the erinys iraq oil protection force

Transcription

THE ERINYS IRAQ OIL PROTECTION FORCE
INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY IN A POST-CONFLICT ENVIRONMENT
In Memory of James Wilshire and the 23 Iraqi citizens who lost their lives whilst serving
with the Erinys Oil Protection Force between August 2003 and December 2004
i
ii
FOREWORD
The security of oil and gas production, domestic supply and export are so obviously one
of the key enablers for Iraq’s reconstruction and rehabilitation. The issue of infrastructure
security – particularly the security of oil pipelines – is critical to the rebuilding of Iraq. This
reality was grasped from the beginning by Coalition governments, the US Government’s
proconsul in Baghdad, and by subsequent Coalition leadership. Security of domestic
supply in a country practically floating on oil reserves is the litmus test for the credibility
of the incumbent Iraqi administration. Failure to meet increasing domestic demand has
significant short-term political implications; dissatisfaction feeds the insurgency and
undermines nascent Iraqi authorities. Export of Iraq’s only significant natural asset is the
single means of funding the country’s long-term economic growth. Failure to maximise
revenues from export has serious macro-economic and longer-term political implications.
Notwithstanding the clarity of purpose expressed both in Washington DC and at the
highest levels of the Coalition’s leadership in Baghdad, the security of Iraq’s national oil
infrastructure continues to present difficult challenges for those charged with realising it.
The Iraqi Reconstruction Management Office (IRMO), an arm of the US Mission in Iraq
charged with the coordination of US Congress funded reconstruction projects, recently
estimated that Iraq loses $8 million in revenue per day because of sabotage on its northern
oil and gas pipelines alone. Yet, after more than two years since the end of the Coalition
campaign to liberate Iraq, both Coalition and Iraqi authorities seem still to be searching
for a coherent mechanism - the ways and means – to develop and implement a realistic
and workable strategy to safeguard the nation’s patrimony.
This struggle has been characterised by amongst other features a series of incremental
initiatives of varying size, duration and success. These not only attempted to address the
rebuilding and repair of a creaking oil infrastructure, and the generation of Iraqi management
capacity in the Iraqi Ministry of Oil, but also to secure strategically significant fixed sites
and sections of pipeline. One of the most important of these was the contract awarded
in early August 2003 by the then Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) to Erinys for the
creation of an oil infrastructure guard force.
During the period August 2003 to December 2004, Erinys Iraq, a subsidiary organisation
of Erinys International Ltd., mobilised, trained, equipped and effectively managed a 16,000
strong Iraqi guard force. This was achieved against the backdrop of a rapidly deteriorating
security environment.
The Erinys Iraq Oil Protection Force (or ‘OPF’ as it became known) had a positive effect
far beyond its contracted and mandated capabilities, or indeed its size in relation to the
huge task of protecting designated static oil sites and significant stretches of pipeline. The
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OPF was successfully transitioned and handed over to Iraqi Ministry of Oil control by the
end of 2004, as ‘work-in-progress’. Under Erinys’ custodianship, and in the face of
considerable political, operational and contractual challenges, the OPF stands out as a
real, and still relatively little known success story which emerged from the post-conflict
security domain in Iraq.
The aim of this paper is to tell the story of how Erinys’ Iraqi and international management
achieved what it did, in many cases against the odds, and to examine some of the broad
operational, political and contractual factors which shaped the force, and some of the
lessons that were learned along the way.
The perspectives offered here are very much those of an organisation which lived and
worked ‘beyond the Coalition perimeter’. This was for two reasons. First, Erinys sought
to integrate itself into the mainstream of post conflict Iraqi society. Erinys senior management,
almost exclusively with a British Army background, instinctively understood from the outset
that for the project to be credible as an Iraqi solution, it had to be accepted by those it
served (ultimately the Ministry of Oil) and employed (ordinary Iraqi citizens from all walks
of life). Second, Erinys, because it was a commercial organisation, was not part of the
administrative apparatus of the CPA and follow-on Coalition organisations.
Written ten months after Erinys’ involvement in the OPF project came to an end, this
document is neither intended as a detailed post-operational report nor is it an academic
analysis of the problems facing Iraq. Part One seeks to explain the context into which the
project was launched; Part Two sets out to bring to life some of the challenges that project
management had to face; Part Three summarises the lessons that Erinys learned from
its time protecting Iraq’s oil infrastructure. Taken together, it is nothing more than a reflection
of Erinys’ collective experience fulfilling a difficult mission in an extraordinary environment.
The views expressed here are therefore necessarily subjective, but it is hoped that
they will find a place within the growing body of commentary generated in the wake of
Iraq’s liberation.
Major General (retired) John Holmes, DSO OBE MC
Erinys, October 2005
Pipeline fire following a rocket attack on the Northern Oil Company complex
in Kirkuk - November 2003
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Assassins’ Gate in Baghdad. One of the major entrances into the former
Republican Presidential complex which housed the CPA - May 2003
IRAQI PIPELINES AND REFINERIES
Dahuk
IT 2A
KASIK KUPRI
HAMMANM AL ALLIT
Mosul
NABI YANUS DEPOT
Arbil
GAZLANI MUASKAR DEPOT
QUBBAT AL ABA DEPOT
AL WAITAIYA
IT 2
KM 245
QAYYARAH
Kirkuk
Sulaymaniyah
K1
AS SULAYMANIYAH
KIRKUK
IT 1
CHAQMAQAH DEPOT
IT 1A
KM 121
Bayji
BAYJI
K2
BAYJI S
K 2 West
TIKRIT DEPOT
Tikrit
KHANAQIN (DISMANTLED)
T1
Samarra
K3
KM 669
AL HADITHAH
Ba qubah
MUSHADAH DISTRN
Ar-Ramadi
MUJARAH
RUSAFA DISTRN
TAJI-NAT GAS DISTRN PT
Baghdad
HASSAN DEPOT
FALLUJAH DEPOT
SADDAM INTL AFLD DISTRN PT
PS 4
KM 515
BAGHDAD AL DOURA
AL ABBAS DEPOT
LATIFIYAH (KARGH) DISTRN
SHAYKH BIYUTI
ASRIYAH DEPOT
MUSAYYIB GAS DISTRN
AR RAZZAZAH DEPOT
Karbala'
Al-Hillah
KM 441
MUDAYSIS AFLD DEPOT
Al-Kut
KUT DISTRN PT
KM 414
An Najaf
AD DIWANIYAH DEPOT
Al 'Amarah
Ad Diwaniyah
PS 3
KM 342
AL AMARAH
AMARAH DEPOT
As-Samawah
AS SAMAWAH
An-Nasiriyah
PS 2
KM 168
UWAYJAH
ABU HAYYAH DEPOT
QARYAT KULLIYAT DEPOT
PS 1
KM 0
IPSA 1
AZ ZUBAYR DISTRN PT NW
AL BASRAH
ASH SHUAYBAH DEPOT
Az Zubayr
IPSA 2
AZ ZUBAYR IRON AND STEEL PLANT-NAT GAS DISTRN
IPSA 2A
Source: Task Force RIO
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CONTENTS
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iii
FOREWORD
IRAQI PIPELINES AND REFINERIES
PART ONE – THE OIL PROTECTION FORCE IN CONTEXT
1
2
6
INTRODUCTION – A CONTRACT OF ITS TIME
BASELINE CHALLENGES
SUMMARY
PART TWO – FROM CONCEPT TO TRANSITION
7
8
THE OPF VISION
THE ERINYS APPROACH
OPERATIONAL CONCEPT AND DESIGN
PHASE ONE: AUGUST – SEPTEMBER 2003. SURVEY, PLANNING AND MOBILISATION
13
14
15
16
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HITTING THE GROUND RUNNING
WHO IS ERINYS?
SURVEY AND PLANNING
RIO TO SHIELD – THE BATON IS PASSED
SUMMARY
PHASE TWO: OCTOBER – DECEMBER 2003. DEPLOYMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION
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22
24
26
PILLARS AND POSTS
THE BRIDGEHEAD EXPANDS TO MEET AN INCREASING THREAT
EXPANDING THE FORCE
SUMMARY
PHASE THREE: JANUARY – JULY 2004. CONSOLIDATION AND GROWTH
27
28
29
31
36
LOOKING FORWARD
CHANGES
TASK FORCE SHIELD
CRANKING THE MOBILISATION HANDLE
CONFIDENCE AND EFFECT
SUMMARY
PHASE FOUR: AUGUST – DECEMBER 2004. TRANSITION AND HAND-OVER
37
39
41
42
NEW GOVERNMENT AND EXTENSION
AN OLD SECURITY AGENDA WITH A NEW HOPE
THE TRANSITION – PLANNING AND CONSEQUENCE
HANDOVER AND ENDGAME
SUMMARY
PART THREE – CONCLUSIONS AND SOME LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE
43
44
45
46
47
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LOOKING BACK
OUTPUT AND PERFORMANCE
LINKAGE AND LEVELS
THE CONTRIBUTION OF OUR IRAQI MANAGEMENT
CONCLUSION
APPENDIX A
ILLUSTRATIONS
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FIGURE 1:
OPF CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS: GRADUATED JOINT RESPONSE
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FIGURE 2:
INFORMATION SHIELD CONCEPT
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FIGURE 3:
THE OPF’S PLACE IN THE SECURITY FORCE CAPABILITY SPECTRUM
12
FIGURE 4:
ERINYS OPF BRIEFING SLIDES
16
FIGURE 5:
TASK FORCE SHIELD’S COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS
17
FIGURE 6:
IMPLEMENTATION SYNCHRONISATION MATRIX EXTRACT
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FIGURE 7:
SECTOR AND REGIONAL BOUNDARIES
20
FIGURE 8:
RECRUITING AND VETTING CONCEPT
21
FIGURE 9:
OPF TRAINING CONCEPT
26
FIGURE 10: INCREASE IN GUARD FORCE NUMBERS - DECREASE IN ATTACKS
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PART ONE – THE OIL PROTECTION FORCE IN CONTEXT
INTRODUCTION - A CONTRACT OF ITS TIME
Erinys, through an open and competitive tender process, won in August 2003 a
US$39.5 million CPA1 firm fixed price contract to raise a 6500 strong Iraqi guard force
to protect 140 fixed oil sites throughout the country. It was at the time one of the largest
single security contracts awarded.
The intent of the contract was to establish and raise a single nationwide Iraqi guard force
in the first year, and then to transition that force to full Iraqi ministerial management and
operational control during the second (option) year. This aspiration remained the only
constant throughout the contract, and provided the conceptual and operational underpinning
for a project that changed constantly throughout its life span. In order to understand the
challenges and achievements outlined in this paper, it is necessary to set these in context
by examining the conditions under which the initial requirement was articulated by the
CPA and which informed the design, mobilisation and development of the force.
The intent of the contract was to establish and raise a single nationwide Iraqi guard
force in the first year, and then to transition that force to full Iraqi ministerial management
and operational control during the second (option) year.
The end of the successful campaign to liberate Iraq was followed by an interregnum whose
defining feature was a widespread and systematic outbreak of looting. The impact of the
looting spree was well documented by the news media; Iraqi government facilities were
particularly hard hit. Only a small number of major oil sites (refineries, gas oil separation
plants, pumping stations, storage and distribution depots and export terminals) guarded
by Coalition Forces escaped serious damage. This episode exposed two related issues
which required the Coalition’s immediate attention. Clearly, provision had to be made to
protect critical oil infrastructure on which the future Iraq was dependent, from mobs of
looters and criminal activity. There was also a concurrent need to release Coalition Force
units from site guarding duties because they were required elsewhere, or were due to
rotate out of the Iraqi theatre of operations.
Urgency was translated by the US led CPA into action. The then seemingly more esoteric
considerations of how to shape a detailed, sustainable long-term strategy for securing
essential infrastructure (including oil, electricity, rail, road, and water) would be considered
1
1 The CPA grew out of and superseded the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) established in May 2003.
at a later time. This was neither surprising
nor necessarily a bad thing. The CPA
was not only trying to establish and
organise itself, it was working hard to
recapture the ‘nation-building’ initiative
lost in the immediate aftermath of the
land campaign. At the same time it had
to grapple with an avalanche of macroissues ranging from maintaining internal
security, providing urgent humanitarian
aid, re-establishing Iraqi civil authorities,
management of reconstruction projects
and kick-starting the Iraqi economy. The time for action was then; joining up the pieces
and building on them would follow.
The road bridge at Al-Fathah crossing,
under which the main pipeline delivering
crude oil from the northern oil fields to the
Bayji refinery runs. Destroyed during the
campaign to liberate Iraq - September 2003
This pragmatism was highly laudable insomuch that the drive for action did achieve real
results. It was enabled by Development Fund for Iraq (or DFI) money earmarked for the
re-building of Iraq, by a tremendous sense of energy and optimism which prevailed both
within the CPA corridors and without, and by a then relatively benign security environment.
The oil security contract therefore was very much a thing of its time. A requirement to
protect oil sites was stated in the broadest of terms by hard pressed Coalition officials
looking for an immediate solution to a very large and urgent problem.
BASELINE CHALLENGES
It was into this heady atmosphere that Erinys senior management was immersed in the
initial rounds of requirement definition with CPA and Combined Joint Task Force-7
(CJTF-7) officials. The contract’s Statement of Objectives was simple enough and required2:
•
“..[the concept is for] the contractor to initially provide the preponderance of the
security architecture and then slowly transfer that responsibility to Iraqi control over
a two year timeframe.”
•
“The end state is a well trained guard force and a mature security infrastructure
capable of protecting the multi-billion dollar oil infrastructure.”
The discussions and briefings with CPA, CJTF-7 and Iraqi Ministry of Oil officials that
followed exposed some of the interrelated challenges that Erinys would have to overcome.
2 Taken verbatim from IFB # DABV01-03-B-0001, the Statement of Objectives incorporated in the CPA Request for Proposal and
shown at Appendix A.
2
Looters exiting the National Intelligence offices
in Baghdad - April 2003
First, any notions that Erinys management had of a deliberate, conventional approach to
the planning, implementation and management of a project of this size were quickly and
unequivocally dispelled by CJTF-7, who wanted ‘boots on the ground’ immediately, not
least to absolve the fighting formations that had successfully prosecuted the liberation
land campaign from site guarding commitments. The Facilities Protection Service (FPS)3,
other dedicated infrastructure guard forces then under consideration, and the Erinys OPF
were the means by which Coalition Force assets could be released.
The very tight project implementation timelines, more than any other factor, served to
shape Erinys’ project planning and approach to implementation. Erinys therefore had
effectively to switch its project management mindset from one of deliberate planning, with
sequentially phased formal implementation, to a much more urgent, responsive and flexible
one to ensure that the demands of the CPA and CJTF-7 could be met. This was not a
straightforward process; the Company’s management had considerable experience of
security project management all over the world, but like so many endeavours in postconflict Iraq, this project was being prosecuted in an unprecedented set of circumstances.
The second challenge was clearly establishing in the minds of the key stakeholders
(CJTF-7, CPA and the Ministry of Oil) the role that the Erinys guard force was to play, what
its contracted capabilities were, and where those capabilities fitted in to the overall security
effort. It became clear that each stakeholder had different ideas of what a contracted
guard force should do. This was exacerbated by different interpretations of what infrastructure
should be the priority for protection, what the force’s limit of exploitation (not just in terms
of ground, but also in terms of the threat it had to be capable of defeating) was to be, and
how these priorities should be adjusted and managed as the security situation developed.
3
3 The FPS consisted of hastily recruited, lightly armed guards whose principal task was to act as a first line of defence for government
buildings, banks and essential infrastructure against looters and criminal activity.
The third baseline issue with which Erinys management had continually to wrestle related
A typical Baghdad rush-hour scene in
August 2003. It is illustrative of a benign
threat environment
to the ownership, contractual oversight and tasking of the Erinys OPF. The CPA let the
contract on behalf of the Iraqi Ministry of Oil using DFI funds under CPA control. Given
that Erinys was contracted to guard Ministry of Oil assets, the beneficiary (or client) was
the Ministry. The Ministry’s interests were represented by its ‘shadow’ in the CPA: the
Senior Oil Advisor’s office. However, security was a CJTF-7 responsibility and the Erinys
OPF was expected to integrate into the array of forces under its control. However, the
Erinys OPF was initially placed under the operational supervision of Task Force RIO4, a
US Army Corps of Engineers organisation working to the CPA, and tasked with the
programme management of the oil infrastructure refurbishment. The CPA’s contracting
office retained contractual oversight.
What became apparent during the planning and early implementation phase of the project
were the tensions between the principal stakeholders – and especially their staffs.
CJTF-7 wanted to unload site guarding commitments from its portfolio and be reassured
that oil infrastructure security was being taken care of. Task Force RIO wanted security
for reconstruction projects. The CPA Senior Oil Advisor’s office was primarily interested
in raising oil production and refinery output but had little understanding of security matters
or guard forces. The Ministry of Oil, watching form the sidelines, was monitoring how the
CPA was disbursing what it regarded as Iraqi funds on an imported solution, and did its
best to ensure that its interests were being addressed.
The diversity of stakeholder interests was exacerbated by the lack of a coherent coordinating
mechanism. No system had yet been developed that was able to balance the different
security needs to determine an integrated approach to prioritisation, operational tasking
and the development of the contract to meet the requirements of the evolving threat
4 RIO was a mnemonic that stood for Restore Iraqi Oil.
4
situation. In the absence of such a unified mechanism Erinys had the difficult and time
consuming task of making sense of often conflicting short-term requirements in which the
strategic imperative articulated at the highest level sometimes became obscured. All of
this was understandable given the embryonic stage of the new administration.
Last, and importantly, the security situation had by September already begun slowly to
change for the worse. We know now that the tipping point beyond which the operating
environment ceased to be ‘benign’ was reached in early November of 2003. This
development could not have been foreseen by those in the CPA who initiated the contract
and was to have serious implications for a lightly armed guard force.
An OPF foot patrol on the perimeter of the Al-Dourah
Refinery complex - February 2004
5
SUMMARY
By the time site surveys were being completed and the mobilisation of the project was
underway, Erinys was left with a very generally stated remit from a chain of command
unfamiliar with guard forces and hampered by multiple reporting lines.
Many of these early challenges were symptomatic of a demanding post-conflict environment,
in which the Coalition was trying to create order from chaos. The intense pressure on the
CPA and CJTF-7 to set Iraq on its road to recovery allowed difficult problems, such as
infrastructure security, to be initially only superficially examined. The sometimes adverse
corollaries to this expediency were to remain with the OPF throughout its project life.
Burning pipelines and storage depot
Rumaylah Southern Iraq - August 2003
6
PART TWO – FROM CONCEPT TO TRANSITION
THE OPF VISION
Against the backdrop outlined in Part One, and taking into account the results of the
survey teams reporting back to the planning team in Erinys’ Al-Mansour headquarters,
project management was able to stick pretty much to its original, very simple concept
articulated in its Technical Proposal. The only fundamental change was the manner in
which the OPF would be mobilised.
Erinys’ vision was to deliver a single, coherent nationwide guard force, lightly armed for
self protection and the protection of sites and Iraqi oil personnel that worked on them.
The force was to be based on three self-contained operating regions, which would,
wherever possible be coterminous with the operational boundaries of the Coalition Major
Subordinate Commands (MSCs). Regional headquarters would be co-located with state
oil operating companies’ head offices, or at important regional oil and gas infrastructure
nodes. Each region was subdivided into sectors, usually based on a major oil installation
such as a refinery. Site guards and mobile patrols, recruited from local communities, would
operate in a system of two or three shifts per 24 hours.
Erinys’ vision was to deliver a single, coherent nationwide guard force, lightly armed
for self protection and the protection of sites and Iraqi oil personnel that worked
on them.
THE ERINYS APPROACH
The defining feature of the CPA Statement of Objectives was the requirement to transition
the OPF to Iraqi control. This determined what became acknowledged as the ‘Erinys
Approach’ to managing guard forces in Iraq. Most importantly, the force had to be seen
as an Iraqi force – distinct from Coalition Forces in order to be acceptable to the local
communities straddling the oil infrastructure from which Erinys recruited its guard force
manpower. The approach that Erinys developed had three linked strands: embedded
international management, local recruiting of Iraqi guards, and the careful selection, training
and mentoring of Iraqi guard force management personnel.
7
Embedded international management was essential to provide continuous, hands-on
direction for the development of a coherent, task focused force made up from many tribal,
religious and ethnic groupings. Erinys’ international management would provide a neutral
component able to arbitrate over the many conflicting local pressures to which Iraqi OPF
personnel were often subjected, and which were not always complementary to the task
of protecting oil infrastructure. Equally, there was an obvious requirement to provide the
foundations of project, training and technical guard force management expertise in an
environment where none existed and a means to transfer it to Erinys’ Iraqi management
during the project term. In recognition that Erinys’ custodianship of the OPF would be
finite, the role of international
management had to gradually adjust.
During the project’s first year, it would
take the lead in planning and
establishing the force. But as the
force became established and its
organisation and operational
capability matured, the emphasis
would switch from one of direct, dayto-day operational control to one of
supporting, mentoring, advising and training Iraqi management, as well as quality control.
Erinys international management would however retain overall responsibility for project
OPF international management in their offices
in the Central Region Headquarters at Al-Dourah
Refinery - March 2004
management, and would take the lead in managing relationships with Coalition Forces –
essential for the success of the OPF project operating under a Coalition security umbrella.
One of the most important requirements to ensure the success of the OPF beyond Erinys’
custodianship was the selection, recruiting and training of capable Iraqi guard force and
administrative management at all levels of the OPF. Erinys identified Iraqi ex-armed forces
personnel, with an understanding of English, and wherever possible, experience of working
with Westerners. The ex-military dimension was regarded as important because officers
who had served in the Iraqi Army, Air Force and Navy were still held in generally high
regard throughout Iraqi society.
OPERATIONAL CONCEPT AND DESIGN
Erinys’ operational design was conventional and based on three basic components. The
most visible was key point security on fixed sites provided by trained and uniformed
guards. Key point security included both static guards and site mobile guards. The second
8
component consisted of mobile patrols with a dual function for pipeline patrols and as a
sector reinforcement capability. Pipeline security would in due course be augmented by
an aerial surveillance capability. The force would operate in a security environment shaped
by the Coalition and Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), creating the conditions for a lightly armed
guard force to effectively carry out its contracted remit. The operational concept is illustrated
at Figure 1.
COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS
OPERATIONAL CONTROL
COORDINATION/LIAISON
TASKING
SECTOR
OPERATIONS ROOM
CO-ORDINATE
PLANNING AND C3
Deter / Detect
IRAQI REACTION
AGENCIES: IPS,
MED, FIRE
REGIONAL
OPERATIONS ROOM
CF/IRAQI UNIT
HEADQUARTERS
CF FORMATION
HEADQUARTERS. JOINT
CO-ORDINATION CELLS
SITE/MOBILE GUARD
SECTOR/SITE
REINFORCEMENT
CAPABILITY
FOLLOW UP
DEPLOY
IRAQI REACTION
AGENCIES: IPS,
MED, FIRE
REACTION
THREAT
REGIONAL
REINFORCEMENT
CAPABILITY
DEPLOY
SITE/MOBILE GUARD
CF/IRAQI SECURITY FORCES
DEPLOY
Figure 1:
OPF Concept of Operations:
Graduated Joint Response.
Source: OPF Briefing slide
The third component consisted of a comprehensive liaison and security information network
encompassing Coalition and Iraqi forces, civil authorities, tribes and local communities.
The concept is illustrated at Figure 2. The intent was to develop an ‘information shield’
through the integration of information resources relevant to the OPF’s operations, which
would generate threat intelligence, in turn allowing counter-measures to be implemented
within the Erinys limit of exploitation, or in support of Coalition Forces.
Each sector was responsible for a set of designated fixed sites and pipelines within
boundaries5. Mobile patrol elements consisted of dedicated site quick reaction forces
9
5 OPF boundaries did not designate tactical areas of operations in the military sense. Rather, they set out areas in which the OPF
had specific site and pipeline guarding responsibilities.
INFORMATION INPUT
DEDICATED CF LOs
ANALYSIS/DISTRIBUTION
OUTPUT/ACTION
ERINYS IRAQ
COHERENT OVERALL
SECURITY PICTURE
CJTF-7 C2
BAGHDAD
HEADQUARTERS
PROJECT PLANNING
AND DEPLOYMENT
ERINYS SECURITY
LIASON OFFICER
AUTHORISATION FOR
ADDITIONAL MEASURES
MINISTRY OF OIL
DEDICATED CF LOs
FOCUSED DEFENSIVE
DEPLOYMENT
LOCAL CF
FORMATIONS
REINFORCEMENT
COMMUNITY LIASON
OFFICER
REGIONAL
HEADQUARTERS
WITH CF AND OTHER
IRAQI AGENCY ‘JOINT’
DEPLOYMENT
LOCAL OIL/GAS
COMPANIES
POST INCIDENT
INVESTIGATION
OTHER LOCAL
GOVERNMENT AGENCIES
LOCAL CF UNITS
FOCUSED DEFENSIVE
DEPLOYMENT
COMMUNITY LIASON
OFFICER CONTACTS
SPECIFIC SITE
PROTECTION MEASURES
SECTOR
HEADQUARTERS
LOCAL OIL/GAS
COMPANIES
REINFORCEMENT
OTHER LOCAL
GOVERNMENT AGENCIES
‘JOINT’ DEPLOYMENT
(QRF) for larger sites, and pipeline mobile patrol teams. Operational coordination, basic
Figure 2:
Information Shield Concept.
training and administrative support (including equipment support, logistics, HR, finance)
Source: OPF Briefing slide
was the responsibility of regional headquarters. Guard force operations, including continuation
training, was the province of the sector and site management. Operational liaison with
Coalition and Iraqi forces at the divisional and brigade combat team level was the
responsibility principally of regional management, with sector management engaging at
the brigade level and below. Liaison with Coalition Forces was supported by dedicated
Coalition Force liaison officers acting as interlocutors between Erinys’ regional headquarters
and Coalition divisional and brigade headquarters.
10
Command and control was enabled by a very simple and robust very high frequency (VHF)
radio system based on a nationwide network of repeaters and base stations allowing for
operational communications within each region and between sectors. Inter-regional
communications would be facilitated by high frequency (HF), InMarSat and satellite
telephony. Data communications was based on a VSAT6 satellite network with terminals
deployed down to sector headquarter level.
Overall project control was exercised by the Project Management Team located in Erinys’
national Head Office in the Al-Mansour District of Baghdad, which also served as the
communications management hub.
The Project Management Team at Head Office had responsibility for overall planning,
implementation and development of the project, operational and policy coordination, the
considerable procurement, logistics, equipment support and asset management effort,
as well as client relationship management. The key business, operational and administrative
functions were cascaded down to sector level.
Erinys’ planners knew from the outset that a lightly armed guard force, with limited
mandated capabilities, operating in a volatile post-conflict environment, could only be fully
Guard Force
Para-military Force
OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY
Acronyms:
IPS: Iraqi Police Service
NIA: New Iraq Army
Fixed Site Guards
ING: Iraqi National Guard
ISF: Iraqi Security Forces
Access Control
Deterring presence
Low
Trespassing
Opportunistic crime
Mobile Guards/Patrol Teams
Site QRFs
Reaction & Reinforcement
Mobile deterring presence
THREAT
Organised crime
Denial of MSRs
Pre-emptive operations
Manoeuvre/Rapid response
Sustained or offensive deployment
Counter-insurgency/terrorist ops
GREEN
GREEN
RED
Within OPF’s
capabilities
Within OPF’s
capabilities
Beyond OPF’s contracted legal
capabilities, or operational remit
Routine criminal activity
Medium
Military Force
ING, NIA
GREEN TO AMBER
GREEN TO AMBER
RED
Within OPF’s capabilities.
May require CF/ISF
General Support
Within OPF’s capabilities.
May require CF/ISF
General Support
AMBER TO RED
RED
RED
At the margins of OPF capability.
Requires CF/ISF. Close support to
accomplish mission
NIA? CF
CF
Armed attack
NIA? CF
High
Insurgency
Specific and sustained
targeting of OPF and
oil infrastructure
Sustained and heavily
armed attack
Figure 3: The OPF’s Place in the Security Force Capability Spectrum7.
6 Very Small Aperture Terminal.
11
7 Although simplistic, this diagram was used by Erinys as a conceptual tool to explain the importance of integrating the OPF into the
security capability spectrum. It relates threat to capabilities able to counter it. The greater the threat, the stronger the capability required
to deal with it. For example, the only forces capable of sustained offensive operations in a high threat environment (red) were Coalition
Forces (CF – shown in green in the bottom right-hand quadrant). Conversely, the OPF conducting site and mobile guarding operations
in low to medium threat environments is operating within its capabilities (green to amber).
effective as an integrated part of the
Coalition security apparatus, as illustrated
by Figure 3.
The operational concept was therefore based
on graduated joint (with Coalition Forces,
ISF and first responder agencies) response
against threats of varying intensity, but with
the OPF very much on the front line, acting
as the trip wire. Joint planning and operations
were facilitated by a small dedicated cadre
of US and British Army liaison officers
reporting to the Contracting Officer’s
Technical Representative, acting as a link
between Coalition formations and units, and
Erinys regional and sector headquarters.
A succinct description of the OPF’s role is
shown in briefing slides at Figure 4. Erinys
project management used these on many
occasions in the corridors of Baghdad’s
Republican Palace, where the CPA and
subsequent Coalition entities were
headquartered.
Notwithstanding the intent of the Erinys
planners at the time and the OPF’s design
and conceptual underpinning, the benefit of
hindsight allows the identification of four
distinct phases of the OPF project: survey,
planning and mobilisation; deployment
and implementation; consolidation and
expansion, and finally transition and handover to the Iraqi Ministry of Oil. Each phase
presented Erinys with a range of challenges,
themselves a manifestation of the baseline
Figure 4:
Erinys OPF Briefing Slides.
challenges outlined in Part One.
Source: OPF Briefing to IRMO (Oil) - May 2004
12
PHASE ONE: AUGUST – SEPTEMBER 2003
SURVEY, PLANNING AND MOBILISATION
“OK, so when can you start?”8
Lieutenant General Sanchez, Commanding General CJTF-7
HITTING THE GROUND RUNNING
August and September of 2003 was a whirlwind of concurrent activity driven by intense
Coalition pressure to deploy guards onto oil infrastructure. The arrival of the Erinys advance
party into the sweltering heat of a Baghdad summer on the 8th August, contract requirement
definition at the CPA, the deployment of the regional survey parties, project planning, the
establishment and deployment of the Project Management Team and the expansion of
the Erinys Head Office all merged into a concentrated burst of activity which touched all
parts of Erinys’ organisation.
With the support of a US Army Task Force RIO liaison officer and a succession of highly
knowledgeable and enthusiastic MSC based infrastructure security liaison officers, the
Erinys advance party wasted no time in validating the Technical Proposal, conceived with
access to only the most rudimentary information, by conducting ground reconnaissance
of the major oil and gas nodes. This whistle-stop tour of Iraq’s oil infrastructure provided
The Southern Region Survey Team in the open
expanses of the vast Rumaylah oilfields August 2003
13
greater clarity on the sheer magnitude of the task facing Erinys and the scale of the
8 Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez, Commanding General of CJTF-7, speaking pointedly to the Lead Project Director at their first
encounter during an infrastructure security meeting in the CPA, early August, 2003.
recruitment, training, logistics and communications effort that would be needed to build
a countrywide guard force from scratch. It also highlighted some significant difficulties.
WHO IS ERINYS?
It became quickly apparent that while the leadership in the CPA, CJTF-7 and the Ministry
of Oil broadly understood what Erinys had been contracted to provide, news of the contract
had yet to be transmitted down respective chains of command. Little direction was given
to Coalition formations and state oil and gas operating companies on Erinys’ remit, limit
of exploitation, and the support that the fledgling OPF would require to establish itself.
The advance party also confirmed that the fabric of site security infrastructure was in an
advanced state of dilapidation – if it existed at all. Other than the major refinery complexes
and storage depots, few sites had functioning barriers, illumination or habitable guard
accommodation.
...the broad concept articulated in the Technical Proposal stood up to
‘ground reality’.
For the moment, an assessment was made that the broad concept articulated in the
Technical Proposal stood up to ‘ground reality’. Furthermore, the advance party’s initial
survey established regional and sector headquarters locations, as well as areas of
responsibility based on groupings of designated oil infrastructure. The Northern Region
Headquarters was initially to be co-located with Task Force RIO’s office in the Northern
Oil Company (NOC) complex at Kirkuk; the Central Region Headquarters was to be
established in the Al-Dourah refinery complex on the southern edge of Baghdad, and the
Southern Region Headquarters was to be established initially in the British logistics base
at Shaiba – just outside Basrah, before establishing in Basrah itself. The disposition of the
regions and sectors is shown at Figure 7 on page 18.
The sole pumping station that supplied water to
the Kirkuk oil fields. Were it to be put out of action
it would have severely curtailed the Northern Oil
Company’s ability to operate. Security was
non-existent - September 2003
14
SURVEY AND PLANNING
The baseline was thus set for the arrival in Baghdad on 19th August of the survey teams
and the balance of the Project Management Team. Following the in-load of four-wheel
drive SUVs, armed with a site list and maps provided by Task Force RIO, a validated
project concept and design, and an understanding of what had to be achieved, the three
regional survey teams deployed by road with a mission to conduct detailed site
reconnaissance. With the surveys underway, the Project Management Team in Baghdad
got to work on the detailed planning, priming the procurement, logistics, training mechanisms,
and the design of the communications infrastructure. During this initial very hectic period,
Erinys management was consistently working an average 20-hour day, living in very basic
conditions, with temperatures reaching the high 50 degrees centigrade. Life support9 had
yet to catch up with the deployment of Erinys project management.
The return of the survey teams at
the beginning of September
exposed myriad regional challenges.
The Southern Regional survey team
discovered a lacuna of suitable
facilities for establishing regional and
sector headquarters, as well as for
training the force. The Director
General of the Southern Oil
Company (SOC) and the Ministry of
Interior Oil Police, recently
disbanded, proved less than
enthusiastic over the prospect of a
foreign company taking over the
security of critical oil sites. In the
The perimeter of the storage and
distribution depot at Lathifiyah showing
the dilapidated state of the sites physical
defences - September 2003
North the survey team faced a lack of cooperation from the NOC illustrating very effectively
the gap between Ministry of Oil intent and the preferences of powerful and strongly
established senior officials of state oil and gas operating companies10. However, this was
not the case in the Central Region where the hugely experienced and dynamic Director
General Dathar of the Al-Dourah refinery complex gave his full backing and support to
the OPF project11.
9 Military vernacular meaning: accommodation, food, water and power.
10 Non-cooperation ranged from polite disinterest to masterful inactivity, to – in the case of the Bayji refinery complex – outright hostility.
Here, the corrupt, disbanded, but still functioning Oil Police did everything it could to prevent Erinys from conducting its surveys and
subsequently its contracted tasks.
15
11 Director General Dathar had personally supervised the defence of the Al-Dourah refinery against mobs of looters. He stood up a
guard force, erected barriers and for five days single-handedly ensured that production of his refinery was maintained.
RIO TO SHIELD - THE OPF BATON IS PASSED
As the project plans began to take shape, the first of many changes in the contractual
oversight and tasking of the Erinys OPF took place. Task Force RIO was fully focused on
its reconstruction programme management mission and saw the need to disaggregate
oversight and control of the oil infrastructure security function, for which it was not geared.
Task Force Shield emerged as the new organisation to take on this role but its provenance
was never entirely understood and seemed to be driven largely by an enterprising US
Army Colonel who understood the need to set the oversight of such an important project
on a more coherent footing.
Task Force Shield was established initially as a component of Task Force RIO. For the first
time, Erinys saw the prospect of a single point of contact and reporting chain, and a more
coherent liaison and enabling capability that would accelerate the establishment of the
force. Task Force Shield would act not only as the contractual and operational socket into
which the Erinys OPF was to be plugged, it would enable the linkages to CJTF-7 at all
levels. However, the establishment of this organisation was beset by problems from the
start. Notwithstanding the briefing slide at Figure 5, Task Force Shield’s position in the
CJTF-7 or CPA chain of command was never clarified. The implications were far reaching
and affected not only the way in which the OPF was developed and directed, but also
the perception of its effectiveness in the minds of Coalition and Iraqi leadership.
Figure 5:
Task Force Shield’s
Command Relationships.
Source: Commander Task Force Shield
For the moment, Task Force Shield succeeded in helping to formalise in general terms
how the Erinys OPF should be integrated into, and supported by MSCs. The concept of
operations shown at Figure 1 was duly enshrined in a Fragmentary Order (or FragO). The
Order was authorised for issue on 7th October, 2003 after long, deliberate and constructive
discussions with CJTF-7 staff.
16
As September drew to a close, the Project Management Team had woven the outcomes
of the surveys into a Deployment Implementation Plan. At the same time, orders for
vehicles, uniforms, personal equipment, radio communications equipment and the like
had been placed and were being chased. International guard force management expertise
began to arrive and got on with the business of familiarisation, further reconnaissance and
detailed site security planning. Skeleton regional, some sector headquarters and training
team staff were already deploying and establishing their operations. Concurrent activity
was the theme of the hour.
TIMELINE
SEPTEMBER 2003
WEEK 2
WEEK 3
NOVEMBER 2003
OCTOBER 2003
WEEK 4
WEEK 5
WEEK 6
WEEK 7
WEEK 8
WEEK 9
WEEK 10
WEEK 11
WEEK 12
WEEK 13
REGIONAL ROLL-OUT AND OPERATION - NORTH
ESTABLISH REGIONAL
HQ (KIRKUK)
30
ESTABLISH TRAINING
CAMP (KIRKUK)
30
TRAINING TEAM
OUTPUT
29
FROM 29 SEPTEMBER: 3 TRAINING TEAMS. 3 STAGGERED INTAKES DELIVERING 600 TRAINED MEN EACH WEEK
ESTABLISH SECTOR 1
(KIRKUK NOC)
ESTABLISHED BY 07 NOVEMBER.
SECTOR STRENGTH: 1200
INTERIM SECTOR
FATAH/IT2 PST AND
LPG PLANT
DEPLOY 08 OCTOBER TO KP’S
ESTABLISH SECTOR 2
(KIRKUK LPG)
ESTABLISH SECTOR 3
(BAYJI)
ESTABLISH SECTOR 4
(HADITHAH)
31
LPG PLANT SECURED BY
SECTOR 1 UNTIL 19 OCTOBER.
BAI HASSAN DAOUD GOSP (3)
BAI HASSAN NORTH (3)
BAI HASSAN SOUTH GOSP (3)
KHABBAZ GOSP
MODERN STORAGE
IT 1 CRUDE PST / TANKS
NEW STABILISATION PLANT
MULLAH ABDULLA
POWERPLANT
IDC WAREHOUSE
NORTH JAMBUR GOSP
JAMBUR WATER PST
SOUTH JAMBUR GOSP
07
KURMALAH MANIFOLD
NW\AVANAH GOSP
SARBALSHAKH GOSP
SARULU GOSP
AVANAH CRUDE PST
DIBBIS WATER PST X 2
DIBBIS POWERPLANT
DIBBIS WTP
NGC WATER PST
QUTON GOSP
HANJERA GOSP
AB2
BAJWAN LPG BOTTLING PLANT
IDC DRILLING WAREHOUSE
NOC INDUSTRIAL AREA
- 14 INCLUDED SITES
07
TAKES OVER FATAH ON 02 NOVEMBER. FULLY
ESTABLISHED BE 19 NOVEMBER. SECTOR
STRENGTH: 800
T1 CRUDE PST AND TANKS
K3 CRUDE PST AND TANKS
HADITHAH REFINERY
ESTABLISH SECTOR 5
(MOSUL)
TAKES OVER IT2 PST KP ON 02 NOVEMBER.
30
30
LOGISTICS ROLL-OUT AND OPERATION
VEHICLE AND
TRANSPORTATION
16 PICK-UPS, 6 PATROLS,
3 TCV
29
EQUIPMENT
SUPPORT
07
ITP METERING STATION
AIN ZALAH WATER PST
IT 2A CRUDE PST
SFIA GOSP, WCT, PST
AIN ZALAH GOSP,WCT
BUTMAH MANIFOLD
KASSIK REFINERY
IT 2 CRUDE PST
AL-QAYYARAH REFINERY
FOOD
ACCOMMODATION
29
WEAPONS
29
UNIFORMS
1000 AVAILABLE FOR
PRIORITY ISSUE
29
SPECIALIST
EQUIPMENT
ID CARD SYSTEM
29
BAI HASSAN DAOUD GOSP (3)
BAI HASSAN NORTH (3)
BAI HASSAN SOUTH GOSP (3)
KHABBAZ GOSP
MODERN STORAGE
IT 1 CRUDE PST AND TANKS
NEW STABILIZATION PLANT
MULLAH ABDULLAH
POWERPLANT
NGC LPG PLANT
TAZA DISTRIBUTION STATION
IDC WAREHOUSE
NORTH JAMBUR GOSP
JAMBUR WATER PST
SOUTH JAMBUR GOSP
1000 AVAILABLE AT 2 WEEK INTERVALS
Figure 6:
Implementation Synchronisation
The conditions were thus set for the next phase; the whole project was now in motion
Matrix Extract.
Source: OPF Deployment and Implementation
Plan - September 2003
and gathering momentum. All those involved in the enterprise knew that the only way of
meeting the CPA, CJTF-7, and the Ministry of Oil’s exacting timelines was to establish an
immediate guard presence on the designated sites, and then to bind these isolated groups
together into a coherent force with organisation, training, equipment, and communications.
Erinys summarised the implementation concept as ‘building the force from the inside out’.
17
SUMMARY
At the conclusion of the survey, planning and mobilisation phase the regional and sector boundaries had been agreed in principle.
The boundaries did not designate tactical areas of operations in the military sense, but rather they set out the geographic areas
in which the OPF had specific site and pipeline guarding responsibilities.
NORTH
MOSUL (Relocated to Q-West)
KIRKUK
BAYJI
CENTRE
BAGHDAD
NAJAF
SOUTH
AMARAH
NASIRIYAH
RUMAYLAH (NORTH)
BASRAH (NORTH)
RUMAYLAH (SOUTH)
BASRAH (SOUTH)
Petroleum Refinery
Petroleum Refinery under construction
Petroleum Pump Station
Crude Oil Pipeline
Natural Gas Pipeline
LPG / Natural Gas Facility
Refined Fuel Pipeline
LPG Pipeline
Figure 7: Sector and Regional Boundaries.
Source: OPF briefing slides
18
PHASE TWO: OCTOBER – DECEMBER 2003
DEPLOYMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION
PILLARS AND POSTS
The Deployment and Implementation Plan came out of a validated concept, adjusted
through survey, and an understanding of the demands of a continually changing environment.
It had therefore not only to provide Erinys’ Iraqi and international project management with
guidance and direction, it had at same time to allow management the freedom to adapt
its approach according to local conditions.
...building the force ‘from the inside out’
The Plan’s key pillars included a regional and sector management structure; a recruiting
and vetting concept; a training concept, and importantly, a pay and employment policy
that adhered to the requirements of CPA ordinances then being promulgated. All of these
set out the fundamental building blocks of the force, but their implementation had to rely
to a large extent on the ingenuity of Erinys management on the ground.
The recruitment of guard personnel ran simultaneously with the establishment of administrative
and operational management capability (and in some cases the buildings to house it),
the in-load and distribution of equipment, the establishment of both communications and
a training regime. Across Iraq, Erinys project management found, recruited and hastily
installed guards at designated oil sites. Some of these guards were already in situ. Some
were recruited and made up with enthusiasm what they lacked in equipment and training,
which would follow. The recruiting and training aspects of deployment and implementation
provide useful snapshots of how concepts and plans had to be adapted to meet local
exigencies.
The Erinys OPF recruiting concept is illustrated at Figure 8, which summarises Erinys’
approach to meeting requirements for vetting and deploying Iraqi guards recruited from
three different sources.
19
FORMER IRAQI
OPPOSITION GROUPS
RECRUIT
SOURCES IDENTIFIED AND STOOD BY
SOURCES ON SITE
VET
TRAIN
NOTES:
VETTING PROCESS:
• MEMBERSHIP OF ILLEGAL
ORGANISATIONS
• CRIMINAL RECORD
• COMMUNITY STANDING
• FITNESS FOR ROLE
• CPA APPROVAL
DEPLOY
ID
CARD
ISSUED
VETTING TEAMS:
• REGIONAL COMMUNITY LOs
• COMMUNITY COUNCILS COMPRISING:
COMMUNITY AND TRIBAL LEADERS, AND
LOCAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS
AT REGIONAL AND SECTOR LEVEL AS APPROPRIATE
INTERNAL INSPECTION TEAMS:
INTERNAL INSPECTION PROCESS:
• REGIONAL COMMUNITY LOs
• REGIONAL AND SECTOR MANAGEMENT
AND HEADQUARTER ADMINISTRATION
SUPPORT GROUP PERSONNEL
• DOCUMENTATION INSPECTION
• MEDICAL & FITNESS FOR TRAINING/ROLE
• FINGERPRINTING
• PHOTO
IN-PLACE, AD HOC & INHERITED
GUARD FORCES
RECRUIT
SOURCES ON SITE
VET
DEPLOY
ON SITE, AT SECTOR OR REGIONAL
TRAINING CAMPS AS APPROPRIATE
VETTING PROCESS:
TRAIN
ID
CARD
ISSUED
NEW CANDIDATES
RECRUIT
RECRUITED FROM SECTOR
OR SITE VICINITIES
VET
TRAIN
DEPLOY
VETTING PROCESS:
ID
CARD
ISSUED
Figure 8:
Whilst sound in theory, the time pressures and absence of acceptably objective criteria
or reliable reference data made it impractical to vet inherited guards already on site before
Recruiting and Vetting Concept.
they signed an Erinys employment contract12. Instead, Erinys devised a system to vet
individuals during training using trusted local Iraqi management who achieved this timeconsuming task through local knowledge, access to often patchy police records, and in
consultation with tribal and Iraqi civic leadership. This inevitably resulted in wastage of
manpower under training, but the overall benefit of having vetted personnel on the force
would be demonstrated in the difficult months to come.
12 Erinys made commitments to the Minister of Oil that the inherited guards would be offered the option of joining the OPF subject
to passing the vetting process and training requirements.
20
It was a similar situation with the related matter of training. The Erinys training concept
is summarised in Figure 9, which illustrates the four major training components that were
needed to realise a capable guard force, fully integrated as part of the spectrum of security
capabilities outlined earlier.
TRAINING
1
SYLLABUS/ACTIVITY
OUTPUT
INDUCTION & BASIC RECRUIT
TRAINING
TURNOUT, BEARING,
COMPORTMENT
ISSUE CLOTHING & KIT
WEAPON HANDLING
TRAINED GUARD
INDUCTION
DOCUMENTATION AND
CONTRACT
SHOOTING
POTENTIAL CANDIDATES FOR
MANAGEMENT TRAINING
RULES OF ENGAGEMENT
7 DAYS AT REGIONAL AND
SECTOR TRAINING CAMPS
POWERS, RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF
A SECURITY OFFICER
CONFLICT RESOLUTION SKILLS
SPECIALIST AND SITE
SPECIFIC TRAINING
2
SITE AND ROLE SPECIFIC TRAINING
GUARD FORCE CAPABLE OF
RESPONDING TO LOCAL/SITE
EXIGENCIES
RE-QUALIFICATION (BASIC
TRAINING SYLLABUS)
BASIC OPERATIONAL STANDARDS
MAINTAINED
OFFICER AND NCO TRAINING
TRAINED OFFICER AND NCO CADRES
THREAT SPECIFIC TRAINING
GUARD FORCE ABLE TO RESPOND
TO CHANGES IN SECURITY
ENVIRONMENT
BASIC SOP DEVELOPMENT
MORE INTEGRATED APPROACH TO
OIL INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY
WITH LOCAL EMERGENCY
AND REACTION FORCES
COMMAND, CONTROL AND
COMMUNICATION ARRANGEMENTS
GREATER TRUST AND CONFIDENCE
AS
APPROPRIATE/POSSIBLE
WITH CF WITHIN AOR
CONTINGENCY PLANNING AND
REHEARSAL
TRAINING CAMPS AND
ON SITE
CONTINUATION TRAINING
3
REGIONAL AND SECTOR
TRAINING CAMPS
RUDIMENTARY ‘JOINT’ TRAINING
4
COHERENT REACTION CAPABILITY
MORE EFFECTIVE GUARD FORCE
TOTAL TRAINING TIME PER INDIVIDUAL LESS
OFFICER/NCO CADRES AND ‘JOINT’ TRAINING = 180 HRS
PER ANNUM.
Figure 9:
OPF Training Concept.
For the moment, the problem of training newly recruited Erinys guards already on site,
and before the in-load and distribution of uniforms and equipment, was solved by the
deployment of mobile recruiting, training and implementation teams. These were made
up of the international and Iraqi management that would ultimately become regional and
21
sector management. The teams’ primary function during the early stages of this phase
was to systematically establish site guard forces providing them with basic organisation,
simple standard operating procedures (SOPs), rudimentary training, and pay.
The issue of training facilities was gradually overcome and Erinys was able to invest in the
construction of small arms ranges and refurbishment of classroom and other facilities –
often with the help of local Coalition Force units. Such cooperation proved especially
effective in the Northern and Central Regions where US Army and US Air Force units could
not have been more supportive. Centralised training facilities at regional and sector level
were gradually removing the need for mobile training teams. Furthermore, a concerted
effort to ‘train the trainer’ meant that Iraqi guard force management on site could make
a substantial contribution to continuation and site specific training.
It was not until the end of December that Erinys knew it had broken the back of the training
challenge. By then, training facilities were mostly fully established and working well and
the supply chain was delivering the much needed equipment to the guards.
THE BRIDGEHEAD EXPANDS TO MEET AN INCREASING THREAT
The implementation process was in full swing by November, but the security situation in
Iraq began to turn for the worse.
Hitherto, Erinys international management was able to deploy by road to and between
sites adopting a low-profile security posture. Such an approach was re-examined after
James Wilshire, an Erinys operations manager from the Central Region, and his Iraqi
translator Majid Husein Jasim were killed in an ambush south of Baghdad on 11th November
whilst returning to Al-Dourah by road. Erinys immediately reviewed its security modus
operandi. Measures were taken to enforce the Company’s existing force protection13 policy
Traditional Iraqi mourning banner for James
Wilshire erected at the national Headquarters
by our guards - November 2003
13 ‘Force protection’ was the commonly used Coalition term for all aspects of an organisation’s own security and defensive measures,
both physical and procedural.
22
and to introduce stricter coordination of road
movement. Escort strength was increased in higher
risk areas, measures were taken to further harden
national, regional and sector headquarter buildings,
and armoured civilian vehicles were introduced
to the fleet. The number of international
management more than doubled from the
contracted 30 to over 70 by end 2003, in no small
part due to the additional force protection
requirements.
The deteriorating security environment and
pressure to spread limited OPF resources ever
wider had significant consequences on the
management of the project. Most immediately, it
made regional and sector management’s
implementation task more difficult because of the
need to survey new sites and the requirement to
adjust the implementation and training plans
accordingly. It also meant that the OPF was
becoming increasingly dispersed.
November and December saw a marked increase
in the number and strengths of attacks specifically
targeted on crude and product pipelines in the
Blast walls and barriers being delivered to
the OPF national Headquarters by local US
forces - November 2003
Northern and Central Regions. Already thinly spread, lightly armed Erinys OPF pipeline
patrols found themselves frequently overmatched by insurgents operating in strength and
armed with rocket propelled grenades.
There was growing recognition in Task Force Shield that the OPF project was simply too
small in scale and scope to have a major impact on securing oil and gas infrastructure
in a deteriorating security environment, which the original contract did not foresee. As
attacks on oil infrastructure intensified, Task Force Shield was being inundated with
demands from MSCs, contractors and the Ministry of Oil for OPF manpower. Deployment
requests were typically passed directly to Erinys which meant that the original list of 140
designated sites grew rapidly, as did the need to cover ever increasing stretches of pipeline.
The following vignette gives a flavour of the time.
23
Erinys was informed by Task Force Shield that, because of the imminent rotation of MSCs,
it was to take over responsibility for the security of Baghdad’s government owned petrol
stations. These were by then suffering serious interruptions to supply because insurgents
were sabotaging product pipelines. As a result Erinys had to absorb the MSC raised and
administered guards which took almost 30% of Central Region’s allocated contracted
manpower earmarked for pipeline patrols. It was difficult for Erinys’ Iraqi management to
understand why the force that they were creating should be used to protect empty petrol
stations from angry motorists when it could have played a more direct role protecting the
pipelines that supplied them. This episode illustrated the power of immediate operational
needs – in this case the requirement to release MSCs from civil administration duties.
EXPANDING THE FORCE
Crucially, by tasking Erinys to take on more and more sites and guards, Task Force Shield
committed the project to a force level that had no contractual underpinning; however, like
so much in Iraq at that time the contractual aspects would catch up with realities on the
ground. By the end of this phase, Erinys had responsibility for 9000 guards and over 200
fixed oil sites, but it was only contracted for 6500 guards.
As sustained attacks on strategically significant pipelines in the Northern Region grew,
Task Force Shield began to explore the possibility of incorporating an aerial surveillance
capability to augment the pipeline patrols. This was a very positive development and an
indication that the CPA and CJTF-7 had realised that more guards were not necessarily
the only option for securing large, vulnerable linear targets. Funding was quickly earmarked
and a contract was duly signed to make this initiative a reality14. Erinys selected and
subcontracted AirScan Inc, a Florida based company with experience of operating in
support of pipeline security operations and facilities
protection for the US Government. A detailed aerial
surveillance concept of operations was agreed during
December; Kirkuk Air Force Base was selected as the
operating base, and surveillance aircraft were positioned
forward ready to fly into the Iraq theatre of operations15.
It took a further four months for Erinys, with the help
of Task Force Shield, the CPA and CJTF-7, to work
through the difficult federal requirements to allow US
civilian aircraft to fly in Iraqi airspace.
AirScan C-337 surveillance aircraft parked on the
apron of its hardened hangar in Kirkuk Air Force
Base. The surveillance pod housing thermal imaging
and low light cameras is clearly identifiable under
the port wing. The aircraft had the capability to
transmit real-time imagery to the Northern Regional
operations room in the Kirkuk NOC
14 Introduction of the aerial surveillance capability illustrated the CPA’s capacity to take action quickly when the situation demanded it.
15 The support provided by the Kirkuk Air Force Base was illustrative of the outstanding cooperation between the OPF and Coalition
Forces at regional and sector levels.
24
By Christmas, the Erinys OPF had achieved its initial goals. The force had been deployed
and contractual requirements for ‘boots on the ground’ had been met and in many cases
exceeded. Contracted sites were now guarded by uniformed, trained and equipped
guards. Pipeline patrols were active and having a positive effect, occasionally at great cost
to themselves – particularly in the Northern Region where the Erinys OPF suffered a
number of casualties. Regional and sector headquarters were building management
capacity and beginning to function; the organisation had settled into an implementation
and operational routine; the communications architecture was starting to take shape
allowing greater coordination of site and sector operations; the basic training system was
beginning to meet the ever growing demand for trained guards to service new sites and
replace the wastage caused by the vetting process; continuation training slowly raised
operational standards on sites hastily established in the previous phase; and basic common
operational and administrative procedures were beginning to take hold. Importantly, strong
bonds were being forged between international and Iraqi management at all levels and
the OPF was beginning to make inroads on terrorist and smuggling activity, as well as
corruption on oil sites.
Commander Task Force Shield addressing
members of the OPF who had recently
completed their training and were assuming
their duties for the first time - December 2003
Shift Supervisor at the main
gate of the Ministry of Oil December 2003
25
SUMMARY
The main components had been put in place in a deteriorating security environment, and
the visibility and utility of the OPF was being recognised by both state oil operating
companies and Coalition units. Nonetheless, there remained much to do to consolidate
and expand what had been created.
Figure 10: Increase in Guard Force Numbers - Decrease in Attacks.
Source: Commander Task Force Shield - February 2004
Phase Two closed with a major success when, during a December night, an alert OPF
guard on the perimeter of the Al-Dourah refinery complex spotted suspicious activity and
alerted his supervisor. The joint OPF/Iraqi Police/Coalition Forces follow-up led to the
discovery of a cache holding two tons of explosives, which were subsequently recovered
along with the four individuals who were trying to access them. It was the most significant
of many successes that the OPF were beginning to realise as a consequence of becoming
operationally capable throughout Iraq.
26
PHASE THREE: JANUARY – JULY 2004
CONSOLIDATION AND GROWTH
LOOKING FORWARD
The Erinys strategy of building the force ‘from the inside out’ had succeeded in establishing
a functioning framework of regional and sector operations throughout Iraq. Within each
sector, site and mobile pipeline guarding tasks were being carried out under the watchful
eye of international management, at this stage still very much in the vanguard of running
the force. Continuation and on-the-job training steadily improved both the capability and
confidence of the OPF’s Iraqi management and guards. Task Force Shield Liaison Officers
were by now embedded in regional headquarters and helping Erinys management to
maintain good working relationships with Coalition units.
NOC fire crews on an Erinys special-totask training course at Kirkuk Air Force
Base - March 2004
After the initial all-consuming dash to get ‘boots on the ground’, the Project Management
Team was able to re-focus on future milestones. Erinys was already considering the more
detailed requirements of the transition process that would see a fully established, capable
and coherent guard force being delivered to Iraqi Ministry of Oil management control by
the end of the second contract year as the original Statement of Objectives envisaged.
Based on the experiences of the previous five months, the Erinys Project Management
Team was under no illusion that the period up to the end of the first contract year would
be anything other than straightforward.
The immediate task facing project management was to consolidate what had been created.
Guard forces, operating under the Coalition Force security umbrella, proved themselves
very effective in protecting fixed sites, but deterring insurgent attacks on vast stretches
of exposed pipeline presented a whole additional range of challenges (both technical and
27
operational) that a lightly armed guard force deploying mobile patrols, supported by a
small aerial surveillance capability, could not fully meet on its own. Two complementary
force development requirements emerged during this phase: the need to extend the OPF’s
guarding operations, and better integrating the OPF into a security infrastructure security
coordination framework in which the concept of graduated joint response would become
a reality.
CHANGES
On the political front, the key development was the announcement of an accelerated
transition of power from the CPA to the Iraqi Governing Council which was to become
the Interim Iraqi Authority in July 2004. The resulting change of atmosphere within the
CPA following the announcement was palpable. Hitherto, the focus was very much on
taking the lead in dealing with the day-to-day problems and solving them. Almost
immediately, the outward orientated drive to put Iraq back on its feet was superseded by
a new focus to implement the transition to follow-on Coalition and Iraqi government entities.
The deterioration of the security situation
showed no signs of abating. Foreign
companies, Coalition Forces and ISF
were being subjected to increasing
numbers of more lethal and systematic
attacks, particularly on the main roads,
and in the major population centres.
The freedom of road movement, on
which Erinys’ OPF management relied
to manage its dispersed operations,
was becoming more difficult because
of the actions of what was now being
labelled by the Coalition as anti-Iraq
forces (AIF).
A civilian armoured vehicle having sustained
an IED attack on the Ramadi - Baghdad road,
February 2004
At the higher levels within the CPA and CJTF-7, and with the handover of power approaching,
the Erinys Project Management Team was an occasional invitee to a CJTF-7 working
group charged with designing a structure and mechanism that would integrate Coalition,
Iraqi and contracted guards into a coherent, nationwide infrastructure security capability.
28
More parochially, Erinys management at all levels had to contend with the lack of continuity
of key CPA, CJTF-7 personnel. Generally, the impact of such changes was directly
proportional to the level at which the changes occurred. The overall effect was that tour
lengths of CPA and CJTF-7 personnel rarely matched project time horizons; discussion
too often reflected short-term needs, touching only briefly on the longer-term and strategic
issues which should have informed the development of the OPF project to a much greater
extent.
Task Force Shield was the single Coalition point of contact for the Project Management
Team to engage.
TASK FORCE SHIELD
Task Force Shield’s Commander was responsible to the CPA’s Contracting
Officer for ensuring compliance with the stipulations of the contract.
In addition to the liaison function already described, Task Force Shield
was the single Coalition point of contact for the Project Management
Team to engage. Task Force Shield sought in this capacity to represent the achievements
of the project to date, and play an active, expert role in efforts to realise the strategic goal
of securing oil infrastructure. He had by implication a vital function in bringing together the
representatives of the various stakeholder organisations to ensure that OPF resources
were used in the most effective, contractually compliant way. Task Force Shield’s output
during Phase One of the project had been constructive: it provided much needed focus
in the CPA, accelerated the implementation process by enabling strong liaison links to be
forged with Coalition Forces, helped the Project Management Team to negotiate many
bureaucratic obstacles, and helped drive forward the deployment of an aerial surveillance
capability.
Senior Management visit to the Rumaylah
Sector accompanied by the Task Force
Shield Liason Officer (South) on secondment
from the British Army. He stands adjacent
to the OPF Iraqi Regional General Manager
- February 2004
29
However, because Task Force Shield straddled both the CPA and CJTF-7, high level
ownership and responsibility for the project at the highest levels was at times confused.
Notwithstanding this, Commander Task Force Shield’s aspirations for standing up his
command so that it could credibly fulfil its roles was never fully supported by the military
chain of command from which he sought his manpower and staff. As a consequence
Task Force Shield was not able to fully realise its intended function as originally conceived.
With limited resources at its disposal Commander Task Force Shield’s primary focus
became the detailed management of the OPF and this exposed a fundamental difference
between what Erinys and Commander Task Force Shield saw as Task Force Shield’s role.
At the heart of this was the perceived belief within Task Force Shield that it ‘commanded’
the OPF. Erinys, as a commercial entity, could not accept this. As the employer of all Iraqi
and international OPF personnel, the Company was accountable for the management of
its assets and responsible for its employees and the consequences of their actions. This
was not always understood by military personnel unaccustomed to working with a civilian
security force.
Commander Task Force Shield’s extensive, Iraq-wide tours, gave him a first-hand feel for
how the force was coming on, but it served to make the Task Force Shield leadership,
and therefore Erinys as a contracted entity which depended on it, virtually invisible where
it increasingly mattered – namely with the Coalition decision makers, and the debates and
forums which were attempting to decide the force’s shape, role and linkages to other
capabilities.
Task Force Shield Liason Officer (North) conducting
an inspection of the on-coming Kirkuk Sector mobile
pipeline patrol shift - May 2004
30
CRANKING THE MOBILISATION HANDLE
During the closing weeks of 2003, the CPA made a commitment to increase the DFI
funding for infrastructure security projects. The most pressing need was to bring contractual
underpinning to the guard force levels to which Erinys had been committed. Task Force
Shield had also successfully argued for the OPF to be substantially expanded. Guard
numbers were to be increased from a contracted 6,500 (although force levels had already
crept above the 11,000 mark by end January) to a maximum of 14,500; the vehicle
strength was to be raised from the current 111 to 500, the majority of which were to be
deployed on pipeline patrols. Higher force levels came with a commensurate slice of
additional communications cover, and
ten additional international managers
bringing the contracted number to
forty16. Thus in addition to consolidating
and operating a nicely maturing guard
force, driving forward the in-theatre
deployment of the aerial surveillance
capability, engaging where possible in
discussion on the OPF’s future, Erinys
found itself with a sizeable mobilisation
task that rehearsed many of the
features of the project’s initial phases.
Morning roll call for the on-coming day
mobile patrol shift. Rumaylah - March 2004
CONFIDENCE AND EFFECT – A MODEL
Erinys’ management capacity was mostly consumed with the huge task of operating and
administering a nation-wide force now numbering in excess of 11,000 guards, and growing.
Whilst the planners, procurers and logisticians were busy in Erinys’ National Headquarters
gearing up for the expansion of the force, regional and sector management continued
with their drive to improve its operational capability. This entailed integrating sites with
sector operations, linking sector to regional operations and binding them with common
standards, procedures and communications. Training, re-training and quality control
remained the principal tasks of operational management, who spent a good deal of their
time travelling between sites, coordinating responses to incidents, and conducting surveys
in response to new tasking orders. Efforts to implement the ‘information shield’ concept
were ongoing, though this proved much more difficult than originally thought; Erinys was
very good at collating local information, but translating that into specific and reliable threat
31
16 In practice, the number of international management committed to the project was now over 80.
data to guide operational planning proved anything but an
exact science17.
Sector and regional managers spent much time conducting
liaison and building working relationships with representatives
of state oil operating companies, director-generals of various
refineries and processing plants, the all-important tribal
leadership, as well as Coalition Force formation and unit
headquarters. Each liaison aspect presented its own challenges
and Task Force Shield liaison officers soon became particularly
adept at circumventing problems. Meanwhile, officials from
Iraqi state oil and gas operating companies were becoming
acclimatised to the presence of the OPF and its international
management, and this did help ease some hitherto tense
relationships.
Access control at the Bayji Refinery - March 2004
The Erinys approach to tribal relations was considered by US Army Civil Affairs officers
and other US civilian staff based at 1st Infantry Division Headquarters in Tikrit as the
template to apply elsewhere in Iraq.
Liaison with tribal leaders deserves a special mention as it was a very important component
of regional and sector management work. Tribal affiliations had been suppressed during
the Saddam regime, and the power of the tribes was in abeyance. The political vacuum
that followed the dismantling of the Ba’athist state apparatus was very quickly and ably
filled by the major tribal leaders, who in the absence of any other structures re-established
themselves as the bulwark of local communities. In areas where the tribal dimension
dominated the local landscape, the OPF community relations effort was synonymous with
developing and maintaining excellent relationships with often powerful tribal sheikhs.
The relationships between tribes and the OPF was often complex and required continual
maintenance. The OPF areas of responsibility crossed the boundaries of tribes who were
rarely in agreement on any issues affecting the security of oil infrastructure occupying their
land. Erinys relied on the tribes’ consent to recruit its members as guards. In some of the
more hard-line areas, Erinys had to obtain tribal assurances that international management
would not be harmed. This was the case in the Bayji and Hadithah areas of the Northern
Region. Over a period of eight months, Erinys’ international management, assisted by its
17 Erinys was clear on its remit in this difficult area. Erinys was not contracted to conduct intelligence operations per se and was
therefore very careful not to associate itself directly with the Coalition intelligence gathering effort. To do so would have had adverse
consequences on international managements ability to sustain the commitment of its Iraqi workforce.
32
Iraqi counterpart, patiently developed such good relations with key tribal sheikhs that the
safe establishment of forward operating bases in areas considered by Coalition Forces
as ‘no-go’ was made possible.
Commander Task Force Shield also understood the importance of the tribal dimension
and became very seized by the idea of using tribes to support the security effort on
Northern Region pipelines. He secured DFI funding to effectively outsource the hiring of
tribal pipeline guard forces to tribal leaders. Tribal guards raised using this scheme were
placed under the nominal control of the NOC’s long-serving Deputy Director General – a
Kurd who was later that year assassinated outside his home in Kirkuk. The scheme to
outsource pipeline security directly to tribes had some unfortunate side-effects that serve
to illustrate how well intentioned initiatives sometimes worked against the goal of securing
infrastructure. First, it was tantamount to paying tribes not to attack the pipeline – with
its obvious potential for blackmail. Second, it undermined Erinys’ efforts to engage the
tribes in order to fulfil its mission. Last, it went against the vision for a single coherent oil
security force, trained uniformed, and under a single, unified operational management
that Task Force Shield was charged with overseeing. This approach was fundamentally
different to that used by Erinys, which, wherever possible, sought to engage tribes as
partners by employing their people as trained and uniformed Erinys OPF guards. The
Erinys approach to tribal relations was considered by US Army Civil Affairs officers and
other US civilian staff based at 1st Infantry Division Headquarters in Tikrit as the template
to apply elsewhere in Iraq.
Meanwhile the OPF was increasingly engaged
with more and more incidents. Fixed sites came
under sporadic indirect fire, and attacks against
pipeline patrols were commonplace. Regional and
sector headquarters did not escape the onslaught.
In the south, Nasiriyah Sector Headquarters
suffered damage in a truck bomb attack against
the Italian Coalition contingent headquarters.
Fortunately, Erinys suffered no casualties. Later
in the year, Erinys international sector management
had to be hastily smuggled from the town in the
Nasiriyah Sector Headquarter offices in the
aftermath of the suicide truck bombing on
the Italian occupied CPA building - the
Headquarters was 50 metres from the blast
boots of cars to escape death threats from the Mahdi Army militia. The Headquarters
remained operationally effective under the command of a very capable Iraqi sector manager
who maintained an uneasy truce with the militia, allowing guard force operations to
33
continue. Amarah Sector Headquarters also had on several occasions to be temporarily
evacuated. In the Central Region, the Najaf Sector Headquarters was evacuated following
an attempt by Shia militias to take it over, and relocated to Baghdad. In the Northern
Region, the Regional Headquarters in Kirkuk suffered
numerous artillery, rocket, small arms and IED attacks which
claimed the lives of several Iraqi OPF guards. It was in many
ways miraculous that none of the volatile refining or storage
installations suffered a direct hit. Mosul Sector Headquarters,
located on the edge of Mosul Dam, was attacked and had
to relocate to a Coalition Force installation south of the city.
Again, no casualties were sustained, but the incident
demonstrated the value of Coalition Force direct support to a lightly armed guard force
Commander of Task Force Shield surveying
damaged pipelines at AL-Fatah Crossing
during times of heightened threat. At the request of the Sector Manager, Coalition Forces
provided over-watch on the headquarters. That support was re-deployed elsewhere as
the upsurge of AIF activity took hold in the Sunni triangle. The night that the Coalition
detachment moved off, a well armed force of insurgents attacked the Headquarters
complex using rocket propelled grenades and small arms fire.
The highest profile incident of that period was the defeat by OPF guards and Coalition
naval forces of a boat-borne suicide bomb attack on Iraq’s off-shore oil terminals
south of Umm Qasr port on 24th April.
As the threat increased so too did the number of OPF successes – a function of higher
force levels and improving drills and organisation as the graph at Figure 10 suggests.
Pipeline patrols were becoming adept at both interdicting AIF and finding improvised
explosive devices (IEDs) placed against pipelines - and with the help of Coalition and Iraqi
explosive ordnance disposal units - neutralising increasing numbers of them. Fixed oil
sites ranging from refineries to storage depots were slowly being re-claimed from the
malevolent clutches of organised crime, smugglers and extortionists. Illegal tapping
operations, very prevalent in the Southern Region, were being consistently intercepted
leading to the arrest of smugglers and the impounding of their vehicles which were handed
over to the Iraqi Police.
The highest profile incident of that period was the defeat by OPF guards and Coalition
naval forces of a boat-borne suicide bomb attack on Iraq’s off-shore oil terminals south
of Umm Qasr port on 24th April. OPF guards, only recently deployed onto the terminals
34
as part of the ongoing consolidation process, caused the premature detonation of two
of the three attacking boats by engaging them with small arms fire. The third boat was
intercepted by Coalition naval forces, which suffered casualties in the resulting detonation.
Had the off-shore terminals been damaged by the attack, Iraq’s ability to export oil, already
severely constrained by attacks on the northern export pipelines, would have been brought
to its knees and the economic repercussions would have been severe.
...the Erinys approach to building and managing the force was unequivocally validated
by the CPA Senior Advisor for Infrastructure Security who, in a report on infrastructure
security to Ambassador Bremer, stated that the Erinys OPF was
“…widely recognised as the model for other infrastructure security programs”.
The most striking demonstration of the OPF’s steadfastness and growing maturity was
made in April and May during a period of sustained insurgent violence across Iraq. Unlike
some of the recently created Iraqi Army, National Guard and police units who suffered
desertion and defections, the OPF remained loyal and continued in the execution of its
mission. No oil installations were lost. The OPF’s achievements during this period and the
Erinys approach to building and managing the force was unequivocally validated by the
CPA Senior Advisor for Infrastructure Security who, in a report on infrastructure security
to Ambassador Bremer, stated that the Erinys OPF was
“…widely recognised as the model for other infrastructure security programs”.
This success was widely attributed to embedded Erinys international management and
its close working relationship with its Iraqi counterpart.
Evening guard at the Rumaylah South Sector Headquarters
35
SUMMARY
By the end of this phase, the OPF numbered over 14,500 guards and management
deployed on over 280 sites and sections of strategically significant pipelines across Iraq.
The aerial surveillance capability was operational and supporting the pipeline security effort
in the Northern and Central Regions. The equipment and communications roll-out had
been completed; the force was fully established.
Access control in Mosul Sector
Operations Centre at Erinys national Headquarters
Perimeter tower at the Al-Dourah refinery complex
36
PHASE FOUR: AUGUST - DECEMBER 2004
TRANSITION AND HAND-OVER
NEW GOVERNMENT AND EXTENSION
The underlying political thrust during this phase and the principal strategic focus of the
new Coalition apparatus was that of preparing Iraq for democratic elections scheduled
for January 2005. Just seven months remained to generate sufficient capacity within the
Iraqi civil administration to administer elections, and for Coalition Forces to come to grips
with the insurgency bent on doing all it could to derail the electoral process.
The arrival of MNF-I preceded that of the CPA’s dissolution. Erinys Project Management,
with the help of Task Force Shield, was already beginning to find its way around the new
military organisation by the time the US Diplomatic Mission, led by the recently appointed
Ambassador Negroponte, arrived in Iraq. The structures, procedures and personalities
with which Erinys had become familiar during the preceding ten months were all in the
process of changing. The CPA’s Senior Oil Advisor’s office was subsumed into IRMO as
its ‘Oil’ section.
The transition of power from the CPA to the Iraqi Interim Gover nment headed by Dr
Ayad Alawi, changed the dynamics of the relationships between Coalition political and
advisory entities on the one hand and Iraqi ministers and their officials on the other. Before
the transition, the Coalition had executed its remit con brio. Now that was to change to
sotto voce. The political imperative in advance of democratic elections can be summed
up in the phrase ‘Iraq for the Iraqis’; the Interim Iraqi authorities had to be seen to take
the lead in the rebuilding of their country. The transition also gave Iraqi ministries control
of DFI funds, a great proportion of which had been committed to contracts let under the
auspices of the CPA.
AN OLD SECURITY AGENDA WITH A NEW HOME
With the first contract year rapidly coming to an end, a newly arrived and supportive
Commander Task Force Shield was firmly focused on the process of negotiating terms
for the contract’s second ‘option’ year. However, Coalition ‘institutional’ understanding
of the OPF project had attenuated during the transition period and, whilst MNF-I clearly
saw infrastructure security as part of its broad remit, it seemed to have difficulty engaging
with either project management or Task Force Shield to determine how the OPF could
37
best be integrated into the Coalition’s evolving operational concept for securing infrastructure.
Headquarters MNF-I’s focus on wider security matters and Task Force Shield’s unsuccessful
attempts to anchor itself within MNF-I meant that the future of the OPF was left for others
within the PCO and IRMO to decide.
At the same time, the Ministry of Oil, now in control of DFI funds earmarked by the CPA
upon exit for the continuance of the project, added its own perspectives to the mix18. It
became clear that the Minister of Oil was intent on taking greater responsibility for securing
his oil infrastructure.
Finally, the transfer of DFI to Iraqi ministerial control did have immediate ramifications on
A recruiting poster for the Iraqi security forces. An OPF guard takes his place next to members of the new Iraqi Army, the
Police Service and the Iraqi National Guard
18 Although over US$ 30 million were physically located in the bowels of the Ministry of Oil building, the Minister of Oil had to gain
Ministry of Finance approval for its disbursement.
38
all contracts using this funding stream, the Erinys OPF project included. PCO took over
the responsibility for administering the contractual aspects of the project and was to take
an active part in the negotiations that were to come. However, other than through moral
suasion, it had no means of getting the Ministry of Oil to commit the funds already allocated
for the contract’s option year.
THE TRANSITION – PLANNING AND CONSEQUENCES
It took over five difficult weeks from the issue of the Request for Proposal for the OPF
contract to be formally extended. Work on the contract renegotiations started in earnest
shortly after the transition of power to the Iraqi Interim authorities at the end of June.
Commander Task Force Shield, as the Contracting Officer’s technical representative, was
charged with drafting a Statement of Work outlining what Erinys was required to do beyond
the end of the contract’s first year.
The General Manager of Erinys
Iraq Limited at the Ministry of
Oil waiting to see the Minister
to deliver his regular briefings
on the OPF
During this process, it became clear that the full second option year of the contract would
not be exercised and instead of a deliberate transition to Iraqi control, Erinys would be
committed to an accelerated hand-over to be achieved by the end of that year. This was
not unexpected. The political implications of a foreshortened process to hand Iraq back
to Iraqi control, which had as its centrepiece democratic elections early in the following
year, would inevitably reach down to the OPF project; the prospect of having a foreign
security company securing the nation’s principal natural resource was politically unacceptable
in the new climate.
The signing of the contract extension had an immediate impact on the project management
organisation at all levels. In Erinys’ national Head Office, the Project Management Team
was reconfigured into a transition team and began the process of turning Erinys’ Technical
39
Proposal into a detailed transition plan. Acting on the Minister’s requests to lower the
profile of the project’s international management, Erinys set about reducing their number
from over 80 to the contracted level of 40. Sector level international management was
withdrawn and consolidated at regional headquarters as Regional Training and Liaison
Teams (RTLTs). Expatriate staff that came off the project and wanted to continue working
in Iraq were redeployed on to other Erinys projects after well deserved spells of leave.
The reduction of the international management footprint in the sectors and regions took
away the in-place ‘neutral’ cover, source of technical expertise and Coalition Force liaison
capability on which Erinys’ Iraqi OPF management still heavily relied. Although the newly
formed RTLTs continued to oversee site and sector operations by conducting regular visits
and coordinating regional operations, the consequences of the removal of hands-on
engagement by international staff quickly manifested themselves.
Iraqi OPF management became increasingly and directly exposed to corrupt elements
and the volatile tribal and ethnic pressures which were particularly prevalent in the Northern
Region. This served gradually to erode the OPF’s impartiality and morale, and effectively
ended its efforts to tackle corruption on major oil sites. Iraqi OPF management prepared
to stand up to the activities of organised crime were occasionally arrested on trumpedup charges framed by elements of the Iraqi Police working in collusion with local crime
gangs and corrupt site officials. As a result, Erinys lost a good few of its best Iraqi
management, which it had trained and nurtured during the past year. This proved a blow
to the project management’s aspiration for leaving the force under trained management
– in good hands - once it had departed from the project.
The OPF’s ability to work closely alongside Coalition Force units was also affected. RTLTs,
supported by Task Force Shield liaison officers, were still able to maintain links with Coalition
formation headquarters, and indeed with ISF and Iraqi first-responder agencies. However,
local links to Coalition units which often relied on personal relationships between unit
leadership and the OPF’s international management, were gradually lost. With the departure
of international management from the sectors went, for all sorts of inevitable cultural and
language reasons, the trust that had been slowly developed between the OPF and Coalition
units. This effectively ended, at the sector and site level, the OPF’s ability to plan and
trigger joint responses to attacks by AIF. The concept of graduated joint response, which
relied so heavily on the OPF’s ability to integrate itself with other, more capable forces at
the tactical level, was in danger of becoming nothing more than a colourful briefing slide19.
The OPF was, as a result of important short-term politically driven transition requirements,
19 One of the most important roles of detailed liaison was to minimise the potential for fratricide (‘blue-on-blue’ engagements) by
Coalition units against OPF. Both the Northern and Central Regions had lost OPF guards through Coalition ‘friendly fire’ incidents.
40
being consigned to greater isolation within the security capability spectrum. Its Iraqi
management and guards were not only being assailed by AIF targeting oil infrastructure,
and occasionally their homes, but by corrupt officials as well as other local tribal and ethnic
pressure which it was not equipped to withstand. Erinys international management did
all that it could to maintain operational capability, but the task was simply too big for the
RTLTs to have anything other than a delaying effect on the force’s slowly declining operational
effectiveness20.
HAND-OVER AND ENDGAME
The transition period was a particularly difficult time for the project’s Iraqi and international
management. Already working flat out to manage the operation with fewer numbers,
RTLTs had also to contend with the detailed and time consuming tasks of preparing for
formal OPF management courses to be held on the Al-Dourah refinery complex, preparing
a great number of assets for hand-over to Ministry officials, and planning their own
extraction from regional bases.
Graduation ceremony for an Erinys OPF first
responder course, one of many held during the
second year of the contract
It was also an uncertain time for the Erinys Iraqi guards who were understandably concerned
over their future livelihood. Their confidence in the Ministry of Oil’s ability to manage the
force had already been tested by delays in payroll administration caused by late invoice
payments. As the hand-over date closed in, the Ministry was only able to give the most
general assurances that all guards would be employed after transition. However, these
were not reinforced by employment terms, salary details, or employment contracts. The
41
20 The effect of international managements’ lower profile varied from region to region. The development of Central Region’s Iraqi
management was most advanced for the simple reason that there was a ready supply of highly capable Iraqis to recruit from.
Consequently, international management were able to adopt a mentoring and supporting role much earlier than in the other regions.
lack of firm commitments affected the morale of the OPF’s Iraqi senior management most
of all; some resigned their posts to look for employment elsewhere; others resolved to
quit after Erinys’ time had ended. This development concerned project management
greatly as it would have a detrimental impact on the force’s future. It therefore spent a
great deal of time reassuring the OPF workforce that their jobs would be secure, at the
same time encouraging the Ministry to set out concrete employment terms.
By the last week of December, Erinys’ RTLTs had withdrawn
back to Al-Mansour. The force was now in the hands of
Erinys’ Iraqi management – under employment until the
end of the year and facing an uncertain future. The OPF,
together with the assets that belonged to the Ministry
under the terms of the contract, was formally handed over
to the Minister of Oil at the end of the year. Erinys’ direct
involvement in protecting Iraq’s oil infrastructure ceased
at midnight on 31st December. It was the end of an era.
SUMMARY
The OPF Asset Register; one of
the many trunk loads of databases,
records and manuals presented to
the Ministry of Oil on hand-over
The trials and tribulations of this last phase of the project in many respects rehearsed the
challenges that Erinys management overcame in the preceding phases. They were
symptomatic of a long-term aspiration to place oil infrastructure security on a sound footing
under Ministry of Oil management being tested against the sensitive political exigencies
of the time. Erinys project management was content in the knowledge that together with
its Iraqi employees, it had achieved what the original contract intended.
In the end, the progress of the OPF from establishment to transition and
ultimately hand-over, mirrored that of a nation also in transition and moving
to take control of its own destiny.
42
PART THREE - CONCLUSIONS AND SOME LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE
LOOKING BACK
Erinys’ experiences on the oil security project left an indelible impression on its management.
It was the first time that the Company performed a task of such avowed strategic importance
on such a scale in such demanding conditions. Notwithstanding the parochial, day-today battles that were part and parcel of prosecuting the project in Iraq, Erinys management
could not help but be utterly astounded at and humbled by the sheer scale, energy and
unflinching commitment of the US led nation-building enterprise in Iraq.
Nonetheless, Erinys also observed that the corollary to both the size and diversity21 was
great complexity. This at times caused the strategic goal of securing oil infrastructure to
become obscured by factional interests - each with its own interpretation of how the goal
set out with great clarity by the Coalition’s leadership was to be achieved.
Erinys management could not help but be utterly astounded at and humbled by the
sheer scale, energy and unflinching commitment of the US led nation-building
enterprise in Iraq.
Erinys counts itself privileged to have played a small but significant part in the Coalition’s
nation-building efforts. The observations that follow are primarily focused on the main
lessons that Erinys, a commercial enterprise, learned through its experiences on the oil
security project.
OUTPUT AND PERFORMANCE
The project was often blighted by differences in interpretation of what the output should
be. A mission to ‘protect’ is superficially straightforward until the question is asked by the
contractor: ‘Against what level of threat?’ Task Force Shield was responsible for ensuring
contractual compliance and had great difficulty in defining or getting consensus on what
the OPF’s limit of exploitation should be. Erinys’ senior management, brought up in the
British Army traditions of operating in complex environments, and with experience of
running guard forces in Africa, South America and elsewhere in the Middle East, believed
that it had a more instinctive understanding of a guard force’s limitations, but had great
difficulty in articulating that to Task Force Shield and others. The view in Coalition and
43
21 Diversity in this sense relates to both the Coalition’s impressive multi-national dimension and the bewildering array of US Government
civil and military organisations represented in the Coalition.
Ministry of Oil circles tended towards protection as an absolute: failure to prevent an attack
was considered a failure of the contractor to fulfil the task that he was being paid to carry
out. No consistent consideration was given to other mitigating factors such as the level
of threat that a guard force had to face and the limited capabilities and powers it had at
its disposal to do so. Erinys and Task Force Shield’s attempts to define and enshrine an
OPF concept of operations based on a graduated joint response went some way in
offsetting the tendency to view protection as an absolute concept. But it was no substitute
for setting out more clearly defined contract outputs, not just in terms of numbers of
guards and sites to be manned, but also in terms of capability and effect. Winning
agreement on outputs from a group of diverse stakeholders, each with their own
requirements, was something that Erinys did not achieve. As a result, project management
was often consigned to fighting rear-guard actions with Coalition staff, who expected
more than a guard force was realistically able to deliver.
Linked to the matter of defining output is the issue of measuring performance. Without
clearly defined outputs, setting performance parameters becomes a nigh-on impossible
task. The project was very adept at churning out useful data on incidents and these gave
some idea of performance in terms of IEDs found, smugglers arrested and attacks defeated.
Equally, Task Force Shield spend a great deal of time counting the contracted number of
assets (essentially inputs) including people, vehicles, weapons, uniforms, radio equipment
and the like, to ensure compliance. However, incident data and measurement of inputs
only gave a partial indication of a force’s performance. How, for example, should the
deterrent effect of a guard force be measured? These and other difficult performance
related questions were never satisfactorily addressed by Erinys and the Coalition stakeholders.
The result was that no common performance criteria were used to evaluate the OPF’s
contribution to the infrastructure security effort and Erinys’ performance on the contract
more objectively. This created the conditions for some ill informed and not always
complimentary speculation on the OPF’s effectiveness in discharging its mission.
The lesson for future projects of this nature is clear: outputs and performance measures
should, if at all possible, be agreed from the outset, and when conditions change, updated
as required.
LINKAGES AND LEVELS
The project was too often bogged down in junior and middle management level battles
between different parts of the Coalition apparatus. Task Force Shield was the appointed
interface between Coalition interests and that of the contractor. However, it was never
44
able to represent the project at the appropriate decision-making level when it mattered,
and instead became a victim of the factional battles that did little to help the project
progress. The project cried out for strategic ownership and this was never really achieved.
It is true that Erinys senior project management was able to engage Coalition decision
makers when it had to, but this course of action was used very sparingly. It was reserved
for instances when the very continuance of the project was under threat and tended to
involve bypassing the established channels which mostly went through Task Force Shield.
The resulting top level interventions often saved the day – unblocking bureaucratic impasses
within Coalition and Iraqi entities.
Given the strategic importance of the task in which the Erinys OPF had such a visible role,
it follows that project management should have had continual and direct links into the
highest decision-making level. Erinys did not have dedicated resource in-country with
regular, continual access to the top level of the Coalition’s leadership. All too often, the
OPF project alighted on the leadership’s consciousness in the event of a drama that the
Coalition’s engine room either failed to solve, or had a hand in creating. It is conceivable
therefore that the leadership tended to see the project as a sequence of problems, in a
country with a sea of problems, all requiring top level attention.
Erinys now understands that it was too focused on the very large demands of delivering
the project; it was too pre-occupied with looking downwards when it should have placed
equal importance on looking upwards. Had it done so, the many struggles which were
symptomatic of the gap between the ends, and the ways and means, could perhaps have
been avoided. The strategic focus would have been more easily maintained and the
collective goal of securing oil infrastructure would have been more effectively realised.
Moreover, the Coalition leadership would have had the benefit of a more balanced and
informed view of the OPF and its many achievements.
THE CONTRIBUTION OF OUR IRAQI MANAGEMENT
Without the commitment, guidance and sacrifices of this impressive, trusted,
dedicated, competent, and courageous cadre of Iraqi management, the OPF project
would not have succeed in the way that it did.
From the beginning of the project, Erinys sought out Iraqi management that was able to
act as the interface between international management and Erinys’ Iraqi guards. The
45
Company was very fortunate in discovering a rich seam of management talent in the ranks
of retired Iraqi Air Force pilots and middle ranking Iraqi Army officers, all of whom spoke
excellent English having undergone training in the UK and US, were respected in the local
community, and importantly, understood some of the ‘expat’ management foibles to which
all Erinys international management were occasionally prone.
Erinys’ senior Iraqis were at the forefront of managing relations with the Iraqi authorities,
Ministry of Oil officials, director generals of state oil companies and refineries. They
represented the Company at the wakes of OPF guards killed, and looked out for the
security and well-being of the expats. They arbitrated and settled workforce disputes and
provided leadership to their Iraqi colleagues. When it was required, they gave encouragement
to international management. They ensured that the considerable Home Nation dimension
that touched every aspect of Erinys’ operations was taken care of, allowing international
project management to focus on the direction of the project and the management of its
relations with Coalition entities. Without the commitment, guidance and sacrifices of this
impressive, trusted, dedicated, competent, and courageous cadre of Iraqi management,
the OPF project would not have succeed in the way that it did.
CONCLUSION
Erinys was the crucible in which the creation of the OPF came together. Above all, the
success of the project is testament to an eclectic mix of people who worked as a very
effective team in an extraordinary time and place in history, and through sheer bloodyminded determination created something that made a difference for the better.
Guards at the Erinys national Headquarters having
voted in Iraq’s January 2004 general election. All
guards on duty that day exercised their democratic
right to vote for the first time in their lives
46
47
Appendix A
RFP DABV01-03-B-001
Solicitation for Security Services
DABV01-03-B-0001
17 July-Noon, 25 July
STATEMENT OF OBJECTIVES
The Iraqi Ministry of Oil seeks to contract for a security infrastructure to protect the petrochemical industry
throughout Iraq. The concept is for a contractor to initially provide the preponderance of the security architecture
and then slowly transfer that responsibility to Iraqi control over a two year time frame. The end state is a well
trained guard force and mature security infrastructure capable of protecting the multibillion dollar oil infrastructure.
The Ministry of Oil seeks to have the contractor(s) provide a technical proposal that will include the contractor's
concept to execute the security infrastructure required. Contractor's capabilities, experience and past performance
should be identified in the technical proposal. As a minimum, the technical proposal must identify based upon
their knowledge how they plan to hire, vett, train, equip and operate a guard force from the Iraqi populace. This
security force needs to be of sufficient size and have the skill set to meet the infrastructure requirements. The
training received must include the use of force, identification examination, verbal de-escalation skills, defensive
tactics, threat reduction, weapons skills, first aid skills, and explosive device detection and evacuation procedures.
Contractor should address a continuous education system to professionally develop individuals identified in
leadership positions, entry level and managerial positions. Contractor will identify the standards they will use
in establishing and determining the graduates will be technically and tactically proficient and be prepared to
assume positions in the oil asset protection force. As a minimum, graduates must be capable of being licensed
IAW guidance from the Ministry of the Interior. Contractor will be required to establish a database and produce
ID cards for all the personnel graduating from the contractor's training program. The technical proposal must
propose the security infrastructure required to provide the command and control for the security force and needs
to include personnel to assist the Ministry of Oil in standing up the security infrastructure.
Lead contractor person would be responsible for all security matters and act as lead security advisor to the
Ministry of Oil. This person would be equivalent to an Executive Vice President of a medium-sized American
Corporation. Contractor should identify their key personnel's knowledge and experience in the oil security
industry who will be establishing the security plan for the oil infrastructure. Contractor will submit a list of five
(5) contracts of the same or similar type to demonstrate previous experiences. The list should indicate the scope
of the contracts. Contractor will also submit as part of the proposal, resumes of the top three personnel who will
be involved in the project. To evaluate past performance, the contractor will submit a list of 5 previous contracts
they had completed. The list will include the contract number, a point of contact, a good telephone number, and
email address.
Contractor must identify their timeline to accomplish an assessment of approximately 140 key sites and security
site plans developed based on the assessments.
Contractor should address in technical proposal how they expect to accomplish logistics to include such items
as vehicles, weapons, ammunition, communications, uniforms, life support and barrier materials.
Contractor should address any proposed reporting procedures (i.e., sitreps, incidents, etc) in the technical proposal.
Contractors with acceptable technical proposals will be asked to submit cost proposals.
48
49
Europe
25 Grosvenor Street
London W1K 4QN
United Kingdom
Middle East
Old Bank of Kuwait Building
Deira, Dubai
United Arab Emirates
Africa
Erinys House
Mulberry Hill Office Park
Johannesburg, South Africa
Tel: +44 (0) 20 7499 4900
Fax: +44 (0) 20 7499 4991
Tel: +971 4 22 33 646
Fax: +971 4 22 70 099
Tel: +27 (0) 11 469 3926
Fax: +27 (0) 11 469 3927
www.erinysinternational.com

the erinys iraq oil protection force

Transcription

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