Russias 21th century - The Re

2014
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Russias 21th century - The Re-emergence of a Superpower ?
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Omar Aa. Souary - 38581
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Vejleders navn:
Annemarie Peen Rodt
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7/10-2014
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Indhold
Abstract ............................................................................................................................................... 4
Resume: ............................................................................................................................................... 4
Chapter 1 ................................................................................................................................................. 8
Introduction ........................................................................................................................................ 8
Motivation ........................................................................................................................................... 8
Re-emerging superpower.................................................................................................................. 10
The identity of a new superpower ................................................................................................ 11
Hypothesis ......................................................................................................................................... 13
Chosen topic and relevance .............................................................................................................. 15
Contemporary relevance............................................................................................................... 15
Limitations ......................................................................................................................................... 18
Chapter 2 – Method and Theory ........................................................................................................... 23
Method .............................................................................................................................................. 23
Sources .......................................................................................................................................... 23
Choice of empirical data................................................................................................................ 23
Methododical framework ................................................................................................................. 24
Theoretical framework ...................................................................................................................... 25
Neo-realism and natural resources ............................................................................................... 25
Energy securitization: ........................................................................................................................ 28
Theory of the three dimensions ........................................................................................................ 29
The Great power ........................................................................................................................... 30
The Empire .................................................................................................................................... 30
The Civilization .............................................................................................................................. 30
Chapter 3 – analysis .............................................................................................................................. 32
A 21st Century Russian Federation. .................................................................................................. 32
Changing relationships .................................................................................................................. 32
The nuclear stockpile .................................................................................................................... 34
Creating a new profile of an enemy .............................................................................................. 35
The connection between the new Russia and Vladimir Putin: Period of the Oligarchs: .............. 35
The Russian Economy during the presidency of Vladimir Putins first two terms: ........................ 36
Present status of the Russian natural gas industry ....................................................................... 38
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Now ............................................................................................................................................... 38
Sources of the gas ......................................................................................................................... 40
Future of the gas industry ............................................................................................................. 43
The connection between Vladimir Putin and focus on natural gas .............................................. 45
The larger picture .............................................................................................................................. 46
Identity crisis ................................................................................................................................. 46
Empire. .............................................................................................................................................. 48
Civilization ......................................................................................................................................... 53
Vladimir Putin ................................................................................................................................ 56
Great Power ...................................................................................................................................... 57
Conclusion ............................................................................................................................................. 59
Perspectivization ............................................................................................................................... 61
References............................................................................................................................................. 64
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Abstract: Russia is currently the largest supplier of gas to the European market and this
position has had consequences for Europe. This was seen with the pricing disputes between
Russia and Ukraine which affected several nations in Europe. This thesis explores the
ambitions and motivations in the Russian government in relations to its natural gas. Further a
analysis of the Russian identity in the post-cold war era is conducted using concepts
developed by Roger Kanet and Pavel Baev.
Resume:
This paper is the natural gas industry of the Russian Federation. The paper aims to investigate
the relations between the natural gas industry of the Russian Federations and how this
industry is related to other parts of the Russian society. Russia has the largest known reserves
of natural gas in the world, and is the largest single provider of natural gas to the European
Union, and parts of Europe. The relations between Russia and Europe have seen its problems
throughout the 2000s and have strained relations between the two. This paper will through a
hypothesis and a following analysis explore how Russia uses it natural gas in various parts of
its society. This is done using a concept described by Roger Kanet in his book Russia: Reemerging Great Power which employs the idea that Russia is regaining a position of
superpower in the international system. A second concept that is used is developed by Pavel
Baev in his book Russian Energy Policy and Military Power. This concept involves three
dimensions called Great Power, Civilization and Empire which are Pavel Baevs method of
describing aspects of Russian society and how they have changed since the end of the Cold
War. Each of the three dimensions are used to explore whether Russia is becoming a
superpower again.
Using these concepts this paper explores the idea of whether Russia is becoming a
superpower again using its natural gas and how this shows itself in the Russian internal and
external policies. Regarding internal policies it is explored what kind of effect it had on the
Russian society when the Cold War ended. This period following the dissolution of the Soviet
Union was a turbulent era, and the paper aims to analyses what affect this had on the way the
Russians view themselves and how they define their identity after the cold war, and more
specifically in the period where Vladimir Putin has been president of the Federation. The
three areas that are explored using the three dimension can be summed up thusly.
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
Empire: Russian and her relations with neighboring states, in particular relations with
south Asian states from which Russia imports natural gas, and the relations with
Ukraine

Great Power: Russian past history as a superpower and how this past is has formed
Russian views on their own current and potential status

Civilization: The national identity of Russia was in flux following the dissolution of
the Soviet Union and how Russia is developing a new national identity, and how this
is related to the precedencies of Vladimir Putin.
The neo-realism theory is used as correlation with these concepts to illustrate how certain
actions fit in to how a Russia is affecting the position in the international system. What is used
are two of the sub categories referred to as Defensive realism and Offensive realism. Both
categories have their own views on the best way a nation can improve its position in the
hierarchical system, and when used in combination with the concepts they provide insight in
to the political maneuverings of the Russian Federation.
Conclusion reached in the analysis:

The natural gas resources of Russia have been moved front and center as the form of
power that Russia employs in building a new position for the Russian nation. Where
nuclear weapons were the security foundation of the Soviet Unions, they have now
moved to a secondary role. Natural gas is the foundation on which Russia intends to
maintain its role a superpower. This can be seen in the way that the EU and USA have
responded to the annexation of Crimea. While sanctions have been put in place, they
are not aimed at the natural gas industry of Russia, and it is concluded that this shows
that Russia have attained a strong position using their natural gas

The relationship between Russia and the Central Asian nations have not changed
greatly since the Soviet era. These nations remain closely tied to Russia through
economic ties such as Russia being the largest importer of the natural gas extracted in
the region. Second, Russia has through acquisitions gained a foothold in the energy
sectors of nations in the Central Asian nations. Using Baevs dimension of Empire The
analysis showed that Russia have maintained its ambitions to have an active role in the
internal policies of its neighboring states. Using theoretical and historical precedents it
5
is argued that it is an ingrained part of Russian foreign policy to be closely involved in
the internal affairs of its neighbors

Russian national identity was in a state of change following the cold war. In the
analysis the conclusion is reached that Russia have found a new identity, but that this
is not a completely new identity. It is one that is based on a combination of existing
ideas ingrained in Russian society, and newer formulized ideas that are derived from
adapting to the changes following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The
precedencies of Vladimir Putin have also played a role in this new identity.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Many nations have in the 20th century undergone large upheavals in the political and social
areas, and Russia is no exception in this context. From the Tsar Empire to Soviet Union and
then on to the process of developing a state where the population can vote for their leaders,
All in the span of a hundred years and the changes do not seem to have found a slower pace
under the 8 and 4 year presidencies of Vladimir Putin, separated by an interim presidency of
Demitry Medvedev. Since the end of the Soviet era, Russia has been in the process of finding
a new role on the international stage.
In the period of that Vladimir Putin have been president he have formulated a strategy that
Russia should use its natural gas resources. The natural gas resources have gained significant
amount of attention over the last decade, mainly due to a series of disputes between Russia
and Ukraine that had wide effects on the Europe. This attention has raised some questions and
concerns that I intend to look closer at. The questions are often related to what are the reasons
that Russia have chosen to focus much of their attention on natural gas, and what are their
long-term ambitions in the area? Another question relates to the how the natural gas relates to
the Russian society. After the cold war they began the transition towards a new method of
governance. The question here is have Russia abandoned all the ideas that were at the center
of Russia during the Soviet years? Further, if Russia have ambitions relating to their natural
resources, then this will affect other nations. Russia imports natural gas from countries in the
Central Asian region, and they primarily export this gas through Ukraine in to Europe. How
will these long term ambitions of Russia affect their neighbors? These are the areas that I
intend to explore and analyze.
Motivation:
Energy securitization is vital to any modern industrial country, and the interdependence that
this breeds in the world is an area that will only continue to grow. Natural gas has since the
late 1980’ies been seen as a source that help with the ever increasing demand for energy in
large parts of the world. It is expected to overtake coal, or at least, settle as the same demand
by 2020. Between 1997 and 2020 the demand for gas is expected to rise by 80% , with Europe
taking about 20% of this increase in demand(Banks 2007:49)
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In the period between 2004 and 2014, there were six disputes between Russia and Ukraine
regarding the pricing of natural gas. The disputes where centered around the prices of the gas
that is being transported through Ukraine and on the other downstream customers in Europe.
In 2008 there was also a dispute between Russia and Belarus regarding the same issue of
pricing. The 2009 dispute resulted in Russia turning off the supplies of gas to Ukraine and in
doing so, the deliveries to the rest of Europe was also interrupted.
The series of events highlighted in particular two things: The position that Russia had gained
as nation that could involve its energy exports in its dealings with other states. Second, that
large parts of Europe was susceptible to disruptions in it energy due to a dispute between to
singular states. While both of these are important areas of research, there is also the question
of how Russia intends to use this position in regards to its domestic issues and foreign policy?
The areas however have been my main motivation for looking at Russia is based in part on the
dispute between Russia and Ukraine regarding the price of gas that flared up in 2008. It
suddenly became very clear to even the average citizen in Europe just how dependent much of
Europe is on the gas flowing from Russia. But in the discourse that I have been following
over the years, the general debate seems to fall on the topic of how Europe will deal with a
possible unbreakable dependency on Russian and not often on what is driving the Russians to
focus so much on this area. This is the area that I see as deserving more research as it has
impacts on not only Europe, but also the countries in central Asia. The topic of how Europe is
becoming dependent on a single nation is important, but it is equally important to understand
the motivations of Russia. Looking at it from an economic perspective is not enough in order
to understand the Russian side of the story. Acquiring wealth and dismissing the underlying
motivations presents and unclear image, and it is here that I intend to paint a clearer picture.
Getting a clearer picture of the intentions of nation that have global ambitions is important in
order to understand how this nation might affect the international communiity
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Re-emerging superpower
Another purpose of this thesis is to elaborate on a concept called “Re-emerging great power”.
The concept that is not widely used in IR theory and my research has led me to believe that
this concept is one that is almost uniquely attributed to the Russian Federation in current
discourse. I have only been able to find one piece of literature that shares my view on the
existence of this concept, Russia: Re-emerging Great power (Kanett 2007) uses it as a
framing concept for observing foreign policies in Russia. In order to fully explain this concept
some background is needed to put it in context.
The terms Great Power, Superpower and Major Power are often used interchangeable but in
essence they refer to the same thing, the level of power a state is able to exercise over
neighboring countries, or on a larger global scale.
Furthermore, power is another term that has various definitions based on context. In this
context the most basic definition will be used, which can be defined as A being capable of
influencing choices or actions of B, even if these choices or actions are not in favor of B.
According to Kenneth Waltz the definition of one of the Powers can be worded as “The
political clout of a nation is correlates closely with their economic power and their military
might” (Dunne et all 2010:64) While this is true, it must be taken into account that Waltz
looks at this with a neo-realistic point of view, and in doing so bases his point of view on the
directly measurable application of power, such as economic sanctions or military power, and
dismisses influences that are not based on these. (Dunne et all 2010:64) The level of power
that a state has is what defines its position in the international hierarchy.
My definition of the term Re-emerging Great Power in short is, a nation that have in the
anarchic system have moved up and down, and up again, on the ladder of influence. This
concept is a nation that for an extended period of time wielded considerable power over other
nations, but lost it at some point, but due to the changing nature of power balances and their
own means, are able to return to the position as a great power in the hierarchical system of the
world.
There have been examples over time that could arguably be considered to following this
pattern, but they are often tied directly to wars. Germany could be an example of this in the
way that their influence and control over landmass evolved between 1939 and 1945. In this
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period of time Germany can be considered a great power according to the standard neorealism definition of power. Germany’s ability to project power was based on a large military
force, and direct control over governments in the occupied states. They then lost this position
as a result of the Allied invasion of Europe in 1944. The British Empire stretched across the
world, but was reduced massively over the post-colonial period. France, Belgium,
Netherlands, Italy, Portugal and Spain all follow the same pattern, which was for a period of
time they had the ability to control the choices of other nations or states, but then loses their
international influence. The US has remained a superpower since the end of World War 2, and
still enjoys significant clout both with allies and adversaries. All of these have both taken
steps up or down, and then stayed there at position.
As for Russia, the concept of a re-emerging superpower becomes relevant when taking in to
account the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The leadership in the Kremlin had very close
relations with the other nations in the union, and even though they did not micro manage the
individual nations, no larger policies would be enacted without the approval of the Russian
Soviet leadership. This is how I intend to use the concept of a re-emerging super. The
question that is here relevant is, did Russia as a result of the dissolution lose the level of
power that they had prior to 1989?
The identity of a new superpower
Mildly put, the world now is different from that of the one during the Cold War as nations
that were previously ruled by a one party system, or simply by a dictator have undergone
reforms in the years since. Today, some of these nations have either adopted democratic
reforms, or are still in the process of trying to do so. Further, some of the nations that were
previously in the Soviet Union are now members of the EU, and have very close political and
economic ties to the nations that they were previously at odds with. The direct threat of a
nuclear war is not as imminent as it was at some points during the cold war. But there remains
a real possibility that the hostile atmosphere could return one day. The temporal frame that is
in play here is not big enough for major cultural ideas about how nation behaves itself to
change. The interest of a nation to increase its power is one that slowly changes, or it needs
outside influence to change. In example, it took a war with almost immeasurable cost in lives
and materiel, to end the quest for continental dominance of Imperial Japan and Nazi
Germany.
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This is the second aspect of the Re-emerging superpower concept that I intend to look at. If a
superpower can be reduced in it influence, but is later able to ragain its level, or perhaps even
increase it, then who is the new superpower? Neo-realism defines influence as the main goal
of a state, but what is also needed is an understanding of the identity of the state. As for
Russia during the soviet period, they were guided by the socialist ideas in the way they
conducted their attempts at increasing their influence. But the Soviet Union fell, so if Russia
is trying to regain a positon they have lost, then who is this new Russia and are they becoming
a new superpower, or are they following the path they did in the past?
For the above reason I believe this concept deserves more research as the possibility of the
return of Russia as a superpower with influence equivalent to that of the Soviet Union, is one
that will be important if European Union will become dependent on Russian natural gas. This
dependency is comparable to the threat of the nuclear war that was the biggest concern during
the cold war. It is comparable because at the time the European nations, as well as the North
American allies, their decision in foreign policy had to take in to account how their decision
might be interpreted by the Russian administration. These are not clear cut comparisons, but
there are parallels that seem prudent to observe more closely
This is where I see the concept of Re-emerging superpower as one that deservers further
research. It is my hope that this thesis will inspire others to look at the concept and evaluate
its potential in helping with our understanding of the changing power system.
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Hypothesis
On the background of the concept, I have developed a hypothesis that I believe warrants
further testing. I will in this section in detail describe my hypothesis. This hypothesis is will
serve as the foundation for my analysis of the Russian Federation in connection with the
above mentioned concept.
When the cold war ended, Russia found themselves in situation where they could allegorically
be called the loser of the ideological struggle that was the cold war. Faced with a world that
was changing and a nation that was also changing, Russia had to reinvent themselves in order
to find their place in this new world. Russia could still be considered one of the most powerful
countries in the world, but this power was measured by military might. And while this might
still counts, the world has changed to a world where interdependence and cooperation have
taken a front seat to that of getting things done through the treat or use of military power. The
period following the fall of the Soviet Union was one that was chaotic as private and
government interest took control of much of the energy infrastructure.
The hypothesis that I will be working with is the idea that Russia is in the early stages of
finding a new identity for themselves and for the nation. During the cold war the Russians
defined themselves to a degree as Not Them. This term is one I will be working with, and in
this context it is meant as a way of identification of national identity. I employ the term "Not
Them" which I see it to be more adequate in order to explain how a specific social/national
identity is united through what they are not, rather than what they are; I have not been able to
find an adequate alternative, and have thus come up with my own term instead. This is the
result of the Bolshevik revolution of 1917 in way that needs some explaining. When the
Russian empire became the Soviet Union, they left behind the culture that was connected with
the Tsar and everything that it stood for. Instead they dressed the nation in the ideas of the
Socialist Revolution. They began referring to themselves as Socialists and a Socialist nation.
But seeing themselves this was had a caveat emptor that was not clear before the end of the
cold war. In order for the Russian Socialist identity to work, they needed to have an opposite
they could reflect themselves in, and this opposite was the capitalism of the west.
I argue that in order for a Us vs Them mentality to work properly, the Us part must be well
defined. Often this is a result of hundreds of years or cultural and historical development. It is
this development that will make it easier for nations population to easily identify themselves
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in the Us vs Them idea. The other way around only points out what you are not, not who you
are. In the case of Russia when they left behind the Soviet and it dominant socialist ideology,
they also left behind the foundation on which they had built their idea of Us. Michael
Harbsmeier argues that the identity of nation is built on how other nations view it: “ When one
calls oneself a Dane, German[…]one does not make the others into barbarians heathens
[…]but assumes that the others can correspondingly put a name on their own
nationality…Nations…seduce each other into recognizing each other in the other’s image.”
(Andersen & Kristensen 2007:462) While I agree with the point, I argue that the opposite can
also take place; that the nation will identify itself by viewing other nations, and create their
own identity by pointing out which parts of identity the “others” that they do not share.
There is an adage that implies that the unifying force in nation is to have a common enemy
that the public can unite in opposing. This idea has many real world examples, but what it
does not deal with, is what happens when that enemy is no longer the enemy? For the
Russians this became a real problem with the dissolution of the USSR. For 70 years they had
defined themselves as the opposite of the capitalist west, but in doing so they had created an
identity based on being different from somebody else. By leaving behind the Socialist identity
and beginning to work with the West and adapting capitalism into how the economy worked,
they had effectively left behind the way they previously viewed the world. Though in order to
understand the development of the
The change that I seek to examine coincides with Vladimir Putin, and over the period of his
three precedencies, with an interim period by the presidency of Dmitry Medvedev from 2008
till 2012 giving a timeframe from 2000 till 2014. But in order to get a full picture of the
developments of this period, older events must also be taken in to account as they have helped
shape the present. Vladimir Putin has laid out his vision for what it is that he believes the
Russian federation should be in the 21st century: A nation that reclaims it identity of a
superpower which they see as both a right and privilege.
To explore this process Pavel Baev (2007) offers an explanation in his book Russian Energy
Politics and Military Power that can be used to analyze this process. His take on the process
can be divided in to three dimensions that are called Empire, Civilization and Great Power. I
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see each is an idea that has made it known in various discourses and in the way the Russian
Federation have conducted themselves over the past 15 years. The three ideas are part of the
new identity that they Russians have been building, and in the end they hope to have taken
Russia from the one role on the international stage to another. As part of the process of
bringing the new identity in to world, they have to choose a foundation that they build on and
they have chosen the energy sector as the foundation, which is an idea Baev shares. With this
as the means for their national identity building in order to reach the goals that Baev describes
in his three dimensions. It is these three dimensions that I will use as the foundation for
testing my hypothesis. The three dimensions will be described in detail in the theory section.
Chosen topic and relevance
Contemporary relevance
Since Vladimir Putin became president Russia has tried to drag itself out of the mire that they
ended up in with the fall of the Soviet empire. In the past Russia placed a large portion of its
interest in it military and this was seen as the key to becoming one, if not the, dominant world
power. With the collapse of the Union, Russia found itself in a situation where they
maintained their military power, but they had lost the political clout that they had during the
cold war. A new approach was needed, but a new direction did not begin to show itself as a
coherent effort till the election of Vladimir Putin. Along with his election came a new
approach to the power. Currently Russia supplies about 25% of the gas that is used in Europe,
and the 2/3 of the world’s proven gas reserves are in Russia and the Middle East, with the
majority in Iran (Lêvêque 2010:91) .
Russia has for the past fifteen years put a lot of their attention in to making their natural gas
reserves available to Europe, and are at the same time looking to the south east for more
natural gas. The idea that seems to be driving it is that with a dominant position on the energy
market, Russia will be able to create a lasting foundation for becoming a once again playing a
decisive role on the world stage.
This new role coincides with the presidency of Vladimir Putin and he is one of the main
architects behind the new vision for a 21th century Russia. But the question of exactly what is
that Russia is hoping to acquire is more complex than just reclaiming former glory.
15
Over the last decade, there has been growing focus on the way Russia conducts itself in the
energy security area due to here have been incidents where the focus came to a very public
light, namely the problems with the gas delivery to Ukraine between 2004 and 2009 and one
between Russia and Belarus in 2007. Not only is Russia the main supplier of energy to these
two nations, but they are also the single largest exporter of oil and gas to Europe. In 2007
Russia supplied 32% of the crude oil and 38% of the total gas imported by the European
Union1. Russia is currently believed to hold more the largest proven reserves of natural gas,
with an estimated 44,800 billion cubic meters in subterranean reserves. This number is
roughly 80% of the combined reserves of the next two countries on the list, Iran and Qatar 2.
Although major investments are needed in order to fully take advantage of these enormous
reserves in Siberia, they remain a strategically important sector for the Russian Federation.
The amount of the gas that is imported is used primarily by former Soviet republics, but
several of the other European Union nations also imports from Russia. For a closer look at the
amounts imported se Appendix 1. It is clear that Russia already has a significant stake in the
the energy sector of Europe and the European Union.
Among observers and commentators, there have for the past years been a growing
apprehension that Russia might be using its position to create political pressure over its
neighboring countries but Russia itself has denied this34, and they claim they are merely
taking part in the free market. However, the fact remains that the company that has full
monopoly of the import and export of LNG (liquefied natural gas) in Russia is the state
owned GAZPROM (Gazprom). In 2006, the Russian Duma approved a bill that created the
legal foundation for this monopoly, and with this legislation Gazprom came under the direct
control of the Vladimir Putin lead Russian government. This law and it’s specfics are
elaborated on in the analysis where it will become relevant. This have created unease in the
EU, centered on the idea that perhaps Russia is not a stable partner in such an endeavor
1
Energy Dialogue EU–Russia. The Tenth Progress Report, 2010, pg. 4-6
http://www.indexmundi.com/g/r.aspx?t=10&v=98
3
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/jan/01/gas-gazprom-ukraine-russia
4
http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/the-european-gas-freeze-supplies-to-turkey-and-bulgariahalted-a-599637.html
Note: In order make a clear devision between literature and websites, I will be citing books and other literature
in text, and websites as foot notes. This is done for the benefit of the reader, as an incomplete website citing in
text will make it problematic to see a source in case the reader feels this is needed. All websites are available in
the reference section, including last date that the site was accessible. Were possible an author has been added.
2
16
The concern of the European Union seems to be that Russia may not be a dependable partner
in the energy market for two reasons: One, there is concern that Russia is using the delivery of
gas a political tool, and second, that there will be future disruptions. These disruptions have
shown to affect a large part of Europe.
The first concern is based on, that while Russia have very large proven field of subterranean
gas, the infrastructure to extract, purify and ship the gas is not entirely in place as of yet. It is
estimated that a 30 billion dollars a year investment is needed over the next 20 years to bring
the infrastructure up to the functionality in order to supply the estimated needs of Europe.
There are some projects underway, but I will get more in to this later.
The second concern is not without its merit, as over the last ten years there have been several
disruptions in the delivery of gas from Russia. The disputes between Russia and Ukraine in
2006,-7,-8,-9 over the delivery and pricing of gas have shown that the rest of Europe is
susceptible to the influence of the state owned Gazprom as the they control 37% of the
European gas market and this supply runs through Ukraine. The disputes over the course of
five years were officially about pricing issues, and allegations from the Russian side that the
Ukrainian subcontractors where siphoning of more than had previously been agreed on.
Gazprom also wanted to renegotiate the pricing contracts. In the 2009 a new dispute arose, on
the same basis, pricing issues. When a deal could not be reached, Gazprom seized their gas
export to Europe and for thirteen days no gas flowed from Russia into Ukraine. The cutoff
had wider consequences than just for Ukraine, as twenty other countries received their gas
through the pipeline that runs through Ukraine.
As mentioned, the gas disputes was claimed by some, including the American Foreign
Secretary Condoleezza Rice, to be about not only the payments, but also about Ukraine
recently having elected a government to wanted to have closer ties with NATO and the West
in general. The idea that was put forth was that Russia was using its gas supplier role as a tool
to put political pressure on Ukraine to pay more attention to the will of Russia. There were
also others who claimed that while the dispute was real, the Russians saw an opportunity to
punish Ukraine for the Pro-western movements over the years (Stein 2006:11ff). Based on
which countries have experienced increases in prices of gas, compared to which countries
have chosen to look westward in the politics shows that there is some correlation. Moldova,
Georgia and Ukraine all receive gas primarily from Russia, and within short time of electing
17
governments that had a more pro-western attitude received increases in gas prices (Stein
2006:11ff). Belarus on the on the other hand has maintained strong ties to Russia after the
dissolution of the Soviet Union, and they have not had an increase in their gas prices. The
expansion of the EU to the east and the admittance of eastern European countries to NATO is
not something that sits well with the Russian government.
Russia has been looking to the south to reuse its old network in the countries that make up the
CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States). At the same time they are also looking further to
the east, namely China, as a new market where they hope to become part of a growing
market5. In may of 2014 a major deal was made between Russia and China regarding a 30
year contract for Russia to deliver 38 billion cubic meters a year6. I will go in to detail
regarding this deal and its ramifications in a later section.
Limitations
The intended purpose of this thesis is to look at the natural gas of Russia and what role it
plays in the nations internal politics, and their foreign policy. In doing so, a series of
limitations arises. I will in this section describe those limitations, both the chosen ones and the
one ones that arises.
Timeframe: The primary timeframe I will be working with is from 2000 till 2014. This
timeframe has been chosen for two reasons. The primary is that mush of Russias focus on
their natural gas has taken place in this period. Second, which is tied to the first, this period is
also the timeframe that Vladimir Putin has been in office. However, for some discussion and
and argumentation a wider timeframe is needed in some contexts. This extended timeframe
will deal with incidents or situations that occurred during the Soviet Union years in order to
draw parallels in order to strengthen argumentation, or rebut position held by some sources
Focus on natural gas: To place much of the focus of a thesis on a single element of export
might seem limiting in itself, but this was done for reason. Natural gas is not the only
economic engine of Russia, and there is also a large private financial sector. I have chosen not
to look at how this plays in to the development of Russia for mainly one reason. As is pointed
5
6
http://www.gazprom.com/about/production/projects/east-program/
http://www.gazprom.com/press/news/2014/may/article191451/
18
out futher down in Limitations, natural gas is the element that has seen the most attention
from the government, and the largest company in the industry in Russia is closely tied with
the government in more than one way. The Russian Duma has passed laws that specifically tie
the natural gas industry to close government scrutiny. Second, the private sector also deals in
the exhumation and transportation of natural gas. But these companies are either privately
owned, or have large shareholders that are not Russian. In order to have the focus on Russia, I
will not look into the private owned trade of Natural gas, unless it is necessary such as in joint
ventures with Gazprom, where the Russian government has the shareholder majority.
Terrorism: Russia has been hit by terrorist attacks over the years, some of which had major
death tolls, such as the Beslan hostage crisis or the attack on a theater in Moscow. I will to
some extent be using terrorism for the purpose of discussing certain aspect that is needed in
the analysis. But this inclusion will not be broader than a certain scope regarding intentions
and statements by Russian officials, or instances of terror that triggered certain courses of
action related to the natural gas industry. I will not go into greater details about the causes of
the terrorist attacks, other than that which the single attacks can be linked to certain situations
such as the war in Chechnya or the Dagestan War. Each of these was both complex matter,
and their starting point or the ramifications are largely beyond the scope of this thesis. The
section of the analysis dealing with the area where terrorism is inexorably tied to, there will be
a detailed description of what terrorism means to Russia.
Ukraine: As of the writing of this section, following an election, the Crimean Peninsula has
been annexed into the Russian Federation. The OSCE was not allowed to enter to observe
whether this was a fair election. Both short term and long term outcome of this is impossible
to accurately describe as it is a situation that is still in flux. There has also been a series of
incidents where smaller parts of the eastern Ukraine have declared their independence, and
are also seeking admittance into the Russian Federations, or some form of autonomy. The
outcome of these incidents, as well as the continuing regional armed conflicts have not
reached any resolution, and peace talks are still taking place.
In order to still use Ukraine, I have chosen to use a timeframe starting in 2000 till mid 2013
for sources regarding the exportation of natural gas through Ukraine. Many sources have
projections that extend from five till twenty-five years in to the future. As these projections
were made long before the current situation, I will consider sources written before the
19
annexations as reliable. I will do this due to that as of September 2014 here have been no
statements by the Ukranian or Russian governments that indicate nullifications of previous
agreements regarding the transit of Russian natural gas to and through Ukraine. While the
disputes are ongoing, Russia does not only export gas to Ukraine as there are many
downstream costumers, and there have also been no statements from any of these that indicate
that they will seek alternate trading partners in gas industry as direct outcome of the territorial
dispute between Russia and Ukraine. The EU have expressed in context with the 2009 gas
dispute that perhaps alternatives may be needed in the future (Pirani 2010:9), but no specific
alternatives have been named. Secondly, as of September 2014 a fourth round of sanctions
have been levied against Russia by the EU, but none of these, or the previous three rounds of
sanctions, do in any way affect the gas exports of Russia to Europe or the EU7
On the other side, due to the nature of the annexation being tied directly to the country of
interest in the context of this thesis, I cannot ignore the situation completely. As the situation
have not reached a conclusion, it is possible to use the previous disputes to analyze the
development of the relations between Russia and Ukraine in regards to natural gas.
Furthermore, I will be using Ukraine as a background for testing some of the points that come
up in my analysis. The situation is not answered but some of the motivation that Russia has in
their dealings with Ukraine can be discussed in context with the dimensions that Pavel Baev
has described. If possible I will draw parallels between the ideas expressed in Baevs
dimensions, and this is done to support my analysis of Russian intentions, as well as the ideas
proposed by in the literature by Pavel Baev and Roger Kanett.
Future projections: For empiric data I will use projections regarding the expected or
calculated rise in use of LNG in Europe, as well as estimations of the available natural gas
sources in Russia and the CIS countries. The data will consist of economic projections,
planned or expected building of infrastructure, as well as the projections of export/import
relating to LNG industry. This data that will be used in the thesis is based on reports from the
EU, Gazprom and the Energy Information Administration, as well as industry news sources.
As for projections for the increase in the Russian export, or estimated import by other
countries, they are also subject to possible change due to the ongoing situation in Ukraine, as
well as how the market reacts. But I will consider these sources usable, as long as the projects
7
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/sep/12/europe-russia-sanctions-ukraine-kalashnikov Sep 13 2014
20
that these predictions are based on are not cancelled by either the Russian government, or
their international partners.
The Arctic:
Russia is one of the nations that have an interest in the future development of the expected oil
and gas reserves beneath the Artic. While this is an area that is of great importance to the
Russian and the other nations surrounding the artic, I will not be analyzing Russian interest in
the Artic in this thesis for the reason that the territorial disputes regarding the Artic have not
been settled by any international organ, and none of claimants have been recognized. Russia
did send an expedition in 2012 that claimed due to the direction of the Lomosov ridge that a
majority of the artic belonged to them . This claim has not verified by independent sources
and can therefore not be considered valid as of yet.
China: Late in the writing process of this thesis, it was announced that Russia and China had
made a 30 year deal for natural gas purchases. This development came in late May of 2014
and this meant that I could not fit it properly in to the analysis as there was no details on how
this agreement would work. But due to the size of the agreements I will in part be making
reference to it in the analysis, but only to serve as exposition for the major future projects.
Natural resources:
Russia currently exports a large variety of natural materials or resources including metal,
timber oil and gas. I will for this thesis be focusing on their export of natural gas, and to some
degree petroleum. This focus is based on that these are the two areas that comprise the largest
chunk of the revenue for the export sector which is the oil and gas sector, which in 2013 made
up 57% of the export of the Russian Federation. Second reason for choosing this focus is
based on a 2008 law by the Duma that states that mining, transport and export of natural gas
is deemed a Strategic Sector, which means that it is a sector that is vital for the security of the
Russian Federation. These sectors also have to seek presidential permission before accepting
foreign investors. This means that these sectors are under direct control of the president.
Military issues: For all intents and purposes I will not be looking at the Russian military,
apart from how revenue from the oil and gas export is used to finance modernizations of the
Russian armed forces. The role of the military is not one that will play a role for the expansion
21
of the energy sector. I will consider the Russian armed forces as a one of the institutions that
benefits from the export of natural resources, but have no influence in its development,
perhaps apart from security measures. It is possible to see the military as force for protecting
the gas transport infrastructure, but so far there have been no indications that this will be a
likely scenario in the near future.
Others: Although I talk about Russia as redefining themselves, I do not consider this an issue
of nation building. In relation to my hypothesis this is meant that they have left behind the
ideology that they had during the Soviet era. Leaving behind a national ideology is not
enough to warrant the concept of nation building. Although the dissolution of Soviet Union
brought large changes, and some violent episodes, it is more a case of a country adapting to a
changing scenario where the outcome will be the new reality for the nation. The largest
change the country had to endure was the transition from an autocracy to a democracy. While
this was a chaotic process in the earlier years, it has found it momentum and it is still in
development. Another aspect that sets Russia apart from nation building is that often in nation
building the whole of society has been rebuild or changed in one way or another. A good
example of this could be that the whole infrastructure of government is rebuilt from scratch,
such as is being attempted in Afghanistan and Iraq. Here the nations have to change every
single aspect of the previous governmental structure from one with a ruling family to that of a
western inspired democracy. Russia has not done this, and many of the people who were in
powerful positions before the dissolution of the Soviet Union, to this day still hold some form
of office. Vladimir Putin himself has a KGB background and many of his deputies were on
one way or another involved with government offices during the Soviet era
22
Chapter 2 – Method and Theory
Method
This thesis is based on an analysis of the degree that natural gas plays in Russian internal
politics and the way it influences foreign policy. It is designed as a study of cases where a
hypothesis serves as the foundation for a theoretical analysis. Where the relevant data is not
sufficient to aid in the analysis, other sources, such as statements of intent from the Russian
Federation or Gazprom will be used to further the analysis. The two areas that are in the
thesis, the natural gas sector and its development and how this is used by the Russian
federation will to some extent be treated as two separate entities. But these two are dependant
on one another, and one will be used to further examine the particulars of the other.
Sources
A critique of some the sources that will be used are necessary. In the analysis part of the thesis
I will be using information that is taken directly from the official website of the Russian
natural gas company Gazprom. While there is good reason to believe that these sources are
inherently biased in their views and positions, they do still have merit for two reasons. First, I
context they are the most reliable source for Gazprom’s interests, and they originate from an
actor that has an importance to this thesis. Second, Gazprom is closely tied to the Russian
administration, and following that I assume that the interest of the two will overlap in this
case. The information might be biased, but there is also much information that is only
available through this source. The industry news also gathers their information based on press
releases or statements made by persons connected to Gazprom. Due to this I will consider
them a valid source regarding the interest at heart of Gazprom and the Russian government.
Furthermore these sources may also provide insight in to the way that the Russia is
developing a new role in the international system.
Choice of empirical data
The data regarding the future projects of the natural gas industry in Russia is gathered from
several sources within in the natural gas industry. I have no primary source of for the data,
and it is often gathered from sources that originate in various nations. The information is
gathered from analysis in various media, both in text and from online sources. Statistics
regarding the exhumed gas, and possible deposits of natural gas, have been gathered to
provide an oversight of the scale of the Russian natural gas industry.
23
Methododical framework
The methodical framework I will use for testing my hypothesis can be summed up in this way
“Idea, means and goal” Each of the three represents one of the dimensions that I will be
working with. They are each a part of what I see as the interest of the Russian Federation. The
terms are based on original research. I have defined this is in part based on Pavel Baevs three
dimensions as well introducing my own terms for the purpose of this paper.
I define the three terms as such:
Idea: The Russian Federation is looking to redefine their role in the international system and
the starting of point will be to define what the core idea of the transformation will be. The
transformations in the Russian Federation since the dissolution of the Soviet Union have been
many, such as the privatization of previously state-owned companies, and the introduction
democratic elections. For most of the nineties the primary focus was stabilizing the Russian
economy which took a heavy hit after the dissolution of the soviet bloc. But over the
presidency of Vladimir Putin, and Dmitry Medvedev8, a clearer focus on identity has begun to
emerge, and a vision for the role of the 21st century Russia is being formulated. It is this idea
that I will explore,
Means: The idea that is being formulated is not one that will transition from the mind to the
real world without the means necessary in order to make it a working reality. As the idea
becomes more fully formulated, the instruments needed be put in place. The idea will be
hinged on not only the means that are available to the Russian Federation, but it is also
dependent on the instruments that are only available other places in the world.
Goal: The center of this will be to explore what is the endgame that the Russians are trying to
achieve? This goal lies at some part in the future, and it is still a work in progress. But from
the idea and the means we can build a cohesive picture of the intentions of the Russian
Federation. Based on the two previous parts of the analysis I will build this picture, and then
offer a discussion of its probability. The endgame is not one that is in controlled primarily by
the Russian administration. It is one the subject to influence by numerous outside interests.
8
Due to Russian law a president may only serve to consectutive terms, but are allowed to return to the
presidency after a interim president. Dmitry Medvedev was the preferred candidate of Vladimir Putin in the
2008 elections and under his presidency Putin served as Prime Ministers. While their policies differed in some
areas, their positions on improving the energy sector were the same.
24
The above mentioned parts will each be supported by relevant theory and data, this will
described fully in the theory section. My intent is to use the framework to either validate or
invalidate my hypothesis.
Theoretical framework
Neo-realism and natural resources
Much of International Relations theory deals with how nations interact with one another in
term of being the most influential nation, and neo-realism and neo-liberalism often the
dominant theories for dealing with this system. These two are especially used in the contest of
states that are considered superpowers.
For the theoretical background for the analysis I will mainly be using Neo-realism as it is the
theory that maintains that nations are at a constant battle with one another for the most
influence in the anarchic system that is our world.
I will be working on the assumption that the Russian Federation wants to improve the position
they currently hold in the system.
Traditional neo-realist theoretician such as Kenneth Waltz and John Mearsheimer represents
two sub categories of neo-realism: Offensive realism and defensive realism. They each have
their own approach to what the ideal method for a nation to improve its position in the
anarchic system. Defensive realism claims that a nation should strive to maintain its position,
and only improve it if there are no negative consequences in improving that position. The
basic tenant is that if a state is too aggressive in its attempts to improve its position, the
system will try to punish them. Offensive realism is more focused on the idea that states
should do everything in their power to increase or better their position in the system.
Both of these can be used as a theoretical tool for analyzing the ramifications of the Russians
states increased focus on the natural gas. Arguably Russia has no interest in losing the
position they have acquired, and at the same time they also have an interest in improving their
position.
The two subcategories of neo-realism are by the defenders seen as the best way to describe
how states operate. But neither of them are capable of giving the full explanation for the
25
actions of a state. For example, while no state would voluntarily negate the position they
have, it is possible to advance it without the system responding with punitive actions. At the
same time, it is also possible to advance your position without having to trample the
opposition. It is possible for a state to unilaterally improve its position without having to
influence other states ability to advance them selves. This is one of the short comings of the
neorealism theory. While it gives good explanations for the way nations behave, IE their wish
for improving their own position, it has a negative view of the interactions between state, and
they claim is that you can never be sure of the intentions of other states. This idea was not
wrong during the tense years of the cold war, but in the after period it has lost some of its
credence. The main shortcoming of neo-realism is that it sees the system as very agresssive
and egotistical on the behalf of the states. If a more softened approach to the ideas of neorealism is taken, then it becomes more applicable. If the interaction is not based on a need for
domination and subjugations, but more as guide for the competition between nations, then the
ideas of realism once again becomes usable. Defensive realism, in context with neo-liberalism
gives more a picture of a system where working both with one another and against one
another. For example, State A wishes to increase it its exports in a certain area, that might be
domintated by State B. Defensive realism would argue that this attempt would be met by
punishment. But if the way for improvement is based on something within the State B, such
as new found reserves or improved production, then this improvement is not something that
State B is capable of punishing. This improvement of State As position is based on their own
doing, but in order for the advancement to take place, they need the cooperation of the other
states in the system.
The same scenario can be constructed for offensive realism. If a state actively sets out to
improve its position they do have the option of being aggressive in their attempts to do so. But
they also have the option to work with other states in the system to improve their position.
State A could for example find a new reserves of natural gas, but if they do not have the
infrastructure to handle the new larger reserves, they ca cooperate with another state that
might have this infrastructure. This cooperation will improve State As position without
affecting the position of State B.
The main problem with the neo-realism theory is that is sees everything as the lead up to an
armed conflict which it considers the only form of true power. The two directions each have
26
their own way of ensuring the balance of power that is a key idea with neo-realism. Hard and
Soft Powers are terms that, within each of the theories, represent the same tactic in
approaching the international system. Each type of power is seen as a tool for taking care of a
type of problems that might arise between two nations. Neo-Realism tends to see hard powers
as an instrument for getting one will through in other nations, and traditionally this instrument
is the threat or directs use of military force in order reach a goal.
Economy is seen as a hard power, but it is often a tool used in context with diplomacy which
is a soft power. The two are connected in the way that economic sanctions are often the first
approach means when dealing with a diplomatic crisis. A contemporary example is the
approach that has been used in dealing with a potential nuclear armed Iran, or the sanctions
against an already nuclear armed North Korea. It is a weapon that both in short and long term
affect the nations they are levied against.
The approach I will be using the neorealist view of economy in this context, will be regarding
an alternative use of economic power. Russia is believed to be willing to use their economy
and exports as a means to improve their situation in the system. Where most nations will
create a system internally that fosters economic growth for the private sector, Russia is a
position to create a system that mainly has positive effects for the state. The only exporter of
LNG in Russia is the state owned Gazprom, and the administration of the company is directly
under the control of the Russian prime minister, who in turn only answers to the president and
the Duma.
When the ties between the exporter and the legislators are this close, it provides opportunities
that are not found in many western countries. Any legislative change that is needed by the
corporation can easily be moved through the Duma. Where other countries are battling one
another in an attempt to attract companies, or try to secure them not moving their production
to other countries; Russia can create the framework for Gazprom as they see fit. It is this
coupling that puts Russia in a unique position to use economy as a weapon.
Natural resources can also be considered a hard power, as the Russians do have the option of
employing it as a weapon. In a hypothetical scenario, should a dispute arise between Russia
and Europe, they could shut off the delivery of gas to dozen countries in a matter of hours.
Most of these countries to not have the emergency reserves to last for more than a few days,
27
and the effects would be felt by entire populations in a very short time. While it is not a
sound strategy to use the gas export as a political tool as the fallout could would be severe
However the need for gas in Europe is still so big that alone the threat is enough for countries
to worry about. This can be explained by the idea that defensive realism relies on. If they use
the natural gas in an aggressive way, then the system can unite in order to punish them, by
refusing to pay for the gas deliveries.
Energy securitization:
Energy securitization is term that covers a variety of areas that have global side to it. For one
thing, the term energy includes gas, electric, nuclear and petroleum. It includes the internal
efforts in a nation to secure access to energy that is vital to any industrial nation. It also deals
with where the states are getting the energy that they need for their nation to be able to uphold
the production in a nation, as well for the population to have the lights on (Collins 2010:309).
Energy securitization on an international scene include the efforts to maintain that the export
and import of energy is not affected by the political instabilities that might arise in a nation. In
the case of oil there is the growing concern that the oil deposits in the world might be nearing
depletion. There are various claims regarding this, but I will not get in to that here. Another
side to energy securitization is the worry that one or very few nations hold the position as the
main exporter of a certain type of energy, such as the middle east having the largest know oil
reserves, and in this case, of Russia gaining the position as the main supplier of gas to Europe.
To nations this is a position that threatens their own energy securitizations as they may longer
have the ability to diversify their sources of import (Collins 2010: 308).
In connection with neo-realism energy is seen as another battlefront between states, and to
some degree it is where their notions are correct. States will do their utmost to maintain and
secure the energy that is vital to maintain their position in the system(Collins 2010: 308).
I will use energy securitization to describe how natural resources play a role in the
interactions between nations. Energy securitizations is also incorporated in the neo-realist
theory and can be summed relevant here because “The fact that most of the largest energy
consumers do not hold sufficient domestic reserves of key source ensures that energy security
becomes irretrievably entwined with wider foreign and security policies” (Collins 2013:309)
in this case, the entwinement is seen in the way that natural gas is becoming a case of national
security for the Russians, as they move more and more of the control of their strategic
28
reservers of natural resources under the control of the government. And with this role they
become part of the energy security for a variety of European nations as they are supplier to
these countries. The interests of these nations becomes one of a battlefield in the anarchic
system as each nations will most likely see to their own needs first. While they do become
dependent on one another, it may not always be a dependency based on amicable relations. It
is more one based on something that resembles the balance of power based on the that both
have a strong interest in that other does not fail, for this failure is detrimental ,while doing so
is based on national interest at first hand.
This idea may resemble the positive interdependency that exists in neo-liberal theory, but this
is not the way I see it. It is a very competitive relation where one side is begrudgingly bound
to the other party out of pure necessity. The consumer is trying to gain the upper hand to
secure the flow of the resources, and vice versa with the supplier.
Theory of the three dimensions
In his book, Russian Energy Policy and Military Power – Putin’s quest for greatness, Pavel
Baev lays out three dimensions he sees as the conceptual ideas that serves a foundation for the
aspirations of the modern Russian state. I have chosen Baev based on reading this book.
While other literature I use also employs the same ideas that Baev does, his approach is based
on creating a concept to make it more accessible. When dealing with a superpower and their
ambitions internationally, as well as producing a new internal identity following the cold war,
the subject can be become very broad. By introducing the three dimensions that he operates
with, it is easier to separate, and join aspects of this process that might be difficult to see in a
larger context. By applying three defined parameters for describing processes, it is more
manageable to refer to areas and ideas that might seem diffuse, such as national identity,
relations between states or superpower ambitions. Each of those can have their very own
meaning depending on context, and it is here those three dimensions play a role. Each
dimension relay to its own area, but at the same times lines can be drawn between the three so
strengthen the argumentation of each one.
Second, as there the area of natural gas and Russia is a massive area that have connections to
not only various areas in Russia, but also internationally. With the aid of the simplification
that the dimensions offer, it becomes more accessible in order to perform an analysis.
29
The other concept I am working with, the re-emergence of a superpower by Roger Kanett,
also has the shortcoming that can be treated as a diffuse idea of what Russia is attempting. By
coupling it with the more specific definitions that Baev has created, then the concept becomes
a frame that fits with the three dimensions.
The three concepts will be described in greater detail below, and they will serve as the
structure for my analysis. These dimensions and a whole are to serve as a guideline for my
interpretation of collected data.
The Great power: The concept of The Great Power is based on the idea that Russia, through
a combination of factors, has earned the right to belong to a small cadre of powerful nations
that shape the direction of international politics. This right is earned through factors such as
the sheer size of the Russian nation, their military and their abundant nuclear weapons
stockpile. An additional factor employs a sort of circular reasoning, in that because Russia has
been a great power in the past, it must be a great power again. This simplification plays a
factor in the way the Russian state conducts itself on the world stage.
The Empire: Baev proposes that part of the way the Russian state conducts is foreign affairs
is through direct control over its neighboring states. He states that this “Russian imperialism”
is an essential part of a Russian state that has always sought to subdue and incorporate its
neighbors. (Baev 2007:33)
The Empire concept is also based on the idea that a great power has a certain level of control
over the nations that it shares its borders with. This idea can to some degree be tied to the
Stalinist idea of the buffer zone that the Soviet Union wanted between Russia and Germany
after the end of the Second World War. The new element in this way of thinking is that Russia
now seeks to use its energy resources as the means through which is controls its neighbors. At
the same time, the income from using energy as the new tool can then be used to strengthen
the military.
The Civilization: The third dimension is the vaguest one of the three, but the idea has been
formulized in the past, and this is the one Baev uses. The notion is that Russia in itself is not
just nation or culture, but more than that. That it is a civilization with very unique traits that
give them aim for a “civilization mission”. The belief is that Russia, though a combination of
Orthodox Christianity, ethno-nationalism (a Russian is russian, no matter where they are
30
born) and the tradition of rallying behind a strong leader, come together to form something
exceptional. This combination sets it apart from not only the western world, but also from the
cultures that are indigenous to its neighboring countries with a predominant Slavic culture.
I see this idea as something that can to some degree be compared to the idea of American
exceptionalism. There are large differences in their basic ideas, but what is comparable is the
idea that a nation is exceptional beyond just its existence, that there is something more to that
nation, something that is brought forth through its unique history. The way Baev describes
the idea can be seen as a sort of nationalism, but it is more than that. It is a combination of
physical, cultural and historical viewpoints that melt together to form the “Russian
civilization”, that then becomes an entity in itself. Baev does point out that the idea is not a
well-researched idea, but that there are several commentators that have pointed to the
tendency over the years (Baev 2007:34)
In order to operationalize the theoretical ideas expressed by Baev I will be testing them on a
theoretical level in context of the situation unfolding between Russia and Ukraine. This is not
to be seen as a case study, but more of choosing a contemporary situation where Russia is
involved. Parallels between what is expressed by Pavel Baev and the situation in Ukraine can
by drawn, and this will be done in the analysis if sufficient argumentations for similarities can
be done without claiming that these are fact. Second reason for using Ukraine as an
argumentation example is in connections with Roger Kanetts book Russia: Re-emerging
Great Power. In connection with the concept of Russia becoming a superpower again, and
with ideas that are part of neo-realism, I will use Ukraine as a starting off point for discussing
some of the traits that are often contributed to a superpower.
31
Chapter 3 – analysis
A 21st Century Russian Federation.
As a preface for the analysis, it seems prudent to look at the changes that the Russian
Federation has had to undergo in the past 25 years. I have been around the subject in the
previous sections, but there are some key points that need to be scrutinized at a closer level.
There is little doubt that Russia have been through a tumultuous time over the past two
decades. They have undergone a move from an autocracy to democracy, and also the move
from a somewhat incompetent, but well-meaning leader, to a leader that has a firm plan for
what he wants to accomplish for the Russian Federation.
Changing relationships
One of the biggest changes in the identity and ideology of Russia that have changed is their
relationship with the USA. By end of World War II the two states no longer had the common
middle ground that the war had provided, and their differences of ideology regarding the
division of Europe, lead to five decades of intense ideological and influence rivalry. Both
sides believed that the other would at some point launch a First Strike against the other side.
The nuclear weapons race kept escalating the point where the Soviet Union developed the
Tsar Bomba, a thermonuclear fission bomb which had an explosive yield of 50 megaton, and
could potentially be doubled in firepower by adding a third uranium stage to its design This
greatly amplifies the explosion of the nuclear warhead. To put in context how powerful this
bomb was, its explosive force was ten times higher than the combined conventional
explosives used in the entirety of World War II9.
The paranoia on the both sides were so intense that in the years following the fall of the
Soviet Empire, there have been revelations of just how many times the two nations almost
went to direct war between one another. The well-known one is the Cuba crisis in 1962, but
there were also instances that did not become public knowledge till after 1990. During the
Cuban crisis, a Russian submarine almost launched nuclear armed torpedoes against the
American blockade, and the only thing that prevented a nuclear exchange was the refusal of
the submarines second in command, Vasili Arkhipov, to order the launch of the nuclear
torpedoes10.
9
http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Russia/TsarBomba.html
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/oct/27/vasili-arkhipov-stopped-nuclear-war
10
32
In 1983 NATO began a 10 day long exercise to evaluate its nuclear readiness, and part of the
exercise was a simulation in which a first strike on Russia was needed. As per simulation
requirements they also began troop movements, and other preparations that would be needed
during actual war time. While this would seem like a standard exercise, the problem was that
the Soviet Union did in fact believe that they were on the brink of a full scale nuclear war
NATO. The soviet leaders believed that the exercise was in face just a false pretense to launch
a first strike on a unsuspecting Soviet Union. The prepared for a massive nuclear retaliation
and also at one point considered launching preemptive strike on the US11.
These examples might seem a little out of the place in the chronology that I am mainly
operating with, but they are needed to show how drastic the changes in the relationship
between the two former rivals have been.
With the enemy of 60 years being gone, a new security vision was needed, and this was one
were a stable and amicable relationship with America could grow. This new partnership was a
symbol of the new security threat assessment the Russian Federations had developed in the
first years of the presidency of Vladimir Putin. While the older ideas of protecting the Russian
nations remained, the ideas were being redefined from one nation seeing the western nations
as the great enemy, to now include specifications about how terror and internal stability were
the key issues that the Federation would have to deal with in the coming years (Lomagin
2007:38). Russia was subject to a series of terrorists bombings in 1999-2002, where one cost
the lives of 130 peopled inside of a theater in Moscow. The last attacks were carried out by a
group of people affiliated with Chechnyan warlords. These attacks Russia almost coincided
with the September 11 attacks in New York City and the two nations found a common ground
where they could form a new relationship.
11
http://www.history.com/news/history-lists/5-cold-war-close-calls
33
The nuclear stockpile
While it is not an area I will be dealing as subject in itself, the Russian nuclear stockpile is not
that cannot be ignored as Russia still consider it the cornerstone of the national security. For
the majority of the cold war the Russian defensive strategy was hinged on the deterrent
model, which is that the fear of a nuclear retaliation would keep their enemies from attack;
they believed that the MAD doctrine would keep America from launching a first strike, even
though they still feared it. The Mutual Assured Destruction doctrine was a concept regarding
nuclear war that existed on both sides of the iron curtain. The idea was that neither side had an
interest in being the first to launch a nuclear strike against the other. The idea was that if one
side launched an all-out attack, then the other side would respond in force. Taking the idea
further it meant that one side would need to launch an attack so massive that the other side
would be wiped out before they had a change to retaliate. But if such an attack was launched,
then the other side would know almost immediately. With the end of the cold war they had to
redefine the role of the nuclear army.
Their arsenal of nuclear weapons have taken on the same role that is has for the other
members of the recognized nuclear powers12. While it is still a deterrent, it is now more
viewed as a shield and a last resort weapon in the unlikely case that another nuclear power
would attack them using ICBMs or similar weapons. Nuclear terrorism is still a viable threat,
and there have been concern in the rest of the world that perhaps the Russians weren’t in
complete control of their massive stockpiles. Rumors of missing portable nuclear devices
began popping up in the late 1990s, and while none of them have ever been confirmed, there
fear is still there. Russia is working alongside the EU, the US and other international
organizations in order to stop nuclear proliferation. This is in part due to a restructuring of the
security views of the Russian Federation. They have made a shift from Hard Secturity issues,
which refers to the security threats that must be met with military force. The restructuring
have moved towards so called Soft Security issues, which are defined as non-military security
questions. This restructuring became part of the way the Russian Federation wanted to deal
with issues that the was both internal and external security problems. (Kanet 2007:35)
12
I am referring here to what has become known as the Nuclear Club, consisting of the USA, Russia, France,
Great Britain and China. These are the nations that were the first to become nuclear powers.
34
Creating a new profile of an enemy
“It is war that turns people in to a nation” – Heinrich von Treitscheke (Lomagin 2007:47).
The previous quote is a good example of the way that many nations have defined themselves
over many centuries, and the Cold War was the most glaring example of two competing
ideologies battling it out on the world stage. The new amicable partnership between Russia
and the western world came at the expense of the way that the Russians have defined
themselves for close to a century, as Not Them. By that term I mean something akin the Us.
vs. Them way of looking at other nations that Michael Harbsmeier talks about(Andersen &
Kristensen 2007:462)., but it is something in itself Where the Us vs Them idea has a good idea
about who We are, the Not Them is defined by not having firm identity. The Soviet Union
only identified is self as not being a capitalist nation, and they needed the West a fixed enemy
in order to identify themselves. Not having the struggle with the western world as a keystone,
the Soviet Union quickly crumbled in to fifteen smaller states. (Lomagin 2007:47)
In the absence of a clear enemy, Russia is in the need of building a new identity, but this new
identity seems more to be an identity that is created out of a national identity, instead of out
how they compare themselves to other nations, by creating a new identity that is uniquely
Russian. This is what can be seen in the dimensions that Baev describes as Empire,
Civilisations and Great Power (Baev 2007:33) This new identity can be built on the
foundation of the civilization that Russia believes they are, or that they believe that they
should become.
The connection between the new Russia and Vladimir Putin: Period of the
Oligarchs:
After the reformation of the Soviet Union in to the Russian Federation, there was a period of
instability within the Russian economy that lasted throughout much of the 1990’ies. Large
portions of the previously nationally owned mines and oil fields were sold off to a series of
new and older private companies. Two reasons were present for this increased privatization.
The first was the president Yeltsins approval ratings were very low, and the second was an
attempt to get a sizable injection of liquidity in to the Russian Economy. Large oil and gas
fields were sold off to industrial giants such as Mikhail Khodorkovsky and Roman
Abramovich (Baev 2007:22) and the most widely used term for the people and corporations
that took over the oilfields, is the moniker Oligarchs. The terms under which they took over
the oil and gas fields were near unanimously in the favor of the corporations. The process of
35
major privatization started around 1995, and by 1998 the corporation such a Yukos, Lukos
and Surgutneftegaz paid a very low corporate tax, and a low lease for the existing
infrastructure that had come with the purchase of the oilfields. (Baev 2007:23) The
stateowned gas company, GAZPROM (Gazprom) was still part of the oil industry, but
beginning in the early 1990’s it had been under the control of Victor Chernomyrdin. First he
served as the CEO on the board of directors and later, in a more indirect way, as the Prime
Minister under the Yeltsin administration. As a Prime Minister he was able to protect
Gazprom from paying taxes and at the same time make sure that no one could touch the inner
workings of the company.(Baev 2007:25)
The Russian Economy during the presidency of Vladimir Putins first two terms:
After being appointed Prime Minister in august 1999, and later winning the presidential
election after the resignation of Boris Yeltsin in 2000, Vladimir Putin became the second
president of the Russian Federation. During Vladimir Putin’s presidency the economy of the
Russian Federation has improved. Between 2000 and 2008 the Russian GDP grew at a steady
pace and had reached roughly 50% of the EU average by 2008. The 2008 financial crisis hit
Russia hard and they did suffer setbacks as many other countries did13. The Moscow stock
exchange saw a dip of 70% following the crisis, but over the course of 2009 the stock market
did regain about 30% of the previous level, but the growth was slow 14. The GDP did start to
grow again following this and by 2011 was closing in on the pre-crisis levels15:
13
European Energy Security in View of Russian Economic and Integration Prospects, Havlik, Peter; 2010: p.2-4
Ibid
15
http://www.indexmundi.com/g/g.aspx?v=66
14
36
For the average Russian Citizen there have been strong improvements in their quality of life
as average monthly wages grew from 80€ in 2000 (adjusted for inflation) to 400€ in 2009.
Employment has not seen much growth in the same period of time, but the unemployment has
been somewhat stable in the same timeframe, with its lowest at 6% in 2007, prior to the world
financial crisis and highest at 8% in 200916.
During the same period, Vladimir Putin also began publically calling for the Russian reserves
of the natural gas to be used to as the driving motor for the Russian Economy.
16
http://www.indexmundi.com/g/g.aspx?c=rs&v=74
37
Present status of the Russian natural gas industry
In order for the Russian Federation to realize some of their long term interests of creating a
natural gas sector as the foundation for a strong economy, and with this foundation build
further on creating a new market capitalism Russia. For this to be possible a solid background
has to be created. The tools and the foundations are intended to be their massive reserves of
natural gas, which they are already exporting. But there are a series of issues that will have to
be resolved before they can attain the export levels that they wish for and that are expected to
be needed by the European and Asian importers. I will in this section outline two things, first
the current state of the extraction and export. The second part will deal with the future
projects that are being planned as well as suggested programs.
Now
Around 2007 Russia was the single largest supplier of natural gas and oil, respectively at 32%
and 38%, for the European Union17. Current estimates of the natural gas in reserves are at as
estimated 44,800 billion cubic meters, most of it in the Siberian area18. As mentioned earlier,
the Russian Federation wrote and passed a law that moved control of the so called Strategic
Sectors under the direct control of the office of the president. 19. This law places any industry
that is deemed vital for the national security under administration of the president, and these
sectors includes industries that deal oil and oil byproducts, any form of overland
transportation of oil and maintenance and construction related to pipelines that carry oil or
gas. There are in total 42 types of industry that are under the administration of this law.20.
With this law and the state ownership of the only company allowed to extract natural gas,
Gazprom, the LNG industry is under the sole control of the government and they decided how
the industry develops.
There are also a series of privately owned enterprises that deals with hydrocarbons, but they
were subject to operation under an approval gained by not openly criticize the government In
2003 Mikhail Khodorovsky was arrested and to be taken to court on charges of fraud and tax
evasion. It was widely believed at the time that his arrest was politically motivated because he
had become a vocal opponent of Vladimir Putin. The trial ended with the result of having the
company Yukos Oil dismantled and sold off to either government owned companies, or his
17
Energy Dialogue EU–Russia. The Tenth Progress Report, 2010, pg. 4-6
http://www.indexmundi.com/g/r.aspx?t=10&v=98
19
Hogan Lovells International LLP 2011, page 3
20
Hogan Lovells International LLP 2011, page 4
18
38
industry rivals. Khordorkovsky himself was sentenced to 15 years in jail. (Moran Et all
2009:124)
The importance of the natural gas that is exported from Russia is not one that should be
underestimated as it is a cornerstone that is needed for Europe and the European Union
(Lévêque et All 2010:19) Therefore is stands to reason that this relationship is symbiotic, and
that the Russians are just at dependent on the gas . In order to remain for the relationship to
remain in equilibrium, the Russian will have to maintain and upgrade their infrastructure. The
current natural gas industry is currently produces 6.29 billion cubic meters (bmc) a year with
4.34 bmc being used to serve domestic needs. The remaining 1.949 bmc are used for exports21
and are sent to a primarily to Europe:
<
21
http://www.eia.gov/countries/country-data.cfm?fips=rs Note: A unit conversion has been used. Numbers in
the source are in the imperial unit system and using an online tool I converted to the metric unit system. This
was done to avoid confusion as other sources use the metric units.
39
As can be seen from the figure above, the need for the Russian gas in Europe is an important
one as 50% are used by Germany and eastern European countries, some of which are
members of the European Union22.
Sources of the gas
Russia primarily excavates their gas in Siberia, but they also import a significant amount from
the other countries in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). This is a union of
nations that was set up in the years after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Currently the CIS
consist of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia,
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Some of these countries are also known to have major reserves of
natural gas, and it is this that the Russians are importing. This is part of a larger strategy that
allows Gazprom to buy natural gas from CIS at a lower price, which is for domestic use, and
then the gas that is excavated in Russia is then the one being primarily used for export to
Europe. For example, Russia Imports gas from the Turkmenistan gas fields at the price of
depressed price of 65$ per 1000 cubic meters, and then resells it to the European market for
230$ (Moran et all 2010:128).
The reason that they can do it is this way is based on how the gas transportation network in
the CIS works. The network of that transports the natural gas from the source to refineries,
harbors or to the export receivers, is part of a massive network of pipelines that run through
much of Russia and the CIS countries. The network is here pictured with the natural gas
pipelines running through Central Asia23
22
23
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia
http://www.eia.gov/countries/country-data.cfm?fips=rs
40
The pipeline that I’m referring to here runs from Chardzhou in Turkmenistan through
Kazakhstan. This network is part of the larger network that is called the Central Asia - Center,
which is also visible above. Gazprom, and there by in extension Russia, have been able to
secure a series of beneficial agreements with the Central Asia republics about the pricing of
the natural gas that is purchased in these countries.
What is at play here is called Transit Geography and it is the core of the struggle that is going
on between the gas producing countries in the region (Kanett et all 2007: 114). In order to try
and secure control of the pipelines that run through many of the countries the Russian
government has been using a variety of methods, this will be described in greater detail later.
While it’s not visible on the map above, there is also a privately owned gas pipeline named
Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan (BTC) which built by a consortium of private gas and oil companies.
41
Some of the partners in this endeavor include Statoil, Chevron and British Petroleum (BP)24
which built the pipeline as an alternative to the Russian controlled pipelines. There is massive
competition between the large natural gas companies in the region to have an upper hand, but
it would seem Russia has the best cards.
Kazakhstan joined in as a supplier for this pipeline in 2006, but it was not without resistance
from the Russian side and they put out the idea that this was a political move push Russia out
of the area25. The Kazak motive to joining the BTC may also be in some part influenced by a
deal that was made in 2002, where they signed a 15 year exclusive deal to transport Kazak
natural gas through Russia. There has also been signed other deals with other countries in the
region. In 2004 Gazprom signed an exclusive deal with Uzbekistan where they acquired the a
15 year deal on the extraction rights to one gas field, and a 35 year development and
extraction deal on an oil and gas field, which is 90% owned by Lukoil. (Kanett et all
2007:114-6) These are not the only either exclusive rights that they own, or have the majority
of shares in companies:

KazRosGaz: Kazakhstani gas company, 50% owned by Gazprom 26

Kyrgyzgas: Previously state-owned, now 75% owned by Gazprom, bought for 1$ 27

Uzbekneftegaz: Joint venture in Uzbekistan through Lukoil, the largest private oil
company in Russia (Kanett et all 2007:115)

Tajikistan: Sangtuda hydroelectric powerplant, 51% owned by the Russian state in
exchange for reduction of the national debt owed to Russia.(ibid)

Tajikistan: Roghun powerplant, 50o million $ investment by the Russian state(ibid.)

Turkmenistan: in 2003 Gazprom bought the exclusive right to any gas excavated in
Turkmenistan for a period of 25 years2829
This is not a complete list as Gazprom have shares or ownership of 250 companies according
to their own website30. There are other privately owned companies that also operate in the
24
http://www.bp.com/en_az/caspian/operationsprojects/pipelines/BTC.html
http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1059060.html
26
http://www.gazprom.com/about/subsidiaries/list-items/
27
http://en.ria.ru/business/20131211/185461731/Russias-Gazprom-Takes-Over-Gas-Monopoly-in-Kyrgyzstanfor-1.html
28
http://www.gazprom.com/about/production/central-asia/
29
http://edition.cnn.com/2003/BUSINESS/04/10/russia.gazprom.reut/
30
http://www.gazprom.com/about/subsidiaries/list-items/
25
42
area, such as the previously mentioned consortium that built the BTC. However, while these
companies do have excavation field in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, they are often required to
the transport the gas through Russian owned pipelines as they are the primary ones that run to
Europe.31 What is clear from all of the above is that Russia have large interests in Central
Asia, and slowly but surely they are fortifying their position as the dominant player in the
natural gas industry in this area. The reason for creating this strong position and what they
stand to gain from it will be analyzed in greater depth in the third part of the analysis.
Future of the gas industry
While the current structure seems like a big one, there are also other plans in the works. In
2003 the Russian government published a document called “Energy Strategy of Russia for the
period up to 2030”. In this document they set out a series of goal that they hope to accomplish
in the natural gas field. These plans are divided in to three phases the run from 2009 till 2030.
Summed up the requirements that should be met by 2030 for the gas industry in order for the
Russian gas industry to remain in growth are:







Building the needed infrastructure in order to live up to increase in demand32
Increase in gas production for export from 664 billion cubic meters to 885-940 billion
cubic meters33.
Investments required to the gas industry for developments is estimated at 565-590
billion dollars 34
Maintaining export levels to Europe, and an increase of export in the Asia Pacific are
of 27% 35
Increase the LNG transport by 14-15%36
Building the needed infrastructure in order to live up to increase in demand
Expanding the Yamal megaproject and securing the 166-198 billion dollars
investments needed.
These expectations are numbers are based in part on the Russians own estimations, and where
done in 2003, before the economic meltdown in 2008. However there have been no revisions
made by the Russian government to this plan, and therefore we must assume that they still
expect these numbers to be real. There are no other major estimations of how much is needed
to update and improve the infrastructure in Russia. This does mean that those numbers could
31
Energy Strategy of Russia for the period up to 2030, 2010 Ed. Pg: 146
ibid
33
Energy Strategy of Russia for the period up to 2030, 2010 Ed. Pg: 146
34
Ibid, pg: 147
35
Ibid pg: 166
36
Ibid
32
43
have changed over the years. Alternative estimations of these investments put the number
needed higher than the Russians estimations. The New York Times puts needed investments
at $738 billion dollars in order to update the infrastructure in order to meet the estimated
increasing needs of Europe37.
There is however the issue that this document refers to Russia as being a member of G8. Due
to the annexation of Crimea in March of 2014 Russia was removed as a member from the
organization, and sanction where levied against members of the Russian administration38.
From the Russian side the being barred from the G8 was played in another way, as Vladimir
Putin has deemed that a membership of the organization was not in Russia interest 39. How this
will affect the Russians long term plans is not clear, and will not be for some time.
The Yamal Megaproject is a major project currently in the development phase but is planned
to be one of the largest gas extraction sites in Russia. It is located in the Yamal Peninsula in
northern Russia. And there is 11 gas fields that have only just begun operation, but is
expected to be able to produce 75-115 bcm per year by 2015, and has goal of total production
of 310 bbc by 20304041. This is a massive project that also includes the construction of the
3200 km pipe line called the Yakutia–Khabarovsk–Vladivostok pipeline, or colloquially
Power of Siberia. This pipeline began construction in 2019 and is expected to be fully
operational in 2019. The pipe line is also part of a deal that was made between Russia and
China in May of 2014. The deal between Russia and China was that has been discussed for
years in meetings and a settle meant was finally reached Russia is to supply 38 bcm of gas to
china a year for the 30 years. The total cost of this deal is estimated to be around 400 billion
dollars, but the real cost has been kept secret. There has been some speculation that this deal
is may in part be beneficial for the Russian government due to the problems they see having
risen out of the gas disputes between Russian and Ukraine, and the political fallout these
created in the west42.
37
http://useconomy.about.com/od/worldeconomy/p/Russia_economy.htm
http://edition.cnn.com/2014/03/24/politics/obama-europe-trip/
39
http://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2014/06/05/russia-quits-g8/
40
http://www.gazprom.com/about/production/projects/mega-yamal/
41
http://www.europeanenergyreview.eu/site/pagina.php?id=400
38
42
http://pipelinesinternational.com/news/gazprom_and_cnpc_sign_mou_on_gas_supplies_via_eastern_route/0
80697/
44
The connection between Vladimir Putin and focus on natural gas
Vladimir Putin can be considered to be at the center of the movement of the Russian
administration to bring the oil and gas industry under the control of the government; This is
not a claim made unfounded as it can be traced back to his own hands. As a student at the St.
Petersburg State Mining Institute, Putin authored a thesis in which he laid out points that can
be seen in the governmental movements during his presidency. The thesis lays out a vision for
a new Russian economy that has strong foundations in the raw materials and mineral export,
and he sees this as an area that should be under the direct control of the state. In his thesis he
writes that “Regardless of who the natural, and in particular mineral resources belong to, the
state has the right to regulate the process of their development and use, acting in the interests
of society as a whole and individual owners whose interests conflict with each other, and who
need the assistance of state authorities to reach a compromise 43”
With the passing of the 2006 law that made the natural gas industry a matter of national
security, it is clear that he still believes this, and is in the process of implementing this idea. In
an effort to further secure this position, has over the years appointed likeminded people to
positions that oversee the industry (Moran 2009:125). His 2004 address to the Federal
Assemby had him pointing out how successful government involvement could be: “Gazprom,
for example, has just become the third biggest company in the world in terms of
capitalization(...) This result did not just come about all on its own, but is the result of
carefully planned action by the state.44” And he added later in the speech “I believe that only
in this way can we ensure that Russia maintains a leading and stable position on energy
markets in the long term. And in this way, Russia will be able to play a positive part in
forming a common European energy strategy.45 ”As late as April of 2014 there was again
problems with the delivery of Gas through Ukraine, and this time the threat of shutting it off
came directly from the Vladimir Putin46.
It would seem that the idea of using the natural resources of the state as the foundation for a
strong Russia is not something that is new to Putin. This idea is one that he has been turning
over since his days as a student. If an idea is present for that long, it stands to reason that is
43
Mineral raw materials in the strategy for development of the Russian economy, pg 6, translation from russian
to English by Thomas Fennel
44
http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2006/05/10/1823_type70029type82912_105566.shtml
45
http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2006/05/10/1823_type70029type82912_105566.shtml
46
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/04/10/ukraine-crisis-russia-gas-idUSL6N0N239U20140410
45
not just an idea, but a conviction. He wrote his thesis long before even being appointed prime
minster, and even before his days in the KGB. This idea in turn is part of a lager idea that will
explore in the next section.
The larger picture
The previous section described the what the Russians are doing now, and part of their larger
plans for the future, but the questions remains, what is it all for? What is the idea that is
driving the Russian government to put so much focus on becoming a large energy provider
for Europe?
As I laid out in my hypothesis, I argue that this is part of a larger strategy to redefine the
Russian Federation and to realize a series of goal. In this section I will be laying out my
analysis for what I see as the reasons behind this foundation of a new identity built on natural
gas.
Identity crisis
With the end of the cold war there rose a need in Russia for a new building identity, because
for the 70 years prior to that they had been a Socialist state devoted to creating a new a nation
that built on the ideas of Karl Marx. Russia was to become a society free of classes, religion
or positions of power and become a society where everybody was equal. When the Union
ended, they were left with nothing close to the idea that had been the core of their national
mentality. Whole generations had grown up in this society, and they knew nothing apart from
this, and barely anything remained for the society that had existed before the Soviet Union.
The communist that came in to power following the 1917 October revolution had done
everything they could to wipe way the remnants of the old empire.
For most of the population at the time, you would have to have been over the age of 80 years
old to be able to remember anything else than the Soviet years. For entire generations they
had lived in privacy intrusive autocracy with no voice regarding their opinions. Everything
they knew at the time, was ripped away, figuratively overnight, when they suddenly where
told that they would now go the route of capitalism and democracy, something that they had
been told for generations was the enemy. Two years is not enough time to get accustomed to
an entire new world that was given to them. As an almost direct opposite to what they had
previously been trying to create, a classless society, the new Russia was heavily impacted by
46
poverty, and over the course of the nineties they even saw the rise of a new powerful financial
class, the Oligarchs.
Another outcome of the fall of the Soviet Union was the lack of an external enemy. As
mentioned earlier, there is the adage that the greatest unifying force for a nation is the idea
that there is an enemy out there just waiting to destroy you, and the most important thing is to
prepare for the battle that will inevitably come. With the wall gone, and the threat of nuclear
war no longer hanging above their heads, they had to face the new security problems. From a
neo-realist point of view the most important security question, is the survival and
improvement of the state in the anarchic system. But this point of view rarely takes in to
account security problems that arise inside of the nations, and to some degree this was the
mindset that drove the Soviet Union. HIV and AIDS were dealt with inside of the Soviet
Union are a good example of this. The first recorded instances of HIV came in the late 1980s,
and the people that were diagnosed were publically scorned for this as it was a seen as result
of deviant behavior such as homosexuality47. The problem with a negative response such as
this means the people that might have contracted the disease in this time, may not have gone
to the doctors. The results of this is clear in the present scale of the epidemic in Russia is
currently the worst one outside of Africa, and that number is expected to rise as number
currently double every 12 months as the new infected from the use of intravenous drugs is on
the rise on Russia48. But in this tragedy there is at least some bright news; there has in the past
15 years, been a change in the way that the Russian government looks at the AIDS problem.
There has been a significant increase in the funding for treatment of those already infected,
and well an increase in funding for public information campaigns that aim at reducing the
number of new infected (Kanett 2007:40-41) The relevance of bringing this up lies in the
way that a state will deal with health problems. Increases in diseases and other ailments are
factors that can both in long and short term have detrimental effects on the social and
financial developments of a state. Illnesses such as HIV are not currently a curable disease,
and the known treatments can be costly both for a state and the individual.
This is an example of the change that is taking part in the search for a new identity. Arguably
no nation can ignore a rising problem that is affecting millions of citizens. But, the change lies
47
48
http://aids.about.com/od/clinicaltrials/a/russia.htm
ibid
47
in the fact that unlike the Soviet identity, they are recognizing that there are problems that
cannot be handled with brute force or public humiliation. This is a sign of growth, at least in
the way that they are tackling problems, and growth is part of the process of redefining. In
order for a new national identity to be built, there are two options that present themselves.
Either they must look at events in the past and alter those for the better, or you must create an
entirely new national identity. The process that Russian is undertaking is a mix of the two.
There are some of the things that were important in the past and they have carried them over
to the new identity. But the new identity needs more than inspiration from the past.
Empire.
In 1991 Russia became a country for the first time since the 17th century49. During this period
between the old Tsar Empire, to the end of the Cold War their direct sphere of influence or
countries under their influence had included the now American state of Alaska, and large
parts Central Asia. Now, in1991, Russia consisted of just that, Russia. The Soviet Union, for
lack of a better word had also been an empire, going by the definition of an empire as smaller
countries with a national government, but is also direct under the rule of supra government in
another nation50.
In the period of the Putin presidencies Russia has kept its interest in having some political
control over their neighbors, but the strategy have changed. The Rose Revolution of Georgia
in 2003 is a good example of this. This small revolution was the result of a strong movement
in Georgia to get rid of the pro-Russian president. The Rose Revolution of Georgia was not
something that was seen as positive in Russia as the president of Georgia, Eduard
Shevardnadze, was a supporter of Russia. Following a chaotic election with claims of election
fraud, the country was on the brink of very violent clashes between the pro-Shevardnadze and
the pro-Mikheil Saakashvili supporters. After a brief meeting with the Russian foreign
minister Igor Ivanov, Shevardnadze resigned and Mikheil Saakashvili became the new
president of Georgia (Kanett 2007:109)
This move is noteworthy due to the fact that Mikhail Saakashvili was not considered a proRussian candidate. The softer political touch that is here in paly seems to fall in the line of
both something new in the identity, but at the same time it is a continuation of the Empire
49
http://www.bucknell.edu/arts-and-sciences-college-of/academic-departments/russianstudies/resources/russian-history/chronology-of-russia/chronology-through-1917.html
50
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/empire
48
politics. It is easier to have a non-pro-Russian president that acknowledges that Russia could
be beneficial partner, rather than a president that is so unpopular with the population that it
might result in situation where they lose any chance of political influence if the entire
government is changed51. The same approach of applying diplomacy has been used in
relations with other nations, and often it has had an economic side to it as well, in what Kanett
et all refers to as a Purse Policy (Kanett 2007: 113). The method being employed is based
using economic methods to either strengthen Russian positions, or in order to reach a
compromise using economic incentive. As mentioned in a previous section Gazprom took
over development of gas fields or operation of hydroelectric plants. These agreements where
in some cases made by writing of some of the debt owed by Tajikistan or Kyrgyzstan to
Russia, in exchange for shareholder majority in the national companies that owned these
operations (Kanett 2007: 114)
The interest remains the same, control over important aspects of the smaller nation’s main
industries. This would seem to fall in line with the interests laid out by Richard Pipes, that
Russia has an inherent interest in direct control over their neighbors (Baev 2007:34-35).. But
the methods have changed from what could been seen during the soviet period. In keeping
with my view of an identity change being applied in order to achieve the goals. While the
Why remains the same, the how has now become a more measured approach that employs
very strong tools, but the approach is not as overtly aggressive in its implementation. This
approach has yielded more results of closer economic ties between Russia and many of the
countries in Central Asia. It seems that this approach is becoming a part for the foreign policy
of Russia in an effort to bring a more economized view into the Russian foreign policy. The
major Russian state owned companies such as Gasprom, Lukoil. Rosneft and Transneft are
becoming the extended arm of the Russian Government. This economic arm also extends in
another direction, towards Europe who is so dependent on Russian gas that this influence now
stretches in several directions around Russia.
Put in context with the Empire model that Baev describes, it would seem that we are seeing
the rise of a new type of Russian empire that builds on its ability to use it economic resources
51
The relationship between Russia and Georgia did however deteriorate severely over the years to come due
to the Georgian attempts to bring two smaller autonomous republics under control. This resulted in an armed
conflict between the two nations. However, I do not see this in any way changing the previous efforts of soft
diplomacy that they used In 2003
49
as an instrument in creating the foundation for this new Empire. This empire however is
different from the models we’ve seen Russia employ in the past. The new empire is built on
two separate foundations, that are mutually dependent. One the one side you have Europe that
is dependent of the gas from Russia, and other hand you have Central Asia that is dependent
on Russia in order to sell their gas. If this is the case then we are seeing the rise of an empire
that has a very interesting powerbase. It is in part built on the control of assets of a group of
nations, and the needs of another group. Russia’s “only” role in this is to make sure the gas
flows from one group to the other. A neorealist would look at this as an optimal position
where a nations safety in the order, is not dependent on the own role, but based on the needs
of others. This position of shifting the foundation to others can be seen as more secure,
because the other nations are forced in to a position where they survival is dependent on
helping Russia survive. The old moniker of the MAD doctrine is still alive in this case, but the
main idea has shifted. Now in order to survive a nation but make sure others survive, because
the fall of one will bring the other down with them.
However, there are also some negative aspects of such a position. If they indeed succeed in
building this empire, it is also based on a relationship based on animosity. The problems that
have been shown with the Russia as the primary supplier of gas to Europe, is not one that was
met with happy faces in Europe. Europe is based between a rock and hard place in this
structure, and it is not one they are happy about. And it stand to reason that they will explore
every option available in order to strengthen their position, or best case scenario, get out of it
all together. Russia is somewhat in the same situation, but to them it’s a survival situation.
They could have chosen an alternate method of getting to this strong position, but have
chosen one that is unpopular all round due to their handling of problems relating to the gas
distribution. Now they seem to have forced themselves in to a place that they now have to
maintain at all costs, and this will most likely result in the problems down the road. For now it
seems that it is a strong position as long as Europe is dependent on their gas. But they are
aware that this position is perhaps not tenable for long. This may be one of the reasons that
they are also putting efforts in to strengthening this position by exporting to the east via
China.
This is another area where the Empire aspect of Baev can be seen in the way that the Russian
Federation now interacts with nations within what they see as their sphere of influence. Pavel
50
Baev cites Richard Pipes as the founder of a theory regarding Russia that sees an inherent
need for expansionism as part of the raison d'être of the Russian nation. This expansionism is
such an important part of the Russian national identity, that they can organically only exist as
an empire, and thereby have an inherent need for control over the political development of
their neighboring states (Baev 2007:34-35). From a historical point of view there is some
truth to these claims as both the Tsar Empire, and the Soviet Union had significant interests in
maintaining a level of power over their neighbors. The Soviet Union even went so far as to
militarily intervene in nations were the public chose a different path then that the Soviets
would have preferred. The most glaring examples would be the invasion of Hungary in 1956,
and the intervention in the Czechoslovakian reforms in the summer of 1968. These two
invasion became known as the Brezhnev Doctrine, which summed up is that the Warsaw Pact
had to intervene in the other USSR nations if they were maneuvering away from socialism,
towards what was perceived as a capitalist agenda.
For a modern day context I will be using Ukraine as an Example of how the Empire
dimension comes in to play. With the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula Russia excersised
direct interference of a nation within its claimed sphere of influence. Although it is claimed
that they merely respected the will of population after an election, this claim has been met
with skepticism by international observers. (OSCE 2014) Larisa Homac is quoted in Kannet
(2007:175) saying that based on the level of control Russia as excerted over its neigbours in
the past century, it is not surprising that Russia has a hard time accepting that these nations
are now moving away from Russia. I would argue that in the context of Ukraine this
conclusion seems to hold merit. Prior to the annexation of Crimea, Ukraine was in the final
stages of negotiating a deal regarding closer trade relations between the European Union and
Ukraine. This deal was met with sharp criticism from the Russian, and they also suggested
that they should be part of trilateral talks52. I argue that this is good example of the ideas that
are expressed both by Kanett and Baev. Arguably Russia is trying to get involved in the
political dealings of a sovereign nation and at that they have a right to be part of the future
developments of this sovereign nation. I also argue that the reason that Russia believe that
they have the right to involve themselves in this issue is due to the gateway nature of Ukraine.
50-60% of the gas used in Europe flows through Ukraine, and prior to the opening of the
North Stream gaspipeline, that number was close to 80%. This gives Russia a huge interest in
52
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-25154618
51
the political dealings in Ukraine, since closer relations with the EU could be seen as a threat
to the Russian gas. I see The Empire dimension and the idea by Kanett seem to be in as being
in line with this interest that Russia has in Ukraine. They believe that they have the right to
influence Ukraine for two reasons, one they are part of the near abroad that Russia wants to
influence, and they have a real interest in maintaining a level of influence over the nation that
serves as the gatekeeper between Russia and the rest of the European downstream customers.
The neo-realist point of view on this would put this in the offensive realism category. I see it a
as a clear cut example of a state doing what it can to improve its position in the system.
Russia saw an opportunity to improve in an area that would not have strong short term
consequences for them. Overall and in the long term the aggressive maneuvering could be
detrimental as the way it is viewed can damage long term relations with other nations. But it
will not, from the Russian point of view, be something that will change its relations and
possible influence in Ukraine. It is not the first time they have taken a very aggressive stance
towards Ukraine, as was seen with the gas pricing dispute of 2009. The direct relations
between Russia and Ukraine are one that is tense, but it would seem that the status quo
remains.
Also, the situation in Eastern Ukraine is another area that where the Empire dimensions plays
a part. Current observes and the United States Department of State claim to have evidence of
Russian Troops being present in Ukraine as early as April of 2014 53. If this is indeed true,
then Russia is getting directly involved in the affairs of the unstable region that is Eastern
Ukraine. Baev points to that since the natural gas sector is so important to the Russians, and it
perceived as the thing that still binds the former soviet Republics. I argue that this point is
valid in this context because if this is the way the Russians perceive the gas and its link to
Ukraine. The Re-emergence of Russia as a superpower is important in this context for two
reasons. The main is that the ability to disregard international conventions and opinions is
something I would argue that only a superpower would be able to do. But it has changed from
the way that the Soviet superpower would have acted in this situation. As previously
mentioned, Russia has a history of employing invasion in order to exercise the will in the
nation they believe they have a right to control. But in the case of Ukraine they are acting in a
53
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/putin-admits-unmarked-soldiers-ukraine-russian-optimisticgeneva-talks/
52
more subtle way. The US claims that there are Russian troops in Ukraine, but the Russian
governments have vehemently denied this. If the US is correct then I would argue that they
are behaving in ways that seem to reflect older ways, but it is stealthier approach this time.
Instead of sending in a large army, they have chosen to work through a proxy. They have
chosen supplying the local pro-Russian insurgency with military hardware, such as the selfpropelled missile launcher that was meant to have used to shoot down a plane in July 2014. In
doing so they are progressing the intentions of state in another state, but they do not have to
take direct control of the insurgency. This is a more calculated way that employs elements of
both defensive and offensive realism. They are advancing their agenda, but they are doing in
such a subtle way that the international system cannot take direct action against them.
Civilization
While the natural gas might be used for building the Russia in foreign policy, there is still the
issue of trying to build a coherent image of Russia that will be the cultural background for the
Empire. As mentioned Russia is in the process of redefining what is means to Russian, and
this is not an easy task. Russia is not a country with homogenous group of people and with a
unified culture. While the ethnic Russians make up the majority of the population (~80%),
there are dozens of smaller ethnic groups and languages spoken throughout Russia54. And the
different cultures of Russia would be almost impossible to determine due to the sheer size of
the country. With such a diverse cultural and lingual combination of the country, it is beyond
the scope of this thesis. Due to this I will be focusing on the culture that is depicted as the
“official” Russian culture, the one that is being described by the Russian government.
Russian political scientist Gleb Pavlovsky said in 2005 that “Russia defines itself as a
European state which is at the same time is also a civilization – a carrier of its own variation
of absolute morals” (Baev 2007:38). This idea can be interpreted in in a varied type of ways
since there is not clear definition of what a Russian civilization is. In the post-soviet period
they did not have the option of seeing themselves as the opposite of the West, because they
had just been given a version of what the West had, democracy and capitalism. If Russia is
part of Europe, then it stand to reason that they would try to incorporate some of the ideals
that is prominent in on Europe. But this does not seem to the case when looking at the
declaration that came out of the World Council of the Russian People, which is an
54
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/countrytemplate_rs.html
53
organization led by the head of the Russian Orthodox Church. The Church and the office of
the president are considered to be allies, Vladimir Putin and the head of the church, Patriarch
Kirill of Moscow, are seen by contemporary observes as being on very friendly terms, and are
also considered moral allies5556. The declarations made by the World Council of the Russian
people have a series of declarations that arguably directly contradicts the idea that Russia is
part of the mainstream European culture. The declaration condemns homosexuality, abortion
and euthanasia as part of Western lifestyle, and that these and the notions western human
rights are not suitable for the Russian society (Baev 2007:39)
Especially homosexuality has been something that has been brought up as something that
appears as a threat to the Russian society. Just prior to the 2014 Sochi Winter Olympics a law
was passed that outlawed any form of promotion of homosexuality on the penalty of prison
and/or fines. The law also states that homosexuality may not be discussed in front of minors
as this is seen as promotion of unnatural sexuality57. This law created a lot of international
backlash, but this was swept away as anti-Russian propaganda by their enemies. The above
could seem like a rehash of what I refer to as Not Them way of self-identification that was the
foundation of the socialist years. But it is part of the Russian way of trying to reclaim the
‘greatness’ that lost with fall of the Soviet Union.
Boris Yeltsin tried during the nineties to modernize Russia and in some ways try to bring
Russia closer to Europe, but this tactic would seem to have been abandoned under Putin. Baev
cites Marshall Poe as believing that Russia has four key components that take place in in
Putins modernization efforts. These are “Autocracy, control of the public sphere, command
economics, and state sponsored militarism” (Baev 2007:105). The control of the public sphere
would seem to be in line with the tightening of the rights of homosexuals that was seen. By
creating a value system that speaks to the average Russian, they are developing a culture that
is seen as uniquely Russian.
A counter argument to this idea was presented by former foreign minister Sergei Lavrov. He
argued that because the Russian Federation is made up of a multitude of minorities and the
multifaith of the nation, Russia is not capable of taking sides in a clash of civilization. Russia
55
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/24/world/europe/24church.html
http://af.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idAFTRE81722Y20120208
57
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-06-30/putin-signs-law-banning-gay-propaganda-amongchildren.html
56
54
intends to work along with every nation and multinational organization in the same manner,
and that no one would receive special treatment (Kanett 2007:46-47) There is alternative way
of understanding this position apart from the literal that Lavrov might have intended. In
conjecture with the way the Russians simply ignored the criticism surrounding Sochi, it can
be argued that the equal way of dealing with nations, is more a of flattering way of saying that
other nations, or the organizations will not get any special treatment from the Russians, as in
should the UN or EU wish to change the Russian value set, then they will have no success.
Exactly what side of the clash of civilizations that Russia is on is one that has been broadly
debated over the period of the what is often referred as the War on Terror. Russia can
aruguably be following Lavrovs model of interacting with other nations in this context. They
have come down hard on terrorism, and have cooperated with NATO in in Afghanistan (Lang
2014:2) but at the same time, they have remained critical of any international effort for
proposed interventions in Libya or Syria. Their position in these cases might seem random,
but it does fall in line with Lavrovs statement, that no one will receive any special treatment.
They are operating in a way that will benefit Russian interests.
In Ukraine some of the reasons that the Russians have used for their annexation of Crimea
and the continued involvement in the conflict in Eastern Ukraine, do fall within the ideas
expressed in Baevs Civilization dimension. Baev points to an Russian idea called
Narodnost(Baev 2007:39) which according to him means national character both home and
abroad. It is the notion of being Russian, no matter where in the world you are. It also an that
I would argue resembles that of ethno-nationalism which is a “form of nationalism that that is
fuelled by a keen sense of ethnic distinctiveness which one is keen on preserving” (Heywood
2010:467) With the situation in eastern Ukraine, it must be taken into account that 17% of the
Ukrainian population refers to themselves as Russian or Russian ethnicity. It is the same
group that makes up the majority of the pro-Russian insurgents. I would argue that, based on
Baevs idea of Narodnost, that the idea of the Civilization also extends to people who are
living in other countries. So not only do Russia have people in the eastern Ukraine, it is also
their responsibility to protect them as the idea of Civilization means that Russians are
Russian, no matter where they are. I argue that the in the case of Ukraine, there are two reason
that would apply. The first is that, at home Vladimir Putin has a strong support among the
population, and this support is based on his perceived unwavering will to defend Russians.
This was seen in Sochi where, as mentioned, there was a complete disregard for the
55
international community’s reaction to the laws regarding homosexuality. For him the
important issue was to defend the will of the Russian people, and their ability to self-govern
in matters relating to them, and only them. If Putin was to ignore the plight of Russians
abroad, then he will be going against the very thing that makes him popular among the
Russians. The second point I would argue harkens back to the Empire. While I do believe
Putin has an interest in defending Russians, it also provides a scenario where they can get
involved in the internal affairs of a neighboring state. They are provided with a situation in
which they can claim that they are protecting the Russian people. And this again provides
some obscuring of their involvement. They are able to satisfy both the people at home and
those who believe themselves to be Russian in Ukraine. And they are also able to do some
level of armed involvement without having to deploy an army. The insurgents are fighting for
principles that align with those of the Russian government, and they in turn are able to
influence another nation thought the proxy of population that identifies with Russia.
Vladimir Putin
The power position that the roles as a super provider of gas is the also the foundation for the
power that is perceived in Russia, and while this position is real; it is also tied to the
presidency of Vladimir Putin. A step back is needed to understand the role of Vladimir Putin
in this context. The first president of Russia following the end of the Cold War was Boris
Yeltsin. He was the one that had to undertake the enormous task of guiding Russia through its
first baby steps in to the world of democracy and capitalism. The Russian economy had taken
a severe beating in the late 1980s and it had become worse after the dissolution of the USSR.
Yeltsin, acting on advice from the west asked for a period of 12 months with free hands in an
effort to restore the Russian economy. The result of this was the rise of the class of citizen that
became known as the Oligarchs who were not met with open arms by the Russian society. His
image also suffered further setbacks with the economic crisis that hit Russia in 1998, where
the value of the Ruble fell drastically over a short period. Yeltsin himself was at the same also
not see as a dignified statesmen, and could often be seen drunk either in international
summits, or just on TV as part of public events (Baev 2007:18-23)
Compare this image of Yeltsin to the image that Vladimir Putin has built around himself in
the years that he has been president. He is a black belt in Judo, and has built an image of
himself as a tough outdoors man that does not shy away from dangerous things. A few years
back a photo was released to the press showing Putin having helped tranquilize a tiger, and
56
there are also a whole series of photos of him riding shirtless with a crossbow. This
strongman image is also mirrored in the song A Man Like Putin that became very popular in
Russia in 2002. The refrain in the song goes “One like Putin, full of strength, One like Putin,
who won't be a drunk, One like Putin, who wouldn't hurt me, One like Putin, who won't run
away!”58. Also his public approval pols have never dropped below 65 %, and were at one time
in 2007 at 81%59. Baev points to that there is a tradition in Russian politics of the people
uniting behind a strong leader in order to show that the nation is unified (Baev 2007:41).This
image of Putin has in a way become synonymous with Russia over the course of his
presidencies, and it is not without merit. As mentioned earlier Putin has had ideas about how
to build the Russian state since before he even took office. Perhaps this is where the new
identity that is growing in Russia has found its inspiration in their leader. With the direct
parallels that can be drawn between the intentions of Vladimir Putin and the expanse of the
energy sector, Russia seem have found the cultural identity they want for now.
Great Power60
Although much of this thesis had been dedicated to the Russian interest in its natural gas, their
immense nuclear stockpile remains the cornerstone of the national security. And their
stockpile is not one that should be neglected at any point, as Russia is still in pure number the
largest nuclear state with reserves nearly twice as large as the combined nuclear stockpile of
the other Nuclear Nations61. Using this as a backbone Russia can arguably still call
themselves a Great Power, because the weight that the nuclear stick carries is also the
backbone of any other Great Power in the world. Any country that has nuclear weapons is
essentially protected from any kind of military assault by any other nation, but it is not the
only defining character of a Great Power. This power does not protect them from criticism,
and Russia has been criticized greatly, namely in context with the handling of the Ukrainian
gas dispute of 2009, and also in their military engagement with Georgia in 2008. So while this
backbone ensures that they don’t have to worry about military assault, it is also somewhat
useless now. It played a significant role in the Cold War were it was part of the power balance
that stopped the world from going up in flames.
58
http://russmus.net/song/1396
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/6265068.stm
60
The term great power, or major power, is not one that has a strict definition, but I have chosen to go by the
dictionary definition of “a state powerful enough to influence events throughout the world”
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/major+power?s=t
61
http://fas.org/programs/ssp/nukes/nuclearweapons/nukestatus.html
59
57
So in order to remain in the role of Great Power but in the new context we need to look back
to what was described in the Empire section above. The natural gas reserves have taken the
role of the nuclear stockpile, in as much as this is now the foundation for their ability to
project their will over countries. As for the self-perception on what other grounds this idea of
a great power, a look to the past is needed here. As mentioned earlier, there are two ways that
one can create a new identity, either looks to the past and improve on it, or a fresh start. When
it comes to the idea of being a Great Power, it would seem that Russia is looking to the past
for inspiration. Russia has had some impressive achievements such as the first satellite
Sputnik and also sending the first man in to space. Achievements such as these serve as a
reminder that Russia has done something great, and this greatness does not go away. Their
seat on the United Nations Security council also speaks as a reminder that Russia still carries
considerable international power.
Kanet points to that the question of whether Russia qualifies as a great power is has not been
settled in any way. However due to the positions that they hold in international relations and
with the new powerbase of energy, and their nuclear stockpile it would stand to reason that
this is not a position that has at any point changed for Russia. As mentioned early there is
varying definitions of what constitutes a Great Power in the theoretical debates. Russia do
have the ability to wield and project power, in the military sense, on a global scale. The
nuclear arsenal, nuclear submarines and mobile launches hidden in Siberia are a weapon that
would seem to qualify it as a great power in the neo-realism sense of looking at what defines a
great power. But having this ability and actually using it is two very different things and it due
to the larger interdependence that exists in the world this is not enough.
Ukraine is a very current example that can be brought in here. The Russian government
annexed Crimea in early 2014, and the circumstances and intentions of this is still being
debated. But what is a fact is that Russia did send a military force in to another nation, and
against the will of the international community they annexed occupied territory. A tenant of a
great power position is arguable that the state in question has the ability to act without severe
repercussions. This is somewhat true in this case. There have been sanctions from other
nations, but these sanctions have been aimed at restricting the movements of a series of high
level Russian officials, but only to a certain degree. None of the top level officials have been
58
Conclusion
The basis on my hypothesis is based on two ideas that I have sought to analyze in greater
detail. The first was my own observation regarding whether Russia had developed the need
for a new identity as a nation following the cold war. The second was the idea of Russia
becoming a re-emerging superpower as the idea was presented by Roger Kanet et all.
After reviewing the data that I have collected in the framework that Pavel Baev lays out, I do
not believe that this is the case. Russia did suffer a series of setback in the period following
the fall of the Soviet Union, but this was mainly internal problematic such as the financial
collapse of 1998, and the wars in the Chechnya. At no point in this period would it seem to
me that Russia lost their position as a super power. Their nuclear arsenal, their seat on the UN
Security Council, and the political alliances that they had before the fall of the Wall, has
remained in place, and when comparing these assets to the power tools described in neorealism, then they do not seem to have lost their international clout at any point. Going by the
hard power instruments that they have had a their disposal all this time, then Kanets idea of a
re-emerging superpower is both true and not true at the same time.
What we are seeing is instead a reprioritization, and the building of a new foundation for the
as the role of a super power that Russia see themselves. They have moved from wielding an
ideological power that was backed by a gigantic military, to now being a superpower based on
the role as an energy provider. This role is similar in scope to the one the Soviet Union held in
the way that there immediate sphere of influence, the nations on their borders, have not
changed radically in the timeframe I was exploring. While this new role is different in it own
way, they still in every sense of the word remain a superpower, and in the spirit of the word,
an Empire. The hold over the political and financial powers in Central Asia has moved from
one where the leader of those nations were supported by the Soviet leadership, to one that is
dependent on the Russian leadership, in this case Vladimir Putin, and the natural gas that have
become the new center of power that Russia is able to wield. I argue that this is visible in the
dealings between Russia and Ukraine in the period from the 2009 gas dispute, to the sanctions
imposed by the EU following the annexation of Crimea in February 2014. While they did
receive sharp criticism, and a series of sanctions, not a single sanction was levied against the
natural gas industry.
59
I argue that this shows that not only is the Russian correct in placing the focus on the gas, but
it has attained the same powers that the nuclear arsenal gave them prior to the end of the cold
war. The position as a superpower is now based on the role of an energy provider, and this is a
strong position that allows them a new type of power, this power is not based on military
strength or economic fortitude. It is a form of power that is usually seen in the Middle East,
where the oil rich states are able to gain a favorable position with the superpowers, by virtue
of being the nation that controls the flow of oil. This is also a form of energy securitization, in
the way that a nation controls the source of the energy other nations rely on. For Russia to
gain this position, along with the existing power structure they are a part of, gives them a
stronger position in the international system. They have regained a position as a superpower,
they have taken the one they already have, remodeled it and cemented it by adding a new
form of power to their arsenal.
As for a change in their identity, I have come to the conclusion that this is in fact the case, but
it is not as clear cut as that they developed a whole new identity. What I see instead appears to
be a convergence of old and new. The old ways of wanting to be a superpower has never left,
and it remains an integral part of the Russian identity. What has changed is the way the
Russians define themselves in this role. Where the old Soviet saw themselves as a moral
bulwark against the decadent West and the capitalist ways; the new Russia has accepted that
the way forward for the nations is capitalism. However, to them capitalism is an instrument
and not a way of life. The capitalist ways of using money as the instrument of power is
something that is new in an economy that for years relied on the 5 year plans, and a limited
market. With the new global market they see a way of improving their own standing in to
world, but on their own terms. The identity change that I see is the result of one powerbase
being replaced with another, and then adapting to it without having to compromise with the
scope of their ambitions. This new identity is in part some that is inherently Russian, but it is
being expanded by picking the attributes that supports and strengthens Russia.
The Russians civilization is perhaps a fluid concept that has not real definition, but it does
have a personification in Vladimir Putin. The image that has been built around him is also the
identity of Russia. Perhaps a stoic image, but one that has a clear image of wanting to return
Russia to its perceived rightful place as a nation that dictates it own term. This is visible in the
ways that they have dealt with international criticism. Even with the annexation of Crimea,
60
and the political fallout such as sanctions and the exclusion from the G8, Russia do not seem
to have taken a severe hit in the way they see themselves. It may be because it is still in the
early stages, but Russia would seem to be taking it in stride. In figurative ways the
presidencies of Boris Yeltsin and Vladimir Putin can be compared to the state of Russia at
their respective ways. The period of Boris Yeltsin was one marked by uncertainty born from
new and unfamiliar circumstances, and mixed with trying to adapt to an unknown system. The
period of Vladimir Putin speak more of a nation that has familiarized itself with the new
playing field, and one that is using new instruments to achieve old and familiar goals.
Perspectivization
There is one question that remains, is this new position as an energy powerhouse a solid
positions, and the answer to it is most likely not one that will be seen for years. The position
Russia is in right now is not one that is popular in Europe as there have simply been to many
times in the last 12 years where financial disputes have resulted in the complete cut off of gas
to Europe via Ukraine. Maybe these cutoffs have been politically motivated as some suspect,
and if they are, then the situation becomes even more unpopular in Europe. The EU has no
interest in being held hostage by Gazprom and they are already exploring alternatives to
having Russia as their main supplier. Germany has begun construction of new coal power
plants, and Norway has tentatively begun exploring their options in increasing the supply to
Europe. At the same time the shale gas extraction industry has begun to grow mainly in the
United States and Canada, but also in parts of Europe. While it is still not a competitor to the
Russian gas extraction, there remains the possibility that if new gas disputes arise between
Russia and Europe, then shale gas extraction could be look at with more favorable eyes. The
main obstacle for shale gas is that is has not yet become environmentally easy to extract the
gas. Another way it could go is that the expected reserves of gas that are currently believed to
be beneath Russia may be wrong. This can be related to the oil reserves of the Middle East
which may reach depletion at some point in the middle of this century. If these predictions
regarding the natural gas are wrong, or that the demand for them is greater than the one they
are provide, there is a real problem in putting too much attention in to the natural gas. They
are just as dependent on their export as their customer is on their imports.
61
One thing that might have consequences for Russia is how the populations of other nations
might begin to perceive Russia and their ambitions. This is something that the Russians are
not capable of influencing apart from changing their method of operations. As of the writing
of this, there is not resolution in sight of the situation in Ukraine, but some things have
become evident. Not only are the political leaders of Europe worried of the situation, but it is
also becoming unpopular with the civilian populations in Europe. There is a real possibility
that this might even grow to a point where governments cannot engage with Russia out of fear
of alienating their constituencies
Another obstacle that the Russian might run in to is that, while for now they remain the
largest supplier but there are other nations that also have large resources such as Qatar and
Iran. The oil industry has already proven that the need for oil is greater than the need for only
trading with nations that the West is on friendly terms with. There is also the possibility that
the market will simply become bigger than what Russia is capable of supplying to and this
may force them out of the role as a the one that sets the terms..
The following describes a series of projects taking place around the world. While none of
them are currently in operational status, but it remains something that must be taken in to
account. The reason it is relevant lies in the fact that they are not projects will low funding, or
only taking place in theoretical realm. These are projects that are funded at a state level, and
sometimes this funding is the billions of dollars and involves the cooperation of universities
and industry across national borders. There are several other clean energy projects under way
all over the world. The United States, Europe and Japan are all working on their own fusion
energy experiments. If just one of these becomes a reality within the next 30 years it will
become an impressive competitor to the gas industry. Most of the electric grid in the EU is
connected across national border, and if this network can be connected to a fusion reactor, the
consequences for the entire energy sector will be felt in short time. This area might seem like
science fiction, but the reality is that the clean energy movement grows stronger all the time,
and may at some point become so influential that the funding for these experiments will
increase. There is also the matter of climate change that is on the table in pretty much every
western country. This influence is tied closely to the clean energy and they are working
together. Giant solar power stations are being discussed as a possibility of being built in North
62
Africa. Hydroelectric power plants are being discussed as possibility for meeting the Japanese
requirements for the next century
The above are all real possibilities, and if the gain momentum there is a possibility that it will
have serious consequences for the Russian natural gas industry. If they can adapt to them, or
if they will try to maintain their course remains a matter that only the future can answer.
63
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