The Naval Review

Vol. XXXVI. No. 3.
a
THE
NAVAL REVIEW
"Tbink W ~ J I ~ P.I@ Boki)..
Act
For Private Circulation
(Foudsd in 1912.)
August, I 948.
Swqtb."
CONTENTS .
... ... ... ... ...
THE GREECEAND CRETECAMPAIGNS.
1941
THE CONTRIBUTION
OF THE BRITISHPACIFICFLEETTO THE ASSAULT
ON
OKINAWA.
1945 ...
...
... ... ... ... ... ...
THE ACTIONWITH THE ITALIANFLEET
OFF CALABRIA
... ... ...
... ...
THE ACTIONWITH THE ITALIANFORCES
OFF CAPESPARTIVENTO
EARLYARCTIC" UNDERGROUND
"
... ... ... ... ... ...
THE GALLANT
ACTIONOF H.M.S. Petevel
... ... ... ... ...
EXERCISES
Bamboo AND Pandora ...
... ... ... ... ... ...
CRIMEAND PUNISHMENT...
... ... ... ... ... ... ...
... ... ... ... ... ... ...
SPECIALIZATION
AND PROMOTION
THE Q.M. BRANCH...
... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
AT THE CLUB-IV ...
... ... . . . . ... ... ... ... ...
WHENTHE BOUGHBREAKS
:1. SOMECOMMENTS ...
... ... ... ... ... ... Y .
2 . C.C.M.S. (NAVALDIVISION)
... ... ... ... ... ...
SOMENOTESON NAVALRECRUITING ...
... ... ... ... ...
SOMEEXTRACTS
FROM NOTESON A NAVALAIR STATION ...
...
...
RED SEA CRUISE ...
... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
... ... ... ... ... ...
THE-Ariadne BOATDISASTER,1872
THE ASHANTEE
CAMPAIGN,
1873-4
... ... ... ... ... ...
THE LOSSOF HIS MAJESTY'S
SHIP Nautilus, 1807 ...
... ... ...
CIVILSERVANTS ...-'
... ... ... ... ... ... ...
THE BATTLEOF MALTA-A GERMAN
REPORT...
... ... ... ...
BOOKS
:i . " WESTERN
MEIIITERRANEAN,
1943-1945." By " Taffrail " ...
...
OF SEAPOWER
ON WORLDWAR11." By Captain
ii . " THE INFLUENCE
... ... ... ... ... ...
W . D . Puleston. U.S.N.
iii. " BRASSEY'S
NAVALANNUAL,
1948." ...
... ... ... ...
WORLDWAR. 1939.45. " By Major-General J . F. C.
iv . " THE SECOND
Fuller ...
... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
HISTORY
O F THE ROYAL
MARINES." By Colonel G. 'V(I. M .
V . " A SHORT
Grover ...
... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
...
vi . " THE AWKWARD
MARINE." By James Spencer
... ...
vii
THE BATTLEOF THE ATLANTIC,
1939-1943." By S . E . Iforison ...
viii. " AIR POWERIN WAR." By Marshal of the R.A.F. Lord Tedder ...
ix . PORTSMOUTH
COMMANDSAILINGASSOCIATION-HANDBOOK
AND
FIXTURES
FOR 1948....
... ... ... ... ... ...
x . " TROOPSHIPS
OF WORLDWAR 11." By R . W Charles
... ...
xi " IN DANGER'S
HOUR." By Gorclon Holman ...
... ... .
xii . " UNDERSTANDING
THE RUSSIANS." By Eileen Bigland
... ...
...
xiii . " THE GREATEST
FOOL." By Gilbert Hackforth-Jones
...
xiv " CARGOFOR CROOKS." By " Sea-Lion "
...
...
... ...
xv. " EVERYMAN'S
HISTORYOF THE SEA WAR." By il. C . Hardy
...
... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
CORRESPONDENCE
...
...
. "
.
.
.
LEADERSHIP-FUTURE
STATUS OF THE DOMINION NAVIES-LEAVE-OPERATION IYoYZC~U~-THE
AMERICAN ATTACKS O N JAPAN I N WORLD WAR II" THE QUESTING HOUND."
OBJECTAND REGULATIONS
OF " THE NAVALREVIEW."
..
Page
219
-
HON. EDITOR'S NOTES.
Requests have recently been received for the following pre-war
numbers :FEBRUARY,
1939,
Will any members who can spare their copies kindly send them to the
Secretary ?
May I again remind members who are kind enough to send me articles,
book notices or correspondence for any issue that they should reach me' not
later than the middle of the month previous to that of issue, or of course
earlier if possible? Compliance with this request will be very much
appreciated.
RICHARD
WEBB,
Holz. Editor.
HILLFIELD,VICARAGE
ROAD,
"
EASTSHEEN,LONDON,
S.W.14.
5th August, 1948:
1
A NAVAL OCCASTON.
Froni "The Tintes" of the 13th o f M a y . 1948. " A dinner was held at the United Service Club last night t o mark the fiftieth anniversary of the naval cadets' term o f
January, 1897, leaving H.M.S. Britannia and joining the sea-going fleet in May 1898. Thirty-one of the original 65 cadets of the term survive to-day; two are admirals of
the fleet two are admirals, one is a vice-admiral, five are rear-admirals fifteen captains four commsnders and two lieutenant-commanders.
" T h e guest of the evening was the lieutenant of the term-no;
Vice-Admiral &gorge ~ r e w h ~ - a A d those present were: Admirals of the; Fleet Lord Cunningharn
and Sir James Somerville, Admiral Sir Charles Li:tle Vice-Admiral R. Wykes-Sneyd. Rear-Admirals Sir C. Vary1 Robinson, J. D. Campbell, E. G. Robinson, V.C.
J. S. C. Salmond, and H. G . Thursfield; Captains ~ u k e s - ~ u g h e L.
s . Smythies, R . T. Amedroz, A. Lovett-Cameron, R. Eyre-Huddlestone, R. B. England, H. ~ a m i l t o n :
Gordqp, N. Thurstan, J. Champ~on,E. A. B. Stanley; Commanders Browne. J. Swift, J. Tyndall, and B. J. D. Guy, V.C. ; and Lieutenant-Commander Sir Henry Colt.
It is probably a unlque record for nearly half of so large a term of naval cadets to survive half a century later, and to include two admirals of the flee! an<! two V.C.S."
T H E GREECE AND CRETE CAMPAIGNS, 1941.
Su$@lementto the LONDON
GAZETTEof the 18th and 21st of May, 1948.
To those able to read between the lines, Admiral Cunningham's Despatches on the Greece
and Crete campaigns in early 1941 carry a fine record of gallant endeavour and high
endurance in the face of overwhelming odds. To those less @ted, only a few brief paragraphs in each covering letter point the high lights of the courage which illuminated the
tale of trials and disasters.
The Despatches are sincere and simple records of a galling and testing period in our
naval history. They were written at the time, in the light of what was known at the time
by officers who had taken part in or were responsible for the operations. They have
reached the public virtually unexpurgated-as, for the sake of truth, they should.
That such documents should contain criticism as well as praise is right. It is too
much to expect in times of prolonged strain, when endurance Is tried to snapping point,
that every man can be right every time and all the time. Failure to point the errors would
breach our trust to posterity, since from errors are lessons learnt. What is lamentable
is that the less reputable organs of the Press, avid for sensation, should see fit, as they did
in their comment, to headline only the errors and to neglect the proud record that surrounded them.
To reach true understanding of the strain endured by the Mediterranean Fleet at that
time it seems necessary to step back a pace and view these Despatches in the broader
frame of the campaign as a whole. The events described, all-absorbing and frequently
horrifying as they were, were but incidents in the wider issue ; incidents in which an already
hard-pressed fleet was called upon successively for harder and heavier tasks in the face of
ever-increasing danger and disadvantage, until the strain came near to outrunning their
endurance.
The Mediterranean Fleet were no strangers to air attack. From the outset of the
Italian War it had been a major preoccupation. Many of them before that had met and
fought it in the fjords of Norway and off the beaches of Dunkirk. But by the end of
1940 they had its measure. The Regia Aeronautica had been routed from the air. The
fleet went about its business without fear and unmolested. Then the Luftwaffe arrived.
On the 10th of January, 1941, near Pantellaria, they struck in strength and well-nigh
destroyed the Illustrious, the ship upon which domination of the air at sea depended.
GREECE.
It was without seaborne air support that the fleet carried on its operation through
January, February and early March. This period covered the support and supply of
the advance of the Army to Benghazi, the attempted opening of that port which was foiled
with losses by the onset of the Luftwaffe, the abortive attack on Castelorizo (again foiled
by air attack) and the continued supply of our air forces already operating in Greece.
On this was superimposed, from the 4th of March, the ill-fated Operation LUSTRE-the
move of our armies into Greece. These operations bore heavily on the light forces. They
never had a rest. Nor was this all, for LUSTREwas undertaken with foreboding. Certainly no commanding officer, and probably no man, but had in his mind the virtual
certainty that this arduous operation could but lead to a fresh " Dunkirk " with all that
that implied. Most of them had experience of the original to aid their imaginations.
On the 10th of March the aircraft carrier Formidable arrived, after an anxious passage
through the mined Saez Canal in which several ships had already been sunk. She restored
A2
220
THE GREECE AND CRETE
CAMPAIGNS, 1941.
freedom of movement to the fleet by giving it the air cover it so sorely needed. Opportunity
was immediately taken to run a Malta convoy (Operation MC9). The supply of Malta
was a continued pressing anxiety. The Italian fleet, based on our flank at Taranto,
was an ever-present threat. Each convoy required a major fleet operation and, with
LUSTREin full swing, made yet another demand on the already heavily pressed light
forces. This one passed without incident, and by the 24th the fleet was back at Alex.
with LUSTREstill proceeding. Within two days, however, the fleet was at sea again,
this time unexpectedly.
The Battle of Cape Matapan ensued. This has already been fully reported in these
pages. After weeks of astonishing inactivity, with convoys running incessantly to Greece
under their noses, the Italians tried to interfere. The result is known : but it is worth
recalling that the forces for this battle were scrambled together from the Piraeus, Crete,
the Aegean, by thinning convoy escorts, and by snatching destroyers from boiler cleaning
and repair. There was no margin. Rest and repair again went to the wall in the face of
operational urgency. In the Mediterranean in 1941 it was never otherwise.
Matapan itself was a godsend. True, the victory might have been more complete ;
but, in view of what was to come and the risks that were to be run, no more opportune
moment could have arisen for the Italians to present themselves for chastisement at the
hands of our great leader. What they received at least ensured that they did not join
hands with the Luftwaffe in the struggle that was to come. Had they done so it might have
proved fatal.
LUSTREcontinued, hardly checked by the battle ; but the tempo of the struggle began
to quicken. The Bonaventzcre fell to U-boat attack on the 31st of March. Losses to air
attack began to rise in the Aegean. In the Western Desert the Army fell back under
Rommel's attack. By the 3rd of April Benghazi fell. By the 13th the Army was back
to the frontier. Tobruk was invested and the first of the naval losses in its supply presaged the running sore that that supply route was to prove. Worse still, the enemy's
air again had a base upon our southern flank. The Army was falling back in Greece.
In Greece also our air forces, gallantly striving against hopeless odds, were wasting at an
alarming rate. By the 16th of April plans for the evacuation from Greece-Operation
DEMON-were already underway. The long dreaded " Dunkirk " was almost upon us.
In the meantime other operations were in progress. Shortage of escorts and the,
preoccupation of those available with LUSTREhad obliged us to leave the attack on Axis
communications across the Central Mediterranean to the S/Ms and the aircraft working
from Malta. Now the advantage accruing from Matapan, and a temporary lull in traffic
to and from Greece, enabled the detachment of a surface striking force to Malta. Four of
the 14th Destroyer Flotilla under Captain Mack were sent. Results were swift, for in
a brilliant night action off Sfax on the 10th of April an entire southbound convoy, full of
German troops and material, was destroyed for the loss of one destroyer, the Mohawk,
torpedoed.
Faced with the urgency of doing all possible to assist our hard-pressed armies in
Africa, a major fleet operation now took place with the object of destroying enemy transit
facilities in his main base at Tripoli. Calling at Suda Bay to fuel destroyers, the entire
fleet arrived off Tripoli in the small hours of the 21st of April and carried out an hour's
bombardment of the port installations. Greatly to the surprise of all, no serious reaction
was evoked from the enemy air forces ; and the fleet, including Captain Mack's force,
returned to Alex. to prepare for the evacuation of Greece, aptly named Operation DEMON.
I n fact a large proportion of the light craft went direct to Greece from the bombardment.
Realizing the coming absorption of the Mediterannean Fleet with Operation DEMON,
the Admiralty despatched reinforcements through the Mediterranean, the Dido and
Abdiel joining the main fleet at Alex. while the 5th D.F. under Capt. Lord Louis Mountbatton stayed at Malta as a striking force, arriving there on the 28th. The cruiser
Glozccester was sent to give them support.
Ships of all types had been moving into position for Operation DEMON.The " Glen "
ships and the first of the later well-known L.C.T.s, sent out for the projected invasion of
Rhodes, were now to prove their value in a reverse role. These, with cruisers, destroyers,
THE GREECE AND CRETE
CAMPAIGNS, 1941.
221
sloops, corvettes, whalers and personnel ships concentrated in Greek waters under
V.A.L.F., who was to conduct the evacuation in concert with Rear-Admiral Baillie
Grohman who was in charge ashore. With every light craft absorbed in evacuation duties,
the battle fleet was immobilized at Alex. No cover could be provided to ensure the nonintervention of Italian surface forces. It is a measure alike of Italian ineptitude and of the
profound significance of Matapan and subsequent offensive operations that no such intervention occurred.
The situation in Greece deteriorated rapidly, as can be seen by reference to Admiral
Baillie Grohman's Despatch. D-Day for the operation was advanced from the 28th to
the 24th of April. Greek resistance was collapsing. On the air side the enemy strength
and ferocity grew daily, while, by the 24th, our own Air Force had ceased to exist in Greece
and only a handful were left to continue the fight from Crete. These could provide only
the thinnest of air cover for shipping in the immediate vicinity of Crete. No reinforcement could be spared from the exigious resources remaining in the Middle East, so their
effort again was a wasting one.
The situation with the light forces as they faced up to the ordeal was by no means
happy. Pressure of operations had been such that maintenance had dropped to an
insufficient minimum. As a background it must be remembered that maintenance
resources were in themselves so slender as to cause grave concern. Malta, under continuous air bombardment, was no place to refit ships. Alex. possessed but two docks,
one large, one small. Certain minor resources existed at Port Said and Suez. The
hard pressed depot-ships strove manfully ; but the sum total was pitifully inadequate
to support a major naval campaign. In addition officers and men, particularly commanding
officers, were already tired and strained. It must be remembered that radar was then in
its infancy. By no means all ships had it ; in fact the majority had not ; so even that
blessed aid to vigilance was lacking to help these war-worn men.
The stories of the evacuation are well told in the Despatches and need not be retold
here. All that need be done is to emphasize the seamanship and resource that was displayed on all sides in closing unlighted and ill-charted beaches, embarking worn-out
troops with every kind of craft and boat that opportunity offered, and striving in the
confusion and uncertainty to embark the maximum number and get away to time, to
avoid air attack which would otherwise be inevitable. In the circumstances it is
amazing that the operation ran so smoothly. The only major error occured at Kalamata
on the night 28th-29th April where confusion caused by enemy action ashore and bad
communications led to a premature abandonment of the night's embarkation programme :
an error which could not be retrieved by the gallant efforts made on the two succeeding
nights by three destroyers who by then could recover only a handful of the 5,000 men
originally present for evacuation.
So, on the 30th of April, the evacuation ended. A total of over 50,000 men snatched
from under the nose of the enemy in conditions of the greatest difficulty. Nor had the
bill been unduly heavy. The Ulster Prince lost by grounding and subsequently by fire
from bombing. The destroyers Diamond and Wryneck sunk, and N ~ b i a ndamaged. The
L.S.I. Glenearn badly damaged but towed to Alex. The personnel ships Penrtland, Slamat
and Costa Rica sunk. A large proportion of landing craft lost from various causes. A
gloomy but on the whole successful operation, and one of which the Navy could be proud.
Pressure of time and shortage of shipping had led to the majority of evacuated troops
being landed in Crete in the first instance. Some were eventually staged onward to
Egypt ; but the majority remained in Crete, being hastily reorganized to meet the inevitable
attack on that island. Reinforcements of men and material were now hastily being sent
there. There was no let up for the light forces. No sooner was the Greek evacuation
over than the Crete build-up began. Nor could this be a well-planned operation. It was
a scramble all the time, units and material being shipped as and when they became available
from General Wavell's slender stock. Reference to Admiral Cunningham's Despatch shows
that 15,000 tons of stores were dis-embarked from fifteen ships during this period (28th
April-15th May), while eight ships were lost or damaged in the process.
It was an uneasy period. The attack on Malta had intensified, accompanied by an
aerial minelaying offensive of the most concentrated kind. The Jersey was sunk in the
222
THE GREECE AND CRETE CAMPAIGNS,
1941.
entrance to Grand Harbour returning from a night sortie in search of Axis convoys. The
Gloucester was mined out and had to run for Gibraltar, incurring minor bomb damage on
the way. Poor Gloucester ! This was her third bomb hit in a year of Mediterranean war.
With the Laftwaffe already on our southern flank and now closing and consolidating
in the north, passage through the Mediterranean was plainly to become a painfully hazardous
affair. Before the door finally shut it was decided to pass through a last convoy of tanks
from England in an effort to restore the balance in the Western Desert. Operation
TIGERit was called, and promised fair to be as fierce. Simultaneously it was decided
to pass two tankers into Malta, where fuel stocks were dangerously short. Again it was
a major operation, Mediterranean Fleet and Force H co-operating. Again more strain
for the light craft in their unending struggle as much against fatigue as against the enemy.
TIGERwent smoothly. Luck was on our side. On the way to Malta a light force
detached to examine Benghazi intercepted a small Axis convoy which they destroyed.
The oilers got safely into Malta despite the mines. The dangerous day (7th May) off
Malta was shrouded by cloud close above our mastheads as the TIGERconvoy, escorted by
the returning Gloucester and new reinforcements, the Queen Elizabeth, C.S. 15 in the Naiad
and the Fiji,came through and joined the fleet. One merchant ship was lost on a mine, and
one was torpedoed but able to proceed. Air attack came the following night at dusk ; but
without effect. The 5th D.F. bombarded Benghazi and regained Malta under heavy air
attack. On the 9th of May the reinforcement was through, and the fleet turned its
attention to Crete and the battle that impended.
CRETE.
I t was clear that attack must come. Identifications of formations told us that airborne troops would be involved. The Luftwaffe was piling thickly onto the Grecian airfields. Middle East air resources were now so depleted that it had been agreed that none
could be spared to face certain destruction in Crete. Navy and Army had to face this
battle hand in hand without their complementary partner in the air,
It cannot be too clearly stated that the risk was faced with open eyes and grave
foreboding : but the necessity was there. Crete was to be held. It would be difficult
and costly to supply, even were the attack repulsed. The wisdom of the decision to hold
it is not subject for comment here. It is part pattern of a wider composition. What
matters here is that it was to be held and that the Navy had a part to play in the holding.
Also it must be remembered that it was deemed inconceivable then that airborne force
alone could take it. Seaborne attack was thought inevitable. Seaborne attack was what
the Navy was pledged to stop.
Again it must be remembered that experience so far of air attack was that it was
dangerous but not by any means always deadly. It had been faced many times in many
various circumstances. Losses had been suffered, but not overwhelming loss. A fair
hazard of war was the general opinion. We had never experienced, nor could we foretell,
air attack-of the weight and ferocity experienced in this operation. The German concentration in the Aegean area was, in speed and extent, an eye-opener in the efficient
conduct of air war. These factors all weighed in the issue : but in any event, and whatever
the risk, the Navy was committed, as ever, to give its best. Of that there could be no
doubt whatever.
Quite apart from the prospect of enemy air action the naval problem was not an easy
one. The date of attack could not be foretold. Suda Bay, under constant air attack,
was no longer available as a fuelling anchorage. So the problem lay in providing, from
limited resources, sufficient forces within easy call of the Aegean coast of Crete and at the
same time of ensuring that these forces should not be short of fuel when the call came.
In addition it was felt essential to provide, to the westward of Crete, a covering force of
sufficient strength to prevent surface intervention by the Italian fleet either in support
of an invasion fleet from Italian ports or solely in an effort to dominate the Aegean. The
THE GREECE AND CRETE
CAMPAIGNS,
1941.
223
Italian fleet, severely handled as it had been from time to time, was still a formidable'
force on paper and could not be dismissed from calculation.
No air cover could be provided even for the battleship covering forces, since the
Formidable, the only aircraft carrier in the station, had flown her fighter aircraft to exhaustion during the preceding fleet operations already described and was busy trying
to restore her serviceability figures to a state which would render her squadrons once
more operational. The day of Reserve Carrier Air Groups was far off in that period of
the war.
In the event dispositions proved well judged. Only one false start had been made.
The waiting period had been used to good effect for landing further reinforcements in,
Crete, and morning of the 20th of May, the day the attack started, found our surface
forces well supplied with fuel and in position close south of both ends of Crete ready for
intervention if required. The policy was not to commit our forces in daylight within the
Aegean unless targets were known to be there. The sequence of events is clearly set forth
in the narrative of the C.-in-C. Mediterranean. The first 24 hours passed with deceptively
little incident. Heavy air attacks took place; but apart from slight damage to the Ajax the
only severe effect lay in the loss of the Jmo to Italian high-level bombing. This 10s
was counted unlucky, since it was the first of its kind in a year's intensive experience of
such attack.
Meanwhile the airborne attacks on Crete continued with varying fortunes ; but
there was yet no cause to believe that, if we could stall off seaborne attack, the defence
would not triumph. Air reports showed movement of shipping southward in the Aegean,
some steamers, but mostly caiques. Here lay the Navy's targets, and on the night 21stl
22nd the striking forces were ordered in to destroy them. One of these convoys was
encountered by night and destroyed by Rear-Admiral Glennie's force-another was met
with by C.S.15's force off Milo at 0830 on the 22nd and briefly attacked. The force
however, withdrew in face of the heavy air attack it encountered ; but the convoy turned
back and did not reach Crete.
Two criticisms arose on these points in C.-in-C. Mediterranean's Despatch. One was
of Admiral Glennie's decision to withdraw owing to shortage of ammunition. True, the
Oriolz's and Ajax's batteries might have served useful purpose by augmenting c.S.15'~
fire that morning. That could scarcely be foretold. With only 40 per cent. ammunition
remaining in any of squadron after a bare 24-hours' operations, replenishment for all
before further combat was so compelling a desire as to seem to many an absolute essential,
At the time the decision to retire was taken the force was expecting to play a lone hand
in daylight next morning, the order to join C.S.15 not having reached R.A.D. until too
late for compliance.
The second criticism was of Admiral King's decision to withdraw his force when he
had the enemy in sight under his guns. Undoubtedly a chance was lost of inflicting
savage loss upon the Germans. C.-in-C. Mediterranean's comment, that the safest place
for the squadron in the circumstances would have been among the enemy ships is true
enough. Before sitting in judgment secure in our chairs ashore, let us try and place
ourselves in the Admiral's shoes on the bridge of the Naiad on that morning. He had a
night action with M.A.S. boats on the night 20th/21st. He had been bombed continuously from 0930 to 1350 on the day before and lost a ship in consequence. The night
had been one of continuous alert. He was already short of ammunition. The air w&
full of aircraft-all hostile-described by observers as like a swarm of bees. The course of
the action would take him away from his supports. He made a mistake. Let us note
that fact and pass on with the lesson learnt, that when we find ourselves weary and nervewracked, the scream of dive bombers in our ears and the din of gunfire and bursting bomb9
to confuse us, and when we are short of ammunition, we must close the enemy still. If
that lesson is learnt and digested then the battle was not in vain.
From then onward a wave of ill-luck set upon the fleet. The Naiad was bad$
damaged. The Carlisb hit and her captai~lkilled as they fell back to join the supporting
battleships under Admiral Rawlings, boldly coming in through the Kithera Strait. The
Wcwspite was already badly damaged with 50 per cent. of her A.A. out of action. The Fiji
224
THE GREECE AND CRETE CAMPAIGNS,
1941.
and Glozccester had slight damage. Ammunition all round was going alarmingly fast.
s
Then, as the forces were joining, the Greyhozcnd was hit and sunk. Then the Glowester,
the veteran with a charmed life, succumbed a t last in a blazing shambles. The Valiant
was hit twice but not too badly. Finally the Fiji, reduced now to using practice ammunition, after repeated hits, capsized at dusk. Most of the ships, battleships only excepted,
were almost out of ammunition. In the face of this crippling loss, and in the belief that
d l were almost out of ammunition C.-in-C. Mediterranean ordered all this force to withdraw
to Alex.
The bar to seaborne invasion was still maintained, though on a reduced scale. The
Navy was still holding to its bargain in spite of sacrifice. Destroyers patrolled the north
coast of Crete by night, and destroyed the few caiques that ventured there. It was
during return from these patrols that further mischance occurred. Three of the 5th D.F.,
rushed up from Malta to assist, were returning on the morning of 23rd a t full speed, when
in one deadly attack the Kelly and Kashmir were both destroyed, leaving only the Kifding,
herself damaged, to carry out the rescue work under relentless air attack.
It is at this point that C.-in-C. Mediterranean expresses regret that owing, to a signal
error, he believed that the battleships were out of ammunition, as otherwise they would
have remained to support D.5's retirement and might have averted this occurrence.
Implication is that the fate of two destroyers hung on the balance between two words
'' empty " and " plenty" as applied to'ammunition. How exactly the mistake arose
cannot now be remembered--only that the pencil " rush copy " bore the first meaning
and the typed " distribution copy next morning bore the second. Whether the mistake
was phonetic or hasty bad writing is still subject of argument among those immediately
concerned. It matters little. Mistake occurred and must be guarded against in future.
The writer, however, begs leave to doubt that the loss of the ships was necessarily attributable. Two ships out of three went down to a series of heavy air attacks. Our luck was
out, the enemy's in the ascendant. Had twenty ships been there instead of three, how
many would have been hit ?
Meantime events in Crete were moving toward defeat. The enemy poured in reinforcements, all by air, with reckless disregard for loss. The Army's position contracted.
Rear-Admiral Morse, at Suda Bay, was, on the 23rd, beginning to find himself forced to
consider plans for evacuation. Plans for reinforcements, however, went forward. Ammunition was ferried in by d e s t r o y e ~ f f o r t swere made to send further troops in the
Glen~oy. The Abdiel, having fulfilled her mining tasks, was starting on the first of her many
trips as a super-fast troop and store ship. The story is all in the Despatch, for those who
care to read it.
Naval forces still scoured the northern coast of Crete by night. The Formidable, her
aircraft partially restored to serviceability, sailed in company with V.A. 1st B.S. with the
Qzcee~Elizabeth and Barham to attempt to strike at the enemy's air in Scarpanto. David
and Goliath stuff this-but any offensive action was to be welcomed at this moment.
The weather was bad on the 25th and foiled several minor undertakings. The situation
in Crete grew worse.
The Formidable's attack on Scarpanto on 26th drew swift retaliation. The Formidable
was hit twice and put out of action as a carrier. The Nzcbian had her stern blown
off, The Glenroy, making a second attempt to take troops to Crete, was hit and took fire
for long enough to prevent her achieving her object. On the night of 26th/27th the
Abdiel and two destroyers ran in a last reinforcement to Suda Bay. On the morning of
the 27th the front in western Crete collapsed suddenly, and early that day C.-in-C. Mediterranean and his staff turned wearily to plan yet another evacuation, with less resources,
less ships and in far less promising circumstances. And if they were weary, what of the
ships concerned ? Blood from stones was nothing to the demands made on the superhuman endurance of these companies and their leaders. They had kept their faith. No
enemy soldier had stepped from sea to shore on to Crete : but the price had been savage
and now they were asked for more from empty tills. On with the dance ! Only 22,000
to lift this time and then, perhaps, a spell. No code names graced these operationsperhaps it was as well.
THE GREECE AND CRETE CAMPAIGNS, 1941.
225
The first stage of evacuation was to be from Heraklion, where a gallant British force
was holding intact positions. They were to come out in one lift, falling back to the harbour
in an orderly operation. After a brilliant embarkation of 4,000 men, ill-luck fell on the
force. There is no space to describe here that gallant, disastrous voyage. The Imperial
and Hereward sunk-the Orion and Dido shattered but still steaming-a fearful 10- in
troops under the Navy's care. With such a terrible example, it took a stout heart to issue
orders for continuation. The stout heart was there. Too many losses ? Leave Dominion
troops to their fate ? Never !
" I t takes the Navy three years to build a ship. I t would take three hundred
to build a new reputation. The evacuation will continue."
I t did. Almost from the moment of that splendid pronouncement the losses ceased
like magic. Slight damage occurred but, with one exception (the unhappy loss of Calcutta),
no more outright loss. There were reasons other than magic to account. After Heraklion
no more embarkations were necessary from the north coast. All remaining troops, in
western Crete, were falling back over the mountains to the little village of Sphakia in the
south. Thence they embarked on four successive nights to a total of 13,000 men. Mercifully Sphakia, further from the Germans, was nearer to our own Air Force which, now
that it could reach a helping hand was giving its best, flying miles beyond normal prudent
range to help the sister Services snatch what they could from the wreck. And well they
did it. The. writer, however, perhaps a little sentimental, still feels that we owed not a
little of our immunity to Providence looking approvingly on dogged courage in adversity.
So ended a disastrous chapter in our naval history. Men tended to draw false conclusion from it of the mastery of air over naval forces. Such conclusions were
plainly false. The way to fight the air is with the air. I t must be carried where necessary
on our backs. This was a tale simply of great achievement by men fighting without
requisite weapons against odds beyond endurance. And in the end they triumphedat a price.
Admiral Cunningham was wont to quote Lord St. Vincent to his staff. " No difficulty
baffles great zeal." Was ever a saying more clearly underlined. The sentiment was
portrayed in every action of the Mediterranean Fleet.
Lastly a word about that great little man "A.B.C." himself. He rose to great heights
throughout the war. He fought against odds, rose to triumph, met disaster like a friend
and rose again. The writer was privileged to be with him in many of these moments :
but never at any time did he see him rise to greater stature than when, in this period of
shattering disaster, with sorrow from his own orders penetrating his own home, his indomitable fortitude bore him up to carry an overdriven fleet to what, after all, was triumph.
Can his spirit be put better than in the words of his guiding motto, by Montrose ?
" He either fears his fate too much,
Or his deserts are small,
That dares not pzct it to the tozcch
T o gain or lose it all ? "
M.L.P.
226
THE CONTRIBUTION O F THE BRITISH PACIFIC FLEET TO THE ASSAULT ON OKINAWA.
THE CONTRIBUTION O F THE BRITISH PACIFIC FLEET
T O THE ASSAULT ON OKINAWA, 1945.
OPERATION ICEBERG.
Supplement to the LONDON
GAZETTE
of the 1st of Jurte, 1948.
THISsupplement to the London Gazette contains the Despatches of Admiral Sir Bruce
"
*
"
Fraser, G.C.B., K.B.E., Commander-in-Chief, British Pacific Fleet, dated 7th June and
10th July, 1945, giving a detailed account of the first series of operations carried out by the
British Pacific Fleet working as a part of the U.S. Pacific Fleet under Admiral Nimitz.
During these operations, as Admiral Fraser remarks, the B.P.F. made British
naval history by operating off the enemy coast for periods up to thirty days
at a time. The organization necessary and the problems which had to be solved to keep
it supplied for such periods were considerable, and before proceeding to the narrative it
seems worth while touching on the planning which preceded them, and describing briefly
the means whereby the fleet was kept supplied with its striking weapon-aircraft-for,
important though it was to the success of the operations, this aspect is naturally not dealt
with in these Despatches.
As a result of the reverses we sustained in south-east Asia and the Indian Ocean in
early 1942, the fleet and its aviation were pushed back on hastily established bases in
East Africa. In 1943, when it became clear that the Japanese advance was held, the flow
back to the eastward commenced. The battles of the Coral Sea and Midway, no less than
the early successes of Japanese naval aircraft, had convinced the Board of Admiralty that
the key to control at sea lay with naval aviation ; a large carrier-building programme had
been launched, and the preparation commenced of a number of naval air bases in Ceylon
and southern India from which naval aviation could be supported in future operations
against Japanese-occupied south-east Asia. At about the same time plans for the Mobile
Naval Air Base (Monab) organization, designed for supporting it from advanced bases,
began to take shape. This organization was to prove most useful, though in a more static
role than originally intended, in later Pacific operations.
About the beginning of 1944, the decision was taken to form a British Pacific Fleet
to participate with the U.S. Fleet in the Central Pacific operations. I t was realized from
the start that this undertaking would require an immense effort, and that it would involve
us in operations of a type of which we had no previous experience. In particular, it meant
supporting the fleet by means of a fleet train, a method which the U.S. Navy had been
forced through lack of overseas bases to develop, but which we had neglected.
I t was decided that the main fleet base should be at Sydney, and in May, 1944, there
Brrived in Australia the British Naval Liaison Party, a small group of staff officers under a
rear-admiral, to start the planning ; amongst its early duties was the selection of the
airfields which would be required in Australia to support the naval air effort in the Pacific.
Advance planning was not rendered easier by the fact that until October, 1944, not even
the approximate size and composition of the British Pacific Fleet were known. In early
November Vice-Admiral (Q) arrived with his staff in Australia and established himself in
Melbourne, followed six weeks later by Flag Officer Naval Air Pacific (as he was later known)
who made his headquarters at Sydney, becoming responsible to V.A. (Q.) for the administration of all shore-based naval aviation and for air logistics.
The airfields selected were grouped in two areas, round Sydney and Melbourne,
respectively, and were in various stages of completion. To them came the Monabs, formed
one by one in the United Kingdom and shipped complete to Australia. Manned and
equipped to operate from a jungle airstrip, these units found much of their equipment
redundant in Australia ; one only, H.M.S. Naberon, which occupied the airstrip at Ponam
in the Admiralty Islands, found itself operating more or less as originally envisaged.
Nevertheless these units were able to commission and bring into efficient use aixiields in
various stages of construction in a fraction of the time which would have been required
had the airfields been commissioned in the usual manner, relying on normal methods for
the provision of airfield facilities. And when the fleet, including four fleet carriers with
some 250 aircraft, arrived in Australia on the 1st of February, 1945, R.N.A.S. Nowra and
Bankstown, and within a few days R.N.A.S. Sckofields also, were ready to receive a hundred
of its aircraft and to provide it with replacements for the casualties suffered in operations
on the passage out, and a start had been made with the building up of reserves in readiness
for its first Pacific operations.
The decision to arm the carriers of the British Paciiic Fleet to as large an extent as
possible with American aircraft-Hellcat and Corsair fighters and Avenger strike aircrafthad been taken, not only because of the better endurance of these aircraft compared to
our own types at that time available, but also for reasons of supply. But Seafire and
Firefly aircraft were also carried in some numbers, and the shore-based facilities for training
and maintenance had therefore to be organized to support five main types. Replacement
aircraft reached Australia in a state of preservation, either by ferry carrier or as deck
cargo in specially fitted freighters, direct from the U.S.A., or by ferry carrier from the
erection unit at R.N.A.S. Cochin in southern India, or in cases by freighter direct from the
United Kingdom. Cased aircraft had to be erected, while those arriving in a preserved
state had to be depreserved and brought to operational standard. All had then to be
represerved before dispatch by ferry carrier to the forward area.
To keep the fleet supplied during its operating cycle with replacement aircraft from
Australia, H.M.S. Unicorn. (aircraft repair ship) and six American-built escort carriers
were available at the time of this operation. Of these, three of the C.V.E.s worked as
ferry carriers taking preserved aircraft from Australia to the Unicorn, first at Manus in
the Admiralty Islands and later at Leyte. The aircraft were depreserved in the Unicorn,
taken to the replenishment area in two other C.V.E.s, and flown to the carriers requiring
them, the C.V.E.s bringing back any flyable duds. The sixth C.V.E. was used to fly a
Combat Air Patrol in the replenishment area. Later, when the Monab at Ponam was
fully established, the fleet air train was again based on Manus.
The foregoing may give some idea of the vast organization required to keep a force of
four fleet carriers supplied with aircraft during extended operations some 4,000 miles from
its main base, and some 10,000 miles from the sources of aircraft production.
NARRATIVE.
=
The object of Operation ICEBERG
was the capture of Okinawa, .and the duty assigned
to the B.P.F. was to neutralize the Japanese airfields in the Sakishima group, southwest of Okinawa and between that island and Formosa, as continuously and for as long
as possible. The operation lasted, in two main periods with an interval of eight days
at the advanced fleet base at Leyte between them, from 26th of March to 25th of May,
1945.
Task Force 57 which, under the command of Vice-Admiral Sir Bernard Rawlings
and supported by Task Force 112 (the fleet train and its escort), carried out the operation
consisted of the King George V (flag of V.-A. Rawlings), Howe, Indomitable (flag of R.-A.
Vian), Victorious, Illustrious, Indefatigable, five cruisers and eleven destroyers, with a
complement of 244 aircraft in the four carriers. The only major change in composition
during the operation was the relief, towards the end of the first operating period, of the
Illzcstrious by the Formidable. The U.S. Fast Camer Force, conducting similar and
simultaneous operations in covering the landings on Okinawa itself, consisted of 15 carriers
with a total of 919 aircraft, 8 battleships, 15 cruisers and 48 destroyers, or just about
fm times the strength of the B.P.F. In addition, a support carries: group with 564
&craft operated in close support of the landings.
The B.P.F., which had amved in Australia on the 1st of February, sailed again on
the 27th for Manus in the Admiralty Islands, where some of the squadrons were landed
228
THE CONTRIBUTION O F THE BRITISH PACIFIC FLEET TO THE ASSAULT ON OKINAWA.
for training, and about ten days were spent exercising. On the 15th of March C.-in-C.,
B.P.F., ordered Vice-Admiral Rawlings to report his force and its train for duty with
C.-in-C. Pacific (Admiral Nirnitz). The tanker group was sailed direct to a fuelling
rendezvous, while the fleet proceeded to Ulithi to complete with fuel and receive final
orders and intelligence before sailing, as Task Force 57, on March 23rd, for Operation
ICEBERG
under the orders of COM 5th Fleet (Admiral Spruance).
The general plan for the operations by the B.P.F. took the form of a series of cycles
of two days of strikes against the island airfields and any other targets which presented
themselves, followed by two days of withdrawal to the replenishment area to complete
with fuel, aircraft and stores. For the first operating period from the 26th of March to
the 20th of April five such cycles were planned ; in fact, owing to the serious situation
brought about by the furious Japanese suicide aircraft offensive against the U.S. forces
off Okinawa in the middle of April, the offer of an extra day's operations was made and
was gratefully accepted by Admiral Spruance. During the second period from 4th to
25th May, six operating cycles were carried out, on conclusion of which the fleet retired
to Australia to replenish. Except for two days during the first period, when the force
was ordered to attack airfields in Formosa, the whole effort was directed against the
Sakishirna group. The two periods were separated by eight days spent recouping at
Leyte. It was on this occasion that, limited boat transport making it impossible for the
libertymen to get to the beer, approval was given for the beer to be embarked and consumed onboard, a concession which was greatly appreciated.
The method adopted to neutralize the Japanese airfields was to send in fighter sweeps
to deal with any enemy air opposition, and attack any suitable targets including aircraft
on the ground, and escorted strikes of Avengers to crater the runways with heavy bombs.
The attacks on the runways were effective enough, but the effort had to be continuous,
as the Japanese were able to repair much of the damage by night. On one occasion the
fleet closed the islands and bombarded the airfields, doing considerable damage ; it was,
however, acknowledged that the heavy aircraft bomb was the better weapon for the
purpose. In general, the fleet seems to have operated its aircraft at distances of fifty
to a hundred miles from the islands. Early in the operation strong fighter sweeps were
employed to insure against interference with the strikes by enemy aircraft, and sometimes
a Combat Air Patrol was maintained over the enemy airfields for this purpose. There
was, however, little or no enemy air opposition in the target area ; such air opposition as was
encountered took the form of suicide attacks, mainly directed against the carriers. Combat
and Anti-submarine Air Patrols were maintained continuously during daylight hours
over the force, and this absorbed a considerable effort, so much so that it was never
possible to split the carrier force to provide a more sustained effort since two carriers alone
could not maintain patrols as well as provide the strike.
Hellcats as well as Avengers were used as bombers, and, in addition to the attention
paid to the airfields and to aircraft on the ground, enemy shipping and any suitable ground
target was attacked. Enemy flak was always a nuisance, and caused many casualties,
the Japanese using flashless ammunition so that our aircraft were unaware that they
were under fire until they were hit. Owing to their low endurance the Seafires had to be
employed on fleet C.A.P. Ship targets for the one Firefly squadron were few and they were
mainly employed on patrols, but on one occasion two of them caught and destroyed four
out of five Japanese bombers.
Though bad weather caused difficulties from time to time, and there were some accidents, things went reasonably well in the replenishment area. During the second period
considerable numbers of bombs were transferred successfully to the carriers from the
supply ships.
ATTACKS BY JAPANESE SUICIDE AIRCRAFT.
The tactics employed by the Japanese suicide aircraft were to approach in small
groups to a distance of thirty to forty miles from the fleet, and then to split up into single
units, taking advantage of cloud cover to make their attacks. They thus presented a
difficult interception problem, as well as difficult targets for long-range gunfire. The
Indefatigable, Victoriozcs and Formidable were all hit by Kamikase aircraft at various
times, the two latter twice, receiving more or less serious damage, while the Indomitable
had a narrow escape, a Kamikase bouncing off her flight deck overboard accompanied by
its bomb. No ship was out of action for flying for more than a few hours, and, in comparison with the much more vulnerable American carriers, our armoured camers showed
up extremely well.
To give an idea of the dimensions of the suicide aircraft campaign, it may be mentioned
that some 1,900 suicide sorties were carried out against the surface forces taking part in
the Okinawa operations. While comparatively minor damage only was inflicted on the
armoured carriers of the B.P.F., the U.S. invasion force of over 1200 vessels suffered
26 ships sunk and 164 damaged by this form of attack alone, a number of the casualties
being carriers.
CONCLUSION.
In the covering remarks to his report on the second operational period, Vice-Admiral
Rawlings thus summarizes the activities of his command during the whole operation :" Over the whole period Task Force 57 was at sea for 62 days, broken by 8 days
re-storing at Leyte, maintaining an intermittent neutralization of (the) airfields
by day. . During this time the Task Force flew 4,852 sorties, dropped 875 tons
of bombs and rocket projectiles, destroyed 100 enemy aircraft and damaged 70
others ; various other targets such as shipping, WIT stations, etc., were also
attacked. Our own losses were 33 aircraft from enemy action ; in addition 92
were lost operationally."
He writes in glowing terms throughout the report of the great assistance and co-operation
given by the American authorities at Leyte, and of the excellent work of the U.S. submarines and aircraft which performed air/sea rescue services for the B.P.F. ; he concludes
with a well-deserved tribute to Rear-Admiral Sir Philip Vian himself and to his carriers
for the manner in which they contrived to remain in operation in spite of damage.
Admiral Fraser, in his Despatch dealing with the first operating period, but dated
7th June and therefore written some 14 days subsequent to the completion of the whole
operation, remarks :
" Doubt as to our ability to operate in the Pacific manner was somewhat
naturally in American minds. This, however, was soon changed. The toll taken
by the suicide bomber of the more lightly armoured American carriers led to an
increase of the proportionate effort provided by our carriers, and the evidence of
American eyes that we could support ourselves logistically relieved their anxieties
on that score. We have now, I am sure, become not only welcome but necessary
in Central Pacific operations.
" Despite their doubts, the Americans put their trust in us unstintedly, and the
generosity and help of all were invaluable to our success, a result which I know is
most satisfactory to them."
There can be no doubt that the close and cordial relations which existed between
the two navies contributed much towards the outstanding success of the B.P.F. And,
apart from the direct help received from the Americans, and the considerable assistance
derived from the use of American types of aircraft with their better endurance, indirectly
the fleet was indebted to them for help in many other ways. We were able to draw on
their tactical and administrative experience, gained the hard way in the early days of the
Pacific war. And in Australia as well as in the Admiralty Islands we found air bases,
constructed by or for the Americans, ready for our use-bases which, through the absence
of our Army with its constructional corps from this theatre of war, we would have been
quite unable to build quickly for ourselves, and without which the effort of the camer
force could not have been sustained. For, complete though they were for the purposes
of operating and maintaining aircraft, the Monabs had no constructional complement or
equipment, being intended to rely, like the R.A.F., on the Army for such work.
In conclusion, it may fairly be said that these Despatches record a landmark in
British naval history. Quite apart from their unusual duration in continuous sea-time,
these were the first major operations in which a large British fleet had employed aircraft
. ..
230
THE ACTION WITH THE ITALIAN FLEET OFF CALABRIA-9TH
JULY,
1940.
as its principal striking weapon. And though its form may not be exactly repeated in the
can
future-for maritime warfare is of infinite variety-nevertheless Operation ICEBERG
be said to mark the close of a naval era and the final passing of a fleet organization and
tactical doctrines based on the turret gun which have held the stage since the early days
of steam.
A.D.T.
THE ACTION WITH THE ITALIAN FLEET OFF
CALABRIA-~TH J U L Y , 1940.
Supplement to the LONDON
GAZETTEof the 27th of April, 1948.
A Soliloquy.
I opened the envelope in which the Hon. Editor had sent me this Despatch in the train
one morning and the heading caught my eye immediately-" H.M.S. Warspite. 29th January, 1941." Those words sent my thoughts roaming. I wondered how many of the last
war's despatches had been composed in the Wars+iteJssmall and congested staff office
and had been scrutinized and finally signed at the big desk in the " cuddy " just abaft it.
Nawik, Taranto, Matapan, Calabria, Crete, the stories of many sweeps through the central
Mediterranean, convoy operations and coastal bombardments. The ice and snow of the
far north searching for the German battle cruisers which sank the Rawdpindi ; the long
trip to Bremerton to repair the damage received off Crete ; and thence back, in due course,
to the heat of the East Indies ; and, finally, the assault on the Normandy coast. She saw
them all and wore an Admiral's flag at most of them.. I wondered whether any other
King's ship could show in her log experiences comparable to the Warsfi'te's-in the last
or in any other war. And that set me thinking about the men who designed her so well
and built her so stoutly, and the wisdom of the decision to modernize and re-equip her
and her sister ships in 1936-37 at a cost of many millions-a programme which,unfortunately, was never completed. I thought on the decisions, so firmly rooted in the study
of naval warfare and so stoutly adhered to, regarding the need for big-gun ships at a time
when all the popular cry was against such " white elephants." I remembered how a famous
admiral once remarked to me on the Wars+itels quarterdeck that such ships existed only
to mount, carry and fire their 15-inch guns, and also of what Lord Chatfield has written
regarding his fight to get the " King George V " class built.
Then I wished that a worthy pen would write the history of the last Warspite, and I
felt glad that she had ended her days on the rocky shores of an England she had guarded
so long and so faithfully, and not in a ship-breaker's yard.
My train then stopped and, idly and still half immersed in my thoughts, I turned the
page, and one paragraph of Admiral Cunningham's covering letter caught my eye : " I
cannot conclude these remarks without a reference to H.M.S. Eagle. This obsolescent
aircraft carrier . . . found and kept touch with the enemy fleet, flew off two striking
forces . . . within the space of four hours, both of which attacked . . . ." My train
started again and so did my train of thought, for I had served two commissions, covering
between them nearly six years, in the Warspite and the Eagle, and they had been the ships
In which I had been most proud and happy to serve-for both had been smart, clean,
efficient and happy ships. Certainly, as "A.B.C." said, the Eagle was, in 1940, very
obsolescent, but her ship's company and air crews were trained in the right tradition and
so she accomplished great things. I wondered how we would have fared between 1939
and 1943 without such " obsolescent " ships. Then as my train drew into the terminus
I pondered the wisdom of consigning " obsolescent " ships to the scrap heap in times of
peace, but remembered in time that a new Eagle would soon be in service, and I hoped for a
new Warspite, too. So my journey ended, and I hadn't even begun to study the Despatch
sent to me for review, since none of my ponderings had had anything to do with that brush
with the Italian Fleet off Calabria in July, 1940.
THE ACTION WITH THE ITALIAN FLEET OFF CALABRIA-9TH
JULY,
2940.
231
The Background.
It is an interesting Despatch, even though the " brief engagement " recounted therein
and the " meagre material results derived . . . were naturally very disappointing " to
the Commander-in-Chief. It is certain that, in his own mind, Admiral Cunningham had
taken the measure of the Italian Fleet's fighting capacity long before this action. That
is why he chased, attacked and tried to make them stand on this occasion with much
inferior and considerably slower forces at his disposal-four cruisers against a t least 16,
and 17 destroyers against 25 or 30. Yet the action must have given him, though he does
not say so, satisfying confirmation of his earlier judgment, and this must surely have
contributed to his confidence in his ability to defeat them soundly on later occasions,
even with his accustomed inferiority in strength. The Despatch bears the mark of the
relatively carefree days before the Lufhaffe had been sent to try to rescue Hitler's " tattered
lackey." The light touches-the intercepted Italian signal that they were " constrained
to retire," the remarks on the bombing of their own fleet by their own aircraft (" No hits
were observed ") and the C.-in-C.'s concluding remark regarding his " determination to
overcome the air menace and not to let it interfere with . . . our control of the Mediterranean " all date the Despatch as belonging to the opening phase of the struggle for control
of the narrow seas. The air menace was not yet fully appreciated since the Stuka and the
Junkers 88, which other ships had by this time encountered off Norway, had not yet '
appeared in force in the Mediterranean. Cover by shore-based fighters, of which few and
of obsolete types were then available, was in its infancy the force . . . was subjected to
bombing attacks between 1056 and 1628. . . . Blenheim fighters were sent out during the
afternoon to provide protection." Or again : " No. 252 Wing [was] requested to send
fighters. Fighters were sent later in the afternoon . . . "). Many lessons were still to
be learnt, and learnt the hard way ; but in July, 1940, Admiral Cunningham was able to
take his fleet to within 25 miles of the enemy coast in his determined effort to slow down
a much faster and retreating enemy sufficiently to bring him to action at close ranges with
the gun.
"A.B.C.'s " strong dislike of long-rauge gun actions, so vividly brought out in " G.B.'s "
description of the Battle of Matapan', appears again and again in these pages. Thus the
" Warspite's hit on one of the enemy battleships at 26,000 yards range might perhaps be
described as a lucky one," and, later, " On our side the action has shown . . . how difficult
it is to hit with the gun at long range, and, therefore, the necessity of closing in . . . in
order to get decisive results."
('I
Preliminary Movements.
But to get on, at last, with the story of the action. The sweep by the Fleet into the
central Mediterranean was designed to cover the passage of two convoys-a fast and a slow
one-from Malta to Alexandria with evacuees and fleet stores. What brought the enemy
to sea in force was uncertain, but he was probably also engaged in covering the passage of
a convoy.
On our side the Fleet was divided into three forces :Force A-7th Cruiser Squadron (Orion, Neptune, Sydney, Gloucester and Liverpool)
and one destroyer.
Force B-Warspite (C.-in-C.) and five destroyers.
Force C-1st Battle Squadron (Royal Sovereign and Malaya), Eagle and eleven
destroyers.
The Gloucester was damaged by a bomb hit on her compass platform on the 8th of
July and took no large part in the next day's action in consequence.' The enemy forces
consisted of two battleships, 16 to 18 cruisers (of which six or seven were 8-inch) and
between 25 and 30 destroyers.
The first enemy report came from the submarine Phoenix at 0807/8th. Flying boats
from Malta were then ordered to patrol to the north-east and east. Bombing started on
this day (the 8th of July), but, except for the damage to the Gloucester already mentioned,
N.R., November, 1947.
The casualties included her commanding officer, Captain I?. R. Garside, six other officers and
eleven ratings killed, and three officers and six ratings wounded.
2
232
THE ACTION WITH THE ITALIAN FLEET OFF CALABRIA-9TH
JULY,
1940.
no damage was suffered. At 1510 a flying boat reported considerable enemy forces to the
west of Admiral Cunningham, and they were resighted on the morning of the 9th. The
heavy bombing and presence of these forces indicated a special desire on the part of the
enemy to keep us out of the central Mediterranean. Admiral Cunningham, therefore,
moved his fleet towards Taranto to get between the enemy and his base.
The A#roach Period.
Early on the morning of the 9th of July, Admiral Cunningham had concentrated his
forces and was steering west. At 0732 flying boat reports placed the enemy 145 miles
280" from the C.-in-C., who then started to work to the north to implement his previously
taken decision to place himself on the enemy's line of retreat towards his bases,
Aircraft from the Eagle now started to search ahead of the fleet and, acting on their
reports, the first striking force was flown off at 1145 to attack the enemy who was then
believed to 6e only 90 miles 295" from the Wars+ite. Due, however, to an alteration of
course to the south by the enemy, this striking force failed to locate their targets but, later,
sighted and attacked unsuccessfully what was almost certainly the rear ship of a squadron
of cruisers.
The striking force had all returned safely by 1434.
By 1340 reports from flying boats and the Eagle's aircraft had made it clear that the
enemy had concentrated his forces and turned north again. The two fleets were thus
closing rapidly. At 1400 the C.-in-C. was satisfied that he was well placed across the
enemy's course to Taranto and, therefore, altered course to the west to increase the rate of
closing. The Wars9ite now acted as a battle cruiser in support of the heavily outnumbered
7th Cruiser Squadron, but the Royal Sovereign's slow speed still limited the rate of closing.
At 1435 the Eagle's aircraft reported the enemy only 30 miles to the west. Thus ended
the approach phase.
.
The Fleet Acti0.n.
The first surface sightings took place between 1452 and 1500 on the 9th of July.
Enemy cruisers opened fire on the 7th Cruiser Squadron at long range at 1514, and our
cruisers replied almost simultaneously. The Warspite, acting in support of the cruisers,
also opened fire and perhaps obtained one hit on an enemy 8-inch cruiser. At 1530 the
enemy made smoke and turned away. Fire was then checked. The enemy's gunnery
had been fairly accurate but, generally, with large spreads. No damage was received on
our side.
At 1553 the Warspite opened fire on the right hand of two " Cavour " class battleships
who, in turn, both engaged the flagship. At 1600 a hit was seen on the Warspite's target
and, presumably in consequence of this, the enemy followed the earlier tactics of his cruisers
and turned away making smoke. Fire was again checked at 1604. The Warspite next
fired at another cruiser and she, too, executed evasive tactics.
Meanwhile, the destroyers, released from the ships they had been screening, had
concentrated, between 1525 and 1552, on the battlefleet's disengaged bow. Enemy
destroyers were then seen to be moving across to starboard and apparently fired torpedoes
a t long range. Our destroyers were ordered to counter-attack at 1614. The enemy
destroyer attacks which then developed were half-hearted, torpedoes were (presumably)
fired a t long range and retirement under cover of smoke followed. Spasmodic actions
between the opposing flotillas took place as the enemy destroyers dodged in and out of
their smoke screens. No damage was received from enemy torpedoes, and the gun actions
had little result on either side. Meanwhile, our fleet was approaching the enemy's smoke
screen. His plain language intercepted signals indicated that we were approaching a
" submarine line," and Admiral Cunningham, therefore, decided that to plunge into the
smoke would be " playing the enemy's own game." He therefore, altered course to the
north to work round it. By 1700 our destroyers were clear of the smoke, but the enemy
was out of sight. He had apparently returned to the west at high speed. The Warspite's
aircraft reported later that the Italian Fleet was " left in considerable confusion " after the
action and did not " sort themselves out " until about 1800.
THE ACTION WITH ITALIAN FORCES OFF CAPE SPARTIVENT-27TH
NOVEMBER,
1940. 233
Bombing Attacks.
Between 1640 and 1925 heavy, high-level bombing attacks took place. The Warspite
and the Eagle received most attention, but no damage was received. The C.-in-C. continued to steer west from 1700 and, by 1735, was 25 miles off the Calabrian coast. When
it became clear that the enemy had no intention of resuming the fight, course was then
altered to the south. The enemy was last reported, by the Warspite's aircraft, about 10
miles off Cape Spartivento, under heavy but ineffectual attacks by their own bombers.
The C.-in-C. now proceeded to the south of Malta and, next day (the 10th of July) detached
his destroyers to fuel there. The fast Alexandria convoy had sailed a t 230019th and the
slow convoy followed next day after the destroyers had fuelled. Escorts were detached
to both convoys by the C.-in-C. One last attempt to get in a blow at the enemy was made
on the 10th of July by the Eagle's hard-worked striking force which was ordered to attack
some cruisers located in Augusta harbour. Unfortunately, they had sailed before the
torpedo bombers arrived, and the only result achieved was the sinking of a destroyer.
Movement of the Fleet to the eastward started early on the 11th of July, covering the
passage of the convoys. A further series of heavy bombing attacks developed that day,
but achieved no more than the previous efforts. On the 12th the Warspite and Eagle and
the 1st Battle Squadron were targets for still more bombs-the
flagship alone had
about 300 aimed at her-but still nothing worse than near misses occurred.
The C.-in-C. with the 7th Cruiser Squadron reached Alexandria a t 0600 on the 13th
and the fast convoy followed in three hours later. Force C, after having an extra day's
bombing, arrived undamaged on the 14th, and the slow convoy with its escorts made
harbour next day.
CONCLUSION.
The Commander-in-Chief's remarks on the ineffectiveness of the enemy's high-level
bombing have already been quoted. Even making every allowance for the difference
between peace practices and war and with some knowledge of the small probability of
hitting moving targets from great lieights, it seems remarkable that out of all the hundreds,
if not thousands, of bombs dropped during these four days only one hit was scored. I t
will, however, be remembered that high-level bombing had strong protagonists much nearer
home than Italy and that, there, too, little was achieved by this method of attack. The
truth is, of course, that "A.B.C.'s " dictum about long-range gun actions applies equally
to long-range bombing, and it will always be so. That is why the dive bomber or torpedo
bomber will obtain substantially more hits than the high-level bomber-but will probably
also suffer more serious losses. I t surprises the writer that this has, as far as he knows,
never been driven home very forcibly on the airmen. In these days when guided missiles
and all sorts of other longer and still longer range contraptions are being talked about and
developed, it is as well that airmen as well as sailors should remember this simple fact.
No other factor is ever likely to increase the rate of hitting with any weapon so substantially as to fire it or to drop'it at closer range !
MEMOR.
T H E ACTION WITH ITALIAN FORCES O F F C A P E '
S P A R T I V E N T O - 2 7 ~ ~ NOVEMBER, 1940.
Supfilement to the LONDON
GAZETTEof the 4th of May, 1948.
Introduction.
I t is interesting, though probably fortuitous, that this Despatch by Vice-Admiral
Sir James Somerville was released to the public almost simultaneously withthat of Admiral
Sir Andrew Cunningham dealing with the action off Calabria on the 9th of July, 1940
(also reviewed in these pages) since there are many aspects in which the two actions
resemble each other. Both came about through the necessity to cover with considerable
forces the passage of convoys through the Mediterranean ; on both occasions superior
234
THE ACTION WITH ITALIAN FORCES OFF CAPE
SPARTIVENTO-27TH
NOVEMBER, 1940.
Italian forces failed, by refusing to stand and fight, to make a serious attempt to prevent the
" safe and timely arrival " of those convoys ; the enemy employed the same tactics of
turning away under cover of smoke as soon as he came under fire in both actions ; the
high-level bombing by the Italian Air Force was ineffective on both occasions, and the
results achieved by the torpedo bombers from the Eagle off Calabria and from the Ark
Royal off Cape Spartivento were also disappointing, and from the same causes-namely,
inexperience of pilots and observers. In both actions the slow speed and short gun range
of an R-class battleship proved a handicap to the British admiral. Neither action resulted
in serious damage to the Italian fleet, but the combined effect of both operations mqst have
been a lowering of the enemy's morale and the establishment over his Navy of a great moral
ascendancy which, in time, was to prove decisive in that theatre of war.
The Plan.
The action off Cape Spartivento took place during Operation COLLAR which had as
its object the passage from Gibraltar to Alexandria of 1,400 R.A.F. and Army key officers
and men, two " Southampton " class cruisers, three motor transport ships carrying badly
needed armoured fighting vehicles, and four corvettes.
The British forces were organized for the operation as follows :Force B-Renown (flagship),Ark Royal, Sheffield, Despatch and nine destroyers.
Force F-The two " Southampton " class cruisers referred to above (Manchester
(C.S. 18) and Southampton), each with 700 passengers embarked, the three M.T.
ships and four corvettes. These were all to proceed to the eastern Mediterranean.
Force D-Ramillies, Newcastle, Coventry and Berwick and four destroyers, all from
the eastern Mediterranean.
Force D was to meet Forces B and F south of Sardinia on the 27th of November.
All three forces would then proceed to a position west of Skerki Bank which they would
reach that evening. From there, after dark, Force F, reinforced by the Coventry and
destroyers of Force D would proceed on through the narrows whilst Force B plus the
Ramillies, Newcastle and Berwick would return to Gibraltar.
Admiral Somerville states that theRenown, Sheffieldand Ark Royal were ingood fighting
condition except as regards the high proportion of inexperienced air crews embarked in
the carrier. The Bemick's speed was limited to 27 knots, and the Newcastle's boilers
were not entirely reliable. Many of the ships taking part had not previously operated
together, and the Manchester and Southam$ton were, of course, handicapped as fighting
units by the large number of passengers embarked. After consultation with the C.-in-C.
Mediterranean, it was agreed that the safe arrival of the military and R.A.F. personnel
should, if need arose, have priority over the M.T. ships, but the Admiralty insisted that if
enemy forces were sighted the two cruisers carrying the passengers must operate as though
they were not embarked. The implementation of this requirement must have set the
commanding officers of the two cruisers a very difficult problem.
Enemy Intelligence.
Admiral Somerville estimated that the enemy could concentrate three battleships,
five to seven eight-inch cruisers plus several six-inch cruisers and other light forces in the
western Mediterranean at this time. Reliance had to be placed on shore-based air reconnaissance to locate the enemy forces, and this proved quite inadequate to the purpose.
In the event no reports of the enemy fleet being at seawere received until they were sighted
by carrier aircraft on the morning of the 27th of November. Here again one comes up
against our lamentable weakness in air reconnaissance during the early stages of the last
war. The same weakness had most serious consequences during the Norwegian campaign1
and, indeed, comes out in almost every Despatch covering operations during the first two
or three years of the war. One can only hope that the lesson has not been forgotten in
the R.A.F. and that, since the Navy has not succeeded in obtaining control of its own
requirements for shore-based air reconnaissance, its needs will be properly met by the
sister Service from the very beginning of another war-if there should, unfortunately,be
one.
N.R., November, 1947.
THE ACTION WITH ITALIAN FORCES OFF CAPE
SPARTIVENT-27TH
NOVEMBER,
1940. 235
Execution of the Operation.
The M.T. ships passed through the Straits on the night of the 24th-25th ofNovember
and were joined by the corvettes next morning. Incidentally, the corvettes only had a
maximum speed of 14 knots against about 17 knots of the M.T. ships, and this not only
made the former next to useless as escorts but complicated the execution of the operation
at times. Forces B and F sailed from Gibraltar at 0800 on the 25th of November.
Admiral Somerville deaIs at some length in his covering letter with the difficulties
of air reconnaissance by inexperienced pilots and observers and with the problem of the
rapid apd correct assessment of the results of attacks by air striking forces. The fact
that one enemy battleship had been hit by air torpedo was not, in this case, established
until after the return of the striking force to the Ark Royal, and this delay (albeit not only
understandable but probably inevitable) might have had important influence on the
Admiral's difficult decision whether or not to continue the chase of the retreating enemy.
His reasons for discontinuing the chase are dealt with fully both in the covering letter
and in the narrative of the operation. They amount to a refusal to hazard the successful
completion of the objects of the operation unless the chance of destroying one or more
major enemy units appeared very favourable.
The A$proach.
At 0852 on the 27th a reconnaissance aircraft from the Ark Royal sighted a group of
warships and closed to investigate. His alarm report was not, however, received by any
ship. The Ark Royal passed a report of the presence of five cruisers and a like number of
'destroyers at 0956, but this might have referred to Force D which was expected within
air reconnaissance range at that time. However, the Admiral ordered steam for full
speed and adjusted his dispositions to be ready for any eventuality. By 1016 the presence
of enemy battleships and cruisers had been confirmed, but the position and composition
of his forces were still far from clear to the Admiral. There appeared at this time to be
three groups of enemy ships about 70 miles to the north-east, steering about south-west and
comprising in all three battleships, 12 cruisers and about 25 destroyers.
Admiral Somerville decided to reduce the convoy's escort and to order the convoy to
continue towards its destination, but on a south-east course such as would keep it clear
of any surface action that might develop. The remaining forces would concentrate,
join up with Force D (then about 40 miles to the east) and proceed to drive off the enemy.
Further air reconnaissance reports did little to elucidate the enemy's strength, but
at 1115 he was reported as steering east instead of west. (This 16-point turn was actually
witnessed by one observer who saw the enemy fleet throw itself into utter confusion and
narrowly miss having several collisions I) Force D was sighted at 1128 and shortly afterwards the first T/B striking force took off from the Ark Royal. The enemy force now
appeared to consist of two battleships and qjx or more cruisers.
At 1134 the Admiral altered course to close the enemy faster and increased speed.
The five cruisers were concentrating about five miles ahead of the Relzowlz and the destroyers
were being collected by Captain (D) 8th Flotilla two miles astern of the cruisers. The
Ramillies was ten miles to starboard of the Relzown ; the Ark Royal had dropped well
astern in carrying out flying operations and was between the main body and the convoy
which, with its diminished escort, was disappearing at full speed to the south-east.
Visual contact with the enemy was first established through a Sunderland flying boat
at about noon, but his reports were incomplete and the Admiral was still left in doubt as
to the course and composition of the Italian fleet. Prospects of bringing him to action then
appeared, however, to be favourable.
Shortly after noon the cruisers, by now all concentrated in the van, sighted masts and
ships in two groups ahead. The Newcastle and the Bemick were, however, having difficulty
in maintaining station. The destroyers, nine of whom were now in company, were in a
favourable position from which to counter-attack enemy destroyers. The mean line of
advance was northerly.
Three enemy cruisers and some destroyers (the " Western Group ") bore 340"-350"
about eleven miles away and were steering north. A second group (the " Eastern Group ")
was further away and steering east.
B2
,
236
THE ACTION WITH ITALIAN FORCES OFF CAPE SPARTIVENT-27TH
NOVEMBER,
1940.
The Action.
At 1220 the enemy opened fire-and nearly hit the Manchester with the first salvo.
Our cruisers opened on the " Western Group" which immediately made smoke and
turned away. The Renown got in a few salvos at long range a t this group before they were
all obscured. The Ramillies, like the Royal Sovereign off Calabria, never got within range
and dropped steadily astern of the Renown.
Meanwhile, our cruisers were hotly engaged with the " Western Group," but the
enemy's smoke made spotting very difficult. Ships engaged several different cruiser and
destroyer targets, and hits were obtained on some of them. The enemy fire, though slow,
was accurate-particularly in the early stages-and the Berwick was hit by an eight-inch
shell at 1222 which put Y turret out of action.
B y 1234 the " Western Group " was more or less completely obscured in smoke and
C.S.18 shifted the fire of his squadron to the " Eastern Group " between 1233 and 1240.
The Berwick was hit again at 1235, but the rear enemy ship was seen to be heavily on fire
aft at this time.
Whilst this cruiser action was in progress the first T/B striking force was approaching
its targets. They sighted firstly the " Western Group " steering north-east in scattered
formation, then the " Eastern Group " steering south-east in line ahead and in action with
our cruisers and, finally, two battleships 20-30 miles further east steering south initially
but turning to south-west and then north-east whilst the torpedo bombers manoeuvred to
get up-sun. The attack was made inside a heavy destroyer screen and ten pilots dropped
at the leading ship-a " Littorio " class-whilst one which had overshot the leading target
dropped a t the second ship--a " Cavour." Careful analysis gave expectation that one
hit was obtained on the " Littorio" class ship, but her speed was apparently unaffected.
At 1300 C.S.18 sighted the battleships which, shortly afterwards, retired north-east at
high speed. By 1315 firing had practically ceased as the e n e q was drawing out of range.
As far as the Admiral knew, no serious damage had been inflicted on any enemy ship. He
was rapidly approaching the enemy coast and had to decide whether or not to continue the
chase. The Admiral sets out the pros and cons fully in his Despatch and " after reviewing
these . . . I had no doubt in my mind whatsoever that the correct course was to rejoin
the convoy as soon as possible."
A report of a damaged cruiser stopped in a position 30 miles away caused the Admiral
to consider detaching a force to deal with her, but he could not justify the use of the
Manchester or Southampton for such a purpose ; he needed the Shefield's R D/F (radar)
to protect the convoy from the inevitable bombing which was still to come, the Berwick was
damaged, and that left only the Newcastle. Actually, air search failed to find the damaged
ship so her stoppage was apparently only temporary.
At 1410 the Ark Royal flew off her second striking force. They sighted the " Eastern
Group " of cruisers, and then the battleships, now heavily screened by ten destroyers.
Surprise was essential, but there was no clouq cover, and to attack the battleships meant
certain sighting by the cruisers. They, therefore attacked the latter, and obtained one hit
on the rear ship and probably another on the leading ship. All aircraft returned safely.
Finally, a striking force of seven Skuas tried unsuccessfully to locate the damaged
cruiser referred to above, and attacked without success one of three cruisers off the southwest corner of Sardinia. Thus ended the chase and the attempt to slow down and thus
to " fix " the enemy.
Enemy Air Attacks.
These began at 1407 while all forces were steering to rejoin the convoy. The Ark
Royal was the target but, in spite of several very near misses, received no damage.
The convoy was sighted at 1700.
CONCLUSION AND A POSTSCRIPT.
Admiral Somerville's Despatch ends with his review of the enemy's probable movements after the action. There is no point in recounting these in detail, but it is worth
mentioning that there was no evidence that the battleships, last seen retreating up the east
coast of Sardinia, ever had their speed reduced below 25 knots. The failure of the T/B
striking forces to effect such a reduction was, of course, the chief reason why the Admiral
considered it would be fruitless and possibly dangerous to the accomplishment of the object
of the operation to continue the chase.
A year later the writer made a long voyage in one of the M.T. ships which had taken
part in Operation COLLAR ( m . ~ .New Zealand Star). He well remembers the pride
of the master, officers and crew at having operated with the famous " Force H," their deep
admiration for the fighting spirit of Admiral Somerville's men, and of the way in which
that convoy was " fought through."
MEMOR.
EARLY ARCTIC " UNDERGROUND."
EXTRACTS FROM A TALK GIVEN TO VARIOUS AUDIENCES IN A NAVAL
AND MILITARY TOWN
1948.
The author had served as navigator and intelligence officer of a fEotilla in the Narvik
o$erations. On his ship returning home to refit he was transferred to another destroyer and was
eventzlally on his way home in a transport when a call went out i n the middle of May, 1940,
for anyone prepared to stay behind for special service. For this he volunteered, being anxiozls
to see the thing through.
Inception, Crew and Armament.-I found myself appointed as first lieutenant to
a curious little 700-ton passenger/cargo steamer of ancient vintage, commandeered from
the Norwegians. Her name was the Ranen. Commander Sir Geoffrey Congreve, Royal
Navy, was the captain. He was what is known as a ball of fire. A few weeks before, having
come off a three weeks' patrol in a trawler in the northern ocean, he had transferred
to a horse and had come in third in the Grand National. He had also had ships
sunk under him twice in the Norwegian campaign already. He had a red beard like
Drake and much of his audacity. I was the executive officer ; and No. 2 was an extraordinary character who we came to call Oerlikon Bill, from the after-gun of which he was
officer of quarters. He might have been Captain Kettle himself, and he spent his years of
peace attending every war which had taken place throughout the world, so far as I could
judge, not omitting the Chinese Wars, the Riff War in Morocco and the Chaco War in South
America. He, too, had a red beard, was full of guts and endless resourcefulness, and was by
profession a chartered accountant ; but he seldom chartered accounts. He had somehow
wangled an R.N.R. commission as a lieutenant. The sub-lieutenant was R.N.V.R., had
played rugger for'scotland and was fresh out of the training establishment, whence he had
been withdrawn by the imperious necessities of the time, without completing more than
half his training. So, though a dinghy-sailor and a stout enough fellow, he was very far
from being confident or experienced as a naval watch-keeping officer. We had also a nice
Norwegian naval officer as interpreter.
Our motley crew consisted of about twenty-five naval ratings, few of them volunteers,
mostly from ships which had been bombed or wrecked ; the latter category in these illcharted waters was the most numerous. In addition we had a faithful old sergeant and
twelve handy young gunners of a Royal Artillery light anti-aircraft regiment and a young
English Irish Guards sergeant called Smith-a first class man-and six Irish Irish Guardsmen.
Our armament consisted of a light anti-aircraft Bofors 40 mm. gun, mounted on the
fore hatch, and a naval 20 mm. Oerlikon gun, more or less lashed on to the poop. The
whole ship rattled when either of them was fired, which was alarming. She wasn't built
to stand it. The Guardsmen had a Bren gun each and, to complete our array of teeth, we
had cutlasses, machets, rifles, bayonets and Mills bombs in any quantity for the unusual
1
See chart facing page 294, November, 1947, N.R.
and rather Elizabethan venture on which we were to be engaged. We were in fact one of
the earlier instances of what later became known as a Blackbeard or Cloak and Dagger
Party, or something between that and a Combined Ops. " Q " ship. None of us wore much
in the way of uniform once we started ; in fact it was banned. This and the fact that every
sailor and soldier had a cabin, added a touch of spice and amenity to the venture. The
only concealment we could arrange a t first for the Bofors gun forward was to cover it with
camouflage netting and hope that unfriendly observers would think it a deck load of spinach.
All this commissioning, storing, coaling and general organization had to be done in thirty-six
hours, almost without a break, most of our stores being salvaged or provided from bombed
ships, including the Eskimo. Oerlikon Bill and I were thankful, however, that we were not
held to account for anything much bar the cash, and we had almost literally no paper
work and no typewriter. Everyone's papers had been lost, but we had some public money
for bribes and payments.
Prayers.-The last thing I remember before sailing was that we held ship's company
prayers-not exactly for protection; how can one expect that in fighting? But, shall we
say, for " sustenance," and we certainly received it during our commission.
To Sea.-When we went to sea there was, luckily, a fog. Luckily because, whilst exercising our unaccustomed crew in seamanlike evolution, gunnery and boarding, the Bofors
gun carried away the R.A.O.C. welding which held it, we had thought doubtfully, to the
hatch, and almost " fell off." Later on we lashed it to baulks of timber (obtained from an
island called Sandnesjoen) laid alongside the hatch in an old-fashioned way, and it sewed
very well. We also painted ourselves to look different, and were well pleased with our fog.
Even before we were capable of fighting or had the gun lashed, we slipped south past
Bodo, where there were some friendly forces, and nipped surreptitiously into the Inner Leads
which lie along most of the Norwegian coast between it and the islets, and so to the south,
as though butter would not melt in our mouths, wearing the Norwegian Merchant ensign,
whilst swarms of German bombers droned overhead on their way to punish our unprotected
friends to the north. Literally swarms, like flies, we thought. Would they attack us?
We never knew from one moment to the next, but they never did until they were wise to
us nearly a month later. The,main reason was that we were apparently harmless Norwegians.
As it happened, many Norwegians were not unfavourably disposed towards the National
Socialists. Moreover, they hoped that the Norwegian Merchant Fleet would fall into their
hands. I should here explain that according to International Law any ship may wear
false colours, provided she shows her real ones when she opens fire. We had no reason to
believe that the German Army had any high regard for Maritime International Law, and
we expected a comparatively short shrift if they should catch us masquerading. However,
that was one of the occupational risks.
Object-to prevent Outflanking.-Our object in doing these strange things, which I will
now reveal, was as follows :-Our troops on the mainland holding off the German advance
from the south, near Mo, were constantly being outflanked by German troops landed from
the sea behind them. Owing to our complete lack, at that time, of air protection, it would
have been suicidal to send an obvious man-of-war down south, near the German air bases,
to deal with this threat ; so we were the answer. The Germans were also supplying their
forces by sea a good deal, and it was hoped we would be able to stop this. Apart from the
danger of bombing, our chief anxiety was to avoid meeting a German man-of-war, because
we had no guns capable of engaging let alone sinking a ship, except at very close range,
if then, and should not have been able to take on even three-inch guns in theory. I t was
for this reason that we hoped, should we be disturbed suddenly in a " lead," to go in for
grappling and boarding tactics in the old-fashioned way, and there was just a chance of
this succeeding in those narrow inner places, which would not have occurred in the open
sea.
Patrolling.-We spent many days patrolling far to the south of our forces, and we
intercepted a few puffers, as the local diesel boats-really large fishing craft-were called,
and ran alongside and boarded them. This was quite a thrilling proceeding, as one never
knew whether we should be counter-boarded by a swarm of highly irascible German
parachutists or something ; but most of these ves~elswere empty or only carried stores.
and the nearest we got to an actual brush was on one or two occasions when a suspicious
looking puffer ran herself aground and such Germans as were aboard buzzed off into the
mountains, followed by myself or Oerlikon Bill, with some of the Irish Guardsmen and a
few others still in fancy dress, after a rapid pull in the dinghy. We always gave up the
chase after half-an-hour for obvious reasons. However, the rumour got around amongst the
enemy that the Inner Leads were no longer safe for them, and by this means we achieved
our purpose. We were helped once or twice by one of our submarines.
When short of coal, we used to sidle guiltily alongside the wharf at 5andnesjoen or
elsewhere, coal ourselves in four hours, with grimy and tremendous efforts by all hands and
officers, from the local stocks, and fill up with Some very good salmon and cod's roe ; then
off to our patrol again. We were always expecting to be given away by the local traitor.
Occasionally we got shot a t by German artillery going through narrow straits, which could
not be avoided, but we acted green as though we were genuine stupid sailors and failed to
stop. As we were usually going south by daylight on these occasions and the country
and many communications were disrupted, we never heard anything more about the matter.
We got as far south as the entrance to Namsos whence our troops had been evacuated
weeks before.
At sea the Irish Guardsmen, all ex-fishermen, were used as look-outs, and I shall never
forget their way of pointing out objects of interest. " Look ! look ! Sorr ! " they would
saE " a shmall little boat," or on other occasions it would be a " little shmall boat," or
a large great aeryplane," but they infallibly used two adjectives. They were all stout
fellows to have around.
Grounding.-There was considerable navigational interest, because the compass m d
charts were doubtful and the sea rock-strewn, and we literally scraped past rocks with
not more than six feet to spare on many occasions. There was no denying that was
nasty. We felt extremely isolated and lonely, like a polar expedition, because we had no
wireless transmitting apparatus which worked at all, and only a B.B.C. receiver, which
gave us nothing but the gloomiest news from France. However, the sun was out a lot,
the snow was melting ashore, the scenery was pleasing, and the Heinkels ignored us.
On one sad occasion we were hoping to lie up for a rest, for we all got extremely tired ,
being in three watches anyway, plus the ordinary administrative work of the ship and
repainting ourselves, coaling, and being tensed up a t action stations much of the time ;
on this occasion we were steaming into a narrow inlet and wished to go astern before
anchoring, but the dear chief engine-room artificer,.rather sleepy, mistook the Norwegian
for " astern " on the engine-room telegraph for " ahead," and put the engines the wrong
way ; seeing the ship not losing way, the captain rang down for full astern, and the engines
enthusiastically went full ahead. Before anything could be done we were hard and fast
a hundred miles behind the enemy lines on the gravel, luckily not holed. So instead of our
rest there was feverish activity. Laying out every known sort of anchor, like St. Paul,
and praying for the dark was the order of the day. There was only an hour or so of
darkness anyway in those latitudes. Long before the tide had risen several Heinkel I11
bombers took an intense and sustained interest in us, circling almost at masthead height,
and every time new ones appeared some of us interrupted our seaman-like exercises and
hid behind the guns wondering whether to press the trigger before the bombs came down
and give ourselves away, or to wait till after bomb release-too late. An interesting plight
to be in. However, they never bombed us and we never fired at them ; in fact we waved
gaily at them to show there was no ill feeling. Particularly one of the cooks dressed up as a
stewardess, stressing the bosom. Eventually, after eight hours, we got the Ranert off
undamaged. I may say that the Oerlikon was painted the colour of an ensign staff and
used as such for the Norwegian ensign. If the gun was lowered to fire the ensign thus
automatically came down and the White Ensign was broken at the peak.
Norwegian Morale.-On one of our visits to Sandnesjoen which had a Norge garrison
of forty soldiers, a revealing little incident occurred. Some agitated locals came over to us
where we were anchored early one morning, claiming that the island was being invaded
by regiments of Germans from the other side, and would we repel them ? We didn't really
believe this, and Oerlikon Bill took a few Guardsmen and sailors round the point in a
240
EARLY ARCTIC
"
UNDERGROUND."
dinghy, where he stalked a forlorn figure who turned out to be a Norwegian deserter in
Norwegian uniform, making for home, having left on the beach the boat he had pulled
across the strait. He was the Germans. After our people had got back to the ship, two of the
Norwegian garrison came alongside in a yacht with the uniforms and arms of the remainder
piled high on deck. These two stout fellows were now the only survivors from the garrison,
the remainder having thrown off their uniforms and skedaddled into the hills, without
confirming the rumour or even asking us to take them to rejoin the rest of their army by
Narvik. We in the Ranen were never very impressed with the high moral splendour of the
Norwegian populace as a whole. Except for the King and Crown Prince and a few Viking
types, they always " took the easy route."' One must, however, take off one's hat to the
minority of spirited ones who did put up a show and fought on with us or in Norway.
Evacuation of Bode.-We had to go back to Harstad every few days for orders and
stores, and towards the end of May our orders were to help evacuate all our troops from
Bodo. This was a sad blow, because it looked like the abandonment of the campaign,
just when we were beginning to get some of our own aircraft up there ; but it was made
necessary by the lack of escorts for supply convoys due to the fall of France. Having
evacuated Bodo we were to try and delay the advance of the enemy through the mountains
and across the fjords northwards between there and our own troops forming up to evacuate
Narvik town itself, which had only recently been captured by us.
During the evacuation of Bodo, I fear the Ranen's true sinister identity was revealed to
Fritz, as we acted openly as flank guard to the army ashore. However, from then to near
the end, whenever bombers appeared to prang us, so did fog or clouds, so we were well
looked after by the Almighty.
By now, through the resourcefulness of Oerlikon Bill, we had a nice, if ramshackle,
bogus cabin arrangement erected over our Bofors gun, complete with elegant painted
porthole curtains. This could be collapsed for action.
Cable Cuttifig.-During this period we had various small excitements, and I took out
a motor dinghy a long way up a fjord where the ship could not follow, to cut a cable. This
prevented the Norwegians in the Narvik district from ringing up Hitler, which it was
quite easy to do from any house with a phone anywhere. Rather an intriguing thought !
I nearly did it myself just for the hell of it. We had to sleep out in the frost for a night or
two, and were very nearly bumped off by an entire Polish battalion to whom it was
rumoured that we were German parachutists in disguise. However, we all ended up
exchanging autographs, tea and visiting cards at two in the morning. I still have my cards.
Delaying the Efiemy Advance.-After this we steamed in a great hurry to a fjord called
Sorfolla, to which the Germans had advanced. No one fired at us on our way in, at which
we were smugly self-satisfied and, once round the comer, we chased some Germans in a
large motor launch, towing two great wooden barges, with which they were obviously
going to collect more Germans to ferry up the fjord. They ran the launch and barges
lightly aground just before we could get up to them and disappeared into the bushes.
We reckoned we had to have those barges to prevent German movement, so I took the
dinghy on a little " cutting-out " expedition into the shallower water and, as we had half
suspected, as soon as we got up to the barges we were fired at quite heartily from the
overhanging bushes. This was my closest approach during the war to armed and offensive
Germans (fifteen yards, I made it), but I couldn't see whether I hit any with my pistol.
Again, quite surprisingly, none of us in the dinghy was hit, though we were in the open.
Anyway, we somehow managed to tow the barges off and sank them by the ship ramming
them. The Bofors was useless for this. Of course, we had been supported byBren gun fire
from the ship. We surprised and engaged a company of Germans at the head of the fjord
and found many more barges, which we could not get at, due to shoals. So it transpired
that the only thing to do was to steam up and down between the two lots of Germans and
stop them ever safely starting their ferrying to the north. This we proceeded to do at
intervals during the next two days, and it was the hottest two days of most of our lives.
I n between whiles we hung about in the fjord just out of range, we hoped, but in a threatening attitude. The Germans brought up all the mountain artillery they could muster,
between ten and twenty guns, to the south, and machine guns to the north. Our total
period of actually being under fire from never more than three-quarters-of-a-mile range
from either bank was about 120 minutes, not all at one time, of course. Apart from disadvantages of burst-short from time fuses, which we didn't understand, the Bofors was
rather good value for this game and we regularly drove the Boche from the more exposed
gun positions which we could see. But as we couldn't damage the guns, he always came
back later. Believe it or not, we never received a single direct hit from a shell, though many
from splinters and bullets. (It was lucky for us the Boche guns were howitzers.) This was
just as well, as one solid shell would have been likely to finish us, as we were built largely of
wood and had no proper warship fire-fighting arrangements or magazine protection.
Only two of us were hit. Myself very slightly and ignominously on my behind by a splinter
which had lost most of its energy by the time it had torn through the bulwarks and innumerable duffle coats I was wearing, and I was cut slightly on the knuckle ; whilst the soldier
next to me at my " quarters " (the Bofors), on another occasion, got a nasty but not dangerous arm wound. I was covered in blood, not him, which made me look very heroic. We all
rather prided ourselves afterwards on this business, because it seemed that we had held up
the advance of a crack mountain division for two whole days by ourselves. Enemy aircraft
had been baffled by cloud, luckily for us.
After this, Harstad again for coal ; no news, save of Dunkirk ; but an atmosphere of
evacuation-never a nice thing. We were told to help ourselves to the army stores ; this
we did right liberally, taking several motor-bikes and even an Austin seven, and skis and
other attractive goods. .I still wear the socks.
Raid on Svo1vaer.-We were told to go home, destroying the fish-oil tanks at Svolvaer
on the way, and given an old armed trawler to accompany us. Very early next morning
we were approaching Svolvaer and were pained at being savagely attacked by an odiouslooking armed steam yacht, under Danish colours-three-inch bricks simply hurtling
towards us out of the dawn. We approached from the south-westward. The trawler was
a help at first, though a bad shot, until she ran out of her only ten remaining rounds of
ammunition. After that we had to rely on our captain's resolution. This, one might
express as follows : " If your bark is worse than your bite, for heaven's sake bark." We
rushed barking towards our assailant, though at this range our little gun could scarcely
have peppered him and was widely inaccurate anyway, and to our astonishment this
unorthodox proceeding caused him after a while to retire discomfited into Svolvaer. The
whole engagement lasted perhaps half-an-hour and utas fought at between one-and-a-half
and two miles range, including intervals for jammed guns. Svolvaer is a large village built
on rocks, the streets being waterways between them and like Venice. Our blood now being
up, at least until we saw the difficulties, we chased him with, I may say, increasing caution,
into this maze, and I ask you to imagine for yourself a somewhat stately and quite silent
gangster-chase by ships of some hundreds of tons burthen, through the streets of Venice,
all windows shuttered, frightened inhabitants peering round doors. We scraped past rocks
at awkward comers with literally two feet to spare. As a navigator, I found it alarming,
but we escaped wreck. The enemy did a complete disappearing act down some side turning
and was not seen again. Then we got into the narrow entranced circular cove around
which the jish-oil tanks were built,and wisely turned our bows to the entrance first. There
was no time to land a demolition party, and in any case enthusiasts were sniping at us from
the high rocks. (We were wearing the Norwegian ensign again now and we never knew
whether the snipers were traitors who thought us pro-British or patriots who thought us
National Socialists.) So we fired point blank into the oil tanks. I have never seen such a
sight as ensued like a clap of thunder-roaring, flaming oil came surging out of the tanks
and on to and across the surface of the cove at a rate of knots. Thick black smoke shot up
to 80,000 feet (I always believed the R.A.F. claim about this sort of thing ever afterwards).
The Ranen had never got off the mark so smartly, but we only just made it before the inferno "
caught us. The Navy and Commandos raided Svolvaer again two years later for the same
purpose. Outside, proceeding to the south-west, we discovered a large trawler, also wearing
the Danish ensign, which promptly opened fire at us. Homd-two three-inch or four-inch
guns she had, so there was nothing for it but to try our barking trick again, and againheaven be praised-it worked. Yet again, though splinters the size of my hand crashed
into the ship's fabric, we had no direct shell hits and no one was hurt. I expect the occasional
sight of our useless old trawler in the far distance may also have given the enemy cause
for caution. We chased this wretched enemy trawler for some miles, until in fact she nipped
through the village of Henningsvaer, which was like Svolvaer in construction, and on into
a very long, tortuous, rocky fjord, and there we decided to lose her altogether. To hold on
would be tempting Providence ; she was obviously far too much of a mouthful for us.
However, we had made her run with our little pea-shooter.
Passage Home.-Then, together with our old trawler, we passed through the notorious
Maelstrom whirlpools. I t was not too bad, weather being calm. After this, for two days we
were rather plagued by visits from bombers, who came down very low sometimes. We
seldom hit them, but they never hit us, except again by splinters. These were ourfirst
serious air attacks since commissioning. The weather remained not too bad, which was
just aswell, for being a short range ship we had to coal the Ramen twice from her own holds,
and it is no fun having to open holds at sea. We now practised, I regret to say, a slight
deception on our own authorities ; we were getting into the habit. Our compass had
17" of deviation on some points. We had no chronometer, only a wrist watch, and a rather
shaky sextant, and only a borrowed magnetic variation chart of the whole northern
hemisphere to navigate with, so we thought we had a good excuse for fetching-up in
Aberdeen, a much more delectable spot than Scapa. This we did, making an unblushingly
perfect land-fall about the middle of June, ten days after Dunkirk had occurred. We
counted well over two hundred holes in the ship, yet we had had only one casualty worth
mentioning. The Army very kindly let us use the vehicles we had salvaged from Harstad
for our leaves. The Austin had its steering wheel and windscreen half shot away while
on board, but was otherwise all right.
Morale.-I cannot now remember many personal anecdotes ; but, in retrospect, the
most interesting part of the whole business to me is the aspect of morale. It is also the
most difficult to talk about. We had been on lonely service, and whenever we had had
outside news it was bad. Our soldiers, bless them, weren't used to the prospect of a swim
in the Arctic after battle, nor our sailors to being fired at from mountains, and the sight of
so many ugly rocks and aeroplanes so close aboard. Neither were used to the underground.
Remember that most of the crew were not volunteers, only the officers, though this does not
imply that they were shirkers, once they had been detailed for the job. In fact, on the
whole, they were a crowd of stalwarts and a very happy company. But I will say this :
this business taught me that in an unpromising situation ten per cent. of random-picked
British sailors or soldiers will follow any lead in the right direction. Eighty per cent. can be
swayed to follow loyally and are usually sound. Discipline is important in this connection.
About ten per cent. may let you down and will infect the eighty per cent. unless the officers
and commander are absolutely, shall we say, resolute. This may sound unfortunate,but
I think it is true. Human nature is like that. In this connection I will only quote a placard
which was put up in the Middle East when a couple of divisions of British troops under
General Wavell were holding fast there against half-a-million Italians in the early days,
and Italians are not bad fighters when they are on the up and up. This placard was a copy
of a pencil notice found by relieving troops in a British machine gun post on the Western
Front in the previous German war, during a grim but unsuccessful German offensive. I t
read :" SPECIAL
ORDERTO NUMBER
1 SECTION.
1. The position will be held and the section will remain here until relieved.
2. The enemy cannot be allowed to interfere with this programme.
3. If the section cannot remain here alive, it will remain here dead, but in any case it will remain
here.
4. Should any man through ' shell shock ' or other such cause attempt to surrender he wili remain
here dead.
5. Should all guns be blown out, the section will use Mills grenades, and other novelties.
6. Finally, the position, as stated, will be held.
(Signed) I?. P. BETHUNE,
Lieut., O/C No. 1 Section."
And lastly, there is the story told about Evelyn Waugh, that author previously
famous for the cynicism of his books, such as Vile Bodies, in the early nineteen-thirties,
but now of a different belief.
THE GALLANT ACTION OF H.M.S. PETEREL.
243
After some considerable fighting experience in the Royal Marine Commandos and
parachuting, Captain Waugh, so the story goes, was attending a school for company officers.
I quote most of the following from Eric Linklater's book " The Art of Adventure " :" The British Army had become seriously addicted to psychology, and before a soldier
could become a tank-driver or a signaller-before an officer could be appointed to command a
platoon or a battery-he had not only to prove that he knew his several duties and was conpetent to discharge them, but also to submit himself to examination by a psychiatrist (or
trick cyclist.') Captain Waugh endyred his examination with patience, but when i t was
finished he said to the psychiatrist : You have asked me a great many questions, which I
have done my best to answer ; and now I should like to ask you something.'
Most of the candidates regarded their interview with him
" The psychiatrist was surprised.
as an ordeal and were thankful when i t was over ; the simple sort believed him to be a kind of
witch-doctor, and were plainly anxious to escape ; very few had ever thought of reversing the
normal process and questioning him. He agreed, however, to satisfy any reasonable curiosity.
" ' I take it,' said Captain Waugh, ' that the whole purpose of this examination is t o find out
whether I have sufficient strengt? of character to stand the anxiety and shock of battle ? '
" ' Yes,' said the psychiatrist,
in a general, unscientific way that does describe it.'
" ' Then why do you make, no reference whatever to the most important of all the agents
that form a manls,character ?
" ' You mean ?
" ' Religion,' said Captain Waugh.
" The psychiatrist was disconcerted."
A lesson which I suggest one could learn from this story of the Ranen is this : That the
imponderables, such as a stout heart like that of the Congrevel family (the captain's father
and grandfather were V.C.s), the weather and other Acts of God,wiU often enable a comparatively weakly armed company to harass and distress an apparently much stronger andhore
up-to-date enemy. Gideon did. With the disruption of communications caused by modem
war this may become even more pronounced. It may well be that the next war will be won
by such individualistic, yet disciplined, small units in the end, if the logistic support
necessary to maintain the big battalions is as disrupted as seems likely.
COCOPPS.
THE GALLANT ACTION OF H.M.S. PETEREL.
A Member has drawn m y attention to the following account of the gallant action of thc
commanding officer and crew of the small British gunboat PETEREL
at Shanghai on the day that
Japan declared war on the Allies. This was circulated to the Press on the 23rd of Octobe~,
1945, by the Department of Naval Information.-HON. EDITOR.
.
CHOSE TO FIGHT.
" RATHER
than obey a surrender order, eighteen men in the 300-ton gunboat H.M.S. Peterel
-led by their 63-year-old commanding officer--chose to fight it out with a Japanese
cruiser, a destroyer and a gunboat. They fought until, swamped in fire and smoke, their
little craft sank under them.
" The story of their epic gallantry is revealed tonight by an announcement in the
' London Gazette ' that the D.S.C. was awarded three years ago to Lieutenant Stephen
Polkinghorn, R.N.R., of Waiuku, New Zealand.
" When the Japs took over the Shanghai International Settlement on the 8th of
December, 1941, the Peterel was in the harbour with her main armament-two three-inch
guns-out of action. All she had in working order were two machine guns. Around her
were numerous Japanese warships including the cruiser, the destroyer and the gunboat.
1 Sir Geoffrey Congreve was killed on one of the first Commando forays t o Northern France later
that summer, 1940.
244
EXERCISES BAMBOO AND PANDORA.
"A Japanese officer came out to the Peterel in a launch. Through an interpreter, he
ordered her immediate surrender. Lieutenant Polkinghorn, through the same interpreter,
told him to go away. ' I refuse to surrender,' he said. The Japanese officer turned his
launch away and retired to a safe distance. Then he fired a red Very light.
" Immediately, the Japanese ships, some of them only 200 yards from the Peterel,
opened fire. Shore batteries joined in. Shells tore into her frail upper works, while men
on board returned the fire with their two machine guns. In a few moments the gunboat
was ablaze from stem to stem.
" Lieutenant Polkinghorn ordered demolition charges to be placed at vital points and
fired. By this time all the men on board had been wounded. Nothing more could be done.
The 63-year-old commanding officer reluctantly gave the order to abandon ship. They
launched a boat in an effort to reach the shore, but the Japs sank it and continued firing at
the survivors in the water.
SEVERELY WOUNDED.
Chinese sampans, putting out from the French Bund, came to the rescue, but when
they reached Lieutenant Polkinghorn they found he was so severely wounded he could not
be lifted on board. He was towed to the Bund where he was taken prisoner.
" News of his heroic action gradually filtered through to the Admiralty and he was
awarded the D.S.C., but nothing was said of the award for fear of Japanese reprisals. Now
he has been released from a prisoner of war camp and is on his way back to New Zealand.
His story has become a legend all over China.
" Commander J. B. Wooley, R.N., who was the Senior Naval Officer in Shanghai,
said that the Peterel's fight made a tremendous impression on the Japanese. When they
took Lieutenant Polkinghorn prisoner they asked him why he did not surrender in view of
the impossible odds. ' Officers of the British Navy do not surrender their ships,' he
replied."
"
EXERCISES BAMBOO AND PANDORA
THE Army and the R.A.F. recently held exercises with the above code names. The code
names were evidently chosen with some care in relation to the exercises since the Army
one, BAMBOO,dealt with operations in Malaya and Burma, and the R.A.F. one,
PANDORA,
went into the shape of things to come and attempted to open the box of
tricks which they may have to compete with in the future.
I t will thus be seen that the two exercises were very different in scope, the Army one
being mostly not in a very high secrecy category, whereas the R.A.F. one was " Top
Secret " throughout. I t is thus quite impossible to describe the subject matter covered
by the two exercises in toto ; all that can be done is to discuss them generally and go into
one or two of the more interesting and less secret aspects.
Although the two exercises were not strictly comparable, much of the interest in them,
to an observer from another Service like myself, lies in consideration of the methods of
presentation and the way they were handled. The first point that naturally arises is,
what is the object of the exercise ? There are, broadly speaking, two main objects in
exercises of this nature : either to educate one's own officers and examine the problems
that they may have to deal with in the future or, alternatively, to educate officers of the
other Services in the problems that one's own Service has got to face. These two exercises
were evidently both framed with the first object in view, both being concerned with
examining their own problems and only covering ground which was of direct interest to
the other two Services where the examination of their own requirements necessitated it.
I n passing, I may say that I asked a senior Army officer which of the above two objects
was really behind their exercise, to which he replied, " Neither. The main reason for an
Army exercise is to get General Officers Commanding from all over the world together
from time to time so that they can interchange views." This, though not suitable for
stating as a main object, is a very real subsidiary one.
EXERCISES BAMBOO AND PANDORA.
245
Next, the method of presentation. The arrangement and setting of the room or hall
in which the exercise takes place is, in my opinion, of primary importance. Human nature
being what it is, if on the first morning you walk into a hall which is unattractive or excessively hot or cold or badly ventilated, and have to listen to a not very interesting lecture
to begin with, one gets a very bad impression of the exercise. I am sure the need is for a
really good room, attractively got up and comfortable to sit in. Both the rooms used by
the Army and the Air Force were satisfactory in this respect, but I mention this point
since both rooms had features which could, with advantage, have been adopted for the
other one. The second point is whether you go in for lectures only, or include some
demonstrations or even plays. A plethora of lectures make the audience extremely tired,
and I regret to say PANDORA suffered from this since it was practically unbroken
lectures. On the other hand demonstrations or plays, though a very welcome break in a
monotonous series of lectures, lose their effect if there are too many in the same style.
In fact, the real requirement is constant variation of lectures, demonstrations and plays,
the latter being as different and as enterprising as possible. In BAMBOO the Army had
a very good idea for putting over appreciations from the enemy's point of view, but spoilt
it by flogging it to death throughout the four days of the exercise.
While on this subject, the point arises as to who gives the actual lectures or prepares
the demonstrations. I t is fairly obvious that the requirement is for the best lecturers and
actors more or less irrespective of whether the subject they are covering is strictly appropriate to their current appointment or not ; but a decision has got to be made as to whether
the bulk of the work is done by the directing staff, who in consequence have to be fairly
numerous, or whether it is better to have a small directing staff and farm out the individual
items to Commands throughout the United Kingdom, or for that matter the world. The
Army and the Air Force with their Command set-ups at home are both organized to make
the latter a very simple process, and in fact that is what they both did ; a similarly run
naval exercise would not be quite so easy to arrange on these lines since the Commandersin-Chief, Home Ports, have not got the type of staffs which are suited to this work.
Another point is the question of the issue of papers beforehand. The R.A.F. plan is
apparently to issue their lectures in advance more or less as they are going to be given.
Thus, if you read them beforehand you need not listen with too much care to the lecturers.
On the other hand, they tended to be in greater detail than the lecturers gave and, during
discussions if they had not been read there was a tendency for speakers to cover points
which were in the book though not made on the platform. The Army also issued voluminous books but, broadly speaking, these books covered ground which the speakers did not
cover, the latter confining themselves to the major points which were intentionally not
brought out in the books. Here again it was necessary for anyone wishing to speak
intelligently in the discussions to have read the books in advance to ensure he was not
asking questions the answers to which had already been given. My own opinion is that
neither of these schemes is ideal, but that it is probably better to issue aprdcis of the actual
lecture or demonstration in advance, keeping it quite short, so that the audience know
what is going to be talked about and roughly the ground going to be covered.
The control of discussions is another controversial point. There are, broadly. speaking,
three methods :(a) To have the discussion entirely free and open ;
(b) To control the discussion rigidly and confine it to subjects which the officer
conducting the exercise wishes brought out and to call on speakers by name
who are capable of making valuable contributions to the item being discussed;
(c) A cross between the two whereby the discussion opens with one or two nominated
subjects but it is open for anybody to speak on them, subsequently the discission being completely open.
The R.A.F., broadly speaking, sometimes adopted (a) and sometimes (c)'; the Army
mostly went in for method (b). My own opinion is that (c) is the best answer. Some
control is most definitely necessary. When there was none, only too frequently speakers
led the discussion on to complete red herrings and were too often prone to air their own
pet theory or grievance. However the discussions are run, one essential is that the timetable must be sufficiently flexible to allow additional time to be given to a discussion which
246
EXERCISES BAMBOO AND PANDORA.
unexpectedly becomes interesting. I t is evidently extremely difficult to forecast what
subject is going to bring out an interesting discussion. One thing to be avoided is set
speeches and, unless care is exercised, methods (b) and (c), and particularly (b), are apt to
get people on their feet delivering what is in fact another short lecture.
A curious feature is that I was assured by both the Army and Air Force officers who
were running the exercises that the discussions during rehearsals, which were attended by
junior officers, gave no guide whatsoever as to how the discussions during the main exercise
would go.
Having run through the problems concerned with preparing and setting the exercise,
I now turn to what might be described as the trimmings. Firstly, there is the question of
security. Unless the exercise has absolutely no security grading at all special arrangements
must be made for this. The large number of senior officers attending want facilities for
leaving their papers without having to lock them up between each session. They are also
bound to talk together at odd' moments, and they are only too liable to discuss matters of
extreme secrecy at inappropriate times, and constant reminders must be given that the
mess and outside the lecture hall are not secure. At PANDORA the Air Force had one
or two check musters of officers entering the lecture hall and staged a small play, quite
well done, whereby an enemy agent was discovered among the audience. I was particularly amused during this last episode by my next-door neighbour who, from other remarks
he had made to me, evidently had a slow-acting brain, and when this alleged enemy agent
was " arrested " in front of the multitude, turned to me and made the somewhat surprising
and irrelevant comment : " How very stupid, that chap can't talk any foreign languages
a t all.''
Another trimming is duty officers. When so many senior officers are present together,
many of whom are very busy men who have left their jobs to attend the exercise, facilities
must be provided for them to get in touch with their staffs in London or in the Commands,
to provide transport when required, and a hundred and one other things. Both our sister
Services did this extremely well and had a duty officer permanently available in an office
in the vicinity of the lecture hall who could do anything from providing a car or an aeroplane
t o producing a 24d. stamp. I am sure they must have had a very uninteresting and very
irritating job, and I should like to pay tribute to their great patience in the way they carried
it out.
Lastly, I should like to say a few words on the subject matter, but I must dismiss
PANDoRA in view of its Top Secret grading with the comment that its method of presentation with the Air Officers Commanding stating the cases for their own Commands and
their requirements in order to carry out their directives, resulted in what one member of
the audience referred to in a discussion as " electioneering speeches." This was not good,
and it is quite clear that one ought not to present an exercise in such a way that interCommand rivalry is the keynote of the summing up of the various commanders. The
naval aspect in PANDORA was rather glossed over and either taken too much for.granted
or suffered from lip service being paid to it without engendering any feeling of certainty that
what was stated as being the intention in war would in fact be attempted or was even
practicable.
BAMBOO,
though mostly not of direct interest to the Navy, was of great general
interest since it took advantage of the experience of many serving officers who fought
during the last war in that area. I t covered much stereotyped ground such as a withdrawal,
holding a defensive position, an advance, a seaborne assault and supply by sea. It struck
me very forcibly that the Army are getting much more knowledgeable about the capabilities
of the Navy to help them in supplying their forces as well as in support of land operations.
They have never been in doubt that we could do a lot to help them in operational situations
that were suitable, but there were far too few Army officers during the last war who
appreciated Bow much more economical supply was by water than by land. Despite my
comment the Army are guilty of lapses ; and, although I am quoting slightly out of context,
it was somewhat surprising to find that in the printed book one of the lessons to be learned
in connection with one phase of the exercise was that the Navy might be called upon to
carry out the-unusual (sic) task of " protecting a line of sea communications."
Most of the phases that interested the Navy were concentrated on one day which was
well attended by members of the Board, and the First Sea Lord, in summing up the naval
CRIME AND PUNISHMENT.
247
point of view, made one comment of outstanding importance in referring to the planning of
a seaborne assault. He said that there is nearly always a conflict between launching an
assault a sufficiently short time ahead and having the wherewithal to mount the assault
on the somewhat Rolls Royce standard that the planners would like. I witnessed that
conflict in the planning of practically every assault operation during the war, and I suppose
it is inevitably a lesson that planners will never learn. We are unlikely ever to have
sufficient resources to mount an assault on a lavish scale without having to delay it beyond
what is strategically desirable.
There was an interesting discussion on native troops and white leadership. This is
not a subject that is applicable to the Navy, but several remarks were made by officers
with experience of these troops which merited the attention they got. One General
Officer who had commanded an East African Division amused everyone by stating, in
emphasizing the need to consider the welfare of black troops just as much as white ones,
that there are two things N.A.A.F.I. must provide for East African troops. One of these
is snuff, not normally provided in canteens, and the other is Brylcreem, not-as he
hastily pointed out-to smear down their hair, but because they use it as a filling for
sandwiches ! I was assured that this is perfectly true, but I have not ventured to try
it myself !
There used to be a parodied proverb quoted by a past Director of Sea Transport at
the Inter-Service dinner at the end of the Staff Course at Camberley to the effect : " You
can lead a soldier to the water but you can't make him think." I am quite clear from
listening to BAMBOO that the enlightened members of the Army have got far away
from this proverb and that in any future trouble our planners will find their Army opposite
numbers much more sympathetic to the Navy's point of view.
One final comment on both exercises was that in many cases the R.A.F. lecturers and
speakers were not as authoritative as the exercise warranted, but this was not the case
with the Army. This leads to one of the lessons I learned that it is most desirable to have
speakers on the platform who are the current occupiers of important appointments. I have
said before that one of the main requirements is that the lecturer must be good, and one is
thus left with the requirement that not only do you want a good lecturer but that he should,
if possible, be holding an authoritative post at the time. In other words, a lecture delivered
by, say, the A.C.N.S. cames more weight than if it were given by Admiral X, unless the
former happens to be a very bad lecturer.
VALOR.
CRIME AND PUNISHMENT.
A BILLrecently presented to Parliament has once again focused attention on capital
punishment,a*d the Editorof "The Times " opened his columns to correspondents anxious
to express their views. Opinion on the desirability of retaining capital punishment is,
as members are well aware, divided between those who urge its abolition on the grounds
that nothing can justify taking a life and those who urge its retention because abolition
would herald a golden age for murderers.
Civilized man has always endeavoured to make the punishment fit the crime ; the
variant throughout the ages has been the classification of crimes. In a very poor community theft is the major crime ; at one period of their history the Chinese classified
theft as a greater social crime than murder. In our own country an outbreak of robbery
with violence in the last century was eliminated by flogging. The scales of punishment are
continually changing to attune to changing classifications.
This correspondence reminded me of my own experiences of administering justice,
and the remarkable change in the methods of maintaining discipline in the Navy during
my forty years' service.
When I joined the Navy there was no standard of punishment common to all ships.
Most captains were benevolent autocrats and dealt humanely with miscreants ; but some
248
CRIME AND PUNISHMENT.
wielded their powers with as little justice and with the same cruel severity as any Communist dictator of the present day. An officer or sailor appointed to a ship commanded
by one of the more notorious bullies was an object of commiseration to his messmates.
There was one captain, commanding a ship of' the China squadron when I was a
midshipman, who achieved fame by court-martialling all but four of his officers. There is
no record of what the sailors suffered ; their lives must have been hell. A medal, called
the " Cherry Medal," was struck for the four survivors, and is described in one of the
standard books on medals. There was, too, a captain who was reputed to have disrated
all his petty officers during the summer maneuvres. Probably a colourful exaggeration,
but not then regarded as outside the bounds of possibility.
Less famous were many captains who dealt with every defaulter with the utmost
severity permitted by the regulations and took no account of mitigating circumstances.
They no doubt satisfied their consciences on the grounds that nine times out of ten the
defaulter concocted a fictitious defence, and it was quite unimportant if one out of ten was
punished unjustly. In those days it was the petty officers whose position was so precarious
in ships commanded by officers of the kind I have mentioned.
Many of the ships were still built to sail ; and, whenever sails were set or furled
and on every drill morning when ships competed against one another at the heavier
evolutions such as shifting topsail yards, the petty officers were on public trial ; a captain
of a top was lucky if he still held his rate after making a bad mistake ; it was not unknown
for a captain, infuriated by the poor performance of his ship a t drills, to end the morning
by disrating several petty officers.
In those days petty officers who had been disrated could soon recover their rate if
they continued to show the ability that had won recognition, but some lost heart, and
disrating had a serious effect on pensions.
This summary justice, which was injustice when administered by intemperate officers,
was not entirely bad. There is no doubt that it produced fine leaders of men. I well
remember the two captains of tops in the barque Pylades ; their word was law, and they
were held in the highest respect by their men. In a gale of wind these two petty officers
held the lives of men in their hands, and their men knew it.
With the advent of the modern mechanized Navy the petty officers ceased to shoulder
such heavy responsibilities and, with such a large number of officers in every ship, there
was a plethora of overseers for every task. Indeed, it became necessary to devise means of
giving the petty officers the chance of exercising command and showing their worth.
Summary disrating faded out with sails ; a man who had to pass stiff examinations to
qualify for promotion could not be rated up one day and disrated the next.
There was so much talk in naval messes about the bullies that a visitor to a mess
in 1898 might well believe that the Navy was still the Navy of the pressgang, when the
harshest punishments were necessary to produce a well-disciplined crew ; but at that date
the bullies were rapidly disappearing and the majority of ships were commanded by strict,
but fair-minded, autocrats who drew loyal, willing service and often affection from their
officers and men. I t was thanks to the pusillanimity of their commanders-inshief and the
Admiralty that the more notorious bullies were allowed to exercise a baneful influence for
so long. Their contemporaries and juniors could never understand why they were again
employed after their punishment returns, which reached astronomical figures, showed
they were unfit to govern their fellow-beings.
Administration of justice in the Navy has always conformed, and must always conform, to its administration in the Law Courts. In the days when a poacher found with
a pheasant was deported for life to Australia a sailor was flogged for an offence that
to-day would be punished by a few days' extra work or stoppage of pay.
When I joined the Navy the standard of life of the poorer section of the community
was being raised progressively by Acts of Parliament and by the activities of voluntary
societies, and every step forward was reflected in a more charitable scale of punishments
in the courts, and fewer crimes.
So, in the Navy, hardly a year passed without some readjustment of discipline. This
was most noticeable in the case of leave-breaking, which often assumed serious proportions
and hampered the mobility of a fleet. It was Lord Charles Beresford who had the initiative
CRIME AND PUNISHMENT.
249.
and courage to introduce a new system which put the sailor on his honour to return to his
ship when his leave expired ; his faith in the sailor was not misplaced. Concurrently, a more
enlightened view on direction and frequency of leave began to prevail.
In 1898a midshipman of a launch embarking liberty men after a general leave following
a cruise would have been extremely surprised to see his boat fill up with sixty well-dressed,
sober men. He was accustomed to dealing with awkward situations on these occasions,
and to several more trips to bring off those leave-breakers who were not cooling their
heels in the local lock-up. Ten years later he would be surprised to find any " drunks "
on the jetty, and both he and his crew would be very annoyed if they had to make a second
long trip to bring off leave breakers.
When I commanded a cruiser on the China Station after the first world war, information about Japan was circulated on the mess-deck some months before we were due to
visit Yokohama. A large number of the ship's company saved up their money ; and on
arrival I gave four days' leave to those who asked for it, and the bluejacket boys all went
to a hotel at Miyanoshita for three days. If, twenty years earlier, a captain had acted in
this way, his brother captains would have regarded him as a dangerous fellow who was
undermining the discipline of the fleet ; and perhaps not without some reason, as therewas
not then that high standard of conduct ashore that justified such departures from routine.
Some years later when I was the admiral commanding the battle cruisers, I never
hesitated to give the widest leave possible at every port we visited ; in my younger days
no senior officer would have dreamt of giving leave except to petty officers at some of the
ports we visited.
From the time I joined the Navy we had been slowly but steadily moving towards a
standard of administration of justice which was observed in all ships, a standard which
fitted the punishment to the crime. And as there was a concurrent rise in the standard of
education and upbringing of the boys and men entering the Service, there was a marked
decrease in the punishment returns every year.
In my younger days the firing of a gun as the colours were hoisted to notify that a
court-martial would assemble in the forenoon attracted no attention ; during my three
years on the China Station after the first world war I never heard that gun fired.
I first became interested in the administration of justice when I was appointed commander of the battle cruiser Queen Mary. My captain was a famous disciplinarian, Reginald
Hall, known throughout the Service as Blinker Hall. I knew that when, as a commander,
he had commissioned a ship for the Mediterranean, every bad hat in the depot had been
drafted to her ; Blinker could be trusted to make or break them.
I soon discovered that this dynamic personality was the most human senior officer
I had yet served with. His method of welding our 1,200 men into a loyal, well-disciplined
ship's company worked like magic. A man who deliberately broke the bonds of discipline
by refusing to obey orders or by insulting a superior received short shrift ; he was punished
with the utmost severity. But other offences, such as leave-breaking and those that arose
from stupidity or the exuberance of youth, were dealt with humanely and every consideration given to the culprit's defence ; and, much more important, the ship's company
soon knew that their captain would leave no stone unturned to improve their comfort
and make their lives as happy as possible. In a few weeks all but those minor delinquencies,
inevitable in any large body of young men, had disappeared.
Blinker's arguments for his system, which he explained to me on our commissioning
day, were irrefutable. The petty officer was the keystone of the disciplinary structure ;
if he could rely on the whole-hearted support of his officers the machine would work
smoothly and efficiently. Therefore the sailors and stokers must be left in no doubt that a
petty officer's word was law and that they disobeyed him at their peril. On the other hand,
great severity was not justified for offences that did not undermine the discipline of the
ship.
I remember bringing before him a hardened leave-breaking offender. He seemed a
hopeless case ; every time he was given leave he stayed away for days. To his utter surprise,
Blinker said : " I'll let you off this time " ; and as the man was moving away he called
him back and said : " If you come before me again I'll put you ashore for good ; and they
don't pipe dinner ashore." I t worked ; that man never again broke his leave ; Blinker's
method of dealing with defaulters almost amounted to genius.
250
CRIME AND PUNISHMENT.
Which reminds me of another captain who, after listening to a leave-breaker's
original defence that he had woken up to find the girl in bed with him was wearing his
flannel and did not like to disturb her, said : " Dismiss the case ; thank God the age of
chivalry is not past."
Social reformers in the Navy are not long remembered, and I doubt if the sailor of the
present day has ever heard of the man to whom he owes so much of his comfort on board
ship.
Improving the lot of the men on the lower deck was, as I have said, a feature of
Blinker's system. On the day we commissioned he told me to investigate the possibility
of converting a compartment into a chapel. He was a good Christian and had set his heart
on removing the grave disabilities under which the chaplain worked and which faced men
who attended the Communion Service ; screening off a part of the messdeck was a very poor
substitute for a chapel. I was able to construct a small chapel, and willing workers soon
furnished it. At first the fleet took little notice of this innovation ; but it was too good
an innovation to be ignored, and ten years later every large man-of-war had a chapel.
The next task he gave me was more difficult to complete. If, he said, we are going to
uphold the dignity of the petty officers, we must improve their quarters ; their messes were
only slightly more comfortable than the messes occupied by their men, they could be
greatly improved, and this was to be done.
I was immensely struck by the response from the petty officers when I told them what
we intended. The shipwrights and other artisans gave up their spare time and sacrificed
their leave to work at rebuilding the messes ; the officers had some exciting experiences
extracting furniture from the old ships in reserve under the noses of the dockyard police.
This activity was soon the talk of the fleet, and though there were not a few senior officers
who frowned at Blinker Hall's innovations, the more enlightened welcomed his lead, and
from then onwards all new ships were fitted with comfortable petty officers' messes.
Then when going rounds one day, Blinker asked how long it took the stokers to get
clean after coming off watch. We had the largest engine room complement in the Navy,
about 640 stokers, petty officers and artscers, and as many as 120 men would often be
queueing up outside the bathroom. The reply--over an hour-aroused all Blinker's
passion for reform. Something must be done and done quickly, or the engineer commander
must find another ship.
The solution was quite simple ; but no one had thought of it before because no one
had bothered about those men, tired after four hours of feeding the furnaces, standing
about for another hour or more waiting their turn to wash.
A week later the engineer commander reported to Blinker that the time was now about
twenty minutes. He had cajoled a friend in the dockyard to give him a large tank into
which he had led a steam pipe and to which he had fitted a large number of taps ; the stokers
were no longer struggling round two geysers. Next day an officer from the Admiralty
appeared to look at this " startling " invention, and in a few years the geyser had disappeared from all bathrooms. That seems rather a silly story, but it is often these little
things that cause contentment, which is the key to good discipline.
" Why shouldn't we have a laundry, we've got the electric power and men to work
one ? " asked Blinker. It was no use enumerating the objections which at once occurred to
me ; if it was possible it had to be done. We found a firm that could supply the machines
and a space to put them in, and our laundry was soon doing a roaring trade : clean, ironed
clothes in exchange for a piece of soap. Some officers looked askance at this innovation ;
it was pampering the sailors who had always washed their awn clothes. They ignored that
for years past the sailor had sent his washing to a shore laundry, which made severe
inroads on his scanty pay.
During our first cruise, when there were few opportunities of giving leave, Blinker
turned his fertile mind to bringing new interest into the lives of the ship's company during
the dog watches and evenings, and surprised us all one day when some large cases arrived
on board, which on being opened disclosed a cinematograph. That was the first one ever
seen in a man-of-war ; no man-of-war to-day is complete without one.
There were many other aids to contentment, and so to good discipline, that sprang
from the restless energy and vision of that dynamic man. " If the officers do not lead,"
he would say, " if they do not keep abreast of the times, they will be forced to improve
SPECIALIZATION AND PROMOTION.
251
conditions by their men. Nothing could be worse for the best form of discipline." How right
he was. If there had been more senior officers with Blinker Hall's courage and vision
there would probably have been none of those lower deck committees which sprang up
later and presented their demands annually to the Board of Admiralty. But Blinker,
with his three-watch system, his petty officersJmesses, his chapel, his laundry, his cinematograph, his bookstall, his decision to abolish the ship's police and rely on the integrity of
the petty officers, was looked on by most of his contemporaries as a disturber of the peace,
and by some as a menace.
What irritated them most was the remarkable spirit of high endeavour and almost
complete disappearance of punishments that followed in the wake of his reforms. Si
monummtum requiris, circums$ice. Memorials to Blinker Hall are to be found in every
man-of-war.
I have dwelt for some time on this unique experience of working with a man who did
far more than any other man to improve the lot of the sailor because I learnt then that the
best form of discipline is the discipline of the heart, and that the discipline of fear, under
which men will do their work because slackness will incur punishment, is only a veneer
which may peel off in times of stress.
I seem to have wandered far from my trailer-the controversy about capital punishment ; but writers of the letters to " The Times " will at least agree on one point-that no
society can prosper unless crimes are adequately punished. Drawing on my own experience, I have shown how, in the course of forty years, justice tempered with mercy has
replaced justice that was often so rough and ready that it was gross injustice, and that,
thanks to Blinker Hall and a few similarlygifted men, the Navy that was put to the sternest
test in two world wars was a Navy of happy warriors, who never failed because they were
happy men and were knit together by discipline of the heart.
SPECIALIZATION AND PROMOTION.
" BEAGLE'S
" article in the May number of THENAVAL
REVIEWhas thrown an enquiring
light on a question which is not only the concern of all junior executive officers but in
every wardroom a subject of interest and speculation, personal or impersonal, when the
lists of half-yearly promotions are received. My interest is that I chose the salt-horse
road purposely, and have eagerly joined battle with those specialist friends of mine who
reckon that I have chosen unwisely. And in this, I think, they do not so much pity my
chances of promotion ; they believe that, promoted or not, I have appointed myself a
" useless ullage " in a technical Service.
Having introduced myself as a salt-horse, let me hasten to concede that the Navy
of to-day is a technical instrument, and as such must achieve perfection. Though I do
not deny having acquired a few wash-deck lockers in war-time refits, the triumph of my
A and A list has always been the latest gadget, and, with it, the operators. Then why did
I not specialize ? If a fair answer can be given in one sentence, it is because I was never
partial to a particular line of gadgets.
I shall preface my reply to the fundamental challenge of my friends with some remarks
on the promotion bogy, which introduced the subject and is the main theme of " Beagle's "
article. In his first paragraph, he associates it in the minds of junior officers with the
question " Shall I specialize ? " and, though he goes on to suggest many other and likely
factors which influence this great decision, the bogy, in his opinion, remains to a great
degree. Even to a lesser degree can this make sense ? Skill in the arms and instruments
of war is one of the corner-stones of the Service ; yet the natural aptitude of its junior
officers, which alone should decide their choice, may be squandered in some ill-suited calling
because, as it seems, the intimacy of a drawing room or the advertisement of a parade
ground will achieve a brass hat where pure proficiency may not. And it is only as it seems.
252
SPECIALIZATION AND PROMOTION.
The inexperienced officer does not know this ; he is told it, sometimes by his elders, always
by loose current opinion, and always by an analysis of the figures when such an analysis
is not qualified in the tone of " Beagle's " closing sentences.
Clearly, promotion should depend upon merit, and only by coincidence would the same
merit be found in each specialist branch in any one year. Clearly, too, once a certain
branch has taken the lead, it gains reputation, attracts the most ambitious and promising
officers, and goes from strength to strength. But is not this reputation soon tainted with
caste, so that the young officer will argue that it is advisable to attempt a scholarship
from a college which has produced so many scholars rather than to rely on ofie's own
talents in the comparative obscurity of a less fashionable institution ? Or, if merit will
out, are gunnery and communication officers perpetually so excellent, and anti-submarine
officers, pilots and-yes-submariners
so poor or inefficient ?
" Beagle's " article was based on the statistics of one year only, though he believes
that in other years the same trends would be shown. I, as a sub-lieutenant, would have
welcomed any such guidance as he has offered, for I felt a little like a man playing darts
blindfold. Even so, I would not play darts with a slide rule, and the statistical approach
may not provide the true yardstick by which to judge. But the promotion factor does
influence the decision whether to specialize, and the choice of branch. In so far as it
clouds the judgment of an officer-too bad, you may say. But if it steals the best recruits
from the more bourgeois, but equally valuable, branches, can the system be defended ?
Fortunately, however, and in fairness to many, I think it is by no means the greatest
consideration amongst sub-lieutenants and lieutenants of to-day. Of the several others
suggested by " Beagle," I would emphasize two. First, the purely technical attraction
of any one of the " trades " ; and it is interesting to speculate if this point will carry more
or less weight when the first of the " Sixteen Entries " are sub-lieutenants. Second, the
environment in which an officer finds himself at the time when he has to make his choice.
Especially in small ships, where a sub-lieutenant, to his mild surprise, is at once given a
substantial responsibility, does he not often say to himself that this is, literally, " just the
iob
" ?
aSub-lieutenants during their courses are the targets for gentle propaganda, particularly with a view to attracting pilots and submariners. But the other schools are not
above a little advertisement, and in this there is an element of competition. Whether it
achieves its object is open to doubt. Indeed, it seems incongruous that to double a class
round the Island should foster such unquestioned enthusiasm for gunnery, unless through
the promise of being able to wreak the same vengeance on later generations. In contrast,
however, I remember being far from impressed by the scornful attitude adopted towards
their rivals by my instructors at one or two of the schools. These inferior insinuations
lowered my opinion of the speaker and his establishment, and tainted the flavour of the
carrot which he was offering. I, as the donkey, felt justified in turning to examine the
other carrots, not all of which were thus adulterated.
What of those salt-donkeys who decline all the prize carrots, or, should I say, prefer
a nibble of each ? " Beagle " suggests no reasons why two-fifths of his term elected not to
specialize. Does this imply that they were not interested, not clever enough, not " good "
enough to be selected ? Or did some of them have a positive reason ? I read it that most
of them found themselves early appointed to destroyers, liked it, and stayed there. The
factor of environment, and a strong one. " Beagle " calls destroyer officers " a branch all
to themselves," and it is a pleasure to see those words in print. They were more true in the
1930s, for during and since the war there has been a lot of mixing-in, and service in
destroyers may only have been an uneasy tenure numbered in months and finishing in
the reserve fleet. But let us discount those years, and hope to see the Sub-NumberTwo-Jimmy progression restored.
With this presumption, destroyers qualify to be termed a branch as much as submarines and aviation, and to those who argue that a destroyer is a simple affair-a ship
which neither sinks nor takes off-I would say this : First, the complexity of modern
equipment has increased the number of specialist officers in the fleet. This stiffening
has affected the expertlamateur ratio in the flotilla as a whole in about the same proportion
as in a single large cruiser-with this difference, that the experts in the flotilla (say, three
gunnery men in eight ships) cannot walk the waters in a night action and show the lonely
SPECIALIZATIONAND PROMOTION.
253
amateur which knob to turn. Quite a number of officers is needed to man the fleet's
destroyers, and I doubt if they could ever all be specialists. A destroyer nowadays
carries cruiser's equipment, but the self-reliant amateur in the destroyer must know more
than the amateur in the cruiser-he must know all the uses of his equipment, and all the
first-aid required to keep it going at sea. This has been and can be done, given periodical
refresher courses, and provided that destroyer officers feel that they are picked and trained
men, and specialists in their own trade.
My second point goes further to the stage where the officer who has had charge of one
weapon becomes the captain who has them all in his hand. Some say the destroyer is
outmoded. Perhaps ; but when they are all scrapped it will be time for someone else to
find employment for their disciples. Whatever the range of battles, the destroyer is likely
to be the nearest to the enemy. She needs to be handled fast. She carries torpedoes,
anti-submarine weapons, guns to strike ship, shore and aircraft, and all the devices which
find, hold and give news of the enemy. Is not the captain of all these a specialist, in that
his knowledge of how to use them must be thorough, finger-tip and almost instinctive ?
Should he not be trained in this pitch, as the other specialist is trained ? One thing is not
possible-he cannot be a lieutenant-commander (G, TAS, ND, C and L) ; nor can he rely
t
at his elbow.
on an e x ~ e rever
~ h l t h e or
r not service in destroyers is held to be akin to specializing, it will remain,
by its very nature, the objective to which the majority of non-specialists aspire, and should
command the best. Next in preference come escort vessels and minesweepers, the former
drawing ever closer t o destroyers in worth and performance, and already more numerous.
In all small ships the non-specialist is a t home and at work. In larger ships he may or
may not feel at home-it is up to him-but the vital question is : can he be said to be at
work ? The increased number of specialist subjects (A.I.O., electrics and radio, damage
control) has given rise-and quite rightly- to teams of specialist officers where before the
war there was one man. The non-specialist here is in danger of becoming a mere novice
in war-time and everybody's housemaid all the time. If that is an exaggeration it is not
groundless, nor should it be lightly dismissed. For no team is a success if some of its
members feel themselves to be mere dogsbodies. Perhaps the problem will solve itself
if specialist complements increase enough to displace the non-specialist element in larger
ships entirely. But let us not retain the latter solely to save the former the cost of a
telescope.
There remain to be considered those non-specialists who are serving the shore time
which comes the way of everybody. A few of these are training boys or cadets, a
thoroughly worthwhile and absorbing job. A very few are doing courses-a privileged dlite
in these days of an executive shortage which must be real but seems hard to credit. But
the majority are occupied in the uninspiring offices of shore establishments, keeping the
monotonous wheels turning, losing touch so very rapidly with ships and weapons, and
seldom sure what the luck of the draw will bring them next, or how soon. Compare this
with the shore service of any specialist. If he is at home, he is never far from his own club,
and has a very fair idea of his likely future. What is more, no matter where he may be,
he can keep abreast of developments in his own subject, and eventually goes to sea again
with very little leeway to make up. He will nearly always be either doing a course himself
or teaching others. He need never feel the disquieting staccato effect of a series of
apparently fortuitous and unconnected appointments.
In a controversy where there are unknown factors and doubtless strong sentiments
it is difficult and even risky to attempt to justify comment with constructive ideas. In
mid-stride, the writer has been presented with a recent A.F.O. reintroducing the examination for command of destroyers which, he feels, adds point to one of his arguments and
promise to several of them. But he is still minded to draw a conclusion and hazard a
suggestion.
The requirements seem to be :First : An acceptance of the equal contribution made by the non-specialist
" trade " ;
Second : An assurance to the non-specialist that his career follows lines of
purpose and leads to a definite objective, even in its least enterprising stages.
254
THE Q.M. BRANCH.
If the first is denied, the second is unattainable. But if the first is denied, let us play the
game and make specialization compulsory.
And the answers ? The Japanese made their torpedo school a destroyer school as
well and had no small success thereby. That is too narrow a system for us and for the
future, but the principle may be worth something. I am not acquainted with the fabulous
" they " who juggle with the pawns until they fall miraculously into their places in the
Navy List, but I venture the following as shots in the dark :First : A place which shall be for the non-specialist officers what the Dobbin
is for submariners ; to arrange complements, appointments and courses; to
conduct one " post-graduate " course-a tactical course-with wide specialist
representation on the instructional staff, and so to become a sorting house for
ideas ; perhaps to conduct a short course for acting sub-lieutenants.
Second: An established scheme for the career of the non-specialist officer
from sub-lieutenant to lieutenant-commander, enabling him to spend much of his
time in small ships, and roughly one year each : in a carrier; a cruiser or battleship;
and a shore job. With the necessary refresher courses between appointments, the
object would be to keep the officer fit for any small ship job appropriate to his rank
and seniority. Destroyers to be recognized as the plum job, and officers reported
on in this light.
In crying for this moon, I set no store by two of the trends of modern fashionneither a distinctive cloth of silver reminiscent of salt crystals, nor a pretty gold destroyer
embroidered on the cuff.
ENO'S.
THE Q.M. BRANCH.
THE Q.M. Branch has been in existence since 1945. The object of the branch is to
provide :(1)Helmsmen at sea,
(2) Quartermasters in harbour, and
(3) Coxswains of small ships.
Due to the shortage of trained Q.M.s it has not yet taken over all these duties in the
Service, but it is becoming apparent that all is not well with this new branch, and it is
probable that its youthfulness is not the only cause.
Firstly, Q.D. watchkeeping under constant supervision by the O.O.W. and the
necessity for smart uniform is not attractive to many seamen. This has been realized ;
and it is now Admiralty policy to increase Q.M. complements by 100 per cent. But it is
questionable whether even this very uneconomical way (from a training point of view)
will equal the added inducement (to potential Q.M.s) of a 50 per cent. stand off from watchkeeping duties.
Secondly, the status of any branch depends largely on the medium type of sailor
who forms the bulk of the branch, and the Q.M. 3 examination, by virtue of its easiness
compared with other branches, attracts the lazier seaman.
Thirdly, the Q.M. Branch is encouraged to believe it is the " specialist seaman"
branch ; but in fact this is not so. Apart from helmsmen and leadsmen they do practically
no seamanship, and certainly considerably less than other Part I1 rates who spend the
majority of their time " part of ship."
These are probably the main reasons why the branch is not entirely satisfactory, and
it is therefore worth considering possible alternatives to the Q.M. Branch as it exists to-day
before it has become too firmly established in the Service.
THE FIRST ALTERNATIVE IS ABOLITION.
This, of course, would take us back to the situation in 1944 and to the problems
that led to the establishment of the branch. Amongst them were the uneconomical method
255
THE Q.M. BRANCH.
of training men for one job at action stations and using them for another job, since suitable
Q.M.s could not always be found from non-specialists. The New Pay Code also made it
undesirable to have non-specialists.
Abolition would therefore create as many problems as it would solve, and should be
avoided.
THE SECOND ALTERNATIVE IS AMALGAMATION WITH ONE OTHER BRANCH.
This would (a) reduce the " uneconomical training " aspect to a reasonable level.
(b) Reduce the time spent watchkeeping on the Q.D. to a reasonable percentage of a
man's time in the Service.
(c) Increase the standard of the examination to enter that branch (though the
increase would not be large as most of the Q.M.'s knowledge is " Part I " knowledge) and thereby decrease the percentage of lazier candidates entering the branch.
(d) Help to explode the dangerous myth that only Q.M.s need to know seamanship.
The most suitable branch with which to amalgamate would probably be the R.P.
Branch, due to its common association with the Navigation School and the present
similarity of the navigational part of both syllabuses.
THE THIRD ALTERNATIVE IS AMALGAMATION WITH TWO BRANCHES.
This depends on the desirability of splitting up the present Q.M. Branch functions.
A close inspection will show that this could be done without dislocating a ship's routine
in any way. A helmsman has little in common with a " ship's routine runner." I t would
slightly favour the ship's routine if anything, as this could then be run by the whole
routine running staff (instead of, as at present, without the senior member, i.e. the Q.M.,
when at sea) if these duties were not combined.
The intention that the Q.M. Branch should eventually provide all small ship coxswains
has already aroused criticism due to the small scope of choice for such an important
executive post as senior rating of a small ship's company. Also it is more than likely
that Q.M. coxswains would be " big ship " men with little " small ship " experience.
This would surely be a job for the best from any executive branch-with the provision of a
refresher course in victualling, etc., if necessary before taking up appointment. (But which
all executive P.0.s should know as Part I knowledge.)
In fact, this is a case of uneconomical training taking second place to " the best man
for the job." I t is more important to have a first class coxswain of a small ship than a
first class gunnery instructor, and this would have to be allowed for in the training margin
of Part I1 first class rates and in the New Pay Code.
This Third Alternative would not therefore dislocate ships' organizations due to the
splitting up of Q.M.'s duties, and would otherwise present a similar case in comparison
with the present situation to that presented by the Second Alternative.
As the responsibility of providing small ship coxswains has already been discussed
above, there only remain two other Q.M. duties for amalgamation with other branches.
The first-providing helmsmen at sea-is clearly a navigational commitment and should
therefore be assumed by the R.P. Branch.
The second, however-the ship's routine and Q.D. ceremonial-does not so easily
attach itself to another branch at first sight.
I t is, so to say, an " executive essentialservice." Unlike other Part I1 rates, it functions
as long as the ship is in commission in the same way that the engineers give us steam and
the Supply Branch produce our food.
The only parallel to such an " executive essential service " is the Communication
Branch, the V/S side of which would be the most appropriate to assume this responsibility,
due to their knowledge of ceremonial.
Having seen how this conclusion is reached from first principles, other advantages
come to mind :(i) A qualilied signalman on the Q.D. would undoubtedly be an asset ; and during
his " Q.D. time " (as opposed to his " V/S time
he would not be entirely
divorced from keeping his hand in at reading signals.
'I)
256
AT THE CLUB.
(ii) In a small ship under certain conditions, quartermasters and signalmen duties in
harbour could be combined in one man.
(iii) In most big ships yeomen of signals and quartermasters already mess together
in the watchkeepers' mess.
But there is no doubt that there would be snags in the implementation of such a scheme.
Though the Q.M.'s syllabus is not extensive, and there is reported to be a surplus of yeomen
of signals, it would mean a large increase in V/S training which could only be brought
about in a matter of years.
It is the right time to implement right principles, however, and in spite of diEiculties
it is suggested that this Third Alternative would give the best results. I t is therefore
proposed that the present Q.M.Branch should be divided up so that :(1) All Executive Branches provide coxswains of small ships.
(2) The R.P. Branch take over helmsmen duties.
(3) The V/S Branch take over running ships' routines.
AT THE CLUB.
IV.
" AH ! CHARLES,
press the bell, will you, and order for yourself what you will ; for me a
large milk and soda ; that chap Walrus is looking.
" Things are not what they were ; we live in a sorry world full of muddled thinkers
who are opposed in every possible way to the thought that Man is more important as an
individual than as a naval officer, or as an Englishman, or as a democrat, or as a world
citizen. The Navy which has hitherto preserved an enviable reputation for being behind
the times is now, alas ! (judging by some of the articles in that little grey book which comes
to one under a plain wrapper) going through a stage of thought that worships efficiency
without being clear as to the meaning of that word. But then words are so difficult.
I t was only recently that I discovered that a Decibel was a unit of something-or-other to
do with a new-fangled thing called electronics, when I had always thought it was the name
of the Fairy Queen in pantomime.
"And now I find that an individual using this scientific symbol as a pseudonym is
convinced it is impossible for a man to acquire merit or distinction in any walk of life
unless he has delved into the fundamental reasons and scientific origins of everything that
he does.
" With an artlessness which does not do him sufficient credit, he says that-' everything else being equal '-the man who knows why a boat sails will be a better sailor than a
man who acquires the art by ' some obscure process of heredity.'
" That phrase, ' everything else being equal,' is as handy a shibboleth as anything,
and is being used more and more to prove less and less. I t starts by postulating an
impossibility. When dealing with human beings ' everything else ' can never be equal.
" But letting that go for a moment, does ' Decibel ' really believe that there is no such
thing as a born helmsman ? Sailing is an art, any sailing man will bear this out ; for it
is possible for a man to achieve more than for which there is any scientific explanation.
The man who knows most about the scientific side of sailing may very well be a thundering
bad sailor when given the tiller. Ocean racing in the days when oceans were crossed were
sailed by skippers who knew nothing about aerodynamics and very little of the elementary
principles of meteorology other than that which they had acquired, not by any obscure
process, but in the hard school of experience and by learning at the knees of individuals
who were themselves great seamen.
" Why, my dear Charles, does ' Decibel ' think it so ludicrous that a man who sails
should not be able to give a clear exposition of the scientific reason why a boat goes to
windward ?
257
AT THE CLUB.
" There are champion cyclists and motor-cyclists who can drive faster and with greater
skill than their fellows and who regularly win the T.T. races ; is it suggested that they do
this because they are better grounded in gyroscopics and engineering ? Has Bradman
taken a course in ballistics ? Has Joe Louis a better knowledge of anatomy than any other
boxer ? This is a very serious misconception and one which was held by the Germans,
who won many battles but not the wars. If it had been as ' Decibel ' says it is surely we
who were bound to lose the last two struggles against Germany. The idea, moreover, that
a man only goes in for sailing for the purpose of achieving distinction and that the only
measure of a good sailing man must be how he fares in open competition with his rivals
is a curiously un-English attitude.
" But clearly ' Decibel ' derides the national characteristics which have brought us
safely to the beginning of this day. He is prepared to abandon tradition and heredity
in favour of correspondence courses on all things scientific. Seamanship, he says, is not
enough ; and since it isn't enough it isn't worth-while a t all. And nowhere with all his
calculating eye has he touched upon that very English asset for which there is no English
word-' morale.'
" Take three dozen alpha-pluses and give them every possible injection of scientific
knowledge, plaster them with lectures on the principles of war and broaden their minds
until they are able to laugh at the characteristics of men who are called English; and then
send them to sea in small ships. It will be found that X per cent. will be sea-sick,
Y per cent. will be frightened, and Z per cent. will be bored after the first trip.
Repeat this treatment regularly and it will be found that these percentages will decrease
almost to vanishing point. Scientifically it is called, I believe, conditioning ; if we like
to call it seamanship instruction it is because we're old fogies.
" Seamanship may not be enough ; but once again I challenge ' Decibel ' to disprove
that you cannot make a seaman without teaching him what it feels like to be at sea; and
since, according to the Press, we no longer have a sea-going navy, I contend that it is better
for the individual to go to sea in a pea-green boat along with the owl and the pussy-cat
than to spend hours in harbour drinking in (No, ' Walrus,' not what you thought) erroneous
doctrines that a young man who takes part in a discussion group will be a better naval
officer than one who does not.
" Surely this wave of muddled thought has gone far enough.
Where, oh ! where, are
the forces of reaction ?
" Recently an Army officer asked a sub-lieutenant what he did on his courses at
Greenwich, and very properly the bright boy answered, 'We are Taught to Think.' ' I say,'
said the military gentleman, ' isn't that a bit dangerous. What ? ' How the young
gentlemen laughed at this story ; they are still laughing at it ; they will be laughing
even more heartily when they see where this process of thinking has led this country.
" When I was a wee lad I was taught science by a gunnery instructor.
' Now,' he
said, ' this yer is worked out by a fing what we calls Pi (9. Mr. Lefroy, our gunnery
lootenant, is a very clever man. He has discovered what Pi is. It is - (pause for sensation) three-point-one-four-of-an-inch.'
" Good enough explanation, if slightly inaccurate.
You know we're rather inclined
to laugh at the Army for refusing to allow too much thinking to chase too little brains.
At Fort Blockhouse there is a classic original of the joke in ' Punch ' (circa 1910).
' I say,' says the Army-type looking at the machinery in a submarine, ' I suppose you have
some sort of Sergeant Johnny who knows about these things. What? ' (All comic
soldiers say ' What.')
" But now in 1948 I'm beginning to wonder whether we had not better call a halt and
take stock. Where are we going-down the slippery slope with the good fairy Decibel,
to the same it into which the Germans fell? Seamanship is not enough. Historv is
bunk. ~eligibnis optional. Science is paramount, only man is vile. This milk "has
gone to my head."
G. H. J.
u
,
WHEN THE BOUGH BREAKS.
WHEN THE BOUGH BREAKS.
1 . 4 0 COMMENTS.
~ ~
ITis nearly always interesting to hear someone else's account of an operation in which you
have taken a part, however humble. When the account is both witty and full of inside
information and background knowledge it is fascinating. I have therefore greatly enjoyed
the two instalments of "When the Bough Breaks," and I think I recognise in "Sirius "
a staff officerof the more able and helpful sort, with whom it is always a pleasure to deal.
After all this, it may seem ungrateful to criticize any part of his article ; but it must
be remembered that no one can see the whole picture, and, from the lower level of " the
toad beneath the harrow," it may look quite different to the view from H.Q. If I challenge
a few of his points, I hope neither " Sirius " nor his readers will suppose that I do not
recognize that in general he has been as fair as he has been shrewd and amusing.
First item : The Post-Hostilities planners at Norfolk House. I t may well be that the
military planners were living in an ivory castle-no mere tower would have contained them
all--of their own. But I think the Naval Division were more solidly based and had a
firmer grip on realities. I should certainly not consider the time we spent there (until
ejected into the wilds of Chelsea) trying to reap the fruits of their labours entirely wasted.
At the very least, they assisted us to follow Doctor Johnson's maxim : " Clear your mind
of cant." And they gave us several useful points to march on.
I think " Sirius " is also a bit captious and wise after the event in his caustic remarks
on the plans. It is over-stating the case to say that a naval party at Sylt " was soon
found to be unnecessary." The initial requirements may perhaps, but not certainly, have
been somewhat over-estimated and, in naval fashion, the party may have undertaken
commitments well beyond the limits of their terms of reference ; but it was a year before
they could be entirely written off.
" The bombed city " of Luebeck was much more heavily bombed by press relations
types than in actual fact-at any rate, by the standards of bombing in Germany. It was
not unattractive. But it held few items of naval interest beyond a retired officer with
an S.T.O. sort of job who had shot himself the day 8 Corps moved in; so the decision to
occupy Travemuende instead was not entirely based on the attraction of the bathing
beaches.
In general, I think the planning was quite creditable. Though plans obviously had
to be adapted to circumstances, the general principles were sound. It was when we were
forced to depart from principles that major troubles usually set in.
For the greater part of the war, the German Admiralty was certainly a "by no means
negligible body," but I seriously question whether that term could fairly be applied to it
in May, 1945. The last few weeks in Germany must have been sheer chaos. The German
Admiralty had had a hurried move, pausing by the way at Ploen, losing and burying its
documents, and by the time it reached Flensburg it had few clues and no grip. It was
nearly as much a spent force as the units it had administered and operated, whose remnants
in any case were soon firmly under the thumb of the British N.0.I.C.s at the ports.
(Nothing capable of moving or being towed was left in the Russian zone.) For the life of
me, I still cannot see why the nominal authority of the Oberkommando der Kriegsmarine
should not have been almost immediately liquidated, by decree, and its members then have
been left to a team of interrogators. It was only when O.K.M. was allowed to meddle with
our local Germans that there was even a vestige of trouble with them, and orders passed
through British channels were much less likely to be mutilated in transmission.
It is on the question of complements that I take issue most strongly with " Sirius."
It may be that owing to the priority which had to be given to the Pacific war nothing
better could be done, but nothing will make me admit that the original complements were
anything like adequate, for the first two or three months at least. As I recall it, the
N.R., February and May, 1948.
WHEN THE BOUGH BREAKS.
259
sequence of events was roughly on the following lines. The Norfolk House planners
produced a first approximation. When the nucleus of the smaller fry joined, the problem
was handed to us ; we examined it in more detail and arrived at very similar figures, which
were submitted for approval. They were returned, arbitrarily halved, regardless of
whether any particular party was divisible by two or not, so that we were allowed, for
example, fewer drivers than the approved number of vehicles, which itself was so low as
to horrify an experienced N.O.I.C. The argument that much smaller parties were required
after World War I was not particularly convincing, since history showed that Germany
had not been thoroughly disarmed then. We went over the figures again and could not
make them much less than our first estimate. Lobbying at Directors' level obtained
agreement on the Old Boy frequency that we were not being unreasonable ; but it was still
more firmly agreed that it would be quite useless to resubmit the question to the Board.
I well remember that, at a lecture given to junior naval officers attending the Army course
at Worthing , the discussion afterwards developed entirely into heckling over the approved
schemes of complement, and the lecturer was very roughly handled. In actual practice,
the position was made much worse by the late formation of the parties, transport difficulties
and the confusion obtaining amongst the Germans. Directly we had moved in there was
an immediate and well justified howl from the N.0.I.C.s which produced some result in
the long run. Eventually we finished up with practically the complement originally asked
for, but not before three commanders in one party had cracked under the strain and had
to be sent home, and a number of other officers had given cause for worry. I don't think
I am particularly allergic to work (and it was absolutely fascinating-just like a non-stop
up-to-date news-reel), but there were occasions when I wondered how much longer I
could cdntinue to take it, and many others were out and only just on their feet.
I am not equipped to comment on the size of the staff at H.Q., but I will never agree
that the workers in the field were adequate in the early stages.
An added complication which "Sirius" scrubs round is that, by way of making
amends for the tardy formation of the parties, it was first intended that they should be
lifted from Bourg Leopold by air. This fell through, owing to priority being given to the
repatriation of prisoners of war, which was fair enough ; but the result, as far as we were
concerned, was that the parties arrived in driblets by road. As bodies became available
they had to turn to on the most immediate jobs, without regard to their qualifications.
Specialist officers and ratings thus found themselves employed in very unexpected
capacities. Owing to the small numbers of bodies and the large number of requirements,
it was some time before the former could be sorted out and directed to the jobs for which
they had been briefed.
Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond has argued that strategic foresight is often an adequate
substitute for high speed. Conversely, high speed-particularly when not available when
required-is no substitute for lack of foresight.
The story of the Milwa~keeis well-worth telling in more detail than " Sirius " has had
time for ; but, as I still continue to dine out on it very successfully, perhaps the time is
not yet ripe for committing it to print.
I would most strongly endorse all that " Sirius " says about 21st Army Group.
Commander King-Hall remarked in a News-Letter about this time that the British Army
of 1945 was as efficient an administrative machine as there ever had been ; or words to that
effect. I endorse this, too, with the qualification noted by " Sirius," viz., that you must
know how to work the machine. The decentralization practised by the Army has its
disadvantages. The statement "All informed " at the end of an Army signal is often a
bit of pious optimism. When you want something done in the Navy you go to the fountainhead, if you are well advised and have access thereto. Try that with the Army and as often
as not your application gets lost in the works. But if you know the pressure-point at
intermediate levels, you are made.
I could not agree more about the Guards either. Great characters, but great fun and
delightful to work or play with.
The transfer to the Russians of their share of the Kriegsmaritze occupied a far bigger
place in our agenda than might appear from the narrative. This was an arduous and
excessively tiresome affair, demanding so much more detailed accuracy and patience
than the ordinary naval officer possesses that I do not think it could have been concluded
260
WHEN THE BOUGH BREAKS.
without the tireless services of the operations W.R.N.S. officers. Operational Wrens
became " redundant " elsewhere about this time ; but they certainly did not in north-west
Germany until the conclusion of Operation SCRAM.
There are so many aspects to the question of demolitions that I am not prepared to
argue it here and now ; but on the whole my feeling is that it was a pity we did not blow
much more while the going was good. I t may be that this is a purely instinctive dislike
Hun, but possibly not. The convertibility of German swords
for being seen off by any
into ploughshares (and vice versa) is remarkable.
On the subject of the Control Commission I agree generally with " Sirius" ; but I feel
that he has not done full justice to a large number of public-spirited and quite competent
citizens who took up the work, not exactly out of altruism, perhaps, but with the firm
intention of making a good job of it and did so, within the limits imposed by quadripartite
decisions, directives and bureaucratic methods from which 21st Army Group was at first
so admirably free.
Well, well. As " Sirius " says, it was broadening. And I am grateful to him for
having recalled it all so vividly.
BETA.
-
I HAVE read " Sirius's " articles " When the Bough Breaks " with much interest,
since they give me an opportunity to add, for the sake of record, a few more notes on the
early planning of the " naval occupation " of Germany which was carried out by the
C.C.M.S., whose work I think " Sirius " too readily disposes of as being of little or no
account.
While in full agreement with almost everything else " Sirius " writes, I do think
he has not fully explained, or perhaps understood, the peculiar problems which the naval
section of the C.C.M.S. had to solve, nor made allowance for the circumstances and conditions in which those problems were tackled.
I t was in May, 1944, that the present writer was recalled from sea (from his ship
then working up to take part in the Normandy bombardments), and appointed for duty
with the Control Commission Military Section (Naval Division)-a rather senseless title,
I agree-and referring to a peculiar body then forming for the purpose of planning the
naval occupation of Germany. So far as the Navy was concerned any practical thoughts
in this direction had hitherto emanated from three senior retired officers working in an
office in Whitehall on plans for post-hostilities generally, and the Admiralty rightly felt
the time was approaching when these thoughts required to take a more practical shape,
and their more specifically naval manifestation formulated by a larger body able to devote
the whole time to the business.
I t is important to recall the war situation at that time-May, 1944. The invasion
of Europe was imminent (though the exact date, time and place were unknown to us all)
and obviously it was not to be expected that anyone in the Admiralty or in the vast
invasion armada, then preparing secretly, was going to spare a minute to concern itself
with post-victory problems. In fact, this was precisely the reason why the C.C.M.S. was
set up, and once it had made a start it was left to get on with the job with the minimum
of interest or attention from anyone else. The idea then obviously was that it should
go ahead and produce a plan of sorts to be ready by the time it would be needed, thus
providing the backbone of a scheme to put into operation when a clearer picture of how the
end would come became apparent.
Simultaneously with my appointment two R.N.V.R officerswere added to the team,
and later two senior Royal Marine officers. In due course this modest nucleus was slightly
increased. I remember vividly the first meeting three or four of us held round the RearAdmiral's table in Norfolk House, and how we asked ourselves what we were going to try
and do, and how we were going to make a start. Practically the only definite information we had to act on was a more or less official understanding that after the war Germany
was to be occupied for a longer period than after the 1914-18 war, and that there would be
three zones of occupation of that country, British, American and Russian. Where the
WHEN THE BOUGH BREAKS.
boundaries of the three zones would run had not yet been determined, but it was to be
assumed that the British zone would include the German sea ports. This latter, however,
was understood to be by no means settled, as it was believed the Americans were also
anxious to claim this area; but nobody knew for certain, and nobody could obtain a
decision.
Working in Norfolk House, too, were our Army and R.A.F. counterparts, engaged
on similar problems relating to their own Service " occupation " plans. I t a t once became
clear that, unless the British zone was to be the north-west area of Germany which included
the sea ports, there could hardly be a " naval " occupation of Germany a t all, and that
we had therefore better assume that this would be our zone. Nebulous foundations indeed
on which to draw up a practical plan, and hosts of unknown factors immediately presented themselves. Let me enumerate a few:When and where would the invasion of Europe begin?
Assuming it succeeded, when would the war end?
Where would the Allied Forces be when the war ended-in France, on the frontiers
of Germany, or in Berlin?
What was meant precisely by a " naval occupation " (for fifteen or twenty years)
of a conquered enemy country?
What forces in terms of men and/or ships were required for the purpose?
Where should they be stationed and why?
What would be their duties?
Who would command such forces and where from-Berlin or the quarterdeck of a
battleship at Kiel?
What ships would be available when the time came? (It was assumed that the war
with Japan would still be on and probably increasing with vigorous intensity.)
How was the Navy going to " get into " Germany immediately after a surrender?
(Bearing in mind the minefield situation in the approaches to all German ports.)
How did one control the German Admiralty, and, when the surrender came, would
it be in Berlin, or Paris, or Kiel, or even exist at all ?
The list was endless, and quite obviously not one single definite answer could be
given by any mortal person on this planet. Lacking all the fundamental data, it was
apparent that any plan we could produce would have to be infinitely elastic and capable
of application to any one of a score or more situations or combination of situations which
might arise.
" Sirius " gives us credit for planning the occupation of the German ports, but rather
implies that nothing further was usefully thought out or accomplished until the posthostilities staff of A.N.C.X.F. absorbed our activities six months later. But what more
indeed could we have planned at that early stage, though it is true that little definite
practical shape could be put on our proposals until it became apparent who was going to
put them into effect? Until that much was known and the ultimate commander's
wishes and intentions communicated, it was obvious that little more could be achieved
beyond giving carefully considered estimates of requirements if such and such a course
were decided on, or that to carry out such and such an operation would involve consideration of so and so.
During this first six months, i.e., from May till November, 1944, we were all working
very much in the dark, and with but the scantiest indication from any of the likely commanders in the field of what their ultimate intentions were. The question of the continuation of the S.H.A.E.F. command immediately after any surrender was another
unknown but very important factor. This very soon gave rise to complications. The
truth is that it was not until the invasion of Europe was safely accomplished and the
allied forces pressing vigorously towards Germany that anybody of the staff of the allied
admirals, generals and air marshals on the Continent began to have opportunity to turn
their attention for the first time to the problem of what was to be done when Germany
surrendered-in other words to all that the C.C.M.S. had been thinking out during the past
six months. And as soon as these problems began to engage the attention of the allied
commanders it is submitted the first serious wrong step was taken. Instead of demanding
all the C.C.M.S. plans hitherto made, examining them, criticizing them, and generally
using them as the foundation on which to build the final structure now becoming dimly
I
WHEN THE BOUGH BREAKS.
visible, S.H.A.E.F. suddenly set to work to devise its own plans, hastily--or so it seemed
to us-throwing together voluminous notes, memoranda, directives and handbooks
about what was to be done.
All attempts at a rational collaboration or amalgamation of plans were brusquely
set aside and shouldered out of the way by S.H.A.E.F. S.H.A.E.F. was in command,
S.H.A.E.F. would do this, and that, and organize everything ; S.H.A.E.F. had the responsibility, S.H.A.E.F. was god on the Continent of Europe, and S.H.A.E.F. could do no wrong.
Possibly I exaggerate a little; but this attitude, perhaps excusable in the first flush of
European successes, was not helpful. For, whatever plans S.H.A.E.F. intended to put
into effect, they must obviously not violently conflict with those to be enforced after
dissolution of the S.H.A.E.F. command, or be incompatible with the long-term plans
to be introduced as soon after the surrender as possible, all of which were considerations
we had had to bear in mind. Duplication and overlapping of plans were therefore soon
inevitable, leading to endless paper work and preparation of conflicting instructions
and much misunderstanding.
The position of A.N.C.X.F. was difficult. As " Sirius " says, he was himself the naval
personification of S.H.A.E.F. and. had now established a post-hostilities section of his
staff in London which was busy absorbing the C.C.M.S. staff and its work. With so many
cooks stirring the broth now from one side of the Channel and now from another, coupled
with the uncertainty as to the precise conditions under which surrender would take place,
and where, it was not surprising that plans and arrangements were being constantly
amended or scrapped. The Admiralty also now began to take a hand in the planning
as certain initial requirements in the way of ships, and more particularly officers and men,
began to crystallize, and another battle had to be fought to obtain anything like what
was considered to be the minimum requirements. As the war against Germany in its
final stages began to diminish in importance so all thoughts in the highest places inevitably
concentrated more and more on finishing off Japan. While not disputing the importance
of this, it did seem to us that it would be futile not to finish off Germany properly too while
about it, and that any half-hearted or under-manned force of naval occupation would
only lead to a repetition of all that we had learnt must be avoided after the lesson of the
1914-18war. Recent experience in the manning of the ports taken over in enemy occupied
countries showed clearly that eventual requirements in this respect would not be less when
we reached enemy territory itself, particularly as such occupation, unlike that in liberated
countries, was to be semi-permanent, and the nature of work to be performed therein
of a drastic nature, and carried out presumably under the nose of a sullen, hostile population,
probably also an actively hostile one. It should here be noted that the C.C.M.S. plans
for the occupation of the German naval ports remained fundamentally as originally
planned, the principal alteration being a vast increase in the numbers of officers and men
required to work the plan, based on recent practical experience gained in the running of
the French and Belgian Channel ports.
All these plans and arrangements moreover had to be dovetailed into the general
scheme for military control of Germany, and later with the plans for ultimate transference to the civil control. I t is in this last connection that " Sirius's " criticism of
some aspects of the Norfolk House planning is mainly justified. It cannot be too strongly
be emphasized that there was no " futility " where the naval planning was concerned,
and I would challenge " Sirius " to state in what respects he considers there was. Over
and over again the Naval Division refused to be entangled with many of the harebrained schemes evolved by the " economic " and " financial " gentry whose principal
achievements appeared to be the building up of elaborate departmental and office staffs,
whose unpractical and narrow outlook expressed itself in the compilation of endless
statistical surveys,and the preparationof academicschemes for the suppression and control
of every aspect of German civilian activity. Few of these schemes, codified into complicated directives and over-detailed handbooks seemed to us in the Naval Division to be
even remotely possible of execution or even of being understood by those likely to have to
carry them out. One may also say that where the Naval Division of C.C.M.S. employed
one junior officer on the job the military division would install two or three senior officers
and four other ranks to do the same work, and the khaki-clad " economic " and " finance "
WHEN THE BOUGH BREAKS.
263
divisions probably more. Inevitably the outcome of such inflation is that a whole unnecessary department grows up and, worse still, begins to breed sections and sub-sections.
As each section expands it requires more and separate office space and before long all start
corresponding with each other on minutes and memoranda. Then someone suggests a
" weekly progress report " which then has to be " co-ordinated " by somebody else with
other similar reports, and all of them circulated to everybody else. And so the useless
paper work grows and grows. Making all allowance for the wider framework within
which the military and civil divisions had to plan, there is no question that the Naval
Division's approach to every problem showed infinitely greater economy of effort, common
sense, grasp of realities, and a closer appreciation of how to set about any particular job.
What can we learn from all this ? First and foremost I think that given a somewhat
similar situation in future, post-hostility planning must, as soon as circumstartces permit,
be considered by the highest " executive authority " who is going to carry it out, and be
controlled by him from one place. No preliminary planning can proceed very far or
effectively until the wishes and intentions of the man who is to put the plans into effect
are known, and his directions received. In 1944 nobody knew who would execute which
plan, or where from, or with what force, or even yho the naval Commander-in-Chief,
Germany was going to be. Naturally no one can foresee how a campaign on such a scale
will develop or end, and those occupied with its day-to-day events and controlling and
commanding the forces concerned cannot be expected to sit quietly and think out plans
But when a body has been set up for that purpose it should either
for " after the war
be used, assisted and directed, or completely assimilated with the " executive authority's "
own staff at a very early date, or scrapped altogether. The one thing not to do, and which
was done in 1944, is to set up a duplicate and triplicate organization to work over the
same ground already ploughed up and sown.
Secondly, those engaged in planning similar undertakings in future must embody
a strong leavening of experienced and practical men, especially at the middle and higher
levels. Without them planning will get into the hands of the clever " office-minded "
worker who, however academically brilliant on paper, has never carried out a practical
job of work in his life and has no idea how one sets about it.
A few final comments. In view of the over-riding requirements for the Japanese
war it soon became apparent that the only officers and men to be made available for the
naval occupation of Germany were those who could be scraped out of the barrel at the last
possible moment. But a great tribute must be paid at once to these " scrapings " who
carried out in magniiicent fashion one of the most difficult tasks the Navy has ever undertaken. The work of the occupying port parties, and may I say particularly the flag officers
and commanding officers and their staffs in the ports, was unsurpassed for virtuosity and
success. Here was the Navy, the majority of it either retired or R.N.V.R. in a completely
new role, brilliantly performing a unique job. Practically nothing has been heard or
written about their achievements, and their efforts one and all appear to have been completely overlooked and ignored. As a senior active service officer at the time I think this
tribute is due to them-rather overdue in fact, but I for one am glad to record it. And
in this connection let me record-what is nowadays all too readily taken for granted and
forgotten-the equally brilliant and successful work done by the Director of Stores and
Director of Victualling and their departments in supplying without question, without
stint and without failure, inconceivably vast quantities of every kind of stores, food,
clothing and equipment, and arranging its transport to a succession of ports on the Continent, just where it was needed, when it was needed. Must we always take this kind of
work for granted without even a nod of recognition in the time-honoured way ?
I have told but a twentieth part of the whole story. Events moved so rapidly,
the organization of every undertaking was on such a vast scale, and every move and step
was so interlocked with those of the other Services and with those of our allies that a clear
and comprehensive narrative of all that was done which would show each activity in its
true relation and proportion to another is a nearly impossible task.
However, I am concerned to make one point only,and wish to ram it home vigorouslythere was no futility in the initial planning of the naval occupation of Germany. I think
" Sirius " really agrees with me in this, and while I fully endorse his scathing remarks
on certain aspects of Norfolk House activities, he has not made it sufficiently clear that the
".
264
SOME NOTES ON NAVAL RECRUITING.
Navy were not the offenders. For, as he himself so admirably puts it : " We in the!
Navy are entitled to expect and accustomed to find a power of improvization and a degree
of initiative among ourselves that very largely does away with the need for referring to
a detailed plan, or going about the job with the eyes glued to a handbook.'* Which was
precisely our outlook from start to finish.
A. D. D.
.
SOME NOTES ON NAVAL RECRUITING.
THE thoughtful article by " Nico," entitled " Special Service Adult Entries " in the
August, 1947, issue of THE NAVALREVIEW,invites not so much a rejoinder as an
explanation of certain factors connected with NAVALRECRUITING
with which the reader
may be unfamiliar. The writer of. these notes is out at grass in the Elysian fields of
retirement ; but there exist a number of very devoted officers and ratings still serving
in whose interests a word seems due.
THE GROWTH OF NAVAL RECRUITING.
If one takes a map of the British Isles one is immediately struck by the long length
of indented coastline. Except for Scandinavia, Denmark, Italy, Portugal, Japan and
the eastern coast of America-all of which zones are productive of seafaring races-there
are few areas in the globe where the land-coast ratio is so heavily weighted in favour of
the latter. It is even more remarkable to cover the map north of a line London RiverGloucester and see what is left. In this area of Southern England, ringed by the sea,
it is difficult to get more than three easy marches from deep or tidal waters. This area
moreover contains areas Exmoor, Dartmoor, Salisbury Plain and the uplands of Harnpshire and Surrey-uninviting for agriculture. The natural resources of the area are
few. Sussex iron has long been abandoned ; there is little coal and, apart from Cornwall,
Quantock and Portland, there are few mines or quarries. In the old days before the
industrial revolution it is true that, leaving London on one side, Bath, Exeter, Taunton
and Bristol were among the foremost boroughs of the Kingdom. Bristol, of course,
always derived its importance from the sea while the rest developed textile industries
from the rich grazing lands in which they were situated. Now all is vanished and only
a few names like Axminster and Honiton remind us of lost glories of English craftmanship.
But the point is really this : that even in its economic heyday Southern England was
incapable of supporting more than a fraction of its population. Even had the urge to
travel been lacking, sheer economic necessity would have compelled large numbers of
men from the southern counties to seek their livelihood at sea.
This is not to decry the services of men from other parts of the Three Kingdoms
nor to deny that things have changed. From the days when Martin Frobisher brought
his Yorkshiremen south the north-countryman has been a factor in the Navy which we
could neglect only at our peril : Wales, Scotland and Ireland all provided desirable
quotas. Now we rely more and more on the industrial Midland areas, and it is interesting
to note that in the year 1945-6 Hampshire was a better recruiting area for the Army
than the Navy. None the less, the long predominance of Southern England is essential
to a comprehension of the history of Naval Recruiting.
In the formative stage of naval history, then, recruiting was largely automatic. Men
went to sea because they had to. In times of strain the press-gang was invoked, though
in my opinion its influence has been greatly exaggerated ; in part, no doubt, owing to
Smollet's writings. None the less there are some interesting survivals from the days of
the press. I think I am correct in saying (though I was never able to check the enactment) that a military or marine recruiter who enlists a prime seaman, i.e, one who without
further training can assume an able rate, commits a misdemeanour. As against that
the Army and Marine recruiter has a formidable weapon in the shape of the " King's
SOME NOTES ON NAVAL RECRUITING.
265
shilling." This, when given to anyone, other than a seaman or an indentured apprentice',
constituted an enforceable contract, determinable only by actual service or the payment
of " smart money." One needs little imagination to picture the Hards of some seaport
when the press was out ; the Hogarthian scene, lit by the flickering light of torches :
the sailors with polished hats, swinging queues and gleaming cutlasses ; the drabs of
the seaport defending their men with gin bottles and-most formidable of feminine
weapons-babies used as clubs ; the scarlet recruiting serjeants (or, if they were Marines,
sergeants) pickhg up the " landsmen " with a shilling that freed them from the attentions
of the press ; the pressed men being rowed across the dark water ; the men slinking up
a side street with murder in their hearts, a shilling in their pockets, and every intention
of " jumping " a sixteen-guinea bounty in their minds. The indentured apprentice
passed on, and here again is a curious survival from the past ; even to-day there' is no
better method of securing identification of a man than tearing a sheet of paper across,
giving half to the man, and sending the other half to the officer who must identify him ;
and this is all a contract of indenture is.
But I digress. The point is, however, that, except in moments of sudden expansion,
the problem of Naval Recruiting solved itself. Apart from the genuine volunteer we
depended on what the late Lord Roberts called " the conscription of hunger," which
always bulked large in southern England, to fill the complements. Even when continuous
service came into being in the 'fifties of the last century the commodores of the three
Home Ports required no assistance to man the depots and fleets. Pride of place belonged
to London river, and the principal flagship is to-day manned from the Nore as H.M.S.
Victory was for Trafalgar.
In the meanwhile the Marines had a recruiting organization of their own. Since
recruiting of seamen was denied them the home ports, or for that matter any ports, had
little attraction for them, and they went inland to pick up lads from the plough and,
later, to the great cities to collect the left-overs from the industrial revolution-the
" conscription of hunger" again. Since they were in competition with the Household,
Departmental, and County Corps their organization was both pushing and efficient-it
had to be. So matters stood until the 'nineties and the turn of the century when two
things happened ; firstly, the Royal Navy became aware of the increased need for technical
ratings which ody industry could provide, and, secondly, the Army, with its Kiplingesque romance derived from the Victorian wars, became a formidable rival from a
recruiting standpoint in southern England. The Royal Marine organization was accordingly invited to undertake recruiting for the Royal Navy on an agency basis and, the
better to fit it for its task, naval officers and ratings were introduced into the Marine
set-up. At the same time a dreary old colonel of Marines was retained at the head of
affairs and of this line I was the last. At the same time some highly questionable
private recruiting came into being.
In 1917 an inquiry was instituted into the whole recruiting position and the astonishing
fact dame to light that there were no fewer than. nine recruiting agencies in Admiralty
pay, viz. : the Crystal Palace for R.N.V.R. ; the Director ef Air Services ; the Mobilizing
Officer ; Auxiliary Patrol ; the Admiral commanding Coastguards and Reserves ; the
Auxiliary Patrol again in another capacity ; the M.D.G. ; the Director of Transports and
Shipping ; the Hydrophone Department ; and the Salvage Section. It was then decided
that the Inspector of Naval Recruiting (late the Inspector of Marine Recruiting) should
be Director of Naval Recruiting and should take over ,dlrating procurement except
Reserves. To this general rule two exceptions were subsequently made ; firstly, that
the entry of artificers remained the province of the Secretariat (N. Branch) though D.N.R.
acted as an agent in such matters as medical examinations, and, secondly, when the
W.R.N.S. were re-constituted in preparation for, and during, World War 11, they set
up their own recruiting organization. In both cases I think the decision was wrong. As
regards artificers, greatly though I respect the Admiralty Secretariat in general and
N. Branch in particular, an overburdened Secretariat can never operate as a prime mover.
We get our numbers, mainly from the dockyard schools, largely by accepting-let's face
it-failures, while the rich field of the Clyde, the Tyne, and South Wales lies untapped.
As regards W.R.N.S., we had women in our centres, and I can see little justification for
the setting up of rival agencies. To return, however, to World War I, a further inquiry
D
266
SOME NOTES ON NAVAL RECRUITING.
in '1919 resulted in a most beneficial overhaul in recruiting procedure including the
abolition of " brin$ng " or head nioney, a deplorable artSce which the other Services
still retain.
RECRUITING FOR WORLD WAR 11.
In 1939, before the outbreak of war, the Military Training Act was passed. On the
3rd of June, 1939, the youth of the country registered at the Ministry of Labour. I
would like, at this stage, to invite all readers to register a token of respect to the Ministry
of Labour and National Service, which, under its chief, the Right Honorable Ernest
Bevin, later appointed by Mr. Winston Churchill, became the model of all departments
of State, not only on account of its efficiency but of the entirely sympathetic way in
which it functioned. On the 3rd of September, 1939, the National Service (Armed
Forces) Act was passed through all its stages, replacing the earlief enactment, and making
all males, from 18 to 40 inclusive, liable for military service. Two other Acts were
subsequently passed with which we need not concern 'ourselves, and the whole call-up
system regulated by Royal Proclamations. The burden thrown on the staffs of the
Ministry of Labour and National Service and Recruiters may be gauged by the fact that,
between the passage of the pre-war Act and the completion of the first year of the war
over 2,700,000 men had been registered.
REGULAR RECRUITING AND RECRUITING UNDER THE N.S. ACTS.
With the exception of an exiguous trickle of seaman boy entrants and of Royal
Marines, who continued to maintain their pre-war approved regular strength, regular
recruiting ceased during the war. How far this was wise from a Service standpoint it
is not for me to say. I t did, however, allow the Recruiting Staffs to deal with the new
situation without any great increase in strength. Regular recruiting is conducted under
quite different conditions from those of the N.S. Acts. In the former case we insist
(which the other Services do not) on medical examinations being conducted by R.N.
medical officers. Birth certificates and references of good character have to be produced.
In the latter case the medical examination is carried out by civilian practitioners controlled
by the Ministry, birth certificates may not be called for, nor are references to character
allowed. Fortunately Recruiting Staffs have their ears fairly close to the ground of the
places in which they are stationed, but they also have access to those things at which
so many hearty laughs are directed-identity cards. Without revealing the secrets of
the Ministry, even if I knew them, it may be remembered that there are 300 combinations
of 25 things taken two at a time. In some respects the identification afforded by the
card, fitting the holder into a category, seems superior to a passport, which purports to
identify the holder as an individual, since the application form for the latter in itself
constitutes an instruction for faking it, whereas the secret of the former is known to
.relatively few people. Of course the '.' spiv " of conynerce who, ex hyfiothesi is no fool,
has already learned in the school of trial and error--or perhaps error and trial-that he
should equip himself with the card of a man of about his awn age who has done his military
service, but even so he is not always safe in a check. As against this it may be remembered that the number of people crossing frontiers guarded at immense cost in Europe
with faked papers runs into thousands a day.
I
PERSONNEL SELECTION.
The entry of men in war, then, came under the aegis of the Ministry. and recruiters
largely busied themselves with the choosing of the men they thought best for the Navy.
Selection was based on physical fitness and on the recruiter's knowledge of the requirements of the Service, and, in general, it worked well enough, few mistakes being made.
But, from the standpoint of the fleets at sea and the training establishments busily
employed in " riddles of death Thebes never' knew," we could not afford to make any
mistakes at all. Accordingly, at the instance of, I believe, the Director of Scientific
Research, the office of the senior psychologist was set up in 'the Admiralty and personnel
selection officers and W.R.N.S. established at training establishments and recruiting
centres. The result of this measure was immediate and gratifying, and the failure rate
in technical courses came down with a run. It is questionable whether the work of this
devoted band (mostly),of R.N.V.R. officers, the majority of whom came, I believe, from
the Institute of Industrial Psychology, and W.R.N.S. is fully appreciated in the Service,
267
SOME NOTES ON NAVAL RECRUITING.
and it is certain that it can never adequately be repaid. It was a very sad day for D.N.R.
and his staff when, following the conclusion of peace, these selection staffs returned to
civil Life. I n the meantime, in the interests of co-operation, short courses in persannel
' selection were held for recruiters under the aegis of the senior psychologist who further
added a liaison officer for recruiting duties alone. After a few pangs which invariably
accompany the birth of what seems to be a new idea, personnel selection methods were
accepted with enthusiasm by recruiters who, for the first time, were provided with a
yardstick by-which to measure an entrant for the job assigned.
There is, in reality, nothing new in selection for a given duty. The devout reader
will remember from the 7th chapter of the Book of Judges how Gideon sorted out his
Army to encounter the Midianites. Napoleon made fourteen marshals of the first
creation and, while seldom employing more than seven at a time in the field, had a margin
of men of equal political stature for diplomatic, admiliistrative and other duties. The
only remarkable thing about personnel selection in the British Service is that it was
never introduced before. For, shorn of its 'ologies and trimmings, all that it boils down
to is man-inspection. It is curious that, although we have a uniform method of inspecting
a man and his possessions outwardly we have no common denominator for assessing his
mind. Those of us who have had to read such matters as confidential reports on officers
Bnd quarterly reports on N.C.0.s are aware that, although they g e n e ~ d yadd up to much
the same thing in the end, the difference of outlook of the reporters is very great. And,
in our recommendations for employment for men leaving the Service we very seldom
tell the employer exactly what he wants to know. I t would seem that, although the
trained psychologist has come to stay, personnel selection is really the task of everybody
who has men under his charge.
THE FORECASTING PROBLEM.
This is not a preoccupation of the Recruiting Department, but of that of Manning,
but it has its recruiting implications. The procedure is briefly as follows : Director of
. Manning states his requirements for the future and D.N.R. goes about meeting it thus :
in the case of entrants under the National Service Acts he fills his files with desirable
men throwing out the rest to the other Services, and in the case of volunteer entrants
he prepares the ground by advertisements and by such methods as hiforming the various
youth movements of pro5able requirements. Thus, in theory all should be well ; but
should conditions alter the result may be dire. Suppose the National Service quota to
be reduced, D.N.R. is compelled to yield from his iiles a number of suitable men for the
other Services with resultant difficulty in securing naval optants next time. If, on the
other hand an unexpected increase in the quota is called for it can only be realized by
taking, irrespective of merit, the next people on the lists. To a lesser extent voluntary
recruiting is affected by changes in manning policy. It has a bad effect on men to enter
them and keep them hanging about the streets awaiting vacancies in training establishments. It is worse to try and meet an unexpected call in a huny since this can only be
achieved by lowering the standard to virtually nothing. In an ideal world from a
recruiter*^ standpoint it would be more desirable to enter too few at times when recruiting
is bad and too many when circumstances are favourable, in much the same way as such
spending departments such as D.N.O. and D.N.C. would dearly like to transfer votes '
from one year to another. As, however, the latter are caged in the conhes of the financial
year so is the recruiter imprisoned in the castle of Vote A. To keep to this he must enter
obvious misfits at times and turn away good men at others.
SOME MINOR POINTS.
a
The Protected Worker.-" Nico " cites a case of a miner who has entered the Service.
While there are a few-very few--coal miners in the R.N. one may be pardoned in doubting
if a miner is a typical entrant. No miners were allowed to be entered under the National
Service Acts after 1942, and regular entry is debarred without special permission of the
Ministry of Labour and National Service, the method of securing him being termed the
waiver " procedure. I t folldws that the miner entrant must be one of two things ;
either he was an astonishingly bad miner or else his case for entry was so strong as to be
wellnigh overwhelming. The same procedure is necessary for agricultural and a few
other types of workers, illthough the Ministry is not so strict as with coal miners.
<I
268
SOME NOTES ON NAVAL. RECRUITING.
The Minor.--Practically every officer at some time or another gets confronted with
the charge of " body snatching." Isn't it a shame, says the critic, that little Ernie was
beguiled into joining for a number of years when only 18, and is it legal? There is a
long, learned and (like so many products of learning) quite incomprehensible, paper on
the subject in Admiralty records, and the question is dealt with in the Manual of Military
Law, at p. 216 in the 1929 edition ; but the simple answer is that a minor can always make
a valid contract to his own advantage (and what else is serving the King ?) and the learning
of a trade or art has been held to be a necessity for which, like other necessities, a minor
can enter into an enforceable contract. It is true that parental consent is always obtained
in the case of entrants under 17, but this is an ex gratia act of the part of the Admiralty, '
which is made quite clear on the rare occasions when the formality has been omitted (in
fairness, while conceding nothing, discharge is generally granted in such cases).
Standard of S.S. Entrants.-" Nico " complains with, I think, considerable justification, that the standard of some S.S. entrants is not high. A standard may be absolute
or relative. To take the latter first it should be borne in mind that, except during periods
of " rush " intakes, the Navy consistently took the best men liable under the National
Service Acts during the entire war, and if, drunk with this heady wine, we expect to get
the same result out of voluntary service we deceive ourselves and the truth is not in us.
Then there is the question of the absolute standard. Regular recruiting began in 1946
after the longest break in its history, in a period of full employment, and at a time when
the Forces were at high National Service strength. The undertaking was, therefore,
one of considerable magnitude and a high absolute standard was not capable of realization
because, partly of war-weariness, partly of rival attractions in other fields of employment,
but chiefly because the absolute standard of the nation has come down with a run. Those
who complain at the quality of what we get might do worse than visit a recruiting station
and look at " the one who got away." At a recent visit to an Army establishment the
War Minister was told by the Colonel that a high proportion of his men were illiterate
and, from experience of would-be entrants, I have no doubt as to the literal accuracy
of the remark.
Active Service Rem~iters.-It is impossible not to agree with " Nico " that more
active service recruiters should be employed, and a scheme was actually worked out for
having them. Briefly the idea was that selected leading rates and above should do a
cycle of : training establishment ; sea ; recruiting ; sea ; training establishment. It
fell down on the score of finance, since a pensioner is always cheaper than an Active
Service man. But I have no doubt that the question is still being raised. The advantage
of an old recruiter, preferably a family man with a stake in his district, is that he is in a
position to advise parents, and it should be remembered that the recruiter's target,
especially with the boy entrant, is not only the boy himself but hi$ mother. With her
on your side you are pretty safe in asking the R.T.O. for one more on the train to H.M.S.
Ganges.
Small Recruitivg Statiorzs.-" Nico " complains that there are too many small stations
which cannot be manned. Agreed ; but it is worth remembering that a man who has
gone to a recruiting station has in some sort burned his boats. His employer will probably
fire him, especially when times are lean from an employment standpoint. Consequently
it is necessary to keep in being small local stations where men and boys can go for advice
without taking time off work. The recruiter can then see from inspection of physique,
teeth and eyes, questions as to character and background, 6hether he has a $rims facie
chance of b&g accepted. If he has none no harm is done as no one is the wiser except
the recruiter. If he has he is sent to the centre for complete examination. The small
station is a very real necessity.
In passing I should like to splinter a lance with those-chiefly naval officers, I am
sorry to say-who assert that a- naval petty officer is not as good in charge of a show as
his Army or Marine counterpart. In my experience he is every bit' as good and, in some respects, better. The trouble is that in peac6-time ships are so grotesquely over-officered and
naval officers for some unexplained reason seem to be afraid of going ashore, that the
petty officer seldom gets a run for his money. Among the splendid regiments I have
been lucky enough to meet the Wiltshires (whose second battalion, the old 99th Foot,
'
'
SOME NOTES ON NAVAL RECRUITING.
269
gave the language the expression " dressed up to the nines " by reason of the splendour
of their uniform) stick in my mind. Under one commanding officer they had a weekly
routine, called unofficially " St. Soviet's day," when all officers except the orderly officer
were compelled to leave camp or barracks for a complete day on a scheme, leaving N.C.0.s
in charge of the battalion. They had superb N.C.O.s, as might well be expected. It
would be interesting to see a similar routine applied to a ship in harbour.
The Recruiting Lure.-It is an old saying in the Recruiting Service that the best
recruiter is the man himself ; and I think that, in my former remarks, I have done.less
than justice to the real reason why recruits were forthcoming at all in 1946 and the period
following. The main reason was the immense prestige with which the Navy ended the
war coupled with tales of new constructions and the multiplication of gadgets which have
their eternal appeal to youth. In his book " The Army of the Future " General de Gaulle
hits the nail square on the head by stating " The fact that our Navy has launched, in
the last fifteen years, the finest type of ship, has had more effect on the quality of the
personnel than any amount of posters could have done." None the less the poster has
its uses and we cannot dispense with it. (In passing I was often asked by those acquainted
with the dimensions of D.N.R.'s office why it is that all advertisements tell the neophyte
to write to a totally mythical Dept. XY. I t is, of course, to check the impact of e a ~ h
advertising medium since each advertising source receives its own code number). Then
there is, of course, the "you are learning a trade" appeal, against which I consistently
set the most unbecoming face in the R.M. forces. To begin with the Navy is a trade
in itself, and, though personally agreeing with much of what Dr. Johnson said about
seafaring, I am blowed if my declining years are to be devoted to apologizing for inducing
people to lead what those who know it best proclaim to be the h e s t life in existence.
Aha ! says the knowing critic, but you throw out people after seven years without qualifications suitable for civilian employment. The answer to this is to suggest that the
critic goes round to the " local " and offer a purse of gold or twenty " Players " to
every man he meets who is certain of seven years' continued employment. To go on
with, we give our men an asset which every employer is looking for-character. In
. London one is-often confronted with discharged soldiers forming bands or playing barrel
organs, but not once have I seen discharged ratings R.N. doing it. And much of this
"learn a trade" nonsense verges on the dishonest, and dishonest recruiting is bad recruiting. It is preposterous to suggest that civil aviation will mop up the R.A.F. ground and
air staffs within any measurable period of time, and it is highly dubious whether the
R.A.O.C. and R.E.M.E. trainees of the Army will be absorbed into their several trades
on discharge. This is not to decry the value of the association with trade unions such
as that which exists in the artificer branch. None the less, it is an eternal truth that, if
a trade is the first consideration, or even a major one, the entrant had better stay ashore.
The Navy, in my judgment, scored heavily by not being ashamed of itself and by stating
in good set terms that it was an honour to join it for its o m sake. I agree with " Nico "
that the recruits we are getting are not all we could wish. None the less we are getting
them, which other Services are not.
There are some things that a recruiter, in t6uch with the public, would like to see
altered. The S. Branch has adopted a new and more resounding appellation; and " Pusser,"
tuggestive of the dirty crack of Arthur Bryant that " Purser is a derivation of Bursar,
and the first Bursar of the Christian era was Judas Iscariot," has vanished ; it is to .
be wished that the sm.e could be said of " cook " or " steward." The Army did itself
a good turn in inventing the Army Catering Corps, and it would be much easier to "sell"
to the public a job such as seaman (S) than the present, titles. Much the same applies
to writers and artificers whom the other Services find difficult to understand. But
tradition, Heaven be praised, dies hard.
For, with the man himself, tradition is our best recruiter. Despite economic fluctuations, despite stifling economy, despite all doubts and discouragements, despite hoary
old blighters like myself as recruiters, the nation has shown throughout countless years
its ability to produce men content to go down to the sea in ships and occupy their business
in great waters, and so long as this flow continues we can substitute hope for fear.
G. W. M. G.
270
SOME EXTRACTS FROM NOTES ON A NAYAL AIR STATION.
SOME EXTRACTS FROM NOTES ON A NAVAL AIR
STATION.
A&ER over two years in command of three Air Stations, it is perhaps worth while setting
forth, in the form of notes, the opinions formed and the experience gained. The writer
is a salthorse c;lpta$ with trqining, barracks and staff experience, and it is against this
background that these notes should be read. The various subjects dealt with are not
necessarily set out in order of importance. .
PERSONNEL.
.
-.
~ i s c i p l i n eand Morale.
In considerin6 this subject, it must always be remembered that the naval air personnel
of to-day are mostly H.O.or short service in one form or another, that their time in the
Service is limited, that of it the most must be made, and that they have essentially a civilian
background. It is therefore necessary to make quite clear to the ship's company on frequent
occasions what is expected of them in the way of dress, discipline and manners, and to
interpret for them without doubt the meanings of and the penalties for mutiny (as opposed
to " strikes "), break-outs, leave breaking, and so forth ; and the routine for and the obligations of compassionate requests and leave. It is not easy to talk to a good ship's company
on the subject of mutiny, and great p r e must be taken to deal impersonally with this
difficult subject. But in the writer's opinion a clear understanding of the matter is vital
to the future of the Navy, bearing again in mind the present civilian background ;for, unless
all officers and men realize fully its meaning and application, it is surely impossible to expect
them to act correctly when the test comes.
The system of leave three times a year offers golden opportunities for what might be
termed the " end-of-term " speech. The ship's company is in a cheerful and receptive
state of mind, and the speech, which can contain as opportunity offers the vital subjects
outlined above, should deal with tasks successfully accomplished, the programme for the
next period, explaining fully the necessities for overtime and such unpleasant features, and
various Station matters of interest, such as the opening of a new recreation room, the
efforts which are being made by all concerned to improve Service conditions, and, most
important, the considerations which govern the rate of progress in the present state of the
nation's health.
The various aids to discipline are well-known, but bear repetition as they affect an
Air Station. The " Gate," the main entrance to the Station, must be as smart as it is
ossible to make it, and should open on an equally smart vista of lawns and flower beds.
Latch personnel should be smartly dressed in spotless white belts and gaiters. Traffic
R.M. police should wear white oversleeves ; and those on duty, duty armlets. The flagstaff
should always be clean, and wear a clean ensign and pendant. Nothing looks worse than if
these are dirty or frayed. Saluting must be meticulous, and officers must be taught to
return salutes with a smile and a cheerful " good morning." Divisions must be attended
by everyone without exception. I t is amazing how many find an urgent job at the critical
moment. Commander's defaulters should be swift and just, with it11 witnesses at hand, so
that men are not kept waiting about. Captain's requestmen must be, without exception,
in their No. 1suits. The progress of requestment should be quick and smartly executed,
as it should be if the captain is correctly briefed and all divisional officersattend with each
case at their finger-tips., Requestmen to see the captain privately should do \just that. No
man will truly tell his tale at the table with a cloud of witnesses even though they may be
withdrawn to a distance. To sit by himself in the captain's visitor's chair, and to receive
that sympathy and help to which he is entitled, means a great deal, and the news of his
reception is soon &own, thereby encouraging the diffident. Finally, the sailors' deportment
ashore should be precisely the same as on board. With a well-taught ship's company this
is pds'ible ;without restrictions and patrols.
SOME EXTRACTS FROM NOTES ON A NAVAL AIR STATION.
271
I t must be made quite clear to the officers in detail, as it is to the ship's company in
general, that the Naval Discipline Act is the legal instrument on which the discipline of
the Navy is founded, and as such that it must be executed to the letter. This, coupled with
an insistence of every man being given one chance, even to prudent scaling down punishments for serious first offences, has been found to produce a most satisfactory absence of
captain's defaulters. For example, the giving of cells before detention is finally awardecl,
except for desertion, has often rendered detention unnecessary, though it is a cardinal
feature of this policy that no serious offence, even a first one, must go unpunished. .
Chief a d Petty Officers.
It is essential that the prestigeand responsibilityof thechief and pettyofficersshould be
built up to the maximum. Probably the best way that this can be done is by the provision
of the accommodation commensurate with their status-well-furnished and appointed
messes, with separate galleys, beer bars and recreation.rooms. In particular it would appear
most necessary to provide entirely separate accommodation for chief petty officers as
opposed to petty officers, rather than the old policy of lumping them together in one mess,
For the rest, the privileges of their own beer bars and messes, and dining halls, of giving
socials and dances in their messes, of wearing plain clothes, and in fact of doing everything
possible to underline their status, has produced loyal and good service, and certainly as
regards the chief petty officers are concerned, who, of course, are much older than the
present run of petty officers, a situation where absolute trust can be reposed in them.
.
0fficers
The officers set the tone of the ship, and it is therefore necessary to obtain for Naval
Air Stations the best that is available. It has been the experience that if the Admiralty
is approached as regards the two key posts of commander and first lieutenant they do their
very best to help, and destroyer officers in particular fit extremely well into the executive
side of Naval Air Stations.
Although the straight stripes are the rule now rather than the exception in an air mess,
and their wearers have noticeably adopted the standards of traditional behaviour that they
represent, many are young both in age and in experience. They require to be taught the
traditions of a naval mess, of dress, bearing, and deportment. The messmust thereforebe
run on the strictest lines, and perhaps the best standard to set is that at a wardroom dance
all must be dressed as for an inspection, behaviour must be entirely in accordance with
tradition, and the appearance, dress and behaviour of their girl friends equally so.
The writer holds the opinion very strongly that officers are given him to be trained
and taught, and that their private lives are of the greatest importance to the Navy if
contentment is to breed efficiency as it should do. In these days of family difficulties, after
years of separation, with no married quarters in sight for officers as opposed to ratings,
this latter problem is one of vital importance and has more effect on the efficiency of the
officersof to-day than almost any other single cause.
COMPASSIONATE LEAVE AND PRIVATE AFFAIRS.
$0 important are these in the post-war Navy that the writer considers that they deserve
a heading to themselves. The guiding principle is, quite simply, that it is not possible to
take too much trouble in dealing wih them. The'war has brought in its wake a dragon's
teeth crop of broken and unhappy homes and marriages, and in the minds of the sufferers
the solution of their problems transcends all else. Here a really good chaplain can be of
immense value, but his sphere must be.limited to such action and advice which can be
taken or given in conjunction with the divisional officers without official letters being
written. Once official action becomes necessary the case must be dealt with by the cornl
mander and the captain, and there must be no departure from this rule if chaos is to be
avoided. Compassionate leave freely granted against full proof without exception has
proved a wonderful panacea, and worth a hundredfold in contentment, gratitude and trust,
the few days that the Navy loses of a man's services. The value of this principle cannot be
aver-emphasized, and to be let down by an absence over this form of leave is the very rare
gxwption6 :
.
272
SOME EXTRACTS FROM NOTES ON A NAVAL AIR STATION.
Many cases have occurred in which unusual behaviour, both disciplinary and otherwise,
have been proved by psychiatric investigation to be due to mental states, often caused by
.depression and despondency over family affairs. This service, provided by the local naval
medical specialist, has on many occasions provided the solution to an otherwise apparently
insoluble disciplinary or personal problem, and should never be omitted from a captain's
or a medical officer's calculations.
The writer has spread himself officiallyin the past on the subject of married quarters,
and it is therefore only necessary here to express his firm conviction that their swift
provision for all ranks and ratings of the Navy is a matter of the very greatest importance
to the future of the Service itself. The officers in particular feel very strongly at the present
time that for them no quarters are in sight, and that they are faced with the alternatives
of living in piggery in lodgings at exorbitant rents or buying a house or a flat wherever
they go.
ADMINISTRATION.
Many people have different views on this matter, but in th'e writer's opinion there is
only one way to deal with the complex organization of an Air Station, and that is for the
captain to look on himself as the managing director, and to deal, in the words of Flag
Officer Air (Home) with " praise, blame and policy." To this end the writer has a heads
of departments' meeting every Tuesday, at which every aspect of the life of his Station is
exhaustively discussed and opinions freely asked for and given. He does not cofisider it
incumbent on him to do more than to indicate the policy to be followed, and he leaves the
writing of letters and the drafting of signals which follow these meetings to his subordinates.
Thereby he not only saves himself much detafl, but he trains his officers in staff work and
in self-expression at which the average naval officer does not usually shine, Similarly,
he insists that his heads of departments shall for their part pursue the same line with
regard to their own junior officers, and let them get on with their job with fatherly guidance
but without harrying them. I t is most interesting to see how they flourish under this simple
system, which is further applied all down the scale of ratings.
ROUTINE.
To fulfil the requirement of the correct hours of work laid down it has been found
necessary to work daily from 0755 to noon, and from 1315 to 1700, all days except Saturday,
when leave is piped from noon. These hours allow a small margin to veer and haul on for
special make and mends, games in working hours, payments, slops, medical attendance,
and so forth. Saturday mornings are devoted to examinations, clean ship, any extra
aircraft work which requires doing, and rounds are done on alternate Saturdays, in principle,
with divisions, at which a full muster is expected. From noon on Saturday to the start of
work on Monday is a closed period with a free gangway and leave to all not on duty. This
routine is immensely popular with the sailors who are prepared to work all hours during
the week provided their week-ends are free to see their football matches and to have a
complete day off on Sundays for picnics and expeditions. Overtime work, amounting to
a considerable total and including sometimes all night work under most unpleasant conditions, is a bugbear of a large maintenance station, and requires very careful handling.
Church is held every Sunday at 1030, but despite every effort attendance is pitifully
small, usually about six and the choir. There seems to be no remedy for this state of affairs,
which is depressing in the extreme. The only comfort is that the introduction of the free
week-end following the abolition of compulsory church has resulted in a very substantial
gain in happiness and contentment.
WRENS.
The diehard will say that there is no place for women in the Navy. He is probably
one of the unlucky ones whose day has not been brightened by flowers on his desk or
attractive legs twinkling round his Station. Quite apart from their Service value, which
requires no emphasis, the Wrens at Naval Air Stations have a morale worth for which no
praise can be too great. In the three Stations he has commanded,the writer has had thegood
fortune to have Wrens, and his task has been the easier thereby.
Possibly one of the greatest advantages that the Navy has derived from the war has
been the importance now attached to dances, cinemas, music and dramatic societies,
SOME EXTRACTS FROM NOTES ON A NAVAL AIR STATION.
273.
choirs, socials, and so forth, as morale builders. In each of these activities the Wrens play
a major part as prwiding bn the spot for the sailor a very high standard of womanhood.
A camaraderie is thus established which forms one of the foundations of a happy station,
and removes from the modern sailor ashore the temptation of the. occupations traditional
to the past, with a corresponding drastic drop in the resultant penalties.
In every way this new social order in the Navy has had its far-reaching effects. Dress
improves, as the Wren demands smartness in her escort; punishment other than that for
offences against routine are the exception ; drunkenness vanishes and leave-breaking falls.
In every way there is ample evidence of what can be done by the healthy mixing of men
and women of high principles and character.
DRESS.
The Naval uniform is the smartest in the world. Unfortunately, it can also be the most
untidyin the world. There were many reasons for this state of affairswhich it is no part of
this paper to discuss. It is concerned with the present, when the efforts of the officers
and the prideof the ratings can produce a high standard. But in the achievement of this
result there are certain aspects of it which are worth discussing.
The average sailor dislikes buying from the "pusser," and will pay quite a lot extra
to the civilian tailor for his uniform. This dislike probably originates from the shapelessness
of his first uniform issued to him on joining the Service. It is nurtured by the lack of alteration facilities in most Service establishments other than depots, and although he can buy
through the Service a made to measure suit if he wishes, few take advantage of this facility.
For one thing, he has to pay cash. For another, he feels that the Naval contractoris cold and
impersonal, and thdt from him he cannot obtain the fit and cut he wishes.
Although these items of themselves add up to quite a large balance adverse in the
sailor's mind to the "pusser" probably the largest single factor in favour of the civilian
firms in lower deck opinion is the iniquitous (so thinks the writer) system of allotments to
these firms, which, once started, virtually tie the sailor for ever. The solution to this problem
lies in the Post Exchange system of our American cousins. Fit, quality, service and choice
are provided at a P.X. at 25 per cent. below commercial prices, and on board the barber,
the shoemaker, the tailor, and so forth, are naval rates and are entered as such. And
does any Service except the Navy pay purchase tax at high rates for the " luxury " of
wearing the gold lace and gold badges which are part of its uniform ?
S.C.E.
The civilian maintenance of an Air Station, together with the complicated relations and
procedure that this involves, comes as a shock to those who are unused to this routine, and
reactions to it are sometimes unfortunate. Whatever the pros and cons of this principle,
it must be accepted and the Best made of it, for on the good relations between the captain
and civil and dockyard departments depend greatly the amenities and progress of the
Station. The S.C.E. should be looked on as being of captain's rank, and should be treated
accordingly. On no account must arrangements be made with his subordinates without his
consent, for this will not be tolerated any more than it would in the Navy itself.
A considerable amount of foresight and a full knowledge of the Station's history is
necessary if one is to be successful in gazing into the crystal as regards works proposals
which the present arrangements require the captain to do. It is here that the wise
counsel and extensive knowledge of the S.C.E. as regards shore establishments in general
and the civil departments of the Admiralty in particular can be of the greatest value, and
he should always be brought into the fullest consultation.
*
GENERAL.
In over two years in Naval Air Stations at a difficult time, the writer has learnt a great
deal, and he leaves it for new fields with the very greatest regret. Quite apart from Wing
the front line of the modern Navy, it has a fascination all its own, for there is never a dull
and it is possible t o see with pride the work of one's hands as time passes, and
es of life in the Navy offer the game opportunities for bringing up its personnel in
way it should go. In his task, the ever-ready support, if he may say so, of his admirals
riendship of their staffs have been an ever-present comfort.
'
274
RED SEA CRUISE.
There is, however, one aspect of Naval Aviation without which this paper would
not be complete. Although Naval Aviation comprises one-third of the Navy it is still
looked upon in some quarters as a rather new-fangled private Navy with all the faults
that these words imply. No opportunity must be missed of convincing the uninitiated
to the contrary, nor must Naval Aviation ever be allowed to be relegated to second place.
It follows that proof to tlie contrary must always be supplied. Visits by V.1.P.s and
others to the Station by air, whether to remain or to pass through, must be perfectly
organized and conducted on the visitors' apron in precisely the same way as on the quarterdeck of a ship, which it must resemble. Aircraft must be ready to taxi out immediately
the V.I.P. or indeed the ordinary visitor, is embarked at the time specified. Briefing,
running up of engines, etc., must be carried out before embarkation and not after. Every
opportunity should be taken, not only forthe good of one's ratings but particularly for the
benefit of the uninitiated, of parading ceremonial guards and parties whose standard must
be better than those of the next ship. Nothing less than the very best can be allowed to
appear as representing Naval Aviation, and in the writer's experience the Naval Air
rating can always be relied upon to produce. just that little extra which makes all the
difference. Here again, and it bears repetition, Naval Aviation must never be allowed to be
excluded from taking its rightful place in the arena in which the parent station is situated.
If there is any one particular principle which, if followed, brings with it success, it is
probably summed up in the one word " leadership." Included in this term can be the other
ones of energy, initihtive, friendship, tolerance, knowledge of one's job and the jobs of
others, and the fact that a sm-art ship is always a happy one. If the personnel of an Air
Station, from the captain through the ranks and ratings to the newest joined air mechanic,
follow this principle in their daily lives, then, and only then, can the motto
THE DIFFICULT CAN BE DONE AT
ONCE, THE
IMPOSSIBLE TAKES A LITTLE LONGER
be txanslated into fact, to the very great benefit of all concerned.
PILGRIM.
RED SEA CRUISE.
.
BEFOREthe war two sloops were normally allocated permanently to the Red Sea ; their
duties to " show the flag " and to suppress the slave trade. For climatic reasons their
commissions were restricted to eighteen months, a period broken only by a visit to Malta
for docking and refit.
Since the war this area, the majority of which (north of latitude lSON.)falls within
the Mediterranean Station, has been covered by the detachment from that Command of
individual ships in turn for periods of about six weeks each. Normally these are frigates
from the Second or Fifth Escort Flotillas, though during February and March this year
the whole of the Second Minesweeping Flotilla was so employed. That there is a need for
a warship in the Red Sea, not only for the pre-war reasons, is shown by the riots which
flared up between Arabs and Jews a t Aden last Christmas-tide, whilst Massawa is always
a potential trouble spot since political feeling is liable to run high in Eritreawhenever
it seems that the United Nations are liable to settle the future of that country.
This, then, is a brief account of one such cruise made by the St. Brides~Bayin May and
June of this year. I had never visited the Red Sea before, apart from steaming straight
through it some twenty years.ago ; nor had any officer or manonboard done more.
We left Malta on the 17th of May encouraged by the Sailing Directions which seemed
to imply that, if I was fortunate enough to avoid running the ship on to a reef, I should
probably expire from heat-stroke !
We reached Port Said on the morning of the 21st, saluted the flag of Egypt, and thereafter entered harbour and secured stern to the jetty in front of Navy House. Next
'
-
RED SEA CRUISE.
275
forenoon the Veryan Bay, our sister ship whom we were to relieve, arrived from the southward, and for an hour we did our turnover. Thereafter we commenced transitting the
Suez Canal. Owing to many northbound tankers, especially those carrying benzine,
which have priority, this proved a slow process. We had tp make fast for three hours that
afternoon, anchor for the night in Lake Timsah, and again for an hour and a half in the
Bitter Lakes next day. We finally cleared Port Tewfik at 1300 on the 23rd, set course down
the Gulf of Suez and, with every indication of the heat ahead, ordered tropical routine.
We reached Lith, our first port of call, on the afternoon of the 26th. Like most places
in this area, the entrance is guarded by reefs. Some just show above water, but the
majority have a foot or two of water over them. In few places are they beaconed or
buoyed. For the navigator there is only one safe rule : don't go near them unless the
sun is well overhead, when they show up clearly as light-coloured patches in the ~ a t e r and even then go slow. Which explains why we always timed our arrival about noon.
I t should be added that, whilst sounding should certainly not be neglected, the reefs are
usually steep-to, and neither echo nor lead will give much warning of an impending bumpwhish disaster we fortunately avoided.
On the subject of navigation in the Red Sea, one other word. The horizon is frequently
false, so that sights are often unreliable. It is best, therefore, to navigate from point to
point, which is fortunately always practicable, even if it means a deviation from the
shortest track, since there is an adequate number of islands, many with lighthouses,
throughout the area.
Lith is a small town of mud huts in Saudi-Arabia, some eighty miles south of Jedda.
It boasts about two thousand inhabitants, but none are European. On landing, I found
the Emir waiting to receive me in a richly carpeted tent specially erected on the foreshore.
" Enthroned " in a tapestried chair, I was refreshed with 3weetened tea, whilst mutual
greetings were exchanged through the medium of my Maltese steward who proved an
admirable interpreter.
Next day the Emir and his entourage visited the ship, the regal conveyance being,
curiously,an ex-L.C.P. Though certainly not to be classed as a "big shot," we decided that
the cause of Anglo-Arabian relations was best served by greeting him with a seven-gun
salute and a seaman guard of honour. He seemed well pleased with his tour of the ship,
with watching a gun's crew at drill, and with the framed photograph of the ship which I
gave him as a memento since, on his departure, he produced from within his flowing robes
a gold wrist-watch which is, arguably, of more use than the traditional herd of live sheep !
That afternoon he returned our hospitality. Within the already mentioned tent four
officers sat down to a mammoth peal-not, alas for those anxious for a new experience,
cross-legged upon a carpet but, out of unexpected deference to European custom, upon
chairs around a table. Nevertheless, despite the comparable provision of spoons and plates,
we were encouraged to tear fried chickens apart with our lingers and to clutch handfuls
from a roasted sheep which had thus found its last resting place upona mountain of, rice.
The quantity of food provided for a party of not more than a dozen would have turned any
English housewife green with envy and, perhaps, caused the Minister of Food to have
immediate apoplexy. We could not hope to consume it all ; but the Emir, ever courteous,
saw that it was not wasted. Such liberty men as had landed were invited .to finish the
- plentiful remains, which they did with relish.
We sailed next day, encountering at sunset a dhow which was in distress for water and
the direction of Port Sudan, matters which we remedied before proceeding. Thereafter
we strayed off our station by request from C.-in-C. East Indies, and made for Aden.
A description of this colony and fuelling port would be superfluous. I will restrict
myself therefore to saying that we received a warm welcome, and that our five-day stay
was made very pleasant by the usual round of entertainments extended to us, particularly
by the R.A.F., whose co-operation also included the provision of an aircraft on two
occasions for height-finding exercises.
We left Aden on the 4th of June, saying farewell to our new friends with regret tinged
pith admiration for the way they put up with the climate. We had had enough of a
.&y
. bulb standing at 95°F. at noon, with the wet bulb some 10" lower, whilst the sea a t '
%?F. scarcely provided a refreshing bathe-though, where climate was concerned, worse
w to come.
'
276
)
ED
SEA CRUISE.
We reached Massawa on the 6th of June and berthed alongside. This ex-Italian port
is still cluttered with numerous wrecks, whilst its naval base, so much extended during
the latter part of the war by both the Americans and ourselves, has been abandoned.
Nevertheless, it is handling a fair quantity of shipping. The place boasts a shadt temperature of 105°F. at this time of the year and a humidity which almost entirely saps me's
energy, which explains why it had been evacuated for the summer by most of its small
English colony. Nevertheless, those who stayed were friendly enough. We who remained
onboard existed largely by sailing each afternoon and thereafter proceeding to the only
hotel which, fortunately, has a swimming pod and an air-conditioned lounge, though the
latter is not an unmixed blessing, since entrance and exit therefrom is like proceeding
from an oven into an ice-box and Y~M-versa. I say " we who remained " because each watch
of officers and men in turn went up,to Asmara for four days in the Army rest camp.
This capital of Eritrea, a splendid modern European town, is situated on a plateau
eight thousand feet up in the mountains, forty miles as the crow fiies to the west of Massawa.
The journey up and down, whether by train (four and a half hours in a diesel coach)
or by car (two and a half hours), is alone w9rth while, for both railway and road are remarkable engineering feats (neither would have been built had the Italians not required them for
the conquest of Abyssinia) and the scenery is both beautiful and awe-inspiring. There is the
additional excitement of a possible hold-up by Shifta (native bandits) against whom one
must be armed. As for Asmara itself, the extent to which the English colony (both Civil
Affairs and Military) went out of their way to make us welcome is, perhaps, best shown by
the advice with which the sergeant-major greeted the ship's company on their arrival at
the rest camp : " Best be turned out by half past ten in the morning--or you won't get no
breakfast."
Most of us found that Asmara, despite its pleasant climate which is that of a good
English summer, had one snag. A four days' visit is insufficient to become accustomed to
the rarified atmosphere ; the least exertion-and many " parties, picnics and balls " were
laid on for us--and one was too short of breath to enjoy life to the full. But the objection
to a longer visit, which would allow one to become acclimatized, is the longer period one
would have to put up with Massawa as watch onboard.
Whilst at Massawa we suffered the loss of a shipmate. One of our Maltese stewards
collapsed and died of heart failure whilst travelling up to Asmara. With the help of the
Army, he was buried with full military honours in the capital's municipal cemetery.
This incident excepted-and a post-mortem showed that it was not attributable to
the climate-the health of our ship's company remained good, though inevitably we suffered
from heat fatigue, " dog," prickly heat and other skin afflictions inseparable from such a
climate. It was noticeable that the younger ratings suffered worst because they would
not take the advice of experience in such matters as covering up their stomachs at night
and not sleeping immediately under a fan.
Leaving Massawa on the 15th of June we reached Port Sudan the next afternoon.
Here %e experienked yet more of that hospitality which an English colony always extends
to a British warship ; and we enjoyed it the more because, with our progress northwards,
both dry and wet bulbs had ceased to break records.
Our whaler's crew had a slightly adventurous arrival. - Dropped about forty-five
miles to seaward to sail in, a voyage which should have been completed within twenty-four
hours, they failed to put in an appearance after forty-eight. We had to take the ship out
to look for them. With-relief, as much to us as to them, they were soon located, having
been delayed by light airs and a distinct set to the southward. The crew were none the
worse ; rather had they gained in experience-and a healthy respect for sharks which had
hungrily followed them most of the time. They soon convinced the ship's company of the
wisdom of my decision that bathing in the Red Sea, however much one might want to seek
that refreshing relief from the heat, was unsafe.
Leaving Port Sudan on the 20th of June, a twenty-four hour voyage further north
brought us to Berenice in Egypt. There being nothing here except too much sand, which
has long buried the ancient ruins of the port, there is little to be said. The deplorable pun
which can be perpetrated on this place's name is the reverse of truth except for fishermen.
The very clear water abounds with fish of every sort of shape and size. Perhaps I should
also add that the place is sufficiently far north to have an acceptably cool temperature
by night. The effect of consequent better nights' sleep was nowhere more apparent than
among our four-inch guns' crews, whose loading rate increased rapidly from eight to twelve
rounds per minute.
From Berenice we took our departure at noon on the 25th, successfully and for the last
time skirting off-shore reefs by those few yardswhich are all that separate one from disaster.
And early on the morning of the 27th of June we reached Suez. At this time the Canal
Company faced two headaches : the number of ships requiring to transit the Canal, was
considerably in excess of pre-war figures, perhaps approaching the maximum that can
conveniently be handled ; and the Canal was closed from 2000 to 0500 daily in order that
Egyptian military traffic could flow uninterruptedly into Palestine across the various
floating bridges. The solution adopted was to sail all traffic simultaneously from each end
in two long convoys starting early each morning and passing each other in the Bitter Lakes.
This system has two drawbacks : if one arrives at either Port Said or Suez after about
0800 one must await the next day's convoy ; and a slow ship in a convoy impedes the
progress of all astern of her. We caught the morning convoy ; but a small coaster ahead of
us, whose speed seemed less than five knots, delayed us reaching Port Said until 2115,
a total transit time of thirteen and a half hours.
At Port Said we again berthed off Navy House. There were signs of warlike activity :
A.A. guns and searchlights deployed, the latter exercising after dark ; rigid censorship ;
no cameras ; and no passengers allowed ashore from liners in transit. Fortunately, H.M.
ships are scarcely affected. But Simon Artz's emporium was devoid of customers, and the
purveyors of " feelthy postcards " had temporarily retired from business.
The Pelican, arrived on the 28th to take over from us, and the next day we sailed into
the Mediterranean. A fair passage with, incidentally, a dry bulb temperature thirty degrees
below that at Massawa, and a four-inch H.A. full-calibre shoot, brought us back to Malta on
the 3rd of July. And with the prospect of spending the remainder of the month doing our
half-yearly docking, our Red Sea cruise thus came to its end.
Was it successful ? Perhaps we found no slaves, nor were we involved in any racial
or political disturbances. But we showed the flag ; and from several sources we received
unsolicited testimonials both to the conduct and bearing of the ship's company when
ashore, and to the beneficial effect which the visit of one of the King's ships always has
upon a foreign community, a factor of particular importance to-day when so many parts
of the world are potential sources of trouble-and the Middle East is certainly not the least
of these.
WALRUS.
THE ARIADNE BOAT DISASTER, 1872.
UNDERthe conditions of maritime war the rescue of men from drowning has to be
accepted as an inevitably frequent occurrence. But in a state of peace, or of war confined
to land, it has become far less common in the present age of steam than it was in the long
age of sail. And in general much easier to deal with. The shout of " man overboard "
was more often heard in the days of masted ships than it is now, because in the great
majority of cases it was the consequence of falls from aloft. And obviously it is considerably less difficult to meet such a sudden emergency, if it does nevertheless arise, with
steam power at command than with canvas alone. Falls from aloft more frequently
ended in the water than on deck for two reasons. If a man was at or near a yard-armas in reefing or in handling stunsails-he was already plumb over the water before losing
jdd. And if nearer amidships-as in ascending or desceqdhg the rigging-he usually
-stllick &st against the outspreading lower shrouds to rebound violently overboard in a
ctlunpkd heap, often unfortunately to sink disabled like a stone. On the other hand if
31e struck nothing before the water he stood a rather better chance, and instances did
occur of men being picked up then with nothing worse than a severe shaking if they had
contrived to hit the surface scientifically like a high diver. Those who fell on deck were
apt to suffer most from the actual fall, but of course escaped the added danger of drowning.
The British Flying Squadron of four ships lost five men overboard in an eighteen months'
cruise during 1880-82 ; always when under sail.
Under either steam or sail, however, all action to be taken must naturally depend
from the very first on whether the effort at rescue is to be by boat or not; and this is
inevitably, to some extent at least, determined by the state of the weather in so far as that
may make boat use possible. Owing to the complication, and the comparative slowness
of handling a ship under sail, occasions often arose in past days in which one of the most
anxious responsibilities falling to a captain's lot was to decide on how far he would be '
justified in seriously risking the lives of a dozen men on the questionable chance of saving
the life of only one. But if that one was seen to be still afloat it was always taken except
in very extreme cases. Everything of course then depended on the handling of the boat.
In the days of a British masted navy no man belonging to the sea-boat's crew of the watch
on deck was ever sent aloft during the watch, though he had to do his full share of other
work. Ifi making a decision the records of experience sometimes offerkd a captain a
powerful inducement to take the risk, with an equally pronounced warning against it ;
both backed by an equally urgent demand for a quick choice, since delay pointed €0 failure
-whatever that choice might be. But greater ease in handling ships has relieved steamer
captains of much of the crucial anxiety of arriving a t a speedy decision. If the weather is
undoubtedly calm enough for boat work, then "full speed astern" with the engines and
" lower away " with the falls is sufficient. And if rough enough to leave any doubt on
that point, comparatively little time need belost in bringing the ship herself round on the
sheltered side of the lifebuoy and swimmer simply by full helm. Such alternatives were
those also open to a ship under sail, but it was much more difficult to control the movements they required, and in even only a moderately heavy sea might take hours.
Under sail the officer of the watch had to make up his mind at once on more than one
important point before the captain arrived up to take charge. Would the latter be likely
to use a boat ? And would he heave-to or tack ? Much, of course, depended not only on
the state of the weather but on the point on which the ship was sailing as regards the
wind. The only certainty was that in all cases she had to be brought to the wind,without
loss of time, either for tacking or heaving-to. And it followed therefore that the closer
to the wind she happened to be lying at the moment, the better the hope of a speedy
rescue whether by boat or a turn of the ship. If the yards were already braced sharp
forward, in a light enough breeze for boat lowering, the quickest rescue was likely to result
simply by letting go the lee after braces to throw the main and mizen aback, which with
a smart watch could be effected almost as soon as the boat was manned and the proper
lowerers throwing the falls off the davit cleats. In such weather the ship would not be
moving fast and the man not left very far astern. Whatever the weather might be, a
ship sailing close-hauled would be a little to windward of him by the time she had hove-to
or tacked, with a corresponding time gain-in reaching him either by boat or ship. And
if a boat was in use it could more quickly and safely be picked up again.
The worst conditions existed when a ship was running down wind and possibly sailing
fast. For then not only did it take longer to trim sails for the windward turn, but any
effort at rescue, whether by boat or ship, had to be made against wind and sea. If too
rough for a boat this necessitated the usually fatal delay (in a rough sea) of a long beat back,
pkhaps with the further handicap of reefed canvas. When the weather was calm enough
for a straight pull towards the man, a boat saved time by its direct approach, but even so
was to some extent retarded by the opposition of what wind and wave there still might be.
And lastly, if the conditions were just bad enough to be dangerous for a boat though not
quite impossible, with the ship too far to leeward to make a beat back in less than a matter
of hours, then her captain was faced with making adecision before which even the toughest
mental fibre was apt to feel an extreme degree of apprehension, and sometimes to display it.
Two instances of precisely these last-mentioned conditions occurred in mid-Victorian
days in H.M.S. Ariadne, one of the Snest wooden steam frigates and fastest sailers ever
built for the British flag. On both occasions a man fell overboard from aloft when the
ship was running at a good speed before a stiffish sea under reefed sail, and a cutter was
lowered. In neither instance, unfortunately, was the man saved in time ; but in the first
the boat eventually regained the ship safely, though two of ber crew were injured in her
re-hoisting by the violent rdlling of the vessel. In the second, however, two boats were
swamped with such heavy loss of life that the incident was talked of in the Navy for years
after as the " Ariad~eboat disaster."
In the first case the ship was homeward bound from Bermuda under command of
Captain Vansittart, a notable seaman of unsurpassed nerve, though reckoned a severe
disciplinarian. The Ariadne's topsails. were treble reefed, and Vansittart admitted
afterwards that in such weather he would never have lowered the cutter had he not with
his own glass spotted the man's head in the water near the lifebuoy, showing he was not
yet drowned, though he had no chance in such a sea of lasting long enough to be reached
by the ship. Vansittart was an officer of stern temperament, and this was said to have
been the sole occasion on which he was ever known to evince emotional anxiety in a long
and adventurous career. In the troughs of the running seas the boat was often invisible
from on deck, and, becoming impatient of the reports called down by the signalman
watching her from aloft, he climbed the rigging himself and noticed that she was now
returning ; which in the circumstances was really the most risky part of her proceedings,
being a square-sterned cutter in a following and heavily breaking sea. Fortunately she
was kept bows on to it by the officer in charge, and backed to leeward till under shelter of the
ship, a slow but successful operation.
Omission to take this precaution was mainly responsible for calamitous consequences
when a boat of the Ariadne was in an exactly similar situation some years later. She
was then outward bound to Gibraltar under Captain Carpenter, and the incident can
perhaps best be described in the words of his official account as below :~ r i a d k eGibraltar.
,
11th March, 1872.
" It is my painful duty to report the very large and lamentable loss of life which
took place on the mo-rning of Friday,'8th March (1872)in Lat. 40.15 N., Long. 12.10 W.,
130miles from the coast of Portugal between Oporto and Lisbon, when Sub-Lieutenants
Jukes and Talbot and eight seamen perished in the gallant but unsuccessful attempt
to save the life of a seaman who had fallen overboard, making a total loss of two
officers and nine seamen ratings, with two quartel: boats and all their gear.
" On the morning of the 8th inst., about 6 o'alock, the maintopsail split and was
shifted by the watch. In re-setting the topgallantsail an hour later Felix Richardson,
O.S., fell overboard from the main topmast crosstrees. The ship was running under
single reefed topsails and foresail with a strong breeze on the starboard quarter and
a long heavy following swell causing her to roll heavily. The wind was force 6 to 7
and the speed of ship 94 to 10 knots.
" She was immediately brought to the wind on the stqboard tack and hove-to,
and the lee cutter lowered and pulled in the direction of the man. When clear of
the ship the boat behaved well, making good way against wind and sea, and I apprehended no danger to her.
" Soon after 8 o'clock, finding the ship was drifting considerably to leeward df
the boat and the wind increasing with heavy squalls, I hoisted the cutter's recall,
ordered full steam to be raised, and having lowered the screw and furled sails was
able to commence steaming to windward in the direction of the boat, which was
shortdy observed to have borne before the wind and be pulling towards us. On
nearing her and rounding the ship to, in order to place the-boat under our lee, I saw
the crest of a heavy wave take her broadside on as she was endeavouring to turn
head to wind, which instantly capsized her. Having brought the ship close to windward of the swamped boat, to which several of her crew were clinging, an attempt
was made to lower the starboard cutter (now the lee one) but the falls fouled a i d she
was swamped also. Fortunately the two dcffiers and 13 men in her were close enough
to be saved by heaving lines and all picked up but one,.
" It then remained to place the ship in a position to drift over the wreck of the
first boat, a matter of considerable difficulty in view of the strength of wind and
sea, but by that time both the officers and seven of the eleven men forming her crew
had gone under. The other four were picked up."
'
.
.
In the present days of steam-at least for oceanic navigation-At seems a reasonable
certainty that no blue water captain now afloat ever had to sign such a report as the above,
or ever will hereafter. It perhaps remains true that the exigencies of maritime war may yet
again necessitate a frequent use of boats to save men from going under. But even so
the command of steam for handling a ship renders the picking up of either a man in the
water or a boat sent after him a vastly simpler and more expeditious matter than it was
when it arose for the Ariadne. In sailing days it was by no means uncommon for a captain,
when he came on deck, to ask the officer of the watch to say what orders he would have
given if a man had fallen overboard a minute before. Nor did a quest for more general
assurance always take form in words. When a ship in the British Navy is at sea the
boatswain--or in a small vessel with no boatswain the chief boatswain's mat-is
responsible that the " sea boat " is kept permanently ready for instant use ; and regularly every
day to report the same t o the executive officer at evening quarters. The present writer,
as a first lieutenant, was once on the bridge at evening quarters (with the captain standing
near) when he received the report of the chief boatswain's mate: " both seaboats correct
and ready for lowering." " We will see," saidathecaptain, and (turning to the C.B.M.)
" now you jump overboard."
And overboard the C.B.M.accordin ly went, though he
was not left long in the '' ditch." A certain other captain went st& further. Standing
on the poop of a corvette under sail one day he suddenly, without warning, called " man
overboard " to the officer of the watch and then jumped over himself. He is said to have
expressed satisfaction with the results, though there is no record of his ever having repeated
the experiment when flying his flag as an admiral in later years.
G. A. B.
THE ASHANTEE CAMPAIGN, 1873-4.
A THUMBNAIL SKETCH IN CO-OPERATION.
THIScampaign is long forgotten in the memory of greater events ; the few remaining
_
survivors must be in the region of 95 years of age ; and, save for the appearance on the
Colours of two regiments-the Black Watch and Royal Welch Fusiliers-and on the
appointments of a third-the Rifle Brigade-of the honour "Ashantee, 1873-4 " there is
little to show for the men whose memory is that they :
" - broke a King and they built a road,
And a court-house stands where the Regiment goed."
Sailors and marines, least Honoured of them all, played more than their share in those
forgotten events.
The war ran true to British tradition. In 1825 the Ashantees had descended on the
coast, deafeated the forces opposed to them, and removed the skull of the British Commander-in-Chief. Inconclusive war was again waged in 1863, and in 1872 the transfer of
the Dutch settlements on the coast to British control again brought the Ashantees face
to face with the British, whose illimitable patience they mistook for weakness. They again
came down to the coast. Thereafter ensued the despatch of inadequate forces with restrictive
orders ; followed, at long last, by an officer with sufficient seniority and prestige to call
for the force essential to the undertaking of stamping out the opposition once and for all.
It is with the penultiniate stage-that we are most concerned.
The threat to the coast towns was reported early in 1873, and on the 13th of May a
a force of 110 R.M.A. and R.M.L.I. under Lieut.-Colonel (afterwards Major-General
Sir Francis) Festing, R.M.A., sailed from Portsmouth to strengthen the existing garrisons
but not go outside the forts. True, again, to form, Festing did not meet his naval colleague,
Captain E. R. (afterwards Admiral the Honourable Sir Edmund, the courtesy style dating
from the elevation of his father to the peerage as "Lord Cottesloe in 18W) Fremantle, until
Lisbon was reached, when the Marines transferred to the latter's ship, H.M.S. Barracouta.
On arrival at Cape Coast Castle, FeSthg took over command ashore, his force consisting of
THE LOSS OF HIS MAJESTY'S SHIP NAUTILUS,
1807.
281
the Marines, and details of Houssas and troops of the West India Regiment, while Fremantle
found himself senior naval officer on the coast, Commodore (afterwards Admiral of the
Fleet Sir Edmund) Commerell being at the Cape. The orders given were quite unsuitable
to the situation on the spot ; the coast towns were too overcrowded and too riddled with
disease for troops to remain in them, and prestige demanded a show of force. In defiance
of instructions, therefore, Fremantle and Festing conducted a series of well-considered
offensive operations, Festing commanding Fremantle (his senior) and the bluejackets
while on shore. Of this Festing wrote :" From the moment we took the field and any of his own men were landed,
Captain Fremantle, with a largeness of heart and mind most unreservedly placed
them under my orders, at the same time coming himself and adding his valuable
services. This step put matters on a good footing and allowed of no divided
directions."
Frernantle referred to the matter as follows :"As Colonel Festing could command the West Indians and Houssas, which
a naval officer cannot, I placed myself with the bluejackets and Marines of the
squadron under his orders during the operation."
~ e t a i l of
s these operations would be wearisome. Reinforcements were received from
home and the West Indies, and more senior officers arrived on the coast ; but the military
command did not pass from Festing nor, for more than short periods, the naval responsibility from Fremantle. Steering a middle course between instructions to do nothing from
one terminal and to advance on Coomassie forthwith from another, these officers retained
the initiative and had the satisfaction that their action was endorsed by General Sir
Garnet Wokeley on his arrival. As was fitting, the Naval Brigade, which included the
Marines, was accorded the privilege of leading the advance of the Army to the enemy
capital.
Festing, probably the most brilliant officer ever produced by the Corps, died as a
major-general on the active list. Another Festing joined the Corps ; transferring to the
Army, he was concerned in the Burma rebellion of 1930-32, and also died in harness. A
third (grandson of the first) led the 29th Brigade at Madagascar in 1942 ; he was a
rifleman. The sailor family needs no tribute from this pen.
Perhaps the best lesson from a minor and forgotten campaign is comprised in five
words used by Festing on which hang all the law and the prophets so far as command in
combined operations is concerned :-"largeness of heart and mind."
GAD, SIR !
THE LOSS OF HIS MAJESTY'S SHIP NAUTILUS, 1807.
THEloss of His Majesty's sloop Nazctihs in the Mediterranean in the early hours of the
morning of the 5th of January, 1807, was attended by one of the few authenticated cases
of canabalism in the Royal Navy.
The Nazctilzcs (18 guns) under the command of Captain E. Palmer, Royal Navy,
was detached from Sir Thomas Louis' Squadron in the Hellespont on the 3rd of January
to carry important despatches to England. On leaving the Squadron the wind was
fresh from the north-east and all went well until the evening of the 4th, when she was
off the island of Anti Milo. Here the pilot they had been carrying surrendered his charge,
as he was ignorant of that part of the coast they were then approaching. Nevertheless,
in view of the importance of the despatches, Captain Palmer decided to press on without
waiting to pick up another pilot, and he left Anti Milo at sunset on the 4th, shaping his
course for Cerigotto, now better known as Anticythera. By midnight the wind had
risen to gale force and was accompanied by heavy rain and thunder. The ship was close
reefed and shortly after 0300/5th a brilliant flash of lightning showed the island of Cerigotto
dead ahead about amile distant. The captain, " being sure of his position," ordered all
possible sail to be set and went below to study the chart : hardly had he left the upper
deck when " Breakers Ahead " was reported and the Nautilus took the ground violently.
At first there was a certain amount of confusion, but order was soon restored:
Lieutenant Nesbitt, the senior officer who survived, later wrote to Lord Collingwood,
" Happy am I to say our gallant crew left nothing untried which we imagined could save
us-all cheerfully obeying the orders of the officers."
Shortly after striking the reef, the main deck was burst in and the lee bulwark
overwhelmed ; seas were breaking heavily over the ship and the sole chance of safety
appeared to be by the boats, of which only one, a small whale boat, managed to get clear
of the ship ; the athers being swamped or stove in on the rocks.
After pulling clear the whale boat, which had a crew of ten onboard, set course for
the island of Pauri (Pori), some twelve miles distant, to see if any help could be obtained
from there. Meanwhile, the fore, main and mizzen masts had fallen and fortunately
formed a gangway on to the rocks on which the Nautihs had grounded. The ship was
therefore abandoned as she was in danger of breaking up, and the crew huddled together
on the rocks without food and with very little clothing.
With the dawn a fire was lit by means of a flint and steel which one of the crew had
on him, and, with the help of a small barrel of powder which was salved from the surf; a
tent was built from the wreckage and clothes were dried. These duties filled the daylight
hours of the 5th of January and the night fell with no signs of help approaching. During
the night, however, the fire was observed by the crew of the whale boat who had succeeded
in reaching Pauri, and on the morning of the 6th they pulled over to see if they could
render any help to the survivors. On arrival they were surprised to see so many left
alive ; but they were unable to help much, especially as regards water which was their
greatest need and of which none had been salved from the wreck. Pauri was very barren
with only a few wild sheep and uninhabited ; the only water there was a little rain water
which had collected in holes in the rocks. However, ten additional men were embarked
in the whale boat, and the coxswain, a man by the name of George Smith, was instructed
to make for Cerigotto to obtain help for the remainder.
Unfortunately the wind, which had died down, got up again shortly after the departure
of the boat, and by nightfall had once more reached gale force with heavy seas breaking
over the rocks. Several men died during the night from a combination of hunger, cold
and thirst, and by the morning of the 7th the survivors were in a bad way and saw little
hope of rescue until the return of the whale boat, when suddenly a sail was sighted.
Signals of distress were hoisted from a temporary mast that had been set up and to
everyone's delight the ship bore down on the rock and lowered a boat, which approached
within pistol range, then turned round and made her way back to the ship, which thereupon
to the despair of all made sail and left the crew of the Nazltilzls to their fate.
The ravages of thirst had by now forced some of the men to drink sea water with
the consequent results of madness and in many cases death-so passed the daylight
hours of the 7th. By midnight the whale boat returned but with no receptacles which
could be filled with water and be passed through the surf without breaking ; however,
they brought the welcome news that by dawn a large vessel would come to their aid.
The dawn brought no vessel and the survivors gave way to despair ; they had had
no food or water for four days and it was obvious that unless some food was eaten all
would undoubtedly perish ; accordingly a young man who had died during the night was
chosen as food for the rest, though many had no power left to eat or swallow, and by the
evening both the captain and the first lieutenant were among the dead. In this connection the following remarks made a few years later by a naval surgeon are of interest :
" I well remember the melancholy event and particularly from one of the
the poor
survivors being drafted onboard the ship to which I belonged
fellow became my patient; he complained of no pain but that which arose
from the horrible recollection of his having tasted human flesh to preserve his
life. This preyed so deeply on his mind, that it rendered him incapable of
performing any duty, and when I saw him sinking under the heavy load, I felt
it to be my duty to order him to the hospital that he might be invalided and
sent home."
...
CIVIL SERVANTS.
283
Night fell, and at dawn on the 9th those left alive decided to build a raft from the
wreckage ; but they were so weak that the task was beyond them and in the afternoon the
whale boat appeared once more with the melancholy news that there was no chance of
rescue that day since the Greek fishermen refused to put to sea until the weather had
moderated.
On the morning of the loth, the sixth day on the rocks, the survivors were taken
off by four Greek fishing boats from the island of Cerigotto. Of the crew of 122, only
64 were left and they eventually reached Malta.
At the subsequent court martial which was held at Cadiz to enquire into the loss of
the Nautilus and to try Lieutenant Nesbitt, the senior surviving officer, and crew, the
court stated :
" That the loss of the sloop was occasioned by the captain's zeal to forward
the public despatches, which induced him to run in the dark, tempestuous night
for the passage between the island of Cerigotto and Candia : but that the sloop
passed between Cerigotto and Pauri, and was lost on a rock on the south-west
part of that passage, which rock does not appear to be laid down in Heather's
chart, by which the said sloop was navigated.
"That no blame attaches to the conduct of Lieutenant Nesbitt, or such
of the surviving crew of the Nautilzcs, but that it appears that Lieutenant
Nesbitt and the officers and crew did use every exertion that circumstances
could admit."
T. P. G.
CIVIL SERVANTS.
MR. EDITOR,may I write to you about CIVIL SERVANTS?All the best papers and
magazines are publishing articles and letters about them now, so I think you ought to, too,
don't you ?
You know, Mr. Editor, a lot of people seem to think that, because they know one or
two lazy and inefficient civil servants, all civil servants must be like them, and you know
they are not.
To begin with, there are all sorts of grades of civil servants-a little point their
detractors conveniently omit to mention when slating them. The highest' grades, who
have to pass a very stiff examination to enter the Service, and who come from much the
same strata of society as your naval officer friends, are at one end of the scale ; the clerical
grades and typists who correspond to those nice sailors who wear bell-bottomed trousers
are at the other. And to complete the analogy, the avenues of promotion from the lower
grades to the highest grade are as restricted or as open (whichever way you like it) as they
are for a sailor to an officer, so that the lazy inefficient clerical will remain a clerical all his
or her life.
The real point to remember about civil servants is that they are condemned to catch
the 8.15 train every morning for the whole of their lives. A lot of your readers, Mr. Editor,
I am sure, have never thought about this. When they are sent to the Admiralty for a
period, they know that in two years' time they will be moved on to another job. Thus
they don't mind putting in long hours and working overtime, partly, I feel certain because
they are keen on their work, but also partly because they say to themselves : " This is
only for two years ; when that time has gone I can ease up." Not so the civil servant,
and so you can't blame him for arranging what in his case is his life on an orderly basis of
not working overtime if he can avoid it. This doesn't say that he will never work overtime ;
he will in an emergency just as you and I do, Mr. Editor.
There is another rather interesting sidelight on the civil servant's outlook on life
which I came across by accident. I was working late-well, I was working up to dinner
time-at the Admiralty one night before the war when, rather to my surprise, one of the
284
CIVIL SERVANTS.
civil servants belonging to my department appeared. I say rather to my surprise, as I
never dreamt of him being there so late. We got talking and I spoke my thoughts, to
which he replied: "Well, Sir, most of us take our cue from the officers we work with.
If they take life easily and catch an early train, so do we ; if they put in long hours we
follow their lead because we don't allow paper work to accumulate if we can avoid it."
So, you see, if any of your readers feel that the civil servants they work with are casual
and slack, it may be that they ought to examine their own habits. Further, harking back
to the analogy I made before, your readers must remember that the clerical grade civil
servants are akin to their sailors, and in most cases their sailors have no intention of doing
more work than they've got to do to avoid any unpleasantness.
The real criticism that could be made about civil servants, as a class, is their dislike
of taking responsibility ; but this yoa know, Mr. Editor, is not so very unnatural when
you think about it. The ones who work with your readers, and with whose habits they
inevitably brand all civil servants, are working with people who have been trained to take
responsibility all their lives and who rather resent having it taken out of their hands.
Hence, these civil servants leave all responsibility to the officers. It is so much easier to
do that in any case, isn't it ? In other Ministries than the one in which your readers
work, the same situation applies because if it is not uniformed or civilian officers that the
civil servants find themselves working with, it is politicians, which is even worse. The
latter, being elected by the people, feel they have a mandate to take every sort of responsibility, though you and I, Mr. Editor, know that many of them are quite unfitted to order
a worm from one bit of grass to another in their gardens.
Of course there is one type of civil servant who is thoroughly blameworthy-the
pedantic paper passer. A civil servant's existence breeds in some individuals the habit of
mind which quibbles about every little paper point and magnifies the importance of every
regulation, and this results in papers which require action being disgracefully delayed
while they add their valueless observations. This type, I agree, deserves all the calumny
you like poured on it-but is it peculiar to the civil servant ? Can your readers honestly
say that they know of no one in the Navy which this description fits ?
During the late war a different breed of civil servant diluted the professionals-the
temporary civil servants who were directed into the Service by the Ministry of Labour.
Some of these were very good, some very bad. I had several in my department ranging
from a veterinary nurse, who was excellent, to a woman who, when I first met her and
asked what her background was, said : " Oh, I've never had to work in my life." The
common factor of all these was that they worked harder and bothered less about their
hours than the permanents-for the same reason that I have given before-they based
the pattern of their existence on the knowledge that it was only till the end of the war
that they had to do this job and, further, that the alternatives into which they might be
directed were probably worse.
There is one more point, Mr. Editor, I should like to bring out if I may have a little
more of your space. Has it ever struck most of your readers that a very large number of
civil servants who they criticize are living in circumstances which necessitate them doing
all the work of the house, flat or rooms they occupy, themselves? Thus outside office hours
they have to get their own meals, do their shopping and do a certain amount of housework.
Can you blame them for wanting to leave the office dead on time then ?
Your readers will by now have appreciated that I don't subscribe to the popular
pastime of branding all civil servants as inefficient bureaucrats, although I fully admit
there are exceptions. In my experience they are loyal, hard-working and trustworthy,
and in support of the last adjective it may interest them to know that I had twenty-one
clericals in my department in the war who knew the date of every operation and the date
and locality of every assault, landing or raid, weeks in advance, and never breathed a word
to anybody. Could your readers trust their ship's companies not to divulge similar
knowledge ?
Finally, Mr. Editor, are not your readers mostly civil servants themselves though in
uniform ? So if the cap fits
In case this article is interpreted too parochially, may I end up by saying that though
inevitably written with an Admiralty background, it applies in general to all Ministries.
ONEWHO HAS BEEN AT THE ADMIRALTY
TOO OFTEN AND TOO LONG.
...
,THE BATTLE O F MALTA.
THE BATTLE OF MALTA.'
A German Report.
1.-FIGHTING
THE MALTA CONVOY.
SOMETIMES
the pilots built up nervous tension until they were near the breaking point.
Then one of them would say to me : " Time for you to come along again, daddy." At
that time I was twenty-five years old. But my pilots were only twenty years of age.
" Biondo," gawky, blond Erich from Frankfurt, even less by a year-and-a-half.
This
time, it was Steyersepp who came to me, his face pale, his eyes red-rimmed. For a
fortnight he had been in command of the 1st squadron, although he was very young and
only a lieutenant. But his predecessors had been shot down over Malta one after the
other. There was no other choice. Never had I seen him so down-hearted. " 'Anton
Ida ' didn't return from a mission yesterday," he says when he sees me, " won't you help
me to take care of his belongings? "
But as I know that he is due for a mission at 11 o'clock, I ask him : "Aren't you
going to fly ? "
He pulls at my sleeve, asks me to come outside : " I have such a strange premonition
today," he complains when we're out of earshot, in front of the mess hall, " I feel bad
luck dogging me."
" I was coming along anyway," I say without hesitation, " then we will see what
we will see."
Now he feels a bit better and smiles. We climb the stairs to the command post.
The commanding general arrives, while the officer on duty outlines the b y ' s targets.
Three crews are assembled around the big map. " Biondo " quickly zips his flying togs
shut. Torpedo-Damaschke reports.
" The convoy is badly damaged.
I should like to thank the crews for their valour,"
begins the general after listening to the detailed flight instructions. " Unfortunately,
yesterday's mission did not succeed all along the line. The remaining freighters have to
be sunk. You'll have to take the anti-aircraft guns of the warships into consideration
as well as the flak of Malta." He ends his speech with the same words that concluded
his teletyped orders of the previous day : " Let it cost what it may." A silent pause.
Outside the caterwauling of the warmed-up engines. " How are you going to
proceed, Lieutenant ? " he asks Damaschke. "We must try to set turnips, Herr General,"
he replies smiling sarcastically. " The clouds are too low, we cannot dive." The general
does not lose his composure. He himself had forbidden this dangerous method of attack.
Now he nods, as if Damaschke had anticipated his order. " Thank you, gentlemen."
We salute.
Sepp looks careworn. "Biondo" laughs. Damaschke passes me as he hastens to the
staircase. He never wears regulation flying togs. His " Mae West " on top of the tunic,
the " emergency " silk muffler-bright yellow so that it will be detected in case he lands
in the drink-wound around his throat, riding breeches on his long legs, and fur boots.
He always dresses like that. Even today, for his last mission. White shapes billow under
the plane. I give my order to Sepp over the bord phone : " Get through." He cuts
the gas. I worm my way around his legs into the plexiglass nose of the plane. I t seems
we are heading into November. Gone is the blue sky. The light is cold, murky.
1
Mr. A. H. Rasmussen of the Allied Control Staff in Hamburg remarks :"From the end of December, 1941, until May, 1942, the author [a German Luftwaffe
pilot] was attached to a squadron of ' Ju. 88 ' dive-bombers which was mainly employed
against Malta. To the best of my knowledge not one member of the flying personnel of this
squadron survived the war. Even at that time its crews suffered heavy losses.
" The first chapter of this report is based on diary notes which are to be used in a more
comprehensive volume to be published later on. It was written without direct reference
to the fate of the cruiser Penelopf. In the second chapter the author recounts his observations
in connection with the cruiser.
286
THE BATTLE OF MALTA.
...
..
More heat, Sepp," I yell, " it's as cold as hell here in front." " Cold
as .
More
heat."
One never knows how long this grey night in the clouds will last. I t always seems
as if time moves along much slower in these foggy jungles. Suddenly glowing red balls
surround us, ascending a slanting, ghostly ladder. The barrage. The bomb clock has
been wound. Sepp will do the rest. I am free to shoot pictures. We all share the
feeling that a blind man must have when he suddenly finds himself on the brink of an
abyss. There must be innumerable guns down there. Sepp tries to get out of the cloud.
But every time it is like the shock of an electric current. "Away. Hands off. Back."
The ceiling is so low that it is impossible to circle above the warships.
.
At every attempt to leave the cloud, for seconds a breath-taking spectacle. A cruiser,
a huge arrow in the waves which is aimed a t the harbour entrance. In her vicinity several
destroyers. A freighter disappears into the mouth of the harbour which is obscured by
low clouds. A second ship follows. Successive veils of rain afford cover for the ships.
Eternities between clouds, water, flak. Sepp's face shines with perspiration. His
features are set like a statue's. If we don't attack soon, there won't be enough gas for
the return flight. It would be suicidal to delay any further.
Suddenly glaring sunshine. To the left, the high, brown cliffs of Malta. The
Mediterranean a brilliant, deep blue. The targets. The freighter on a course diagonal
to our own. In her vicinity, the cruiser and the destroyers. Flashes of lightning follow
each other. My forehead behind the glass is the foremost point of the plane. Just the
same, I imagine myself invisible. There is a yell in my earphones. I can't understand
a thing. Where are we going ? The wireless operator seems to have gone mad, his
machine-gun never stops firing. A destroyer in front of us-under us-gone-we
curve.
That is the voice of the mechanic. Clouds.
" Both bombs too short."
After a flight lasting four-and-a-half hours we land, on our last drop of gas, at
Trappani. Other crews report back. One after the other. Two of them were unable
to locate either the island or the convoy. "And you? " they ask. " Nothing," Sepp
replies quickly. Two Spitfires had dashed out of nowhere and forced him to turn off.
The squadron lost four first-class crews during the two days' attacks on the convoy.
Damaschke, the gay, is among them. But there is one 8,000-ton freighter and a 10,000-ton
ship in the harbour. A cruiser of the "Aurora" class is in dock. Malta, this fire-spewing
yellow waterbug, doesn't let us rest.
"
hell.
...
...
2.-THE PENELOPE.
I t was not until 4th April that I took off again. At that time I was much impressed
by the devastations in the Grand Harbour area which had been caused by the bombings
which had been carried out unintermittently, several times daily. While initially missions
against the harbour, which was bristling with flak, had been flown only occasionally, the
tempo of the raids was stepped up more and more from the end of March. This change
in strategy may have been caused by the consideration that the supply line to Malta
would have to be cut before this British bulwark in the Mediterranean could be put
hors de combat. Furthermore, it had become much less hazardous to carry out this series
of attacks since the flak barrage around the harbour had noticeably weakened soon after
the arrival of the remnants of the convoy.
Our tactics had undergone a change in so far as the bombers of the different squadrons
did not launch concentric attacks on their targets any more but proceeded, so to speak,
in Indian file. The leading machine of the squadron began to dive on to the target and
in its wake one bomber after the other pointed its nose in the same direction as if all of
them were strung up on an imaginary chain which hung down from the clouds.
As it impeded
movements too much, I used to take off my parachute before we
went into an attack. Only thus was I able to crawl around the legs of the pilot into the
glass-enclosed observation post in the foremost part of the Ju. 88. In this position I
saw more of what happened below than any other member of the crew, or of the entire
squadron. My eagerness to discern anything down there that would give me an indication
of what the enemy was up to often made me .take foolish risks. Whenever the frozen
my
THE BATTLE OF MALTA.
287
quiet of the dive was shattered for seconds by a sudden movement on the rapidly approaching ground I was pierced by a sudden, breathless shock during which certain pictures
engraved themselves on my mind with photographic exactitude.
Even today I am able to recall them at will, disjointed, but clear in every detail.
At one time it was a man on a bicycle on the square in front of the Governor's mansion
who automatically made for the cover of a narrow lane ; another time the startling height
of an office building ; almost always sluggishly moving clusters of people who watched
the spectacle of the diving planes from the squares of villages near the town ; and, finally,
the muzzle flashes of the guns lighting the crew members as they flitted about on the
deck of the cruiser of the "Aurora" class whose name, Penelo$e, I learned only now. Their
death-defying and, at the same time, death-dealing movements, which could not be
stopped even by concentric attack on the cruiser, were immensely impressive.
In the time between Easter and 10th April, a day which began with a celebration
over the imagined sinking of the cruiser in the dock of the Government wharf, the fire of
the flak in the harbour zone had appreciably diminished. Only the cruiser whose neighbourhood had been converted into more and more of a shambles did not only seem to
be invulnerable, but her crew appeared determined to show the less weakness the more
our attacks concentrated on her. As she did not leave the dock despite continuous,
heaviest blastings we were fully convinced that she was too badly damaged to be able
to leave the dock under her own power. Thus, our squadron considered the Penelope
as good as sunk already, and the report of a reconnaissance plane in the morning of
10th April that the dock was vacant seemed to verify the report of the plane, which had
flown the last mission on the previous day, that it had registered a fatal direct hit.
We were hit by an actual blast of dismay when we learned that the cruiser had been
sighted on the high seas steaming to the west.
Thus disappeared not only a young officer's dream of a Knight's cross but also a
warship that we Germans should have preferred to see at the bottom of the sea, and not
on its way to Gibraltar.
288
BOOKS.
" WESTERN MEDITERRANEAN, 1942-1945."
By " TAFFRAIL,"
Captain TAPRELL
DORLING,
D.S.O.,F.R.Hist.S., Royal Navy.
(Hodder & Stoughton. 20s.)
CAPTAINTAPRELLDORLING Taffrail ") was Public Relations Officer first to Admiral
Sir Andrew Cunningham and then to Admiral Sir John Cunningham ; his book covers the
period after the initial landings in North Africa until the end of the war and is dedicated
to these two officers and to Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, United States Navy, as well as to
all ranks and ratings who served under them.
" Taffrail " first explains fully the reason for the lack of publicity possible to the Navy
in war. As he says, naval operations do not as a rule lend themselves to publicity because
of the possible revelations of valuable information to the enemy, and he gives various
instances. The ship's radio, moreover, can rare1 be made available to correspondents for
~bviousreasons ; thus the news has to wait the sXiP9sreturn to harbour and in consequence
newspapers are naturally reluctant to have their correspondents, as it were, lockea up
in ships and'yielding little or no news dividend. The chapter as a whole is of great interest,
founded as it is on the first-hand knowledge of a wise and experienced man, and it furnishes
in a sense the raison, d'etre of the book. As Naval P.R.O. " Taffrail " seems to have felt
that in lacking publicity the Naval Services have received less credit than was their due,
and that as he was in a position to have access to the information withheld at the time,
he could now make public the deeds and achievements of ships and individuals.
His method has been to string on a thin, strategical thread stories of the actions and
exploits by which the allied strategy was carried out. It is a method which ensures justice
being done to everyone concerned, but it is a possible criticism that where each tree is so
meticulously described, the wood itself is sometimes lost sight of. Nevertheless, the book
does succeed by sheer multiplication of evidence in bringing out the essential fact that the
allied victories in the Mediterranean, as elsewhere, stemmed from and were made possible
only by the work of the allied Navies.
" Taffrail " has several excellent stories of Lord Cunningham, including one quoting
a signal made to one of his ships : " It is observed that Able Seaman Brown considers the
correct manner of receiving his Commander-in-Chief is in a recumbent attitude upon
sacks of vegetables, improperly dressed."
The author refers to the lavish equipment of the Americans as compared with our
own ; this is undoubtedly a point worth emphasizing, for we had to come some way
towards it in the end and we certainly lost a great deal in efficiency and contentment until
we did.
" Taffrail " first describes the operations after the landing and until the final Axis
surrender of Tunisia and describes in detail the constant work of the navies. While paying
tribute throughout to the ships of the United States Navy, he has evidently not had full
access to their records, and his primary task has been to erect a memorial to the Royal Navy.
The book follows the course of the operations after the surrender of Tunis on to the
taking of Pantellaria and thence to the invasion of Sicily. This operation showed the
great advance made in the technique of amphibious warfare since the North African
landings ; and the experience gained in all these and the subsequent landings in Italy
proved invaluable for the Normaady invasion in the following year.
" Taffrail " brings out clearly in his account of all these operations the important
part in the success of the Army played by the supporting bombardment of the ships,
and he cites evidence from both our own troops and those of the enemy to this effect.
('I
;
"
THE INFLUENCE O F SEA POWER ON WORLD WAR 11."
289
As he says, chronicles of such bombarding is dull work and is unlikely to " hit the headlines "
even if reported. Yet both Salerno and Anzio would probably have failed if it had not been
for the ships' supporting fire.
Full justice is done to the work of destroyers, small craft and M.T.B.s on both coasts
of Italy, both in support of the Army and in the offensive against the enemy, and the
accounts of the co-operation-if that is the word-with the Jugoslavs against the Germans
in the Adriatic is of particular interest.
The final operation in the western Mediterranean was the invasion of southern France,
the description of which, though it provided some tough problems and hard fighting, has,
by comparison with other offensives, almost a holiday air.
The work of the minesweepers, arduous, dangerous and continuous as it was, is well
described throughout, and the account of the work of the port parties in rapidly putting
into order harbours in which the retreating enemy had used every device of diabolical
cunning to reduce to a condition of apparently utter chaos is of outstanding interest.
" Taffrail " has many good stories. One that demands quotation concerns the Aurora
transporting a large number of Wrens from Algiers to Naples. As she moved to
her anchorage the onlyofficers and ratings to be seen on deckwere feminine; even the officer
holding and dropping the anchor flag was a Wren officer !
Although not in the Western Mediterranean at the time, naval events in the Dodecanese
and Aegean are described in considerable detail. I t is definitely stated that the decision to
occupy Kos, Leros and Sarnos in 1943 was made on the highest level. It was an unfortunate
one and disregarded all the lessons we had learnt about the necessity for fighter protection.
The islands were quickly retaken by the enemy, and it was not until the following year
that adequate naval forces, including carriers, cleared up the area and that the Army was
landed in Greece. An account of the difficult and frustrating events which followed is
given from the naval point of view.
The tributes by the Admiralty and the senior officers concerned are quoted by
" Taffrail," but it will be a satisfaction to a l l those who took part in the operations as well
as to their friends and brother officers and men that so full and detailed a record has been
compiled.
The maps and illustrations are good and there is a full index.
R. M. C.
"THE INFLUENCE OF SEA POWER ON WORLD WAR 11."
By Captain W. D.PULESTON,
U.S.N. (Retired).
(Yale University Press 1947. $5.)
CAPTAIN
PULESTON,
the author of " The Life of Mahan," has undertaken the task of " revealing the extent and limitationsof sea power during the struggle which began in Poland and
ended in Germany and Japan." " If the task is completed successfully and convincingly,"
says the author, " the book may be regarded as a postscript to the voIurnes of Mahan."
I t was indeed a high endeavour.
In the first five chapters Captain Puleston outlines the thesis bf Mahan, shows the
influence of sea power in World War I, how it iduenced, and was influenced by, events
between 1919 and 1939, and how it saved Great Britain in 1940 and 1941. Nine chapters
deal with events after the entry of U.S.A. into the war, primarily with those of the war in
the Pacific, but without losing sight of the Battle of the Atlantic and the war in. Europe,
which, having the prior call on resources, greatly influenced the course of the war against
Japan. The last chapter deals with the impact of new weapons on sea power and world
relations, and is written " more in the ho e of stimulating thought about American sea power
in the corning atomic era than of precise y forecasting its developments." " If World War II
marks the end of the influence of sea power, which the author does not believe, never has so
persistent an influence on human history reached such transcendent power and then passed
SO quickly into oblivion."
P
290
"
THE INFLUENCE OF SEA POWER ON WORLD WAR 11."
The data used have been obtained, he says, wherever possible from official sourcesthis statement, for reasons no doubt beyond the author's control, refers mainly to American
sources. Full use has been made of the testimony of captured Japanese officials, collected
by the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey (Pacific) and published in two volumes entitled
" Interrogation of Japanese Officials." This is, indeed, the most interesting feature of the
book. Acknowledgment is made to the help received from "Brassey's Nava1Annual"and to
the encouragement given by Secretary Forrestal, Fleet Admirals King and Nimitz, and
other senior officers of the U.S. Navy and Marines. The author adds that the opinions
expressed are his own, and in no circumstances should be attributed to the Navy Department.
The book is neither a narrative nor a critique ; its object, like that of the books of
Mahan, is rather to bring home to the American public the practical importance to it of
sea power. In studying the book, particularly the early chapters, it is well to bear the
author's point of view in mind ; though Captain Puleston pays generous tribute to the work
of the British Fleets he takes over-lightly the tremendous burden camed by the British
peoples, and leaves rather more " holidays" than one would expect in a work of the
character intended.
Those who are not already familiar with the course of the war may find the train of
events not very easy to follow.
In Chapter I Captain Puleston revives the old argument about Torrington's " Fleet
in Being." The point is of some interest, because it brings out the difference which has
hitherto existed between the American and British approach to the problem of sea power.
Colomb held that Torrington was right in supposing that, by breaking off contact with the
French fleet and keeping his fleet in being, he would force Tourville to defer the invasion of
England ;Mahan maintained that it was the indecision of the French Court that stopped
the invasion, and that Torrington's action was simply a poor excuse for his flight to the
Thames, and that it did not and could not affect the proceedings of the French. Three
years later Cervera's four old cruisers upset for thirty-three days all the arrangements of
the U.S. Navy Board, to which Mahan was attached, and enabled Colomb to remark :
"There is some irony in the fate which made Captain Mahan a party to the strongest
affirmation of this [Colomb's] view that history has yet afforded."'
Captain Puleston says that the weaker fleet, unless protected by a greatly superior
air force, must either come out in the open sea and fight or submit to being bombed or torpedoed in harbour, and claims that this should permanently demolish the " myth " of the
Fleet in Being. He omits to notice the great influence upon our dispositions of the presence
of the Tireitz in the Norwegian fiords, and the l+rge forces it was necessary to divert from
other purposes to deal with the Graf vos S$ee, the Bismarck and the battle cruisers, or the
successful defence of Malta. The truth is that a force which cannot easily be watched or
contained, and which is in a position to strike at vital sea communications, may have a
" nuisance value " out of all proportion to its strength, particularly if time is on its side.
Modem conditions have made it harder for an inferior force to evade observation and attack,
but they have also added to its nuisance value.
It is only natural that Mahan and Captain Puleston, seeking to persuade the American
public that only the best and biggest is good enough for U.S.A., should abhor a view that
does not fit their case. Furthermore, since 1783 the U.S.A. have never had to meet a serious
threat to their national existence. Time has been on their side. They have not hitherto been
obliged, a s we have again and again, to commit themselves to a policy without really
sufficient resources to carry it through. In consequence, they are scarcely able to comprehend
the difficulties of our position in the Abyssinian crisis, at the time of Munich, and during the
so-called " phoney war." This fundamental difference of outlook crops up constantly in
Captain Puleston's book, His belief that the new weapons have strengthened,not weakened,
the influence of sea power relative to land power will, however, be generally agreed'in.
Dealing with the situation in 1914, the author says that, with the decision to entrust
British interestsin theMediterranean to theFrench Navy,Britain "abandoned her traditional
policy and naval strategy which together had created and maintained her sea empire."
This is exaggeration, inspired, we must suppose, by the desire to teach the American public
"
Naval Warfare," Colomb. 1899. App., p. xxxix.
" THE INFLUENCE OF SEA
POWER ON WORLD WAR 11."
291
to rely on their own force alone. Similarly, he criticizes the British blockade policy of making
trade agreements with neutrds adjacent to Germany. He does not seem to realize that
a total blockade, even if the Prize Courts had been able to justify it, would have thrown the
neutrals into the arms of Germany, given her the lion's share of all their products and all
their stocks, and deprived the Allies of articles they could not do without, such as ballbearings for tanks and high explosive material for the French Army. Is he certain, too, that
American public opinion would have allowed the President to accept the stoppage of
American exports ?
Referring to the situation between the wars, Captain Puleston points out that " air
power " in the sense of Mahan's " sea power " will not exist until airborne commerce become.
essential to a country's existence, and that proper use of terms would have avoided unnecessary rancour. This may be true of the arguments used in the U.S.A. ; but on this side of the
Atlantic the main thesis of the advocate of " air power " was that a war would be ended by
bombing long before the control of sea communications could take effect.
Speaking of the Limitation Treaties, he says : " The bitter feeling between the British
and American Navies increased and until 1937 was skilfully utilized by Japan to strengthen
her own fleet." I cannot believe that he means what he appears to be saying here.
He criticizes the R.A.F. for sacrificing co-operation in its eagerness to show its own
independent powers and continues :
" By establishing an independent air force, the British Government removed from their
battleships and cruisers the very officers who would have made their navy air-conscious, and
denied the fleet what it most needed, close co-operation between surface and air ships and a
corps of aviators trained to fly over long ocean stretches and to work in harmony with the
ships."
Somewhat of an exaggeration, but we must remember the audience he is addressing.
Captain Puleston, like most American writers, seems to have misunderstood completely
the events of the Twilight War, and the tragic reasons for them. His comments on economic
war are particularly ill-founded, which is a pity in a book about sea power. Like his master,
Mahan, however, he can sometimes draw sound conclusions from unsound data, for he
concludes :
" Whatever the future holds for navies and sea power, it is clear that British sea power
between June, 1940, and June, 1941, obtained and maintained control of the sea and control
of the air over certain strategic areas, such as the Dover Straits, the English Channel, and the
waters around Malta, and was the decisive influence on the course of the war and the fate of
the Empire. Further, the ability of Great Britain to save herself primarily by her own exertions and the intelligent use of sea power, which involved Germany in a war with Russia,
forecast the downfall of Hitler's Europe, now enveloped by land as well as by sea."
In Chapter VI Captain Puleston turns to his main task, the expansion and exploits
of the U.S. Navy and its autonomous components, the Marine Corps, the Coastguard and
the Seabees. For the first time in American history, one admiral, E. J. King, became
responsible, under the Secretary, for expanding and maintaining the Navy and directing
its fighting.
Chapter VII, one of the most interesting of all, describes the procurement of naval
material and personnel. " Occasionally the system failed, but by July, 1943, Admiral
King could make strategic plans with the assurance that his logistic and personnel demands
would be met." A happy state, indeed, never attained in all our long history. But this
envious thought does not check our admiration for the wonderful organization and the
remarkable adaptability shown by the American people which made it possible. On the
31st of December, 1941, there were some 38,600 commissioned officers ; on the 30th of
June, 1945, there were 317,000. Most sea-going reserve officers " learned by doing." The
Seabees, in amphibious operations, landed soon after the first wave. They had been
sufficiently drilled to protect themselves and their equipment ; " on at least one occasion
a Seabee bulldozer fought it out with a Japanese tank." The fire-power of all guns in the
Navy, which in mid-1940 approximated 411 tons in 15 seconds, five years later reached
4,500. Captain Puleston rightly claims that it was the ability of American industry and
the Navy to expand without losing efficiency that has given the United States the priceless
possession of sea power.
The author refrains from discussing the causes of the Pearl Harbour disaster, but
comments : " If the Navy Department had condoned the conduct of the officials it con-
292
"
THE INFLUENCE OF SEA POWER ON WORLD WAR 11."
.
sidered responsible . . it would have fatally lowered the standard of conduct expected
of its high commanders." He could find warrant for this view in the words of Nelson:
" I would have every man believe, I shall only take my chance of being shot by the enemy,
but if I do not take that chance, I am certain of being shot by my friends."'
Captain Puleston supports Admiral Phillips' decision to go and look for the Japanese
expeditionary force on the ground that, inview of the lack of defences at Singapore,hewodd
have been sunk in harbour. The 22nd Flotilla of aircraft, which attacked him, was reputed
to be the best trained in Japan.
Of the Battle of the Coral Sea, a Japanese officer testXes that they gave up the att
to reach Moresby because they could not destroy Admiral Crace's surface force and
carrier planes were running out of fuel. This battle, says the author, stopped the Jap
advance on Australia and deprived Yamamoto of two or perhaps three of the carriers
could otherwise have fought in the decisive battle of Midway Island.
The Japanese defeat at Midway Island was due, he suggests, to over-confidence. The
island would have been valuable only as an outpost for an immediate attack on Hawaii.
Had the Japanese attempted to maintain an air force there, attrition would have been heavier
even than in the Solomons campaign. The American victory was due to the willingness of
Admiral Nimitz to accept a calculated risk and, in the field of tactics, to the success of the
dive-bombers. It gave the U.S. Fleet control of the Central Pacific and enabled Admiral
King, by opening the campaign for the Solomons, to retain the initiative. By depriving
Japan of carriers it relieved the British from further raids in the Bay of Bengal. Above all,
it began a serious drain on Japan's supply of trained pilots, and this, as the author later
shows, was fatal to her.
Next, Captain Puleston turns to the Battle of the Atlantic and the landings in North
Africa, pointing out that not only those landings, but also the victories of El Alamein and
Stalingrad, were possible only because the Anglo-American navies controlled the Atlantic
and most of the Indian Ocean.
Coming to the Solomons campaign, the author observes that Yamamoto's sudden
decision to defend those islands was a complete reversal of the strategy adopted when his
proposals to extend the perimeter of occupation were approved in April, 1942. I t had
been agreed that ships and carriers should be withdrawn and kept ready for decisive action
in an area where shore-based aircraft could assist them. But when it came to the point,
the bulk of the Army insisted that the Navy should supply these " marooned outposts."
Unlike Togo, Yamamoto yielded. The Solomons, says Captain Puleston, were never worth
the strength expended in trying to hold them. Destroyers suffered heavily, experienced naval pilots were practically annihilated, and the Allies never again gave the
Japanese time to train their carrier pilots.
At the beginning of Chapter XI1 there is a short discourse on amphibious operations,
in which Captain Puleston points out that, owing to the lack of funds for development
in peace-time, the sea Powers had to learn amphibious warfare " the hard way, in the school
of experience." He describes the overall technique evolved by the U.S. Fleet, including
the provision of the service squadron which gave the Paciiic Fleet " what appeared to the
enemy to be a magic carpet."
Next he turns to the " three-pronged attack " which, beginning in November, 1943,
and continuing throughout the spring of 1944, overtaxed Japan's defensive strength and
foreshadowed her defeat. Admiral Koga, contrary to his own intentions, was forced to
expend his jealously-guarded carrier pilots and much of his light forces, in a hopeless
attempt to hold Bougainville, and thus in turn was compelled to abandon his plan to
oppose the attack of Admiral Spruance on the Gilberts. Koga's next plan was to bring
the enemy to action in the Palau-Saipan area, within flying distance of which he was concentrating 2,000 shore-based aircraft. The aircraft were to play the major, the ships the
minor, part. The A m y refused to send all its air force, in view of its other commitments,
mainly in Asia, but promised to despatch the remainder if subsequent developments
proved its presence necessary. Koga, like Yamamoto, was lost flying. His successor,
Toyoda, adopted the same plan. The engagements of the 19th and 20th of June, 1944,
Nicolas, ill, 2. Misconduct of a captain at Camperdown.
293
showed that the U.S. forces could not be prevented from capturing the Marianas by the
combined assault of all the land and carrier planes the Japanese could concentrate. And
their carrier pilots had again been annihilated.
Captain Puleston's account of the circumstances of the final battle of Leyte Gulf is
not very clear. I t was apparently part of the general plan of the Imperial General Staff
to risk the fleet for the defence of the Philippines and Formosa. Toyoda gave another
reason : he was convinced that fuel for the fleet could not be obtained from the East
Indies unless the Philippines were held. The most compelling reason, says the author,
was that so few aircraft remained that the Japanese Fleet would have been at the mercy of
the United States Fleet in the Inland Sea itself. He also states that American submarines
had sunk so many tankers that bunker oil could not be shipped from the East Indies. His
narrative, confusing as it is, does but reflect the confusion in the Japanese command.
Toyoda had sent his carriers to the Inland Sea to train fresh pilots, and brought thenl
south again, short of pilots, to divert attention from the main attack of the battle fleet.
The diversion succeeded as such ; but in so doing proved its futility. Much of the shorebased aircraft concentrated for thedefence of the Philippines was diverted to meet Halsey's
air attacks on Formosa. The battle fleet, having sailed, apparently resolved to fall with
honour, turned back from Leyte Gulf with nothing before it but a few escort carriers,
just when the American situation appeared most critical, and withdrew to the westward.
Your reviewer can think of no other case in history in which a great fleet has come to
such a pitiful end ; not even that of Rozhdestvenski's, which in some ways it resembles.
It is to be hoped that someone will be found to tell the story as it is told in that great book
" Rasplata."
In the final chapter on New Weapons, Captain Puleston sums up as follows :" THE
INFLUENCE OF SEA POWER ON WORLD WAR II."
" Unquestionably, atomic bombs, like submarines and aircraft, add t o the difficulties of
controlling the sea and using it in time of war. And a nation without a navy but with enough
atomic bombs can make the use of the sea very dangerous and can deny adjacent waters t o
even the most powerful fleet. But certainly the nation with the most powerful fleet and its
own supply of atomic bombs will have the advantage. There will probably be times when all
the ships in the world will be denied certain sea areas because of bombs, but even in the sailing
era, no single nation was ever able t o control all the oceans and the connecting seas. The
United States, however, thanks to its geographical position, its powers of production, and its
proved capacity t o fight on the sea, has the best opportunity of retaining and using sea power."
It was a hard task that Captain Puleston undertook, and I do not feel that he has
altogether accomplished it. Nothing is more difficult than to combine narrative with
profound reflections in the style of Mahan. Mahan had a wonderful gift for separating the
wheat from the chaff, and drawing illuminating deductions from unpromising material.
Captain Puleston has not this gift in the same degree. He has no adequate comment to
make on the omission of the Japanese to cut our communications in the Indian Oceanan act which, if it had been practicable, would have been of the utmost value to Germany
wd, through Germany, to Japan. He tells us of the tremendous energy put by the U.S.
into the re-creation and multiplication of her sea forces, but does not, as other writers have
done, point out with sufficient force the fundamental error of the Japanese in thinking
they could fight a limited war against the Anglo-Saxon Powers. In short, though the book
contains some valuable lessons, its author often fails to see the wood for the trees.
" BRASSEY'S NAVAL ANNUAL, 1948."
Edited by Rear-Admiral H. G. THURSFIELD.
(William Clowes & Sons, Limited. 30s.)
THEbulk of this year's issue is occupied, and most usefully occupied, by the full text of the
" Fuehrer Conferences on Naval Affairs "-an action for which the Editor deserves our
thanks and congratulations.
As already stated in THE NAVALREVIEW,August, 1947, p. 198, the Admiralty
issue had to be given a very limited distribution, owing to shortage of paper, and this is the
first time that the text has been published in full. Admiralty notes relate to the background of the minutes of the conferences and give a great deal of useful supplementary
information.
The text has already been dealt with in THENAVAL
REVIEWin the following places :
1939, November, 1947, p. 336 : 1940, February, 1948, p. 54 : 1941, May, 1948, p. 132:
1942-43-44, August, 1947, p. 198 : and 1945, November, 1947, p. 343. On the details,
no more comment need be made.
On a general view, the most striking feature is the sound strategical view constantly
put forward by Raeder and Doenitz and the persistent failure of Hitler, Goering and the
Army leaders to take it in. Again and again we read : " The Fuehrer agreed." But he
seldom took steps to make his subordinates carry out the action for which the Navy had
asked ; they were all too keen on prosecuting the claims of their own Services, in accordance with their preconceived partisan views. It looks almost as if Hitler's neurotic mind
shied at the laborious and exacting task of planning and prosecuting the war against
England, and took refuge in plans--or dreams-of triumphal progresses elsewhere, which
would flatter his vanity and exalt his personal prestige. Like a child, peevishly throwing
aside a toy that bored him.
Another thing which the reports of these conferences seem to indicate is that the
O.K.W. was quite innocent of the charge of having " planned " the war. Nothing is
more surprising than the skill with which the Armed Forces of Germany leapt from each
one of Hitler's startling improvizations to the next.
Yet his followers continued to believe in him. Doenitz, who ought to know, and whose
opinion deserves respect, wrote of him at the height of the Italian crisis, on the 11th of
August, 1943 :
"The enormous strength which the Fuehrer radiates, his unwavering confidence, and his far-sighted appraisal of the Italian situation have made it very clear
in these days that we are all very insignificant in comparison with the Fuehrer,
and that our knowledge and the picture we get from our limited vantage are fragmentary. Any one who believes that he can do better than the Fuehrer is silly."
Did Doenitz really believe this, or was it written to meet the Fuehrer's eye ? Or
did his followers, conscious of the coming dangers, seek comfort in Hitler's self-assurance ?
Perhaps the wiser ones still thought that they could not get on without his personal
prestige? Did they think they could get rid of him at the right moment and
lay the blame of their defeat on his incompetent shoulders ? Or was it the machine
which they had helped to make which had taken charge and which they found no means
of stopping ?
The, volume opens with a Naval Survey by the Editor. In this, Rear-Admiral
Thursfield deals with the causes and the effects of the sudden reduction which became
necessary in the number of ships in service in the British Fleet. He criticises the Government for not taking the public into their confidence, quotes with approval the Duke of
Wellington's remark of a hundred years ago-" When did any man hear of allies of a country
unable to defend itself? "-and expresses the certainty, which, let us hope, will prove
justified, that public opinion will insist that the Government's undertaking that the
" BRASSEY'S
NAVAL
ANNUAL, 1948."
295
reductions are to be only temporary, shall be strictly observed. Of the change in the age
of entry into Dartmouth he observes that, while actual experience only can prove how
successful the new scheme is going to be, there is no reason to fear that it will fail to produce
the numbers required, or, provided it is carefully and conscientiously administered, to
maintain the quality. On the scrapping of the old battleships he remarks that while the
requirements of naval operations of today dictate the provision of ships of the general
characteristic of the modern battleship, what they do not dictate is the provision of the
battleship of yesterday which lacks one or more of the essential qualities-high speed,
protection and armament against air attack, and accommodation for the complex installations today demands. Dealing with the new qualities of the submarine, he points out
that these demand longer and more intensive periods of training even than the German
U-boats, and that these require a large sea training area immune from enemy action.
Of the gas turbine, he thinks it too early to make any forecast of the future ; but, if there is
to be progress, the Navy is assured, by the lead which the Admiralty has taken, of being
in the forefront. As to the atomic bomb, it should, he thinks, be possible to design a ship
with adequate defence against a burst outside the limited lethal range. Everyone must
be under cover ; radar must replace the naked eye ; and superstructures must be reduced,
strengthened and stream-lined. In the present state of scientific knowledge and practice
the appearance of a ship propelled by nuclear power is not in sight. He concludes his
survey by re-emphasizing the view stated in last year's "Brassey," that command of the sea
remains as fundamental and indispensable a factor as ever in the achievement of victory.
It alone can create the conditions that make victory possible. This cannot be achieved
by destruction alone ; it involves the continuous control and protection of sea traffic.
" Volage " follows the Editor with a review of Naval Air Power. Tracing the rise of
naval air power from the initial experience gained in World War I to the approach of
World War 11, he suggests that a mistaken faith in the powers of land-based aircraft a t sea
hindered the development and practice of co-operation between warships and such aircraft in the British Services and to an even greater extent in Germany ; while the American
and Japanese Services, where these misconceptions were not to be found, made good progress both in efficiency and in the provision of equipment and fighting units. In the case of
the British Fleet, technique and training were largely related to the part it was expected
aircraft would play in main fleet actions. World War I1 brought out successively the
need for aircraft in the defence of convoys, in the location of raiders, and in coastal operations ; and called for many more carriers, both large and small, and for the co-operation
of long-range reconnaissance aircraft to supplement them. Special carriers with fighter
aircraft enabled the Navy to offer the Army, in a new form, its traditional support in
amphibious operations. The Pacific War showed that the stronger fleet must now derive
its initial superiority from the possession of the greater and more effective air arm. In
any future war, he suggests, such a Navy, as a " mobile offensive base," will have a high
importance in wider fields of general strategy than ever before.
There is nothing to add to the Reference Sections of the 1943 issue ; but Mr. Daniel,
who revised them thoroughly last year, gives a short survey of the developments of the
last twelve months.
At the end come the Abstract of Navy ~stimates,the First Lord's Memorandum,
and the White Paper on Defence, already touched upon in the May number of THENAVAL
REVIEW," Defence in Parliament," p. 101; and, last but most important, Fleet Admiral
Nimitz's Report to the Secretary of the Navy, on the future employment of naval forces.
Raleigh's dictum, he claims, is as true today as when uttered. Cargo-carrying aircraft
will no more replace vehicles of the same type on the seas than they will those on land.
The United States possesses control of the sea more absolute than was possessed by the
British ; its interest is not riches and power, but national security and stability amongst
the nations. But it is so absolute that it is sometimes taken for granted. It can be
perpetuated only through the maintenance of balanced naval forces of all categories which
can flexibly adjust themselves to new modes of air-sea warfare and which are alert to
develop and employ new weapons. Invasion in some form is essential to obtain decision
in war, but it is sometimes unnecessary to prosecute it to a greater extent than is needed
" THE SECOND WORLD WAR, 1939-45."
296
to establish the destructive potential of the victor and to engender hopelessness in the
enemy. Naval forces have always played a vital and often deciding role in projecting such
pressure. The development of naval aviation has provided naval forces with a stnking
weapon of vastly increased flexibility, range and power ; the Pacific operations demonstrated the ability of the Navy to concentrate aircraft strength at any desired point in
such strength as to overwhelm the defence a t the point of contact. The Navy of the
future will be capable of launching new types of missile from surface vessels and submarines and of delivering atomic bombs from carrier-based planes. Defensively, the
Navy is still the first line the enemy must " hurdle " either in the air or on the sea. If we
are to project our power against the vital areas of any enemy before beachheads on his
territory are captured, it must be, for several years to come, by air-sea power ; by aircraft
launched from carriers ; and by heavy surface ships and submarines projecting guided
missiles and rockets. Naval forces including these types are capable of remaining at sea
for months. They are mobile offensive bases that can be employed with the unique
attributes of secrecy and surprise. It is clear, therefore, that the Navy and Air Force
will play the leading roles in the initial stages of a future war. Eventually, the reduction
and occupation of certain strategic areas will require the utmost from Navy, Army and
Air Force. Each should be assigned broad functions and vigorously develop, in that area
where their functions meet, that flexibility and team-work essential to operational success.
We may find ourselves comparatively weak in some elements of power, but we are superior
in naval air-sea strength. " Hence a policy which provides for balanced development
and co-ordinated use of strong naval forces should be vigorously prosecuted in order to
meet and successfully counter a sudden war in the foreseeable future."
No summary can do justice to so succinct a document, which each must read for
himself.
Views like these were put forward both in the Admiralty and at sea, twenty-five years
or more ago. But the tide of public opinion ran too strongly in favour of economy, disarmament and the claims of the " aerocrats."
A.H.T.
THE SECOND WORLD WAR, 1939-45."
A Strategical and Tactical History
By Major-General J. F. C. FULLER,
C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O.
(Eyre & Spottiswoode. 21s.)
"
GENERAL
FULLERhas given us many books (26 in fact) on the subject of war in all its
forms ; but it is doubtful if any of them exceed this one in importance.
Not by any means everyone will agree with his opinions on the conduct of the late
war nor with his deductions from the lessons, both military and political, which the war and
its aftermath have taught us. Indeed, so severe are his strictures at times that one finds
oneself wondering how in the world we managed to win the war at all-if not the peace.
But none the less, whether we agree or disagree, the book does call for earnest thought by
students of war in all its many phases.
General Fuller has been at great pains to consult many founts of information. These,
he tells us, include official despatches, biographies, war correspondents' reports, the
Nuremburg Trial and enemy interviews-a pretty comprehensive lot.
He explains that his omission to deal in detail with the Battle of the Atlantic and
naval operations in the Mediterranean-which, as he says, form so much of the background
of all the land campaign in Europe-is due, briefly, to lack of space in this essentially
military study. But this is not to say that he does not throughout the book take due
" THE
SECOND WORLD WAR,
1939-45."
293
notice of the vital importance of sea power. Indeed, our alleged failure to make due use
of sea power runs like a thread through the book, coupled as it is with severe criticisms
on the policy of strategic bombing.
The following extract well sums up his contentions. Writing of the final victory of
the Allies in Tunis, he concludes :" Thus ended the first of the great amphibious campaigns in the West : a campaign
which conclusively showed that the strategical foundations of trictoiy lay in sea power. It was
the command of the Atlahtic and not the so-called strategic bombing of Germany which
rendered it possible. Quite otherwise ; . . the latter actually impeded speedy victory;
for had not a single German city been bombed, and instead had half the vast man-power
employed on the building of heavy bombers been diverted to the roduction of landing craft
and transport aircraft, there can be no shadow of doubt that, not on% wduld Africa have been
the war in Europe would have been won at least a year earlier
won months earlier, but .
than it actually was."
.
..
The General also strongly condemns the announcement at the Casablanca Conference
of January, 1943, that the war aim of the Allied Powers was " Unconditional Surrender."
These words, he says, were to hang " like a putrefying albatross round the n e ~ k of
s America
and Britain."
Why ? Firstly, because no great Power could submit to them, and therefore the war
must be fought to the point of annihilation. Secondly, because it would mean the smashing
of the balance of power in Europe, leaving Russia as the dominant power. " Consequently,
the peace these words predicted was the replacement of Nazi tyranny by an even more
barbarous despotism."
The author takes as his central theme the initiative in war-that is freedom of movement and of action. This he elaborates in nine chapters, tracing how and why the initiative
started with the two enemy countries-Germany and Japan-and gradually passed to
the Allies.
General Fuller follows this with a final chapter on what he calls the Foreground of
the War. This falls into three parts or factors : Policy and War ; Morality and War ;
Science and War. To-day, he says, science is in the saddle, morality is in collapse, and
policy is therefore at a discount. None the less, solutions to these problems must be found
if we are to avoid a third world war which can only be a war of extermination. And in
his preface he reminds his readers that he has always held that war is no more than a
lethal argument and that to be worth the fighting it demands a sane and profitable political
end : " not slaughter and devastation, but to persuade the enemy to change his mind."
In an appendix the author tells of an invention which, to your present reviewer at
least, has been hitherto unknown. This is a C.D.L., an infantry tank fitted with a powerful
projector emitting a fan-shaped flickering beam of light which illuminates a wide field and
dazzles the eye. The dazzling light obscures everything behind it and also renders aimed
fire impossible. Apparently after some hesitation the War Office accepted it in 1940 but
it was never used in action. Lord Louis Mountbatten asked for a brigade of C.D.L.s
to be sent out, but they arrived too late to take part in the final operations in Burma.
Remembering the recent discussion in THE NAVALREVIEWon the question of the Sailor
and the Scientist, perhaps some members can suggest how this invention can be adapted
for tactical use in naval warfare.
"A SHORT HISTORY OF THE ROYAL MARINES."
By Colonel G. W. M. GROVER,
O.B.E., Royal Marines.
Illustrated by Lieut.-Colonel H. A. BASS,Royal Marines.
(Gale & Polden, Limited. 1s. 6d.)
THE Royal Marines must speak for themselves ; but this little book is, I am sure, what
,
every naval officer wants to see. I t gives in a compact and readable form all those facts that
we all ought to know about our shipmates but so seldom do, and it will serve to settle
many an argument. '
The key-note rightly struck by the author is the need for Marines in combined operations. He shows that from the seventeenth century and for many years after, soldiers
were embarked in ships for this purpose, but that until these troops were properly
organized and equipped for the purpose of combined operations they were seldom if ever
satisfactory, and it is interesting to notice, first, how long it took for the need for a Corps to
be recognized and, secondly, how at the start of most of our wars we were found short of
adequate numbers. The book starts from the .raising of the first regiment and its plan
is to follow the course of history giving the chief causes of each war, then a brief narration
of the principal events in and between the wars and on this outline tracing the history of
the Corps to the present day.
The regular Army was born in 1660 on the restoration of Charles 11, and the first
regiment to serve afloat was raised from the trained bands in the City of London in 1664
and was the thud regiment of the line. I t served in the Second and Third Dutch Wars
and was known as the Maritime Regiment of the Duke of York and Albany, subsequently
James 11. When the revolution of 1688 put William and Mary on the throne and James I1
fled, the regiment was disbanded as being too favourable to its former patron and chief.
In the war of the English Succession or of the League of Augsberg, Marine regiments were
again raised in 1690, but these were abolished in 1699 after the war. It was in this war
that there is the first mention of Marines being exercised at the " great guns " which
they have ever since so worthily served.
In the war of the Spanish Succession six Marine regiments were raised of which three
afterwards became line regiments, and--six land regiments served at sea. I t was in this
war that Admiral Sir George Rooke took Gibraltar with 8,000 men and subsequently held
it against an eight months' seige. Gibraltar, where, in the words of a contemporary writer,
" the British Marines gained immortal honour " is the only honour worn on the Colours
and appointments of the Royal Marines. After this it is bathos to read that on the conclusion of the war in 1713 all Marine regiments were abolished except those transferred to
the line.
In 1739 war broke out with Spain and the war of the Austrian Succession followed.
Ten Marine regiments were raised and partook in operations and actions all over the
globe, including Anson's voyage round the world, in which his squadron embarked five
companies of Marine " invalids." Their main qualification, it is stated, is that they were
too feeble to desert. The author cites the curious fact that Admiral Boscawen-arrived
ofi Madras in 1748 with a Fleet, Army and Marines (including Hannah Snell, the female
Marhe), holding a commission to command both Navy and Army, an arrangement not
repeated until 200 years later when Admiral Mountbatten held the same authority in the
same theatre. I t is disheartening to read that, in 1748 at the end of the war, the regiments
of Marines were once again abolished.
Nevertheless the lessons so often disregarded had at last sunk in ; Anson, supported
by Hawke, pressed for and, on the outbreak of the Seven Years' War in 1755, succeeded
in obtaining an Order in Council for the creation of 50 companies of Marines in three
groups based on the three Home Ports and permanently under Admiralty control. This
organization was suited to the requirements and conditions of the time ; it ended the
continual disbandments and re-raising of their regiments and still holds good in principle.
"A SHORT HISTORY OF THE ROYAL ~~ARINES."
299
The Seven Years' War was, as the author states, the golden age of combined operations
in which the Marines took their full share, and it will be remembered that Wolfe, the
hero of Quebec, was first commissioned in the Marines.
The War of American Independence which began in 1775 found the Marines fighting
in America and setting an example which led the American Congress to form their own
Marine Corps that year.
The Napoleonic Wars followed, and the book outlines the services rendered by the
Corps which included their steadfast loyalty during the mutinies at Spithead and the.
Nore. It was in 1802 after the Treaty of Amiens that George I11 directed that the Corps
should in future by styled " The Royal Marines." It was on this occasion that Lord St.
Vincent paid his memorable tribute to the Corps in these words :
" In obtaining for them the title of ' Royal ' I but indifferently did my duty.
I never knew an appeal to them for honour, courage or loyalty, that they did not
more than realize my highest expectations. If ever the hour of real danger should
come to England, they will be found the Country's Sheet Anchor."
War was resumed in 1803, and in 1805 the Royal Marine Artillery was constituted.
In that year at Trafalgar the Royal Marines lost their most famous colonel, Nelson,
who, like St. Vincent, had always taken the keenest interest in the Corps.
In 1827 Colours were presented to each division, and the Globe encircled with Laurel
selected as the badge in view of " the greatness of the number of actions to be considered."
The single battle honour, Gibraltar, was to be worn and the motto PERMARE,PERTERRAM.
In 1855 the much-prized title of Light Infantry was added, and the Corps then consisted
of the Royal Marine Artillery and the Royal Marine Light Infantry. As such the Corps
served afloat and ashore in various operations described in the book until the first World
War of 1914-1918.
Here again it is impossible to follow the accounts of the Corps' activities, but the
V.C. awarded to Major Harvey, R.M.L.I. of the Lion cannot be omitted. When mortally
wounded and almost the only survivor after the explosion of an enemy shell in Q turret,
with great presence of mind and devotion to duty he ordered the magazines to be flooded,
thereby saving the ship. He died shortly afterwards.
In 1923 the two branches of the Corps were amalgamated, and the Corps again became
the Royal Marines.
The outbreak of the second World War found the Marines very short-handed after
meeting the first commitment of manning the Fleet, but as the war went on the members
increased as did the functions for which they were required. Mobile naval base organizations, fortress units, a striking force and, finally, in 1942 Marine Commandos were started
and their activities are traced in outline. It is interesting to recall that the 300 survivors
of the Marine detachments of the Prilzce of Wales and Re$dse joined the 2nd Battalion of
the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders in Malaya and the composite battalion was nicknamed the Plymouth Argylls, both the lost ships being West Country manned.
In the Normandy landings the Marines played a very large part as Commandos,
as artillery support, as an anti-aircraft brigade and in almost innumerable other functions
ashore and afloat. Their most prominent exploit after the landing was the capture of
Walcheren, a most successful operation, though losses were very heavy.
The services above described are mainly those in co-operation with the Army ; but,
as Colonel Grover very rightly says, the work of the Royal Marines afloat enhanced the
reputation of the ships in which they served. He also says that " they were proud to
serve the Royal Navy ; it is possible that the Royal Navy was proud to be served by
these men." It is more than possible ; it is very certain.
The book concludes with a number of interesting appendices giving among other
facts the strength of the Corps at various periods, the casualties and honours in the two
World Wars and much information on regimental matters. There is also a list of all
regbents who have been Marines and the citations of the awards of the Victoria Cross to
Royal Mariries.
As a tail piece a map of the world is inserted carrying on it the names of some of the
main scenes of action of the Royal Marines.
I can imagine no better book for the young Royal Marine; but, as I said before, it
should appeal just as much to his naval shipmates.
R.M.C.
THE AWKWARD MARINE."
By JAMES SPENCER.
(Longrnans, Green and Co. 10s. 6d.)
"
A REVIEWER exercises his trade under the shadow of a number of unwritten rules. Among
these are that he should not undertake the notice of a book in which he personally has an
interest, that he should not make use of information privately acquired to illustrate the
book itself, but be guided solely by the written evidence, and, lastly, that he should not
concern himself with minor errors that do not detract from the value of the work reviewed
as a whole. In departing from the first two of these-the third does not arise-your reviewer does so deliberately, because the author has represented his own character and
activities in a less favourable light than a fuller knowledge of events would reveal.
" James Spencer "-that
is not his name-has a criminal record (and here again
the observation may be permitted that scrutiny of his career reveals it in a more favourable
light than the bare record would suggest) and is the author of several " tough guy " books
on the American underworld. On the outbreak of war he tried to enlist in the Army, was
rejected, and, in October, 1941, was passed for service in the Royal Marines under the
National Service Acts. Being then approaching forty years of age he was detailed, not
for a combatant unit, but for the R.M. Auxiliary Battalion, a labour corps employed at
Scapa Flow. To state that he took a poor view of this is an excursion into the realm of
meiosis, and be fully justified the title he has given the book. Discovering the undoubted
truth that Military Law knows nothing of a " frivolous complaint " he filled the orderly
room with his grievances all day and most of the night. His complaints had the complete,
ab omnibus. Nothing escaped
ness of Mother Church itself, qorod sem$er, qorod u b i q ~ equod
the range of his interests and, to continue the ecclesiastical metaphor, he cursed the Corps
with the full completeness of the Cardinal's damning of the jackdaw. He was sent to
Scapa, and there his complaints redoubled in scope and in the number of persons addressed.
"Awkward Marine " indeed ; one thinks that the author would be the first to forgive a
harassed staff oficer at the home terminal for suggesting that " D - - - d Awkward
Marine " might have been more appropriate.
His release from Scapa came about in a curious way. Since his real name and his
pen name were not identical, nobody had connected Marine Blank with the Mr. Blank
Blanco who had approached the Director of Combined Operations, General Sir Alan
Bourne, with a scheme for attacking enemy bomber stations in the early days of the war,
and still less with " James Spencer." By chance " Spencer " saw a notice in a Sunday
paper of an inspection by Sir Alan Bourne, who had resumed duty as Adjutant General
R.M.on relief by Sir Roger Keyes some time before, and he wrote to Sir Alan reminding
him of their previous meeting. The Adjutant General, who knew the whole of " Spencer's "
background and realized his qualities of toughness and initiative, saw him and posted him
to the R.M.Commando, later numbered 40 and then undergoing training for the Dieppe
raid. It says much for " Spencer's " toughness and endurance that he was able to stand
Commando training at forty years of age, and more for his patriotism that he refused to
take a job that would have kept him out of action.
His account of the raid is very interesting, and casts a new light on the death of the
commanding officer of the R.M. Commando, Lieut-Colonel J. (" Tigger ") Picton Phillipps,
" . . dying with his boots on ; dying tembly ; dying without any show of fear, without
any fuss : dying like the brave man he was."The landing craft was sunk; and " Spencer,"
after trying to swim out to the fleet, was forced to land and was made prisoner. In that
state of life he displayed a remarkable degree of naivety and dismissed the idea of hidden
microphones as " Sax Romerish " with the result that his whole background became known
to his captors. He was, in consequence, specially treated and tempted to become a
collaborator by wireless or by writing, an idea with which he affected to toy because he
thought it increased his chance of escaping. Finally he was given up as a bad job by the
.
" THE
BATTLE. OF THE
ATLANTIC, 1939-1943."
301.
enemy and sent to a labour camp in Upper Silesia from which he managed to escape for
a short time. Recaptured, he was again sent to North Germany where he remained until
liberated by the advancing armies.
An interesting book. Whatever mistakes " Spencer " may have made in the past
they were not due to lack of courage or fundamental decency of outlook. He flung a
mixture of cunning and defiance at this captors and ever tried to live up to a standard of
personal smartness that he felt becoming to a Marine. For he developed a genuine pride
in the Corps ; and the closing words of the book are : " . if in the future anybody
asks me what I did in the war against Hitler's Germany I shall think I have made enough
answer when I say :
" I was in the Marines."
Spencer " is, of course, no more a typical Marine than Mr. Midshipman Easy was
a typical naval officer ; but, as Easy owed much to his handling by Captain Wilson,
so did " Spencer " owe much to some (not all) of the officers who had charge of his destinies.
To us professional officers there is the constant danger of forgetting that original characters
cannot be best governed by ordinary rules, and this danger arises when we have the nation
in arms more than at any other time. In the case of " Spencer" there was the peril
that the twig might again become bent ; that it did not is tribute, not only to the character
of " Spencer " but-inspired as that was by Sir Alan Bourne, our Chief-to our own.
Well worth reading.
GAD,SIR !
..
' I
HISTORY OF UNITED STATES NAVAL OPERATIONS IN WORLD WAR 11.-VOL. I.
"THE BATTLE OF THE ATLANTIC, 1939-1943."
By SAMUEL
ELIOTMORISON.
(Oxford University Press-30s.)
THIS is chronologically the first volume of the series of thirteen which Captain S. E.
Morison, U.S.N.R., is writing to place on record the operations of the United States Naval
Forces in the late war. Actually it is the second to appear, as the author was taken off
the task of preparing it to take part in the operations in North African waters which
he has recounted in the second volume and of which an account is given in the February,
1948 issue of THENAVALREVIEW.
An introduction of some length by Commodore Dudley W. Knox, U.S.N. deals with
the inter-war period; and the writer has some very severe things to say about the Washington Conference.
As the story in these pages is essentially that of the doings of the U.S. naval forces
and is written primarily for the benefit of the author's own countrymen, it is only natural
that our own naval operations should take second place ; and he has gone into his own
country's activities in the Atlantic Ocean " from Pole to Pole " in great detail up to and
including the middle of the year 1943. Further operations will be covered in subsequent
volumes. He has made use of all available documents and tells us that the material on
convoy and anti-submarine history is already so vast that he has only been able to make
a selection of typical or outstanding actions. He has been fortunate, also, in having
the German records to refer to, including chiefly the Fuehrer Conferences on Naval Affairs,
although he tells us there was not as much material in them as he could have wished,
the U-boat logs themselves not proving uniformly reliable.
None the less, the result is a remarkably clear, well written and fully documented
book of this vitally important part of the struggle against Fascism as carried out by the
U.S.Naval Forces both in what the author calls the " Short of War " operations arid in
the struggle itself.
G
After describing the fight up to the middle of June, 1942, Captain Morison breaks off
to deal with the organization of anti-submarine warfare in all its many ramifications ;
the ships themselves with all their special equipment for their task ; the Army antisubmarine air command and the naval air patrol ; coastal convoys ; " amateurs and auxiliaries " ; and, lastly, the all-important merchant ships themselves and their armament.
He then resumes his narrative which he calls the "Ten Months Incessant Battle,
July, 1942-April, 1943," and which is well worth very close study.
He has devoted a special chapter to the North Russian run, and he deals particularly
fully with the terrible ordeal of P.Q.17. It makes still more poignant reading now when
one considers the tremendous efforts and sacrifices made by both British and American
naval and mercantile forces to supply our Russian allies and the lack of appreciationto put it mildly-on the part of the latter of these self-same efforts.
Running through the book is the constant cry of the U.S. Naval authorities, so often
re-echoed on this side also, for more escort vessels. In those days, as in 1917, there were
never nearly enough ; and, looking to the future, one is forcibly reminded of Lord Tovey's
warning in the House of Lords Debate of the 8th of March of the lesson which has
emerged from the war : " never to scrap any small ships but to keep them as long as they
will remain afloat." To what extent his warning has been heeded it is hard to say in view
of the long list of small ships ranging from cruisers to minesweepers which the Parliamentary Secretary recently announced were being sold or otherwise transferred to foreign
countrie~.~
In conclusion the author points out that had the Allied Commanders been able to
listen in to conferences at ~ i t l e r ' sheadquarters their picture of the anti-submarine
situation in April, 1943, would have been far brighter than it was. Hitler had definitely
lost the strategic initiative, and for the enemy the world situation was very black. The
author then summarizes the situation on our side, which fairly justified the Prime Minister's
phrase as marking " the end of the beginning." Captain Morison's volume on subsequent operations in the Atlantic will be awaited with interest.
The book contains a series of excellent charts showing the activities of the U-boats
from time to time, the trans-Atlantic convoy routes and other matters, including a very
clear exposition of the movements of the convoy force and German naval forces in the
attack on Convoy PQ.17. There are also many interesting photographs.
Altogether a valuable addition to the history of the naval war, though the index is
not as full as one could have wished.
M. M.
"AIR POWER IN WAR."
By Marshal of the R.A.F., THELORDTEDDER,G.C.B.
(Hodder & Stoughton. 9s. 6d.)
THIS book, comprising the four Lees Knowles lectures delivered by Lord Tedder at
Cambridge University during 1947, is well worth the attention of the naval reader, who
will lind it more palatable, and probably a great deal more useful, than the book by Sir
Arthur Harris, which was recently the subject of some mild controversy in the pages of
THENAVALREVIEW. Lord Tedder is well-informed on naval matters and has had many
contacts with the Navy. Those who know him will probably agree, however, that he has
his doubts about the necessity for naval aviation as a separate entity, and, while these are
not openly expressed in this book, the discerning reader may be able to descry them.
In the opening lecture, after driving home the point that war is one and indivisible
and that the country cannot to-day afford the luxury of three Fighting Services, each
1
2
N.R., May, 1948,p. 109.
*' Hansard," 30th June and 2nd July.
-
preparing for its own war with little regard for the plans of the others, Lord Tedder makes
a strong plea for the discarding of old shibboleths and outworn traditions, and for the
proper integration of the armed forces to form
"
what we need-a united, efficient and economical armed force ; not an embryo Goliath which
would take years to come to maturity after outbreak of war, but a fully-grown David ready to
act swiftly and decisively as one of the world's policemen."
He does not, however, go so far as to advocate the merging of the three arms to form a
single defence force.
The next lecture deals with the subject of air superiority, which is defined as the
situation in which enemy air forces are unable to interfere effectively with our own operations.
..
" We were to find out in the hard school of war that without
. air superiority sea power
could no longer be exercised . . and that, given air superiority, air forces themselves could
be the decisive factor in securing sod maintaining command a t sea. But the outstanding lesson
of the late war was that air superiority is the prerequisite to all war-winning operations, whether
a t sea, on land, or in the air."
.
He contrasts the situation at Dunkirk, where our troops got away under our air umbrella,
with that at Tunis, where Rommel's men were unable to escape.
Contending that the most effective defence against air attack is to stop it at source,
the lecturer attributes the total eclipse of the Lufimaffe mainly to its acceptance of the
defensive. In late 1944, German fighter production exceeded that of Great Britain and
America combined, and much of the Allied production was employed in other theatres,
but more and more was the German effort devoted to passive defence measures-fighters,
A.A. and radar defences, and A.R.P. measures. The Germans, in fact, had misunderstood
the first principle of air power :
"An air force composed of fighters is not an air force and is not a defence ; as well have
ships without guns and armies without artillery."
The third lecture discusses the influence of air power on the exercise of sea power, of
which the late war provides so many examples worthy of detailed study. Lord Tedder
deals at length with a number, and only brief references to a few are possible here. In 1940
our seaborne and sea-supported invasion of Norway was repulsed mainly through German
air superiority ; in 1944 we were able to exert an air effort which brought German seaborne
trade with Scandinavia to a standstill, largely by mining. Our command of the Mediterranean established by the victories of Taranto and Matapan came to an end when the
Lu$!waffe was ready to operate in strength and to neutralize our carriers and small landbased air forces in Greece, and at Crete sea power was virtually helpless in face of enemy
air supremacy. But the Germans never obtained the complete air supremacy necessary
to bomb Malta into submission or completely to cut its supply lines, and it was from Malta
that the air effort was exerted which deprived Rommel of his supplies and directly led to
the German defeat in North Africa.
Turning to the Pacific, the basic problem is shown to be the same as in the westair superiority and air bases ; but owing to the enormous distances the shore bases had to
be captured by carrier-borne aircraft, and the fight for air superiority therefore became a
fight to destroy the opposing aircraft carriers.
" Whether the immense effort involved by the seaborne air force was actually the most
economical method of solving the difficult problem of great ocean distances, I cannot say.
That it was effective there can be no doubt, and it culminated in the establishment of the air
bases in the Marianas, Iwojima, and on Okinawa, from which the final and decisive air a t t a c h
were delivered. I t is d a c u l t , however, to overlook the fact that the performance, especially
in hitting power, of land-based aircraft is inevitably far greater than that of ship-borne aircraft.
and moreover that aircraft carriers are not like Malta-unsinkable. One cannot help wondering
what would have happened had the Japanese adopted earlier the suicide tactics which a t
Okinawa sank scores of ships."
One feels that Lord Tedder finds it a little difficult to accept the complete success of
American naval aviation in the Japanese war.
The third lecture concludes with a discussion of the question : " Is the theory of the
fleet in being still tenable in face of air attack ? " The lecturer admits that it played a
considerable part during World War I1 both in Europe and the Pacific, but recalls the
ignominous end of a number of battleships. It is curious to find so experienced a student
304
PORTSMOUTH COMMAND SAILING ASSOCIATION.
of war boggling over such a question, for surely the answer is plain enough. The theory
is unchanged, but a modem fleet, whose core will generally be the aircraft carrier rather
than the battleship, is only likely to remain in being if it possesses and can carry with it
an air component powerful enough to enable it to hold its own against the expected scale
of enemy air attack. And as long as it remains in being and capable of operating it constitutes, as in the past, a threat which cannot be ignored.
The final lecture, entitled " The Exercise of Air Power," is devoted almost exclusively
to the development of our air bombardment of Germany, and describes in some detail the
rapid success of the ftnal air offensive against German oil and transportation which was
the direct cause of the German collapse.
Lord Tedder concludes :
" I am utterly convinced that the outstanding and vital lesson of this last war is that
air power is the dominant factor in this modem world and that though the methods of exercising it will change it will remain the dominant factor as long as power determines the fate of
nations. I believe that sea power is still vital to our very existence and I am sure that sea
power properly exercised can still be one of the keys to our security and not merely a commitment. I also believe that in view of the inevitable dominance of air power purely passive
defence would be certain and painful suicide ; it is peace with teeth and the teeth must be
able to bite hard and swiftly."
The book is illustrated with a number of excellent diagrams, and there are line maps
of north-west Europe and the Mediterranean inside the covers. Your reviewer only
noticed one clear error of fact : on page 77 the loss of the Eagle is attributed to air instead
of to submarine attack.
A. D. T.
PORTSMOUTH COMMAND SAILING' ASSOCIATION.
(Incorporating Portsmouth Branch R.N.S.A.)
HANDBOOK
AND FIXTURES
FOR 1948.
(Acme Printing Co., Ltd., Portsmouth. Is.)
THISis a model book, full of information and devoid of any padding. It tells the reader
exactly what sailing is available for officers and ratings in the Portsmouth Command and
how he or she can avail themselves of these facilities.
It was composed and printed at the instigation of the Commander (D) Portsmouth
Flotilla. Half the cost was recovered from advertisements and the balance was paid for
by the Command Sports Fund,
The Portsmouth Command Sailing Association is a comprehensive affair which
incorporates the R.N.S.A. (Portsmouth Branch) and is affiliated to the local Racing
Associations. All officers and ratings belonging to ships in the Command who subscribe
to the Command Sports Fund are automatically members, and the other Services in the
area are also eligible for membership.
This little book is by way of being a bit of a revelation, in that it shows how much
attention is being paid on paper to sailing as a sport by the local authorities. Every
possible facility is offered to individuals. Boats are provided, races laid on and honorary
memberships available at other yacht clubs. It all looks pretty good, but there is another
side.
Twelve ex-German yachts are held by units in the Command and are raced regularly
with great determination and no little valour ; for these boats are in need of a more comprehensive maintenance than the purses of the units will allow.
Recently one 50 square-metre put to sea and sprained her mast badly. She returned
to harbour and fished the spar with splints and steel wire and then set out in pursuit of
her confrkres who were racing to Dartmouth ; she was not the last to finish. She successfully sailed back to Portsmouth and has now to face a large bill for repairs.
"TROOPSHIPS
OF WORLD WAR 11."
305
This financial stringency will, unless relieved, eventually put most of the sailing
facilities out of commission. It would be a tragedy if this healthy organization was
bankrupted for the sake of a few hundred pounds per annum. Surely the Admiralty
should be prepared to contribute on a pound-for-pound basis in the same way as the
handbook under review was financed ?
We have seen the advertisement of the Admiralty-owned Taimo-shun offered for sale
to the public for ;64,000. Cannot the profit, if any, be made over for the maintenance of
the ex-German yachts ?
Alternatively, we hear of a munificent gift of L100,OOO by the held Trust for the
creation of better facilities at the United Service Club, Portsmouth. Cannot a little of
this sum be transferred to the sailing side of sport ?
To any keen sailing man it is a really sad sight to see the conditions under which the
" sailers " of the Service are obliged to sail their boats.
I t is a poor advertisement for the
official attitude to sailing for these boats to be obliged to trail their ragged coats amongst
the privately owned vessels which abound everywhere around this island's shores.
On every hand, in yachting circles, one hears nothing but admiration for the officers
and men who are prepared to face every form of discouragement for the sake of the sport.
They give much of their time and money for this end, but yachting is very expensive
nowadays and naval officers are not awfully well paid.
On paper this handbook is, as we have said, a revelation. That we have strayed
from praising the printed word into a description of the facts lying behind it we make
no apology.
We appeal, yet again, to the busy Sea Lords to pause for a moment from the affairs
of State and see what can be done to put Royal Naval Sailing on a secure financial basis.
Now that the R.N.S.A. includes ratings in its membership there can be no political
objection to providing sailing facilities for the Navy. People (even M.P.s) have heard all
about Dunkirk and the little ships, and there would not be a single squeak if the next
Navy Estimates included a vote of twenty thousand pounds for the promotion of sailing
facilities in the Royal Navy.
ISLANDER.
"TROOPSHIPS OF WORLD WAR 11."
By ROLAND
W. CHARLES.
Foreword by Major-General EDMOND
H. LEAVEY,
U.S. Army.
(Army Transportation Association, Washington. $3.25.)
INthe preface the author explains that the purpose of his book, published in America in
April, 1947, is threefold :
(1) To form a compact, permanent record of certain troopship information that
is now scattered throughout many 61es in different offices and departments ;
(2) To assemble for ready reference essential technical data required in connection
with planning the use of troopships ;
(3) To make available to those personally interested a brief story of any particular
ship.
On the whole he may be said to have succeeded, certainly as far as (1) and (2) are concerned.
His industry in collecting so much information about every vessel and presenting it clearly
is highly to be commended. Ready reference is facilitated by the alphabetical index, as
well as by the systematic arrangement of ships under categories, which is also alphabetical.
These categories are : Army troopships ; Navy troopships ; War Shipping Administration
troopships, divided into two groups according to whether of U.S. or other registry ; Britishcontrolled troopships ; and Army hospital ships.
To each ship is allotted a full page, headed by a photograph, and containing details
of dimensions, draught, gross tonnage, speed, radius of operation, type of propulsion,
number of troops accommodated, cargo space, date and place of construction, and the
year and circumstances in which each vessel entered the transport service. Below are
summarized the voyages accomplished, with a note of the ship's ultimate disposal. A fact
not mentioned is that the former Navy transports of the "Admiral " series taken over by
the Army were renamed after generals.
There are 13 appendices, including a summary of the principal work involved in converting a merchant vessel into a troopship ; definitions of certain shipping terms employed
in the book ; lists of Army inter-island troopships, copverted liberty and victory ships,
ships adapted to carry war brides and military dependants, animal transports, engineering
port repair ships, spare parts ships, marine repair ships, aircraft repair ships, and-last,
but not least-a news transmission ship. Finally comes yet another useful feature, a
gazetteer of the various places referred to throughout the volume.
Information about British-controlled troopships is conspicuously scanty compared
with the others. They number 34 in all, ranging from the 12,390-ton Mataroa to the
83,673-ton Queen Elizabeth. Perhaps someone on this .side of the Atlantic will now write
a book telling exactly what each of them did during the war.
FORETOP.
" IN DANGER'S HOUR."
By GORDON
HOLMAN.
(Hodder & Stoughton. 15s.)
THISis a most comprehensive and detailed account of the work and adventures of the ships
of the famous Clan Line during the war.
This line began about seventy years ago, with two ships of some 4,000 gross tons ;
by the end of the century Clan Line steamers controlled 45 ships, some 150,000 tons in all,
and by the time war broke out it had more than 300,000 gross tons.
The book takes as its heroine the Clan Forbes, 7,529 tons, with a speed of ten knots,
and follows her on her ten voyages, but she was fortunate in only being bombed once.
Then, like tributaries of the main stream, there are vivid and detailed descriptions of the
adventures of many of the Clan ships, some tragic, some humorous and some very exciting.
The first Clan ship to be sunk was the Clan Chisholm, torpedoed twice, three hundred
miles off Cape Finisterre, and in seven minutes she had disappeared beneath the greywaters
of the Atlantic. This led to the long controversy as to the efficacy of the convoy system ;
the Clan Chisholm was limited to the 94 knots of the slowest ships in the convoy, when she
could have done 15 knots. And this at a time early in the war when we were desperately
short of escort vessels. So was it better for ships with a fair turn of speed to rely on that
speed, or would they benefit more by the slight protection offered by one or two escort
vessels guarding thirty or forty ships, all going slowly ? After all, as many people said:
what about the Queen Mary and the Queeut Elizabeth flitting unescorted and undamaged
through waters supposedly crawling with U-boats ? Still, as we know, many ships in
convoy won through with the help of long-range aircraft and carriers sailing with the
convoys. The advocates of the convoy system had their theories upheld.
On a journey to Malta, the Clan Forbes, we read, was disguised to look something like
the Maidstone, thereby hoping to avoid some of the enemy's attention as she was carrying
a large cargo of supplies for Malta. The trip, luckily for her and for Malta, was successful.
Many of the masters of these Clan Line shipswere wonderful, taking it all in their stride.
For instance, after forty-two air-raid experiences off Malta and Alexandria, Captain
Coulthart of the Lanarkshire merely remarked on " some trying times." In eastern waters,
too, the Clan ships were busy, and in 1942 only one was lost.
Then in 1943 came the fiercest phase of the U-boat offensive, and they seemed to
infest the seas from the Arctic to the Indian Ocean. Altogether we lost 108 ships, a total of
600,000 tons, in March alone. In April things improved, and by May many more U-boat
" kills " took place.
Mr. Holman tells four detailed stories of Clan Line ships that did not get through ;
but to cheer us up there is still the Clan Forbes solidly ploughing along on her eighth voyage.
Much pressure at this time was put on the American port organization, and masters
had trouble with loading. For instance, Captain Hardy of the Clan Cameron found that
he was expected to put 25-ton tanks on top of barrels of lard. But he was most impressed
by the size of the escorts provided for American convoys, as compared with the British,
He says :
" In the convoy from Algiers to U.S.A. with seventy vessels, we had over
eighteen destroyers with an escort for each column, beam and stem escorts, and a
double screen ten miles outside. With this convoy of ninety ships we have seven
miserable corvettes."
I hasten to say that the record of the corvettes does not deserve such an epithet, and in
any case the convoy arrived " without incident."
On D-Day one Clan ship, the Clan Lamont, carried troops across to Normandy and got
her fair share of excitement. And still the Clan Forbes continued on her way, now on her
tenth voyage, to Suez, with a load of tea for the troops, returning with a cargo of much
needed ground nuts, castor seed and bone-meal. After all, when a war ends there are still
mouths to feed. So the Clan Line, as well as all the other merchant ships, must go on with
their work up and down the waters.
The book ends with the King's message to the Merchant Navy, Christmas, 1945 :
" To you whom fate cannot harm or death dismay."
There is an appendix giving all fatal casualties, decorations and awards, and a list of
ships with their different fates.
All members of the Clan Line, and many others both in and out of the Merchant Navy,
will find this book a real memorial of the part they and their ships played in the war. It is
well produced, clearly written, and there are sixteen extremely good illustrations.
" UNDERSTANDING THE RUSSIANS."
By EILEENBIGLAND.
(Peoples' Universities Press. 6s.)
As one who has long known the Russians and lectured about them, the author of this small
and, appropriately enough, red book attempts to present a picture of them, not so much
from the political aspect as from their character, the way they look at things inside Russia,
their background, and some of the reasoning behind their present apparently unreasonable
actions.
Admittedly, trying to co-operate with them at the moment is rather like trying to
play tennis with someone who refuses to return the ball over the net. So, with the best
will in the world, what is one to do ? Miss Bigland does not solve the problem, but she
tries to explain what is the matter ; and I think, before everybody starts shouting at once
that she is whitewashing the Russians, I should perhaps make the point that what white-'
washing there is is about the ordinary Russian citizen and not those enigmatic men who
sit brooding in the Kremlin. One might conveniently mislay one's brush and bucket when
it came to them !
She thinks that the British and Americans are convinced that the reason behind
Russia's behaviour is that she is getting ready for a future war between Democracy and
Communism ; and she tells us how she learnt from talks she had in Russia, between the
two wars, with intelligent men and women, of the bogy which has haunted the Soviet
leaders since the inception of their rCgime-that is, the " capitalist encirclement of
Russia." The " cordorc sarcitaire " of Clemenceau started it, and it gained in strength
during those years in the wilderness when Europe condemned everything done by Russia.
L
Deep distrust of capitalism still lingers, after all those years, in the Russian mind,
fostered of course by the propagandists, both cultural and economic, who condemn every
habit, manner and custom of the West as bourgeois, poisonous and contaminating.
A Russian Miss Bigland met asserted quite vehemently and seriously that Europe
was a dying continent, and was finished as a centre of culture and industry. He honestly
thought private enterprise was a depraved and evil system, and lauded the benefits to be
gained from a state-controlled land. To him everything outside the U.S.S.R. was suspect ;
everything inside was wonderful beyond compare. And when it was suggested to him that
the Russians would one day have to draw their Iron Curtain and see the West for themselves, he replied that, if that time ever came, the people would be so trained and so conditioned that life in the outside world would have no effect on them at all. And this
was an educated, intelligent man.
Russia, says Miss Bigland, still suffers from the most colossal inferiority complex.
She spent twenty years building up her industry and agriculture with " blood, toil, tears
and sweat," onlyto have it all swept away on the flood of thewarwith Germany; and she is
terrified lest the same thing should happen again. So she settles down, huge and enigmatic,
behind her bulwark of satellite States.
To help us to understand all this the author starts at the beginning of Russian history ;
the Russian himself has changed very little, though he is no longer an illiterate peasant
surrounded by snow, furs, wheat and timber, ruled over by an autocratic Emperor. But
his history runs rather like a scenic railway, with more swoops down than up. We read
of him from the days when the Eastern Slavs settled on the Neva and the Dnieper to the
time when the Christian Princes were subservient to the Moslem Khans, through the
period of Tatar domination, down to the first Tsar, Mikhail Romanov. Then came Peter
the Great, the epitome of his savage and barbarous land, followed by Tsar after Tsar, each
graduay annexing more land, such as the Crimea and the lowlands of the Caucasus.
Under Nikolai I the Nihilists met secretly and discussed revolution and the necessity to
better the lot of the peasants. All this was fostered during the extreme tyranny of the
Church and the disastrous Russo-Japanese war ; and Marx's slogan " The proletarians
have nothing to lose but their chains " was an inspiration. The rest we know only too well,
and in 1918 Russia was plunged into a state of internal anarchy.
It is necessary to know all this background, and then the rest of the book describes
the growth and progress of Bolshevism, the death of Lenin, the downfall of Trotsky,
and the taking over of control by the unassuming but quietly powerful Stalin.
The great First Five-Year Plan is described in detail, with its colossal blueprint,
and, with it, what was the beginning of a full life for so many hitherto mentally and
physically starved people. And then the Reward, after the completion of the Plan ;
the small luxuries that were allowed to creep into their ascetic lives-presumably the
carrot dangled in front of the donkey, for yet greater efforts to come. Incidentally, the
only imported film entertainment allowed at that time was Chaplin's " Modern Times,"
said to be excellent propaganda !
At this point I think one might remind people who say "Lookhow well Russia has done
under Communism, and how much better off the people are-why not in other countries ? "
that a starving man will grab at a dry crust and devour it as if it were ambrosia. A man
who has been eating pretty well all his life considers that crust as not worth bothering
about. The Russian had starved, and the crust of bread, with a little butter and jam,
was Paradise indeed. Thus, his case is not to be compared with that of the inhabitants of
other countries.
With the launching of the Second Plan the country was really getting into its stride.
The First, at colossal expense, had provided foreign technicians and machines. The
Second, far more ambitious and expensive, was to ensure that Russia, alone and unaided,
could produce everything for her well-being within her own borders. It was the machine
age and the name of Ford was breathed with a reverence second only to that of Lenin.
And then this immense edifice was blasted to bits by the war.
And after it the Peace, bringing with it, to quote the author :
" an atmosphere of mutal distrust
.as the Red Army moved into occupation
of their German and Austrian Zones and assumed control over the Eastern European
Countries they had liberated, so their behaviour became worse-when viewed
..
from the Allied standpoint " (Personally, I should say it was disreputable when
viewed from any standpoint.) " They seized whatever caught their fancy, from
watches to furniture, from bicycles to razors. They got drunk, they brawled,
they stampeded cinemas and cafes. Their keymen refused information, permits,
everything, to Allied representatives, anxious to know what was going on. Finally,
they ringed their territories around with an iron curtain no curiosity could pierce."
The book really does make an honest attempt to see the Russian at his best, and to
explain why we so often see him at his worst, but in the light of present happenings much
of the admiration and friendly feeling we had for him has gone, and we are little nearer to
understanding him than we were fifty years ago.
If the book were published in Russia, I wonder if it would be taken as " soft soap "
or " a capitalist trick " !
P. A.
THE GREATEST FOOL."
The Story of Stephen Hawkins.
By GILBERT
HACKFORTHJONES.
(Hodder & Stoughton. 8s. 6d.)
"
COMMANDER
Hackforth-Jones dedicates his book to his term-mates of the Osborne 1914
Drake Term, but he is at pains to explain that the book is not an autobiography, neither
does it portray any actual person or incident. As a matter of fact what it does do is to
draw a very clear and forthright picture of naval life in the earlier years of the century
and to give at the same time an interesting psychological study of the reactions of naval life
on the central figure of the story.
The severity of the discipline at Osborne comes as a considerable surprise to
those of us who look back with some affection to our milder treatment in the old
Britannia days. There was no occasion in those far-away times to say one's prayers
against time or to have to do everything at the double, and it is hard not to think that all
this seemingly senseless rushing about must have had its effect on an impressionable
youngster. Fortunately, however, Stephen's term lieutenant was a man of sense and saw
that a little authority would do him good. So in due time he blossomed out as a cadet
captain, much to the disapproval of his form master.
We next meet Hawkins as a midshipman, and here again he seems to have bumped
into some pretty severe discipline, chiefly from the Sub. of the gunroom. The tale of his
experiences, however, is well and forcefully told, and it is interesting to watch the gradual
effect of it all on the boy's character.
And so the years pass until, in the winter of 1917-18, we find Hawkins a lieutenant of
only four years seniority in command of an " M " class destroyer--sufficient proof that
he has made good. He shows himself a fine seaman and a rigid disciplinarian-possibly
after all one good result of his Osborne days--and at sea he handles his destroyer and his
crew as a good seaman should. But in harbour is a different story. " Stephen's development as a hard-drinking, hard-swearing, poker-playing seaman of the old school has been
inevitable in the circumstances of his experience."
And thus it comes about that when, one dark night, the fleet is suddenly ordered to
sea, Stephen is caught napping ; but the loyalty of his first lieutenant pulls him through,
though not without damage.
His matrimonial affairs have their inevitable ups and downs, but his little chorusgirl wife sticks to him loyally as long as she can.
In due course the Geddes Axe, surely the most cruel and unjust instrument ever used
on a splendidly loyal Service, descends with brutal force. None of us who saw those days
can ever forget the stunning effect of that monstrous measure.
Stephen falls-a stunned victim-and we see his gradual descent. Then comes the
Second World War. Stephen regains his lieutenant-commander's commission, his appointment to the destroyer he had been commanding when the axe fell-and his self-respect.
In the destroyer he takes part in the Battle of the Atlantic.
The rest of the career of Stephen Hawkins must be read in its entirety. It would
be a pity to spoil such a good yarn by too much " condensation."
And a gmd yarn it undoubtedly is, if somewhat overloaded with expletives. Once
started it is hard to put it down. The naval episodes ring many a familiar bell, and the
gradual shaping of the boy's character to its tragic but seemingly inevitable climax is well
worked out.
HINDOSTAN.
CARGO FOR CROOKS."
By " SEA-LION."
(Collins. 8s. 6d.) .
ITis related of the older Dumas that he emerged one day from his study weeping bitterly ;
when questioned by his solicitous family as to the cause of hi grief, he exclaimed between
his sobs, " I have killed Porthos." It took the famous Frenchman a quarter of a century
and more of fictional time to break up his renowned quartette of heroes, but " Sea-Lion "
(who now flings off his cloak of anonymity and appears on the reverse of the dust cover of
his new book as Commander Geoffrey M. Bennett, D.S.C., R.N.), has wielded the axe very
much more expeditiously, and killed his Leading .Man in the first chapter of this work,
within a year or so of introducing us to him. Certainly, the pace set by Commander
Peter Browning in this author's previous works was a hot one, and I believe that I professed
when reviewing the last book but one-and indeed felt-real concern lest he overdo it,
and rob his public prematurely of the pleasure of wondering how he was to get out of his
various imbroglios ; and I most sincere1 regret his departure.
I did not have the pleasure of reaJing the actual predecessor to this volume, and so
do not know to what extent he tempted Providence in it ; in " Cargo for Crooks," however,
he seems to have had a miserable run for his money. No sooner has he got on to the smell
of a very promising bit of dirty work than he is out, obviously playing a rotten shot to a
simple ball for so experienced a player. I hereby record my surprise that so unsinkable a
hero should fall victim to the simple combination of a writing table by an open scuttle in a
practically deserted ship, and a knife between the shoulder-blades which " gave him
protracted repose " with no reservations whatever. It would have been better for us all
if, as in the recent and much debated case of Mr. Hutton, he had been left out of the side
altogether this tine to play again another day.
But then, of course, there would have been no story, and this is such a good one that
his demise is almost worth it, even if those of us who have followed his fortunes to date
are the losers thereby.
The next man in, Lieut.-Commander John Prentice, provides the tale and really gives
a sparkling display, hitting all round the wicket with nonchalant ease, getting through the
field, place it as the captain of the other side will, and being young enough for us to look
forward to seeing a lot more of him. His false strokes, and there are some, are readily
forgiven in such a sparkling display. He is ably supported on and off the field by the lady
of the previous works : Tania of the " Eton-blue eyes, golden hair, skin like a peach that
has ripened on the hot wall of a Liza Lehmam garden, teeth much better than pearls,
ankles that you can span with thumb and middle finger, height a bit above the average
man's heart, and a voice sweeter than any cooing dove." She is also the widow, be it
recollected, of the last man in ; and when such an assembly of the perfections is considered
it must be obvious that she won't be a widow much longer. Not with naval officers
about, anyway ! But I anticipate.
The strange happenings of which Commander Browning, with his unemng nose for the
scent of trouble, had begun to become aware, a knowledge which resulted in his removal
from the scene, concern the activities of a gang of crooks engaged in smuggling and black
marketing. This occupation is carried on by a super-villainous villain posing alternately
as a highly respectable London parishoner, persona grata with the vicar as a generous
contributor to Church funds, and a retired and benevolent Army officer who has recently
bought a Devonshire property. In either capacity he talks like " The Family Herald "
and is perhaps too much above suspicion not to be suspected. His control of the gang of
thugs and criminals who carry out his schemes, however, is entirely admirable, and his
language when dealing with them quite in character and to the point.
These schemes range over sea and land, include a tin mine in Devonshire as one bolt
hole for introducing his goods into the country, and subterraneah oil tanks at Invergordon
as the other. In both, surprising adventures take place. Whether or no the practically free
run which is given him of what we used to .call " the Baltic Fleet " in my day-i.e. ships
laid up in care and maintenance up Fareham Creek and elsewhere as stowage for his
stock-is a bit of an oversize in careless watchkeeping, is perhaps open to question. But,
as he also seems to be able to place his own shipkeepers in such ships as he requires, perhaps
it was easier for him. Whichever way it is, it all adds up, as usual with this writer, to a
cracking yarn. It would be unfair to relate more of it.
Coincidence, which I ventured to complain before " Sea-Lion " was rather wont to
overwork, has settled down to a reasonable percentage and, since Commander Bennett
is a signalman, all technical detail-particularly as regards the signal communications
branch (as I understand it to be styled now)-are naturally immaculate. Nor are, as
previously, undue demands made upon the stamina of the " cast." As opposed to what he
has shed, however, to the benefit, in my view, of his work, I note an increasing tendency
in " Sea-Lion " to throw in a fashion note for his superlative heroine from time to time
which rather gets in the way. Sir Walter Scott was perhaps the greatest protagonist of
the custom of his day for describing the costumes of his characters in detail, a custom which
has to a large extent died out in modern writing. Man or woman, boy or girl, the great
novelist never allowed them to take their part in the performance until he had described
minutely what they had got on. I am in no position to judge whether or no the turn-outs
which " Sea Lion " describes are worthy of Mrs. Peter Browning (which is Tania's official
designation) but I do know that, whereas such detail seemed part of the make-up of a
character of the classics of a bygone age, it rings false as far as I am concerned in the
he-man surroundings in which Tania moves, and in which the male costumes are taken for
granted.
I mentioned the dust cover at the beginning of this review and, a t the risk of seeming
allergic to the dust cover of to-day, I do protest against this one. After all that we have
heard of Tania-as she is depicted in it, I wouldn't walk across the road to offer her a light
for her cigarette. The gallht hero-shown apparently carrying her, in a fit of absentmindedness obtiously, from his appearance, the result of a bad hangover, up the main
drainage system of some seaside resort, could never be the object of any maiden's fancy,
Actually, he is a stout lad and I am sure was intended to look it. As he deserves to get her
eventually and the author allows us more than a hint that he will, this is unfair to both of
them.
In the next tale I trust that any representation of the survivors of this entertaining
trio will do them more justice, or else that the cover may boldly go for the crooks and
hang the looks.
AMPHIBIAN.
"EVERYMAN'S HISTORY OF THE SEA WAR."
By A. C. HARDY,B.Sc., M.I.N.A.
Vol. I, September, 1939-December, 1941.
(Nicholson & Watson. 18s.)
To have introduced the word " History " into the title of this book is definitely misleading.
Qne has only to compare the slipshod way in which it has been written with Dr. Samuel
Eliot Morison's admirable " History of U.S. Naval Operations in World War I1 " to realize
the truth of the adage about chalk and cheese !
In his introduction, the author remarks that
" There are three kinds of books about World War I1 : heavy authoritative volumes
; official histories ; and lots of
written by Cabinet Ministers and high-ranking officers .
books of ' lash-up ' variety, hurriedly produced, and based on Press cuttings to snatch at a
transitory market. The trilogy about the naval war, of which this is the first volume, seeks a
happy compromise with all three."
..
In the publishers' blurb it is explained that the three volumes " were actually written
and prepared in first rough draft from notes made while fighting was in progress."
Apparently very little pains were taken to bring those notes up to date, for many facts
published since the war terminated have been ignored. Indeed, one might be excused
for preferring to assign the book to Mr. Hardy's third variety, to which he has himself
applied the term " lash-up." A few examples taken at random will illustrate what is
meant.
On page 79 appears the novel announcement that H.M.S. Courageous was sunk in the
Nortlz Sea ; one had always believed it was in the Western Approaches that she met her
fate. She and her sister ship, the Gloriozls, are stated to have been built to mount 18-inch
guns, though, according to the late Lord Fisher, only the Furiozls, was intended to be so
armed. Equally extraordinary is the description of the Courageous and Glorious as the
" mother and father of all aircraft carriers."
These two ships were not taken in hand for
conversion from cruisers to carriers until 1924, after years of experience with the Argus,
Furious and Eagle.
To surmise that the enemy ship which sank H.M.S. Glowworm was " probably of the
10,000-ton 'Admiral Hipper ' class " is hardly excusable, as it has long been established
that it was the Hipper herself that was responsible. I t is also common knowledge that
she was nearer 15,000 tons (standard displacement) than the 10,000 tons at which she stood
in the pre-war return of fleets.
Even more inaccurate is the account given of one of the finest feats of British naval
aviation in the first year of the war.
" Before dawn [on the 9th of April, 19401 16 'planes of the Fleet Air Arm took off from the
' sunken ' Ark Royal and headed towards Bergen. One ship, a ' Koln ' class cruiser, remained
in the harbour. The 'planes dived in at low level and made three direct hits with 500-lb.
bombs. The fate of that unidentified ship was never completely established, but when R.A.F.
reconnaissance 'planes photographed Bergen harbour four hours later there was no sign of the
German cruiser."
Now the author need only have taken the trouble to refer to the official booklet, " Fleet
Air Arm," published in 1943, to have ascertained, first, that the aircraft did not come from
the Ark Royal, but were Skuas from H.M.S. Sparrowhawk, a shore establishment ; and
secondly, that the cruiser, which capsized and sank within 50 minntes of being bombed,
was the Konigsberg, which he himself lists later in the book as having been lost on that
date.
Mr. Hardy is equally vague in his ideas about the ships responsible for sinking the
Glorious, Acasta and Ardent. He remarks that they were " probably the Gmisenau and
Prinz Eugen," whereas it has been known for quite a long time that they were the Gneisenau
and Scharnhmst.
Most of the statements put out by the Soviet Government during the war appear to
have been accepted at face value, to judge from the following eulogy :
" Until the advent of the present regime in Russia, she never regarded herself as in any
sense of the word a maritime nation. With the difficulties which the present Russian Government has had to overcome. it is little short of marvellous that a fleet of the stature that exists
a t present has been attained . . . At the beginning of World War I, Russia stood seventh
on the list of the world's fleets, but by 1938 she was sixth in the larger class of surface ships."
Yet the Russian Navy under Peter the Great and Catherine I1 had quite a respectable
record, to say nothing of the fact that when it reached its zenith, about 45 years ago, the
Russian fleet was the fourth in the world.
An appendix of 25 pages is devoted to " Losses of Principal Warships " down to the
10th of December, 1941, in which ships of diverse nationalities are listed under their
respective categories (battleships, carriers, cruisers, etc.) in chronological order. Very
little detail is afforded, and errors are not infrequent.
The foregoing should be sufficient to demonstrate that, regarded as a history, the book
is of no particular value. There are a few photographs of interest, with some line drawings
and solid silhouettes of ships, none of which exhibit any particular novelty. The best
illustration shows detailed profdes of a River-class frigate and a Flower-class corvette.
CORRESPONDENCE.
LEADERSHIP.
Sx~,-The following extract is taken from a f r h e d copy which Admiral of the Fleet Lord Cunningham always kept on his mantelpiece. It is therefore doubly interesting : not only because i t is an
analysis of the character of a great man-Montrose-by
another great man, Lord Tweedsmuir (GovernorGeneral of Canada in 1936),but also because a third great man, Lord Cunningham, found it a source of
inspiration.
" LEADERSHIP.
(After John Buchan.)
" First, there will be fortitude, the power of enduring when hope is gone, the power of taking upon
oneself a desperate responsibility and daring all.
"There must be self-forgetfulness, a willingness to let worldly interests and even reputation and
honour perish if only the task be accomplished. The man who is concerned with his own repute will
never move mountains. There must be patience, supreme patience, under misunderstandings and
setbacks and the muddles and interferences of others. There must be resilience in defeat, a manly
optimism which looks a t all the facts in all their bleakness and yet dares to hope. There must be a sense
of the eternal continuity of a great cause so that failure will not even seem the end and a man sees himself
Leadership, then, depends primarily upon moral endowas only;,a part in a predestined purpose
ments.
Yours truly.
-
. ..
G . I?.
THEHON.EDITOR,
THE NAVALREVIEW.
FUTURE STATUS OF THE DOMINION NAVIES.
SIR.-I am sorry that Admiral Tweedie has lent the authority of his name to the support of " Uno's "
project for one combined Empire Navy.
The theoretical advantages of this proposal are attractive a t first sight, but I am convinced that
they would never be achieved in practice. I spent four years a t the head of the Royal Australian Navy
and I can assure Admiral Tweedie that such a proposition would receive no assent whatever from
Australian public opinion.
The Royal Australian Navy, fully grafted into and co-ordinated with the Royal Navy, bas in two
wars made and maintained its own distinctive tradition and will not relinquish it. Can it be supposed
that a proud people of our own blood will agree to pay someone else to defend them at sea 7 One might
as well suggest that we should put down our own Navy and pay a lump sum per annum to America to
defend us. The arguments are nearly as strong.
Apart from such considerations of szntiment and prestige, the practical effect of " merging all the
naval forces into one Royal Navy," as Uno " proposes, would have the effect of checking the great
material efforts made by Australia in building up and maintaining her own Navy. Does anyone suppose
that a poll tax for defence a t sea, or its equivalent, would yield anything approaching the sums expended
by Australia in developing her ship-building facilities, her munition factories, her graving docks, and a
hundred and one other activities ?
It is, of course, possible that the extent of the co-ordination between the R.N. and the R.A.N.
is not fully realized, either by " Uno " or Admiral Tweedie ; but I can aasure them that it is very
complete. Very many members must have served in Australian waters and in or with ships of the
R.A.N. during the late war, and I feel sure that most of them would agree with me in thinking that
" Uno's " proposal is unwise and impracticable.
I have no special knowledge of Canada and her Navy ; but I feel sure that similar considerations
hold good.
I am, Sir,
Your obedient Servant,
RAGNARCOLVIN,
Admiral.
CORRESPONDENCE.
LEAVE.
SIR,-" Yorick " deplores that the Services have a reputation with many sections of the ublic
for always being on leave ; and he suggests, mainly but not entirely for that reason, that the navageave
regulations should be tightened. Few will deny the Services' reputation for leave ; but surely most of
the criticism on this score is in a humorous vein and is not intended to be taken seriously. I n any case,
I fail to see why the Services should be influenced by such criticism unless the criticism is justified.
What is the truth about this comparison between the sailor and the civilian ? " Yorick " excludes
long leave from his strictures, and evidently has harbour ships and shore establishments in mind rather
than seagoing ships and foreign stations. Long leave for the sailor is better than that for the civilian ;
but in determining the scale of long leave we should not begrudge the sailor compensation for the long
periods during his service when he is perforce separated from his home and living under a discipline
which would be irksome to the civilian. As regards week-ends, short leave and compassionate leave,
how does the civilian fare ? Miners, and workers in many other industries, now work a five-day week.
If a civilian is unable to get compassionate leave he can take a day off whenever he likes, whether on
compassionate grounds or merely to go to the races. This is called voluntary absenteeism. To come
nearer home, and particularly since " Yorick " mentions civilians working in the vicinity of naval shore
establishments, what is the position of the dockyard " matey " ? He goes home every night and works
a five-day week, having Saturday and Sunday free. Translated into naval parlance, he gets all night
leave every night and a long week-end every week-end.
I do not think that the sailor is too generously treated in comparison with the civilian. His enjoyment of home life is greatly limited, and it is wrong to expect him during his shore service to live a
monastic existence in the dank, dark cloisters of a naval barracks. Everything possible should be done
to give him the opportunity of spending his nights, and particularly his week-ends, in something better
than the appallingly depressing atmosphere of some of our naval establishments.
At the bottom of " Yorick's " plaint is the difficulty often experienced in getting work and training
done. If there is anything that could give rise to criticism by the civilian it is the sight of masses of
libertymen pouring out of the dockyard and barracks gates one hour, or even two hours, before the
ordinary civilian can hope to pack up for the day. Have we not here a pointer to the cause of the
trouble ? I suggest that the trouble may be due to a fundamental misuse of the time available. Because
we are slaves to tradition we try to follow on shore a routine which was designed to meet the requirements
of seagoing ships, and it does not appear to have struck anyone that possible more efficiency might be
attained if the routine were made for the job rather than the job for the routine.
Dinner a t 1200 and tea a t 1600 really does not give one a chance. How often have we not seen
working parties spending most of the forenoon going to and returning from their job and achieving
very little in between ? Saturday forenoon is often a farce, even if no one is on week-end leave.
I therefore suggest that readers of THE NAVALREVIEWshould consider the practicability of
reorganizing the routine of shore establishments. possibly on a basis of dinner a t 1300 and tea a t 1700.
The work itself must, of course,also be really efficiently srganized,and the sight of men officiallyemployed
but obviously not working should become a thing of the past. This is more difficult than i t may seem
a t first sight. The civilian employer takes on his casual labour as required ; in a naval barracks we
cannot refuse surpluses of casual labour, nor can we enter casual labour during a shortage. The difficulty
in many establishments is that they have more than one role ; the depots have to act as training establishments as well as transit camps, and what is suitable for one role may be quite unsuitable for another.
Here we are up against another problem, mentioned by " Union " in his article on Administration,
viz., the desirability of having more and smaller establishments. Let every establishment be limited
not only in size but also in function and be organized for that function. I think depots should be
retained for transit purposes, drafting pool, foreign service leave, final discharges, etc. ; they present a
special employment problem quite different from the training establishments. I feel that the present
system of sending men of some branches to their training establishments while waiting draft is wrong
and must interfere with the proper functions of those establishments unless the men are required for
requalifying courses or for some particular purpose ; but I have no practical knowledge of the working
of the " schools " from this point of view.
What I have in mind is five days of genuine work each week, with optional all night leave and a free
Friday night to Monday morning for week-end leave or local recreation a t the option of each man.
I n this scheme the administrative staff would have to be treated differently ; but they should be allowed
as part complement with an expectation of a definite period in the job and not have to be culled from the
drafting margin and subject to the present bad system of being liable to removal without notice or, a t
the best, stopped draff;" Too many officers and men look upon their time in shore establishments as
a period for legitimate sitting back." Let there be a new spirit for a genuine day's work with the
reward of genuine freedom outside working hours.
And finally, since this all started on the subject of leave, do not let us forget the exhortation of that
great naval poet to :
" Pray for leave, for the good of the Service
As much and as oft as may be."
Yours truly,
BOB.
CORRESPONDENCE.
OPERATION IRONCLAD.
S R,-I detect in the article by " Gad, Sir I " in the May NAVAL
REVIEW'certain criticisms of the
g and mounting of this operation, about which I happen to have some behind-the-scenes know:
ledge, and your readers may be interested in it though it can have no bearing on history.
Firstly, the point is made that in the IRONCLAD version of the plan as opposed to the BONUS
version, the Combined Commander and the Military Commander could not meet until the latter reached
Freetown in April. This is true, but it ignores the fact that it so happened that the Combined Commander had a new Chief Staff Officer due to join him, and this officer did the planning in the Admiralty
in conjunction with General Sturgess before the expedition sailed.
" Gad, Sir ! " also suggests that it was a bad thing that the amphibiously trained Marine Brigades
were not employed. Leaving aside the fact that the strength of the force required did not warrant the
inclusion of extra brig~des,to which I refer later, the Marine Brigades, unlike the Army ones, suffered
from having no " tail and hence to use them would have necessitated their working with Army administrative units which they had never met before. This lack of administrative units in the Royal Marine
Division has been referred to in previous articles in THE NAVALREVIEW,and does not merit further
comment here.
The other big point is the inference that the force employed should have been bigger. When
BONUS was originally planned, the military force stated to be necessary was such that the resources
to mount the operation could not be spared. I t must be remembered that a t this time the situation in
Burma was very bad and that all available reinforcements were being sent to India and any operation
which called for the employment of large trained military forces, and, incidentally, much shipping,
had to be discarded because of'the effect it would have on the reinforcements for India.
The scale of IRONCLAD from the military point of view came about in a very unusual way, and the
credit for the operation taking place a t all really belongs to a relatively obscure naval commander in the
Executive Planning Section. The attitude of Vichy France and the threat that was stated to exist to
Madagascar from the Japanese, who if they occupied it would have caused us grievous difficulties with
our shipping passing to the Indian Ocean by the Cape route, led to the BONUS plan being re-examined
for the " nth " time early in 1942 to see whether it was possible. A meeting was held in the War Office
and ended up, as had all the previous meetings on this operation, with a definite War Office view of the
minimum forces required which we knew would make it unacceptable to the Chiefs of Staff. On going
back to the Admiralty, this commander, who had attended the meeting, came to me and said that he
felt that the Army were killing a most necessary operation by over insurance and that he really felt that
one brigade group in the assault ought to be adequate. (He had had considerable experience of assault
planning.) We discussed it for some time and decided that his ideas really merited attention;
accordingly we left the room together to go to the Director of Plans to enlist his support. On the way.
entirely fortuitously, we ran into Brigadier Festing (as he then was),who happened to be in the Admiralty.
What prompted us I don't know, but knowing that he commanded the 29th Independent Brigade we took
him to our room and explained our ideas. Greatly to our gratification, Brigadier Festing agreed that
had he a free hand he would be prepared to take the operation on on these terms. With this very
unexpected support from an officer who commanded one of the brigades which would inevitably be used,
we rapidly secured the support of the Director of Plans and a t that moment Operation IRONCLAD was
born. The War Office view that much larger forces were required could not be sustained in the face of
the fact that one of the officers mainly concerned with carrying out the operation held contrary views.
The supporting brigades were, as " Gad, Sir I " says, drawn from divisions who were a t sea on their
way to India a t the time. The whole point of this was not to tie up shipping and supporting forces
specially for the operation but to use those that were in the area, if they were required ; if not, they would
go on to India unaffected. In practice it is possible that the forces employed in the assault were too
small ; but it remains a fact that had the view prevailed that larger forces were essential, the operation
would never have taken place and, after all is said and done, the proof of the pudding is in the eatingIRONCLAD was a success.
Yours truly,
E. P. S.
THE Hon. EDITOR,
THE NAVALREVIEW.
THE AMERICAN ATTACKS ON JAPAN IN WORLD WAR 11.
SIR,-I am rather disturbed to see that in Captain Cyril Falls' book " The Second World War" and
the review of it by " M. M." in the May NAVALREVIEW,a popular misconception is perpetuated-a
misconception which causes some annoyance to the American Navy.
In the part dealing with the American Campaign against Japan, it is stated :" In this case sea, land and air forces working in the closest co-operation, fought their way
forward from island to island till they reached the outskirts of Japan . . So far it was an
t: in the last assault upon Japan it was the A.A.F. which dealt the overequal partnership. Y
.
whelming blows
Now this is not accurate. I t was not the A.A.F. which dealt the overwhelming blows, but the American
carrier-borne naval air forces. The A.A.F. backed them up nobly ; but their effort was a steady one
.
..
317
CORRESPONDENCE.
gradually increasing in tempo but never overwhelming by itself. I t served to prevent the Japanese
having time to recover between the overwhelming blows dealt by the carrier air forces, which could not
be continuous since the Task Forces had to withdraw from time to time to refit and replenish.
I t may be that if and when an actual landing in Japan had taken place the overwhelming blows
would have come from the A.A.F. ; but i t is not true to say that they did come from it up to the time
that Japan unconditionally surrendered.
Yours truly,
FLAT-TOP.
THEHON.EDITOR,
THE NAVALREVIEW.
" THE QUESTING HOUND."
SIR,-I was a t sea when I read " Walrus' " review of "The Questing Hound " and was sorely
puzzled by his reference to libel.
On my return I looked a t page 64 and read that I had mentioned the name of " Wiggy Bennett."
Now to me, all Bennetts are " Wiggy," just as all Wrights are " Shiner," and so on. In selecting
this not uncommon name, therefore, I did it as a guarantee that no individual was being pilloried.
Selection of names is to the author the most dangerous part of his profession, and especially so for the
naval author, who is not even allowed a peep a t a Navy List by which he may be able to avoid personalities.
Therefore, Sir, will you allow me to state, before all the other Wiggy Bennytts who see themselves
as the one who was " no seaman, but put up a pretty good show on that occasion instruct their lawyers
to proceed, that these little things are bound to happen.
" Walrus " of course knows this as well as I do ; he was indulging himself in a gentle leg-haul
with considerable success ; but others may not know, and may begin to search for resemblances which
are not there, and it is for their sake that I trespass on your valuable space.
By the way, in this same book there is a lady called Bella Jones who was the widow of Mr. Sidney
Jones : " 'E'd been unfortunate early on, before 'e met me, and served a time in quod
May I take this opportunity of clearing the good names of all the Sidney Joneses and, in fact, all
the Joneses and remain,
Your obedient servant,
GILBERT(HACKFORTH)
JONES.
THEHON.EDITOR,
THENAVAL
REVIEW.
. . ."