Was Gordon Allport a Trait Theorist? - Psychology

PERSONALITY PROCESSES AND INDIVIDUAL
DIFFERENCES
Was Gordon Allport a Trait Theorist?
David C. Zuroff
McGill University, Montreal, Quebec, Canada
Contemporary discussions have generally defined a trait as a pervasive, cross-situational consistency
in behavior. A careful examination of Allport's (1937, 1961, 1966) writings reveals that he did not
believe in such pervasive consistencies. In fact, he maintained that behavior in different situations is
frequently inconsistent, even contradictory, because different traits are aroused to different degrees
in different situations. Allport was, therefore, an interactionist in the sense that he recognized that
behavior is determined by the person and the situation. However, he failed to develop an interactionist
process theory that could predict and explain the situational variability that he observed and described. Allport's concept of a trait as well as those of several contemporary theorists are compared
and found to differ in terms of (a) the ontological status they ascribe to traits and (b) the type of
consistency over situation they require. Distinctions among types of trait concepts are then used to
clarify the debate about the existence of traits. It is argued that the evidence for traits as pervasive,
cross-situational consistencies is quite negative but that there is considerable evidence for the existence of traits as average levels of responses and as consistent patterns within delimited ranges of
situations. Mischel's (1984) concept of a context-bound consistency is shown to be surprisingly similar to Allport's concept of a trait. The future of trait constructs is discussed in relation to the descriptive, predictive, and explanatory functions of traits.
Disenchantment with the trait concept is widespread among
personality psychologists and is often attributed to Mischel's
(1968) influential critique. Critics of trait psychology have portrayed Gordon Allport as both the originator and the principal
exponent of the doctrine of traits (Bern & Allen, 1974; Mischel
& Peake, 1982). This article seeks to rehabilitate Allport by
demonstrating that he was not a trait theorist, at least in the
sense that most psychologists now understand the term. This
reexamination of Allport's conceptualization of traits leads to
a discussion of some issues in trait psychology that are relevant
to contemporary work in personality. In particular, I attempt
(a) to delineate the types of definitions of the trait concept that
psychologists have used; (b) to compare Allport's definition
with those of Mischel (1968), Epstein (1979), Moskowitz
(1982), and Buss and Craik (1983); (c) to consider the implications of definitional differences for the ongoing debate about
the existence of traits; and (d) to consider the future of trait
constructs in personality psychology.
In order to rehabilitate Allport, we must first determine precisely what he has been accused of espousing. In their various
writings, both Mischel and Bern have suggested that a belief in
pervasive, cross-situational consistency is the defining feature
of trait psychology. I will argue that although pervasive consistency defined a trait for Mischel and Bern, it was not implied
by Allport's original use of the term. What, then, have Allport's
critics meant by pervasive consistency? Mischel and Peake
(1982) argued that the appropriate empirical index of consistency is the correlation between subjects' behaviors in pairs of
distinct situations. It follows that they believed that trait theories predict consistency in the rank ordering of subjects across
pairs of situations. The crucial point, however, is that Mischel
and Peake (1982) examined the average of all pair-wise correlations. This criterion of traitlikeness implies that a true trait
is manifested throughout an individual's life-space; consistent
behavior in some situations does not meet this criterion and
cannot qualify as a trait.1 Stated differently, Mischel and Peake
(1982) apparently thought that for trait theories, pervasive
means consistency across all or practically all situations. Is this
an accurate representation of trait psychology? Did Allport in
fact believe that traits are manifested by a relatively constant
rank ordering of individuals across practically all situations?
Answering this question is complicated by Allport's (1937)
distinction between nomothetically defined common traits and
1
In a recent article, Mischel (1983) seems to have altered his position
and accepted the reliability of measures aggregated over situations as a
legitimate measure of traitlikeness. The present article's argument is
directed toward Mischel's earlier and highly influential statements. It is
also true that at one point Mischel (1968, p. 295) acknowledged that
"Allport (1966) recognized the enormous evidence that the behavior of
the same person is variable and may change in accord with situations."
In general, however, Mischel portrayed trait theory as oblivious to situational influences on behavior.
I would like to express my gratitude to Jonathan Cheek, Debbie
Franko, Debbie Moskowitz, Ted Powers, Jules Rotter, Conrad Schwarz,
and several anonymous reviewers for their thoughtful comments on earlier drafts of this article.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to David
C. Zuroff, Department of Psychology, McGill University, 1205 Docteur
Penfield Avenue, Montreal, Quebec, Canada, H3A 1B1.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, !986, Vol. 51. No. 5,993-1000
Copyright 1986 by the Aimrican Psychological Association, lnc.0022-3514/86/$00.75
993
994
DAVID C. ZUROFF
idiographically defined individual traits. Allport prescribed
Thus, if a given child steals pennies, but does not lie, it might be
different procedures for establishing the existence of common
that the child has two individual traits, one determining one be-
traits, which apply (approximately) to many individuals, and
havior and one the other, rather than a single inconsistent disposi-
individual traits, which exist only in one individual. The stabil-
tion toward honesty (Allport, 1937, p. 251). Both of the first two
ity of the rank ordering of individuals is pertinent to common
types of explanation minimize the importance of apparent vari-
traits, but not to individual traits. For individual traits, the cru-
ability in behavior. Allport's third type of explanation, however,
cial question is the degree to which the individual's behavior is
recognized genuine situational differences in people's behavior.
self-consistent from time to time and situation to situation. Let
He believed that such differences exist because different situa-
us set aside the incompatibility between Allport's critics' focus
tions can arouse different traits in a person or, more commonly,
on a nomothetic criterion of consistency (constant rank order-
different mixtures of traits. In fact, Allport emphasized that di-
ing) and Allport's focus on idiographic criteria (self-consis-
rectly opposite traits could be activated in different situations:
tency). The question then becomes, Does trait psychology predict consistency across practically all situations, for either common or individual traits?
No doubt, one can find numerous passages in both Allport's
1937 text and his 1961 revision in which he appears to endorse
that belief. He wrote, for example:
The statistical proof for the existence of a trait lies in various measures of reliability.. . .It is likewise essential that if a person shows
himself to be ascendant in one situation, he also shows himself
(usually) to be ascendant in other situations. (AUport, 1961, p. 341)
Nevertheless, a careful reading of Allport reveals that he was
fully conscious, even in 1937, of the variability as well as the
consistency of behavior. Allport added a chapter in the 1961
text entitled "Character, Situation, Role," but it did not alter
Every person has conflicts, frequently expressed in antagonistic dispositions. The ever-changing environment raises now one trait and
now another to a state of active tension. (Allport, 1937, p. 330)
. . . traits are often aroused in one type of situation and not in
another; not all stimuli are equivalent in effectiveness. (Allport,
1937, pp. 331-332)
Sometimes a person may harbor personal dispositions that are exactly opposite. Conquering and yielding, exlraverted and introverted, saintly and sinful dispositions may reside within one breast.
(Allport, 1961, p. 363)
. . . personality traits often contradict each other. People may be
both ascendant and submissive, perhaps submissive only towards
those individuals bearing traditional symbols of authority and
prestige; and towards everyone else aggressive and domineering.
(Allport, 1937, p. 330)
his basic conceptions of traits or the role of the environment.
Likewise, Allport's (1966) final statement admitted, "my earlier
The key to understanding Allport's conception of traits is his
views seemed to neglect the variability induced by ecological,
social, and situational factors" (p. 9), but this admission did not
willingness to accept the notion of contradictory traits. The
phrase contradictory traits makes sense only if a trait is under-
lead to any qualitative changes in his theorizing. Because of the
stood to imply consistency over a limited range of situations.
essentially stable nature of Allport's conceptualization of traits,
Thus, in Allport's terminology, a person could be said to display
I will present representative quotations from both the 1937 and
a trait of meticulousness in one set of situations and a trait of
1961 books. Consider the following statements about the vari-
disorderiiness in another set of situations. Allport (1937) gave
ability of behavior:
the following example:
. . . the ever-changing nature of traits and their close dependence
upon the fluid conditions of the environment forbid a conception
that is over-rigid or over-simple. (Allport, 1937, p. 312)
Perfect consistency will never be found and must not be expected.
(Allport, 1937, p. 330)
. . . trait-names . . . imply too much. The young teacher is not
always "friendly"; he is not uniformly "ambitious" in every direction; his "enthusiasm" surely depends on what and whom he is
teaching. (Allport, 1961, p. 333)
. . . we must admit at the outset that no trait theory can be sound
unless it allows for, and accounts for, the variability of a person's
conduct. (Allport, 1961, p. 333)
The pull of the situation is, however, so powerful that we are forced
to regard personality as never a fixed entity or pattern.. . . (Allport, 1961, p. 181)
This man, a teacher, seemed one moment meticulous in his behavior, the next, careless and even slovenly. Measures of neatness in
this case would certainly not correspond. But by looking further
into the case, the illusion of specificity vanishes, for it appears that
(he) is always orderly in respect to his personal possessions, and
always disorderly in respect to other people's, (p. 3 57)
For Allport, then, a trait was inferred to account for a set
of equivalent responses that tended to occur in response to a
delimited range of situations. He stated that "it is the repeated
occurrence of actions having the same significance (equivalence
of response), following upon a definable range of stimuli having
the same personal significance (equivalence of stimuli) that
makes necessary the postulation of traits . . ." (Allport, 1937,
p. 340). Allport recognized that traits vary in consistency, that
How could Allport reconcile his belief in traits with these re-
is, the range of equivalent situations in which they are active.
peated acknowledgments of situational variability? Allport
He did claim that some few individuals possess a cardinal trait
offered three types of explanations for inconsistencies in people's behavior. In some cases, he regarded situational variability
that pervades virtually all their behavior, but he thought that
the majority of people display central and specific traits that
as error variance linked to momentary fluctuations in the per-
have lower levels of generality. It follows from the notion that
son's psychological state, to momentary conditions in the envi-
central and specific traits are linked to a definable range of stim-
ronment, to specific, dissociated habits, or to defensive masking
uli that a given person can display different traits in different
of underlying traits. Another type of explanation viewed appar-
situations and, of course, that different people can vary in the
ent inconsistencies as the result of the researcher's imposing an
inappropriate common trait concept on the subject's behavior.
traits activated in those same situations. Stated in this manner,
Allport's theory has more in common with what are now called
ALLPORT, TRAIT PSYCHOLOGY, AND INTERACTIONISM
interactionist theories than with trait psychology as it has been
presented by Mischel and Bern.
Allport did not, of course, describe his theory as interactionist, but the substance of his theory is consistent with contemporary interactionism. One might object that Allport himself
wrote, "I do not believe that traits can be denned in terms of
interaction effects," but he went on to explain, "since all tendencies draw their energy from within the person" (Allport, 1966,
p. 9). It is clear that his objection was to statistical interactions
as explanations of behavior; he did not criticize them as descriptions of behavior.
Allport's conception of a trait can be better understood by
comparing it with certain concepts in Rotter's (1954,1982) social learning theory (SLT), an explicitly interactionist account
of personality. In Rotter's SLT, a behavior potential refers to the
potential for a given behavior's occurring in a specific situation.
Behavior potentials are determined by, among other variables,
situation-specific expectancies and situation-specific reinforcement values. This is a highly specific level of analysis, but Rotter
went on to hypothesize that various behavior potentials become
related (i.e., predictable one from the other) as various situations come to be perceived as related. Rotter's molar concept of
need potential refers to the average potential for occurrence of
a set of behaviors in a group of related situations; thus, one can
speak of need potential for dominance in situations of athletic
competition and need potential for dominance in heterosocial
situations.
Social learning theory predicts a moderate level of consistency of behavior within a class of situations and a low, but nonzero, level of consistency across classes of situations. One might
expect moderate consistency in dominance in different athletic
situations and moderate consistency in dominance in different
social situations, but one would not be surprised if dominance
on the playing field failed to predict dominance in social groups.
Allport's concept of a trait is similar to Rotter's concept of a
need potential.2 A teenager who would be said by Allport to
possess the trait of dominance in athletic contexts and the trait
of submissiveness in social contexts would be said by Rotter to
have a high need potential for dominance in athletic contexts
and a high need potential for submissiveness in social contexts.
There are, however, important differences between the constructs. Allport viewed traits as causal entities, whereas Rotter
did not conceive of need potentials as corresponding to neurophysiological structures. More fundamentally, Allport's analysis of the causes of behavior relied entirely on the trait concept.
Social learning theory, in contrast, postulates that need potentials are themselves determined by expectancies and reinforcement values. Thus, SLT provides a deeper level of causal analysis in which traitlike variables (need potentials) are predicted
using cognitive and motivational variables that are linked to
specific situations. To anticipate a later argument, SLT differs
from Allport's theory in that it includes a process theory that
describes the effects of the immediate situation on the person.
The process theory makes it possible to predict consistencies in
behavior; the absence of a process component largely restricted
Allport to post hoc descriptions of such consistencies.
Trait Psychology as Interactionism
Magnusson and Endler (1977) distinguished between two
meanings of the expression "person-situation interaction." The
995
mechanistic sense refers to a statistical interaction between persons and situations in which person and situational variables
must be considered conjointly in order to predict behavior accurately. The dynamic sense refers to a "model of behavior in
which person mediating variables, person reaction variables,
and situations (environments) are integrated in order to describe and explain the process whereby individual behavior develops and maintains itself" (Magnusson & Endler, 1977, p.
19). It has already been shown that Allport was an interactionist
in the former sense, that is, that he acknowledged that each person's traits are uniquely linked to classes of activating situations. Was he an interactionist in the second sense as well? In
order to qualify as a dynamic interactionist, a theorist should
be able to describe both the effect of the situation on the person
and the effect of the person on the situation.
There is no question that Allport described dynamic processes by which individuals affect the situations in which they
find themselves. Like the more recent theorists Wachtel (1973)
and Snyder (1981), Allport (1937) proposed that situations are
to some extent products of the person because people choose
the situations to which they expose themselves:
Traits may be even more self-active.. . . The egotist and the gossip
when alone may feel quite restless until they have sought out an
opportunity to unburden themselves. They seek an excuse to talk,
and put themselves in the way ofstimuli that will release the flood,
(pp. 321-322)
A still more radical interactionism is embodied in the idea that
persons create the situations in which they live and, in turn,
are products of those situations (Bandura, 1978; Snyder, 1981;
Wachtel, 1973). In this conception, persons are not regarded as
fixed entities that simply make choices from an array of fixed,
static situations. Situations are created, in part, by the person's
own actions. Allport was well aware of this effect of people on
situations:
. . . most people do a good deal to create the situation to which
they respond.... In brief, the situations we find ourselves in are
often the direct product of our previous (and continuing) personalities. (Allport, 1961, p. 179).
Unfortunately, Allport was far less clear about the processes
by which situations affect persons. He repeatedly referred to the
immediate situation as "arousing" various traits, but he failed
to explicate how this arousal took place; arousal remained essentially a neurophysiological metaphor. Absent from his theory is anything analogous to Rotter's description of how situational cues activate situation-specific expectancies and situation-specific reinforcement values, which together determine
behavior. It should be emphasized, however, that there is nothing in Allport's account that is inconsistent with a process theory of the effects of the immediate situation; the problem,
rather, is that he was unable to develop an explicit theory of such
interactions.
Allport also had little to say about how the environment can,
2
Allport distinguished adaptive from expressive (i.e., stylistic) traits.
The comparison with need potential is more apt for the former than the
latter. Furthermore, the concept of need potential implies an averaging
over situations. It will be seen that definitions of traits in terms of averages are somewhat different from Allport's definition.
996
DAVID C. ZUROFF
over the course of time, transform a person's personality (traits).
The fact that adults change was important to Allport, but he
thought of such change as resulting from the innate propensity
of the organism to grow and develop, rather than as a result of
the impact of the environment (Allport, 1960). He denied, in
fact, that anything but the most extreme environmental
changes could affect a person's basic personality: "Even under
conditions of social anomie... the person manages to retain
his personality system more or less intact" (Allport, 1961,
p. 188).
In summary, Allport failed to specify the processes by which
the immediate situation affects a person's behavior, although he
knew that in some way it did so. He was, in addition, basically
unsympathetic to the idea that environments can have transforming effects on persons. It is time for Allport to be recognized as an interactionist in the descriptive (mechanistic) sense,
but he cannot be said to have achieved an interactionist theory
in the dynamic (process) sense. This shortcoming prevented
him from moving much beyond post hoc descriptions of observed regularities in behavior. Nevertheless, the regularities
that he described (and hoped to explain) were more situationally dependent than the pervasive consistencies of Mischel and
Bern's version of trait psychology.
If Allport was not a trait theorist, who was or is a trait theorist? Cattell's trait theory could be the subject of another lengthy
article. For now, it is sufficient to note that Cattell's (1965) specification equation for predicting behavior explicitly takes into
account the unique meaning of each situation for each person;
behavior is predicted by considering both person and situation
variables. Cattell did not claim pervasive consistency in overt
behavior. In fact, the specification equation is conceptually very
similar to Allport's (1937, p. 327) statement that "the arousal
of several dispositions in varying degrees seems to be the rule,
each contributing to the convergent conduct in proportion to
its degree of arousal."
Is the layperson a trait psychologist, possessed of a commonsense conviction in the reality of pervasive cross-situational
consistency (Bern & Allen, 1974; Mischel, 1968; Mischel &
Peake, 1982)? Recent evidence brings this conclusion into
doubt, too. Allen and Smith (1980) showed that subjects preferred interactional explanations of behavior to either trait or
situational explanations. Epstein and Terapulsky (1986) reported that people do not perceive high correlations among the
behavioral referents of traits, that they discriminate degrees of
relatedness, and that they report relying on situational as well as
trait concepts in making such judgments. Lastly, Zuroff(1982)
showed that subjects were aware of both situational and personby-situation interaction effects in the behavior of their friends.
The layperson, like Allport, may be more accurately described
as an interactionist than as a trait theorist. Of course, no one
doubts that the lay psychologist draws freely on the lexicon of
18,000 trait terms when describing other people; what is debatable is whether this reflects a belief in pervasive consistencies.
What Is a Trait?
So far I have argued that neither Gordon Allport nor the person in the street can be called a trait theorist or, to put it less
dramatically, that their definitions of trait are quite different
from the Mischel-Bem definition. It may be useful for the ongo-
ing discussion of the nature of personality to consider the widely
varying definitions that have been proposed for the term trait.
Several excellent conceptual analyses of trait concepts are available, including those of Alston (1975), Buss and Craik (1984),
Hirschberg (1978), Ryle (1949), and Wiggins (1974). For present purposes, it is convenient to distinguish two principal ways
in which definitions of trait can vary: the ontological status they
accord to traits and the type of consistency over situations that
they require.
There are three basic positions on the reality of traits. As is
well known, Allport held that traits are real, causal entities that
correspond to as yet unknown neurophysiological structures.
An opposing view is that traits are purely descriptive; they summarize a person's past behavior, but they have no real existence
and are certainly not causal entities (Buss & Craik, 1983; Wiggins, 1974). A third possibility is that traits are dispositional
concepts (Ryle, 1949). Hirschberg (1978) summarized this position as follows:
Consider solubility in water: to say X is soluble in water is to say
that if X were placed in water, X would dissolve.. . . Similarly, to
say X is courageous is to say that in the face of danger X would
stand fast. The dispositional form of the definition is that if X were
in a certain kind of situation (S), X would emit a certain kind of
response (R). (p. 49)
The dispositional view of traits, then, is that they describe a
tendency to perform a certain class of acts when the individual
is placed in a certain class of situations. Dispositions are distinct from summaries because they do not imply anything
about the actual occurrence of behavior; in the absence of the
eliciting stimulus, even a strong disposition will not be manifested in the stream of behavior. Although there are some phi-1
losophers who view dispositions as causal concepts (Armstrong,
1969; Hirschberg, 1978), they are generally not considered to
provide causal explanations and, of course, they are not entities.
Note that each of these definitions is potentially compatible
with an interactionist psychology or, to put it differently, that a
theorist's position on the ontological status of traits does not
constrain his or her position on the consistency issue. The summary view of traits can accept traits that summarize over any
range of situations, broad or narrow; the dispositional view can
define broad or narrow dispositions as traits; and the causal
view can postulate neuronal structures that are activated by a
broad or narrow class of situational stimuli.
Alston (1975) proposed a distinction that corresponds to that
between the causal and dispositional views identified earlier. Alston's T-concepts are dispositional concepts that describe regularities in a person's behavior of the type: If situations of type S
are present, then responses of type R will generally occur. Theoretical concepts (or purposive-cognitive concepts, as Alston also
referred to them) are causal concepts that are used to explain
regularities (or departures from regularity) in behavior. The
most familiar examples of T-concepts in psychology are certain
trait concepts (e.g., trait anxiety and dominance), and the most
familiar theoretical concepts are beliefs, desires, and abilities.
Because Allport used trait terminology, one might think that
he should be placed in the T-concept camp. In fact, however,
Allport's traits were theoretical terms that he regarded as inferred rather than observed and that were intended to provide
explanations of observed regularities. Allport's limited success
ALLPORT, TRAIT PSYCHOLOGY, AND 1NTERACTIONISM
997
in constructing a predictive theory suggests that he bet on the
be expected of a trait. They defined a disposition (trait) as the
wrong theoretical horse when he adopted trait concepts, but
frequency of occurrence of acts prototypical of that disposition
there is no doubt that his trait concept is as truly a theoretical
over a fixed period of time.5 The concept of a prototypical act
concept as the beliefs and desires emphasized by Alston (1975).
was derived from recent analyses of the structure of natural lan-
This analysis is consistent with Wiggins's (1974) argument that
guage categories and refers to acts that are perceived to be core
AUport and most other trait theorists went wrong precisely at
elements (or good exemplars) of the concept. Organizing a
the point where they interpreted traits as generative mecha-
game of charades is a prototypically extraverted act. For any
nisms rather than as categorical summaries.
given individual, summing over time is equivalent to averaging
With respect to the type of consistency that is required in the
over all the situations that are encountered in the interval and,
definition of a trait, there are four basic positions. The first two
therefore, Buss and Craik's definition is somewhat similar to
positions have already been described. The first requires a per-
Epstein and Moskowitz's. Furthermore, Buss and Craik (1983),
vasive consistency and, in the case of common traits, uses the
like Epstein, emphasized that the appropriate criterion for the
average of all pair-wise correlations between situations as the
reliability of a disposition is another, similar aggregate.
criterion for consistency. The second requires a high level of
However, there are also some important divergences. Buss
consistency within a delimited range of situations and permits
and Craik's (1983) definition required aggregating frequencies
inconsistency or even contradiction outside that range of situa-
of prototypic acts, whereas Epstein and Moskowitz made no
tions. In Allport's (1961) words:
commitment to a specific form of measurement prior to aggregation over situations. Epstein and Moskowitz could accept ag-
There must be some demonstrable relationship between separate
acts before (a trait's) existence can be inferred. Yet the occurrence
of dissociated, specific, and even contradictory acts is not necessarily fatal to the inference, (p. 363)
gregating measures of intensity as easily as aggregating measures of frequency. The most fundamental difference, however,
is that Buss and Craik advocated aggregating over time, not situations; the sampling of situations produced by their definition
The third position defines a trait as a person's average level of
is uncontrolled and unsystematic. The Buss and Craik defini-
response over a given range of situations.3 Studies by Epstein
tion even allows individuals who experience totally different sit-
(1979, 1980) and Moskowitz (1982) exemplify this approach.
uations to be compared in terms of their summed act frequen-
Epstein (1979) measured a variety of traits by averaging over
cies over a given time period.
multiple occasions of observation.4 Moskowitz (1982) defined
It could be argued that the Buss-Craik definition has the im-
trait levels of dominance and dependency by averaging chil-
portant advantage of making possible interindividual compari-
dren's scores in various specific situations. A trait defined in
sons of traits, because all that must be controlled is the time
this fashion is not incompatible with the presence of variability
interval during which the individuals are observed. The Ep-
within the set of situations over which the averaging takes place.
stein-Moskowitz definition appears to run into difficulties
However, the average level should be reasonably consistent. The
whenever individuals encounter different samples of situations,
consistency required of the average level can be assessed by one
which will usually be the case in natural environments. Can one
of two criteria. Epstein's (1979) criterion was that average
compare aggregate levels of aggression if subjects are free to
scores should predict other comparable averages. Moskowitz's
create or seek aggression-instigating situations? This apparently
(1982) criterion was that the correlations between average
reasonable question misses the point that Epstein and Mosko-
scores and behavior in independent situations (i.e., individual
witz would not be interested in the actual number of aggressive
scores) should be, on the average, of substantial magnitude.
actions, but instead would be interested in a (aggregated) dispo-
Allport's conception of traits and that of Epstein and
sition to aggression. Pragmatic difficulties may exist, but con-
Moskowitz cannot be regarded as antithetical. Both tolerate
ceptually it is clear how to compare individuals in terms of Ep-
some inconsistency in trait-relevant behaviors, and both are
stein-Moskowitz traits; one must observe their behavior in
flexible in the range of situations that are encompassed by traits.
equivalent samples of the situations over which aggregation is
I believe that AUport expected a higher level of consistency and
to take place.
was more willing to select compatible (equivalent) situations in
Returning to the question of situational consistency, one can
order to attain it. For example, AUport might describe a child
see that Buss and Craik transcended the debate by defining dis-
who takes female peers' toys, threatens male peers, tells female
positions independently of evoking situations. There is no re-
teachers what to do, but avoids male teachers, as having a trait
quirement of situational consistency in their definition of a dis-
of dominance that extends only to the first three types of situa-
position (trait); instead, it is replaced by a requirement of tem-
tions. Moskowitz (1982) would describe the child as being, on
poral consistency. Buss and Craik's focus on units of time rather
the average, dominant within the entire set of situations. Allport's approach of constructing traits that are highly consistent
over a selected group of situations is more feasible given an idiographic examination of a specific individual's life, whereas the
Epstein-Moskowitz approach is more readily applied in nomothetic research. Another difference between the definitions concerns the ontological status accorded to traits; AUport viewed
them as causal entities, whereas Epstein (1979) and Moskowitz
(1982) regarded them as dispositions.
Buss and Craik's (1983) act frequency analysis of traits presents a fourth position on the type of situational consistency to
'Average here is meant to include both arithmetic means and
weighted averages derived from regression analyses (see Moskowitz,
1982).
4
Epstein (1980, 1983b) and Mischel and Peake (1982) differed on
whether Epstein (1979) succeeded in aggregating over situations as well
as occasions. For the present purposes, it is only important that Epstein
(1979,1980, 1983a, 1983b) endorsed averaging over situations.
5
Buss and Craik (1983) used the term disposition, but in Hirschberg's
(1978) terminology, they advocated a summary rather than a dispositional view of traits.
998
DAVID C ZUROFF
than ranges of situations is in part a reflection of their ontologi-
of situations tends to be weakly related, and Mischel (1983) has
cal position that traits are simply summaries of how a person
clearly stated that behavior is stable, in the sense that one aggre-
has acted. Epstein and Moskowitz, in contrast, viewed traits as
gated sample of behavior is able to predict another sample. Mis-
behavioral dispositions defined for classes of situations that
chel (1983) suggested that although this pattern of results has
might or might not actually occur in a given time interval.
been well documented, "It is the implications that continue to
be read in quite different ways" (p. 598). Specifically, one can
Do Traits Exist?
conclude either that traits do or do not exist, depending on
whether one adopts the Epstein-Moskowitz or the Mischel-
A comprehensive examination of the empirical literature rel-
Bem definition of traits.
evant to this question is beyond the scope of this article. How-
Perhaps because the act-frequency approach is relatively new,
ever, there are certain aspects of this literature about which
there is little evidence that bears directly on the question of
there is considerable agreement, and it is to these that I wish to
whether frequencies of prototypical acts are stable over time.
draw attention. These points of agreement become obvious
There is, of course, considerable evidence for the temporal sta-
once one insists that the answer to the question depends on how
bility of various traits, a point that Mischel did not dispute.
the term trait is defined. If trait is a pervasive cross-situational
However, the operations employed to measure traits in studies
consistency, then the answer seems to be no. None of the major
of temporal consistency do not correspond precisely to the act-
studies that have measured overt behavior in clearly discrimina-
frequency conceptualization, so their results are difficult to in-
ble situations have found impressive average correlations be-
terpret. At present, I am aware of only one study that has di-
tween behavior in pairs of situations (Dudycha, 1936; Hartshorne & May, 1928; Mischel & Peake, 1982; Moskowitz, 1982;
rectly assessed the stability of an act-frequency disposition.
Mischel and Peake (1982) reported statistically significant levels
Newcomb, 1929, cited in Bern & Allen, 1974). It is possible,
of temporal stability for conscientiousness, although the stabil-
of course, that improved designs would yield higher pair-wise
ity of more prototypical acts did not appear to exceed that of
correlations (Block, 1977). Nevertheless, the available data sug-
less prototypical acts. The need for more research on act-fre-
gest that Mischel was correct, within the terms of the argument
quency dispositions is evident.
as he originally defined it.
Lastly, let us consider whether traits in Allport's sense of the
One must ask next whether traits defined as average levels of
word can be shown to exist. This question can be approached
response exist. Mischel and Peake (1982) reported that when
behavioral measures of conscientiousness were aggregated over
by considering the relation between Allport's definition of a
trait and the Epstein-Moskowitz definition. Because Mosko-
occasions, response forms, and situations, there was an increase
witz (1982) averaged over all available situations, and Allport
from an "average .13 cross-situational consistency coefficient
only required consistency within a subset of situations, All-
(to) an internal reliability estimate of .74" (p. 738). In other
port's definition is less stringent and should be easier to satisfy.
words, the trait measure of conscientiousness defined by averag-
In effect, the existence of Epstein-Moskowitz traits guarantees
ing over situations would be expected to be highly predictive of
the existence of at least some Allport traits. A recent reanalysis
average measure.6 Moskowitz
of Mischel and Peake's (1982) observational study of conscien-
(1982) studied two traits, dominance and dependency. She
tiousness provides empirical support for this conclusion. Jack-
found that trait scores, defined as weighted averages over three
son and Paunonen (1985) obtained mean correlations between
situations, had an average correlation with behavior in a new
pairs of situations that exceeded .65, corrected for attenuation,
another, similarly obtained
situation of .62 for dominance and .26 for dependency. She con-
by aggregating within subsets of the 19 situations. They concep-
cluded that dominance could be considered a reasonably con-
tualized this procedure as identifying/acew within the domain
sistent trait, but dependency was not traitlike. The need to study
of conscientiousness. It is interesting to observe that one and
other potential traits is evident, but it is also clear that at least
the same data set (Mischel & Peake, 1982) has been used to
some behavioral characteristics can be meaningfully described
demonstrate that average correlations between pairs of situa-
as traits, provided, of course, that trait is understood to mean
tions are low, that correlations between broad aggregates are
an average response level.
substantial, and that pair-wise correlations within meaningful
Note that Mischel and Peake (1982) dismissed the procedure
of aggregating over situations as "bypassing the problem of
subsets of situations can be quite high.
A major stumbling block for Allport's approach has been the
cross-situational consistency instead of solving it" (p. 738).
inability of the theory to predict groupings of situations within
This argument makes sense if one accepts Mischel and Peake's
which consistency should be high. In the absence of such pre-
definition of a trait, because averaging will indeed "hide" lack
dictions, Allport's definition requires either idiographic post
of consistency between pairs of situations. However, trait need
hoc identification of meaningful groups of situations or the use
not imply pervasive consistency over pairs of situations, and the
of broad, culturally shared groupings of situations (Rotter,
appropriate criterion of traitlikeness is not necessarily the aver-
1955). In principle, however, it should be possible to identify
age of pair-wise correlations (Epstein, 1983b). From the Epstein-Moskowitz perspective, averaging over situations is not an
evasion, but a requirement of the definition of trait.
It seems that the debate about the existence of traits can be
brought to an end and that the field is ready to move on to new
questions (Epstein, 1983a;Funder, 1983; Mischel, 1983). In recent articles, Epstein (1983a) has clearly stated that behavior is
highly situationally specific, in the sense that behavior in pairs
6
Epstein (1979) reported apparently similar increases in stability of
a variety of variables after aggregation, but there is some controversy as
to whether he aggregated over different situations or simply different
occasions of the same situation (Epstein, 1983b; Mischel & Peake,
1982). I find Epstein's (1983b) arguments to be generally persuasive,
but certainly future research should attempt to sample clearly discriminable situations.
ALLPORT, TRAIT PSYCHOLOGY, AND INTERACTIONISM
999
useful traits by defining them within groups of situations that
serve different purposes. The apparently incommensurate
have either similar meanings for a particular individual or that
definitions of trait reviewed earlier can be seen to be the servants
have similar meanings for most individuals within a culture.
of different scientific purposes; more specifically, the summary,
Situations that have a similar meaning (e.g., situations in which
dispositional and causal views of traits serve the descriptive,
aft'ectional needs can be met with little danger of rejection)
predictive, and explanatory purposes of science. It is naive,
should generally lead to similar behavior. This should be true
therefore, to ask, "Do people have traits?" or "Are traits real?"
regardless of whether the similar meaning reflects an idiosyn-
The question of the merits of trait constructs is better posed
cratic perception of the individual or a perception that is widely
as, "Are traits useful in describing, predicting, or explaining
shared within the culture. Of course, the burden of demonstrat-
behavior?"
ing this possibility empirically remains with Allport's intellectual descendants.
Although description may be a subordinate scientific goal to
explanation, it is hard to see how personality psychology can
Help in shouldering that burden appears to be on the way, but
exist without traits (or a conceptually equivalent term) as a de-
from a somewhat unexpected quarter. Mischel (1984) recently
scriptive unit (Briggs, 1985; Wiggins, 1974). I do not mean to
proposed that personologists begin to study what he termed
imply that familiar, highly generalized traits such as introversion-extraversion or dominance will play a prominent role; it
context-bound (or specific
or local) consistencies. Mischel
(1984)suggestedthat
may be that narrower traits (Mischel's local consistencies) will
turn out to be more fruitful.
Instead of seeking high levels of consistency from situation to situation for many behaviors in a wide range of contexts or looking for
broad averages, one might try to identify unique "bundles" or sets
of temporally stable prototypic behaviors, key features, that characterize the person even over long periods of time but not necessarily across most or all possibly relevant situations, (p. 362)
Will applied psychologists persist in using traits as predictive
tools? The predictive value of both generalized (aggregated) dispositions and narrowly defined dispositions has been questioned (Epstein, 1983a; Mischel, 1983). However, we must remember that different predictive purposes are served by different kinds of constructs. For example, the prediction
This is clearly a contemporary reformulation of Allport's con-
of
dominance in specific situations is best accomplished with a
cept of a trait, but in one important respect Mischel (1984) ad-
narrowly defined construct; the prediction of dominance in a
vanced beyond Allport's work; he provided a theoretical ratio-
range of situations is best accomplished with a broadly defined
nale for the selection of a class of situations within which the
construct (Moskowitz, 1982). Similarly, some clinical problems
consistency of a class of behaviors should be high.7 On the basis
may require the assessment of narrow dispositions, whereas
of his cognitive social learning theory, he predicted that the level
of problematic behavior displayed by emotionally disturbed
others may require the assessment of broad dispositions. The
coming years should bring increased recognition of the possibil-
children would be relatively consistent within the class of situa-
ity—in fact, the necessity—for the development of trait con-
tions in which task demands exceeded the subjects' competen-
cepts and measures of varying generality. Of course, the burden
cies and that it would be relatively inconsistent in other situa-
of demonstrating the utility of a trait construct will remain on
tions. Mischel and his doctoral student, Jack Wight, empiri-
the psychologist who defines it.
cally confirmed the prediction of high average correlations
What is the trait construct's future as an explanatory con-
between pairs of situations with high-competence require-
cept? Allport's attempt to use traits as explanatory terms was
ments. It appears, therefore, that Mischel has provided some
not especially successful. I suggested that the principal short-
of the strongest available evidence that Allport's conception of
coming of Allport's theory was that it failed to describe the pro-
traits is a viable one. He has also demonstrated the possibility
cesses by which persons and situations interact. In particular, it
of predicting the boundaries of a trait on theoretical grounds, a
failed to provide explicit accounts of how traits develop and are
type of prediction that generally eluded Allport.
transformed over time and how they are activated in particular
The convergence between Mischel and Allport's views is less
situations. Consequently, Allport's theory did little more than
surprising when one recognizes that they share certain impor-
describe observed regularities in behavior. Allport's traits may
tant pretheoretical commitments. Like Allport, Mischel is com-
explain behavior in the sense that they identify the cause of be-
mitted to understanding the nuances and particularities of indi-
havior as an internal property of the organism (Briggs, 1985;
vidual lives. Again like Allport, Mischel is committed to a pro-
Hirschberg, 1978), but this explanation is too vague to be satis-
active view of the person that emphasizes the meanings that the
individual finds in the situation and the purposes that the indi-
fying or heuristically valuable. As Briggs (1985) put it, "traits
themselves require further explanation; they are, after all, only
vidual brings to the situation. Both men's pretheoretical com-
promissory notes (for causal explanations)" (p. 17). An explan-
mitments led them to seek constructs that could be linked to
atory system that makes use of trait concepts must embed the
the person's purposes and perceptions and that respected the
uniqueness of the patterning of each person's life. Trait served
trait terms in a process theory that redeems the promissory
these ends for Allport and local consistency serves them for Mis7
chel.
Do Trait Constructs Have a Future?
Different scientific purposes lead psychologists to create
different kinds of constructs (Rotter, 1954,1975). It follows that
different types of constructs can coexist peacefully when they
Interestingly, Mischel's proposal is strikingly similar not only to Allport's view of traits, but also to Bern and Allen's (1974) description of
how the layperson uses trait terms. Bern and Allen (1974) credited the
layperson (but not trait psychologists!) with an "intuitive process [that]
automatically finesses the problem of situational specificity by embracing in a common equivalence class only those behaviors and situations
which cohere for the individual, thereby excluding a priori any maverick behaviors and situations" (p. 310).
1000
DAVID C. ZUROFF
notes if it is to generate new findings and deeper understanding.
Social learning theory's (Rotter, 1982) treatment of the traitlike
concept of need potential has been mentioned as one model of
how this can be done. Briggs's (1985) analysis of shyness illustrates how psychobiological as well as learning and cognitive
variables can be linked to a trait that is viewed as a cause of
behavior.
Once a trait has been embedded in a process theory, does
it contribute anything further to the explanation of behavior?
Realistically speaking, it is difficult to think of any trait that has
been so fully studied that it has become a redundant part of a
theoretical network. Trait terms will therefore continue to serve
a useful function by directing investigators' attention to places
in nomological networks where important questions about the
causes of behavior can be asked.
References
Allen, B. P., & Smith, G. F. (1980). Traits, situations, and their interaction as alternative "causes" of behavior. Journal of Social Psychology,
111, 99-104.
Allport, G. W. (1937). Personality: A psychological interpretation. New
York: Holt.
Allport, G. W. (1960). The open system in personality theory. Journal
of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 61. 301-310.
Allport, G. W. (1961). Pattern and growth in personality. New York:
Holt, Rinehart & Winston.
Allport, G. W. (1966). Traits revisited. American Psychologist, 21, 110.
Alston, W. P. (1975). Traits, consistency, and conceptual alternatives for
personality theory. Journal for the Theory of Social Behavior, 5, 1747.
Armstrong, D. M. (1969). Dispositions are causes. Analysis, 30, 28-36.
Bandura, A. (1978). The self-system in reciprocal determinism. American Psychologist, 33, 344-358.
Bern, D.!., & Allen, A. (1974). On predicting some of the people some
of the time: The search for cross-situational consistencies in behavior.
Psychological Review, SI, 506-520.
Block, J. (1977). Advancing the study of personality: Paradigmatic shift
or improving the quality of research? In D. Magnusson & N. S. Endler
(Eds.), Personality at the crossroads: Current issues in interactional
psychology (pp. 37-64). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Briggs, S. R. (1985). A trait account of social shyness. In P. Shaver (Ed.),
Self, situations, and social behavior—Review of personality and social psychology (Vol. 6, pp. 35-64). Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
Buss, D. M., & Craik, K. H. (1983). The act frequency approach to
personality. Psychological Review, 90,105-126.
Buss, D. M., & Craik, K. H. (1984). Acts, dispositions, and personality.
In B. Maher (Ed.), Progress in experimental personality research. Vol.
13 (pp. 242-301). New York: Academic Press.
Cattell, R. B. (1965). The scientific analysis of personality. Chicago:
Aldine.
Dudycha, G. J. (1936). An objective study of punctuality in relation to
personality and achievement. Archives of Psychology, 29 (204), 1-53.
Epstein, S. (1979). The stability of behavior: I. On predicting most of
the people much of the time. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 37, 1097-1126.
Epstein, S. (1980). The stability of behavior: II. Implications for psychological research. American Psychologist, 35, 790-806.
Epstein, S. (1983a). Aggregation and beyond: Some basic issues in the
prediction of behavior. Journal of Personality, 51, 360-392.
Epstein, S. (1983b). The stability of confusion: A reply to Mischel and
Peake. Psychological Review, 90, 179-184.
Epstein, S., & Terapulsky, L. (1986). Perception of cross-situational
consistency. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. SO, 11521160.
Funder, D. C. (1983). The "consistency" of controversy and the accuracy of personality judgments. Journal of Personality, 51, 346-359.
Hartshorne, H., & May, M. A. (1928). Studies in deceit. New York: Macmillan.
Hirschberg, N. (1978). A correct treatment of traits. In H. London
(Ed.), Personality: A new look at metatheories (pp. 45-68). New York:
Halstead Press.
Jackson, D. N., & Paunonen, S. V. (1985). Construct validity and the
predictability of behavior. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 49, 554-570.
Magnusson, D., & Endler, N. S. (1977). Interactional psychology: Present status and future prospects. In D. Magnusson & N. S. Endler
(Eds.), Personality at the crossroads: Current issues in interactional
psychology (pp. 3-36). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Mischel, W. (1968). Personality and assessment. New York: Wiley.
Mischel, W. (1983). Alternatives in the pursuit of the predictability and
consistency of persons: Stable data that yield unstable interpretations. Journal of Personality, 51, 578-604.
Mischel, W. (1984). Convergences and challenges in the search for consistency. American Psychologist, 39,351-364.
Mischel, W., & Peake, P. K. (1982). Beyond deja vu in the search for
cross-situational consistency. Psychological Review, 89, 730-755.
Moskowitz, D. S. (1982). Coherence and cross-situational generality in
personality: A new analysis of old problems. Journal of Personality
and Social Psychology, 43, 754-768.
Rotter, J.B. (1954). Social learning and clinical psychology. Englewood
Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Rotter, J. B. (1955). The role of the psychological situation in determining the direction of human behavior. In M. R. Jones (Ed.), Nebraska
Symposium on Motivation (Vol. 3, pp. 254-269). Lincoln: University
of Nebraska Press.
Rotter, J. B. (1975). Some problems and misconceptions related to the
construct of internal versus external control of reinforcement. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 43, 56-67.
Rotter, J. B. (1982). The development and applications of social learning
theory: Selected papers. New York: Praeger.
Ryle, G. (1949). The concept of mind. New York: Barnes & Noble.
Snyder, M. (1981). On the influence of individuals on situations. In N.
Cantor & J. F. Kihlstrom (Eds.), Personality, cognition, and social
interaction (pp. 309-332). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Wachtel, P. L. (1973). Psychodynamics, behavior therapy and the implacable experimenter: An inquiry into the consistency of personality. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 82, 324-334.
Wiggins, J. S. (1974, February). In defense of traits. Paper presented at
the Ninth Annual Symposium on Recent Developments in the Use
of the MMPI, Los Angeles.
Zuroff, D. C. (1982). Person, situation, and person-by-situation interaction components in person perception. Journal of Personality, 50,
1-14.
Received April 1,1985
Revision received August 16,1985 •