Factually true, legally untrue

Transcription

Factually true,
legally untrue
Political Media Ownership in Kenya
A Research Paper Written
By Othieno Nyanjom
Factually true, legally
untrue: Political Media
Ownership in Kenya
A Research Paper Written
By Othieno Nyanjom
© Internews November 2012
Contents
Foreword
Executive Summary
List of Acronyms/Abbreviations
1
1 Introduction
3
2 Research Methodology
6
3 Media Concepts and Practices
8
4 Legislative and Institutional Frameworks
11
5 A Review of the Kenyan Media in Practice
17
5.1 A History of the media in Kenya
17
5.2 Structure of the media in Kenya
22
5.2.1 R
adio
24
5.2.2Television
27
5.2.3 P
rint 31
5.2.4Mobile Telephony and the Internet
33
5.2.5 M
edia Training Institutions in Kenya
34
5.2.6 M
edia Management Institutions in Kenya
34
6 Issues in Ownership and Content of the Kenyan Media
36
6.1Legal Framework for Media Practice
38
6.2Ownership of the Kenyan Media
40
6.3The Conduct of the Kenyan Media
51
6.4Conduct of Institutions of the Media Industry
58
6.5Training and Profesionalism in the Media
60
6.6Political Opinion Polling in Kenya
61
7 Discussion
67
8 Conclusions and Recommendations
75
9 Bibliography
78
10 Appendices
81
Foreword
The political ownership of media outlets can act against the requirement for a
fiercely independent media – especially during election times.
In the run up to the 2007 general elections, the Kenyan media was seen as partisan because of political interference in editorial content. This had devastating
consequences. Public, private and community media took sides, undermining
their objectivity and credibility. The public received unbalanced and sometimes
inappropriate information. The political campaign turned virulent – the media being a platform for accusations and abusive language.
Five years down the line, as the country approaches the much anticipated March,
4th 2013 general elections, has the situation changed? Yes and no. Some media
outlets have learnt a lesson and reviewed their structures and policies to safeguard their integrity from boards of directors and owners. Editors now appear
more capable of resisting the risk of influence.
But other outlets, especially radio stations operating at the local level, still depend
on a powerful ‘big man’ who has the final say on editorial content and programming. This situation can put staff under immense pressure and poses a dilemma:
should they take sides or risk being fired? In some provinces, politicians have
joined the rush to own a radio station. Take Eastern and Coast provinces for instance: for the last two years, a number of new radio stations have been created
by politicians vying for parliamentary or county seats.
Internews in Kenya, under its election focused “Free and Fair Media” program,
wanted to find out more about this particular problem. We commissioned a researcher for a nationwide investigation into political ownership of the full range
of media outlets. This research would establish data on the make-up of media
boards, coverage areas and broadcast licensing, and identify conflict of interest
arising from the political ownership and socio-economic interests at play at media
houses.
The main objective of this report is not to point an accusing finger at media owners
and managers. Rather, it is to identify weaknesses in the sector to resist political
influence on editorial content and to propose solutions and recommendations.
The report will also inform innovative interventions such as an interactive map of
ownership of the Kenya media (available at www.internewsinkenya.org) and several events to directly engage stakeholders.
This unique engagement seeks to stimulate ongoing discussion on the challenges
posed by political ownership, and to chart the way forward for journalists and
editors willing to report in a more independent manner on the electoral process.
Brice Rambaud
Program Director
(Democracy & Governance)
Internews in Kenya
Internews in Kenya | Factually true, legally untrue: Political Media Ownership in Kenya / 2012
About the author
Othieno Nyanjom holds a doctoral degree from the
University of Sussex, an MSc degree from Bradford
and a Bachelors degree from Nairobi. He is a researcher
and private consultant on a wide range of development
issues. Besides his special interest in the media, his
other areas of research and consulting interest include
public spending, health, the Kenyan Constitution and its
provisions for devolved government.
VI
Executive
Summary
The media is important as an efficient mirror of society’s status, an amplifier
of development initiatives, and an agenda setter. Yet, the media can be an
agency of destruction, as some have alleged over Kenya’s 2007/08 postelection violence [PEV]. On the eve of Kenya’s first general election under its
new constitution (2010), it is significant that two aspiring presidents, who are
among the four Kenyans indicted at the International Criminal Court [ICC],
for PEV, are also major media investors. Kenya’s legislation for media management has not been fully operationalised due to a history of weak governance and impunity. This has spawned weak professionalism, with many
media practitioners being poorly trained and/or remunerated, and working
under unsatisfactory terms and conditions of employment. This makes them
amenable to manipulation by politician-owners of media outlets, politicians
in general, and the corporate sector. Additionally, some of the roles of the
statutory but weak Media Council of Kenya [MCK] have been usurped by the
self-interested Media Owner’s Association.
Kenya’s two foremost media houses – Nation Media Group [NMG] and Standard Group [SG] – are on the domestic stock exchange. While NMG’s dominant shareholder, the Aga Khan, has traditionally deferred to the government, SG’s dominant shareholding involves former President Moi, even if
only indirectly so. However, the electronic media is dominated by the Royal
Media Services which has been partial to President Mwai Kibaki. Prime Minister Raila Odinga is associated with Neural Digital’s multiple radio stations,
while ICC-bound, presidential aspirants, Deputy Prime Minister Uhuru Kenyatta and ex-minister William Ruto are respectively associated with Media
Max and Kass Media Group. Other national politicians with media interests
include presidential aspirants, Vice President Kalonzo Musyoka, minister
Charity Ngilu, and ex-minister Raphael Tuju. Several current parliamentarians and aspiring politicians also have direct or indirect media interests, most
notably FM stations. Kenyan politicians also subscribe to internet facilities.
The Constitution has focused extensively on improving governance, underscoring the freedoms of information and the media, necessitating reviews of
the key media legislation, the Media Act (2007), Kenya Information and Com-
VII
munications Act (1999) and the Books and Newspapers Act (2009). The reviews should result in more independent and efficacious media management
institutions insulated from government, politician and corporate interference,
while addressing media misconduct. MCK’s improved oversight capacity
should explore synergistic links with other institutions that address mediarelated concerns, such as the National Cohesion and Integration Commission on ethnic jingoism. MCK’s effectiveness could also be enhanced by:
Undertaking an extensive stakeholder-driven review of the media sector’s
needs against the backdrop of the Constitution (2010).
Consequently review of the adequacy of existing legislative and institutional
frameworks of the sector, to arrive at a lean but efficacious integrated management framework.
Using the integrated sector management framework to review capacity and
training needs resulting in elaborate curricula content for all categories and
levels of the sector.
Building on the approved curricula to develop an accreditation basis for institutions offering media studies on the evidence of their having adequate
capacities. This should then lead to the development of frameworks for accession of individuals to the various professions.
List of Acronyms
and Abbreviations
ACC
Advocates Complaints Commission
AKFED
Aga Khan Education Foundation
AMWIK
Association of Media Women in Kenya
ASAL
Arid and Semi-Arid lands
BAKE
Bloggers Association of Kenya
CCK
Communications Commission of Kenya
CDF
Constituency Development Fund
ESOMAR
European Standards for Opinion and Marketing Research
ICC
International Criminal Court
ICCK
Independent Communications Commission of Kenya
ICT
Information and Communications Technology
IEBC
Independent Boundaries and Electoral Commission
IPPG
Inter-Parliamentary Parties Group
ISP
Independent Service Provider
KADU
Kenyan African Democratic Union
KANU
Kenyan African National Union
KBC
Kenya Broadcasting Corporation
KCA
Kenya Correspondents Association
KEG
Kenya Editors’ Guild
KNA
Kenya News Agency
KTN
Kenya Television network
KUJ
Kenya Union of Journalists
LLS
Local Language Station
MCK
Media Council of Kenya
MOA
Media Owners Association
MPDB
Medical Practitioners and Dentists Board
1
2
MSRA
Marketing and Social Research Association
MTL
Miller Trust Limited
NARC
National Alliance Rainbow Coalition
NCCK
National Christian Council of Kenya
NMG
Nation Media Group
NSE
Nairobi Securities Exchange
NSSF
National Social Security Fund
NTV
Nation TV
ODM
Orange Democratic Movement
PEV
Post-election violence
PNU
Party of national Unity
RMS
Royal Media Services
SG
Standard Group
SMS
Short Messaging Service
STV
Stellavision TV
TV
Television
TWKL
Trade World Kenya Limited
VOK
Voice of Kenya
Introduction
1
The media is a significant channel
religious and village fora. Globally,
of communication. The manner in
the media has played a significant
which it executes its duties has a
role in promoting good governance
critical impact on events such as
and development, but it has also
political electioneering. In most
posed major risks in certain areas.
developing countries, the print
Most Kenyan electoral processes
media has remained largely out of
are marked by violence, but the in-
reach for the average citizen due
tensity increases during the specific
to low literacy levels and non af-
periods of immediately before, dur-
fordability.
ing and after general elections. This
In the Kenyan context, the print media is divided into four broad categories: regular (daily and weekly)
newspapers; magazines; regional
newspapers; and the ‘alternative
has been the case since the beginning of the multi party system. The
violence that followed the disputed
2007 presidential elections was unprecedented.
press. In the electronic media, radio
The perception has been that Ke-
has far wider reach than television
nyan media’s conduct was a sig-
(TV). Information and communica-
nificant trigger for the violence. Ke-
tions technology (ICT) provides new
nya’s next general elections are due
and significantly expanding com-
in March 2013,1 placing the country
munications opportunities through
at the crossroads of either pros-
the mobile phone, e-mail, internet,
pering under the new constitution
blogs, and other social media tools.
promulgated in 2010, or regressing
A comparatively new entrant into the
into electoral violence once more.
Kenya media scene, in relation to
Hence this timely study: a review
elective politics, is the opinion poll-
of the potential conflicts of interest
ster whose findings can significantly
that might arise from political influ-
shape public opinion. Alternative
ence in the ownership and manage-
media comprise populist dailies and
ment of the media in Kenya.
1
In resolving a constitutional ambiguity over the date of the next general elections, the High Court set this at March 4th 2013.
However, delays in preparations, such as the registration of voters, have raised some doubts on the efficacy of this date.
3
Three of the four Kenyans presently
governed by the Books and News-
indicted before the International
papers Act (2009).
Criminal Court (ICC) for various
crimes over the 2007/08 PEV hold
media interests. One is a local-language radio journalist. Two are active politicians with reported media
interests (see Section 6.2). While
the journalist only recently (October 2012) decided not to contest
a county political seat in Kenya’s
upcoming elections, the two politicians have declared their presidential candidacy. The concern extends
to the media in general in the light
of (often anecdotal) information that
active and prospective politicians
are investing in media outlets directly or through proxies (see Section
the Kenyan media a closed sector
during the early independence decades. The government owned the
only national TV and radio stations;
and two multinational companies
had near-absolute duopoly over the
nation-wide print media. Into the
1980s, however, growing civil society demands coincided with the
global drive for economic and political liberalization to change the landscape, with various private interests
joining the industry, some linked –
even if surreptitiously so – to the demands for greater political space.2
6.2), raising the scope for biased
The grudging and therefore ad hoc
and politicized reportage. Further,
manner in which the-then President
there is practitioner evidence of ex-
Daniel arap Moi conceded to de-
tensive corruption by politicians and
mands for media-focused reforms
the corporate sector to influence
undermined orderliness in the pro-
media content.
cess that allowed new formal and
Kenya’s media straddles the formal/
informal sector divide. The Media
Act (2007), as umbrella legislation,
establishes the national media oversight body, the Media Council of
Kenya (MCK). The formal electronic
media is governed by the Kenya In-
4
Years of single party rule rendered
informal investors into the industry.
While the media has since made
great strides in formalising its legal
and institutional frameworks, it constantly acknowledges the need for
improvement and attention to previous oversights.
formation and Communications Act
This is especially true against the
(2009) while the print component is
backdrop of Kenya’s promulgation
As illustrated in Section 5.1, Kenya has a long history of media in politics. For detailed discussions of this history, see
Ngugi (2012), Nyamora (2007) and MCK (forthcoming).
2
of its arguably progressive Consti-
What is the social network of me-
tution (2010). Media conduct during
dia owners in Kenya, i.e. those per-
and after the 2007 general elections
ceived to be business partners of
was not satisfactory. What needs to
media owners working especially in
be most critically addressed is the
the political and economic arena?
interface between media owners,
managers and journalists.
How does ownership, as analyzed
above, influence media content in
The primary task of this research re-
Kenya, if so? How did media own-
port is to:
ership influence the coverage of the
Investigate
nationwide
political
ownership of the full range of media outlets: print, online, television,
2007 general election, and how is it
likely to influence the coverage of
the 2013 general election?
radio (from community to main-
Section 2 of this paper presents its
stream media).
research methodology. Section 3
Establish the political affiliation or
ownership of opinion pollsters.
provides a brief review of the models of media management, and the
debates surrounding media owner-
Examine the make-up of the
ship and its independence. Section
boards of governors of media in-
4 summarises the key frameworks
stitutions, their broadcast footprint
for media management in Kenya.
areas and broadcast licensing
(conditions under which license
was granted and compliance).
A brief overview of the structure of
the media in Kenya is presented in
Section 5, whose influences on me-
The report also attempts to answer
dia independence and the scope for
the following questions:
political interference is addressed
Who owns the media in Kenya?
What else do they own? Which politicians own media outlets or media
groups in Kenya?
in Section 6. The final section (7)
makes
some
recommendations
arising from the emerging picture on
the interface between politics and
media ownership in Kenya.
5
2
Research
Methodology
The probing manner of data col-
nyan media industry. Finally, the
lection for this assignment re-
foregoing processes pointed to ma-
quired a research permit which
terial overlooked during the initial lit-
was obtained from the National
erature review. The various sources
Council of Science and Technol-
consulted include:
ogy. The research was conduct-
Registrar of Companies and the
ed between March and October
State Law Office – registration data
2012, its design involving the fol-
of formal media
lowing steps:
Literature review: This was designed
tion of opinion pollsters, and private,
to establish the nature of media
public and community print and
ownership globally, as well as in-
electronic media
teractions between media owners,
managers (editors) and journalists.
The review would also cover the
Registrar of Books and Newspapers
– registration of formal print media
policy, legal and institutional frame-
Communications Commission of
works within which the Kenyan me-
Kenya – registration of electronic
dia operates, and an examination of
media
how these frameworks affect relations between owners, managers
and journalists, especially in relation
to electioneering.
Key Informant Interviews on the Kenyan Media Structure: This phase
6
Ministry of Information – registra-
Media Owners Association – media ownership; policies/frameworks
governing interactions with editors
Alternative Media Network – ownership and interactions with editors
collected registration data on me-
Media Council of Kenya – media
dia operators to establish their legal
self-regulation frameworks, espe-
status. It also explored the percep-
cially with respect to interactions
tions of key informants on the Ke-
between owners and editors
Marketing and Social Research
KCA, but was unable to interact with
Association – ownership, regula-
National Security Intelligence Ser-
tion, and operations of opinion
vices officers, whose insights into
polling companies
the political nature of media owner-
Association of Media Women of
ship would have been valuable.
Kenya – gender dimensions of
A nationwide survey of KCA corre-
ownership and editorial functions
spondents and officers of the Min-
Field work – data collection: In this
phase, the research focused on a
sample of print and electronic media
outlets to investigate interactions
between media owners, managers
and journalists, especially in relation
to politics.
The
researcher
istry of Information and Communications was conducted, alongside
interviews with media professionals.
The findings of these undertakings
were triangulated with material from
the literature review and interviews
with at least 30 key informants who
were broadly representative of the
interacted
with
history and hierarchical structure of
field officials of the Information and
the media industry ownership
Communications ministry and the
in Kenya.
Notes
7
3
Internews in Kenya | Factually true, legally untrue: Political Media Ownership in Kenya
Media Concepts
and Practices
The characteristics of varied me-
self. Consequently, while incorpo-
dia models provide insights into
rating the right to publish, the model
the scope for interaction among
also expects high standards of self-
protagonists, including the gov-
regulation, allowing for possible
ernment, media owners, media
government intervention such as in
professionals and society, which
establishing a public broadcaster.
in-turn provides the basis for exploring specific media contexts,
such as the place of political media ownership.
8
The professional model recognises
the potential tyranny of the government and consequently strives
for its own institutional and profes-
The motives for media investment
sional autonomy to enable it to keep
can be commercial, political or both
the government in check, especially
(Wanyande, 1995); these motives
with respect to preserving the space
shaping, or being shaped by, the
provided to citizens through demo-
design of a national media model.
cratic struggles. Thus, the profes-
Makokha (2010) distinguishes four
sional model informs of and com-
media models, viz. the market mod-
ments on government conduct, but
el, social responsibility model, pro-
it also provides a platform on which
fessional model, and the alternative
the public can offer views on the
media model.
same issues.
Under the libertarian market mod-
Finally, Makokha distinguishes the
el, the media environment is a free
alternative media model which in-
market of ideas in which there is
corporates
neither state interference nor self-
non-formal operations at the grass-
regulation among the practitioners.
roots and community levels. Ma-
Juxtaposed against such a poten-
kokha suggests that these models
tially utopian model is the social
‘prune and subsume’ the authori-
responsibility model which places
tarian state model and the devel-
societal interests above those of the
opmental journalism model (2010:
non-mainstream
and
274): yet, none of the four models
argued that agenda in the media
adequately captures an absolute
is set by elites outside the sector,
statist media in which no other opin-
including advertisers (commercial
ion exists.
interests) and politicians. A Marxian
3
Nonetheless, Makokha (2010) identifies six roles of the media in the
democratic process, including: information dissemination; analysis of
information; social representation;
forum for discussion; entertainment;
and oversight over the government. In discussing the media and
electoral violence, Stremlau and
Price (2009) distil these roles into
three: mirroring the current status
analysis of trends in media ownership argues that the loss of balance
between public and private ownership leads to a loss of voice for capital and labour, jeopardising truth,
freedom, progress and democracy
(Welton, 2002: 368). This analysis
sees government funding of private
media as being as ‘corrupt and crippled’ as corporate funding of the
public media.
of society; amplifying on-going in-
Yet, therein exists a dilemma: John-
terventions; and enabling national
son sees corporate ownership as
agenda-setting. Success in these
enhancing media concentration, in-
roles depends on the extent of the
creasing the quantity of the media,
media’s freedom from interference
but neither its quality nor diversity of
by owners (including politicians),
content. In the context, Beder (2004)
the state and commercial interests,
sees the emergence of a ‘propa-
as well as – and critically so – the
ganda model’ in which money and
extent to which the media is itself
power prune news and marginalise
professional, often gauged by its
dissent to enable their own interests
own conformity with a code of pro-
to dominate content.
fessional conduct.
While ‘media diversity’ is an ideal,
Thus, Oriare et al (2010) are right to
Oriare et al (2010) distinguishes
ask about who benefits from media
between its expanding (mere) ‘out-
liberalisation, which should ben-
lets’ as opposed to ‘opportunities’.
efit the masses who might however,
For media concentration transforms
have little or no access. Skewes
editors into ‘proprietors’ voices’ in
(2007) and Johnson (2009) have
a context where ‘objectivity’ is not
3
Oriare et al’s (2010) make a distinction between a government broadcaster and a public broadcaster, the former being
an exclusive mouthpiece with low attention to objectivity, as opposed to the latter, a public resource.
9
synonymous with ‘truth’ (Beder,
In effect, therefore, Welton (2002:
2004). While content might have the
384) argues, media ownership be-
attributes of objectivity – accurate;
comes a greater weapon (than
balanced; depersonalised – value
politics) for controlling people’s
judgement is critical for concerns,
‘minds and souls’ (over political and
such as who was interviewed, what
socio-economic choices), making
was asked and what was cited.
editors the “unelected and unregu-
This filtering by media owners, advertisers and news agencies – such
lated keepers of the public trust and
moulders of the public mind.”
as through Johnson’s ‘eliminative
Into which of the theoretical mod-
journalism’, ‘feel good news’ and
els does the Kenyan media fit? The
‘agenda setting’ – leads to an ‘echo
review below should illustrate the
effect of master narratives’ which
fact that the media models are not
undermine substantive investigative
discrete, that ascription to them is
reporting. Johnson sees the con-
a fluid rather than static reality over
sequence of this to be reliance by
time and space. This consequently
politicians on the media, which the
calls for a legal and institutional
public must therefore engage if they
framework that is sufficiently dex-
are to connect with their political
trous over the medium to long term,
leaders.
and across contexts, to manage the
fluid realities likely encountered.
Notes
10
Legislative and
Institutional
Frameworks
Kenya
promulgated
transformative
a
highly
Constitution
4
ment. The Preamble’s ethno-cul-
in
tural, social and governance values
2010. This has triggered a flux in
and Article 10’s national values and
legislation: while the Constitution
principles which bind all individuals,
itself mandates the enactment of
are significant for the media in light
new legislation necessary for its
of accusations that its broadcast
full implementation, pre-existing
of ‘hate speech’ contributed to the
legislation must also be reviewed
2007/2008 PEV.
to ensure conformity.
The Bill of Rights (Chapter Four) ap-
The Constitution has various impli-
plies to all laws and binds all per-
cations for conduct of media busi-
sons, and must be interpreted in or-
ness, occasioning the on-going re-
der to favour fundamental freedoms
views of the Media Act (2007) and
(Article 20). In relation to the me-
the Kenya Information and Commu-
dia environment, the Bill of Rights
nications Act (1999). Of the Consti-
protects the media (professionals
tution itself, and certainly in relation
against owners and the public) by
to the current discussion on the im-
guaranteeing
pact of political media ownership on
and security (Article 29), freedoms
media content, media practitioners
of conscience, religion, belief and
would do well to familiarise them-
opinion (Article 32), and expres-
selves with at least the following
sion (Article 33), besides guarantee-
areas: the Preamble; Bill of Rights;
ing the media’s own freedom (Ar-
Leadership and Integrity; and the
ticle 34); but it also protects society
principles of representation. Indeed,
against the media, by guaranteeing
these constitutional provisions set
privacy over family and private af-
the agenda for Stremlau and Price’s
fairs (Article 31). Besides the ‘tradi-
(2009) media as a mirror, amplifier
tional rights (assembly, association
and enabler of national develop-
and politics), Article 46 invokes the
personal
freedom
11
consumer’s right to goods and ser-
and to promote media freedom and
vices of reasonable quality and the
independence, ethical standards,
full information with which to enjoy
discipline and rights of journalists.
such goods and services – provisions
Its chief executive officer, the Secre-
with implications for media content.4
tary to the Council, should conduct
Oriare and Mshindi (2008) adjudge
the plethora of laws affecting the
Kenyan media to be “controver-
based on the register it maintains
(Sections 12, 13 and 19).
sial… retrogressive, punitive and
The Council has a membership of
repressive...”5 However, this report
13 graduate representatives of two
focuses only on the ownership and
public institutions and seven non-
operational provisions of the three
government media sector institu-
central acts, i.e. the Media Act, Ke-
tions (Sections 6 and 7) whose re-
nya Information and Communica-
muneration is provided through a
tions Act and the Books and News-
parliamentary budget line and the
papers Act.
Council’s own revenues (Sections
The umbrella legislation for the media industry is the Media Act (2007),
which contains the Media (Complaints Commission) Rules (2009).
In establishing the MCK (Section 3),
the Media Act oversees “the conduct and discipline of journalists
and the media (and) the self-regulation of the media and for connected
purposes.” The Council’s functions
include mediation and arbitration in
11 and 18). MCK’s main agency, the
Complaints
Commission
chaired
by an advocate assisted by three
members, undertakes conciliation,
mediation and arbitration (Sections
23 and 24), over complaints against
media houses, their operatives, or
on behalf of journalists. Appeals
against Commission decisions can
be to the Council, and eventually to
the High Court on legal matters.
disputes between the industry and
The Second Schedule of the Act
government, between it and the
provides the Code of Conduct for
public, and within itself (Section 4).
the Practice of Journalism, covering
The Council is also obliged to ad-
23 areas of concern. Most relevant
vise the government on media pro-
for a discussion on the impact of
fessionalism, employment criteria,
political media ownership on media
This matter is taken up by Section 46A of the Kenya Information and Communications Act’s emphasis of ‘public interest’
and ‘protection of privacy’.
5
The list includes: Defamation Act, Cap 36; The Penal Code, Cap 63; Copyright Act, Cap 130; Preservation of Public Security
Act, Cap 57; Public Order Act, Cap 56; Film and Stage Plays Act, Cap 222 (1962); Chief’s Authority Act, Cap 128; Official
4
12
an annual review of the profession
content is the Code on Indepen-
political parties – must keep to their
dence, which charts that profes-
respective categories, areas, geo-
sional journalists guard against self-
graphical limits, and timeframes.
interest, and commercial or political
controls or influences as they gather
and disseminate news.
The intention to grant a licence must
be gazetted for feedback within 30
days from the public (Sections 77–
On Integrity, journalists should not
79). Section 46B declares Kenya
pay news sources, accept gifts, fa-
Broadcasting Corporation the public
vours or compensation from those
broadcaster, while a private licence
who might seek to influence cov-
may be issued to any person fulfill-
erage, or engage in activities that
ing CCK conditions (Section 46G).
may compromise their integrity or
The community radio licence is
independence.” These factors are
however, conditioned on, amongst
echoed in the recently published
other things, it being a not-for-profit
Guidelines for Elections Coverage
community initiative, with an inten-
(MCK, 2012).
tion of involving the community in its
Part II of the Kenya Information
and Communications Act (2009)
management and benefits
(Section 46H).
Communications
Stations must ensure a distinctive
Commission of Kenya [CCK] which
Kenyan identity, while broadcasting
manages, amongst other aspects of
accurate, impartial and balanced
communications, broadcasting ser-
news and views, and protecting
vices (Part IVA), licensing and en-
the privacy of individuals (Section
forcement (Part VI), electronic trans-
46I) – such matters are overseen by
actions (Part VIA), and fair competi-
the Broadcasting Content Advisory
tion (Part VIC).6 Under broadcasting,
Council (Section 46S). Legislation
Section 46B provides for public,
prohibits unfair conduct by licens-
private and community stations,
ees (Section 84Q–S), and condition-
whose licences may be free-to-air
ally allows the minister or CCK to
radio or TV, subscription radio or
revoke licences (Sections 46J and P)
TV, and subscription management.
and provides various financial and/or
Licensees – which may not include
custodial penalties for infringements.
establishes
the
Secrets Act, Cap 187; Police Act, Cap 84; Armed Forces Act, Cap 199; Kenya Broadcasting Act, Cap 221; and ICT Act.
6
The intention to supersede this legislation is contained in the Independent Communications Commission Bill (2010) about
which Nairobi university journalism lecturer Oriare sees to: “provide(s) a good legal and regulatory framework for ensuring
that the Information and Communications Act 1998 complies with the provisions of the Constitution 2010... meet(ing) the
minimum international standards on broadcasting regulations.” (see http://eastafricapress.net/index.php?option=com_conte
nt&view=article&id=557:assessing-icck-bill&catid=133:media-law). Accessed 8/9/2012.
13
The Act’s Regulations (2009) pro-
pendent communications regulator,
vide that licence applicants follow
the Independent Communications
CCK prescribed procedures (Sec-
Commission Bill (2010) has been
tion 3). Applications for commercial
published. It includes the estab-
broadcast licences must be accom-
lishment of the Independent Com-
panied by a business plan which re-
munications Commission of Kenya
flects technical capacity, experience
(ICCK), the dissolution of the CCK
or expertise, programme line-up or
and amendments to existing sector
schedule and the capacity for eight
legislation, among which is the Me-
hours of continuous broadcasting
dia Act and the Kenya Information
per day (Regulations, Section 4).
and Communications Act.
For community broadcasting, the
applicant must provide minutes of
meeting(s) that resolved on the need
to establish the service, funding
sources, sustainability and weekly
programming (Section 5). Section
10 of the regulations declares that
no individual entity will be issued
more than a frequency per area.
of the Constitution which provides
for the freedom and independence
of print, electronic and all other
media, from state control or interference, except as required by licensing provisions. Specifically, the
Bill responds to Article 34 (5) which
requires legislation establishing “a
Any changes in the ownership sta-
body… independent of control by
tus of the frequency require CCK
government, political interests or
approval. While community stations
commercial
must re-invest in their respective
the interests of all sections of the
domains, all stations must espouse
society; and (setting) media stan-
decorum in content and conduct
dards (compliance with which it)
(Sections 19–29) and facilitate com-
regulate(s) and monitor(s)…”
plaints handling procedures (Section 39).
14
The Bill is derived from Article 34
interests
(reflecting)
Designed to assume CCK’s functions, the ICCK will have a chair and
Arising from perceived shortcom-
six commissioners identified by the
ings of the Kenya Information and
Public Service Commission through
Communications Act – notably with
a competitive process and thereaf-
respect to CCK’s status as an inde-
ter appointed by the President. To
facilitate sub-section 5, the Bill bars
media policy document. However,
all public servants and political of-
the bill has been criticised for pay-
fice holders from the Commission
ing scant attention to the media’s
whose members will be full-time
obligations to the public and an
staff.
outlet’s obligations ahead of licence
As noted above, the Internet and
renewals.
other forms of technology are pro-
For the print media, the Kenya
viding a new and important but hith-
Books and Newspapers Act estab-
erto weakly regulated media plat-
lishes the office of the Registrar of
form. Consequently, the Information
Books and Newspapers, with whom
Communications and Technology
two copies of every publication
[ICT] Bill (2012) is in the pipeline. Its
must be deposited (Sections 3 and
main objectives include empower-
7). Printers and publishers must in
ing the CCK and harmonising all ICT
the first instance deposit a Kenya
legislation.
Shillings 1 million bond backed by
With respect to broadcasting, it addresses local content and media
diversity, which the current legislation ignores despite its being in the
sureties – validated through registration with the Registrar of Documents – against which any subsequent liabilities would be defrayed.
Notes
15
Notes
16
A Review of the
Kenyan Media
in Practice
5
Only a keen look at the historical
liest publication was the Christian
perspective will help us to clearly
Missionary Society’s quarterly, Ta-
understand the character of con-
veta Chronicle launched in 1895,
temporary media ownership in
followed by the Church of Scot-
Kenya. It is likely that the most
land mission’s Kikuyu News and
apparent insight from this review
the Catholic Church’s Wathiomo
will be the extent to which the
Mukinyu and Rafiki Yetu. On the
Kenyan media has always been
secular front, the pioneering pub-
politicised, both during colonial-
lication was The East Africa and
ism and into independence. That
Uganda Mail (1899-1904). In 1901,
background offers an insight into
Alibhai Jevanjee launched the East
the dialectics governing the con-
African Standard in Mombasa, but
temporary Kenyan media indus-
this was eventually bought out by
try.
colonial interests in 1905, moving
it to Nairobi in 1910 to continue to
5.1 A History of the
media in Kenya
represent the mainstream European
The origins of the modern media in
In the intervening years to the 1952
Kenya was extensively racialised
declaration of the state of emer-
with missionaries evangelising ‘na-
gency, the Asian community was in-
tives’, Europeans championing their
volved in the media industry for their
settler and investor interests, and
own consumption. Fledgling African
Asians and Africans championing
nationalists were also busy publish-
justice for themselves (MCK, forth-
ing, some with the help of Asian
coming; Ngugi, 2012; Nyamora,
entrepreneurs, such as Achariar
2007).7 Of the print media, the ear-
printing Jomo Kenyatta’s Muigwith-
7
viewpoint (Nyamora, 2007).
‘Modern media’ acknowledges the existence of a pre-colonial traditional media.
17
ania (launched 1928) and the Vidy-
the eve of independence, various
arthis publishing the Kenya African
papers
Union’s Sauti ya Mwafrika (1945).
the Aga Khan’s 1960 launch of the
Among the other earlier publications
Nation to counter the anti-African
were Harry Thuku’s Tangazo (1921)
stance of the Standard.
and H.M. Owiti’s Luo Magazine
(1937) Into the post world War II period, Oginga Odinga’s press printed
Ramogi and Nyaza Times, and other African publications like Agikuyu
Mwiathia, Mulinavosi, Mumenyereri
and Paul Ngei’s Uhuru wa Mwafrika.
culminating
in
At independence, the mainstream
press was foreign owned, a convenient reality for Kenyatta’s leadership style, which quickly turned
against the nationalist aspirations of
the independence struggle (Odinga,
1965). The 1968 legislation of the
Nyamora (2007) reports the exis-
Official Secrets Act was a clear in-
tence of 17 independent papers by
dication of the direction the govern-
1946, which prompted the settler
ment was taking over information
driven Standard to sponsor local
and media freedoms. Additionally,
language publications. New sedi-
Nation soon became an arena of
tion and libel laws enacted in 1950
editorial struggles with its owner-
raised the costs of publishing, giv-
ship keen on toning down criticisms
ing rise to an alternative media. At
of the government, resulting for ex-
the 1952 declaration of emergency,
ample, in the departures of editors
all African papers were banned, the
John Abuoga, Hillary Ng’weno and
colonial government filing the re-
George Githii (Nyamora, 2007: 62-
sulting gap by sponsoring several
7). With political detention without
local language publications begin-
trial in the statutes alongside the
ning 1954, while employing the re-
Official Secrets Act, it became very
strictive Books and Newspapers
easy for the increasingly repres-
Act to maintain control of the sector
sive Kenyatta government to con-
(Oriare and Mshindi, 2008).
tain dissent that would have come
However, Nyamora (2007: 53-4)
18
emerged
through the media.
reports that editors cleverly kept
By 1967, the British multi-national,
issues of nationalism alive by cov-
LONRHO had bought out The Stan-
ering related developments in other
dard, joining the Aga Khan in the
countries, like South Africa. Into
market stranglehold of foreign own-
ers even as enduring publications
launched in 1984 while Pius Nyamo-
like the National Christian Council
ra’s Society (1988) would have the
of Kenya’s (NCCK) Target/Lengo
distinction of pioneering cartooning
chugged away quietly in the back-
the President, no mean feat during
ground, edited at some point by
a period that saw the emergence of
the indomitable Bishop John Henry
‘subversive’ publications like Mwak-
Okullu who would in 1974 author
enya and Pambana whose posses-
the controversial Church and Poli-
sion consigned many individuals
tics in East Africa. The 1970s and
into prison or preventive detention.
1980s saw the emergence of various other mainstream publications,
notably
Ng’weno’s
The
Weekly
Review (1975) and his daily Nairobi Times – which the sole political
party KANU acquired and renamed
Kenya Times, both initially edited by
veteran journalist Philip Ochieng’.
Into the late 1980s, NCCK’S Target/
Lengo would courageously publish
Odinga’s series of ‘open letters’ to
President Moi on the state of democracy. These initiatives heightened the government’s displeasure
with the media, causing the banning
of some 20 publications in the two
After the 1982 coup attempt, the-
years to 1990. A notable publication
then President Moi’s government
launched in 1992 was ex-detainee
had become additionally repressive,
Kenneth Matiba’s weekly newspa-
transforming Kenya into a consti-
per, The People edited by Bedan
tutional single-party state. With the
Mbugua, which took criticism of
mainstream press largely intimi-
the government to unprecedented
dated into towing the government
heights. Matiba also authored the
line, the gap in critical journalism
autobiographical Kenya Return to
was gradually taken up by various
Reason which was banned a year
publications of varied levels of se-
later in 1994. These struggles saw
riousness that have generally been
many Kenyans tortured, maimed,
dubbed
imprisoned, detained without trial
the
‘alternative
media’
(Nyamora, 2007).
and even killed.
These publications included the
Regarding electronic media, the
courageous Gitobu Imanyara’s Nai-
colonial government launched the
robi Law Monthly launched in 1982.
East African Broadcasting Corpora-
Njehu
tion (1927), later English Broadcast-
Gatabaki’s
Finance
was
19
ing Corporation (1928), targeting
tions were however, short-lived. In
news to European settlers (Oriare
turn, Mangelete applied in 1997,
and Mshindi, 2008). The first official
but had to wait for its licence until
broadcast focus on Africans came
2002. In the meantime, however, in
through the 1939 launch of the Afri-
the mid-1980s the first private TV
can Language Broadcasting Servic-
station, STV, reprotedly owned by
es using eight local languages. The
Ng’weno, was licensed. Ng’weno
seven-language African Broadcast-
had sold Nairobi Times to KANU
ing Service was launched in 1953,
party – opening the door to pri-
clearly designed to counter the Mau
vately-owned TV stations, such as
Mau uprising.
Kenya Television Network (KTN).
This expanded through the 1959
launch of the Kenya Broadcasting
Services. Given the financial and
formed into a state corporation, the
station reverting to the KBC name.
technological needs of this sub-sec-
This highly restricted radio and TV
tor, it did not generate the private
environment remained as such un-
interests seen in the print media.
til 2000, despite various attempts
Into the 1950s, however, the Afri-
by entrepreneurs to register pri-
can Inland Church’s Bibilia Husema
vate radio stations. Notable among
Studios had launched Radio Kijabe,
these attempts were the repeated
which remained for many years the
applications by the Nation Media
sole privately owned station in the
Group (NMG) and those of Royal
country.
Media Services (RMS) proprietor
On the eve of independence, the
20
In this period, the VOK was trans-
S.K. Macharia.8
colonial radio station was renamed
Githii has remarked on the tolerance
Kenya Broadcasting Corporation
of Kenyatta towards the media, with
(KBC), a further change in 1964
the former president in one instance
creating the Voice of Kenya (VOK),
asking merely that government po-
a couple of years after the launch
sition on political detentions without
of its TV service. Oriare et al (2010:
trial be also explained.9 Successor
6) report a Homa Bay 1982 initia-
president Moi was however less
tive to be the first licensed com-
tolerant even as vice-president, a
munity radio station whose opera-
factor that probably led to KANUs’
8
9
Macharia’s run ins with the government also extended to long-running litigation over his paper mill investment in Webuye.
See Press Reference: Kenya. Available at http://www.pressreference.com/Gu-Ku/Kenya.html Accessed 4/11/2012.
desire to own its own media outlet,
won US$375,000 in damages from
Kenya Times.
the authors of a book linking him
While Kenyatta’s aura generated
media self-restraint, media repression during the Moi era has been
well documented.
to the murder of the late foreign affairs minister Robert Ouko, with the
store selling the book ordered to
pay US$ 125,000 (Ochieng’, 2011).
Biwott was in 2002 awarded a fur-
The list of the victims during 1994-
ther USS$ 250,000 for a 1999 story
95 included Alex Chege, Julius Mo-
in Matiba’s People Daily that had
kaya, Mutegi Njau, Joseph Ngugi
linked the former to a hydro-electric
and David Makali (Article XIX, 1995).
power station scam.
Ever the reluctant reformer, the government instituted several inquiries
into media reforms through the
1990s;10 yet, it was not until ‘people power’ succeeded in instituting
the 1997 Inter-Parliamentary Party
Group (IPPG) reforms that hope for
substantive change arose. IPPG did
away with various constitutional and
legal constraints to the freedoms of
conscience, assembly and participation, amongst other areas.
In the late 1990s the national telecommunications
parastatal
was
split into the distinct functions of
the CCK, Telkom Kenya Ltd and the
Postal Corporation of Kenya. With
CCK as a mere regulator of broadcasting, the pressure grew for the
licensing of private stations, made
possible by the addition of frequencies in the mid 2000s. After Mwai
Kibaki’s 2002 victory, economic recovery soon brought benefits to the
While Moi won the 1997 presidential
information and communications
elections, IPPG had unshackled his
sector. Kibaki’s post-2003 eco-
monopoly of political power in irre-
nomic revival strategy opened up
versible ways. The IPPG did away
opportunities for SK Macharia and
with sedition in the statutes, which
others (see Box 5.1). It is the intense
Moi had employed to deter critical
mistrust of (the Moi) government in
journalism; but the system fought
the management of the media sec-
media freedoms through libel and
tor that led to a weakly regulated
slander suits. In 2000 for example,
liberalisation context within which
cabinet minister Nicholas Biwott
RMS ended up capturing an exten-
10
Successive orchestrated task forces came up with proposals that did not substantially reform the media
environment, and were appropriately rebuffed. For details, see Oriare and Mshindi (2008)
21
sive share of sector resources.11
Thus there is evidence that leading
politicians position themselves for a
substantive slice of the media industry through direct ownership of print
media, the Kenya Information and
Communications Act establishes
the CCK, which is answerable to the
Minister for Information and Communications.
and electronic outlets. There is fur-
The potential damage to national
ther evidence that some, who might
security, which in theory can occur
not have the same financial clout,
through brief and illegal access to
are also purchasing media content
the airwaves, inspires the govern-
through surreptitious means, such
ment to ensure stringent monitoring.
as engaging media practitioners at
The same vigilance is not applied to
various levels as gate-keepers for
the print media, which gives rise to
private interests (Namwaya, 2010).
an informal sub-sector. The pre-
Given the fickle nature of Kenya
conditions imposed on printers and
politics in which upwards of 50% of
publishers by the Books and News-
parliamentarians lose their seats at
papers Act are quite demanding for
succeeding general elections, this
a country with nearly 50% of the
ad hoc approach may be seen to
population living in poverty. This re-
be more cost-effective than the out-
sults in non-compliance by many of
right ownership of a media outlet.
the sectors’ operators, even though
the exact extent is not known, as
5.2 Structure of the
Kenyan Media
acknowledged by a March 2010 Ke-
As noted above, conduct for the en-
Before considering the context of
tire formal Kenyan media industry is
the various individual media catego-
governed by the Media Act (2007),
ries, it is useful to have a picture of
which creates the MCK. The Kenyan
their comparative influence. Radio
print media is specifically governed
penetration is greatest at about 90%
by the Books and Newspapers Act
according to Steadman statistics for
which establishes the office of the
2008 cited by Oriare et al (2010).13
The added significance of radio is
in the State Law Office/Attorney
that one set can serve a multiple
General’s office. For the electronic
ears – as happens in a matatu or in
Contemporaneous operations of the Kenyan media are discussed in Section 6.
See Q. 45 at www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/copyright/en/registration/replies/doc/kenya.doc+keny
a+compliance+books+and+newspapers+act&hl=sw&gl=ke&pid=bl&srcid=ADGEESgjox6q2TppwK
FyXMcgCRN-M4010GSAzmHIx8opzl1bBS98jiPfklcRQ-KR3zE_pKWguQvngbgFnprvpPbMYTpUOmh8_
KcCarNAA5xT85SH3k3JnsBuhn545btpnux7zyLwrlGZ&sig=AHIEtbR1sLnhVNj0eY8U7urZMhYqOwSp5Q Accessed 7/09/2012
11
22
nya Copyright Board document.12
12
Box 5.1: S. K. Macharia: Kenya’s media mogul14
Viewed from the perspective of audience size, S.K. Macharia’s Royal Media Services (RMS) is arguably the leading media house in the Eastern Africa region; yet,
it was not always like that! Born into abject poverty, Macharia aspired beyond
his Primary-3 teaching certificate to eventually win a ‘Mboya Airlift’ scholarship
to the US. Despite the backdrop of the 1960s civil rights movement, Macharia
was apparently greatly impressed by the host country’s ‘uplifting of justice and
human rights’. Returning to Kenya in 1968, civil servant Macharia developed
into an astute businessman trying his hand at many ventures. A 1970s visit to an
Italian paper recycling plant inspired his investment in the ill-fated Madhupaper
Kenya. At Kenya’s 1992 return to multi-party democracy, Macharia appreciated the might of the media: his preferred presidential candidate Oginga Odinga
lost badly. Electronic media monopolist KBC refused with impunity to carry the
Odinga campaign adverts which Macharia had personally paid for.
Even as KBC refused to refund his advertising fees, Macharia resolved to launch
his own media outfit. The Information ministry initially denied him a licence;
but years of litigation finally secured one in 1998, only for his operations to be
interrupted in 2000, and again in 2001 when the paramilitary police vandalised
his country-wide network. Re-launched ahead of the 2002 general elections,
and with Macharia in tussles with Moi on multiple fronts, RMS became the
opposition National Alliance Rainbow Coalition (NARC) and Kibaki’s mouthpiece, implicitly countering KANU’s monopoly of KBC. Against the backdrop
of the euphoric democratisation and attendant liberalisation policies of a NARC
government that ‘owed him’, Macharia acquired numerous electronic media
frequencies. He used these to thank Kibaki through blanket support during the
2005 referendum on the proposed constitution whose failure ended the NARC
honeymoon. RMS’ support for Kibaki would be even more explicit into the
fateful 2007 elections with Inooro FM being amongst the stations adjudged to
have instigated the post-election violence.
The 2002 media liberalisation occurred in the absence of a substantive regulatory
framework, which individuals like Macharia exploited. While independence
had been legislated for the Communications Commission of Kenya [CCK],
provisions, such as the ministerial appointment of its management, undermined
such autonomy. Politically-connected individuals like Macharia could violate
the pertinent legislation with impunity. When CCK tried to enforce licensing,
Macharia teamed up with the Nation Media Group to block CCK through
protracted judicial processes. Thus RMS has operated unlicensed for years.
However, Macharia has also fallen foul of the courts that have previously
protected him, and recently faced a bankruptcy judgement over a Kshs 35
million award against him and his wife in 2001. Should Macharia lose the various
cases against government agencies, he will experience extensive financial
stress. That possibility is likely to determine Macharia’s choice of candidate for
the upcoming presidential elections.
13
Data from 2008 is admittedly old. While AudienceScapes provides 2009 data, its analysis covers only the top media
outlets. See http://audiencescapes.org/country-profiles/kenya/media-and-communication-overview/radio/radio-323
Accessed 6/11/2012.
14
Much of the foregoing information is from a 19/10/2012 speech by Macharia to Kenyatta University Students on
Business Perspective. Available at http://www.ku.ac.ke/images/stories/featured/chairman_rms_ku_speech.pdf Accessed
24/10/2012.
23
the village. While TV is a very attrac-
that if you have [media ownership]
tive medium, it only reaches 39%
then you will spend less and influ-
of the population. The newspapers’
ence more (voters) (Abdi and Deane,
limited coverage – 23% - reflects
2010: 5).”
both literacy and cost constraints.
Thus, entrepreneur and politicians
would be most likely to target radio
5.2.1 Radio
for its cost effectiveness and wide
As at October 2012, CCK has is-
reach. The significance of these
sued nearly 365 radio frequencies
realities is heightened by the trust
listed by location of transmitter,
Kenyans have in the media – for
about 300 of which are operational,
“gospel truth”, with 81% believing
reported ‘on air’.15 KBC accounts
it to report accurately on the gov-
for 85 (22%) of the frequencies,
ernment (Oriare et al, 2010: 60). It is
but 64% of these are ‘not on air’.
thus easy to agree with the obser-
RMS has 63 frequencies – 16% of
vation that: “politicians have found
the total, with only 3 ‘not on air’.15
Figure 5.1: Regional Distribution of Radio Frequencies -
Source: CCK database
24
15
The National Assembly presently broadcasts live parliamentary debates on 92.80 MHz, a KBC frequency..
Table 5.1: Distribution of Radio Stations by Language of Broadcast 16
Broadcast Language/Dialect
FM Stations
DhoLuo
Mayienga (N); Nam Lowle; Radio Lake Victoria
(Osienala); Ramogi FM
DhoLuo/Kiswahili
Radio Maendeleo; Sahara;
Embu
Wimwaro;
English
Capital; One; Classic; Easy; Family; Hot; Hope;
KBC English Service (N); Kiss 100; Venus; X;
English/French
Radio France International ;
English/Hindi
East; Sound Asia Radio;
English/Sheng
Homeboyz;
Giriama/Miji Kenda/Kiswahili
Bahari; Pwani (N); Kaya;
Kalenjin
Chamgei; Kass; Kitwek (N);
Kamba
Athiani; Musyi; Radio Mangelete; Mbaitu;
Syokimau
Kikuyu
Coro; Countryside; Inooro; Kameme;
Kisii
Minto; Egesa;
Kiswahili
Baraka FM; Biblia Husema Broadcasting; Pamoja
FM; Citizen Radio; Pilipili; Radio Jambo; Radio
Amani; QFM; Radio Maisha; Radio Rahma; Radio
Salaam; Radio Taifa (N); Radio Salaam; Sauti ya
Mwananchi; Sheki FM; Sifa; Sifa Mataa; Milele
FM;
Kiswahili/English
BBC; East Africa Radio; Equator; Heroes; Radio
Umoja; Sayare FM; Voice of America; Waumini
Radio;
Luhya
KBC Western (N); Mulembe; West;
Luhya/Kiswahili
Radio Mambo;
Maasai
Nosim;
Meru
Mugwambo Ivetu; Mwariama; Muuga FM;
Sheng
Ghetto Radio; Koch FM;
Somali
Frontier; Garissa; KBC Eastern;
Somali/Kiswahili
Iqra; Star FM;
Taita
Anguo FM;
Turkana
Akicha.
Source: MCK (forthcoming) citing Reelforge Media; and own compilations
The list of FM stations might either be incomplete or include duplications due to variations in the spellings of the
names of various stations. For example, some documents refer to Çhamge FM which might be a misspelling of RMS’
Chamgei FM, Also consider Sheky FM and Sheki FM.
16
25
The National Assembly has 21 frequencies none of which is ‘on air’.
The other 3 frequencies ‘not on air’
belong to Elgonet Telecommunications Technologies.17 Nation Media
Group and Kalee Ltd have 6 frequencies each. Regionally, Rift Valley province leads with about over
88 frequencies, followed by Coast
province with 82 frequencies; but
Nairobi with 46 frequencies has the
highest density of radio frequencies,
the regional percentage shares be-
ing illustrated in Figure 5.1.
Since the liberalisation of the airwaves, a notable trend has been the
growth not just in FM stations, but
also in local language – so-called
‘vernacular’ – FM stations [LLS]. In
2000, Kameme FM became the first
LLS, whose operation was however
suspended the following year. A
new round of local language stations emerged starting 2004, their
distribution covering all of the major
ethnic languages across the coun-
Box 5.2: Community Radio Stations
Kenya Institute of Mass Communication – Nairobi
Koch FM – Korogocho, Nairobi
Maseno University – Maseno
Masinde Muliro University – Kakamega
Pamoja – Kibera, Nairobi
Radio Maria Kenya – Muranga
Ghetto FM – Kawangware, Nairobi
Sidarec – Pumwani, Nairobi
Light FM – St. Paul’s Theological University – Limuru, Nairobi
Others which are members of the the Community Radio Association of Kenya
include:
Bulala FM, Budalang’i, Busia
Serian FM, Maralal, Samburu
Ol toilo le Maa, Suswa, Narok
Mugambo Jwetu FM, Tigania West, Meru
Mang’elete FM, Kibwezi, Makueni
Kangema FM, Kangema, Murang’a
Wajir FM, Wajir.
26
17
For some ownership details, see section 6.2.
try. As Table 5.1 shows, there is at
was listened to by about 50% of
least one local language radio sta-
the respondents. RMS’ six local lan-
tion for each of Kenya’s most popu-
guage stations – Mulembe, Inooro,
lous ethnic groups, Kikuyu, Luhya,
Ramogi, Musyi, Chamgei and Egesa
Kalenjin, Luo Kamba, Kisii and
– are also competitive against other
Meru, who constitute about 70% of
stations broadcasting in the same
the national population. Kiswahili,
languages. For example, its Kikuyu-
the national language and one of
language station Inooro FM out-
the official languages, has the larg-
performs the much older Kameme
est number of stations, followed by
FM, even if Kass FM outdoes its
English, the other official language.
Chamgei FM.
There are various other radio sta-
While these performance data put
tions whose primary language of
various stations in the shadows, it is
broadcast was not established, but
critical from a political influence per-
it is likely that they use either Kiswa-
spective that the stations which are
hili or English or both languages.
small on the nation-wide radar are
These
Fam-
not ignored, because they can be
ily; Fish; Hero; Imani; Injili; Jesus is
include:
Bahasha;
very significant in influencing people
Lord; Mambo; Pambo; Radio 316;
at the grassroots level where politi-
Relax; Shine FM; Umoja; Uptown;
cal turmoil is fomented.
Voice of Africa; Radio Waumini; and
YFM. Additionally, Box 5.2 lists the
5.2.2 Television
registered community radio stations
For television, the CCK has issued
which are non-commercial by stat-
108 frequencies across the country.
ute, and invariably broadcast in the
Regionally, the expansive Rift Valley
local language even if they may have
has the largest number of frequen-
a little Kiswahili programming.
cies, 28. Nairobi and Coast prov-
Table 5.2 illustrates the dominance
of RMS-operated radio stations,
based on a survey of listeners
above 15 years of age conducted
by Ipsos Synovate during the first
inces have 18 each. While North
Eastern province is also expansive,
socio-economic factors mean the
region has only two frequencies.
Central province has 9.
quarter of 2012. RMS’s Radio Citi-
As with radio frequencies, KBC
zen which broadcasts nationally
dominates the TV frequencies with
27
Table 5.2: Top 50 Radio Reach (% shares)
Radio Station
28
Market
(%)
Radio Station
Market
(%)
Citizen (RMS)
49.78
Mbaitu FM (Eastern
Broadcasting Corp)
3.23
KBC (state owned)
25.04
Nam Lolwe FM (Neural
Digital)
3.22
Milele (Digitopia)
24.86
Muuga FM (RMS)
3.13
Q FM (NMG)
16.68
Lake Victoria FM (OSIENALA)
2.90
Jambo FM (Africa Ltd)
16.41
Radio Star (North Eastern
Media & Telcomms)
2.86
Inooro FM (RMS)
15.42
Bahari FM (RMS)
2.77
Kiss FM (Radio Africa)
15.19
Kaya FM (Southern Hills
Development Agency)
2.64
Kameme FM (Media Max)
12.34
Kisima FM
2.52
Ghetto Radio (SIDAREC
Pwani)
12.00
Risala FM
2.45
Coro FM (KBC)
10.17
Capital FM (Capital Group
Ltd)
2.40
Ramogi FM (RMS)
9.98
Radio One FM (GO
Communications)
2.40
Classic FM (Radio Africa)
9.47
Syokimau FM (Eastern
Broadcasting Corp)
2.35
West FM (KBC)
8.85
Injili FM (Africa Gospel
Church)
2.26
Musyi FM (RMS)
7.21
Minto FM (KBC)
2.19
Kass FM (Kalee Ltd)
6.42
Pwani FM (KBC)
2.18
Easy FM (NMG)
5.91
Baraka FM (FEBA Radio)
2.15
Chamgei FM (RMS)
5.89
Wimwaro FM (RMS)
2.14
KBC English (KBC)
5.14
Metro FM (KBC)
2.05
BBC (Foreign)
5.10
Imani FM (International
Christian Ministries)
2.02
Radio Maisha (SG)
4.85
Kitwek FM (KBC)
1.82
Sayare FM (Sauti ya
Rehema)
4.35
Sauti ya Mwananchi FM
(Sauti ya Mwananchi FM&TV)
1.73
Egesa FM (RMS)
4.08
Hope FM (NPC)
1.55
Mulembe FM (RMS)
4.05
Sahara FM (Ke-Wi Media)
1.50
KBC North Eastern (KBC)
3.40
Jesus is Lord (International
Children’s Mission)
1.40
Bibilia Husema (AIC, Kijabe)
3.38
Mambo FM (SG)
1.40
Source: Ipsos Synnovate (2012)
Table 5.3: Regional Distribution of TV Frequencies
Region
Central – 7
Coast – 12
Eastern – 9
Nairobi – 17
North Eastern
–2
Nyanza – 11
Frequency of Stations
Nyahururu - 1
Nyeri - 6
Lamu - 1
Malindi - 1
Mombasa - 10
Kitui - 1
Machakos - 2
Makueni - 1
Nyambene - 5
Nairobi - 17
Garissa - 2
Kisii - 5
Kisumu - 5
Migori - 1
Rift Valley – 17 Eldoret - 8
Kapenguria - 1
Lokichogio - 1
Nakuru - 7
Rongai - 2
Timboroa - 3
Western – 3
Webuye - 3
45 (41.7%); but it also owns all the
25 frequencies which are ‘Not on
Air’. Among the private investors,
RMS has 11 frequencies; KTN has
9, with 7 for NMG. KBC’s monopoly of frequencies – more than half
of which are not on air, means that
the vast northern Kenya has no
terrestrial TV broadcasts, viewers
having to acquire satellite dishes.
The regional distribution of TV frequencies is summarised in Table
5.3 and Figure 5.2. Nairobi’s extensive endowment – both in numbers of frequencies and their power likely explains the low subscription for Central which neighbours
Nairobi. The expansive Rift Valley
has the largest number of stations.
Source: CCK database
Figure 5.2: Regional Distribution of TV Frequencies
- Source: CCK database
29
Figure 5.3: Share of TV Viewing Across Stations – 2011 and 2012
North Eastern province is also ex-
whose peoples are therefore denied
pansive, but is inhabited by nomad-
participation in national debates.
ic pastoralist communities. Located
at the southern-most tip of the province, Garissa signals cannot reach
the population concentrations of
Wajir (450km) and Mandera (750km)
CCK data shows a total of 22 TV
stations on air. RMS’ dominance
of the radio sub-sector is also extended to TV viewing as illustrated
in Figure 5.3.
Figure 5.4: Daily Newspaper Readership – Past 7 Days Trend
30
5.2.3 Print
shows that NMG’s flagship product,
As will be illustrated below, there is
the Daily Nation, accounts for a dai-
extensive cross-media ownership in
ly newspaper market presence that
Kenya; yet RMS has not had a sig-
is double that of its nearest rival,
nificant impact in the print media, its
the Standard Group’s [SG] Stan-
fledgling initiative, The Leader, col-
dard, their respective circulations
lapsing several years ago.18 While
being 205,000 and 75,000 for 2009.
the Aga Khan’s Daily Nation made a
NMG’s dominance is underscored
comparatively late (1960) entry into
when its Kiswahili publication, Taifa
the print media (see Section 5.1), it
Leo, and its Business Daily are also
soon became and remains domi-
considered. NMG also has the very
nant in the sub-sector. Figure 5.4
influential weekly – Sunday Nation
Box 5.3: Print Media in Kenya
Dailies
Business Daily; Daily Nation; People Daily; Taifa Leo; The Standard; The Star
Weeklies
Coast Week; Financial Post; Inside Kenya Today; Newsweek; Standard on
Sunday; Sunday Nation; The County Weekly (Nation); The County Weekly
(Standard); The East African; The Economist; The Sunday Express; The Weekly
Citizen; Time.
Monthlies
African Business; African Woman; Business Journal Africa; Business Monthly
EA; Business Woman; CEO Africa; CIO East Africa; Drum; HFM; Kenyan
Kitchen; Management; Nairobi Law Monthly; New African; Parents; Passion;
Prime Parenting; Small and Medium Enterprise; Sports Monthly; The Diplomat;
The Insyder; True Love.
Bi-monthlies
BBC Focus on Africa; Biashara Leo; Business Africa; Business Post; Go Places;
Safari Digest; Sokoni.
Quarterlies
Chobo; Doctor News; G; Her; HM; Host Africa
While there is a prevalent opinion that The Leader self-destructed through an excessive pro-Kibaki bias, an RMS
executive notes that its withdrawal from circulation was a conscious decision to focus the media group exclusively on
the electronic media sub-sector.
18
31
– which outstrips its most immedi-
cho); Sauti ya Gusii (Kisii); Nuru
ate competitor, Sunday Standard.
(Isiolo); Nyota ya Magharibi (Vihiga);
Launched in 2009, The Star is a
Sauti ya Pwani (Mombasa); Maarifa
new entrant to the sub-sector and
(Murang’a); and Habari (Garissa)
performs well for its age, while The
People is undergoing restoration, its
Media Max owners having bought it
from retired politician Kenneth Matiba’s Kalamka Ltd in 2009. The survey report’s focus on mainstream
newspapers means it has omitted
the alternative media where the
controversial Citizen Weekly reportedly sells close to 30,000 copies because of its salacious reports. Box
5.3 provides a summary of publica-
also invested in various grassroots
publications with varied sustainability, according to KCA information.19 In Nairobi, there is The Truth
and Education News. The Kajiado/
Narok region has Kajiado County
News and Narok County News.
Migori has The Link. Kericho has
South Rift Times; and Kisumu the
Nyanza Weekly.
tions categories and the various pa-
Towards the north-west, Bungoma
pers in each category.
produces Horizon Weekly and Com-
Besides the mainstream commercial publications listed above, the
Directorate of Information also has
some regional community papers,
which are a carry-over from the
early 1990s initiatives of UNESCO
to encourage grassroots journalism.
32
Finally, local entrepreneurs have
munity Eye, and the Eldoret/Kitale
area has Trans Nzoia Magazine,
Trans Nzoia Times and Weekly Mirror. Central Province has four publications, including Slopes Weekly,
County Leader, Highlands Tribune
and Business Express. While Machakos has The Anchor, Meru has
The following are among the cur-
three publications, including Imenti
rent titles, based on the informa-
News, Wembe and County Focus.
tion department’s database: The
Finally, Mombasa has the long-run-
Sun (Kabarnet); The Eye/Mwangaza
ning, tourism-focused Coast Week
(Siaya); The Eastern Star (Macha-
and Pambazuko which discusses
kos); Ngao (Nakuru); Sauti (Keri-
coastal issues.
19
The ownership of some of these publications is discussed in Section 6.2.
5.2.4 Mobile Telephony
and the Internet
Additionally, there has been rapid
While
have
ers (ISP). By 2012, the ISP num-
been important in Kenya over the
bers stood at about 50, the main
years, the outreach was severely
ones being Safaricom, Kenya Data
constrained by inefficiency at the
Networks, Airtel, Orange, Zuku and
monopoly provider, Kenya Posts
Access Kenya.21 CCK data show
and Telecommunications Corpora-
that the number of subscribers rose
tion, later transformed into Telkom
from 1.8 million in 2008/09 to 4.3
Kenya Ltd. While Telkom launched
million by 2010/11. By June 2012,
the pioneering mobile telephone
there were 14 million users.
telephone
services
service around 1997, the high access costs constrained use to the
upper income brackets of society
until the entry of a second provider
in 2000. This liberalisation generated competition that reduced costs.
The mobile phone provides a new
growth in Internet service provid-
An important outgrowth of the Internet is the emergence of blogging by
Kenyans at home and abroad. Practitioners recently formed the Bloggers Association of Kenya (BAKE)
in 2012.
important means of communica-
An initiative to enhance profession-
tion in Kenya, through the voice
alism among bloggers, the associa-
message and the short-message
tion held its inaugural BAKE Blog
service (SMS) or text message. By
Awards 2012 in May during which
2012, there were 25.3 million sub-
14 categories of practitioners were
scribers, according to CCK data, up
recognised, and a BAKE Technical
from 9.3 million in 2006/07.20 CCK
and Online Freedom Workshop in
reports that the SMS load grew from
August, which noted the weak un-
316 million in 2006/07 to 2.6 billion
derstanding of blogging regulations.
in 2010/11. Safaricom accounts
Kenyans in the Diaspora are also
for a dominant 64% of the market
very active on the Internet, politics
share, with Airtel, Orange and Essar
being a major area of often vitriolic
accounting respectively for 16.5%,
interaction, as evidenced by Wa-
10.5% and 9%.
Mungai (2010).
20
See Communications Commission of Kenya Annual Report Financial Year 2010/11. Available at http://www.cck.go.ke/
resc/publications/annual_reports/CCK_Annual_Report_2011.pdf Accessed 5/11/2012
21
For lists of ISPs, go to http://softkenya.com/technology/internet-service-providers-isp-in-kenya/ and http://www.mbendi.
com/indy/cotl/isrv/af/ke/p0005.htm
33
Conflict Sensitive Reporting Curriculum | A facilitator’s guide
5.2.5 Media Training
Institutions in Kenya
Other universities include Kenyatta
With respect to media training,
sity of Agriculture and Technology,
Wanyande’s (1995: 65) decades old
Moi University, Egerton University,
lament remains pertinent, that:
Maseno University, Masinde Mu-
“…it appears that anybody can consider
himself or herself a journalist simply on
account of having written an article for a
newspaper or having read news on radio
University, Jomo Kenyatta Univer-
liro University, St. Paul’s University,
Catholic University of East Africa,
and United States International University, among others.
Nairobi’s School of Journalism and
or television.”
The number of institutions offering
media studies have grown extensively in recent times, reflecting the
weak regulation of the media environment despite the arrival of the
legislative and institutional frameworks provided by the Media Act
Mass Communication and Daystar
University have started doctoral degree programmes. Several institutions around the country also offer
diploma and certificate level programmes in journalism and media
studies.
(2007). Thus, besides the full desities, a raft of other qualifications
5.2.6 Media Management
Institutions in Kenya
is offered by institutions of varied
The
quality. Yet, as lamented by Wan-
ment institutions in Kenya include
yande, very many prominent mem-
the MCK and its Complaints Com-
bers of the media sector practice
mission, the CCK, the Registrar of
without any of these paper qualifi-
Books and Newspapers, and the
cations.
Kenya Union of Journalists. Howev-
grees offered by about six univer-
Among
the
universities
offering
graduate qualifications are the two
UNESCO Centres of Excellence,
the University of Nairobi’s School
of Journalism and Mass Communications and Daystar University.
34
legislated
media
manage-
er, there are a number of other formal and non-formal, unlegislated institutions which contribute to varied
degrees to the professional conduct
of media work.22 In the recent context, the Media Owners Association
(MOA) stands out among the non-
22
Among these are: Kenya Editors Guild; Association of Media Women in Kenya; Kenya Journalists Association; Kenya
Parliamentary Journalists’ Association; Foreign Correspondents Association of East Africa; Kenya Business Writers’
Association; Kenya Correspondents Association; Science Reporters’ Association; Kenya Sports Writers Association;
Environmental Journalists Association; Kenya Association of Designers and Illustrators; and the Association of Women
Conflict Sensitive Reporting Curriculum | A facilitator’s guide
government institutions because of
open to all media owners, its mem-
its capacity to exert political pres-
bership seems concentrated among
sure on the government, reflected
the big media players; NMG, SG,
in the manner it took responsibility
RMS, Radio Africa Group, Family Me-
for the fledgling MCK, and gener-
dia, Media Max, Kass FM, Hope FM
ally sets the media freedom agenda,
and Star FM (Oriare et al, 2010: 36-7).
amongst other initiatives.
Its membership stands at about 92,
MOA’s significance is probably best
including 17 newspapers, 30 radio
illustrated by the Media Act’s reser-
stations, 10 TV stations, 8 news
vation of 3 MCK seats for it, the sin-
agencies, 15 training institutions
gle largest bloc on the 13-member
and 12 media related professional
Council. While MOA is in principle
bodies.23
Notes
Journalists. Others include: Kenya Journalists Association; Senior Women Editors Group; Kenya Community Media
Network; Alternative Media Network; Mohamed Amin Foundation; and Media Educators and Trainers Association. Others
stiil are: Kenya Journalists Association; Senior Women Editors Group; Kenya Community Media Network; Alternative
Media Network; Mohamed Amin Foundation; and Media Educators and Trainers Association. Prominent non-government
organizations include: the African Woman and Child Feature Service; Kenya Community Media Network; The Media
Institute; EcoNews Africa; Africa Broadcasting Network; FEMNET; Africa Council for Communication Education; Media
Focus Africa; and Media Speak Africa.
23
This information is found at http://www.zebraproductionskenya.com/zebra/aboutus.php Accessed 5/11/2012
35
6
Issues in Ownership
and Content of the
Kenyan Media
This paper set out to examine
Consequent to such ‘covering of
the actual and potential impact
one’s tracks’ – Oriare et al (2010:
of political ownership of the Ke-
43) – this report has not sought the
nyan media on the output of the
investigative journalist’s ‘smoking
industry. The Kenyan literature
gun’. Instead, it has synthesised the
reviewed, the key informant in-
issues gleaned from the interviews
terviews and the field interviews
and other interactions into five areas
revealed extensive connections
which are seen as avenues through
between politicians and media
which political influence can be, and
ownership.
is indeed, brought to bear on me-
While it was – unsurprisingly so –
difficult to interview media owners
on their links with politicians, the
reluctance of employees to talk de-
36
dia content. Attending to identified
gaps reduces the risk of political
manipulation of the media, even if it
is unlikely to be eradicated
spite assurances of anonymity was
Notwithstanding the various media
surprising. The situation is prob-
roles expounded on by Makokha
ably best captured by Radio Africa
(2010) and Stremlau and Price
Group chairman Kiprono Kittony’s
(2009), Wanyande (1995) and MCK
reported observation to former US
(forthcoming) propose two motives
ambassador Michael Rannenberg
for investment in the media: com-
that:
merce and politics. In some instanc-
“the Kenyatta connection (with Media
es, these motives will stand alone:
Max) is ‘factually true but legally untrue’
business – such as stock exchange
because as in many cases in Kenya, Uhuru
investors – will see the media as an
Kenyatta’s name does not appear in any of
avenue to profits; and politicians will
the legal documents of the merger…”
see the sector as an efficient means
24
24
See http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/12/09NAIROBI2656.html, Accessed 3/9/2012.
Table 6.1: Advertising Revenues Shares (%) in the Kenyan Media – 2010 to 2012
2010
Television
2011/
Jan - Apr
2012
2010 (%)
Citizen
38.7
41.0
54.0
46.6
NTV
22.6
24.7
59.0
26.0
KTN
15.6
13.3
23.0
11.7
KBC
11.4
13.7
76.0
9.9
14,153
20,552
45.0
7,666
Kass FM
11.8
11.8
37.0
9.8
Kiss FM
6.2
11.9
161.0
9.5
Totals (Kshs mn)
Radio
2011
Citizen
9.5
7.2
3.0
7.9
West FM
9.1
10.4
56.0
7.8
Inooro FM
6.6
3.2
-33.0
6.3
Ramogi FM
5.2
3.3
-13.0
5.9
19,865
27,130
37.0
8,517
49.9
45.2
48.0
46.0
Standard
24.3
21.5
44.0
23.4
The Star
6.7
5.8
89.0
10.6
Saturday Nation
2.3
4.4
208.0
2.4
Saturday Standard
1.2
1.4
104.0
1.4
Sunday Nation
4.6
5.9
111.0
4.4
1.7
2.3
102.0
1.9
1,194
1,950
63.0
1,210
Totals (Kshs mn)
Print Media Daily Nation
Sunday Standard
Totals (Kshs mn)
Source: MCK (forthcoming) citing Reelforge Media.
of electoral publicity. Yet, the inter-
by politicians to become media
connections between the two mo-
owners. While these two motives
tives is well illustrated by Abdi and
for ownership benefit the politician/
Deane’s (2010: 5) finding that me-
investor, Namwaya (2010) illustrates
dia ownership reduces the extent
across the various mainstream me-
of political spending while increas-
dia houses that the benefits could
ing the extent of political influence.
also be accruing to the media prac-
This finding supports an underlying
titioners through bribes, even if this
concern of this paper with the drive
is in most cases intermittent.
37
A key source of media revenue
formance of smaller FM stations –
is advertising for which Table 6.1
Kass FM and Kiss FM – are quite
provides returns for Kenya’s main
impressive. So, the media provides
electronic and print players. Aggre-
a strong commercial incentive for
gate TV advertising revenue grew
investment therein.
by 45% between 2010 and 2011.
Meanwhile, radio advertising revenue grew by 37%, roughly 35%
more than the TV revenues for both
years. However, the TV and radio
revenues were competitive during
the first quarter of 2012, suggesting
either a swing to TV, or comparatively higher rates, or both. Print media revenue was significantly lower
than those for the other two media,
but the inter-year growth was a high
63%, with the first quarter 2012 performance a great improvement on
the previous two years.
38
6.1 Legal Framework for
Media Practice
On the right of access to justice,
journalist Frank Ojiambo of CCK’s
Broadcast Content Advisory Council deems the MOA injunctions that
have shackled CCK’s oversight of
licensing an unpatriotic use of the
court process. Yet, the history of
mutual suspicions between regulators and operators (Section 5.1)
should be treated differently in this
post constitutional era. Indeed,
this need for wisdom is illustrated
The wide extent of cross media
in both MOA’s acknowledgement
ownership (Section 6.2) means that
of its inability to fund MCK, and its
revenue often accrues to the same
proposal for a government subsidy
individuals or companies. Thus RMS
for that purpose (Oriare et al, 2010:
accounts for an average 40% and
37). This shift to government pro-
18% respectively of TV and radio
visioning previously considered a
advertising income, while NMG’s
hindrance to self-regulation – has
TV and print shares average 24%
prompted a
and 50% respectively. Together,
Act. The stakeholders would have
NMG and SG account for more than
done well to heed Wanyande’s
80% of print revenue, but growth
(1997) caution a decade before the
in The Star’s share is remarkable
passage of the Media Act that rela-
for its publication size. While RMS
tions between government and civil
dominates radio revenue, the per-
society – including the media – need
review of the Media
Box 6.1: Who Owns the Nation Media Group and the Standard Group?
Nairobi Securities Exchange [NSE] data show the ownership structure of the Nation
Media Group [NMG] as at 8th September 2012 to be as follows:
The data shows that aggregate local ownership
(individuals plus companies) is greater than the
Local individuals
30.22
company’s foreign ownership. However, the
dominant NMG share holder is Geneva-based
Local companies
22.89
Aga Khan Foundation for Economic Development
Foreign individuals 0.71
(AKFED) which accounts for 46.66% share.
Among the other investors with more than a 1%
Foreign companies 46.29
shareholding include Amin Nanji Juma (9.98%),
Total
100.00
the National Social Security Fund Board of
Trustees (3.82%), John Kibunga Kimani (1.30%)
and Jubilee Insurance Company (1.15%). The rest of the top 20 shareholders accounts
are held via nominee accounts in banks (Standard Chartered Bank and Kenya
Commercial Bank) and insurance companies (Insurance Company of East Africa;
Phoenix of EA Company; Old Mutual; Kenya Reinsurance Company). These top 20
shareholders account for 65.99% of NMG’s 157,118,572 shares, the company having
another 10,902 shareholders.
Category
Share (%)
At the Standard Group [SG], NSE records of the 31st July 2012 show the ownership is
structured as follows:
Unlike the NMG, the distribution of SG shares
favours foreigners who account for about 70% of
ownership. Interestingly, 90.56% of the company’s
Local individuals 7.11
81,646,978 shares are in the 1,000,001 to
Local companies 23.22
2,000,000,000 share band, while a small 0.34% are
Foreign investors 69.67
in the 1 to 500 band, meaning control of the
company is weighted in favour of large
Total
100.00
shareholders. Globally, the company’s largest
shareholder is S.N.G. Holdings Limited (UK) with 69.11% of the shares. The other two
shareholders with more than a 1% share are both Kenya-based, Trade World Kenya Ltd
(10.91%) and Miller Trustees Ltd (10.54%). Of the global top ten individual shareholders,
Kirtesh Premchand Shah has the highest holding at 0.53%. Shah’s shares amount to
7.41% of local individual shareholding. The third largest local individual shareholder is
Julius Gecau (3.81%), a prominent Jomo Kenyatta-era personality who once chaired the
boards of BAT (K) Ltd and EAPL Co Ltd., amongst other companies The top 10 local
individual shareholders account for 30.30% of all local individual shareholding, among
them being – based on their names – 5 Asians, 4 Africans and a single European.
Category
Share (%)
Among the top 10 local institutional SG investors, the prominent holders are Trade
World Kenya Ltd (TWKL) (46.97%) and Miller Trustees Ltd (MTL) (44.40%). These rates
translate to 10.91% shares globally for TWKL and 10.54%for MTL. The only other
institutional investor with more than a 1% share is Denroma Investment Limited with
1.26% share of local institutional share. Under a title Who Owns What with Whom, the
MARS Group website associates TWKL 100% with Joshua Kulei, who it reports to have
represented ex-President Moi in over 50 companies.25
25
See http://www.marsgroupkenya.org/corruption/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=51&Itemid=26
Accessed 3/9/2012
39
not always be confrontational given
– these have not been adequate
the heterogeneity of both civil soci-
for planned activities, including the
ety and the media.
Council’s critical role as a civic edu-
MCK’s provisioning problem arose
because of poor preparation for
the liberalisation of the airwaves
which, amongst other things, allowed strategically placed individu-
whereby media operators contribute to MCK on a pro rata basis has
been unsustainable for both operations and independence.
als to amass frequencies, hence
Meanwhile, the electronic media’s
the current debilitating imbalances
legal framework is being reviewed
in the sector.
The Constitution
via the ICCK Bill (2010) whose main
(2010) makes a review of the legal
objectives include the establish-
(and institutional) frameworks of the
ment of ICCK as an autonomous
sector an imperative, a fact which is
institution that can regulate without
on-going with the Media Bill (2012)
fear or favour (see Section 4). The
and ICCK Bill (2012). However, the
Bill focuses greatly on ICCK’s con-
review proposals of this report are
stitution, but does not suggest ways
based on current legislation, includ-
in which the new body will resolve
ing the Media Act (2007).
the current impasses between MOA
26
Reforms to the MCK are impera-
and CCK.
from an ad hoc volunteer’s institu-
6.2 Ownership of the
Kenyan Media
tion housed through charity in 2002,
Ngugi wa Thiong’o’s A Grain of
to a statutory body in 2007. Yet, the
Wheat’s was prophetic of the Ke-
media sector’s understandable sus-
nyan elite with its newly elected
picion of the government seemed to
parliamentarian promptly straddling
have delivered MCK into the hands
into settler farming (wa Thiong’o,
of a new tyranny – of the non-stat-
1965). In Kenya – as in many coun-
utory MOA, a members’ club of
tries – the tendency has been for
owners or their representatives –
the wealthy to spread their tentacles
primarily of the large media houses
into as many areas of the economy
(Oriare et al: 2010: 37). While the Act
as possible, regardless of their ef-
specified MCK’s sources of funding
ficiency. The media industry has
– fees, incomes, gifts, grants, etc.
recently become an arena for such
tive despite its remarkable evolution
40
cator. The unlegislated arrangement
RMS was a major beneficiary of the government’s dithering; but it was ‘just rewards’ for its years of persistent
struggle for the liberalization of frequencies.
26
self-enrichment, motivated by po-
stantial evidence of electoral mis-
tential commercial returns (Table
conduct which can sustain a peti-
6.1), or likely political harvest (Wan-
tion against a victor, resulting in the
yande, 1995; MCK, forthcoming).
extreme in a custodial sentence.
Kenyan parliamentary politics is an
increasingly expensive affair:
One approach to understanding the
influence of media ownership on
Masime and Otieno (2012: 467) es-
media content was to review the
timate that each 2007 parliamentary
effect of management structures –
candidate spent an average Kshs 7
whether corporate or not – on the
million on direct financial benefits to
scope for interference in content,
voters and supporters. With 46% of
whether by politicians, owners, or
Kenyans living below the poverty
editors. The expectation is that cor-
line, such spending is the preserve
poratisation – such as quotation on
of those with resources, whether
a stock exchange –distances the
generated honestly or not.
Con-
owners and the medium, thereby
sequently, the Kenyan Parliament
reducing the scope for parochial
has few exclusively ‘professional’
influences. From the small sample
politicians, many members having
of media houses reviewed, interfer-
originally amassed wealth in other
ence and non-interference were re-
professions, or through corruption.
ported across the different manage-
27
As the stakes in Kenyan politics
ment structures.
have risen, politicians have increas-
Of the two Kenyan media houses
ingly taken advantage of media lib-
that are corporate by virtue of list-
eralisation to directly or indirectly
ing on the stock exchange, NMG’s
acquire media interests with which
Aga Khan seems far removed from
to secure their place in politics. As
mundane Kenyan politics; yet, the
one editor observed, politicians
individual has always had access to
have realised that acquiring votes
State House, not the least because
through the airwaves is more cost-
of the vast business empire of the
effective than traversing a constitu-
Ismaili community. From the expe-
ency personally or using proxies,
riences of the early independence
giving monetary or material favours.
years, when the Aga Khan owned
The
of
a significantly greater portion of
hand-outs is that they involve sub-
what became NMG, he was quite
additional
disadvantage
Obviously, candidates without such resources, but with a political premium, might acquire coalitional funders.
This could be such as through one of the major political parties, the main three of 2007 estimated to have spent a
total Kshs 5.6 billion.
27
41
conscious that his paper should not
Anecdotal information from the
fall foul of the government, causing
Kenyan-based NGO, Mars Group
various editorial changes (Nyamora,
suggests Kulei to be a Moi proxy at
2007).
TWKL, meaning the former presi-
28
The current NMG ownership structure summarised in Box 6.1 shows
the Aga Khan to continue to be the
single largest shareholder with 47%.
While the Aga Khan’s hand might
be imperceptible to the average
journalist at NMG, his shareholding
must be significant in determining
editorial policy and practice. The
more intriguing ownership structure
is that of SG, which has generally
been associated with former President Moi and his associates, with
anecdotal information suggesting
10% of SG through that channel.
The ownership of Miller Trustees
Ltd (MTL) – and its own global 10%
share of SG – is unclear. Given the
Kenyan elite’s penchant for offshore companies – a practice that
escalated during Moi’s presidency,
it would be instructive to unpack
SG’s off-shore shareholding to see
if there are any links to Moi and his
business empire, testing the widely
held view that the family owns the
media group.
he controls an estimated 85% of
NMG has in the past been perceived
the company, making other share-
to be against the Moi regime, and in
holders functionally inconsequen-
time, for Kibaki. Given the extensive
tial. Yet, the NSE evidence (see Box
Kenyan business interests of the
6.1) paints a sharply different pic-
Aga Khan and his local Ismaili com-
ture, with a UK-registered company,
munity,29 it is unsurprising that NMG
S.N.G Holdings Ltd accounting for
has traditionally found soul mates
69.11% of the shares.
among a Kikuyu business elite that
Meanwhile, only 30% of the SG
shares are held locally by individuals or institutions. As the analysis in
Box 6.1 shows, Trade World Kenya
42
dent could have access to at most
saw in Moi an obstacle to growth
and development – hence the perceived control of NMG by a Kikuyu
elite.
Ltd (TWKL), a company associated
This further would seem to have
100% with Joshua Kulei, owns 47%
translated to the 2007 support for
of the aggregate local shareholding,
Kibaki and his Party of National
which amounts to about 10% of SG.
Unity (PNU), with an NMG director
The more prominent politically instigated editorial departures have included John Abuoga, Hillary Ng’weno, and George
Githii.
29
NMG apart, the other flagship local Ismaili business interests include the Aga Kahn hospitals and schools, the Serena Hotel
chain, Diamond Trust Bank, to name a few.
28
being at the heart of the PNU cam-
connections between a top SG
paign effort.
manager and (then) ODM’s William
Yet, that election saw Moi behind
Kibaki/PNU
and
visibly
against
Odinga and his Orange Democratic
Movement (ODM), who was broadly
perceived to have had the support
Ruto enabled an ODM bias, which
was also driven by the desire not
to alienate the group’s top regional
market, Western Kenya, an ODM
stronghold.
of Moi’s SG. This latter reality would
Yet, a study of media coverage dur-
support the NSE evidence of a weak
ing the 2007 elections shows that the
Moi ownership of SG. Indeed, one
coverage by the main media houses
ex-SG staffer argues that notwith-
for PNU/Kibaki dominated that for
standing Moi’s position, the close
ODM/Odinga across the board.
Box 6.2: Media Professionalism vs. Employment Expediency
A former SG editorial director recalls the difficulties of balancing media
professionalism against the idiosyncratic demands of owners, especially when
such an owner had the additional clout in being Head of State. A professional
board too would be quite aware of the commercial risk posed by partisanship,
especially given when theirs is the media house playing catch-up with their
main competitor. LOHNRO vice-chair and Moi-protégé Mark Too’s presence
on the board in 1997 had ensured the paper give disproportionate coverage
to Moi’s presidential re-election bid. Similarly in 2002, Moi demanded and
expected exclusive coverage of his chosen successor, KANU’s Uhuru Kenyatta,
meaning a complete black-out on NARC politics. The former editor recalls
that when Moi felt this directive had been ignored, he personally called for
an explanation, even summoning such SG employees to State House for
explanations. On many other occasions, the calls came from senior KANU and
government operatives.
But there is evidence that many media practitioners have succumbed to the
lure of lucre, so that politicians and the corporate sector do not have a very
difficult time influencing what appears in print or on the airwaves. Namwaya
(2010: 19) notes:
“Politicians in Kenya claim that they are besieged by journalists demanding bribes in
exchange for coverage and threats of blackmail. They claim that they are forced to apportion
a percentage of their monthly expenditures to pay journalists and generally ‘manage’ the
media. This could partly explain why every media content analysis last year by Synovate
showed that politics and politicians took up the largest space or airtime in both print and
broadcast media.”
43
In the case of the individually owned
The scope for political interference
media
politi-
in such stations is vast since such
cal connections are either overtly
houses,
however,
politicians assure the financing of
stated or easier to discern. RMS’
such stations, in a context in which
SK Macharia overtly supported the
secure financing for rent, wages and
‘Yes’ campaign in the 2005 referen-
other overheads renders many FM
dum and PNU in the 2007 elections,
stations vulnerable. This is espe-
even if surreptitiously so; after all, it
cially the case with those registered
was the Kibaki tenure that had fa-
as community radio stations, which
cilitated his realisation of the RMS
Section 46F of the Kenya Informa-
empire. However, Synovate media
tion and Communications Act de-
monitoring data show RMS cover-
clares to be not-for-profit, meaning
age during the 2007 campaigns to
they cannot generate commercial
have been most balanced across
revenue. The plight of such stations
the mainstream media houses, an
was vividly illustrated by a broad-
outcome contributed to in no small
caster with a slum-based station
way by the contemporary RMS
who revealed the staff had received
managing director’s professional
no pay for over six months prior
objectivity which had previously
to our interview. This makes such
seen him eased out of KBC (see
staffers vulnerable to political inter-
Box 6.2).
ference: politicians will make direct
The connections in the FM stations
are often also quite obvious, even
if relevant documentary evidence is
not to be found. Various politicians
own FM stations, directly (e.g. Mutava Musyimi, Raphael Tuju, Jakoyo
Midiwo and Koigi Wamwere) or
through direct proxies (e.g. the kin or
spouses of Joan Pogishio and Rose
Mwakwere for respective politician
44
hand-outs, such as against personal coverage. But, in some of our
interviews, there were also allegations of Constituency Development
Fund [CDF] resources – patronised
by the incumbent parliamentarian –
being allocated to such grassroots
media outlets, with obvious implications for the independence of such
broadcasters.
spouses Samuel Pogishio and Chi-
The need to secure sustainable
rau Mwakwere) or remote proxies
funding causes many community
(for a detailed listing, see Table 6.2).
stations to transform into commer-
cial ones, with Radio Lake Victoria
ownership links to media houses.
(Osienala)
interesting
Among the spouse owners listed
lessons. The station was launched
are the wives of Vice President
as a medium for championing non-
Kalonzo Musyoka, Information and
governmental organisation (NGO)
Communication minister Poghisio,
OSIENALA’s original environmen-
and Environment minister Mwak-
tal concerns over the lake, the sta-
were. Other links are through vocal
tion becoming just one among the
lieutenants, like Midiwo for Prime
NGO’s various other enterprises.
Minister Raila Odinga, C.K.
Thus, OSIENALA already had a
Joshua for presidential candidate
trustees’ board and a management
Ruto,
board backed by an executive sec-
vid Musila for presidential hopeful
retary to whom the radio station’s
Kalonzo Musyoka, or less vocals
manager reports. Thus, while the
ones, such as Hannington Gaya for
station’s success has attracted poli-
presidential candidate Raphael Tuju.
ticians, the management framework
Additionally, politicians employ sub-
has protected the station manager
terfuge to cover their tracks, such
from excessive interference. Effec-
as using their long-discarded first/
tively, Radio Lake Victoria is there-
Christian names to register their
fore not a typical community radio
media outlet. Appendix Table A–6.1
station susceptible to manipulation
lists some other publications and
by political and commercial inter-
their respective owners about whom
ests in pursuit of its sustainability.
there was no immediate information
presenting
Thus, even as Table 6.2 lists known
and
parliamentarian
Da-
on potential political links.
links between practising and/or
There was evidence of much cross-
prospective political office holders
media ownership in the mainstream
and the media, such as through the
media as illustrated in Table 6.3.
CCK database, or suspected links
The government’s presence is per-
between them, Zipporah Kittony’s
vasive when one adds the Kenya
dilemma with Uhuru Kenyatta’s Me-
News Agency (KNA) correspon-
dia Max ownership status must be
dents to the regional newsletters
borne in mind. However, Table 6.2
and the radio and TV stations listed.
lists at least six declared political
However, cross-media ownership in
candidates with direct or proximate
the private sector is also quite ex-
45
Table 6.2: Known and Likely Kenyan Political Links with the Media (September 2012)
Registered Frequency
Holder/Station ID
46
Likely Political Link
Bondo Community Multimedia
Centre – Radio Maendeleo
Anthony Munyao, associated to Raphael Tuju,
presidential aspirant
Capital Group Ltd – Capital FM
Chris Kirubi, probable associate of President
Mwai Kibaki
Citizen Weekly
Tom Aluaka; has been associated with various
Nairobi parliamentarians
Digitopia – Milele FM, Anguo FM
Granton Samboja, a prospective Taita
Taveta politician (Milele FM allegedly sold to
MediaMax as we go printing)
Eastern Broadcasting
Corporation Ltd – Mbaitu FM;
Syokimau FM
John Musyimi; Mbaitu FM linked to Charity
Ngilu, presidential aspirant (Mbaitu FM and
Syokimau FM allegedly sold to MediaMax as
we go printing)
Elgonet Communications
Technologies Ltd -
Joan Chelimo Poghisio, wife of Information
and Communications minister Samuel
Poghisio
Fish Media – Fish FM
Reuben Kigame, gubernatorial candidate,
Vihiga
Golden Dreams – Content
production
Alfred Mutua, gubernatorial candidate,
Machakos
Kalee Ltd – Kass FM; Kass
Weekly; Kass TV
CK Joshua, probable associate of presidential
aspirant William Ruto
Mau West Development Initiative
- Mururi FM
John Muthutho, parliamentarian
MediaMax – The People, K24,
Kameme FM, Meru FM
Connected to Uhuru Kenyatta, presidential
aspirant
Media Seven Group Magazines
Hannington Gaya, member of presidential
candidate Raphael Tuju’s campaign team
Neural Digital Broadcaster Ltd –
Radio Umoja; Radio Nam Lolwe
Peter Oluoch, connected to parliamentarian
Jakoyo Midiwo, first cousin to Prime Minister
Raila Odinga
Pili Pili FM
Associated to Najib Balala, parlementarian
Radio Africa Ltd – Kiss FM; Kiss
TV, Radio Jambo, XFM, Classic
105
Kiprono Kittony, son of former Maendeleo
ya Wanawake chair Zipporah Kittony, distant
relative of former President Moi
Regional Reach Ltd – Kameme
FM
Rose Kimotho, sold to Media Max, company
associated with presidential aspirant Uhuru
Kenyatta
Royal Media Services Ltd –
Citizen TV; Citizen Radio and 11
vernacular radio stations
Samuel K. Macharia, previous parliamentary
candidate Gatanga, links to various senior
politicians
Radio Salaam
Associated to Yusuf Haji, parliamentarian
Sauti ya Mwananchi Radio and
TV Ltd
Joseph Koigi Wamwere, ex – parliamentarian,
senator candidate, Nakuru
Sauti ya Pwani
John M. Musyimi, parliamentarian and
presidential candidate
Sauti ya Rehema – Sayare FM;
Sayare TV
Rev. Eli Rop, board of directors previously
included Prof Margaret Kamar, parliamentarian
and wife of former parliamentarian Nicholas
Biwott
Southern Hills Development
Agency – Kaya FM
Mandale Warrakah/Rose Mwakwere, brother
and wife of minister Chirau Mwakwere
Star Radio and TV Network Star
FM
Former parliamentarians Hezron Manduku and
Reuben Oyondi
STV Holdings – STV
Sold to TV Africa Holdings, associated with
presidential aspirant Uhuru Kenyatta
Universal Broadcasting Ltd –
Radio Rahma
Abdul Swammad Nassir, parliamentary
aspirant Mombasa
Source: own compilation
tensive; NMG leads the way despite
ment that optimise professionalism
RMS dominating the airwaves. Such
among staff. Indeed, editors could
cross-media ownership is especially
resist cross-media ownership, de-
undesirable where there is a confla-
nying media owners the attendant
tion of ownership and editorship, as
economies of scale in employment
is evident in editors sitting on the
– which would require owners to
MOA board.
employ more journalists.
Media owners are invariably driven
But there are other channels through
by commercial and political con-
which owners may influence edi-
cerns, which can often conflict with
tors. Among these are the relative
the professional obligations of edi-
personalities of the two: owners that
tors. For example, while the owner
see strong personalities in editors
might wish to constrain the wage
might not only refrain from attempt-
bill to enhance profits, an editor
ing to compromise their profession-
should be obliged to secure those
alism, but might also just admire
terms and conditions of employ-
and encourage such integrity.
47
Table 6.3: The Patterns of Cross Media Ownership in Kenya
Publisher/Owner Print Titles Electronic Assets
48
Associations
Government of
Kenya, Ministry of
Information and
Communications,
Director of
Information,
Managing Director,
KBC
The Sun
(Kabarnet);
The Eye/
Mwangaza
(Siaya); The
Eastern Star
(Machakos);
Ngao
(Nakuru); Sauti
(Kericho);
Sauti ya Gusii
(Kisii); Nuru
(Isiolo); Nyota
ya Magharibi
(Vihiga); Sauti
ya Pwani
(Mombasa);
Maarifa
(Murang’a);
and Habari
(Garissa)
Nation Media Group
Daily Nation,
NTV; Q FM; Easy FM;
Sunday
QTV
Nation,
Saturday
Nation, The
East African,
Taifa Leo,
Taifa Jumapili,
Daily Metro,
Business Daily
See Box 6.1
and related
discussion
Standard Group
The Standard,
Sunday
Standard,
Saturday
Standard,
Game Yetu,
County
Weekly
KTN, Radio Maisha
Moi family.
See Box 6.1
and related
discussion
Media Max including
former Regional
Reach
People Daily,
Sunday
People
K-24, Kameme FM
Kenyatta family
and associates
National Kiswahili
Service; National
English Service;
Eastern Service
(Somali, Borana,
Rendile, Burji and
Turkana); Central
Service (Meru, Embu,
Maasai and Kamba);
Western Service (Luo,
Kisii, Kalenjin, Kuria,
Teso, Luhya, Suba
and Pokot); Metro FM;
Coro FM; Pwani FM;
Free to air KBC TV;
Pay TV; Entertainment
Metro TV
The emphasis on
the state rather
than the public
renders these
outlets amenable
to Government
manipulation
Royal Media Services After demise
of The
Leader, RMS
apparently
no longer
interested
in the print
media.
Mulembe; Chamgei;
Inooro; Musyi; Egesa;
Hot 96; Muuga;
Ramogi; Radio
Citizen; Citizen TV;
Bahari; and Wimwaro
Radio Africa Group
The Star
Kiss FM; Kiss TV;
Patrick Quarco
Classic FM; East FM; and William Pike
Jambo FM; X FM;
Smooth FM; Relax FM
Kalee Ltd; Kass
Media Group
Kass Weekly
Kass FM; Kass TV;
Kass Washington;
Kass London
Media Seven Group
Magazines
Monthly
Motor, Mum
and Dad, G
Magazine,
Business
Monthly and
HM
S.K. Macharia
CK Josiah
H. Gaya, member
Tuju campaign
team
Source: author’s compilation
Namwaya (2010: 18) reports of an
“…journalists are even driving cars that
SG bureau chief in Mombasa who
were bought for them a few years ago by
refused bribes from a major 2007
a former Police Commissioner. A number
political party, subsequently sus-
of journalists also benefited from hefty
pended two of her journalists who
packages from police after helping lure
had taken bribes from the party,
(civil society activist) Oscar King’ara to
and when she was adamant on her
his death and then obscuring the story by
actions, was simply asked by her
writing only what the police said…”
superior to “go slow on the matter”. The reverse is obviously true;
in which case such editors will be
bombarded with directives and lavished with free riders that compromise professional integrity. Namwaya (2010: 13) reports an informant
stating that:
The same relationship can be replicated between owners and journalists, as well as between editors
and journalists. The extent of such
interference – whether successful
or not – will partially depend on the
extent that issues, rather than personalities, drive the national and lo-
49
cal political agenda. Yet, even when
including the use of the Internet.
issues drive the agenda, there will
There is also extensive evidence of
be attempts to compromise the me-
politicians directly corrupting media
dia. For example, while one could
practitioners for coverage, as well
argue that Raila Odinga’s profile fu-
as the latter demanding consider-
els his domination of The People’s
ations for coverage, various illustra-
coverage among presidential candi-
tions of this from Namwaya (2010)
dates, reported at 33% against Uh-
being presented in various informa-
uru Kenyatta’s 8% (MCK, 2012), the
tion boxes in this chapter. However,
greater proportion of that publica-
the predisposition of individual poli-
tion’s negative coverage of Odinga
ticians to media access is also sig-
at 18% compared to Uhuru’s 14%
nificant for the extent to which such
could be by design.
politicians will make the news.
In this regard, the Internet and ICT
Makokha (2010) notes that PNU
in general, provides a somewhat dif-
spent the most on advertising during
ferent problem because the owner
the 2007 elections – placed at Kshs
or sender is out of contact. Brows-
378 million compared to ODM’s
ing Kenya discussion forums and
Kshs 200 million (Masime and Oti-
blogs on the Internet, one devel-
eno, 2010: 468-9): however, ODM
ops a perception that ethnic vitriol
had a better grasp of media funda-
and hate speech is greater among
mentals, its candidates being read-
expatriate Kenyans than it is within
ily accessible to journalists. Indeed,
the country. Kenyans abroad often
certain politicians ‘sell’, meaning
seem caught in a time-warp that
that even rational editors will place
does not allow them to appreciate
such politicians’ stories strategically
the dynamism of the home context.
to attract buyers and audiences,
A final consideration is whether owners need to intervene for politicians,
50
Raila Odinga seemingly being preeminent among such politicians.
or whether politicians drive their
Where the agenda is thus driven by
own media agenda. During 2012,
the market, even media owners must
the media has been rife with reports
know that (political) interference will
of politicians hiring key media per-
undermine market strength. Key
sonalities to manage their commu-
informants report RMS’ desperate
nications and marketing strategies,
effort to recover market share after
Box 6.4: Oiling the wheels in ‘enemy’ territory…
During the 2007 general elections, protagonists PNU and ODM had media
experts on their payrolls with the former party having a larger war-chest, while
the latter had a broader reach (Namwaya, 2010: 21). The PNU was reportedly
alarmed at not making any headway in the Rift Valley despite its spending
there, with one insider lamenting that:
“Neither the use of The Standard nor The Daily Nation was helping. So it was decided that
we should try to use the Kalenjin language stations. It was very hard pushing a PNU story
through to these FM stations, so we decided to use money.”
The insider reportedly personally delivered between KSh.10,000 and
KSh.20,000 per story on each of the FM stations, with the amounts rising as
the elections drew closer, to KSh.200,000 per week on FM stations alone, and
KSh.10, 000 paid to individual journalists per day.
its ill-fated decision to concentrate
political interference. The larger
support on the ‘Yes’ camp during
media houses are likely to be more
the 2005 referendum on the pro-
resource-secure, and should there-
posed constitution, the suggestion
fore be less amenable to manipu-
being that the strategy estranged
lation; yet interview evidence sug-
pre-referendum audiences.
gested that their dependence on
advertising has exposed them to
6.3 The Conduct of the Kenyan Media
In terms of political interference
through the media, the radio is most
powerful, because it is the ‘medium
manipulation by the big clients, such
as Safaricom over issues related to
the Kenya Revenue Authority (Oriare
et al, 2010: 45) and Initial Public Offering (Namwaya, 2010).
of the masses’, reaching deep into
Other sources report that when
the country side, hardly discrimi-
Safaricom suspended a reported
nating for socio-economic status
Ksh 8million advertising account in
and therefore reaching the largest
reaction to an expose in RMS’ The
Leader, of a perceived underpayment of dividends to Telkom (K),
this prompted RMS’ retraction of
audience. Section 6.2 argued that
the size of the media house does
not automatically predispose it to
51
Box 6. 5: Corporate corruption for self-preservation
The corporate sector is adept at securing their interests against negative
media while ensuing positive stories see the light of day (Namwaya, 2010: 23).
Namwaya reports a March 10, 2010, Daily Nation story Extracted from the
Auditor General’s reports on irregularities in Safaricom’s 2008 Initial Public Offer
(IPO). While individual business writers knew even more damaging material than
had been reported by the Auditor General, NMG received many complaints of
inaccuracy of content from those mentioned. While the NMG chief executive
defended journalist Joseph Bonyo, he acknowledged that Safaricom was
indeed “our largest advertiser”, but pointed out that he had never influenced
content on behalf of anyone. That neither NMG nor any other media house ever
carried the story (again) is likely evidence of the might of Safaricom’s pressure.
Namwaya notes that such situations are made even more complicated
when there is a cross-over of interests, such as when the NMG board chair,
Hannington Awori also sat on the boards of numerous other companies,
including Unilever, and former NMG chief executive returned to the board,
while also being on the boards of Standard Chartered Bank and East African
Breweries.
Besides influencing what journalists do, or do not write, corporations engage
public relations companies which submit complete stories, including TV
footage, which editors use verbatim, meaning PR firms provide editorial content
at the expense of essential journalism.
the story in the following issue. In
Editorial practices across media
another instance, a story on Kenya
houses
Canners’ dogs harassing villagers
with significant consequences for
led NMG managers to stop press.
the scope for controlling extenu-
The smaller, resource-insecure me-
ating influences. In only a couple
dia houses are likely to be more
of instances did this research find
vulnerable, such as those finding
any acknowledgement of extensive
themselves depending of CDF re-
owner editorial presence in a media
sources. Indeed, weak resource
outlet. As for the editor/journalist in-
bases undermine the sustainability
teractions, in some instances, there
of appropriate terms and conditions
were daily editorial meetings, in oth-
of employment, making junior cad-
ers fortnightly, while in others still,
res especially susceptible to ma-
such meetings were of an ad hoc
nipulation, and to the lure of moon-
nature.
lighting.
52
also
vary
considerably,
Box 6.6: KBC Managing Director ‘eased out’….
During the 2002 general elections, KBC – the public broadcaster – gave
exclusive coverage to KANU presidential candidate and Moi protégé Uhuru
Kenyatta, to the great detriment of the commercial interests of a corporation
whose establishing statute requires it at Section 38 “to conduct its business
according to commercial principles and to perform its functions in such a
manner as to secure that… its gross revenue is not less than sufficient to meet
its outgoings…” As if the commercial lessons of 2002 were not learnt, the 2005
referendum saw KBC being pushed by the ‘reformist’ NARC government to
exclusively back the ‘Yes’ side of the constitutional referendum. These attitudes
by successive governments reflected serious misinterpretation of the KBC Act
(1989), of which Section 8 mandates the corporation to “provide independent
and impartial broadcasting services… with impartial attention to the interests
and susceptibilities of the different communities in Kenya.” Indeed, Section 44
requires the Information minister to demand redress from the board should the
corporation violate its mandate.
KBC’s attempt at editorial impartiality in 2005 led a national leaders’ induction
workshop into the workings of the government to conclude that the corporation
had worked at the behest of the ‘No’ side of the referendum. Among the
Managing Director’s [MD] accusers were the Internal Security minister whose
‘rattled snake would bite’ SG in 2006, and the Information minister, a seasoned
media practitioner, and the egregious government spokesperson. Despite the
MD’s protestations to the contrary, and his elaboration of the corporation’s
statutory obligations, the impending renewal of his contract never occurred,
and he was transferred to the low profile Kenya Film Corporation.
The difficulty of getting interviews
quency of owner-attended meet-
with consistent slates of decision
ings, or the existence of a clear sta-
makers across media houses un-
tion focus, facilitates tight control –
dermined the conduct of a mapping
‘guided content’, if that is desirable.
study, meaning it is not possible to
Efforts to interview Koigi Wamwere
evaluate the impact of the frequency
of Sauti ya Mwananchi failed; but
of meetings on political content. In-
a listen in to his radio station sug-
deed, such mapping would require
gested his close personal attention
a very elaborate analysis of the con-
to the station’s editorial content.
tents of such meetings against that
However, rare editorial meetings
of the media outputs.
can also provide room for political
However, it is likely that a high fre-
interference: in such an absence
of editorial policy focus, dissatis-
53
fied journalists can fill their material
media practitioners (Oriare et al,
needs gap by soliciting additional
2010: 31), opening doors for com-
incomes from outsiders, such as
promising activities among disad-
politicians.
vantaged staffers – even if Namwa-
Such realities – including the idea
that politicians may drive the media agenda beyond the desires of
owners and editors – heighten the
pervasiveness of the problem. For
one, live broadcasts – including text
messaging and the Internet – pose
a problem over content even if the
scope for controls is greater in the
print media. Sunday Nation columnist Maina Kiai recently questioned
the wisdom of the media omitting to
publish the vitriolic utterances at the
Hague-bound politicians’ ‘prayer
rallies’ – in the name of ‘responsible
journalism’.
common among well-remunerated
managers. Recruitment and remuneration often focus on the ‘radio
voice’ and ‘TV face’ instead of substance, breeding discontent and
consequent susceptibility to compromise, reported various interviewees. Furthermore, when colleagues
live beyond their known means,
this is often attributed to their being compromised, inducing others
to follow suit. Further, the perception is that rising competition has
caused political parties to infiltrate
media houses, making attempts at
editorial objectivity futile,30 a phe-
If such self-censorship is good, it is
nomenon well illustrated by Nam-
nonetheless always threatened by
waya (2010). Additionally, there are
the pervasive competition across
perceptions that NSIS has also infil-
media houses for the most engag-
trated the media, driving an agenda
ing headlines and stories. Further,
that might be quite distinct from that
media houses are often caught be-
of the owner or editor.
tween getting the right headlines
and meeting the desired deadlines;
a delay in launch for some may result in extensive constraints to sales.
54
ya (2010) shows this scourge to be
Journalists outside the mainstream
media houses, such as members
of the Kenya Correspondents Association (KCA) face multiple disad-
Disparities in terms and conditions
vantages despite a 2002 determina-
of employment can be a major
tion that they contribute upwards of
source of discontentment among
65% of all media content.31 While
30
31
An example cited was the shutting down of Express FM which saw its entire staff complement cross over to Kass FM.
KCA chairperson Oloo Janak places his members’ contributions at 80%.
Box 6.7: Negative Ethnicity in the Media?
Given the ethnic nature of Kenyan politics, the ethnic structure of a media’s
management could also point to the extent that it could be a conduit for the
political agenda of a few people. In response to allegations that NMG was a
‘Kikuyu fiefdom’, the CEO declared satisfaction with the ethnic diversity of his
team which included “Tom Mshindi, the Managing Director of the Newspapers
Division, comes from somewhere in the Rift Valley; Joseph Odindo, the Group
Editorial Director is a Luo; Ian Fernandes, the director in charge of the NMG
Digital Division, is Goan; Mutuma Mathiu, the Managing Editor of the Daily
Nation, is Meru and Eric Obino, the Managing Editor of the Sunday Nation, is
Kisii.” By contrast, the Standard Group had Paul Wanyagah as its official chief
executive but in reality he remained inferior to the Group Vice Chairman and
Strategy Advisor, Paul Melly, who basically ran the company. Melly is Kalenjin
and a representative of the Moi family, which is Kalenjin. The Group Chief
Editor, John Bundotich, is Kalenjin, and Kipkoech Tanui, the Managing Editor of
The Standard daily editions, is Kalenjin. The weekend edition has no Managing
Editor… after the resignation of Dr. George Nyabuga, a Kisii.
some are retained by established
enemy of our development’. Poor
media houses as ‘stringers’, notably
terms and conditions of employ-
by NMG, the majority of the 400-
ment, or simple greed, often cause
odd registered members survive
correspondents and media house
precariously, unsure whether their
journalists to indulge in mercenary
(sometimes
activity, such as in publishing bi-
tortuously-generated)
article will deliver returns.
This causes them to be prolific in
the hope that at least one article
ased analyses of political contests
or pre-empting the outcome of an
electoral contest.
will succeed. With respect to con-
As Goldenberg architect, Kamlesh
tent, such journalists often face
Pattni illustrated, and Namwaya
danger in either refusing to tow a
(2010) underscores, journalists can
politician’s line, or in their story los-
be ‘gate keepers’ who block certain
ing its original intention through the
news items, or they can be paid to
editing process. Journalists men-
damage people’s reputations. Many
tioned instances where politicians
analysts have blamed the conduct
and other leaders have provoked
of the Kenyan media for the 2008
crowds against them for being ‘the
PEV (MCK, forthcoming), arguing
55
Box 6.8: Efforts to Stifle Anglo-Leasing Exposes
According to Namwaya (2010), a former NMG Crime and Investigations editor
was the centre of exerted efforts of the management and fellow journalists
to block Anglo-Leasing exposes in the media between 2004 and 2005. The
editor reports that colleagues on monthly retainers of as much as Kshs
200,000 would use the office intranet to access his draft stories, promptly
notifying the senior people in government who were implicated. The editor was
offered a ‘hefty lump-sum’ in addition to monthly payments of Kshs 50,000
to refrain from negative reportage on Anglo Leasing, which he turned down,
reporting the matter to his managers – only to realise that they too had vested
interests in blocking the stories. He believes his obduracy was the cause of
his ‘unceremonioal’ exit in 2006. However, NMG CEO attributed the editor’s
exit to misuse of company facilities to do private business, and his ‘unhealthy’
relations with the Police department from which he purportedly successfully
tendered for the purchase of a vehicle, a transaction the editor proved to have
involved a cousin. But the editor reveals that ‘most’ Crime and Investigation
journalists are on the police ‘payroll’.
that a partisan, co-opted media that
analysts have advised on the need
resembled a political party uncriti-
for a more nuanced analysis of the
cally reproduced inflammatory po-
context to better understand what
litical statements which aggravated
transpired (Hirsch, n.d.; Stremlau
tensions. The 2008 Kriegler inquiry
and Price, 2009). For example, ‘hate
into the Electoral Commission of
speech’ can simultaneously con-
Kenya conduct adjudged the media
stitute ‘in-group humour’ and ‘out-
a problem as well as a solution. The
group castigation’; and violence is a
Kenya National Commission of Hu-
process not an event.
man Rights indicted about five FM
stations for incitement and/or hate
speech, including Cooro, Inooro,
Kameme, Kass FM and Radio Injili.
56
However, there is consensus that
the Kenyan media lacked the capacity for conflict-sensitive journalism, which, in the context of the
The Waki inquiry into the post-
freedoms created by media liber-
electoral violence also indicted FM
alisation, allowed the airing of com-
stations, including Bahasha, Clas-
bustible material. Further, a study
sic, Easy, Kiss and Namlolwe. Other
found a low awareness of the me-
dia Code of Conduct, a mere 60%
and the ‘multiplicity of factors mak-
of the respondents owning a copy
ing proof of causality problematic’.
– 18% through the employer (AW-
Oriare further points to media mo-
CFS, 2005).
bilisation for registration and civic
On the other hand, media houses
and practitioners point to their many
education, as well as its highlighting
grassroots ECK conduct in rigging.
positive – even if ad hoc – ‘peace
Building on the media’s indictment
journalism’ initiatives during and
over the 2007/08 violence, there is
after the fighting. Using grassroots
concern that little has been done to
discussions on-air in Kibera, for ex-
reform the media scenario. There is
ample, Pamoja FM highlighted the
apprehension that the key players of
folly of looting and rioting which re-
2007/08 remain the same: the poli-
sulted in higher consumer prices in
ticians, media owners, media man-
those outlets courageous enough to
agers, journalists, and of course, the
remain open during PEV. The sta-
citizens. What has been done, it is
tion also hosted forums where citi-
asked, to raise the level of propriety
zens held discussions with village
among these groups of individuals
elders and members of the Provin-
when key perpetrators of the inequi-
cial Administration. Sayare FM also
ties of the previous elections remain
conducted
reconciliatory
unpunished at the local, national and
initiatives in Eldoret. Other observ-
international levels? In this context,
ers point to the positive media ini-
the CCK has received disturbing re-
tiatives in the run up to the general
ports of frequency hijacking across
elections.
stations, which might also raise
similar
In submissions to the Waki commission, the Kenya Editors’ Guild
noted that the media was already
actively suppressing inflammatory
statements. In a March 13, 2008
Daily Nation article, journalist Peter Oriare argued there was only “a
grain of truth in the charge that vernacular stations fuelled… violence”,
pointing to “simplistic accusations”
temperatures further. This development calls for immediate attention
by the CCK since it grows out of an
emerging tendency of concentrating
frequencies in the hands of a few
entrepreneurs. In this context, the
KBC proposal to decentralise to the
counties is timely. According to the
Permanent Secretary, Information
and Communications, the intention
57
Box 6.9: ‘There’s no honour among thieves…’
Ahead of the 2007 general election, mainstream media political reporters
continued the tradition of collecting their ‘brown envelopes’ from political party
secretariats whose contents would be shared among editorial colleagues,
reports Namwaya (2010). Through prior arrangements with political parties,
senior editors would despatch a trusted reporter to collect their joint dues. In
October 2007, one such emissary collected their respective Kshs 10,000 dues
from a political party, but decided his personal needs required the whole loot.
Thus, he kept the superior’s share ‘knowing there was nothing he could do
about it, having previously been given shares of money he was not expecting,
and would likely receive some more in the future’.
is to establish local language sta-
for the dissolution of the CCK on
tions in the counties which will pro-
the effective date of the new legis-
vide competition to the dominance
lation when the Independent Com-
of selected private operators. Since
munications Commission of Kenya
KBC is the public broadcaster, such
is to take over. However, the sig-
stations will undertake social re-
nificance of the proposed legislation
sponsibilities which private stations
is the independence it affords the
might not prioritise, such as civic ed-
ICCK, through a transparent estab-
ucation in the context of devolution.
lishment process, compared to that
of predecessor CCK.
58
6.4 Conduct of Institutions
of the Media Industry
The extent to which the various
The all encompassing role of the
mandate is obviously curtailed by
MCK specified in the Media Act is
many of them having no legal status
presently under review in the Media
with which to leverage their inter-
Bill (2012). Meanwhile, the CCK’s
ests, which is critical for their ability
operations have been hampered
to ameliorate political pressure. This
by political interference and what
was however not the case with the
amounts to misuse of the freedoms
Kenya Union of Journalists (KUJ), a
availed for litigation that undermine
statutory trade union organisation
decisiveness.
Independent
that originally championed media
Communications Commission of
reforms but has lately faded from
Kenya Bill, (2010) merely provides
the limelight. KUJ pioneered the
The
media organisations can fulfil their
search for media self-regulation,
original hosts, and has been bank-
responding to the rejection of the
rolling the organisation, a significant
Press Council of Kenya Bill (1995)
factor in its successful resistance
by leading a media review task force
to the incorporation of cross-media
that developed the Media Bill (1998)
ownership restrictions in the Media
which recommended the repeal of
Act (Oriare and Mshindi, 2008: 35).
Section 79 of the Constitution, and
the establishment of the Independent Mass Media Commission and
the Media Council of Kenya (Oriare,
2008: 5).
In 2007, the MOA successfully
pressed the government to ratify
the Kenya Media Council Bill (2007)
while repulsing the statutory disclosure of information sources and the
A probable contributing factor to
2008 threat to close media houses
KUJ’s emasculation might be –iron-
over incitement during the post-
ically so – the growth of a private
election violence. In 2009, MOA
sector media after the 1998 liber-
members closed ranks to fight a re-
alisation, in which competition for
view of the Kenya Communications
employment enables media owners
Act (1998) that would have given
to dictate that their members must
the Information minister the powers
eschew union activity or resign (Ori-
to confiscate radio equipment, but
are et al, 2010: 34). This would of
successfully pressed for the estab-
course be a violation of Article 41’s
lishment of the Broadcast Content
constitutional right of workers to fair
Advisory Board and government
labour practices. While membership
funding of the MCK.
of a union is optional, certain professional arrangements mandate it.
In March 2011, the Information
ministry complained that MOA was
A primary non-statutory media or-
frustrating the digital migration by
ganisation is the MOA, a grouping
refusing to submit their proposed
of the most financially and politi-
content to the authorities, even as
cally powerful media houses. At one
MOA members continued to operate
point, MOA was chaired by the long
without licences. In 2011, MOA re-
running media freedom advocate,
ceived Intellectual Property Kenya’s
and now RMS chairman, SK Mach-
support in fighting a CCK intention
aria. A dominant player on MCK,
to close 26 unlicensed frequencies
MOA early inherited MCK from
by November, CCK’s action being
59
adjudged to amount to government
broadcast should not cause one to
interference contrary to Article 34 (2)
be considered a journalist. Yet, Ke-
and (3) of the Constitution.
nya’s media potential is evident in
Against these realities, Oriare et al’s
(2010: 36) conclusion is that MOA’s
the number of journalists who have
excelled in contexts abroad.
primary concern is its members’
The media is expanding as an are-
private business interests. This ex-
na of investment and employment,
plains its failure to deploy its politi-
making it imperative that frame-
cal and financial muscle in strength-
works be in place to promote pro-
ening the weak media professional
fessionalism. The pioneering Kenya
bodies, instead undermining them
Institute of Mass Communications
such as by inducing professional
was launched in 1963 to serve the
conflict of interest in having media
needs of the KBC/VOK and the
managers hold MOA offices, effec-
Information Ministry’s KNA. The
tively emasculating the Kenya Edi-
University of Nairobi’s media initia-
tors’ Guild. While MOA’s profit mo-
tive was launched as the diploma-
tive has been seen to overrun social
awarding School of Journalism in
sensitivities, it was instrumental in the
1971.
2011 private sector-driven Kenyans
for Kenya! initiative against hunger.
Both institutions admitted students
who had not qualified for degree
studies. Presently, all eight public
60
6.5 Training and
Professionalism in the Media
universities offer degree-level media
Various
have
graduate studies. Daystar Univer-
blamed the lack of professionalism
sity pioneered private sector media
among media practitioners – includ-
studies in 1973, and would in 2007
ing owners, editors and journalists,
become a UNESCO Centre of Ex-
on the lack of training or orientation.
cellence alongside the University
That many of them literally learn by
of Nairobi’s School of Journalism
doing, was the cause of Wanyande’s
and Mass Communications. Into the
(1995) frustrated perception that the
1990s, various private institutions
mere writing of a newspaper article,
began offering middle level media
or the reading of a radio or TV news
studies.
sector
analysts
studies, with some offering post-
Despite the Media Act mandating
governance, environment, gender
the MCK to provide guidance on
and human rights, devolution and
professionalism, the media training
children’s rights.
environment remains unregulated
with the various institutions offering
seemingly self-structured courses
(Oriare and Mshindi, 2008). This gap
in regulation has meant that training needs are identified in an ad hoc
manner, providing a training system
based on ‘template pedagogy’, undermining sustainability. Thus, for
example, while UNDP’s 2007, sixmonth training on media reporting
in conflict contexts was commendable, it did not underscore the fact
that contexts needing conflict-sensitive reporting – such as livestockbased conflicts of northern Kenya
6.6 Political Opinion Polling
in Kenya
Political opinion polling has increasingly become controversial especially into and around the 2005 referendum on the proposed constitution. However, Kenya has a history
of opinion polling dating back to the
first independence decade when a
261-sample survey of voters in Central Nyanza produced a result reasonably similar in overall terms to
the final result...” (Kiage and Owino,
2010: 315).
– preceded and have outlived the
Another election result confirmed
tensions of the 2007 elections.
the findings of a Gallup-type poll
Besides academic training, an additional important area to be covered by media training curricula is
the issue of socialisation that allows
a media practitioner to understand
the context in which they are operating. Hirsch (n.d) highlights difficulties with distinguishing hate speech
(‘out-group castigation) from the
kind of in-group humour (that characterises the performances of Ke-
survey in the same year, but the
poll’s variation from the final count
showed that polling could predict
a winner, but not (necessarily) the
margin. Political polling continued in
Kenya until the 1966 emergence of
Oginga Odinga’s opposition Kenya
People’s Union party which President Kenyatta proscribed in 1969,
sending its entire national leadership into political detention.
nyan stand up comedy). Training
A USAID-funded 1973-4 survey
should also cover issues like the
investigated constituents’ percep-
61
tions of the roles and personalities
Since then, political opinion polling
of parliamentarians. After Moi’s
has become an indispensable part
1978 accession, Weekly Review
of the Kenyan electoral landscape,
habitually published constituency-
with a special focus at the level of
level electoral reviews, incurring the
the presidency and party – rather
Government’s
Substan-
than the parliamentary seats. Yet,
tive opinion polling returned in the
political opinion polling seems to
wake of the 1991 return to multi-
generate controversy, partially be-
partyism, with 1992 seeing various
cause of results in relation to the
exercises including write-in polls
2007 presidential elections. Some
by opposition-sympathetic Society
quarters have attributed the PEV to
wrath.
32
and Finance magazines, two polls
the expectations raised by the poll
by the National Election Monitoring
results that consistently returned an
Unit, and some constituency-based
Odinga/ODM victory.34 In effect, po-
analysis sponsored by the KANU
litical opinion polling remains poorly
party. Polling became widespread
understood.
leading up to the 1997 general elections with various institutions offering predictions of outcomes.
62
This context gave rise to the hurried
drafting and tabling in Parliament of
the private member’s bill, the Re-
Into the millennium, International
lease of the Opinion Polling Results
Republican
conducted
Bill. Consisiting of eight clauses, the
at least seven pre-2002 election
Institute
proposed legislation is “borne of the
opinion polls, while the first of the
reality that the publication of the re-
five Afrobarometer surveys to date
sults of electoral opinion polls influ-
was conducted in 2003 (Kiage and
ences voters to vote in one way or
Owino, 2010: 340).33 Steadman
the other.” It is designed to regulate
launched quarterly popularity polls
“the manner of publication of elec-
in 2005, while NMG contracted three
toral opinion polls and for connect-
companies – Consumer Insight; In-
ed purposes.” Since its publication
fotrak Harris; and Strategic PR and
as a private Member of Parliament’s
Research – to conduct simultane-
bill – as opposed to a government
ous weekly opinion polls leading up
sponsored bill tabled by the At-
to the 2007 general elections (: 350).
torney General, political opinion
32
This would especially be the case if Weekly Review’s analysis led to a victor that was different from KANU’s preferred
candidate.
33
The Afrobarometer is an independent, nonpartisan research project that measures the social, political, and economic
atmosphere in Africa. See http://www.afrobarometer.org/ Accessed 5/11/2012.
34
According to the Waki Report on the post-election violence, electoral monitoring the National Security Intelligence Services
also pointed to an Odinga/ODM victory.32 This would especially be the case if Weekly Review’s analysis led to a victor that
pollsters have consulted with the
at three month intervals, opinion
parliamentarian and contributed to
polling must allow a six-moth lapse.
its revision into the Opinion Polls
MSRA has various sub-committees
Council Advisory Board Bill. While
that vet its members’ activities as
June 2012 media reports indicate
part of the self-regulating process.
the President assented to the opin-
MSRA has nearly 200 practitioner
ion polling management legislation,
members among whom 10 are mar-
its existence is curiously not reflect-
ket research/opinion poll compa-
ed in the Kenya Law Reports data-
nies. Of the ten polling companies
base. While as a consequence, we
in the country, only four undertake
are unable to summarise the final
political opinion polling, viz. (i) IP-
provisions of the legislation, media
SOS Synovate; (ii) TNSrms EA Ltd;
reports indicate that Parliament ap-
(ii) Infotrak Research & Consulting;
proved the doubling of the penalty
and (iv) Strategic PR & Research.
for violating the law’s provisions to
Another political opinion polling
Kshs 1 million.
company which remains outside
35
Kenya’s mainstream individual and
corporate pollsters come together
under the Marketing and Social Research Association (MSRA), a selfregulating body whose operations
are guided by the opinion polling
principles and methods established
the ambit of MSRA is Nakuru-based
Smart Octopus, whose contacts
could not be obtained. In the event,
this study only managed interviews
with two of these companies, that is
Infotrak Research & Consulting and
Strategic PR & Research. .
under the European Standards for
All the political opinion polling com-
Opinion and Marketing Research
panies are private companies (of
[ESOMAR].36 Among the basic te-
limited liability) run on a profit-mak-
nets of the ESOMAR framework
ing basis. They have standard insti-
are the screening of questions, the
tutional management frameworks of
standardisation of the question for-
varied sizes; political opinion polling
mat and the timely release of the re-
forms only a small part of their work
sults to ensure relevance to context.
portfolios, the bigger part involves
ESOMAR also provides that while
market research, public relations,
market research can be undertaken
events management and related ac-
was different from KANU’s preferred candidate.
35
See http://www.kenyalaw.org/kenyalaw/klr_home/ Accessed 5/11/2012.
36
See http://www.esomar. Opinion polling companies relate professionally – such as through sub-contracts – to marketing
companies, such as members of the Association of Practitioners of Advertising.
63
tivities.37 For opinion polling, these
need for the pollsters to declare
companies have a regular ‘omnibus’
who has sponsored or commis-
countrywide survey within which cli-
sioned the survey. Opinion polling
ents from any sector can contract
expert, Dr. Tom Wolfe, says the fol-
the inclusion of own inquiries.
lowing of the high expenses related
If an intending politician commissions a question about the state of
“…the survey firms (except those that
affairs in constituency X, this will be
receive direct donor or parent-company
included in only the questionnaires
funding from abroad) must scamper
of that constituency, alongside the
around to find enough sponsors so as to
rest of the questions asked in that
at least break even, given the very sig-
constituency which were also be-
nificant costs of conducting such surveys
ing asked across the rest of the
where (due to the spatial distribution of
country. The client has the option
over the landscape) the population re-
of having the raw data generated by
mains predominantly rural, with some of
their specific questions analysed, or
it in very distant and infrastructure-poor
delivered raw according to Infortrak
locations). Such efforts often produce a
and Strategic PR.
very complex funding ‘mix’, with clients
As for the question on the presidential elections, as discussed above,
NMG commissioned three political
opinion polling companies to work
simultaneously in 2007, producing
results which could be compared
for verification. The Star has also
recently commissioned a survey
conducted by Strategic PR, which
also conducted three surveys during 2011.
64
to polling exercises:
having various ‘profiles’ like: (1) Those
who contribute to the firm for its work in
general, but such payments are not associated with any particular poll; (2) Those
clients who pay for an entire poll (and may
or may not want the results released to
the public through the media); (3) Those
clients who pay for a number of specific
questions, the results to which only they
receive/learn about, while other clients...
(4) Pay for a number of specific questions,
but allow the results (to at least some of
A major issue raised by political
them) to be released to the media; and
opinion polling detractors is the
so on.” 38
37
For example, Strategic PR was founded by the late University of Nairobi journalism lecturer, Peter Oriare Oriare and a
partner. In turn, Infotrak is a family-based company. See hhtp://www.infotrakresearch.com for the company’s portfolio of
clients, many of whom have nothing to do with politics.
38
See interview at http://www.bizcommunity.com/Article/196/15/76480.html, accessed 10/9/2012
All pollsters use the MSRA/ESOMAR
opinion pollsters were partisan in
framework to develop survey instru-
2007; these perceptions remain so
ments and delineate samples, both
to date. The view was that with its
of which must be peer reviewed by
Central Kenyan CEO, IPSOS Syn-
MSRA colleagues. The companies
novate was PNU aligned, while Info-
are conscious to the problem of
trak with a Western Kenya CEO was
survey fatigue among respondents
ODM aligned.
who do not see any direct benefit in
responding. Consequently, survey
instruments are concise, and the
pollsters report that their research
assistants are well trained for efficiency, many of them being retained
from previous survey cycles.
Namwaya’s (2010) revelations about
politicians and their political parties’
interactions with media houses also
lend some credence to the suspicions that pollsters might collude
with certain politicians. Yet, the
consistency of the returns – such as
The companies report conducting
NMG’s 2007 commission – suggest
call-back reviews to confirm that
objectivity among pollsters, who,
outputs are based on bona fide in-
like the mainstream media houses
terviews, failing which the work of
risk losing clientele if they are seen
the offending interviewer is rejected
to be partisan. Kenyan pollsters
and a repeat survey conducted. The
point to the fact that in spite of their
interviewers are normally college
operational independence, their re-
and university students working un-
sults are often quite comparable
der supervisors overseen by com-
across companies, and with those
pany officers.
of the National Security Intelligence
Data collection is usually preceded
Service (during 2007).
by a courtesy call on the local ad-
Indeed, when in 2007 NMG hired
ministration to ensure the smooth
the two pollsters interviewed for this
conduct of the exercise.Political
report and Consumer Insight, the re-
pollsters deny any collusion with
sults from the 50 surveys conducted
politicians, pointing to the fact that
between 29th September and 17th
not many politicians even take the
December were comparable, with
initiative of loading their questions
Odinga consistently ahead of Kibaki
on the omnibus. Yet, there are per-
(Kiage and Owino, 2010: 351).
sisting perceptions that the political
65
It is therefore curious that NMG
the country.”40 Poll Kenya promises
would produce a 2012 caution to its
a cost-effective means of collect-
journalists declaring:
ing data, thereby enabling the ex-
“We take the view that, not knowing the
sponsors of and how the polling was conducted, we risk our reputation if we play
up the “findings” of these pollsters,” 39
pansion of the survey sample size.
However, the lack of a face to face
interaction with the respondent is
likely to undermine aspects of data
collection, such as the random dis-
A new entrant to the political opin-
tribution of the sample. The initiative
ion polling scene is Poll Kenya, “a
by opinion pollsters incorporate a
web/sms based interactive system
council advisory board in the pend-
that will allow Kenyans to give their
ing opinion polling legislation should
opinions on next year’s elections as
enhance confidence in the product
well as other topical issues within
of opinion polls.
Notes
66
39
40
This is reported by Caroline Kimutai at http://www.bizcommunity.com/Article/196/15/76480.html Accessed 12/10/2012
http://www.pollkenya.co.ke/index.php Accessed 12/10/2012
Discussion
7
In finalising this discussion on
should licence practitioners; and
the influence of ownership and
that process should mandate dues
content, we consider some im-
from practitioners which can be set
plications of the issues that have
by the Act – in relation to the rec-
arisen. Most important of all is
ommendations below on a statutory
that the review of the Media Act
framework for terms and conditions
should produce a more effective
of employment.
framework for MCK operations.
Thus, besides the remedial mea-
Along those lines, it is critical that
sures currently availed to the Com-
MCK get government funding with-
plaints Commission, it or MCK
out strings attached to make it inde-
should be able to discipline errant
pendent of big media, MOA. Such
practitioners by, amongst other
an arrangement already exists in the
things, suspending or even cancel-
legal sector where the Advocates
ling their practicing licences. In the
Complaints Commission (ACC) is an
proposed context, individual media
integral part of the State Law Office,
professions could have societies
but handles complaints against all
that perform a similar role to the
private and public sector advocates.
Law Society of Kenya in relation to
Similar arrangements exist for the
medical profession through the
ACC, or Kenya Medical Association
in relation to MPDB.
Medical Practitioners and Dentists
The Kenya Information and Com-
Board (MPDB). In keeping with that
munications Act already gives CCK
ACC model, therefore, it will be nec-
extensive powers of regulation over
essary to strengthen MCK’s func-
the electronic media. However, the
tions relating to the registration of all
appointment of the executive by
media practitioners, not just its cur-
the Minister undermines the CCK’s
rent statutory function of registering
independence. The proposed new
local journalists and accrediting for-
legislation radically changes the
eign journalists.41 Effectively, MCK
landscape and provides greater
41
The Act’s limiting definition of a journalist is a person who ‘collects, writes, edits and presents news or news articles in
newspapers and magazines, radio and television broadcasts, and in the internet’.
67
independence of the sub-sector’s
or diploma colleges. Legislation for
oversight body, ICCK, by removing
curricula for different levels of quali-
the arbitrary ministerial choice of
fications would enable MCK to reg-
its commissioners. The selection of
ulate the qualifications of individuals
the commissioners has been shifted
entering the media and their subse-
to the Public Service Commission
quent professional conduct, such
which is itself being reformed for
as with respect to handling sensitive
fidelity to the Constitution. Mean-
political matter.
while, the Constitution (2010) and
legislation arising have offered variants for appointments to sensitive
public offices that enhance their
distance from the Executive, and indeed the Legislature and Judiciary.
The measures include preliminary
(public) screening of applicants for
suitability, and a secondary screening of recommended appointees by
Parliament. Advantage should be
taken of these experiences to enhance the independence of the proposed ICCK.
68
A further area needing improved
legislation for MCK is in regulating and monitoring media content.
For politics, the concern is with inflammatory material in the context
of electioneering, but this concern
also has to do with improving capacity in the rest of the areas the
Act requires MCK to monitor, such
as inaccuracies, and pornography.
The effective use of curricula developed in a consultative manner
would enhance regulation of media
content as it is produced. In terms
These proposals lead to a further
of monitoring output, MCK’s scope
major concern in the sector, that of
for universal monitoring is limited;
training which currently reflects no
hence it must look for partnerships
universal status (in terms of scope
recognised by its revised legislation
and content). While the central ac-
to collect credible evidence with
creditation of universities (probably)
which to undertake its mandate. For
universalises the scope and con-
political issues, for example, MCK
tent of their mass communication
could liaise with other government
curricula, the same cannot be true
and non-government agencies that
of an aviation college of tourism
monitor political mischief, such as
studies institute offering journalism
the National Security Intelligence
in comparison to other certificate
Service, National Cohesion and Inte-
gration Commission, Peace-building
dilemma in distinguishing art – such
and Conflict Resolution Programme,
as the ethnicised content of Kenyan
human rights commissions, and the
stand-up comedians – from hate
police amongst others. In these re-
speech and jingoism. It is the comi-
spects, the Internet presents an
cal characterisations of ethnic Ke-
especial even if surmountable chal-
nyans that provides the background
lenge, being the arena of much eth-
against which ethnic chauvinists ply
nic, racist and divisive vitriol. How-
their trade.
ever, the Internet also offers a costeffective platform on which to undertake such integrated monitoring.
Finally, the Media Act should also
address the status of media owners.
Firstly, in many other jurisdictions,
Directly related to these concerns
media conglomeratisation and con-
with curbing hate speech and ethnic
centration is statutorily controlled.
jingoism is the reality that since the
For Kenya, while the ICT Policy 2006
2007/08 elections and violence, var-
advocated against the two practices
ious people have been arraigned in
(Oriare et al, 2010), subsequent re-
court on suspicion of having com-
lated legislation (Section 4) did not
mitted such crimes; yet many such
address this area which is critical
cases have not been finalised four
from the perspective of the misuse
years later. This is also true of a lot of
of the media for political gains. In
impunity in the country. Such con-
truth, RMS’ control of radio and TV
duct – including the government’s
frequencies and audiences pres-
current attitude to the impending
ents real challenges for democratic
ICC trials – fuels the perception that
deepening in Kenya. The failure to
crimes of particular kinds will never
legislate against the two practices
be prosecuted and finalised.
has been attributed to the strength
Thus, even as MCK’s capacity for
monitoring such misconduct is improved, it is timely that prosecution
and judicial reforms are underway
that can act decisively on misdeeds.
of the mainstream media lobby,
MOA. It is imperative that legislation
restrain the scope for monopolistic
practices that can undermine the
deepening of nationhood.
Such finalisation would in itself pro-
Additionally, how can MOA con-
vide a deterrent against further mis-
duct be reined in specifically in the
conduct. However, there is also a
context of the Media Act, additional
69
to the weak provisions presently
mismanagement, but arguably also
provided by the Kenya Information
through a liberalisation that has ex-
and Communications Act and the
panded the sector at a faster rate
Books and Newspapers Act, which
than the union could monitor and
largely focus on the technical as-
respond to. However, the union
pects of the industry?
For one,
should also review its rules to en-
applicants for print and electronic
able it to have a strong base from
media licensing could be required
which it can defend journalists who
to declare their political affiliations,
might fall foul of owners and man-
including relationships to active
agers rebuffing a compromising
politicians. Further, media operators
situation. Thus, while there is need
could be required to declare alle-
to strengthen KUJ, there is also a
giances so many months ahead of
need to rein in MOA in the interests
a general election.
of enhancing the capacities of em-
42
If media practitioners – the media
owners’ employees – are regulated
as proposed above, it is necessary
to provide measures that regulate
owners’ (mis)conduct towards employees and profession associates.
At too many FM stations, staff remain unpaid for months on end;
yet legislation requires wonwers to
show evidence of financial solvency.
70
ployees to stand up to threats of
disciplining by employers for refusing to comply with orders that might
threaten political harmony. Provisions could be made in the Media
Act; or alternatively, the government
could legislate for a nationwide media owners’ policy and legal framework, an approach that could rein in
the alternative media.
KCA members are also at the mercy
Vulnerability is a major avenue
of the media houses to whom they
through which unprofessional in-
submit their stories. This is indeed
fluences are made to prevail over
the domain of KUJ, whose activism
individuals. As individual media as-
amongst other things, produced
sociations, some of whose mem-
the 1992 proposals of the Media
bers work under a single owner or
Industry Steering Committee, the
editor, it will always be difficult to
earliest foundations of MCK. Yet,
extract concessions from the latter.
KUJ appears to have been emascu-
However, there is a possibility that
lated reportedly through its internal
a united front under the umbrella of
42
For example, the Kenya Information and Communications Act only provides under its Regulations (2009) for the restriction
of multiple frequencies per licensee within the same “broadcast coverage area”.
MCK could enable the associations
organisations’ core objectives are
to extract reasonable concessions
unlikely to map. Special attention
from employers. Thus, a revitalised
should also be paid to KCA given its
MCK should provide a platform on
contribution to media output.
which all the sector associations
meet. Such a platform would, for
example, deliberate on the curriculum content, alongside the proposals concerning accreditation, registration, recruitment, discipline and
related matters.
The
persistence
of
personality-
based politics perpetuates the risk
of a return to violence in the next
general elections – for many of the
reasons cited above, such as the
media agenda being demand rather
than supply-driven. The conduct
While employers will agree with
of the Independent Electoral and
employees on the specific terms
Boundaries Commission (IEBC) will
of engagement, there should be
be critical to whether the forthcom-
minimum terms and conditions of
ing elections are peaceful or not.
service which ensure professional
Yet, many lament the failure by IEBC
dignity in the sector, keeping com-
and its predecessor, the Interim In-
promising situations at bay, such as
dependent
the rampant corrupting practices by
sion, to take advantage of the many
politicians and the corporate sec-
by-elections conducted since the
tor. Finally, such deliberations could
signing of the National Accord, to
rationalise the existence of the vari-
stamp authority on the electoral
ous media management organisa-
process, having failed to take action
tions, as some likely duplicate oth-
against many electoral indiscretions.
ers’ functions, to arrive at a leaner,
more internally coherent set that is
better able to represent members of
the profession.
Boundaries
Commis-
Kenyans also wait to see the value
of the investment in the Truth Justice and Reconciliation Commission
which failed to interview key perpe-
In that context, it is important to re-
trators of injustices over the years.
vamp the Kenya Editors’ Guild (KEG)
The work of the National Cohesion
and make it a more professionally
and Integration Commission is also
focused entity. It is sacrilegious that
critical in these respects. These re-
a member of the Guild should also
lated scenarios will necessarily be
sit on the MOA board as the two
played out in the media, meaning
71
tensions can arise outside the im-
mittent violence over access to wa-
mediate political context.
ter between its pastoralist and farm-
A final issue is over the likelihood
of violence in the impending 2013
But it is the scope for mobilising for
elections, and whether the media
such crimes that makes media own-
conduct is likely to promote such
ership attractive. Electoral violence
violence. Stremlau and Price (2009)
is a characteristic of all electoral
empahsised the need to place elec-
politics in Kenya since indepen-
toral violence in the context of time
dence, the extent varying over time
and space, rather than viewing it
and across regions; and it has not
as an event, arguing that election-
depended on the media. What can
eering provides an opportunity for
be done is to minimise the extent
opening up old wounds, bringing
to which media conduct either pro-
underlying grievances to the fore.
vokes or fuels such violence while
Wanyande (1997) used heterogene-
also championing peaceful coexis-
ity of civil society to underscore the
tence. There is already in place the
same characteristic in the media,
Code of Conduct for the Practice
which has progressive and reaction-
of Journalism in Kenya and New
ary elements.
Guidelines on Election Coverage.
Thus, while various commentators
have blamed the Kenyan media for
the 2007/08 PEV, others have pointed to its double edged performance,
providing civic education over many
AWCFS (2005) established that the
existence of such material does not
translate directly into their use as
sometimes, journalists do not even
have ready access to them.
years while also stoking violence.
Consequently, it is important to con-
Since August 2012, the Tana River
duct regular education on such mate-
delta in north-eastern Kenya has
rial. This conforms with Stremlau and
been experiencing violence which
Price’s (2009) various recommenda-
some analysts have associated with
tions on managing electoral violence,
local politicians’ need to influence
including inter-media dialogue, clear
the ethnic configuration of the vot-
definitions of hate speech and its
ers’ roll. Significantly, the Tana Delta
monitoring, partnerships and the man-
was not a locus of the 2007/08 PEV,
agement of opinion political polling.
but has always experienced inter-
72
ing communities.
The history and contemporary prac-
The Kenyan alternative media distin-
tice of the media in Kenya presents
guished itself through guerrilla-like
a sustained rebellion by private in-
tactics that contributed to the liber-
vestors against the colonial and in-
alisation not just of the media sector,
dependence governments’ desire to
but also of national politics. Thus, to
over-regulate the media.
paraphrase a Marxian framework,
As with the European community
during colonialism, the mainstream
media owners have preferred Makokha’s (2010) professional media
the emergence of MCK and CCK
were mere preliminary syntheses of
media dialectics given the dictatorial
scope of the old constitution.
model in which private interests
These gains are arguably only now
prevail over all others, leading to the
being made substantive in the con-
2007 emergence of an MCK con-
text of the progressive Constitution
trolled by MOA.
(2010), with the media sector trans-
And as the government and the
mainstream media have struggled
against each other, those excluded
have evolved their own alternative
media model which strides the divide
from outright gutter material to serious publications that are only constrained by resources from entering
the mainstream media category.
forming more into a social responsibility model, even if threat remain.
But the foregoing chapters have illustrated the manner in which the Kenyan media has continually lived up
to Stremlau and Price’s (2009) characterisation of the media as a mirror of society that amplifies reforms
while also enabling agenda-setting.
Notes
73
Notes
74
Conclusions and
Recommendations
8
The Constitution (2010) revolu-
which politicians own, or might have
tionises government in Kenya.
access to owners of, the media, and
Specifically, the Bill of Rights
to therefore adversely influence me-
(Chapter 4) has far-reaching im-
dia content for a favoured agenda.
plications for personal freedoms,
In order to better understand the
including those that require the
context in which the media operates
media for their enjoyment.
vis a vis the risk of political interfer-
Yet, media practitioners need to be
aware that the Constitution contemplates the oppressive enjoyment of
rights and freedoms and provides
that these can be limited by law “to
the extent… reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic
society based on human dignity,
equality and freedom, taking into
account all relevant factors…” Fundamentally, then, the document
is not a carte blanche for anarchy:
instead, it is a framework for enhancing psychological and material
human welfare, which is consistent
with enhancing democracy.
ence, this report is the product of
a limited review of the literature on
the dialectics of media ownership,
policy and output, interviews with
key informants, and a unstructured
survey of various media houses.
The study found various avenues
through which politics can enter
media houses, including areas outside and inside the media houses.
The Kenyan practice since independence of the elite straddling multiple
economic sectors – politics, industry and agriculture – has been reinvented in the media industry where
the mainstream investors straddle
the print/electronic divide, some-
Concern has revived with the me-
times with multiple investments in
dia’s perceived role in Kenya’s
each sub-sector. This has been
2007/08 post-election violence, in
made possible because of the weak
the context of the impending gen-
legislative and institutional frame-
eral elections under the new consti-
works governing the sector which
tution. The focus is on the extent to
are also inefficiently applied.
75
The media training arena lacks
the following recommendations:
adequate regulatory frameworks,
It is necessary to undertake an ex-
resulting in many graduates with
tensive stakeholder-driven review
questionable orientation. The pro-
of the legal and institutional frame-
liferation of media houses attracts
works governing the media sector.
many young people to pursue stud-
Such a review should take into
ies at questionable institutions, but
consideration the various provi-
the large numbers graduating also
sions on the media in Constitution
weakens their bargaining power,
(2010). The review should be suf-
including their scope for resisting
ficiently wide to cover all aspects
interference.
of the media industry.
The line between media owners
Critically, the review of legislations
and editors has increasingly been
should arrive at a stronger, well re-
blurred as the latter are co-opted
sourced and therefore more effec-
into the formers’ domain, meaning
tive MCK that is respected by all
the editors no longer exclusively
sector players, including the gov-
pursue professionalism.
ernment, owners, editors, manag-
Most importantly, the core legislative frameworks – the Media Act
The legislative reviews should also
and those governing CCK and the
improve the capacities of the vari-
ous media oversight bodies, such
– are out of focus in terms of the
as CCK and Registrar Books and
needs of the sector.
Newspapers, to perform their
Consequently, MCK and other regu-
76
ers and journalists.
functions.
latory bodies are unable to efficiently
There should be a stakeholder as-
fulfil their mandates, leaving gaps
sessment of the institutional needs
through which weak professionalism
of the sector, which will rationalise
creeps in, providing opportunities for
the various organisations that are
political interference. With an under-
currently active in the sector with a
lying objective of enhancing the me-
view to providing an efficient inte-
dia sector’s independence and pro-
grated framework for the sector’s
fessional integrity, the study makes
management.
Arising from the development of
The development of appropriate
an integrated sector manage-
curricula should form the basis
ment framework, there should be
for accreditation of institutions to
a review of capacity needs which
offer mass communication stud-
leads to a review of training needs.
ies on the evidence of their having
This should cover elaborate curri-
adequate capacities. This should
cula content for all categories and
then lead to the development of
levels of the sector.
frameworks for accession of individuals to the various professions.
Notes
77
6
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Notes
80
Appendix
10
Publishers with Unknown Political Allegiances
Publication
Publisher/Editor
Africa Woman magazine
Sylvia Owori
Animal welfare
Gatu Mbaria
Business Post Magazine
Alex Ndung’u
CIO East Africa Magazine
Leadership - Kommunication Ultimate
Ltd – Zachary Ochieng
Diplomatic Magazine
Global Village Publishers (EA) Ltd –
Kwendo Opanga
Expressions Today
David Makali, Henry Makori
Homes Kenya Magazine
Beyond Media – Carole Muchendu
East Africa Destination Magazine
Haligonian Investment Ltd – Brennen
Matthews
Management Magazine
Kenya Institute of Management Carole
Kimutai
Nairobi Law Monthly
Law Monthly Ahmednasir Abdullahi and
Dennis Ben Mosotah
Parent Magazine
Stellan Consult Ltd – Eunice Mathu
Pregnant Magazine
Integral Media – Brenda Wangwe
Sacco Review
Peter Silsil and Joseph Karanja
Salon Business Solutions Magazine
Afri-Salon Consultants Ltd – Faith Harry
Small Medium Enterprises Today
Liason Media – Munene Kaboro
Smartlife – Nakumatt
Creative Edge – Jenny Luesby
SWARA
East Africa Wild Life Society – Nigel
Hunter
The Agrolink
Tropex Limited – Mumassabba Michael
The Corporate Intelligence Africa
Talanta Africa Media &
Telecommunications Ltd – Bernard
Gitonga
The Exchange Magazine
East African Securities Exhanges –
Donald Ouma
The Property Zone
Property Zone Consulting Ltd – Christine
Mweteeli
True Love Magazine
Carole Mandi
Tupike Magazine
Lavender Hues Limited – Catherine
Muraguri
Unique Homes
Unique Homes Magazine Kenya Limited
– Boniface Gatobu
Source: MCK (forthcoming), citing Reelforge Media Monitoring
81
Notes
82
Notes
83

Factually true, legally untrue

Transcription

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