Strategies to increase health facility deliveries: Three case studies

Transcription

Strategies to increase
health facility deliveries:
Three case studies
Strategies to increase
health facility deliveries:
Three case studies
Copyright © 2014 UCSF Global Health Group
The Global Health Group
Global Health Sciences
University of California, San Francisco
550 16th Street, 3rd Floor
San Francisco, CA 94158 USA
Email: [email protected]
Website: globalhealthsciences.ucsf.edu/global-health-group
Ordering information
This publication is available for electronic download at
globalhealthsciences.ucsf.edu/global-health-group/
ghg-publications
Recommended citation
Butrick, E., Diamond-Smith, N., Beyeler, N., Montagu, D.,
Sudhinaraset, M. (2014). Strategies to increase health facility
deliveries: Three case studies. Global Health Group, Global
Health Sciences, University of California, San Francisco.
Cover photos courtesy of Photoshare. © 2006 Abhijit Dey (India)
and © 2012 Akintunde Akinleye/NURHI (Nigeria).
Produced in the United States of America.
First Edition, December 2014
This is an open-access document distributed under the terms
of the Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial License,
which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original authors and source
are credited.
Contents
Introduction | 1
Methods | 2
Country selection process | 2
Interviews and recruitment | 2
Description of each case study | 3
Malawi | 3
Nigeria | 3
India | 3
Summary of themes | 4
Lesson
Lesson
Lesson
Lesson
Lesson
learned
learned
learned
learned
learned
#1:
#2:
#3:
#4:
#5:
Political will | 4
Balancing supply, demand and quality | 5
Improving access to facility deliveries | 6
Community engagement | 7
Norm change | 8
Other policy implementation issues | 9
Transparency and accountability | 9
Conclusion | 10
Scale and sustainability | 10
Summary | 10
Appendix | 11
Malawi: TBA Ban | 11
Nigeria: Subsidy re-investment and empowerment program | 14
Uttar Pradesh, India: Janani Suraksha Yojana (JSY) program | 16
References | 18
Acknowledgements | 18
Introduction
The past few decades have seen a growing number of
women delivering in facilities around the globe. Facility
deliveries are known, in more developed countries, to
be associated with improved maternal and child health
outcomes. Complications may arise with any birth, in
which case even a well-trained attendant at home cannot
provide adequate care. In many rural areas distances to
facilities are great and roads poor, making transfer after
onset of delivery difficult and dangerous.
According to the most recent Demographic and Health
Surveys (DHS) in Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia, more than
75% of women combined in both regions now deliver
in facilities (Montagu et al., 2014). This change did not
occur without impetus, as many countries, often with the
support and encouragement of the international community, have pursued strategies, programs and policies aiming
to increase the number of women delivering in facilities,
ranging from small scale interventions to national policies
and laws. Many different approaches have been used.
These approaches can be thought of as targeting different determinants of why women fail to deliver in health
facilities, which have been characterized into four major
categories by Gabrysch and Campbell (2009) (Gabrysch
and Campbell, 2009). Some strategies target sociocultural
determinants (for example, banning or integrating traditional birth attendants), some try to increase perceived
need (such as through pregnancy counseling), some target economic barriers (such as conditional cash transfers,
fee removal, or vouchers), and others address physical
barriers (such as improving facility infrastructure and staff).
Understanding the challenges and successes of these
policy approaches, and the factors that facilitate successful implementation, can inform decision makers interested
in increasing the number of facility deliveries, and
ultimately improving maternal and child health outcomes.
To this end, we conducted in-depth case studies in India,
Malawi, and Nigeria, three countries that have implemented policies to increase facility deliveries. India and Malawi
have both experienced a large increase in the number of
women delivering in facilities following the implementation
of their policies. Early findings also show that Nigeria’s
policy is increasing facility deliveries, although it is still too
new for any country-level analysis. Through interviews with
key informants, including policy makers, maternal health
experts, implementers and providers, we gathered information about the history, successes, challenges, changes,
and future of policies.
In this synthesis, we analyze the factors that contributed
to the successful creation and implementation of maternal
health policies, and assess the challenges faced in implementing and sustaining these policies. This report draws
out crosscutting themes and lessons learned from three
unique country experiences to provide insight relevant for
policy-makers and advocates on strategies and considerations for policy and programmatic approaches to increasing facility deliveries.
We identified five key lessons learned about effective
policies to increase facility delivery, including: 1) the importance of political will; 2) the need to balance supply,
demand, and quality; 3) the importance of addressing access to the health system; 4) the important contribution of
community engagement, and finally 5) the need to create
changes in social norms.
Introduction | 1
Methods
Country selection process
Interviews and recruitment
To select the case study countries, we first conducted a
review of policies aimed to increase facility deliveries, with
a focus on Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa. We focused on
countries where policies were accompanied by increases
in the percent of women delivering in facilities. From this,
we selected India, Malawi, and Nigeria to explore policies
across different developmental timelines. India and Malawi
both experienced large increases in the rates of facility
delivery in the past 10 years using very different policy
approaches: India introduced a conditional cash transfer
program, while Malawi instituted a ban on traditional birth
attendants. Given the variation in implementation across
states in India, we focus our study specifically on Uttar
Pradesh state, where maternal and neonatal mortality
indicators lag behind other states in India. Nigeria recently
initiated a maternal health program, which includes a conditional cash transfer program similar to that in India. Although this is a new program, and the impacts on national
facility delivery rates are yet unknown, the policy provides
a useful comparison with India on effective finance-based
approaches.
Interviews were conducted with three broad groups of
people: 1) maternal health experts including both in-country and international representatives of donor and development agencies, NGOs, and academic/research institutions; 2) health officials and policy makers from case study
countries; and 3) people involved in policy implementation,
including program staff and high-level personnel at implementing health facilities. Interviews were conducted using
semi-structured guides that included questions about the
policy development and implementation processes, and
the outcomes and effects of the policy, including on-going
and expected modifications to implementation plans.
Respondents were recruited through directly contacting
government and other agencies involved in the creation
and implementation of the policies of interest, as well
as research and program staff involved in supporting or
evaluating implementation. Snowball sampling was then
used to expand our sample to other relevant individuals
and organizations.
The study received exempt IRB approval from the University of California, San Francisco. Consent was received
from all respondents prior to their participation. Two
personnel from UCSF conducted each case study, with a
total of three UCSF staff involved in data collection, analysis, and write up. We conducted a total of 15 interviews in
India, 16 in Nigeria and 16 in Malawi. The findings presented below are based on analysis of these interviews.
INDIA
NIGERIA
MALAWI
Methods | 2
Description of each case study
Each policy is described briefly below. For a more detailed
description, please see the Appendices.
Malawi
In the mid-2000s, deliveries by traditional birth attendants
(TBA) in Malawi were banned by the Malawian president,
with the support of the Ministry of Health (MOH). TBA’s
roles were refocused from being birth attendants to being
community resources who would advise women and refer
them in to health facilities. The TBA ban was effective and
popular, however in 2010, the then-president of Malawi
made a proclamation that effectively reversed the ban (due
to international pressure). This was done without consultation with the MOH and was contrary to their program and
work plan. In 2012, the subsequent president launched an
initiative called the Presidential Initiative for Safe Motherhood which had three pillars, including a reinstatement of
the ban on TBAs, which was implemented through mobilization of community members (mainly chiefs). The other
two pillars are the expansion of maternity waiting homes
and training and employing a new cadre of community
midwives.
Nigeria
The Subsidy Re-Investment and Empowerment Program
(SURE-P) was created in 2012 following large-scale
protests about the fuel subsidy reduction in Nigeria. In
response, President Goodluck Jonathan announced the
re-investment of fuel subsidy funds into infrastructure
and social safety net programs. Maternal health is one
of nine priority social safety net programs funded
through SURE-P.
The SURE-P MCH program is designed to increase access to maternal health services and improve the quality
of maternal health care through a number of supply- and
demand-side interventions. The program includes the
following components: health facility staffing and renovations; supply chain for essential maternal health commodities; conditional cash transfers for ANC, facility-delivery,
and post-natal care attendance; and community mobilization through village health workers and leadership committees. The program focuses on rural and high need areas.
The SURE-P MCH program is dually managed by a
federal-level implementing unit affiliated with the National
Primary Health Care Development Agency (NPHCDA), and
presidentially appointed oversight committee responsible
for approving fund allocation and monitoring implementation. States are engaged through state-level steering
committees, and agreements to contribute to SURE-P
health worker salaries.
India
In 2005, India began the National Rural Health Mission,
one key component of which is to provide financial incentives for women to deliver in facilities. This component,
called Janani Suraksha Yojana (JSY), provides financial
incentives to women for delivering in a health facility, and
also provides financial incentives for Accredited Social
Health Activists (ASHAs) to help incentivize, arrange transport for, and accompany women to facilities for delivery. In
low performing states, women are also given an incentive
for delivering in accredited private facilities. The main
goals of JSY are to increase early registration of women,
identify complicated cases, ensure women receive at
least 3 antenatal care visits (ANC) and post delivery visits,
organize referrals and transportation for delivery and
referrals. In 2011 JSY was expanded with a program
called Janani Shishu Suraksha Karyakram (JSSK) to cover
more services free of charge and provide additional
services, mainly targeting getting women to facilities
sooner (ambulances), and keeping women in facilities for
48 hours after delivery (free food and transportation).
Description of each case study | 3
Summary of themes
Although each country utilized different strategies and
activities to increase facility delivery, there were common
approaches across these policies that can be useful to
policy-makers and advocates in other settings. These
lessons learned provide important insight into strategies
decision-makers should consider when thinking about
how to pass maternal health policies, how to successfully
implement facility-based policies, and how to sustain
program impact over time.
Lesson learned #1: Political will
In each country, the ability to pass and to effectively implement a policy resulted from a high level of political will
among a small number of policy makers and community
stakeholders. Political will is particularly important in the
realm of maternal health, as women are often less powerful and less valued members of society, which can translate into harmful programs and policies, and inadequate
resources for implementation of strong maternal health
programs. In Malawi, Nigeria, and India, maternal health
“champions” were able to articulate the importance of
facility delivery to maternal health, effectively pushing for
greater attention to policies focusing on facility delivery
including the dedication of significant social and
financial resources.
In Nigeria, then State Minister for Health, Dr Muhammed
Ali Pate, was a strong advocate for maternal health. He
spearheaded a predecessor program called the Midwives
Service Scheme from which many elements were pulled
for the SURE-P MCH program. In addition he was a savvy
politician. He participated in several key government
committees, particularly within the Ministry of Finance,
and he effectively stated the investment case for maternal
health—bringing attention to the issue beyond the health
community, and highlighting the importance of maternal
health financing to the broader goals of the country.
Minister Pate also positioned the NPHCDA to be able to
capture the financial opportunity presented by the creation
of the Subsidy Reinvestment Program (SURE-P). He prepared a clear program plan and investment case—leading
to the prioritization of maternal health over other social
safety net programs during the allocation of SURE-P
funds. The ability to see and take advantage of this policy
window is the classic mark of a champion or advocate.
In Malawi, when Joyce Banda was Vice President, she
was named Malawi’s Ambassador to CARRMA (the
Campaign for Accelerated Reduction of Maternal Mortality
in Africa) in 2009. She was very active as a CARMMA
Ambassador and brought international attention to the
cause of Safe Motherhood. Later when she became
President she used her position to create a new central
initiative for safe motherhood, including the ban on TBAs.
The Presidential Initiative for Safe Motherhood worked
through the system of traditional chiefs and religious
leaders, educating them and sensitizing them to the
importance of facility delivery. This effort created
leadership and champions at the local level as well.
All three countries in some way used the power of the
executive, or central government to push forward the
agenda. This is particularly clear in the case of India. JSY
is a completely federally funded program and the federal
Ongoing evaluation and the use of evidence
for program implementation
All three programs studied rely, to varying degrees,
on evaluation and evidence-based feedback for
ongoing program adjustments. Researchers from
India and around the world, have studied the JSY
Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) configurations
and outcomes achieved extensively and there is
a rich body of literature on JSY. Further, program
modifications in India (the addition of JSSK in
particular) appear to be a direct response to
concerns raised in evaluations of the program in
the first few years.
In Malawi, policy makers drew on international and
domestic evidence that TBA integration was not
improving maternal health outcomes in formulating
the ban and the repurposing of the TBAs to new
roles.
In Nigeria, the SURE-P MCH program included
a widespread supply side element, with a more
limited demand-side intervention that was rigorously tested in fewer communities. Some supply
side elements, such as monetary or non-monetary
incentives to improve staff retention, are being
tested before being rolled out, all in the context
of a robust program-wide evaluation framework.
When the SURE-P MCH program began in 2012,
a staff member from the Oportunidades program
in Mexico was seconded to Nigeria for 6 months
to help design the CCT component.
government of India set clear parameters and guidelines
for implementation. Both India and Nigeria, large countries with substantial national resources, have financed
these programs largely from national sources. Nigeria’s
contribution to just the salaries of the midwives deployed
to the first 1000 facilities comes to around USD1 million
per month. The SURE-P MCH investment by the Nigerian
Government is a substantial one that dwarfs much donor
funding. India’s contribution is similarly impressive; in 2011
the program cost the Indian government US$333 million
(Kapur and Chowdhury, 2012) These large national investments are, perhaps, the ultimate expression of political
will. SURE-P MCH has also been run by a federal agency,
although the program makes a concerted effort to partner
with the states. Malawi has also used the convening power of the executive branch to organize and prioritize its
efforts, but it is a much smaller, more centrally run country
than the other two.
merely driving demand to increase the number of births in
facilities rather than a focus on the quality of the services
provided. Although JSY is part of the overarching National
Rural Health Mission that was intended to address some
supply elements, these were insufficient and underemphasized. There were two conflicting viewpoints about
India’s approach to prioritizing demand-side interventions
before addressing supply. One group of respondents felt
that supply and demand should have been addressed
together, perhaps through a slower rollout, starting with
piloting the program, and then expanding it. Some in this
group felt that encouraging women to come into facilities
when the facilities were not prepared was unethical. The
second group of respondents felt that the government
had to start somewhere, and that it made sense that they
began by focusing on demand, and that now that people
were coming in, the government was starting to focus on
improving supply.
Creation of political will can be aided by the leadership
of an advocate or champion. That champion must have
the ability to spot opportunities, or policy windows, and
take advantage of them to advance the cause, such as
Minister Pate did in Nigeria. External pressure can also
create political will, such as the creation of the Millennium
Development Goals (MDGs) with clear targets and close
monitoring of countries’ progress toward those goals. The
MDGs also created fiscal space for work on key targets by
providing debt relief money to free up resources specifically for these targets.
SURE-P MCH in Nigeria, in contrast, put a higher emphasis
on supply side elements, while also including some
demand side interventions. SURE-P MCH’s supply side
component had reached 1250 facilities by early 2014, in
comparison to just 46 PHC’s where demand side incentives, similar to those in JSY, were offered. In addition the
supply side focus of SURE-P MCH is very comprehensive,
including: physical renovations, including boreholes for
clean water; increased numbers of qualified providers; ongoing supply of drugs and consumables; and construction
of staff accommodation to support staff retention. As a result of the improved physical facilities and expanded staff
capacity, SURE-P MCH facilities do not seem to complain
of being overwhelmed or inundated the way some facilities
in India were. In addition, respondents in Nigeria said that
facility delivery rates were increasing even in sites that
received only supply side interventions, which suggests
that high quality supply can also draw demand.
Political will, in the context of policies to increase facility
delivery, is important in order to get policies in place, to
have needed resources allocated to implement policies,
and to ensure things happen. Although political will
manifested in a different way in each country, it was
central to getting maternal health on the agenda, and
ensuring the financial resources were made available
for implementation.
Lesson learned #2: Balancing supply,
demand and quality
In our three case studies we saw many different configurations of targeting supply, demand or quality, leading us to
conclude that the most successful strategies incorporate
elements of all three.
India’s JSY program, the oldest and most established program of the three policies, is a demand-focused program.
While it has been successful at increasing the rates of
facility delivery, issues of quality emerged because supply
side factors such as number of beds, staff, staff training,
and supplies were not addressed. The federal government emphasized the state’s role in setting and attaining
numerical targets, which resulted in greater attention to
Malawi’s policies represent a different approach to dealing
with both demand and supply. Rather than incentivizing
women to deliver in a facility, the implementation of local
bylaws effectively punishes women who fail to do so with
a fine. Our respondents were comfortable with the coercive nature of fines because of the intended health benefit
for women, however issues of equity may raise concerns
that poor women are the least likely to be able to afford
both transport to a facility or the fine for a home delivery.
However, for a poor country like Malawi, this type of finebased disincentive to home delivery is clearly more affordable and thus sustainable. On the supply side Malawi has
focused on increasing skilled staff and adding maternity
waiting homes. The increases in skilled staff have been
incremental and take time, however the building of waiting
homes has been a visible achievement in a number of
sites and they are very well received in the communities
where they have been constructed. The one area not
explicitly addressed by the policy we examined in Malawi
is quality. Concerns have been raised that driving demand
with the TBA ban may result in overcrowding at facilities
that are already low in resources, which would negatively
affect quality. Given the concerns raised in India about
the impact of increased volume on quality, this is likely a
valid concern.
Each of the cases we examined had different strengths
and weaknesses, but all of them, individually and together
serve to highlight that supply, demand, and quality are
deeply intertwined. Policy makers wishing to increase
facility delivery should take stock of their supply and demand, and strive to keep those in balance while working
to achieve optimal quality. It may be important to assess
the reasons for lack of demand, as these may be related
to transport difficulties, poor quality services, or other barriers. Understanding the context in one’s country is an important preliminary step to deciding between supply side
and demand side interventions. The process may also be
dynamic and iterative as shifts in one may be reflected
in the other, and quality can be an intervening factor that
affects that balance.
Challenges with conditional cash transfer
payment mechanisms
Lessons from India and Nigeria illustrate some of
the challenges in implementing a conditional cash
transfer program. India began JSY with a commitment of giving cash to a woman before she left the
facility. Subsequent complaints showed the money
did not all get to women so a series of other mechanisms including bearer cheques and account pay
checks have been tried. These reduce corruption
but made it difficult for poor rural women without
bank accounts to receive the incentive. In addition, the one-time payment in India means only the
conditionality of facility delivery is emphasized, and
only available to poor women after delivery. It has
been suggested that this is partly responsible for
the lackluster increase in antenatal care.
Nigeria has avoided the pitfalls of provider corruption by having central program staff disburse money directly. This is done quarterly and payments
are broken up in tranches to ensure emphasis
on antenatal care and postnatal care conditionalities. However central verification and quarterly
disbursement days result in long waits for some
women, eroding confidence in the program. Nigeria is working on piloting a mobile money option to
overcome these challenges.
Getting supply-side interventions right
The SURE-P MCH program in Nigeria highlighted
some challenges and best practices in addressing
the supply side needs in order to increase facility
delivery.
• Problem: The program has had difficulties
recruiting and maintaining midwives, particularly in Northern states where there is a smaller
health workforce and more security concerns.
• Solution: Construction of staff accommodations at participating facilities is designed to
minimize this problem.
• Problem: The package of resources is fixed,
and not easily tailored to the needs of the facility/community. For example, staffing is based
on program guidelines not on service numbers.
• Solution: A flexible resource package implemented based on recurring needs assessments might better address this.
• Problem: Stock outs. The program is not integrated into the existing state-level drug supply
chains, because the states often charge for the
drugs they distribute. This can at times result
in poor stocking at facilities and causes tension
between state and federal agencies.
• Solution: SURE-P is currently working on
improving the logistics chain to begin
addressing this.
• Problem: Staff intensive—SURE-P MCH
found it was challenging to train and supervise
12,000 new health workers, and there was no
pre-existing monitoring system for CHEWs
and VHWs.
• Solution: Still in development
Lesson learned #3: Improving access to
facility deliveries
A major barrier to facility-based delivery is the accessibility
of facilities—for many communities, the difficulties in
reaching a facility is a deterrent to seeking maternal health
care and results in delayed care in case of emergencies.
Although closely related to the supply-side issues of
making sure there are existing, staffed facilities, improving
access goes a bit further and looks at how women will get
there. The case study programs highlight the importance
of including components designed to reduce the barriers
to access—on their own, strategies to generate demand
or improve quality are not sufficient. These programs each
included elements designed to reduce the challenges in
reaching facilities for delivery after initial implementation
demonstrated the access gap between communities and
facilities, and in each case, this component has been
considered of central importance.
All three countries now include ambulances in their program. In India, the majority of facilities have an ambulance
or can link patients to an ambulance service that will provide free transport to any woman in labor; while in Nigeria
and Malawi ambulances are placed only at the referral
facilities and are intended for use in the case of a complication for transport from the primary health center to the
hospital. Both India and Nigeria added this transportation
component after the initial program rollout in response
to the challenges women faced in reaching facilities. The
addition of transportation is considered to be a crucial
addition in both locations. In India, adding ambulances is
thought to have increased the number of women coming
to facilities for delivery and for post-natal care services,
and it is likewise expected that the ambulances in Nigeria
will improve access to emergency services. However,
no country has reached universal coverage with
ambulance services.
Malawi has primarily addressed access in a different way:
through the construction and renovation of maternal waiting homes at 130 of the 300 facilities in Malawi that attend
deliveries. Rather than invest resources in adding facilities
or providing ambulances to bring women in labor in to the
facilities, Malawi provides a place for the women to stay,
so that they may travel by normal, more affordable means
of transportation to the facility before she is in labor and
wait there for labor to begin. Since travel during labor is
difficult, and women are charged more for transportation
in an emergency, this option is attractive to many women.
The waiting homes concept draws from an existing system in Malawi of “guardian shelters” that hospitals already
had available for people to stay at the facility while their
relatives were admitted.
Although these programs focus primarily on generating
demand for facility delivery and/or improving the quality of
maternal health care at facilities, it is clear that ensuring
access to facilities both for delivery and emergency services is crucial to the long-term success of these programs. Countries considering policies to increase facilitybased delivery need to consider strategies that improve
accessibility of health facilities, including the availability of
transportation, in order to increase demand and ensure
service utilization. Reducing the barriers to reaching health
facilities improves the ability of women to access facilities
for normal delivery, and can minimize delays in accessing
care in case of complications.
Lesson learned #4: Community
engagement
Community engagement was an important component
of all three case studies. In India, the ASHA program
incentivized village health workers to help get women into
facilities. In Nigeria, village health workers and ward development committees (not paid) helped incentivize women
and act as an accountability mechanism and advocacy
organizations raised awareness of the program in communities where they work. In Malawi, local chiefs and other
leaders motivated women to deliver in facilities and enacted bylaws involving fines for both women and TBAs who
The role of the private sector: An opportunity
to expand access?
Another way to expand access includes adding in
additional facilities, not by building facilities, but by
giving poor women who use government facilities
affordable access to private facilities that already
exist. In Malawi, the private not-for-profit sector,
primarily the Christian Health Association of Malawi
(CHAM), plays a large role in MCH care provision. The health districts in Malawi have created
service-level agreements with CHAM facilities to
provide care where government facilities lack capacity or are nonexistent. In Uttar Pradesh, India,
private providers participate in JSY and can be
reimbursed for incentives paid to women below the
poverty line who deliver in their facilities. Elsewhere
in India, private providers play an even larger role
in provision of care under JSY. To date, Nigeria,
which has a large number of existing government
health facilities, has not engaged the private sector
health facilities under SURE-P MCH.
delivered at home. Malawi also engaged local women at
the village level to serve as “Secret Mothers” and mentor
women by encouraging them to seek antenatal care and
facility delivery.
All three countries used local (village) level individuals to
strengthen the program. In Malawi, the local engagement
was at the religious and traditional leadership level, in
India it was local women, similar to the women who would
be delivering, and Nigeria had both of these components.
The ASHAs in India and the VHWs in Nigeria received
some payment for their efforts, while the Ward Development Committees in Nigeria and the Chiefs, Traditional
Leaders, and Secret Mothers in Malawi did not. While
payment was not used in all cases, some type of
recognition or honor was associated with the position.
This helped incentivize the community members to want
to participate, even if they did not receive monetary
compensation for their time.
In all three countries there were previous systems in place
through which community members were involved in
promoting healthy behavior, and therefore, there was a
precedent (and in some cases structure) for this type of
community involvement. This allowed for a more natural
acceptance of community involvement by local populations, but may not make the findings transferrable to other
settings. Notably, the chiefs system in Malawi is successfully encouraging women to deliver in facilities by fining
them for delivering at home using a system of bylaws that
are used for other social behaviors and therefore accepted. Fining women for delivering at home might not be as
socially acceptable in other settings where this was not
already the norm.
Federal versus state control: Challenges and
opportunities
Federal Control
Challenge: Individual states or facilities in Nigeria,
were unhappy with one-size fits all programming.
Malawi’s federally run program has limited staff to
cover the whole country.
Opportunity: Federal funding and control in all
three countries increased the coordination and
cohesiveness of the program
State Control
Challenge: State policies in some states in Nigeria
include charging users fees for medication and
supplies; allowing state policies to prevail in the
SURE-P MCH program would erode some of the
equity goals of the program.
Oopportunity: States in India have had some
flexibility in how to implement JSY such as whether
to engage the private sector, which has improved
adoption within India’s complex political system.
In summary, community engagement was a key component of each policy, and in all countries community involvement was seen as an important piece to the success
of the policy in increasing the number of women delivering
in facilities. Payment is not the only possible motivator for
community leaders or volunteers to encourage women to
deliver in facilities, as the honor of a leadership/special
role was compelling in all cases.
Lesson learned #5: Norm change
In order for policies to have a lasting effect, they need
to remain in place, or create a societal change in norms
away from home deliveries to facility deliveries. If this
can be achieved, the more expensive demand-creation
policies can be phased out over time. The cases studied
differed on the level of norm change that had accompanied each policy. It appeared that there has been a
normative shift in Malawi: women would continue delivering in facilities without the TBA ban. This did not happen
in India: women would deliver at home without JSY. It is
unclear in Nigeria.
Community involvement was an important part of the
reason for norm change in Malawi and possibly in Nigeria—where the local leaders and ward development
committees were helping to create a normative change in
people’s expectations about what they should do and also
what should be provided to them in terms of services.
In India and also possibly in Nigeria, the problems with
the policies/programs or failures in implementation were
reasons that people would revert back to delivering at
home if the policies ended. The poor quality of care and
patient-provider interactions, lack of supply to match
demand, and problems in payments, were making women
actively not want to deliver in facilities.
In summary, a certain policy succeeding in increasing the
number of women delivering in facilities does not necessarily mean that norms had changed to accept this
practice without the incentive or policy. Where community
leaders were involved, norm change seemed to be easier
to achieve. However, where serious problems arose with
women’s experiences while at facilities, norms did not
change and a preference for home births remained.
Other policy implementation issues
In addition to the above-mentioned lessons learned about
policies to increase facility deliveries, our cases provided
insights on topics applicable to a wider spectrum of policy
initiatives.
Transparency and accountability
The ability of policy-makers and program implementers to
develop structures for ensuring greater transparency and
accountability appears to be important to maintain the
acceptability of the program among government and community stakeholders. Without buy-in from these groups,
the sustainability of the program in terms of on-going
funding and continued utilization of services is uncertain.
Accountability, at the policy level and at the level of program implementation, was a challenge faced by each of
these programs, and each program used different strategies to increase accountability at different levels.
Nigeria’s SURE-P program includes multiple mechanisms
to ensure accountability and transparency in implementation and resource allocation. This is in response to the
origin of the program as an answer to protests about the
allocation of government revenue as well as the history
of corruption in the country. At the national level, there
are two mechanisms to improve accountability in public funds allocation. First, the program is overseen by a
committee of non-politically-affiliated individuals who are
responsible for making decisions about resource allocation and verifying the appropriate utilization of these funds.
Second, the organization responsible for program implementation sits outside of existing government agencies.
By placing SURE-P outside of the traditional funding and
implementation pathways, there is greater transparency
about where public funding is spent, and accountability
to ensure that program funds are used to provide the
intended services. SURE-P also instituted community-level
mechanisms through which residents can monitor implementation of program activities. The program has revitalized community based leadership committees (known
as ward development committees), which communicate
directly with the federal oversight and implementation
bodies, and are encouraged to verify that promised resources are made available to the community. For example, committee members may be called upon to check
the supply of drugs to health facilities or report on health
worker absenteeism.
In India, efforts to improve accountability occurred primarily at the level of implementation. There were concerns that
the cash incentives were not reaching the intended beneficiaries due to corruption in the payments. In both of the
initial payment models—cash and bearer check—women
were frequently required to pay part of their incentive to
the provider in order to receive the money. To address this
problem the program has made several modifications to
the disbursement system. The current system of using
account checks reduces the amount of bribery, increasing
the amount of cash that women are able to keep. However, it introduced the challenge that many women do
not have access to bank accounts. In addition, there are
some concerns that the facilities are inflating the number
of recorded facility deliveries, such that the facilities, women, and ASHAs each receive a part of a false incentive
payment.
Though financial incentives are generally effective in
driving behavior change, payment systems need to be
carefully implemented to avoid corruption and inflation
of service numbers. While Nigeria’s payment system has
effectively reduced corruption, the implementation is potentially un-scalable due to the staff intensive model. Likewise, it remains unclear the scale at which Malawi’s policy
will be implemented, given the reliance on local leaders
rather than a centralized implementation strategy.
Other policy implementation issues | 9
Conclusion
Scale and sustainability
The policies in the three case studies were enacted at
various levels: India was at the country level, Malawi
was mostly at a country level, although traditional chief
involvement was not everywhere. Nigeria was federally
implemented in all 36 states, but only includes 1,250 out
of 26,000 facilities across the country, and is also the
newest policy. It appears thus far that the slower, stepwise approach that Nigeria is taking to rolling out the
program is helping it have fewer problems than India’s
similar program. However, Nigeria’s program is only funded for a few more years, therefore, there we do not know
if it will be scaled up, or even if the existing program will
be sustainable over time. Some efforts have been made in
increase the possibility of sustainability, including engaging
states, which receive most of the federal funds for health,
in committing some of their resources to staff salaries to
ensure retention.
Malawi’s initial announcement of the TBA ban was at the
nation-wide level, however, how it is implemented depends on the level of engagement of the chiefs. Therefore,
in some ways it is more similar to Nigeria, in that it is scaling up the policy more slowly, by reaching out to different
chiefs and trying to bring them on-board over time. It is interesting to note that although the government officials in
Malawi have gone back and forth on their support for the
TBA ban, lower level support for the policy has remained,
and hence it appears to be fairly sustainable over time.
However, Malawi’s policy is not a program in the same
way that Nigeria or India’s is (requiring a lot of funding,
infrastructure, etc.), therefore the effort to scale up and to
sustain is much smaller than in the other two countries.
Despite the problems faced by India which have been
well-documented in the literature, it is important to
highlight that it has increased access to facility deliveries
for a nation of over a billion people in a very short time
period, and increased the percent of women delivering in
all states by substantial percentages. Not only this, but
the policy has been sustained for almost 10 years, and
still has strong governmental support, suggesting that it
will be sustained in the coming years. India has continued to make changes to the policy to address problems,
and increase access in less well-performing states and
sub-populations.
It seems that there may be a tradeoff between scale and
quality, at least in the early stages of policy rollout. Slower
scaling up allows for more careful rollout, and allows for
tweaks to be made earlier on to the system. The issue
of sustainability is still up in the air for all of these. Policy
makers should consider issues of sustainability at the outset of a policy, and consider it in the scale that things are
implemented at. Implementing a new policy nationwide
can vary in degree of difficulty, depending on the cost and
nature of the interventions. Regulatory policies like the
TBA ban are easier to implement nationwide, but may not
be effective without a widespread community support.
Large complex programs may benefit from step-wise
implementation, if leaders are committed to learning from
the problems that arise and making adjustments. National
simultaneous roll-out may be the most effective in creating
widespread measureable impact.
Summary
In examining these three different cases, with widely
different approaches to increasing facility delivery, we
found a number of important commonalities. The first was
the importance of getting maternal health on the policy
agenda and being able to use policy windows to generate
the political will to implement new policies. Next, we found
that implementation is central to the success of a strategy
and that policy makers need to take great care to balance
supply, demand, and quality; to ensure access to services;
and to engage communities as part of the implementation process. Finally, if policies are to be sustainable and
affordable it is critical to work to make facility delivery the
social norm. Additionally these policies, like other policy
initiatives should be transparent and accountable to the
population and carefully consider the scale of a policy with
an eye toward potential for sustainability.
While these three case studies are only a snapshot of
the types of policies that have been implemented around
the globe with the aim to increase the number of women
delivering in facilities, they provide insight that might help
future policy makers create successful policies. Lessons
learned from these three countries and their policies have
broader applicability, not only in India, Nigeria, and Malawi
relating to maternal health, but to other countries and
regions, and to polices related to similarly complex other
health interventions and improvements.
Conclusion | 10
Appendix
Malawi: TBA Ban
Background
In the 1990s Malawi invested in formal training of TBAs
and in trying to connect them to the formal health system
as a strategy for improving women’s health. By the mid
2000’s the international consensus was that the evidence
did not support using TBAs to try to improve maternal
health outcomes. Malawi MOH staff also reviewed Malawi’s evidence on TBAs and reached the same conclusion.
With the support of the reproductive health directorate,
TBA deliveries in Malawi were banned by the Malawian
president. This policy was what some call a podium policy,
a pronouncement by the executive, but the MOH supported it and internally they shifted away from all work supporting and engaging TBAs as birth attendants and tried
to refocus their roles as community resources who would
advise women and refer them in to health facilities.
The TBA ban was effective and popular, however in 2010
after attending an event at the UN, the then-president of
Malawi made a proclamation that effectively reversed the
ban. This was done without consultation with the MOH
and was contrary to their program and workplan. This
was an example again of a podium policy, which although
not codified in law, made it difficult for MOH staff to make
progress toward their goals of having all women deliver in
the hands of a skilled birth attendant.
Current policy
In 2012, the Malawian president died suddenly and Joyce
Banda, the then-Vice President ascended to the presidency.
She launched an initiative called the Presidential Initiative
for Safe Motherhood which includes three pillars:
1. Community mobilization to increase facility
based deliveries. This is primarily done through
working with traditional (chiefs) and religious leaders,
educating them about safe motherhood. They in turn
educate other traditional leaders and their community
members, and they have also taken the initiative to
pass local bylaws formally prohibiting TBA deliveries.
These local bylaws generally include punishment (a
fine of a goat or a chicken) for any pregnant woman
who delivers with a TBA, and the TBA who delivers
her. The chiefs or community leaders also recruit
community volunteers to serve as “secret mothers” to
track all the pregnant women in the community and
direct them to attend prenatal care and deliver at the
nearest health facility. Where possible, they have tried
to redefine the role of the TBAs to be “secret mothers”
instead, but not all TBAs had the literacy skills required
for the tracking of pregnant women.
2. Construction/expansion of maternity waiting
homes at health facilities. Maternity waiting
homes—in either a 24 bed or 36 bed design—are
being constructed or expanded across the country
so that women can come to the health facility when
they reach their 9th month of pregnancy (36 weeks)
and wait their until labor happens and they deliver.
This eases the burden of women in labor trying to
find transport. Women are frequently accompanied by
a female relative who stays in the facility’s guardian
shelter—a simple shelter designed to provide housing for family members of inpatients. The time during
which women are in residence at the waiting homes
facilitates their regular check ups in the final weeks of
pregnancy and presents an opportunity for additional
health education.
3. Community midwives. The final strategy being implemented is training of a new cadre of midwives known
as “community midwives.” This program is shorter
than the traditional midwifery training program—18
months rather than 3 years. As these midwives will be
less experienced, the plan is that they be placed where
they can be supervised by fully qualified midwives.
There are some challenges related to this as there is an
overall very high vacancy rate in the midwifery posts.
Furthermore, when the program was initiated it was
envisioned these midwives would be placed in the
community, but there is no infrastructure at that level—
no buildings for them to use as delivery centers, no
connection to ensure quick safe referral when needed.
So, the actual role and how they will be used seems to
be part of an ongoing discussion. At least two cohorts
have completed training so far, and to date it appears
these are being placed at health facilities.
Policy focus: Community mobilization to
increase facility based deliveries
Our primary area of interest was the banning or refocusing
of TBAs on other tasks. This is implemented through the
community mobilization element of the Presidential Safe
Motherhood Initiative. However, the other two pillars are
important complementary policies.
The strategy of community mobilization is centrally driven
and leverages the traditional ruling structures in Malawi
for both diffusing the messages and making community
members accountable for complying with them. This
Appendix | 11
strategy is run from the Ministry of Local Government,
which targets traditional chiefs, religious leaders and other
community leaders and the works with them and the
District Assembly, Area Development Committees, Village
Development Committees and community committees
and members (Republic Of Malawi, Presidential Initiative
on Safe Motherhood, Strategic Plan 2012–2016). Chiefs
and other local leaders are trained on Safe Motherhood
issues, and then encouraged to train other chiefs including their under-chiefs and their local committees. As part
of this process the chiefs pass local bylaws which assert
that all women in the community should deliver in a health
facility and that anyone who does not will pay some fine or
penalty, such as a goat or a chicken. This strategy builds
on existing community structures in which community
members already participate.
Some key aspects of the community mobilization strategy
to consider include:
Demand-side elements
This strategy is a demand side strategy, driving demand
through community mobilization and education about the
advantages of facility birth, creating social norms around
facility delivery, and enforcing those social norms with
penalties if necessary.
Supply-side elements
While the community mobilization strategy does not address the supply side, the two other pillars of the Presidential Initiative on Safe Motherhood do. The community
mobilization strategy is clearly complemented by efforts
to improve the supply side through provision of maternity
waiting homes and training of community midwives which
are also included in the Initiative
Community engagement efforts
The Malawi strategy also exhibits strong community engagement. Because it works through existing traditional
ruling structures it engages community members in a way
that is familiar and comfortable to them. In some areas, as
part of the community sensitization campaign, community
members are encouraged to think about what was one of
the key messages they learned and the committee members ask them if they are willing to paint that message
on the outside wall of the house. This way they share the
message with passersby and the chiefs and village leadership can, at a glance, see what messages have been really taken in by the community and which ones may need
further emphasis. The structure of the community mobilization efforts also presents opportunities for community
members to play a specific role in Safe Motherhood, by
taking on the role of “Secret Mothers” or Distributors of
Family Planning methods.
Access to care
Issues of access to care are addressed in this policy
primarily by the complementary elements of maternity
waiting homes. Malawi is striving to ensure every Malawian lives within 8 km of a primary health center, but that
goal has not yet been reached. In addition, the road and
transport networks are very poor, making reaching a facility especially difficult for a woman in labor. Malawi has tried
to reduce this burden by building maternity waiting homes
adjacent to the health centers and encouraging women to
come stay there and wait for delivery once they reach their
9th month of pregnancy.
Scale
The community mobilization strategy has a national focus.
Priority has been given to some key strategic areas, and
only chiefs who are willing to participate are included, but
the initiative aims to reach as many communities as it can.
In the first Safe Motherhood Chief Workshop in 2012 39
traditional leaders from 21 of Malawi’s 28 districts were
present. (Republic Of Malawi, Presidential Initiative on
Safe Motherhood, Strategic Plan 2012–2016).
Resources
Resources for the Presidential Safe Motherhood Initiative
come from a variety of sources. These include development partners, the private sector, the Ministry of Finance,
USAID, and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation.
(Republic Of Malawi, Presidential Initiative on Safe Motherhood, Strategic Plan 2012–2016).
Political context
Malawi has strong political will to reduce maternal mortality. Malawi was one of 8 countries to launch CARMMA (the
Campaign for Accelerated Reduction of Maternal Mortality
in Africa) in 2009 (others joined in 2010 and 2011). The
then-Vice president Joyce Banda was named then CARMMA Ambassador for Malawi. Later, after the sudden death
of the Malawian president Joyce Banda ascended to the
presidency and used her position to further the cause of
Safe Motherhood by establishing the Presidential Initiative
for Safe Motherhood. Recent elections have resulted in a
change in leadership in Malawi, which leaves some question about whether Safe Motherhood will continue to be a
priority. However, Malawi has a long-standing commitment
to free maternal and child health services. Many services
at public facilities are free and the key maternal and child
health services never have any user fees attached. The
government commitment to this has even led to some
public-private partnerships (see below) in which the government subsidizes the cost of care in private facilities and
insists on users not being charged any user fees under
these agreements.
Appendix | 12
Complementary programs
Malawi has a number of complementary programs, that
support the goal of increasing facility-based delivery in
direct or indirect ways. The other pillars of the Presidential
Initiative for Safe Motherhood mentioned above, directly
support the goal by strengthening the supply side through
construction of maternity waiting homes and training of
community midwives. The Strategic Plan for the Initiative
also includes other supply-side improvements such as
EMONC training, and recruitment and retention of skilled
personnel.(Republic Of Malawi, Presidential Initiative
on Safe Motherhood, Strategic Plan 2012–2016., n.d.)
Outside of the initiative there are also other strategies that
reinforce the goal of increased facility delivery.
Public-private partnership: Service Level Agreements
with the Christian Health Association of Malawi. Malawi
is a poor country with a largely rural population. The
government’s goal is to have a public health facility within
8 km of every person, however, this has not yet been
achieved. As a way to extend the reach to where facilities
are inadequate to meet demand, some districts have been
empowered to enter into service level agreements (SLAs)
with a network of private health providers known as the
Christian Health Association of Malawi (CHAM). CHAM is
a network of church owned private facilities that typically provide care for a (subsidized) fee. Under the Service
Level Agreements, districts have contracted with individual
CHAM facilities to provide key maternal and child health
services free of charge to the population. While these
agreements are not without their challenges, they have effectively extended the capacity of the public sector. CHAM
association members also run a significant portion of the
health worker training institutions in the country.
OPTIONS- Results Based Financing. Malawi currently
has 4 districts participating in a results based financing
program for maternal and newborn health called Options.
The program includes 3 main components
• Immediate investments in minor infrastructure
and equipment for participating facilities to bring
them up to a minimum operating level to participate in
the project
• Supply-side component: provide financial rewards
to facility-based teams at both district level and below
and district health management teams
• Demand-side component: a conditional cash transfer to women delivering in an approved health facility.
Impact
The TBA ban per se has not been formally evaluated.
However, there is some objective evidence that it has
been effective in increasing facility based deliveries.
According to the 2010 Malawi DHS, the facility delivery
rate was up to 73.2% in 2010 compared to 56.4% in
2004(National Statistical Office (NSO) and ICF Macro,
2011; National Statistical Office (NSO) [Malawi], and ORC
Macro., 2005). In addition, in an evaluation of another
community based intervention to decrease maternal and
neonatal mortality, facility delivery statistics were collected
and there was a strong temporal association between the
TBA ban and increases in facility delivery (Barker, 2014).
In addition to the quantitative evidence, our key informants
clearly felt that norms in Malawi had shifted from home
delivery to facility delivery.
Future direction: As of June 2014, Joyce Banda lost
a bid for re-election. Maternal and child health issues
including safe motherhood specific interventions are still a
priority in the current health sector strategic plan. The new
government has not dismantled the Presidential initiative
on Safe Motherhood, but new officials have been appointed to the program. The former First Lady has been appointed to be the National Coordinator and her chief role
will be to continue advocacy and resource mobilization for
safe motherhood. To ensure alignment, the Presidential
Safe Motherhood Initiative reports to the Minister of Health
whose responsibility is to ensure access and availability of
health services to all Malawians.
Appendix | 13
Nigeria: Subsidy re-investment and
empowerment program
History and background (political context)
The Subsidy Re-Investment and Empowerment Program
(SURE-P) is a federally-run social safety net program in
Nigeria. The SURE-P program was initiated in 2012,
following large-scale protests over the government’s decision to reduce the fuel subsidies. In response to public
dissent, President Goodluck Jonathan announced the
re-investment of the Federal Government’s savings from
the subsidy reduction into programs intended to reduce
the effect of subsidy removal, with a focus on infrastructure projects and social safety net programs.
Maternal health is one of the priority social safety net
programs funded through SURE-P, alongside vocational
training, mass transit, community service, youth and
empowerment, HIV/AIDS, polio eradication, and a heart/
stroke center. The program is designed to increase
access to maternal health services and improve the
quality of maternal health care through a number of
supply- and demand-side interventions. The program
focuses on rural and high need areas: communities and
facilities are selected for inclusion through discussion with
state- and LGA-level health departments, with a focus on
selecting high-need facilities in areas with poor maternal
health outcomes.
The structure of the SURE-P MCH program is based on
a previously implemented maternal health intervention—
the Midwifery Service Scheme (MSS). The MSS program
placed midwives to work in rural primary health centers
throughout the country, and provided a one-time supply
of maternal health commodities to participating facilities. The MSS is believed to have increased the rates of
ANC attendance while not significantly changing rates of
facility-based delivery. Learning from that experience, the
SURE-P MCH program added on-going supply chain for
essential health commodities, facility upgrades, supplemental staff programs, and a demand-side component,
in an effort to increase the impact on maternal and postnatal health services utilization.
Program description
The SURE-P MCH demand-side component consists
of a conditional cash transfer to incentivize antenatal
and post-natal care attendance and facility delivery. The
maximum incentive is 5000 Nigerian Naira (NGN), with
payments made based on completion of a number of
co-responsibilities. Women receive 1000 Naira for registration and attendance at first ANC; 1000 NGN pro-rated
for attendance at 2nd, 3rd, and 4th ANC; 2000 NGN for
facility delivery; and 1000 NGN for attendance at the first
post-natal appointment and child immunization with the
first dose of BCG. Payments for the CCT program are
made once every three months, and payment days are
advertised in the community and through text messages
to enrolled women. The quarterly cash payment system
minimizes corruption, however it is staff intensive and
results in delayed payments to beneficiaries. Alternative
payment models—such as mobile money—are being
piloted in 2 Northern States.
The SURE-P MCH supply-side work includes human
resources, supply chain, and infrastructure components.
Each participating facility is staffed with an additional four
midwives and two Community Health Extension Workers (CHEWs). The CHEWs are primarily employed to do
community outreach and education to encourage use of
maternal health services. This outreach is done in coordination with Village Health Workers who are selected by
the community and paid a monthly stipend by the SURE-P
program. Where required, participating facilities are renovated and upgraded. Upgrades include clinic expansions,
installation of solar electricity, and provision of boreholes
for clean water. In addition, health worker accommodations
are being constructed to reduce staff attrition. All facilities
receive essential maternal and child health commodities;
SURE-P is partnering with USAID/Deliver to manage the
supply chain of essential medicines to participating facilities. Women that deliver at SURE-P facilities also receive
MAMA kits containing a set of supplies and materials for
delivery and infant care.
Community engagement
SURE-P staff and community organizations conduct
outreach and advocacy activities in participating communities both to introduce the program and to encourage
use of the services. The Village Health Workers(VHWs)
are also intended to provide on-going community-based
education and encourage utilization of the services.
SURE-P has re-established or supported the Ward
Development Committees that operate in each health
center catchment area, and the members of this
committee are responsible for monitoring and oversight
of the program as well as increasing awareness of the
program at the community level.
Accessibility
SURE-P MCH is in the process of introducing transportation services, through partnership with Riders International.
Through this partnership, the program is purchasing
ambulances to be stationed at each of the referral facilities;
however to date only 50 ambulances have been procured.
In addition, the SURE-P MCH program pays for the cost
of any services received at the referral hospital, as well
as transportation for complicated deliveries to reach the
referral facility.
Appendix | 14
Program structure
The SURE-P MCH program is dually managed by the
Program Implementation Unit (PIU)—a federal-level implementing unit affiliated with the National Primary Health
Care Development Agency—and the SURE-P Committee,
a presidentially-appointed oversight committee tasked
with approving work plans and budgetary allocations, as
well as monitoring the activity of the PIU. At the state level, each state has a steering committee that is intended to
provide input to and oversight of the program. States are
also expected to contribute a percentage of the SURE-P
health worker salaries. In practice, the level of state engagement varies widely.
Scale
Currently, the supply-side components of the MCH program are being implemented in all 36 states as well as the
FCT, while the demand-side elements are being implemented in 9 states and the FCT. Within the states, the program
is implemented in selected Local Government Areas (LGA)
in a cluster model. In each LGA, four Primary Health Centers
and one referral hospital are selected for participation. To
date, 1200 PHCs have received supplies of essential
drugs and commodities, 500 PHCs have been renovated,
with 628 boreholes installed and 128 general hospitals
have been upgraded (SUREP website). There are 12,000
Midwives, CHEWs, and VHWs working under the program.
The Midwives Service Scheme (MSS) on which the
SURE-P MCH human resources component is based,
continues to staff PHCs throughout the country, though
there is no overlap between MSS and SURE-P MSS sites.
Together, these programs are increasing the coverage
for facility-based deliveries by improving access to better
staffed and equipped health facilities. In additional, a number of other national initiatives, such as Saving One Million
Lives and Primary Health Care Under One Roof, are also
working on improving the quality of services provided at
Primary Health Centers and conducting policy advocacy
to increase awareness of and engagement on maternal
and child health issues at the state and federal level.
Impact
Given the program’s recent initiation, there is little evidence available on the impacts of the SURE-P MCH, however interviews with program staff indicate that the program is well-received in the communities, including those
communities who receive only supply-side interventions.
Initial program data also indicates that the program is
improving service quality and access to services. According to a SURE-P MCH Status Report from March 2014:
• The SURE-P MCH program has placed an additional
12,000 health staff in participating facilities
• 519,539 women have received ANC services; 88,982
women delivered in SURE-P facilities, and the program
enrolled 19,399 new FP clients
• The CCT program provided payment to 16,447
women for facility delivery
Rates of maternal and child health service utilization have
also increased in participating communities. Comparing
current rates to those prior to program implementation,
the program has resulted in a 67% increase in ANC
attendance, a 55% increase in facility-based deliveries,
and a 64% increase in post-natal care attendance. There
is also good retention in the CCT program, with 80% of
women completing all conditionalities. This has increased
since the initial pilots, and it is thought that this may be
the result of restructuring the payments into only 2
installments, with the larger payment following delivery
and post-natal care.
Sustainability
The SURE-P funding is set to end in December 2015,
and although there is lots of interest and positive feedback about the program, given the upcoming elections
and unsure funding future there are questions about the
sustainability of the program. Despite this, there is the
potential to sustain some program elements. The SURE-P
MCH program is providing many lessons learned that can
be drawn into other national MCH initiatives, and provides
proof of concept for these ideas. The SURE-P program,
together with the World Bank, is currently evaluating
the program, including conducting several RCTs of the
health worker incentive, CCT, and supply chain components. This evaluation will provide more information about
the program’s impact and the essential components for
program success and continuation. As the majority of
implementing staff are employed by government agencies
responsible for MCH program, the lessons learned from
SURE-P can be utilized in on-going programs.
In addition, the vast majority of the resources for the
SURE-P MCH program are from the federal government.
Although the existing resource allocation mechanism may
not be permanent, there are domestic resources available
that can continue to be invested in health.
Appendix | 15
Uttar Pradesh, India: Janani Suraksha
Yojana (JSY) program
Elements of program
Basic description of the program
In 2005, India began the National Rural Health Mission, of
which one key component is the Janani Suraksha Yojana
(JSY) Program. JSY provides financial incentives to women for delivering in a government health facility, and also
provides financial incentives for Accredited Social Health
Activists (ASHA’s) to help incentivize, arrange transport
for, and accompany women to facilities for delivery. In low
performing states, women are also given an incentive for
delivering in accredited private facilities. The amount of
the incentive differs by rural/urban status and whether the
woman lives in a low performing or high performing state.
In low performing states, like Uttar Pradesh, rural women
receive 1400 Indian Rupees (INR) upon delivering in a facility and urban women 1000 INR, and the ASHA’s receive
600 INR in rural and 200 INR in urban areas when they
bring a woman into the facility to deliver. In high performing
states, incentives are only available to women who are below poverty line, had <=2 live births and over 19 years old.
The main goals of JSY are to increase early registration
of women, identify complicated cases, ensure women
receive at least 3 antenatal care visits (ANC) and post
delivery visits, organize for referrals and transportation for
delivery and referrals. In addition to the cash incentives for
women and ASHA workers, JSY includes the payment of
1500 INR to private providers to do caesarean sections
in cases where the government facilities cannot provide a
C-section. JSY also includes a partnership with the private
sector, where accredited private sector institutions can
provide care to JSY beneficiaries and receive compensation for those deliveries.
In 2011 some changes were made to JSY to expand the
program to cover more services free of charge and provide additional services, mainly targeting getting women
to facilities sooner, and keeping women in facilities for
48 hours after delivery. The new scheme, called Janani
Shishu Suraksha Karyakram (JSSK) includes ambulances
at facilities that can pick up women free of charge when
she is in labor and bring her to the facility, free meals for
women while in the hospital for 2 days after delivery, free
drop back home from the facility 2 days after delivery, free
referral services, free treatment for the newborn for 30
days after birth and free treatment of postpartum complications for 40 days after delivery.
JSY is primarily a demand side program. By incentivizing
women to deliver in facilities and ASHAs to bring women
to facilities the program has lead to a large increase in the
number of women delivering in facilities. However, facilities
were not prepared for the influx of patients. JSY focused
on creating demand, without providing additional staff,
infrastructure, supplies, etc. This was perceived to have
lead to the inability to provide high quality care, and in
some cases, an inability to even provide any care (leaving
women to deliver unattended, but in a facility).
The addition of the ASHAs to the health workforce has
been the most significant supply-side contribution of the
JSY program. Prior to JSY the AHSAs did not exist and
they have made an important contribution linking the community to the facility. Also when the JSSK program was
added to JSY in 2011, it included facilities for transport
and food in PHCs, which were important upgrades to
the supply side.
Resources (financing)
JSY (and JSSK) is a 100% centrally sponsored program.
At the national level, there is a Mission Steering Group,
chaired by the Minister or Health and Family Welfare to
oversee implementation. At the state level, there is a State
Health Mission, which oversees the implementation and
is responsible for guiding an Implementation Committee
that makes the State Action Plan for JSY. Each State’s
Government must monitor the expenditure. The District
Health Mission is responsible for actually implementing
JSY, has a District Implementation Committee, which
oversees this process (Janani Suraksha Yojana: Guidelines
for Implementation, n.d.). In 2011, JSY/JSSK constituted
11% of the National Rural Health Mission budget, which
came to 1998.92 crores (1 crore=10,000,000) INR (about
333,000,000 USD) (Kapur and Chowdhury, 2012).
Community engagement
The primary interface for community engagement in JSY
is the ASHA. Having a community health worker cadre
as outreach workers has been effective, especially since
ASHA’s are incentivized. ASHAs do receive incentives for
many other health promotion activities as well, and therefore they may become or already be overburdened. There
is heterogeneity in the commitment/quality of ASHAs, and
some cases where ASHAs might be acting unethically (allowing women to deliver at home, but recording the birth
as being in a facility, so everyone receives the incentive).
Another positive outcome of JSY is the fact that being an
ASHA is potentially a pathway for women’s empowerment
and economic independence for village women who
otherwise might not have such opportunities.
Appendix | 16
Scale
The JSY program achieved an impressive goal of rolling
out a fairly complex program to an entire country of a
billion people virtually simultaneously. There is heterogeneity both within and across states in terms of the level of
uptake of JSY and many implementation problems remain,
however, the program does exist across the country.
Some respondents suggested that it would have been
better if the program had been piloted first, and rolled out
in a phased manner, so as to better address problems as
they occurred.
Transport
The provision of reliable and affordable transport was one
of the key pieces missing in the initial JSY program; JSSK
has added transportation (ambulances), and this is helping
to get women into facility. The ambulances are one of the
most positive pieces of and improvements to JSY/JSSK
across the board. Issues remain with not enough ambulances, but it is clear that transportation is helping to get women
to the facility to deliver, and increasing the number of women bringing newborns back for check-ups and emergencies.
Political context
JSY was enacted in the context of the NHRM—a very
large, comprehensive national program to improve access
to health in rural areas. There was a lot of political will
behind the NRHM to make health services available to
the poor all over India. The NRHM is a large program with
many components, however due to general political will
for maternal health, JSY became a real centerpiece of
NHRM. Maternal health had become a higher political priority due to the large number of maternal deaths that occur there. Part of the reason that maternal health became
a priority was that delegates from India went to an international meeting about progress toward the MDGs and
realized that Bangladesh, its poorer neighbor, was making
more progress towards reducing maternal mortality than
India. Generally, there is a lot of pressure to achieve the
MDGs in India, as India lags in term of maternal mortality.
JSY is in many ways a multi-pronged program, involving not just the conditional cash transfer for women, but
for the ASHAs too, and including the transport to and
from the facility, and the incentive to stay for 48 hours
post-delivery (food and transportation). JSY is part of the
National Rural Health Mission which is an overarching policy designed to provide universal access to quality health
services for India’s rural poor population. The NHRM includes a number of strategies across multiple sectors and
includes infrastructure improvement, and human resource
provision and training among other things.(nhrm.gov.in)
India is currently in the process of launching the National
Urban Health Mission. This will involve USHAs (like the
ASHAs but for urban women) to help motivate poor urban
women to use ANC and deliver in facilities, and will
complement the already existing JSY program.
There are other programs under various Ministries in India
which target maternal and child health, such as nutrition
for children and women through the Anganwadi centers,
free Iron Folic Acid tablets, nutrition for teenage girls,
etc., but no other national program specifically targeting
improvement of facility delivery (either from the supply or
demand side, such as training midwives, etc.) that are at
the national level. These programs and policies also act
to improve maternal and child health, but do not directly
impact deliveries in facilities.
Impact
JSY has been credited with increasing the number of
women delivering in facilities throughout India, though the
amount of increase varies by state dramatically. In India as
a whole, the number of facility based deliveries increased
from 20% to 49% in 5 years (Randive et al., 2013).
Uttar Pradesh is one of the states that showed the least
improvement in rates of facility-based delivery. There is
mixed evidence as to whether JSY has led to an improvement or decline (or no association) in perinatal, neonatal,
and maternal mortality (Das et al., 2011; Lim et al., 2010;
Randive et al., 2013; Rv, 2011). Several problems have
been identified relating to informal payments, out of pocket
expenditures, delay in payments being made, low utilization
of the ASHA’s, the cash incentive perhaps not being large
enough, facility overcrowding, no additional supplies or
training for providers and facilities, etc. (Dongre and Kapur,
2013; Gopalan and Durairaj, 2012; Mazumdar et al., 2012).
Overwhelmingly, respondents felt that if the cash incentive
portion of JSY/JSSK was discontinued, the majority of
women would not continue delivering in health facilities.
This was because respondents felt that women thought
that they were receiving poor quality of care: not enough
providers, not enough beds, not enough supplies, etc. Additionally, women felt that they were treated disrespectfully
at facilities by the staff at all levels. These factors, coupled
with anecdotal evidence of women gaming the system to
deliver at home if possible, led respondents to think that
norms had not changed for the most part and women still
had a preference for delivering at home.
Appendix | 17
References
1
Barker, P., 2014. Decreasing Facility Based Maternal Mortality:
Lessons from Malawi.
10 Mazumdar, S., Mills, A.J., Powell-Jackson, T., 2012. Financial
Incentives in Health: New Evidence from India’s Janani Suraksha
Yojana [WWW Document]. URL http://researchonline.lshtm.
ac.uk/20618/ (accessed 2.25.14).
2
Das, A., Rao, D., Hagopian, A., 2011. India’s Janani Suraksha
Yojana: further review needed. The Lancet 377, 295–296.
doi:10.1016/S0140-6736(11)60085–8
3
Deshpande, R.V., 2011. Is Janani Suraksha Yojana (JSY)
contributing to the reduction of maternal and infant mortality?
An insight from Karnataka. J. Fam. Welf. 57.
4
Dongre, A.A., Kapur, A., 2013. How is Janani Suraksha Yojana
Performing in Backward Districts of India? (SSRN Scholarly
Paper No. ID 2197248). Social Science Research Network,
Rochester, NY.
5
Gabrysch, S., Campbell, O.M., 2009. Still too far to walk:
Literature review of the determinants of delivery service use.
BMC Pregnancy Childbirth 9, 34. doi:10.1186/1471-2393-9-34
6
Gopalan, S.S., Durairaj, V., 2012. Addressing Women’s Non-Maternal Healthcare Financing in Developing Countries: What Can
We Learn from the Experiences of Rural Indian Women? PLoS
ONE 7, e29936. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0029936
14 Randive, B., Diwan, V., De Costa, A., 2013. India’s Conditional
Cash Transfer Programme (the JSY) to Promote Institutional
Birth: Is There an Association between Institutional Birth Proportion and Maternal Mortality? PLoS ONE 8, e67452. doi:10.1371/
journal.pone.0067452
7
Janani Suraksha Yojana: Guidelines for Implementation, n.d. .
Ministry of Health & Family Welfare, Government of India.
15 Republic Of Malawi, Presidential Initiative on Safe Motherhood,
Strategic Plan 2012–2016., n.d.
8
Kapur, A., Chowdhury, A., 2012. National Rural Health Mission,
GOI, 2011–12.
9
Lim, S.S., Dandona, L., Hoisington, J.A., James, S.L., Hogan,
M.C., Gakidou, E., 2010. India’s Janani Suraksha Yojana, a
conditional cash transfer programme to increase births in health
facilities: an impact evaluation. The Lancet 375, 2009–2023.
doi:10.1016/S0140-6736(10)60744-1
11 Montagu, D., Sudhinaraset, M., Diamond-Smith, N., Campbell,
O.M.R., Gabrysch, S., Freedman, L.P., Kruk, M.E., Donnay, F.,
2014. Where Women Go to Deliver: Understanding the
Changing Landscape of Delivery in Africa and Asia. Rev.
12 National Statistical Office (NSO) and ICF Macro, 2011. Malawi
Demographic and Health Survey 2010. NSO and ICF Macro.,
Zomba,Malawi, and Calverton, Maryland, USA.
13 National Statistical Office (NSO) [Malawi], and ORC Macro.,
2005. Malawi Demographic and Health Survey 2004. NSO and
ORC Macro., Calverton, Maryland.
Acknowledgements
We are grateful to the individuals in India, Malawi, and Nigeria who took the time to speak with us or refer us to others
in the field. Any insight we gained was through their help and patience, and any errors or misrepresentations are fully
our responsibility.
References | 18
The Global Health Group
The Global Health Gorup (GHG) at the University
of California, San Francisco (UCSF) is an “action tank”
dedicated to translating major new paradigms and
approaches into large-scale action to positively
impact the lives of millions of people. Led by
Sir Richard Feachem, the founding and former
executive director of the Global Fund to Fight AIDS,
Tuberculosis and Malaria, the GHG works across
the spectrum—from analysis, through policy
formulation and consensus building, to
comprehensive implementation of programs in
collaborating low- and middle-income countries.
One of GHG’s programmatic focuses is documentation
and analysis of the private sector components of
health systems. The GHG studies a variety of
innovative delivery platforms that leverage the
strengths of the private sector to achieve public
health goals.
globalhealthsciences.ucsf.edu/
global-health-group

Strategies to increase health facility deliveries: Three case studies

Transcription

Similar documents

Newsletter November-December 2014

maternal presentation

here - Lark in the Park

Newsletter January-February 2015

10 Night Malawi Self Drive holiday

SEEDSOWERS NEWSLETTER

A UK Based Diaspora Led Development Agency Working In Nigeria

Chintheche Inn - Malawi Tourism