National Transportation Safety Board

Transcription

National Transportation Safety Board - Aircraft Accident/Incident Database
Accident Rpt# CEN14LA211
04/22/2014 1310 CDT Regis# N51990
Garfield, KS
Apt: N/a
Acft Mk/Mdl AIR TRACTOR INC AT 502B-B
Acft SN 502B-0557
Acft Dmg: SUBSTANTIAL
Rpt Status: Factual Prob Caus: Pending
Eng Mk/Mdl PW&C PT^A-34AG
Acft TT
Fatal
Flt Conducted Under: FAR 137
Opr Name: STEVEN GOSS
Opr dba:
4236
1
Ser Inj
0
Aircraft Fire: NONE
Summary
The pilot was preparing to spray a hay field when the airplane collided withÿthe top setÿof power lines that were about 60 feet tall and impacted the ground. The
operator said that this was theÿpilot's first time spraying this field and that the pilotÿwas not familiar with the field or the surrounding obstacles. The operator
reported that a stand of trees was opposite the power lines and that it was difficult to see the topÿwires as you approached the fieldÿbecause "they would get
lost in the trees." Postaccident examination of the airplane and engineÿrevealed no pre-impact mechanical anomalies that would have precluded normal
operation prior to the accident.
Cause Narrative
THE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD DETERMINED THAT THE CAUSE OF THIS OCCURRENCE WAS: The pilot's inadequate preflight
planning and subsequent failure to remain clear of power lines while maneuvering low to the ground.
Events
1. Maneuvering-low-alt flying - Collision with terr/obj (non-CFIT)
2. Maneuvering-low-alt flying - Low altitude operation/event
Findings - Cause/Factor
1. Personnel issues-Task performance-Planning/preparation-Flight planning/navigation-Pilot - C
2. Environmental issues-Physical environment-Object/animal/substance-Wire-Awareness of condition - C
Narrative
On April 22, 2014, about 1310 central daylight time, N51990, an Air Tractor 502B, was destroyed when it collided with power lines then terrain while spraying a
hay field in Garfield. Kansas. The airline transport rated pilot was fatally injured. The airplane was registered to Farmer's Spraying Service Incorporated, Pratt,
Kansas, and operated by Gross Flying Service, Pratt, Kansas. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed and no flight plan was filed for the aerial spraying
flight conducted under 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 137.
A witness stated that he had hired the operator to spray his hay field for weevils. He heard the airplane circle over his field twice then looked out the window
where he saw the airplane start its first pass from south to north. The witness then saw a puff of smoke when the airplane struck a set of power lines (about 60
feet tall) that ran east and west along the southern edge of the field. The airplane descended behind a tree line and the witness no longer heard or saw the
airplane. He then drove toward where he last saw the airplane and discovered that it had crashed on a dirt road east of the field and called 911. There was no
post-impact fire.
A Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) inspector responded to the accident site and said the airplane struck the two very top wires to a set of power lines,
which were 3/8-inch-wide steel, static cables. The wires sat about 5 feet below the top of the poles, about 55-feet-above the ground. The airplane crossed over
a set of trees before it collided with terrain about 275 feet north of the power lines on a dirt road then traveled about another 145 feet to where it came to rest.
There was no evidence the airplane struck the trees; however part of the airplane did impact a large haystack adjacent to the road. The landing gear came to
rest about 130 feet forward of where the airplane came to rest. Examination of the airplane revealed wire strike marks on the propeller blades and main landing
gear. The pilot remained strapped into the 5-point restraint system and was wearing a helmet with a glare shield.
According to the operator, he stated that he normally handles all of his own spraying jobs, but during busy times he hired the pilot to help him. He said that he
and the pilot had four loads to spray on the day of the accident and the accident occurred on the fourth load. He and the pilot discussed breaking for lunch after
the third load, but they were excited about "making money" and decided to finish the job. Plus, the wind was picking up out of the south-southeast about 17-18
miles per hour (mph) and they wanted the last field sprayed before it got too windy. The operator added that the previous flights were normal and both airplanes
were operating fine. The pilot was in a good mood, not tired, and happy to be flying.
The operator put about 300 gallons of chemicals in the pilot's airplane and then refueled it with fuel from his own fuel-storage tank. The operator did the same
with his airplane then they both departed for their respective fields. The operator didn't learn that the pilot had crashed until after he landed.
The operator said that he has sprayed the field where the pilot had crashed numerous times. However, the pilot was not familiar with the field or the
Printed: February 15, 2015
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surrounding obstacles. The operator described the power lines that the pilot struck as "H Poles." At the very top of the poles were two high-tension ground
wires that were "very taught." Below these lines were the power lines that carried electricity. The operator said these lines had a lot of slack in them and sagged
"quite a bit". They were also a lot darker than the ground wires and much easier to see. The operator said there was a stand of trees on the opposite side of the
street where the power lines were located and it was really difficult to see the top ground wires as you approached the field because "they would get lost in the
trees."
The operator also thought that the pilot was most likely setting up his "A and B" lines along the haystack via the onboard GPS when he struck the power lines.
The next pass would have been the first spray pass.
The airplane and engine (including the propeller) were examined on June 10, 2014, under the supervision of the National Transportation Safety Board
Investigator-in-Charge (NTSB IIC). Examination of the airplane revealed that it had sustained extensive impact damage to the fuselage, wings, and tail section.
Flight control continuity was established for all major flight controls to the cockpit. An after-market airbag system was installed on both the left and right
shoulder harnesses. Both airbags were out of their respective housing and deflated, indicative that the airbags had deployed upon impact with the ground. No
mechanical deficiencies were noted with the airplane or the restraint/airbag systems.
The turbine engine sustained extensive impact damage and was separated in three major sections. Internal examination of the engine revealed deep rotational
scoring consistent with it operating at the time of impact. No mechanical anomalies were noted that would have precluded the engine from operating at the time
of impact.
The 3-bladed propeller had separated from the engine during impact and all three blades remained in the hub and were loose. One of the blade's tip was
missing and never recovered. The fractured end of the blade was curled aft and exhibited 45 degree shearing. The second blade was relatively straight and
exhibited rotational scoring on the front of the blade near the tip. The third blade was relatively straight and also exhibited front face rotational scoring near the
tip. This damage was consistent with the propeller turning at the time of impact. No mechanical anomalies were noted that would have precluded normal
operation of the propeller at the time of impact.
A visit to the accident site revealed that the two top, high-tension cables struck by the airplane had been re-installed by the utility company. It was evident that
these top cables were more difficult to see than the lower set of cables, which were much darker in color.
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02/05/2015 1510 CST Regis# N602PB
Acft Mk/Mdl AIR TRACTOR INC AT 602
Acft SN 602-1233
Eng Mk/Mdl P&W PT-6A
Opr Name: FRONTIER AG INC.
Slaton, TX
Apt: Slaton Muncipal F49
Rpt Status: Prelim
Fatal
0
Ser Inj
Opr dba:
0
Prob Caus: Pending
Aircraft Fire: NONE
AW Cert: SPR
Events
1. Takeoff - Loss of engine power (partial)
Narrative
On February 5, 2015, about 1510 central standard time, an Air Tractor AT-602, airplane, N602PB, lost engine power shortly after departing the Slaton Municipal
Airport (F49) Slaton, Texas. The commercial rated pilot was not injured and the airplane was substantially damaged. The airplane was registered to Neal
Aircraft, Inc., Slaton, Texas and operated by Frontier Ag Inc., Oakley, Kansas under the provisions of the 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 as a cross
country flight. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident.
The pilot reported to the responding Federal Aviation Administration inspector, that during takeoff, the engine did not produce full power. The airplane
descended and the pilot conducted a forced landing in a field. The airplane nosed over and came to rest inverted. Examination of the airplane revealed that the
engine had torn free from the fuselage, the vertical stabilizer and wings were substantially damaged in the accident.
The airplane was retained for further inspection.
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Accident Rpt# ERA14CA458
09/25/2014 1510 EDT Regis# N211PC
Oneida, TN
Apt: Scott Muni SCX
Acft Mk/Mdl BEECH C90
Acft SN LJ910
Eng Mk/Mdl PRATT AND WHITNEY PT6A-21
Acft TT
Fatal
Opr Name: REMOTE AREA MEDICAL FOUNDATION
Opr dba:
7203
0
Ser Inj
0
Aircraft Fire: NONE
AW Cert: STN
Summary
According to the pilot's written statement he departed runway 05 and the airplane veered "sharply" to the right. The pilot assumed a failure of the right engine
and turned to initiate a landing on runway 23. Seconds after the airplane touched down it began to veer to the left. The pilot applied power to the left engine and
right rudder, but the airplane departed the left side of the runway, the right main and nose landing gear collapsed and the airplane came to rest resulting in
substantial damage to the right wing. The pilot reported that he had failed to configure the rudder trim prior to takeoff and that there were no preimpact
mechanical malfunctions or anomalies that would have precluded normal operation.
Cause Narrative
THE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD DETERMINED THAT THE CAUSE OF THIS OCCURRENCE WAS: The pilot's failure to properly
configure the rudder trim for takeoff and his failure to maintain directional control during a precautionary landing, which resulted in a runway excursion and
collision with terrain.
Events
1. Prior to flight - Preflight or dispatch event
2. Landing - Runway excursion
3. Landing - Collision with terr/obj (non-CFIT)
1. Aircraft-Aircraft systems-Flight control system-Rudder control system-Incorrect use/operation - C
2. Personnel issues-Task performance-Use of equip/info-Aircraft control-Pilot - C
3. Aircraft-Aircraft oper/perf/capability-Performance/control parameters-Directional control-Not attained/maintained - C
Narrative
According to the pilot's written statement he departed runway 05 and the airplane veered "sharply" to the right. The pilot assumed a failure of the right engine
and turned to initiate a landing on runway 23. Seconds after the airplane touched down it began to veer to the left. The pilot applied power to the left engine and
right rudder, but the airplane departed the left side of the runway, the right main and nose landing gear collapsed and the airplane came to rest resulting in
substantial damage to the right wing. The pilot reported that he had failed to configure the rudder trim prior to takeoff and that there were no preimpact
mechanical malfunctions or anomalies that would have precluded normal operation.
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08/10/2013 1818 CDT Regis# N804LA
Albers, IL
Apt: N/a
Acft Mk/Mdl BELL 206B
Acft SN 680
Eng Mk/Mdl ROLLS ROYCE 250C20B
Acft TT
Fatal
Opr Name: N M LAND LLC
Opr dba:
7292
0
Ser Inj
0
Aircraft Fire: NONE
Events
1. Maneuvering-low-alt flying - Loss of engine power (total)
Narrative
On August 10, 2013, at 1818 central daylight time, a Bell 206BA helicopter, N804LA, rolled over during a forced landing in a corn field following a loss of engine
power. The accident occurred near Albers, Illinois. The private pilot and two passengers were not injured. The helicopter received substantial damage to the tail
boom and fuselage. The helicopter was registered to and operated by N M Land LLC as a personal flight under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal
Regulations Part 91. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the flight, which was not operating on a flight plan. The flight originated from private property
in Albers, Illinois, just prior to the accident and was destined for Pevely, Missouri.
The pilot reported he performed a preflight inspection on the helicopter and pulled it out of the hangar in preparation for the flight. He did not notice any
anomalies with the helicopter. He added 50 gallons of Jet A fuel to the helicopter which brought the total amount of fuel onboard to 75 gallons. The pilot then
checked the weather, calculated the weight and balance, and loaded the passengers for the flight.
The pilot reported he started the helicopter's engine and performed a 2 minute run-up procedure. The pilot took off and departed to the north, leveling off at 600
feet above ground level. He initiated a turn and about half way through the turn the engine lost power. He stated that it seemed as though the throttle rolled
back. The pilot noticed a loss of N2 speed. The "engine out" horn sounded and the "engine out" caution light illuminated, so he located a corn field in which to
land. He decreased the collective and entered an auto-rotation. The helicopter settled into a corn field and rolled onto its left side during the landing. The tail
boom was severed from the fuselage during the landing.
The helicopter was fueled from an above ground tank which belonged to the pilot's family who owned the helicopter. The pilot stated they purchased the new
tank in 2010 and had it filled with 2,000 gallons of Jet A fuel shortly thereafter. The fuel that was added to the helicopter just prior to the accident was part of
the 2,000 gallons of fuel purchased in 2010.
Fuel samples were taken from the airframe fuel filter housing, the fuel sump drain, and the above ground fuel storage tank. The sample from the storage tank
and the fuel sump were clear of any visible contaminants. The sample drained from the airframe fuel filter housing separated into two layers. The top layer
appeared similar to Jet A fuel and the bottom layer was opaque and brown in color. The airframe fuel filter housing was then removed from the helicopter and
drained. This fuel sample also separated into two layers similar to the sample taken from the fuel filter housing.
The layered fuel samples were tested by Phoenix Chemical Laboratory, Inc., to determine their compositions. The tests results concluded that the upper
organic layer of the liquid consisted of a mixture of aliphatic, aromatic, naphthenic hydrocarbons typical of aviation fuel. The lower layer consisted primarily of
water plus a small amount of alcohol/ether.
The postaccident examination of the helicopter did not reveal any anomalies other than the contaminated fuel found in the airframe fuel filter housing.
A 100/300 hour inspection on the helicopter was completed three day and 2.5 flight hours prior to the accident. According to maintenance records, the engine
fuel filter and the airframe fuel filter were replaced during the most recent inspections.
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Accident Rpt# CEN13FA122
01/02/2013 2057 CST Regis# N445MT
Clear Lake, IA
Apt: Mason City Municipal MCW
Acft Mk/Mdl BELL HELICOPTER 407
Acft SN 53959
Acft Dmg: DESTROYED
Eng Mk/Mdl ROLLS-ROYCE 250-C47B
Acft TT
Fatal
Opr Name: MED-TRANS CORPORATION
Opr dba: MERCY AIR
953
3
Ser Inj
0
Aircraft Fire: GRD
Summary
GPS tracking data revealed that, after departure, the helicopter proceeded westbound about 600 ft above ground level (agl), following a roadway. About 6
minutes after liftoff, when the helicopter was about 3/4 mile south of the accident site, it turned right and became established on a northerly course. The
helicopter subsequently turned left and appeared to be on a southerly heading at the final data point. Shortly before beginning the left turn, the helicopter
entered a climb, reached an altitude of about 1,800 ft agl, and then entered a descent that continued until impact.Weather observations from the nearest
Automated Surface Observing System, located about 7 miles east of the accident site, indicated that the ceilings and visibility appeared to be adequate for
nighttime helicopter operations and did not detect any freezing precipitation. Although an airmen's meteorological information advisory for icing conditions was
current for the route of flight, and several pilot reports of icing conditions had been filed, none of the reports were in the immediate vicinity of the intended route
of flight. Witnesses and first responders reported mist, drizzle, and icy road conditions at the time of the accident. It is likely that the pilot inadvertently
encountered localized icing conditions, which resulted in his subsequent in-flight loss of helicopter control.A postaccident examination of the helicopter
revealed no preimpact failures or malfunctions. The engine control unit recorded engine torque, engine overspeed, and rotor overspeed events; however, due to
their timing and nature, the events were likely a result of damage that occurred during the impact sequence. Evidence also indicated that the cyclic centering,
engine overspeed, and hydraulic system warning lights illuminated; it is also likely that their illumination was associated with the impact sequence. Further, the
engine anti-ice status light was illuminated, which was consistent with the activation of the anti-ice system at some point during the accident flight.
Cause Narrative
THE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD DETERMINED THAT THE CAUSE OF THIS OCCURRENCE WAS: The pilot's inadvertent encounter
with localized icing conditions and his subsequent in-flight loss of helicopter control.
Events
1. Enroute - Structural icing
2. Enroute - Loss of control in flight
3. Uncontrolled descent - Collision with terr/obj (non-CFIT)
1. Personnel issues-Task performance-Use of equip/info-Aircraft control-Pilot - C
2. Environmental issues-Conditions/weather/phenomena-Ceiling/visibility/precip-Freezing rain/sleet-Awareness of condition - C
3. Environmental issues-Conditions/weather/phenomena-Ceiling/visibility/precip-Freezing rain/sleet-Effect on equipment - C
4. Aircraft-Aircraft oper/perf/capability-Performance/control parameters-(general)-Not attained/maintained - C
Narrative
HISTORY OF FLIGHT
On January 2, 2013, at 2057 central standard time, a Bell Helicopter model 407, N445MT, impacted terrain near Clear Lake, Iowa. The pilot and two medical
crew members sustained fatal injuries. The helicopter was destroyed. The helicopter was registered to Suntrust Equipment Leasing & Finance Corporation and
operated by Med-Trans Corporation under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 as a positioning flight. Night visual meteorological
conditions prevailed for the flight, which was operated on a company flight plan in accordance with Part 135 of the aviation regulations. A flight plan was not
filed with the Federal Aviation Administration. The flight originated from the Mercy Medical Center, Mason City, Iowa, about 2049, with an intended destination
of the Palo Alto County Hospital, (IA76), Emmetsburg, Iowa.
A witness located about 1 mile south of the accident site, reported observing the helicopter as it approached from the east. He noted that it appeared to slow
and then turn to the north. When he looked again, the helicopter appeared to descend straight down. He subsequently went back into his house and called 911.
He described the current weather conditions as "misty," with a light wind.
A second witness reported that he was working in his garage when he heard the helicopter. He stated that the sound of the helicopter changed as if it was
turning, followed by what he described as a "thump" and then everything was quiet. He subsequently responded to the accident with the Ventura Fire
Department. He reported that there was a coating of ice on his truck windshield that the wipers would not clear. He decided to drive another car to the fire
stations because it had been parked in the garage. He was on the third fire truck out of the station and as they were waiting to cross Highway 18 at Balsam
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Avenue, they observed a Clear Lake police car, also responding to the accident, slide through the intersection. They informed dispatch to advise following units
to expect slick road conditions. He noted that there was a haze in the air, which was evident when looking toward a street light; however, he did not recall any
precipitation at the time.
A pilot located at the Mason City Municipal Airport (MCW) reported that he saw the helicopter fly overhead and estimated its altitude as 300 feet above ground
level (agl). He was leaving the airport at that time and noted there was a glaze of ice on his car. He added that the roads were icy as he drove out of the airport
and onto Highway 18. He commented that he had flown into Mason City about 1830 and encountered some light rime ice while flying through a cloud.
GPS tracking data depicted the helicopter at the medical center at 2049:44 (hhmm:ss). After liftoff, the helicopter proceeded westbound along Highway 18
about 1,800 feet mean sea level (msl). The helicopter passed just south of the Mason City airport at 2052:44. About 2056:09, the helicopter entered a right turn,
becoming established on a northbound course about 10 seconds later. The helicopter simultaneously entered a climb, ultimately reaching approximately 2,995
feet msl at 2057:04. About one minute prior to reaching the apex of the climb, the helicopter entered a left turn, which continued until the helicopter was
established on a southbound course. The final tracking data point was recorded at 2057:14. The final data point was located about 774 feet north of the
accident site, with an associated altitude of 2,723 feet msl. The published field elevation of the Mason City airport was 1,214 feet.
The helicopter impacted a harvested agricultural field. The main wreckage came to rest along a line of trees and bushes separating the fields. The debris path
was about 100 feet long and was oriented on a 246-degree magnetic bearing.
PERSONNEL INFORMATION
The pilot held an airline transport pilot certificate with helicopter and single-engine airplane ratings; his airplane rating was limited to private pilot privileges. He
was issued a second class airman medical certificate on April 17, 2012, with a limitation for corrective lenses.
The pilot completed the operator's new hire training program on September 24, 2012, with night vision goggle (NVG) training completed on September 27, 2014.
The pilot's Part 135 checkride was completed on September 29, 2012, and his new hire base training was completed on October 5, 2012.
At the time of his initial employment, the pilot reported having accumulated a total flight time of 2,808 hours, with 2,720 hours in helicopters. Of that total flight
time, 248 hours were at night. Duty and flight time records indicated that during October, the pilot accumulated 3.7 hours of flight time, all in daylight conditions.
During November, the pilot accumulated 9.9 hours total flight time. Of that flight time, 3.1 hours were at night with the aid of NVGs. During December, the pilot
accumulated 5.6 hours, all of which were at night, with 5.4 hours using NVGs. His most recent flight for the operator was December 21, 2012.
The pilot was on-duty for 12 hours the day before the accident, but did not log any flight time during that shift. The pilot reported for duty at 1820 on the evening
of the accident.
AIRCRAFT INFORMATION
The accident aircraft was a Bell Helicopter model 407, serial number 53959. The helicopter was configured for helicopter emergency medical services (HEMS)
operations. The FAA type certificate required one flight crew member (pilot) and permitted operations under day or night visual flight rules (VFR). The helicopter
was not certificated for intentional flight into known icing conditions. The operator noted that the helicopter was equipped for instrument flight; however, it was
not certified for flight under instrument flight rules (IFR). The helicopter was equipped with heated pitot and static ports; however, the rotor blades were not
equipped with ice protection. The helicopter was powered by a Rolls-Royce Allison model 250-C47B turboshaft engine, serial number CAE-847212, with
maximum takeoff and maximum continuous power ratings of 650 and 600 shaft horsepower, respectively.
The helicopter was issued a normal category standard airworthiness certificate in June 2009. The helicopter was purchased by Sun Trust Equipment Finance
on April 29, 2010, and subsequently leased by Med-Trans Corporation. The helicopter was maintained under an approved aircraft inspection program. The
most recent inspection was completed on December 28, 2012, at 952.2 hours total airframe time. A review of the available maintenance records did not reveal
a history of outstanding maintenance discrepancies. At the time of the accident, the helicopter airframe and engine had accumulated about 956 hours total
time.
The engine anti-ice system is controlled by a switch on the overhead panel. When activated, the system routes air from the diffuser scroll to the engine
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compressor front support guide vanes in order to prevent the formation of ice. In the event of a loss of electrical power, the system will be activated and route
hot air to the engine guide vanes.
METEOROLOGICAL CONDITIONS
The Mason City Municipal Airport Automated Surface Observing System (ASOS), located about 7 miles east of the accident site, at 2053, recorded weather
conditions as: wind from 300 degrees at 8 knots; 8 miles visibility; broken clouds at 1,700 feet agl, overcast clouds at 3,300 feet agl; temperature -3 degrees
Celsius; dew point -5 degrees Celsius; and an altimeter setting of 30.05 inches of mercury. At 2100, the recorded conditions included a wind from 310 degrees
at 9 knots, broken clouds at 1,700 feet agl, and overcast clouds at 3,300 feet agl. At 2105, the wind was from 310 degrees at 10 knots, with broken clouds at
1,500 feet agl and overcast clouds at 2,000 feet agl. At 2110, the wind was from 310 degrees at 12 knots, with overcast clouds at 1,500 feet agl.
The Forest City Municipal Airport Automated Weather Observing System (AWOS), located about 8 miles northwest of the accident site, at 2055, recorded
conditions as: wind from 300 degrees at 9 knots; 10 miles visibility; overcast clouds at 1,000 feet agl; temperature -2 degrees Celsius; dew point -3 degrees
Celsius; and an altimeter setting of 30.04 inches of mercury. At 1955, about one hour before the accident, the observation included a note of unknown freezing
precipitation. However, this notation was not included in the subsequent observations.
The MCW terminal forecast, issued at 1959, expected wind from 250 degrees at 6 knots, 5 miles visibility in light snow, and overcast clouds at 1,400 feet agl.
Satellite imagery depicted an overcast layer of stratiform clouds over the region with cloud tops near 11,000 feet. The regional radar mosaic for Iowa did not
depict any significant meteorological echoes in the vicinity of the accident site about the time of the accident. However, the radar scan sampled the airspace
from about 6,630 feet to 15,100 feet over the accident site. Any echoes below this height would not have been detected by the weather radar.
Pilot reports (PIREP) filed between 1500 and 2400 over Iowa indicated light to moderate rime ice ranging in altitude from 3,500 feet msl to 8,500 feet msl.
These reports ranged from Sioux City, at the western end of the state, to Dubuque at the eastern end of the state. The closest PIREP was over Spencer, Iowa,
about 70 miles west of the accident site where a pilot reported light rime icing during climb at 6,400 feet msl. This was about 23 miles west of the accident flight
intended destination.
An Airman Meteorological Information (AIRMET) advisory for icing was current for the route of flight. AIRMET Zulu was issued at 2045 and was in effect until
0600. It warned of moderate icing conditions below 10,000 feet msl, with icing conditions expected to continue through 0900.
Witnesses and first responders reported mist, drizzle, and icy road conditions at the time of the accident. One first responder reported observing a police car
slide through a roadway intersection due to the slick conditions while responding to the accident site.
WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION
The helicopter impacted a harvested agricultural field. The debris path was about 100 feet long and was oriented on a 246-degree magnetic bearing. The
helicopter was fragmented, and the cockpit and cabin areas were compromised. A postimpact fire ensued. The main wreckage consisted of the main rotor
blades, transmission, engine, portions of the fuselage, and the tail boom. The tail rotor had separated from the tail boom and was located about 80 feet
east-northeast of the main wreckage. The landing skids had separated from the fuselage. The left skid was located at the initial impact point; the right skid was
located about 35 feet west of the main wreckage.
The main rotor blades remained attached to the hub; however, each blade exhibited bending and delamination consistent with ground impact. Separations of
the pitch change links and one pitch change horn were consistent with overstress. The main rotor transmission remained attached to the fragmented upper
fuselage bulkhead. The transmission drive input/output shafts and main rotor mast rotated freely. Examination of the freewheeling unit revealed that the shaft
had fractured at the main rotor drive spline and at the tail rotor drive spline. Appearance of the fracture surfaces was consistent with overstress failures.
The flight control system was fragmented similar to the overall airframe structure. Separations of the control tubes and support brackets appeared consistent
with overstress failures. The hydraulic actuator servos remained secured to the mating fuselage bulkhead; however, the attached fuselage structure was
separated from the surrounding airframe panels. Portions of the servos were deformed consistent with impact forces. The mating control system push-pull
tubes and hydraulic lines remained secured to the servos.
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The tail boom was separated at the forward end and was located with the main wreckage. The tail boom remained straight from forward to aft ends; however,
the tail boom cross-section was deformed at both ends. The tail rotor assembly was separated from the boom. The tail rotor blades were deformed and
fragmented consistent with impact forces; however, both blades remained secured to the hub. The pitch change links were intact; although, the green pitch
change link was deformed. Continuity within the gearbox was confirmed via rotation of the output drive mast. The forward portion of the tail rotor drive shaft
remained attached to the tail boom. A separation of a section of the drive shaft near the horizontal/vertical stabilizers appeared consistent with a main rotor
strike at that location. The tail rotor bearing supports remained attached to the tail boom except for one support located near the horizontal stabilizer, which was
separated from the tail boom and remained attached to the separated section of the tail rotor drive shaft. The bearings appeared intact.
A postaccident examination of the engine was performed under the direct supervision of an NTSB powerplant specialist. The engine exhibited deformation of
several components, which appeared consistent with impact forces. The hydro-mechanical unit (HMU) was partially separated from the accessory gearbox; the
HMU drive shaft was fractured consistent with an overstress failure. The compressor impeller blades, the impeller inducer shroud, gas producer rotor, and
power turbine rotor exhibited rub marks consistent with rotation at impact. The power turbine N2 coupling was fractured near the forward spline consistent with
tensile overload. The accessory gearbox components appeared intact and rotated freely. The engine bearings appeared intact, were oil wetted, and rotated
freely. Dirt and corn stalk debris was observed throughout the engine air flow path. No anomalies consistent with a preimpact failure or malfunction were
observed.
MEDICAL AND PATHOLOGICAL INFORMATION
An autopsy of the pilot was completed at the Mercy Medical Center, Mason City, Iowa, on January 3, 2013. The pilot's death was attributed to multiple blunt
force injuries sustained as a result of the accident. FAA Civil Aerospace Medical Institute toxicology testing was negative for all substances in the screening
profile.
TESTS AND RESEARCH
Helicopter engine operation was controlled by a Triumph Engine Control Systems, formerly Goodrich Pump & Engine Controls, model EMC-35R Engine Control
Unit (ECU), serial number JG09ANU1247. One corner of the ECU housing was broken out, exposing a portion of the underlying circuit board. The non-volatile
memory components related to the primary and reversionary governors was downloaded. The total ECU and engine operating times were 1,196.80 hours and
1,003.06 hours, respectively.
The ECU did not provide for continuous recording of engine parameters. However, the unit did record engine fault and incident data. The ECU incorporated
primary and reversionary governor systems, which provided redundancy for engine operation. ECU data was organized into engine history, last engine run
faults, time stamped faults, accumulated faults, and incident data. Time data associated with each fault or incident corresponded to the engine run time. Upon
logging of a fault or incident event, the ECU also recorded 12 seconds of pre-event data into non-volatile memory.
The last engine run fault data files associated with both the primary and reversionary governors did not contain any fault codes. The time stamped fault data file
associated with the primary governor did not contain any fault codes. The time stamped fault data file associated with the reversionary governor contained a
total of 21 faults. The most recent fault was recorded at 733 hours ECU operating time. Because the current engine operating time was about 1,003 hours, the
most recent fault was recorded about 270 hours before the end of data, which was well before and not relevant to, the accident flight. The reversionary
governor accumulated fault data file contained only faults also recorded into the time stamped fault data file.
Three incidents were contained in the snapshot data file. The first was recorded at 1,003:06:16.344 (hh:mm:ss.sss) engine operating time and consisted of a
high engine torque event of 110 percent. The associated 12 seconds of pre-event data were unremarkable, with engine speed, rotor speed, and engine torque
parameters within normal limits. The collective pitch parameter was about 58 percent and the fuel flow about 452 pounds per hour (pph) during this timeframe.
Cyclic and anti-torque pedal positions were not recorded by the ECU. The second snapshot was recorded at 1,003:06:22.873 and consisted of a high power
turbine event of 108 percent. An engine overspeed parameter is set due to this event. In addition, the collective pitch parameter had decreased to 32 percent
and fuel flow to 36 pph at this time. The third snapshot was recorded at 1,003:06:22.920 and consisted of a high rotor speed of 109 percent. The loss of
subsequent data was consistent with a loss of electrical power to the ECU at impact. In addition, the engine and rotor overspeed events, in conjunction with a
decreasing fuel flow and collective pitch, was consistent with the rotor system being aerodynamically driven above 100-percent, such as in the descent prior to
impact.
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ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
Light bulb filaments from the caution and warning panel were examined by the investigator-in-charge at the NTSB materials laboratory. The filaments
associated with the cyclic centering, engine anti-ice, engine overspeed, and hydraulic system exhibited stretching consistent with illumination at the time of
impact.
According to the aircraft flight manual, the cyclic centering annunciator light will be illuminated when the helicopter is on the ground and the cyclic stick is not
centered. The engine anti-ice annunciator will illuminate when the engine anti-ice system is activated. Engine overspeed annunciation is provided when an
overspeed condition is detected by the ECU. Hydraulic system indication is provided when the system pressure decreases below 650 psi. The normal hydraulic
system operating pressure is 1,000 psi.
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Air Data Research
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02/04/2015 2109 CST Regis# N441TG
Acft Mk/Mdl CESSNA 441
Acft SN 441-0200
Eng Mk/Mdl HONEYWELL TPE331-10N-51
Opr Name: DEL AIR ENTERPRISES II, LLC
Argyle, TX
Apt: Denton Municipal Airport DTO
Rpt Status: Prelim
Fatal
1
Ser Inj
Opr dba:
0
Prob Caus: Pending
Aircraft Fire: NONE
AW Cert: STN
Events
2. Approach-IFR initial approach - Loss of control in flight
Narrative
On February 4, 2015, about 2109 central standard time, a Cessna model 441 twin turbo-prop airplane, N441TG, was substantially damaged when it collided
with terrain following a loss of control during an instrument approach to Denton Municipal Airport (DTO), Denton, Texas. The commercial pilot was fatally
injured. The airplane was registered to Del Air Enterprises II, LLC, and was operated by the pilot under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part
91 while on an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan. Night instrument meteorological conditions prevailed for the cross-country flight that departed Willmar
Municipal Airport (BDH), Willmar, Minnesota, about 1829.
According to preliminary Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Air Traffic Control data, at 2050:47 (hhmm:ss), the accident flight established contact with
Dallas-Fort Worth Terminal Radar Approach Control and reported being level at 4,000 feet mean sea level (msl). According to radar data, the flight was located
about 35 miles northwest of DTO and was established on a southbound course at 4,000 feet msl. The approach controller issued the current weather
conditions at DTO and told the pilot to expect the GPS runway 36 approach. At 2052:57, the approach controller told the pilot to fly direct WOBOS, an
intermediate fix associated with the instrument approach. The plotted radar data showed the airplane turned to the south-southeast to a direct course toward
WOBOS. At 2059:35, the flight was cleared to descend to maintain 3,000 feet msl and the pilot acknowledged the altitude clearance.
At 2101:24, the DTO tower controller advised the approach controller that a Cessna 172 had just landed at DTO and that the pilot reported light-to-moderate
turbulence during approach along with an inflight visibility of about 1.5 miles. The approach controller subsequently advised the accident pilot of the
light-to-moderate turbulence. At 2103:09, the flight was cleared to descend to maintain 2,500 feet msl and the pilot acknowledged the altitude clearance.
At 2103:23, the approach controller told the pilot to turn to a south heading. The pilot acknowledged the heading change and subsequently turned southbound.
According to radar data, at 2104:09, the airplane descended below 2,500 feet msl. At 2104:26, the approach controller told the pilot to turn to an east heading.
The pilot acknowledged the heading change, but according to radar data did not initiate the turn as requested. The airplane continued to descend while on a
southbound course until reaching 2,100 feet msl at 2104:46 when it began to climb. At 2104:59, after establishing that the flight had not turned to the assigned
heading, the approach controller told the pilot to turn to a heading of 080 degrees. The pilot acknowledged the assigned heading and radar data showed the
flight entering a climbing left turn toward the east.
At 2105:40, when the flight was 8 miles from the final approach fix (NULUX), the approach controller told the pilot to turn to a heading of 030 to intersect the
final approach course, to maintain 2,500 feet msl until established on the final approach course, and that the flight was cleared for the GPS runway 36
approach. The pilot responded, "Okay, 030 maintain 2.5 until established on the approach." According to radar data, the flight turned to a north heading instead
of the assigned heading of 030 degrees.
At 2106:17, the approach controller told the pilot to contact the DTO tower controller and the pilot replied with the correct frequency change. The flight
continued due north until 2106:38, when it turned to a 030 degree course and subsequently descended through 2,500 feet msl at 2107:01. At 2107:16, the pilot
established communications with the DTO tower controller. The tower controller told the pilot that the surface wind was 360 degrees at 19 knots with 25 knot
gusts, and then cleared the flight to land on runway 36. The tower controller also asked the pilot if he had received the pilot report (PIREP) that had been
issued by the proceeding Cessna 172. The pilot confirmed that he had received the PIREP from the approach controller. According to radar data, the airplane
continued to descend as it intersected the final approach course and continued northbound toward NULUX.
At 2108:44, the automated air traffic control system issued a low altitude alert for the accident flight. The system presented the low altitude alert on both the
control tower and the approach control radar displays. According to radar data, at the time of the low altitude alert, the airplane had descended to about 1,500
feet msl. At 2108:51, the tower controller told the pilot to "... check your altitude, you are still a couple of miles from the marker (NULUX), and uh believe your
altitude should be about 2,100 there." The pilot replied, "Okay, going back up." According to radar data, following the altitude alert, the airplane continued to
descend until the final radar return, recorded at 2109:11, about 2.5 miles south of NULUX at 1,000 feet msl (about 300 feet above the ground). At 2109:12, the
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tower controller transmitted again that the airplane was lower than the specified minimum descent altitude (2,000 feet msl) for that segment of the instrument
approach. There was no response from the accident pilot.
According to preliminary airplane performance calculations, based on available radar data, during the time period 2106:43 to 2108:43, the airplane's ground
speed decreased from about 145 knots to 95 knots and the airplane descended from 2,400 feet msl to 1,500 feet msl. During the final 28 seconds of radar
data, the airplane's ground speed further decreased from 95 knots to 55 knots, while the descent rate decreased from 1,300 feet per minute to 650 feet per
minute.
The flight path of the accident airplane was captured by a security video camera installed on the exterior of a building that was located about 1/2 mile southeast
of the accident site. The video camera, which was facing west, captured the accident airplane's wingtip navigation and strobe lights as it crossed from left to
right at the upper portion of the camera's field of view. According to a preliminary review of the camera footage, the airplane entered the camera's field of view
at 2108:48 and appeared to be in a wings level descent as it continued across the first half of the camera's lateral field of view. At 2109:00, the descent angle
increased substantially before the airplane entered a near-vertical spiraling descent. The airplane's navigational lights and strobes were not visible after
2109:09.
According to 911-emergency calls received following the accident, several individuals reported hearing an airplane overfly their position at a low altitude
followed by the sound of a large ground impact.
According to first responders with the Argyle Fire Department, upon arrival at the accident site, there was no evidence of ice or frost accumulation on the
airplane's fuselage, wings, or tail. Additionally, the first responders reported that there was a substantial smell of Jet-A fuel at the accident site; however, there
was no evidence of an explosion or postimpact fire. The pilot was seated in the left cockpit seat and was secured by a lap belt. The available shoulder harness
did not appear to have been used.
The airplane wreckage was found in a grass-covered industrial storage yard located about 6.35 nautical miles (nm) south of the runway 36 threshold. The
accident site was 400 feet northeast of the final radar return and about 207 feet right of the final approach course. There was no appreciable wreckage debris
path identified at the accident site. The entire lower fuselage surface was crushed upward, consistent with a vertical impact while in a near level pitch attitude.
The airplane tail section was found partially separated immediately aft of the aft pressure bulkhead. The vertical stabilizer, rudder, horizontal stabilizers, and
elevators remained relatively undamaged. The leading edges of both wings, propeller spinners, and the airframe radome did not exhibit evidence of a ground
impact. Aileron control cable continuity was established through an overstress separation of the aileron sector drive cable in the mid cabin area and a
separation of the balance cable near the right wing root. All other flight control cables were continuous from the cockpit control inputs to their respective flight
control surfaces. The landing gear was found extended. The wing flaps were found extended about 10-degrees. The stall warning horn and landing gear warning
horn were extracted from the cockpit and both horns produced an aural tone when electrical power was applied. Switch continuity for the wing-mounted lift
sensor was confirmed with an Ohmmeter. The left side altimeter's Kollsman window was centered on 30.24 inches-of-mercury. The right side altimeter's
Kollsman window was centered on 30.09 inches-of-mercury. Both engines remained attached to their respective wing nacelle structures. The first stage
compressor impeller of each engine exhibited blade tip bends that were opposite the direction of rotation and/or visible scoring as result of the rotating
compressor impeller coming in contact with its respective shroud. The third axial turbine stage of each engine exhibited re-solidified metallic splatter on the
turbine nozzle. The observed damage to the first compressor stage and third turbine stage was consistent with each engine operating at the time of impact.
Both propeller assemblies remained attached to their respective engines. There were two approximately 12-inch deep holes observed aside and slightly behind
the engines where the rotating propellers had dug into the soil. Both propellers exhibited significant bending of their blades opposite the direction of rotation.
Additionally, all propeller blades exhibited leading edge gouges, chordwise scratches, and polishing of the cambered side.
At 2103, the DTO automated surface observing system reported: wind 350 degrees at 17 knots, gusting 25 knots; an overcast ceiling at 900 feet above ground
level (agl); 2 mile surface visibility with light rain and mist; temperature 3 degrees Celsius; dew point 3 degrees Celsius; and an altimeter setting of 30.26 inches
of mercury.
The airplane's multi-hazard awareness system, the cockpit annunciator panel, and a cockpit multi-function display were retained for additional examination.
Both engines and their control units were retained for possible teardown and/or testing. Additionally, the pilot's personal mobile phone, tablet computer, and a
handheld device that provided his mobile devices with Attitude Heading Reference System (AHRS) information, weather data, ADS-B traffic, and GPS data
were retained for potential retrieval of non-volatile data.
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08/23/2014 1300 EDT Regis# N202EH
Acft Mk/Mdl DEHAVILLAND DHC 6 TWIN OTTER
Acft SN 48
Eng Mk/Mdl PRATT & WHITNEY PT6A-27
Acft TT
Opr Name: SKYDIVE FACTORY, INC
Opr dba:
42864
Pepperell, MA
Apt: Pepperell Airport 26MA
Fatal
0
Ser Inj
0
Aircraft Fire: NONE
AW Cert: STN
Summary
While climbing through 2,500 feet after takeoff, the pilot observed a red-tailed hawk approaching the airplane from below. The hawk impacted the left wing, and
the pilot elected to perform a precautionary landing. The airplane subsequently landed without incident. Postaccident examination by a Federal Aviation
Administration inspector revealed substantial damage to the left wing.
Cause Narrative
THE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD DETERMINED THAT THE CAUSE OF THIS OCCURRENCE WAS: An inadvertent collision with a
bird, which resulted in substantial damage to the left wing.
Events
1. Enroute-climb to cruise - Birdstrike
1. Environmental issues-Physical environment-Object/animal/substance-Animal(s)/bird(s)-Effect on equipment - C
Narrative
While climbing through 2,500 feet after takeoff, the pilot observed a red-tailed hawk approaching the airplane from below. The hawk impacted the left wing, and
the pilot elected to perform a precautionary landing. The airplane subsequently landed without incident. Postaccident examination by a Federal Aviation
Administration inspector revealed substantial damage to the left wing.
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Accident Rpt# WPR15CA063
12/16/2014 900 MST
Acft Mk/Mdl EUROCOPTER AS 350 B2 ECUREUIL-B
Regis# N352SL
Bicknell, UT
Acft SN 2798
Fatal
Eng Mk/Mdl TURBOMECA ARRIEL 1
Opr Name: UTAH HIGHWAY PATROL
0
Apt: N/a
Ser Inj
Opr dba:
0
Aircraft Fire: NONE
AW Cert: STN
Events
1. Maneuvering-low-alt flying - Settling with power/vortex ring state
Narrative
The pilot stated that the flight was in support of a Department of Natural Resources (DNR) pronghorn animal capture project. During takeoff, the pilot noted that
the cockpit gauges were in the green range in indication that the helicopter had enough power available for the weight and density altitude he was operating.
The pilot began herding operation, by maneuvering behind a small group of animals and successfully directing them toward the trap configured on the ground.
After about 20 minutes, a large group of pronghorn were found and again the pilot maneuvered the helicopter behind them in an effort to herd them toward the
trap's funnel. The animals suddenly reversed course and ran directly under the helicopter.
In response, the pilot maneuvered the helicopter backward about 50 to 100 feet while applying forward cyclic and maintaining an altitude of about 15 feet above
ground level. The helicopter began to settle with power and as he applied up collective, the descent rate increased. The helicopter landed hard and incurred
structural damage to the tail boom and bulkhead. The pilot reported that there were no preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures with the helicopter that
would have precluded normal operation.
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Accident Rpt# CEN14CA444
08/18/2014 1350 CDT Regis# N369GN
Saint Peter, MN
Apt: N/a
Acft Mk/Mdl HUGHES 369HS-HS
Acft SN 140553S
Eng Mk/Mdl ALLISON 250-C2-B
Acft TT
Fatal
Opr Name: TERY JON AVIATION INC
Opr dba:
9106
0
Ser Inj
0
Aircraft Fire: NONE
AW Cert: STN
Summary
During an application flight, the pilot maneuvered the helicopter in order to conduct another pass, maintaining vigilance of the high lines and trees in the vicinity
of his operations. The pilot stated that he did not see the 2 wires spanning from across the road into the bean field where he was applying insecticide. He flew
right into the wires which subsequently entangled around the mast of the helicopter. During the forced landing to the field, the "controls locked up" and the
helicopter spun to the right 3 times before impacting the ground. The helicopter was substantially damaged. The pilot reported no preimpact mechanical failures
or malfunctions with the helicopter that would have precluded normal operation.
Cause Narrative
THE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD DETERMINED THAT THE CAUSE OF THIS OCCURRENCE WAS: The pilot did not see the wires
resulting in the subsequent wire collision.
Events
1. Maneuvering-low-alt flying - Collision with terr/obj (non-CFIT)
2. Maneuvering-low-alt flying - Low altitude operation/event
1. Personnel issues-Psychological-Attention/monitoring-Monitoring environment-Pilot - C
2. Aircraft-Aircraft oper/perf/capability-Performance/control parameters-Altitude-Not attained/maintained - C
3. Environmental issues-Physical environment-Object/animal/substance-Wire-Effect on equipment
Narrative
During an application flight, the pilot maneuvered the helicopter in order to conduct another pass, maintaining vigilance of the high lines and trees in the vicinity
of his operations. The pilot stated that he did not see the 2 wires spanning from across the road into the bean field where he was applying insecticide. He flew
right into the wires which subsequently entangled around the mast of the helicopter. During the forced landing to the field, the "controls locked up" and the
helicopter spun to the right 3 times before impacting the ground. The helicopter was substantially damaged. The pilot reported no preimpact mechanical failures
or malfunctions with the helicopter that would have precluded normal operation.
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02/04/2015 1930 CST Regis# N301D
Acft Mk/Mdl PIPER PA46 500TP
Acft SN 4697043
Lubbock, TX
Acft Dmg: DESTROYED
Fatal
Eng Mk/Mdl P&W PT6A SER
Opr Name: KENNETH MICHAEL RICE
Apt: Lubbock Preston Smith Intl LBB
1
Ser Inj
Opr dba:
Rpt Status: Prelim
0
Prob Caus: Pending
Aircraft Fire: NONE
AW Cert: STN
Events
2. Approach-IFR final approach - Loss of control in flight
Narrative
On February 4, 2015, at 1930 central standard time, a Piper PA46-500TP airplane, N301D, collided with a TV tower guy wire while on approach to Lubbock
Preston Smith International Airport (LBB), Lubbock, Texas. The pilot, who was the sole occupant, was fatally injured and the airplane was destroyed. The
airplane was registered to Deadalus Air LLC, and operated by a private individual under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 as a business
flight. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident and an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan was filed en route. The flight
departed the Cavern City Air Terminal (CNM), Carlsbad, New Mexico and was en route to LBB.
According to the air traffic control recording, the pilot was executing the RNAV Y instrument approach to runway 35L. The controller vectored the airplane off of
the first approach for re-sequencing. While the airplane was being vectored for a second approach, contact with the pilot was lost and the airplane was no
longer visible on the radar display. Attempts to contact the pilot were unsuccessful.
According to a witness who was in the parking lot next to the TV tower, he heard the accident airplane overhead and it sounded like the airplane's engine was
operating. He looked up and saw a large flash of light that filled his field of view. He observed the TV tower's red beacon lights turn off and then the tower
collapsed on top of itself. He described the weather as cold, very low clouds and no precipitation.
According to surveillance video which was recorded 1.6 miles northeast of the accident site, the airplane was observed in a 30ø nose low descent near the
tower. There were multiple bright flashes of light and the airplane was not observed again.
At 1853, the weather observation for LBB, which was 10 miles north of the accident site, reported wind from 30ø at 21 knots gusting to 31 knots, 8 miles
visibility, overcast cloud layer at 800 feet, temperature 28ø Fahrenheit (F), dew point 25ø F, and altimeter 30.24 inches of mercury. Remarks: peak wind from
20ø at 34 knots and occasional blowing dust.
At 1947, the special weather observation for LBB reported wind from 40ø at 18 knots gusting to 27 knots, 7 miles visibility, overcast cloud layer at 700 feet,
temperature 28ø F, dew point 25ø F, and altimeter 30.28 inches of mercury. Remarks: peak wind from 30ø at 31 knots.
Prior to the accident, a pilot report (PIREP) was issued for moderate rime ice at 5,200 feet mean sea level (msl) / 1,918 feet above ground level (agl) about 10
miles south of the airport. The pilot acknowledged receipt of this report.
Lockheed Martin Flight Services had no contact information with the accident airplane on February 4, 2015.
The wreckage has been retained for further examination.
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Accident Rpt# WPR15CA031
10/24/2014 1645 PDT Regis# N211JY
Borrego Valley, CA
Apt: Borrego Valley L08
Acft Mk/Mdl SIAI MARCHETTI S211-A
Acft SN 013/02-010
Eng Mk/Mdl PRATT AND WHITNEY JT150-4C
Acft TT
Fatal
Opr Name: PROGENITECH LLC
Opr dba:
6018
0
Ser Inj
0
Aircraft Fire: NONE
AW Cert: SPE
Events
1. Landing-flare/touchdown - Abnormal runway contact
Narrative
The private pilot stated that the purpose of the flight was for him to receive instruction from the rear-seated certified flight instructor (CFI). Following departure,
they flew to a nearby airport with the intent of performing touch-and-go practice takeoffs and landings. As the airplane approached the touchdown zone, the
private pilot prematurely flared. The CFI assumed control of the airplane and decreased the pitch attitude while simultaneously applying engine power. Despite
his attempts, the airplane contacted the runway hard in a nose-high attitude. The CFI opted to abort the landing and climbed to traffic pattern altitude to verify
proper control input. He landed on the same runway without incident.
In the section titled "RECOMMENDATION" in the NTSB Pilot/Operator Report, form 6120.1/2, the pilots stated that the accident could have been prevented if
they had flared closer to the runway. During the impact sequence, the airplane sustained substantial damage to the fuselage structure. Both pilots reported that
there were no pre impact mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation.
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Air Data Research
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11/13/2014 1310 EST Regis# N524MB
Acft Mk/Mdl BELL BILL SERIES 6-NO SERIES
Acft SN S60005-008
Columbus, NC
Acft Dmg:
Fatal
Opr Name:
Page 18
0
Rpt Status: Prelim
Ser Inj
Opr dba:
Air Data Research
0
Prob Caus: Pending
Aircraft Fire:
All Rights Reserved

National Transportation Safety Board

Transcription

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