final - The Process Report

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Foreword – by Jonah Keri
O
ne game away from losing the 2008 World Series, Joe Maddon faced a tough decision. In
the 7th inning of that Game 5, the Rays had just tied the game on a Rocco Baldelli homer.
Jason Bartlett lashed a one-out single, bringing up the pitcher's spot, and J.P. Howell.
Rain had already soaked and delayed the game, forcing starter Scott Kazmir out early. Never one to
wait for a situation that might never arise, Maddon brought in his two best relievers, both in non-save
situations: Grant Balfour in the 5th, and Howell in the 6th. With another batch of potent Phillies hitters
due up the next inning and a thinned bullpen, Maddon elected to leave Howell in the game to
sacrifice, a job the pitcher executed successfully. The next batter, Aki Iwamura, cracked an infield
single, moving Bartlett to third. But the 2008 team MVP didn't stop there, taking a wide turn after
biting on Chase Utley's fake throw. A peg back to third and Bartlett was out, ending the inning. Pat
Burrell then led off the bottom of the 7th with a double off Howell, a hit that led to the winning run,
ending the Rays' season.
By conventional baseball standards, Maddon made the wrong decision. Maddon left Howell in the
game. Howell gave up the winning run. Therefore, Maddon was wrong. But Howell had held righthanded hitters to an anemic .197/.290/.315 line that season. The Rays needed outs right then, in a
tie game, with the outcome hanging in the balance. Howell was their best option. Maddon's decision
didn't work out that time. But based on the information available to him at the time, it was the right
thing to do. Sometimes the game just delivers a bad result, despite a manager's best intentions.
Like the other decision makers in the Rays organization, Maddon valued process over results. Befitting
its name, The Process Report also focuses on how baseball decisions are made, rather than what
happens after the fact.
A typical observer might look at Matt Joyce's .080 batting average vs. left-handed pitchers last season
and conclude that a full-time platoon is needed. The writers at TPR go deeper. They point out the lack
of opportunity Joyce had to improve vs. southpaws, the possibility of positive regression ahead, and
the ways to get Joyce's plus glove on the field while also finding workable match-ups against certain
left-handed pitchers.
A typical observer might wonder why Maddon would stack his lineup with left-handed batters against
select left-handers, or go with copious right-handed hitters against a handful of righties. TPR's writers
mine the data, and the Rays' thought process, to uncover "The Danks Theory," which holds that certain
pitchers throw change-ups which nullify opposite-handed hitters, making unusual lineups the best way
to fight back.
More broadly, The Process Report provides intelligent analysis for a team whose unusual methods
demand it. TPR's writers don't see Maddon's lineup tinkering as an ego trip, or Andrew Friedman's
1
Foreword| The Process Report 2011
trades of veterans for prospects as a fire sale. They understand that to survive in the toughest division
in North American professional sports, with a payroll a fraction the size of their mighty rivals, the Rays
need to think differently, and make unpopular moves.
The Rays' rise from baseball laughingstock to two-time AL East champions is one of the greatest and
most unlikely sports stories of this generation. The Process Report is the publication best equipped to
describe the next chapter.
For more on the book, please visit Extra2Percent.com
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Foreword| The Process Report 2011
residual benefits without profligate use of
resources.
T
he Beast is real and it has many
heads. Four of them, covered in oily
scales and stuffed with teeth. They
have the tongues of cynics and beneath
their shared breast a lump of cold gristle.
This creature is a composite horror,
bonded with the meat and blood of
enemies afar and at home. This terrible
thing is Andrew Friedman’s destiny. A
gnomish fellow, himself the patchwork
avatar of many faceless heroes, perhaps
no taller than the sword he carries to the
duel. It is a sturdy sword, a practical
implement for a use such as this, and
forged to endure many blows. But it will
never kill the Beast. Andrew has long since
accepted this, embraced it. In the spring,
he will meet the Beast and one of them will
live to see the leaves change. No matter
how deeply in the earth Andrew buries the
cloven heads, the Beast will rise in six
months with sharper fangs.
Odds are that you’ve become aware of
this annual by visiting websites that have
done well to describe and explore The
Process as it concerns the Tampa Bay
Rays. This entire publication is devoted to
reporting on it, so if you are confused, for
now know that The Process means to make
a personnel decision based on diligent
research that will provide immediate and
3
Of all sports, baseball most accurately
captures the human condition. It is a grind
defined by failure and the response to
failure. The sport consumes more than half
of the calendar. The best players (with the
exception of the otherworldly early 2000s
Barry) don’t achieve their primary objective
even half of the time. Some teams have
unfair natural advantages, like market size
or absurdly wealthy owners. Players must
tolerate accumulated pains and injuries for
the good of the team. The baseball Powers
That Be are ruthless pricks shamefully
indulgent in favoritism. In the end, very few
teams can recognize success. The World
Series is the most difficult trophy to win in
American sports. Baseball is designed to
beat you. And, I’m not being a deliberate
sourpuss here, but such is life. Life is a
grind spotted with meager successes and
rare episodes of euphoria. Day in, day out,
we slog through and take our bumps (boss
was in a foul mood, traffic was brutal, DVR
didn’t record Pretty Little Liars) and enjoy
the small pleasures (free bites of bourbon
chicken at the food court). But, in thinking
about The Process, I’ve arrived at a
comfortable understanding with baseball
and sports and life and Beast-fighting:
winning and happiness are beside the
point.
In 2003, the Tampa Bay Buccaneers
crushed the Oakland Raiders in Super
Bowl 37. I was eighteen years old. I
remember my mother crying. I’ve never
The Process, the Beast, and the Emptiness of Winning | The Process Report 2011
asked her about the tears, but I’m certain
that they weren’t shed for Derrick Brooks
and John Lynch. She was crying for my
father, my grandparents, my uncle, who
had spent – at that point – more than 25
years boiling in the concrete crucible
obtusely bynamed The Sombrero and then
at the luxurious (in the sense that the seats
weren’t planks of metal) Raymond James
Stadium. To my mom, the satisfied grin on
Malcolm Glazer’s face as he hoisted the
Lombardi Trophy was a symbol of
vindication of her loved ones’ investment.
At the time, I couldn’t disagree with her.
That confetti may as well have rained
down on me. We won the fucking Super
Bowl. SCOREBOARD, etcetera, all caps
required. Victory granted immunity from
other fans’ derision, justification for
something as simple as having been born
somewhere. Eight years later, I confess that
it means nothing to me and it hasn’t for
about five years, probably seven but I can’t
remember. I know that Derrick Brooks
returned an interception for a touchdown
in that Super Bowl. I can picture him
crossing the goal line with his right arm
raised, but I no longer feel his gallop in my
chest. It’s just footage. Awesome footage,
to be fair. I’m able to recognize that this
interception was more significant than
other interceptions, but the elation and
relief and specialness I felt because the
flag on his helmet represented a
community of which I’m a part has
vanished.
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G
lory is quick to fade. I know this
because Yankees fans aren’t
satisfied with 27. Because threepeats are better than repeats. Because
champions don’t get an automatic spot in
the title game the following year. Title
defenses are illusory. Championships last
until training camp. This is true in every
sport. So why, as a fan, obsess over a
feeling, an emotion, with so short a shelf
life? The wisdom of crowds and its high
priest Herman tells us that you play to win
the game. Winning is the goal. I’m not so
sure how true that holds for fans. I am
certain of how true it holds for me, which is
to say, not a lot. I watch sports in general
for the same reason I once read comic
books: these cats can do stuff that I can’t
and it’s really effing sweet. I enjoy the
sweeping arc of Junior Griffey’s bat, the
hitched step when he knew that only an act
of God was keeping that ball playable. I
think Ben Gordon’s parabolic jump shot is
a work of art. I feel the way Prince feels
about sex when BJ Upton dashes from
second base to the wall and hauls in a
screamer around his belt buckle. None of
this is to say that I don’t care about
winning. After all, I still root for my teams.
It’s nice to win and it’s fun and the internet
is less annoying when it happens. But the
2010 San Francisco Giants taught me that
baseball is ruled by luck and awful
scheduling practices. Any Giants fan who
raises an argument against this is
unreasonable scum. (on a westerly wind, a
thundering
shout:
SCOREBOARD,
etcetera.)This is a Rays-centric publication,
so I feel no shame in saying that it’s
absolute bullshit that the Rays won
baseball’s hardest division and had to play
the best team in the American League in
the first round. I haven’t ever been as
thoroughly dejected as I was leaving the
Trop after Game 5. It was like every cell in
my body had developed a tiny fracture.
The 2010 edition of the Rays was hitched
to a large cart groaning under the weight
of a fanbase’s hopes and expectations.
Rooting for them was emotional abuse –
and this team won 96 games. Due to the
elevated expectations for the squad, every
loss felt like a cataclysm and every
strikeout a sudden, cruel dicktap. When
they crashed out of the playoffs, I felt like a
cerebral amputee struggling with the
sensation of a ghost dream. Something
that was both present and not. A furiously
imagined glory stillborn in gray matter.
For several days, I was grouchier than
usual. Maybe I cried, but it was only for a
second and then I stuffed some nerds in a
toilet to restore my swagger. But from
under that miasmic cloud emerged a zenlike perspective that winning trophies is a
bonus; it isn’t guaranteed to the most
deserving and it’s often subject to
randomization in physics. A grounder
careens wildly off the lip of the infield or it
takes even skips onto the clay. Too much
or too little finger on the seams turns
James Shields, professional baseball
thrower, into James Yields, professional
turdface. To ape soccer magi: the ball is
round. Even when the home team is
treated to the greatest of all wins, its
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impact will erode sharply. I was finally
honest with myself about the 2002 Super
Bowl while sitting shiv’ah for the 2010
Rays. Defining my team by trophies and
banners would no longer be enough. It no
longer made sense.
The goal of
competition is to win, from the most
narrow sample set of one game to the
most broad sample set of an entire season,
but the point of competition is not to pray
for virtue, it is to earn it. The point is The
Process.
The Beast is real and it can’t be
vanquished. Delayed, at best. Andrew
raises his blade to it because the sword is
his best chance to stay standing, now and
every spring hereafter. The Beast may parry
or its hide may shrug off the thrust. The
Beast may tear Andrew’s heart from its
cavity. But should The Beast falter, Andrew
will be there, his movements practiced and
crisp and with a series of wet thuds The
Beast will be divested of its menacing
heads.
The Process is a weapon. A beauty
tempered in logic and patience. The tool
with which the Rays arm themselves to
combat the beasts of the AL East. There’s
something romantic about the Rays front
office’s conviction to certain philosophies.
It obviously hasn’t won them any world
championships.
They’re
budget
constrained by more socio-economic
problems than I care to devote time to
discussing. And their infallibility is far
overblown. But they persevere, they fight,
they rely on The Process, they go to work. I
struggle to commit to the idea that I’d
rather lose the right way than win the
wrong way, because it’s superficially
opposite of the premise of competition. But
that struggle is rooted in fear of going
against the crowd. In truth, I’m soothed by
the blade. It’s a great relief to place my
confidence in an organization knowing
that, year to year, the utmost care was
taken with every decision, every strategy
thoroughly scrutinized. The Process doesn’t
always produce optimal results. In
hindsight, it’s easy to criticize the Rays for
signing Pat Burrell, Jason Isringhausen, for
not pulling the trigger on trades for Jason
Bay in 2008 and Cliff Lee in 2009 and
2010. But, to make this brief, the team has
won more than 250 games in the last three
years, two division titles, and one pennant.
Only a lunatic would suggest that The
Process hasn’t been a successful
methodology. The rationale behind every
decision since Sternberg bought the team
has been consistent and wholly evident –
and that is just about the most a customer
can ask for. No strategy is ever going to be
perfect. Losses will occur. That’s just part of
the game. It’s okay to lose this way,
though, because with The Process, losing is
a temporary madness. The Process has
come to define this organization in the
same symbiotic way that that the grind
defines life, that failure defines baseball.
The Process is a literal meme, a set of
principles, an ideology that sticks to the
heart and mind with more tenacity than the
rush of winning. That’s what I’ve come to
root for.
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T
he eternal lesson of baseball is to
keep steady. No matter how well the
Rays do, no matter how giddy fans
get over the arrival of the Manny
Ramirezes and Rafael Sorianos of the
baseball world, the team will always have
to reckon with the twin behemoths of the
northeast. Alex Anthopolous and the Blue
Jays have just served the AL East notice this
off-season as well. The Yankees and Red
Sox have responded to failure in the past
three years by renting a solid gold zeppelin
and flinging cash and cheese baskets
down into the laps of the game’s best free
agents. This is our unfortunate reality (until
someone with engorged testes in
baseball’s ivory tower makes one of those
For the Good of the Game decisions and
abolishes the division format). Our highs
aren’t ever truly so high; Theo and the
Steinbrenner rugrats are always circling
with javelins to pop our piñata. But the
dejection of watching Carl Crawford sprain
his wrist by dotting the I’s too quickly on his
Boston contract shouldn’t dominate our
perspective, either. The team lost quite a
few fan favorites this off-season and
seemingly all of them to our sworn
enemies. But that hasn’t stopped me from
lacing up my Rays-blue high tops and
setting chunky black frames on my nose.
Supporting an organization that subscribes
to The Process means that a place has
been reserved for me in the bunker; there
are blankets and flashlights and even a
scented candle. Things are going to be
okay, even when the baseball world
collapses in a flaming heap, as it does
every winter. These end times have been
prepared for. Just take the hand of the
Rays fan next to you and breathe in slowly
through your nose. Not only will we ball
on a freakishly minute budget this year, but
the draft picks received for letting those fan
favorites depart will sustain the talent
pipeline for the next half-decade. These
decisions were the right ones, given all that
is known at present. That’s the core idea of
The Process. Andrew could’ve sat this one
out, huddled in his 2008 and 2010
division banners and let The Beast trample
through Tampa Bay. But our Andrew
doesn’t cower. He scraped the dried
Yankee blood off of his sword and went to
work.
7
“He was an early pioneer in a lot of respects,
and his actions led directly to changes
throughout the game and industry. The
thought process that he had and the ways he
sought to create competitive advantages are
things we strive to achieve.” – Andrew
Friedman on Branch Rickey during an
interview with Baseball Prospectus
M
uch of the Tampa Bay Rays’
success should be credited
towards Vice President of Baseball
Operations Andrew Friedman and his staff.
Attempting to compete with the beasts of
the American League East on the field is
tough. Doing so while also battling their
enormous payrolls and quick wits off the
field becomes a nearly impossible task,
one that requires Friedman to apply
creativity in team-building methodology.
Although Friedman and his talented
groups’ methods are often described as
new age and progressive, most of the
concepts and thought processes exhibited
can be traced back to the 1930s. Back
then, the original Andrew Friedman – a
fellow by the name of Branch Rickey –
bucked trends and blazed new trails
without the benefit of the internet, Bill
James’ writings, or annual publications by
Baseball Prospectus. The Hall of Fame
executive was once a player and manager
before turning into a front office pioneer
and one of the game’s greatest thinkers.
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Rickey is known for being the architect of
four World Series victors, but he also
started what became the modern-day farm
system.
Rickey
dabbled
in
other
developmental experiments too, including
opening the league’s first spring training
facility (one that held batting cages and
pitching machines). Rickey’s most wellknown personnel moves include signing
Jackie Robinson and drafting Roberto
Clemente in the Rule 5 draft.
Rickey took chances in the front office too.
In 1947, he hired Allan Roth to serve as a
full-time statistical analyst and in the mid1950s wrote an article (which appeared in
LIFE Magazine) where within he described
the runs batted in measure as “misleading”
and “dishonest”. Rickey openly touted onbase average/percentage as a more
complete statistic than the more popular
batting
average;
and
took
his
experimentations one step further by
acknowledging the flaw in slugging
percentage and then taking steps to
correctly measure power production (by
subtracting a player’s batting average from
his slugging percentage; commonly known
today as Isolated Power or ISO). Over a
half-century before Friedman called
fielding percentage the most overrated
statistic in the game, Rickey said it was
“utterly worthless.”
Most Tampa Bay baseball fans may know
Rickey as the man who signed Jackie
Robinson and while, some may not know
him for anything, his words and ideas live
on through many of the decisions made
within the Tropicana Field offices daily.
Since taking over in late 2005, Friedman
has placed Rickey’s beliefs on display;
although whether this is a conscious effort
is up for debate.
Andrew Friedman Didn’t Fall Far From the Branch (Rickey) | The Process Report 2011
“Luck is the residue of opportunity and
design.” ~ Branch Rickey
T
alent alone can only get a team so
far. In order to succeed, a degree of
luck is required. Whether that luck
embodies itself in the form of on-the-field
performance, injuries, or something more
trivial is irrelevant. What matters is that
luck does play a role in success and
failures alike. The 2008 Rays were
benefactors of some luck. Going from the
American League cellar to its storefront
requires good fortune. Among the
fortunate strokes: the team made it
through the regular season relatively
unscathed by injuries and also received
career-best seasons from numerous players
at key positions.
On the other hand, the team’s success was
not entirely a product of horseshoes and
unicorns. The team-building and designing
process of that 2008 squad started long
before the season itself. Though the rise to
prominence seemed abrupt, the amount of
thought and careful detail required to build
the team necessitated a timetable two
years in the making.
During the 2006 season, Friedman laid
the groundwork for the future. He traded
Danys Baez, Lance Carter, Joey Gathright,
Aubrey Huff, Mark Hendrickson, and Toby
Hall while receiving 2008 contributors
Dioner Navarro, Edwin Jackson, J.P.
Howell, and Ben Zobrist in return. Only
Gathright had figured into the Rays’ longterm plans, and even then, Gathright faced
steep competition from the various top
outfield prospects in the system; as such,
the Rays dealt from a position of strength
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(the outfield) for a position of weakness
(pitching) – this has since become a motif
in Friedman’s trades.
The Rays signed free agent Ty Wigginton
for pennies on the dollar before trading
him in 2007 for reliever Dan Wheeler. In
the 2006 draft, Friedman’s first at the
helm, the team selected one franchise
player (Evan Longoria) and another with
high hopes and potential (Desmond
Jennings). Friedman then topped the
Wigginton signing during the offseason by
adding Carlos Pena on a similar deal.
Pena, 29, had passed through numerous
organizations since being hailed as a top
draft pick. Despite showing the power
potential that made scouts swoon over his
talents once before, he never quite lived up
to his billing. The low-risk, high-reward
signing almost never had the chance to
succeed as Pena was released at the end
of spring training. Greg Norton then
suffered a knee injury in the hours
afterward, and Pena grabbed a quick flight
for the team’s Opening Day game in New
York. He would eventually take over as the
team’s starting first baseman and hit
.281/.411/.627 with 46 home runs that
season – earning a ridiculous return rate
on the Rays’ originally measly investment
and becoming the poster boy for Andrew
Friedman’s process.
Pena was not the Rays’ only low-key
acquisition that worked out during the
2007 season. Friedman traded cash to the
Cincinnati Reds for another former top
prospect, infielder Brendan Harris, who
would eventually operate shortstop for the
Rays. While other teams competed for the
chance to sign pitcher Daisuke Matsuzaka,
Friedman scooped the finest infielder on
the Japanese free agent market and his
Opening Day third baseman, Akinori
Iwamura. The Rays were going nowhere
fast at the trade deadline, but that did not
stop Friedman from trading minor leaguer
Seth McClung for another pitcher with
potential, yet a reputation of poor control,
the Milwaukee Brewers’ Grant Balfour.
After employing a poor fielding team in
2007, Friedman exploited the market’s
undervaluation of defensive players during
the 2008 offseason. Initially, the team had
only two plus defenders (Carl Crawford
and Pena) attempting to support a
talented, but young rotation. Friedman
overhauled the rest of the team. He
upgraded the shortstop position through
trade – netting a defensive-metric favorite,
Jason Bartlett (using Harris in the process)
– and then found a position for his former
shortstop of the future by placing B.J.
Upton in center. He moved Iwamura to
second base in order to prep third base for
the arrival of Longoria. The upgrades
trailed into the season as well, as the team
acquired its best defensive right fielder,
Gabe Gross, in an early season trade for a
minor league pitcher.
Friedman took steps to sustain the strong
offensive output the team showed in 2007
by adding role players with offensive
abilities. Designated hitter Cliff Floyd,
outfielder Eric Hinske, and infielder Willy
Aybar were acquired for less than $4
million and a minor league lefty specialist.
With the team’s position player roster filled
out, Friedman spent time on the pitching
staff too. In addition to adding a young,
quality starting pitcher in Matt Garza, the
bullpen also received a makeover. Gone
were retreads like Gary Glover and Al
Reyes. Whereas the team had refused to
flush money into the bullpen of a team
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without contention hopes, the Rays now
upped their focus to finding dependable
relievers. Friedman convinced Troy Percival
(in part with Joe Maddon’s presence and
the promise of a luxury car) to take less
money from the Rays in order to close
rather than sign with the New York
Yankees and set-up. The team signed lefthanded specialist Trever Miller as well,
while constructing the rest of the pen
through parts already in place (Howell,
Balfour, and Wheeler).
The 2008 squad fell shy of winning the
World Series, but the group will live on as
a beautiful piece of architecture.
“Never Surrender Opportunity
Security” ~ Branch Rickey
for
P
art of the success in 2008 stemmed
from one trade. In November of
2007,
Friedman
shocked
the
baseball world by trading Delmon Young,
Brendan Harris, and minor league
outfielder Jason Pridie to the Minnesota
Twins for Matt Garza, Jason Bartlett, and
minor league reliever Eduardo Morlan. At
the time of the trade, Young was a 22year-old who hit .288/.316/.408 during
his rookie season. Young had previously
ranked as one of the top three prospects in
baseball but had his share of off-the-field
issues; including a pungent sense of
entitlement.
Young was pre-prime, pre-arbitration, and
talented – the epitome of what the Rays
desire from a position player. Yet, Young
was only the third-best outfielder on the
roster and the team had an obvious need
in the rotation. Without the money to
acquire a starting pitcher on the free agent
market, the Rays resorted to the other
market – the trade market – in order to fill
the hole. In exchange for Young’s upside,
the Rays received two key 2008
contributors in Garza and Bartlett. The
team has since continued this trade string
by moving Bartlett after the 2010 season.
Given the attrition rate of pitchers, holding
onto Young appeared less risky. Young
has not lived up to the Manny Ramirez
comparisons that beset his youth, but he
might be on the way to becoming an
above average player. It would have been
difficult to question Friedman if he chose to
pass on trading Young then, but in
retrospect it appears to be a good usage
of inside information on the player’s work
ethics.
The risk was huge; however, Friedman saw
opportunity and never looked back.
“Trade a player a year too early rather
than a year too late” ~ Branch Rickey
F
riedman cut his teeth on playing the
market while serving as an analyst for
Bear Stearns. Although he did not
acquire Scott Kazmir, he did choose to
invest in the ace southpaw in early 2008
and bought out a year of free agency in
exchange for a guaranteed $28.5 million.
The contract included a club-option for a
fourth year which pushed the potential
value of the deal over $40 million. At the
time, the deal appeared to be another
masterstroke in Friedman’s portfolio.
Kazmir was just 24, left-handed, and the
most successful pitcher in franchise history.
His career ERA of 3.64 in 98 career starts
was impressive considering the competition
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and defensive backing, but concerns about
Kazmir’s fragility and efficiency were
prevalent throughout.
Those injury concerns may have played a
catalyst role in the extension as Kazmir
inked the contract just days after returning
from an early season trip to the disabled
list. From that point on, Kazmir appeared
to be a different pitcher. James Shields
would usurp the Opening Day starter and
ace title from the Texas native, and soon
enough would become the most
dependable pitcher on staff. Nevertheless,
it was Kazmir, not Shields who started the
first World Series game for the Rays;
although Shields would record the team’s
only World Series victory in the next game.
The 2009 season became the scene for
Kazmir rejuvenation. It never occurred.
Kazmir would struggle (prompting boos
from the home crowd at one point) and
miss five weeks with a quad-injury. His
velocity appeared down and his slider
lacked its signature bite. Kazmir was
already a fastball pitcher, and yet, here he
was, pitching without a good fastball and
doing about as well as one would expect.
By late August, the team sat in third place
behind the division’s mammoths. With
Kazmir boasting an ERA around six, an
unimpressive strikeout-to-walk ratio, and
waning velocity, Friedman took the Los
Angeles Angels of Anaheim up on an offer
to move his former ace in exchange for
infielders Sean Rodriguez and Matt
Sweeney, as well as pitcher Alex Torres.
The Rays continued to fade while Kazmir
pitched well in his first six starts with the
Angels, albeit thanks to some luck.
Those starts caused many to wonder if the
Rays had pulled the cord too soon. Yet,
Friedman had decided the time was ripe to
move on and (more importantly) ditch the
commitment. The contract that looked
team-friendly in 2008 now showed signs of
becoming a sunk cost worth $20 million if
Kazmir continued his descent into
irrelevancy.
After taking heat for the trade in 2009,
Friedman’s intuition appeared sound after
2010. Kazmir pitched just 150 innings for
the Angels, going 9-15 with a 5.92 ERA. It
was easily the worst season of his career.
His velocity continued to decrease and he
made two trips to the disabled list for
shoulder-related injuries. The Angels paid
him $8 million for that “production” and
will pay him at least $14.5 million more
over the next two seasons.
Meanwhile, the Rays’ 2010 rotation ran a
total cost around $8 million. Of the
players acquired in the trade, only Sean
Rodriguez impacted the big league team,
but
the
super-sub’s
contributions
outweighed his salary and playing time.
Torres – who shared similarities with a
young Kazmir – has moved up the Rays’
prospect lists while Sweeney battled injuries
in 2010, but still has power potential.
At age 27, there is still time for Kazmir to
rebound and become an above-average
starter again, but his days of being a staff
ace are almost certainly over. While most
agree with the process behind the trade,
some still question the timing. However,
looking at Mr. Rickey’s words of wisdom, it
seems Friedman made the move just in
time.
12
“It's unbelievable how much you don't
know about the game you've been
playing all your life” ~ Branch Rickey
O
ne of the biggest misnomers
about Andrew Friedman is that he
is an outsider to the world of
baseball. Friedman is an outsider by the
traditional means. He did not play at any
level professionally and did not work his
way up from the intern ranks like other
young executives such as Theo Epstein and
Jed Hoyer. On the other hand, Friedman
has a deep history in baseball as both a
fan and a former player.
Before his days as a mover on Wall Street,
Friedman was “in” the game. As a
Houston-native, Friedman grew up rooting
for the Astros. In addition to being a fan,
Friedman also played the game well
enough to earn a baseball scholarship
from Tulane University. Like his father,
Kenny, Friedman went on to play outfield
for the Green Wave before suffering
career-ending injuries. Although he went
into the finance world after, his passion for
baseball remained.
History has since played out and
Friedman’s path found him involved with
the game after all. However, unlike some,
Friedman does not rely simply on his
playing and fandom experiences. Instead,
he has merged business savvy with
baseball intellect; an equation that occurs
often within the staff around him.
The Rays’ Baseball Operations department
is an eclectic group. There are “baseball
men” like Gerry Hunsicker, Dan Feinstein,
R.J. Harrison, Mitch Lukevics, and the
venerable Don Zimmer. Hunsicker has
three decades worth of experience within
the front office ranks, including his time
with the Houston Astros as general
manager – a period which brought much
success to that franchise; including nine
first or second place finishes within eleven
seasons. Feinstein toiled in the Oakland
Athletics and Los Angeles Dodgers’ front
offices before landing in Tampa Bay.
Although his path to the system is
conventional in terms of roles, he never
played professionally, making him a hybrid
of a new- and old-school executive.
Harrison and Lukevics oversee the scouting
and developmental aspects of the system.
Drafted as a player by the St. Louis
Cardinals
and
Oakland
Athletics,
Harrison’s work in front offices dates back
to the 1970s when he scouted for the
Seattle Mariners. He dabbled in managing
with the organization as well before
returning to the scouting world, where he
would work for various organizations
before becoming the Rays’ director of
scouting.
Like Harrison, Lukevics is also a former
player. He spent several seasons as a
pitcher in the Chicago White Sox system
before transitioning into the front office in
the mid-1980s. Lukevics became the
director of minor league operations for the
New York Yankees in 1989 where he
oversaw the development of players like
Derek Jeter, Mariano Rivera, Andy Pettitte,
and Jorge Posada – a group commonly
referred to in New York tabloids as the
Core Four.
James Click, Chaim Bloom, Peter Bendix,
and Josh Kalk to the fold. It’s hard to say
whether those names would get the
opportunity in an old-school environment.
Click and Bloom attended Yale University
and later wrote for Baseball Prospectus –
Click even penned several chapters in the
best-selling Baseball Between the Numbers
primer and invented a metric named ParkAdjusted Defensive Efficiency. Bloom’s
work at Prospectus included work on the
peak age of players.
Like Click and Bloom, Bendix and Kalk
had little experience within the real
baseball world. Bendix previously wrote for
websites like Beyond the Box Score, The
Hardball Times, and FanGraphs before
moving to St. Petersburg. He is perhaps
best known for his work on expected
batting average on balls in play (alongside
Chris Dutton) which weighed various
factors. Kalk, meanwhile, also authored
articles for The Hardball Times and proved
his wit as a pitchfx pioneer; examining
sophisticated topics like fastball aging and
indicators of pitcher injuries.
Friedman’s unprejudiced hires have
resulted in a unique juxtaposition; the
baseball lifers like Zimmer and the
basement dwellers like Bendix work in
harmony to create one of the game’s most
well-balanced staffs. As Rickey did in his
time, Friedman chooses to prove time and
time again that blending traditional
experience with unconventional technique
is a must on the quest for success.
That collection of executives would still
breed success even if Friedman filled the
rest of the front office positions with a
squadron of replacement-level monkeys.
Instead, Friedman has added names like
13
“Problems are the price you pay for
progress ~ Branch Rickey
F
ew Rickey-isms ring more true with
the Rays’ present than this. The
progress of the last three seasons
began to manifest itself this offseason.
Before the 2006 re-birth of the franchise,
Tampa Bay had seen multiple players
come and go without much fanfare. The
team unceremoniously traded away its first
recognizable face in Fred McGriff without
much dismay – although McGriff himself
actually wavered at the trade, but was
convinced to accept the deal in order to
play for a contender. When the new
regime traded away Aubrey Huff – the
most productive player in the team’s history
until that point – there were no cries of
salary dump. The reason for the silence?
Nobody cared.
At that time in history, the Devil Rays were
essentially a minor league team in a major
league world. Once the winning started,
the emotional paralysis faded. The moves
were no longer coin flips in the dark, but
critical decisions under the spotlight.
Trading Huff in the middle of the 2006
season had little to do with the team’s final
record of 61-101. Keeping him meant the
team probably wins a few more games,
but costs the Rays the top pick in the next
draft (which became David Price). A game
in the standings then was a matter of draft
circumstances; a game in the standings
now is a matter of playoff consequences.
Only one game separated the 2010 Rays
and the Yankees for the American League
division title, just as it was one game that
separated the 2006 Rays and the Kansas
City Royals.
14
The margin for error continues to diminish
by the year as the crowd builds. This is
where progress has created what may
become the biggest problem: increased
expectations amongst both fans and the
team of a winning product. The team has
established a high level of play that
resulted in mundane attendance numbers
(albeit during one of the toughest
economic times in the area’s history). A
drop-off in play could have unfair
repercussions at the ticket office.
Along with attendance issues, there are
(related) stadium issues. The team wants a
new stadium for the revenue boost;
however the local government seems
committed to keeping the Rays under the
roof through the end of their lease (which
expires in 2027, or 11 seasons after
Longoria’s contract). The undependable
revenue stream meant Carl Crawford,
Rafael Soriano, Carlos Pena, and Joaquin
Benoit were allowed to leave through free
agency. The potential for Pena to accept
salary arbitration (and therefore earn a
salary above $10 million) became such a
risk to the team’s finances that they were
forced to go without offering arbitration;
thusly gaining no draft picks compensation
when Pena signed with the Chicago Cubs.
All of this matters now because of the
progress made under the current regime;
the same progress which could leave them
shy of expectations in the immediate
future. Though, as Branch Rickey would
assert, the price paid for organizational
progress is well worth the problems. After
all, this is the man who once said “if things
don't come easy, there is no premium on
effort. There should be joy in the chase,
zest in the pursuit.”
Well said, Mr. Rickey. Well said.
15
The joke: Joe Maddon, Eugene Debs
Hartke, and a philistine walk into a dinner.
The punch line: Only one didn't finish their
Plato.
H
artke, Kurt Vonnegut's protagonist
in the novel Hocus Pocus, is a
military man turned college
educator. Hartke's constant biting nature
becomes abrasive, as one would expect,
and eventually causes the college to
dismiss him. In Hartke's time, segregation
is in style, but pessimism is taboo. Hartke
winds up at a prison and observes the
culture as a whole in the only fashion he
can. Keep in mind, this is a man who
begins to question his atheistic views after
discovering that he'd killed and sexed an
equal number of people. Hartke's unusual
ways lead to the community treating him as
a pariah and accusing him of leading a
prison outbreak; thus landing him in the
same jail at which he worked.
During Hartke's time in prison he writes
quite a bit. Perhaps the most quotable
passage goes like this:
"Others shook their heads and
indicated in other ways that
such information was not only
tiresome but offensive. It was as
though
we
were
in
a
thunderstorm, and I had begun
lecturing on the circulation of
electrical charges in clouds, and
16
the formation of raindrops, and
the paths chosen by lightning
strokes, and what thunder was,
and on and on. All they wanted
to know was when the storm
would stop, so they could go on
about their business. "
Maddon is the protagonist in this chapter
known as The Symposium. The title is a
play on Plato's essay in which he questions
the essence of knowledge. Essentially: how
do we know what we know? One thought
is that all human beings have innate
knowledge from birth. Such an answer
implies the existence of instincts. No one
would deny the existence of instincts, but
nobody would submit that instincts should
be the only source of knowledge - except
maybe those who question Maddon's gut.
At some point or another, the gut became
synonymous with instincts. A man on the
street said the gut don't lie, but how does it
know what the gut knows?
One of Maddon's favorite sayings goes like
this, "Tell me what you think, not what you
heard." This statement implies free will
exists and hive talk is unprogressive. It is an
interesting statement for a baseball
manager to make to his players and
coaches given his title. Baseball managers
rarely have free will. Physically they are free
to do as they please, but spiritually they
know a movement that strays from
managerial uniformity - the book - and
fails is one that will create more trouble
than it might be worth.
The Symposium (Συμπόσιον)| The Process Report 2011
To be a manager is to accept that
everyone that has ever touched a baseball
bat or glove will believe he or she is
smarter than you are. How do they know
what they know? That information usually
comes from a loved one who taught them
the game: a father, a brother, maybe a
cousin or a friend, sometimes the
announcers and writers that surrounded
their impressionable youth.
Another memorable moment in Hartke's
writing involves this sentence, "The lesson I
myself learned over and over again when
teaching at the college and then the prison
was the uselessness of information to most
people, except as entertainment.''
The rhetoric around a player or a game is
usually narrative driven, not factually
driven. How do we know? Countless
examples exist of a narrative not matching
with reality. Take the barrage of stories
arriving each spring about the players who
are in the best shape of their life. Focusing
on the best story rather than the best
representation when covering a story or a
game creates perversions of reality that
resonate with the consumer base. The
gospel is items that sound good and make
good copy - like bunting, ignoring pitch
17
counts, and having set roles and so on
and so forth. When Maddon ignores these
supposed truths - and he does so often
enough - he draws ire from those who take
the sacred text literally.
Maddon once issued an intentional walk
with the bases loaded in a four-run game.
He employs same-handed lineups against
pitchers with plus-changeups and little
else. Heck, he even has switch-hitters bat
from the same side; creating an
unconventional look for the pitchers, but
more so the batters. While not a slave to
the sacrifice bunt, Maddon uses the game
theory aspects of bunting for a hit and
squeeze bunting to his team's advantage.
On defense, he shifts anyone and
everyone; from overload pull shifts against
the hulking David Ortiz, to employing four
outfielders against Travis Hafner, to
moving the outfield to the right against
Derek Jeter - the Derek Jeter of all people.
In situations requiring a double play ball
late and deep into games, Maddon has
brought outfielders who used to play the
infield back to their roots; playing an extra
fielder who stands directly behind the
second base bag.
Maddon's antics carry over to the mound.
In 25 years, someone will scan the
statistics from the 2010 Rays and wonder
why each of the team's top three starting
pitchers wound up making relief
appearances. James Shields appeared
during his throw day to extend an
exhausting extra inning marathon with the
Florida Marlins and save some relief
bullets for the next day's game. Matt Garza
finished out a game against the Boston
Red Sox that left the Rays without the
service of their best relievers. In order to
gain a win and favor with Cy Young voters,
David Price appeared out of the bullpen
instead of making his final scheduled start
of the regular season.
How does Maddon know what he knows?
He daily receives packets of information
from the Rays' baseball operations
department. The packets include statistics
and other tidbits vital to Maddon's job,
namely forming strategies and attacking
the opposition. Maddon then does his own
research before creating the night's lineup.
He also leans on close personal
relationships with the players and other
coaches. Players hate to come out of the
lineup unless it's for a good reason. On
Maddon's team, players consider a
platoon a worthwhile reason.
Earl Weaver once expanded on how
important coaches are in noticing when
players are hurting or fatigued in his book,
Weaver on Strategy. Weaver used his fair
share of platoons and acknowledged the
best dreamt platoon only works if the
players buy in. To Maddon's credit, the
players buy in. Convincing millionaires
who grew up with similar gospel to ignore
their beliefs and trust that their manager
has their best interests in mind involves a
18
complicated
trust-building
process.
Assisting in the trust-building process is
Maddon's tendency to stick up for his
players, but never to criticize them in the
press.
Maddon stuck up for Elliot Johnson after a
spring collision at the plate. He stuck up
for Akinori Iwamura when Joe Torre
challenged one of his bats - responding by
challenging one of Alex Rodriguez's in the
next half-inning. When Kerry Wood
brushed back B.J. Upton twice, Maddon
expressed concern towards the home plate
umpire, only to have Wood's catcher Victor
Martinez spit vile in his direction. Before
Maddon could finish his charge towards
home plate, Carl Crawford was there sending the rabble-rousing Martinez
retreating into the infield.
Hartke and Maddon exhibit critical thinking
skills while boasting temperaments that
often make them societal outcasts. Hartke's
negativity is suffocating, but Maddon's
optimism is at times eye roll worthy. Aside
from fictional and nonfictional, perhaps
the biggest difference in the protagonists is
a tact filter. Maddon has one. Hartke does
not. That much is clear when considering
their treatment of the youth. As Hartke
writes: "I see no harm in telling young
people to prepare for failure rather than
success, since failure is the main thing that
is going to happen to them.''
Maddon approaches young players in the
opposite manner. He is aware of failure's
place in life and baseball. To be a good
baseball player is to fail in reaching base
60% of the time. When Dioner Navarro
struggled at the plate during the 2006 and
2007 seasons, Maddon relied on an old
strategy he used with Dante Bichette.
Before each plate appearance, Maddon
would reiterate important notes about the
pitcher on the mound: How he liked to
attack batters, what Navarro's game plan
would be, and so on. Maddon calls this
mental batting average and wants his
batters to feel prepared in upwards of 90%
of their at-bats.
Maddon is no secret to motivation
techniques. His "9=8" motto took the
2008 season by storm and his willingness
to dress quirkily along with his team is a
unique motif few managers employ.
Perhaps no other manager in baseball
would have allowed his team to take the
field wearing plaid blazers, and perhaps
no other manager in baseball would have
lobbied to have plaid on the team's hat
bills and championship t-shirts. Yet,
Maddon also creates a loose, but focused
environment in the clubhouse, in part by
decorating the area with inspiring, yet
unique signage. One sign reads, "Fortune
favors the bold."
How does Maddon know? Because he is
living proof.
19
approach, and he would unload on
mistakes. When Moneyball was released,
the mainstreaming of advanced stats was
such that only offense mattered, a
phenomenon that benefited Ramirez's
stature.
S
ports nostalgists lament Willie Mays
finishing his playing days in a New
York Mets uniform, or Michael Jordan
doing the same for the Washington
Wizards. When players have made their
money and cemented their legacy, why not
just take a Ripken-esque lap around the
stadium, graciously accept your retirement
car, and be done with it?
In Manny Ramirez's case, he has a little
work to do on his legacy. Wrapping up his
career as a Tampa Bay Ray is the perfect
way to make the necessary repairs, and he
should help the Rays win a bunch of
baseball games along the way, too.
We know how good a hitter Ramirez is.
He's one of the all-time great right-handed
sluggers. He's sandwiched between Dick
Allen and Hank Aaron on the all-time Onbase Plus Slugging Plus (OPS+) list,
between Joe DiMaggio and Honus
Wagner for Weighted Runs Created Plus
(wRC+). But time, and more specifically
advancements in our understanding of
what constitutes a winning baseball player,
have been a bit unkind to Ramirez. As
Manny came into his own, statistically
inclined baseball fans, writers, and analysts
marveled. He mashed, he saw a lot of
pitches, he walked, he had a perfect
20
Advanced fielding metrics now afford us a
better picture of who the best players are,
though, and no-defense sluggers like
Ramirez no longer rank the way we may
have thought a decade ago. When you
combine this trend with his largely selfimposed image-hit over the last few years,
Ramirez’s reputation is slipping. Now with
the Rays, a team that knows full well how
to deploy his talents, Manny just needs to
hit. And that's the beauty of the RamirezRays marriage. All Manny was ever meant
to do was hit.
In the Minors, it was evident from the start
Ramirez was going to be a big league
offensive force. He posted a 1.105 OPS
as a 19-year old in rookie ball. At High-A
the next season, he had another standout
year, and then at 21, between AA and
AAA, he hit .333/.417/.613. After just
269 Minor League games, Ramirez made
his Major League debut on September 2,
1993. He took an o-for-4, but the next
day he, hit his first two career home runs.
He was in Cleveland to stay.
When Ramirez arrived, the Indians were
wrapping their 21st losing season in 25
years. Not once in that span had they
managed even a third place finish. In the
strike shortened season of 1994, the Tribe
Manny Moons Ago in Boston| The Process Report 2011
was 66-47 when play wrapped. In 1995,
they went 100-44 and lost in the World
Series. They would win the AL Central four
more times before Manny left after the
2000 season. There were other excellent
players around Ramirez, but it is no
coincidence that Cleveland’s ascension
began upon his arrival. He left Cleveland
the greatest hitter in franchise history.
W
hen Ramirez hit the free agent
market, there were no shortage
of suitors, but Dan Duquette and
the Boston Red Sox stepped up with the
best offer. The free agent market and
economy in general were frothy in the
2000-2001 offseason. That was the year
Texas guaranteed Alex Rodriguez 10 years
and $252 million, and the same offseason
Mike Hampton decided the metro Denver
school system, and not the $121 million
the Rockies guaranteed him, was enough
to lure him. For their part, Boston gave
Ramirez a $160 million deal.
From there, the pressure was on. Fans
and media alike couldn’t believe the
dollars Boston forked over, even knowing
the caliber of hitter Manny was. He didn’t
disappoint.
When
Ramirez
hit
.306/.405/.609 his first season for the Red
Sox, he became just the eighth Red Sox
player to eclipse the 1.000 OPS mark in a
single season. The rest? Williams, Foxx,
Ruth, Lynn, Boggs, Garciaparra, and
Vaughn. He was already in elite company,
and he would accomplish the feat five
more times in his seven-plus years in a Red
Sox uniform.
21
Just as it did in Cleveland, Ramirez’s
presence coincided with his employer’s
ascension in on-field success, brand, and
overall stature. Before Ramirez joined the
Red Sox in 2001, the team had won four
playoff games in 14 seasons. By the time
Ramirez was done in Boston, they had won
28 postseason games and two World
Series titles. Ramirez was the 2004 World
Series MVP, and he hit .321/.422/.556 in
his postseason career with Boston.
Nonetheless,
for
all
of
his
accomplishments, Ramirez became a
target for the brutal Red Sox media. He
had a reputation for dogging it in the field,
for asking out of games unnecessarily, and
fighting with teammates who confronted
him on this perceived lack of commitment.
By 2008, he seemed to have quit on the
team and the Red Sox decided the best
move for all parties was to deal Ramirez to
the Dodgers, netting Jason Bay from
Pittsburgh in the process.
In Los Angeles, Ramirez hit as he never
had before. He raked to the tune of a
.396/.489/.743 slash line, leading the
Dodgers to the NLCS. He finished 4th in
National League MVP voting despite
playing just 53 games in Dodger blue.
Jon Heyman and Scott Boras had visions
of another nine-figure deal for Ramirez,
but it never came. He “settled” for a twoyear $45 million contract.
And then
everything went downhill.
Early in May of 2009, Ramirez was
suspended for 50 games after violating
W
Major League Baseball’s substance abuse
policy. When he returned he hit well
(.290/.418/.531) and the Dodgers once
again qualified for postseason play, losing
again to the Phillies in the NLCS. Still, he
was less a hero than he had been in 2008
and the Los Angeles media, every bit as
silly and relentless as Boston’s, was having
their way with Ramirez. He battled injuries
in 2010 and was unceremoniously dealt to
the Chicago White Sox in a post-waiver
August deal. Nobody seemed to want
Manny anymore.
here does that leave us?
Ramirez’s reputation is damaged
both on the field and off. He is
not going to get any better with the glove
at the age of 39. He has earned an
average of $20.1 million in every season
since 2003, but here’s the thing: Ramirez
never stopped hitting. Since 2008, amid
the aging and the quitting and the
suspension and the all rest, Ramirez trails
only Albert Pujols in wRC+. And he is now
a Tampa Bay Ray in 2011 for the paltry
price of $2 million.
As Ramirez’s image slipped further and
further, defensive metrics and how they fit
into
a
player’s
overall
winning
contributions gained prevalence among
fans, media, and front office personnel
alike.
According
to
BaseballReference.com, Ramirez has given back in
the field almost 12 of the 79+ Wins Above
Replacement he’s been worth at the plate
over the course of his career.
This
revelation, or crude calculation, rather,
rendered Ramirez more All Star than MVP
type over the last handful of seasons.
Anyone who questions this shift should
simply consider the Boston Red Sox. The
biggest contract they have ever given out
was to Ramirez.
He was a
.313/.407/.592 career hitter at that point
with a reputation as an awful defender.
The second biggest contract in team
history is the one they agreed to with Carl
Crawford this past offseason. Crawford is
a career .296/.337/.444 hitter.
What a perfect time for a team with an eye
for undervalued assets to swoop in. Here
is the Rays’ bet: At just $2 million and in
the twilight of his career, Ramirez will fall in
line. With extra motivation in the form of
~40 games against the Red Sox and
Yankees, it is even more likely. Without
asking him to field, the Rays are taking that
negative value he has been contributing all
these years out of the equation. They are
also lessening the risk he hurts himself.
22
They have made Ramirez just a hitter, a
move that arguably enhances his value,
and they are paying him a tenth of what he
has made on an annualized basis over the
last eight seasons.
All Ramirez has been is a hitter anyway.
The image problems over the years came
from his aloof and lazy approach in the
field.
His poor defensive output has
rendered him a mere Hall of Famer, as
opposed to an inner- circle, all- time great.
Now he just gets to hit while all the media
noise subsides in small market Tampa Bay.
With a dimmer spotlight and a shorter todo list that aligns with his extraordinary
skillset, look for Manny to roar once again.
23
A
t the outset of the off-season the
typical narrative was that the Rays
were entering a transition year. After
their successful reclamation of the AL East
crown in 2010, they stood to lose a
number of key free agents. Without Rafael
Soriano, Joaquin Benoit, and Grant
Balfour their bullpen was weakened.
Without Carlos Pena their lineup lost a
little pop. But perhaps the most painful loss
was lifetime Ray Carl Crawford. His
presence in the lineup and his prowess in
the field weren’t likely to be replaced from
within or in a trade. His absence leaves the
Rays with a weaker lineup heading into
2011.
That outlook changed in January, when
the team sat down with Scott Boras and
worked out a deal that netted the Rays two
players, Johnny Damon and Manny
Ramirez. The move might have seemed
curious at first, since both players profile as
a DH. Ramirez's defensive woes have been
long documented, and his injury riddled
2010 further pegs him as a DH. Damon,
too, has developed a reputation as a poor
defender. The Tigers, perpetually short on
outfielders, started him just 31 times in left
field last season. How, then, will Damon in
any way replace Crawford's production?
24
The answer is that he will not. What he will
do is provide a close approximation of
Crawford's production at a fraction of the
price. During the last three seasons Damon
and Crawford actually matched each
other's production, each finishing with a
121 wRC+. Of course, Crawford remains
in his prime, during which he has
produced two career seasons, while
Damon enters his age-37 season after
experiencing a relative dip in production
last year. Even still, Damon produced a
.340 wOBA to Crawford's .378. That
might seem like a huge gap, but it doesn't
take into account Damon's home park,
Comerica, which is a bit less friendly to
lefties than The Trop.
The main difference between the two will
come in the field. During the last three
seasons no left fielder has come even close
to Crawford's production. Every fielding
metric has him ahead of his peers by a
wide margin. It wasn't until Brett Gardner
showed up in 2010 that any left fielder
challenged him as best in game. Damon
has also inhabited left field for the past
three seasons, but he has gained a
reputation as a poor defender. But that
might be more narrative than substance.
By the numbers, Damon has by no means
been a poor defender in left.
When Damon first made the move to left
during the 2008 season, he ranked among
the league's best defenders. Though he
played only 659 innings there that season,
his 5.3 UZR still ranked sixth in the league.
His Total Zone with Location, 15.3, ranked
Johnny Damon as Carl Crawford| The Process Report 2011
second, and his DRS was tied for third
best. The eye test helped confirm these
defensive metrics. But in 2009 it appeared
that Damon dropped off considerably.
Fans observed his troubles in left, and his
UZR reflected that. Yet, as can be expected
of anecdotal evidence combined with a
stat unreliable in one-year samples, that
didn't tell the whole story.
As we know, UZR is not the only credible
defensive statistic. We also have Total
Zone, which, when combined with location
data, ranked Damon the third best left
fielder in 2009. Defensive runs saved was
also kinder, pegging Damon as just below
average at -1 runs, which ranked 10th in
the majors. Given Damon's deftness in
2008 and the discrepancies between his
scores in 2009 -- combined, of course,
with his minuscule 2010 sample -- it's
tough to conclude that Damon is anything
less than an average left fielder. Perhaps if
we factor in age he's slightly below
average, but he's not the butcher that his
reputation suggests.
fraction of it for an equal fraction of the
price appears to be their best bet.
Even in his best years, Johnny Damon
didn't produce at the levels that Carl
Crawford has during the past two seasons.
His peak WAR came a dozen years ago,
during the 2000 season with the Royals,
during which he produced 4.6 WAR.
Crawford, meanwhile, beat that by one win
in 2009 and two wins in 2010. What the
Rays found in Damon was value. For his
potential production at a mere $4.75
million price tag, the Rays have found their
man. The move will go a long way towards
a repeat of the AL East division crown.
Where Damon could certainly match
Crawford is in dollar-for-dollar value. In
2010 the Rays paid Crawford $10 million
for 6.9 WAR. In 2011 the Rays will pay
Damon just $4.75 million, so if he
produces around 3.2 WAR he'll represent a
better value. That's an important
consideration for the Rays, a team that has
to allocate its budget very carefully. With
no player on the market who could
reproduce Crawford's actual production,
finding a player who can produce a
25
Johnny Damon as Carl Crawford| The Process Report 2011
just have to change what I think is kind of
a mindset.”
P
itching coaches often sit in the
dugout like the bulldog who lived
down the alleyway in my childhood
home. They sit there, ominous, brooding,
enigmatically spitting things. Like that
occasionally freed bulldog, we only see
them in times of trouble – when a pitcher
has loaded the bases or plunked Yuniesky
Betancourt or allowed a victory to some
other ham sandwich with batting gloves.
The mere sight of the pitching coach puts a
rotten, mustardy taste in our guts. We
know the next at bat will make half the
viewing audience happy, and we fear it will
not be us.
When Jim Hickey came to the Rays from
Houston in 2007, he arrived promising
control, if not suicide. In an interview with
MLB.com, Hickey clambered atop the
tallest tower and yawped:
“I think [throwing strikes is] something you
can attack," Hickey said. "That's always one
of my goals, to lead the league in fewest
walks… I think that's absolutely something
that can be attacked, addressed. In the
American League East, you've got those
offensive-minded clubs, and I think the
tendency – particularly for young pitchers –
is to shy away from the strike zones. You
26
The man’s Texas-sized proclamation likely
made little impact on the Red Sox and
Yankees. In their clubhouses, as they
scraped the remainders of past Devil Rays
seasons from between their cleats, hearing
news of a revised pitching strategy in
Tampa would no doubt have birthed
cheers: Tampa wants to attack the strike
zone more? At most, a few Yanks and Sox
began practicing their home run trots and
bat flips.
Tampa Bay’s strike zone had long been
property of the Northeast.
From about 2000 until the moment Hickey
said, “Let’s throw more strikes,” the Devil
Rays had – on average – surrendered 870
runs per season. By contrast, in over 100
years of team history, the Yankees have
only allowed more than 800 runs 5 times.
In 2007, under Hickey’s crafty new plan of
charging the front gate, the Devil Rays set
a franchise record, nearly allowing 1000
runs.
I do not believe I actually ever confronted
the bulldog in my alleyway. I just
remember biking or walking by and
hearing its rattling chain dance in the
Florida dust as he ran to bark at me. I
never hung around long enough to
exchange words with the beast; I fled at the
first sign of him.
The Jim Hickey Effect | The Process Report 2011
Baseball front offices often react this way
too, willing to assess a manager or coach
on the briefest of interactions – and yes, a
single, 162-game season can indeed be
brief. But, despite the Devil Rays
humorously bad run-prevention in 2007,
Andrew Friedman and the Rays front office
elected to hold on to Hickey.
And Hickey rewarded them.
Now entering his fifth season with the Rays,
the Story of the Hickey has transformed
from a hubris tragedy to a heroic epic. The
once hopeless pitching corps has become
the nation’s powerhouse, a steamrolling
machine of fearless pitching.
Discerning Hickey’s value is a truly tricky
task. We do not want to simply compare
the 2006 Devil Rays to later renditions –
because high roster turnover makes the
comparison useless. We would be
essentially comparing Mark Hendrickson to
David Price. And that’s just not fair.
Instead, it helps us most to examine the
players who overlapped Hickey’s tenure –
players like Scott Kazmir, Casey Fossum,
and Dan Wheeler – players who did not
debut under Hickey, or if they did, went on
to play elsewhere.
By isolating these pitchers, we end up with
about 5000 innings of pre-Hickey data,
almost 4000 innings of during-Hickey
data, and a little over 1000 innings of
post-Hickey data. What we find may shock
the reader – do not repeat the following
information aloud to children: Pitchers
27
under Hickey’s watchful eye allowed about
0.1 fewer earned runs per 9 innings.
Zero point one? Yes, 0.1 – the difference
between a 4.36 and a 4.26 ERA.
“That’s pretty little. What good is it?” asks
Joe Fan. An excellent question, sir, but do
not interrupt me again. Though 0.1 indeed
seems small, consider how it alters the final
result: 0.1 runs per game means about
16.2 runs over a whole season; 16.2 runs
tends to result in about 1.6 wins.
In 2008, the Rays won the AL East but just
2 games. In 2010, they did it by a single
game. On average, Hickey’s methods add
about one and a half wins – which in real
terms means quite a lot to the Rays. If he
was an athlete, a team would typically pay
upwards of $5 million dollars for his
services. Hickey the coach earns, at best, a
tenth of that, and his skillset – coaching –
does not suffer from age or injury.
So how does he do this? How does he
make pitchers magically better? By staying
true to his word.
Under Hickey’s supervision, the above
pitchers – ranging from Edwin Jackson to
Troy Percival to Jason Hammel – typically
gained better control (improving their
strikeout-to-walk ratio about 15%) while
surrendering more homers (homeruns-perfly-ball increased about 6%). Though this
seems counterproductive (homeruns are
worth more than walks or strikeouts), the
net result is actually fewer runs scored.
Some might postulate the success has
come on the shoulders of the Rays everincreasingly improved defense – which
began setting new precedents in 2008 and
beyond. But even metrics that neutralize
defense – such as Fielding Independent
Pitching (or FIP) – reflect this same, distinct
chasm between pitchers under and not
under Hickey’s guidance. Moreover, if the
change owes partly to the defense, then
kudos still belongs to Hickey for
encouraging his pitchers to take advantage
of their ravenous fielders and the
cavernous Tropicana Field.
The simple truth is this: Jim Hickey makes
pitchers better.
This may appear a lunatic statement. The
very proclamation may bring to mind the
vainglorious mound trips of so many
previous games. It may remind us instantly
of Hickey’s slowly shaking head as the
camera pans to him for a reaction to a
recent two-run homer.
“Oh,” I said, nonchalantly, fibbing like a
master, “he hand no teeth. Yup, he is
toothless.”
I told it so convincingly, performed the
grand narrative so impressively, that I
began to believe the lie. To this day, I can
still feel the ridges of the dog’s gums, the
brief impression of the biting dog, the
impression that existed only in my mind.
We fans make this same mistake too: We
see the thinnest sliver of Hickey’s job and
either ignore him completely, or wrongly
build a narrative of his failure. The true
tale of his talent has been written in the
annals of statistical databases, and it has
spelled the story of a man who fearlessly
grabbed the larynx of monsters, who spoke
brazenly against the status quo, who
devised
and
executed
his
plan
uncompromisingly – a man who liberated
the strike zone for Tampa Bay and then
took a little more.
But resist! In truth, it is merely our complex,
delicious brains playing tricks on us!
Though I never truly encountered the pitbull in my alleyway, I once crafted a lie
about him – a masculine tale of me biking
down the alley and glancing down to see
the dog lunge for a bit of my ankle.
“Why are there no bite marks?” my brother
astutely asked, pointing at my naked,
unharmed ankle.
28
I
t sometimes feels like fans need to be
masochists to root for a small-market
team. Like we saw this past off-season
with the Rays, rooting for a small-market
team means getting used to saying
goodbyes. Payrolls are small, so players
come and go at a high rate and stars can
only be kept around for a limited period of
time. The Rays lost seven key players this
winter – Dan Wheeler, Joaquin Benoit,
Rafael Soriano, Jason Bartlett, Matt Garza,
Carlos Pena, and Carl Crawford – and the
mainstream media lambasted the Rays for
being so cheap. How could they let
Crawford go? How could they trade Garza
and Bartlett? If you listened to ESPN or the
MLB Network, the Rays had a horrible offseason and raised the white flag for 2011.
But the problem is this mainstream analysis
is wrong – skewed by what I call the ESPN
Prism.
Whenever you turn on SportsCenter or
MLB Network, the baseball analysis you’ll
see is based on a fallacious principle: that
all teams are created equal. That’s not to
say that the major networks give equal
airtime to every team – as any casual
consumer of mainstream sports media can
collaborate, large-market teams like the
Yankees and Red Sox get top billing – but
instead that they analyze each and every
29
team through the same prism. Signing topof-the-line free agents is good; “salary
dumps” are bad. High payrolls mean a
team is committed to winning; low payrolls
mean the ownership doesn’t care. Good
pitching beats good hitting, and every
team needs an established closer. It is very
subtle, but careful listeners can hear the
underlying message: “There is only one
way to judge a baseball team, and it is our
way.”
But as we all know, all teams are not
created equal and shouldn’t be judged
using the same criteria. Small market
teams are at a competitive disadvantage in
baseball, so they cannot operate using the
same strategies as large market teams and
be expected to succeed. It is like giving
one person $40 and another $200, and
then telling them to build you the fastest
soapbox car possible; the person with $40
could win, but they would have to be
creative to overcome the other person’s
financial advantage. The ESPN Prism is
based off the way large market teams
function, which means small market teams
typically
get
overlooked
and
misunderstood.
What we need is another set of tropes to
counteract the ESPN Prism – simple
phrases that are built around the guiding
principles of small market teams and can
help put their actions into some context.
How do you run a successful small market
team? How do you compete with teams
that have payroll three or four times the
size of yours? The Rays have won two of
The ESPN Prism: Why Rooting for Small-Market Teams is So Hard | The Process Report 2011
the past three AL East division titles and are
in a position of strength for the future, but
what were the guiding principles that
helped them get where they are today?
Thinking like the Rays requires a paradigm
shift for fans accustomed to the ESPN
Prism, but hopefully these tropes will make
it easier to understand:
Get More for Your Money
I
f there is one principle worth taking
away from this article, let it be this one:
the Rays have got to get more value for
their dollar than large market teams. The
Red Sox and Yankees take on payroll each
off-season, signing elite players for huge
(yet market value) contracts; in order to
compete with them, the Rays need to put
together a roster with a similar talent level,
but at 25% the cost. The Rays do not
bargain shop because they prefer to – they
do it because it is a necessity. So before
judging a signing as good or bad,
remember the Golden Rule: will this player
provide good value to the dollar?
Risk and Reward
S
ince the Rays have limited monetary
resources, they need to be careful
when assessing risk and signing
players to contracts. The Rays cannot
afford to eat bad contracts like the
Yankees, so one poor long-term deal
could hamper the team for years to come.
Just imagine what the Rays could have
done last season with the $8M they spent
on Pat Burrell. Due to the risk involved, the
Rays are very hesitant to hand out large
30
contracts, especially those stretching for
more than a handful of years.
Also, since the Rays cannot afford to sign
the big name free agents, they are
normally stuck picking from a bunch of
risky, fringe options. These players have a
very low cost, yet their upside can
sometimes be impressive. For example,
Carlos Pena, Joaquin Benoit, and Dan
Johnson were all originally signed by the
Rays to minor-league deals for little-to-no
cost. These types of players will likely not
amount to much, but the risk in acquiring
them is minimal. It is like playing the penny
slots in a casino: it is unlikely you will win,
but the cost is so low and the upside is so
high, why not give it a whirl?
Youth Before Beauty
E
stablished,
older
players
are
normally reliable for a set amount of
production, yet that reliability comes
at an increased cost. Young players, on
the other hand, are controlled by their
team for the first six years after they come
up from the minor leagues, and they make
a fraction of their true market value during
that time. For example, the Rays’ rotation
will make a total of around $8M next
season – less than half of what the
Yankees are paying A.J. Burnett – almost
entirely because their rotation is full of
young, cost-controlled players.
Hit It Where They Ain’t
“M
arket inefficiencies” was a
term
first
coined
in
Moneyball by Michael Lewis,
and it has become a catchphrase for
small-market teams. The basic concept is
simple: are teams over- or under-valuing a
specific type of player? If they are, then
whichever team realizes this inefficiency
can make a killing by signing players for
less than they are worth. The early 2000s
A’s did this with high-OBP players, while
the 2008 Rays did it with good defensive
players.
These holes in common knowledge do not
last long, though, so this concept has
limited utility: instead, it is better to think in
terms of specific players being over- or
under-valued. Is this player getting
overlooked on the free agent market
because of his recent injury? Is this player
going to sign a below-market contract
simply because he has few suitors left?
While large, market-wide holes rarely open
up, it is not uncommon for one or two
players each year to slip through the cracks
and receive a below market-value
contract.
Buy Low, Sell High
T
his is a simple concept: in order to
get the most for their money, teams
want to acquire players when they
are cheap and then unload them once
their value is at its peak. It is what the Rays
just did this past off-season with Matt
Garza and Jason Bartlett: both players had
31
high trade values on the market this winter,
and with prospect replacements waiting in
the wings, the Rays were able to bring in
large hauls by trading both of them.
Here is a useful hint: just because a player
has a high salary, trading them is not
automatically a “salary dump”. ESPN and
MLBN will treat it as such, but there is a
big difference between trading a player to
shed payroll and trading a player to
improve your team. Scott Kazmir was not
traded in 2009 as a “salary dump”; he
was traded because the Rays got offered
Sean Rodriguez and top prospect Alex
Torres for him. Kazmir, Garza, and Bartlett
were all getting more expensive and
inefficient, but these trades were completed
primarily because they gave the Rays talent
that will help them win for years and years
in the future.
Information is Power
S
ince the Rays want to get the most
bang for their buck, they need to
have
accurate,
up-to-date
information at all times. Their front office is
full of brilliant baseball minds on both the
statistical side (Josh Kalk, Peter Bendix,
Dan Feinstein) and scouting side (Matt
Arnold, R.J. Harrison, Gerry Hunsicker).
This knowledge is passed along to Andrew
Friedman and Joe Maddon, who both use
it to make informed decisions for the
betterment of the team. Whether this
means line-up shuffles or unconventional
signings, the Rays use the information they
have to get the most out of their team.
T
he ESPN Prism has led most analysts
and fans to view the Rays’ past offseason as a flop, as they saw a large
number of valuable players leave through
free agency and trades. However, by
promoting top rookies like Jeremy
Hellickson and Matt Joyce, and by signing
Manny Ramirez and Johnny Damon to
below market deals, the Rays have a
balanced 2011 roster, full of potential.
They have a chance to compete for a Wild
Card spot in 2011, and they have also
managed to turn inefficient players like
Matt Garza and Jason Bartlett into nine
new, cost-controlled players, including top
prospects Chris Archer and Hak-Ju Lee.
Also, the Rays collected draft picks when
players like Carlos Pena, Joaquin Benoit,
and Carl Crawford signed free agent
contracts elsewhere, meaning they have 10
picks in the first round of this year’s draft.
analysts suck you in with their large-market
priorities and focus. This is not a team that
just had a poor off-season; this is a team
that had an amazing off-season.
These new tropes will not make “better”
fans, but they will help fans enjoy following
the Rays more. It is difficult to follow a
small-market team, since no fan likes to
watch their favorite players leave time and
time again, and the year-to-year turnover
can be difficult for even the staunchest fans
to stomach. But remember these maxims –
get more for your money, youth before
beauty, and buy low / sell high – and it
should help things make more sense. The
Rays can be exciting to watch and follow:
they are a team full of young, talented
players that perennially play at a high
level, yet are always seen as the
underdogs. Do not let the mainstream
32
dangerous
franchise?
C
arl Crawford played the role of
Superman to the Tampa Bay Rays
and their fans over the last nine
seasons. Crawford wore the Rays’ garb on
1,256 regular and postseason occasions
while performing like only a few can. From
the sensational catches to amazing
displays of speed on the bases, watching
Crawford was a pleasure. That was then.
This is now. Crawford will likely become a
nightmare as a member of the Boston Red
Sox for the next seven seasons, all the
while collecting $142 million. Though the
Rays accepted that re-signing Crawford
was not an option long ago, he remains
on the team’s radar. Instead of game
planning on how to use Crawford for their
own utility, the Rays will now look for his
kryptonite.
Despite his supernatural appearances,
Crawford is not without exploitable flaws.
His struggles against left-handed pitching
are obvious, but having a lefty pitch to
Crawford on every occasion is an
unreasonable option. Instead, that strategy
will be employed during high leverage
situations when the bullpen comes into
play; but what about before those late
innings? Is there a defense to the most
33
weapon
created
by
the
The Rays possess unmatched quantities of
intimate Crawford knowledge. This
provides them with a unique perspective
amongst the league. From proprietary data
to
basic
analytical
and
scouting
information, the Rays will conceivably have
the best chance league-wide of limiting
Crawford. Meanwhile, there is enough of
that information available in the public
realm to theorize what the Rays may look
to attack.
Crawford’s inability to hit same-handed
pitching is nothing new. In fact, Crawford
would likely be a platoon player if not for
his otherworldly defense and base running.
Throughout his nine-year career, Crawford
has hit .308/.346/.470 versus righthanded pitchers, but only .270/.315/.382
versus lefties, causing a .120-point
differential in OPS. Crawford also sees his
stolen base success rate drop from 83% to
72% when a lefty is on the mound. As
such, expect the first line of defense to be
situational lefties.
Another way to attack Crawford involves
throwing sliders and lots of them. Of the
four most commonly thrown pitches
(fastballs, sliders, curveballs, and changeups), the slider has been by far the most
effective pitch against Crawford. His plate
discipline has always left something to be
desired, but a slider in the dirt will test his
resolve like none other.
Defending Carl Crawford| The Process Report 2011
According to pitchfx data, Crawford
offered at nearly 50% of the sliders thrown
his way this season. He made contact only
three-fourths of the times – his lowest
against any pitch type. Crawford’s usually
solid contact rate on pitches thrown by
righties dipped to 70% when the pitch was
a slider – only 1% better than his contact
rate on left-handed thrown sliders –
suggesting the better angle does nothing
for him.
shift his defense on just about anyone.
Granted, the shifts are unlikely to be as
dramatic as placing another outfielder on
the warning track (as he does against
Travis Hafner), but slight variations can still
create a competitive advantage.
What this means strategically: Crawford is
vulnerable to right-handed pitchers with
devastating off-speed pitches and only
pedestrian sliders. Like, say, James Shields.
The pitches still have to be located well –
ideally, on the inner-third of the plate –
otherwise
Crawford
can
use
his
tremendous bat speed and knock one into
the gap or over the wall. The same applies
to left-handed pitchers, although David
Price figures to fare better if he works
away, away, away, and then comes inside.
Pitchers are only responsible for so much
of what results from an at-bat, as talents
like Crawford can conquer even the best
pitch selection and finest location. When a
ball is put into play, it becomes the
responsibility of the defense to be in
position to make a play or to get to it quick
enough to prevent excess advancements.
Using spray charts, one can create
theoretical defensive alignments designed
to maximize defender’s positions. If history
tells the world anything about Joe
Maddon, it’s that he remains unafraid to
34
W
hen it comes to the balls no
defense can account for –
otherwise known as home runs –
Crawford is a predominant pull-hitter.
Seventy-four of his 104 career home runs
have exited stage right field; which is
roughly 30% of his career fly balls to that
field, according to Baseball Info Solutions.
Short of playing Matt Joyce or Ben Zobrist
in section 144, the Rays will not be able to
change this. At the same time, the other
outfield hits off Crawford’s bat are
distributed more equally.
Crawford’s non-extra base hits are usually
hit the other way and up the middle.
Therefore, the Rays may opt to shade their
outfield towards the left field line and sag
off the right field line. In addition, the Rays
could benefit from playing a step or two in
– Crawford is notorious for reaching base
off hits landing just in front of charging
fielders – however this comes with a snag.
If Crawford really gets into one, he could
turn a likely double into a potential insidethe-park home run in a split second.
limiting the Red Sox in 2011, just as it was
for stopping the Rays for so many years.
Whereas outfield shifts are risky and carry
the design of limiting extra bases, infield
shifts are safer and cut into the amount of
times Crawford reaches base on singles.
More than 2,000 of Crawford’s plate
appearances have ended with a
groundball and the majority of those on
grounders to the right side of the infield.
Since the infield itself could be in a state of
change, the exact shift may vary based on
who is on the field, but the premise is each
player should step towards the right field
line with a focus also placed on the middle
of the field. The first baseman may also
play in the hole between first and second,
but that has the potential to set up a foot
race between a lead-footed first baseman
and perhaps the fastest man in baseball.
The resources and wit held within the Rays’
front office are infinitely more expansive
than those of its fan base. For that reason,
their game plans against him are likely
more complete. Fans should hope so,
since stopping Crawford will be a key to
35
W
hen the king’s wound healed, he
divided the known world among
his companions. – Donald Hall,
The Third Inning
Minor league pitcher Dirk Hayhurst wrote
about his dealings with failure in his New
York Times best seller, The Bullpen
Gospels. After struggling for the first time
in his career during his third professional
season, Hayhurst reached this realization:
“I imagine a lot of guys who get drafted
aren’t used to struggling.” Hayhurst then
compares baseball to a dice game, a
comparison appreciated by street hustlers
like Nas and sabermetric pushers like Nate
Silver alike, while suggesting randomness
can dictate success as much as hard work
and talent.
The Rays demoted Evan Longoria heading
into the 2008 regular season; the narrative
surrounding the demotion claimed the
team wanted him to experience failure
before becoming a fixture in the majors.
Nobody remembers whether Longoria
experienced failure in the minors, but it
makes for a better narrative than the Rays
fudging with his service time and legend
has it he became better for it.
Well-dressed people inside of boxes say
resiliency is the mark of a champion. They
say recovering from devastating defeats
tells us more than win totals or season
long performances. The resiliency refrain
36
arises seemingly once a month in the world
of sports analysis and came to the forefront
after Game Five of the American League
Divisional Series between the Rays and
Texas Rangers. While David Price pitched
well, he also made two fielding blunders
that directly resulted in two runs scoring; a
problem, because the Rays only scored
one on the night.
Resiliency is either the mark of a champion
or the job description of an underdog. The
little guys overcome and overachieve and
never ever give up. Making Price’s story
into a good underdog tale would be
difficult given his physical tools. He is a tall
left-hander with a blazing fastball, plus
secondary offerings, good command and
control, a repeatable delivery, and clean
bill of health. In the world of baseball,
Price’s physical ability makes him a god.
After reading about Price’s embarrassment
of physical wealth, what makes him such a
soldier of resiliency? And what has he
overcome in order to earn such a label? A
few things:
Draft Status
T
o date, Price has overcome being the
top overall draft pick a pitcher, which
reads like an honorable distinction
but haunts like a curse. The list of pitchers
taken first overall includes fellow
southpaws David Clyde (1973), Floyd
Bannister (1976), Brien Taylor (1991) as
well as righties Mike Moore (1981), Tim
Belcher (1983), Andy Benes (1988), Ben
McDonald (1989), Paul Wilson (1994),
Kris Benson (1996), Matt Anderson
(1997), Bryan Bullington (2002), and Luke
Hochevar (2006).
Price Will Overcome| The Process Report 2011
None of those pitchers ever won a Cy
Young (Price’s second place finish is the
highest finish ever for a first overall pick) or
earned entry into Cooperstown. In fact,
amongst those pitchers with at least 25
starts, Price has the lowest earned run
average. Only two pitchers finished with a
career ERA under 4.00 and only four won
more than 100 games (with only two of
those winning more games than they lost).
Prospect Attrition Rate
Y
ears ago, Baseball Prospectus coined
the acronym TINSTAPP. It stands for
There Is No Such Thing As a Pitching
Prospect; a catchy way of noting the
unpredictability of pitchers, particularly
those unproven at the big league level.
There are various reasons why some
talented pitching prospects do and do not
work out. The considerably lower levels of
competition in the minor leagues means
bad habits may create good results on the
farm, but lead to extended batting practice
in the bigs – overdependence on hot
fastballs or poor plate discipline being the
most obvious. Injuries also play a large
role in forming the survivor pool.
Florida Marlins drafted Oaks as a pitcher
years later), so imagine the exhilaration
that flowed through Oaks’ body as his
batted ball cleared the fence. Price would
not pitch in a competitive game until the
next minor league season.
From early summer until the next spring is
a long time to dwell on a game where the
team lost as a direct result of plays made
(or rather: not made) by a pitcher. Price
responded by seemingly shrugging the loss
off. Significance? David Price cares not
about significance because David Price is
significance. Ask the opposing batters he
chopped down in the American League
Championship Series some sixteen months
later.
Price lost two of his closest friends within a
year of being drafted. Those are
devastating defeats, not making a mistake
on a baseball field or losing a playoff
series. If devastating losses really do
anneal character, then Price has it in
spades. Nearly 30 months later, Price
started the All-Star game and three months
after that he threw the first pitch of the
2010 postseason. Price can overcome.
Price has overcome. Price will overcome.
Heart-Breaking Defeat
P
rice’s final college appearance is
easy to overlook, but hard to relive.
Price rarely broke a sweat during the
2007 college season, but his final
appearance changed it all. A game
against Michigan late in the College World
Series qualifying process saw Price enter as
a reliever. A win and Vanderbilt moved on
while a loss meant the season was over.
Price would face a pinch hitter named Alan
Oaks. Price was the bigger name on that
night and the only sure pro (although the
37
Price Will Overcome| The Process Report 2011
T
hey say if you truly love something let
it go, and if it comes back to you,
then it was meant to be. After hitting
one of the most memorable home runs in
Tampa Bay history in 2008, the Rays
unceremoniously sold Dan Johnson to the
Yokohama Baystars of Japan for the 2009
season. It must be love because Johnson
returned to the United States and the
Tampa Bay Rays in 2010. After the mass
exodus of free agents – including
incumbent first baseman Carlos Pena – it
finally looked as if Johnson would finally
get a fair chance with the Rays. Then the
off-season signings of Manny Ramirez and
Johnny Damon happened.
Some players like Desmond Jennings – the
heir apparent to Carl Crawford in left field,
who will now likely be the Durham Bulls
center fielder – have been negatively
impacted by the “idiots” re-united in terms
of playing time. However, the recent
additions have not changed the fact that
Johnson is currently projected to get the
bulk of playing time at first base, even after
the signing of Casey Kotchman. There is a
chance Damon could slice into some of
the playing time at first base, but how
much is unknown. Meanwhile, the Great
Pumpkin heads into the 2011 season an
underrated offensive weapon in the newlook Rays' lineup.
38
That statement may draw some eye rolls
from around the area; however, there is no
reason to think that Johnson won’t
produce at least average offensive
numbers with the potential to be aboveaverage.
This
off-season,
Andrew
Friedman said he thinks Johnson can hit
20 home runs and be a stellar on-base
performer in an expanded role. It would
not come as a surprise if Friedman turns
out to be correct.
In general, statistics from the Japanese
League should be looked up similarly to
Triple-A. As a member of the Yokohama
club, he slugged 24 home runs in just
under 400 plate appearances (382). A first
baseman for most of his career in the
States, Johnson played across the diamond
at third base in 2009. Since returning
home, he has openly talked about
receiving an unfair strike zone while
playing abroad. Meanwhile, he credits his
time in Japan with helping him improve his
pitch selection and ability to handle offspeed pitches.
Though called up to the big league club in
early August of 2010, Johnson earned the
International
League’s
2010
Most
Valuable Player award for his work as a
member of the Durham Bulls. While in
Durham, he led the IL in home runs (30),
on-base percentage (.430), and slugging
percentage (.624) despite missing the final
month of the their season. Johnson also
led the International League in OPS (.980)
as a member of the Bulls in 2008.
Underpaid and Underrated: the Dan Johnson EP| The Process Report 2011
Despite his minor league mashing, no one
expected those gaudy numbers to transfer
at the next level. On the other hand,
Johnson hit seven home runs in 140 atbats with the Rays; or one home run every
20 at-bats. If he can sustain that rate over
the course of 400 at-bats as the lead in a
first base platoon, that would give him
exactly 20 home runs. In his last fullregular season in the majors, he hit 18
home runs in 416 at-bats playing for the
Oakland A’s in a notorious pitcher’s park.
Further fueling his power projection is
Johnson’s raw power as measured by
Isolated Power (ISO). The statistic, which
was created by the Rays’ patron saint,
Branch Rickey, suggests that Johnson’s
overall power numbers were aboveaverage. Albeit in a sample size of roughly
one-fourth of a season, his ISO (.216)
ranked second among Rays’ players with at
least 100 plate appearances and fell well
above the league’s average (.145).
In spite of his ugly batting average of .198
in 40 games, Johnson had a .343 on-base
percentage thanks to his affinity for 90-foot
walks along the infield dirt. In fact, that
number is an exact match of his career
OBP. Had he been a full-time member of
the team, it would have ranked just sixth
best on the on-base heavy Rays, but would
be nearly 20 points higher than the league
average of .325.
With good power, and above-average onbase skills, the only negative from
Johnson’s slash line last year was batting
39
average. His .198 average was similar to
that of Carlos Pena. Concurrently, the two
first basemen shared similar bad luck on
balls in play (BABIP). In just over 1,400
career plate appearances in the big
leagues, Johnson has a lower-than-normal
BABIP of .250; however, compared to his
career number and the league average of
around .300, his .188 BABIP in 2010 was
flat out abysmal.
According to the research of Jason
Hanselman of Dock of The Rays,
Johnson’s expected BABIP (xBABIP) should
have been right around the league
average at .301. That equates to 13 extra
hits and an expected slash line of
.311/.432/.527. Even the biggest Johnson
supporters would say that line is extremely
optimistic, but keep in mind we’re talking
about a small sample size of 40 games.
The point is, even if Johnson’s 2011 BABIP
is in the neighborhood of .250-.260, his
batting average will improve and so will his
already admirable on-base percentage.
As of now, the Rays have no natural righthanded platoon partner for Johnson. The
team has the switch-hitting Ben Zobrist and
right-handed Sean Rodriguez as options;
however, their defensive abilities are better
served at more difficult positions. The other
option is using Johnson versus lefties even
though he is left-handed himself.
In just under 400 career plate
appearances, he owns a slash line of
.243/.346/.403 versus LHP. That batting
average matches his average versus
righties. His OBP versus southpaws is
actually a few ticks higher. It is not an ideal
situation, yet the notion of him playing
versus some lefties isn’t completely out of
the question.
For reasons unknown, there is a perception
that Johnson is not an adequate defender
at the position. Like his offense, Johnson’s
D may be actually underrated. He has
logged nearly 2,600 innings at first base
and rates out as slightly above-average
defender, but is mostly likely closer to
average than anything else. Given his
potential offensive output and the
position’s place on the defensive spectrum
(last), an average defender is more than
acceptable at first base.
Since Manny Ramirez and Johnny Damon
signed, many – the writers of TPR included
– have wondered about the new Rays
replacing the offensive losses of Carl
Crawford and Carlos Pena; however
Johnson’s power potential, on-base skills,
and ability to handle himself versus LHP
provide a hidden value in a lineup
featuring more well-known names.
North Carolina rapper J. Cole once closed
a verse with this line: “ironic you been
sleeping on the one that you been
dreaming about.” Perhaps Dan Johnson
may be the one we’ve been dreaming
about all along.
40
O
n September 9th, 2003, Edwin
Jackson celebrated his 20th
birthday party in Phoenix,
Arizona. Most guys that age are trying out
fake ID’s at bars or finding a buddy’s
house to party at where they can drink an
older friend’s alcohol, but not Jackson.
Jackson made his major league debut that
night against the Arizona Diamondbacks
and got his first major league win in that
contest despite Randy Johnson being the
opposing pitcher.
That night, Jackson threw 80 pitches in six
innings
against
a
barely
.500
Diamondback lineup that included Luis
Gonzales, Steve Finley, and Raul Mondesi
in the top half of the lineup. Jackson threw
49 pitches for strikes and held Arizona to 3
singles, a triple by Junior Spivey, and 1 run
before handing the ball off to Paul Shuey
and eventual Cy Young Award winning Eric
Gagne. Jackson went on to appear in
three more games for the Dodgers that
month and went 2-1 with a 2.45 ERA that
season despite a 4.5 walk rate.
At the time of his promotion, Jackson had
pitched all of 275 innings in the minor
leagues in Rookie Ball Low A, and AA.
Simply put, the Dodgers were extremely
aggressive in getting Jackson to the major
41
leagues believing they had yet again struck
gold with their scouting and development
efforts. Unfortunately for them, Jackson’s
stats began circling the drain rather quickly
in 2004 as he had a 5.86 ERA in AAA Las
Vegas and a 7.30 ERA in his time back
with the Dodgers. They sent him back
down to AA in 2005 where he found some
success but he was once again pummeled
in AAA and the majors later that season.
That 2005 season was also a very poor
one for the Dodgers as they were 71-91
and finished fourth in the NL West. That
season, the Dodgers lost all-star closer Eric
Gagne to a season-ending TJ surgery and
Yhency Brazoban collected all 21 of his
career saves to close out that season. The
Dodgers, needing more help in their
bullpen, called up the Devil Rays and
asked for help. GM Andrew Friedman
offered up Danys Baez and Lance Carter.
Those two relievers had given the Devil
Rays six years of service as a pair for
roughly $7.5m. Carter was the primary
closer in 2003 and the token All-Star
representative with 26 saves but Chuck
Lamar went out and signed Baez as a free
agent on a two-year deal and it was Baez
who led the club in saves for two seasons
and also made the All-Star team in 2005.
Had both pitchers been retained for 2006,
the club would have had to pay nearly
$5m for their services which would have
accounted for twenty percent of the club’s
payroll. It is rarely a good idea to pay onefifth of your payroll to one player but it is
even less of a good idea to give that much
From Jackson to Joyce| The Process Report 2011
to two relief pitchers on a team that will be
out of contention by the second week of
the season.
made, but the trade took a while to
materialize in results.
Most Rays fans knows the front office is as
secretive with trade negotiations as KFC is
with the Colonel’s original recipe. Try as
any local beat writer or blogger may, Rays
fans rarely get any insight into the
discussions leading to a trade. That said, it
would be nice if one day the story could be
told about how the Rays acquired two of
the top arms in the Dodgers system for two
relievers that ended up throwing under 62
innings for the Dodgers before retiring
(Carter) or being traded (Baez). As
Dodgers, Baez and Carter combined for a
5.14 ERA and gave up 70 hits and 40 runs
while striking out just 34 batters.
Tiffany began the season in AA
Montgomery, but quickly felt pain in his
shoulder diagnosed as a rotator cuff injury.
The surgery and related rehab cost Tiffany
the rest of the 2006 season as well as the
entire 2007 season. He gave it one more
go in 2008 back in the Florida State
League but his control was all over the
place and he was released by the Rays
only to find his way back to the Dodgers
organization where he is today. Tiffany’s
career in the Rays’ organization was an
afterthought for everyone but the most
diehard prospect fan but Edwin Jackson’s
career in the organization was, at best,
frustrating.
Friedman asked for and received two of
the better pitching prospects in the
Dodgers organization and in baseball.
Edwin Jackson was ranked one of the three
best prospects in the Dodgers system in
2003, 2004, and 2005 by Baseball
America. Additionally, that group ranked
him as the 99th best prospect in 2003, the
4th best in 2004, and the 30th best in
2005. However, it was the addition of
Chuck Tiffany in the deal that caused the
most angst with Dodger fans and the most
excitement with Devil Rays fans. Tiffany had
been ranked as the tenth best prospect in
the Dodgers organization in 2005 and was
coming off a season in which he struck out
134 batters in just 110 innings as a 20
year old lefty. The trade was panned as a
steal for the Devil Rays at the time it was
Jackson, sent back to AAA to start the
2006 season, struck out 66 in 73 innings,
but also walked 35 while giving up 84 hits.
Despite a lively fastball and biting slider,
his command came and went as quickly as
a sunny summer day in Tampa Bay.
Jackson was still promoted to the big
leagues again in 2006, where he worked
mostly in relief with the same struggles as
he had in AAA. Those struggles both
highlighted the Dodgers willingness to
trade Jackson and brought to light the
other issue surrounding Jackson – his
service time. The Dodgers added Jackson
the 40 man roster quicker than most
prospects, and he was moved up and thus
his options were burned before his
development as a pitcher was complete
meaning whatever was left in Jackson’s
42
training as a pitcher would have to be
done in the pressure cooker that was the
American League East.
The beatings commenced early and often
in 2007 as Jackson went 5-15 with a 5.76
ERA pitching in front of a very suspect
defense and even worse bullpen. Jackson
was his own worst enemy giving up more
hits than innings pitched and walking 4.9
batters per nine innings. 2008 was
magical for the Rays but not for the
maligned Jackson. Sure, he won 14 games
and had a 4.42 ERA, but he once again
gave up more hits than innings pitched,
had a 1.4 strikeout-to-walk ratio, and was
left off the initial post-season roster despite
being tied for the leading the team in wins.
Heading into the 2008 off-season,
Jackson’s future was quite cloudy as he
clearly was struggling at the major league
level on a team set up to be an annual
contender and with pitching talents such as
Jeff Niemann and Wade Davis in AAA
ready to make the next step.
It has been rumored that the Rangers
offered Nelson Cruz to the Rays in
December of 2008 but the offer was
declined. Whether that is folklore or an
early precursor to the Rays bypassing on
Buster Posey we will never know, but it
became very clear Jackson was likely to
have a new address before the 2009
season. Rays fans did not have to wait long
as Jackson was dealt on December 10th to
Detroit for Matt Joyce.
43
Joyce was the 360th overall pick in the
2005 amateur draft out of Florida
Southern College in Lakeland. He grew up
just outside of Tampa at Seffner playing for
Armwood High School which is more
known these days for being a football
powerhouse. Joyce was never a member of
Baseball America’s Top 100 list and only
made it into Detroit’s thin Top Ten
rankings in 2008 after a year in which he
hit .257/.333/.454 in AA Erie. He played
in AA that season after skipping over High
A ball completely – a rare feat for
prospects these days. His BA scouting
report stated:
“Joyce has a smooth left-handed
stroke and a knack for driving in runs.
He generally works gap-to-gap but
possesses some home run power and
has the potential top last year’s career
high of 17. He can play an adequate
center field if needed but he is an
above average right-fielder who gets
great jumps and has as strong and
accurate throwing arm.”
Joyce had been promoted to the majors on
May 5, 2008 and he went onto hit
.252/.339/.492 in 277 plate appearances
for the Tigers that included 31 extra base
hits. That same season, Gabe Gross was
the Rays’ primary right-fielder and he hit
.242/.333/.434 in 345 plate appearances
with less extra base hits. It seemed logical
that the Rays would take their newly
acquired talent and plug him into right
field as he was cheaper than Gabe Gross
and had more upside than Gross at the
plate. The organization patiently waited
three seasons to see if the fruits of their
laborious trade negotiations would ever
pay off but they were apparently in no rush
to see if the next move of the trade would
help as Joyce was sent to AAA for 2009
shortly after the season started and never
came back up.
2009 did not go the Rays way as they fell
apart down the stretch after stumbling out
of the gate in April and mid-May, and
Joyce got but 32 at bats with the club that
season. Down in AAA Durham, he hit
.273/.373/.481 with 53 extra base hits
and even threw in 14 steals under the
aggressive running style of manager
Charlie Montoya, earning him a chance to
make the 2010 club. That effort was
sidelined nearly immediately with a
strained elbow in Spring Training, causing
him to start the season on the disabled list.
The Rays allowed Joyce to take his time
during his rehab assignment in the minors,
and he collected 18 extra base hits in just
121 at bats. Once he was promoted, he
earned most of the at bats against righthanded pitching for the rest of the season
and hit .241/.360/.477 in 216 at bats.
Joyce’s potential was obvious last season
as fans watched him pull late-inning magic
at the plate and drive the ball with
authority while playing excellent defense in
the outfield. It is for those reasons why
Joyce is a key factor in the success of the
44
2011 Rays as the club looks to replace 65
of the 160 team home runs that departed
via free agency or trade this off-season.
In 2010, Joyce’s .236 Isolated Power
rating was the 17th best amongst all
American League batters with at least 250
plate appearances. That was better than
Alex Rodriguez, Adrian Beltre, Nick
Swisher, and even Evan Longoria just to
name a few stars. Certainly, the fact Joe
Maddon only allowed him to hit against
right-handed pitching helped his cause as
Joyce’s .262 IsoP rating versus righthanded pitching was the 10th best in the
American League. He slugged .559 in 68
at bats in July and .508 in 63 at bats in
September as well.
I do not believe it justifiable to completely
write off Joyce’s ability to hit lefties because
he has had an incredibly small sample size
of plate appearances against them at the
major league level – 60 to be exact. He’s
hit .157/.267/.235 against them in that
time, but he also hit .323/.364/.581 in 31
at bats against lefties in Durham last
season. If you break down his at bats
against lefties in the major leagues, it is the
lefty specialists that are hurting his overall
numbers. His .157/.267/.235 line above
improves to .191/.377/.362 if you include
just his 47 at bats against left-handed
starting pitchers and not the 13 at bats
against specialists. Against lefty starters,
Joyce has walked 14 times while striking
out 15 times which is actually a stronger
ratio than his efforts against righties.
In all, the Rays turned 6.6 wins from two
relievers into an enigmatic starting pitcher
into a potential every day corner outfielder
which the team controls through the 2015
season as he enters his prime years. The
Rays will have paid Matt Joyce roughly
$1.2M for his services from 2009 to 2011.
Meanwhile, the Tigers, Diamondbacks,
and White Sox will have spent a combined
amount of $15.1M for Jackson’s services,
and he will be a free agent after this
season. The Rays may not even spend that
much on Joyce over the next four seasons
which highlights how much of a bargain he
is for the franchise.
Joe Maddon mentioned at the winter
meetings that players were going to be
given more of an opportunity to earn
everyday playing time and not be
platooned as much and Joyce was one of
the names Maddon mentioned. He is
already a terrific defensive outfielder, so
those talents are going to earn him more
at bats alone, but if he can demonstrate a
consistent ability to handle left-handed
pitching when given the chance, Joyce
could easily double and potentially triple
his home run total of ten from this past
season. Joyce’s power is one of the better
kept secrets on this team and 2011 will
hopefully be the time that secret is let out.
45
Baseball Reference’s Play-By-Play chart
describes the event like this:
b11
8-8
16%
1
123
100%
4,(0-2)
RO
TBR
Upton
Timlin
Flyball: RF/Sac Fly; Perez Scores
T
ranslated, in the bottom of the 11th
inning of an 8-8 ballgame, with
bases loaded and on a 0-2 count,
the Tampa Bay Rays’ BJ Upton hit a
sacrifice fly ball to right field that scored
Fernando Perez. The 100% figure is the
game’s overall Win Expectancy, meaning
that after the play, the Rays had no chance
of losing. It was a walk-off blooper into
shallow right. I was sitting in Seat 4, Row
K, Section 316. My eyes were pinned to
the runner on third for the entire play.
Peripherally, I saw JD Drew strafing over to
the foul line. He was in close enough to
challenge a decent runner, even an
especially swift one, and the angle was
perfect. There are about a half-dozen
cellphone videos of this moment uploaded
on YouTube, so you can independently
confirm this next detail if you wish: breath
had stuck in the crowd’s collective throat.
Not even Upton thought the ball was hit
deep enough. He’d sliced it off the tapered
part of the bat. And Drew, well, he may
not be Ichiro, but he isn’t known to be
46
10/12/2008 | The Process Report 2011
jelly-armed either. The Red Sox had battled
back twice in this game from two-run
deficits and tied it in the 8th off a Dan
Wheeler wild pitch. Nobody needs
reminding that 2008 was an enchanted
season, but for the first time, in Game 2 of
the ALCS, the magic seemed to be shorting
out. It wasn’t the White Sox in the other
dugout. It was our most hated rivals, the
darlings of baseball, the reigning world
champs,
our
silver
spoon-fed
doppelgangers, the big, brightly pulsing
source of our inferiority complex. The god
damned Red Sox - three years into a
nauseating mutation into the 21st Century
Yankees. Of course they’d be the ones to
blot out our one shining moment. They’d
already blanked us in Game 1. I grew up
rooting for snakebit Tampa Bay sports
teams, so it wasn’t unreasonable for me to
expect the worst from BJ’s short fly. This
was it. We’d had our fun, but the champs
had come for their pound of flesh.
Fernando got a good jump. He slashed for
home, never once looking for the ball.
Drew’s footwork was solid, but his release
a little rushed. The ball tailed up the line
and before Varitek ever got close,
Fernando flashed by him and slid through
home. Ballgame. Rays win. Series tied. An
upsurge of humanity in the seats. I’m sorry
I ever doubted you, magic.
Fernando Perez had made his major
league debut five weeks prior to Game 2.
He was 25 years old, a 7th round pick in
the 2004 draft. Before he’d arrived at The
Trop, the most we knew about Fernando
the ballplayer was that he was fast – 189
stolen bases in the past five minor league
seasons – and a good defender with little
power. What we knew about Fernando the
person was that he was whip smart, a
Columbia graduate with a flair for words.
Baseball’s future poet laureate. It was his
intelligence that endeared him to the
fanbase before he’d ever recorded a
franchise-altering walk-off run. He wasn’t
the typical lunkhead baseballer. Maybe
some of us imagined hanging out at the
batting cages with Fernando and just
talking about writing and great books and
what it’s like to be really fast and good at
baseball.
I’m
sure
some
people
entertained that fantasy. Probably. He
seemed like a good dude, as far as
anyone can tell these things about perfect
strangers. And there were worse options to
have as a fourth outfielder.
I
n 2008, Fernando Perez submitted a
.250/.348/.433 line in 72 plate
appearances. He jacked a trio of
dingers and stole five bases. In the playoffs
that year, he went 1-4. And the world
remained uninflamed.
The following
season was rough for Fernando. Expected
to break camp with the club and make a
larger contribution off the bench, his
season was fraught with injury and he
recorded just 35 plate appearances in the
majors, mired for the most part in Durham.
On January 8th of this year, Fernando was
packaged with pitcher Matt Garza and
minor league arm Zach Rosscup for a
barrelful of prospects from Chicago’s
47
northside. For the foreseeable future,
Fernando Perez’s last action as a Ray was
a strikeout on October 4, 2009, in New
York, his only at-bat of the game.
Fernando’s legacy to date in Tampa Bay
can
be
summarized
like
this:
.234/.301/.351, 3 homers, 10 RBI, 5
stolen bases, 8 walks, 27 strikeouts. The
operative word in that sentence is “can”.
This is a publication about numbers, but
I’m breaking rank to emphasize what
Fernando Perez meant to the Tampa Bay
baseball community beyond what can be
found on the back of a baseball card.
The greatest thing that happened in
Tropicana Field prior to 2008 was the
attendance of a toothless, suspendered
hillbilly flailing his straw hat around to
“Cotton Eye Joe” in the corner seats while
his ungroomed wife bobbed and swayed
behind him. No matter how dire the score,
it’s impossible to stave off a grin when the
Trop video guys cue up that clip. But that’s
it. Literally. We might as well cast the first
10 seasons of this franchise into a
steaming chasm. Those years are a litany
of dearths: dearth of stars, wins, fans in the
seats, classic moments, hope. Forever and
ever and ever, the 2008 Tampa Bay Rays
will be remembered as the group that
changed everything. Even as that season
was occurring, I felt like we’d stolen
something. The talent had been in place
since 2007 and I’d honestly expected the
2008 team to challenge for a wild card
spot. But 97 wins, a division title, and a
king’s ransom of lose-your-shit-everybody
moments seemed too good to be true. Like
if I believed hard enough, the whole thing
would break apart. As the postseason
evolved, the cynic in me was almost
relieved by drawing the Red Sox in the
ALCS. The inevitability of that series was
staggering. The only thing between us and
the pennant was baseball’s elite
organization. The other shoe would
mercifully stop dangling overhead and just
drop as though it had a lead sole. But
hope achieved permanence for me at
1:35am on October 12, 2008, which is
the exact time that Fernando Perez’s
smoldering cleats scuffed home plate.
P
rofessional athletes have to possess a
resilient sense of optimism, probably
bordering on the irrational. The odds
are never with them, especially in baseball,
especially in the major leagues. I’m sure
Fernando himself can articulate his
emotions as they regard his future with
more sophistication, but I’m willing to bet
that he still believes in those sandlot
fantasies. He has to. But this game has
been around for over 125 years and our
forebears and contemporaries have done
a decent job of archiving it all. It’s not
common to see a player of Fernando’s
skillset erupt at age 28 for a sustained
period of time. I’m not saying it’s
impossible. I don’t know what the future
holds. Obviously, I’m rooting for the guy.
He and I are around the same age and
we’ve both long dreamed of reaching far
away stars. I was compelled to write this,
though, because of the transaction’s
48
bittersweet portents. Fernando may never
make an All-Star team. Hell, another
major league at-bat isn’t guaranteed. A
.652 OPS might be the best that he can
do. He might have to compromise on that
boyhood dream, might have to shoot for a
closer, fainter star. But for me, and judging
by the reaction to his inclusion in the
Garza trade, for a lot of Rays fans, he’ll
live forever in the moment in which the
pitiable Tampa Bay Rays punched Pink Hat
Nation in the teeth on the biggest stage in
the American League. Fernando helped us
claw back from the baseball hinterlands.
He’ll never be a legend like Longo or Carl
or David or Carlos or even on the level of
tarnished heroes like BJ and Shields.
Maybe a bench role is as far as his body
will take him and as much as luck will
favor him. But before Fernando, we who
give a crap about baseball in Tampa Bay
were a band of stragglers given little to
believe in. After Fernando, we’re an
emerging community. Not specifically
because of him, but in part because of a
moment he authored, because he was fleet
of foot enough to outrace JD Drew’s
formidable arm and charming enough to
get us behind him. If this community of
sweaty virgin nerds on the internet
accomplishes nothing more, it should be to
chronicle and remember the contributions
of players like Fernando who are more
man than god. We have the opportunity to
build
a
mythology,
perhaps
the
responsibility to do it. Fernando’s time in
the spotlight was brief and most of the
country was probably asleep for it, but he
gave us something special. Our very own
Did I Ever Tell You About The Time. And
we shouldn’t forget that.
Good luck in Chicago, Nando. We’ll
always have Game 2.
49
2010 Season Stats:
New York Yankees
2010 Record: 95-67
ERA
SV
K
R
HR
RBI
BA
SB
4.06
39
1154
859
201
823
.267
103
15th
17th
15th
1st
3rd
1st
8th
12th
Manager: Joe Girardi
Offseason Recap: In the most bizarre offseason in recent memory, the Yankees did
next to nothing on the free agent market.
They did not get Lee, Werth, or Crawford,
Pettitte retired and they lost Kerry Wood
out of the pen. The only two additions they
made to the team was Russell Martin
behind the plate and overpaying Rafael
Soriano to join the bullpen in front of
Mariano Rivera. There is a lot of angst in
the fanbase as they watch the Red Sox
retool their roster into a juggernaut while
Brian Cashman has an off-season much
like his counterpart over in Flushing.
Position Battles: The only position battle
that may exist is the fifth’s starter spot
between the likes of Chamberlain and
Mitre. Adding Martin to the roster almost
assures Jesus Montero of a return back to
AAA to start the season as the Yankees will
want to give him regular at bats over
backing up Martin. Robertson likely
assumes the 7th inning role that now that
Soriano has been brought on board to
help bridge the gap between the other
relievers and Rivera. The salaries make this
team rather stable.
50
AL East Preview | The Process Report 2011
2011 Outlook: The entire cast of batters
returns albeit a year older which is not
good for some of them. Jeter hit .300 or
higher five straight seasons and then saw
his batting average drop 64 points last
season. A-Rod’s offensive production fell
for a fourth straight season and Posada’s
value fell off as well. Brett Gardner may
have been the toast of the town in the first
half but his awful second half numbers
somehow flew under the radar. Swisher
and Cano should be able to pick up where
they left off and one has to hope this is the
season that Teixeira realizes that April and
May actually count in baseball and that his
slow starts have become quite frustrating
for Yankees fans. The pitching staff was not
that great last year and it has not added
any names of merit at press time while
losing Pettitte and Wood. This will be the
torpedo tube of the Evil Empire’s Death
Star.
Park Factors: Yankee Stadium is a
monumental launching pad for lefties, so
much so that its park factors for singles,
doubles, and triples were below league
average in 2010. Home runs are the only
park factor above league average in the
new yard thus making the parks’ overall
effect rather neutral outside of runs and
home runs. Right-handed pitchers enter at
their own risk.
Ballpark HRs:
223 (2nd)
Ballpark BA:
.264 (11th)
Ballpark ERA:
5.02 (30th)
percentage and struck out just 16% of the
time. The league figured him out with
more exposure and his BABIP also
dropped 60 points from one half to the
next. The speed is enticing but there are
enough red flags here to signal potentially
rough times ahead for Gardner.
Boston Red Sox
X Factor: Derek Jeter. The lineup’s success
will be determined by how well Jeter does.
If he is going to hit near the top of the
lineup, his .710 OPS is not going cut it
and he cannot hit into 22 double plays
again. His 16% line drive rate was his
worst in recent memory which was a good
part of his demise as he is no longer fast
enough to out-run a 66% groundball rate.
His GB/FB ratio is in a four year climb and
that’s the wrong direction for an aging
player hitting high in the order.
Sleeper: David Robertson. Rivera is never
going to be supplanted as the closer, but
Robertson did a fine job helped to set him
up. He has a very strong strikeout rate for
a middle reliever but his control comes
and goes which leads to some issues with
too many baserunners. He got off to a
brutal start but from June on, was one of
the better middle relievers in baseball.
Bust: Brett Gardner. He had a
.233/.361/.342 slash line in the second
half of the season that included a 26%
strikeout rate compared to a first half in
which he hit .321 with a .399 on base
51
2010 Record: 89-73
Manager: Terry Francona
Offseason Recap: Boston had the best offseason of any team in baseball. They
added Adrian Gonzalez, Carl Crawford,
Bobby Jenks, and Dan Wheeler to a roster
that was still in the playoff hunt in the
season’s
final
week
despite
an
unbelievable amount of injuries. Outside
of catcher and shortstop, their regular
lineup is arguably the most dangerous in
baseball. If Gonzalez’s shoulder is 100%
at the start of the season, he could have a
monster season in a park tailor-made for
his style of hitting.
Position Battles: The everyday line-up is
rather settled here unless the club decides
to give Jed Lowrie more time at shortstop.
Jarrod Saltalamacchia will catch the
majority of games with Varitek coming
back as a fallback option. The back end of
the bullpen now boasts three pitchers with
closer stuff in Jonathan Papelbon, Daniel
Bard, and Jenks. Francona has stuck with
Papelbon through thick and thin of late but
not has a big insurance policy in Jenks or
Bard’s electric arm to fall back on if he
struggles again in 2011.
2010 Team Stats:
ERA
SV
K
R
HR
RBI
BA
SB
4.19
44
1207
818
211
782
.268
68
22nd
7th
9th
2nd
2nd
2nd
6th
25th
2011 Outlook: Boston should put on an
offensive show in 2011 as they have one
of the best lineups, on paper, in recent
memory. The club finished in the top six
spots in four categories despite Youkilis,
Pedroia, and Ellsbury missing significant
chunks of the season. Sure, they lose
Beltre’s potent bat and replace it with
Gonzalez but they also move Mike
Cameron out and add Crawford to the
mix. Crawford had to hit down in the
lineup in Tampa Bay last season to help
knock in runs but he’ll be in front of a
murderer’s row of bats in Boston and
Francona’s usage patterns with Ellsbury on
the basepaths should keep Crawford active
on the basepaths. The bullpen will be
much improved which should help the
rotation but Beckett and Lackey have to
bounce back from sub-par seasons. The
club’s overall defense should be very good
while their outfield defense may be the best
in baseball.
52
Park Factors: Fenway is actually not the
home run dream people make it out to be.
The Monstah steals a lot of homers and
turns them into doubles and also takes
some flyballs from guys like Pedroia and
Scutaro and turns them into home runs.
Pesky Pole rarely comes into play and the
gaps in Fenway are well-patrolled by their
very athletic outfield. If anything, cold
weather is the biggest factor.
Ballpark HRs:
169 (11th)
Ballpark BA:
.264 (13th)
Ballpark ERA:
4.67 (28th)
X Factor: The Red Sox gave up three
players to get him, so now it is time for
Salty to produce, particularly behind the
plate. Part of the Red Sox’ pitching woes
last season was their catchers threw out
just 20% of attempted basestealers which
was second worst in the league. Taking
Crawford away from the Rays removes
public enemy #1 as they had not thrown
him out since 2004, but Boston catchers
were still 6% below league average last
year. Improvement here has a trickle-down
effect.
Sleeper: Playing time is the only issue for
Jed Lowrie. He missed the first half with
mono and then went on a tear in the
second half with career best walk rates,
strikeout rates, and nearly doubled his
slugging percentage from 2009. He can
play all over the infield, but his best chance
at time is going to be at shortstop if
Scutaro struggles or is traded
Bust: Papelbon blew eight saves from
2008 to 2009 but blew eight in just 2010.
His walk rate is in a three-year decline as is
his FIP and general approval ratings with
the fanbase. Last year, Francona stuck with
him through his issues because he had no
experienced fall-back option but with Jenks
looming large in the bullpen, Francona
may not hesitate to yank Papelbon within
the season and give Jenks a chance to
steal the job.
Baltimore Orioles
2010 Record: 66-96
Manager: Buck Showalter
Offseason Recap: Ty Wigginton is gone,
but they upgraded hit bat by trading for
Mark Reynolds. Koji Uehara returns to be
the closer and has competition in the form
of Keving Gregg but the bullpen is thinner
with losses of David Hernandez and Kam
Mickolio. The hole at shortstop is now with
J.J. Hardy and the added veteran Derrek
Lee to solidify the mostly revamped infield.
The club lost veteran presence Kevin
Millwood but replaced him with the oftinjured yet skilled Justin Duchscherer. The
biggest news in the off-season may have
been Luke Scott’s off-season interview until
the club gave Vladimir Guerrero $8M to
be their DH in 2011.
53
Position Battles: Uehara and Gregg will
battle it out for the closer’s role. Both put
the ball in the air, but Uehara’s command
of the strike zone is much better than
Gregg’s wild ways of late. The addition of
Mark Reynolds means Josh Bell’s
development has more time and adding
Guerrero puts Scott in the outfield full time
at the expense of playing time for Felix Pie
and Nolan Reimold.
2010 Team Stats:
ERA
SV
K
R
HR
RBI
BA
SB
4.59
35
1007
613
133
577
.259
76
27th
23rd
28th
27th
21st
27th
13th
23rd
2011 Outlook: I was very optimistic about
this team last season and thought they had
a legitimate shot at going at least .500.
Instead, they went 32-73 for Dave
Tremblay and Juan Samuel until Showalter
took over and led the team to a 34-23
record to close the season out refusing to
roll over for anyone. The additions of
Reynolds, Guerrero, Lee, and Hardy bring
some well needed pop to a team that
finished in the bottom third in most
offensive categories. The pitching staff is
still quite young and there is still a
considerable gap between the starters and
the tandem closers outside of Jim Johnson.
Park Factors: Camden Yards is a very
good hitter’s park, especially for righthanded batters. It is above league average
for everything but triples which is great if
you are targeting Reynolds, Hardy, and
Jones but not so much if you want to take
a flyer on Orioles pitching. This also
increases the risks with Uehara in the
closing role as he is an extreme flyball
pitcher.
Ballpark HRs:
178 (9th)
Ballpark BA:
.270 (5th)
Ballpark ERA:
4.26 (19th)
Bust: The rankings just do not match the
results for Chris Tillman yet. Last season,
he walked as many batters as he struck out
and had a 1.5 HR/9 rate. His AAA
strikeout rate fell more than two full
strikeouts before his promotion and he
gave up 19 home runs in 175 innings of
work between AAA and the majors. There
is a time for Tillman, but that time is not
2011 as he still has some work to do after
being rushed up.
Toronto Blue Jays
2010 Record: 85-77
X Factor: Adam Jones continues to show
promise, but there is still room for
improvement. The first half of 2010 was
one filled with power (13 homers) while the
second half saw him hit .296. He has to
find more patience as a 4% walk rate and
0.19 BB/K is going to get exposed by
pitchers. 2011 will be his fourth full season
in the big leagues; he has improved his
contact rate four straight seasons so now it
is time for him to improve his walk rate to
maximize his potential.
Sleeper: A list of injuries have side-tracked
the ascent of the Orioles’ former top draft
pick Nolan Reimold. He had a solid track
record of plate discipline and power in the
minors but back, oblique, and heel injuries
set him back. He is still just 27 years old
and is without a starting job, but the
Orioles reportedly refused to trade him to
acquire Jason Bartlett early in December.
54
Manager: John Farrell
Offseason Recap: The Jays lost their
primary closer, their primary first baseman,
and starting catcher but the most painful
loss may be Cito Gaston who got the most
out of a team people wrote off this time
last year. The club traded for the speedy
Rajai Davis to play left and traded and
then brought back Edwin Encarnacion but
to DH and back up first while staying as far
away from third base as possible. Marcum
will be sorely missed from the rotation but
the club wanted to clear a spot for Kyle
Drabek at some point.
Position Battles: The back end of the Jays
rotation is unsettled with the departure of
Marcum. Drabek, Jesse Litsch, and Marc
Rzepczynski are all fighting for the final two
spots and Drabek could be the likely loser
due to service time issues. The Jays re-did
most of the back end to their pen by
adding Frank Francisco, Jon Rauch, and
Octavio Dotel to join the returning Jason
Frasor. That gives Farrell four different
pitchers with closing experience although
Francisco is the likely favorite out of that
group
from
a
skills
perspective.
Encarnacion and Lind are scheduled to
share the duties at first and DH but it is
unclear at this time how Farrell plans on
handling those assignments.
2010 Team Stats:
ERA
SV
K
R
HR
RBI
BA
SB
4.22
45
1184
755
257
732
.248
58
23rd
5th
11th
9th
1st
9th
24th
28th
2011 Outlook: The big question is whether
Jose Bautista will be able to repeat his
Bondsian performance from last year. He
had just two months where he did not hit
double-digit home runs and for the second
straight season, finished strong. He has hit
66 home runs since 9/1/09 while people
continue to doubt him. Davis should help
the running game as the Jays plodded
around the bases last season waiting for
the three-run homerun. J.P. Arencibia has
the potential to pick up right where Buck
left off in the power department but also
has little experience above AAA. The
starting rotation, despite losing Marcum,
remains solid as Ricky Romero, Brandon
55
Morrow, and Brett Cecil have a lot of
potential and Drabek is on the way. Don’t
forget about the talented McGowan who
hasn’t pitched since 2008 with elbow
issues.
Park Factors: Rogers Centre was quite the
hitter’s park last season as it played above
league average for doubles, triples, and
home runs. When they open the roof, it is
said the balls flies even more so pull for
global warming so the weather is above
50 degrees in Toronto before June 1st.
The fast turf and the slower corner outfield
play had something to do with this which
has been somewhat addressed.
Ballpark HRs:
227 (1st)
Ballpark BA:
.254 (20th)
Ballpark ERA:
4.49 (25th)
X Factor: Rajai Davis nearly out-stole the
entire Jays team by himself last season
falling just eight bases short. Gaston took
the Earl Weaver approach to baseball last
season waiting for the three run home run
so Davis adds a much-needed dynamic to
the Jays lineup. However, he must get his
OBP back up over .350 where he was in
2007 and 2009. Last season, he had 130
more plate appearances than in 2009 and
yet stole just nine more bags. In a division
with poor-throwing catchers, he could steal
60.
Sleeper: Edwin Encarnacion had the
second highest Isolated Power rating of all
third baseman in baseball last season,
trailing on Bautista. His .787 OPS was
better than Ian Stewart, Mark Reynolds,
Michael Young, and Aramis Ramirez and
over the past five seasons, his Isolated
Power has been better than Adrian Beltre’s.
Last season, he had 37 extra base hits
including 21 home runs in just 332 at
bats. He has the potential to put 30 on the
board in 2011.
Bust: Arencibia has hit 53 home runs in
AAA over the past two seasons so the
power potential is enticing but he is a
rather
undisciplined
free
swinging
youngster playing a very challenging
position in the game’s toughest division.
Jaso succeeded last year but was much
more disciplined and hackers like
Arencibia tend to get exposed quite quickly
and there is a lot of talented pitching in the
AL East. Temper your expectations.
56
Player Profiles
57
Player Profiles | The Process Report 2011
Chris Archer – SP
Synopsis:
Strengths:
Archer’s fastball and slider are his two best pitches:
they’ve been ranked by some scouts at around 70
on the 20-80 scouting scale. His change-up is also
pretty good; he uses it around 10-15% of the time,
and he feels confident in using it against both
hands. With such impressive pitches, Archer is very
good at generating strikeouts, never falling below
eight strikeouts per nine at any level of the minors.
Weaknesses:
Command. Archer has struggled in the past with his
control, walking over five batters per nine innings in
the low minors. As he’s gotten older, Archer has
worked on his command through drills and has
seen significant improvement over the last few years.
He’s continuing to work on it, but at this point, his
command is the only thing holding him back.
One of the key pieces of the Matt Garza trade, Chris
Archer is a stud young starting pitcher that has lots of
potential. He was ranked by Baseball America as the
Cubs best prospect, and most analysts seem to think
he ranks somewhere in the top seven in the Rays
organization. He’s a hard-throwing right-handed
pitcher, featuring a fastball that sits around 93-94
MPH and can be cranked up to 98-99 MPH, a hard
slider, a change-up, and a see-me curveball. Archer is
only 22-years-old and will likely start the season in
Double-A, but he could move quickly up to Triple-A
and could serve as a September call-up for the Rays.
Keys to Success in 2011:
- Improve control – As stated already, Archer needs to
get better control of his pitches if he’s going to realize
his potential. Thankfully, that’s an area the Rays seem
adept at teaching.
- Stick as a starter – Some analysts have proposed that
if Archer’s repertoire may be best suited for the
bullpen, especially if he can’t learn to improve his
control. His fastball may be impressive, but he’s more
valuable to the Rays as a starter.
Year
Team
IP
K/9
BB/9
HR/9
ERA
2008
CLE (A)
115.1
8.3
6.6
0.6
4.29
2009
CHC (A)
109.0
9.8
5.5
0.0
2.81
2010
CHC (A+)
72.1
10.2
3.2
0.5
2.86
2010
CHC (AA)
70.0
8.6
5.0
0.3
1.80
*All stats courtesy of Baseball-Reference.com
58
Player Profiles: 40 Man Roster (Pitchers) - Chris Archer | The Process Report 2011
Matt Bush – RP
Synopsis:
Strengths:
Though his minor league pitching career consists of
just 17 appearances, Bush has the potential to be a
useful relief pitcher down the road. Before the injury
he was clocked in the mid-90s and recent reports
say he is not far off from that now. In his bullpen
work, he struck out an impressive 36 batters in 21.1
innings.
Weaknesses:
Thus far, his body has been his biggest weakness.
He made just 10 appearances at the lower levels of
the minor leagues in 2010 before he was sidelined
for the rest of the year. In addition to the large
health issues, little is known about his secondary
pitches.
The top overall selection as a shortstop in the 2004
major league draft (San Diego), Bush was converted
into a pitcher during the 2007 season. Subsequent
Tommy John surgery and personal issues have kept
him off the field for most of the last three years. Signed
by the Rays last year, the team deemed him worth of a
40-man roster spot and protection from the Rule 5
draft this offseason.
- Get Healthy – It would be stay healthy, but he has to
get there first.
- Stay Out of Trouble
- Develop secondary offerings – A blazing fastball may
get results in A-ball, but few have success with just one
pitch at the upper levels.
Year
Team
IP
K/9
BB/9
HR/9
ERA
2010
TB (R)
5.1
13.5
1.7
0.0
1.69
2010
TB (A+)
8.1
13.0
2.2
1.1
4.32
59
Player Profiles: 40 Man Roster (Pitchers) - Matt Bush | The Process Report 2011
Cesar Cabral – RP
Synopsis:
A 21-year-old Rule 5 pick from Boston, Cabral
certainly has a chance to make the team in a relief
capacity.
- Sticking around – The longer Cabral sticks around,
the more likely he is to get a shot.
Strengths:
Can hit 95 with his fastball and throws a strong
circle change that results in empty swings. Strong
minor league track record in the low minors.
- Taking advantage of the opportunity – If there's one
position that can make such a leap with success, it's
the left-handed specialist role.
Weaknesses:
- Avoid a family reunion – Cabral's brother, also
named Cesar, pitches in the Boston system.
Awfully raw and inexperienced.
Year
Team
IP
K/9
BB/9
HR/9
ERA
2010
BOS (A)
31.1
10.1
2.0
0.0
0.29
2010
BOS (A+)
48.0
8.4
2.6
0.2
5.81
60
Player Profiles: 40 Man Roster (Pitchers) - Cesar Cabral | The Process Report 2011
Alex Cobb - RP
Synopsis:
The fourth round pick of the 2006 draft (which also
produced Evan Longoria and Desmond Jennings),
Cobb had a career best season in 2010 and rounded
it out by dominating the Arizona Fall League. Arguably
the best non-Hellickson right-handed pitching prospect
in the system.
Strengths:
The athletic righty works with a low-90s fastball that
sinks and a plus curveball. Strong groundball rate
should hold up despite natural attrition. Could be
ready for the big leagues by the end of 2011.
Weaknesses:
Doesn’t light up the radar gun and needs to
continue showing marked improvement with his
changeup. Questions about durability come with
the size (6’1”).
- Stay healthy – Self-explanatory.
- Improve his offerings – The change-up supposedly
flashes plus at times.
- Improve his command – Yes, it's different than
control.
Year
Team
IP
K/9
BB/9
HR/9
ERA
2009
TB (A+)
124.2
7.7
2.2
0.4
3.03
2010
TB (R)
25.0
10.8
5.0
0.7
6.12
2010
TB (AA)
119.2
9.6
2.6
0.5
2.86
61
Player Profiles: 40 Man Roster (Pitchers) - Alex Cobb | The Process Report 2011
Wade Davis – SP
Synopsis:
Strengths:
Though he struggled at times in 2010, Davis has
the potential to be a middle of the rotation starter or
better for the Rays. Led by a fastball that lives in the
low-to-mid 90s, he throws four pitches that rate at
least average. He throws a change-up in the range
of 83-85 MPH and two variations of a breaking ball
(curve and slider). His slider proved to be an
effective weapon, inducing the most swing and
misses of any of his pitches. Despite the time
missed with arm soreness, Davis’s frame should
make him a perennial workhorse. In fact, his best
work on the mound came as he approached the
100 pitch mark.
Weaknesses:
Though he has the size and the stuff of a strikeout
pitcher, Davis’s 6.05 strikeouts per nine innings
(K/9) was underwhelming. We know he has the
ability to get swings and misses, so perhaps the
problem was related to pitch sequence. Davis went
to his slider more with two strikes – which is good –
but still relied on his fastball, making him
predictable when just one swing away from an out.
A former top prospect in the system, Davis graduated
to the major leagues with a varying degree of success
in 2010. Despite some struggles early on, he returned
from a late-season stint on the disabled list (elbow)
with better results and earned a spot in the postseason
rotation.
- Improve strikeout rate – Which should balance out
bouts of inconsistency.
- Be efficient – Davis was the only starter who did not
average at least six innings per start and had the
highest pitch per plate appearance in the rotation.
- Trust the secondary stuff – This could go a long way
in correcting some of his flaws.
Year
Team
IP
K/9
BB/9
HR/9
ERA
2008
TB (AAA)
53.0
9.3
4.1
0.9
2.72
2009
TB (AAA)
158.2
7.9
3.4
0.8
3.40
2009
TB
36.1
8.9
3.2
0.5
3.72
2010
TB
168.0
6.1
3.3
1.3
4.07
62
Player Profiles: 40 Man Roster (Pitchers) - Wade Davis | The Process Report 2011
Dane De La Rosa - RP
Synopsis:
Signed out of an independent league, De La Rosa is a
former Yankees’ farmhand given a second shot at
making the show. Figures to have an outside shot at
making the bullpen.
Strengths:
Throws a fastball that can get up to the mid-90s
with an occasionally plus curveball. Gets
groundballs and posted impressive strikeout-to-walk
ratios in 2010.
Weaknesses:
Age matters less for pitchers than hitters and even
less for relievers, but given the competition level
previously faced, it’s not impossible that De La Rosa
hits the proverbial wall in the high minors or majors.
- Take advantage of the chance – This is probably the
best chance for him to ever make a big league team.
- Master the curve – Despite being inexperienced at
the top levels, De La Rosa needs to prove he can get
big league hitters out now.
- Prove it’s real – His success has come against
weaker batters.
Year
Team
IP
K/9
BB/9
HR/9
ERA
2010
TB (A+)
3.0
15.0
0.0
0.0
3.00
2010
TB (AA)
73.0
9.3
3.2
0.4
1.97
63
Player Profiles: 40 Man Roster (Pitchers) - Dane De La Rosa | The Process Report 2011
Rob Delaney – RP
Synopsis:
Strengths:
Control. Delaney has limited walks at every step
through the minors, normally averaging 2 walks per
nine innings. This control has allowed him to
succeed even without overpowering pitches, and
he’s struck out over 10 batters per nine in Single-A,
Advanced-A, Double-A, and Triple-A. He’s also very
durable, averaging around 1 1/3 innings per
appearance.
Claimed off waivers from the Twins this offseason, Rob
Delaney is an intriguing bullpen option. A righthanded, 26-year-old reliever, Delaney has risen slowly
through the minors, finally reaching and sticking in
Triple-A in 2009. He’s not an overpowering pitcher,
throwing a 90-MPH fastball and an 82-MPH slider,
and instead relies upon control for his success. He’s
only thrown one inning at the major league level, so
it’s difficult to say at this point how his stuff would
translate against tougher competition.
Weaknesses:
Delaney’s pitches aren’t overpowering, so it’s
possible that his minor league success won’t
translate well to the majors. For example, both Jeff
Niemann and Andy Sonnanstine struck out over 8
batters per nine in Triple-A, yet upon reaching the
majors, they’re averaging around 6 strikeouts per
nine. If Delaney’s strikeout numbers dropped slightly
and he started walking a few more batters upon
reaching the majors, it’d make it more difficult for
him to stick around.
- Don’t lose command – It can be tough transitioning
to the majors, but Delaney needs to keep his
command superb if he wants to succeed there.
- Average is fine – As a middle reliever, Delaney
doesn’t need to light the world on fire to be a success.
We shouldn’t expect another Rafael Soriano: a 4.30
ERA is still valuable.
- Sport a moustache – He’s had a fabulous one in the
past, and the Rays are missing a mustachioed reliever
now that Dale Thayer is on the Mets.
Year
Team
IP
K/9
BB/9
HR/9
ERA
2009
MIN (AA)
36.0
10.0
1.5
0.3
2.00
2009
MIN (AAA)
47.2
7.2
2.8
0.9
4.53
2010
MIN (AAA)
80.0
10.4
2.6
1.4
4.73
64
Player Profiles: 40 Man Roster (Pitchers) - Rob Delaney | The Process Report 2011
Mike Ekstrom - RP
Synopsis:
Strengths:
Ekstrom has three pitches: a 90 MPH fastball, a
low-80s slider, and a low-80s change-up. He
primarily works fastball/slider against right-handed
batters and fastball/change against left-handed
batters, and he succeeds by limiting walks and
home runs. In fact, in 583 professional innings,
Ekstrom has only allowed 36 home runs – only two
more than James Shields allowed in last season
alone.
Weaknesses:
Picked up off waivers from the Padres before the 2010
season, Mike Ekstrom saw a handful of innings in the
majors last season, serving as the Rays’ relief pitcher
of last resort and pitching primarily in low-leverage
situations. He received flak from fans for his spotty
command, but overall he performed reasonably well,
posting a 3.31 ERA during his 16 inning stint.
Although overlooked by most, Ekstrom has moderate
upside as a reliever, putting up respectable strikeout
and walk numbers in the minors over the last few
seasons.
While Ekstrom’s pitches are good enough to get by
in the minors, he doesn’t have overpowering stuff.
He’s averaged around seven strikeouts per nine
innings in the minors, which raises some concerns
about if he’ll be able to fool enough batters to be
effective long-term in the majors. If he keeps his
walk and homerun rates low, he can be a
serviceable middle reliever; if one of those rates
balloon even a little, though, he quickly becomes
ineffective.
- Keeping the ball in the park – With marginal
peripheral statistics, Ekstrom needs to limit his home
runs allowed to be successful.
- Limit the walks allowed – His pitches won’t blow a
batter away, so Ekstrom needs to keep his walks
allowed low to maintain an effective K/BB ratio.
- Location, location, location – Ekstrom is at his best
when he keeps pitches low in the zone, making batters
whiff or pound the ball into the ground.
Year
Team
IP
K/9
BB/9
HR/9
ERA
2008
SD (AA)
108
8.4
2.8
1.2
4.58
2009
SD (AAA)
62.1
6.2
2.3
0.3
6.38
2010
TB
16.1
5.5
5.0
0.0
3.31
65
Player Profiles: 40 Man Roster (Pitchers) - Mike Ekstrom | The Process Report 2011
Kyle Farnsworth – RP
Synopsis:
Strengths:
Even at age 34, Farnsworth’s fastball still lives in the
mid-to-upper 90s and gets whiffs. Over the past two
years he has cut down his walks and home runs
thanks to a change in pitch selection. He has thrown
less sliders and replaced it with a similar pitch – the
cutter. He gets swings and misses with all of his
pitches. According to Pitch F/X analyst Mike Fast,
he has also tightened up his release point and
changed his position on the pitching rubber.
Farnsworth has always been able to handle righthanded batters, but was especially good last
season. He does have a platoon split, but not as
pronounced as some.
Weaknesses:
While his recent history shows low walk and home
run totals, his career totals are average-to-below
average. In his first go around in the American
League East (New York Yankees) he struggled in
both categories.
One of the few free Major League agent additions of
the Rays this off-season, Farnsworth brings experience
and intimidation to the Rays relief corps. After
struggling with home runs and walks for most of his
career, he has added some pitches to his arsenal,
becoming a well-rounded pitcher.
- Continue to evolve – Farnsworth has transformed
from a thrower to a pitcher in recent years. He will
need to keep the adjustments coming now that he is
facing a ridiculously stacked AL East.
- Be the fireman – Farnsworth may not assume the
closer’s role, but he will likely be placed in similar
situations to Grant Balfour. If you have not noticed,
Balfour was brought in high-leverage situations quite
often before the 9th inning; saving the game before
the closer’s save opportunity.
- Bring the pain – Ever since Jonny Gomes left for
Cincinnati the Rays have lacked an ass-kicking
enforcer. Enter Kyle Farnsworth.
Year
Team
IP
K/9
BB/9
HR/9
ERA
2008
NYY
44.1
8.7
3.5
2.2
3.65
2008
DET
16.0
10.1
2.8
2.3
6.75
2009
KC
37.1
10.1
3.4
0.7
4.58
2010
KC/ATL
64.2
8.5
2.6
0.6
3.34
66
Player Profiles: 40 Man Roster (Pitchers) - Kyle Farnsworth | The Process Report 2011
Brandon Gomes – RP
Synopsis:
Strengths:
Peralta does not have much natural ability, but he
does possess a really good off-speed pitch; like,
really good. Some classify it as a change-up while
others call it a split-fingered pitch. Either way, his
swing-and-miss rate per pitch was among the best
in the league. Despite being below-average against
left-handed batters overall, the split-finger/changeup has acted as a neutralizer when faced with the
platoon disadvantage.
Weaknesses:
It is not really a weakness in terms of production,
but since he was drafted at age 23, Gomes has
been a bit old for his level of competition. That said,
he is likely to start the season at Triple-A Durham
and could be first in line for a spot the Rays bullpen
opens up. His small frame (5’11” 175 pounds) is a
negative to some, but he has proven durable thus
far.
Acquired as part of the Jason Bartlett trade, Gomes
has been one of the minor leagues’ best strikeout
pitchers over the last two years. At age 25, he could
be on an accelerated path to the Rays bullpen which is
in search of new blood.
- Succeed at the next level – He has not pitched above
Double-A. While it is not a requirement for promotion,
the organization would probably like to see some
success at Triple-A.
- Continue success against lefties – Some project him
as a righty-specialist, but the splitter could make him a
legit full-inning pitcher at the next level.
- Stand tall – Although he lacks the size, he has the
label as a bulldog and a competitor.
Year
Team
IP
K/9
BB/9
HR/9
ERA
2008
SD (A)
56.2
7.2
3.0
0.8
3.49
2008
SD (A+)
28.0
11.6
1.9
1.0
2.89
2009
SD (AA)
72.0
12.5
3.5
0.5
2.63
2010
SD (AA)
72.1
11.6
3.1
0.3
1.87
67
Player Profiles: 40 Man Roster (Pitchers) - Brandon Gomes | The Process Report 2011
Jeremy Hellickson – SP
Synopsis:
Strengths:
What he lacks in pure stuff, he makes up for with his
pitching ability. He may not have the fastball of
David Price, but he is a much more polished
product for his age. He surrendered just eight walks
while striking out 33 batters in his first 36.1 innings.
While throwing a good enough fastball (89-94) and
a loopy bender (around 75 MPH), his best pitch was
his mid-80s change-up. The off-speed pitch was
used as his strikeout pitch while serving as an
equalizer against left-handed batters; which is a key
to the right-hander’s future success.
Weaknesses:
While it is not really a weakness in terms of ability,
Hellickson has yet to surpass 160 innings in any of
his seasons as a professional. With some arm issues
in 2009 and the cautious approach of the Rays, his
innings total could be a topic of conversation
toward the end of 2011.
One of the top prospects in all of baseball, Hellickson
was a late season call-up of the Rays and immediately
showed he was ready for the show. Perhaps the most
complete pitching prospect in Rays’ history due to
fantastic control, the young kid from Iowa showed
tremendous poise and make-up in his first taste of big
league action.
- Continue development – Easier said than done at the
major league level.
- Be a chameleon – He baffled major league batters in
limited exposure, but once teams can develop a
scouting report on him he will need to adjust to the
changes.
- Keep’em off balance – In conjunction with the key
from above, without a dominant fastball, Hellickson
must rely on his ability to mix pitches to keep that
above-average strikeout rate intact.
Year
Team
IP
K/9
BB/9
HR/9
ERA
2009
TB (AA)
56.2
9.9
2.2
0.6
2.38
2009
TB (AAA)
57.1
11.0
2.4
0.6
2.51
2010
TB (AAA)
117.2
9.4
2.7
0.4
2.45
2010
TB
36.1
8.2
2.0
1.2
3.47
68
Player Profiles: 40 Man Roster (Pitchers) - Jeremy Hellickson | The Process Report 2011
J.P. Howell - RP
Synopsis:
Strengths:
Howell’s out-pitch against both hands is his
knuckle-curve: it’s a devastating pitch with lots of
sinking action and movement. His fastballs won’t
blow anyone away, but Howell mixes his pitches
well and induces plenty of swings-and-misses. The
sinking action on his fastball and knuckle-curve
makes batters hit a large number of groundballs,
reducing the number of extra base hits against him.
Weaknesses:
While Howell strikes out a high number of batters,
averaging more than one an inning, he also walks a
high number of batters as well. This isn’t a large
concern because he limits hits and strikes out lots of
batters, but it can be a disadvantage if he enters the
game with men already on base. Also, due to the
low velocity of his pitches, Howell is prone to
allowing home runs if his pitch placement is off.
One of the key pieces in the Rays’ 2008 and 2009
bullpens, J.P. Howell missed the entire 2010 season
due to shoulder weakness. Howell had lost steam at
the end of the 2009 season, and he ended up
needing surgery to repair his labrum when his arm
strength didn’t return by spring training. Howell is
expected to return a few months into the 2011 season.
When healthy, Howell’s one of the best relief pitchers
in the majors. A converted starter, his repertoire
includes a sinking, 86-90 MPH fastball, an 80-82
MPH knuckle-curve, a 78-80 MPH change-up, and a
high-80s cutter.
- Endurance– Since he’ll still be recovering from his
injury this season, Maddon will likely play it cautious
with Howell’s workload.
- Bring the walks down – Howell got a bit too walk
happy in 2009, resulting in longer innings and more
pitches thrown.
- Be clutch – In 2009, Howell had some of his worst
performances coming in pressure situations. He was
extremely clutch in 2008, though, so there’s hope for
a reversal.
Year
Team
IP
K/9
BB/9
HR/9
ERA
2007
TB
51.0
8.7
3.7
1.4
7.59
2008
TB
89.1
9.3
3.9
0.6
2.22
2009
TB
66.2
10.7
4.5
1.0
2.84
69
Player Profiles: 40 Man Roster (Pitchers) - J.P. Howell | The Process Report 2011
Jake McGee – RP
Synopsis:
Strengths:
As has been the case for his whole career, McGee
possess a plus, plus fastball that reaches the upper90s even after the 2008 injury. In his brief work as a
relief pitcher, he was lights-out on left-handed
batters, but his ability to handle righties as well
makes him a legit “closer of the future” more than a
left-handed specialist. His slider is also a weapon
with nearly 20 miles per hour separation from the
fastball.
Weaknesses:
The biggest mark against McGee as a starter was
his secondary offerings. He has the fastball and
slider, but not much after that. The good news is, as
a relief pitcher, McGee does not need much more
than his prized heater and a second pitch. Even
though he will rack up the punch outs in bunches,
his control leaves a little to be desired, but nothing
uncommon for a young pitcher.
Once a top prospect as a starter, Tommy John
surgery, as well as the emergence of other arms in the
system, has put McGee’s future role in limbo. While
the Rays will not say his days as a starter are over, his
transition to the bullpen began late last season and
will likely continue in 2011 – where he has a chance
to be the first homegrown impact reliever in franchise
history.
- Continue work on the secondary pitch – Though it is
not as vital as it was before, McGee will need continue
working on his slider to go along with the heater.
- Do not discriminate – McGee should have no
problems with left-handed batters, but in order to be
that potential impact guy, he will need to get righthanders out on a regular basis.
- Keep control of the heat
Year
Team
IP
K/9
BB/9
HR/9
ERA
2009
TB (A+)
22.1
10.5
3.6
0.8
6.45
2010
TB (AA)
88.1
10.2
3.4
0.3
3.57
2010
TB (AAA)
17.1
14.0
1.6
0.0
0.52
2010
TB
5.0
10.8
5.4
0.0
1.80
70
Player Profiles: 40 Man Roster (Pitchers) - Jake McGee | The Process Report 2011
Jeff Niemann - SP
Synopsis:
Strengths:
Niemann won’t blow anyone away, but he does
many things well on the mound. He mixes pitches,
strikes out around 6.5 per 9 innings, walks only 3
per 9, and induces groundballs. That isn’t a recipe
for becoming an ace, but it’s a good way to be a
consistent, above-average starter.
Weaknesses:
Without a doubt, injuries. Niemann battled arm
injuries in college and after being drafted, he had to
undergo shoulder surgery in 2005 to shave the joint
between his collarbone and shoulder. Since then,
he’s been on the disabled list a couple times due to
shoulder issues, most recently this past season.
Niemann has never pitched over 180 innings in a
season, so endurance over the course of the season
is a concern.
A former first-round draft pick, Niemann has found his
calling as the world’s largest junkball pitcher, throwing
six effective, yet not overpowering pitches: a four-seam
fastball, two-seam fastball, curveball, slider, changeup, and sinker. His two fastballs are the same speed
(91 MPH), but his two-seam fastball breaks in on righthanded batters while his four-seam fastball remains
relatively straight. He attacks hitters primarily with
these two pitches, relying on the four-seamer against
lefties since it appears to ride in on their hands, and
he mixes in his four other pitches to keep hitters offbalance. Niemann is one of the Rays’ most consistent
starters, although he does have a significant injury
history and struggled after coming back from an injury
late last season.
- Avoid injuries – Niemann’s most recent injury
derailed his 2010 season.
- Endurance – This goes hand-in-hand with the injury
concern, but Niemann has a history of losing
effectiveness as the season wears on.
- Limit the home runs – Niemann had the highest
homerun rate of his career last season, inflating his
ERA.
Year
Team
IP
K/9
BB/9
HR/9
ERA
2008
TB (AAA)
133.0
8.7
3.4
1.0
3.59
2009
TB
180.2
6.2
2.9
0.9
3.94
2010
TB
174.1
6.8
3.2
1.3
4.39
71
Player Profiles: 40 Man Roster (Pitchers) - Jeff Niemann | The Process Report 2011
Joel Peralta – RP
Synopsis:
Strengths:
Peralta does not have much natural ability, but he
does possess a really good off-speed pitch; like,
really good. Some classify it as a change-up while
others call it a split-fingered pitch. Either way, his
swing-and-miss rate per pitch was among the best
in the league. Despite being below-average against
left-handed batters overall, the split-finger/changeup has acted as a neutralizer when faced with the
platoon disadvantage.
Weaknesses:
The off-speed pitch has helped him versus lefties,
and he did hold them to .474 OPS last season;
however it was just 17 innings, and he has struggled
versus lefties in his career. His fastball sits in the low
90s and does not get many whiffs. As a flyball
pitcher, he is prone to give the long ball.
After bouncing around between the major and minor
leagues for the past few seasons, Peralta turned in his
best results in 2010 (2.02 ERA 49 innings) as a
member of the Washington Nationals. Signed to a
one-year deal, he will turn 35 years-old before
opening day 2011.
- Be the new ROOGY – As a member of the revamped Rays’ bullpen, Peralta could see significant
high-leverage innings. If Joe Maddon uses him similar
to Dan Wheeler, he should produce at a high level.
- Build on past success – The Rays will also likely test
last season’s stellar numbers against left-handed
hitters in hopes that 2010 was more than a fluke.
- Let the fielders work – Peralta’s low .219 batting
average on balls in play (BABIP) was a key in his lower
than normal ERA last season. While he may experience
some regression, the flyball pitcher should benefit
pitching in front of the Rays’ solid outfield defense and
under Tropicana Field’s roof.
Year
Team
IP
K/9
BB/9
HR/9
ERA
2009
COL
24.2
8.0
4.4
1.1
6.20
2010
WAS (AAA)
33.1
10.3
1.9
0.3
1.08
2010
WAS
49.0
9.0
1.7
0.9
2.02
72
Player Profiles: 40 Man Roster (Pitchers) - Joel Peralta | The Process Report 2011
David Price - SP
Synopsis:
Strengths:
Price won a franchise best 19 games in 2010, so he
was obviously doing something right. His fastballs
are by far his best pitches, and he uses them to blow
away batters. His strikeout and swinging strike
numbers aren’t gaudy, but are still respectably
above average. Price also limits walks and induces
an above-average amount of groundballs.
Weaknesses:
If Price’s fastballs aren’t working for him one
evening, he could be in for a rough time. Price
throws his two fastballs nearly 80% of the time,
regardless of the count, and his two alternative
pitches – his spike curve and change-up – are
merely average. He needs an effective fastball to be
able to succeed, but luckily that’s very rarely an
issue.
After a mediocre rookie campaign, David Price
emerged as the ace of the Rays’ staff in 2010. The
Rays had eased Price along in 2009, giving him a
couple months in the minors to develop a third
offering, and Price has been changing his arsenal ever
since. Currently, Price features a four-seam fastball
and two-seam fastball, both of which sit in the mid-tohigh 90s, and he also throws a 78 MPH spike (AKA
knuckle) curve and an 83 MPH change-up. Price’s out
pitch used to be his hard slider, but he throws that
pitch only rarely now and instead relies heavily upon
his two fastballs. Both fastballs have a large amount of
movement, with his two-seam fastball breaking in on
lefties more than his four-seamer.
- Increase the whiffs – For a pitcher that throws in the
high-90s, Price doesn’t generate as many strikeouts as
you’d expect. To become a true ace, he needs to
become more unhittable.
- Stick with the new fastball – Price developed a new
two-seam fastball midway through the 2010 season,
gaining both velocity and movement on the pitch.
- Knuckle-curve and change-up – If Price improves his secondary pitches, it’ll keep batters from being able to
sit on his fastballs.
Year
Team
IP
K/9
BB/9
HR/9
ERA
2008
TB*
14.0
7.7
2.6
0.6
1.93
2008
TB
128.1
7.2
3.8
1.2
4.42
2009
TB
209.2
8.1
3.4
0.7
2.72
*During 2008, Price pitched at the Single-A, Double-A, and Triple-A levels before joining the Rays’ bullpen for the playoff run. **All stats courtesy
of Baseball-Reference.com
73
Player Profiles: 40 Man Roster (Pitchers) - David Price | The Process Report 2011
Cesar Ramos – RP
Synopsis:
Acquired in the Jason Bartlett trade, the former Padres’
swingman could leap right into the Rays’ bullpen.
- Use the starting experience – To make it this far as a
starter, Ramos should have some pitches that make
playable against weaker right-handed batters.
Strengths:
Showed the ability to retire left-handed hitters over
the past several years with a low-90s fastball and
effective curveball.
- Be the better Cesar – Ramos should have the inside
track on the LOOGY job, as he is on the 40-man
roster and has big league experience.
Weaknesses:
- Stay stretched out – If nothing else, Ramos could
provide value by filling a mop-up role too.
Unlikely to handle righties well enough to become
more than a situational reliever, although stranger
things have happened.
Year
Team
IP
K/9
BB/9
HR/9
ERA
2009
SD
14.2
6.1
2.5
0.0
3.07
2010
SD
8.1
9.7
4.3
1.1
11.88
74
Player Profiles: 40 Man Roster (Pitchers) - Cesar Ramos | The Process Report 2011
Adam Russell - RP
Synopsis:
Strengths:
Russell is good at nearly everything you could ask
for from a pitcher. He generates lots of swing-andmisses with his pitches, resulting in a very high
strikeout rate. He induces an above-average
number of groundballs, resulting in fewer extra base
hits allowed. And, to top it off, he allows a small
number of home runs, posting a below-average
homerun rate at every step of his professional
career.
Acquired this offseason from San Diego in the Jason
Bartlett trade, Adam Russell profiles very similarly to a
pre-2008 Grant Balfour: a journeyman reliever with a
blazing fastball and insane strikeout rates, but with
control problems that have kept him from sticking in
the majors. Russell relies heavily on his 94-95 MPH
fastball against both hands, and he mixes in a
curveball against right-handed batters and both a
change-up and curveball against left-handed batters.
All of his pitches have swing-and-miss potential.
Weaknesses:
While Russell’s pitches are tough to hit, they can
also be tough for him to locate. Last year in TripleA, Russell struck out nearly 9 batters per 9 innings,
but he also walked around 5.5 batters per 9. This
has been a problem that has followed Russell ever
since he moved to the bullpen in 2008.
- A modicum of control – With his high strikeout rate,
Russell can still thrive with a high walk rate. His walk
rate just can’t be astronomically high.
- Opportunity – Russell has never been given the
chance to pitch more than 26 innings in the majors
during a season. If given the chance, his
overwhelming stuff should speak for itself.
- Limit the home runs – Pitching in the AL East is much
different than pitching in the NL West.
Year
Team
IP
K/9
BB/9
HR/9
ERA
2008
CWS (AAA)
37.1
6.8
4.6
0.7
2.89
2009
CWS (AAA)
56.1
8.2
2.9
0.8
3.20
2010
SD (AAA)
51.2
8.9
5.6
0.7
4.88
75
Player Profiles: 40 Man Roster (Pitchers) - Adam Russell | The Process Report 2011
James Shields - SP
Synopsis:
Strengths:
Shields typically doesn’t strike out a large number of
batters, but he walks very few batters and he’s a
workhorse, pitching over 200 innings each of the
last four seasons. His best pitch is his change-up,
which has fantastic movement and creates a large
number of swings-and-misses. He’s durable and
consistently above-average – an effective
combination.
Weaknesses:
The dreaded homerun. Shields allowed a whopping
34 home runs last season, the most home runs ever
allowed in a single season by a (Devil) Ray pitcher
(trivia: who’s second worst? See below). This is
largely the fault of Shields’ fastball – it’s straight and
flat, and if Shields misses over the plate with it,
batters can crush it. As a result, Shields is prone to
allowing a large number of hits and home runs, but
the 2010 season was bad even for him.
James Shields is currently the most polarizing player
on the Rays. He was one of the Rays’ best pitchers
from 2007 through 2009, but his 2010 season was
an utter disaster. He allowed way too many home runs
in 2010, but his history and statistics suggest that he’s
bound to bounce back in 2011.
Shields throws 6 pitches: 91 MPH four- and two-seam
fastballs, an 83 MPH change-up, a 77 MPH curveball,
an 84 MPH slider, and his newest pitch, an 86 MPH
cutter. He relies on his fastballs more and more with
each ball he throws, and he uses his change-up as his
out-pitch against both lefties and righties.
- Locate that fastball – Better location with his fastballs
will help with point number two, which is…
- Keep the ball in the park – This is far and away
Shields’ Achilles heel. One fewer homerun every five
starts and his 2010 season would have been
completely different.
- Scrap the cutter – This is Shields’ newest pitch, but
also his most ineffective one. He should go back to
using either his fastball or slider – not this in-between
garbage.
Year
Team
IP
K/9
BB/9
HR/9
ERA
2008
TB
215.0
6.7
1.7
1.0
3.56
2009
TB
219.2
6.8
2.1
1.2
4.14
2010
TB
203.1
8.3
2.3
1.5
5.18
*All stats courtesy of Baseball-Reference.com **Trivia answer: Tanyon Sturtz allowed 33 home runs in his epically awful 2002 season (5.18 ERA,
18 losses).
76
Player Profiles: 40 Man Roster (Pitchers) - James Shields | The Process Report 2011
Andy Sonnanstine - RP
Synopsis:
Strengths:
Since Sonnanstine’s pitches aren’t dominating, he
succeeds by locating his pitches well, hitting corners
and limiting walks. His cutter is his main weapon,
using it over 50% of the time against both hands
and in all counts, but he does also use his curveball
frequently when he gets ahead in the count.
Sonnanstine has increased his groundball rate each
of the past three seasons, making him slightly
above-average in generating grounders.
Weaknesses:
Since moving to the bullpen in 2009, Sonnanstine
has lost some of his impressive command: he’s
striking out a similar number of batters, but his walk
rate has jumped by 3%. This increase may not
sound like much, but to a pitcher that strikes out as
few batters as Sonnanstine, it can be a concern.
Also, Sonnanstine typically allows a large number of
home runs; if he misses the corners and leaves a
pitch over the middle, odds are that ball is going to
put on some mileage.
Andy Sonnanstine is one of those players that is always
ignored. Drafted in the 13th round by the Devil Rays,
Sonnanstine rose through the minors easily, seeing
great success at each level and reaching the majors at
age 24, but he was never viewed as much of a
“prospect”. His pitches aren’t exciting – he primarily
throws an 86 MPH cutter, a 78 MPH slider, and a 74
MPH curveball – so scouts were unconvinced that he’d
be able to stick in the majors. He’s stuck, though, and
has been an overlooked part of the Rays’ rotation and
bullpen over the past few seasons. Shields throws 6
pitches: 91 MPH four- and two-seam fastballs, an 83
MPH change-up, a 77 MPH curveball, an 84 MPH
slider, and his newest pitch, an 86 MPH cutter. He
relies on his fastballs more and more with each ball he
throws, and he uses his change-up as his out-pitch
against both lefties and righties.
- Lower his walk rate – Lowering his walk rate from 7%
back down to 4% would be a huge help.
- Watch the home runs – Sonny is always going to
allow a high number of home runs, but less the better.
- More outfield wall art – One of the most entertaining sub-plots of the 2010 season was watching Sonny
deface pictures of his teammates on the outfield wall. David Price with a beard was one of the best.
Year
Team
IP
K/9
BB/9
HR/9
ERA
2008
TB
193.1
5.8
1.8
1.0
4.38
2009
TB
99.2
5.4
3.1
1.7
6.77
2010
TB
81.0
5.6
3.0
1.2
4.44
77
Player Profiles: 40 Man Roster (Pitchers) - Andy Sonnanstine | The Process Report 2011
Albert Suarez – RP
Synopsis:
Another offseason 40-man roster addition, Suarez
missed time due to Tommy John surgery. A product of
the Rays’ international signings, Suarez snuck up
prospect lists before his injury.
Strengths:
Suarez throws a mid-90s fastball with sink. Suarez
will be 21 on Opening Day, suggesting he’s got
more than enough time to fully recover and make
something of his once-promising career.
- Recovery – Tommy John surgery usually holds an 18month timetable before the arm’s full ability returns.
- Don’t rush – Suffering another injury is about the
worst possible outcome.
- Get back on track – Suarez could shoot up the
prospect rankings once healthy again.
Weaknesses:
Suarez’s breaking pitches still need polish and his
2010 performances were mundane, albeit
understandable given the circumstances.
Year
Team
IP
K/9
BB/9
HR/9
ERA
2009
TB (A-)
9.2
3.7
1.9
0.9
2.79
2010
TB (R)
9.0
8.0
1.0
0.0
1.00
2010
TB (A)
41.2
6.5
3.5
1.1
3.89
78
Player Profiles: 40 Man Roster (Pitchers) - Albert Suarez | The Process Report 2011
Alexander Torres – RP
Synopsis:
The pitching portion of the Scott Kazmir return could
arguably outpitch the man he was traded for at the big
league level as soon as 2011.
Strengths:
Just about everything Torres throws features a good
piece of movement, including his low-to-mid 90s
fastball. Projects as a starter at the big league level,
although could do damage out of the bullpen as
well.
- Trust his stuff – Torres has the offerings to get by
without being perfect.
- Prove the size doesn’t matter – Smaller pitchers are
always going to be considered bigger injury risks, but
Torres has managed to stay mostly healthy.
- Sharpen feel over pitches – A reduction in walk rate
could boost his status.
Weaknesses:
He’s shorter than his listed size, which will give
some pause as to whether he can handle a starter’s
workload. Needs to improve his control.
Year
Team
IP
K/9
BB/9
HR/9
ERA
2009
TB (AA)
8.2
7.3
5.2
1.0
3.12
2009
LAA (AA)
26.0
8.7
5.9
0.0
2.77
2010
TB (AA)
142.2
9.5
4.4
0.6
3.53
79
Player Profiles: 40 Man Roster (Pitchers) - Alexander Torres | The Process Report 2011
Nevin Ashley – C
Synopsis:
A portly backstop from Idaho State, Ashley is a
defensive maven and an offensive barren. Ashley’s
ability to draw walks is conceivably his only offensive
skill and even those are outweighed by high strikeout
rates relative to his power production. He projects as a
career backup or maybe a future coach in the big
leagues, but starter aspirations are far too optimistic.
Strengths:
Easily the best defensive catcher at the top of the
system, Ashley might be the best backstop defender
in the system. A strong accurate arm and the ability
to pop out of a squat quickly help him control the
running game well. He’s received positive marks for
leadership and game calling abilities as well.
- Stay ready – As John Jaso showed in 2010, injuries
can create unexpected opportunities.
Weaknesses:
- Continue to excel at working with the pitching staff –
Nothing can endear a catcher to an organization like
having the trust of its pitchers.
A college draftee, Ashley has consistently registered
as too old for his leagues and yet still fails to
produce with the bat. Ashley is short and thick, yet
hits weaker than his build would suggest. Outside of
a hot streak in the 2009 Arizona Fall League,
there’s little reason to believe that’ll change anytime
soon.
- Pick up pointers from the coaching staff – Poor
hitting, good defensive catchers have the tendency to
become big league coaches and managers.
Year
Team
PA
HR
SB
BA
OBP
SLG
2009
TB (AA)
139
1
0
.212
.331
.314
2010
TB (AA)
391
7
4
.255
.333
.375
2010
TB (AAA)
26
1
1
.167
.200
.292
80
Player Profiles: 40 Man Roster (Catchers) - Nevin Ashley | The Process Report 2011
Robinson Chirinos – C
Synopsis:
At 26-years-old, Robinson Chirinos is not your typical
prospect. Acquired in the Matt Garza trade, the Rays
seem to like Chirinos a lot, enough so that the
Rangers tried to trade for Chirinos in order to package
him to the Rays for Matt Garza. He’s taken time to
climb through the minors, but only because he
switched positions partway through his career; he’s
now a catcher, and used to be a middle-infielder. After
posting a 1.000 OPS between Double- and Triple-A
last season, he’s very close to the majors and could
break camp with the Rays as a utility player.
Strengths:
Peter Gammons compared Chirinos to Carlos Ruiz
and while that’s a high comparison, they both
profile similarly: good defensive catchers that throw
out ~30% of basestealers, have excellent plate
discipline, and provide a moderate amount of
power. Chirinos’s plate discipline is similar to
Jaso’s; he’s very patient and will likely walk as often
as he strikes out. He won’t be a huge homerun
threat, but he’ll hit a handful while also hitting lots
of doubles. Also, his defensive versatility will likely
be put to optimum use by Joe Maddon.
- Transition well to the majors – Chirinos only has 62
plate appearances at the Triple-A level, so it’s likely
that the Rays will let him spend some more time in the
minors before calling him up.
Weaknesses:
Chirinos has below-average speed, meaning his
defensive ability is likely limited to playing catcher,
first base, and third base. And his offensive upside is
good, but we should temper expectations: he’s not
going to be Mike Piazza at the plate. Expect
something more along the lines of .270/.370/.420.
- Stay patient – Seeing as his power is only moderate,
a large part of his offensive value comes from his plate
discipline.
- Defensive focus – The Rays have never had a catcher
that was above-average both defensively and
offensively. Chirinos could be a first.
Year
Team
PA
HR
SB
BA
OBP
SLG
2009
CHC (A+)
270
11
2
.300
.400
.546
2010
CHC (AA)
318
15
1
.314
.409
.576
2010
CHC (AAA)
62
3
0
.345
.419
.582
81
Player Profiles: 40 Man Roster (Catchers) - Robinson Chirinos | The Process Report 2011
John Jaso – C
Synopsis:
Jaso came into spring training 2010 as a distant third
on the Rays’ depth chart at catcher. However, after
Kelly Shoppach’s knee injury and Dioner Navarro’s
ineffectiveness, Jaso ended the season as the team’s
primary backstop and surprise lead-off hitter.
Strengths:
A large part of Jaso’s success in 2010 was his
fantastic plate discipline. His walk rate was among
the league leaders, and by the end of the year, he
had more walks (59) than strikeouts (39) in just over
400 plate appearances. He did most of his damage
against right-handed pitchers with an OPS of .772
against the major’s dominant hand. He was rarely
fooled at the plate and did well against breaking
ball pitches. As a baserunner, Jaso was one of the
best on the team taking the extra-base on balls in
the dirt and on singles and doubles.
- Continue to be patient – His best offensive weapon is
the ability to get on-base and then advance – both
keys to the Rays offense. Some more gap power would
be nice as well.
- Continue development behind the plate – Jaso
worked on his defense with Bobby Ramos last spring,
but as a third catcher probably did not get the reps or
attention he will get this year as the team’s starting
catcher.
Weaknesses:
If you noticed, none of his strengths included
defense. The knock on Jaso since forever has been
his lack of defensive abilities behind the plate. His
caught stealing percentage was decent, but he
allowed more than a handful of passed balls and
was out of position at times. He has not had much
success on fastballs which may be the reason his
power is way behind the rest of his offensive game.
- Be flexible – With Robinson Chirinos in the mix, and
spots available at other positions, do not be surprised
if the Rays at least try Jaso at first base or even a
corner outfield position as a spring experiment.
Year
Team
PA
HR
SB
BA
OBP
SLG
2009
TB (AAA)
387
5
1
.266
.362
.366
2010
TB (AAA)
12
0
0
.364
.333
.455
2010
TB
404
5
4
.263
.372
.378
82
Player Profiles: 40 Man Roster (Catchers) - John Jaso | The Process Report 2011
Jose Lobaton – C
Synopsis:
A waiver claim from the San Diego Padres in the
summer of 2009, Lobaton has lingered at the upper
levels of the organization for the past two years. He
was briefly called up to the Rays in 2010, but did not
make an appearance in a game.
Strengths:
His 40-man roster status. In 2010, the Rays used
Lobaton’s spot on the 40-man roster as an injury
exemption to add a player to the playoff roster
called up after the September 1st deadline. On the
field, he has shown the ability to walk with gap
power at the catcher position. He is generally
regarded as a good defender behind the plate.
- Get noticed – Lobaton is battling with Robinson
Chirinos and Nevin Ashley for the third and fourth
spots on the organizational depth chart at the position.
If he falls back to the fifth spot, there may not be a
need to keep him on the 40-man roster.
Weaknesses:
With a largely average game, Lobaton strikes out
more than he should. As a slow-footed catcher, he
hits a lot of groundballs which easily covert into
outs.
Year
Team
PA
HR
SB
BA
OBP
SLG
2009
TB (AA)
102
3
0
.262
.376
.452
2009
SD (AAA)
148
3
0
.241
.292
.353
2010
TB (AAA)
271
7
1
.261
.337
.394
83
Player Profiles: 40 Man Roster (Catchers) - Jose Lobaton | The Process Report 2011
Kelly Shoppach – C
Synopsis:
The goat of Game Five, Shoppach mostly lived up to
expectations by hitting lefties while struggling against
righties and defensively. Shoppach will enter the 2011
season as the Rays’ primary reserve catcher and best
pinch-hitting option against left-handed pitchers.
Strengths:
It cannot be repeated enough that Shoppach simply
haunts southpaws. He’s hit .288/.383/.542 against
them over the last three seasons, with 14 home runs
in 277 plate appearances. It’s not a quantitative
strength, but Shoppach’s willingness to take a lesser
role for the best of the team is also commendable.
His insistence on running after being plunked –
which is a common occurrence, he’s been hit the
tenth most since 2008 despite not being a regular -or walked also adds entertainment points.
- Keep hitting lefties – It’s Shoppach’s offensive
lifeblood and the biggest way for him to help the
team.
- Beg out of the lineup versus righties – Nothing good
arises from Shoppach facing righties.
Weaknesses:
- Continue running after walks – Just because.
It also cannot be repeated enough that Shoppach is
simply haunted by righties. He’s hit .207/.314/.396
versus them over the last three seasons. He’s not
very good defensively either with questionable
throwing ability and tagging mechanics. Both came
into play during that infamous Game Five.
Year
Team
PA
HR
SB
BA
OBP
SLG
2009
CLE
327
12
0
.214
.335
.399
2010
TB (AAA)
13
0
0
.308
.308
.308
2010
TB
187
5
0
.196
.308
.342
84
Player Profiles: 40 Man Roster (Catchers) - Kelly Shoppach | The Process Report 2011
Reid Brignac – SS
Synopsis:
A prospect in the Rays’ system since 2006, Brignac
gets his first chance to be an everyday starter in 2011.
As a semi-everyday player in 2010, he flashed
excellent defense with the potential to be an aboveaverage offensive player at shortstop. With more
playing time should come more consistency.
Strengths:
At one point Brignac’s defense was a question
mark. Now it is his greatest asset. Playing both sides
of the middle infield last year, he showed fantastic
range and a strong, accurate throwing arm. On
offense, his upper cut swing could lead to some
above-average power numbers at short stop. While
playing in a weird platoon split, Brignac did most of
his damage against right-handed pitchers with
groundball tendencies.
- Take control of the shortstop position – Sean
Rodriguez and Elliot Johnson will compete for playing
time, but Brignac is the guy who needs to take charge.
Weaknesses:
- Improve plate discipline – Likely the biggest key to his
season, if Brignac takes a step forward in his pitch
recognition and swing selection he will round-out his
offensive game quite a bit.
Brignac’s plate discipline is almost non-existent. At
this point in his offensive progression, he does not
walk much; he swings at pitches outside of the zone,
and strikeouts like a 40 home run hitter. The good
news is a lot of young hitters have had this problem
including the recently departed Carl Crawford. As a
left-handed hitter, he will have to show the ability to
handle pitchers of the same hand or he will
continue to be used in a platoon role.
Year
Team
PA
HR
SB
BA
OBP
SLG
2009
TB (AAA)
453
8
5
.282
.327
.417
2009
TB
93
1
2
.278
.301
.444
2010
TB
326
8
3
.256
.307
.385
85
Player Profiles: 40 Man Roster (Infielders) - Reid Brignac | The Process Report 2011
Dan Johnson – 1B
Synopsis:
Everyone’s favorite redhead, Dan Johnson (AKA “The
Great Pumpkin”) cemented himself in Tampa Bay lore
this past season, hitting another game-winning
homerun against the Boston Red Sox shortly after
being called up from the minors.** Johnson is a
journeyman first baseman that has never been able to
solidify a place in the majors, but still has many useful
skills and could flourish if given consistent playing
time. After playing in Japan for the 2009 season, he
signed a minor league deal with the Rays and hit 30
home runs in Triple-A before being called up in late
August. He will likely be given a chance to win the
Rays’ full-time first base job in 2011.
Strengths:
Johnson is a very patient hitter, rarely chasing
pitches outside the zone. He’s also flashed an
impressive amount of power in recent seasons – he
hit seven home runs in only 140 plate appearances
for the Rays last year – more power than he showed
earlier in his career. While such power may not hold
up over an entire season, his recent performances
in Japan and in Triple-A suggest his power may be
legit. He also appears to be an average defender at
first base.
Weaknesses:
While Johnson has normally been platooned in the
past, his career numbers suggest he can be
passable against lefties. Pitchers tend to work the
outside part of the plate against Johnson, as he’s a
pull hitter and hits most of his home runs off pitches
inside or over the middle of the plate. Also, Johnson
strikes out around 20-24% of the time, making it
tough for him to hit for a high average.
- Playing time – Johnson has talent, but has lacked the
opportunity to establish himself.
- Power – The large part of Johnson’s value is tied up
in his power production. If his power drops but nothing
else improves, he suddenly becomes a bench player.
- Don’t chase low – The large part of Johnson’s value
is tied up in his power production. If his power drops
but nothing else improves, he suddenly becomes a
bench player.
Year
Team
PA
HR
SB
BA
OBP
SLG
2008
OAK/TB
29
2
0
.192
.276
.423
2009
YOK (Japan)
382
24
0
.215
.330
.462
2010
TB
140
7
1
.198
.343
.414
*All stats courtesy of Baseball-Reference.com **Johnson’s first game-winning homerun against the Red Sox came on September 9, 2008,
when in his first at bat since being called up from the minors, he took Jonathan Papelbon deep to tie the game in the ninth inning. The Rays
went on to win the game, and held onto their tenuous lead in the AL East.
86
Player Profiles: 40 Man Roster (Infielders) - Dan Johnson | The Process Report 2011
Elliot Johnson - IF
Synopsis:
An offseason addition to the 40-man roster prevented
Johnson from testing minor league free agency and
saw him garner a nice raise. This marks the second
time Johnson will be on the Rays’ 40-man roster in his
career.
Strengths:
- Be everything – Follow in Ty Wigginton and Sean
Rodriguez’s footsteps, even if it means volunteering as
the emergency catcher.
Johnson is a versatile defender with experience
throughout the infield and outfield that figures to fill
the super utility player role. Showed good pop for
his size and speed too.
- King of little things – Pinch-running, situational
bunting, and defensive ability could boost Johnson's
stock.
Weaknesses:
Older and blocked by more talented players. Strikes
out quite a bit for someone of his skill set.
- Hope to impress other teams – Johnson may not start
the year with the Rays, but could finish elsewhere, as
he is out of options.
Year
Team
PA
HR
SB
BA
OBP
SLG
2008
TB (AAA)
427
9
15
.261
.322
.424
2009
TB (AAA)
260
11
7
.262
.319
.451
2010
TB (AAA)
481
11
30
.319
.375
.475
87
Player Profiles: 40 Man Roster (Infielders) - Elliot Johnson | The Process Report 2011
Evan Longoria – 3B
Synopsis:
Really, what is there to say about Evan Longoria? After
just three seasons in the majors, Longoria has
cemented himself as one of the best all-around players
in the game. He hits for power, has patience at the
plate, can steal some bases, and is debatably the best
defensive third baseman in all of baseball. He’s only
25-years-old, he’s signed to an incredibly teamfriendly contract that could keep him with the Rays
through 2016, and he’s already become the face of
the Rays. In short, he’s a superstar and he’ll be on the
Rays for many, many more years.
Strengths:
Longoria does nearly everything well. His walk and
strikeout rates have improved each year he’s been
in the majors, and he’s making contact with more
pitches. While he makes a handful of errors each
year, his range at third base is spectacular and he is
arguably the best third baseman around at starting
double-plays. He’s a balanced hitter, spraying balls
to all fields, but most of his power comes when he
pulls the ball.
Weaknesses:
Pitchers try and work Longoria outside (especially
low and outside), since Longoria crushes inside
pitches, dropping the head of the bat on the ball
and ripping shots to leftfield. Also, Longoria has had
his total power decrease slightly each of the last
three years, and his homerun total last season (22)
was his lowest yet. However, he did also hit a career
best 46 doubles and 5 triples, so he’s still bringing
plenty of offensive firepower.
- Stay the course – Longoria does nearly everything
right – how can you improve on that?
- Drive the ball to right field more – One theory is that
Longoria’s homerun total decreased due to pitchers
working him outside more often. If Longoria can make
pitchers pay by driving doubles to right field, they may
be forced to start attacking him inside more often.
Year
Team
PA
HR
SB
BA
OBP
SLG
2008
TB
508
27
7
.272
.343
.531
2009
TB
671
33
9
.281
.364
.526
2010
TB
661
22
15
.294
.372
.507
88
Player Profiles: 40 Man Roster (Infielders) - Evan Longoria | The Process Report 2011
Sean Rodriguez – IF
Synopsis:
The most productive player in the Scott Kazmir trade
(including Scott Kazmir) thus far, Rodriguez assumed a
super-sub role with the Rays and became an everyday
player by season’s end.
Strengths:
Though he looks like a prototypical slap-hitting
middle infielder, Rodriguez biggest offensive asset is
power. After mashing at the minor league levels in
the past, Rodriguez belted 30 extra-base hits in less
than 400 plate appearances. In addition to the
power, he showed improved plate discipline at the
end of the season. In the field, he has proved to be
an above-average second baseman with the ability
to play the entire infield (minus catcher) and all
three outfield positions.
- Wait for it – Rodriguez is pretty much a mirror image
of Reid Brignac in terms of abilities on the field. Like
Brignac, he seems to have defense down, but needs to
improve his plate presence.
- Get it right – Also like Brignac, Rodriguez has
struggled with platoon splits. The right-handed batter
has handled left-handed pitching just fine, but is not
very good versus righties.
Weaknesses:
Rodriguez’s walk rate improved, but his strikeout
rate is still extremely high. He handled fastballs and
change-ups well, but struggled against breaking
balls of all kinds. Like a lot of young hitters, better
pitch recognition could go a long way. Righthanded pitchers have carved him up in a small
sample size.
Year
Team
PA
HR
SB
BA
OBP
SLG
2009
TB (AAA)
24
1
0
.200
.333
.450
2009
LAA
29
2
0
.200
.276
.440
2010
TB
378
9
13
.251
.308
.397
89
Player Profiles: 40 Man Roster (Infielders) - Sean Rodriguez | The Process Report 2011
Johnny Damon – OF
Synopsis:
To anyone that’s followed the AL East over the last 9
years, Johnny Damon needs no introduction. Sporting
a fauxhawk now instead of his caveman beard,
Damon signed a $5.25M, one year contract with the
Rays this offseason, and he will likely serve as the fulltime left fielder while batting toward the top of the
batting order. As a contact hitter, Damon brings some
much needed offensive balance to the low-average,
strikeout heavy Rays. He will not be able to replace
Carl Crawford’s production in left field, but he’s a
valuable player and a good clubhouse presence, and
he allows top prospect Desmond Jennings to get more
seasoning time in Triple-A.
Strengths:
Although 37-years-old and in the decline phase of
his career, Johnny Damon has still got enough left
in the tank to be a successful, productive player. His
range in a corner outfield spot is still above
average, and he’s a contact hitter that will bring a
good batting average and provide above-average
plate discipline (11% walk rate). He’s slowed down
in recent years, meaning his stolen base totals have
declined, but he’s still hitting around 35 doubles
and a handful of triples each year.
Weaknesses:
Damon’s arm is well below-average, making his
total defensive package close to average in left
field. Also, despite his time in New York, Damon is
not a powerful hitter: all his power comes from
pulling the ball, so pitchers typically work him
outside. Damon’s power got swallowed by
Comerica Park last season, and the Trop also
suppresses left-handed power (although not as
much as Comerica), so don’t expect Damon’s
homerun totals to jump back up near 20.
- Age gracefully – Damon’s skills are declining –
there’s no doubt about that. Will he continue to age
slowly and gracefully, or will his skills experience a
sharp drop-off? Only time will tell.
- Get on base – Damon will hit at the top of the lineup, so he’ll need to reach base at a high rate to be
valuable. His on base percentage has declined in
recent years, but it’s still above-average at the
moment.
- Be flexible – Maddon loves to shuffle line-ups and play match-ups, and Damon has been an everyday player
for his entire career. He may need to get used to the idea of sitting against certain pitchers.
Year
Team
PA
HR
SB
BA
OBP
SLG
2008
NYY
623
17
29
.303
.375
.461
2009
NYY
626
24
12
.282
.365
.489
2010
DET
613
8
11
.271
.355
.401
90
Player Profiles: 40 Man Roster (Outfielders) - Johnny Damon | The Process Report 2011
Sam Fuld – OF
Synopsis:
Sam Fuld is quite possibly the most interesting fourth
outfielder in the game. He’s a rarity in baseball:
Jewish and a diabetic. Instead of carrying around a
blanket as a child, he carried around a book of
baseball statistics. He majored in economics at
Stanford and interned at Stats, Inc. He plays with
reckless abandon – running at full speed, diving after
balls, and smashing into walls. He’s a fun player, and
since he’s 29-years-old and is out of options, he will
likely be on the Rays’ 25-man roster come Opening
Day.
Strengths:
Fuld has three main strengths: his defense, speed,
and patience. Scouting reports rave about Fuld’s
range, and he can play above-average defense at
all three outfield positions. He’s also moderately fast
and has good baserunning instincts, stealing bases
at a high rate of success. He’s a small fellow and
won’t hit for much power, but he’s a contact hitter
that doesn’t strike out often, hits for a good
average, and walks at a high rate.
Weaknesses:
- Stay healthy – With his propensity to run into walls,
Fuld can be a danger to himself at times.
As a contact hitter, Fuld has little power and is not a
threat to hit many home runs. That said, he’s a solid
overall player otherwise and should flourish with the
Rays. Some coaches on the Cubs tried pushing Fuld
to be more aggressive at the plate, but the Rays
encourage patience and plate discipline. He should
fit in fine.
- Flash the leather – If Fuld proves to be as good at
defense as his scouting reports suggest, he’ll likely
have no problem winning playing time as the Rays’
fourth outfielder.
- Get playing time – The Rays have a crowded outfield
going into Spring Training, with at least six people for
only three spots. How much playing time will Fuld be
able to get as a fourth outfielder?
Year
Team
PA
HR
SB
BA
OBP
SLG
2009
CHC (AAA)
370
2
23
.284
.358
.415
2009
CHC
115
1
2
.299
.409
.412
2010
CHC (AAA)
440
4
21
.272
.383
.394
91
Player Profiles: 40 Man Roster (Outfielders) - Sam Fuld | The Process Report 2011
Brandon Guyer – OF
Synopsis:
Acquired in the Matt Garza trade, Brandon Guyer is
25-year-old outfielder whose strongest tool is his bat.
He played in Double-A last season and put up
successful numbers there, hitting .344/.398/.588,
while playing in all the outfield positions. While
scouting reports suggest his range best suites a corner
outfield slot, he’s athletic enough to adequately pass
in centerfield as a back-up. He’s also very speedy,
stealing 30 bases last season while only getting caught
3 times. He’ll likely start the season in Triple-A, and
could see time with the Rays in September as a fourth
outfielder.
Strengths:
Guyer is a strong hitter and has put up impressive
totals at every stop in the minors. His power has
developed over the last three years, and he’s posted
above a .450 slugging percentage in Single-A,
Advanced-A, and Double-A. Also, for a player with
that much power, he strikes out at a relatively low
rate (around 15%) and steals bases at a high
success rate (around 85%).
Weaknesses:
There are a few question marks surrounding Guyer
at the moment. He broke out offensively in 2010,
and it remains to be seen if he can replicate this
success at a higher level. Also, while his defense
appears best suited in a corner outfield slot,
offensively he looks more like a centerfielder. His
plate discipline skills could be improved (6.7% walk
rate in 2010), and he needs to prove his power in
Double-A was for real. Right now, he projects as a
back-up outfielder, able to play all three positions
and hit at an average clip.
- Prove the power is real – If Guyer can put up a
slugging percentage above .450 in Triple-A, he could
become more than a fourth outfielder.
- Walk more – While his 7% walk rate is passable, the
Rays love players with patience and Guyer would have
more value if he took more walks.
- Centerfield defense – Guyer has the speed and raw
athleticism, so even being average defensively in
centerfield greatly increases his value.
Year
Team
PA
HR
SB
BA
OBP
SLG
2009
CHC (A+)
305
2
23
.347
.407
.453
2009
CHC (AA)
205
1
7
.190
.236
.291
2010
CHC (AA)
410
13
30
.344
.398
.588
92
Player Profiles: 40 Man Roster (Outfielders) - Brandon Guyer | The Process Report 2011
Desmond Jennings – OF
Synopsis:
The top prospect in the system, Jennings figures to
become the starting left fielder at some point this
season and hold onto the job for at least a few years.
- Health – More than anyone else, Jennings needs to
prove he can stay mostly healthy year in and year out.
Strengths:
Defensive wunderkind who plays the outfield with a
kamikaze streak, as evident by his multiple diving
attempts in September preview. Has an approach at
the plate and has speed to burn on the base paths.
- Bide his time – Jennings should be an injury to
Ramirez, Damon, Upton, or Joyce away from seeing
serious time in the big league outfield.
- Stay flexible – There’s a chance Jennings could be
needed at any of three outfield positions.
Weaknesses:
Unlikely to ever develop serious power. Has
struggled staying healthy in the past. Has an
average arm in center.
Year
Team
PA
HR
SB
BA
OBP
SLG
2009
TB (AAA)
137
3
15
.325
.419
.491
2010
TB (AAA)
458
3
57
.278
.362
.393
2010
TB
24
0
2
.190
.292
.333
93
Player Profile: 40 Man Roster (Outfielders) - Desmond Jennings | The Process Report 2011
Matt Joyce – OF
Synopsis:
One of the more exciting offensive players in the
system, Joyce finally got his shot at becoming a
regular in St. Petersburg in June and made the most of
it. The best of Joyce was on display as he showed off
his plus-power stroke and ability to get on base
throughout.
Strengths:
Joyce showed an excellent approach at the plate,
exercising a plus-eye at identifying pitches. The ball
makes a different sound off his bat and a career
ISO of .243 through 575 plate appearances nearly
matches Carlos Pena’s career ISO.
A solid
defender in the corners as well. Feasts upon righthanded pitching.
- Improve versus southpaws – Joyce showed flashed
against lefties in Triple-A, but the larger track record
suggests he still needs to improve his plate approach.
- Stay the course – If Joyce’s 2010 season can
become the norm, then he’s on his way to being one
of the most underrated hitters in the game.
Weaknesses:
Needs work against left-handed pitching. Isn’t the
best of base runners either, although the rest of the
package makes up for it. Could stand to strike out
less too.
- Stay healthy – Joyce’s elbow interfered with his
season last year.
Year
Team
PA
HR
SB
BA
OBP
SLG
2009
TB (AAA)
493
16
14
.273
.373
.482
2010
TB (AAA)
115
3
1
.293
.435
.478
2010
TB
261
10
2
.241
.360
.477
94
Player Profiles: 40 Man Roster (Outfielders) - Matt Joyce | The Process Report 2011
B.J. Upton – CF
Synopsis:
There are few players that have inspired as much
vitriol and hatred as B.J. Upton. After a breakout
season in 2007 where he hit 24 home runs and batted
.300 at 22-years-old, fans understandably set their
expectations high for Upton – unobtainably high.
Things didn’t go well for Upton from there: his power
disappeared in 2008 due to a shoulder injury, and
he’s struggled with his mechanics ever since. Upton
doesn’t showcase much emotion on the field, leading
to many people criticizing him as “lazy”, but he’s put
in extra work each of the past few offseasons to
improve his mechanics.
Strengths:
Upton’s biggest strength is his defense: he’s one of
the best centerfielders in the game, playing very
shallow yet still reaching a high percentage of fly
balls. His arm is very strong, and batters rarely
attempt to take an extra base on him. On offense,
Upton is a patient hitter that takes a lot of walks and
rarely chases pitches outside of the zone. He hits for
a moderate amount of power (60 extra base hits in
2010), steals around 40 bases a year at a high
success rate, and has become a strong baserunner
Weaknesses:
Upton has a tough time making consistent contact,
and he strikes out around 30% of the time. This
makes it tough for him to have a high batting
average, ending up around a .240 batting average
the past two years. Most of Upton’s homerun power
comes to left field, while he laces many doubles to
right field. Due to his current mechanics, he has a
tough time getting around on hard fastballs, so
pitchers either work him outside or attack him high
with hard heat.
- Reduce strikeouts – This is by far Upton’s biggest
problem, and changing it would boost his average
and offensive contributions. However, it’s also one of
the tougher things to change. His mechanics and
swing seem to make him prone to contact problems.
- Continue going to the opposite field – Upton started
hitting to right field again in 2010, and it helped
increase his power production. It also forces pitchers
to challenge him inside on occasion.
Year
Team
PA
HR
SB
BA
OBP
SLG
2008
TB
640
9
44
.273
.384
.401
2009
TB
626
11
42
.241
.313
.373
2010
TB
610
18
42
.237
.322
.424
95
Player Profiles: 40 Man Roster (Outfielders) - B.J. Upton | The Process Report 2011
Ben Zobrist – IF/OF
Synopsis:
Not surprisingly, Zobrist took a step back from his
career year of 2009, which included a top-10 MVP
finish. Though he remains without an everyday home,
he remains an everyday player for the team. Zobrist
will probably never repeat his magical 2009, but is a
better offensive player than he was in 2010.
Strengths:
Defensively, Zobrist is still an above-average
defender at four or five positions. His power
numbers took a hit in 2010, but his ability to take a
walk remains among the best in the league. Once
he gets on base, Zobrist is one of the better base
stealers on the team. Even with the down offensive
year, he is still among the team’s top hitters against
the fastball.
- Control the zone – While his walk rate remained
near the top of the league, he went fishing more than
usual. Better pitch recognition means better pitch
selection, which should lead to more hits of all kinds.
Weaknesses:
While Zobrist’s walk rate remained stellar, he did
chase more pitches out of the zone last year.
Though it is not a traditional weakness, it seems
there was a bit of bad luck in Zobrist’s batted ball
data that suggests he could regress in a positive way
in 2011. After crushing left-handed pitching in
2009, he was below average against south-paws in
2010, but the same can be said against righthanders as well.
- Continue to bring the glove – Even with the
departures of several key players, Zobrist is still
penciled in as a starter in the corner outfield, second
base, and possibly first base as well.
- Eat Lucky Charms – As mentioned, Zobrist faced
some regression from 2009 to 2010, but perhaps was
served a bit too much bad luck in 2010.
Year
Team
PA
HR
SB
BA
OBP
SLG
2008
TB
227
12
3
.253
.339
.505
2009
TB
599
27
17
.297
.405
.543
2010
TB
655
10
24
.238
.346
.353
96
Player Profiles: 40 Man Roster (Outfielders) - Ben Zobrist | The Process Report 2011
Manny Ramirez – DH
Synopsis:
Arguably the greatest right-handed hitter of his
generation, Ramirez is looking to "bounce back" as a
member of the Rays in 2011. Some casual observers
have mentioned his 2010 as poor or disappointing;
however, in terms of overall production, he was one of
the better hitters in baseball. The Rays will take that
kind of “down production” in place of the truly poor
numbers we have seen from the recent designated
hitter position in Tampa Bay
Strengths:
Hitting. He may not the same MVP-type hitter he
was 10 years ago, but he is still plenty productive.
He can make contact, spray the ball around the
park, get on-base via walk, work the count, and still
has some power in the tank. Ramirez is AL-Eastproven and his skill set might not erode as quickly
as some aging sluggers because he does not fit the
true three-outcome, power-hitter profile.
- Be Manny – You can hate it. You can love it. But you
cannot ignore it. Much like Rafael Soriano last year,
Ramirez marches to the beat of a different drum. And
like Soriano last year, the Rays and Joe Maddon are
better served to leave it that way.
Weaknesses:
Everything else. When he is not hitting or providing
fantastic quotes, he brings little to the table. He is a
huge liability in the field and is not fleet of foot on
the bases. His power has faded in recent years, but
he has been dealing with some nagging injuries and
there is whole PED issue. That said, he is healthy
now by all accounts and has been training hard all
offseason.
- Stay healthy – Easier said than done. The offseason
training program in Arizona should help. A healthy
Manny means a productive Manny at the plate, even
as he approaches age 40.
- Stay off the field – Manny is free to trot around the
infield dirt on home runs, but green does not mean go
for him. Signed to be the DH, that is where 99.9% of
his at-bats should come, although I think we should be
treated to one home game in the outfield.
Year
Team
PA
HR
SB
BA
OBP
SLG
2008
LAD
229
17
2
.396
.489
.743
2009
LAD
431
19
0
.290
.418
.531
2010
LAD/CHW
320
9
1
.298
.409
.460
97
Player Profiles: 40 Man Roster (DH) - Manny Ramirez | The Process Report 2011
Juan Cruz – RP
Synopsis:
Strengths:
When at his best, Cruz is the definition of a power
arm. In 2007 and 2008, he struck out over 12
batters per nine innings while making batters whiff
on around 12-15% of his pitches; for comparison,
Joaquin Benoit stuck out 11 batters per nine this
past season while generating whiffs on 14% of his
pitches.
Weaknesses:
Control. Over the past four seasons, Cruz has
averaged approximately 5 walks every nine innings
pitched. While this isn’t a large problem if Cruz is
striking out 12 batters per 9 innings, in 2009 Cruz
moved to the American League and saw his
strikeout rate plummet to only 7 batters per 9.
Unless Cruz’s strikeouts bounce back or he
improves his command, he may not be a very
effective reliever.
Every year the Rays sign one or two players with upside
to minor league deals, on the off-chance that they’ll
rebound and be contributing members at the major
league level. While these players don’t always pan
out, every now and then the Rays catch lightning in a
bottle: Carlos Pena in 2007, Grant Balfour and Dan
Johnson in 2008, and Joaquin Benoit in 2010 are
three prime examples. Juan Cruz has the potential to
be that player for the Rays in 2011.
Cruz is a 32-year-old middle reliever that’s bounced
around between organizations, succeeding in some
and flopping in others. He works a 94 MPH fastball,
an 81 MPH slider, and an 82 MPH change-up, but
he’s recovering from shoulder surgery that limited his
2010 season to five innings pitched. His timetable is
unknown, but he has the raw stuff to be a contributing
member of the Rays’ bullpen if healthy.
- Health – The severity of Cruz’s shoulder injury is
unclear, and Cruz is at his best when he’s chucking his
fastballs at 94 MPH. How quickly will he be able to
recover?
- Control – Relief pitchers normally see their control improve slightly with the Rays, and Cruz could use to
lower his walk rate.
- Defensive focus – Cruz looks like he has the potential to be the next Grant Balfour, but it’s impossible to say
if he’ll be able to harness that potential this season.
Year
Team
IP
K/9
BB/9
HR/9
ERA
2008
ARI
51.2
12.4
5.4
0.9
2.61
2009
KC
50.1
6.8
5.2
1.1
5.72
2010
KC
5.1
11.8
6.8
0.0
3.38
98
Player Profiles: Non-Roster Invitees (Pitchers) - Juan Cruz | The Process Report 2011
Cory Wade – RP
Synopsis:
Strengths:
Wade has taken part in two major league seasons
(2008 and 2009), throwing 99 innings in 82
appearances. In his brief career, he has shown an
above-average curveball and a pretty good changeup. In the small sample selection, his curveball and
change-up have above-average swinging strike
percentages. He locates his curveball well, burying it
low in the zone against batters on both sides of the
plate. The useful secondary offerings have made the
right-handed Wade effective against left-handed
batters.
Weaknesses:
While his secondary offerings are effective, Wade’s
fastball is rather pedestrian. He tops out in the 90
MPH range and rarely fools the opposition with the
heater. He is somewhat of a flyball pitcher who has
a home run rate around the league average. That
said, pitching at the Trop could help ease some
concerns.
Wade signed a minor league deal with the Tampa Bay
Rays after being non-tendered by the Los Angeles
Dodgers. He underwent shoulder surgery in March,
but returned to pitch in the minor leagues by the end
of the season.
- Stay healthy – As mentioned, he is coming off arm
surgery, so health is the first key.
- Improve against batters of the same hand – At this
point he is a reverse-platoon-split reliever.
- Keep the off-speed and breaking balls coming –
With an unimpressive fastball, stick with the stuff that
gets whiffs.
Year
Team
IP
K/9
BB/9
HR/9
ERA
2009
LAD
27.2
5.9
3.3
1.0
5.53
2010
LAD (R)
2.0
9.0
0.0
0.0
9.00
2010
LAD (AAA)
29.1
6.1
0.9
1.2
4.91
99
Player Profiles: Non-Roster Invitees (Pitchers) - Cory Wade | The Process Report 2011
Felipe Lopez – IF
Synopsis:
Felipe Lopez is the definition of a journeyman player.
Out of the last five seasons, only once has he finished
the year on the same team he started on. He’s played
with 6 different teams over that time, with wildly
varying results along the way. He’s had some great
seasons – like 2005, when he posted 23 HRs, 85 RBIs,
15 SBs, and nearly hit .300 – but he’s also had some
real clunkers, like last season when he hit .233 and
played below average defense. The Rays signed Lopez
to a minor league deal, and he’ll compete with Elliot
Johnson for the back-up infielder / utility player role.
He’s a low risk signing, and will provide minor league
depth at the very least.
Strengths:
Lopez is essentially Willy Aybar with more offensive
upside and a bit more defensive flexibility: he’s a
switch-hitting infielder with versatility, subpar
defense, and balanced platoon splits. Lopez has
enough defensive skills to be slightly below average
at every infield position. Also, he walks around 10%
of the time, has moderate power, and is only one
season removed from hitting .310 with 50 extra
base hits.
Weaknesses:
The Rays value defense, and Lopez isn’t particularly
strong anywhere on the field. His best position is
second base, where he rates around average, but
he’s well below average at shortstop. Also, Lopez’s
value is closely tied to his batting average; his
average has fluctuated over the last five years,
bouncing up and down between .240 and .300. As
a player with limited power and defensive ability, if
he can’t get on base at a high rate, his value is very
limited.
- AL Adjustment – Lopez has spent almost his entire in
the National League, and some players have trouble
adjusting upon moving to the AL (e.g. Pat Burrell).
- Bring the average up – If Lopez had raised his
batting average 30 points last season, he’d have
raised his value significantly. He’ll walk at a fine clip
no matter what, but he needs to hit around .270 or
higher to have real value
- Accept a bench role – He’s been a full-time player for most of his career, but even if he makes the Rays, he
won’t get many plate appearances.
Year
Team
PA
HR
SB
BA
OBP
SLG
2008
WAS/STL
532
6
8
.283
.343
.387
2009
ARI/MIL
680
9
6
.310
.383
.427
2010
STL/BOS
441
8
8
.233
.311
.345
100
Player Profiles: Non-Roster Invitees (Infielders) - Felipe Lopez | The Process Report 2011
Leslie Anderson – OF
Synopsis:
One of the few signings made by the Rays on the
international market, Anderson started at the season in
Rookie Ball, but quickly advanced to Triple-A by the
end of the year. At age 29, the infielder/outfielder has
a chance to make the team out of spring training
Strengths:
On offense, he projects to be at least an average
hitter with decent power. In his brief professional
career, Anderson has shown the ability to put the
bat on the ball and hit for a good average. He is
not a 30 home run hitter, but has enough power to
get over 15 with the ability to find extra-base hits in
the gaps. On defense, he is a flexible defender with
a reputation of being a plus-defender in the corner
outfield positions and first base.
- Show us what you got – In a bit of bad news for the
29-year-old, the Rays have already re-moved him
from the 40-man roster and exposed him to waivers.
The good news is he cleared waivers and the team
invited him back. With lack of organization depth at
first base, there is still time to prove he can fill a role.
Weaknesses:
We still do not know exactly what to expect from
Anderson since he is still new to the States. That
said, his reported above-average plate discipline
has only been seen in glimpses. Meanwhile, he did
not strikeout too much and added more walks at the
Double-A level. As noted, his power is rather
average despite playing positions regarded as
power-producing spots. Left-handed pitchers ate the
left-handed batter’s lunch in a small sample size at
the minor league level.
- Improve versus left-handed pitching – At this point,
he is a platoon player who opponents can exploit with
left-handed pitchers.
Year
Team
PA
HR
SB
BA
OBP
SLG
2010
TB (A+)
89
3
0
.262
.303
.405
2010
TB (AA)
203
6
3
.304
.379
.475
2010
TB (AAA)
129
2
0
.328
.359
.418
101
Player Profiles: Non-Roster Invitees (Outfielders) - Leslie Anderson | The Process Report 2011
Justin Ruggiano – OF
Synopsis:
Nicknamed “Scrooge” by his Durham teammates,
Ruggiano’s time with the Rays has involved plenty of
bus rides and his removal from the 40-man roster
means more are on the way.
- Impress other teams – Ruggiano’s chance at
sustained big league employment is likely to come
from another team.
Strengths:
He hits lefties and shows a competence in the
corner outfield.
- Keep his head up – He's probably better than some
fourth outfielders around baseball.
Weaknesses:
- Stay healthy – Hey, it goes for everyone.
Strikes out quite a bit. His offensive performances
have stalled over the years spent in Triple-A.
Probably a fourth outfielder at best.
Year
Team
PA
HR
SB
BA
OBP
SLG
2008
TB
81
2
2
.197
.247
.329
2009
TB (AAA)
532
15
23
.253
.330
.412
2010
TB (AAA)
507
15
24
.287
.357
.453
102
Player Profiles: Non-Roster Invitees (Outfielders) - Justin Ruggiano | The Process Report 2011
103
Rays 40-Man Roster Matrix | The Process Report 2011

final - The Process Report

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