How to negotiate the ‘right’ oil contract BY JENIK RADON
Transcription
How to negotiate the ‘right’ oil contract BY JENIK RADON
How to negotiate the ‘right’ oil contract BY JENIK RADON COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PHNOM PENH, MARCH 26 – 28, 2008 Background Done right, natural resource extraction can be a boon for social and economic development The so-called natural resource curse is not inevitable (see success stories of Botswana and Norway) Negotiating the right contract is vital to a government’s effort to reap the benefits of its natural resources. How governments can develop their resources 1. STATE COMPANIES, E.G. SAUDI ARABIA, BRAZIL (SEMI) 2. PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL MAJORS, E.G. US, CANADA, UK, 3. COMBINATION OF 1 & 2, E.G. NIGERIA, AZERBAIJAN, KAZAKHSTAN Why do contracts matter? Contract terms determine (1) how much a producing country earns from it natural resources; (2) the regulatory power of government to enforce environmental, health and other standards, if legal and regulatory system not well established Key issues of all oil contracts How profits are divided between government and participating companies How costs are treated, expensed or depreciated What to treat as costs, e.g. Expat housing, best technology Taxes, royalties, excess profit taxes Stablization, what kind Timing Uncertainty about development and exploration costs complicates negotiations abandonment Balance needed between country’s and investor’s interests. Contractual Systems To achieve such balance of country and investor interests the choice of contractual system is crucial 4 basic contracts: Concession or license agreement Joint venture (JV) Production-sharing agreement (PSA) Service Agreement Transparency All contractual systems and most terms should be disclosed; no need for full confidentiality. Contract transparency is key to curb corruption “biggest obstacle to social and economic development” (World Bank) The four basic contractual provisions • CONCESSION OR LICENSE AGREEMENT • JOINT VENTURE (JV) • PRODUCTION-SHARING AGREEMENT (PSA) • SERVICE AGEEMENT Concession or license agreements GRANT OIL COMPANY EXCLUSIVE RIGHTS TO EXPLORE, DEVELOP, SELL, AND EXPORT OIL FROM A SPECIFIED AREA FOR A FIXED PERIOD OF TIME USED IN KUWAIT, SUDAN, ANGOLA, AND ECUADOR Concession or license agreements Advantages Disadvantages More straightforward, Lack of adequate particularly if basic terms set in public bidding system Less expertise needed to negotiate them than JV or PSA BUT well-developed bidding process and legal system to interpret complex agreements needed information about the potential of concession turns bidding process into auction Continued Advantages Disadvantages Financial and other terms Companies will be of license are set forth in an agreement drafted by the host government (should be published and opened to competitive bidding process) Successful bidder pays bidder price (usually license fee and/or signing bonus) cautious in the amount it is prepared to bid since there is no guarantee that the concession will cover the company’s costs and return a profit. Continued Advantages Disadvantages If production occurs, Risk that government government earns royalties based on gross revenue and/or profit tax based on net income; both are based on the quantity produced and the price at which oil is sold will not realize full potential from auction system Continued Advantages All financial risks of development and exploration are borne by the successful bidder Disadvantages Joint Ventures • NO SINGLE DEFINITION; HIGHLY FLEXIBLE TOOL • 2 OR MORE PARTIES WISH TO PURSUE A JOINT UNDERTAKING IN SOME STILL TO BE CLARIFIED FORM • LOW SUCCESS RATE; LESS COMMONLY USED • NIGERIA: STATE OIL COMPANY FAVORED JV UNTIL IT COULD NO LONGER MEET ITS SHARE OF THE JV’S FINANCIAL COMMITMENTS; NOW GOVERNMENT OF NIGERIA PREFERS PSA • AS NAME IMPLIES, IN JV THINGS ARE DONE JOINTLY; THEREFORE, MATERIAL ISSUES NEED TO BE RESOLVED PRIOR TO ENTERING INTO A JV; REQUIRE LONG NEGOTIATIONS TO ENSURE THAT ALL MATTERS ARE THOUGHTFULLY ADDRESSED. Joint Ventures Advantages Disadvantages Government is not alone Risks and costs are also in the decision-making and responsibility for a project Government can count on expertise of oil company Government shares profit, on top of taxes or royalties shared Responsibility also brings with it potential liability, incl for environmental damage JV is inherently ambiguous and can complicate negotiations which tend to be lengthy; require more legal advice than any other agreement Joint Venture Characteristics Pure JV All costs/risks Shared Typical JV Government carried through Exploration Full carry JV Former Soviet Union type JV Government carried Government carried through through exploration and rehabilitation and development development until cash flow from operations NOC←------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------→IOC Risk sharing Production-sharing agreements FIRST USED BY INDONESIA IN 1966 AFTER INDEPENDENCE TO REPLACE OLD COLONIAL LAW (“LICENSE CONCESSION”) BASIC CONCEPT: STATE RETAINS OWNERSHIP OF NATURAL RESOURCES AND NEGOTIATES PROFIT-SHARING SYSTEM NOW COMMON FORM OF AGREEMENT, ESPECIALLY IN CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS PSA RECOGNIZES THAT THE OWNERSHIP OF THE NATURAL RESOURCES REST WITH THE STATE BUT AT THE SAME TIME PERMITS FOREIGN CORPORATIONS TO MANAGE AND OPERATE THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE OIL FIELD. OIL COMPANY CARRIES MOST FINANCIAL RISKS OF EXPLORATION AND DEVELOPMENT OFTEN GOVERNMENTS CONTRIBUTE TO THE SHARE CAPITAL OF THE CONSORTIUM Production-sharing agreements (continued) EXACT SPLIT OF SHARES IS THE RESULT OF HARD BARGAINING FINANCIAL TERMS: HOST GOVERNMENT OFTEN EARNS SIGNING BONUS, REGULARLY WAIVED FOR A GREATER SHARE OF FUTURE PROFITS; OIL COMPANY IS FIRST ENTITLED TO COST RECOVERY ; DEFINITIONAL PROBLEMS OF WHAT IS A CAPITAL COST. WHAT REMAINS IS SHARED ACCORDING TO THE AGREED PERCENTAGE DIVISION WITH THE HOST GOVERNMENT. FOREIGN COMPANY IS REQUIRED TO PAY TAXES BUT OFTEN WAIVED AND INCLUDED IN THE COMPANY’S PORTION OF THE AGREED PERCENTAGE SPLIT. THE COMPLEXITY OF A PSA DEPENDS ON THE SOUNDNESS OF THE LEGAL INFRASTRUCTURE OF A STATE; IF BASIC RULES ARE ABSENT PSA WILL HAVE TO ADDRESS THEM Production-sharing agreements (continued) Advantages Disadvantages Government shares Government generally has potential profits without having to make a direct investment PSA can be enacted into law to provide legal security (Azerbaijan and other former Soviet republics) less knowledge about potential of oil field than oil company If government holds significant share, it will face conflict of interest: it has to balance the desire for higher profits with the enforcement of environmental and other regulations Production-sharing agreements (continued) Advantages Disadvantages PSA grants oil companies a say in environmental and other standards when these standards have been incorporated as contractual provisions; violating a contractual provision is less costly than violation of a regulation because only in case of a serious or material breach of contract is the termination of the agreement a possibility Production-sharing agreements (continued) Advantages Disadvantages Violation of a legal statute is an offense, subjective to legislatively approved sanctions and penalties Making contracts into law creates a legal infrastructure of exceptional situations; little possibility of developing a coherent and comprehensive legal system; Production-sharing agreements (continued) Advantages Disadvantages PSA positive legal discrimination for oil companies; investors in other sectors will invariably lobby the host government for similar special treatment Contractual Provisions COMMON PROVISIONS FOR CONCESSION OR LICENSE AGREEMENTS AND PRODUCTION-SHARING AGREEMENTS Parties Host government should not assume contractual liability as a direct party to an agreement to avoid direct responsibility and unlimited liability Instead, it should engage a state-owned enterprise as a separate legal entity as contractual partner to limit its liability; in case of liability only the enterprise’s assets can seized In practice national oil companies often serve as intermediaries for government Oil companies usually create local subsidiaries with limited or no assets of their own Government should require guarantee from parent company so it can tap into its resources to cover potential liabilities Accounting Methods To determine profits, there must be a decision on accounting methodology Still no international accounting principles; only national standards Accounting standards leave room for discretion and can lead to serious disputes; e.g. they don’t have provisions prohibiting any particular type of expenses; clarification in contract needed Accounting standards do not provide resolution for intercompany pricing, which can inflate costs and decrease government compensation Recovery of Costs How companies account for their costs determines the taxes companies pay and the royalties they share with governments 2 types of costs Current operating costs: expensed in the year in which they are incurred; immediate reduction in taxable profits Capital investment costs: long term and can be depreciated over a set period of time: quick depreciation means less profits and decreases incentives to continue operations Taxation or Compensation Taxation of production matters because income from oil production often accounts for biggest portion of government budget Profit tax Can come in form of corporate income tax or as part of the amount government agrees to take from any profits Tax inspectors need to collect production and sales data and audit company expenses Problem of transfer pricing: oil sold to subsidiaries may be priced above or below market price Taxation or Compensation (continued) Royalty or excise tax which is normally a percentage of the value of the production Often imposed on top of other taxes Easy to administer Can be inefficient, however, because they tax production without regard to profit; when project is marginal, excise tax may discourage further investment Bonuses Signature bonus: one-time payment before exploration starts Production bonus: continued fixed payments Bonuses are fixed payments and do not take profitability of project into account SERVICE AGREEMENT SIMPLE: Payment for services, effectively set fee CHALLENGE: Most energy companies reluctant to sell services and/or technology know-how as earning more limited Country Case Study: Norway NORWAY HAS ORDINARY CORPORATION TAX (28%) AND PETROLEUM TAX(50%) BOTH TAXES ARE BASED ON COMPANIES’ NET PROFITS AN UPLIFT ALLOWANCE LETS COMPANIES DEDUCT 30% MORE THAN THEY INVEST AGAINST PETROLEUM TAX FAVORS MARGINALLY PROFITABLE PROJECTS TAX RATE HAS CHANGED OVER TIME Environment When environmental standards are covered by contractual agreements, oil companies can interpret, negotiate, or even veto environmental standards No reason why environmental standards should be lower in developing countries considering that oil and gas are in such high demand Governments must take into account that companies prefer to pay relatively low noncompliance penalties over investments in pollution control Fines should be high enough to act as deterrent Restoration of polluted area by companies should be mandatory Country Case Study: Azerbaijan PSA ALLOWS COMPANIES TO DISCHARGE AIR EMISSIONS “IN ACCORDANCE WITH GENERALLY ACCEPTED INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM INDUSTRY STANDARDS AND PRACTICES” PROBLEM: THERE ARE NONE! Work Program A work program details a company’s exploration or development plan Companies tend to slow down projects they deem too expensive Governments should insist on a work plan that specifies clearly the circumstances under which a project could be delayed or discontinued Stabilization Stabilization provisions protect oil companies from the cost of governmental or legislative changes affecting contract terms during life of agreement Stabilization provisions are extremely disadvantageous for governments because it freezes the legal and regulatory situation of the country for an extended period of time (“Contractual Colonialism”); Price Method of determining market price is critical as it directly impacts compensation of government A contract should specify what prices serve as benchmark (e.g. price established by spot market in the particular region) Governments should never accept as contract price the price paid between related companies; this price is likely to be well below market price Termination Contract needs to address under what circumstances an agreement can be terminated Examples: Repeated and/or severe environmental violations If companies no longer develop the field Outside Experts Governments have to ensure that foreign experts who negotiate contracts are truly independent Outside experts must be evaluated, selected, then managed and directed Transparency Oil contracts are complex and can be subject to abuse and corruption To avoid corruption all terms should be disclosed to the public Transparency will prevent governments from agreeing to terms the public cannot accept