Page1 of 3 EMU: Roberto Gualtieri responds to Jean
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Page1 of 3 EMU: Roberto Gualtieri responds to Jean
EMU: Roberto Gualtieri responds to Jean-Claude Juncker | Europolitics EDITOR'S CHOICE post-Charlie Hebdo Schengen Watch 315 billion Page 1 of 3 COP21 Language EN Log in Follow us: Videos ENERGY ENVIRONMENT TECH TRANSPORT Blogs & Opinions BANKING & INSURANCE About Europolitics HEALTH & CONSUMERS AGRIFISH SUBSCRIBE Most read on EU GOVERNANCE NEWSROOM / REDACTION EMU: Roberto Gualtieri responds to Jean-Claude Juncker The chair of the ECON committee answers the 11 questions submitted by the Commission president to the member states By NEWSROOM / REDACTION 25 March 2015 Last updated 20:00 MEPs waive Viktor Uspaskich's immunity REFIT: ENVI recalls its priorities Timmermans points to lack of trust between EU institutions EMU: Roberto Gualtieri responds to Jean-Claude Juncker Parliamentary immunity: Pro-Russians can be counted Better regulation: MEPs offended by 'political discontinuity' MEPs postpone Council's discharge again IMG: Compromise amendment Merkel and Tsipras excel at diplomacy Misappropriation of humanitarian aid: Compromise found MEP Roberto Gualtieri (S&D, Italy), EP Just as Mario Draghi called for a "quantum leap" in institutional convergence for the Economic and Monetary Union, Europolitics asked MEP Roberto Gualtieri, chair of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON), to respond to the 11 key questions submitted by Jean-Claude Juncker to the member states during the informal European Council back in February. How can we ensure sound fiscal and economic positions in all eurozone member states? The precondition is relaunching sustainable growth with an appropriate policy mix of a fiscal policy avoiding pro-cyclicality, an EU investment strategy, structural reforms, stronger social policy and monetary easing. How could a better implementation and enforcement of the economic and fiscal governance framework be ensured? More attention must be paid to the eurozone as a whole, including its macroeconomic imbalances. The best use of flexibility should ensure that the rules are enforced in the framework of a viable economic policy strategy and not in a mechanical and bureaucratic way or on the basis of a country-by-country approach. Current account surpluses should be persistent. The use of positive incentives should better complement the threat of sanctions. Enhanced economic policy coordination should be based on more binding convergence guidelines defined at EU level on the one hand, and on the other hand on stronger ownership of concrete reforms at national level. An appropriate level of democratic legitimacy involving the European Parliament and the national parliaments at the respective levels should be ensured. Is the current governance framework – if fully implemented – sufficient to make the eurozone shock-resilient and prosperous in the long run? No. In the long run the EMU requires a fully-fledged economic government with an appropriate fiscal capacity and a shared competence on economic policy. Meanwhile, the current governance framework should be streamlined and improved. file://mepbrusfsd1/WKRedirXP$/mformisano/Desktop/EMU%20%20Roberto%20Gu... 27/03/2015 EMU: Roberto Gualtieri responds to Jean-Claude Juncker | Europolitics Page 2 of 3 To what extent can the framework of EMU mainly rely on strong rules and to what extent are strong common institutions also required? The current framework is already based not only on rules but also on institutions. Their role must be enhanced by transforming the European Commission into an economic government, by giving the European Parliament full co-decision in the area of economic policy and taxation, and by transforming the ESM in an EU monetary fund, fully incorporating it into the Union law. What instruments are needed in situations in which national policies continue – despite surveillance under the governance framework – to go harmfully astray? A "eurosystem of fiscal policy with direct power to overhaul national parliaments' fiscal and economic policy prerogatives," as recently suggested by Bruegel, does not seem constitutionally viable or appropriate. As it is the case in all federal entities, competences and resources at EU level should be gradually strengthened, while being better distinguished - on the basis of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality - from national level instead of being further confused and overlapped. Has the fiscal-financial nexus been sufficiently dealt with in order to prevent the repetition of negative feedback loops between banks and sovereign debt? Big steps have been made with the SSM, the SRM and the new set of regulations of the financial markets. Now the banking union has to be completed (including an appropriate deposit guarantee mechanism and a fiscal backstop for resolution), shadow banking has to be better regulated and the capital markets union must be appropriately designed and implemented. How could private risk-sharing through financial markets in the eurozone be enhanced to ensure a better absorption of asymmetric shocks? A viable and well regulated capital markets union, including a common supervision, could contribute to this aim, but this cannot substitute for the need for public asymmetric shock absorbers. To what extent is the present sharing of sovereignty adequate to meet the economic, financial and fiscal framework requirements of the common currency? The current asymmetry between the EU's exclusive competence on monetary policy and coordination competence on economic policy, and the limitations in the area of taxation, own resources, debt management, and in the capacity to properly organise a social level playing field in order to avoid social dumping, are inadequate in the long run. Is a further risk-sharing in the fiscal realm desirable? What would be the preconditions? Yes it is. The preconditions are the strengthening of the EU public sphere and political parties and the relaunch and "politicisation" of the Community method. It is a process which has started with the 2014 European Parliament elections and the Juncker Commission but has to further go ahead. In any case, the current legal framework and the improved level of democratic legitimacy already allow some forms of risksharing in the fiscal realm. Under what conditions and in which form could a stronger common governance over structural reforms be envisaged? How could it foster real convergence? The macroeconomic imbalances procedure (MIP) already provides a number of instruments for enhanced economic policy coordination. In the short run, it should be better used and reinforced with the definition of convergence guidelines at the EU level [see answer No 2] and with a mechanism of incentives based on the SGP's flexibility and on new common financial instruments to be used as embryo for a fiscal capacity. In the long run, economic policy should become a shared competence. How can accountability and legitimacy be best achieved in a multilevel setup such as EMU? Accountability and legitimacy should be provided at the level where decisions are taken. Enhanced EU competences require a stronger role for the European Parliament. Under the current legal framework, an interinstitutional agreement could better involve the European Parliament in the 'semester' process, namely in the preparation of the 'Annual growth survey'. A treaty change should introduce co-decision on these matters. A formal division of the European Parliament on national lines (eurozone committee) is incompatible with the current treaties and is neither necessary nor appropriate, as the euro is the currency of the Union, and its governance affects also citizens of non-euro countries. The Council represents the member states, the European Parliament the Union's citizens. The fact that currently a number of decisions ('two pack' regulation under Article 136 TFEU, the election of SSM and SRM chairs and board under the respective regulations) is taken in an asymmetric format is an element of institutional balance and not a democratic shortcoming. Informal arrangements to improve EMU scrutiny are possible. file://mepbrusfsd1/WKRedirXP$/mformisano/Desktop/EMU%20%20Roberto%20Gu... 27/03/2015 EMU: Roberto Gualtieri responds to Jean-Claude Juncker | Europolitics Page 3 of 3 More from NEWSROOM / REDACTION NEWSROOM / REDACTION EU targets long-term cooperation with Tunis EMU: Franziska Brantner responds to Jean-Claude Juncker European public prosecutor's office still in limbo Opt in-opt out: Copenhagen decides ahead of referendum Italy called on to halt deadly olive disease EUROPOLITICS Essentials BUSINESS SOCIAL POLICY ECOFIN EU GOVERNANCE INTERNAL POLICIES EXTERNAL AFFAIRS Extensive investigations in sight on e-commerce competition Benefits tourism: Advocategeneral qualifies situations “Challenge is to address the problems without a treaty change” Timmermans points to lack of trust between EU institutions PNR: Sophie in 't Veld ups pressure on Commission EU industry reps warn against China's cyber protectionism Subscribe Go Premium Advertise INDUSTRY SECTORS ENERGY ENVIRONMENT BANKING & INSURANCE EUROPOLITICS ESSENTIALS TECH TRANSPORT HEALTH & CONSUMERS AGRIFISH BUSINESS SOCIAL POLICY EU GOVERNANCE BLOGS & OPINIONS ECOFIN INTERNAL POLICIES EXTERNAL AFFAIRS About Europolitics Contact us Work with us General conditions of sale file://mepbrusfsd1/WKRedirXP$/mformisano/Desktop/EMU%20%20Roberto%20Gu... 27/03/2015