(Seminar) (April 2012)
Transcription
(Seminar) (April 2012)
IMPACT OF COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH ON COMMAND AND CONTROL 17-19 April 2012, Ankara, Turkey www.c2coe.org Review Document # 18 Seminar date: Apr 17 – 19, 2012 Table of Content Introduction ............................................................................................. 3 Executive Summary ................................................................................... 4 Seminar Facts ........................................................................................... 5 Day 1 ...................................................................................................... 8 Prof. Dr. Tim GRANT - Command and Control in the Context of Comprehensive Approach: A Scientific View ........................................................................ 8 Maj. Cengiz Mesut BÜKEÇ (TUR AF) - Information Management in NATO Operational Environment .................................................................................... 9 LtCol Heiko HERKEL (DEU A) - The Role of CIMIC in a CA ................................ 11 LtCol Siegfried Eisenreich (DEU A) - Impact of CA on C2:The Steadfast Series Perspective-Current Status and Challenges ................................................... 14 Mr. Ali Nasuh MAHRUKİ - CA in Search and Rescue Operations ........................ 17 Day 2 ...................................................................................................... 20 CDR Marten MEIJER (NLD N) - Consequences of the NATO Comprehensive Approach for Command and Control ................................................................ 20 Mrs. Suzana LIPOVAC - 10 Years of Civil-Military Cooperation with the Bundeswehr in Afghanistan– An Insight View from a Civilian ........................... 22 Lieutenant General A.J.H.Van LOON - Keynote Speaker .................................. 24 Mrs. Christine MacNulty - The Human Elements of a Comprehensive Strategic 2 Approach to C2 ......................................................................................... 26 Day 3 ...................................................................................................... 29 Mr. Sylvain Vité- The Notion of Armed Conflict under IHL ................................ 29 Mr. Peter KRUIT- Red Cross Casualty Information in WW2 .............................. 32 Seminar Closure ........................................................................................ 34 Seminar Pictures ....................................................................................... 35 ANNEX A Seminar Program ......................................................................... 36 ANNEX B List of Used Abbreviations ............................................................. 37 Introduction D ear Reader, from 17 until 19 April 2012, The Command and Control Centre of Excellence (C2CoE), in close cooperation with the Defence Against Terrorism Centre of Excellence (CoEDAT) organized the first seminar of 2012 on The Impact of Comprehensive Approach (CA) on Command and Control (C2) in the facilities of CoE-DAT, Ankara, Turkey. This event was executed in accordance with the C2CoE Program of Work for 2012. A s a catalyst in the field of C2, we aimed to present a catalyz- ing platform about The Impact of CA on C2. I am very pleased with the opportunity to organize this seminar in a location within Turkey, as this supported our ambition to reach out to our Sponsoring Nations. I I hope that the fruitful discussion we have started during this semi- nar will continue and will lead us to a future event on this topic in the near future. am satisfied to conclude that we reached our goal. There was an international audience with a considerable number of attendees from E nding this short introduction, it is my honour to offer you this Seminar Review Document. I wish Turkey. Speakers came from NATO you a good reading and hope that we entities, NATO members and other can non-military organizations and they events organized by our centre. welcome you at upcoming shared their knowledge and experience. The openness, quality, and in- Yours sincerely, tensity of the discussions contributed to the success of the seminar. Therefore, I would like to express my gratitude to all the speakers and participants. A.P.P. Visser Director C2CoE Colonel NLD A 3 Y ou are being presented with the Seminar Review Document, published by the Command and Control Centre of Excellence after each seminar. These Seminar Review Documents give the reader an overview of the event, highlighting the main topics and providing some of the lessons identified. This document will cover only the key themes of the seminar and is not an entire summary of all the briefings. Executive Summary T he C2 seminar was held in the facilities of Defence Against Terror- ism Centre of Excellence (CoE-DAT) in ticipants are mostly interested in the New NATO Command Structure. Ankara, Turkey, from the 17th to 19th For consideration there are other pos- of April 2012. Since many different sible topics such as: best practices of aspects of CA and C2 were covered, CA, lessons learned from past and this C2 seminar was a great success. current operations with regard to C2 T and CA, C2 in mobile operations, aphe seminar covered many inter- proaches esting topics such as: Command making/planning in a multiple contri- and Control in the Context of Compre- butions mission/operation and C2 in- hensive Approach, Information Man- teroperability. agement in NATO Operational Environment, The Role of CIMIC in a CA, The Steadfast Series Perspective- Current Status and Challenges, CA in T to harmonizing decision he audience underlined that C2 seminars are a great environment to learn about C2 and to open the Search and Rescue Operations, Con- eyes for different aspects of CA. The sequences of the NATO Comprehen- diverse sive Approach for Command and Con- provided interesting insights in real trol, 10 Years of Civil-Military Coop- world problems as well as the selec- eration with the Bundeswehr in Af- tion ghanistan – An Insight View from a over, seminars are great opportunities Civilian, The Human Elements of a for networking, the exchange of ideas, Comprehensive Strategic Approach to views and to enlarge the C2 commu- C2, The Notion of Armed Conflict un- nity. der International Humanitarian Law, Red Cross Casualty Information in the Second World War and included a small workshop. 4 F or a follow-on seminar, the par- of background of participants presentations/topics. More- Seminar facts Background Seminar Agenda T T he complexity of operations has increased as a significant pres- ence of non-military participants has he focused three days seminar sought to achieve its aim through a combination of presentations and become more common than in the discussions. The briefings mainly fo- past. NATO seeks to achieve its ob- cused on cooperation among national jectives Comprehensive governmental departments and agen- Approach that requires effective co- cies, non-governmental organizations operation among all actors. In all cir- (NGOs), cumstances, the commander and his (IOs) and the private sector. More- task forces find themselves part of an over, the seminar included a work- interrelated network that extends up- shop on The Human Elements of a ward to the strategic level, downward Comprehensive Strategic Approach to to the tactical level and laterally to a C2. through a range of military and civilian organizations. P M international organizations rogram of the seminar is added in Annex A. Seminar’s Aim T he main aim was to offer a forum for C2CoE Sponsoring Nations oderator for this seminar was LtCol Achim MÜLLER (DEU AF), Deputy Director C2CoE. (SNs), other Nations, NATO entities and other organizations to discuss topics related to CA and C2. The seminar focused on both the military and civilian aspects of the subject. Our intention was to bring together professionals with an operational background - both military and nonmilitary – who had an interest in CA and C2. T he Seminar was also geared at the possibility to extend or main- tain social networks. 5 Seminar attendance T participating in the seminar. he seminar's primary audience consisted of both military (in the level of OF-2 or higher) and nonmilitary (IOs, NGOs, GOs, etc.) per- I n total 54 persons from different nations and organizations (Netherlands Defence Academy, JWC, AKUT, Kinderberg International, sonnel who had an interest in one or ICRC, more aspects of the seminar topics. CIMIC CoE, CoE-DAT, C2CoE) at- C onducting the seminar at a location within one of the Sponsoring Nations (SN) of the C2CoE was a result of the enhanced activities of the C2CoE to support its Sponsoring Nations. TNO, 1 st DEU/NLD Corps, tended the seminar. This contributed to fruitful discussions not only during the briefings and syndicate work but also during networking breaks and the social event. Furthermore, it allowed the host SN to have more individuals Audience Breakdown - Nations 6 Belgium 3 Norway 1 Bosnia and Herzegoniva 1 Romania 1 Czech Republic 1 Slovakia 2 France 4 Turkey 16 Germany 13 United Kingdom 1 The Netherlands 9 USA 2 Total 54 Audience Breakdown - Affiliation 16 14 12 10 8 6 4 2 0 Evaluation of the Seminar T he seminar was evaluated by the topics/speakers excellently met their participants by filling out a short expectations and another 63% of the survey at the end of the seminar. Out of 54 seminar participants, 24 filled out the questionnaire with their assessment of the quality of the seminar. O respondents rated this as good. S ome negative comments were made on the time limitation as “a lot of subjects were requiring discussion, but time was limited.” n the question about the overall quality of the seminar, 33% of the respondents rated this quality as excellent. Another 58% rated this M ost of the respondents reported that they would recommend this seminar to a colleague. quality as good. O n the question if the topics/ speakers of the seminar met the expectations of the participants, 21% of the respondents stated that the 7 Presentation by Professor Doctor Tim Grant, Operational ICT, Faculty of Military Sciences, Netherlands Defence Academy (NLDA) C2 in the Context of Comprehensive Approach: A Scientific View the partners‟ C2 systems must be linked together, forming a system of systems of systems. The central issue is how to make their C2 systems interoperable, enriching facilitating information between the and sharing partners, while respecting their cultural differences. This requires achieving more technical than just interoperability, because information sharing must be The science of Command & Control (C2) multi- and pragmatic levels. The key is to combining physical, find and build on the common ground informational, cognitive, disciplinary, technical, is inherently between the partners. and socio-organizational aspects. In The purpose of his presentation his presentation Professor Tim Grant was to identify the implications of the focused on the socio-organizational CA on the design and implementation aspects. Traditionally, C2 is a top- of down, formal communication process multidisciplinary nature that takes place in a hierarchical systems. Next, the organization. However, reviewed the Comprehensive Approach requires a organizations wide to the systems. outlined of the C2 presentation range of possible of enforcing a change in form from a together hierarchy to a coalition. Then the towards shared goals despite highly presentation disparate differences national, It organizational forms, with the CA diversity work C2 (CA) organizational, showed how constrain cultural the and professional cultures. Since the interoperability between systems. It partner organizations retain their own argued for a focus on the common sovereignty, the collective takes the ground between partners as a way of organizational form of a coalition. maximizing Communication the between partners may be both formal and informal. In his presentation, interoperability. presentation drew Finally, conclusions and recommended areas for future he regarded an organization‟s C2 system as a set of networks (a “system of systems”). In the context of the CA, 8 compatible at the syntactic, semantic, research, concept development, and experimentation. Presentation by Maj. Cengiz Mesut BÜKEÇ (TUR AF), Turkish General Staff Information Management in NATO Operational Environment economic, financial, social, and commercial aspects as well as military. Having been evolved for a new way of conflict resolution since November 2006, NATO military power elements need precise and timely information while they interact with variety of national and NATO entities. These interactions require organizations to adapt to a very complex security environment where information manHe presented a systematic method for Information Management (IM) in the NATO Operational Environment where a joint operational task is achieved with a multi-national military power. The aim of his study is to define an IM-based advisory promise in NATO‟s complex security environment in order to endorse comprehensive approach. Knowledge became a strategic resource for organizational systems to survive. For modern organizations, managing this strategic resource requires utilization of new and complicated technologies as well as a set of complex techniques. Knowledge is gathered from variety of sources, processed for due tasks of the organizations and valued en route for the aims of the organizations. Today‟s security environment drives the alliance to change its way of thinking in the operational environment where its multidimensional characterization requires political, agement among a range of partners is utmost important. The alliance is aware of the fact that information technology and a well-considered concept to accomplish management of it, are compulsory since the environment is ever more dynamic, uncertain and challenging. However, experiences on the ground clearly show that the alliance has a lot to do. Aiming to build a bridge between the theory and facts, the systematic approach herein may clarify how to achieve a new type of operations better while utilizing Communications and the NATO‟s Information Technology (ICT) tools. IM does not merely refer to implementations of technology but it cuts across the organization and the environment surrounding it. Managing such a bigscale IT structure will require due understanding of organizational behaviour, leadership and strategic management. 9 Joint and international elements of the Alliance, equipped with high technology systems and products, utilize a variety of IT artefacts in order to communicate, report position and/or mission to others and the commanders who have the operational command authority within the complex operational environment of NATO. In his presentation he explained the systematic way of IM for accurate information exchange among civil and military authorities in this complex environment. He proposed a KM Model for NATO Tasks which he named after a myth in Greek Mythology. He says the more we gather and assess the experiences in recent and ongoing NATO operations within systematic context, the better we guide future operations. Conclusion: In order to increase mission effectiveness, the Alliance is evolving towards a networked force with enhanced capability of efficient information sharing. Both as arranged within the organization and as interacted with the global actors surrounding in collaboration with any necessary agency of the new security environment aiming to synchronize with all civil and military authorities. 10 Presentation by LTC Heiko Herkel (DEU F), Civil-Military Co-operation CoE The role of CIMIC in a Comprehensive Approach As NATO did not define CA by purpose, to avoid claiming ownership, the following description was offered for consideration: “Comprehensive Approach is the synergy amongst all actors and actions of the International Community through the coordination and de-confliction of its political, development and security capabilities to face today‟s challenges including complex emergencies”. As the interaction among relevant military and civil stakeholders is fundamental for a CA, the following description of Civil-Military Interaction (CMI) was also offered: “CMI is the appropriate engagement, governed by political decisions, between military and non-military actors. CMI is therefore a permanent strand in order to optimize NATO‟s contribution to a coherent response by the International Community. CMI takes place throughout the entire crisis management process, prior to and during its operations and missions, and it requires adequate capabilities, functions and procedures.”. The levels of interaction can range from awareness to integration (see figure) as not all IOs and NGOs have the same will to cooperate with the military based on security and safety reasons and on internal principles institutional (impartiality, independence, neutrality, etc). Another significant aspect to be taken into consideration is the need for some humanitarian organizations to give visibility to their contributors on the independent (and not in support of others) humanitarian assistance they provide, to maintain current funding and ensure future donations. 11 How much NATO‟s understanding of military command and control (authority, orders, control, accountability,…) is in line with the CA principles (common aim, no ownership, self-commitment, respect of individual principles, …) was questioned. Initial conclusions seem to suggest that there is no possible C2 in a CA but a strong requirement to harmonize efforts through consultation and dialogue. The following CIMIC Core functions are to be addressed to analyze how CIMIC could facilitate the cooperation and coordination between a NATO Commander and relevant civil actors including the indigenous authorities and population: Civil-military liaison, as a way to establish direct contact with relevant civil actors to facilitate harmonized planning and the conduction of operations, and as a way to share information with the civil environment. Support to civil actors and their environment, which could comprise a wide variety of activities and resources (preferably enabling support, but also direct support, like specialized advice, equipment, transportation, road / harbour engineering, information, communications facilities…) Support to the forces, including among others the assessment of the civil environment especially in terms of cross-effects and interdependencies of military and non-military entities‟ actions and incorporating it into the planning process, and promoting civil-military interaction and force acceptance. The CIMIC operational design to contribute to the CA is based on linking military operations with civil actors in a comprehensive context, facilitating the full spectrum of civil-military interactions, incorporating civil environment into the planning and conduct of operations, all of which enhance the military‟s ability to reach the desired end state. The challenges and opportunities for CIMIC/CMI are the following: CIMIC is a well-known military “brand”, but has been „misused‟ (limiting it to a tool for force acceptance only) and wrongly focused (projects) during several missions. The level of interaction with civil organizations is strongly influenced by individuals and organizational cultures. Thus personal contacts are keys to success, while the high frequency of rotation on the military side causes problems. 12 Many civil organizations would accept the interaction with the military at the lowest structural level, but not officially and openly. Consequently we often have no Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with these organizations, but good relationships on TF level, where we exchange situational information and military guarantees for an extraction in the worst case. Humanitarian organizations require visibility of their independent efforts in international media to find donors. Hence they prefer „invisible‟ enabling support by the military or any other governmental organization. This sometimes is in contrast with our political aim to show our efforts for relief and reconstruction. Regarding the technical dimension of C2 in CA, there is a need to increase the information sharing with relevant civil partners, the requirement for the military to extend the use of data available in social media and collaboration tools, which are extensively used in the civil environment, and the significance of new initiatives such as the Relief Web (UN) and the Civil-Military Fusion Centre and Civil Military Overview (CFC/CMO – NATO/ACO). Finally it is relevant to emphasize the importance for the military to understand and respect the perception, boundaries and principles of GOs, IOs and NGOs as well as the expectations of the indigenous authorities and population, as some civil actors have expressed their concerns about the way NATO is implementing the comprehensive approach. 13 Presentation by LTC Siegfried Eisenreich (DEU A), JWC, Chief ESB Impact of CA on C2: The Steadfast Series Perspective – Current Status and Challenges The development of a “contribution to a Comprehensive Approach” has been influenced by the operational experience gained in the fields after the fall of the “IRON CURTAIN”. “Train as you fight – fight as you train” this well known maxim is a driver of the exercises facilitated by JWC. NATO contribution to a CA is a major design criterion for the two types of exercises to which JWC is contributing. While the ISAF Training Events truly replicate the current C2 architecture in theatre and the content relevant in theatre, the STEADFAST Series Exercises are built on the concepts, policies and doctrine agreed as well as operational experience. The exercise and training objectives reflect also the lessons identified and the current prudent thinking “how to approach the challenges”. The NRF and its mission spectrum have been determining the SF series exercises. For the past years the focus has been laid on Crisis Response Operations (scenario “CERASIA”), but with the Lisbon Summit NATO re-focused on collective defense and SKOLKAN is the new setting allowing full spectrum exercising. Within SF series exercises the main means to facilitate a CA are: The scenario modules through phases 1-3 of the exercise The MEL/MIL in phase 3 of the exercise The role players provided in phase 3b and limited in phase 2. 14 The phase 1 “situational awareness and knowledge development” provides a lot of input pertaining to the non-military operational environment; in phase 2 the OLRT (Operational Liaison and Reconnaissance Team) adds to these processes supported by some Grey Cell interaction. Event 1 called “STAKEHOLDERS” is completely built to facilitate the activities of the TA COMs and HQs with the HN, the international community to include UN, other IOs, and NGOs as well as other countries relevant in theatre; usually two other events also provide input to these processes. We have seen that the contribution to a CA is an important part of the ISAF Training Events and the SF series exercises. Knowledge Centre (KC), Effects Management, Joint Plans, Joint Assessment and Theatre Engagement Centre (TEC) are the most relevant elements to implement the contribution to a CA. This organization was built to support the idea of CA. An organizationally important fact is that the strategic level elements are not yet built. This organizational approach is a past approach since NATO is developing a new DHQs concept with JFC LB in lead. Currently JFC LB is going to execute the final preparations for the execution phase of the conceptual exercise – SFJT 12. This concept provides more and earlier in-theatre capabilities especially to liaise, understand, and prepare KLE if needed and appropriate. The next issues - Role of a NATO SCR and Civil-military planning are organizationally relevant, also at the military strategic level and at the political level. Ambassador Sedwill emphasized the role of a NATO Senior Civilian Representative (SCR) and the necessity to define this role alongside the NATO Military Commander. The SF Series exercises only played with this role limited to a “Double-headed JFC Commander”. Therefore the exercise experience is very limited. A JFC Commander, double-hatted as NATO SCR doesn‟t own the civilian analysis and planning capabilities to support this role. Secondly the relations of the JFC Commander, SACEUR, and NATO HQ tend to be uncertain. The appointment of a real NATO SCR and the clear delineation of the Command Arrangement would be a better support to the CA. Civil-Military Planning is an issue also touched by the Lisbon Summit documents and related documents as the “Political Guidance on Ways to Improve NATO‟s Involvement in Stabilization and Reconstruction”. Overall the exercise observations show that there is a growing understanding for the need to develop a more comprehensive analysis and planning. The C2 process is covered inter alia through the Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive (COPD), the system of Boards and the designated Battle Rhythm. Capability to share information is defined through the rules that are applied to the process and the physical ability to share information. Right now this capability is very limited and hampers the design and execution of exercises as it does hamper real world operations. NATO Security Office is developing rules that allow better 15 Info-Sharing with NN entities. The physical ability to share information is very restricted (mission secret networks) – at the least it does not support the necessities of a CA. Reviewing the current status within the SF Series Exercises, there are challenges which will further impact C2: a. In the organizational domain: The development of Command Arrangements for the role of a NATO SCR alongside the military commander; being in place and assuming the SCR was not subordinated to the military commander, an additional element to coordinate with was introduced in the system. The provision of a mature KD organization throughout ACO and a coherent training regime. Activities are based on mutual trust and need therefore a high level of engagement – not only at working level but especially on Command level (KLE). b. In the domain of C2 means: The introduction of Info Sharing rules and the provision of an infrastructure that supports the contribution to a CA. Info Sharing has been identified as an especially difficult issue. The supportive policy, rules, and systems for the physical exchange of information are needed. c. In the domain of C2 processes: As with the NATO SCR the design of NATO-internal Civil-MilitaryPlanning will impact on C2 and the exercise design creating additional complexity. The establishment of a well designed KD process which allows the timely production and provision of actionable knowledge from collection over analysis to dissemination and finally using it for planning purposes. 16 Presentation by Mr. Ali Nasuh MAHRUKİ, SAR Association, TURKEY Comprehensive Approach in Search and Rescue Operations Mr. Nasuh MAHRUKİ is the co-founder and the president of AKUT (Arama Kurtarma DerneğiSearch and Rescue Association). The number of people doing outdoor sports in Turkey has increased considerably during the 90‟s resulting in an increase in accidents in the outdoors. Nasuh Mahruki together with a group of mountaineers started thinking on how search and rescue activities should be made more efficient and so he founded AKUT in 1996. AKUT is a volunteer search and rescue team. At the beginning, the main goal was to organize search and rescue activities on mountain and in other nature environments. After completing earthquake and flood training 1997, AKUT became capable of helping official institutions during natural disasters. Today AKUT has more than 30 teams and 1500 volunteers. On August 17, 1999 AKUT was faced with the Marmara earthquake and reacted to the disaster immediately. Working with 150 permanent members at that time, they rescued 200 people from the debris. Before the Marmara Earthquake, the only volunteer association focused on search and rescue was AKUT. After the disaster, hundreds of search and rescue groups came into life in different regions of the country. Associations got founded in different provinces and districts in order to react locally to disasters. In addition to the restructuring of the army and government institu- tions, a lot of big factories and firms developed teams supported by materials, logistics, and training within themselves. This movement has turned into a national mission and extremely positive steps have been taken. As a result, AKUT has changed the search and rescue standpoint of many governmental and private sector institutions. It has been a leader of new leaps. 17 civil initiative task, including the very difficult disaster relief operations, 3. Volunteering is a very economic & effective tool and has many side benefits for the society, 4. NGOs are a great sector with an amazing potential between the public and private sectors and can set good and effective examples to motivate both, 5. With the right mind set, positive attitude, strong commitment, proper education & training and enough equipment anybody can make a difference, 6. Instead of expecting everything from the State as the old vision, every citizen should behave, act and The Athens Earthquake that choose in harmony with the needs came after the Marmara Earthquake and necessities of the society. This is and the work that AKUT did there, the key element of living and improv- has been a symbol of peace and ing brotherhood regardless of the process healthy, strong and promising com- unresolved for tens of years. It has munity, showed that at hard times, people 7. Leadership and teamwork are key can work side by side, despite differ- elements and if well used can make a ences in language, religion, race, and great difference. nationality. Mr. Nasuh MAHRUKI listed his organization‟s principles as: voluntary effort, honesty, reliability, helpfulness and respect for and giving value to human life. AKUT has 7 perspectives leading them in their effort: 1. If you get well organized, preplanned, prepared, cooperate, and coordinate, you can even manage to deal with the greatest disasters, 2. Volunteering became a very important tool for achieving any kind of 18 life together and building a He elaborated on the Disaster Management Cycle and tional response and relief efforts to a paradigm more comprehensive risk reduction shift in disaster management. Until culture. It must involve every part of recently, the approach to Disaster the society, every part of the govern- Management has been reactive and ment and every part of the profes- relief centric. A paradigm shift has sional and private sector; it must now taken place from the relief cen- involve all of us. tric approach to holistic and integrated approach with emphasis on prevention, mitigation and preparedness. These efforts are aimed at conserving developmental gains and also at minimizing loss of lives, livelihood, and property. Comprehensive Disaster Management (CDM) is actually a globally sustainable development issue. He says that we need a paradigm shift in Disaster Management from conven- 19 Presentation by Commander Marten MEIJER, (NLD N), C2CoE Human Aspects of the NATO Comprehensive Approach Journal. However, in the internet version of this journal, this definition was not available. Other authors in this field have stated that there is no definition for Comprehensive Approach. Some others even state that NATO cannot define the Comprehensive Approach, as NATO does not own the processes involved in this approach. All this confusion might originate from the fear for loss of control, which is Commander Meijer of the Com- hard to stand for males and for mili- mand and Control Centre of Excel- tary males even more. Anyhow, the lence provided the definition of the Comprehensive Approach urges the NATO or military to cooperate with non-military Whole Nation Approach: the integra- actors. This presents the question: tion of military security efforts in di- What are the consequences of the im- plomacy and development. plementation of the Comprehensive Comprehensive Approach Approach for command and control in NATO and exer- Through inter- operations cises? views, and observations, questionnaires, various aspects of military command and control were assessed in two NATO operations in Afghanistan and Libya and two major NATO exercises. From these assessments it appeared that key fea- 20 This definition was given by Ad- tures of traditional military command miral Stavridis, Commander Supreme and control are deeply challenged by Allied Headquarters Europe in Mons, the necessity to cooperate with civilian Belgium in the 60th NATO Anniversary actors, who organize and perform in a edition of the SHAPE Community Life different cultural context. Non-military actors write letters use violence against opposing forces and non-secured phones and operate on the protection of non-military actors social media, which are not connected are still needed. However, the tradi- to the secured NATO information and tional military culture is not open communication networks. These tech- enough to optimize cooperation with nology gaps prevent cooperation be- non-military tween military and non-military ac- mended to bridge cultural differences tors. Social media can fill these gaps. between military and non-military or- Lack of trust between military and non ganizations, which have to cooperate -military actors also prevents this co- in the same field of operations, includ- operation (see figure). ing the use of social media and effec- It is concluded that traditional actors. It is recom- tive gender policy. military roles like the use of massive 21 Presentation by Mrs. Suzana Lipovac, Head and Founder of KinderBerg International e.V. Ten years of Civil-Military Cooperation with the Bundeswehr in Afghanistan: An Insight View from a Civilian “Why they don’t listen to me and I don’t understand them!” To illustrate the long way KBI and the military had to go to understand each other, Mrs. Lipovac took an example right from the beginning of the activities in Afghanistan when she requested support from the German troops to organize a treatment session near Kabul. Because KBI and the military communicated in their own languages, but not with each other in a common language, the support was KinderBerg International e.V. (KBI) has been present in Afghanistan since February 2002. The main features of the projects there are to provide ambulant primary medical care in remote rural areas of Kunduz, Badakhshan, Baghlan, Taloquan and Logar with a focus on mother and child health care. The project is implemented in collaboration with three partners: the Afghan Ministry of Public Health, local representatives of traditional informal structures and the German Federal Foreign Office. In addition, the project is logistically supported by the German Armed Forces (Bundeswehr). The current project phase is scheduled to run until 31 December 2012. Until then, an estimated 3.5 million patients will have been treated within the scope of the project. 22 there in the end, but there was too much of it, and it was badly prepared. This was not the only event man government was deeply divided which nearly failed because of a lack in this issue. KBI‟s main concern was of understanding, but it shows that a that cooperation with the military will successful compromise the neutrality of all hu- cooperation depends mainly on local acceptance, a com- manitarian aid. mon civil-military language, mutual The strategy on if and how to understanding and respect and a proceed when the German armed clear demarcation between civilian forces are withdrawn from Afghani- and military actors. stan is not yet clear, but Mrs. For this civil-military approach, Lipovac left no doubt that KinderBerg which is defined by clear guidelines, will certainly continue its work in Af- KBI has been strongly criticized by ghanistan in some way. members of the German humanitarian aid community and even the Ger- The presentation ended with a quote from Seneca on a strong plea for deliberate action in the direction of a clear goal: “If a person does not know to which port he is steering, no wind is favourable to him.” 23 Presentation by Lieutenant General A.J.H. Van LOON, Com 1st German Netherlands Corps Keynote Speaker Developing and Sustaining Interagency Competency multiply the security domains, which results in multiple networks. In addition to that complexity, the majority of information is classified, which restricts the accessibility of this information. The default network classification is mission secret, even for invitations to lunch together. A third complicating factor is that some functional applications are often only available on one network. Lieutenant General Van Loon, The emphasis is placed on the security commanding officer of the First Ger- of information, and not on sharing in- man Netherlands Corps in Münster, formation. However, the Comprehen- Germany served on two deployments sive Approach requires the connection in the International Security Assis- of networks and exchange of informa- tance Force in Afghanistan. He was tion with open and accessible sys- the first Dutch commanding officer of tems. This requirement conflicts with the Regional Command South in Af- current military security policies and ghanistan. presents a need for accredited inter- He has concluded that the cur- that share information with rent military Communication and In- trusted partners using minimal secu- formation Technology is not yet fit for rity over the World Wide Web. the Comprehensive Approach, both from his experiences in Afghanistan and from his observations in exercises with the German Netherlands Corps Headquarters. Shortcomings originate from the fact that most of the time there is only one isolated highly protected network for one community or security domain. During longer deployments, troop contributing nations tend to 24 faces The general shift of focus in military information and communication systems can be described as follows (see table) Traditional Military Communication Information and Comprehensive Approach Information and Communication Technology Situational Awareness for Military Eyes Only Situational Awareness for all entities who act in the area of operations Joint Cooperation between the Armed Services Shorten time lags between sensor to shooter Interagency Cooperation between Armed Services and all other entities and agencies Lengthen time between sensor to shooter, by considering all effects of kinetics use Preventing damage to allied military members Avoiding civilian casualties Using secret systems for military use only Sharing sensitive information in common systems Command and control and the supporting communication and information systems remain crucial capabilities, but must adapt to new environments and missions. The transformation of the architecture for command and control urges to accept the consultative nature of today‟s command and control, with a multinational approach from the start. It also increases the need for the transformation of “network” thinking to make it more comprehensive in nature. In that respect the inclusiveness of information is more important than the speed of the actions, which are based on this information. Seamless intelligence sharing has to be based on the desire to share and has to be designed to build knowledge. All in all the Comprehensive Approach adds to satisfying the need for a smarter defense, which is on the agenda of the NATO summit in Chicago, USA in May 2012. 25 Presentation by Mrs. Christine MacNulty, FRSA, CEO Applied Futures The Human Elements of a Comprehensive Strategic Approach to Command and Control Warfare has become much more complicated than it used to be for many reasons, but one of the main reasons is that technology has enabled it to be conducted with much greater precision over much larger areas of the globe. This expansion in space and time has resulted in the need for a comprehensive approach that takes into account the elements of the space (cultural, economic, political, as well as military and technological) and time (from short-term and tactical to longerterm and strategic). Today we rarely operate alone, and our complicated relationships with allies, host nations, other government agencies and NGOs require us to understand cultures more than ever before – and this applies to C2 as well as more general communications. C2 is often considered from a technological perspective. There is validity in that, but C2 is so much more… especially when considered from a comprehensive perspective. C2 is about leadership, management and how the entire C2 structure supports military operations and strategies. This means that C2 itself needs to be thought about strategically. Characteristics of the New C2 Culture require more strategic thinking - problems and issues are more complex, involving more organizations and more people with different perspectives. Collaboration and cooperation becomes a key to enable people and organizations to share and utilize their knowledge and expertise and build a team of subject matter experts to have on call. 26 MacNulty examined the changing contexts in which C2 is required and a particular perspective on C2 developed by Pigeau and McCann, including the nature of Command Capability (Competency, Authority and Responsibility) and challenges encountered. They suggest that Command is an art – the expression of human will; while Control is a science – the systems and processes to enable Command and manage risk. She also looked briefly at leadership, strategy and the characteristics that are required. Effective communication is a key to effective C2. Different cultures use different words and phrases and non-verbal communications may be different. Her briefing illustrated problems of perception, including some key cultural differences. After the presentation, Mrs. MacNulty organized a short workshop where the participants were divided in four small groups to discuss what their group found as the most challenging strategic and communication issues that their organizations have had with respect to command and control. The results of the groups‟ findings were interesting and varied in many aspects. * Strategic issues/problems that organizations have had with respect to C2: NGOs‟ resistance to share information with the military and how or why the organizations are blamed for having close contacts with military organizations, Difference in C2 of military and civilian structures when dealing with natural disasters, Lack of unity of command, Lack of coordination, 27 * Legal limitations (could not start planning), Slow political decision making process, Lack of “learn” mindset and creativity reacting in a timely manner, Communication issues/problems that organizations have had with respect to C2: Frequent change of com- mand, Lack of cultural awareness, Delegation of authority and responsibility – who does what, Underestimating professionalism of the CIMIC and NGOs, * Potential solutions Liaisons between organizations, Governmental representatives should be part of planning/coordinating process, 28 Learn to “fly as you go” – be creative, Act and plan in parallel, Leaders take risks, Education/training of subordinates, Supervision, Control of personal media devices, Respect for the expertise regardless of rank and/or positions, Presentation by Mr. Sylvain Vité, Former Legal Adviser ICRC, FRA The Notion of Armed Conflict under International Humanitarian Law Mr. Sylvain Vité, former legal adviser at the International Committee of the Red Cross (He did not speak on behalf of the ICRC), explained how the understanding of the notion of armed conflict under international humanitarian law has evolved over the past decades. This evolution followed changes in the character of modern warfare, from traditional wars between States to armed conflicts involving other actors, such as multinational forces or non-State armed groups. The four Geneva Conventions of 1949 provide extensive protections for victims of armed conflicts, including civilians. All States have ratified them. However, a challenge is to have a clear understanding of what is an armed conflict for the purpose of international humanitarian law, as this notion defines the scope of application of this legal framework. First, each of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 provide that : "In addition to the provisions which shall be implemented in peacetime, the present Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by one of them" (Art. 2(1) common to the four Geneva Conventions). This provision defines what is an "international armed conflict”, i.e. armed conflict arising between States. It shows that international humanitarian law governing such conflicts applies not only when States have formally declared a war, but also when States resort to armed force against each other without any formal recognition of the situation. The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia has proposed a general definition of international armed conflict, stating that such conflict "exists whenever there is a resort to armed force between States". Other international bodies have adopted this definition since then. The armed conflict between Sudan and South-Sudan is an example of an international armed conflict, of two opposing States. 29 Apart from regular, inter-state national dimension. Whatever the armed conflicts, Additional Protocol I nature of the conflict, once a person of 1977 extends the notion of inter- is in the hand of a party; he or she national armed conflict to include must be respected and protected "armed conflicts in which peoples are against all forms of violence, includ- fighting against colonial domination ing murder, torture and other forms and alien occupation and against rac- of ill-treatment. ist regimes in the exercise of their right of self-determination, as en- Additional Protocol II of 1977 shrined in the Charter of the United applies to armed conflicts "which Nations and the Declaration on Prin- take place in the territory of a High ciples of International Law concern- Contracting Party between its armed ing Co- forces and dissident armed forces or operation among States in accor- other organized armed groups which, dance with the Charter of the United under responsible command, exer- Nations" (Art. 1(4)). cise such control over a part of its Friendly Relations and territory as to enable them to carry Article 3 common to the Ge- out sustained and concerted military neva Conventions of 1949 applies to operations and to implement this "armed conflicts not of an interna- Protocol" (Art. 1(1)). tional character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Additional Protocol II therefore Parties". Those are armed conflicts of applies to a limited number of non- opposing States forces and non- international armed conflicts. First, it opposing applies only to conflicts of opposing State armed groups or such groups against each other. State armed forces and organized non-State armed groups. It does not The International Criminal Tri- to conflict between such bunal for the former Yugoslavia went groups only. Second, it requires that on to determine the existence of a parties involved must exercise terri- non-international conflict torial control. In a number of non- "whenever there is […] protracted international armed conflicts, non- armed violence between governmen- State armed groups do not meet this tal authorities and organized armed condition. groups or armed between such groups within a State". An example is the initial stages of the crisis in Libya, when a certain level of intensity in the violence between government forces and dissident forces was reached. With the intervention of NATO units, the conflict got an inter- 30 apply In practice, assessing and classifying situations may be complicated, as different armed conflicts may occur in the same territory. Depending on the opposing sides, such conflicts may be either of an international or noninternational nature (see figure). Most recently, cyber warfare has presented a plethora of new questions, which have to be answered for determining the applicable rules. A cyber attack against a State does not necessarily entail the application of international humanitarian law. 31 Presentation by Mr. Peter KRUIT, TNO, NLD Red Cross Casualty Information in the Second World War societies are guided by the Geneva Conventions but are independent in nature. That is strength, but also a weakness of the Red Cross movement: the implementation of the Geneva Conventions is local and takes the character of the people of the home-nation. So how the people treat the casualties of a conquered army is very dependent on how the International Humanitarian Law is implemented if they are imple- mented at all. The difference in how Nazi Germany treated Western POWs Nowadays we know the ICRC (Prisoner of War) and Soviet POWs is and the IFRC mainly for their hu- a shocking example of the influence manitarian work and as the guardi- of local circumstances and policies. Secondly ans of the International Humanitar- explained how ian Law. But when the ICRC was and why the Netherlands Red Cross, founded in 1863 it was a pure mili- during WW2 had become responsible tary occasion. The reasons for that for the supply of information about lay in the nature of 19th century the warfare. European warfare in the missing and how they had prepared middle of the 19th century had, com- for that task. The Netherlands Red pared to Napoleonic and 20th cen- Cross was more or less part of the tury warfare, a limited character. The military and functioned as a part of ICRC was founded in that era of lim- the Military Medical Services. Nowa- ited warfare. Wars between Euro- days the Red Cross is very appre- pean nations were mostly fought on hensive in showing their commitment the battlefield between soldiers, so to one party or another. During the the rules of war at the beginning of Second World War it was widely ac- WW2 were designed for the military. cepted that the national Red Cross military dead, wounded and In his presentation Mr. Peter societies were involved in revitalising KRUIT first introduced the ICRC as the Armies on both sides of the an organization and it‟s relation to front. the national societies. The national 32 he Thirdly he described how this judgment, this source was an impor- hugely complicated stream of infor- tant tool to help explain how severe mation had been organized and how the fighting was and what was the it functioned in the Netherlands dur- decisive weapon in a specific front. ing the May 1940 battles. The war The that came to the Netherlands in May ceived image of the severity of the 1940 was not the war the Nether- battle and the real effectiveness of lands weaponry proved to be very surpris- Armed Forces expected to fight. The unexpected developments difference between the per- ing. during those 5 days of war made the task to inform the families and the Army about whereabouts the of well-being the wounded and or killed soldier very complicated, if not almost impossible. Finally he elaborated how he had used the military medical information to clarify the tactical battle circumstances. The information about the wounded and killed soldiers proved to be a valuable source for research and to separate fact from perception. Because the medical information is objective and independent from political or emotional 33 Closing remarks by LtCol Achim MÜLLER, Colonel Altan ÖZTAŞ and Colonel Toine Visser M oderator, LtCol Achim MÜLLER, briefly summarized the previous presentations and thanked all for their Visser, thanked the host CoE-DAT for their hospitality, their support, and participation in the seminar, the very the use of their facilities for the semi- pro-active work, the good contribu- nar. tions and the fruitful discussions. H e expressed his hope that everybody found the seminar interest- C olonel Visser closed the seminar, expressing the hope that the par- ticipants had an interesting seminar ing, had established new contacts to and thanked all involved in organizing widen their social network and will in this seminar. He wished all partici- the future always stay in touch with pants a safe trip and invited all to the the Command & Control Centre of Ex- upcoming C2CoE activity, most likely cellence. in the autumn 2012 in the Kromhout T Barracks, Utrecht, The Netherlands. he CoE-DAT director, Colonel Altan ÖZTAŞ, expressed that it was an honour to host the seminar in the facilities of CoE-DAT and wished all participants a safe trip back. 34 T he C2CoE director, Colonel Toine Seminar Pictures 35 ANNEX A Seminar Program Tuesday 17 April 2012 ADMINISTRATION and INTRODUCTION 0800-0900 Arrival and in-processing (pay fee for seminar and if applicable Non Hosted Dinner) 0900-0915 Opening of Seminar Colonel A.P.P. VISSER, Director C2CoE 0915-0930 Welcome Speech by Director of CoE-DAT Colonel Altan ÖZTAŞ, Director DATCoE 0930-0945 Introduction to the Seminar Maj. Serkan ERDİNÇ (TUR AF), C2CoE Moderator, LtCol Achim MUELLER, Dep. Dir. C2CoE 0945-1000 Participant Introduction All 1000-1030 Icebreaker 1030-1115 Command and Control in the Context of Comprehensive Approach: A Scientific View 1115-1130 Coffee-Break 1130-1215 Information Management in NATO Operational Environment Maj. Cengiz Mesut BÜKEÇ (TUR AF), Turkish TGS 1215-1400 Lunch (Merkez Officers' Club) 1400-1445 The Role of CIMIC in a CA 1445-1500 Coffee-Break 1500-1545 Impact of CA on C2:The Steadfast Series PerspectiveCurrent Status and Challenges 1545-1600 Coffee-Break 1600-1645 CA in Search and Rescue Operations Mr. Ali Nasuh MAHRUKI, SAR Association, TUR 1645-1700 Wrap up, End of Day One Moderator, LtCol Achim MUELLER, Dep. Dir. C2CoE Prof. Dr. Tim GRANT, Netherlands Defence Academy LtCol Heiko HERKEL (DEU A), CIMIC CoE LtCol Siegfried Eisenreich (DEU A), JWC Wednesday 18 April 2012 0900-0945 Consequences of the NATO Comprehensive Approach for Command and Control 0945-1000 Coffee-Break 1000-1045 10 Years of Civil-Military Cooperation with the Bundeswehr in Mrs. Suzana LIPOVAC, Kinderberg International Afghanistan– An Insight View from a Civilian 1045-1100 Coffee-Break 1100-1200 Keynote Speaker 1200-1400 Group Photo and Lunch (Merkez Officers' Club) 1400-1500 The Human Elements of a Comprehensive Strategic Approach to C2 1500-1515 Coffee-Break 1515-1715 Workshop Mrs. Christine MacNulty, Applied Futures 1715-1730 Wrap up, End of Day Two Moderator, LtCol Achim MUELLER, Dep. Dir. C2CoE 2030-2230 Social event: Non Hosted Dinner "Restaurant Behzat" (30 Euro to be paid inprocessing morning) 0900-0945 The Notion of Armed Conflict under International HumanitarSylvain Vité, Former Legal Adviser ICRC, FRA ian Law. 0945-1000 Coffee-Break 1000-1045 Red Cross Casualty Information in the Second World War 1045-1115 Coffee-Break 1115-1130 Closing of the seminar CDR Marten MEIJER (NLD N), C2CoE Lieutenant General A.J.H.Van LOON, Com 1st German Netherlands Corps Mrs. Christine MacNulty, Applied Futures Thursday 19 April 2012 36 Peter KRUIT, TNO, NLD Moderator, LtCol Achim MUELLER, Dep. Dir. C2CoE ANNEX B List of Used Abbreviations ACO Allied Command Operations ACT Allied Command Transformation AKUT (Arama Kurtarma Derneği - Search and Rescue Association) AMN Afghan Mission Network CA Comprehensive Approach C2 Command and Control C2CoE Command and Control Centre of Excellence C3 Consultation, Command and Control CDM Comprehensive Disaster Management CFC Civil-Military Fusion Centre CIMIC Civil-Military Cooperation CIS Communication and Information Systems CMI Civil-Military Interaction CMO Civil Military Overview COPD Comprehensive Operational Planning Directive DAT-CoE Defence Against Terrorism Centre of Excellence DEU Germany DOTMLPFI Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel, Facilities, Interoperability FRA France GOs Governmental Organizations HQ Headquarters ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross ICT Information and Communications Technology IHL International Humanitarian Law IJC ISAF Joint Command IM Information Management IOs International Organizations ISAF International Security Assistance Forces IT Information Technology JFC Joint Force Command JHQ Joint Headquarters JWC Joint Warfare Centre KC Knowledge Centre KBI KinderBerg International LL Lessons Learned MOU Memorandum of Understanding NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation NC3A NATO Consultation, Command and Control Agency NEC Network Enabled Capabilities 37 ANNEX B List of Used Abbreviations 38 NGOs Non-Governmental Organizations NLD The Netherlands NLDA Netherlands Defence Academy NML NEC maturity level NNE Non-NATO Entities NNEC NATO Network Enabled Capabilities NOR Norway NRF NATO Response Force OF3 Major OF4 Lieutenant Colonel OF5 Colonel, Captain Navy OLRT Operational Liaison and Reconnaissance Team OUP Operation Unified Protector POW Prisoner of War SAR Search and Rescue SACEUR Supreme Allied Commander Europe SCR Senior Civilian Representative SHAPE Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe SN Sponsoring Nations TA Training Audience TEC Theatre Engagement Centre TNO The Netherlands Organization (Dutch Organization for Applied Scientific Research) TOPFAS Tool For Operational Planning, Force Activation and Simulation TRIF Task Related Information Flow UN United Nations UK United Kingdom USA United States of America This page intentionally left blank 39 Catalysing the art of C2 Command and Control Centre of Excellence Kromhout Kazerne, Utrecht Mail address: Post Box 90004 Visiting address: Herculeslaan 1 MPC 55A 3584 AB Utrecht 3509 AA Utrecht The Netherlands The Netherlands Building K01, Floor 4 Tel: +31 (0)30 218 7012 Fax: +31 (0)30 218 7022 Unclass: [email protected] NSWAN: NLD MOD C2COE Web: http://www.c2coe.org Twitter - @c2coe LinkedIn - C2CoE Facebook - Command and Control Centre of Excellence www.c2coe.org