EASTERN PARTNERSHIP With or without Moscow

Transcription

EASTERN PARTNERSHIP With or without Moscow
THE EUROPEAN
AFFAIRS DAILY
europolitics.info
EASTERN PARTNERSHIP
With or without Moscow
www.europolitics.info
Wednesday 20 May 2015 N°5092
43rd year
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EUROPOLITICS N° 5092 Wednesday 20 May 2015
Contents N° 5092
Top stories
TELECOMS
INTERVIEW
EXTERNAL RELATIONS
MEPs apprehensive about
digital divide Page 4
Olivier Costa, researcher,
College of Europe Page 11
Free movement: Switzerland
never so attractive Page 14
Business & competitiveness
MEPs apprehensive about
digital divide............................................. 4
Conditional green
light for Orange-Jazztel merger............... 5
Financial services, banks
Benchmarks:
EP ready to negotiate
with Council............................................ 6
Sectoral policies
Emissions from
ETS-covered
installations decline................................. 6
New vans becoming
more fuel-efficient - EEA......................... 7
Don’t make us
a digital laughing stock,
Oettinger tells Council............................ 7
Economic and Social
Committee in ombudsman’s sights......... 8
Tobacco:
Tensions mount in Parliament................ 8
Parliament and US Congress:
Investigative powers compared..............12
Trade policy
Moscow backs down
on demand to postpone
EU-Ukraine DCFTA.............................14
External relations
Free movement:
Switzerland never so attractive..............14
Lavrilleux, Uspaskich,
Korwin-Mikke, COP21:
Merkel and Hollande call for general
mobilisation...........................................15
In brief
Juncker expects
Greece deal in coming weeks.................. 9
Raffaele Fitto leaves
EPP for ECR............................................ 4
EFSI financing:
Commission presents options.................. 7
EUNAVFOR Med mission formally
established.............................................11
Zagorakis:
Immunity lifted .....................................14
German minimum wage:
Infringement
proceedings launched............................15
Institutions
EU agenda...........................................23
Economic & monetary affairs
Comitology:
Consultation may expose
policies to heavy lobbying......................10
Impact assessment:
“EP doesn’t have to be
a reasonable chamber”..........................11
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ENERGY PREMIUM
On europolitics.info
- Europe left out of global hydropower
upsurge - study
- Fossil fuel subsidies in EU 300 bn
dollars a year - IMF
- Lower Asian LNG prices could set ball
rolling in Europe
Eastern Partnership
Divisive and getting nowhere................16
Diverging expectations and
misunderstandings.................................17
Russo-Ukrainian hurdle.........................18
Review of neighbourhood
policy not free of complications............19
From ‘sick man’ Belarus to
exemplary Georgia.................................20
“Our partners are primarily
interested in investments”.....................21
Open forum
Eastern Partnership: EU needs
political will and ambition....................22
www.europolitics.info
4
Wednesday 20 May 2015 N° 5092 EUROPOLITICS
MEPs apprehensive about digital divide
By Nathalie Steiwer
The EP reacts coolly to the Commission’s
digital strategy, saying it lacks ambition
“There will be losers and some jobs
will disappear, but digital technology
creates more jobs than it destroys,”
assured Commission Vice-President
Andrus Ansip, who presented his strategy for a digital single market to the
European Parliament on 19 May in
Strasbourg. His remarks were meant
to be reassuring to the plenary, which
nevertheless reacted coolly to the proposals announced by the EU executive
on 6 May.
The digital strategy is headed “in the
right direction,” as the Chair of the Committee on the Internal Market (IMCO),
Vicky Ford (ECR, UK), put it. But “the
text could have been even more ambitious. It gives the impression it is already
a compromise,” stated Dita Charanzová (Czech Republic) on behalf of the
Liberals.
“The proposals could have been more
concrete” on copyright reform or net
neutrality, added Jan Philipp Albrecht
(Greens, Germany). For Kathleen Van
Brempt (S&D, Belgium), the Commission’s initiative is “good news,” but there
needs to be “more investment in infrastructure”. The Commission’s strategy is
“too broad” and “lacks concrete actions,”
regretted Anneleen Van Bossuyt (ECR,
Belgium).
From one end of the political spectrum to the other, MEPs are concerned
about the risks of the “social divide”
that may result from digitisation of the
European economy.
“The European Union needs to create
- not just consume - digital technology,”
observed Françoise Grossetête (EPP,
France). This will require copyright
reform that takes account of remuneration of authors, skills development and
the financing of start-ups.
“If we have to register online to go
to school or have access to health care,
what impact will the digital revolution
have on social equality,” asked Liisa
Jaakonsaari (S&D, Finland). “Like my
fellow members on the left, I think that
the risks of exclusion need to be taken
into account, otherwise the digital
single market will not produce results,”
added Róza Thun Und Hohenstein
(EPP, Poland).
Clare Moody, (S&D, UK) pointed out
that an EU-financed digital project in
Cornwall has enabled 40% of the population to access broadband and 43%
of SMEs say they save time and money
thanks to the new networks. “But the
neighbouring county has a completely
different experience because it did not
obtain access to EU funds for this type of
project,” said the Labour member. She
asked the Commission to “think about
that aspect of the issue”.
All in all, MEPs nevertheless
applauded the Commission’s determination to present proposals over the next
two years. Like Charanzová, they hope
“to advance quickly”. n
Digital divide in figures
According to the Commission staff working document presented on 6 May together with
the digital single market strategy for Europe:
- 39% of EU citizens have low or no digital skills
- 18% of the EU population never uses the internet
- One teacher in three uses information technologies regularly
- 10% of the EU workforce is employed in high-tech industries and services (+20% from
2000 to 2011)
- 90% of future jobs will require digital skills
- Low-skilled jobs declined by 3% between 2008 and 2011
- 40% of companies trying to recruit highly-skilled ICT professionals have difficulty doing so
In brief
Raffaele Fitto leaves EPP for ECR
Italian MEP Raffaele Fitto, a Forza
Italia dissident, has joined the European
Conservatives and Reformists group in
the European Parliament. “I am certain
that he is the first and not the last of
www.europolitics.info
EPP deputies to join us over the coming
months,” said Syed Kamall, president
of the ECR group, announcing his
new recruit on 19 May in Strasbourg.
For Fitto, the seeds of divorce are of
national origin: the former president of
Puglia is seen in Italy as the leader of
the rebellion against Silvio Berlusconi’s
party. He intends to rebuild a new
centre-right party in his country, “based
on the British model: neither Merkel,
nor Le Pen”.
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5
EUROPOLITICS N° 5092 Wednesday 20 May 2015
Conditional green light for Orange-Jazztel merger
By Sophie Mosca
The Commission imposes commitments on Orange to ensure effective
competition on the fixed internet access
services markets
operators, Telefónica (Spain) and Vodafone
(UK). The Commission also had concerns
that new players would have faced significant barriers to entering the market due to
the high investments needed, and the costs
imposed by Telefónica to use its network.
purchaser of the FTTH network wholesale access to Jazztel’s national ADSL line
for up to eight years (remunerated) for an
unlimited number of subscribers.
The leading French telecoms operator
should also provide the purchaser with
Nationwide providers of fixed
telecommunications services in Spain
New operator
Jazztel
Vodafone
Concern
The takeover makes Orange an
integrated telecoms operator able
to compete with the market leader,
Telefónica, and with Vodafone.
However, it reduces the number of
providers of fixed Internet access
from four to three. This could have
led to consumers paying higher
prices for these services
Traditional Internet
services and fixed voice
services – by having
access to Jazztel ADSL
network
Mobile services – by having
access to Orange mobile
network (if this operator
does not yet have access to
such services)
Movistar (Telefónica)
Orange’s bid to take over Jazztel for €3.4
billion, launched in September 2014,
received the green light from the European
Commission on 19 May – but on certain
conditions, to ensure that a new competitor
can enter the retail markets for fixed internet access services. The Commissioner in
charge of competition policy, Margrethe
Vestager, said: “A very important thing
before agreeing to Orange’s takeover of
Jazztel was to make sure that consumers in
Spain would not suffer from higher prices
for fixed internet access services”.
Vestager opened an in-depth inquiry into
the proposed merger in December 2014,
which concluded that the entity resulting
from the merger between the third and the
fourth providers of fixed telecommunication services in Spain – which would then
become the second major provider - would
have had fewer incentives to compete
aggressively against the remaining major
Ultra-fast Internet access
services – by acquiring a
next-generation fibre-optic
network from Jazztel
It also emphasised that “the main impact
of this reduced level of competition would
have been in the short to medium-term in
the market segment with speeds up to 30
megabits per second, which represented
around four out of five internet connections
in Spain in 2014”.
FOURTH COMPETITOR
In order to avoid a veto from the Commission, Orange submitted commitments
in March. It agreed to free up a significant
share of its optical fiber and copper networks
to enable a fourth nation-wide competitor to
enter the market.
The French company must now agree
to divest an FTTH (fibre-to-the-home)
network that covers between 700,000 and
800,000 building units, and serves 13 local
exchange areas in five of the largest cities in
Spain: Barcelona, Madrid, Malaga, Sevilla
and Valencia. Moreover, it must grant the
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May 2015
Orange
Solution
The European Commission
approves the merger
subject to remedies that
will allow the emergence of
a new operator, which will
be able to provide:
wholesale access to the Spanish mobile
network, including 4G services, unless the
purchaser already has access to a mobile
network. The Spanish daily newspaper El
Pais said at the beginning of May that Yoigo,
a newcomer on the Spanish market owned
by the Swedish company TeliaSonera, is
interested in the networks to be divested
by Orange – as is the virtual operator
Masmovil.
Orange has welcomed the green light,
emphasising that it has submitted balanced
commitments,
which
simultaneously
address the Commission’s desire to maintain the intensity of competition on the fixed
internet market in Spain and meet Orange’s
ambitions in termes of synergy, convergence and deployment of optical fibre. To
recall, Orange has global synergies worth an
estimated €1.3 billion, particularly due to
economies in operational costs and network
investment. n
www.europolitics.info
6
Wednesday 20 May 2015 N° 5092 EUROPOLITICS
Benchmarks: EP ready to negotiate with Council
By Manon Malhère
In plenary, a large majority of MEPs
back the ECON committee’s position
Negotiations between the European
Parliament, Council and Commission
can get under way on the draft regulation setting rules for the establishment,
use and governance of indices used as
benchmarks (like Libor and Euribor) to
determine other interest rates and the
pricing of financial instruments and
contracts, such as mortgages. During a
19 May vote in plenary (517 for, 146
against), MEPs supported amendments
to this text, adopted in the Committee
on Economic and Monetary Affairs
(ECON), and issued a solid negotiating
mandate to rapporteur Cora van Nieuwenhuizen (ALDE, Netherlands). The
position is nonetheless a compromise
that shows certain weaknesses, some
MEPs pointed out before the vote. The
Council adopted its position in February, so the first three-way session will
certainly be held in early June. The
Commission’s 2013 text came in the
wake of the scandal of manipulation of
the Libor and Euribor interbank rates,
which came to light in 2012.
“I think we share common goals with
the Council [halting conflicts of interest in the setting of benchmarks, transparency, supervision – Ed], but this is
all about how to achieve results. I will
fight for a proportionate approach,”
the rapporteur told Europolitics.
Indeed, the EP seeks a more proportionate approach to rules for benchmarks that are “critical” to financial
stability, which would be subject to a
strict regime, while other benchmarks
would be covered more by rules on
transparency.
“It is very important that we not
frustrate providers of smaller benchmarks because if we lose a lot of the
smaller benchmarks, there would
be less competition and we would
become even more dependent on the
few large benchmarks that we have.
In fact, if we have more small benchmarks, the systemic risk for the whole
financial system is smaller,” she added.
“Enhanced transparency is sufficient”
for smaller benchmarks, which need
to be “kept alive,” the shadow rapporteur for the EPP, Ludek Niedermayer
(Czech Republic) told Europolitics.
Like the Commission’s initial text, the
EP’s position establishes that benchmarks
would be classified as “critical” if they
are used for financial instruments with
an average value of at least €500 billion.
MEPs maintain that benchmarks below
the €500 billion threshold should also be
eligible for the “critical” classification if
they can impact financial stability. n
Emissions from ETS-covered installations decline
By Anne Eckstein
The rate of decrease was 4.5% in
2014, but air transport emissions
are increasing
According to data from the European registry, verified greenhouse gas
emissions from stationary installations
(power plants and industrial installations) amounted to 1,812 million
tonnes CO2-equivalent in 2014, a
reduction of around 4.5% from 2013.
But emissions from air transport rose
by 2.8% over the 2013 figure, reaching
54.9 million tonnes CO2.
The cumulative surplus of emission
allowances (one allowance = 1 tonne
CO2) dropped slightly from 2.1 billion
in 2013 to some 2.07 billion in 2014.
The auctioning of allowances was cut
by 400 million units in 2014 due to the
implementation of back-loading.
www.europolitics.info
The European Commission, which
published the findings, is pleased and
notes that, overall, companies’ level of
compliance with ETS rules is high. Less
than 1% of installations that reported
emissions for 2014 did not surrender
allowances covering all their emissions
by the deadline of 30 April 2015. These
are generally small installations with
cumulative emissions of less than 0.5%
of those covered by the system. Only a
small number of installations (accounting for less than 0.2% of emissions the
previous year) did not report their 2014
emissions by 30 April 2015.
AVIATION SECTOR REPORTED EMISSIONS
In line with the directive establishing the ETS for the years 2013-2016,
all commercial and non-commercial
aircraft operators with activities in the
European Economic Area (EEA) in
2013 and 2014 were required to report
their emissions for both years and to surrender the corresponding allowances by
30 April 2015. Verified CO2 emissions
from aviation activities carried out
between airports located in the EEA
amounted to more than 54.9 million
tonnes CO2 in 2014, a 2.8% increase
from 2013 (53.4 million tonnes).
Application of the ETS to air transport is hotly contested by the sector.
The Commission nonetheless notes
that aircraft operators responsible for
99% of these emissions covered by
the ETS comply with the rules. This
includes more than 100 commercial
operators outside the EU that operate
flights in the EEA.
Lastly, the total number of international credits exchanged into allowances
since March 2014 amounted to 388.44
million. These came from projects
taking place in a small number of countries, including China and Ukraine. n
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7
EUROPOLITICS N° 5092 Wednesday 20 May 2015
New vans becoming more fuel-efficient - EEA
By Anne Eckstein
The automobile industry has already
met the 2017 goal of bringing emissions
from vans down to 175 gr CO2/km
According to data published by the European Environment Agency, almost 1.4
million new light utility vehicles (LUVs)
were registered in the EU in 2014. These
vehicles consume less fuel (they are 2.4%
more fuel efficient) and are less harmful
to the environment, since on average they
emit 169.2 gr CO2/km, which is 4 gr CO2/
km less than the average emissions from a
van sold in 2013, and is also is well below
the objective set for 2017. New passenger
cars were also increasingly energy efficient
in 2014 (+ 2.6% more fuel efficient). The
market is in good health: sales increased
by 18% in 2014, compared to 2013, while
vehicle registration increased in all EU
member states except Malta and the Netherlands. More than 60% of new vehicles
were registered in France (24%), the UK
(21%) and Germany (15%). Diesel is still
used by 97% of new cars sold, while those
using alternative fuels, such as liquefied
natural gas (LNG) and natural gas (NG),
account for less than 2%, and electric cars
less than 0.5%. Average levels of emission vary according to country. Slightly
more fuel efficient models were sold in
the older member states (169 gr CO2/
km), compared to those purchased in the
member states that joined the EU after
2004 (171.6 gr CO2/km). The new LUV
‘champions’ are Portugal (145.1 gr CO2/
km), Malta (145.7 gr CO2/km) and Bulgaria (148.6 gr CO2/km). At the other end
of the spectrum, average emissions were
around 30% for new vans sold in Slovakia
(193.3 gr CO2/km), the Czech Republic
(191.1 gr CO2/km) and Germany (190.4 gr
CO2/km). n
Don’t make us a digital laughing stock, Oettinger tells Council
By Mari Eccles
He calls on the capitals to move quickly
on audiovisual modernisation
Act soon or risk making us a joke: this was
the gist of the message addressed by the Commissioner for the digital economy and society,
Günther Oettinger, to the participants in the
Culture Council, on 19 May, as he presented
the European Commission’s digital single
market (DSM) strategy. Blaming slow procedures in Council for potential delays, he said
that “Change is so rapid that we could make
ourselves a laughing stock if we come up with
something in 2017”. The directive on audiovisual services is currently going through a
REFIT review and Europolitics understands
that the Commission may start a new consultation in June, after the REFIT process has
been clarified. The directive was last updated
in 2009, and the Commission believes some
tweaking is vital to keep abreast of the technological advances. The Council debate was
focused on ways to balance freedom of expression and security and the need to preserve cultural diversity. While the ministers agreed on
the latter question, the former posed greater
challenges. Freedom of expression has gained
traction since the Charlie Hebdo shooting, the
cyber attack on TV5 Monde and the rise of
extremism within the EU and of censorship
abroad. Many ministers recognised the need
to tackle hate speech, agreeing that freedom
of speech was not an “unlimited right” and
that it had to be balanced against other priorities. Yet if Commissioner Oettinger was
hoping for consensus, disagreement around
the country of origin (COO) principle, which
means providers come under the jurisdiction
of their country of origin, will have been a
little disappointing. Poland favours a country
of destination approach, while some states
advocating retaining COO, such as Ireland
and Portugal, want to see exceptions. n
reduce the short-term impact on the
research envelope (Horizon 2020)
and the Connecting Europe Facility
(CEF), an EU official said. The
European Parliament has insisted on
minimising as much as possible the use
of these two budget lines to finance
the EFSI. Another three-way meeting
is scheduled for 21 May as both
sides stick to the goal of reaching an
agreement by the end of May. However,
the Council and MEPs still need to
narrow their differences on important
aspects, including the nomination
of the investment committee´s top
officials. Parliament wants to approve
these nominations, but an EU source
underlined that although the legislators
could participate in the selection
process, the final word should belong to
the European Investment Bank.
In brief
EFSI financing: Commission
presents options
The European Commission presented,
on 18 May, a paper to the co-legislators
to analyse options for financing the
new European Fund for Strategic
Investments (EFSI), the main bone of
contention at the three-way meetings
on the EU´s investment plan. An
extended period for ‚filling up‘ the
EFSI could be considered in order to
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www.europolitics.info
8
Wednesday 20 May 2015 N° 5092 EUROPOLITICS
Economic and Social Committee in ombudsman’s sights
By Sophie Petitjean
Seven associations denounce a conflict
of interest following adoption of a report
on electromagnetic hypersensitivity
The European Ombudsman, Emily
O’Reilly, has just opened an investigation to
determine whether the opinion issued by the
European Economic and Social Committee
(EESC) on electromagnetic hypersensitivity
was adopted independently and in compliance with rules of procedure. On 12 May,
she wrote to EESC President Henri Malosse
to ask him to clarify these matters by 31 July.
On 21 January, EESC members were
asked to vote on a report by Bernardo Hernandez-Bataller (Spain, Group III) recommending the adoption of “binding legislation
to mitigate human exposure to electromagnetic fields”. They ended up adopting instead
the more cautious counter-opinion drafted
by Richard Adams (UK, Group III), which
recognises the existence of electromagnetic
hypersensitivity but does not recognise a
cause and effect relationship between such
hypersensitivity and electromagnetic or
radiofrequency exposure.
Seven associations representing persons
suffering from electromagnetic hypersensitivity (their names were not disclosed for
data protection reasons) denounce a conflict of interest and a procedural irregularity.
They single out for blame Adams’ alleged
close ties with bodies such as Sustainability
First and RWE AG. These bodies have an
interest in defending smart grids and smart
meters, which use radiofrequencies for data
transmission. The associations also claim that
the counter-opinion tabled by Adams fails to
meet the initial objective, which is to support
and make life easier for electrosensitive persons, and that it should have been sent back
to working group level. Some associations go
even further, maintaining that Adams’ reference to the preliminary opinion of SCENHIR (Commission’s scientific committee) is
invalid because this group is also a victim of
conflicts of interest.
The French consumer organisation UFC
Que Choisir recently questioned the credibility of the organisations representing electrosensitive persons, saying they are “willing to
lie and publish distorted press releases to win
their case”.
Contacted by Europolitics, Adams said he
was not aware of the complaints against him
and not in a position to defend himself for the
time being. He nonetheless has the support of
one of his fellow committee members, who
describes him as “honest and hard-working”.
Adams has been a member of the EESC
since 2001. n
Background
Electromagnetic fields are increasingly present in the environment,
notably because of computer screens
and cell phones. Some are concerned
about the multiplication of these
waves, alleging that they could impact
human health.
Tobacco: Tensions mount in Parliament
By Sophie Petitjean
In question is the extension of the
cooperation agreement with Philip
Morris, which currently hangs in the
balance in Brussels
The renewal of cooperation agreements
between the EU and the tobacco industry was at the heart of debates during the
European Parliament’s 18 May plenary session. MEPs unanimously called for greater
transparency in future talks. The European
Commission’s Vice-President for budget
and human resources, Kristalina Georgieva, certainly took note of their request
but indicated that the issue was not on the
agenda for the time being. “At the present
time, there are no negotiations underway.
We have only undertaken exploratory
discussions. That’s all,” she said.
The European Union is collaborating
with four major tobacco manufacturers to
combat the smuggling and counterfeiting
of cigarettes on its territory. This concerns
www.europolitics.info
Philip Morris International, Inc, Japan
Tobacco International, British American
Tobacco and Imperial Tobacco Limited.
These agreements provide that companies
make annual payments to the EU in order
to help combat smuggling and counterfeiting, as well as additional payments each
time illegal cigarettes (more than 50,000)
are seized.
The Commission is currently examining
ways to extend the cooperation agreement
relating to the fight against the smuggling
and counterfeiting of cigarettes concluded
with Philip Morris International. This
agreement, which will expire in July 2016
(compared with 2022 for JTI and 2030 for
BAT and Imperial), stipulates that in the
two years preceding its expiry, the parties
must consider a possible extension. According to Georgieva, several exploratory meetings have already taken place with PMI,
during which the cigarette manufacturer
expressed its desire to see the 2004 agreement extended. But the EU has not yet
made its decision: it is currently in the
process of evaluating the benefits of the
agreement over these past ten years and the
developments in illegal trade. “The results
should be published over the next few
weeks,” indicated Georgieva, after having
underlined the numerous advantages of
these types of instruments, which make it
possible to go “where regulation cannot
act”.
There was disappointment on the part
of some MEPs, who consider that each
meeting with the tobacco industry and
each document transmitted to it should
be revealed on the big day. “We want
greater transparency during the process.
We also want to know the advantages and
disadvantages of this type of agreement:
does it really bring added value? Lastly,
we want budgetary control of the criteria
and conditions,” said Spanish MEP Ines
Ayala Sender (S&D). “Parliament must
not only be briefed once everything has
been decided. It should also participate
in discussions as an observer,” added EPP
member Petri Sarvamaa (Finland). n
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9
EUROPOLITICS N° 5092 Wednesday 20 May 2015
Juncker expects Greece deal in coming weeks
By Jorge Valero and Markus Bernath in Athens
A Commission proposal contemplates
an agreement with Athens without the
IMF´s involvement
For the first time since the negotiations
began between Greece and its international
lenders in February, an agreement now
appears to be within reach. The President
of the European Commission, Jean-Claude
Juncker, said, on 19 May, that he was “optimistic” that a compromise on the reform
package could be found “toward the end
of May or start of June,” he told Bloomberg
news agency.
This final agreement could be based on
the European Commission´s latest proposal.
This document, leaked to the press, proposes to cut Greece’s primary surplus target
for this year to 0.75% of GDP (compared
to the current 3%) and includes a reform
of the VAT system, already accepted by the
SYRIZA-led government. However, it is
still vague on the crucial issues of reform of
the labour market and the pension system.
Commission officials have played down this
proposal, describing it as but a sheet of paper
from a thick wad of documents exchanged
by the two sides.
According to its proposal, the Commission does not count on the International
Monetary Fund´s part of the €7.2 billion
still in the aid scheme, as it does not expect
the IMF to accept this ”light” version of the
agreed programme. A Commission spokesperson pointed out that the outstanding
funds will be disbursed only if it is approved
by all institutions, including the IMF, as was
agreed on 20 February. However, officials
commented informally that this framework
could be amended by the eurozone´s finance
ministers. An agreement without the IMF on
board will hardly be acceptable for Germany,
as the fund´s strict stance on the list of reforms
matches Berlin´s opinion. Eurogroup sources
said that no extraordinary meeting is being
planned for now.
Meanwhile, Juncker has dashed Athens´
hopes of reaching a political agreement with
the EU leaders during the Eastern Partnership summit in Riga on 21-22 May. “Riga
isn’t made for that,” he said. But EU officials
commented that the last week of May could
bring a breakthrough as the finance ministers of the G7 will meet in Dresden on 27-29
May.
Meanwhile, Yet again, Greece’s leftist
Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras made good
on his election promises and announced the
reopening of the national broadcaster ERT
on 25 May, with possibly more than 2,000
former employees to be rehired. The move
has angered the country’s lenders, who have
repeatedly complained that the Tsipras government had introduced legislation without
consulting the creditors. “This undermines
trust,” a participant in the negotiations in
Brussels remarked when talking to Europolitics on condition of anonymity. “We read
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about this in the newspapers.” The source
described the current talks as being “substantive” on a number of issues and noted
the replacement of negotiators who had
represented controversial Finance Minister
Yanis Varoufakis.
At the same time, the creditors‘ representative noted that Greece’s fiscal gap has
become “pretty big by now”. The primary
deficit could easily shoot way above €1 billion if the government continues to insist on
the suspension of the so-called ‘zero deficit
clause for the pension system.
Addressing a conference in Athens, on
15 May, Tsipras said his government’s
negotiating plan was “realistic and
viable” and he called on the lenders to be
equally “realistic”. n
Tsipras to visit Parliament
Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras is
expected to attend the Conference of
Presidents of the European Parliament
during the last week of May. “There is a
strong possibility that Tsipras will come,”
a Parliament source told Europolitics.
Eurogroup President Jeroen Dijsselbloem has also been invited to the same
meeting to assess the ongoing negotiations on the Greek programme. Parliament sources expected Dijsselbloem to
accept the invitation if Tsipras does the
same.
www.europolitics.info
10
Wednesday 20 May 2015 N° 5092 EUROPOLITICS
the
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EU decision-making
EU lobbying
delegated & implementing acts
Comitology: Consultation may expose policies to heavy lobbying
By Joanna Sopinska
Accepting binding comments from
different stakeholders, including from
non-EU countries, could make the
drafting process more political
Although it seems to be a purely internal
matter, the European Commission’s proposal for a new agreement on delegated acts
might also assume an international dimension. The idea to include consultations with
stakeholders in the process of drafting delegated acts might open the door for the US and
other non-EU countries to become formally
www.europolitics.info
involved. The White House has been pushing for such a possibility under the ongoing
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) negotiations. The US negotiators
argue that the current comitology rules do not
allow for any outside comments, unlike in the
US, where all legislative proposals are subject
to an up to 180-day notice and comment
period. Opening the door for binding comments from different stakeholders, including
from non-EU countries, could, however,
make the drafting process more political - contrary to what the EU had wanted to achieve
during the 2011 reform of the comitology
system. Back then, the Commission insisted
on including most trade measures under the
new standard comitology rules with qualified
rather than simple majority vote. This, according to the EU executive, was supposed to
“help to avoid the politicisation of the process,
leave less room for lobbying by any party or
by third countries, and ensure a more robust
trade defence policy”. “By proposing a system
of stakeholder consultations, the Commission
might want to increase the transparency of
the whole system. But it would at the same
time expose trade and other equally sensitive
policies to stronger lobbying and political
pressure, also from the White House,” an EU
diplomat commented to Europolitics. n
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11
EUROPOLITICS N° 5092 Wednesday 20 May 2015
Impact assessment: “EP doesn’t have to be a reasonable chamber”
Commission, or a technocratic chamber
that produces only perfectly reasonable
texts.
It is also tantamount to saying that all
MEPs have to be technical experts. But not
all of them are specialists. A Communist
MEP has the right to vote for an amendment that can be considered completely
off the wall by the Commission because it
will have a considerable impact, for example, on one budget or another. There is a
real democratic problem with submitting
MEPs’ words or actions to technocratic
oversight.
By Ophélie Spanneut
In its better regulation package, the
Commission asks Parliament to carry
out impact assessments on substantial
amendments. What do you think about
that?
This in fact fits into a broader process,
in which Parliament’s Bureau has for a
number of years told MEPs to table “fewer
amendments and better amendments,
because we look like clowns when we hold
talks with the Council and Commission”.
In a way, Parliament’s vice-presidents have
played the role of the Commission’s advocate, saying that MEPs spend their time
adopting amendments that make no sense.
So impact studies are the final stage of this
process, where civil servants are put in
charge of assessing the relevance of MEPs’
amendments.
How does that represent an abusive
practice?
On the principle, there’s nothing new.
The question of expertise in chambers is
not new. Every parliament in the world
has set up bodies to assess technical and
scientific choices, whatever they may be
© College of Europe
Interview
with
Olivier
Costa,
researcher and director of political
and administrative studies, College of
Europe
Olivier Costa
called. What is troubling is the systematic
aspect. It seems logical and relevant that
an MEP who, for instance, wishes to table
an amendment on the percentage of nitrogen dioxide in polluting emissions, would
want an impact study. But submitting a
large number of amendments to an impact
study without taking account of the nature
of the amendment or the political intention behind it seems problematic because
Parliament has the right to adopt irrelevant
amendments. Otherwise, this amounts to
obliging Parliament to be a sort of second
“There is a real democratic
problem with submitting
MEPs’ words or action to
technocratic oversight”
Parliament is not opposed, however.
What is most troubling is that there is no
reflection under way. The starting point is
always the view that Parliament has to be
as specialised as possible. That’s true for
certain issues, because it empowers Parliament in relation to the Commission and
Council. But for others, Parliament doesn’t
have to be a reasonable chamber. n
In brief
EUNAVFOR Med mission
formally established
The framework decision launching the
EUNAVFOR Med mission goes a step
further than the proposals made by the
EU high representative on 18 May. It
was published on the morning of 19
May, before a vote by the UN Security
Council expected at the end of the
week. The document clearly states
that the Union will lead a military
crisis management operation, and sets
out three phases - which do not each
require a resolution. The first will
support the detection and surveillance
of migration networks by collecting
information and organising patrols
on the open seas, while adhering
to international law. It will gather
personal data from migrants. The
second phase of the mission will focus
on inspecting, seizing, searching and
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diverting ships, firstly on the open seas
and subsequently “in territorial waters
and the internal waters of the coastal
state” in line with the UN Security
Council’s resolution. The third phase
refers to “elimination” or disabling
of the ships on the territory of this
member state. The operation must still
be approved by the Council in June.
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12
Wednesday 20 May 2015 N° 5092 EUROPOLITICS
Parliament and US Congress: Investigative powers compared
By Ophélie Spanneut and Brian Beary in Washington
a congressional aide involved in the
process said. “It is very helpful when
witnesses provide us with their bio and
written testimony about a week before
the hearing. Some do, but others wait
until a few hours beforehand to give
© EP
As MEPs ramp up their probe into
EU member states’ tax rulings, can
US lawmakers teach them some
tricks?
tember 2012 attacks on the US consulate in Benghazi, Libya, which killed
four people, has had huge problems
extracting cooperation for a star witness, the Democrats’ frontrunner in
the 2016 presidential election, Hillary
Meeting of TAXE committee in the European Parliament
The United States Congress has had
more than two centuries to hone its
investigative skills, having launched its
first inquiry in 1791 against President
George Washington over a botched
battle against the American Indians.
“Investigations are an essential power
for Congress and our courts have consistently upheld this,” says Donald
Wolfensberger, scholar at the Woodrow
Wilson Center and Bipartisan Policy
Center in Washington, who has three
decades of hands-on experience of congressional oversight. Congress exercises
this power via ‘standing committees’
that meet regularly (foreign relations,
finance, etc), and purpose-specific
‘select committees’ that usually handle
hot political scandals like Watergate in
the 1970s or Iran-Contra in the 1980s.
PLENTY OF POWER, MIXED RESULTS
But the US lawmakers have a rather
chequered record in recent times. The
select committee investigating the Sepwww.europolitics.info
Clinton. House Republicans continue
to demand that Clinton give them
relevant correspondence and appear
before the committee. A tense stand-off
continues, made worse by recent revelations that Clinton had her own personal server installed to circumvent the
US State Department’s e-mail system.
On the plus side, the House Standing
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform got better results when
investigating the Obama administration’s Fast and Furious operation, an
anti-gun running sting that went awry
by unintentionally putting weapons in
the hands of criminal gangs. In November 2014, then US Attorney-General
Eric Holder, responding to a court
order, gave the committee 64,280 pages
of documents.
When witnesses do appear before
Congress – and it is hard to those summoned to ignore a congressional subpoena – rigorous preparations are key
to getting the most from the witness,
it,” the aide said. At the hearing itself,
“we try to get our members to ask tight,
specific questions as it helps in getting
Committees of inquiry
Made possible by the Maastricht
Treaty, three committees of inquiry
have been put in place by the
European Parliament:
- 2007: on the Equitable Life
insurance crisis
- 1997: on mad cow disease
- 1997: on VAT and customs duties
fraud in EU transit rules.
These committees examined allegations of infringement of EU law or
maladministration in the application
of EU law. After a year’s work (or up
to 18 months if extended), the committee of inquiry concludes its investigation with a report put to the vote
in plenary.
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13
EUROPOLITICS N° 5092 Wednesday 20 May 2015
more useful information”. The media
can be very useful, the official noted.
The dawn of television channels like
CSPAN, which specialise in reporting on political events like committee
hearings, “has been a game-changer in
Washington. We can extract short sound
bites and put them on social media.
Then other outlets like Fox News pick
them up on and rebroadcast”.
MEPs DEMAND GREATER POWERS
While MEPs have less experience
in this domain, they have a solid legal
basis for asserting this role, enshrined
in Article 226 of the EU treaty and
fleshed out in 1995 when Parliament,
Commission and Council agreed on
the powers of investigating committees.
But Parliament’s powers of inquiry are
in fact relatively limited, something
MEPs complain about, saying they do
not match Parliament’s political clout.
The EU lawmakers would like to have
the right to do on-the-spot investigations, request documents, summon witnesses, hear EU and national officials
and request experts’ reports. Under
the 1995 interinstitutional agreement,
a committee of inquiry can summon
civil servants as witnesses but it is the
member state concerned that designates the official who testifies and that
official speaks “in the name of, and on
the instructions of, the institution”.
MEPs are trying to revise this agreement to free themselves from such
restraints but the negotiations with the
Council and Commission are difficult.
Ramon Jauregui Atondo (S&D, Spain)
has been assigned to lead a new charge
on behalf of Parliament.
Until then, MEPs have the option
of establishing either a ‘committee of
inquiry’ (EP Rule 198), which has the
greater political standing, or a ‘special
committee’ (EP Rule 197), which has
less standing but is easier to set up and
more flexible in terms of what topics it
can investigate. The latter was preferred
in the LuxLeaks scandal that blew up in
late 2014 over the Luxembourg government’s favourable tax rulings to multinationals based there. They picked this
option as the European People’s Party,
Parliament’s largest group, wanted to
shield newly-elected Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker, a fellow
EPP member, from the heightened
media and political scrutiny they felt
that a ‘committee of inquiry’ would
bring.
ADMINISTRATIVE OBSTRUCTIONISM
Probably the single biggest challenge
that both Congress and Parliament face
when investigating is getting administrations to cooperate. With Parliament,
MEPs sometimes even refrain from
requesting witnesses from member
state governments to appear to avoid
the humiliation of having their request
rejected and having no legal power to
compel them to testify. Asked about
this obstacle, Alain Lamassoure (EPP,
France), chair of the Special Committee on Tax Rulings (TAXE) that was
set up in February 2015, says that to
overcome it, “we are sending fact-finding missions to the member states with
debatable practices”. When the committee wraps up its work, it will make
recommendations, which Parliament
will likely enshrine in a non-binding
resolution. But with MEPs having no
powers to set tax policy - in stark contrast to Congress which does - all they
can hope for is that the Commission
and Council will take on board their
recommendations voluntarily.
In the US, when subpoenaed witnesses refuse to cooperate, Congress
is equipped with sharper tools to make
them change their minds. In the late
1700s and early 1800s, Congress used
to actually imprison people inside the
Capitol until they cooperated. Wolfsenberger notes that “no serious consideration” has been given to using this tool
in recent times. Subtler means can be
equally effective. For instance, Wolfsenberger notes how in 1987 the Senate
managed to get Colonel Oliver North
to testify in the Iran-Contra inquiry by
granting him immunity from prosecution for the testimony he provided.
By contrast, in 2013, the House failed
to make a senior Internal Revenue Service (IRS) official, Lois Lerner, answer
questions in a probe into whether the
IRS held a bias against conservative ‘tea
party’ political groups when granting
tax exempt status. The House formally
declared Lerner in contempt of Congress, which is a punishable offence.
The problem was that it was then up to
the Department of Justice (DOJ) - like
the IRS, a part of the administration – to
prosecute Lerner and the DOJ refused
to do so. “The administration has been
defying Congress on contempt orders
more often in recent years, reflecting
the heightened partisanship in Washington,” Wolfsenberger says. Despite
the challenges, the congressional official, asked if investigations were worth
the effort in terms of return-on-investment, says without hesitation, “absolutely. I am always amazed at the things
we gather from hearings”. n
Congressional investigations
- 1791: First ever congressional investigation, focused on a battle the US military lost to American Indians. President George Washington refuses to hand
over documents, setting the “executive privilege” precedent
- 1912: Sinking of Titanic investigated by Senate Commerce Committee, leading to passage of the Radio Act requiring all ships to maintain constant radio
alert for distress signals
- 1929: Wall Street stock market crash leads Senate Banking Committee to
hold investigations culminating in much tighter regulation of financial services
sector
- 1957: Supreme Court limits Congress’ right to question citizens about their
political views in a case brought by labour union leader John Watkins in
response to the anti-Communist witch-hunts
- 1974: President Richard Nixon resigns after extensive congressional probes
into the wire-tapping of the Democratic Party headquarters at the Watergate
building
- 1988: 120,000 Japanese-American civilians interned by the US during World
War Two are financially compensated, eight years after Congress launches
investigation into the episode.
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14
Wednesday 20 May 2015 N° 5092 EUROPOLITICS
Moscow backs down on demand to postpone EU-Ukraine DCFTA
By Joanna Sopinska
Technical talks will continue to find
“practical solutions to the concerns
raised by Russia”
It seems that the Kremlin has backed
down on its demand to postpone by at least
one year the provisional application of the
EU-Ukraine free trade agreement, known as
DCFTA. In “joint operational conclusions”
issued by the European Commission on 18
May, after a day-long ministerial meeting,
the EU, Russia and Ukraine confirmed that
the deal “will provisionally apply as of 1 Jan-
uary 2016”. The parties decided that until
that date their experts will continue to seek
“practical solutions to the concerns raised by
Russia” within the “flexibility provided by the
DCFTA”. The quest will focus on three areas
in particular: customs cooperation, technical barriers to trade (TBT), and sanitary and
phytosanitary issues. The results of the technical-level talks will have to be reported to the
Ukrainian and Russian ministers and the EU
trade commissioner no later than July, the
conclusions read.
Narrowing down the number of contentious issues to three areas only is another
concession the EU and Ukraine secured
during their talks with Russia. According to
diplomatic sources, at the beginning of the
consultations in mid-2014, Moscow’s list
of concerns “was enormous” and included
inter alia a demand for changing nearly all
tariff lines. The EU, Ukraine and Russia
agreed, on 11 July 2014, to initiate “a consultation mechanism” on the consequences
of tighter trade links between Kyiv and the
EU. The two-level process, including technical and political discussions, was meant to
address the “potential economic risks” the
DCFTA, signed on 27 June 2014, could pose
for Russia. However, the process has been
affected by the Ukraine-Russia crisis. n
Free movement: Switzerland never so attractive
By Edgar Bloch in Berne
The increase in foreign and EU workers is more than twice that of Swiss
nationals
More than a year after the vote against
mass immigration, Switzerland has never
attracted so many workers from the EU. The
labour force in Switzerland expanded by
2.8% between the first quarters of 2014 and
2015, reported the Federal Statistics Office
(OFS) on 18 May. But the number of foreign
nationals (increase of 4.5%) rose far more
than the number of Swiss in the workforce
(only +2.1%). Nearly four-fifths of these workers come from the EU. The phenomenon is
all the more striking because the increase is
greatest, nearly 9%, among persons holding a
residence permit and living in the country for
a short time, compared with +4.2% for holders of a residence permit who have already
lived in Switzerland for five to ten years, and
+2.6% for cross-border commuters. Only the
number of holders of a short-term residence
permit shows a decrease (-7.6%). These figures may be correlated with the unemployment rate. According to the definition used
by the International Labour Office (ILO),
the rate declined over the same period from
4.8% to 4.4% in Switzerland and from 11% to
10.2% in the EU. The confederation’s power
to attract foreign workers has thus remained
steady. The general increase of 4.5% is even
greater than the rise seen in the three previous
years. “Although the tendency is not linear,
the increase in the number of workers without
a Swiss passport is more than 37% between
2005 and 2015,” observes Thierry Murier of
the OFS. Based on this body’s data, there is a
total of nearly 30% of foreign nationals living
in Switzerland today, compared with just
under 25% in 2005. The workforce currently
stands at nearly five million (4.972 million),
compared with 4.2 million ten years ago. n
will prevent them from carrying out
their functions, until a final verdict
has been given. Regarding Viktor
Uspaskich, this is not the first time
his case has been brought to MEPs’
attention, but this time it concerns
an accusation of contempt of court.
Uspaskich faces up to two years in
prison, especially since judges have not
shown much clemency towards him so
far – he has already been sentenced to
four years in prison for illegal financing
of a political party. Unsurprisingly,
Janusz Korwin-Mikke (Poland) has
had his immunity lifted for hitting
MEP Michal Boni (EPP, Poland).
Meanwhile, Theodoros Zagorakis (EPP,
Greece), who is being prosecuted for
financial inconsistencies when he was
president of the PAOK football club,
has also had his immunity lifted.
In brief
Lavrilleux, Uspaskich, KorwinMikke, Zagorakis: Immunity lifted
Although the scandal surrounding
Jérôme Lavrilleux’s actions during
Nicolas Sarkozy’s 2012 presidential
campaign has nothing to do with his
role as an MEP, nonetheless he risks
going to prison. He has defended
himself using Article 9.6 of the
regulation, which states that MEPs
cannot be arrested or imprisoned if it
www.europolitics.info
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15
EUROPOLITICS N° 5092 Wednesday 20 May 2015
COP21: Merkel and Hollande call for general mobilisation
By Anne Eckstein
They bring the Petersberg Dialogue to a
close with a joint declaration identifying
the emergency measures to be taken
With 200 days to go before the climate
conference in Paris (COP21), “we have very
little time,” underlined François Hollande
on 19 May, while addressing the 35 countries meeting in Berlin from 17 to 19 May in
the context of the Petersberg Dialogue. The
objective of the meeting was to review international negotiations and consider ways in
which to accelerate the process. The French
president had joined German Chancellor
Angela Merkel at the origin of this initiative
launched in the wake of the Copenhagen
failure (2009) to give political impetus to the
negotiation process. In a joint declaration,
the two heads of state call on all countries to
deploy the greatest efforts to reach an agreement in Paris. “We have a duty to succeed,”
hammered home President Hollande.
Hollande insisted on the requirement
to meet the needs of the most vulnerable
countries, including small island countries,
and stressed that “without financing there
would be no agreement in Paris” and that
developing countries would not accept anything if they were not supported in their fight
against climate change. He reminded the
countries of the G7 (who were due to meet
in connection with this, also in Berlin) and
the G20 (who will meet in September) “that
belonging to the club of the richest countries
assumes responsibilities and dictates duties”.
To put it clearly: that it is urgent to maintain the promises made and to capitalise the
Green Climate Fund.
In their joint declaration, Merkel and Hollande call on the international community to
urgently undertake a series of measures:
1. Establish a shared vision and concrete
action for a profound transformation of the
world economy and society to achieve full
decarbonisation by 2100 and reduce emissions by 2050 to a level compatible with the
recommendations of the IPCC while taking
into account that global warming should be
maintained under 2°C
2. Submit ambitious and transparent
nationally determined climate contributions
(INDCs) well before the COP21. It should
be pointed out that Canada, which on 18 May
submitted its nationally determined contributions, is committed to reducing its greenhouse
gas emissions by 30% by 2030 compared with
2005 emission levels. It is the 37th country
to have done its duty, Japan being the only
member of the G7 still not “in order”
3. Advance long-term national and regional
strategies for low-carbon and resilient development
4. Mobilise climate finance for developing
countries reaching US$100 billion per year
goal by 2020 from a variety of sources, both
public and private, as promised in Copenhagen
5. Strengthen support for low-carbon
development and climate resilience in our
development assistance
6. Establish initiatives for investment in
low-carbon technologies, especially in renewable energies and resource efficiency, and sustainable land use (with a specific focus on the
development of renewable energies in Africa)
7. Strengthen adaptation and resilience of
the particularly vulnerable countries against
climate change, including small island developing states, Africa, Asia, Latin America and
the Caribbean through the spread of insurance mechanisms and national early warning
systems
8. Introduce carbon markets and pricing
on national and regional level with the aim
of giving strong economic incentives for
low-carbon transformation. n
minimum wage. On 19 May, the EU
executive launched an infringement
procedure against Berlin, saying that
the application of this law to the
transport sector creates disproportionate
administrative obstacles to the
functioning of the internal market.
In particular, the Commission targets
transit traffic and certain international
transport operations, saying that «more
proportionate measures could be taken
to guarantee the social protection of
workers and fair competition without
threatening the free circulation of
goods and services». The German
authorities now have two months to
respond to the arguments presented by
the Commission.
Busy week
Besides the Petersberg Dialogue and
the G7 meeting in Berlin, Paris will
host a Business and Climate Summit
on 20 May, which will bring together
more than 1,000 representatives
from the private sector (industry and
finance), as well as a conference on
climate financing, on 21 and 22 May.
In brief
German minimum wage:
Infringement proceedings
launched
Three-and-a-half months of discussions
with the German authorities have not
been enough to appease the European
Commission’s concerns over the
legality of the Mindestlohngesetz,
Germany’s new national regulation on
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www.europolitics.info
16 INSIGHT
Wednesday 20 May 2015 N° 5092 EUROPOLITICS
INSIGHT Eastern Partnership
Divisive and getting nowhere
By Antoine Jacob in Riga
The 21-22 May Riga summit will reflect
the difficulties the EU is encountering on its Eastern flank, faced with
Russia’s offensive approach
The EU’s fourth Eastern Partnership
summit looks as though it will be calm
and predictable. The crisis in Ukraine has
dampened the 28’s inclination to advance.
It has also heightened internal divisions
between the member states that wish to
reinforce the partnership and those calling for restraint and caution, not least to
prevent fuelling tension with Moscow.
Barring unforeseen events, the heads
of state or government meeting in Riga
will not endorse any major new advances.
They will primarily reiterate certain key
principles already formulated at previous
summits (Prague, Warsaw and Vilnius).
“The key message that will be reflected in
the declaration is that the EU will reconfirm its commitments towards its Eastern
www.europolitics.info
neighbours and the strategic importance
of the partnership as part of the European Neighbourhood Policy,” Juris Poikans, Latvia’s ambassador in charge of the
Eastern Partnership, told Europolitics.
As “strategic” as it may be, many experts
find that the EU has not matched the
partnership with a well thought out and
consistent policy. Launched in 2009 on
the initiative of Poland and Sweden, in
the wake of the Union for the Mediterranean, it set ambitious objectives in certain respects. The association agreements
negotiated with three partner states (Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine) are deemed
the most comprehensive ever offered to
neighbourhood countries. But implementation and the resources invested have not
been equal to the task.
This ambiguity has already created
frustration and disappointment in some
of the populations living in the six countries concerned and among certain local
elites. For others, including some of the
leaders of partnership countries attend-
ing the Riga conference, the European
offer is not a priority. Belarus in particular, but also Azerbaijan and Armenia, are
not expecting much from the partnership,
for (geo)political and economic reasons
alike. So not everyone will be upset over
the guarded attitude expected in Riga.
That includes Moscow, where the foreign
minister nevertheless denounced in April
the summit’s “pronounced anti-Russian
purpose”. That is its way of keeping up the
pressure on neighbouring countries that
the Kremlin has no intention of seeing
‘defecting’ to the West.
It may be only small comfort for proponents of a more pronounced rapprochement, but a process of revision of
the European Neighbourhood Policy (of
which the Eastern Partnership is just one
element) has just been launched. Its primary focus, a more individualised and
differentiated approach, is meant to better
meet the needs of the countries concerned. The question is whether it can be
put into practice. n
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INSIGHT
EUROPOLITICS N° 5092 Wednesday 20 May 2015
17
Diverging expectations and misunderstandings
By Antoine Jacob in Riga
By its very nature, the Eastern Partnership cannot please all member
states.
The
Russian
element
complicates matters
How can the Eastern Partnership’s
achievements be summed up? Association agreements signed with three of the
six partner countries, schemes ranging
from visa facilitation to elimination of visa
requirements with five of the six partners
and relatively poorly funded multilateral
cooperation. Does that equate to success
or failure? The question that will be hanging this week over the National Library in
Riga, seat of the Latvian EU Council Presidency, begs another. What do the Union
and its partners expect of this Eastern
chapter of the European Neighbourhood
Policy (ENP)?
The problem is that the different parties do not all necessarily want the same
thing. This was the case even before the
European Council set the wheels in
motion with its March 2009 approval of
the partnership. At the time, Poland and
other new member states were looking
for a way to stabilise their own Eastern
neighbourhood, starting with Ukraine.
But regionalisation of the ENP was
not considered a priority by the Union’s
Western and Southern members, including Berlin (see box). The situation nevertheless changed when, at the insistence
of Nicolas Sarkozy, the Union for the
Mediterranean (UfM) was set up in July
2008. Backed by Stockholm, Warsaw then
succeeded in obtaining the creation of an
Eastern Partnership that essentially would
be the equivalent to the UfM. Ukraine,
Georgia and Moldova were joined by
Belarus, Armenia and Azerbaijan.
“A coalition of member states got what
it wanted but there has not been any strategic debate in the EU about this neighbourhood policy,” observes Stefan Meister, head of the Eastern Europe and Russia
programme at the German Council on
Foreign Relations (DGAP). “That is the
limit of the EU policy. It is based on the
minimum on which the member states
can agree.” Setting up this partnership
with former Soviet republics obviously
constituted a strategic turning point. “But
the EU didn’t think enough about certain
aspects: Russia’s importance in the region,
what these countries really need, their differences and the split between societies
and the elites,” Meister told Europolitics.
Disappointment is already pronounced
among those who expected a lot – too
much? – from the EU’s involvement. That
is the partnership’s principal misunderstanding. Indeed, this initiative requires
the keenest among them (Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine) to adopt a range of
reforms meant to bring about extensive
change. The association and free trade
agreements signed with them provide
for “transposition of around 80% of the
EU acquis. That’s a lot,” notes Krzysztof
Bobinski, co-chair of the Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum Steering
Committee.
Compared with the treatment of applicants under the 2004 and 2007 enlargements, however, what is lacking is “the
same political will, financial resources
[and] the ultimate prize of EU membership,” explains Adam Hug in a report
Sold by subscription only © reproduction strictly prohibited in any language
published in February by the Foreign
Policy Centre in London. Further, adds
Bobinski, “the programme offered to
these countries will lead basically to eliminating oligarchs and corrupt governments
and will destroy the basis of power, which
makes everything complicated”.
For Bobinski and others, though, it is
worth the effort. “We can’t abandon the
good and young people who live there.”
The Polish national finds that “the Eastern Partnership has some tangible successes” compared with the “mess of the
Southern dimension”. One more reason
to give priority to the latter? n
German shift
The Eastern Partnership has never
been a priority for Berlin. “As with
the UfM, Germany was not particularly disposed towards a regionalisation of the neighbourhood policy.
But since this innovation materialised, it sought to advance its own
interests, as usual,” commented a
French member of a Brussels institution, who preferred to remain anonymous. At the start of the partnership,
“Germany only tried to bring in projects with Russia and not to provoke
Russia,” recalls Meister (DGAP). But
with the tougher Russian policy and
the war in Ukraine, “this has changed
towards a more balanced approach”
by Germany towards the partnership. There is nonetheless “no real
will to seriously develop the Eastern
Partnership,” adds the researcher.
www.europolitics.info
18 INSIGHT
Wednesday 20 May 2015 N° 5092 EUROPOLITICS
Russo-Ukrainian hurdle
By Antoine Jacob in Riga
The armed conflict, a unique case in
the Eastern Partnership, is impeding
progress
that date. Meanwhile, the EU grants trade
preferences to Ukraine. As for the visa-free
regime, there is every indication that it
will not be granted to Ukraine at the Riga
summit. The risk of a surge in emigration
if the conflict should worsen doubtless has
something to do with the postponement.
It is clear that Russia has the means
to stall or even prevent Ukraine’s rapprochement with the EU. While it denies
doing so, its Permanent Representative to
the Union, Vladimir Chizhov, observed
recently that “it was a mistake of the EU
to push the association agreement without taking into consideration existing ties
between those focus countries and their
neighbours”. “We are trying to explain to
our Russian partners that this is not about
a geopolitical competition in the area,”
replies Poikans. That approach does not
sit well with Ukrainians like Volodymyr
Kuprii, head of an NGO based in Kyiv:
“The result of the policy of appeasement
is that each EU concession was succeeded
by Russia’s further demands”. n
© EPYF
Conforming with a new international
agreement in spite of a war on one’s territory and without being certain of the area
to which it will apply is just one of the
many challenges facing the Ukrainian government. Without being the most urgent
of these challenges, the Eastern Partnership is not neglected either. Because, for
Kyiv, starting to put into practice the association agreement concluded with the EU
means maintaining its crucial ties with the
European bloc.
It also means acting consistently: the
Euromaidan protest movement originated
with the agreement, or rather with the
refusal of the previous regime to sign it at
the EU summit in Vilnius, in late November 2013. Under pressure from Russia, the
previous government abandoned the deal
for establishment of a free trade area, political and financial support, elimination of
the visa requirement and cooperation in a
large number of areas, in return for reforms
meant notably to strengthen the rule of law.
For now, “the key element is reducing the
security challenge,” says Juris Poikans, Latvia’s Eastern Partnership ambassador. An
effort is being made on both sides to make
sure that the Minsk agreements restoring
peace continue to hold. As fighting raged
in the eastern part of the country, Kyiv’s parliament ratified the association agreement
on 16 September 2014, together with the
European Parliament.
A month and a half later, some of its provisions – human rights, fundamental freedoms and rule of law, political dialogue,
justice, economic and financial cooperation – entered into force. But these did not
include the important free trade component, postponed until January 2016 at Moscow’s request. On 18 May, the Commission
indicated that Moscow would not oppose
this component’s entry into force after
Juris Poikans
www.europolitics.info
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INSIGHT
EUROPOLITICS N° 5092 Wednesday 20 May 2015
19
Review of neighbourhood policy not free of complications
Differentiation and flexibility lie at the
heart of the review under way, along
with greater involvement of civil
society
The European Commission and Federica Mogherini, the high representative
for foreign affairs and security policy, have
until the autumn to present proposals to
“reform” the European Neighbourhood
Policy (ENP). Given the determination
to consult extensively, the European
machinery and the complexity of the issue
on both the Eastern and Southern flanks,
this time frame does not seem excessive.
Opinions and proposals have been
streaming in since the 4 March launch
of a public consultation on review of the
ENP. They implicitly contain a criticism
of the policy launched a decade ago. The
main objection expressed in the East is
the Eastern Partnership’s overly systematic
approach, regardless of which of the six
countries is concerned (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and
Ukraine). “It is important to differentiate,
to put more resources in the countries
with which we have an interest in integrating, and to take into consideration
those countries which don’t share such
an interest at the moment, like Armenia,
but without closing the door on them,”
points out Stefan Meister, head of the
Eastern Europe, Russia and Central Asia
programme at the German Council on
Foreign Relations (DGAP).
The European External Action Service
has received the message loud and clear.
“One size fits all doesn’t fit. We need to
differentiate,” its Deputy Secretary-General, Maciej Popowski, told MPs from
the 28 meeting in Riga in March. Since
then, the Foreign Affairs Council has followed suit. In its 20 April conclusions on
the ENP review, the European Council
endorsed the concept of ‘differentiation’,
which promises to be one of the leitmotifs
of the revised ENP.
Another “priority area” that the Council
wishes to address is “flexibility”. The idea
is to make the EU’s action “more flexible and responsive to changing situations
on the ground”. “Very good, but all the
instruments are already in place. It won’t
be possible to revise the multiannual
financial framework before its mid-term
review in 2017,” regrets Elzbieta Kaça.
This specialist in the European Neighbourhood Policy at the Polish Institute of
International Affairs (PISM) is concerned
that the review may serve primarily to
allow member states to channel available
resources into other priorities not connected to neighbourhood policy.
A more differentiated and flexible ver-
it is hard to imagine initiatives that could
be misinterpreted by Russia.
Moscow’s concerns are also taken into
account. The Council “acknowledges that
the broader geographical context of our
partners and their relations with their neighbours are important considerations impacting upon the ENP”. The conclusions go on
to add that “it is the sole right of the EU and
its partners to decide in a sovereign way on
how they want to proceed in their relations”.
The art of not offending either side. n
© MP
By Antoine Jacob in Riga
Maciej Popowski
sion of the ENP “will not solve the problems,” notes Meister, who mentions “the
fact that Russia has the capacity to put
pressure” on the Union’s partner countries. The ENP should therefore place
greater emphasis on security. “You cannot
implement reforms, democratisation and
good governance policies without addressing the serious security threats that these
countries have to face,” insists the German
expert.
In its conclusions of 20 April, the Foreign Affairs Council advocates “closer
coordination between ENP and wider
CFSP [Common Foreign and Security
Policy] and CSDP [Common Security
and Defence Policy] activities”. What
will this mean in practice on the ground?
That remains to be determined, but considering the extremely guarded attitude of
member states like Germany and France,
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Civil society interested
The reproach comes from non-governmental organisations: the assistance granted by the EU in the context
of the Eastern Partnership should be
further channelled through civil society. This would help better involve
civil society and the risks of corruption would be partially reduced.
For the changes recommended by
the Union to have a chance of succeeding, “they must come from the
inside, from civil society,” argues
Meister (DGAP). In its 20 April conclusions, the Foreign Affairs Council
“underlines the need to broaden the
EU’s engagement with civil society
and the business community”.
www.europolitics.info
20 INSIGHT
Wednesday 20 May 2015 N° 5092 EUROPOLITICS
From ‘sick man’ Belarus to exemplary Georgia
By Antoine Jacob in Riga
A brief review of ties between the EU
and the Eastern Partnership countries (except Ukraine, addressed
separately)
ARMENIA
The only partner country (of the six
in all) to break off association agreement negotiations, Yerevan announced
its decision ahead of the Vilnius
summit (November 2013), bringing
rapprochement with the EU to a halt.
Armenia then joined (in January 2015)
Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus as a
member of the Eurasian Economic
Union. The EU claims that this is not
incompatible with a new agreement
and has even drawn up the outlines of a
new text. The Riga summit could mark
the official launch of negotiation of a
new agreement. Since January 2014,
this country of three million inhabitants has benefited from a visa facilitation regime. The territorial conflict of
Nagorno-Karabakh is poisoning Armenia’s relations with Azerbaijan.
AZERBAIJAN
The country furthest geographically
from the EU, Azerbaijan has limited
interest in an association agreement
with the Union. Its oil and gas reserves
are such, though, that it is wooed by the
EU and others despite its human rights
violations. While it is free to choose
what interests it in the European offer,
Baku sees its relations with the Union
primarily in a strategic perspective. At
www.europolitics.info
the Riga summit, the Azeri government
is expected to explain to the 28 how it
visualises this partnership in the future.
This country of 9.5 million inhabitants
has benefited from a visa facilitation
regime since September 2014. The
territorial conflict of Nagorno-Karabakh is poisoning its relations with
Armenia.
BELARUS
A special case in the Eastern Partnership, cooperation between the EU and
Belarus was for years kept to a minimum
due to the nature of the regime in Minsk
and President Alexander Lukashenko’s
rejection of the principles promoted
by the 28, such as freedom of expression and human rights. However, there
have been signs of a possible detente in
the wake of the leader’s involvement in
brokering the Minsk agreements for a
solution to the crisis in Ukraine. At the
Riga summit, the EU may initiate a visa
facilitation agreement with this country
of 9.5 million inhabitants. In keeping
with its “policy of critical engagement,”
the Union continues to apply targeted
sanctions against this member of the
Eurasian Economic Union.
GEORGIA
Together with Ukraine, this country
of 4.5 million inhabitants is considered
the most determined in its rapprochement efforts. On 27 June 2014, it signed
an association agreement with the EU
(including a deep free trade agreement)
that has been applied provisionally
since September pending ratification
by each of the 28 EU national parliaments. Tbilisi has achieved what are
seen as positive results in preparing the
way for a visa-free regime. The European Commission has nevertheless
stopped short of recommending this
step. In addition to its serious measures
to tackle corruption, Georgia set itself
apart with its participation in the EU
military mission in the Central African
Republic, where it provided the largest
contingent (150 troops). One of the
country’s problem areas is the situation
of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, occupied by Russia since the war of August
2008.
MOLDOVA
With a population of 2.9 million,
Moldova is the first of the six Eastern
Partnership countries to be granted a
visa-free regime. Since the end of April
2014, its citizens holding a biometric
passport are entitled to spend up to
three months in the Schengen area.
In addition, the association agreement
and its free trade component, signed
on 27 June of the same year, have
been applied provisionally since September pending ratification by the 28
EU national parliaments. These steps
look promising on paper, but cannot
mask the negative points of state corruption – “endemic,” according to a
recent study – the conflict in Transnistria (breakaway region backed by
Moscow), a complex ethnic situation
and the very pronounced temptation of
rapprochement with Russia. n
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INSIGHT
EUROPOLITICS N° 5092 Wednesday 20 May 2015
21
“Our partners are primarily interested in investments”
Interview with Elzbieta Kaça, specialist in ENP, Polish Institute of
International Affairs (PISM)
Shouldn’t the EU take on a greater
role as a geopolitical player?
The problem is that the EU
pretends not to be a geopolitical player. It should be more
engaged in its neighbourhood,
especially in the area of security,
to help resolve frozen regional
conflicts. But the member
states’ different foreign policy
priorities are problematic. The
28 disagree over the extent of
engagement in the Eastern
policy. Many states – mainly in
the South – question the need
for an ambitious engagement in
the Eastern Partnership, which
they hold responsible for the
destabilisation in Ukraine. So
the EU is not likely to become
more involved. In recent years
we have also seen the lack of
political will to develop the
Common Security and Defence
Policy. The EU is showing itself
incapable of acting to address
the current crisis.
One of the main problems of the Eastern Partnership is the ineffectiveness of
its financial instruments. What can be
done to make sure that European money
is better spent?
The current financial instruments are
not suited to circumstances in the region.
Budgetary support, which goes directly
into the partner states’ budgets, is not
effective in countries where corruption
is rampant. The EU does not have the
means to oversee the way this money is
spent. The second problem is that the
EU makes budgetary support conditional
on legislative changes, but does not really
monitor implementation of reforms. Most
of the time, these exist only on paper. To
improve the situation, the EU should
start by reducing the rate of budgetary
support and then increase funding on
the basis of tenders and direct subsidies
to players on the ground. The EU should
also improve mechanisms for supervising effective implementation of reforms.
Lastly, it should improve the consultation
process on the conditions of such reforms
by organising transparent consultations
with all interested stakeholders, not just
There is also a need to develop projects
that aim to place business people from
these countries in contact with those in
the EU. The East Invest project is a very
good idea, but it is an initiative with a
budget of barely €8.75 million for the
years 2010-2014. That’s not enough to
have a significant impact.
The Eastern Partnership
also needs to cut the number
of its priorities. What should
it focus on to try to better
meet the expectations of its
partners?
In this financial perspective,
the EU has put in place three
priorities at bilateral level, differentiated according to country. In Georgia, for instance,
the focus is reform of the judicial system, the public administration, agriculture and rural
development. The problem is
that there is a considerable dissonance between the priorities
chosen by the External Action
Service and the funds allocated
by the European Commission.
Better coordination is needed.
The partner states would like
to see more positive impacts
in the short term. The EU
should give up its Eurocentric
approach based on the assumption that
we can impose our values and complex
reforms on these countries with promises
of benefits only for the longer term. The
implementation of deep and comprehensive free trade agreements (DCFTAs) will
be a very long process and the EU has few
ideas on new incentive measures. Our
partners are primarily interested in greater
European investment on their territory.
Programmes for SMEs and the business
community could be tangible incentives.
Since there is no possibility of giving these
countries membership perspectives, there
is a need for more win-win solutions with
tangible short-term effects for the population. And most importantly, budgetary
support must be conditional on efforts
to tackle corruption, which is the principal barrier to these countries’ economic
development. n
© EK
By Jakub Iwaniuk in Warsaw
Elzbieta Kaça
civil servants, but also MPs, the business community and civil society, so that
implementation of reforms takes account
of local circumstances. That would considerably improve the effectiveness of the
funds committed.
Shouldn’t the EU do more to support
the business community and SMEs in
the Eastern Partnership states?
Up until now, EU support for business
in these countries has been very limited.
In the partner states, SMEs are developing in a dynamic manner but in difficult
conditions. Their main problem, above
and beyond unfavourable legislation, is
access to capital. It would be a good idea
to boost EU aid for business projects with
micro-credits, in association with the EIB
and the EBRD. This type of funding
already exists but on too small a scale.
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www.europolitics.info
22
Wednesday 20 May 2015 N° 5092 EUROPOLITICS
OPEN FORUM
Eastern Partnership: EU needs political will and ambition
This week, the leaders of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and
Ukraine will arrive at the Eastern Partnership summit in Riga with different
track records and agendas. The EU
will arrive divided and undecided on
its goals for the region and the way to
achieve them.
The developments in Ukraine
have caught many EU leaders by surprise. Most member states were not
paying attention while the Eastern
Partnership - the 2009 brainchild of
the ex-Foreign Ministers of Poland,
Radek Sikorski, and Sweden, Carl
Bildt - was gaining ground, covered
behind a veil of bureaucratic and
technical cooperation. They only
woke up to the fact that the Eastern
Partnership has real political impact
when bloodshed casted Ukraine’s
decision to opt for Europe.
Unlike elsewhere in the world
where it strives to find its political relevance and influence, in Ukraine, Moldova
and Georgia the EU has become deeply
relevant. It supported home-grown transformation and transfer of political power.
The EU nurtured the reformers who took
to the streets in Kyiv in 2013, Chisinau in
2009 and Tbilisi in 2003. They invoked
European standards of rule of law and governance to call for change in their countries.
Today, all three have proven that they
are prepared to pay a high price with their
security and welfare to defend these standards and the EU association agreements
they have signed. Ukraine has lost lives and
territory. It faces all-out war in its East and
barely averted bankruptcy. Moldova suffers
punitive trade measures. Both Chisinau
and Tbilisi are under permanent threat of
destabilisation in their separatist territories,
controlled by Moscow. They need the EU’s
support to become stable and prosperous
states.
The EU’s other partners - Armenia, Azerbaijan and Belarus - are less interested in
integration but look to the EU for market
access, financial aid, visa-free travel, technology and energy links. They all need
changes of government and at great personal risk, expect that the EU will uphold
its commitment to base relations on respect
for human rights and democratic standards.
But will the EU do either in Riga?
With war dragging on in Ukraine
and the deadlock in talks with
Russia, EU support for Ukraine and
the other signatories of association
agreements has started to falter. At
the previous summit in Vilnius - just
before Euromaidan - EU leaders
“acknowledged the European aspirations and the European choice
of some partners” and pledged to
support them in seeking “an ever
closer relationship with the EU”.
Nowadays, as demonstrated at the
recent EU-Ukraine summit, they
are reluctant even to repeat that the
association agreement is not the final
goal in relations. EU concessions to
Russia on the implementation of the
EU-Ukraine deep and comprehensive free trade agreement (DCFTA)
and its insistence to maintain trilateral talks on what is a bilateral trade deal,
is another sign of its readiness to scale back
its commitments and ambitions to yield to
Moscow.
As regards its commitment to rights
and democracy, the EU recently started a
rethink of its neighbourhood policy, questioning whether a partnership driven by the
promotion of democratic and economic
reforms gives it enough political influence.
Events in Ukraine confirm that it does.
Well-governed, sovereign neighbours are
a better guarantee for long-term security
than any short-term deal making. The Eastern Partnership is a good enough policy to
establish the EU as a strong player in the
region. What is missing are the political will
and ambition to defend it and make real use
of what it offers. n
© OSEPI
By Iskra Kirova (*)
Iskra Kirova
the Eastern Partnership to broaden their
foreign policy options and strengthen their
independence vis-à-vis Russia. It is in the
EU’s long-term interest to use these levers
to sustain cooperation and invest in political inclusion, stable and transparent institutions, and economies free from corruption.
But the EU member states do not seem
willing to embrace these opportunities. Some
seem prepared to bargain the countries’
European aspirations and their future potential to reform in order to reach an accord
with Moscow or with regional political
elites bent on preserving their power.
Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine expect to
be rewarded for their pro-European choice
and the sacrifices they have made. It will
be hard to sell EU-inspired reforms to the
peoples of these countries without tangible
returns. Rights defenders and reformers in
Armenia, Azerbaijan and Belarus, who have
carried the democracy agenda through
(*) Iskra Kirova is policy analyst at the Open
Society European Policy Institute
Europolitics is offering a platform for outside comment and opinion by opening a regular Open forum section. All contributions are welcome, up to 4,500 characters
(including spaces). They should be sent in to [email protected] and, if possible, accompanied by a translation into English or French along with a photo of the
author in jpg format (300 dpi). The final decision on whether to publish these contributions or not remains solely with Europolitics.
www.europolitics.info
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23
EUROPOLITICS N° 5092 Wednesday 20 May 2015
EU agenda
Wednesday 20 May
EUROPEAN
PARLIAMENT
PLENARY SESSION
Strasbourg
09:00 - 11:50 Debates
•European Agenda on Migration
2015/2648(RSP)
12:00 - 14:00 Votes followed by
explanations of votes
•Election of a Vice-President of the
European Parliament 2015/2696(RSO)
•Parliament’s calendar of part-sessions –
2016, 2015/2695(RSO)
•Trade, development and cooperation
agreement with South Africa (Protocol to
take account of the accession of Croatia)
2014/0236(NLE) Report Davor Ivo Stier
(A8-0146/2015) DEVE
•Prevention of the use of the financial
system for the purposes of money
laundering or terrorist financing
2013/0025(COD)II Report Judith
Sargentini , Krisjanis Karins (A80153/2015) LIBE , ECON
•Information accompanying transfers
of funds 2013/0024(COD)II Report
Timothy Kirkhope, Peter Simon (A80154/2015) LIBE , ECON
•Insolvency proceedings
2012/0360(COD)II Report Tadeusz
Zwiefka (A8-0155/2015) JURI
•Self-certification of importers of
minerals and metals originating in
conflict-affected and high-risk areas
2014/0059(COD)I Report Iuliu Winkler
(A8-0141/2015) INTA
•Commission Delegated Directive
../…/EU amending, for the purposes of
adapting to technical progress, Annex
III to Directive 2011/65/EU of the
European Parliament and of the Council
as regards an exemption for cadmium
in illumination and display lighting
applications” 2015/2542(DEA)
•Implementation of the Common
Security and Defence Policy
2014/2220(INI) Report Arnaud Danjean
(A8-0054/2015) AFET
•Financing the Common Security and
Defence Policy 2014/2258(INI) Report
Eduard Kukan , Indrek Tarand (A80136/2015) BUDG , AFET
•Security and defence capabilities in
Europe 2015/2037(INI) Report Ana
Gomes (A8-0159/2015) AFET
•Maternity leave 2015/2655(RSP) Report
(O-000050/2015 - O-000049/2015)
•UN Convention on the Rights of Persons
with Disabilities 2015/2684(RSP)
•Outbreak of Xylella fastidiosa affecting
olive trees 2015/2652(RSP) Report
(O-000038/2015)
15:00 - 23:00 Debates
•2014 Progress Report on Turkey
2014/2953(RSP)
•Situation in Ethiopia 2015/2703(RSP)
•Situation in the former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia 2015/2704(RSP)
•Eastern Partnership summit (21-22 May)
2015/2610(RSP)
•EU - CELAC summit (10-11 June)
2015/2637(RSP)
•Youth Employment Initiative
2015/2679(RSP)
Report (O-000051/2015)
•Japanese whaling activities in the
Antarctic 2015/2702(RSP)
THE PRESIDENT’S DIARY
Strasbourg
n09:00Chairing of the Plenary: Council
and Commission statements - European
Agenda on Migration
n11:00 Meeting with Michel Vauzelle
- President of the regional council of
Provence-Alpes-Cote-d’Azur
n12:00 Chairing of the votes in Plenary
n14:45 LEX signing - Louise Weiss
building, Floor 0, Salon Protocolaire
n17:30 Meeting of the delegation to the
Parliamentary Assembly of the Union
for the Mediterranean - Louise Weiss
building N3.2
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COUNCIL
OF MINISTERS
COREPER I
Brussels
COREPER II
Brussels
EASTERN PARTNERSHIP MEDIA
CONFERENCE
Riga
EASTERN PARTNERSHIP CIVIL SOCIETY
CONFERENCE
20 – 21 May, Riga
“PARTICIPATION OF NON-GOVERNMENTAL
ORGANISATIONS IN THE RESOCIALISATION
PROCESS” II
18 – 20 May, Brussels
EUROPEAN POLICE COLLEGE (CEPOL)
GOVERNING BOARD
19 – 20 May, Riga
EUROPEAN
COMMISSION
TRAVEL AND VISITS
nMaros Sefcovic participates in the
ministerial conference on the International
Energy Charter in The Hague,
Netherlands.
nJyrki Katainen participates in a panel
debate at European Centre of Employers
and Enterprises providing Public Services
(CEEP), in Brussels.
nJohannes Hahn participates in the First
Eastern Partnership Media Conference, in
Riga.
nNeven Mimica attendsthe Sustainable
Energy for all Initiative forum, in Brussels.
nMiguel Arias Canete participates in the
Petersberg Climate Dialogue VI, in Berlin,
Germany (17-20 May).
nPierre Moscovici heard by the European
www.europolitics.info
24
Affairs Committees and Finance of the
French Senate (Paris).
nPhil Hogan in Memphis USA;
participation in OECD 10th Rural
Development Policy Conference (19/0521/06).
nMargrethe Vestager in Madrid (20-21
May): meets representatives of the Joint
Committee for the EU and the Committees
for Financial Affairs and Competitiveness
of the Spanish Parliament and Senate;
meets with Luis de Guindos,Minister for
Economy and Competitiveness; meets with
José Manuel Soria, Minister for Industry,
Energy and Tourism; meets with José
María Marín Quemada,President of the
Spain’s National Authority for Markets
and Competition; meets with José María
Roldán, President of the Spanish Banking
Association (AEB).
nCarlos Moedas is on mission to Lorraine,
France.
COURT OF JUSTICE
09:30
Third Chamber
nHearing C-141/14 Commission v Bulgaria
09:30
Third Chamber
Wednesday 20 May 2015 N° 5092 EUROPOLITICS
GENERAL COURT
09:30
First Chamber
nHearing T-9/11 Competition
Air Canada v Commission
09:30
Ninth Chamber
nHearing T-195/14 Intellectual property
Compagnie des gaz de pétrole Primagaz v
OHMI - Reeh (Prima Klima)
09:00-18:30
09:30
Second Chamber
nJudgment T-310/12 Commercial policy
Yuanping Changyuan Chemicals v Council
14:30
Fifth Chamber
nHearing T-276/13 Commercial policy
Growth Energy and Renewable Fuels
Association v Council
INT/736 Space policy project - event in
Lituania, Hrs siège
nHearing Joined cases T-292/14, T-293/14
Intellectual property
Cyprus v OHMI (Halloumi), Cyprus v
OHMI (Halloumi)
09:30
First Chamber
nHearing T-78/14 Intellectual property
Benediktinerabtei St. Bonifaz v OHMI Andechser Molkerei Scheitz (Genuß für
Leib & Seele Kloster Andechs Seit 1455)
nHearing Joined cases C-283/14, C-284/14
Commercial policy
CM Eurologistik
GLS
09:30
Fifth Chamber
nHearing C-319/14 Customs union
B&S Global Transit Center
09:30
Fifth Chamber
nOpinion C-595/13 Taxation
Fiscale Eenheid
www.europolitics.info
2nd SG meeting TEN/567 “Energy storage:
a factor of integration and energy security”,
JDE61
09:00-17:30
14:30
Fourth Chamber
15:00
Eighth Chamber
09:30
Fourth Chamber
Eastern Partnership Civil Society
conference 2015: empowering civil
society in the European Union Eastern
Neighbourhood, Hrs siège
09:00-12:30
nOpinion C-177/14 Social policy
Regojo Dans
nOpinion C-240/14 Transport
Prüller-Frey
•integration of satellite data
•nanosatellites
•regional cooperation in the space industry
•funding opportunities at EU and national
level.
The conference will bring together
representatives from the European
Commission, national and regional
governments, space associations, scientists,
big businesses and SMEs and many others.
www.eurisy.org/event-satellite_applications_
benefits_for_the_Baltics/about
09:00-13:00
NAT/664 Common Agricultural Policy:
implementing arrangements - hearing on
19/5, SG on 20/5, JDE60
12:00-20:30
ECONOMIC AND
SOCIAL COMMITTEE
BOOSTING REGIONAL SUCCESS IN SPACE:
THE BALTIC WAY!
Kaunas, Lithuania
In the framework of the Space & Society
project, the EESC and the project
partners will organize six events in six
different countries. The objective is to
inform, network and discuss on specific
thematic subjects related to EU space
policy. Lithuania is one of the six selected
countries. The main topics discussed at the
conference will include:
•space market in the Baltic region and
SMEs
Business & Climate Summit, Paris, France,
20-21 May 2015, Hrs siège
13:30-18:00
European Youth Conference - Let’s Take
Care of the Planet! in partnership with
Monde Pluriel, JDE63
16:00-19:00
Group Delegation Eastern Partnership
Business Forum (Riga), Hrs siège
CONFERENCES
AND SEMINARS
Symposium
SECURITY OF ELECTRICITY SUPPLY – A
360° VIEW OF MARKET DEVELOPMENTS
AND POLICIES IN THE EU
3 June, Brussels
Organisers: Egmont – Royal Institute for
International Relations, Development Group
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