SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA - Alabama Appellate Watch

REL: 01/29/2010
Notice: T h i s o p i n i o n i s s u b j e c t t o f o r m a l r e v i s i o n b e f o r e p u b l i c a t i o n i n t h e advance
s h e e t s o f Southern R e p o r t e r . R e a d e r s a r e r e q u e s t e d t o n o t i f y t h e R e p o r t e r o f D e c i s i o n s ,
A l a b a m a A p p e l l a t e C o u r t s , 300 D e x t e r A v e n u e , M o n t g o m e r y , A l a b a m a 3 6 1 0 4 - 3 7 4 1 ( ( 3 3 4 ) 2 2 9 ¬
0 6 4 9 ) , o f a n y t y p o g r a p h i c a l o r o t h e r e r r o r s , i n o r d e r t h a t c o r r e c t i o n s may b e made b e f o r e
t h e o p i n i o n i s p r i n t e d i n Southern R e p o r t e r .
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2009-2010
1080884
Ex p a r t e t h e I n d u s t r i a l
Development B o a r d
o f the C i t y o f
Montgomery
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In
r e : George E . R u s s e l l
et a l .
v.
The I n d u s t r i a l
Development B o a r d
o f the C i t y
o f Montgomery
P r i c e McLemore e t a l .
v.
The I n d u s t r i a l
(Montgomery
Development B o a r d
o f the C i t y
o f Montgomery)
C i r c u i t C o u r t , CV-04-3282 and CV-05-1728)
1080884
SMITH,
Justice.
The
plaintiffs
petitioner,
Montgomery
for
("the
t h e IDB.
IDB"),
court
The
grant
trial
to vacate
a
the p e t i t i o n
following
previous
in
the
Board
Montgomery
sued
court
I I I , one
denied
the
of the C i t y
Circuit
During discovery, the
plaintiffs
of the
t h e IDB's
of
Court
attorneys
motion
for a
f o r a w r i t o f mandamus d i r e c t i n g
the order
and t o e n t e r
Facts
The
Development
actions
o r d e r p r e v e n t i n g G a l l i o n ' s d e p o s i t i o n , a n d t h e IDB
a p r o t e c t i v e order
We
underlying
Thomas T. G a l l i o n
has p e t i t i o n e d t h i s C o u r t
trial
the
of c o n t r a c t .
to depose
protective
in
the I n d u s t r i a l
a l l e g i n g breach
sought
1
denying
and P r o c e d u r a l
facts,
consolidated
t h e IDB's m o t i o n f o r
an o r d e r
and i s s u e t h e
taken
from
appeal
in
the
g r a n t i n g the
motion.
writ.
History
this
the
Court's
opinion i n
underlying
actions,
T h e p l a i n t i f f s i n t h e u n d e r l y i n g a c t i o n s a r e G e o r g e E.
R u s s e l l a n d Thomas E. R u s s e l l , a s c o e x e c u t o r s a n d c o t r u s t e e s
o f t h e w i l l a n d t e s t a m e n t a r y t r u s t o f E a r n e s t W. R u s s e l l , a n d
M y r t i s R u s s e l l (case no. C V - 0 4 - 3 2 8 2 ) , and P r i c e McLemore, Mary
H. M c L e m o r e , J o h n M c I n n i s , J r . , T i m o t h y N. M c I n n i s , C h a r l e s R.
M c I n n i s , W i l l i a m s S. N e w e l l , a n d t h e P e o p l e s B a n k a n d T r u s t
Company, as t r u s t e e f o r t h e A d a l i n e H o o p e r T r u s t A and B ( c a s e
no. C V - 0 5 - 1 7 2 8 ) .
1
2
1080884
McLemore v. H y u n d a i M o t o r M a n u f a c t u r i n g Alabama, LLC,
318
( A l a . 2008),
are
r e l e v a n t to the
present
7 So.
petition:
" G e o r g e E. R u s s e l l a n d Thomas E. R u s s e l l ,
as
coexecutors
and
cotrustees
of
the
will
and
t e s t a m e n t a r y t r u s t o f E a r n e s t W. R u s s e l l , a n d M y r t i s
R u s s e l l ('the R u s s e l l s ' ) , a n d P r i c e M c L e m o r e , M a r y
H. M c L e m o r e , J o h n M c I n n i s , J r . , T i m o t h y N. M c I n n i s ,
C h a r l e s R.
M c I n n i s , W i l l i a m s S. N e w e l l , a n d
the
P e o p l e s B a n k and T r u s t Company, as t r u s t e e f o r t h e
A d a l i n e H o o p e r T r u s t A a n d B ('the M c L e m o r e g r o u p ' ) ,
sued the I n d u s t r i a l Development Board of the C i t y of
Montgomery
('the
IDB')
and
Hyundai
Motor
Manufacturing
Alabama,
LLC
('Hyundai'),
alleging
breach of c o n t r a c t .
S p e c i f i c a l l y , they a l l e g e d that
t h e I D B , on b e h a l f o f H y u n d a i , e x e r c i s e d o p t i o n s t o
p u r c h a s e t h e i r r e a l p r o p e r t y b u t f a i l e d t o pay them
i n accordance w i t h the most-favored-nation c l a u s e i n
t h e o p t i o n a g r e e m e n t s t h e same p r i c e p e r a c r e t h a t
was p a i d t o a n o t h e r l a n d o w n e r .
...
"Facts
" I n September 2001,
v a r i o u s o f f i c i a l s of the
State
of Alabama,
the
City
of Montgomery
('the
City'),
the
Montgomery
County
Commission
('the
C o u n t y ' ) , t h e M o n t g o m e r y A r e a Chamber o f Commerce,
and t h e Montgomery W a t e r Works B o a r d began m a k i n g
p r e p a r a t i o n s to secure options to purchase p r o p e r t y
in
the
Montgomery
area
to
create
an
incentive
p a c k a g e i n t h e hope t h a t t h e y c o u l d p e r s u a d e H y u n d a i
t o b u i l d an i n d u s t r i a l p l a n t i n t h e M o n t g o m e r y a r e a
for
the purpose
of manufacturing
and
assembling
motor v e h i c l e s .
This intent
i s e v i d e n c e d by
a
s i g n e d l e t t e r to Hyundai from the C i t y , the County,
a n d t h e IDB s t a t i n g t h a t t h e y , ' i n p a r t n e r s h i p w i t h
t h e S t a t e , ' w o u l d c o m m i t t o p r o v i d i n g an i n d u s t r i a l
s i t e t o H y u n d a i a t no c o s t .
Although the funds to
purchase
t h e p r o p e r t y w e r e t o be p r o v i d e d b y
the
C i t y a n d t h e C o u n t y o n l y , t h e o p t i o n a g r e e m e n t s on
t h e p r o p e r t y w e r e a c q u i r e d by t h e IDB, whose p r i m a r y
3
3d
1080884
role in industrial
projects
i s to
' s e r v e as
the
e n t i t y through which monies f l o w f o r the purchase of
l a n d f o r the u l t i m a t e use i n i n d u s t r y . '
B.M.
Ahn,
the Hyundai r e p r e s e n t a t i v e
i n charge of Hyundai's
project
to
open a p l a n t
i n the
United
States,
testified
during
his deposition
that
one
of
the
basic
e l e m e n t s o f an
i n c e n t i v e package i s
'free
l a n d ' o f f e r e d t o an a u t o m o b i l e c o m p a n y as p a r t
of
the i n c e n t i v e f o r the company t o l o c a t e i n a c e r t a i n
area.
Ahn
stated
that
H y u n d a i had
no
role
in
a c q u i r i n g t h e o p t i o n s on t h e
land.
"The
R u s s e l l s o w n e d a p p r o x i m a t e l y 328 a c r e s o f
l a n d i n Montgomery County.
In the f a l l of
2001,
R e u b e n T h o r n t o n , t h e c h a i r m a n o f t h e IDB,
entered
i n t o an o p t i o n a g r e e m e n t on b e h a l f
o f t h e IDB
to
purchase the R u s s e l l s ' p r o p e r t y
f o r an
industrial
project.
The a g r e e m e n t p r o v i d e d an o p t i o n p e r i o d o f
120 d a y s a n d
stated:
"'3.
I f Purchaser e l e c t s to e x e r c i s e
this
O p t i o n the
purchase p r i c e
for
the
P r o p e r t y s h a l l be d e t e r m i n e d as f o l l o w s :
" ' S e l l e r and P u r c h a s e r s h a l l
each,
at
its
own
cost
and
expense,
secure
a
current
a p p r a i s a l of the P r o p e r t y .
The
purchase
price
shall
be
the
average
of
the
two
appraisals
provided,
h o w e v e r , i n no
event
s h a l l t h e p u r c h a s e p r i c e be l e s s
t h a n $4,500 p e r a c r e and
further
p r o v i d e d t h a t the purchase p r i c e
shall
i n no e v e n t be
l e s s than
the p r i c e per
acre p a i d to
any
other landowner i n c l u d e d
in
the
p r o j e c t p l a n n e d f o r the
Property.
The
a c r e a g e s h a l l be
determined
4
1080884
by
a good and a c c u r a t e
p r o v i d e d by P u r c h a s e r .
survey
[ 2 ]
"'16.
This Option constitutes the
e n t i r e and complete agreement between t h e
p a r t i e s h e r e t o and supersedes
any p r i o r
oral
or w r i t t e n
agreements between the
parties with respect to the Property. I t
is
e x p r e s s l y agreed
that
there
a r e no
v e r b a l understandings or agreements which
i n a n y way c h a n g e t h e t e r m s , c o v e n a n t s , a n d
c o n d i t i o n s h e r e i n s e t f o r t h , a n d t h a t no
m o d i f i c a t i o n o f t h i s O p t i o n a n d no w a i v e r
o f any o f i t s t e r m s a n d c o n d i t i o n s s h a l l be
e f f e c t i v e u n l e s s made i n w r i t i n g a n d d u l y
e x e c u t e d by t h e p a r t i e s h e r e t o . '
"The
Russells
and
the IDB
amended
agreement i n February 2002 t o p r o v i d e :
the
option
"'1.
I t i s hereby
agreed that the
purchase p r i c e f o r the P r o p e r t y i s Four
T h o u s a n d F i v e H u n d r e d and No/100 D o l l a r s
($4,500.00) p e r a c r e .
The e x a c t n u m b e r o f
acres
t o be
determined
by
the
survey
p r o v i d e d by P u r c h a s e r .
"'2.
extended f
Effective
Effective
expiration
i s now May
The o p t i o n p e r i o d
i s hereby
o r a p e r i o d o f 120 d a y s f r o m t h e
Date
of
the
Option,
which
D a t e i s O c t o b e r 3, 2 0 0 1 .
The
d a t e o f t h e O p t i o n , as e x t e n d e d ,
31, 2002.
As n o t e d i n McLemore, " [ t ] h e p r o v i s i o n
'the purchase
p r i c e s h a l l i n no e v e n t b e l e s s t h a n t h e p r i c e p e r a c r e p a i d
to any o t h e r landowner i n c l u d e d i n t h e p r o j e c t p l a n n e d f o rt h e
P r o p e r t y ' i s known as a m o s t - f a v o r e d - n a t i o n c l a u s e o r a p r i c e e s c a l a t i o n c l a u s e . " 7 So. 3d a t 3 2 2 n.3.
2
5
1080884
"'3.
E x c e p t as a m e n d e d h e r e b y ,
the
Option i s i n a l l other respects
ratified
and
confirmed.'
" I n F e b r u a r y 2 0 0 2 , T h o r n t o n , on b e h a l f o f t h e
IDB,
entered
into
an
option
agreement w i t h
the
M c L e m o r e g r o u p , who o w n e d a p p r o x i m a t e l y 54 a c r e s o f
l a n d near the R u s s e l l p r o p e r t y .
The t e r m s i n t h e
option
agreement
with
the
McLemore
group
are
identical
to
the
terms
i n the
original
option
a g r e e m e n t b e t w e e n t h e R u s s e l l s and t h e
IDB.
"The I D B a l s o a c q u i r e d f o u r a d d i t i o n a l o p t i o n
agreements
with
landowners
near
the
property
b e l o n g i n g t o t h e R u s s e l l s and t h e McLemore g r o u p .
D u r i n g the a c q u i s i t i o n p r o c e s s , the IDB
approached
Joy
Shelton
about
an
option
to
purchase
her
p r o p e r t y ; h o w e v e r , she
r e f u s e d to enter
into
an
o p t i o n agreement.
The I D B d e c i d e d t h a t t h e S h e l t o n
property
was
not
necessary
for
the
incentive
p a c k a g e . By m i d - M a r c h 2 0 0 2 , t h e IDB d e t e r m i n e d t h a t
i t was n o t g o i n g t o d e s i g n a t e a n y a d d i t i o n a l f u n d s ,
other
than
the
funds a l r e a d y committed, to
this
particular project.
The S t a t e a n d t h e I D B s e n t t h e
i n c e n t i v e package, i n c l u d i n g the proposed p r o j e c t
s i t e , to Hyundai f o r c o n s i d e r a t i o n .
"On M a r c h 2 8 , 2 0 0 2 , Ahn c o n t a c t e d T o d d S t r a n g e ,
then the d i r e c t o r of the Alabama Development O f f i c e .
He s t a t e d t h a t H y u n d a i h a d n o t d e c i d e d w h e t h e r t o
l o c a t e the p l a n t i n Montgomery or i n K e n t u c k y but
t h a t a d d i t i o n a l p r o p e r t y w o u l d n e e d t o be a c q u i r e d
f o r the r a i l access Hyundai r e q u i r e d i f Montgomery
was
t o be
s e l e c t e d as
the
site
f o r the
Hyundai
plant.
Ahn i n f o r m e d S t r a n g e t h a t he w o u l d n e e d an
a n s w e r b y n o o n o f t h e n e x t d a y as t o w h e t h e r t h e
property
could
be
acquired.
Strange
met
with
v a r i o u s S t a t e , C i t y , and C o u n t y o f f i c i a l s t o d i s c u s s
Hyundai's request.
R e c o g n i z i n g t h a t the C i t y
and
the County would not p r o v i d e a d d i t i o n a l funds to
a c q u i r e more p r o p e r t y
and
t h a t the
other
option
agreements c o n t a i n e d
most-favored-nation
clauses,
6
1080884
t h e y d e c i d e d t o a s k CSX
Transportation, Inc.,
the
r a i l company, t o a c q u i r e t h e o p t i o n t o p u r c h a s e t h e
Shelton property.
On M a r c h 2 9 , 2 0 0 2 , S t r a n g e s e n t
David
Hemphill,
an
assistant vice president
for
CSX,
the f o l l o w i n g l e t t e r v i a f a c s i m i l e :
"'Last evening,
Thursday, March
28,
2 0 0 2 , a t 6:05
p.m.
C e n t r a l S t a n d a r d Time,
I
received
a
call
from
Mr.
B.M.
Ahn,
P r e s i d e n t H y u n d a i M o t o r C o m p a n y , U.S.
from
Seoul, Korea.
He t o l d me t h e y w e r e i n t h e
f i n a l s t a g e s o f t h e d e c i s i o n and n e e d e d t o
make m o d i f i c a t i o n s t o t h e i r M o n t g o m e r y s i t e
layout
because
the
CSX
Railroad
yard
e s t i m a t e h a d come i n e x t r e m e l y
high.
In
t h e i r ( H y u n d a i ' s ) r e d e s i g n , he w a n t e d t o do
p a r a l l e l t r a c k s r u n n i n g n o r t h a n d s o u t h on
the e a s t e r n s i d e of the p r o p e r t y boundary.
His engineers
t o l d h i m he w o u l d n o t h a v e
enough room u n l e s s
[additional
property
was]
o b t a i n e d i n the southeast
corner
of
the
quadrant.
This
property
had
been
d i s c u s s e d a c o u p l e o f m o n t h s ago b u t we
had
b e e n t o l d as r e c e n t l y as two w e e k s ago t h a t
i t w o u l d n o t be n e c e s s a r y .
So a c c o r d i n g l y ,
we d i d n o t p u r s u e a n y o p t i o n s
"'As
I i n d i c a t e d t o you l a s t n i g h t ,
o u r o p t i o n a g r e e m e n t s h a v e a 'most f a v o r e d
n a t i o n ' c l a u s e w h e r e we a g r e e d t o p a y
no
m o r e f o r a n y one p a r c e l t h a n a n y o f
the
other parcels.
A c c o r d i n g l y , I assembled a
working
group
of
the
local
Chamber
of
Commerce e x e c u t i v e s , e n g i n e e r i n g e x p e r t i s e ,
Dave E c h o l s
and m y s e l f .
We d e c i d e d
the
m o s t a p p r o p r i a t e c o u r s e t o f o l l o w w o u l d be
t o a s k CSX
to o b t a i n a p a r c e l f o r
rail
access
to keep
i t outside
the
project
[ 3 ]
A s n o t e d i n M c L e m o r e , " E c h o l s was t h e p r o j e c t m a n a g e r
Alabama Development O f f i c e f o r the Hyundai p r o j e c t . "
3 d a t 324
n.5.
3
the
So.
7
at
7
1080884
agreement.
As y o u k n o w C S X ' s a g r e e m e n t
w i t h H y u n d a i i s s e p a r a t e and t h i s p r o p e r t y
in t h e i r view i s f o r r a i l access only
" ' D a v e , as y o u c a n a p p r e c i a t e
there
a r e a l o t o f d e t a i l s t o be w o r k e d o u t , b u t
t h e s p i r i t and c o n c e p t i s f o r CSX t o o b t a i n
the
needed p a r c e l f o r r a i l
access
and
w h a t e v e r t h e p u r c h a s e p r i c e , C S X w o u l d be
made w h o l e i n a m a n n e r we m u t u a l l y
agreed
upon.'
" A l s o on M a r c h 2 9 ,
f o l l o w i n g e - m a i l t o Dave
2002, H e m p h i l l
Echols:
sent
"'Regarding
the
[Shelton
property]
t h a t w i l l n e e d t o be p u r c h a s e d ,
you
asked
if
CSX
would
be
willing
to
buy
this
p r o p e r t y f o r t h e S t a t e and Montgomery a t
a p p r o x i m a t e l y $ 8 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 an a c r e .
There i s
no
c o n t r a c t or
option
on
the
property
c u r r e n t l y and you e s t i m a t e i t w i l l c o s t us
approximately
$750,000.00 w h i c h you
are
w i l l i n g t o r e f u n d t o us i n some f a s h i o n
d u r i n g the t r a c k c o n s t r u c t i o n phase. Randy
Evans[,
a CSX
official,]
in
principle
a g r e e d t o t h i s a n d I a s k t h a t y o u f a x us a
l e t t e r o u t l i n i n g e x a c t l y what you have i n
mind.
The p u r p o s e o f d o i n g i t t h i s
way
r a t h e r t h a n what you d i d i n g e t t i n g c o n t r o l
o f t h e o t h e r 1600 a c r e s i s t o a v o i d p a y i n g
the
other
landowners
$8,000.00
an
acre
which
would
have
a negative
impact
of
$10,000,000.00
on
the
site
cost.
The
r a i l r o a d does not get good l a n d v a l u e s i n
a s i t u a t i o n l i k e t h i s a n d so I t h i n k t h e r e
will
be
upward p r e s s u r e
on
that
$8,000
number.
Moreover, the other
landowners
w i l l g e t w i n d o f t h i s p l o y a n d may
create
n e g a t i v e community p u b l i c i t y .
...
I n your
8
the
1080884
l e t t e r t o u s we w o u l d a s k t h a t y o u i n d i c a t e
e x a c t l y how y o u i n t e n d t o p a y us d u r i n g t h e
t r a c k work c o n s t r u c t i o n . '
"Mayor Bobby B r i g h t , mayor of
the
City
of
M o n t g o m e r y a n d an e x o f f i c i o member o f t h e I D B ,
was
s e l e c t e d as t h e m a i n r e p r e s e n t a t i v e t o m e e t w i t h
S h e l t o n t o a c q u i r e an a s s i g n a b l e o p t i o n a g r e e m e n t
d e s i g n a t i n g t h e C i t y as t h e p u r c h a s e r o f t h e S h e l t o n
property.
Before
Bright
agreed
to
meet
with
S h e l t o n , he t o l d S t r a n g e a n d o t h e r S t a t e o f f i c i a l s
t h a t t h e C i t y and t h e C o u n t y w o u l d n o t p r o v i d e
any
a d d i t i o n a l money t o w a r d t h e p r o j e c t .
They a s s u r e d
h i m t h a t t h e C i t y a n d t h e C o u n t y w o u l d n o t be a s k e d
or
expected
to
c o n t r i b u t e any
funds
toward
the
p u r c h a s e o f t h e S h e l t o n p r o p e r t y and t h a t t h e o p t i o n
w o u l d be a s s i g n e d t o e i t h e r C S X o r t h e S t a t e .
Randy
G e o r g e , p r e s i d e n t of the Montgomery A r e a Chamber of
Commerce and
s e c r e t a r y of
the
IDB,
and
[Ellen]
M c N a i r , a member o f t h e C h a m b e r o f C o m m e r c e , w e n t
w i t h B r i g h t t o meet w i t h S h e l t o n .
Bright obtained
an a s s i g n a b l e o p t i o n , d e s i g n a t i n g t h e C i t y , n o t t h e
I D B , as t h e p u r c h a s e r o f t h e p r o p e r t y ; t h e p u r c h a s e
p r i c e o f t h e p r o p e r t y was $ 1 2 , 0 0 0 p e r a c r e .
"McNair informed
Thomas H.
G a l l i o n I I I , the
IDB's a t t o r n e y , of the a c q u i s i t i o n of the o p t i o n to
purchase
the
Shelton
property.
During
her
d e p o s i t i o n , she s t a t e d :
"'On
F r i d a y when
...
I
came b a c k
from
v i s i t i n g w i t h Mrs.
Shelton, I
contacted
both
Mr.
Gallion
and
Mr.
[Frank]
M c P h i l l i p s [ , one o f t h e a t t o r n e y s f o r t h e
State i n v o l v e d i n the Hyundai p r o j e c t ] .
My
c o n c e r n was,
... j u s t t o l e t t h e m k n o w w h a t
had h a p p e n e d , you know, w i t h T h u r s d a y n i g h t
b e c a u s e i t h a p p e n e d so f a s t .
They were not
aware of i t u n t i l
a f t e r the f a c t ,
so
I
w a n t e d t o t e l l them what had happened.
9
1080884
"'But
a l s o I was
just a l i t t l e
concerned
w i t h [Mayor B r i g h t ] t a k i n g out the o p t i o n - b e c a u s e he
was
a l o c a l p e r s o n , and
his
a c t i o n of j u s t t a k i n g out the o p t i o n w h i c h
w o u l d be a s s i g n e d t o CSX o r s o m e b o d y , t h a t
j u s t made me a l i t t l e n e r v o u s .
"'So
I j u s t said--you
know, I was,
you
know, j u s t c a l l i n g t h e m j u s t t o be
sure
t h a t t h a t w o u l d n ' t t r i g g e r a n y - - y o u know,
we
j u s t d i d n ' t know w h e t h e r o r n o t
that
w o u l d , a n d so I j u s t w a n t e d t o be s u r e .
So
I c o n t a c t e d b o t h of them.'
"On A p r i l 1, 2 0 0 2 , H y u n d a i a n n o u n c e d t h a t i t was
g o i n g to b u i l d the p l a n t i n Montgomery.
On
April
15, 2 0 0 2 , t h e v a r i o u s S t a t e a n d l o c a l g o v e r n m e n t a l
e n t i t i e s i n v o l v e d , i n c l u d i n g t h e IDB,
entered
into
a
project
agreement
with
Hyundai
detailing
the
l o c a t i o n a n d d e v e l o p m e n t o f t h e p l a n t ('the
project
agreement').
The p r o j e c t a g r e e m e n t , i n s e c t i o n
3.1
of
Article
3,
stated
that
'the
Montgomery
IDB
presently
holds
purchase
options
necessary
to
acquire
fee
simple
title
to each p a r c e l of
real
estate comprising
the P r o j e c t S i t e . '
The
project
a g r e e m e n t f u r t h e r p r o v i d e d i n s e c t i o n 3.4
that
the
IDB
was
to e x e r c i s e
each option
and
in
section
3 . 6 ( a ) t h a t t h e IDB was
then to t r a n s f e r t i t l e
of
the
property
to
Hyundai.
Section
3.20
of
the
project
agreement,
entitled
'CSX
Agreement,'
provided
separately
for
the
a c q u i s i t i o n of
the
Shelton property, s t a t i n g :
"'The
State
and
Local
Governments
s h a l l use t h e i r b e s t e f f o r t s t o c a u s e
CSX
T r a n s p o r t a t i o n t o e n t e r i n t o an a g r e e m e n t
with
[Hyundai]
i n form
s a t i s f a c t o r y to
[Hyundai],
which w i l l
provide
for
rail
service
for
[Hyundai]
on
terms
and
conditions
as
favorable
to
[Hyundai]
as
those
offered
to
other
automobile
manufacturers.
In a d d i t i o n , the S t a t e
and
10
1080884
C i t y s h a l l use t h e i r b e s t e f f o r t s t o cause
CSX
Transportation
to
provide
the
i n c e n t i v e s s e t f o r t h i n t h e l e t t e r f r o m CSX
Transportation dated
D e c e m b e r 17,
2001.
The
State
represents
and
warrants
that
[Hyundai] w i l l a c q u i r e fee simple t i t l e to
[the
Shelton
property]
for
use
in
connection
with
c o n s t r u c t i o n of
a
rail
s w i t c h y a r d by
or b e f o r e
September
30,
2002.
I f and t o t h e e x t e n t [ H y u n d a i ] makes
any payment f o r t h e c o s t o f a c q u i r i n g s u c h
acreage,
the
State
shall
reimburse
[ H y u n d a i ] f o r s u c h c o s t s by i n c r e a s i n g by
an
equivalent
amount
the
monies
made
available
from
the
State
in
Training
E q u i p m e n t F u n d p u r s u a n t t o A r t i c l e 4 b y no
l a t e r than the l a s t q u a r t e r of the c a l e n d a r
year 2003.
The C i t y a g r e e s t h a t i t w i l l
zone such a d d i t i o n a l
a c r e a g e t h e same a s
the P r o j e c t S i t e .
The L o c a l G o v e r n m e n t s
agree to abate taxes that are a p p l i c a b l e to
s u c h a d d i t i o n a l a c r e a g e i n t h e same m a n n e r
a n d t o t h e same e x t e n t a s ...
abatement of
taxes of the P r o j e c t S i t e . '
"The
IDB a s s i g n e d t h e o p t i o n s on t h e p r o p e r t y
owned by t h e R u s s e l l s and t h e McLemore g r o u p t o t h e
C i t y and t h e C o u n t y .
On May 14, 2 0 0 2 , t h e C i t y
and
t h e C o u n t y p u r c h a s e d t h e p r o p e r t y f o r $4,500
per
acre.
The
City
and
the County then
deeded
the
p r o p e r t y t o t h e IDB, w h i c h t h e n d e e d e d t h e p r o p e r t y
to Hyundai.
"The
C i t y n e v e r e x e r c i s e d i t s o p t i o n on
the
Shelton property.
On May
22, 2002, H e n r y M a b r y ,
t h e n d i r e c t o r o f f i n a n c e f o r t h e S t a t e , s e n t Ahn a
l e t t e r c o n f i r m i n g t h a t t h e S t a t e w o u l d be
funding
the purchase of the S h e l t o n p r o p e r t y ,
stating:
"'This i s to c o n f i r m t h a t the S t a t e of
Alabama w i l l p r o v i d e the f u n d i n g f o r the
p u r c h a s e of the
93 a c r e s
set aside
for
11
1080884
H y u n d a i ' s r a i l y a r d on t h e d a t e o f c l o s i n g .
This w i l l o b v i a t e any need f o r Hyundai t o
borrow t o pay f o r t h i s a c q u i s i t i o n .
In
a d d i t i o n , the State w i l l pay the reasonable
due d i l i g e n c e c o s t s i n c u r r e d i n c o n n e c t i o n
with
Hyundai's
acquisition
of
this
property. This l e t t e r of assurance i s being
p r o v i d e d t o y o u p u r s u a n t t o S e c t i o n 3.20 o f
the P r o j e c t Agreement.'
"On May 3 1 , 2 0 0 2 , t h e d a y t h e o p t i o n a g r e e m e n t
on t h e S h e l t o n p r o p e r t y was t o e x p i r e , CSX e n t e r e d
into a r e a l - e s t a t e sales contract f o r the purchase
o f t h e p r o p e r t y a t $12,000 p e r a c r e .
When H y u n d a i
l e a r n e d t h a t C S X , a n d n o t t h e S t a t e , was t o p a y f o r
the
rail
installation
a n d t h a t H y u n d a i w o u l d be
expected
to enter into a long-term
contract with
CSX,
Hyundai decided t o i n s t a l l the r a i l using i t s
own f u n d s .
As a r e s u l t o f H y u n d a i ' s d e c i s i o n n o t t o
i n v o l v e CSX i n r a i l i n s t a l l a t i o n , CSX a s s i g n e d t h e
r e a l - e s t a t e contract to Hyundai.
According to the
a s s i g n m e n t c o n t r a c t , CSX a s s i g n e d t h e c o n t r a c t t o
H y u n d a i on May 2 8 , 2 0 0 2 , t h r e e d a y s b e f o r e t h e r e a l estate
contract
between
CSX
and
Shelton
was
executed.
On J u l y 1 2 , 2 0 0 2 , f u n d s f r o m t h e S t a t e o f
Alabama
Incentives
Finance
Authority
were
transferred
t o Hyundai
t o pay f o r the Shelton
p r o p e r t y , and Hyundai purchased t h e p r o p e r t y .
" A f t e r a l l t h e l a n d was a c q u i r e d a n d d e e d e d t o
Hyundai,
Hyundai leased a l l the property, i n c l u d i n g
t h e S h e l t o n p r o p e r t y , t o t h e IDB s o t h a t t h e A l a b a m a
D e p a r t m e n t o f T r a n s p o r t a t i o n ('ALDOT') c o u l d p e r f o r m
s i t e p r e p a r a t i o n on t h e p r o p e r t y .
Additionally, the
IDB
entered
into
a tax-abatement agreement
with
H y u n d a i so t h a t H y u n d a i ' s p r o p e r t y c o u l d r e c e i v e t h e
p r e v i o u s l y a g r e e d upon abatement from ad
valorem
t a x a t i o n and other
tax incentives.
The S h e l t o n
property
was
included
in
the
tax-abatement
agreement.
12
1080884
"Subsequently,
t h e R u s s e l l s and
the McLemore
group each f i l e d a b r e a c h - o f - c o n t r a c t a c t i o n a g a i n s t
the
IDB
and
Hyundai,
alleging
t h a t the
IDB
and
H y u n d a i had b r e a c h e d the m o s t - f a v o r e d - n a t i o n
clause
i n t h e o p t i o n a g r e e m e n t s by not p a y i n g them $12,000
per
acre
for their
property.
According
to
the
Russells
and
the
McLemore
group,
the
Shelton
p r o p e r t y was
' i n c l u d e d i n the p r o j e c t agreement'
and,
consequently,
t h e y s h o u l d h a v e b e e n p a i d , as
Shelton
was
paid,
$12,000
per
acre
for
their
property.
A f t e r some d i s c o v e r y , t h e IDB a n d H y u n d a i
moved f o r summary j u d g m e n t s .
The t r i a l c o u r t d e n i e d
the motions.
A d d i t i o n a l d i s c o v e r y was
conducted,
a n d a s p e c i a l m a s t e r was
appointed.
The
IDB
and
Hyundai
filed
renewed
motions
for
a
summary
judgment.
The s p e c i a l m a s t e r h e a r d o r a l a r g u m e n t s
on t h e m o t i o n s a n d t h e n r e c o m m e n d e d t o t h e
trial
c o u r t t h a t t h e m o t i o n s f o r a summary j u d g m e n t
be
granted.
The
trial
c o u r t , a f t e r c o n s i d e r i n g the
special
master's
recommendation,
entered
summary
j u d g m e n t s f o r t h e IDB a n d H y u n d a i .
The R u s s e l l s a n d
the McLemore g r o u p
appealed."
7
So.
3d
In
at
321-26
(footnotes
McLemore,
this
omitted).
Court
affirmed
entered
i n f a v o r of Hyundai but
entered
i n f a v o r of the
summary
address
of
its
judgment
"the
order
counsel
to
reversed
In l i g h t
the
IDB,
i s s u e whether the
discretion
protective
legal
as
IDB.
by
f o r the
"[r]econsideration
IDB."
of t h i s
i s s u e by
13
the
of the
judgment
summary
judgment
r e v e r s a l of
we
the
IDB's
3d
motion
Thomas T.
a t 339.
the
trial
the
declined
c o u r t exceeded the
deposing
7 So.
summary
however,
trial
granting
prohibiting
the
We
to
scope
for
a
Gallion I I I ,
stated
court
on
that
remand
1080884
is
proper."
On
court
The
Id.
remand,
on
February
5,
2009,
IDB f i l e d a r e s p o n s e
March
5,
2009,
recommended
Gallion's
an
the p l a i n t i f f s
order
trial
the
that
master
court
Gallion's
assigned
grant
5 order
master's
trial
deposition.
order.
to
the motion
T h a t same d a y , t h e t r i a l
the special
c o u r t ' s March
i n the
a n d moved f o r a p r o t e c t i v e
the t r i a l
adopting
a motion
t o compel
special
deposition.
filed
On
the
case
t o compel
court
entered
recommendation.
The
stated:
"[The p l a i n t i f f s seek] t o t a k e t h e d e p o s i t i o n
t e s t i m o n y o f o n e o f D e f e n d a n t I D B ' s c o u n s e l , Thomas
T. G a l l i o n , I I I , c o n c e r n i n g h i s i n v o l v e m e n t i n t h e
negotiation
and
exercise
of
the options,
the
n e g o t i a t i o n s c o n c e r n i n g t h e P r o j e c t Agreement, and
the c l o s i n g of the s a l e .
T h i s C o u r t i s w e l l aware
of t h e s t a n d a r d s s e t f o r t h i n S h e l t o n v. A m e r i c a n
M o t o r s C o r p . , 805 F . 2 d 1 3 2 3 ( 8 t h C i r . 1 9 8 6 ) .
After
applying those standards to t h i s matter, i t i s the
o p i n i o n a n d o r d e r o f t h i s C o u r t t h a t [ p ] l a i n t i f f s be
p e r m i t t e d t o t a k e t h e d e p o s i t i o n t e s t i m o n y o f Mr.
G a l l i o n as t o t h e s e l i m i t e d a r e a s . "
Noting
that
testimony,
certain
Mr.
the
objections
likely
Gallion
questions
improper,"
attend
" i t is
that
the t r i a l
t h a t may
and/or
Mr.
court
deposition
that
and
during
h i s counsel
Gallion
and/or
instructed
to
arise."
14
"make
the
will
deposition
object
h i s counsel
the special
immediate
to
deem
master to
rulings
on
1080884
On
March
deposition
12,
2009,
the p l a i n t i f f s
f o r G a l l i o n , s t a t i n g that
v i d e o t a p e d and r e q u e s t i n g
available
On
f o r production
March
deposition
Among
13,
notice
other
reconsider
2009,
and
that
the
i t s March
5
a
the deposition
trial
court
deposition
be
t h e IDB
objection
to the
protective
order.
filed
moved
IDB
an
for a
requested
order.
On
the
trial
April
10,
The
plaintiffs
initially
written
had
written
supplemented
questions
motion
requested
to
to
in a
t h e IDB a s k e d
Gallion's
and
not
oral
that
the
Gallion
upon
noted
depose
court
2009,
a s an a l t e r n a t i v e , t h a t
upon
examination.
documents
4
to consider,
taken
of
w o u l d be
G a l l i o n have c e r t a i n
supplement to i t s motion f o r a p r o t e c t i v e order,
the
notice
at the d e p o s i t i o n .
again
things,
issued
questions.
On A p r i l
1, 2 0 0 9 , t h e p l a i n t i f f s
deposition
to G a l l i o n , along
production
of documents.
with
On
issued
another notice of
a d d i t i o n a l requests
April
9,
2009,
the
f o rthe
plaintiffs
A l s o on M a r c h 1 2 , 2 0 0 9 , t h e IDB i s s u e d d e p o s i t i o n n o t i c e s
f o r F r a n k Hawthorne and Randy M y e r s , t h e a t t o r n e y s
f o r the
plaintiffs.
On M a r c h 2 0 , 2 0 0 9 , t h e p l a i n t i f f s m o v e d f o r a
p r o t e c t i v e order
as t o t h e n o t i c e o f d e p o s i t i o n i s s u e d t o
Hawthorne and Myers.
The t r i a l c o u r t u l t i m a t e l y d e n i e d t h e
IDB's r e q u e s t t o depose Hawthorne and M y e r s .
In the present
p e t i t i o n , t h e IDB d o e s n o t c h a l l e n g e t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s d e n i a l
of i t s r e q u e s t t o depose Hawthorne and Myers.
4
15
1080884
issued
a third
indicated
of deposition
the deposition
On A p r i l
the
notice
video
w o u l d be
15, 2009,
deposition
to Gallion.
be
areas
set f o r t h i n the t r i a l
court's
i.e.,
Gallion's
in
option
involvement
agreements
negotiations
closing
t h a t G a l l i o n be r e q u i r e d
April
in
20, 2009.
an o r d e r
filed
the project
of the " s a l e . "
its petition
permitted
order
on
three
5,
2009,
of the options;
agreement;
also
that
the
of March
The s p e c i a l m a s t e r
and
of the
(2) t h e
(3) t h e
recommended
t o produce t h e r e q u e s t e d documents by
The t r i a l
on A p r i l
recommended
(1) t h e n e g o t i a t i o n
and t h e e x e r c i s e
concerning
notices
videotaped.
the s p e c i a l master
of G a l l i o n
Both
court
adopted those
15, 2009.
f o r the writ
Standard
On A p r i l
recommendations
20, 2009,
t h e IDB
o f mandamus.
of Review
"'A w r i t o f mandamus w i l l b e " i s s u e d
o n l y when t h e r e i s : 1) a c l e a r l e g a l r i g h t
i n t h e p e t i t i o n e r t o t h e o r d e r s o u g h t ; 2)
an i m p e r a t i v e d u t y u p o n t h e r e s p o n d e n t t o
p e r f o r m , a c c o m p a n i e d b y a r e f u s a l t o do s o ;
3) t h e l a c k o f a n o t h e r a d e q u a t e r e m e d y ; a n d
4)
properly
invoked j u r i s d i c t i o n
of the
court."
Ex p a r t e
United
Serv.
Stations,
I n c . , 628 S o . 2 d 5 0 1 , 503 ( A l a . 1 9 9 3 ) . '
"Ex p a r t e H o r t o n Homes, I n c . , 774 S o . 2 d 5 3 6 , 539
(Ala.
2000).
Regarding
discovery
matters
s p e c i f i c a l l y , t h i s Court has s t a t e d :
16
1080884
"'Discovery
matters
are within the
t r i a l c o u r t ' s sound d i s c r e t i o n , and t h i s
Court w i l l
not reverse
a trial
court's
ruling
on a d i s c o v e r y
issue unless the
trial
court
has
clearly
exceeded i t s
discretion.
Home I n s . C o . v . R i c e , 585 S o .
2d
8 5 9 , 862 ( A l a . 1 9 9 1 ) .
Accordingly,
mandamus w i l l
issue to reverse
a
trial
c o u r t ' s r u l i n g on a d i s c o v e r y i s s u e o n l y
(1) w h e r e t h e r e i s a s h o w i n g t h a t t h e t r i a l
c o u r t c l e a r l y exceeded i t s d i s c r e t i o n , and
(2) w h e r e t h e a g g r i e v e d p a r t y d o e s n o t h a v e
an a d e q u a t e r e m e d y b y o r d i n a r y a p p e a l .
The
p e t i t i o n e r h a s an a f f i r m a t i v e b u r d e n t o
prove
the existence
of each
of
these
conditions.
" ' G e n e r a l l y , an a p p e a l o f a d i s c o v e r y
order
i s
an
adequate
remedy,
notwithstanding
the
fact
that
that
p r o c e d u r e may d e l a y a n a p p e l l a t e c o u r t ' s
review
of a p e t i t i o n e r ' s grievance
or
impose
on
the
petitioner
additional
expense; our j u d i c i a l system cannot a f f o r d
immediate
mandamus
review
of
every
discovery order.'
"Ex p a r t e Ocwen F e d e r a l B a n k , F S B , 872 S o . 2 d 8 1 0 ,
813 ( A l a . 2 0 0 3 ) ( f o o t n o t e o m i t t e d ) .
I n Ocwen, t h i s
Court
identified
'four circumstances
i n which a
d i s c o v e r y o r d e r may b e r e v i e w e d b y a p e t i t i o n f o r a
w r i t o f mandamus.'
Ex p a r t e D i l l a r d Dep't S t o r e s ,
Inc.,
879 S o . 2 d 1 1 3 4 , 1 1 3 7 ( A l a . 2 0 0 3 )
(citing
Ocwen).
Those c i r c u m s t a n c e s
include:
"'(a)
[W]hen a p r i v i l e g e i s d i s r e g a r d e d ,
s e e E x p a r t e M i l t o p e C o r p . , 823 S o . 2 d 6 4 0 ,
6 4 4 - 4 5 ( A l a . 2 0 0 1 ) ; (b) when a d i s c o v e r y
order compels the p r o d u c t i o n of p a t e n t l y
irrelevant
o r d u p l i c a t i v e documents t h e
production
of which c l e a r l y
constitutes
harassment
or imposes
a burden
on t h e
17
1080884
producing
party f a r out of proportion to
any
benefit
received
by t h e
requesting
p a r t y , s e e , e . g . , Ex p a r t e Compass Bank,
686 S o . 2 d 1 1 3 5 , 1138 ( A l a . 1 9 9 6 ) ; ( c ) when
the t r i a l c o u r t e i t h e r imposes
sanctions
e f f e c t i v e l y p r e c l u d i n g a d e c i s i o n on t h e
merits
or denies
discovery
going
to a
p a r t y ' s e n t i r e a c t i o n o r d e f e n s e so t h a t ,
i n e i t h e r e v e n t , t h e outcome o f t h e case
has
been
a l l but determined
and t h e
p e t i t i o n e r w o u l d be m e r e l y g o i n g
through
t h e m o t i o n s o f a t r i a l t o o b t a i n an a p p e a l ;
o r (d) when t h e t r i a l c o u r t
impermissibly
prevents
the p e t i t i o n e r from
making
a
r e c o r d on t h e d i s c o v e r y i s s u e s o t h a t a n
a p p e l l a t e court cannot review the e f f e c t of
the
trial
court's
alleged
error.
The
burden
rests
on
the
petitioner
to
demonstrate that i t s p e t i t i o n presents such
an e x c e p t i o n a l c a s e - - t h a t i s , o n e i n w h i c h
an a p p e a l i s n o t an a d e q u a t e r e m e d y . S e e E x
p a r t e C o n s o l i d a t e d P u b l ' g C o . , 601 S o . 2 d
4 2 3 , 426 ( A l a . 1 9 9 2 ) . '
"Dillard,
Ex
parte
(Ala.
Guaranty Pest
2009).
proper
879 S o . 2 d a t 1 1 3 7 . "
Thus,
Control,
a petition
means b y w h i c h
to review
I n c . , 21 S o . 3 d 1 2 2 2 , 1 2 2 5 - 2 6
f o r the writ
o f mandamus
the discovery
order
i s a
i n these
cases.
Discussion
In
exceeded
i t s petition,
t h e IDB c o n t e n d s
i t s discretion i n ordering
c o u l d depose G a l l i o n ;
that
(1) t h a t
the t r i a l
the
court
plaintiffs
(2) t h a t t h e d e p o s i t i o n o f G a l l i o n c o u l d
18
1080884
be r e c o r d e d
documents
on v i d e o ;
and
(3) t h a t
the p l a i n t i f f s
had
G a l l i o n had t o produce the
requested
in their
notices
of
deposition.
"The
liberal
200,
959
Alabama
Rules
discovery."
208
( A l a . 2008)
to
discovery
relevant
"
discovery
Rule
Ex p a r t e
26(a),
oral
any
matter
i t "appears
not
involved
reasonably
30(a),
C i v . P.,
and s t a t e s ,
broad
and
991 S o . 2 d
956,
authorizes
ways,
26(b)(1)
i n the pending
sought might
permits
is
action
n o t be
under Rule 26(b)(1)
addresses
i n relevant
to
a
including
p r i v i l e g e d , which
calculated
evidence."
A l a . R.
Rule
information
of admissible
examination
5
i t i s discoverable
Hosp.,
C i v . P.,
several
matter,
the relevant
at t r i a l ,
in
allow
O ' N e a l , 713 S o . 2 d
A l a . R.
examination."
to the subject
Although
as
oral
upon
Procedure
St. Vincent's
discovery
"regarding
admissible
long
(citing
Rule
obtain
"depositions
Civil
Ex p a r t e
( A l a . 1998)).
party
of
lead
to
depositions
so
the
upon
part:
R u l e 2 6 ( a ) , A l a . R. C i v . P., s t a t e s : " P a r t i e s may o b t a i n
d i s c o v e r y b y one o r more o f t h e f o l l o w i n g m e t h o d s : d e p o s i t i o n s
upon
oral
examination
or
written
questions;
written
interrogatories;
production
of
documents
or
things
or
permission
to
enter
upon
land
or
other
property,
for
inspection
and
other
purposes;
physical
and
mental
examinations;
and r e q u e s t s f o r a d m i s s i o n . "
5
19
1080884
" A f t e r commencement o f t h e a c t i o n , any p a r t y
may
t a k e t h e t e s t i m o n y o f any p e r s o n , i n c l u d i n g a p a r t y ,
by
d e p o s i t i o n upon o r a l
examination.
Leave of
court,
granted
with
or without
n o t i c e , must
be
obtained
only
i f the p l a i n t i f f
seeks to take
a
d e p o s i t i o n p r i o r to the e x p i r a t i o n of t h i r t y
(30)
d a y s a f t e r s e r v i c e o f t h e summons a n d c o m p l a i n t u p o n
a n y d e f e n d a n t o r o t h e r mode o f s e r v i c e u n d e r R u l e 4,
e x c e p t t h a t l e a v e i s n o t r e q u i r e d (1) i f a d e f e n d a n t
has
served
a
notice
of
taking
deposition
or
o t h e r w i s e s o u g h t d i s c o v e r y , o r (2) i f s p e c i a l n o t i c e
i s g i v e n as p r o v i d e d i n s u b d i v i s i o n ( b ) ( 2 ) o f t h i s
r u l e . ... "
(Emphasis
Rule
30
including
Even
required
permitted
added.)
allows
On
the
opposing
i t s face,
taking
of
a
therefore,
deposition
limit
under
of
any
of
person,
counsel.
so, under c e r t a i n circumstances
to
the language
a
Rule
party's
use
26(a).
In
of
the
the t r i a l
discovery
particular,
Rule
court i s
methods
26(b)(1)
states:
"The f r e q u e n c y o r e x t e n t o f u s e o f t h e d i s c o v e r y
methods
set forth
in subdivision
(a) s h a l l
be
l i m i t e d by t h e c o u r t i f i t d e t e r m i n e s :
( i ) that the
discovery
sought
i s unreasonably
cumulative
or
d u p l i c a t i v e , o r i s o b t a i n a b l e f r o m some o t h e r
source
t h a t i s more c o n v e n i e n t ,
l e s s burdensome, or l e s s
expensive;
( i i ) t h a t t h e p a r t y s e e k i n g d i s c o v e r y has
had ample o p p o r t u n i t y by d i s c o v e r y i n t h e a c t i o n t o
obtain the information sought; or ( i i i ) that the
d i s c o v e r y i s u n d u l y burdensome or e x p e n s i v e ,
taking
i n t o a c c o u n t t h e n e e d s o f t h e c a s e , t h e amount i n
c o n t r o v e r s y , l i m i t a t i o n s on t h e p a r t i e s '
resources,
and t h e i m p o r t a n c e o f t h e i s s u e s a t s t a k e i n t h e
litigation.
The
court
may
a c t upon
i t s own
20
1080884
i n i t i a t i v e a f t e r reasonable n o t i c e or
motion under s u b d i v i s i o n ( c ) . "
Rule
26(c)
pursuant
to
a
provides:
"Upon m o t i o n b y a p a r t y o r b y t h e p e r s o n f r o m whom
d i s c o v e r y i s s o u g h t , and f o r good c a u s e shown, t h e
court
in
which
the
action
is
pending
or
a l t e r n a t i v e l y , on m a t t e r s r e l a t i n g t o a d e p o s i t i o n
or
production
or
i n s p e c t i o n , the
court
in
the
circuit
where
the
deposition
or
production
or
i n s p e c t i o n i s t o be t a k e n may make a n y o r d e r w h i c h
j u s t i c e r e q u i r e s to p r o t e c t a p a r t y or person from
annoyance,
embarrassment,
oppression,
or
undue
b u r d e n o r e x p e n s e , i n c l u d i n g one
o r more o f
the
following:
(1) t h a t t h e d i s c o v e r y n o t be h a d ;
(2)
t h a t t h e d i s c o v e r y may
be h a d
o n l y on
specified
t e r m s and c o n d i t i o n s , i n c l u d i n g a d e s i g n a t i o n o f t h e
time or p l a c e ;
(3) t h a t t h e d i s c o v e r y may
be
had
only
by
a method
of
discovery
other
than
that
s e l e c t e d by t h e p a r t y s e e k i n g d i s c o v e r y ;
(4) t h a t
c e r t a i n m a t t e r s n o t be i n q u i r e d i n t o , o r t h a t t h e
scope
of
the
discovery
be
limited
to
certain
matters;
(5) t h a t d i s c o v e r y be c o n d u c t e d w i t h no
one
p r e s e n t e x c e p t p e r s o n s d e s i g n a t e d by t h e c o u r t ;
(6)
t h a t a d e p o s i t i o n a f t e r b e i n g s e a l e d be o p e n e d o n l y
b y o r d e r o f t h e c o u r t ; (7) t h a t a t r a d e s e c r e t o r
other
confidential
research,
development,
or
commercial
information
not
be
disclosed
or
be
disclosed only in a designated
way;
(8) t h a t
the
p a r t i e s s i m u l t a n e o u s l y f i l e s p e c i f i e d documents or
information
enclosed
in sealed
envelopes
to
be
o p e n e d as d i r e c t e d b y t h e c o u r t . A m o t i o n f o r a
p r o t e c t i v e o r d e r s h a l l be a c c o m p a n i e d b y a s t a t e m e n t
of the a t t o r n e y f o r the moving p a r t y s t a t i n g t h a t
the
attorney,
before
filing
the
motion,
has
endeavored to r e s o l v e the s u b j e c t of the d i s c o v e r y
motion t h r o u g h c o r r e s p o n d e n c e or d i s c u s s i o n s w i t h
o p p o s i n g c o u n s e l or, i f the o p p o s i n g p a r t y i s not
r e p r e s e n t e d by c o u n s e l , w i t h t h e o p p o s i n g p a r t y . "
Thus,
the
trial
court
is
21
authorized,
on
its
own
1080884
initiative
under
under Rule
26(c),
would
otherwise
Subpoena
("In
words,
the
circumstances
or
under
a party
Rule
seeking
of
of a
30.
See
In
the
re
2003)
a deposition
when
are such that i t creates
that
(2d C i r .
i t s request,
deposition
party
of a deposition
350 F . 3 d 6 5 , 70
the propriety
proposed
the motion
need
judges
may
facts
and
an i n a p p r o p r i a t e
burden
hardship.").
Some
party
courts
have
i s attempting
approach, the party
initial
Shelton
1986),
6
applied
t o depose
seeking
v.
The l e a d i n g
American
a heightened
opposing
i t s request
case
Motors
utilized
counsel.
before
exemplifying
Corp.,
a n d t h e IDB i n t h e p r e s e n t
approach
standard
i n Shelton
805
petition
a
this
has t h e
the deposition
this
F.2d
when
Under
t o depose opposing counsel
burden of j u s t i f y i n g
may p r o c e e d .
the
permitted
although
o r on
the taking
to Friedman,
demonstrate
prevent
26(b)(1)
to prevent
be
Issued
other
not
Rule
approach i s
1323
(8th
Cir.
u r g e s us t o adopt
f o r instances
i n which
a
"'Federal cases construing the Federal Rules of C i v i l
Procedure a r e p e r s u a s i v e a u t h o r i t y i n c o n s t r u i n g the Alabama
Rules of C i v i l
P r o c e d u r e , w h i c h were p a t t e r n e d
after the
F e d e r a l R u l e s o f C i v i l P r o c e d u r e . ' " Ex p a r t e S a f e w a y I n s . Co.
o f A l a b a m a , 990 S o . 2 d 344 , 349 n.2 ( A l a . 2 0 0 8 ) ( q u o t i n g H i l b ,
R o g a l & H a m i l t o n C o . v . B e i e r s d o e r f e r , 989 S o . 2 d 1 0 4 5 , 1 0 5 6
n.3 ( A l a . 2 0 0 7 ) ) .
6
22
1080884
party
seeks
In
Eighth
to
Shelton,
Circuit
depose
the
held
opposing
United
that
counsel.
States
the
Court
taking
of
of
Appeals
opposing
for
the
counsel's
deposition
" s h o u l d be l i m i t e d t o [ t h o s e c i r c u m s t a n c e s ]
where
t h e p a r t y s e e k i n g t o t a k e t h e d e p o s i t i o n has shown
that
(1)
no
other
means
exist
to
obtain
the
i n f o r m a t i o n t h a n t o d e p o s e o p p o s i n g c o u n s e l ... ; (2)
the
information
sought
is
relevant
and
n o n p r i v i l e g e d ; a n d (3) t h e i n f o r m a t i o n i s c r u c i a l t o
the p r e p a r a t i o n of the case."
805
F.2d
at
1327
(emphasis
In d i s c u s s i n g S h e l t o n ,
for
the
Second C i r c u i t
has
added).
the U n i t e d
States
Court of
Appeals
observed:
"Shelton
...
represents
a
departure
from
the
otherwise
permissive
deposition-discovery
regime
under the F e d e r a l Rules of C i v i l Procedure.
The
E i g h t h C i r c u i t summarized the s p e c i f i c p o l i c i e s t h a t
animated i t s h e i g h t e n e d standard f o r d e p o s i t i o n s of
o p p o s i n g c o u n s e l as f o l l o w s :
" ' T a k i n g the d e p o s i t i o n of o p p o s i n g c o u n s e l
not o n l y d i s r u p t s the a d v e r s a r i a l system
and l o w e r s t h e s t a n d a r d s o f t h e p r o f e s s i o n ,
but i t a l s o adds to the a l r e a d y burdensome
t i m e and c o s t s o f l i t i g a t i o n .
I t i s not
hard to imagine a d d i t i o n a l p r e t r i a l delays
t o r e s o l v e w o r k - p r o d u c t and a t t o r n e y - c l i e n t
o b j e c t i o n s , as w e l l as d e l a y s t o r e s o l v e
c o l l a t e r a l i s s u e s r a i s e d by t h e
attorney's
testimony.
Finally,
the
practice
of
deposing opposing counsel d e t r a c t s from the
q u a l i t y of c l i e n t r e p r e s e n t a t i o n .
Counsel
s h o u l d be f r e e t o d e v o t e h i s o r h e r
time
23
1080884
and e f f o r t s t o p r e p a r i n g t h e c l i e n t ' s c a s e
w i t h o u t f e a r o f b e i n g i n t e r r o g a t e d by h i s
or her opponent.
Moreover, the
"chilling
e f f e c t " t h a t s u c h p r a c t i c e w i l l h a v e on t h e
t r u t h f u l communications from the c l i e n t to
the a t t o r n e y i s obvious.'
" [ 8 0 5 F.2d]
a t 1327.
Although the S h e l t o n c o u r t d i d
not e x p l i c i t l y r e s t t h i s aspect of i t s h o l d i n g
on
concerns
about
intruding
on
attorney-client
privilege,
such
concerns
were
implicit
in
the
court's
concern
over
a
'chilling
effect'
on
a t t o r n e y - c l i e n t communications.
"The
Eighth
Circuit
further
explained
the
p o l i c i e s animating i t s S h e l t o n d e c i s i o n i n Pamida,
I n c . v . E.S. O r i g i n a l s , I n c . , 281 F . 3 d 726 ( 8 t h C i r .
2 0 0 2 ) , and
limited
the
Shelton
r u l e ' s reach.
In
Pamida,
the
plaintiff
shoe
retailer
sued
for
indemnification
from
shoe m a n u f a c t u r e r s
for
the
c o s t s i t i n c u r r e d i n t h e d e f e n s e and s e t t l e m e n t
of
a patent infringement lawsuit.
The d e f e n d a n t s h o e
m a n u f a c t u r e r s sought to depose the a t t o r n e y s
who
represented
the
plaintiff
both
in
the
indemnification
action
and
the
original
patent
lawsuit
about
whether
the
plaintiff
had
given
a d e q u a t e n o t i c e o f i t s i n d e m n i t y c l a i m , as w e l l as
whether
the
fees
the
plaintiff
sought
were
reasonably
incurred
in
defending
the
patent
infringement
lawsuit.
In
permitting
the
depositions,
the
Eighth
Circuit
explained
that
Shelton
'was
intended
to
guard
against
the
" h a r a s s i n g p r a c t i c e of deposing opposing counsel
...
t h a t does n o t h i n g f o r the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of j u s t i c e
but
rather prolongs
and
increases
the
costs
of
l i t i g a t i o n , demeans t h e p r o f e s s i o n , and c o n s t i t u t e s
an a b u s e o f t h e d i s c o v e r y p r o c e s s . " '
I d . a t 729-30
( q u o t i n g S h e l t o n , 805 F . 2 d a t 1 3 3 0 ) .
Such c o n c e r n s
were
not
implicated,
according
to
the
Eighth
Circuit,
when
an
attorney
seeks
only
relevant
i n f o r m a t i o n about p r i o r t e r m i n a t e d
litigation:
24
1080884
"'The
Shelton
test
was
intend[ed]
to
protect
against
the
ills
of
deposing
opposing counsel i n a pending case which
c o u l d p o t e n t i a l l y l e a d to the d i s c l o s u r e of
the
attorney's
litigation
strategy.
Because t h i s abuse of the d i s c o v e r y p r o c e s s
had
b e c o m e an e v e r
increasing practice,
t h i s C o u r t e r e c t e d t h e S h e l t o n t e s t as a
barrier
to p r o t e c t t r i a l
attorneys
from
these
depositions.
But
S h e l t o n was
not
intended to provide heightened
protection
t o a t t o r n e y s who r e p r e s e n t e d a c l i e n t i n a
c o m p l e t e d c a s e and t h e n a l s o h a p p e n e d t o
represent
t h a t same c l i e n t i n a p e n d i n g
c a s e w h e r e t h e i n f o r m a t i o n known o n l y
by
the a t t o r n e y s r e g a r d i n g the p r i o r
concluded
c a s e was
crucial.'
"Id.
at
730
(internal
citations
omitted).
A c c o r d i n g l y , the c o u r t h e l d t h a t '[the defendant]
need not s a t i s f y S h e l t o n to depose the
[plaintiff's]
attorneys
regarding
information
involving
the
concluded
patent
infringement
case,' but t h a t
the
proposed
depositions
were
still
subject
to
the
s t a n d a r d s o f R u l e 26.
I d . at 730-31."
Friedman,
350
F.3d
In
Friedman,
Shelton
approach.
7
at
70-71.
the
Second
Instead,
Circuit
the
court
declined
held
to
adopt
the
that
The
court
stated
that
"only
the
Sixth
Circuit
has
f o l l o w e d the E i g h t h i n adopting the S h e l t o n r u l e . "
350
F.3d
a t 71 ( c i t i n g N a t i o n w i d e M u t .
I n s . Co. v . Home I n s . Co.,
278
F . 3 d 6 2 1 , 628 ( 6 t h C i r . 2 0 0 2 ) .
However, the c o u r t a l s o n o t e d
t h a t "[t]wo o t h e r c i r c u i t s have u p h e l d
lower court
rulings
p r e m i s e d on S h e l t o n b y a f f i r m i n g on t h e g r o u n d s t h a t
the
r u l i n g s w e r e w i t h i n t h e l o w e r c o u r t ' s d i s c r e t i o n t o manage
d i s c o v e r y u n d e r R u l e 26."
350 F . 3 d a t 71 n.3 ( c i t i n g B o u g h t o n
v . C o t t e r C o r p . , 65 F . 3 d
823,
830-31 (10th C i r . 1 9 9 5 ) ,
and
N g u y e n v . E x c e l C o r p . , 197 F . 3 d 2 0 0 , 2 0 8 - 0 9 ( 5 t h C i r . 1 9 9 9 ) ) .
7
25
1080884
" t h e s t a n d a r d s s e t f o r t h i n R u l e 2 6 [ , F e d . R. C i v .
P.,]
require
a
flexible
approach
to
lawyer
d e p o s i t i o n s whereby t h e j u d i c i a l o f f i c e r s u p e r v i s i n g
discovery
takes
into
consideration
a l l of the
relevant
facts
and
circumstances
to
determine
whether the proposed d e p o s i t i o n
would e n t a i l
an
inappropriate
burden
or
hardship.
Such
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s may i n c l u d e t h e n e e d t o d e p o s e t h e
lawyer, the lawyer's role i n connection
with the
m a t t e r on w h i c h d i s c o v e r y i s s o u g h t a n d i n r e l a t i o n
to the pending l i t i g a t i o n , the r i s k of encountering
p r i v i l e g e and w o r k - p r o d u c t i s s u e s , and t h e e x t e n t o f
discovery already conducted.
T h e s e f a c t o r s may, i n
some c i r c u m s t a n c e s ,
be e s p e c i a l l y a p p r o p r i a t e
to
consider
i n determining
whether
interrogatories
s h o u l d be u s e d a t l e a s t i n i t i a l l y a n d s o m e t i m e s i n
l i e u of a deposition.
Under t h i s approach, t h e f a c t
t h a t t h e p r o p o s e d deponent i s a l a w y e r does n o t
a u t o m a t i c a l l y i n s u l a t e him or her from a d e p o s i t i o n
nor
automatically
require
prior
resort
to
alternative
discovery
devices,
but
i t is
a
c i r c u m s t a n c e t o be
considered."
350
F.3d a t 72.
As
to
t h e Second
the Federal
that
requires
justify
normal
Rules
observed
of C i v i l
the party
i n Friedman
Procedure,
seeking
process
under
i s sought
compliance with
must j u s t i f y
("Shelton
Rule
26,
must
...
move
a
party
protective
the party
of
Shelton
to
seeking
from
order
whom
in
discovery
S e e F r i e d m a n , 350 F . 3 d a t
a departure
26
respect
i s a departure from the
for a
request.
represents
that part
i n which
Rule 26(c) before
i t s discovery
with
t o depose o p p o s i n g c o u n s e l
i t s request f o rthe deposition
discovery
70
Circuit
from
the
otherwise
1080884
permissive
of C i v i l
v.
deposition-discovery
Procedure.").
Fuji
Trucolor
1996)
Federal
good
Shelton
depose
the
of
for
evaluating
Rule
26(c)
noted
limit
cause
to
counsel
of
do
not
counsel.
under
Rule
or
the
limit
the
to
party
of
adopt
seeking
the
to p r e v e n t the d e p o s i t i o n of i t s counsel
has
the
a
however,
a party's
to
Rule
protective
26,
Ala.
order
R.
and
demonstrating
26(c).
that
the
motion
prevent
or
Shelton
deposition
requires
extent
in subdivision
27
factors
are
useful
for a p r o t e c t i v e order
the
26(b)(1)
frequency
forth
under Rule
initially
their
26(c)
IDB's r e q u e s t
i t requires
...
to preclude
preclude
justify
La.
P.,
for
to
(W.D.
Procedure
deposition
burden
36
Inc.
Civ.
Rather,
above,
set
the
Group,
for
seeking
"[t]he
methods
bears
under Rule
think,
Civil
Rules
i t s need
moving
"good c a u s e "
We
the
F.R.D. 34,
t h e r e f o r e d e c l i n e the
opposing
seeking
burden
of
a p p r o a c h i n s o f a r as
deposition.
party
As
We
168
the p r o t e c t i v e order
deposition
testimony.").
to
Rules
seeking
demonstrating
the
Inc.,
prohibit taking
Thus, the p a r t y
attorney's
a l s o Rainbow I n v e s t o r s
Missouri,
("[T]he
specifically
See
regime under the F e d e r a l
of
use
the
of
(a)" i f the
of
its
trial
the
court
under
counsel.
court
to
discovery
concludes
1080884
"(i)
that
the discovery
sought
i s unreasonably
cumulative
or d u p l i c a t i v e ,
or i s obtainable
from
some o t h e r
source that
i s more c o n v e n i e n t ,
less
burdensome, or l e s s expensive;
( i i ) that the party
seeking
discovery
has had ample
opportunity
by
discovery i n the action to obtain the information
sought;
or
( i i i ) that
the discovery
i s unduly
burdensome or e x p e n s i v e ,
t a k i n g into account the
needs
of the case,
t h e amount
in
controversy,
limitations
on t h e p a r t i e s '
resources,
and t h e
importance
of
the
issues
at
stake
in
the
litigation."
In
the unique
context
of a
d e p o s i t i o n of i t s counsel,
means
of implementing
evaluating
whether
protective
order
Therefore,
order
attempt
the Shelton
there
i s good
i n support
to prevent
the
factors are a p r a c t i c a l
the requirements
under Rule
to prevent
party's
cause
of Rule
26(b)(1)
f o r the issuance
and
of a
26(c).
of
i t s motion
the deposition
for a
of i t s counsel,
protective
the moving
p a r t y may d e m o n s t r a t e " g o o d c a u s e " u n d e r R u l e 2 6 ( c ) b y s h o w i n g
that
one o r more
that
there
sought;
not
Shelton
could
are other
(2) t h a t
relevant;
crucial
to
of the f o l l o w i n g circumstances
or
means b y w h i c h t o o b t a i n
the information
(3)
that
the preparation
the
of
sought
case.
sought
Of
that
good
cause
exists
28
under
Rule
or i s
i s not
course,
f a c t o r s a r e n o t t h e e x c l u s i v e means b y w h i c h
show
(1)
the information
i s privileged
information
the
exist:
a
the
party
26(c) f o r a
1080884
protective
order
counsel.
Similarly,
consider
only
preventing
the
the Shelton
the deposition
trial
court
factors
attempt t o depose opposing c o u n s e l
circumstances
o u t l i n e d i n Rule
other
makes
the
and t h a t ,
presents
t h e same
arguments
of
the options;
As
under
and
the
Gallion's
the
whether
the information
i n i t sp e t i t i o n
was
cases.
to this
Court
as t o
court's
order
o f G a l l i o n as t o h i s i n v o l v e m e n t i n
agreements and t h e e x e r c i s e
(2) t h e n e g o t i a t i o n s
relating
to the project
(3) t h e c l o s i n g o f t h e " s a l e . "
IDB
points
involvement
option
as
out, there
i s evidence
to the actual
agreements,
aspect of negotiating the option
Ellen
not
The IDB
but
purchase
there
is
indicating
price
no
McNair
agreements.
o f t h e Montgomery A r e a
29
According
Chamber o f
paid
evidence
i n d i c a t i n g t h a t G a l l i o n was s p e c i f i c a l l y i n v o l v e d i n a n y
IDB,
an
t h e IDB a r g u e d t h a t t h e
of the p l a i n t i f f s '
the negotiation of the option
agreement;
to
one o r more o f t h e
s p e c i f i c areas i d e n t i f i e d i n the t r i a l
permitting the deposition
(1)
required
26(b)(1).
therefore,
to the preparation
three
i s not
party's
s o u g h t b y G a l l i o n ' s d e p o s i t i o n was a v a i l a b l e f r o m
sources
crucial
the
i n determining
In moving f o r a p r o t e c t i v e o r d e r ,
information
of
other
to the
Commerce
1080884
testified
that
Gallion
was
involved
in
p u r c h a s e p r i c e t o be p a i d u n d e r t h e o p t i o n
also
testified
Todd
Strange,
Development
involved
then
and
John
same
the
purchase
that
IDB
also
there
has
information
option
represented
t h e Chamber
the
director
of
Walter Stowers
of
testified
are
other
shown
of
the
the
IDB
were
there
are
the
negotiations
the
obtaining
than deposing
that
Alabama
Additionally,
about
of
she
Commerce,
the
Consequently,
means
the
agreements, but
negotiations.
IDB
has
information
Gallion.
other
means
of
about the n e g o t i a t i o n of the language of
agreements.
a group
of
price.
the purchase p r i c e
obtaining
the
was
those
demonstrated
The
Kyser
t h e m s e l v e s have
regarding
about
who
Jerry
Office,
in
landowners
that
negotiating
Jesse
Williams,
of landowners, d r a f t e d
an
attorney
those
who
agreements.
No e v i d e n c e i n d i c a t e s t h a t G a l l i o n was
involved in negotiating
the
agreements.
language of or d r a f t i n g the o p t i o n
t o i n t e r r o g a t o r i e s , t h e IDB a s s e r t e d
with
of
that
i t d i d not
t h e R u s s e l l s o r t h e McLemore g r o u p r e g a r d i n g
the option
agreements,
Thomas R u s s e l l ,
Price
and George
McLemore,
that they d i d not n e g o t i a t e
with
30
and
In
anyone
negotiate
the language
Russell, Myrtis
Mary
answers
Russell,
McLemore
testified
f r o m t h e IDB
regarding
1080884
the
language
the
record
of
from
understanding
Williams
IDB
exercise
The
IDB
of
points
exercised
on
from G a l l i o n
options,
and
plaintiffs
the
options
plaintiffs
the
IDB
t o why
the
has
the
IDB
clause,
relating
information
t h a t the
has
options
produced
the
project
including
agreement
i n t e r r o g a t o r i e s from
the
exercised.
information
the
project
The
project
that property
referred
i n c l u d e the S h e l t o n / W a l k e r p r o p e r t y .
31
regarding
agreement
agreement
LLC,
McPhillips testified
to
under o p t i o n
were
letters
exercise
Frank M c P h i l l i p s of Maynard, Cooper & Gale,
the
sources.
the
were
State.
regarding
other
d r a f t e d by
the
the
clause.
from
representing
both
agreements
option
available
attorney
sources.
and
of
shown t h a t
to
their
the
regarding
options
to
about
IDB
answered
has
other
The
as
in
testified
that i t i s undisputed
2002.
i s evidence
IDB
i s a v a i l a b l e from
to
negotiations
of
demonstrated that
15,
as
have
language
April
the
the
most-favored-nation
the
out
Similarly,
the
George
regarding
a l s o has
the
of
There
most-favored-nation
Randall
the
agreements.
members
the
particularly
The
option
two
of
and
negotiations
and
the
the
with
project
the
According
IDB
and
is
was
an
that
site
as
did
not
to M c P h i l l i p s ,
1080884
the
Shelton/Walker
property
project
site.
treated
separately."
addressing
project
it
the Shelton/Walker
2002.
yard
to
site,
testified
property
was
do
with
the
and
so
i t was
that
a
section
included
n e g o t i a t i o n s with Hyundai's
M c P h i l l i p s s a i d he d i d n o t p r o v i d e
i n the
attorneys
a d r a f t of
s e c t i o n t o t h e IDB b e c a u s e t h e IDB h a d made i t c l e a r t h a t
would
not provide
Finally,
regarding
the
a n y m o r e money
IDB
has
f o r the project.
demonstrated
that
the c l o s i n g i s a v a i l a b l e from other
Gallion.
The
Additionally,
the
the r a i l
nothing
McPhillips
agreement a f t e r
in April
that
I t was
"had
IDB
has
IDB
has
produced
the p l a i n t i f f s
answered
several
the
argues
sources
a l l the c l o s i n g
were p r e s e n t
information
besides
documents.
at the closing,
interrogatories
and
about
the
Gallion
i s
closing.
In
sum,
unnecessary
the
areas
Gallion's
plaintiffs
IDB
because,
as
to
or has
i t says,
which
deposition
that
already
information
the
either
trial
the concerns expressed
Appeals
i n Shelton,
t h e IDB
regarding
court's
i s otherwise
been
Echoing
deposing
obtained
available
by
by t h e E i g h t h
contends
32
order
that
the
each
of
compels
to the
plaintiffs.
Circuit
deposing
Court of
Gallion
1080884
would
best
produce
cumulative
worst
further
disrupt
the
litigation
harassment,
increased
costs,
and
unnecessary
Shelton,
F.2d
and
at
at
counsel
the
805
not
only
standards
already
Fla.
the
to
harass
the
case.
of
the
...
relationship
is
1267
to
deposition
a
quarterback
also
(3d
or
6 Moore's
ed.
and
(W.D.
listen
Federal
i t
of
also
delay.
of
and
...
i n on
lowers
to
to
These
other
invitation
and
33
delay
burdens
attorney
client
presumptions
party
shouldn't
the
side's
under
be
huddle.").
at
may
897
other
Practice § 2 6.105[2][b](ii)
2009):
302
that
a p r o t e c t i v e order
sucker-punch
the
West
held
disrupt
the
("[A]
the
F.R.D. 3 0 1 ,
N i l e s Home f o r C h i l d r e n ,
1 995)
to
and
added to l i t i g a t i o n ,
for obtaining
Mo.
opposing
adds
have
in
See
litigation.");
however,
p a r t i e s , and
C a s c o n e v.
Supp. 1263,
result
i n h e r e n t l y c o n s t i t u t e an
threatened.
R u l e 2 6 ( a ) . " ) ; and
use
courts,
attorneys,
good cause
but
costs
Moreover, costs are
upon
and
deposition
P a l m B e a c h C o u n t y , 132
attorneys
information
a d v e r s a r i a l system
and
("Federal
attorney
placed
constitute
the
profession,
v.
duplicative
("Taking the
time
Co.
1990)
depositions
are
of
Title
1327
disrupts
burdensome
Peninsular
(S.D.
at
or
F.
able
side's
See
26-527
1080884
"Most
courts
have
recognized that
deposing
c o u n s e l t e n d s t o d i s r u p t t h e a d v e r s a r i a l s y s t e m and
add
to the
time
and
costs
of
litigation.
It
n e c e s s i t a t e s p r e t r i a l delays to resolve work-product
and a t t o r n e y - c l i e n t o b j e c t i o n s .
In a d d i t i o n ,
the
practice
of deposing
counsel detracts
from
the
quality
of
client
representation
because
the
r e l a t i o n s h i p i s t a i n t e d by t h e w o r r y t h a t c o u n s e l
w i l l be i n t e r r o g a t e d b y t h e o p p o n e n t . "
We
agree
with
the
IDB
that
present
cases
implicate
the
same
Shelton
decision
typically
doing
regarding
the
the
circumstances
concerns
burdens
and
the
underlay
the
problems
a c c o m p a n y an a t t e m p t t o d e p o s e o p p o s i n g c o u n s e l .
so,
we
recognize that
those
concerns
i m p l i c a t e d t o t h e same d e g r e e h e r e b e c a u s e
completely analogous to Shelton.
in
that
in
which
the
information
litigation,
deposition
the
attorney
of
obtained
perhaps
unlike
counsel
in
preparation
only
for
t h e IDB h a s n o t a s s e r t e d s p e c i f i c w a y s i n w h i c h i t
8
However,
analogous
we
a l s o are not persuaded
that the present cases are
to
Pamida,
Originals,
2002),
not
Shelton,
sought
contends t h a t the i n f o r m a t i o n sought i s p r i v i l e g e d .
Cir.
In
these cases are not
For example,
opposing
had
are
that
I n c . v.
E.S.
i n which
the
I n c . , 281
United States
Court
F.3d
72 6
of Appeals
(8th
for
T h e IDB h a s made g e n e r a l a l l e g a t i o n s t o t h a t e f f e c t , s u c h
a s t h e a s s e r t i o n t h a t " [ a ] n y t e s t i m o n y o f Mr. G a l l i o n a b o u t
t h e n e g o t i a t i o n s a l s o r u n s t h e r i s k o f i n t r u d i n g on p r i v i l e g e d
matters."
( P e t i t i o n , p. 27 ( e m p h a s i s
added).)
8
34
1080884
the
Eighth
Circuit
distinguished
d e p o s i t i o n of o p p o s i n g c o u n s e l
from the
opposing counsel's
lawsuits.
Unlike
the
Shelton
regarding
involvement
scenario
and
permitted
relevant
information
in a prior,
i n Pamida, the
completed
plaintiffs
seek to depose G a l l i o n about h i s involvement i n the
transaction
his
that
forms the
involvement
Under
obtain
the
in a prior,
the
demonstrated
the
by
deposing
burden
then
Gallion's
of
was
personally
the
project
parties,
other
and
person
information
transaction."
contend
was
agreement,
the
the
case.
in
case,
the
closing
plaintiffs
of
p.
to
the
was
knowledge
24.)
that
35
sought
to
sources,
show
that
argue
that
case because " G a l l i o n
options"
IDB
IDB
plaintiffs'
plaintiffs
negotiations
the
not
the
other
of
the
r e l a t i o n s h i p between
personal
(Answer,
once
c r u c i a l to the
to t h e i r
the
underlying
lawsuits,
plaintiffs
The
here
lawsuit.
this
nonetheless
representing
from
to
is crucial
involved
the
present
G a l l i o n i s a v a i l a b l e from
their
testimony
of
information
shifted
Gallion's testimony
of the
completed
circumstances
that
preparation
basis
the
and
able
options,
a l l of
because
to
provide
concerning
Ultimately,
the
the
"[n]o
any
this
plaintiffs
1080884
" [ t ] h e t e s t i m o n y f r o m t h e IDB members a n d o t h e r s
i n v o l v e d , h a s b e e n t h a t M r . G a l l i o n was t h e p e r s o n
f r o m t h e IDB t h a t was i n v o l v e d i n t h e n e g o t i a t i o n o f
the
options;
that
received
notice
that
the
Shelton/Walker property
was p a r t
of the p r o j e c t ;
t h a t was i n v o l v e d i n t h e n e g o t i a t i o n o f t h e p r o j e c t
agreement
(which i n c l u d e d the Shelton/Walker
land
and
required
t h e IDB t o e x e r c i s e
the options
to
purchase the P l a i n t i f f s ' property); that
exercised
the o p t i o n s t o purchase t h e P l a i n t i f f s ' p r o p e r t y by
t h e I D B ; a n d t h a t was i n v o l v e d i n t h e c l o s i n g o f t h e
property.
Mr. G a l l i o n i s , t h e r e f o r e , a m a t e r i a l and
n e c e s s a r y w i t n e s s t o t h e e n t i r e t r a n s a c t i o n and i s
t h e o n l y p e r s o n f r o m t h e IDB who c a n t e s t i f y
from
p e r s o n a l knowledge.
No o n e e l s e h a s b e e n a b l e t o do
s o , n o t e v e n t h e I D B ' s [ R u l e 3 0 ( b ) ( 6 ) , A l a . R. C i v .
P.,] r e p r e s e n t a t i v e . "
( A n s w e r , p. 2 8 . )
In
support
of t h e i r
position,
deposition
testimony of Berry
30(b)(6),
A l a . R.
the p l a i n t i f f s
G r a n t , who t e s t i f i e d
C i v . P.,
representative
cite
the
as t h e R u l e
f o r the
IDB.
9
The p l a i n t i f f s argue t h a t G a l l i o n has a l r e a d y agreed t o
be d e p o s e d , a n d t h e p l a i n t i f f s s u p p o r t t h a t a s s e r t i o n w i t h a
s e l e c t i v e quotation from a t r a n s c r i p t of a hearing before the
t r i a l court i n which G a l l i o n stated:
9
"The
question
i s
do I h a v e t o s u b m i t t o a
d e p o s i t i o n w h i c h I ' l l t e l l y o u r i g h t now I w i l l .
He
[the a t t o r n e y
f o r the p l a i n t i f f s ]
can ask those
questions.
I d o n ' t g i v e a h o o t o r h e c k i f he v i d e o s
i t o r b r i n g s i n MGM s t u d i o s , b u t I w a n t t o be a b l e
to ask him those questions
I j u s t t o l d you."
I n i t s m a t e r i a l s , t h e IDB p r o v i d e s a d d i t i o n a l
transcript
of that
same h e a r i n g ,
and those
i n d i c a t e t h a t G a l l i o n ' s s t a t e m e n t t h a t he was
d e p o s e d was c o n d i t i o n e d u p o n t h e p l a i n t i f f s '
36
pages from t h e
pages
clearly
w i l l i n g t o be
attorneys
also
1080884
Specifically,
he
had
the
very
the p l a i n t i f f s
little
this
knowledge
t r a n s a c t i o n " and
keep them i n f o r m e d
case."
The
on
that
concerning
"the
IDB
the
depends
t r a n s a c t i o n s such
( A n s w e r , p.
testimony
a s s e r t t h a t Grant
as
"admitted
negotiations
on
the
Mr.
Gallion
of Grant
p r o v i d e d by
the
plaintiffs
was
"A.
You're coming to the wrong p e r s o n .
Again,
you've got to understand
the context i n which the
[ I D B ] o p e r a t e s , t h e way we m e e t .
We d e a l i n l e g a l
d o c u m e n t s , w h i c h I c o u l d r e a d 10 t i m e s a n d c o u l d n ' t
t e l l you t h r e e - f o u r t h s o f what I r e a d o r what i t
m e a n t , a n d t h a t ' s why we d e p e n d on c o u n s e l .
That's
why o u r - - a n y p r o j e c t t h a t c o m e s b e f o r e u s r e q u e s t i n g
a c t i o n , t h e v e r y f i r s t t h i n g we do i s we w a n t t o
know f r o m o u r a t t o r n e y i f t h i s i s c o r r e c t , i f i t ' s
s o m e t h i n g we c a n a c t on i n t h e a f f i r m a t i v e , i f t h e r e
a r e a n y p r o b l e m s w i t h i t . A n d t h a t ' s t h e way
we
operate.
"Q.
A n d I'm u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h a t a n d I'm h e a r i n g
it
from a l o t of people.
...
But
the Rules
of
P r o c e d u r e a l l o w me t o d e p o s e s o m e b o d y f r o m t h e
IDB
who c a n a n s w e r s p e c i f i c q u e s t i o n s .
deposed.
to
25.)
"Q.
B u t many o f t h e q u e s t i o n s I a s k e d o f Mr.
[Reuben] T h o r n t o n [ ,
t h e c h a i r m a n o f t h e IDB,]
he
s a i d he w a s n ' t a b l e t o
a n s w e r t h a t ... t h a t t h i n g s
w o u l d be
presented
and
he w o u l d s i g n t h e m .
So
t h a t ' s why I'm t r y i n g t o f i n d s o m e b o d y w i t h t h e
IDB
who
can
answer
specific
questions
and
detailed
q u e s t i o n s about the
involvement.
t o be
and
transaction in
follows:
agreeing
that
See
supra
37
note
4.
as
1080884
"A.
memory.
I will
answer
them as b e s t
I can given
my
"Q.
Right.
B u t as I g a t h e r f r o m y o u , d e t a i l e d
q u e s t i o n s a b o u t why a l e a s e was e n t e r e d i n t o o r why
t h e o p t i o n was a s s i g n e d t o t h e C i t y o r t h e C o u n t y
was n o t r e a l l y
a d e c i s i o n t h a t would have
been
d i s c u s s e d o r made b y y o u a n d t h e o t h e r m e m b e r s o f
the board.
"A.
I t ' s p o s s i b l e i t would have been.
with [Gallion's] consent."
Other
not
than
asserting that
explained
why
Grant's
Gallion's
testimony
i s crucial
case.
discussed
above,
that
of
As
G a l l i o n was i n v o l v e d
the option
The
Area
the
also
testimony
that
demonstrates
to the preparation
there
i s no
i n negotiating
cite
evidence
of
their
indicating
any o f t h e language
the a f f i d a v i t
a c t i o n s were f i l e d .
representatives
County,
have
and
deposition
o f R e u b e n T h o r n t o n , t h e c h a i r m a n o f t h e IDB when t h e
underlying
how
i t i s so, the p l a i n t i f f s
agreements.
plaintiffs
testimony
Again,
the C i t y
of
Thornton's a f f i d a v i t
the
State
o f Montgomery,
Chamber o f Commerce w o r k e d
industrial
project.
IDB's p a r t i c i p a t i o n
plaintiffs
assert
The
of
Alabama,
38
Montgomery
t h e IDB, and t h e Montgomery
together
affidavit
to obtain
also
i n the purchase of the land.
that
described
land f o r
described
the
However, t h e
1080884
"when
Mr. T h o r n t o n ' s
deposition
was
taken,
he
a d m i t t e d t h a t he h a d no p e r s o n a l
knowledge
of the
statements contained i n h i s a f f i d a v i t [ , ] i n d i c a t i n g
t h a t h i s a t t o r n e y , M r . G a l l i o n , was t h e p e r s o n w i t h
the most knowledge c o n c e r n i n g t h e t r a n s a c t i o n , t h a t
Mr. G a l l i o n a u t h o r e d t h e A f f i d a v i t , a n d t h a t he j u s t
signed i t . "
(Answer,
p . 2 5.)
In s u p p o r t o f t h i s
following
portion
assertion, the p l a i n t i f f s attached the
of Thornton's
deposition:
"Q.
And your
attorney
drafted
advised to sign [thea f f i d a v i t ] ; isn't
"MR.
GALLION: W e l l ,
A g a i n , t h e r e was a l i t t l e
o v e r i t , b u t ...
you
that
up a n d
true?
l e t me o b j e c t
to that.
b i t m o r e t o i t . We w e n t
"Q.
Many o f t h e t h i n g s t h a t w e ' v e g o n e o v e r - a n d I r e a l l y d o n ' t w a n t t o go t h r o u g h p a r a g r a p h b y
paragraph--but
you
would
agree
with
me
that
s t a t e m e n t s t h a t a r e made i n y o u r a f f i d a v i t a n d y o u r
supplemental
affidavit,
you have
no
independent
k n o w l e d g e o f t h a t , do y o u ?
"A.
I guess
that's
"Q.
I'm c o r r e c t ;
right.
Yes.
right?
"MR. G A L L I O N : W e l l ,
I object.
A s t o some.
O b v i o u s l y , he h a s i n d e p e n d e n t k n o w l e d g e o f w h a t h i s
name i s a n d w h e r e i n t h e h e l l h e i s .
"(Off
The
is
eight
the record
affidavit
pages
discussion.)"
of Thornton
long
to which
and d e s c r i b e s
39
the p l a i n t i f f s
in detail
refer
how t h e v a r i o u s
1080884
governmental
obtain
the
asserts
in
representatives
land
do
t h a t he h a s
not
"personal
think
deposition
personal
entities
f o r the p r o j e c t .
[the] a f f i d a v i t . "
we
and
worked
together to
In the a f f i d a v i t ,
knowledge
of a l lf a c t s set
C o n t r a r y to the p l a i n t i f f s '
the
above-quoted
demonstrates
knowledge
Thornton
portion
forth
assertion,
of
Thornton's
t h a t T h o r n t o n " a d m i t t e d t h a t he h a d
of
the
statements
contained
in
no
his
affidavit."
Finally,
member
of
testified
the
the
that
negotiations
do
assertion,
and
with
the
McNair
Montgomery
Mr.
the
not
assert
Area
Gallion
with
plaintiffs
Gallion's
plaintiffs
was
Chamber
involved
landowners."
include
they
do
a
citation
not
landowners.
negotiation
of
involvement
in
negotiating
the
necessarily
As
elaborate
that
the
the
stated
Gallion
purchase
"initial
purchase
e s t a b l i s h that
Ellen
of
during
in
was
Even
negotiations"
however,
Gallion's
40
IDB
involved
price.
price,
the
a
"has
initial
26.)
support
on
the
the
p.
the i n i t i a l
above,
McNair,
Commerce,
(Answer,
alleged involvement during
testified
that
The
of
that
extent
of
negotiations
asserts
only
i f
in
the
Gallion's
extended
that
that
beyond
does
testimony i s crucial
not
to
1080884
the
plaintiffs'
In
the portion
exhibit
Gallion
28,
"tak[en]
she
was
of McNair's
to the p l a i n t i f f s '
contacted
March
cases.
2002,
an
and
that
option
told
on
the
as
on
that
attached
testified
the night
then
... w o u l d
have
property
The p l a i n t i f f s
as
that
an
she
Thursday,
Bright
had
property,
and
known t h a t
before
also cite
w h i c h were s e r v e d
of
Mayor
on t h e S h e l t o n / W a l k e r
the Walker
f o r admission,
IDB a n s w e r e d
them
"Gallion
a g r e e m e n t was s i g n e d . "
requests
answer, McNair
and M c P h i l l i p s
out the option"
testified
deposition
the
there
project
the following
on t h e IDB a n d w h i c h
"denied":
"35.
A d m i t t h a t Thomas T. G a l l i o n , I I I , t h e
attorney
f o r the
IDB,
knew
that
Hyundai
was
demanding
that
the Shelton/Walker
property
be
purchased
f o r use by Hyundai
prior
t o t h e IDB
s i g n i n g the P r o j e c t Agreement.
"36.
A d m i t t h a t Thomas T. G a l l i o n , I I I , t h e
a t t o r n e y f o r t h e I D B , knew t h a t a n O p t i o n was s i g n e d
by t h e Mayor o f Montgomery f o r t h e p u r c h a s e o f t h e
S h e l t o n / W a l k e r p r o p e r t y p r i o r t o t h e IDB s i g n i n g t h e
P r o j e c t Agreement."
The
only
plaintiffs
representative
contend that
of
the
"[t]he only person
IDB]
that
would
[i.e., the
have
personal
knowledge concerning
the notice provided
b y M r s . M c N a i r i s Mr.
Gallion."
p.
however,
(Answer,
28.)
Clearly,
41
McNair
has
1080884
testified
Gallion;
the
about
thus,
alleged
Gallion
notice,
the
notice
the
the
contract;
747
So.
demonstrated
alleges
claim
she
source
of
not
preparing
order
the
sought
preventing
Accordingly,
we
McNair
See
f o r an
IDB
shown
has
cases,
the
hold
the
each
of
depose
him
and
the
IDB
is
plaintiffs
that
the
deposing
the
42
must
a breach
& Cas.
the
of
on
because
the
Gallion
is
from
trial
to
a
deposing
court
have
by
the
v.
not
McNair
of
their
contract.
i s not
topics
entitled
Co.
notice
preparation
Gallion
about
that
(2)
alleged breach
that
alleged
breach-of-
plaintiffs
about
to
a
have
performance under
The
Gallion
that
plaintiffs
Farm F i r e
1999).
recover
the
be
the
on
to
about
"would
provided
own
State
may
who
contract;
plaintiffs'
is crucial
to
IDB
claim,
a valid
deposing
demonstrated
their
of
(Ala.
information
plaintiffs
have
293
the
i t
cases seek to recover
the
provided
to
of
provided
information
Although
whether
damages.
2d
was
have o b t a i n e d
e s t a b l i s h that
(3)
that
seeking
Because
of
To
(4)
alleges
representative
existence
and
she
Gallion.
plaintiffs'
defendants;
Slade,
to
only
claim.
(1)
notice
plaintiffs
knowledge"
contract
prove
the
i s the
personal
the
the
which
only
the
plaintiffs
crucial
to
protective
Gallion.
exceeded
its
1080884
discretion
i n d e n y i n g t h e IDB's m o t i o n f o r a p r o t e c t i v e
to prevent the p l a i n t i f f s
g r a n t t h e IDB's p e t i t i o n
the
trial
court
for
a protective
from deposing G a l l i o n .
i t s order
and t o e n t e r
IDB's m o t i o n f o r a p r o t e c t i v e o r d e r
from deposing G a l l i o n .
therefore
f o r a w r i t o f m a n d a m u s , a n d we d i r e c t
to vacate
order
We
order
denying
t h e IDB's
a new o r d e r
preventing
motion
granting the
the p l a i n t i f f s
1 0
Conclusion
The
IDB's p e t i t i o n
PETITION
Lyons,
Cobb,
GRANTED; WRIT
Woodall,
Murdock,
f o ra writ
Stuart,
o f mandamus i s g r a n t e d .
ISSUED.
B o l i n , a n d Shaw, J J . , c o n c u r .
J . , dissents.
C.J., recuses
herself.
O u r h o l d i n g t h a t t h e IDB i s e n t i t l e d t o a p r o t e c t i v e
o r d e r p r e v e n t i n g G a l l i o n ' s d e p o s i t i o n r e n d e r s moot t h e IDB's
challenges
to the t r i a l court's additional rulings that the
d e p o s i t i o n c o u l d be v i d e o t a p e d a n d t h a t G a l l i o n p r o d u c e a t t h e
d e p o s i t i o n t h e documents t h e p l a i n t i f f s
requested i n their
notices of deposition.
1 0
43
1080884
MURDOCK, J u s t i c e
In
adopting
ordering
the
IDB"),
standard
F.2d
in
Development
as a f a c t
articulated
i t s application
those
insufficient
trial
court
discretion"
preventing
FSB,
the t r i a l
The f a c t s
of the Shelton
opinion.
o f t h e main
Given
opinion,
evidence
and t h a t
i ndenying
legal
A
parties
already
11
applied the
I
cannot
to support
the t r i a l
by t h e t r i a l
advocated
d e s c r i b e d near t h e
conclude
that
there i s
t h e f i n d i n g s made
court
court
areinconsistent
i n t h e manner
the testimony
"clearly
by t h e
exceeded i t s
t h e IDB's m o t i o n f o r a p r o t e c t i v e o r d e r
Ex p a r t e
(citing
862 ( A l a . 1 9 9 1 ) ) .
that thepetitioner
right
found
to rule
Gallion's deposition.
585 So. 2 d 859,
conclude
o f Montgomery
court
standard
872 S o . 2 d 8 1 0 , 813 ( A l a . 2 0 0 3 )
Rice,
I I I , counsel f o r
of the City
1 1
master and
i n S h e l t o n v . A m e r i c a n M o t o r s C o r p . , 805
f i n d i n g s necessary
t h e main
end
Board
witness,
1323 ( 8 t h C i r . 1 9 8 6 ) .
with
in
t h e recommendation of t h e s p e c i a l
t h e d e p o s i t i o n o f Thomas T. G a l l i o n
Industrial
("the
(dissenting).
... t o t h e o r d e r
Ocwen
Home I n s . C o . v .
A c c o r d i n g l y , I cannot
h a s shown i n t h i s
sought."
F e d . Bank,
Ex p a r t e
Court
Horton
n u m b e r o f o t h e r a t t o r n e y s who r e p r e s e n t e d
i n v o l v e d i n the " p r o j e c t " at issue i n these
have been deposed as f a c t w i t n e s s e s .
44
"a c l e a r
Homes,
various
actions
1080884
Inc.,
774
compelled
So.
to
2d
536,
539
( A l a . 2000 ) .
dissent.
45
Therefore,
I
am