Security and Cryptography 1 Stefan Köpsell, Thorsten
Transcription
Security and Cryptography 1 Stefan Köpsell, Thorsten
Security and Cryptography 1 Stefan Köpsell, Thorsten Strufe Disclaimer: this course has been created with very valuable input from Dan Boneh (go check his videos!), Stefan Katzenbeisser, Mark Manulis, Günter Schäfer, and the members of the Chair. Dresden, WS 15/16 Lecture Outline Who are we? Organizational matters Course outline Basic concepts of security and cryptography 15.10.2015 Privacy and Security Folie Nr. 2 Who we are Professur „Datenschutz und Datensicherheit“ For this lecture: • Thorsten Strufe (Lectures) • INF 3070 / +49 351 463 38247 • thorsten.strufe [at] tu-dresden.de • Dr. Stefan Köpsell (Lectures and Exercises) • INF 3062 • stefan.koepsell [at] tu-dresden.de https://dud.inf.tu-dresden.de 15.10.2015 Privacy and Security Folie Nr. 3 What we‘re interested in • Can we prevent surveillance and retain our privacy? • How can networks be made robust and secure? • How can you communicate with confidentiality? • Can we provide competitive (useful and performant) services without snooping on the users? • • • Social Networking? Recommendation Systems? Data Mining on confidential data (biomedical!)? • How can we analyse this context and develop sustainable solutions (scientifically)? • With everything getting digital: how can we avoid the next big data-loss desaster? [1] [2] [3] [4] 15.10.2015 Privacy and Security Folie Nr. 4 A Case Study: Social Media and the Web Web traffic is converging to sites of 6 corporations • Success due to integration and strong personalization • Data minimization and avoidance in conflict to business modell Convergence of communication and expression • Facebook evolves to integrated communication platform with 1.3 Bn users • Google, g+: 500 Mio User • Clear name: perfectly identifiable Increasingly mobile utilization • Perfect location, easy tracking • Configuration more tedious [Nielsen] 15.10.2015 Privacy and Security Folie Nr. 5 The Stakeholders Subscribers Provider Partner Advertisers Extending Partner Public 15.10.2015 Institutions Privacy and Security Network Provider Folie Nr. 6 The Providers and the Data at their Hands Explicit Incidental / „metadata“ • created content (profile, posts) • annotations/comments • preferences/structural interaction (contacts, +1, etc) • Observed: session artifacts (time of actions), interest (retrieved profiles; membership in groups/ participation in discussions), influence (users) clickstreams, ad preferences, exact sessions, communication (end points, type, intensity, frequency, extent), location (IP; shared; gps coordinates), udid • Inferred derived from observations homophily Extracted • Profiling • preference models • image recognition models 15.10.2015 Externally correlated • interest/preferences (clickstreams through ad networks, fb-connect) Privacy and Security Folie Nr. 7 Model and Adversaries Communication Relation “Friend”, Social Engineering Trust Real Time Application Server End device A Add Interface DB B delegated Secondary Server App Server SNS-Provider, Prism (TAO) Alice SNP ISP, Echelon, Eikonal, Tempora Internet 15.10.2015 Privacy and Security Folie Nr. 8 Our Research Clusters • Network Security • • Protecting the transmission Protecting the network A • Privacy Enhancing Tech • • B D B Network anonymisation Anonymous services Alice Alice InternetSNP 15.10.2015 Privacy and Security SNP Folie Nr. 9 Dezentralize to Encounter Censorship Entire distribution of data and control • • Decentralize everything Use trusted service providers only System classes: • • • Federated SNS P2P / D-OSN Social Overlays and Darknets 15.10.2015 Privacy and Security Folie Nr. 10 Lösungsklassen / Research Clusters • Network Security • • • • Protecting the transmission Resilient networks Data Analysis User understanding Inference assessment Intention recognition • • • Privacy Enhancing Tech • • • Network anonymisation Anonymous services Darknets/Social Overlays A • Content protection • • A BB Secure Computation Oblivious Recommenders D B Alice Alice InternetSNP 15.10.2015 Privacy and Security SNP Folie Nr. 11 What we offer you FS Wintersemester 1 FS Sommersemester 2 Informations- und Kodierungstheorie 3 Betriebssysteme & Sicherheit 4 Forschungslinie 5 BAS-4 SaC-1 / Kanalkodierung 6 BAS-4 SaC-2/Crypto 8 Vert-4, ANW/AFT, Beleg SaC-2/Crypto/Resilient Networking 10 Diplomarbeit 7 9 Vert-4, ANW/AFT FB-Mining/Kanalkodierung B-510/B-520: • Security & Crypto 1 • S&C 2 (PETs) • Kanalkodierung • Seminare/Praktika FS Wintersemester BAS-4: • Security & Crypto 1 • S&C 2 (PETs) • Crypto • Kanalkodierung Vert-4: • S&C 1&2 • Crypto • Resilient Networking • Mining Facebook • Kanalkodierung FS Sommersemester B1 B2 Informations- und Kodierungstheorie B3 B4 B5 B-510 Betriebssysteme & Sicherheit B6 B-520 Bachelor-Thesis M1 BAS-4 M2 BAS-4, VERT-4, ANW M3 Vert-4, FPA M4 Master-Thesis 15.10.2015 Privacy and Security Folie Nr. 12 Topics of this Lecture Basic concepts of privacy, IT security, and crypto A little mathematical background • discrete probability • some number theory Crypto • Symmetric crypto • Asymmetric crypto Additional Services and Primitives • Modification/Integrity checks • Key agreement and key exchange • Authentication • Access Control Network security 15.10.2015 Privacy and Security Folie Nr. 13 Material Slides/recordings will be on the web site Literature/References • Dan Boneh‘s coursera course. • Boneh & Shoup: Graduate course in applied crypto • Katz & Lindell: Intro to modern crypto • David Kahn: The Codebreakers • Simon Singh: The Code Book • „Applied Cryptography“ (MOV, Schneier) • Schäfer, Roßberg: Netzsicherheit 15.10.2015 Privacy and Security Folie Nr. 14 Organizational matters Courses • Thu 9:20 – 10:50 • E023 Exercises • Thu 11:10 – 12:40 • E023 • Both theory and practical tasks Communication • There‘s a mailing list, please register here: https://mailman.zih.tu-dresden.de/groups/listinfo/dud-sac • Establish a healthy culture of common discussions • Talk to us. Exams • Oral exams, make appointments All necessary information on the Web site 15.10.2015 Privacy and Security Folie Nr. 15 Trends around you: large to small Challenges: • Pervasive computing • Identification of individuals Tracing • Integrity of information 15.10.2015 Privacy and Security Folie Nr. 16 Trends around you: static to mobile Challenges: • Disclosure of information • Unreliable devices • Unreliable connections • Deception (IMSI catcher) • Increased attack surface 15.10.2015 Privacy and Security Folie Nr. 17 Trends around you: tangible to virtual Challenges: • Integrity of information • Authenticating counterpart • Observability of acts • Mass data collection 15.10.2015 Privacy and Security Folie Nr. 18 Trends around you: offline goes online Challenges: • Increased attack surface • Loss of PII • Profiling • Observation 15.10.2015 Privacy and Security Folie Nr. 19 Trends around you: occasional to pervasive Challenges: • „Always on“ • Proximity and coverage • Dragnet surveillance 15.10.2015 Privacy and Security Folie Nr. 20 Introducing some Actors of the Play For clarity it‘s good to have some model… Mallory : message Alice Bob Eve 15.10.2015 Privacy and Security Folie Nr. 21 Variations of the Play Craig File Alice HDD Trudy Bob „Terrorist“ Carol Alice „Honest but curious“ Dan 15.10.2015 Privacy and Security Folie Nr. 22 A little terminology: What is a Threat? Abstract Definition: A threat is any possible event or sequence of actions that might lead to a violation of one or more security goals The actual realization of a threat is called an attack Examples: A hacker breaking into a corporate computer Disclosure of emails in transit Someone changing financial accounting data A hacker temporarily shutting down a website Someone using services or ordering goods in the name of others ... But what are security goals? Security goals can be defined: depending on the application environment, or in a more general, technical way Privacy and Security Folie Nr. 23 Security Goals in Application Environments Public Telecommunication Providers: Protect subscribers’ privacy Restrict access to administrative functions to authorized personnel Protect against service interruptions Corporate / Private Networks: Protect corporate confidentiality / individual privacy Ensure message authenticity Protect against service interruptions All Networks: Prevent outside penetrations (who wants hackers?) Security goals are also called security objectives Privacy and Security Folie Nr. 24 Security Goals Technically Defined (CIA) Confidentiality: Data transmitted or stored should only be revealed to the intended audience Confidentiality of identity is also referred to as anonymity (Data) Integrity: It should be possible to detect any modification of data This requires to be able to identify the creator of some data Availability: Services should be available and function correctly Accountability: It should be possible to identify the entity responsible for any communication event Controlled Access: Only authorized entities should be able to access certain services or information Several other models have been proposed, anything beyond CIA is constantly subject to arguments and discussions… Privacy and Security Folie Nr. 25 Threats Technically Defined Masquerade: An entity claims to be another entity Disclosure of confidential information (eavesdropping): An entity reads information it is not intended to read Authorization violation: An entity uses a service or resources it is not intended to use Loss or Modification of (transmitted) information: Data is being altered or destroyed Denial of Communication Acts (Repudiation): An entity falsely denies its participation in a communication act Forgery of information: An entity creates new information in the name of another entity Blackout (Denial of Service, Sabotage): Any action that aims to reduce the availability and / or correct functioning of services or systems Privacy and Security Folie Nr. 26 Threats Technically Defined Masquerade: An entity claims to be another entity Disclosure of confidential information (eavesdropping): An entity reads information it is not intended to read Authorization violation: An entity uses a service or resources it is not intended to use Loss or Modification of (transmitted) information: Data is being altered or destroyed Denial of Communication Acts (Repudiation): An entity falsely denies its participation in a communication act Forgery of information: An entity creates new information in the name of another entity Blackout (Denial of Service, Sabotage): Any action that aims to reduce the availability and / or correct functioning of services or systems Privacy and Security Folie Nr. 27 A little more Terminology Security Service: An abstract “service” seeking to ensure a specific security property Can be realised with the help of cryptographic algorithms and protocols or with conventional means: Keep electronic document on a floppy disk confidential by storing it on the disk in an encrypted format or locking away the disk in a safe Usually a combination of cryptographic and other means is most effective Privacy and Security Folie Nr. 28 Security Services – Overview Authentication Ensure that an entity has in fact the identity it claims to have Integrity Ensure that data created by specific entity is not modified without detection Confidentiality Ensure the secrecy of protected data Access Control Ensure that each entity accesses only services and information it is entitled to Non Repudiation Prevent entities participating in a communication exchange from later falsely denying that the exchange occurred Privacy and Security Folie Nr. 29 Crypto and Auxilliary Mechanisms Cryptographic Algorithms • Ciphers • Symmetric (Stream / Block) Asymmetric Cryptographic Signatures Key Management • Generation, storage, access, and exchange of keys Random number generation • Generation of cryptographically secure random numbers Intrusion Detection • 15.10.2015 Analyse activity records to detect succesful intrusions or attacks Privacy and Security Folie Nr. 30 Crypto? Cryptographic Algorithm: A mathematical transformation of input data (e.g. data, key) to output data Cryptographic algorithms are used in cryptographic protocols Cryptographic Protocol: A series of steps and message exchanges between multiple entities in order to achieve a specific security objective 15.10.2015 Privacy and Security Folie Nr. 31 Potential Attackers and an Adversary Model A word on assumptions. Assume an omnipotent adversary. She could: • access all information of interest • modify data unnoticed • physically destroy the system (or parts thereof) Could we deal with this? Unfortunately, no: Nothing can protect from an omnipotent adversary. More realistic (specific!) model of adversaries needed. 15.10.2015 Privacy and Security Folie Nr. 32 On Eve, Mallory, Craig, and Trudy… An adversary model needs to define • The intention of the adversary • Break and/or access <something> • The behavior • Passive or active? • The capabilities of an attacker • Computational capacity • Resources (time and money) • The area of control • Insider or outsider? • Local, regional, or global? 15.10.2015 Privacy and Security Folie Nr. 33 Eve and Mallory… Some common assumptions… Area of attack Trusted domain Trusted domain IT system Generally: • Adversary limited: • Limited access • Attack has to be „efficient“ Trusted domain 15.10.2015 Privacy and Security Man in the middle Trusted domain Folie Nr. 34 Summary You know who we are You know what to expect from the lecture You have seen some trends that are happening You have been introduced to Alice, Bob, Eve, and Mallory You understand what threats are … and what this means You can tell security goals (CIA!) from security services You know adversary models and which aspects they define 15.10.2015 Privacy and Security Folie Nr. 35