PHILIPPINES: SK Watch - Monitoring SK Funds and Functionality

PHILIPPINES:
SK Watch - Monitoring SK Funds and Functionality
Project Completion Report
PROJECT OVERVIEW
Project Background
1.
The SK Watch Fund Monitoring project (SK Watch), another collaboration between the
Environmental Cooperation and Linkages, Inc. (ECOLINK) and the Partnership for Transparency
Fund (PTF), received a grant of US$29,228 with ECOLINK providing local counterparts of
US$17,065. The project ended in November 2010 and the detailed Project Completion Report
(PCR) was submitted in December 2010.
2.
SK Watch was a citizen-based initiative to curb corruption in the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK),
a government-supported youth council in every village, providing young citizens a direct role in
governance at a community level. By law, it receives a mandatory share in the Internal Revenue
Allotment for Local Government Units. Over the years, the use of the SK funds has been marked by
widespread corruption which ECOLINK estimated to be at US$15 million annually nationwide.
Stopping this corruption by establishing youth-based, youth-led transparency and accountability
mechanisms is the overarching objective of the project. These mechanisms were piloted in the cities
of Oroquieta, Dapitan, Iloilo and Pagadian.
Project Results
3.
The most significant of these mechanisms was the transformation of the Junior Graft Watch
(JGW), a joint-program of the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB) and the Department of Education
(DepEd), into an organization of well-motivated SK Watch monitors. Despite some project
setbacksa/, these JGW Monitors, trained on the use of the Manual on Monitoring SK Funds and
Functionality developed in the project, were able to achieve the end goal of controlling SK corruption
in the key areas where they were most rampant. The table below highlights this goal achievement in
the pilot cities.b/ A more comprehensive report on project accomplishments is detailed in the table of
Highlights at the end of this Project Overview.
4.
ECOLINK estimated that a total of P7.7 million (or US$167,000) had been protected from
corruption and waste by tight budget verification and expense monitoring of the JGW Monitors
deployed in 75 SK councils. For PTF, this represented a return of $6 for every $1 invested in the
project at this initial stage. The more important impact arising from this investment however was the
empowerment of the youth sector, the JGW in particular, to take responsibility – and be very
effective at it - in fighting SK corruption.
5.
This financial impact could be more directly estimated from the increase in budget surplus at
the end of 2009 in the pilot cities. c/ Based on available information from 50 SK councils in Oroquieta
and Pagadian, the total savings (that is, amount saved from corruption) amounted to $13,000 or an
a/
Discussed in detail in Para 3 of the Main Report
Table is derived from PCR and shows only partially information on total financial impact from the project; no
performance report from Iloilo City
c/
It is reasonable to attribute the increase in budgetary surplus at the end of the year to strict verification and
monitoring of SK budget and expenditures which resulted, among others, in cancellation of fraudulent
procurements and waiting shed construction and retrieval of SK properties. The presence of JGW Monitors
would have been sufficient to deter SK councils from undertaking corrupt practices.
b/
average of $260 per SK council. Nationwide, these savings would total to $13 million.d/ This is the
potential financial impact of implementing SK Watch nationwide through the proposed SK Watch
Exit Plan Implementation and Monitoring project.
Goal Achievement, By Pilot City
Impact & Results
Oroquieta
Pagadian
Dapitan
Ozamis
No. of JGW Monitors
Organized/Trained
No. of SK Councils
Monitored by JGW Monitors
Increase in SK Budget
Surplus (2009 vs 2008) due to
SK funds monitoring
Disbursements with 100%
Verification
No. and amount of fraudulent
procurements cancelled
2,660
340
400
100
40
10
20
5
25%
($6,522 )
20%
($6,500)
Increase
reported; no
amount given
$50,000
$15,200
$10,300
50
(no amount
reported)
10
$7,400
$6,900
5
(no amount
reported)
No Data
10
(no amount
reported)
No construction
Increase
reported; no
amount given
No amount
given
10
($2,800)
$2,600
$1,700
No. and amount of Waiting
Shed constructions prevented
SK Properties Verified or
Recovered
No Data
$1,000
6.
These results also showed that empowering the youth to take responsibility in fighting SK
corruption is a very productive option going forward. This empowerment took the following forms in
the pilot cities: (a) the JGW program was re-oriented to focus on fighting SK corruption; (b) the JGW
Monitors trained on the use of the SK Fund Monitoring Manual; (c) committed support from OMB,
DepEd and DILG left SK councils little choice but to accept the entry of JGW Monitors; and finally
(d) the provision of open-access facility by partner anti-corruption agencies of facility for JGW
Monitors to report and investigate SK wrongdoing faster, to secure technical assistance, and to lobby
for policy and administrative reforms led to more efficient and effective field monitoring operations.
All these gains enhanced transparency and accountability and improved governance in the SK
system. The key is ensuring that these gains are sustained.
Project Sustainability/Follow-Up Action
7.
The use of JGW has been the key success factor of the project, and it will remain a critical
element in sustaining project gains. Another important output of SK Watch however is the Draft
Junior Graft Watch Reform Plan, which was formulated on the basis of actual experiences and
practices of SK Watch. The JGW Reform Plan is a comprehensive set of reforms encompassing
Policy, Organizational Setup, Constituency Building, and Resources Mobilization to maximize the
effectiveness of JGW in promoting transparency and accountability in SK governance. Perhaps the
best example of practical innovation in the Plan is the proposal for DILG to require a JGW Monitor
Certification for every SK procurement. It is akin to implementing the new Government Procurement
d/
In the proposal ECOLINK estimated the extent of SK corruption nationwide at US $15 million, based on
extrapolation from results of its case study of 47 SK councils in Oroquieta City.
Reform Act down to the SK level, particularly Section 13, with JGW acting as the CSO designate.
This JGW Reform Plan now serves as the framework for the proposed SK Watch Exit Plan
Implementation and Monitoring project that will replicate SK Watch nationwide. PTF approval of
the proposed SK Watch Exit Plan Implementation and Monitoring is highly desired.
Highlights of Project Achievements, By Objectives and Activity
Objectives
Activities

2-Day
Anti-Corruption
Youth
To raise the awareness
Festival/Anti-Corruption Public
of youth on extent of
Speaking Competition &
corruption in SK and
Debate
the need to curb it
 Video Documentation
 Online “Youth on Corruption”
Portal
To improve youth
participation in SK
governance/ develop
at least 4,000
volunteers
 SK Watch Monitoring Kit
 Trainer’s Training on SK
Monitoring
 Training Series on SK
Monitoring & JGW Convention
 SK Watch Network
 Actual Monitoring
To enhance youth
access to anti-graft
offices and concerned
institutions
 Forum on SK Watch
 Online “Youth on Corruption”
Portal
 SK Watch Hotline
 Review of Junior Graft Watch
Program
To improve
transparency in SK
funds use and
compliance with
procurement
 Online Portal for all SK
Councils all over the country
 Development of Code of Ethics
on SK Services
Outputs
Held in Oroquieta, Pagadian and Dapitan, with total
attendance of 5,500: Oroquieta, 4,000; Dapitan, 1,000;
Pagadian, 500. 20 public and private schools joined
debate competition.
Still for completion in first quarter of 2011. As an
alternative, engaged in issue media exposure;
newspapers, 15; local TV stations, 7; speaking
engagements, 19.
Not completed yet, with the beta testing scheduled for
March 2011.
4,000 copies printed; Manuals distributed to 3,600
JGW Volunteers.
Trained 65 Trainers from the ranks of JGW members
and advisers.
Trained 3,600 JGW: Oroquieta, 2,600; Dapitan, 400;
Pagadian, 340; Ozamis, 100; Iloilo, 100; Other Cities,
60.
Network established in every pilot city.
Monitored no less than 75 SK councils: Oroquieta, 40;
Dapitan, 20; Pagadian, 10; Ozamis, 5. No report from
Iloilo.
Held in Cagayan de Oro, instead of Manila. MOA at
regional level only.
Website development still on-going. New expected
date of completion: end of March 2011.
Established coordination mechanism between
ECOLINK, DepEd, LGUs and OMB for the JGW
program at the regional (Mindanao) level.
Completed very comprehensive Draft JGW Reform
Plan for presentation to DepEd and the OMB in the
proposed SK Watch Exit Phase.
Development of On-Line Portal in progress; new
expected completion is end of March.
Code of Conduct not completed; priority shifted to
advocacy of Reform, instead of Abolition of the SK
councils.
Project Completion Assessment
SK Watch – Monitoring SK Fund and Functionality
MAIN REPORT
1.0
Background
1.1 The SK Watch Fund Monitoring project was another collaboration – the third in 4 years between the Environmental Cooperation and Linkages, Inc. (ECOLINK) and the Partnership for
Transparency Fund ((PTF).1/ The Grant Agreement was signed in July 2009 with PTF providing a
grant of US$29,228 and ECOLINK committing a counterpart of US$9,293 from its General Fund
(US$2,457) and Other Sources (US$6,836). The project whose mobilization was moved from July
2009 to October 2009 ended in November 2010. The detailed Project Completion Report (PCR) was
submitted in December 2010.
1.2 SK Watch was a citizen-based initiative to curb corruption in the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK),
a government-sponsored Youth Council in every village of the country, providing young citizens a
direct role in governance at a community level. By law, the SK has a mandatory share in the
Barangay Funds which mostly come from the government’s Internal Revenue Allotment for Local
Government Units. Over the years, the use of the SK Funds has been punctuated by widespread
corruption, as documented in the case study by ECOLINK in 47 SK councils in Oroquieta City.2/
This is the context of the project goal to establish accountability and transparency mechanisms to
curb corruption of SK funds in 4 pilot cities - Oroquieta, Dapitan, Iloilo, and Naga City. Naga City
was eventually dropped and replaced by Pagadian, Ozamis and Dipolog.
1.3 This Project Completion Assessment (PCA) would evaluate whether the purposes of the Grant
were achieved, addressing in particular the following dimensions:
a. Appropriateness of the original project objectives and design;
b. Whether the project was carried out as planned, and if there were significant changes, whether
they affected the project outcome materially;
c. Project outcome and impact in terms of project accomplishments, measurable impact on
corruption, and its sustainability;
d. Project impact on the institutional development of the partner CSO;
e. Major lessons learned from project implementation, and to the extent relevant, identifying
generic lessons replicable to other PTF projects;
f. Steps taken by the partner CSO to disseminate the results of the project and their
appropriateness; and
g. Adequacy of financial management and whether the partner CSO has received a satisfactory
2009 audit for the organization.
1.4
Various project documents were reviewed for this assessment particularly the Interim Final
Report, Grant Agreements, Project Proposal, and Accomplishment Report for October 2009-January
2010. The field visit in September 2010 to assess ACT II also discussed SK Watch with ECOLINK
1/
ECOLINK Philippines is now called Philippine Center for Sustainable Development and Environmental
Conservation Linkages, Inc. The CSO is still referred to as ECOLINK Philippines in this report.
2/
For details of the case study, please refer to the project proposal.
Project Management Team, CSO Project Coordinators for Oroquieta and Dapitan, and officials of
DepEd in Oroquieta City.
2.0
Appropriateness of Project Objectives and Design
2.1
Project objectives and design were assessed in the context of (a) the problems being
addressed, (b) the partner’s capacity to implement, and (c) the realism and consistency of the
components with the objectives. Advice provided by PTF and the extent to which the advice was
followed by the partner was also examined.
2.2
Extrapolating on the results of the Oroquieta SK study, ECOLINK estimated that some $15
million of SK funds were being lost to corruption every year nationwide. ECOLINK, a CSO of
young reform advocates, had a unique perspective for resolving this problem - by establishing a “3rdparty youth-driven, youth-led” mechanism for transparency and accountability in SK governance.
Four interrelated objectives were pursued to achieve the goal. In Table 1 above, these objectives
were presented in a cause-effect matrix starting with the factors that allowed corruption to flourish
and leading to the activities undertaken to achieve the objectives and stop corruption. The table
reflected the unity of project design and the consistency of project components with the objectives
and problem addressed.
Table 1
Problem-Objective-Activities Structure of SK Watch Project
Factors Contributing to
Rise in Corruption
Low awareness of youth to
extent of SK corruption
Objectives To Address
Corruption Problem
To raise the awareness of youth
on extent of corruption in SK and
the need to curb it
Minimal knowledge of
youth of ways to curb
corruption
To improve youth participation in
SK governance/ develop at least
4,000 volunteers
Limited access of youth to
anti-corruption agencies
To enhance youth access to antigraft offices and concerned
institutions
Weak compliance to
procurement laws and
disclosure in the use of SK
funds
To Improve transparency in SK
funds use and compliance with
procurement processes (bidding
in particular)
Activities
 Anti-Corruption Youth
Festival/Anti-Corruption Public
Speaking Competition
 Video Documentation
 Online “Youth on Corruption”
Portal
 SK Watch Monitoring Kit
 Trainor’s Training on SK
Monitoring
 Training Series on SK Monitoring
& JGW Convention
 Actual Monitoring
 SK Watch Network
 SK Watch Hotline
 Online “Youth on Corruption”
Portal
 Review of Junior Graft Watch
Program
 Forum on SK Watch
 Online Portal for all SK Councils all
over the country
 Development of Code of Ethics on
SK Services
2.3
The findings of the case study enabled ECOLINK to focus the project to four major problemareas where SK corruption was most prevalent. These were (a) diversion of funds, (b) the so-called
“Waiting-Shed Syndrome”, (c) misuse and misappropriation of SK properties, and (d) overpricing of
sports facilities & equipment. ECOLINK coined the “waiting-shed syndrome” to describe the
addiction of SKs around the country to build waiting sheds that hardly benefited communities and
were thus eventually laid to waste – simply because they were ‘tangible’ and easy-to-do projects;
they were also prone to corrupt practices. Thus these four centers of SK corruption became the
impact-level indicators for assessing achievement of project goal.
2.4
Thru ACT I & II projects, ECOLINK has proven its capacity to implement citizen-based,
community-level anti-corruption projects. However, there were new risks associated with the design
of this particular project and these involved the expansion of coverage to LGUs in Visayas (Iloilo
City) and Luzon (Naga) which posed the problem of coordination and control in areas where
ECOLINK had no existing network.
2.5
The Project Management Team could not recall any major recommendation from PTF/MBC
that had not been acted upon regarding project design at the time of proposal evaluation or during
project implementation. On the other hand, there were occasions ECOLINK diverted from planned
activities without sufficient clearance from PTF/MBC, as discussed below.
3.0
Plan vs. Actual in Project Implementation
3.1
Implementation of SK Watch was marked by changes, some minor but others managed to
modify the character of the project:
a.
b.
c.
d.
Project mobilization was delayed from July 2009 to October 2009 as ECOLINK undertook
corporate reorganization. Then planned activities for April and May were rescheduled to give
way to the election campaign period. Consequently, the project completion date was moved from
March 2010 to November 2010 and the planned 9 months project duration became 14 months.
This delay did not affect the attainment of project goal.
Naga City representing Luzon was dropped when ECOLINK did not get the endorsement of the
city government. Replacing Naga with another city in Luzon did not materialize; instead, Naga
was replaced by more Mindanao cities: Pagadian, Dipolog, Ozamis and Iligan (not all Activities
in Table 1 were implemented in these cities). Thus the original design to have a national project
with coverage of the three major island groupings (Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao) was
abandoned.
The Stakeholders’ Forum was moved from Manila to Cagayan de Oro due to the flooding in
Metro Manila. This move deprived ECOLINK the platform to launch SK Watch as a national
program supported by the national leadership of relevant agencies. The forum in Cagayan de
Oro was attended mostly by Mindanao-level officials of these agencies thus transforming SK
Watch to a regional project.
But the most significant departure from the original design was the decision not to continue with
the Code of Ethics, diverting attention and resources instead to generating a youth consensus for
the retention with reform of the SK system and to counter the move to abolish it. The Project
Management justified its decision: the Code of Ethics would have been meaningless if the SK
system is abolished.
3.2
Despite all these changes, the assessment below indicates that the core purpose of the Grant
was achieved. In tapping and capacitating the Junior Graft Watch, the project has put into operation
the powerful concept of a “youth-driven, youth-led” mechanism to institute transparency and
accountability in SK governance – the idea of the youth taking responsibility to curb rampant
corruption in a youth-based governance system.
4.0
Assessment of Project Performance, Outcome and Impact
This covered the assessment of project accomplishments and their impacts, the measurement of the
impact on corruption, and finally, an assessment of sustainability of project achievements.
Fortunately, the project proposal included a very detailed logical framework which provided for each
of the four objectives the performance indicators for assessing project achievements.
Project Performance
4.1
Project Management
Project Management was fully tested by the series of setbacks that occurred right from project
mobilization. It muddled through, to its credit, with key achievements at the end. The Interim Final
Report presented three levels of project assessments. The Output Assessment showed Activity-level
performance without details as to how each Activity performed in each of the pilot cities. Objective
Assessment showed the level of accomplishments for each of the four objectives and, in some cases,
how each pilot city performed. Goal Assessment showed the quantitative and qualitative impact of
results or outputs of objectives and activities in each of the pilot cities with appropriate final reports.
4.2
Raising the Awareness of the Youth on Extent of SK Corruption and the Need to
Curb It
Problem analysis by ECOLINK revealed that most of the times SK funds were disbursed without
prior knowledge of the youth councils and their actual uses were not available public information.
Thus the youth had very low awareness of the status – amount, use and abuse - of SK funds. This
objective addressed this fundamental problem. In Table 2 were the activities and expected output, the
target performance indicators, the actual performance, and the impact from achieving this objective.
This tabular summary presentation, which was used also for the other objectives, captured the
important highlights of project performance or nonperformance.
4.2.1 The 2-day Youth Art Festival remained the most popular and highly-visible way of raising the
awareness of the youth sector and to engage them in drawing solutions to the problem. It followed
the ‘good practices’ established in the two vehicle monitoring projects. It fostered collaboration
among the major sectors of the community, with the DepEd taking charge of organizing and
managing the festival events and the city government, the police, business community and the other
civic groups providing help and assistance. It was used to generate additional project revenues which
enabled ECOLINK to increase its local counterparts from $9,293 to $17,065. The youth festival was
tailored-fit to the liking and festive mood of the youth, as well as their craving for self-expression in
their denunciation of corruption in youth governance.
Table 2
Objective 1: Raise Youth Awareness on Extent of SK Corruption and the Need to Curb It
Activities & Output
Indicators
Performance & Impact
Anti-Corruption Youth
Festival and AntiCorruption Public
Speaking Competition
Festival held in 4 pilot
cities with thousands of
youth participating
Video Documentary
Video Documentary
shown in Schools and
TV stations
Online SK Watch Portal
Website operational,
thousands of youth
worldwide exchanging
views on SK corruption
Output:
JGW mainstay
volunteers in SK funds
monitoring. 3,500 youth
volunteers registered for
the project.
Held in Oroquieta, Pagadian and Dapitan with
total estimated attendance of 5,500 for the twoday event (Oroquieta, 4,000; Dapitan, 1,000;
Pagadian, 500). 20 public and private schools
participated in the anti-corruption debates and
public speaking competition.
Still for completion in first quarter of 2011.
Number of appearances in media events:
newspapers, 15; Local TV stations, 7; speaking
engagements, 19.
Not completed yet, with the beta testing
scheduled for March 2011.
Impact: Youth Empowerment
Raise awareness and participation of youth in
anti-corruption monitoring of SK fund. With
skills training on monitoring tools, the JGW
Volunteers were empowered as anti-SK
corruption monitors.
4.2.2 Two Activities - Video Documentation and SK Watch Online Portal – were on-going at the
close of the project. The Video Documentation was originally intended for showing in schools and
local TV stations, while the Online SK Watch Portal was envisioned to promote real-time worldwide
exchanges among the youth on the issue of corruption, transparency and accountability in the
management of SK funds. ECOLINK is committed to pursue post-project the completion of these ongoing Activities.
4.2.3 Output & Impact. Only the Youth Arts Festival, which included mural painting and public
speaking competition on the subject of SK corruption, became effective during the project life. An
estimated 5,500 young citizens, mostly students from the participating 20 private and public schools,
attended the Youth Festival. From this group, many became active JGW volunteers who were later
trained and deployed to monitor the use of SK funds. The impact in terms of raising SK corruption
consciousness and triggering appropriate anti-corruption initiatives among the hundreds and
thousands of young participants in the pilot cities will likely be significant and long-term under a
sustaining environment.
4.3
Increasing Youth Participation in SK Governance and Developing 4,000
volunteers to Monitor SK Funds.
4.3.1 This objective is the meat of the SK Watch project. In Table 3 were the activities for
achieving this objective, as well as the performance indicators and the actual performance generated.
The two most important outputs of this project that generated immediate positive impact were the
toolkit Manual on Monitoring SK Funds and Functionality and the utilization and training of the
Junior Graft Watch into an army, 3,600 strong, of SK Watch Monitors.
Table 3
Objective 2: Increase Youth Participation in SK Governance and Develop 4,000 Volunteers to
Monitor SK Funds
Activities & Output
Indicators
Performance & Impact
Develop SK Monitoring
Manual
4,000 copies of SK
Manual printed
Conduct Trainer’s
Training on SK
Monitoring Kit
Conduct series of Training
of JGW on SK
Monitoring Kit
Actual SK Funds
Monitoring
40 Trainors trained and
deployed
Formation of SK Watch
Network
Output:
Total of 3,600 JGW
Volunteers were trained
and ready for deployment
as SK Monitors
Network functional
4,000 JGW trained and
functional
120 SK councils
monitored
4,000 copies printed; Manuals distributed to
3,600 JGW Volunteers. Proven effective
during actual monitoring.
Trained 65 Trainers from the ranks of JGW
members and advisers. Trainers trained total of
3,600 Volunteers.
Trained total 3,600 JGWs on SK monitoring:
Oroquieta, 2,600; Dapitan, 400; Pagadian, 340;
Ozamis, 100; Iloilo, 100; Other Cities, 60.
Monitored no less than 75 SK councils from
the pilot cities: Oroquieta, 40; Dapitan, 20;
Pagadian, 10; Ozamis, 5. No report from Iloilo.
Network established in every pilot city.
Impact: Empowerment of the Youth and
Improved Transparency in use of SK Funds.
All SK councils targeted by SK Watch
accepted the entry of JGW Monitors. Their
deployment and use of SK Monitoring Manual
resulted in increased transparency and SK
accountability.
4.3.2 The Manual on Monitoring SK Funds and Functionality was developed in the early part of the
project, field-tested in the different pilot cities, and printed with 1,000 copies for the first edition and
3,000 for the second edition. A third edition has been planned to reflect changes in policies and
processes should the proposed Junior Graft Watch Reform Plan is adopted. The manual provided
guidelines, references and the “means to identify, measure, and address issues concerning SK.” It
may be accessed thru http://www.pcsdi.org/SOHFiles.
4.3.3 The strategy to tap Junior Graft Watch, a youth-based anti-corruption program of DepEd and
OMB to implement SK Watch, embodied ECOLINK’s philosophy for the project: to establish a
youth-driven, youth-led transparency and accountability mechanism in SK governance. Some 3,600
JGW volunteers from the pilot cities were trained on the use of the manual and then organized for
deployment in a total of no less than 75 SK councils where 100% of SK funds disbursements were
monitored and verified and the inventory of all SK properties were traced and checked for misuse.
The series of JGW training were undertaken by the 65 SK Watch trainers who were trained by
ECOLINK. The trainers’ training also included field-testing the manual for local adaptation and
revision, if needed.
4.3.4 Output & Impact. The project organized and empowered thousands of JGW Monitors in the
pilot cities to conduct monitoring of targeted SK councils, including 4 SK federations, using the
Manual on Monitoring SK Funds and Functionality. This resulted in improved transparency and
accountability in the management and disbursements of SK Funds. Based on partial data, these close
monitoring involved a total amount of P 7.7 million of SK funds. Detailed in Table 6 were (partial)
financial impacts derived from (a) the surplus of SK budgeted funds - perhaps indicative in part of
the amount saved from corruption and misuse; (b) cancellation of procurements found defective; (c)
cancellation of planned construction of waiting sheds found unnecessary; and (d) recovery of SK
properties misappropriated for personal use by SK officials. The monitoring also resulted in sanctions
to SK officials: (a) the one-month suspension of 2 SK Council Presidents, (b) the resignation of one
SK Federation President, and (c) the investigation of another SK Federation President requiring him
to go on leave for 6 months.
4.4
Enhancing Youth Access to Anti-Graft Offices and Concerned Institutions
4.4.1 The aim was for SK Watch to establish operational linkages with agencies and institutions with
the formal mandate to supervise SK councils and resolve performance and abuse issues through
judicial, policy, and administrative measures. These included the Office of the Ombudsman, the
Commission on Audit, National Youth Commission, Presidential Anti-Graft Commission, the DILG
and DepEd. At the basic level, the linkage would provide community-level monitors a red tape-free
reporting and access to technical support. The activities selected to pursue this objective were shown
in Table 4, together with the target indicators of performance, the actual performance and impact of
the results.
4.4.2 The installation of the SK Watch Hotline network provided the JGW Monitors the facility to
report and to investigate SK wrongdoing and lobby for policy and administrative reforms. Now
operational in some regions in Mindanao, the hotline resulted in stronger coordination among
ECOLINK, DepEd, and the OMB leading to more effective and efficient functioning of SK Watch’s
JGW Monitors. The next step going forward would be the creation of JGW Help Desk in every
strategic regional office.3/
4.4.3 On the other hand, the On-Line Portal, expected to be operational first quarter of 2011, wanted
to interconnect the SK councils and the JGW networks all over the country, as well as other
concerned youth groups worldwide, and allow them all the benefits of real time internet information
exchange. It is unfortunate that the independent web developer contracted for the job was delayed
and will require more time (end of March) to complete, fine tune, and ‘beta test’ the website.
ECOLINK remains committed to putting this into full operations post-project using its own
resources.
4.4.3 The Review of Junior Graft Watch Program was intended to develop a policy and action
framework for revitalizing and refocusing the current implementation of JGW program grounded on
the successful experiences and practices of SK Watch. Discussion with project team and school
officials during field assessment, for instance, highlighted the Oroquieta experience where young
3/
A follow-through Activity has been included in the proposed SK Watch Exit Phase short listed for PTF
funding support in the 2011 cycle.
JGW Volunteers responded more powerfully when provided specific missions whose results were
immediate and concrete than to classroom instruction on the broad concept of corruption. The
discussion also showed preference for the classroom-based JGW training provided by DepEd to be
more specific and targeted and geared towards developing skills for fighting corruption. SK Watch
had developed a JGW training curriculum and conducted training of that kind.
Table 4
Objective 3: Enhancing Youth Access to Anti-Graft Offices and Concerned Institutions
Activities & Output
Indicators
Performance & Impact
SK Watch Hotline
Online SK Watch
Portal
Review of Junior
Graft Watch
Program
Forum on SK Watch
Output:
Establish access and
cooperation with
anti-graft agencies
and institutions at
regional and national
level
Hotline established and
functional; thousands of
youth accessing and using
the Hotline
Website operational;
thousands of youth
worldwide into online
discussion of corruption
Proposed reforms to the
JGW Programs drafted
MOA at national level
signed with Partner
Institutions with MOA
Established coordination mechanism between
ECOLINK, DepEd, LGUs and OMB for the JGW
program at the regional (Mindanao) level.
Website development still on-going. New
expected date of completion: end of March 2011.
Completed very comprehensive Draft JGW
Reform Plan for presentation to DepEd and the
OMB in the proposed SK Watch Exit Phase.
Held in Cagayan de Oro, instead of Manila. MOA
at regional level only.
Impact:
Access and cooperation at the regional level
resulted in faster provision of assistance to
community-level JGW Monitors leading to more
transparency and control in the abuse of SK funds
in the Mindanao region. More effective if also
established at national level.
4.4.4 The JGW Reform Plan is very comprehensive, if ambitious. It encompasses very important
reform areas covering policy, organizational setup, constituency building, and resources mobilization.
Perhaps the best example of practical innovation in the plan is the proposal for DILG to require a
JGW Monitor Certification for every SK funds’ procurement. This proposal will make SK funds’
management and use very transparent and accountable. It is akin to implementing the new
Government Procurement Reform Act down to the SK level, particularly Section 13 with JGW acting
as the CSO designate.
4.4.5 Output and Impact. Access and coordination for the implementation of SK Watch through the
JGW program was established in the pilot cities. That made possible conduct of SK Fund monitoring
by JGW in Mindanao, which resulted in substantial savings from misuse and corruption.
Establishing this access and mechanism for cooperation at the national level will make the SK
Watch-JGW program more effective. Achieving this is the objective of the proposed SK Watch Exit
Phase project.
4.5
Improving Transparency in SK Funds Use and Compliance with Procurement
Processes
4.5.1 Until this time, disclosure of the uses of SK Funds is not the common practice in SK
governance and improvement in this area alongside strict compliance with procurement procedures
were addressed by this objective from both the supply and demand side. The On-Line Portal would
establish the medium through which the youth would demand and access fund use allocations and
expenditures. The Code of Conduct would impose self-regulation on the ethical use of SK funds
among SK council members. Together, these interventions would enhance the ‘check and balance’
system in SK governance. The activities to achieve the objective were shown in Table 5, together
with the target indicators of performance, the actual performance and the impact of the results.
Table 5
Objective 4: To Improve Transparency in SK Funds Use and Compliance with Procurement
Processes
Activities & Output
Indicators
Performance & Impact
Online Portal for all
SK Councils all over
the country
Development of Code
of Conduct on SK
Services
Output:
Adoption and Use of
Code of Conduct and
On-Line Portal
Website established and
functional; thousands of youth
accessing and using the Portal.
Code of Conduct adopted;
series of workshops on the
Code held in all cities
Development of On-Line Portal in progress;
new expected completion is end of March.
Code of Conduct not completed; priority shifted
to the advocacy of Reform, instead of Abolish
the SK councils.
Impact:
Both the Code of Conduct, as self-regulating
measures enhancing accountability, and the OnLine Portal, as pressure mechanism to improve
transparency and accountability, were not
completed at end of project.
4.5.2 Two workshops were held to develop the Code of Conduct. In the first workshop, the
participating stakeholders -- the SK Federations, the Office of the Ombudsman (Mindanao), and the
Department of Education – agreed on the framework for this Code and the assignment of
responsibilities of the respective offices. The succeeding workshop, however, attended by about 100
participants from the ranks of JGW and SK council officials became a forum for public consultation
and launching of a petition campaign on the then burning issue of SK Abolition (because of
corruption and ineffectiveness of this government-sponsored youth governance program). ECOLINK
- through SK Watch - wanted to create common advocacy among the youth for “Reforming rather
than Abolishing” the SK program. By engaging in this campaign, ECOLINK sacrificed the
completion of the Code of Conduct, one of the major deliverables that would sustain the achievement
of the project.4/
4.5.3 Output and Impact. None of the activities designed to accomplish the objective was
completed during the life of the project, hence no impact has yet been generated. Nonetheless,
4/
It is noted that completion of the Code of Conduct is not included in the proposed SK Watch Exit Phase
project that has been short-listed in the 2010 funding cycle.
transparency in SK Fund use has been improved as the result of activities undertaken in relation to
Objective #2 (refer to para 4.3.4). The empowerment of the JGW to conduct field monitoring with
the use of the SK Watch Monitoring Manual succeeded in bringing about transparency and
accountability.
Outcomes and Impact on Corruption
4.6
Project impacts, qualitative and partial in nature, were described in sections 4.2.3, 4.3.4, 4.4.5
and 4.5.4 above. These impacts resulted in financial benefits (saved from wastage and corruption)
estimated by ECOLINK to a total to over P7.7 million or $167,000. At this initial stage, this
represented a return of $6 for every $1 of investment in the project for PTF.
Table 6
Project Impact: Indication of Corruption Prevented, by Pilot Site
Oroquieta
Items Monitored
Pagadian
Dapitan
No. of JGW Monitors
2,660
340
400
Organized/Trained
No. of SK Councils
40
10
20
Monitored
Increase in SK Budget
20%
Increase
25%
Surplus (2009 vs. 2008) due ($33,000 )
($39,000)
reported; no
to SK Watch
figure given
Disbursements with 100%
$50,000
$15,200
$10,300
Verification
No. and amount of
50
5
10
Fraudulent Procurement
(no amount (no amount (no amount
reported)
reported)
reported)
No. and amount of Waiting
10
No Data
0
Shed construction prevented
$7,400
SK Properties Recovered
$6,900
$2,600
$1,700
Ozamis
100
Iloilo
100
5
No
Report
No
Report
Increase
reported; no
figure given
No amount
10
($2,800)
No Data
$1,000
No
Report
No
Report
No
Report
No
Report
4.7
More important were the indicators showing real progress towards curbing corruption in SK
Funds. Table 6 above highlighted the impact of SK Watch’s direct actions in the key centers of SK
corruption (refer to para 2.3). Specifically, the increase in SK budget surplus ending 2009 reflected,
among others, the financial impact of JGW monitoring that resulted in the cancellation of defective
procurement and waiting-shed construction. These positive results showed that allowing the youth to
take responsibility in fighting corruption is a real option going forward.
4.8
SK Watch Project Management considered the performance of the Iloilo pilot to be a “relative
failure”. It attributed the failure to the wrong choice of partner. Instead of partnering with the Iloilo
Graft Watch as intended in the project proposal, ECOLINK chose the local DepEd hoping it would
respond with the same intensity as did DepEd offices in Oroquieta and other cities in Mindanao. This
experience provided ECOLINK a valuable lesson in choosing partners.
Sustainability of Project Achievements
4.9
The major achievement of SK Watch is the demonstration that the Junior Graft Watch is an
effective counterforce to abuses by SK councils. At work here is the “youth-driven, youth-led”
transparency and accountability mechanism that ECOLINK advocated. The JGW is also the major
sustaining factor of SK Watch. It is an existing program that can be tapped on a continuing basis
under the cooperating environment agreed upon by ECOLINK, DepEd, LGUs, and OMB and found
effective at the regional level. Completion of remaining activities - such as Video Documentary and
On-Line Portals – will only improve the effectiveness of the JGW-SK Watch system.
4.10 Successful implementation of the proposed SK Watch Exit Phase will ensure the replication
and sustainability of the SK Watch-Junior Graft Watch program nationwide. The project is easy to
implement, all that is needed is a joint policy from DepEd, OMB and DILG for the reorganization,
refocusing, training and mobilization of the JGW nationwide network to implement SK Watch. All
these are included in the Junior Graft Watch Reform Plan drafted by SK Watch. The SK Watch Exit
Phase will implement the Reform Plan and institutionalize the achievements of SK Watch within
DepEd, OMB and DILG.
5.0
Impact on Institutional Development of Partner CSO
5.1
The new element in SK Watch which is not present in ACT I and II was the inclusion of
project sites in Luzon and the Visayas, or in areas where ECOLINK has no established networks.
Problems immediately surfaced. Naga City did not join the project and replacing it with another city
in Luzon did not materialize. Project implementation in Iloilo City suffered relative failure. These
experiences should lead ECOLINK to assess its current capability, plan more realistically, and adopt
a program to further build up its institutional capability. Through its projects with PTF, ECOLINK
has shown its passion and commitment, its creativity, and its ability to deliver. These qualities will
always make ECOLINK overcome setbacks such as those encountered in SK Watch when it starts, as
it does, to learn from them.
5.2
In SK Watch, ECOLINK was able to develop further its ability to raise additional resources to
expand project activities. Leveraging the good reputation and community acceptance of past
projects, ECOLINK had raised total of about $14,450 from corporate sponsorship, public
contributions, production and sale of souvenir items, etc. during the Youth Art Festivals.
6.0
Lessons Learned
6.1
The choice of partner always matters especially in new territories (geographic or subject
matter) less familiar to proponent CSO. In such instance, the choice of partner should strengthen
success factors and diminish the risks. The ‘good practice’ is to reference the prospective partner’s
track record and evaluate its actual experiences in similar projects. In the future, PTF progress
monitoring of on-going projects should include reports on performance of sub-partners (partners of
Grantee) to determine weak points in project implementation management.
6.2
Decision on local partnership is important to the proponent CSO also because, in the end, the
“buck stops" at its door. From the mistake in Iloilo City, ECOLINK has learned this lesson: "In
scaling-up, coordination and overall management should remain with the main proponent. But a
local partner should be tapped to facilitate the conduct of field activities with relative resources and
leeway for their initiatives to work." In ACT I & II, ECOLINK had chosen to work only in areas
where there were “NGOs with proven track records which were willing to work with us”.
6.3
As a youth-based CSO, ECOLINK felt compelled to advocate for SK Reform as an
alternative to SK abolition. Doing so required trading-off the completion of the Code of Conduct on
SK Services, a major project deliverable. That decision had logic: “What is the use of the SK Code if
the SK is abolished?” The issue, however, is the diversion of project resources from approved
activity to a new activity without the concurrence of PTF. The trade-off decision could have
benefited from advise from a more detached and objective perspective. Without PTF’s prior
approval, the assessment would count both the non-completion of a major deliverable and the fund
diversion itself as negative practices. The lesson here is for Parties to the Grant Agreement to abide
by the specific provisions of that agreement.
7.0
Steps taken to disseminate the results of the project
7.1
The Interim PCR reported that major project activities and achievements were covered in 15
newspaper articles, 7 appearances in local TV shows, and some 19 public speaking engagements. SK
Watch is also being prominently bannered in ECOLINK website: www.pcsdi.org. But the two SK
Watch deliverables – On-Line SK Portals and SK Hotline – which were designed to broadcast project
activities and results and to make its anti-corruption campaign more accessible have not yet been
fully installed.
8.0
Adequacy of financial management and Audit
8.1
The Interim Project Completion Report included the Statement of Financial Operations as of
SK Watch Project closure on November 30, 2010. Several pieces of information are important to
highlight:
Total project cost went up from $38,521 to $46,293 when local counterparts increased by
$7,772.4/ This was made possible by ECOLINK’s ability to raise funds from local contribution,
corporate donation and sponsorship, and marketing of promo materials during the Arts Festivals.
In this project, ECOLINK managed to raise $14,458 – an indication of its all-around reputation,
community acceptance of its projects, and its entrepreneurial spirit.
b. ECOLINK, a relatively small regional CSO, was nonetheless capable of allocating from its
general fund a working capital of $6,522 comprising its counterpart commitment of $2,457 and a
contingency allowance of $4,065. The amount of $4,065 which remained unused at the end of
the project was reverted back to ECOLINK’s general fund.
a.
8.2
The assessment noted two good practices in ECOLINK financial management. First, it is
recording project revenues and expenditures separate from general accounting using QuickBooks
4/
Project Management reported total project cost at only US$45,316. However, total funds used as derived
from the Statement of Financial Operations amounted to $46,293. The difference of $977 pertained to the
amount of contract that remained payable and unliquidated since some contracted projects (i.e. Video
Documentation and On-Line Portal Development) are still on-going.
Finance software. Second, it has a policy to put project financial statements to independent audit to
check that the integrity of its accounting system is kept by its finance team and to ensure “we are
gaining the trust from our partners”. Project Management reported that the audit of SK Watch’s
balance sheet and related statement of expenses had been conducted, with no negative findings, by
Manuel Sy Ratunil, CPA, the auditor who also did the audit for ACT I & II. The External Audit
Report will be due soon; copy will be furnished PTF.
9.0
Follow-Up Action
9.1
Completion of the On-Line Portal and the Video Documentary should be followed up.
ECOLINK is committed to doing this. The completion of the Code of Conduct on SK Services
should be considered as well. The Interim Project Completion Report, however, did not mention any
future plan to complete the Code, nor did it describe the Code’s level of completion by the end of the
project. ECOLINK should consider the Code’s completion in the proposed SK Watch Exit Phase.
9.2
Implementation of the proposed SK Watch Exit Phase is necessary to maximize the potential
impact of the SK Watch Fund Monitoring project, simply by scaling-up the SK Watch-Junior Graft
Watch program nationwide. If it worked in the pilot cities in Mindanao, it can work anywhere else in
the country. The idea of an anti-corruption youth group taking responsibility to curb abuses and
corruption in the governance system that was designed to be the training ground for young citizens in
public service is indeed very powerful. What is needed is a policy from the national leadership of
DepEd, OMB and DILG supporting the nationwide implementation of the program. That’s the goal
of the proposed SK Watch Exit Phase.