Courage, Blood and Treachery

Courage, Blood and Treachery
A short overview of police sergeant Herman Grobler’s involvement in the Namibian
Bush War (1982‐1989)
Herman Grobler
By: Leon Bezuidenhout
April 2009-06-08
Edited: Marinda Conradie
1
Introduction
The role of South African law enforcers as soldiers
The following story of courage and endurance should never be viewed
separately from a proud past - spanning 300 years. The story of
Herman Grobler tells how an ordinary policeman had been obligated
by time and circumstances to become a soldier. To this unique
situation of policeman acting as soldier, members of the South African
Police had been exposed as well. But by 1996 the SAP was
“demilitarised”, which would mean the end of an era.
Police as militarist
Herman Grobler ‐ Police student 1983
The militarisation of the law-enforcer in South Africa originated with Photo: Herman Grobler
the Dutch in the 17th century, and by the 1880’s the South African Republic (ZAR) formed its
own police force, the ZARP. When the Anglo Boer War broke out the ZARP became an elite
fighting force. At the Battle of Bergendal on 28 August 1900 the ZARP had their finest hour.
Their last stand against an overwhelming British force “out-rednecked even the Rednecks”.
Even the British respected their fierce opponent afterwards. It was, however, the last day for
the ZARP as a force.(1)
With the coming of the First World War the police were thrown into the thick of the fighting
once more. First the policemen were sent to suppress the Afrikaner rebellion. Jopie Fourie and
his rebels where eventually cornered by a police force commanded by Major Trew. At
Hammanskraal Fourie surrendered. Trew and his men were the personal body guard of Gen
Louis Botha.(2) Some of the Policemen were then sent to German West Africa to fight against
the Germans.(3)
During the Second World War it was decided to recruit a number of policemen to form a
“Police Division”. The idea proved to be a pie in the sky and eventually only two battalions
volunteered for a “Police Brigade”. The Transvaal Scottish Regiment offered its 2nd battalion to
complete the Brigade. The 6th Brigade (Police Brigade) fought with distinction in North Africa
but was trapped inside Tobruk with the other South African units.(4) When Gen. Klopper
surrendered, the 6th Brigade also surrendered unnecessarily.
The idea of pushing policemen to the front as first line soldiers continued with the start of the
Namibian and Rhodesian Bush Wars. The first battle with Swapo insurgents took place at
Omgulumgashe in 1966.(5) A combined force of policemen and Army members of the soon to
be special forces attacked the base and destroyed it. In 1973 the Army eventually took over
the operations in northern Namibia, but only where the fighting was considered to be abroad,
which action was labelled border protection. Once the insurgents were inside Namibia it would
once more become a police matter.
2
There are a few reasons why police involvement was continued. For one, it proved the
insurgency was less serious, and secondly, the then Prime Minister was surrounded by “pro”
police advisers, the most important factor being police Gen. Lang Hans van den Berg.(6)
The SA Police in Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) and South West (Namibia)
Because of a similar approach as in Namibia, the SA Police also entered into the fighting in
Rhodesia in 1968. (7)By 1975 the police would officially withdraw, but in reality this did not
happen before 1980. Many of the police tactics and legends originated in Rhodesia. Except for
a number of huge clashes with insurgents, the Rhodesian campaign was always remembered
for the “Battle of Bulawayo”. During the 1975-withdrawl two trucks loaded with policemen on
their way home came across some of their comrades being “greeted” by a number of
Rhodesian Light Infantry soldiers. The trucks debussed and the greeting took serious
casualties when the two groups came to
“meet” each other. (8)The SAP claimed to
have won the “battle”.
In the meantime the war in Northern
Namibia soon became even hotter. The
police had to react quickly to meet the
escalating situation. Initially a few
detectives were placed to investigate
landmine
incidents
etc.
Then
the
investigators had a few hair-raising
experiences when they were attacked by
the insurgents they were investigating. This
led to a number of special constables being
employed to protect the investigation teams. But the special constables proved to be only
excellent trackers. So the police started their own follow up operations. (9)This led to the police
being ambushed in their soft-skinned vehicles. Landmines were a problem, too.
So the SAP and CSIR together developed a mine- and small arms-resistant vehicle, later to be
called “Casspir” (above right). This is how a new unit “Koevoet” (Crowbar) was founded,
Operation K in later years. New tactics were employed and developed, most of these revolving
around the Casspir’s mobility and firing
power.(10)
In its time the Unit members were
ridiculed
by
communist
bloc
propaganda
as
a
bunch
of
uncontrolled
murderers,
rapists,
torturers and arsonists that destroyed
lives and property, having no respect
for people, dead or alive. Many
3
western liberals and church groups supported the opinion. These allegations were mostly
unfounded and without factual substance. Koevoet was subjected to this one-sided
propaganda even to this day.
But in truth the unit would be nothing more than committed black and white policemen
passionately doing their job. In their own way they would become the best in the world.
Herman Grobler’s involvement is part of this story.
Herman Grobler- the boy from Ovamboland
Herman Grobler’s story is one of many boys of his time, and yet in a sense it differed. Only
about 5% of the 400 white policemen to fight with Koevoet were real “Southwesters”, real
Namibians.(11) Herman was a real Namibian, born in Windhoek in 1963. His father became
the electrician in the little village of Oshakati, the administrative capital of the then
Ovamboland, along the Angolan border. (12)
He went to primary school in Oshakati. The war was also
heating up during the late ’70’s. His best friend from
school, Bertus Louw, and his mother were murdered on
their farm by insurgent. Bomb shelters were part of going
to school in Oshakati. When he became older he went to
school in Windhoek. He took up electronics as a subject.
At times in one’s life one makes an insignificant decision,
and that decision eventually plays a significant role in
one’s future. His choosing Electronics proved to be just
that.(13)
“I always wanted to be a soldier, but as Southwester,
different from white South African men who all had to do
national service, Southwesters had to be drafted. If you
were lucky or unlucky enough you had to do two years
service. I was unlucky. I missed the draft.’’
‘‘Very disappointed’’ is an understatement.
Herman on a Casspir in Ovamboland 1985
Photo :Herman Grobler
4
“My sister had a few young men who regularly came to visit her. They were policemen.
Detectives. So my road led to the police. I joined the police, but I was too late for the 1982
intake to the college. As an untrained policeman, I was banished to the back of the Oshakati
Police Station. For a whole year.”(14)
“The next year I was trained at the police
college in Pretoria.” But again Herman
was exempted from counter-insurgency
training”. Southwesters were not COIN
trained. Thus he was sent back to
Ondangwa to become a detective.
Herman was to investigate complaints
against the police and the army. It would
make him very unpopular in some
circles, also with Koevoet.(14)
The Ondangwa CID-branch had to
investigate cases inside the “operational
area”. “Now, the police gave us two
Casspirs and a Buffel. Two detectives and a driver had to go out to investigate cases. But the
area is hot. At the same time the army drives around in platoon strength, and Koevoet in
fighting teams of 45 men. We had to do it alone. So I made a plan. I “co-opted” Koevoet or the
friends I had there. They would come to Ondangwa to pick me up and drive me to the base
where I should be. I would do the investigation, and later they would come along to pick me up
and drop me off. (15)
Ovamboland in the rain season is pure mud. Five O and 2 Three O’s on
Photo: Peter Stiff
top and a Three O for the co‐driver.
“For nearly three years I heard the
stories and saw the dead insurgents,
but I never I experienced a contact. I
tried everything I could. Nine
attempts to get a transfer. All
unsuccessful. Then I realized that
my father and the commanding
officer in Oshakati were conniving.
Every time I applied, my father
lodged a counter application to his
friend Brig Pool, and so I remained a
detective. Every time the reason for
the unsuccessful attempt was,
“Member did not successfully
complete a counter insurgency course”. (16)
Koevoet.
Photo: André Pienaar
But with three years exposure to the operational area Herman was now a well known
personality. The commanding officer of Koevoet, Gen. Hans Dreyer, knew him well. Dreyer
heard about his “Electronics” background. And he needed radio technicians. That made the
transfer possible.(17)
5
A new career in the Police
On the first day after his transfer to Koevoet, Gen Dreyer encountered Herman. “Get the man
decent clothing”, he said. “I was issued with the green combat fatigues of Koevoet and ordered
to join Fighting Team Z.F. Zulu Foxtrot was commanded by Warrant Officer Louis (Boats)
Botha. “I would never come even close to repairing a radio. For the next three years Fighting
Team Zulu Foxtrot would be my home”. (17) Zulu was the call sign for the Namibian Police’s
Counter Insurgency Unit. X-Ray was the South African Counter Insurgency call sign. (18)
The seasons were decisive in the fighting of
the war in Ovamboland. The Ovambos
were existence farmers and dependent on
the rain. Before the rains came, they would
be struggling. Come the rains the
mohango, staple diet of the Ovambos,
grew. Then comes the harvest, and all goes
full circle to the coming of the next season.
But the Swapo insurgents were also
dependent on the local population for food
and water. So, with the coming of the rainy
season, came Swapo. When Herman
arrived at Koevoet in September 1986,
everything was quiet. The rainy season was
three months away. “We spent one week in Herman and an unknown car commander take a smoke‐
break in Ovamboland 1985.
Photo: Herman
the bush, then the next week at base
repairing and cleaning everything, before leaving for the next week in the bush. For the first
three months I camped in the bush every second week. No action. I was beginning to think I
was never going to see action.”(19)
As new comer he was posted to “Number 4 Car”. There was a hierarchy in each team. The
hierarchy dictated where you fitted into the tactics, which comprised the following: The
Ovambo trackers picked up a
spoor and identified it as those of
a possible insurgent. Many times
the local population informed on
the insurgents; sometimes it was
picked up at the cut line, next to
the border, many times it was
stolen from the army. Also the
scenes of landmine blasts or
sabotage
incidents
virtually
always provided tracks to pursue.
Ovambo trackers 1986.
6
Photo: Jim Hooper
Then the big follow-up started. The trackers were masters. Among hundreds of other tracks
they could identify a specific one. “We once caught an insurgent that proved to be a Swapo
tracking instructor. We ‘converted’ him to our side, and many a time, if we crossed a track, he
would identify it as of one of his “students”. We knew exactly who we were pursuing. Some of
these guys were outstanding”.(20)
Ops K operated with four armoured personnel carriers, mostly
Casspirs and later also the Namibian Manufactured Wolf
APC’s. A Blesbok support vehicle accompanied the other four
vehicles. Some of the cars were equipped with “five O”
(12.7mm) machine guns or 20mm canons. The other vehicles
were equipped with “three O Browning” turret machine
guns.(21)
A team usually consisted of 40 black Ovambo policemen and
four white car commanders. The Blesbok carried a driver and a
machine-gun operator. But on the ground the senior warrant
officers and sergeants among the trackers took the command.
The whites relayed the information over the radio. The
Herman’s car and men. Photo: Herman Grobler
trackers had the ability to describe a spoor over the radio for
the benefit of the Ovambo co-workers. The whites were often sidelined. (22)
But no white member could ever be part of a team unless he had proved himself to his team.
Before you had proven yourself to the trackers you
remained a nonentity. Many a time a white member was
transferred between teams because he could not get along
with the black members. Once a white started to travel
between teams, his days as a unit member were almost
surely numbered. (23)
“Car Nr 1 was the team commander with the best trackers.
They always stuck close to the tracks. The Blesbok
supported them. Car Nr 2 was the second best. They went
forward and usually operated 100 to 200m in front of Car Unknown members of a team behind Three O
Nr 1 searching for the spoor. (24)
Brownings. Photo:Unknown
Then Car Nr 3 operated around 800m or so to the front looking to cross the tracks. Lastly was
Car Nr 4. They usually consisted of the rather useless trackers, the lazy ones, those that drank
too much and the new ones. Brave men nonetheless. Car Nr 4 operated as far as 2km in front
of Car Nr 1. With their luck, they were virtually always the car that ran into the ambushes and
contacts. The more experienced and better you became, the more you moved up in the
hierarchy. (25)
Once the spoor had been found in the front, the cars in the back were informed. The senior
cars would rush up the line and the whole process would start again.
7
The right place at the right moment – Jim Hooper captures
the first contact of Herman’s car on film. December 1986.
Photo: Jim Hooper
This way the insurgent’s head-start would
shrink rapidly”.
The terrain where the teams operated also had
an influence on the tactics. In the mountainous
Koakoland the teams mostly used infantry
tactics. They would establish observation posts
and lay ambushes. A lot of night work. Once a
Swapo presence was picked up the stopper
groups would be laid out and the ambush put in place. Then it was a waiting game. In this kind
of terrain the vehicles just could not operateMortars had to stand in for the heavy machineguns.(26)
In the sparsely populated Kavango the teams would always attempt to break up the
insurgency groups. The insurgents would then be dealt with individually or in twos or threes.
“We chased the groups of five or six until we thought we were fairly close. We would then fire a
few mortars at about 2000m range. This made the insurgents think we knew where they were
and they would “bombshell”- i.e. split up. If we reached the mortar range and they were all
together we would fire some more mortars until we achieved our goal. We would then start
chasing the individual members of the gang. It reduced our risk considerably. One or two
against 40 is a bit better than 5 or 6 against 40”.(27)
In Ovamboland we could not use the mortar tactic because of the denser population. We could
not just blindly fire into an area for fear of killing or injuring the local population. At times when
having helicopter support we could follow that
route, but the helicopter had to get out of the
way first!(28)
First blood in the Mahongo
It was now December 1986. Herman had been
with Koevoet for three months. And he was still
untrained! In an attempt to counter the antisecurity force propaganda, the Police hierarchy
and the SA government decided to place an
independent American journalist with Koevoet.
The journalist was allowed to mingle freely with
the teams - when and where he wanted. Totally
by chance Jim Hooper one day decided to get
into the Casspirs of Zulu Foxtrot.(29)
8
The first Swapo felled by Herman’s Casspir
guns.
Photo: Jim Hooper
“We were busy pursuing information at a
kraal. Car Nr 4 was still in the process of
leaving the kraal. Only the driver, radio
operator, the medic and I were in the car,
when shots were fired at three other cars,
about 100m to our front. Boats’ car was
passing a few low bushes next to a
mohango field when three insurgents fired
at them.”
“Our driver instinctively accelerated
towards the contact. I was in the turret.
Before the other cars could turn around to
re-engage the enemy we confronted them.
I spotted one of the insurgents and fired a
burst or two from the machine guns. Our
car claimed one kill. Jim Hooper wrote
about my first contact in his book
“Koevoet”. He also published a photograph
he took through the dust and smoke.(30)
Landmine incident Ovamboland – this time a Koevoet
car, but there were tracks to follow up, and the teams
Photo: Herman Grobler
get going.
After this contact the black policemen had
a degree of trust in their white counterpart.
He was now one of them. He had had his
first encounter and showed his worth.
But Herman’s lack of training eventually
caught up with him, and with all the other untrained ones. In an attempt to train them, a
selection course was held. Sixty men started the course. “Lots of walking and ‘opfok’,” Herman
would later label it. For six weeks they would walk 30km, every second day. The sand and
heat made carrying a rifle, backpack and other equipment heavy going. The days in between
were covered by fire arm, mortar and tactical
training (mixed with huge amounts of
“opfok”: police terminology for unnecessary
running and getting dirty). The last day
covered a route march of 100km. Lots of
walking for men with the best counter
insurgency vehicles in the world! Just 45 of
the 60 men passed the test. (31)
Thus Herman became a selected, trained,
trusted member of the unit. His time at Car
Nr 4 taught him a lot. He became involved in
many a contact. Many of the insurgents were
mere school children when abducted by
Swapo. If caught, it did not take much to turn
them against their old masters. They joined
Arms cache showed out to ZF by captured
insurgent
Photo: Herman Grobler
9
the unit. However, one of the “converted” ones could not be trusted so easily. He was a
counter-tracking instructor at a Swapo base. “He is kept in the back of the Casspir until the
insurgent we are chasing starts anti-tracking. Then we take him out and let the guy that trained
the insurgent, unravel the riddle before we put him back and the follow up continues”.(32)
“The uncooperative Swapo are given a choice. They are either sent to a farm where they have
a degree of freedom, but they may not leave the area. If they do they are handed over to the
courts and are dealt with according to the law. In PLAN (People’s Liberation Army of Namibia)
one finds the good and the bad soldiers. The useless ones tried half-heartedly to plant mines
or sabotage, and would then with great speed make it
for the border. There were the even more useless ones.
Those that came over the border. They cached their
weapons and then disappeared into the rural areas or
into the soft life of the locations. The new PLAN
members usually came in gangs of five or six under
control of a seasoned veteran. Those who survived
were promoted and separated from the new
recruits.”(33)
Then there was the “Typhoon Detachment”. They were
the best, and trained to create the most havoc. Every
now and then Swapo would send “Typhoon” members
in groups of 20 to 30 in an attempt to reach the farming
areas to the south. Sometimes up to three groups
operated individually. They had to walk 300 km to get to
the target. They always tried to avoid the local
population and the security forces. Very seldom the
“These guys came to fight!” Anti armour
weapons and ammunition, PKM machine
Photo: Herman Grobler
guns – all in vain…
remnants of a group would reach the farms. Nearly
always they were tracked down and hunted. “Once
we tracked and destroyed 19 out of a 20 member
group.”(34)
“Yes, we did get paid “head money”. But it was a policy initiated by the government and it was
applied to all. Any person handing in weapons, ammunition, landmines or equipment was paid
an amount. Money was also paid for handing over an insurgent, not for dead ones only. The
head money for an insurgent was about R900.00. If shared, every man would get a mere
R20.00, not much. But it did lead to a few plans of our own. Teams usually worked alone, as
far as possible. Getting helped by another team meant that the R20.00 would be cut to R10.00
per insurgent. It also led to many a team or a car “getting lost” and ending up with a team
following up spoor. This way the “lost car” also claimed the “head money” when running into a
contact. When necessary Zulu Foxtrot would call in the sister team, Zulu Hotel, to come and
help”.(35)
10
The “kill ratio” of the
unit was also much
higher than that of any
other unit in the then
South West Africa.
This can be ascribed
to the effective tactics
and the overwhelming
fire power of five
heavily
armed
vehicles and the rifles
of the 40 occupants. A
handful of insurgents
never really stood a
chance. In a contact
with all those guns
Koevoet Casspirs engaged in a follow- up 1986. Photo: Jim Hooper
firing, surrendering was not
necessarily a logical option. An
insurgent was on death’s doorstep. (36)In the 10 years of existence the unit killed more than
3200 insurgents. In a conventional war it would mean the destruction of four fighting
battalions.(37)
The rest of the world would see (through inaccurate propaganda) Koevoet as a band of violent,
merciless killers. Herman never experienced this. In his days as detective he would investigate
cases against the security forces, also Koevoet. “Yes, there was violence against insurgents,
but never more than just a few slaps. You always work in an environment where your own or
the death of your colleague is imminent. It was not a place for debate. We needed the
information, and we needed it fast. But I never came across any form of torture, nor do I know
about any such incident. Yes, it did happen that huts or kraals burnt down. We fired tracers,
and the huts were grass
and pole constructions. It
is inevitable that a fire
would start from time to
time. It must always be
remembered
that
our
policemen came from the
same villages. We needed
information and the local
population gave it to us.
Out of their own free will. If
we had mistreated them it
would
never
have
happened.”(38)
Herman (far right), Wessie (top) and others.
Photo: Peter Stiff
11
“Like in many other units,
as the army, rapes did
occur. Yes, after hours, off-duty. Never as part of an operation. We acted against such
perpetrators and handed them over to the criminal investigators. There was also an incident
where a white soldier was prosecuted and found guilty of murdering a local tribesman. There
were also a number of cases where white policemen were transferred back to South African
when they were heavy handed. As an unwavering rule the unit was well disciplined. Gen Hans
Dreyer was a man of discipline and there were no short cuts”.(39)
April 1989 – Another contact, more dead. Photo: Herman Grobler
12
Bravery in the smoke and dust
After three years Herman became commander of Fighting team Zulu Foxtrot.
During 1988, Angola, South Africa and Cuba came to an agreement. The communist USSR
after 70 years ran out of steam - as did the Angolans. Of the once proud Angolan nation
nothing remained to pay the Cubans for their soldiers, except oil in Cabinda. For Cuba it
became their Vietnam. And the Angolans were tired of war. The South Africans were willing to
implement UN resolution 435 on condition that the Cubans withdrew their 50 000 soldiers. By
now it was possible.(40)
As part of the New York agreement Swapo would not have any members south of the 16
degree latitude. It was also agreed that all fighting units would return to their bases. Unlike the
army, the police could continue with patrols, but they had to rid the vehicles of and heavy
machine-guns.(41)
For the next six months the most effective counter-insurgency unit in the world would become
the world’s most successful counter-poaching unit. Poaching around Etosha Park dropped to
zero. The famous green uniforms would be exchanged with the grey of the Namibian
Police.(42)
But the informers of the once proud unit were still in place. In October 1988 Zulu 3, the
intelligence unit of Koevoet, followed up information and caught a Swapo political commissar
that had infiltrated Ovamboland. He had information about a big insurrection being planned for
1 April. The day Resolution 435 was to be implemented; the UN was to take over the
administration. The information was fed through the channels, but the SA government rejected
it as false. Six months later, after more than 300 men had died, then Minister of Foreign Affairs
Pik Botha said on TV that the SA Government had known about the insurrection for more than
6 months!(43)
Every now and again more information would emerge. These were no false alarms. It was
decided to deploy some of the unit’s men and vehicles at the unused army bases around
Ovamboland every night, in case Swapo decided to move into the empty bases. On 31 March
the Casspirs were withdrawn and placed along the border at specific points. It did not take long
before Zulu Quebec under Constable Fourie caught an insurgent dressed in civilian clothes as
he was crossing the Cut line. He was armed with a Makarov pistol. (44)He explained that he
was there on a reconnaissance mission, and that the big group he was preceding would come
the next day. He would meet them at a place 80km south, where they would establish a base.
He also said that four groups of 70 insurgents each would cross the border between Beacons
21 and 25. They would then, just south of the border, consolidate in two groups before moving
south. It was all part of a bigger plan. Swapo would bring along SAM7’s, RPG7 and RPG75
rocket- propelled grenades and launchers, 60 and 82mm mortars and armour piercing rounds
for their rifles. About 1200 Swapo’s would come.(45)
13
The next day, 1 April 1989, the bomb exploded. Hundreds of Swapo soldiers poured over the
border, expecting the army to be cornered in their bases and the police to be toothless. Swapo
also expected the UN would handle them with kid gloves.
Everywhere the police units ran into heavily armed Swapo groups. And they had brought along
heavy stuff. Ammo to fight armoured vehicles: many RPG’s and lots of anti-armour rounds,
RPD rounds that can slice through the side armour of a Casspir. And the police in their grey
uniforms had their heavy
weapons removed from their
vehicles! The Air Force could
not send support unless it was
to transport the wounded.
(46)The battles were heavy
and bloody. The tactics had
changed from one team
tracking a few, to a few teams
hunting many. There were from
50 to 100 insurgents in a
group. But in an act of foresight
the
Koevoet
operational
commander, Col Fouché, had
decided
to
remove
the
machine-guns, but to keep
them near at hand. The
vehicles raced forth and back to Opipela – the war is over for Herman, as well as for these 23
Photo: Herman Grobler
get the machine-guns back Swapo dead.
on.(47)
On 2 April Zulu Quebec picked up the spoor of the groups the talkative insurgent had told them
about two nights ago. The groups were already consolidated into two groups of about 100
each. They were moving south in a two lines a few hundred metres apart.(48)
“We were busy at Eenhana to replace the 20mm and “five O’s” when we received the
message that Zulu Quebec had found the spoor of the expected group. Zulu Quebec waited
for reinforcements. Zulu Foxtrot and Zulu Hotel left some of their cars behind to be repaired
and to be refitted. With half teams we arrived at Zulu Quebec close to Beacon 25 where they
were waiting for us. Two more teams also arrived. I took over as commander and we grouped
the combined teams. We were to follow up in two lines, the one behind the other one - about
20 cars in total. The line stretched for about 2km across, with the second line around 30m to
the back. The heavy weapons (20mm and five O’s) would be in the front and the lighter armed
vehicles with the three O’s and the Blesboks in the second row. As soon as we had made
contact, the second row would fill the gaps.(49)
“About 5km south of Beacon 25 we arrived at a kraal in the Opipela ward, but it was virtually
empty. Most of the population had fled. Not a good sign. The few people left in the kraal told us
that Swapo were many and they were heavily armed. They used donkeys to carry the heavy
14
weapons. Swapo had also left a message for us: -“Tell the police they are too few, they should
get re-enforcements. Today we will kill them all”.(50)
“We moved away from the kraal. It was clear the two Swapo groups now used the same track.
There was disagreement amongst the trackers. Some said the spoor was two hours old;
others said the urination marks were five minutes old. A few hundred metres further on the
trackers asked me to stop. I got out with a few of the senior black policemen. Again the
argument about the time began. But the feeling of an
imminent fight was now almost tangible. And yes,
there were donkey tracks. Everybody got back into
the vehicles. Trackers could stay inside the vehicles,
as the tracks were clearly visible from there.”(51)
“About 500m past the kraal where we had stopped
(the bush was very thick), my Wolf had to go through
a small clearing of about 25m in diameter. Suddenly
an insurgent dressed in camouflage uniform rose up
right in front of me, the RPG rocket launcher on his
shoulder aimed straight at me. As he rose, he fired
the RPG75 rocket- propelled grenade. He was too
fast for me to react”. (52)
The initiation shot to trigger the ambush was a direct April 1989, another contact – two team
hit. The projectile hit the Wolf right between the two members with casualties of war.
Photo: Peter Stiff
front windows. Herman was hit in the leg where he
was standing in the machine-gun hatch. The shrapnel caused havoc in the confined space of
the interior. Everybody, except the driver, was wounded. Two men with serious head wounds
later died, another had his leg shot off close to his hip. Most of the other had wounds to their
faces and some to their eyes.(53)
The Wolf came to a crushing halt. The engine stopped. Inside the driver’s cab the wiring was
burning. There was blue smoke everywhere. Herman: “I fired a few bursts, not more than 20
rounds in total with the 20mm, and then my radio cord became entangled in the ammunition
belt. I struggled to get it loose, but to no avail. There was not enough time. I shifted over to the
five O Browning machine-gun. My concern was that our vehicle could be charged and
overwhelmed. But I had to be cautious. Our Five O was all we had left to defend ourselves. A
few metres behind us, to our right (at a 90 degree angle) stood another damaged car. (54)
The two of us now fought it out with the insurgents very close to us. Somewhere below me I
felt the driver, Daniel Uyepa, move to the back. I thought he was running away but, but far
from that. He was in a fighting mood and needed a weapon. He fired until the first R5 assault
rifle was empty, and then he grabbed another. He had 10 weapons to at his disposal.”(55)
15
“I felt dizzy. When the rocket struck us I felt a shock in my leg, but did not realize what had
happened. When I looked down I saw blood and a gaping wound to my right leg. It was only
then that I realized how seriously I
was wounded. Below my knee about
20cm of the bone was missing”.(56)
“The fight still raged on, but suddenly
the mortars that had pounded us,
stopped. When we had left Eenhana,
the remaining cars of our two teams
Zulu Foxtrot and Zulu Hotel were still
being repaired and fitted. These cars
now, in an attempt to get to us faster,
took the “Oom Willie se pad”. Then
they turned off and bundu-bashed
towards us. It was then that they ran
into the Swapo mortar positions 5km
to our south. A heavy fire-fight started and
Helicopter-support after the Battle of Opipela- 23
Swapo casualties in body bags. Photo Herman Grobler
the Swapo position was overrun. Ten
more minutes of these 82mm mortars
would have put us in an extremely bad position”. Warrant Officer Attie Hattingh, one of the
unit’s old hands, was in charge of these vehicles.(57)
“I gave the order to “debuss”. We struggled to get outside. We started to treat the worst
wounded. I had already applied, as a tourniquet, the radio cord just above my knee. I knew
that my leg could not be saved and the loose lower leg was having serious impact on my
mobility. I asked one of our trackers Gabriël Moses to hand me his hunting knife. He put two
and two together and refused. After a very serious threat, he unwillingly handed over the knife.
I cut through the skin and muscle and removed my leg.”(58)
Herman had just amputated his leg with a knife they had always joked about – that “Moses
could not open a rat-pack tin with”.(59)
“I already had a drip going. I think I used 38 units of blood between getting wounded and being
admitted to 1 Military Hospital. But it was only after I had made the cut, that the most hideous
ghost pains hit me. I injected a painkiller and took a handful ampoules, injections and syringes
and put them into my shirt pocket. That soothed me somewhat. (60)
As the team commander and as trained medic I had all the medical information of the team
with me in a notebook. I asked someone to bring it to me and we wrote down the blood group
of all of the wounded on their foreheads. We prepared everybody for the Puma flight. After two
hours a Puma flown by Major Willie Ras arrived, (61)but 21 were seriously wounded and the
Puma could not take everybody. So the pilot decided to drop the regulation and loaded all 21
in the aircraft. He took a chance and saved many lives. The overloaded Puma struggled to get
into the air. My friend, Danie Fourie, was lying next to me in the Puma. He had a serious head
wound. He would not make it to the next day”.(62)
16
We landed at Ondangwa and I lost consciousness. We had to go to Waterkloof using the
Flossie. On the aircraft the shock and hallucinations hit me hard. It felt as if I was in a bath of
water. Through a haze I heard the doctor saying to someone else, “He thinks he is lying in his
own blood”. I had an ‘idea’ they wanted to implant a pink tooth into my mouth, and I put up a
huge fight. (63)
At Waterkloof we were placed in ambulances for the short ride to the hospital. I was the last to
leave. But the ambulance refused to start. Everybody gathered to push, but the thing had an
automatic transmission. So I stayed on the tarmac for 30 minutes before another ambulance
arrived and transported me to the hospital”.(64)
Herman spent two months in 1 Military Hospital. Because of the tourniquet his right leg was
amputated above his knee.
Herman in 1 Military Hospital
– ready with a smile despite the recent trauma.
17
Life goes on
…as temporary member of the South African Police 1990
Herman was transferred back to Ovamboland, but this time in the role of game ranger. When
the unit was eventually closed on 12 January 1990 he boarded the aircraft for South Africa.
Suddenly his life seemed to make no sense any more. For a long time he had tried to get an
official transfer to the South African Police. All that seemed to remain now was one month
leave. After the leave, he and another ex-Koevoet had to undergo psychological evaluation.
The other person went overboard the night before and had a hangover when he arrived for the
tests. Herman was sober and prepared. Of the two, Herman failed the tests! “You cannot work
with people” he was informed, and thus received a temporary appointment only.(65)
But then a few things happened that would have a serious impact on his future. During 1989
the South African Government and the Police made various pledges that they would receive
any of the policemen that wanted to move to South Africa. An official plan was documented
with routes that could be used as well as final destinations. The final settlement would be at
Van Zylsrus. (66)
But the first six members did not know anything about plans, routes etc. They knew they
should get to Pretoria, and that is what they did. “And here sat these six Ovambos before
Police Head office and the police did not know what to do with them. So they instructed Col
Fouché, the last operational commander of the unit, to make a plan with them. Col Fouché
contacted temporary sergeant Herman Grobler. The trickle had since developed into a stream.
More than 600 men with their people were waiting at Upington. Men, women and children,
more than 2500 souls. So Herman, the guy that could not work with people, ended up with
2500 people! “We moved them to a number of police farms near Rustenburg. To start off we
would house them in tents”.(67)
Later when the Rooiberg Mine fell into disuse, the police acquired the mine complex.
Everybody was moved to the mine. But what to do with these people still remained a
challenge. “These guys all came from the rural areas in Ovamboland. Most of them could not
do much more than basic reading and writing. They were people taken from school at Std 1 to
go look after the cattle. And that is why they became such outstanding trackers”.(68)
Then Col Fouché came up with the idea of “police auxiliaries”. These old warriors would be
employed as helpers in the areas where the police had a personnel shortage or where the
police was under pressure because of continued crime. The first batch of 60 men was sent to
Natal where stock theft was a huge problem in certain areas. Within a few months the problem
was eradicated, the criminals all apprehended and through the justice process. Many of the
area commanders saw the benefits of the unit. When in 1992 the first farm murders occurred
near Pietersburg 40 members were sent there. In all the cases the murderers were caught.
(69)
But in the Pretoria Head Office were a number of senior officers who were not interested in
these people. They openly pressurised the area commanders to force the members to take
severance packages. (70)Perhaps they interpreted the politics of the day incorrectly. Or
18
perhaps some wanted to impress the new minister, and the state president who never was a
supporter of the security forces.
By 1994 the region at Rustenburg offered packages. Virtually all the old members were
pressurised into breaking their ties with the police. By the time Herman Grobler and Col
Fouché became involved, the ship was below the waterline. In one case a senior officer said to
Herman, “We have paid these people their money, we do not have any contract with them; we
owe them nothing”. (71)This officer, if he had had a fraction of the courage these men had,
would have taken a much more humane approach. He was a pen pusher and all he wanted
was to impress his bosses. When they were bleeding and fighting he was a staff officer in a
cosy office somewhere far away from the war.(72)
Except for a small group in Pietersburg and another small group in the Cape no black Ovambo
members remained in the police. They were sold for less than a pot of lentil soup. Herman
took a transfer to the Firearm Tracking unit in Rustenburg and met his future wife. On his
wedding the police eventually decided to appoint him permanently. (73)
Tribute
Herman says, “I am often asked if I will do it all again if given the same choices, even if it
meant losing my leg. And I always answer the same. Definitely! I always wanted to be a
soldier. I lived my dream. I sleep peacefully every night. For my old enemy, Swapo, I have the
greatest respect. I’ve always respected them. When we were wearing that uniform we were all
soldiers, and we recognised one another as being soldiers and opponents. I remember one
day during a shootout after a follow up. We were a whole team. He was alone. He took an
ambush position right in front of us. His magazine was well-packed for quick reloading. He
never had a chance, but he was willing to fight. Such a man deserves respect”. (74)
Not a single policeman who was involved in stopping the senseless and mindless April 1989
invasion was ever honoured for his bravery. Medals were issued for loyal service and merit.
(75)That was all. But between doing what is expected and walking the extra mile in extreme
bravery and leadership is a different matter all together.
Surely, we can write a tribute of our own?
“On 2 April 1989, near the Odila River in the Opipela ward, north of Eenhana in Ovamboland,
Sergeant Herman Grobler distinguished himself as leader of a combined fighting team of 20
Casspir and Wolf APC’s. He led his group against a determined and well-established Swapo
force of 200 insurgents. Even when he was seriously wounded, he still commanded the group
to eventually destroy the ambush. As trained operational medic, in spite of losing his own leg,
he took charge of the medical preparation of 21 seriously wounded men under his command.
Sergeant Grobler’s leadership and bravery exceeds what was expected and surpasses
anything considered ‘normal’.
19
Conclusion
Tide has turned
The way the black policemen from Namibia were treated by both the South African Police and
the South African Police Service will forever be a disgrace to their name. These men sacrificed
what they had when it was needed. The manner in which the politicians and some senior
officers left these people in the lurch, is even worse than the treatment experienced by the
brave men of the previous 32 Battalion. It will stain their names forever. Today those politicians
are retired with big pensions.
When they came here after the war, the SA Government asked them to drop their civil claims
against Swapo, “because it undermined the international relationships between the RSA and
the new Namibia”. The aggrieved would be compensated once off by the SA Government. The
result was a payment of less than 2% of the initial claims!(76)
Was the evacuation of the Ovambos to Rustenburg tenable? During 2000 the UN Commission
for Human Rights and other human rights organizations came across five mass graves in
northern Namibia. It was then identified as the remains of “Koevoet members” killed by Swapo
during the run-up to the election in 1990. It could have been many more.(77)
At the time of this article the author tried to get sponsorship to continue the research. Two
companies made millions of Rand out of the police during this war. One company supplied the
police with armoured vehicles to continue the counter insurgency war. The company refused
point blank to be involved. They did not answer any telephone calls or e-mails. The other was
a medical company. They were sympathetic but apologetic. The request was kindly rejected.
Yes, that is the way times have changed. Some believed in the cause, others saw it as a way
to make money, without any responsibility, much like those who left the Ovambos to their own
fate…
20
Notes & References
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
Packenham, T, The Boer War
Scholtz,L, Grootkrygsmanne van die Suid Afrika, stuk oor Jopie Fourie(miskien ook Imperial Service)
Imperial Service
Cooper, The Police Brigade
The Border War, Willem Steenkamp
Potgieter se boek
Shay & Vermaak
Cocks, C,Fireforce
Stiff, the secret war
Stiff, the taming of the mine
Estimate by Herman Grobler, january 2009
Herman Grobler: Personal interview, January and February 2009 in Pretoria.
Ibid
Ibid
Ibid
Ibid
Ibid
Police Calls Sign used by author
Herman Grobler Interview
Ibid
Ibid
Ibid
Ibid
Ibid
The tactics described by Herman Grobler is diffrent from those described by Jim Hopper in his book
Koevoet. He explains the dynamics of the cars as working in pairs. It was likely that pairs method was
used by some of the teams.
Herman Grobler Interview
Ibid
Ibid
Hooper, J, Koevoet
Ibid
Ibid
Ibid
Ibid
Ibid
Ibid
Ibid
Stiff, P, The Covert War
Herman Grobler Interview
Ibid
Geldenhuys, J, Wenners
Beeld of geldenhuys
Herman Grobler
Stiff, P, Nine days of war
Herman Grobler
Stiff, P, Nine days of War & the Covert war
Stiff, P, Nine days
Herman Statement
Ibid
Ibid
Ibid
Ibid
Ibid
Ibid
Ibid
Ibid
Ibid
21
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
Ibid
Ibid
Ibid
Ibid
Stiff, the Covert war
Ibid
Herman Grobler Interview
Ibid
Ibid
Official Police Document
Herman
Ibid
Beeld Article 1992-02-27
Herman Interview
Ibid
Ibid
Ibid
Ibid
Police document shown to author, with names of all recipients of merit medals, 226 in total
Herman Grobler claimed an amount of R875 000 from Swapo, he was paid less than 2% of the claim.
Document by the ICRC written in 2000
Herman Grobler: Personal documents, including statements taken two months and two years after the Battle of
Opipela.
Peter Stiff, 1989, Nine days of war, Lemur Press.
Peter Stiff, 2004, Koevoet, the Covert war, Galago Press.
Jim Hooper, 1988, Koevoet. Southern Book Publishers.
Photos:
Jim Hooper, Koevoet.
Peter Stiff, Personal collection.
Herman Grobler, Personal collection.
André Pienaar.
Marius van Aardt www.geocities.com/sa_bushwar.
22