Luggage positioning in AVE4041

Luggage positioning in AVE4041
The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that the suitcase containing the bomb which
destroyed Pan Am 103 over Lockerbie was one seen by baggage handler John Bedford while
the container was still in the interline shed at Heathrow, an hour before the feeder flight from
Frankfurt landed.
The blast which destroyed Maid of the Seas was relatively small, and only a limited number of
items were recovered showing damage due to the explosion itself. These were
•
•
•
•
Fragments of baggage container AVE4041, which was blown apart by the blast
A section of the airframe, the part which was underneath the loading position of
AVE4041
Approximately 25 items of luggage, many of which were only lightly damaged
Baggage container AVN7511, which had a small area of blast damage on one side
It is self-evident from the condition of AVE4041 that the explosion occurred inside that
container, low down to the extreme left, as viewed from the open side. (The open side will be
referred to as the front of the container, although when loaded this side was in fact facing aft.)
Flight 103 was carrying eight containers of passenger baggage; seven holding luggage
belonging to passengers who checked in for the flight de novo at Heathrow itself, and one
holding the luggage of passengers who flew into Heathrow on other flights. AVE4041 was the
container which held the transfer luggage.
Inquiries at Heathrow revealed that there were two categories of transfer luggage in the
container. A fairly small number of suitcases belonging to passengers who flew into Heathrow
on earlier connecting flights (‘interline luggage’) were loaded while it was in the interline shed,
before about quarter to five, and the remainder of the space was filled with luggage from the
PA103 feeder flight which arrived at Heathrow at twenty to six (‘online luggage’). While luggage
in the first group was x-rayed before being placed in the container, the luggage from the feeder
flight was thrown straight into the container from the aircraft’s hold, out on the tarmac, and
thereafter the container was sealed up and loaded directly on to Maid of the Seas without any
security examination. It was not considered necessary to carry out further screening at that
stage because the items from the feeder flight had all passed through Pan Am’s security
procedures at Frankfurt.
The baggage containers used for 747 aircraft are cubical in form, approximately 5 feet in each
dimension, but with an additional ‘overhang’ section welded to one side to maximise capacity
by following the curve of the plane’s hull.
1
The left-hand image shows an empty container and the right-hand image, taken from a BBC2
Newsnight Special about the Lockerbie evidence, shows one loaded with suitcases.
There was no hard-and-fast rule governing the loading of the containers, but in general the
cubical section was filled with suitcases stacked in a more or less regular manner, while the
overhang section was reserved for holdalls and “soft zip-up bags”. While it was not entirely
impossible that a full-size hardshell suitcase would be placed in the overhang, it was unlikely.
A particular feature of the loading of AVE4041 on 21st December 1988 was that the suitcases
at the back, in the bottom row, were not loaded flat but were placed upright, hinge-downhandle-up, like slices of toast in a toast rack. It was not uncommon for the baggage handlers
to load the containers in this way.
John Bedford was the baggage handler responsible for the luggage coming in to the interline
shed that day. He described the arrangement of the container when he last saw it as a number
of cases in the upright row at the back, plus two cases lying flat at the front with their handles
pointing towards the back. He said that the entire floor of the container was covered, but there
were no suitcases in the second layer. This arrangement was confirmed by two other baggage
handlers who saw the container before the feeder flight luggage was added.
The second of these was Amarjit Sidhu, who took the container out on to the tarmac to the
newly-arrived feeder flight and filled it with the Frankfurt luggage. He confirmed that the
suitcases were still in the configuration Bedford described when he collected the container, and
still in the same positions when he arrived beside the feeder flight, because “they didn’t have
room to move around.” In a statement dated 10th January 1989 he said that, assisted by his
supervisor Darshan Sandhu, he put the Frankfurt luggage on top of the cases that were already
there. In a further statement dated 7th August 1989 he confirmed that he had not repositioned
any of the interline suitcases, nor had he seen anyone else do so. He repeated the same
information in a third statement dated 2nd February 1990 – he didn’t move the interline luggage,
neither did Sandhu, and they simply tossed the Frankfurt luggage on top of what was already
there.
Detailed examination of the blast damage to the container allowed the position of the explosion
to be estimated as about 10 inches above the flat part of the floor, and up to 2 inches to the left
of the vertical strut, just within the V-shape of the overhang section. The distance from the
open front of the container (about 20 inches) confirms that the explosion occurred inside a piece
of luggage loaded at the front rather than the back.
The left-hand image is a diagram of the position of the explosion and the associated damage
to the airframe, prepared by Peter Claiden of the AAIB and dated April 1989. The right-hand
image is a bird’s-eye photograph of the recovered container floor.
2
While Mr. Claiden had second thoughts about his 10-inch estimate in the witness box at Camp
Zeist in 2000 and indicated that perhaps he should have said 13.5 inches, his diagram had by
then been reproduced in two forensic reports and the estimate of 10 to 11 inches (25 to 28 cm)
confirmed by RARDE scientists Thomas Hayes and Allen Feraday based on more detailed
assessment of the damage to the horizontal strut of the container. Mr. Feraday held to the
figure of 25 to 28 cm in the witness box.
Forensic examination identified the suitcase that had contained the bomb as a Samsonite
‘Silhouette 4000’ model. This case was recovered in multiple fragments, many of the smaller
ones having been blasted into other items of luggage. It could not be linked to any of the
passengers or to any known item of legitimately unaccompanied ‘rush tag’ luggage on the
plane, and it appeared to be an illegitimate, unaccompanied ‘rogue bag’. The suitcase was
constructed of grey plastic with an embossed simulated leather finish on the outer surface, itself
covered by a metallic lacquer in a colour described by the manufacturer as ‘antique copper’ and
by the investigators as brown, bronze, maroon or burgundy.
Taking into account the known packing arrangement of the suitcases, it can be seen that the
bomb suitcase must have occupied one of two positions within the container (bomb suitcase
indicated in brown in each case).
Position 1
Position 2
A third position was favoured by Mr. Feraday, in which the bomb suitcase was loaded handle-up
in the overhang section, however this can be ruled out both by the distribution of the damage
to the airframe (which was under the floor of the container, not level with the overhang section)
and the locations where certain specific fragments of the suitcase were recovered. Recovery
of a part of the locking mechanism and a fragment from the hinge end confirmed that the
suitcase was loaded more or less flat with the handle facing the rear of the container. It can
be seen that in either case, the IED itself was packed very asymmetrically in the suitcase, to
the extreme left as viewed from the hinge end.
Determining which of these two positions was occupied by the bomb suitcase is vital to solving
the Lockerbie case, because in position 1 the bomb suitcase is one of those transferred by
Sidhu from the feeder flight, while in position 2 it is the left-hand of the two front-loaded suitcases seen by Bedford while the container was still in the interline shed, an hour before the
feeder flight landed. Three aspects of the evidence shed light on this question.
•
•
•
Whether or not a suitcase can be identified which was between the bomb suitcase
and the floor of the container at the moment of the explosion
The pattern of damage to the two suitcases loaded upright behind the bomb suitcase
The pattern of damage to structures below the stacked suitcases
3
Which, if any, case was under the bomb?
It is self-evident, and it was agreed in court, that any suitcase loaded flat against the bomb
suitcase – either above or below – would inevitably have been blown to bits. If position 1 represents the actual arrangement of the luggage there should be two such ‘secondary suitcases’
in the recovered debris, whereas if position 2 is correct then there will be only one.
It was also agreed in court that there was only one ‘secondary’ suitcase identifiable among the
25 described in the Joint Forensic Report as showing explosion damage. This was a large navy
blue canvas American Tourister case belonging to Miss Patricia Coyle, a student from Boston
College, Massachusetts, who was returning to the USA having spent a term studying in Vienna.
Miss Coyle flew from Vienna to Frankfurt by Lufthansa and joined the PA103 feeder flight at
Frankfurt. Her suitcase was therefore one of those transferred to the container on the tarmac.
Material from that case found adherent to the largest recovered fragment of the bomb suitcase
(PI/911) confirmed that the two cases had indeed been loaded flat against each other.
In court Dr. Hayes of RARDE represented that this fragment had come from the lower aspect
of the bomb suitcase, and had been blasted downwards. There is however nothing to support
this assumption. Semtex blasts upwards as well as downwards, and the compression and
fracturing of the plastic suitcase shell could just as easily have been caused by its being blasted
against the case on top as against a case underneath.
In fact, examination of the other suitcases which were close to the explosion reveals clearly that
the blue Tourister was indeed blasted upwards, on to and into the rest of the luggage in the
container. Material from the Tourister was recorded as having been deposited on about six
other items of luggage, which would be essentially impossible if the case had been blasted
downwards, away from the other suitcases. In addition, the largest recovered portion was
found entangled with large pieces of two other Frankfurt transfer suitcases.
The most compelling support for the Tourister having been on top of the bomb suitcase comes
from the condition of another canvas suitcase belonging to Herr Johannes Schäuble, who also
travelled on the feeder flight. His case was recovered more or less intact, with the contents still
inside (although “very tightly packed”). Photographs show extensive deposits of blue material
across the lid, and analysis of these deposits revealed the cross-hatched pattern which was a
characteristic of the blue plastic lining of the Coyle case. In addition a screw from the radiocassette player in which the Semtex was concealed was blasted head-first into the trim,
together with some small fragments of the bomb suitcase itself.
4
Left is the complete Schäuble suitcase, upper right is a close-up of the screw (seen as a black
dot on the leatherette trim in the left-hand photo) and lower right is a close-up showing the blue
material lying on top of the weave of the canvas.
These observations demonstrate beyond any reasonable doubt that the court erred when it
concluded that the Coyle case had been lying beneath the bomb suitcase at the moment of the
explosion (Opinion of the Court, paragraph 25). The Coyle case was on top of the bomb
suitcase, with the Schäuble case on top of the Coyle case.
The only other possible candidate among the recovered blast-damaged luggage for a suitcase
under the bomb suitcase is a collection of seven very small fragments designated ‘grey
hardshell 2’ (or in some reports ‘grey hardshell A’). These were clearly part of a case which
was very close to the bomb, but they were never reconciled to any known passenger luggage.
The fragments are something of an anomaly, as despite their being the only possible candidate
for the missing second ‘secondary suitcase’ they were never represented as such either in the
forensic reports or in court. There is a record of an attempt to match the fragments to a suitcase belonging to Mr. George Williams, another Frankfurt boarder, however they proved to be
unrelated to that case.
In fact close examination of the grain of the imitation leather and comparison of the detailed
descriptions and measurements recorded in the Joint Forensic Report reveals these seven
fragments to be identical to the smaller fragments of the bomb suitcase itself, apart only from
the colour. ‘Grey hardshell 2’ is merely more pieces of the bomb suitcase with the shiny bronze
finish cooked off.
Left is a composite photograph of
most of the recovered fragments of
the bomb suitcase. The inset photo
(lower right) shows the fragments of
‘grey hardshell 2’ to scale.
It is also noteworthy that the
production numbers allocated to the
seven orphan fragments are part of
the same series as most of the
similarly-sized fragments of the
bomb suitcase, suggesting that they
were recovered in the same general
location in similar circumstances.
There is nothing else among the recovered blast-damaged fragments that might have originated from a suitcase positioned between the bomb suitcase and the floor of the container.
The court took the view that the suitcases placed in the container in the interline shed had been
rearranged when the feeder flight luggage was added out on the tarmac. However, this conclusion was based solely on the assumption that the Coyle case (from Frankfurt) had found its
way under the bomb suitcase, and therefore must have replaced the case Bedford reported
seeing in that same position. The bench came to this view without being aware that Amarjit
Sidhu had repeatedly denied moving the suitcases, as he was not called as a witness and his
police statements were not referred to in court.
Given the fact that the Coyle case was actually on top of the bomb suitcase, there is no reason
to doubt Sidhu’s word, or to conclude that he must have been mistaken when he denied moving
5
the interline suitcases. In that event, if there was indeed another case below the bomb suitcase
which completely vanished after the explosion, it was the case Bedford saw, and we should be
looking for it among the luggage belonging to the passengers who transferred to PA103 at
Heathrow from other incoming flights.
Seventeen passengers in total flew into Heathrow on other airlines to connect with PA103, but
they only had fourteen items of checked-in luggage among them. Three of these suitcases did
not fly on PA103; one because it arrived very early in the morning and was sent ahead on the
previous flight, and two late-arriving items which were left behind and discovered in the interline
shed the following morning. Of the eleven which did fly on the aircraft, five later-arriving items
were not loaded into AVE4041 but were loose-loaded in a pallet in the rear of the plane. These
items were recovered with no evidence of explosives involvement, in the north part of Lockerbie
town itself along with other debris from the rear of the plane.
Only six items were identified as being loaded into the container in the interline shed; those
carried on flights which touched down before four o’clock in the afternoon. These six items
were all recovered in an area of countryside near Newcastleton, where the debris from
AVE4041 fell, and all were either visibly blast-damaged or tested positive for explosives contamination. The six items of luggage and their owners were as follows.
Flight
From
Arrived
Passenger
Luggage
1
BA391
Brussels
11.06
Bernt Carlsson
Grey Presikhaaf hardshell
2
CY504
Larnaca
14.34
Charles McKee
Grey Samsonite hardshell
3
CY504
Larnaca
14.34
Charles McKee
Grey American Tourister hardshell
4
CY504
Larnaca
14.34
Matthew Gannon
Navy blue soft-sided Samsonite
5
BA701
Vienna
15.35
Michael Bernstein
Maroon soft-sided Samsonite
6
BA701
Vienna
15.35
Michael Bernstein
Tan/brown checked case/holdall
All six can be excluded from the under-the-bomb position on the basis of the pattern of damage
sustained. Just as there is no suitcase in the recovered debris which can be reconciled to that
position, there is no suitcase known to have been routed to the container in the interline shed
which might have been in that position. The Coyle case which was above the bomb is the only
‘secondary suitcase’. This finding is compatible with position 2 on page 3, not with position 1.
The two suitcases behind the bomb suitcase
John Bedford explained in his police statements that he set up container AVE4041 to receive
the interline transfer luggage for PA103 just after two o’clock. At that time there were already
“one or two” suitcases for the flight in the shed, sitting next to the x-ray machine with security
stickers in place to show that the x-ray screen had been carried out. From the arrival data
above it can be seen that there was in fact only one such case, and it belonged to Mr. Carlsson.
Bedford explained that he placed that case to the extreme left at the back of the container. He
then filled the row with cases as they arrived, working from left to right.
That being so, Mr. Carlsson’s case would be expected to be the one more or less immediately
behind the IED, the left-hand of the two shown in the illustration on page 3. The case next to
it, the right-hand of the two shown, would be expected to be one of the three cases arriving on
the Larnaca flight. Both cases are shown in the photographs below. Mr. Carlsson’s grey
Presikhaaf was so badly damaged by the explosion that it essentially disintegrated. The next
most damaged case was Major McKee’s grey Samsonite, which had one corner blown apart.
The other four cases sustained relatively light blast damage.
6
Charles McKee’s case
(photograph rotated to highlight the pattern
of blast damage to the bottom corner)
Bernt Carlsson’s case (photograph rotated 180o to put the handle at the top)
Mr. Carlsson’s case is the only one of the six items to be so damaged that it lost all its contents.
The distortion to the metal frame (left-hand side of the photograph) confirms it was positioned
exactly where Bedford said he put it, almost immediately behind the IED with the blast hitting
it on the side. The pattern of damage to Major McKee’s Samsonite is also highly consistent
with its having been positioned in the back row with the right-hand side (as seen in the photograph) closest to the explosion.
The implications of the damage to the McKee suitcase are more or less self-evident. The
damage is concentrated on the bottom corner of the case, at the hinge end, not half way up the
side. When Dr. Hayes examined and drew that suitcase he sketched it sitting upright on its
hinge end in the way Bedford described having placed it in the container. He then drew an
arrow labelled “blast direction” which impinges on the lower front corner of the case at the level
of the floor of the container. This is quite obviously correct.
Thomas Hayes’s sketch of the
McKee Samsonite, shown in the
position in which it was loaded,
with the level at which the blast
impacted the suitcase indicated.
Page 22 of Hayes’s examination
notes, dated 20th January 1989.
Close examination of the fragments of the Carlsson case leads to a similar conclusion. It is less
easy to gauge the height of the impact on the side of that case, however even position 2 places
the bomb suitcase several inches above the floor of the container at the left-hand side (again
see diagrams on page 3). The crucial piece of evidence is the rectangular panel of lining fabric
designated PK/139, shown at the bottom of the photograph above. This is a separate panel
which covered the inside of the hinge end of the case, and which was held in place by eight
7
press-studs. The end facing the explosion (to the right of the photo – it has been placed the
wrong way round in the montage) shows severe, destructive charring.
The diagram below illustrates where these two items fit in relation to the packing of the baggage
container.
It is absolutely clear that the bottom front corners of the Carlsson and McKee suitcases, the two
cases on the left of the row at the back, the ones immediately behind the bomb suitcase, were
not protected from the blast by another case stacked underneath the bomb suitcase.
The structures beneath the stacked suitcases
None of the above inferences was drawn either by the original Lockerbie investigation or by the
trial court. The only reference to the relative positions of the various suitcases in the container
was when the blue deposit on PI/911 was used to conclude that the Coyle case had been flat
against the bomb suitcase at the time of the explosion. However, as noted above, that association was misinterpreted by the court, with the Coyle case assumed to have been below the
bomb suitcase when in fact it was on top of it.
There is no record of even that inference being made prior to Dr. Hayes’s appearance in the
witness box in 2000. When he was asked when he had arrived at the opinion that the bomb
suitcase had been on top of the (not explicitly identified) blue one and whether he had recorded
this conclusion anywhere, he replied “No, I can’t help you with that” (day 16, page 2630), and
indeed no such analysis appears in any of the forensic reports. The only reference to this point
is in a number of press reports from 1989/90 which state that the blue Tourister (sometimes
said to belong to Miss Coyle’s friend and travelling companion Karen Noonan) was on top of
the bomb suitcase.
In 1989-90 the sole justification for the unanimous forensic opinion that the bomb suitcase had
not been on the floor of the container was the pattern of damage seen on the floor itself when
its pieces were reassembled. One photograph of this is reproduced on page 2 above and there
are several more in the Joint Forensic Report. Various forensic and AAIB investigators
individually expressed their opinion that there had been another suitcase below the bomb
suitcase, with Mr. Feraday being particularly dogmatic on this point. He indeed went so far as
to initiate an approach to the bench at the Fatal Accident Inquiry in 1990, asking counsel to
request that the transcript of his evidence be altered. The original transcript had presented his
opinion that the suitcase containing the bomb had not been the one on the floor as a probability
assessment, and counsel, at his request, petitioned the bench to ensure that he was recorded
as expressing absolute certainty.
8
It is difficult to understand the certainty of the various assertions that the bomb suitcase could
not possibly have been in position 2 above. The inference is far from self-evident, and certainly
less self-evident than the opposite inference that can be drawn from the nature of the damage
to the Carlsson suitcase lining panel and the corner of the McKee case, once the loading
positions of these items have been established. A number of test explosions carried out in the
USA in April and July 1989 were held to support the conclusion that the bomb had been on the
second layer, however the results were far from conclusive. Only a very few tests were carried
out, and not only were they all different, more than one variable was altered between each trial.
In only one test was the bomb in the suitcase on the floor of the container, and in that one the
materials caught fire with very little useful data being obtained. These results were not referred
to in court, with the witnesses relying purely on asserted opinion.
A number of different reasons were cited for excluding position 2 from consideration, but the
principal reason appeared to be the absence of direct blast damage – pitting and sooting and
shattering – on the surface of the aluminium container floor. Such damage was present on the
horizontal and vertical struts of the container, and this was explained by the theory that the
bomb suitcase had been loaded offset to the left in relation to the case on the bottom layer, as
shown in the diagram of position 1 (page 3). The case in the bottom layer was held to have
protected the floor itself.
This aspect was the subject of much discussion in court, with various interpretations of the
damage and deformation being advanced by witnesses and advocates. Whatever the reason
for the absence of direct blast damage on the container floor itself, what seemed to be overlooked was the damage to the airframe immediately under the floor. The extent of the direct
blast damage to that structure is indicated in Mr. Claiden’s April 1989 diagram, hatched in red,
and the same area can be seen in photographs of the reassembled airframe.
AAIB (Claiden) diagram
Photograph of airframe damage
However it was that the container floor itself came to be reflected out of the direct blast line, the
damage to the airframe under the floor is clear. This damage included “pitting and sooting”.
It is extremely difficult to reconcile the pattern of damage to the airframe itself with there having
been another suitcase between the bomb suitcase and the airframe.
Further evidence from the Heathrow baggage handlers
John Bedford’s police statements contained further vital information about the two suitcases
which were lying flat at the front of the container. In his first statement on 3rd January 1989 he
explained that he himself had only loaded the cases in the row at the back, between 2 pm and
about 4.15 pm. At that time he had left the interline shed for a tea break, and didn’t return until
9
about 4.45. On his return he noticed the two extra cases at the front of the container. He was
not concerned about these, he said, because one of the x-ray operators, Sukash Kamboj, told
him he had put them there after x-raying them. However in his police interviews Kamboj denied
having placed any luggage in the container that afternoon, saying that it wasn’t his job, and
denied having said anything to Bedford about it. The other x-ray operator, Harjot Parmar, said
much the same thing.
In his second police interview, on 9th January 1989, Bedford described the two mysteriouslyappearing suitcases. One, he said, was “a brown hardshell, the type Samsonite make”, while
the other was “if not the same, then similar”. In the witness box at the FAI he confirmed that
the case he was describing as a brown Samsonite hardshell (later amended to maroon) was
the one on the left.
As noted in the table on page 6, none of the legitimate items of passenger baggage loaded into
the container in the interline shed was a brown or maroon Samsonite hardshell. There is,
however, a candidate for the right-hand suitcase. One of Mr. Bernstein’s items of luggage was
indeed a maroon Samsonite, though soft-sided rather than a hardshell. That item was not
sitting handle-up at the back when the explosion occurred, as is demonstrated by explosion
damage all along the handle side and not elsewhere. This is consistent with its having been
the right-hand of the two front suitcases, although loaded with the handle to the left rather than
to the back as Bedford remembered.
Further evidence indicating that there was an extra, illegitimate suitcase in the container before
it was taken out on to the tarmac is provided by a trial loading exercise carried out (separately)
by all three baggage handlers who saw it at that time. These were Bedford himself, Tarlochan
Sahota who checked the container about half past five to see if there was enough room for the
luggage from the feeder flight, and Amarjit Sidhu, who dealt with the transfer of that luggage.
None was able to say with certainty how many cases were in the row at the back, however all
agreed that the row was complete with the entire floor of the container covered. When asked
to load a container in the way they remembered seeing that container loaded, all three men
placed five suitcases along the back (seven cases in all), and indeed it is impossible to make
the back row appear full using only four suitcases.
Conclusion
Multiple strands of evidence and reasoning all point to the inescapable conclusion that the
bomb suitcase was the one seen by Bedford lying flat at the front of the container.
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
There should have been only six cases in the container in the interline shed, but in
fact seven were present
The positions of the six legitimate cases can be identified, and none of them was in
the front-left position at the time of the explosion
The front-left suitcase was described as a brown or maroon Samsonite hardshell,
which perfectly fits the description of the bomb suitcase
That suitcase appeared mysteriously in circumstances suggesting it might have
circumvented the security screen
Sidhu repeatedly confirmed that he did not reposition that suitcase while he was
loading the transfer luggage from the feeder flight
None of the damaged cases recovered on the ground can be reconciled to the frontleft, floor-level position, except the bomb suitcase itself
The pattern of damage to the two suitcases sitting upright behind the explosion
shows that there was no other suitcase under the bomb suitcase, protecting their
bottom front corners from the blast
10
•
Regardless of the condition of the floor of the container, the nature of the damage to
the airframe under the floor demonstrates that it too was not protected by another
suitcase under the bomb suitcase.
As Bedford, Sahota and Sidhu all saw that case in position before the feeder flight landed, it
follows beyond reasonable doubt that the bomb suitcase was introduced into the baggage
system at Heathrow and did not fly in on the feeder flight. Any contrary interpretation requires
the available data to be tortured well beyond breaking point.
Additional questions
It is extremely difficult to understand the thinking of the Lockerbie investigation team in relation
to the evidence of the Heathrow staff and the recovered luggage items. There are a number
of questions the Commission may wish to address.
1.
Why were several members of both the AAIB and RARDE investigation teams prepared
to declare so categorically that the condition of the floor conclusively ruled out the bomb
suitcase having been the one on the base of the container, when that is exactly where
it was? In particular, Allen Feraday’s request to have the records of the FAI proceedings amended speaks to a huge preoccupation with this point.
2.
Why was the above analysis of the relative positions of the various blast-damaged
suitcases in relation to the centre of the explosion not undertaken by the original
forensic team? In a memo dated 19th January 1989 Thomas Hayes indicated his intention to carry out such an analysis, however there is no record of its being done.
3.
Were the forensic scientists provided with the information from Heathrow that would
allow them to identify the six legitimate Heathrow interline suitcases and determine
where each one may have been placed in the container? In the witness box at the FAI
Allen Feraday appeared to state that he had not been given this information. Nevertheless the degree of importance attached to ruling out the suitcase on the bottom layer is
difficult to explain unless the forensic investigators were aware that that case had a
different provenance from the one on top of it.
4.
Why did the police inquiry make no effort to establish the identity of the case Bedford
described as a brown or maroon Samsonite hardshell? There is no evidence of any
attempt to match it to one of the legitimate items loaded into the container or to a blastdamaged item recovered on the ground. What did they think it was?
5.
How is it possible to reconcile the diametrically opposed determinations of the FAI and
the trial court as regards the suitcase positioning? The FAI’s conclusion that the bomb
must have come in on the feeder flight was predicated firmly on the assumption that
Sidhu had not moved the Heathrow interline luggage, and since Mr. Feraday was
“adamant” the bomb could not have been in the suitcase on the floor of the container,
the case Bedford saw in the interline shed could be disregarded. In contrast the trial
court’s conclusion relied on the assumption that Sidhu must have moved the interline
luggage, in order to explain away the fact that no suitcase that was or might have been
loaded at Heathrow could be identified as having been positioned under the bomb. Did
the investigators, and indeed the Crown, ever have a coherent theory about how the
luggage had been arranged, or were they simply making it up as they went along?
This paper does not seek to imply deliberate misdirection of the investigation or the judicial
process by anyone involved in the case. Nevertheless the comprehensive and wholesale failure
to figure out what might well be described as the “bleedin’ obvious” in respect of the arrange11
ment of the suitcases in the crucial corner of the container and the significance of Bedford’s
evidence inevitably raises eyebrows, if not suspicions. To this might be added the disregarding
of Raymond Manly’s evidence about the break-in into the Heathrow airside space the night
before the bombing. His statement was logged into the HOLMES system on 2nd February 1989
and never referred to again, apparently having been judged to be of no importance whatsoever
to the inquiry. While the re-interviewing of the other Heathrow witnesses was desultory and
lacking in urgency, as can be seen from the dates on their statements, Manly was not reinterviewed at all.
It is submitted however that the evidence as it stands, and as it was available to the original
investigation, the Fatal Accident Inquiry and the trial court, demonstrates beyond any reasonable doubt that the Lockerbie bombing was a crime carried out at Heathrow airport, London,
at about half past four in the afternoon, and not at Luqa airport, Malta, at nine o’clock in the
morning.
Considerable additional detail concerning the above and other matters can be found in my 2013
book, Adequately Explained by Stupidity?, which I understand is also being submitted to the
SCCRC as part of the application.
Morag G. Kerr, April 2014
Paper produced for submission to the Scottish Criminal Cases Review Commission
12