RAUL SANCHEZ DE LA SIERRA Harvard University

RAUL SANCHEZ DE LA SIERRA
Harvard University
1727 Cambridge Street, Cambridge, MA 02138
Tel: +19174889151 Fax: +16174969592
[email protected]
www.raulsanchezdelasierra.com
Academic Positions:
20152014-2015
Assistant Professor, UC Berkeley Haas School of Business
Academy Scholar, Harvard University
Education:
2014
2011
2008
2004
Ph.D. Economics
M.Phil. Economics
M.Sc. Development Economics
B.Sc. Economics
Columbia University
Columbia University
Sciences-Po, Paris
Carlos III U, Madrid,
University of Munich (LMU)
Dissertation:
Title: “Essays on the Economics of Statelessness and State Formation”
Committee: S. Naidu (sponsor), E. Verhoogen (sponsor), C. Blattman, P.C. Chiappori, B. Salanie
Fields of Specialization: Development Economics, Political Economy, Taxation, Government
Working Papers
“On the Origin of States: Stationary Bandits and Taxation in Eastern Congo”
Coverage: Marginal Revolution, Christopher Blattman’s blog, Frankfurter Allgemeine, Die Zeit
Abstract: When do states arise? When do they fail to arise? A dominant view across disciplines is that
states arise when violent actors impose a "monopoly of violence'' in order to extract taxes (Tilly 1985).
One key fact underlies all existing studies: states precede the existence of statistics. In this chapter, I
provide the first econometric evidence on the determinants of nascent states' formation. I conducted
fieldwork in areas of DRC removed from the central state, managing a team that collected village-level
panel data on armed groups. I develop a model that introduces optimal taxation theory to the decision of
armed groups to form local "monopolies of violence'', and argue that the returns to such decision hinge on
their ability to tax the local population. A sharp, exogenous rise in the price of a bulky commodity used in
the electronics industry, coltan, leads armed groups to impose a "monopoly of violence'' in coltan villages.
A later increase in the price of gold, easier to conceal and hence more difficult to tax, does not. Results
from auxiliary tests provide additional support to the theory. The findings support the hypothesis that the
expected revenue from taxation, in particular tax base elasticity, is a determinant of state formation.
“Defining the state: when do criminal monopolies of violence behave like states?”
Abstract: A dominant view across disciplines defines states as a "monopoly of violence'' and argues that
states are a developed form of successful organized crime. Is this characterization of the state sufficient?
In this paper, I examine this view of the state empirically, and show when state-like behavior emerges
from criminal "monopolies of violence''. To observe the behavior of criminal "monopolies of violence'', I
collected a panel dataset of armed groups' behavior in 140 villages of Eastern Congo removed from the
central state' reach. I apply optimal taxation theory to armed groups' behavior, and show that armed
groups will tax and promote growth like states whenever their "monopoly of violence'' is uncontested.
Based on this data, I find that criminal ``monopolies of violence'' consistently provide public goods,
develop popular support, and elaborate taxation schemes consistent with optimal taxation and European
medieval states. Furthermore, using the timing of a relocation of armed groups decided in a peace
agreement, I establish that these "monopolies of violence'' have a positive impact on economic activity.
To study the role of the time-horizon, I then exploit the news of a military operation which threatened
existing criminal "monopolies of violence''. I find that when their "monopoly of violence'' comes under
threat, armed groups turn from partial expropriation with full commitment, taxation, to arbitrary violent
expropriations. These findings support the view that the origins and workings of states can be obtained
from criminal "monopolies of violence'', but only if they have a stable time horizon.
“On the impact of the state: Contract Enforceability and Ethnic Institutions in East Congo Trade”
Abstract: Absent states to enforce contracts, societies may develop group-based mechanisms to generate
trade when commitment problems prevail (Greif, 1993). However, groups are often fragmented. Can
expanding access to the state legal system complement social mechanisms of contract enforcement
sustained by groups? Or does legal intermediation by the state crowd them out? In this chapter, I provide
evidence on the impact of state contracts on trade. As a foundation for this chapter, I created a home
delivery business in DRC. Traders sell a domestic good in households of different ethnic groups, and
commit to deliver the good in the future. Shared ethnicity and formal contracts are equally effective at
increasing trade by sustaining trust. Furthermore, contracts do not crowd-out ethnic group based
mechanisms of trust production. Why do contracts increase trust? Results from a last experiment suggest
that contracts are enforceable. However, they only protect claimants of ethnic groups that have captured
the state administration. These findings suggest that even the state apparatus is embedded in the social
structure, and expanding the reach of the state may have positive welfare effects, only for the groups that
have vested control in the state institutions.
“Social Engineering in the tropics: Case study evidence from DRC” – under review
with M Humphreys and P Van der Windt
Mention: Financial Times, World Bank Development blog, Tim Hartford’s blog
Abstract: Many international interventions try to alter social structures without seeking to change
economic fundamentals. The theory is that brief exposure to good institutions leads directly to subsequent
adoption. We examine this idea exploiting random assignment of a post-conflict intervention
implemented in 1,250 villages in Congo. We measure social outcomes using a cash transfer activity later
implemented across all areas and find almost no evidence of effects on governance practices. Unique in
its use of an unconstrained behavioral measure and unusual in scale, our study suggests that current
conceptualizations of local governance structures, and strategies to alter them, are misguided.
“Who’s watching? Effects of Monitoring on Strategies of Corruption: Lessons From an Experiment
in Congo”
with M Humphreys and P Van der Windt
Abstract: Existing research has found mixed evidence on the effects of different types of monitoring
aimed at rendering local elites accountable. Is community-based monitoring more effective than external
monitoring by aid donors? Does one undermine or complement the other? Using a strategy that focuses
on differential access to audit results rather than differential capacity to implement audits, we study the
effects of pre-announcing that audit information will be shared with communities and/or donors in the
context of a village- level, unconditional cash transfer of $1,000 in 457 villages in Eastern Congo. We
find that announcing that populations or donors will be informed shifts beliefs by local elites in the
expected direction, but only when communicated separately. Threats of oversight — from the population
or from donors — have no discernible effects on the levels of fund misuse. However, we also find
suggestive evidence that these announcements affect the type of strategies employed by committees for
corruption, substituting activities towards less visible types of fraud.
Publications
“Fishing, Commitment, and Communication: Comprehensive Nonbinding Registration”
with M Humphreys and P Van der Windt (2013) Political Analysis, Winter 2012, 21 (1) pp 1-20
Abstract: Social scientists generally enjoy substantial latitude in selecting measures and models for
hypothesis testing. Coupled with publication and related biases, this latitude raises the concern that
researchers may intentionally or unintentionally select models that yield positive findings, leading to an
unreliable body of published research. To combat this “fishing” problem in medical studies, leading
journals now require preregistration of designs that emphasize the prior identification of dependent and
independent variables. However, we demonstrate here that even with this level of advanced specification,
the scope for fishing is considerable when there is latitude over selection of covariates, subgroups, and
other elements of an analysis plan. These concerns could be addressed through the use of a form of
comprehensive registration. We experiment with such an approach in the context of an ongoing field
experiment for which we drafted a complete “mock report” of findings using fake data on treatment
assignment. We describe the advantages and disadvantages of this form of registration and propose that a
comprehensive but non-binding approach be adopted as a first step to combat fishing by social scientists.
Likely effects of comprehensive but non-binding registration are discussed, the principle advantage being
communication rather than commitment, in particular that it generates a clear distinction between
exploratory analyses and genuine tests.
Work in Progress
Public Sector Administration reform, Democratic Republic of Congo (with World Bank)
Tax Administration reform, Kyrgyzstan (with World Bank)
The political economy of household relations, Democratic Republic of Congo
Identity and Socialization (With Sebastien Turban)
Stationary bandits, taxation, and government: evidence from Eastern Congo
Research Grants:
2013
2013
2013
2013
2013
2013
2012
2012
2012
2011
2011
2010
PI
PI
PI
PI
PI
PI
PI
PI
PI
PI
Private Enterprise in Developing and Low-income Countries Major Grant
Private Enterprise in Developing and Low-income Countries Exploratory Grant
National Science Foundation Graduate Dissertation Improvement Grant
Russell Sage Foundation Small Grant in Behavioral Economics
International Peace Research Association Foundation Grant
Advanced Consortium on Cooperation, Conflict and Complexity
Program for Economic Research grant, Columbia University
Cross-Cutting Initiative, Earth Institute
Economics Development Colloquium Research Funds, Columbia University
CSDS Research Grant, Columbia University
Lead researcher on 3ie grant for a analysis of data in the DRC. We raised:
Lead researcher on a 3ie grant for a field experiment in the DRC. We raised:
$240,000
$55,000
$30,000
$7,500
$5,000
$3,000
$5,000
$5,000
$700
$9,000
$40,000
$400,000
Fellowships and Awards:
2014
2013
2013
2010-2014
2009
2008-2010
2004-2005
2004-2005
Academy Scholar, Harvard University
Leitner Family student fellowship for research in Africa
University of Chicago Summer School in Socioeconomic Inequality
Columbia University Teaching, Research and Dissertation Fellowships
IGERT Fellow (with J Stiglitz and A Noman)
La Caixa Foundation Scholarship for Postgraduate studies in the United States
Leonardo/Goya Fellowship
Erasmus Scholarship for Ludwig-Maximilians University, Munich
Teaching Experience:
Spring , Fall 2011
Economics of Uncertainty and Information (P. A. Chiappori)
Professional Service:
Referee for:
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Review, Journal of Comparative
Economics, Journal of Development Economics, Journal of Peace Research, Journal of Political
Economy, Theoretical Economics
Invited Presentations:
2014-2015
(scheduled)
Workshop on the Co-evolution of Institutions and Behaviors (Santa Fe), NEUDC
(Boston University), CEMFI, Harvard Africa Conference, Conference on the Political
Economics of Conflicts and Development (U Lausanne), Symposium on Economic
Experiments in Development Countries, NHH in Bergen
2014
Stanford, Harvard Academy, Oxford (CSAE), Oxford (OxCarre), World Bank,
Barcelona Graduate School of Economics, U Toronto (ICTD/Munk School of global
affairs), APSA
2014
(job market)
Toulouse School of Economics, MIT, Chicago Booth, Brown, Berkeley Haas, LSE
(ID), Warwick, IIES Stockholm, Sciences-Po, Universtitat Pompeu Fabra, Fundacao
Getulio Vargas (Rio), Georgetown Qatar
2013
NEUDC (Harvard), Columbia Comparative Politics Seminar (Columbia), Development
Seminar (Columbia), Chicago Summer School in Socioeconomic Inequality, Working
Group in African Economy national meeting (MIT), Social Impact (DC)
2011
INET Conference (New York), Columbia Political Economy Colloquium, Columbia
Workshop on Experiments in Political Economy, Columbia Social Impact Workshop
Personal:
Nationality: Spanish, French
Languages: Spanish (Native), French (Native), English (Fluent), German (Fluent), Italian (Intermediate)
Swahili (Basic)
Fieldwork: Democratic Republic of Congo (13 months), Chile (7 months), Kyrgyzstan (1 month)
References:
Suresh Naidu (Primary)
Department of Economics and SIPA
Columbia University
[email protected]
Pierre-André Chiappori
Department of Economics
Columbia University
[email protected]
Christopher Blattman
Department of Political Science
Columbia University
[email protected]
Eric Verhoogen (Primary)
Department of Economics and SIPA
Columbia University
[email protected]
Bernard Salanié
Department of Economics
Columbia University
[email protected]
Macartan Humphreys
Department of Political Science
Columbia University
[email protected]