 2001 that restructured US$1.75 billion in debt and payment arrears on extremely
favorable ("Houston") terms.
Pakistan’s foreign currency government bond rating had been downgraded to Caa1 from B3 in October
1998, reflecting the increased risk of default on rated instruments given the ongoing balance of payments
crisis. Moody’s assigned a first-time rating on local currency government bonds of Caa1 in June 1999.
Ecuador 1999
Ecuador's foreign and local currency government bond ratings were lowered to B3 in September and
October 1998 respectively, indicating a high probability of default. On 1 October 1999, Ecuador
officially suspended payment on almost half of the interest due on its Brady bonds. The ratings were
lowered to Caa2 for foreign currency and Caa1 for local currency later that month to indicate
expectations of significant loss of principal on the defaulted bonds. The US and the IMF publicly backed
Ecuador's efforts to restructure its US$13 billion in foreign debt. About half of this debt was in the form
of Brady Bonds. With the support of the US, Ecuador renegotiated its US$1 billion of debt outstanding
with the Paris Club of creditor nations and was able to restructure over 98% of the bonds into new
bonds. Ecuador also defaulted on its domestic debt by unilaterally changing the interest rates on domestic
bonds after it had defaulted on its foreign currency bonds.
Turkey 1999
Moody’s did not rate Turkey in local currency at the time.
19
MAY 10, 2011
The Turkish economy had been badly battered over 1998-99 by a series of shocks ranging from the Asian
and Russian crises to domestic political turbulence. Conditions worsened in 1999 as on 17 August Turkey
was hit by the Kocaeli Earthquake, the worst ever to hit the country. In 1999, real GDP declined 3.4%
and inflation was 68.8%.
Within the context of an inflation stabilization program and as part of a larger package of emergency tax
measures, designed ostensibly to help defray the costs of the devastating earthquake, Turkey imposed a
retroactive withholding tax on interest income on all outstanding domestic currency securities issued by
the government prior to December 1, 1999. The withholding tax, applied to nominal interest earnings,
was structured as follows: 1) Discounted bills and bonds were taxed in the range of 4-14% depending on
their maturity - 4% (1-91 days); 9% (92-183 days); 14% (more than 183 days). 2) Floating rate notes
were taxed at 4%. 3) Fixed rate bonds were taxed at 19%. Domestic securities issued after December 1,
1999 were specifically exempted from the tax, as were the government’s private placements and bonds
denominated in foreign currency.
Domestic banks were the most significant class of investors, with a 70% share of the total outstanding
domestic debt, while foreign investors held less than 10%. The tax was intended to capture the windfall
gains to be generated by the difference in expected and ex-post real returns over a period of rapidly falling
inflation and the impact on most holders was intended to be mild. Although the contractual terms
governing the domestic debt have not directly been changed, the government had unilaterally reduced the
nominal amount that it had promised to pay investors by taxing the coupons as they mature. In effect,
the coupon rates have been reduced – and Moody’s includes such events in its definition of default.
Although the tax diminished the government’s credibility with investors, it enhanced the credibility of the
stabilization program. At the end of 1999, Turkey entered into a three-year standby arrangement with the
IMF with an approved credit line of SDR 15.038 billion, with a stringent set of conditions designed to
bring chronic inflation under control.
As mentioned above, Moody’s did not rate Turkey’s local currency bonds at the time that the tax was
imposed. A first-time local currency government bond rating of B3 was assigned in April 2001. The
foreign currency government ratings had remained at B1 in the 1997-2005 period.
Côte d’Ivoire 2000
Moody's does not rate Côte d’Ivoire.
Côte d’Ivoire defaulted on its Brady Bonds obligation in March 2000. General Guei, after proclaiming
himself the new leader, suspended payment of the country's external debt (estimated in 1997 at US$15.6
billion). When the IMF stressed the severity of the consequences of this unilateral moratorium, he
resumed payments on 8 January 1998. His administration nevertheless had to go into technical default on
CI Brady Bonds in April 2000 and into arrears, yet again, on debt in September 2000.
Côte d’Ivoire was successful at obtaining restructuring of its Paris Club debts. The restructuring means
that debt servicing requirements were reduced to around 23% of exports, compared to 28% before the
20
MAY 10, 2011
default. With the restructuring, the short-term debt component was reduced, but it was still well over
100% as a proportion of foreign exchange reserves. 17
Peru 2000
On 7 September 2000, Peru decided not to pay US$80 million in interest payments on four of its Brady
Bonds. Peru had been trying to renegotiate its commercial loans with Elliott and Associates ("Elliott"), a
fund specializing in sovereign and distressed debt. Peru had offered to restructure the commercial debt
into Brady Bonds, which the lender had refused. Additionally, Elliott filed a lawsuit against the
government of President Alberto Fujimori and a US judge granted an injunction authorizing Elliott to
attach any financial assets owned by the Peruvian government in the United States. The government of
Peru was concerned that Elliott would attach the US$80 million debt service payment.
After tense negotiations that lasted four weeks and failure to find a safe depository for the US$80 million,
Peru settled the dispute with Elliott through a multimillion-dollar payment. This settlement allowed the
Peruvian government to make the interest payments through its fiscal agent in the United States. The
payment was made on 4 October 2000 and the default was thus fully cured within its grace period. Peru's
grace-period default is reported in this appendix for the sake of completeness, but it is excluded from all
formal calculations found in this study.
Peru’s foreign currency government bond rating was downgraded to B1 from Ba3 in September 2000,
reflecting the missed interest payment but incorporating an expectation that the government would honor
its Brady obligations in full before the 30-day grace period. Following the resolution of the legal dispute
and the payment of the past-due interest before the 30-day grace period in October 2000, the rating was
upgraded to Ba3.
Argentina 2001
Argentina defaulted in 2002 by missing an interest payment on 3 January 2002. While the actual default
occurred in 2002, Moody's had already downgraded the long-term foreign and local currency sovereign
credit rating to Ca on 20 December 2001, reflecting a very high probability of default and a high loss
given default.
Three factors led to the default. In 1989, then President Menem agreed to peg the Argentine peso to the
dollar on a parity basis by establishing a currency board. However, when Brazil devalued its real in 1999,
foreign investors and buyers found their dollars could buy more in Brazil than in Argentina. As a result,
Argentina's foreign investment and exports dried up — buyers of Argentine products could get more for
the same price in other countries, particularly in neighbouring Brazil.
Secondly, the Menem government accrued a significant amount of debt, both domestic and foreign,
sending domestic interest rates up. This led to the squeezing of private investment out of the market,
forcing many companies to close and pushing up unemployment. Many of the privatized companies were
utilities, which raised prices for such basic services as electricity and phones. Argentina's recession grew
17
21
Côte d’Ivoire defaulted again on its Eurobonds when it failed to pay at the end of its 30-day grace period in January 2011. More details will be provided in next year’s annual
update on sovereign defaults.
MAY 10, 2011
steadily worse. Thirdly, the IMF declined to bail Argentina out by making an advance payment on
a previously agreed loan.
These three factors converged to the point that, in December 2001 and early January 2002, there was a
rush on the banks to convert pesos into dollars at the one-to-one rate. Argentina subsequently defaulted
on its foreign debt.
After prolonged negotiations with its lenders and multilateral institutions to restructure the debt,
Argentina completed several exchange offers covering various series of defaulted bonds. By some estimates,
the ultimate haircut taken by investors was as high as 65%.
Moldova 2002
In 1990, the Moldovan parliament voted to issue a declaration of sovereignty and secession from the
USSR, establishing the supremacy of the Moldovan constitution and legislation throughout the country.
In 1998, Moldova was especially affected by the Russian economic crisis as exports in hard currency and
in rubles almost dried up. The country faced a significant shortfall in its foreign reserves, which made
servicing of foreign currency-denominated debt extremely difficult. However, it avoided default until June
2001 when it missed a payment on a foreign currency bond. It subsequently cured the default in July
within the grace period.
Moldova started buying back its bonds some time after July 2001 and was successful in repurchasing
approximately 50% of the outstanding amount. However, on 13 June 2002, it defaulted on the same
bond, which matured that day. It was not able to cure the default within the grace period, which expired
on 27 June 2002.
The country successfully negotiated with its bondholders to restructure and roll over the matured bond
into a new debt instrument with a maturity date of 2009 and face value of US$39.6 million. The annual
coupon was 6.8% with the first payment due by the end of 2002. For the purposes of this study, the
cured grace period default is not considered as an actual default event and only the final 2002 default
counts.
Moldova’s foreign currency government bond rating was downgraded to Caa1 from B3 in July 2001, in
expectation that the delayed payment reflected stresses that reduced the likelihood of future payments
being made on time. The local currency rating was already at Caa1 at that time. In July 2002, the foreign
currency rating was downgraded to Ca from Caa1, reflecting the default on the Eurobond and the
difficult overall economic and financial position of the country. The local currency rating was
downgraded to Caa2 from Caa1 at the same time.
Nicaragua 2003
Nicaragua’s debt levels had risen during the 1980s to reach about 1,000% of GDP in 1989. During the
1990s and the 2000s, successive rounds of debt renegotiation and debt forgiveness initiatives led by the
multilateral institutions aimed to reduce the debt burden; after protracted debt relief negations and
successive IMF programs, debt eventually fell to about 45% of GDP in 2010.
22
MAY 10, 2011
Nicaragua experienced a banking crisis in 2000-01, during which Central Bank CENI bonds were issued
as bank recapitalization bonds to finance the purchase of distressed assets. The CENI bonds were
denominated in US dollars and payable in local currency and the payment on the bonds absorbed
significant part of government resources. In July 2003, Nicaragua completed a distressed exchange of
CENI bonds held by a few domestic banks. The exchange reduced the interest rate paid on the bonds
from 15.3%-21.0% to 8.3-10.0% and extended the maturity from five to ten years. Debt-to-GDP was
over 130% in 2003.
In June 2008, another debt exchange of the same CENI bonds followed. The exchange helped to cover
Nicaragua’s financing gap at the time arising from lower tax revenues and a drop in foreign financing and
it happened in the context of continued debt relief operations. The bonds had a face value US$295.7mn
at that time, and were held by two domestic banks. The exchange took place in June 2008 and was later
formally approved by the Central Bank in February 2009. The maturity of the bonds was extended
further from ten to twenty years and the interest rate was reduced to about 5%. The 2008 exchange
involved 12.5% of the total debt at the time and resulted in 50% NPV loss. The rest of Nicaragua’s debt,
including locally-issued market debt, continued to be paid on time.
The foreign and local currency government bond ratings for Nicaragua had been at B2 since 1998, based
on the country’s narrowly-based economy and limited prospects for export diversification, institutional
weaknesses, and debt overhang. In June 2003, the foreign currency government bond rating was lowered
to Caa1 and the local currency government bond rating to B3, reflecting the vulnerabilities arising from
high debt burden, highly-dollarized banking system, political instability, and limited ability to pay. The
government bond ratings were unified at B3 in May 2010.
Dominica 2003
Moody’s does not rate Dominica.
Dominica suffered from a series of permanent external shocks, including declining revenues from banana
exports and a slump in tourism after the September 11, 2001, attacks, causing public debt to expand
quickly and shutting off access to foreign capital. Dominica had trouble servicing its debt, which totalled
almost 120% of GDP.
In May 2004, the government launched a restructuring of about US$290 million of local currency bonds.
Private and public sector creditors were offered to exchange outstanding bonds for three new ones with
10, 20 and 30-year maturities. The new bonds carry a fixed interest coupon of 3.5% and are denominated
in Eastern Caribbean dollars. These bonds entailed principal reductions of 30, 20, and 0% respectively. As
the original bonds were horizontally stripped into zero coupons and sold to a wide range of regional
investors, the main challenge of the exchange was gaining a critical acceptance rate. Thus the
exchange remained open for a prolonged time in 2004. Finally, 72% participation rate was realized. The
long duration of the new bonds and the face value reduction improved both liquidity and solvency.
Uruguay 2003
Prior to May 2002, Uruguay had been rated investment grade (Baa3) since the middle of 1997. However,
Argentina's severe currency crisis led to concurrent debt servicing problems for Uruguay in 2002.
Uruguay's total debt had escalated to about 100% of GDP, or roughly US$11 billion, with a significant
23
MAY 10, 2011
amount of bonds coming due in 2003 and 2004. To help restore debt sustainability, the authorities
launched in April 2003 a debt exchange aiming at lengthening the average maturity on the bonds with no
principal reduction. The exchange was completed fairly soon after (at the end of May) and participation
rates averaged about 93%.
The debt restructuring involved three components: an international component, covering mainly bonds
issued in Europe and the US (amounting to some US$3.6 billion), a Japanese component (covering
Samurai bonds worth about US$250 million) and a domestic component (covering domestic currency
bonds worth about US$1.6 billion).
As a result of the maturity extension but no principal reduction, Moody's classified the offer as a distressed
exchange/default. The foreign and local currency issuer ratings for Uruguay had been downgraded to Ba2
in May 2002, B1 in July 2002, and B3 in end-July 2002, reflecting the increasing vulnerability to
macroeconomic shocks emanating from Argentina. The ratings were B3 when the offer was first proposed
and were maintained after the exchange was completed.
Grenada 2004
Moody's does not rate Grenada.
Grenada incurred arrears on most of its commercial debt after the authorities declared public debt to be
unsustainable after Hurricane Ivan struck in September 2004. Damage from the hurricane exceeded
200% of GDP. In October 2004, the authorities announced that the public debt was unsustainable and
they intent to seek a cooperative solution with creditors and donors. In late December, interest payments
on two large international bonds were missed.
Almost a year after Ivan, Grenada launched an exchange offer for its commercial debt. The offer covered
about half of the country’s total public sector debt, and sought to restructure approximately US$190
million of external debt – including one global bond of US$100 million – as well as US$86 million of
domestic debt. (The authorities reached a separate settlement on US$17 million claims by domestic banks
in October, ahead of the closing of the general offer.)
On 15 November 2005, Grenada successfully completed a distressed debt exchange and debt rescheduling
affecting about US$276 million of local and foreign currency bonds and bank loans. The debt exchange
did not involve any write down of principal, and past-due interest was fully capitalized. The new bonds
have a 20-year maturity and interest rates of 1% for the first three years, which gradually increases
thereafter. The lower interest rates in the near to medium term imply that creditors accepted a haircut in
NPV terms of 40-45% for exit yields in the 9-10% range.
Cameroon 2004
Moody’s does not rate Cameroon.
As a result of serious budget slippages, in part due to the November 2004 presidential elections campaign,
Cameroon underwent a severe fiscal crisis in 2003 and 2004, which eventually caused the government to
default on part of its domestic debt. Cameroon’s debt burden had been very high and debt service
24
MAY 10, 2011
payments absorbed a large part of government expenditure. The country also suffers from a weak external
economic position and large current account deficits. Cameroon had concluded an agreement with
London Club creditors in 2003 whereby approximately 85% of the face-value of outstanding claims
was written-off, and the remainder was repaid with a World Bank loan. In H2 2004, the inability to
complete the final review of Cameroon’s IMF program prevented the country from reaching the
completion point for the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) debt-reduction initiative. Cameroon
defaulted on local currency bonds in 2004. At the time, roughly one-half of the domestic debt stock
equivalent to some 13% GDP was made up of bonds that were issued to clear previous arrears (to
domestic suppliers, banks, and salaries) and were traded locally.
Following a comprehensive audit of domestic debt in H1 2005, the government implemented an arrears
settlement plan, whereby the debt owed to all creditors was rescheduled over several years. The overall
financial and economic situation greatly improved in 2005, owing to the combined effect of the increase
in oil prices and the fiscal austerity measures put in place by the government. Positive developments with
regard to structural and fiscal reforms prompted the IMF to grant Cameroon a new three-year
Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) in October 2005. In 2006, Cameroon qualified for the
HIPC Initiative and the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI), which led to a significant debt
reduction.
Dominican Republic 2005
The Dominican Republic missed a bond payment in January 2004, but cured that default within the 30day grace period. After a number of additional late interest payments over the following year, in April
2005, the country proposed a debt exchange to investors which would extend the existing maturities on
its two outstanding foreign currency bond issues and defer their cash interest payments for two years. In
May 2005, roughly 95% of the investors in the bond coming due in 2006 and one coming due in 2013
had agreed to extend the maturity dates by an additional five years at the original coupon rate and
accept payment-in-kind (additional bonds) in lieu of all the interest due in 2005 and half of the interest
due in 2006.
Moody's views the exchange as "distressed" and hence tantamount to a default, both because the maturity
extension and the interest deferral were needed to avoid outright default and because the terms of the new
securities (maintaining the original coupon rate) were insufficiently attractive to induce new investor
participation. The date of the actual default for the purpose of this study is set at April 2005.
The issuer's foreign and local currency bond ratings were B3 before the exchange (the Dominican
Republic was downgraded to B3 from B2 on 30 January 2004) and remained at B3 following the
exchange because the realized loss severity of the exchange was modest, yet the potential for further losses
going forward remained material.
Belize 2006
A period of modest economic growth in the late 1990s prompted the government to stimulate economic
activity through aggressive policies largely financed by foreign borrowing. As a result, the fiscal balance
quickly swelled to a deficit in excess of 10% of GDP. In 2005, the government embarked on a series of
stabilization policies by rising taxes, cutting expenditure and tightening monetary conditions. During the
25
MAY 10, 2011
2005 fiscal year, the deficit was reduced to 3% of GDP. The debt restructuring was part of the efforts
aimed at placing Belize on a more sustainable economic path.
The government announced in August 2006 its intention to reach an agreement with external commercial
creditors and, in mid-December, a debt exchange was launched to which over 98% of bondholders had
subscribed by its conclusion in February 2007. The exchange did not decrease the overall amount owed
by Belize, although its servicing has been made easier by a lengthening in the maturity and a lower
coupon. Specifically, the new dollar-denominated bonds mature in 2029 and do not start amortizing
before 2019 - providing a 12-year grace period to the government. The new debt carries a lower
coupon of 4.25% for the first three years that gradually increases up to 8.5%.
Reflecting the expectation of default, Moody's had already downgraded the foreign and local currency
sovereign credit ratings to Caa3 on 26 October 2005. The ratings were raised to Caa1 on 13 February
2007 in light of improved liquidity following the restructuring of the government’s external commercial
obligations.
Ecuador 2008
In November 2008, Ecuador announced that it would not honor the payments due on its 2012 and 2030
global bonds, after the findings of an audit declared these debts “illegal” and “illegitimate.” The
government’s decision to default was based on ideological and political grounds and was not related to
liquidity and solvency issues – the default thus represented a problem of “willingness to pay” rather than
“capacity to pay.” The default occurred in a situation of relative macroeconomic strength, despite the
recent downturn in commodity prices. At the time of the announcement, the country's debt-to-GDP
ratio stood at around 23%, well below the 85% level during its previous default in 1999.
Measured against central government revenues, Ecuador's debt burden was at 100%, compared to over
500% in 1999. Nevertheless, the fall in oil prices aggravated the economic downturn as oil is Ecuador’s
main export and finances 40% of its federal budget.
In November 2008, Ecuador missed an interest payment of $30.6 million on its $510 million of 12%
global bonds due in 2012; then in February 2009, it missed an interest payment of $135 million on its
$2.7 billion of 10% global bonds due in 2030. It continued to pay on its 2015 global bonds. In May
2009 the government announced a restructuring plan which included a 65% haircut on the face value of
the bonds. Subsequently, Ecuador bought back 91% of the defaulted foreign bonds.
In light of the government’s announcement that it would not pay the coupon on the 2012 global bonds
on time, Moody’s downgraded Ecuador’s foreign currency rating to Caa1 from B3 in November 2008.
The rating was further downgraded to Ca in December 2008, reflecting an expectation of severe losses to
bondholders.
Seychelles 2008
Moody’s does not rate the Seychelles.
26
MAY 10, 2011
In July 2008, the Seychelles failed to pay the principal due on a privately placed Euro 54.75 million
amortizing note due 2011. Then in October 2008, it missed an interest payment on its $230 million
global bond due 2011.
The Seychelles’ default occurred in the context of a difficult economic environment, severe fiscal and
balance-of-payments constraints, an unsustainable debt burden, and a depleted international reserves
position. Several previous years of moribund economic growth, expansionary fiscal policy, and increased
indebtedness, combined with fall in tourism, on which the country is heavily dependent, and exacerbated
the situation in 2008.
The country had embarked on a reform process in 2004, which although having positive results, had put
significant pressure on the country’s fiscal and external balances. Due to the accrual of arrears with
multilateral creditors, commercial borrowing was pursued instead. The expansionary fiscal policy
combined with a restrictive currency regime, low foreign exchange reserves, and rapid import growth. The
liquidity pressures culminated in a balance-of-payments crisis in November 2008, when the currency was
floated and depreciated by 50%. The rise in interest rate up to 30% has helped stabilize the currency.
At almost 175% of GDP, the Seychelles’ debt burden was among the highest in the world. The
government announced that it was seeking a restructuring of its external debt stock of approximately
US$800 million and embarked on its first-ever IMF-supported economic and financial program. A twoyear Stand-by arrangement was approved by the IMF in November 2008, for about US$ 24 million. A
debt restructuring agreement with Paris Club creditors was reached in April 2009. Paris Club creditors
granted exceptional debt treatment to Seychelles under the 2003 Evian approach to debt relief, reducing
the debt stock by 45% in nominal terms in two tranches, with the remainder rescheduled over 18 years
with 5 years grace period.
A formal exchange offer to commercial bondholders was launched on 7 December 2009 and was closed
on 14 January 2010. Tenders for 89% of the debt were received and collective action closes were evoked
to include the remainder of the bonds. Defaulted debt (more than US$311 million) was exchanged for
new notes (with face value of US$168.9 million) at a discount of 50% to face value. The new notes will
amortize in equal semi-annual installments commencing July 2016 and ending January 2026. They have a
step-up interest payment of between 3% and 8% over their duration. The new notes carry a partial
guarantee on interest from the African Development Bank (AfDB) of up to US$10 million. The exchange
offer has brought about the cancellation of approximately US$225 in principal, accrued interest, and
other charges.
Jamaica 2010
Jamaica completed a domestic debt exchange in February 2010 in order to reduce the burden the debt
was placing on public finances. The ratio of public debt to GDP had remained above 100% over the
previous decade and the debt-to-revenue ratio stood at around 400%. The cost of servicing Jamaica’s
debt was estimated at over 55% of central government revenues and 16% of GDP. The country had run
primary surpluses in recent years, some in the order of 10% of GDP, which, however, proved to be at the
cost of slashing public investment and contributed to the very low economic growth. GDP growth
averaged 1% annually prior to the default.
27
MAY 10, 2011
The debt exchange did not involve external debt, but it included the entire stock of marketable domestic
debt, worth around 60% of GDP or 700 billion Jamaican dollars. The exchange proceeded in an orderly
fashion with 99% participation rate. The terms of the exchange provided for zero reduction in principal,
a cut of the average coupon to 11% from 17%, and an extension of the average debt maturity to five years
from two. It caused relatively little dislocation to the economy and the financial sector due to the
majority of the debt being held by a few local financial institutions and the exchange being designed to
strike a balance between a meaningful cash flow alleviation and preserving the health of the banking
system.
Jamaica’s government bond ratings had been lowered to Caa1 from B2 at the end of 2009 in expectation
of a possible debt restructuring. At the announcement of the debt exchange in January 2010, the local
currency bond rating was downgraded further to Caa2 to reflect the 20% loss implied by the terms of the
debt exchange. After the resolution of the exchange, in March 2010, the government bond ratings were
upgraded to B3, balancing the fiscal relief following the debt exchange and the economic and financial
vulnerabilities. Jamaica’s overall debt burden remained relatively high with a debt-to-GDP ratio of
113% and interest payments-to-revenue ratio of 42% in 2011.
28
MAY 10, 2011
Appendix II – Prices of Defaulted Sovereign Bonds
1983-2010
Defaulting
Issuer
29
MAY 10, 2011
Date Of
Issue
Maturity Date
Russia
14-May-94
14-May-99
Russia
6-Oct-97
Ecuador
Default
Amount In Recovery
$Mm
Price Currency
Initial
Rating
Issue
Default Date
Default
Rating
3%
Ba3
20-Apr-99
Ca
1307
25
USD
15-Dec-15
FLT
Ba3
25-May-99
Ca
6051
10.5
USD
18-Apr-97
25-Apr-04
FLT
B1
22-Oct-99
Caa3
150
59.9
USD
Ecuador
24-Jul-97
25-Apr-02
11.25%
B1
22-Oct-99
Caa3
350
43
USD
Ecuador
24-Jul-97
28-Feb-25
4%
B1
22-Oct-99
Caa2
1914
30
USD
Pakistan
23-Nov-94
22-Dec-99
11.50%
Ba3
6-Dec-99
Caa1
150
40
USD
Pakistan
30-May-97
30-May-00
FLT
B1
6-Dec-99
Caa1
300
62.0
USD
Pakistan
20-Feb-97
26-Feb-02
6%
B2
6-Dec-99
Caa1
160
55
USD
Ukraine
19-Feb-98
26-Feb-01
16%
B2
25-Feb-00
Caa1
500
68.8
DEM
Ukraine
9-Mar-98
17-Mar-00
14.75%
B2
25-Feb-00
Caa1
489
69.3
EUR
Ivory Coast
31-Mar-98
29-Mar-18
2%
NR
31-Mar-00
NR
410
18.1
USD
Argentina
8-Dec-93
20-Dec-03
8.38%
B1
30-Nov-01
Caa3
1000
31
USD
Argentina
1-Oct-96
9-Oct-06
11%
B1
30-Nov-01
Caa3
1213
30.5
USD
Coupon
Argentina
22-Jan-97
30-Jan-17
11.38%
B1
30-Nov-01
Caa3
2491
27
USD
Argentina
29-Jan-97
12-Feb-07
11.75%
B1
30-Nov-01
Caa3
80
10
ARS
Argentina
26-Jun-97
10-Jul-02
8.75%
B1
30-Nov-01
Caa3
113
25
ARS
Argentina
28-Jul-97
20-Dec-03
8.38%
B1
30-Nov-01
Caa3
500
31
USD
Argentina
12-Sep-97
19-Sep-27
9.75%
B1
30-Nov-01
Caa3
891
26
USD
Argentina
27-Mar-98
10-Apr-05
FLT
Ba3
30-Nov-01
Caa3
456
30
USD
Argentina
29-Jul-98
20-Dec-03
8.38%
Ba3
30-Nov-01
Caa3
300
31
USD
Argentina
18-Nov-98
4-Dec-05
11%
Ba3
30-Nov-01
Caa3
862
26.5
USD
Argentina
17-Feb-99
25-Feb-19
12.13%
Ba3
30-Nov-01
Caa3
176
28
USD
Argentina
19-Feb-99
1-Mar-29
8.88%
NR
30-Nov-01
NR
125
20
USD
Argentina
29-Mar-99
7-Apr-09
11.75%
Ba3
30-Nov-01
Caa3
1163
30.3
USD
Argentina
25-Jan-00
1-Feb-20
12%
B1
30-Nov-01
Caa3
158
28
USD
Argentina
6-Mar-00
15-Mar-10
11.38%
B1
30-Nov-01
Caa3
1000
32
USD
Argentina
2-Jun-00
15-Jun-15
11.38%
B1
30-Nov-01
Caa3
903
31
USD
Argentina
11-Jul-00
21-Jul-30
10.25%
B1
30-Nov-01
Caa3
241
29.5
USD
Argentina
7-Feb-01
21-Feb-12
12.38%
B1
30-Nov-01
Caa3
905
29
USD
Argentina
24-May-01
19-Dec-08
7%
B2
30-Nov-01
Caa3
11456
30.6
USD
Argentina
24-May-01
19-Jun-18
12.25%
B2
30-Nov-01
Caa3
7463
25.5
USD
Argentina
24-May-01
19-Jun-31
12%
B2
30-Nov-01
Caa3
8821
25
USD
Moldova
6-Jun-97
13-Jun-02
9.88%
Ba2
13-Jun-02
Caa1
75
60
USD
Uruguay
9-Jul-97
15-Jul-27
7.88%
B3
15-May-03
B3
510
58.5
USD
Uruguay
13-Nov-98
18-Nov-03
7.88%
B3
15-May-03
B3
200
80
USD
Uruguay
19-Jun-00
22-Jun-10
8.75%
B3
15-May-03
B3
300
66.5
USD
Uruguay
21-Nov-01
20-Jan-12
7.63%
B3
15-May-03
B3
300
63
USD
1983-2010
Defaulting
Issuer
30
MAY 10, 2011
Date Of
Issue
Maturity Date
Uruguay
20-Mar-02
25-Mar-09
Uruguay
20-Mar-02
4-May-09
7.25%
B3
Grenada
20-Jun-02
30-Jun-12
9.38%
NR
Dominican
Republic
27-Sep-01
27-Sep-06
9.50%
Ba2
Dominican
Republic
23-Jan-03
23-Jan-13
9.04%
Belize
15-Aug-02
15-Aug-12
Belize
9-Jun-03
12-Jun-15
Default
Amount In Recovery
$Mm
Price Currency
Coupon
Initial
Rating
Issue
Default Date
Default
Rating
7.88%
B3
15-May-03
B3
250
66
15-May-03
B3
250
64
USD
30-Dec-04
NR
100
65
USD
20-Apr-05
B2
500
98.5
USD
Ba2
20-Apr-05
B2
600
91.8
USD
9.50%
Ba2
7-Dec-06
Caa3
125
75
USD
9.75%
Ba3
7-Dec-06
Caa3
100
76
USD
USD
Seychelles
27-Sep-06
3-Oct-11
9.125%
NR
23-Oct-08
NR
230
30
USD
Ecuador
23-Aug-00
15-Nov-12
12.00%
Caa2
16-Dec-08
Ca
510
25.75
USD
Ecuador
23-Aug-00
15-Aug-30
10.00%
Caa2
15-Mar-09
Ca
2700
30.5
USD
Jamaica
8-Mar-02
8-Mar-12
15.125%
NR
24-Feb-10
NR
6.7
97.1
JMD
Jamaica
22-May-02
22-May-22
16.25%
NR
24-Feb-10
NR
11.2
91.5
JMD
Jamaica
18-Jun-02
18-Jun-27
16.25%
NR
24-Feb-10
NR
5.6
88.8
JMD
Jamaica
2-Aug-02
2-Aug-17
14.5%
NR
24-Feb-10
NR
4.5
87.3
JMD
Jamaica
6-Sep-02
6-Sep-32
15%
NR
24-Feb-10
NR
3.4
80.5
JMD
Jamaica
22-Aug-02
22-Aug-19
15.75%
NR
24-Feb-10
NR
1.1
91.1
JMD
Jamaica
19-Aug-05
19-Aug-15
14.25%
NR
24-Feb-10
NR
3.4
89.1
JMD
Jamaica
28-Apr-06
28-Apr-11
14%
NR
24-Feb-10
NR
160.1
97.2
JMD
Jamaica
17-Mar-08
15-Mar-13
14.25%
NR
24-Feb-10
NR
13.4
93.4
JMD
Appendix III – Sovereign Bond Rating Histories 18
Sovereign issuer
FCR date
FC rating
Albania
06/29/07
B1
Angola
5/19/10
B1
Argentina
11/18/86
Ba3
Argentina
12/04/87
05/26/89
LC rating
Albania
06/29/07
B1
Angola
5/19/10
B1
01/28/97
B1
B2
10/02/97
Ba3
B3
10/06/99
B1
07/13/92
B1
03/28/01
B2
Ba3
07/13/01
B3
10/06/99
B1
07/26/01
Caa1
03/28/01
B2
10/12/01
Caa3
07/13/01
B3
12/20/01
Ca
07/26/01
Caa1
08/20/03
Caa1
10/12/01
Caa3
06/29/05
B3
12/20/01
Ca
08/20/03
Caa1
06/29/05
B3
Armenia
07/24/06
Ba2
Armenia
07/24/06
Ba2
Australia
01/15/62
A
Australia
07/26/99
Aaa
10/15/74
Aaa
09/10/86
Aa1
08/28/89
Aa2
10/20/02
Aaa
Austria
06/26/77
Aaa
Austria
10/27/86
Aaa
Azerbaijan
09/14/06
Ba1
Azerbaijan
09/14/06
Ba1
Bahamas
04/08/97
A3
Bahamas
11/12/98
A1
10/14/09
A3
01/29/96
Ba1
03/30/99
Baa3
08/15/02
Baa3
08/15/02
Baa1
12/11/03
Baa1
10/04/06
A3
10/04/06
A3
07/24/07
A2
07/24/07
A2
010/6/09
A3
010/6/09
A3
Bangladesh
04/12/10
Ba3
Bangladesh
04/12/10
Ba3
Barbados
12/05/94
Ba2
Barbados
12/09/02
A3
04/18/97
Ba1
10/13/09
Baa2
02/08/00
Baa2
10/13/09
Baa3
08/22/07
B1
08/22/07
B1
Belarus
31
LCR date
10/02/97
Bahrain
18
Sovereign issuer
Bahrain
Belarus
The Appendix presents the history of sovereign issuer ratings. For study coverage and methodology, refer to Exhibit 1 and the Data and Methodology section.
MAY 10, 2011
Sovereign issuer
FCR date
FC rating
LCR date
LC rating
Belgium
03/27/88
Aa1
Belgium
01/27/97
Aa1
Belize
01/21/99
Ba2
Belize
01/21/99
Ba1
05/28/03
Ba3
05/28/03
Ba2
08/05/04
B2
08/05/04
B1
06/07/05
B3
06/07/05
B3
10/26/05
Caa3
10/26/05
Caa3
02/13/07
Caa1
02/13/07
Caa1
02/10/09
B3
02/10/09
B3
06/10/94
Aa1
11/09/98
Aaa
04/29/09
Aa2
04/29/09
Aa2
05/29/98
B1
10/02/98
B1
04/16/03
B3
04/16/03
B3
09/28/09
B2
09/28/09
B2
12/05/10
B1
12/05/10
B1
03/29/04
B3
03/29/04
B3
05/16/06
B2
05/16/06
B2
03/12/01
A2
03/12/01
A1
03/12/09
A2
06/19/98
B2
Bermuda
Bolivia
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Botswana
Brazil
Bulgaria
32
MAY 10, 2011
11/18/86
Ba1
Sovereign issuer
Bermuda
Bolivia
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Botswana
Brazil
12/04/87
B1
09/03/98
Caa1
10/15/89
B2
12/16/99
B3
11/30/94
B1
10/16/00
B1
09/03/98
B2
08/12/02
B2
10/16/00
B1
09/09/04
Ba3
08/12/02
B2
08/31/06
Ba2
09/09/04
B1
08/23/07
Ba1
10/12/05
Ba3
09/22/09
Baa3
08/31/06
Ba2
08/23/07
Ba1
09/22/09
Baa3
09/27/96
B3
02/18/99
B1
12/16/97
B2
06/05/03
Ba2
12/19/01
B1
11/17/04
Ba1
06/05/03
Ba2
03/01/06
Baa3
Bulgaria
11/17/04
Ba1
03/01/06
Baa3
Cambodia
05/21/07
B2
Cambodia
05/21/07
B2
Canada
05/22/68
Aa
Canada
05/03/93
Aaa
04/12/74
Aaa
04/12/95
Aa1
06/02/94
Aa1
05/03/02
Aaa
Sovereign issuer
Aa2
06/21/00
Aa1
05/03/02
Aaa
Sovereign issuer
12/16/97
Aa3
Cayman Islands
Chile
02/17/94
Baa2
Chile
06/29/95
Baa1
07/07/06
A2
03/23/09
A1
06/16/10
Aa3
Colombia
Costa Rica
Croatia
05/23/88
A3
11/08/89
Baa1
09/10/93
A3
10/02/03
A2
07/25/07
A1
11/15/10
Aa3
08/04/93
Ba1
09/19/95
Baa3
08/11/99
Ba2
06/19/08
Ba1
05/08/97
Ba1
09/09/10
Baa3
01/27/97
Baa3
Cuba
04/05/99
Caa1
Cyprus
02/28/96
A2
07/10/07
Czech Republic
Denmark
Dominican Republic
MAY 10, 2011
FC rating
Cayman Islands
China
33
FCR date
04/12/95
China
Colombia
Costa Rica
Croatia
Cuba
Cyprus
LCR date
LC rating
07/29/99
A1
06/16/10
Aa3
07/25/07
A1
07/25/07
A1
06/19/98
Baa2
06/29/06
Baa3
10/02/98
Ba1
09/09/10
Baa3
03/02/99
Baa1
11/19/08
Baa2
04/17/09
Baa3
07/19/99
A2
A1
07/10/07
A1
01/03/08
Aa3
01/03/08
Aa3
03/01/93
Baa3
Czech Republic
06/22/98
A1
05/01/94
Baa2
09/01/95
Baa1
11/02/02
A1
09/06/67
Aa
Denmark
07/08/86
Aa
08/15/86
Aa1
08/15/86
Aa1
08/23/99
Aaa
02/03/87
Aaa
05/30/97
B1
11/09/98
B1
08/29/01
Ba2
08/29/01
Ba2
10/07/03
B1
10/07/03
B1
11/10/03
B2
11/10/03
B2
01/30/04
B3
01/30/04
B3
Dominican Republic
Sovereign issuer
Ecuador
Egypt
El Salvador
Estonia
Fiji Islands
LCR date
LC rating
B2
Sovereign issuer
05/07/07
B2
04/22/10
B1
04/22/10
B1
07/24/97
B1
10/02/98
B3
Ecuador
09/14/98
B3
10/05/99
Caa1
10/05/99
Caa2
02/24/04
B3
02/24/04
Caa1
03/21/08
WR
01/30/07
Caa2
09/24/09
Caa3
03/20/08
B3
11/14/08
Caa1
03/04/99
Baa1
05/18/05
Baa3
06/23/08
Ba1
12/16/08
Ca
09/24/09
Caa3
10/09/96
Ba2
11/14/97
Ba1
07/07/97
Baa3
11/15/09
Ba1
09/11/97
Baa1
11/12/02
A1
03/31/99
Ba1
Egypt
El Salvador
11/09/98
Baa2
09/14/09
WR
Estonia
02/18/99
A1
Fiji Islands
03/31/99
Ba1
07/19/00
Ba2
07/19/00
Ba2
B1
04/21/09
B1
10/19/77
Aa
Finland
01/15/97
Aaa
02/07/86
Aaa
10/22/90
Aa1
01/13/92
Aa2
01/15/97
Aa1
05/04/98
Aaa
France
01/23/79
Aaa
France
09/28/88
Aaa
Georgia
10/07/10
Ba3
Georgia
10/07/10
Ba3
Germany
02/09/86
Aaa
Germany
04/29/93
Aaa
Greece
07/19/90
Baa1
Greece
01/28/97
A2
05/24/94
Baa3
11/04/02
A1
12/23/96
Baa1
12/22/09
A2
07/14/99
A2
04/22/10
A3
06/14/10
Ba1
11/09/98
Ba1
06/01/10
Ba1
Guatemala
MAY 10, 2011
FC rating
04/21/09
Finland
34
FCR date
05/07/07
11/04/02
A1
12/22/09
A2
04/22/10
A3
06/14/10
Ba1
07/08/97
Ba2
06/01/10
Ba1
Guatemala
Sovereign issuer
FCR date
FC rating
LCR date
LC rating
Honduras
09/29/98
B2
Honduras
09/29/98
B2
Hong Kong
8/11/1988
A2
Hong Kong
5/10/1998
A1
1/11/1989
A3
1/8/2000
Aa3
Hungary
Iceland
India
Indonesia
35
MAY 10, 2011
Sovereign issuer
2/10/2003
A1
25/7/2007
Aa2
27/9/2006
Aa3
11/15/10
Aa1
25/7/2007
Aa2
11/15/10
Aa1
07/18/89
Baa2
06/22/98
A1
07/13/90
Ba1
12/22/06
A2
Hungary
12/19/96
Baa3
11/07/08
A3
05/08/98
Baa2
03/31/09
Baa1
06/25/99
Baa1
12/06/10
Baa3
11/14/00
A3
11/12/02
A1
07/30/97
Aaa
12/22/06
A2
11/07/08
A3
03/31/09
Baa1
12/06/10
Baa3
05/24/89
A2
Iceland
06/24/96
A1
05/20/08
Aa1
07/30/97
Aa3
10/08/08
A1
10/20/02
Aaa
12/04/08
Baa1
05/20/08
Aa1
11/11/09
Baa3
10/08/08
A1
06/19/98
Ba2
07/26/10
Ba1
12/04/08
Baa1
11/11/09
Baa3
01/28/88
A2
10/04/90
Baa1
03/26/91
Baa3
India
06/24/91
Ba2
12/01/94
Baa3
06/19/98
Ba2
02/03/03
Ba1
01/22/04
Baa3
03/01/94
Baa3
09/01/98
B3
12/01/97
Ba1
09/01/03
B2
01/01/98
B2
05/18/06
B1
03/01/98
B3
10/18/07
Ba3
09/01/03
B2
09/16/09
Ba2
05/18/06
B1
Indonesia
Sovereign issuer
Iran
Ireland
Israel
Italy
Jamaica
Japan
Jordan
Kazakhstan
36
MAY 10, 2011
FCR date
FC rating
10/18/07
Ba3
09/16/09
Ba2
-
Sovereign issuer
LCR date
LC rating
Iran
06/10/99
Ba2
12/31/01
WR
Ireland
09/04/92
Aaa
07/15/87
Aa3
08/31/94
Aa2
07/05/09
Aa1
02/13/97
Aa1
10/05/10
Aa2
05/04/98
Aaa
12/17/10
Baa1
07/05/09
Aa1
12/15/98
A2
04/17/08
A1
10/05/10
Aa2
12/17/10
Baa1
11/02/95
A3
07/06/00
A2
04/17/08
A1
10/10/86
Aaa
11/02/93
A1
07/01/91
Aa1
07/03/96
Aa3
08/13/92
Aa3
05/15/02
Aa2
05/05/93
A1
07/03/96
Aa3
03/30/98
Baa3
Israel
Italy
05/05/02
Aa2
03/30/98
Ba3
05/17/03
B1
05/17/03
Ba2
03/04/09
B2
03/04/09
B2
11/18/09
Caa1
11/18/09
Caa1
03/02/10
B3
Jamaica
Caa2
B3
05/07/93
Aaa
10/01/81
Aaa
11/16/98
Aa1
11/16/98
Aa1
10/20/02
Aaa
09/08/00
Aa2
05/18/09
Aa2
10/27/95
Ba3
08/21/03
Ba2
11/11/96
Ba3
02/18/99
06/18/01
Japan
01/22/10
03/02/10
Jordan
12/04/01
Aa3
05/30/02
A2
10/11/07
A1
06/29/08
Aa3
05/18/09
Aa2
11/24/99
Ba2
08/21/03
Baa3
06/25/99
B1
B1
06/18/01
Ba1
Ba2
09/19/02
Baa1
Kazakhstan
Sovereign issuer
Korea
Kuwait
Latvia
Lebanon
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Macao
Malaysia
37
MAY 10, 2011
FCR date
FC rating
09/19/02
Baa3
06/08/06
Baa2
11/18/86
A2
Sovereign issuer
Korea
LCR date
LC rating
05/12/09
Baa2
12/04/98
Baa1
04/04/90
A1
03/28/02
A3
11/27/97
A3
07/25/07
A2
12/10/97
Baa3
04/14/10
A1
12/21/97
Ba1
02/12/99
Baa3
12/16/99
Baa2
03/28/02
A3
07/25/07
A2
04/14/10
A1
01/29/96
Baa1
01/21/99
Baa1
05/15/02
A2
05/15/02
A2
10/04/06
Aa3
10/04/06
Aa3
07/24/07
Aa2
07/24/07
Aa2
12/17/97
Baa2
03/02/99
A2
11/12/02
A2
11/07/08
A3
11/07/08
A3
01/07/09
Baa1
04/23/09
Baa3
08/26/99
B1
Kuwait
Latvia
01/07/09
Baa1
04/23/09
Baa3
02/26/97
B1
07/30/01
B2
07/30/01
B3
03/14/05
B3
04/01/09
B2
04/01/09
B2
04/13/10
B1
04/13/10
B1
09/04/96
Ba2
02/18/99
Baa1
12/16/97
Ba1
12/11/03
A3
11/12/02
Baa1
09/11/06
A2
Lebanon
Lithuania
12/11/03
A3
04/23/09
A3
09/11/06
A2
09/28/09
Baa1
04/23/09
A3
09/28/09
Baa1
09/20/89
Aaa
Luxembourg
07/13/99
Aaa
Macao
11/03/97
Baa1
09/04/98
A3
02/09/03
A3
10/15/03
A1
10/15/03
A1
07/25/07
Aa3
07/25/07
Aa3
11/18/86
Baa1
09/04/98
A3
03/12/90
A3
Malaysia
Sovereign issuer
Malta
Mauritius
Mexico
Micronesia
Moldova
38
MAY 10, 2011
FCR date
FC rating
03/15/93
A2
03/15/95
A1
12/29/97
A2
Sovereign issuer
LCR date
LC rating
03/25/98
A3
07/23/98
Baa2
09/14/98
Baa3
10/17/00
Baa2
09/24/02
Baa1
12/15/04
A3
03/14/94
A2
03/25/98
A3
07/10/07
A2
07/10/07
A2
01/03/08
A1
01/03/08
A1
03/28/96
Baa2
01/15/99
A2
06/01/06
Baa1
Malta
Mauritius
12/14/07
Baa2
05/20/93
Baa1
Ba2
01/06/95
Baa3
08/10/99
Ba1
03/07/00
Baa1
03/07/00
Baa3
02/06/02
Baa2
01/06/05
Baa1
04/20/90
Aa2
05/23/90
Aa1
01/13/03
WR
12/18/90
Ba3
01/22/96
Mexico
Micronesia
Moldova
-
01/14/97
Ba2
07/13/99
Caa1
07/14/98
B2
07/11/02
Caa2
04/19/00
B3
05/06/03
Caa1
07/03/01
Caa1
10/01/09
WR
07/11/02
Ca
08/01/10
B3
05/06/03
Caa1
10/01/09
WR
08/01/10
B3
Mongolia
10/03/05
B1
Mongolia
10/03/05
B1
Montenegro
03/12/08
Ba2
Montenegro
-
04/30/09
Ba3
Morocco
03/02/98
Ba1
Morocco
12/03/01
Ba1
Netherlands
01/10/86
Aaa
Netherlands
05/05/98
Aaa
New Zealand
07/01/65
Baa
New Zealand
09/14/91
Aaa
07/10/75
Aa
06/29/77
Aaa
Sovereign issuer
Nicaragua
Norway
Oman
Pakistan
Panama
MAY 10, 2011
FC rating
Aa
08/15/86
Aa3
03/16/94
Aa2
02/26/96
Aa1
09/23/98
Aa2
10/20/02
Aaa
03/27/98
B2
06/30/03
Caa1
05/26/10
B3
Sovereign issuer
LCR date
LC rating
03/27/98
B2
06/30/03
B3
Norway
08/11/95
Aaa
Oman
07/15/99
Baa2
Nicaragua
11/12/78
Aaa
07/13/87
Aa1
09/30/97
Aaa
01/29/96
Baa2
10/06/05
Baa1
10/06/05
Baa1
10/04/06
A3
10/04/06
A3
07/24/07
A2
07/24/07
A2
02/18/10
A1
02/18/10
A1
11/23/94
Ba3
06/25/99
Caa1
07/11/95
B1
02/13/02
B3
Pakistan
11/06/96
B2
10/20/03
B2
05/28/98
B3
11/22/06
B1
10/23/98
Caa1
05/21/08
B2
02/13/02
B3
10/28/08
B3
10/20/03
B2
11/22/06
B1
05/21/08
B2
10/28/08
B3
06/30/58
A
06/27/78
Aa
Panama
-
01/22/97
Ba1
06/09/10
Baa3
Papua New Guinea
12/31/98
B1
Papua New Guinea
01/25/99
B1
Paraguay
07/13/98
B2
Paraguay
07/13/98
B1
04/28/03
Caa1
04/28/03
Caa1
04/09/08
B3
04/09/08
B3
12/05/10
B1
12/05/10
B1
02/05/96
B2
11/09/98
Baa3
03/27/98
Ba3
09/19/00
B1
10/05/00
Ba3
Peru
39
FCR date
10/17/84
Peru
Sovereign issuer
Philippines
Poland
Portugal
Qatar
Romania
Russia
40
MAY 10, 2011
FCR date
FC rating
07/16/07
Ba2
08/01/08
Ba1
12/16/09
Baa3
07/01/93
Ba3
05/12/95
Ba2
05/18/97
Sovereign issuer
LCR date
LC rating
09/04/98
Baa3
01/27/04
Ba2
Ba1
02/05/05
B1
01/27/04
Ba2
07/23/09
Ba3
02/05/05
B1
07/23/09
Ba3
Poland
06/22/98
A2
Portugal
02/10/97
Aa2
07/13/10
A1
12/15/99
Baa2
Philippines
06/01/95
Baa3
09/01/99
Baa1
11/02/02
A2
11/18/86
A1
02/10/97
Aa3
05/04/98
Aa2
07/13/10
A1
01/29/96
Ba1
11/04/96
Baa2
08/15/02
A3
08/15/02
A3
05/18/05
A1
Qatar
05/18/05
A1
10/04/06
Aa3
10/04/06
Aa3
07/24/07
Aa2
07/24/07
Aa2
03/06/96
Ba3
02/22/99
Caa1
09/14/98
B1
12/19/01
B2
11/06/98
B3
12/16/02
B1
12/19/01
B2
12/11/03
Ba3
12/11/03
Ba3
03/02/05
Ba1
03/02/05
Ba1
10/06/06
Baa3
10/06/06
Baa3
Romania
10/07/96
Ba2
05/29/98
B2
03/11/98
Ba3
Russia
08/13/98
Caa1
05/29/98
B1
08/21/98
Ca
08/13/98
B2
01/05/00
Caa2
08/21/98
B3
12/07/00
B3
09/05/01
B2
10/11/01
B1
11/29/01
Ba3
11/29/01
Ba2
12/17/02
Ba2
10/08/03
Baa3
10/08/03
Baa3
10/25/05
Baa2
10/25/05
Baa2
07/16/08
Baa1
07/16/08
Baa1
Sovereign issuer
FCR date
FC rating
Saudi Arabia
01/29/96
Baa3
06/16/03
Singapore
Slovakia
Slovenia
LC rating
Ba1
Baa2
06/16/03
Baa1
11/14/05
A3
11/14/05
A3
10/04/06
A2
10/04/06
A2
07/24/07
A1
07/24/07
A1
02/15/10
Aa3
02/15/10
Aa3
09/20/89
Aa3
Singapore
09/04/98
Aaa
05/24/94
Aa2
01/18/96
Aa1
Slovakia
06/22/98
Baa2
06/14/02
Aaa
05/15/95
Baa3
03/30/98
Ba1
11/13/01
A3
11/13/01
Baa3
01/12/05
A2
11/12/02
A3
10/16/06
A1
01/06/99
Aa3
07/26/06
Aa2
11/20/95
Baa1
01/12/05
A2
10/16/06
A1
05/08/96
A3
11/14/00
A2
11/12/02
Aa3
Slovenia
Aa2
10/03/94
Baa3
11/29/01
Baa2
11/29/01
A2
01/11/05
Baa1
07/16/09
A3
07/16/09
A3
02/03/88
Aa2
01/31/97
Aa2
12/13/01
Aaa
12/13/01
Aaa
09/30/10
Aa1
09/30/10
Aa1
Sri Lanka
09/09/10
B1
Sri Lanka
St. Vincent & the
Grenadines
12/10/07
B1
St. Vincent & the
Grenadines
12/10/07
B1
Suriname
02/03/04
B1
Suriname
02/03/04
Ba3
Sweden
11/10/77
Aaa
Sweden
01/18/95
Aa1
08/23/99
Aaa
Spain
MAY 10, 2011
LCR date
01/12/99
Saudi Arabia
07/26/06
South Africa
41
Sovereign issuer
01/17/91
Aa1
02/01/93
Aa2
01/05/95
Aa3
06/04/98
Aa2
08/23/99
Aa1
South Africa
Spain
-
04/04/02
Aaa
Switzerland
01/20/82
Aaa
Switzerland
11/10/98
Aaa
Taiwan
03/24/94
Aa3
Taiwan
12/04/98
Aa3
Sovereign issuer
FCR date
FC rating
Thailand
08/01/89
A2
04/08/97
A3
10/01/97
Baa1
Trinidad & Tobago
Tunisia
Turkey
Turkmenistan
Ukraine
United Arab Emirates
42
MAY 10, 2011
Sovereign issuer
LCR date
LC rating
Thailand
09/04/98
Baa1
Trinidad & Tobago
11/09/98
Baa3
04/06/00
Baa1
06/25/99
Baa2
11/27/97
Baa3
12/21/97
Ba1
06/22/00
Baa3
11/26/03
Baa1
02/08/93
Ba2
10/10/95
Ba1
04/06/00
Baa3
08/09/05
Baa2
07/07/06
Baa1
04/06/95
Baa3
04/17/03
Baa2
05/05/92
Baa3
04/06/01
B3
01/14/94
Ba1
09/30/04
B2
06/02/94
Ba3
02/11/05
B1
03/13/97
B1
12/14/05
Ba3
12/14/05
Ba3
01/08/10
Ba2
01/08/10
Ba2
12/04/97
B2
01/14/02
B2
09/09/10
WR
09/09/10
WR
02/06/98
B2
02/22/99
Ca
09/09/98
B3
01/05/00
Caa3
01/05/00
Caa1
11/20/01
Caa1
01/24/02
B2
01/24/02
B2
11/10/03
B1
11/10/03
B1
05/12/09
B2
05/12/09
B2
01/29/96
Baa1
10/04/06
Aa3
07/09/07
Aa2
Aaa
Tunisia
Turkey
Turkmenistan
Ukraine
United Arab Emirates
12/11/97
A2
12/21/04
A1
10/04/06
Aa3
07/09/07
Aa2
United Kingdom
03/31/78
Aaa
United Kingdom
04/27/93
United States of America
02/05/49
Aaa
United States of America
02/05/49
Aaa
Uruguay
10/15/93
Ba1
Uruguay
10/02/98
Baa3
06/10/97
Baa3
05/03/02
Ba2
05/03/02
Ba2
07/10/02
B1
07/10/02
B1
07/31/02
B3
07/31/02
B3
12/21/06
B1
Sovereign issuer
Venezuela
Vietnam
43
MAY 10, 2011
FCR date
FC rating
LCR date
LC rating
12/21/06
B1
Sovereign issuer
01/12/09
Ba3
01/12/09
Ba3
12/08/10
Ba1
12/08/10
Ba1
12/29/76
Aaa
07/22/98
B3
02/04/83
Aa
09/03/98
Caa1
06/03/87
Ba2
12/20/99
B3
12/04/87
Ba3
09/20/02
Caa1
08/07/91
Ba1
09/07/04
B1
02/07/94
Ba2
04/08/94
Ba3
01/22/96
Ba2
07/22/98
B1
09/03/98
B2
09/20/02
B3
03/14/07
Ba3
12/15/10
B1
01/21/03
Caa1
09/07/04
B2
10/31/05
Ba3
12/15/10
B1
Venezuela
Vietnam
Report Number: 132672
Author
Merxe Tudela
Editor
Maya Penrose
Production Associate
Alisa Llorens
© 2011 Moody’s Investors Service, Inc. and/or its licensors and affiliates (collectively, “MOODY’S”). All rights reserved.
CREDIT RATINGS ARE MOODY'S INVESTORS SERVICE, INC.'S (“MIS”) CURRENT OPINIONS OF THE RELATIVE FUTURE
CREDIT RISK OF ENTITIES, CREDIT COMMITMENTS, OR DEBT OR DEBT-LIKE SECURITIES. MIS DEFINES CREDIT RISK AS
THE RISK THAT AN ENTITY MAY NOT MEET ITS CONTRACTUAL, FINANCIAL OBLIGATIONS AS THEY COME DUE AND ANY
ESTIMATED FINANCIAL LOSS IN THE EVENT OF DEFAULT. CREDIT RATINGS DO NOT ADDRESS ANY OTHER RISK,
INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO: LIQUIDITY RISK, MARKET VALUE RISK, OR PRICE VOLATILITY. CREDIT RATINGS ARE
NOT STATEMENTS OF CURRENT OR HISTORICAL FACT. CREDIT RATINGS DO NOT CONSTITUTE INVESTMENT OR
FINANCIAL ADVICE, AND CREDIT RATINGS ARE NOT RECOMMENDATIONS TO PURCHASE, SELL, OR HOLD PARTICULAR
SECURITIES. CREDIT RATINGS DO NOT COMMENT ON THE SUITABILITY OF AN INVESTMENT FOR ANY PARTICULAR
INVESTOR. MIS ISSUES ITS CREDIT RATINGS WITH THE EXPECTATION AND UNDERSTANDING THAT EACH INVESTOR
WILL MAKE ITS OWN STUDY AND EVALUATION OF EACH SECURITY THAT IS UNDER CONSIDERATION FOR PURCHASE,
HOLDING, OR SALE.
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MIS, a wholly-owned credit rating agency subsidiary of Moody’s Corporation (“MCO”), hereby discloses that most issuers of debt
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Notwithstanding the foregoing, credit ratings assigned on and after October 1, 2010 by Moody’s Japan K.K. (“MJKK”) are MJKK’s
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or any form of security that is available to retail investors. It would be dangerous for retail investors to make any investment decision
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44
MAY 10, 2011

Sovereign Default and Recovery Rates, 1983-2010

Transcription

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