discussion paper - Russian Institute for Strategic Studies

Transcription

The US strategy of "rebalancing" in Asia Pacific and Russia’s national security interests
2/2015
DISCUSSION PAPER
November 2015
Russian Institute
for Strategic Studies
1
Centre for Asia and
the Middle East
Discussion paper
2/2015
November 2015
2/2015
DISCUSSION
PAPER
November 2015
The US strategy of "rebalancing"
in Asia Pacific and Russia’s national
security interests
2
Russian Institute
for Strategic Studies
Centre for Asia and
the Middle East
The Russian Institute
for Strategic Studies (RISS)
© Russian Institute
for Strategic Studies, 2015
A major scientific-research and analytical centre established by the President
of the Russian Federation.
Responsibility for the information and
views set out in this paper lies entirely
with the authors and their views do not
necessarily reflect the position of the
Russian Institute for Strategic Studies.
The main task of RISS is to provide information support to the Administration of the President of the Russian
Federation, the Federation Council, the
State Duma, the Security Council, Government offices, ministries and departments. RISS provides expert appraisals
and recommendations and prepares
analytical materials for those bodies.
Centre for Asia and the Middle
East (CAME) of RISS is dedicated
to the study of political, economic and
military issues of the countries situated
in Asia Pacific and the Middle East.
Director – Leonid Reshetnikov
Deputy Director, Director
of the CAME – Anna Glasova
http://www.riss.ru
CAME Discussion Paper. No 2/2015 /
November 2015. Russian Federation. Moscow.
Russian Institute for Strategic Studies.
32 p.
1. Asia Pacific. 2. US "pivot to Asia".
3. ASEAN. 4. Trans-Pacific Partnership.
5. US military activity.
Reproduction is authorised provided the
source is acknowledged.
Authors:
Dr. Boris Volkhonsky,
deputy head of the Centre for Asia
and the Middle East (CAME) at the
Russian Institute for Strategic Studies
(RISS), head of the Asian section
([email protected])
Irina Komissina,
senior research fellow at CAME
([email protected])
Leonid Gladchenko,
([email protected])
Ivetta Frolova,
([email protected])
Dr. Andrey Gubin,
head of the Regional Center
for Asia Pacific Studies of RISS
(Vladivostok) ([email protected])
Yulia Kryachkina,
research fellow at CAME
([email protected])
Maria Zelenkova,
research fellow at CAME
([email protected])
Design and Publication:
Oleg Strizhak,
Head of Publishing Department
Zhanna Logunova,
Editing and Producing
This paper can be downloaded from
http://en.riss.ru/news/19206/
Ekaterina Dunaeva,
Design and Layout
3
Discussion paper
November 2015
2/2015
Summary
The trend in contemporary global geopolitics is to shift the political centre
of gravity to the Asia-Pacific region, where the United States is making every
effort to contain Russia and China, its main strategic competitors. America’s strategy
is to strengthen its military-technical cooperation with individual countries in
the Asia-Pacific Region within the framework of trilateral formats and create
new international structures under the auspices of the United States, as well as
by intensifying its presence in existing structures. Under such circumstances, Russia
intends to intensify its political, economic and military-technical cooperation
with its regional neighbours.
4
The US strategy of "rebalancing"
in Asia Pacific and Russia’s national
security interests
Asia Pacific region is the most
rapidly and dynamically developing
region of the world. It also attracts
and concentrates the interests of the
leading global powers. One of the
most notable features of the region
at present is the intensification of
integration processes which leads to
emergence of numerous international
formats and organizations. As a result, the impact of the regional processes in Asia Pacific on the global
agenda is also intensifying, and in future, as most observers believe, this
may turn the region into the global center of economics and politics.
Quite naturally, this cannot but affect Russia’s geopolitical interests,
since a considerable part of Russia
(i.e. Siberia and the Far East) is located in the region. That is why Asia
Pacific is one of the most important
vectors not only of Russia’s economic
development, but also of its political
dialogue with partners. This has been
reflected in numerous official documents including the Concept of the
Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation approved by President Vladimir
Putin in 20131.
The implementation of Russia’s
strategic interests in Asia Pacific is
complicated by the fact that the US
is strengthening its political and military presence in the region, which is
basically aimed at containing China
and Russia. The policy of "return",
or "pivot to Asia" was first declared
by the then US Secretary of State
Hillary Clinton in October 20112.
During the first months of President Barack Obama’s first term,
some political circles close to the administration toyed with the idea of
widening cooperation with China.
This was articulated in the concept
of a G2, in other words – of a system
of privileged US – Chinese partnership on the key issues of the global
5
Discussion paper
November 2015
agenda3. Anyway, when in November
2009 President Obama voiced this
idea during his visit to Beijing, the
Chinese part reacted negatively.
As a result of China’s rejection
of the idea of commonly solving the
existing international problems on
the "G2" basis, starting from spring
2010, a new period of confrontation
in US – China relations emerged
again. The US adopted a much more
rigid policy in regard to a number of
issues sensitive for the bilateral relations. Today, the US – China interaction, as most Russian and foreign
experts believe, can be characterized
as a combination of contradictory
tendencies of competition and cooperation, while Washington’s policy in Asia Pacific is basically aimed
at containing China’s ambitions and
limiting its capabilities.
Enhancement of US military
presence in Asia Pacific
6
In January 2012, the US President Barack Obama declared that
the Pentagon’s military strategy for
the next 10 years, "Sustaining US
Global Leadership: Priorities For 21st
Century Defense", presupposes reorientation of US military’s actions at
containing and curbing the threats to
international security in Asia Pacific,
and specifically in East Asia4.
Lately, Obama’s administration
has introduced a new term into the
political discourse to characterize the
present stage of implementation of
the US strategy in Asia Pacific – rebalance. It has replaced the "pivot to
Asia" and is aimed at producing the
impression that the US is not going
to abandon its obligation in other
parts of the world, despite the fact
that Asia’s importance for welfare
2/2015
and security of the US is constantly
rising (at present, up to one third of
global trade is held in Asia)5.
Washington’s political line in Asia
Pacific is implemented with the help
of some traditional military and political tools in a number of domains.
First, by maintaining firm alliances with a number of regional countries (primarily, Japan, the Republic
of Korea, Australia, the Philippines),
Obama’s administration has decided
to relay the burden of basic military
expenditures and responsibility for
regional security upon its allies and
to resort to the tactics of "proxy-confrontation". Thus, the maintenance
of the US military presence in the
region while expenditures in the
US military budget are being cut is
thought to be ensured by means of
creating numerous formats of cooperation in the region rather than by
means of setting up numerous (and
costly) military bases.
Second, the current US strategy in
Asia Pacific is carried out by means
of enhancing its military presence in
Southeast Asia and intensifying political dialogue with the countries of
the sub-region. Washington’s interest to Southeast Asia is determined
by the need to find new partners and
the desire to attract even those states
which previously had no military relationship with the US, but presently
are concerned with China’s rigid policy regarding the disputed territories
in the South China Sea. As a result of
the new US policy, the level of bilateral cooperation has been elevated up to signing the agreements on
comprehensive partnership with a
number of states (Indonesia in 2010,
Vietnam in 2013, Malaysia in 2014).
Third, the US is widening trade
and economic cooperation within the
framework of a new free trade zone –
the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP),
which never presupposed the participation of China or Russia. Besides
the promotion of the TPP idea, the
US intensifies its ties with ASEAN –
basically, not with the organization
as a whole, but rather with every individual member state.
By implementing this strategy, the
US is determined to isolate China and
encompass China with US-friendly
states to a maximum possible extent.
Quadrennial Defense Review published by the US Department of Defense in March 2014 once again states
that the US is primarily a Pacific
country; therefore the region is of vital importance for the nation. China’s
fast growth in terms of its military
capabilities and lack of transparency
in bilateral relation was defined as
the main threat to the US security6.
As one of the means of conflict prevention the Pentagon considers the
formation of a multilateral security
architecture based on ASEAN mechanisms with invitations to Australia,
Japan, the Republic of Korea, Indonesia and India.
The US cooperation with the Pacific states is to be exercised in such
spheres as anti-missile defense, cyber-security, space exploration, maritime security, management of natural
and technological disasters7. In case
the US allies face threats to their
security, military aid is promised to
them. In particular, this was stated
by Barack Obama on May 28, 2014,
in his address to the graduates of the
West Point Military Academy8.
Within the framework of cooperation in the field of maritime security,
the US is to render assistance to its
allies and partners in strengthening
their naval potential. Back in 2013,
the US was planning to allocate more
than $156 million for the countries of
Southeast Asia for the period of two
years. That money was supposed to
be spent on the equipment of coastal
patrol units in Vietnam, on anti-piracy activity close to the Strait of Malacca, as well as on building counterterrorist potential at the junction of
maritime borders of the Philippines,
Indonesia and Malaysia in the Sulu
Sea9. Within this context lie the US
efforts aimed at intensifying and widening the scale of joint military exercises with its partners – primarily
CARAT, which is the annual naval
exercise with the participation of the
US and Southeast Asian countries
(Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, the
Philippines, Thailand, Bangladesh,
Brunei, Cambodia and East Timor).
The basic task of such exercises is
to strengthen partnership and to increase the operational readiness of
the navies of the participating countries10.
Within the framework of "rebalancing" in Asia Pacific, the US is
trying to increase its military presence in the region. In particular, it is
notable that the US declares the need
to increase the share of its Navy and
Air Force in Asia Pacific to 60 per
cent of its total force by 202011. At
present, there are 51 US warships in
Asia Pacific, by the end of 2015 the
number is to grow up to 58, and up
to 67 by 202012.
US military bases on the territory of sovereign states – US partners
in military and political cooperation
and participants of a number of security treaties – have always been an
important element of the US military
presence in the region. In this regard,
it is worth paying attention to the
structure of bases (Pict. 1), and the
dynamics of quantitative changes
undergoing in the US Armed Forces
based on the territory of Asia Pacific
countries.
7
Discussion paper
2/2015
November 2015
MONGOLIA
RUSSIA
DPRK
Seoul
CHINA
SEA
OF JAPAN
JAPAN
REPUBLIC
OF KOREA
Tokyo
EAST
CHINA
SEA
Taiwan
MYANMAR
LAOS
THAILAND
Manila
CAMBODIA
VIETNAM
PACIFIC
OCEAN
PHILIPPINES
Guam
PHILIPPINE
SEA
SOUTH
CHINА
SEA
BRUNEI
Kuala
Lumpur MALAYSIA
Singapore
PAPUA
NEW
GUINEA
INDONESIA
Jakarta
Port Moresby
Dili
Regional Center
of the US Navy
in Singapore
AUSTRALIA
INDIAN
OCEAN
Pine Gap
(Satellite tracking station)
BEAUFORT SEA
PACIFIC OCEAN
BERING
SEA
ALASKA
(USA )
Kauai
CANADA
HAWAII
Honolulu
Maui
Hawaii
PACIFIC OCEAN
US MILITARY BASES
Navy
8
Air Force
Ground
Forces
Marine
Corps
US Pacific
Command
Country – military
ally of the US
Pict. 1. The US military deployment in Asia Pacific (as of 2013)
(Макаров А. Азиатский фокус / Андрей Макаров // Коммерсант.ru : интернет-сайт.
2013. 4 января. URL: http://www.kommersant.ru/Doc/2101505 (accessed: 12.02.2015))
2014
2013
2012
Lately, it has not been so much
the total number of American armed
forces deployed in Asia Pacific that
has grown considerably, but rather
the percentage of the troops deployed
in comparison with other regions of
the world (Pict. 2).
The data of 2009–2012 shows that
the percentage of American armed
forces deployed in Asia Pacific grew
up from 15 per cent to 25 per cent13.
But it’s important to mention that
the US Department of Defense rarely
publishes data of the American active
duty military personnel deployed in
the Republic of Korea (RK), while
the country hosts the third largest
American overseas military contingent (29,564 active duty military
personnel as of September 2013)14.
As a result, the United States
will maintain military and strategic
dominance in Asia Pacific. The current task for the US armed forces in
this region is the transformation of
deployment and operation patterns
according to the changing geopolitical situation. Particularly, the South
China Sea and the East China Sea are
in the focus of the current American
strategy in Asia. The reason for this
is the growing Chinese activity there.
Thus far, the area of the key interest
for the US was the Northeast Asia
(Japan and South Korea). The main
goal was that of preventing conflicts
on the Korean Peninsula and across
the Taiwan Strait.
The other task within the current
US strategy is to include the Indian
Ocean as an element of "rebalance to
Asia" considering the strategic importance of its maritime routes (70 per
cent of the world’s oil shipping and
50 per cent of the world’s container
shipping)15.
The strategy characterized by the
then US Secretary of State Hillary
Clinton as the "consolidation of efforts to form the new order in the
region and in the world" began with
the strengthening of bilateral security
alliances in Asia. The core alliances
for the US here are those with Japan,
the Republic of Korea and the Philippines – all based on bilateral security treaties, as well as those with
Australia, New Zealand and Thailand
March
49,1
193,1
June
53,5
184,8
September
52,4
173,9
30 %
December
54,02
172,9
31 %
March
51,9
163,9
32 %
June
51,3
164,3
31 %
September
51,4
125,2
41 %
December
51,6
125,1
41 %
March
51,9
126,2
41 %
Asia Pacif ic
June
51,4
126,5
41 %
World
0
50
100
25 %
29 %
150
200
250
Pict. 2. American active duty military personnel strength in Asia Pacific in 2012–2014 (in thousands
and in percentage) (Compiled according to: Active Duty Military Personnel by Service by Region/
Country, DoD Personnel, Workforce Reports & Publications // DMDC Web : website. URL: https://
www.dmdc.osd.mil/appj/dwp/dwp_reports.jsp (accessed: 14.11.2014))
9
Discussion paper
10
November 2015
(within multilateral formats). These
alliances remain the cornerstone of
the US strategic positioning in Asia
Pacific, and in recent years the US
military cooperation with its Asian
allies has intensified.
According to some American analysts, the key task for Washington
now is the formation of new military
alliances in Asia Pacific in order to
prevent China from establishing itself as the regional leader. Special
attention in this respect is paid to
India, one of the leading economic
and military powers in Asia Pacific,
having territorial disputes with China and possessing its own regional
ambitions16.
Further deterioration in Japan –
China relations alongside with the
speculations on China opting to use
"Russian experience in the Crimea"
in its territorial disputes with Japan
could prompt India to establish quasialliances with the United States
and Japan. The tendency of the three
countries coming closer to each other
was manifested back in 2006, when
the Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo
Abe called for a US – Japan – Australia – India Quadrilateral Security
Dialogue (Quad). Nevertheless, this
idea got a cool reception17. At the
same time, military Malabar exercises which initially began as bilateral
US – Indian naval exercises, present
an example of far more successful
cooperation, especially after Japan
joined them. The trilateral contacts
intensified after Narendra Modi won
the elections in spring 2014 and his
party formed the government of
India. Between September 2014 and
September 2015, Modi and Obama
met for four times, one of the meeting being on January 26, 2015, when
Obama was the guest of honor at
India’s annual Republic Day parade.
According to Japanese experts,
"India, Japan and the United States
2/2015
have mutual strategic interests"18.
Therefore it’s highly possible that
the idea of strategic partnership between the United States, Japan and
India, which will not only cover the
Pacific Ocean region, but also the
Indian Ocean area, will be implemented19. Japanese Foreign Minister
Fumio Kishida also emphasized the
mutual interaction of the two regions
during his visit to New Delhi on January 17–18, 2015.
Washington is trying to revitalize the ANZUS Treaty between Australia, New Zealand and the United
States which played a significant role
at cold war times. After New Zealand
declared its territory and adjacent
waters a nuclear-free zone in 1984,
the US – New Zealand cooperation
stalled for 30 years, so the Treaty ceased to be active. At present,
when China is expanding its "security perimeter", it may become necessary for the United States to use
New Zealand sea ports, the way it
did at the times of World War II20.
In November 2010, the two countries signed the Wellington Declaration on strategic partnership, and in
2012 – the Washington Declaration
which further widened their military
cooperation21.
The US has special interest in
forming a new trilateral partnership
format with Japan and the Republic of Korea. South Korea, as well
as Japan, has a bilateral security
treaty with the Unites States. Still,
Japan – South Korean relations presently are at all-time low since the
normalization of diplomatic ties in
1965 due to some disputes, primarily the territorial one22. Recently, the
United States has intensified its activity aimed at inducing Tokyo and
Seoul to overcome divisions and to
enhance bilateral defense cooperation23. According to some experts,
"Trilateral Information Sharing Arrangement Concerning the Nuclear
and Missile Threats Posed by North
Korea" that was signed by the US,
Japan and the Republic of Korea on
December 29, 2014, has become an
important element of this process24.
Therefore, it is not coincidental
that during the Fourth Conference
on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA) summit in May 2014, Chinese President
Xi Jinping appeared to warn some
Asian nations against strengthening
military alliances to counter China,
saying this would not benefit regional security. Though President Xi
did not overtly mention the United
States in his speech, it’s obvious that
his statement meant the intention of
some Asian countries to enhance their
defense ties with the US25.
One of those countries is Japan.
Both sides see the enhancement of
the US – Japan alliance as the cornerstone of regional stability. According to the US President National Security Advisor Tom Donilon,
"there is scarcely a regional or global challenge on the President’s agenda where the United States does not
look to Japan to play an important
role"26.
On April 27, 2014, the United
States and Japan released the new
Guidelines for US – Japan Defense
Cooperation. The document, which
is fundamental for the alliance, had
been last revised in 1997, and the recent revision was the second one in
the history of the alliance. The two
countries justified the revision of the
Guidelines citing the changing political situation in the world and around
Japan, particularly the intensified
Chinese maritime activity. The new
Guidelines announced "the global
nature of the Japan – US Alliance",
which includes lifting geographical
constraints on the alliance activities
and defining the situations when the
countries will cooperate to respond
to an armed attack against the US
or a third country27.
However, lifting geographical
constraints on the alliance area of
activity and widening Japan’s responsibilities primarily corresponds
with the American tactical objectives
in Asia Pacific and globally28. Japanese political elite is highly divided
on the issue of the national defense
legislation, which has been revised
recently. Still, the revision of the
Guidelines reflects the changes in the
Japanese defense policy, specifically
the widening of Japanese Self-Defense
Forces (JSDF) responsibilities overseas.
It’s also notable that during the
drafting of the new Guidelines some
Japanese experts suggested that the
document should include references to the need of joint defense of so
called "Northern Territories" in case
they are handed over under Japanese
jurisdiction29.
Significant element of the new
Guidelines is the strengthening of
US – Japan cooperation in the field
of Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD).
The cooperation had started in 2003,
when Japanese authorities announced
the participation of the country in
co-development and deployment of
the US air defense and BMD facilities on its territory under the pretext of defending their country from
North Korean ballistic missile threat.
The problem of the American Marine Corps Air Station "Futenma" in
Okinawa prefecture still complicates
the Japan – US relations. The original agreement on its relocation and
the realignment of the 9,000 Marines to Guam, Hawaii and Australia signed in 2006 has been revised
11
Discussion paper
12
November 2015
several times. The agreement on
the relocation of "Futenma" to the
sparsely populated area of Okinawa
reached in 2013 positively affected
the Japan – US relations. But still,
the latest parliamentary elections in
Japan (December 2014) demonstrated the local opposition to the
Shinzo Abe Cabinet’s plans. Politicians opposing "Futenma" relocation
won elections for governor of Okinawa, mayor of Nago City, and in all
four Okinawa electoral districts to
the Lower House of the Parliament30.
The realignment of some of the US
armed forces from Japan and the Republic of Korea to Australia should
strengthen the American military
presence in the Indian Ocean region,
particularly for the naval control of
shipping in the strategically important Malacca, Sunda and Lombok
straits connecting the Indian and the
Pacific Oceans.
The realignment of the American
troops to Australia is carried out under the US – Australia agreement
signed in November 2011. In August
2014, Australian Ministers for Foreign Affairs and for Defense and the
US Secretaries of State and Defense
signed a 25-year agreement that
would more than double the number
of US troops rotating through Darwin (North Australia) from the current 1,200 to around 2,500 by 201731.
The US forces deployment to Robertson Barracks military base located in
Darwin, Northern Territory, ensures
the control over the whole Southeast
Asia region and thus constitutes an
essential element of the "rebalancing"
strategy. The joint US – Australia
exercises are expected to be held under the US Pacific Command supervision. The US Air Force would be
granted greater access to the Northern Territory air bases, and the Australian Navy will contribute to the
2/2015
American ballistic missile defense in
the region32.
The US and Australia discussed
the establishment of a jointly-run
military air base on the Cocos Islands,
an Australian territory in the Indian Ocean. The islands are currently
used by the Australian Air Force as
a refueling station for its Orion surveillance aircraft. The upgrading of
the facilities as a joint air base will
enable the US Air Force to monitor
key shipping lanes in the region.
The United States will render
assistance in developing Australian
special Amphibious Ready Group
(ARG) based on the 3d Royal Australian Regiment. This group, which
is planned to be established by 2016,
will be comparable with the US Marine Corps in its force composition
and mission area.
The ARG has to be able to conduct
high-intensity assault naval capture
operations using advanced amphibious warfare ships and landing craft
with support of combat helicopters
and heavy armored vehicles 33.
The Australia – US agreement
has given way to the first long-term
expansion of the American military
deployment in Asia Pacific since the
end of the Vietnam War. President
Barack Obama called the new troop
deployment to Australia "necessary to
maintain the security architecture of
the region". Further, he added, "this
will allow us to be able to respond in
a more timely fashion" and "to meet
the demands of a lot of partners in
the region"34.
The US has military bases in
South Korea with the purpose of
fulfillment of their obligations fixed
by the bilateral treaty on mutual defense. About 30,000 troops are allocated there upon the pretext of the
threat coming from Pyongyang.
In early January 2014, the deployment of another US army battalion
counting 800 servicemen, about 80
tanks and armored vehicles to South
Korea was announced within the
framework of Pentagon’s efforts to
rebalance forces in Asia and in the
Pacific. The same year, the US and
South Korea decided to widen the
range of joint military exercises35.
The Republic of Korea Defense
Ministry announced its plans to form
a new large unit in 2015. It will be
a combined division consisting of the
2nd US Army infantry division (based
in the Korean city of Uijeongbu) and
a South Korean army brigade36. The
division will be managed by a joint
staff and will be under command of
an American general. The formation
of a new joint division is aimed at
strengthening cooperation between
the two states and also increasing
their ability to deter North Korea. It
is expected that in case of a full-scale
military conflict, the new division
will be allotted special tasks. In particular, it may receive the order to
exterminate North Korea’s weapons
of mass destruction.
The Treaty on cooperation in space
signed in September 2014 between
the US and South Korea implies the
exchange of information about objects on the Earth’s orbit. The treaty
is beneficial for both sides. Korean
Army will receive updated and more
qualitative data about the moving of
different space vehicles. In exchange,
the US STRATCOM will obtain information on exact location of their
satellites and radio frequencies used.
For several years, Washington
has been insisting that South Korea
should join the American global ballistic missile defense (BMD) system
by deploying mobile ground based
BMD systems for a high-altitude extraterrestrial interception of intermediate range missiles – the so-called
THAAD (Terminal High Altitude
Area Defense) on its territory37.
South Korean government has repeatedly refused to deploy American
weapons on its territory arguing that
it already has its national KAMD
(Korea Air & Missile Defense System)38. Seoul may also be concerned
about a possibility to worsen its relations with China and Russia as
a result of the US BMD elements’
deployment on the Korean peninsula. Nevertheless, in July 2014 South
Korean Minister of National Defense
Han Min-Koo practically gave the
green light to the US BMD and stated that "deployment of THAAD on
the Korean peninsula will contribute
to balancing the North Korean nuclear and missile threat and increase security on the peninsula"39.
Therefore South Korea could be
involved in the US plans for building
BMD oriented rather at middle-range
missiles than towards short-range
ones. This raises the level of objects
BMD system must intercept. Besides,
the THAAD systems could be used
for supervision and building up antimissile structure and also against
other states, primarily China and
Russia40.
Seoul is continuing to follow in
the wake of Washington’s policy being guided by cooperation with US.
However, in spite of strong pressure
on the South Korean government,
Americans have failed to make it join
the anti-Russian sanctions. Despite
allied relationship with Washington,
the implementation of the Eurasian
Initiative put forward by the President of Republic of Korea is impossible without Russia. Besides, Moscow
plays an important role as an intermediary in relations with North
Korea.
Starting from early 2012, President Obama’s administration was
holding talks with the Philippines
on widening military cooperation.
13
Discussion paper
14
November 2015
The talks successfully ended in April
2014. The agreement is aimed at
strengthening the Philippine military
forces in the field of external defense,
naval security, humanitarian aid and
disaster control41.
The agreement defined frameworks of cooperation but specific details are to follow. In particular, it
includes construction and equipment
of new facilities for American personnel in the Philippine bases to which
Philippine military forces will get
access. American servicemen will be
present there "on temporary and rotational basis". The US is allowed to
construct facilities, deploy weapons
and ammunition, military and civil
personnel in the Philippine bases42.
Apparently, Subic Bay which used
to be the main US Pacific Fleet base
until 1991 will be one of these bases.
American ships are permitted to
use the ports and American troops are
allowed to hold joint military exercises in the Philippines including
joint exercises in the Pacific. At the
moment, the Philippines is considering the US proposal concerning temporary deployment of American surveillance aircraft on the Philippine
territory on rotational basis, allocation of fighter jets to the archipelago and the increase of the number
of American troops (since 2002, a
counterterrorist unit of 320 servicemen has been deployed on the island
of Mindanao to fight against guerillas). The term of the agreement is 10
years with an option of prolongation
if needed. President Benigno Aquino has called the new agreement the
most significant development in the
bilateral relations in the past decade.
Moreover, back in 2013 the US
Missile Defense Agency considered
the possibility of deploying the third
BMD radar station in Southeast Asia
to form a sort of anti-missile arc
which would allow a more precise
2/2015
monitoring of missile launches from
North Korea and some regions of China. It is possible that the BMD will
be deployed in the Philippines.
Since 2002, the US has provided
military aid to the Philippines which
amounts to $312 million. Meanwhile, only in 2014 fiscal year the
US planned to allocate another $50
million that are partly considered to
boost the country’s ability to patrol
its territorial waters43.
The Philippine leaders believe
that the increase of the US military
presence is in their country’s interest.
This is a part of Manila’s comprehensive strategy directed at strengthening the national defensive capacity
in view of the aggravating territorial disputes with China in the South
China Sea.
Singapore has also found itself
involved in the process of American
military deployment in the region.
In accordance with bilateral agreements, since 2012 up to four American Coast Guard combat vessels used
for operating in the coast waters have
been deployed in the state port on
rotational basis. The two states have
upgraded the level of "Commando
Sling" air combat training exercises
in order to increase coherence and
achieve closer cooperation. Until
now, the USA had just a little logistic point in Singapore which was used
during exercises in Southeast Asia. In
Pentagon’s opinion, the deployment
of vessels in Singapore is a sign of the
US adherence to the task of ensuring
security in the region which provides
for improved opportunities for cooperation with regional partners44.
The supplies of military equipment and weapons are carried out.
In spring 2013, the US Defense Security Cooperation Agency approved
Singapore’s request for the supply of
120 air-to-air guided aircraft missiles
(100 AIM-120C7 AMRAAM and 20
AIM-9X-2 Sidewinder Block II missiles including concomitant equipment) at total cost of $246 million45.
Vietnam has also found itself involved in military and technical cooperation (MTC) with the US. The
signing on August 1, 2011, of an
agreement on cooperation in the field
of military medicine (for the first
time since the end of the war in Vietnam in 1975), being a routine one as
such, has opened the way for official
military relationship between the
two countries. Later in 2011, the first
American – Vietnamese joint military exercises took place. Nowadays,
the US proposes to carry out joint
exercises in the South China Sea on a
regular basis. However Vietnam isn’t
satisfied with the fact that, for instance, on January 12, 2015, the US
and China conducted exercises near
the disputed territories.
Completely lifting embargo on
military supplies to Vietnam could
become an important milestone in relations between the two states. On
October 2, 2014, the State Department announced partial removal of a
ban on lethal weapons’ sales to Vietnam46. In 2014, within the frameworks of intergovernmental agreement the US announced the delivery
to Vietnam of the Oliver Hazard
Perry class guided missile frigates
which means the emergence of a new
competitor to Russia on Vietnamese
weapon market. Recently the US has
proposed to Vietnam to strengthen its
Navy Air Force with P-3 Orion patrol
aircraft. Thus the US tends to provide aid to Vietnam in reinforcement
of defensive abilities in such fields as
maritime security, search and rescue
operations, disaster management and
peace keeping operations47.
Thailand is the longest-standing
US partner in Southeast Asia; their
bilateral relations were established
back in 1832. Modern cooperation
between the two states is based on
rescue and peace keeping operations,
providing humanitarian aid in regions which have suffered from natural disasters, holding joint naval
exercises and effective preparation to
multilateral operations for the purpose of strengthening cooperation
and relations at all levels48. Since
the beginning of the 1980s, the parties have been holding bilateral war
games "Cobra Gold" which were later
upgraded to international level.
Nevertheless, after the military
coup in May 2014, the US has repeatedly declared a freeze on military ties
with Thailand, suspending military
aid and cancelling the "Cobra Gold"
games (in particular, this was stated
by Pentagon spokesman Colonel Stephen Warren on May 22, 201449). As
it turned out later, after the coup the
US continued supplying the country
with war equipment including spare
parts for aircraft and three UH-60
"Blackhawk" helicopters (the total
amount of supplies exceeded $40 million)50. Moreover, the US Army representatives have stated that they are
considering all requests for aid from
friendly governments, although according to the Foreign Assistance Act
it is prohibited to provide undemocratic countries with weapons using
state funds.
In early 2015, "Cobra Gold" multinational military exercises were held
as scheduled with the participation
of states that were traditionally involved in them51.
Relations between USA and
Malaysia for a long time were quite
strained including the times of
Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad
(1981–2003) whose attitude towards American foreign policy
was negative. A thaw in relations
is connected with the election in
15
Discussion paper
16
November 2015
2009 of the new Prime Minister
Najib Razak and the start of the
US "pivot to Asia".
In 2010, Malaysia took part in
the largest international naval exercises RIMPAC for the first time.
In 2011, it also joined to the "Cobra
Gold" maneuvers, and intensified
its participation during the following years. The frequency of the US
Navy ships’ visits to Malaysian
ports has grown drastically (from
several ships per year in the beginning of 2000s to more than 30 in
2011 alone)52.
The US resumed military ties
with Indonesia in 2005 mainly in
the field of maritime security in the
straits. Nevertheless, behind the antipiracy campaign there is a wider
program of military and technical cooperation which allowed the US to
start providing larger support to
Indonesia’s efforts in reforming national military forces. In 2010, the two
sides singed a framework agreement
on further development of bilateral
defense interaction and the US began gradually lifting restrictions
which had been imposed earlier on
the defense, military and technical
cooperation with Indonesia. As a result the supplies of weapons and military equipment have increased up to
$1.5 billion. Indonesia has recently
allocated $700 million on modernization of 24 F-16 C/D fighter jets, purchased 8 AH-64 "Apache" helicopters
worth $700 million and 45 missiles
for "Javelin" MANPAD. In January
2015, Indonesia and the US signed
a plan of actions aimed at widening
military cooperation and improving Indonesia’s defense alertness.
The US Pacific Fleet Commander
Vice Admiral Scott Swift expressed
confidence that the Indonesian Navy would play a greater role in the
region53.
2/2015
The two sides have huge experience of interaction at the international level. They hold up to 200
low-scale exercises and maneuvers
annually, more than 500 Indonesian
officers have been sent to study in
the US54.
Jakarta’s interest in the US Navy presence in Southeast Asia seems
to be connected with the "nine-dotted line" map published by Beijing.
According to it, part of Indonesia’s
exclusive economic zone is located in
the area under Chinese control. This
includes Natuna Islands where rich
gas fields have been found.
Cambodia has become one of
the new participants in the military
exercises the widening of which and
inclusion of new members is a key
point of the US strategy. Thus in
the summer 2010, Cambodia presented its territory for the international
"Angkor Sentinel 10" exercises which
have been held since 2006 within the
framework of the American Global
Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI).
Since then, bilateral "Angkor Sentinel" exercises have been held annually. The National Center for Peacekeeping Forces was established in
Cambodia, with the cost of $1.8 million being covered by the Pentagon.
In 2010, Cambodia for the first time
took part in the CARAT Navy exercises55.
Cooperation in the defense field
between the two states is carried out
in the following directions: the US
aid in combating terrorism; peacekeepers’ training and an opportunity
to get professional military education. Since 2006, the US has spent
more than $4.5 million on military
equipment and training of Cambodian servicemen56.
The widening of the US presence
in Asia Pacific presents a dangerous
tendency for regional security and
economic development of Russia.
Strengthening of military cooperation between the US and countries
of the region is taking place against
the backdrop of territorial disputes
in the South China Sea. However,
the US, despite its declarations of
support tends not to bind itself with
any formal obligations to its allies,
i.e. it does not guarantee support to
any of these states in case of escalation. Moreover, one cannot exclude
a possibility of a US-induced situation when Russia will have no choice
other than overtly support one or the
other side of a conflict.
The above list of scheduled
events and current steps intended
to strengthen the American military
presence in Asia Pacific is far from
being complete and indicates Washington’s intention to preserve its
global leadership role of the mightiest military power in the world. The
Trans-Pacific Partnership, although
initiated mainly for economic purposes, also serves as a tool of widening
cooperation in the field of security,
and fits into the overall American
strategy.
Trans-Pacific Partnership
By establishing a new international trade and economic organization, the Trans-Pacific Partnership
(TPP), the US attempts to build a
platform for economic integration
beneficial for it and capable of substituting APEC as the main mechanism of regional trade and investment cooperation. Some Chinese
experts have estimated that APEC
failed to be a very efficient structure
in terms of promotion of American
interests in Asia57.
The main goal of the TPP is to create a free-trade zone in Asia Pacific.
Former Prime Minister of Malaysia
Mahathir Mohamad considers TPP
to be "just a trick on the US part,
aimed to counter the threat of further economic growth of China, putting in one pocket all the countries of
Asia Pacific"58. In fact, this project
is a continuation of the US policy
of keeping control over the Pacific
zone and creation of an economic
bloc to oppose the growing influence
of China and Russia. According to
some estimates, the TPP states’ share
of GDP can reach 38 to 40 per cent,
while the commodity turnover can
reach a quarter of the global value59.
The idea of the TPP was first put
forward in 2005 by a group of four
countries: Brunei, Singapore, New
Zealand and Chile. In 2008, the US
decided to exploit the organization’s
concept and to expand it with new
content by broadening the number of
participants inviting Canada, Australia, Peru, Vietnam, Malaysia, Mexico and Japan. Now these countries
discuss the conditions of participation in the TPP and the rules of the
new trade bloc. Taiwan and South
Korea expressed the wish to join the
Trans-Pacific Partnership in autumn
2013. A number of new countries expressed their interest in participation
during its institutionalization, among
them the Philippines, Laos, Cambodia, Indonesia, Bangladesh, Columbia, India.
The agreement regulates a wide
range of issues dealing with intellectual property, agriculture, telecommunications, financial services,
customs rules and tariffs, mutual investments, etc. The parties are likely
to eliminate all obstacles for trade. In
this connection, some international
experts express concerns that among
such "obstacles" can be the laws regulating food safety, agriculture protection and security of personal data.
Malaysia’s MP Nurul Anwar thinks
17
Discussion paper
18
November 2015
that the TPP agreement "lets the international corporations to circumvent laws and regulations adopted by
the country’s government in public
interests, among them are provisions
on natural resources, environment
protection, healthcare, etc."60 As a
result, people living in the TPP member states fall under unlimited power
of the biggest multinational corporations. Moreover, conforming matters
of healthcare and environmental protection to the interests of the multinational corporations is presented as
serving the needs of economic development of Asia Pacific countries61.
There are provisions for establishment of a special court where companies will be able to pursue claims
against governments. Fundamental
rights of citizens of the participating
countries will be threatened. According to Lori Wallach, Director of the
"Global Trade Watch", the TPP can
be very perilous. For example, the
North American Free Trade Treaty
has been signed by the USA, Canada
and Mexico, but only the US companies constantly air discontent over
the treaty and appeal against it62.
In future, the partnership is to
unite countries of three regional
zones (Asia Pacific, North and South
Americas) and it will include parties
that largely vary in terms of the size
of their economies, industrialization
level, management practices, share
of global trade, etc.
It is too early to speak about integration capabilities of the TPP,
but such a trade bloc promises big
advantages for the US. First, it is
"competition liberalization" – the
standards of competition openness
to be adopted by the participants.
Practically, it means that the US
will stimulate the production of
goods and services in which it is
primarily interested. So, systematic
competitive advantages will be made
2/2015
for the US. Second, it is a tool designed to support the role of the US
as a key player in Asia Pacific and
gradually oust China from the leading position in the region.
According to analysts’ opinion,
current participants of the TPP to
a large extent are becoming hostages tо the US – China confrontation.
They are forced to accept American
conditions as a preventive measure
aimed against economic and military
activities of China in the region.
Quite possibly, the negotiating
countries, such as Brunei, Malaysia,
Vietnam and Singapore can use this
factor as a bargaining tool in negotiations with China to reach an agreement on their own interpretation of
the TPP – Free Trade Area of Asia
Pacific (FTAAP).
According to the US Trade Representative Michael Froman, it was
expected that the 12 countries would
complete the negotiations on participation in TPP by mid-2015. It would
allow the US Congress to ratify the
agreement by the end of the year.
Establishing of the TPP is considered critical for Washington as it
will increase American exports and
help create jobs. The main thing is it
will show that reorientation towards
Asia foresees cooperation not only on
security questions, but in economic
sphere as well and mainly "will remove obstacles to market access of
goods and services and solve new
trade problems of the 21st century"63
The agreement was finally signed on
October 5, 2015, but still is to be
ratified by the 12 countries.
Some experts think that the aim
of the TPP is to destroy the existing
system of consultations within the
framework of ASEAN which lets the
participating countries work out a
unified approach on the international
arena64.
US-ASEAN Cooperation
"Rebalance" of American strategy
in Asia Pacific is aimed at developing cooperation with the leading regional association – the Association
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
as a priority objective. Such US tactics are quite logical, since its main
goal is to control China. China has
reached an unprecedentedly high
level of relations with ASEAN, and
this fact is reflected in the signing
of the Declaration on the ASEAN –
China Strategic Partnership for
Peace and Prosperity in 2003, in
establishing China – ASEAN Free
Trade Area (2010), in China’s leadership among the Association’s trade
partners since 2009, in a multimillion China – ASEAN Investment
Cooperation Fund, in several dozens
of big and small economic projects
implemented by China in ASEAN
member countries.
It is worth noting that ASEAN
occupies a unique position among
other forms of cooperation in Asia
Pacific. It should be mentioned that
the Association is able to "work out
and maintain a coordinated attitude
on the most important aspects of interaction with outside states"65. The
term "ASEAN centrality" is widely
used by experts to describe the role
and place of this phenomenon in political and economic structures of
Asia Pacific. The term underlines the
system-building role of ASEAN in
the region66.
ASEAN member countries have
created a unique model of international political behavior that allows
them to oppose ambitions of non-regional states successfully avoiding
open confrontation. It means that
regional diplomacy of the ASEAN
countries is aimed to neutralize leadership ambitions of the US, China,
Japan primarily by means of "passive
opposition", so called "the ASEAN
Way". The ASEAN member countries
have learned to act in close cooperation as a consolidated team, not giving an opportunity to greater powers
for serious talks with each of the
small countries separately. Of course,
joint efforts of small and middle-sized
countries are not enough to impose
their will upon stronger players. But
such tactics of ASEAN are effective
as an instrument to resist the pressure
of great powers. "ASEAN member
countries cannot oppose the leaders
by bunching in a clod but they can
hinder their ambitions by quenching
or stimulating impulses emanating
from more powerful states"67.
All main trans-regional dialogue
formats are centered on ASEAN:
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF),
Asia-Europe Foundation (ASEF),
Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation
(APEC), East Asia Summit (EAS)
and many unofficial structures. Basically, ASEAN has outstepped the
geographical boundaries as the leading regional player connecting all
elements of Asia Pacific institutional
structure.
Though US – ASEAN relations
began in 1977, Washington’s insubstantial involvement in regional developments has let China become the
regional leader.
Sharp intensification in US –
ASEAN cooperation began when
the United States adopted a new
strategy in Asia Pacific. It was expressed by reorientation of the US
foreign policy priorities. First steps
in this direction were made in July
2009 by the US Secretary of State
Hillary Clinton, who signed one of
the most important documents of the
Association – Treaty of Amity and
Cooperation in Southeast Asia (the
Bali Treaty of 1976). The US had
19
Discussion paper
20
November 2015
not been signing the treaty for many
years, but China signed it in 2003.
In November 2009, for the first time
in the history of bilateral relations,
Joint Declaration on Enhanced Partnership for Enduring Peace and Prosperity was signed during the First
ASEAN – US Leaders’ Meeting. In
June 2010, the US opened a Mission
to ASEAN. The US became the first
non-member state to have such a mission. (It is worth mentioning that in
October 2012, China appointed its
Ambassador to ASEAN). Later, the
US Pacific Command appointed a
communication officer to the Mission
to ensure the information exchange
between the military bodies taking
part in international security programs in Southeast Asia and to interact at ASEAN defense and security
forums. Facing new tasks, in 2011 the
US Department of State undertook
reorganization. Deputy Assistant
Secretary for East Asian and Pacific
Affairs was appointed. A new office
for multilateral affairs was formed at
the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific
Affairs.
Recently, there has been an active process of institution building in
Asia Pacific. The Multilateral Affairs
Staff Unit is to promote US interests in the region by developing and
implementing the strategy of multilateral regional institutions. The
main attention in the work of the office is paid to such organizations as
ASEAN, East Asia Summit and
ASEAN Regional Forum on Security,
as well as the sub-regional Lower
Mekong Initiative.
At the same time, the work to
fill the bilateral cooperation with
new meaning is continued. A vast
draft program has been worked out
to provide advancement of relations in three directions accepted in
ASEAN – in the field of politics and
2/2015
security, economy and social culture.
The goal of the program is to form
a strategic partnership among the
parties. In 2012, decision was taken
to upgrade the US – ASEAN relations to a strategic level. Taking into
consideration the importance of the
annual ASEAN – US meetings, they
were reformatted to summits. Two
summits have already been held.
The foundation for the US –
ASEAN cooperation is laid by the
ASEAN – US Partnership for Good
Governance, Equitable and Sustainable Development and Security (PROGRESS). Members of the
Partnership strengthen cooperation
to combat transnational crime, protect human rights, manage natural disasters, develop ties in science
and technology, as well as in other
spheres68.
Implementation began of the Expanded Economic Engagement (E3)
Initiative, which was put forward in
2012 by the US to expand multidimensional cooperation. The Initiative
encourages international investment
through common policy regarding
broadening market access, increased
transparency and responsible business conduct69. Currently member
states have reached significant results
in developing shared principles of international investment. It seems that
one of the main strategic goals is to
stimulate the six of the ASEAN members which are not part of the TPP to
join the agreement.
Socio-cultural cooperation with
countries of Southeast Asia is expanding due to exchange programs
for scholars, students, young specialists and others.
The US strategy to develop relations with ASEAN has allowed
adjusting it to a new level not only
in the sphere of politics and security, but in trade as well in relatively short time. Trade volume of the
parties has increased during the decade (2004-2013) from $127 million
to $206 billion. ASEAN is among the
four largest US trade partners. The
US has become a significant investor
for ASEAN member states in industry, finance and insurance, non-bank
holding companies. Direct investments of the US amounted to $189
billion in 2012 (19 per cent growth
as compared with 2011). As a result,
the US invested in ASEAN 3 times
more than in China and 10 times
more than in India70. In 2013, the
growth continued and investments
exceeded $204 billion.
The new strategy of relations with
ASEAN shows – and not only to
ASEAN member states, but to Asia
as a whole – that the US acknowledges the Association’s central role
in the new regional architecture of
trade and security, revealing (mainly to China) Washington’s serious
intentions to built long-term connections with ASEAN. In its turn,
ASEAN tends to consider the US as
its key partner.
Boosting US cooperation
with China’s traditional
partners in Asia
The US has since long ago expressed concern about the increasing volume of cooperation between
China and some states of Asia Pacific.
In the context of ongoing rebalancing
of forces in Asia, the US has not only been strengthening links with its
strategic military-political allies, but
has been searching for partners that
can support Washington in its standoff with Beijing. Myanmar was
one of the first to be focused on. And
not incidentally.
In late 1980s, the US imposed
trade sanctions against Myanmar.
The European Union imposed arms
embargo on Myanmar that covers
arms, non-humanitarian aid, visa
sanctions in relation to the regime’s
military leaders and restrictions
in investment. The reason was the
violation of human rights in that
country. During recent two decades,
Myanmar was literally in isolation,
being criticized for lack of democracy and large scale drug production.
Under such circumstances, China
continued to render all the necessary
aid to the country. China became the
leading trade partner of Myanmar
(its share is 40 per cent in import and
24.5 per cent in export)71, the largest investor and the main supplier
of arms: fighter jets, armored vehicles and warships. Also, aid in military training was provided. In May
2011, China and Myanmar signed an
agreement on comprehensive strategic economic partnership72.
For Beijing, Myanmar presents interest not only as a state reach in natural resources (oil, gas, copper, tin,
timber), but also as a strategically
important state in the Bay of Bengal.
The shortest way connecting China
with the Indian Ocean goes through
the territory of Myanmar. Myanmar
borders important countries of the
region, such as India and Thailand.
Myanmar is a close neighbor of
Vietnam which is of big importance
for China, as India, Thailand and
Vietnam are gaining cooperation
momentum with Washington.
A 900 kilometer-long gas pipeline was put into operation in 2014,
connecting the Shwe gas field with
Yunnan province of China. Pipelines under construction by China
will not only shorten the way of
transportation, but allow avoiding
risks when tankers go through the
21
Discussion paper
22
November 2015
Strait of Malacca which is located
on the route where up to 70 per cent
of imported oil is presently being
shipped to China from Africa and
the Middle East. China is also constructing deep-sea port Kyaukphyu
on the Ramree Island to make it
possible to transport oil products
through the territory of Myanmar73.
As a result, Myanmar can become
a "bridge" connecting China with
oil-producing countries, regardless
of any possible move of Washington
even though it controls the Strait of
Malacca. In other words, the variant
when the United States Navy blocks
the way of oil transportation to China through the Strait of Malacca in
case of a protracted conflict makes
no sense.
The US rapprochement with
Myanmar is taking place under the
flag of establishing humanitarian dialogue with the country’s semi-civil
government. In autumn 2009, the
White House expressed its intention
to start a direct dialogue with the
authorities of Myanmar who asked
to suspend the economic sanctions.
In late 2011, during the first visit of
a US high-level executive to Myanmar in 50 years, the US State Secretary Hillary Clinton announced a
new phase in relations of the two
countries. The main result of the visit was a promise of Myanmar’s top
political leadership to diminish its
dependence on other countries such
as China.
In 2012–2013, exchange of visits
by presidents of the USA and Myanmar took place. In 2014, Barack
Obama visited Myanmar to take
part in the East Asia Summit. In
2013, the US and some other lenders
to Myanmar agreed to write off 50
per cent of its external debt, sanctions against some Myanmar banks
were eased74. Within this period, the
2/2015
country received assistance exceeding $200 million for cooperation
programs to improve democracy,
human rights, rule of law, transparency, etc. Cooperation in combatting drug trafficking was resumed75.
Still, military-technical cooperation of the two countries is not
maintained because of the sanctions.
Military relations are limited to participation of Myanmar Armed Forces in various military exercises,
such as "Cobra Gold" in Thailand,
only in observer status.
Nowadays Myanmar is undergoing changes regarding reorientation
towards the US in foreign policy.
Washington encourages the country
to do so, promising assistance in economic reforms.
Recently, the US has activated relations with Laos, and the tendency
is increasing. The process especially
speeded up in 2009, when the Lower Mekong Initiative was launched.
The initiative serves as a problem
solving platform for the Lower Mekong sub-region. In particular, the
US puts pressure on Laos to make
it withdraw from the ambitious program of constructing a hydro power
station on the Mekong River that is
being implemented with Chinese political and financial assistance. According to Washington’s plan, Laos’
withdrawal from the program will
ease economic influence of China on
that country.
Protection of national
security interests of Russia
in Asia Pacific
The currently observed escalation
of the US expansion in Asia Pacific
contradicts Russia’s interests in the
region.
Historically, the security of the Far
Eastern frontiers of our country was
ensured by military means. Under the
current circumstances in Asia Pacific,
a purely coercive response to the existing challenges is of little promise.
One of Russia’s political goals is minimization and leveling of American
influence in the region through the
development of economic relations
with countries of the region. It is not
only designed to give economic benefit but also is to strengthen Russia’s
political stance in the region.
Russia can effectively provide security on its Far Eastern borders only through attracting the neighbors
by advantages of a longtime and
full-scale economic partnership that
would ensure economic and political
security in the region on the multipolar basis. Much has been done already. The main strategic partners of
Russia are China, India, and Vietnam. Relations with South Korea
and dialogue with ASEAN are developing dynamically. Russia has strong
stance in multilateral regional associations. It is important to say that
despite the evident US pressure only
one Asia Pacific state, Japan, went
as far as imposing sanctions against
Russia.
Even under the current political
circumstances of tension and economic sanctions, Russia can exploit opportunities effluent from its unique
geographical and natural resource
benefits, to strengthen partnership
with growing economies of the region. For example, the extensive
chain of railways and gas pipelines
that connects South Korea and Japan
with their Western neighbors can
guarantee large economic profit and
enhance Russia’s role.
Since early 21st century, Russian
leadership has initiated several large
projects to promote social and economic development of the Far East,
based on budgetary funds and on
private (including foreign) investments. Apart from improvement of
infrastructure and creation of industrial capacities, the aim of these initiatives is the amplification of geopolitical position in the Pacific Ocean,
which is on the whole positively met
by countries on the region. According to experts, "Russia’s pragmatic
neo-mercantilism will bring no damage to countries of Asia Pacific as
well as it will not hinder growing
regionalism. In case this line is realized in a proper scale, it will make
substantial support to bilateral and
multilateral regimes of cooperation
in Northeast Asia"76.
Foundation has been laid already
to implement this strategy. In 2010,
"Russia – China" oil pipeline was
put into operation within the frameworks of the "Eastern Siberia – Pacific Ocean" (ESPO) project. Its
projected capacity is 15 million tons
per year with a possibility to increase
the transportation volume up to
30 million tons77. Profits from the
pipeline’s work have compensated
the decrease in income from selling
Russian resources to Europe. The
"Eastern Siberia – Pacific Ocean"
pipeline commissioned in 2013 is to
make Russian Far East one of the
leading oil suppliers to Japan, China,
South Korea, Taiwan and the Philippines.
A new agreement between Russia and China on the construction of
"The Power of Siberia" gas pipeline
got a wide international response
(total contract amount for gas supply within 30 years is about $400
billion). Gas is to be supplied from
Yakutia to Primorsky Krai and the
countries of Asia Pacific. According
to this agreement, from year 2018 to
year 2048, Gazprom is to supply up
to 38 billion cubic meters of gas per
year to China National Petroleum
Corporation78.
23
Discussion paper
24
November 2015
Japan also expresses its interest in partnership of this kind with
Gazprom. Being the world’s largest importer of natural gas, Tokyo
aims at diversification of sources of
supply. Before the Crimea events,
Russia and Japan were discussing a construction project of gas
pipeline from the island of Sakhalin to Japanese city of Wakkanai
on Hokkaido Island79. It would be
the first foreign pipeline to Japan.
Russia provides the logistical support to the project that costs $6 billion. In case the project is a success,
it will allow exporting more than 20
billion cubic meters of gas per year80.
Despite the policy of sanctions, the
matter is constantly being touched
upon at bilateral meetings by the
Japanese side.
Russia aims to prolong the
Trans-Siberian railway till North and
South Korea. In long-term outlook
high-speed traffic is to be provided
to make a direct and convenient way
from South Korea to West European
markets. The plan can be realized
in combination with agreements on
pipelines that cross both Koreas.
There are plans to conduct a major
reconstruction of the Baikal-Amur
Mainline and the Trans-Siberian
Railway for transportation of Russian resources to the East in appropriate amount. The problem has
since long ago been on the agenda, but right now there is dire need
for real action. The government announced that investment amounting
up to 562 billion rubles is required
(150 billion of it to be borrowed
from the National Welfare Fund, the
rest – of the Russian Railways own
funds plus private investments)81.
Implementation of the contract
signed by Russia and China in October 2014 on the construction of a
high-speed railway to connect the
two capital cities is of huge political
importance.
2/2015
In December 2014, negotiations
between Vietnam and the Eurasian
Economic Union (EEU) on a free
trade zone were completed. The
agreement was signed on May 29,
201582. The formation of a free trade
zone with Vietnam will allow both
sides to increase trade turnover and
to strengthen economic relations. It
is expected that the cost of the first
investment projects to be about $20
billion83. Signing of the agreement
between the EEU and Vietnam will
stimulate work on similar agreements
with other ASEAN member-states.
Thailand has also expressed its interest in a free trade zone with EEU.
Development of partnership with
ASEAN member states is seen to be
of exceptional value, as they look upon Russia as a destination for their
hi-tech exports. In this context, it is
possible to continue dialogue within
the framework of EAS and gradually
create a multipolar security system
in East Asia with Russia’s help.
It is reasonable to use Russia’s
experience of participation in the
ASEAN Regional Forum and ASEAN
Defense Ministers’ Meetings-Plus
(ADMM-Plus) to consider key problems in various formats with participation of the Russian Federation.
Specialized organizations of cooperation in Asia Pacific should be used
to articulate our position on sectoral
matters, and as an opportunity to
make decisions for subsequent presentation in larger formats.
Current initiatives of the Russian
leadership to develop international
relations with the countries of Asia
Pacific can be presented as a concept of regional openness based on
the federal resources and diversified
export84. "Co-development strategy"85
has not resulted in the leveling of the
pace of development in Russia’s border regions with that in the provinces
of the People’s Republic of China,
as well as in prefectures and provinces of Japan and South Korea. Therefore, the stake on foreign investment
in the development of Russian territories would seem premature.
The countries of Asia Pacific have
always been Russia’s important partners in the sphere of military cooperation, and presently, with the
escalation of territorial disputes in
the region, they have started to pay
special attention to modernization of
their armed forces and development
of defense industry. As a result, Russia’s opportunities have increased
drastically. Modern tendency for diversification of military equipment
suppliers contributes to it, since
several countries have been targeted
by American sanctions (e.g. Vietnam,
Indonesia, Myanmar). Modern
Western sanctions against Russia, in
particular the restrictions on civilian
weapons’86 sales imposed in the US,
have caused the Kalashnikov Concern, which used to supply about 90
per cent of its products to the US,
to re-orient towards countries of Asia
Pacific and Africa87.
According to weekly magazine
"Aviation Week & Space Technology", it is expected that in 2013–2018
aggregate military expenditures of
Australia, India, Indonesia, Japan,
Malaysia, Pakistan, Singapore,
Republic of Korea, Taiwan and
Thailand can reach $1.4 trillion, that
exceeds the data for the previous
5 years (2008–2012) by more than
50 per cent88. The main expenditure
is to be connected with naval forces’
modernization and purchase of appropriate equipment. Up to year
2018, the countries of Asia Pacific
are planning to buy 18 marine helicopters, 31 submarines, 13 aircraft
and 263 ships of various designs89.
At present, two groups of Asia
Pacific countries can be identified in
regard to military cooperation with
Russia. The first group consists of, so
to say, regional leaders like Malaysia,
Indonesia, Vietnam. The second
group includes countries cooperation
with which is on the initial stage, but
which are potentially rather attractive – Bangladesh, Myanmar, Brunei, Thailand. There is also a group
of countries cooperation with which
is almost nonexistent (Australia, New
Zealand, the Philippines, Maldives,
Nepal, Fiji, Papua New Guinea).
This is caused by objective reasons
(e.g. lack of resources allotted by respective governments on buying arms
and military equipment), as well as
by orientation of these countries towards Western suppliers of products
for military purposes. That is why, in
order to further develop military cooperation with the countries of Asia
Pacific in mid-term perspective, Russian suppliers of military products
are to concentrate on strengthening
their stance in traditional markets
and on promotion of their products
to countries conventionally defined
as belonging to the third group.
According to management of the
Federal Service for Military-Technical Cooperation (MTC) of Russia,
it is expedient to work on forming
new relations with foreign partners,
which basically presume:
– transition from the "seller-buyer" scheme to joint development
of high-tech weapons and military
equipment;
– introduction of new, better
forms of military-economic cooperation that fully take into account
interests of foreign partners in developing their own military-technical
production that not only implies selling armaments, but also supplying
technologies;
– development and participation
in licensed manufacturing of hightech armaments in foreign countries;
25
Discussion paper
November 2015
– opening of joint post-sale service technical centers;
– conduct of joint and ordered research and development;
– transfer of armaments on conditions of leasing and other promising
forms of cooperation90.
Such format of relations with
countries of Asia Pacific in military-technical sphere is determined
by global tendencies. Russia has to
keep it to maintain its status on the
global arms market despite the fact
such conditions may seem unfavorable for the supplier.
Relations of Russia with the majority of the Asia Pacific countries
are not burdened with past historical
grievances. The relationship is held
in a traditionally friendly way. Our
countries have no territorial disputes
and share opinions on majority of
26
2/2015
important international problems.
Russia’s "pivot to Asia Pacific" in
the long-term perspective is to contribute to overcoming the recession
and to further development of Russian economy. A pledge for it is the
demand for natural resources in most
of the dynamically developing countries (China, ASEAN member states,
South Asia), strengthening of their
military potential, as well as views
on the incipient multipolar world
coinciding with those of Russia and
antagonism to monopolar principles
of security.
Keywords: Asia-Pacific region – "pivot
to Asia" – ASEAN – Trans-Pacific
Partnership – USA – China – Japan –
South Korea – Australia – Thailand –
Malaysia – Singapore – Vietnam –
Myanmar – Cambodia – Laos.
Endnotes
1
 Концепция внешней политики Российской Федерации : Утверждена Президентом
Российской Федерации В. В. Путиным 12 февраля 2013 года // Министерство иностранных
дел Российской Федерации : офиц. интернет-сайт. 2013. 18 февраля. URL: http://www.
mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/0/6D84DDEDEDBF7DA644257B160051BF7F (accessed: 10.10.2014).
2
 Clinton H. America’s Pacific Century / Hillary Clinton // Foreign Policy : website.
2011. October 11. URL: http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/10/11/americas-pacific-century/
(accessed: 20.04.2015).
3
 Brzezinski Z. The Group of Two that could change the world / Zbigniew Brzezinski // The
Financial Times : website. 2009. January 13. URL: http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/
d99369b8-e178-11dd-afa0-0000779fd2ac.html#axzz3aZWFmrGs (accessed: 12.03.2015).
4
 Sustaining US Global Leadership: Priorities For 21st Century Defense // US Department of Defense : website. 2012. January. URL: http://www.defense.gov/news/Defense_
Strategic_Guidance.pdf (accessed: 05.04.2015).
5
 Whitten G., Jilani E A New US Defense Strategy for the 21st Century. Rebalance to the
Asia-Pacific / Gregory Whitten, Erum Jilani // Harvard Kennedy School Review : website.
2014. June 28. URL: http://harvardkennedyschoolreview.com/rebalance-to-the-asia-pacific/
(accessed: 10.03.2015).
6
 Quadrennial Defense Review 2014 // US Department of Defense. 2014. March.
P. 4. URL: http://www.defense.gov/pubs/2014_Quadrennial_Defense_Review.pdf (accessed: 11.04.2015).
7
 Губин А. США – преимущественно тихоокеанская держава / Андрей Губин //
Российский совет по международным делам : интернет-сайт. 2014. 15 мая. URL: http://
russiancouncil.ru/inner/?id_4=3703#top (accessed: 03.02.2015).
8
 Remarks by the President at the United States Military Academy Commencement
Ceremony, US Military Academy-West Point, West Point // The White House : website.
New York, 2014. May 28. URL: https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/05/28/
remarks-president-united-states-military-academy-commencement-ceremony (accessed: 15.03.2015).
9
 US takes aim at China, ups naval aid to Southeast Asia // Indiatvnews : website. 2013.
December 16. URL: http://www.indiatvnews.com/news/world/us-takes-aim-chinaups-navalaid-Southeast-asia-15361.html (accessed: 18.01.2015).
10
 Cooperation Afloat Readiness And Training (CARAT) // GlobalSecurity.org : website.
URL: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/carat.htm (accessed: 12.03.2015).
11
 Pellerin C. Budget constraints won’t halt Asia-Pacific rebalance, work says / Cheryl
Pellerin // US Department of Defence : website. 2014. October 1. URL: http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=123308 (accessed: 14.11.2014).
12
 Beattie V. US Navy ’shaping events’ in South China Sea / Victor Beattie // Voice of
America : website. 2014. May 20. URL: http://www.voanews.com/content/us-navyshapingevents-in-south-china-sea/1918187.html (accessed: 16.03.2015).
13
 US military presence in Asia – graphic of the day // Thomson Reuters : website. 2012.
December 
11. URL: http://blog.thomsonreuters.com/index.php/u-s-military-presence-inasia-graphic-of-the-day/ (accessed: 14.11.2014).
14
 Base Structure Report FY 2014. Baseline / Department of Defense // Office of the
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics : website. P. 194. URL:
http://www.acq.osd.mil/ie/download/bsr/Base per cent20Structure per cent20Report per
cent20FY14.pdf (accessed: 14.11.2014).
15
 Лебедева Н. Большой Индийский океан и китайская стратегия "Нить жемчуга" /
Н. Лебедева // Фонд исторической перспективы : интернет-сайт. 2011. Октябрь. URL:
http://www.perspektivy.info/print.php?ID=104809 (accessed: 14.02.2015).
27
Discussion paper
November 2015
2/2015
16
 Саммит АТЭС 2012 // Центр изучения международных отношений в АзиатскоТихоокеанском регионе : интернет-сайт. 2012. Сентябрь 26. URL: http://ru.apircenter.org/
archives/1419 (accessed: 24.04.2015).
17
 Green M. Japan is Back: Unbundling Abe’s Grand Strategy / Michael Green //
LOWY Institute for International Policy : website. 2013. December. P. 9. URL: http://www.
lowyinstitute.org/files/green_japan_is_back_web_0.pdf (accessed: 14.11.2014).
18
 США, Индия и Япония проводят учения в Тихом океане // Российский военно-морской
флот : интернет-сайт. 2014. 29 июля. URL: http://flot.com/news/navy/?ELEMENT_
ID=169266 (accessed: 22.04.2015).
19
 Rossow R., Toru Ito, Srivastava A., Glosserman B. US-Japan-India cooperation:
a trilateral whose time has come / Richard Rossow, Toru Ito, Anupam Srivastava, and Brad
Glosserman / Pacific Forum CSIS : PacNet. 2014. October 20. № 76. P. 1. URL: http://csis.
org/files/publication/Pac1476.pdf (accessed: 20.03.2015).
20
 Мозговой А. Антикитайский вал / Александр Мозговой // Национальная оборона :
интернет-сайт. 2014. Май. № 5. URL: http://www.oborona.ru/includes/periodics/geopolitics/2014/0326/133412804/detail.shtml (accessed: 25.02.2015).
21
 Watkins T. Agreement with US sees NZ as ’de facto’ ally / Tracy Watkins // Fairfax New Zealand Ltd : website. 2012. June 20. URL: http://www.stuff.co.nz/national/
politics/7133939/Agreement-with-US-sees-NZ-as-de-facto-ally (accessed: 14.03.2015).
22
 Sneider D. Japan-Korea Relations: Time for US Intervention? / D. Sneider // NBR
Analysis Brief. 2014. January 6. P. 1. URL: http://www.nbr.org/publications/analysis/
pdf/Brief/010614_Sneider_Japan-KoreaRelations.pdf (accessed: 05.03.2015).
23
 Glosserman B., Cunico J. Trilaterial Cooperation in Northeast Asia: expactations and
limitations : PacNet / Brad Glosserman, Julia Cunico. 2015. January 21. № 6. P. 1. URL: http://
csis.org/files/publication/Pac1506B.pdf (accessed: 10.02.2015).
24
 Япония, Южная Корея и США договорились об обмене разведданными по
КНДР // РИА Новости : информ. агентство. 2014. 26 декабря. URL: http://ria.ru/
world/20141226/1040244424.html#ixzz3PNuf833i (accessed: 21.02.2015).
25
 Ruwitch J. China’s Xi issues veiled warning to Asia over military alliances /
John Ruwitch // Reuters : website. 2014. May 21. URL: http://www.reuters.com/
article/2014/05/21/us-china-xi-idUSBREA4K02V20140521 (accessed: 14.03.2015).
26
 Kurata P. US Rebalances Strategic Focus Toward Asia-Pacific / Phillip Kurata //
State Department’s Bureau of International Information Programs : website. 2013. March 13.
URL: http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/article/2013/03/20130313144068.html
(accessed: 24.04.2015).
27
 The Guidelines for Japan-US Defense Cooperation // Ministry of Defense of Japan :
website. 2015. April 27. URL: http://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_act/anpo/pdf/shishin_201504
27e.pdf (accessed: 03.06.2015).
28
 Стапран Н. Воевать без оружия, торговать без прибыли… О визите Синдзо Абэ
в США / Н. Стапран // Российский совет по международным делам : интернет-сайт.
2015. 30 апреля. URL: http://russiancouncil.ru/inner/?id_4=5822#top-content (accessed:
03.06.2015).
29
 Kamiya M., Kato Y., Przystup J., Schoff J. L. The US-Japan Alliance in a New
Defense Guidelines Era / Matake Kamiya, Yoichi Kato, James Przystup, James L. Schoff //
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace : website. 2014. November 21. URL: http://
carnegieendowment.org/2014/11/21/u.s.-japan-alliance-in-new-defense-guidelines-era (accessed:
21.02.2015).
28
30
 Charlett-Avery E. Japan-US Relations: Issues for Congress / E. Charlett-Avery /
Congressional Research Service // Federation of American Scientists : website. 2015.
January 13. 35 p. URL: http://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33436.pdf (accessed: 05.03.2015).
31
 Cossa R. A., Glosserman B. Regional Overview: The Rebalance Remains a Reality :
Comparative Connections A Triannual E-Journal on East Asian bilateral relations / Ralph
A. Cossa, Brad Glosserman // Center for Strategic and International Studies : website.
2014. September. P. 5. URL: http://csis.org/files/publication/1402qoverview.pdf (accessed:
03.06.2015).
32
 Scott J., Tweed D. US Navy Considers setting up ship base in Australia / Jason Scott,
David Tweed // Bloomberg : website. 2015. February 10. URL: http://www.bloomberg.
com/news/articles/2015-02-10/u-s-considering-basing-navy-ships-in-australia-greenert-saysi5yxouxp (accessed: 21.04.2015)
33
 Самсонов А. Австралийский плацдарм США // Александр Самсонов // Военное
обозрение : интернет-сайт. 2013. 22 ноября. URL: http://topwar.ru/36331-avstraliyskiy-placdarm-ssha.html (accessed: 17.02.2015).
34
 Mulrine A. How US military plans to carry out Obama’s ’pivot to Asia’ / Anna
Mulrine // The Christian Science Monitor : website. 2013. February 18. URL: http://www.
csmonitor.com/USA/Foreign-Policy/2013/0218/How-US-military-plans-to-carry-outObama-s-pivot-to-Asia (accessed: 27.03.2015).
35
 США и Южная Корея: азиатский расклад, Голос Америки // Рамблер-Новости :
интернет-сайт. 2014. 9 января. URL: http://news.rambler.ru/23010724/ (accessed:
10.03.2015).
36
 Рябов К. Новости сотрудничества США и Южной Кореи / Кирилл Рябов //
Военное обозрение. 2014. 9 сентября, URL: http://topwar.ru/57753-novosti-sotrudnichestvassha-i-yuzhnoy-korei.html (accessed: 27.03.2015).
37
 Jackson V. A US Perspective / Van Jackson // The ASAN Forum. Online Journal :
website. 2015. March 31. URL: http://www.theasanforum.org/a-us-perspective-4/ (accessed:
03.06.2015).
38
 Montague K. A Review of South Korean Missile Defense Programs / Karen Montague //
George C. Marshall Institute : website. 2014. March. URL: http://marshall.org/wp-content/
uploads/2014/03/South-Korean-BMD-Mar-14.pdf (accessed: 03.06.2015).
39
 Rinehart I.E., Hildreth S. A., Lawrence S.V. Ballistic missile defense in the AsiaPacific Region: cooperation and opposition / Ian E. Rinehart, Steven A. Hildreth, Susan V.
Lawrence. // Congressional Research Service. 2015. April 3. P. 12. URL: https://fas.org/sgp/
crs/nuke/R43116.pdf (accessed: 03.06.2015).
40
 Ibid.
41
 Thayer C. Analyzing the US-Philippines enhanced defense cooperation Agreement /
Carl Thayer // The Diplomat : website. 2014. May 
2. URL: http://thediplo
mat.com/2014/05/analyzing-the-us-philippines-enhanced-defense-cooperation-agreement
(accessed: 14.04.2015).
42
 Fact Sheet: United States-Philippines bilateral relations // The White House, Office
of the Press Secretary : website. 2014. April 
28. URL: http://uspolitics.einnews.com/
pr_news/202201436/fact-sheet-united-states-philippines-bilateral-relations (accessed: 17.06.2015).
43
 Mogato M. US raises military assistance to the Philippines / Manuel Mogato //
InterAksyon : website. 2013. July 31. URL: http://www.interaksyon.com/article/67669/
us-raises-military-assistance-to-the-philippines (accessed: 12.02.2015).
44
 Pellerin C. USA: Panetta, Singapore Defense Chief affirm deeper cooperation / Cheryl
Pellerin // US Department of Defense : website. 2012. April 6. URL: http://www.defense.
gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=67837 (accessed: 04.04.2015).
45
 Singapore seeks AMRAAM and AIM-9X Sidewinder missiles from US // : website. 2013.
April 9. URL: http://www.airforce-technology.com/news/newssingapore-seeks-amraam-andaim-9x-sidewinder-missiles-from-us (accessed: 24.02.2015).
29
Discussion paper
November 2015
2/2015
46
 США частично снимают эмбарго на поставки оружия Вьетнаму // РИА "Новости".
URL: http://ria.ru/defense_safety/20141002/1026684121.html (accessed: 02.03.2015).
47
 Statement of Admiral Samuel J. Locklear, US Navy Commander, US Pacific Command
before the Senate Committee on Armed Services on US Pacific Command Posture, Senate Armed
Services Committee // Document Repository – US House of Representatives : website.
2014. March25. P.16. URL: http://www.armed-services.cenate.gov/imo/media/doc/
Locklear_03-25-14.pdf (accessed: 23.02.2015)
48
 2012 Joint Vision Statement for the Thai-US Defense Alliance : Release №: 904-12 //
US Department of Defense : website. 2012. November 15. URL: http://www.defense.gov/
releases/release.aspx?releaseid=15685 (accessed: 23.04.2015)
49
 As US weighs sanctions, foreign reaction rolls in // Bangkok Post : website. 2014.
April 22. URL: http://m.bangkokpost.com/topstories/411293 (accessed: 17.04.2015).
50
 Merit Freeman. US Funds Coup In Thailand // Word Press: website. 2014.
December 4. URL: https://consciousawarenessforall.wordpress.com/2014/12/04/us-funds-coupin-thailand (accessed: 10.04.2015).
51
 СМИ: крупнейшие американские военные учения в АТР начались в Таиланде //
РИА Новости : информ. агентство. 2015. 9 февраля. URL: http://ria.ru/world/
20150209/1046728298.html (accessed: 20.04.2015).
52
 Rinehart I. E. Malaysia: Background and US Relations / Ian E. Rinehart ; Congressional
Research Service // Federation of American Scientists : website. 2014. May 23. P. 14. URL:
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R43505.pdf (accessed: 10.04.2015)
53
 Sheldon S. US-Southeast Asia Relations: Military Commitments and Human Rights
Concerns / Simon Sheldon // Center for Strategic and International Studies: website.
2013. May. P. 4. URL: http://csis.org/files/publication/1301qus_seasia.pdf (accessed:
19.02.2015)
54
 Cogan J. US military intensifies training for a war with China / James Cogan //
World Socialist website: website. 2014. May 7. URL: https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2014/05/07/asia-m07.html (accessed: 18.04.2015).
55
 Thayer C. A. The tug of war over Cambodia / Carlyle A. Thayer // USNI News :
website. 2013. February 19. URL: http://news.usni.org/2013/02/19/the-tug-of-war-overcambodia (accessed: 23.02.2015).
56
 Thayer C.A. The tug of war over Cambodia / Carlyle A. Thayer // USNI News :
website. 2013. February 19. URL: http://news.usni.org/2013/02/19/the-tug-of-war-overcambodia (accessed: 23.02.2015).
57
 See, "Американо-китайский диспут об инициативе АТЭС": 中美APEC主导权之争? //
Foreign Affairs Observer : website. 2014. November. URL: http://www.faobserver.com/
NewsInfo.aspx?id=11000 (accessed: 10.02.2015).
58
 Зубов Д. Новая уловка Вашингтона – Транстихоокеанское партнёрство / Даниэль
Зубов // РИА Новости : информ. агентство. 2014. 18 ноября. URL: http://ria.ru/cj_
analytics/20141118/1033851469.html (accessed: 02.02.2015).
59
 АТЭС выбрал вариант Китая. США проигнорировали // Вести. Экономика :
интернет-сайт. 2014. 11 ноября. URL: http://www.vestifinance.ru/articles/49251 (accessed:
16.02.2015).
60
 Транс-Тихоокеанское партнёрство: свободная торговля, но не справедливая //
Юнитрейд : интернет-сайт. 2013. 11 июня. URL: http://www.unitrade.su/novosti/trans_
tihookeanskoe_partnerstvo_svobodnaja_torgovlja.html (accessed: 10.02.2015).
61
30
62
 Зубов Д. Op. cit.
 Эксперт: Будущее Транстихоокеанское партнёрство – масштабная угроза для
стран-участниц // RT : интернет-сайт. 2013. 10 декабря. URL: http://russian.rt.com/
article/19541 (accessed: 17.02.2015).
63
 "Транстихоокеанское партнёрство – это не дублёр АТЭС", – эксперт Анастасия
Митрофанова // Newsland : интернет-сайт. 2011. 15 ноября. http://newsland.com/news/
detail/id/823284/ (accessed: 13.02.2015).
64
 Территориальные споры в Азиатско-Тихоокеанском регионе // Геополитика :
интернет-сайт. 2012. Октябрь 23. URL: http://www.geopolitics.ru/2012/10/territorialnye-spory-v-aziatsko-tixookeanskom-regione/ (accessed: 13.03.2015).
65
 Сhalk P. ASEAN Ascending. Achieving "centrality" in the emerging Asian order :
Strategy. Australian Policy Institute / P. Сhalk. 2015. March. P. 12.
66
 Petri P., Plummer M. ASEAN centrality and ASEAN-US economic relationship /
P. Petri, M. Plummer // Policy Studies / East-West Center. Honolulu, 2013. № 69. P. 6–7;
Acharya A. ASEAN 2030: Challenges of building a mature political and security community :
Working paper 441 / A. Acharya ; Asian Development Bank Institute. Tokyo, 2013. P. 20.
67
 Богатуров А. Д. Лидерство и критерии лидерства в мировой системе / А. Д. Богатуров // Современная мировая политика. Прикладной анализ. М. : Аспект Пресс, 2010.
С. 161.
68
 ASEAN-US Partnership for Good Governance, equitable and sustainable development
and security (ASEAN-US Progress) // DAI : website. URL: http://dai.com/ourwork/
projects/southeast-asia per centE2percent80percent94asean-us-partnership-good-governanceequitable-and-sustainable (accessed: 20.04.2015).
69
 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) // The Office of the US Trade Representative : website. URL: https://ustr.gov/issue-areas/trade-development/associationsoutheast-asian-nations-asean (accessed: 21.03.2015).
70
 See, Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
71
 Burma // Central Intelligence Agency : website. URL: https://www.cia.gov/
library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bm.html (accessed: 21.03.2015).
72
 Гулевич В. Мьянма – Китай – США – треугольник соперничества и кооперации /
Владислав Гулевич // Междунарожная жизнь : интернет-сайт. 2013. 5 декабря. URL:
http://interaffairs.ru/read.php?item=10277 (accessed: 30.01.2015).
73
 Волхонский Б. М., Комиссина И. Н., Фролова И.Ю. Азиатско-Тихоокеанский
регион: новые тенденции и интересы России / Б. М. Волхонский, И. Н. Комиссина,
И. Ю. Фролова // Проблемы национальной стратегии. 2013. № 4. С. 26.
74
 Paris Club cancels 6 billion dollars of burma’s debt // Hla Oo’s Blog : website.
2013. January 28. URL: http://hlaoo1980.blogspot.ru/2013/01/paris-club-cancels-6-billiondollars-of.html (accessed: 25.04.2015).
75
 Harding B., Jordan C. A., Gunasekaran A. Supporting continued reform in Myanmar / Brian Harding, Charles A. Jordan, Aarthi Gunasekaran // Center for American
Progress : website. 2014. November 13. URL: https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/
security/report/2014/11/13/101379/supporting-continued-reform-in-myanmar/ (accessed:
20.04.2015).
76
 Kim T. Impassive to imperial? Russia in Northeast Asia from Yeltsin to Putin /
Taehwan Kim // Northeast Asia: Ripe for Integration? / Vinod K. Aggarwal, Min Gyo
Koo, Seungjoo Lee, Chung-in Moon (Eds.). New York : Springer, 2008. P. 179–211.
77
 Запущен в эксплуатацию нефтепровод Россия – Китай // РБК : интернет-сайт.
2010. 29 августа. URL: http://top.rbc.ru/economics/29/08/2010/457477.shtml (accessed: 09.01.2014).
78
 Газотранспортная систем "Сила Сибири" обеспечит российскому газу доступ в Китай,
на принципиально новый для Газпрома рынок // Газпром Экспорт : интернет-сайт. URL:
http://www.gazpromexport.ru/projects/3/ (accessed: 19.04.2015).
31
Discussion paper
November 2015
2/2015
79
 США бессильны: Япония ускользает в трубу // Экономика сегодня : интернет-сайт.
2015. 1 июня. URL: http://rueconomics.ru/64288-ssha-bessilnyi-yaponiya-uskolzaet-v-trubu/
(accessed: 09.06.2015).
80
 Lee K. Understanding the key developments as Russia continues its Pivot
East / Kangkyu Lee // Asia Briefing : website. 2014. November 3. URL: http://www.
asiabriefing.com/news/2014/11/understanding-key-developments-russia-continues-pivoteast/ (accessed: 19.04.2015).
81
 Пале С. Партнёрство со странами АТР компенсирует России потери от возможных
санкций Запада / София Пале // Новое Восточное Обозрение : интернет-сайт. 2014.
3 апреля. URL: http://ru.journal-neo.org/2014/04/03/rus-partnerstvo-so-stranami-atrkompensiruet-rossii-poteri-ot-vozmozhny-h-sanktsij-zapada/ (accessed: 11.04.2015).
82
 Зона свободной торговли ЕАЭС и Вьетнама: возможности, риски и планы. //
РИА Новости : информ. агентство. 2015. 29 мая. URL: http://ria.ru/economy/2015
0529/1067199933.html (accessed: 29.05.2015).
83
 Вьетнам войдет в зону свободной торговли ЕАЭС в конце мая // Известия :
интернет-сайт. 2015. 19 мая. URL: http://izvestia.ru/news/586678 (accessed: 20.05.2015).
84
 Большая Восточная Азия: мировая политика и региональные трансформации /
под ред. А. Д. Воскресенского. М. : МГИМО, 2010. С. 291.
85
 Кузык Б. Н., Титаренко М. Л. Китай – Россия 2050: стратегия соразвития /
Б. Н. Кузык, М. Л. Титаренко. М. : Ин-т экон. стратегий, 2006. 656 с.
86
 Civil weapons are defined as weapons designed for such purposes as self-defense,
for sports and hunting, as well as for cultural and educational purposes. (See, Федеральный закон "Об оружии" (150-ФЗ) : вступил в силу: 13.12.1996 : с изменениями от:
11.01.2015 // Договор-Юрист.ру : интернет-сайт. URL: http://dogovor-urist.ru/законы/
закон_об_оружии/ (accessed: 02.06.2015)).
87
 Кравченко А. Бренд Kalashnikov в США регистрирует американская компания /
Анастасия Кравченко // Известия. 2015. 27 января. URL: http://izvestia.ru/news/582212
(accessed: 24.05.2015).
88
 Соколов А. Страны АТР, армия Китая и ВТС России. Что общего? / Анатолий
Соколов // Росинформбюро : информ. агентство. 2013. 15 октября. URL: http://rosinform.
ru/2013/10/15/strany-atr-armiya-kitaya-i-vts-rossii-chto-obschego/ (accessed: 21.04.2015).
89
90
 Ibid.
 ФСВТС: Россия намерена активно налаживать и развивать военно-техническое
сотрудничество со странами АТР // Новости@mail.ru : интернет-сайт. 2013. 26 февраля.
URL: https://news.mail.ru/economics/12129522/ (accessed: 02.06.2015).
32

discussion paper - Russian Institute for Strategic Studies

Transcription

Similar documents

13503 Pumice St. Norwalk, CA 90650 tel: 562.802.2199 fax

PILSA Verbatim article - Pacific Islands Law Students Association

SUSTAINABLE PACIFIC GROVE APRIL MEETING

Enjoy A CarEfrEE All-inclusivE Family Vacation To Club MEd

Help Document Open the URL – www.irctc.co.in Enter your login

XGames.ESPN.go.com

Region by GDP per caita - Institute for Governance and Policy Studies

Pacific Stages and ESMoA Present Concert Reading of Abundance

CashWizard BR3119

Enhancing Maritime Domain Awareness in the