Crisis in the South Caucasus: Turkey`s Big Moment?

Analysis
Summary: As the only NATO
member to border the Caucasus.
Turkey control the Bosporus
and Dardanelles, through which
Russia and other Black Sea
countries conduct most of their
trade. The conflict between
Georgia and Russia offers Turkey
a unique opportunity to bolster
its regional clout, to check Russian and Iranian influence, and to
help secure the flow of Westernbound oil and natural gas from
former Soviet Central Asia and
Azerbaijan. Will Turkey’s leaders
rise to the occasion?
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Crisis in the South Caucasus:
Turkey’s Big Moment?
by Amberin Zaman*
ANKARA — Turkey is the sole NATO
member that borders the Caucasus. It
control the Bosporus and Dardanelles,
through which Russia and other Black
Sea countries conduct most of their
trade. The recent crisis between
Georgia and Russia, offers Turkey a
unique chance to bolster its regional
clout, to check Russian and Iranian
influence, and to help secure the flow
of Western-bound oil and natural gas
from former Soviet Central Asia and
Azerbaijan. Will Turkey’s leaders rise
to the occasion? Turkey’s proposal to
create a “Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform,” a scheme calling for
new methods of crisis management and
conflict resolution, is a step in the right
direction. Yet, there’s one glaring hitch.
Turkey does not have formal ties with
one proposed member: Armenia. And
without Armenia, Turkey’s hopes of
becoming a regional bigwig aren’t likely
to go far.
Turkey’s Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip
Erdoğan, floated the idea of a Caucasus
Stability and Cooperation Platform
during a string of meetings with
Russian, Georgian, and Azerbaijani
leaders over the past week. Critics have
dismissd the initiative as an empty
gesture that will allow Prime Minister
Erdoğan to burnish his credentials as
a statesman and hog the international
stage. The plan (which also talks about
cooperation in tourism and trade) is
vague and lacking in substance. No wonder Erdoğan’s respective hosts embraced
it so effortlessly, the cynics add.
Not everyone agrees. Many believe that
the “Platform” could serve as a useful
cover for mending fences with Armenia,
a step that is clearly in Turkey’s interests
but which faces formidable diplomatic
obstacles. In 1993, Turkey sealed its
border (though not its air links) with its
eastern neighbor after Armenia occupied a chunk of Azerbaijan following a
nasty war over the Nagnorno-Karabakh
enclave.
OSCE-sponsored talks to broker a peace
have failed so far. Keeping the Turkish
border shut has hurt exports to Central
Asia and limited Ankara’s regional influence, yet it has not humbled Armenia
into returning occupied Azerbaijani
land. Instead, it has spawned a flourishing black market trade in Turkish goods
carried via Georgia by a handful of
oligarchs who have propped up successive Armenian strongmen and pushed
Armenia further into the arms of Russia
and Iran. Meanwhile, flush from its
recent oil earnings, an increasingly bellicose Azerbaijan has been muttering
Amberin Zaman has been the Turkey correspondent for The Economist since 1999. She has also been a regular contributor to the
Washington Post, the Los Angeles Times, and the Daily Telegraph of London. The views expressed here are those of the author and
do not necessarily represent the views of the German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF).
*
Analysis
about retaking Nagorno-Karabakh by force if need be.
America) Turkish and Armenian diplomats have been holding
secret talks in Switzerland over the past few months that could
lay the ground for reestablishing diplomatic ties.
All of this creates the regional backdrop for the current conflict
in Georgia, which has starkly illuminated the need for all sides
to rethink the status quo. The need for new strategic thinking
was never more clear than last week, when Russia blew up a
rail bridge near Tbilisi, thereby disrupting Georgia’s main rail
network that runs to Armenia and Azerbaijan. This disrupted
Azerbaijan’s oil exports, which had already been hit by an
explosion earlier this month in the Turkish section of its main
export pipeline running from Baku to the Mediterranean port
of Ceyhan. Yet a proposed extension of the pipeline looping
through Armenia might have saved the day.
Turkey has several key demands. The first is that Armenia
declare that it has no territorial claims on Turkey. The second is
that Armenia shelve its backing for its diaspora’s campaign for
international genocide recognition and allow a commission of
historians from both countries investigate the events of 1915
instead. Armenia’s pragmatic president, Serzh Sarkisian, has
responded positively to both. And upping the ante, Sarkisian
invited his Turkish counterpart Abdullah Gül to a football
World Cup qualifier between Turkey and Armenia to be played
in Yerevan on September 6.
Landlocked and poor, Armenia is looking even more vulnerable. Most of its fuel and much of its grain comes through
Georgia’s Black Sea ports, which are virtually paralysed. The
capital city of Yerevan is already experiencing a serious fuel
shortage, where many filling stations have halted sales of gasoline and supplies of key commodities such as jet fuel and wheat
are dwindling. Armenia is reportedly trying to secure additional fuel supplies through Iran, its only remaining neighbor
whose border remains open.
Azerbaijan is deeply unhappy, and President Gül has yet to respond. As ever, all eyes are turned to Turkey’s influential army,
which trained and armed Azeri officers during the NagornoKarabakh war. In a hopeful sign, pro-establishment newspapers that tend to reflect the generals’ views have commented
favorably on the secret talks after they were leaked. More
significantly perhaps, the habitually meddlesome top brass has
not uttered a word. Gül may well decide to travel to Yerevan.
The question may then become whether the Turkish leader will
take the train from Kars or fly.
This is the moment for Turkey to step forward. By re-opening
the rail line linking the eastern province of Kars to Armenia,
which then hooks up with both the Georgian and Azeri grids,
Turkey could both expedite the delivery of humanitarian aid to
Georgia’s war-ravaged north and help avert the looming crisis
in Armenia. Azerbaijan would benefit too. But its leaders, who
oppose the slightest contact between Turkey and Armenia, are
sure to disagree.
Amberin Zaman, Correspondent, The Economist
Amberin Zaman has been the Turkey correspondent for The Economist
since 1999. She has also been a regular contributor to the Washington
Post, the Los Angeles Times, and the Daily Telegraph of London.
About GMF
Turkey’s ethnic and religious ties with its Azeri cousins have
long held sway over Ankara’s regional policy. But there seems
to be growing recognition in official circles that isolating
Armenia is hurting Turkey without necessarily helping Azerbaijan. For one, there are renewed worries that a congressional
resolution calling the mass slaughter of the Armenians by the
Ottoman Turks in 1915 genocide may be passed should the
Democrats win this November’s presidential election. Relations
between Turkey and the United States, already bruised by Iraq,
would sink to new lows. Whereas if Turkey and Armenia were
to make peace beforehand, the resolution might be buried for
good. Besides, relations with Armenia would make it easier for
Turkey to push for a deal on Nagorno-Karabakh.
The German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) is a nonpartisan
American public policy and grantmaking institution dedicated to
promoting greater cooperation and understanding between North
America and Europe. GMF does this by supporting individuals and
institutions working on transatlantic issues, by convening leaders to
discuss the most pressing transatlantic themes, and by examining ways
in which transatlantic cooperation can address a variety of global
policy challenges. In addition, GMF supports a number of initiatives to
strengthen democracies. Founded in 1972 through a gift from Germany,
on the 25th anniversary of the Marshall Plan, as a permanent memorial to Marshall Plan assistance, GMF maintains a strong presence on
both sides of the Atlantic. In addition to its headquarters in Washington,
DC, GMF has seven offices in Europe: Berlin, Bratislava, Paris, Brussels,
Belgrade, Ankara, and Bucharest.
Mindful of such rewards (and with plenty of nudging from
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