Number of Parties, Voter Turnout, and Political Efficacy: Evidence

Number of Parties, Voter Turnout, and Political
Efficacy: Evidence from Mayoral Elections and a
Public Opinion Survey in Brazil
Guilherme Russo
Vanderbilt University
April 13, 2015
One important difference between democratic systems around the world is the number
of political parties competing for power. While in the United States there are only
two parties in Congress, Brazil’s lower chamber is composed of representatives from 28
different political parties.
A prevailing view among scholars of parties is that systems with more political parties
increase individual efficacy for two reasons.1 First, a larger number of parties promote
a more diverse set of options in the political menu of voters, which should motivate
those who would otherwise feel alienated by a limited choice set to participate in politics
(Dalton 2008, Karp 2012, Powell 1986).2 Secondly, a larger number of parties should
increase competition for votes and outreach efforts from parties, thereby enhancing the
information available to individuals, which should heighten their levels of political efficacy,
or sense that they understand and can meaningfully participate in politics (Karp 2012,
Karp and Banducci 1999).
The political behavior literature tells a different story. As scholars offer evidence that
most individuals are not always certain of their own political positions (Converse 1964,
Hochschild 1981, Zaller and Feldman 1992), have difficulties understanding the position of
elites (Miller and Stokes 1963), and do not adjust their perceptions of parties according to
alteration of ideological positions (Adams, Ezrow, and Somer-Topcu 2011), more parties
would result in an increase in the level of complexity of a political system and, as a result,
lessen an individual’s capacities to understand politics.
In exploring this question of how party systems affect individuals perceptions of their
ability to understand and participate in politics I rely on a framework from social cognitive
theory to argue that from a theoretical perspective, at least, the “party complexity reduces
1
I differentiate between internal and external political efficacy in the next section.
In the spatial models of voting framework, this means that more parties should increase the probability that a party approximates voters political positions, when other factors are held constant.
2
1
efficacy” argument is more compelling than one touting the participatory benefits of a
system with numerous political parties. Larger numbers of political parties diminish the
utility of parties as heuristics for voters and reduce levels of individual political efficacy.
The paper evaluates the merits of these competing views, with a theoretical expectation
of finding more is not necessarily always better when it comes to the impact of political
parties on citizens’ efficacy and voter turnout.
In the following pages, I discuss how studies of comparative politics have often assumed
a positive effect of the number of parties on turnout, but overlooked the deleterious role
large party systems have on levels of political efficacy. Then, I borrow from social cognitive
theory to explain the process with which multiple parties increase the complexity of
politics, and consequently reduce perceptions of self-efficacy. Finally, I provide evidence
of the negative effect of party system fragmentation on turnout and individual efficacy
with analyses of mayoral elections in Brazil and Colombia, and AmericasBarometer data
from Brazil 2014.
The Effect of Parties on Turnout and Efficacy
Few findings in political science are as reliable as the increase in voter turnout associated with proportional representation electoral formulas (compared to majoritarian).
Proportional formulas motivate voters to cast ballots as the probability that their participation will be ineffectual decreases (Blais and Dobrzynska 1998, Karp and Banducci
2008, Powell 1986). Proportional electoral formulas are also associated with multi-party
systems due to the inherently lower threshold for parties to gain seats. As voters are
strategically incentivized to select only parties that stand a chance of winning seats,
proportional systems do not create incentives for the convergence of parties like in ma2
joritarian systems (Duverger 1954). These findings combined have led scholars to assume that individuals feel more politically efficacious in contexts with multiple parties as
turnout rates are higher. For example, Lijphart (1999) states that consensual democracy
is “gentler” because it promotes higher participation in elections, but does not differentiate between the effect of the number of parties and the effect of electoral formula.
The failure to discern the two in the study of political behavior can lead to misleading
interpretations.
The (dis)proportionality of an electoral formula is not only different than the
fragmentation of a party system, but actually one of its causes. The idea that more
parties lead to higher voter turnout is driven by a spurious correlation in both turnout
and number of parties are negatively affected by the degree of disproportionality of the
electoral formula. Hence, the disproportional translation of votes into seats leads to less
parties competing for parties and lower levels of electoral participation.
Assumed Effect
Number of Parties
+
Spurious Effect
Voter Turnout
Disproportionality
−
−
Number of Parties
Voter Turnout
Figure 1: Relationship between Number of Parties and Voter Turnout
Three studies of voter turnout address the problem of convoluting disproportionality with number of parties. Using multivariate regression, Blais and Carty (1990), Blais
and Dobrzynska (1998), and Jackman (1987) discriminate the two and find that an increase in the number of parties actually depresses turnout when controlling for degree of
disproportionality. According to Jackman (1987), this negative relationship is explained
by the compromises parties have to make when forming coalitions in the aftermath of
3
elections. That is, individuals have less incentive to participate if who voted for will not
follow through with the promises from the campaign because of coalitions with parties
of different agendas. Recent experimental work from Brazil also finds that in scenarios
with a larger choice set, individuals are more likely to abstain (Cunow 2014a), to acquire information, and to choose the “correct” candidate due larger cognitive costs for
voters (Cunow 2014b). While these studies contradict the idea that more options in
elections promote electoral participation, they are not explicit about the effect of party
fragmentation on individual efficacy, and do not test the merits of specific mechanisms.
Scholars of party systems argue that there is a positive effect of number of parties
on individual political efficacy through two mechanisms: diversity of options and mobilization. Dalton (2008), Karp (2012) and Powell (1986) suggest that systems with a large
number of parties provide individuals with more political efficacy because it fosters more
options in the electoral ballot. By offering a wider range of party choices, these systems
most closely approximate the democratic ideal of interest-based representation. In Karp’s
(2012) words, “a larger number of parties should increase the options from which voters
can choose, which should lead to a greater sense of efficacy” (p.73-74).
Another set of works pose that a larger number of parties should increase competition for votes and efforts from parties, which in turn makes individual more efficacious
and likely to show up to the voting booth (Karp 2012, Karp and Banducci 1999). Mueller
and Murrell (1986) propose that because variation in electoral participation is explained
by the turnout of the poor, more parties competing for the vote of the poor should lead
to higher voter turnout.3
The extent to which these mechanisms have found empirical support, however,
3
I recognize that Mueller and Murrell (1986) do not make an argument specific to efficacy, but the
extent to which mobilization efforts affect from affect voting not only through the promise of goods,
individual efficacy is as a fundamental mechanism to generate participation.
4
is limited. In a comprehensive cross-national study of elections, Blais and Carty (1990)
do not find the number of parties and competitiveness to mediate the positive effect of
proportional representation on turnout. Contrary to their initial expectations, Karp and
Banducci (2008) do not find a relationship between the number of parties in parliament
and political efficacy with data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Studies. In
fact, their result suggests that a larger number of parties in the coalition government is
associated with a decrease in efficacy. Moreover, when evaluating the theoretical predictors of political mobilization in Europe, Karp (2012) does not find an increase in the
effective number of parties to be associated with higher rates of individuals reporting
more experiences of mobilization.
On the other hand, findings from the political behavior literature provide reason for skepticism toward the idea that more parties increase individual efficacy. The
diversity of options theory assumes that individuals first develop their preferences on issues, and then are able to correctly identify the congruent political party. Yet, Converse
(1964), Hochschild (1981) and Zaller and Feldman (1992) provide evidence that ordinary
citizens often do not have consistent views around issues, and Miller and Stokes (1963)
demonstrate that most individuals have difficulties in understanding the position of elites.
The mobilization story, on the other hand, implies that a larger amount of information is positive for individuals’ political efficacy, which contrasts studies on cognitive
capacity and information overload (Rahn et al. 1994, Sniderman and Levendusky 2007).
Even considering heuristics, Kuklinski et al. (2001) question this assumption,“(I)t is
natural to think solely in terms of the sheer volume of information- facts, arguments,
policy details, and so on- that the environment provides, on the assumption that more
information is better than less. However, this approach misses the point. A small amount
5
of highly pertinent information will often enhance citizen competence far more than a
mountain of peripherally relevant facts and arguments”. Therefore, the behavior literature raises important considerations regarding the idea that more parties and more
information would represent a benefit for individuals. Following this trend, I argue that
more parties result in an increase in the level of complexity of politics and, as a result,
lessen individuals’ capacities to understand politics. But first, I clarify what political
efficacy is and why it matters.
What Political Self-Efficacy Is and Why It Matters
The concept of political efficacy4 is not new to political science. Studies of public
opinion have long recognized the importance of efficacy to individual political behavior
(e.g. Almond and Verba 1963, Campbell et al. 1954, Campbell et al. 1960).5 Perceptions
of political efficacy matter to democratic politics to the extent that they affect levels of
support for the system and political participation.6 Individuals who perceive themselves
as represented by political actors and capable of understand what happens in politics are
more likely to support the system in place and to participate in politics. Almond and
Verba (1963) describe the relationship of efficacy toward feelings toward democracy and
participation as follows:
“The belief in one’s competence is a key political attitude. The self-confident
citizen appears to be the democratic citizen. Not only does he think he can
participate, he thinks others ought to participate as well. Furthermore, he
4
The use of political efficacy here is concerned with individual-level beliefs, and should be discerned
from concepts regarding governments capabilities such as government effectiveness or government efficacy.
5
Campbell et al. (1954) define political efficacy as “the feeling that individual political action does
have, or can have, an impact on the political process” (p. 187).
6
The use of political efficacy here is concerned with individual-level beliefs, and should be discerned
from concepts regarding governments capabilities such as government effectiveness or government efficacy.
6
does not merely think he can take part in politics, he is likely to be more
active. (p. 257)”.
Hence, a citizenry with low level of political efficacy means that individuals do not feel
they are in control of politics, which dissents from the idea that in a representative
democracy citizens ought to act as agents who delegate decisions to elected politicians.
The concept of political efficacy has been divided into internal and external political efficacy to differentiate the individual from the institutional component of citizens’
political action.7 This distinction separates the individual from the exterior world by
recognizing that as much as an individual may believe she has the capabilities to understand and be an effective actor in the political process, institutional constraints may
impede her from achieving her aspirations.8 Clarke and Acock (1992) distinguish the two
by defining internal political efficacy as “the perception that one has the requisite skills
and resources to influence the political system”, and external efficacy as “the perception
that government institutions and elites are responsive to ones attempts to exert political influence” (p. 552).9 This paper focuses on internal political efficacy, which although
considered by numerous works of political behavior, still lacks a theory of how individuals
develop these beliefs, and how political contexts may affect them.
To fill in this gap, I draw from the psychological sciences literature on the concept
of self-efficacy. Vecchione and Caprara (2009) expose the inattention of political science
work on efficacy to this parallel literature in psychology, “surprisingly, despite the vast
literature on political efficacy, little attention has been paid to Bandura’s (1986) work
on perceived self-efficacy and to social-cognitive theory, which embeds self-efficacy beliefs
7
Lane (1959) is the first to raise attention to the importance of differentiating between the two.
For example, as much as an African American was highly qualified and motivated to enter politics
in southern states during the 1950s, the institutional settings of the time would not permit it.
9
The response of institutions to ones attempts to exert political influence is captured in social cognitive
theory by the concept of locus control, which apprehends the decision over the success of an action.
8
7
in a comprehensive theory of personality” (p. 487). Bandura (1986) argues that selfefficacy beliefs shape the decision and level of determination one engages with a certain
task.10 “People with assurance in their capabilities approach difficult tasks as challenges
to be mastered rather than as threats to be avoided. Such an efficacious outlook fosters
intrinsic interest and deep engrossment in activities. They set themselves challenging
goals and maintain strong commitment to them” (Bandura 1994).11 That is, positive
perceptions of self-capability to understand the positions of political parties on issues or
how a bill is passed leads one to be more likely to seek political information or participate
in a protest in the same manner positive self-perceptions of understanding what is a
normal distribution or how a correlation is calculated affects one’s likelihood to seek
more information on statistics or to use an statistical program. On the other hand,
people who doubt their capabilities to perform an action are more likely to shy away
and/or slacken their efforts in tasks from that domain (Bandura 1997). Therefore, an
individual who doubts his ability to understand political issues is less likely to participate
in politics than his confident counterpart.
A Theory of Party Systems and Self-Efficacy
I posit that political self-efficacy is affected by previous experiences with politics,
which in turn are a function of the system they live in. The extent to which individuals
believe in their ability to be competent agents is driven by the difficulty to understand
politics at the elite-level. Different institutions and context level variables may factor
10
Efficacy is not the motivation per se (i.e. one does not engage with politics to be more efficacious),
but it is a condition that increases the probability an individual will engage in politics (Renshon 1974).
11
I argue that political self-efficacy beliefs affect political behavior in the same fashion as educational
self-efficacy beliefs affect behavior in education. For reviews on the extensive literature on the impact of
self-efficacy beliefs on behavior in education and health behavior, see Bandura (1997) and Gecas (1989).
8
in the complexity of the political system, however, the electoral system is the topmost
institution because it shapes the party system and composition of coalition governments
(Norris 2008). The organization of parties and government make the frame with which
citizens perceive and interact with politics.
The complexity of the organization at the elite-level given by the organization
of political parties affects individuals’ experiences of taking charge of politics (understanding and participating), which in turn predict their political self-efficacy beliefs. In
other words, as the political reality becomes more complex, individuals have a harder
time understanding political issues when watching the news, discussing politics among
acquaintances, picking candidates among the options, etc. When individuals are not able
to adequately comprehend and manage (make associations between actors, categorize
parties in the left-right spectrum, understand the implications of positions on issues, etc)
the complexities the political scenario presents, they believe less in their capacity to be
competent political agents.
If we imagine a controversial issue being debated in a two-party legislative chamber,
and the same issue being debated in a eight-party chamber, the probability that an
individual will fully grasp the particularities and position of the parties will be much
higher in the two-party context. Stewart et al. (1992) provide some evidence for my
argument as they find that feelings of efficacy related to province and federal politics
were less correlated as the party systems were increasingly different in Canada. That is,
for those under provinces where the parties were the same at both levels, the proximity
of their feelings of efficacy was significantly larger (Stewart et al. 1992). Therefore, the
extent to which individuals feel successful and not confused by the complexities at the
elite-level shape their self-efficacy beliefs about future political behavior, like voting.
9
Evidence from Mayoral Elections
An implication of my theory is that as the number parties in an election is higher,
all else equal, the level of complexity in politics increases, which in turn should depress individuals’ self-efficacy beliefs and likelihood to vote. However, even if we find such result,
Jackman (1987) proposes post-election coalition formation as an competing mechanism
to the decrease in voter turnout. Mayoral elections in Brazil provide an opportunity to
disentangle these two mechanisms because as the formation of coalition between parties
is done prior to the election, voters can take coalitions into consideration when deciding
to turnout or not. Hence, it is possible to isolate the effect of coalitions from the effect
the complexity of information given by a larger number the number of options produces
on efficacy and turnout.
The comparison of elections across municipalities also provides common advantages of subnational analysis (see Snyder 2001). First, because the number of observations is higher, the probability of bias due outliers is substantially reduced. Second,
the comparison of municipal elections inherently controls for a number of possible confounding factors in cross-national analysis like time, electoral laws, ballot structure, etc.
Moreover, comparing municipalities of the same country also reduces the potential impact of other important variables in the party system like ideology (Sartori 1976), and
institutionalization (Mainwaring and Scully 1995).
In the Brazilian mayoral elections of 2012, there was ample variation in the number
of candidates across municipalities. Figure 1 presents the distribution of candidates
in the 5568 elections, in which municipalities with between five and eight candidates
were grouped together, as well as those with nine or more candidates.12 While the
12
In the analysis, I only have 5563 cases because 5 municipalities were created between 2008 and 2012.
10
number of uncontested elections (one candidate) was low, the number of elections with
two candidates was superior to 2000. The number of mayoral elections with more than
1500
1000
500
0
Number of Municipalities
2000
two candidates gradually decreases as the number of candidate continue to increase.
1
2
3
4
5−8
9+
Number of Candidates
Figure 2: Municipalities by Number of Candidates in Mayoral Elections in Brazil 2012
To adequately compare turnout rates13 across elections with different number of
candidates, however, it is necessary to control for a number of confounding factors. First,
because the number of candidates in an election is a function of the previous elections in
the municipality, it is fundamental to take into account the turnout rate in the previous
election to serve as the baseline (where municipalities were in the past), and it directly
influences the number of candidates in the future. Hence, Model 1 presents turnout rate
in 2008 as the only predictor, and not only demonstrates the high correlation with the
previous election, but also already explains more than 70% of the variation in turnout
levels in 2012. Second, numerous important differences across states in Brazil could
confound the results of the number of parties. In Model 2, I include fixed effects to explain
13
Turnout is measured as the percentage of votes casted divided by the total number of registered
voters, and it ranges from 85% to 99%.
11
all the variation across states, and the percent of variation explained increases to 82.75%.
Third, because larger municipalities have, on average, a higher number of candidates,
and there may be differences of levels of turnout across size of municipalities, I include
a five-category measure of the size of the polity.14 After controlling for previous turnout
and state-level differences, different polity sizes do not present significant differences in
turnout.
Model 4 finally includes the number of candidates in the election, with those of five
or more candidates divided into categories, as well as the average size (number of parties)
of coalitions in that election. The results indicate that, after controlling for the number
of candidates, elections in which there is on average on extra party in each coalition,
turnout is significantly lower by .74%. This result support Jackman’s (1987) theory that
larger-sized coalitions reduces turnout through the “dissolution” of candidates’ campaign
platforms. Nonetheless, Model 4 also presents a negative relationship between number
of candidates and turnout. With the exception of uncontested elections (one candidate)
in which citizens likely perceive voting as fruitless (and thus turnout should be lower),
Model 4 demonstrates that turnout is significantly lower in elections with more candidates. Holding previous turnout level, size of municipality, and state differences constant,
turnout in elections with nine or more elections is, on average, 1.13 percentage points
lower than counterparts with two candidates.
The within-country comparison avoids electoral rules differ across observations,
but the extent to which votes matter in an election are also a product of the level of
competition, or what Downs (1957) calls the “p” term.
14
This measure was created directly from the number of votes cast in the municipal election: “Very
Small” are polities with less than 20.000, “Small” have between 20.000 and 39.999 votes, “Medium”-sized
polities have between 40.000 and 99.999 votes, “Big” polities have between 100.000 and 199.999 votes in
the mayoral election, and “Very Big” had 200.000 votes or more cast.
12
Table 1: OLS Regressions of Turnout, Mayoral Elections - Brazil 2012
(Intercept)
Turnout Rate in 2008
Model 1
11.69∗∗∗
(0.65)
0.84∗∗∗
(0.01)
Model 2
14.60∗∗∗
(0.71)
0.81∗∗∗
(0.01)
Model 3
14.85∗∗∗
(0.73)
0.81∗∗∗
(0.01)
−0.15
(0.11)
−0.20
(0.14)
0.01
(0.25)
0.17
(0.27)
Model 4
15.97∗∗∗
(0.77)
0.80∗∗∗
(0.01)
−1.55∗∗∗
(0.26)
−0.23∗∗
(0.08)
−0.21∗
(0.10)
−0.50∗∗∗
(0.13)
−1.13∗∗∗
(0.32)
−0.08∗∗∗
(0.02)
0.01
(0.11)
0.02
(0.15)
0.34
(0.26)
0.61∗
(0.30)
Yes
0.83
5563
Yes
0.83
5563
1 Candidate
3 Candidates
4 Candidates
5-8 Candidates
9+ Candidates
Average Size of Coalition
‘Small’ Polity
‘Medium’ Polity
‘Big’ Polity
‘Very Big’ Polity
‘Not Competitive’
‘Highly Competitive’
State Fixed Effects
Adj. R2
Num. obs.
∗∗∗ p
< 0.001,
∗∗ p
No
0.71
5563
Yes
0.83
5563
Model 5
16.13∗∗∗
(0.77)
0.80∗∗∗
(0.01)
−1.22∗∗∗
(0.26)
−0.27∗∗∗
(0.08)
−0.26∗
(0.10)
−0.56∗∗∗
(0.13)
−1.17∗∗∗
(0.32)
−0.08∗∗∗
(0.02)
0.01
(0.11)
0.02
(0.15)
0.37
(0.25)
0.70∗
(0.30)
−0.48∗∗∗
(0.08)
−0.13
(0.13)
Yes
0.83
5562
Model 6
16.16∗∗∗
(0.78)
0.80∗∗∗
(0.01)
−1.22∗∗∗
(0.26)
−0.27∗∗∗
(0.08)
−0.27∗∗
(0.10)
−0.57∗∗∗
(0.13)
−1.24∗∗∗
(0.34)
−0.08∗∗∗
(0.02)
0.01
(0.11)
0.01
(0.15)
0.39
(0.27)
0.57
(0.41)
−0.48∗∗∗
(0.08)
−0.14
(0.14)
Yes
0.83
5510
< 0.01, ∗ p < 0.05
That is, assuming voters have an idea about how close the election will be, highly contested elections provide more incentive for turnout given that one’s vote has a higher
probability of actually making a difference. In Model 5, I include a three-category measure of the level of competition in the election.15 As expected, those in which the winner
15
This categorization derives from the proportion of votes received by the winning candidate in each
election: “Not Competitive” are elections in which the winning candidate received more than 60% of
the votes, in “Competitive” elections if between 40 and 60% of the vote, and “Highly Competitive” are
13
had a clear advantage were associated with a significantly lower rate of turnout, when
compared to competitive elections. Finally, in Model 6, I exclude the fifty-two larger municipalities in which the observations were only the first-round elections, and the results
are practically the same.
These results bolster the theory that the complexity of the electoral scenario seems
to turn voters away because of the complexity of information a larger number of candidates produces. Moreover, Brazil is serves as an unlikely case considering the small
amount of variation in turnout levels across municipalities due to enforced compulsory
voting. In Colombia, on the other hand, where voting is voluntary and there is a lot more
variation in turnout, Figure 3 presents a similar negative correlation in mayoral elections
60
50
20
30
40
Electoral Turnout
70
80
90
where increase in the number of candidates reduces turnout.16
2
4
6
8
10
Number of Candidates
Figure 3: Number of Candidates and Turnout across Mayoral Elections in Colombia 2011
elections in which the winning candidate received less than 40% of the vote.
16
Controls will be added in a future version, but unfortunately I cannot disentangle the effect of
coalitions as information on coalitions is not available.
14
The evidence presented heretofore relies on aggregate data to make inferences
about individuals’ self-efficacy beliefs, which could be problematic given the possibility of
ecological fallacy (Kramer 1983). To address this issue, I explore individual-level survey
data from Brazil 2014.
Evidence from Survey Data
According to my theory, an increase in the complexity of information produced by
more parties in a political context should lead to, all else equal, lower levels of political
efficacy. Thus, I should find similar results to the mayoral electoral data when analyzing
individual-level measures of self-efficacy. That is, increase in the number of candidates in
mayoral races across municipalities should negatively affect individual efficacy. I analyze
a question measuring self-perceived capability to understand politics at the municipal
level from the AmericasBarometer, Brazil 2014.17
The survey interview respondents from 106 different municipalities across the country.18 Using the same variables at the election-level in the previous analyses19 , I model
the data with a multi-level model in which municipalities are clusters of individuals20 .
At the individual-level, I control for standard demographic variables such as gender, age,
education and income levels, as well as individuals’ efficacy at the national level.21 At
the second level, besides the number of candidates, coalition, size of polity, and level
17
BRAEFF2B. You feel that you understand the most important political issues of the country. How
much do you agree or disagree with this statement? The variables is measured on a seven-point scale in
which more indicates higher perception of efficacy
18
Bras´ılia is not included in the analysis because it does not have a mayor.
19
Unfortunately, there is not a sufficient number of observations to include fixed effects per state. I
have included dummies for regions, and the results are practically the same.
20
Although responses at the municipal level are not representative, the random selection of neighborhoods and large number of municipalities make measurement error to be random, which does not bias
my results, and only makes it more difficult to find an effect (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994)
21
This measure serves as a baseline, especially given that it was the previous question.
15
of competition, I also include a second measure of size of municipality from the survey
database, and a binary variable for the presence of a Worker’s Party candidate (PT).22
Table 2 presents the results from the hierarchical linear models, first with all the municipalities included, and a second with the municipalities in which the election was not only
the first round.
Table 2: Multilevel Linear Models of Municipal-Level Self-Efficacy
All Municipalities
(Intercept)
0.58 (.53)
Female
−1.67∗∗ (.06)
Age
0.00 (.00)
Years of Education
0.03∗∗∗ (.01)
Urban
0.69∗∗∗ (.24)
Quintis de Riqueza
-0.01 (.03)
(Country) Self-Efficacy
0.69∗∗∗ (.02)
3 Candidates
−0.41∗∗∗ (.15)
4 Candidates
−0.31∗ (.19)
5-8 Candidates
−0.49∗∗ (.23)
9+ Candidates
−0.61∗∗ (.26)
Average Size of Coalition
−0.08∗∗ (.04)
‘Small’ Polity
0.47∗∗∗ (.16)
‘Medium’ Polity
0.54∗∗ (.20)
‘Big’ Polity
0.29 (.22)
‘Very Big’ Polity
0.65∗∗ (.28)
Mid-Sized City
−0.52∗∗ (.24)
Small City
−0.43∗∗ (.19)
‘Not Competitive’
0.06 (.11)
‘Highly Competitive’
-0.07 (.12)
Worker’s Party (PT)
0.10 (.07)
Num. obs.
1441
Num. municipalities
105
Variance (Municipality)
.18 (.06)
Residual
1.24 (.02)
∗∗∗ p
< 0.01,
∗∗ p
Final Election
0.98 (.70)
−1.68∗∗ (.08)
0.00 (.00)
0.04∗∗∗ (.01)
0.45 (.34)
-0.01 (.03)
0.67∗∗∗ (.02)
−0.40∗∗ (.16)
−0.29 (.20)
−0.52∗∗ (.24)
−0.54∗ (.29)
−0.08∗ (.04)
0.46∗∗∗ (.17)
0.55∗∗∗ (.21)
0.26 (.23)
0.48 (.34)
0.28 (.34)
0.19 (.29)
0.08 (.12)
−0.11 (.21)
0.11 (.09)
1047
84
.20 (.07)
1.26 (.03)
< 0.05, ∗ p < 0.01
The individual level predictors mirror results from other individual-level studies
of efficacy. Women, less educated, and those in the rural area present lower levels of
22
The literature on partisanship in Brazil points to the PT as the party with the largest number of
militants and partisans. Moreover, the fact that it has held the presidency for 12 years in the moment
of the survey contributes to its fame.
16
efficacy. The results from the second-level predictors are quite similar to the findings
from the turnout analysis. Controlling for a number of factors including the coalition
size, as the number of candidates increases, the average level of self-perceived efficacy
significantly decreases. The drop is particularly strong when we compare elections with
two and nine or more candidates. On average, the estimated drop is of .61 points, which
is equal to more than a third of a standard deviation change, or an increase of more than
18 years of education. The models also suggest a negative effect of the size of coalition,
but higher levels of efficacy associated with larger cities and when the Worker’s Party
(PT) is present.
Conclusion and Lessons for Brazil’s Democracy
The first contribution of this paper is to demythify the presumption that more
parties promote higher electoral participation due a spurious correlation. Secondly, it
questions the current theories of party system on personal efficacy, and presents a new
framework for the study of efficacy across political contexts. Empirically, it disentangles
two alternative explanations for the negative effect more candidates have on turnout, and
finds that the size of coalition as well as complexity of information significantly reduce
turnout. Finally, the paper presents evidence for the negative effect of more fragmented
party systems using a individual-level measure of self-efficacy from different municipalities
in Brazil.
Along with another piece I analyze cross-national variation in efficacy and Cunow’s
(2014a, 2014b) experiments in S˜
ao Paulo, these recent works have raised attention to the
negative effect a multitude of parties in a system can have on individuals’ political behavior. Observers of democracy are advised to reconsider the pros and cons of electoral
17
systems to, at least, take into consideration the disadvantage multi-party systems implicate on voters efficacy, particularly in non-consolidated democracies in Latin America,
Eastern Europe, Africa, and Asia.
´
In a recent interview to Epoca,
Scott Mainwaring mentioned that Brazil might have
the most fragmented party system of all times (Tavares 2015). The extent to which the
ultra-diverse menu of options is promoting effective representation and political stability
seems to be limited given public opinion data and the current mobilizations of discontent
with democratic politics (Russo 2015). In the debates of electoral reform, the party
system is often discussed, but the direction which the bill will take is not clear. Given
the evidence presented here, it seems fair to advocate for a reduction in the number
of parties and in the complexity of the information environment for citizens, may it be
through artificial or organic restructuring of parties.
18
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