LAO PEOPLE`S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

LAO PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC:
Lack of independent access to resettled
ethnic Hmong raises concern about
achievement of durable solutions
A profile of the internal displacement situation
7 May, 2010
This Internal Displacement Profile is automatically generated from the online IDP
database of the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC). It includes an overview
of the internal displacement situation in the country prepared by the IDMC, followed by a
compilation of excerpts from relevant reports by a variety of different sources. All
headlines as well as the bullet point summaries at the beginning of each chapter were
added by the IDMC to facilitate navigation through the Profile. Where dates in brackets
are added to headlines, they indicate the publication date of the most recent source used
in the respective chapter. The views expressed in the reports compiled in this Profile are
not necessarily shared by the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre. The Profile is
also available online at www.internal-displacement.org.
About the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre
The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, established in 1998 by the Norwegian
Refugee Council, is the leading international body monitoring conflict-induced internal
displacement worldwide.
Through its work, the Centre contributes to improving national and international
capacities to protect and assist the millions of people around the globe who have been
displaced within their own country as a result of conflicts or human rights violations.
At the request of the United Nations, the Geneva-based Centre runs an online database
providing comprehensive information and analysis on internal displacement in some 50
countries.
Based on its monitoring and data collection activities, the Centre advocates for durable
solutions to the plight of the internally displaced in line with international standards.
The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre also carries out training activities to
enhance the capacity of local actors to respond to the needs of internally displaced
people. In its work, the Centre cooperates with and provides support to local and
national civil society initiatives.
For more information, visit the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre website and the
database at www.internal-displacement.org.
Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre
Norwegian Refugee Council
Chemin de Balexert 7-9
1219 Geneva, Switzerland
Tel.: +41 22 799 07 00
[email protected]
www.internal-displacement.org
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CONTENTS
CONTENTS
3
OVERVIEW
8
LACK OF INDEPENDENT ACCESS TO RESETTLED ETHNIC HMONG RAISES CONCERN ABOUT
ACHIEVEMENT OF DURABLE SOLUTIONS
8
CAUSES AND BACKGROUND
17
BACKGROUND
17
MODERN HISTORY OF LAOS (1893-1954)
17
HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF PEOPLE DISPLACED BY CIVIL WAR AND US "SECRET WAR"
(1961-1974)
18
THE HMONG "SECRET ARMY"
22
AN ESTIMATED 10 PER CENT OF THE POPULATION FLED THE CONSOLIDATION OF COMMUNIST
POWER IN LAOS (1975-1992)
24
NEW COMMUNIST GOVERNMENT CRUSHES HMONG RESISTANCE WITH HELP OF VIETNAMESE
FORCES (1975-1980)
25
EXPANSION OF GOVERNMENT CONTROL THROUGH RESETTLEMENT AND OPIUM ERADICATION
PROGRAMMES FUELS CONFLICT WITH THE HMONG "RESISTANCE" (1990-2009)
28
GROUP OF HMONG ARRESTED IN US IN 2007 ON CHARGES OF PLANNING TO OVERTHROW THE
LAO GOVERNMENT (SEPTEMBER 2009)
32
LACK OF SEPARATION OF POWER FAILS TO SAFEGUARD FUNDAMENTAL CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS
33
ETHNO-LINGUISTIC AND RELIGIOUS DEMOGRAPHY (2010)
35
CAUSES OF DISPLACEMENT
36
NUMEROUS REPORTS OF ALLEGED HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS COMMITTED BY THE
GOVERNMENT IN ITS FIGHT AGAINST HMONG REBEL GROUPS (2009)
36
DISCRIMINATION AGAINST RELIGIOUS MINORITIES, FORCED CONVERSION AND EVICTIONS
(MARCH 2010)
42
GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED INTERNAL RESETTLEMENT IS A MAJOR CAUSE OF POPULATION
DISPLACEMENT (2010)
46
CONSTRUCTION OF NAM THEUN 2 DAM DISPLACED 6,200 INDIGENOUS PEOPLE (MARCH 2010)
49
OVERVIEW OF DISPLACED POPULATIONS
51
HIDING IN THE JUNGLE (MARCH 2007)
51
DISPLACED HMONGS HIDING IN THE JUNGLE ARE FORMER REBELS AND THEIR FAMILIES WITH
NO MILITARY CAPABILITY (2007)
52
THE HUAI NAM KHAO CAMP IN THAILAND (2010)
54
IDP POPULATION FIGURES
57
3
NUMBER OF IDPS
57
SEVERAL THOUSANDS HMONG PEOPLE HIDING IN THE JUNGLE OR LIVING IN RESETTLEMENT
VILLAGES (2010)
57
LOCATION(S) OF IDP POPULATIONS
60
DISPLACED HMONGS HIDING IN THE JUNGLE ARE SPREAD OVER SEVERAL PROVINCES IN
CENTRAL LAOS (2007)
60
THE MAJORITY OF HMONG PEOPLE FORCIBLY RETURNED FROM THAILAND ARE LIVING IN A
RESETTLEMENT VILLAGE BUILT FOR THEM IN CENTRAL BOLIKHAMSAY PROVINCE (MARCH
2010)
61
IDP POPULATION MOVEMENTS AND PATTERNS
63
POPULATION MOVEMENTS
63
LARGE POPULATION MOVEMENTS INSIDE AND OUTSIDE OF LAOS DUE TO THE WAR, THE
ESTABLISHMENT OF A COMMUNIST REGIME, INTERNAL RESETTLEMENT AND ETHNIC TENSIONS
63
PATTERNS OF MOVEMENT
63
HMONG IDPS FORCED TO CONSTANTLY MOVE TO AVOID HARASSMENT AND ATTACKS BY LAO
SECURITY FORCES (FEBRUARY 2010)
63
HMONG PEOPLE FLEE ATTACKS ON THEIR VILLAGES TO SEEK REFUGE IN THE JUNGLE
(OCTOBER 2006)
64
PATTERNS OF REPATRIATION FROM THAILAND (MARCH 2010)
65
PHYSICAL SECURITY AND INTEGRITY
67
PHYSICAL SECURITY, DIGNITY, MENTAL AND MORAL INTEGRITY
67
REPORTS OF HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES COMMITTED BY LAO GOVERNMENT FORCES AGAINST
DISPLACED HMONG HIDING IN THE JUNGLE (FEBRUARY 2010)
67
HIGH LEVEL OF TRAUMA OBSERVED AMONG DISPLACED HMONGS IN THAILAND (MAY 2009) 70
DISPLACED HMONG SENT BACK TO LAOS REPORT OF HUMILIATION AND RAPE WHILE HELD IN
DETENTION (MAY 2009)
73
MINES AND UXOS THREATEN SAFETY OF DISPLACED HMONG AND THE GENERAL POPULATION
AND HINDER SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (2010)
75
INCREASED DANGER FOR FLOOD-AFFECTED PEOPLE DUE TO MOVING OF UXO PIECES BY
TYPHOON KETSANA (DECEMBER 2009)
75
LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT
76
THOUSANDS OF HMONG FORCIBLY RETURNED TO LAOS FROM THAILAND END UP IN A
MILITARY-CONTROLED RESETTLEMENT CAMP WITH NO OR LIMITED FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT
(MARCH 2010)
76
DISPLACED HMONGS FORCIBLY RETURNED FROM THAILAND REPORTEDLY HELD IN DETENTION
(2007)
77
FATE OF DISPLACED HMONGS COMING OUT OF THE JUNGLE TO SURRENDER TO AUTHORITIES
REMAINS OFTEN UNKNOWN (2007)
78
BASIC NECESSITIES OF LIFE
81
FOOD AND WATER
81
4
CONSTANTLY ON THE MOVE TO AVOID LAO SECURITY FORCES DISPLACED HMONGS CANNOT
CULTIVATE PERMANENT FIELDS AND ARE AT CONSTANT RISK OF STARVATION (MARCH 2010)
81
CONCERN ABOUT ADEQUACY OF FOOD AND MEDICAL ASSISTANCE AVAILABLE TO RESETTLED
HMONG (MARCH 2010)
83
MASSIVE MIGRATION FROM RURAL TO SEMI-URBAN AREAS PUT STRAIN ON SMALL TOWNS'
CAPACITY TO PROVIDE BASIC SERVICES (FEBRUARY 2010)
84
HIGH LEVELS OF FOOD INSECURITY STRONGLY INFLUENCED BY GOVERNMENT POLICIES SUCH
AS RESETTLEMENT AND OPIUM ERADICATION (DECEMBER 2007)
85
MEDICAL CARE AND SANITATION
87
MALNUTRITION AND HEALTH PROBLEMS ARE COMMON AMONG DISPLACED HMONGS CHILDREN
87
LIVING IN THE JUNGLE (2007)
PROPERTY, LIVELIHOODS, EDUCATION AND OTHER ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND
CULTURAL RIGHTS
90
PRIMARY EDUCATION AND EDUCATIONAL PROGRAMMES
90
DISPLACED HMONGS HIDING IN THE JUNGLE HAVE NO ACCESS TO FORMAL EDUCATION (2005)
90
WORK AND LIVELIHOOD OPPORTUNITIES AND COPING STRATEGIES
90
CONCERNS ABOUT LIVELIHOOD OPPORTUNITIES AVAILABLE TO RESETTLED HMONG DUE TO
90
ISOLATION OF RESETTLEMENT VILLAGE (MARCH 2010)
CONCERNS THAT RIGHTS OF MINORITIES RESETTLED TO MAKE WAY FOR A DAM ARE NOT
SUFFICIENTLY SAFEGUARDED (MARCH 2010)
91
UXOS LEFT OVER FROM THE VIETNAM WAR LIMIT FARMING AND HINDER SOCIO-ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT (NOVEMBER 2009)
94
INTERNAL RESETTLEMENT OF MINORITIES REPORTED TO SOMETIMES HAVE NEGATIVE IMPACT
ON SOCIAL SYSTEMS AND LIVELIHOODS (DECEMBER 2008)
95
OTHER ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS
99
RESETTLEMENT FOSTERS SOCIAL CONTROL AND CULTURAL ASSIMILATION OF MINORITIES
(2007)
99
FAMILY LIFE, PARTICIPATION, ACCESS TO JUSTICE AND OTHER CIVIL AND
POLITICAL RIGHTS
101
RESPECT OF FAMILY LIFE AND FATE OF MISSING RELATIVES
101
DISCERNIBLE PATTERN OF SEPARATION OF IDP FAMILIES (2007)
101
DOCUMENTATION AND CITIZENSHIP
101
GOVERNMENT FAILS TO PROVIDE HMONG RETURNEES WITH ID DOCUMENTS 3 MONTHS AFTER
RETURN (MARCH 2010)
101
ACCESS TO JUSTICE
102
DISPLACED HMONG PEOPLE FEAR ARREST AND DETENTION WITHOUT ACCESS TO JUSTICE
(2006)
102
ARBITRARINESS AND WEAK RULE OF LAW REMAINS THE NORM IN LAOS (MAY 2004)
102
PROTECTION OF SPECIAL CATEGORIES OF IDPS (AGE, GENDER, DIVERSITY)
105
5
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, MINORITIES, PEASANTS, PASTORALISTS AND OTHER GROUPS WITH A
SPECIAL DEPENDENCY ON AND ATTACHMENT TO THEIR LANDS
105
INTERNAL RESETTLEMENT OFTEN DOESN'T SUFFICIENTLY TAKE EMOTIONAL ATTACHMENT OF
105
POPULATION TO LAND INTO ACCOUNT (2007)
DURABLE SOLUTIONS (RETURN, LOCAL INTEGRATION, SETTLEMENT
ELSEWHERE IN THE COUNTRY)
DOCUMENTED RETURNS, SETTLED LOCALLY AND SETTLED ELSEWHERE
GOVERNMENT SAYS MAJORITY OF HMONG RETURNEES WAS SENT TO PHONKHAM
RESETTLEMENT CAMP WHILE THE REST WAS SENT HOME (MARCH 2010)
TENS OF THOUSANDS OF HMONGS FORCIBLY RETURNED TO LAOS SINCE 1991 (2010)
PROSPECTS FOR AND OBSTACLES TO VOLUNTARY RETURN, LOCAL SETTLEMENT AND
107
107
107
107
SETTLEMENT ELSEWHERE
109
FATE OF MANY RESETTLED IDPS REMAINS UNKNOWN DUE TO LACK OF INDEPENDENT ACCESS
(MARCH 2010)
109
GOVERNMENT REPORTED TO ARREST DISPLACED HMONG PEOPLE WHO WISH TO INTEGRATE
111
IN MAINSTREAM LAO SOCIETY AND SOMETIME EXECUTE THEM (OCTOBER 2006)
SUPPORT FOR RETURN INTEGRATION AND REINTEGRATION
114
GOVERNMENT PLEDGES TO SUPPORT RESETTLEMENT OF 4,500 HMONG PEOPLE RETURNED
FROM THAILAND (JANUARY 2010)
114
CONCERNS ABOUT ADEQUATE FACILITIES IN RESETTLEMENT CAMPS HOSTING THOUSANDS OF
HMONG RETURNEES (NOVEMBER 2009)
115
HMONG REPATRIATED FROM THAILAND PROVIDED WITH RESETTLEMENT ASSISTANCE AS WELL
115
AS "RE-EDUCATION" (SEPTEMBER 2009)
NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE
118
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN LAW FRAMEWORK INCLUDING
REFERENCES TO THE GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT
118
HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES SIGNED BY LAOS (2010)
118
NATIONAL RESPONSE
120
GOVERNMENT RESPONSE (MAY 2010)
120
HUMANITARIAN ACCESS AND ASSISTANCE
121
LACK OF INDEPENDENT ACCESS TO RESETTLED HMONGS MAKE IT DIFFICULT TO ASSESS THEIR
SITUATION (APRIL 2010)
121
INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE
124
INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE (MAY 2010)
124
THAILAND HAS VIOLATED THE INTERNATIONAL PRINCIPLE OF NON-REFOULEMENT
125
THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL IGOS AND NGOS (MAY 2004)
125
RECOMMENDATIONS BY INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS BODIES
127
RECOMMENDATIONS BY THE UN SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR ON FREEDOM OF RELIGION OR BELIEF
(JANUARY 2010)
127
CERD RECOMMENDATIONS (2009)
128
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL'S RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE LAO GOVERNMENT (2007)
130
LIST OF SOURCES USED
132
6
7
OVERVIEW
Lack of independent access to resettled ethnic Hmong raises concern about
achievement of durable solutions
Since 2006, an estimated 7,700 Lao-Hmong who had sought refuge into neighbouring Thailand
claiming persecution by the Lao government due to their role during the civil war have been
forcibly sent back to Laos, both countries considering them as “illegal migrants”. An unknown
number of Hmong, believed not to exceed a few hundreds, may remain displaced within Laos,
hiding in small groups in the jungle in fear attacks by government forces. The majority of those
who have come out of hiding and those who have been repatriated from Thailand have been
resettled in existing or new villages where the government claims all their needs will be catered
to.
Some international human rights groups have expressed serious doubts about the voluntary
character of their return and resettlement as well as concern about the curtailment of some of
their fundamental rights in the resettlement sites such as freedom of movements or the right to an
adequate standard of living due to inadequate resources or limited livelihood opportunities. Past
resettlement schemes carried out by the government since the 1980s as part of its development
and poverty alleviation strategy have sometimes resulted in increase food insecurity and higher
mortality rates for the resettled population. In the absence of independent access provided to the
resettled Hmong groups, it remains difficult to assess whether they will be able to achieve durable
solutions.
The government does not acknowledge any internal displacement due to conflict or human rights
violations, with displaced Hmong hiding in the jungle considered as mere “bandits” and those who
have been repatriated from Thailand as “illegal migrants” or “victims of traffickers”. Return and
resettlement are the two options offered to displaced Hmong who surrender and returnees from
Thailand. There are no international organisations directly involved in assisting any of the
displaced groups. In recent years, most of the international efforts have focused on advocacy
activities often carried out from the United States where large numbers of Hmong have resettled
since 1975 and where they have managed to establish effective lobby groups.
Introduction
Laos, a landlocked country surrounded by Vietnam, Thailand, China, Burma and Cambodia, is
one of the poorest countries of the Southeast Asian region. It is currently ranked 133th out of 181
countries on the Human Development Index. Most recent estimates put the total population at
around 6 million, three-quarters of which live in rural areas (HRC, 22 February 2010, p.3). Laos
recognises 49 ethnic groups which can be broadly divided in four broad ethno-linguistic groups of
which the Lao-Tai predominate with two-thirds of the population belonging to that group. The
three other groups are the Mon-Khmer (23 per cent), the Hmong-Mien (7.4 per cent) and the
Chine-Tibet (2.7 per cent). The Lao-Tai and the Hmong-Mien are sometimes also referred to as
“lowlanders” and “uplanders” (or hilltribes). There is a correlation between ethnicity and poverty.
While only one in four Lao-Tai is reported to be living in poverty, twice as many Mon-Khmer and
Hmong-Mien are reported as “poor” (NSCCPI, ADB, SIDA, WB, 2006).
Laos has experienced massive population displacements since it gained independence in 1954;
first mostly internal as a result of the civil war which ended in 1973, then mainly external when
people fled the country following the communist takeover in 1975. Since the mid-1980s, the
8
government’s internal resettlement programme, aimed primarily at alleviating poverty, has had a
profound impact on human geography causing large population movements from the remote
highlands to the more accessible lowlands. Before the government-initiated internal resettlement
programmes, internal migration often motivated by the search of better lands was common. In the
past years, economic and development –motivated internal resettlement has remained a major
cause of displacement in the country.
Minority groups, in particular Hmong have since the end of the civil war claimed to suffer from
human rights violations at the hands of government forces causing them to flee their homes and
hide in the jungle. Most of them have sought refuge across the border in Thailand where the
majority are considered as “illegal migrants” and therefore to be returned to Laos. Similar to other
countries of the region, Laos is also highly prone to natural disasters. In 2008, the country
suffered the most severe floods in many years. In 2009, Typhoon Ketsana displaced 60,000
people, mainly in the southern provinces (OCHA, 18 December 2009, p. 6).
The "Secret War"
The Lao People’s Democratic Republic (LPDR) was established in December 1975 following the
collapse of the Royal Lao Government (RLG) earlier that year. The establishment of the
communist government resulted from the alliance between the Pathet Lao (PL) -the Lao People’s
Revolutionary Party- and the North Vietnamese army which had overtaken the South Vietnamese
government the same year. Laos had a vital strategic importance for belligerents of the Vietnam
war because of the passing on its territory of the logistical network known as the Ho Chi Minh
trail, a system of tracks used by the North Vietnamese to provide support to the National Front of
Liberation of South Vietnam, or Vietcong.
In addition to economic and military support provided to the RLG, the United States also
recruited, trained and armed from the 1960s onwards a secret guerrilla force composed
essentially of ethnic Hmong to fight the PL and its North Vietnamese ally in what became known
as the “Secret War”. According to some estimates, the Hmong numbered 350,000 at the time
(EP, 2 September 2005, p. 3). In total up to 60,000 Hmong guerrillas were trained and armed by
the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) (CRS, 4 January 2010, p.7). They were an integral part
of a covert military operation aimed at disrupting North Vietnamese supply routes and preventing
the establishment of a communist regime in Laos. Part of this “Secret War” plan was an illegal
bombing campaign which was to last for nine years and result in the dropping between 1964 and
1973 of an estimated two million tonnes of bombs on Laos making it, per capita, the most heavily
bombed country in the world (MAG, 27 April 2006, p. 6). The bombing included the dropping over
Laos of at least 260 million cluster bomblets, 30 per cent of which failed to explode and remain a
threat today (Khamvongsa & Russel, June 2009, p. 293).
The main targets of the bombing were the Ho Chi Minh trail along Laos’ south-east border with
Vietnam as well as areas in the north under PL control. The north-east in particular came under
intense aerial bombardments which resulted in massive destruction, killings and population
displacements. Bombardments intensified from 1968 onwards when US aircrafts were diverted
from North Vietnam and focused on Laos instead. In heavily-affected provinces such as
Savannakhet in the south and Xieng Khouang in the north-east, most of towns were destroyed
and most of the population fled their homes taking shelter in IDP villages established along the
main roads or in camps set up in the main towns (LoC-FRD, 1994). Some preferred to remain
near their homes often moving underground in caves and tunnels where some lived for years
(MCC, November 2000, appendix 1).
By 1973, when the ceasefire came into effect and peace negotiations started between the PL and
the RLG, it was estimated that between 700,000 and 750,000 people or 25 per cent of the
population were displaced (Evrard and Goudineau, November 2004, p. 942). Most had fled the
9
highland and north-east occupied by the PL and had sought refuge in RLG-controlled areas
mainly situated in the lowland and the Mekong Valley (LoC-FRD, 1994; Lee, Gary Yia, 1990).
After the ceasefire, tens of thousands of people returned to their homes only to find that
everything had been destroyed and that their villages and farming lands were infested by
unexploded ordnances (UXOs). Most returnees had no choice but to remove the UXOs with their
bare hands (MCC, November 2000, appendix 1).
Population movements after the civil war
In the years following the end of the war, hundreds of thousands of people fled the consolidation
of PL power, most of them seeking refuge across the border in Thailand. In early 1975, large
numbers of people associated with the RLG , including business people, civil servants and army
personnel began leaving the country. This included also the leader of the “Secret army”,Vang
Pao, and 12,000 of its fighters with their families who were airlifted into Thailand. Many Hmong
soon decided to follow their leader across the border. By May 1975, it was estimated that at least
25,000 Hmong had crossed the border into Thailand. Others, including both soldiers and civilians
who could not leave the country and who feared retribution from the PL for their role in the war,
went into hiding in remote mountainous areas to continue some form of armed resistance. “Reeducation seminars”, to which many disbanded RLG soldiers were sent to, also encouraged
many to leave.
Between 1977 and 1978, the Lao government supported by North Vietnamese forces launched a
major military operation aimed at crushing the Hmong resistance. Largely outnumbered and
poorly equipped, the Hmong fighters were no match for government forces who went in heavy
handed using artillery, aerial bombardments including sometimes napalm. This is reported to
have resulted in large number of Hmong casualties, including many civilians who lived with the
fighters. The Hmong resistance soon no longer represented any serious security threat to the
new government. Many surrendered and were either resettled in the lowlands or sent to
“seminars”, or prison camps, from which many did not return. Others fled to Thailand or remained
hidden in small groups in inaccessible mountainous areas. By 1986, an estimated 125,000
Hmong had fled to Thailand (Ferris, 1993, p. 184).
Towards the end of the 1970s, the re-organisation of Lao villages under a collectivisation
programme and adverse weather conditions, resulting in poor harvests, provided further
incentives for people to leave the country. Many were also attracted by the perspective of being
resettled in countries such as the United States, France or Canada. By 1986, an estimated
325,000 people, or 10 per cent of the country’s population had fled the country (Ferris, 1993,
p.183). The majority, which included both lowland Lao and upland Hmong, had by 1990 been
resettled in the United States. An estimated 49,000 Lao refugees returned to Laos between 1980
and 1993 where they were resettled in up to 40 sites spread over 11 provinces. 19,000 of them
did so with assistance from UNHCR (Writenet, May 2004, p.25). An estimated 30,000 Lao
refugees, mainly upland Hmong remained living in refugee camps in Thailand. In 2003, the
United States agreed to resettle a group of 15,000 of these refugees (CRS, 4 January 2010, p. 8).
Internal resettlement, opium eradication and escalating conflict with Hmong resistance
During the 1990s, the Lao government started opening the country to the outside while at the
same time stepping up its internal resettlement programme. This consisted into moving people
from remote mountainous areas to lowland areas along the main roads. The main justifications
for this programme, still ongoing today, are to reduce poverty and to improve the standard of
living of the population (HRC, 22 February 2010, p.9). Other drivers for resettlement included the
need to eradicate opium cultivation, in particular in the north, the reduction of swidden (slash and
burn) agriculture and the need to improve accessibility to government (Baird & Shoemaker, 2007,
p. 867). According to some estimates, between 1980 and 2000, the internal resettlement policy
10
caused the displacement of nearly 33 per cent of the population (FIDH & MLDH, January 2005,
p.8). While some resettlements are clearly voluntarily with people joining programmes to try to
improve their living conditions, in many cases pressure exerted by the government on villagers is
such that resisting resettlement is not an option (Baird & Shoemaker, 2007, p. 881).
Increased control over the population has also been a factor behind resettlement, in particular in
the years following the end of the war when Hmong rebels continued to challenge the new
regime. Hmong communities, as well as other ethnic minorities, were moved from the highlands
to the lowlands for security reasons and to increase control over areas in the northern highlands
but also for the purpose of eradicating opium, which traditionally played an important role for the
Hmong economy. This caused discontent with communities already living on the edge of the
poverty line and further impoverished by the suppression of an important cash crop for them. As a
result, conflict between the government and the Hmong resistance escalated again and gained
visibility. In 2003 a number of attacks on civilians were attributed to Hmong rebels groups. In one
incident, passengers of a bus travelling in Luang Phrabang province were robbed and the bus set
on fire. 12 people were killed and 31 injured (BBC, 21 April 2003).
Since 2003, there have also been a number of reports of counter-insurgency operations against
small groups of Hmong fighters living with their families scattered across remote areas in the
north, in particular the Xaysomboune Special Zone, an area of Vientiane and Xieng Khouang
provinces under military control until 2006, but also in the provinces of Xieng Khouang, Luang
Prabang and Bolikhamsay. Government forces attacks have reportedly made little distinction
between the Hmong fighters and their unarmed relatives caught in the crossfire and who have
been subject to a number of human rights violations including extra-judicial killing (HRC, 12
February 2010, p.6). Most of the limited information available has come from journalists who
managed to spend a few days with Hmong groups or from displaced Hmong who have continued
to seek refuge across the border into Thailand.
The Thai government has restricted international access to the Lao-Hmong refuged on its territory
and has considered the majority as “economic migrants”. Since 2005, some 7,500 Lao-Hmong
have been sent back to Laos. At the end of December 2009, despite strong international protest,
some 4,500 Lao-Hmong were forcibly returned, including a group of 158 people recognised by
the UN as refugees. As with previous groups of Lao-Hmong returned to Laos, international
organisations have only had very limited access to the returnees, most of whom have been
relocated in resettlement villages, and have therefore been largely unable to independently
assess their conditions and needs.
IDP groups
There are currently three main groups of people who can be considered as internally displaced in
Laos due to conflict or human rights violations. No accurate figures are available for any of these
groups but available information indicates that the total the number of internally displaced people
(IDP) in the country may range between several hundreds and several thousands.
The first group of IDPs is composed of people living with Hmong rebels, mostly their relatives,
and who should be considered as civilians. They are hiding in the jungle, for some since 1975,
although the majority has been born in displacement. Others may have fled in recent years as a
result of attacks by government forces on Hmong villages suspected of supporting the rebels
(STP, October 2006, p.10). Lack of access makes it impossible to give any precise figures.
Estimates range from several hundreds to several thousands although the former is a more likely
figure given the fact that many have come out of hiding in recent years (AI, 23 July 2007, p. 6;
CRS, 4 January 2010, p. 8). Most are reported to have been relocated in resettlement villages,
although information remains scarce mainly due to limited independent access.
11
The second group of IDPs is closely linked to the first one and is composed of Hmong civilians
who in recent years have fled to Thailand to escape alleged human rights violations but have
been forcibly sent back to Laos. Due to access restrictions imposed by Thai authorities
international organisations have been prevented from assessing how many had fled for legitimate
protection concerns and how many had done so for economic reasons. Access has only been
granted to one group of 158 Lao-Hmong held in detention and now recognised by the UN as
refugees but who have also been forcibly sent back to Laos. Since 2006, an estimated 7,700 LaoHmong have been forcibly returned to Laos (VOA, 6 January 2010). The majority has reportedly
been resettled but in the absence of any independent access provided to international
organisations it is not possible to assess to what extent their return was voluntary and if they have
been able to achieve durable solutions.
A third group of IDPs is composed of religious minorities, in particular Christians, evicted or
forced to flee their villages because of a limitation of their freedom of religion imposed by local
authorities, including in some cases campaigns aimed at forcing them to renounce their faith
(HRC, 12 February 2010, p. 8). According to information received by the UN Special Rapporteur
of freedom of religion or belief, Ms. Asma Jahangir, who visited the country at the end of 2009,
these incidents were on the decline (HRC, 27 January 2010, p. 13). No estimates are currently
available on the number of internally displaced religious minorities in Laos but their numbers are
believed to relatively small.
Life on the run: the Hmong resistance
While there is no doubt that the Laos government has little sympathy for the group of Hmong
rebels who fought alongside the RLG and United States during the war and that it has since 1975
sought to eliminate any remaining resistance by all means necessary, including probably a
disproportionate use of force which has made little distinction between Hmong fighters and their
families, there is no indication that the Lao-Hmong as an ethnic minority group is the subject of
any systematic discrimination on the part of the government nor that the latter is conducting any
policy of “ethnic cleansing” against this group. In most regions of the country, members of the
Hmong community do not suffer from discrimination and some have even managed to achieve
the highest ranks within the government and the LPRP political party (USDOS, 11 March 2010;
Bangkok Post, 8 July 2003).
In a country where Constitutional provisions do not protect people against arbitrary arrests and
detention or provide for fair trials, and restrict access to prisons or legal counsel, many groups, in
particular those suspected of carrying out subversive political activities are at risk of having a
number of their fundamental rights violated. Given the recent past and the ongoing Hmong
“resistance”, members of this community clearly appear to be a group at risk of human rights
violations, including arbitrary detention and possibly more severe violations, in particular when
suspected of insurgent activities.
In 2003, the UN Committee for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) noted with alarm
that it had received reports alleging the existence in Laos of “violations of the rights to life,
physical integrity and security, and of the freedoms of expression, association and religion, and at
reports of economic, social and cultural discrimination against members of the Hmong minority”.
It reported further that “some members of the Hmong minority, who have taken refuge in the
jungle or certain mountainous regions of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic since the end of
the war in 1975, have been subjected to severe brutalities”. In particular, “acts of extreme
violence such as bombing of villages, use of chemical weapons and landmines and extrajudicial
killings and torture are currently being committed by the armed forces in military campaigns
against the inhabitants of remote villages in the provinces of Xieng Khuang, North Vientiane-Vang
Vieng, Bolikhamsai, Sainyabuli, and the Saisombun Special Zone (CERD, 10 December 2003,
p.2). In 2009, CERD informed the government that it was “concerned about reports citing the use
12
of military force against these people and action depriving them of access to traditional sources of
food and livelihoods.” (CERD, 13 March 2009).
In the past years, a number of journalists have managed to get in direct contact with Hmong rebel
groups hiding in the mountains with their families. They described to them their predicament;
forced to be constantly on the move to avoid attacks by government forces, unable to secure
sources of livelihood, to grow food or to access health care (Times, 23 April 2003; EP, 2
September 2005, The Independent, 19 February 2010). Hmong refugees in Thailand have given
similar testimonies, some describing how they were forced to flee their villages due to constant
harassment and abuses by security forces who accused them of helping Hmong insurgents (STP,
October 2006, p.10). Others, who were sent back from Thailand to Laos in 2005 and detained
there, but who managed to flee back to Thailand, described severe abuses including beating and
rape while in detention (MSF, May 2009, p.6). Those surrendering have allegedly often been
separated with the men arrested and put away and the women relocated in isolated villages.
Some others were reportedly subject to ill-treatment, including rape (AI, 23 March 2007, p.15).
Mines used by government forces in their counter-insurgency campaign as well UXOs left over
from the war represent another threat for displaced Hmong hiding in the mountains. Provinces
such as Xieng Khouang, Luang Prabang or Huaphan, where most Hmong are located, have
particularly high concentrations of UXOs left over from the war. A 2010 UXO report showed that
these 3 provinces account for nearly 30 per cent of all UXO accidents recorded between 1968
and 2008. The same report revealed that over 29 per cent of all UXO accidents occurred in the
forest (NRA, 2 February 2010, pp.44-68).
Mines and UXOs also represent a serious threat for the general population as well as a significant
obstacle to livelihoods and food security. It is estimated that nearly 30,000 people have died and
20,000 have been injured since 1964 as a result of the large bombs, the mines, the mortars and
the bomblets. While 60% of the casualties occurred during the conflict years (1963-1973), the
remainder, or 20,000 accidents, occurred after the war ended in 1974 (NRA, 2 February 2010,
p.x). Children and the poorest people, some of whom collect UXOs as scrap metal to make a
living are particularly at risk (IRIN, 12 November 2009). Between 1999 and 2006, records show
that the two main causes of UXO accidents were “children playing” and “tampering”, usually
attributed to scrap metal recyclers (NRA, 2009). It should however be mentioned that there is a
lack of reliable data on scrap-related casualties and on UXO accidents in general with many
accidents going unreported (GICHD, September 2005, p.25)
Limited international access to Hmong returnees raises doubts about the voluntariness of
return
According to the Framework on Durable Solutions for IDPs, a number of important principles
should guide the search for durable solutions. Key principles relevant in the case of resettled
Hmong and which the Lao government has failed to guarantee so far include the “rapid and
unimpeded access to assist IDPs” provided to international humanitarian and development actors
which should also be allowed to “set up effective mechanisms to monitor the process of
supporting durable solutions”, the right of IDPs to “make an informed and voluntary decision on
what durable solution to pursue” and their “right to participate in the planning and management of
durable solutions strategies and programmes” (HRC, 9 February 2010, pp. 9-10). The Framework
also lists a number of criteria to determine to what extent a durable solution has been achieved.
These include among others “access to employment and livelihoods” or “an adequate standard of
living”.
According to the government, Lao-Hmong who have been returned to Laos since 2005 have
either returned to their homes villages or have been relocated in resettlement sites, such as the
Phalak Village, in Vientiane Province where they have been provided with farming land and
13
houses (UN, 7 June 2005). Prior to their return home or resettlement, they were kept for one or
two weeks in a “welcoming center” for registration and “re-education”, which consisted mainly in
lectures to warn them about the “ill and deceiving intention of bad elements and trans-boundary
human traffickers” (HRC, 18 September 2009, p.42). Lack of independent access to these
returnees has led a number of international organisations to raise doubts about the adequacy of
facilities and resources available in the resettlement sites hosting Hmong people repatriated from
Thailand over the past years as well as former Hmong rebels (AI, 2 November 2009, p.4). An
estimated 2,000 former “insurgents”, including many women and children, are thought to have
surrendered since 2005 (USDOS, 11 March 2010).
According to the government, 3,457 out of the 4,500 Hmong repatriated from Thailand at the end
of 2009 were relocated in Phonkham village, a resettlement site specifically built for them in
central Bolikhamsay province, while the others were sent back to their homes (AFP, 28 March
2010). All were initially placed in a temporary camp in Paksan on the Mekong River described by
journalists as a “heavily guarded camp” with “razor wire” and appeared to bear more similarities
with a detention center than a transit centre (SMH, 13 January 2010). The government claims
that
each resettled family will be entitled to a house, land as well as food and that the villages will be
equipped with water, toilets, schools and health care facilities (Vientiane Times, 19 January
2010).
In February 2010, the government pledged to spend 200 billion Kip, or the equivalent of US$23
million, for the construction of the Phonkham resettlement site, which is expected to be finished
by the end of 2010 (VOA, 24 February 2010).
HRW described the village, situated in a remote area, as a “Laos equivalent of a desert island”
(AFP, 28 March 2010). According to a Thai official who visited the camp at the end of February,
the village lacked electricity as well as a road to the nearest city (McClatchy newspaper, 5 March
2010). During March and April, UN representatives, including a group of western diplomats and
foreign journalists, were allowed to briefly visit the camp under close surveillance from Lao
authorities. They were not given one-to-one access to Hmong returnees who had not chance to
express themselves freely (AFP, 27 March 2010; SMH, 5 April 2010).
Information on the living conditions of Hmong returnees remains scarce mainly because of the
continued lack of independent access to the resettlement sites. Information available on past
resettlement schemes conducted in Laos show a mixed picture and clearly call for a close
monitoring of the implementation of projects currently underway for Hmong returnees. Initial
resettlement programmes conducted by the government in the 1970s and 1980s were not very
successful mainly due to the lack of preparation and resources. In the 1990s, increased
resources, better preparation as well as the adoption of resettlement guidelines did appear to
improve the overall quality of resettlement projects, although many were not successful. The
standard of living of people relocated in resettlement villages often deteriorated instead of
improving. In recent years, a number of studies have revealed higher mortality rates in
resettlement sites and warned about the potential negative effect of resettlement schemes on
food security caused by the lack of access to farmland and forests (IRIN, 17 December 2008;
WFP, December 2007, p.48)
Under intense international scrutiny since the end of 2009, the Lao government appears prepared
to make genuine efforts to meet the basic needs of the Hmong returnees and ensure they are
provided with livelihoods opportunities. However, there are very serious doubts that their return to
Laos and their move to the resettlement sites was voluntary, let alone that they have participated
in its planning. Until unfettered and independent access is provided to international organisations
and effective monitoring can take place, displaced Hmong in resettlement sites, both those
returned from Thailand since 2006 and those resettled from within Laos, cannot be considered as
having achieved durable solutions.
14
Government response
The Lao government does not acknowledge any conflict-induced internal displacement in the
country, nor does it recognise the existence of a Hmong insurgency in the northern provinces.
Officially, Hmong rebels and their families are considered as “bandits” and the problem
considered as of minor importance. The government denies any human rights violations
committed by military or police forces against Hmong “bandits” or their families, and it refutes the
existence of any discrimination targeting Hmong people or any other ethnic minority. These
claims are considered by the government as “groundless”. Similarly, since Hmong refugees in
Thailand have, according to the Lao government, no possible legitimate protection concerns, they
are all automatically considered as “illegal migrants” and invited to return home or be relocated
elsewhere in Laos, an option also offered to Hmong “bandits” who accept to surrender (Vientiane
Times, 19 January 2010).
The military has generally been in charge of dealing with the Hmong “bandits” in particular in the
Xaysomboune Special Zone where many Hmong groups were reported to hide and which
remained under military rule until 2006. Institutional responsibilities for coordinating the
resettlement of Hmong returnees appear to be shared between different government bodies. The
resettlement of the group of Lao-Hmong returned from Thailand at the end of 2009 is overseen by
the Minister of Defense who is also the government’s Deputy Prime Minister. The Ministry of
Labour and Social Welfare (MLSW), established in 1993, has led previous refugee repatriation
and reintegration processes. The MLSW is also in charge of the reintegration of trafficking victims
and other vulnerable illegal migrants, a status the government has applied to all Hmong returned
since 2006 (Vientiane Times, 5 January 2010).
Other national actors involved in the Hmong resettlement programme include provincial and
district-level authorities as well as the Lao Red Cross, which in April 2010 distributed US-donated
food and other assistance to the Hmong returnees (AAP, 15 April 2010). There are few national
NGOs in Laos as these have only been allowed to register officially since November 2009
(Forum-Asia, 18 May 2009). Some have, however, been working for years without formal
authorisation, often under the umbrella of international NGOs.
The Lao government is party to a number of core human rights treaties, including the
International Covenant of the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (ICERD), the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and the Convention on the Rights
of the Child (CRC). In 2009, the Lao government ratified the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR) as well as the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC).
The Lao government has yet to sign the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT). The Lao Constitution, promulgated in 1991 and
amended in 2003, contains key provisions for the protection of human rights, including regarding
equality between ethnic groups (art. 22), the freedom of settlement and movement (art. 27) or
freedom of religion (art. 30). Major obstacles to the effective safeguarding of these rights include
the lack of independence of the judiciary, widespread corruption and the absence of separation of
power between the executive and political wings of the government with the Lao People's
Revolutionary Party as its “leading nucleus” (art. 3) (Writenet, May 2004, p. 11).
International response
Most international organisations present in Laos are involved in development assistance and
none is involved in any form of assistance to conflict-induced IDPs. Prior to its departure from
Laos, in 2001, UNHCR assisted with the return and resettlement of thousands of Laotians from
Thailand. Despite repeated requests to continue assisting the government with the repatriation of
15
Hmong from Thailand, UNHCR has yet to re-establish a presence in the country and is covering
the country through its regional office in Thailand.
In recent years, international involvement with displaced Hmong people has focused on advocacy
either directly with the Lao government or through UN Treaty Body mechanisms such as the
Committee of the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) or the Convention on the Right of
the Child (CRC). The last CERD periodic report was submitted by the government in 2004, or 19
years later than scheduled and was probably prompted by the activation, a year earlier, of the
CERD’s early warning and urgent action procedure. With the 16th and 17th reports overdue since
March 2007, CERD informed the Lao government by letter in March 2009 that it was considering
new information received on the situation of displaced Hmong hiding in the jungle in
Xaisomboune province and that it was requesting updated information from the government on
the situation of this group (CERD, 13 March 2009). In 2007, several UN Special Rapporteurs as
well as the Special Representative of the Secretary-general on the human rights of internally
displaced persons, expressed concern at reports of human rights violations committed in the
context of the government’s fight against Hmong rebels (HRC, 27 February 2008, p.10).
A number of international NGOs, including Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have
in recent years drawn attention to the plight of displaced groups in Laos. Some NGOs are very
actively involved in advocacy, in particular in the United States, where a large number of Hmong
refugees now live and where they have managed to establish an effective lobby group. This also
creates a risk of biased information on the issue. In 2007, the former leader of the Hmong secret
army, Vang Pao, now still a very influential person among the Hmong diaspora in the United
States was arrested there on the charges of conspiring to overthrow the Lao government.
Charges against him were dropped in September 2009, although charges remained against other
members of the group arrested (NYT, 18 September 2009).
International humanitarian assistance has in recent years largely focused on demining and UXO
clearance activities as well as on the response to needs created by recurrent natural disasters.
Chronic food insecurity is also a major problem, as it is reported to affect two-thirds of the rural
population (WFP, December 2007). Following the landing of typhoon Ketsana in September
2009, the IASC Country Team issued a Flash Appeal requesting around $13 million to address
for a six-month period the needs of an estimated 180,000 people affected in the southern
provinces, 60,000 of which were displaced (OCHA, 18 December 2009).
International UXO removal assistance to Laos, for the most part coordinated by UNDP, totalled
$89 million between 1994 and 2007. Between 1993 and 2009, the United States contributed a
total of $25 million, or an average of $1.5 million per year, which is less than the average amount
the US government spent every day for nine years to bomb Laos (Khamvongsa & Russell, June
2009, p.295). According to some estimates, between 1996 and 2006 only 144km2 of land,
equivalent to just 1 per cent of high-risk areas and 0.4 per cent of the total contaminated areas
was cleared (Khamvongsa & Russell, June 2009, p.296). Since 2008, UXO clearance efforts
have been scaled up with international support reaching $15 million in 2009. US annual
contribution increased to $3.7 million in 2008-2009 and is expected to reach $5 million for 20102011 (US DOS, 22 April 2010). A 2008 UXO assessment showed that at present capacity it
would take 16 years to clear all contaminated agricultural land in Laos (UNDP, 29 April 2010).
16
CAUSES AND BACKGROUND
Background
Modern history of Laos (1893-1954)
•
Laos' modern borders were established between 1903 and 1907 wehn the country was under
French control
•
It is estimated that the ethnic Tai migrated to Laos around the 10th century who populated the
lowlands and upland valleys. The Hmong or Mien arrived around the 18th century from China
•
Laos was briefly independent in 1945 when the Japanese forced Lao King to declare
independence. The movement was known as Lao Issara.
•
The French returned and provided more freedom but Laosremained under French
supervision until 1954 when Laos became fully independent .
•
The strategic importance of Laos for the Vietnam belligerents put the country under intense
external pressure. Between 1960 and 1973 a civil war, in which the US supported the Royal
Lao Government and the Vietnamese supported the left-wing Pathet Lao, left much of the
country devastated.
•
In 1975, the Pathet Lao established a communist regime in Laos, the Lao People’s
Democratic Republic (LPDR).
Writenet, May 2004, pp. 1-2
"Laos emerged as a modern nation following the French colonization of the country and mapping
of its borders after 1893. Had the French not colonized Laos the lowland areas probably would
have been absorbed by Thailand, while many highland areas would have become part of
Vietnam. In a series of negotiations with the Thai between 1903 and 1907 the modern borders of
Laos were basically established, although demarcation on the ground continues to this day
between Thailand and Laos and Vietnam and Laos (as well as Cambodia, Myanmar and China).
The population of the country at the time the French took control was probably around 500,000; it
is now around 5 million. The French found a society made up of many different ethnic groups,
usually estimated at around 50. Some, perhaps 30% of the population today, had been there prior
to the coming of the Tai (Lao) around the tenth century. Perhaps another 10% is made up of
relative newcomers like the Hmong or Iu Mien (Yao), who began migrating into Laos in the late
eighteenth century, partly due to conflicts with the Chinese. The lowlands and upland valleys
were populated by people of Tai descent. Those who were Buddhists were recognized as “Lao”.
The Second World War was a watershed for French colonialism in Laos. In 1945 the Japanese
forced the Lao King to declare the independence of the whole of Laos, and this was then carried
forward by a short-lived independence movement, the Lao Issara. The returning colonial French
recognized a unified Laos in 1946, and the new Kingdom of Laos was proclaimed in early 1947,
although initially remaining under close French supervision. Substantial political concessions by
the French and the incorporation of Laos into the French Union in 1949 satisfied all but a handful
of the Issara group who went with the Vietnamese communists. The long serving Prime Minister,
Prince Souvanna Phouma, and his associates returned to Vientiane from exile in Bangkok. In
1954 Laos withdrew from the French Union and became completely independent.
17
However, by the mid-1950s Laos had become a pawn in the Cold War in Asia. At the Geneva
Conference in 1954, which had led to France’s withdrawal from Indochina, the Vietnamese
communist delegation had gained some minimal recognition for their handful of Lao clients, who
would later be known as the Pathet Lao (PL). The United States swung its support behind the
Royal Lao Government which quickly became heavily dependent on US aid. The key issue that
emerged in the late 1950s, however, was North Vietnamese incursions into Laos through the
network of tracks known as the Ho Chi Minh trail. Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma in 1958 said
that Laos had fulfilled all the conditions of the Geneva Agreements, but in the opinion of the North
Vietnamese the problems of Laos and Vietnam were “indivisible”. Thus, because of North
Vietnam’s strategic needs for the trails through Laos it was swept into the vortex of the Vietnam
War. From 1960 onwards the Royal Lao Government (RLG), which throughout tried to retain
some semblance of democratic government, came under very strong external and internal
pressure, politically and militarily. With Vietnamese support the Pathet Lao grew stronger during
the 1960s as war raged across the country, which in the late 1960s would include massive
American bombing of parts of the country. The relative strengths of the Lao sides, however, had
little to do with the outcome, which was decided in Hanoi and Washington. A coalition
government was formed in Vientiane in 1973, supposedly aimed at national reconciliation. But the
determination of Hanoi and the Pathet Lao to install a communist government in Laos, and the
gradual withdrawal of American support for the RLG, ensured the latter’s collapse during 1975
and the proclamation of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic (LPDR) on 2 December 1975."
Hundreds of thousands of people displaced by civil war and US "secret war" (19611974)
•
In 1964, the US support to the Royal Lao Government (RLG) was extended to include also
"unarmed" reconnaissance flights. From 1965 onwards bombing targeted the Ho Chi Minh
trail as well as areas under Pathet Lao control in the north often in support of RLA military
troops on the ground who would move in the area only after it had been bombed and
depopulated by US forces.
•
From October 1968, U.S. aircraft switched their targets to Laos, with between 17,000 to
27,000 sorties a month to the PL zone. US war efforts in Laos became publicly known in
1969 leading to many public protests and a US Senate Committee Inquiry in October 1969.
•
The RLG and the US resettled some 370,000 IDPs, a third of which were reported to consist
in ethnic Hmong.
•
Between 1954 and 1975, most people who fled their villages, did so either to escape frequent
bombings or as a result of forced relocations by one side or the other seeking to consolidate
control over an area. In the eastern zone controlled by the Pathet Lao, many villages were
abandoned, and the inhabitants either lived in caves, fled across the border to Vietnam or
moved to refugee villages or camps in Royal Lao Government (RLG) areas.
•
An estimated 700,000 persons were displaced by the war. Most IDPs began to return to their
villages, or at least to the same general area, after the cease-fire of 1973, emptying many of
the IDP villages set up along Route 13. Others chose to remain in more populated areas near
the Mekong and the larger towns.
•
After the ceasefire, tens of thousands of people returned to their homes only to find that
everything had been destroyed and that their villages and farming lands were infested by
unexploded ordnances (UXOs). Most returnees had no choice but to remove the UXOs with
their bare hands
Lee, 1990
"Between 1955 and 1963, American support for the Royal Lao Government had been limited to
development grants (totaling US $8 million), government budget support (US S320 million), and
18
military assistance (US $152 million). According to Dommen (op.cit.: 104-105), this made Laos
the biggest foreign aid recipient in the world at the time in terms of number of population
(3,000,000). In 1964, this support was extended to include "unarmed" reconnaissance flight by
American aircraft based in Udom Thani, Thailand, and in South Vietnam, carried out to see
whether NV troops and war materials were sent to Laos
As American bombing raids on Vietcong supply routes increased in early 1965, North Vietnam
began using the Ho Chi Minh trail linking North and South Vietnam through Laos. PL forces
sought to extend their control over the areas along the Ho Chi Minh trail, and in doing so clashed
with RLA troops , American planes were then diverted to bomb the trail, but the bombing was
soon extended to PL controlled areas in northern Laos, involving strikes at enemy supply routes
and troop concentrations and offering close tactical air support for RLA troops during ground
battles (Brantman, 1970: 231).
This pattern soon formed the normal military engagement in Laos: government troops would
move into an area only after it had been cleared of enemy forces by American bombing. The
result was that Laos was subject to the most intense aerial bombardment, especially in the
northeast where most of the offensives took place. Large areas became depopulated and scarred
by bomb craters, and many historical places such the provincial town of Xieng Khouang were for
ever obliterated. Unexploded ammunitions dropped by American planes and mines planted by
soldiers also littered the ground and continue to kill or maim civilian population even today.
(...)
Following President Johnson's announcement of American bombing halt over North Vietnam in
October 1968, U.S. aircraft switched their targets to Laos, with between 17,000 to 27,000 sorties
a month to the PL zone (Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars, 1970: 49). On some days, 800
sorties were flown "dropping napalm, phosphorous and antipersonnel bombs ... on everything,
buffaloes, cows, schools, temples, houses and people (Lewallen, 1971: 40). This increased
bombing only made the PL more determined to counter-attack on the ground, resulting in many
RLG strongholds being lost to them and traffic cut off between many RLG areas along the
Mekong River.
Most of these PL victories were, however, reversed in September by U.S. bombing and counterattacks from the Special forces, which drove communist troops out of Xieng Khouang, the Plain of
Jars and Muong Phone on the Ho Chi Minh trail, the Pathet Lao military headquarters for
southern Laos. Although the North Vietnamese Ambassador to Laos had talks with the Lao King
and the Prime Minister, further attempts to arrive at a peaceful settlement of the Lao conflict were
dimmed by the escalation of military activities. In America, the US war efforts in Laos which were
so far hidden from the world, received wide coverage in the media, leading to many public
protests and a US Senate Committee Inquiry in October 1969.
(...)
The war also imposed heavy social and economic burden on the RLG and the US which had to
resettle and support 370,000 refugees displaced by military activities in various parts of the
country. The Hmong which formed the backbone of the RLG defence in northern Laos, suffered
the most casualties. Although numbering about 300,000 at the time, they made up 32% of this
total refugee population, and 70% of the 155,000 displaced persons in Xieng Khouang province.
More than 12,000 are said to have died fighting against the PL from 1962 to 1975 (HamiltonMerritt, 1980: 36). This heavy toll was partly the result of military conscription by the RLA in its
efforts to maintain military strength against PL and NY troops, and partly voluntary enlistment
because the war made it impossible to carry out farming or to find other means of livelihood.
Civilian casualties and loss of lives were also high due to sickness, malnutrition and military
attacks on villages or refugee camps."
LoC-FRD, 1994
19
"During the Second Indochina War (1954-75), particularly between 1960 and 1973, large
numbers of Laotians were displaced from their villages, either to escape frequent bombings or as
a result of forced relocations by one side or the other seeking to consolidate control over an area.
In the eastern zone controlled by the Pathet Lao, many villages were abandoned, and the
inhabitants either lived in caves, fled across the border to Vietnam (where, despite the massive
United States aerial war, the bombing was less intense than in the areas to which they moved), or
moved to refugee villages or camps in Royal Lao Government (RLG) areas. These villages were
established along Route 13 from Savannakhét to Pakxan and continued north of Vientiane. In
addition, many Hmong and Mien villages that had allied with the RLG were frequently forced to
move as a result of the changing battle lines and were regularly supplied by the RLG and United
States.
At the end, an estimated 700,000 persons, or about 25 percent of the population, were in some
way displaced from their original homes. Many of these refugees began to return to their villages,
or at least to the same general area, after the cease-fire of 1973, emptying many of the refugee
villages along Route 13. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR provided
some assistance in transportation and initial rice supplies, and after 1975 the government also
assisted to the extent possible with its meager resources. Hmong who sided with the RLG were
forced to flee after 1975.
Not all internal refugees returned to their home districts, however. Some chose to remain in more
populated areas near the Mekong and the larger towns, continuing to farm land that they had
cleared during the war."
Evrard and Goudineau, November 2004, p. 942
"Although no major shifts of population occurred during the colonial period, the Indo-China war
and, especially, the American war had a deep impact on the human geography of Laos. The
country was progressively divided into two major zones of influence. The lowlands and the
Mekong valley were controlled by the royalist troops supported by the American Air Force, while
the highlands and north-east were occupied by the Pathet Lao army. Huge movements of
population ensued, with larger and larger numbers involved throughout the civil war: 27,000
people were displaced in 1958,
90,000 in 1960, 125,000 in 1962 and up to 730,000 in 1973 during the ceasefire (Taillard, 1989:
95). After the change of regime in 1975, more than 300,000 people (including the majority of the
country’s technicians and well-qualified cadres) fled to Thailand (Stuart-Fox, 1986: 52), from
where many of them went to France and to the United States of America. Taking all these
migrations together, more than half of the country’s villages actually moved during this period of
hostility (Goudineau, 1997b: 11)."
MCC, November 2000
"From 1964 to 1973, Laos endured one of the most intensive bombing campaigns in history, as
the US attempted to destroy the social and economic infrastructure of the Pathet Lao communist
forces. Part of the larger war in Indochina, the US bombing attempted to block the flow of
supplies over the Ho chi Minh trail which went through southern Laos. In addition, the US bombed
northern Laos in support of Royal Lao Government military campaigns.
During the war, the US dropped over 6 million conventional bombs and likely well over a 100
million cluster bomblets.[1] The 580,000 bombing missions flown over Laos equaled one bombing
mission every eight minutes ‘round the clock, for nine full years. In Xieng Khouang Province, one
of the most heavily bombed areas, an estimated 300,000 tons of bombs were dropped, equaling
more than two tons per inhabitant. A 1971 US Information Service refugee survey found that at
least 80% of the victims were civilians.[2]
20
Because of the air war, many Lao villagers fled to the larger cities where they lived in refugee
camps. A significant number, however, stayed near their villages, living in caves and forests in
order to escape the bombing. Many of these villagers lived in caves for years, doing their field
work under cover of darkness, and hiding their cooking fires so they would not be seen by the
bombers. Villagers in Xieng Khouang repeatedly assert that the air war did not distinguish
between military and civilian targets, and that any sign of life or activity risked an attack by the
bombers.[3]
After the War
When the war ended, tens of thousands of Lao villagers returned to their homes. In most cases,
everything had been destroyed. They had to rebuild their homes, repair the paddy dikes in their
rice fields, and open up the soil with shovels and hoes. They carried on this intensive work in the
midst of a staggering array of still-lethal unexploded ordnance which littered the soil. Unknown to
them, their villages had become one vast, unmarked minefield. Indeed, the population tended to
resettle along the roads for easier access to markets and health care. Ironically, these were the
areas of heaviest bombing, and consequently the areas most infested with unexploded ordnance.
According to estimates of ordnance clearance agencies working in Laos, “there were probably in
excess of nine million BLU 26 bomblets still unexploded at the end of the war.”[4]
In the aftermath of the war, Lao villagers had to deal with the scourge of unexploded ordnance by
themselves. Mr. Thongsavanh, a teacher in Xieng Khouang Province during the war years,
remembers instructing his students to pick up the strange round pieces of ordnance which
appeared in the forests and hillsides near his school. “I didn’t know it was dangerous,” he
recalled. “I thought since the bombs hadn’t blown up on impact they weren’t dangerous
anymore.”[5]
Typically, when villagers found ordnance in their fields and gardens, they simply removed it with
their bare hands. They found within themselves a courage borne out of necessity. Farming was
their livelihood, and the only land available to them was filled with bombs. Indeed, with the
passage of time, villagers became almost casual in their approach to the ever-present bomblets.
The account of Mennonite Central Committee worker Titus Peachey’s visit with Mr. Thong Dee in
Lek Village illustrates.
When I asked Mr. Thong Dee if any bombies had been turned up during the plowing thus far (1 _
hectares), he matter-of-factly replied that over 20 bombies had been plowed up the previous day.
Some of the bombies he had thrown/placed into a hole just at the edge of the plowed field. As I
walked over to the hole and peered over the edge, Mr. Thong Dee hurriedly pulled away the
weeds and scrap metal he had placed on top, to reveal the 4 or 5 bombies underneath. Noticing
that I was about to take a picture, he quickly moved each bombie into clearer view, handling them
like they were merely billiard balls.[6]
Another Lao villager, when asked why he continues to grow vegetables in a location where he
has found bomblets, responded by saying:
I can’t move my garden. There wouldn’t be any point to it anyway. If I moved it to a new location,
I’d just find more bomblets there. So I might as well keep it where it is.[7]
Deaths and Injuries
Tragically, as Lao villagers moved back to their villages and farms after the war, they were to
discover that the war had not ended for them. Unexploded cluster bombs which were buried in
the soil, hidden in the weeds, or lying exposed on top of the soil exacted a grim toll of suffering
and death.
21
In the first twenty-five years following the end of the war, over 11,000 people were killed or injured
by unexploded ordnance, according to recent surveys.[8] Injuries continue to the present day. In
fact, the number of casualties has remained steady since the mid-1980's despite expanding
clearance efforts and community awareness programs.[9] Aid workers cite expanding population
and more intensive land use as the likely reason for this. As more new land is brought into
production, the number of encounters withUXO rises, keeping the casualty rate steady.
According to data collected in 1998, the percentage of child victims is on the rise. Forty per cent
of UXO victims are killed outright. Fourteen of Laos’ provinces are affected by UXO, and 25% of
the country’s villages remain severely contaminated.[10]
Statistics from Xieng Khouang province, one of the most heavily bombed regions in Laos, provide
a detailed window into casualty rates. In the districts of Moung Bek and Moung Kham Xieng
Khouang province, by late 1995, information had been gathered on over 1500 accidents since
1973. 56% of the victims had died of their injuries.[11] As time passes, the fatality rate seems to
have decreased. According to statistics gathered in the Moung Bek district of Xieng Khuong
province from October 1994-January 1995, 43% of the persons involved in UXO accidents were
killed, and 57% injured.[12]"
The Hmong "secret army"
•
From 350,000 in 1974, the number of Hmong is believed to have been reduced to 200,000
today as a result of massive population movements out of Laos after the war, mainly to
Thailand from where most were resettled to the US, France or Canada. Other probably more
realistic estimates put their number today at 450,000 or 8 per cent of the total population.
•
Hmong are traditionally agrarian and live in the highlands where they produce rice and and
maize applying the system of slash and burn in their agriculture. The cultivation of the opium
poppy is widespread among Hmong and is a source of conflict with the government. Many
Hmong have also integrated into business and political life across Laos; they are
represented, though in limited numbers, at all levels of the administration and government.
•
During the US Secret War (1962 – 1975), an estimated 30,000 Hmong were recruited by the
CIA to fight against the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) and the growing Pathet Lao.
According to some estimates, 17,000 Hmong died in fighting, while another 50,000 Hmong
civilians perished during the war. After 1975, demoralization and panic resulted in a massive
exodus of the Hmong to Thailand.
European Parliament, 2 September 2005, pp.3-4
"The Hmong people of Southeast Asia are believed to have originated in China, and some
scholars argue that their customs preserve many elements of an ancient civilisation from an area
that is now China. The expansion of the Han Chinese people forced the resisting Hmong and
other indigenous minorities to flee southwards into the northern areas of present-day Laos,
Vietnam and Thailand, early in the nineteenth century. Due to a constant cycle of rebellions and
brutal reprisals, this process continued for several decades.
Today, around 8 million Hmong live in China, 250,000 in Vietnam, 125,000 in Thailand, 4,000
live in Burma (Myanmar) and around 200,000 are scattered around Laos with a large
concentration in the northern part of the country. The 1974 census indicated that there were
350,000 Hmong living in Laos, but tens of thousands soon fled the country after the communist
takeover of the country in 1975. Fearing persecution for their wartime alignment with the
United States and the Royal Lao Government, these people ended up in refugee camps in
Thailand where the majority of them were resettled in the United States (around 160,000), but
22
smaller numbers ending up in France, Canada, and Australia.
The traditionally agrarian Hmong live at altitudes of 2,000 feet and higher. They produce rice
and maize throughout the year as their main source of food. They apply the system of slash and
burn in their agriculture, which is a known source of antagonism between the Hmong
highlanders and the Lao government who fear deforestation. The Hmong have also been known
for the cultivation of the opium poppy, inflaming conflict with both Lao and Thai authorities in
the past.
(...)
After World War II, with the withdrawal of the French and the conflict in Indochina escalating,
the US government feared that the whole region would fall into the hands of the communists.
The US thus increased its presence in the area and began secret operations in Laos designed to
stop the spread of communism from North into South Vietnam. Once again, the Hmong were
co-opted into the confrontation, and played a major role in the US Secret War (1962 – 1975)
against the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) and the growing Pathet Lao, or Laotian Communist
insurgents."
(...)
For ten years thousands of armed Hmong under General Vang Pao halted the advance of the
NVA through Lao territory into South Vietnam, and disrupted its supply lines, known as the Ho
Chi Minh Trail. Trained and armed by the CIA, the Hmong not only fought with incredible
courage, tenacity and loyalty, saving thousands of US soldiers’ lives, but provided safe homes
for US personnel, guarding their military installations and rescuing downed pilots. All told,
some 30,000 Hmong tribesmen fought alongside the Americans against Pathet Lao and
Vietnamese forces. Some 17,000 died in fighting, while another 50,000 Hmong civilians
perished in the conflict.
In June 1974 the US negotiated its way out of the Vietnam War, and the last American plane
flew across the Mekong River. The Pathet Lao soon dominated the political scene in Laos, and
subjected the Hmong to retribution. Those suspected of collaborating with the CIA were
dispatched to so called “seminars”, or re-education camps. Many never returned to their
families. Demoralization and panic resulted in a massive exodus of the Hmong. In 1975, over
44,000 Hmong had fled to Thailand, and by 1990 about 120,000 Hmong left Laos. Thousands
died in Pathet Lao retaliation and re-education camps.
However, there was a third group who never made it across the Mekong River, yet who escaped
the fate of the camps. Instead, they retreated into impenetrable mountain jungles, disappearing
there for decades. This is the community that I visited, and whose human rights situation I have
witnessed and recorded resulting in a documentary shown on the BBC in May 2004."
AI, 23 March 2007, pp.3-4
"Ethnic Hmong people are a highland tribe that lives in southern China, Laos, Viet Nam,
Cambodia and Thailand. They arrived in Laos from south-eastern China in the late eighteenth to
early nineteenth century and settled as farmers in the mountainous north. Today, the Hmong in
Laos number over 450,000 people, constituting eight per cent of the population, making them the
third largest ethnic group in the country after the Lao and the Khmou.7 The ethnic Lao are the
largest and politically, economically and culturally dominant group, with 55 percent of the
population according to a national census carried out in 2005.8
The Hmong’s social organisation is clan-centred9 and they live – for the most part – in small
villages in the northern and central parts of the country, many of them only accessible by footpath
or small tracks. But the Hmong have also integrated into business and political life across Laos;
they are represented, though in limited numbers, at all levels of the administration, including in
the newly elected National Assembly, and in the government that took office in June 2006. For
23
the first time ever, 2006 also saw a Hmong enter the 11 member strong and highly influential
politburo."
(...)
The war that ended in 1975 was partly an internal armed conflict between the left-wing Pathet
Lao and the right-wing royalists and nationalists. But it was partly also a war that spilled over from
Viet Nam and related to access to the so-called Ho Chi Minh trail, a network of supply lines that
crossed into Laos and Cambodia and which was used by the North Vietnamese fighting the USA
and the South Vietnamese forces.10 The USA supported the right-wing faction, while the North
Vietnamese backed the Pathet Lao.
On the side of the right-wing faction and alongside the USA, fought the so-called “Secret Army,” a
CIA-funded irregular armed force established in 1961 and led by Royal Lao Army Lieutenant
Vang Pao,11 an ethnic Hmong. “The Secret Army” reached some 30,000 troops in the early
1970s, and comprised of several ethnic groups, including ethnic Lao, but the majority were ethnic
Hmong. Not all ethnic Hmong, however, supported the royalists and nationalists. In fact, many
Hmong and other minority groups supported Pathet Lao.12"
An estimated 10 per cent of the population fled the consolidation of communist power
in Laos (1975-1992)
•
The fall of the Royal Lao Government and increased control by the new communist over the
daily lives in villages prompted many to flee the country to seek refuge in Thailand. Between
1975 and 1992, it is estimated that more than 360,000 people, including large number of
Hmong fled Laos, the majority being resettled in the US, France and Canada.
•
The Hmong resistance was largely crushed by 1979, but small resistance pockets persisted
for many years despite continued counter-insurgency operations against them.
LoC-FRD, 1994
"The fall of the RLG and increased control by government cadres over daily activities in the
villages also caused many villagers to flee the country, ending up in refugee camps in Thailand.
The outmigration occurred in three phases. An initial flight of RLG officials and Westernized elite
began in 1975. A second period of departures by many more ordinary villagers occurred between
1977 and 1981, responding as much to economic hardship caused by poor weather and
government mismanagement of the agricultural sector than to political control measures. A later
period of less rapid departure lasted through the late 1980s. In all, more than 360,000 Laotians-about 10 percent or more of the population--fled the country between 1975 and 1992. This group
included nearly all Western-educated Laotians, and, as political scientist Martin Stuart-Fox has
noted, the loss of the intelligentsia may have set the country back an entire generation. Some
upland minorities who had supported the RLG and the United States military effort also fled
immediately, while other groups continued a guerrilla insurgency, which was not brought under
control until after about 1979.
By the end of 1992, approximately 305,000 Laotian refugees had been permanently resettled in
third countries, most commonly in the United States and France. Forty thousand Laotians--mostly
Hmong-- remained in refugee camps in Thailand, and 12,000 refugees had been voluntarily
repatriated to Laos under the supervision and with the assistance of the UNHCR. International
agreements mandated the resettlement or repatriation of all remaining refugees in Thailand by
the end of 1994."
STP, October 2006, p. 6
24
Following the Pathet Lao’s eventual seizure of power as many as 300,000 Hmong fled Laos.
Hundreds of thousands are now living in exile in the United States. Since 1976 the Lao and
Vietnamese armies have repeatedly used chemical and biological weapons, as the U.S. did
during the Vietnam War, to destroy vast areas of forest in the effort to locate the last hiding places
of the Hmong and destroy any potential resistance.
Hmong are still fleeing in their thousands into neighbouring Thailand in fear of their lives or to
escape discrimination in Laos. Among the other problems faced by Lao Hmong have been the
large-scale relocation projects associated with a dramatic rise in the demand for hydroelectric
power and the construction of new dams. Campaigners for democracy and Hmong rights in Laos
put their lives at risk. In the last few years many Hmong have been handed down lengthy prison
sentences after an unfair trial."
AI, 23 March 2007, pp.3-4
Following the end of the war in 1975, the Hmong came to be perceived with suspicion by the new
Communist government because of the involvement by Hmong in the “Secret Army”. After the
victory of the Pathet Lao, tens of thousands of its former adversaries were jailed. Officials of the
former government and its army, members of the “Secret Army” and Hmong who were perceived
by the new government as having collaborated with the enemy side were sent to “re-education”
camps, euphemistically called seminars,13 or prisons. They were held in harsh conditions,
without ever facing charge or trial, some for over a decade. It is not known how many people died
in such detention, but many never returned.
Ostracism of the Hmong, mass arrests, violence and harassment were some factors pushing
thousands of Hmong to flee the country in 1975 and afterwards. All in all around 300,000 people,
including many Hmong, fled Laos during the first ten years,14 mostly to Thailand where they
sought refugee status. The majority resettled in third countries, particularly in the USA, which
received some 250,000 Lao people between 1975 and 1996.15 Over half of those 250,000 were
ethnic Hmong, and Vang Pao was one of them.
New communist government crushes Hmong resistance with help of Vietnamese
forces (1975-1980)
•
There were a number of massacres of Hmong reported in the aftermath of the communist
revolution when the government attempted to crush the last Hmong fighters still resisting in
the northern mountains. Fear of governemnt retribution for their role in the war and lack of
livelihood options prompted many Hmong civilians to flee to Thailand where many Hmong
fighters had already sought refuge. By the end of 1975 the Hmong refugee population in
Thailand had reached around 34,000
•
By 1978, most the of the Hmong resistance had now been largely terminated by government
forces operations which alos involved North Vietnamese forces. While it seems clear that
widespread human rights violations were committed in the the armed campaign against the
Hmong resistance, these did not appear to be ethnically motivated as was and has been
widely reported since.
•
During the 1990s and early 2000 there were occasional reports of attacks lauched by Hmong
rebels hiding in remote areas, in particular in 2003 when two attacks were carried out on
public buses. There have been more frequent reports and accounts about attacks against
Hmong groups by the Lao People’s Army.
Writenet, May 2004, pp. 4-5
25
"Although there were no major torture and death camps in Laos, like the notorious Tuol Sleng in
Phnom Penh, there were massacres of Hmong in the aftermath of the revolution. In the refugee
camps that received the exhausted survivors it sometimes seemed that the LPDR was intent on
annihilating them and terms like “genocide” were used by journalists and others.
The war in the northern mountains had been bitterly fought, and as often as not it had been
Hmong soldiers led by General Vang Pao pitted against Vietnamese. Hmong civilians were
caught many times in the crossfire as they were forced to flee their homes during the war. While
latent ethnic tensions were mostly kept under control before 1975, they would burst forth in the
campaigns against Hmong remnants of Vang Pao’s forces afterwards.
By the time the PL began to assert final control over Laos in mid-1975 the upland economy was
in crisis, because it could not sustain the Hmong population which had previously been supported
by USAID. For the thousands of Hmong spread through the mountains to the south of Long
Cheng, their upland fields were already depleted and they needed to move on. For many, fearing
the communists, a natural move was to Thailand where Vang Pao and other leaders had already
fled. This in itself had caused a panic, and thousands of Hmong began to surge down Route 13 in
late May, 1975. Hmong leader Touby Lyfoung, emissary of Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma,
tried to calm them. “Vang Pao has gone”, he said, “because he was too involved in the war. But
you have committed no crimes, so why are you leaving the country?” (Soon afterwards Touby
was sent off to the notorious Camp 01 where he died). But the crowds were not satisfied and
continued to Hin Heup where, on the 29 May, their way was barred at a bridge by PL troops.
Apparently, by this time the size of the crowd had swelled to 20,000 or 30,000 people. The
soldiers told them to return to their villages, but the crowd rushed the bridge whereupon the
troops opened fire, killing five people and wounding around thirty others. A Thai photographer,
Anant Chomcheun, who was on the scene the following day, reported seeing PL troops herding
groups of Hmong back to the hills at gunpoint, while others melted into the countryside off the
highway to continue their trek towards Thailand. “I want to stay with my father Vang Pao”, one
Hmong told the photographer. By the end of 1975 the Hmong refugee population in Thailand had
reached around 34,000. News of the killings at Hin Heup quickly spread, confirming the Hmong’s
worst fears. At Long Cheng, Hmong soldiers and officers had been rounded up and sent off to
“seminar”, and when they did not return their families were convinced they had been executed.
Accounts of continuing, sporadic fighting in the mountains emerged in early 1976, and in July that
year there were reports of the use of napalm against resistance strongholds. While soldiers loyal
to Vang Pao made up part of this resistance, another group came to prominence, the Chao Fa,
perhaps best rendered as “Soldiers of God”. This was a nativistic millenarian movement that had
emerged in the early 1960s, a result of the disruption of Hmong culture and society. Its leader,
Yong Shong Lue, promoted his own messianic script for the Hmong, believing in the coming of a
Hmong king and in his own ability to protect his followers from enemy bullets. There had always
been some overlap between these two groups, and indeed Vang Pao had tried to suppress the
Chao Fa’s influence among his men.
In the chaos that followed the fleeing of Vang Pao the influence of the Chao Fa appears to have
grown dramatically and fuelled Hmong resistance to the new regime. With the collapse of
American support the Hmong drew on their own cultural resources to maintain their resistance.
These forces, however, had little ammunition and could only really harass the new government.
Nevertheless, any opposition was intolerable to the new leaders in Vientiane and in 1977 they
decided on a showdown with the Hmong resistance. This coincided with a treaty drawn up with
Vietnam which legitimized the use of Vietnamese forces against the resistance, and perhaps
upwards of 30,000 North Vietnamese Army (NVA) troops were used in the large scale operation
launched against the Hmong in 1977. The fighting by all accounts was ferocious and included
shelling, aerial bombing with napalm, and perhaps even the use of chemical agents. The Hmong
resistance fighters, of course, lived with their families and therefore operations against them
26
entailed indiscriminate civilian casualties, leading to charges of genocide when these people
staggered into the camps in Thailand and told their stories. Some stories were so horrific that
they billowed into charges that the communists were using a hitherto unknown chemical weapon,
known as “yellow rain”. These claims, which were promoted by hawkish anti-communists in
Washington DC were never substantiated. That the Hmong were fighting against overwhelming
odds is clear from the account given, for example, by a Hmong Major in December 1977: “My
group of 30 fighters got separated from the others a month ago. We had only fifty rounds of
ammunition per man, no food and no medicine.” The fighting further disrupted the Hmong
economy, and many who took flight through the forests would arrive in Thailand emaciated.
It is clear that the campaign against the Hmong at times degenerated into the savagery we now
associate with “ethnic cleansing” but this was not its official motivation. However, although the
LPDR and its ally Vietnam had broken the back of the Hmong resistance by 1978, they had killed
and mistreated so many people in the process that resentment has festered on until today, finding
sporadic expression in outbreaks of fighting against the government."
Lee, 1990
"Fearing retributions from the new regime after the PL control of Laos, many former RLA Hmong
soldiers and civilians who could not flee to Thailand went into hiding with their families in
inaccessible mountain areas. They were joined by others who were released or who escaped
from "seminar" centres. From their jungle hide-outs, small groups of these men first ambushed PL
trucks travelling between Vang Vieng and Vientiane in early 1976, but soon Included PL troops in
their attacks. They repeatedly used arms and ammunitions left hidden by Vang Pao in Phu Bia or
collected from their dead victims.
Although American diplomats in Laos disclaimed any involvement with these tribal dissidents,
reports about their skirmishes filtered through to the outside world throughout 1976. Armed
resistance was also reported in Sayaboury where refugees in Thailand were said to return to
Laos and carry out their separate campaign against PL and Vietnamese soldiers (FEER, 13l2176:
32). Initial casualties on the Government side were believed to include two Soviet helicopters and
crew, in addition to "serious losses" suffered by village militia and local military personnel (FEER,
10/9/76: 13).
The Government decided to send troops to the hills to crush this resistance When they proved
ineffective, four regiments of NV soldiers were brought in from other parts of Laos. Many Hmong
settlements were burned to the ground, sometimes accompanied by mass execution of their
inhabitants. Aerial bombing was carried out along with heavy artillery lifted to the highlands by
helicopters. Poisonous chemicals were alleged to have been dropped on civilians hiding in the
jungles and defoliants were sprayed on their crops. Those who surrendered themselves to the
authorities were taken to "resettlement villages" in the lowlands where they were selected for
"seminars", imprisonment or executions, depending on the decisions of the military.
This pattern of resistance and government counter-attacks persists even today, and is one the
major causes of the continuing refugee movement to Thailand. The resistance has been further
fuelled by political groups formed by Lao refugees who have resettled in the West, among which
was the United Front for the Liberation of Laos under Vang Pao's leadership. Border Thai
intelligence officers have also played an ongoing role in this resistance by supplying small groups
of refugees with arms and sending them back to Laos to gather military information, thereby
putting into jeopardy the lives of villagers who come into contact with these teams. The only
recourse for such villagers is to escape to Thailand with their families in order to avoid
persecution by PL officials.
27
Official estimates put the number of Hmong dissidents killed in the military operations of 1977 at
1,300 and "thousands" captured in "heavy fighting" (Asia Week, 16/12/79: 16). On his part, Vang
Pao alleged that 50,000 Hmong died from PL chemical poisoning between 1975 and 1978, while
another 45,000 perished "form starvation and diseases or were shot trying to escape to Thailand''
(Hamilton Merritt, op.cit.: 37). Whatever the number of casualties, there is no doubt that the
campaign against Hmong and other dissidents had significantly increased the number of people
crossing to Thailand. One group of 2,500 Hmong, for instance, arrived in Nong Khai refugee
camp in December 1977 (Asia Week, 10/3/78: 38). This was the biggest single escape party
which was said to number more than 8,000 members when it first set out from Phu Bia, but a
number of them changed their mind and return to their jungle hide-outs while many others were
captured, died from exhaustion, shot by PL troops along the escape route, or drowned trying to
swim across the Mekong river."
AI, 23 March 2007, p.3
Fearful of retribution and in turmoil after the escape of Vang Pao, thousands of irregular Hmong
soldiers from the “Secret Army” retreated to inaccessible forest areas with their families from
where they mounted armed resistance to the new government. The resistance was largely
crushed within the first years by the Lao People’s Army with the help of some 30,000 Vietnamese
troops,16 though the defeat of the rebel groups was not total. A small rebel force held out,
supported by Hmong groups in exile, particularly in the USA, including by Vang Pao.
From inaccessible encampments, particularly in the remote areas around Laos’ highest mountain,
Phu Bia, the armed rebels launched occasional attacks against the Lao People’s Army into the
1990s.17 Since then, dwindling Hmong groups of rebels have made sporadic attacks on army
positions, and were accused by some representatives of the authorities of responsibility for two
attacks on public buses in 2003 which caused multiple casualties. From then on very few reports
have come out of Laos about other sporadic attacks allegedly involving groups that live in hiding
in the jungle. By contrast, Amnesty International has frequently received reports and accounts
about attacks against such groups by the Lao People’s Army."
Expansion of government control through resettlement and opium eradication
programmes fuels conflict with the Hmong "resistance" (1990-2009)
•
During the 1990s, the government started to open up the country to the outside and to
improve access to remote areas inside the country. The resulting expansion of government
control was accelerated by resettlement programmes aimed at alleviating poverty fuelled
discontent, in particular in the northern highlands where the governement also started
implementing a opium cultivation eradication programme which particularly affected Hmong
communities heavily engaged in opium cultivation.
•
As government officials and armed forces encroached on the redoubts of the “resistance”,
conflicts escalated. It became also more visible as attacks attaributed to Hmong rebels were
carried out against two public buses in 2003
and a number of journalists managed to get
in contact with Hmong rebels and their communities hiding in the jungle and reportedly under
constant attacks by government forces.
•
There were reports of clashes in 2005 and 2007 and between 2006 and 2007, more than one
thousand former fighters and family members are reported to have surrendered to Lao
authorities.
•
During 2009, it was reported that security forces continued operations against small,
scattered pockets of insurgents and their families in remote jungle areas. A total of 2,000
former Hmong rebels had reporetdly surrendered since 2005.
28
Writenet, May 2004, p. 18
"As we have already seen there was fierce fighting between the government and the remnants of
Vang Pao’s forces in the aftermath of the revolution. However, in the 1980s clashes between the
scattered groups of Hmong and the army died down, largely because the Hmong had retreated
into remote terrain and a kind of live-and-let-live arrangement prevailed. This began to change in
the 1990s as the government began to open up the country to the outside, but this also entailed
improving access to remote areas inside the country and meant the expansion of government
control on the ground too. From its inception the LPDR had promoted a policy of resettling upland
groups on the plains. The main reason given was that it would help the government promote
development, in particular by stopping slash and burn agriculture which was said to be destroying
forest resources, and make it easier for the government to provide services to these peoples,
such as health and education. The unspoken premise was that it would extend and strengthen
the government’s control over the population. The centrality of control to their plans can be seen
in the government’s imperviousness to arguments by foreign experts concerning the merits of
shifting cultivation. Indeed, the greatest destruction of primary forest in the past 20 years has
been by logging companies, the largest of which have been controlled by the army since the late
1980s. Resettlement had been attempted after 1975, often by soldiers turning up in a village and
ordering the villagers to relocate. However, rarely were proper preparations made for these
people in their new locations and they experienced such hardship that many fled back to their old
highland villages or across the Mekong to refugee camps. In fact government resources were
simply not adequate to implement such a programme at this time, regardless of its desirability.
In the 1990s, as new sources of foreign aid flooded into the country, the government has been
able to yoke some of this aid to the resettlement programme. This has ensured that better
(though far from perfect) preparations have been made for those who have been resettled, the
process has been less brutal as it has been carried out with some supervision from foreign
donors.31 The programme has picked up speed over the last ten years and in many cases has
caused considerable unhappiness among those pressured to move. This has been one source
fuelling discontent.
In more recent years the government has also come under strong international pressure (from the
United States in particular) to suppress opium growing. Besides being used as medicine and as a
narcotic among the people who grow it, opium has been an important cash crop for highland
villages for the past 100 years. The money earned by selling opium is often used to buy rice (if
there is a shortfall) or medicines.32 The US has provided aid to help with crop substitution
programmes in Hua Phan and Xieng Khoang provinces, with some minor success.33 But until
such programmes are successful and are spread to all villages that grow opium, the suppression
of opium by officials marching into villages and instructing villagers to “voluntarily” cut down their
crops simply further impoverishes the villagers, and perhaps the government hopes that this
impoverishment will force them to join relocation programmes.34 In general this is what has been
going on for the past few years as the government attempts to reach its target of eradicating
opium by 2005.
(...)
Vientiane Times reported that the area under opium had fallen from 26,837 hectares in 1998 to
7,847 hectares in 2003.36 The economic hardship caused by this programme, driven by foreign
pressure, has also caused discontent.
The above programmes had several consequences. As government officials and armed forces
encroached on the redoubts of the “resistance”, conflicts escalated. Furthermore, discontent with
the above programmes provided recruits for the “resistance”, but they would also prove fatal to it
as well. The conflict has become very visible in recent years as members of this “resistance” have
carried out several brutal attacks on travellers on the road between Vientiane and Luang
Phrabang. It also became very visible after a Time magazine reporter and his photographer made
29
their way to one of the redoubts of the Hmong resistance in the special zone of Saysomboune
north of Vientiane and in May 2003 published a graphic report of their plight in this globally read
magazine.37 In early June two Bangkok based reporters tried to repeat their feat and were
captured and rapidly sentenced to 15 years in jail, causing an uproar among foreign journalists
and governments. A deal was quickly done, and they were released, but not the local Hmong who
were with them, whose fate remains unknown.
The group visited by Time reporter Andrew Perrin was led by 46 year old Moua Toua Ter who
had joined Vang Pao’s army at the age of 15. All this time he has expected that Vang Pao and
the Americans would come and save the remnants, no doubt encouraged by vague messages
from Vang Pao himself, now in Minnesota. Moua is one of the few original soldiers from that
army, the new recruits often coming from children of former soldiers who are either dead, aged or
disabled. The arms available to his soldiers were no match for the Lao army. He described to
Perrin the heavy attacks by artillery, mortars and gunships that his several hundred persons
strong group had endured in October 2003, and the casualties among young and old as well as
the soldiers. There are no reasons to doubt Moua’s general description, but there are reasons to
doubt the common assertion by groups in the US and journalists, including Perrin, that these are
ethnically motivated attacks.
On the other hand, on 6 February 2003 a public bus was attacked by the “resistance” on Road
13, just north of Vang Vieng, a some hours drive north of Vientiane. Ten Lao passengers were
killed, as well as two Swiss cyclists who were travelling behind the bus. Then on 20 April another
bus travelling on Road 13 just inside Luang Phrabang province was also attacked with 12 people
killed and 31 injured, and property looted.
(...)
The “resistance” leader believed to have been responsible for these attacks is Yang Toua Thao
whose base is in Luang Phrabang province. The scattered groups of Hmong are led by such
individual leaders who were once part of an army, but have long ceased to be part of a disciplined
force. These leaders may or may not cooperate with one another and the allegiance they
command is that of a phu nyai, at the head of an entourage, in this case made up of a substantial
number of clan members. His authority is traditional more than it is that of a modern army
commander. Indeed, over the years these Hmong groups have come to resemble the “primitive
rebels” described by historian Eric Hobsbawm in his renowned book, Bandits. Such rebels have
sprung up in Europe and Asia and elsewhere during the transition from traditional societies to
ones commanded by modern states and economies. Hobsbawm writes: “Bandits, except for their
willingness or capacity to refuse individual submission, have no ideas other than those of the
peasantry… They are activists and not ideologists…tough and self-reliant men… Insofar as
bandits have a ‘programme’, it is the defence or restoration of the traditional order of things ‘as it
should be’…”39 It should be clear that this use of the term “bandits” is very different from the
government’s description of the Hmong as “bandits”, their translation of khon bo dii, which is their
attempt to depoliticize the problem. But in this respect the government’s description is no more
inaccurate than that of groups in the US who wish to describe these Hmong as “freedom fighters”
against communism. The majority of the Hmong still in the forests today have little or no
understanding of abstract terms like “freedom”, “democracy”, “communism”, or indeed
“capitalism”. They are tragic leftovers from a tragic war, and have survived into another period
purely by virtue of the rugged and remote terrain available to them in Laos. But this is finally
coming to an end.
(...)
In September 2003 there was some kind of Hmong uprising in the old revolutionary base province
of Hua Phan. It was serious enough for the UN to withdraw several volunteers from the
province.46 A Hmong official in the LFNC said it was led by Chao Fa, the Hmong millennial
movement that has been intermittently active in the region for several decades. They had, he
said, a flag with a moon and stars and carried out rituals to protect followers from enemy bullets.
They attacked traffic along main roads, and they attacked army outposts. Provincial officials
30
ascribed the uprising to dissatisfaction with the opium eradication programme. These are not
exclusive explanations, because the discontent with the opium eradication programmes, the
impoverishment it causes, and attempts at relocation would all disrupt Hmong society sufficiently
for a movement to arise to “set things right”. Indeed, it is hard to know how much this messianism
is also influenced by the Hmong in neighbouring north Vietnam, with whom they have contact,
where evangelical religious beliefs and messianism has struck deep roots in the past decade.47
Indeed, open forms of a kind of messianism have manifested themselves among the Hmong of
Xieng Khoang. In 2003 a Hmong preacher in Ban Lae, Muang Khun, encouraged his followers to
go into the forest for prayers, and when there to take off all their clothes, a kind of baring their
soul to God, but also a transgression of norms of comportment, something common to millennial
movements. In a re-enactment of Christ’s resurrection he, with his son’s help, killed his wife and
proclaimed she would rise again in three days. She did not, and he was arrested for murder.48
More significantly, in early 2004 fourteen Hmong protestant churches, led by a Pastor Lee,
defected from the LEC to the still underground Methodists and called on the LEC to
“excommunicate” them. This would seem to be an expression of Hmong attempts to align
themselves as an ethnic group with one particular variant of Protestantism. In other words,
Christianity is being mobilized to express ethnicity, and indeed the LEC has been concerned
about young Hmong pastors who come for training being more interested in their “Hmongness”
than the Scriptures.49
All of this presages the coming of a consciousness of modern ethnicity to Laos, rather than the
more traditional concerns one might find among the Chao Fa and the “resistance”. This ethnic
consciousness is promoted by the government, by international organizations, and by overseas
Hmong, especially those in the US, who have been exposed to the modern politics of ethnicity. In
this respect one might suggest that even though the armed “resistance” is ebbing, ethnic politics
is only just beginning in Laos.
Critics of the LPDR have employed the term “ethnic cleansing” to criticize the Lao Government’s
policies towards the Hmong. However, neither this term, nor the earlier use of the term “genocide”
is a proper description of the complex situation we find inside Laos.50 Many Hmong supported
the Pathet Lao, just as many opposed them. The government has not tried to “cleanse” those
Hmong who support it; and many who did oppose the Pathet Lao have made their peace with the
regime. Indeed, among the minorities in Laos the Hmong have been among the most successful,
with people high in the government, in the bureaucracy and in business."
USDOS, 30 October 2009
"Since the end of the Indochina conflict, a small-scale insurgency against the regime has
continued. Incidents have included attacks in 2003 and 2004 against various types of land
transportation and public markets. There were reports of clashes in 2005 and 2007. In late 2006
and 2007, more than one thousand former fighters and family members were estimated to have
surrendered to Lao authorities. The United States opposes any acts of violence against the Lao
Government."
USDOS, 11 March 2010
"Although there were no reports of attacks by the few remaining Hmong insurgent groups during
the year, the government leadership maintained its suspicion of Hmong political objectives.
Security forces continued operations to isolate and defeat or force the surrender of the residual,
small, scattered pockets of insurgents and their families in remote jungle areas.
The government continued to offer "amnesty" to insurgents who surrender but continued to deny
international observers permission to visit the estimated more than 2,000 insurgents who have
31
surrendered since 2005--other than a few families in Pha Lak village. Their status and welfare
remained unknown at year's end. Because of their past activities, amnestied insurgents continued
to be the focus of official suspicion and scrutiny.
The government generally refused international community offers to assist surrendered
insurgents directly but allowed some aid from the UN and international agencies as part of larger
assistance programs."
Group of Hmong arrested in US in 2007 on charges of planning to overthrow the Lao
government (September 2009)
•
In 2007, a group Hmong whihc included Vang Pao, the former leader of the Hmong guerilla in
Laos, were arrested in the US on charges of planning to overthrow the communist
government of Laos and possibly assassinate top leaders and establish martial law before
forming a democratic regime.
•
In September 2009, charges against Vang Pao were dropped but 10 members of the group
remained concerned by the indictement.
NYT, 18 September 2009
"The federal government said Friday that it had dropped all charges against the exiled Hmong
military leader Gen. Vang Pao, who had been accused of plotting to overthrow the Communist
government in his native Laos.
The announcement came after a grand jury in Sacramento issued a new indictment on Thursday
against a dozen men accused of conspiring to give money, arms and other support to insurgents
in Laos, and violations of the Neutrality Act.
Ten of the 12 defendants, all of whom live in California, had been charged in a 2007 indictment
that named Gen. Vang Pao, as a ringleader in the plot. The new indictment replaces the previous
one.
(...)
The case against Gen. Vang Pao — and the ongoing prosecution — was largely based on a sting
operation involving conversations in 2007 with an undercover agent from the Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives.
In those conversations, the government said the defendants outlined a plan to provide the means
and manpower for insurgents to bomb government buildings in the Laotian capital, Vientiane, and
shoot down Laotian military planes with Stinger missiles.
The indictment lists a raft of weapons and equipment that defendants plotted to supply to
insurgents, including antitank rockets, mines, explosives, night-vision goggles and medical kits.
The goal, the new indictment says, was “to overthrow the government of Laos,” which remains a
Communist state. Its relations with the United States have thawed since the cold war ended."
The Guardian, 18 June 2007
"A group from California's Hmong community had a detailed, 90-day plan to overthrow the
communist government of Laos and possibly assassinate top leaders and establish martial law
before forming a democratic regime, according to a new brief filed in the case.
32
The 18-page document, Operation Popcorn: a Comprehensive Plan of Action, outlines a $28m
(£14.2m) budget to pay local mercenaries to carry out the plot.
The document, obtained by the Associated Press, was filed this week after the arrest of an 11th
suspect in the case, Dang Vang, 48, who is listed as the plan's author. Prosecutors say he and
nine other members of California's Hmong community, along with a former national guard official,
wanted to bomb government buildings and shoot down military aircraft in an effort to topple the
communist regime, which has persecuted Hmong since the end of the Vietnam war, when Hmong
people aided the US.
At the heart of the alleged plot is Vang Pao, 77, a former general in the royal army of Laos, who
led CIA-backed counter-insurgents during the Vietnam war, and Lieutenant Colonel Harrison
Jack, a retired national guard officer. Prosecutors say the leaders planned to purchase nearly
$10m of weapons, including AK47 rifles and Stinger missiles. A network of underground
sympathisers would "neutralize trusted government leaders." "
Lack of separation of power fails to safeguard fundamental constitutional rights
•
Since 1975, the government has remained a one-party system. The 1991 constitution
confirms that the Lao People's Revolutionary Party (LPRP) is the “leading nucleus” of the
political system and indirectly prohibits political opposition on any grounds.
•
The Lao Constitution contains key provisions for the protection of human rights, including
regarding equality between ethnic groups (art. 22), the freedom of settlement and movement
(art. 27) or freedom of religion (art. 30).
•
Major obstacles to the effective safeguarding of these rights include the lack of independence
of the judiciary, widespread corruption and the absence of separation of power between the
executive and political wings of the government with the Lao People's Revolutionary Party as
its “leading nucleus” (art. 3)
SAHRDC, 22 February 2004, p. 2
"The 1991 Lao Constitution describes the LPRP as the “leading nucleus” of the political system
and indirectly prohibits political opposition on any grounds.2 The LPRP maintains effective control
of all institutions in Laos such as the media, religious organisations and trade unions, which are
constitutionally obligated to “popularise and propagate all policies, regulations and laws among
the people.”3 It provides for the “right and freedom to believe or not to believe in religions”, but
does not provide for the constitutional right to “manifest one’s religious belief.” It provides for the
“right and freedom of speech, press and assembly; and the right to set up associations and to
stage demonstrations which are not contrary to the law,”4 but does not define any parameters for
the “the law”, such as the necessity in a democratic society for the protection of national security
and public order, public health, or morals. It does not acknowledge any adherence to international
law, nor are there any official legal procedures to ensure that national laws are brought into
compliance with international instruments to which the Laos is a party.
Statutory protections in Laos are likewise grossly inadequate, and effectively exacerbate human
rights abuses. The Laos Penal Code forbids “slandering the State, distorting party or state
policies, inciting disorder, or propagating information or opinions that weaken the State.” Violators
are believed to incur prison sentences of anywhere between one year and five years. Article 59 of
the Penal Code sets a prison sentence of one to five years for “anti-government propaganda”.
The Labour Code restricts any possibility of strikes by punishing “any person or organisation that
is involved in a work stoppage.” Article 50 of the Law Concerning Criminal Procedure, allows up
to one year's administrative detention without charge or trial.5
33
Legislative provisions are in most cases incidental in Laos. Local and central authorities act with
relative impunity outside any noticeable rule of law. Despite the fraudulent denials of the LPRP,
there are consistent accounts of activities by the authorities that are in violation of Laos’ limited
domestic legal protections."
Writenet, May 2004, p. 11
""The Constitution that was promulgated in 1991 appeared to contain most key safeguards for
human rights. For example, in Article 8 it makes it clear that Laos is a multiethnic state and is
committed to equality between ethnic groups
(...)
The Constitution has provisions for gender equality and freedom of religion, and for example in
Article 31 it says: “Lao citizens have the right and freedom of speech, press and assembly; and
have the right to set up associations and to stage demonstrations which are not contrary to the
law”.10
The Lao Government signed the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(ICESCR) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) on 7 December
2000. Both are awaiting ratification by the National Assembly and so the LPDR is not yet bound
by the provisions of the ICESCR and ICCPR. By signing these covenants, Laos has
demonstrated that it is willing to continue the treaty making process and agrees to be restrained
by them. Laos ratified the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (ICERD) in 1974, the Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
against Women (CEDAW) in 1981 and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) in 1991.
But Laos has not signed the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment (CAT).11
(...)
While the provisions of the Constitution and the signing of the above treaties appear to provide all
the necessary key provisions for the protection of human rights, these are all vitiated by the
“leading role” reserved for the Party, which ensures that the Party can override the judiciary if
necessary and indeed any other government institution. In reality there is little separation of
powers between the executive and political wings of government. The Party aims to recruit into its
ranks all individuals holding key civil service positions; or one might put it another way, a main
precondition of holding a key civil service position is being a member of the Party. Consequently,
there is little likelihood of differences arising between the executive and political wings of the
government."
Society for Threathened Peoples, 6 March 2007, p.2
"Ever since the founding of the Lao PDR, the country has been led by the only legal party Lao
Revolutionary Popular Party (LRPP). Article 8 of the Constitution of the Lao PDR guarantees that
“the state pursues the policy of promoting unity and equality among all ethnic groups”.
Furthermore, it states that “[all] ethnic groups have the rights to protect, preserve, and promote
the fine customs and cultures of their own tribes and of the nation”, and that “[all] acts of creating
division and discrimination among ethnic groups are prohibited”. However, as the “Alternative
Report of the Lao Movement for Human Rights (LMDH)” on the “Situation of the ethnic and
religious minorities in the Lao People’s Democratic Republic” has pointed out in 2005, Article 8
stands in direct contradiction to Article 3 of the Constitution: “The rights of the multi-ethnic people
to be the masters of the country are exercised and ensured through the functioning of the political
system with the Lao People's Revolutionary Party as its leading nucleus“, which basically (re)inforces the monopoly of the LRPP and is therefore incompatible with the democratic standards
that the Lao PDR has recognized by signing various international conventions."
34
Ethno-linguistic and religious demography (2010)
•
About two thirds of the population are Theravada Buddhists, 30 per cent are practitioners of
animism or ancestor worship and 2 per cent are Christians.
•
There are 49 different ethnic groups. Through ethno-linguistic classification these 49 groups
can be classified into four main groups: the Lao-Tai, the Austro-Asiatic, the Sino-Tibetan and
the Hmong-Mien. The Lao include from 55 to 65 of the population with other ethnic groups
accounting for 35 per cent of the population. The Lao group is linked to lowland paddy rice
production and is more urbanized, the minority groups are traditionally more linked to shifting
cultivation in the rural uplands.
•
Ethnic groups can also be classified in the following way: The Lao Taï (53%), the Khmu
(11%), the Phou Taï (10%), the Hmong (7%), the Lü (2,88%), the Katang (2,03%), the
Makong (1,97%) and the Akha (1,64%).
•
The ethnic groups are sometimes also divided into three broad categories: lowlanders or Lao
loum, Lao theung, which refers to the people who live on the slopes, and Lao soung, those
who live on the mountain tops. The Hmong belong to the latter.
UN Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief, 27 January 2010, p. 8
"20. With regard to the religious demography of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, the
Special Rapporteur was informed by the Government that about two thirds of the population are
Theravada Buddhists, most belonging to the Lao Loum group (lowlanders). In addition, about 30
per cent of the population are practitioners of animism or ancestor worship, mainly among the
ethnic groups of Lao Soung (highlanders/minority tribes) and Lao Theung (mid-slope dwellers).
Also among lowlanders, many pre-Buddhist animistic beliefs have been incorporated into
Buddhist practice.
21. Christians constitute around 2 per cent of the population and many are also members of
ethnic minorities in remote areas. The Government officially recognizes the Lao Evangelical
Church (with an estimated 100,000 believers), the Roman Catholic Church (with around 40,000
believers) and the Seventh-Day Adventist Church (with around 2,000 believers). Further Christian
denominations are active in the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, including from the
Assemblies of God, the Baptist Church, the Church of Christ, the Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-day Saints, Jehovah’s Witnesses, the Methodist Church and the Lutheran Church.
22. In addition, there are further religious minorities in the Lao People’s Democratic Republic,
constituting altogether less than 1 per cent of the population. These include around 8,000 Bahá’í
adherents, who are active in five Bahá’í centres across the country. The majority of the 400
Muslims in the Lao People’s Democratic Republic reside in Vientiane, where there are two Sunni
mosques. Furthermore, a very small number of citizens follow no religion."
WFP, December 2007, p. 16
"Lao PDR is one of the world’s most ethnically diverse countries. The Government of Lao PDR
has acknowledged 49 different ethnic groups8. Linguists claim that the country’s population is
comprised of more than 200 linguistic subgroups9. The highest level of distinct ethnic
diversification can be found in the uplands10. Through ethno-linguistic classification these 49
groups can be classified into four main groups: the Lao-Tai, the Austro-Asiatic, the Sino-Tibetan
and the Hmong-Mien.
The majority group, the Lao, only make up 55 percent of the population. If one includes ethnic
groups with similar language (the Tai), the majority group increases to approximately 65 percent.
Other ethnic groups make up as much as approximately 35 percent of the total population.
Whereas the majority group traditionally is linked to lowland paddy rice production and is more
35
urbanized, the minority groups are traditionally more linked to shifting cultivation in the rural
uplands."
FIDH & MLDH, January 2005, p. 3
2 – Composition of the population: the main ethnic groups
The data provided by the LPDR diverge with those of the international organizations on the
composition of the Lao population, in particular on the number of ethnic groups residing in this
country. Indeed, in a recent report transmitted to the United Nations (CEDAW, August 2003), the
LPDR stated that there exists “48 ethnic groups, classified in four main groups” in Laos. The Lao
Taï (53%), the Khmu (11%), the Phou Taï (10%), the Hmong (7%), the Lü (2,88%), the Katang
(2,03%), the Makong (1,97%) and the Akha (1,64%) were mentioned among others. “The rest of
the population can be divided between forty other ethnic groups”, as emphasized by the LPDR
report.
The data dating from before 1975, year during which the communist party took over power,
established the number of ethnic groups in Laos to 68. As to international organizations, they
simply presented the Lao population as being divided in three main ethnic groups. In the
"background Notes" on Laos, the American Department of State estimated the LPDR population
to 6,06 million people in July 2004, and that it could be divided between the "Lao Loum" (Laotians
from lowlands) 68%, the "Lao Theung" (Laotians from the plateaus) 22%, and the "Lao Soung"
(Laotians from the mountains, including the Hmong and the Yao) 9%. The remaining 1% is
composed of foreign
residents."
AI, 23 March 2007, p. 3
"One of Asia’s poorest nations, Laos has an ethnically diverse population of 5.6 million, over three
quarters of whom live in rural areas.1 Laos is home to some 50 ethnic groups,2 until recently
officially divided into three broad categories: lowlanders or Lao loum, Lao theung, which refers to
the people who live on the slopes, and Lao soung, those who live on the mountain tops.3 The
Hmong belong to the latter.
Land-locked Laos is largely covered by rugged mountains and borders Cambodia, China,
Myanmar, Thailand and Viet Nam. Laos has one of the lowest densities of roads in the world,4
although the road network is gradually expanding, large parts of the country are almost
inaccessible.
The Lao People’s Democratic Republic (LPDR) is a one-party state, which was established on 2
December 1975 when the Communist Pathet Lao forces entered the capital Vientiane and a
protracted war ended. The abdication of the king at the same time also marked the end of the
constitutional monarchy, which had lasted for just under 30 years."
Causes of displacement
Numerous reports of alleged human rights violations committed by the government in
its fight against Hmong rebel groups (2009)
•
In early 2010, a journalist who got in contact with a group of former Hmong rebels hiding in
the jungle reported that Lao government forces were still attacking them. In the last attack, a
14-year old boy was allegedly killed while foraging food for his family. Many members of the
36
groups were visibly malnourished due to their frequent displacement from one hiding place to
another leaving no opportunity to grow food.
•
In 2008, Hmong refugees in Thailand living in a military-guarded camp in Huai Nam Khao in
northern Thailand reported fleeing violent attacks and persecution in Laos, witnessing the
murder of family members, suffering rape, surviving bullet and shrapnel wounds, and
enduring malnutrition and disease.
•
During medical and psychosocial consultations, MSF found extreme fear and psychological
distress among the Hmong refugees, which was exacerbated by the threat of a return to Laos
where they fear more abuse.
•
According to MSF, in December 2005, 27 Lao Hmong children were forcibly sent back from
Thailand Of these, 12 girls managed to come back to Thailand in May 2007 and told MSF
staff of enduring repeated beatings, rapes, and other abuses during their detention in Laos.
•
In 2007, Amnesty International reported that a number of displaced Hmong groups were
living in the jungle in the provinces of Bolikhamxay, Xieng Khouang, Vientiane, and Luang
Phrabang. They consisted of men and women, including elderly people, and children who
reported being constantly pursued and attacked by the military.
•
These violent attacks led to numerous deaths, injuries and continual displacement which
deprived the women, men and children of their right to an adequate standard of living,
including shelter, drinking water, and food. Many were sick but without any access to health
services and died as a result.
•
In 2003, the CERD reporetd that it was "extremely disturbed to learn that some members of
the Hmong minority, who have taken refuge in the jungle or certain mountainous regions of
the Lao People’s Democratic Republic since the end of the war in 1975, have been subjected
to severe brutalities."
The Independent, 17 February 2010
"Cut off from the outside world, this is the first time the jungle leaders have heard that the Hmong
refugees were being sent back to Laos. On receiving the news their despair is evident.
"At least before, we thought we could escape to Thailand but now we have no place to run to,"
says Chao Fer as he looks over to a mountain just three miles away. "We can't keep running,
soon we will all die here. Just over that mountain is where the enemy is and as we speak they are
hunting us down with dogs – it's just a matter of time before they attack us again."
Weeks earlier the Laos army had stormed the Hmong's previous temporary camp in what they
believe was part of campaign to prepare for the 25th Southeast Asian Games. In the raid a 14year-old boy was killed, the leaders say he was unarmed and foraging for food to feed his family.
"My son was shot by the communists last month," the boy's mother says as she prepares food for
her other children. He didn't have any gun, just finding food for us but I don't have the ability to do
anything – I can only die inside".
Frequent attacks force the groups to change camp every two weeks and break up into small
numbers to avoid large-scale offensives by the Laos army. This leaves the community no chance
to farm food or forge a proper way of life. With no other choice, boiled tree shrub has become
their daily diet and at times they are lucky if they can catch a jungle rat or monkey. The lack of
nutrients has left the group visibly malnourished – both young and old have swollen abdomens.
MSF, 1 May 2008, p. 1-6
37
"Nearly 8,000 ethnic Lao Hmong currently confined to a guarded, barbed-wire enclosed camp
controlled by the Thai military in the village of Huai Nam Khao in Petchabun province in northern
Thailand face the imminent threat of a forced return to Laos. Many of these refugees have told
the international medical humanitarian organization Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), the sole
nongovernmental organization working in the camp, of a life in Laos spent fleeing violent attacks
and persecution, witnessing the murder of family members, suffering rape, surviving bullet and
shrapnel wounds, and enduring malnutrition and disease.
Out of grave concern for their safety and well-being, MSF is calling upon the governments of
Thailand and Laos to immediately stop the forced repatriation of these Lao Hmong refugees
without independent monitoring and guarantees for their safety.
MSF began providing humanitarian aid to this group of refugees in July 2005. During medical and
psychosocial consultations, MSF has found extreme fear and psychological distress among this
population, which has only been exacerbated by the threat of a return to Laos.
Refugees have told MSF field staff about recent abuses suffered in Laos, which are consistent
with reports by human right organizations1 and independent journalists2 who have visited the
areas of Laos (Borikamxai, Xieng Khouang, Xaisomboune, and Vientiane provinces) where many
of the Hmong refugees have fled. At least 181 refugees in the camp bear physical scars, such as
bullet and shrapnel wounds, from alleged abuses in Laos.
(...)
The repatriation process agreed upon by Thailand and Laos seriously threatens the legal and
fundamental right of non-refoulement—whereby people fleeing persecution must not be sent back
to countries where their lives or liberty would be threatened.4
The government in Laos has continually prevented nongovernmental organizations and
international organizations from monitoring and assessing the safety of Lao Hmong returnees.
Since December 2005, more than 370 Hmong have been forcibly returned to Laos. Some of
these individuals have been held in arbitrary detention, and there have been credible reports of
torture.5 The Lao government has made the firm demand that no third party should be included in
the repatriation process. This was made a condition of any negotiation with Thailand on the issue
of Hmong returns.
Fearing and unsafe return to Laos
The alleged abuses perpetrated against Lao Hmong refugees who have been forcibly returned to
Laos have intensified the stress and anxiety among an already traumatized population. In
December 2005, 27 Lao Hmong children (5 boys and 22 girls) from Huai Nam Khao were
arrested by the Thai police and sent back by force to Laos. Twelve of the girls managed to come
back to Thailand and join their parents in the camp in May 2007. They told MSF staff of enduring
repeated beatings, rapes, and other abuses during their detention in Laos. Ten girls and five boys
are still in Laos, their whereabouts and fates unknown.
Such incidents have only heightened anxieties among the population living in the camp. Following
a mental health assessment in the camp to obtain some indicators of the prevalence of
psychological disorders among the Hmong refugees, MSF began providing mental health
counseling in November 2007 to the most traumatized refugees.
The adults interviewed presented various psychological disorders as well as a high level of
psychological distress: pathological mourning due to death or disappearance of multiple family
members, psychotraumatic disorders due to exposure to numerous highly traumatic situations
(being forced to hide, flee under dangerous conditions, live under constant threat of attack and
38
sexual violence), anxiety disorders due to the uncertainty of their future, and the inability to
control their present living conditions.
In clinical interviews, patients presented several symptoms related to post-traumatic stress
disorder as well as anxiety-related depressive disorders. Their main symptoms are persistent
sadness, anxious mood, crying easily, sleeping disorders, recurrent nightmares of traumatic
events, feelings of hopelessness, difficulty concentrating, and somatic complaints such as
headaches and other chronic pains.
(...)
Living in Constant Fear
A pervasive fear stalks the Lao Hmong refugees in Huai Nam Khao camp because of the
prospect of a forced return to Laos. In testimonies provided to MSF staff, many of these refugees
tell of facing a daily struggle to survive targeted attacks, witnessing the murder of family
members, suffering rape, and surviving bullet and shrapnel wounds, as well as malnutrition and
disease. They endured these hardships and acute stress for prolonged periods with little or no
access to any health-care services or medicine beyond herbal remedies harvested from the
jungle. During these interviews, many of the refugees repeatedly stated to MSF staff members
that they feared death, torture, and imprisonment if returned to Laos. Further attesting to the
intense and overwhelming stress felt among the refugees, some of the interviewees expressed
suicidal thoughts when asked about being sent back to Laos. "
AI, 23 March 2007, p. 9
"There are Hmong groups living in the jungle in the provinces of Bolikhamxay, Xieng Khouang,
Vientiane, and Luang Phrabang, including Xaysomboune Special Zone, which was under military
administration until 2006 and stretched over parts of the three former provinces.
The groups that have had the means to contact the outside world or have had clandestine visits
by journalists consist of men and women, including elderly people, and children. According to
their accounts, they have not engaged in any attacks on the military, but are constantly pursued
and attacked by the military.
Regular violent attacks by the military around and on encampments and their inhabitants have led
to numerous deaths, injuries and continual displacement. This displacement in turn deprives the
women, men and children of their right to an adequate standard of living, including shelter,
drinking water, and food. Their destitution further perpetuates ill-health and disease; without any
access to health services, many of them die.
During periods of heightened international attention after the first few visits by journalists to the
jungle, the international donor community was reportedly ready to offer humanitarian assistance
to the Lao government in order to address the needs of those in the jungle. No such assistance
was requested by the authorities."
RFA, 8 February 2008
"Government troops in Laos have been ordered to shoot to kill ethnic Hmong insurgents in the
country's northern jungle regions, with cash rewards offered for every "enemy" killed, RFA's Lao
service reports.
A military official in the northern province of Luangprabang said the orders had now become an
"open secret" in Laos. The orders apply to the region extending from lower Luangprabang to
Xiengkkhouang and the northern part of Vientiane province, where the government hopes
systematically to break up Hmong opposition groups by force.
39
For the past year, those who kill a Hmong fighter have been promised automatic grass-roots
Communist Party membership and a one-step promotion, together with a reward of six million kip
(U.S. $600) per head, said the military official, who requested anonymity. A spokesman for the
Laos Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Vientiane dismissed the report."
HRW, 5 March 2008
"Since the 1970s, the Laotian authorities have targeted ethnic Hmong in Laos and subjected
them to arbitrary arrest and detention, torture, sexual violence, and extrajudicial killings.
Human Rights Watch noted that in 2005 the UN Human Rights Committee, the expert body that
monitors state compliance with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, expressed
concern about the imminent deportation of Hmong refugees and asylum seekers in Petchabun
province to Laos, where they feared persecution."
HRC, 1 November 2007, pp.11-12
"In the Lao People’s Democratic Republic and Viet Nam, some indigenous peoples still face
retaliation for their involvement in armed conflicts during the war with the United States of
America a generation ago, and they are reportedly denied full citizen rights and persecuted as
criminals.
(...)
32. Different sources have documented the countless deaths of civilians, including children and
elders, as a result of the continuous struggle of the Hmong with the Lao Government since 1975.
It has been estimated that 20 rebel groups are surrounded by the Lao military and reduced to
starvation and disease in the forest where they have sought refuge. Many of them have fled to
Cambodia and Thailand, where there have been reports of hundreds of deportations. Following
the upsurge of military activity reported in recent years, several hundred Hmong have reportedly
“surrendered” to Lao authorities, and episodes of human rights abuses have been reported, like
the killing and gang rape of five girls by armed forces in 2004 (CERD/C/LAO/CO/15, para. 22)."
STP, October 2006, p. 10
"The refugees interviewed had many experiences in common. Many had been hiding in the jungle
ever since the Pathet Lao (3) came to power in 1975, others had been born in the jungle and
spent their entire lives there, in constant flight, and a third group had been forced to abandon their
villages and farmland only relatively recently as a result of repeated military action and surprise
attacks. All had fled from military violence and finally joined up with one another to form large or
small groups
hiding in the jungle.
All of the members of the six focus groups reported experiencing frequent brutal attacks by armed
military units, often dating back to 1975, and said that the Lao PDR was continuing its relentless
efforts to find Hmong hiding places. They had all been driven countless times from their hiding
places by military units using guns, artillery and even chemical weapons. The military forces
deployed often appeared to include Vietnamese soldiers.
The refugees reported that over the past few years there had been a steady increase in the
number of military incursions into the area where the Hmong were hiding and increasingly
aggressive efforts were being made to locate and destroy their hiding places. The number of
aerial reconnaissance flights had increased to the extent that the Hmong were no longer able
40
to build themselves permanent housing, clear the undergrowth from around their huts or light
fires, from fear that rising smoke could betray them. Once they had been spotted from the air it
was not long usually before ground forces surrounded their hiding place and they were attacked
without warning on all sides. Frequently aircraft would spray poisonous chemicals over the area
surrounding their hiding place.
All of the adults without exception and most of the younger children reported having personally
experienced surprise attacks carried out by Lao military units. Ground forces surrounded the
group or their hiding place and shot at them without giving any warning. Group members or
relatives had often been killed in the course of such attacks – usually while inside their leaf huts
or outside digging for roots. After an attack the military usually set fire to the huts and the
Hmong’s possessions and
either destroyed everything or occupied the “hiding place“ and turn it into a military encampment.
They all described in close detail the trauma and stress that these lightning attacks caused,
describing how people would be running to escape the volleys of gunfire and at the same time
desperately trying to find their children or their husband or wife, how they would struggle to carry
infants and small children unable to run to safety, and how they themselves had had
to run for their lives, often losing all contact with their family. Weeks would often pass before
members of a family would find one another again. Children were often found dead because
without adults to find food and care for them they had no means of survival. According to these
witnesses the Lao authorities have never made any serious effort to find a peaceful solution to
the conflict. Once a Hmong group is located it is attacked without warning and no opportunity to
surrender."
CERD, 10 December 2003, p. 2
"2. The Committee expresses its grave concern at the information it has received of serious and
repeated human rights violations in the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, in particular violations
of the rights to life, physical integrity and security, and of the freedoms of expression, association
and religion, and at reports of economic, social and cultural discrimination against members of
the Hmong minority, which constitutes approximately 7.4 per cent of the population.
3. The Committee is extremely disturbed to learn that some members of the Hmong minority, who
have taken refuge in the jungle or certain mountainous regions of the Lao People’s Democratic
Republic since the end of the war in 1975, have been subjected to severe brutalities. It has been
reported that acts of extreme violence such as bombing of villages, use of chemical weapons and
landmines and extrajudicial killings and torture are currently being committed by the armed forces
in military campaigns against the inhabitants of remote villages in the provinces of Xieng Khuang,
North Vientiane-Vang Vieng, Bolikhamsai, Sainyabuli, and the Saisombun Special Zone.
According to some information, men, women and children belonging to the Hmong population live
in terrible poverty, suffer from malnutrition and have no access whatever to medical care.
4. The Committee deplores the measures taken by the Lao authorities to prevent the reporting of
any information concerning the situation of Hmong people who have taken refuge in the jungle or
the mountains. It is particularly concerned by the arrest and subsequent sentencing to 15 years’
imprisonment, in June 2003, of two foreign journalists and their assistants, who were investigating
this matter. The Committee, while welcoming the release of the two journalists and their
interpreter, remains concerned at the fate of the Hmong assistants who were tried at the same
time and who are reportedly still being held in detention under harsh conditions."
41
Discrimination against religious minorities, forced conversion and evictions (March
2010)
•
In 2009, the Lao government's tolerance of religion, particularly Christianity, appeared to vary
by region. It was reported that in some provinces authorities used threats of arrest to
intimidate local religious communities. In some instances, Protestant groups were singled out
as targets of abuse or pressure to renounce their faith. In July 2009, it was reported that local
officials banned Christianity in Katin village, Salavan Province, and confiscated pigs from
Christians.
•
According to information received by the UN Special Rapporteur of freedom of religion or
belief, Ms. Asma Jahangir, who visited the country at the end of 2009, some religious
minorities, in particular Christians had been evicted or forced to flee their villages because of
a limitation of their freedom of religion imposed by local authorities, including in some cases
campaigns aimed at forcing them to renounce their faith. These incidents were however on
the decline.
USDOS, 11 March 2010
"The constitution provides for freedom of religion and notes that the state "mobilizes and
encourages" Buddhist monks and novices as well as priests of other religions to participate in
activities "beneficial to the nation and the people." In most areas officials generally respected the
rights of members of most religious groups to worship, albeit within strict government-imposed
constraints. The constitution prohibits "all acts of creating division of religion or creating division
among the people." The LPRP and the government used this to justify restrictions on religious
practice by all religious groups, including the Buddhist majority and animists. Official
pronouncements acknowledged the positive benefits of religion, but they also emphasized its
potential to divide, distract, or destabilize.
(...)
The LFNC often sought to intervene with local governments in cases where minority religious
practitioners, particularly Christians, had been harassed or mistreated. The LFNC reportedly
became more proactive about solving problems by educating persons to respect the law as well
as by training local officials to respect religious believers and to understand Decree 92 better.
The government's tolerance of religion, particularly Christianity, varied by region. In most areas,
members of long-established congregations had few problems practicing their faith. Authorities in
some areas sometimes advised new congregations to join the LEC, despite clear differences
between the groups' beliefs. However, in others authorities allowed congregations not affiliated
with the LEC or Seventh-day Adventists to continue worship unhindered. Authorities in some
provinces used threats of arrest to intimidate local religious communities.
Authorities in some areas continued to be suspicious of non-Buddhist religious communities and
displayed intolerance for minority religious practices, particularly by Protestant groups, whether or
not they were officially recognized. Some local authorities, apparently at times with
encouragement from government or LPRP officials, singled out Protestant groups as targets of
abuse or pressure to renounce their faith.
In July local officials reportedly banned Christianity in Katin village, Salavan Province, and
confiscated pigs from Christians.
In September inhabitants of Bansai village, Savannakhet Province, reportedly pressured a
Christian man to renounce his faith or leave the village. Other Christians in the same area
reported difficulty in holding worship services, because there was no authorized building for
worship and the police harassed them for worshipping in houses.
42
Also in September in Jinsangmai village, Luang Namtha Province, all Christian believers
reportedly recanted their faith, including a man previously jailed for refusing to do so.
In November police in Vientiane Municipality told three Christian churches to cease holding
services until the Southeast Asian Games ended in December. Authorities prevented one church
from holding services, which resumed the following week. At another church, the police reportedly
forced worshipers to sign either a renunciation of their faith or a petition against the games.
(...)
Local officials in some areas threatened to withhold government identification cards and
household registration documents as well as to deny educational benefits to those who did not
give up their religious beliefs. In addition the most common problem faced by Christian
communities was the inability to obtain permission to build new churches, even though group
worship in homes was considered illegal by local authorities in many areas. Religious
organization representatives pointed out that the building-permit process at both local and
provincial levels was used to block new church construction.
HRC, 27 January 2010, pp. 13-16
"40. The Special Rapporteur has received a number of serious allegations that members of the
Christian community were coerced by local authorities into renouncing their faith in order to
preserve the harmony and unity of society. In extreme cases, Christians have reportedly been
evicted from their native homes by village or district authorities. During her mission, the Special
Rapporteur received reports about two recent cases where evictions had been ordered by the
village administration. Reportedly, the Christians were asked to renounce their faith, to leave the
village or to sign a letter that they would burn the Bible. When they declined to sign these
documents, they were allegedly arrested and detained by the local authorities. In addition, their
children faced harassment and were denied access to public schools. The Human Rights
Committee emphasizes that article 18, paragraph 2, of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights bars coercion that would impair the right to have or adopt a religion or belief as
well as policies or practices having the same intention or effect, such as those restricting access
to education.13
41. At the same time, the Special Rapporteur was informed by different interlocutors that such
unacceptable practices, which are obviously a flagrant violation of freedom of religion or belief,
seem to be very much on the decline in the Lao People’s Democratic Republic. The authorities
that she met acknowledged that some incidents had indeed taken place in the past but this has
now been corrected. They assured the Special Rapporteur that fresh instructions had been
passed down to the local administration level and that these incidents will not be tolerated in the
future. Representatives of local administration and members of the Christian community also
confirmed this turn of events.
(...)
44. The Special Rapporteur remains concerned about the isolation of members of religious
minorities. They have little or no access to higher education and do not seem to benefit from the
quota system that exists in the Lao People’s Democratic Republic. Article 22 of the Constitution
requests the State to create opportunities and favourable conditions in education for all people
throughout the country, especially people in remote areas, ethnic groups , women and
disadvantaged children. The Special Rapporteur was also informed of the quota system which is
designed to support members of ethnic groups who apply for access to higher education and
universities. At university level, there is currently a quota of 40 per cent for entry of ethnic
minorities and this quota is apparently scheduled to increase to 60 per cent by the year 2012. The
Special Rapporteur urges the State to consider affirmative action in the education policy towards
members of religious minorities too.
43
45. In addition, members of religious minorities are not encouraged – on the contrary, it seems to
be frowned upon – to join the only political party in the State. The Special Rapporteur was
informed that Christians who wanted to become a member of the Lao People’s Revolutionary
Party were asked to sign a declaration that they have renounced their faith. Such a discriminatory
approach places a glass ceiling on access to, and promotion in, public service for religious
minorities and their effective participation in decision-making. Article 25 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights stipulates that every citizen has the right and the
opportunity, without any distinction of religion and without unreasonable restrictions, to take part
in the conduct of public affairs; to vote and to be elected; and to have access, on general terms of
equality, to public service in the country.
(...)
50. During the past 12 years, the Special Rapporteur has received allegations that members of
religious minorities were arrested and detained in the context of their religious activities.16
Reportedly, they were convicted for creating divisions, for alleged proselytizing
activities without official authorization, for having converted to Christianity or for refusing
to renounce their faith. The Special Rapporteur is concerned about the alleged discriminatory
implementation of domestic laws, the denial of due process and the bias by law enforcement
organs against religious minorities. In addition, there were reports that Christian detainees had
been shackled in wooden stocks, denied food and consigned to solitary confinement when prison
guards saw any religious activities."
AI, 2 November 2009, p. 4
"According to reports, local officials in Savannaketh and Saravan provinces have tried to force
Christians to recant their faith, including through interrogation, harassment and death threats.
Recent converts to Christianity appear to be particularly targeted. In the period between July and
September 2008, the prosecution of Christians intensified and at least 90 Christians, from mainly
evangelical congregations, were arrested and detained without charge or trial. Some were held
for several weeks. At least two people were released after being forced to renounce their faith."
FIDH & MLDH, January 2005, p. 4
"By introducing this annual report on the implementation of the International 3 Convention for the
Elimination of Racial Discrimination introduction (ICERD), the Lao Movement for Human Rights
(LMHR) once again expresses its very serious concern on the different forms of discriminations
suffered by ethnical minorities and religious minorities in the Lao Popular Democratic Republic.
In the absence of any urgent reaction from the international community, the Hmong minority from
the Saysomboun Special Zone, and from the Bolikhamsay and Luangprabang provinces in
particular, is doomed to disappear.
Regarding religious minorities, the persecutions of minority religions, in particular the Christian
religion (belief adopted principally by ethnic minorities) seem to be ongoing in the whole country,
in spite of the denials of the leaders of the regime. In the beginning of January 2005, dozens of
Christians who were arrested in the course of 2004 for practicing their faith, are still being held in
the LPDR prisons, according to the information obtained by the LMHR.
(...)
3 – Religions repression: ethnic minorities in the line of fire
According to article 30 of the LPDR Constitution, "Lao citizens have the right and freedom to
believe or not to believe in religions". However, in practice, the Home Office monitors religious
activities and affairs through the Lao Front for National Constitution. The practice of Christianity
and of religions other than Buddhism is difficult, dangerous, and often impossible. In big cities, the
Catholic Church, the "Lao Evangelical Church" and the "Seventh -Day Adventist Church", which
44
are recognized and tightly watched by the Lao Front for National Constitution, seem to be more or
less tolerated.
(...)
According to matching pieces of information received by the LMHR, between 2000 and 2002,
nearly 200 churches existing in Laos since the beginning of the 20th century were destroyed or
forced to shut. Such was the case of every church in Hin Heup and Muong Feuang, Vientiane
province, of every church in Champhone, Savannakhet province, of the church in Sayphouthong,
Savannakhet province, of numerous churches of Songkhone, Savannakhet province, of every
church in Khamkeut, Bolikhamsay province.
The LPDR government stated that it did not lead a repressive policy against religious freedom,
when local authorities arrest and put Christians in prison, accusing them of causing social
diversions, of engaging in activities against the State, of holding religious services without
authorization, and of being in possession of religious documents.
The Christian minorities, which are often also ethnic minorities, especially for Christians belonging
to churches not recognized by the State, are often threatened, harassed, arrested, imprisoned,
forced to renounce their faith or forced out from their village. Those who recovered their freedom
after having signed an act of renunciation to their faith are still under the surveillance of the local
authorities, and do not have any freedom of action or movement.
(...)
It should be noted that when the international press or western governments are informed of
these arrests of Christians, the LPDR authorities release some of them…only to arrest others, or
the same persons some time later. These detentions can last for days, weeks, months or years,
from case to case and based on the good will of the authorities. Lately, knowing itself watched by
the international community, the Lao authorities now use new "forms of physical and
psychological constraint", according to the sources of the LMHR inside the LPDR. These
methods are called "forced labor" and "vocal community shame". In the forced labor method,
Christians are brought to an area far from their village to accomplish extremely hard work, without
any remuneration, for a long period of time. They are told that should they accept to renounce
their religion, they will be
authorized to return to their village and will not be taken to work again. This constitutes a clear
violation of ILO Convention n° 29 concerning forced labor, and ratified by the LPDR in 1964.
As to "vocal shame", the Christian is put in front of the other villagers, who will then each in turn
shout Christian related insults for his attention."
SAHDRC, 8 March 2004, p. 3
"Religious persecution is still endemic in Laos. NGOs routinely list accusations of religious
persecution on a weekly basis, including forced recantation, the closing of churches, eviction,
arrest, detention and imprisonment.6
The Decree on the Administration and Protection of Religious Practice requires that the Lao Front
for National Construction (LFNC) officially approve all organisations and all activities.7 The
decree permits the LFNC to prohibit activities that “create social divisions,” thus “codifying the
government’s primary justification for repressing religious minorities and jailing their members in
recent years.”8 The process for determining the standards required for approval is entirely
arbitrary. 9
45
Government-sponsored internal resettlement is a major cause of population
displacement (2010)
•
During 2009 it was reported that government continued to relocate villagers for land
concessions given to development projects and to relocate highland farmers, most of whom
belonged to ethnic minority groups, to lowland areas under its plan to end opium production
and slash-and-burn agriculture.
•
Assistance provided to resettled farmers for lost land was in many cases not available or
insufficient. In some cases, land allotted to them was poor and unsuited for intensive rice
farming, resulting in increased poverty, hunger, malnourishment, disease, and death.
•
During the 1960s and early 1970s, resettlement was commonplace, much of it related to the
second Indochina war and US bombing. In 1975 the newly formed Lao PDR government
began moving ethnic minorities out of mountainous and remote areas, often due to security
concerns related to armed rebel activities.
•
Resettlement carried out by the government since then have 5 main motivatations: opium
eradication, security concerns, access and service delivery, cultural integration and nation
building, and swidden agriculture reduction.
•
Security is no longer the primary motivating factor for most resettlement in Laos, although it is
relevant in some areas, and with regard to some ethnic groups such as the ethnic Hmong
communities perceived as having the most potential to challenge state control.
USDOS, 11 March 2010
"The government relocated some villagers for land concessions given to development projects
and continued to relocate highland farmers, most of whom belonged to ethnic minority groups, to
lowland areas under its plan to end opium production and slash-and-burn agriculture. In some
areas officials persuaded villagers to move; in others villagers relocated spontaneously to be
closer to roads, markets, and government services. There also were some reports of force used.
Although the resettlement plan called for compensating farmers for lost land and providing
resettlement assistance, this assistance was not available in many cases or was insufficient to
give relocated farmers the means to adjust. Moreover, in some areas farmland allotted to
relocated villagers was poor and unsuited for intensive rice farming, resulting in some relocated
villagers experiencing increased poverty, hunger, malnourishment, disease, and death. The
government relied on assistance from nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), bilateral donors,
and international organizations to cover the needs of those recently resettled, but such aid was
not available in all areas."
Ian G. Baird and Bruce Shoemaker, 2007, p. 867
"Periodic resettlement and movements of people in the Lao People’s Democratic Republic (Lao
PDR or Laos)—whether voluntary, negotiated, forced, coerced, manipulated, or strongly
encouraged — have been a prominent aspect of the country’s recent history. While there were no
major shifts in populations during the French colonial period (Evrard and Goudineau, 2004),
resettlement during the 1960s and early 1970s was commonplace, much of it related to the
second Indochina war and US bombing. In 1975 the newly formed Lao PDR government began
moving ethnic minorities out of mountainous and remote areas, often due to security concerns
related to armed rebel activities (Goudineau, 1997; Ireson and Ireson, 1991). Over the last ten
years the pace of internal resettlement in Laos has been steady although it has occurred in
uneven spurts in different provinces and districts throughout the country. The result has been the
dramatic deconstruction and restructuring of upland Lao societies over very short periods.
(...)
Internal resettlement is mainly justified under the government’s expressed goals of ‘poverty
alleviation’ and ‘rural development’; ‘nation building’ is also seen as a critical policy. For all of
46
these, the ethnic minority populations living in mountainous areas are frequently seen as ‘holding
the country back’ from achieving ‘development’. Central government sets all policies, while
various levels of government, including provinces and districts, have important roles in
interpreting and implementing them.Within this framework, the GoL’s motivations for internal
resettlement fall into five main categories: opium eradication, security concerns, access and
service delivery, cultural
integration and nation building, and swidden agriculture reduction. Although causally different,
these five lead to a set of risks and adverse effects that are essentially common to all forms of
displacement. The relative importance of the five justifying factors varies from case to case, and
decisions to resettle particular villages are often based on a combination of motivations. Opium
eradication is a key factor in northern Laos but, on a national scale, reducing swidden agriculture
and improving accessibility to government services appear to be the main reasons for the GoL to
promote internal resettlement.
(...)
Security Concerns
Most of the internal resettlement associated with security issues took place during and shortly
after the Second Indochina war, and during the turbulent years of the late 1970s and early 1980s
(Goudineau, 1997; Ireson and Ireson, 1991). Security is no longer the primary motivating factor
for most resettlement in Laos, although it is relevant in some areas, and with regard to some
ethnic groups. In parts of the country where armed rebels are active, or are believed to have the
potential to become active, security concerns may play an important role in whether villages are
resettled, but security issues are rarely the only factor in resettlement. Security appears to be
especially
important with regard to ethnic Hmong communities, as GoL officials frequently perceive the
Hmong as having the most potential to challenge state control: a lingering insurgency led by
Hmong dissidents has made security questions surrounding the Hmong particularly sensitive for
the GoL."
WFP, December 2007, p. 25
"Even though resettlement or relocation is not an official policy26, it is used to pursue other
objectives such as reducing shifting cultivation, eradicating opium cultivation, and providing social
services. Three important instruments are generally used for community or household
resettlement:27
First, the focal sites, which bring households from various ethnic groups into selected areas. In
these areas, they are cost-effectively provided with development. Focal sites were first initiated in
the early 1990s and remain a major component of the Government of Lao PDR’s rural
development strategy. In general, the sites are infrastructure-oriented (roads, schools, health
clinics, irrigation, and market facilities).
Second, village consolidation combines scattered smaller settlements into larger permanent
villages, so that the Government of Lao PDR can more easily administrate them. Although
Finally, the land and forest classification’s goal is to improve land-use planning and natural
resource management. The initiative started in 1990, with pilot projects supported by donors, and
became a national policy through the adoption of Decree No186 in 1994. It places severe
restrictions on upland shifting agriculture, raising concerns about its implications in terms of food
shortages. These restrictions may oblige upland farmers to follow government recommendations
to resettle into the lowlands or along the roads.
It is difficult to ascertain whether the relocation is voluntary, involuntary or both28. Even though
the Lao people have a history of migration, the current resettlement only involves moving people
from the uplands to the lowlands with the aim of promoting sedentary settlements. It is difficult for
external agencies to get an overview of recent and planned resettlement.
47
This resettlement has several implications: planning development interventions has become very
difficult in the uplands, because it is not always clear whether the village will still be there in a few
years. It is difficult to justify investments in locations that soon could be abandoned. Some
agencies are trying to develop upland villages with the aim of preventing resettlement. Although
this may be successful, it risks prioritizing interventions that may not be what people want or need
but rather what will prevent resettlement.
Relocation of villages due to road constructions, hydropower activities, mining activities is of
increasing concern. The decree No192/PM on “Compensation for Resettlement of People
Affected by Development Projects” was adopted in 2005. It seeks to ensure that affected people
are compensated so that that they are “not worse off” than they would have been without an
intervention. But in a study published in 2007, GTZ29 notes that ‘the decree has not yet been well
disseminated, and even among government officials, awareness about its contents and
stipulations are not widespread’.
Resettlements can change livelihood opportunities sometimes resulting in households’ diminished
availability of food. A livelihood assessment carried out by WFP cautioned that many resettled
households had lost their livelihood activities such as upland farming and collection of NTFP30. In
order to compensate for this loss, households need to develop new livelihood activities. This
takes time and may require external assistance. Such assistance is not always forthcoming and
thus increases the risk of food insecurity."
Society for Threathened Peoples, 7 March 2006, p. 2
"Tens of thousands of members of ethnic minority groups have been forcefully relocated during
the last three decades in the Lao People’s Democratic Republic because of the construction of
hydropower projects. Most of the resettled people have been belonging to indigenous minority
groups. The Lao PDR is an ethnically diverse country. Less than 50 percent of the population is
Lao. The remaining 50 percent are mostly members of 49 upland hill tribes. The Hmong are one
of the largest and most prominent highland minority groups. The Lao constitution provides for
equal rights for all minority citizens. There is no legal discrimination against them, but social
discrimination against ethnic minorities persists. Indigenous minority groups have almost no say
in government decisions that affect their traditional lands and the allocation of natural resources.
Several of the dams have been funded by the Asian Development Bank (ADB), in spite of its
promise to pay close attention to development projects that directly affect the lives of ethnic
minority groups. “Indigenous peoples need to have the possibility to participate in and of the
projects”, states the ADB in its policy objectives. Rather than ensuring the participation of
indigenous peoples, large and costly hydropower projects in Laos have caused nothing but harm
and suffering. During the fall of 2005, the World Bank decided to fund the controversial Nam
Theun 2 Hydropower Dam. In the course of this project 4.500 indigenous people will be displaced
from their ancestral lands. Tens of thousands will be deprived of their fishing and farming
livelihoods, and 450 square kilometres of the Nakai Plateau, an area of rich biological diversity,
will be flooded. Proposed to generate electricity for export to Thailand, the economic viability of
the project is in doubt due to Thailand’s oversupply of power and its changing power market. 110
NGO’s from 33
countries expressed their concern about the project, but the Lao government went ahead with the
project without engaging indigenous peoples in the process.
Apart these relocation programs for the construction of hydropower projects, various resettlement
programs have been launched in the last ten years to remove indigenous ethnic communities
from the more remote highlands to lowland areas. The government of Lao PDR has given seven
major justifications for its resettlement policy. The development of rural areas, the reduction of
poverty, the eradication of the shifting cultivation, free access to infrastructure, the cultural
48
integration and assimilation of ethnic minority groups, security concerns and the eradication of
opium production."
FIDH & MLDH, January 2005, p. 8
"For surveillance purposes, tens of thousands of Laotians, in majority members of ethnic
minorities, have constantly been displaced in the course of these last twenty years. Officially, the
LPDR government explained that these massive displacements of the population were made in
application of a policy of rural development, and the fight against poppy cultivation and burning
cultivation. The practice of burning cultivation was designated by the Lao authorities as the
principal
cause for deforestation in the LPDR. However in his report to the UNHCR, Grant EVANS, the
Laos specialist, wrote that: "the greatest destruction of primary forest in the past 20 years
has been by logging companies, the largest of which have been controlled by the army
since the late 1980s ".
Regarding the displacement of the population within the LPDR, the report of a debate meeting
"Displacement of the populations in Laos, what is at stake for the development of the
country?" organized on 20 January 2000, with the participation of the ethnologist Yves
GOUDINEAU, the geographer Christian TAILLARD (CNRS - LASEMA) and Olivier EVRARD
(University of Paris I), indicated that "from 1985 to 1995, 166.000 people changed districts, a
figure to which must be added the number of intra-districts displacements. In total, nearly 33% of
the Lao population was relocated in 20 years ". According to these experts, these displaced
populations were resettled in Priority Development Zones (PDZ), generally in the lowlands,
alongside of the roads. Being for the most part members of the ethnic minorities from the
mountains are the high plateaus, these populations have very serious difficulties in adapting
themselves and are faced with the disappearance of their ethnic cultural heritage."
Construction of Nam Theun 2 dam displaced 6,200 indigenous people (March 2010)
•
In 2006, the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights and fundamental
freedoms of indigenous people, jointly with the Special Rapporteur on the right to food,
expressed concern about the government's plans to construct a dam, Nam Theun 2, which
could displace 6,200 indigenous people living on the Nakai Plateau and affect another
100,000 people living downstream of the project.
•
In particular, the Special Rapporteur called on the government to due its utmost to protect the
rights of the affected communities and to replace their subsistence livelihoods at a level which
guaranteed people’s right to an adequate standard of living.
•
In March 2010, the Nam Theun 2 Dam began full operation but according to a fact-finding
mission by International Rivers, the project violates people's human rights by preventing
access to clean water and by destroying critical food sources without providing
compensation. In particular, resettled villagers had not been provided with irrigation systems.
UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights and fundamental freedoms of
indigenous people, 19 March 2007, p. 57
"272. By letter dated 3 April 2006, the Special Rapporteur, jointly with the Special Rapporteur on
the right to food, brought to the attention of the Government that they had received information
regarding the Government’s plans to build or to participate in building Nam Theun 2, a
hydropower project which would be situated in Khammouane Province in Central Laos,
approximately 40 kilometres upstream from the already completed Nam Theun Hinboun
hydropower project. The information received claimed that the Government had signed a
concession agreement with Nam Theun 2 Power Company Limited (NTPC) for the construction,
49
operation and ownership of the power plant and its transfer back to the Government on the expiry
date of the agreement. According to this information, in November 2003 the NTPC had signed a
power purchase agreement with the Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand (EGAT) paving
the way for the project’s development and in June 2005 the World Bank had announced its
financial help in the form of grants and guarantees for the construction of Nam Theun 2 dam. The
reports received alleged that the terms of the above mentioned concession agreement could
make it difficult for the relevant authorities to
take an impartial position when it would come to balancing commercial returns against social
concerns and protecting the rights of the affected communities.
273. The allegations also claimed that the construction of Nam Theun 2 could displace 6,200
indigenous people living on the Nakai Plateau and affect another 100,000 people living
downstream of the project along the Xe Bang Fai and Nam Theun who rely on these rivers for
fish, drinking water and agriculture. The construction of this dam could allegedly affect the right to
food of the affected communities whose members are subsistence farmers dependent upon
natural resources for their livelihoods. It was reported that the villagers living downstream of the
project rank their fishing and other aquaculture activities for income and food supply second or
third in terms of household food security after rice and vegetable cultivation. The reports received
indicated that the project developers had estimated that at least 1,500 families living along the
lower Nam Phao could experience 60 per cent declines in their fish catches as a result of a
reduction of the river flow which the project could lead to. In addition, experience from other
hydropower projects and resettlement programmes in Laos had reportedly pointed to the fact that
replacing subsistence livelihoods at a level which guaranteed people’s right to an adequate
standard of living, could be difficult."
The Huffington Post, 25 March 2010
"Laos' largest and most controversial hydropower project, the World Bank-funded Nam Theun 2
Dam, began full operation last week. It did so in violation of legal obligations to provide
compensation and livelihood restoration to affected communities. In an attempt to avoid its
obligations, the Nam Theun 2 Power Company called the start of power production "commercial
export" of electricity rather than "commercial operation," which would require compliance with
Concession Agreement provisions.
(...)
My colleague Ikuko Matsumoto, the Lao program director of International Rivers, just returned
from a fact-finding trip to the Nam Theun 2 region. She reports that the project violates people's
human rights by preventing access to clean water and by destroying critical food sources without
providing compensation. On the Nakai Plateau, where 6,200 people have been resettled to make
way for the reservoir, villagers have not been provided with irrigation systems. This violates legal
commitments made in the project's Concession Agreement.
The project is also affecting around 120,000 people who live downstream along the Xe Bang Fai
River. Since the project started full operation, the water level of the upper Xe Bang Fai River has
increased by 3.6 meters or 12 feet. The power company has warned communities living along the
Xe Bang Fai not to drink the river water because it is contaminated. However, replacement
groundwater pumps which were provided to communities are not functioning or the groundwater
is unsuitable for domestic consumption. Last week, only two groundwater pumps out of seven
were working in Navan Tai Village, and in Mahaxai Tai Village only two pumps were working.
Villagers in Boueng Xe Village were told that the groundwater contained elevated levels of iron,
making it unsuitable for human consumption."
50
Overview of displaced populations
Hiding in the jungle (March 2007)
•
According to several reports, an unknown number of ethnic Hmong women, men and children
live in scattered groups in the Lao jungles, hiding from the authorities, particularly the military
who regularly attack their temporary encampments, killing and injuring them, perpetuating
their life on the run.
•
They live with their families and communities in small groups struggling to survive, unable to
realise their basic human right to a standard of living adequate for their health and well-being;
they lack food, clothing, housing and medical care.
AI, 23 March 2007, p. 2
"Thousands of ethnic Hmong women, men and children live in scattered groups in the Lao
jungles, hiding from the authorities, particularly the military. The armed forces regularly attack
their temporary encampments, killing and injuring them, perpetuating their life on the run.
These predominantly Hmong groups are a remnant of a faction who in the early 1960s fought
against Communist Pathet Lao forces and alongside the USA in its war against the North
Vietnamese, which spilled over into Laos and Cambodia. After the Pathet Lao won the war in
Laos in 1975, small numbers of soldiers from the losing side launched armed resistance against
the new government basing themselves in the jungles. Some of these remain in the jungle to this
day, remnants of a former armed rebel force, which no longer appears able to pose a military
threat against the Lao government. They live with their families and communities in small groups
struggling to survive, unable to realise their basic human right to a standard of living adequate for
their health and well-being; they lack food, clothing, housing and medical care.
(...)
Over the years thousands have fled to Thailand, where some have been resettled as refugees in
third countries; some have been forcibly returned to Laos. Amnesty International has repeatedly
called on Thai authorities not to forcibly return any Lao Hmong who would be at risk of serious
human rights violations, in keeping with Thailand's obligations under international law.
Living on the run and in hiding, these groups have limited contact with the outside world. A few
journalists have managed to pay clandestine visits, smuggling out film footage and stories. Others
have tried, but been imprisoned when attempting to access the groups."
Society for Threathened Peoples, 6 March 2007, p. 3
"As the Vietnam war spread into the neighbouring Laos, the Hmong became an integral part of a
secret CIA-trained militia that helped to dismantle Pathet Lao supply lines. Fearing the worst
when communists came into power in Laos at the end of the war, a third of the Hmong population
left the country. However, some Hmong continued their armed struggle against the Pathet Lao
Movement, while ten thousands of Hmong, and other ethnic minorities such as the Khmu simply
fled into the isolated remote mountainous jungles, in order to avoid persecution and relocation
camps.
Today, more than 30 years later, many of the descendants of those who fled into the jungles after
the war still live in-hiding in the Laotian jungle under disastrous circumstances. Internally
displaced and isolated, they face frequent military attacks and rarely remain in one place for
longer than three weeks. Most of them are women and children. They constantly live in desperate
need for food and medical care. Journalists, who spent time with Hmong in the jungle, reported
51
that many Hmong have scars from bullet wounds or other deformities caused by military
aggressions. The Hmong avoid contact with the Lao military, and are too afraid to come out of
hiding. These Hmong, who are constantly on the run today, are being persecuted because of
their grandparents’ decision to support the US army. In the last few years, the military attacks
have become more frequent and merciless in their attempts to eliminate the Hmong from the Lao
jungles.
In their fear of death, torture, rape or capture through the Lao and Vietnamese soldiers, who are
hunting down the Hmong in Laos, many thousand Hmong Lao have tried to escape these life
threatening dangers and severe human rights violations by fleeing over the border to Thailand.
Right now there are over 8.000 Hmong refugees in the make-shift camp in Phetchabun, Thailand,
or held detained in Thailand’s detention facilities under unacceptable conditions, including
children and infants. Many more are believed to be hiding in other places in Thailand.
The most recent developments have been more than worrying. After facing a number of heavy
attacks and years of hunger and fear in the jungle of Laos, more than 400 Hmong surrendered to
the Lao military on December 13, 2006. They were put onto military trucks and driven away, the
military was not willing to tell where – their fate has been unknown ever since."
Zawacki B., July 2007
"Unknown numbers of internally displaced Hmong continue to seek refuge in inaccessible parts of
Laos. While access by human rights organisations is restricted, Amnesty International reports that
thousands of ethnic Hmong women, men and children live in scattered groups in the Lao jungles,
hiding from the authorities who regularly attack their temporary encampments, killing and injuring
them, perpetuating their life on the run.2 Human Rights Watch confirms that arbitrary detention,
torture and ill-treatment remain features of ‘re-education’ camps.3"
Displaced Hmongs hiding in the jungle are former rebels and their families with no
military capability (2007)
•
According to AI, while Hmong groups living in the jungle originated as an armed opposition to
the LPDR government which came to power in 1975, 30 years later they are not longer in a
position to carry out anything more than sporadic acts of violent opposition to the
government.
•
Journalists who visited the groups reported that most had no significant military capability and
so posed no real threat to the government forces although they would defend themselves if
attacked.
•
Given the lack of information and access to the displaced Hmong reported to hide in the
jungle, AI says it is is in no position to determine conclusively that the situation no longer
amounts to an armed conflict but that in any case international human rights law.
AI, 23 March 2007, p. 6
"So far lobby groups, media and human rights organisations have predominantly described those
in hiding as rebels. Without unfettered access to the regions in question it is hard to assess
whether such a description remains accurate or whether it merely reflects a historical position. Up
until 2004, Amnesty International received information indicating that anti-government groups of
Hmong ethnicity were involved in attacks, including against government positions in Houa Phan
in 2004. In 2003, there were also ambushes against public buses, including two along the road
that links Vientiane with Luang Phrabang, which killed 25 people and wounded many more. In
both instances witnesses reported that the perpetrators had been ethnic Hmong, and
consequently most observers attributed the attacks to armed rebels. To the knowledge of
Amnesty International, however, no group ever took responsibility for the attacks against the
52
buses, and although some initial arrests were made,20 no one has been held to account for these
serious crimes.
The journalists who visited the jungle have pointed out that the people they met were extremely
vulnerable because they were hiding form the authorities, coming under violent attack, and lacked
food, medicine and shelter. They described former armed rebels and people in hiding with very
limited means for survival and in isolation from other groups in the same circumstance.
(...)
While the Hmong groups living in the jungle originated as an armed opposition to the LPDR
government which came to power in 1975, the remnants over thirty years later are not in a
position to carry out anything more than sporadic acts of violent opposition to the government.
The Lao government have themselves implicitly acknowledged this, by describing the
perpetrators of the 2003 bus attacks as “bandits”, rather than seeking to characterise those
attacks as part of any armed conflict. The military, however, continues to pursue and attack those
who formerly belonged to the rebels and their descendants, compelling them to keep on the
move, and denying them the opportunity to exercise their human rights.
Amnesty International is not in a position at this time to determine conclusively that the situation
no longer amounts to an armed conflict, although this appears to be the case. It is clear that the
Lao military continues to pursue those who belong, or belonged to rebel groups and their
relatives. At any rate, international human rights law is applicable at all times, and should, in the
circumstances, form the primary international legal framework governing the authorities’ conduct
towards and treatment of the Hmong people."
STP, October 2006, p. 11
"The interviewees all maintained that they had never sought to engage in armed conflict with the
Lao government. Only one group - from Bolikhamsay – declared that they had resorted to preemptive strikes in order to defend themselves after military units established a base dangerously
close by (less than a kilometre away). Refugees from Bolikhamsay also said that
members of their group still inside Laos would actively defend themselves because they had no
alternative.
Members of the other groups said that they would defend themselves as best they could if
attacked but they had no ammunition and only a few usable weapons. They often had no more
than six or seven bullets that they fired in the general direction of the soldiers attacking them. The
Hmong did not have the capacity to engage in a proper fight. A few members of each group
would be assigned the task of defending the group and would fire off the few bullets they had in
order to gain time while the others fled for their lives."
European Parliament, September 2005, p. 9
"All the men and some younger boys were armed with AK-47 assault rifles and old American
rifles, leftovers from the days of General Vang Pao. They have to forage or barter for weapons.
Each man had at least five bullets in the magazine – “it is not enough even to protect ourselves”.
The Hmong have been accused by the Lao government of banditry and wide-scale insurgency
which includes alleged attacks on tourist buses and villages. However, in our observation this
particular group has no significant military capability and so pose no real threat to the government
forces but will defend themselves if attacked. To protect our journey out of the jungle, the fighters
gathered the collective bullets in the group and handed them to the six men walking us out. They
were left with six bullets to defend their village.
53
Many Hmong have given themselves up in the hope of amnesty to live as citizens in Lao society.
The Hmong we met simply ask for freedom and democracy and to be left alone with a piece of
land to farm and education for their children. However reports indicate continuous persecution
and in my understanding, they mistrust the government and so fear surrender. They ask for the
international community to intervene in supervising their exit from the jungles to live as equal
citizens in Lao society. They are running out of food supplies and if the international community,
human rights organizations and the Red Cross don’t gain access to these desperate people, they
will eventually die out."
The Huai Nam Khao Camp in Thailand (2010)
MSF, 1 May 2008, p. 3
"In late 2004, a portion of the current refugee population of Huai Nam Khao camp – an estimated
4,000 to 5,000 ethnic Hmong – began fleeing from Laos across the Mekong River into Petchabun
province in search of safety from what they claimed as violence and persecution in Laos.
Many of these refugees first lived in the forest on the village’s outskirts and were provided food by
local residents. Some worked on local farms to support their families. Others used the little money
or resources they had to buy or trade for food at the local market. In June 2005, local Thai
authorities allegedly began forcing the Lao Hmong refugees to leave the forests surrounding Huai
Nam Khao and started pressuring the village residents to stop assisting the refugees.
During the first week of July 2005, MSF learned of their plight through several articles published
in the Bangkok Post. MSF dispatched a medical and logistical team to assess the situation,
where approximately 5,000 to 6,000 refugees were now settled on both sides of the town’s main
road. The refugees had little access to shelter, food, safe drinking water, or health care. The MSF
team immediately opened an outpatient clinic.
By mid-2007, with new arrivals, the population of the makeshift camp in Huai Nam Khao had
grown to approximately 7,800 people. These arrivals included an estimated 1,000 Hmong from
the former refugee camp in Wat Tham Krabok. In June 2007, the refugees were relocated to a
new site, approximately three kilometers from the village center. The new camp, roughly 20
hectares (49 acres) in size, is enclosed with barbed-wire fencing and lies on a hillside. Access is
controlled by the Thai military. The refugees have better living conditions, but their movements
are confined to the camp and there are no adequate educational facilities for the children or
employment opportunities for adults. According to an MSF registration from April 2008, at present
there are 1,451 families and a total of about 7,850 people living in the camp."
MSF, 20 May 2009, p. 3
"Late 2004: 4,000 to 5,000 Hmong fled Laos, crossing the Mekong River to seek refuge in the
Thai province of Petchabun. Initially, many of them lived in the forest near the village of Huai Nam
Khao, where local residents gave them food. Some worked in farms and others sold or bartered
their few possessions to be able to eat.
June 2005: Thai authorities force the Hmong refugees to leave the forests surrounding Huai Nam
Khao and pressure residents to stop helping them.
July 2005: MSF learns of the situation from several articles in the Bangkok Post. The medical
and logistics team sent to evaluate the situation reports that 5,000 to 6,000 refugees have settled
along the main road, on a strip of land less than 10 meters wide, living in makeshift shelters with
minimal access to food, drinking water and health care. The MSF team immediately sets up a
clinic, provides water and sanitation and distributes basic supplies.
54
December 2005: 27 adolescents are arrested outside the camp and deported to Laos. This
deportation creates a diplomatic incident among Thailand, Laos, and the international community.
MSF seeks more space for the Hmong and improved sanitary conditions.
March 2006: Military checkpoint is set up in the village of Huai Nam Khao and the Thai
government announces its intention to deport all the refugees to Laos. Every new arrival is
systematically arrested. In May 2006, MSF builds an outpatient center and a logistical
warehouse.
June 2006: Refugees begin to run out of food and malnutrition in the camp increases. MSF
seeks partners and/or funding for food aid. Under pressure from MSF, the United Nations
evaluates the situation in the camp but UNHCR does not receive government’s permission to
access the refugees.
Between June and December 2006: 2,000 new refugees arrive in the camp. In November, 147
refugees are imprisoned in Nong Khai prison. The Thai decide to move the population of the
camp to a new site.
January 2007: MSF undertakes an exploratory mission into Laos to try to reach the area where
many of the refugees claim to have fled from violence and persecution. Preparations for the new
camp are underway and arrests resumed. The assessment mission failed. The MSF team was
prevented from accessing the area by authorities
In May 2007: Eight of the adolescents arrested in November 2006 and deported to Laos return to
the camp and speak to MSF teams about the violence they had experienced in Laos. The Thai
and Laotian governments sign a joint repatriation agreement covering all Hmong refugees in the
camp.
Mid-2007: New arrivals swell the population at the Huai Nam Khao makeshift camp, bringing the
total number of individuals there to 7,800.
June 2007: The refugees are transferred to a new site, approximately three kilometers from the
center of the village. The new camp, on a 20-hectare site, was set up on a hillside, is surrounded
by barbed wire. The Thai army controls the only entry point. While living conditions improve, the
refugees are confined to the small area and children have no access to education. According to
MSF statistics, in April 2008, 1,451 families (approximately 7,850 people) live in the camp.
September 2007: The Thai and Laotian governments agree to repatriate the Hmong to Laos.
Given the fears expressed by people in the camp about their security in Laos and the complete
lack of transparent, independent screening, MSF issues a public report8 and press release in
October.
Between December 2007 and January 2008: The Thai government conducts a review of
requests without the participation of a third party. The results are not transmitted to UNHCR. The
operation is intended to separate refugees fleeing persecution in Laos from economic migrants.
Despite its repeated requests, UNHCR does not receive authorization to enter the camp or
monitor the review of requests at any time during the prior three years.9
February 2008: MSF witnesses the forced repatriation of a group of 11 refugees, allegedly part
of a list of voluntary returnees. MSF interviews four families registered as voluntary returnees.
None of them express the desire to return to Laos. Indeed, they fear for their safety if they return.
A 27-year-old man registered on the list tells MSF, “I never said I wanted to go back to Laos—no
one has told me why I’m on this voluntary list. I don’t want to go back to Laos—I’m afraid of what
55
will happen to me if I go back there.” A 50-year-old man who is the head of a family of 9 said, “I
don’t know why I’m on this list, but I do not want to go back to Laos. If I return to Laos they’re
going to kill me.” It immediately notifies the media and representatives of the international
community in Bangkok.
April 2008: Another 67 Hmong are again allegedly voluntarily returned to Laos. However, their
protection claims are never reviewed by any third party.
May 2008: Refugees protest the arrest of one of their leaders. A fire breaks out and burns 60
percent of the shelters and the water-and-sanitation infrastructure (including latrines and water
distribution points). During the four weeks following the fire, several thousand refugees refuse to
return to the camp and settle outside, intentionally blocking the camp’s access road to protest
their situation and, specifically, to demand that they be interviewed by UNHCR. Hundreds of
demonstrators go on a hunger strike and MSF has to treat dozens of others on an emergency
basis. MSF issues a public report, again denouncing the situation.10
June 20, 2008: Approximately 5,000 refugees decide to march to Bangkok in an effort to attract
more attention from the international community regarding their situation. Military forces stop the
demonstrators several kilometers away from the camp and more than 800 refugees were subject
to forced repatriation to Laos. MSF issues a new press release at that time, criticizing the forced
repatriation and restates its call for more transparency on the part of the Thai and Laotian
governments.
Between June and December 2008: The situation appears to have calmed. However,
repatriations to Laos continue on a “voluntary” basis, according to Thai authorities. Nonetheless,
the line between voluntary and forced departure is increasingly difficult to define because most
refugees agree to return out of resignation and under pressure and threats from Thai soldiers.
56
IDP POPULATION FIGURES
Number of IDPs
Several thousands Hmong people hiding in the jungle or living in resettlement villages
(2010)
There are currently three main groups of people who can be considered as internally
displaced in Laos due to conflict or human rights violations. No accurate figures are
available for any of these groups but available information indicates that the total the
number of internally displaced people (IDP) in the country may range between several
hundreds and several thousands.
The first group of IDPs is composed of people living with Hmong rebels, mostly their
relatives, and who should be considered as civilians. They are hiding in the jungle, for
some since 1975, although the majority has been born in displacement. Others may have
fled in recent years as a result of attacks by government forces on Hmong villages
suspected of supporting the rebels. Lack of access makes it impossible to give any
precise figures. Estimates range from several hundreds to several thousands although the
former is a more likely figure given the fact that many have come out of hiding in recent
years (AI, 23 July 2007, p. 6; CRS, 4 January 2010, p. 8). Most are reported to have been
relocated in resettlement villages, although information remains scarce mainly due to
limited independent access.
The second group of IDPs is closely linked to the first one and is composed of Hmong
civilians who in recent years have fled to Thailand to escape alleged human rights
violations but have been forcibly sent back to Laos. Due to access restrictions imposed by
Thai authorities international organisations have been prevented from assessing how
many had fled for legitimate protection concerns and how many had done so for economic
reasons. Access has only been granted to one group of 158 Lao-Hmong held in detention
and now recognised by the UN as refugees but who have also been forcibly sent back to
Laos. Since 2005, a total of 7,500 Lao-Hmong have been forcibly returned to Laos. The
majority has reportedly been resettled but in the absence of any independent access
provided to international organisations it is not possible to assess to what extent their
return was voluntary and if they have been able to achieve durable solutions.
A third group of IDPs is composed of religious minorities, in particular Christians, evicted
or forced to flee their villages because of a limitation of their freedom of religion imposed
by local authorities, including in some cases campaigns aimed at forcing them to
renounce their faith (HRC, 12 February 2010, p. 8). According to information received by
the UN Special Rapporteur of freedom of religion or belief, Ms. Asma Jahangir, who visited
the country at the end of 2009, these incidents were on the decline (HRC, 27 January 2010,
p. 13). No estimates are currently available on the number of internally displaced religious
minorities in Laos but their numbers are believed to relatively small.
A. Displaced Hmong people reported to be hiding in the jungle
57
MSF, 1 May 2008, p.3
"According to people living in the camp and human rights organizations, up to a few thousand
Hmong, including women, children and elderly people, still live in the jungle today and continue to
be subject to attacks and persecution by the Lao military. As a result, Hmong have continued to
flee Laos since the end of the war."
AI, 23 March 2007, p. 6
"No comprehensive data is available about how many people continue to eke out a living in the
Lao jungles, on the run from frequent attack by the Lao People’s Army. A precise figure is
impossible to calculate: independent observers are not allowed access and the groups are
moving around in the jungle. There is also a movement between the jungles and mainstream
Laos as people leave their hiding places to try to assimilate into regular society. Current
estimates by observers and lobby groups range from several hundred to 3,000 up to as many as
17,000, although the latter figure is probably a significant overestimate."
World Press, 19 January 2007
"The ragtag Hmong guerrillas are one of many small groups estimated to number between 2,000
and 12,000 still hiding in the mountains of Laos. For the last 30 years, their only contact with the
outside world is said to be with the Lao and Vietnamese communist soldiers who are hunting
them and their families. The Hmong jungle people are the remnants of a "secret war," a
counterinsurgency sponsored by the C.I.A. during the Vietnam War. Both the Americans and the
communists kept this war secret, even though it became one of the most intensive bombing
campaigns in world history."
STP, October 2006, p. 5
"The several thousand Hmong still living in the forest are eking out a miserable existence there in
atrocious circumstances, lacking the most basic necessities of life, medicine as well as food.
Wounds cannot be dressed and limbs and other body parts are often amputated because wounds
cannot be treated properly.
In 2003 the leader of an once sizeable Hmong community used a smuggled solar-powered
satellite telephone to give a journalist working for Time Asia Magazine (Time Magazine, 2003-428) details he had recorded of the suffering endured by his group. In 1975, when he first began
keeping a record of the community’s health, there were 7,000 members. In the years that
followed the group broke up into several smaller groups, always on the move from one hiding
place to another. By 2003 there were only 800 people left in these groups, including 56 orphans,
40 widows and 11 widowers. 30 per cent of them were suffering from the effects of gunshot
wounds. The leader had had to have his own left hand amputated in the rain forest in 1974. The
extraordinarily high level of injuries sustained by the members of this one group is indicative of
the grim health conditions that the Hmong hidden in the jungle face.
The group now (summer 2006) numbers only 300-500 members, the group’s leader told his
brother in the U.S.A. when they spoke over the solar-powered satellite telephone. He could not
give a more precise figure because the four sub-groups were surrounded by soldiers and unable
to communicate with one another."
European Parliament, 2 September 2005, p. 4
"During the research process we found that there are still somewhere around 12,000 – 20,000
people, former CIA soldiers and their families, still living in the jungle and resisting the Lao
authorities. They live in groups of 250 to 800 people, concentrated in the provinces of
58
Bolikhamsay, Xaysomboune, Xieng Khouang and Luang Prabang."
B. Displaced Hmong people forced back to Laos from Thailand and China after seeking
refuge there
SMH, 13 January 2010
"The 4500 ethnic Hmong asylum seekers - including more than 40 probably bound for Australia who were forcibly deported from Thailand in late December are being held in squalid secret
camps in remote parts of Laos, guarded by soldiers.
The Herald reached the main entrance of a camp at Paksan, on the Mekong River, where
hundreds of Hmong hilltribes people stood barefoot in the dirt behind three metres of razor wire
as loudspeakers ordered them to move away from the gate."
UNHCR, 28 December 2009
"The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, António Guterres, expressed his dismay
today at Thailand's deportation of Lao Hmong. "I call upon the Thai Government to halt the forced
return of the Lao Hmong, some of whom have international protection needs," he said.
This morning Thailand began deporting the first group of an estimated 4000 Lao Hmong from the
Huay Nam Khao camp in Petchabun, to whom UNHCR has not been granted access. The
deportations will continue over the coming days and, as announced by the Thai Government, will
include a second group of 158 recognized refugees held in detention in Nong Kai."
UN Special Rapporteur on the situation and fundamental freedoms of indigenous people,
18 September 2009, pp. 38-40
"207. In a letter of 18 July 2008, the Special Rapporteur drew the attention of the Government to
concerns over the alleged recent forcible return of over 1,200 Hmong individuals to the Lao
People’s Democratic Republic.
208. In summary, according to the information received: On 22 June 2008, 837 Lao Hmong and
on 11 July 2008, a further 391 Lao Hmong were returned to the Lao People’s Democratic
Republic from a camp in northern Thailand by the Thai Government. After weeks of protests, on
20 June 2008 about 4,500 to 5,000 Hmong individuals left the Ban Huay Nam Khao camp in the
Phetchabun Province and marched towards Bangkok. However, according to the information,
when the group reached a few miles from the camp, they were confronted by Thai troops and
were told that they must either return to the camp or be returned to the Lao People’s Democratic
Republic. Some 3,500 individuals returned to the camp. However, about 1,300 Lao Hmong are
now unaccounted for and the details surrounding their whereabouts are vague. On 22 June,
following the march, some 837 Hmong individuals were repatriated to the Lao People’s
Democratic Republic from the Ban Huay Nam Khao camp and an additional 400 were repatriated
on 11 July."
STP, October 2006, p. 5
"Another cause for great concern is the fate of a group of 26 Hmong refugees – including 20
young women aged between 12 and 16 years old, according to the Lao Human Rights Council –
who were forcibly sent back from Thailand to Laos in December 2005. According to reports
received by the Society for Threatened Peoples (SfTP) the young women are still detained in
59
various prisons and military camps, where they are cut off from the outside world have been
brutally treated andraped. The male members of the group are said to have been taken to a
remote prison in northern Laos and two youths have reportedly been shot and killed."
FIDH & MLDH, 2 January 2005, p. 10
"From 1990 to the end of 2001, more than 20.000 Laotians, who had previously taken refuge in
Thailand and in China during the 1975 exodus, were repatriated to Laos in the frame of a
program supervised by the LDPR and the UNHCR. These refugees, who were repatriated to a
regime from which they fled as they could not find a host country, were settled in more than 40
sites located in 11 of the 18 Lao provinces.
Location(s) of IDP populations
Displaced Hmongs hiding in the jungle are spread over several provinces in central
Laos (2007)
•
Displaced Hmong groups living in the jungle are reported to be located in the provinces of
Bolikhamxay, Xieng Khouang, Vientiane, and Luang Phrabang.
AI, 23 March 2007, p. 9
"There are Hmong groups living in the jungle in the provinces of Bolikhamxay, Xieng
Khouang, Vientiane, and Luang Phrabang, including Xaysomboune Special Zone, which was
under military administration until 2006 and stretched over parts of the three former provinces."
European Parliament, September 2005, p. 7
"On the third day we arrived at the base camp of the group led by Wa Leng Lee. The emotional
meeting was beyond any comprehension. Men and elders, women and children, with their hands
clasped were weeping and prostrating themselves to us, showing their wounds and pleading for
help - “We waited 30 years for you to come here, like children waiting for parents”. Even our
guides broke down. I have never experienced anything like this before, and the emotional impact
of this first encounter will stay in my psyche forever. Since fleeing to the jungle this group had not
encountered any journalists or in fact any outsiders. The international community has failed to
notice this conflict because of the secrecy and the Lao government’s prohibition of any contact or
communication with these remaining children and grandchildren of the veterans of the Vietnam
War.
During our five-day stay in the camp we interviewed people, took photos and video of the
wounded, and followed the daily routine of the Hmong. Gradually the full tragic story of a never
resolved conflict unravelled. The camp consisted of about 250 people; about ten men who had
been directly involved in the CIA secret war, and their families – mostly women and children.
Most households belonged to the Lee and Yang clans, although there were people of different
family lineages living in the same village. The older men who were actual veterans, fighting with
the Americans, still held fading documents proving their membership of the Royal Lao military.
However they had no official documents proving their involvement with the CIA because of its
clandestine nature. Even Americans involved in the operation in Laos were not allowed to carry
their identity tags or documents aligning them to this war effort against the North Vietnamese and
Communist Pathet Lao.
60
Commander Wa Leng Lee explained that he personally was assigned to guard American radar
installations for aircraft navigation and other Hmong units were assigned to disrupt North
Vietnamese supply lines which went through the jungles of Laos. Since they were unable to flee
to Thailand after the US left, his group took to the mountains in the Bolikhamsay region of Laos,
where they have lived ever since. In the last few years the aggression of the Lao troops has
accelerated making it harder for them to cultivate and maintain permanent fields, they are forced
to live on what they can forage for in the jungle. There are known to be many such groups
comprised of Hmong, Khmu, and Lao scattered across the vast mountainous jungles of Laos.
The largest settled in the Xaysomboune special zone, led by Moua Toua Ter and Yang Toua Tao
who were first reached in January 2003 by Andrew Perrin of Time Asia magazine and
Independent photographer Philip Blenkinsop, whose award winning photographs of this journey
have been exhibited across the world. Later that year, Belgian Journalist Thierry Falise and
French journalist Vincent Reynaud reached the same region. Upon exiting the jungle the
journalists and their guides were arrested and jailed by the Lao authorities. After intervention of
the French authorities the two journalists and their American Hmong translator were freed leaving
their Hmong guides Thao Moua, Pafue Khang and Va Char still in jail. One of these guides, Va
Char managed to escape and is now living in safety in the United States, he is available as a
witness and was responsible for bringing out the video footage of the May 2004 massacre of the
teenagers."
The majority of Hmong people forcibly returned from Thailand are living in a
resettlement village built for them in central Bolikhamsay province (March 2010)
•
According to the government, of the 4,500 Hmong repatriated to Laos in December 2009,
3,457 were sent to Phonkham resettlement village in central Bolikhamsay province while the
others went home.
•
Hmong repatriated since 2005 are reported to have returned home or to have been resettled
in camps such as Pha Lak in Vientiane Province.
•
Former insurgents who surrender are reported to also be offered to return or resettle.
•
Access to resettled Hmong remains limited.
AFP, 28 March 2010
"Though Thailand insisted all the Hmong recently sent back to Laos were illegal economic
migrants, the United Nations recognised 158 of them as refugees, but was never allowed to
assess if the thousands of others needed international protection.
While diplomats say there have been no reports of mistreatment, suspicions remain about the
Hmong's rights and living standards in Phonkham village, which was built specifically for the
group in central Bolikhamsay province.
"They've put them on a Laos equivalent of a desert island," said Phil Robertson, deputy Asia
director of Human Rights Watch. "There's no sustained access to these people or quality of
access."
Laotian officials said 3,457 of the repatriated Hmong were sent to Phonkham, while others went
back to their home towns."
USDOS, 11 March 2010
61
"During the year the government accepted the repatriation of an estimated 1,900 Lao Hmong
from Thailand from a group of approximately 7,800 confined to a camp by Thai authorities. Thai
and Lao authorities considered these Hmong to be illegal migrants. The international community
was concerned that there was no internationally accepted process for determining whether any of
the Hmong in the camp could establish a well-founded fear of persecution and seek status as an
international person of concern. Although Lao and Thai authorities stated that the returns were
voluntary, the absence of a process to verify these claims also raised concerns. More than 5,000
Lao Hmong remained in the camp in Thailand at year's end.
The government's policy both for Hmong surrendering internally and for those being returned
from Thailand was to return them to their communities of origin whenever possible. Several
hundred persons without strong community links were relocated in government settlements such
as Pha Lak in Vientiane Province.
In October an international NGO raised questions about the whereabouts of five Lao Hmong who
had been returned from Thailand after reportedly helping lead a June protest at the Thai
detention camp. They were reportedly detained for several months after being returned. Late in
the year, government officials stated that all five were living in Lao communities. Foreign
diplomats met two of the five during a December visit to Pha Lak.
The government at times permitted limited access by international organizations and NGOs to
provide food and other material assistance to former insurgents who had accepted government
resettlement offers.
62
IDP POPULATION MOVEMENTS AND PATTERNS
Population movements
Large population movements inside and outside of Laos due to the war, the
establishment of a communist regime, internal resettlement and ethnic tensions
Laos has experienced massive population displacements since it gained independence in
1954; first mostly internal as a result of the civil war which ended in 1973, then mainly
external when people fled the country following the communist takeover in 1975. Since
the mid-1980s, the government’s internal resettlement programme, aimed primarily at
alleviating poverty, has had a profound impact on human geography causing large
population movements from the remote highlands to the more accessible lowlands. Before
the government-initiated internal resettlement programmes, internal migration often
motivated by the search of better lands was common. In the past years, economic and
development –motivated internal resettlement has remained a major cause of
displacement in the country.
Minority groups, in particular Hmong have since the end of the civil war claimed to suffer
from human rights violations at the hands of government forces causing them to flee their
homes and hide in the jungle. Most of them have sought refuge across the border in
Thailand where the majority are considered as “illegal migrants” and therefore to be
returned to Laos.
Patterns of movement
Hmong IDPs forced to constantly move to avoid harassment and attacks by Lao
security forces (February 2010)
•
The constant threat of military attacks force displaced Hmong hiding in the jungle to change
camps on a frequent basis to avoid detection.
•
In 2005, one group reported having to move the location of its village 15 times in one year.
Continuously harassed by the Lao military, the member of the group are forced to pack up
their belongings and trek through the jungle for days until they are safe.
The Independent, 17 February 2010
"Frequent attacks force the groups to change camp every two weeks and break up into small
numbers to avoid large-scale offensives by the Laos army. This leaves the community no chance
to farm food or forge a proper way of life. With no other choice, boiled tree shrub has become
their daily diet and at times they are lucky if they can catch a jungle rat or monkey. The lack of
nutrients has left the group visibly malnourished – both young and old have swollen abdomens.
(...)
"The Lao foreign ministry spokesman Khenthong Nuanthasing has denied that the group exists,
stating, if anything, they are nothing more than "bandits". However, according to the Hmong, the
Laos army has recently increased their campaign with the assistance of the Vietnamese. Hmong
63
leaders report that the intensity of attacks against them has increased and their groups are being
driven further and further into the jungle."
European Parliament, September 2005, p. 6
"Pa Yeng said: “We are sorry that we have to take you to our homes in this horrible way, but this
is the only way to get there, and thanks again for coming so far, just to see how we live”. We
had to climb the mountain to avoid two Lao villages in the ravine. I will never forget my first
encounter with the jungle, the sheer physical exhaustion, the scratches and bruises and being
exasperated by the continuous struggle through the thicket of this impenetrable jungle. This was
a good indication of how difficult it is to move freely in this terrain, but more specifically this
showed the conditions the Hmong were pushed into, while running for their lives to hide from
the Pathet Lao. Therefore, by being in the jungle myself the realisation came to me of the extent
of these people’s isolation from the rest of the country and the world.
Before descending into the ravine, we enjoyed a modest meal when I noticed Pa Yeng stepping
aside with a spoonful of rice, and praying to the spirits of the jungle to protect our journey. With
a lack of weapons, these Hmong rely on the spirits of the jungle for protection. After eating we
began to record interviews on camera. Our guides told us about their village and people. We
found out that they had moved the location of their village 15 times the previous year. Since
January 2004, they had already been forced to move five times, losing several men in the
ambushes. The aftermath of this ambush, three weeks before our arrival, was recorded by the
Hmong on cameras provided by supporters and the footage is available as evidence**. As a
consequence they had not stayed in one place even for a full month. Systematically harassed by
the Lao military ambushes, the whole camp, including women, children and the elderly are
forced to pack up their belongings and trek through the jungle for days until they are safe. This
movement of people continues to this day."
Hmong people flee attacks on their villages to seek refuge in the jungle (October 2006)
•
According to testimonies from Hmong refugees in Thailand, many of them were living in
permanent settlement in Laos before they were forced to leave Laos. They told of being
subject to harassment, intimidation, arbitrary arrest and sometimes torture in the hands of
government forces who accused them of supporting Hmong rebels hiding in the forest.
STP, October 2006, p. 10
"According to various witness statements many of the members of the six focus groups had still
been living in their traditional villages as late as 2003. They had never taken part in or supported
“rebel activities” of any kind. Without warning they were arrested, subjected to intimidation or
harrassment or led to fear violent attack, arbitrary arrest and even torture. Eventually they were
forced to abandon their villages.
Villagers accused of being in contact with local Hmong in hiding gave told similar stories with few
discrepancies. The military had intimidated them, threatened them with imprisonment or used
violence to persuade them to reveal the Hmong hiding places. When these efforts proved
unsuccessful, either because the villagers had no idea where these hiding places were
located or they were unwilling to endanger lives, increased force was applied, involving extreme
violence and destruction, in clear violation of international law. In many cases soldiers carried out
arbitrary killings of villagers. In others they began by killing all the village leaders, so that other
villagers and often the whole of the rest of the village fled into the jungle in fear for their own lives,
abandoning all their possessions. They often met up eventually with another group already in
hiding and joined them, or in other cases they formed small independent groups."
64
Patterns of repatriation from Thailand (March 2010)
•
According to the Lao government, 3,457 of the 4,500 Hmong repatriated from Thailand at the
end of December 2009 have been relocated in Phonkham village, a resettlement site
specifically built for them in central Bolikhamsay province, while the others were sent back to
their homes.
•
Prior to their resettlement there, the 4,500 Hmong were placed in a temporary camp in
Paksan on the Mekong River. The camp was described by journalists as a “heavily guarded
camp” with “razor wire” and appeared to bear more similarities with a detention center then a
transit centre .
AFP, 28 March 2010
"Thailand faced a barrage of international criticism in December when it used troops to forcibly
repatriate about 4,500 Hmong from camps in the country's north back to Laos, despite concerns
of persecution on their return.
(...)
Laotian officials said 3,457 of the repatriated Hmong were sent to Phonkham, while others went
back to their home towns. "
SMH, 13 January 2010
"The 4500 ethnic Hmong asylum seekers - including more than 40 probably bound for Australia who were forcibly deported from Thailand in late December are being held in squalid secret
camps in remote parts of Laos, guarded by soldiers.
The Herald reached the main entrance of a camp at Paksan, on the Mekong River, where
hundreds of Hmong hilltribes people stood barefoot in the dirt behind three metres of razor wire
as loudspeakers ordered them to move away from the gate."
VOA, 6 January 2010
"According to Thai authorities, a total of 4,518 Hmongs were transported to Laos via the first LaoThai Friendship Bridge linking Nongkhai to Vientiane capital. The refugees were then taken to a
temporary receiving center in Paksan, Bolikhamxay province, where they will undergo screening
and orientation before being sent back to their former home villages or to new resettled village."
UN HRC, 18 September 2009, pp.42-43
211. In summary, the Government responded that: The issue relating to the thousands of Hmong
who have illegally immigrated into Thailand and have been retained in the temporary camp in
HuayNamKao Village, KaiKor District, Phetsaboun Province is now being addressed as a result
of the Meeting of the Joint Committee for Cooperation in General Security Border co-chaired by
the Defense Ministers of the Lao PDR and Thailand in September 2006, which had carefully
considered the situation and seriously discussed the issue.
(...)
214. Upon the arrival of each illegal-immigrant Lao Hmongs group, the Lao sent them to the
temporary welcoming center in Paksane District, Borikhamxay Province for interviews,
registration of their identities and records of related information. In order to prevent the repeated
65
illegal migration in the neighbouring country, whether intentionally or being lured to do so, they
were retained in the camp for one or two weeks for re-education to ensure that they were aware
of and understood the ill and deceiving intention of bad elements and trans-boundary human
traffickers. They were then sent by plane or by bus, as the case may be, to their hometowns,
where their relatives welcomed them and local authorities were readily awaited to provide them
with initial assistance until they can lead their normal lives as other villagers.
215. For those people who had sold all their properties or for those whose livelihoods were
previously relied on shifting slash-and-burn cultivation and had not permanent domicile, the
Lao Government agencies have provided them with new shelters, farmlands as well as initial
assistance until they can lead their normal lives. One of the most relevant cases is the
establishment of Phalak Village in Kasy District, Vientiane Province in early 2006. The
Government has provided these villagers with land areas for farming and permanent houses. This
model village for development was established for the purpose of providing essential assistance
to those Hmongs in need of returning from Thailand with no home or dependable relatives.
Inter-University Committe on International Migration, 19 April 2003, p. 3
"By December 2001, when the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) closed
its office in Laos, some 29,000 refugees had been repatriated to Laos. Three patterns of
repatriation were used to facilitate the refugees’ return. First, individuals returned directly to live
with their families, often in their community of origin. Second, small groups of 30 or fewer families
were repatriated to already existing communities. Third, large groups involving 50 or more
families required the establishment of entirely new communities, to which about 10,700 people
were repatriated in 29 different large group resettlement sites, including Ban Pha Thao."
66
PHYSICAL SECURITY AND INTEGRITY
Physical security, dignity, mental and moral integrity
Reports of human rights abuses committed by Lao government forces against
displaced Hmong hiding in the jungle (February 2010)
•
A number of UN Special Rapporteurs have in the past years reported receiving credible
information from various source alleging the death and forced displacement of civilians,
including children, as a result of the struggle of Hmong rebel groups with the Lao
government. According to these reports, up to 20 rebels groups were surrounded by the
military and reduced to starvation and disease in the forest. It was also alleged that
repression persisted against ethnic Hmong as a consequence of their involvement in cold-war
conflicts.
•
It was also reported that indigenous and tribal peoples were victims of arbitrary arrests, false
criminal charges and other forms of threats and intimidation as a result of their mobilization to
defend their rights.
•
In 2007, Amnesty International reported having received "multiple credible accounts over the
past four years from a range of sources" that would lead to the conclusion that there is an
established pattern of attacks by the military on people living in the jungle.
•
A large proportion, reaching maybe 30%, of the people living as IDPs in the jungle appeared
to be injured exhibiting bullet and shrapnel wounds sustained during alleged military attacks.
•
Reported incidents of include the alleged killing of 26 IDP women and children by soldiers in
April 2006 near the town of Vang Vieng as well the alleged execution of five unarmed young
Hmong on 19 May 2004 in the Xaisomboun area four of which were raped before being killed.
UN HRC, 12 February 2010, p. 6
"24. In 2007, the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights and fundamental freedoms
of indigenous people expressed concern at reports of alleged deaths of civilians, including
children, as a result of the struggle of Hmong rebel groups with the Government. Information was
cited that approximately twenty rebel groups had been surrounded by the military and reduced to
starvation and disease in the forest, where they had sought refuge.62 Similar concerns were
raised jointly by the Independent Expert on minority issues, the Special Rapporteurs on the right
to food and on adequate housing and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the
human rights of internally displaced persons.63 In 2006, the Special Rapporteur on summary
executions had drawn attention to reports alleging the killing of 26 ethnic Hmong by troops in an
attack in northern Vientiane province.64
25. Previously, in 2005, CERD expressed concern at reports of serious acts of violence against
the Hmong, in particular allegations that soldiers brutalized and killed a group of five Hmong
children on 19 May 2004. It strongly recommended that United Nations human rights bodies be
allowed to visit the areas where Hmong have taken refuge.65 In its followup response, Laos
indicated that no complaint on the incident had been brought to Lao concerned authorities’
notice.66
26. The Special Rapporteur on indigenous peoples also noted reports of arbitrary arrests, false
criminal charges and other forms of threats and intimidation against indigenous and tribal
peoples, as a result of their mobilization to defend their rights.67 The Special Rapporteur and
67
CERD68 noted that repression persisted against ethnic Hmong as a consequence of their
involvement in cold-war conflicts more than three decades ago.69 CERD called for measures to
quickly find a political and humanitarian solution to this crisis and create the necessary conditions
for the initiation of a dialogue. It strongly encouraged Laos to authorize United Nations agencies
to provide emergency humanitarian assistance to this group.70 In its follow-up reply, Laos
reiterated that there was no conflict between the Government and Hmong, citing that there had
been acts of banditry.71"
AI, 23 March 2007, pp. 9-15
"Amnesty International has received numerous reports about armed attacks by the military on
people in the jungle. Accounts of such attacks are often difficult to corroborate because they take
place in isolated locations, far from populated areas and independent observers. Nevertheless,
Amnesty International has received multiple credible accounts over the past four years from a
range of sources sufficient to conclude that there is a pattern of such attacks. Most frequently,
attacks take place while people forage for food. Foraging is a vital but time-consuming and
dangerous task which can take between 12 and 18 hours a day. The further the people venture
from their encampments, the more vulnerable they are to attacks by the military.
Numerous individuals have reported how their relatives have been shot dead while searching for
food. The family patterns of the groups in the jungle reflect this; family members outside the
nuclear family, such as uncles, aunts and grandparents, are often referred to as being custodians
of children whose parents have been killed.
Bullet and shrapnel wounds are also widespread in the jungle groups. In one of the largest
encampments with a population of over 800, the leader, who kept a tally of the number of injuries,
told a journalist that 30 percent had shrapnel wounds. 25 Reports, including photographs, from
the six visits by journalists have provided evidence of the large numbers of injured and scarred
people, including children. Invariably victims attributed scars and injuries to attacks by the
military.
Those who have been injured have had no access to medical services inside Laos.
STP, October 2006, pp. 4-11
"For many years there have been reports of horrific massacres of groups of Hmong hidden in the
jungle of the Xaisomboun Special Zone. However the international public is still unaware of the
extent of the human rights violations and humanitarian distress suffered by the forest-dwelling
Hmong, primarily because the Lao authorities have declared the area where most of the Hmong
are hiding a prohibited area for foreigners so that very limited news of what has been happening
in the area has reached the outside world.
One of the most recent massacres of unarmed Hmong occurred on 6 April 2006, near the Laotian
town of Vang Vieng, when at least 26 women and children – among them 12 children under 10
years old - were slaughtered by soldiers. Four more individuals were wounded and five suckling
infants starved to death after their mothers died. The unarmed Hmong were massacred while
they were searching for food away from their hiding place. (1)
Another individual massacre reported by credible sources took place in the Xaisomboun area on
19 May 2004, when five unarmed young Hmong out looking for food were attacked by soldiers.
Four young women aged between 14 and 16 years old were raped before being killed. Their 15
year old brother was also killed. The bodies of the victims were shot through with bullets fired
68
from very close range. Although the Lao government denies that regular soldiers are in any way
responsible for such human rights violations films smuggled out of Laos show the bullet-riddled
bodies of the young people.
The few severely traumatised refugees who have managed to flee to Thailand report that in
recent months thousands of soldiers have been flown into the special exclusion zone to - literally hunt down the Hmong groups in hiding. Typically fighter planes and helicopters are used to locate
the groups from the air and drop chemical weapons and bombs on them. These attacks are often
followed a few days later by a ground assault by troops who start shelling the fleeing Hmong
without giving any advance warning.
According to Hmong witnesses who fled to Thailand to escape the massive military presence in
the region, captured Hmong prisoners have repeatedly been subjected to horrific torture,
mutilation and rape before without exception being killed."
European Parliament, 2 September 2005, pp. 4-7
"During the research process we found that there are still somewhere around 12,000 – 20,000
people, former CIA soldiers and their families, still living in the jungle and resisting the Lao
authorities. They live in groups of 250 to 800 people, concentrated in the provinces of
Bolikhamsay, Xaysomboune, Xieng Khouang and Luang Prabang. We were getting continuous
reports of atrocities and human rights abuses against the Hmong – Lao military offensives on the
settlements using assault helicopters and ground troops, systematic shelling and allegations of
spraying the areas adjacent to the camps with chemical agents. The evidence for this was video
footage smuggled out to the west by an underground network called the ‘Blackbirds’ with the help
of the Fact Finding Commission (FFC) based in California, USA.
(...)
We descended into the valley with the darkness broken by silhouettes of men with backpacks and
machine guns moving silently in the moonlight. We crossed a burnt out rice field and a road, and
then began another climb, which continued for six full hours through the night. With the constant
threat of being discovered by Lao troops, we had to get away as far as possible from the roads
and places populated by Lao loggers who see any Hmong emerging from the jungle as legitimate
targets.
It took us three days to reach the rebels’ camp. Having lived their entire lives in the jungle, these
Hmong guides have become attuned to their situation, which helps them negotiate through this
often dangerous and hostile environment. They exercise resilience, tenacity and calmness and
were always watchful for our safety. It was important for them to get us to their base camp so we
could witness their conditions.
On several occasions on the way to the camp we came across abandoned and burned villages,
ruined plantations, sites of ambushes and the traces of the Lao military presence. This has been
observed to be a tactical strategy employed by the Laotian troops in systematically killing through
starvation. The Hmong avoid harvesting fruit or cassava root for fear of leaving visible signs of
their presence at specific locations. It forces them to search wider for limited food sources that
are now becoming scarce. There are also many examples of the Hmong being attacked, often
women and children, while out gathering food. They become sitting targets. After a few months of
our visit, in May 2004, a dozen young boys and girls were out gathering food when they were
ambushed; the teenage girls raped and brutally mutilated to death. Evidence footage** of this was
smuggled out of the jungle and given to Time magazine Journalist Andrew Perrin who had the
footage authenticated by independent sources. It was concluded to be a genuine attack carried
out by Laotian troops. When challenged by journalists the Lao government denied responsibility
for lack of evidence and dismissed the footage as a fabrication that could have been staged in the
69
jungles of Thailand or Burma. Subsequently, the same was said about our filmed footage
questioning the integrity of the BBC and our journalism. It is clear there is a pattern of denial of
the problem or even the existence of any of these rebel groups by the Lao Government."
FIDH & MLDH, January 2005, p. 13
"Acts of maltreatment against Hmong populations seem to continue. In September 2004,
international medias (CNN, BBC, ARTE) reported the "attack" led against five young Hmongs –
four girls: Mao Lee, 14 years old, hers sister Chao Lee, 16 years old, Chi Her, 14 years old, Pang
Lor, 14 years old, and a boy of 15 years old, Pang Lor's brother—by LPDR soldiers in May 2004
in the Saysomboun jungle. These acts, which were recorded on video by a witness, were
denounced by Amnesty International as "war crimes" (AI press release, 13 September 2004). The
Lao authorities mentioned "gross fabrications" and "false" accusations."
AI, 13 September 2004
"Amnesty International is horrified by recent reports, including video evidence and witness
testimony, of an attack by Lao soldiers against a group of five children, four of them girls, in the
Xaisomboune military zone on 19 May 2004.
The children, aged between 13 and 16 years old and part of an ethnic Hmong rebel group, were
brutally mutilated -- the girls apparently raped before being killed -- by a group of approximately
30-40 soldiers. The victims -- four girls, Mao Lee, 14; her sister Chao Lee, 16; Chi Her, 14; Pang
Lor, 14; and Tou Lor, Pang Lor’s 15 year old brother -- were killed whilst foraging for food close to
their camp. They were unarmed.
The attacks violate the most fundamental principles of international human rights and
humanitarian law. These rapes and killings constitute war crimes. The Lao authorities must bring
to justice those responsible for this atrocity and cease attacks on unarmed civilians.
A witness, who has subsequently fled the country and been recognized as a refugee by the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, reported hearing one of the soldiers saying:
"Meo (Hmong). Your kael ni (mouth) allows you to speak. Your hin (vagina) allows you to breed".
He then heard moans and a gunshot. Mao Lee was shot in each breast and the other bodies
were mutilated by what appears to be high-powered rifle shots fired at close range. One of the
girls was disembowelled.
(...)
Credible sources have reported the deaths of scores of civilians, mainly children, from starvation
and injuries sustained during the conflict. It is known that several of approximately 20 rebel
groups with their families are surrounded by Lao military and prevented from foraging for food
that they traditionally rely on to survive. Amnesty International has protested to the Lao authorities
at what it believes is the use of starvation as a weapon of war against civilians."
High level of trauma observed among displaced Hmongs in Thailand (May 2009)
•
A mental health assessment carried out by MSF in 2007 among Hmong refugees living in the
military-guarded village of Huai Nam Khao, Petchabun province, Thailand, showed that many
adults were affected by various psychological disorders as well as a high level of
psychological distress. These were attributed to the exposure in Laos to numerous highly
traumatic situations such as being forced to hide, flee under dangerous conditions, live under
70
constant threat of attack and sexual violence. High levels of anxiety disorders were attributed
to the uncertainty of their future, and the inability to control their present living conditions.
•
The majority of the refugees reported a lifetime of loss, torture, running, hiding, and starving
in the mountainous jungles of Laos. They showed extensive documents including photos of
the dead and relatives in military uniforms, papers showing the family’s connection to the CIA,
and maps of hiding places and routes of escape from attacks. MSF concludes that "while
many details differ, the elements are quite consistent".
•
High levels of anxiety producing somatic disorders and depressive symptoms were caused by
their present situation (threat of being sent back) and the lack of real protection which
prevented the patients from recovering from their psychological wounds.
MSF, 20 May 2009, pp. 6-8
"Following a mental health assessment in the camp to obtain some indicators of the prevalence of
psychological disorders among the Hmong refugees, MSF began providing mental health
counseling in November 2007 to the most traumatized refugees.
The adults interviewed presented various psychological disorders as well as a high level of
psychological distress: pathological mourning due to death or disappearance of multiple family
members, psychotraumatic disorders due to exposure to numerous highly traumatic situations
(being forced to hide, flee under dangerous conditions, live under constant threat of attack and
sexual violence), anxiety disorders due to the uncertainty of their future, and the inability to
control their present living conditions.
In clinical interviews, patients presented several symptoms related to post-traumatic stress
disorder as well as anxiety-related depressive disorders. Their main symptoms are persistent
sadness, anxious mood, crying easily, sleeping disorders, recurrent nightmares of traumatic
events, feelings of hopelessness, difficulty concentrating, and somatic complaints such as
headaches and other chronic pains.
(...)
Mental Health Status – Hmong Refugees
The stress of life in the camp for refugees who report a long personal history of traumatic events
in Laos continues to intensify in the face of ongoing uncertainty about their future and lack of any
economic opportunity. So far, 286 patients have been seen for psychological consultation. MSF
staff living in the camp report there are many more whom suffer symptoms of stress but are not
yet referred. Nearly every day, new faces come to the consultation room door and ask to be seen.
Of those seen, a majority reported a lifetime of loss, torture, running, hiding, and starving in the
mountainous jungles of Laos. Patients present extensive documents showing photos of the dead
and relatives in military uniforms, papers showing the family’s connection to the CIA, and maps of
hiding places and routes of escape from attacks. While many details differ, the elements are quite
consistent.
Of the 286 patients seen for consultation many of them threaten suicide if they are forced to
return to Laos. They make statements that vary in intensity, from: “I would rather die in this camp
than return to Laos” to: “If I am forced to go back to Laos I will kill my family with a knife and then
hang myself.” Or, “I will force the soldier to shoot me.” One patient who tried to kill himself by
drinking wood staining liquid reported that he was tortured by thoughts of the past suffering in
Laos, humiliated by his present circumstances of being poor and unable to provide for his family,
and hopeless about the future, convinced he will be killed anyway if he is sent back. “At least I
can choose my time to die and join my father (who recently was reported killed in Laos)”. Another
male patient expressed suicidal thoughts and a plan to kill his family if forced to return: Since I
was a small child, my life has been running from the war, hiding and starving in the jungle, and
71
seeing my family killed. Now I am afraid of being sent back to the same suffering, and I have to
beg for protection. I thought I would find a better life.”
Every day, these people face Thai soldiers with weapons who have decided to send them back to
Laos even by force. According to the MSF psychologist, these conditions for the traumatized
refugees—facing weapons and the imminent threat of deportation to Laos—serve as a constant
reminder of the violence and persecution they endured in Laos. This situation and the lack of real
protection creates high levels of anxiety and has produced somatic disorders and depressive
symptoms in the patients admitted to MSF’s mental health program. This lack of protection also
prevents the patients from recovering from their psychological wounds.
The fact that they are traumatized leads them to believe that they are destined to experience
additional catastrophic events. According to the MSF psychologist, traumatized individuals who
feel powerless and helpless may resort to killing themselves as they feel it is their only power to
avoid the repetition of the trauma they have experienced in the past. For all of these reasons, the
threat of suicide voiced by patients during psychotherapy poses a major concern for MSF."
STP, October 2006, pp. 6-13
"Children and young people have been particularly affected by shortage of food and the everpresent danger that life in the rain forest means for many of the Hmong groups. Many are
severely traumatised after years of living in constant fear of dying and witnessing the death of
many of their close relatives. Yeng Houa, now 13 years old, tells how in August 2002 a mortar
round landed a few metres away from his family as they were preparing their evening meal
together. His parents were killed while he himself was hit by 18 pieces of shrapnel in his leg. His
jaw was broken and a wound in his thigh became infected.
(...)
Very young refugee children spoke about their terrible experiences before leaving the country, the
suffering caused by repeated attacks by armed military units and the pain of watching their close
family circle continue to shrink. Many of the children, whether born in a village or in the jungle,
had lost parents, brothers and sisters and other close relatives. Orphan children were usually
looked after by the families of blood relatives or by members of the same clan living in small
groups.
According to the refugees the reason why they split up into small groups was for safety, in
addition to the near-impossibility for larger groups to find enough food.
In the course of their interviews all of these young people without exception described their
experiences as having been extremely traumatic. They expressed their anguish as they told how
much they missed the rest of their family and how they grieved for them. Orphans appeared
particularly severely traumatised, after having probably observed the violent death of
their parents and then, after finally reaching safety, often being separated from their brothers and
sisters for “practical reasons”.
(...)
Rebecca Sommer describes all the refugees as having experienced severe psychological
damage as a result of what they had experienced. They had all been forced to witness the deaths
of loved ones, been subjected to extremes of violence over a long period and endured a constant
threat of death. Children in particular were often unable to sleep. They were either afraid
of falling asleep or their sleep was disturbed by recurring nightmares in which they relived the
horror of what they had been through. Some of the children showed obvious symptoms of stress
and behavioural disorders. Many of the refugees appeared to be suffering from depression and
they frequently broke down in tears that revealed a much deeper unresolved anguish."
72
Displaced Hmong sent back to Laos report of humiliation and rape while held in
detention (May 2009)
•
Around 50 of the 4,500 displaced Hmong forcibly returned to Laos in December are reported
to have been imprisoned.
•
•
In May 2007, 12 of a group of 27 Lao-Hmong children sent back from Thailand to Laos in
December 2005 and who managed to return to Thailand described being arrested upon
return to Laos, emprisoned and subject to ill-treatment including beatings and rape.
•
•
In 2007, Amnesty International reported having received information alleging harassment and
rape committed by government forces against IDPs who had chosen to come out of the
jungle. There was also a discernible pattern of separation of families with men and women
sent to different camps.
The Irrawaddy, 22 January 2010
"Around 50 Hmong refugees who were forcibly repatriated by Thailand to Laos on Dec. 28 have
been imprisoned in Paksan jail, according to the Fact Finding Commission (FFC), an American
based NGO.
It is suggested that the group may have been isolated because of their role as leaders in the
camps and during the “secret war,” when the CIA hired the Hmong as foot soldiers to prevent the
spread of communism during the Vietnam War.
(...)
Speaking to The Irrawaddy on Thursday, Amnesty International confirmed that one group has
been separated from other returnees and expressed concern about their treatment by the Laos
government.
“We are aware that some of the leaders have been separated from the group, taken out of
Vientiane and remain unaccounted for,” said Benjamin Zawacki, a Bangkok-based researcher for
Amnesty.
“Our primary concern for them is torture, which we know is often employed in Laos’ prisons and
could be used as a punitive measure for them bringing shame to Laos or for information
gathering.”
He went on to add that Thailand has not only broken refugee law by expelling the Hmong but has
also gone against the UN treaty against torture, which Thailand has signed and ratified."
MSF, 20 May 2009, p. 11
"In December 2005, 27 Lao Hmong children (5 boys and 22 girls) from Huai Nam Khao were
arrested by the Thai police on their way to celebrate Christmas and sent back by force to Laos.
Since then, in May 2007, 12 of the girls managed to come back to Thailand and join their parents
in the camp. Their testimonies collected directly by the MSF team attest to the harsh treatment
those children had endured during their detention in Laos. PHY is one of the girls who returned to
Huai Nam Khao. Her statement was taken in the presence of two other girls, PKY, 16, and MY,
16, who were also among the group sent to Laos. During the interview, they occasionally added
details and information regarding their own experience. Ultimately, all three girls endured the
same situation. PHY describes their experience after being deported to Laos.
73
“Six policemen arrived and started asking us questions, beating us at the same time. They
questioned each girl privately (one girl after another in different rooms). They asked, ‘Where do
you come from and what are you doing?’
We answered that we were from Huai Nam Khao in Thailand and that we were telling the truth,
but the police wouldn’t believe us and they beat us even more. They asked us our religion and we
told them that we believed in Jesus. They asked who the priest at Huai Nam Khao was and if he
was an American priest. They asked if we had been sent by the Americans or the Thais to talk to
other Hmong about Jesus. The police also tried to force us to say that we were being paid by
Thailand or the Americans to go to Xieng Khouang province to find other Hmong. They also
asked who the leader of our group was, but we told them that we didn't have any leaders. They
accused us of trying to meet the Hmong who live in the jungle to start a war in this country. They
accused us of being spies and things like that.
The more we said no, the more they beat us. They hit us in the stomach, grabbed our hair and
beat our heads on the floor. They tore our clothes and touched our private parts, saying they
wanted to make sure that we weren’t hiding anything. One of the policemen held my legs while
others raped and beat me. They did that for an entire day, one man after another. There were six
rooms in the prison. Every day, we would experience the same treatment. They would beat us
until we were nearly unconscious, let us recover, sometimes for a day, and start over again. They
also terrorized us with a revolver. The policemen told us that the boys had already confessed and
so it would be a good idea for us to tell the truth.
They made us listen to a recording. You could hear each boy being beaten, crying and
answering, “Yes, yes,” to the questions the police were asking. They asked, “Were you going to
Xieng Kouang? Were you going to the market to take the money the Americans gave you to
support the war in the jungle? Are you from Xieng Kouang?” The boy was just crying, and saying,
“Yes, yes, yes.”
AI, 23 March 2007, p. 15
In connection with attacks by the military or when groups from the jungle have tried to leave
their life in hiding, there is a discernible pattern of separation of families. Reports provided to
Amnesty International describe how men have been arrested and taken away, while the
women have been taken to isolated villages, most often along the Vietnamese border in the
province of Houa Phan. In other instances families have been placed in small camp-like
settlements in the same area, while young women have been separated and taken away. Some
have been subject to slavery-like treatment and torture and ill-treatment, including repeated
rapes by law enforcement officers.
(...)
Around August 2005, Pakou35 and her family were captured in the jungle. Within a week of her
capture, she was separated from her parents and siblings and taken to a police post outside a
village south-east of Sam Neua. For approximately one year she was locked up with two other
young Hmong women in a room at the police post. All three women were used for house chores,
did laundry for the policemen, and they were also forced into sexual servitude. Several times
Pakou was gang raped by the police. After about one year she finally saw an opportunity to
escape as she acquired a sum of money with which she bribed some of the police officers to set
her free.
Pakou is now around 20 years old, distressed and traumatized. She is a refugee in Thailand, at
risk of deportation back to Laos."
There is not enough information at this stage to conclude whether there is a pattern of
sexual abuse by military and police of Hmong women from the jungle. It remains an area that
urgently needs further research. What is clear, however, is that there are allegations that
74
serious crimes have been committed by police in Houa Phan province. So far, Amnesty
International has received no information to suggest that there has been any investigation into
such crimes by Lao authorities.
Mines and UXOs threaten safety of displaced Hmong and the general population and
hinder socio-economic development (2010)
Mines used by government forces in their counter-insurgency campaign as well UXOs left
over from the war represent another threat for displaced Hmong hiding in the mountains,
but also for the general population. Provinces such as Xieng Khouang, Luang Prabang or
Huaphan, where most Hmong are located, have particularly high concentrations of UXOs
left over from the war. A 2010 UXO report showed that these 3 provinces account for
nearly 30 per cent of all UXO accidents recorded between 1968 and 2008. The same report
revealed that over 29 per cent of all UXO accidents occurred in the forest (NRA, 2 February
2010, pp.44-68).
Mines and UXOs represent a serious threat for almost all Laotians as well as a significant
obstacle to livelihoods and food security. It is estimated that nearly 30,000 people have
died and 20,000 have been injured since 1964 as a result of the large bombs, the mines,
the mortars and the bomblets. While 60% of the casualties occurred during the conflict
years (1963-1973), the remainder, or 20,000 accidents, occurred after the war ended in
1974 (NRA, 2 February 2010, p.x). Children and the poorest people, some of whom collect
UXOs as scrap metal to make a living are particularly at risk (IRIN, 12 November 2009).
Between 1999 and 2006, records show that the two main causes of UXO accidents were
“children playing” and “tampering”, usually attributed to scrap metal recyclers (NRA,
2009). It should however be mentioned that there is a lack of reliable data on scrap-related
casualties and on UXO accidents in general with many accidents going unreported
(GICHD, September 2005, p.25)
Increased danger for flood-affected people due to moving of UXO pieces by Typhoon
Ketsana (December 2009)
•
Typhoon Ketsana is believed to have carried off or unearthed some UXO pieces among
those previously mapped resulting in a increase of risk for the flood-affected population as
well as relief providers.
•
Up to 3 Laotians are killed every month by UXOs left over from the Vietnam war.
OCHA, 18 December 2009, p. 6
"Lao PDR is the most heavily UXO-affected nation (per capita) in the world, with 25% of the
nation’s
10,000 villages blighted by remnants of the Indochina War. More than two million tons of
explosive
ordnance, including an estimated 266 million anti-personnel sub-munitions released from cluster
bombs and four million large bombs were dropped during the years of conflict in the 1960s and
1970s, including over the area hit by Typhoon Ketsana. It is estimated that up to 30% of all
ordnance did not explode and is still in the ground. Some UXO pieces among those previously
mapped are believed to have been carried off or unearthed by the strong river and flood currents
generated by Ketsana, increasing the risk for the flood-affected population as well as relief
providers. Remapping of the shifted UXO, intensifying public awareness and education
campaigns, and clearing of unearthed UXO will be a priority to ensure that the population at risk
75
can quickly resume agriculture and other activities. If this is not done, the gains made over the
past decade will be reversed as an increase of UXO victims begins to be recorded."
USA Today, 11 December 2003
"Three decades after the bombing stopped, two or three Laotians are killed every month and
another six or seven are maimed by unexploded ordnance, called UXO, left over from the war.
Cluster bombs, known here as "bombies," account for about half the unexploded ordnance on the
ground and most of the casualties. Since the bombing ended in 1973, 5,700 Laotians have been
killed and 5,600 injured by UXO. Through the end of August, 14 of the 30 Laotians reported killed
this year and 33 of the 58 injured by UXO have been children.
Cluster bombs contain dozens, even hundreds, of submunitions the size of tennis balls, soft drink
cans or D batteries. The submunitions, or bomblets, are scattered over a wide area and are
intended to explode on impact. The problem is a high percentage — experts estimate up to 30%
in Laos — of bomblets don't go off. Hidden under bushes or buried in the ground, they can
detonate if someone touches them, or never explode.
(...)
This impoverished, landlocked country endured one of history's heaviest bombing campaigns.
From 1964 through 1973, the United States flew 580,000 bombing runs over Laos — one every 9
minutes for 10 years. More than 2 million tons of ordnance was unloaded on the countryside,
double the amount dropped on Nazi Germany in World War II. "Certainly, on a per-capita basis,
Laos remains the most heavily bombed nation in the history of warfare," says Martin Stuart-Fox, a
historian at Queensland University in Australia and author of A History of Laos.
(...)
The United States dropped 80 million cluster bomblets on Laos. Ten percent to 30% did not
explode, leaving 8 million to 24 million scattered across the country; 15 of Laos' 18 provinces are
contaminated with UXO. In the northern Xiangkhoang province, grazing water buffalo have eaten
dud submunitions and exploded.
(...)
The United States, which spent $9 million a day (in today's dollars) bombing Laos for 10 years,
last year contributed $1 million to UXO Lao. That was 26% of the agency's budget and more than
any other country contributed. Douglas Hartwick, U.S. ambassador to Laos, says he wishes the
United States could pay more."
Liberty and freedom of movement
Thousands of Hmong forcibly returned to Laos from Thailand end up in a militarycontroled resettlement camp with no or limited freedom of movement (March 2010)
•
According to the government, 3,457 of the 4,500 Hmong repatriated from Thailand have been
resettled in a camp specifically built for them in central Bolikhamsay province.
•
Visits by diplomats, foreign media and UN representatives were allowed in February and
March 2010 albeit under strict surveillance by the Lao government and with no possibility of
one-to-one talks with the returnees.
•
According to the diplomats there were no reports of mistreatment.
•
Almost none of the returnees had been out of the camp in the three months they had been
living there and no ID cards had been delivered.
76
AFP, 28 March 2010
"While diplomats say there have been no reports of mistreatment, suspicions remain about the
Hmong's rights and living standards in Phonkham village, which was built specifically for the
group in central Bolikhamsay province.
"They've put them on a Laos equivalent of a desert island," said Phil Robertson, deputy Asia
director of Human Rights Watch. "There's no sustained access to these people or quality of
access."
Laotian officials said 3,457 of the repatriated Hmong were sent to Phonkham, while others went
back to their home towns. Laos said it would grant the international community's request for "free
and unfettered" access to the returnees within 30 days of their repatriation, but so far visits have
been scarce, brief and strictly monitored.
On the latest two-hour visit Friday, foreign diplomats, reporters and a few UN representatives
were among those escorted in two helicopters from the Laotian capital Vientiane, a 45-minute
flight away.
The delegation was ushered straight to an unfinished village hall to be greeted by smiling
youngsters in traditional Hmong dress, before a briefing by central government and Phonkham
officials.
"In the beginning of their resettlement... they were afraid because of not being familiar with their
new environment and not understanding the Lao government's policies," said Bounthan
Douangtanya of the village administration committee. "But the authorities have conducted an
education course for these returnees in order to... make them understand the policy regulations,"
he said, before detailing plans to develop the village infrastructure.
Diplomats were given a brief but revealing chance to question the 300 or so Hmong gathered in
the hall. How many had been outside of the village since arriving? One hand went up in
response. How many had received money, parcels or anything else from contacts outside the
village? Two. How many had yet received ID cards or official registration? None.
As the meeting ended, several of the Hmong approached their visitors, saying they wanted to
leave. "I want to go to Canada," one 16-year-old girl told AFP, in English, as tears welled in her
eyes. She said she was one of the 158 recognised refugees who have been offered resettlement
in Canada, the United States, Australia and the Netherlands. Embassies have been told by Laos
that these people now want to stay.
One diplomat on the trip said that the Hmong who "explicitly" expressed a desire to leave
"seemed to be demonstrating courage in coming to talk to us, despite the best efforts of the
authorities to stage-manage the situation"."
Displaced Hmongs forcibly returned from Thailand reportedly held in detention (2007)
AI, 23 March 2007, p. 18
"In violation of their obligations under customary international law and the CRC as outlined above,
the Lao authorities have also reportedly been holding a group of returnees from Thailand, mostly
minors, in arbitrary detention.
On 5 December 2005, following their forcible return from Thailand, a group of 27 Lao Hmong, 22
of them children, were detained in Laos.40 According to eyewitnesses, Thai officials in Ban Pak
77
Khat in the province of Nong Khai had transported the group across the Mekong in two small
boats, making two journeys each, to the Lao village of Ban Phabat. As the deportation was
completed, Lao officials had joined Thai immigration officials for a drink on the Thai side of the
river. The 27 spent the first night on Lao soil in a temple in the village. On the following day they
were arrested.
Since then the group has been held in deplorable conditions and there have been consistent
reports about ill-treatment. There are reports that the boys and men have been tortured.
The 22 children and 5 adults are believed to have been held in two separate prisons: the girls and
women were reportedly detained at a prison attached to an army base outside Paksen, 200 km
east of Vientiane. The two boys and three men were first held in Vientiane, but around May 2006
they were reportedly transferred to a detention facility in Phongsaly, in the far north.
Lao authorities have never confirmed the whereabouts of the group. In responses to Urgent
Action appeals from Amnesty International members across the world, officials have repeatedly
denied any responsibility for them, while at the same time claiming to be looking for them out of
humanitarian concern. On 8 March 2007 information emerged that Lao authorities had found 21
girls and young women from the group, while the six still unaccounted for are being sought. At the
time of writing this report, Lao and Thai authorities were drafting a plan to reunite the 21 with their
families.
Information about the children’s and girls’ whereabouts during the 15 months since their forcible
return to Laos was unclear.
The children’s parents, who are asylum-seekers in Thailand, live at an informal refugee camp in
the northern Thai province of Phetchabun.
In this case, where the detention of the children appears politically motivated, Lao authorities
have failed in their obligation under the CRC to ensure that children are protected against
discrimination or punishment on the basis of the activities or opinions of their parents or family
members."
Fate of displaced Hmongs coming out of the jungle to surrender to authorities
remains often unknown (2007)
•
According to Amnesty International, groups of displaced Hmong who have decided to
surrender to the authorities have sometimes been subject to harassment, detention and illtreatment. Sources close to the Hmong claim that 2 children who were part of a group of 30
families who surrendered in June 2005 died of malnourishment while in detention.
•
The group of 30 families were reportedly held for six months without charge or trial, in
appalling conditions which violated their human rights including the right to liberty and the
prohibition on arbitrary deprivation of liberty, the right to access to legal counsel, to be
brought before a judge and to challenge the lawfulness of detention, the right to humane
conditions of detention and the freedom from torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment.
•
Several hundreds of Hmong were reported to have surrendered or to have been captured in
February 2004. However, it remains unclear how they have bee treated as the government
refused to provide international organizations access to them.
AI, 23 March 2007, p. 16
"In several instances, groups who have decided to give up their life in hiding have been
harassed, detained and subjected to ill-treatment, according to reports provided to Amnesty
78
International.
On 4 June 2005, a group of 173 people emerged from the jungle after a long jungle trek to the
village of Chong Thuang in a planned “surrender”.
The US-based Hmong lobby group The Fact Finding Commission (FFC) had advised authorities
and international organisations that a group of 30 families would emerge from the jungle, and also
attempted to arrange a presence of international organisations with the aim of monitoring their
arrival and ensure their well-being. International presence was not secured. In the absence of
such monitoring, three members of the FFC were themselves at hand.36
“We received help by these Americans who came to meet us when we came out of the forest to
take us to Laos where we would become Lao citizens”, Chong Vang Lor, 37 a 56-year old
member of this group told Amnesty International when the organisation met him later in Thailand.
The 30 families had left behind a life in hiding inside Xaisomboune Special Zone, four days trek
from Phoukout district in Xieng Khouang province. They were first provided assistance
coordinated by a local police chief.
“Then came the soldiers. They took us to a prison inside an army camp outside Phoukout town.
For two months we were kept inside the cells at all times, around 10 families in each cell. If we
needed to go to the toilet, we had to ask the guards to be let out,” according to Chong Vang Lor.
The prison building was in the middle of the camp, and the doors were sealed by chains and
locks. Food was very limited – two meals a day of a handful of rice. “The guards were very
intimidating, particularly in the beginning: at night they would fire shots over the roof of the
building, shout at or harass the detainees from outside. Many of the guards, both military and
police, were ethnic Hmong.”
“No one was killed, but two children died of malnourishment,” said Chong Vang Lor.
After two months the families were allowed outside the cell in the daytime, though confined to the
army camp area; at night they would be locked up again. Food remained very limited through this
period, which lasted around four months. The international provisions of food that authorities
reportedly received did not alter the limited supplies. Altogether, they were held for around six
months, before being told to leave. They were instructed not to leave in groups, but only as
individual families. Fearful, they all left at the same time, at night, but in different directions as
they had been told.
For six months the 173, including small children, were reportedly held without charge or trial, in
appalling conditions which violate human rights which have been recognised as being rules of
customary international law binding on all states:
The right to liberty and the prohibition on arbitrary deprivation of liberty;
The right to access to legal counsel, to be brought before a judge and to challenge the lawfulness
of detention;
The right to humane conditions of detention;
Freedom from torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.
In the case of children, deprivation of liberty must be a last resort and for the shortest time
possible – clearly not justified here.38 This and the rights above are also provided for in the UN
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), to which Laos is a state party.39 Several of the 173
are now refugees or asylum seekers in Thailand. The Lao government has publicly denied all
reports that have emerged about their background. There are also unconfirmed reports that some
of the 173 have successfully reintegrated into the Lao Hmong mainstream, just as the group had
79
wanted. In view of the fact that there is no access to them by independent monitors, it has not
been possible to confirm
these reports."
Writenet, May 2004, p. 20
"In late February 2004 there were several mass surrenders of Hmong from Yang Toua Thao’s
group, Moua Tua Ter’s group, and a group in Bolikhamsai under Xa Phia Ya. The numbers
remain unclear. Initially it was reported that some 300 people surrendered in Luang Phrabang
Province, and that some 300 to 400 people from the Saysomboune zone surrendered in Xieng
Khoang, and 100 or so in Bolikhamsai.40 These reports were later modified by the US-based
Fact Finding Commission for Laos, who claim to have been in touch with Moua Toua Ter who
said that “18 families, 96 people, were captured by military troops” and that three of the men
“captured” were executed. Yang Toua Thao, for his part, said that “over 200 people from his
group were captured by LPDR military troops”.41 The treatment of these groups of people after
their surrender remains unclear, and Amnesty International among others have called on the Lao
Government to provide international organizations access to them.42 The Lao, however, have
refused all approaches by international organizations outside and inside the country, claiming that
it is an “internal” matter. This, of course, only increases international suspicion about their fate
and provides fuel for any rumour. The Lao Human Rights Council in the US, for example, says
that if access is denied “then the denial is evidence that the Communist Lao Government of the
LPDR committed ‘war crimes, crimes against peace, and crimes against humanity’…”43 The
explanation for the Lao Government’s myopia in this regard would seem to be years of secrecy
with a strong dose of paranoid nationalism. After all, the issue could be defused so simply if the
government provided access to these Hmong – assuming, of course, that the government has
nothing to hide.
Of course, the Hmong commanders are unlikely to admit that their people are voluntarily
surrendering, but this seems to be what is happening. For a long time these Hmong have refused
to come in from the mountains because of a very well-founded fear that they would be killed.
They had memories of brutal campaigns in the past, and occasional ongoing fire fights. But even
the mountains are no longer as cut off as they once were. In the early 1990s television dishes
appeared in the mountain provinces beaming in news from far away. The telephone system was
renovated and Hmong walked to post offices in Oudomxai or Sam Neua to call relatives
overseas, or fax them letters. Then the mobile telephone revolution occurred in the late 1990s,
suddenly making it possible for people in remote areas to be in touch with anywhere (and this is
probably how the Fact Finding Commission gets some of its information). This means that even
very remote communities know about the changes that have been taking place in the broader Lao
society, and therefore they have come to know about the possibility of living a different life. No
doubt this has led to debates within these groups about the wisdom of continuing their resistance
to the LPDR. Perhaps it is this wavering that led to the terrorist attacks on the buses last year by
Yang Toua Thao’s group. It was an attempt by Yang to tie the group together through the
committing of politically senseless atrocities which the government would never forgive. A way of
blocking the waverers exit. However, it did not work. Moreover, the larger pressures on these
groups, which have been removing the potential supporters of the resistance by relocating them,
seem to be having an impact and defections have followed.
(...)
It is unlikely that all attempts by Hmong to come in from the mountains work out so smoothly.
There is a great deal of suspicion on both sides, and it would be easy for something to go wrong,
and a trigger-happy soldier on either side could cause chaos. But there is evidence, including
from conversations with diplomats and aid workers in Vientiane that the government is now trying
to solve the problem peacefully."
80
BASIC NECESSITIES OF LIFE
Food and water
Constantly on the move to avoid Lao security forces displaced Hmongs cannot
cultivate permanent fields and are at constant risk of starvation (March 2010)
•
According to a journalist who met with a group of Hmong rebels, attacks by government
forces continued in 2010 forcing the displaced Hmong to regularly change camp. Unable to
grow food because this would make them moe detectable by the military, they are forced top
forage food in the jungle, boil tree shrub and try to catch small animals. The lack of nutrients
has left the group visibly malnourished.
•
In 2008, the UN Special Rapporteur on the right to food reported having received information
alleging regular violent attacks around and on encampments and its inhabitants that had led
to continuous displacement which affected their right to an adequate standard of living
including shelter, drinking water and food.
•
In 2007, Amnesty International reported that most displaced Hmong live of cassava roots,
leaves, wild yams and the husk of an Asian palm tree known as ‘Tong-La’, which is slightly
poisonous and so requires a laborious process to make it edible.
The Independent, 17 February 2010
"Weeks earlier the Laos army had stormed the Hmong's previous temporary camp in what they
believe was part of campaign to prepare for the 25th Southeast Asian Games. In the raid a 14year-old boy was killed, the leaders say he was unarmed and foraging for food to feed his family.
"My son was shot by the communists last month," the boy's mother says as she prepares food for
her other children. He didn't have any gun, just finding food for us but I don't have the ability to do
anything – I can only die inside".
Frequent attacks force the groups to change camp every two weeks and break up into small
numbers to avoid large-scale offensives by the Laos army. This leaves the community no chance
to farm food or forge a proper way of life. With no other choice, boiled tree shrub has become
their daily diet and at times they are lucky if they can catch a jungle rat or monkey. The lack of
nutrients has left the group visibly malnourished – both young and old have swollen abdomens.
Eating the tree shrub leaves them starving, so like animals, women and children take to the
surrounding hills to dig on their hands and knees. Outside the camp, they claim that many women
and children have been killed by the Laos army and the "lucky ones" have bullet wounds to show.
"I feel so unhappy to give this food to my kids, but we have no other choice," one mother
explains. "It's too dangerous to hunt and we can't reach the villages because the communists will
kill us. Sometimes we are too scared to go out so we just starve."
UN Special Rapporteur on the right to food, 5 March 2008, p. 57
"68. On 10 May 2007, the Special Rapporteur together with the Independent Expert on Minority
Issues, the Representative of the Secretary-General on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced
Persons and the Special Rapporteur on adequate housing as a component of the right to an
adequate standard of living, and on the right to non-discrimination in this context, brought to the
81
Government’s attention information received that thousands of men, women and children from
the Hmong ethnic minority, who have been living and hiding in the jungle and on the run from the
military, having been driven to destitution as well as lacking food, water, clothing, housing and
medical care. According to these allegations, these people are unable to cultivate crops because
they fear that it would make them easily detectable by the military particularly from the air. They
reportedly live from what they can gather in the forest although it is alleged that they do not pick
up any visible quantity of wild fruit in certain areas in order to evade being found and do not hunt
animals. The information received indicated a high level of malnutrition within this group
particularly of children who have reportedly distended bellies, bleached hair and skinny frames as
a result. The reports claimed that regular violent attacks around and on encampments and its
inhabitants have led to continuous displacement which affect their right to an adequate standard
of living including shelter, drinking water and food. According to these reports, armed attacks by
the military on people in the jungle have occurred on many occasions while they forage for food
including roots and husks. For example, it was reported that in one of these incidents, in April
2006, 17 children were among the 26 people who were killed while they were searching for food."
AI, 23 March 2007, p. 12
"Life on the run has driven the Hmong living in the jungle to destitution and hunger. They cannot
cultivate crops because it would make them too easily detectable, particularly from the air.
Accounts provided to Amnesty International describe how they avoid picking any visible quantities
of wild fruit in certain areas in order to evade being found or do not hunt animals with their old
guns.
They stay for short periods of time in very basic temporary shelters and have no access
whatsoever to basic services including education, health care or sanitation. Sometimes they
leave an encampment behind because they come under direct attack; at other times they leave
because they feel insecure due to military movements in the vicinity.
“We never stayed longer than 15 days in the same place”, one young man who recently fled from
the jungle in Vientiane province to Thailand told Amnesty International.
Living in hiding from the authorities and in almost complete isolation, the meagre diet of these
groups consists by and large of what they can gather from the forest without leaving conspicuous
traces. The most important foods are cassava roots, leaves, wild yams and the husk of an Asian
palm tree known as ‘Tong-La’, which is slightly poisonous and so requires a laborious process to
make it edible. 34
Recently arrived asylum-seekers and refugees in Thailand, as well as video footage and reports
from the jungle, indicate signs of malnutrition, particularly among children, many of whom have
distended bellies, bleached hair or slight frames. This suggests that the authorities in Laos have
taken insufficient measures to give effect to the right of every child to a standard of living
adequate for the child's development, in particular with regard to the right to adequate food, as
they are required to do as a state party to the CRC. In fact, Amnesty International has obtained
credible evidence that the military regularly attacks those who forage for food, preventing them
from taking their own steps to realize their right to adequate food."
European Parliament, September 2005, p. 8
"Commander Wa Leng Lee explained that he personally was assigned to guard American radar
installations for aircraft navigation and other Hmong units were assigned to disrupt North
Vietnamese supply lines which went through the jungles of Laos. Since they were unable to flee
to Thailand after the US left, his group took to the mountains in the Bolikhamsay region of Laos,
where they have lived ever since. In the last few years the aggression of the Lao troops has
82
accelerated making it harder for them to cultivate and maintain permanent fields, they are forced
to live on what they can forage for in the jungle. There are known to be many such groups
comprised of Hmong, Khmu, and Lao scattered across the vast mountainous jungles of Laos.
(...)
Chong Cha Lee, one of the young men who guided us in, lives with his family of eight in a small
bamboo hut, with makeshift beds and a little yard, which serves as a kitchen. The extended Lee
family lives together in a little four-hut compound. Their basic everyday diet consisted of cassava
roots and palm trees. Every day the women seek food (cassava, palms and leaves) in the nearby
jungles; they also look after numerous children, many of them malnourished.
(...)
The women spend their entire day in the production of food. Collecting, gathering and digging for
the cassava root. Always accompanied by young armed men for protection they wander far and
wide in search for this rapidly limited resource. Unable to cultivate and maintain permanent fields,
they are forced to live on what they can forage for in the jungle. Many have been ambushed and
killed while collecting food.
Once gathered, the cassava is eaten simply boiled like a potato or grated and eaten as a rice
substitute; many of the children have never tasted rice – generally a staple in Southeast Asia.
The palm tree husk is laboriously prepared by chopping and hacking out the husk which is then
washed several times to eliminate the poison. This is finally used as a makeshift noodle substitute
to be eaten with the boiled leaves. The additional but rare source of nutrition is from small fish
caught in the streams."
Concern about adequacy of food and medical assistance available to resettled Hmong
(March 2010)
•
Limited access provided to repatriated Hmong resettled in central Bolikhamsay province raise
concerns about their human rights and standards of living, in particular the availability of
clean water, food and medical treatment .
•
In 2009, Amnesty International expressed concern about inadequate facilities in two
resettlement camps hosting around 2,800 Hmong repatriated from Thailand. Independent
observers have not been allowed unfettered access to these areas and the situation of most
of the returnees is not known.
AFP, 28 March 2010
"While diplomats say there have been no reports of mistreatment, suspicions remain about the
Hmong's rights and living standards in Phonkham village, which was built specifically for the
group in central Bolikhamsay province.
"They've put them on a Laos equivalent of a desert island," said Phil Robertson, deputy Asia
director of Human Rights Watch. "There's no sustained access to these people or quality of
access."
Laotian officials said 3,457 of the repatriated Hmong were sent to Phonkham, while others went
back to their home towns.
(...)
Diplomats were given a brief but revealing chance to question the 300 or so Hmong gathered in
the hall.
How many had been outside of the village since arriving? One hand went up in response. How
many had received money, parcels or anything else from contacts outside the village? Two. How
many had yet received ID cards or official registration? None.
83
(...)
Rights groups say they have serious concerns about availability of clean water, food and medical
treatment for the group.
"As long as access is strictly scripted and stage-managed, visitors will not be able to assess the
well-being of the returnees," said Brittis Edman of Amnesty International. "
AI, 2 November 2009, p. 4
"Following the return of around 2,800 Lao Hmong people from Thailand, coordinated by Thai and
Lao authorities, several hundred returnees resettled at two designated sites, Phalak village in
Kasi district and Namtha on the Vietnamese border. However, Amnesty International is
concerned that these resettlement sites do not have adequate facilities and resources to cope
with the large influx. Independent observers have not been allowed unfettered access to these
areas and the situation of most of the returnees is not known.
A camp in Phetchabun province in northern Thailand, with a Lao Hmong population, is scheduled
to close in December 2009. Most of the 4,200 persons in the camp are to be returned to Laos,
according to a bilateral agreement between the two countries. There are concerns that
humanitarian provisions to meet the basic needs of the returnees are not in place in Laos, and
that the Lao government is not allowing for any third party monitoring of the well-being of the
returnees."
Massive migration from rural to semi-urban areas put strain on small towns' capacity
to provide basic services (February 2010)
•
According to the UN and government officials, small towns in Laos experience strain a on
infrastructure and services such as water and sanitation due to the large influx of migrants
looking for imporved living conditions.
•
Improved access to water and sanitation in the small towns are a magnet that attracts too
many people.
•
The government development plan appears unable to meet the demands for all the
inhabitants needing improved water and sanitation services.
IRIN, 18 February 2010
"Small towns in Laos are experiencing an influx of migrants in search of better living conditions,
increasing the strain on infrastructure and services such as water and sanitation, the UN and
government officials say.
Laos is experiencing a high urbanization rate of 4-5 percent per annum, adding to pressure on
local authorities to provide basic infrastructure, according to the UN Human Settlements
Programme (UN-HABITAT).
There are an estimated 139 small towns in Laos, and many of those along economic corridors –
bordering Cambodia, China, Thailand and Vietnam – are seeing influxes from rural areas.
“Many of these small towns experience high population growth, and increased pressure on the
local environment. Small towns are now becoming increasingly polluted because of a lack of
adequate infrastructure,” said Buahom Sengkhamyong, chief technical adviser for UN-HABITAT
in Laos.
(...)
The lure of basic services
84
Water and sanitation has been identified as a development priority by the Lao government, which
has floated an urban water sector investment plan estimated at US$266 million from 2005 to
2020.
But as the government improves services in small towns, they are proving a draw to migrants and
creating unmanageable population growth in certain areas, including southern Savannakhet
Province, according to UN-HABITAT and the government's Nam Papa State-Owned Water
Supply Enterprise.
“In Savannakhet Province, water and sanitation services are a serious issue for many districts,”
Phandola Khouanemeuangchane, director of Nam Papa Savannakhet, told IRIN.
“Yet, we have a more complicated problem: the districts with improved water and sanitation
services are flooded with ‘resource migrants’. In the end, our services often do not meet the
demands of these growing small towns,” he said.
(...)
In Laos, insufficient data on small-town population growth means development programmes are
planned according to the national population growth rate of 2.8 percent, rather than the local rate,
which is unknown.
According to Nam Papa, the number of small towns, and the percentage of the country’s
population of some 5.86 million living in small towns by 2015, will exceed the government’s own
estimates.
“Our investments in the sector disregard the true impact of resource migrants. Funding will not be
adequate and will not meet the demands of our small towns along the economic corridors of
Savannakhet Province,” said Phandola.
The Lao government, in its 2004 National Growth and Poverty Eradication Strategy (NGPES),
aims to improve services for an additional 1.95 million urban population.
But with rapid small-town growth, the NGPES will not be able to meet the demands for all the
inhabitants needing improved water and sanitation services, officials say.
Meanwhile, small-town populations face the problem of the high cost of water, especially where
local authorities lack the ability to supply it."
High levels of food insecurity strongly influenced by government policies such as
resettlement and opium eradication (December 2007)
•
According to a 2007 study by WFP, chronic malnutrition in rural Lao PDR is alarmingly high.
•
Only about one third of the rural population of Lao PDR can be considered food secure and
the rest of the population faces risks, endangering their food security.
•
Profile of food insecure households in Laos: unskilled labourers or farmers who seldom fish
and hunt, practice upland farming on a small plot of land in fragile areas with steep slopes, do
not possess kitchen gardens, are mostly asset poor, poorly educated, illiterate and from nonLao-Tai ethnic groups.
•
The implementation of some governmental policies such as the ban on opium cultivation and
shifting cultivation, the land allocation programme and the resettlement programme have had
a strong impact on food security. The implementation of the resettlement programme has
85
increased vulnerability to food insecurity where resources and services were inadequate for
the resettled populations.
WFP, December 2007, p. 11
The study’s main conclusions can be summarized as follows:
• Chronic malnutrition in rural Lao PDR is alarmingly high. Every second child in the rural areas is
chronically malnourished, affecting not only their physical development but also their cognitive
capacity.
• The steady economic growth that Lao PDR has experienced over the past 15 years, has not
translated into improved nutritional status of the rural Lao population. Chronic malnutrition is as
high today as it was ten years ago.
• Thirteen percent of the rural households have poor food consumption2 (at harvest time).
• Two thirds of the rural households have a livelihood portfolio that puts them at risk of becoming
food insecure should one or more shocks occur in a given year.
• The Sino-Tibetan ethnic groups are the most disadvantaged and food insecure followed by the
Hmong-Mien and the Austro-Asiatic. Most of these groups live in the Northern Highlands and in
the Central and Southern Highlands.
Who are the food insecure?
A total of 84,000 households were food insecure at the time of the survey (poor and borderline
food consumption). The largest proportion of food insecure households was found in Bokeo (41
percent), Saravane (30), Xiengkhuang (25), and Sekong (24).
There is no single indicator that can easily identify food insecure households. However, a
combination of several characteristics can be used to differentiate food insecure from food secure
households. For instance, food insecure households tend to be either unskilled labourers or
farmers who seldom fish and hunt. They practice upland farming on a small plot of land in fragile
areas with steep slopes. Often, they do not possess kitchen gardens. They are mostly asset poor,
poorly educated, illiterate and from non-Lao-Tai ethnic groups. They live in villages with little or no
key infrastructure, and suffer from bad sanitary conditions. Who could become food insecure?
Although few households (13 percent) show a food consumption pattern that would categorize
them as food insecure (poor or borderline food consumption), risk analysis indicates that a high
number are vulnerable to becoming food insecure due to different types of shocks.
The analysis shows that only about one third of the rural population of Lao PDR can be
considered food secure (acceptable food consumption). The rest of the population faces risks,
endangering their food security. One quarter (26 percent) faces multiple risks (more than one
shock affecting a household simultaneously). Another 40 percent of the rural population is at risk
of becoming food insecure because of either loss of access to natural resources, flood, drought or
due to a sudden increase in food prices.
The political context
The implementation of some governmental policies such as the ban on opium cultivation and
shifting cultivation, the land allocation programme and the resettlement programme have had a
strong impact on food security, perhaps more than the Food Security Strategy 2001-2010 itself.
The opium eradication policy, which was swiftly implemented due to a strong political will and
donor support, led to a significant decline in opium cultivation but also resulted in the loss of an
important source of income for many communities. The implementation of the resettlement
programme has increased vulnerability to food insecurity where resources and services were
inadequate for the resettled populations.
86
Therefore, it is very important to closely monitor the implementation of the above-mentioned
policies and their impacts on food security. The development community should help the
Government of Lao PDR to identify ways of mitigating any negative effects on food security
from other development sectors.
Rapid changes in rural Laos, especially in the uplands, are also being driven by other forces that
include fast-rising agribusiness (such as large scale plantations of rubber, corn, sugar cane),
mining and hydropower development, and other foreign direct investments. The potentials but
also potentially adverse effects of these livelihood changes on the Lao people and their particular
link to food security and malnutrition have to be evaluated in depth and their evolution closely
monitored."
Medical care and sanitation
Malnutrition and health problems are common among displaced Hmongs children
living in the jungle (2007)
•
As a result of the continuous harassment of Hmong groups by government forces, the Hmong
are prevented from taking their own steps to realize their right to adequate food. Many are
reported to show signs of malnutrition.
•
Most have no access to healthcare as they are too afraid to seek medical treatment outside
of the jungle. They have to rely on traditional medicine.
•
Common reported ailments include respiratory problems and malnutrition. There is no or
limited access to fruit, meat or vegetables in the jungle and the basic diet consists of cassava
roots, leaves and the husk of an Asian palm tree known as ‘Tong-La’.
•
According to WFP, the level of chronic malnutrition, or stunting, is alarmingly high in Lao with
38 percent of rural children under 5 underweight.
AI, 23 March 2007, p. 14
"Recently arrived asylum-seekers and refugees in Thailand, as well as video footage and reports
from the jungle, indicate signs of malnutrition, particularly among children, many of whom have
distended bellies, bleached hair or slight frames. This suggests that the authorities in Laos have
taken insufficient measures to give effect to the right of every child to a standard of living
adequate for the child's development, in particular with regard to the right to adequate food, as
they are required to do as a state party to the CRC. In fact, Amnesty International has obtained
credible evidence that the military regularly attacks those who forage for food, preventing them
from taking their own steps to realize their right to adequate food.
After the attack outside Vang Vieng in April 2006, at least five breastfeeding infants whose
mothers had been killed died as a consequence of losing their mothers, according to reports to
Amnesty International. The same month, in the jungle of Xieng Khouang a boy of around ten
years old received a serious injury to the stomach in an attack while searching for food. His belly
had
been slit wide open by shrapnel; he survived two days without any professional medical attention
before he died.
Although the groups in the jungle rely on traditional medicine that they can find in their vicinity,
there is a serious shortage of healthcare to control or tackle disease, which is reportedly
widespread amidst food shortages and malnourishment. Moreover, those living in the jungle,
including those wounded in direct attacks, cannot seek medical attention outside of their hiding
87
places as they would risk being detected and attacked. This undermines their ability to realise the
right to the health, set out in the ICESCR and, with respect to children in the CRC, which states
that “States Parties shall recognize the right of the child to the enjoyment of the highest attainable
standard of health” and “to ensure that no child is deprived of his or her right of access to such
health care services.”
European Parliament, September 2005, p. 8
"Most children suffer from poor health, the most common ailments being respiratory problems
(constant coughing) and malnutrition due to lack of milk, protein, and a monotonous diet since
birth. The idea of a luscious jungle full of fruit and wildlife is not the case in these mountains. The
Hmong have no access to any forms of meat, vegetables or fruit. Although they keep a handful of
pigs and chicken these are only eaten by women during pregnancy and consumed in conjunction
with their spiritual ceremonies. The basic diet consists of cassava roots, leaves and the husk of
an Asian palm tree known as ‘Tong-La’.
(...)
They also collect herbs and leaves for medicinal purposes. The children have insect bites and
wounds that are festering and never heal. In this particular group, adult men and children had
wounds from direct bullet hits and shrapnel which disabled and maimed them. We witnessed a
two year old who was hit by a bullet in the back of his knee while being carried in his mother’s
arms running away from Lao soldiers. To this day the child is unable to walk and continues to
crawl dragging his wounded leg. Another 18 year old young man can only walk supported by
crutches, his knee bone was totally smashed by a bullet in an ambush.
Men and boys mostly patrol surrounding areas, guarding the settlement and scouting new routes,
after older ones were mined. We covered one such patrol with Chong Cha, accompanied by his
10-year-old nephew Sor. Chong Cha commented: “Of course, he shouldn’t be carrying a gun, he
should be studying. But in this situation we have to be able to defend ourselves, otherwise we’ll
be wiped out. We don’t trust the Lao government, because they kill us and that’s why we are here
in the jungle.”"
WFP, December 2007, p. 13
"The level of chronic malnutrition, or stunting, is alarmingly high in Lao PDR. Every second rural
child under 5 years of age is stunted. The survey shows that 38 percent of rural children under 5
are underweight. Wasting is at 8 percent for the same group. There has been no improvement in
the chronic malnutrition in Lao PDR over the past 10 years. A small reduction in underweight has
been noted, and some reduction in wasting. These reductions are positive, but the persistently
high chronic malnutrition rate remains a big challenge.
The statistical analysis shows that ethnic groups (especially Sino-Tibetan and Austro-Asiatic)
are highly vulnerable to nutritional problems, and that people from certain agro-ecological zones
are disadvantaged. The highest prevalence of wasting was found in the economically better off
Mekong Corridor. Furthermore, children from families with better road access do not necessarily
have better nutritional status.
Other surveys have shown (MICS III) that stunting increases significantly after the first year. The
CFSVA confirms this finding. This is most likely linked to inappropriate breastfeeding and
complementary feeding practices.
Research has proven that growth stunting in infants is a risk factor for increased mortality, poor
cognitive and physical development and other impairments. Lao children, who are malnourished
and living in poverty, cannot fulfil their development potential. They may perform badly at school
88
and have low productivity in adulthood. As a result, these children pass on poverty and
deprivation to future generations."
89
PROPERTY, LIVELIHOODS, EDUCATION AND OTHER
ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS
Primary education and educational programmes
Displaced Hmongs hiding in the jungle have no access to formal education (2005)
European Parliament, September 2005, p. 8
"The children in the jungle are given no formal education; they resent their illiteracy and
ignorance of the world beyond. When we showed them our copy of the Lonely Planet guide to
Laos, they yearned to be part of this country, its peoples and cultures described. Yet these
Hmong don’t officially exist. All the parents wish for is a peaceful life where their children can
enjoy the benefits of basic education. The only way they can communicate with their relatives in
other camps in the jungle is by sending recorded tape messages."
Work and livelihood opportunities and coping strategies
Concerns about livelihood opportunities available to resettled Hmong due to isolation
of resettlement village (March 2010)
AFP, 28 March 2010
"While diplomats say there have been no reports of mistreatment, suspicions remain about the
Hmong's rights and living standards in Phonkham village, which was built specifically for the
group in central Bolikhamsay province.
"They've put them on a Laos equivalent of a desert island," said Phil Robertson, deputy Asia
director of Human Rights Watch. "There's no sustained access to these people or quality of
access."
Laotian officials said 3,457 of the repatriated Hmong were sent to Phonkham, while others went
back to their home towns.
(...)
Diplomats were given a brief but revealing chance to question the 300 or so Hmong gathered in
the hall.
How many had been outside of the village since arriving? One hand went up in response. How
many had received money, parcels or anything else from contacts outside the village? Two. How
many had yet received ID cards or official registration? None.
(...)
Rights groups say they have serious concerns about availability of clean water, food and medical
treatment for the group.
"As long as access is strictly scripted and stage-managed, visitors will not be able to assess the
well-being of the returnees," said Brittis Edman of Amnesty International. "
90
AI, 2 November 2009, p. 4
"Following the return of around 2,800 Lao Hmong people from Thailand, coordinated by Thai and
Lao authorities, several hundred returnees resettled at two designated sites, Phalak village in
Kasi district and Namtha on the Vietnamese border. However, Amnesty International is
concerned that these resettlement sites do not have adequate facilities and resources to cope
with the large influx. Independent observers have not been allowed unfettered access to these
areas and the situation of most of the returnees is not known.
A camp in Phetchabun province in northern Thailand, with a Lao Hmong population, is scheduled
to close in December 2009. Most of the 4,200 persons in the camp are to be returned to Laos,
according to a bilateral agreement between the two countries. There are concerns that
humanitarian provisions to meet the basic needs of the returnees are not in place in Laos, and
that the Lao government is not allowing for any third party monitoring of the well-being of the
returnees."
Concerns that rights of minorities resettled to make way for a dam are not sufficiently
safeguarded (March 2010)
•
In March 2010, the Nam Theun 2 Dam began full operation but according to a fact-finding
mission by International Rivers, the project violates people's human rights by preventing
access to clean water and by destroying critical food sources without providing
compensation. In particular, resettled villagers had not been provided with irrigation systems.
•
In particular, the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights and fundamental
freedoms of indigenous people expressed concern about the repercussions of the project and
called on the government to due its utmost to protect the rights of the affected communities
and to replace their subsistence livelihoods at a level which guaranteed people’s right to an
adequate standard of living.
The Huffington Post, 25 March 2010
"Laos' largest and most controversial hydropower project, the World Bank-funded Nam Theun 2
Dam, began full operation last week. It did so in violation of legal obligations to provide
compensation and livelihood restoration to affected communities. In an attempt to avoid its
obligations, the Nam Theun 2 Power Company called the start of power production "commercial
export" of electricity rather than "commercial operation," which would require compliance with
Concession Agreement provisions.
Nam Theun 2 is being financed by the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the European
Investment Bank, government-backed financiers from France, Norway, Sweden, and Thailand,
and a host of private banks. These institutions have maintained their support for the project
despite violations of their policies and the project's Concession Agreement. For example, last
week's commercial operation started before resettled communities received irrigated land, and
before downstream communities received compensation for flooded gardens and alternative
water supply sources, to which they are legally entitled.
My colleague Ikuko Matsumoto, the Lao program director of International Rivers, just returned
from a fact-finding trip to the Nam Theun 2 region. She reports that the project violates people's
human rights by preventing access to clean water and by destroying critical food sources without
providing compensation. On the Nakai Plateau, where 6,200 people have been resettled to make
way for the reservoir, villagers have not been provided with irrigation systems. This violates legal
commitments made in the project's Concession Agreement."
91
AFP, 24 March 2010
"The largest hydroelectric project in Laos, which began selling power to Thailand last week,
should suspend operations until it has fulfilled its obligations to local people, activists said
Tuesday.
US-based watchdog International Rivers accused the Nam Theun 2 Power Company (NTPC) of
flouting an agreement not to start commercial operations at their dam on the Nam Theun river
before they had compensated affected villagers. "The Nam Theun 2 Power Company (NTPC) is
operating the dam illegally," Ikuko Matsumoto, the group's Lao programme director, said in a
statement.
International Rivers said resettled communities were entitled to irrigated land while downstream
villagers should have already received compensation for flooded gardens and alternative water
supply sources.
More than 6,000 villagers were relocated to make way for the project.
(...)
The World Bank, which has supervised and monitored the project, denied the activists'
allegations. "The notion that the project is in violation of legal agreements is incorrect," the Bank
said in a statement to AFP. It added that many people were already benefiting from a
compensation programme that has been implemented for several years."
UN HRC, 18 September 2009, p. 42
"192. In a letter of 3 October 2007, the Special Rapporteur, together with the Special Rapporteur
on the right to food, thanked the Government for its willingness to continue dialogue with the
Special Rapporteurs on the potential impact of the construction of Nam Theun 2 dam on the
human rights of the affected communities. They noted that they were encouraged by the
exhaustive information provided by the Government concerning the measures taken to monitor
the social and environmental impact of the project. Additionally, the Special Rapporteurs called
the attention of the Government to several allegations received concerning the situation of
various villages, including the Vietic indigenous communities that will likely be affected by the
construction of the dam, particularly as regards their food security and access to land and natural
resources.
193. In summary, according to the information received: In the Nakai Plateau area, with regard to
food security, including access to water and other natural resources, it was reported that there
continue to be problems with the livelihood restoration plans for the affected communities in three
principal project areas: the Nakai Plateau resettlement, the Project (construction) Lands
Compensation, and the Xe Bang Fai Downstream Program.
194. Concerning the Nakai Plateau resettlement area, it was alleged that there was widespread
confusion among local villagers concerning the exact scope of their compensation entitlements.
In this regard, according to the reports, people who have lost approximately 10% of their land as
a result of the dam construction have not been compensated and have not been informed of their
right to be compensated according to existing plans. Moreover, the reports received, including the
recent report of the International Panel of Experts, claimed that the project income targets for the
resettlers are unlikely to be met, and that the area currently selected for their resettlement is not
92
appropriate for continuing their traditional livelihoods. In particular, the reports indicate that the
resettlement areas do not provide for enough lands for buffalo and other cattle, which the villages
have substantively depended upon for their subsistence economies, and that no clear fisheries
development programs have been put in place for the reservoir. In addition, the reports document
the various problems faced by resettled families as a result of constant water shortages and of
the rapid deterioration of temporary shelters, in the absence of a more definitive solution to their
housing.
195. The Special Rapporteurs took further note with special concern of the reports regarding the
situation of the Vietic indigenous communities, which have inhabited the Nakai Plateau since time
immemorial. It was alleged that the proposed resettlement area (Area 7) does not respond to the
community’s expressed views, including their request to be resettled within their spirit territory
and to be clustered in a village of their own. Lastly, different reports, including the Panel of
Expert’s reports and the Lender Engineer reports, indicate serious malfunctioning of the Village
Forestry Association (VFA) in Nakai. According to the information received, the VFA is still not
fully functioning, and it is reportedly thwarted by widespread corruption and illegal logging. This
situation seems to be at least partly connected to the attribution of the VFA’s management to an
official of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, which has reportedly led to a number of
irregularities in the functioning of the association and deprived it from its original communitybased spirit.
196. With respect to project (construction) lands compensation, the reports received also point
at the existence of problems in the implementation of resettlement plans and livelihood
restoration options for communities displaced from the project lands. Similar to the situation
described in relation to the Nakai Plateau, problems reportedly exist as a result of inadequate
access to water and delayed construction of replacement houses. In addition, there also seems to
be an overall lack of understanding of existing entitlements. The lack of compensation for the loss
of fish raises special concern. This situation seems to be linked to the fact that the Resettlement
Action Plans for Project Lands were disclosed nearly two years after the affected villages lost
their lands and assets as a result of the project.
197. In addition, the reports indicate the existence of problems in the process of identification of
suitable alternative lands for resettlement, which lead in turn to a pattern of inequalities in the
distribution of available land. In this regard, it has been suggested that the Independent
Monitoring Agency for the Resettlement Management Unit (RMU) should review project land
compensation and publicly disclose its findings. With respect to the Xe Bang Fai Downstream
Program, according to information received, the implementation of the Downstream Livelihood
Restoration Program is currently experiencing serious delay, to the effect that it would so far
apply only to 21 villages - 10% of the 226 villages that are expected to be affected. It was alleged
that, under its current rate of implementation, the livelihood restoration program will not be
completed when the project enters into full operation in November/December 2008. Furthermore,
it was alleged that the resources assigned to that program are clearly inadequate to face the
needs of all affected villages that emerged following the implementation of the project.
198. In relation to the actual operation pilot projects under the Livelihood Restoration Program,
concern was expressed that the communities are unfairly bearing the risk involved in those
projects. This has seemingly been the case of the pig raising scheme, whose failure has left
many
villagers in a situation of insolvency due to their obligation to pay back the cost of the animals to
the Village Saving Funds."
93
UXOs left over from the Vietnam war limit farming and hinder socio-economic
development (November 2009)
•
It is estimated that up to one third of UXO accidents in Laos are the result of people collecting
scrap metal. In Laos collecting scrap metal can represent a significant part of the familiy's
income.
•
Landmines and UXOs represent a major obstacle for people's livelihoods, food security and
overall development. It is estimated that 50 per cent of the agricultural land is affected by
landmines and UXOs. Only 6 per cent was cleared between 1999 and 2007.
Reuters, 30 November 2009
"A family business
"Anyone over the age of five who can walk collects the unexploded bombs," Sara Alexander,
CRS program manager for Laos, told AlertNet. "People need to have other options for earning a
living. If your only option is to engage in risky business, like scrap metal collection, then that is
what you do."
Proceeds from sale of scrap metal can make up a significant source of income for many families,
especially during months of food shortages. Although officially illegal, most uses primitive tendollar Vietnamese metal detectors and small shovels to search the ground while others only pick
it up when they see it.
The collectors then sell it to scrap metal dealers, who in turn passed it to foundries, which melt
them down and turn them into reinforcing bars used in construction. Tom Morgan, MAG's regional
information officer, said, "Estimates vary, but perhaps one third of all UXO accidents are the
result of collecting scrap."
Accident records for 2008 are not yet complete, but it seems casualty figures may have doubled
to about 600, Morgan said, possibly as a result of high prices for metal resulting in an increase in
scrap metal collection. "
WFP, December 2007, pp.15-50
"Lao PDR was one of the most heavily bombed countries in the world, and UXOs continue to
have a major impact on rural lives. Thirty years after the war, lives are still being lost due to
UXOs. Further, livelihoods are restricted as agricultural expansion in many areas is impossible
until the land is cleared of UXOs. In the Eastern part of the country, along the Vietnamese border,
UXOs continue to impact livelihoods and food security for a large number of households.
(..)
Severe UXO contamination still affects 15 of the provinces. The most severely hit provinces are:
Savannakhet, Xiengkhuang, Saravane, Khammuane, Sekong, Champasack, Huaphanh, Attapeu
and Luangprabang63.
The affected areas represent 50 percent of all agricultural land. The Government of Lao PDR
launched the Lao National Unexploded Ordnance Programme (UXO Lao) to clear land for
development and safety. Since 1999, this programme has cleared land area in districts where
about 40 percent of the rural population live, amounting to 6 percent of the land area affected.
It will take another 10 years to clear or mark all land highly impacted with UXO in Lao PDR64.
UXO presence still affects access to land, making it more difficult to plant crops, herd animals,
and collect fuel, water and NTFPs."
USA Today, 11 December 2003
94
"Economics also drive Laotians, young and old, toward reckless behavior. Recycling old
ordnance has become a big business in Laos, one of the poorest countries in Asia. Scrap metal
dealers, many from neighboring Vietnam, offer 2,000 kip (about 20 cents) per bombie and
sometimes lend scavengers metal detectors to scour the forests for unexploded ordnance. "UXO
is seen as a cash crop," UXO Lao concluded in a 2002 study.
Some parents send their kids into the forest in search of dud bombs. In a country where farm
families earn less than $2 a day, the potential income is seductive. "For many of them, it's
survival. If they don't do it, they don't have rice," says Didier Bertrand, a researcher with the
humanitarian group Handicap International. In a study of the Savannakhet village Tam Luang last
year, UXO Lao found only three of 71 households produced enough rice to live on.
There would be more rice to go around if farmers didn't have to worry about unexploded
ordnance buried in the brush. Cultivating new land is risky. Savannakhet rice farmer Songkan, 35,
learned the hard way. He was trying to clear land for his crop in mid-August when his hoe hit what
turned out to be a BLU-26 cluster bomblet, buried about 8 inches deep in mud.
(...)
UXO limits farming
Outside the Savannakhet village of Haise, Phousavien Phetdonxay, 40, owns about 5 hectares
(about 12 acres) of land. But he only farms one. "We want to extend our land, but we cannot. We
have to wait for the (UXO Lao) clearance team," to remove any unexploded ordnance.
"It's a very sad legacy of the Vietnam War," says Finn Reske-Nielsen, Laos the United Nations
Development Program's representative. "UXO inhibits development in rural areas. It is difficult to
cultivate new land because you don't know what it contains. It slows the building of new roads
and schools and clinics."
Clearance is painstaking work. UXO Lao team members rope off sections of a field 1 yard wide
and 25 yards long, then search with metal detectors. When the detectors start to whine, the
workers probe the ground and slowly dig out what they can. Often, they find fragments of
exploded munitions. When they come across unexploded ordnance, they stop digging, mark the
spot with measuring sticks painted red and wait for demolition squads. Some unexploded
ordnance can be moved safely to demolition grounds, where it can be destroyed with dynamite or
C-4. Bombies, which are too volatile to move, usually are destroyed on the spot.
Since UXO Lao started its work in 1996, it has cleared nearly 10,000 acres of land — about 16
square miles in a country that is more than 90,000 square miles. UXO Lao also has destroyed a
half million pieces of ordnance, half of which were cluster submunitions. It expects to clear
another 2,000 acres this year.
The United States, which spent $9 million a day (in today's dollars) bombing Laos for 10 years,
last year contributed $1 million to UXO Lao. That was 26% of the agency's budget and more than
any other country contributed. Douglas Hartwick, U.S. ambassador to Laos, says he wishes the
United States could pay more."
Internal resettlement of minorities reported to sometimes have negative impact on
social systems and livelihoods (December 2008)
•
Information available on past resettlement schemes conducted in Laos show a mixed picture
and clearly call for a close monitoring of the implementation of projects currently underway for
Hmong returnees. Initial resettlement programmes conducted by the government in the
95
1970s and 1980s were not very successful mainly due to the lack of preparation and
resources.
•
In the 1990s, increased resources, better preparation as well as the adoption of resettlement
guidelines did appear to improve the overall quality of resettlement projects, although many
were not successful. The standard of living of people relocated in resettlement villages often
deteriorated instead of improving. In recent years, a number of studies have revealed higher
mortality rates in resettlement sites and warned about the potential negative effect of
resettlement schemes on food security caused by the lack of access to farmland and forests
IRIN, 17 December 2008
"The issue of how to ensure that remote communities have access to transportation and other
services to achieve adequate standards of living has often resulted in controversial resettlement
schemes*. Now the Lao government is collaborating with the international NGO, Action Contre la
Faim, and the European Commission, to offer an alternative.
"In 2004, ACF conducted an internal study of the development effect of resettlement on the
communities from the Lao uplands to the plains," the ACF head of mission in Laos, Emmanuel
Cibla, told IRIN. "The study found that for resettlement to be a success it has to be properly
planned and assisted or poverty can be exacerbated."
He said the study showed higher rates of mortality in the recently resettled villages and a lack of
access to farmland and forests, increased food insecurity and vulnerability.
"The government's aim of resettlement was to reduce poverty and abolish slash-and-burn
agriculture," Cibla said, adding that in some instances, it did not work. "Our idea was to offer an
alternative which would achieve the same goals but in the communities' own environment."
Since the study, the government has established criteria for relocation. They include villages with
populations below 200, lack of access to potable water or roads, as well as communities that rely
on slash-and-burn cultivation."
Ian G. Baird and Bruce Shoemaker, 2007, p.
"Periodic resettlement and movements of people in the Lao People’s Democratic Republic (Lao
PDR or Laos)—whether voluntary, negotiated, forced, coerced, manipulated, or strongly
encouraged — have been a prominent aspect of the country’s recent history. While there were no
major shifts in populations during the French colonial period (Evrard and Goudineau, 2004),
resettlement during the 1960s and early 1970s was commonplace, much of it related to the
second Indochina war and US bombing. In 1975 the newly formed Lao PDR government began
moving ethnic minorities out of mountainous and remote areas, often due to security concerns
related to armed rebel activities (Goudineau, 1997; Ireson and Ireson, 1991). Over the last ten
years the pace of internal resettlement in Laos has been steady although it has occurred in
uneven spurts in different provinces and districts throughout the country. The result has been the
dramatic deconstruction and restructuring of upland Lao societies over very short periods.
(...)
There is a compelling and growing volume of evidence demonstrating that internal resettlement in
Laos is having a major and mainly negative impact on the social systems, livelihoods and cultures
of many indigenous ethnic communities and people. The French anthropologist Yves Goudineau
conducted the first major study of internal resettlement in Laos. Researching over 1,000 families
in sixty-seven villages, twenty districts and six provinces in various parts of the country,
Goudineau (1997) found that Lao development initiatives have been unable to meet the goals of
stopping swidden agriculture, resettling people, or improving the livelihoods of rural populations.
He reported that forced transition from upland agriculture to lowland paddy rice cultivation
96
resulted in overall reductions in rice production, with insufficient alternatives to make up for these
losses. He also found that relocation has had severe impacts on people’s health, with the first
three years bringing particularly severe disease and epidemic rates. Some villages have ‘literally
been decimated (with up to 30 per cent dying), mostly due to malaria’ (Goudineau, 1997: 28).
These relocated people have not benefited much from the supposed improved access to health
services, and resettlement has led to long-term impacts, as shown by continued high infant
mortality rates
(Goudineau, 1997).
This studywas followed up in 2000 by a Participatory Poverty Assessment, funded by the ADB
and co-ordinated by the State Planning Committee,which examined who in Laos is poor and why.
One of the most striking findings of this nationwide study was the extent to which many rural
people, particularly ethnic minorities, consider themselves newly poor—that is, they understand
their acute poverty to be a recent phenomenon, not a long-standing condition. Moreover, reduced
swidden agriculture has increased rather than decreased poverty. Shortened swidden fallow
periods have resulted in soil and forest degradation, and subsequent large declines in crop
production, even when labour inputs remain the same. In turn, this has led to the degradation of
wildlife and forest resources, as people have attempted to substitute losses in food production
with other sources of income and food. The study also reported on serious health problems
amongst those who have resettled from the uplands to the lowlands (ADB, 2001; Chamberlain,
2001; SPC, 2000)."
Society for Threathened People, 7 March 2006, p. 3
"Human rights organisations have expressed their worries about the impact of a resettlement
program for ethnic minorities sponsored by the government. The negative impact of internal
resettlement in Laos was first documented in an UNESCO/UNDP study in 1997. The report
detailed mortality rates of up 30%, much higher than the national average, in indigenous highland
communities following poorly managed resettlement. In 2000 a Participatory Poverty Assessment
sponsored by the Asian Development Bank documented that many resettled people are
convinced, that the program has created more poverty. Academic research and NGO studies
have confirmed that the resettlement has contributed to environmental degradation, cultural
alienation, increasing social conflicts and long-term poverty.
A program as such should promote the prohibition of the production of opium and methods of
slash-and-burn agriculture, but not interfere with the cultural practices and traditions of the
resident indigenous peoples. The program requires relocation of indigenous groups from the
highlands to large communities in the lowlands where they have to adapt to unknown techniques
of paddy rice farming. Tens of thousands of indigenous ethnic minority people have suffered and
many died due to the impacts of ill-conceived and poorly implemented resettlement projects.
Much of what officially is classified as “voluntary” resettlement is, in reality, not villager-initiated.
Official services in villages
targeted for relocation may be suspended, thus providing further inducement to move. By
officially restricting swidden agriculture, the fallow cycles are shortened to such a degree that
villagers are no longer able to grow enough food to survive. When conditions deteriorate to a
certain level, many villagers agree to move to new centralized villages, the so called “Focal sites”.
In 1998 the government of Lao PDR announced plans to create at least 87 “Focal sites”,
regrouping 1.200 traditional villages and 450.000 people. Amid dozens of international aid
agencies at least six UN agencies (UNDP, UNCDF, UNICEF, UNDCP, FAO, WFP) supported the
establishment of “Focal sites”. Many Hmong have been forced to move from their highland homes
to areas with poor
agricultural potential. Furthermore, lacking knowledge of the different farming conditions in the
lowlands, many resettled peasants have run into dept, lost their land and properties and become
97
marginalized. The negative impacts on traditional society and cultural practices have been
outweighing the benefits (easier access to schools, medical care and markets)."
European Parliament, 2 September 2005, p. 5
"The communist government of Laos has systematically resettled minority people; mountain
tribes were encouraged to leave their villages in the inaccessible highlands and settle in specially
selected areas. There are concerns about the on-going Hmong resettlement programmes. Social
control is one of the driving forces behind the government’s resettlement programmes, and the
government justifies this as the only way to provide education, basic provisions and better social
services. We visited one such settlement near Vientiane, named “52nd kilometre”, the exact
distance from Vientiane. It was a small village of approximately 400 people on the edge of a
Lao town, comprised of traditional Hmong one-storey houses made of wooden planks notched
together without nails, and a few modern houses built of brick and concrete.
The people were generally friendly and would greet us sitting in front of their home. Men
seemed absent, and mostly we saw women and young girls embroidering. At one newly built
house a woman secretly introduced us to her husband. Surprisingly open, the man told us his
story, how he fought with the CIA. After the Americans withdrew, he was arrested along with
many other soldiers and sent to a re-education camp. He said that all the officers were
summarily executed without a trial as “war criminals”. Soldiers like him were given the choice
to rehabilitate themselves and join Lao society in rebuilding the country. “What choice did we
have?” he said to us, “It was either you choose to cooperate with them or you die”. He also told
us that life in this settlement is very harsh. They have homes to live in, but no land to cultivate.
So the men were out doing manual labour while the women embroidered to make a living. The
morale of these people seemed to be at quite a low point and they didn’t seem to feel included
within the greater Lao society. The historical antagonism between Hmong highlanders and the
Lao government has left a legacy of discrimination, in education in particular. The Hmong
remain deeply suspicious of the Lao government and the government of them. There have been
some allegations of attacks on the government by the Hmong, some said to be perpetrated by
Hmong groups inside the country and others from outside the country."
FIDH & MLDH, January 2005, p. 9
"In his study for the UNDP ("Resettlement and Social Characteristic of New Villages. Basic need
for resettled communities in the Lao PDR"), the ethnologist Yves GOUDINEAU wrote : "regarding
health and hygiene, deaths related to displacements occur (weakened populations, epidemics
and aggravated endemic diseases, up to 30% of deaths were counted in certain villages), the
infant mortality rate is high (higher than the national rate) ". "Displacement often leads to a better
usage of the Lao language, but also contributes to the disappearance of multilingualism" and
leads to "cultural break-ups and to modifications of social structures (giving-up of the traditional
costume, houses constructed on pile in the Lao Loum style are encouraged)", as underlined by
Mr. GOUDINEAU.
In its activity report of 2003, Action against Hunger mentioned a study undertaken upon its own
initiative "to demonstrate the dramatic impact of the displacement of ethnic minorities from the
mountains to the plains, in the Luang Namtha province ", in the North of the LPDR. Action against
Hunger further stated that in Laos, "populations suffer from hunger as a result of acts of
discrimination made against them".
98
Other economic, social and cultural rights
Resettlement fosters social control and cultural assimilation of minorities (2007)
•
One of the government’s long-standing priorities has been integrating minorities into the
dominant Lao culture, by encouraging them to adopt ethnic Lao livelihoods, practices and
language. Resettlement has been an instrument to foster cultural integration.
•
The assumption by the governemnt and seldom disputed by aid agencies is that minorities
who become more ‘Lao’ (by adopting Lao language, clothing, housing styles, religion and
other customs) will be more ‘developed’ and ‘civilized’.
•
Ethnic minorities, in particular Hmong perceived with suspicion by the government , have also
been resettled for security purpose, i.e. to increase governent control over them.
Ian G. Baird and Bruce Shoemaker, 2007, p. 867
"Internal resettlement is mainly justified under the government’s expressed goals of ‘poverty
alleviation’ and ‘rural development’; ‘nation building’ is also seen as a critical policy. For all of
these, the ethnic minority populations living in mountainous areas are frequently seen as ‘holding
the country back’ from achieving ‘development’. Central government sets all policies, while
various levels of government, including provinces and districts, have important roles in
interpreting and implementing them.Within this framework, the GoL’s motivations for internal
resettlement fall into five main categories: opium eradication, security concerns, access and
service delivery, cultural
integration and nation building, and swidden agriculture reduction. Although causally different,
these five lead to a set of risks and adverse effects that are essentially common to all forms of
displacement. The relative importance of the five justifying factors varies from case to case, and
decisions to resettle particular villages are often based on a combination of motivations. Opium
eradication is a key factor in northern Laos but, on a national scale, reducing swidden agriculture
and improving accessibility to government services appear to be the main reasons for the GoL to
promote internal resettlement.
(...)
Cultural Integration and Nation Building
The Lao population consists of many different ethnic groups, most with their own languages,
customs and livelihood systems, with the ethnic Lao making up less than half the total population.
Although the establishment of Lao PDR in 1975 was based on a multi-ethnic vision of the nation
(Ireson and Ireson, 1991; Pholsena, 2003), and ethnic minorities are frequently pictured in
posters and other ‘visual propaganda’ (Evans, 1998), one of the government’s long-standing
priorities has been integrating minorities into the dominant Lao culture, by encouraging them to
adopt ethnic Lao livelihoods, practices and language. Cultural integration has therefore been an
important motivation for resettlement.
The case of access and service delivery, above, demonstrates how ethnocentric Lao views and
the objectives of international aid agencies can converge — despite different origins — to justify
support for internal resettlement. Few donors explicitly support cultural integration, but they do
tend to support nation building, especially if they believe that it will lead to political and economic
stability. Since almost all aid agencies in Laos are based in the nation’s capital, Vientiane, this
also reinforces the imagined and material importance of the central nation state, as opposed to
regional and local powers.
While stability and increased central control invariably come at a cost to local self-determination,
aid agency personnel have rarely considered the negative cultural impacts of nation building, with
its implicit ethnic bias. This is odd, considering that many international aid agencies claim to be
99
promoting ‘bottom-up’ or ‘participatory’ approaches to development. The assumption for Laos is
simply that minorities who become more ‘Lao’ (by adopting Lao language, clothing, housing
styles, religion and other customs) will be more ‘developed’ and ‘civilized’; aid agency personnel
rarely challenge that view. Yet some observers concluded as early as 1991 that, ‘[R]esettlement
becomes another means by which ethnic minorities are Laoized as they are “developed”’ (Ireson
and Ireson, 1991: 936)."
FIDH & MLDH, January 2005, p. 8
"For surveillance purposes, tens of thousands of Laotians, in majority members of ethnic
minorities, have constantly been displaced in the course of these last twenty years. Officially, the
LPDR government explained that these massive displacements of the population were made in
application of a policy of rural development, and the fight against poppy cultivation and burning
cultivation.
(...)
Regarding the displacement of the population within the LPDR, the report of a debate meeting
"Displacement of the populations in Laos, what is at stake for the development of the
country?" organized on 20 January 2000, with the participation of the ethnologist Yves
GOUDINEAU, the geographer Christian TAILLARD (CNRS - LASEMA) and Olivier EVRARD
(University of Paris I), indicated that "from 1985 to 1995, 166.000 people changed districts, a
figure to which must be added the number of intra-districts displacements. In total, nearly 33% of
the Lao population was relocated in 20 years ".
100
FAMILY LIFE, PARTICIPATION, ACCESS TO JUSTICE AND
OTHER CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS
Respect of family life and fate of missing relatives
Discernible pattern of separation of IDP families (2007)
•
According to Amnesty International, there is a "discernible pattern of separation of families"
when Hmong come out of the jungle and surrender to the authorities.
AI, 23 March 2007, p. 15
"In connection with attacks by the military or when groups from the jungle have tried to leave
their life in hiding, there is a discernible pattern of separation of families. Reports provided to
Amnesty International describe how men have been arrested and taken away, while the
women have been taken to isolated villages, most often along the Vietnamese border in the
province of Houa Phan. In other instances families have been placed in small camp-like
settlements in the same area, while young women have been separated and taken away. Some
have been subject to slavery-like treatment and torture and ill-treatment, including repeated
rapes by law enforcement officers.
(...)
Around August 2005, Pakou35 and her family were captured in the jungle. Within a week of her
capture, she was separated from her parents and siblings and taken to a police post outside a
village south-east of Sam Neua. For approximately one year she was locked up with two other
young Hmong women in a room at the police post. All three women were used for house chores,
did laundry for the policemen, and they were also forced into sexual servitude. Several times
Pakou was gang raped by the police. After about one year she finally saw an opportunity to
escape as she acquired a sum of money with which she bribed some of the police officers to set
her free.
Pakou is now around 20 years old, distressed and traumatized. She is a refugee in Thailand, at
risk of deportation back to Laos."
Documentation and citizenship
Government fails to provide Hmong returnees with ID documents 3 months after
return (March 2010)
•
Almost 3 3 months after their arrival, few if any of the Hmong forcibly repatriated and
resettled in Phonkham village have been provided with ID cards.
AFP, 28 March 2010
"On the latest two-hour visit Friday, foreign diplomats, reporters and a few UN representatives
were among those escorted in two helicopters from the Laotian capital Vientiane, a 45-minute
flight away.
101
The delegation was ushered straight to an unfinished village hall to be greeted by smiling
youngsters in traditional Hmong dress, before a briefing by central government and Phonkham
officials.
"In the beginning of their resettlement... they were afraid because of not being familiar with their
new environment and not understanding the Lao government's policies," said Bounthan
Douangtanya of the village administration committee.
"But the authorities have conducted an education course for these returnees in order to... make
them understand the policy regulations," he said, before detailing plans to develop the village
infrastructure.
Diplomats were given a brief but revealing chance to question the 300 or so Hmong gathered in
the hall.
How many had been outside of the village since arriving? One hand went up in response. How
many had received money, parcels or anything else from contacts outside the village? Two. How
many had yet received ID cards or official registration? None.
As the meeting ended, several of the Hmong approached their visitors, saying they wanted to
leave. "I want to go to Canada," one 16-year-old girl told AFP, in English, as tears welled in her
eyes."
Access to justice
Displaced Hmong people fear arrest and detention without access to justice (2006)
STP, October 2006, p. 5
"Members of the Hmong emerging from their hiding places in response to the various amnesties
promised by the Lao government’s rightly fear arrest and detention. When a group of 171 Hmong
forest-dwellers gave themselves up to the authorities in June 2005, what they found waiting for
them instead of the promised amnesty was internment in a concentration camp in Xieng Khouang
province. In desperation these people had given themselves up after hiding in the jungle for 30
years because they could see no prospect of survival. “We are surrounded, we are always under
attack. (…) We’re not able to go looking for food, we’re starving“, said one of their leaders, “If we
wait till the end of this month or next month, our women and children will all be dead, as a result
of attacks by the soldiers or the impossibility of finding food.“
(...)
On 6 October 2005 another 242 Hmong emerged from their jungle hiding place in Bolikhamxay
province and gave themselves up to the authorities. Their current whereabouts are unknown, like
those of the approximately 600 Hmong who gave themselves up in 2004."
Arbitrariness and weak rule of law remains the norm in Laos (May 2004)
•
There is little separation of powers between the executive and political wings of government
and all existing key provisions for the protection of humn rights are vitiated by the "leading
role" reserved for the Party.
102
•
As a result, all the way down the structure there is felt to be no unbiased institution that
people can appeal to, and therefore informal channels (and bribery) remain important for
everyone.
•
The very weak rights of appeal available to ordinary citizens should they be arrested means
that the situation is open to abuse, and arbitrary arrest for the purposes of extortion, for
example, is well known.
•
With regards to the Hmong "resistance", the government refuses to acknowledge that this
may be a political issue by dismissing them as “bandits”, thus attempting to make it a simple
law and order issue.
Writenet, May 2004, p. 12
"While the provisions of the Constitution and the signing of the above treaties appear to provide
all the necessary key provisions for the protection of human rights, these are all vitiated by the
“leading role” reserved for the Party, which ensures that the Party can override the judiciary if
necessary and indeed any other government institution. In reality there is little separation of
powers between the executive and political wings of government. The Party aims to recruit into its
ranks all individuals holding key civil service positions; or one might put it another way, a main
precondition of holding a key civil service position is being a member of the Party. Consequently,
there is little likelihood of differences arising between the executive and political wings of the
government.
Before the enactment of the Constitution, when the government ruled by decree, there was no
pretence about any separation of powers. Among the citizenry there was no sense that they had
any formal redress in the event of the abuse of power by police or local security officials. Where
they could they would draw on informal relationships of friendship or kinship to achieve redress,
such as the release of someone from detention, or the dropping of charges. Of course, in this
atmosphere, the police and security officials developed a sense of omnipotence and
untouchability. Although since the early 1990s there have been attempts to change these
patterns, the continued weak separation of powers between Party and bureaucracy means that
all the way down the structure there is felt to be no unbiased institution that people can appeal to,
and therefore informal channels (and bribery) remain important for everyone. This attitude is
reinforced by the widespread knowledge that police, for example, are reluctant to prosecute
leading officials or their families for normal offences, such as traffic offences, let alone more
serious charges. It is worth noting, that for all the talk by the government about the need to stamp
out corruption there has not been a single higher official in Laos who has been prosecuted for
corruption - a situation which compares starkly and unfavourably with Vietnam or China. And,
since people are aware of the fact that higher officials get involved with massive corruption with
impunity, this further saps their faith in the law enforcement agencies. Nevertheless, the attempts
by the government to establish a legal system that works, especially as it relates to economic
affairs, land ownership, etc. has definitely produced a rise in confidence about approaching
judicial institutions for the arbitration of justice. In this respect an idea of the rule of law is being
practised and propagated.
Nevertheless, the prevailing attitude of ordinary Lao is to simply to keep “the Law” at arms length.
And for good reason too. The very weak rights of appeal available to ordinary citizens should they
be arrested means that the situation is open to abuse, and arbitrary arrest for the purposes of
extortion, for example, is well known. While there are supposedly procedural safeguards for
making arrests, these are easily swept aside for “urgent” cases, and rarely will police be
challenged. There is no automatic access to lawyers or family members. Such arbitrariness
applies especially to “political” detainees, who can be held beyond the statutory limitation of one
year without charges being laid or a trial held, and kept incommunicado. The harshness of the
treatment meted out to political prisoners is widely understood and is one of the main deterrents
to non-Party political activity in Laos. Indeed, given the lack of information about any such
103
detainees, many ordinary Lao believe those detained to have simply been taken away and shot.
The prison system, which is known to be harsh, is beyond international scrutiny and Laos has
come under remarkably little pressure to open it up.
When challenged about its human rights record the response of the Lao Government has been to
point to its formal adherence to major human rights conventions, and to simply deny all charges
of human rights violations. For example, challenged about the arrest of students and others who
attempted to demonstrate in front of the Presidential Palace on 26 October 1999, government
spokesmen initially denied that anything had occurred at all, but have subsequently claimed that
these people acted against the law and were “bribed” by foreigners. Thus, the LPDR claimed,
their rights to free assembly had not been violated.14 Similarly with reports about repression of
Hmong “resistance”, the government refuses to acknowledge that this may be a political issue by
dismissing these Hmong as “bandits”, thus attempting to make it a simple law and order issue.15"
104
PROTECTION OF SPECIAL CATEGORIES OF IDPS (AGE,
GENDER, DIVERSITY)
Indigenous peoples, minorities, peasants, pastoralists and other
groups with a special dependency on and attachment to their
lands
Internal resettlement often doesn't sufficiently take emotional attachment of
population to land into account (2007)
•
According to Baird and Shoemaker, proponents of resettlement, including aid agencies tend
to underestimate the level of emotional attachment that people can feel to the villages and
land that their families have lived on for generations.
Ian G. Baird and Bruce Shoemaker, 2007, p. 867
"Internal resettlement is mainly justified under the government’s expressed goals of ‘poverty
alleviation’ and ‘rural development’; ‘nation building’ is also seen as a critical policy. For all of
these, the ethnic minority populations living in mountainous areas are frequently seen as ‘holding
the country back’ from achieving ‘development’. Central government sets all policies, while
various levels of government, including provinces and districts, have important roles in
interpreting and implementing them.Within this framework, the GoL’s motivations for internal
resettlement fall into five main categories: opium eradication, security concerns, access and
service delivery, cultural
integration and nation building, and swidden agriculture reduction. Although causally different,
these five lead to a set of risks and adverse effects that are essentially common to all forms of
displacement. The relative importance of the five justifying factors varies from case to case, and
decisions to resettle particular villages are often based on a combination of motivations. Opium
eradication is a key factor in northern Laos but, on a national scale, reducing swidden agriculture
and improving accessibility to government services appear to be the main reasons for the GoL to
promote internal resettlement.
(...)
Access and Service Delivery
In upland areas ethnic minority groups often live in small, scattered settlements far from roads but
near to the forests, streams and agricultural lands on which they depend for their livelihoods. The
concentration of these scattered communities, as well as their cultural and livelihood integration
into
ethnic lowland Lao society, has long been a goal of the ethnic Lao dominated central government
(Evrard and Goudineau, 2004; Ireson and Ireson, 1991). It is claimed that by moving scattered
remote upland communities into more accessible areas it will be easier and cheaper to provide
what the GoL and aid agencies consider to be essential development services, such as health
care, sanitation, education, roads, irrigation and electricity. And by providing people with better
access to markets, the GoL expects the resettled populations to become integrated into the
dominant cash-based economy (GoL, 1998). The GoL assumes that resettlers will benefit from
‘permanent occupations’ in one location, intensified agricultural production, and cultural
integration
with other ethnic groups (Evrard and Goudineau, 2004).
105
Many international aid groups support the GoL’s position on access and service delivery, but
these proponents of resettlement often fail to appreciate the existing livelihood bases of remote
communities and underestimate the difficulty of creating new livelihoods for the resettled. There is
a tendency for aid agency personnel to devalue or neglect important issues such as the
availability of adequate land for farming and grazing livestock, as well as access to forestry and
fishery resources, which may be lost when people are resettled. Proponents of internal
resettlement also underestimate the level of emotional attachment that people can feel to the
villages and land that their families have lived on for generations."
106
DURABLE SOLUTIONS (RETURN, LOCAL INTEGRATION,
SETTLEMENT ELSEWHERE IN THE COUNTRY)
Documented returns, settled locally and settled elsewhere
Government says majority of Hmong returnees was sent to Phonkham resettlement
camp while the rest was sent home (March 2010)
AFP, 28 March 2010
"Though Thailand insisted all the Hmong recently sent back to Laos were illegal economic
migrants, the United Nations recognised 158 of them as refugees, but was never allowed to
assess if the thousands of others needed international protection.
While diplomats say there have been no reports of mistreatment, suspicions remain about the
Hmong's rights and living standards in Phonkham village, which was built specifically for the
group in central Bolikhamsay province.
"They've put them on a Laos equivalent of a desert island," said Phil Robertson, deputy Asia
director of Human Rights Watch. "There's no sustained access to these people or quality of
access."
Laotian officials said 3,457 of the repatriated Hmong were sent to Phonkham, while others went
back to their home towns.
Laos said it would grant the international community's request for "free and unfettered" access to
the returnees within 30 days of their repatriation, but so far visits have been scarce, brief and
strictly monitored.
On the latest two-hour visit Friday, foreign diplomats, reporters and a few UN representatives
were among those escorted in two helicopters from the Laotian capital Vientiane, a 45-minute
flight away.
The delegation was ushered straight to an unfinished village hall to be greeted by smiling
youngsters in traditional Hmong dress, before a briefing by central government and Phonkham
officials.
"In the beginning of their resettlement... they were afraid because of not being familiar with their
new environment and not understanding the Lao government's policies," said Bounthan
Douangtanya of the village administration committee. "But the authorities have conducted an
education course for these returnees in order to... make them understand the policy regulations,"
he said, before detailing plans to develop the village infrastructure."
Tens of thousands of Hmongs forcibly returned to Laos since 1991 (2010)
•
It is estimated that between 2006 and December 2009, a total of 7,691 Hmongs have been
repatriated to Laos from Thailand.
107
•
About 1,300 ethnic Hmong forcibly returned to Laos from Thailand between June and July
2008.
•
Between 1990 and the end of 2001, some 20,000 Laotians were repatriated to Laos wit
supervision fom UNHCR. Most were resettled in over 40 sites located in 11 of the 18
provinces.
•
Three patterns of repatriation were used: first, people were returned to their families and
communities; second, small groups of 30 or fewer families were repatriated to already
existing communities and third, large groups of 50 or more families were repatriated in 29
different large group resettlement sites, such as Ban Pha Thao
VOA, 6 January 2010
"In addition, Thai and Lao authorities have said that they do not consider these Hmongs as
refugees; thus, they absolutely would not allow any third party to be involved with the Huay
Namkhao Hmongs issue. Between 2006 and the last repatriation in December 2009, a total of
7,691 Hmongs were returned to Laos."
UN HRC, 18 September 2009, pp. 38-40
"207. In a letter of 18 July 2008, the Special Rapporteur drew the attention of the Government to
concerns over the alleged recent forcible return of over 1,200 Hmong individuals to the Lao
People’s Democratic Republic.
208. In summary, according to the information received: On 22 June 2008, 837 Lao Hmong and
on 11 July 2008, a further 391 Lao Hmong were returned to the Lao People’s Democratic
Republic from a camp in northern Thailand by the Thai Government. After weeks of protests, on
20 June 2008 about 4,500 to 5,000 Hmong individuals left the Ban Huay Nam Khao camp in the
Phetchabun Province and marched towards Bangkok. However, according to the information,
when the group reached a few miles from the camp, they were confronted by Thai troops and
were told that they must either return to the camp or be returned to the Lao People’s Democratic
Republic. Some 3,500 individuals returned to the camp. However, about 1,300 Lao Hmong are
now unaccounted for and the details surrounding their whereabouts are vague. On 22 June,
following the march, some 837 Hmong individuals were repatriated to the Lao People’s
Democratic Republic from the Ban Huay Nam Khao camp and an additional 400 were repatriated
on 11 July."
FIDH & MLDH, January 2005, p. 10
"From 1990 to the end of 2001, more than 20.000 Laotians, who had previously taken refuge in
Thailand and in China during the 1975 exodus, were repatriated to Laos in the frame of a
program supervised by the LDPR and the UNHCR. These refugees, who were repatriated to a
regime from which they fled as they could not find a host country, were settled in more than 40
sites located in 11 of the 18 Lao provinces.
In its report "Refugee Focus: Refugees Returnees in Laos (Washington DC, 13 March 2002),
"Refugees International", a non governmental organization (NGO) stated that it "followed these
repatriated refugees, and considers that in a general manner, the UNHCR did not managed
to provide appropriate assistance to these persons". "On nearly every hosting site, the
land put at the disposal of these persons required irrigation to be cultivable, which was
never done ", as revealed by this NGO."
Inter-University Committe on International Migration, 19 April 2003, p. 3
108
"By December 2001, when the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) closed
its office in Laos, some 29,000 refugees had been repatriated to Laos. Three patterns of
repatriation were used to facilitate the refugees’ return. First, individuals returned directly to live
with their families, often in their community of origin. Second, small groups of 30 or fewer families
were repatriated to already existing communities. Third, large groups involving 50 or more
families required the establishment of entirely new communities, to which about 10,700 people
were repatriated in 29 different large group resettlement sites, including Ban Pha Thao."
Prospects for and obstacles to voluntary return, local settlement
and settlement elsewhere
Fate of many resettled IDPs remains unknown due to lack of independent access
(March 2010)
USDOS, 11 March 2010
"During the year the government accepted the repatriation of an estimated 1,900 Lao Hmong
from Thailand from a group of approximately 7,800 confined to a camp by Thai authorities. Thai
and Lao authorities considered these Hmong to be illegal migrants. The international community
was concerned that there was no internationally accepted process for determining whether any of
the Hmong in the camp could establish a well-founded fear of persecution and seek status as an
international person of concern. Although Lao and Thai authorities stated that the returns were
voluntary, the absence of a process to verify these claims also raised concerns. More than 5,000
Lao Hmong remained in the camp in Thailand at year's end.
The government's policy both for Hmong surrendering internally and for those being returned
from Thailand was to return them to their communities of origin whenever possible. Several
hundred persons without strong community links were relocated in government settlements such
as Pha Lak in Vientiane Province.
In October an international NGO raised questions about the whereabouts of five Lao Hmong who
had been returned from Thailand after reportedly helping lead a June protest at the Thai
detention camp. They were reportedly detained for several months after being returned. Late in
the year, government officials stated that all five were living in Lao communities. Foreign
diplomats met two of the five during a December visit to Pha Lak.
The government at times permitted limited access by international organizations and NGOs to
provide food and other material assistance to former insurgents who had accepted government
resettlement offers.
RFA, 8 February 2008
"U.S. eyewitnesses described Hmong villagers coming out of hiding in 2005 as "desperate," with
big-bellied children with untreated injuries, and weaker people being carried on the backs of
others. Some were starving; others were naked.
Beginning in 2004, Hmong rebels began surrendering to government troops, emerging from the
jungle in their thousands amid promises of land and building materials to set up new homes.
109
But sources say many of those new settlements have dispersed, and it is unknown whether the
Hmong who surrendered have gone back into hiding or died. Asked if the Hmong who
surrendered had gone back to the jungle, Yong Chanthalangsy said: "Very few of them."
AI, 23 March 2007, p. 19
"Uncertainty prevails around the whereabouts and well-being of several other groups of Lao
Hmong who are perceived by the authorities as having links to the former rebels. Beyond the
group of 173 there is no or limited information about many groups that have attempted to come
out from the jungle to join the mainstream. There is also little information about groups that have
been deported to Laos from Thailand where they had sought international protection.
“Surrenders”
In different periods over the years, scattered groups have emerged from the jungle, either in more
formal “surrenders” in which they have reported themselves to the local authorities and carried
white flags, or simply by trying to informally integrate into the mainstream.
According to reports, in many instances in the 1990s and early 2000s, authorities assisted such
groups, offering amnesties and enabling them to join planned resettlement schemes of highland
communities, while providing some assistance such as land and farming tools.
After more recent “surrenders”, Lao authorities have rebutted information that those concerned
had any links to former rebels. Instead they referred to them as mainstream Hmong villagers in
the process of resettling from isolated areas in the highlands to the plains or along main roads, in
accordance with an ongoing government resettlement policy. 41
To Amnesty International’s knowledge there has been no systematic assessment as to how such
Hmong groups from the jungle have been able to reintegrate into mainstream Hmong
communities. Nor is it known to what extent resettlement was negotiated with them in a manner
that ensured them their rights to freedom of movement and to choose their own residence in
accordance with international human rights standards. 42 This absence of information is partly
the result of a lack of clarity on the part of the Lao authorities as to the background of those
resettled, partly the result of a lack of access for independent monitors.
In October and November 2006, at least two large groups of mostly women and children
“surrendered”, after which reports about their whereabouts came to an end. Some 370 people
emerged in the area of Vang Vieng around 10 October 2006, while 420 left the jungle and came
out in Xieng Khouang’s Phoukout district on 14 December. Amnesty International remains
concerned about their well-being.
Forcible returns
Another group about whom limited information is available are Lao Hmong individuals, who have
been forcibly returned to Laos from Thailand before their refugee claims had been assessed, in
breach of international refugee and human rights law. The most recent instance concerned a
group of 16 asylum seekers in Thailand who were deported to Laos on 26 January 2007.43
In a welcome development, in March 2007 Lao authorities arranged for a visit by UN officials,
diplomats and journalists to the three heads of families of the 16 deportees. The visit did not take
place in the village where the 16 currently reside, but in a different village to which the three had
travelled to meet the visitors.
This was the second time in recent weeks that such a visit had been arranged by the Lao
authorities. The first time some 40 diplomats, journalists and UN officials were taken to a
110
family belonging to a group of 53 people who had been deported in November 2006. These visits
have provided some, albeit limited and not independent, information about a few of the returnees,
who appeared to have been well-received according to accounts and media reports.44 When the
53 were first deported, Lao authorities stated in the official media that the group would undergo
“re-education” without providing any further details.45 It remains unclear if this had happened.
The 16 had been “re-educated” on three occasions since their return late January 2007."
Government reported to arrest displaced Hmong people who wish to integrate in
mainstream Lao society and sometime execute them (October 2006)
•
According to Amnesty International, groups of displaced Hmong who have decided to
surrender to the authorities have sometimes been subject to harassment, detention and illtreatment. Sources close to the Hmong claim that 2 children who were part of a group of 30
families who surrendered in June 2005 died of malnourishment while in detention.
•
The group of 30 families were reportedly held for six months without charge or trial, in
appalling conditions which violated their human rights including the right to liberty and the
prohibition on arbitrary deprivation of liberty, the right to access to legal counsel, to be
brought before a judge and to challenge the lawfulness of detention, the right to humane
conditions of detention and the freedom from torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment.
•
Several hundreds of Hmong were reported to have surrendered or to have been captured in
February 2004. However, it remains unclear how they have bee treated as the government
refused to provide international organizations access to them.
AI, 23 March 2007, p. 16
"In several instances, groups who have decided to give up their life in hiding have been
harassed, detained and subjected to ill-treatment, according to reports provided to Amnesty
International.
On 4 June 2005, a group of 173 people emerged from the jungle after a long jungle trek to the
village of Chong Thuang in a planned “surrender”.
The US-based Hmong lobby group The Fact Finding Commission (FFC) had advised authorities
and international organisations that a group of 30 families would emerge from the jungle, and also
attempted to arrange a presence of international organisations with the aim of monitoring their
arrival and ensure their well-being. International presence was not secured. In the absence of
such monitoring, three members of the FFC were themselves at hand.36
“We received help by these Americans who came to meet us when we came out of the forest to
take us to Laos where we would become Lao citizens”, Chong Vang Lor, 37 a 56-year old
member of this group told Amnesty International when the organisation met him later in Thailand.
The 30 families had left behind a life in hiding inside Xaisomboune Special Zone, four days trek
from Phoukout district in Xieng Khouang province. They were first provided assistance
coordinated by a local police chief.
“Then came the soldiers. They took us to a prison inside an army camp outside Phoukout town.
For two months we were kept inside the cells at all times, around 10 families in each cell. If we
needed to go to the toilet, we had to ask the guards to be let out,” according to Chong Vang Lor.
The prison building was in the middle of the camp, and the doors were sealed by chains and
locks. Food was very limited – two meals a day of a handful of rice. “The guards were very
111
intimidating, particularly in the beginning: at night they would fire shots over the roof of the
building, shout at or harass the detainees from outside. Many of the guards, both military and
police, were ethnic Hmong.”
“No one was killed, but two children died of malnourishment,” said Chong Vang Lor.
After two months the families were allowed outside the cell in the daytime, though confined to the
army camp area; at night they would be locked up again. Food remained very limited through this
period, which lasted around four months. The international provisions of food that authorities
reportedly received did not alter the limited supplies. Altogether, they were held for around six
months, before being told to leave. They were instructed not to leave in groups, but only as
individual families. Fearful, they all left at the same time, at night, but in different directions as
they had been told.
For six months the 173, including small children, were reportedly held without charge or trial, in
appalling conditions which violate human rights which have been recognised as being rules of
customary international law binding on all states:
The right to liberty and the prohibition on arbitrary deprivation of liberty;
The right to access to legal counsel, to be brought before a judge and to challenge the lawfulness
of detention;
The right to humane conditions of detention;
Freedom from torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.
In the case of children, deprivation of liberty must be a last resort and for the shortest time
possible – clearly not justified here.38 This and the rights above are also provided for in the UN
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), to which Laos is a state party.39 Several of the 173
are now refugees or asylum seekers in Thailand. The Lao government has publicly denied all
reports that have emerged about their background. There are also unconfirmed reports that some
of the 173 have successfully reintegrated into the Lao Hmong mainstream, just as the group had
wanted. In view of the fact that there is no access to them by independent monitors, it has not
been possible to confirm
these reports."
STP, October 2006, p. 12
"In the 1980s and 1990s the government of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic sought to give
the impression that it wanted to enter into a dialogue with the Hmong hiding in the jungle.
Spokespeople for the six groups interviewed told of experiences at that time that explained why
so many of the Hmong in hiding were unwilling to give themselves up.
Sometimes the Lao authorities distributed leaflets or sent representatives to encourage the
Hmong to come out from their hiding places and meet them for a “safe discussion“. They always
insisted that their motives were genuine and held out the promise of a ceasefire. When Hmong
leaders believed those promises and came out from the jungle, what they found waiting for them
instead of the promised “safe discussion“ was arrest and detention and sometimes summary
execution.
One witness who said that he had been at one of these “meetings” told how he had been very
badly tortured and beaten unconscious and only narrowly escaped death. When he regained
consciousness, his companion was lying dead next to him.
He himself was tied up and left in the hot sun for three days without food and water. He was kept
in prison for another eight days. He testified to having seen several executions take place during
the “meeting” itself and later in prison. The current whereabouts of many other individuals remain
unknown. Their relatives presume that they are dead.
112
Attempts to intimidate people into betraying other Hmong in hiding continue. Many people said
that after they were released from prison by the Lao authorities after spending many years in
detention they were urged to lead the authorities to their group’s hiding place or somehow coax
the group out of the jungle. If they were unwilling to cooperate they were threatened with being
thrown back in prison."
Writenet, May 2004, p. 20
"In late February 2004 there were several mass surrenders of Hmong from Yang Toua Thao’s
group, Moua Tua Ter’s group, and a group in Bolikhamsai under Xa Phia Ya. The numbers
remain unclear. Initially it was reported that some 300 people surrendered in Luang Phrabang
Province, and that some 300 to 400 people from the Saysomboune zone surrendered in Xieng
Khoang, and 100 or so in Bolikhamsai.40 These reports were later modified by the US-based
Fact Finding Commission for Laos, who claim to have been in touch with Moua Toua Ter who
said that “18 families, 96 people, were captured by military troops” and that three of the men
“captured” were executed. Yang Toua Thao, for his part, said that “over 200 people from his
group were captured by LPDR military troops”.41 The treatment of these groups of people after
their surrender remains unclear, and Amnesty International among others have called on the Lao
Government to provide international organizations access to them.42 The Lao, however, have
refused all approaches by international organizations outside and inside the country, claiming that
it is an “internal” matter. This, of course, only increases international suspicion about their fate
and provides fuel for any rumour. The Lao Human Rights Council in the US, for example, says
that if access is denied “then the denial is evidence that the Communist Lao Government of the
LPDR committed ‘war crimes, crimes against peace, and crimes against humanity’…”43 The
explanation for the Lao Government’s myopia in this regard would seem to be years of secrecy
with a strong dose of paranoid nationalism. After all, the issue could be defused so simply if the
government provided access to these Hmong – assuming, of course, that the government has
nothing to hide.
Of course, the Hmong commanders are unlikely to admit that their people are voluntarily
surrendering, but this seems to be what is happening. For a long time these Hmong have refused
to come in from the mountains because of a very well-founded fear that they would be killed.
They had memories of brutal campaigns in the past, and occasional ongoing fire fights. But even
the mountains are no longer as cut off as they once were. In the early 1990s television dishes
appeared in the mountain provinces beaming in news from far away. The telephone system was
renovated and Hmong walked to post offices in Oudomxai or Sam Neua to call relatives
overseas, or fax them letters. Then the mobile telephone revolution occurred in the late 1990s,
suddenly making it possible for people in remote areas to be in touch with anywhere (and this is
probably how the Fact Finding Commission gets some of its information). This means that even
very remote communities know about the changes that have been taking place in the broader Lao
society, and therefore they have come to know about the possibility of living a different life. No
doubt this has led to debates within these groups about the wisdom of continuing their resistance
to the LPDR. Perhaps it is this wavering that led to the terrorist attacks on the buses last year by
Yang Toua Thao’s group. It was an attempt by Yang to tie the group together through the
committing of politically senseless atrocities which the government would never forgive. A way of
blocking the waverers exit. However, it did not work. Moreover, the larger pressures on these
groups, which have been removing the potential supporters of the resistance by relocating them,
seem to be having an impact and defections have followed.
(...)
It is unlikely that all attempts by Hmong to come in from the mountains work out so smoothly.
There is a great deal of suspicion on both sides, and it would be easy for something to go wrong,
and a trigger-happy soldier on either side could cause chaos. But there is evidence, including
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from conversations with diplomats and aid workers in Vientiane that the government is now trying
to solve the problem peacefully."
Support for return integration and reintegration
Government pledges to support resettlement of 4,500 Hmong people returned from
Thailand (January 2010)
•
In February 2010, the government pledged to spend 200 billion Kip, or the equivalent of
US$23 million, for the construction of the Phonkham resettlement site, which is expected to
be finished by the end of 2010.
•
In January, the governemnt announced that the long-term plan was to build a house for each
family in the resettlement villages and allocate land for farming activities. It will also provide
food to the returnees until they are able to make their own living, as well as one year of free
electricity use.
VOA, 24 February 2010
"The government of Laos expects to spend up to 200 billion kip on a new resettlement site it is
building for the Hmong refugees repatriated last year from Thailand. Construction is expected to
be finished at the end of 2010. The returnees, meanwhile, reaffirm that they will remain in Laos
permanently and become good citizens of the country.
Visiting some of the repatriated Hmong recently at Phonkham village, a new resettlement site that
is being developed in Bolikhamxay province, Lieutenant General Douangchai Phichit, Laos'
Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defense, confirmed that the site development is
progressing well, and the government is currently focusing on building more houses and
providing sufficient basic necessities for each family.
The general added that his government will speed up land clearances for agricultural and
cultivation purposes so that the task will be completed before this year's rainy season.
Construction of the necessary infrastructures, such as roads, irrigation system and electricity
transmission grid, will also be accelerated so that the work will be finished by the end of 2010. "
Vientiane Times, 19 January 2010
"A senior diplomat has announced that the Lao government will be happy to arrange visits to
Hmong returnees requested by foreign ambassadors when they have been properly resettled,
while reiterating the government's humanitarian policy to the returnees.
Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Phongsavath Boupha restated the position to ambassadors of
European Union countries, the United States and Australia recently when the ambassadors called
on him to request information on the situation of the Hmong returnees.
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Hmong returnees would be able to live in villages of their own choice, he told the ambassadors,
adding that the government had provided them with food, clothing and medicines on arrival in
their homeland.
Later, the returnees were transported to their original villages or to live with relatives or in
government-resettlement villages.
Mr Phongsavath said the government's long-term plan was to build a house for each family in the
resettlement villages and allocate land for farming activities.
The government will also build gravity-fed water systems, toilets, roads and schools as well as
expanding the electricity network to include the villages, he said, adding that hospitals would also
be available in village groups.
The government will also provide food to the returnees until they are able to make their own
living, as well as one year of free electricity use.
The deputy minister reaffirmed to the ambassadors that receiving the returnees reflects the
extension of the government's humanitarian policy to its citizens."
Concerns about adequate facilities in resettlement camps hosting thousands of
Hmong returnees (November 2009)
AI, 2 November 2009, p. 5
"Following the return of around 2,800 Lao Hmong people from Thailand, coordinated by Thai and
Lao authorities, several hundred returnees resettled at two designated sites, Phalak village in
Kasi district and Namtha on the Vietnamese border. However, Amnesty International is
concerned that these resettlement sites do not have adequate facilities and resources to cope
with the large influx. Independent observers have not been allowed unfettered access to these
areas and the situation of most of the returnees is not known.
A camp in Phetchabun province in northern Thailand, with a Lao Hmong population, is scheduled
to close in December 2009. Most of the 4,200 persons in the camp are to be returned to Laos,
according to a bilateral agreement between the two countries. There are concerns that
humanitarian provisions to meet the basic needs of the returnees are not in place in Laos, and
that the Lao government is not allowing for any third party monitoring of the well-being of the
returnees."
Hmong repatriated from Thailand provided with resettlement assistance as well as "reeducation" (September 2009)
•
A total of 1,673 Lao-Hmong were repatriated from Thailand in 2008. Upon arrival in Laos,
they were first sent to Paksane District, Borikhamxay Province for interviews, registration of
their identities and records of related information. They stayed there for 2 weeks for "reeducation" before being sent home or being resettled.
115
•
According to the governement, resettled Hmong were provided with new shelters, farmlands
as well as initial assistance.
•
One of these resettlement site is Phalak Village in Kasy District, Vientiane Province
established in 2006 and where the government claims to have providedd villagers with land
areas for farming and permanent houses.
UN Special Rapporteur on the situation and fundamental freedoms of indigenous people,
18 September 2009, p. 42
"210. In a letter of 24 October 2008, the Government of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic
responded to the concerns of the Special Rapporteur.
211. In summary, the Government responded that: The issue relating to the thousands of Hmong
who have illegally immigrated into Thailand and have been retained in the temporary camp in
HuayNamKao Village, KaiKor District, Phetsaboun Province is now being addressed as a result
of the Meeting of the Joint Committee for Cooperation in General Security Border co-chaired by
the Defense Ministers of the Lao PDR and Thailand in September 2006, which had carefully
considered the situation and seriously discussed the issue.
212. The meeting agreed that those Lao Hmongs who had illegally immigrated into Thailand
were migrated for economic reasons and to be repatriated to their original home country in
accordance with the Thai law. The sub-committee of the Joint Committee has been entrusted to
implement the agreement, starting from collecting their personal identities and basic information
for the purpose of such repatriation.
213. At the sub-committee’s last meeting held in September 2007 in Vangvieng District, Vientiane
Province, the two sides reached an agreement on arrangements for the repatriation of the Lao
Hmongs to their hometowns by their respective competent authorities. This repatriation process
had to be completed by the end of 2008. As of 22 September 2008, the two sides had handed
over eight groups of Hmongs in a total number of 1,673 persons, including the three remaining
groups consisting of the group of 837 persons returned on 22 June, the group of 391 persons
returned on 10 July and the group of 119 persons returned on 29 August.
214. Upon the arrival of each illegal-immigrant Lao Hmongs group, the Lao sent them to the
temporary welcoming center in Paksane District, Borikhamxay Province for interviews,
registration of their identities and records of related information. In order to prevent the repeated
illegal migration in the neighbouring country, whether intentionally or being lured to do so, they
were retained in the camp for one or two weeks for re-education to ensure that they were aware
of and understood the ill and deceiving intention of bad elements and trans-boundary human
traffickers. They were then sent by plane or by bus, as the case may be, to their hometowns,
where their relatives welcomed them and local authorities were readily awaited to provide them
with initial assistance until they can lead their normal lives as other villagers.
215. For those people who had sold all their properties or for those whose livelihoods were
previously relied on shifting slash-and-burn cultivation and had not permanent domicile, the Lao
Government agencies have provided them with new shelters, farmlands as well as initial
assistance until they can lead their normal lives. One of the most relevant cases is the
establishment of Phalak Village in Kasy District, Vientiane Province in early 2006. The
Government has provided these villagers with land areas for farming and permanent houses. This
model village for development was established for the purpose of providing essential assistance
to those Hmongs in need of returning from Thailand with no home or dependable relatives.
216. Furthermore, international aid agencies and organizations concerned have witnessed the
hand-over of the Lao Hmongs between the Thai and Lao PDR Government authorities. Both
116
sides signed a handover memorandum containing all related information on the returning Lao
Hmongs such as the number of returnees or families, names and surnames, sex, age and others.
Subsequently, those records possessed by the Lao authorities were signed when returning
the Hmongs to local authorities and their families. Besides, the hand-over events opened to the
public, including Lao and foreign journalists, ensure absolute transparency.
217. Since those returning Lao Hmongs arrived in their home towns or settled in the PhaLak
Village, they have obtained Lao citizen ID cards and are able to travel wherever in the Lao PDR.
In addition, they are entitled to obtain passports for traveling outside the country. They have also
regained their full status in the Lao society, exercising all rights and obligations of a Lao citizen."
117
NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE
International human rights and humanitarian law framework
including references to the Guiding Principles on Internal
Displacement
Human Rights treaties signed by Laos (2010)
•
The Lao government is party to a number of core human rights treaties, including the
International Covenant of the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (ICERD), the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and the Convention on the
Rights of the Child (CRC). In 2009, the Lao government ratified the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) as well as the United Nations Convention Against
Corruption (UNCAC).
•
The Lao government has yet to sign the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT). The Lao Constitution, promulgated in
1991 and amended in 2003, contains key provisions for the protection of human rights,
including regarding equality between ethnic groups (art. 22), the freedom of settlement and
movement (art. 27) or freedom of religion (art. 30).
UN Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief, 27 January 2010
"Apart from the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers
and Members of Their Families, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic has signed and ratified all
of the other above-mentioned human rights treaties. In this regard, the Special Rapporteur would
like to highlight that the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which had already
been signed by the Lao People’s Democratic Republic in 2000, was also ratified by the
Government on 25 September 2009."
AI, 2 November 2009, p. 3
"On 25 September 2009, Laos ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
nine years after signing the treaty. The country also ratified the Convention on the Rights of
Persons with Disabilities, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
and the Convention against Corruption.
Laos has not yet ratified the Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment; the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All
Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families; the International Convention for the Protection
of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance; and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court.
A number of periodic reports to the UN treaty monitoring bodies are overdue, including the 16th
and 17th periodic reports under the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination. Members of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination held
a workshop in Vientiane in April 2008 on reporting; however, the reports, due since 2007, have
not yet been submitted by the government.
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The Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women considered Laos’ combined
sixth and seventh report in July 2009. The Committee found that the information provided in the
report was too general in many aspects and lacked the necessary disaggregated data pertaining
to, inter alia, the various ethnic groups so as to permit the Committee to evaluate the situation of
women in Laos."
STP, October 2006, p. 7
"In 1980 Laos ratified the Protocol Additional to the four Geneva Conventions and relating to the
protection of victims of noninternational armed conflicts (Protocol II). As a signatory Laos is
obliged not only not to attack civilian groups and individual civilians but also to guarantee
protection to all persons not taking a direct part or who have ceased to take part in hostilities.
Laos is also signatory to the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial
Discrimination (ICERD) and therefore under an obligation not to tolerate or support any
discrimination on grounds of membership of an ethnic group.
Laos is also a signatory to the International Convention on the Rights of the Child, which requires
state parties “to ensure to the maximum extent possible the survival and development of the
child” (Article 6) and establishes that a child must not be separated from his or her parents
against their will, except when such separation is necessary for the best interests of the child."
Writenet, May 2004, p. 11
"The Constitution that was promulgated in 1991 appeared to contain most key safeguards for
human rights. For example, in Article 8 it makes it clear that Laos is a multiethnic state and is
committed to equality between ethnic groups:
Article 8. The state pursues the policy of promoting unity and equality among all ethnic groups. All
ethnic groups have the rights to protect, preserve, and promote the fine customs and cultures of
their own tribes and of the nation. All acts of creating division and discrimination among ethnic
groups are prohibited. The state implements every measure to gradually develop and upgrade
the levels of socio-economy of all ethnic groups.9
The Constitution has provisions for gender equality and freedom of religion, and for example in
Article 31 it says: “Lao citizens have the right and freedom of speech, press and assembly; and
have the right to set up associations and to stage demonstrations which are not contrary to the
law”.10
The Lao Government signed the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(ICESCR) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) on 7 December
2000. Both are awaiting ratification by the National Assembly and so the LPDR is not yet bound
by the provisions of the ICESCR and ICCPR. By signing these covenants, Laos has
demonstrated that it is willing to continue the treaty making process and agrees to be restrained
by them. Laos ratified the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (ICERD) in 1974, the Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
against Women (CEDAW) in 1981 and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) in 1991.
But Laos has not signed the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment (CAT).11
The signing of the ICESCR and ICCPR by the Lao government in the year 2000 reflected a
general trend towards universal ratification of the six principal UN human rights treaties. The
‘universality goal’, which had been laid out in the Programme of Action of the 1993 Vienna World
Conference on Human Rights, was endorsed by the General Assembly of the UN in its resolution
119
48/121 in December 1993. As a consequence of this development, the various UN agencies
began to promote the idea of universal ratification on a global scale. 12
Indeed, the linking of human rights to foreign aid was a major motivation for countries like Laos to
sign such treaties.
ICERD, CEDAW and CRC assumes that Laos will apply these international instruments to its
domestic legal framework. The LPDR is obliged to submit regular reports on the implementation
of the treaty obligations, but this has strained the capacity of the country’s legal system.
The Department of Treaties and Legal Affairs at the Lao Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which
oversees the relationship between domestic and international law, has admitted that the
understanding of international treaties and conventions that Laos has signed or ratified is very
limited, not only within the government but also within the judiciary and the legislature. This lack
of legal infrastructure and general understanding has led to a huge backlog of overdue state
reports on compliance to the treaty bodies which monitor Laos’ performance under the ICERD,
CEDAW and CRC. Moreover, the few reports which have been produced so far, such as the
initial report on the Convention on the Rights of the Child (due 7 June 1993 and finally submitted
18 January 1996), relied on the input and expertise of foreign consultants.13
While the provisions of the Constitution and the signing of the above treaties appear to provide all
the necessary key provisions for the protection of human rights, these are all vitiated by the
“leading role” reserved for the Party, which ensures that the Party can override the judiciary if
necessary and indeed any other government institution. In reality there is little separation of
powers between the executive and political wings of government. The Party aims to recruit into its
ranks all individuals holding key civil service positions; or one might put it another way, a main
precondition of holding a key civil service position is being a member of the Party. Consequently,
there is little likelihood of differences arising between the executive and political wings of the
government."
National Response
Government response (May 2010)
The Lao government does not acknowledge any conflict-induced internal displacement in the
country, nor does it recognise the existence of a Hmong insurgency in the northern provinces.
Officially, Hmong rebels and their families are considered as “bandits” and the problem
considered as of minor importance (UN HRC, 12 March 2007, p. 195). Consequently, claims of
human rights violations against Hmong rebels or civilians accompanying them, or for that matter
against any Hmong in the country, are considered by the government as groundless. Similarly,
since Hmong refugees in Thailand have, according to the government, no possible legitimate
protection concerns, they are all automatically considered as “illegal migrants” and invited to
return home or be relocated elsewhere in the country, an option also offered to Hmong “bandits”
who accept to surrender.
The military are in charge of dealing with the Hmong “bandits” although the situation is
considered as a mere police matter. The resettlement of the group of Lao-Hmong recently
returned from Thailand is overseen by the Minister of Defense who is also the government’s
Deputy Prime Minister. In February 2010, he pledged to spend 200 billion Kip, or the equivalent of
US$23 million, for the construction of the Phonkham resettlement site, which is expected to host
around 3,000 people and be finished by the end of 2010 (VOA, 24 February 2010). The Ministry
120
of Labour and Social Welfare (MLSW) has led previous refugee repatriation and reintegration
processes. The MLSW is also in charge of the reintegration of trafficking victims and other
vulnerable illegal migrants. In January 2010, the government stated that the 7,691 Lao Hmong
repatriated to Laos since 2006 were “the victims of human trafficking rings and deception”
(Vientiane Times, 5 January 2010). Other national actors involved include the Lao Red Cross,
which in April 2010 distributed US-donated food and other assistance to the Hmong returnees
(AAP, 14 April 2010). There are no national NGOs in Laos.
The Lao government is party to a number of core human rights treaties, including the
International Covenant of the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (ICERD), the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and the Convention on the Rights
of the Child (CRC) and . In 2009, the Lao government ratified the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (ICCPR) as well as the United Nations Convention Against Corruption
(UNCAC). The Lao government has yet to sign the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT). The Lao Constitution, promulgated in
1991 and amended in 2003, contains key provisions for the protection of human rights, including
regarding equality between ethnic groups (art. 22), the freedom of settlement and movement (art.
27) or freedom of religion (art. 30). Major obstacles to the effective safeguarding of these rights
include the lack of independence of the judiciary, widespread corruption and the absence of
separation of power between the executive and political wings of the government with the Lao
People's Revolutionary Party as its “leading nucleus” (art. 3) (Writenet, May 2004, p. 11).
Humanitarian access and assistance
Lack of independent access to resettled Hmongs make it difficult to assess their
situation (April 2010)
SMH, 5 April 2010
"Australia's ambassador to Laos has been allowed to briefly visit the Hmong refugees formerly
destined for Australia before they were forced into a refugee camp in the remote interior of the
country.But Michele Forster was only given limited access to the Hmong under strict military
supervision late last month. The refugees appear no closer to being allowed to leave the country
they have already fled once.
''We are disappointed access to returnees … was limited,'' a spokeswoman for the Department of
Foreign Affairs said. ''We reiterate the government's deep concern and disappointment at the
forced repatriation of Laos Hmong [and] are concerned for the welfare of the broader group.''
(...)
Only 158 of those had been allowed to see the United Nation's human rights agency while in
Thailand. All were found to be genuine refugees with legitimate fears of persecution in Laos.
Australia was working to resettle 47 of them and 17 had been granted humanitarian Australian
visas.
(...)
Human rights groups say the asylum seekers have been pressured to sign forms that say they
are happy to live in Laos.
''We received several credible reports that they had to sign printed documents saying that they
didn't want to leave, and that at least some of them felt forced to sign,'' said Brittis Edman of
Amnesty International."
121
Bangkok Post, 27 March 2010
"Foreign Minister Kasit Piromya says he will ask Vientiane to give "free and unfettered" access to
Lao Hmong repatriated from Thailand.
He would talk to Laos during the Mekong River Commission (MRC) meeting in Hua Hin early next
month.
Mr Kasit unveiled his move after meeting European diplomats, including the envoys of the EU,
Switzerland, UK, the Netherlands, and Canada yesterday.
Earlier, the European diplomats raised concerns about the fate of the 4,500 ethnic Hmong
deported from Thailand to Laos last December.
The diplomats called for free and unfettered access to the Hmong returnees. "It is now March and
we have not been granted free and unfettered access, especially to the 158 Lao Hmong from
Nong Khai.
"The Netherlands, the US, Canada and Australia have offered them resettlement," said EU
ambassador David Lipman. "Concerning these 158 refugees, we want to ask them about their
needs, including their wishes for resettlement."
Mr Kasit said he had spoken to Lao authorities about access, but would raise the matter again at
the MRC meeting."
AFP, 27 March 2010
"The UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) was never given access to the vast majority of the Hmong in
Thai camps to assess if any were in fact refugees, despite concerns that a significant number
would need international protection.
But a UNHCR official was invited to take part in Friday's short visit, along with representatives of
the World Bank, the UN Development Programme, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime and the
International Organization for Migration (IOM).
"We're glad the Laotian government did invite us to go... I think it's a good first step," said UNHCR
spokeswoman Kitty McKinsey. "We would like an opportunity to talk to the people who returned."
The visitors included about 20 Western diplomats including the US ambassador to Laos,
European Union delegates, and foreign reporters. They were welcomed to the village by Deputy
Minister of Foreign Affairs Phongsavath Boupha.
He said his ministry was pleased about the visit, "so you can experience the real atmosphere of
the village".
But for most of the two-hour stay, the delegation was confined to an unfinished village hall, mainly
to be briefed about planned infrastructure developments, with no time allocated for one-on-one
discussions with the Hmong."
USDOS, 11 March 2010
"The law provides for freedom of movement within the country, foreign travel, emigration, and
repatriation, but in practice the government imposed some restrictions. The government did not
122
cooperate with the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other
humanitarian organizations in providing protection and assistance to internally displaced persons,
refugees, returning refugees, asylum seekers, stateless persons, and other persons of concern.
(...)
Lao Hmong who had been detained in Thailand began to return to Laos during 2007. The
government continued to refuse the UNHCR's request to reestablish an in-country presence,
which it had in the 1990s, to monitor the reintegration of returnees. The government stated that
the UNHCR's mandate expired in 2001 and all former refugees had successfully reintegrated. In
December 2008 and during 2009, foreign diplomats, representatives from international
organizations (including the UNHCR), and the press visited various sites, including Pha Lak,
where the Lao Hmong returned from Thailand were resettled.
During the year the government accepted the repatriation of nearly all Lao Hmong from Thailand
from a group of approximately 5,700 persons confined to a camp or held in a detention center by
Thai authorities and considered by both countries' authorities to be illegal migrants. The UNHCR
had granted person-of-concern status to the 158 persons held in the detention center, however,
and there was no internationally accepted process used to determine whether any Hmong in the
camp could establish a well-founded fear of persecution and seek status as an international
person of concern. Although Lao and Thai authorities stated that the returns were voluntary,
independent observers were not allowed to witness the December 28 repatriation of more than
4,350 persons, and the government did not allow access to the returnees.
The government's policy both for Hmong surrendering internally and for those being returned
from Thailand was to return them to communities of origin whenever possible. However, at year's
end the government held most of the December 28 returnees at a camp in Paaksan,
Borikhamsay Province, for settlement processing. Among earlier returnees, several hundred
persons without strong community links were relocated in government settlements such as Pha
Lak village, Vientiane Province, where the government provided land, housing, clean water, and
electricity plus one year's supply of food. Of the December 28 returnees, initial indications were
that approximately 1,300 persons returned to communities of origin and the remaining number
went to other government settlements.
At times during the year, the government permitted limited access by international organizations
and NGOs to provide food and other material assistance to former insurgents who had accepted
government resettlement offers. Independent observers were not allowed access to December 28
returnees by year's end, however.
(...)
The government continued to offer "amnesty" to insurgents who surrender but continued to deny
international observers permission to visit the estimated more than 2,000 insurgents who have
surrendered since 2005--other than a few families in Pha Lak village. Their status and welfare
remained unknown at year's end. Because of their past activities, amnestied insurgents continued
to be the focus of official suspicion and scrutiny.
The government generally refused international community offers to assist surrendered
insurgents directly but allowed some aid from the UN and international agencies as part of larger
assistance programs."
European Parliament, September 2005, p. 11
"Recently for these people in the jungle the situation has become untenable. Continuous attacks
by the Lao troops and the lack of food has compelled a group of 171 women and children to
surrender on 4th June 2005. According to the Vientiane Times in Laos, the surrendered Hmong
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have been resettled in Ban Pua and are receiving food, medical attention, money and materials
for construction of homes, and have been given land to grow rice. However, it is difficult to assess
the accuracy of these reports as no International organization or even the United Nations have
been granted access to these people. This has not given any confidence to the remaining groups
in the jungles to surrender and join the women and children. There is still fear and distrust by the
remaining Hmong groups in the jungle who are assessing and monitoring the surrender. This
situation will inform their decision to surrender or not."
International Response
International response (May 2010)
Most international organisations present in Laos are involved in development assistance and
none is involved in any form of assistance to conflict-induced IDPs. Prior to its departure from
Laos, in 2001, UNHCR assisted with the return and resettlement of thousands of Laotians from
Thailand. Despite repeated requests to continue assisting the government with the repatriation of
Hmong from Thailand, UNHCR has yet to re-establish a presence in the country and is covering
the country through its regional office in Thailand.
In recent years, international involvement with displaced Hmong people has focused on advocacy
either directly with the Lao government or through UN Treaty Body mechanisms such as the
Committee of the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) or the Convention on the Right of
the Child (CRC). The last CERD periodic report was submitted by the government in 2004, or 19
years later than scheduled and was probably prompted by the activation, a year earlier, of the
CERD’s early warning and urgent action procedure. With the 16th and 17th reports overdue since
March 2007, CERD informed the Lao government by letter in March 2009 that it was considering
new information received on the situation of displaced Hmong hiding in the jungle in
Xaisomboune province and that it was requesting updated information from the government on
the situation of this group (CERD, 13 March 2009).
In 2007, several UN Special Rapporteurs as well as the Special Representative of the Secretarygeneral on the human rights of internally displaced persons, expressed concern at reports of
human rights violations committed in the context of the government’s fight against Hmong rebels
(HRC, 27 February 2008, p.10). In May 2010, the situation of human rights in Laos will be
examined at the Universal Periodic Review (UPR).
A number of international NGOs, including Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have
in recent years drawn attention to the plight of displaced groups in Laos. Some NGOs are very
actively involved in advocacy, in particular in the United States, where a large number of Hmong
refugees now live and where they have managed to establish an effective lobby group. This also
creates a risk of biased information on the issue with some groups clearly looking to damage the
Lao’s government credibility for political purpose. In 2007, the former leader of the Hmong secret
army, Vang Pao, now still a very influential person among the Hmong diaspora in the United
States was arrested there on the charges of conspiring to overthrow the Lao government.
Charges against him were dropped in September 2009, although charges remained against other
members of the group arrested (NYT, 18 September 2009).
International humanitarian assistance has in recent years largely focused on demining and UXO
clearance activities as well as on the response to needs created by recurrent natural disasters.
Chronic food insecurity is also a major problem, as it is reported to affect two-thirds of the rural
population (WFP, December 2007). Following the landing of typhoon Ketsana in September
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2009, the IASC Country Team issued a Flash Appeal requesting around $13 million to address
for a six-month period the needs of an estimated 180,000 people affected in the southern
provinces, 60,000 of which were displaced (OCHA, 18 December 2009).
International UXO removal assistance to Laos, largely coordinated by UNDP, totalled $89 million
between 1994 and 2007 (Khamvongsa & Russell, June 2009, p.295). Between 1993 and 2009,
the United States contributed a total of $25 million, or an average of $1.5 million per year, which
is less than the average amount the US government spent every day for nine years to bomb Laos
(Khamvongsa & Russell, June 2009, p.295). According to some estimates, between 1996 and
2006 only 144km2 of land, equivalent to just 1 per cent of high-risk areas and 0.4 per cent of the
total contaminated areas was cleared (Khamvongsa & Russell, June 2009, p.296). Since 2008,
UXO clearance efforts have been scaled up with international support reaching $15 million in
2009. US annual contribution increased to $3.7 million in 2008-2009 and is expected to reach $5
million for 2010-2011 (US DOS, 22 April 2010). A 2008 UXO assessment showed that at present
capacity it would take 16 years to clear all contaminated agricultural land in Laos (UNDP, 29 April
2010).
Thailand has violated the international principle of non-refoulement
Bangkok Post, 9 January 2009
"The Abhisit government attempted to explain and justify its actions as somehow lawful, even
humane. They were neither. Everyone has a human right to seek asylum. The Thai government
denied this right to thousands of Hmong in Phetchabun, and to the Rohingyas from Burma.
Moreover, people seeking asylum _ especially those granted protection by UNHCR, such as the
158 refugees in Nong Khai have a right to not be sent back to their place of persecution. The
forcible return of these people was thus an unequivocal violation of the principle of nonrefoulement, a rule of international customary law.
Thailand also violated its obligations under the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, which provides that state parties must not send
people to countries where they risk torture. The government also claimed, after holding them for
three years in arbitrary detention in constant fear of forcible return, that the Hmong agreed to
return to Laos voluntarily. In fact, the Thai authorities told them that they would be resettled to
third countries only if they first agreed to go back to Laos.
(...)
Concerning the Lao Hmong, the international community should seek access to the returnees
inside Laos and respond to any reports of ill-treatment. Bilaterally, the United States, one of the
countries that was considering the Hmong refugees for resettlement, should review the conduct
of the Thai military during the forced repatriation of the Hmong refugees. There are strong
reasons to believe that Thai military units violated human rights law in their operations, which
would place them in violation of US laws that condition US funding and assistance to foreign
militaries on their compliance with human rights law (``the Leahy law'').
Asean's new Inter-governmental Commission on Human Rights should address the unlawful
actions of both Thailand and Laos, and urge Laos to permit immediate and unimpeded access for
UNHCR to the 4,500 Hmong. The UN should also raise these violations if Thailand seeks a seat
on the UN Human Rights Council. Last year saw the Abhisit government roll back Thailand's
protection of asylum-seekers, tarnishing the country's human rights record."
The role of international IGOs and NGOs (May 2004)
125
Writenet, May 2004, pp. 27-28
"After the revolution most of the major IGOs, such as UNDP or the IMF, maintained some
programmes inside Laos. At a governmental level, key western donors that had previously been
vital to the survival of the RLG, such as the USA, dropped out of the picture, but others stayed on,
in particular Australia, Sweden and Japan. The LPDR has been as dependent on foreign aid as
its predecessor; however in the immediate aftermath of 1975 the place of the USA was replaced
by the USSR and by the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, who supplied thousands of advisers at all
levels of the Lao state. In terms of general policy advice the LPDR remained heavily dependent
on these states up until the collapse of the USSR and of communism in Eastern Europe, and
during this period IGOs had relatively little influence on the direction of Lao Government policy.
In the 1990s IGO presence and influence in the LPDR expanded dramatically as Laos became
increasingly dependent on their support for economic, social and cultural programmes. Over the
same period there has been a general shift in policy emphasis towards issues of “governance”
and “human rights” as criteria for the supply of foreign aid. This has meant that the Lao
Government has had to become much more responsive to these international concerns. This is
best exemplified in the long-running debate over the feasibility or not of the Nam Theun Dam on a
tributary of the Mekong for which the LPDR has sought World Bank support.
(...)
Laos has announced other dam projects in conjunction with China and Vietnam, and although
these deals claim they will respect environmental and social issues, in reality they will be under
no democratic restraints. Perhaps Laos has turned to these neighbours deliberately in order to
avoid the complications that have dogged them over Nam Theun.68 The costs of this manoeuvre,
however, may be that Laos will find itself in no position to complain about the impact that large
Chinese built dams inside China are having on water levels and the ecology of the Mekong
downstream.69
IGOs have also been directly involved in attempts to improve governance inside Laos, either by
providing aid to the Justice Ministry to improve laws and administration (UNDP, SIDA), or even to
the National Assembly, where study tours of other parliamentary systems have been sponsored
(Germany, SIDA) in the hope that some lessons can be transferred to Laos. World Bank and
Australian aid is involved in a land-titling project whose aim is to introduce secure tenure as the
basis of a market driven system.
After 1975 only two foreign NGOs were left with offices inside Laos, the Quakers and the
Mennonites, who were allowed to stay because of their pacifism and criticism of the US during
the Vietnam War. They have been involved in small scale health and nutrition projects, and in
clearing up unexploded ordinance (UXO) left from the war. For a time they were the main conduit
for other NGO aid.70 When Laos’ thirst for foreign aid shifted westward in the 1990s it was also
with the realization that NGOs could play an important role in Lao development, especially given
their focus on smaller scale projects. But this required the formulation of clear regulations which
were finally released in March 1995, after which the foreign NGO presence inside Laos rapidly
increased. Today there are over 50 NGOs in Laos engaged in agriculture, education, UXO
clearance, health, etc.
(...)
Foreign NGOs quickly realized that the situation inside Laos was very different from, for example,
Thailand. They had to work closely with a government department or ministry and could not
comment publicly on government policies or events inside the country. Any criticisms or pressure
on the government or on international organizations delivering aid to Laos had to be done by their
parent organizations. Nevertheless, their presence on the ground has ensured that the
international wings of the NGOs are better informed on issues than they would be otherwise and
any criticisms more effective as a result. Their aid work practices and their training for local Lao
has also spread a more participatory ethos among the Lao they come in contact with and work
with. Both the IGOs and NGOs have had an informal impact on Lao who work with them through
126
their demonstrations of different methods of working, and their practice of a more democratic
work style. Within these organizations Lao employees are exposed to ideas, debates and
literature that would normally have been unavailable to them. In this sense the IGOs and NGOs
have created a kind of incipient civil society."
Recommendations by international human rights bodies
Recommendations by the UN Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief
(January 2010)
UN HRC, 27 January 2010, p. 19
"65. The Special Rapporteur would like to make the following recommendations with regard to
Decree No. 92/PM for the Management and Protection of Religious Activities; allegations of
forced conversions and evictions; the isolation of religious minorities; liberty of movement in the
context of religious activities; freedom of religion or belief of persons deprived of their liberty; and
some beliefs and customs of animists or ancestor worshippers.
66. As the National Assembly is currently contemplating the introduction of legislation to replace
Decree No. 92/PM, the Special Rapporteur would like to refer to her legal analysis and
observations in this regard (see paras. 24–39 above). Any legislative text should avoid imposing
vaguely worded obligations on religious communities, including with regard to registration
procedures, and should discontinue the extensive oversight powers currently given to various
government entities in this regard. Explanatory policy directions should be passed on to the
provincial and district levels in order to avoid any discriminatory interpretation to the detriment of
religious minorities.
67. While the Special Rapporteur very much welcomes the recent ratification of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights by the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, she regrets that
the Government has felt it necessary to enter a declaration stating that all acts creating division
among religions are incompatible with article 18 of the Covenant. The Special Rapporteur is
concerned that the domestic concept of “acts creating division among religions” is highly
subjective and vague, which increases the risk of it being abused to prohibit religious activities
that are protected under international law, for example the teaching and dissemination of religious
beliefs. Arguably, the declaration of 25 September 2009 is not in line with the text and spirit of the
Covenant and the Special Rapporteur consequently encourages the Government to keep its
declaration under review and to revisit it in the near future.
68. Furthermore, the Special Rapporteur is concerned about the inadequate level of
implementation of the legislative protection for freedom of religion or belief. The central and
provincial authorities should ensure that the local administration level ceases ordering evictions or
otherwise trying to coerce Christians to renounce their faith. The Special Rapporteur also calls for
the immediate release of religious prisoners of conscience. During her mission she has received
positive signals from the Government regarding the release of Mr. Boon Chanh, who has been
imprisoned for more than ten years, allegedly also in relation to his religious activities. The
Government should thoroughly investigate all cases with a link to freedom of religion or belief and
find prompt remedies for those who may have been victimized or continue to suffer. In addition,
various state authorities and international donors could envisage supporting legal aid
programmes in order to help, inter alia, members of religious minorities and provide capacitybuilding to grass-roots initiatives."
127
CERD recommendations (2009)
UN Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief, 27 January 2010, p. 5
"8. In terms of the human rights monitoring by United Nations treaty bodies, the Committee on the
Elimination of Racial Discrimination in 2005 recommended that the Lao People’s Democratic
Republic recognize the rights of persons belonging to minorities and indigenous peoples as set
out in international law, regardless of the name given to such groups in domestic law. The
Committee also invited the State party to take into consideration the way in which the groups
concerned perceive and define themselves, recalling that the principle of non-discrimination
requires taking into consideration the specific characteristics of ethnic, cultural and religious
groups (CERD/C/LAO/CO/15, para.17). The Committee was disturbed by reports of the
infringement of the freedom of religion of members of religious minorities, in particular Christians,
who are also often members of ethnic minorities. The Committee recommended that the
Government ensure that all
persons enjoy, without discrimination, their right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion
(CERD/C/LAO/CO/15, para. 20). In addition, the Government was informed by a letter of 13
March 2009 that the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination considered
information received on the situation of the Hmong indigenous people in Xaisomboune province
under its early warning and urgent action procedure.5"
CERD, 13 March 2009
"I wish to inform you that the Committee, at its 74th session held from 16 February to 6 March
2009, considered new information received on the situation of the Hmong indigneous people in
Xaisomboune province under its early warning abd urgent action procedure. The Committee is
concerned about reports citing the use of military force against these people and action depriving
them access to traditional sources of food and livelihoods.
The Committee therefore requests to be informed about the situation of the Hmong indigenous
people in this area, in particular with regads to allegations concerning the deployment of military
operations against them. In addition, the Committee would appreciate receiving information on
the general situation of the Hmong people in the Lao PDR (demographic, economic and sociocultural data).
Also, given the ongoing repatriation of Lao Hmong refugees from the Huai Nam Khao camp in
Thailand, scheduled to end in June this year, the Committee would like to receive information
about the status, safety and well-being of returnees in the Lao PDR. The Committee urges the
State Party to accept United Nations assistance to help manage the repatriation process."
CERD, 18 April 2005, p. 3
"18. The Committee notes that the State party has adopted a policy of resettling members of
ethnic groups from the mountains and highland plateaux to the plains (art. 5).
The Committee recommends that the State party describe in its next periodic report the
scope of the resettlement policies being implemented, the ethnic groups concerned, and
the impact of these policies on the lifestyles of these groups and on their enjoyment of
their economic, social and cultural rights. It recommends to the State party that it study all
possible alternatives with a view to avoiding displacement; that it ensure that the persons
concerned are made fully aware of the reasons for and modalities of their displacement
and of the measures taken for compensation and resettlement; that it endeavour to obtain
the free and informed consent of the persons and groups concerned; and that it make
remedies available to them. The State party should pay particular attention to the close
cultural ties that bind certain indigenous or tribal peoples to their land and take into
128
consideration the Committee's general recommendation XXIII of 1997 in this regard. The
preparation of a legislative framework setting out the rights of the persons and groups
concerned, together with information and consultation procedures, would be particularly
useful.
(...)
20. The Committee is disturbed by reports of the infringement of the freedom of religion of
members of religious minorities, in particular Christians, who are also often members of ethnic
minorities.
The Committee recommends to the State party that it ensure that all persons enjoy their
right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, without discrimination, in
accordance with article 5, subparagraph (d), of the Convention.
21. The Committee remains concerned at persistent allegations of conflict between the
Government and members of the Hmong minority who have taken refuge in the jungle or
mountainous areas of the Lao People's Democratic Republic since 1975. According to various
corroborating reports, this group is living in difficult humanitarian conditions (art. 5).
The Committee calls on the State party to take all measures, if necessary with the support
of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, the United
Nations and the international community, to find a political and humanitarian solution to
this crisis as quickly as possible and to create the necessary conditions for the initiation
of a dialogue with this group. The Committee strongly encourages the State party to
authorize United Nations agencies to provide emergency humanitarian assistance to this
group.
22. The Committee is concerned at reports that serious acts of violence have been perpetrated
against members of the Hmong minority, in particular allegations that soldiers brutalized and
killed a group of five Hmong children on 19 May 2004 (art. 5).
The Committee recommends to the State party that it provide more precise information
about the bodies responsible for investigating these allegations. It also strongly
recommends that the State party allow United Nations bodies for the protection and
promotion of human rights to visit the areas in which members of the Hmong minority
have taken refuge."
CERD, 10 December 2003, p. 2
"6. In the light of the foregoing information, the Committee:
(a) Urges the State party to halt immediately acts of violence against members of the Hmong
population who have taken refuge in the jungle or certain mountainous regions of the Lao
People’s Democratic Republic;
(b) Urgently calls upon the State party to ensure that these persons have freedom of movement
and access to adequate food and medical care;
(c) Requests the State party to take all possible measures to release as soon as possible the
Hmong assistants who contributed to the report of the two foreign journalists concerning the
situation of the Hmong minority, given that the journalists themselves have been released;
(d) Calls upon the Lao authorities to submit to the Committee, as a matter of urgency, a special
report containing information about the matters referred to above, measures taken to prevent
racial discrimination and, in any event, the periodic reports due under article 9 of the Convention.
7. The Committee urges the Secretary-General of the United Nations:
(a) To draw the attention of the competent United Nations bodies to the particularly worrisome
human rights situation in the Lao People’s Democratic Republic and request them to take all
appropriate measures in this regard, including the dispatch of a mission to the Lao People’s
129
Democratic Republic with a view to helping the State party to fulfil its obligation to respect human
rights and eliminate all forms of racial discrimination. In this connection, the Committee draws the
attention of the Secretary-General to the willingness of its members to participate in such a
mission;
(b) To request the United Nations organizations, funds and programmes and the specialized
agencies, within their respective fields of competence, to take appropriate measures to provide
humanitarian assistance, particularly with regard to food and access to medical care, to the
members of the Hmong population who have taken refuge in the jungle or certain mountainous
regions of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic.
Amnesty International's recommendations to the Lao government (2007)
AI, 23 March 2007, p. 27
"Amnesty International makes the following recommendations:
To the Lao authorities
Immediately stop all armed attacks against Hmong people living in the jungle;
Ensure that the security forces immediately end the use of arbitrary detention, rape and torture or
other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment of detainees, and in particular the
unlawful detention and ill-treatment of children;
Ensure prompt, independent and impartial investigation of all allegations of attacks by the security
forces on Hmong living in jungle encampments or other unlawful use of force against them,
including killings, torture or other ill-treatment, rape and other sexual abuse, and bring the
perpetrators to justice in proceedings which meet international standards of fairness and without
the imposition of the death penalty;
Enable the people living in jungle encampments to realise their basic economic, social and
cultural rights, in particular their right to an adequate standard of living, including access to food,
water, shelter, and essential health care, including through permitting access by international
humanitarian organisations to the areas of concern;
Allow and assist those Hmong who want to reintegrate into mainstream society and have not
committed any internationally recognizably criminal offence to do so, while ensuring respect for
their human rights during this process, including the right to life, liberty and security of person, an
adequate standard of living, and liberty of movement and freedom to choose their place of
residence. Any resettlement should be with the free and informed consent of those affected who
should be involved in the planning and management of their relocation;
Allow international monitoring, including by UN human rights bodies and experts, of such
reintegration.
To the Thai authorities
Ensure that under no circumstances persons are returned to Laos if they face a risk of serious
human rights violations, including violations of the right to life, torture or other ill-treatment;
Ensure that Lao Hmong asylum seekers inside Thailand, including approximately 7,000 Lao
Hmong at the camp in Huay Nam Khao, are provided access to a fair determination process in
order for their protection claims to be assessed either by UNHCR or national bodies, in keeping
with international human rights law and international refugee law;
Ensure that those who are in need of international protection inside Thailand are provided with
such protection and that all attempts at finding durable solutions, including local integration and
resettlement are explored.
To UN agencies and the international community
130
Whenever possible open up dialogue with the Lao authorities about human rights and exert
pressure on the Lao government to end human rights violations committed against Hmong living
in the jungle;
Call on the Lao government to accept independent monitoring of the concerned areas inside the
Lao jungles and areas where groups from the jungle have resettled so as to ascertain their needs
and assure their well-being;
Those states in a position to do so make clear to the Lao government their willingness to provide
international assistance to support the authorities in meeting its minimum core obligations with
regard to ensuring the economic, social and cultural rights of the groups in the jungle as well as of
those who reintegrate in to themainstream."
131
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