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Cultural Interoperability
Ten Years of Research into Co-operation in the
First German-Netherlands Corps
SOZIALWISSENSCHAFTLICHES INSTITUT DER BUNDESWEHR
FORUM
International
Band
Cahier
Volume
27
Ulrich vom Hagen, René Moelker & Joseph Soeters (eds.)
Cultural Interoperability
Ten Years of Research into Co-operation in the
First German-Netherlands Corps
Breda & Strausberg
May 2006
Opinions expressed are solely
those of the authors.
Die Verantwortung für den Inhalt liegt bei den Autoren.
Copyright by
SOWI 2006
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ISSN 0177-7599
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Contents
Introduction: Cultural Interoperability
Ulrich vom Hagen, René Moelker and Joseph Soeters
7
Sympathy, the Cement of Interoperability –
German-Netherlands Military Co-operation,
Cross-cultural Images and Attitudes in Longitudinal
(10 Years) Perspective
René Moelker, Joseph Soeters and Ulrich vom Hagen
15
Communitate Valemus –
The Relevance of Professional Trust, Collective Drills
& Skills, and Task Cohesion within Integrated
Multinationality
Ulrich vom Hagen
53
Who is We?
Narratives Regarding Trust, Identity and Co-operation
within 1 (GE/NL) Corps
Schelte van Ruiten
97
Smooth and Strained International Military
Co-operation
Joseph L. Soeters, Delphine Resteigne, Rene Moelker and
Philippe Manigart
131
Appendix: Questionnaire for 1 (GE/NL) Corps in 2005
163
Authors
179
5
6
Introduction: Cultural Interoperability
Ulrich vom Hagen, René Moelker and Joseph Soeters
1
Basic Concepts and the Study in German-Dutch Co-operation
Culture can be defined in many ways. One popular definition by
Hofstede (2005) refers to culture as the software of the mind. This
analogy to the computer era suggests that the „organisation“ provides
the hardware. Immediately the limitation of such a definition is revealed
because human societies and human cultures are not comparable to the
soft and hardware of machines. The implicit „body versus mind“ analogy doesn’t work out as well because culture comprises body, soul and
mind. One could go on criticising a multitude of definitions of cultures.
There must be over a hundred definitions. One can also be a pragmatic
and jump to a definition, that certainly is not perfect, but that suffices the
purposes of this report.
A definition that would fit the purpose of this report focuses on the way
in which people make sense of their interactions in an organisational
context (Weick 1995). In this context the concept put forward by Geertz
(1973: 5) proves adequate: „The concept of culture I espouse (…) is
essentially a semiotic one. Believing, with Max Weber, that man is an
animal suspended in webs of significance he himself has spun, I take
culture to be those webs, and the analysis of it to be therefore not an
experimental science in search of law but an interpretive one in search of
meaning.“ Trying to make sense of cultures means trying to understand
the differences between those cultures and to grasp the meaning of
norms, values, symbols, cognitions, feelings and behaviours.
When countries co-operate militarily, when they share a headquarter and
together command an international array of troops, they are sending a
message. It is not persé a message of unification, of an evolution towards one European army, but it is a message of intensifying cooperation and even though unification is an objective for the long term
future the ever increasing co-operation between the nations military’s
will in the end effect the sovereignty of nations. As always, when
7
institutions are scaling up, and become more integrated and interdependent on a higher level of abstraction, the question of identity and of cultural uniqueness becomes more prominent. The more nations integrate,
the more their populations will ask what is typically „Dutch“, typically
„German“, typically „British“, typically „Norwegian“ etceteras.
That is why nations who are trying to co-operate ever more intensely,
will experience frictions on the cultural level. The more the cultures are
alike, the more fiercely the friction may be expressed. This is certainly
the case between the Dutch and the Germans. More specifically, it is the
smaller partner that feels the most threatened. That is the first and most
important reason why the relationship between the Dutch and the Germans is analysed in this longitudinal study into co-operation in the
1 (German/Netherlands) Corps. The authors wanted to know whether
cultural interoperability was feasible, which conditions would further
cultural interoperability and into which direction it would develop. The
relevance of cultural interoperability hardly needs clarification. It is a
precondition for co-operation. Whereas Nato Response Forces and
European Battle Groups are acknowledged to be the operational frameworks of the future, combined forces will not be able to function without
cultural interoperability.
The second reason is that 1 (GE/NL) Corps has celebrated its tenth
anniversary in 2005. The study reported here offers an evaluation of the
way in which the Corps dealt with the challenges it came across, and the
way it successfully coped with problems. It also discusses the problems
that will have to be solved in the future, like the problem of common
procedures or the language problem. Scholars from the Sozialwissenschafliches Institut der Bundeswehr and the Netherlands Defense Academy monitored the co-operation in the 1 (GE/NL) Corps three times
from its start in 1995 (Klein et al. 1996, 1999; Hagen et al. 2003) and
were invited by the commander Lieutenant General Norbert van Heyst
to monitor the developments for the fourth time in 2005. It was courageous to assign critical scientists with this study, because the cooperation had experienced a low in 2003 when the Dutch and the Germans were deployed in Kabul. The General took a risk in congratulating
the Corps with a study that could easily turn out unfavourably (in fact, as
we will see, the study turns out quite favourable).
8
2
The Circumstances of Current Multinational Collaboration
For many years 1 (GE/NL) Corps was a truly bi-national structure. With
the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on Monday
23 September 2002, the Headquarters 1 (GE/NL) Corps was officially
designated as an International Military Headquarters to NATO. Already
on 19 June 2002 the Commanding General of 1 (GE/NL) Corps declared
1 (GE/NL) Corps operational ready to act as a High Readiness Forces
Headquarters to the Dutch and German ministers of defence. This declaration marked the end of an intense transformation period that lasted
eighteen months. While for several years 1 (GE/NL) Corps only consisted of Dutch and German soldiers the HQ was opened by early 2002
to small contingents of soldiers from now ten different NATO countries,
the so called Other Participating Nations (OPN), making the HQ truly
multinational.
Since a few years 1 (GE/NL) Corps is certified as a NATO High Readiness Force HQ. The HQ 1 (GE/NL) Corps is under Operational Command of Allied Command Operations and will conduct operation once
the North Atlantic Council has agreed upon a mission. The governments
of Germany and the Netherlands offered NATO the Headquarters
1 (GE/NL) Corps as Land Component Command (LCC) for NRF 4
(January–July 2005) under the lead of NATO’s Joint Forces Command
Naples (Italy). The concept of NATO Response Force (NRF) was first
endorsed with a declaration of NATO’s Heads of State at the Prague
Summit on 22 November 2002 and is planned to be fully developed by
October 2006. Now that HQ 1 (GE/NL) Corps is certified to act as Land
Component Command for the NATO Response Force, the time to respond to crises has even been reduced to five days for the first Corps
elements. A constant pressure of time as well as the multinational corps’
environment has both contributed to a current state of readiness that has
to provide swift answers to future challenges. First elements of the NRF
are able to deploy within five days and the whole force is able to operate
self-sufficiently for thirty days. Units that are assigned undergo a specialised 12-month preparation program that is split into the six months of
unit training under national responsibility and six months of joint and
combined training under the responsibility of the respective component
9
command. After a successful final test, NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) certified the forces of 1 (GE/NL) Corps.
In the first half of 2004, Headquarters 1 (GE/NL) Corps prepared itself
through a series of seminars, workshops and the two main exercises
Peace Rider 1 in January and Honest Sword in March. To meet NATO’s
demands, as of 1 July 2004 the HQ has deepened the joint and combined
training as highlighted by exercises Peace Rider 2 in July, Heroic Sword
in October and SACEUR’s final certification exercise Allied Warrior in
November 2004. On 14 January 2005, Headquarters 1 (GE/NL) Corps
took over the lead of the six-month NRF-4 LCC stand-by period. It
ended officially on 28 June 2005. From 21 April to 22 April 2005,
Headquarters 1 (GE/NL) Corps conducted a seminar on Non-Combatant
Evacuation Operations (NEO) and Counter Terrorism Operations since
the planning and execution of these operations are two potential missions of the NRF concept. Then from 23 May until 17 June 2005, about
5500 soldiers from various NATO nations participated in Norway in an
exercise at the training areas south-east from Hamar. The exercise Iron
Sword 05 was a combined Deployment and Field Training Exercise in
which the Headquarters of 1 (GE/NL) Corps performed its role as Land
Component Command (LCC) for the (NRF). The NRF-4 Land Contingent has shown that it is capable to conduct a complex Joint and Combined Operation for four weeks from scratch and without much preliminary training, 1500 kilometres away from the peacetime location. NRF-4
practised operational principles and demonstrated their capabilities.
Demanding tasks such as the deployment of 5500 soldiers and more than
2000 vehicles as well as Non-Combatant Evacuation and Counter Terrorism Operations were trained.
As a High Readiness Forces (Land) Headquarters, HQ 1 (GE/NL) Corps
is keen on maintaining the basic military skills of its staff members.
From 4 to 8 July 2005, the entire Headquarters staff set out to do so in
exercise „Back to Basics“ in Daaden, Germany. Basic soldiering skills
were trained such as life-firing of small arms and hand grenades, first aid
on the battlefield, and the handling of equipment for communication and
to protect the Corps troops from nuclear, biological, or chemical (NBC)
attacks. Even though the Corps was not on standby anymore for the
NATO Response Force, 1 (GE/NL) Corps has to keep up its readiness.
10
3
Overview of the Report
The report comprises four chapters (not counting this introduction).
In chapter two we present the findings of ten years of research concerning bi-national military co-operation in the 1 (GE/NL) Corps. Since it
was founded in 1995 the Corps was confronted with some problems,
because the interaction between Germans and Dutch in the populations
at large was not considered to run very smoothly. We focus on two well
known hypotheses from intercultural theory, claiming that the frequency
of contacts as well as mutual trust are likely to foster feelings of sympathy for one another. The data demonstrate that during the ten years of
study the service(wo)men of both nations have converged in their feelings of sympathy towards one another; in addition, the two general
hypotheses were confirmed. These findings provide an indication that
smooth international military co-operation indeed is possible and can be
„managed“. The fact that service(wo)men of other NATO member states
have entered the corps’ HQ since 2003, may help to create a more international atmosphere where the integration model of cultural interaction
(instead of the assimilation and separation model) stands relatively more
chances of success.
In chapter three the focus is on leadership and trust. From theory and
literature we know that task cohesion, leadership and training are the key
multipliers for successful operational performance of integrated multinational forces. Positive qualities of community (social cohesion) of the
service member’s face-to-face unit; competent, ethical, and properly
supported leadership; and prolonged, realistic, progressive, statedependent training that works for what troops and their leaders really
have to do and face are the elements that build collective drills & skills.
Styles of leadership in the Netherlands and in Germany differ. Authoritarian styles are more common in the German army, whereas participative styles are characteristic for the Dutch. Most German servicemen
prefer the Dutch style of leadership. Maybe those styles are influenced
by structural differences like the difference between an all-volunteer
army versus a conscript army. The very progressive approach of
1 (GE/NL) Corps to also practice integrated bi-nationality outside the
HQ can be considered a milestone in European integration. Though there
11
seems little room for emotional sameness between the members of
different military culture there is a lot of common ground when it comes
to peruse a commonly shared idea on the basis of collective professional
standards. In order for those standards to amalgamate it is necessary to
share as much time as possible together and especially to establish
collective drills & skills through permanent training.
Chapter four is based on interviews. When asked for his evaluation of
German-Netherlands co-operation General-major Marcel Celie, Second
in command in the 1 (GE/NL) Corps till 2005, pointed at positive experiences and improved relationships in the Headquarters where officers
work together intensively. But, he continued: „when I ask my driver the
same question I will hear quite a different story“. In this chapter the
author is asking the driver’s opinion. The focus is on lower ranking
servicemen stemming from the Netherlands Armed Forces. They work
mostly in the Staff Support Battalion and the Signals Battalion. These
units support the headquarters. Statements from German soldiers and
servicemen from other countries have also been included in this chapter
but the bulk of the data is Dutch. In previous studies (Klein et al. 1996,
1999; Hagen et al. 2005) lower ranking Dutch servicemen were identified the most negative group. For this reason this part of the study explores narratives from this group and contrasts these narratives with
those working at the headquarters. The question that is brought to the
fore ventures into the possibility of a collective identity; hence the title
„Who is We?“.
In chapter five the successes and failures of international military action
are examined. It analyses three recent operations in Kabul, Afghanistan,
two of which ended less successfully, whereas the third one still runs
fairly smoothly. Using existing literature on co-operation in (international) organizations, the chapter seeks to explain these different outcomes and points at six determinants explaining the differences between
the three operations. At the end, we discuss the implications for the
organizational set-up of future international military operations.
In a way, the study is not only a celebration of ten years of co-operation
in the 1 (GE/NL) Corps but it is also a celebration in itself of a longstanding friendship and fruitful working relationship between the schol12
ars from Germany and the Netherlands who worked together on this
project. It marks a decade of co-operation, but most of all a decade of
friendship.
References
Geertz, C. (1973). The Interpretation of Cultures. New York: Basic
Books.
Klein, P./Rosendahl Huber, A./Frantz, W. (1996). Das DeutschNiederländisches Korps im Meinungsbild seiner Soldaten. SOWIArbeitspapier N° 97, Strausberg.
Klein, P./Rosendahl Huber, A./Frantz, W. (1999). Zwei Jahre DeutschNiederländische Korps. Eine Begleituntersuchung 1995–1997.
SOWI-Berichte N° 67, Strausberg.
Hagen, U. vom/Klein, P./Moelker, R./Soeters, J. (2003). True Love. A
Study in Integrated Multinationality within 1 (GE/NL) Corps. SOWIFORUM International N° 25, Strausberg.
Hofstede, G./Hofstede, G. J. (2005). Cultures and Organisations. Software of the Mind. New York: McGraw-Hill.
Weick, K. E. (1995). Sensemaking in Organisations. Thousand Oaks:
Sage Publications.
13
Sympathy, the Cement of Interoperability –
German-Netherlands Military Co-operation, Cross-cultural
Images and Attitudes in Longitudinal (10 Years) Perspective
René Moelker, Joseph Soeters and Ulrich vom Hagen
1
Sympathy is what Holds it Together
In 1995, the First German-Netherlands Corps was established as a result
of political processes that began with the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989.
This event stimulated many European countries to restructure the armed
forces and to co-operate more intensely. In this line of reasoning, Germany and the Netherlands decided to join forces and form a bi-national
army corps. In this way, the countries intended to comply with policies
to downsize the organisation while at the same time maintaining and
enhancing the quality and sustainability of military capabilities. But
more changes were to come. The prevalence of Peace Support Operations after 2000 forced the First German-Netherlands Corps to transform. In 2003 the 1 (GE/NL) Corps no longer commanded the troops of
the German and Netherlands Divisions but instead it was designated as
one of the six European High Readiness Forces Headquarters 1 who are
to lead any combination of international troops abroad. It did so in 2003
when it provided the headquarter to ISAF 3 in Kabul. The 1 (GE/NL)
Corps is restructured to perform within the context of the NATO Response Force concept (NRF). In 2005 it took command over NRF 4
designated troops. 1 (GE/NL) Corps is scheduled to command the
NRF 10 in 2007 (Diepenbrugge et al. 2005: 542).
But is 1 (GE/NL) Corps really ready to function as an international
headquarters? Readiness depends on interoperability. Maybe the logistical and military hardware compatibility is the least of worries although
some scholars seriously criticised the backwardness of German equip1
HQ 1 (GE/NL) Corps is one of the six HRF (Land) HQ. The other headquarters are ACE Rapid
Reaction Corps (Rheindalen, DEU), Eurocorps (Strassburg, FRA) NATO Rapid Deployable
Corps (NRDC) (Istanbul, Turkey), NRDC Spain (Valencia, Spain) and NRCD Italy (Milan,
Italy). As of 2006 France will establish a NRDC in Lille. (taken from Diepenbrugge et al. 2005:
537)
15
ment and the fact that Germany still relies on the conscript system
(Kreemers 2000, 2001). But the hardware side of interoperability is
sufficiently covered and the Corps strives for improvement continuously. In contradistinction, the softer issues like cross-cultural appreciation and communication could prove detrimental to interoperability.
Two examples serve to illustrate this point. The first stems from operational experiences. The second from Dutch studies into bi-national
relationships.
Schröder (2005: 521) states that „it will be very difficult to find two
other nations where bi-national co-operation in the daily practise has
proven to be as successful“. Schröder is right regarding the co-operation
in the Münster headquarters during „office“ conditions. Out in the field,
during the ISAF 3 deployment in Kabul/Afghanistan, cultural frictions
and differences in procedures and attitudes towards security did lead to
serious misunderstanding and conflict among German and Dutch troops
in Camp Warehouse. The Dutch were quite resentful. Some of the Dutch
service personnel declared in the media that the „real enemies“ were not
the Afghan warring parties, but the Germans. The substandard cooperation drew the attention of the Dutch newspapers. According to
Soeters et al. (2003) these tensions stemmed amongst others from the
unequal participation in numbers resulting in the German side being the
largest of the troop contributors. The Germans carried responsibility for
logistics and support. De facto, the Germans were in charge, whereas the
Dutch felt that they were the most experienced in peacekeeping.
The second example is derived from society at large. The German and
the Dutch national cultures are in fact quite similar in many ways. „For
90 per cent, Germans and Dutch are alike and for 10 per cent, they are
different; all attention is devoted to those 10 per cent“ (Olie 1996). This
causes minor differences to be magnified and leads to national stereotyping and mild jokes about the neighbouring country. One may argue that
jokes about neighbouring countries are common. One can think of the
Canadians and the Americans, the Scots and the English, the Dutch and
the Belgians. But when national stereotyping gets edgy, it starts to look
like a phenomenon that Ignatieff (1998) coined the „narcissism of minor
difference“. Especially the Dutch attitudes towards the Germans were
generally quite negative, much more than towards other nationalities. At
16
least, that is what research findings by the prestigious Clingendael
Institute (Jansen 1993) would have us believe. This research, which
received quite some publicity, stated that the Dutch youngsters are not as
tolerant (towards Germans) as they themselves think they are. Positive
stereotypes towards the Germans relate to disciplined and orderly behaviour. The more frequent negative stereotypes, however, referred to items
such as: „the Germans think that they own Europe“, and „the Germans
are proud that everything in their country is bigger and better“. From
various sources (Jansen 1993; Oudenhoven 2000a, 2000b), it is known
that the Germans are more often positive towards the Dutch. Germans
think the Dutch are more open and flexible. Among the Germans there
are, however, negative stereotypes towards the Dutch as well, such as:
„In traffic the Dutch are a disaster“ and „the Dutch are self-righteous“.
A basic condition for successful military collaboration between two
nations is communication and mutual understanding. This condition is
best summarised in the concept of sympathy. One needs to consult
philosophers like Hume to see the relevance of this concept. „For Hume,
sympathy is a disposition of the human mind through which our ideas of
pleasure, pain or passion in others generate vivid impressions, in proportion to our degree of identification with them, and so produce the same
feelings in us“ (Setiya 2004). Though not exactly the same this concept
resembles Cooley’s (1922: 184) concept of the looking glass self. We
built our identity reflecting the reactions of others. The reciprocity in the
relationships is what builds society by processes of „taking the role of
the other“ (Mead 1934: 150–151), „defining the situation“ (Thomas
1923: 42–43), the Thomas Theorem (Thomas and Thomas 1928: 572)
and „the self fulfilling prophecy“ (Merton 1968). All this is based on the
human capacity for mutual understanding or sympathy. Without sympathy co-operation is impossible even despite superior organisational
concepts, or total compatibility of equipment. Sympathy is the cement of
interoperability.
At the time 1 (GE/NL) Corps was founded, there were reasonable doubts
regarding the possibilities for mutual understanding. This situation
provided ample reason to monitor the formation and the development of
this bi-national corps on the basis of sound social research. In 1996,
Klein, Rosendahl, Huber and Franz published first results. Based on this
17
first study, optimism was justified. The findings indicated that feelings
of sympathy among the Dutch and German military were better than
could be expected on the basis of the report of the Clingendael Institute.
A second monitor study followed in 1997. The findings of this survey,
however, concerned the researchers. The results indicated that the twoyear-old collaboration did not result in a higher percentage of Dutch
liking the Germans. Discussing this somewhat worrying result, Klein et
al. (1999) argued that more time and prolonged contacts were necessary
to really get to know each other and to appreciate the colleagues of the
other nationality. This argument was based on the so-called acculturation-hypothesis.
Following this hypothesis (see figure 1), the first stage of collaboration
between „strange“ parties is characterised by high expectations that may
result in feelings of mutual sympathy and even some kind of excitement
and euphoria. In the next stage, however, mutual sympathy will decrease
because both parties increasingly see each other’s weaknesses and
problems. This may even result in what is commonly known as a „culture shock“. During the following acculturation phase, routinisation and
normalisation will return. Positive and negative experiences are being
balanced and finally (in phase four) come to a new equilibrium. This
new equilibrium, however, is seldom higher than during the first phase
of euphoria. In general, one could say, this acculturation curve is a
specification of the contact hypothesis: the more contacts people have
with one another, the more they will start liking each other. Applying
this acculturation curve to 1 (GE/NL) Corps, the authors expected that
sympathetic feelings would be higher in 2000 (five years after the foundation of the corps) than in 1997 because of this contact hypothesis: the
more military personnel from both nations work and live together, the
more they will like each other. This expectation was confirmed in the
third monitor study by vom Hagen, Moelker and Soeters (2003). Now,
in the fourth monitor study, one of the questions is whether the empirical
trend regarding sympathy still follows the predicted acculturation curve.
In this fourth monitor study consolidation, in figure one this phase is
called equilibrium, is expected!
18
Figure 1: The acculturation curve (Hofstede 2005: 324)
Time →
Positive
+
c
b
a
Feelings
Negative
Phase :
1
2
Euphoria Culture shock
3
Acculturation
4
Equilibrium
This chapter will provide an in-depth analysis of the contact hypothesis
by analysing the data of the four monitor studies of 1995, 1997, 2000
and 2005. Some notes on theory and recent findings as well as some
methodological information precede the presentation of our empirical
findings. In the first empirical section, we will examine the mutual
(stereotypical) cultural images of German and Dutch military. The
central question in this section, consequently, refers to the image Germans and Dutch military have of each other. After answering this question, we will try to find an answer to the question whether contacts
between people of two nationalities working closely together will result
in a higher percentage of people liking each other. The chapter ends with
a concluding section.
19
2
Some Theoretical Notions on Stereotypes
Stereotypes are closely connected to prejudice and discrimination, and
they are relevant factors in the explanation of the genesis of ethnic
conflict and terrorism (Soeters 2005). According to the seminal work of
Gordon Allport (1954), „prejudice is antipathy based on a faulty and
inflexible generalisation. It may be felt or expressed. It may be directed
toward a group or toward an individual because he (or she) is a member
of that group.“ Stereotypes are generalised attitudes of a group of people
concerning another group of persons that apply to all members of that
group. This generalisation does not necessarily have to be negative.
There are many positive stereotypes. As already mentioned: it is a common idea in Dutch society that the Germans are correct, reliable and
thorough in their work. Stereotypes make the world understandable by
simplification and by this simplification they make it easier for people to
act. This is a positive function of stereotypes. However, if negatively
oriented and taken to the extreme, generalisations can result in negative
consequences such as discrimination on the basis of race, religion,
gender or sexual preference. There are three important theories on intergroup-relations that are relevant to the topic of stereotypes (van Oudenhoven 2000a).
The social identity theory states that people in a group want to feel good
about themselves by making comparisons with another group of people. 2
In this concept members of the in-group are evaluated more positive
than the members of the out-group. 3 In addition, attribution theory states
that good things, good achievements or good character properties are
ascribed to the in-group, whereas evil, wrong or bad things are ascribed
to the out-group. In this theory, individuals are clearly looking for a kind
of scapegoat to put the blame on, so that they themselves will have a
positive appearance. As Merton’s famous saying goes: „the in-group’s
virtues are the out-groups vices“. From various studies it is known that
when people behave in this manner, they will make the self-fulfilling
prophecy work. 4 The relevance of the theory is that it can be used in a
2
3
4
20
See also: Festinger’s social comparison theory, 1962.
See also: Merton’s reference group theory, 1968.
E. g. when white teachers consider black students to be lazy and unintelligent, these students
will not perform as well as they otherwise would.
positive manner when positive characteristics are ascribed to people
from different nationalities in situations were co-operation is necessary.
The contact hypothesis was put forward by Allport (1954) in his classic
text „The Nature of Prejudice“. He states that contact between two
different groups will result in sympathetic feelings and less negative
stereotyping. But this will not occur unconditionally. For example:
policy makers in the USA attempted to promote mutual understanding
between the races by transporting black and white students to school
together in buses. Contrary to what was expected, achievements of the
black students did not improve, racial tensions augmented and black
self-esteem lowered. The reason was that the „busing project“ did not
meet the conditions that were formulated by Allport:
There has to be a climate of co-operation and a feeling of interdependency, which means that the groups need to have common goals.
•
Contacts should be based on equal status; there should not be one
group that is considered to be more important than the other.
•
It is necessary that people have the opportunity to get to know each
other personally.
•
Authorities, i. e. higher status people such as teachers, managers,
commanders or politicians, should support contacts.
In the case of 1 (GE/NL) Corps, much effort is put in meeting these
conditions. Germans and Dutch are equal partners in this project. Command positions are equally balanced and are rotated between the two
nations every three years. The two national armed forces have several
goals in common, which are defence-related as well as political (towards
political co-operation and eventually perhaps even towards an integrated
European army). People within 1 (GE/NL) Corps units in Münster and
Eibergen know each other on a personal basis and even spend their
leisure time together. The German-Netherlands collaboration in general
is strongly supported by authorities from both countries. Following the
theory, it may therefore be hypothesised that the Dutch and the Germans
will increasingly get to like each other because of the regular and long
standing contacts within 1 (GE/NL) Corps.
21
3
Recent Findings from Other Studies
As mentioned previously, the Clingendael Institute published a report on
the attitudes of Dutch youths towards the Germans (Jansen 1993). No
less than fifty-six per cent of the respondents in this study showed a
negative attitude towards the Germans. The report, however, was not
undisputed. Firstly, it was criticised because of the unfortunate time of
data collection. The data were collected shortly after an extremist assault
on Turkish minorities and refugees in Germany. Secondly, because of its
focus on youths, no comparison was made with older generations. Without such a comparison group one is limited in the possibilities for generalisation. And thirdly, during the data collection that had taken place in
schools, the study had been presented as specifically focussing on Germans. This may have caused serious bias among the young respondents.
The recently published study by van Oudenhoven (2000b) does not have
the aforementioned flaws as it was based on an a-select sample of the
Dutch population. In 1994, 1728 Dutch people filled in the questionnaire
of this study. In 1996, this research was replicated with 2389 persons.
All age groups were included. The findings of this study show that the
Dutch do not dislike the Germans at all. The report of the Clingendael
Institute seems to have produced rather exaggerated and flawed results.
Regarding the extent to which the Dutch have sympathetic feelings
towards the Germans, the new study shows that the Germans occupy a
position in between other larger countries such as France, Italy, the
United States and the United Kingdom. The French and the Italians are
less popular than the Germans. Comparatively speaking, the position of
Germany is average.
Granted, quite a few Dutchmen score Germany at the bottom end of the
sympathy scale, but at the same time there is an only slightly smaller
group that appreciates the Germans to a high degree and that perceives a
large degree of similarity between these two nations. Apparently, there
is a division in the Netherlands between those who like and those who
dislike the Germans. When we consider other nations like France or
Italy, there is more agreement in the opinions of the Dutch. If Dutchmen
have contacts with Germans, they indicate that they are quite content
with these interactions. Hence, if interactions between Germans and the
22
Dutch indeed do take place, the situation is evaluated positive and contacts between members of the two nations are mostly pleasant. But when
it comes down to general opinions not based on actual interaction, the
situation is different. It then looks like as if there were a tacit norm not
permitting someone to express positive feelings about Germans. Another
major finding is that there is no significant difference between the various age groups. The sympathy scores of the older generations are not
really different from those of the younger generations. The younger
generations more frequently adhere to the opinion that the Germans and
the Dutch are alike than the older generations do. This is an indication
that history (World War II) is not such a big barrier in the mind of the
younger generation anymore.
In van Oudenhoven’s research, smaller countries like Belgium and
Denmark score considerably higher on the sympathy scale. Seen through
Dutch eyes, the most popular country is Belgium. Bigger countries such
as Germany are perceived to be more threatening, for which reason
smaller countries are seen as more sympathetic. Demographically,
economically and politically, the Germans are stronger. The advantage
of scale is apparent in the national sport of soccer, where the Germans
prove to be strongest in many cases. The threat is perceived as being
greater because of cultural and linguistic similarity. Cultural and linguistic similarity is also the reason why the Flemish (Dutch-speaking Belgians) consider the Dutch as more arrogant than the French-speaking
Belgians do. To the (Flemish-speaking) Belgians, the Dutch are the
bigger and threatening country. Hence, the Dutch are the Germans of the
Belgians. Regarding Germany, the social-psychological factor sometimes described as the BIG-SISTER-syndrome may explain why (some)
Dutch develop negative stereotypes and prejudices towards the Germans. By means of stereotypes and prejudices, the Dutch can compensate for their feelings of inferiority while developing some sort of moral
superiority.
The replication of the 1994-study in 1996 showed a more positive attitude among the Dutch towards the Germans. The Dutch are gradually
displaying a more sympathetic attitude towards the Germans. In addition, the number of Dutchmen preferring to live in Germany is growing.
This finding is important with regard to the attitudes of German and
23
Dutch military working for the First German-Netherlands Corps. Are
German and Dutch soldiers also becoming more sympathetic towards
each other? If so, this development may be favourable to the project of
collaboration between the armies of the two nations.
4
Sampling
1499, 1305, 1111 and 215 military personnel respectively participated in
the surveys in 1995, 1997, 2000 and 2005. The total study therefore
comprises 4130 cases 5. Of this total sample, 2301 respondents were
Germans whereas 1829 were Dutch (see table 1). As can be seen from
table 2383 German servicemen in the sample worked in a bi-national
headquarters over the period of ten years. Among the Dutch respondents, 417 military worked in the integrated staff. The distinction between respondents in integrated bi-national units and those outside these
units is vital to the contact hypothesis because, as mentioned earlier, the
people in integrated staff-units have contact with the people of the other
nation on a day-to-day basis.
In the year 2000, the Dutch part of the study only succeeded in sampling
199 Dutch respondents that were not working in an integrated binational headquarters. This number was considerably lower than was the
case in the surveys in 1995 and 1997. In 2005 the research assignment
was limited to only the Headquarters (the integrated staff), the Support
Battalion and the Signals Battalion for the simple reason that national
troops were no longer assigned under the command of the 1 (GE/NL)
Corps. In the 2005 situation the High Readiness Headquarters is designed to operate as a stand alone headquarters that is able to command
any give combination of international troops. Therefore the sample is
much smaller but still it is representative of the total Corps that numbers
circa 1200 personnel.
5
24
The study from 2005 comprised also multinationals i. e. military from other participating
countries, but these were excluded from the data set. Multinationals entered the 1 (GE/NL)
Corps only recently from 2003 on.
To enable comparisons over time it is important to create equal size in
the cell of key variables. This could have been achieved by weighing 6
the data. This option was tried and tested upon all subsequent analyses
reported in this study. However, weighing the data did not change any of
the conclusions, it did introduce artificial elements in the analysis and in
some cases it lowered the strength of relationships. The unweighed
analysis proved better in the end. Other solutions like using only a part
of the data would inevitably lead to restriction of range. Therefore the
original data file was used. In order to enable comparisons the columns
in the cross tabulations were set at 100 per cent. In regression analysis
variables are controlled for by the other inserted variables, which also
enables fair comparisons.
In longitudinal research, certainly in studies that stretch over ten years,
many methodological problems arise. The organisation, the tasks the
people have all changed and therefore changes will affect sampling
methods and the items in the questionnaires. Items and questions sometimes had to be changed because they had to be adapted to changing
conditions. The study reported here departs as much as possible, from
the items in the questionnaires that have remained the same.
Table 1: Nation by Year
Nation
6
Year
Total
1995
1997
2000
2005
Germany
836
566
775
124
2301
Netherlands
663
739
336
91
1829
Total
1499
1305
1111
215
4130
In Moelker and Soeters (2003) the data was weighed, therefore the results presented here will
differ from the previous publication.
25
Table 2: Working in integrated Staff/HQ? by Year by Nation*
Nation
Germany
Netherlands
1995
Integrated
Staff/HQ
Other
Year
1997 2000
2005
Total
111
91
122
59
383
690
449
591
65
1795
N
Integrated
Staff/HQ
Other
801
540
713
124
2178
135
114
127
41
417
478
591
199
50
1318
N
613
705
326
91
1735
Total
1414
1245
1039
215
3913
* 5 % of cases were missing in this cross-tabulation
5
The Cultural Image of the Other Nation
For the purpose of this section it is more accurate to use the concept of
„image of the other“ or „xeno image“ than the concept „stereotype“. The
cultural image of the other only becomes a stereotype when it is connected with positive or negative connotations that influence the way
people think about and interact with each other. In the questionnaire,
several characteristics were used as items. Respondents could give a
mark from 1 to 10 indicating the extent to which each characteristic was
applicable to respectively the German soldiers and the Dutch soldiers. In
this way, Dutch service men could rate the characteristic of „reliability“
and indicate to what extent this characteristic applies to the Germans. In
the same manner German military service personnel evaluated the
characteristics of the Dutch soldiers. This method makes it possible to
draw a picture of what German soldiers think of the Dutch military and
vice versa. The marks on the characteristics were averaged and displayed in the figures below. In the questionnaires of 1995, the items
were measured in a different way and therefore they have not been
included in the analysis. Comparisons were possible for 1997, 2000 and
2005.
26
Figure 2: German soldiers’ image of the Dutch (averages) in 1997, 2000
and 2005 (* = F significant at p < 0,05)
8
7,5
7
6,5
6
5,5
5
4,5
4
coura- reliageous ble *
tough
high
dutiful comraspiri*
dely
ted
bold
indusprepar
sociarigid * trious
ed *
ble
*
indecompepentent
dent
1997 ger
6,03
5,87
5,72
6,11
7,4
6,15
4,95
6,8
4,9
5,9
6,88
6,6
2000 ger
6,02
6,28
5,52
6,38
7,5
6,05
4,6
6,8
4,43
6,06
7,21
6,6
6,78
6,8
2005 ge
5,82
5,21
5,19
5,37
6,68
6,24
5,3
5,86
5,59
5,18
7
6,56
6,68
Most surprising in the cultural perception of the other nation is the
perseverance of traditional imagery. There are indeed relevant and
significant changes in the xeno image, but striking are the resemblance
and the reproduction of the same pattern over a period of eight years.
This observation holds true for the German image of the Dutch (see
figure 2) as well for the Dutch image of the Germans (see figure 3). The
findings underline the traditional xeno images of the Dutch and the
Germans that are and have been in existence for decades. The images
need not to be true, but they are alive in the conscience collective of both
nations. The recurring pattern is that German soldiers think the Dutch to
be very much comradely, reasonably high spirited, not overly bold and
not too courageous, nor tough, very sociable, very independent and also
very competent. The Dutch are, according to the Germans, not at all
rigid, although there seems to be a shift in perception regarding this
point in 2005. (see figure 2). German features commonly mentioned by
the Dutch (see figure 3) refer to the very high sense of duty of the Ger27
mans, the high level of competence, industriousness and preparedness
and a high level of reliability. The Germans are not perceived to be too
sociable and they score low on independence. The traditional images are
confirmed, and the cultural pattern of the imagery remains stable, but –
paradoxically as it may seem – at the same time there are significant
changes.
Looking at the changes regarding the German image of the Dutch (see
figure 2) it must be concluded that the images are less positive than in
previous years. The general image had always been quite positive, but a
downward trend has become manifest in 2005. In 2005 the Dutch are
seen as less reliable, they score lower on sense of duty, are perceived to
be less prepared for their task, and are less industrious in the eyes of the
Germans than before. Most surprising, the Dutch score higher on rigidity
than ever before. The average is still very low, and maybe the change is
a correction of an image that was too positively colouring the Dutch as
being laid back and informal. One can imagine that the German image of
the Dutch has become more realistic, but regarding some of the images
the changes also contains warnings. Certainly regarding the image of
being a reliable, dutiful, prepared and industrious partner in the business
of conflict management the Dutch will have to be on their guard!
28
Figure 3: Dutch soldiers’ image of the German (averages) in 1997, 2000
and 2005 (* = F significant at p < 0,05)
8
7,5
7
6,5
6
5,5
5
4,5
4
high
coura- reliable
dutiful comratough *
spirited bold *
geous *
*
*
dely *
*
indeprepaindus- sociacompetrigid *
pendent
red *
trious * ble *
ent *
*
1997 nl
5,89
6,18
5,98
7
6,3
6,26
4,3
5,9
6,14
6,17
5,17
4,8
6,37
2000 nl
6,56
6,89
6,29
7,42
6,8
5,71
4,65
6,3
6,46
6,58
5,99
5,2
6,85
2005 nl
6,41
6,78
6,55
7,38
6,58
6,41
5,63
6,59
6,82
6,57
5,97
4,71
6,52
All the averages in figure three differ significantly. Still the pattern is
remarkably consistent and it appears as if cultural images are replicated
year after year. The change is that the pattern has become more pronounced and resolute. Graphically the lines that are higher each year, but
yet follow the same pattern, illustrate this. Also, most changes in the
Dutch imagery are in a positive direction, in contrary to the changes in
the German imagery.
In 2005 the Germans are perceived to be more courageous than eight
years ago, even more reliable than they already were, more tough and
dutiful than in 1997. The average for „comradely“ is in the middle of the
averages for 1997 and 2005. The Germans are perceived to be bolder in
2005, better prepared but also more rigid! The average for „industrious“
in 2000 is equal to the average in 2005. The same goes for „sociable“.
The mean score for „independence“ is low, meaning that the Dutch think
that the Germans want authorisation first, before undertaking action. The
29
image of the Germans being competent remains high (though slightly
lower than in 2000).
In general, the mutual images of the Dutch and the German military are
fairly positive. The Germans and Dutch seem to hold their neighbours in
high regard when it comes to being a professional soldier. This finding is
a constant over a period of eight years. Whereas the image of the reliable
German has become stronger, the Dutch will have to work on their own
image in order to catch up. The same could be said about the sense of
duty and industry. The most striking difference concerns the dimension
of formal versus informal codes of conduct (the Dutch being the informal and liberal ones regarding traits like rigidity, sociability and independence). The difference could result in different styles of interaction
that in its turn might lead to clashes between Dutch and German military
when they are not sensitive to cultural differences.
6
The Dependent Variable: Changes in Attitudes and Feelings
of Sympathy Towards the Other Nation
Cultural images prove resistant to change. They change only gradually
and slowly. Attitudes might work in a different way. Maybe it is easier
to change attitudes in order to reach the organisational goal of interoperability. The German respondents were asked whether or not they liked
the Dutch, and the Dutch military servicemen were asked the same
question regarding the Germans. The categories „very much“ and „quite
a lot“ were combined, likewise are the categories „not so much“ and
„not at all“.
The general trend is upward. Over time it can be concluded that the
acculturation hypothesis has become true and the general development
follows the line: high expectations, culture shock, acculturation and
equilibrium, but there are remarkable differences between German and
Dutch service personnel (see figure 4).
From 1995 on the majority of the German military have liked the Dutch.
In 1997 and 2000 over 62 per cent stated to like the Dutch. Popularity
30
peaked in those years. The popularity of the Dutch dropped to 56 per
cent in 2005.
The Dutch started quite negative in their attitudes towards the Germans
in 1995 and more seriously, the Dutch were even more negative in 1997.
Only 25 per cent of the Dutch military in 1997 liked the Germans which
stands in contrast to the 28 per cent that signalled the start of the cooperation between German and Dutch soldiers in 1995. This development worried the researchers and they decided to monitor the developments intensely over the years to come (Klein/Rosendahl Huber/Frantz
1999). The researchers actually feared for the worst. If the trend could
not be reversed it could mean the end of German-Dutch military cooperation. But based on the acculturation hypothesis put forward by
Hofstede (2005) they also hypothesised recovery (Rosendahl Huber/
Klein/Soeters 1999). The hypothesis proved right as can be seen from
figure four. The Dutch military liked the Germans better in 2000 (48 per
cent). In 2005 popularity of the Germans among the Dutch military
reached it peak (54 per cent). Using the original five point scales it turns
out that the Dutch and the German average scores in „liking“ are equal
to each other (the average for the Dutch and the German in 2005 is 2,5).
31
Figure 4: How well do you like the Dutch (first, N = 2221), how well do
you like the Germans? (second, N = 1792) (Sign. Chi-sq: P <
0,01 for both graphs) (answers in per cent)
60
40
20
0
1995
1997
2000
2005
Quite a lo t
53
62
62
56
Ne utral
35
29
30
31
No t s o m uch
12
9
8
13
1995
1997
2000
2005
Quite a lo t
28
25
48
54
Ne utral
53
59
44
37
No t s o m uch
19
16
7
9
60
40
20
0
32
7
The Independent Variables
The question is how to explain the changes that occurred over time. As
mentioned earlier, the hypothesis is that contacts will lead to a higher
percentage of servicemen with sympathetic feelings towards the people
of the other nation. But there are also other correlates of „sympathy“ that
have to be taken into account. Before putting the contact hypothesis to
the test by using multivariate methods, several variables are presented
using cross tabulation analysis. These variables are:
•
Rank
•
Nation
•
The number of contacts the military of the two nations have with
each other
•
The question whether soldiers, NCOs and officers spend their leisure
time together
•
The contacts resulting from working together in a bi-national headquarters
•
Trust in the other nation to come to the rescue when under attack
•
The faith in 1 (GE/NL) Corps being a step towards the formation of
one European Army.
The first and second variables considered are „rank“ and „nation“. In
earlier reports on German-Dutch co-operation Klein, Rosendahl Huber
and Frantz (1999) found that „liking“ the other nation correlates with
rank and nation. The higher the rank of the military service member, the
higher the feelings of sympathy towards the other party are. With regard
to nation, the Germans showed more positive attitudes towards the
Dutch whereas the Dutch were more often negative. In all survey years
these findings were replicated as can be seen in table 3. This table also
demonstrates that Dutch attitudes have changed in a positive direction
The German military show remarkable stability in their attitude towards
the Dutch. They were highly sympathetic towards the Dutch from the
very start of 1 (GE/NL) Corps and still are! German soldiers and corporals did not think unfavourable of the Dutch at all in 1995 (48 per cent
33
liked the Dutch) and their positive feelings even grew significantly over
the years. In 2005, 57 per cent liked their colleagues from the Netherlands. German NCOs were and remained very sympathetic towards the
Dutch (60 per cent in 1995, 54 per cent in 2005). This attitude is comparable to that of their fellow countrymen on CO-level (65 per cent in
1995, 56 per cent in 2005). The Chi-square statistic, indicated by asterisks in table 3a, underlines the stability in the development of German
attitudes towards the Dutch. The chi-square statistic can be interpreted as
an indicator of change. Where asterisks appear in table 3, a significant
positive change has taken place. Where the symbol „NS“ (not significant) appears in the column, there is no change at all: the opinions have
remained stable over the years.
Dutch attitudes towards the Germans have been developing favourably.
This is true for all ranks. In 1995, Dutch soldiers and corporals started
out with a quite negative attitude about their neighbouring colleagues:
only 20 per cent of them displayed sympathetic feelings for the Germans
whereas 28 per cent expressed negative feelings. In 2005, the situation
had improved considerably with 39 per cent of the Dutch respondents
liking the Germans. When looking at the attitudes of the NCOs , the
conclusion again has to be that these are much more positive than ten
years before (from 26 per cent in 1995 to 56 per cent in 2005 feeling
sympathetic towards Germans). Right from the beginning, Dutch officers displayed the most positive attitudes with 44 per cent expressing
feelings of sympathy towards Germans in 1995. In 2005, the attitude of
Dutch officers is even more favourable than the attitude of their German
colleagues. No less than 64 per cent of them expressed feelings of sympathy towards the Germans.
34
Table 3: How well do you like the Germans/Dutch? by Year by Nation
by Rank (answers in per cent)
Year
Rank
Nation
Non Commissioned Officers
Soldiers and Corporals
Germany
Quite a
lot
Neutral
Not so
much
%
N
Netherlands Quite a
lot
Neutral
Not so
much
%
N
Germany
Quite a
lot
Neutral
Not so
much
%
N
Netherlands Quite a
lot
Neutral
Not so
much
%
N
1995 1997 2000 2005
Total
48
59
58
57
54
37
30
33
27
34
15
11
9
16
12
100
506
100
308
100
423
100
49
100
1286
20
17
27
39
20
52
60
50
52
56
28
22
23
9
24
100
267
100
306
100
66
100
23
100
662
60
67
70
54
64
33
28
26
37
30
7
5
4
9
6
100
162
100
96
100
122
100
35
100
415
26
30
43
56
33
59
55
55
38
56
14
15
3
6
12
100
212
100
205
100
119
100
32
100
568
chisq
Sig
**
*
NS
**
35
Year
Rank
Nation
Commissioned Officers
Germany
Quite a
lot
Neutral
Not so
much
%
N
Netherlands Quite a
lot
Neutral
Not so
much
%
N
1995 1997 2000 2005
Total
65
71
69
56
67
29
26
25
31
27
6
3
5
14
6
100
132
100
116
100
150
100
36
100
434
44
34
63
64
46
44
60
34
27
46
12
7
3
9
8
100
169
100
188
100
131
100
33
100
521
chisq
Sig
NS
**
** sign. Chi-sq: P < .01; * sign Chi-sq: P < .05; NS = not significant
The third variable to be considered is the number of contacts. The frequency of contacts between Dutch and German servicemen is clearly
increasing. In 1995, we asked whether German and Dutch personnel
expected that the frequency of contacts would rise. In 1997, 2000 and
2005 the question was rephrased. The new question related to the actual
frequency of contacts between the military. Due to the incomparability
of these questions, only the findings of 1997, 2000 and 2005 can be
compared. In 1997, 9 per cent of the German military indicated to share
very many contacts with the military of the other nation. In 2005, this
percentage had risen to 50 per cent. 34 per cent indicated to have many
contacts in 2005. In 1997 7 per cent of the Dutch service men stated to
have very many contacts with German soldiers. In 2005, 36 per cent of
the Dutch respondents indicated to have a high contact frequency. The
percentage that only had sparse or no contact at all declined to practically zero. There is a strong correlation (r = -.42) 7 between the frequency
7
36
The sign is negative because of reverse coding.
of contact and rank. The higher the rank, the more persons have contacts
with military of the other nation in order to co-ordinate their work.
Table 4: During your years of service in the 1 (GE/NL) Corps, how
much contacts did you have with the other nation’s soldiers
(GE/NL)? by Year by Nation (answers in per cent)
Year
Nation
Germany
1997 2000 2005
Total
Very many contacts
9
8
50
13
Many Contacts
14
15
34
17
Few contacts
35
34
15
32
No contacts at all
42
44
1
39
%
100
100
100
100
N
211
760
123
1094
7
20
36
13
Many Contacts
15
31
39
22
Few contacts
47
38
26
42
No contacts at all
32
11
%
100
729
100
332
Netherlands Very many contacts
chisq
Sig
**
**
23
100
90
100
1151
The fourth variable of interest is the question whether or not soldiers
from both nations have spend their leisure time together. Spending
leisure time together is a good indicator of people liking each other. In
1997, 3 per cent of the German respondents did meet members of the
other nation after hours on a regular basis. In 2005, this percentage had
increased to 14. The occasional contact frequency rose from 16 per cent
to 51 per cent. A similar development is seen among Dutch military
service men. In 1997, 7 per cent had regular contact whereas 28 per cent
of the contacts were occasional in character. In 2005, 12 per cent of the
37
Dutch soldiers met regularly with Germans during leisure time and
51 per cent met occasionally. Not surprisingly the frequency of contacts
again varies according to rank. The higher the rank, the more likely that
the military will interact after hours. (r = -.35)
Table 5: Have you had contact with Dutch resp. German soldiers in
your leisure time? by Year by Nation (answers in per cent)
Year
Nation
Germany
1997
2000
2005
Total
Yes, often
yes, occasionally
Not at all
3
5
14
5
16
23
51
23
81
73
35
73
%
100
100
100
100
N
552
744
121
1417
7
16
12
10
28
36
51
32
65
48
37
58
100
716
100
330
100
91
100
1137
Netherlands Yes, often
yes, occasionally
Not at all
%
N
chisq
Sig
**
**
It is hardly necessary to dwell on the fifth variable even though it is one
of the central ones. The relevance of the variable „working in an integrated staff“ is evident. When service personnel works in an integrated
staff they will share more formal and informal contacts with colleagues
from the other nation and will therefore be more positively inclined
towards each other. In 2005 the per cent of service members who work
in an integrated staff is larger than in previous years because of changes
in the sampling procedure. The reasons for changing the procedure have
been discussed in the section on sampling a few pages above (see table 2).
38
Trust in the military of the other nation is the sixth variable in the analysis. Trust is a key variable because, as van der Kloet (2004, 2005) has
demonstrated, trust enhances unity! Wherever units show high levels of
trust, the levels of cohesion are also higher. In the questionnaire trust
was measured by asking „suppose the Dutch of the German platoon is
attacked. Do you think the Dutch respectively the Germans would come
to aid the other.“ In other words the question was whether or not soldiers
of the one nation trusted the soldiers of the other nation with their lives.
The question boils down to the existential level of military operations.
The remarkable finding is that mutual trust is very high. Both the Germans and the Dutch trust each other to a large degree to come to the
rescue when their platoons would be under attack. The level of trust is
on the rise over time. Both the Germans and the Dutch trust one another
more in 2005 than before.
Table 6: Suppose the Dutch or the German platoon is attacked. Do you
think the Dutch resp. the Germans would come to the aid the
other? by Year by Nation (answers in per cent)
Year
Nation
Germany
1995 1997 2000 2005
They would
help
Very probable
I do not think
it very probable
It seems
improbable
%
N
Total
56
54
52
65
54
38
39
43
26
39
3
6
4
6
4
3
1
1
3
2
100
100
100
100
100
779
522
698
109
2108
chisq
Sig
**
39
Year
Nation
Netherlands They would
help
Very probable
I do not think
it very probable
It seems
improbable
%
N
1995 1997 2000 2005
Total
54
47
57
67
53
43
48
40
29
44
1
3
2
4
2
1
2
1
100
622
100
675
100
312
chisq
Sig
**
1
100
82
100
1691
The seventh variable to be discussed here is the faith in 1 (GE/NL)
Corps being a step towards the formation of one European Army. The
question is an expression of optimism regarding the European project of
unification. In 1995 most respondents, and Germans to a larger degree
than the Dutch, were very optimistic about 1 (GE/NL) Corps being a
first step toward one European Army. Optimism dropped significantly,
and was replaced by more „realistic“ evaluations of the possible contribution of a common corps to the larger project of European unification.
In 2005, 49 per cent of the German and 47 per cent of the Dutch military
servicemen think that 1 (GE/NL) Corps is a step towards the formation
of one common army.
40
Table 7: Do you think that 1 (GE/NL) Corps is a step towards the
formation of one European Army? by Year by Nation (answers
in per cent)
Year
Nation
Germany
Total
1995
1997
2000
2005
Yes
76
69
60
49
67
No
24
31
40
51
33
%
100
100
100
100
100
N
705
440
597
107
1849
54
44
47
47
48
No
46
56
53
53
52
%
N
100
577
100
578
100
280
100
83
100
1518
Netherlands Yes
chisq
Sig
**
**
8
Testing the Contact Hypothesis
The contact hypothesis was tested by means of regression analysis. The
dependent variable was of course the question „How well do you like
the German respectively the Dutch?“ As independent variables in the
regression, the variables discussed above (nation, rank, number of contacts, contacts after hours, working at an integrated headquarters, trust,
faith in the Corps contribution to one common European Army) were
used in the regression equation. The results are presented in table 8.
In regression analysis the effect of variables are measured whilst controlling for the other variables in the equation. For example, it is necessary to assess the effect of the „number of contacts“ on the dependent
variable controlled for the impact of all the other variables in order to
test the contact hypothesis. Most important for testing the contact hypothesis are the significant values for the regression coefficients for
„number of contacts“ and „contacts after hours“. When regression
41
coefficients prove to be significant, the contact hypothesis is supported.
A similar argument goes for the hypothesis that trust causes liking. This
hypothesis can only be tested when other variables, like „rank“ or „nation“, are controlled for.
Table 8: Regression Analysis: How well do you like the Dutch resp. the
Germans? (Dependent)**
Year
1995* 1997 2000 2005
During your years of service in the 1
(GE/ NL) Corps, how much contacts did
you have with the other nation’s soldiers
(GE/NL)?
Have you had contact with Dutch resp.
German soldiers in your leisure time?
Nation
-
-
,18
-
-
,21
,13
,18
,26
,35
,24
-
Rank
-,09
-,08
-
-
Working in integrated staff/HQ?
Suppose the Dutch or the German platoon is attacked. Do you think the Dutch
resp. the Germans would come to the aid
the other?
Do you think that 1 (GE/NL) Corps is a
step towards the formation of one European Army?
N
Adjusted R Square
Sig. F.
,17
-
-,12
-
,27
,20
,25
,40
,09
,12
,10
-
1143
.20
.000
661
,25
.000
766
,18
.000
167
,22
.000
* A reduced set of variables served as input in the equation for 1995 (the first
two variables were not entered in the equation because the items made no
part of the 1995 questionnaire)
** Method = stepwise; the regression coefficients in the table are standardised
(beta’s).
42
In 1997, 2000 and 2005 the same set of seven independent variables
were inserted in the equations. In 1995 the two contact variables were
left out, simply because the items from 1995 were not comparable to the
items used in later years. This means that in 1995 the contact hypothesis
can only be tested indirectly, by the variable „working in an integrated
staff“. If persons working in an integrated staff like colleagues from the
other nation more, than indirect support for the contact hypothesis is
found. It is only logic that people working in an integrated staff, share
more contacts with each other. And indeed, in 1995 the beta for „working in an integrated staff“ turns out to be third largest and a significant
contributor to the explained variance. In the other years the beta on this
variable does not reach the required level of significance or only delivers
a minor contribution to the explained variance (actually, due to suppresser effects the initial positive sign for the bivariate correlation reverses into a negative for the beta in the year 2000).
A general observation across all the equations is that the „contact hypothesis“ and the „trust causes liking hypothesis“ are supported. Interestingly, the simple bivariate correlations between the item „how much
contact did you have“ and „liking“ is about the same size as the correlation between the item „have you had contact in your leisure time“ and
„liking“. But in the regression equations in 1997 and 2005 the leisure
time contacts pushes the other variable out of the equation. That is not
surprising because of the multicolinearity between the two variables
(r = .60). Only in 2000 both the contact variables are included in the
equation. These findings emphasises the importance of informal contacts
i. e. contacts after working hours. Informal contacts may even be more
important than the formal work based contacts during office hours.
Trust also proves to be a central concept when it comes to the question
of sympathy for the service members of the other nation. The more
contact between soldiers of both nations and the more the service members of both nations trust each other to come to the rescue when under
attack, the more the military like each other. The effect from „trust“ on
„liking“ is especially strong in 2005.
The differences between years in fact support the general conclusions. In
1995, 1997 and 2000 „nation“ significantly effects „liking“. German
43
soldiers express more feelings of sympathy for the Dutch than vice
versa. But in 2005 the effect of „nation“ disappears because of the much
stronger effects of „contacts“ and „trust“. In 2005 these two variables
explain 22 per cent of the total variance. At first sight it might seem
strange that a former strong variable turns into a weak variable in 2005.
But the bivariate analysis presented above (for example in figure four)
has already demonstrated that the Germans and the Dutch are growing
towards each other regarding the mutual feelings of sympathy. If they
grow towards each other, than the variable „nation“ will loose its power
of discrimination.
The beta coefficients for „rank“ and „faith in 1(GE/NL) being a step
towards one European army“ do not reach the required significance level
in 2005 and are therefore excluded from the equation. In other years the
beta’s divert significantly from nil, but the contribution to the explained
variance is only modest. Regarding the variable „rank“ regression analysis proves extremely useful in explaining away the alluded effects of this
variable. It is true that higher ranking officers like the soldiers from the
other nation better (the sign of the beta-coefficient is negative because
reverse coding), but this is a result of the higher contact frequency
higher ranking military have with each other, better proficiency in
language, higher education and other correlates of „rank“. The „faith in
1(GE/NL) Corps being a step towards one European army“ is an interesting variable because it expresses that optimism regarding to European
unification does lead to a more cosmopolitan attitude of sympathy for
European citizens in general and, more specifically, for Germans. Again
this variable does not significantly contribute to the explained variance
in 2005. Variables like „rank“ and „faith in 1 (GE/NL) being a step
towards one European army“ still remain correlated in 2005, but in the
regression equation for 2005 „contacts“ and „trust“ explain them away.
44
9
Conclusion
The data taken from a ten-year spanning period are unique and allow for
conclusions on culture change. That in it self is rare in sociological
research because of the scarcity of longitudinal data files. The conclusions also are theoretically relevant as they support several hypotheses
and lead to better understanding of the theoretical framework. Furthermore the results provide useful management tools for ameliorating
interoperability in military operations. The conclusions summarised here
are twofold. The first conclusion is that cultural xeno images are very
resistant to change and appear to be cultural constants. Values and
images that form part of the cultural nucleus of a nation remain stable
and change only gradually. The second conclusion is that attitudes
towards other cultures are more susceptible to change. Attitudes can be
effected by organisational policies. These two conclusions will be elaborated upon here below.
(a) Dutch and German cultures are like and unlike. Both share a network type of culture (Hagen et al. 2003). But none of the soldiers of
both nations would be willing to give up cultural peculiarities. The
nations want to hold on to their respective values, norms and cultural
identities. The adherents of a nation’s culture do not easily change
their perception or image of other nation’s cultural traits. The Germans image of the Dutch comprises traditional traits such as „comradely“, „low rigidity“ (implicating flexible and informal behaviour,
but also looseness and sometimes impertinence), „sociable“, „independent“ and „competent“. The Dutch image of the Germans has
remained stable as well and it is a very traditional image. The Germans are seen as „reliable“, „dutiful“, „prepared“, „rigid“ (meaning
bureaucratic and formal in behaviour), „not independent in behaviour“ and „competent“. In eight years the same pattern, both for
Germans as well as for the Dutch, emerged from the surveys. But to
say that xeno images do not easily change is not to say that the military from one nation do not appreciate the other nation’s culture. On
the contrary, exactly the fact that the other culture is different makes
it attractive and likeable. Most of the soldiers in integrated headquarters mutually participate in cultural events (and, for instance, the
Germans participate in Remembrance Days and „Sinterklaas“
whereas the Dutch celebrate German heydays like „Labour Day“).
45
(b) Attitudes, such as liking the other nation’s soldiers, are much more
changeable than the image of cultural traits of the nations. Attitudes
influencing co-operation between German and Dutch soldiers are
evolving in a positive direction. From 1995 to 2005 the popularity of
the Dutch among the German military was well above 50 per cent.
In 2005, 56 per cent of the German liked the Dutch. The Dutch however have changed from quite negative to positive. The per cent liking the Germans was only 28 in 1995. In 2005, 54 per cent of the
Dutch likes the Germans. What is perhaps even more encouraging
than the increase in „liking“ is the fact that attitudes like „liking“ can
be changed by organisational policies. Regression analyses support
both the contact hypothesis as the „trust causes liking“ hypothesis.
German and Dutch servicemen, who engage in informal contacts
during leisure time and/or have much work related contacts, like
each other better than people who remain behind in contact frequency. Germans and Dutch who trust the other nations’ soldiers to
come to the rescue when they are under attack like the members of
the other nation better. The variables that are causally related to the
attitude of „liking the other nation“ provide a starting point for attitude change. Organisational policies aimed at influencing these variables can contribute significantly to military interoperability, simply
because the soldiers will like each other better and hence will work
better together. The longitudinal research has demonstrated that the
Germans and the Dutch are growing towards each other. They are
growing in mutual understanding.
This is an important conclusion based on empirical findings, but how is
it to be understood and how can it be used? How can we interpret these
facts so that they become meaningful? Berry et al. (2006) offer a practical framework for interpretation. The axis „wish to keep your own
culture“ is almost self-explanatory. People a have need for cultural roots
and will be much happier and healthier when they hold on to their cultural identity. Swearing off the old identity without supplanting it with
other cultural values will lead to anomie and deculturation. The axis
„attractiveness of the other culture“ refers to an attitude. It is possible to
preserve the own cultural identity and at the same time come to terms
with the other culture by integrating the best of both worlds into ones
own frame of reference. The research by Berry et al. demonstrates that
46
people who choose this integrative strategy are more content and psychologically healthy. But under some conditions a separation strategy or
an assimilation strategy is preferable. Not all conditions allow for an
integration strategy.
Figure 5: Patterns of intercultural interaction (Source: Berry et al. 2006)
Wish to keep own culture (values)
Attractiveness
of the other
culture (attitude)
Yes
No
Yes
Integration
Assimilation
No
Separation
Deculturation
Three strategies in particular are considered for furthering interoperability (it goes without saying that „deculturation“ is not even considered an
option, it would imply both nations to give up their cultures).
The first strategy is assimilation; this implies that one party – often the
smaller one – should become similar to and internalise the culture of the
other group. This strategy generally seems not to be working very well
in the military, since most national armed forces (including the Dutch
and the Germans) are proud of themselves and are not likely to hand
over their collective identity. One might see patterns of assimilation
occurring in the air forces, where, due to the overwhelming US technology, most Western air forces gradually become „Americanised“. Technology is a drive for isomorphism. The Dutch Marine Corps provide
another example of the use of the assimilation strategy. Dutch marines
have for long been training together with the English, have often used
English troop transport ships, and base their operational doctrines on the
English doctrine. However, this example of assimilation is unique and
only possible because the Dutch marines are the smaller party and they
need to assimilate in order to function. In the land forces, however, this
strategy is unlikely to be successful. Assimilation does not seem to be
the most suitable road towards integration for the army.
The other two strategies may be more successful in the land forces. One
is the separation strategy; the other the integration approach. Separation
47
works well, when every national contingent has to deal with its own
lines of command, gets its own area of responsibility as well as its own
housing facilities in its own camp. The strategy is also well applicable
for elite units who invest strongly in internal cohesion, meaning that
they are strong in internal bonding, but weak in bridging with other units
(Soeters et al. 2006). The separation strategy is preferable if it is too
difficult given the short time span in the preparation stage to change the
attitudes by making the other culture more attractive. The Dutch for the
Iraq-operation chose this strategy in 2003 where the Dutch co-operated
with the English whilst at the same time being responsible for a specific
area. Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan are also organised
along the lines of separation in which each will keep to its own area of
responsibility. Actually, this strategy is the most commonly used
approach in multinational peacekeeping operations.
The integration approach, on the other hand, really tries to get people
from different nationalities working and living together, which happens
rather successfully in multinational headquarters. According to this
approach, working and living conditions are shared, and the lines of
command are fully international. One common language is used requiring all members to be sufficiently proficient. And working procedures
are to a high degree standardised according to NATO of UN guidelines.
In the case of 1 (GE/NL) Corps there is a clear desire to keep the
uniqueness of the own national cultures and national values. Both the
Germans and the Dutch value their own cultures highly. On the other
side, the findings point out to the fact that on the attitude level mutual
understanding, respect and sympathy are growing. The other culture is
perceived as attractive and this attractiveness is an attitude that can be
influenced even more. Indeed, the attitudes have changed over the ten
years we accompanied the corps with research. Even the Dutch have put
aside their initial hesitations and acknowledge the attractiveness of the
other nation’s culture. In the scheme of Berry et al. (2006) this can only
be understood as the integration of two cultures into one new transnational organisational culture.
Both approaches, separation and integration, seem to work. Under
certain conditions the separation strategy is preferable (Soeters et al.
2006). Integration comes with problems related to differences in formal
48
regulations, language and communication problems, differences in
sanctioning styles, styles of leadership and the like. That is no reason not
to strive for integration, though. Certainly when the aim is to further
interoperable headquarters commanding Nato Response Forces or EU
Battle Groups. If international co-operation is to be stimulated, work on
sympathy for sympathy is the cement of interoperability.
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51
52
Communitate Valemus –
The Relevance of Professional Trust, Collective Drills & Skills,
and Task Cohesion within Integrated Multinationality
Ulrich vom Hagen
To this day the motto of the 1 (German/Netherlands) Corps is „communitate valemus“ or „together we are strong“. Now, such a motto raises
the question of the specific quality of togetherness within a military
context in general and within integrated multinationality in special. An
implicit assumption within most Western militaries and within modern
military sociology is that strong group cohesion is at least an advantage
if not a basic precondition for good operational performance of military
units. But this rather functional imperative seems too narrow given the
wide variety of different types of military forces and the range of functions today’s armed forces are called upon to perform. Understanding
the current evolution of military roles as a primarily functional response
to objective threat appears to be of ultimately limited utility. A more
explicit recognition of the contextual and contingent nature of armed
forces functional imperatives – that without a doubt exist – is important
for the understanding of the manifold aspects of „togetherness“ for the
military. Especially integrated multinational units do not only have
functional purposes but fulfil within the process of European integration
socio-political roles. Therefore military roles are emerging as a consequence of domestic and international socio-political influences that
shape states’ perceptions of what their armed forces should look like and
the purposes they should serve. As a consequence armed forces’ functional imperatives are themselves primarily a response to changing
socio-political influences rather than an inevitable institutional response
to objective threat. These conditions already characterize the national
armed forces and especially multinational military units as a consequence of some trends within international security policy:
There is a decline in the significance of the defence of national territory
role as a core organising principle for regular armed forces of the
Western hemisphere. Secondly, the increasing dominance of a model of
53
military „professionalisation“ equates modern armed forces with
smaller, highly skilled, flexible force structures able to project power
abroad whether for war fighting or peacekeeping operations. Finally, the
emergence of a discourse concerned with the threats of the so-called
„New Security Environment“ (NSE) such as civil wars, trans-national
terrorism, weak states, drug smuggling and growing scarcities of resources that has refocused military roles of external armed forces into
internal-security issues. That is, these military missions so-called „Operations Other Than War“ (OOTW) are being conducted in alien environments where language, custom, culture, and religion differ from the
expeditionary Western soldiers’. 1 OOTW include peacekeeping, „drug
war“, interdiction and surveillance operations, educational programs,
environmental preservation, disaster support to civil authorities, and
support to civilian law enforcement. Operational effectiveness in a
broader sense, therefore, requires Western armed forces to expand their
skill sets accordingly.
Most security forces, and the armed forces especially, are notable for
their relative homogeneity – not only insofar as phenotypic visible
minorities or members from minority ethnic groups is concerned but
also on just about all other conceivable counts of diversity, 2 as exemplified manifestly by recent debates about women and homosexuals in the
military and more latently by the lack of religious and linguistic pluralism. Most military’s ultimate principle is force cohesion resp. group
cohesion. The relevance of the concept of group cohesion to the military
was introduced by Shils/Janowitz (1948), who focused on the question
why even separated units of the German Wehrmacht were vigorously
fighting until the very end of the II. World War. Theirs and the explanation of Stouffer et al. (1949) for that phenomenon was the extreme
cohesion within the primary group of those military units. Shils/Janowitz
(1948: 196ff.) were aware of the specifically military functions of primary groups and the relevance of a disciplined hierarchy to the creation
1
2
54
Instead of „service-man and -women“ I use throughout the text the term „soldiers“ referring to
all rank groups.
The term diversity refers to all the ways we have of being different (James 2000). It covers
distinctions based on phenotype, sex, age, language, ethnic origin, faith, opinion, orientation,
and association (Rutherford 1990; Shuster/van Pelt 1991; James 1994). It also refers to
differences in personal experience, personality, approach, and position in a hierarchy (Griggs/
Low 1994).
of these military units. For them primary groups were held together by
bonds of comradeship produced by personal relations and the fulfilment
of psychological and physical organic needs by their leadership and the
organisation. In organisational research the study of complex organisations demands to go beyond the small group. With this focus in mind
Etzioni (1961: 176) defines cohesion as „a positive expressive relationship among two or more actors“. His definition emphasizes the norms
that define the relationship of actors and avoids the notions of shared
values. This approach seems to be valuable for a pragmatic but rigorous
approach of professional trust. It allows keeping cohesion and consensus
apart.
Along with the construct of trust go the constructs of cohesion, leadership, and organisational commitment. Although most of the time only
cohesion and organisational commitment are considered to have a strong
influence on each other, it seems to be more fruitful to look at all these
four factors at the same time because they depend on each other. To
each of these four constructs exists a rich literature within many disciplines and sub-fields of the social sciences. So far the construct of social
cohesion remains within modern military sociology to be central among
the other three. The problem is, though, that force cohesion may be the
function of professional trust and not its prerequisite.
Literature within modern military sociology and psychology offers many
approaches for describing force cohesion. Basically it can be found, that
this very concept describes the solidarity of a military unit, most of the
time on or below company level, which will motivate soldiers to fight
and accept a harsh environments for the sake of their fellows. It is seldom geared to a higher political or strategic ideal. Force cohesion, to
different extents, can have a vital effect on the outcome of armed conflicts. There are many examples within modern history (e. g. the Vietnam War) that show that a strong cohesion can help to defeat an overwhelming enemy.
55
The traditional republican legitimisation for the existence of a military is
that it remains every citizen’s responsibility to defend one’s country. 3
This raises the question if cohesion within a multinational context where
soldiers from more than one country serve and work together is the same
as in national defined armed forces and what the implications of such an
assumption are for multinational co-operation. In the case of integrated
multinationality the relevance of cohesion is extremely virulent because
the Western military is since round about 200 years mainly nationally
defined and by the same token a major defining institution for national
sovereignty. Therefore the question arises, how parts of nationally
defined armed forces and their soldiers can co-operate with each other in
a multinational environment. In the self image of most armies their own
main purpose is still the protection of national sovereignty and national
territory. But with the ongoing process of European integration this
legitimisation seems to change. Parts of the armed forces of most EU
countries are meanwhile involved in multinational forces; be it in ad-hoc
deployments or on a regular basis as integrated bi- and multinational
units. Since in bi- and multinational formations the centripetal forces of
a commonly shared national heritage do not exist, it is expected that, in a
bi- and multinational context group cohesion is even more sensitive. In
order to uphold coherent operational capabilities such multinational
formations like 1 (GE/NL) Corps have a special interest in positive
cohesion among its members. This raises the question how coherent, coordinated, and integrated structures operate within a multinational context.
More recently, Elron, Shamir and Ben-Ari (1999) illustrated how
multinational forces solve cross-cultural problems, while Kretchnik
(2003) has shown the importance of training to the effectiveness of
multinational staffs. To provide a convincing account of multinational
military structures, it is necessary to follow the advice by King (2006)
and focus on military practices rather than on informal rituals. Therefore
it seems extremely relevant to concentrate on procedures that assist
multinational military units to create organisational effectiveness at the
operational and the tactical level. In the case of 1 (GE/NL) Corps group
activities that devise and execute operations on the operational level are
3
56
In the NSE more and more Western armed forces no longer operate mainly in areas of
responsibility, but operate in areas of interests. Therefore the question of „self legitimisation“ is
becoming more complicated and relevant.
that devise and execute operations on the operational level are mainly
conducted by the headquarters (HQ) of 1 (GE/NL) Corps. The tactical
level is subordinate to the operational level and is being represented by
the two integrated battalions of 1 (GE/NL) Corps.
Hypothesis: Well-trained teams and units display an intuitive communication that is built on shared experiences in complex team skills. Sufficient training and good leadership help to create collective drills & skills
that are a precondition for successful operational performance. This
specific form of confidence and reliance based on co-operation between
social actors (i. e. in a group between peers, and between subordinates
and leaders) creates professional trust which results in task cohesion.
The evaluations made in this essay are based upon data from oral interviews with Dutch and German soldiers from the two integrated battalions (StSptBn and CIS-Bn) of 1 (GE/NL) Corps and a quantitative
survey. The twenty Dutch and German interviewees that we talked to
belonged to all rank groups and had different functions and levels of
experience. The interviews were conducted in May 2005 in Münster and
Eibergen in the respective military facilities. The quantitative data stem
from a questionnaire survey conducted in May and June 2005 in the HQ,
the StSptBn and the CIS-Bn. Every soldier of 1 (GE/NL) Corps was
provided with a questionnaire (in English for the HQ; in Dutch resp.
German for the battalions). One quarter of the total population of soldiers responded. All rank groups, nations and military installations of 1
(GE/NL) Corps are equally represented.
1
Collective Drills & Skills
In a recent publication British sociologist Anthony King (2006: 3)
argues that by focusing on the exclusively military practices a better
understanding of how military groups are able to sustain themselves
even at the cost of personal injury and death to their members a better
understanding can be reached. His research focus is social practices that
are critical to social cohesion. King holds that it is not personal relations
that account for strong social cohesion but other social practices he calls
collective drills. He suggest that rather than looking at informal rituals
57
one should focus on formal rituals that soldiers undergo, e. g. intense
training regimes, in which collective drills are inspired. Formal training
practices stand in the forefront of his research because King is mainly
interest in the social practices at the tactical level of combat units. Like
the huge majority of the literature on cohesion of military units also
King focuses on relatively small and stable groups of combat units. But
King (2006: 3) argues that socially cohesive structures are not merely
the consequence of mutual, continuous, and common personal experience, but result from intense training regimes.
The rigorous and lengthy training processes in which soldiers learn
collective drills are essential because troops become oriented to collective representations, collective movements, and efficient ways of communication. King (2006: 13) argues that it is a high level of collective
military proficiency that causes cohesion: „Successful armies like the
Wehrmacht consist of a myriad of mutually supporting primary groups,
all militarily proficient, and all ultimately directed to the same shared
goals.“ In this sense King (2006: 16) considers genuine military comradeship to be a function of collective drills and military proficiency
because within the troops one has to prove worthy of comradeship.
There are integrating mechanisms that are relevant for the ground forces
and the staff personnel as well. In an article on cultural diversity within
multinational UN-peace-keeping missions Elron, Shamir and Ben-Ari
(1999: 87ff.) give several specific and actively managed mechanisms
that help to create operational unity. By including the operational level
of staff units it turns out to be necessary not only to take collective drills
but also to take shared skills into account. A few of these mechanisms
described by Elron et al. (1999) on the basis of their analysis of multinational UN-peace-keeping missions seem also to be highly relevant for
the analysis of collective drills & skills within integrated multinational
staffs and units:
•
58
Joint operations and training: Training in and with other armed
forces and various joint exercises allow as concrete instances for cooperation and incorporation. Common military practices and values
can be established.
•
Formal co-ordinating mechanisms: Co-ordination structures at the
top of the command framework representing all participating countries.
•
Information flow and sharing knowledge: The exchange of information and sharing of professional knowledge can facilitate better coordination and forms part of a process of mutual learning that may,
in turn, lead to an increase in the will to engage in further interactions.
•
Leadership and deliberate social activities: Leaders have to take
efforts to make goals and tasks clear. By creating sentiments of cooperation and affiliation through social events the concept of teamwork will be sustained.
On the operational level of staffs and headquarters military proficiency
may look different than in the „mud zone“ of combat units. Here the
procedures for effective command & control – in a more general sense –
are the central elements of military practices. Therefore King’s construct
of collective drills has to be enlarged to collective skills. So-called
standard operating procedures (SOPs) are laid down in written form but
they have to be trained in exercises in the „learning by doing“ fashion.
The staff must establish and practice an SOP to effectively manage all
the information the operational level has to check and evaluate. This
SOP must include standard displays the commander can use for decision
making, as well as procedures and techniques the staff uses to report
critical information. Trough the played but realistic events and incidents
of the exercises the staff personnel can undergo processes where they
have to develop militarily relevant collective skills. Another aspect of
such exercises is to train the co-operation with assigned and subordinated units. Collective drills in the form of formal training practices
resp. commonly shared procedures can be understood as mechanisms for
integration. The staff level must be highly competent in the skills relevant to the discharge of the primary task of the organization. In order to
be able to co-operate the staff level must share collective skills since
usually more than one person is involved in evaluating and handling an
new situation. In an integrated multinational setting it is necessary that
staff soldiers from all nations involved are familiar with the relevant
procedures of their unit.
59
2
Professional Trust
Trust is widely considered a necessary condition for co-operation of
actors in positive social interaction, within organisations and between
groups (cf. Kramer/Tyler 1995). To be sure, co-operation among individuals or organisations can occur without the involvement of trust. This
is often the case in first-time or one-time encounters when we have no
experience to support expectations about trust. Trust (or mistrust) develops out of the joint experience of living or working together. By observing how different individuals, groups or organisations deal with risk and
vulnerability, we learn to expect certain behaviours. Trust, therefore
embodies an expectation that those we deal with are reliable and will not
take advantage of one another or exploit situations that benefit one at the
expense of others. When trust is low, we usually build formal protections into these relationships. When trust is high, we are more likely to
develop informal but well-understood ways of acting together. Alan Fox
(1974) established the concept of „high-trust vs. low-trust“ within organisations. Fox (1974: 13ff.) emphasizes that for the level of trust
within an organisation one has to take the level of discretion for the
exercise of one’s tasks into account, although one has to be aware that
the level of discretion is one among other factors that contribute to or
compromise the establishment of trust. Within the social context of
organisation that demands a formal framework for collaboration the
relations of trust are mainly based on reciprocity. Fox (1974: 69) even
argues that institutionalised trust is „compatible with personal dislike of
the person trusted; distrust with personal liking and respect for him“.
Trust is less a strategy, i. e. the result of intentional acting of an interested person or group, but rather the consequence of processes of acting
which are the results of a successful common praxis on which they are
based. Therefore Gambetta (1988: 225) argues that trust can be found
„in societies and groups which are successful because of their ability to
co-operate, and would consist in nothing more than trust in the success
of previous co-operation. Co-operation could be triggered not by trust,
but simply by a set of fortunate practices, random at first, and then
selectively retained (with various degrees of learning and intentionality).“ It remains highly interesting why even in very hierarchical organisations, characterised by institutionalised distrust and a low level of
60
discretion, the idea of trust is considered as something positive and
important for co-operation even by the managers or the leadership of
such hierarchical organisations.
In the military context for some time now the value of trust to operational effectiveness has been accepted. However, as organisational
structures have slowly changed towards collective work in the form of
units or teams, both virtual and proximate, the importance of trust has
become even more prominent. For example, trust within a work unit
environment is more complex due to there being multiple agents acting
to establish or degrade trust, so that a single action may impact on the
perception of trust of the entire group. Trust among peers solidifies.
Concerning the military as an hierarchical organisation there is the
fundamental problem of discretion and trust. Within different armed
forces there are diverse levels of discretion for accomplishing a task. Not
only do leadership doctrines differ in this respect but especially the
social practices. It can be assumed that the aspect of discretion within
military leadership doctrines has an impact on the level of trust within
multinational military co-operation.
The current US Marine Corps doctrine on Command and Control
(MCDP 6: 115) argues on trust in the following way: „In order to earn a
senior’s trust, subordinates must demonstrate the self-discipline to
accomplish the mission with minimal supervision and to act always in
accord with the larger intent. Seniors, in order to earn subordinates’
trust, must likewise demonstrate that they will provide the subordinate
the framework within which to act and will support and protect subordinates in every way as they exercise initiative.“ That is to say that there
seems to be a connection between trust and personal leadership.
The concept of professional trust holds that trust is an essential component of what it means to be a „professional“. Under professional trust we
can understand the degree to which individuals and organisations
charged with developing and delivering a service believe they can rely
on the motives and predict the performance of the other participants due
to common professional standards. Similar to this approach is Sako’s
concept of „competence trust“ that entails the confidence in the other’s
ability to perform properly (cf. Sako 1992). But the idea of professional61
ism goes beyond the notion of mere competence. In addition to mere
competence in handling required skills to fulfil given tasks, professionalism furthermore includes not only the knowledge of commonly shared
explicit and implicit rules but especially the self-obligation towards the
ethics of the profession and its standards of performance. Military sociologist Morris Janowitz defined a profession in the following terms: (1)
„special skill, acquired through intensive training“; (2) „a sense of group
identity“; (3) „a system of internal administration“; (4) „a body of ethics
and standards of performance“ (Janowitz [1960] 1964: 5f.). Concerning
trust in the „profession of controlled violence“ Collins and Jacobs (2002:
39) put it in the following words: „In respect to professionalism, trust is
so critical that it is hard to imagine a healthy profession of arms without
widespread trust.“
Trust is based on a number of assumptions about professional behaviour
and its underpinning ethical norms. They include the belief in the integrity and honesty of the professionals in all of their activities, the impartiality of their knowledge, the fiduciary nature of their relationship with
their colleagues resp. comrades, their adherence to their profession’s
standards of practice, the confidentiality of information, their willingness to disclose conflicts of interest and their regard for the public interest (cf. Daykin 2004). This list is not exhaustive, but it makes sufficiently clear that professional behaviour is not limited to a judgement on
competence or knowledge, although this is certainly taken for granted,
and is also concerned with the character of the individuals assuming a
professional status. Therefore, competence is not enough on its own;
what is required is the ability to make appropriate professional judgements that go beyond standardised, codified knowledge. As already
stated, traditional conceptualisations of professionalism rest upon the
attainment of certified skills and knowledge in order to practice. The
benign spiral at the heart of the formation of trust between practitioner
and client is arguably predicated upon the practitioner’s legitimate,
authentic possession of this expert, accredited knowledge (cf. Gilmore/
Hoecht/Williams 2005).
Concerning professional trust in the military in general and in an integrated multinational context especially it’s the collaboration between
individuals and groups that all belong to a single profession what counts.
62
If the military were world-wide „brothers in arms“ conducting the same
craft with the same skills and the same leadership doctrines there
wouldn’t be any problems concerning multinational collaboration apart
from sometimes being enemies. There are indeed indications from UNPeace-Keeping missions that something like a common world-wide
military culture exists (cf. Moskos 1976; Belamy 1996; Segal/Tiggle
1997; Soeters/Recht 1998). In particular Elron et al. (1999: 84) argue
that the military culture common to armed forces around the globe
centres on the notion of the military profession. Elron et al. (1999: 85)
put it this way: „(...) even before entering a specific multinational force,
officers (and some men) may have already undergone vicarious, anticipatory, and actual socialization to work in such frameworks.“ That is to
say that at least the armed forces of those countries that support multinational collaboration in UN-Peace-Keeping missions or in military alliances like NATO find themselves in processes of institutionalised isomorphism, i. e. they are structurally converting to each other due to
internal and especially external developments (cf. DiMaggio/Powell
1983). In this sense the existence of military professionalism would
therefore be the precondition to high professional trust and task cohesion. This constellation can contribute to successful operational performance of multinational units. Those who are militarily proficient can
be trusted because they are able to contribute to collective goals and
share similar norms. In respect to professionalisation within Western
militaries Elbe and Richter (2005: 148) argue that the phenomenon of
military professionalism leads to normative isomorphism through common standards, defined work methods, common standards and commonly shared way of thinking. Since there is usually only one military
force per country this implies that theses processes of convergence take
place on a transnational level. Therefore professional trust can be understood as an integrating condition for successful multinational cooperation in operations abroad, in a multinational high-readiness unit or
headquarters in garrison.
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3
Social Cohesion and Task Cohesion
Research has made it clear that cohesion is not a unitary construct. Many
dimensions of cohesion have been discussed in the research literature.
Perhaps the most important and fruitful distinction is that between social
cohesion and task cohesion (cf. Davis 1969; Tziner/Vardi 1982; Carron/
Widmeyer/Brawley 1985; Griffith 1988; Siebold/Kelly 1988; Zaccaro/
McCoy 1988; Mudrack 1989; MacCoun 1993; Mullen/Copper 1994;
MacCoun 1996; Kier 1998). MacCoun (1993: 291) offered the following
definitions:
•
Social cohesion refers to the nature and quality of the emotional
bonds of friendship, liking, caring, and closeness among group
members. A group is socially cohesive to the extent that its members
like each other, prefer to spend their social time together, enjoy each
other’s company, and feel emotionally close to one another.
•
Task cohesion refers to the shared commitment among members to
achieving a goal that requires the collective efforts of the group. A
group with high task cohesion is composed of members who share a
common goal and who are motivated to co-ordinate their efforts as a
team to achieve that goal.
Both, social cohesion and task cohesion have two dimensions: a horizontal and a vertical one. The constructs of social cohesion and task cohesion includes within military a military context the relationship between
soldiers within the same rank group (horizontal cohesion) and the relationship towards the superior (vertical cohesion). The principle of social
cohesion is within the military still considered the alpha and omega of
operational effectiveness. Whether social cohesion is important to military effectiveness, irrelevant or something in between can not be answered on the grounds of our results, since that was not the aim of this
research project. What is obvious is that multinational soldiers consider
the principle of social cohesion – that has its origins in the national
armed forces – also to be relevant for the context of integrated multinational units. This alone might have an impact on the attitudes and social
practices within multinationality.
64
Horizontal cohesion is basic for the trust shared between peers. It stems
from the cohesive bond of actors of the same rank and may be supported
by building teams. Like sports teams or music bands, individual skill is a
prerequisite for trust into one self and others, but a unit needs to practice
and interact extensively and continuously. The imperatives for small unit
leaders to build horizontal cohesion are clear and straightforward: keep
units together as much as possible, assign units not individuals to duty
on guard and maintenance, billet units together, emphasise unit uniqueness, insure barracks and other facilities support distinctive unit identity
and clear unit boundaries, schedule non-training appointments together
to minimise absences, manage off-duty time, grant leave and liberty to
entire units, and plan picnics, sports, and family days together (cf. Wong
1985; Henderson 1985). Leaders need to insure that the unit satisfies the
soldier’s physical needs for food, water, medical, shelter, social needs
for esteem and affection, and security needs. These actions, and others,
increase interdependency, trust, respect, and peer bonding, which all
contribute to horizontal cohesion. When men and women are of the
same background, horizontal cohesion develops usually more rapidly.
When they are not of the same background, more effort is required to
build and support the creation of horizontal cohesion.
Performance, behaviour and feelings of the soldier are to a large extent
shaped by the hierarchical relation of superiors and subordinates (Bröckling 1997: 11). This also holds true for vertical cohesion, which is the
direct result of the relationship between direct or higher superiors and
the vast majority of subordinates. Cohesion within work units impacts
on work unit effectiveness. However, the relationship between cohesion
between the member s of a group and operational effectiveness is moderated by many variables, of which leadership may be one. Horizontal
cohesion is the bond of confidence between soldiers within a single unit
or horizontally between leaders of separate units. Trust in leadership
builds vertical cohesion.
Vertical cohesion is strengthened considerably and soldiers gain critical
confidence, trust, and respect in their leader when the leader displays
professional competence and tactical abilities while leading his or her
unit in training evolutions that simulate deployment. Policies of the
higher leadership can strengthen an organisation’s vertical cohesion in
65
the sense that decentralised leave and liberty decisions, promotion
recommendations, and assignment policies empower small unit leaders,
strengthen each leader’s contributions to the welfare of his or her troops,
and thereby increase an organisation’s vertical cohesion (cf. Tillson
1990). In the end we are all involved in relationships of trust but by the
same token trust also involves risk and the possibility of mistrust.
Groups need to find ways to work effectively together to accomplish
their goals and to solve problems that are sometimes quite serious.
Meta-analyses of studies of the cohesion/performance relationship
indicate that a modest positive relationship exists between cohesion and
performance, and is greater when a group task requires high levels of coordination, communication, and performance monitoring among group
members. A causal direction, though, cannot be concluded on the basis
of these correlations (MacCoun 1993). The authors of a study that analysed sixty-six cohesion/performance correlations from forty-nine studies even asserted that the effect of success on cohesion appears to be
greater than the effect of cohesion on successful performance (Mullen/
Copper 1994). The authors of another study (Gully et al. 1995), though,
argued that too few appropriate studies are currently available to permit
any conclusion about causality.
According to most findings in organisational theory, social psychology
and sociology task cohesion may be more important than social cohesion in enhancing group performance. After reviewing military and
civilian studies of cohesion and performance, MacCoun (1996) concluded that it is task cohesion – not social cohesion or group pride – that
drives group performance. He pointed out that when social cohesion is
too high, deleterious consequences can result, including excessive socialising, group-think (the failure of a highly cohesive group to engage
in effective decision-making processes), insubordination, and even
mutiny. MacCoun’s arguments are echoed by Segal and Kestnbaum
(2002: 453) who stated that, „there is no clear causal link that can be
demonstrated using rigorous methods between social cohesion and high
levels of military performance“. It seems that bonding within military
units increases social cohesion but might have no or even counterproductive outcomes concerning operational effectiveness. This holds
66
especially true for tasks where co-operation with non-group members is
demanded.
What remains very emotionally discussed within the military establishment and even within modern military sociology is the importance of
each type of cohesion (social or task) for the level of operational performance. In the military as well as the civilian context all over the
world commonsensical notions emphasise the importance of emotional
bonds, trust, and loyalty to the primary group for successful operational
performance. Researchers such as Elizabeth Kier (1998: 18) examined
the literature on cohesion and concluded that concerning social resp.
primary group cohesion „fifty years of research in several disciplines has
failed to uncover persuasive evidence (...) that there is a causal relationship leading from primary group cohesion to military effectiveness“.
The construct of social cohesion is know to the military world as comradeship, which signifies most often the trust into one another on the
same rank level, but also towards superiors and subordinates. Sometimes
cohesion is misunderstood by military scholars (e. g. Manning 1991:
456) as being simply military group cohesion which then is described by
the notions of trust in and solidarity with the cohesive primary group.
Cohesion is then similarly used to the concept of esprit de corps, which
becomes relevant on the level of the rank group or even larger military
unit, where the soldier is bond to the institution. Traditionalists argue
that the level of (social) cohesion explains soldiers’ combat or deployment motivation (cf. Oetting 1990; Wong et al. 2003). Approaches that
equal cohesion simply with strong emotional bonds fail to consider the
importance of different qualities of cohesion on operational performance.
Still, social bounds and trust into one another are important for human
beings, and due to emotional stress and lethal danger they might especially relevant for soldiers in a deployment or combat theatre. But the
idea of comradeship and the construct of trust get easily mingled up
because they depend heavily on each other although they are not the
same, since comradeship is heavily loaded with normative values while
trust expresses simply confidence in each others reliability. One is
considered reliable because of one’s good (human and professional)
67
reputation and not only because of belonging to a group. What is beyond
the formal structures of the military is comradeship. It can play a major
role concerning the specific positive or negative quality of military force
cohesion (Roghmann/Ziegler 1977: 149, 169f.).
Trust is not only central for building up social cohesion but also vital for
task cohesion. That posses the question if social cohesion may be a
precondition for task cohesion? There is no proper answer to that assumption. What seems to be pretty obvious is that professional trust and
leads to strong task cohesion. At the same time social cohesion seems to
be a „hygiene factor“ for professional trust: the absence of social cohesion damages professional trust, but more social cohesion does not
automatically lead to more professional trust. At the same time does
within a military context only professional trust allow for social cohesion, because a not trustworthy soldier endangers the military unit.
3.1
Leadership resp. Followership
Leadership involves influencing the behaviour and interaction of others,
and presupposes the existence of followers resp. subordinates. What
leaders do is to influence the behaviour, beliefs, thinking and feelings of
other group members in an intended direction (cf. Katz/Kahn 1978).
Thus, leadership can be understood as social actions, through which
common efforts are co-ordinated towards common goals and collective
goods. Leadership skills are not personal. Rather a leader can be effective if the group he/she represents has a clear understanding of what it is
trying to achieve and how to do it. Groups ultimately create the leaders
they get, for a leader will draw upon collective group symbols to direct
action. However, the potency of those group symbols rests with the
group not with the leader.
More recent theories of leadership are based not so much on classic
traits of leadership, but on analyses of the relationship between the
leader and the follower. Particularly relevant for this purpose is the
current debate between transactional and transformational leadership.
Transactional leadership is considered an increasingly common form of
leadership in business, in politics, and in government bureaucracy (Mac
68
Gregor Burns 1978: 19f.). However, this kind of leadership has limitations. A transaction creates no enduring purpose that holds the parties
together. It does not bind the leader and follower in a mutual and continuing pursuit of a higher purpose.
In contrast, transformational leadership „(...) occurs when one or more
persons engage with others in a way that raises both leaders and followers to higher levels of motivation and morality (...). Their purposes,
which might have started out as separate but related, as in the case of
transactional leadership, become fused (…).“ (Yammimarino/Bass 1990:
157f.) The concept of transformational leadership is in the military
context sometimes referred to as ethical leadership. Ethical leadership
would be a tautology if the espoused values and the practiced values
concerning responsibility of superiors towards the well-being of their
inferiors within the military were identical. Transformational leadership
allows for and needs superiors that are bound to a moral that puts the
soldier’s welfare first. Experts appear to prefer transformational leadership to transactional leadership.
There is no standard accepted definition of military leadership. Instead,
it is a combination of various qualities which, when taken together, are
called leadership. The people exercising these qualities are deemed to be
leaders, and, based on an assessment of their effectiveness in a given
situation, are rated as „good“ or „bad“. Leadership must be distinguished
from other related concepts such as command and management, although these terms are often used interchangeably. A good manager and
a good commander both require leadership ability, but simply occupying
a position of authority does not necessarily make a person a leader.
Management can be viewed as a craft, specifically the craft of employing people and materiel in the most economical and effective way to
accomplish an objective. Hence, the difference between the corporate
ethic of the military and the managerial ethic is important. For, unlike
civilians who work for a private company or the public service, soldiers
ultimately are expected to get injured or even die for their mission if
necessary.
Superiors will not be leaders if they do little to motivate and inspire their
subordinates. The superior, in effect, becomes a leader only when the
69
leader is accepted as such by subordinates because they chose to be his
followers. Leadership requires much more than management skills or
legal authority. The leader is the one who encourages the other members
of the unit. Trusted leadership – high level of vertical cohesion – reduces
the outside stresses not related to operational tasks that can destroy a
unit. Central prerequisites for effective leadership are therefore constructive social interaction, known goals, lucid timeframes, clear work roles
and knowledge of tasks, distribution of relevant information, guidance,
control and acceptance, allocation of time and resources, and if necessary the initiation of corrective actions. In relation to leadership within
larger work units, organisations prove to be a prerequisite for coordinated leadership. Uncertain information and rumours, that contribute
to friction and lost morale, can be clarified by trusted leaders. Confusing
operational aims, opposition in the home society, unsound strategy, and
other questions can all be mitigated to a certain extent by nurturing,
caring commanders that have the trust of their subordinates (Stewart
1991). In this sense task cohesion is highly dependant on effective
leadership.
Successful leadership and high task cohesion depend on each other.
Leader stability appears to be the central requirement for a high level of
vertical cohesion. Small unit leaders must serve long tours in the same
billet, ideally equivalent to the length of their soldier’s tours, to build
credibility and teamwork. Leaders should join a unit early and train that
unit throughout its full training cycle. Armies that keep leaders in place
stabilise unit habits, standard operating procedures, expectations, and
performance. In cohesive units, leaders know and try to understand their
men. They know why soldiers fight and show a caring concern and
respect for their soldiers. Subordinates must be convinced that their
leader has their welfare in mind. Leaders must continually set a strong
personal example, especially in deployment, in order for men to follow
them. In deployment or in an exercise good leaders live with their unit,
eat with their unit, empathise with their unit, and care for their unit (cf.
Henderson 1985; Stewart 1991). Good leaders share discomfits and
danger and their optimism and courage is contagious (Stewart 1991).
Not through paternalism but through giving a good example good leaders earn their followers trust. As well, leaders are only entitled to ask
from below what they are prepared to give above, and the people in
70
charge must put first the interests of those over whom they are positioned (vertical social cohesion). A leader must proof competent in the
skills relevant to the fulfilment of the primary task of his unit (vertical
task cohesion). Personal bonds between leaders build substantial horizontal cohesion within the leadership, something that is know to the
military world as esprit de corps.
3.2
Organisational Commitment
The construct of organisational commitment appears to be relevant as an
indicator for the explanation of successful „followership“, high morale
within one’s unit and an identification with the organisation’s aims and
goals: therefore this construct goes hand in hand with social and task
cohesion and stays in close relation to concepts like motivation, occupational content and involvement, but still goes beyond them because it is
more global, and thus more stable in the face of day-to-day work experience. Some psychological approaches of „combat morale“ (Manning
1991: 458) are quite similar to approaches of organisational commitment, in both denotation and connotation. Military psychological and
military sociological literature most often simply uses the term „commitment“, without further distinguishing between different approaches
and concepts to it. Within the construct of organisational commitment
there are three dimensions that can be distinguished. This tridimensional approach that was introduced by Allen and Meyer (1990) –
meanwhile broadly and generally accepted – consists of affective commitment, normative commitment and continuance commitment.
The dimension of affective commitment represents mainly aspects of
occupational content and perceived organisational fairness. Affective
commitment represents the bonds between each soldier and his or her
army. These organisational bonds are often built around symbols and
stories, the legacy and the culture of the military organisation. The
history and traditions of a military organisation, the valour and reputation of it members, are all reinforced during training and ceremonies.
Distinctive uniforms and insignia give members a sense of exclusiveness
and a strong sense of belonging. Promotions, awards, and retirement
ceremonies are all opportunities for increasing affective commitment.
71
Normative commitment can be understood as a more idealistic motivation towards the participation to an organisation. Normative commitment
is argued to develop from attitudes that steam from idealistic motives
which develop through long term processes and which often develop
rather before the organisation is entered, and even contribute to the
decision to become part of a specific organisation. However, these are
often symbolic ideas and rarely generate individual commitment. Similarity of attitudes promotes organisational cohesion, but creating these
larger group attitudes is difficult (cf. Henderson 1985). Normative
commitment, esprit and morale do not translate directly into group
cohesion and good operational performance.
Continuance commitment is much more characterised by an unmotivated
attitude towards the organisation, where e. g. a situation of not being
capable to leave the organisation due to the lack of other possibilities
creates rather a dependency on the organisation. Therefore it represents a
factor of maintenance to an organisation.
4
The Praxis of Multinational Interaction
Although Germany and the Netherlands share only to a certain extent a
common history, one can find that their cultures are not as diversified as
one may think. Several research projects have shown (e. g. Hagen/Klein/
Moelker/Soeters 2003) that the people of both countries show common
cognitive schemas, attitudes and through their lingual and cultural roots
both countries can be placed within the „Germanic European cluster“
(cf. Szabo et al. 2002). As one soldier put it: „We are very much alike
[i. e. the Dutch and the Germans], but that is exactly why all the differences that do exist are under the magnifying glass.“
4.1
Language
In 1 (GE/NL) Corps a notable difference is that most Dutch soldiers are
very proficient in the English and the German language. This is among
other factors due to the fact that people in the Netherlands are confronted with these languages in their everyday life, e. g. that all origi72
nally Anglo-Saxon TV-Programmes are subtitled. Their aptness to
communicate in three different languages is a key advantage for the
Dutch soldiers to work in an international environment. The contrary is
often the case for German ranks, of which a majority seems not having a
good knowledge of the working language of 1 (GE/NL) Corps and the
other multinational formations (cf. Gareis 2005: 168). Since the average
Dutch soldier is able to communicate more easily in English than his or
her German comrades he or she might get the impression that the German soldier is less qualified and even expects Dutch soldiers to speak
German. This is to say that a lack in the proficiency of the English
language is more than a simple communication problem.
In the integrated battalions of 1 (GE/NL) Corps the overall understanding is that German is the language primarily utilised in informal binational co-operation. Though English is the official language for meetings and documentation, all soldiers benefit from the fact that the Dutch
usually have proficient knowledge of the English as well as the German
language. A Dutch soldier of the StSptBn: „Everyday practice is that on
an informal level the Dutch adjust to the Germans and start speaking
their language, whilst on a formal level people usually speak English.“
German Enlisted have often poorer proficiency in the English language,
which has lead to supplemental mandatory language instruction initialised by the battalion commander in Münster. In Eibergen the situation
was a little different. In the interviews with German soldiers it was
stated that English, thus spoken by both nations, is the major language
for official and informal use, although people would often switch between English and German. The Dutch interviewees in Eibergen perceived the language situation differently. One of them said: „When
working with Germans I immediately start talking to them in German.
Just to prevent myself from having to say the same thing twice.“ It is
recognised that the overcoming of the lingual barrier is vital for the
functioning of the integrated battalions. That is why the slots are geared
to standardised proficiency knowledge of the English language. De facto
the German human resources department is not always able to find
enough personnel with apt qualifications in the usage of the English
language. In order to avoid gaps, the slots are filled with personnel who
hold minor lingual skills. A German sergeant called that: „Manpower
before language proficiency.“ The problems of the German Army in
73
finding soldiers with the right skills and a working knowledge of the
English language causes sometimes eye-brow raising among Dutch
soldiers concerning the professionalism of the German Army. Doubts
like these can have further implications when it comes to professional
trust.
On the other hand there have been in Eibergen already a couple of
courses for German soldiers to learn the Dutch language conducted with
the support of the local communal college and a Dutch NCO. They were
initiated by lower file ranks and highly appreciated and well attended.
Although not significant for Dutch-German collaboration, given that
English is the official working language, initiatives like the above described have symbolic value for the bi-national idea. The willingness of
German soldiers to build up a basic knowledge of the Dutch language
shows good will and creates reciprocity that is so fundamental for the
establishment and nourishing of trust. The best thing would be if differences in proficiency in English would not have to be an issue anymore.
The following statement highlights that concerning the English language
issue there is more on stake than just being able to communicate or the
idea of the military professionalism of the partner army: „It is very easy
to say to in English to a lieutenant colonel ‘good morning Sir’, but
somehow it feels very different for a Dutch soldier to say to a German
‘Guten Tag, Herr Oberstleutnant’.“ All in all the black and white image
of the German soldiers in the battalions having problems with the English language and the Dutch soldiers not was often drawn. In the next
statement this image gets repeated and corrected at the same time: „It is
always a struggle that the German refuse to learn and speak Dutch and
hardly speak English. Only from the level of cadet officer/officer the
level of English is workable. The Dutch normally take pride in their
skilfulness with languages and the fact that we all speak German (...)
well (...) the practical situation is very different.“ Initiatives like the
above mentioned ones remain crucial as long as there is no structural
solution to the language issue.
74
4.2
Leadership Styles
Leadership style is the manner and approach of providing direction,
implementing plans, and motivating people. The U. S. Army Handbook
(1973) mentions three styles of leadership:
•
Authoritarian: This style is used when the superior tells the subordinates what he or she wants done and how he or she wants it done,
without getting the advice of his or her subordinates. Some of the
appropriate conditions to use it are when the superior has all the information to solve the problem, there is time pressure, and the subordinates are well motivated.
•
Participative: This type of style involves the superior including one
or more subordinates in on the decision making process determining
what to do and how to do it. However, the leader maintains the final
decision making authority. This style is normally used when the superior has part of the information, and the subordinates have other
parts. Using this style can improve the quality of decisions and improves team building processes.
•
Delegative: In this style, the superior allows the subordinates to
make the decision. However, the leader is still responsible for the
decisions that are made. This style is used when employees are able
to analyse the situation and determine what needs to be done and
how to do it. This is a style to be used when the superior has the full
trust and confidence in the subordinates.
Although good leaders use all three styles, with one of them normally
dominate, bad leaders tend to stick with one style. A good leader uses all
three styles, depending on what forces are involved between the followers, the leader, and the situation. In order to find out what type of leadership the Dutch and German soldiers of 1 (GE/NL) Corps would prefer if
they had their choice and what type their immediate superior resembles
the most we depicted four ideal type superiors. The first two superiors
(type 1 and 2) resemble the authoritarian leadership ship style – with
superior 1 being more autocratic than superior 2 –, the third ideal type
superior stands for participative and the fourth superior type for delegative leadership.
75
Table 1: Which type of superior would you prefer? (answers in per
cent) 4
Superior 1
Superior 2
Superior 3
Superior 4
Dutch
9.3
24.4
61.6
4.7
100
Germans
5.7
36.6
54.5
3.3
100
Total
7.2
31.6
57.4
3.8
100
Eta = .046
Table 2: Which of these four types of superiors resembles you own
superior the most? (answers in per cent) 5
None of the four types
Superior 1
Superior 2
Superior 3
Superior 4
Dutch
15.9
19.3
25.0
38.6
1.1
100
Germans
7.3
17.7
40.3
29.8
4.8
100
Total
10.8
18.4
34.0
33.5
3.3
100
Eta = .083
During the research on the tactical level of the battalions within 1
(GE/NL) Corps the observation was made, that the German soldiers are
used to more hierarchical and strict formal rules and regulations in the
Bundeswehr than what is the case within the less authoritarian form of
leadership practised by the Dutch army. Furthermore it was frequently
quoted, that Dutch subordinates often feel the need to discuss orders,
which is rather strangely perceived by the German chain of command.
Again it was quoted, that there seems to be a more moderate military
tone within the battalions of 1 (GE/NL) Corps than in the Bundeswehr.
Furthermore German soldiers appreciate the fact, that within 1 (GE/NL)
Corps they are not tied to the rather strict formalism of the Bundeswehr.
A Dutch NCO stated in this respect: „You come across different men4
5
76
All data of this and the following tables refer to the integrated battalions and the HQ.
All data of this and the following tables refer to the integrated battalions and the HQ.
talities here in Münster, but all in all I don’t think working with Germans is any different from working with Dutch people. As long as you
keep account for their strictness and more hierarchical approach. We
Dutch tend to do things outside of set rules and functions. We are more
inclined to evaluate somebody on the premises of his personal qualities
rather then his hierarchical position. Germans play it more by the system.“ In the Dutch system orders often seem to offer a basis of discussion, prior to execution. Compared to the Dutch conduct, the German
soldiers interviewed stated that the German system implies authoritarian
styles of leadership and a stronger usage of leading by orders to be
immediately executed. The following table may be able to give an
impression concerning the differences between the Dutch and the German army in respect to differences in leadership styles.
Table 3: How do superiors interact with their subordinates in
1 (GE/NL) Corps in comparison to your country? (answers in
per cent)
Dutch
Germans
OPN
Total
Do
not
know
3.3
7.4
.0
5.4
Rougher
and
stricter
34.4
.8
.0
14.5
Approximately the
same
47.8
21.3
55.6
33.5
More
relaxed and
friendlier
14.4
70.5
44.4
46.6
100
100
100
100
Eta = .450
Concerning command and control on the operational level of the HQ
1 (GE/NL) Corps the practises of all the nations involved are naturally
not the same. Concerning the level of empowerment one member of the
OPNs stated the following: „Overall I find command and control [within
HQ 1 (GE/NL) Corps] dogmatic, bureaucratic and timid, not at all what
I have experienced in other UK and multinational formations. Mission
command is not generally practiced.“ Another member of the HQ from
one of the OPNs put it this way: „There is little sense of empowerment
across the whole HQ. In some staff divisions it is obvious whereas in
others the book is followed without question. The HQ, although an
enjoyable, relatively happy HQ, is nonetheless the most bureaucratic one
77
that I have served in.“ The question whether these alleged characteristics
of the HQ 1 (GE/NL) Corps reflect the military cultures of both the
frameworks nations remains open. Although officially the armies of the
Netherlands and Germany use the concept of mission command, there
seem to be differences between the ten nations involved in 1 (GE/NL)
Corps when it comes to the practical side of the notion of mission command.
There tend to be a lot of subtle differences concerning leadership between the Dutch and the German national military cultures which lead to
misunderstandings. Do German soldiers wrongly interpret the lack of
formalism within the Dutch chain of command? In field manuals of the
Bundeswehr it is strictly expressed, that the official military language is
a formal one. This means among other rules, that soldiers are not supposed to address each other by the first name. This is freely overlooked
by the Dutch superiors resulting in a collegial tone, to which German
soldiers are at first not accustomed to. It seems that this might lead to
confusion among some German soldiers. In the German system, especially young NCOs are taught to guard their formal distance in order to
be able to breach authority difficulties resulting out of lack of experience, young age and uncertainty. The formal language does help many
young superiors to lead more effectively, because they are taken as an
authority. When the formal discipline is put away, the formal authority
of the superior can be more easily questioned. Often then, subordinates
feel that they do not have to perform as highly anymore. Here is what a
typical Dutch corporal stated concerning formal discipline resp. self
discipline (Selbstdisziplin) of German soldiers: „The Germans are very
keen on hierarchical positions and give very directive and piecemeal
[hapklare brokken] orders, while the Dutch are know for taking own
initiative, which is something a German would never do.“ For the
evaluation of the research findings this allegedly behavioural pattern of
authoritarian thinking among some German soldiers leads to the assumption that such German soldiers might receive the lack of formalism on
the part of Dutch superiors as an invitation to show lower performance
because they misunderstand the signals sent. This is the point where the
renowned German leadership concept of „Innere Führung“ (inner direction and moral guidance) must come in. Soldiers from the battalions and
the HQ answered in the following way:
78
Table 4: I support the German leadership concept of „Innere Führung“
(answers in per cent)
Never heard of
Strongly agree
Partially agree
Neither/nor
Partially disagree
Strongly disagree
Dutch
23.5
5.9
25.9
30.6
7.1
7.1
100
Germans
2.5
28.9
40.5
18.2
9.1
0.8
100
Total
11.2
19.4
34.5
23.3
8.3
3.4
100
Eta = .032
Those soldiers who are familiar with „Innere Führung“ were asked if the
principles of this concept were applied in their unit. As it turns out the
German soldiers have quite a different perception concerning the application of „Innere Führung“ in their unit. Some Dutch soldiers might
have given a negative answer since they serve in purely Dutch units
where rather the principles of the Dutch leadership concept „Leidinggeven“ are applied.
Table 5: The principles of „Innere Führung“ are applied in my unit.
Strongly agree
Partially agree
Neither/nor
Partially disagree
Strongly disagree
Dutch
5.3
25.3
46.7
5.3
17.3
100
Germans
16.5
41.7
34.8
6.1
0.9
100
Total
12.1
35.3
39.5
5.8
7.3
100
Eta = .193
It was often mentioned by most German interviewees of the two battalions, that the Dutch soldiers feel the need to discuss orders once they are
issued. In the Dutch military culture this does not mean that these orders
are taken into question, but that the execution is being re-examined
collectively without taking the formal authority of the superior into
79
question. Furthermore, the subordinates get a chance to contribute their
own thoughts to the order. This may lead to the perception, that subordinates actively participate in the decision making process. A German
corporal expressed it this way: „With us things go more through orders,
with them things go more through comradeship.“ The discussion of
orders is something rather unknown within the Bundeswehr. It is rather
evaluated as a lack of respect than a sign of trust or constructive critique.
In the German system orders are perhaps discussed after they were
executed. Due to our Dutch and German interviewees there were moments when this phenomenon has lead to frictions between German
superiors and Dutch subordinates. Generally speaking, most German
soldiers within the integrated battalions of all ranks appreciate the Dutch
way of leadership and the moderate military formalism and tone. One
German NCO put it this way: „What I envy the Dutch for is their ease in
challenging tasks. Also their leadership style is much more co-operative
than ours. Also the Germans can learn from the Dutch social systems,
e. g. medical welfare, care for soldiers, giving trust. I think the Dutch
Army is several years ahead of us.“ Those German soldiers who prefer
the normal German military way of „Lage, Auftrag, Ausführung“ and
the traditional military ideas of hierarchy, discipline, and formalism are
often older in age.
On the battalion level soldiers from both armies feel to be, in a professional sense, in a privileged position because of the amount of exercises
conducted. The perception, that leisure time is drastically reduced due to
the large amount of manoeuvres in the field, seems to challenge especially the mature ranks. Integrated bi-nationality as such is well appreciated. Soldiers seem to serve with a certain consciousness concerning
integrated bi-nationality which still cannot be described as an overwhelming pride for serving in those exposed units. The development
within the StSptBn in Münster suggests that the work on a bi-national
basis has improved during the last 1½ years. 6 Soldiers feel that the
leadership emphasises bi-national work and contributes means in order
to improve cohesion, whilst leading and living the bi-national idea by
example. Most conflicts are attributed to personal issues and explicitly
not to problems deriving from national cultural differences. The daily
service shows that when the battalion command performs bi-nationally,
6
80
The field research was conducted in May 2005.
then the subordinate units will do the same. Furthermore, all German
interviewees agreed that they like the Dutch form of leadership. As long
as the Dutch soldiers are also satisfied with the Dutch leadership style it
should therefore be possible to find common grounds concerning the
norms and standards of command and control on the tactical level within
1 (GE/NL) Corps. Concerning practiced leadership this would obviously
ask much flexibility on the German side.
4.3
Regulations, Procedures and Professionalism
Service in a multinational environment always implies different national
regulations not always being compatible with each other. „We have
German, Dutch AND Nato procedures working here. They sometimes
simply don’t match.“ Sometimes bi- or multinational regulations are
introduced without the national regulations being diminished in the
everyday praxis. „It is typical that we have an office German material,
an office Dutch material and also work with bi-national material. On
three similar vehicles totally different rules may apply. But this office
for material consists of three people who work quiet closely together and
juggle their way through the regulatory jungle.“ Concerning procedures
there seems not to be one standardised bi-national way. When it comes
to decide which procedures are chosen a Dutch officer emphasizes in the
interview the importance of the person in charge: „What procedures are
leading, more or less depends of the division heads. The amount of
relative power/authority this person has will guide the choice for either
Dutch or German procedures.“ The problem of common procedures is
virulent for all branches but especially for logistics: „Regularly though,
we have to switch gears between the prescribed Dutch procedures and
the procedures originating from Germany, which – more often then not –
lie quiet far apart.“ But for some units there seems to be light at the end
of the tunnel: In May 2005 a section of the StSptBn was in midst of
introducing a NATO system in order to harmonise the two logistical
supply chains. The introduction of NATO SOPs is viewed as positive
and the personnel are looking forward to completing the process thus it
might further upgrade the interoperability and operational readiness of
the StSptBn.
81
In the CIS-Bn the maintenance and application of material seems to
fairly work out without larger deficiencies. Both sides make an effort to
treat each others material well. The main problem in this respect seems
to be that there exists the perception among Dutch and German soldiers
that the Dutch Army – perhaps due to lesser financial restrictions –
provides the better personal equipment to their soldiers and also provides the more up-to-date material to the CIS-Bn.
Limits for bi-national co-operation are found with adequate translations
of field manuals and contradicting national guidelines. A German NCO
stated: „One should start to think about common ‘regulations’. E. g,
concerning training on the obstacle course there are different regulations
in Germany than in the Netherlands. Which one is relevant for me?
Whose liability is it when something happens to me? This is only one
example but it applies on all fields of bi-national co-operation.“ On a
shooting range, e. g. different rules apply depending on the country the
bi-national soldiers are training in; this is in bi-national setting normal
but can be confusing for the individual soldier. Even though there are
official regulations for cases like the before mentioned one, they can
only be considered to be effective for bi-national co-operation as long as
they are well known. There seems to be a connection between the internal logics of national regulations and the practical outcomes they show.
One Dutch sergeant put it this way: „During exercises you often see a lot
of people putting effort in, but in opposite directions, and you see a lot
of national regulations that contradict each other.“ If differences in
national regulations that are used parallel would result in different standards of professionalism, which they might very well, the basis for the
establishment and development of professional trust would be hard to
achieve. The same Dutch sergeant emphasizes the importance of the
notion of professionalism: „For a newly arrived here, who wants to be
accepted, you have to show professionalism and a honest and open
attitude.“ This raises the question of the structures and standards of
professionalism.
Those common professional standards can be achieved through shared
drills & skills that only can develop in training and exercises, and common daily practices. The establishment of such common drills & skills
are not sustained through national practices within the respective sec82
tions and units: „During the exercise [Iron Sword 05] there will mainly
be Dutch procedures since the Dutch OpCo is leading. That will almost
certain conflict with German procedures and we will need different kind
of forms and documents.“ In order to establish common procedures the
staff level has to be highly competent in their basic skills as soldiers and
as well as professional staff personnel, because this is relevant to the
discharge of the primary task of any military organization. Therefore the
staff level has to share collective skills since it takes a team for evaluating and handling a new situation. In an integrated multinational setting
the staff soldiers from all nations involved must be familiar with the
relevant procedures of their common unit. A high level of collective
drills & skills can have further outcomes, as the following statement
should make clear: „There is not a constant corps spirit. It does exist
after, e. g. successful exercises though.“ In successful exercises you
learn from each other, change together and establish new common
procedures. Only under these preconditions a specific corps sprit can
develop. Not only due to structural reasons internal to the two contributing mother-organizations, i. e. the Dutch and the German Army, such a
bi-national corps spirit has to be constantly renewed.
Differences or similarities in personnel structure will also have an impact on commonly shared professional standards. The Dutch and the
German personnel structure appear to be quite different: „We also know
two totally different personnel structures. The Dutch are here for 3 years,
fill their pockets with the expatriate bonus and are off to another position. The Germans on the other hand are in the same position for 20
years and are impossible to get rid off when they perform badly.“ The
fact that there is a constant fluctuation of the personnel makes it difficult
to establish a bi-national continuity: „Due to the major changes in the
personnel every three years, there hardly is any continuity here. You can
start from scratch over and over again.“ It seems that a little more personnel continuity would be helpful for the further development of cohesion and commitment within 1 (GE/NL) Corps.
83
4.4
Social Cohesion and Affective Commitment
Feelings of most German soldiers towards the Dutch soldiers are
straightway positive, due to the collegial tone and little formalism in the
Dutch military culture. It is perceived that the Dutch soldiers are more
easygoing while they also have a higher ability of improvisation. Binational socialising outside of the barracks does not take place very
often and is of coincidental nature. German-Dutch friendships are rare
and togetherness is limited to service and function. In the CIS-Bn in
Eibergen/Netherlands there are several initiatives which aim at upgrading cohesion and cross-cultural understanding. The NCO-Club holds
meetings once a month in order to introduce newcomers and keep members informed about latest developments concerning the overall situation. This meeting is held during office hours and has a rather formal
character. Other than that, bi-national workshops were held in order to
emphasise teambuilding and a better understanding as well as cultural
awareness for the juxtaposed nation. These events were bi-nationally
initiated and are maintained by senior warrant officers of the battalion.
Many soldiers really like working for a multinational unit because of the
„special feel“ it sometimes gives. The case that 1 (GE/NL) Corps often
falls outside normal procedures makes things more demanding but also
more challenging for proactive soldiers. This special feel can be at the
same time highly contradictory, as one platoon commander stated: „My
boys do not have one good word for the corps. This negative attitude is
rather striking among the groups. But I sometimes see them busy with
their work and you can tell that they think it is pretty cool to do a lot of
things in English. Then there is also the blue beret and the NRF badge
which are among peers nothing special; but to the outside world that is
something they wear with pride.“ All in all on the tactical level of the
integrated battalions there appears to be a friendly disinterest among the
members of two nations. A Dutch sergeant: „I myself do not spend
social time with the Germans and none of my colleagues do. The contacts are good, but professional.“ On the small group level, though,
nationality does not seem to be very important for social cohesion. A
Dutch corporal: „What keeps me going is the small group that I work
with daily and my direct chef that does appreciate me.“ This statement
confirms the academic wisdom and common sense knowledge that there
84
can hardly be any social cohesion beyond the company level anyway, be
a national or bi-national unit. Social cohesion is often understood as a
kind of trustful feeling between individuals in a given context. We were
interest in the question whether people in 1 (GE/NL) Corps not felt that
they share bonds but what the practices are like. On most questions on
social cohesion the Dutch and the German answers were pretty similar.
Therefore we were puzzled to see clear differences on the following
questions.
Table 6: The members of my unit stand up for each other (answers in
per cent)
Strongly agree
Partially agree
Nether/nor
Partially disagree
Strongly disagree
Dutch
19.1
57.3
11.2
10.1
2.2
100
Germans
13.0
37.4
35.8
10.6
3.3
100
Total
15.6
45.8
25.5
10.4
2.8
100
Eta = .177
Table 7: The members of my unit are interested in what I think about
things (answers in per cent)
Strongly agree
Partially agree
Nether/nor
Partially disagree
Strongly disagree
Dutch
12.1
52.7
25.3
8.8
1.1
100
Germans
12.3
34.4
28.7
14.8
9.8
100
Total
12.2
42.3
27.2
12.2
6.1
100
Eta = .195
85
Table 8: The members of my unit are satisfied with each other (answers
in per cent)
Strongly agree
Partially agree
Nether/nor
Partially disagree
Strongly disagree
Dutch
7.9
55.1
24.7
12.4
.0
100
Germans
7.5
30.8
44.2
10.8
6.7
100
Total
7.7
41.1
35.9
11.5
3.8
100
Eta = .198
It seems that the Dutch soldiers are much more content with their direct
comrades at 1 (GE/NL) Corps than the German soldiers are. Interestingly the soldiers in Garderen responded in pretty much the same way as
their Dutch comrades in Münster and Eibergen. According to the quantitative data on social cohesion the most contented Dutch soldiers are to
be found in the HQ 1 (GE/NL) Corps. The same holds true for the
German soldiers of the HQ 1 (GE/NL) Corps.
Given that most German soldiers actually like the more relaxed and
friendlier leadership style of the Dutch Army one would have expected
the German soldiers to be more enthusiastic on matters of social cohesion. The answers might express the feeling of certain strangeness on the
German part with the more vivid but laid back attitude of this bi- and
multinational setting at 1 (GE/NL) Corps.
The construct of organisational commitment describes an over a longer
period of time established, basic and stable attitude towards the own
organisation (cf. Moser 1996). As mentioned above especially affective
commitment was in the focus of the quantitative survey. In order to find
out about its level in 1 (GE/NL) Corps, an item battery 7 with two negative and two positive statements concerning affective commitment was
used.
7
86
The four items were taken from Meyer & Allen (1997) and modified into military terminology.
The majority of Dutch and German members of 1 (GE/NL) Corps agree
that the corps has a personal meaning for them. The clear majority of
soldiers from both armies also agree that the have a strong sense of
belonging to 1 (GE/NL) Corps. Working in 1 (GE/NL) Corps is for one
half of the Dutch and German soldiers more than just a job. Interestingly
the structure of the answers on one specific question on affective commitment is quite different from the rest.
Table 9: I feel like „part of the family“ in 1 (GE/NL) Corps (answers in
per cent)
Strongly agree
Partially agree
Nether/nor
Partially disagree
Strongly disagree
Dutch
12.5
37.5
21.6
17.0
11.4
100
Germans
15.8
24.2
15.8
25.0
19.2
100
Total
14.4
29.8
18.3
21.6
15.9
100
Eta = .114
Although the German soldiers appear to be emotionally more distanced
towards the corps it may as well be possible that they simply do not
perceive the corps as warm and friendly as their Dutch comrades. Still,
the majority of Dutch and German soldiers do to nearly the same extent
not regret their decision to come to 1 (GE/NL) Corps.
Table 10: If I had to decide again to 1 (GE/NL) Corps, I would come ...
Strongly agree
Partially agree
Nether/nor
Partially disagree
Strongly disagree
Dutch
43.2
31.8
17.0
6.8
1.1
100
Germans
30.9
30.9
21.1
9.8
7.3
100
Total
36.0
31.3
19.4
8.5
4.7
100
Eta = .176
87
Affective commitment towards 1 (GE/NL) Corps appears to be on a
rather high level. It seems that the Dutch soldiers of 1 (GE/NL) Corps
feel more to be in their element than the German soldiers. This relative
difference might be due to the organisational climate of 1 (GE/NL)
Corps that looks as if it is closer to the climate of the Dutch Army than
of the German Army.
4.5
Task Cohesion
Achieving a common goal requires the collective efforts of the group.
Only groups that are composed of members who share a common goal
and who are motivated to co-ordinate their efforts as a team are able to
achieve such common goals. Beyond the pure will to be successful in
pursuing the set goals there must be trust in the group being able to
succeed. In a military context the need to trust in the professional capabilities needs to be even stronger than in a civilian context because
profession of arms involves the risk of getting injured and even killed.
Therefore it should seem evidently that trust in the professional skills
and work of the other member of one’s group is very important.
Table 11: The members of my unit trust each others work (answers in
per cent)
Strongly agree
Partially agree
Nether/nor
Partially disagree
Strongly disagree
Dutch
20.0
46.7
21.1
11.1
1.1
100
Germans
11.5
34.4
42.6
9.8
1.6
100
Total
15.1
39.6
33.5
10.4
1.4
100
Eta = .157
As it turns out Dutch and German soldiers of 1 (GE/NL) Corps have a
different perception concerning the level of professional trust within
their unit. The perceived feeling of trust in each others work within
one’s unit is on the German side clearly lower than on the Dutch side.
88
According to most interviewees there is an apparent difference concerning the level of bi-national task cohesion in and shortly after exercises
compared to „peacetime routine“. Successful combat units all around the
world therefore emphasize the need for constant training of collective
drills. The units of 1 (GE/NL) Corps find together on shared tasks and
the necessary skills. A Dutch NCO put it this way: „The main advantage
of bi-nationality is that you sometimes come to solutions that you normally never would have thought of. It is sometimes those small details
that seem to matter so much.“ He expresses a pragmatic but at the same
time very hopeful sight on bi-national togetherness. Also in the spirit of
the less emotional idea of task cohesion a German officer made the
following statement: „Getrennt marschieren, gemeinsam schlagen“
(marching separately, fighting together). Healthy bi-national cooperation within the military is based on such open-minded pragmatic
approaches.
5
Conclusion
A grand tattoo took place on the occasion of the leaving of Major General Celie from 1 (GE/NL) Corps, who also retired from active service.
The Commander of the Netherlands Armed Forces in Germany, who is
at the same time Deputy Commander of 1 (GE/NL) Corps, was honoured with the German Grand Tattoo („Zapfenstreich“) in June 2005 at
the Prince Claus Barracks. The Commander-in-Chief of the German
Army, Lieutenant General Hans-Otto Budde, acknowledged in his
speech Major General Marcel Celie’s meritorious service and his outstanding contribution to the co-operation of the Netherlands and German
Army.
Symbolic events like the above mentioned one are of utter importance
for bi- and multinational integration. They highlight the urge of appreciation of the partner and build bridges between the national traditions.
Such high level ceremonies also help to construct symbolic links between usually nationally defined armies.
On the echelon of the integrated battalions where the real bi-nationality
the platoon and company is lived and the corps’ HQ is far away the
89
more practical aspects of bi-nationality matter. The very progressive
approach of 1 (GE/NL) Corps to also practice integrated bi-nationality
outside the HQ can be considered a milestone in European integration.
The higher the wishes the harder reality appears to be. Though there
seems not be much space for emotional sameness between the members
of different military culture there is a lot of common ground when it
comes to peruse a commonly shared idea on the basis of collective
professional standards. In order for those standards to amalgamate it is
necessary the share is time as possible together and especially to establish collective drills & skills through permanent training.
Whereas there are still differences between the national and the military
cultures of the Netherlands and Germany there seems to be much common ground on the personal and professional level. The organisations of
the Dutch and the German Army show structural differences that often
make co-operation harder than the soldiers involved wish. Soldiers from
both nations experience their secondary socialisation within their organisations and they are coined through these experiences. Yet a lot of them
perceive being a member of an outstanding military formation like
1 (GE/NL) Corps to be a professional challenge. It does not look like
there is the easy way out of bi-national comradeship, with all its emotional notions, but rather that the pragmatic idealism of learning from
each other how to perform as professional soldiers without the dark side
national chauvinism for a better way of living together as European
citizens in uniform offers a lot of motivational aspects. The higher
military and political echelons have to make the way so that unnecessary
frictions between the members of one European military formation are
put aside. Personal and professional trust can only flourish when the
structures ameliorate and there is enough time given to establish common grounds. In the respect the 1 (GE/NL) Corps is on the borderline
between yesterday and tomorrow.
90
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95
Who is We?
Narratives Regarding Trust, Identity and Co-operation within
1 (GE/NL) Corps
Schelte van Ruiten
When asked for his evaluation of German-Netherlands co-operation
Lieutenant-General Celie, Second in command in the1 (GE/NL) Corps
till 2005, pointed at positive experiences and improved relationships in
the Headquarters where officers work together intensively. But, he
continued: „When I ask my driver the same question I will hear quite a
different story.“ In this chapter the author is asking the driver’s opinion.
The focus is on lower ranking servicemen stemming from the Netherlands Armed Forces. They work mostly in the Staff Support Battalion
and the Signals Battalion. These units support the headquarters. Statements from German soldiers and servicemen from other countries have
also been included in this chapter but the bulk of the data is Dutch. In
previous studies lower ranking Dutch servicemen were identified the
most negative group. For this reason this part of the study explores
narratives from this group and contrasts these narratives with those
working at the headquarters. The question that is brought to the fore
ventures into the possibility of a collective identity; hence the title „Who
is We?“.
1
Introduction and Research Question
Integrated multinationality within 1 (GE/NL) Corps has been a much
debated and studied topic within the NATO corps in Münster. Since
1995 a bi-national corps is established. The integrated Dutch-German
headquarter resides in Münster, under a periodically changing
Dutch/German command. Formation and development of this corps and
the bi-national co-operation has been monitored by the Netherlands
Defence Academy and the Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut der
Bundeswehr. Previous surveys were conducted in 1995, 1997 and 2000.
97
„True Love“, the title of the previous study, is illustrative for the entrancing image of this process of integration (Hagen/Klein/Moelker/
Soeters 2003). Grosso modo, the Germans and Dutch soldiers seem to
like each other and evaluate the collaboration between the soldiers from
the two nations as „positive“ or even „very positive“. It must be said
though that the Germans tend to like the Dutch more than vice versa.
Accountable for this skewed perspective will probably be the Dutch
Rank and File (lowest in rank) who seem to be the ones getting caught in
the trenches of negative stereotyping.
Only stains on this overall rather rosy picture is the inadequate collaboration during the deployment of the corps in a ISAF operation in Kabul
2002, where the co-operation was put to the test in a stressful and sometimes life-threatening situation. Probable cause is that the feeling of
equality came under pressure (Soeters/Moelker 2003). In the Münster
situation both parties were viewed as equally dominant by respondents
of the surveys. Whereas in The Kabul expedition, the Dutch were totally
outnumbered. The Germans played the dominant role in the operation
and had a greater say in operational issues. The Dutch felt dependent.
Furthermore, the population density of the camp caused a „crowding
effect“ and the stressful nature of the operation urged the soldiers of
different national backgrounds to „close ranks“. Ultimately the situation
led to newspaper articles quoting Dutch soldiers that „the Afghans are
not the problem, the Germans are (…)“ (Soeters/Moelker 2003). This
teaches us that although the collaboration in one German/Dutch –
1 (GE/NL) – corps is evaluated as very successful over the years; the
equilibrium reached is rather precarious. Fragile, when really put to the
test.
In the last years the corps more or less has lost its bi-national character
after being awarded with the „NATO High Readiness Forces Headquarters“ (HRF) status. Fifteen per cent of the staffing is now manned by
personnel from other NATO member states such as the United Kingdom, Greece, Italy, the United States, Norway, Turkey, etc.
Although there is an international diversified staff, the current workforce
of the corps is not really all that diverse. The German and Dutch people,
as neighbouring countries, share to a large extent a common back98
ground. Many norms, values and cognitive schemata’s are shared. According to Olie (1996): „For 90 per cent German and Dutch are alike and
for 10 per cent they are different.“ In the large-scale GLOBE research
(2002), Germany and the Netherlands are placed together in the „Germanic Europe cluster“ – together with Switzerland and Austria.
Hofstede’s (1980) cluster analysis on national value orientation on the
other hand places them in two distinct – though closely related – clusters. More than just by characteristics on value orientations, differences
and similarities, perceptions are also coloured by history (for instance
WWII), stereotypical predispositions and geographical proximity.
Comprising a workforce out of German and Dutch servicemen as opposed to multinational constitution might have the advantage that the
shared values and believes serve as a solid common ground to build
integration upon. Research suggests a seemingly universal human tendency to respond positively to similarity and negatively to dissimilarity
(Byrne 1999). We are attracted by people who have similar attitudes
because they confirm our norms and values and because they facilitate
communication with (similarity attraction hypothesis Newcomb 1965
and self categorization theory Turner 1982). More diversity – i. e. less
sameness – would frustrate integration and internal cohesion.
But, bi-nationality might also encourage polarization into two camps. Ingroup and out-group affiliation mechanisms might cause a more juxtaposed internal atmosphere than would be the case with higher diversity.
On one hand interactions between individuals with different norms and
perspective may create conflict and tension that might frustrate group
effectiveness. On the other hand, the creative tensions associated with
diversity may encourage mutual inspiration and facilitate learning.
„Diversity ensures richness of input that may facilitate creative and
innovative work outcomes.“ (Zee et al. 2004)
Over the last years, consensus seems to have risen that diverse and
multicultural groups are better equipped to deal with complex and creative tasks. The diversity enhances the breadth of perspective and overall
problem-solving capacity of the group. More and different viewpoints
are brought to bear on the task at hand. A study of Watsen (2003) even
99
shows that heterogeneous groups outperform homogeneous groups,
regardless of the task nature.
On the other hand, team members in homogeneous groups generally
report stronger affinity for their teams than members of heterogeneous
groups. So, through the shared conception of – and affect for – a team, a
team-member would be more inclined to contribute fully to the collective and thereby the team would be more successful.
An integration of these different perspectives is postulated by Earley and
Mosakowski (2000).
„Research has shown that both highly homogenous and highly heterogeneous teams tend to perform better than only moderately heterogeneous teams. In the instances of high heterogeneity, teams must develop a
common ground and sense of order before they can be productive. This
leads to an emergent culture within the group, called a hybrid.
Thus, researchers developed two major hypotheses. The first hypothesis
stated that, initially, teams that were homogenous in terms of the nationality of team members would outperform both highly and moderately
heterogeneous teams. It also stated that members of the homogenous
teams would report greater satisfaction with the team. Secondly, the
researchers hypothesized that a curvilinear relationship would eventually develop between heterogeneity and team performance, and satisfaction. The result would be an upright U-shaped curve, as teams moved
from homogenous to highly heterogeneous.
The studies by Earley and Mosakowski showed that the most heterogeneous teams consistently performed the most effectively over the long
term and reported the greatest amount of team member satisfaction.
They also demonstrated the emergence of a hybrid team culture based
on foundational groundwork in establishing rules of procedure and
development of relationships within the team. While homogenous teams
also performed well, mildly heterogeneous teams seemed to have diffi-
100
culties due to divisions created between subgroups in that team and lack
of communication between those subgroups.“ 1
The „power“ of homogeneous teams lies in the pre-existing commonalties among members, by which a unified team culture will form rather
quickly and with ease. Within highly heterogeneous teams there is a
total absence of these commonalties, people differ „a lot“ from each
other. But, given time – and opportunities for exchange and interactionan „own“ culture will develop and form the binding factor. On the
contrary, within moderately heterogeneous teams, subgroup-identities
will form the basis for the (absence of) team spirit and cohesion. There
are inter-group commonalties between subgroups in the team. As challenges or threats confront the team, members will retreat toward those
pre-existing subgroup identities for „ego protection“. Instead of forming
a unitary identity, the team divides into pre-existing subgroups, creating
a potential for relational conflicts (Earley/Mosakowski 2000). Following
this theory, more heterogeneity within the 1 (GE/NL) corps will improve
the performance.
In the aforementioned approach it is assumed that the teams with a
„strong“ team-culture will outperform the others. Shared expectations,
value systems and overlap in personal identities, combined with a vivid
„identifiable“ organizational identity, would be the key in building
productive co-operation.
Co-operation is the embodiment of integration. Integrating the „other“ as
part of your team, identifying with the „other“ and the team as a whole.
Voluntary collaboration is what builds successful co-operation. Therefore, I hypothesise, that identification processes lie at the very core of
successful integration and co-operation within multinational teams.
Furthermore, in building identification and integration, trust is an essential element. When integrating, adhering yourself to a larger collective,
you are giving some forms of control over to other actors. Thereby, you
acknowledge the mutual dependencies and you place yourself in a
1
Quoted from Amy Nelson, Synopsis of P. Christopher Earley and Elaine Mosakowski’s
„Creating Hybrid Team Cultures: An Empirical Test of Transnational Team Functioning“,
Kravis Leadership Institute, Leadership Review, Winter 2002.
101
vulnerable position to the action of others. Particularly in an occupation
where people execute tasks that may endanger their lives, as within the
army, a connection between trust and co-operation becomes extremely
salient: employees depend on each other, and non-co-operation between
soldiers may even cost lives (Kloet 2005)
Deliberating on the aforementioned the following research questions are
formulated:
•
How do members of the corps narrate about the success of cooperation and integration within the corps?
•
Is the corps succeeding in overcoming national differences and
integrating the different nationalities into one corps?
•
Does a supra-national organizational identity exist? Do the members
of the corps affiliate and identify with the corps as such, superseding
their national background?
•
How do trust-mechanisms play a role in co-operation and identification?
•
How do these stories differ for bi-national and multi-national
groups?
2
Methodology
The study reported here is predominantly a qualitative one. Participatory
observations and open interviews were the methods used to gain insight
in the world of the 1 (GE/NL) corps. There have been three moments of
data collection. Two days in the Münster Head Quarter, two days in the
Staff Support Battalion in Münster and a full day at the SIS battalion in
Eibergen. During those visits in-depth open interviews were conducted
with – in total – fifteen respondents. All interviews took about one hour.
Respondents were selected at random, apart from the consideration that
the total group largely had to represent a cross section of all the hierarchical layers within the corps.
102
A large scale questionnaire was set out in the organization at the same
time, in a joint effort of the Netherlands Defence Academy and the
Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut der Bundeswehr (N=223). Ten respondents were „multinationals“, military from countries other than Germany
of the Netherlands. Because of their small numbers no statistical inferences could be made regarding these multinationals. For this reason the
ten „multinationals“ were deleted from the data file.
3
Narratives
3.1
Stories on Co-operation and Integration
In general, the multinational co-operation within the corps is positively
evaluated by the respondents:
„I greatly appreciate the diversity of people within the unit and I think
we can learn a great deal from each other.“
„All in all the co-operation – as is normal – knows its ups and downs. It
greatly depends of the people you work with on a daily basis. We used to
be quite a tight bunch, but cohesion varies from time to time.“
„Co-operation here is generally very good. The Germans are (…) not
really that different from us at all.“
This view seems to be supported by data gathered through the questionnaires:
The question posed in 2005: „How sympathetic are you towards the fact
that you serve in a common corps together with soldiers from other
nations?“ is answered as „very positive“ by 46 % of the Dutch, 47 % of
the Germans. Respectively 34 % (NL) and 35 % (GE) evaluate this as
„positive“, so the vast majority of the respondents sees the multinational
corps as something positive (table 1). Compared to the study in the year
2000 the servicemen have developed into a positive direction.
103
Table 1: How sympathetic are you toward the fact that you serve in a
common corps together with soldiers from other nations?
Nation
Year
2000
2005
very positive
Positive
Neutral
Negative
Very negative
%
N
very positive
Positive
Neutral
Negative
%
N
Germany
Netherlands
15
43
38
3
2
100
718
47
35
16
2
100
122
17
49
32
2
0
100
331
46
34
19
1
100
91
Total
16
45
36
2
1
100
1049
46
35
17
2
100
213
chisq
Sig
NS
NS
Nevertheless, the feeling remains that the full potential of multinationality is not used to the full:
„‘Il pape e un contade sano piu del pape solo’ is an Italian saying that
states ‘the pope and the peasant know more than the pope alone’. In cooperation within the Headquarter, the Germans and the Dutch (as
dominant partners) could be called the pope, and the other participating
nations can be compared to the peasant. But the wider variety of perspectives could be more beneficial.“
„Bi-nationality in it self is a hollow phrase. It is something you should
yourself strive for in a sincere way on a every-day basis“ (…) „In the
end we make far too little use of all the advantages we could have from
this dual nationality. People have become stuck in their own way of
104
working. Through our tendency for routine we have become attached to
a certain way of working.“
In general, the respondents acclaim that they have grown to realize that
genuine „integrated multinationality“ is something they should invest in
each and every day.
„Real collaboration is broken or made on the inter personal level. It all
depends on individuals and you can’t force co-operation“ (…) and:
„Integration is something you should genuinely want and make a serious
effort for. For instance by not clinging together in those trusted
cliques.“
Also: „Bi-nationality is something you should actively pursue, not
something of purely political good intentions. But in practice, I hardly
see any support for it.“
The people with whom I talked often held a rather peculiar dualistic
approach to co-operation and integration. They all see „multinationality“
as something valuable, but some of them somehow found it hard to
reconcile themselves with the more practical spin off of the concept: the
„differences“ that are the consequence of heterogeneity.
The same respondent that stated „I greatly appreciate the diversity of
people within the unit and I think we can learn a great deal from each
other“ also said: „I was called to order in a totally improper manner by
a German superior. Minutes later I returned, flung open the door of his
office and threw in a dogs leash (...) ‘That’s the way you talk to an
animal, but not to me!’ (…) With that [he smiles] (…) I’ve set him
straight and he now knows how not to deal with us Dutch.“
According to some of the respondents integration remains something of
political good intentions on a macro level, it is not something that reflects on daily action. The categorical „otherness of others“ based on a
nationality-construct seems readily available.
„Those Germans are not in the position to order me anything. I will not
tolerate that. As soon as I got here I made that abundantly clear and
105
immediately put an end to that“ (…) and „they“ are wrenchingly categorized as „very different from us“.
This juxtaposed construct is mainly employed in Dutch/German (and
vice versa) relationships.
„It also has something to do with language and the relation between the
two country’s. It is very easy to say to an English lieutenant ‘good
morning Sir’, but somehow it feels very different for a Dutch soldier to
say to a German superior ‘Guten Tag Herr Oberstleutnant’ (…).“
Fortunately, also the much more moderate perspective on intercultural
differences is shared in stories: „There are differences between the
nationalities, but not on such a large scale that it would hamper cooperation“ (…) and: „I really like working with my Dutch colleagues,
the bi-nationality is a real added value.“
3.2
De-categorizing Out-Groups
Nevertheless, on a large scale, benefits can be drawn from moving away
from categorical out-group typifying and moving towards more piecemeal/individuating information processing.
In the quantitative part of this study, the question was posed whether
„the multinational collaboration within 1 (GE/NL) Corps has lead to the
lessening of prejudices towards the others?“ In 2005 this is answered by
26 % as „yes, a lot less“, 48 % as „yes, a little“, 16 % claim that it has
not changed a thing, whilst 10 % claim that it has only made prejudice
towards other nations stronger. (see column „total“ table 2) The variation in answers between the different nations, shows no significant
difference. In 2000 the same question is answered by 18 % as „yes, a lot
less“, 54 % as „yes, a little“, 24 % claim that it has not changed a thing,
whilst 3 % claimed that it only reinforced prejudice.
106
Table 2: In your opinion, did the multinational collaboration within
1 (GE/NL) Corps already lead to the lessening of prejudices
towards the others? (answers in per cent)
Nation
Year
2000 Yes, the collaboration
has led to a lot less
prejudice
Yes, the collaboration
has led to a little less
prejudice
No, collaboration has
changed nothing.
No, prejudices have
been reinforced
%
N
2005 Yes, the collaboration
has led to a lot less
prejudice
Yes, the collaboration
has led to a little less
prejudice
No, collaboration has
changed nothing.
No, prejudices have
been reinforced
%
N
Germany Netherlands
Total
17
20
18
55
54
54
25
23
24
3
3
3
100
661
100
301
100
962
26
26
26
47
49
48
19
12
16
8
12
10
100
121
100
89
100
210
chisq
Sig
NS
NS
„The Dutch that are stationed here are quite a close group, but they are
mainly internally focused. I do not know any of them, that socially see
German people or visit them at their house. I myself also do not have
any Dutch friends.“
107
„The social contacts here are quite good, but I must admit I hardly see
them outside duty hours. I sleep on the Prins Claus Kazerne. But, I chat
with my German colleagues on the work floor every now and again.“
In general, the contacts are called „good, but professional“.
This same conclusion is also provided by the questionnaires, since about
51 % of the respondent state that they have had „occasional“ contact
with soldiers from the other nations in their leisure time. Grossly 36 %
acclaim that they have had „totally none“ contact in their leisure time
(table 3). 13 % often had contacts in their leisure time. Comparing 2005
with previous years, it can be concluded that the number of leisure time
contacts is steadily increasing.
Table 3: Have you had contact with Dutch resp. German soldiers in
your leisure time? (answers in per cent)
Year
1997 Yes, often
yes, occasionally
Not at all
%
N
2000 Yes, often
yes, occasionally
Not at all
%
N
2005 Yes, often
yes, occasionally
Not at all
%
N
chiTotal sq
Netherlands
Sig
7
5
28
23
**
65
72
100
100
Nation
Germany
3
16
81
100
5
23
73
100
16
36
48
100
8
27
65
100
14
51
35
100
12
51
37
100
13
51
36
100
108
**
NS
The focus is predominantly within the own group and especially on a
social level the clear fault lines are drawn between the nations:
„We have our own bar. The BBT-bar. We never see any Germans there.
They also have their own place, the Heimbetrieb, but this probably is not
so much fun. It’s also closed at nights“ (…) and: „That is where all the
Dutch are. Beers only cost 25 cents. It is of course not prohibited for
Germans to come in and have a beer, but I have never seen a German
enter.“
„Internally we really have a German club and a Dutch club. People that
sleep over, at the barracks, stick together with their own nationalities.“
Even when the accommodation is not nationally organized, but shared,
people tend to uphold divisions along national lines.
„We do have bi-national quarters here (…) In my hallway we are with
20 Dutch and 2 Germans. We [Dutch] took possession of the living
room, but the Germans don’t seem to mind. They never come sit with us,
but always go to a German living room on a other floor.“
In an office visited, the smoking room downstairs was confiscated by the
Dutch, whilst the coffee room upstairs was „German-territory“.
„You still see that a full integration between the nationalities is not
present. During lunch breaks everybody sticks to their own [nationality].
Also, for instance, this meeting I attended lately. Around the big table
there was free seating. Within minutes the room was divided in a Dutch
and a German side. Our group is too small to close ranks, so we dangle
in-between.“
Integration seems something that, as a concept, is valued positively but
somewhat remains something that must be done by „others“ or through
official means.
„As we speak, section 1 is out on a team-building exercise (...) Why
don’t they just start with drinking coffee together in the morning!? In
this building the custom has developed that the coffee chamber down109
stairs is occupied by the Dutch, while all the Germans get their coffee in
the kitchen upstairs. How is that for teambuilding?“
Noteworthy exception on this approach is the „new“ commander at the
Staff Support Battalion. Who, according to many respondents: „makes
the positive bi-national attitude the leading ground rule“ (…) „really
genuinely wants to work bi-national, puts in the effort and functions as a
leading example.“
Although the corps as a whole nowadays is multinational, the organization, typically, is rendered as a „Dutch-German-affair“. In the lower
echelons of the organization the respondents perceive themselves as part
of a bi-national organization, which – in effect – they also are on a
battalion level. Nevertheless, also in Head Quarters, the Dutch-Germandichotomy has a strong pervasiveness.
„Against the GE/NL majority we, other participants, do not have much
to say. In the highest positions of the organisation, the ‘other participating nations’ are not represented. The Germans and the Dutch have the
tendency to be not very open minded. An real open exchange of views
does not takes place“ (…) and: „It is quite clear that there are two
distinct pillars (GE and NL). In both pillars there are parallel efforts
that are not always harmonizing and sometimes even really conflicting,
due to different agenda’s. They are not always ‘in tune’.“
„The Dutch pillar is the ‘Oranje bar establishment’. From there you can
see rumours developing and carry into HQ. The Germans also have
informal lines that function in similar manner (…) thereby, levels of
information vary throughout the organization. The other participating
nations get news on a rumour basis, instead of through more formal
communication lines (…) Sometimes you hear things from the ‘Oranjebar-lines’ that is not always in sync with the information stemming from
the German channels. It is not until much later that you will hear about
the real decision that eventually is taken, through more formal channels.“
110
All in all, according to some of the respondents, Dutch and Germans are
the dominant parties in the corps. For some hardly surprising: „For in
the end, who pays the pipe calls the tune.“
4
Foundations for Otherness
4.1
Procedures
Strongest leverage for the distinctiveness – or otherness – of others is
provided by the variation in rules, procedures and legislation. „Juggling
your way through the administrative jungle“ is even seen by most of the
respondents as one of the biggest day to day challenges, faced within the
Corps. This view is slightly different for the Head Quarter (HQ) compared with the Staff Support battalions. Within the HQ, more and more
uniform (NATO-based) procedures are at place (…) „Overcoming
differences by uniform procedures.“ (…) At the lower echelons of the
organization, the work procedures lean more heavily on legislation
originating from the national pillars.
„We have German, Dutch AND NATO procedures working here. They
sometimes simply don’t match.“
„The first year I worked here, the way things were done surprised me.
Finding my way round and learning how to arrange things was an
immense job. You have to observe a lot in the beginning. Be sensitive for
the existing power structures and relationships and double check everything they tell you. Sometimes the people that tell you ‘how to work
things’ are just telling you nonsense since they themselves also don’t
know how it works.“
„What procedures are leading, more or less depends of the division
heads. The amount of relative power authority this person has, will
guide the choice for either Dutch or German procedures (…) Planning
and execution on a battalion level is predominantly Dutch oriented. On
a company level this is mostly German oriented.“
111
„The formal lines procedures now and then takes are dazzling. For
instance a Dutch superior is not allowed to punish a German subordinate. Who is under jurisdiction from who?“
These differences in rules are a major pitfall in co-operation and stand in
the way of providing unity and cohesion within the corps: „On paper I
have one battalion at my request for maintenance of vehicles. In reality I
have 4 battalions. One German and a Dutch battalion here in Münster
and a German and a Dutch battalion in Eibergen.“
But, on the other hand, exactly this is what some people see as a unique
feature of working for a multinational Head Quarter: „The integration of
all the different protocols is what makes work here so much fun.“
4.2
Military Culture
Also eliciting otherness within the corps are the different military cultures:
„The German and Dutch military cultures simply don’t fit together. This
mainly is because the German army is used to conscript soldiers and
they – therefore – have a much more authoritarian culture.“
„What we [the Dutch] see as joviality can also be perceived as rude [by
the Germans]. But, to be honest, we Dutch also make deliberate use of it.
It is tolerated/accepted from us Dutch to directly step up to your superior. They tolerate (and perhaps sometimes even expect) behaviour from
us they wouldn’t tolerate from a German in the same position.“
„The reaction of the Dutch to this [authoritarian] culture more or less is:
‘bugger off, I’ll do things my way with my own Dutch friends’.“
These views are much more mitigated, the higher in hierarchy you come.
The construct „they are so very different from us“ is most readily employed in the bi-national part of the organisation (i. e. the Staff Support
Battalion and the Systems Battalion). The heightened heterogeneity
within the multinational HQ cushions this effect considerably:
112
„You come across different mentalities here in Münster, but all in all I
don’t think working with Germans is any different from working with
Dutch people. As long as you keep account for their strictness and more
hierarchical approach. We Dutch tend to do things outside of set rules
and functions. Germans play it more by the book.“
„At first sight it might look like a bit of a hassle, the way Germans
conduct their regulatory matters, but in the end they are quite relaxed
about it. You just have to play it a bit by their rules. Once you get the
hang of the system it is not all that bad.“
„Differences in cultures is not something you should want to change, but
rather something you should get used to. Learn to accept from each
other.“ (…) „the eventual goal at which they all strive for, very often is
the same. It’s just the way they think they can achieve it which differs.“
„We try to work together for better and worse. We all try to achieve a
result that we can be proud of, and that is what makes the difference. We
have to do it together and extreme ‘Dutch’ and extreme ‘German’
behaviour will level itself out in the end.“
4.3
Language
Although the official language within the corps is English, the proficiency in this language, in a vast part of the corps could be improved.
This is experienced as a barrier for co-operation.
Especially in the Staff Support Battalion: „Everyday practice is that on
a informal level the Dutch adjust to the Germans and start speaking
their language, whilst on a more formal level people usually try to speak
English.“
Noteworthy is the growth of percentage German-Russians in the battalions Who, apart from a low proficiency in English, also have only a very
basic knowledge of the German language.
113
„The contact with the colleagues is almost always in German. Also in
the HQ, it is just the way it works. It is the easiest way to get things done
around here.“
„When working with Germans I immediately start talking German. Just
to prevent myself from the hassle of having to say the same thing twice.“
Within HQ, proficiency in English is much higher. Nevertheless, people
tend to resort to their native language rather often in interaction:
„Germans and Dutch in day to day contact still speak their own language. It is not so much a problem for me that people speak their own
language during lunch breaks, but what really bothers me are those
quick-interactions that you miss out on. This is especially frustrating
when you are in a stressful situation, for instance in ‘combat-mode’
during an exercises. It is not conducive for us [other participating
nations] not knowing the full picture all the time and not obtaining full
operational awareness. Nevertheless it is not a malicious thing. It is not
an active pursuit to exclude anyone. If they need me to do something,
they will eventually tell me. But, as I said, I sometimes miss out on the
whole picture.“
4.4
Pride in Membership
The feeling of „being part of something special“, through membership
of the corps, is vivid in several layers of the organization. „The HQ often
falls outside normal procedures. We are doing things here that you
cannot do anywhere else. For instance the budgets with which we can
work are immense“ and: „We also often fall outside normal procedures.
We are doing groundbreaking activities here.“
„Working here is something I have never experienced before. Incomparable with other places I have been. Within this bigger NATO picture us
Dutch are merely a smaller part of things and I get the chance to work
together with a variety of nationalities.“
114
The diversity of nationalities within the corps is on the one hand „foundation for otherness“, but at the same time it also provides leverage for
the ‘special feeling’ attached with group membership:
„(…) we are special here. Nowhere in the world do corporals work
together like this on a corporal level (…) this diversity is something
special and I wear this beret with pride.“
„My boys usually do not have one good word for the corps. This negative attitude is rather striking amongst the groups (…) But, I sometimes
see them busy with their work and you can just tell that they think it is
pretty cool to do a lot of stuff in English (…) also the blue beret and the
NRF badge (...) amongst peers it is nothing special, but – to the outside
world – it is something they are proud off.“
A more personal „pride in the job“ is provided by the feeling of mastery,
or ability to handle the daily challenges, provided by the necessity to
find your „own way round complex regulations and challenges for
which there are no standard answers“.
„What makes working here really special is the chaos. Everyday is
different. We sometimes come to solutions that you normally never
would have thought of. It is sometimes those small details that seem to
matter so much.“
Especially after (successful) exercises, the feeling persist that „we pulled
it off with each other, no matter how difficult ‘they’ [HQ] made it for us
(...) we did it again“.
Status is derived from the prestige of the Head Quarter and the felt
successes of working in a challenging, complex, environment with,
sometimes, difficult tasks. Nevertheless, a „esprit the corps“ can not be
said to be present in full extent.
„Yes, I do think I am proud, but mainly about the way I built up the
logistics here. Sometimes it is also just something I do for a living. A job
like any other. Pride is not prominent in the battalion. Not that strong as
for instance in armoured infantry or combat units. There is not a con115
stant corps spirit. It does however exist after for instance successful
exercises.“
Pride of membership and the „sense of belonging“ also have been questioned in the survey.
Around 14 % of the 208 respondents „strongly agree“ with the statement
„I feel like ‘part of the family’ in 1 (GE/NL) Corps“. 30 % „partly
agree“. 18 % choose a neutral position, whilst about 22 % „partly disagree“ and 16 % „strongly disagree“ with the statement (see table 4). All
in all, the central tendency is towards being „in the family of the corps“.
Table 4: I feel like „part of the family“ in 1 (GE/NL) Corps. (answers in
per cent)
Total
chisq
Sig
14
30
18
22
16
100
208
NS
Nation
Year
2005 Strongly agree
Partially agree
Neither / nor
Partially disagree
Strongly disagree
%
N
Germany Netherlands
16
24
16
25
19
100
120
13
38
22
17
11
100
88
Working within the corps can also be called „just a job like any other“.
13 % of the respondents agree to this, 21 % also does so, but partly.
16 % choose the in-between position, 29 % partly disagree and 21 %
disagree fully. The Dutch seem to think (a bit more) that it is „just a
job“, while the Germans slightly disagree with this statement. But the
differences are not significant (see table 5). The general feeling is, just
like in the „I-feel-part-of-the-family“ question, on the „it-is-more-thanjust-a-job“ side. This feeling is counterbalanced though by a rather
substantial minority that is inclined to approach it more from a rational
point of view.
116
Table 5: Working in 1 (GE/NL) Corps is just a job for me. (answers in
per cent)
Total
chisq
Sig
13
21
16
29
21
100
214
NS
Nation
Year
2005 Strongly agree
Partially agree
Neither / nor
Partially disagree
Strongly disagree
%
N
Germany
Netherlands
12
19
17
29
23
100
124
13
24
16
29
18
100
90
Largely the same tendency can be seen when evaluating the statement
„1 (GE/NL) Corps has no personal meaning to me“. 22 % to agree with
this. Another 22 % is neutral. 56 % is disagreeing (see table 6).
Table 6: 1 (GE/NL) Corps has no personal meaning to me. (answers in
per cent)
Year
2005 Strongly agree
Partially agree
Neither / nor
Partially disagree
Strongly disagree
%
N
Nation
Germany Netherlands
12
7
9
17
26
17
21
29
31
30
100
100
121
89
Total
chisq
Sig
10
12
22
25
31
100
210
NS
Grossly 16 % has „a strong sense of belonging to 1 (GE/NL) Corps“. A
statement with which 31 % of the respondents „partly agree“, the Dutch
more than the Germans (37 % vs. 27 %). About 28 % of all respondents
117
take a neutral stance. 15 % „partly agree“ versus about a 10 % that
„strongly agree“ (see table 7).
Table 7: I feel a strong sense of belonging to 1 (GE/NL) Corps. (answers in per cent)
Year
2005 Strongly agree
Partially agree
Neither / nor
Partially disagree
Strongly disagree
%
N
Nation
Germany Netherlands
17
15
27
37
29
26
17
13
11
9
100
100
121
89
Total
chisq
Sig
16
31
28
15
10
100
210
NS
It can be said that there is a „sense of attachment“ to the corps. People
seem to do feel an emotional connection towards the organisation.
Nevertheless, a large group does not have these „family-feelings“. There
is no significant difference in these attitudes between the Dutch and the
Germans.
4.5
Stories on Trust
Most of the direct references to trust, in the interviews, were framed
around the more calculus and deterrence based trust mechanisms:
The importance of a „honest division of labour“, which refers to the fear
of contributing relatively too much to the collective, is stipulated by
several respondents. „Especially during an exercise you see al lot of
people absolutely doing nothing and a few shoulders who pull all the
load“ (…) and: „I do not have a negative attitude towards Germans at
all, but if I resent one thing it is the easiness with which they sometimes
leave all the work for us“ (…) and: „I do not trust the Dutch. All the
work always seems to land on our shoulders. I always try to be of help
118
and co-operate, but get kicked back time and time again. They run off
with your work and take the credits for it and always play the ‘rank’
card.“
Through the differences in (military) culture it is more difficult for trust
based on a category-presumption to be invoked. „I do trust my German
colleagues. The trust I feel towards my Dutch colleagues is far less. This
is quite natural, it is normal to be more trustworthy to people that speak
your own language.“
On the one hand, the inclination of the Germans to be „more formal and
play it more by the rules“ leads to the impression [according to some
Dutch] of the Germans being reserved: „Placing yourself in a vulnerable position is also something typically not-done in German culture.“
On the other hand, the „jovial“ and more direct approach, that is held
high in the Dutch camp, is sometimes considered by the Germans as
„respectless“. Both types of conduct are not in line with expectations
and therefore it prevents that specific base of trust to flourish.
This, together with behaviour „not worthy of a soldier“ (within a cultural
perspective), and differences in regulation, makes the categorical otherness of „them“ more profound:
„In the Afghanistan deployment, the Germans were allowed to drink as
much as they liked – and did so on a large scale. While we had to obey
the ‘two-can-rule’. One night an officer waggled into our tent, utterly
drunk and fell down on his bed (…) When there is a bomb attack and I
have the choice to save either a German or a Dutch soldier. I will immediately choose the Dutch guy. I think a German colleague would do the
same, or would be too drunk to do anything.“
„During the Norway exercise you will clearly see how all the work will
be done by only a few people. Furthermore there will be people that,
during a weekend break, will go out of camp, drink beer and hang out in
bars, wearing civilian clothes. There will be a clear division between
Germans and Dutch all over in the camp. The officers will probably
sleep in luxury hotels while we, the workforce, get to stay in tents.“
119
Although in 1995, the mutual ties between the Netherlands and Germany
within the 1 (GE/NL) corps were formalised by establishing the corps,
and through the NATO agreement multilateral co-operation is an institution. Not all the respondents are fully convinced that placed trust, on the
premises of that institution, will be safeguarded in moments of crisis.
„Suppose that during a combat military operation, a German and a
Dutch platoon are deployed next to each other. And suppose the Dutch
or the German platoon is attacked. Do you think the Germans/Dutch
would come to aid to the Dutch/Germans?“
67 % of the Dutch think the „Germans will help“, 29 % think „it is
probable that the Germans would help“, 4 % of the Dutch think it is
„probable that they will not be helped by the Germans“. If this question
is framed the other way round and the question is whether „(...) the
Dutch would come to aid to the Germans?“ we find approximately the
same level of trust. 62 % of the Germans trust the Dutch to come to the
rescue when in need, 25 % think it „probably“ that the Dutch would
help. 9 % of the Germans think the Dutch will not come to their aid. (see
table 8).
120
Table 8: Suppose the Dutch or the German platoon is attacked. Do you
think the Dutch resp. the Germans would come to the aid the
other? (answers in per cent)
Year
1995
1997
2000
2005
They would help
Very probable
I do not think it
very probable
It seems improbable
%
N
They would help
Very probable
I do not think it
very probable
It seems improbable
%
N
They would help
Very probable
I do not think it
very probable
It seems improbable
%
N
They would help
Very probable
I do not think it
very probable
It seems improbable
%
N
Nation
NetherGermany
lands
56
54
38
43
Total
55
40
3
1
2
3
100
779
54
39
1
100
622
47
48
2
100
140
50
44
6
3
4
1
100
522
52
43
2
100
675
57
40
2
100
119
53
42
4
2
3
1
100
698
65
26
1
100
312
67
29
1
100
1010
66
27
6
4
5
3
100
109
100
82
2
100
191
chisq
Sig
*
**
NS
NS
121
(Remark: The percentages differ from those mentioned in chapter two;
in this table „nation“ is the independent variable and the columns for
nation are set at 100 %)
From table 8 we learn that circa sixty to seventy per cent of the respondents will, willingly, put themselves at risk for „the collective“ and will
make an active attempt to safeguard the institutional „we“. Grossly
about the same percentage thinks the partner in the trust-relationship will
do the same. Over time the per cent trust in the other nation has become
higher.
4.6
Identification Based Trust: Redefining the „We“
As mentioned before, the „us-them“ construct based on nationality is
most readily available. All the respondents firstly deliberated on how
nationalities found it – sometimes difficult – to co-operate. Thereby
employing the nationality aggregate and not the co-operation between,
for instance, different functional departments. This functional aggregate
is only vivid in second instance, between „us“ from Staff Support
against „them“ from HQ, but not vice versa.
The feeling that the save hedges of the „nationality-based-we“ are put to
question does persist. The sense that different levels of „we“ are at hand
is pervasive.
„The continuous switching between different procedures is sometimes
very difficult and I have the feeling to be drifting away from my Dutch
procedures. My knowledge on Dutch regulations is not anymore up to
date. This is sometimes difficult when I apply for something in Holland, I
am for too long ‘out of that system’. I am not fully adjusted to either of
both regulatory systems, which is sometimes quite frustrating.“
„Our unit is very low on the priority list concerning the assignment of
equipment [by the Dutch ministry of defence]. Despite our NRF and
HRF-HQ status. For example: they also skipped us with the latest distribution of clothing sets (…) We often remain the separate part of the
army. From the Netherlands they look at the Dutch section and quite
122
often forget us. DIDO, the new software system for declaration of travel
expenses. Works everywhere except here (...)“
„On the one side we have the NATO élan here, but at the same time this
is held back by Dutch and German restraints.“
There is a feeling of drifting away from old certainties and being asked
to reconsider what you always saw as valid: „It also has something to do
with fear. You know your own rules and procedures. That is how you
have been brought up. When you are in unknown territory and feel
insecure, you try to fall back on certainties.“
„We have an international HQ with many national procedures and
regulations and functions that are purely national oriented, which is a
rather strange position. We have Dutch trucks and German trucks and
some bi-national material, but mainly all is based on the two countries.
It would be much easier to make all thing international, but then we
[Dutch] would loose all grip on things.“
The sentiment „I am not giving away ‘my’ [either Dutch or German]
material“ does exists. „That the Dutch place more emphasize on the
importance of bi-nationality, is also a trick of them. They are of course
the minority.“
There appears to be a fear of „losing grip“ and reluctance to integrate in
a larger, newly defined, „we“; out of preservational concerns for selfworth and self-image.
„The Dutch seem to suffer from a ‘complex of inferiority’ [although, the
respondent says, this might be a too strong term]. To overcome this, the
Dutch try to assert their own ideas and ways of working – be protective
for their own procedures. There are often discussions on the way you
should do things. To others [i. e. other participating nations] it is sometimes rather embarrassing to witness this.“
This basically is the trust dilemma in full effect. Being asked to place
yourself in a vulnerable position, give up own certainties and contribute
to the collective without guarantees that actions will be reciprocated.
123
The higher in the hierarchy you come, the broader the scope of the
respondents tends to be. This is all in all quite natural, considering the
level of education, responsibilities, tasks and availability of information
that grows incrementally with every step up in rank.
Sometimes respondents referred to the phenomenon of keeping ranks
closed. Several respondents recall incidents were „people tend to support other colleagues from their own nationality no matter what, in
moments of stress or in arguments“.
„On the lower levels there are just the ‘soldiers’ and not something
‘multi- or bi-national’“ (…) „Within a platoon the scope is predominantly within the own group. Anything outside is considered ‘different’.
But this also holds true in the army for other functional areas. For
instance infantry vs. cavalry.“
The people within the battalions deliberate on the „great gap there is
between the people of the HQ and us, the ‘workforce’“.
By the balance in power and the great distance in rank, between HQ and
the Staffsupport Battalions some people have the feeling that: „HQ are
‘the difficult men’ who harass us with orders. Us from the staff support
are meaningless for them.“
Which, in itself, has an effect on in-group cohesion within the battalions:
„But once we are in action as a team and are independent from others,
we can do our own thing. Then, everything comes all right. We always
get the job done“ [platoon level] (…) and: „It is something that binds us
together. under difficult circumstances, with hardly any supports; we –
as an unit – always pull through and get the job done.“
124
5
Conclusions
Even though German soldiers and multinationals were interviewed as
well, in this chapter the focus predominantly is on lower ranking Dutch
servicemen. This restriction was a deliberate choice. We already knew
from previous studies that we would find the most negative category of
soldiers among these lower ranking Dutchmen. These illustrations serve
the point that the problem of a biased perspective on work relationships
is mainly a Dutch problem. Quotations of German soldiers are presented
in the appendix of this chapter in order to compensate for the German
side of the story.
The co-operation is successful – within the limits of it’s natural ups and
downs – and – for as far as it is my prerogative to judge this – the operational and cultural compatibility between the two nations seems to be no
obstacle for co-operation in a HRF or NRF. However, a ‘redefinition of
the we’ has not taken place. There is reluctance regarding the acceptance
of a collective identity. This reluctance, through resolving the fault lines
that are drawn between the nations, is the trust-dilemma at large.
The willingness to accept vulnerability and contribute to the collective is
the key in this process for the 1 (GE/NL) Corps. Deterrence bases for
trust are not equipped to deal with processes of this altitude, for the
gains and losses at stake, in the end, far surpass transactional deliberation. Furthermore, the decision is too pivotal to be discarded from the
point of view of a benevolent character.
Only by supplanting the nationality based „we“, with a strong identifiable supranational identity, can the fear of „losing grip“ be impeded, and
assimilation in a larger collective (e. g. „the leap of faith“ on the premises of identification based trust) be facilitated.
Membership of the 1 (GE/NL) Corps does not provide enough leverage
for this identification to be endorsed.
On an absolute notion: it is difficult to say whether the percentages of
perceived, and intended trustworthiness – reported in the question
„would the Dutch and Germans help each other when in need?“ – are
125
high or low, since we miss out on a referent-group (i. e. „normal“ situation).
Nevertheless, as I stated before, the ability to „blindly trust your comrades during employment“ is crucial in life-threatening-war-situations.
The percentages that were found: the number of people that state that
they doubt whether they would help – or will be helped, give me reason
to believe that the boundaries of „comradeship“ are not inclusive for
platoons from another national background, within the corps.
But why does it seems so difficult for two groups, who at first sight have
so much in common, to overcome the differences that do exist?
One remark, made by a respondent, haunted my mind for quite some
time. It seemed such a true observation. „We are very much alike [i. e.
the Dutch and Germans], but that is exactly why all the differences that
do exist, are under the magnifying glass.“
This can be explained by what Freud (1917) has called „the narcissism
of the little differences“. This theorizes on how we feel threatened not
by: „the other“ with whom we have little in common – but by the
„nearly-we“, who is very much the same, and mirrors and reflects us.
„We reserve our most virulent emotions towards those who resemble us
the most.“ Others are not so much threatening when they are radically
different from me. But, the more „the other“ resembles me, the more I
will stipulate „my identity“ to be very different from – and unique of –
the other. Thereby, inflating the otherness of others. The more these
(small) differences are enlarged, the easier it is to distinguish yourself
from out-groups and therewith enhance your own self-worth and selfesteem. This is of course the perfect refuge when the very image of self
is under pressure – e. g. is being challenged.
In the case of the 1 (GE/NL) Corps people do feel the question to redefine themselves, or, at the least, re-evaluate old certainties and existing
group memberships. Since the corps does not provide enough leverage
for identification with a supranational „we“, people tend to resort to selfpreservation mechanisms in this uncertain environment, and – therewith
– obstruct full integration.
126
The finding, and the stories people tell, seem to support the hypothesis
of Earley and Mosakowski (2000) who propose an upright U-shaped
relationship between team heterogeneity and effectiveness. That is,
given enough time to work together, homogeneous and highly heterogeneous teams will be more effective than moderately heterogeneous ones.
A much more moderate view on „difficulties of integration“ is found in
the more heterogeneous Head Quarter. Nevertheless, it is possible that
these findings are moderated by the higher level of education of the staff
of HQ and the (generally) higher proficiency in English.
References
Earley, P. Ch./Mosakowski, E. (2000). Creating Hybrid Team Cultures:
An Empirical Test of Transnational Team Functioning. Academy of
Management Journal, February 2000, 26–49.
Freud, S. (1917). On Narcissism – The Standard Edition of the Complete
Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, eds. James Strachey,
Hogarth Press, London, vol. XV, 158.
Hofstede, G. (1980). Culture’s consequences: International differences
in work-related values. Beverly Hills, Cal. – London: Sage.
Kloet, van der, I. (2005). A soldierly perspective on Trust. A study into
Trust within the Royal Netherlands Army. Ph. D. Thesis. Tilburg
University.
Nelson, A. (2002). Synopsis of P. Christopher Earley and Elaine Mosakowski’s ‘Creating Hybrid Team Cultures: An Empirical Test of
Transnational Team Functioning’. Kravis Leadership Institute Leadership Review, Winter 2002.
Olie, R. (1996). European Trans-National mergers. Ph. D. Thesis. University of Limburg. Maastricht.
127
Watsen, W./Kumar, K./Michaelson, L. (1993). Cultural diversity’s
impact on interaction process and performance. Comparing homogeneous and diverse task groups. Academy of Management Journal,
36: 3, 590–602.
Zee, van der, K./Atsma, N./Brodbeck, F. (2004). The influence of social
identity and personality on outcomes of cultural diversity in teams.
Journal of cross-cultural psychology, 35: 3, May 2004, 283–303.
Appendix: quotations illustrating the German side of the story
„Binationalität wird im I. D/NL Korps meistens wie folgt ausgelegt: Für
die Arbeit sind die deutschen Soldaten zuständig und für das Feiern sind
die niederländischen Soldaten da. Obwohl ich ein Befürworter von
Binationalität bin, sieht man immer wieder das oben geschilderte Bild.
Binationalität ist für Holländer meistens dann, wenn für sie was Positives herausspringt. Wenn es negativ ist, macht es lieber der deutsche
Soldat. Ich spreche hier nicht von allen niederländischen Kameraden.“
„Man sollte mal wieder versuchen herauszufinden, was der linke bzw.
rechte Nachbar tut, damit man sich doppelte Arbeit und Zeit spart.“
„Ich denke, dass das Disziplinarrecht schnellstens abgeglichen werden
sollte.“
„Man sollte sich mal über gemeinsame ‘Vorschriften’ Gedanken machen. Zum Beispiel: Für das Begehen der Hindernisbahn gibt es in
Deutschland andere Vorschriften als in den Niederlanden. Welche gilt
jetzt für mich? Wer haftet, wenn etwas passiert? Dies ist nur ein Beispiel
und trifft in fast allen Bereichen der binationalen Zusammenarbeit zu!“
„Es wird immer Probleme geben, da es zwei verschiedene Nationen
sind. Versucht man die Probleme zu lösen durch Änderungen, so träten
andere wieder auf. Ich denke es wäre besser, nur die Richtung der
Binationalität vorzugeben und dann flexibel zu sein, sonst beruhen
manche wieder auf den Befehlen und Vorschriften. Einfach = Entscheidung Chef, wenn es mal nicht anders geht.“
128
„Zu viele Dienstgrade. Mannschaften (Zeitsoldaten) werden teils wie
Rekruten behandelt. Viele können kein Englisch.“
„In gewisser Hinsicht aber fehlen die Eigenschaften einer NATOEinheit.“
„Negativ: Das diverse Fw, OFw, HFw, SFw, Adj (...) beim Bn-Grillen
über ‘arbeitende’, merke ARBEITENDE Kameraden herziehen, sich
köstlich kranklachen und einfach eine (…) Einstellung zur Kameradschaft haben! Ich bedanke mich bei den Superkameraden für so viel
Humor!“
„Was ich bei den Holländern beneide, ist die Ausgeglichenheit Sachen
anzugehen. Auch der Führungsstil ist viel kooperativer als bei uns. Auch
könnten sich die Deutschen eine Scheibe vom Sozialsystem der Holländer abschneiden, z. B. ärztliche Versorgung, Betreuung der Soldaten,
Vertrauen schenken. Ich schätze die Holländer (Armee) sind uns einige
Jahre voraus.“
129
Smooth and Strained International Military Co-operation 1
Joseph L. Soeters, Delphine Resteigne, Rene Moelker and Philippe
Manigart
1
Abstract
The nature of today’s military operations nearly always forces national
armed forces to collaborate. Continuous budget cuts have decreased
armed forces’ resources worldwide, which further pushes almost all
national militaries to work together in operations. In addition, the need
for legitimacy urges national militaries to seek support from others when
engaging in operations abroad. As such, the military finds itself in the
same position as internationalising business firms. This article examines
the successes and failures of international military action. It analyses
three recent operations in Kabul, Afghanistan, two of which ended less
successfully, whereas the third one still runs fairly smoothly. Using
existing literature on co-operation in (international) organizations, the
article seeks to explain these different outcomes and points at six determinants explaining the differences between the three operations. At the
end, we discuss the implications for the organizational set-up of future
international military operations.
2
Introduction
At the beginning of the twentieth century, rebellious groups, called the
Boxers, attacked the foreign community as well as thousands of converted Christian Chinese people in the city of Beijing (Preston 2002).
The foreign community consisted of a variety of nationalities, among
which Americans, British, Australians, Russians, Germans, French,
Italians, Austrians and Japanese. They were diplomats, tradesmen,
military men, journalists and their families. The fights were severe: there
1
This research is supported by a long term research contract of the Belgian Defense Ministry
(contract ERM HF-04). We are grateful for the constructive comments we received from C.J.
Lammers as well as for the editing work by A. Hendricks.
131
were thousands of casualties, especially among the missionaries and the
Chinese converts. Inside the besieged area in China’s capital city and
during the military campaign set up to relieve the foreigners under
attack, troops of the various nationalities assembled and fought side by
side. This may have been one of the first well-documented examples of
international military co-operation. This campaign was fairly successful:
the besieged were rescued and the number of casualties among the
military were not very high.
Nonetheless, it was clear from the beginning that mutual stereotypes and
rivalries between the various national troops would not fade away during
the siege and the following military campaign. Quite systematically, the
American and British troops were considered to be the best and bravest,
the least dirty and those least taking part in the looting and punitive
actions after the hostilities had ceased. At any rate, the Americans and
British citizens were inclined to think this way (Preston 2002: 66, 93,
195). On the other hand, continental European military men – in particular the Germans and the French – deemed the British behaviour as too
bold, reckless and presumptuous. They criticized the fact that the British
would not accept a foreigner to command their troops and that they had
claimed the victory that was actually won by the brave actions of others
(Preston 2002: 92, 117, 175, 194). Even the way injured soldiers behaved displayed remarkable differences along national lines: the French
and the Italians were said to „make the most of their wounds“, whereas
the British and the Americans were found to be eager to return to the
battle (Preston 2002: 186). Clear rivalries between the national troops
developed after the campaign, sometimes even causing fights between
soldiers of the various nations. These hostilities did not come as a surprise. As a general of one nation had prophesied, there would be fighting
coming up, but „not with the Chinese“ (Preston 2002: 321–322).
Clearly, in today’s international military co-operation, there is no fighting going on between the contributing troops (e. g. Elron et al. 1999;
Elron et al. 2003). This is important because – within the framework of
international institutions such as NATO or the UN – national forces are
increasingly compelled to work together with militaries of other nations.
Due to permanent budget cuts most national forces lack sufficient resources to engage in large-scale operations. Besides, military collabora132
tion with other nations enhances a mission’s legitimacy. Both arguments
apply to all national militaries, even to the sizable U. S. forces as the
operations in Iraq demonstrate. Given these developments international
military co-operation is not likely to disappear. Consequently, the importance of the success and effectiveness of such cross-national military
collaboration can hardly be overestimated (Duffey 2000; Soeters/
Poponete/Page 2006).
Yet, it would be naive to assume that all of today’s international military
missions run smoothly, nor can one expect that they are effective all of
the time. International collaboration in business, such as international
mergers, alliances, joint ventures and partnerships have not always been
very successful, to put it mildly. Cultural and institutional differences
between the partnering organizations often account for less than optimal
performance of the newly founded organizational entities (e. g. Olie
1994). In fact, in multi-organizational arrangements coherence and unity
of purpose are often lacking (Clegg/Pitsis/Rura-Polley/Marosszeky
2002). Similarly, international military co-operation is unlikely to yield
exclusively results that are up to or even above standard expectations.
In this article we aim to describe and analyse three recent examples of
international military co-operation. All of these operations are part of
NATO’s ISAF mission (International Security Assistance Force) in
Kabul that started early 2002. Two of our case studies regard bi-national
co-operation within the framework of the multinational ISAF-mission;
the scope of the third one is truly multinational, in that it analyses how
the everyday collaboration between more than twenty countries takes
place at Kabul International Airport (KAIA). We regard two of these
cases as examples of strained co-operation, whereas we deem the third
one to be running fairly smoothly. Using existing literature on cooperation in (international) organizations, we try to compare the three
cases and point at various possible factors explaining the differing
outcomes. Finally, we discuss the implications of our findings for future
military operations.
Although the military traditionally has played a central role in organization studies (Lang 1965; Smith/Carrol/Asford 1995: 7–8; Soeters 2000),
international military co-operation is a rather under-researched field of
133
study. The contribution of this article therefore primarily lies in presenting and analysing unique cases in the „study of organizations, organizing
and the organized in and between societies“. The cases’ uniqueness
derives from two elements. International military co-operation brings
together organizations that derive their core – and perhaps even their
sole – identity from national sovereignty (e. g. Soederberg/WedellWedellsborg 2005). In addition, the organizations featured in this article
operate under threatening circumstances where human lives are at stake.
With this article we do not claim to improve the existing literature on cooperation within organizations. However, we do believe that this article
provides a sound test of the applicability of general organization theory
to specific and exceptional organizational situations. Such a test will add
to the confidence we may have in the relevance and explaining power of
organization theory.
3
Existing Literature on Co-operation within (International)
Organizations
Co-operation between units within an organization is at least as important as co-operation between individuals or co-operation between organizations. Co-operation is imperative if tasks are too extensive, complex and hazardous to be performed by one single individual, unit or
organization. In addition, co-operation may provide people within and
between organizations with learning opportunities, work satisfaction and
stress reduction (Argyle 1991). Yet, co-operation does not always have
such positive results, certainly not if the co-operation consists of people
and organizations from different nationalities (e. g. Olie 1994). Examining the literature on collaboration, we have identified six relevant factors.
3.1
The Personnel Composition of Multinational Co-operation
Nowadays, it is generally accepted that the composition of teams and
organizations in terms of nationality – its national demography so to
speak – plays a role in the success of international collaboration (Adler
2002). Current understanding based on the work of the late sociologist
134
George Simmel makes it clear that proportions between demographic
minorities and majorities account for numerous social and behavioural
patterns in groups, organizations and societies. Kanter (1977), for example, has demonstrated that the quantitative distribution of men and
women in organizations plays a major role in explaining social dynamics
in gender-mixed work situations. In a similar vein, recent studies have
revealed a U-shape-relation between national composition and performance. Highly heterogeneous teams – with many nationalities of equal
size (ten times 10 % for example) –, and highly homogeneous teams –
with few nationalities and one nationality clearly outnumbering the
others (in a 90/5/5 %-ratio or so) – outperform teams and organizations
that are moderately heterogeneous (Earley/Mosakowski 2000; Adler
2002). In other words, high and low heterogeneous teams show the least
amount of conflict, the most effective communication patterns and the
highest level of satisfaction, planning and co-operation. The highly
heterogeneous teams for their part emphasize rules and practices that are
inclusive rather than exclusive; this means that heterogeneous teams
tend to be more open to its participants’ ideas and input. Hence, these
teams develop the highest levels of team identity. Moderately heterogeneous teams – for instance, teams composed of two or three more or less
equally sized nationalities – on the contrary, tend to display dysfunctional interactions. The members of such teams are likely to accuse one
another of not fully understanding or even being the source of a problem. Additionally, such teams show many difficulties in communicating
as well as low levels of team identity (Early/Mosakowski 2000: 36, 45).
An illustration of this „mechanism“ in the field of international military
co-operation can be found in an article by Soederberg and WedellWedellsborg (2005). In this article they compared a multinational corps,
consisting of personnel from three countries, i. e. Germany, Denmark
and Poland, with a multinational military training centre consisting of
personnel from 15 countries. In the latter organization „national identities played a minor role, whereas at the former organization national
identification seemed to be almost an organising principle – the basis for
coalitions, a source of conflict and the standard explanation for problems“. (Soederberg/Wedell-Wedellsborg 2005).
135
3.2
Cultural Distances
International co-operation is intercultural co-operation, bringing together
people with different demeanours, languages, cognitive schemas and
values (Hambrick/Canney Davidson/Snell/Snow 1998; Adler 2002).
Cultural differences also exist between military organizations, even
within the ones belonging to NATO (Soeters/Poponete/Page 2006).
First, it does not seem too speculative to assume that within NATO an
Anglo-Saxon cultural „complex“ exists, consisting of the so-called
ABCA-countries (America, Britain, Canada and Australia) who indeed
have a common history (e. g. Lammers/Hickson 1979) as well as elaborate forms of joint defence policies and practices. The affinity between
the British and the American militaries during the campaign against the
Boxers in Beijing in 1900 (Preston 2002) seems to have continued to
exist until today. This is not to say that these four countries always
operate in a completely identical style; in general, the Americans (and
the Australians) have been reported to make a much more tough and
distant impression with regard to their contact with the local population
than the British (and the Canadians) (Duffey 2000; Caniglia 2001; FitzGerald 2003). However, in matters of discipline, hierarchy and punishment these four countries act quite similarly, which is distinct from the
working style in many continental European armed forces who seem to
be more easy-going, relaxed and perhaps even less ambitious when it
comes to operational-military affairs (Soeters/Poponete/Page 2006).
Given these differences, it should come as no surprise that ABCA-armed
forces know lesser degrees of civilianisation than armed forces from the
West European continent. For instance, in the ABCA-armed forces
military unions are not allowed or in the case of Australia they have
been admitted only very recently, whereas in countries such as the
Netherlands, Belgium and Germany military unions have existed for a
considerable period of time (Bartle/Heinecken 2006). Another cultural
gap that seems to exist within NATO concerns the interactions with
armed forces perceived to be of lower status. Previous research on
Dutch-Turkish military co-operation in Kosovo and Afghanistan revealed that the cultural distance between the two militaries is fairly
large, and that – on top of that – derogatory stereotypes of the „Turkish
migrant worker“ seem to be prevalent among West European soldiers
(Soeters/ Tanercan/Varoglu/Sigri 2004). A similar rift seems to exist
136
between soldiers from „old“ and „new“ NATO member states – such as
between Danes and Germans on the one hand and Poles on the other
(Soederberg/ Wedell-Wedellsborg 2005). Hence, even among NATO
countries clear cultural differences between nationalities have existed
and continue to do so (Lammers 2003; Soeters/Poponete/Page 2006).
One can only guess what this means for missions in which NATO and
non-NATO armed forces work together. Not surprisingly, this type of
international military co-operation does not occur frequently.
3.3
Cohesion within and Status of Units
Military organizations are characterized by a high degree of functional
and structural differentiation, based on the existence of different services
(land, air and sea), functional groupings (engineers, signals), and front
versus rear positions (i. e. military core versus support and staff units).
One special distinction refers to so-called „elite units“. „Elite units“ –
such as special forces, air manoeuvre and airborne troops – are designed
and trained to operate under dangerous conditions, and to use and sustain violence. „Elite units“ generally are considered to be high status
groups – or at least this is what they think they are. They tend to emphasize group bonding, disregarding and actually looking down upon others
(Winslow 1999). In correspondence with their (self-) attributed high
status and their inner directed elite culture, these units are not likely to
accept orders, instructions and inspections from people who do not
belong to their own units. In general, soldiers in such units are critical of
outsiders and protective of the ones inside. This deliberately created
attitude of internal solidarity and bonding has proven to be useful in
battle and clear friend-and-foe situations. Not surprisingly, the „leaveno-man-behind“ ideology is particularly strong among „elite“ troops, but
it is noteworthy that this ideology specifically pertains to casualties of
the own unit (Wong 2005). In today’s fuzzy, multinational peace support
operations, however, displaying an open mind and developing ties to
others in the mission is at least as important. If such a „bridging“ attitude
is lacking, units tend to become isolated and oblivious to negative feedback from other parts of the organization, while tending to stick to
internal (within unit) communication and territorial behaviour (Browne/
Lawrence/Robinson 2005). All this lowers their general performance
137
and creativity in situations that are new, ambiguous and unclear (Ancona/Caldwell 1992; Kratzer/Leenders/van Engelen 2004; see also:
Granovetter 1983; Burt 2004).
3.4
Technology
Although air forces – even within NATO – experience the impact of
differing cultural styles leading to varying levels of accidents (Soeters/
Boer 2000), the cultural impact on air force operations seems to be far
less pervasive than among land forces. Air forces, especially the ones
operating in NATO, are subject to isomorphing, technology-driven
impulses (e. g. Dimaggio/Powell 1991). In the air forces uniformity in
technologies (for instance Blackhawks, F-16’s) reduces variation in
human behaviour, and, hence, the impact of the cultural factor decreases.
In air force operations tasks are mostly based on relatively objective
standards for assessing the correctness or superiority of a particular
solution. Performing such tasks is generally expected to be unrelated to
cultural diversity (Hambrick/Canney Davidson/Snell/Snow 1998: 194–
196; see also: Jackson 1992). Comparable findings have been demonstrated at the – also very technology-driven – European Air Space
Agency; here, however, one might claim that the creativity needed for
the design of air space technology profits from cultural diversity (Jackson 1992; Zabusky 1995). Land operations – especially the ones in
peace operations – however, allow for much more variation in procedures and behaviours. These operations are far less technology-based,
but they do require an „elaborate and well-orchestrated interaction
among groups members“ (Hambrick/Canney Davidson/Snell/Snow
1998: 194). Hence, these operations are subject to endless discussions on
how things should be done (Soeters/Poponete/Page 2006). Brocades
Zaalberg (2005), for instance, has described the many different ways
national armed forces interpret and operationalise the concept of CivilMilitary Co-operation. Previous studies have repeatedly shown that even
a seemingly simple activity such as patrolling the streets can be done –
and actually is done – in many ways: weapons on the back or not, wearing sunglasses or not, having interpreters in the squad or not, driving in
armoured vehicles or not, driving slowly or not, etc. The role of technology also comes to the fore in Soederbeg and Wedell-Wedellsborg’s
138
(2005) comparative case-study. They found that the multinational military organization that was relying on training facilities using technologydriven computer modelling and simulation experienced less difficulties
in co-operation than the other organization in their analysis. This was a
headquarter tasked with executing strategies and policies – clearly a type
of work entailing endless debates and discussions as well as limited
mutual adjustment among group members (Hambrick/Canney Davidon/
Snell/Snow 1998).
3.5
Organizational Set-up of the Mission
The way tasks in multinational operations are organized and allocated
seems to play a role as well in the possible success or failure of international military collaboration. The work that needs to be done in a collaborative effort of many can be divided in at least two different ways
(Thompson 1967: 54–55; Argyle 1991): parallel tasking in which (national) units are assigned their own geographical area of responsibility
where they can act fairly independently versus reciprocal tasking in
which each (national) unit, on the one hand, is providing a discrete,
complementary contribution to the whole while, on the other hand, being
supported by the whole and, hence, impregnated by the other units.
Combining these structural arrangements with possible cultural outcomes when culturally distinct organizations come together, the following picture emerges (Nehavanda/Malekzadeh 1988; Berry 2004). Parallel tasking, i. e. the allocation of specific geographical areas of responsibility to different national units, implies a separation strategy which will
produce positive outcomes, if the work of one unit has no impact on the
work of another, and vice versa. However, if the different units remain
connected in one way or another (for instance, through joint living
facilities or due to the impact of other units’ actions), problems may
occur. In a reciprocal organizational set-up, either assimilation (one
group submits to the dominating group), or integration (the formation of
a „third culture“) may follow. As we noticed earlier, assimilation can be
observed in technology-driven operations, or when one nation clearly
outperforms the other nations and indeed is deemed to be superior by
these nations. If the other nation’s (claimed) superiority is not accepted,
however, co-operation is likely to be strained. The integration outcome
139
is more likely to occur if the commander successfully sets super ordinate
and super-national goals, emphasizing goal interdependence and goal
sharing, as well as a strong common code and culture (Chen/Chen/
Meindl 1998; Soederberg/Wedell-Wedellsborg 2005). If the commander
is not capable of doing so, the operation tends to become flawed. In sum,
the structural and cultural elements of an organizational set-up should
match for a mission to be successful.
3.6
Danger and Threat
When people and organizations experience adversity, forms of mental
and organizational rigidity are likely to occur. Sociological and psychological research has shown that under conditions of threat information
processing is restricted and control is constricted, leading to lesser
degrees of individual and organizational flexibility and even inducing
„primitive forms of reaction“ (Staw/Sandelands/Dutton 1981: 505).
Soldiers, however, are likely to experience more than general forms of
adversity only. In their perception a threat may endanger their lives,
which impacts on what they think and how they behave. Recent socialpsychological studies have demonstrated that people realizing the fragility of their lives tend to increase stereotypical thinking. This implies that
people under such conditions focus their frustration on out-groups, cling
to values that are essential to their own common identity and worldview
and tend to reject people who are different (Schimel et al. 1999;
Pyszczynski/Solomon/Greenberg 2003). While these studies mostly rely
on laboratory-experiments, more realistic evidence is also available. A
quasi-experiment measuring cultural values among U. S. students before
and after 11 September 2001 revealed that students had become less
cosmopolitan and more power-oriented after the attack had occurred
(Olivas-Lujan/Harzing/McCoy 2004). This implies that they were less
inclined to value foreign people and cultural manifestations, such as
music and food from abroad. The implication of these findings for our
purpose is that international military co-operation is quite likely to
develop less smoothly, if there are signals indicating that life-threatening
situations may occur in the area of operations. A study conducted among
Dutch troops in Kabul and Europe has confirmed these behavioural
tendencies to a large degree (Dechesne/van de Berg/Soeters 2005).
140
In summary, we expect international military co-operation to be more
difficult, if this multi-organizational arrangement a) is moderately heterogeneous in composition, b) concerns interactions between soldiers
from the European continent and from ABCA countries, or from supposedly „higher status“ versus „lower status“ militaries, c) concerns
interactions between so-called „elite“ and „non-elite“ units, d) is less
technology-driven, e) is based on organizational set-ups in which structural and cultural elements do not fit, and e) is executed under conditions
that are experienced to be life-threatening.
4
Research Methodology
Given the under researched character of our subject, we have chosen to
use an inductive, qualitative methodology based on comparative casestudy analysis. The methodology in the case studies relies on semistructured interviews and participatory observation, and comes close to
what has become known as organizational anthropology (e. g. Gellner/
Hirsch 2001).
Study 1 on German-Dutch co-operation in Kabul is based on – partly
retrospective – data collected in Germany and the Netherlands, hence
outside the area of operation. In May 2003 the first and third authors had
in-depth interviews with around 25 Dutch and German NCOs and officers with bi-national working experience in the German-Netherlands
Corps HQ in Muenster, Germany. The interviewees not only talked
about the situation at HQ, but also provided information on the collaboration taking place in Kabul, given that, at the time of data collection,
more than 25 % of the HQs staff were in Afghanistan commanding the
ISAF-operation. Our interviewees in the Corps’ HQ were in close contact with their colleagues in Kabul, so they knew about the situation
there. In the months before, the first author had already interviewed
about 15 Dutch soldiers and NCOs who had just returned from Kabul.
They had been deployed as operational („air-manoeuvre“) units working
closely together with German operational troops. The interviews in
Muenster were conducted in English and Dutch, the others in Dutch.
141
Study 2 on the multinational co-operation at Kabul International Airport
(KAIA) is based on data that were collected at the airport in Afghanistan
between 27 January and 3 February 2005. Hence, this approach can be
seen as a form of „Blitz fieldwork“ (Gellner/Hirsch 2001). During this
period the first and second authors stayed at the airport on a 24/7-basis.
They conducted formal, in-depth interviews (lasting 1 to 2 hours each)
with 10 Belgian NCOs and officers, four Dutch servicemen, three
French soldiers, one Turkish officer and two local interpreters. In addition, they continuously had informal conversations with other people,
mostly Belgian and Dutch service (wo)men, who were deployed at the
airport. The interviews were performed in French, Dutch/Flemish and
English.
Study 3 on bi-national Belgian-Canadian co-operation in Kabul relies on
the same data as study 2. In addition, a visit to Camp Julien (the „Canadian“ camp in Kabul) enabled the researchers to do five more interviews
with Belgian officers and NCOs, who had direct working experience
with the Canadians deployed at the camp. These interviews were conducted in French or Dutch/Flemish. In all cases the researchers stopped
with the formal interviews when they decided the study had reached a
degree of saturation (Ezzy 2002).
In all three studies the authors have used various sorts of additional
information, in particular data from a survey conducted among Belgian
service(wo)men in Kabul (both at KAIA and Camp Julien), evaluation
reports, newspaper articles, „talks at the bar“ and organizational artefacts
such as pictures and banners expressing vision statements (see e. g.
Clegg/Pitsis/Rura-Polley/Marosszeky 2002). The interviews were analysed on the basis of extensive interview notes taken by the researchers
independently of one another. The Turkish officer requested us not to
take any notes, which necessitated us to draft a summary of the interview afterwards, based on our memories of what he had said. In all three
studies the first author drafted (in English) preliminary reports on the
findings, using procedures of triangulation and „open coding“ (Ezzy
2002). These preliminary reports were then checked independently by
the second researchers who relied on their own field and interview notes.
With respect to study 2 and 3 the second researcher drafted her own
report in French, independently and not knowing the content of the first
142
author’s report. On the basis of her report she cross-checked his accounts. The confrontation of the insights of the different researchers led
to a number of changes and additions. The results of an earlier publication on study 1 (Soeters/Moelker 2003) have been presented a number of
times to audiences consisting of people who had been in Kabul. These
presentations have elicited various „member-check“ comments varying
from „this is a fair description and analysis“ to „it was far worse than
that“. We have, however, preferred to remain on the safe side, avoiding
the risk of exaggeration.
5
Three Cases of International Military Co-operation
5.1
German-Dutch Co-operation in Kabul
In 1995 the first German-Netherlands Corps was founded. The start of
the bi-national co-operation was slow, but gradually the integration
deepened. Mutual appreciation has increased step-by-step, as was shown
in surveys among both German and Dutch servicemen in 1995, 1997 and
2000. In the years after its inception the HQ has been awarded the status
of NATO High Readiness Headquarters, which has been regarded as a
major achievement that could be attributed to the joint efforts of both the
Germans and the Dutch. The first combined deployment in Kosovo in
1999 was rated favourably by external examiners and the German and
the Dutch military themselves. The 2000-survey showed that despite
some differences in style and work orientation the Germans and Dutch
really liked working together especially at the Corps’ HQ; this impression was confirmed in interviews we did in May 2003 (Soeters/Moelker
2003).
However, everything changes and nothing ever remains the same. In
2002 the Corps was tasked to contribute operational (infantry) troops to
the ISAF-operation. In 2003 the Corps HQ was ordered to take over the
command of the mission in Kabul for a period of six months. Both
deployments turned out to be less successful that might have been expected given the previous positive developments. From the onset of the
deployments in 2002, especially the Dutch felt uncomfortable with the
German dominance in personnel, material resources and command. At
143
HQ there had always been a careful equilibrium in numbers and responsibilities, but in Kabul this precarious balance was absent due to political
decisions made by both national governments.
The relations soured considerably and that became public via newspaper
articles quoting Dutch soldiers saying that „the Afghans are not the
problem, the Germans are (...)“ (Soeters/Moelker 2003). This referred to
the situation in the operational camp („Warehouse“). In this camp some
2300 troops, consisting of 1400 Germans, a little over 300 Dutch servicemen and 600 troops of 18 other countries were working and living
together. This was a case of bi-national co-operation against the background of a multinational mission, but the contribution of the two countries was clearly not balanced. The whole camp was densely populated,
housing the Dutch service(wo)men in tents that were located closely to
one another at one side of the camp. Hence, a tendency to isolate themselves developed.
144
Table 1: Summary of findings of the three case studies
Nature of
activities
German* OperaDutch cotional duties
operation (in (patrolling,
a multinamanning
tional concheck
text)
points,
demining,
civilmilitary cooperation,
etc.) since
2002.
* Command
of mission
in 2003.
Organizational
set-up
* ISAF-HQ
was equally
manned by
Germans and
Dutch (in
2003).
* In the operational camp the
Germans
dominated in
numbers and
command.
* Operational
tasks in distinct
geographical
areas in Kabul
were allocated
to each nation.
Multinational Running
* Multinational
co-operation military and staff and
at KAIA
civilian
command unit.
airport, air * All national
and land
operational
patrolling.
units are
roughly equally
large, and all
have been
assigned one
specific, independent operational task.
Mutual
appreciation
* Dutch operational troops
harshly criticized German
ways of working, commanding and behaving.
* Dutch staff
officers had far
less problems,
and even disapproved of their
compatriots’
attitudes.
Current
situation
* Command
of mission
(ISAF-HQ)
ended
according to
plan in 2003.
* Operational binational cooperation (in
Camp
Warehouse)
ended
suddenly and
unexpectedly
in 2003.
* Mutual stereo- Continues up
typing espetill now.
cially vis-a-vis
the (growing
numbers and
increasingly
more powerful)
Turkish military.
* All units are
satisfied with
living and
working conditions at the base.
145
Nature of
activities
CanadianOperational
Belgian coduties only
operation (in (patrolling,
a multinamanning
tional concheck
text)
points,
demining,
civilmilitary cooperation
etc.).
Organizational
set-up
* Canadians in
charge of camp
Julien.
* Operational
duties in
distinct geographical areas
in Kabul
separately
assigned to
national units.
Mutual
Current
appreciation
situation
* Belgians felt
Ended in
dominated by
2005 accordcondescendingly ing to plan.
acting Canadians.
* Old memories
revived.
In an isolated position internal gossip and complaints are likely to develop, which indeed happened among the Dutch. They continuously
complained about the supply of goods (including weapons and ammunition), about logistics in general, the safety policies implemented by the
Germans, the availability of telephones, the quality of the food as well as
the alcohol policies which varied between the Germans and the Dutch.
In general the Dutch criticized the way the Germans conducted the
mission and the assignments the Germans ordered them to do. All these
complaints were vented with an air of superiority: the Dutch airmanoeuvre soldiers considered themselves to be far more experienced in
peacekeeping. In addition, the Dutch did not understand why the Germans had better housing facilities and financial allowances. The resentment among these Dutch soldiers was so pronounced that they met with
criticism from their compatriots at HQ: these Dutch staff officers commented that their fellow-Dutchmen at the camp should stop whining and
should „leave their corner every once in a while and join the others“
(Soeters/Moelker 2003).
This situation did not improve, not even when the first rotation of soldiers were replaced by other Dutch units. The problems at Camp Warehouse resonated in Muenster (the Corps’ HQ) and at ISAF HQ in Kabul,
where the bi-national staff of the Corps HQ had taken over command of
the mission in 2003. This was remarkable because – as mentioned before
– the relations between the Germans and Dutch staff officers in Muenster had proven to be rather good. After the planned return of the HQ
146
personnel to Muenster, the Corps’ Dutch and German commanders felt
the need to pay considerable attention to improving the relations between their staff officers that had soured in Kabul. The operational
German-Dutch co-operation in Camp Warehouse ended suddenly and
unexpectedly in the fall of 2003. Given all these processes and outcomes, we consider this case to be an example of strained international
military co-operation.
5.2
Multinational Co-operation at Kabul International Airport (KAIA)
At the start of the ISAF mission at the end of 2001, its most important
priority was restoring air traffic at Kabul airport that had been destroyed
during the hostilities. The airport serves both civilian and military purposes. Because almost all of ISAFs resources have to be supplied by air
transport, the airport has been one of the most strategic elements in the
mission. Therefore, a command and staff unit, consisting of officers and
NCOs of nearly all NATO air forces, has been tasked by NATO with
keeping the airport running. The command is rotated every six months
over representatives of various nations. The operational tasks at the
airport have been assigned to „normal“ units from separate nations: for
instance force protection to a Belgian unit, de-mining to a Czech detachment, air transport with Black Hawks to a Turkish unit, air reconnaissance with Apaches to a Dutch air force unit, land patrolling
amongst others to a French company, medical services to a Spanish
contingent, etc. Hence, every national operational unit performs its
duties fairly independently and, therefore, coordination costs are kept to
a minimum. Every national unit is housed per section on the premises,
but eating facilities are centrally provided. In total some 25 nations
contribute troops, and no single country dominates the others in numbers.
The operations at the airport are running fairly smoothly and successfully, even enabling an increasing number of civilian airliners to operate
their flights. The interviewees at the airport stressed that this KAIA
operation is „business as usual“. People are encouraged to report „challenges instead of problems“ (a slogan made visible on banners and
posters), quite similar to the way they are used to at their own NATO
147
bases. The personnel’s attitude is said to be service oriented: „They want
to help maintain Afghanistan’s door open to the world.“ Clearly, the
international composition renders the base a bit more „messy“ than one
would see in the U. S. A. or at a base entirely run by the U. S. Air Force,
as some respondents said. Not surprisingly, during the period since 2001
there have been a number of language-related problems. The most
prominent one referred to the Spanish medics who did not master the
English language sufficiently, inducing people in case of emergency to
seek medical help outside the base at the German medical facilities at
ISAF HQ. In addition, different national rules and regulations sometimes
caused discipline-related problems. Furthermore, the pace of decisionmaking was sometimes criticized and attributed to the complex international chain of command.
During our stay at the base the command was handed over by a general
from Iceland to a Turkish general. This caused a certain discomfort
among a number of Western European service(wo)men. Rumours and
gossip flourished indicating that „once the Turkish commander would
have taken over command, alcohol would be banned, female soldiers
would no longer be allowed to leave their premises after 1900 hours and
the military hierarchy would become far more important“. As one of the
Western European interviewees indicated, „for the Turks the commander
is God, for us he is only a little God“. A Turkish officer, confronted with
these „expectations“, responded astonished and irritated, pointing at the
various female jet fighter pilots in the Turkish air force and the fact that
the use of alcohol is permitted on Turkish bases. Other examples of
multiple realities could be observed in the „book of complaints“ in the
dining hall. Turkish military personnel wrote down that „they don’t
understand that kebab is made of pork instead of lamb“, and that „they
don’t want Chinese food“. Some others, clearly not Turkish personnel,
wrote that „they don’t understand that recently olives are being served at
breakfast“. However, all this calmed down very soon after the Turkish
general had taken over command. Things became quickly „business as
usual“ again.
148
This leads us to conclude that, despite some problems, people at KAIA
in general are satisfied with the mission and consider their work in
Afghanistan as „just another job“. In addition, the continuously increasing number of civilian airline connections to and from Kabul demonstrates the success of the KAIA operation. We, therefore, deem this case
as an example of fairly smooth international military co-operation.
5.3
Canadian-Belgian Co-operation in Kabul
The same cannot be said about our last case study. This example of
international co-operation revolves around a tri-national battle group,
consisting of some 230 Belgian Airborne troops, a Norwegian reconnaissance squadron and a Hungarian light infantry company. This trinational battle group was located at a large Canadian base, called Camp
Julien, where Canadian soldiers (of unilingual Canadian units) dominated in numbers and territorial behaviour. In general, the commanders
of the tri-national battle group were fairly satisfied with the work of their
units; the battle group had been very effective in a number of critical
incidents. But with respect to living at the Canadian camp, they were
less satisfied. Especially, the Belgians reported to feel uncomfortable
working and living with the Canadians. A small survey among the
Belgian servicemen showed that slightly more than half of them indicated that their contacts with the Canadian military were „(very) bad“.
In addressing these findings, some of our Belgian interviewees pointed
out that this particular Belgian unit had operated under the command of
the Canadian General Romeo Dallaire in Rwanda in 1994, during the
genocide in that country. In a book describing his experiences at that
time, Dallaire (2004) had not only heavily criticized the Belgian political
decision to pull out its troops after they had incurred ten casualties at the
beginning of the upheaval in April 1994, but also the behaviour of the
Belgian paratroop regiment (its alleged lack of discipline etc.). According to some interviewees, this caused a certain deep-seated resentment
among some of the members of the Regiment. Furthermore, in Kabul
they felt the Canadians treated them in a condescending manner, which
can only be understood by closely examining the interaction of the two
working styles.
149
The Canadian soldiers display a professional attitude next to a high
degree of discipline and strict rule orientation, the enforcement of which
relies on substantial monetary and physical punishments. Besides, the
Canadians often punish collectively even if a single person or a very
small number of persons in a unit have committed the offences. Even
informally, reactions to breaches of the rules (for instance, when servicemen forget to take off their hat when entering the mess) are loud and
aggressive. Since Belgians do not tend to have such habits, they were
rather frequently addressed in this rude way. In addition, the Belgians
are not used to the presence of rank-related messes that seem to be
separated by „walls“.
In contrast to these specific Canadian practices, the Belgians seem to be
somewhat more relaxed, laid-back and easy-going, and superiors react to
misconduct in a far less sharp, let alone aggressive way. Fines of several
hundreds of Euros going up to a full monthly allowance are unknown in
the Belgian army. After working hours, the rank-and-file, the NCOs and
the officers in the Belgian army are used to socializing in the „all ranks
bar“, drinking a beer and discussing problems that may have occurred
during the day. Belgian service(wo)men indicated that they were
shocked when they were confronted with (collective) penalties like
being banned from the bar. Furthermore, they felt uncomfortable for
they had the impression that the Canadians looked down upon them, in
particular with respect to an insufficient degree of professionalism and
discipline. Of course, the Belgian rank-and-file refuted such claims and
saw things differently. In contrast to the interactions with the Canadians,
the contacts with the Norwegians and the Hungarians did not create
many problems. The problematic Canadian-Belgian interaction, however, did not stop before the Belgians returned home, which was, unlike
the Dutch, according to plan. All in all, we deem this case of international military co-operation to be rather strained.
150
6
Analysis
The three case studies provide three different pictures of international
military co-operation. None of these cases, however, is a picture of
perfect co-operation. Even the second case (Kabul International Airport)
shows national isolation and stereotype-related friction occurring among
the service personnel of the various nations. However, this case of
international military co-operation has been (and still is) fairly successful with respect to both its effectiveness and mutual relations, whereas
the two other cases have turned out to be much more problematic. The
question is how these differing outcomes can be explained. Using the six
insights we have discussed before, we now want to analyse the processes
and outcomes of international military co-operation in the three different
cases. Each of the six „mechanisms“ has its own influence, but if they
coincide within one single case, their impact becomes more powerful.
151
Table 2: Summary of the analysis (+ = high impact; - = no impact; +/- =
moderate impact)
Strained
International military
Co-operation due to:
1. moderate heterogeneity
2. cultural distances:
interaction between
continental and
ABCA militaries
and/or between
„higher“ and „lower“
status militaries
3. co-operation involving „elite“ units
4. lesser degree of technology orientation
5. no fit between
structural and cultural
elements of organizational set up
6. danger and threat
GermanMultinational
Dutch
Co-operation
Co-operaat
tion at
KAIA
Camp
Warehouse
BelgianCanadian
Co-operation at
Camp
Julien
+
-
+
-
+/-
+
+
-
+
+
-
+
+/-
-
+/-
+
+/-
+
1. The impact of national composition clearly plays a role in our three
case studies. The KAIA case is an example of high heterogeneity involving more than twenty national contingents of about equal size, a
condition we now know to be most conducive to optimising processes and outputs. The other two cases were examples of moderate
heterogeneity having two sizable participating partners, who easily
form two „blocks“ continuously frustrating one another. As interviewees in the German-Dutch case study reiterated: it is not a matter
of Germans and Dutch, it is a matter of being only two. At Camp
152
Julien too, most friction evolved between two sides: the large minority of Belgians versus the dominating Canadians.
2. With respect to cultural distances we witnessed Western European
military at KAIA expressing discontent with Turkish staff being in
command, which was often times attributed to Turks being culturally distinct. This comes close to what other studies involving Turkish military personnel have shown and to what has been reported
with respect to the way Danish and German soldiers perceive their
Polish colleagues when co-operating with them. More tellingly with
respect to cultural distances seems to be the Belgian-Canadian interaction, because this case illustrates the aforementioned cultural
„complex“ of the ABCA countries within NATO. While interviewing the Belgians in Kabul, we were struck by the resemblance of
their stories with accounts we heard in a case study into BritishDutch co-operation in Cyprus (Soeters/Op den Buijs/Vogelaar
2001). The similarities of the data in both studies with respect to hierarchies, discipline and punishments were astonishing. Clearly, the
Dutch and the Belgian armed forces have more in common than with
the English and Canadian forces, let alone the American troops
(Soeters/Poponete/Page 2006).
3. It was striking that in the two cases in which co-operation was less
successful, problems and accusations against the other party were
almost exclusively aired by members of so-called „elite“ units. In
the Dutch-German case the problems were the greatest when Dutch
air-manoeuvre units had to co-operate with German paratroopers.
The problems decreased when German „Bergtruppe“ (mountain
units) relieved the German „Fallschirmjäger“ (paratroopers) in the
course of 2003. It appeared, the „Bergtruppe“ do not have such an
explicit elitist (self-) image as the paratroopers do. As mentioned before, Dutch servicemen from other, non-elite units blamed their
compatriots from the air-manoeuvre companies for complaining too
much and not being sufficiently constructive. Similarly, in the Belgian case the frictions particularly arose among the paratroopers. In
KAIA, there were no „elite“ units; so this phenomenon was not present.
153
4. The rather successful results of the operations at KAIA can undoubtedly also be attributed to technology-driven normative and
professional isomorphism (e. g. Dimaggio/Powell 1991). Air force
operations are completely routinized because of the danger that is
inherent to flying. The risks are well-known and the ways to cope
with those risks are incorporated in procedures that are enforced
upon the servicemen with a large degree of discipline. These procedures are identical for all servicemen at KAIA. In the army operations of the other two case studies, however, every aspect of the
work can, and indeed is, debated. These discussions most of the
times follow national lines.
5. In all three cases, different operational tasks were divided among the
participating national units. Each national unit in case study 1 and 3
had their own geographical area of responsibility, where they were
tasked to control the situation, safeguard the area against hostilities
and develop projects in co-operation with civilians. However, the
various national contingents were not really independent: as far as
living conditions were concerned all nationalities were put together
in a camp hosted by one nation, and also in the operations the national contingents were supervised by one nation (study 1: Germany;
study 3: Canada). At the airport (case study 2) every national unit
was assigned a specific functional task, such as de-mining, force
protection or air patrolling. Such a structure is based on pooled interdependence (Thompson 1967: 54–55), implying that every unit
renders a discrete, complementary contribution to the whole. The
way these processes are administered, however, differs among the
three cases. Administration implies reciprocal interdependence and
mutual adjustment. Only in KAIAs case does this mutual adjusting
at staff level take place in a truly international atmosphere, necessitating everyone to interrelate heedfully all the time, thereby creating
what can be called a collective mind (Weick 2001: 266–268). In
each of the other two operational camps (Warehouse, Julien), however, only one country pulled the strings, enabling staff to easily
overlook the concerns of personnel of other nationalities under their
command.
154
6. Even though since ISAFs inception Kabul is not officially seen as a
war zone, the situation in the area has, at times, been really dangerous . Especially during ISAFs first year (2002–2003) there were several missile attacks as well as assaults with grenades and other small
explosives on Camp Warehouse and ISAFs HQ (Dechesne/van den
Berg/Soeters 2005). This applies particularly to the first case study
in this article. As for the other two, more recent case studies, while
the actual danger had, at the time of our field observations,
substantially decreased (although not fully disappeared), some of the
friction can be attributed to the danger and death awareness that still
existed among the military personnel. The air force operations,
however, have for a long time incorporated the well-known risk of
their operations in everyday routines and procedures, as we
mentioned before. Furthermore these operations attract virtually no
concrete hostile attention, because they hardly interact with the local
population, unlike land forces which are continuously in interactions
with locals during patrols, transports, house searches and the
manning of road blocks and check points. The danger – unpredictable and hidden as it is – particularly lurks in these close contacts. If the aforementioned social-psychological laboratory studies
are right, these differences in threat perception (in case 1 and 3 relatively more than in the second case) account at least partially for the
differences in process and outcome of the three cases.
7
Conclusions and implications
We have identified several factors that are propitious for reaching satisfying results in international military co-operation: a heterogeneous (or
the opposite: a nearly homogeneous) composition of the mission in
terms of nationality; as much as possible, agreement about operational
matters and uniformity of technologies; insistence on an open mindset
toward others in the mission especially among so-called „elite units“; an
organizational structure in which all nationalities contribute in a recognizable and respected way to the grand output of the mission; and a
thorough preparation of the soldiers with respect to coping with riskinducing situations, if these are expected to occur. If all these conditions
155
are met, international military co-operation is more likely to be
smoothly, as in the case of KAIA.
However, even the operation at KAIA was not without flaws. The general collaboration, mutual appreciation and professional atmosphere at
the base for instance were threatened when the Turks, who were perceived as culturally distant, took over command. This did not persist,
however. Nonetheless, commanders of international military missions
should continuously try to foster collaboration by paying attention to the
different cultural baggage national troops bring along with them (Chen/
Chen/Meindl 1998). For commanders to be able to do so, they need to be
made aware of this and trained accordingly. In general, in multinational
military co-operation one should try to seek ways to create „a collaborative commitment and transparency into the moral fibre of the project“, a
„govern mentality“ among all participants so to speak (Clegg/Pitsis/
Rura-Polley/Marosszeky 2002: 325). This can be done by emphasizing a
strong mission culture (with clear goals and performance indicators), a
respecting attitude towards all, but perhaps also by creating conditions in
which power is not put in the hands of one stakeholder only. A certain
„circularity of power“ (Romme 1999) – as could be most clearly seen at
KAIA – is likely to strengthen collaborative commitment among all
participants of the mission.
This way of organizing at KAIA can even be enhanced through possible
changes in the organizational structure at the airport. Now the various
functional operational tasks at KAIA are separately assigned to the
different national units. This division of labour will produce satisfactory
results as long as every national contingent performs adequately. But, as
the problem with the Spanish medical unit not mastering the English
language sufficiently illustrates, a functional structure is inherently
vulnerable if one contributing part fails. Not only the operations are
threatened, but the whole idea of international co-operation runs the risk
of becoming a fiasco in an organizational arrangement where the different functions are allocated to the various national contingents.
Therefore, it would be wise to experiment cross-cutting national/functional group structures (see also: Brewer 1996). This could
for example imply that the Belgian contingent performing the force
156
protection and safety tasks at the airport would be mixed with service(wo)men from other nations (e. g. with soldiers of the French company whose task it is to patrol outside of the airport). Or that the Turkish
unit responsible for logistics at the base would be mixed with military
(wo)men of other nations. Of course, this would require a certain degree
of preparation and gradual implementation. This idea, though, is far
from being irrealistic given the fact that the command and staff unit at
the airport is both fully internationally composed and operating
smoothly. At the airport’s international command and staff unit, people
take care of each other, interrelate heedfully and form a sort of collective
mind. This example demonstrates that cross-cutting the functional/national structure could prevent the mutual stereotyping and
blaming we witnessed at the base. So, even though KAIA on the whole
can be deemed to be successful, the latter social dynamics at the base
render the co-operation less than optimal.
If our article has contributed to a better understanding of these dynamics, it has fulfilled its intentions.
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SO
WI
Koninklijke Militaire Academie
(KMA)
Postbus 90002, 4800 PA Breda,
Nederland
Tel PTT: 0031 76 527 3245
Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut der
Bundeswehr (SWInstBw)
Prötzeler Chaussee 20,
15344 Strausberg, Deutschland
Tel: 0049 3341/58-1815
AllgFspWNBw: 8221/1815
Questionnaire for 1 (GE/NL) Corps in 2005
The commander of the 1 German Netherlands Corps, Lieutenant General van
Heyst, commissioned the Bundeswehr Institute of Social Sciences and the
Royal Netherlands Military Academy to study for the fourth time in ten years
the experiences of Dutch, German and multi-national military service personnel
belonging to the 1 (GE/NL) Corps.
Your collaboration with us is of course voluntary. The questionnaires are
anonymous. The study is directed at the similarities and differences between the
nationalities in general. We are also very interested in the experience of militaries from other nations than Germany and the Netherlands. The results will be
presented in such a way that opinions cannot be traced back to individual
persons.
This questionnaire will be offered at the same time to military service personnel
from other nationalities in 1 (GE/NL) Corps. In order to compare the answers,
the questions are kept similar in the Dutch, German and English versions of the
questionnaire.
Prof. Dr. Joseph Soeters
Koninklijke Militaire Academie
Oberst i. G. Jürgen Buchholz
Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut der Bundeswehr
163
Please fill in with pen (black or blue) or pencil!
1.
In your opinion, do the Dutch and the Germans play a role of equal importance within 1 (GE/NL) Corps?
Yes, the Germans and the Dutch in the Corps are approximately of equal
importance.

<Continue with question 3!>
No, the Germans and the Dutch in the Corps are not equally important.
2.

Who plays the most important role within 1 (GE/NL) Corps?
The Dutch

The Germans

One of the other participating nations

3.
During your years of service in the 1 (GE/NL) Corps, how much contact did
you have till now with ...
No
Many
Very
Few
contact
many contacts contacts at all
contacts
a)
... Dutch soldiers?

b)
... German soldiers?

c)
... the military from the other participating nations?

4.
How sympathetic are you toward the fact that you serve in a common corps
together with soldiers from other nations?

Very positive
164
Positive

Neutral

Negative

Very negative

5.
6.
In your opinion, compared to your home country how do superiors interact
with subordinates in the 1 (GE/NL) Corps?
Rougher and stricter than in my country.

Approximately the same.

More relaxed and friendlier than in my own country.

Do not know.

The following characteristics may or may not be applicable to Dutch soldiers.
Mark each characteristic with a number from one to ten to indicate the
degree to which the characteristic is typical for Dutch soldiers (10 = very
typical, 1 = not at all typical). When you do not have an opinion you can
leave the box empty.
Example:
Courageous
0 9
Courageous
Reliable
Lax
Tough
Dutiful
Comradely
High-spirited
Bold
Prepared
Rigid
Industrious
Sociable
Independent
Competent
165
7.
The following characteristics may or may not be applicable to German
soldiers. Mark each characteristic with a number from one to ten to indicate
the degree to which the characteristic is typical for German soldiers (10 =
very typical, 1 = not at all typical). When you do not have an opinion you can
leave the box empty.
Courageous
Reliable
Lax
Tough
Dutiful
Comradely
High-spirited
Bold
Prepared
Rigid
Industrious
Sociable
Independent
Competent
8.
166
If you could choose, which of the following units would you prefer to work
in?

In a mixed and deeply integrated multinational unit.
In a multinational unit, where my nation would be the framework nation.

In a completely national unit, with only soldiers from my own nation in
the barracks.

9.
10.
11.
12.
In the mixed German-Dutch units and in the integrated headquarters at
corps level the English language is used. How do you rate your knowledge of
the English language?

I speak English very well.
I can make myself understood.

I know a few English words.

I do not speak English at all.

In your opinion, did the multinational collaboration within 1 (GE/NL) Corps
already lead to the lessening of prejudices towards the others?

Yes, the multinational collaboration has led to a lot less prejudice.
Yes, the multinational collaboration has led to a little less prejudice.

No, the multinational collaboration has changed nothing.

No, the multinational collaboration has reinforced the prejudices.

If you could choose between a posting within 1 (GE/NL) Corps or with a
completely national unit, or in another multinational unit what would you
choose?

The German-Netherlands Corps
Another multinational unit (like e.g. the Eurocorps)

A completely national unit

I have no preference

Were you deployed to Kabul (ISAF 3)?
Yes

No <Continue with question 14!>

167
13.
What were your experiences in Kabul regarding co-operation with …
Very
positive
Positive
Very
Neutral Negative negative
... the Dutch soldiers?

b)
... the German soldiers?

c)
... the military from the other
participating nations of
1 (GE/NL) Corps?

a)
14.
How well do you like ...
Very
much
Quite
a lot
Not at
Neutral Not so all
much
a)
... the Dutch soldiers?

b)
... the German soldiers?

c)
... the military from the other participating nations of 1 (GE/NL) Corps?

15.
How well do you like ...
Very
much
Quite
a lot
Not at
Neutral Not so all
much
a)
... the Dutch?

b)
... the Germans?

168
16.
17.
18.
19.
Suppose that during a combat military operation a German and a Dutch
platoon are deployed next to each other. And suppose the Dutch or the
German platoon is attacked. Do you think ...
A) ... the Germans would come to aid the Dutch?
A
B
B) ... the Dutch would come to aid the Germans?
I am convinced they would come to aid the other platoon.

I think it very probable.

I do not think it very probable.

It seems improbable.

No opinion.

Do you support the current draft for a EU constitution?
Yes <Continue with question 19!>

No

I do not know, because I do not know its contents.

Do you support a EU constitution in general?
Yes

No

What is your opinion on the idea of one European Army, that integrates the
armed forces of Europe?

Very positive
Positive

Neutral

Negative

Very negative

No opinion

169
20.
21.
22.
23.
170
Do you think that 1 (GE/NL) Corps is a step towards the formation of one
European Army?

Yes, I think so.
No, I don’t think so.

No opinion.

How do you regard the Dutch armed forces?
Very positive

Positive

Neutral

Negative

Very negative

No opinion

How do you regard the German armed forces?
Very positive

Positive

Neutral

Negative

Very negative

No opinion

The Royal Netherlands Armed Forces suspended conscription. The Bundeswehr still drafts conscripts. Given your experiences, does this difference give
rise to problems in the collaboration between Dutch and German soldiers?
Yes

No

Don’t know

24.
25.
Is it your opinion that in Germany conscription should remain in existence
or do you think that an all-volunteer force is the better solution?
Retain conscription.

All-volunteer army is the better solution.

No opinion.

Have you had contact with soldiers from one of the other nations of the
1 (GE/NL) Corps in your leisure time?
Yes,
often
Yes,
Not at
occaall
sionally
a)
Contacts with the Dutch soldiers.

b)
Contacts with the German soldiers.

c)
Contacts with the military from the other participating nations of 1 (GE/NL) Corps.

26.
Have you invited one soldier or more from one of the other nations of the
1 (GE/NL) Corps at your home or in your own quarters?
Yes,
often
Yes,
Not at
occaall
sionally
a)
I have invited Dutch soldiers.

b)
I have invited German soldiers.

c)
I have invited military from the other participating
nations of 1 (GE/NL) Corps.

27.
How often do you experience that people in your unit disagree with their
superior, but do not dare say so to him/her?

Never
Seldom

Sometimes

Most of the times

Always

171
28.
The following descriptions refer to four types of superiors/managers. Please
read these descriptions first.
Superior 1: Is, in general, quick in decision-making and communicates the
decisions clearly and plainly to the employees. Expects them to carry out the
decisions loyally and without trouble.
Superior 2: Is, in general, quick in decision-making, but tries to explain
his/her decisions first of all completely to his/her employees before continuing. Gives the reasons for the decisions and answers any questions.
Superior 3: Consults, in general, his/her employees before making a decision. Listens to their advice, weighs pros and cons, and then announces the
decision. Expects everyone – even those who were of a different opinion – to
carry out the decision loyally.
Superior 4: In general, organises a meeting with all employees first before
making a decision. Explains the problem to the group and encourages discussion. Accepts the opinion of the majority as the decision.
a)
b)
172
Which type of superior would you prefer to work for? (one answer only)
Superior 1

Superior 2

Superior 3

Superior 4

Which of these four types of superior resembles your own superior
most? (one answer only)
Superior 1

Superior 2

Superior 3

Superior 4

He/she resembles non of the four types.

29.
Please rate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following
statements:
Strongly Partially Neither/ Partially Strongly
agree
agree
nor
disagree disagree
a)
I feel like ‘part of the family’
in 1 (GE/NL) Corps.

b)
1 (GE/NL) Corps has no
personal meaning to me.

c)
I feel a strong sense of
belonging to 1 (GE/NL)
Corps.

d)
Working in 1 (GE/NL) Corps
is just a job for me.

29.
To which degree do you feel that there is consistency between what your
nearest superior says and does?

High
30.
Rather high

Neither high nor low

Rather low

Low

To what degree do you feel that there is consistency between what the
leadership of 1 (GE/NL) Corps say and do?

High
Rather high

Neither high nor low

Rather low

Low

173
30.
statements:
agree
agree
nor
disagree disagree
a)
The members of my unit are
co-operative with each other.

b)
The members of my unit
know that they can depend
on each other.

c)
stand up for each other.

d)
trust in each others’ work.

e)
praise others for a job well
done.

f)
The members of my unit take
care of each other.
g)
interested in what I think
about things.

interested in what I feel
about things.

satisfied with each other.

h)
i)
174
31.
How important are the following matters in your daily work?
Very
Rather Neither/ Rather Complete-ly
important important
nor
unimpor- unimportant
tant
a)
To reach common
decisions.

b)
To reach the objectives and deadlines.

c)
To learn from my
colleagues.

d)
To share my experience with others.

e)
To reach the optimal
solution.

f)
To fulfil my function.

32.
In your experience, when co-operation takes place, how are conflicts managed?
33.
Overt and diplomatic

Overt and straight

Covert

Not at all

If I had to decide again to come to 1 (GE/NL) Corps, I would come again ...
... without hesitation.

... most probably.

... likely.

... probably not.

... definitely not.

175
34.
a)
b)
35.
statements:
Strongl
y agree
Partially
agree
Neither/
nor
Partially
disagree
Strongl
y
disagree
Never
heard
off
I support the Dutch leadership concept of ‘Leidinggeven’.

I support the German
leadership concept of
‘Innere Führung’.

statements:
agree
agree
nor
disagree disagree
a)
b)
176
The principles of ‘Leidinggeven’ are applied in my
unit.

The principles of ‘Innere
Führung’ are applied in my
unit.

Socio-demographic items:
36.
37.
38.
39.
How many months have you worked with your present unit?
Shorter than 4 months.

4 to 12 months.

13 to 24 months.

25 to 60 months.

Longer than 60 months.

Your rank is?
Rank and file soldier

Corporal

NCO

Junior officer

Staff officer

What is your nationality?
Dutch

German

Other

I am posted at ...
... Münster (Headquarters).

... Münster (Support Staff).

... Eibergen.

... Garderen.

177
40.
It is possible that certain things you find of importance were not discussed in
this questionnaire. If so, please state them below. We are interested in your
personal comments.
Thank you for your co-operation!
178
Authors
Ulrich vom Hagen – SOWI
Rene Moelker – Netherlands Defense Academy (NLDA)
Joseph Soeters – Netherlands Defense Academy (NLDA)
Schelte van Ruijten – Student Tilburg University
Philippe Manigart – Royal Military Academy Brussels
Delphine Resteigne – Royal Military Academy Brussels
179

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