External Influences and the 2006 Fiji Military Coup

GOVERNANCE
External Influences and the 2006 Fiji Military Coup
RICHARD HERR
It is in the nature of any civil conflict for the protagonists to be more concerned with their internal divisions than with the impact of their dispute abroad. This
political fact of life played a significant, if perverse, role
in the dynamics of the recent coup in Fiji. For the people
of Fiji, the December 5, 2006 military overthrow of the
Government of Prime Minister Laisenia Qarase was very
a Fijian event driven by the conflicted pluralism of a
deeply divided society. Yet, as the regional hub of the
South Pacific, the archipelagic country looms large in the
interests of many powers engaged with the Pacific Islands. Thus, the relevance of the international dimension
in the overthrow of the Qarase Government has tended
to be under-regarded by those within Fiji and overestimated by those outside.
This interpretation may appear to be gainsaid by
coup leader Commodore Voreqe (Frank) Bainimarama’s
claim that he would appeal to the People’s Republic of
China and other Asian countries to offset any sanctions
by Fiji’s Western supporters. This was not a particularly
startling tactic since variations on the theme have been
offered by several other Pacific Island states in recent
years. The PRC’s growing wealth has been matched by an
increased presence in the Pacific Islands, making it an
obvious target for support when the more traditional
avenues of assistance have been threatened or withdrawn.
Beside evidence to the contrary, many Pacific Island leaders tend to assume that Beijing is willing to serve as a foil
to any Western power the Islands find irksome.
This brief overview of the Bainimarama coup, the
fourth in Fiji’s last two decades, argues that external influences have contributed to the current ambiguities that
surround the way forward for Fiji since early December.
Naturally, a certain naivety by those in Fiji about the significance of the coup for regional affairs and for the interests of established regional powers has contributed to
the consternation felt by these powers in responding to
the coup. Arguably, Bainimarama could have achieved his
ends without direct military intervention had he played
his foreign relations cards more skillfully. More certainly, a
better understanding of the internal dynamics in Fiji
could have enhanced the influence that the external powers had in preventing the coup or modifying its course.
The mutual consternation may be resolved eventually
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without major repercussions but the odds are that the
positions taken by the extra-regional powers will seriously
complicate a return to democracy in Fiji.
THE ORIGINS OF THE 2006 COUP
Few military interventions can have been as well advertised in advance as that by Commodore Bainimarama,
Commander of the Republic of Fiji Military Forces
(RFMF). He had been sending strong signals for perhaps
eighteen months that the Qarase Government was living
on borrowed time unless it took heed of his concerns
about the Government’s abuse of power. The Australian
Government admits it was aware of the real threat of a
coup months before it occurred and pre-positioned three
warships in Fiji waters more than a month before the
event. Unlike the military coup d’états of May 1987,
September 1987 and May 2000, this one came as no surprise.
This was not its only break with the precedents of
the earlier coups. The previous military interventions
were undertaken to overturn democratic results that appeared to favor Indo-Fijian interests against the established indigenous elites. Bainimarama, an indigenous Fijian himself, overthrew the Qarase Government, which
had only been re-elected narrowly in May 2006, to defend
the position of marginalized Indo-Fijian and Melanesian
interests against the indigenous Melanesian elite establishment as well as to “clean up” a Government he
deemed corrupt. Somewhat ironically, he came to this
stand largely in reaction to the 2000 coup by disgraced
businessman George Speight. The irony in this case arises
from the fact that the Commander was profoundly
scarred by the Speight coup and had no desire to become
“another” George Speight but, nonetheless, appears to
many critical external observers as being merely the next
in his line.
The 2000 coup was not engineered by the military
leaders but, a week after Speight and a handful of supporters seized the Prime Minister Mahendra Chaudhry
and many of his cabinet as hostages to bring the Government down, a small number of RFMF soldiers mutinied in support of Speight. The mutineers made an attempt to assassinate Bainimarama and succeeded in killing
three other loyal soldiers. As head of the RFMF, Bainima-
flickr.com/people/joshua
rama played a central role in defeating the Speight coup
puted by Bainimarama, however). At a personal level, he
and installing Laisenia Qarase as prime minister in the
could scarcely accept that the men who had conspired to
military’s interim government following the collapse of
kill him were welcomed back into power by Qarase, the
the coup. He therefore felt a strong sense of responsibilvery man he had elevated to the office of prime minister
ity, perhaps even ownership, of the aftermath of the 2000
in order to restore democracy to Fiji after the 2000 coup.
coup. It was largely for these reasons that Bainimarama
Pardoning such traitors was a personal insult as well as an
found himself caught between his desire to prevent the
affront to the state. In terms of national integrity, BainiSpeight agenda from succeeding and being in command
marama believed the ultra-nationalist agenda that Qarase
of the only force, in his judgment, with sufficient power
came to embrace was essentially the same that Speight
to prevent this from occurring.
had sought to achieve. Particularly galling was the Qoliqoli
This tension explains the repeated warnings to the
bill that would have alienated coastal land from all but
Government about the actions that the RFMF might take
indigenous clan ownership (dominated by the chiefly systo oppose the Qarase Government. From early 2006, the
tem) and so seriously disadvantage both Indo-Fijian and
RFMF Commander demanded that the Qarase Governmany ordinary Fijian interests while putting the country’s
ment resign. Nevertheless, his wish to avoid the Speight
vital tourism industry at risk.
label found the threats of intervention followed by an “unless”.
BAINIMARAMA FAILS TO MANIn attempting to pressurize the Bainimarama’s action undermined the pos- AGE EXTERNAL INTERESTS
sibility that other extra-regional powers While Bainimarama’s defenders
Government into deflecting from
its ultra-nationalist course that might follow the New Zealand lead and
point to the validity of his subsmacked of a slide toward apartaccept a legitimate military role securing stantive concerns, his critics point
heid, Bainimarama made three
to the illegitimacy of his method
domestic stability in Fiji.
sets of demands of Qarase. If
in pursuing them. Some further
these were fulfilled, they would
claim that he was attempting also
obviate the need for military intervention. These centered
to avoid prosecution for his alleged collusion in the death
on draft legislation to further entrench indigenous Fijian
of some mutineers following the 2000 coup. Indeed, the
control of the land and water resources, legislation that
former especially proved to be a vital issue for virtually all
appeared to legitimize the Speight coup, and the continthe extra-regional powers in the weeks leading up to the
ued participation in politics of convicted coup-plotters.
December coup. The truth (or otherwise) of BainimaThus, Bainimarama had a mix of motives for taking
rama’s regularly expressed concerns about governance
on the Qarase Government notwithstanding the apparent
issues scarcely attracted any attention outside Fiji despite
legitimacy gained by its narrow re-election in May 2006
the fact that there was substantial internal support for
(the validity of the electoral result was subsequently disthem especially amongst the minority Indo-Fijian com-
Harvard Asia Pacific Review 11
munity and advocates of better economic management.
Zealand initiative may well have shortened the odds for
Had he been a politician rather than a military comBainimarama.
mander, Bainimarama might have used the increasing
donor emphasis on “good governance” as an asset in his
EXTERNAL PRESSURE FAILS TO STOP THE COUP
test of wills with Prime Minister Qarase. Instead, his reAs notable as was Bainimarama’s omission of the
peated threats to use the RFMF to ensure a “clean up” of
external factor in his attempt to influence the course of
Fiji politics played into the GovernFiji politics, even more so was
ment’s hands. Friendly powers were far The prospect that China would be prepared to the inability of countries like
more interested in preventing a coup
to deflect the
become a new regional hegemony replacing Australia
than determining the levels of corrupCommander from his course.
Australia is fanciful.
tion and political bias in a democratiBainimarama gave ample
cally elected Government.
warning of the threat and yet
Bainimarama’s failure to reach beyond Fiji for supAustralia, Britain, the United States, and other interested
port was clearly somewhat naïve given the Qarase Govpowers proved unable to influence either the Governernment’s success in parlaying this into a political ace. It
ment or the Commander effectively to prevent a coup.
would have been a problematic tactic since it could not
Much of the responsibility here would have to rest with a
have been used directly. However, without attempting to
fundamental weakness in the Australian strategy for dealdeal directly with foreign governments, Bainimarama
ing with the threat to democratic stability. Canberra apcould have attempted to build a coalition of international
peared more intent on stopping a military intervention
media and NGO support to minimise the open official
than addressing the causes of the deepening volatility.
support for the Qarase Government (however, it is true
As a regional hegemony, Australia and its views were
that he did campaign openly against the Government
decisive for most extra-regional powers although New
during the May 2006 election but enjoyed little success at
Zealand distanced itself somewhat from the Australian
this level). Had such external pressure been applied to
stance. Prime Minister Helen Clark’s parallel but indeQarase, he may have proved more amenable on the legispendent line throughout condemned the prospect (and
lation Bainimarama opposed and less committed to the
afterwards, the reality) of a coup but kept open its acSpeight loyalists. The effect may not have been as comcess to the RFMF.
prehensive as the December coup but it would have alIn the event, Australia’s support for the Qarase Govlowed Bainimarama to keep in place the image of a Fiji
ernment devolved into a confrontational, divisive posture
rebuilding its democratic credentials.
that marginalized its influence on events. Prime Minister
A more obvious missed opportunity to make use of
John Howard’s repeated support for his Fijian counterexternal influence occurred just before the coup. New
part gave no incentive for Qarase to modify his domestic
Zealand’s Prime Minister Helen Clark and Foreign Minisagenda. From early November Australia built up a small
ter Winston Peters managed at the last minute to secure a
naval group of three warships to assist with the evacuameeting between Bainimarama and Qarase in Wellington.
tion of Australian nationals should the need arise. SkepThe official New Zealand account of the meeting showed
tics in Fiji interpreted the ships’ presence more as intimia considerable back down by the Fiji prime minister on
dation than prudent insurance against future chaos. Austhe contentious issues raised by the RFMF commander.
tralian Minister for Foreign Affairs Alexander Downer’s
This appeared to be confirmed by a gracious yet humlate attempt to invoke the Biketawa Agreement to bring
bling national broadcast the following day when Qarase
regional foreign ministers together to develop a common
returned to Suva. Yet, before the collective sigh of relief
response to the developing crisis also looked quite differcould be breathed that the crisis had passed, Bainimarama
ent from outside Fiji than within it. Instead of a show of
attacked Qarase’s speech declaring it to be only a ploy and
strength, it only demonstrated the limitations of this rethat a deadline for the dismal the following day was still in
gional collective security arrangement drafted at the 2000
place. The Commander’s stunning response may have
Pacific Islands Forum meeting of Heads of Government
recognized some prevarication in Qarase’s concessions
in the wake of the Speight coup. Intended to deal prebut a more astute politician would have used the public
cisely with a Fiji coup scenario, the Agreement could only
back down as an opening gambit for further gains.
offer the damp squib of an ineffectual talkfest.
As it was, Bainimarama’s decision to reject the bePerhaps most damaging in the minds of the critics
lated attempt to bargain a solution left him alienated from
was the effect of what they perceived to be Australian
the one country that had been willing to act as an honest
pressure on the Fiji police service. A senior member of
broker in the matter. His action undermined the possibilthe Australian Federal Police, Andrew Hughes, was apity that other extra-regional powers might follow the New
pointed Fiji Commissioner of Police in 2003. His apZealand lead and accept a legitimate military role securing
pointment was widely regarded within Fiji as a success
domestic stability in Fiji. Such a prospect was always gountil the final few months before the December 2006
ing to be a long shot but making the most of the New
coup. He was untainted by the Speight coup and did
much not only to improve law and order in Fiji but also
12 Harvard Asia Pacific Review!
pursue those involved in the 2000 coup. However, when
he began to position the police to oppose a military coup
and increasingly became embroiled in the Government’s
attempts to discredit Bainimarama, relations between the
police and the RFMF deteriorated. Internal critics believed that Hughes was politicizing his office by taking on
roles that more properly belonged to the Justice Minister
or the Director of Public Prosecutions.
Significantly, Bainimarama blamed Hughes’ more
public political role on Australian interference rather than
the Qarase Government and, in time, his removal was
added to the Commander’s list of demands. The allegation that Hughes was an Australian instrument appeared
to gain credibility despite the commissioner’s fine record
in Fiji until 2006 due to complaints against Australian
intervention and the perceived similar actions of other
Australian police officers and other officials in other
Melanesian countries. Indeed, this resentment against the
Howard Government’s activism in the Pacific Islands
explains much of the reluctance of the Melanesian
Spearhead Group (a sub-regional association of Fiji,
Papua New Guinea, the Solomons, and Vanuatu) to support broader regional sanctions against the 2006 coup.
Thus, by failing to engage Bainimarama and the RFMF
before the coup, those powers with the greatest interest in
preventing the military action inadvertently helped to make
it more likely. They had little to tender in resolving the internal tensions and their threats of sanctions were too public and too confronting to put off a military leader passionately focussed on his domestic agenda. The mutual misunderstandings and miscalculations have not only deepened
the tragedy of the coup but also significantly complicated
the way forward since December 5.
THE WAY FORWARD
Bainimarama’s angry appeal to the PRC to deal with
the sanctions already in place and against those that may
yet be forthcoming is an eloquent testimony to the lack of
planning as to the external consequences of carrying out
a post-Cold War coup. Expulsion from the Commonwealth, travel restrictions on those involved in the December coup, the loss of an international netball competition, and related sanctions were predictable given their
use in reaction to previous coups. Yet it seems they have
come as a surprise or, at least, a severe disappointment.
Whether the targeted sanctions against the RFMF
will tell is yet to be tested. The withdrawal of UN
peacekeeping opportunities appears to have suffered a
setback despite alleged support from former Secretary
General Kofi Annan. Prime Minister Clark of New Zealand pressed the issue after the coup but reported that not
only was the UN bureaucracy unsympathetic but also that
Britain and the United States were unwilling to endorse
the sanction. This reluctance may portend also that the
UK Government will not follow through with its threat to
reduce its military recruitment in Fiji that now has some
2000 citizens serving with British forces.
The prospect that China would be prepared to become a new regional hegemony replacing Australia is fanciful. The cost to Beijing would be counted not just in its
vastly more important relationship with Canberra but also
in the impact it would have on other significant actors in
the region including Japan and the United States. The fact
that the idea was publicly mooted without reference to
the PRC reveals the international relations naivety of the
interim Government in Fiji and its continuing underestimation of the importance of external influences on Fiji’s
prospects after the coup. The overt pursuit of sanctionbusting connections with the PRC, Malaysia, India, and
Indonesia will not ease the path forward for the interim
Government in rebuilding relations with Fiji’s most important regional allies. It only invites stentorian megaphone diplomacy in response, further widening the current political divide.
As difficult as the external pressures might be for
interim Government leader Prime Minister Frank Bainimarama, the internal difficulties in securing the early return to civilian rule required to lift the external sanctions
will be more complex than was the case with the earlier
coups. The earlier coups not only were affected to promote elite indigenous Fijian interests but also with the
support of key elements of these groups. Politically creditable interim Governments were relatively easy to manufacture. By intervening for the weak and disadvantaged in
Fiji society (Melanesian as well Indo-Fijian), Bainimarama
has alienated these elites or, at least, not endeared himself
to them. Thus far he has found constructing an interim
Government that is unifying internally and acceptable
externally more difficult than in earlier episodes. Perhaps
the fact that, against the advice of the powerful Great
Council of Chiefs, Bainimarama took on the role of interim prime minister suggests both the extent of this
problem as well as the extent of his personal ownership
of reversing the Qarase agenda. It is clear that an acceptable interim Government able to return Fiji to democracy
will be the sine qua non for lifting external sanctions.
The tragedy of the December 2006 coup in Fiji was
not a consequence of external influences, but more
thoughtful foreign engagement may have prevented it. It
is equally true that Bainimarama might have more effectively manipulated external interests to pre-empt the need
for military intervention from his perspective. Nevertheless, regardless of the apportioning of blame, the way
forward will depend on a more sophisticated appreciation
of the international environment by the new interim
Government and a more informed understanding by the
metropolitan powers of Fiji’s internal issues than most
sides to this unhappy situation have shown to date.
Richard Herr is Adjunct Professorial Fellow in the
Centre for International and Regional Affairs (CIRA)
at the University of Fiji and Reader in Political Science, School of Government, University of Tasmania.
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