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FIFTY
YEARS
OF Z I O N I S M
A HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF
DR. WEIZMANN'S ' TRIAL AND E R R O R '
By
OSKAR K. RABINOWICZ
LONDON
ROBERT ANSCOMBE & CO. LTD.
1950
\ m e r \ e a n •Jtwrtsb C o m n v i W
UBiiARY
FIFTY
YEARS
OF Z I O N I S M
A HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF
DR. WEIZMANN'S ' TRIAL AND ERROR '
By
OSKAR K. RABINOWICZ
LONDON
ROBERT ANSCOMBE & GO. LTD.
1950
td
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED
PRINTED BY FREDK. W . K A H N , L T D . , EMPIRE HOUSE, LONDON,
F O R ROBERT ANSGOMBE & CO. LTD. 2 9 1 / 3
E.C.I.
GRAYS INN ROAD, LONDON,
W.C.I.
This book is an expansion of three lectures delivered
by Dr. Oskar K. Rabinowicz on June 5, 12 and
19,1949, before the Zionist Study Group in London.
INTRODUCTORY
D
R. WEIZMANN'S autobiography offers an important
contribution to Jewish and particularly Zionist history
of the last fifty years. It is, however, autobiographical only
in those portions where the author adopts the point of view
of participant in events, while the other parts constitute
an account of contemporary Zionist history in the course of
which he quotes numerous documents, letters, dates, authoritative statements and verbatim conversations, and even
refers to notes "made at the time" (p. 220 [276]). This opens
the way to investigation by the student of history.
This investigation is also invited by the fact that a book by
Dr. Weizmann—the man of so many achievements, the leader
of the Zionist Movement for so many years, the first President
of Israel—will, whether so desired or not, have to be taken
into account by the future student of Jewish history of the
twentieth century. A number of reviewers have already
stressed this point. Malcolm Muggeridge, for instance, describes the book in the London Daily Telegraph as "an authentic
contribution to contemporary history"; and Prof. Sir Reginald
Goupland stresses in the London Jewish Monthly that "Dr.
Weizmann's autobiography will always be the primary Jewish
'document', the book which will first be read by every student
who wants to understand the principle and policy of Zionism
in those fifty decisive years".
There is a further reason for such an investigation.
Numerous reviews were written on Trial and Error, someuncritically glorifying it, others uncritically condemning it. In
most cases, praises or rejections are based on a superficial
approach. None of these do justice to Dr. Weizmann and his
book. He is a scholar, and his method is a scientific one; and
nothing short of a scholarly and scientific approach can claim
to reach his level.
It is in view of all this that I set out to analyse the historical
parts of Dr. Weizmann's life story as rendered by him in his
book, and to investigate his conclusions on Zionist policy,
labours and leaders.
After what was said above, it does not seem necessary to
add that I am dealing with the parts of Dr. Weizmann's book
6
INTRODUCTORY
which refer to Zionism and his Zionist work only. My aim in
doing so is to draw the author's attention to a number of
errors, inaccuracies, and discrepancies, as well as conclusions;
and to draw the attention of the historian to them should he
consult Dr. Weizmann's memoirs.
There are interesting passages in Trial and Error, moving
paragraphs referring to the Jewish life in the Russian Pale,
and to Dr. Weizmann's home and family. There are many
enumerations of events, with morals deduced from them,
which show the author in his characteristic wit or in his
spiritual preponderance. There can be found a vast store of
short stories which often clarify complicated issues in a flash.
Parallel to them runs the story of a chemist and his work,
which, although mostly a matter for experts, makes pleasant
reading, and helps one to understand the author's method
of approach to other subjects also. I do not concern myself
with any of these particular aspects.
I should further like to point out that I have not included
in my investigation the events of World War II, the inadequacy of documents and literature at my disposal having
prevented my doing so.
Full references to chapter and verse are given in the text.
An index to the literature I have used in my study (and of the
abbreviations employed) can be found on p. 121. Finally, I
should like to stress the fact that I have quoted official
translations where they existed, and am not responsible for
any inaccuracies or harshness they may contain.
It now only remains to state that the edition I have used
was published by Harper & Brothers in New York in 1949.
For the convenience of English readers, the corresponding
pages in the slightly amended English edition (Hamish
Hamilton, London, 1949) are quoted in square brackets [ ].
O.K.R.
I. HERZL AND HERZLIAN ZIONISM
1
L
ARGE sections of the Zionist history dealt with in Dr.
j Weizmann's book are devoted to Herzl and the Herzlian
Zionist conception; and problems as well as controversies—
even those of thirty and forty years after his death—are traced
back to the father of modern Zionism. Thus Herzl's importance is amply exemplified. On the other hand, there is a
definite tendency to depose Herzl from the top place he
occupies in Zionist history and to make him appear insignificant. This tendency is not confined to basic issues alone;
in many respects it digs up minor matters in so far as they
serve the general line of belittling Herzl's importance. In
this respect it is interesting to note that Dr. Weizmann's
references to the same matters in the past often contradict
those in his book. To quote a few instances:
The Judensiaat is to him a "naive" book (p. 44 [62]), which
"contained not a single new idea" (p. 43 [61]), which "by
itself would have been nothing more than a nine days' wonder" (p. 44 [62]), Herzl's name being remembered through
it today only "as one of the oddities ofJewish history" {Ibid.).
Yet, on a previous occasion,1 he found that "the booklet
radiated an atmosphere and a warmth which immediately
won the hearts of the Jewish masses. There was something
messianic in it, particularly so as it appeared at a moment
when the horizon looked black for Russian-Polish Jewry. At
times like these there is always a recrudescence of messianic
hope."
Dr. Weizmann tells us (p. 44 [62]) that when he saw Herzl
for the first time at the Second Zionist Congress in 1898, he
was not at all overwhelmed, as most of the delegates and
guests to Zionist Congresses were: "Though he was impres‫־‬
sive, I cannot say that I was swept off my feet," But seventeen
months previously he registered quite a different impression.
He then said: 2 "To see him was an unforgettable experience.
He glowed—at the time radium was not yet known—with a
kind of Zionist radio-activity, electrifying his entire environ1
%
Basle speech, p. 10.
Ibid. p. 11.
8
FIFTY YEARS OF ZIONISM
ment, urging towards action. He had everything to make us
admire him."
Some other characteristic instances of the same tendency
are those in which the author attributes to Herzl statements
or tendencies which the latter neither made nor pursued. He
says, for instance, that Herzl in his Judenstaat "did not mention Palestine; he ignored the Hebrew language" (p. 43 [61]).
But it is evident from any issue of the Judenstaat that it refers
to the Hebrew language, 1 and contains a whole chapter
headed "Palestine or the Argentine?" wherein the author
says {inter alia):2 "Palestine is our ever memorable historic
home. The very name of Palestine would attract our people
with a force of marvellous potency."
Some pages further on (p. 88 [116]) Dr. Weizmann states
that in his article "The Weepers", Achad Haam also points to
the fact that "Zion had not even been mentioned" in Herzl's
Judenstaat. But Achad Haam's article referred to does not
contain this statement. 3
There is undeniably a tendency in Trial and Error to describe Herzl as the prototype of a "German"—a tendency
which may easily lead the uninformed reader to the conelusion which R. H. S. Grossman, M.P., drew when, after
reading Dr. Weizmann's book, he wrote 4 of the "Teutonic
generalities of Herzl." For instance, Dr. Weizmann says
(p. 44 [62]): "Herzl began by putting the emphasis on
Germany and the Kaiser; afterwards he shifted it to England."
As a matter of fact, Herzl had already suggested in his Judenstaat the establishment of the headquarters of the "Jewish
Company" in London. 5 Adolf Boehm regarded this6 as an
"ingenious foresight, by which he [Herzl] saw from the start
in England the Power which would have to play the most
important role for Zionist policy." At that time, Herzl
planned to get the Prince of Wales to become the protector
of the Jewish State. 7 Later, when his political work commenced, Herzl took his first actual steps for the realisation of
his plans in England. 8 In his famous letter 9 to the foundation
1
Judenstaat, p. 80.
Ibid. p. 41.
Al Parashat Derachim, Berlin, 1921, III, 200-209, "Habochim".
4
The New Statesman and Nation, London, March 26, 1949, p. 303.
5
Judenstaat, p. 43.
6
Boehm I, 163.
7
Diaries I, 59.
8
Ibid. I, 317; Josef Fraenkel, Theodor Herzl• A Biography, London, 1946,
pp. 85-143.
9
Letter reproduced in Goodman, Zionism, p. 18.
2
3
9 FIFTY YEARS OF ZIONISM
conference of the E.Z.F. in 1898, he wrote: "From the first
moment I entered the Movement, my eyes were directed towards England, because I saw that by reason of the general
situation of things there it was the Archimedean point where
the lever could be applied." This was written at a time when
there was no necessity for the Zionist leader to stress a British
orientation. It was written eight months before Herzl met
Kaiser Wilhelm. 1
When Herzl outlined the plan for his diplomatic work, he
wrote: 2 " I shall first negotiate with the Czar (to whom our
protector the Prince of Wales will introduce me) to set the
Russian Jews free . . . Then I shall negotiate with the German
Kaiser. Afterwards with Austria. Then with France, because
of the Algerian Jews." This also shows that Herzl had no fixed
political leanings towards one or other great power, but as
we now know from his work and, as we shall see in the foliowing pages, he was neither "German", "English" nor
"Turkish", but the "first Jewish statesman since the destruction of Jerusalem." 3
2
T
HE same line of thought and the analogous tendency to
minimise Herzl's work, attains in Dr. Weizmann's book
more serious significance in questions of greater importance
in which basic matters are touched upon. The following
paragraph from Trial and Error may serve as an example
(P• 5 2 [7 2 /73]) : "Herzl's pursuit of great men, of princes and
rulers, who were to 'give' us Palestine, was the pursuit of a
mirage. It was accompanied, most unfortunately, but perhaps inevitably, by a shift of the leadership to the right.
Herzl played to the rich and powerful, to Jewish bankers and
financiers, to the Grand Duke of Baden, to Kaiser Wilhelm I I
and to the Sultan of Turkey; later to the British Foreign
Secretary. We, on the other hand, had little faith in the
benevolence of the mighty."
Herzl's political activities on behalf of the Z.O. were based
on Article 4 of the Basle Programme, which emphasises the
necessity of taking "Preparatory steps towards obtaining
consents of governments, which are necessary for the attainment of the Zionist aim." Herzl accordingly approached
ministers and princes, so far as these were heads of States or
1
2
3
Diaries II, 183.
Ibid. I, 59.
Zangwill, quoted in Boehm I, 258.
10
leaders of governments, or were of some political importance
in their respective countries. He negotiated with the German
Kaiser, the British Foreign Secretary, the Pope and the
Russian Minister, von Plehve. It was his duty to do so.
Notwithstanding the efforts to treat these activities with
irony or to belittle them, it is a fact that Herzl did not
"pursue a mirage" but created politically the basis upon
which Dr. Weizmann and his collaborators were able to
work in later years. It was Herzl who, during his lifetime,
laid the foundations which made possible the Balfour
Declaration. The Cabinet in England with which Herzl
negotiated in 1902/1903 was headed by Mr. (later Lord)
Balfour, and that Cabinet's letter of August 14, 1903,1 (fourteen years before the Balfour Declaration) is described by Dr.
Weizmann himself (p. 84 [ i n ] ) as re-establishing "the
identity, the legal personality of the Jewish people"; it was
Mr. Lloyd George who drew up for Herzl in 1903 a draft
charter for an autonomy in East Africa,2 and, during the
debate in Parliament (1904) advocated a pro-Zionist
attitude, 3 and expressed his sympathies with Zionism in a
telegram to a Zionist meeting in Cardiff addressed by L. J .
Greenberg; 4 it was Lord Cromer—whose help in 1916 is
especially stressed by Dr. Weizmann (p. 183 [231/232])—
who learned Zionism from Herzl and Greenberg during their
negotiations with him on El Arish in 1902/1903;5 it was Sir
Edward Grey—contact with whom, in Dr. Weizmann's
words (p. 159 [203]), "led to useful results" during World
War I—who was pro-Zionist in Herzl's days, and expressed
himself so in the Commons debate on East Africa; 6 it was
Lord Milner—High Commissioner in South Africa at the
time of Herzl's negotiations with the British Government
regarding East Africa—who became associated with the
project and was very helpful, 7 and was in later years of great
assistance to Dr. Weizmann (p. 178, 284 [201, 304]).
The names of the statesmen just mentioned are now
synonymous in Jewish history with friendship and assistance to
1
Sir Clement Hill's letter to Greenberg of August 14, 1903. See Protocol V I ,
215-216.
2
Letter from Greenberg to Herzl of July 4, 1903. Copy supplied to me b y
Greenberg's daughter, Mrs. Sholto.
3
Hansard, June 20, 1904.
4
J.C. March 9, 1906, p. 29.
5
Foreign Office Files 78 (547g) Turkey. Immigration of Jews into Palestine etc*
(18g1-1g05); Diaries III, 297-423.
6
Hansard, June 20, 1904.
7
Jewish World, London, November 14, 1917, p. 5.
the Zionist cause. They all learned Zionism in Herzl's school.
One of Dr. Weizmann's most ardent adherents, Jacob Hodess,,
wrote a few days after the publication of the Balfour Declaration: 1 "And it does indeed seem ironic that he [Dr. Weizmann], the most vehement critic of diplomatic Zionism,
should have himself been instrumental in carrying through
such a diplomatic stroke. One pictures the shade of Herzl
saying: 'I have conquered thee, Ghayim, my son; you have
acted in the light of my vision'."
In a speech in 1923, Dr. Weizmann himself paid tribute to
Herzl for his great political preparatory work. He said: 2
"Herzl went further and further. The greatest political suecess has been achieved through the fact that the great
governments began to give consideration to the Zionist
Movement."
On various occasions even Trial and Error records conversa tions with statesmen which make it clear that Herzl had
prepared the political ground upon which Dr. Weizmann
later continued. When the latter met Balfour for the first
time in 1906 the British statesman remembered Herzl, the
Zionist Movement's "very distinguished leader who had
founded and organised it" (p. n o [144]). When he had an
audience with the King of Italy, Dr. Weizmann noticed
(p. 286 [355]) that the King "spoke appreciatively of his
acquaintance with Dr. Herzl (whose photograph stood on his
desk)". And, when he saw Wickham Steed, the Editor of The
Times, Dr. Weizmann narrates (p. 202 [255]): " I found him
not only interested in our movement, but quite well informed
on it. He had known Herzl in Vienna." Notwithstanding all
this important preparatory political work of Herzl's, Dr.
Weizmann still classifies these activities in his book as "the
pursuit of a mirage" (p. 52 [72]) and "nebulous negotiations"
(p. 53 [73]), which were "of a phantom diplomatic triumph"
(p. 81 [108]), and insists (p. 53 [73]) that all this work's
"practical effect was nothing."
In the appraisal of these activities, too, Dr. Weizmann's
method of substituting a retrospective judgment for impressions gained at the time is clearly discernible. In his
autobiography he says (p. 44 [63]): "Young as I was, and
totally inexperienced in worldly matters, I considered the
entire approach simpliste and doomed to failure." But, forty
years before writing his memoirs, and only five years after
1
3
Ibid. p. 13.
Krojanker, p. 130.
12
Herzl's death, he praised the latter 1 for "having brought us
into the political school", where "we learned a little bit of
politics." And later, in a speech in New York in 1923,2 he
admitted: "Our negotiations with the British Government
were simple compared with the unending, intense, tiresome, heartrending negotiations which he [Herzl]
conducted." Even in 1947—seventeen months before
publishing his book—Dr. Weizmann valued Herzl's work
very highly when he said: 3 "To all of us he was first and foremost a great teacher of organisation and politics, although
many of us believed we were experts in diplomacy and politics.
We hearkened to his maxims and his teaching with joy."
3
W
E now turn from what Dr. Weizmann terms (p.52
[72/73]) Herzl's "pursuit of princes and rulers" to his
playing "to the rich and powerful". It is historically correct to
describe Herzl's efforts before calling the First Zionist Congress as dependent on the help of the rich. But, when he saw
that his efforts with Baron Hirsch, the ICA and Lord
Rothschild absorbed his energies without producing or promising results, Herzl turned to the people. Yet Dr. Weizmann
says of him, not only with reference to the pre-Congress period
(p. 45 [63]): "He was not of the people, and did not grasp
the nature of the forces which it harboured." However,
known facts reveal that, once Herzl turned his back on the rich
and instructed his friends in London 4 to "organise the East
End", he found his way to the masses, and proudly regarded
himself as "the man of the poor". 5 In 1909,6 Dr. Weizmann
himself mentioned this reorientation from the rich to the masses
(thus contradicting the quotation from p. 45 [63] referred to
above): "When Herzl commenced his work, when he went to
London, Berlin and Paris, he found closed doors. Afterwards,
he came into the Jewish quarter, and there he found those
*conspirators', and with them he began to work."
There is no doubt that the creation of the Z.O. was an
expression of Herzl's belief in the strength of the masses and
his deep understanding of the forces inherent in them, and
1
Protocol I X , 104.
Krojanker, p. 129.
4
Diaries I, 485.
5
{Ibid.
6
Protocol I X , 104.
2
3
Dr. Weizmann (again contradicting himself) admits this
(p. 45/46 [64]): "Most profound in its effect on the movement was Herzl's creation of the Zionist Congress. Having
failed with the Jewish notables and philanthropists, he turned
to the Jewish masses." On a previous occasion as well he came
to the same conclusion, when he wrote 1 that Herzl, "a true
aristocrat by nature . . . was instinctively drawn towards the
'common people' who so trustfully acclaimed him at first
sight as their leader."
Into the same category falls Dr. Weizmann's statement
(p. 52 [72]) that "Herzl had no access" to the youth, and "he
did not speak its language." The student organisations in
Vienna, Berlin, Prague, Brno, in France and in Switzerland,
were the first to join Herzl enthusiastically, and they became
the vanguard of Zionism. One only needs to read reports on
meetings at ‫ ן‬the Viennese "Kadimah" or the "Juedische
Akademische Lese- und Redehalle", 2 to appreciate that
enthusiasm. Dr. Weizmann contradicts himself by pointing
on another page (p. 43 [62]) to the student groups from
which "Herzl drew much of his early support." They understood Herzl, and he understood them. The hundreds of
addresses sent to him by the young Jews bear witness to this. 3
"Herzl's Yinglach" was a well known slogan of anti-Zionists
at the time, as it was almost entirely a movement of youth;
and "the laughter grew louder in journalistic circles" 4
because of that "movement of boys". But, with the help of
these young men, students and professionals, Herzl set out to
build the Z.O. He would never have achieved this great task
if he had not had access to them and had not spoken their
language. And they in turn were the people who "did everything that lay in their power to encourage Herzl along the
path of leadership." 5
While Herzl's way thus led to the masses, Trial and Error
reveals that Dr. Weizmann's way took the reverse direction:
he began as one of the vast Jewish mass, and, on attaining
his high position, turned to the rich and mighty. We see him
at first struggling in the "Democratic Fraction" (p. 52 [72]),
and continuously stressing the poverty and greatness of the
masses, but, in the other parts of the book, there are frequent
1
Chaim Weizmann, "The Laurels of Immortality", in Theodor Herzl,
Memorial, ed. by M. W. Weisgal, New York, 1929, p. 16.
2
Diaries I, 343, 350.
3
Boehm I, 169.
4
Bein, p. 186.
5
Ibid.
A
14
meetings with Baron Edmond de Rothschild (p. 137 [177])
or Mrs. Dorothy de Rothschild (p. 160 [205]); conversations
or negotiations with the Hon. Walter Rothschild (he is incorrectly indexed Lord Walter) and his brother Charles
(p. 161 [205]), with James de Rothschild (p. 160 [205]) and
Sir Philip Magnus (p. 161 [205]); or visits to the "political
salon in her wonderful house on Curzon Street" of Lady
Crewe (p. 160/161 [205]); or approaches to Lady Astor
(p. 332 [412]), Lady Passfield and Mrs. Philip Snowden
(p. 331 [410]). One could go on enumerating dozens of
ladies and gentlemen upon whom Dr. Weizmann waited,
who are of the category which—when referring to Herzl
(p. 52 [73])—he would call his "playing to the rich and
powerful.'' The above mentioned facts do not bear out Dr.
Weizmann's statement (p. 52 [73]) that he and his friends
"on the other hand, had little faith in the benevolence of the
mighty", and that (p. 44 [63]) he "had no faith at all in the
rich Jews." Among the names selected at random above, no
reference is made to the vast number of "Jewish bankers and
financiers" upon whom Dr. Weizmann "waited" during the
years of his efforts for the enlarged Jewish Agency. The
Marshalls, Warburgs, Wassermanns, etc., were the types
of those "bankers and financiers" for whom—when speaking
in relation to Herzl—Dr. Weizmann has few kind words to
say. It was one of his old comrades-in-arms since 1901,
Yizchak Gruenbaum, who appealed to him in 1923 to return
from pursuing the rich and powerful to the Herzlian conception of mass-Zionism. He said:1 "The most tragic words
uttered once by Dr. Weizmann, which he often repeats, are:
Jewish people, what have you done, Jewish people, where
are you? . . . But do you want to find it in the salons and in
the organisations of the money Jews? . . . Dr. Weizmann
was once the leader of the Democratic Fraction. I should like
to talk to him as a one-time member, as the conscience of the
Democratic Fraction. We must not become unfaithful to the
principle of the people's movement, of a mass movement, to
the principle of the leader's responsibility, otherwise the
Zionist organs would turn into a Committee, and the
Zionist Movement into a colonisation enterprise." But Dr.
Weizmann did not hearken to this voice from his own past
and continued his "pursuit of the rich", although he confessed
frankly (p. 307 [380]) that "to the people whose co-operation
we sought, the ultra-democratic machinery of Congresses was
1
Protocol X I I I , 120.
wholly unattractive." He even expresses thanks to and
satisfaction with those {Ibid.) who "agreed with me that it
would be a grave mistake to exclude from our work, on
grounds of purely formal 'democracy', those powerful and
responsible groups of American Jews." This is a classical
example of the tendency which does not believe in the masses
and turns, therefore, away from them in search of other
sources of strength.
4
P
URSUING his tendency to minimise Herzl's importance,
Dr. Weizmann sees the main source for Herzl's lack of
understanding ofthepeople and oftrue Zionism in "the Western
conception of Zionism, which we felt to be lacking in
Jewishness, in warmth and in understanding of the Jewish
masses" (p. 53 [73]). This is partly a continuation of what
was said about Herzl's relations to the masses in the preceding
section. We concern ourselves here with the geographical
differentiation—East and West—which returns again and
again throughout Dr. Weizmann's book, whenever the author
tries to explain a Zionist problem, even at a time when he
declared 1 himself as a kind of semi-Westerner, because "long
years of life in the West cannot remain without consequences:
and the British climate is so cold." He speaks of Herzl, the
"Westerner"—notwithstanding his own admission (p. 53
[73/741) that Herzl had some understanding of the Russian
Jews, which he expressed "immediately after the First
Congress." But he does not believe him. "With all this
intuitive perception", he says (p. 53 [74]), "this generosity of
understanding, Herzl could not remake his own approach to
Zionism." No proof, however, of this statement is submitted.
As to the matter itself, it suffices to contrast Dr. Weizmann's
continuous stressing of the cleavage between "East and
West" with the emphatic statement made by Herzl in his
Judenstaat, even before he actually became a Zionist: "We
are one people: one people." 2 This proves his intention
right from the start to do away with the unorganised and
scattered Jewries and to organise them into one unified
nation.
Later, in 1898, at the Second Zionist Congress (the first
attended by Dr. Weizmann (p. 49 [68]) ), Herzl spoke at a
1
2
Goodman, p. 196.
Judenstaat, p. 27.
16
banquet of the Russian Zionists, and there outlined his belief
in the necessity for doing away with the divisions in Jewry,
whether they live in the "East" or in the "West", whether
they are orthodox, radical or socialist. It was the Zionist task
to unite them into one nation again. He compared himself
with a cooper. " I am a good cooper," he said,1 "and I under‫־‬
stand the art, to make one whole cask out of many various
boards. And our boards vary so considerably! I understand
how to hoop one whole cask out of the extremely different
parts. And I shall unify our cask with our hoops, which are
kept together by our past and our future. And the cask will
not remain empty; it will be filled with our national principles:
Right and Justice."
Ussishkin, Herzl's great opponent, regarded Herzl's efforts
for the unification of "East" and "West", as his greatest
achievement. He said in 1904:2 "The Jewish world was eight
years ago split into two camps, East and West . . . then
Herzl came and said: We must unite East and West. . . and
he did it. This was what Herzl gave the Jewish people: unity."
None other but Dr. Weizmann himself praised Herzl's
efforts to establish unity within Jewry as his most important deed. He said in a speech in New York in 1923:3
" H e [Herzl] came like an eagle from the sky. He found
completely splintered elements. And I believe that it was
Herzl's greatest achievement to have given a definite form
and a definite expression to these errant feelings which lay
splintered and dormant in the Jewish people. He created the
Zionist Organisation."
I have not found in any of Herzl's speeches, articles, or
letters, any indication of lack of respect for or belittlement of
"Eastern" Jewry, nor any desire whatever to do anything
but strive to unite the nation into one whole.
As was pointed out, and is so visible in Trial and Error, this
is contrasted by Dr. Weizmann's repeated elaboration of the
difference between "East" and "West", which is not only
characteristic of his outlook in the Herzlian era, but marks
his approach to most of the Zionist leaders with whom he
came in conflict. But whereas Herzl always sought to
bridge the various sections of opinion and unite them,
1
Recorded by Litman Rosenthal, in Tribune, London, 1922, No. X I , p. 32.
Speech at a memorial meeting in Vienna, July 10, 1904, in Die Welt, No.
29, July 15, 1904, p. 8.
3
Krojanker, p. 129.
2
17 F I F T Y Y E A R S O F Z I O N I S M
Dr. Weizmann's attitude is expressed in his well known
phrase: 1 "We are different, absolutely different. There is no
bridge between Pinsk and Washington" [i.e., between
East and West]. This was his creed in 1921 and his autobiography confirms that it has not changed since (pp. 43 [61],
47 [66], 53 [ 7 3 ] 7 4 / 7 5 ]
54
‫י‬
L
68 [92], 6g [93
87 [115], 107 [139], 121 [156], 267 [333])•
Dr. Weizmann has strong words also against men like
Max Nordau, Alexander Marmorek, Leopold J . Greenberg,
all "Westerners who joined" Herzl and "did not believe that
Russian Jewry was capable of furnishing leaders to the movement" (p. 53 [73]). One has only to read Nordau's appreciation of Russian Jewry and its youth 2 in the cause of Zionism
—before Herzl's appearance and after—to arrive at a correct
appraisal of his attitude. It would lead too far to quote the
deep, moving words about the Jews in the East of Europe and
especially in Russia, spoken at the First Congress.3 It was
Nordau, who, after the First Congress, having made the
acquaintance there of Jews from the East, wrote: 4 "The
Zionist ideas came to me in lofty embodiments, of which the
proudest is my friend Theodor Herzl. At the Congress of
Basle I came to know another kind of Judaism, which
reconciled me to my race." Nordau's opposition in his
correspondence with Herzl to the East Africa offer of the
British Government was partly based on his deep understanding of the East European Jews, their tradition, and
history. 5 Finally, it was Nordau who persuaded the "Easterner" (if a pure specimen ever existed!) Wolffsohn, to become
Herzl's successor,6 thus showing that he regarded Russian
Jewry capable of furnishing not only leaders but even the
President.
Greenberg, too, although born in England, was not a
"Westerner" in the derogatory way in which the word is
applied in Trial and Error. A glance at his articles and speeches
on the Russian and Polish Jews, 7 and his fight for their rights,
1
Dr. Weizmann's address delivered at the Cleveland Convention of the Z . O .
in America, on J u n e 8, 1921. In The World Zionist Organisation and the Keren
Hayesod Controversy in America. Statements and Documents. London, 1921, p. 87.
2
Max Nordau, Zionism, New York, 1905, pp. 20-25.
3
Protocol I, 21, 23, 27, 30/31.
4
Anna and Maxa Nordau, p. 155.
5
Bein, p. 444.
6
A. Robinsohn, David Wolffsohn, Berlin, 1921, p. 65.
7
For instance, "Alien Immigration", in Jewish Tear Book, London, 5663, pp.
409-423; 5664, pp.434-453; 5665, pp. 473-493, and in the J.C. from 1903
onwards. See also Jewish Chronicle 1841—1941, London, 1949, p. 125, 139/140.
18
reveals a deep love and understanding for those masses. So do
his activities in the London Russian Society.1
It seems completely unreal when one reads of such sharp
divisions between Herzl and his circle as the "Westerners" on
the one hand, and the "Eastern" Zionists on the other. Such
a geographical differentiation does not stand scrutiny for a
moment. Herzl himself was born in Budapest, and, by all
standards of value in Jewish eyes, this was regarded as an
"Eastern" city. Nordau also was born in Budapest, and his
mother was from Russia (Lithuania), while his father wrote
Hebrew poetry, and received his education on the RussianGerman border—spiritually much nearer to the Russian side.2
Dr. Alexander Marmorek was born in Mielnice,3 and his
brother Oscar in Skala (both in Galicia). 4 Dr. Kokesch5 also
came from that country, while Dr. Leopold Kahn was born
in Suczawa (Bukovina),6 Dr. Moritz Tobias Schnirer in
Bukarest (Rumania), 7 and Johann Kremenetzky in Odessa
(Russia). 8 Not one of the members of Herzl's Inner Zionist
A.C. (I could not trace the birthplace of Dr. A. Minz) was a
'Westerner". They all came from the "East", like Dr.
Weizmann himself, and like him, they continued their studies
in the West and then settled there permanently.
It is interesting to contrast these facts with Dr. Weizmann's
own circle. Right at the beginning of his career, when he set
out to participate in the formation of the "Democratic
Fraction", his two most celebrated friends and collaborators
were Martin Buber and Berthold Feiwel (p. 63/64 [86]).
Both were "Westerners", Buber was born in Vienna, 8 and
Feiwel in Pohrlitz (Moravia) .x 0 One ofhis closest collaborators
and "brother‫־‬in‫־‬ideal", was Dr. Ruppin (p. 129 [165/166]),
who was born in Rawitsch (Germany). 11 It was Dr. Eder
(born in London) 12 whom Dr. Weizmann entrusted with a
most important post in Palestine (p. 226 [284]) and in his
Executive (p. 295 [366]); also his successor, Colonel Frederick
1
Landman, p. 262.
Nordau's autobiographical letter to Brainin, in Lmh Ahiassaf, 5658.
3
J . Lex. I l l , 1385.
4
Ibid. 1386.
5
Ibid., 761.
6
Ibid., 537.
7
Ibid. V, 233.
8
Ibid. I l l , 890.
9
Ibid. I, 1189.
10
Ibid. II, 617.
11
Ibid. IV, 1537.
. 12 Ibid. II, 235.
2
Kisch (son of a British official, born in India), 1 who conducted
Zionist affairs in Palestine between 1922 and 1931 (p. 296
[367]). Richard Lichtheim, another of Dr. Weizmann's
Executive members (p. 420 [515]), was born in Berlin, 2 and
Julius Simon in Mannheim (Germany), 3 while Nehemiah de
Lieme came from The Hague. 4 Van Vriesland, Louis Lipsky,
Harry Sacher, Miss H. Szold, Dr. Felix Rosenblueth, and
many more, were also born in the "West". It would be futile
to continue this enumeration, especially if it were to include
names of American, English and German Zionists who
became the pillars of "Weizmannism", or of persons highly
active with Dr. Weizmann in the enlarged Jewish Agency,
where so many of his collaborators were American and
European "Westerners". It was Dr. Weizmann himself who
pointed in 1927 to the phenomenon that he and his Zionist
colleagues were educated in the West:5 "Germany and the
German speaking countries gave us the officers of the Zionist
Movement for almost a generation. We all, who now stand
in the Zionist Movement, have gone to school in Germany,
and especially here in Berlin."
One of the main objections against the "Westerners" seems
to Dr. Weizmann to be their belief that the "Easterners"
were incapable of supplying leaders for Zionism (p. 54 [74]):
"Excluded as we were from the leadership of the movement,
we were expected to regard ourselves merely as its beneficiaries, and not, as we felt ourselves to be, the true source of its
strength." We have already pointed out that "the Litvak"
Wolffsohn was elected President through Nordau's efforts. An
important factor should not be overlooked, namely, that
Herzl could not rule against the "Easterners" as they
represented the great majority in the Z.O. and at the
Congresses. The official Protocols confirm beyond any doubt
that the delegates attending Zionist Congresses from East
European countries were always in the majority, and could
have disposed of Herzl or any of his officers at any time. This
majority is, in fact, co-responsible with Herzl's Executives for
the policy pursued, because they accepted it time and again
at Congresses, as well as at meetings of the A.C.
This continuous emphasis in Trial and Error on the geographical cleavage reminds one that it was at one time
1
2
3
Ibid. I l l , 721.
Ibid. 1103.
Ibid. V, 429.
*Ibid.
Ill, mo.
5
Krojanker, p. 164.
20
a welcome weapon against Herzl in the hands of the
opposition. Many of them regarded Herzl as an "intruder"
who came from a strange unknown world. Dr. Weizmann
himself remarks (p. 43 [61]) that "we had never heard the
name Herzl before", and the narrative does not leave the
reader unmindful of the fact that Herzl was "this Westerner
[who] came to us" (p. 43 [61]). One of these "us", Dr. Adolf
Friedemann, once formulated this attitude towards Herzl in
the following words: 1 "For a long time past I was active for
the idea, and it annoyed me like many others that a strange,
unknown man took over the leadership as a foregone conelusion." But it was left to Dr. Tshlenov, one of the Russian
Zionist leaders, to proclaim the end of this division in a
statement confessing2 "that he had always considered
Western Zionists to be animated solely by philanthropic
motives, and he was glad to modify this view and to find the
Western Zionists on the same platform as their Eastern
comrades." And as in some other instances, Dr. Weizmann
also supplies us in this connection with a remarkable statement made at the time when the controversy about "East"
and "West" was at its peak. He said: 3 "It is self-understood
that no Zionist, if he is a sincere and good Zionist, makes any
difference between Eastern and Western Jews." This was
said in 1901, 48 years before the appearance of Trial and
Error.
5
W
HAT does the main difference between the "Easterners'*
and "Westerners" consist of in Dr. Weizmann's view?
It is the difference between the "mechanic" and "organic"
Zionism. The "mechanic" (p. 53 [74]), also called
"schematic" Zionism, (p. 47 [66]) Dr. Weizmann attributes
to Herzl and to all those whom he regards as his followers,
like (p. 363 [448]) "Greenberg, Marmorek, Nordau . . .
Jabotinsky and the Revisionists." He defines this conception
as follows (p. 44 [62]): "As he [Herzl] saw it, or seemed to see
it, there were rich Jews and there were poor Jews. The rich
Jews, who wanted to help the poor Jews, had considerable
influence in the councils of the nations. And then there was
the Sultan of Turkey, who always wanted money, and who
1
2
3
Theodor Herzl, in Juedischer Volkskalender 5666, Bruenn, 1905, p. 16.
Meeting of the A.C. in Vienna, 1904, in J.C. April 22, 1904, p. 19/20.
Protocol V , 54.
was in possession of Palestine. What was more logical then,
than to get the rich Jews to give the Sultan money to allow
the poor Jews to go to Palestine?"
It was not always that Dr. Weizmann regarded this conception as typical "mechanic" Zionism, which he set in contrast to his "organic" one. In a speech in New York in 1923, he
said:1 "Which was the first Zionist formula? It was as follows:
Here are the Jews who need a country, and here is a country
which needs a people. Here are rich Jews who have got the
money and here is the Sultan who needs the money. Why
not combine those four things? This was the formula which I,
myself, repeatedly preached in every small, dark corner of the
Ghetto. And thus we set forth to realise it."
I find it impossible to understand why this "mechanic" and
"schematic" Zionism should be described as "Western" and
as expression of "naivity" (p. 44 [62]) and of "lack of faith"
(p. 363 [448]) when adhered to by Herzl and his followers;
but turns into "Eastern" and "organic", and becomes the
incarnation of a power which gives "will, direction, organisation and the feeling of realities" (p. 45 [63]) to the masses
if applied by Dr. Weizmann himself.
An analysis of Herzl's attitude brings clearly to light thefact
that his conception cannot be classified as a "mechanical"
one at all. At the First Congress he formulated 2 as one of the
fundamental pre-conditions for the attainment of the Zionist
aim "the homecoming to Judaism before the return to the
Jewish land." He made this still clearer in an article 3 in
which he said: "Zionism, as I understand it, signifies not
merely striving for a legally assured soil for our people, but
also striving after moral and intellectual perfection." All this
pre-supposes an important process of organisation and
education, in the course of which the people must be
"encouraged to self help" in order to find itself. "We organise
Jewry for its future destinies" is how Herzl described on
another occasion the Zionist task.4 This is diametrically
opposed to the "quick solution" (p. 81 [108]) which Dr.
Weizmann so often attributes in his book to Herzl or his
followers in later years. There did not exist for Herzl any
quick solution by mechanical means. He introduced himself
to the Jewish and non-Jewish world at the First Congress
1
2
3
4
Krojanker, p. 130.
Protocol I, 16.
Preface to Unsere Hoffnung, in Vienna, reprinted in J.C. April 15,1904, p. 22.
Protocol IV, 6.
22
with the statement: 1 "In doing so [i.e., educating the people
for Zionism] no premature, unhealthy hopes should be
stimulated." In 1900, Herzl again warned the people:2 "Let
those who run after immediate successes steal away from
under our flag."
And it was Nordau who gave the following warning to the
East European Jewish masses in 1899:3 "These Jewish masses
think that this is the essence of Zionism: In Vienna [Herzl's
residence] or in one of the other big cities, there live great
and well known men who, by most secret ways, negotiate
with the representatives of the governments, with princes . . .
and kings
and persuade them to give Palestine to the Jews.
And when they get it, they turn to the Jewish people with
these words: Dear brethren, here is the agreement signed and
sealed that Palestine was given to you for your eternal ownership. And here is the money which is needed for the transfer of
the Jews from dispersion into Palestine. . . . This is a selfdeception of grave and dangerous consequences, and it is our
duty to dispel and wipe it out. Historical events do not take
such a path. The leaders will not give presents to the people,
because they have nothing else at their hands but what the
people will give them in order to enable them to bring the
Zionist idea to fact. . . . The way to this is the preparation of
the Jewish people for Palestine.... We are obliged, therefore,
to work fully for the preparation of Jewry by way of moral
and political education, before we even set out to work for the
settlement of Palestine." This not only refutes any idea of a
"mechanic" conception, it also shows that any suggestion of
a desire on the part of Herzl and his colleagues for "pursuing
princes and rulers" (p. 52 [72]), without the support of the
masses, has no foundation.
All this is also far from the "quick solution" (p. 81 [108],
far from the belief "that things could be done in a hurry"
(p. 45 [63]), far from the way so "easy for Nordau to believe
in the possibility of a tremendous and miraculous leap forward in Zionist work" (p. 47 [66]), and far from Herzl's
"pursuit of. . . men. . . who were to 'give' us Palestine"
(p.52 [72]). Herzl did not believe in miracles, nor did he ever
rely on them. He began doing things. We saw what he
achieved politically in the few years of his activity4, and we
shall refer later on to the results of his activities in the field
1
2
3
4
ibid, I, 17.
Ibid. IV, 8.
Luah Ahiassafy 5659.
See p. 9-12.
of practical work. This, of course, implies a great leap
forward, because the amount of work often determines the
essence of a Movement. "Tempo" is thus one of the essentials,
and Herzl considerably accelerated the tempo of the Zionist
Movement; he converted it into a movement of today.
One rather gains the impression from some of Dr. Weizmann's steps that they bear the sign of "panic" or of "quick
solutions", far from any "organic" way of gradual and slow
development. For instance, when he prepared the enlargement of the Jewish Agency, he spoke1 of a "crisis which we
went through last year, we never shall be able to get through
again". Therefore, he came to the conclusion2 "that we ourselves shall not be able to solve the great problems with the
speed with which they must be solved". And when reproached
by Gruenbaum 3 not to "pursue the money Jews" but to return
to the original conception of Zionism as a mass-movement, he
replied: 4 "Naturally, Mr. Gruenbaum can wait. I saw also
other Jews who can wait. But I believe that the situation is
such that we cannot wait''. Surely, this tendency is far from
what Dr. Weizmann defines as his "organic" Zionism, of a
"slow and gradual" development, a conception (p. 45 [63])
"which had to grow like a plant, had to be watched, watered
and nursed, if it was to reach maturity".
6
D
R. WEIZMANN sees in Herzl's and his colleagues'
attitude towards practical work another symptom of the
"Western" or "mechanic" conception of Zionism. "For them
it was always political Zionism first and practical work nowhere" (p.68 [92]), because their "quick solution" brought it
about that "the official Zionist Organisation had neglected
the spiritual development, leaving that to us of the Democratic Fraction" (p. 81 [108]).
What does Dr. Weizmann understand by practical work?
He has in mind cultural activity first, and colonisation in
Palestine second.
As in questions of "East" and "West", of "political"
and "practical" work, of "mechanic" and "organic" Zionism, Dr. Weizmann also tends as regards culture to
accentuate differences, in contrast to Herzl, who always
1
2
3
1
Protocol
Ibid. p.
Ibid. p.
Protocol
X I I I , 226.
227.
120; see also p. 14.
X I I I , 226.
24
pleaded for bridging them over. The autobiography does not
conceal the fact that Dr. Weizmann was all along in his Zionist career opposed to the religious concept of the Mizrachi
(p. 52, 81, 86,. 301, 338, 386 [73, 108, 114, 373, 418, 475]),
notwithstanding the fact that it was only thanks to the
Mizrachi that at most of the Zionist Congresses he got a working majority and was elected President, and they in turn had
joined his Executives.1 Dr. Weizmann blames Herzl (p. 81 /82
[108]) for the "clericalist coloring" of his Zionism, and for his
(P* 45 [63]) "excessive respect for the Jewish clergy", so that
(ibid.) "his leaning towards clericalism distressed us". It is
interesting to recall in this connection that Rabbis, on the
other hand, blamed Herzl (who was not an observant Jew)
as one who,2 "far from understanding true Judaism, . . . considers all great Rabbis, heads of congregations and Jewish
scholars, as being valueless."
Herzl's own statements clearly show his tendency to
neutrality in regard to this problem, for he wished to unite in
the ranks of the Z.O. all forces in Jewry without any regard
to their religious, social and other differences.3 When the
Basle Rabbi, Dr. Cohn, expressed the fear 4 at the First
Zionist Congress that orthodox Jewry may be "oppressed" in
the Jewish State, Herzl replied: 5 "Zionism does not intend to
do anything that could infringe the religious conviction of any
group within Jewry."
At the following Congress6 (1898), a resolution was accepted stating: "Zionism does not only strive for the economic
and political but also for the spiritual regeneration of the
Jewish people, and finds itself therein on the ground of
modern culture, to the achievements of which it strongly
adheres. Zionism will do nothing that contradicts the Jewish
religious laws." Herzl and his Executives strictly obeyed and
adhered to that decision, and he stated so officially three years
later from the platform of the Congress.7 At the Second Congress also, a "General Hebrew-Speaking Society" was established with the head office in Vienna. 8
1
Protocol X I I (1921); X I I I (1923); X I V (1925); X V I (1929); X I X (!935);
X X (1937); X X I (1939),
2
Dr. A. Kaminka, in Hamaggid, April 5, 1898, quoted in Bein (German ed.)
P• 395•
3
See p. 15/16.
4
Protocol I, 215.
5
Ibid. p. 216.
6
Ibid. II, 222.
7
Ibid. V, 425.
8
Ibid. II, 222.
At the Third Congress Herzl again pleaded for neutrality
and said1 that "the Zionist movement keeps itself completely
aloof from interfering in matters of creed, in matters of the
various forms of the Jewish denominations, and we do not
regard it our duty to conduct here religious debates. And as
you know, we are therein not less Jewish than the Rabbis
who, when they meet, exclude discussions on religious
questions. We do not believe that it can contribute to strength•ening of bur movement, if we bring into the movement such
divergences of views which are so natural in this field. We
esteem and respect every religious conviction. This is selfunderstood among civilised people, in the same way as we
fully respect the political party differences; and as within
Zionism all political convictions have room, so it is with the
religious questions. This should not be our concern. We are
Jews, we are nationally conscious Jews, we have a common
ground, upon which we can, shall and will work. Let us not
weaken ourselves by emphasising now our differences, which
certainly will come in time and will contribute to the useful
life of the people. Because these differences are not at all bad
in themselves, if they will be brought out at the right time
and will then serve as mutual correctives."
Thus we see that Herzl did not in any way lean to the one
or the other side, but always sought to stress the necessity of
avoiding a clash, emphasising his desire to unite both for the
common task. He showed a full understanding of religious
convictions, as he did in the same measure of matters of
modern culture; which is self-understood in the case of
Herzl, a true exemplar of a man of modern culture.
When, for instance, the opposition against him grew,
which finally led to the establishment of the "Democratic
Fraction" (p. 52/53 [72/73]), Herzl did not hesitate to appoint as editors of Die Welt leading members of that group,
first Berthold Feiwel (Dr. Weizmann's close associate (p. 63
[86])), and in summer 1901, Martin Buber (another of Dr.
Weizmann's close friends (Ibid.)), and even accepted Buber's
condition that Die Welt, Herzl's own paper, become "the
organ and the centre of the young Jewish spiritual and
cultural movement". 2 This clearly proves his personal regard
and understanding for the ideas fought for by these opponents
of his.
1
2
Ibid. I l l , 78.
Bein (German ed.), p. 514.
26
So far as Dr. Weizmann is concerned, the debate on
"culture" had its highlight at the Fifth Congress, when the
"Democratic Fraction" entered the debate in the name of
culture. What did they suggest? They demanded: 1 Education
of the Jewish people in the national sense; the setting up of a
permanent statistical commission; study of the question of
establishing a Jewish High School (University); the establishment of a cultural commission in every territorial organisation to report on their activities at every Congress; to ask the
Stockholm Nobel Prize Institute to give to modern Hebrew
and Jewish literature their place at the Library of the
Institute; a subvention of 2,000 francs for the National
Library in Jerusalem; a loan to Der Juedische Verlag of 2,500
francs, 50 per cent repayable from subscriptions; the distribution of prospectuses of Der Juedische Verlag to all local
organisations before the middle of February, 1902.
There is no doubt that Herzl's conception was entirely based
on the presumption that the Jewish was a national question,
and that, in order to lead the people to Zion, an educational
process on national lines would have to be carried out. He
said at the First Congress in his opening speech:2 "Congress
will have to deal also with the spiritual means for the revival
and for the cultivation of the Jewish national consciousness
. . . We do not think of giving up the smallest part of our
acquired culture but think of a further deepening of culture,
which is the meaning of all knowledge."
The suggestion of setting up a statistical office was made by
Nordau, accepted by the "Democratic Fraction", and submitted to the Congress in their name. 3
Speaking of the University resolution, Dr. Weizmann maintains (p. 68 [92]) that "the Western Zionist leaders considered
the idea Utopian to the point of childishness". But none of
the "Westerners" spoke at the Congress against the University or its idea; it was an "Easterner" (to use Dr. Weizmann's
nomenclature), the Russian delegate, Avinovitzki, who, in
his Congress speech, regarded the University as a "pious
wish", and said that if a resolution is desired, "there is
nothing against expressing a wish". 4
It is worth while to note in this connection that, although
always very anxious to show that in this or that instance
Herzl did not think of Palestine, in his speech at that Fifth
1
2
3
4
Protocol V , 389-393.
Ibid. I, 16; III, 78.
Ibid. V , 390.
Ibid. p. 423.
Congress on the University, Dr. Weizmann did not once
mention the suggestion for its establishment in Palestine, 1
while in his autobiography he refers to this subject as the
"Hebrew University in Jerusalem" 2 (p. 68 [92]). It was
actually Herzl who took up Dr. Weizmann's general suggestion and submitted it sua sponte to the Sultan, as an institution
to be established in Palestine, with the observation that a
University in Jerusalem could also be of importance to
Turkish students. But nothing came of this intervention. 3
When the suggestions referred to came before the Congress
Herzl clashed with the members of the "Democratic Fraction" on the question of procedure, because he had promised
them to have the resolutions discussed before the elections of
the new A.C. 4 But the deliberations of the Congress on the
Bank dragged on too long, and Herzl saw that if a debate on
culture was to open, for which sixty speakers had been registered, 5 the Congress would disperse without electing a leadership. Therefore he asked6 that the discussion be postponed and
be conducted "after we have held the elections which are
indispensable for the future existence and functioning of the
movement". Thereon, Buber, accepting Motzkin's suggestion, 7 proposed that only a vote be taken, without a debate. 8
But Herzl had already said 9 before this that the cultural
question "is too serious to be decided incidentally. Tfiis
question demands a full debate, and if you don't believe that,
then you don't regard that question as serious, as it actually
is". Congress voted for Herzl's view, and the elections of the
A.C. took place. 10 Thereafter the members of the "Democratic
Fraction" left the Congress hall, 11 as Herzl later explained, 12
"in the wrong assumption that a vote in principle had been
taken". After the elections, Herzl pleaded with the Congress
to enter into a debate on the cultural resolutions and his
suggestion was accepted. 13 When the vote was finally taken,,
1
His speech in Protocol V , 392/393.
In the booklet Eine Juedische Hochschule (Berlin, 1902), the authors, Buber,
Feiwel and Weizmann, suggest the establishment of a Jewish University in.
Switzerland or England (because Palestine was not then feasible).
3
Diaries III, 199, 203, 213.
4
Protocol V , 400/401.
5
Ibid. p. 401.
6
Ibid. p. 399.
7
Ibid.
8
Ibid. p. 400.
9
Ibid. p. 398.
10
Ibid. p. 402.
11
Ibid. p. 412.
12
Ibid.
13
Ibid. p. 419.
2
28
Herzl himself introduced the resolutions with a speech, 1 in
which he again pointed to the Zionist movement as not intended to do anything that would infringe religious convictions, and simultaneously constituting a centre of modern
culture. Herzl voted for all the resolutions. Congress followed
him in most instances,2 but opposed some, which contained
financial demands for certain institutions, as, for instance, the
establishment of a paid commission for statistics and the payment to Der Juedische Verlag.3 Notwithstanding this negative
vote Herzl promised to take these matters up with the A.C.,
and appealed to the Zionists to support them. 4
All this clearly shows that Herzl had a deep understanding
of the cultural question, that he assisted wherever he could,
and that his was a lion's share in securing the acceptance by
Congress of the resolutions formulated by Dr. Weizmann and
his friends.
Notwithstanding all this Dr. Weizmann states (p. 81 [108])
that Herzl "had neglected the spiritual development of the
movement, leaving that to us of the Democratic Fraction",
and emphasises (p. 68 [92]) that "we went ahead in the face
of their opposition". What did they do? Buber, Feiwel, Lilien
and Trietsch established a publishing house, Der Juedische
Verlag, in Berlin in 1902, which edited highly important
books on Jewish knowledge, art and literature, while Dr.
Weizmann opened an office of the Jewish University in
Geneva (p. 68 [92]). The office published the following
accounts 5 for the period ended December 31, 1903:
Income:
Cash in hand (15. VII)
Jewish Colonial Bank
Total
1
Frs.
Frs. 1250.69
Ibid. p. 424/425.
Ibid. p. 425-428.
3
Ibid. p. 428-430.
4
Ibid.
® Die Welt, No. 1, January 1, 1904, p. 15.
2
750.69
500
Expenses:
I. JOURNEYS.
For studying the technical secondary school
Winterthur-Zurich
Frs.
Berne-Biel
For organising a holiday course
45
35
1
75
II. OFFICE.
Salary of secretary
Rent
Stamps, telegrams, etc.
Total expenditure
Gash in hand
480
150
136.95
Frs. 1021.95
228.74
Frs. 1250.69
This then was the result after two years of "going ahead in the
face of opposition". The only big contribution, that of the
bank, is, of course, that of Herzl's "official Zionism", and it
covers the greater part of the budget. One thus feels that the
"Westerners" had some understanding for Dr. Weizmann's
cultural suggestions. In the list of contributors one misses
names of members of the "Democratic Fraction" and of
other "Kultur-Zionisten" who fought so ardently for the idea.
In the end it was David Wolffsohn, the most faithful
adherent of Herzl and Herzlian Zionism—the man who
"looked upon us younger men as something like desperadoes,
quite unfit to be entrusted with responsibilities" (p. 112 [146])
—who made to the University "the first substantial contribution toward its fulfilment . . . the gift of one hundred
thousand marks—twenty-five thousand dollars" (p. 137
[176]). This cannot, indeed, be classified as a "Utopian"
attitude "to the point of childishness" (p. 68 [92]).
While in his book Dr. Weizmann writes (p. 68 [92]) that he
and his friends "went ahead with the work in the face of their
opposition", he confessed 36 years previously1 that they did
not go ahead and did not do anything at all, because "the
time was apparently not yet ripe, and the interest for Palestine matters and especially for cultural questions was not yet
deep enough, to enable a successful activity".
1
Protocol X I , 30 x.
30
It seems appropriate to conclude this part of the analysis
with another quotation from Dr. Weizmann, with which he
again refutes his statement (p. 81 [108]) that Herzl "had
neglected the spiritual development of the movement". The
statement, made only in 1947, reads: 1 "In spite of all that
has been written about him, Herzl did take keen interest in
certain cultural elements of the Zionist Movement. When
people spoke of Jewish culture at the First and Second Congress, Herzl still asked what it actually meant. But once he
had learned something about it, he began to take a very keen
interest in questions of Jewish culture".
7
H
AVING dealt with the cultural side of Zionist work,
it now remains to analyse the second, namely, the
*'practical" work for and in Palestine which, according to
Dr. Weizmann (p.68 [92]), was disregarded by Herzl and
the "political" Zionists. In this respect, too, the reproach is
not justified. Because, even before the First Congress, Herzl
proved himself eminently practical in his approach to the
solution of the Jewish question. As every page reveals, his
Judenstaat is a blueprint for practical work.
After the First Congress, in the political field as well as
in the practical, the basis for Herzl's activities was derived
from the Basle Programme. Article II recommends "the promotion on suitable lines of the colonisation of Palestine by
Jewish agricultural and industrial workers". Article I I I
recommends "the organisation and binding together of the
whole of Jewry by means of appropriate institutions, local
and international, in accordance with the laws of each
country". These were the rules laid down by the Basle Programme, which, as is well known, was considered by a Commission of five (Dr. N. Birnbaum, S. Bromberg, Dr. S. R.
Landau, Dr. A. Mintz and Dr. Nordau) with the addition of
Prof. Schapira and Dr. M. Bodenheimer, because of their important preliminary work.2 The text was formulated by Max
Nordau, whom Dr. Weizmann himself once called 3 "the
father of the Basle Programme", and was accepted by the
Congress. As most of the members of this Commission were
"Herzlians" it is quite evident that the Basle Programme
1
Protocol I, 130; Bein, p. 228 and 238; Henrietta H a n n a h Bodenheimer,
History of the Basle Programme (Hebrew). Jerusalem, 1947.
3
gionistisches Bulletin, London, September 12, J 922, p. 41.
2
itself proves the full awareness on the part of Herzl and his
colleagues of the necessity for practical work in Palestine.
Where Herzl differed from all previous attempts at
practical work was in his entirely new approach to this problem on principle. He once formulated it in the following
way: 1 "The sore point of colonisation will in future be approached in another way
Owing to the fact that the Zionist
idea has been openly declared before the whole world, there
can in any case be no further question of smuggling colonists
into the country. The so-called infiltration must be brought
to a standstill, until the guarantees secured by public law, as
demanded unanimously by the Congress, will be created.
The existing settlements will be preserved and fostered,
the existing colonies no longer alimented from outside,
but from the ranks of the proletarian population living in
Palestine".
"We do not wish to create colonies lacking security which,
without any political reciprocity, would make the country
more valuable and would simultaneously be a prey to any
change in the government's intentions and to any change in
the present friendly attitude of the population". 2
This formulation reveals the basic difference between all
previous Jewish colonisation efforts in Palestine and elsewhere, and Herzl's new approach. In reading Dr. Weizmann's book one has the feeling that the author does not do
justice to the greatness of that new approach, as he does not
hesitate to put Herzl's conception on an equal footing with that
of Baron Hirsch. We read (p. 44 [62]): "His Zionism began
as a sort of philanthropy, superior of course to the philanthropy of Baron de Hirsch, but philanthropy nevertheless."
Yet it was just this important point of the attitude towards
practical colonisation work which so clearly divided the two
schools. "Hirsch and the Choveve %ion approached the problem
from the angle of private law, while we, the political Zionists,
approach it according to public law", is Herzl's own reply
when reproached for philanthropy. 3 On another occasion,
replying to Dr. Nossig's challenge 'You too are a Baron
Hirsch', Herzl said:4 "No . . . this is your mistake and I am
surprised that such a clever man as you can say this. For I
say: this cannot be done with money at all, but with the
national idea only!"
1
2
3
4
"Ergebnisse des Kongresses", in Gesammelte Schriften, Berlin, 1920, p. 148.
"Der Baseler Kongress", in Gesammelte Schriften, p. 164.
Ibid. p. 155.
Protocol V I , 116.
32
Herzl's conception did not imply the intention of doing
nothing as far as the practical side was concerned. If the
colonisation work in Palestine was not feasible or possible at
the moment, then the duty arose to prepare for it and to build
up right away all those instruments which would be needed
when the moment arrived. And this is exactly what Herzl
and his colleagues did.
1. They created the Congress, the platform of the Jewish
parliament—an achievement so highly appraised by Dr.
Weizmann himself (p. 45/46, 49 [64, 68/69])—and they
created the Z.O. as the "power" expressing the Jewish
people's will to rehabilitation.
2. Immediately after the First Congress, Herzl sent
Motzkin out to Palestine (p. 61 [83]), and, in a comprehensive and fundamental speech1 at the Second Congress, the
latter reported on the social and economic conditions of the
Jews in Palestine, and on future colonisation possibilities. (In
order to minimise the seriousness of Herzl's desire for practical
work, Dr. Weizmann states in this connection (p. 61 [83])
that Herzl "tried to win him [Motzkin] over. He sent him to
Palestine. . . . It placed him under a certain obligation to
Herzl". Apart f r o m t h e injury to the memory of both
Herzl and Motzkin in such a statement, there is no justification whatever for it, as it was Motzkin who had bitter duels
with Herzl at all the following Congresses.2 He was a cofounder, if not the main moving spirit, of the "Democratic
Fraction"—the first organised opposition against Herzl.)
3. At the Second Congress, the Jewish Colonial Bank was
created 3 by Herzl as the Jewish national finance institute—
in favour of which Dr. Weizmann otherwise has much to say
(p. 76, 129, 342 [101, 166, 423]). Simultaneously, a Colonisation Commission was set up 4 to ensure that the "Coloni‫־‬
sation be carried on in accordance with a permit to be
obtained from the Turkish Government, and along the plan
and under the direction" of that Commission.5
4. The Jewish National Fund was founded by Herzl in
1901,6 for the purpose of acquiring land in Palestine as the
inalienable property of the Jewish people.
1
Protocol II, 99-127.
Ibid. I l l , 67-71, 79-82; IV, 99/100; V, 90-94.
Ibid. II, 137-177.
4
Ibid. p. 128 and 220/221.
5
Ibid. p. 128.
6
Ibid. V, 265-302.
2
3
5. Finally, it was in 1907/1908 that actual planned work in
Palestine commenced, as Dr. Weizmann confirms (p. 123
[ 158 /159]), without giving credit for it to the man under whose
Presidency this began: David Wolffsohn, Herzl's colleague and
successor.1 On the contrary, he claims all this—quite unjustifiably and without submitting any evidence—for himself
and his circle, stating (p. 123, 128 [159, 164]): "We laid the
foundations of institutions which are part of the re-created
Jewish National Home."
Although Dr. Weizmann says in his book that with Herzl
and his colleagues there was "practical work nowhere"
(p. 68 [92]), in his Basle speech,2 delivered one-and-a-half
years previously, he fully recognised, in addition to the "unprecedented", "skilful" and "enormous" political activities,
also "Herzl's other achievements". He said: "The foundation
of the Bank was sponsored by him. Thanks to Herzl, the
Keren Kayemeth was founded, and the Zionist Organisation developed and broadened".
We have seen in a previous section3 that Herzl and his
colleagues laid the political foundations for Zionism, and it
has now been shown that they also created the practical instruments for and in Palestine. These were the basic factors
for the Zionist work and for the upbuilding of Palestine, and
they were ready when fate decided that Dr. Weizmann and
his friends were to continue on the foundation so laid.
8
A
LL Dr. Weizmann's criticisms of Herzl and Herzlian
Zionism appear in the book to be confined to the enumeration of sometimes small, at other times important,
details on political or practical issues; but the narrative fails
to deal with the one great fundamental difference which lay
between Herzlian Zionism and Weizmannism—the State
conception and all it stands for. This alone is the underlying
motive for their deep cleavage. These two conceptions not
only clashed in Herzl's lifetime, they continue to do so until
this day—as the book reveals in the portions dealing with
Nordau, Wolffsohn, Jabotinsky and his followers.
For many years after World War I Dr. Weizmann was the
central figure of a struggle for or against the Jewish State con1
Ibid. V I I I , 232-334. Cf. also Soskin5s report in Protocol V I I ,
Israel Cohen, Zionist Work in Palestine, London. 1911.
2
3
See p. 9-12.
193-199;
34
ception, a struggle which is not referred to at all in the book.
He did not believe in Herzl's State Zionism, and what
followed in later years in Dr. Weizmann's work of implementing Zionism in actuality, was necessarily influenced by his
approach.
As far back as 1917, Dr. Weizmann said (p. 200/201 [253]):
"One reads constantly in the press, and one hears from
friends, both Jewish and non-Jewish, that it is the endeavour
of the Zionist movement immediately to create a Jewish State
in Palestine. . . While heartily welcoming all these demonstrations as a genuine manifestation of the Jewish national
will, we cannot consider them as safe statesmanship". He was
more explicit thirteen years later: 1 "The Jewish State was
never an aim in itself, it was only a means for a purpose. In
the Basle Programme nothing is said about the Jewish State;
nor in the Balfour Declaration. The essence of Zionism is: To
create a number of important material foundations in Palestine, upon which can be built an autonomous, compact and
productive community". A year later he then stated:2 " I
have no understanding and no sympathy for the demand for
a Jewish majority in Palestine. Majority does not guarantee
security, majority is not necessary for the development of
Jewish civilisation and culture."
From all the above follow clear conclusions: If no State,
with its premise, a population majority, is desired, then no
large immigration is required, and in that case, of course, it
will suffice to demand a "qualitative" rather than "quantitative" immigration. For that, then, there is no need to
strive for the implementation of Zionism with the help of
political means. For that, there is ample time, and a slow
process the right method. Logically, therefore, Herzl's Zionism aimed at the solution of the Jewish problem as a whole,
Dr. Weizmann's at that of individual Jews.
From this point of view, of course, he fought Nordau in
1920 (p. 47 [66]), "the father of what is known as the Max
Nordau Plan, if plan it can be called, which proposed the
transfer of a million Jews to Palestine in one year, and the
solution of the Jewish problem within a space often years".
Nordau then demanded 3 the immigration of 600,000 (not
•one million) souls because "we must at any price become a
1
Speech at the meeting of the A.C., Berlin, August 27, 1930; in Krojanker,
p . 218.
2
Protocol X V I I , 290.
3
Le Peuple Juif, November 20, 1920, reprinted in Max Nordau elAmo, Vol. II,
T e l Aviv, 1937, p. 267; also Anna and Maxa Nordau, p. 2 9 3 / 4 .
majority in Palestine", for "otherwise our 'National Home'
would remain a delusion and a will-o'-the-wisp".
Like Herzl, Nordau, Jabotinsky and the other "political"
Zionists also saw themselves confronted with the tremendous
task of finding a solution for the homelessness of the Jewish
people. In their opinion, Statehood answered the problem.
They saw the anti-Semitic storm gathering all over Europe,
and felt that within one or two generations a substantial part
of Jewry would have to be transplanted to Palestine. Massimmigration thus became their Alpha and Omega. Dr. Weizmann fully recognises the necessity of a large immigration if
the establishment of a State is aimed at, and he fully appreciates the necessity of settling these immigrants to a greater
extent in towns and cities, if such vast numbers are to be
absorbed. He says (p. 298 [369]): "Faced with the task of the
rapid absorption of considerable numbers ofpeople, one would
naturally turn to urban industrial development as the easier
course." But we have seen that he did not recognise the
creation of a State in Palestine as the aim of his Zionism, for
he strove "for the development of Jewish civilisation and
culture", for which, by the very nature of such a conception,
the presence of a limited number of selected people was quite
sufficient. Trial and Error leaves us in no doubt that Dr.
Weizmann was mainly concerned with the task of safeguarding this development, and, therefore, did not support any
system favouring a mass-immigration, as for instance, the
establishment of "industries and the development of towns"
(p. 298, 300 [369, 372/373]). He emphatically stresses
(p. 298 [369]) that in his opinion it is only an "agricultural
basis" which would safeguard "Jewish culture. . . the Jewish
way of life, and even a Jewish economy". However, even
as regards agricultural colonisation he did not favour that
which would absorb larger numbers of people, but favoured
the one which—by its nature—could only absorb still smaller
numbers of settlers, "the collective settlement, the kvutzah"
(p. 299 [371]). Dr. Weizmann leaves us not unmindful of the
fact that he did not concern himself with the mass of the
Jewish people, but with individuals and small groups only; and
that it was only towards them that he felt his obligation
(p. 276/7 [344]): " I saw my duty for the next five or ten
years very clearly; it was to help these people make a suecess of their venture."
It is not clearly stated in Trial and Error that Dr. Weizmann's opponents also accepted the truism that agriculture
36
constitutes a vital and important factor in the upbuilding
and the strength of a country. But they also agreed with Dr.
Weizmann 1 that "Land colonisation is a difficult and slow
thing by its very nature. It is an organic growth, so to speak,
and it needs a very considerable amount of preparation, both
of human material and of the land." They, accordingly,
maintained that this principle would apply in general either
to experimental purposes or to established countries. But
Jewry and Palestine did not fit in either, and the normal
rules or laws of the organic development did not apply in
either case, for the Jewish situation was that of abnormality
par excellence. Anything fostering the settlement of large parts of
Jewry in Palestine would have to be attempted—this was the
conception of Herzl's pupils. Not a one-sided obligation
towards one system but the synthesis of both—village and
town—was their insistence. The facts and the results offer
enlightenment on this matter:
Dr. Weizmann claims (p. 299 [371]) that the past "25 years
have proved" that his conception, based on Dr. Ruppin's
practical execution, was right. He proudly records (p. 328
[406]) the achievement of his system, that in 1928 "the lands
of the Jewish National Fund had increased until they had the
lead over the old, rich PICA". This, however, is not correct.
Taking the figures at the end of 1930, they show that by then
the PICA had acquired 454.907 metric dunams, 2 while the
Jewish National Fund owned 270.084 metric dunams. 3
As further proof of his successes, he states that "in 1928 the
Jewish population had tripled since the close of the war; it
stood at close to one hundred and seventy thousand". First of
all, these figures are not correct. There were approximately
90,000 Jews in Palestine4 in 1918, and in 1928—151,656.5
Accordingly, the population had not even doubled in the said
period. But, on the other hand, Dr. Weizmann also takes
credit for the settlement of these 60,000 new immigrants, and
this does not seem in any way justified. He did not encourage
these people to immigrate. On the contrary "in the end, I felt
that I had to give warning. I had to give it many times, in
fact" (p. 301 [373]), because "the immigration figures rose
1
Statement made before the Royal Commission on Palestine on November 25, 1936.
London, 1939, p. 26.
2
Dr. A. Granovsky, Die Bodenfrage und der Juedische Aufbau in Palaestina,
Vienna, 1931, p. 75.
3
Ibid. p. 64.
4
Dr. A. Ruppin, Der Aufbau des Landes Israel, Berlin, 1918, p. 10; cf. also Davis
Trietsch, Juedische Emigration und IColonisation, Berlin, 1923, p. 8.
5
Gt. Britain and Palestine, p. 56.
month by month" (p. 300 [372]) and "I was uneasy" (Ibid.).
In his warning he said (p. 301 [373]): "The rising stream of
immigration delights me, and I am delighted, too, that the
ships should bring these thousands of people who are prepared to risk their life's savings in the Jewish National Home
. . . But we must see to it that we direct this stream and do not
allow it to deflect us from our goal." The emphasis here lies
on the word "goal". Had Dr. Weizmann striven for statehood, this mass influx would have received his full-hearted
support, for it constituted the only means for attaining a
Jewish population majority in Palestine. But, as has been
said Dr. Weizmann's goal was not the creation of a state
in Palestine, but a "cultural community", a centre "for the
Jewish way of life" (p. 298 [369]), and, therefore, he did not
welcome the masses there. Dr. Weizmann does not conceal
from his readers his antagonism towards these immigrants,
and confesses (thus at the same time confirming his onesided approach p. 302 [375]): "AH the same, they had, I am
afraid, some reason to be dissatisfied with the Executive and
myself. There was a time when the agricultural settlers were
getting the advice and support of the Zionist Organisation,
while the urban settlers were left to their own devices. But
the fact was that it was impossible to satisfy everybody, and
we—particularly I—believed the agricultural side to be the
most important". Notwithstanding this neglect on the part of
the Weizmann Executives, the people immigrated into Palestine, and the historian, surveying the events retrospectively,
had to admit: 1 "It later became obvious that this much
condemned fourth Aliya was of great advantage to Palestine."
It is this same immigration, left by Dr. Weizmann to "their
own devices" (p. 302 [375]), which he uses in his book to
prove the correctness of his own conception of Zionism, and of
his own successes in Palestine. The figures reveal why this inelusion is necessary. The immigration and settlement of
agricultural settlers alone, in the period referred to by Dr.
Weizmann, was insignificant. Altogether, a population
7>5562 lived in the various agricultural settlements of
Palestine in 1930. This slow development—the main
characteristic of Dr. Weizmann's colonisation system—also
continued in later years. He confessed to the Royal Commission in 1936:3 "The number of Jews engaged in agricul1
Boehm II, 405.
Report X V I I , 247.
Statement made before the Royal Commission on Palestine on November 25, 1936,
London, 1939, p. 26.
2
3
38
tural occupations in our own settlements, settlements which
have been created by the Zionist Organisation and the
Jewish Agency, is about 4,200 families. The percentage has
become smaller in the past few years". In that year (1936),
the total Jewish population of Palestine 1 was 370,483, and one
can imagine that the influence of the "village on the town"
(p. 298 [369]), the former representing some 2 per cent of the
population, was insufficient to justify any claim to a " firm
foundation" (p. 299 [370]) for the Jewishness of Palestine
which Dr. Weizmann attributes to his system (p. 298 [369]),
though its opponents do also not deny the great pioneering
importance played by these men and women in the fields for
the upbuilding of Palestine.
As has been seen (p. 298 [369]) Dr. Weizmann emphasises
that the settlements had first to be put on strong foundations in
order to enable further immigrants to follow. For that reason
the immigration "stream had to be stemmed and regulated"
(p. 277 [344]). This special role which Dr. Weizmann attributes to these settlements—the preparation for and the
absorption of further immigrants—was lately put to a test
case of great significance. The London Zionist Review2 reports
that "since the establishment of Israel's independence, all
these settlements together have absorbed only 12,000 immigrants out of some 250,000 newcomers", and even a "substantial part of these 12,000 have left" them again. And this
notwithstanding the fact that the settlements "have been
receiving new lands and new implements", and "can offer work
and subsistence to a large number of new members". Significantly it is pointed out that the "comparative importance
of the collective settlements as political and economic factors
is decreasing in a most astonishing way."
Labour agreed with Dr. Weizmann for a number of years.
But when Ben Gurion accepted the Nordau Plan in the end
as the basis for the upbuilding of the State, and was courageous enough openly to break with his past, Dr. Weizmann
rightly sees in that step the revival of the old fight (p. 364
[449]) "between a few of the urban labour leaders and my
group. And again, significantly enough, inevitably I might
say, it is a struggle between those who proclaim that they
know how to bring a million and two million Jews into
Palestine in three or four years, and those who know the
possibilities and accept them". It was one of history's
1
2
December 23, 1949, p. !2.
strange tricks, that it was under Dr. Weizmann's Presidency
of the new State that his own conception is reduced adabsurdum
by the fact that the same Ben Gurion, as Prime Minister of
Israel, submitted 1 to its Parliament, a " Nordau Plan " for
the immigration of almost a million Jews in four years, and the
legitimate representatives of the State were unanimously in
favour of it. From subsequent speeches of Dr. Weizmann it is
evident that he fully endorsed that plan and that policy.
But even in his autobiography we find a remarkable statement challenging his own rejection of the Nordau Plan
(p. 47 [66]) and accepting—like Ben Gurion before him—the
Zionist-Revisionist thesis for the evacuation of the Galut.
He says (p. 440/441 [541]): "Every objective study of the
immediate and long-range problem of European Jewry
pointed to one solution: mass evacuation, as fast as economic absorption would permit, into Palestine."
Thus, after a struggle of fifty years against Herzlianism,
Dr. Weizmann—confronted with reality—accepts the conception of mass-immigration into Palestine, which, by its
very nature, is the pre-condition for statehood striven for
by Herzl and his followers.
9
I T MAY be opportune at this stage to refer to a chapter
which characterises Dr. Weizmann's conception of
"political" and "practical" Zionism in a striking way: his
controversy with Brandeis. While the cleavage between Herzl
and Dr. Weizmann was deep, no difference of any basic
importance is traceable between him and Brandeis, so that
the historian could rightly say2 that "on the whole it is to be
stated that most things demanded by Brandeis . . . gradually
have been executed". But, as usual in his controversies, Dr.
Weizmann also defines the differences here (p. 267 [333]) as
" a revival, in a new form and a new country, of the old
cleavage between 'East' and 'West', in Zionism and Jewry;
and the popular slogan called it, in fact, 'Washington versus
Pinsk'." What were the main issues giving rise to this cleavage?
Dr. Weizmann says (p. 249 [312]) that the controversy
began when Brandeis "repeatedly stated—this was thirty
years ago—that Zionist political work had come to a close,
1
2
Dime haKnesset (official record) I, 55.
Boehm II, 217.
40
that nothing remained but the economic task". In his controversy with Brandeis, Dr. Weizmann joined the defenders of
"political Zionist work", and stood up against "Brandeisism"
in the name of "the Herzlian tradition", 1 and in the name of
"the precious legacy left us by our immortal leader—Herzl." 2
In view of Dr. Weizmann's attitude towards "political" Zionism, and towards Herzl, already referred to in previous sections, his dispute with Brandeis seems in this respect—to say
the least of it—a contradiction of his whole past.
But the actual developments following the Brandeis controversy contradict this argument of his. It was barely one year
after Brandeis' dismissal that Dr. Weizmann stated: 2 "By
virtue of the Act of International Law, significant alike both
for the Jewish people and the comity of nations, the political
aim formulated in the Basle Programme—the securing of the
Home by public law—has been fulfilled." Two years later, he
called to all Zionists from Jerusalem: 4 "Listen to my advice
and forget politics for two years. After two years we shall discuss the matter again. Our political progress will only be
made in the fields and in the orchards, in the vineyards and
in the farms, in Nahalal, Nuris, and Petach Tikvah." And in
1947, referring to the Brandeis conflict, he stated: 5 "At the
time, the political foundations of Zionism seemed to be more
or less firm, and all that was needed was to begin practical
work". Thus, there is no difference whatsoever between the
Brandeis and the Weizmann conceptions. From the time of the
conflict in 1920/21 onwards, the latter pursued "practical"
Zionism, which in reality was identical with what Brandeis
had demanded in theory. All along Dr. Weizmann abhorred
the way of getting results through "political concessions"
(p. 277 [344]), and refused time and again to embark upon
any "political offensive". 6 His rejection of political work was
the main reason for the emergence of the Revisionist Movement (Dr. Weizmann assesses it as a continuation of Herzlian
Zionism (p. 363 [448])), under Jabotinsky's and Grossman's
leadership.
1
The World Zionist Organisation and the Keren Hayesod Controversy in America.
Statements and Documents. London, 1921, p. 18.
2
Dr. Weizmann's letter to Judge Mack of April 20, 1921; in The World Z-O.
and the Keren Hayesod Controversy, etc., p. 61.
3
"Call to the Jewish people after the Mandate", in J.C., July 28, 1922, p. 21.
H e repeated that statement at the Annual Conference in Karlsbad, August 25,
1922. (See Zi°nistisches Bulletin, September 12, 1922, Nr. 6, p. 40.)
4
Krojanker, p. 142.
5
6
Protocol X I I I , 228.
Like Brandeis, Ussishkin, "the practical leader of Russian
Zionism" (p. 58 [80])—and spiritually then on the same footing as Dr. Weizmann—also opened his speech at the London
Conference, 1920, by saying:1 "The first part of our work
—the political work—is ended". Unlike Brandeis Ussishkin
was not driven out—he was elected a member of Dr. Weizmann's Executive at that Conference. 2
Reading all the statements in retrospect, one gains the impression that, for the sake of leadership, the weapon of
"political" activities was chosen in the fight against Brandeis,
in the same way as twenty years previously Herzl and the
Herzlians were fought with the weapon of "practical"
‫״‬activities.3
The other basic point, among a number of critical observations and practical suggestions raised by Brandeis, was that
of the future of the Z.O., especially as regards securing the
collaboration of the non-Zionists.
To the Brandeis group (p. 261 [326]) "it seemed unneces:sary to have any kind of double organisation; it was their view
that people who wished to co-operate in the work of rebuilding the Jewish National Home could join the Zionist Organisation". Dr. Weizmann puts his divergent opinion in the
following words (p. 261 [327]): "But our reason for wishing
to keep the Zionist Organisation in being as a separate body
was precisely the conviction that the political work was far
from finished".
The creation of the enlarged Jewish Agency -shows that
Dr. Weizmann was as strong a Brandeisist as any of the
latter's other adherents; he only differed in the form he chose.
The enlarged Jewish Agency was created in 1929 as a separate
organ, but the Z.O. was not kept "as our instrument of
political action" (p. 262 [327]). It was stripped of its right to
undertake any political action, that prerogative having been
transferred from the Z.O. to the Jewish Agency which henceforth became the only political factor in respect of Palestine,
as defined in Art. 4 of the Mandate. 4 The British Government
,and the League of Nations were duly notified 5 of the fact that
the Z.O., until then recognised as the Jewish Agency, had
1
The Speech is recorded in Sefer Ussishkin, Jerusalem, 1934, p. 195.
Org. Report X I I , i n .
3
See p. 30.
4
Letter of the Zionist Executive to the Revisionist Office in London of
February 20, 1930. See Selbstwehr, Prague, July 18, 1930; Protocol X V I I , 360;
.also Boehm II, 580.
5
2
42
F I F T Y YEARS OF ZIONISM
ceased to exercise that function which had been taken over
by an entirely new "public body"—the enlarged Jewish
Agency for Palestine. Thus the Z.O. ceased to be a political
organisation and became a practical colonisation party as
envisaged by Brandeis.
Here again, when reading the book in the light of actual
facts, one feels that the cleavage between Dr. Weizmann
and Brandeis was artificial rather than fundamental
or, as the Zionist historian puts it: 1 "The whole quarrel
appears more as one of the tempo for the fulfilment of these
[Brandeis'] demands and less as one in principle." There is nodoubt that the conflict was considerably aggravated by a
personal note.2 It began with the accusation of the Americans
that 3 Dr. Weizmann had committed a "breach of promise''.
It was said that he "gladly assented to the Brandeis project"
for the establishment of an "Economic Council", consisting of
Zionists and non-Zionists, to be responsible for and in control
for three years of "the economic development in Palestine".
Dr. Weizmann was not only said to have agreed but
"every step was taken in consultation with" him and his.
associates. In the end he "expressed his gratitude by impulsively kissing Brandeis' hand", but later Dr. Weizmann
"killed the plan". The historian then records: 4 "Brandeis‫״‬
very sensitive regarding a given word, saw in . . . Weizmann's
retreat a kind of 'breach of promise' over which he felt terribly hurt". The Zionist Executive denied 5 the accusation that
Dr. Weizmann had "wrecked" the Brandeis project, though
at the Cleveland Conference Dr. Weizmann said with reference to the Brandeis plan for setting up a new leadership in
London: 6 "Possibly it was a good plan, possibly it was a bad
plan. . . But it was said that one member of the Executive
wrecked this plan. The wrecker of this plan was myself. . .
When the time comes I think I shall be able to answer for my
action."
It is undeniable that the personal note, once introduced,,
remained an important, if not the most important factor in
1
Boehm II, 217.
Ibid.
Ibid. p. h i ; Jacob de Haas, Louis D. Brandeis, New York. 1929, p. 133 ff.
Also for the following.
4
Boehm II, i n .
5
The World Zionist Organisation and the Keren Hayesod Controversy in America, etc.‫״‬
pp. 24-28.
6
Dr. Weizmann's address ofJune 8, 1921, at the Cleveland Convention of the•
American Z.O., in The World Zionist Organisation and the Keren Hayesod Controversy in America, etc., p. 82.
2
3
that dispute. In a speech in New York in 1921, Dr. Weizmann emphasised: 1 "You must know that not the Keren
Hayesod is the stumbling-block. The fundamental question
is, who shall control the work in Palestine. The American
leaders wish to make themselves the rulers of the Zionist
movement." The personal note appears again in another
reference in his speech at the Cleveland Conference: 2 "Is all
that because we are jealous of others? I wish to God there
would be others that I could be jealous of. The misfortune of
it, the tragedy of the movement, is that I have no competition." And he summarised it at the Twelfth Zionist Congress:3 "If Mr. Brandeis has a programme, and if Mr.
Brandeis has got plans, and if Mr. Brandeis has got men, and
if with his programme, with his plans, with his men, he
would come here and from here will proceed to Palestine in
order to work there, then I shall be the first to clear the way
for him". Trial and Error avoids this personal note, and
persists in accentuating ideal and basic differences, which,
however, as seen in retrospect, do not exist. The personal note
is slightly discernible in only one place in the book. When
Brandeis maintained that "astronomical" figures could not
be collected in America at that time Dr. Weizmann retorted
(p. 262 [327]): "If this was all he could find in America, I
should have to come over and try for myself". And he coneludes: " I doubt if Justice Brandeis ever quite forgave me for
that challenge".
10
W
E have seen that Dr. Weizmann emphasises the fact that
he did notbelieve in approaching the Government with
demands for larger colonisation and larger immigration by
way of "political concessions'‫( י‬p. 277 [344]). This is another
characteristic of the cleavage between his conception and that
of Herzl and his followers. We have seen him develop his antithesis to the political and state conception of Herzl. Throughout he rejected the way and use of any of the means of a
political fight. "We are not able to make a political offensive"
he stated once.4 " I t is enough if we can hold the positions
which we acquired legally." Jabotinsky once formulated the
1
2
3
4
Krojanker, p. 90.
Ibid. p. 86.
Protocol X I I , 284.
Ibid. XIII, 228.
44
divergence of the two schools in this respect as follows:1
"When we started our movement in 1925 the official point of
view, as expressed by Dr. Weizmann and his associates, was
this: the business of Zionism can be completed and achieved
simply by the process of the Jews pouring into Palestine
money and energy and it ought not to matter at all what the
attitude of the Government was, provided that the Government was a decent European Administration. We demanded
the revision of this point of view, saying that a large scale
colonisation cannot be conducted independently of a Government, that it is Government enterprise by nature and can only
be completed if the Government by legislative and administrative action supports the colonisation".
Seven years later, Dr. Weizmann came very near to this Revisionist thesis in a statement before the Royal Commission
on Palestine:2 "Land colonisation . . . really requires a State
organisation in order to do it successfully. We have met with
considerable handicaps, and I think unless the Government
adopts a dynamic and positive policy in helping to establish
close settlements on the land of Palestine . . . our work of
colonisation will naturally be slow". He was forced to seek
refuge in this "political" conception, because he had to explain
the tragically small results of almost twenty years of "practical
work in Palestine". But he did not draw the necessary conelusions from his demand for a "dynamic and positive policy"
to be obtained from the Mandatory Government, because
political means would have had to be used to achieve it and
he was not willing to apply these.
He did not believe in the political method, which, naturally, must be based on the power, the strength and the will
of the masses. He challenges Herzl for not having grasped" the
forces which the masses harbored" (p. 45 [63]), but he himself opposed the method of employing the masses as a "pressure force", as demanded by the Herzlians throughout Zionist history. He said in a speech in Czernowitz: 3 "Other
peoples enforce successes for themselves through pressure and
demonstrations, through exhibiting their power, but in our
Movement such things only count very little. To say it in one
simple sentence: we cannot force the British Government, we
can only convince i t . . . They are optimists who believe that
1
Report of the Commission on the Palestine Disturbances, Cmd. 3530 of 1930,
p . 108/9.
2
Statement made before the Royal Commission on Palestine on November 25, !936,
London, 1939, p. 26.
3
Krojanker, p. 187.
anything can be achieved with the help of p arades and demonstrations, in which hundreds of thousands ofJews in New
York shout and demonstrate against England. In my deepest
conviction, this is a wrong way. 11 is not Jewish in its conception,
because it works with means which cannot be applied to our
Movement, which is based on slow and organic growth." Dr.
Weizmann records in his book that he challenged his opponents and asked them what they would have done in his place,
and that he received the reply (p. 327 [405]): "Protest! Demand! Insist! And that seemed to be the ultimate wisdom to
be gleaned from our critics. They seemed quite unaware that
the constant repetition of protests, demands and insistences
defeats its own ends, being both futile and undignified. I
emphasised once more that the only real answer to our
difficulties in Palestine was the strengthening of our position
by bringing in the right type of immigrant in larger numbers,
by acquiring more land, by speeding up our productive
work."
He defined this attitude on another occasion "still more
clearly than in the book: 1 "What we have created since that
moment in Palestine has effected an increase in the mutual
confidence and a closer relationship between the aspirations
of the Zionists and the problems and difficulties facing the
Mandatory Power. With every step forward of our work, the
mutual understanding deepens. Thus our political position
becomes more and more stabilised, not only in relation to
those Government organs with whom we come into direct
touch, but also—a highly important fact in so democratic a
country—in relation to the public opinion of the English
people."
Here again facts disprove Dr. Weizmann's statement. The
stronger Palestine grew the weaker became the political situation and the Administration's attitude stiffened from immigrant to immigrant and from settlement to settlement.
After the great achievements in Palestine up to 1928, which he
emphasises so strongly (p. 328 [406]), after setting up the enlarged Jewish Agency in 1929 as representative of "all sections
of the Jewish people . . . and every community of any size"
(p. 313 [388]), Dr. Weizmann's position, according to his conCeption, should have been stronger than it had been 10 years
before, and the "mutual understanding between Britain and
the Zionists deepened". Yet this strong position resulted in
the launching by the British Government of "the political
1
Protocol X V , 4.
46
attack on our position in Palestine" (p. 332 [411]), and the
White Paper of 1930 was issued. And then a very curious thing
occured. Dr. Weizmann records (p. 333 [413]): "We realised
that we were facing a hostile combination of forces in the
Colonial Office and in the Palestine administration, and un‫״‬
less it was overcome it was futile to think of building on the
foundations which we laid so solidly in the previous years.
There were, of course, great protests throughout the Jewish
world; they were backed by powerful figures in the nonJewish world . . . Apparently the Prime Minister had anticipated an unfavourable reaction, but not the force and the
volume of it". At that moment the Jewish masses "demanded,
protested, insisted". Dr. Weizmann was soon able to reap the
fruits of this "storm" which showed all the elements of a
political struggle. The protests all over the world forced the
British Government to reconsider the White Paper and, under
that pressure, it "invited the Jewish Agency to appoint a
committee which should consult with a special Cabinet Committee on the Palestine policy" (p. 333-334 [413])• This was
the result of the Herzlian "political" method.
But even then Dr. Weizmann did not accept it. Although
he recognises the fact that "on February 13, 1931, there was
an official reversal of policy" (p. 335 [415]), which may have
been "due to the pressure and adverse public opinion in
England"; yet he accepted the MacDonald letter, which
*'rectified the situation" {Ibid.) in his opinion. He accepted it
when addressed to him personally and points out in this connection that he did not demand the official retraction of the
White Paper because {Ibid.) "that would have meant a loss of
face" for the Government and he did not even attempt to
insist on it, although he not only had the "power" behind
him but also the admission of the Government that they were
obliged to "reverse officially their policy" {Ibid.).
So far as the British Government is concerned it has shown
itself quite capable of officially reversing its policy without being afraid of losing face, as two later White Papers
prove—in one of which1 the partition of Palestine and the
creation of a Jewish State were suggested and in the other
were completely rejected.2
Eight years later Zionism reached its nadir politically
(p. 443 [544]). Notwithstanding the great increase of
population and enterprise in Palestine, the White Paper of
1
G m d . 5 5 1 3 of 1937.
‫ ־‬G m d . 5 8 9 3 of 1938.
1
939 was issued, which "threatened the destruction of the
National Home" (p. 413 [508]). Looking at matters retrospectively one might even venture to say that that White Paper
was issued, inter alia, because the strength and power of the
Jews in the country grew so fast without, however, the political
basis and security which Dr. Weizmann continuously opposed in the Herzlian conception, and which Herzl demanded
as far back as 1897 for the practical upbuilding of
Palestine:1 "We do not wish to create colonies lacking
security, which without any political reciprocity would make
the country more valuable, and would simultaneously be a
prey to any change in the government's intentions and to any
change in the present friendly attitude of the population."
What a prophetic warning!
At the two great political demonstrations of the Jewish
masses which were instrumental in achieving definite results
in the Mandatory period, Dr. Weizmann was not at the head
of the Movement. When, in view of the pressure put upon the
British Government which led to the reversal of their White
Paper policy in 1931, "the magnificent gains of the ensuing
years" (p. 335 [415]) became apparent, Dr. Weizmann was
no longer in office. The immigration grew to sixty-two
thousand in 1935 (Ibid.), and the country flourished.
In September of that year (1935) he was re-elected
President of the Z.O. It was his fate (p. 379 [466]) that his
return to office was accompanied by a series of grave
set-backs for the Zionist cause. Immigration decreased
drastically. In 1936—29,72 7 immigrants came into the country,
in 1937—10,536, and in 1938—12,868.2 The High Commissioner also saw fit at that moment to re-open the matter of
the Legislative Council and got Dr. Weizmann's consent "to
reconsider it if there was equality of representation" (p. 381
[468]). It was two years after his return to office that the
scheme for the partition of Palestine was suggested of which
Dr. Weizmann became a protagonist (p. 385/387 [473/476])
to such an extent that he arrived at an understanding with
Ormsby-Gore, Under Secretary for the Colonies, without
first consulting the Congress, as was revealed by Meir
Grossman in a secret session of the Twentieth Zionist
Congress.3 Finally, it was four years after his return to power
that the White Paper of 1939 was issued which constituted the
1
2
3
"Der Baseler Kongress", in Gesammelte Schriften, p. 164.
J.C. August 13, 1937, p. 24 ff.
48
last effort of Britain "toward the nullification of the Balfour
Declaration" (p. 388 [477]).
It was, again, during Dr. Weizmann's absence from office,
that, having failed to be re-elected in 1946, the last great fight
commenced, led by some of the "urban labor leaders"
(p. 364 [449]), by "political" Zionists all over the world, and
by many leading non-Zionists, especially in America, as well.
This was preceded and accompanied by the strong stand of
the Yishuv, sword in hand, headed by the youth of Irgun,
Lechi and later by Haganah—a campaign, the support
of which, in Dr. Weizmann's words (p. 442 [543]), was
tantamount to a "truckling to the demoralising forces in the
movement", and which he was convinced would remain "on
the British Government ineffective" {Ibid.). He suggested as
an alternative (p. 442 [543]) the method of "protest against
our frustrations, against the injustices", etc., etc. But it was,
by then, too late for his acceptance of "protests and demands",
which he had previously so strongly rejected 1 (p. 327 [405])
as a means of carrying on the struggle. The fight in Palestine,
backed up by the pressure of organised Jewish and nonJewish public opinion all over the world was by no means
"ineffective". It was the cause for the decision of the British
Labour Government to submit the Palestine issue to the U.N.
No less a statesman than Winston Churchill confirmed this in
a speech in the House of Commons.2 It was the same masspressure which led to that great event—the establishment of
Israel. And it was the same spirit which, finally, after the
proclamation of the State, showed itself miraculously ready
for the great Arab assault.
The conclusions from this chapter on "Herzl and Herzlianism" undoubtedly reveal that political and practical results
were achieved by those who enabled the will of the Jewish
masses to express itself.
Thus, it was Herzl's spirit which led the healthy instinct of
Jewry from 1896 to the great historic turning point in 1947.
1
2
See p. 45.
Hansard, December 10, 1948, col. 720.
II.
T H E EAST AFRICA PROJECT
1
A
LARGE part of the book is devoted to the dispute on
the East Africa colonisation project, which was offered
to the Z.O. in 1903 by the British Government. Dr. Weizmann
sees in this controversy the exemplary proof of the cleavage
between Herzl and himself, between "East and West", between the "mechanic" and "organic" Zionism. In this
controversy the two worlds are represented as having clashed
in a final battle. In his book Dr. Weizmann appears as the
top antipode of Herzl and leading strategist in the fight against
East Africa. The documents, however, reveal that it was
Dr. Weizmann who, from the platform of the Sixth Zionist
Congress, welcomed the East Africa scheme, and declared:
" I take a positive attitude towards it", 1 and only in the end
voted against the sending of a commission there. 2 This is
a fact which is not referred to in Trial and Error, but it is the
truth. In dealing with his further observations regarding the
East Africa scheme, this important revelation should not be
lost sight of.
Dr. Weizmann analyses the reasons for what he calls (p. 84
[112]) "a shift of objective" (East Africa instead of Palestine),
and regards it as the "logical consequence of his [Herzl's]
conception of Zionism". It seems we are to suppose from such
an interpretation that the British offer was the result of
Herzl's planning or initiative. This is both incorrect and
unjust to Herzl's memory.
First of all, it should be pointed out that Dr. Weizmann
erroneously refers throughout to "Uganda" as the territory
offered (pp. 58 [74], 83 [ n o ] , 89 [117], 90 [118], 109 [142],
110 [143], 164 [209]), instead of the proposed Guas Ngishu
Plateau on the Western border of the East Africa Protectorate. 3
The offer was neither initiated nor pressed on the British
Government by Herzl. Joseph Chamberlain mentioned
1
Protocol VI, 101.
Ibid. p. 226.
Greenberg's letter to Herzl of May 20, 1903. (Copy supplied to me by
Greenberg's daughter, Mrs. Sholto.)—Protocol VI, 8/9, 2x5/16 (Sir Clement
Hill's letter).—Report on the Work of the Commission sent out by the Z-O. t° examine the
territory . . . in British East Africa, London, 1905.
2
3
50
Uganda to Herzl for the first time on April 23, 1903,1 but
Herzl declined even to discuss it. He was then solely concerned with the negotiations for a Jewish settlement in the
Sinai Peninsula.
When it became clear that the Sinai Scheme was doomed,
Chamberlain offered Greenberg 2 a settlement in the East
Africa Protectorate. The offer was thus entirely the result
of Chamberlain's initiative. In view of the great importance
of this point I think it right to quote Greenb erg's verbatim
report to Herzl on his conversation with Chamberlain: 3 "He
then turned to the place he had mentioned to you. I asked—
4
Do you mean Uganda?' He said 'No, it is not in Uganda—I
did not go as far when I was in Africa'. He told me the part
he mentioned was on very high ground, with fine climate and
every possibility for a great Colony, which could support at
least a million souls. 'I did not press it upon Dr. Herzl', he
said, 'because I sympathised with his desire to satisfy the
sentimental idea in regard to Palestine, and I quite saw the
Sinai plan to some extent did so. But, if that comes to nothing,
I do hope Dr. Herzl will consider very seriously the suggestion.
At the moment, there is nothing in the way of his having the
place, but it will not be long vacant as there are undoubtedly
large mining prospects apart from all else'. I asked him if it
would be possible, providing you considered the scheme, for
us to have Local Self Government, and he replied 'Certainly'.
H e said it would be necessary to send out a Governor—'Who
would be a Jew?' I asked; 'Who could be a Jew' he replied.
Anyway, he said, let Dr. Herzl consider this, and I shall be
glad to hear further upon it."
After having termed the Project the result of Herzl's
*'conception of Zionism" (p. 84 [112]), a few pages further on
(p. 90 [118]) Dr. Weizmann himself absolves Herzl from
blame for East Africa, and puts it on Greenberg, who "had
indoctrinated Herzl with the idea". But this also is without
justification. The letter to Herzl just quoted shows that
Greenberg did not initiate the Africa scheme either. Nor was
he even sympathetically inclined to it. He wrote in the letter
quoted above: "As to the East Africa plan, I am not prepared
offhand to say very much. Indeed, the question concerning it
is largely whether it will be in the interests of our Movement
-—whether it will get us nearer or take us further from
1
2
3
Diaries III, 412.
See Greenberg's letter to Herzl of May 20, 1903; and Protocol V I , 215.
Greenberg to Herzl, I.e. (This letter is hitherto unpublished.)
Palestine—and as to that I should like to have your view
before expressing mine . . . The fact is I am so thoroughly a
Palestine Man that directly you speak of any place outside
there almost any place is as good as another." He even tried
to dissuade Herzl from continuing, but Herzl "did not follow
my suggestion and, therefore, in the sense as he wished it, I
approached the British Government". 1 David Wolffsohn, the
closest of Herzl's friends, confirmed at a public meeting in
London 2 that "in the early stages of the East Africa affair,
Mr. Greenberg had been reluctant to approach the British
Government, and it was only at the command of Dr. Herzl
that he had gone".
Dr. Weizmann's argument as to Herzl's reasons for
opening negotiations on the scheme runs as follows (p. 84
[112]): "Herzl had been in Russia and had cast a shuddering
glance at the Pale and its miseries. Everywhere he had been
received by a desperate people as its redeemer; it was his duty
now to redeem." Consequently, he then turned to East Africa,
as "Palestine was not, at the moment, feasible". Thus it was
"panic that moved Herzl to accept the Uganda offer
uncritically" (p. 88 [117]).
The negotiations of Herzl and Greenberg regarding East
Africa were already at an end when Herzl went to Russia 3 on
August 5, 1903. On his visit to that country, he "was already
in possession of the British proposals". 4 Indeed Sir Clement
Hill's letter to Greenberg containing the East Africa offer is
dated August 14, two days before Herzl left the Russian
capital. 5 Therefore, he could not have been influenced in his
negotiations by what he saw in Russia, and, accordingly, was
not moved by "panic" to open the negotiations with Great
Britain. If, as a result of the Kishinev pogrom, any of the
Zionist leaders became panicky, it was Dr. Weizmann, who
in his book even reproaches Sokolow for not also having lost
his head. He says (p. 79 [105]): "It was during those
Passover days that we got the news of the ghastly Kishinev
pogrom. I lost my head, and was in something like a panic.
Not so Sokolow. . . . In the midst of the universal horror
Sokolow remained calm."
Dr. Weizmann further records (p. 91 [120]) that "during
the Sixth Congress we learned that, side by side with the
1
Protocol V I I , 65.
J . C . J u n e 9, 1905, p. 13.
Diaries III, p. 459.
4
Interview with Reuben Brainin, in J.C.,
5
Diaries III, 487.
2
3
September 18, 1903, p. 27.
52
Uganda offer, there was another in the making". There was
none "in the making". Herzl informed 1 the Sixth Congress in
his opening speech that, after long negotiations and investigations on the spot, the Sinai Scheme had already been
abandoned by the British and Egyptian Governments.
It is well known that Herzl was interested in the establishment of an autonomous settlement on the Sinai Peninsula
because of its neighbourhood to Palestine, and at the
Congress,2 as well as in his Memoirs (p. 92 [121]), Dr. Weizmann proclaimed himself an adherent of such a scheme,
because it might have made "a very considerable difference
to the present fate of Palestine if we had then concentrated on
making a beginning, however small, along the coast of
southern Palestine". It is thus indisputable that Dr. Weizmann accepted Herzl's Zionist conception out of which this
Project was born. His only objection is—that it was not put
into effect. He attributes the failure of the Sinai Scheme to
Herzl (p. 92 [121]) because the latter did not want to
confine it to a small tract in El Arish, for "that was too small
a task for the great ideas which then prevailed in the circles of
the Zionist leadership. It was too modest a beginning. It did
not appeal to the vision and imagination either of the leaders
or of the masses, before whose eyes the word 'solution' was
constantly dangled. So the commission felt obliged to include
in its investigation the 'Pelusian Plain' (Sinai Desert); and
this did not lend itself to colonisation unless water was found.
The project was abandoned in its entirety, and no attempt
made to examine in detail the smaller strip of territory where
colonisation was possible." This same idea was expressed as far
back as 1903 by Herzl's great opponent, Davis Trietsch, 3 and
although Herzl gave the appropriate answer at the same
Congress,4 Dr. Weizmann seems to disregard that answer and
the facts adduced. These confirm that Herzl in his negotiations
with the British Government did not make any conditions as
regards the size of the territory, he laid much greater stress
on the "guaranteeing of colonial rights", 5 which he regarded
as tantamount to autonomy. He was quite willing to accept
anything feasible for a colonisation, and, contrary to Dr.
Weizmann's criticism, asked precisely for the smaller strip, as
1
Protocol VI, 7/8.
Ibid. p. 101 ff.
3
Ibid. p. 35.
4
Ibid. p. 111-114.
5
Herzl's memorandum to Lord Lansdowne of November 12, 1902, in Foreign
Office Files, 5479} 8‫)ך‬, Turkey.
2
Herzl's letter to Lord Lansdowne proves:1 "Assuming‫ ־‬that so
far as the Pelusiac Plain is concerned, the Irrigation authorities
are correct, then I respectfully submit that there still remain
large portions of the Territory examined by the Commission
of Enquiry which . . . are still capable of being utilised for the
purposes of a Jewish settlement". It is also known that, long
after the official abandonment, Herzl tried time and again
to revive the Sinai Scheme,2 but failed owing to the refusal
of the Egyptian Government. 3
While Herzl regarded the Sinai Scheme as a strategic
colonisation of great practical and political (and even
bargaining) value, 4 the East Africa project was important to
him from another viewpoint. He made this clear to the Zionist
movement in his opening speech at the Sixth Congress: 5 " I
would not like to anticipate the opinions of Congress on the
policy which the Zionist Movement will adhere to in respect
of these proposals, though it is self-understood that the Jewish
people can have no other ultimate aim than Palestine; and
though, whatever the fate of the proposal may be, our
opinions on the Land of our Fathers are and must remain
unalterable, the Congress will nevertheless recognise the
extraordinary advancement rendered to our Movement
through these negotiations with the British Government. I am
allowed to say that our opinion in regard to Palestine has
been openly and to the fullest extent explained to the members of the British Cabinet and to the high Government
official responsible for these matters". The political importance of those negotiations was not only stressed in public but
is also obvious from the correspondence. In his letter of May
20, 1903, quoted above, Greenberg wrote to Herzl: "But it
occurs to me that from the political point of view it would be
no mean thing to say that Britain had offered us a Refuge".
Two months later, one month before the assembly of the
Sixth Congress, Herzl revealed his innermost thought to
Nordau: "If we acknowledge Chamberlain's offer with
thanks, while retaining the conditions mentioned, we
strengthen our position in his sympathies, we involve him in
the necessity of doing something for us in the event that our
commission (which is under our control) brings in a negative
1
Foreign Office Files, I.e. Herzl's letter to Lord Lansdowne of June 5, 1903.
Quoted by permission of the Foreign Office.
2
Diaries III, 412-419.
3
Foreign Office Files.
4
Diaries III, 295-304.
5
Protocol VI, 8.
54
recommendation; and we have, in our relationship with this
gigantic nation, acquired recognition as a state-building
power (cf. in international law the quality of a war-waging
power)". 1
Dr. Weizmann knows the political significance of these
negotiations very well, for he stresses (p. 84 [ i n ] ) that "this
was the first time in the exilic history of Jewry that a great
government had officially negotiated with the elected
representatives of the Jewish people. The identity, the legal
personality of the Jewish people, had been re-established".
How then can he maintain that Herzl's policy was dictated
by "panic" (pp. 88, 105 [117, 138]), and by a desire for
"dismantling... the Z.O. insofar as it had to do with Zion"
(p. 84 [ i n ] ) ?
Trial and Error continues in the narrative (p. 84 [ i n ] ) :
"Herzl had already encountered deep opposition in the
closed session of the Actions Committee. But he had obtained
a majority, and had enforced the unit rule, so that he could
present the British offer in the name of the Actions Committee". The meeting of the A.C. took place in Basle on
August 21, 1903, and Herzl submitted the East Africa
Project to his colleagues. Dr. Kohan-Bernstein and Dr.
Jassinovsky, both from Russia, maintained that the Russian
Jews would go anywhere in times like these; Dr. Tshlenov
disagreed with them. Dr. Bodenheimer and Dr. Alexander
Marmorek 2 opposed the East Africa proposal on principle.
The most remarkable thing in this connection is the fact
that such prominent Russian members in the A.C. were in
favour of East Africa, while the so-called "Herzlians" and
"Westerners", Dr. Bodenheimer and Dr. Marmorek,
opposed it. On August 22, 1903, the second meeting of the
A.C. took place, at which Herzl read the British official letter.
It made a great impression. Tshlenov "stood up and made the
Sheheheyanu, for the document was the first recognition of the
Jewish people as such since its dispersal". 3 This documentary
evidence clashes with Dr. Weizmann's thesis of a difference in
principle between the "Eastern" and "Western" Jews on the
subject of East Africa. How could there have been such a
difference in principle if in the A.C. the former voted for the
project and afterwards in the Congress voted against it; or, as
1
Bein, p. 445.
T h e Protocol of that meeting in M. Medzini, Hamediniyut Hazionit,
salem, 1934, p. 2 5 9 / 6 0 .
3
Bein, p. 454.
2
Jeru-
Herzl formulated it: 1 "These petty Russian A.C.-politicians,
who at first were in the A.C. for the immediate acceptance
of the East Africa Project, and later dramatically left the
hall as if their innermost feelings were hurt."
Dr. Weizmann's part was similar. If he knew, as he says
he did (p. 84 [111]), that Herzl had "encountered in the A.C.
deep opposition" from those who were of Dr. Weizmann's
ideology, why did he speak two days after the A.C. meeting
in favour of the scheme, while his colleagues were then
already so strongly against it? The A.C. meeting, dealing with
East Africa, took place on August 22, 1903,2 while the
Protocol shows3 that Dr. Weizmann spoke in favour of the
scheme on August 24; and in the end, on August 26, voted
"No". The Protocol further reveals4 that on August 30
Congress set up a "Commission for the study of the East
Africa expedition" among whose members the only one
who four days previously voted "No" was—Dr. Weizmann.
This, too, would point to a more uncertain and hesitant
attitude rather than to a "violent" and outspoken opposition.
Dealing with the attitude of the Russian delegates at the
Congress Dr. Weizmann states that he "made a violent
speech against the Uganda project" (p. 86 [114]) at their
internal meeting "and swung to our side many of the
hesitant". Herzl's biographer, however, states5 that in his
speech Dr. Weizmann "seemed not yet clearly decided".
Also Shmarya Levin, Dr. Weizmann's "sterling collaborator
and warm-hearted friend" (p. 62 [85]), reveals in his
memoirs 6 that Dr. Weizmann at that meeting of the Russian
delegates was not at all as definite in his opposition against the
East Africa scheme as may appear from Trial and Error. He
writes; "After him [Tshlenov] spoke Weizmann . . . But he
too, on this occasion, did not find himself so easily. Even in
him the delegates noticed uncertainty."
In connection with the deliberations of the Russian caucus
at the Sixth Congress Dr. Weizmann narrates (p. 86 [114]): " I
closed my speech with these words: 'If the British Government
and people are what I think they are, they will make us a
better offer.' This last sentence became a sort of slogan for
the anti-Ugandists at the Congress." The verbatim text of
1
2
3
4
5
6
Diaries III, 495.
Bein. p. 454.
Protocol VI, 1 ox and 226 respectively.
Ibid. p. 327.
Bein, p. 625 (German edition).
The Arena, London, 1932, p. 256.
56
Dr. Weizmann's speech at the meeting of the Russian
delegates, where, according to the above quotation, these
words were spoken, does not contain them. 1 But on a
previous occasion Dr. Weizmann himself stated that that
same sentence was not uttered by him at all, but by somebody else. He said in 1947:2 "An old friend of ours, who is
with us today, said in a speech after the Uganda episode
ended: 'If the British are really what they are said to be, then
a time will come when they will give us Palestine'." The
Protocol of the Sixth Congress records a similar thought in the
speech of Prof. Belkovsky,3 an ardent anti-East African who
died in Tel Aviv in 1948.
Trial and Error gives the impression that Dr. Weizmann
played a predominant role at the Congress in the fight
against East Africa. But apart from his speech favouring the
Sinai as well as the East Africa schemes, from his negative
vote and from joining the "Commission for the study of the
East Africa expedition", the Protocol of that Congress does
not mention his name with reference to East Africa. The
reporter surveying the Sixth Congress said in regard to him: 4
*'The excited Dr. Weizmann, of the Fifth Congress, was in
harness on the Credentials Committee, and Martin Buber was
silent in the face of the bitter opposition of Nossig and
Trietsch—neither of these have added to their Zionistic
reputation."
2
T
HE East Africa episode did not end with the Congress.
Dr. Weizmann reveals (p. 89 [117]) that, "shortly after
the Sixth Congress", he went to England "to find out for
myself, if I could, what there was in the Uganda offer". He
visited Lord Percy at the Foreign Office, who was astonished
"that the Jews should ever so much as have considered the
Uganda proposal" and "could even entertain the idea of any
other country than Palestine"; and "if he were a Jew he
would not give a halfpenny for this proposition".
I could not trace Dr. Weizmann's visit to Lord Percy in
the archives of the Foreign Office in London while I was
permitted to work in 1943 on materials relating to the early
history of Zionism. The whole matter of East Africa for that
period
is dealt with there in a file headed Jewish Settlement in
1
2
3
4
Hazophe, No. 195, 1903; reprinted in Krojanker, p. 17.
Protocol V I , 159.
J.C., September 4, 1903, p. 14.
the East Africa Protectorate, igoj, Foreign Office Documents and
Correspondence, F.0.2{y8§), East Africa. Every visit, every interview, every item referring to the scheme, is meticulously
recorded therein. Dr. Weizmann's name is not mentioned
anywhere. The first time Lord Percy's name crops up in
connection with the Project is in a memorandum dated
December 14, 1903, recording his and Sir Clement Hill's
interview with Leopold Greenberg. The gist of that conversation is also contained in a letter from Greenberg to Herzl,
dated December 15, 1903.1 He wrote: "Lord Percy said that
his information was that there was very little enthusiasm
about East Africa amongst us, and that some Jews even
objected. I then brought him on to Palestine by explaining
that that was the place in which our people's hopes were
centred, and when he said 'Yes, that is a different matter', I
drew him on to El Arish. . . . After some little time, however,
he turned to me and said, 'Tell me, has anything serious been
done in endeavouring to acquire Palestine, for that seems to
me from all you say to be the thing to get'. I told him that so
far as Palestine was concerned . . . you would be glad to tell
him all about it. He assured me he was very interested, and
will be glad to see you and hear what you can tell him upon
the matter".
It appears that Lord Percy had quite a different aim in mind.
Apparently by arrangement he was asked by Sir Clement
Hill to attend the meeting with Greenberg, 2 in order to persuade him to accept a tract in Tanaland or Somaliland instead of East Africa. A glance at the Foreign Office file I have
mentioned shows what happened. After the publication
‫׳‬during the Sixth Congress of Sir Clement Hill's letter of
August 14, 1903, a press campaign against it began in
England as well as within the Protectorate. There was
Lucien Wolf's letter in The Times (August 28, 1903) and
a series of others. Many of them were collected at the Foreign
Office and are now in the file referred to above. This public
opposition was obviously the reason why the Government
suggested to Greenberg Tanaland or Somaliland instead of
East Africa. At the time when these new suggestions were
made (December, 1903) Lord Percy was brought into the
picture. Until then he had not participated in the discussions,
as Greenberg's memorandum quoted above also proves.
1
Copy supplied to me by Mrs. Sholto. (This letter is hitherto unpublished.)
In his letter to Herzl, Greenberg wrote: "He [Hill] suggested I might see
Lord Percy who . . . then came down to us".
8
58
Indeed Lord Percy only became Under Secretary for Foreign
Affairs at the beginning of October, 19031 (until then he had
been concerned with Indian affairs),2 almost two months
after Sir Clement Hill's letter was written and published.
(He became known in wider Jewish circles as Government
spokesman on East Africa during the debate in the House of
Commons on June 20, 1904, two months before Dr. Weizmann's settlement in England.) Apparently, because of the
public opinion aroused, the British Government was endeavouring to drop the East Africa matter and Lord Percy
was asked to assist Sir Clement Hill in this. A marginal note
in the handwriting of Lord Lansdowne, then Foreign
Secretary, confirms this. He wrote at the end of the Foreign
Office memorandum on Greenberg's visit, already referred
to: 3 "We shall probably be well out of it! But it was right to
treat the application considerately."
Dr. Weizmann says that the interview took place "shortly
after the Sixth Congress" (p. 89 [117]). In a previous speech
he was more definite: 4 "A week after the vote I travelled to
London . . . and saw there . . . Percy". The vote was taken on
August 26, and the Congress ended on August 28, 1903.^
But then, in September, Lord Percy was not yet at the Foreign
Office and had not yet participated in the discussions on the
East Africa project, for, as the documents quoted reveal,
he only joined the Foreign Office in October and first participated in the talks in December of that year. On the other
hand, from the well-known pedantical policy of interdepartmental non-interference traditional in British Government, it is obvious that anybody then wishing to ascertain
the official attitude would have tried to see the man in
charge of the negotiations who was not Lord Percy at that
date but one of three men: Sir Clement Hill, Sir Eric
Barrington or Mr. Hurst, all of the Foreign Office. 6
Two pages before mentioning his visit to Percy, Dr.
Weizmann describes a conversation with Sokolow (p. 87
[115]) "in the train which was taking a group of us from
Basle toward Russia". This seems to indicate that Dr.
Weizmann went straight to Russia from Basle, and not to
London.
1
2
3
4
5
6
EncyclopaediaBritannica ( n t h . e d . ) , I l l , 253; Whitakers Almanack 1905, p. 155.
HazelVs Annual for 1904, p. 454.
Quoted by permission of the Foreign Office.
Goodman, p. 197.
Protocol VI, 221-227 and 341.
Foreign Office Files.
Two other statements made by Dr. Weizmann in this
connection do not corroborate each other. On p. 89 [118], he
says that after the interview with Lord Percy he "wrote a
report of the conversation to my fiancee". But, in a speech in
Czernowitz, he said:1 "I wrote about this to Herzl—I still
have a copy of the letter—and the realisation of this truth was
for Herzl the greatest tragedy, but also his highest experience.
Thus he became an adherent of Palestine". Neither Herzl's
Diaries, however, nor the Zionist Archives contain this letter.
Nor is Herzl referred to in Trial and Error as recipient of such
a letter or of its copy.
While in his Czernowitz speech Dr. Weizmann said that
through his letter he converted Herzl to "an adherent of
Palestine", according to his book (p. 89 [118]) he transmitted the substance of the letter, written to his fiancee, to
the 'Nay-sayers' in Russia, through which, he says {Ibid.), he
"contributed not a little to the final defeat of the Uganda
proposal". That letter is not mentioned in the proceedings of
the Charkov Conference which constituted the culmination
of the opposition against Herzl, and dealt very thoroughly
with all aspects of the East Africa scheme.2
In London Dr. Weizmann also visited Sir Harry Johnston
(p. 89 [118]) who "was of the opinion that the practical value
of the offer was nil". Johnston's viewpoint was largely publicized in the London Times and Daily Graphic and many
Jewish papers reprinted it. The Jewish Chronicle published
a special interview with him. 3 In these articles Sir Harry
stressed that the territory offered was unsuitable for white
colonists although he was honest enough to point out later
that, when making his statements, he had Uganda in mind
and did not know that the Guas Ngishu Plateau had been
offered, which was "free from the objections entertained
to other areas". 4 In his book, Dr. Weizmann omits any
reference to this important geographical error of Johnston's.
It is worthy of note that Dr. Weizmann strongly stresses
the fact that (p. 68 [92/93]) "we fought these problems out
internally, on the floor of the Zionist Congresses. . . . It was
within the Zionist Organisation that the opposition which
Motzkin and I headed . . . sought to strengthen . . . the
movement." Such action of course implies the exercise of dis1
Goodman, p. 197.
See "Protocol of the Conference of Zionist representatives in Russia", i n
Die Welt, Nr. 6, February 5, 1904 (3 pages).
3
September 4, 1903, p. 9.
4
J.C. October 7, 1904, p. 7, 9.
2
60
cipline, the same which Dr. Weizmann demanded thirty years
later of the Revisionists when they approached Governments
and Ministers. But it seems from Dr. Weizmann's narrative
that he was the first within the Z.O. to disregard such
discipline, and through his approach to Lord Percy, a
member of a Government, took independent political steps
which, according to his own story, were not authorised by,
nor known to, the legitimate leadership.
3
F
O R Dr. Weizmann, the East Africa schism became the
criterion by which to judge people and events, even many
years after the project had been abandoned and the discussion
had died down. It was still his guide in 1914 (p. 164 [209]),
and he referred to it at the Zionist Congresses of 19251 and
1931•2
The conclusions drawn from this criterion appear mostly to
be unjustified, especially when they involve a reaction to
"persecutional delusions". For instance, he describes his first
visit to England (pp. 93/95 [123/126]), where he found
himself "isolated, socially, intellectually and morally" (p. 94
[125]), because everybody was for East Africa, and "it was
regarded as something very near treason against Zionist
ideals to permit oneself to criticise the East Africa project"
{Ibid. [124]). Yet the columns of the Jewish Chronicle prove the
reverse. At the time of his arrival in England, articles and
letters appeared therein, and speeches were quoted sharply
opposing the Project. Dr. Samuel Daiches even threatened
secession from the Z.O. 3 "in case the scheme being persevered
with", and Dr. Gaster, the head of the anti-East Africans in
England, presented an ultimatum 4 demanding: "East Africa
must be blown off the platform of Zionism." Herbert Bentwich
also opposed it in the strongest possible terms. 5 And many
more outbursts of the same kind are recorded among English
Zionists. In 1905, under Dr. Gaster's chairmanship, a
"Palestinian Zionist Association" was formed to fight against
territorialism and among its members we find Dr. Max
1
Protocol X I V , 332.
Ibid. X V I I , 64.
J.C. August 26, 1904, p. 7 and p. 17/18.
4
Ibid. p. 7; and August 12, 1904, p. 10.
5
Speech at the Order of Ancient Maccabaeans, J.C.,
P• 31•
2
3
November 18, 1904,
I61FIFTY YEARS OF ZIONISM
Bernstein, E. Ish Kishor, Rev. J . K. Goldbloom, M. Shire
as well as Dr. Weizmann. 1
In view of the divided opinions regarding East Africa the
Executive of the E.Z.F. resolved2 at their meeting under
Greenberg's chairmanship on May 16, 1904 (three months
before Dr. Weizmann's arrival in England): "That the E.Z.F.
in view of the resolution passed by the A.C. in Vienna, and
by reason of individual expression of opinion, resolve t a
confirm their previous declaration that the Federation holds
itself neutral on the East Africa question."
A characteristic instance given in this connection is that of
Dr. Charles Dreyfus, who was Dr. Weizmann's one time
employer (p.95.[126]), who introduced him to Balfour (p. 109
[142]), and who became and remained his friend until his
death (Ibid.). Dr. Weizmann tells us that this Dr. Dreyfus
"was an ardent Ugandist, and was forever arguing the issue
with me" (Ibid.), but his "plan for my re-education had gone
awry" (p. 111 [145]). Yet, Dr. Dreyfus was not a "Ugandist"
at all. He abstained from voting 3 at the Sixth Congress and,
in a speech in Manchester after the Seventh Congress, he
declared: 4 "At the Sixth Congress my opinion was distinctly
against" the East Africa Project "but in view of my col‫־‬
leagues' pressure I, instead of voting against—abstained".
He concluded this speech with the words: "Every man and
woman who wish to become a Zionist in future must declare
their adherence to the principles of the original programme."
This, indeed, is the opposite of an "ardent, forever arguing,
Ugandist". It is worthy of note that, at the meeting at which
Dr. Dreyfus made these statements, the second delegate for
Manchester at the Congress also reported on its deliberations
and seconded Dr. Dreyfus' motion for accepting the decisions
of that Congress. The other speaker was—Dr. Charles
Weizmann 5 (as he then was referred to in the J.C.).
Thus we see that in England, too, men of great importance
and influence in the Zionist Movement strongly objected to
the East Africa scheme and it was not left to Dr. Weizmann
to carry the burden on his shoulders alone in "isolation and
endurance".
A few more "trifles" seem to be worthy of note in this
connection. Five months after his arrival in Manchester, Dr.
1
Die Welt, No. 18, 1905.
J.C., May 20, 1904, p. 26.
Protocol VI, 227.
4
J.C., September 8, 1905, p. 25.
5
Ibid.
2
3
I
62
Weizmann had already been elected as a delegate to the Conference of theE.Z.F., 1 so that his "isolation" and "persecution"
did not last nearly so long. But at that Conference the Executive's Report 2 was submitted which contained references
to the Aliens Bill, the Russian refugee question, and the East
Africa project. In his speech in the debate Dr. Weizmann
strongly objected to the references to the Aliens Bill and
the refugees, and—strangely enough—did not mention the
reference to East Africa at all. This attack was launched later
in the debate by the ardent anti-East African M. Shire. 3
On April 3, 1905, Dr. Weizmann participated in ManChester in a Conference, convoked by Nathan Laski, to
decide upon calling "a special conference at which the
provinces might be worthily represented to consider the
offer of the British Government". A resolution was moved by
B. I. Belisha (who is referred to in Trial and Error on p. 104
[the English edition omits his name]) and carried: "That,
whereas more than one half of the Jewish Nation are still the
victims of intolerance and persecution, and, whereas it is
absolutely necessary for the safety of the oppressed, and for the
welfare of all Israel that the policy of laissez faire shall be
superseded by manly, intelligent, and statesmanlike efforts to
counteract the evils from which our historic people have
suffered for centuries; and, whereas the British Government
has made an offer of East African territory for a Jewish
settlement, with certain autonomous rights, and, whereas it is
essential that the offer referred to shall be most carefully
considered from every point of view, this Conference of
Provincial Jewish Workers, assembled at Manchester, recommends that delegates to the projected Special Conference re
East Africa be appointed by all the principal provincial
Jewish institutions." Although Dr. Weizmann spoke it is not
indicated that he opposed the East Africa scheme or the
resolution. 4
Dr. Weizmann frequently refers to Joseph Massel, the
'veritable angel" (p. 95 [125]), the Friday evenings in whose
house were "the highlights of my life" (ibid. [126]). Massel
met Dr. Weizmann at the station on his first arrival in
Manchester, arranged lodgings for him, introduced him to
Dr. Dreyfus {Ibid.), and thus became one of Dr. Weizmann's
4
1
2
3
4
Ibid.
The
Ibid.
Ibid.
January 20, 1905, p. 36.
Report in J.C., January 20, 1905, p. 35.
January 27, 1905, p. 29.
May 5, 1905, p. 33.
intimate friends from 1904 onwards. The book, however,
omits to record that Joseph Massel voted "Yes" at the Sixth
Congress.1 This is a further instance which does not bear out
Dr. Weizmann's statement that, owing to his attitude on the
East Africa question, on his arrival in England, and for a
considerable time later, he was "isolated, socially, intellectually and morally" (p. 94 [125]).
4
R O M his basic viewpoint of Zionist affairs Dr. Weizmann
also divides the adherents and adversaries in connection
with the East Africa project, into "Westerners" and
"Easterners" respectively (p. 86/87 [ 1 1 5])• But this
mechanical method is also not applicable to the East Africa
controversy. Nordau, the "Westerner" (p. 53 [66]), for
instance, was against the project, 2 or, as it is put in Trial and
Error (p. 86 [114]), "was not thoroughly convinced, and had
yielded only to pressure". Dr. Weizmann's own father and
brother voted "Yes" (p. 86 [113]), and so did a number of
other "Eastern" Zionists, like Nachman Syrkin, Dr. S.
Bojukanski, Ch. Chasan, Dr. D. Farbstein, N. Finkelstein,
Dr. Ph. Menczel, Dr. Avinovitzky, Dr. J . Chasanovitz,
W. Javitz, F. and M. Pines,3 etc. The resolution against
East Africa was carried even in the caucus of the Russian
delegation by 146 against 84 votes4 and all 84 were, naturally,
"Easterners". The well known "Easterner", Jakob Konstantinovski, formerly of Rishon Lezion, wrote after the Congress
from Odessa his consent.5 There were many "Easterners"
who abstained at the Congress, foremost among them: Dr. J .
Tshlenov, Prof. Belkovsky, Dr. J . Kohan-Bernstein, Dr.
Victor Jacobson, Dr. I. Jassinovsky, Dr. J . Jelsky, Ing.
Vladimir Tiomkin, Prof. M. Mandelstamm, Dr. Pasmanik,
Nahum Sokolow, Dr. Hirsch Perez Chajes. 6 Similarly,
"Westerners" are also to be found among those who voted
"No," like Dr. Buber, Dr. M. Bernstein, Berthold Feiwel,
Dr. Freudenberg, Davis Trietsch, Dr. E. M. Zweig and others, 7
or who abstained, like Herbert Bentwich, Dr. G. Cohen,
Dr. Ch. Dreyfus, Dr. I. Harris, Dr. Henrich Lowe, Marco
1
Protocol VI, 224.
Bein, p. 444 f.
3
Protocol VI, 223-225.
4
Ibid. p. 166.
5
Die Welt, No. 44, October 30, 1904, p. 7.
6
Protocol VI, 227.
7
Ibid‫־‬p. 225/226,
2
I
64
Romano, Prof. R. Gottheil, Leopold Greenberg, Jacob de
Haas, Herzl, Dr. Ravenna, and many more. 1 All this shows
that the East Africa problem did not divide the Zionists
according to their place of birth, but according to their
convictions—or if not, in most cases, according to whether
they belonged to the opposition against the "Western
intruder" Herzl, or not. Jabotinsky, for instance, who voted
"No", could not explain why he did so.2 Like many others at
the Congress he "felt immediately that I too belonged to the
opposition, though I did not know yet why". 3
Dr. Weizmann interrupts the narrative on East Africa in
order to single Nahum Sokolow out for his "crime" of having
abstained from voting. He refers to a conversation which took
place between himself, Sokolow and Tshlenov (p. 87 [115]).
Sokolow is stated to have answered to the latter's question why
he had abstained "with unwonted heat: T could write you a
dozen articles on this issue, and you would not find out
whether I am pro or con. . . . And here you dare to ask me
to my face for a definite reply. That's more than I can stand'!"
As a matter of fact, Sokolow had quite a definite opinion on
the subject and was not at all the double-faced political sly
old fox, as would appear from this and other references in the
book (p. 78/79, 339 [105, 420]). First of all it should not be
overlooked that the question came from Tshlenov, who was
the leader of Herzl's opponents at the Congress and who
abstained from voting himself.4 On the other hand one can
assume that Sokolow would have given Tshlenov the answer
which he gave to his readers shortly after the Congress in an
article 5 wherein he says: "I considered the matter carefully
and abstained from voting. The East Africa proposal did not
seem to me in the right place at a Zionist Congress. If it was
a tactical question towards England, then the decision
should have been quite a different one, other than sending a
Commission to East Africa. I submitted to the Presidium a
resolution with reference to this, but the resolution was
ignored . . . I believe that the whole matter should have been
left to the very honourable ICA."
After the Charkov Conference (October, 1903), which
accepted the famous ultimatum to Herzl, the highly personal
1
Ibid. p. 226/227.
"Sippur Yamai", in Ketavim nivharim, Tel Aviv, 1936, I, 56.
Ibid. p. 55.
4
Protocol VI, 227.
5
Hazefirah, Nr. 223, 1903; reprinted in Die Welt, Nr. 43, October 23, 1903,
pp. 9 / 1 0 .
2
3
opposition to him became more obvious. This caused a still
further and more considerable shift among the "Eastern
Jews" in favour of sending the Commission to East Africa.
Die Welt published in a few issues1 the reaction to this step,
showing an overwhelming wave of protest among the Russian
Zionist masses against their local leaders' attitude. Dr. Weizmann records (p. 87 [115]) that the No-votes at the Sixth
Congress of the delegates from Kishinev made a deep
impression on Herzl. But in the list of places recorded in Die
Welt which protested against Charkov's ultimatum to Herzl
Kishinev is strongly represented through the "Agudas Osrei
Zion", "Agudas Zion" and "Agudas Ahave Zion". Protest
meetings were held all over Russia and resolutions passed
against the "Charkovers". A Conference of the local and
Lodz Zionists took place in Warsaw2 (Sokolow was also
present) and they declared as illegal the attempt of the
"Charkovers" to raise questions which "undermine the
authority of the Congress and of our leader".
The Special Correspondent of the then anti-Zionist Jewish
Chronicle (Greenberg became editor only in 1907)3 reported
from St. Petersburg 4 on the attitude of Russian Jewry towards
the East Africa scheme: "On the whole, opinion is decidedly
in favour of the project, and people find it difficult to understand the action of the minority at the Congress." And, after
the Charkov Conference, the Correspondent reported: 5 " T h e
East Africa project had, without doubt, many more
adherents among the Russian Jews than Zionism itself."
One can sum up by saying that there was no question of
superseding Palestine by East Africa, and Herzl's opening
speech at the Sixth Congress bears this out in full. It was not
even a question of for or against East Africa; the only point
under discussion and put to vote was, whether or no to send
a Commission to investigate the territory. Never for one
moment was there the threat (p. 85 [113]): "If you won't
give us Palestine, we'll drop you completely and go to British
East Africa." Herzl did not cease to continue working for
Palestine after the Congress decision had been taken. He
revealed in an interview: 6 "This [East Africa] did not cause
me to abate anything from our original programme in regard
1
1904, No. 4, 5, 6, 7, 11.
Die Welt, No. 1, January 1, 1904.
Cecil Roth, Magna Bihliotheca Anglo-Judaica, London, 1937, p. 185.
4
October 2, 1903, p. 12.
5
January 8, 1904, p. 11.
6
Given to R. Brainin; in J.C. September 18, 1903, p. 27.
2
3
I 66
to Palestine. . . . Never were our hopes brighter than at
present for the attainment of our ultimate goal. My striving
for Zion will now be greater and more powerful, for now
new forces and new conditions are ranging themselves on our
side." Finally, it was the proof which Herzl submitted in 1904
to the meeting of the A.C. in Vienna—the last he attended—
that convinced his opponents that "since the Congress he
worked all the harder for Palestine". 1 With all the votes of the
Russian members the A.C. unanimously expressed its
"satisfaction in taking cognisance of the continuous efforts of
the Smaller Actions Committee for Palestine" and even
reconciled themselves to sending the Commission to East
Africa which had been so bitterly contested. They passed
the following resolution: "The Greater A.C. takes it for
granted that the A.C., in accordance with the resolutions of
the Sixth Congress, will undertake the despatch of the Africa
expedition."
1
Full report in J.C. April 22, 1904, pp. 19/20. All the further quotations are
taken from here.
III. WORLD WAR I AND T H E
BALFOUR DECLARATION
T
HE preparatory work for achieving the Balfour Declaration has widely been dealt with in various historical
books and memoirs, though complete clarity has even now
not been achieved. Unfortunately, Dr. Weizmann's narrative
of that period does not add to clarification. To begin with, he
says (p. 148 [190]) that he returned from Switzerland to
Manchester "at the beginning of the college term", which
would correspond with the end of September or beginning of
October, 1914. He then met C. P. Scott of the Manchester
Guardian "some two months after my return" {Ibid.), i.e. at
the end of November. A few days later Dr. Weizmann was
invited to Scott's house and from then onwards they became
friendly (p. 149 [191]. Later, "it became a practice with me,
whenever I happened to be in London, and Mr. Scott came up
on the night train, to meet him at Euston Station for breakfast" (p. 150 [192]). And on one of these mornings—it was
December 3, 1914—Mr. Scott informed Dr. Weizmann that
they were going "to have breakfast at nine o'clock with Mr.
Lloyd George" (p. 150 [192]). The above quoted sequence
of events as recorded in the book itself makes it impossible
that the meeting could have taken place on December 3.
When Dr. Weizmann met Scott for the first time at the end
of November the latter suggested that he should approach
Herbert Samuel, then a member of the Government (p. 149
[191]), but Dr. Weizmann refused, expecting him to be a
"type of Jew who by his very nature was opposed to us"
{Ibid.). He then describes the "surprise of his life" (p. 150
[192]) when he saw Samuel at the breakfast with Lloyd
George on December 3, the former even interposing "some
helpful remarks". This story disagrees with another statement
of Dr. Weizmann's (p. 181 [229]) that he met Samuel in
November, 1914, and on that occasion heard that he,
"though not a member of the Zionist Organisation, had long
been interested in the idea of a Jewish State in Palestine".
How then is it possible that Dr. Weizmann should have had
I 68
the "surprise of his life" on December 3 about what he had
already heard in the previous November?
Apart from Dr. Weizmann's statement, nowhere else is
that date or breakfast recorded. Lloyd George in his Memoirs
does not make Dr. Weizmann's acquaintance before 1916.1
This year is also corroborated by the biographer of C. P.
Scott.2 Lord Samuel in his Memoirs does not record any such
meeting or breakfast at the beginning of December, 1914.3
In a letter to Dr. Weizmann, dated December 16, 1914,
Achad Haam said: 4 "With regard to Lloyd George I think
you could see him without the memorandum and could send
it on to him afterwards. Otherwise you would have to give up
your idea until he has read the memorandum." Thus, on
December 16, it was not yet clea:r how to approach and visit
Lloyd George. How, under these circumstances, could they
have met thirteen days earlier?
During the breakfast Lloyd George is stated to have
suggested to Dr. Weizmann (p. 150 [192]) "to talk with
Balfour" on the matter, and " I followed up at once Lloyd
George's suggestion about seeing Balfour. Professor Alexander,
with whom Balfour was acquainted as a brother-philosopher,
sent him a note reintroducing me and received in reply a
postcard" (p. 152 [195]). Dr. Weizmann sent Balfour's reply
on to Achad Haam and the latter returned it on November
22, 5 eleven days before the meeting with Lloyd George at
which the approach to Balfour was suggested.
The accuracy of these dates is important in order to
determine how, when, and by whom the movement during
World War I was initiated in England, which finally led to
the Balfour Declaration.
Soon after the outbreak of the War suggestions for a
Jewish political offensive with the object of obtaining
Palestine for the Jews after the War appeared from all sides
in the Press. Achad Haam wrote to Dr. Weizmann on
November 15, 1914:6 "If you read the last issue of the
Jewish Chronicle you may have noticed that not only we are
aroused. Every Jew with some brains understands that the
great historical hour for Jewry and Palestine has come and
that something must be done." H. G. Wells in the Daily
1
Lloyd George I, 348.
J. D . Hammond, C. P. Scott, 1846-1932, London, 1946, p. 52.
3
Samuel, p. 139 ff.
4
Iggerot V, 205.
5
Ibid. p. 203.
6
Ibid. p. 202.
2
I69F I F T Y Y E A R S O F Z I O N I S M
Chronicle1 asked Israel Zangwill in an open letter: " And
now, what is to prevent Jews having Palestine and restoring
a real Judaea?" The most important statement made at that
early date was that of the Prime Minister, Mr. Asquith, of
November 9, 1914:2 "It is the Ottoman Government and not
we who have rung the death-knell of Ottoman dominion,
not only in Europe but in Asia." A leader in the Jewish
Chronicle3» (written by L. J . Greenberg?) demanded, in view
of this statement, that the Jewish leaders take action for
securing Palestine for the Jewish people "if the Ottoman
dominion is to cease in Asia".
On the day Mr. Asquith made his important statement
Herbert Samuel went to see the Foreign Secretary, Sir
Edward Grey, and discussed with him the question of
Palestine and "the restoration there of a Jewish State". 4 He
then also discussed it with Lloyd George who "was very keen
to see a Jewish State established there". On the basis of these
discussions Herbert Samuel later drafted a memorandum for
the Cabinet. 5 Thus it was he who actually took the first
practical step in World War I to inform British statesmen
on the issue of establishing a Jewish State in Palestine.
It is much to Dr. Weizmann's credit that with reference
to Lloyd George's Memoirs6 he sets out at this point to destroy
the legend that it was as reward for his chemical discovery
during World War I that "the British Government had
offered him millions and honours but he demanded one
reward only: Palestine for the Jews". 7 Dr. Weizmann
emphatically denies this legend (p. 150 [191/192]). "History
does not deal in Aladdin's lamps" he wisely remarks in this
connection. As a matter of fact Dr. Weizmann frankly says
(p. 174 [222]) that he had worked on his process in the
Government's employ since March 1916 and after the War
{Ibid.) "the Government gave me a token reward for my work,
amounting to about ten shillings for every ton of acetone
produced, a total o f t e n thousand pounds."
1
Quoted in J.C. November 6, 1914, p. 8.
Ibid. November 13, 1914, p. 8.
Ibid.
4
Samuel, p. 140 (where the Note on the conversation, dated November 9,
1914, is recorded).
6
Ibid. p. 142.
6
7
J. Jaari-Poljeskin, Holmim veLohamim (Dreamers and Fighters) Tel Aviv,
!946‫ ־‬P- 329/330.
2
3
I 70
2
D
R. WEIZMANN was not alone in the work which he began
at the end of 1914. Though he reports (p. 184 [233])
that "Sokolow appeared in London some time in 1916" it is
quite evident that the latter arrived in London at the end of
1914.1 Together with him came Tshlenov who, at that time,
was the virtual head of the Zionist Executive.2 At the end of
1914 all three visited Herbert Samuel and that conversation,
so far as he recollects, was the latter's "first serious conversation with Dr. Weizmann about Palestine". 3 Tshlenov and
Sokolow had official status, for they belonged to the World
Executive of the Zionist Organisation and thus were able to
give prestige and value to any eventual negotiations. Apart
from them the whole machinery of the E.Z.F. as well as their
leaders in Britain, were at their disposal—a fact to which,
unfortunately, almost no reference is made in Trial and Error.4‫׳‬
In the narrative Dr. Weizmann writes (p. 164 [210]) that
from the beginning of the War it was he and Achad Haam
who believed "that the Allies were going to win" and that it
was on that issue that "a new internal division" in Zionism
arose. In his review R. H. S. Crossman, M.P., after reading
Dr. Weizmann's book, came to the conclusion5 that a "Teutonic Herzl" was contrasted by Dr. Weizmann, whose "love for
England" is one of the two outstanding features of his life (the
other being chemistry). We have proved 6 that, as far as the
1
Pol. Report XII, 5.
Org. Report XII, 15.
Letter of Viscount Samuel to me of June 21, 1949.
* The names of those who helped in this struggle are recorded in Goodman,
Zionism, pp. 33-64. I think it is only fair to refer in this connection to the conspicuous fact of the absence in Trial and Error of so many illustrious names in
Zionism, and their contribution to the movement. An autobiography gives, of
course, its author the right to insert or omit references to events and persons
in so far as he regards them important or not. But Dr. Weizmann's book is, as far
as Zionism is concerned, only in a very small part an autobiography, while in the
main it represents without doubt a Zionist history. Therefore, such omissions
obviously conceal a certain tendency, to investigate which cannot be the object of
this study. But reference must be made to this in a historical analysis, especially
in view of the fact that a great number of those Zionists also played a not unimportant part in Dr. Weizmann's political career, and were fellow creators
with him, and faithful adherents to this day, of the so-called "Weizmannism".
There is also a striking disproportion as regards the appraisal of many men's
work in comparison with others. It is perhaps typical of Dr. Weizmann's profound human sympathies that Tom Edwards, the chief steward of the ManC h e s t e r laboratories is allotted 57 lines in t h e book (p. 97/98 [127/128]). But did
Meir Weisgal play such a role in Zionism as to deserve 18 lines (p. 343/344 [425])
—all the more since Ben Gurion or Prof. Brodetsky or Rabbi Silver are only referred to en passant in one line?
8
The New Statesman and Nation, London, March 26, 1949, p. 303.
6
See p. 8-9.
2
3
facts are concerned, this conclusion as regards Herzl is not
justified. In connection with his activities during World War I,
Dr. Weizmann takes to his credit his strong opposition against
the "Germans" throughout his Zionist career and quotes as an
instance his role in the fight for the introduction of Hebrew
instead of German at the Haifa Technikum (p. 144 [183/184]).He even introduced himself to Balfour with reference to this
(P• 1 53 [196]), though it is known that this was a fight of the
whole Zionist Organisation without any difference of party
and creed. As is shown in another section 1 the records do not
refer to any special activities of Dr. Weizmann in this
struggle on the Technikum.
Having stated his and Achad Haam's belief in an Allied
victory Dr. Weizmann then continues (p. 164 [210]): " T h e
Zionists who were arriving in England from the Continent
were not only anti-Russian but believed, for the greater part,
in the inevitability of a German victory". He does not
mention in this connection the name of Sokolow, who then
arrived from the Continent in England, and it is, therefore,
necessary to point out that no proof whatsoever is submitted
that he shared this belief. Nor is there any evidence of
Tshlenov's belief in a German victory (p. 167 [212]). Dr.
Weizmann mentions in this connection another name, that
ofMenahem Ussishkin {Ibid.). But throughout World War I
Ussishkin lived in Russia, first in Odessa, then in Moscow,
and did not come to England until 1919.2 It was hardly possible
to ascertain his attitude before that date. But if the fight for
Hebrew at the Technikum is an indication of an anti-German
attitude, as Dr. Weizmann insists it is in his case (p. 144,
153 [183/184, 196]), then it must be pointed out that at the
Zionist Congress following the teachers* strike in Palestine it
was Ussishkin who moved the resolution for teaching Hebrew
at the schools there. 3
Dr. Weizmann also states that Dr. Gaster (p. 181 [230])
"felt that all our negotiations with British statesmen and
officials were pointless, and that they would only upset the
Germans and the Turks, who were going to win the war".
Surely one cannot imagine the Haham of the Spanish and
Portuguese community in Britain to be pro-German in a war
against Germany. On the other hand what sense would it
have to be instrumental (as Dr. Gaster was even according to
1
2
3
p. 103-104.
Klausner, pp. 57-63.
Protocol XI S 295.
I
72
Dr. Weizmann's book (p. 188 [238])), in calling the "first
full-dress conference leading to the Balfour Declaration" in
his house, if he believed that all such negotiations were
pointless?
In view of the grave statements against Dr. Gaster in this
as well as in other respects (p. 181/182 [229/230]), I approached the late Haham's son, Mr. Vivian J . Gaster who
wrote me on September 12, 1949, as follows:—
"With regard to the suggestion that he was pro-German,
this is entirely unwarranted. No man was more anxious
than himself for the victory of the Allied powers, and whatever help he could give was given willingly. It is true that with
his wide knowledge of Germany and the Continent, he was
not willing to underrate the strength of the Central powers,
nor to swallow all the propaganda statements put out from
time to time, and in those rather hectic days some people
were only too willing to dub as pro-German anyone who
did not swallow every optimistic statement made. You may
recollect that it was in the autumn of 1917 that Lord Lansdowne, Foreign Secretary in Balfour's government and the
architect of the Entente Cordiale, and leader of the Conservative side of the House of Lords during the Liberal
government of 1906-14, wrote a letter to the Telegraph1
pointing out the strength of the German army, the fact that
forces were so equally matched that the war might continue indefinitely, with such destruction on both sides that
a recovery would be gravely impeded, and urging consideration of a negotiated peace. I think my father had much the
same view, but this no more makes him pro-German than
it made Lord Lansdowne.
I have no doubt from the papers I have read that in the
negotiations preceding the Declaration he bore in mind the
necessity of so framing any statement that it would not adversely react on the Jews in Germany or under German
control, and opposed the inclusion in the formula of any
suggestion that the Jewish home in Palestine' should be
under the suzerainty of England or any other particular
power; but while deprecating the inclusion of such a statement in a public formula, he was very much in favour of
England's suzerainty in actual fact."
1
T h e letter was published in the London Daily Telegraph on November 29,
1917. (About this affair see Lord Newton, Lord Lansdowne. A Biography, London,
1929, pp. 463-483.)
It is evident from the records that the anti-Russian
attitude of the Zionists (though Dr. Weizmann denies it
(p. 164 [210]) without evidence) was often confused with a
pro-German tendency, as happened to Dr. Weizmann himself
when he met Balfour (p. 153 [196]): "We talked of the war, of
course, and I spoke openly of my feelings toward Russia. Mr.
Balfour wondered how a friend of England could be so antiRussian, when Russia was doing so much to help England win
the war." Pro-German in that War were those Zionists who
lived in Germany or in countries fighting on Germany's side,
and this was natural; they were citizens of their respective
countries. But the bulk of the Zionists, so far as they lived in
countries at war with Germany, or in neutral lands, supported
the plans of the English and American Zionists, especially in
respect to the "neutrality" of the Z.O. 1
Dr. Weizmann is very well aware of these facts and it is
strange that he should depict Dr. Gaster—as we have seen—
as so ardently pro-German when he states elsewhere in
his book (p. 181 [230]) that "Gaster was so furiously antiRussian that he seemed to be pro-German". Thus the Haham
was no more and no less "pro-German" than Dr. Weizmann
himself.
This, too, was the attitude of Ussishkin who was bitterly
anti-Russian and, therefore (and also because of his contacts
with the Zionist Bureau in Copenhagen) had to leave Odessa
secretly in 1915 and transfer himself to Moscow.2
The attitude of all these Zionists was once described by
Jabotinsky as follows:3 "From the first moment I hoped and
prayed with all my heart and soul for the defeat of Russia. If
the fate of the war had depended on me in those weeks, I
would have decided: Quick peace in the West, without
victors or vanquished—but first of all, Russia's defeat."
It was the memory of the horrible anti-Jewish measures and
pogroms in Tsarist Russia which was the cause of this attitude
of the Zionists. Their tendency was not pro-German but
anti-Russian. One would have expected Dr. Weizmann to
apply this differentiation not only to himself but also to the
rest of the Zionists.
At the beginning of World War I the political orientation of
the English Zionists was not yet clearly defined; it was of a
rather negative character. On November 28,1914, L.J. Green1
2
3
Gelber, p. 32.
Klausner, p. 58.
"Sippur Yamai", in Ketavim nivharim, Jerusalem, 1943, II, 25.
I 74
berg met members of the A.C. in The Hague and "transmitted the attitude of the English Zionists, Joseph Cowen,
Kessler and Dr. Weizmann. They demanded the removal of
the Head Office from Berlin and objected to a Zionist policy
based on the Central Powers (Austria, Germany, Turkey)". 1
The historian of that period does not refer to any other
positive demands as to political orientation.
This as yet vague political orientation also found expression
in the attitude of Dr. Weizmann and his friends towards the
"neutrality" of the Z.O. From the last paragraph it is clear
that they demanded the removal of the Headquarters from
Berlin without stating where to. But they had in mind a
neutral country, as Dr. Weizmann reveals (p. 165 [211]), for
as far back as October 18, 1914, he suggested that "the
American Provisional Executive Committee should be given
full power to deal with all Zionist matters, until better times
come". Yet, notwithstanding this, he maintains (p. 165 [210])
that he strongly opposed the neutrality of the Z.O. "on which
the Zionists insisted", and demanded a clear-cut pro-Ally
orientation but could do nothing because the Zionist leadership "discouraged my first tentative steps to get in touch with
the British statesmen."
As a matter of fact it was because the Russian, English, and
American Zionists demanded "neutrality" that the meeting
of the A.C. of December 1914 decided to embark upon such
a political orientation. 2
As soon as the A.C. accepted "neutrality" as its policy a
number of members of the Smaller A.C. set out for the various
centres in the belligerent as well as neutral countries, and by
the "decision of the Smaller A.C. at its meeting in Copenhagen" Sokolow and Tshlenov arrived in London at the end
of December 1914.3 They certainly did not discourage Dr.
Weizmann from his political work. On the contrary, owing to
their official status which Dr. Weizmann did not then have,
they gave his work the proper backing. The official Report
records: 4 "Since then the Zionist political work stood in the
Allied countries under the leadership of these three gentlemen."
The only one who discouraged Dr. Weizmann's work at
the beginning of the War was Achad Haam in his letter of
1
Gelber, p. 31.
Ibid. p. 31/32, where the proceedings of the A.G. meeting are recorded in
detail.
3
Pol. Report X I I , 5.
4
Ibid.
2
November 15, 1914;1 though he was one of the two (the other
was Dr. Weizmann) who from the very beginning is said to
have believed (p. 164 [210]) "that the Allies were going to
win".
Dr. Weizmann continues (p. 166 [211]): "When the bureau
in Copenhagen was actually opened, I cut myself off from the
European Zionists, even though they had transferred themselves to neutral territory. I wrote to the bureau asking that
no mail be sent to me". I tried to check the letter referred to
by Dr. Weizmann in the files of the Copenhagen Bureau deposited in the Zionist Central Archives, but in vain. Nor
does the published literature reveal any such letter at the time
of the Bureau's transfer to Copenhagen in February 1915.
Gelber quotes from a letter from Dr. Weizmann and Sokolow,2 written in 1916, stating that the two of them must now
be very careful in their correspondence with the outside
world because "under the present circumstances the smallest
misunderstanding may make us lose the connections". Paul
Goodman, who at the time was Hon. Secretary to the E.Z.F.,
records, 3 that some of the letters received from Copenhagen
"were sometimes couched in a tone of misplaced mystery and
obscure allusion that made the receipt of such communications rather unwelcome to their recipients".
In a letter, dated March 16, 1916, Sokolow asked the
Copenhagen Bureau to write to him less in the future, 4
"because almost every letter is subject to opening by the
censor who always puts manifold questions to him." Thus
there is no question of any complete cutting off from Copenhagen nor are the motives for caution obscure. At that time
Dr. Weizmann's position was more precarious because he had
entered into the Government's employ and was in charge of
highly confidential work in the interests of the War effort.
He could not maintain correspondence abroad. Not in 1915,
when the Bureau was opened, as he maintains (p. 166 [211]),
but only in 1916, did he decide "to cease all correspondence
with the neutral countries for personal reasons, completely
justified because of his chemical work in the interest of the
War". 5 In the meantime Sokolow carried on the correspondence even if only on a limited scale.
1
2
3
4
6
Iggerot V , 203.
Gelber, p. 44.
Goodman, Zionism, p. 37.
Gelber, p. 44.
Ibid. p. 45.
I 76
3
F
R O M Dr. Weizmann's book it becomes obvious that up to
1916 discussions with leading personalities in public life
in England went on but no definite or concrete proposals
were submitted nor, of course, accepted. During 1915 and
most of 1916 matters appear to have come to a standstill for,
during that period, important developments took place which
showed that the Zionist solution was then not acceptable to the
British Government. The secret agreements between Britain,
France and Russia of March 1915 and between them and Italy
of April 1915, as well as the Sykes-Picot agreement of May 1916,
divided the spheres of influence in the Middle East among
these Powers without reference to a Jewish Home or State in
Palestine.1 The British Government opened independent
negotiations on October 15, 1915, with the Shariff of Mecca
regarding Arab independence after Turkey's defeat. 2 All this
shows that the preparatory steps of Dr. Weizmann and his
colleagues and their conversations with British statesmen
had until then born no fruit. The historian sums up: 3 "The
year 1915 . . . went by without any political results for the
English Zionists".
At such a moment a complete re-orientation became unavoidable. The political as well as the propaganda work
among the British public now had to be revised and put on
a different footing (p. 182 [231]) and for that purpose a
Political Committee was formed (p. 183 [232]). At that dark
moment help was to be forthcoming from an unexpected
quarter. In the narrative of this most important chapter of
Zionist history before the Balfour Declaration Dr. Weizmann
omits the most important link in the chain. He says (p. 181
[229]) that it was Sir Mark Sykes who became "one of our
greatest finds" about whose services rendered to Zionism and
Jewry he "cannot say enough" (p. 182 [230]). From Dr.
Weizmann's story it appears (p. 181 [229]) that "Sykes was
brought in touch with Zionist affairs and myself through Dr.
Gaster". The facts, however, are as follows:
At the time the British Government felt it necessary to influence President Wilson towards a more favourable attitude
to the Allies and it was James Malcolm, President of
the Armenian National Committee in London, who advised
1
2
3
Gt. Britain and Palestine, p. 5-7.
Ibid.
Gelber, p. 44•
Sir Mark Sykes to try to influence Wilson through Brandeis. 1
It also seemed important to the Government to win over
American Jewry towards the Allied cause and Malcolm therefore advised Sykes to "promise Palestine to the Jews after the
victory" and thus gain their sympathies. Brandeis was a
Zionist and the Zionist aim was the restoration of Palestine—
Sykes understood where his work would have to start. Being
Under Secretary of the War Cabinet he • immediately
sounded some of its members, and after further negotiations Sykes requested and authorised Malcolm to approach
the Zionist leaders and give them the assurance that the War
Cabinet was disposed to promise Palestine to the Jews. This
conversation took place in October 1916. The fact that the
Cabinet, to which Balfour as well as Lloyd George then belonged, authorised Sykes to contact Zionist leaders through
Mr. Malcolm shows the scanty results of the preparatory
political work of Dr. Weizmann and his colleagues, in great
contrast to its appraisal in Trial and Error. Malcolm did not
approach Dr. Weizmann nor did Sykes ask him to do so. He
personally knew L. J . Greenberg, editor of the Jewish
Chronicle, and the Chief Rabbi, Dr. J . H. Hertz, who were both
members of the "Russian Society" founded by Malcolm in
1915. He wrote the former a letter informing him of the important decision of the Government. Greenberg thereupon
arranged a meeting between Malcolm and Dr. Weizmann.
The latter, in view of the complete deadlock in his efforts,
wished to see Sykes immediately. Malcolm telephoned Sykes
from Dr. Weizmann's house and Sir Mark invited him to call
the next morning. As Dr. Weizmann was unable to attend
Sokolow went instead. Further conversations were held in
which Dr. Weizmann also participated. All these interviews
took place with the knowledge and approval of Sir Maurice
Hankey, the Secretary of the War Cabinet. The first important formal meeting at which Sir Mark Sykes as well as the
Zionist and Jewish representatives participated was that of
February 7, 1917 in the house of Dr. Gaster (p. 188 [238]).
Malcolm Thomson, Lloyd George's biographer, corroborates2 the important initiative of Malcolm and confirms that he
"when writing the biography of the late Earl Lloyd George,
studied the mass of documents dealing with the affair, and
independently reached the same conclusion". Malcolm pub1
Landman, pp. 261-270 also for the following.
"Origin of the Balfour Declaration", in The Times Literary Supplement,
London, July 22, 1949, p. 473; and "The Balfour Declaration" in The Times>
London, November 2, 1949, p. 5.
2
I 78
lished in the Jewish Chronicle a letter 1 referring to the fact that
Dr. Weizmann in his memoirs did not mention his intervention and simultaneously released Dr. Weizmann's communication to him, dated March 5, 1941, in which the latter
said: " I n reply to your inquiry, you will be interested to hear
that some time ago I had occasion to write to Mr. Lloyd
George about your useful and timely initiative in 1916 to
bring about the negotiations between myself and my Zionist
colleagues and Sir Mark Sykes and others about Palestine
and Zionist support of the Allied cause in America and
elsewhere."
1
April 8, 1949, p. 16.—Mr. Hamish Hamilton, the publisher of the English
edition, in a letter in The Times (December 3, 1949, p. 5) in the name of Dr.
Weizmann again confirmed Malcolm's initiative and apologised for omitting
a n y reference to it in Trial and Error.
IV.
T H E SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS
I
N a separate chapter Dr. Weizmann deals with the
events of the Seventeenth Zionist Congress which led to
his relinquishing the Presidency of the Z.O. It appears therefrom that he was chosen as the scapegoat for the British policy
which was laid down at that time in the White Paper of 1930
and in the MacDonald letter following it, and for that purpose his opponents chose to "initiate a debate on 'the ultimate aims of the Zionist movement' as if that had any relevance
at the moment" (p. 337/338 [418]). As a matter of fact the
debate on the ultimate aim of Zionism was opened by Dr.
Weizmann himself, who dwelt upon it at great length in his
Report on the Zionist policy which he made at that Congress
as President of the Organisation. 1 He tried to prove therein
that the aim of Zionism was not the creation of a Jewish State
in Palestine, as neither the Basle Programme nor Herzl demanded it after the first Congress. It was only logical that the
debate which followed his speech should devote some length
to the question of the "aim". It is surprising that Dr. Weizmann should now state in his autobiography (p. 338 [418)],
that "it is difficult to say if this debate was meant sincerely,
and was the expression of a desire to fix the Zionist program for all time, and to provide guidance for future generations, or whether it was simply a means to provoke my
opposition, and thus facilitate my resignation from office".
Having initiated the debate Dr. Weizmann bears as great a
responsibility for it as those who participated in the debate
after him.
But the whole matter had a deeper significance. It was at
the meeting of the A.C., held in Berlin on August 27, 1930,
that Dr. Weizmann set the debate going. He said there: 2 "The
Jewish State was never an aim in itself, it was only a means for
a purpose. In the Basle Programme nothing is said about the
Jewish State; nor in the Balfour Declaration. The essence of
Zionism is: To create a number of important material foundations in Palestine, upon which can be built an autonomous,
compact and productive community". This statement created
1
2
Protocol XVII, 55-81.
Krojanker, p. 218,
I 80
a big stir among the Zionist public and a heated debate set in
as to the aim of Zionism. It is thus evident that the discussion
was initiated by Dr. Weizmann long before the Seventeenth
Congress. We have seen in a previous section1 that throughout his Zionist career he disregarded the Zionist State conception or refuted it. The statements of 1930 and 1931 were the
logical sequence to his conception. Yet, had it been a question of these statements alone, Dr. Weizmann would not have
been dismissed at Basle. As can be concluded from the debate
at the Congress his majority was strong enough. But it was he
who continued to challenge those who still believed in the
Jewish State as the Zionist aim. During the Congress Dr.
Weizmann granted an interview to the representative of the
J.T.A. in which he said: 2 " I have no understanding of and no
sympathy for the demand for a Jewish majority in Palestine.
Majority does not guarantee security, majority is not necessary for the development of Jewish civilisation and culture.
The world will construe this demand only in the sense that we
want to acquire a majority in order to drive out the Arabs".
The late Robert Strieker read this statement out to the Congress.
It created a deep impression, and it was not a Revisionist or a
Mizrachi, whom Dr. Weizmann blames (p. 338 [418]) for the
events in Basle, but Dr. Arlosoroff, the leader of the socialists
(of whom Dr. Weizmann says (p. 339 [420]) that they were
the only ones who understood him) who demanded of Dr.
Weizmann in an interpellation that he should make a statement as to his interview, which "if correctly quoted, is in its
essence wrong and politically harmful". 3
Dr. Weizmann's whole narrative is incorrect in this connection. No "resolution of non-confidence in my policy"
(p. 338 [418]) was submitted, 4 nor was a "roll-call vote"
{Ibid.) for such a resolution taken, as Dr. Weizmann maintains. The answer he gave to Dr. Arlosoroff's interpellation
was dealt with in the Political Committee of the Congress, on
whose behalf Dr. Goldmann reported in the plenum, suggesting the acceptance of the following resolution: 5 "The Congress
regrets the views expressed by Dr. Weizmann in his interview
in the J.T.A., and regards his answer in reply to the interpellation as unsatisfactory". This resolution was accepted. No
"roll-call vote" was taken on this resolution either. Ac1
P•
2
3
4
.
5
33-34•
Ibid. p. 304.
Ibid, p.324.
Ibid. p. 385.
cordingly it became self-understood that Dr. Weizmann
would not be elected President of the Organisation any more.
He refers in his book (p. 337 [417]) to his "demission
from the Presidency of the Z.O." adding (p. 338 [418])
that it was indecent to hasten his resignation because he
had "announced in my opening address, my intention of resigning because of the precarious state of my health". The
Protocol does not contain any such statement of his. There are
only two references to his resignation: when he spoke of submitting his "report—which is simultaneously a good-bye
report", 1 and when he said that he "surrenders the office,
formally and definitely." 2 Congress apparently did not treat
these remarks with the necessary seriousness—no delegate to
the Congress referred to them—as similar utterances were
made at almost all previous Congresses at which, in the end,
Dr. Weizmann was re-elected. 3
He regards as a "curious outcome of the Congress" (p. 339
[420]), the election of Prof. Brodetsky (among others) to
the Executive, although, like Sokolow and others, he "had
been closely identified with me since 1916". So far as my own
recollection is correct (I was a member of the Permanenzausschuss at the Congress in 1931), Prof. Brodetsky was asked to
join the Executive at a meeting of General Zionists in Basle
in order to safeguard the Weizmann line of politics. The man
who asked him to do so was—Dr. Weizmann.
1
Ibid. p.
Ibid. p.
Protocol
Krojanker,
2
3
56.
80.
XII (1921) p. 289; X I I I (1923), p. 230; X I V (rg25), p. 332; and
p. 188; X V (1927), p. 211, 2 1 4 / 2 1 5 .
V.
MAX NORDAU
THIS is what Dr. Weizmann has to say about Max Nordau
(p. 46/47 [65/66]): "The passionate devotion of selflessness . . . was lacking in Nordau, whom we found artificial, as
well as inclined to arrogance . . . He was an ardent Zionist
only during the sessions of the Congresses. During the other
three hundred and fifty odd days of the year we heard only
occasionally of him within the movement; for then he attended to his business, which was that of a writer. He was not
prepared, like Herzl and many others, to sacrifice his career
for Zionism . . . For the movement was not, strictly speaking,
his business. He was a Heldentenor, a prima donna, a great
speaker in the classical style; spadework was not in his line . . .
Nordau thought the movement could be directed from Paris
—with speeches".
Fortunately we have an excellent biography of Nordau
written by his wife and daughter, based on documentary as
well as other relevant evidence, 1 where the great work Nordau
did for Zionism is faithfully recorded. It reveals the many
journeys Nordau undertook for the cause of Zionism^ the immense correspondence he had to conduct with people all over
the world, everywhere advising, helping, educating, and admonishing to greater efforts. Every page of that biography
demonstrates this clearly, and it would be futile even to
begin to quote. Apart from this he was a permanent guide
to Herzl who sought his advice by correspondence or in
personal meetings on every political matter. Herzl's Diaries
are full of proof of this. 2 He definitely did more spadework in
those years than many a man of the first Zionist generation—
Dr. Weizmann included. The columns of the Zionist and
World press show quite definitely the great importance of
his work. One could justifiably correct Dr. Weizmann's
statement and say that Nordau worked whole-heartedly for
Zionism notwithstanding the fact that he attended to his
business which was that of a writer as well as of a physician.
1
Anna and Maxa Nordau, Max Nordau, New York, 1943.
See, for instance, Diaries II, 45, 57, 58, 67, 74, 76, 93, 115, 127, 243, 281,
287, 3
3
6
0
6<584‫ ג ז‬429‫ י‬5 7 9 ‫ ; ל‬I I I , 57-65, 163, 169, 3
500.
2
Nordau was 48 years of age when the First Congress assembled in Basle. The present generation has no conception
of his fame at that time. Nordau was the only one among the
Zionists to whom Europe and the civilised world listened, the
only one whom they knew. And he, the "Westerner" (p. 47
[66]), the "artificial" and "selfish" man (p. 46 [65]), was he
really "not prepared to sacrifice his career[for Zionism" (Ibid.)?
He was the only one who had a career and, by joining a
Movement regarded by many as "crazy", he jeopardized
it with unique courage.
Far from believing that the Movement could be led from
Paris Nordau refused the acceptance of the Zionist leadership offered to him by Herzl during his lifetime, 1 and afterwards by the whole Movement. 2 Among those who then
asked him to assume the leadership was—Dr. Weizmann. 3 It
seems, therefore, that at that time the latter did not have the
opinion of Nordau he now expresses, 45 years later.
It is worth while noting in this connection how differently
Dr. Weizmann values different people. He blames Nordau
(p. 46 [65]) for not having been prepared to sacrifice his
career for Zionism but, on the other hand, has contempt for
people who did sacrifice their careers for Zionism, like
Motzkin (p. 60 [82/83]), Aberson (p. 64 [87]), or others, notwithstanding the fact that they were his "closest friends"
(p. 67 [91]). Men like these did not care about their own
future, regarding service to Zionism as their highest duty.
They are blamed for the fact that they "never achieved complete independence" (p. 61 [83]), meaning material independence in this connection. While the others were immersed
in Zionism and Zionist work, Dr. Weizmann (p. 37/38
[54/55]) " refused to neglect the lecture hall and the laboratory, to which I gave at least six or seven hours a day". He
did feel, of course, the urge to do something, for he knew the
importance of his own question (p. 67 [91]): "Was it not
cowardly and selfish to pursue one's academic work in seeming deafness to the cry of one's people?" But the narrative reveals (p. 38 [55]) that only in his free time had he had his
"share of the social and intellectual life of the Verein, and of
Jewish student life generally".
Another instance of this attitude towards "sacrifice" on the
one hand and "career" on the other is referred to in the book
1
3
3
Diaries II, 6 0 / 6 1 , 75.
Anna and Maxa Nordau, p. 182.
Ibid.
I
84
(p. 48 [67]) with regard to Dr. Weizmann's absence from
the First Zionist Congress. Many reasons were advanced why
he did not attend this Congress in 1897. He studied in Berlin
then and, after the summer vacation at home, had to return
"Westwards" in any case. Why did he not attend the Congress? Some said, "because he was then taking his doctor
examination"; 1 others that it was 2 owing to "the lack of direct
travelling facilities from Pinsk to Basle"; others again, 3 that
he actually "had hastened to Basle from Pinsk, but he arrived
two days after the Congress had ended."
Dr. Weizmann reveals in his book (p. 48/49 [67]) that just
at that time he "made a little discovery in dyestuff chemistry",
and that, on his professor's recommendation, he went to
Moscow to sell his patent. It was too late to go to Basle when
he returned, even if he had taken the money offered to him by
his father for the journey. This otherwise unimportant matter
as well as the attitude towards his friends referred to above
also show how unjustified the reproach to Nordau appears in
the light of the reproacher's own attitude. It becomes still
more accentuated if one reads (p. 93 [123]) that during the
gravest crisis in pre-World War I Zionism (East Africa and
Herzl's death), Dr. Weizmann settled in Manchester because
" I had to continue my education in chemistry and wait for a
more propitious time in the Zionist movement".
Another personal attack is launched against Nordau in
connection with the so-called Nordau Plan. We have dealt
with it from the point of view of principle in a previous section;4
the personal side which Dr. Weizmann connects with it is
considered here. We are told (p. 47 [66]) that the Plan was
the result of Nordau's "irresponsibility" and "facile Zionism". As is known, the Plan foresaw the transfer of 600,000
Jews (Dr. Weizmann incorrectly speaks {Ibid.) of one million)
to Palestine in a short period after World War I, in order to
create a Jewish majority there and thus secure the country
for the Jewish people, whatever the subsequent political developments might be. In this connection the allegation is
made (p. 47 [66]) that Nordau "assumed that even if, of the
million suddenly transplanted Jews, two or three hundred
thousand perished, the remaining seven or eight hundred
thousand would 'somehow' be established".
1
Palestine. A study of Jewish, Arab and British Policies. Esco Foundation for
Palestine. N e w Haven, 1947, I, 78.
2
Paul Goodman in Goodman, p. 15.
3
M. Smilansky in Goodman, p. 61.
4
P• 34-35•
The Nordau Plan was published in ten articles in Le Peuple
Juif of Paris, between September 17 and November 20, 1920.
They do not contain one word about the prospect that any
Jews would perish on their way to or after arriving in
Palestine.
On the other hand the literature records that it was Dr.
Weizmann who spoke of the "objective reasons . . . which
would tend to grind the Jewish c o m m u n i t y . . . into economic
dust" when he testified before the Royal Commission on
Palestine. 1 He repeated this statement at the following Congress, at which he said: 2 "The old ones will pass, they will
bear their fate or they will not. They are dust, economic and
moral dust in a cruel world . . . Two millions, and perhaps
less:'She'erith Hapleta'—only a remnant shall survive. We have
to accept it."
As regards the Nordau Plan itself it was shown in a
previous chapter 3 that developments have fully endorsed its
soundness and have induced the Zionist leadership to its unequivocal acceptance. Thus history has turned it from a plan
of "irresponsible" and "facile Zionism" (p. 47 [66]) into the
accepted blueprint for the upbuilding of Israel.
1
Published by the Z.O., London, 1939, p. 8.
In Goodman, p. 277.—See official Kongresszeitung, Zurich, August 5, 1937,
N o . 3, p. 4.
3
See p. 38-39.
2
VI.
DAVID WOLFFSOHN
H
ERZL'S successor, David Wolffsohn, is referred to in the
following paragraphs (p. 112 [146]): "We—that is, the
younger group of the Democratic Fraction—were trying to
unseat Wolffsohn, whom we considered unfit for the Presidency . . . At bottom, Wolffsohn was a businessman, and his
passion was the Zionist Bank . . . We got him out somewhat
later and substituted for the Presidency a general Presidium,
or Council, with Professor Otto Warburg as chairman." This
refers to a report on the meeting of the A.C. in 1906. A few
pages further on (p. 122 [158]), it is said that it was at the
Eight Congress in The Hague, in 1907, after Dr. Weizmann's
speech, "that we managed to effect a change in the Executive,
and in the program. David Wolffsohn was displaced from the
Presidency. A Presidium was formed, to which the younger
men were admitted—Victor Jacobson and Shmarya Levin
among others—together with some of the 'practical' Zionists,
like Ussishkin and Tshlenov. Professor Otto Warburg, the
distinguished botanist, a definite exponent of 'practical'
Zionism, was elected chairman of the Presidium."
Dr. Weizmann did not always maintain the negative
approach as regards Wolffsohn, the "business-man", which he
now adopts in his book. For instance at the Ninth Congress
(1909) he said: 1 "It is quite correct that one must act in a
businesslike way in business matters. I am more than in
agreement, and would rather cut out my tongue than utter
one word against the business-like conduct of the Zionist
Movement."
The whole narrative of Wolffsohn's displacement is incorrect. At the Eighth Congress, at which Dr. Weizmann is
supposed to have delivered his "rallying cry" (p. 122 [158])
as a result of which "Wolffsohn was displaced from the
Presidency", the latter was elected President. 2 His colleagues
were Prof. Warburg and Jacobus Kann. 3 Wolffsohn and his
colleagues were also re-elected at the following Congress,4 at
1
Protocol IX, 103.
Ibid. VIII, 394.
Ibid. p. 395.
4
Ibid. IX, 343-344.
2
3
which Dr. Weizmann had tried in vain to suggest another
list. 1 It was at the Tenth Congress that Prof. Warburg, Dr.
Arthur Hantke, Shmarya Levin and Nahum Sokolow, were
elected to the Presidium. 2 There was no question that Wolffsohn was "displaced from the Presidency" (Ibid.) after Dr.
Weizmann's or anybody else's speech. Ussishkin testified at
that same Congress3 that if Wolffsohn had wanted it, "he
would have remained President".
Dr. Weizmann also confuses the names of the Presidium
members and the times when they served. Shmarya Levin
was elected four years after Dr. Weizmann's date 4 , Victor
Jacobson six years later 5 , and Menachem Ussishkin thirteen
years later. 6
As in so many other instances, in retrospect, Dr. Weizmann's attitude towards Wolffsohn is quite different from
his attitude in former years. It was Dr. Weizmann who, at a
time when according to his book he was "trying to unseat
Wolffsohn whom we considered unfit for the Presidency' 1
(p. 112 [146]), moved a resolution at the Conference of the
E.Z.F. in Glasgow in 1906, to the effect: 7 "That this mass
meeting of Glasgow Zionists and delegates from the Federated Zionist Association of the United Kingdom, gathered
under the auspices of the English Zionist Federation, declares
its fullest confidence in the Chief Executive Committee of the
Zionist Organisation, appointed at the last Congress, and its
president, Mr. David Wolffsohn. It pledges itself loyally to
abide by the decisions of the Zionist Congress and to work
earnestly in accordance therewith, under the direction of the
Chief Executive Committee."
It was after the Eighth Congress—at which Wolffsohn was
supposed to have been "displaced from the Presidency"
through Dr. Weizmann's "rallying cry" (p. 122 [158]), but
was elected President—that, in a speech in Manchester at the
Conference of the E.Z.F. Dr. Weizmann supported Dr.
Gaster's resolution, seconded by Sheikh Abdullah Quilliam
Effendi Bey, pledging the Zionists "to support loyally the
leaders of the movement". 8
1
2
3
4
6
6
1
8
Ibid. p. 343,
Ibid. X , 341.
Ibid. p. 346.
Ibid. p. 341.
Ibid. X I , 358.
Minutes of the A.C. meeting, July 23, 1920, in Org. Report X I I , 41.
J.C. January 19, 1906, p. 3 0 / 3 1 .
J.C. February 7, 1908, p. 26.
I 88
And at the Ninth Congress—when Wolffsohn was supposed
to have been dismissed from office long ago (p. 122 [158])—
Dr. Weizmann said in the general debate with reference to
Wolffsohn: 1 " I have absolutely no attacks to make against the
leadership and I have no war to conduct against the leadership. I am even of the opinion that what the leadership has
done—it may have erred in some points—was possibly very
good . . . I did not come here to criticise; because I am, even
if to a smaller degree, as responsible as the President".
1
Protocol I X , 102/103.
VII.
LEOPOLD J . GREENBERG
D
R. Weizmann repeatedly refers to Leopold J . Greenberg
who conducted the negotiations with the British Government in 1902-1904 on behalf of Herzl. For instance, he writes
(p. 89 [r 17]): "My opposition to the Uganda offer had made
Greenberg my enemy, and we never established friendly relations again. When I settled permanently in England, Greenberg did his best to keep me out of the movement; he sueceeded, certainly, in preventing me for a long time from
developing close contact with the London Zionists, and the
Jewish Chronicle remained consistently hostile to me".
As we have seen1, Greenberg himself was not so much of an
ardent East African that he would have singled Dr. Weizmann out for his revenge because of the latter's negative
attitude towards East Africa. Dozens of speeches, recorded in
the Jewish Chronicle of the time, prove that Greenberg acted
on Dr. Herzl's instructions, in the full conviction that this
work was politically vital for securing the attainment of the
ultimate aim—Palestine. How could Greenberg have kept
Dr. Weizmann out of the movement? He was not the dictator
of a totalitarian organisation. The facts also contradict this.
Dr. Weizmann settled in Manchester in August 1904 (p. 95
[126]). Five months later, in January 1905, he had already
been elected a delegate to the Conference of the Zionist Federation which took place in London. 2 He spoke first in the debate
at the Conference and his speech is given proper prominence
in the report of the Conference in the Jewish Chronicle.3
It must also be pointed out that the Jewish Chronicle was
anti-Zionist at that time as Greenberg only became its
editor in 1907.4 But the pages of that paper do not corroborate the complaint of an "hostile attitude." Whenever Dr.
Weizmann participated in any public function his name is
mentioned and his speech recorded. This applies to the
1
p . 50-51.
J.C.January 20, 1905, p. 36.
January 27, 1905, p. 29.
4
Cecil Roth, Magna Bibliotheca Anglo-Judaica, London, 1937, p. 185 ; see also
The Jewish Chronicle 1841-1941, London, 1949, p. 124.
2
3
I 90
period before Greenberg's editorship 1 as well as afterwards. 2
This is also true of private matters so far as they were of
wider interest. Thus we read in a report from Manchester: 3
"Last Sunday a special meeting of the Association was held
under the Presidentship of Mr. Jos. Massel for the purpose of
making a presentation to Dr. G. Weitzmann, one of the VicePresidents, on the occasion of his recent marriage to Miss
Vera Ghatzmann, M.D., of Dantzic. Dr. Weitzmann, who
has been in the midst of Manchester Jewry for the past three
years, has gained the confidence and support of all parties,
Zionist and non-Zionist, and, although busily occupied at the
Manchester University as lecturer on Chemistry, he still
finds time to devote a large amount of attention to the Jewish
community. The quarterly report of the Council spoke of the
valuable services rendered by him to the Zionist movement,
not only in Manchester but all over the country. In recognition of those services it had been decided to enter the names
of Dr. Weitzmann and Miss Chatzmann in the Golden Book
of the Jewish National Fund. The presentation, which was
subscribed to by various friends and consisted of a handsome
mahogany bureau and bookcase, was made by Mr. Massel.
The Rev. M. M. Cohen, Mrs. H. Weisberg, Messrs. A. Sunderland and J . Jacobs testified to the esteem in which Dr.
Weitzmann was held and the appreciation of his valuable
services. Dr. Weitzmann suitably responded."
There is also no evidence that (p. 116 [150]) Dr. Weizmann
"was not invited to address any meetings there [i.e. London].
The road was still barred by Greenberg of the Jewish Chronicle." Greenberg had no power to allow or to forbid people to
give public lectures in London, and there were dozens of
meetings, addressed by men like Dr. Daiches, Dr. Gaster, the
Rev. J . K. Goldbloom, Herbert Bentwich and many, many
more, who spoke in London against the East Africa project.
1
A t random, a few instances from the J.C. 1905: January 20 (p. 36); 27
(p. 29); March 24 (p. 26); April 14 (p. 23); 21 (p. 24); May 5 (p. 33); 19 (p. 32);
J u n e 2 (p. 20); 9 (p. 28); 30 (p. 32); July 21 (p. 27); September 8 (p. 25); 15
(p. 24); October 20 (p. 27); 27 (p. 29); November 3 (p. 30); 10 (p. 38); Decernb e r 8 (p. 34); 15 (p. 32, 37); 22 (p. 35); 29 (p. 32); ^ ( ? : J a n u a r y 12 (p. 44); 19
(p. 29); February 9 (p. 32); 16 (p. 35); March 2 (p. 32); May 11 (p. 31); June 1
(p. 38); 8 (p. 21); October 12 (p. 24); 19 (p. 34); November 30 (p. 34);
December 21 (p. 32); 28 (p. 28).
2
A few further instances from the J.C. under Greenberg: 1907: October 18
(p. 30); 25 (p. 29/30); November 1 (p. 29); 22 (p. 27); 29 (p. 24); December 13
(p. 39); 1908: January 24 (p. 29); February 7 (p. 2 5 / 2 6 / 2 7 ) ; March 27 (p. 29).
3
J.C. November 30, 1906, p. 34.
Apart from this the complaint is not justified. Dr. Weizmann
spoke in 1906 in London, after Sokolow, at a great mass
meeting in the East End at which Ussishkin was the main
speaker and at which Greenberg also spoke. 1 On a previous
occasion the Executive of the E.Z.F.—with Greenberg's
vote—invited Dr. Weizmann to speak in London together
with Dr. Alexander Marmorek. 2 In this connection the
linguistic difficulties should also be mentioned for, as reports
in the Jewish Chronicle show, Dr. Weizmann spoke at that
time at public meetings in German.
From the first Conference of British Zionists in 1905 onwards, at which Dr. Weizmann took part, he was elected to
the Council and to the Executive. Dr. Weizmann was elected
to the Council in January 19053 and in the following year
to the Executive of the Federation. 4 He served therein
together with Greenberg and afterwards appeared on public
platforms together with him. 5 Together with Greenberg and
Shire, he was elected by the E.Z.F. to represent Britain in the
Permanenzausschuss at the Seventh Congress6 and also as
delegate for Manchester. 7
Greenberg and the Jewish Chronicle did not suppress Dr.
Weizmann's activities even in later years. His successes before
and after the Balfour Declaration were highly praised in the
paper, as the following quotation from 1918 shows: 8 "Dr.
Weizmann and his colleagues seem to have added a fresh
miracle to the many with which the Holy City is linked."
Finally, it was Greenberg who in 1916 introduced Malcolm
to Dr. Weizmann and thus enabled the latter to re-open
negotiations with the British Government, which were then
at a dead end and which finally led to the Balfour Declaration. 9
Greenberg's opposition to Dr. Weizmann's policy began
after the White Paper of 1922 was issued, which—like many
others at the time—he regarded as the first major "whittling
down" of the British pledge to the Jews.
1
Ibid. June 8, 1906, p. 21.
Ibid. June 2, 1905, p. 20.
Ibid. January 27, 1905, p. 29.
4
Ibid. January 19, 1906, p. 29.
5
Ibid. June 9, 1905, p. 28; January 19, 1906, p. 29; June 1, 1906, p. 38;
June 8, 1906, p. 21.
6
Ibid. July 21, 1905, p. 27.
‫ י‬Ibid. June 30, 1905, p. 32.
8
Ibid. April 26, 1918, p. 5.
9
Landman, p. 265. Cf. also p. 77.
2
3
I 92
Dr. Weizmann says in connection with Greenberg's attitude towards him (p. 116 [150/151]): " I am sorry to say that
we never became reconciled, but I do not think the fault was
mine." After the above analysis one may venture to remark
that the facts do not put the blame on Greenberg either.
VIII.
VLADIMIR JABOTINSKY
S
URPRISINGLY, Dr. Weizmann treats Jabotinsky—who
was his most vigorous opponent—with more sympathy
than any other of the Zionist leaders not of his narrowest
circle. There are, nevertheless, a few historical inaccuracies
which should be corrected.
Dr. Weizmann reveals (p. 167 [213]) that he drew his
opinion of Jabotinsky from a "memorable conversation which
opened my eyes." He then proposed to him in 1915/1916,
that he should take over the platform and literary propaganda of the movement, for he regarded him "a genius in
that field" {Ibid.). Jabotinsky is reported to have answered:
"Now, Dr. Weizmann, the one thing I am fitted for is political work, and here you are trying to shove me into the
entirely wrong path." On that Dr. Weizmann comments in
his book (168 [214]): " I t startled me beyond words, for
political work was precisely for what he was unfit for; and
above all he was unfit to negotiate with the British."
Even if Dr. Weizmann had believed in 1915 in Jabotinsky's
unsuitability for political work, when writing his book he
could not have overlooked the fact that it was Jabotinsky
who, almost alone, conducted negotiations with the British
Government and their statesmen, and had achieved during
World War I the first great Zionist political victory, the
creation of the "Jewish Legion", 1 more than two months
before the publication in 1917 of the Balfour Declaration,
which was still in the balance at that time. His was a political
work and struggle par excellence. Dr. Weizmann himself appredates that great achievement and work (p. 167 [213]):
"It is almost impossible to describe the difficulties and disappointments which Jabotinsky had to face. I know of few
people who could have stood up to them, but his pertinacity,
which flowed from his devotion, was simply fabulous."
If, even after the creation of the Legion, Dr. Weizmann
was convinced ofJabotinsky's inability for political work—as
his book indicates—then, in the interest of the Zionist work,
he should have objected to Jabotinsky being made the
political representative in Jerusalem in 1918 (p. 227 [285]).
1
London Gazette, August 23, 1917.
I 94
Nor should he have allowed him to be co-opted into the
Zionist Executive in 1921, choosing him (next to Sokolow) as
his colleague in the political department. 1 Nor should he have
permitted the Twelfth Congress in Karlsbad to elect Jabotinsky to the Executive.2 But it was Dr. Weizmann who was
instrumental in these appointments on all these occasions.
Jabotinsky revealed 3 that it was on the basis of an agreement
with Dr. Weizmann that he took upon himself participation
and work in the Executive.
Dr. Weizmann continues (p. 326 [404]): "Jabotinsky withdrew from the Executive shortly after the issuance of the
White Paper of 1922, which he denounced, though he had, like
the rest ofhis fellow-members, signed the letter of acceptance."
Dr. Weizmann once publicly referred to Jabotinsky's
acceptance of the White Paper4 and the latter also publicly
replied. 5 Jabotinsky's declaration, summarised in a letter to
Dr. Bodenheimer, 6 reads as follows: "When I returned in
1922 from America to London, Dr. Weizmann told me that
the Government sent us the White Paper and demanded our
consent by next morning; otherwise they would alter Article 4
of the Mandate and transfer the function of the Agency to
other Jewish organisations. In the six hours at my disposal
between this information and the meeting of the Actions
Committee which was called for the same evening, it was
naturally impossible for me to do anything positive, or
investigate whether Dr. Weizmann and the Executive had
done in my absence 'everything' (as he maintained) to
persuade the Government to change their attitude. But one
thing was clear to me: Almost every sacrifice was worth
while—if only the Agency would remain in our hands.
Therefore, I did not fight against the acceptance of the
White Paper; true, I did not agree to the form of our answer, I
voted against it; and it is not true that I signed the answer—
but I did not resign, and thus assumed responsibility."
As a matter of fact, the official White Paper (Cmd. 1700)
corroborates Jabotinsky's statement, for it shows that the
letter of acceptance, dated June 18, 1922, was signed only by
Dr. Weizmann, and the official Report of the Zionist Executive
says the same thing. 7
1
Org. Report X I I , 42.
Protocol X I I , 731.
3
Ibid. p. 179/180.
4
Ibid. X V , p. 211.
6
Ibid. p. 299.
6
In Shalom Schwarz. Jabotinsky Lohem haUmah, Tel Aviv, 1943, p. 420.
7
Report X I I I , 11.
2
IX.
MENAHEM USSISHKIN
T
RIAL AND ERROR contains a number of inaccuracies
with regard to Ussishkin's activities, part of which have
already been dealt with in a previous section. 1 It is said
(p. 60 [82]) that "before the World War [I] and the Russian
Revolution—he [Ussishkin] had lived in Odessa and from
that city he had directed the affairs of the southern Zionist
district." Ussishkin's biographer records2 that the Russian
Zionist leader lived in Yekaterinoslav from 1891-1906, and
that from 1899 onwards he headed the Yekaterinoslav region
of the Russian Zionist Organisation and not the southern
district, the centre of which was Odessa. 3 In 1906 he was
elected Chairman of the Hovevei Zion Committee and
moved to Odessa. He retained that office until 19194. In the
same year (1906) a Central Office of the Russian Z.O. was
established and, at the Helsingfors Conference (December,
1906) a Central Committee of the Russian Z.O. for the whole
country elected.5 Thus, when Ussishkin settled in Odessa
the Zionist district representatives of the Z.O. ceased to exist.
Dr. Weizmann also records (p. 45 [64]) that, at the Sixth
Zionist Congress, he had wished that "that particular VicePresidency on the Permanenzausschuss go to some real personality, like Ussishkin". But the latter who was then in
Palestine did not take part at the Congress6.
It is further stated (p. 59 [81]) that Ussishkin "came to
England during the First World War. . . . Driven from
Odessa, he had taken refuge in Istanbul. Thence he made
his way circuitously to London, where he arrived in 1918."
But Ussishkin stayed in Russia until the end of 1918. 7 During
World War I he left Odessa secretly, having learned that he
was to be arrested because of his contacts with the Copenhagen Bureau. He went to Moscow (not to Istanbul). 8 He left
1
See p. 71.
Klausner, p. 25.
3
Ibid. p. 28.
4
Ibid. p. 49.
5
Die Welt, 1906, No. 50-52.
6
Klausner, p. 38.
7
Ibid. p. 61.
8
Ibid. p. 58.
2
I 96
Odessa at the end of 1918, and arrived in Paris in February,
1919.1 After staying some time in France he went to England. 2
The records also do not corroborate Dr. Weizmann's
statement (p. 327 [405]) that Ussishkin resigned from the
Executive at the Thirteenth Zionist Congress in 1923.
Actually he never resigned. After his stand against Dr.
Weizmann's policy he was not re-elected. 3
1
Ibid. p. 61.
Ibid. p. 64.
3
Protocol X I I I , 508; cf. Israel Cohen, "Monumental—But Incomplete", in
Zionist Review, London, July 22, 1949, p. !5.
2
X.
DISCREPANCIES
T
H R O U G H O U T the book a number of matters and
events are referred to which either did not occur or
happened in different circumstances; or which, though attributed to Dr. Weizmann, were performed by others; or which,
attributed to others, were not their work. All these have a
definite bearing on the role of the persons and events in
question which, if correctly presented, would lead the reader
to different conclusions. A number of these matters were
dealt with in the previous chapters. Here I have selected a few
other characteristic ones:
1
P. 51 [71]: "But we founded, on our feet, a Zionist society,
the first in Switzerland, under the name of Ha-Schachar, the
Dawn; and we resolved to carry the fight into the open."
This refers to 1898, the first year of Dr. Weizmann's
residence in Switzerland (p. 49 [69]). But there existed in
Switzerland before then a number of Zionist student
societies like that in Berne, which had a delegate at the First
Congress1 in 1897, or the "Hessaniah" (named after Moses
Hess) in Zurich, 2 or the "Academie de la nouvelle Sionie"
in Geneva. 3
2
P. 68 [92]: " I t was in Geneva that we founded the first
Zionist publishing house, Der Juedische Verlag, with its
periodical, Der Jude"
Der Juedische Verlag was founded in Berlin in 1902 by
Martin Buber, Berthold Feiwel, E. M. Lilien and Davis
Trietsch. 4 Dr. Weizmann's name is not recorded as
participant.
Der Jude was published fourteen years later, during World
War I, while Dr. Weizmann lived in England, under Buber's
editorship. The issues from 1916 to 1920 were published by
1
2
3
4
Die Welt, Nr. 4, June 25, 1897, p. 11.
Ibid. Nr. 18, October 1, 1897, p. 11.
Ibid. No. 17, April 29, 1898, p. 11.
J. Lex. V, 1189; Boehm I, 203/204.
I 98
R. Loewit in Vienna and from then onwards by Der Juedische
Verlag, Berlin.
3
P. 68 [92]: "This [Der Juedische Verlag] was the first cultural
literary enterprise within the Zionist Movement/'
There existed in Eastern Europe long before 1902 a
number of Zionist cultural and literary enterprises. But also
in Western Europe there existed Der Juedische Buck- und
Kunstverlag, founded in 1898 by the Zionist Max Hickl in
Brno (Bruenn, Moravia) which was the first literary enterprise owned by a Zionist and bringing out Zionist publications
in German. They also published from 1898 onwards the
Zionist weekly Die Juedische Volksstimme under the editorship
of Berthold Feiwel and Robert Strieker; and the Juedischer
Volkskalender, an illustrated Zionist annual. Later Feiwel
became a co-founder of Der Juedische Verlag.
4
P. 70 [94]: " I became acquainted with the Swiss Jews . . .
whom I began to win over to the Zionist movement. It was
the only Zionist work I did outside of academic circles,
except at the Congresses and on my visits home. By the time
I left Switzerland in 1904 there were Zionist societies in
Berne, Lausanne and Geneva."
Before Dr. Weizmann's arrival in Switzerland (1898),
there existed six Zionist societies.1 In Basle, Berne, Geneva,
Lausanne and Zurich there were at this time active groups,
as the press reports show.2 As far back as 1897 the Swiss
Territorial Zionist Federation, the Union de Sionistes Suisses,
was established3 and twelve delegates from Basle, Berne and
Zurich attended the First Zionist Congress.4 At the last Swiss
territorial Conference before Dr. Weizmann's departure to
England, held in Biel in 1903, it was reported 5 that there
existed in the country thirteen societies with 600 members.
5
P. 45 [63]: " I remember . . . a characteristic incident at
one of the early Congresses. The committee which I liked
1
Protocol II, 47.
Die Welt, 1897: Nr. 4, p. 11; Nr. 11, p. 12; Nr. 17, p. 13; Nr. 18, p. 11; Nr.
25, p. 15; Nr. 30, p. 2. 1898: Nr. 17, p. 11; Nr. 21, p. 11.
8
Juedisches Jahrbuch fuer die Schweiz, 1920/21, p. 270.
4
Protocol I, 219-221.
5
Die Welt, Nr. 4, January 23, 1903, p. 4.
2
most to serve on, and on which I was occasionally the chairman, was the Permanenzausschuss, a combination resolutions,
steering and nominating committee."
At none of the early Congresses was Dr. Weizmann chairman of the Permanenzausschuss. During Herzl's lifetime he was
only once a member; at the Sixth Congress.1 He was for the
first time its chairman at the Ninth Congress in Hamburg, 2
five years after Herzl's death.
6
P. 83 [ n o ] : "There was, among many of the Russian
delegates, a deep resentment against Herzl in connection
with his visit to Von Plehve. They could not speak out—
though Nachman Syrkin did express bitter disapproval on
the floor of the Congress."
With reference to Herzl's visit to von Plehve, Syrkin's
speech contains the following words: 3 "My political tact tells
me that questions upon which, owing to the nature of the
matter, a discussion is not permissible, should be, if possible,
avoided. Dr. Herzl's speech transgressed against this principle.
There exist questions on which it is better to keep silent than
to deal with them publicly." This is all. There is no word of
any resentment or disapproval of the visit to von Plehve.
7
P. 103 [135]: "In September, 1904, before Professor Perkin
returned from his vacation, I interrupted my work to make a
dash for Vienna, where the Actions Committee held its first
meeting after the death of Herzl."
The A.C. meeting took place in Vienna from August
16-19, 1904.4 Dr. Weizmann (who settled in Manchester at
the beginning of August, 1904 (p. 95 [126]) was then not a
member of that Committee 5 and his name is not mentioned
in the list of those present. 6
8
P. 119 [154]: "Professor Rutherford . . . one morning, when
I came into the common room, . . . thrust the London Times
1
Ibid. August 24, 1903, Separatausgabe, Nr. 1, p. 7.
Protocol I X , 26.
Ibid. V I , 83.
4
J.C. August 26, 1904, p. 10.
5
T h e names of those elected in Protocol V I , 329-332.
6
Die Welt, August 19 and 26, 1904; also J.C. August 26, 1904, p. 10.
3
3
I
IOO
under my nose: 'Look at that'! he roared. Israel Gollancz had
been appointed Professor of Old English literature at Queen's
College, London." A discussion between them—recorded
verbatim—followed on the question of the appointment of
Jews in gentile Universities and vice versa.
This incident took place in 1906 in Manchester. Israel
Gollancz, however, was appointed professor of English
Language and Literature at King's (not Queen's) College,
London, in 1903,1 approximately one year before Dr. Weizmann's settlement in England and three years before the
conversation in Manchester referred to. The Times for 1906
does not contain any announcement about Gollancz's
appointment. 2
9
PP. 122/123 [158]: "Dr. Arthur Ruppin, who was to
become our foremost colonising expert, was invited [by the
new Warburg Executive] to go out to Palestine and organise
a Colonisation Department."
Dr. Ruppin was sent out to Palestine for this task by
Wolffsohn in 1908.3 Dr. Warburg's Executive came to
power only in 1911.4
10
P. 122 [158]: "To carry my point, I coined the phrase
'synthetic Zionism', which became a slogan among the
practical Zionists."
It was Theodor Herzl who spoke of the synthesis of all the
various shades within Jewry for the Zionist idea, at a banquet
of the Russian Zionists in Basle, 1898, the first Congress
attended by Dr. Weizmann. 5
Martin Buber wrote about the synthesis of cultural and
political Zionism in 1905.6
Ussishkin in the same year demanded the synthesis of the
three elements in Zionism: the cultural, the practical and
diplomatic. 7
1
The Jewish Tear Book, London, 1903/04, p. 309; J.C. October 2, 1903, p. 21
(Inaugural lecture); also J. Lex. II, 1203; Jew. Encyclopedia, 1925, VI, 40.
2
Index of the Times for 1906.
3
Protocol I X , 136/137.
4
Ibid. X , 341.
5
Litman Rosenthal, in Tribune, London, 1922, No. 11, p. 32.
6
"Das Juedische Kulturproblem", in Die Stimme der Wahrheit, edited by
Lazar Schoen, Wuerzburg, 1905, p. 209.
7
M. Ussishkin, Unser Programm, Vienna, 1905, p. 5, 30.
At the Eighth Congress, at which Dr. Weizmann uttered
his statement of a synthesis in Zionism, he was one of the last
speakers to do so. Before him the synthesis of practical and
political Zionism was dealt with by Dr. Alfred Nossig,1 Dr.
Daniel Pasmanik, 2 Dr. Niemirover, 3 Dr. Salz, 4 and only then
followed Dr. Weizmann. 5 He spoke in this debate on the
necessity of the synthesis of both methods of work (practical
and political) but he did not use the phrase "synthetic
Zionism." The only speaker who did use this very phrase was
Dr. Niemirover, 6 who was a "political" Zionist. The resolution incorporating the "synthesis" in the Zionist programme
was formulated and submitted to the Congress by Syrkin. 7
11
PP. 142-144 [182-184]: "Mr. Wissotzky, the Russian tea
magnate, a man of immense wealth, devoted to Jewish
causes, and something of a Hebrew scholar. . . . was the
main support of Ha-Shiloach, the Hebrew monthly, and the
Maecenas of Achad Ha-am. Wissotzky's contribution [for the
Haifa Technikum] was one hundred thousand roubles, then
about fifty thousand dollars, and with this the building could
be put up and the necessary equipment purchased. Wissotzky,
who was advanced in years, and could not often attend the
meetings of the Curatorium, or Board of Directors, which
were held in Berlin, appointed Achad Ha-Am a member" . . .
"The Haifa Technikum . . . was completed in 1913. The
Curatorium consisted at first of representatives of the
Hilfsverein and of Mr. Wissotzky" . . . "Achad Ha-Am himself did not wish to be brought into too open conflict with his
old friend Wissotzky, who, though a Hebraist, was weakening
on the question under the pressure of the majority" whether
German was to remain or Hebrew introduced "as the
language of instruction at the Technikum."
The decision to establish a Technikum in Palestine was
taken on March 29, 1908.8 By that time Kalonymos Wolf
Wissotzky had already been dead four years; he died on May
1
Protocol V I I I , 83.
Ibid. p.9?!
Ibid. p. 94.
4
Ibid. p. 103.
5
Ibid. p. 301.
6
Ibid. p. 94.
7
Ibid. p. 324/325.
8
Hecker, p. 1.
2
8
I 02
25, 1904, in Moscow, at the age of 80. 1 All references to
Wissotzky's activities on the Technikum, his membership of the
Guratorium, his participation in meetings and submission to
the majority in the question of Hebrew or German are therefore incorrect; in the last instance, also gravely unjust to the
memory of a man who did so much for the Hebrew language
and literature.
There was David Wissotzky (the son2 of the above referred
to Kalonymos Wolf Wissotzky) on the Guratorium, 3 but he
was not "advanced in years", for he was then fifty-three years
of age. 4 Dr. Weizmann's description of Wissotzky's age and
activities points definitely to Wissotzky senior.
Achad Haam became a member of the Guratorium after
its formation, by virtue of his appointment in 1904, together
with Rabbi J . Mase and the banker Shmelkin, as executors of
Wissotzky's will.5 In accordance with this will's proviso, to
establish every five years some institution in the deceased's
name, the now accumulated interest of 100,000 roubles was,
after consultations with the heirs, put at the disposal of
the Hilfsverein der deutschen Juden for educational purposes in
Palestine. 6 When the decision was taken, to establish a
Technikum, the "Jewish Institute for Technical Education in
Palestine" was formed and a new board elected, in which the
Hilfsverein, the Wissotzky family as well as Zionists (but in a
private capacity only) participated. 7 The J.N.F. provided
the land. The building work commenced in 1912, was interrupted during World War I, and completed in 19208 (and
not in 1913).
Nor was it "Wissotzky's contribution" alone with which
this was done. Jacob Schiff of New York contributed for that
purpose before World War I $100,000,9 and another big
amount in 1920.10 Other contributions came from Julius
Rosenwald of Chicago ($5,000), and Karpas of Yekaterinoslav
($2,500). 11
1
Luah Ahiassaf Warsaw, 5665—1904/1905.
A. Alsberg, "The Hebrew Technical College", in £ion, Jerusalem, No. 5-6,
1950,
p. 54•
3
Im Kampf um die Hebraische Sprache, Berlin, 1914, p. 21.
4
Index to the Hebrew edition of Trial and Error, Jerusalem, 1949, p. 475.
5
Luah Ahiassaf I.e.
6
A. Alsberg I.e.
7
Iggerot IV, 8-21; Hecker, p. 2/3.
**
8
Ibid.
9
Boehm I, 471.
10
Hecker, p. 3.
11
Im Kampf um die Hebraeische Sprache, p. 19.
2
12
P. 143 [183]: "Later, when he sensed that a critical point
would be reached in the struggle round the language,
Achad Ha-Am obtained a place for me on the board" of the
Technikum. . . . "The decisive meeting took place in Berlin, in
June 1914." That meeting is then precisely described, and
Dr. Weizmann's speech at the meeting referred to, in which he
"went on, however, to warn them, that if German was voted,
nobody in Palestine would pay the slightest attention to the
decision. . . . The vote was taken, and I found myself in a
minority of one. I escaped from the meeting and telegraphed
a digest of the proceedings to Shmarya Levin, who was
conducting the struggle at the Palestine end. Within twentyfour hours the teachers of the Technikum had gone out on
strike. The German Hilfsverein withdrew its support from its
schools, which the Zionist Organisation had to take over."
In none of the official or unofficial documents, statements,
books and reports on the question of the Technikum was I able
to trace Dr. Weizmann's name as member of the Curatorium
before or during the teachers' strike in Palestine. There were
then three Zionists only on that board: Achad Haam,
Shmarya Levin and Dr. Tshlenov. 1
The "decisive meeting" which led to the strike in Palestine,
as described in Trial and Error, was not held in June, 1914,
but on October 26, 1913, in Berlin.2 When at that meeting
the vote was taken, there was not a "minority of one" but of
three, and all the three Zionists resigned their offices.3
Achad Haam, on his return from Berlin to London, informed Dr. Weizmann about it in a letter dated October 30,
1913:4 "I returned yesterday from Berlin. We three (Tshlenov,
Levin and myself) left the Curatorium. From this you can
judge yourself about the course of the meeting and the
decisions taken. You will find the particulars in Die Welt."
The strike in Palestine broke out soon afterwards and
the Hilfsverein leader, Dr. Paul Nathan, was unable to
settle it by a personal appearance in Palestine in November,
1913.5 In June, 1914, there was no teachers' strike in
Palestine and Dr. Levin, to whom Dr. Weizmann telegraphed
1
Boehm I, 471; Org. Report X I I , 24.
Ibid.; Boehm I, 472.
3
Org. Report X I I , 25; Paul Nathan, Palaestina und Palaestinensischer
Berlin, 1914, p. 4.
4
Iggerot V, 100.
5
Paul Nathan, op. cit., p. 12 ff.
2
£ionismust
I 104
during that month to Palestine, was not there for he had
arrived on May 8, 1914, in London 1 and stayed in England
till the beginning ofJune 2 and then proceeded to the U.S.A.
where he attended the Zionist Conference. 3 He remained
in America throughout World War I. 4
The Official Report finally records 5 that at the Curatorium
meeting on February 22, 1914 it was decided, in view of the
events (i.e. the strike) in Palestine and of pressure from
America, to introduce Hebrew for some disciplines and to
consider after four years which other disciplines should be
taught in Hebrew. Thus the controversy was officially and
amicably settled in February, four months before the meeting
of which Dr. Weizmann speaks in his book.
At that latter meeting (June, 1914) Dr. Weizmann did
participate, as is shown in the Circular Letter, dated July 23,
1914, and in the attached Protocol of the meeting of the Curatorium
of the Jewish Institute for Technical Education in Palestine.6 The
minutes of that meeting reveal that Dr. Weizmann then asked
for Dr. Nathan's resignation and for the establishment of a
secretariat for the Technikum. This Protocol, however, does
not record any reference to the language dispute in Dr.
Weizmann's speech or to the proceedings so vividly described
in Trial and Error (p. 143 [183]).
It was not as a result of the "fight for Hebrew" that the
Hilfsverein decided "to withdraw its support from the schools"
(p. 144 [184]). On the contrary, it took over the Technikum
after the outbreak of the War, put it into bankruptcy and
acquired the Institute because the creditors, i.e., those who
spent the money, could not claim their rights as foreigners.
The liberation of Palestine prevented the Hilfsverein from
continuing to exercise their right of ownership. In 1920 (and
not in 1914) the Technikum was officially taken over by the
Zionist Organisation. 7
P• 1 39 [179]: " I had heard, moreover, that he [Paul
Ehrlich] took little interest in Jewish matters." Notwithstanding this Dr. Weizmann approached him for help in
1
J.C. May 8, 1914, p. 34.
Ibid. May 29, 1914, p. 31.
Ibid. June 12, 1914, p. 36.
4
Boehm I, 475; Org. Report X I I , 27.
5
Ibid. p. 25; cf also: Im Kampf um die Hebraische Sprache, pp. 70-72.
6
Protocol No. 232a.
7
Org. Rep. X I I , 2 5 / 2 6 .
2
3
regard to the Hebrew University and won him over. During
the discussion Ehrlich exclaimed (p. 141 [181]): "You have
kept me nearly an hour. Do you know that out there, in the
corridor, there are counts, princes and ministers, who are
waiting to see me, and who will be happy if I give them ten
minutes of my time."
Ehrlich took "lively interest in Jewish matters and was
active in the Society Lemaan
He had, on the other
hand, no private practice and did not treat anybody
privately 2 for he devoted all his time to research work at the
Frankfurt Institute for Experimental Therapy.
14
PP. 172/173 [219/220]: "So it came about that one day
in March 1916 . . . I was engaged by the Government. To
finish the business, my new employers brought me into the
presence of the First Lord of the Admiralty, who was at that
time Mr. Winston Churchill." Dr. Weizmann then describes
the appearance of Churchill ("a much younger man, was
brisk, fascinating, charming and energetic") and records a
verbatim report of their conversation at the end of which he
"was given a carte blanche by Mr. Churchill and the
department."
Mr. Churchill resigned his post as First Lord of the
Admiralty on May 26, 1915,3 almost one year before Dr.
Weizmann's appointment. At the time referred to Arthur
James Balfour was First Lord of the Admiralty, 4 and Dr.
Weizmann himself stated in 1930 that it was Balfour (and
not Churchill) with whom he conversed at the Admiralty
in 1916.5
!5
P. 179 [227]: "There was [at the time before the Balfour
Declaration of 1917] a general atmosphere of sympathy, all
the way from General Wilson, the Chief of Staff, who was a
great friend of Lloyd George, to the lower ranks of the
department."
Sir Henry Wilson was appointed Chief of Staff in February,
1918,6 almost four months after the publication of the Balfour
1
Encyclopaedia Judaica, V I , 300.
Martha Marquardt, Paul Ehrlich als Mensch und Arbeiter, Stuttgart, 1924,
p. 92.
8
Winston S. Churchill, The Great War, II, 703.
4
Dugdale II, 125.
5
Krojanker, p. 318.
6
Lloyd George II, 1694.
2
I
106
Declaration. As regards his "great friendship with Lloyd
George", the latter wrote: 1 "Invariably to me personally he
was effusive. Behind my back he was abusive. One can
understand the imputation of treachery which was associated
with his name."
16
P. 190 [241]: "It was again the attitude of the French
which came to the fore in my talk with Herbert H. Asquith,
the Prime Minister, on April 3 [1917]. In spite of what we
have seen . . . his official attitude was helpful."
At the time referred to the Prime Minister was Lloyd
George, who formed his Cabinet in December, 1916.2
17
P. 193 [244]: "Mr. Louis D. Brandeis was at the head of
the movement then [1917], and I was in constant touch
with him."
Having taken his seat on the Supreme Court in October,
1916, Brandeis ceased to be President of the American
Zionist Organisation. His successors were Dr. Stephen S.
Wise and Judge Julian W. Mack. 3
18
P. 227 [285]: "When I came into Clayton's tent to take
leave of him on the eve of my departure" a discussion
developed during which "General Clayton, the political
officer" asked Dr. Weizmann to induce Jabotinsky "not to
walk in on him at all hours of the day and night."
Dr. Weizmann left Palestine on September 10, 1918.4
The official History of the War records: 5 "The Chief
Political Officer, Br. General G. F. Clayton, carried out the
duties of Chief Administrator until the 16 April [1918], when
he was succeeded by Major General Sir A. W. Money."
After a rest of two weeks in the mountains of Samaria
Jabotinsky moved from Sichem with his regiment into the
Jordan Valley at the middle of August, 1918. He remained
there for a further five weeks.6
1
Ibid. p. 1695.
Ibid. I, 585; Dugdale II, 184.
Jacob de Haas, Louis D. Brandeis, New York, 1929, p. 62, 77.
4
Pol. Report XII, 45 (English edition).
5
Military Operations: Egypt and Palestine, London, 1930, Part I, 300.
6
V. Jabotinsky, "Megillat haGedud", in Ketavim nivharim, Vol. II, Jerusalem,
‫ג‬943‫ י‬P• 213•
2
3
1
9
P. 232 [290]: "It was in June, 1918 . . . that the
Commander in Chief suggested that we attempt to approach
King Feisal for at least a tentative agreement on the Zionist
program."
At the Seventeenth Zionist Congress, 1931, Dr. Weizmann
said: 1 "In the middle of the war . . . when the temptation
was great to regard the support of the European Powers as
sufficient, I regarded it as one of the first duties of the
Zionist Commission in Palestine, to establish a direct contact
with the Arabic peoples. Already then did I meet the man,
who then was the leader of the Arab Freedom Movement,
Emir Feisal, now King of Iraq."
20
P. 236 [295]: "Before leaving London I had secured from
Mr. Balfour his consent in principle to our trying to lay the
foundation stones of the Hebrew University."
The Official Report says:2 "An important act of the
Commission—though then only of symbolic value—was the
laying of the foundation stone of the Jerusalem University,
which took place on July 24, 1918. Many technical difficulties
had to be overcome, before the necessary permission was
granted. On Mr. Sokolow's representations, Mr. Balfour
personally intervened in the matter."
21
P. 286 [356]: "Under the influence of Peretz Chayes, the
brilliant scholar who later became Chief Rabbi of Vienna, a
group of young people had founded an Italian Zionist
Organisation. They had begun in Florence, where lived a
young and ardent prophet of Zionism, Arnoldo Pacifici."
Dr. Chajes settled in Italy in 1902.3 But in 1897 twelve
Zionist groups already existed there, which by 1898 had risen
to twenty-one. 4 The first Zionist Society was established at
Ancona (and not in Florence), 5 and in the same city the first
Italian Zionist Conference took place. 6 The second Conference
1
J. Lex. I, 1304.
4
Protocol I I , 47.
5
Cecil Roth, History of the Jews in Italy, Philadelphia, 1946, p. 5 1 9 / 5 2 0 .
6
Die Welt, May 27, 1904, Nr. 22, p. 7.
2
3
I 108
was held in Modena in 1901,1 at which the Italian Zionist
Confederation was founded.
The prophet's name was not Arnoldo but Alfonso.2
22
P. 287 [357]: "Before World War I, on my very first visit
to Italy, friends had pointed out to me with pride that the
Italian cabinet contained four Jews: Luzzati, Ottolenghi,
Sonnino, and—I think—Titoni."
Sonnino was a half-Jew 3 and Titoni is nowhere recorded
as a Jew. There was never an Italian Cabinet which contained
four Jews. On the other hand there were Jewish ministers
who at various times served in the Cabinet: Luigi Luzzatti
(repeatedly between 1891 and 1910),4 Leone Wollemborg
(Minister of Finance in 1901),5 General Giuseppe Ottolenghi
(Minister of War in 1902/1903), 6 and Lodovico Mortara
(Minister of Justice in 1919/1920). 7
23
P. 290 [361]: "The Churchill White Paper . . . detached
Trans-Jordan from the area of Zionist operation." And on
p. 325 [402]: "The White Paper of 1922, which removed
Trans-Jordan arbitrarily from the operation of the Mandate."
The White Paper, Cmd. 1700 of June, 1922, does not deal
with Trans-Jordan at all.
The detachment of that territory from the Mandate area
was practically executed during the Cairo Conference in
19218 and the Mandatory function was officially excluded
therefrom through acceptance by the League of Nations of
the Memorandum submitted by the British Government on
September 16, 1922.9
24
P. 293 [364]: "Mr. Balfour introduced the subject of the
ratification of the Palestine Mandate [at the open Council
1
Protocol V, 433.
Cecil Roth, op. tit. p. 508.
Ibid. p. 478.
4
J. Lex. I l l , 1259.
5
Ibid. V, 1495.
6
Ibid. IV, 642.
7
Ibid. p. 299.
8
Josef Schechtmann, Transjordanien im Bereiche des Palaestinamandates, Vienna,
1937, P- 72•
0
The Palestine Mandate and the Memorandum edited by the League of Nations,
C.P.M. 466; see also Schechtmann, op. cit. pp. 259/260.
2
3
meeting]. Everything went smoothly and with the unanimous
vote of ratification there ended the first chapter of our long
political struggle."
The President, Senor Quinones de Leon, opened the
meeting and announced that the terms of the Mandate had
been approved. M. Viviani, the French representative,
followed with a statement. After him spoke the representatives of Gt. Britain (Balfour) and Italy (Imperiali). No
proposal for ratification was made; no vote was taken. 1
25
P. 300 [372]: "In 1923 a new regulation offered settlement
visas to anyone who could show possession of twenty-five
hundred dollars—this was called 'the capitalist' category."
Dr. Weizmann regards this as one of the reasons for the
economic crisis between 1923 and 1925.
The possession by immigrants of resources of their own for
admission into Palestine was enacted in the High Commissioner's Immigration Ordinance in 1920.2 The term "independent means" was not then specified. Only in 1925 was
the first Ordinance repealed and replaced by a new one, 3 in
which immigrants with independent means were defined as
persons with an assured income of £P60, skilled artisans with
a capital of ^ 2 5 0 or a capital of their own of £?500. (One
£ P was at that time worth $5.)
These rules could have had no bearing on events before
1925•
26
P. 128 [164]: "Between 1906-1914 . . . we had founded
the Jewish National Library."
Dr. Weizmann did not participate in the foundation of that
Library. It was founded in 1892, fourteen years before the
date given in Trial and Error. In view of the conditions under
Turkish rule it was then called Bet Midrash Abarbanel. In
1895, after receiving the great collection of Dr. Joseph
Ghasanovitz, it was called Bet Hasefarim Hakelali Libne
Tisrael Biyerushalayim: Midrash Abarbanel Veginze Jossef.1 In
1901, five years before Dr. Weizmann's foundation date, the
"Democratic Fraction", of which he was a leading member,
demanded from the Zionist Congress "a financial subvention
1
The Times, July 25, 1922, p. 9.
Palestine Official Gazette, September 16, 1920.
Ibid. June 15 (draft) and September 1, 1925 (promulgated).
4
J . Lex. I, 1028.
2
3
I 10
of 2,000 frs. for the National Library in Jerusalem". 1 At the
Tenth Zionist Congress, Mr. Rabinersohn of Kiev suggested
that the Z.O. should take charge of the Library 2 and a
commission was elected at that Congress for the purpose of
"extending and developing our National Library in
Jerusalem." 3 At the Eleventh Zionist Congress, at the suggestion of Ussishkin and Dr. Heinrich Loewe, it was decided
that the J.N.F. take steps to take over the Library as the
property of the Jewish people. 4
27
P. 315 [391]: "Our first Librarian was Dr. Heinrich Loewe,
an old Zionist comrade-in-arms of my student days. . . . To
Dr. Loewe we owe the establishment of a sound bibliographical organisation and tradition."
Dr. Loewe was originally appointed Librarian and by an
arrangement with Dr. Weizmann in America the day for
commencing his activities in Jerusalem was set for October 1,
1924. But on his arrival in March of that year in London,
Messrs. Cowen and Lipsky received him on behalf of Dr.
Weizmann and both informed him "that the Actions Committee did not agree to his working in the Jerusalem Library,
that there existed no agreement and that he had no claim''. 1
Accordingly Dr. Loewe did not take up the post of
Librarian at all.
28
PP• 333/334 [413/414]: "A few days before the issuance of
the White Paper he [the Prime Minister] had, perhaps with
the idea of heading off my protests, invited the Jewish Agency
to appoint a committee which should consult with a special
Cabinet Committee on the Palestine policy. We accepted—
but that did not prevent my resignation. . . . On the Cabinet
Committee there were, among others . . . Malcolm MacDonald as secretary. On our side . . . Leonard Stein,
Harry Sacher, Harold Laski, James de Rothschild, Professor
Brodetsky and Professor Namier."
The Prime Minister's invitation was not extended "a few
days before the issuance of the White Paper" but on Novem1
Protocol V , 389.
Ibid. X , 75.
3
Ibid. p. 339.
4
Ibid. X I , 297 and 341-344.
5
Yehouda Louis Weinberg,
Jerusalem, 1946, p. 128.
2
Nizane
haZionut—Elyakim
Heinrich
Loewe,
ber 6, 1930,1 sixteen days after the White Paper (Cmd. 3692)
had been issued on October 21 and after Dr. Weizmann's
resignation on the same day. 2
The Secretary to the Committee was Major Hind (not
MacDonald). 3
Leonard Stein was not a member of the Committee, while,
in addition to those referred to, Sir O. E. d'Avigdor Goldsmid,
Dr. M. Hexter, Dr. Arlosoroff, Leo Motzkin, S. Kaplansky
and Dr. Eder also attended the meetings. 4
29
PP. 430/431 [529/530]: "One correspondent who had just
[July, 1942] flown in from Cairo and Palestine . . . reported
that General Wavell had called in some Jewish leaders and
told them confidentially how deeply sorry he was that the
British Army could not do any more for the Tishuv; the troops
were to be withdrawn toward India, the Jews would have to
be left behind, and would be delivered up to the fury of the
Germans, the Arabs, and the Italians."
Lord Wavell left the Middle East Command in July, 1941,
to take up the post of Commander-in-Chief in India 5 —
exactly one year before the reported conversation took place. 6
1
Ibid. p. 187.
Ibid. p. 189.
4
Ibid. p. 190.
6
The Times, July 2, 1941, p. 4.
6
Mr. Hamish Hamilton, the publisher of the English edition of Trial and
Error, stated in The Times (November 8, 1949, p. 5) that Lord Wavell denied
ever having made such a statement, and apologized for this error. H e
simultaneously stated that Dr. Weizmann had apologized privately to
Lord Wavell.
2
3
XI.
M I N O R ERRORS
T
H E R E are also a number of incorrectly recorded dates or
events in the book which have no bearing on the issue
or the broader background of the narrative. For the sake of
accuracy I should like to point out a number of instances,
and am sure that many more could be found.
1
P. 19 [31]: "Matters were infinitely more difficult at the
universities, where the Humerus clausus was 3 or 4 per cent."
The regulations of July 1887 fixed the percentage of Jews
at universities in Russia as follows: 3 per cent in St. Petersburg
(Leningrad) and Moscow; 5 per cent at the universities
outside the "Pale", and 10 per cent inside the "Pale". 1
2
P. 57 [79]: "The London Congress was actually of some
historic importance.... It was there that the Jewish National
Fund . . . was founded."
The London Congress was the Fourth and took place in
1900. The J.N.F. was founded in Basle at the Fifth Congress
in 1901.2
3
P. 77 [103]: Grezhdanin, the anti-Semitic paper, was not
published in Kiev but in Moscow. The anti-Semitic paper
issued in Kiev was Kievlanin.3
4
P. 83 [ n o ] : At the Sixth Congress "Herzl read forth the
famous letter from the British Government, signed by Lord
Lansdowne, offering the Jews an autonomous territory in
Uganda."
1
J . Lex. IV, 531; S. Dubnow, History of the Jews in Russia and Poland, II,
Philadelphia, 1918, p. 350.
2
Protocol V, 265-302.
8
S. Dubnow, History of the Jews in Russia and Poland, Vol. I l l , Philadelphia,
1920, p. 20.
The letter was read by Leopold J . Greenberg to the
Congress.1 It was not signed by Lord Lansdowne but by Sir
Clement Hill 2 and does not contain any reference to Uganda. 3
5
P. 83 [ n o ] : " I remember one deeply significant detail of
the stage setting. It had always been the custom to hang on
the wall, immediately behind the President's chair, a map of
Palestine. This had been replaced [at the Sixth Congress] by a
rough map of the Uganda protectorate, and the symbolic
action got us on the quick, and filled us with foreboding."
I inspected many pictures and photos in magazines as well
as in the Zionist Archives in Jerusalem, depicting scenes and
portraits at the Sixth Congress, but was unable to find in any
of them a map of Uganda behind the President's chair or in
the Congress hall. On the other hand the Zion flag is
clearly visible behind the President's chair on the pictures
I saw.
6
P. 87 [115]: When at the Sixth Congress the vote on the
resolution was taken by roll call " I remember vividly Herzl
calling Sokolow's name. 'Herr Sokolow.' No answer. 'Herr
Sokolow!' No answer. And a third time, 'Herr Sokolow!*
With the same result."
It was not Herzl, but the Secretary of the Congress, A. H .
Reich, who called out the names of the delegates when the
vote was taken by roll call. 4
7
P. 92 [122]: " O n July 4, 1904, Herzl died in Vienna."
Herzl died on Sunday, July 3, 1904, in Edlach. 5
8
P. 107 [141]: "Achad Ha-am was the secretary of the old
Odessa Committee for Palestine in the days of the Chibatk
Zion."
Achad Haam was a member of that Committee but not
its secretary.6
1
2
3
4
6
6
Protocol V I , 214.
Ibid. p. 216.
Ibid.
Ibid. p. 223.
Die Welt, July 8, 1904.
S. L. Zitron, Toledot Chibbat JZion, I, Odessa, 1914, p. 381.
9
P. 129 [165/166]: "The Seventh Zionist Congress—that of
T h e Hague."
The Congress in The Hague was the Eighth and was held
in 1907. The Seventh Congress was held in Basle in 1905.1
10
P. 136 [175]: "At about the same time [1902], Israel
Abrahams, of Cambridge University, wrote an article in
support of the idea [of a Hebrew University in Jerusalem] in
the London Jewish Chronicle."
Israel Abraham's article "A University for Jerusalem" was
published in the London Jewish Chronicle of February 28,
1908, p. 15.
11
P. 156 [not in the English edition]: "The 'Conjoint Committee' composed of representatives of the Anglo-Jewish
Association (presided over by Lord Montagu) and the Board
of Deputies."
There has never been a Lord Montague in the peerage,
nor any Lord Montagu of Jewish family 2 (though that is the
family name of Baron Swaythling). The President of the
Anglo-Jewish Association from 1895-1921 was Claude G.
Montefiore. 3 Dr. Weizmann confirms this elsewhere
himself (p. 202 [254]).
12
P. 160 [204]: "[Zangwill's] Territorial Organisation had
become meaningless and he dissolved it that year", 1917.
The J.T.O. was dissolved in 1925.4 Dr. Eder represented
this Organisation when 5 he went with Dr. Weizmann's
Zionist Commission to Palestine in 1918 (p. 226 [284]).
13
P. 162 [207]: "Returning from Palestine, I found him
[Leonard Stein] in a rest camp in Taranto." Elswhere
it says (p. 215 [269]): "[On my way to Palestine] I
discovered my old friend Leonard Stein . . . at Taranto."
1
See the respective Protocols.
Burke's Genealogical and Heraldic History of the Peerage, etc., London, 1949,
p . 1412; Who's Who, 1950.
3
J . Lex. I V , 279/280.
4
Ibid. V , 1534.
5
2
Dr. Weizmann's journey to Palestine took place in March,
1918 (p. 213 [267]) and he returned in September, 1918.1
I checked up on this discrepancy with Mr. Leonard Stein.
They met on the return journey of Dr. Weizmann from
Palestine.2
14
P. 167 [213]: ‫״‬The opening of the war found Jabotinsky
in Alexandria."
The opening of World War I found Jabotinsky in Russia.
On September 1, 1914, he crossed the border into Sweden
and visited a number of European countries, including
England, where he met Dr. Weizmann. He arrived at
Alexandria at the middle of December. 3
15
P. 193 [244]: "America had entered the war in March"
1917•
President Wilson's statement to a special meeting of the
Congress pronouncing a state of war with Germany was made
on April 2, 1917.4
16
The meeting in Dr. Gaster's house did not take place on
February 17, 1917 (p. 188 [238]), but on February 7 of that
year. 5
17
P. 200 [252]: "I had been the President of the Zionist
Federation for about a year." This was said on May 20, 1917,
at a Conference of the E.Z.F.
Dr. Weizmann was elected President of the E.Z.F. on
February 11, 1917; three months before the opening of the
Conference mentioned. 6
18
P. 212 [266]: "The Italian Government sent us Commendatore Levi Bianchini" as member of the Zionist Commission.
The Official Report records 7 two Italian representatives.
The other was Dr. Artom, Captain in the Italian Army.
1
2
3
4
5
6
‫ל‬
Ibid. p. 45. (English edition.)
Mr. L. Steins letter to me of May 27, 1949.
Vladimir Jabotinsky, Sippur Tamai, Jerusalem, 1943, II, 29.
Pol. Report XII, q; Gelber, p. 59 (quotes Sokolow's report on the meeting).
Goodman, Zionism, p. 41.
I 116
19
P. 213 [267]: "Our [the Zionist Commission's] departure
was set for Monday, March 8, 1918."
The calendar for that year shows that March 8 was a
Friday.
20
P. 214 [269]: " I was presented to His Majesty King
George V " on "the very day of our departure for Palestine."
As in the previous paragraph Dr. Weizmann thus also
records the audience on "Monday, March 8, 1918."
Dr. Weizmann was received by the King on Monday,
March 4, 1918.1 Consequently his departure to Palestine also
took place on that day.
21
PP. 218/219 [274]: "I stayed three days [in Gen. Allenby's
Headquarters] at Bir Salem . . . I felt that those days were in
the nature of a period of probation. . . . After those three
days I was, so to say, released from G . H . Q / '
The Official Report records: 2 "Dr. Weizmann spent the
first day of his stay in Palestine as guest of General Allenby
in the G.H.Q. near Rehovoth."
22
P. 220 [276]: "The Governor of Jaffa—and thus of Tel
Aviv—was at this time [before September, 1918] a Colonel
Hubbard." Then follows an instance quoted "from a note
made at the time" showing Hubbard's anti-Jewish bias.
There is no doubt that Hubbard was anti-Jewish and his
acts are recorded in the Official Report to the Twelfth
Zionist Congress.3 But therein it is stated that Colonel
Hubbard was appointed Military Governor of Jaffa in the
autumn of 1919, a year after Dr. Weizmann's departure
from Palestine.
23
On pp. 168, 227 and 255 [214, 285 and 319], Jabotinsky is
referred to as "Captain." His rank was that of lieutenant. 4
1
The Times, March 5, 1918; J.C., March 8, 1918, p. 11.
3
Ibid. p. 49.
4
V . Jabotinsky, "Megillat haGedud", in Sippur Yamai, II, 193; Lieut.-Gol.
J. H. Patterson, With the Judaeans in the Palestine Campaign, London, 1922, p. 44.
2
24
P. 229 [287/288]: The promises given by Dr. Weizmann
"at the end of September, 1918" to two gentlemen in
Palestine, to help them to get myrtles in time for the Feast of
Tabernacles, would have come (like in the old Jewish saying
"Essrogim noch Sukkess") too late. The Feast in 1918 lasted
from September 21 to 27.
25
PP. 227/228-229 [285-288]: Some of the misunderstandings mentioned in these pages arise owing to the statements that he left Palestine "at the end of September, 1918."
He left the country on September 10, 1918.1
26
P. 241 [302]: At the February conference of the A.C.
and of the Territorial Federations, in London, 1919, only
Continental Zionists were present and "an American
delegation arrived later, for the June meeting."
At that February conference twelve American delegates
participated. 2
27
The statement on behalf of the Z.O. to the Paris Peace
Conference was not submitted on February 23, 1919 (p. 243
[303]), but on February 3 of that year. 3
28
Nor was the Zionist delegation "admitted to the Conference chamber at three-thirty on Thursday afternoon,
February 23" (p. 243 [304]) because February 23 was a
Sunday. They were admitted on February 27, 1919.4
29
The report Dr. Weizmann gave to his colleagues in London
"on my return to London on March 5" (p. 243 [304]), was
actually given by him on March 7, 1919.5
1
Pol. Report X I I , 45 (English edition).
Org. Report X I I , 81.
Pol. Report X I I , 20, 72 f.; M. Medzini, Esser Shanim shel Mediniyut
israelit, Tel Aviv, 1928, p. 91; Boehm II, 53.
4
5
Ibid.
8
3
Erez-
I 118
30
Feisal's letter to Prof. Felix Frankfurter is quoted
(p. 245 [307]) as having been dated March 3, 1919. It is
dated March i. 1
31
P. 292 [363]: "The Palestine Mandate came up for
ratification only on the last day of the League Council meeting
(Saturday, July 24, 1922), in London." On the following
page (293 [364]) it is repeated that the ratification took place
"on Saturday morning".
The calendar shows that July 24 was a Monday, and it was
on this day that the Mandate was publicly confirmed. On the
previous Saturday (July 22) the draft Mandate was approved
in a closed meeting of the Council. 2 It was on Sunday, July
23, that Dr. Weizmann himself informed the Conference of
the E.Z.F. that as was known "from the official Communique
which was issued by the Council of the League of Nations
last night, the Mandate for Palestine is approved by the
League, subject to an official confirmation at tomorrow's
open meeting." 3
32
Dr. Chaim Arlosoroff was not assassinated in
(p. 300 [372]), but on June 16, 1933.4
1935
33
P. 309 [382]: "I did not meet Felix Warburg until the
spring of 1923" who "within a fortnight of this first conversation left for Palestine together with Mrs. Warburg. I wired
Kisch to show them around" (p. 310 [384]).
Colonel Kisch records the first visit of the Warburgs in
Palestine on March 5, 1924,5 not two weeks, but one year
after the first conversation to which Dr. Weizmann refers.
34
P. 362 [446]: "The Abyssinian war finally broke out in the
summer of 1935."
That war broke out at the beginning of October, 1935.6
1
Ibid. p. 23, where the whole letter is reproduced.
Gt. Britain and Palestine, p. 13; Jîonistisches Bulletin, London, No. 4, July 24,
1922, p. 1.
3
J.C. July 28, 1922, p. 18/19.
4
Report X V I I I , 13.
5
Lt.-Col. F. H. Kisch, Palestine Diary, London, 1938, p. 107.
6
Survey of International Affairs, 1935, Vol. II, London, 1936, p. 200.
2
35
P. 367 [452]: "[de Jouvenel said:] 'Dr. Weizmann, it is
written in the Book of Nehemiah that Tadmor, which as you
know is Palmyra, was built by the Jews'."
Dr. Weizmann should, of course, have answered that
Tadmor is not mentioned at all in Nehemiah and that its
building is referred to in 2 Ghron. viii, 4.
36
Another phrase, this time from the New Testament, is
attributed to Nietzsche (p. 381 [469]). The words "Den
Reinen ist alles rein" ("unto the pure all things are pure")
are a famous phrase from the Epistle of Paul to Titus, i, 15.
37
A grammatical error occurs in the quotation from
Goethe (p. 338 [419]), where Dr. Weizmann writes "Was
Du ererbst" ("what you inherit"), while in the original it
says:1 "Was du ererbt hast" ("what you have inherited").
38
"The Twentieth Zionist Congress" was not "held in
Basle in August, 1937" (p. 386 [475]) but in Zurich. 2
39
The small group of followers of Sabbathai Zevi do not
"call themselves Dumbies" (p. 404 [497]) but Doenme 3
or Donmeh.
40
The "first postwar Zionist Congress" of December, 1946,
was not "held in Geneva" (p. 442 [543]) but in Basle.4
*
1
2
3
4
Goethe, Faust I, Nacht.
Protocol X X .
Encyclopaedia Judaica, V , 1189.
Protocol X X I I .
*
*
I 120
T
HIS
ENDS my analysis.
I
have submitted
Dr.
Weizmann's Trial and Error to such detailed examination only because of its intrinsic importance. It was not
my object to investigate the reasons for the many errors and
omissions which came to light. Certain glaring inaccuracies
are in all probability due not to Dr. Weizmann himself but
to his literary collaborators, who in some cases sacrificed
Fact to Effect. For my part, from start to finish I have, as
I intended, only cited facts. I do not draw any conclusions
therefrom and I do not advise the reader to do so. It is my
hope that future editions of the book which will no doubt
appear, will include the corrections and additions which may
be suggested by my study as well as by certain other reviews.
We may then be presented with an authoritative work,
reliable down to the smallest detail, giving a factual picture
of Dr. Weizmann's life.
ABBREVIATIONS
A.G. = Actions Committee of the Zionist Organisation.
Anna and Maxa Nordau = Anna and Maxa Nordau, Max
Nordau, A Biography, New York, 1943.
Basle speech = Speech of Dr. Weizmann in Basle,
August 31, 1947; in The Jubilee of the First Zionist Congress.
1897-1947, Jerusalem, 1947.
Bein = Alex Bein, Theodore Herzl, Philadelphia, 1945.
(German ed. Vienna, 1934.)
Boehm I, II = Adolf Boehm, Die %ionistische Bewegung,
Vol. I, Berlin, 1935; Vol. II, Berlin, 1937.
Diaries I, II, I I I = Theodor Herzl, Tagebuecher, Berlin, 1923.
Vols. I, II and III.
Die Welt = The Central Organ of the Zionist Organisation.
Dugdale = Blanche E. C. Dugdale, Arthur James Balfour.
Two Vols., London, 1936.
E.Z.F. = English Zionist Federation.
Gelber = Dr. N. M. Gelber, Hatzharat Balfour veToldoteyhay
Jerusalem, 1939.
Goodman = Paul Goodman, Chaim Weizmann. A tribute on
his Seventieth Birthday. London, 1945.
Goodman, Zionism — Paul Goodman, Zionism in England,
1S99-1949, London, 1949.
Gt. Britain and Palestine — Great Britain and Palestine, 1915-1939‫׳‬
Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 1939.
Hecker = Max Hecker, Das Juedische Technikum in Haifa.
Vienna, 1921.
Iggerot = Achad Haam, Iggerot, Tel Aviv, 1925. Five Vols.
J.C. — Jewish Chronicle, London.
J. Lex. = Juedisches Lexikon, Berlin. Five Vols.
J.N.F. = Jewish National Fund.
J.T.A. = Jewish Telegraphic Agency.
Judenstaat = Theodor Herzl, Der Judenstaat, in Prof. Dr. L.
Kellner, Theodor Herzl's îonistischeSchriften, Berlin, 1920.
Klausner = Joseph Klausner, Menahem Ussishkin, London,
1944.
122
ABBREVIATIONS
Krojanker = Gustav Krojanker, Chaim Weizmann: Reden und
Aufsaetze, 1901-1936. Tel Aviv, 1937.
Landman = S. Landman, The Origin of the Balfour
Declaration; in Essays presented to J. H. Hertz> London,
1
943•
Lloyd George = David Lloyd George, War Memoirs. Two
Volumes, London, 1938.
Org. Report X I I — Reports of the Executive of the Zionist Organisation to the XII. Zionist Congress. III. Organisational Report,
1921. (German.)
Pol. Report X I I == Reports of the Executive of the Zionist Organisation to the XII. Zi°ni^ Congress. I. Political Report, 1921.
(German.)
Protocol I, II, III, etc. == Official Protocols of the I, II, I I I ,
etc., Zionist Congress. (German).
Report X I I I , X I V , etc. == Reports of the Executive of the Zionist
Organisation to the XIII, XIV, etc., Congress.
Samuel = Viscount Samuel, Memoirs, London, 1945.
Z.O. = Zionist Organisation.
INDEX
Abdullah Q u i l l i a m Effendi Bey,
Sheikh, 87
Aberson, Zvi, 83
Abrahams, Israel, 114
Abyssinian War, 118
" Academie
de
la
nouvelle
Sionie", 97
A c h a d H a a m , 8, 68, 70-71, 74,
101-103, 113
Actions Committee (A.C.), 18-20,
27‫ ־‬28, 34, 54, 55, 61, 66, 74, 79,
8 6 , 8 7 , 9 9 , n o , 1x7
Agriculture, 30-38
Agudas A h a v e Zion, 65
Agudas Osrei Zion, 65
A g u d a s Zion, 65
" Akademische Lese- u n d R e d e halle", 13
AlParashatDerachim (Achad H a a m ) ,
8
Alexander, Prof. Samuel, 68
Alexandria, 115
Algerian Jews, 9
Allen by, Field-Marshal Lord, 116
Alsberg, A., 102
America or U . S . A . , 17, 40-43,
48‫ ־‬73‫ ־‬74‫ ־‬77‫ ־‬78‫ ־‬104, 106, 115,
117
Ancona, 107
Anglo-Jewish Association, 114
A n n u a l Conference 1922, 4 0
Anti-Semitism, 35, 112, 116
Arabs, 48, 76, 80, 107, 111
Arena, The, (Levin), 55
Arlosoroff, Dr. C h a i m , 80, i n ,
118
A r m e n i a n National Committee, 76
Artom, Dr., 115
Asquith, Herbert Henry, 69, 106
Aufbau
des Landes
Israel,
Der
(Ruppin), 36
Austria, 9, 74
Avinovitzki, Dr. Ph., 26, 6 3
Balfour, Arthur J a m e s (Earl), 10,
11, 68, 71-73, 77, 105, 108-109
Balfour Declaration, 10, 11, 34,
48, 67-78, 79, 91, 93, 105-107
Barrington, Sir Eric, 58
" Baseler Kongress, Der " (Herzl),
31‫ ־‬47
Basle, 58, 80, 83-84, 100, 112,
114, 119
Basle Programme, 9, 30, 34, 40, 79,
98 Alex, 13, 17, 24, 25, 30, 54,
Bein,
55‫ ־‬63
Belisha, B. I., 62
Belkovsky, Prof. Zvi, 56, 63
Ben Gurion, D a v i d , 38, 39, 70
Bentwich, Herbert, 60, 63, 9 0
Berlin, 12, 13, 17, 19, 31, 34, 36,
7
4
1
‫ ־‬79‫ ־‬9 8 ‫ ־‬o i ,
Berne, 29, 97, 9 8
Bernstein, Dr. M a x , 61, 63
Beth Hasefarim Hakelali Libne Tisrael
Biyerushalayim: Midrash Abarbanel
Veginze Toseph, 109
Beth Midrash Abarbanel, 109
Biel, 29, 9 8
Bir Salem, 116
Birnbaum, Dr. N a t h a n , 30
Board of Deputies ( L o n d o n ) , 114
Bodenfrage und der Juedische
Aufbau
inPalaestina, Die (Granovsky), 3 6
Bodenheimer,
Miss
Henrietta
Hannah, 30
Bodenheimer, Dr. M a x , 30, 54, 9 4
Boehm, Adolf, 8, 13, 37, 3 9 , 4 1 , 4 2 ,
97, 102, 103, 104, 117
Bojukanski, Dr. S., 6 3
Brainin, R e u b e n , 18, 51, 65
Brandeis, Justice Louis D e m b i t z ,
39-43‫ ־‬77‫ ־‬106
British Foreign Secretary, 9, 10
British or M a n d a t o r y G o v e r n m e n t ,
10, 12, 41, 44-49, 51-53, 55, 58,
62, 69, 75-77, 84, 89, 91, 93,
94, 105, 108, 112
Brno (Bruenn), 13, 20, 9 8
Brodetsky, Prof. Dr. Selig, 70, 81,
no
I(J
2103
‫־‬
124
INDEX
Bromberg, S., 30
Buber, Dr. Martin, 18, 25, 27, 28,
56, 63, 97, 100
Budapest, 18
Bukovina, 18
Burke's
Genealogical and
Heraldic
History of the Peerage, 114
Cairo Conference (1921), 108
Cambridge University, 114
Chajes, Dr. H . P., 63, 107
Chamberlain, Joseph, 49, 50, 53
Charkov Conference, 59, 64, 65
Chasan, Ch., 63
Chasanovitz, Dr. Joseph, 63, 109
Chatzmann, Vera, see W e i z m a n n ,
Vera
Chibath
113
Chicago, 102
Choveve £ion, 31
Churchill, Winston Spencer, 48,
105, 108
Clayton, Br. General G.F., 106
Cleveland Convention, 17, 42, 4 3
Cohen, Dr. G., 6 3
Cohen, Israel, 33, 9 6
Cohen, R e v . M . M . , 9 0
Cohn, R a b b i Dr., 2 4
Collective settlements, see also
Kvutzah, 35-38
Colonial Office, 4 6
Colonisation, 31, 32, 35-38
Colonisation Commission, 32
Commission for the study of the
East Africa Expedition, 55, 5 6
Copenhagen, 73, 74, 75, 9 5
Coupland, Prof. Sir Reginald, 5
Cowen, Joseph, 74, n o
Crewe, Lady, 14
Cromer, Lord, 10
Crossman, R . H . S., M . P . , 8, 70
Czar (Tsar), 9, 73
Czernowitz, 44, 59
Daiches, Dr. Samuel, 60, 9 0
Daily Chronicle, 68/69
Daily Graphic, 59
Daily Telegraph, 5, 72
Danzig, 90
Democratic Fraction, 13, 14, 18,
23‫ ־‬25-29, 32, 86, 109
Diaries (Herzl), 8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 27,
50‫ ־‬51‫ ־‬53‫ ־‬55‫ ־‬82, 8 3
D i v r e haKnesset, 39
D o e n m e , 119
D o n m e h , 119
Dreamers and Fighters (Jaari-Poljeskin), 69
Dreyfus, Dr. Charles, 61, 62, 6 3
D u b n o w , Simon, 112
Dugdale, Blanche E. C., 105
East Africa, 10, 49-66, 89, 9 0
East E n d (London), 12
Eastern and Western Jews, 15-21,
23> 24, 29, 39, 49, 54, 63, 6 4 ,
65, 83
E c o n o m i c Council, 42
Eder, Dr. M . D., 18, 111, 114
Edlach, 113
Edwards, T o m , 70
Egypt, 52, 53
Ehrlich, Dr. Paul, 104-105
Eine Juedische Hochschule (Buber,
Feiwel, W e i z m a n n ) , 27
El Arish, 10, 52, 57
Encyclopedia Britannica, 5 8
Encyclopedia Judaica, 105, 119
England, 8, 27, 45, 46, 56, 57, 6 1 ,
63‫ ־‬7°‫ ־‬7‫ יז‬72, 73‫ ־‬76, 89, 95, 9 6 ,
97, 100, 115
English
Zionist
Federation
(E.Z.F.), 8, 61, 62, 70, 73, 74,
75, 76, 87, 89, 91, 115, 118
" Ergebnisse des Kongresses "
(Herzl), 31
Esco Foundation ( N e w H a v e n ) ,
84
Esser Shanim shel Mediniyut
Erezisraelit (Medzini), 117
"Evacuation of the Galut", 39
Farbstein, Dr. David, 6 3
Faust (Goethe), 119
Feisal, K i n g of Iraq, 107, 118
Feiwel, Dr. Berthold, 18, 25, 2 7 ,
28, 63, 97, 98
Finkelstein, N . , 63
Florence, 107
Foreign Office Files, 78
{5479),
Turkey, 52, 53
Foreign Office Files, see
Jewish
Settlement, etc.
Fraenkel, Josef, 8
France, 9, 13, 76, 96, 109
Frankfurt a m / M a i n , 105
Frankfurter, Justice Felix, 118
Freudenberg, Dr., 6 3
Friedemann, Dr. Adolf, 20
INDEX
Galicia, 18
125
Hazophe, 5 6
H e b r e w language, 8, 26, 71,
Gaster, H a h a m D r . Moses, 60, 71,
101-104
72, 73‫ י‬76, 77, 87, 90, 115
Hecker, M a x , 101, 102
Gaster, V i v i a n J . , 71
Helsingfors Conference, 9 5
Gelber, Dr. N . M . , 73, 74, 75, 76,
Hertz, Chief R a b b i Dr. J . H . , 77
‫״‬5
Herzl, Dr. T h e o d o r , 7-66, 70, 71,
General H e b r e w Speaking Society
79, 82, 83, 98, 99, 100, 112, 113
24
Hess, Moses, 97
General Zionists, 81
" Hessaniah", 97
G e n e v a , 28, 97, 98, 119
Hexter, Dr. M . , 111
George V , K i n g of England, 116
Hickl, M a x , 9 8
German, Germans, Germany, 8,
H i g h Commissioner, 47
18, 19, 71, 72, 73, 74, 91, 98,
Hilfsverein der deutschen J u d e n ,
102, 103, h i , 115
101-104
Gesammelte Schriften (Herzl), 31, 47
Hill, Sir Clement, 10, 49, 51, 57,
Glasgow, 87
58, 113
Goethe, 119
H i n d , Major, 111
Goldbloom, R e v . J . K . , 61, 9 0
Hirsch, Baron Moritz de, 12, 31
Goldmann, Dr. N a h u m , 80
History
of the Basle
Programme
Goldsmid, Sir O . E. d'Avigdor,
(Bodenheimer), 3 0
hi
History of the Jews in Italy ( R o t h ) ,
Gollancz, Prof. Israel, 100
107, 108
G o o d m a n , Paul, 8, 15, 58, 59, 70,
History of the Jews in Russia and
75, 84, 85, 115
Poland ( D u b n o w ) , 112
Gottheil, Prof. R . , 6 4
G r a n d D u k e of Baden, 9
Hodess, J a c o b , 11
Granovsky, Dr. A b r a h a m , 36
Holmim veLohamim (Jaari-Poljeskin)
Great Britain and Palestine, 36, 38,
69
H u b b a r d , Colonel, 116
47, 76, 118
Greenberg, Leopold J . , 10, 17, 20,
Hurst, Mr., 5 8
1
49> 50, 5
6,64,57,53‫י‬
g
,
73,
77> 89-92, 113
I C A , 12, 6 4
Grey, Sir Edward, 10
Iggerot ( A c h a d H a a m ) , 68, 75, 102,
Grezhdanin, 112
103
Grossman, Meir, 40, 47
Im Kampf urn die Hebraeische Sprache,
Gruenbaum, Yizchak, 14, 23
102, 104
Guas N g i s h u Plateau, 49, 59
Immigration, 10, 17, 31-39, 45>
47, 109
Imperiali, 109
Haas, J a c o b de, 42, 64, 106
Index of the Times, 100
Haganah, 48
India, 19, h i
H a g u e , T h e , 19, 74, 114
Industry, 30, 35
Haifa, 71, 101
Iraq, 107
Hamaggid, 24
Irgun, 4 8
H a m b u r g , 99
Ish Kishor, E., 61
Hamediniyut Hazionit (Medzini), 5 4
Israel (State o f ) , 38, 39, 48, 85
H a m i l t o n , H a m i s h , 6, 78, 111
Istanbul, 95
H a m m o n d , J . D . , 68
Italy, 11, 107, 108, 109, i n , 115
Hankey, Sir Maurice, 77
Hansard, 10
Jaari-Poljeskin, J . , 6 9
Hantke, Dr. Arthur, 87
Jabotinsky Lohem haUmah, 9 4
Harris, Dr. I., 63
Jabotinsky, V l a d i m i r , 20, 33, 35,
Ha-Schachar, 97
40, 43, 64, 73, 93‫־‬94, 1 0 6 ‫ ־‬r 1 5>
Ha-Shiloach, 101
116
Hazephirah, 6 4
126
INDEX
Jacobs, J . , 90
Jacobson, Dr. Victor, 63, 86, 87
Jaffa, 116
Jassinovsky, Dr. Isidor, 54, 63
Javitz, Seev Wolf, 6 3
Jelsky, Dr. J . , 63
Jerusalem, 9, 26, 40, 41, 54, 73, 75,
93, 102, 106, 107, 109, n o , 115
J e w i s h Agency, 14, 23, 38, 41, 42,
45, 46, 94, n o
Jewish Chronicle (London), (J.C.),
10,17,20,21,40,47,51,59,60,
61, 62, 65, 66, 68, 69, 78, 87, 89,
9°> 9 1 ‫ ־‬99‫ י‬IGO > IQ 4> 1 1 4 1 1 8
‫־‬
Jewish Chronicle 184.1-1941, The, 17,
89
Jewish Colonisation Association, see
ICA
J e w i s h Colonial Bank or Trust,
27‫ ־‬28, 32, 33, 86
"Jewish Company", 8
Jewish Encyclopedia, 100
" J e w i s h Institute for Technical
Education i n Palestine", 102
J e w i s h Legion, 9 3
Jewish Monthly (London), 5
Jewish National F u n d (J.N.F.) or
K e r e n K a y e m e t h , 32, 33, 36,
90, 102, n o , 112, 114
J e w i s h National H o m e , 33, 35, 37,
40, 41, 47, 76
J e w i s h National Library, 26,
109-110
Jewish Settlement in the East Africa
Protectorate, 1903, Foreign Office
Documents
and
Correspondence,
F.0.2(785),
East Africa, 57, 58
Jewish State ; Statehood; State
Zionism ; State conception, 8,
33‫ ־‬34‫ ־‬35‫ ־‬39‫ ־‬4 6 ‫ ־‬4 8 ‫ ־‬67, 69,
76‫ ־‬79‫ ־‬80
Jewish
Telegraphic
Agency
(J.T.A.),80
J e w i s h Territorial Organisation
( J . T . O . ) , 114
Jewish World (London), 10
Jewish
Tear Book (London), 17,
100
Johnston, Sir Harry, 59
Jouvenel, de, 119
Jude, Der, 97
Judenstaat, Der (Herzl), 7, 8, 15, 30
Juedische
Buch- und
Kunstverlag,
Der, 98
Juedische Emigration und !Colonisation
(Trietsch), 3 6
Juedische Verlag, Der, 26, 28, 97, 9 8
Juedische Volksstimme, Die, 9 8
Juedischer Volkskalender, 20, 98
Juedisches Jahrbuch fuer die Schweiz,
98
Juedisches Lexikon (J.L.),
18, 97,
X07, 108, 109, 112
" K a d i m a h " , 13
K a h n , Dr. Leopold, 18
Kaminka, R a b b i Dr. A r m a n d , 2 4
K a n n , Jacobus, 86
Kaplansky, Solomon, 111
Karlsbad, 40, 94
Karpas, 102
K e r e n Hayesod, 40, 42, 4 3
Keren
Kayemeth
see J e w i s h
National F u n d
Kessler, Leopold, 74
Ketavim nivharim (Jabotinsky), 64,
73, 106
Kiev, n o , 112
Kievlanin, 112
Kisch, Colonel Frederick, 18-19,
118
Kishinev, 51, 65
Klausner, Dr. Joseph, 71, 73, 95,
Kohan-Bernstein, Dr. J . , 54, 6 3
Kokesch, Dr. Oser, 18
Kongresszeitung, 85
Konstantinovski, Jakob, 6 3
Kremenetzky, J o h a n n , 18
Krojanker, Gustav, 11, 12, 16, 19,
21, 34, 40, 43, 44, 56, 79, 81, 105
Kvutzah, 35 {see Collective settlements)
Landau, Dr. Saul R a p h a e l , 30
L a n d m a n , Samuel, 18, 77, 91
Landsdowne, Lord, 52, 53, 58,
72, 112, 113
Laski, Prof. Harold, n o
Laski, N a t h a n , 62
" Laurels
of
Immortality"
(Weizmann), 13
Lausanne, 98
Le Peuple Juif (Paris), 34, 85
L e a g u e of Nations, 40, 108, 118
Lechi, 4 8
Legislative Council, 47
Lemaan %ion, 105
127
INDEX
Military
Operations:
Egypt
and
Leningrad, 112
Leon, Senor Q u i n o n e s de, 109
Palestine, 106
Levin, Dr. Shmarya, 55, 86, 87,
Milner, Lord, 10
103
Minz, Dr. A., 18, 3 0
Mizrachi, 24, 8 0
Lichtheim, Richard, 19
Modena, 108
Lieme, N e h e m i a h de, 19
Lilien, E. M., 28, 97
M o n e y , General Sir A. W . , 106
Lipsky, Louis, 19, 110
Montagu, Lord, 114
Lithuania, 18
Montefiore, C l a u d e G., 114
Moravia, 18, 9 8
Lloyd George, D a v i d (Earl), xo,
Mortara, Lodovico, 108
67, 68, 69, 77, 78, 105-106, 115
Moscow, 71, 73, 84, 95, 102, 112
Lodz, 65
Motzkin, Leo, 27, 32, 59, 83, 111
Loewe, Dr. Heinrich, 63, 110
Muggeridge, M a l c o l m , 5
Loewit, R., 98
London, 12, 16, 17, 18, 30, 33, 36,
Nahalal, 4 0
37, 38, 40, 4 1 , 42, 44, 49, 5 1 ‫ ־‬55‫־‬
Namier, Prof. L e w i s Bernstein, 110
58, 67, 72, 74, 76, 77, 85, 89, 90,
N a t h a n , Dr. Paul, 103, 104
9J5 9
5
,
1
0
6,103,104°°5*,99,96‫י‬
National
Library,
see J e w i s h
107, 112, 114, 116, 117, 118
National Library
L o n d o n Conference 1920, 4 0
N e w Haven, 8 4
London Gazette, 9 3
New Statesman and Nation, 8, 70
Louis D. Brandeis (de H a a s ) , 42,
N e w York, 12, 13, 16, 17, 21, 42,
106
Luah Ahiassaf, 18, 22, 102
Luzzatti, Luigi, 108
M a c D o n a l d Letter, 46, 79
M a c D o n a l d , M a l c o l m J . , 110, 111
Mack, J u d g e J u l i a n William, 40,
106
Magna Bibliotheca
Anglo-Judaica
(Roth), 65, 8 9
Magnus, Sir Philip, 14
Malcolm, James, 76, 77, 78, 91
Manchester, 61 62, 67, 87, 89, 90,
91, 100
Mandate, see Palestine M a n d a t e
Mandatory
Government,
see
British Government
Mandelstamm, Prof. M a x , 63
M a n n h e i m , 19
Marmorek, Dr. Alexander, 17, 18,
20, 54‫ ־‬9 1
Marmorek, Oscar, 18
Marquardt, Martha, 105
Marshall, Louis, 14
Mase, R a b b i J . , 102
Massel, Joseph, 62, 63, 90
Max Nordau el Amo, 3 4
M e c c a , 76
M e d z i n i , M . , 54, 117
Megillat haGedud (Jabotinsky), 106,
116
Menczel, Dr. Ph., 6 3
435 45‫ ־‬102
N e w t o n , Lord, 72
Nizam
haZionut-Elyakim
Heinrkk
Loewe (Weinberg), 1 xo
Niemirover, Dr. J a k o b , 101
Nietzsche, Friedrich, 119
N o b e l Prize Institute, 2 6
Nordau, A n n a , 17, 34, 82, 8 3
Nordau, Dr. M a x , 17, 18, 20, 22,
26, 30, 33, 34, 35, 53, 82-85
Nordau, M a x a , 17, 34, 82, 83
N o r d a u Plan, 34, 38, 39, 84-85
Nossig, Dr. Alfred, 31, 56, 101
Nuris, 4 0
Odessa, 18, 63, 71, 95, 96, 113
Odessa C o m m i t t e e , 113
Order of A n c i e n t Maccabaeans, 6 0
Ormsby-Gore, Major W . G. A., 47
Ottolenghi, General Giuseppe, 108
Pacifici, Alfonso, 107, 108
Palaestina
und
Palaestinensischer
Zionismus ( N a t h a n ) , 103
Palestine, 8, 9, 10, 18, 19, 21, 22,
26, 27, 30-38, 41-49, 51‫ ־‬52, 53,
56, 575 595 65, 66, 68-70, 72, 76,
77, 85, 89, 95, 100-104, 106, 111,
113-117
Palestine. A Study of Jewish,
Arab
and British Policies, 8 4
Palestine Diary (Kisch), 118
128
INDEX
Palestine
Jewish
Colonisation
Association (P.I.C.A.), 36
Palestine M a n d a t e , 41, 94, 108,
109, 118
Palestine Official Gazette, 109
" Palestinian Zionist Association",
60
Palmyra, 119
Paris, 12, 82, 83^.96, - n 7
Paris Peace Conference, 117
Parliament (House of Lords a n d
C o m m o n s ) , 10, 48, 58, 72
Parliament (in Israel), 39
Pasmanik, Dr. Daniel, 63, 101
Passfield, Lady, 14
Patterson, Lieut.-Col. J . H . , 116
Paul Ehrlick als Mensch und Arbeiter
(Marquardt), 105
Pelusian Plain, 52, 5 3
Percy, Lord, 56, 57, 58, 59, 6 0
Perkin, Prof. William H . , 99
Permanenzausschuss, 81, 91, 95, 99
Petach Tikvah, 4 0
Philadelphia, 107, 112
Philanthropy, 20, 31
Pines, F., 63
Pines, M . , 63
Pinsk, 17, 39, 8 4
Plehve, von, 10, 99
Pohrlitz, 18
Pope, T h e , 10
Prague, 13, 41
Prince of Wales, 8, 9
Protocols of the Zionist Congresses :
I, 17, 21, 24, 26, 30, 98
II, 24, 32, 98, 107
I I I , 25, 32
I V , 21
V, 20,24,26-28,32,108,110,112
V I , 31, 49, 50, 52, 53, 55, 56, 58,
61, 63, 64, 99, 113
V I I , 33, 51
V I I I , 33, 86, 101
I X , 12, 86, 88, 99, 100
X , 87, n o
X I , 29, 71, 87, n o
X I I , 24, 43, 9 4
X I I I , 14, 23, 24, 40, 43, 96
X I V , 24, 60
X V , 45, 9 4
X V I , 24
X V I I , 34, 41, 60, 107
X I X , 24
X X , 24, 119
X X I , 24
X X I I , 119
Rabinersohn, n o
R a b i n o w i c z , Dr. Oskar K . , 3
R a v e n n a , D1. Felice, 6 4
Rawitsch, 18
R e h o v o t h , 116
Reich, A. H . } 113
Report of the Commission on the
Palestine Disturbances, C m d . 3530
of 1930, 47
Report of the Zionist Executive to the
Zionist Congresses:
X I I , Political Report, 70, 74,
106, 107, 114, 115, 116, 117,
118. Organisational Report,
41‫ ־‬70, 87, 94, 103, 104, 117
X I I I , 94
X V I I , 37, h i
X V I I I , 118
Report on the Work of the Commission
sent out by the
Organisation
to examine the territory . . . in
British East Africa, 4 9
Revisionism, Revisionists, 20, 39,
40, 41, 44, 60, 80
R i s h o n Lezion, 63
Robinsohn, A., 17
R o m a n o , Marco, 6 4
Rosenblueth, Dr. Felix, 19
Rosenthal, Litman, 16, 100
Rosenwald, Julius, 102
R o t h , Dr. Cecil, 65, 89, 107, 108
Rothschild, Lord, 12, 14
Rothschild, Baron E d m o n d de, 14
Rothschild, H o n . Charles, 14
Rothschild, Mrs. Dorothy de, 14
Rothschild, J a m e s de, 14, n o
Rothschild, H o n . Walter, 14
R o y a l Commission o n Palestine,
36‫ ־‬37, 44‫ י‬85
R u m a n i a , 18
R u p p i n , Dr. Arthur, 18, 36, 100
Russia, Russian Jewry, 7, 9, 15,
17, 18, 51, 58, 65, 71, 73, 76, 95,
112, 115
Russian Society (London), 18, 77
Russian Zionists, 16, 20, 55, 56, 59,
635 65, 74, 95, 99, 100, 101
Rutherford, Prof. Ernest, 99
Sabbathai Zevi, 119
Sacher, Harry, 19, n o
129
INDEX
Salz, Dr. A b r a h a m , i b i
Samaria, 106
Samuel, Lord, 67, 68, 69, 70
Schapira, Prof. Dr. H e r m a n n , 30
Schechtmann, Dr. Josef, 108
Schiff, Jacob, 102
Schmrer, Dr. Moritz Tobias, 18
Schoen, Lazar, 100
Schwarz, Shalom, 9 4
Scott, C. P., 67, 68
Sefer Ussishkin, 41
Selbstwehr (Prague), 41
Shariff of Mecca, 76
Shire, M., 61, 62
Shmelkin, 102
Sholto, Mrs., 10, 49, 57
Sichem, 106
Silver, R a b b i A b b a Hillel, 70
Simon, Julius, 19
Sinai Peninsula, 50, 52, 53, 5 6
" Sippur Y a m a i " (Jabotinsky),
Syrkin, N a h m a n , 63, 99, 101
Szold, Miss Henrietta, 19
T a d m o r , 119
T a n a l a n d , 57
Taranto, 114
Technikum (Haifa), 71, 101-104
T e l Aviv, 34, 56, 69, 94, 116, 117
Thomson,
M a l c o l m , 77
Times, The, n , 57, 59, 77‫ ־‬78, 99‫־‬
l o o , 109, h i , 116
Times Literary Supplement, The, 77
Tiomkin, Vladimir, 6 3
Titoni, 108
Toledot Chibbat /{ion, 113
Trans-Jordan, 108
Transjordanien
im
Bereiche
des
Palaestinamandates
(Schechtmann), 108
Trial and Error, 1-119
Tribune, Di, ( L o n d o n ) , 16, 100
Trietsch, Davis, 28, 36, 52, 56, 63,
64‫ ־‬73, 115‫־‬
97
Smilansky, Moshe, 8 4
Tsar, see Czar
Snowden, Mrs. Philip, 14
Tshlenov, Dr. Yechiel, 20, 54, 55,
Sokolow, N a h u m , 51, 58, 63, 64,
63, 64, 70, 74, 86, 103
65, 70, 71‫ ־‬74‫ ־‬75‫ ־‬77, 87‫ ־‬91‫ ־‬94‫־‬
Turkey, Turks, 9, 10, 20, 32, 52,
107, 113, 115
71, 74, 76, 109
Somaliland, 57
Sonnino, Sidney, 108
Soskin, Dr. Selig E u g e n , 3 3
South Africa, 10
St. Petersburg, 65, 112 (see also
Leningrad)
Statehood ; State Zionism; State
conception ; see‫ ׳‬J e w i s h State
Statement made before the
Royal
Commission (Weizmann), 36, 37,
44
Steed, Wickham, 11
Stein, Leonard, n o , i n , 114, 115
Stimme der Wahrheit, Die (Schoen),
100
Stockholm, 26
Strieker, Robert, 80, 9 8
Student organisations, 13
Suczawa, 18
Sultan of Turkey, 9, 20, 21, 27
Sunderland, A., 90
Survey of International Affairs, 118
Swaythling, Baron, 114
Sweden, 115
Switzerland, 13, 27, 67, 97, 9 8
Sykes, Sir Mark, 76, 77, 78
Sykes-Picot Agreement, 7 6
U g a n d a , 49, 50, 51, 52, 55, 56, 59,
61, 89, 112, 113; see East Africa
Union de Sionistes Suisses, 9 8
U n i t e d Nations ( U . N . ) , 4 8
University, H e b r e w ; J e w i s h , 26,
27, 28, 29, 105, 107, 114
Unser Programm (Ussishkin), 100
Unsere Hojfnung, ( V i e n n a ) 21
U . S . A . see America
Ussishkin M e n a h e m M . , 16, 41, 71,
73, 86, 87, 91, 95-96, 100, n o
Victor E m a n u e l , K i n g of Italy, 11
V i e n n a , 11, 13, 16, 18, 20, 21,
22, 24, 36, 61, 66, 98, 99, 108,
113
Viviani, V . , 109
Vriesland, Dr. S. A . van, 19
Warburg, Felix, 14, 118
Warburg, Prof. Otto, 86, 100
Warsaw, 65, 102
Washington, 17, 39
Wassermann, Oskar, 14
Wavell, Field-Marshal Earl, 111
130
INDEX
Weinberg, Y e h o u d a Louis, n o
Weisberg, Mrs. H., 90
Weisgal, M . W., 13, 70
W e i z m a n n , Dr. Chaim, 1-120
W e i z m a n n , Mrs. Vera, 90
Wells, H . G., 68
Welt, Die, 16, 25, 28, 59, 61, 63, 64,
655 9 5 ‫ ־‬9 7 ‫ ־‬9 8 , 9 9 ‫י‬
l
°3>
IQ
7,
1 1
3
" Western " Jews, see " Eastern "
a n d " Western "
Whitaker's Almanack, 58
White Paper of 1922, CmcL 1700,
91, 94, 108
White Paper of 1930, C m d . 3582,
46, 79, n o , i n
White Paper of 1937, C m d . 5 5 1 3 , 4 6
White Paper of 1938, Cmd. 5 8 9 3 , 4 6
White Paper of 1939, Cmd. 6019,
46-47
Who's Who, 114
W i l h e l m II, German Kaiser, 8, 9,
10
Wilson, General Sir Henry, 105
Wilson, Woodrow, 76, 77, 115
Winterthur, 29
Wise, Dr. Stephen S., 106
Wissotzky, David, 102
Wissotzky,
Kalonymos
Wolf,
I0I-I02
With the Judaeans in the Palestine
Campaign (Patterson), 116
Wolf, Lucien, 57
Wolffsohn, David, 17, 19, 29, 33,
51, 86-88, 100
Wollemborg, Leone, 108
World War I, 10, 33, 67-78, 84,
93‫ ־‬95‫ ־‬97‫ ־‬102‫ ־‬104, 108
World War II, 6
World Zionist
Organisation and the
Keren
Hayesod
Controversy
in
America, 40, 42
Wuerzburg, 100
Yekaterinoslav, 95, 102
Zangwill, Israel, 9, 69, 114
Jîon (New Judaea), 102
Zionism, 6, 7, 10, 11, 13, 14, 15,
19, 21, 22, 24, 25, 29, 34, 37,
44, 49, 65, 70, 76, 82, 8 3
a i m of, 33-36, 79, 80
a n d religion, 24, 25, 28
cultural, 23, 25-30, 34, 35, 37,
80, 100
Herzlian, 7-48, 49, 50, 52, 5 4
mechanic, 20-23, 4 9 6 3
‫־‬
organic, 20-23, 35, 49
political, 23, 30, 31, 33, 35, 39,
40, 41, 43, 44, 45, 46, 48, 100,
101
practical, 23, 30-33, 39-41, 44,
48, 86, 100, 101
schematic, 20, 21
synthetic, 36, 100-101
Zionist Central Archives (Jerusalem), 59, 75, 104, 113
Zionist Bureau (Copenhagen), 73,
75‫ ־‬95
Zionist Commission, 114, 115, 116
Zionist Congresses, 7, 12, 13, 14,
19, 24, 26, 27, 28, 31, 32, 47,
52, 53‫ י‬59‫ י‬60, 64, 65, 66, 79,
80, 81, 8 2 , 9 8 , 9 9 , 1 0 0 , 1 0 9 , 1 1 9
First, 17, 21, 24, 26, 30, 32, 83,
845 97‫ י‬9 8
Second, 7, 15, 24, 30, 32
Third, 25
Fourth, 112
Fifth, 26, 56, 112
Sixth, 49, 51-58, 61, 63, 65, 66,
955 995 112, 113
Seventh, 61, 91, 114
Eighth, 86, 87, 101, 114
Ninth, 86, 88, 99
Tenth, 87, n o
Eleventh, n o
Twelfth, 43, 81, 94
Thirteenth, 81, 96
Fourteenth, 81
Fifteenth, 81
Seventeenth, 79-81, 107
Twentieth, 47, 119
Zionist Executive, 18, 19, 24, 37,
41, 42, 70, 74, 86, 87, 94, 96,
100
Zionist M o v e m e n t , Organisation
(Z.Q.), 9, n - 1 4 , 16-19, 23-25,
28, 30, 32-34, 37, 38, 40-45, 47,
495 50, 535 5 4 6 ‫־‬
5 9 ‫ ־‬i 5 67, 7*5 73,
74, 79, 81, 83, 85-87, 89, 98,
103, 106, 107, 108, n o , 117
Zionist Review, (London), 38, 9 6
Zionist Work in Palestine (Cohen),
33
Zionistisches Bulletin, 30, 40, 118
Zitron, S. L., 113
Zurich, 29, 85, 97, 98, 119
Zweig, Dr. Egon M., 63
CONTENTS
Introductory
.
.
.
.
.
.
I. Herzl and Herzlian Zionism .
II. The East Africa Project
.
.
.
.
5
.
.
.
.
7
49
III. World War I and the Balfour Declaration .
67
IV. The Seventeenth Congress
79
.
.
.
.
V. Max Nordau
82
VI. David Wolffsohn
86
VII. Leopold J . Greenberg
89
V I I I . Vladimir Jabotinsky
93
IX. Menahem Ussishkin
95
X. Discrepancies
97
XI. Minor Errors
112
Abbreviations
121
Index
:
.123

of zionism - Berman Jewish Policy Archive

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