Resources and Infrastructure Babcock Marine Clyde

Resources and Infrastructure
Babcock Marine Clyde
Introduction to Babcock Marine
(Clyde)
Introduction to Clyde
1963 – 3rd Submarine Squadron - Dreadnought arrival
1967 – 10th Submarine Squadron – Resolution Class
1986 – New nuclear facilities construction
1992 – 1st Submarine Squadron – Vanguard & Swiftsure
1995 – Surface Ships Arrival
1999 – Nuclear Authorisation
2009 – Valiant Jetty Arrival, Astute Arrival
2009 – Explosives Handling Jetty mid-life update
2009 – Clyde confirmed as future Base Port for all submarines
2067 – Projected life of “Successor” submarine
HMNB Clyde - Faslane
HMNB Clyde - Coulport
HMS Vanguard – 4 in class
HMS Astute – 7 in class
HMS Trafalgar – up to 4 (interim)
Successor – up to 2067
Lodger Units
Fleet Protection Group
Faslane Flotilla
Royal Marines
Northern Diving
Group & Bomb
Disposal
Flag Officer
Sea Training (FOST)
MoD Police
What is it Babcock do at HMNB Clyde?
Submarines
Nuclear
Operations
Estates
Waterfront
Support
Logistics
SWS
Hotel
Business
Mgt
Design and
Safety
Ships
Resources and Infrastructure
Management System for Nuclear
Installations IAEA GS-G.3.5
• Section 4.1
‘Senior management shall determine the
amount of resources necessary and shall
provide the resources to carry out the activities
of the organisation and to establish, assess
and continually improve the management
system’
Management System for Nuclear
Installations IAEA GS-G.3.5
• Section 4.1
‘Senior management shall determine the
amount of resources necessary and shall
provide the resources to carry out the activities
of the organisation and to establish, assess
and continually improve the management
system’
• Human resources
• Infrastructure and the working environment
HMNB Clyde Site Safety Case
The maintenance of nuclear and radiation safety
standards requires that there shall be:
•A structured and adequately manned organisation with clearly
defined responsibilities for nuclear safety
•Suitably trained and qualified personnel to carry out tasks
having nuclear safety implications
•Services and facilities essential to nuclear safety, properly
designed, constructed, maintained and available when required
Reflects principles of IAEA GS-G3.5
Human Resources provided by suppliers & partners
11/01/2017
16
Partnering at Clyde
MoD Intelligent Customer
• Babcock commercial partner
• Principles include the maintenance of a sound safety culture
• Babcock responsible to NBC(C) for service delivery to the required
standards of safety, performance quality and cost
• Service provision reflects competency
• Shared management & information systems
• Joint management boards
Anomalies
• Budget is set by customer
• Budget is controlled by customer
• Significant Capital projects are out-with the contract including setting of
initial requirements
• Investment is constantly pressurised
• Budgets are on an annualised footing
• Little opportunity/scope for company investment/return
Human Resources
Management System for Nuclear
Installations IAEA GS-G.3.5
• Section 4.15
‘Senior management shall determine the
competence requirements for individuals at all levels
and shall provide training…’
‘….shall ensure individuals are competent to perform
their assigned work and that they understand the
consequences for safety of their activities….’
‘Individuals shall have received appropriate
education and training…..to ensure their
competence.’
Human Resources
SQEP, SqEP, SQeP, SqeP
OR EVEN JUST sqeP!
Maintaining & developing a competent
workforce in a changing environment
Human Resources
1980s – mid 1990s
• Nuclear SQEP prescribed
• General SQEP requirements less formal
Late 1990s – mid 2000s
•
•
•
•
Nuclear SQEP guidance (minimum requirements)
NSQEP Allowances
Line Managers’ influence prevalent
Inconsistent definition of SQEP, over focus on Nuclear
2008 –
• Capability Clyde – qualifications based approach
• Succession Planning – addressing the “E” in SQEP
Human Resources – How Many?
Job Families and Norms
Past Performance – sick, leave, training
Master Schedule
400
350
201003
Production Aggregate - By Month
201002
201001
200912
200911
200910
200909
200908
200907
200906
200905
200904
200903
200902
200901
200812
200811
200810
200809
200808
200807
Headcount
Forward Plan Aggregate
NPF
S,L,T
Load
Capacity
300
250
200
150
100
50
0
4
Fleet Maintenance Support - Surveyor
201003
4
201002
Fleet Maintenance Support - Metallurgist
201003
201001
200912
200911
200910
200909
200908
200907
200906
200905
200904
200903
200902
200901
200812
5
201002
201001
200912
200911
200910
200909
200908
200907
200906
200905
0
200904
5
200903
NPF
200902
10
200811
NPF
200901
20
200812
Fleet Maintenance Support - NDE Officer
200811
0
200810
2
200810
Capacity
200809
Load
200809
3
200808
4
Headcount
S,L,T
200808
15
Headcount
25
201003
5
201002
Fleet Maintenance Support - Chem ist
201003
201001
200912
200911
200910
200909
200908
200907
200906
200905
200904
200903
200902
200901
200812
200811
200810
200809
200808
Headcount
6
201002
201001
200912
200911
200910
200909
200908
200907
200906
200905
200904
200903
200902
200901
200812
200811
200810
200809
200808
Headcount
Forward Plan by Section
NPF
S,L,T
Load
Capacity
3
3
2
2
1
1
1
0
S,L,T
10
NPF
S,L,T
Load
9
Load
Capacity
8
Capacity
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
Human Resources - Plugging Skill
Gaps at Clyde
How the capability Clyde project drives upskilling
Introduction
1. Identifying required competence by role
2. Identifying competence of current role holder
Capability Clyde Project
3. Identifying competence gap
PDR/Training Planning
4. Prioritising competence gap
5. Filling competence gap
Clyde Academy
6. Evolving competence database
Job Evaluation
Capability Clyde
• Skills mapping project kicked around in various
iterations for 2 years prior to January 2009
• Major NC resulting from LRQA surveillance audit April
2008
– NC downgraded IN October 2008 on basis of initial
work done to identify
– Scope of issue
– Plan to address
• Project passed to HR in January 2009 to inject ‘second
wind’ ahead of April 2009 audit
Why was this project important?
•
Fundamental to maintaining right to
operate
–
Non-compliant with AC10 (training)
–
Risk of Regulator suspending
operations
–
‘Failure to address and resolve
these issues will result in LRQA
implementing its approval
suspension procedures’
–
LRQA approve ISO9001 certification
–
ISO9001 = essential for operating
WSMi contract
–
Threat to SWS Alliance bid
–
Certainly not helpful in 2013
•
Fundamental building block for future
capability
Scope
•
To ensure compliance with AC/regulatory requirements
•
To address and resolve the outstanding issues from the 2008 LRQA
surveillance visits such that;
– Minor NC remains a minor or is closed at April ’09 visit
– Work completed by end June to close NC at next visit (October ’09)
•
To build a skill/competency map for BM (C) (roles not people/not just
nuclear) that will support Resource Based Management
•
Areas to address;
–
–
–
–
–
Datum Organisation
NTRP
BMC-wide capability
Induction
PDR/Training Planning
Deliverables
•
Datum Organisation
–
–
–
–
•
Clarify what’s in and what’s not
Bring current up-to-date accordingly
Clarify relationship with DO
Create BMC equivalent in IFS
Process that guarantees integrity and
compliance including capture of new starts
BMC-wide Capability
–
–
–
–
As NTRP but for whole organisation
Create ‘footprint’ for the skills, competency,
qualifications and experience of BMC
Construct to facilitate RBM
Devise common language capability v planning
to enable ‘automated’ RBM
Assessment methodology
–
–
•
–
–
•
Standardised assessment/verification
methodology
Training for on-site assessors
Induction
–
NTRP
–
–
–
–
–
•
Clarify what’s in and what’s not
Bring current DO up-to-date
Accurately reflect actual and remit
Process that guarantees integrity and
compliance with AC36
•
Develop and implement ‘gateway’ induction
programme
Include; site/department roles and
responsibilities, policy, objectives, CMS,
management systems, safety, site tour
Identify responsibility for maintaining
‘proof’/records of inductions
PDR
–
–
–
–
Re-engineered process that delivers high
quality cascaded objectives that can be
measured and monitored
Identification of NTRP requirements by role to
facilitate focused discussion
Collation of training needs into consolidated
training plan
Booking methodology
How?
•
Identify all roles (prioritise Datum/nuclear/other); bundle where possible
•
Define Capability Framework; skill, competency, experience, qualification
•
Determine what we want to assess
–
–
–
•
Capture role profiles
Capture ‘capability profile’ - SCEQ required per role (review existing info)
Create a behavioural competency framework
How do we assess capability?
–
–
–
Migrate non-industrial records from legacy systems + test results against ‘known’ capability of individuals
Improve PDR process for non-industrials
Create a standardised skills assessment process for industrials prior to PDR roll out in 2011
•
Develop robust process to maintain integrity of capability & supporting data
•
So far
–
–
–
–
Slide 34
1396 people evaluated vs 925 positions under Capability Clyde Project
Job Evaluation completed for non-industrials (500 people), in train for remaining population
Revised PDR process entering 3rd year of evolution
2 years of new training planning process completed
©2007 Babcock International Group PLC
Plugging competence gaps
SEARCH
DATABASE FOR
GAPS
IDENTIFY
SKILL
NEED
SET SKILL
DELIVERY
AS PRIORITY
CONDUCT
PDRs
•
NB not all gaps plugged by training
•
Graduate scheme covers 2 year programme of
learning to grow future talent
•
Apprentice scheme recruits annually for 4-year
programme; numbers based on attrition +
workload
•
RN secondments provide
– Competence ‘on tap’ for Company
– Competence/experience development for RN
AGREE
TRAINING
PLAN
DESIGN
TRAINING
INTERVENTION
DELIVER
TRAINING
INTERVENTION
Training planning/prioritisation
Competence requirement
Current Competence
Competence gap
Competence surplus
Babcock (Clyde) has visibility of the whole
competence picture and can set priorities
accordingly
Integrated competence delivery
model
CAPABILITY
CLYDE
COMPETENCE DELIVERY MECHANISM
JOB
EVALUATION
TRAINING
PLANNING
PDR
CLYDE ACADEMY
Human Resources
Scenario for CQI NucSIG consideration:
• Marine & Nuclear Engineering Company
• 2 most senior Quality posts vacant at 2 locations
– A – Chartered Engineer, no quality background
– B – ACQI minimum, no engineering background
Which one, if any, is correct?
Infrastructure and the
Working Environment
Management System for Nuclear
Installations IAEA GS-G.3.5
• Section 4.18
‘Senior management shall determine, provide, maintain and
re-evaluate the infrastructure and the working environment
necessary for work to be carried out in a safe manner and for
requirements to be met’
Management System for Nuclear
Installations IAEA GS-G.3.5
• Section 4.18
•
•
•
•
‘Senior management shall determine, provide, maintain and
re-evaluate the infrastructure and the working environment
necessary for work to be carried out in a safe manner and for
requirements to be met’
Registers of significant material assets
Appropriate inventories of consumables and spares
Consideration of damage or theft
Specific threats from certain assets (chemicals/gases etc)
Register of Material Assets
Company ERP System now hosts the Asset Register
• Asset Register central to Asset Management
– Asset Management Plan
– EMIT Programme
– EMIT & Trend Information
•
•
•
•
Nuclear Safety Implicated, non Nuclear Safety Implicated assets
Safety Case derived nuclear asset management plans
Facility Life Plans (nuclear only)
Periodic Review of Safety also used to inform plans
Asset Management
Facilities, Systems and Equipment
• Old (pre-date safety cases)
– operating restrictions
– obsolete spares
• Extended Life
• Mid Life Upgrades & Stage Improvement Programmes
• New & Commissioning
Unregistered assets
• Several “light touch” procurement routes
• Significant inventory built up over time
• Action taken to contain and recover situation
Inventory Management
•
Currently historical spares levels have set themselves
– High profile spares and consumables are managed according to
lead times, historical data in terms of useage and failure rates
(e.g Shiplift wire ropes).
•
Obsolescence issues are captured and understood but lack
rigour and timely investment/action.
•
Generally spares kitting process for maintenance activities
have improved under the maintenance management system further advances in stock management can be made in terms
of auto replenishment.
•
Cost savings versus material spend – good in parts but
isolated Management naivety exists – HPAC Event.
Safety/Security of assets
Safety/Security of assets
Specific Materials Management
Significant risk elements
• Radioactive materials – controlled areas, operations etc.
• Industrial gases – controlled storage & distribution
• Bulk fuel oils – COMAH (MACR) site
• Explosives (conventional) – controlled areas & quantities
Risk management
•
•
•
•
Risk Assessment primary mechanism used
HAZOP/HAZID Analysis and FMEA reflected in Safety Cases
Environmental Aspects & Impacts Assessment
Authorised Persons in place for each significant entity
Questions/debate