Rooke J judgment freemen sovereign

Court of Queen’s Bench of Alberta
Citation: Meads v. Meads, 2012 ABQB 571
Date: 20120918
Docket: 4803 155609
Registry: Edmonton
Between:
Crystal Lynne Meads
Appellant
- and -
Dennis Larry Meads
Respondent
Editorial Notice: On behalf of the Government of
Alberta personal data identifiers have been removed
from this unofficial electronic version of the judgment.
_______________________________________________________
Reasons for Decision
of the
Associate Chief Justice
J.D. Rooke
_______________________________________________________
ii
Table of Contents
I.
Introduction to Organized Pseudolegal Commercial Argument [“OPCA”] Litigants.. . . . 1
II.
The Present Litigation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
A.
Prior Activity. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
B.
The June 8, 2012 Hearing. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
C.
Subsequent Developments. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
D.
The Purposes of These Reasons.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.
Ms. Meads. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.
Mr. Meads. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
3.
A Broad Set of OPCA Concepts and Materials. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.
Mr. Meads Faces No Unexpected Sanction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
III.
Overview of these Reasons. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
IV.
The OPCA Phenomenon. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
A.
Characteristics of OPCA Group Members.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
B.
The OPCA Guru. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1.
Russell Porisky and the Paradigm Education Group. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.
Other Canadian Gurus. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
a.
David Kevin Lindsay. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
b.
John Ruiz Dempsey. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
c.
Robert Arthur Menard .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
d.
Eldon Gerald Warman. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
e.
David J. Lavigne. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
f.
Edward Jay Robin Belanger.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
g.
Other Gurus. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
h.
Mr. Meads’ Guru. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
3.
How Gurus Operate. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
C.
OPCA Litigants. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
D.
OPCA Movements. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
1.
Detaxers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
2.
Freemen-on-the-Land.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
3.
Sovereign Men or Sovereign Citizens. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
4.
The Church of the Ecumenical Redemption International [“CERI”]. . . . 44
5.
Moorish Law. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
6.
Conclusion - OPCA Movements. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
V.
Indicia of OPCA Litigants, Litigation, and Strategies. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
A.
Documentary Material. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
1.
Name Motifs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
2.
Document Formalities and Markings.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
3.
Specific Phrases and Language. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
4.
Legislation and Legal Documents. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
iii
B.
C.
VI.
5.
Atypical Mailing Addresses.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
6.
Conclusion and Summary of Documentary Indicia. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
In Court Conduct. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
1.
Demands. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
2.
Documentation.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
3.
Names and Identification. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
4.
Court Authority or Jurisdiction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
5.
Other In-Court Motifs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
6.
Summary of In-Court Indicia. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
Conclusion - OPCA Indicia. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
1.
Procedural Responses to Suspected OPCA Documents. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
2.
Courtroom Procedure Responses to Suspected OPCA Litigants.. . . . . . . 62
OPCA Concepts and Arguments. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
A.
The Litigant is Not Subject to Court Authority. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
1.
Restricted Court Jurisdiction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
a.
Admiralty or Military Courts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
b.
Notaries are the Real Judges. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
c.
Religion or Religious Belief Trumps the Courts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
2.
Defective Court Authority. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
a.
Oaths. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
b.
The Court Proves It Has Jurisdiction and Acts Fairly. . . . . . . . . . 69
c.
Court Formalities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
d.
The State is Defective. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
e.
Conclusion - Defective Court Authority. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
3.
Immune to Court Jurisdiction - ‘Magic Hats’. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
a.
I Belong to an Exempt Group. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
b.
I Declare Myself Immune. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
c.
I Have Been Incorrectly Identified. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
d.
I Am Subject to a Different Law. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
e.
Conscientious Objector. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
f.
Tax-Related ‘Magic Hats’. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
g.
Miscellaneous. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
4.
The Inherent Authority of Provincial Superior Courts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
a.
Superior Courts of Inherent Jurisdiction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
b.
Procedural Jurisdiction.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
c.
Subject Jurisdiction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
d.
Inherent Jurisdiction vs. OPCA Strategies and Concepts. . . . . . . 88
B.
Obligation Requires Agreement.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
1.
Defeating Legislation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
2.
Everything is a Contract.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
3.
Consent is Required. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
4.
Conclusion - Obligation Requires Agreement. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
5.
Court Misconduct by ‘Everything is a Contract’ and ‘Consent is Required’
Litigants. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
iv
C.
D.
E.
F.
Double/Split Persons. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
1.
Unshackling the Strawman. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
2.
Dividing Oneself. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
3.
In-Court Behaviour of the Divided Person. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
4.
Conclusion - Double/Split Person Schemes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
Unilateral Agreements. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
1.
The Legal Effect of a Foisted Agreement. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
2.
Common Uses of Unilateral Agreements. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
a.
To Create or Assert an Obligation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
b.
To Discharge an Obligation or Dismiss a Lawsuit. . . . . . . . . . . 113
c.
Foisted Duties, Agency, or Fiduciary Status. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
d.
Copyright and Trade-mark.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
3.
Fee Schedules.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
a.
Disproportionate and Unlawful Penalties. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
b.
The Targets and Intended Effect of ‘Fee Schedules’. . . . . . . . . . 121
4.
Effect of Unilateral Agreements. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
Money for Nothing Schemes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
1.
Accept for Value / A4V. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
2.
Bill Consumer Purchases. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
3.
Miscellaneous Money for Nothing Schemes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
Legal Effect and Character of OPCA Arguments. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
1.
OPCA Strategies that Deny Court Authority. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
a.
An OPCA Argument that Denies Court Authority Cannot Succeed
Due to the Court’s Inherent Authority. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
b.
An OPCA Argument that Denies Court Authority is Intrinsically
Frivolous and Vexatious. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
c.
An OPCA Argument that Denies Court Authority May Be
Contempt of Court Authority.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
i.
Denial of Tax Obligation Evades Tax. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
ii.
Denial of Firearms Restrictions Proves Intent for Illegal
Possession. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
iii.
Denial of Court Authority May Prove the Intent to Engage
in Contempt of Court. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
iv.
Other Government Authorities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
2.
Other OPCA Strategies. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
3.
Responses to OPCA Strategies. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
a.
Strike Actions, Motions, and Defences. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
b.
Punitive Damages. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
c.
Elevated Costs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
d.
Order Security for Costs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
e.
Fines.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
f.
One Judge Remaining on a File. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
4.
Responses to OPCA Litigants and Gurus. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
a.
Vexatious Litigant Status.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
b.
Deny Status as a Representative. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
v
5.
Conclusion - Responses to OPCA Litigation and Litigants.. . . . . . . . . . 141
VII.
Review. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
A.
Judiciary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
B.
Lawyers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
1.
A Lawyer’s Duties. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
a.
Notarization of OPCA Materials. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
b.
Triage: Identification of Legal Issues.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
2.
Education. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
a.
Judges and Courts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
b.
The OPCA Litigant. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
3.
Conclusion - Lawyers and OPCA Litigation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
C.
‘Target’ Litigants. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
D.
OPCA Litigants. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
E.
OPCA Gurus. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
VIII.
Application of These Reasons to the Meads v. Meads Litigation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
A.
Ms. Meads. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
1.
Case Management. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
2.
Disclosure by Mr. Meads. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
3.
Ongoing Communication with Mr. Meads. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
B.
Mr. Meads. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
1.
Pre-Hearing Activities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
a.
The February 15, 2011 Document. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
b.
The March 3, 2011 Document. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
c.
The April 27, 2012 Documents. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
2.
The June 8, 2012 Hearing. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
3.
The June 19 and June 21, 2012 Documents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160
4.
Conclusion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162
Appendix “A” - Meads’ Fee Schedule.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164
Appendix “B” - Meads’ Copyright and Trademark Notice. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176
1
Where there is no common power, there is no law, where no law, no injustice.
Force, and fraud, are in war the two cardinal virtues.
...
The laws are of no power to protect them, without a sword in the hands of a man, or men, to
cause those laws to be put in execution.
...
And law was brought into the world for nothing else but to limit the natural liberty of particular
men in such manner as they might not hurt, but assist one another, and join together against a
common enemy.
Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (Forgotten Books, 2008), at pp. 87, 147, 184
I.
Introduction to Organized Pseudolegal Commercial Argument [“OPCA”] Litigants
[1]
This Court has developed a new awareness and understanding of a category of vexatious
litigant. As we shall see, while there is often a lack of homogeneity, and some individuals or
groups have no name or special identity, they (by their own admission or by descriptions given
by others) often fall into the following descriptions: Detaxers; Freemen or Freemen-on-the-Land;
Sovereign Men or Sovereign Citizens; Church of the Ecumenical Redemption International
(CERI); Moorish Law; and other labels - there is no closed list. In the absence of a better
moniker, I have collectively labelled them as Organized Pseudolegal Commercial Argument
litigants [“OPCA litigants”], to functionally define them collectively for what they literally are.
These persons employ a collection of techniques and arguments promoted and sold by ‘gurus’
(as hereafter defined) to disrupt court operations and to attempt to frustrate the legal rights of
governments, corporations, and individuals.
[2]
Over a decade of reported cases have proven that the individual concepts advanced by
OPCA litigants are invalid. What remains is to categorize these schemes and concepts, identify
global defects to simplify future response to variations of identified and invalid OPCA themes,
and develop court procedures and sanctions for persons who adopt and advance these vexatious
litigation strategies.
[3]
One participant in this matter, the Respondent Dennis Larry Meads, appears to be a
sophisticated and educated person, but is also an OPCA litigant. One of the purposes of these
Reasons is, through this litigant, to uncover, expose, collate, and publish the tactics employed by
the OPCA community, as a part of a process to eradicate the growing abuse that these litigants
direct towards the justice and legal system we otherwise enjoy in Alberta and across Canada. I
will respond on a point-by-point basis to the broad spectrum of OPCA schemes, concepts, and
arguments advanced in this action by Mr. Meads.
2
[4]
OPCA litigants do not express any stereotypic beliefs other than a general rejection of
court and state authority; nor do they fall into any common social or professional association.
Arguments and claims of this nature emerge in all kinds of legal proceedings and all levels of
Courts and tribunals. This group is unified by:
1.
a characteristic set of strategies (somewhat different by group) that they employ,
2.
specific but irrelevant formalities and language which they appear to believe are
(or portray as) significant, and
3.
the commercial sources from which their ideas and materials originate.
This category of litigant shares one other critical characteristic: they will only honour state,
regulatory, contract, family, fiduciary, equitable, and criminal obligations if they feel like it. And
typically, they don’t.
[5]
The Meads case illustrates many characteristic features of OPCA materials, in court
conduct, and litigation strategies. These Reasons will, therefore, explain my June 8, 2012
decision and provide analysis and reasoning that is available for reference and application to
other similar proceedings.
[6]
Naturally, my conclusions are important for these parties. However, they also are
intended to assist others, who have been taken in/duped by gurus, to realize that these practices
are entirely ineffective; to empower opposing parties and their counsel to take action; and as a
warning to gurus that the Court will not tolerate their misconduct.
[7]
As a preliminary note, I will throughout these Reasons refer to persons by their ‘normal’
names, except to illustrate various OPCA motifs and concepts. OPCA litigants frequently adopt
unusual variations on personal names, for example adding irrelevant punctuation, or using
unusual capital and lower case character combinations. While OPCA litigants and their gurus put
special significance on these alternative nomenclature forms, these are ineffectual in law and are
meaningless paper masks. Therefore, in these Reasons, I will omit spurious name forms, titles,
punctuation and the like.
II.
The Present Litigation
[8]
These Reasons relate to materials and arguments advanced by Dennis Larry Meads [“Mr.
Meads”] in and after a hearing on June 8, 2012 for appointment of a case management justice, as
authorized by Alberta Rules of Court, Alta. Reg. 124/2010, s. 4.11(c) [the “Rules”, or
individually a “Rule”]. The application was brought by Crystal Lynne Meads [“Ms. Meads”] in a
divorce and matrimonial property action against Mr. Meads initiated on January 11, 2011.
3
[9]
I granted that application and appointed myself as the Case Management Justice. These
Reasons follow from that hearing and deal with materials that have been filed or submitted by
Mr. Meads.
[10] Mr. and Ms. Meads were married in 1980. They had six children. The Meads separated in
2010. At present two children are potential dependants. On March 18, 2011, Veit J. ordered
interim monthly child and spousal support payments from Mr. Meads. My understanding is that
to date Mr. Meads has generally honoured that obligation.
A.
Prior Activity
[11]
Review of the divorce file discloses a number of unusual documents filed by Mr. Meads:
February 15, 2011: Mr. Meads filed a one page notarized document, printed in black and
red ink, and marked with what may be a red thumb print. It also bears postage stamps in
three corners on front and back, and includes various declarations including that
“::dennis-larry:meads::” is a “living flesh and blood sentient-man”, a postmaster general,
and that Barb Petryk, a clerk of the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench, is appointed his
fiduciary and is liable for “all financial damages and bodily harm against myself ::dennislarry:: of the meads-family::”.
Mr. Meads then purports to “...do here and now Adjourn this instant matter until further
notice, from my office.”
March 3, 2011: Mr. Meads filed a second one page notarized document, in black, red,
orange, and blue ink. Again, it has unusual formalities such as a red thumb print. This
document is directed to “Audrey Hardwick/AUDREY HARDWICK BEING A
CORPORATE ENTITY”, and in part is a “Notice for a Cease and Desist” in “Enticement
in Slavery”, that threatens criminal charges, and “FULL COMMERCIAL LIABILITY
AND YOUR UNLIMITED CIVIL LIABILITY”. This one is signed “:::dennis-larry:: of
the meads-family:::”.
April 27, 2012: Ouellette J. authorized the simple filing of these materials by Mr. Meads
“... for the purposes of argument before the A.C.J. Rooke at the case conference” on June
8, 2012. This was a “Notice for an Order to Show Cause”, “Affidavit in Support of Order
to Show Cause”, “Order to Show Cause and Appear”, and “Affidavit in Support of Order
to Show Cause” filed by “::Dennis Larry:: on behalf of DENNIS LARRY MEADS
(juristic person)”.
The “Notice for an Order to Show Cause” states, “::Dennis Larry::” is “attorney in fact”
and seeks an order that Ms. Reeves (Ms. Meads counsel) be “... held in contempt for
violation of false claims made under penalty of perjury ...” and that Ms. Reeves has taken
on “... full responsibility/liability for CRYSTAL LYNNE MEADS the Debtor and
Grantor.”
4
The two “Affidavit in Support of Order to Show Cause” documents restate the claims
that Barb Petryk has a fiduciary obligation to Mr. Meads, quote part of the March 18,
2011 transcript before Justice Veit, and allege that Ms. Meads has not conformed to the
Veit order. Mr. Meads denies contact with Ms. Reeves and that he has been difficult. He
states Ms. Reeves has made “... an offer to Contract and/or Enticement of Slavery (Title
18 United States Code and/or Article 4 Universal Declaration of Human Rights) ...”, and
that Ms. Meads had “... voided/annulled the Marriage Contract by adulterous affair in
2011 ...” [sic]. Mr. Meads observes Ms. Meads has a share of “acuminated assets from
the Marriage Contract” [sic], a new home, training, and a job opportunity as a lab
technician. Mr. Meads says Ms. Meads has sent various messages that are “disturbing
communications” and quotes email messages that indicate conflict between the parties.
The February 15 document is attached to the April 27 materials.
B.
The June 8, 2012 Hearing
[12] Mr. Meads and Ms. Reeves appeared before me on June 8, 2012. Ms. Reeves explained
that Mr. Meads had generally conformed to the terms of Justice Veit’s March 18, 2011 Order,
but that he had not disclosed financial records to calculate interim child and spousal support
amounts. She also indicated that she was experiencing problems in moving this litigation
forward as a consequence of unorthodox documentation from Mr. Meads. She had difficulty
communicating with Mr. Meads, and asked the Court to appoint a case management justice to
facilitate that process.
[13] Mr. Meads commenced his submissions by noting that he was not Dennis Meads, the
“corporate identity”, but was present as Dennis Larry Meads, “a flesh and blood man”. He said
this Court is “a house of law.”
[14] I explained the nature of case management and asked as to his position on that. He did
not object, but wanted to talk about his own Motion, the April 27 documents, rather than Ms.
Reeves’ point of interest.
[15] Mr. Meads launched into an explanation of a number of things. He said that when he was
born, he was given a register of birth, “a corporate identity”, bonded and registered in the Bank
of Canada and in the state stock exchange, and that registration had an imputed income.
[16] When Mr. Meads married Ms. Meads, he said he was told he required a marriage license
to avoid commission of incest, but he has subsequently learned, from Black’s Law Dictionary,
that a licence is an authorization to do something that is otherwise illegal. But, Mr. Meads said,
he is only subject to God’s Law, the “Maximus of Law”, and the Bible indicates that adultery is
the sole basis to dissolve a marriage. In this case, he alleged that Ms. Meads had committed
adultery with his brother-in-law, and that she had broken the contract of marriage by that
adultery - that is God’s law - the remainder is man’s law, statute law: which does not affect or
apply to Mr. Meads.
5
[17] Mr. Meads rejected the assertion that he had a legal obligation to pay spousal and child
support, though he did so on his own accord. Further, he had identified to Ms. Meads and her
lawyer (and myself) a method to access a huge amount of money that was attached to his
“corporate identity” via his birth certificate. That could pay his child and spousal support
obligations. Mr. Meads said he had provided the documentation to pursue that avenue, but Ms.
Meads and her lawyers had not done so.
[18] Mr. Meads asserted that he has done nothing wrong; he has committed no criminal
offence; nothing that Ms. Meads’ lawyers have sought is mandatory; Ms. Meads has her 50%
share of the marriage corporate entity; and his ongoing payments to Ms. Meads have purchased a
new home for her and her partner, an RCMP officer.
[19] Mr. Meads, at this point and later, provided his position concerning potential issues in
dispute. Ms. Meads was concerned that a part of his reported income were RRSP withdrawals.
Mr. Meads explained that amount was a living allowance he received for travelling to work away
from home, a legitimate expense that is not a part of personal income for support calculations.
Mr. Meads also alleged that his wife had received training as a laboratory technician, but had not
pursued that career as she did not like the work.
[20] Mr. Meads also explained why he discontinued child support payments after one of his
children had her 18th birthday. He explained that several of his older children have attended and
been successful in post-secondary education, but that he and his wife believed that a child should
pay for their own education. He saw no reason to treat this now adult child differently. That said,
the Meads had assisted their older children during their studies, when necessary, and Mr. Meads
reaffirmed he would do the same for the daughter who was now about to enter post-secondary
education.
[21] In his opinion, Ms. Meads had already received a fair share of the matrimonial property.
She had taken the bulk of his silver bullion, and $250,000.00 from a joint bank account.
[22]
Mr. Meads then said:
I do not want to be enticed into slavery, sir. She contacts me, her other lawyer
contacted me, they are enticing me into contract. And I do not want to go there. I
just want to be left alone. Give me a divorce.
...
I speak passionately when I talk, but I am not angry. I want you to understand
that. My voice is raised. That is the emotional side of me that is coming out. I am
not mad or angry. I want to make that clear as well.
You sir, are the judge in this matter. And so I, Dennis Larry Meads, being a flesh
and blood man, and as the creditor and beneficiary for and the private record, do
here nominate and appoint you, Judge Rooke, fiduciary trustee liable under your
6
full commercial liability, and your unlimited civil liability capacities, for my full
protection and benefit as a de jure court.
For the record, I, Dennis Larry Meads, and for the record a child of the almighty
God Jehovah, and not a child of the state. For the lord and saviour Jesus the Christ
is my spiritual advocate and in this instant matter at hand, and that God’s laws
rule supreme in my life and this court, and I, Dennis Larry Meads, being a flesh
and blood man pray that the judge, you sir Mr. Rooke, Justice Rooke, and court
follows this claim in God’s law, and if they should they decide not to they should
make the claim right now that they are above God’s law and prove beyond the
breath they let out pray again that the almighty God, all of us and protect us all,
will abide with us in his laws.
[23] After hearing submissions from the parties I concluded that case management would be
appropriate in this instance, and appointed myself to that task. I noted that this Court will apply
the laws of Canada, and explained to Mr. Meads the basic aspects of child and spousal support,
matrimonial property division, and the mutual and reciprocal obligations for disclosure in family
law proceedings, including disclosure that he may seek from Ms. Meads.
[24] Mr. Meads then asked me “about the sign above my head”, which is the Royal Coat of
Arms of Canada, and declared:
This is an admiral court, your jurisdiction is on water, it’s not on land; I am a
freeman on the land, and for you to play down some of the statements I am
making is not acceptable unless you prove it to me in law, and just saying it to me
is nothing.
[25] He complained that he had asked Ms. Reeves to provide her bond and license to practice
law, but had not received that, and continued:
But I do sir want to work with law, and not statutes and rules that have come up
from man over time. I understand they work for the bulk of the people, but ... I’m
representing myself and what I speak about I believe in. There are rules above
man’s rules, and God’s laws is where your laws originated from, so let’s go back
to the Maximus, and deal with it as quickly as possible.
[26] Mr. Meads stated that his birth certificate has an associated bond with large amounts of
money that could easily discharge in full the claims advanced by Ms. Meads. He said this Court
could order that payment. He then attempted to provide me with an envelope, presumably
containing documents. Mr. Meads said the contents of the envelope had been “filed
internationally”: a UCC filing, a Canadian filing, a commercial security agreement, an identity
bond, “actual and constructive notices”, hold harmless and identity agreements, non-negotiable
security agreements, an affidavit of his status, a copyright and trade-mark of his name contract,
and definitions of the words used in those documents. “UCC” means the “Uniform Commercial
Code”, which is U.S. commercial legislation.
7
[27] I refused the envelope, and noted that if the envelope was abandoned then I would put
those materials in the garbage. I reassured Mr. Meads that I will apply the laws of Alberta and
Canada, and that while he is in Court, he will follow the Court’s rules. Mr. Meads’ reply was that
was “unacceptable”, and he claimed that the “UCC” is “universal law”.
[28] It appeared to me that it would be possible to sever the divorce and have that proceed, but
there remained issues to address, specifically spousal and child support, and division of
matrimonial property. It is generally my personal practice not to sever while such collateral, but
important, matters remain unresolved. I asked Ms. Reeves to explain what disclosure she
required, which amounted to 2010 and 2011 tax returns, certain employment pay and
compensation information, as well as information in relation to Mr. Meads’ investments,
including the precious metals he personally owns.
[29] Mr. Meads explained he has yet to file his 2010 and 2011 income tax returns, and he did
acknowledged that was a task he needed to address. He promised to provide that information by
September 1, 2012.
[30] After informing Mr. Meads about the Court’s contempt authority, I reassured him that I
want to assist him and Ms. Meads to move forward, separate their affairs, and allow each to live
on their own. There were still issues to explore, but that I would assist. Mr. Meads responded in
this manner:
Mr. Meads:
A lot of things have happened today that I need to wrap my mind around.
The one thing that comes out to me loud and clear is you’re treating the
person Dennis Meads with all of these statements, and not the living soul.
You are enticing me into slavery ...
The Court:
I am going to let someone else deal with your living soul. I’m just going to
deal with your person.
Mr. Meads:
Alright, then that’s your responsibility, because you created it.
[31] He asserted he was willing to go to jail, but as he is “flesh and blood” he is free from the
“mumbo jumbo that is law”. Mr. Meads alleged that an emergency protection order to which he
is subject was the result of a trap, and his wife had been coached by the RCMP to spring that
trap. He rejected the system into which he is pushed, and indicated that my statements are
directed to a “corporate entity” created by the government.
[32] I reassured Mr. Meads that I did not want to put him into jail, but would do so if
necessary. His recourse to my decisions is an appeal to the Alberta Court of Appeal. Conversely,
Mr. Meads could apply and the Court would order disclosure from Ms. Meads to learn the fate of
the $250,000.00 and silver bullion that he alleges Ms. Meads possesses.
8
[33] This led to a final statement by Mr. Meads. He asserted the Bible is the “Maximus of
Law” and is the binding basis of all law, and said:
You are enticing me again to ask her to disclose $250,000, you are trying to bring me
into this court proceeding that I have no desire to get into.
[34] Mr. Meads then left the courtroom before the completion of the hearing. He abandoned
the envelope he had attempted to provide to me. The envelope was put in the trash by the Clerk.
[35] My “Conditions and Guidelines of Case Management” [“Conditions and Guidelines”]
were sent to Mr. Meads on June 13, 2012. Part of those instructions was that in these
proceedings Mr. Meads was not to correspond with the Court, except to either:
1.
propose an application, or
2.
to request a case management conference.
[36] Though I will later return to this hearing at various points in these Reasons, I will now
briefly outline my understanding of the meaning of certain of Mr. Meads’ actions and
statements:
1.
Mr. Meads clearly subscribes to the OPCA concept that he has two aspects, what
I later discuss as the ‘double/split person’ concept. The German folk term
“doppelganger”, a kind of paranormal double, is a useful concept to describe this
curious duality. Mr. Meads labels one aspect as a “person” or “corporate entity”
while the other is his “flesh and blood” form.
2.
Mr. Meads also subscribes to the theory that almost any interaction with the court
or state can result in a binding contract. That is why he was so apprehensive about
accepting my proposal to order disclosure from Ms. Meads - that apparently
benign act would allegedly bind him in contract to this Court’s authority.
3.
The reference to Admiralty Law relates to an OPCA concept that there are two
kinds of law, “common law” and “admiralty law”, and Mr. Meads rejected
application of the latter to himself.
4.
The discussion of the alleged source of funds to discharge his child and spousal
support obligations, a bank account related to his birth certificate, indicates Mr.
Meads has advanced a ‘money for nothing’ scheme called “A4V”.
These are all, of course, nonsense.
C.
Subsequent Developments
9
[37] On June 19 and 21, 2012 the Court received two effectively identical sets of documents
sent by Mr. Meads. One was addressed to me, the second to the Chief Court Clerk. These were
not filed with the Court.
[38] These documents generally match Mr. Meads’ verbal description of the abandoned
envelope’s contents. The June 19 and 21 materials were returned to Mr. Meads as they do not
represent an application for leave, supported by a draft application and supporting affidavit(s), as
required by my Conditions and Guidelines for Case Management. Further, they have no
application known to law. However, copies were retained.
[39] The first document is a letter with multicoloured text (that facet I do not reproduce). It is
addressed in this manner:
SECURED PARTY CREDITOR
FIDUCIARY-TRUSTEE-LIABLE
is ::Dennis-Larry:Meads::
is “Associate Chief Justice” J.D. Rooke
[40] Summarizing this document, it thanks me for accepting appointment as “FIDUCIARYTRUSTEE-LIABLE” on June 8, 2012. It then appoints me:
... with the Fiduciary-Trustee-Liable Position with the highest and with the
greatest-level for the care in the equity and in the Law and is with the
expectation that-is that-you being the Fiduciary-Trustee-Liable are Duty-Bound
for the utmost-case and protection for the living flesh and blood sentient - man,
::Dennis-Larry:Meads:: who is the creation for the Lord God Almighty Jehovah
with whom you owe the duty (the “principal” qui facit per alium, facit per se):
you, “Associate Chief Justice” J.D. Rooke must not place your personal
interests before the duty, and must not profit in your position as the FiduciaryTrustee, unless the principal gives you consent in the written-format. [sic,
emphasis in original]
If I believed that Mr. Meads acted sincerely (which I do not), I would conclude Mr. Meads
misapprehended the scope of the responsibility and authority of a case management justice.
However, this, instead, seems to be a kind of OPCA document that purports to unilaterally foist a
particularly impressive sounding string of gibberish obligations upon me.
[41] The letter then instructs, “under the guidance and direction with the Almighty God
Jehovah watching over us through His Son and Reigning King Jesus Christ”, that I use the
attached documents to do the following:
•
... for the completion and carrying-out for the full protection and benefit
for the ::Dennis-Larry: Meads:: and for the children of the union with the
full-written-text/report for the “Instant-Matter-In-The-Hand” at the end
of the every-month till the end for the contract with the child of the union,.
10
•
One time Lump Sum Payout (With-Out-Recourse) in the form of a bond
or other financial instrument from the Provincial-Registered-Estate for the
Persona DENNIS LARRY MEADS (juristic person) thru the ProvincialRegistered-Event in the PROVINCAIL BIRTH CERTIFICATE and/or
any other government(s) for the Canada Registered Event(s) - for the
make-whole for the Debtor CRYSTAL LYNNE MEADS and Michele J.
Reeves DRA MICHELE J. REEVES (PERSONA-AT-LAW-PERSONA)
•
Debtor, being the CRYSTAL LYNNE MEADS and Michele J. Reeves
DBA contact via the any media with the living flesh and blood sentient man, ::Dennis-Larry:Meads:: and/or the DENNIS LARRY MEADS
(juristic person) and when-there is the claim for a breach face the
penalties as-is prescribed in the attached-documents.
•
For the claim for the Divorce-Papers signed as the CRYSTAL LYNNE
MEADS, which does not abhor delay.
•
For the claim for the Child-Support-Payments for the child in the Union,
[child #1] of $1000.00/ month. (When is for the claim for the habituation
with mother) till the full-age-eighteen years with the no-section-7-rules
application/begging, for the child being the [child #1] can/must dialogue
the her-needs as-is needed with the father with the new-arrangements
provision-in the written-format and fully-notarized and fullauthentication.
•
Child-Support-Assistance for the child of the union being the [child #2]
as per the negotiation with her-earthly-father till the full-age being the
twenty-one (21) and being in the attendance in the post-education.
•
And other useful-beneficial-information for the make and for the
keeping for the all parties-whole.
[sic, emphasis in original, some reformatting for clarity.]
[42]
The remaining documents are:
1.
a power of attorney where DENNIS LARRY MEADS grants general authority to
Dennis-Larry: Meads;
2.
a UCC Financing Statement registered in Ohio for a Certificate of Birth;
3.
a UCC search of “DENNIS LARRY MEADS, foreign situs cestui qui vie trust”;
4.
a government of Alberta Personal Property Registry Verification Statement for
“DENNIS LARRY MEADS, foreign situs cestui qui vie trust” that lists as
11
collateral a birth certificate, social insurance number, UCC1 financing statement,
a certificate of marriage, an operator’s license, Canadian passport, and what I
believe are two court orders;
5.
a commercial security agreement where DENNIS LARRY MEADS assumes all
debts and obligations of Dennis-Larry:Meads, while granting DennisLarry:Meads all his property;
6.
an “Actual and Constructive Notice” from Dennis-Larry: Meads to the Bank of
Canada that “accepts for value” enclosed documents in accordance with the
Uniform Commercial Code and the Bank of Canada Act to charge his “public
treasury”, which is identified by his social insurance number, for $100 billion
Canadian dollars or the equivalent in silver or gold;
7.
a “Hold Harmless and Indemnify Agreement Non Negotiable Between the
Parties”, that DENNIS LARRY MEADS generally indemnifies Dennis-Larry:
Meads;
8.
a ‘fee schedule’, which is a kind of document I will later discuss in more detail;
9.
a document entitled “Notice to YOURFILINGCOUNTY County Register Of
Deeds Clerk”;
10.
an “Affidavit of Political Status”, with “Grantor: DENNIS LARRY MEADS” and
“Grantee: Dennis-Larry: Meads”;
11.
a “Copyright Trade-name/Trademark Contract” between DENNIS LARRY
MEADS and Dennis-Larry: Meads, the intellectual property subject being the
name Dennis Larry Meads, in various forms; and
12.
a document that purports that anyone who uses “Dennis Larry Meads” (or
variations of that) owes Dennis-Larry: Meads $100 million per use of that.
[43] From a review of these documents, it appears that Mr. Meads is purporting to split
himself into two aspects. One gets his property and benefits, the other his debts and liabilities.
The ‘Mr. Meads with liabilities’ has entirely indemnified the ‘Mr. Meads with property’. He also
appears to instruct me and the Bank of Canada to use a secret bank account, with the same
number as his social insurance number or birth certificate, to pay all his child and spousal
support obligations, and provide him $100 billion in precious metals. Mr. Meads has also
purported to create various contractual obligations for those who might interact with him, or who
write or speak his name.
[44] This is, of course, nonsense. As I have noted to Mr. Meads, these materials have no force
or meaning in law, other than they indicate an intention on his part to evade his lawful
12
obligations and the authority of the Court and government. He is an OPCA litigant. That has
legal consequences for him, which these Reasons will explain.
D.
The Purposes of These Reasons
[45] These Reasons have a number of purposes. The requests of both Mr. and Ms. Meads are
best met by a broad and comprehensive response. The scope and variety of Mr. Meads’ materials
and submissions touches on many related issues.
[46] Its context is also important. These Reasons sets the stage for an ongoing procedure case management of this file - and respond to a collection of issues that have emerged
immediately at the beginning that process. If not fully addressed, I believe the OPCA aspect of
this litigation will hamper successful resolution of Mr. and Ms. Meads’ divorce.
1.
Ms. Meads
[47] Counsel for Ms. Meads, Ms. Reeves, sought case management because she cannot
meaningfully communicate with Mr. Meads. She explained she had attempted to engage in
mundane procedural steps, such as requests for disclosure, and instead received complex and
cryptic documents, demands, and threats. She turned to the Court for hands-on management
because she does not otherwise have an effective mechanism to deal with Mr. Meads, and his
OPCA strategies.
[48] These Reasons are intended to assist her, explain what she faces, and illustrate how this
and other Courts have responded to litigants who adopt and advance OPCA concepts and
strategies. I cast these Reasons broadly to help her both understand what she has already
encountered, but also to deal with developments in the ongoing litigation and case management
processes.
2.
Mr. Meads
[49] These Reasons are also a response to Mr. Meads. He clearly plans to frame his entire
divorce action in an OPCA context. He arrived in court with that intention. That was the only
‘issue’ on which he wanted to respond. Since the June 8 hearing I have seen no evidence that Mr.
Meads intends to abandon his strategies to defeat Court authority and his child and spousal
support obligations.
[50] I was explicit on June 8 that I considered Mr. Meads’ OPCA submissions and claims
irrelevant, yet he has persisted. At that hearing he announced that my decision was
“unacceptable”, and has subsequently acted in defiance of my explicit instructions that he only
communicate with the Court to propose an application or to request a case management
conference. He said he would not voluntarily put himself under the Court’s authority, denied the
Court had any lawful hold over him, and left.
13
[51] Mr. Meads did not accept the result of the June 8 hearing, and proceeded to send
additional documentation to the Court and myself. His intention to employ OPCA concepts and
defy my instructions is very clear in his June 19 and 21 cover letters. He demands that I act on
his behalf, using highly unusual and mandatory language.
[52] These Reasons are not merely a response to Mr. Meads’ in-court misconduct but also a
global response to the entire litigation strategy he has underway. There are no signs he has
decided to back down and adopt a more reasonable approach. From the file record and his
documents, he has been on this path for over a year and a half. I intend these Reasons to clearly
identify for him why it is time to change his approach.
3.
A Broad Set of OPCA Concepts and Materials
[53] There is a third reason for a broad-based decision and analysis. It so happens that Mr.
Meads has provided a remarkable and well developed assortment of OPCA documents, concepts,
materials, and strategies. These materials also illustrate particular idiosyncrasies that this and
other Courts have identified as associated with the OPCA community and OPCA litigation.
Phrased differently, Mr. Meads’ materials and approach provide an ideal type specimen for
examination and commentary, which should be instructive to other OPCA litigants who have
been taken in by these ideas, opposing parties and their counsel, as well as gurus.
[54] Mr. Meads’ submissions also make an excellent subject for a global review of the law
concerning OPCA, the OPCA community and its gurus, and how the court, lawyers, and litigants
should respond to these vexatious practices and the persons who advance and advocate these
techniques and ideas. In this sense, the present case management allows the litigation between
Mr. and Ms. Meads to explore the OPCA community and its concepts, for the benefit of this and
other Canadian Courts, and litigants appearing before the courts.
[55] I will use Mr. Meads’ materials and arguments to illustrate many points in this review.
Those materials will be supplemented from several sources. First, I review judgments from this
and other Courts that report on OPCA strategies and court responses to OPCA litigants.
[56] Second, this Court and its justices have been involved in a large number of court
proceedings that include OPCA elements, deployed by a spectrum of OPCA litigants. As the
senior administrative judicial official of the Court of Queen’s Bench in Edmonton, I am usually
made aware of this litigation. Our Court’s experience has been that OPCA-related litigation
involves particular security and court efficiency issues, which fall within my purview. Thus, I
will, in certain instances in my review and analysis, reference unreported litigation before
justices of this Court that has come to my attention.
[57] Last, I am frequently the direct recipient of documents sent by OPCA litigants. This may
be because I am the senior administrative justice of this Court in Edmonton. These documents
frequently purport to ‘bind’ or ‘notify’ me of various OPCA schemes and obligations. I review
this correspondence as a facet of my administrative judicial duties. Though no doubt
14
unintentional, these materials are a useful and direct way to investigate certain OPCA schemes
and strategies, and provide a plethora of characteristic OPCA litigation ‘fingerprints’.
4.
Mr. Meads Faces No Unexpected Sanction
[58] Mr. Meads does not face any sanction or other negative consequence flowing from these
Reasons. To date, I have not accepted any of his materials or submissions and he is aware of
that. These Reasons do not put him at greater risk for his prior activities. However, to be clear,
my decision to direct disclosure does anticipate sanctions for non-compliance, that should be of
no surprise to Mr. Meads.
[59] In fact, Mr. Meads can only benefit from a comprehensive response by this Court.
Through these Reasons, Mr. Meads is now on notice of how Canadian courts have responded to
OPCA litigation and litigants. The more thorough my explanation of that, the better.
III.
Overview of these Reasons
[60] The remainder of these Reasons address aspects of the OPCA phenomenon, and the
courts’ responses, closing with the application of these Reasons to the Meads litigation. There
are four main parts to these Reasons:
The OPCA Phenomenon
[61] This part of the Reasons is a detailed review of the OPCA community, its membership,
organization, and known history. It sets out the Court’s understanding of persons who affiliate
with OPCA concepts, what traits they do and do not share, and how they organize themselves.
[62] This community has “guru” leader, and follower / customer, cohorts. Groups of persons
who have similar beliefs join together into “movements”. Known gurus and movements are
identified and described.
Indicia of OPCA Litigants, Litigation, and Strategies
[63] The documentary material and in-court conduct of OPCA litigants involves very unusual
and stereotypic motifs. The second part of these Reasons identifies these ‘fingerprints’ that
characterize OPCA activities. The problematic character of OPCA litigation and litigants may
warrant special court procedures; some possibilities are surveyed.
Judicial Response to OPCA Concepts and Arguments
[64] This part of the Reasons surveys existing caselaw that reports and rejects OPCA
strategies and concepts. Those strategies and concepts are grouped by their shared themes and
15
mechanisms. The theoretical basis and operation of certain more elaborate OPCA schemes are
examined in detail.
[65] No Canadian court has accepted an OPCA concept or approach as valid. This part of the
decision identifies a common basis to reject these ideas as a category: they directly attack the
inherent jurisdiction of Canadian courts. That fact is also a basis for why OPCA schemes are
inherently vexatious, and provide evidence that may potentially lead to orders for contempt of
court. Remedies for OPCA litigation and litigation strategies are reviewed.
Summary and Direction
[66] There is no place in Canadian courts for anyone who advances OPCA concepts. The last
part of these Reasons suggests how judges, lawyers, and litigants may respond to persons who
adopt and advance th ese concepts. I also comment directly to those in the OPCA community both gurus and their followers - with the hope that these Reasons will lead them to more
productive and successful interaction with the courts, government, and their fellow citizens.
IV.
The OPCA Phenomenon
[67] I will first engage in an overview of the OPCA community, its composition, and their
concepts. Certain of these observations are generalizations that flow from the more specific
examples and materials that make up the bulk of these Reasons. In other instances, this
information reflects the experiences of justices of this Court that have come to my attention as
the supervising administrative Justice of this Court.
[68] Members in the OPCA community appear surprisingly unified by their methodology and
objectives. They are otherwise diverse. OPCA litigants appearing in our Court may be anything
from educated professionals to retired senior citizens. They may be wealthy or poor. The famous
are not immune; for example the American action movie actor Wesley Snipes adopted OPCA
techniques in an attempt to defeat his income tax obligations: United State v. Wesley Trent
Snipes et al., No. 5:06-cr-00022-WTH-GRJ-1 (U.S.D.C. M.D. Fl., February 1, 2008). Snipes
presently is serving a three year prison sentence for income tax evasion.
[69] In Canada, this category of litigation traces into the late 1990’s, representing the spread
of concepts that emerged much earlier in the United States. Our Court’s experience has been that
persons involved in the OPCA community often hold highly conspiratorial perspectives, but
there is no consistency in who is the alleged hidden hand. Another uniform OPCA characteristic
appears to be a belief that ordinary persons have been unfairly cheated, or deceived as to their
rights. This belief that the common man has been abused and cheated by a hidden hand seems to
form the basis for OPCA community members perceived right to break ‘the system’ and retaliate
against ‘their oppressors’.
[70] These Reasons in many instances identify reported caselaw that comments on OPCA
litigants, OPCA gurus, and their misconduct. It should be understood that the reported caselaw is
the proverbial tip of the iceberg. The vast majority of encounters between this Court and OPCA
16
litigants are not reported. These litigants and their schemes have been encountered in almost all
areas of law. They appear in chambers, in criminal proceedings, initiate civil litigation based on
illusionary OPCA rights, attempt to evade court and state authority with procedural and defencebased schemes, and interfere with unrelated matters.
[71] OPCA strategies as brought before this Court have proven disruptive, inflict unnecessary
expenses on other parties, and are ultimately harmful to the persons who appear in court and
attempt to invoke these vexatious strategies. Because of the nonsense they argue, OPCA litigants
are invariably unsuccessful and their positions dismissed, typically without written reasons.
Nevertheless, their litigation abuse continues. The growing volume of this kind of vexatious
litigation is a reason why these Reasons suggest a strong response to curb this misconduct.
[72] Beyond that, these are little more than scams that abuse legal processes. As this Court
now recognizes that these schemes are intended for that purpose, a strict approach is appropriate
when the Court responds to persons who purposefully say they stand outside the rules and law,
or who intend to abuse, disrupt, and ultimately break the legal processes that govern conduct in
Canada. The persons who advance these schemes, and particularly those who market and sell
these concepts as commercial products, are parasites that must be stopped.
[73] A critical first point is an appreciation that the concepts discussed in these Reasons are
frequently a commercial product, designed, promoted, and sold by a community of individuals,
whom I refer to as “gurus”. Gurus claim that their techniques provide easy rewards – one does
not have to pay tax, child and spousal support payments, or pay attention to traffic laws. There
are allegedly secret but accessible bank accounts that contain nearly unlimited funds, if you
know the trick to unlock their gates. You can transform a bill into a cheque with a stamp and
some coloured writing. You are only subject to criminal sanction if you agree to be subject to
criminal sanction. You can make yourself independent of any state obligation if you so desire,
and unilaterally force and enforce demands on other persons, institutions, and the state. All this
is a consequence of the fact gurus proclaim they know secret principles and law, hidden from the
public, but binding on the state, courts, and individuals.
[74]
And all these “secrets” can be yours, for small payment to the guru.
[75] These claims are, of course, pseudolegal nonsense. A judge who encounters and reviews
OPCA concepts will find their errors are obvious and manifest, once one strips away the layers
of peculiar language, irrelevant references, and deciphers the often bizarre documentation which
accompanies an OPCA scheme. When reduced to their conceptual core, most OPCA concepts
are contemptibly stupid. Mr. Meads, for example, has presented the Court with documents that
appear to be a contract between himself, and himself. One Mr. Meads promises to pay for any
liability of the other Mr. Meads. One owns all property, the other all debts. What is the
difference between these entities? One spells his name with upper case letters. The other adds
spurious and meaningless punctuation to his name. Mr. Meads (with punctuation) is the Mr.
Meads who appeared in court. He says the Mr. Meads (all capitals) is the one who should pay
child and spousal support.
17
[76] So where is that Mr. Meads (all capitals)? At one point in the June 8 hearing Mr. Meads
said that Mr. Meads (all capitals) was a “corporate entity” attached to his birth certificate. Later,
he told me that the other Mr. Meads was a “person” - and that I had created him! Again, total
nonsense.
[77] The bluntly idiotic substance of Mr. Mead’s argument explains the unnecessarily
complicated manner in which it was presented. OPCA arguments are never sold to their
customers as simple ideas, but instead are byzantine schemes which more closely resemble the
plot of a dark fantasy novel than anything else. Latin maxims and powerful sounding language
are often used. Documents are often ornamented with many strange marking and seals. Litigants
engage in peculiar, ritual-like in court conduct. All these features appear necessary for gurus to
market OPCA schemes to their often desperate, ill-informed, mentally disturbed, or legally
abusive customers. This is crucial to understand the non-substance of any OPCA concept or
strategy. The story and process of a OPCA scheme is not intended to impress or convince the
Courts, but rather to impress the guru’s customer.
[78] Mediaeval alchemy is a helpful analogue. Alchemists sold their services based on the
theatre of their activities, rather than demonstrated results, or any analytical or systematic
methodology. OPCA gurus are modern legal alchemists. They promise gold, but their methods
are principally intended to impress the gullible, or those who wish to use this drivel to abuse the
court system. Any lack of legal success by the OPCA litigant is, of course, portrayed as a
consequence of the customer’s failure to properly understand and apply the guru’s special
knowledge.
[79] Caselaw that relates to Gurus, reviewed below, explains how gurus present these ideas in
seminars, books, websites, and instructional DVDs and other recordings. They provide
pre-prepared documents, which sometimes are government forms, and instruct how to fill in the
necessary information that then produces the desired effects. Gurus write scripts to follow in
court. Some will attempt to act as your representative, and argue your case.
[80] When gurus do appear in court their schemes uniformly fail, which is why most leave
court appearances to their customers. That explains why it is not unusual to find that an OPCA
litigant cannot even explain their own materials. They did not write them. They do not (fully)
understand them. OPCA litigants appear, engage in a court drama that is more akin to a magic
spell ritual than an actual legal proceeding, and wait to see if the court is entranced and
compliant. If not, the litigant returns home to scrutinize at what point the wrong incantation was
uttered, an incorrectly prepared artifact waved or submitted.
A.
Characteristics of OPCA Group Members
[81] As is illustrated in the specific examples that follow, persons who adopt OPCA ideas
may come from practically any part of society. OPCA ideas appear to be developed in social
groups. For example, this Court has often observed ‘supporters’ attending OPCA litigation
hearings. OPCA litigants frequently say they work or study in groups. Mr. Meads mentioned he
studies the law with a number of other persons with similar interests. Internet forums are clearly
18
important mechanisms by which OPCA litigants and those interested in OPCA concepts discuss
and plan their activities. OPCA litigants and gurus often appear to prefer to communicate and
broadcast their ideas with video recordings made available on the “www.youtube.com” website.
[82] This Court and the reported caselaw indicates that OPCA litigants and gurus do not have
a particular political orientation. Intriguingly, the same concepts and mechanisms are advanced
by both persons who hold perspectives that are alternatively extremely right wing (for example:
R. v. Warman, 2001 BCCA 510; Warman v. Warman, 2005 CHRT 36; Warman v. Warman,
2005 CHRT 43) or extremely left wing (for example: Jackson v. Canada (Customs and
Revenue Agency), 2001 SKQB 377 at para. 21, 210 Sask.R. 285). They use the same
‘techniques’ but each has a different backstory or context for that methodology.
[83] Other OPCA litigants proclaim bizarre alternative histories which have no obvious or
explicit political affiliations, for example: Henry v. Starwood Hotels, 2010 ABCA 367, leave
refused [2010] S.C.C.A. No. 475; Henry v. El, 2010 ABCA 312, leave refused [2011] S.C.C.A.
No. 138. Some, like Mr. Meads, frame their beliefs in a religious context, for example: Bloom v.
Canada, 2011 ONSC 1308; Sandri v. Canada (Attorney General), 2009 CanLII 44282, 179
A.C.W.S. (3d) 811 (Ont. Sup. Ct. J.); Pappas v. Canada, 2006 TCC 692, [2006] G.S.T.C. 161;
R. v. Lindsay, 2011 BCCA 99, 302 B.C.A.C. 76, leave refused [2011] S.C.C.A. No. 265.
[84] The alternative history and conspiracy stories that cloak various different groups of
OPCA litigants may be very different, but the caselaw and this Court’s experience increasingly
points to these apparently disparate groups making the exact same pseudolegal arguments. The
only ideology, such as it is, that unifies these litigants and their leaders is a belief that they
should be immune from obligations.
B.
The OPCA Guru
[85] These Reasons will survey a number of known OPCA gurus, and their activities. In
summary, the guru class are nothing more than conmen. Gurus are the usual source of new
OPCA concepts, though more often their novel contribution is to simply create a variation on or
repackage a pre-existing strategy, perhaps changing language or putting in some particular twist
to a concept. Gurus seem to borrow extensively from one another. For example, its appears that
parts of a document filed in one OPCA matter may be reproduced in another proceeding. An
excellent example of that is the ‘fee schedule’ attached to these Reasons. Identical language is
reproduced in materials discussed in Szoo v. Canada (Royal Canadian Mounted Police), 2011
BCSC 696.
[86] The caselaw indicates that gurus adopt a number of strategies. One is that they provide
materials, such as seminars, books, and DVDs, that explain the theoretical context of their ideas,
and demonstrate the application of those ideas for the benefit of their customers. These
commercial products may include items such as form documents, scripts, and other materials
that can be used in court, sent to government actors, or used in litigation. Some OPCA gurus
hold seminars to promote the materials they sell. Many have Internet web pages that serve the
same function.
19
1.
Russell Porisky and the Paradigm Education Group
[87] Typically, this Court has learned about gurus and their activities from the perspective of
an outside observer. For example, in court, justices see litigants identify certain persons who
provide assistance or guidance to an OPCA litigant. Some gurus have appeared before justices of
this Court and have directed (or appear to direct) the OPCA litigant’s conduct, or attempt to
represent the OPCA litigant.
[88] Recently, a more complete window into the operations of an OPCA guru and his
customer base has been provided by the trial and conviction (R. v. Porisky, 2012 BCSC 67, 2012
D.T.C. 5037 [“Porisky Trial Decision”]) and sentencing (R. v. Porisky, 2012 BCSC 771
[“Porisky Sentencing Decision”]) of Russell Porisky and Elaine Gould for tax evasion and
counseling others to commit fraud. R. v. Sydel, 2006 BCPC 346 also reports on the Porisky
operation but from the perspective of one customer, a dentist. These cases provide many details
on how an OPCA scheme operates.
[89] Porisky operated a business, named “The Paradigm Education Group”, that advanced a
concept that it was possible for a potential taxpayer to:
... structure their affairs so that they were a “natural person, working in his own
capacity, under a private contract, for his own benefit”. Paradigm taught that
money earned under this arrangement was exempt from income tax.
(Porisky Trial Decision, at para. 1)
[90]
Porisky claimed this was in response to a banking conspiracy:
He founded what he eventually called The Paradigm Education Group to “create a
structure that everyone could work together in to save the country from a foreign
parasite”. The foreign parasites were the international bankers who were, directly
or indirectly, responsible for the income tax system.
(Porisky Trial Decision, at para. 38)
[91] Porisky taught that the Canada Revenue Agency had tricked persons into believing there
was an obligation to pay tax, and further that taxation is slavery, serfdom, and contrary to the
Canadian Bill of Rights: para. 111. Justice Myer helpfully isolates representative examples of the
alternative reality and rhetoric Porisky directed to his customers in the Appendix to the trial
decision. It is typical that a guru will frame his or her arguments in a conspiratorial context, and
claim that the potential customer has been cheated. The state is an enemy and oppressive. A few
sample passages illustrate Porisky’s perspective on the world:
... When I was a good slave I dismissed my thoughts because I was taught that I
was incapable of understanding the superior wisdom of my elected officials. The
20
more I studied though, the freer my mind grew and the clearer it became. They
never had some kind of superior wisdom as I had been taught, in fact it became
painfully clear that many of them could not or would not even think for
themselves ...
...
As far as propaganda goes, the “National Post” article was a great textbook
example of promoting a victim mentality. It seems to stimulate sympathy for our
poor federal government, while painting everyone who doesn’t submit to their
national plundering program as a criminal. Nevertheless, it was a great read, I
laughed, I cried and I’ll definitely want to read it again when I feel like being
shamed into feeling that I should waive my natural rights so our government can
keep its trough full enough to ensure their fiscal mismanagement can continue
unabated.
...
This mental shift toward total government dependence is what will allow the
implementation of the banker’s ultimate agenda, a New World Order run by a
One World Government that they control.
...
... The choice is yours, but consider this, ignorance may be bliss, but it costs you
plenty.
[92] I will not review the basis on why Porisky’s “natural person” scheme is incorrect, as this
question is thoroughly dissected in reported cases including: R. v. Klundert, 2008 ONCA 767 at
para. 19, 93 O.R. (3d) 81, leave denied [2008] S.C.C.A. No. 522; R. v. Lindsay, 2011 BCCA 99
at para. 27, 302 B.C.A.C. 76, leave refused [2011] S.C.C.A. No. 265; R. v. Pinno, 2002 SKPC
118 at paras. 12-13, 15-16, [2003] 3 C.T.C. 308; Kennedy v. Canada (Customs and Revenue
Agency), [2000] 4 C.T.C. 186, 2000 D.T.C. 6524 (Ont. Sup. Ct. J.); and Porisky Trial Decision
at paras. 58-61.
[93] Porisky and Paradigm advanced this scheme on a commercial basis. Porisky operated a
website, and sold instructional materials such as books and DVDs: Porisky Trial Decision, at
para. 39. Porisky also conducted seminars where he changed a fee (at para. 39), and provided
levels of training and exams (at paras. 101-105). Paradigm operated as something of a pyramid
scheme; Porisky also qualified “educators” to further proselytize his approach: Porisky Trial
Decision, at paras. 39, 106. At least one of these educators is now also the subject of criminal
litigation: R. v. Lawson, 2012 BCSC 356, at para. 21, as are other participants in the Porisky tax
evasion ring: R. v. McCartie, 2012 BCSC 928. Many other persons who used Porisky’s
techniques have already been convicted of tax evasion: Porisky Trial Decision, at para. 63.
21
[94] Additionally, and in what can only be described as an exercise in pure arrogance, Porisky
demanded 7% of the next two years income from his subscribers in exchange for his or his
educator’s assistance: Porisky Trial Decision, at para. 40. The tax liberator had become a tax
collector.
[95] The pseudolegal basis for Porisky’s claims is very representative of how OPCA
arguments are rationalized and explained by their proponents. Statutes, caselaw (often foreign or
obsolete), legal platitudes and definitions (again often foreign or obsolete), political ideology,
and conspiracy, were strung together into a loose cloud that pointed to a desired result. Justice
Myers eloquently described this process at para. 67 of the trial decision:
Mr. Porisky’s analysis picks and chooses snippets from various statutes and cases,
and attempts to create logical links where none exist. It is, in effect, legal
numerology.
[96] It is important at this point to again stress the audience for Porisky’s ideas. That was not
the courts, government actors, but his clientele. What mattered was that his customer base
believe and then pay for his services.
[97] Porisky was convicted and sentenced for having personally evaded taxes, and having
aided and abetted the evasion of income tax. Justice Myers rejected a disclaimer by Porisky that
his ideas, materials, and advice were for “educational purposes only”: Porisky Trial Decision, at
para. 98. Porisky had gone so far as to prepare (unsuccessful) legal arguments for one of his
clients who had been sued for tax evasion. Porisky then analyzed that result, and told his
subscribers why the client’s conviction was “ambiguous” and “... just another desperately needed
bowl of propaganda pabulum for public consumption, to keep the masses asleep and enslaved ...”
[sic]: paras. 118-121.
[98] In total, Porisky’s guru activities led to substantial tax evasion, which was difficult to
quantify with precision: Porisky Sentencing Decision, at paras. 38-40. He had approximately
800 “students” who applied his scheme: at para. 40. A 4.5 year prison sentence was ordered:
para. 57.
2.
Other Canadian Gurus
[99] Porisky’s guru activities are far from unique in Canada. A number of other gurus have
been the subject of reported decisions, or have become directly known to this Court.
a.
David Kevin Lindsay
[100] For over a decade David Kevin Lindsay [“Lindsay”] (usually styled David-Kevin:
Lindsay) has been involved in OPCA type activities as a guru and litigant. He has repeatedly
personally challenged various aspects of tax legislation and the authority of the Canadian state
and courts: R. v. Lindsay, 2004 MBCA 147, 187 Man.R. (2d) 236; R. v. Lindsay, 2006 BCSC
188, 68 W.C.B. (2d) 718, affirmed 2007 BCCA 214; R. v. Lindsay, 2006 BCCA 150, 265 D.L.R.
22
(4th) 193; R. v. Lindsay, 2008 BCCA 30, 250 B.C.A.C. 270; R. v. Lindsay, 2011 BCCA 99, 302
B.C.A.C. 76, leave refused [2011] S.C.C.A. No. 265. In 2008 he was sentenced to 150 days
imprisonment for failure to file income tax returns: R. v. Lindsay, 2008 BCPC 203, [2009] 1
C.T.C 86, affirmed 2010 BCSC 831, [2010] 5 C.T.C. 174, affirmed 2011 BCCA 99, 302
B.C.A.C. 76, leave refused [2011] S.C.C.A. No. 265.
[101] OPCA concepts that Lindsay has promoted include:
1.
various deficiencies in judicial oaths prohibit court action: R. v. Lindsay, 2006
BCSC 188 at paras. 30-38, 68 W.C.B. (2d) 718, affirmed 2007 BCCA 214;
2.
that the relationship between the state and a person is a contract, and one can opt
out of that contract: R. v. Lindsay, 2011 BCCA 99 at para. 32, 302 B.C.A.C. 76,
leave refused [2011] S.C.C.A. No. 265;
3.
that the obligation to pay income tax is one such agreement: R. v. Lindsay, 2011
BCCA 99 at para. 31, 302 B.C.A.C. 76, leave refused [2011] S.C.C.A. No. 265;
4.
legislation, the common-law, and court principles and procedures are trumped by
“God’s Law” and other divinely ordained rules and principles: R. v. Lindsay,
2011 BCCA 99 at para. 31, 302 B.C.A.C. 76, leave refused [2011] S.C.C.A. No.
265;
5.
the same natural person argument advanced by Porisky: R. v. Lindsay, 2011
BCCA 99 at para. 27, 302 B.C.A.C. 76, leave refused [2011] S.C.C.A. No. 265;
6.
that an aspect of the 1931 Statute of Westminster meant all post-1931 government
legislation and action is unauthorized: R. v. Lindsay, 2004 MBCA 147 at para.
32, 187 Man.R. (2d) 236; and
7.
that the Magna Carta has super-constitutional status and restricts state and court
action: R. v. Lindsay, 2008 BCCA 30 at paras. 19-21, 250 B.C.A.C. 270.
[102] Lindsay holds seminars (for pay) to teach his beliefs. R. v. Dick, 2002 BCCA 27, 163
B.C.A.C. 62, leave refused [2002] S.C.C.A. No. 128 provides a useful review of those activities
and the manner in which Lindsay promotes himself:
10
Further, there is evidence that Mr. Lindsay has, in this province, been
advertising himself as an expert on legal matters or permitting others to do so on
his behalf. In advance of a recent "seminar" that he instructed, he was described
in an Internet notice (essentially promotional material for the seminar) as
"Canada's foremost freedom expert on the secrets of laying criminal charges
against government officials." The notice continued:
23
Dave will examine some of the common law, principles and
obligations as well as some of the rights and freedoms we have
there under. Included will be answers to pertinent and repeatedly
asked questions involving our RIGHT to use the highways, how
this right has been denied to us, how the courts have
self-admittedly been a part of this fraud, what happens with
insurance, and how the Charter of Rights and Freedoms does not
protect you.
You will learn how the criminal process works, Dave will be
explain [sic] how one can lay their own private criminal charges
against anyone in the country, including government ministers,
CCRA and other government officials, and even police officers ...
11
According to other material published on the Internet, Mr. Lindsay has
also negotiated an “exclusive agreement” with a publisher:
... to work with our subscribers as a court procedure assistant.
Whether it means getting help in drafting up court documents
correctly, how to lay charges against government agents or how to
deal with your own lawyer more effectively, Lindsay has the
solution. ...
Lindsay has been involved in court procedures literally hundreds
of times, for both defendant and plaintiff's challenges, or for filing
court documents on their behalf. Lindsay is not a "lawyer" but has
the ability to act as an "agent" for anyone who has to go to court
and wishes to do so without spending a fortune on lawyer fees.
We have arranged to make Lindsay available for one-on-one
telephone assistance to any Canadian who needs help with court
challenges or wishes to learn how to deal with court challenges for
their own benefit.
[Emphasis added.]
[103] As is typical of most recent gurus, Lindsay also advertises his services on an Internet
website: British Columbia (Attorney General) v. Lindsay, 2007 BCCA 165 at para. 15, 238
B.C.A.C. 254.
[104] Sadly, some persons have taken up that offer. Lindsay has a history of advising and
representing persons who advance his schemes (Superior Filter Recycling Inc. v. Canada, 2005
TCC 638, 2005 D.T.C. 1426; R. v. Meikle, 2008 BCPC 265 at para. 5, [2009] 1 C.T.C. 184,
affirmed 2009 BCSC 1540, [2010] 2 C.T.C. 76, affirmed on other grounds 2010 BCCA 337,
2010 D.T.C. 5140; Coulbeck v. University of Toronto, [2005] O.J. No. 4003 (QL), 142
24
A.C.W.S. (3d) 889 (Ont. Sup. Ct. J.); Coulbeck v. University of Toronto, [2005] O.J. No. 5688
(QL), 145 A.C.W.S. (3d) 393 (Ont. Sup. Ct. J.); R. v. Dick, 2000 BCPC 221, [2003] 1 C.T.C.
277 (and related proceedings); R. v. J.B.C. Securities Ltd., 2003 NBCA 53 at para. 9, 261
N.B.R. (2d) 199; Canadian Western Bank v. Ricci, 2003 CanLII 45381 (Ont. Sup. Ct.); R. v.
Gibbs, 2002 BCPC 703, [2006] 3 C.T.C. 307; Kennedy v. Canada (Customs and Revenue
Agency), [2000] 4 C.T.C. 186, 2000 D.T.C. 6524 (Ont. Sup. Ct. J.); Audcent v. Maleki, 2006
ONCJ 401, [2007] 1 C.T.C. 212 (and related proceedings); Canada v. Galbraith, 2001 BCSC
675, 54 W.C.B. (2d) 504; R. v. Warman, 2001 BCCA 510)), though he has been denied that role
in a number of jurisdictions, including the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench (R. v. Main, 2000
ABQB 56, 259 A.R. 163; Hill v. Hill, 2008 SKQB 11 at paras. 29-30, 306 Sask.R. 259; Warman
v. Icke, [2009] O.J. No. 3482 at para. 1 (QL), 2009 CanLII 43943; Ambrosi v. Duckworth, 2011
BCSC 1582; Superior Filter Recycling Inc. v. Canada, 2006 FCA 248, [2006] 5 C.T.C. 85; R.
v. Linehan, 2000 ABQB 815, 276 A.R. 383).
[105] He has been declared a vexatious litigant: British Columbia (Attorney General) v.
Lindsay, 2007 BCCA 165, 238 B.C.A.C. 254, leave refused [2007] S.C.C.A. No. 359; Manitoba
(Attorney General) v. Lindsay, 2000 MBCA 11, 145 Man.R. (2d) 187. Lindsay frequently
initiates legal proceedings and files private informations to harass lawyers, Canada Revenue
Agency employees, and court sheriffs: British Columbia (Attorney General) v. Lindsay, 2007
BCCA 165 at paras. 11-14, 27, 238 B.C.A.C. 254.
[106] Lindsay’s misconduct goes further. Lindsay was, at a minimum, a “cheerleader” for an
attempt by OPCA litigants to ‘arrest’ an Alberta Provincial Court judge during a hearing: R. v.
Main, at para. 8. He persistently filed ungrounded complaints against judges: R. v. Main, at
paras. 18, 28-29. He alleged judicial and state corruption: R. v. Main, at paras. 25-26. His
activities are “... a wrongheaded, destructive, malicious use of the justice system by the
defendant to effect a purpose which is the very antithesis of that which the section intends ...”
[emphasis added]: Manitoba (Attorney-General) v. Lindsay (1997), 120 Man.R. (2d) 141, 13
C.P.C. (4th) 15 (Man. Q.B.), varied on other grounds 2000 MBCA 11, 145 Man.R. (2d) 187.
[107] Lindsay’s rhetoric is also documented. R. v. Lindsay, 2004 MBCA 147 at para. 35, 187
Man.R. (2d) 236 provides a review:
The appellant's court filings abound with unfounded and scurrilous accusations of
"corruption and criminal activity at all levels of the justice and political levels,"
"unlawful Gestapo [S]earches," "unlawful court fees for justice" and judges who
"wilfully violated a court order" and "participated in the cover up." Even on the
first page of his notice of appeal we find this gratuitous and insulting greeting:
I'm Baaaack!!
And you thought I was gone! NOT! I still demand the rule of law be
obeyed If you know how.
25
The appellant takes issue with words such as "scandalous, vexatious, frivolous,
and irrelevant" that the motions judge used in describing portions of his affidavit
and brief. That description was clearly invited and justified by the tenor of his
material.
[108] Those justices of the Alberta Queen’s Bench who have encountered OPCA litigants and
gurus can attest this conduct is unexceptional.
b.
John Ruiz Dempsey
[109] Sometimes OPCA gurus claim to be lawyers. A particularly troubling set of reported
decisions from British Columbia relate to John Ruiz Dempsey [“Dempsey”], or as he styles
himself, “John-R: Dempsey”. Dempsey’s claims to be a lawyer were spurious, as is explained in
Law Society of British Columbia v. Dempsey, 2005 BCSC 1277 at para. 22, 142 A.C.W.S. (3d)
346, affirmed 2006 BCCA 161, 149 A.C.W.S. (3d) 735:
Mr. Dempsey is not, and never has been, a member of the Law Society. He states
that this is so as a matter of choice. Due to what he considers the Law Society’s
monopoly on the word “lawyer” and the negative regard with which lawyers are
held, Mr. Dempsey has taken instead to referring to himself as a “forensic
litigation specialist”. He advised the Court that he has a law degree and a degree
in criminology; he also uses the designations LL.B and BSCr. on his personal
website and in correspondence. There is, however, no evidence before the Court
that he has had any such education or training. Documents from the Supreme
Court of the Philippines and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines indicate that
Mr. Dempsey has never been qualified to practice law in that country.
[110] Dempsey advertised his ‘services’ with a webpage entitled “The People v. The Banks:
The Greatest Battle”. Law Society of British Columbia v. Dempsey recounts Dempsey’s
activities, and they make a sorry tale. He initiated lawsuits in his own name, which were
uniformly unsuccessful, except for waiver of court fees due to his indigent status: para. 25.
Dempsey filed a succession of improper and related lawsuits and judicial reviews that led to him
being declared a vexatious litigant: Dempsey v. Casey, 2004 BCCA 395 at paras. 36-38, 132
A.C.W.S. (3d) 833. Dempsey made numerous law society and police complaints (para. 44) and
alleged (para. 43) that the judge presiding over the Law Society of British Columbia v. Dempsey
proceeding:
... had conscientiously, arbitrarily, capriciously, deliberately, intentionally, and
knowingly engaged in conduct in violation of the Supreme Law of the Land, in
violation of her duty under the law, in ‘fraud upon the court’ and to aid and abet
others in criminal activity, thus making herself a principal in the criminal activity.
[111] Denied personal and direct access to the courts, Dempsey turned to the practice of law,
and acted as an “agent” in 10 civil actions that largely involved persons attempting to avoid
26
debts owed to financial institutions (para. 47) and a number of labour matters (para. 51). In
addition to what might be classified as ‘conventional’ claims, Dempsey advanced a collection of
arguments, including:
1.
an ‘A4V’ ‘money for nothing’ scheme,
2.
immunity on the basis of religious authority,
3.
a peculiar concept that debts only relate to ‘hard money’, which seems to mean
physical cash, and
4.
that tax or liability only attaches to a “corporate name” and not a physical person.
(Dempsey v. Envision Credit Union, 2006 BCSC 750, 151 A.C.W.S. (3d) 204; Dempsey v.
Envision Credit Union, 2006 BCSC 1324, 60 B.C.L.R. (4th) 309; Gravlin et al. v. Canadian
Imperial Bank of Commerce et al, 2005 BCSC 839, 140 A.C.W.S. (3d) 447; Ancheta v. Joe,
2003 BCSC 93, 11 B.C.L.R. (4th) 348; Ancheta v. Joe, 2003 BCSC 1597, 20 B.C.L.R. (4th)
382; Ancheta v. Joe, 2003 BCSC 529, 121 A.C.W.S. (3d) 1070; Ancheta v. Joe, 2005 BCCA
232, 213 B.C.A.C. 21; Ancheta v. Kropp, 2004 BCSC 60, 128 A.C.W.S. (3d) 175).
[112] The British Columbia Court of Appeal in Ancheta v. Joe, 2005 BCCA 232 at para. 7,
213 B.C.A.C. 21, noted the defiant and uncooperative attitude typically expressed during this
litigation, including the following:
The court can dismiss the Plaintiff's claims a thousand times, but unless the
defendants can prove that claims have no merits, the Plaintiff reserves the right to
keep re-filing his claims. This is trite law.
[113] Dempsey also initiated a total of six class actions (Law Society of British Columbia v.
Dempsey, at paras. 73-83), directed at a variety of targets, including a government operated
school for girls, a number of financial institutions, and the Government of Canada. The last
action is described in this way at para. 81:
This action challenges the validity of the federal Income Tax Act and alleges that
the defendants, in collecting taxes in reliance on this “non-existent and bogus
federal statute”, have engaged in illegal taxation, fraudulent misrepresentation,
extortion, breach of trust, treason, enterprise corruption, slavery, conversion,
misappropriation of funds and other crimes against the people of Canada. The
proposed class comprises “all persons within or without Canada who have been
the subject of a colossal national tax collection scheme wherewith the people of
Canada, inter-alia were systematically robbed, defrauded, enslaved, imprisoned,
arrested, fined, maliciously prosecuted, and tortured. The class is intended to
include all persons who are ‘tax payers’ within the meaning of the impugned
Income Tax Act.”
27
[114] Law Society of British Columbia v. Dempsey, at paras. 84-103, summarizes affidavit
evidence of those who entrusted their legal actions to Dempsey. The accounts make painful
reading, as it becomes apparent that certain litigants had been deceived as to Dempsey’s true
status, and that their potentially legitimate claims had been compromised by Dempsey’s
activities. It is telling that Dempsey sued in defamation when one of his former clients made her
experiences public: para. 90.
[115] Dempsey alleged the legal profession is an unjust monopoly, and in his submissions and
website engaged in the kind of rhetoric sadly typical of OPCA gurus, for example:
Due process as defined by most Judges: “First, decide how we want the case to
go. Second, formulate a legal logic to support our decision. Third, manipulate,
dissect or eliminate the facts and evidence to support our decision. Then the
rubber stamp doctrine of “judicial discretion” will prevent most decisions from
being overturned.”
...
Just hang in there, truth and justice will prevail. I know this will be difficult for
as long as the legal industry is being run by monopolistic societies supported by
corrupt politicians and judges. These corrupt entities have no power over us until
we surrender it to them. They can all kiss my ass for all I’m concerned.
[116] Dempsey also orchestrated in-court misconduct. Justice Garson reports in Dempsey v.
Envision Credit Union, 2006 BCSC 1324 at paras. 16-24, 60 B.C.L.R. (4th) 309 that persons in
the public gallery would engage in “... chanting, disrespectful comments ...” that she concluded
were “... tactics employed to frustrate the legitimate hearing of the applications and were
deliberate, planned in advance, and well rehearsed.”
[117] Dempsey then posted his account of that online:
16.
... The events of February 27, 2006, were recounted by Mr. Dempsey in an
internet blog attached as an exhibit to affidavits filed on this application
for special costs in following way:
The People shut the court down after about twenty minutes
into the hearing scheduled to be heard on February 27, 28
and March 1, 2006. After intensive questioning by the
People represented by John-Ruiz: Dempsey, Pavel-N:
Darmantchev, Pedro Liong and Otto Luinenburg, the
presiding judge, Nicole Garson got out of the courtroom
and left after she gave the Sheriff an order to clear the
courtroom. Game over, the banks' motion to dismiss the
People's claim will not be heard - at least for now.
28
17.
The "intensive questioning" referred to in the internet blog was a question
as to whether I was a public civil servant chanted over and over again.
[118] Other times litigants did not attend (paras. 18-19) and “... the supporters in the gallery
rose in what was clearly an orchestrated response and began reciting the Lord's Prayer aloud.”
(para. 24). Dempsey also wrote the opposing parties that (para. 35):
... We the People are sick and tired of being pushed around by public servants
who have betrayed their oaths.
You people have to stop thinking that we the People are stupid that you can just
set us up and heard us into a judicial holocaust and gas us all in Garson's
chamber.
And just because you have sold yourselves to devil doesn't mean that you now the
right to call our legitimate and righteous claim frivolous and vexatious. The
whole world is watching. All you have to do is type my name in a search engine
and you will see that no one but you have agreed to label our claims frivolous and
vexatious. Of course the love for money makes everything right. What is at stake
here is more than money.
...
I would advice you not to underestimate the People anymore. February 27, 2006
is nothing compared to what may happen if you invoke the People's wrath.
This matter can be resolved quickly out of court if you honestly concern
yourselves with the best interests of your clients. Again, I leave that up to you.
[sic]
[119] Justice Garson ordered that Dempsey be personally liable for special costs along with the
plaintiffs, as he was a person who instigated and guided “money for nothing” litigation: paras.
46, 48, 60. Dempsey also has been denied permission to represent OPCA litigants on the basis of
his history of misconduct: Gravlin et al. v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce et al, 2005
BCSC 839, 140 A.C.W.S. (3d) 447.
[120] Dempsey’s advice and representation had substantial costs for four of his clients and
himself. People of Canada v. Envision Credit Union; Dempsey v. Envision Credit Union, 2007
BCSC 1276, 160 A.C.W.S. (3d) 962 reports a cost award totalling $92,850.00. This seems to be
the last reported action that involves Dempsey, though his webpage remains.
c.
Robert Arthur Menard
[121] Robert Arthur Menard [“Menard”] (typically styled “Robert-Arthur: Menard”) is the
subject of less case commentary. He is associated with the Freeman-on-the-Land OPCA
29
movement, and identifies himself as such: United States of America v. Emery, 2005 BCSC 1192
at para. 7, 70 W.C.B. (2d) 37. Menard has attempted to participate in legal actions as an
intervener, but was denied that status: United States of America v. Emery. That was an
extradition proceeding. Menard’s OPCA concepts outlined in that case include:
1.
state actors require the consent of persons, any state activity without consent is
oppressive;
2.
a statute is not law and cannot be the basis for extradition; unlawful conduct is
only something such as rape or murder; and
3.
Canada had “abdicated” its role in the extradition process and that Menard would
represent the interests of Canadians.
[122] Menard’s submissions concerning the United States were dramatic:
The American Prison System and SLAVERY:
Robert-Arthur: Menard will argue that the American prison system has in fact
turned into a system amounting to slavery, where prisoners are economically
forced to provide labour for corporate entities. Stock in private prisons can even
be purchased on the open market and the Prison Industrial System now operating
is one very hungry Beast with a growing appetite. It a clear they will always need
MORE employees/prisoners/slaves. Furthermore, these corporate enterprises are
primarily concerned with profit and not-rehabilitation or re-integration and using
punishment as a means of corporate enrichment is cruel and unusual. Speaking of
societies, none of the accused are members of the society governed by and under
the jurisdiction of the Grand Jury which handed down the Indictment.
[123] In 2008 the British Columbia Supreme Court in The Law Society of British Columbia v.
Robert Arthur Menard (8 January 2008) Vancouver S073719 (B.C.S.C.) granted an order
prohibiting Menard from acting as a lawyer and providing legal advice, and receiving
compensation for the same.
[124] This Court’s review of the Freeman-on-the-Land phenomenon has observed that Menard
is associated with or operates a number of “Freeman” Internet websites that market OPCA
materials, including the “Canadian Common Corps Of Peace Officers” (“C3PO”) (website:
http://www.c3po.ca), a group of self-declared and appointed vigilante “peace officers” who:
... are the answer to avoiding a police state in Canada. All able bodied and
suitable candidates can if they wish be hired to preserve and maintain the public
peace under affirmation and contract. In this way the people of Canada can deal
with errant or rogue police from the position of a peace officer, and those who are
Freemen can exercise their rights without hindrance by existing policy
enforcement officers and with the full protection of true peace officers.
30
These websites also indicate Menard travels and gives seminars, for pay.
d.
Eldon Gerald Warman
[125] Eldon Gerald Warman [“Warman”] is a “Detaxer”; he operates the
“http://www.detaxcanada.org/” website. Warman typically styles himself via the ‘dash-colon’
motif as “Eldon-Gerald: Warman”. He has a historic association with Lindsay: R. v. Warman,
2001 BCCA 510; Warman (Re), 2000 ABPC 181, 48 W.C.B. (2d) 194. His stated beliefs
combine the “natural man” scheme of Porisky and Lindsay, with an emphasis on historical
common law and the interrelationship between the king and society, such as the Magna Carta. A
helpful survey of Warman’s concepts is found in R. v. Warman, 2001 BCCA 510 at paras. 9-10.
[126] In 2000 Warman had a roadside encounter with a peace officer who attempted to
investigate the permit status for Warman’s vehicle. That led to an assault on the officer for which
Warman was subsequently convicted: R. v. Warman, 2000 BCPC 22, affirmed 2001 BCCA 510.
Warman had denied the officer’s authority because “... issuing tickets at the side of the road is to
conduct a roving court not permitted by Section 17 of Magna Carta.”: para. 36. These roadside
confrontations between peace officers and OPCA community members are a reported aspect of
OPCA litigation, for example in R. v. Kaasgaard, 2011 MBQB 256.
[127] Mr. Warman has been the subject of complaints of racist and anti-Semitic statements that
were considered by the Canadian Human Rights Commission: Warman v. Warman, 2005
CHRT 36; Warman v. Warman, 2005 CHRT 43. The other “Warman” here is not a relative but
instead is Richard Warman, a person who frequently advances human rights complainants. The
former decision at para. 12 reproduces certain relevant passages from the “detaxcanada.org”
website:
YOU ARE BEING SUBJECTED TO HIGH TREASON
Judges are primary factor in this TREASON against the Canadian people
Canadian judges are using an American produced "Anti-Government Movement
Guidebook" to deprive sovereign Canadians of their God Given Rights within the
de facto corporate commercial Canadian court system - controlled by the Inner
Temple of the `City of London, a hostile foreign entity.
[128] The CHRC continues at para. 12:
The threat is palpable. A box states: "you have a right to use deadly force to stop
these unlawful acts against you". There are dark suggestions that the sovereignty
of the people should be restored.
[129] Warman’s current status is uncertain. The ‘detaxcanada.org’ website remains, however
there is no recent Alberta legal proceeding that involves this person.
31
e.
David J. Lavigne
[130] David J. Lavigne [“Lavigne”], operator of “The Tax Refusal” website
(“http://www.taxrefusal.com/”) and founder of the “International Humanity House”, promotes an
argument that a person need not pay tax on a moral or conscience basis. The one instance where
Lavigne has argued his approach in Federal Court is unreported (see Jackson v. Canada
(Customs and Revenue Agency), 2001 SKQB 377 at para. 21, 210 Sask.R. 285). After that
Lavigne attempted to represent several other litigants who adopted his concepts, but without
success: Jackson v. Canada (Customs and Revenue Agency), at para. 40; R. v. Reddick, 2002
SKCA 89, 54 W.C.B. (2d) 646.
[131] Lavigne provides an interesting contrast to Warman. Both adopt almost the exact same
pseudolegal arguments, but their ideologies could hardly be more opposite. Lavigne’s
perspective is explained in Jackson v. Canada (Customs and Revenue Agency), at paras. 18-20:
18]
The plaintiff's claim, as I understand it, is based on the decisions arising
out of Nuremberg. The plaintiff submits that as a member nation within
the United Nations, Canada is bound to abide by the principles espoused
at the trial and judgments of Nuremberg following the Second World War.
The plaintiff contends that by participating in the production of materials
including Tritium and enriched Uranium, Canada is assisting in the
production of thermonuclear weapons or the delivery systems thereof.
[19]
Based upon the plaintiff's contention that Canada is participating in the
production of these kinds of weapons, the plaintiff submits he is bound by
an "unconditional duty" to refuse to support a society that "wilfully
participates in plans and preparations that are predicated on a sure and
certain will and capacity to commit mass murder". In furtherance of his
claim the plaintiff relies on specific provisions of the Criminal Code
which forbids anyone from conspiring with any other to do anything that
may lead to the murder of any person, or to do anything that involves the
will and capacity to commit murder.
[20]
Based upon the plaintiff's contention that Canada is on a current agenda to
participate in the production of materials and therefore participate in the
will and capacity to commit mass murder, the plaintiff has attempted to
commence what he refers to as an "opting out" procedure. The procedure
involves a membership within an International Humanity House where
"Sovereign-Citizens/Natural-Persons" reject the "madness of greed" and
embrace "the tenets and credo" of that organization. As part of their
membership, the "Sovereign-Citizens/Natural-Persons" refuse to pay taxes
of any nature to any and all governments.
[132] The materials filed in R. v. Reddick, at para. 5, express that ideology as a:
32
... claim to having an imprescriptible right and a lawfully compellable duty to
forevermore refuse to aid and abet or otherwise assist, fund or support, a society
that participates in plans and preparations that are predicated on a sure and certain
will and capacity to commit Mass Murder.
[133] Lavigne’s webpage ‘/www.taxrefusal.com’ remains and is apparently being updated,
though he does not seem to have been involved in further reported litigation.
f.
Edward Jay Robin Belanger
[134] Some gurus market themselves as religious authorities. An example is Edward Jay Robin
Belanger (typically self-styled as the “minister Edward-Jay-Robin: Belanger”) [“Belanger”].
Belanger seems to be the leader or dominant personality in a local Edmonton-area OPCA
movement named the “Church of the Ecumenical Redemption International” [“CERI”]. Its
members usually give themselves the title “minister”. I have no explanation for why this title is
never capitalized, however that is their consistent practice. Belanger and CERI members are
frequent visitors to and litigants in the Edmonton-area courts.
[135] A brief excerpt from a very lengthy “Asseveration/Affidavit of Criminal Complaint” sent
to my office by Belanger provides the flavour of this guru’s rhetoric:
Even though I am not a Canadian citizen, I am a man born upon, standing on,
living and ministering on the geographical land mass known as Alberta, and
futher,
Neither the men or woman listed herein and acting as The private man Vaughn
Myers acting as the judge in Stony Plain Alberta on March 17th and 24th 2010
A.D. and the private man acting as the judge in Stony Plain on August 4th 2010
named Caffaro, The private man acting as the federal crown prosecutor for
CANADA named Adam Halliday on the 4th of August 2010 A.D. , the private
woman Malina Rawluk acting as the prosecutor for the PROVINCE OF
ALBERTA Stony Plain March 17th and 24ty 2010 A.D. nor any other government
entity, nor any BAR member, nor any “Person” anywhere is competent nor has
any consent to operate in any of My affairs, and further,
The witness affidavits confirm the aforementioned did criminally conspire
without authority of law and did intend to intimidate me to violate my
sincerely held faith and belief and thereby breached their trust as Allegiants fo the
Christian Defender of the faith to save my faith harmless from reproach, and
further,
I asked the man named Caffaro on August 4th 2010 in Stony Plain Alberta at
10:00 AM if he was aware I could not violate my sincerely held faith of not
associating my name with a dead entity in law a legal fiction all capital letter
version of my name used as a pledge to trade as value on the stock exchange,
33
he did intimidate me that if I did not violate my faith and do a thing I had a
right not to do he would put out a warrant for my arrest, and further, he
without lawful excuse violated 423 of the criminal code by intimidating me to
do a thing I had a lawful right to not to do ,towhit [:submit to an altered
version of my name formed in fraud for a financial purpose. [sic, emphasis in
original.]
[136] Belanger’s typical strategies are:
1.
arguments based on alleged defects in judicial and government oaths,
2.
that the King James Bible (or some specific version thereof) is the primary or
overriding law of Canada,
3.
a ‘double/split person’ argument where the state has ‘attached’ a legal fiction to
persons and only may assert its authority on that basis,
4.
an argument that all interactions are contracts, and
5.
various foisted unilateral agreements and demands.
[137] Belanger and his followers attempt to detach themselves from state and court authority
by ‘publishing’ foisted unilateral agreements, either on the CERI website or via other means. In
2011 Belanger attempted to email a number of these documents to every person employed in the
Alberta Justice department.
[138] Belanger appears to administer the CERI website and posts in various online forums. He
is one of the many gurus who use the Youtube service to host his videos. He has attempted to
represent persons in court.
[139] Belanger frequently files complaints and Criminal Code private informations directed to
the judiciary, court, government, and law enforcement employees. He apparently has also sought
military intervention against “traitors” in the state and court apparatus. Recently, Belanger and
other CERI members entered the Edmonton Courts during the annual “Law Day”, a public and
family oriented event intended to introduce lay people and particularly children to court and trial
operations. Belanger’s group intended to disrupt that event, but were ejected. Belanger
immediately attempted to press criminal charges against Court Sheriffs.
g.
Other Gurus
[140] This list is not exhaustive; for example another candidate guru is reported in Dirks v.
Canada (Minister of National Revenue - M.N.R.); Dirks, Re, 2007 SKQB 124 at paras. 4-5, 31
C.B.R. (5th) 192 and R. v. Lemieux, 2007 SKPC 135 at paras. 34-35, [2008] 2 C.T.C. 291. This
may be the Douglas Martin Nagel whose conviction was confirmed in R. v. Nagel, 2010 SKCA
118. Similarly, the “Mr. Plotnikoff” mentioned in Canada (Minister of National Revenue -
34
M.N.R.) v. Stanchfield, 2009 FC 99 at para. 4, 340 F.T.R. 150 appears to be a guru given he
apparently provided workshops on how to evade income tax.
[141] This review of gurus is also undoubtedly incomplete since at least some OPCA schemes
encountered in Canadian courts clearly originate from the United States. Those U.S. schemes
made up much of the ‘first wave’ of OPCA litigants and still do appear.
[142] Unsurprisingly, American OPCA schemes simply make no reference to Canadian law,
principles, legislation, or institutions. They will only cite U.S. legislation, caselaw, history, and
constitutional materials. Objectively, it is difficult to understand how any Canadian might
imagine these techniques would prove successful.
[143] A helpful example is that of American guru David Wynn Miller [“Miller”] (usually
styled “PLENIPOTENTIARY JUDGE David-Wynn: Miller”), who advocates a bizarre form of
“legal grammar”, which is not merely incomprehensible in Canada, but equally so in any other
jurisdiction. National Leasing Group Inc. v. Top West Ventures Ltd., 2001 BCSC 111, 102
A.C.W.S. (3d) 303 provides examples of the resulting text. See also: Canadian Imperial Bank
of Commerce v. Chesney, 2001 BCSC 625, 104 A.C.W.S. (3d) 826; Borkovic v. Laurentian
Bank of Canada, 2001 BCSC 337, 103 A.C.W.S. (3d) 700. Succinctly, it appears that his law
grammar provides rules on how to structure ‘legally effective’ documents. The result is very
difficult to understand. Any defective document (ie. one not written in ‘Millerese’) is
“fictitious-language/scribble”: National Leasing Group Inc. v. Top West Ventures Ltd., at
para. 6.
[144] More recently ‘Canada-specific’ schemes have emerged from the Canadian OPCA gurus.
These often are crude adaptations of the American schemes, and simply replace American with
Canadian law and institutions, for example, the ‘A4V’ ‘money for nothing’ approach reported in
Underworld Services Ltd. v. Money Stop Ltd., 2012 ABQB 327, and the restricted scope of
income tax liability advanced in Turnnir v. The Queen, 2011 TCC 495 at para. 5.
[145] That said, certain Canadian OPCA gurus, particularly Lindsay, have produced true
“made in Canada” schemes which make little or no reference to American law and legislation,
see: R. v. Lindsay, 2011 BCCA 99 at paras. 31-32, 302 B.C.A.C. 76, leave refused [2011]
S.C.C.A. No. 265; R. v. Lindsay, 2004 MBCA 147 at para. 32, 187 Man.R. (2d) 236.
Nevertheless, many “made in Canada” OPCA strategies will still retain some common
conceptual foundation with an American equivalent. For example, all ‘A4V’ schemes depend on
American commercial law principles. It may therefore be useful to refer to U.S. commentary on
OPCA strategies, if an equivalent concept can be identified.
h.
Mr. Meads’ Guru
[146] At present, Mr. Mead’s guru and source for his arguments is unidentified.
35
[147] This court has encountered documents substantially identical to those in Mr. Meads’ June
19 and 21 packages (other than personal information). Interestingly, Szoo’ v. RCMP, 2011
BCSC 696 attaches documents that duplicate text in Mr. Meads’ materials.
[148] That suggests Mr. Mead is not the author of those documents, but rather that he has
purchased a kit with those materials and the instructions as to their use. Evidence of the ‘pre-fab’
nature of the documents can be found in their content and format. For example, Mr. Meads
forgot to fill in all the information for the “Notice to YOURFILINGCOUNTY County Register
Of Deeds Clerk” document, as is shown by the “YOURFILINGCOUNTY” placeholder that
remains in the title.
[149] It appears that Mr. Meads’ guru is American. Review of the materials filed by Mr. Meads
shows a strong American influence in his OPCA materials. For example, in one of his April 27,
2012 “Affidavit in Support of Order to Show Cause” documents he references “Title 18 United
States Code”, which is the criminal and penal code for the federal government of the United
States. Stating the obvious, this court will not be applying that legislation.
[150] Similarly, Mr. Meads in his documents and arguments references the Uniform
Commercial Code [the “UCC”], which is American legislation to harmonize commercial
transactions within the United States. That too is not relevant to this proceeding, and will not be
applied by this court. That said, as the caselaw survey that follows illustrates, the UCC is also a
common motif in material from Canadian OPCA gurus, and forms a significant element in much
OPCA mythology. However, why anyone would believe that American commercial legislation
would apply in Canada is baffling. Still, OPCA litigants indicate that this legislation has a broad,
even extraordinary scope. My office has recently received a document where an OPCA litigant
said the UCC applies to governments, “... whether interstellar, intergalactic, international,
national, state, provincial, or local ...” [emphasis added].
[151] The various agreements, appointments, and the ‘fee schedule’ in Mr. Meads’ materials
contain other language that suggests an American origin. For example, the property shuttled
between the Meads dualities include:
1.
“All military (Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine, National Guard, etc.) discharge
papers and the like” (these are branches of the American military);
2.
“... the right to petition any military force of the United States for physical
protection from threats to the safety and integrity of person or property by either
"public" or "private" sources ...”; and
3.
“Individual Retirement Accounts”, (the American analogue to the Canadian
Registered Retirement Savings Plan accounts).
[152] Similarly, the ‘fee schedule’ references “Miranda” warnings, 4th Amendment rights, and
“Title 42 (Civil Rights), Title 18 U.S.C.A. (Criminal Codes), Title 28 U.S.C.A. (Civil Codes)”.
These are American legislation and constitutional documents.
36
[153] I would classify Mr. Meads’ OPCA materials as an ‘adapted American’ strategy. He (or
his guru) has customized aspects of his documentation and arguments for a Canadian setting, but
this does not appear to be a ‘home grown’ effort.
3.
How Gurus Operate
[154] Gurus may be distant parties in OPCA litigation. In Mercedes-Benz Financial v.
Kovacevic, [2009] O.J. No. 783 at paras. 53-54, 2009 CanLII 9368 (Ont. Sup. Ct. J.), the OPCA
litigant appeared to have used materials and techniques from an OPCA guru who promoted his
techniques with radio broadcasts and hotel seminars. The OPCA litigant knew at least one
person who helped promote those schemes in his geographic region. While not an explicit
conclusion of that decision, the materials cited and described by Justice Brown in
Mercedes-Benz Financial v. Kovacevic indicate the litigant had been introduced to his scheme
by a nomadic American “Sovereign Man” guru, Sam Kennedy. The OPCA litigant in
Mercedes-Benz Financial v. Kovacevic then attempted to obtain a luxury car for free via those
techniques.
[155] Sometimes gurus are indirectly involved in litigation, by providing advice and argument
(for a fee), as did Porisky in the Sydel trial: Porisky Trial Decision, at para. 18.
[156] In other instances the guru is present in the court, either representing the litigant, or
offering instruction and advice. That kind of activity has been reported or observed for Canadian
gurus Dempsey, Lavigne, Belanger, Menard, and Lindsay.
[157] OPCA gurus and community members sometimes are ‘legal busybodies’ who attempt to
introduce themselves into other proceedings. This Court’s experience has been that kind of
participation consistently leads to further issues. Worse, there may be a potential resolution
masked by that intervention. For example, a Moorish Law advocate, Sean Henry, has acted to
represent his mother in a credit card debt collection proceeding. Henry’s conduct, described in
more detail below, is exceptionally problematic.
[158] The initial hearings to address this matter were entirely unsuccessful. Henry was then
arrested. At the subsequent hearing before Belzil J. it was discovered that the mother was not
only entirely willing to pay her outstanding debt, but had an investment account which she
suggested could provide those funds. For whatever reason, the mother had not been willing to
communicate those facts while her son, an OPCA litigant, was present. One can only guess at
how many other conflicts might be resolved, were it not for interference of this kind.
C.
OPCA Litigants
[159] In this Court’s experience, there are no stereotypic OPCA litigants. They may be of any
age or gender. Some are affluent, while others are not. Canadian caselaw reports OPCA concepts
advanced by professionals, ‘blue collar’ workers, business persons, and retired individuals. Some
travel in groups, while others appear to operate by themselves.
37
[160] This Court has observed that some OPCA litigants appear to suffer from cognitive or
psychological disorders, however one should not presume those conditions from the presence of
OPCA arguments and concepts. Similarly, bizarre in-court conduct does not necessarily mean
these persons suffer from that kind of disorder. Anomalous behaviour may instead reflect the
‘rules’ of an OPCA strategy and script.
[161] The motivation to adopt an OPCA approach varies. Certain OPCA litigants are clearly
undergoing some kind of stress, such as:
•
foreclosure on a home (Borkovic v. Laurentian Bank of Canada, 2001 BCSC
337 at para. 15, 103 A.C.W.S. (3d) 700; Bank of Montreal v. McCance, 2012
ABQB 537);
•
a bankruptcy (R. v. Sydel, 2006 BCPC 346);
•
disputes over child and spousal support (Hajdu v. Ontario (Director, Family
Reponsibility Office), 2012 ONSC 1835; Callaghan v. McCaw; C.C. v. J.M.,
2010 SKQB 79, 351 Sask.R. 55);
•
deportation (Shakes v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness),
2011 CanLII 60494 (I.R.B.)); or
•
in response to large debts (Dempsey v. Envision Credit Union, 2006 BCSC 1324,
60 B.C.L.R. (4th) 309; Gravlin et al. v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce
et al, 2005 BCSC 839, 140 A.C.W.S. (3d) 447).
[162] Other times, OPCA litigation may be linked to some distressing event, such as a parent’s
losing custody of a child. This may be the case for Mr. Meads, as he seems intensely dissatisfied
with the end of his marriage.
[163] Other OPCA litigants are simply scammers out for a quick buck: Mercedes-Benz
Financial v. Kovacevic, [2009] O.J. No. 783, 2009 CanLII 9368 (Ont. Sup. Ct. J.); MBNA
Canada Bank v. Luciani, 2011 ONSC 6347. A substantial amount of OPCA litigation seems to
revolve on comparative trivialities, such as parking tickets: Waterloo (Regional Municipality) v.
Bydeley, 2010 ONCJ 740 at para. 46, affirmed 2011 ONCJ 842, affirmed [2011] O.J. No. 6282
(QL) (Ont. C.A.); Sydorenko v. Manitoba, 2012 MBQB 42; R. v. Kaasgaard, 2011 MBQB 256.
[164] OPCA litigants sometimes call themselves students of the law. That is a sham; their
interest goes no further than finding the proverbial “Gotcha!” exception or loophole that they can
spring to defeat state and court authority, see for example the Porisky Trial Decision and R. v.
Sydel, 2006 BCPC 346.
[165] Courts have commonly rejected claims by OPCA litigants that their actions were in good
faith or innocent. R. v. Sydel, 2006 BCPC 346 provides a good example. The reason for that
38
result is illustrated in Judge Meyer’s review at para. 20 of evidence that led him to dismiss a
dentist’s claim she had a reasonable basis to believe the validity of OPCA Detaxer concepts:
At the tax seminars most of the lecturers used aliases, as opposed to their real
names. ... She did not regard this as suspicious or unusual, even though one of the
lecturers went by the alias, “Sir Larry Loophole”. How could an intelligent, well
educated, worldly, 39 year old professional, not be suspicious?
At the beginning of each of the five lectures presented by Mr. Porisky, the
following caution was given: “In no way should this be construed as either legal
or financial advice. You should consult a competent expert”. Mr. Porisky frankly
told the attendees at his lectures that “I am in the building trade. I am not a
lawyer. I can’t give legal advice. I am not an accountant. I can’t give accounting
or financial advice. I am just a guy banging nails”. He also said, ‘I strongly
recommend you consult a competent expert on this subject matter”.
...
Dr. Sydel knew that each and every lecturer was not a tax lawyer or tax
accountant. Every lecturer was “up front” about their lack of accreditation.
Nonetheless, they talked about the law, the statutes, the interpretation of the law
and the statues, they discussed court cases and reported court judgments. Dr.
Sydel accepted their views as “experts” who were imparting accurate information
and opinions as to what the Canadian law was. She said that she could not recall
if she questioned any of the lecturers during the seminars, she said that she did
not research any court cases they referred to, she did not go “on line” or to the law
library. She was told that there were decided and reported legal cases throughout
Canada relating to the issues under discussion. To not have read any of these
cases for herself, or even so much as to ask the lecturers for copies of the cases
they said were directly on point, is evidence of her wilful blindness.
...
Dr. Sydel asked her father to attend one of the tax lectures with her. He walked
out in the middle of the lecture. She testified that she didn’t ask him why. She
did say though, that her father and her sister became “estranged” as a result of
disagreements over her views regarding taxation. Dr. Elmajian testified that he
had told Dr. Sydel on one occasion that he thought that “she was being
brainwashed by a bunch of losers who don’t work”. These were two or three key
people in her life and yet, their contrary views still did not cause her to seek some
independent tax advice. ...
[166] It appears this is not atypical. The justices of this Court routinely encounter OPCA
litigants who seem quite willing to ‘pull the wool over their own eyes’.
39
[167] What is crucial is to understand that an OPCA litigant in court is likely operating under
instructions obtained from a commercial source, and has been told to conduct and frame his or
her court activities in an unnatural, incorrect, and distorted context. The litigant is instructed to
follow a script that is, in all probability illogical, and certainly contrary to law. The OPCA
litigant may not be able to explain his or her actions for the very same reason that a judge is
confused by the documents, submissions, and in-court conduct they provide. Neither really
understands what is going on, but for different reasons.
D.
OPCA Movements
[168] The OPCA community includes a number of subsets that I will call ‘movements’. Each
movement includes persons who have adopted similar alternative histories, and hold generally
compatible beliefs. Different movements in many instances use exactly the same OPCA
strategies. Members of a movement will often attend one another’s court appearances. They
appear to engage in considerable ‘lateral’ discourse, and often seem to be, at a minimum, social
acquaintances.
1.
Detaxers
[169] The first OPCA movement to appear in Canada were the “Detaxers”. These OPCA
litigants focussed almost entirely on avoiding income tax obligations. Porisky, Lindsay, Lavigne,
and Warman are or were some of the gurus in this community.
[170] The Detaxer movement has employed a very wide assortment of OPCA strategies over
the past decade, all without success. Lindsay, in particular, appears to have been an innovator
and the source of many Canadian OPCA strategies. Lavigne and Warman’s litigation history
illustrates how Detaxers may have either ‘left wing’ or ‘right wing’ leanings. In recent years this
court has observed fewer true Detaxers, no doubt in part due to the failure of Lindsay’s many
court actions and the ongoing prosecution of members in the Porisky tax evasion ring.
[171] Many Detaxers were professionals or business persons with substantial incomes: R. v.
Klundert (2004), 242 D.L.R. (4th) 644, 190 O.A.C. 36 (Ont. C.A.), leave refused [2004]
S.C.C.A. No. 463; R. v. Klundert, 2008 ONCA 767 at para. 19, 93 O.R. (3d) 81, leave denied
[2008] S.C.C.A. No. 522; R. v. Amell, 2010 SKPC 107, 361 Sask.R. 61; R. v. Turnnir, 2006
BCPC 460; Turnnir v. The Queen, 2011 TCC 495; R. v. Sydel, 2006 BCPC 346. Meads appears
to share that characteristic from the data before the court. Other Canadian OPCA movements
seem to emerge from a lower income and/or occupational and employment context.
2.
Freemen-on-the-Land
[172] The Freemen-on-the-Land are a comparatively newer movement. From reported caselaw,
individuals who self-identify with this movement appear active across Canada. The
membership’s focus is strongly anti-government, and has libertarian and right wing overtones.
Christian rhetoric is common. Menard is a guru in this movement.
40
[173] It appears the Freemen are a Canadian innovation, which I understand has spread to other
common-law jurisdictions, including the UK, Australia, and New Zealand, see for example:
Australian Competition & Consumer Commission v Rana, [2008] FCA 374; Glew v. White,
[2012] WASCA 138; Van den Hoorn v Ellis, [2010] QDC 451. I am unclear whether Canada
has returned the favour and this group has established itself in south of the 49th parallel.
[174] Stated simply, Freemen-on-the-Land believe they can ‘opt out’ of societal obligations
and do as they like: Harper v. Atchison, 2011 SKQB 38 at paras. 6, 15, 369 Sask.R. 134; R. v.
McCormick, 2012 NSCA 58 at paras. 19, 21; R. v. McCormick, 2012 NSSC 288 at paras. 28-32.
A common theme in Freeman arguments is that state and court action requires the target’s
consent, for example: Jabez Financial Services Inc. (Receiver of) v. Sponagle, 2008 NSSC 112
at para. 14, 264 N.S.R. (2d) 224.
[175] Alarmingly, certain members of the Freeman-on-the-Land movement believe they have
an unrestricted right to possess and use firearms. That has led in at least once instance to a
Freeman-on-the-Land being found with a concealed unauthorized handgun; that Freeman-onthe-Land threatened to use the weapon on law enforcement personnel: R. v. McCormick, 2012
NSCA 58 at paras. 19, 21; R. v. McCormick, 2012 NSSC 288. In that, and many other ways, the
Freemen-on-the-Land parallel the American Sovereign Man community. Both engage in a broad
range of OPCA activities directed towards almost any government or social obligation. Both
habitually use ‘fee schedules’, and advance claims and liens against state, police, and court
actors. Many apply the ‘everything is a contract’ approach and so are extremely uncooperative,
in and out of court.
3.
Sovereign Men or Sovereign Citizens
[176] The Sovereign Man / Sovereign Citizen movement is the chief U.S. OPCA community.
Several reported Ontario decisions document court interactions with self-identified Sovereign
Men. This court has had a limited exposure to Sovereign Men, most notably being a lawsuit
advanced by Glenn Winningham [“Winningham”] (usually self-styled as “Glenn Winningham:
House of Fearn”): Winningham v. Canada (30 November 2010) Lethbridge 1006 00907 (Alta.
Q.B.), leave to appeal denied (Alta. C.A.).
[177] I was a defendant in this action, along with Canada, Alberta, many police officers, the
Prime Minister, government ministers, the Lieutenant and Governor Generals, and Alberta Court
of Queen’s Bench Chief Justice Wittmann. The action alleged broad conspiracy and misconduct
by Canadian state actors. A chief complaint by Winningham, who is a self-declared member of
the “Republic of Texas”, is that Canada Customs had refused to admit him into Canada with his
firearms. This was followed by a number of confrontations with Lethbridge area peace officers,
particularly at traffic stops.
[178] Winningham’s documents claim he is not subject to Canadian law on ‘everything is a
contract’ and ‘courts apply admiralty law’ bases. He also claimed ‘governments’ are only
corporations. The allegations and rhetoric in his court submissions express a perspective that is
alarming:
41
1 have tried to use administrative procedure against these criminals, but they
don’t get the message, so this is the message. If they want to perjure their oaths of
office and engage in TREASON and SEDITION, and BREACH OF TRUST, and
other crimes to numerous to list, against Me, that they BETTER be prepared to go
ALL THE WAY, and MURDER Me as well, because by the time I am done
with them, (I will do it all within the law), they will wish they had MURDERED
Me. It is My patriotic duty to come after them to My last dying breath, and I will
file commercial liens against them, I will liquidate their bonds, I will file criminal
complaints against them and their bosses, I will seize their assets, and I will not
rest until I see them do that little dance they do at the end of a common law rope,
and even then, in the next life, I will be DEMANDING Justice before the
judgment BAR of God, to make sure they get to spend the rest of eternity
receiving their just reward. Also, after I am dead and gone on to the next life,
because this is on the record, these criminals will be hunted down, just like the
NAZI war criminals that are still hunted down this day.
Furthermore, these criminals are hereby put on NOTICE that with criminals like
them in this world, I have a DEATH wish, because this world is NOT big enough
for both of us, so go ahead and make MY day, the sooner I am out of here the
better, and I shall exercise My God given RIGHT to resist their unlawful arrest
with lethal fource, if necessary, and then they will have an excuse to MURDER
Me, so go ahead criminals, MAKE MY DAY!
[179] My part in the conspiracy was to “... shove ... foreign martial law jurisdiction down the
throats of all of the people ...” as an excuse to “... bring out [my] martial law shock troops and
really "kick some ass!"” This would alienate the populace from the Queen and trigger a coup
d’etat.
[180] Langston J. struck Winningham’s action on, among other things, that the defendants had
acted in various nefarious and treasonous ways, and refused Winningham’s demand for $1
billion in damages. American courts have similarly rejected Winningham’s claims. His action in
Winningham v. Schulman (30 December 2009) District of Columbia 09 2435 was dismissed as
being:
A complaint that describes fantastic or delusional scenarios is subject to
immediate dismissal. ... Moreover, a complaint may be dismissed as frivolous
when it lacks "an arguable basis in law and fact." ... This complaint appears to
lack an arguable basis in either law or fact, and may reflect delusional thinking.
Accordingly, this complaint will dismissed.
[181] Winningham’s perspective of state oppression and violent focus seems representative of
the Sovereign Man movement. In the United States, Sovereign Men are notorious for their
violent conduct, intimidation of state and court personnel, and their misuse of legal processes to
engage in “paper terrorism”: Robert Chamberlain & Donald P. Haider-Markel, “"Lien on Me":
42
State Policy Innovation in Response to Paper Terrorism” (2005) 58 Political Research Quarterly,
pp. 449-460; Erick J. Haynie, “Populism, Free Speech, and the Rule of Law: The "Fully
Informed" Jury Movement and Its Implications” (1997) 88 The Journal of Criminal Law and
Criminology pp. 343-379; Susan P. Koniak “When Law Risks Madness” (1996) 8 Cardozo
Studies in Law and Literature, pp. 65-138. The FBI classifies Sovereign Men as a domestic
terrorist movement.
[182] A court that encounters what appears to be a genuine Sovereign Man / Sovereign Citizen
may wish to take additional security precautions.
4.
The Church of the Ecumenical Redemption International [“CERI”]
[183] The Church of the Ecumenical Redemption International [“CERI”] is an Edmonton area
OPCA group, apparently headed by Belanger. This Court has extensive exposure to CERI and its
members.
[184] First and foremost, CERI is a ‘pot church’. Like the pot churches reported in R. v.
Baldasaro, 2009 ONCA 676, 265 O.A.C. 75, R. v. Baldasaro, [2006] O.T.C. 134, 68 W.C.B.
(2d) 787 (Ont. Sup. Ct. J.), affirmed 216 O.A.C. 68, 213 C.C.C. (3d) 89 (Ont. C.A.), leave
refused [2006] S.C.C.A. No. 474, and Tucker v. Canada; Baldasaro v. Canada, 2003 FC 1008,
239 F.T.R. 81, Belanger and CERI claim that marijuana is a lynchpin element of the Christian
religion, and its use is mandated by the Bible, specifically the King James Bible. CERI’s
membership otherwise appear to hold “left wing” and anti-capitalist views. Most members seem
to belong to a low income demographic.
[185] Some CERI members were involved in an earlier (unsuccessful) attempt to claim a
religious right to use marijuana: R. v. Fehr, 2004 ABQB 859, 368 A.R. 122. At that point they
defined themselves as “Reformed Druids”. In the present CERI members could be classified as
King James Bible literalists. This Court therefore may have been witness to the cusp of the
transformation (or conversion) of CERI from faith to faith, as in R. v. Fehr the “reformed
druids” interpreted Exodus 30:23 as the basis for their claim: paras. 20-21.
[186] CERI’s members generally reject state and court authority. Many of CERI’s arguments
have religious trappings. CERI members have been encountered in all manner of proceedings.
CERI members have adopted the ‘everything is a contract’ concept, and frequently argue ‘magic
hat’ (discussed below) exceptions to the law. For example, a CERI member has recently in
Alberta Provincial Court argued that her car was not subject to motor vehicle legislation because
it is an “ecclesiastical pursuit chariot”. CERI members subscribe to the ‘double/split person’
concept, but attempt to detach themselves from their associated “corporate entity”.
[187] Documents filed by CERI-associated litigants are unusually haphazard, even by OPCA
documentary materials standards. In most instances they are clearly ‘cut and paste’ assemblies of
other parent documents.
43
[188] CERI’s membership is in frequent conflict with police, judges, and government officials.
They file private criminal offence informations for “obstructing or violence to or arrest of
officiating clergyman”, Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 176. CERI’s members had at
least some contact with Winningham; CERI members witnessed his court materials. I have
discussed how Belanger and several other CERI members recently attempted to disrupt a familyoriented public education event held at the Edmonton Courts.
5.
Moorish Law
[189] Edmonton is home to Sean Henry (typically styled “:Chief : Nanya-Shaabu: El: of the Atsik-hata Nation of Yamassee Moors”, or less commonly, “Sean Henry Bey”), one of Canada’s
very few Moorish Law OPCA litigants. He has frequently appeared in this Court.
[190] The exotic nature of the Moorish Law movement and its claims warrant some comment,
as casual exposure to a Moorish Law litigant may lead an observer to suspect mental impairment
or disorder. The Moorish Law community is a predominately American offshoot of urban
American black muslim churches such as a Nation of Islam. They claim that black muslims who
self-identify as “Moors” are not subject to state or court authority because they are governed by
separate law, or are the original inhabitants of North and South America.
[191] In the case of Henry, he claims that the At-sik-hata Nation owns North America (now
renamed “Atlan, Amexem, Turtle Island, Land of Frogs”) as a result of his treaty with the Olmec
people, an early culture that existed in meso-America from 1500-400 B.C. and who are noted for
their large sculptures of human heads. Justice Sanderman of our court, who had reviewed the
documentary foundation of Henry’s many claims observed:
...it would be an affront to the dignity of this Court and an affront to the dignity of
any Court to allow a document such as this to stand and to force individuals to
come to court to have to answer this, as I say, just absolute gibberish.
[Henry Estate v. Alberta Health Services, 2011 ABQB 113, quoting a related
proceeding.]
[192] Henry claims his ownership of Canada renders him immune to court and state action, but
also applies many other OPCA strategies such as ‘magic hats’, foisted unilateral agreements, and
a variant on the ‘A4V’ ‘money for nothing’ concept.
[193] Henry apparently spent some time in the United States and attempted to apply those
concepts. United States of America v. Nanya Shaabu El, a/k/a Sean Wesley Henry (25 April
2008), 06-5197 (U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals) confirmed conviction of Henry for false
claims of diplomat status, and rejected Henry’s argument that because he had claimed to be a
diplomat for a non-existent state, “Atlan”, he could not have committed that offence.
[194] Though it may seem unlikely to many readers, Henry is not alone in his peculiar beliefs.
Shakes v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2011 CanLII 60494 (I.R.B.)
44
reports on another Moorish Law OPCA litigant who claimed to be named “El Afif Hassan
Hetep-Bey”. In this action the litigant resisted a deportation order of the Immigration and
Refugee Board of Canada, Immigration Appeal Division. Para. 10 describes the litigant’s
materials:
The attached seven pages consisted of a colour photocopy of was purports to be
“The Moorish American Nationality Card” of a certain El Afif Hassan Hetep-Bey
at page 1. Pages 2 through 7 purport to be a “Judicial Notice and Proclamation”
signed by El Afif Hassan Hetep-Bey on January 5, 2010, in which he makes
certain claims to title, rights and privileges, on the basis of his being a “Noble of
the Al Moroccan Empire.” Written in legalese and citing various statutes of the
United States, international treaties and covenants and extensive US case law, the
documents purports to deny the jurisdiction of the governments of the Americas
over the members of the Al Moroccan Empire, and in particular, El Afif Hassan
Hetep-Bey, and to establish him and other members as sovereign entities.
[195] The decision at paras. 14-18 reviews other documents received, including “a "Writ of
Right" constituting "Notice of Default Judgement"”, rejection of the Immigration Appeal
Division as not authorized by American law, and a “Claim of Right, Appellation/Name
Correction, Pursuant to Indigenous Nationality & Aboriginal Citizenship” whereby Kiba Kerry
Nicholas Shakes renounced his name, in favour of the name El Afif Hassan Hetep-Bey.
[196] The litigant was ordered deported, and a subsequent appeal, with counsel, was denied.
The Board concluded at para. 32:
Now, a reasonable person, viewing the various documents submitted by the
appellant, in the name of “El Afif Hassan Hetep-Bey” could reasonably be
expected to conclude that he was mad and delusional. However, from reading
these documents it is abundantly clear to the panel that the appellant is not mad
although he might be self-delusional. Rather, the appellant is apparently making
a political statement.
6.
Conclusion - OPCA Movements
[197] There are likely additional OPCA movements in Canada other than those identified
above. Some may be local, such as CERI, and are therefore not known to Alberta courts. Others
may be ‘below the radar’. Members of this Court report to me that they have encountered a
significant number of OPCA litigants who do not self-identify with a known OPCA movement,
or who, like Mr. Meads, do not have a known guru. Other movements will most probably
emerge over time.
[198] It is useful for a judge to know an OPCA litigant is associated with an organization,
movement or guru. That, at a minimum, implies organized application and distribution of a set of
OPCA concepts and beliefs, probably on a commercial basis. Useful movement-specific data
includes the stereotypic strategies of that movement, any known movement gurus, and typical
45
responses to court and state action by persons affiliated with that movement. Moveover,
members of the OPCA community have proven violent; always an important fact.
V.
Indicia of OPCA Litigants, Litigation, and Strategies
[199] This Court’s experience (personal and by other members) and the relevant caselaw has
indicated that persons who engage in OPCA litigation tend to adopt certain stereotypic motifs in
their written materials and in-court conduct. The vast majority of these indicia are almost never
shared by other self-represented litigants, including those who may have difficulty
communicating their positions and arguments, and by litigants who are affected by cognitive and
psychological dysfunction.
[200] Language that has a biblical or religious aspect, though common, is not as definitive an
indication of OPCA context. Much of that is also present in a broader self-represented litigant
population.
[201] What follows is an incomplete summary of elements that suggest when a person has been
exposed to OPCA concepts, is a part of the OPCA community, or has adopted OPCA-based
litigation strategies. These features were identified from reported caselaw, from the experiences
of the justices of this Court, and documentation received by this Court and my office.
[202] To be explicit, however, these indicia do not prove a claim or action is invalid, or that a
litigant is vexatious. These are telltale fingerprints that are typically found in OPCA litigation,
and that, if identified, may warrant closer review and specific court procedures.
A.
Documentary Material
[203] The documentation filed by OPCA litigants often includes many unusual features. Their
significance, if any, is often opaque. Courts, lawyers, and litigants may find it helpful to identify
persons with expertise in the rationale for these motifs, so that future reviews of OPCA indicia
approach the telltale fingerprints on a schematic rather than anecdotal basis.
[204] Beyond that, OPCA documents are highly variable. They range from what appear to be
professionally prepared, polished materials, to crude assemblages of photocopied pages with
inconsistent fonts, formats, and paragraph and page numbers that imply a ‘copy and paste’
composition. OPCA documentation is sometimes ‘flamboyant’, with multicoloured text, bright
water marks, graphics, and elaborate ornamentation on coloured paper: however, this is not
necessarily that useful as a identifying motif.
[205] Sometimes an OPCA document may be so disjointed that the OPCA fingerprint motifs
are only evidence that the author is not suffering from mental or cognitive disturbance. This is
particularly true for documents prepared according to the ‘legal grammar’ of Miller: National
Leasing Group Inc. v. Top West Ventures Ltd., 2001 BCSC 111, 102 A.C.W.S. (3d) 303;
Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v. Chesney, 2001 BCSC 625, 104 A.C.W.S. (3d) 826;
Borkovic v. Laurentian Bank of Canada, 2001 BCSC 337, 103 A.C.W.S. (3d) 700.
46
1.
Name Motifs
[206] The vast majority of OPCA litigants use highly stereotypic formats to name and identify
themselves. The most common form adds atypical punctuation, usually colons and dashes, into a
name. Any litigant who uses this ‘dash colon’ motif almost certainly has some kind of OPCA
background or affiliation. The most common versions of this name format are:
: [first name] – [middle name] : [last name] :
or
[first name] – [middle name] : [last name]
The difference is the first alternative has an additional colon before and at the end of the name.
[207] For example, OPCA guru David Kevin Lindsay styles his name as “David-Kevin:
Lindsay”. There are many variations on this basic form with various combinations of colons and
dashes. Mr. Mead in his documents identifies himself as “::Dennis-Larry: Meads::”, “::dennislarry: meads::”, or “:::dennis-larry:: of the meads-family:::”. The ‘dash colon’ motif has no legal
significance or effect: R. v. Lindsay, 2006 BCCA 150 at para. 3, 265 D.L.R. (4th) 193; R. v.
Lindsay, 2008 BCPC 203 at para. 7, [2009] 1 C.T.C 86, affirmed 2010 BCSC 831, [2010] 5
C.T.C. 174, affirmed 2011 BCCA 99, 302 B.C.A.C. 76, leave refused [2011] S.C.C.A. No. 265.
[208] The rationale for the ‘dash colon’ motif is unknown. However, it seems to be derived in
some manner from the “legal grammar” of Miller.
[209] A second common name motif is that a litigant identifies his or herself as being:
[first name] [middle name] of the Family [last name]
or
[first name] [middle name] of the Clan [last name]
or
[firstname] [middle name] of the House of [lastname]
[210] Mr. Meads also sometimes employs the clan/family/house name motif, but he combines
it with the ‘dash colon’ motif to create a hybrid: “::dennis-larry: of the meads-family::”. The
family/clan/ house motif is also meaningless: R. v. Sargent, 2004 ONCJ 356 at para. 29, [2005]
1 C.T.C. 448.
47
[211] A third name-related phenomenon is that the litigant states their name in duplicate forms,
one with only upper case letters, the second with either upper and lower case letters or only
lower case letters. Again, Mr. Meads’ written materials shows this motif, for example, the
‘signature’ of the April 27, 2012 “Notice for an Order to Show Cause” has “DENNIS LARRY
MEADS by ::Dennis Larry::” below a handwritten signature. This duplication extends to
handwritten signatures. For example, most of Mr. Meads’ documents are double signed, with
one signature reading “DENNIS LARRY MEADS Grantor” and the other “::Dennis-Larry:
Meads:: Grantee”. The capital version of the signature is printed and in black ink, while the
‘dash colon’ version is in red ink and handwritten. Meads extends this ‘double name’ form to
others, including his wife, lawyer, a lawyer’s assistant, but strangely, not the Court.
[212] It appears that duplicate names of this kind are usually an indication that the OPCA
litigant has adopted a ‘double/split person’ strategy, which is later reviewed in detail. In brief,
the capital letter version of the name is some kind of non-human thing, while the lower case
name is the ‘flesh and blood’ aspect of the litigant. The red ink colour is presumably intended to
represent blood. OPCA materials are rife with these kinds of arbitrary symbolism.
[213] Another name-related indication of an OPCA litigant is that the litigant marks their name
with a copyright and/or trade-mark indication, usually the ©, (T) and TM symbols. These
markings likely indicate a foisted unilateral agreement strategy.
2.
Document Formalities and Markings
[214] OPCA litigants frequently mark their documents in unconventional ways. The meanings
of many of these marks is unclear, and these certainly have limited or no legal significance. It
may be that these motifs simply are theatre used by gurus to impress their customers, and create
what appear to be ‘powerful’ documents.
[215] Indicia that appear restricted to OPCA documents include:
1.
a thumbprint, typically in red ink, though in certain instances our Court has
encountered litigants who will injure themselves when presenting documents to
the court clerks, so that they can make a thumb mark in blood (for example
Mercedes-Benz Financial v. Kovacevic, [2009] O.J. No. 783 at para. 12, 2009
CanLII 9368 (Ont. Sup. Ct. J.); Callaghan v. McCaw; C.C. v. J.M., 2010 SKQB
79 at para. 10, 351 Sask.R. 55; this proceeding;
2.
more than one signature, often in atypical colour ink such as red or green ink: this
proceeding; and
3.
attaching one or more postage stamps, sometimes the stamps have text or a
signature written across the stamp (for example Mercedes-Benz Financial v.
Kovacevic, [2009] O.J. No. 783 at para. 12, 2009 CanLII 9368 (Ont. Sup. Ct. J.);
this proceeding) and in certain instances these stamps are ‘simulated’ and simply
printed on the document itself.
48
Mr. Meads’ February 15, 2011 and March 3, 2011 documents show many of these unusual
features.
[216] OPCA litigants sometimes appear to imbue notaries with extraordinary court-like
authority. That may explain why so many OPCA documents, including those filed by Mr.
Meads, are often notarized when that formality is neither legally necessary nor appropriate. I will
later comment on the responsibilities of legally trained persons to not notarize documents in that
manner. A notary cannot give special status to an OPCA document: Papadopoulos v. Borg, 2009
ABCA 201 at paras. 3, 10.
[217] One very peculiar form of notation is an indication of a specific OPCA ‘money for
nothing’ scheme. This is a document that will have text written or stamped across it, typically at
a 45 degree angle off vertical. The text will include the phrase “accept for value” or “accepted
for value”. Typical target documents marked in this way include a birth certificate, a bill to the
litigant, a court order against the litigant, a demand letter, or court document filed by an
opposing party, for example: Underworld Services Ltd. v. Money Stop Ltd., 2012 ABQB 327 at
paras. 5, 13; Mercedes-Benz Financial v. Kovacevic, [2009] O.J. No. 783 at paras. 10-11, 2009
CanLII 9368 (Ont. Sup. Ct. J.).
[218] One example stamp, described in Mercedes-Benz Financial v. Kovacevic, [2009] O.J.
No. 783, 2009 CanLII 9368 (Ont. Sup. Ct. J.), read as follows:
NON-NEGOTIABLE
ACCEPTED FOR VALUE
APPROVED FOR PAYMENT
Accepts for value this presentment and ALL related endorsements front and back, in
accordance with Uniform Commercial Code 3-419 and House Joint Resolution 192 of
JUNE 5, 1933. Please release ALL proceeds, products, accounts and fixtures and the
order of the court to me immediately.
EXEMPT FROM LEVEY
DEPOSIT TO UNITED STATES TREASURY AND CHARGE THE SAME TO [name]
[number]
Stamped versions of this motif will often have spaces for handwritten components.
[219] This particular notation has many variations but all share the “accept for value” language,
and usually mention the UCC. Notations of this kind are a clear indication that the litigant has
adopted the ‘A4V’ ‘money for nothing’ scheme described below.
3.
Specific Phrases and Language
49
[220] OPCA documents frequently include atypical language and terminology that can indicate
OPCA affiliation. Presumably some of these terms have symbolic or scheme-related
significance. These are helpful indicia to identify OPCA litigation and litigants.
[221] Documents frequently refer to the litigant as having a particular status or characteristic:
•
a “flesh and blood man” (this has many variations);
•
a “freeman-on-the-land” or “freeman”;
•
a “free will full liability person”;
•
a “sovereign man”, “sovereign citizen” or “sovran”;
•
that the litigant:
•
is a person or a natural person, but not a corporation;
•
is not a person;
•
was created by God;
•
is only subject to a category of law, typically “natural law”, “common
law” or “God’s Law”;
•
is an ambassador;
•
is the postmaster general;
•
is a member of a fictitious nation-state or aboriginal group;
•
represents or is “an agent” or “secured party” for a similarly named
individual or thing; and
•
is a “private neutral non-belligerent”.
Most of these items are strong indicia, with the exception of those that involve God or religion,
which also stereotypically emerge in submissions of certain persons with mental impairment and
disorder.
[222] Identification that a municipality, province, or Canada is a corporation is a clear
indication of OPCA affiliation: Dempsey v. Envision Credit Union, 2006 BCSC 1324 at para.
37, 60 B.C.L.R. (4th) 309. A litigant with documents of this kind will typically be using the
‘everything is a contract’ OPCA scheme, discussed below. Similarly, a statement that a court is
50
an admiralty or military court suggests OPCA affiliation, particularly when in an inappropriate
context, such as litigation that does not involve military personnel, ships, or maritime subjects.
[223] Any use of phrases such as “accept for value”, “accept for value and return for value”, or
“accept for value and consideration and honour” indicates OPCA affiliation but not necessarily
use of the ‘A4V’ OPCA scheme; this language arises in multiple contexts when incorporated in a
document.
[224] A statement that a court, government, or official is “de facto” is very indicative of OPCA
affiliation.
[225] Many OPCA documents, including those of Mr. Meads, feature a declaration concerning
service, such as “service to agent is service to principal” and “service to principal is service to
agent”, presumably an attempt to expand the ‘notification’ function of these materials.
[226] The term “strawman” usually indicates an OPCA ‘double/split person’ strategy:
Mercedes-Benz Financial v. Kovacevic, [2009] O.J. No. 783, 2009 CanLII 9368 (Ont. Sup. Ct.
J.). So does framing other persons or parties with duplicate names, one in upper case letters, the
other lower case.
[227] A demand that a remedy be paid only in precious metals, usually gold or silver, is typical
in OPCA litigation. Many OPCA ‘backstories’ revolve on the idea that national currencies have
no actual or little ‘true’ value, hence the emphasis on precious metals.
4.
Legislation and Legal Documents
[228] Many OPCA documents mention certain obsolete, foreign, or typically otherwise
irrelevant legislation, including:
•
the Magna Carta: Harper v. Atchison, 2011 SKQB 38 at paras. 9-15, 369 Sask.R.
134; R. v. Jebbett, 2003 BCCA 69, 180 B.C.A.C. 21; R. v. Lindsay, 2008 BCCA
30 at paras. 19-21, 250 B.C.A.C. 270; R. v. Warman, 2001 BCCA 510 at paras.
9-10, 13-14; Winningham v. Canada:
•
the Uniform Commercial Code of the United States of America, often simply
identified as the “UCC”, this is sometimes mistakenly named the “Universal
Commercial Code”;
•
the Constitution of the United States;
•
other American state and federal legislation: Winningham v. Canada;
•
UNIDROIT and UN CITRAL contract interpretation and dispute guidelines;
51
•
versions of the Income Tax Act other than the current legislation; the 1948 version
of the legislation is a particular target; see R. v. Crischuk, 2010 BCCA 391 at
para. 3, 2010 D.T.C. 5141; R. v. Sydel, 2010 BCSC 1473 at paras. 24-25, 35,
[2011] 1 C.T.C. 200, affirmed 2011 BCCA 103, leave refused [2011] S.C.C.A.
No. 191;
•
‘oaths’ legislation, such as the Alberta Oaths of Office Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. O-1,
and the federal Oaths of Allegiance Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. O-1 and Oaths of Office
Regulations, C.R.C., c. 1242, or any version of the U.K. Coronation Oath Act;
Bank of Montreal v. McCance, 2012 ABQB 537 at para. 9;
•
the Canadian Bill of Rights, S.C. 1960, c. 44: Canada (Minister of National
Revenue - M.N.R.) v. Stanchfield, 2009 FC 99 at para. 13, 340 F.T.R. 150; R. v.
Amell, 2010 SKPC 107 at paras. 156-157, 361 Sask.R. 61; this proceeding;
•
the Statute of Frauds: Summerland (District) v. No Strings Enterprises Ltd.,
2003 BCSC 990 at para. 19, 124 A.C.W.S. (3d) 39, leave denied 2004 BCCA
360, 131 A.C.W.S. (3d) 994;
•
the 1931 Statute of Westminster: R. v. Dick, 2001 BCPC 275; R. v. Lindsay, 2004
MBCA 147 at para. 32, 187 Man.R. (2d) 236; and
•
the April 10, 1933 Order-in-Counsel that abandoned the gold standard for
Canadian currency.
[229] Reliance on Black’s Law Dictionary, particularly an obsolete version of Black’s Law
Dictionary, is suggestive of OPCA affiliation: Waterloo (Regional Municipality) v. Bydeley,
2010 ONCJ 740 at para. 39, affirmed 2011 ONCJ 842, affirmed [2011] O.J. No. 6282 (QL) (Ont.
C.A.). OPCA litigants also often stress the relevance of and quote from the Bible, usually the
King James version: Callaghan v. McCaw; C.C. v. J.M., 2010 SKQB 79 at para. 7, 351 Sask.R.
55.
[230] A person’s birth certificate is a focus of certain OPCA schemes. Any mention or
reproduction of that certificate in atypical circumstances is a strong indication of an OPCA
‘A4V’ scheme: Underworld Services Ltd. v. Money Stop Ltd., 2012 ABQB 327 at paras. 5, 13.
5.
Atypical Mailing Addresses
[231] OPCA litigants sometimes use abnormal formats and elements in their mailing addresses.
A common feature is omission of the postal code, or some variation from the postal code’s usual
format. For example, Mr. Meads frequently encircles his postal code with square brackets:
“[T7Z 1L5]”. Other times he states the postal code as “near [t7z 1l5]”. Other OPCA litigants
replace postal codes with land registration information, such as the Torrens registration location
for their mailing address. Yet another motif is that a return address includes “C/O a Third Party
Acceptor”, or “No Code Noncommercial”.
52
[232] Any avoidance or variation on postal code strongly suggests the OPCA litigant has
adopted an ‘everything is a contract’ scheme. OPCA litigants in that category apparently believe
that use of a postal code means accepting some kind of contract with the state.
[233] Another variation is that an address is, in some manner, stated to qualify the manner of
delivery. For example, Mr. Meads has filed several documents that include the phrase “Non
Domestic to CANADA” after the postal code. That implies the litigant is not in Canada, and
presumably therefore not subject to Canadian authority.
[234] Sometimes an OPCA litigant will demand he or she only receive mail addressed in an
unconventional manner. For example, Belanger in correspondence with my office has instructed
that I only send him correspondence in this manner:
Edward-Jay-Robin: house of Belanger
Non-Domestic Mail,
C/O The Chuch of the Ecumenical Redemption International
[street address]
Edmonton, Alberta
POSTAL CODE EXEMPT No code non commercial [sic]
Failure to comply will mean I am “... guilty of fraud, conversion and coercion and further
become consenting and contractually bound debtors to the Church”.
[235] OPCA litigants sometimes include fictitious nation states in their addresses, or indicate
that their mailing address is an embassy. These motifs indicate an ‘immunity’ OPCA strategy.
[236] OPCA litigants also have a pattern of addressing government and court officials in a
characteristic double-name format:
[name in upper and lower case letters] “doing business as” [name in upper case letters
only] [title of the official]
For example, this Court has received correspondence addressed, in part, to “Stephen Harper,
doing business as STEPHEN HARPER, PRIME MINISTER OF CANADA, CEO CANADA,
INC.”.
[237] This motif usually indicates a litigant has adopted the ‘everything is a contract’ OPCA
concept.
6.
Conclusion and Summary of Documentary Indicia
[238] The examples identified above will very likely be encountered in related but variant
forms. For example, Mr. Meads expresses the “flesh and blood man” declaration motif as “the
living flesh and blood sentient-man” and that he is “the creation for the Lord God Almighty
53
Jehovah”. Similarly, Mr. Meads expresses copyright in his name in a different manner:
“DENNIS LARRY MEADS (Copyright for the Province-Alberta)”. I note, parenthetically, that
this notation is nonsensical given that The Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, s. 91
explicitly assigns jurisdiction for copyright to Canada.
[239] These stylistic variations do not necessarily imply that documentation is not of an OPCA
origin. There is a certain crude level of creativity and adaptation practised by OPCA litigants and
gurus that has led to many meaningless variations in their irrelevant motifs.
[240] Another common phenomenon is that OPCA litigants combine these features, and other
aspects of OPCA schemes, in a single document. An extreme example of this is found in the full
style of cause of Bloom v. Canada, 2010 FC 621, [2010] 5 C.T.C. 143:
The Natural and Sovran-on-the-land Flesh, Blood and Bone, North America
Signatory Aeriokwa Tence Kanienkehaika Indian Man: Gregory-John: Bloom
(C), as created by the Creator (God), Plaintiff,
and
Her Majesty the Queen, Defendant
[241] Similarly, most of Mr. Meads’ documents exhibit multiple OPCA features.
B.
In Court Conduct
[242] OPCA litigants often engage in unusual in-court conduct. That seems to be in part
because many OPCA litigants are following a ‘script’ prepared by OPCA gurus. This was
apparently true for Mr. Meads. For example, at certain points in the court hearing he appeared to
read, word for word, from a prepared document. Other aspects of his speech seemed rehearsed.
1.
Demands
[243] Common ‘scripted’ motifs include demands by the OPCA litigant:
•
to see the oath of office of a judge, lawyer, or court official: R. v. Lindsay, 2006
BCSC 188, 68 W.C.B. (2d) 718, affirmed 2007 BCCA 214; Law Society of
British Columbia v. Dempsey, 2005 BCSC 1277 at para. 179, 142 A.C.W.S. (3d)
346, affirmed 2006 BCCA 161, 149 A.C.W.S. (3d) 735; Ramjohn v. Rudd, 2007
ABQB 84 at para. 9, 156 A.C.W.S. (3d) 38; Alberta Treasury Branches v.
Klassen, 2004 ABQB 463 at para. 25, 364 A.R. 230;
•
that a judge prove his or her appointment: Ramjohn v. Rudd, 2007 ABQB 84 at
para. 9, 156 A.C.W.S. (3d) 38;
54
•
the judge make certain oaths or statements, such as that the judge is a public
servant: Kilini Creek/Patricia Hills Area Landowners v. Lac Ste. Anne (County)
Subdivision and Development Appeal Board, 2001 ABCA 92, 104 A.C.W.S.
(3d) 1142; Dempsey v. Envision Credit Union, 2006 BCSC 1324, 60 B.C.L.R.
(4th) 309;
•
to see the ‘bond information’ of a litigant, judge, lawyer, or court official:
Winningham v. Canada; this proceeding;
•
that the court indicate the basis or scope of its authority: Canada v. Galbraith,
2001 BCSC 675 at paras. 26-28, 54 W.C.B. (2d) 504; Law Society of British
Columbia v. Dempsey, 2005 BCSC 1277 at paras. 10-11, 142 A.C.W.S. (3d) 346,
affirmed 2006 BCCA 161, 149 A.C.W.S. (3d) 735; R. v. Martin, 2012 NSPC 73
at para. 4;
•
that the Crown provide proof that it has authority to proceed against a litigant: R.
v. Martin, 2012 NSPC 73 at para. 4;
•
that an opposing party provide proof it has authority to proceed against the OPCA
litigant; Bank of Montreal v. McCance, 2012 ABQB 537 at para. 7;
•
for a ‘certified’ copy of a document or legislation: R. v. Bruno, 2002 BCCA 348;
R. v. Gibbs, 2006 BCSC 481, [2006] 3 C.T.C. 223; Iwanow v. Canada, 2008
TCC 22, 2008 CCI 22; R. v. Fehr, 2002 SKPC 8, 224 Sask.R. 132; Audcent v.
Maleki, 2006 ONCJ 401, [2007] 1 C.T.C. 212; and
•
that the court state whether it is addressing the litigant in one of two roles, such as
whether this is to a “legal person” or a “corporation”, vs. a “flesh and blood
person”, or a “natural person”: Porisky Trial Decision at para. 60; R. v. Lindsay,
2011 BCCA 99, 302 B.C.A.C. 76, leave refused [2011] S.C.C.A. No. 265;
Mercedes-Benz Financial v. Kovacevic, [2009] O.J. No. 783, 2009 CanLII 9368
(Ont. Sup. Ct. J.); Mercedes-Benz Financial v. Kovacevic, [2009] O.J. No. 783 at
para. 24, 2009 CanLII 9368 (Ont. Sup. Ct. J.); this proceeding.
2.
Documentation
[244] OPCA litigants often present documentation to the court or another party at the hearing
itself, without prior service or warning. Common examples include:
•
an attempt to present the judge or a court official with documents that make the
court a fiduciary, agent, or foist a contract on the judge or court official: this
proceeding; and
•
presenting the judge, the court clerk, or an opposing litigant with a ‘fee schedule’
or other foisted unilateral agreement (see below).
55
3.
Names and Identification
[245] Another common motif is that an OPCA litigant will engage in various peculiar
comments that relate to names and identification. For example, an OPCA litigant may refuse to
identify themselves by name, instead stating they are an agent or representative of an entity
identified by the litigant’s name, typically these entities are described in a manner such as:
•
a ‘person’ of the litigant’s name,
•
a corporation or a ‘dead corporation’ with the litigant’s name,
•
a ‘legal fiction’ or ‘fictitious corporation’ with the litigant’s name,
•
a trust, named after the litigant,
•
an estate, named after the litigant;
•
a deadman, or
•
a ‘strawman’.
See: Hajdu v. Ontario (Director, Family Reponsibility Office), 2012 ONSC 1835;
Canada v. Galbraith, 2001 BCSC 675 at paras. 26-28, 54 W.C.B. (2d) 504; Turnnir v.
The Queen, 2011 TCC 495 at paras. 5-6; Canada (Minister of National Revenue M.N.R.) v. Stanchfield, 2009 FC 99 at paras. 2-4, 340 F.T.R. 150; Canada (Minister of
National Revenue - M.N.R.) v. Camplin; M.N.R. v. Camplin, 2007 FC 183 at paras. 8-9,
28, [2007] 2 C.T.C. 205; Bank of Montreal v. McCance, 2012 ABQB 537 at para. 9;
this proceeding.
[246] Additionally, the OPCA litigant may identify him or herself with an entirely fictitious
name or via a OPCA alternative name format: Shakes v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency
Preparedness), 2011 CanLII 60494 at para. 11 (I.R.B.); R. v. Sargent, 2004 ONCJ 356, [2005] 1
C.T.C. 448; R. v. Crischuk, 2010 BCSC 716 at paras. 31-32, affirmed 2010 BCCA 391, 2010
D.T.C. 5141; Services de financement TD inc. c. Michaud, 2011 QCCQ 14868 at para. 6; this
proceeding.
[247] Similarly, an OPCA litigant may make an unusual mention of copyright or trade-mark,
typically because the OPCA litigant claims copyright or trade-mark in their own name: Hajdu v.
Ontario (Director, Family Reponsibility Office), 2012 ONSC 1835 at para. 23; Dempsey v.
Envision Credit Union, 2006 BCSC 1324 at para. 37, 60 B.C.L.R. (4th) 309.
4.
Court Authority or Jurisdiction
56
[248] OPCA litigants frequently deny that a court has jurisdiction or authority over them. That
emerges in a number of ways:
•
a direct denial that the court has authority over the litigant: R. v. Jennings, 2007
ABCA 45; Hajdu v. Ontario (Director, Family Reponsibility Office), 2012
ONSC 1835; R. v. Warman, 2001 BCCA 510 at para. 18; R. v. Linehan, 2000
ABQB 815, 276 A.R. 383; Dempsey v. Envision Credit Union, 2006 BCSC 1324
at para. 9, 60 B.C.L.R. (4th) 309; this proceeding;
•
identification of some physical elements of the courtroom or court dress that
indicates the court is a military or admiralty court: R. v. J.B.C. Securities Ltd.,
2003 NBCA 53, 261 N.B.R. (2d) 199; Winningham v. Canada; this proceeding;
•
a statement or declaration that:
5.
•
the litigant is only subject to a specific category of law, most often
expressed as “natural law” or “the common law”: Canada v. Galbraith,
2001 BCSC 675 at paras. 26-28, 54 W.C.B. (2d) 504; R. v. Warman, 2001
BCCA 510 at paras. 9-10, 15;
•
the court is restricted to certain domains of law, usually legislation,
military law, and/or admiralty law: Canada v. Galbraith, 2001 BCSC 675
at paras. 26-28, 54 W.C.B. (2d) 504; R. v. Warman, 2001 BCCA 510 at
paras. 9-10, 15;
•
the court is only a “de facto” court or the judge is only a “de facto” judge;
•
a declaration that the litigant only takes a certain step “without prejudice”
or “without consent to restriction” to the litigant’s rights: Mercedes-Benz
Financial v. Kovacevic, [2009] O.J. No. 783 at para. 9, 2009 CanLII 9368
(Ont. Sup. Ct. J.); and
•
a declaration that the litigant’s presence or participation is “under duress”:
Canada v. Galbraith, 2001 BCSC 675 at paras. 26-28, 54 W.C.B. (2d)
504.
Other In-Court Motifs
[249] Other stereotypic OPCA litigant conduct includes:
•
a refusal to pass the bar: Canada v. Galbraith, 2001 BCSC 675 at paras. 25-29,
54 W.C.B. (2d) 504; Mercedes-Benz Financial v. Kovacevic, [2009] O.J. No. 783
at para. 8, 2009 CanLII 9368 (Ont. Sup. Ct. J.); Callaghan v. McCaw; C.C. v.
J.M., 2010 SKQB 79 at para. 7, 351 Sask.R. 55;
57
•
reliance on Black’s Law Dictionary (and usually an out-of-date version) as an
authoritative source of law; the litigant may demand the judge acknowledge the
determinative and binding character of definitions from that text: Waterloo
(Regional Municipality) v. Bydeley, 2010 ONCJ 740 at paras. 39, affirmed 2011
ONCJ 842, affirmed [2011] O.J. No. 6282 (QL) (Ont. C.A.); this proceeding;
•
inquiry whether the court is attempting to create a contract with the litigant;
•
refusal to enter or a premature departure from a courtroom, this is often
accompanied by a denial of court authority: Mercedes-Benz Financial v.
Kovacevic, [2009] O.J. No. 783 at paras. 15-16, 2009 CanLII 9368 (Ont. Sup. Ct.
J.); Sydorenko v. Manitoba, 2012 MBQB 42 at para. 10; this proceeding; and
•
‘ritualistic’ responses to inquiries, such as repetition of what seem to be formal,
automatic responses, for example:
6.
•
“I accept that for value and honour”: Henry v. El, 2010 ABCA 312, leave
refused [2011] S.C.C.A. No. 138,
•
“Your Honour, I accept it for value and return it for value for settlement
closure in this matter.”: Mercedes-Benz Financial v. Kovacevic, [2009]
O.J. No. 783 at para. 51, 2009 CanLII 9368 (Ont. Sup. Ct. J.), and
•
“You are intimidating me.” or “Are you intimidating me?”: Belanger and
other CERI members.
Summary of In-Court Indicia
[250] These various motifs are usually found in combination. A useful and representative
sample transcript of OPCA litigant conduct is found in Canada v. Galbraith, 2001 BCSC 675 at
paras. 26-28, 54 W.C.B. (2d) 504.
[251] A particularly difficult category of OPCA litigant are those who adhere to the OPCA
concept that all interactions between the state, courts, and individuals are contracts. As is later
explained in greater detail, persons who adopt this concept will interpret almost any invitation by
the court or compliance with court procedure as the formation of a contract. For example,
members of this Court have observed that litigants who apply the OPCA ‘everything is a
contract’ strategy will refuse simple court directions and processes, such as to pass the bar, sit,
stand, or acknowledge their identity.
[252] Similarly, litigants who refused to identify themselves but claim to represent an entity
related to the litigant will often maintain this role in the face of strong court warning. These
OPCA litigants are often very argumentative.
58
[253] The manner in which the refusal occurs is often highly formalistic. Mr. Meads, for
example, made this bizarre response to my suggestion of cooperation on a point:
... you’re treating the person Dennis Meads with all of these statements, and not the
living soul. You are enticing me into slavery ... [Emphasis added.]
The March 3, 2011 document uses the same language and indicates the same motif. These are a
sign of the ‘everything is a contract’ OPCA concept.
C.
Conclusion - OPCA Indicia
[254] OPCA litigants’ materials and in court strategies usually exhibit many of these features.
Thus, they provides a certain ‘redundancy’ that makes these markers a helpful indication that a
particular litigant has purposefully adopted vexatious pseudolegal strategies intended to frustrate
the operation of the court. As noted, these specific indicia are almost never encountered with
non-OPCA litigants, including those with either cognitive or psychological dysfunction.
[255] OPCA litigants prefer to make their submissions in a highly complex and indirect
manner. As a consequence, this Court’s experience has been that a typical OPCA submission
will incorporate a great many of the indicia identified here. This too creates a high confidence
that documents and litigants with these features have an OPCA affiliation.
1.
Procedural Responses to Suspected OPCA Documents
[256] Given the intrinsically vexatious nature of OPCA methodologies, which I review in detail
below, it is appropriate that a court adopt special procedures for documents that show OPCA
indicia, which may include:
1.
that court clerks reject the materials that do not conform with required standards;
2.
that the court clerks accept and mark these materials as “received” rather than
“filed”; and
3.
that materials that disclose OPCA characteristics may be reviewed by a judge
without further submission or representation by the litigants, and that the judge
may:
a)
declare that the litigation, application, or defence is frivolous, irrelevant or
improper (Rule 3.68(2)(c)), or an abuse of process (Rule 3.68(2)(d)), also
Canam Enterprises Inc v. Coles, (2000), 51 O.R. (3d) 481 (Ont. C.A.) at
paras 55-56, affirmed 2002 SCC 63, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 307;
b)
order that the documents are irrelevant to the substance of the litigation,
but are only retained on file as evidence that is potentially relevant to costs
against the OPCA litigant, vexatious status of the litigation and litigant,
59
and/or whether the litigant has engaged in criminal or contemptuous
misconduct.
2.
c)
reject the documents and order that if the litigant wishes to continue its
action, application, or defence, the litigant then file replacement
documentation that conforms to court formalities and does not involve
irrelevant OPCA arguments;
d)
order that the litigant appear a before the court in a “show cause” hearing
to prove the litigant has an action or defence that is recognized in law; that
hearing need not involve participation of the other party or parties; and
e)
assign fines, as authorized by Rule 10.49(1).
Courtroom Procedure Responses to Suspected OPCA Litigants
[257] OPCA litigants are known to engage in disruptive and inappropriate in-court conduct: for
example, Callaghan v. McCaw; C.C. v. J.M., 2010 SKQB 79 at para. 9, 351 Sask.R. 55, and
sometimes appear with supporters who do the same: Dempsey v. Envision Credit Union, 2006
BCSC 1324 at paras. 16-24, 60 B.C.L.R. (4th) 309. This misconduct extends to disrespect,
threats, and in some cases violence directed to court personnel, judges, and other parties. For
example: Shakes v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2011 CanLII 60494
(I.R.B.) and Hajdu v. Ontario (Director, Family Reponsibility Office), 2012 ONSC 1835 at
paras. 10-14.
[258] OPCA litigants have an alarming predisposition to a belief that they can ‘take justice into
their own hands’ and act against the judiciary. The attempted arrest of a judge reported in R. v.
Main, at para. 8 is a good example. More recently, during the trial of a Porisky associate (R. v.
Lawson, 2012 BCSC 356 at para. 26, 2012 D.T.C. 5069) the defendant referred to:
... "YouTube" videos showing people swarming the courts of England "to demand
justice and chasing judges from the bench." There is a reference to the "public,
who are paying close attention to this and related proceedings in growing
numbers."
[259] While Justice Myers chose to “... give Mr. Lawson the benefit of the doubt and assume
that this was not meant as a veiled threat ...” (para. 27), I think this very effectively illustrates the
potential activities that judges and court officials can expect when dealing with OPCA litigants.
They have been incited by the misguided and dangerous rhetoric spewed by their gurus, and that
raises the troubling possibility of in-court misconduct, if not physical risks.
[260] OPCA litigants often attempt to ‘rally the troops’ so that groups of supporters appear at a
hearing. That can lead to orchestrated disruptions (Dempsey v. Envision Credit Union, 2006
BCSC 1324 at paras. 16-24, 60 B.C.L.R. (4th) 309) including threats directed at judges (R. v.
60
Main, at para. 8). Our Court has experienced high tension incidents, particularly with Freemenon-the-Land and CERI members, where persons in the public gallery had to be expelled,
sometimes by force.
[261] It is therefore appropriate that a court may adopt specific in-court and security procedures
in response to persons who are suspected OPCA litigants. Additional in-court security is
generally warranted.
[262] In particular, this Court has discovered that OPCA litigants will make clandestine audio
and video recordings of Court proceedings, in violation of Court rules. These are then often
posted on the Internet.
[263] The fact that litigation involves OPCA motifs may also be a basis for a judge to order a
courtroom closed to the public, particularly if persons in the public gallery disrupt proceedings,
such as in Dempsey v. Envision Credit Union, 2006 BCSC 1324 at paras. 16-24, 60 B.C.L.R.
(4th) 309, or pose a physical threat. I have made an order of this kind about allowing public
entry, subject to a search and removal of prohibited electronic recording equipment prior to
entry.
VI.
OPCA Concepts and Arguments
[264] Though OPCA concepts initially appear to be very diverse, they may be grouped into a
limited number of general categories. In this Court’s experience, apparently novel OPCA
concepts very often recycle old schemes, but use somewhat different terminology. These
variants, once assigned to a general category, are obviously defective.
[265] Different OPCA concepts and arguments are often interwoven. Concepts from different
general categories often appear in the same document or argument, as OPCA litigants freely
interchange and mix these ideas. As Mr. Meads’ materials and arguments illustrate, even a single
letter may apply numerous concepts from multiple general OPCA scheme and concept
categories. This ‘mixing’ and ‘layering’ occurs even when the result is illogical. For example,
Mr. Meads claims to only adhere and be subject to “God’s law”, yet emphasizes the alleged
operation and binding “universal” character of the UCC.
[266] As a preliminary note, review of the caselaw and this Court’s experience indicates that
OPCA concepts and argument do not generally rely on the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms, Part 1, Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.),
1982, c. 11 [the “Charter”]. This may reflect the fact most OPCA concepts are adapted from
American precursors, or that the typical OPCA litigant is unwilling to shield themselves under
the authority of the Charter. They instead prefer to frame their arguments around the Canadian
Bill of Rights (Canada (Minister of National Revenue - M.N.R.) v. Stanchfield, 2009 FC 99 at
paras. 29-30, 340 F.T.R. 150; see also R. v. Amell, 2010 SKPC 107 at paras. 156-157, 361
Sask.R. 61; Friesen v. Canada, 2007 TCC 287 at para. 3, [2007] 5 C.T.C. 2067), which has a
61
well-established limited legal effect (Attorney General of Canada v. Lavell, [1974] S.C.R. 1349,
38 D.L.R. (3d) 481).
A.
The Litigant is Not Subject to Court Authority
[267] A very common OPCA scheme category is that the OPCA litigant is in some manner
outside the jurisdiction of the court or state, or is somehow rendered immune from legal
obligations. This category has three general forms:
1.
the jurisdiction of the court is restricted to certain specific domains, and the
OPCA litigant falls outside those categories;
2.
the jurisdiction of the court is eliminated due to some defect; and
3.
the OPCA litigant is in some manner immunized from the court’s actions.
1.
Restricted Court Jurisdiction
[268] A common and older OPCA concept is that a Canadian court has a restricted jurisdiction.
The majority of these schemes appear to have an American origin.
a.
Admiralty or Military Courts
[269] A typical situation is that an OPCA litigant may claim a court is a military or admiralty
court, and therefore has no jurisdiction over the litigant: Hajdu v. Ontario (Director, Family
Reponsibility Office), 2012 ONSC 1835; Ramjohn v. Rudd, 2007 ABQB 84, 156 A.C.W.S. (3d)
38; R. v. J.B.C. Securities Ltd., 2003 NBCA 53, 261 N.B.R. (2d) 199; this proceeding. Once the
true restricted nature of the court is ‘unmasked’, the litigant will declare themselves immune to
court action. That, of course, has been uniformly unsuccessful.
[270] Mr. Meads at one point pursued this approach in his oral arguments. He demanded to
know the meaning and significance of the Royal Coat of Arms of Canada attached to the back of
the courtroom, behind the bench. Once I translated the Latin motto “A Mari usque ad Mare”,
“from sea to sea”, Mr. Meads declared it meant the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench was an
admiralty court which had no jurisdiction over himself. Mr. Meads was in one sense correct; this
court can potentially address admiralty law matters, subject to legislation that assigns that
jurisdiction to the Federal Court (Zavarovalna Skupnost, (Insurance Community Triglav Ltd.)
v. Terrasses Jewellers Inc., [1983] 1 S.C.R. 283, 54 N.R. 321; Federal Courts Act, R.S.C. 1985,
c F-7, s. 22). Admittedly landlocked as Alberta is, litigation of that kind is not exactly a common
occurrence. Mr. Meads is, however, manifestly mistaken if he thinks that is the sole jurisdiction
of the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench.
[271] Another Admiralty Law based argument illustrates how the word “includes” seems to
baffle OPCA litigants. I have personally received a ‘foisted unilateral agreement’ (see below)
that explains that “Canada” is restricted to the oceans that surround the landmass and its internal
62
waters. The writer explains the basis of this argument is the Interpretation Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.
I-21, s. 35(1), which reads in part:
35. (1) In every enactment,
...
“Canada”, for greater certainty, includes the internal waters of Canada and the
territorial sea of Canada ... [Emphasis added.]
The author continued to declare that all Canadian courts:
... are nothing but pirates (criminals) operating on the high seas of commerce,
looking for some prize, and as such, they are de facto courts ... [Emphasis in
original.]
This may have been the argument advanced in R. v. Martin, 2012 NSPC 73 at para. 11.
[272] OPCA litigants who advance these schemes will often focus on certain aspects of court
formalities. Like Mr. Meads, they may scrutinize the court for some hidden indication of its true
nature. A strange but common belief is that a flag with yellow or gold thread ‘fringes’ “denotes a
military jurisdiction, not common law”. In R. v. J.B.C. Securities Ltd., 2003 NBCA 53 at para.
2, 261 N.B.R. (2d) 199, Chief Justice Drapeau of the New Brunswick Court of Appeal rejected a
motion by Lindsay “... removing the gold-fringed Canadian flag that has adorned the Court of
Appeal’s hearing room for years ...”. This motion, and the argument that “[t]here is no lawful
reason for a Canadian flag to be present other than the regular statutory authorized flag” was
frivolous and vexatious: para. 9.
b.
Notaries are the Real Judges
[273] Another curious belief that purports to limit court jurisdiction is that notaries, as a kind of
common law official, in some manner possess judicial or judge-like authority that displaces the
authority of Canadian courts. In Jabez Financial Services Inc. (Receiver of) v. Sponagle, 2008
NSSC 112 at paras. 14, 264 N.S.R. (2d) 224 the OPCA litigant made the following claim:
Whereas it is my understanding that I can use a Notary Public to perform duties
found under any Act including thus they have the power to hold court and hear
evidence and issue binding lawful judgments, and,
Whereas it is my understanding that a Notary Public can also be used to bring
criminal charges to bear against traitors, even if they hold the highest office ...
[274] Naturally, this claim is rubbish, and the litigants offered no foundation for this concept.
The relevant legislation (Notaries Public Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. N-6; Notaries Public Regulation,
Alta. Reg 68/2003) does not authorize notaries to function in that manner. While I am a notary as
63
a consequence of my office as a Justice (Notaries Public Act, s. 4), that does not make all
notaries judges. OPCA litigants often assign special and misplaced significance to notaries and
their activities, see for example Papadopoulos v. Borg, 2009 ABCA 201 at paras. 3, 10.
[275] I will subsequently comment on the well established general authority of a superior court
of inherent jurisdiction, and how that defeats this argument category.
c.
Religion or Religious Belief Trumps the Courts
[276] Religion is a common basis for a claim that a court cannot act. While the precise manner
in which religion or religious principles are invoked may vary, all these schemes appear to flow
from a common rationale; there is some form of religious authority or law that trumps that of the
court and Canada.
[277] Some OPCA litigants claim immunity on the basis of religion, or like Mr. Meads, say
they are only subject to something like “God’s Law”, or biblical principles. Often these religious
beliefs conveniently excuse an OPCA litigant from some onerous obligation, such as paying
taxes, or obtaining a driver’s licence, motor vehicle registration, and automobile insurance.
Members of the Edmonton area Church of the Ecumenical Redemption International, the group
headed by “minister” Belanger, claim that their possession and use of marijuana is authorized by
the King James Bible and therefore the state and courts have no authority to restrict those
activities. Similarly, Mr. Meads, in his submissions, stated he does not recognize marriage
outside a biblical context, and divorce can only flow from infidelity. He says a court-ordered
divorce based on other criteria cannot bind him.
[278] Belief, religious activity, and association is a protected right under Charter, s. 2(a).
However, Canadian courts recognize that as a restricted right that is subordinate “... to such
reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic
society.”: Charter, s. 1. The Supreme Court of Canada has been explicit that religious beliefs do
not trump the right of government to organize and regulate Canadian society, as was recently
reviewed in Alberta v. Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, 2009 SCC 37, [2009] 2 S.C.R.
567.
[279] OPCA litigants do not usually frame their religious arguments in a Charter context, but
that would be the appropriate approach for them to pursue the rights they say flow from their
beliefs, rather than a bald declaration of religion-based immunity. That is not to suggest that such
Charter-based arguments will succeed, but they will at least be appropriately framed.
[280] OPCA litigants have also seized on the preamble to The Constitution Act, 1982, Schedule
B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c .11, which reads:
Whereas Canada is founded upon principles that recognize the supremacy of God
and the rule of law ... [Emphasis added.]
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[281] This passage has been the subject of occasional judicial commentary, most simply
because various litigants have argued that the preamble makes any of Canada’s laws subject to
the “supremacy of God”. This proposition is expertly dismantled and dismissed by Justice
Muldoon in O’Sullivan v. Canada (No. 2) (1991), 45 F.T.R. 284, 84 D.L.R. (4th) 124
(F.C.T.D.), where he concludes:
The preamble to the Charter provides an important element in defining Canada,
but recognition of the supremacy of God, emplaced in the supreme law of
Canada, goes no further than this: it prevents the Canadian state from becoming
officially atheistic. It does not make Canada a theocracy because of the enormous
variety of beliefs of how God (apparently the very same deity for Jews, Christians
and Muslims) wants people to behave generally and to worship in particular. The
preamble's recognition of the supremacy of God, then, does not prevent Canada
from being a secular state. [Emphasis added.]
See also Mercedes-Benz Financial v. Kovacevic, [2009] O.J. No. 783 at para. 42, 2009 CanLII
9368 (Ont. Sup. Ct. J.); Pappas v. Canada, 2006 TCC 692 at paras. 1, 9-10, [2006] G.S.T.C.
161; R. v. Demers, 2003 BCCA 28 at paras. 15-16, 177 B.C.A.C. 16, leave refused [2003]
S.C.C.A. No. 103.
[282] Other OPCA litigants claim that legislation, common law, and court principles and
procedures are subject to “God’s Law”, or other divinely ordained rules or principles, have been
uniformly rejected: Bloom v. Canada, 2011 ONSC 1308 at paras. 6-7; Sandri v. Canada
(Attorney General), 2009 CanLII 44282 at paras. 5, 13, 179 A.C.W.S. (3d) 811 (Ont. Sup. Ct.
J.); Pappas v. Canada, 2006 TCC 692 at paras 1, 9-12, [2006] G.S.T.C. 161; R. v. Lindsay, 2011
BCCA 99 at para. 31, 302 B.C.A.C. 76, leave refused [2011] S.C.C.A. No. 265; Gravlin et al. v.
Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce et al, 2005 BCSC 839 at para. 50, 140 A.C.W.S. (3d)
447.
[283] In Dempsey v. Envision Credit Union, 2005 BCSC 1730 at para. 6, 145 A.C.W.S. (3d)
1040, this declaration took the form of a colourfully named “Constructive Notice of Child of
God Status”. At para. 30 Justice Garson concluded that was not a basis to remove her from a
trial, as the litigant “... has not "accepted" my jurisdiction to hear this matter.” The same
approach was unsuccessful at defeating the Law Society of British Columbia’s authority to
regulate legal practice: Law Society of British Columbia v. Dempsey, 2005 BCSC 1277 at paras.
8, 16, 179, 194, 142 A.C.W.S. (3d) 346, affirmed 2006 BCCA 161, 149 A.C.W.S. (3d) 735, see
also Szoo v. Canada (Royal Canadian Mounted Police), 2011 BCSC 696 at paras. 21, 45.
[284] Similarly, there is there is no “God given right” to travel on public roads that trumps
legislation: Sydorenko v. Manitoba, 2012 MBQB 42, see also R. v. Kaasgaard, 2011 MBQB
256, para. 7 and Winningham v. Canada. Justice Herauf concluded a debtors’s claim to be
“washed of debt by the blood of our Lord Jesus Christ who has redeemed us of all debt ... is pure
unadulterated rubbish!”: Dirks v. Canada (Minister of National Revenue - M.N.R.); Dirks, Re,
2007 SKQB 124 at para. 7, 31 C.B.R. (5th) 192.
65
[285] Mr. Meads advanced an ill-formed argument that “God’s law” or the “Maximus of Law”
is the law that he chooses to apply in this proceeding. There is, of course, no basis for that
demand, and in any case that would not defeat or restrict the authority of this Court. The same
would be true of any argument that this Court’s authority is subject to any other religious
perspective or prescription.
2.
Defective Court Authority
[286] In some instances an OPCA litigant may argue that a defect of some kind renders a court
or judge without authority. An OPCA litigant may attempt to identify that defect by demanding
that the court prove its authority is valid and genuine.
a.
Oaths
[287] A very common demand is that a judge provide some indication of valid authority.
Commonly that demand is for documentation, such as a certificate of appointment, or a copy of
an oath of office: R. v. Lindsay, 2006 BCSC 188, 68 W.C.B. (2d) 718, affirmed 2007 BCCA
214; Ramjohn v. Rudd, 2007 ABQB 84 at para. 9, 156 A.C.W.S. (3d) 38; Bank of Montreal v.
McCance, 2012 ABQB 537 at para. 7. In Alberta Treasury Branches v. Klassen, 2004 ABQB
463 at para. 25, 364 A.R. 230, an OPCA representative added the following post-script to his
submissions:
If you had jurisdiction on June 7th, even under an Admiralty Court, you must
have taken an Oath. Can you provide me with a copy of your Oath, like other
professions must provide to show copies posted) of their certification, they are
legitimate and not imposters? It would be appreciated since it is demanded in Sec.
9.12,b of the Provincial Court Act. ("transmitted forthwith")
[288] Curiously, these litigants do not appear aware that judicial appointments are published as
an Order-in-Council.
[289] It is well established that a judge or court officer is presumptively authorized to act as
they do, and rather the OPCA litigant who claims some deficiency or bias must prove that
deficiency. In R. v. Crischuk, 2010 BCSC 716 at paras. 36-38, affirmed 2010 BCCA 391, 2010
D.T.C. 5141, Justice Barrows explained that onus in this manner:
37 ... His position appears to be that simply announcing a challenge to the
authority of the judge or the Crown to occupy the positions they occupy is
sufficient. It is not. There must be some evidence that casts into doubt that which
otherwise appears regular on its face. There is no evidence to doubt Judge
Hogan's status. Thus, this ground of the appeal, to the extent it relates to Judge
Hogan's failure to produce a certified copy of his oath of office, has no merit.
[Emphasis added.]
See also: R. v. Lemieux, 2007 SKPC 135 at para. 12.
66
[290] An OPCA litigant sometimes demands that a judge swear various oaths and follows with
an allegation that a failure to do so defeats the court’s authority. That is what appeared to happen
in Kilini Creek/Patricia Hills Area Landowners v. Lac Ste. Anne (County) Subdivision and
Development Appeal Board, 2001 ABCA 92 at para. 2, 104 A.C.W.S. (3d) 1142. Justice
McClung’s response was succinct:
Reverend Belanger demands that I take an oath (for his use) that acknowledges
the supremacy of God and the Charter of Rights. I have declined this opportunity.
b.
The Court Proves It Has Jurisdiction and Acts Fairly
[291] Other reported demands to demonstrate judicial authority include:
•
“are you a public servant?”: Dempsey v. Envision Credit Union, 2006 BCSC
1324 at paras. 31, 32, 33, 60 B.C.L.R. (4th) 309;
•
that the court “state its jurisdiction”: Hajdu v. Ontario (Director, Family
Reponsibility Office), 2012 ONSC 1835 at para. 20; and
•
a court disprove it acts “in colour of law”: Hajdu v. Ontario (Director, Family
Reponsibility Office), 2012 ONSC 1835 at para. 22.
[292] Other OPCA litigants claim judicial bias, influence, or conspiracy. However, a litigant
who advances that kind of claim has an obligation to provide positive evidence to support the
alleged conspiracy: R. v. Sydel, 2010 BCSC 1470 at paras. 27-29, see also R. v. Sydel, 2010
BCSC 1473 at paras. 18-23, 39, [2011] 1 C.T.C. 200, affirmed 2011 BCCA 103, leave refused
[2011] S.C.C.A. No. 191.
c.
Court Formalities
[293] A further alleged defect category involves some formal aspect of the court or its
activities. For example, Henry has argued that whether a judge is or is not gowned affects the
judge’s jurisdiction: Henry v. Starwood Hotels, 2010 ABCA 367, leave refused [2010] S.C.C.A.
No. 475; Henry v. El, 2010 ABCA 312 at para. 3, leave refused [2011] S.C.C.A. No. 138.
[294] A parallel concept is advanced by Edmonton area OPCA guru Belanger, who puts special
significance on the edition of the Bible present in the courtroom and that a witness holds when
swearing their evidence will be accurate and complete. Belanger claims that only a King James
Bible (and perhaps a specific edition) can serve in that role. Of course, that is nonsense. There is
neither legislation or common law that makes that requirement. The Alberta Evidence Act,
R.S.A. 2000, c. A-18, s. 15(1) states the oath requires a person hold “... the Bible or New
Testament, or Old Testament in the case of an adherent of the Jewish religion ...”, while s. 15(2)
also permits that “... the oath may be taken or sworn on any one of the 4 Gospels.”
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[295] As for any common-law requirement, there is no question that the specific choice of
Bible (or other sacred text) present in a courtroom falls within the jurisdiction of a court to
manage its proceedings and procedures: I.H. Jacob, “The Inherent Jurisdiction of the Court”
(1970) 23 Current Legal Problems 23, cited in B.C.G.E.U. v. British Columbia (Attorney
General), [1988] 2 S.C.R. 214, 53 D.L.R. (4th) 1; R. v. Morales, [1992] 3 S.C.R. 711, 144 N.R.
176; R. v. Hinse, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 597, 130 D.L.R. (4th) 54; MacMillan Bloedel Ltd. v. Simpson,
[1995] 4 S.C.R. 725, 130 D.L.R. (4th) 385, see also R. v. Gillespie, 2000 MBCA 1, 185 D.L.R.
(4th) 214 and R. v. Levogiannis, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 475 at paras. 27-28, 160 N.R. 371.
[296] A recent Ontario case, Hajdu v. Ontario (Director, Family Reponsibility Office), 2012
ONSC 1835 at paras. 10-14, reports a bizarre defective court authority OPCA concept. The trial
judge adjourned a hearing and exited the courtroom in response to disruptive conduct by the
OPCA litigant. That litigant, a self-declared sovereign man, then said:
The judge has left the court; has abandoned the court. I, as a sovereign, claim
authority and dismiss the matter.
[297] The transcript indicates the clerk then responded: “No, you cannot.” The OPCA litigant
left the courtroom. The proceeding continued later after first the judge and then the OPCA
litigant returned. On appeal, Justice Coats concluded that the adjournment did not end the matter
in the OPCA litigant’s favour, or permit the litigant to ‘seize control’ and end the proceeding.
d.
The State is Defective
[298] A more global attack on the authority of the state has also been advanced as a defect that
allegedly defeats court action. A good example of this variant is a peculiar argument that no
post-1931 Governor General had a valid appointment because of a defect in the 1931 Statute of
Westminster. That defect alleged cascaded to invalidate all post-1931 government legislation and
action, including the operation of the courts and appointment of judges: R. v. Dick, 2001 BCPC
275; R. v. Lindsay, 2004 MBCA 147 at para. 32, 187 Man.R. (2d) 236.
[299] Lindsay has also alleged that a defect in Queen Elizabeth II’s coronation oath subverts all
government and judicial authority, as the Queen is “... constitutionally and contractually to
uphold and enforce the laws of God as they are set out in the King James Version of the Holy
Bible, which are the supreme source of law ...”: R. v. Lindsay, 2011 BCCA 99 at paras. 31, 302
B.C.A.C. 76, leave refused [2011] S.C.C.A. No. 265. That allegedly collapses state and judicial
authority. Unsurprisingly, the British Columbia Court of Appeal has concluded that argument
has no basis: at para. 32.
e.
Conclusion - Defective Court Authority
[300] All ‘defective court authority’ schemes face two issues:
1.
a rebuttable presumption that a court and judge are authorized; and
68
2.
the intrinsic authority of superior courts of inherent jurisdiction, a point I will
further explore.
[301] OPCA litigants do not address either point. ‘Defective court’ arguments are bald
allegations that the litigant deploys and then demands the court rebut. These frivolous arguments
have a strong parallel in certain American OPCA concepts. Perhaps the strangest is reported by
Jol A. Silversmith in “The "Missing Thirteenth Amendment": Constitutional Nonsense and
Titles of Nobility”, 8 Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal 577 (April 1999). That
paper documents how certain U.S. OPCA litigants allege that a secret and lost U.S.
Constitutional Amendment subverts the authority of judges and lawyers by stripping their status
as American citizens because they are petty British nobility, “esquires”.
3.
Immune to Court Jurisdiction - ‘Magic Hats’
[302] Another branch of the immunity category flows from an argument that a person has some
status or has undertaken certain steps that renders the OPCA litigant immune to court action. I
have given this category the name ‘magic hats’ to capture the manner in which OPCA gurus and
litigants approach these arguments. They freely wear, remove, and switch ‘magic hats’ as need
be. Many OPCA schemes are a combination, or succession, of ‘magic hats’.
[303] The manner in which ‘magic hat’ schemes are presented is sometimes entirely arbitrary;
a litigant only need say “I am a sovereign man”, or “I am a Freeman-on-the-Land”, and then are
allegedly rendered immune to state and court action, all without any other further effort,
explanation, or rationale. Some litigants go further: Gravlin et al. v. Canadian Imperial Bank of
Commerce et al, 2005 BCSC 839 at para. 24, 140 A.C.W.S. (3d) 447 reports a litigant who filed
an “Affidavit of Non-Participation in Commercial Activity” that announced “I am immune from
the Jurisdiction of any Court in Canada.”
[304] Sometimes a ‘magic hat’ is accompanied by a theoretical context to explain the operation
of the ‘magic hat’. Mr. Meads, for example, explained his immunity to state and court action via
his choice to be subject to “God’s law”, the “Maximus of Law”, which applies to him as he is a
“living flesh and blood sentient-man”.
[305] In these Reasons I will survey and categorize the plethora of ‘magic hats’ that are
reported in Canadian jurisprudence and that have also been identified by this Court. There are
three special categories of ‘magic hat’ schemes that will be reviewed separately because of their
complex nature and due to the variations in which they are often expressed, that:
1.
no legal obligation can be enforced on the OPCA litigant without his or her
agreement,
2.
a single person has two legal aspects, or can be split into two legal entities, and
3.
an OPCA litigant can unilaterally bind the state, a state actor, a court, or other
persons with a ‘foisted’ agreement.
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[306] I will first examine and catalogue the simpler ‘magic hats’. These are not so much
separate and distinct categories, but instead potentially useful groups for analysis and review.
Sometime a particular ‘magic hat’ will fall into more than one group, depending on how it is
expressed (or worn).
a.
I Belong to an Exempt Group
[307] Many OPCA litigants argue that they cannot be the target of state sanction or legal
obligation because they are not subject to that kind of obligation. These arguments are often
bizarre. For example, Warman, then represented by Lindsay, (unsuccessfully) argued that the
Criminal Code only applies to “fictitious persons”, and not “a sovereign, flesh and blood living
man”: R. v. Warman, 2001 BCCA 510 at paras. 9-10, 13-14. That was “... rejected as being
without any legal, historical or constitutional foundation whatsoever.”: para. 14. A similar
argument that only corporations, and not human beings, are subject to Canadian law was
addressed and rejected in Waterloo (Regional Municipality) v. Bydeley, 2010 ONCJ 740 at para.
54, affirmed 2011 ONCJ 842, affirmed [2011] O.J. No. 6282 (QL) (Ont. C.A.), see also
Winningham v. Canada where the litigant claimed the Criminal Code only applies to
“corporations and fictitious persons”.
[308] In R. v. Martin, 2012 NSPC 73 at para. 10 a Detaxer interpreted Charter, s. 32 to
indicate that all Canadian law only applies to entities that advance government policy, programs,
or functions. That proposition was rejected.
[309] Another school of the ‘exempt’ category claims the OPCA litigant is immune because of
an association with some foreign nation-state, or aboriginal affiliation. These jurisdictions are
often imaginary. This concept is popular among American OPCA litigants. For example, my
office occasionally receives complex documents from persons who claim to be citizens of Texas,
an independent nation-state. On that basis, they claim immunity from traffic tickets issued in
Alberta. Persons in this category will manufacture their own ‘national’ identification and license
plates. Winningham attempted this approach, but also claimed to be an ambassador of the
“Nation of Texas”: Winningham v. Canada.
[310] Aboriginal status (real or fictitious) is another basis that allegedly provides immunity to
court action or income tax obligation: Bloom v. Canada, 2010 FC 621 at paras. 3, 16, [2010] 5
C.T.C. 143; R. v. Crischuk, 2010 BCSC 716 at paras. 26-29, affirmed 2010 BCCA 391, 2010
D.T.C. 5141; see also Louison v. Ochapowace Indian Band #71, 2011 SKQB 87, 369 Sask.R.
258, affirmed 2011 SKCA 119 for a general commentary on the effect of pre-colonial
occupation of lands. This court has received correspondence from “The Tacit Supreme In Law
Court” of the “Sovran Nations Embassies of Mother Earth” which appears to combine aboriginal
status and claimed nation status as a basis for immunity.
[311] An interesting variation on the aboriginal immunity concept is advanced by Henry as
“:Chief : Nanya-Shaabu: El: of the At-sik-hata Nation of Yamassee Moors.” Henry not only
claims to be the head of an independent nation-state and aboriginal community, but that his tribe
owns Canada. He now demands rent. Henry has at times filed bizarre and elaborate documents
70
with this Court that appear intended to assert and enforce that ownership. I agree with Justice
Sanderman’s succinct evaluation of Henry’s claims as “total gibberish”: Henry Estate v. Alberta
Health Services, 2011 ABQB 113. Similarly, “Moorish” affiliation, in this case membership in
the “Moorish Divine and National Movement of North America”, did not provide inherent
jurisdiction or a capacity to trump Canadian legislation, administrative tribunals, or the courts:
Shakes v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2011 CanLII 60494 at para.
33 (I.R.B.).
[312] Henry also has worn a literal ‘magic hat’! In the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench Henry
v. Starwood Hotels (1 September 2010) Edmonton 1003-01152 (Alberta Q.B.) before Justice
Shelley, Henry appeared wearing what is best described as ceremonial garb, with a robe and red
fez, that he indicated had special significance. Subsequently, Henry has appeared in Chambers
wearing what appeared to be a lawyer’s robes. It seems that Moorish Law advocates place
special weight on court dress, particularly since Henry appealed Justice Shelley’s findings in part
on the basis that he had garbed himself in a manner appropriate for the occasion, but she had not:
Henry v. Starwood Hotels, 2010 ABCA 367 at para. 4, leave refused [2010] S.C.C.A. No. 475.
[313] Unsurprisingly, the Detaxers have developed their own “exempt” arguments as to why
they should not have to pay income tax. I have previously commented on the thoroughly
discredited argument that only corporations are taxpayers: R. v. Klundert, 2008 ONCA 767 at
para. 19, 93 O.R. (3d) 81, leave refused [2008] S.C.C.A. No. 522; R. v. Lindsay, 2011 BCCA 99
at para. 27, 302 B.C.A.C. 76, leave refused [2011] S.C.C.A. No. 265; R. v. Pinno, 2002 SKPC
118 at paras. 12-13, 15-16, [2003] 3 C.T.C. 308; Kennedy v. Canada (Customs and Revenue
Agency), [2000] 4 C.T.C. 186, 2000 D.T.C. 6524 (Ont. Sup. Ct. J.). Justice Myers put it as well
as anyone in Porisky Trial Decision at para. 58:
Mr. Porisky's theory not only does not bear any legal logic but it also fails to
accord with common sense. It is a failed attempt at word magic and has no
validity.
[314] Similarly, a claim that the obligation to pay tax falls solely on government employees
was rejected in Turnnir v. The Queen, 2011 TCC 495 at para. 5. I believe this is a literal
application of what I understand to be a common American OPCA argument that the Internal
Revenue Service classifies and penalizes as a “frivolous tax argument”, for example: McAffee v.
United States, 84 A.F.T.R. 2d 99 (N.D.Ga. 1999)
[315] Obligation to adhere to motor vehicle licensing, registration, and insurance seems to have
spawned considerable OPCA litigant activity. One apparently common argument is that the
OPCA litigant is not subject to those requirements because that legislation only applies to either
commercial vehicles (Waterloo (Regional Municipality) v. Bydeley, 2010 ONCJ 740 at paras.
35-38, affirmed 2011 ONCJ 842, affirmed [2011] O.J. No. 6282 (QL) (Ont. C.A.)), or vehicles
operated by corporations (R. v. Kaasgaard, 2011 MBQB 256 at paras. 8-9).
[316] Similarly, courts have rejected arguments that a “driver” in motor vehicle legislation is
restricted to obsolete interpretations of that definition: persons who direct horse-drawn vehicles,
71
or persons whose profession involves moving livestock (Waterloo (Regional Municipality) v.
Bydeley, 2010 ONCJ 740 at paras. 39-46, affirmed 2011 ONCJ 842, affirmed [2011] O.J. No.
6282 (QL) (Ont. C.A.)). This case reports the quite common OPCA litigant strategy of only
citing historic rather than current references: para. 39. The failure of this and related arguments
was summarized by Justice Stinson in this manner at para. 56:
It may well be the defendant's wish not to be governed by the HTA, or any other
statute, for that matter. It may offend her personal beliefs, which she is obviously
entitled to have. But, if she does not wish to be subject to the HTA, the solution is
quite clear. She simply need not drive. The HTA, whether the defendant likes it or
not, governs her conduct when she is the driver of a vehicle on a highway in the
Province of Ontario. [Emphasis added.]
b.
I Declare Myself Immune
[317] Another common variation on the ‘immunity’ category is that a unilateral declaration of
some form may defeat state and court authority. This concept is closely associated with the
Sovereign Man and Freeman-on-the-Land movements, but also emerges in other contexts. The
‘immune declaration’ concept is interwoven into the general ‘obligation requires agreement’
OPCA strategy category, later reviewed in more detail.
[318] Of course, it is indeed possible to cease to be governed by Canadian law. One only need
leave Canada and break formal ties with this jurisdiction. However, the ‘immune by declaration’
school claims a person can live in Canada but without any obligation or responsibility as a
consequence of some special status, which has various names such as a “sovereign man”, a
“freeman”, or a “Freeman-on-the-Land”. This “immune by declaration” group often draws an
arbitrary line between “statutes” and “common law”, and says they are subject to “common
law”, but not legislation. Mr. Meads appears to have adopted that kind of distinction.
[319] Often immunity is based on nothing more than a bald allegation of some ‘magic hat’
status that flows from a name-based category. Examples include a claim to be:
•
a “Freeman-on-the-Land”: Harper v. Atchison, 2011 SKQB 38 at paras. 6, 15,
369 Sask.R. 134, see also Szoo v. Canada (Royal Canadian Mounted Police),
2011 BCSC 696; Jabez Financial Services Inc. (Receiver of) v. Sponagle, 2008
NSSC 112 at paras. 14, 18, 264 N.S.R. (2d) 224; in relation to criminal
prosecution: R. v. McCormick, 2012 NSSC 150 at para. 9;
•
a “Freeman and a Natural Person”: Summerland (District) v. No Strings
Enterprises Ltd., 2003 BCSC 990 at para. 19, 124 A.C.W.S. (3d) 39, leave denied
2004 BCCA 360, 131 A.C.W.S. (3d) 99;
•
a “Freeman-on-the-Land” and unilaterally defining relationships and obligations
with others by “treaty”: Harper v. Atchison, 2011 SKQB 38 at paras. 6, 15, 369
Sask.R. 134;
72
•
a “free will full liability person” under “Anglo-Saxon Common Law”: Dempsey
v. Envision Credit Union, 2006 BCSC 1324 at para. 39, 60 B.C.L.R. (4th) 309;
Alberta Treasury Branches v. Klassen, 2004 ABQB 463 at para. 25, 364 A.R.
230;
•
a “sovereign man” or “sovereign citizen”: MBNA Canada Bank v. Luciani, 2011
ONSC 6347 at para. 14; R. v. Warman, 2001 BCCA 510 at paras. 9-10, 15; and
•
a nation-state: Williams v. Johnston, [2008] O.J. No. 4853 (QL) at para. 8, 2008
CanLII 63194 (Ont. S.C.), affirmed 2009 ONCA 335, 176 A.C.W.S. (3d) 609,
leave refused [2009] S.C.C.A. No. 266.
[320] Attempts to unilaterally declare immunity to income tax obligations are not uncommon,
see: R. v. Klundert, 2008 ONCA 767 at para. 20, 93 O.R. (3d) 81, leave refused [2008] S.C.C.A.
No. 522; R. v. Klundert (2004), 242 D.L.R. (4th) 644, 190 O.A.C. 36 (Ont. C.A.), leave refused
[2004] S.C.C.A. No. 463; R. v. Pinno, 2002 SKPC 118 at paras. 22, [2003] 3 C.T.C. 308; R. v.
Sargent, 2004 ONCJ 356 at paras. 40-41, [2005] 1 C.T.C. 448.
[321] Similarly, in Jabez Financial Services Inc. (Receiver of) v. Sponagle, 2008 NSSC 112
at para. 14, 264 N.S.R. (2d) 224 and Szoo v. Canada (Royal Canadian Mounted Police), 2011
BCSC 696 at paras. 17, 45 the OPCA litigants declared they had “abandoned” their social
insurance number. In Gravlin et al. v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce et al, 2005 BCSC
839 at para. 24, 140 A.C.W.S. (3d) 447 the claim of immunity was a consequence of a
declaration the OPCA litigant would not enter into “commercial activities”, and therefore “I am
immune from the Jurisdiction of any Court in Canada.”
c.
I Have Been Incorrectly Identified
[322] Another common claim is that the OPCA litigant is not the person identified in the
litigation documents: R. v. Lindsay, 2011 BCCA 99 at para. 31, 302 B.C.A.C. 76, leave refused
[2011] S.C.C.A. No. 265. This concept is usually linked to the ‘double/split person’ OPCA
strategy category, so the OPCA litigant will then explain they are some kind of representative,
agent, trustee, or guardian for the litigation’s actual target.
[323] Given the obsessive focus of the OPCA movement for documentary and procedural
formalities (real or imagined), it is unsurprising that they have developed a wealth of arbitrary
name-related rules. For example, Canadian courts have evaluated and rejected the following
nomenclature-related schemes:
•
a person is not immune from court action if that person identifies himself by an
entirely different name, for example, “Mythlim-Axkw” instead of “Kazimierz
Chester Crischuk”: R. v. Crischuk, 2010 BCSC 716 at paras. 31-32, affirmed
2010 BCCA 391, 2010 D.T.C. 5141; Shakes v. Canada (Public Safety and
73
Emergency Preparedness), 2011 CanLII 60494 at para. 11 (I.R.B.); Services de
financement TD inc. c. Michaud, 2011 QCCQ 14868 at para. 6;
•
structuring a name in the format of [Firstname]-[Middlename]: [Lastname], i.e.
“David-Kevin: Lindsay”, does not mean one is a separate person from “David
Kevin Lindsay”: R. v. Lindsay, 2006 BCCA 150 at para. 3, 265 D.L.R. (4th) 193;
R. v. Lindsay, 2008 BCPC 203 at para. 7, [2009] 1 C.T.C 86, affirmed 2010
BCSC 831, [2010] 5 C.T.C. 174, affirmed 2011 BCCA 99, 302 B.C.A.C. 76,
leave refused [2011] S.C.C.A. No. 265;
•
structuring a name in the format [Firstname] of the [family] of [Lastname], i.e.
“John Donald of the family Sargent”, does not mean one is a separate person from
“John Donald Sargent”: R. v. Sargent, 2004 ONCJ 356 at para. 29, [2005] 1
C.T.C. 448;
•
there is no legal distinction between a name in upper case and lower case letters,
and a name all in capital letters: R. v. Linehan, 2000 ABQB 815 at para. 13, 276
A.R. 383; R. v. Loosdrecht, 2008 BCPC 400 at para. 36, [2009] 4 C.T.C. 49; R. v.
Lemieux, 2007 SKPC 135 at paras. 45-46, [2008] 2 C.T.C. 291;
•
a claim that the person named in litigation is incorrectly identified by a “war
name” or “nom de guerre” is irrelevant: Canada v. Galbraith, 2001 BCSC 675 at
paras. 25-29, 54 W.C.B. (2d) 504; and
•
a name all in capitals is not a “legal fiction” and not different from “a flesh, blood
and bone man”: Ontario (Director, Family Responsibility Office) v. Boyle,
[2006] O.J. No. 2181 (QL) at paras. 3-5, 149 A.C.W.S. (3d) 127 (Ont. Sup. Ct.
J.).
[324] Similarly, OPCA litigants have demanded that court documents, such as informations
and summons, display their names in all capital letters: R. v. Lawson, 2012 BCSC 356 at para. 9,
2012 D.T.C. 5069. That, presumably, would then allow the litigant to claim that the all-capitals
name related to someone else, and thereby go free.
d.
I Am Subject to a Different Law
[325] Another ‘immunity’ ‘magic hat’ is an argument that the litigant is only subject to a
different form of law than that which would otherwise apply to the present action. This category
is arguably a facet of the ‘restricted court authority’ immunity group.
[326] It is helpful at this point to make a few comments on the manner in which OPCA litigants
often use the term “common law”. OPCA litigants often draw an arbitrary line between
“statutes” and “common law”, and say they are subject to “common law”, but not legislation. Of
course, the opposite is in fact true, the “common law” is law developed incrementally by courts,
and which is subordinate to legislation: statutes and regulations passed by the national and
74
provincial governments. The Constitution Act provides the rules and principles that restrict the
scope and nature of legislation, both by jurisdiction and on the basis of rights (ie. the Charter).
[327] Persons who claim to only be subject to the “common law” also do not appear to mean
the current common law, but typically instead reference some historic, typically medieval, form
of English law, quite often the Magna Carta, which, as I have previously observed, is generally
irrelevant.
[328] Alberta Treasury Branches v. Klassen, 2004 ABQB 463 at para. 25, 364 A.R. 230
provides an example of how this ‘mutant’ common law may be expressed:
The above pose the fundamental reasons why I asked for a Court where this case
could be tried under Natural law, for the Natural human person, an Anglo-Saxon
Common Law Court. A Court without pretension, on a level floor without tiers,
where the Judge is not in an Administrative capacity, but that of a Minister - not
unlike the clergy. It's a court where jurisdiction is declared with a flying Canadian
flag on the building or within the designated Courtroom.
If Alberta does not have such a Court, it is incumbent to be provided. Otherwise it
is contravening justice being served or seeming to be served, because the Court is
operating under the colour of law.
[329] Another example of the peculiar OPCA definition of common law is that certain litigants
will claim to not require motor vehicle registrations, licenses, or license plates, because when
they operate a motor vehicle they are exercising their common law “right to travel”: R. v.
Peddle, 1999 ABCA 284 at para. 7, 244 A.R. 184.
[330] The Courts have consistently rejected OPCA arguments that the common law trumps
legislation: R. v. Sargent, 2004 ONCJ 356 at paras. 42-43, [2005] 1 C.T.C. 448. OPCA litigants
also sometimes advance an ill-defined “natural law” which is the sole authority over “flesh and
blood” or “natural human persons”: Alberta Treasury Branches v. Klassen, 2004 ABQB 463 at
paras. 25, 32, 364 A.R. 230, see also R. v. Warman, 2001 BCCA 510 at paras. 9-10, 15. This
language also appears in Mr. Meads’ ‘fee schedule’.
[331] Similarly, attempts to apply foreign law, very often the UCC, are without merit: Henry v.
El, 2010 ABCA 312 at para. 3, leave refused [2011] S.C.C.A. No. 138; R. v. Pinno, 2002 SKPC
118 at paras. 12-13, 17-18, [2003] 3 C.T.C. 308. A combination of these features is evident in
the documents reproduced in Papadopoulos v. Borg, 2009 ABCA 201 at para. 3.
[332] Reversing the more typical position that a court is restricted to an admiralty law
jurisdiction, some OPCA litigants have instead claimed they are solely subject to that kind of
authority: Ramjohn v. Rudd, 2007 ABQB 84 at para. 9, 156 A.C.W.S. (3d) 38; Papadopoulos v.
Borg, 2009 ABCA 201 at para. 3.
75
[333] Last, OPCA litigants and gurus tend to emphasize Black’s Law Dictionary as an
authoritative source for Canadian law. One could say that this is their (legal) bible. For example,
Mr. Meads explained to me that as he learned about the law, he discovered the true meaning of
the word “license”, “an authorization to do something otherwise illegal”, from Black’s Law
Dictionary.
[334] This choice of ‘bible’ is peculiar, given that Black’s Law Dictionary is an American,
rather than Canadian text. Of course, Canadian courts do make reference to Black’s Law
Dictionary, but it has nowhere near the same relevance as, say, Justice Côté’s recent text, Words
That Bind: Words and Phrases Judicially Considered by the Supreme Court of Canada and by
the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council to 1949 (Edmonton: Juriluber, 2011), or John B.
Saunders, Words and Phrases Legally Defined (3rd ed.) (London: Butterworths, 1988-2007).
[335] Further, it is not uncommon that OPCA litigants will cite obsolete, older versions of
Black’s Law Dictionary. The second edition appears particularly popular, perhaps because it is
now in the public domain. In court, an OPCA litigant may recite a passage from Black’s Law
Dictionary and then demand to know how that is incorrect.
[336] As discussed below in relation to the ‘obligation requires agreement’ OPCA scheme
category, certain OPCA litigants attempt to frame interactions between individuals and states as
purely a form of contract, thus allegedly negating the effect of legislation. This approach has
been uniformly rejected (Sandri v. Canada (Attorney General), 2009 CanLII 44282 at paras. 6,
13, 179 A.C.W.S. (3d) 811 (Ont. Sup. Ct. J.); R. v. Lindsay, 2011 BCCA 99 at para. 32, 302
B.C.A.C. 76, leave refused [2011] S.C.C.A. No. 265), as are claims that the state has no
authority in matrimonial and family matters because that too is a contract between two private
persons (Hajdu v. Ontario (Director, Family Reponsibility Office), 2012 ONSC 1835 at para.
25).
[337] Mr. Meads has advanced that latter argument. He says his marriage with Ms. Meads was
a contract governed by “God’s law”, rather than the Divorce Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 3 (2nd Supp),
and Matrimonial Property Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. M-8. Neither legislation provides for an
alternative scheme of law, and so I reject Mr. Meads’ claim.
e.
Conscientious Objector
[338] Non-religious belief has been advanced and rejected as a basis for immunity to state and
court action. This has typically emerged in an income tax context. This is the chief theme of
OPCA guru Lavigne, his thesis being that he should not be obliged to pay tax or presumably
engage in any other activity that may promote thermonuclear war or cause mass murder:
Jackson v. Canada (Customs and Revenue Agency), 2001 SKQB 377 at para. 36, 210 Sask.R.
285; R. v. Reddick, 2002 SKCA 89 at para. 8, 54 W.C.B. (2d) 646.
[339] In R. v. McMordie, 2001 BCCA 412, 155 B.C.A.C. 21, Justice Proudfoot, at para. 9,
rejected a parallel argument:
76
It appears that the appellant and his friends are under the impression that because
he is contesting the payment of taxes based on his "political beliefs" rather than
"self-interest" he is somehow or other entitled to immunity and cannot be
prosecuted. This is a very interesting notion, but wholly devoid of merit.
Similarly, a claim that a person is a “tax protestor” also does not eliminate the obligation to pay
income tax: R. v. Klundert, 2008 ONCA 767 at para. 24, 93 O.R. (3d) 81, leave refused [2008]
S.C.C.A. No. 522.
[340] Though perhaps disappointing to those who advance these theories, the fact remains that
issues of policy are not ones that a court can review. As a consequence, the courts have no
authority to evaluate the policy aspects that drive state processes such as taxation. This was
clearly expressed in Giagnocavo v. Canada (1995), 95 D.T.C. 5650 at paras. 7-9, 58 A.C.W.S.
(3d) 401:
... From a philosophical point of view, a case can no doubt be made that the
impugned statute is cruel and inhuman, that it is a travesty of recognized moral
values, that it constitutes an intrusion of the state not only in the bedrooms of the
nation, as was said in another case, but in its piggy-banks as well. One could also
say that a good number of citizens share the applicant's view in these matters, and
would ring bells and dance in the streets if ever there were liberated from the
unconscionable burden of taxation.
The basic difficulty, however, is that the position taken by the applicant, although
under the umbrella of judicial proceedings, is in fact a policy position over which
courts and their judges have no jurisdiction. Policy issues are for legislators, and
judicial issues only for judges. [Emphasis added.]
f.
Tax-Related ‘Magic Hats’
[341] Detaxers and other OPCA litigants have advanced a wealth of ‘magic hats’ that allegedly
negate an obligation to pay income tax. Some relate to the relationship between the state and an
individual, that:
•
a person is immune from tax obligation because they are “a shareholder” in a
jurisdiction or municipality has been rejected: R. v. Lawson, 2012 BCSC 356 at
para. 10, 2012 D.T.C. 5069;
•
a person can pay for their income tax via a pro-rated share of government
property “... is pure unadulterated rubbish!”: Dirks v. Canada (Minister of
National Revenue - M.N.R.); Dirks, Re, 2007 SKQB 124 at para. 7, 31 C.B.R.
(5th) 192;
•
an obligation to pay income tax arises only as a bargain in exchange for
government programs such as the Canada Pension Plan, so if a person waives a
77
claim to government programs, they also waive their requirement to pay income
tax, has been rejected: Porisky Trial Decision at para. 66; and
•
the Canadian government has been financed by a secret arrangement that turns its
citizens into corporations with “military names” has been rejected: R. v. Proteau,
2002 SKPC 119 at paras. 6-7, [2003] 3 C.T.C. 118.
[342] Others allegedly relate to some kind of right:
•
collecting income tax:
•
is contrary to religious belief and thus offends Charter, s. 2(a): Pappas v.
Canada, 2006 TCC 692 at paras. 1, 11-12, [2006] G.S.T.C. 161;
•
breaches the taxpayer’s Charter, ss. 7-8 rights: Coulbeck v. University of
Toronto, [2005] O.J. No. 4003 (QL) 142 A.C.W.S. (3d) 889 (Ont. Sup. Ct.
J.); and
•
is a prohibited indirect tax under British North America Act (the
Constitution Act), s. 91(3) as that authority is negated or displaced by the
s. 92(2) provincial authority of direct taxation: Bruno v. Canada, 2000
BCSC 190, [2000] 2 C.T.C. 16, affirmed 2002 BCCA 47, 162 B.C.A.C.
293;
•
the redistributive effect of the Income Tax Act is contrary to the Charter and
causes involuntary servitude: Giagnocavo v. Canada (1995), 95 D.T.C. 5650 at
paras. 7-9, 58 A.C.W.S. (3d) 401 (F.C.(T.D.));
•
an unlimited right to demand information from the Canada Revenue Agency and
its employees: R. v. Voth, 2001 SKQB 469 at paras. 6-16, 211 Sask.R. 270,
affirmed 2002 SKCA 47, 223 Sask.R. 119;
•
income tax violates “human rights and fundamental freedoms” derived from the
Canadian Bill of Rights: Friesen v. Canada, 2007 TCC 287 at para. 3, [2007] 5
C.T.C. 2067; and
•
the notwithstanding clause is required to allow the Income Tax Act to operate
without breach of the Canadian Bill of Rights: Canada (Minister of National
Revenue - M.N.R.) v. Stanchfield, 2009 FC 99 at paras. 29-30, 340 F.T.R. 150,
see also R. v. Amell, 2010 SKPC 107 at paras. 156-157, 361 Sask.R. 61.
[343] Some OPCA litigants allege that the income tax system is in some manner fraudulent.
For example, the OPCA litigant in R. v. Callow, 2000 ABQB 335 at para. 18, [2000] 3 C.T.C.
427 argued that filing an income tax return is committing fraud. Alternatively, in Bruno v.
Canada, 2000 BCSC 190 at paras. 10, 34, [2000] 2 C.T.C. 16, affirmed 2002 BCCA 47, 162
78
B.C.A.C. 293, the litigant said the ‘alleged’ national debt is a fraudulent scheme to extract funds
for the International Monetary Fund.
[344] Unsurprisingly, there are a range of income tax related ‘formalities’ caselaw. For
example, Detaxers have argued that the state must provide a fully amended and certified
complete version of the Income Tax Act: R. v. Bruno, 2002 BCCA 348 at para. 7; R. v. Gibbs,
2006 BCSC 481 at para. 54, [2006] 3 C.T.C. 223; Iwanow v. Canada, 2008 TCC 22 at paras. 1821, 2008 CCI 22; R. v. Fehr, 2002 SKPC 8, 224 Sask.R. 132, see also Audcent v. Maleki, 2006
ONCJ 401, [2007] 1 C.T.C. 212. They also have attempted to use a “certified copy” of
legislation, here the Excise Tax Act, to prove compliance, where that legislation was
subsequently amended: R. v. Nagel, 2010 SKCA 118 at paras. 13-14, 362 Sask.R. 145.
[345] Some perceived defect in the 1948 version of the Income Tax Act has been rejected as a
basis to invalidate the current income tax legislation scheme: R. v. Lemieux, 2007 SKPC 135 at
paras. 31-33, [2008] 2 C.T.C. 291; R. v. Crischuk, 2010 BCSC 716 at paras. 48-52, affirmed
2010 BCCA 391, 2010 D.T.C. 5141; R. v. Crischuk, 2010 BCCA 391 at para. 3, 2010 D.T.C.
5141; R. v. Sydel, 2010 BCSC 1473 at paras. 24-25, 35, [2011] 1 C.T.C. 200, affirmed 2011
BCCA 103, leave refused [2011] S.C.C.A. No. 191.
[346] Other OPCA litigants claim that ‘income’ has a restricted meaning, and for example:
•
does not include compensation for work: R. v. Amell, 2010 SKPC 107 at para.
144, 361 Sask.R. 61; R. v. Turnnir, 2006 BCPC 460; Porisky Trial Decision at
para. 65; R. v. Smith, 2006 BCSC 1493 at para. 34, [2007] 1 C.T.C. 147, leave
refused 2007 BCCA 499, [2008] 1 C.T.C. 61,
•
does not include payments made under a “contract for hire” to a “natural person”:
R. v. Amell, 2010 SKPC 107 at paras. 137-138, 361 Sask.R. 61; R. v. Turnnir,
2006 BCPC 460; R. v. Smith, 2006 BCSC 1493 at para. 34, [2007] 1 C.T.C. 147,
leave refused 2007 BCCA 499, [2008] 1 C.T.C. 61, and
•
taxable income is only the value of a person’s labour, as “a man is worth his
labour”: Porisky Trial Decision at para. 65.
[347] There really is no question that the Canadian government is authorized to require
individuals pay income tax or other forms of indirect tax. Further, the consequences to a
taxpayer who simply refuses to pay income tax are clear. It does not matter on what basis that
claim is made, that refusal proves the willful intention to evade payment of tax: R. v. Klundert
(2004), 242 D.L.R. (4th) 644 at paras. 58, 62-64, 190 O.A.C. 36 (Ont. C.A.), leave refused
[2004] S.C.C.A. No. 463; R. v. Ricci (2004), 190 O.A.C. 375 at para. 6, [2005] 1 C.T.C. 40 (Ont.
C.A.), leave refused [2004] S.C.C.A. No. 551; R. v. Kennedy, 2004 BCCA 638 at para. 14, 207
B.C.A.C. 102, leave refused [2006] S.C.C.A. No. 15.
g.
Miscellaneous
79
[348] Last are several ‘magic hats’ that do not seem to fall into a convenient category.
[349] There are several that relate to legislation. In R. v. Nagel, 2010 SKCA 118 at paras. 1516, 362 Sask.R. 145, an OPCA litigant argued that the presence or absence of formalities of how
legislation was printed, such as a coat of arms and “Queen’s Printer” notations, were significant.
Another legislation-related argument is that a person cannot know the law unless legislation is
“fixed, certain and accessible”: Audcent v. Maleki, 2006 ONCJ 401, [2007] 1 C.T.C. 212 (Ont.
Ct. J.). The ‘magic hat’ was that if law is amended, it is no longer knowable. Of course, that too
was rejected.
[350] Finally, Ellis v. Canada (Office of the Prime Minister), 2001 SKQB 378 at paras. 23-27,
210 Sask.R. 138, affirmed 2002 SKCA 35, 112 A.C.W.S. (3d) 849 comments on an OPCA
litigant’s attempt to use the common law “Petition of Right” cause of action, which has been
abolished by legislation; see also Winningham v. Canada.
4.
The Inherent Authority of Provincial Superior Courts
[351] OPCA litigants and gurus often claim that they are, somehow, not subject to Canadian
law (common law and legislation) and the authority of the courts in this nation to enforce that
law. They are, of course, wrong, but it is helpful to explain why.
a.
Superior Courts of Inherent Jurisdiction
[352] The courts in Canada are a separate, distinct, and independent branch of government. In
Ref re Remuneration of Judges of the Prov. Court of P.E.I.; Ref re Independence and
Impartiality of Judges of the Prov. Court of P.E.I., [1997] 3 S.C.R. 3, 150 D.L.R. (4th) 577,
Lamer C.J.C concluded that the independent character of this and other Canadian courts flows
from unwritten constitutional principles that have been inherited from the U.K. (para. 83) and are
a separate and essential constitutional aspect of government, “definitional to the Canadian
understanding of constitutionalism” (para. 108).
[353] The authority of this Court, like other superior courts of inherent jurisdiction, does not
flow from legislation, as does, for example, the Provincial Court of Alberta. Rather, this Court
has inherited that jurisdiction as a successor to the English Royal Courts. Canada (Attorney
General) v. Law Society of British Columbia; Jabour v. Law Society of British Columbia,
[1982] 2 S.C.R. 307, 137 D.L.R. (3d) 1 explains this Court’s genealogy:
... The provincial superior courts have always occupied a position of prime
importance in the constitutional pattern of this country. They are the descendants
of the Royal Courts of Justice as courts of general jurisdiction. ...
80
[354] That heritage reaches to the very foundation of an independent judiciary:
... “Superior Court” is to be construed historically, and that ... it connotes a court
having an inherent jurisdiction, in England, to administer justice according to the
law, as and being a part of, or descended from, and as exercising part of the
power of, the Aula Regia, established by William the First, which had universal
jurisdiction in all matters of right and wrong throughout the kingdom, and over
which, in its early days, the King presided in person.
(Daniel Greenberg, Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary Words & Phrases, 7th ed.
(London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2006)).
[355] That history and its associated authority is described in Canada (Human Rights
Commission) v. Canadian Liberty Net, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 626 at para. 26, 137 D.L.R. (3d) 1 this
manner:
... The notion of inherent jurisdiction has developed from the role of provincial
superior courts in Canada's legal system. The unique historical feature of
provincial superior courts, as opposed to the Federal Court, is that they have
traditionally exercised general jurisdiction over all matters of a civil or criminal
nature. This general jurisdictional function in the Canadian justice system
precedes Confederation, and was expressly continued by s. 129 of the
Constitution Act, 1867, "as if the Union had not been made". ... [Emphasis
added.]
[356] The Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench and similar Courts are now Canadian courts, but
these superior courts of inherent jurisdiction are the successors to earlier English colonial courts
that predate Confederation: Valin v. Langlois (1879), 3 S.C.R. 1 at 19-20. In Alberta, that
‘inheritance’ was expressly indicated in the legislation that created this province: The Alberta
Act, 1905, 4-5 Edw. VII, c. 3, s. 16(1). The general authority that this court inherited is restated
in the Supreme Court Act of Alberta, S.A. 1907, c. 3, s. 9:
... the jurisdiction which on July 15, 1870, was vested in, or capable of being
exercised in England by (1.) the High Court of Chancery, as a Common Law
Court, as well as a Court of Equity, including the jurisdiction of the Master of the
Rolls as a judge or Master of the Court of Chancery, and any jurisdiction
exercised by him in relation to the Court of Chancery as a common law Court;
(2.) The Court of Queen's Bench; (3.) The Court of Common Pleas at
Westminster; (4.) The Court of Exchequer as a Court of Revenue as well as a
Common Law Court; (5.) The Court of Probate; (6.) The Court created by
Commissioners of Oyer and Terminer, and of Gaol Delivery, or of any of such
Commissions.
[357] Inherent jurisdiction has two relevant aspects: procedural and subject matter.
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b.
Procedural Jurisdiction
[358] A commonly cited description of that procedural authority is provided by I.H. Jacob,
“The Inherent Jurisdiction of the Court” (1970) 23 Current Legal Problems 23:
... the superior courts of common law have exercised the power which has come
to be called "inherent jurisdiction" from the earliest times, and . . . the exercise of
such power developed along two paths, namely, by way of punishment for
contempt of court and of its process, and by way of regulating the practice of the
court and preventing the abuse of its process.
...
For the essential character of a superior court of law necessarily involves that it
should be invested with a power to maintain its authority and to prevent its
process being obstructed and abused. Such a power is intrinsic in a superior court;
it is its very life-blood, its very essence, its immanent attribute. Without such a
power, the court would have form but would lack substance. The jurisdiction
which is inherent in a superior court of law is that which enables it to fulfil itself
as a court of law. The juridical basis of this jurisdiction is therefore the authority
of the judiciary to uphold, to protect and to fulfil the judicial function of
administering justice according to law in a regular, orderly and effective manner.
[Emphasis added.]
[359] That passage has been quoted with approval by the Supreme Court of Canada on a
number of occasions: B.C.G.E.U. v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [1988] 2 S.C.R. 214,
53 D.L.R. (4th) 1; R. v. Morales, [1992] 3 S.C.R. 711, 144 N.R. 176; R. v. Hinse, [1995] 4
S.C.R. 597, 130 D.L.R. (4th) 54; MacMillan Bloedel Ltd. v. Simpson, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 725, 130
D.L.R. (4th) 385.
[360] R. v. Gillespie, 2000 MBCA 1, 185 D.L.R. (4th) 214 includes some interesting comments
on the scope of the general authority in a courtroom setting:
21 To enable a judge to fulfil his or her adjudicative function, a judge has
authority to maintain order and control process in the courtroom. A judge might
order a witness yelling at him or her to desist. A judge might require counsel to
disclose the general nature of the contents of a briefcase. Or a judge might order a
person bringing a potential weapon into the courtroom to remove it. Each such
order would be incidental to the exercise by the judge of primary jurisdiction and
would be enforceable by the threat of punishment.
22 A good example of a judge exercising such incidental or auxiliary
jurisdiction is R. v. Hothi et al. (1985), 33 Man.R. (2d) 180 (Q.B.); aff'd (1985)
35 Man.R. (2d) 159 (C.A.). In that case, the jurisdiction of a judge trying a
criminal case to require the removal of kirpans (ceremonial daggers with religious
82
significance) from the courtroom was upheld on the ground that they were
possible weapons. Dewar C.J.Q.B. said (at 33 Man.R. (2d), para. 7):
The ruling serves a transcending public interest that justice be administered in an
environment free from any influence which may tend to thwart the process.
Possession in the courtroom of weapons, or articles capable of use as such, by
parties or others is one such influence. [Emphasis added.]
[361] A person who purports to dictate when and how a Canadian court shall operate that
court’s inherent procedural jurisdiction. In Canada, there is no right by a litigant or any other
person to advance that claim or engage in that kind of conduct. The judge, and no one else, rules
the court.
c.
Subject Jurisdiction
[362] A superior court of inherent jurisdiction has a special general jurisdiction in substantive
as well as procedural law. It is a clear and well-understood principle of Canadian law that where
a person has a right in law, there must exist some tribunal where that right may be exercised and
defended. If no other court has been assigned authority to address a particular kind of legal
action or subject matter, then that authority falls to the superior courts of inherent jurisdiction.
[363] The Supreme Court of Canada considered this inherent substantial jurisdiction of
provincial superior courts in Canada (Human Rights Commission) v. Canadian Liberty Net,
[1998] 1 S.C.R. 626 at para. 32:
The notion of “inherent jurisdiction” arises from the presumption that if there is a
justiciable right, then there must be a court competent to vindicate the right ... the
doctrine of inherent jurisdiction requires that only an explicit ouster of
jurisdiction should be allowed to deny jurisdiction to the superior court.
[Emphasis added.]
[364] The Privy Counsel, then the highest court of Canada, commented on the authority of the
precursor to the present Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench in Board v. Board, [1919] A.C. 956
(P.C.). At pp. 962-963 the Court concluded:
... a well-known rule makes it plain that the language there used ought to be
interpreted as not excluding the jurisdiction. If the right exists, the presumption is
that there is a Court which can enforce it, for if no other mode of enforcing it is
prescribed, that alone is sufficient to give jurisdiction to the King's Courts of
justice. In order to oust jurisdiction, it is necessary, in the absence of a special law
excluding it altogether, to plead that jurisdiction exists in some other Court. This
is the effect of authorities . . . [The Alberta] Act set up a Superior Court, and it is
the rule as regards presumption of jurisdiction in such a Court that, as stated by
Willes J. in London Corporation v. Cox ((1867) L.R., 2 H.L. 239, 259), nothing
83
shall be intended to be out of the jurisdiction of a Superior Court, but that which
specially appears to be so. [Emphasis added.]
[365] Canada’s constitution authorizes the Provincial and the Federal governments to create
courts in addition to the superior courts ‘inherited’ from the period of direct British rule. The Tax
Court of Canada, the various provincial courts, the military courts, and the federal courts are
examples of these ‘statutory’ courts. In certain instances a statutory court has been granted sole
jurisdiction for a particular subject or a part thereof, such as authority granted in the Tax Court of
Canada Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. T-2. The Tax Court of Canada:
... has exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and determine references and appeals
to the Court on matters arising under ... the Income Tax Act ... where references
or appeals to the Court are provided for in those Acts. [Emphasis added.]
That means the Tax Court of Canada is the Court that interprets the Income Tax Act, and
determines the amount that a taxpayer owes. Other tax-related processes, such collection of
outstanding tax and criminal prosecution for evasion of income, fall into the jurisdiction of the
superior courts, see for example: Porisky Trial Decision.
[366] Assigning jurisdiction to a statutory court has the effect of removing that aspect of this
Court’s general authority, see Canada (Human Rights Commission) v. Canadian Liberty Net
for a more detailed review of this concept. Suffice to say that a person’s right to approach a
Canadian court for recourse is generally not a question of “is there a court?” but rather “which
court can hear this subject?”
[367] There are, nevertheless, certain limits. Some subjects are simply not justiciable, for
example government policy decisions: Operation Dismantle v. The Queen, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 441,
18 D.L.R. (4th) 481.
[368] The inherent jurisdiction of Canadian courts cannot be defeated by Parliament and the
provincial legislatures. Administrative tribunals are sometimes ‘protected’ by what are called
“privative clauses”, legislative provisions that say that all or part of a decision of that tribunal is
final. For example, in Pasiechnyk v. Saskatchewan (Workers' Compensation Board), [1997] 2
S.C.R. 890, 149 D.L.R. (4th) 577 the Supreme Court of Canada evaluated the effect of a
privative clause that read:
The decision and finding of the board under this Act upon all questions of fact
and law are final and conclusive and no proceedings by or before the board shall
be restrained by injunction, prohibition or other proceeding or removable by
certiorari or otherwise in any court.
[369] That did not stop the courts. As Justice Sopinka observed at para. 16:
A legislature cannot completely insulate a tribunal from the superintending and
reforming power of the superior courts.
84
See also Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190 at para. 31.
[370] This fact is why the majority of OPCA arguments can never succeed. There is always a
court, though perhaps not this one, that has jurisdiction over these litigants and their activities.
They cannot opt out. All arguments that invoke ‘immunity’ and indeed any schemes that claim a
person can possess or acquire a status that allows them to ignore court authority are incorrect in
law. I note this authority is a phenomenon that flows from the historical development of
constitutional government, and is therefore an aspect of the common law so often stressed by
OPCA litigants and gurus.
[371] As is made expressly clear in Board v. Board and Canada (Human Rights Commission)
v. Canadian Liberty Net: for every injury there is a forum to grant the appropriate remedy. A
superior court of inherent jurisdiction, such as the Court of Queen’s Bench, has the jurisdiction
to address any Alberta matter that has not been delegated to another statutory court. The inherent
authority of a provincial Superior Court is therefore very broad indeed.
[372] OPCA litigants also fail to appreciate that this inherent jurisdiction is adaptive, and
‘expands’ into any aspects of Canadian legal existence that are not explicitly allocated to another
court. In Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees v. Canadian Pacific Ltd., [1996] 2
S.C.R. 495, 136 D.L.R. (4th) 289 McLachlin J. (as she then was) confirmed at para. 5 that
provincial superior courts had authority to grant an interlocutory injunction in labour disputes,
even though labour agreements are considered a complete code, and even where that injunction
did not relate to a cause of action that would be heard in a provincial superior court (at para. 17).
Justice McLachlin observed that this authority flows from that fact that the labour agreement
provided “no adequate alternative remedy” (at para. 6), and it was this gap in an otherwise
complete scheme that gave the court inherent jurisdiction.
[373] This adaptive facet of inherent jurisdiction goes so far as to allow this Court to intrude,
when necessary, into domains that would appear to have been allocated to a statutory court. The
Alberta Court of Appeal in 783783 Alberta Ltd. v. Canada (Attorney General), 2010 ABCA 226
at paras. 24-28, 322 D.L.R. (4th) 56 concluded this Court had jurisdiction to interpret and apply
the Income Tax Act, if that was necessary for a given case. Similarly, Thomas J. concluded he
may examine Indian band counsel activities, despite the jurisdiction assigned to the Federal
Court by the Federal Courts Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. F-7, s. 18: 1985 Sawridge Trust v. Alberta
(Public Trustee), 2012 ABQB 365 at paras. 50-54.
d.
Inherent Jurisdiction vs. OPCA Strategies and Concepts
[374] The inherent jurisdiction of Canada’s superior courts defeats almost all OPCA
pseudolegal strategies. No person can claim to be outside court authority because they are
subject to no court or law, or a restricted kind of law. No ‘magic hat’ can ever create an
exemption from court supervision. All these arguments are defective and fail as a consequence.
[375] For a moment, let us imagine that an OPCA guru were to discover some new realm or
aspect of law. Novel developments are not unknown. For example the last quarter century has
85
seen many innovations with potentially profound legal effects, including the advent of electronic
communications and genetic material as form of property. What would be the effect? Once
identified, that legal domain would necessarily become a part of the jurisdiction of some
Canadian court, and typically that would mean that the jurisdiction of this court would
necessarily expand to include this new facet or aspect of law, unless and until it was statutorily
grants to another court.
[376] I am aware of one attempt by an OPCA guru, Frank O’Collins, to ‘invent’ a new and
total code of law. This person, whom I understand is an Australian, has published what he calls
“Divine Canon Law”, the law that governs persons in the “One Heaven Society of United Free
States of Spirits”. At least one Alberta OPCA litigant has claimed to be subject to only this
“Divine Canon Law”. Does this defeat the inherent jurisdiction of the Alberta Court of Queen’s
Bench? Of course not. While I strongly question that a person could bind themselves and society
to abide by some distinct legal scheme that trumps the common law and statute, success would
still leave that person subject to the scrutiny and supervision of this court.
[377] In summary, when a litigant claims he or she has found themselves in the wrong court,
then that is a potentially valid question of jurisdiction. However, a litigant is wrong in law if they
say that, at this time, they choose to not be subject to any Canadian court, unless they claim that
the subject in dispute is the jurisdiction of another tribunal, such as an arbitrator, or the courts of
a different national or provincial jurisdiction. A defence with that basis may be struck without
further analysis. A denial of court authority on that basis should be ignored.
[378] The nature and jurisdiction of Canadian courts, globally, defeats all the OPCA strategies
and concepts identified and reviewed in these Reasons, including the ‘obligation requires
agreement’, ‘double/split person’, and ‘unilateral agreements’ categories discussed below. The
exceptions are the ‘money for nothing’ schemes that I will review at a later point. The superior
court’s inherent jurisdiction is a single basis that may be adopted and applied by any Justice who
faces a novel OPCA strategy, if that argument, at its core, reduces, subverts, or denies court
authority.
B.
Obligation Requires Agreement
[379] A second common OPCA litigation category is grounded in a belief that all legally
enforceable rights require that a person agree to be subject to those obligations. This strategy
takes two closely related forms:
1.
every binding legal obligation emerges from a contract, and
2.
consent is required before an obligation can be enforced.
[380] Persons who advance this concept extend it to interactions between state actors, including
Canada and the provinces, and individual persons. This is a kind of ‘magic hat’; the OPCA
litigant says he or she has not agreed to be governed or subject to court authority, and the OPCA
litigant is therefore allegedly immune.
86
[381] Sometimes OPCA litigants and gurus express this global concept as that they only
engage in commerce; this seems to be an attempt to declare that any interaction between persons
and/or state actors is a contract. This may explain the curious but common manner in which I
find myself addressed in OPCA correspondence, “John Rooke, carrying out business as
Associate Chief Justice John Rooke”.
1.
Defeating Legislation
[382] A necessary first step in any ‘everything is a contract’ or ‘consent is required’ scheme is
that the OPCA litigant develop a mechanism that denies a unilateral obligation can arise from
legislation.
[383] Some OPCA litigants argue they have opted out of legislated obligations: Sydorenko v.
Manitoba, 2012 MBQB 42 at paras. 17-18. Others simply claim consent is required, otherwise
legislation is a set of optional guidelines: Waterloo (Regional Municipality) v. Bydeley, 2010
ONCJ 740 at para. 56, affirmed 2011 ONCJ 842, affirmed [2011] O.J. No. 6282 (QL) (Ont.
C.A.); Bank of Montreal v. McCance, 2012 ABQB 537 at para. 29.
[384] Another OPCA approach is to argue that a court or government actor is a corporation and
therefore only has the rights of a corporation: Dempsey v. Envision Credit Union, 2006 BCSC
1324 at para. 37, 60 B.C.L.R. (4th) 309. The result is a claim that legislation has no more special
meaning than any unilateral declaration. A telltale indication of this scheme is that a litigant files
corporate registry documents for Canada, a province, or a municipality. For some reason, many
OPCA litigants claim Canada is a “municipal corporation domiciled in the District of
Columbia”.
[385] Others wear a ‘magic hat’ that they say makes them immune from legislation, and only
subject to the common law (which, as noted above, is often an aberrant definition of that
category of law). In Dempsey v. Envision Credit Union, 2006 BCSC 1324 at para. 39, 60
B.C.L.R. (4th) 309 the ‘magic hat’ was being a “free will full liability person” under “AngloSaxon Common Law”. Freemen-on-the-Land take a similar approach: Harper v. Atchison, 2011
SKQB 38 at paras. 6, 15, 369 Sask.R. 134, see also Szoo v. Canada (Royal Canadian Mounted
Police), 2011 BCSC 696, and Jabez Financial Services Inc. (Receiver of) v. Sponagle, 2008
NSSC 112 at paras. 14, 18, 264 N.S.R. (2d) 224; Summerland (District) v. No Strings
Enterprises Ltd., 2003 BCSC 990 at para. 19, 124 A.C.W.S. (3d) 39, leave denied 2004 BCCA
360, 131 A.C.W.S. (3d) 994.
[386] Similarly, Detaxer gurus such as Warman and Lindsay have argued the that Magna Carta
operates in a constitutional manner and invalidates legislation: R. v. Lindsay, 2008 BCCA 30 at
paras. 19-21, 250 B.C.A.C. 270; see also R. v. Warman, 2001 BCCA 510 at paras. 9-10, 13-14.
[387] Of course, any other ‘magic hat’ or alleged defect that negates state authority would have
the same effect. That is a reason why OPCA litigants have often focussed on some arcane flaw
that collapses state authority, for example the alleged defect in Queen Elizabeth II’s coronation
87
oath (R. v. Lindsay, 2011 BCCA 99 at paras. 31-32, 302 B.C.A.C. 76, leave refused [2011]
S.C.C.A. No. 265), or a flaw in the appointment of Governor Generals after passage of the 1931
Statute of Westminster (R. v. Dick, 2001 BCPC 275; R. v. Lindsay, 2004 MBCA 147 at para. 32,
187 Man.R. (2d) 236).
2.
Everything is a Contract
[388] An OPCA litigant may argue he or she has no obligation unless the litigant has explicitly
formed a contract for that obligation. In Canada this argument has frequently been advanced in
an income tax context: R. v. Lindsay, 2011 BCCA 99 at para. 31, 302 B.C.A.C. 76, leave refused
[2011] S.C.C.A. No. 265; R. v. Pinno, 2002 SKPC 118 at paras. 12-13, 21, [2003] 3 C.T.C. 308;
Banilevic v. Canada (Customs and Revenue Agency), 2002 SKQB 371 at para. 10, 117
A.C.W.S. (3d) 549; Bruno v. Canada, 2000 BCSC 190 at para. 34, [2000] 2 C.T.C. 16, affirmed
2002 BCCA 47, 162 B.C.A.C. 293; Turnnir v. The Queen, 2011 TCC 495 at paras. 5, 8; Sandri
v. Canada (Attorney General), 2009 CanLII 44282 at paras. 6,13, 179 A.C.W.S. (3d) 811 (Ont.
Sup. Ct. J.); Dempsey v. Envision Credit Union, 2006 BCSC 1324 at para. 37, 60 B.C.L.R. (4th)
309.
[389] An interesting variation on this approach was made by Porisky, who at trial argued that if
he did not want any government services, then he ought not be obliged to pay income tax:
Porisky Trial Decision at para. 66. Though not expressed in quite that manner, Porisky seems to
argue that he should not be bound in the ‘income tax contract’ as he has not received any
consideration from the government.
[390] In yet another variation of the ‘everything is a contract’ concept, a person attempt to
sever all ‘contractual relationships’ with the state; success would presumably defeat all
government authority. R. v. Pinno, 2002 SKPC 118 at paras. 22, [2003] 3 C.T.C. 308 provides
an example where an OPCA litigant sent the Canada Revenue Agency a “constructive notice”
that included this statement:
... I further learned that I have been deceptively induced by Revenue Canada's
propaganda into making a supposed contract by filing an income tax return, thus
changing my status to "taxpayer" which makes me subject to the income tax by
that supposed contract. ...
The litigant then ‘revoked and voided’ the income tax contract, and demanded a refund: para. 13.
[391] R. v. Sargent, 2004 ONCJ 356 at paras. 40-41, [2005] 1 C.T.C. 448 and Dempsey v.
Envision Credit Union, 2006 BCSC 1324 at para. 37, 60 B.C.L.R. (4th) 309 report a similar
strategy. A similar scheme appears to have been advanced by a Freeman-on-the-Land in R. v.
McCormick, 2012 NSSC 288 to withdraw from a “social contract” with the state: paras. 28-32.
[392] An OPCA litigant may also attempt to use the right of contract as a shield. For example,
in Dempsey v. Envision Credit Union, 2006 BCSC 1324 at para. 9, 60 B.C.L.R. (4th) 309 an
88
OPCA litigant challenged the court’s authority to refuse representation by an OPCA guru
because:
The court has no jurisdiction to interfere or make void any private agreement I
may have with other men for such is my inalienable right as a free man.
[393] The OPCA litigant in Sandri v. Canada (Attorney General), 2009 CanLII 44282 at para.
10, 179 A.C.W.S. (3d) 811 (Ont. Sup. Ct. J.) took his defence one step further:
I (the Plaintiff) state and the fact is that according to Contract Law there is no
Queen who has any authority over me; however, I have complete authority over
the aforesaid monarch by Contract Law. I am lord. The aforesaid monarch has
authority only over those who give her authority and in turn, all those who have
done so, by default give me authority. I am ONLY a beneficiary to the contracts
that compose the Constitution Acts, 1867 to 1982. It is a TRUST and the “queen”
therein stated is my lieutenant, or in other words, my helper. By law, she is
compelled to obey me.
[394] Sometimes OPCA litigants claim that their interaction with the court is a contract. For
example, the OPCA litigant in Borkovic v. Laurentian Bank of Canada, 2001 BCSC 337 at
paras. 4-12, 103 A.C.W.S. (3d) 700 argued he had ‘purchased’ a trial date by paying a court
filing fee. The litigant then purported to direct court procedure: paras. 13-16.
[395] OPCA litigants who adopt this scheme tend to identify practically any state document,
even a driver’s license or a birth certificate, as a contract. CERI members explain that is the
reason why they do not use driver’s licenses or license plates. They argue, in effect, that they do
not wish to be in a contract with the state, and should be able to engage in activities, for example
operation of a motor vehicle, without being bound to the state in that manner.
[396] These persons go to great lengths to scour away all ‘contractual’ links, expecting that at
some point the state’s authority will evaporate. The ‘everything is a contract’ concept may also
emerge in a court context in another way. A OPCA litigant may, for example, demand to know
whether the court is offering to enter into a contract with a litigant, or the terms of the contract
between the court and the OPCA litigant.
[397] Mr. Meads clearly adheres to the ‘everything is a contract’ concept. In his March 3, 2011
“""Good Faith Notice"" in the Nature of an Affidavit”, Mr. Meads says that a telephone call and
a follow-up email from an Audrey Hardwick, who seems to have been the assistant to Ms.
Meads’ then counsel, was an “Enticement into Slavery”. I am presuming here that ‘enticement
into slavery’ is simply a particularly dramatic expression for contract obligation. Notice how
simple receipt of communications is interpreted as a potential contract.
[398] Later in the same document Mr. Meads adds:
89
Please take “Notice”” that should you Audrey Hardwick/AUDREY HARDWICK
and or Audrey Hardwick/AUDREY HARDWICK make the any or the all attempt
at a “Novation” of this “Good Faith Notice” will be accepted as an admission of
your “Attempt at Enticement into Slavery by you and yourselves and that of the
LAW FIRM “RESOLVE LAW” [sic]
Now Mr. Meads is attempting to diffuse the possibility that his reply letter could form a contract
in some manner.
[399] Still later on in this same document is the following:
“Using a Notary Public with this document does not create an adhesion contract
with the any-state /province, nor does it alter my status in any manner for the
claim is for the use only-for the verification of the identification-purposes, therefor this ““Good Faith Notice”” is the Nature of an Affidavit is with the lack of the
claim of the foreign jurisdiction.” [sic.]
[400] Once again, Mr. Meads is attempting to pre-empt formation of a contract. An analogous
disclaimer in materials my office has received from an OPCA litigant read:
Attention: {The use of a Notary is for attestation and verification purposes only
and does not constitute a change in status, entrance, or acceptance of foreign or
domestic jurisdiction.} [Emphasis in original.]
[401] Interestingly, this seems to be the only instance where Mr. Meads saw notarization in this
potentially dangerous light. Many of Mr. Meads’ June 19 and 21 documents also have been
notarized, and some are directed to specific government officials, but Mr. Meads does not
include the March 3, 2011 disclaimer. Consistency is not a strong point in OPCA litigant
conduct.
[402] The August 27, 2012 filings by Mr. Meads continue this theme. He states that Ms.
Reeves has made “... an offer to Contract and/or Enticement of Slavery (Title 18 United States
Code and/or Article 4 Universal Declaration of Human Rights) ...”.
[403] Similarly at the June 8 hearing, when I made proposals to address disclosure by Ms.
Meads, Mr. Meads responded with alarm: “You are enticing me into slavery.”
[404]
Earlier he alleged the same in response to activities by Ms. Reeves:
I do not want to be enticed into slavery, sir. She contacts me, her other lawyer
contacted me, they are enticing me into contract. And I do not want to go there. I
just want to be left alone.
3.
Consent is Required
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[405] A second common variant of the ‘obligation requires agreement’ category is a belief that
a person is immune if they simply say they have not consented to be subject to the law and the
courts. Of course, this concept has not met with success: R. v. Jennings, 2007 ABCA 45 at para.
6; Hajdu v. Ontario (Director, Family Reponsibility Office), 2012 ONSC 1835 at paras. 25, 29;
see also Jabez Financial Services Inc. (Receiver of) v. Sponagle, 2008 NSSC 112 at paras. 14,
18, 264 N.S.R. (2d) 224; Szoo v. Canada (Royal Canadian Mounted Police), 2011 BCSC 696 at
paras. 17, 45.
[406] Sometimes this motif emerges in documentary form. For example, this Court has
received issued court orders stamped and returned with various messages, such as:
*** ALL CONSENT DENIED ***
RETURNED FOR CAUSE
OFFER REJECTED FOR
1. THIRD PARTY INTERFERENCE
2. BREACH OF CONTRACT
3. BREACH OF TRUST
4. BREACH OF CRIMINAL CODES OF CANADA
5. COMMERCIAL IMPROPRIETY
6. EXTRA JURISDICTIONAL
7. DEEMED UNLAWFULLY VEXATIOUS
8. DEEMED WITH MALICE AFORETHOUGHT
Of course, that had no effect.
[407] Various ‘magic hats’ may allegedly provide a basis for that declaration of immunity.
Courts have encountered claims that Freeman-on-the-Land status (Harper v. Atchison, 2011
SKQB 38 at paras. 6, 15, 369 Sask.R. 134; Szoo v. Canada (Royal Canadian Mounted Police),
2011 BCSC 696), or the Magna Carta (Harper v. Atchison, 2011 SKQB 38 at paras. 9-15, 369
Sask.R. 134; R. v. Jebbett, 2003 BCCA 69, 180 B.C.A.C. 21; Winningham v. Canada) nullifies
government or court authority.
[408] In R. v. McCormick, 2012 NSSC 150 at para. 9 an OPCA litigant argued the Freemanon-the-Land ‘magic hat’ immunized against criminal sanction; see also R. v. McCormick, 2012
NSSC 288 at paras. 28-32. Naturally, that did not work. As Justice Moir observed in R. v.
McCormick, 2012 NSSC 288 at para. 32: “[t]his teaching is not only wrong in the sense that it is
false. It is wrongful. That is, it is full of wrong.”
[409] A foisted unilateral contract can be an alleged basis for non-consent. One this Court has
received concluded:
NULL APPEARANCE. As a private non-belligerent without the Canada or
United States, I do not consent to a general appearance now and/or in
perpetuity, and none can be assumed without a conversion of personal
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liability. No grant of in rem or in personam jurisdiction is expressed or implied.
No chose in action is expressed or implied on behalf of the Defendant/Debtor or
any legal fiction, juristic personality or ens legis artificial person. I do not intend,
nor will I, argue the merits, facts or law, represent the Defendant/Debtor, request
any action that would imply a cause is properly pending, or engage in any
controversy. [Emphasis in original.]
The cryptic “without the Canada or United States” language relates to an alleged earlier deeming
provision that set the litigant outside those countries, even when he was physically inside those
countries. See also R. v. Boisjoli, 2012 ABQB 556 at paras. 44-48.
[410] As with the ‘all relationships are contracts’ variant, OPCA litigants seem to see ‘consent’
emerging from very mundane activities. They may, for example, refuse to advance past the bar
in a courtroom because that would ‘consent’ to court authority: Canada v. Galbraith, 2001
BCSC 675 at paras. 25-29, 54 W.C.B. (2d) 504; Mercedes-Benz Financial v. Kovacevic, [2009]
O.J. No. 783 at para. 8, 2009 CanLII 9368 (Ont. Sup. Ct. J.). The same reasoning leads this
category of OPCA litigant to refuse to plead guilty or not-guilty, or to disobey an instruction to
sit or stand.
4.
Conclusion - Obligation Requires Agreement
[411] A claim that the relationship between an individual and the state is always one of contract
is clearly incorrect. Aspects of that relationship may flow from mutual contract (for example a
person or corporation may be hired by the government to perform a task such as road
maintenance), but the state has the right to engage in unilateral action, subject to the Charter,
and the allocation and delegation of government authority.
[412] Similarly, my authority over this dispute is not subject to the agreement or consent of
either party. It flows from the inherent authority of this court, as shaped by legislation.
[413] Either branch of the ‘obligation requires agreement’ OPCA strategy category seeks
unsuccessfully to deny court authority, and operationally is an attempt by an OPCA litigant to
restrict the scope of state and court jurisdiction.
5.
Court Misconduct by ‘Everything is a Contract’ and ‘Consent is Required’
Litigants
[414] OPCA litigants who use ‘consent’ and ‘contract’ approaches are often difficult courtroom
participants. These persons may be highly disruptive as they attempt to avoid any step or action
that they apparently fear might create a contract, or acknowledge consent. They may refuse to
comply with practically any request by a judge or court official on that basis. That is a possible
explanation for Mr. Meads’ premature exit. If he had waited until I completed the hearing, he
arguably would have ‘consented’ to my authority. This kind of belief is not atypical of the
distorted perspective of ‘obligation requires agreement’ OPCA litigants.
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[415] ‘Non-consent’ may be indicated by a mantra-like non-reply to all court comments, for
example the curious Moorish Law phrase “I accept that for value and consideration and honour”
(see Henry v. El, 2010 ABCA 312 at para. 3, leave refused [2011] S.C.C.A. No. 138), see also:
Mercedes-Benz Financial v. Kovacevic, [2009] O.J. No. 783 at para. 51, 2009 CanLII 9368
(Ont. Sup. Ct. J.)). Mr. Meads’ did not engage in a ‘mantra response’, but still showed a clear
apprehension that our exchange in the June 8 hearing could result in what he appeared to believe
would be a contract.
[416] There is no obvious or simple way to address persons who believe obligation may
emerge from the most trivial of conduct, other than to perhaps emphasize the inherent
jurisdiction of the courts means that the OPCA litigant is subject to court authority, no matter
what the litigant may think or say. Admittedly, that explanation will not likely be welcomed, and
may well fall on deaf ears. However, the failure of an OPCA litigant to obey the Court’s lawful
orders cannot be a judicial excuse to not grant and enforce the law.
C.
Double/Split Persons
[417] A strange but common OPCA concept is that an individual can somehow exist in two
separate but related states. This confusing concept is expressed in many different ways. The
‘physical person’ is one aspect of the duality, the other is a non-corporeal aspect that has many
names, such as a “strawman”, a “corporation”, a “corporate entity”, a “corporate fiction”, a
“dead corporation”, a “dead person”, an “estate”, a “legal person”, a “legal fiction”, an “artificial
entity”, a “procedural phantom”, “abandoned paper work”, a “slave name” or “slave person”, or
a “juristic person”.
[418] Many OPCA nomenclature schemes relate to this duality. For example, the ‘lower case’
vs. ‘upper case’ name pairs indicates the ‘physical person’ and ‘non-corporeal aspect’,
respectively. When “::Dennis-Larry: Meads::” says he acts “on behalf of DENNIS LARRY
MEADS (juristic person)”, he appears to indicate he believes he has two separate aspects, and
that the man in the courtroom (“::Dennis-Larry: Meads::”) is representing his other half
(“DENNIS LARRY MEADS (juristic person)”). Other times OPCA litigants say they are
“agents”, “trustees”, “owners”, “representatives” or “secured party” for their other aspect: Hajdu
v. Ontario (Director, Family Reponsibility Office), 2012 ONSC 1835; Canada v. Galbraith,
2001 BCSC 675 at paras. 26-28, 54 W.C.B. (2d) 504; Turnnir v. The Queen, 2011 TCC 495 at
paras. 5-6; Dempsey v. Envision Credit Union, 2006 BCSC 1324 at para. 37, 60 B.C.L.R. (4th)
309; Canada (Minister of National Revenue - M.N.R.) v. Stanchfield, 2009 FC 99 at para. 27,
340 F.T.R. 150; Bank of Montreal v. McCance, 2012 ABQB 537 at para. 9; Services de
financement TD inc. c. Michaud, 2011 QCCQ 14868 at para. 6; this proceeding.
[419] A particularly surreal variation on this theme is reported in Dempsey v. Envision Credit
Union, 2006 BCSC 750 at para. 92, 151 A.C.W.S. (3d) 204, where the ‘physical litigants’
purported to intervene in the action against their ‘non-corporeal aspects’. Justice Garson
classified that attempt as “unintelligible” and struck the associated counterclaim: para. 93.
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[420] The ‘dash colon’ and ‘family/clan/house of’ motifs uniformly indicate the ‘physical
person’ half of these double/split individuals. Other times the ‘physical person’ is called a
“natural person” or is described as being “flesh and blood”: Porisky Trial Decision; R. v.
Lindsay, 2011 BCCA 99, 302 B.C.A.C. 76, leave refused [2011] S.C.C.A. No. 265;
Mercedes-Benz Financial v. Kovacevic, [2009] O.J. No. 783, 2009 CanLII 9368 (Ont. Sup. Ct.
J.); Mercedes-Benz Financial v. Kovacevic, [2009] O.J. No. 783 at para. 24, 2009 CanLII 9368
(Ont. Sup. Ct. J.)). Mr. Meads adopts the latter kind of language, he (the physical litigant) is “the
living flesh and blood sentient-man”.
[421] There are different explanations for the non-corporeal similarity. Some OPCA gurus
promote the idea that this aspect is created by the state, burdened with legal obligations, then
‘shackled’ to the physical person. Other OPCA gurus present the non-corporeal aspect as a part
of a person that can be split away, and then burdened with obligations and debts.
[422] Of course, either approach is legally ineffectual. Canadian law does not provide for a
person to have two aspects - this entire concept is yet another ‘magic hat’. This fundamental
misapprehension was eloquently explained by Justice Gauthier in Canada (Minister of National
Revenue - M.N.R.) v. Stanchfield, 2009 FC 99 at paras. 17, 27, 340 F.T.R. 150:
... Mr. Camplin in the above-mentioned case seems to have argued, in the same
fashion as the respondent, that he had two capacities, one which he characterised
as being his "private capacity as a "natural person" for my own benefit" and the
other as his capacity as "legal representative of the taxpayer". Here, the
respondent characterises his purported capacities as being (1) as a natural person,
and (2) as a taxpayer. The deletion of the words "legal representative" from the
latter purported capacity does not render this case distinguishable from the one at
bar. The whole notion of their being a second capacity distinct from the one of a
natural person or human being is a pure fiction, one which is not sanctioned by
law. One can describe nothing in any terms one wishes; it still remains nothing.
...
Cory Stanchfield’s attempt to argue before this Court that his body comprises two
persons which act in different capacities is of one of two things: (1) an
inadmissible division of his indivisible entity, or (2) an attempted creation of a
second entity in a fashion which is not recognized by law, the result of which
amounts to nothing in the eyes of the law. It is an attempt at the impossible and
the respondent cannot do the impossible. Therefore, “Cory Stanchfield (the
Respondent)” and “Cory Stanchfield, in his capacity as a natural person (the
Witness)” is but one person, with one single capacity ...
[Emphasis added.]
See also Canada (Minister of National Revenue - M.N.R.) v. Camplin; M.N.R. v. Camplin,
2007 FC 183 at paras. 8-9, [2007] 2 C.T.C. 205; R. v. Lindsay, 2006 BCCA 150 at para. 3, 265
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D.L.R. (4th) 193; Mercedes-Benz Financial v. Kovacevic, [2009] O.J. No. 783 at paras. 40, 4445, 2009 CanLII 9368 (Ont. Sup. Ct. J.); Turnnir v. The Queen, 2011 TCC 495 at paras. 6, 8;
Hajdu v. Ontario (Director, Family Reponsibility Office), 2012 ONSC 1835 at paras. 24-29;
Ontario (Director, Family Responsibility Office) v. Boyle, [2006] O.J. No. 2181 (QL) at paras.
3-5, 149 A.C.W.S. (3d) 127 (Ont. Sup. Ct. J.).
[423] The answer is that, as Justice Gauthier observed, no matter whatever nomenclature the
OPCA litigant wants to adopt to describe his ‘other self’, it is the person before the Court who is
subject to its order.
1.
Unshackling the Strawman
[424] Certain gurus see the non-corporeal half of a person as detrimental, a kind of parasitic
conjoined legal twin, and believe the state and court can only affect that aspect of a person.
Lindsay is a major proponent of this theory; he invites his followers to ‘kill their strawman’ and
thereafter be free of any income tax obligation. These OPCA litigants will therefore refuse to
acknowledge their non-corporeal aspect and its obligations: R. v. Lindsay, 2011 BCCA 99 at
para. 27, 302 B.C.A.C. 76; Canada (Minister of National Revenue - M.N.R.) v. Stanchfield,
2009 FC 99, 340 F.T.R. 150; Turnnir v. The Queen, 2011 TCC 495 at paras. 6, 8; Porisky Trial
Decision.
[425] This objective can lead to very unusual OPCA litigant responses. For example, in reply to
an action against “FRED L. JAJCZAY”, the defendant responded:
It is agreed by you in your private capacity with no dispute coming from you that
my name, Fred L. Jajczay, is my private property; that I have never given
permission or authority to any person, men or women to associate my name with
a dead corporate entity; that the alteration of my name in any manner is fraud.
[Emphasis in original.]
The intended effect is that Jajczay is trying to deny affiliation with his all capital letters
‘strawman’.
[426] OPCA gurus often seem drawn to the sea, so it is perhaps unsurprising that one variant
on this theme is that a newborn is issued a “Berth Certificate” that makes a person a “passenger”
on the “ship of state”. Instead of killing their ‘strawman’, these litigants emphasize they are “on
dry land”, and not subject to Admiralty law. They may ceremonially destroy or denounce their
“berth certificate”.
[427] Mr. Meads appears to subscribe to an aspect of this theory. In court he explained how he
was two persons, a “corporate identity” that was created by the state (or alternatively, me), and
was subject to legislation and this court. That “person” had been involuntarily attached to his
other aspect, his “living flesh and blood sentient-man” or “soul”. He now rejects that association
and the obligations that follow.
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2.
Dividing Oneself
[428] Mr. Meads also applied the other form of the OPCA ‘divided/split person’ concept, that
these two linked imaginary personalities can interact with one another, and thereby structure a
kind of inter-relationship. In Mercedes-Benz Financial v. Kovacevic, [2009] O.J. No. 783 at
para. 14, 2009 CanLII 9368 (Ont. Sup. Ct. J.), Justice Brown reproduces a “most unusual”
contract:
... signed twice by Mr. Kovacevic: once in his capacity as “secured-party,
first-party”, and then again as “debtor, second-party”.
[429] Brown J. then at para. 15 summarizes the document’s intended effect:
It appears that by this document Mr. Kovacevic has attempted to split himself into
two separate persons – a “flesh and blood living man”, and a “juristic
person\strawman\legal entity” created by the Province of Ontario. If one takes
the document at face value, then Mr. Kovacevic impliedly acknowledges that up
until December 11, 2007 – i.e. three months after he had purchased the
Mercedes-Benz - he was a “juristic person”. He then attempts to transfer to his
newly created “flesh and blood living man” all his property then owned. The
document notably is silent as to what happened to the debt held at that time by the
“juristic person”.
[430] He then concludes at para. 45:
Of course this document has no legal effect. In the eyes of the law it is rubbish.
However, when read together with the other documents created by Mr. Kovacevic
it forms part of what I conclude to be a deliberate effort on his part to avoid
payment of his debt obligations.
[431] A similar strategy is reported in R. v. Crischuk, 2010 BCSC 716 at paras. 41-45,
affirmed 2010 BCCA 391, 2010 D.T.C. 5141, where the litigant attempted to create a lien
between two aspects of himself; see also Turnnir v. The Queen, 2011 TCC 495 at para. 6.
[432] With that, I turn to the documents delivered by Mr. Meads on June 19 and 21. These are,
I believe, the most complex set of ‘intra-personal’ contractual and trust relationships reported in
a Canadian court. These are carefully formatted, impressive looking documents, and are
obviously by the same author who composed the ‘fee schedule’ attached as Appendix “A” to
these Reasons. These documents share much parallel, if not identical, language and format. For
example, the “Property List” in the ‘fee schedule’ is also an element of other items.
[433] I will briefly explain my interpretation of the intended operation of these documents.
[434] As previously explained, Mr. Meads subscribes to the idea that the non-corporeal aspect
of himself was created by the state (or alternatively by me, on June 8, 2012). He must believe he
96
nevertheless has ‘signing authority’ over that other personality because in his “power of
attorney” he, as “DENNIS LARRY MEADS, Debtor and Grantor”, authorizes his “attorney-infact”, “Dennis-Larry: Meads, Secured Party Creditor” total control over his affairs. Presumably,
the ‘corporate entity’ is now a puppet for the physical person.
[435] The UCC Financing Statement registered in Ohio for a Certificate of Birth purports to
create or reflect a trust of “DENNIS LARRY MEADS, foreign situs cestui qui vie trust” in
favour of “Dennis-Larry:Meads, as Beneficiary of the Revested Trust”. The document continues:
This is actual and constructive notice that all of Debtors interests now owned or
hereafter acquired is hereby accepted as collateral for securing contractual
obligations in favour of the Secured party as detailed in a true, complete notarized
security agreement in the possession of the Secured party. Notice in accordance
with UCC-Property- this is the entry of the debtor in the Commercial Registry as
a transmitting utility and the following property is hereby registered in the same
as public notice of a commercial transaction: Certificate of Birth Document #[...]
[sic.]
Translated out of ‘gibberese’, Mr. Meads is purportedly assigning the value of his birth
certificate, a “commercial transaction” presumably with Canada, to his “flesh and blood” self.
[436] The Alberta Personal Property Registry Verification Statement for “DENNIS LARRY
MEADS, foreign situs cestui qui vie trust” presumably does the same for his a birth certificate,
social insurance number, UCC1 financing statement, a certificate of marriage, a motor vehicle
operator’s license, Canadian passport, and several court orders.
[437] The “Commercial Security Agreement”, which is identified by the cryptic notation
“DLM042011960 SA 01 Registration # 11120912227” purportedly promises that “DENNIS
LARRY MEADS, A LEGAL ENTITY” assumes all debts and obligations of “DennisLarry:Meads, a "Personam Sojourn and People of Posterity"”, while granting DennisLarry:Meads all his property. Similarly, the “Hold Harmless and Indemnity Agreement Non
Negotiable Between the Parties” causes “DEBTOR: DENNIS LARRY MEADS” to generally
indemnify “CREDITOR: Care of Dennis-Larry Meads”.
[438] This duplicates in general effect the analogous material advanced in Mercedes-Benz
Financial v. Kovacevic: everything good and of value attaches to the physical person of Mr.
Meads, while all obligation and debt is allocated to the unfortunate DENNIS LARRY MEADS,
corporate entity.
[439] Of course, that does not work. Mr. Meads is Mr. Meads in all his physical or imaginary
aspects. He would experience and obtain the same effect and success if he appeared in court and
selectively donned and removed a rubber Halloween mask which portrays the appearance of
another person, asserting at this or that point that the mask’s person is the one liable to Ms.
Meads. Not that I am encouraging, or indeed would countenance, the wearing of a mask in my
courtroom.
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3.
In-Court Behaviour of the Divided Person
[440] The in-court conduct of OPCA litigants who advance a double/split person approach can
be confusing. They may ask to whom the court is talking. Or, like Mr. Meads, they may
conclude that the court is addressing the “person” rather than the “soul”.
[441] Detaxer cases provide some examples of this kind of conduct. R. v. Turnnir, 2006 BCPC
460 at para. 65 reports how the defendant referred to himself both as “the taxpayer” and “the
legal representative of the taxpayer”. During cross-examination when he was asked who signed a
document; Turnnir replied: “Who are you talking to?”
[442] In Porisky Trial Decision at paras. 60-61, Judge Myers related this kind of dialogue:
[60]
... Mr. Porisky said he could not make that decision unless he understood
whether he was to give evidence in his “inherent personality as a natural person
with no intent to profit”. He wanted to tell the truth in the stand but the capacity
he was to testify in would make a difference to his evidence. A few minutes later
in the dialogue he said:
I need to know if I make the decision to get into the stand, from which
perspective can I speak? Like therefore I need to know, in the eyes of the
law, if one man is two persons, the natural or the legal, okay, which one
can I speak as, or does it matter -- am I have the liberty to speak the truth
and qualify it so I can speak to everything? Because what it -- they have
commingled a lot of stuff, and for me to properly address it, I'm going to
have to be able to speak to everything to properly address it.
And later:
Again, I feel like I'm being railroaded because I'm asking for clear
answers. I came here with a full intention on defending my -- my rights
and -- and not having things being converted into something they're not,
and I don't know how to do that if nobody's going to give me a straight
answer. I thought Crown had a duty -- I read their web page and they talk
about honour and integrity, and now I'm been led one thing -- and for me
to speak to everything, I'm going to need to be able to speak to it from my
starting point of my existence.
I didn't make it up. Sir John Salmond I think is a highly respected man.
The Supreme Court relies on him. I didn't make it up that one man's two
persons in the eyes of the law. And so from that perspective, I need -that's why I tried to be as honourable and as open in the development of
this, so that I could speak the truth and the whole truth from the proper
perspective, so it does not get misconstrued or mislabelled or presumed to
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be something it's not. And that's what I need to know. If I make the
decision and I go in that box, which person, in the eyes of the law am I?
THE COURT: You are Mr. Porisky.
THE ACCUSED PORISKY: Am I Russell Anthony Porisky in my inherent personality
as a natural person, or am I a sovereign-granted personality?
THE COURT: You're Russell Porisky.
THE ACCUSED PORISKY: That's fairly misleading because that's not clear enough for
me, Your Honour.
...
THE COURT: … Let's assume you get into the stand… and the Crown asks you, "What
did you have for breakfast today?" Would it make a difference as to what capacity you
were in?
THE ACCUSED PORISKY: For me, it would, Your Honour, yes.
[443] Justice Midwinter in R. v. Kaasgaard, 2011 MBQB 256 at para. 10 characterized the
result as a “... "song and dance" routine of Mr. Kaasgaard being present but not wanting to be
identified ...”.
[444] In this Court’s experience that is an accurate characterization of these antics. Alberta
courts have observed OPCA litigants, particularly Freemen-on-the-Land, allege the correct target
of civil and criminal litigation is a piece of paper such as a birth certificate, rather than the
person holding that document. There is no adequate way to describe the absurdity of that display.
4.
Conclusion - Double/Split Person Schemes
[445] ‘Double/split person’ schemes have no legal effect. These schemes have no basis in law.
There is only one legal identity that attaches to a person. If a person wishes to add a legal ‘layer’
to themselves, then a corporation is the proper approach. The interrelationship between
corporation and owner, and the legal effect of that ‘layer’ is clearly established in common law
and statute.
[446] The ‘double/split’ person’ strategies all have a common underlying kernel; that the
OPCA litigant is not the person before the court, or is not subject to the court’s jurisdiction. That
allegedly falls on the other, non-corporeal (but otherwise similar) person. In other words, a
litigant who advances a variation of this scheme says to the court ‘you have no jurisdiction over
me - the person you want is someone else.’ That allegedly denies this Court’s authority, but of
course fails in effect.
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D.
Unilateral Agreements
[447] OPCA litigants frequently attempt to unilaterally foist obligations on other litigants,
peace officers, state actors, or the court and court personnel. These foisted obligations take many
forms. None, of course, creates any binding legal obligation. In that sense, these are yet more
‘magic hats’.
[448] Mr. Meads’ June 19 and 21 materials includes a number of these unilateral foisted
agreements:
1.
the “Actual and Constructive Notice” filed to the Board of Governors of the Bank
of Canada;
2.
his ‘fee schedule’, that is attached to these Reasons as Appendix “A”; and
3.
the “Notice By Declaration and Affidavit of Consequences for Infringement of
Copyright Trade-Name/Trademark”, that is attached to these Reasons as
Appendix “B”.
The February 15, 2011 letter to Court worker Barbara Petryk, Clerk of the Court, that appoints
her a fiduciary of “::dennis-larry:meads::” as a “living flesh and blood sentient-man” is another
example of this kind of foisted unilateral agreement. The same is arguably true of the cover letter
for Mr. Meads’ June 19 and 21 packages.
[449] Common examples of these foisted agreements purport to appoint someone a fiduciary,
establish a contractual relationship or declare an OPCA person no longer has an obligation, such
as to pay income tax. Some purport to unilaterally settle lawsuits or legal claims, without court
direction. Others provide a system of predetermined fines.
[450] Sometimes the unilateral agreement says that the recipient has a certain window of time
to respond and disagree, otherwise they are held to have agreed to the terms of the unilateral
agreement. That may be framed as a requirement that the recipient must rebut or prove
themselves exempt from the foisted obligation. However, some foisted unilateral agreements do
not even provide that courtesy, and instead allegedly indicate the recipient is bound, whether
they like it or not.
[451] Foisted unilateral agreements are almost always expressed in a documentary form. Many
foisted unilateral agreements include dramatic language and warnings. For example, the ‘fee
schedule’ employed by Mr. Meads states in startling large print:
ATTENTION AND WARNING!
THIS IS A LEGAL NOTICE AND DEMAND
FIAT JUSTITIA, RUAT COELUM
(Let right be done, though the heavens should fall)
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To: All Provincial, State, Federal and International Public Officials, by and through
Province of Alberta, Lieutenant Governor, Donald S. Ethell and/or Governor General, David
Lloyd Johnston
TAKE NOTICE IGNORANCE OF THE LAW IS NO EXCUSE
THIS IS A CONTRACT IN ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION
Take a moment to read this before you proceed any further.
I do not wish to speak to you under any circumstances excluding federal judicial review
THIS TITLE IS FOR YOUR PROTECTION!
[Styling in original, see Appendix “A” for a more precise reproduction of this document.]
Later the ‘fee schedule’ sternly warns: “IGNORANCE OF THE LAW IS NO EXCUSE!”
[452] Some foisted unilateral agreements are amateurish amalgams of different documents,
cobbled together, while others may appear professional and authoritative to the layperson. These
documents often feature spurious formalities such as notarial marks, witnessing, stamps, and
seals.
[453] OPCA gurus appear to have a large role in creating these documents. For example, this
Court has repeatedly received identical or very similar versions of a particular unilateral foisted
agreement, that only differ in personal information. In certain instances partially completed
forms still show tags that indicate the original document was obtained in an electronic format,
and then (partially) filled by the litigant using an automated script. I have previously noted these
features in Mr. Meads’ materials.
[454] Documents of this kind may emerge in number of ways. The foisted unilateral agreement
may be delivered to a target (often a government or elected official), filed in court, presented in
court, or ‘published’. This last approach deserves some further comment. OPCA litigants
sometimes appear to put special significance on ‘giving notice’ to others by making a document
available to the public on the Internet, for example Bank of Montreal v. McCance, 2012 ABQB
537 at para. 22. This Court has frequently received OPCA documents that direct a recipient to an
Internet website where that same document is ‘published’.
[455] Other mechanisms to provide notice border on harassment. In 2011 Belanger attempted
to email each person employed in Alberta Justice a number of unilateral foisted agreements with
titles such as “Ecclesiastical Notice of lawful excuse for non appearance and determination of
the account of minister :Edward Jay-Robin: of the Belanger family” and “Ecclesiastical Notarial
Notice of Understanding and Intent styled after the notice to admit”, which, if not rebutted,
allegedly discharged any criminal liability by Belanger for various illegal acts.
[456] Most foisted unilateral agreements, including those of Mr. Meads, include language such
as “[notice or service] to the agent is [notice or service] to the principal, and [notice or service]
101
to the principle is [notice or service] to the agent”. This instruction is presumably intended to
create as broad an ‘area of effect’ for the foisted unilateral agreement as is possible. Mr. Meads
‘fee schedule’ is addressed to government officials such as the Lieutenant Governor and
Governor General, whose acquiescence, as ‘principals’ would presumably trickle down to all
those subordinate in their organizations.
[457] Of course, documents of this kind that purportedly unilaterally impose an obligation on
another have no legal effect: Papadopoulos v. Borg, 2009 ABCA 201 at para. 4; Henry v. El,
2010 ABCA 312 at para. 3, leave refused [2011] S.C.C.A. No. 138.
1.
The Legal Effect of a Foisted Agreement
[458] Though OPCA litigants claim these documents can impose obligations on other persons,
there is no dispute that an individual person lacks that kind of authority. The best-case legal
foundation for these documents is that they are a kind of contract. Indeed, that is usually how
OPCA gurus and litigants characterize these materials.
[459] There is no question that common law contract law, in Canada and elsewhere, prohibits
enforcement of the kind of unilateral ‘agreements’ typically employed by OPCA litigants. It is
useful to examine the basis for this conclusion, since foisted unilateral agreements are such a
frequent motif in OPCA misconduct.
[460] Both parties to a contract must agree to its terms and to be bound in legal relations. The
corollary of that is that one person cannot unilaterally impose a contract on another. In Silver’s
Garage Ltd. v. Bridgewater (Town), [1971] S.C.R. 577 at 596, 17 D.L.R. (3d) 1, Laskin J. (as he
then was) expressed the rule as “... a person cannot foist a contract upon another without his
consent ...”.
[461] A contract requires a “meeting of the minds”, or in Latin, “consensus ad idem”. This is
another way of saying that the parties to a contract must agree to the terms of that contract. In
Ron Ghitter Property Consultants Ltd. v. Beaver Lumber Co., 2003 ABCA 221 at para. 8, 330
A.R. 353, Fraser C.J.A. explained the concept this way:
... Regardless of the theories underlying the enforcement of contracts, mutuality
of agreement lies at the root of any legally enforceable contract. The required
degree of mutuality of agreement mandates that the parties reach a consensus ad
idem on essential terms. ... [Emphasis added.]
[462] She continues at paras. 8-9 to outline the well established common-law test:
8.
... The accepted test is whether a reasonable observer would infer from the
words or conduct of the parties that a contract had been concluded ... That
is, on an objective basis, have the parties reached consensus ad idem?
...
102
9.
The common thread running through the cases is that the parties will be
found to have reached a meeting of the minds, in other words be ad idem,
where it is clear to the objective reasonable bystander, in light of all the
material facts, that the parties intended to contract and the essential terms
of that contract can be determined with a reasonable degree of certainty ...
This requires the court to decide whether "a sensible third party would
take the agreement to mean what A understood it to mean or what B
understood it to mean, or whether indeed any meaning can be attributed to
it at all" ... "the consensus ad idem would be a matter of mere conjecture."
[Citations omitted, emphasis added.]
[463] This alone provides a basis for why the stereotypical foisted unilateral agreement cannot
bind its recipient. An objective person knows that he or she cannot usually be held bound in
contract by simple receipt of an offer. Many OPCA foisted unilateral agreements feature
language that demands its recipient respond or rebut an obligation by a certain deadline. If not,
then the agreement proclaims the recipient is bound by its terms. A moment’s consideration
shows it is absurd that the law would respect that requirement. What if a document was received,
but not read within the deadline? What if the document was received by an illiterate person, or
one who did not understand the document’s meaning? Could they have a ‘meeting of the
minds’? Of course not, no more than handing a document to a sheep and saying “By not
repudiating this agreement, I may eat you.” establishes a mutual and common intent.
[464] Instead, the common law in most cases requires that the recipient of an offer (if that’s
what these OPCA documents represent) must take a positive step to accept that offer,
acknowledge its terms and benefits, and communicate that fact. Harris C.J.B.C. in Cypress
Disposal Ltd. v. Inland Kenworth Sales (Nanaimo) Ltd. (1975), 54 D.L.R. (3d) 598, [1975] 3
W.W.R. 289 expressed the rule as :
... I do not think that to be an acceptance creating a contract. It is communication
of the acceptance that creates the contract between the parties. One must
distinguish between the act of deciding to accept or reject an offer and the act of
communicating acceptance or rejection. [Emphasis added.]
[465] This requirement is not some recent legal innovation, but relates to the U.K. case of
Felthouse v. Bindley (1862), 11 C.B. (N.S.) 869, 142 E.R. 1037 (Ex. Ch.), part of the “common
law” so dear to OCPA gurus and litigants. In that decision a man attempted to enforce a price for
sale of a horse. He was in negotiation with his nephew over the purchase of a horse, and wrote:
“... you said the horse is mine ... If I hear no more about [the horse], I consider the horse mine at
£30 and 15s.” The horse was inadvertently sold by an auctioneer to a third party, and the uncle
sued.
[466] The nephew had, in fact, intended his uncle have the horse, but he had taken no steps to
communicate that fact. Justice Willes concluded:
103
... It is clear, therefore, that the nephew in his own mind intended his uncle to
have the horse at the price which he (the uncle) had named, £30 and 15s.: but he
had not communicated such his intention to his uncle, or done anything to bind
himself. Nothing, therefore, had been done to vest the property in the horse in the
plaintiff down to the 25th of February, when the horse was sold by the defendant.
It appears to me that, independently of the subsequent letters, there had been no
bargain to pass the property in the horse to the plaintiff, and therefore that he had
no right to complain of the sale. [Emphasis added.]
[467] Felthouse v. Bindley is a universally accepted cornerstone of the common law of
contract. Citing only a few of many possible similar authorities:
•
An offeror may not arbitrarily impose contractual liability upon an offeree merely
by proclaiming that silence shall be deemed consent.
(M. P. Furmston, Cheshire, Fifoot and Furmston’s Law of
Contract, 15th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) at p.
61)
•
... the silence of the offeree, his failure to reject an offer, cannot amount to
acceptance without more. ... Although the offeror can dictate the time, place, and
manner of acceptance ... it seems clear that this will not cover the situation where
the offeror says that silence will be enough ... Indeed the Supreme Court of
Canada has said that something more than a failure to reject an offer is required to
constitute a binding contract.
(G.H.L. Fridman, The Law of Contract in Canada, 5th ed. (Toronto: Thomson
Carswell, 2006) at p. 54.)
•
... As a general rule, it is not enough for one to whom an offer is made to assent
inwardly; the offeree must communicate acceptance to the offeror ...
Ordinarily, therefore silence will not operate as an acceptance even
though the offeree should prove an intention to accept. This is not
a technicality but part of the requirement of a bargain. No
reasonable person, on receiving a proposal that looks for a reply,
considers the bargain concluded until the manifestation of assent.
Nor will a reasonable offeror ordinarily consider that silence on the
part of the offeree manifests the latter’s acceptance. It would
plainly be an imposition for an offeror to write to a stranger
offering to sell an encyclopedia and adding that the latter’s silence
will be considered an acceptance. ...
(S. M. Waddams, The Law of Contracts, 6th ed. (Toronto: Canada Law Book,
2010) at p. 67-68)
104
•
The requirement that there has to be an acceptance cannot be avoided or waived
by the offeror’s saying that the offeree will be assumed to have accepted the offer
if no rejection is received by the offeror. This rule is a reflection of the very
general principal that people are not to have obligations thrust upon them without
their consent and that, in general, people have to indicate their consent by some
positive action. The principle is expressed in the statement that “silence cannot be
consent”.
(Angela Swan, Canadian Contract Law, 2nd ed. (Markham:
LexisNexis, 2009) at p. 234.)
[468] This principle continues to be uniformly applied by Canadian courts. For example:
Schiller v. Fisher; Nu Towne Dev. Inc. V. Kingsmont Properties Ltd., [1981] 1 S.C.R. 593 at
598-599, 124 D.L.R. (3d) 577; Pumphrey v. Carson, 2002 NSSC 170 at paras. 19-20, 206
N.S.R. (2d) 338; Gellen v. Public Guardian and Trustee of British Columbia et al, 2005 BCSC
1615 at para. 17, 21 E.T.R. (3d) 146; Vollmer v. Jones (2007), 36 R.F.L. (6th) 340 at para. 46,
155 A.C.W.S. (3d) 1079 (Ont. Sup. Ct. J. (Fam. Ct.)).
[469] There are certain very limited instances where a court may infer acceptance of a contract,
despite failure to explicitly communicate acceptance, for example where the offoree uses an
offered service: St. John Tug Boat Co. v. Irving Refining Ltd., [1964] S.C.R. 614 at 623-624,
46 D.L.R. (2d) 1. In that case the Irving Oil Company received a contract offer that a tug
company’s ships would assist in docking oil tankers. Acceptance was not formally
communicated, but the oil company nevertheless used the tugs, and that was basis to infer the
offer and its terms had been accepted. Exceptions of this kind do not apply to the kinds of foisted
agreements used in OPCA strategies.
[470] So, even if the relationship between the state and an individual was one of contract
(which it isn’t), and the Governor General and/or Lieutenant-Governor General had the authority
to declare a person no longer subject to the organizations which they administer on behalf of the
Queen (which I seriously doubt), Mr. Meads’ ‘fee schedule’ still founders on this key point.
Neither he, nor anyone else, can impose a demand that a person deny or disprove a foisted
agreement.
[471] Some final context may be helpful, as the rule OPCA litigants find so attractive has a
nightmarish effect. There is a story, perhaps apocryphal, that the press gangs of the English
Royal Navy would trick civilian sailors to unwittingly accept a first military employment
payment, the “King’s Shilling”, by concealing that coin at the bottom of a tankard of beer. If the
civilian sailor accepted the apparently free beer, and the concealed payment within, then he was
trapped and was deemed to have agreed to be a new recruit of the Royal Navy.
[472] That is the kind of world that is the end-point of the reasoning advanced by this OPCA
concept. If it were the law (which it is not), we all would watch, scrutinizing every document and
act, for a hidden foisted agreement. Perhaps ironically, that neatly corresponds to the neurotic
105
consent/contract-fearing perspective that flows from the OPCA ‘obligation requires agreement’
strategies.
2.
Common Uses of Unilateral Agreements
[473] OPCA litigants appear very fond of the foisted unilateral agreement strategy, and employ
it in a wide variety of ways.
a.
To Create or Assert an Obligation
[474] A common strategy is to foist a unilateral agreement on a target, then claim the failure to
refuse or refute the “agreement” creates an obligation. The most common form of this kind of
foisted OPCA unilateral agreement is the ‘fee schedule’, which I address in more detail below.
[475] In Gravlin et al. v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce et al, 2005 BCSC 839 at
para. 8, 140 A.C.W.S. (3d) 447, litigants who had hired Dempsey attempted to evade debts by
foisting unilateral agreements on certain lawyers who were engaged in the debt collection
process. These ‘contracts’ demanded $100,000.00 if the lawyers continued to “... trespass on or
interfere, in any manner whatsoever, with the private contract between CIBC and [Gravlin] ...”
or triple damages of $300,000.00 if the lawyers failed to promptly deliver the $100,000.00.
[476] Similarly, in Bank of Montreal v. McCance, 2012 ABQB 537 at para. 15, Master
Hanebury reports on a “Notice Of No Trespassing” intended to resist a foreclosure. One of its
remedies is an unusual form of misconduct:
That document advises that a penalty will be imposed of up to ten million dollars,
the greatest amount being for anyone who violates any of God’s Supreme Laws
or causes the McCances to violate any of God’s Supreme Laws.
Several bills were issued on that basis: para. 17. Alarmingly, these tactics were at least in part
effective, as attempts to sell the property were unsuccessful (para. 18) and an involved realtor
found “... that the notices and demands were extremely disturbing and made her fearful and she
would not swear the draft affidavit prepared by the Bank.” (para. 18).
[477] Williams v. Johnston, [2008] O.J. No. 4853 (QL) at para. 3, 2008 CanLII 63194 (Ont.
S.C.), affirmed 2009 ONCA 335, 176 A.C.W.S. (3d) 609, leave refused [2009] S.C.C.A. No. 266
details a set of foisted obligations and claims:
In the statement of claim the plaintiff asserts in paragraph 3 that he has “issued
three default judgments against the defendants by doctrine of tacit procuration”
and that “all matters have been deemed stare decisis, res judicata and collateral
estoppel”. In paragraph 4 he states he issued default judgment against them
because they did not respond to his “International Commercial Claim” issued July
2, 2008 or his “Affidavit of Obligation” issued on July 18, 2008. In paragraph 5
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he claims that the defendants have committed the crimes of “misprision of felony,
fraud, theft, embezzlement, conspiracy, sedition, enticement into slavery, and
treason”. In paragraph 6 he refers to the Court of International Trade and penalties
due to crimes against a sovereign.
[478] These were rejected as a basis for a civil action: paras. 10-11. This OPCA litigant had
claimed what is probably best described as nation-state authority, and had personally tried and
convicted the defendants on that basis (para. 8):
In his submissions, the plaintiff made representations to the court that he had
declared himself a sovereign and as such he had established a trust account with
the US Treasury, which had provided him with an unlimited amount of credit.
Further, he advised the court he had instituted his own court proceedings as a
sovereign and had issued default judgments against the defendants because they
had not complied with his endorsement and direction. ...
Mention of the U.S. Treasury ‘trust account’ suggests this litigant had also subscribed to the
‘A4V’ ‘money for nothing’ scheme discussed below.
[479] MBNA Canada Bank v. Luciani, 2011 ONSC 6347 discusses a foisted unilateral
agreement which was the basis for a $28,000,000.00 Personal Property Security Act registration
against a bank. The OPCA litigant offered to remove the registration in exchange for the bank
providing a $125,000.00 line of credit. Justice Brown called this “[a] good old-fashioned shakedown!” (para. 3), which is an apt way to describe all foisted unilateral agreements.
[480] A similar strategy was advanced by two members of CERI, “Carl-Wayne: Duchek” and
“Judith-Patricia: Duchek”, who sent my office a unilateral foisted agreement that demanded I
disprove the supremacy of the King James Bible:
We wish to know if you have any law that can induce me or intimidate us to
violate our faith in practising the laws of the King James Bible of which such
faith is founded upon?
[481] I had seven days to respond, and if not, I:
... consent to pay me 1 million Dollars $1,000,000.00 in Gold Maple Leaf coin for
the damages to my ability to practice my faith unimpeded and that you will, once
our agreement is witnessed and published, provide me the name and address of
your liability insurance bond agent to pay me for damages due to your
intimidation should you choose to break the laws and violate your oath.
I did not respond, and to date have not faced a demand for payment, in gold. I presume from no
demand that Mr. and Ms. Duchek have been able to practice their faith without impediment.
107
[482] Once an obligation is allegedly ‘created’ by a unilateral foisted agreement, the OPCA
litigant may attempt to enforce that obligation in court. Alternatively, an OPCA litigant may
register a lien or interest against property held by the agreement’s target, such as happened in
MBNA Canada Bank v. Luciani, 2011 ONSC 6347 at para. 17. I understand that a number of
justices in this Court have been the subject of this kind of spurious and unlawful security
interest. My understanding is that this lien strategy is very popular among American OPCA
litigants; this technique is sometimes referred to as “paper terrorism”: Robert Chamberlain &
Donald P. Haider-Markel; Erick J. Haynie; Susan P. Koniak. OPCA gurus commonly teach these
approaches to their customers as a response to ‘unjust’ and ‘illegal’ state and court authority.
[483] Another variant of this category is reported in Papadopoulos v. Borg, 2009 ABCA 201.
This decision is particularly helpful as it reproduces much of the foisted agreement (para. 3) and
outlines the OPCA litigant’s conduct (paras. 4-10). He had asserted a foisted unilateral
agreement entitled “Admission of Facts - Non-negotiable” that, if not refuted, would mean the
defendants had admitted certain facts that would effectively decide a lawsuit:
It is My intent with this Admission of Facts, to establish agreement with you
administratively by the response or lack thereof to the questions provided. Please
answer the following questions, if you fail to do so, you will be deemed to admit,
for the purposes of this proceeding only, the truth of the facts and the authenticity
of the documents set out herein below ...
The net result was a claim for “triple damages”, a total of $74,851,078.50.
[484] The OPCA litigant explained how he had proven his case (para. 8):
I have provided all of the evidence before you in fact in the form of an Affidavit
of assessment, an Affidavit of judgment, an Affidavit of default, an Affidavit of
mode of service, a judicial notice, and an Affidavit of search. All of these
documents have been served upon the other side. They have been accepted. They
have been provided to them, served to them by a notary under notary seal.
They've accepted to all of the terms and conditions. And, therefore, they presently
are in default. I note their dishonour and on and for the record. ...
[485] The court continues at paras. 9-10 to describe the litigant’s in-court activities:
[9]
The appellant was intransigent. Despite the best efforts of the trial judge to
explain the rules of procedure and evidence, the appellant refused to
testify or call any evidence. He insisted that the service of his
unconventional documents on the defendants had somehow turned into an
admission of liability by them. He insisted that the affidavits which he had
tendered on the Court, and which attached copies of those documents were
admissible evidence at the trial. He refused to be cross-examined, arguing
that counsel for the defendants had “no standing”, and were “in
dishonour”. (AR p. 76, l. 36-40)
108
[10]
The appellant took the position that the purpose of the trial was really to
enforce or compromise the “agreement” he had tried to foist on the
defendants:
Now, I have no desire to liquidate them and enforce the
entire default upon them. I want to settle. And I have a
judgment against them in the order of $49.9 million. And I
don't want to enforce that entire judgment against them. I
want to settle with them.
God requires of his mankind a tithe of 10 percent. I'm in a
position where I'm willing to take the example that God has
put forth and settle for 10 percent. Is that not fair? (AR p.
74, l. 21-9)
[486] Perhaps unsurprisingly, the OPCA litigant’s claims were dismissed at trial: para. 10. The
Court of Appeal confirmed that result (at para. 4):
The law does not recognize the ability of one person to foist liability on another if
they do not reply to a unilateral communication within an arbitrarily set time
limit.
b.
To Discharge an Obligation or Dismiss a Lawsuit
[487] Similarly, OPCA litigants will often claim to use foisted unilateral agreements to
discharge an obligation or end a lawsuit. Gravlin et al. v. Canadian Imperial Bank of
Commerce et al, 2005 BCSC 839 at para. 23, 140 A.C.W.S. (3d) 447 provides an example of a
foisted notice that purported to discharge a debt. The OPCA litigants sent a bank a “Report and
Notice to Solicitor/Counsel and Notice of Suspension of Account Pending Provision of Proof of
Non-Criminality of Activity” that said:
Pending the provision of proof to the contrary, and subject to the
attached/enclosed UNCONDITIONAL TENDER OF FULL PAYMENT ON
DEMAND the aforementioned account is accordingly suspended. I will not
knowingly be a party to moral turpitude or unlawful or illegal activity.
[488] Another example is a document that my office received which, I believe, purports to
defeat a foreclosure. The writer directed a foisted unilateral agreement to the bank. Ten days
without a response led to a “NOTICE OF NON RESPONSE” which stated the bank:
... acquiesces and admits all terms by Tacit Procuration: and all issues are now
deemed Stare Decisis and may not be argued, controverted or protested; and said
acquiescence shall act as a witness and as DEFAULT JUDGMENT IN
ESTOPPEL against [the court master].
109
[489] Another variation on this form is that a state actor receives a demand to prove its
authority. In Law Society of British Columbia v. Dempsey, 2005 BCSC 1277, 142 A.C.W.S.
(3d) 346, affirmed 2006 BCCA 161 at paras. 10-12, 149 A.C.W.S. (3d) 735, Dempsey demanded
the Law Society of British Columbia prove, to his satisfaction, that it had the authority it had
claimed. As usual, a stern warning explained the consequence of failure:
Ten (10) days have been allowed for the Petitioner, the LAW SOCIETY OF
BRITISH COLUMBIA to respond to this Jurisdictional Challenge. Failure to
comply with the above shall be deemed that the Petitioner does not have the
jurisdiction or legal standing to file this Petition.
[490] That same action had Dempsey direct a foisted agreement at the judge hearing whether
Dempsey had practiced law without a license:
The Undersigned does hereby and herein accept the Oath of Office of James
W. Williams d/b/a/ JUSTICE (JAMES W.) WILLIAMS / PUBLIC
SERVANT and all heirs, assigns, and successors, as his open and binding
offer of contract to form a firm and binding, private, bilateral contract
between parties in which he agrees to perform all of his duties as a Public
Servant and promises to uphold all of the Undersigned’s rights.
The foregoing “Notice of Acceptance of Oath of Office” is an instrument in
commerce CUSIP No. 718895600, and is made explicitly under reserve and
without recourse and the foregoing has established your promise to uphold all of
the Undersigned’s rights and not allow any third-party agents to interfere in your
duties to the Undersigned Failure to respond to this offer of contract within three
business days of receipt establishes your unconditional acceptance and will place
you and your office in default, and the presumption will be taken upon the public
record that you, and your office, fully agree to the points and authorities
contained within this Notice of Acceptance of Oath of Office and that they are
true, correct and certain. [Emphasis in original.]
[491] Callaghan v. McCaw; C.C. v. J.M., 2010 SKQB 79 at paras. 10-12, 351 Sask.R. 55
reports what appears to be a foisted unilateral contract scheme to deny child support. In this case
the trigger was that if the support recipient cashed a cheque, that discharged any future child
support obligation, because the cheque carried the following notation:
By Accepting and/or Endorsing and/or Indorsing and/or Cashing and/or
Negotiating and/or Selling and/or Purchasing and/or Holding this Instrument,
Payee and any/all Endorsers (and any/all of their Agents and/or Principals),
jointly and severally explicitly consent and agree to be irrevocably bound by
Agreement RW 065 579 297 CA (and all terms and conditions contained therein).
This instrument remains the property of the Drawer © common-law copy claim.
All Rights Expressly Reserved.
110
The OPCA indicia on this notation are obvious.
c.
Foisted Duties, Agency, or Fiduciary Status
[492] Another application of a foisted unilateral agreement is to transfer or assign some kind of
obligations to someone else. For example, in R. v. Leis, 2008 SKQB 123, 77 W.C.B. (2d) 323,
affirmed 2008 SKCA 103, 311 Sask.R. 310 the OPCA litigant had tried to unilaterally transfer
his obligation to pay utility costs to a government actor as an agent. Bank of Montreal v.
McCance, 2012 ABQB 537 at para. 6 reports an attempt to name this Court and opposing
counsel as fiduciaries.
[493] Mr. Meads’ February 15, 2011 letter to Barbara Petryk (discussed above) falls into this
category. Arguably Mr. Meads’ declaration that I am his fiduciary represents another foisted
duty.
d.
Copyright and Trade-mark
[494] One of the strangest expressions of the foisted unilateral agreement concept relates to
copyright and trade-mark. OPCA litigants very frequently claim copyright and/or trade-mark of
their own names. That can combine with a ‘double/split person’ concept so that the physical
person has an intellectual property interest in the ‘name’ of the non-corporeal aspect. That
appears to be the function of Mr. Meads’ “Copyright Trade-name/Trademark Contract” between
DENNIS LARRY MEADS and Dennis-Larry: Meads.
[495] The OPCA litigant then unilaterally foists on a target a document that purports to govern
use of the copyright and/or trade-mark protected name. Invariably, the document warns that any
unauthorized use of the protected intellectual property means the target has agreed to pay a
certain sum, per use.
[496] Mr. Meads’ material includes one such document, entitled:
NOTICE BY DECLARATION and AFFIDAVIT OF CONSEQUENCES FOR
INFRINGEMENT OF COPYRIGHT TRADE-NAME/TRADEMARK.
And same are accepted for value and exempt from levy.
and is reproduced in whole as Appendix “B”.
[497] This cannot even be described as a ‘unilaterally foisted contract’, it is instead a unilateral
notice foisting obligations on the world:
With the intent of being contractually bound, any juristic person, as well as the
agent thereof, consents and agrees by this Notice that neither said juristic person
nor agent thereof shall display, nor otherwise use in any manner, the common-law
trade-name/trademark DENNIS LARRY MEADS©, nor the common-law
copyright described herein, nor any derivative of, or any variation in the spelling
thereof without the prior, express, written consent and acknowledgment of
111
Secured Party, as signified by Secured Party’s signature in red ink. Secured Party
neither grants, nor implies, nor otherwise gives consent for any unauthorized use
of DENNIS LARRY MEADS©, and all such unauthorized use is strictly
prohibited. [Emphasis in original.]
[498] Any use of Mr. Meads’ protected names:
DENNIS LARRY MEADS© — including any and all derivatives and variations
in the spelling, i.e. DENNIS LARRY MEADS, MEADS DENNIS LARRY,
DENNIS L MEADS, MEADS D LARRY, D L MEADS
means a person owes Mr. Meads $100,000,000.00:
... grants Secured Party a security interest in all of User’s assets, land and
personal property, and all of User’s interest in assets, land and personal property,
in the sum certain amount of $100,000,000.00 per each occurrence of use of the
common-law copyrighted trade-name/trademark DENNIS LARRY MEADS©, as
well as for each and every occurrence of use of any and all derivatives of and
variations in the spelling of DENNIS LARRY MEADS©, plus costs, plus triple
damages ...
[499] This kind of document is far from unique, see for example: Gravlin et al. v. Canadian
Imperial Bank of Commerce et al, 2005 BCSC 839 at para. 9, 140 A.C.W.S. (3d) 447; Dempsey
v. Envision Credit Union, 2006 BCSC 1324 at para. 37, 60 B.C.L.R. (4th) 309.
[500] Sometimes an OPCA litigant claims that breach of a purported copyright interest does
not merely cause a financial penalty, but can even disqualify a court or state actor’s jurisdiction.
For example, in Hajdu v. Ontario (Director, Family Reponsibility Office), 2012 ONSC 1835 at
paras. 23-25, 31, an appeal was based, in part, because the trial court “... was in violation of
international copyright law”. Coats J. concluded this argument “... that the Director or the court
was in breach of copyright law throughout the default hearing is without merit.”
[501] Mr. Meads’ copyright and trade-mark claims are suspect in a number of ways. First, he
claims ownership of his “... common law right of, in and to my Copyright(s), Trademark(s) and
Trade-Name(s) ...” [emphasis added]. The special property interests provided by copyright and
trade-mark flow from legislation (the Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-42, and the Trade-marks
Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. T-13). There has never been a common law right to either.
[502] There is not authority present, nor, I believe, capable of establishing that a personal name
can form a creative work that would be subject to copyright. In any case, even if that were so,
then copyright in a name would presumably vest with its authors, Mr. Meads’ parents. The
Copyright Act also sets the consequence of infringement on copyright: ss. 34-41. Infringement
can lead to damages and recovery of profit (s. 35) and where no damage is proven then statutory
damages (s. 38.1) can be claimed. There is no provision for the kind of ‘contract’ or ‘notice’
claims found in OPCA foisted unilateral copyright agreements.
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[503] Similarly, the claim in relation to trade-mark or trade-name is nonsense. The process to
obtain a trade-mark and the rights that flow from that are set by the Trade-marks Act, not some
unilateral declaration. A trade-mark that has legal effect requires application to the Canadian
Intellectual Property Agency [“CIPO”] for registration. Once a trade-mark is registered and
published, then its owner has associated rights. No evidence has been provided from the CIPO
trade-marks database to establish a registered trade-mark that includes the word “Meads”.
[504] The entire ‘my name is copyright/trade-mark protected’ scheme has an overwhelmingly
juvenile character. People necessarily use names in everyday interaction, commerce, and most
certainly in court. Does it make any sense that any person who were to correspond with Mr.
Meads would be liable to him for $100 million dollars simply because they put his name in the
address? Could people operate in this regime? Must we all address one another by arbitrary
nicknames or some kind of functional description? The answer to these questions is an
overwhelming “no.”
3.
Fee Schedules
[505] OPCA foisted unilateral agreements can target anyone, however, many focus on state,
government, and court actors. These purport to be agreements that a state or court actor agrees to
pay the OPCA litigant a particular amount if a certain legal procedure or result occurs, or law
enforcement personnel engage in certain conduct. OPCA litigants often label the documents that
target state actors with the title “fee schedule”, though other language is also encountered.
[506] Mr. Meads’ June 19 and 21 documents included a fee schedule, cryptically entitled:
Registered Private Tracking Number - LT 679 966 085 CA
UCC-1 Files in ALBERTA - Secured Transaction Registry Number- 11120912227
This is reproduced as Appendix “A”.
[507] Like the copyright and trade-mark notice, this is a formal appearing document, with
impressive legal-sounding language. Once the reader gets past that, one reaches the meat of the
subject. Those served with this document (directly or indirectly) have 30 days to reject it.
Otherwise, the fee schedule, addressed to “All Provincial, State, Federal and International Public
Officials, by and through Province of Alberta, Lieutenant Governor, Donald S. Ethell and/or
Governor General, David Lloyd Johnston”, states that the state, government actors, institutions,
and employees are liable to pay certain amounts if Mr. Meads is subjected to certain conduct, for
example:
Unlawful Arrest, Illegal Arrest, or Restraint, or Distraint, Trespassing/Trespass,
without a lawful, correct, and complete 4th amendment warrant: $2,000,000.00
(Two Million) CAD Dollars, per occurrence, per officer, or agent involved.
...
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Assault or Assault and Battery without Weapon: $2,000,000.00 (Two Million)
CAD Dollars, per occurrence, per officer, or agent involved.
...
Unfounded Accusations by Officers of the Court, or Unlawful Determination:
$2,000,000.00 (Two Million) CAD Dollars, per occurrence, per officer, or agent
involved.
...
Incarceration for Civil or Criminal Contempt of Court without lawful,
documented-in-law, and valid reason: $2,000,000.00 (Two Million) per day, per
occurrence, per officer, or agent involved.
Disrespect by a Judge or Officer of the Court: $2,000,000.00 (Two Million) CDA
Dollars per occurrence, per officer, or agent involved.
Threat, Coercion, Deception, or Attempted Deception by any Officer of the
Court: $2,000,000.00 (Two Million) CAD Dollars per occurrence, per officer, or
agent involved.
...
Coercion or Attempted Coercion of the Natural Man or Woman to take
responsibility for the Corporate Strawman against the Natural Man or Woman
Secured Party's Will: $2,000,000.00 Two Million CAD Dollars, per occurrence,
per officer or agent involved. ...
[508] This document purports to defeat all statutory, common law, judicial, or prosecutorial
discretions and immunities:
... Should you move against me in defiance of this presentment, there is no
immunity from prosecution available to you or to any of your fellow public
officers, officials of government, judges, magistrates, district attorneys, clerks, or
any other persons who become involved in the instant actions, or any future
actions, against me by way of aiding and abetting. Take due heed and govern
yourself accordingly.
[509] Further, the ‘fee schedule’ allegedly cannot be a basis for any legal obligation, sanction,
or punishment, because it says so:
This Statute Staple Securities Instrument is not set forth to threaten, delay, hinder,
harass, or obstruct, but to protect guaranteed Rights and Protections assuring that
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at no time my Unalienable Rights are ever waived or taken from me against my
will by threats, duress, coercion, fraud, or without my express written consent of
waiver. None of the statements contained herein intend to threaten or cause any
type of physical or other harm to anyone. ...
[510] Not merely satisfied with state actors and the courts, the ‘fee schedule’ extends to apply
to international entities (para. 21), businesses (para. 22), and financial institutions (para. 26). In
case any bound person dared defy their obligation, the ‘fee schedule’ warns:
All penalties contained herein will be subject to a penalty increase of one million
dollars per day, plus interest, while there is any unpaid balance for the first thirty
(30) days after default of payment. This penalty will increase by 10% per each
day until balance is paid in full, plus 18% annual interest, beginning on the thirtyfirst (31st) day after default of payment.
“Naturally”, all payments must be in gold or silver.
[511] What is the value of this document? Nothing. It is just another foisted unilateral
agreement. Courts have uniformly refused to enforce ‘agreements’ of this kind: Szoo v. Canada
(Royal Canadian Mounted Police), 2011 BCSC 696; Jabez Financial Services Inc. (Receiver
of) v. Sponagle, 2008 NSSC 112 at paras. 14, 18, 264 N.S.R. (2d) 224; Sydorenko v. Manitoba,
2012 MBQB 42 at para. 5; Canada v. Rudolf, 2010 BCSC 565.
a.
Disproportionate and Unlawful Penalties
[512] The amounts claimed by fee schedules are clearly disproportionate to the alleged
misconduct. If a ‘fee schedule’ were an enforceable contract, then the damages it would
authorize are limited to that which would restore the injured party to their state as if the contract
had been performed. In Fidler v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada, 2006 SCC 30 at para. 27,
[2006] 2 S.C.R. 3, McLachlin C.J.C. and Abella J. stated this principle as:
Damages for breach of contract should, as far as money can do it, place the
plaintiff in the same position as if the contract had been performed.
[513] That does not preclude persons who contract setting damages in advance, what is
sometimes called “liquidated damages”. However, even liquidated damages must be reasonable,
and not a threat held over one party, “in terrorem”: Calgary (City) v. Janse Mitchell Const. Co.
(1919), 59 S.C.R. 101, 48 D.L.R. 328. Whether a predetermined damage amount is reasonable is
always subject to court review; “[i]t is always open to the parties to make the predetermination,
but it must yield to judicial appraisal of its reasonableness in the circumstances.” [emphasis
added]: H.F. Clarke Ltd. v. Thermidaire Corp., [1976] 1 S.C.R. 319 at 331, 54 D.L.R. (3d) 385.
[514] The test to evaluate the validity of a liquidated damages amount is found in the U.K.
House of Lords case of Dunlop Pneumatic Tire Co. v. New Garage and Motor Co., [1915] A.C.
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79 at 86 (H.L.). Two aspects of the test are particularly relevant, that reasonable liquidated
damages are a prohibited penalty where the pre-set amount:
... is extravagant and unconscionable in amount in comparison with the greatest
loss that could possibly follow from the breach [or]
... a single lump sum is made payable upon the occurrence of one or more or all of
several events, some of which may occasion serious and others only trifling
damage, there is a presumption, but no more, that the sum is a penalty.
This was, and remains, the law in Canada: H.F. Clarke Ltd. v. Thermidaire Corp., at 327.
[515] Mr. Meads’ ‘fee schedule’ liquidated damages amounts are an archetype for the first
category of prohibited penalties. As an example, Mr. Meads is due $2,000,000.00 (in gold or
silver) for each occasion I, as a Justice, am disrespectful of Mr. Meads, or if I engage in
“Coercion or Attempted Coercion of the Natural Man or Woman to take responsibility for the
Corporate Strawman against the Natural Man or Woman Secured Party's Will”. I take that latter
prohibition to mean any attempt on my part to reject a ‘double/split person’ or other related
OPCA argument.
[516] Beyond that, these amounts are so grossly disproportionate to awards made by Canadian
courts for injuries outside a contractual context that I do not think it is necessary to survey
Canadian caselaw on that point, beyond referencing a few potential comparators: Andrews v.
Grand & Toy Alberta Ltd., [1978] 2 S.C.R. 229, 83 D.L.R. (3d) 452),
[517] Offenses to personal dignity and liberty may also lead to awards under the Charter.
Recently, the Supreme Court of Canada in Vancouver (City) v. Ward, 2010 SCC 27, [2010] 2
S.C.R. 28 ordered a $5,000.00 payment as a Charter (s. 24(1)) remedy for an unwarranted and
unlawful strip search. That stands in stark contrast to the amounts in Mr. Meads’ ‘fee schedule’.
[518] This Court has received many ‘fee schedules’ and not one has set damage claims in a
reasonable manner. That does not exclude the possibility that such a ‘fee schedule’ may exist or
could be advanced, but to date that possibility remains only a hypothesis. Nevertheless, even in
that case that “agreement” would still be illegally imposed, and have no legal effect no matter
what amount was claimed.
b.
The Targets and Intended Effect of ‘Fee Schedules’
[519] What makes ‘fee schedules’ especially problematic is the manner in which these
documents are used. ‘Fee schedules’ are commonly targeted to peace officers, government
officials, and to court personnel such as law clerks, sheriffs, and legal assistants, or court
administration personnel. Other ‘fee schedules’ purport to create an obligation for a judge or the
state, for example: Canada v. Rudolf, 2010 BCSC 565; Bank of Montreal v. McCance, 2012
ABQB 537 at para. 24; Services de financement TD inc. c. Michaud, 2011 QCCQ 14868 at
para. 9. A particularly bizarre ‘fee schedule’ demand that I have received notifies this court of a
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claim for: “Ignorance of your Legal Maxims: $500,000.00 x 7 Counts”. Never has quizzing the
court been so potentially, but unlawfully, profitable!
[520] One use of ‘fee schedules’ that has become notorious is that OPCA litigants will present
these documents to a peace officer engaged in their duties, and warn the officer that they are
bound by these obligations, personally, to pay these amounts. This is a very common way that
Freeman-on-the-Land and Sovereign Man litigants respond to being stopped while driving, see
for example: Szoo v. Canada (Royal Canadian Mounted Police), 2011 BCSC 696.
[521] Obviously, a ‘fee schedule’ has no legal effect. A person cannot unilaterally foist
obligations of this kind on another or on the state. That is particularly obnoxious when coupled
with declarations that an OPCA litigant is outside state and court authority, which for example
would allegedly make any detention illegal.
[522] The amounts claimed in Mr. Meads’ ‘fee schedule’ are not atypical. ‘Fee schedules’
uniformly include dramatic, threatening language and instruct the recipient they have been
warned and are to watch their step.
[523] Plain and simple, in these contexts ‘fee schedules’ are tools of intimidation. These
documents are intended to deter state and court officials from the proper exercise of their
obligations. They are often physically presented to persons who may have less understanding of
their legal effect (ie. none). The language used in ‘fee schedules’ is intended to heighten those
intimidation effects, as is the totally unwarranted ‘damage’ quantums demanded.
4.
Effect of Unilateral Agreements
[524] In a civil context, advancing a foisted unilateral agreement is very strong evidence that a
litigant has not bargained in good faith, discharged their Rule 1.2(3) obligations, and is engaged
in vexatious litigation worthy of a declaration under Judicature Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. J-2, s.
23.1(1).
[525] Punitive damages are warranted when a person bases a legal action or files a spurious
lien or personal property claim on the basis of a foisted unilateral agreement. The courts have
authority to indemnify the legal costs of a litigant who is forced to defend against a foisted
unilateral agreement scheme: Williams v. Johnston, [2008] O.J. No. 4853 (QL) at para. 15, 2008
CanLII 63194 (Ont. S.C.), affirmed 2009 ONCA 335, 176 A.C.W.S. (3d) 609, leave refused
[2009] S.C.C.A. No. 266; MBNA Canada Bank v. Luciani, 2011 ONSC 6347 at para. 17.
[526] It occurs to me that ‘fee schedules’ may also have a potential criminal effect. Documents
of this kind are intended to impede the legitimate action of government, law enforcement, and
court actors by purporting to assign very sizable penalties for actions that are not only a part of
their jobs, but very often a duty. These penalties are a threat of “damage to property”. Since ‘fee
schedules’ have no legal force, the threats they contain are by definition unlawful.
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[527] If so, it seems that perhaps when a person advances a ‘fee schedule’, that may be prima
facie evidence of the act and intention of the Criminal Code, ss. 423.1, intimidation of a justice
system participant offence. Advancing a ‘fee schedule’ and claims based on the same, may
perhaps also prove other criminal offences. Mr. Meads’ ‘fee schedule’ claims damages that
clearly escalate in a manner that offends the Criminal Code, s. 347 criminal interest rate
prohibition. Documents of this kind may have relevance for whether bail should be granted or
denied: R. v. Boisjoli, 2012 ABQB 556 at para. 51.
[528] In summary, unilateral foisted agreements have no effect in law: Papadopoulos v. Borg,
2009 ABCA 201 at para. 4; Henry v. El, 2010 ABCA 312 at para. 3, leave refused [2011]
S.C.C.A. No. 138. Operationally, these alleged agreements would deny the authority of the court
to determine the substance of a legally binding agreement and all parties intentions. Their effect
is to say the court has no authority to implement legislative rules and prohibitions, and instead
purport to allow a litigant to fine the court, judges, and peace officers for the proper exercise of
their authority and duties. Foisted unilateral agreements are therefore a prohibited attempt to
restrict the jurisdiction of the courts, and merit civil, and possibly criminal, sanction.
E.
Money for Nothing Schemes
[529] To date, OPCA litigants have employed a limited number of what may be called ‘money
for nothing’ schemes. These are different from the other OPCA strategies that I have previously
reviewed, as they do not challenge or subvert the court’s authority, but instead purport to provide
a mechanism by which the OPCA litigant can obtain unconventional benefits.
[530] These are the proverbial caves of hidden treasure. OPCA gurus who advance these
concepts claim that, with the correct combination of documents, one can open a secret path to
vast riches. One needs only know the spell!
1.
Accept for Value / A4V
[531] The most common ‘money for nothing’ scheme has a number of names: “Redemption”,
“Accept for Value”, and “A4V”. The A4V concept originated in the United States, but a
Canadian version has emerged, and Mr. Meads appears to subscribe to that.
[532] The mythology behind the ‘A4V’ scheme is extremely peculiar, and requires travel into
the conspiratorial and demon-haunted shadow world of the OPCA community. Aspects of this
scheme are explained in reported U.S. cases, including: United States v. Heath, 525 F.3d 451
(6th Cir. 2008); United States v. Anderson, 353 F.3d 490, 500 (6th Cir. 2003), certiorari denied,
541 U.S. 1068 (2004); United States v. Oehler, 2003 WL 1824967 (D. Minn. Apr. 2, 2003),
affirmed, 116 Fed. Appx. 43 (8th Cir. 2004); United State v. Eddie Ray Kahn et al., No.
1:08-cr-00271-RCL-1 (U.S.D.C. D.C. May 26, 2010). As I understand it, A4V’s guru promoters
claim that each person is associated with a secret government bank account which contains
millions of dollars. The exact sum varies from guru to guru. The bank account’s number is
usually related to some identification number assigned to a person by the state, such as a Social
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Security Number, a Social Insurance Number, or a birth certificate number. The specific details
of that relationship also seem to vary between A4V schemes.
[533] Mr. Meads clearly has attempted to apply an A4V scheme. His in-court explanation of
the “corporate identity” registered at birth and its associated funds and income are a reference to
this concept. Similarly, a number of the documents Mr. Meads included in his June 19 and 21
materials indicate an A4V strategy, and his cover letter instructed that I order payment of his
child support obligations:
... thru the Provincial-Registered-Event in the PROVINCAIL BIRTH
CERTIFICATE and/or any other government(s) for the Canada Registered
Event(s) ... [sic.]
[534] In Underworld Services Ltd. v. Money Stop Ltd., 2012 ABQB 327 Justice Veit
encountered an A4V variation that relied on a special property of a birth certificate. Mr. Meads’
scheme involves both his Social Insurance Number and birth certificate as having special A4V
properties.
[535] A4V proponents claim that the government maintain these bank accounts to monetize the
state after it abandoned the gold standard. Put another way, the theory, as I understand it, is that
people are property of the state that it uses to secure its currency. This is often expressed as some
form of ‘slavery’.
[536] OPCA gurus who sell the A4V scheme claim that, with a correct combination of
government documents, a person can access their secret bank account and its funds. Mr. Meads’
relies on the following documents to unlock this “account”:
1.
the UCC Financing Statement registered in Ohio for a Certificate of Birth;
2.
the UCC search of “DENNIS LARRY MEADS, foreign situs cestui qui vie trust”;
3
the government of Alberta Personal Property Registry Verification Statement for
“DENNIS LARRY MEADS, foreign situs cestui qui vie trust” that lists as
collateral a birth certificate, social insurance number, UCC1 financing statement,
a certificate of marriage, an operator’s license, Canadian passport, and what I
believe are two court orders; and
4.
the “Actual and Constructive Notice” from Dennis-Larry: Meads to the Bank of
Canada that “accepts for value” enclosed documents in accordance with the
Uniform Commercial Code and the Bank of Canada Act to charge his “public
treasury”, which is identified by his social insurance number, for $100 billion
Canadian dollars or the equivalent in silver or gold.
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I would describe how these documents have the intended effect, except that the A4V
documentary material I have reviewed has never made any sense, so I can only observe the
‘ingredients’ and describe the intended ‘spell effect’.
[537] The exact form of an A4V scheme and associated ‘unlocking spell’ varies from guru to
guru, but there are common motifs that indicate an OPCA litigant is attempting to use these
processes:
1.
any reference to the UCC, or any UCC filing documents;
2.
the language “accept for value” and “return for value”;
3.
a claim that a government bank account exists that is linked to a personal
identification number;
4.
mention of the gold or precious metal standards for money, and the dates those
standards were abandoned;
5.
a claim by a litigant that they are not a slave; this relates to the idea that the state
uses people as collateral;
6.
the U.S. “Emancipation Proclamation” of January 1, 1863, and/or the 13th
Amendment to the U.S. constitution; and
7.
the characteristic “accept for value” stamp or statement written on a bill, court
order, or other correspondence.
[538] In Mr. Meads’ case, he seems to claim that the Court should make an order to discharge
his spousal and child support obligations by payment from the secret A4V government account.
As I understood his statements in court, he had already told his wife’s Counsel to access his
secret bank account, and presumably she too has received many of the documents that Mr.
Meads sent to this Court on June 19 and 21st. Mr Meads also asked for the modest award of $100
billion in gold or silver.
[539] When an A4V litigant writes or stamps a notation such as that described above at paras.
213-215, that, according to A4V mythology, transforms a bill or court order into a cheque drawn
from the secret account. The OPCA litigant’s obligation is gone once the modified document is
returned to its source.
[540] This Court has also seen this concept expressed as a mechanism to negate criminal
charges or an arrest warrant. For example, I have reviewed documents that say:
That the commercial offer presented, (WARRANT FOR ARREST) has been
accepted for value and endorsed by GORDON MICAHEL SCHILLER and
returned to you for settlement and account closure. [sic.]
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The litigants then demanded a $1,000,000.00 payment, or that the court:
... perform the offset, adjust and close the account and provide the original blue
ink WARRANT FOR ARREST to us ...
[541] The entire A4V concept has been reviewed and rejected in Underworld Services Ltd. v.
Money Stop Ltd., 2012 ABQB 327, and Mercedes-Benz Financial v. Kovacevic, [2009] O.J.
No. 783 at para. 42, 2009 CanLII 9368 (Ont. Sup. Ct. J.). I do the same.
[542] Courts have awarded special damages against OPCA litigants who advance A4V
schemes: CIBC v. Marples, 2008 BCSC 590 at paras. 3, 4, 7.
[543] It is very unfortunate that any person would be so gullible as to believe that free money
can be obtained by these theatrics, but nevertheless some, like Mr. Meads, appear unable to resist
the temptation of wealth without obligation. One can only hope that in the future OPCA gurus
will find A4V less attractive, and their risk-loving customers instead invest in alternative forms
of speculation, such as lottery tickets, which provide infinitely better prospects for return.
2.
Bill Consumer Purchases
[544] Recently the Ontario Court of Appeal has, in Toronto-Dominion Bank v. Di Iorio, 2011
ONCA 792 a paras. 2-3, rejected what seems to be a new ‘money for nothing’ scheme, where the
applicants claimed that documents called “Bill-Consumer Purchases” would discharge a debt:
2
The appellants contend that the motion judge erred by not accepting that
the documents they submitted to the respondent, namely, so-called
"Bill-Consumer Purchases" were legal tender for their debts.
3
We disagree. The appellants' documents have no commercial value
whatsoever. Accordingly, the appellants' debts to T-D Bank remain
unpaid.
[545] The trial judgment is not reported, and the Court of Appeal offers little detail on the
theoretical basis of this scheme. My assumption is that this concept in some manner relates to the
“consumer bills and notes” component of the Bills of Exchange Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-4, ss. 188192.
[546] A similar scheme may have been in play in Papadopoulos v. Borg, 2009 ABCA 201.
There the court evaluated whether a claim had been proven, when not refuted by affidavit, and
concluded that it:
... appears to be a distorted view of the Bills of Exchange Act. It is, however,
apparent that the documents do not even slightly resemble genuine bills of
exchange. Furthermore, signing for the registered mail that contained the
documents does not amount to an “acceptance” of any legitimate bill of exchange
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that might be in the envelope. “Acceptance” in the Bills of Exchange Act is a
technical term, and is not the same as acknowledging physical receipt of the
envelope.
[547] A scheme of this type warranted elevated costs against the OPCA litigant: Ramjohn v.
Rudd, 2007 ABQB 84 at paras. 9-10, 156 A.C.W.S. (3d) 38.
3.
Miscellaneous Money for Nothing Schemes
[548] I will briefly review a particularly bizarre ‘money for nothing’ scheme advanced by
Dempsey and described in Dempsey v. Envision Credit Union, 2006 BCSC 750 at paras. 27, 37,
39, 151 A.C.W.S. (3d) 204, Dempsey v. Envision Credit Union, 2006 BCSC 1324 at para. 34,
60 B.C.L.R. (4th) 309, and Gravlin et al. v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce et al, 2005
BCSC 839, 140 A.C.W.S. (3d) 447. For lack of any better description, Dempsey appeared to
claim that the only physical cash, or “hard currency” has value. Therefore, a loan or debt that
was a result of a cheque or electronic transaction did not have to be repaid.
[549] For example, in Dempsey v. Envision Credit Union, 2006 BCSC 750, 151 A.C.W.S. (3d)
204, Garson J. at para. 27 explained Dempsey’s theory this way:
In his submissions on the motions, in the actions concerning him, Mr. Dempsey
described the "money for nothing" theory. He stated that the banks do not have
money. Rather, they create money out of "thin air". He asks, "where did that
money come from", he answers "it came from us". He says the plaintiffs create
money by signing promissory notes, and as soon as the promissory note is signed
the banks deposit money in their own statement of account. The banks do not
place hard currency in the hands of the debtors. Mr. Dempsey complains that the
banks then charge interest on nothing and that is a criminal rate of interest
because interest is charged on nothing. Mr. Dempsey states, "it is not like the old
days, when people used to go to the bank and, in the back room, count out dollars,
there is no law that allows the banks to create dollars out of thin air."
[550] Unsurprisingly, the British Columbia courts have rejected this “fanciful theory” as “so
completely devoid of merit” that litigants should be penalized for launching such actions:
Dempsey v. Envision Credit Union, 2006 BCSC 1324 at paras. 34, 46, 60 B.C.L.R. (4th) 309.
F.
Legal Effect and Character of OPCA Arguments
1.
OPCA Strategies that Deny Court Authority
[551] The majority of OPCA concepts, those other than the ‘money for nothing’ category, in
one sense or another seek to deny court authority.
a.
An OPCA Argument that Denies Court Authority Cannot Succeed Due to
the Court’s Inherent Authority
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[552] As I have previously explained, that crucial flaw in the OPCA concepts is a basis to
categorically dismiss the majority of OPCA strategies and mechanisms. A court should do so at
the first opportunity.
[553] OPCA litigants cannot evade, deny, or re-frame the jurisdiction of the Canadian courts.
The judicial system is an independent, free-standing apparatus that neither relies on the state or
the individual. This authority serves everyone who has suffered an injury to their rights,
including the very OPCA litigants who deny the court’s role, when convenient, but who seem so
eager to exploit its authority to meet their own ends.
b.
An OPCA Argument that Denies Court Authority is Intrinsically Frivolous
and Vexatious
[554] As discussed above, many individual OPCA concepts that attack court jurisdiction have
been identified and rejected as frivolous and vexatious arguments. For example:
1.
litigation based on ‘double/split’ person schemes: Tuck v. Canada, 2007 TCC
418 at para. 18; Hovey Ventures Inc. v. Canada, 2007 TCC 139 at para. 12, 2007
CCI 139; Friesen v. Canada, 2007 TCC 287 at para. 6, [2007] 5 C.T.C. 2067;
2.
tax protest based immunity: Jackson v. Canada (Customs and Revenue Agency),
2001 SKQB 377 at paras. 18-19, 210 Sask.R. 285; Country Plaza Motors Ltd. v.
Indian Head (Town), 2005 SKQB 442 at paras. 21-22, 272 Sask.R. 198;
3.
a foisted unilateral agreement: Banilevic v. Canada (Customs and Revenue
Agency), 2002 SKQB 371 at paras. 12-13, 117 A.C.W.S. (3d) 549;
4.
“Moorish Law” concepts: Henry v. El, 2010 ABCA 312 at para. 3, leave refused
[2011] S.C.C.A. No. 138;
5.
a ‘military flag’ appeal: R. v. J.B.C. Securities Ltd., 2003 NBCA 53 at para. 9,
261 N.B.R. (2d) 199; and
6.
an ‘everything is a contract’ argument: Sandri v. Canada (Attorney General),
2009 CanLII 44282 at paras. 11-14, 179 A.C.W.S. (3d) 811 (Ont. Sup. Ct. J.).
[555] These are simply examples of a more general principle. A pleading is frivolous if its
substance indicates bad faith or is factually hopeless: Donaldson v. Farrell, 2011 ABQB 11 at
para 20. A frivolous plea is one so palpably bad that the Court needs no real argument to be
convinced of that fact: Haljan v. Serdahely Estate, 2008 ABQB 472 at para 21.
[556] My previous review indicates why, globally, any OPCA strategy that denies court
authority is intrinsically frivolous and vexatious. These arguments cannot succeed in the face of
123
the inherent jurisdiction of the superior courts of Canada. Any argument or scheme that
possesses this characteristic is therefore clearly invalid and cannot be a basis for litigation.
Further, the conduct of OPCA litigants and gurus, and their rhetoric, makes very plain that these
schemes are advanced with the express purpose of abusing the court’s processes.
c.
An OPCA Argument that Denies Court Authority May Be Contempt of
Court Authority
[557] There is a further implication to the fact that OPCA strategies generally attempt to defeat
the intrinsic authority of Canadian superior courts. In my view, when a person advances an
OPCA argument, other than a ‘money for nothing’ scheme, that litigant is potentially in
contempt of court. Put another way, an OPCA technique of that kind may meet both the actus
reus and mens rea of the contempt offence.
[558] This conclusion draws from jurisprudence that evaluates the legal effect of a denial of
state authority.
i.
Denial of Tax Obligation Evades Tax
[559] Several provincial courts of appeal have accepted as a principle that the mens rea
component for income tax evasion (Income Tax Act, s. 239(1)(d)), is proven where a person:
1.
denies income tax liability on the basis that the Crown has no jurisdiction to tax,
or
2.
chooses not to pay income tax.
[560] The income tax evasion sanctions provided by Income Tax Act, s. 239(1)(e-f), and
potentially enhanced under Income Tax Act, s. 239(2), represent serious criminal consequences:
a fine of up to 200% of the amounts evaded, and imprisonment of up to two years (s. 239(1)(ef)) or five years (s. 239)(2)).
[561] R. v. Klundert (2004), 242 D.L.R. (4th) 644, 190 O.A.C. 36 (Ont. C.A.), leave refused
[2004] S.C.C.A. No. 463 involved a taxpayer who claimed that income tax had no constitutional
basis. The central issue on appeal was whether a defence of honest mistake was possible or
instead the intentional refusal to pay tax proved an intent to evade paying tax (paras. 43-49).
Doherty J.A. noted that intent and ignorance of the law is relevant in certain criminal contexts
(para. 54), but that an asserted belief in the unconstitutional character of tax legislation does not
indicate a misunderstanding. Rather, it indicates a conscious intention to disobey:
58.
... Dr. Klundert knew full well that he owed tax imposed by the Act. His
mistake did not go to knowledge of his obligation to pay taxes owing
under the Act but rather to the government's right to impose that
obligation on him. He did not assert that he was doing his best to comply
with the law but, through ignorance or mistake, failed to do so. To the
124
contrary, he acknowledged the obligation to pay under the Act and made a
considered decision to refuse to pay because of a belief that the law
requiring him to pay was invalid. [Emphasis added.]
That refusal established the mens rea component of the tax evasion offence, that the taxpayer
had willfully evaded paying income tax (paras. 62-64).
[562] The Ontario Court of Appeal returned to this issue in R. v. Ricci (2004), 190 O.A.C. 375,
[2005] 1 C.T.C. 40 (Ont. C.A.), leave refused [2004] S.C.C.A. No. 551, and evaluated a taxpayer
who advanced the relatively common OPCA argument that the taxpayer was not a person but “...
a "natural person of commoner status" and not subject to payment of income tax.” (para. 4). The
taxpayer argued he was not guilty of tax evasion, as that was his honest belief (para. 5).
Following R. v. Klundert the court concluded the taxpayer was guilty of tax evasion:
6 The trial judge concluded that the appellant intentionally disregarded his
obligations under the Act thereby finding that the requisite mens rea for the
offence had been made out. In our opinion it was open to him to do so. R. v.
Klundert, [2004] O.J. No. 3515, made it clear that a person is not exempt from
paying taxes based on his political, religious, philosophical or moral beliefs. ...
[Emphasis added.]
[563] In R. v. Kennedy, 2004 BCCA 638 at para. 14, 207 B.C.A.C. 102, leave refused [2006]
S.C.C.A. No. 15, Hall J.A. determined that the appellant’s guilt was proven by his choice to file
inaccurate income tax returns “... because of his belief that the Income Tax Act was
constitutionally invalid ...” and concluded:
... In my opinion, Klinger P.C.J. correctly held that the appellant was required to
disclose that income tax in his return regardless of any belief he may have had as
to the constitutional right of the federal government to levy or collect income
taxes. Having reached this conclusion about the appellant's duty to report income,
it seems to me that the trial judge was bound to find the appellant guilty on count
3 in the Information. No additional mental element was required ... [Emphasis
added.]
While the R. v. Kennedy cases does not explain the rationale for the litigant’s belief, the full
style of cause of his Supreme Court of Canada leave for appeal application,
“Robert-Victor-MacPherson: Kennedy v. Her Majesty the Queen (B.C.)”, is highly suggestive.
[564] The Alberta Court of Appeal has cited R. v. Klundert in R. v. Breakell, 2009 ABCA 173
at para. 17, 454 A.R. 205 though not specifically for the ‘mens rea’ rule.
ii.
Denial of Firearms Restrictions Proves Intent for Illegal Possession
[565] Similarly, the Ontario Court of Appeal in R. v. Montague, 2010 ONCA 141 at paras. 3941, 260 O.A.C. 12 applied the R. v. Klundert presumption in a separate criminal context,
125
regulation of firearms. The appellant was a person who had been found with weapons and
ammunition stored in a hidden room: “It is fair to say that the quantity and nature of the seized
arsenal of weapons and associated items may have been sufficient for a small-scale
insurrection.” (para. 3).
[566] The court concluded it was unnecessary in this circumstance to have a jury consider
whether the gun collector had intended his unlawful conduct:
40 In this case, it is apparent from his own evidence that Mr. Montague was not
trying to obey the law; instead, in protest against various firearms laws and
regulations with which he disagreed, he was choosing which laws he thought
should be obeyed. In sum, he knowingly disobeyed the current law. In these
circumstances, the defences of honest but mistaken belief and colour of right have
no application. [Emphasis added.]
iii.
Denial of Court Authority May Prove the Intent to Engage in
Contempt of Court
[567] A general principle emerges from these cases where a person denies application of law
on the basis that it is contrary to the person’s “political, religious, philosophical or moral
beliefs”. Denial that a law applies is proof that the person has intended to disobey the law. One
such possible expression of “political, religious, philosophical or moral beliefs” is a statement
that the state or the courts have no authority over a person.
[568] I have reviewed, in my discussion of the inherent authority of superior courts, why
everyone who is in Canada is subject to Canadian law and the Canadian courts. Further, this is a
simple fact known by all, an element of the most basic levels of education, and a cornerstone of
the operation of an ordered society. As Chief Justice Lamer indicated in Ref re Remuneration of
Judges of the Prov. Court of P.E.I.; Ref re Independence and Impartiality of Judges of the
Prov. Court of P.E.I., [1997] 3 S.C.R. 3 at para. 108, 150 D.L.R. (4th) 577, the independent but
overarching operation of Canadian courts is “definitional to the Canadian understanding of
constitutionalism”.
[569] If so, then it is possible that simply advancing many OPCA concepts arguments may
prove an intention to disobey and ignore the courts and the law. Reduced to their simplest form,
many, if not most, OPCA arguments and concepts resolve to a simple claim: “I am not subject to
control or sanction by any court or government.”
[570] I have previously concluded that an OPCA concept that denies the jurisdiction of the
court is vexatious in character and a basis to immediately strike out arguments, applications, and
litigation. That also may be a basis to find a person in contempt of court.
[571] The long-established contempt of court authority exists to ensure a court can uphold its
dignity and process. Justice McLachlin (as she then was) in United Nurses of Alberta v. Alberta
(Attorney General), [1992] 1 S.C.R. 901 at 931-933, 89 D.L.R. (4th) 609 observed that “[t]he
126
rule of law is directly dependent on the ability of the courts to enforce their process and maintain
their dignity and respect.”
[572] She continued to identify the kinds of misconduct that constitute the more serious form
of contempt, criminal contempt of court:
... A person who simply breaches a court order, for example by failing to abide by
visiting hours stipulated in a child custody order, is viewed as having committed
civil contempt. However, when the element of public defiance of the court's
process in a way calculated to lessen societal respect for the courts is added to the
breach, it becomes criminal. ...
... The gravamen of the offence is rather the open, continuous and flagrant
violation of a court order without regard for the effect that may have on the
respect accorded to edicts of the court.
... To establish criminal contempt the Crown must prove that the accused defied
or disobeyed a court order in a public way (the actus reus), with intent, knowledge
or recklessness as to the fact that the public disobedience will tend to depreciate
the authority of the court (the mens rea). The Crown must prove these elements
beyond a reasonable doubt. As in other criminal offences, however, the necessary
mens rea may be inferred from the circumstances. An open and public defiance
of a court order will tend to depreciate the authority of the court. Therefore when
it is clear the accused must have known his or her act of defiance will be public, it
may be inferred that he or she was at least reckless as to whether the authority of
the court would be brought into contempt. [Emphasis added.]
[573] Any hearing before a court, with some specific exceptions, is open and public. The
intended purpose of OPCA strategies and the stereotypical forms of OPCA litigant in-court
activity generally appear intended to both reduce public respect for and defeat court authority.
Therefore, advancing an OPCA strategy, concept, or mechanism that denies court authority in
Court may, by definition, meet the actus reus and mens rea elements of criminal contempt of
court.
[574] As noted above, Justice McLachlin at 931 emphasizes that defiance of court authority in
a non-public context is a basis for a finding of civil contempt. She offers, as an example:
A person who simply breaches a court order, for example by failing to abide by
visiting hours stipulated in a child custody order, is viewed as having committed
civil contempt.
What is crucial is the intention that the defiant act be public, rather than that it happens for some
reason to become the subject of public attention.
127
[575] In my view, advancing OPCA strategies outside the courtroom may in certain instances
qualify as civil contempt.
[576] Mercedes-Benz Financial v. Kovacevic, [2009] O.J. No. 783, 2009 CanLII 9368 and
Mercedes-Benz Financial v. Kovacevic (2009), 308 D.L.R. (4th) 562, 74 C.P.C. (6th) 326 (Ont.
Sup. Ct. J.) provide an example of an OPCA litigant being found guilty of contempt of court for
ignoring a court order and advancing a range of ‘immunity’, ‘double/split person’ and A4V
techniques.
[577] As previously explored in relation to the intrinsic jurisdiction of the courts, when a
person says they are in the wrong court then that could be a legitimate argument, however the
argument that no court has jurisdiction over a person is vexatious and may be in contempt of
(some) court.
[578] However, in the final analysis, the limits of the application of the contempt of court
principles are best explored in a proceeding where an OPCA litigant is alleged to engage in
contempt of court by some form of OPCA conduct.
iv.
Other Government Authorities
[579] It occurs to me that the approach to denial of state legislative authority taken in R. v.
Klundert, R. v. Ricci, R. v. Kennedy, and R. v. Montague could potentially also apply to
government authority outside the income tax and firearms contexts.
[580] For example, a court may conclude an OPCA litigant who argues that no government has
the authority to restrict or legislate use of automobiles advances a vexatious argument, unless the
litigant frames that argument in a constitutional context. That denial of state authority would
presumably prove the intent to engage in unlawful conduct.
[581] As the facts of this case do not relate to that kind of situation, I will leave exploration of
that possibility to another proceeding. Nevertheless, I think it is important that OPCA litigants,
including Mr. Meads, be aware of this possible consequence to their common practice of
denying state authority.
2.
Other OPCA Strategies
[582] The ‘money for nothing’ category of OPCA litigation strategies is not inherently
frivolous and vexatious. That said, Canadian courts have consistently rejected the validity of
these schemes, and identified these concepts as an inappropriate basis for litigation. Litigants and
involved gurus who advance ‘money for nothing’ schemes have attracted elevated and special
costs awards: Dempsey v. Envision Credit Union, 2006 BCSC 1324 at paras. 34, 46, 60
B.C.L.R. (4th) 309; CIBC v. Marples, 2008 BCSC 590 at paras. 3, 4, 7; Ramjohn v. Rudd, 2007
ABQB 84 at paras. 9-10, 156 A.C.W.S. (3d) 38.
128
[583] Mr. Meads has advanced a ‘money for nothing’ scheme, the A4V technique. I have
previously concluded that it has no effect in law. A4V is a fiction that OPCA litigants use to
defeat valid fiscal obligations.
[584] Further, I conclude that any litigation or defence based on the pseudolegal A4V concept
is inherently frivolous and vexatious. That favours full indemnification of a person who faces an
A4V strategy, and punitive and aggravated damages where the A4V strategy is advanced outside
a litigation context.
[585] I see no reason why other OPCA ‘money for nothing’ schemes will not be evaluated in
an analogous manner, but leave that issue to future proceedings.
3.
Responses to OPCA Strategies
[586] Canadian courts have adopted a variety and range of responses to OPCA litigants and
litigation. Any judge who faces OPCA litigation should consider deployment of all tools in this
arsenal, and others that may be developed for this difficult litigant category.
a.
Strike Actions, Motions, and Defences
[587] A court may strike claims or dismiss an action where the judge concludes that a
commencement document or pleading is frivolous, irrelevant or improper (Rule 3.68(2)(c)), or
an abuse of process (Rule 3.68(2)(d)).
[588] There is also a well established common-law authority that a court’s inherent jurisdiction
may be applied to control its own process and prevent abuse: Canam Enterprises Inc v. Coles,
(2000), 51 O.R. (3d) 481 (Ont. C.A.) at paras 55 56, affirmed, 2002 SCC 63, [2002] 3 S.C.R.
307; McMeekin v. Alberta (Attorney General), 2012 ABQB 144 at para. 14.
[589] This is a common response by courts to OPCA litigation. Examples where an action or
defence was struck on that basis include: Jabez Financial Services Inc. (Receiver of) v.
Sponagle, 2008 NSSC 112 at para. 19, 264 N.S.R. (2d) 224; Tuck v. Canada, 2007 TCC 418 at
para. 18; Hovey Ventures Inc. v. Canada, 2007 TCC 139 at para. 12, 2007 CCI 139; Friesen v.
Canada, 2007 TCC 287 at para. 6, [2007] 5 C.T.C. 2067; Dempsey v. Envision Credit Union,
2006 BCSC 750, 151 A.C.W.S. (3d) 204; National Leasing Group Inc. v. Top West Ventures
Ltd., 2001 BCSC 111 at para. 9, 102 A.C.W.S. (3d) 303; Borkovic v. Laurentian Bank of
Canada, 2001 BCSC 337 at para. 23, 103 A.C.W.S. (3d) 700.
[590] Alternatively, when faced with truly baffling OPCA materials, a court may take the
approach applied in Kisikawpimootewin v. Canada, 2004 FC 1426 at para. 9, 134 A.C.W.S. (3d)
396 and strike a proceeding based on incomprehensible arguments and allegations, where the
defendant is “left both embarrassed and unable to defend itself” and the court faces “a
proceeding so ill-defined that it is unable to discern an argument, or identify any specific
material facts.”
b.
Punitive Damages
129
[591] Where specifically sought by the party opposing an OPCA litigant, punitive damages
may be appropriate where a litigant advances an OPCA scheme, concept, or strategy. An award
of this kind would relate to pre-trial misconduct (Polar Ice Express Inc. v. Arctic Glacier Inc.,
2009 ABCA 20 at para. 21, 446 A.R. 295), such as a demand for payment or a lien filed on the
basis of a foisted unilateral agreement.
[592] The test for misconduct of this kind was recently restated by the Supreme Court of
Canada in Richard v. Time Inc., 2012 SCC 8 at para. 149, 342 D.L.R. (4th) 1:
At common law, punitive damages can be awarded in any civil suit in which the
plaintiff proves that the defendant’s conduct was “malicious, oppressive and high
handed [such] that it offends the court’s sense of decency” ... The requirement
that the plaintiff demonstrate misconduct that represents a marked departure from
ordinary standards of decency ensures that punitive damages will be awarded
only in exceptional cases ... [Citations omitted.]
See also Hill v. Church of Scientology of Toronto, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 1130 at para. 196, 126
D.L.R. (4th) 129; Whiten v. Pilot Insurance Co., 2002 SCC 18 at para. 136, [2002] 1 S.C.R.
595.
[593] It appears to me that asserting an OPCA scheme, particularly one that has been identified
and dismissed as ineffective, can attract punitive damages, where specifically sought by the party
opposing the OPCA litigant. The manner in which ‘fee schedules’ and other foisted unilateral
agreements are used seem to make that strategy a particularly appropriate target. These
documents have no basis in law, reverse the burden of evidence, and typically involve grotesque
and unwarranted ‘fines’. To quote Justice Brown, in MBNA Canada Bank v. Luciani, 2011
ONSC 6347 at para. 3, these are “[a] good old-fashioned shake-down!” Extortion deserves a
punitive response.
c.
Elevated Costs
[594] Presumptively, an unsuccessful litigant is expected to pay the opposing parties an amount
to offset the legal cost of a proceeding, hearing, or application: Rule 10.29(1). One potential
exception to that is where an issue is novel, and therefore the court should take the exceptional
step of not ordering costs, see Grant v. Grant, 2010 ABQB 735 at paras. 9-17, 1 R.F.L. (7th) 203
for a helpful review of the novelty criteria. Though many OPCA concepts and arguments
certainly are unusual, I am not aware any case where costs obligations against an OPCA litigant
were waived on the basis they are “novel”. Instead, the opposite has occurred.
[595] Perhaps unsurprisingly, OPCA litigation has historically led to elevated cost awards.
Examples that are reported include:
1.
double costs: Banilevic v. Canada (Customs and Revenue Agency), 2002 SKQB
371 at paras. 12-13, 117 A.C.W.S. (3d) 549; Ellis v. Canada (Office of the Prime
Minister), 2001 SKQB 378 at para. 29, 210 Sask.R. 138;
130
2.
special costs: Dempsey v. Envision Credit Union, 2006 BCSC 1324 at paras. 46,
48, 60 B.C.L.R. (4th) 309; CIBC v. Marples, 2008 BCSC 590 at paras. 3, 4, 7;
and
3.
substantial or full indemnification: Williams v. Johnston, [2008] O.J. No. 4853
(QL) at para. 15, 2008 CanLII 63194 (Ont. S.C.), affirmed 2009 ONCA 335, 176
A.C.W.S. (3d) 609, leave denied [2009] S.C.C.A. No. 266; MBNA Canada Bank
v. Luciani, 2011 ONSC 6347 at paras. 3, 17.
[596] A cost award that indemnifies an innocent party has merit where that person faces OPCA
litigation, at least for the portions of an action that relates to an OPCA concept, argument, or
strategy. Frequently that may be either on a full indemnity, solicitor and own client basis, or an
elevated solicitor and client costs award. Moen J. has recently reviewed the criteria for elevated
cost awards of this kind in Brown v. Silvera, 2010 ABQB 224 at paras. 29-35, 488 A.R. 22.
[597] Some of the identified criteria for an award of those kinds include:
•
solicitor and client costs are awarded where the conduct of a party has been
‘reprehensible, scandalous or outrageous’: Walsh v. Mobil Oil Canada, 2008
ABCA 268 at para. 112, 440 A.R. 199; Hamilton v. Open Window Bakery Ltd.,
2004 SCC 9 at para. 26, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 303; Young v. Young, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 3
at 134, 108 D.L.R. (4th) 193;
•
solicitor and client costs might suffice to satisfy the objectives of deterrence and
punishment that would otherwise be served by a punitive damage award:
Colborne Capital Corp. v. 542775 Alberta Ltd., 1999 ABCA 14 at para. 294, 228
A.R. 201; College of Physicians & Surgeons, 2009 ABQB 48 at paras. 4-23, 468
A.R. 101;
•
misconduct during the litigation can surely be found if there is no reasonable
basis on which to commence, or continue, litigation: College of Physicians &
Surgeons, at para. 33;
•
a proceeding that was based on groundless allegations and was a type of conduct
that should be discouraged: College of Physicians & Surgeons, at para. 33;
•
justice can only be done by a complete indemnification for costs: Foulis v.
Robinson (1978), 21 O.R. (2d) 769, 92 D.L.R. (3d) 134 (Ont. C.A.);
•
there is evidence that the plaintiff did something to hinder, delay or confuse the
litigation, where there was no serious issue of fact or law which required these
lengthy, expensive proceedings, where the positively misconducting party was
“contemptuous” of the aggrieved party in forcing that aggrieved party to exhaust
legal proceedings to obtain that which was obviously his: Max Sonnenberg Inc.
131
v. Stewart, Smith (Canada) Ltd., 48 Alta. L.R. (2d) 367, [1987] 2 W.W.R. 75
(Alta. Q.B.);
•
an attempt to deceive the court and defeat justice, an attempt to delay, deceive
and defeat justice: Olson v. New Home Certification Program of Alberta (1986),
69 A.R. 356, 44 Alta. L.R. (2d) 207 (Alta. Q.B.);
•
where the defendants were guilty of positive misconduct, where others should be
deterred from like conduct and the defendants should be penalized beyond the
ordinary order of costs: Dusik v. Newton (1984), 51 B.C.L.R. 217, 24 A.C.W.S.
(2d) 465 (B.C.S.C.), varied on other grounds 62 B.C.L.R. 1, 31 A.C.W.S. (2d)
199 (B.C.C.A.);
•
an attempt to delay or hinder proceedings, an attempt to deceive or defeat justice,
fraud or untrue or scandalous charges: Pharand Ski Corp. v. Alberta (1991), 122
A.R. 81, 122 A.R. 395 (Alta. Q.B.); and
•
the positive misconduct of the party which gives rise to the action is so blatant
and is calculated to deliberately harm the other party, then despite the technically
proper conduct of the legal proceedings, the very fact that the action must be
brought by the injured party to gain what was rightfully his in the face of an
unreasonable denial: Jackson v. Trimac Industries Ltd. (1993), 138 A.R. 161 at
para. 32, 8 Alta. L.R. (3d) 403 (Alta. Q.B.), affirmed on costs, 155 A.R. 42, 20
Alta. L.R. (3d) 117 (Alta. C.A.) (but see Polar Ice Express Inc. v. Arctic Glacier
Inc., 2009 ABCA 20 at para. 21, 446 A.R. 295).
[598] Many, if not most, of these characteristics emerge in a typical proceeding that involves
OPCA concepts and litigants. The character of that misconduct is further aggravated by the fact
that OPCA litigants enter into the courts wielding tools that they anticipate will disrupt, if not
break, the system, and thereby defeat genuine legal rights.
[599] I note that increased costs, such as special costs or double costs, were awarded by courts
which had a more limited appreciation of the OPCA movement, its members, and strategies.
With our present understanding of this vexatious litigation phenomenon, a strong deterrent
response is appropriate. Similarly, the courts have an obligation to help shield those who are
targeted in this manner.
[600] Courts have made gurus liable for costs where a guru participates and instigates litigation
of this kind: Dempsey v. Envision Credit Union, 2006 BCSC 1324 at paras. 46, 48, 60 B.C.L.R.
(4th) 309, see also Jackson v. Canada (Customs and Revenue Agency), 2001 SKQB 377 at
para. 40, 210 Sask.R. 285. I think that is a reasonable response to the participation of these
highly disruptive and manipulative persons.
d.
Order Security for Costs
132
[601] I am not aware of any OPCA litigation where the target of the OPCA strategy has applied
for payment into court of security for costs (Rule 4.22). That said, it seems to me that litigation, a
defence, or an application, that flows from a known OPCA strategy, might favour an order of
that kind. OPCA strategies that are proven as invalid means the merits of an OPCA litigation are
poor: Rule, 4.22(c). Second, OPCA litigants stereotypically deny any obligation to pay state and
court obligations, which would make enforcement of a costs award difficult: Rule, 4.22(a).
[602] Last, there is the fact these OPCA litigants usually say they stand outside the court’s
authority. That alone is a strong factor that may favour a security for costs order (Rule, 4.22(e)),
as that certainly does not favour a reasonable confidence that in this instance the OPCA litigant
will acknowledge and discharge his or her cost liability.
e.
Fines
[603] Rule 10.49(1) authorizes a judge to order “a party, lawyer or other person” [emphasis
added] pay the court clerk a penalty where a person:
(a)
fails to comply with these rules or a practice note or direction of the Court
without adequate excuse, and
(b)
the contravention or failure to comply, in the Court’s opinion, has
interfered with or may interfere with the proper or efficient administration
of justice.
[604] At the present date there do not seem to be any reported judgments that apply Rule
10.49(1). A number of decisions report on application of its precursor, Alberta Rules of Court,
Alta Reg 390/1968, s. 599.1, for instances where misconduct had led to delay and unnecessary
steps (Pollock v. Liberty Technical Services Ltd. (1997), 50 Alta. L.R. (3d) 335, 71 A.C.W.S.
(3d) 20 (Alta. Q.B.)) and as a mechanism to pay for expenditures that were otherwise beyond
recovery (A.S. v. N.L.H., 2006 ABQB 708, 405 A.R. 35).
[605] This Rule provides a potentially very helpful mechanism to address OPCA litigant and
guru misconduct. Further, any fine issued under this Rule does not affect the substance of a
dispute, thus respecting any genuine legal rights and issues that an OPCA litigant may possess.
[606] Practically any OPCA document fails to comply with the formal and content
requirements of the Rules. Those criteria may be developed further by specific court procedures.
Similarly, in-court OPCA litigant behaviour often ignores judicial direction. Most OPCA
strategies are intentionally disruptive, or at least have that effect, meeting the second penalty
criterion of Rule 10.49. OPCA arguments and concepts are generally frivolous, spurious, and
vexatious, and therefore employment of these would “interfere with ... the proper or efficient
administration of justice.”
[607] If so, this Court has a very flexible tool that may be applied to penalize persons who
advance OPCA methods. Notably, this Rule allows a judge to target ‘other persons’, such as the
133
third-parties who sometimes claim to ‘represent’ or act as an ‘agent’ for a OPCA litigant, or an
OPCA litigant employing a ‘double/split person’ strategy who refuses to identify themself.
f.
One Judge Remaining on a File
[608] OPCA litigation is often associated with complex and unorthodox court documentation,
correspondence, irregular litigation procedures, and a difficult history, both inside and outside
the courtroom. A lay person, lawyer, or judge who confronts one of these files for the first time
will probably require significant time and effort to become familiar with the materials and events
to date.
[609] That fact is compounded by the potentially very uncooperative nature of OPCA litigants,
particularly those who are attempting to apply ‘everything is a contract’ and ‘dual/split person’
schemes. In that sense, OPCA litigation has many of the characteristics of high conflict family
disputes.
[610] As a consequence, it makes sense that a single judge should usually supervise a court
proceeding in which OPCA activities have emerged, and that action is an ongoing process. This
may be achieved by having a judge seize themselves of the matter, or a more formal process
such as assigning a case management judge - in our Court, the former converts into the latter.
[611] This has a further advantage in that the judge then will have a direct opportunity to
observe the activity and development of in-court OPCA litigant strategies and conduct. Whether
an ongoing relationship with a supervising judge is a better way to establish a meaningful
dialogue with these difficult litigants is not, at present, clear. Time will tell.
4.
Responses to OPCA Litigants and Gurus
a.
Vexatious Litigant Status
[612] The vexatious character of OPCA litigation may be a basis for an application under
Judicature Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. J-2, s. 23.1(1) that a litigant be restricted in their authority to
initiate or continue an action.
[613] Vexatious litigant declarations of this kind are reported for OPCA gurus Lindsay (British
Columbia (Attorney General) v. Lindsay, 2007 BCCA 165, 238 B.C.A.C. 254, leave refused
[2007] S.C.C.A. No. 359; Manitoba (Attorney General) v. Lindsay, 2000 MBCA 11, 145
Man.R. (2d) 187) and Dempsey (Dempsey v. Casey, 2004 BCCA 395 at paras. 36-38, 132
A.C.W.S. (3d) 833), and Edmonton area Moorish Law OPCA litigant Henry (Henry v. El, 2010
ABCA 312 at para. 3, leave refused [2011] S.C.C.A. No. 138).
b.
Deny Status as a Representative
[614] For reasons that I suspect are made obvious by these Reasons, there is good basis for a
court to deny persons in the OPCA movement, particularly gurus, from acting as representatives
134
or agents, in court. Moreover, such representation is contrary to the Legal Profession Act, R.S.A.
2000, c. L-8, s. 106(1).
[615] Even where otherwise not prohibited by law (as it is in Alberta), I have identified a
number of decisions where agency has been denied, and those courts have offered very useful
bases for their action. In Gravlin et al. v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce et al, 2005
BCSC 839 at para. 71, 140 A.C.W.S. (3d) 447, Justice Garson concluded that any agent who
claims to not be subject to the rule of law is unfit to represent a client in court. The late Justice
Nash in R. v. Main, 2000 ABQB 56 at para. 36, 259 A.R. 163 observed that an advocate who “...
has demonstrated an intention not to be bound by rules and governing procedures in court ...”
should not be permitted to represent a litigant. I agree with both of these principles.
[616] Similarly, the fact that a person is a known OPCA litigant was a basis to deny that
litigant agent status: Hill v. Hill, 2008 SKQB 11 at paras. 29-30, 306 Sask.R. 259, see also R. v.
Romanowicz (1999), 45 O.R. (3d) 506, 178 D.L.R. (4th) 466 for commentary on “disreputable
or incompetent” representatives.
[617] In R. v. Martin, 2012 NSPC 73, Judge Atwood at para. 6 describes how an OPCA
movement member was so ineffectual as a representative that he was denied agent status:
... This agent, who identified himself as “Patrick”, known alternatively as “Ellis”,
stated clearly that he recognized the King James Bible as the only source of law,
and embarked on a lengthy inquiry of the Court as to the source of its authority,
raising the significance of portraiture of the Sovereign over the bench. As this
agent kept getting bogged down in questions and issues that were not properly
before the Court, I concluded and ordered that he not be permitted to act as agent.
I agree that Judge Atwood acted properly to deny representation by this agent once his nature
had become apparent. That said, I do not believe it is necessary to defer denial of status so as to
test effectiveness where the proposed representative has a known or obvious OPCA affiliation.
[618] I note that in R. v. L’Espinay, 2005 BCPC 662 at paras. 45-53, affirmed 2008 BCCA 20
at paras. 3-7, 228 C.C.C. (3d) 129, leave denied [2011] S.C.C.A. No. 494, the court did not limit
itself to observed misconduct, but concluded that a person’s out-of-court statements, such as a
webpage, were a fair basis to evaluate whether that person was an appropriate agent for a party. I
agree that kind of evidence is appropriate to test whether or not a person with OPCA affiliations
is an appropriate in-court litigation representative, assuming legal prerequisites are otherwise
met.
5.
Conclusion - Responses to OPCA Litigation and Litigants
[619] The objectives and mindset of the typical OPCA litigant presents a challenge to the
courts. One should never lose sight of the possibility that a genuine legal issue may lurk,
somewhere, behind strange courtroom conduct, and peculiar documentation. However, that is no
135
basis to allow a disruptive and malicious litigant to run rough-shod over innocent parties and
proper judicial and court procedures.
[620] With that in mind, perhaps the best perspective is that a judge carry both carrot and stick.
It has been this Court’s experience that a firm notice that certain kinds of conduct will not be
tolerated sometimes produces the desired result. On other occasions, only active
countermeasures and sanctions will bring this kind of litigation under control.
[621] Existing court responses provide a range of response. How that will be tailored will, no
doubt, be the subject of considerable future analysis and commentary.
VII.
Review
[622] Mr. Meads has advanced a remarkable cross-section of the litigation strategies and
arguments typical of the OPCA movement. All are invalid. I note with interest that Canadian
courts have previously issued written decisions on every last approach Mr. Meads has employed,
with perhaps one exception: I have not encountered a litigant or a reported case which involves
the ‘double outside colon’ or ‘triple outside colon / double inside colon’ variations of the
‘dash-colon’ magical name format. To be explicit, adding one or two additional pair of colons
outside or inside one’s name has no legal effect. I do not find, but strongly suspect, that even
more colons, within or without a name, will similarly be rejected by Canadian courts as an
operational and effective ‘magic hat’.
[623] My observation that Mr. Meads has not brought any novel concepts to the court indicates
the legal and intellectual bankruptcy of the OPCA movement. At this point they have exhausted
their schemes and now simply employ variations on prior strategies that have been rejected
following careful and exhaustive judicial review.
[624] In that sense the debate on the validity of OPCA concepts, such as there ever was, is
over. The provincial and federal courts of appeal have uniformly upheld trial decisions to reject
OPCA concepts. By my count at least nine of these cases sought leave to appeal from the
Supreme Court of Canada. None were granted. Legally, there is no dispute or issue outstanding.
[625] As such, these arguments and concepts should be disposed of in as direct a manner as
possible that:
1.
protects the rights of those persons and entities who are the target of OPCA
schemes and harassment by OPCA litigants;
2.
minimizes misuse and waste of court and state resources; and
3.
sends a clear message that these schemes do not work, and that the misuse of
court procedures and processes in this manner will not be tolerated.
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[626] I have previously discussed the potentially appropriate civil responses to arguments of
this kind. What remains is to determine suitable penalties for those persons who sell and promote
OPCA schemes, and for their customers who, perhaps naively, employ those instructions,
techniques, and materials. I believe that question is better fully explored in a relevant factual
context.
[627] Nevertheless, I have some general guidelines, suggestions, and comments.
A.
Judiciary
[628] OPCA litigants are typically self-represented, and that means they are owed the R. v.
Phillips, 2003 ABCA 4, 320 A.R. 172, affirmed en toto, 2003 SCC 57, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 623,
duty that a judge act to ensure the OPCA litigant’s right to a fair proceeding is preserved by
guiding the litigant through the trial process. The Alberta Court of Appeal in Cold Lake First
Nations v. Alberta (Minister of Tourism, Parks and Recreation), 2012 ABCA 36 at para. 24
described that obligation as a judge has “... a special duty to provide limited assistance to
unrepresented parties ...”. At para. 25 the scope of that obligation is reviewed:
The extent of this duty depends on the totality of the circumstances, including the
seriousness of the offence, the defences raised, and the sophistication of the
unrepresented party ... The judge's advice must be interactive, appropriate to the
unrepresented party and to the surrounding circumstances of the case ... Just how
far a judge should go in guiding an unrepresented party is a matter of judicial
discretion ... [Citations omitted.]
[629] That is clearly a contextual response. In OPCA litigation, that duty occurs in the face of
vexatious litigation and procedural strategies that are designed to disrupt court operation and
impede the exercise of legal rights. OPCA litigants have chosen to implement strategies that they
have been told will, at a minimum, paralyze court operation, if not break it. That means OPCA
litigants have, first and foremost, decided to adopt vexatious litigation strategies. These OPCA
litigants claim (wrongly) to be outside court jurisdiction - the rules do not apply to them.
[630] In McMeekin v. Alberta (Attorney General), 2012 ABQB 456 at para. 201, Justice
Shelley commented on the obligation of a court when faced by a litigant who purposefully
ignored court procedure and rules, engaged in repeated, abusive, and vexatious litigation, and
challenged court independence and authority:
I do not pretend to fully understand why Mr. McMeekin persists in this manner,
but I have no doubt that he knows very well that he is ignoring court procedure,
court etiquette, and advancing spurious, exaggerated claims. That is not tolerable.
Mr. McMeekin has no right to force on an ever expanding cast of Defendants in
this matter the cost and time commitments necessary to respond to his allegations
and abuse of court processes.
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[631] I believe that a key element of an appropriate and successful response to OPCA litigation
is that these proceedings be segregated, where possible, to minimize their effect on the innocent
other parties involved. The suggested novel and conventional OPCA-specific court procedures
(judicial review of suspect documents, show cause hearings, court security procedures,
contempt, security for costs, elevated costs and damages, declaration of vexatious litigant status)
may be a starting point for that objective. A second aspect is that innocent parties be indemnified
for the legal costs associated with OPCA litigation. No, or little, cost should flow to a litigant
who is abused by OPCA strategies.
[632] The countervailing factor is that the courts should watch carefully for genuine arguments
masked inside OPCA litigation. However, since the purpose of pleadings is for a party to
identify its case for the benefit of the court and the opposing parties (Waquan v. Canada, 2002
ABCA 110 at para. 85, 303 A.R. 43; Madill v. Alexander Consulting Grp. (1999) 237 A.R. 307,
71 Alta. L.R. (3d) 50 (Alta. C.A.)), that means that it is not the court’s job to engage in an
archaeological survey, piecing together fragments of potential issues. A ‘show cause’ hearing is
therefore a potentially appropriate tool for this objective, where the OPCA litigant is invited to
demonstrate that he or she has a case.
[633] Another alternative, albeit compounded by funding challenges, is to appoint an amicus
curiae, as occurred in R. v. Martin, 2012 NSPC 73 at para. 5. In that case the appointment was
... not to represent [the Detaxer], but to assist the Court in ensuring that
evidentiary, admissibility, Charter, general and specific defence issues, as well as
other arguments that would promote the fair trial of Mr. Martin’s charges might
be raised in Court at appropriate times. ...
[634] OPCA litigants and litigation may involve significant frustration. OPCA litigants are
often instructed to follow scripts that implement strategies such as the ‘double/split person’ or
‘everything is a contract’ concepts which require the OPCA litigant act in an inscrutable, if not
defiant manner. There are no obvious solutions for that kind of conduct, other than a firm
indication that these strategies have no legal meaning.
[635] That challenge is not assisted by guru indoctrination that court and state actors are parts
of an oppressive, malignant entity, or at a minimum willing supporting characters of a dark,
concealed design. Given that, to say that the typical OPCA litigant appears to be ‘tightly wound’
is an understatement.
[636] It is my hope that these Reasons will provide a foundation for court response, but also act
to educate potential OPCA litigants. It may be helpful to refer persons who appear to have
adopted OPCA concepts to these Reasons. If nothing else, the parade of failures will refute
OPCA gurus’ all too frequent claims that the techniques they sell are universally effective.
[637] Other potentially useful steps include:
1.
an explanation of court costs, and the court’s contempt authority,
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2
refusal to permit any non-lawyer representation (Legal Profession Act, s. 106(1)),
and
3.
dismissing any application, action or defence where a litigant refuses to identify
themselves, or identifies themselves via cryptic double/split person language,
what Justice Midwinter called a “song and dance routine”.
[638] The first point deserves some elaboration. It has been this Court’s experience that OPCA
gurus do not educate their customers on the purpose and operation of court cost awards. An
OPCA litigant may perceive explanation of this mechanism as a threat, but this explanation is a
crucial aspect in the “limited duty” a judge owes to these self-represented litigants. OPCA
litigants seem to often believe there are no potential negative consequences to their adopting
OPCA techniques and strategies. Evidence to the contrary is a challenge to that indoctrination.
[639] Another mechanism to curb OPCA litigant misconduct is Rule 10.49(1). That too
provides a tangible measured response, but preserves potentially enforceable legal rights.
[640] My previous practice has been to simply reject OPCA materials. With this Court’s new
approach to OPCA litigation those materials become a foundation for a variety of court
responses (costs awards, vexatious litigation and litigant status, contempt, and criminal
offences), and are generally only relevant for those purposes. Of course, it is necessary to make
very clear to OPCA litigants that is the sole effect of these documents.
[641] Any OPCA litigation will be a challenge. However, time and experience will allow the
development of efficient court responses to these litigants. The first key is to know who they are,
and why they act as they do. Canadian courts have now passed that hurdle. What remains is to
manage these problematic self-represented and vexatious litigants in an effective manner.
B.
Lawyers
1.
A Lawyer’s Duties
[642] Like the judge, a lawyer who represents the target of an OPCA litigant faces a difficult
task. However, as an officer of the court each lawyer has certain duties not only to the client, but
also to the justice system as a whole.
a.
Notarization of OPCA Materials
[643] One duty is to not participate in or facilitate OPCA schemes. During preparation of these
Reasons, I reviewed a large number of OPCA litigation files in our Court. I was very disturbed
and profoundly disappointed to see the number of occasions where an OPCA document was
notarized by a practicing lawyer. Certain of Mr. Meads’ materials were marked in that manner,
by two different members of the Alberta Bar.
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[644] Alberta Justice has instructed lay notaries to not endorse documents of this kind:
Papadopoulos v. Borg, 2009 ABCA 201 at para. 3.
[645] This Court has, on previous instances, drawn to the attention of the Law Society of
Alberta that this kind of action is inappropriate for an officer of the court. It assists
implementation of vexatious litigation strategies. In my view, a lawyer has a positive duty not to
engage in a step that would ‘formalize’ (though typically in a legally irrelevant manner) an
OPCA document. I have previously noted that certain OPCA gurus place a peculiar and mythical
authority in a notary’s hands. A lawyer should not, directly or indirectly, reenforce, or support
that purpose.
b.
Triage: Identification of Legal Issues
[646] A second duty of lawyers in OPCA litigation is that captured in Rule 1.2(3)(a), that a
litigant has an obligation “... to identify the real issues in dispute and facilitate the quickest
means of resolving the claim at the least expense ...”. OPCA litigants mask their potential real
disputes in a bog of cryptic documentation, spurious argument, irrelevant legal maxims, and
stereotyped and caricatured court conduct. A judge can very much benefit from the opposing
party’s understanding of what tangible legal issues may lay buried in that morass. Indeed, once
those spurious OPCA characteristics and components are stripped away, it is the duty of the
Court to fairly adjudicate the legitimate issues that remain.
[647] As a lawyer and his or her client will have likely had much more exposure to the OPCA
litigant, those persons may be able to help identify any issues that led to the litigation now
framed in an OPCA context. It is very important to identify and narrow a proceeding to remove
illegitimate issues and procedures, so as to concentrate on any valid aspects that remain. That
helps a judge identify, isolate, and preserve the OPCA litigant’s potential valid (or arguable)
legal claims. The end result is that a dispute will be more readily resolved in a timely and
cost-effective manner.
2.
Education
a.
Judges and Courts
[648] The Edmonton Court of Queen’s Bench has had the dubious fortune to host not only a
significant number, but also a variety, of OPCA litigants and OPCA movements. Other parts of
Alberta and Canada may have had less exposure to OPCA litigants, their concepts, and in-court
(mis)conduct.
[649] As a consequence, a lawyer may find it useful to provide some background and evidence
to a judge. My hope is that these Reasons will provide a useful point of departure. In many
instances it should be possible to assign an OPCA strategy or concept to an identified category,
followed by dismissal, or other appropriate sanction(s), on that basis. Review for relevant
caselaw is helpful, particularly where a particular OPCA concept has been identified and
rejected.
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[650] To this point lawyers in this jurisdiction have not submitted background evidence on
OPCA litigation and concepts that explains the particular strategies advanced in a specific
dispute. While this kind of evidence is not necessary to manage and resolve OPCA litigation, it
can provide a very useful context to a judge, particularly one who is less familiar with OPCA
concepts, language, and strategies. This information may include:
1.
OPCA fingerprint motifs, such as those identified in these Reasons,
2.
materials from the OPCA litigant that the court has not received,
3.
information about the OPCA litigant’s guru or host movement,
4.
expert evidence of persons familiar with OPCA fingerprints, concepts, schemes,
and gurus,
5.
communications by the litigant within the OPCA community, and
6.
known security risks of a relevant OPCA movement.
[651] Several of these items deserve some elaboration. OPCA litigants often post in online
forums run by OPCA movements and gurus. The communications or recorded videos may be
helpful evidence of the litigant’s plans and perspective.
[652] There is no better way to illustrate the intention and basis for OPCA litigant misconduct
than the materials provided by the litigant’s guru. Not only do these place the litigant’s frame of
mind and attitude front and center, but they also illustrate how an OPCA scheme is intended to
operate – in a disruptive manner that subverts state and court authority. As these Reasons have
attempted to show, the rhetoric employed by OPCA gurus is anything but subtle. Of course,
these materials may not be easy to identify or obtain, but where available they are damning.
[653] Curiously, to this point the OPCA community seems to have attracted very little
academic and legal commentary. There is clearly an emerging law enforcement and security
awareness of the potential threats posed by certain OPCA movements. Nevertheless, there are
some useful starting points for a lawyer who seeks a better understanding of OPCA litigants and
concepts.
[654] Several American sources are helpful. The IRS maintains a detailed index of “frivolous
tax arguments”, which, when advanced, result in an automatic rejection and fine. Canadian
variations have emerged in one form or another for almost all of these concepts. American
lawyer Daniel B. Evans maintains “The Tax Protestor FAQ”
(http://evans-legal.com/dan/tpfaq.html), which is a remarkably comprehensive index of
American OPCA concepts and associated jurisprudence, as well as an index of certain known
American OPCA gurus.
141
[655] Perhaps unsurprising for what appears to often be an Internet driven phenomenon, the
OPCA community has drawn the critical attention of others online. Anti-scam and skeptic web
forums include persons interested in OPCA concepts and their proponents. The “James Randi
Educational Foundation” (http://forums.randi.org/) and “Quatloos! Cyber Museum of Scams &
Frauds” (http://quatloosia.blogspot.com/) have significant and ongoing discussion of OPCA
concepts and movements, world-wide. Persons in these forums go so far as to actively challenge
and debate OPCA gurus, including Canadian OPCA gurus.
b.
The OPCA Litigant
[656] It may be difficult to engage in meaningful discussion with a typical OPCA litigant
outside a court setting given their frequently confrontational character and distorted world
perspectives. Some of the documents from Mr. Meads in the court file illustrate that point.
Nevertheless, a lawyer may find it helpful to inform an opposing OPCA litigant of certain things.
[657] As previously noted, OPCA gurus do not appear to educate their customers on the
concept and implications of court costs awards. Similarly, cases that directly relate to arguments
advanced by an OPCA litigant may be of assistance. These Reasons provides what I hope is a
generally comprehensive review of those. In many instances OPCA gurus have appeared in
court. They have been unsuccessful. That too may assist an OPCA litigant in adopting a more
appropriate litigation approach.
3.
Conclusion - Lawyers and OPCA Litigation
[658] Dealing with an OPCA litigant is difficult and frustrating. The fact that they are almost
always self-represented adds to the challenge. What is worse is if a guru is directly involved. I
anticipate most judges will not tolerate representation by these persons (Legal Profession Act, s.
106(1)), particularly if the judge understands the nature of the guru and his activities. The
reported case-law in relation to Lindsay, Dempsey, Lavigne, and Menard confirms that.
[659] Timely and cost-effective resolution of these disputes requires that an action be pared
down to its legitimate substance. That can be achieved by applications to strike irrelevant
submissions and pleadings, and to categorize materials as irrelevant except for the purpose of
costs, vexatious litigation and litigant status, and contempt and criminal sanction.
[660] I have previously commented on the vexatious and abusive character of OPCA concepts.
Litigation of that kind meets both the criteria for punitive damages and elevated cost awards,
including solicitor and own client costs. Lawyers should pursue those awards to minimize harm
to their clients.
[661] The courts are now live to these persons and their schemes. Lawyers should structure
their pre-trial steps and arguments on that basis.
C.
‘Target’ Litigants
142
[662] The same considerations that apply to lawyers also are generally relevant to litigants who
are the subject of OPCA schemes and approaches. The place where a litigant can provide further
assistance is in identification and isolation of potential OPCA litigant legal issues. I anticipate
this will prove particularly relevant where an OPCA litigant is involved in a family law context.
D.
OPCA Litigants
[663] As I suspect these Reasons will come to the attention of present and potential OPCA
litigants, and other members in the OPCA movements, I wish to make some comments directly
to these readers that I hope will prove of some assistance.
[664] I have attempted to review and explain every OPCA scheme of which this Court has
become aware, and why those concepts are invalid. If you seek to apply an OPCA strategy
described in these Reasons, then I hope you will carefully review the relevant caselaw.
[665] I suggest you familiarize yourself with the concept of court cost awards. This Court has
the authority to make these orders under Rules 10.28-10.33. These are amounts that a court may
require an unsuccessful party pay the other litigants. Court costs have a variety of purposes, but
generally are intended to offset the fiscal effect of a person being forced to appear in court
without a valid legal reason. Rule 10.33 includes important factors that affect costs, as do the
litigants’ duties and responsibilities that are listed in Rule 1.2: Paniccia Estate v. Toal, 2012
ABQB 11, at para. 115; Paniccia Estate v. Toal, 2012 ABQB 367 at para. 38. The ‘default’ scale
of court costs varies with the amount in dispute: Rules, Schedule C.
[666] If you choose to assert a right based on an OPCA concept, strategy, or scheme, then you
may wish to take steps to minimize the potential deleterious effect of failure. Mr. Meads
provides a helpful example of how to avoid further liability in the event his approach is not
successful. He has continued to (generally) follow this Court’s instructions and pay child and
spousal support. Compliance with existing court orders avoids a finding of contempt of court.
That precaution also reduces the possibility and quantum of interest awards that a court will
usually order where a past obligation has not been met, see the Judgment Interest Act, R.S.A.
2000, c. J.-1.
[667] That is particularly important if you choose to challenge an income tax obligation. The
Income Tax Act permits significant late payment penalties in addition to interest due for an
outstanding income tax payment. You may avoid these penalties by paying assessed income tax
amounts. If you are later successful in court in a dispute on the amount of income tax due, you
will then be refunded the excess assessed. If not, you will at a minimum avoid penalty.
[668] Last, I have some questions you may wish to direct to those gurus who provide you
advice:
1.
Why do these gurus seem to have little, if any, wealth, when they say they hold
the proverbial keys to untold riches?
143
E.
2.
Why do those gurus not go to court themselves, if they are so certain of their
knowledge? If they say they have been to court, ask them for the proceeding file
number, and see if their account is accurate. Those are public records.
3.
Can that guru identify even one reported court decision where their techniques
proved successful? If not, why then are all successes a tale of an unnamed person,
who knew someone who saw that kind of event occur?
4.
How are their ideas different and distinct from those surveyed and rejected in
these Reasons?
5.
How are these advisors different from the OPCA gurus who have been
unsuccessful and found themselves in jail? What did Porisky, Warman, and
Lindsay do wrong?
6.
Will your advisors promise to indemnify you, when you apply the techniques they
claim are foolproof? If not, why?
7.
If they cannot explain these points, then why should you pay them for their legal
nonsense?
OPCA Gurus
[669] In his poem Inferno at Cantos 26-30, Dante placed the “evil counsellors” - those who
used their position to advise others to engage in fraud, and “the falsifiers” - alchemists,
counterfeiters, perjurers, and imposters, into the inner canyons of the eighth circle of hell. As
sinners, the evil counsellors and falisifiers were matched by those who induce religious schisms,
and surpassed only in fault by oath-breakers.
[670] Persons who purposefully promote and teach proven ineffective techniques that purport
to defeat valid state and court authority, and circumvent social obligations, appear to fall into
those two categories. That they do so, and for profit at the expense of naive and vulnerable
customers, is worse.
[671] William S. Burroughs in Naked Lunch (New York: Grove Press, 1962, p. 11) wrote:
“Hustlers of the world, there is one Mark you cannot beat: The Mark Inside.” I believe that is
true for you. At some basic level, you understand that you are selling lies, or at the very most
generous, wildly dubious concepts.
[672] It does not matter whether you frame your ‘business’ as a joke, religion, for educational
purposes only, or as not being legal advice; your ‘business’ harms your naive or malicious
customers, their families, and the innocent persons whom your customers abuse as they attempt
to exercise what you have told them are their rights.
144
[673] You cannot identify one instance where a court has rolled over and behaved as told. Not
one. Your spells, when cast, fail.
[674] If you believe what you teach is true, then do not encourage others to be the ones to
execute those concepts in the courts. Present your ideas and concepts yourselves. You will get a
fair hearing, and as detailed a response as your ideas warrant. The caselaw cited in these Reasons
make that very clear. Canadian courts will hear you and will consider whether what you claim is
or is not correct.
[675] In that sense, I acknowledge a grudging respect for David Kevin Lindsay, in that he has
personally tested many of his ideas in court. That does not excuse his inciting others to engage in
vexatious, illegal conduct, or his profiting from the same. Nevertheless, he has “walked the
walk”. If you truly believe your ideas are valid, look at how Lindsay has been treated by
Canadian courts and the careful analyses of his ideas. Yes, he has failed, but where he has
approached Canada’s legal system with clarity and respect, he has received the same.
VIII. Application of These Reasons to the Meads v. Meads Litigation
[676] I return to the parties to this litigation.
A.
Ms. Meads
1.
Case Management
[677] Counsel for Ms. Meads applied to have a case management justice appointed in this case.
That was granted, and I appointed myself in this role.
[678] Case management is appropriate for several reasons. First, Mr. Meads’ materials that Ms.
Meads had attached to her application and which were already filed with the Court have obvious
OPCA characteristics. The February 15 document attempts to foist a fiduciary relationship, and
indicates Mr. Meads believes he has a unilateral authority to control litigation. These are
evidence that he believes he is not subject to this Court’s authority.
[679] Counsel for Ms. Meads did not explain in detail the OPCA strategies she had
encountered, however these were very obvious from Mr. Meads’ submissions at the June 8, 2012
hearing. His conduct in court had problematic aspects.
[680] OPCA litigation, in general, warrants close and direct judicial supervision to both control
the scope of the action and ameliorate the consequences to the target of vexatious OPCA
strategies. Here, the divorce and matrimonial property actions are in an early stage. There is
much yet to be done, absent settlement. Ongoing supervision by a single justice is therefore
appropriate.
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[681] The need for case management is confirmed by Mr. Meads’ failure to adhere to my case
management Conditions and Guidelines by his filing of the June 19 and 21 document sets
contrary to the terms thereof. I will further comment on those documents below.
2.
Disclosure by Mr. Meads
[682] On June 8, counsel for Ms. Meads sought disclosure of certain information from Mr.
Meads. The information requested was routine for a divorce and matrimonial property division
proceeding. On June 25, 2012 I granted an order that required Mr. Meads, by August 31, 2012,
provide to Ms. Meads his:
1.
T1 General Income Tax Return, including all schedules and attachments, and
Notices of Assessment for the 2010 and 2011 taxation years. (Since then, with the
passage of time, the same would now follow for the 2012 taxation year, by Mr.
Meads providing some voluntarily or further application by Ms. Meads and a
further Court Order);
2.
three most recent statements of earnings indicating Mr. Meads’ total earnings
paid in the year to date, including overtime, or where such a statement is not
provided by the Mr. Meads’ employer, a letter from Mr. Meads’ employer setting
out that information, including Mr. Meads’ rate of annual salary or remuneration;
3.
copies of the statements from 2008 to present for all RRSPs, pensions, term
deposit certificates, guaranteed investment certificates, stock accounts and other
investments in Mr. Meads’ name or in which Mr. Meads has an interest; and
4.
a sworn statement of Mr. Meads’ income, assets and liabilities, which would
include a listing of the quantity and quality of his precious metals and stones
failing which the powers granted to me by the Rules of Court (including contempt of court) may
be exercised on application by Ms. Meads.
[683] The OPCA character of this action is not the basis for this Order, which is a typic order in
a family matter where disclosure has not occurred voluntarily by one or more parties.
3.
Ongoing Communication with Mr. Meads
[684] Counsel for the Ms. Meads applied for case management as she could not find an
effective way to deal with Mr. Meads in an efficient and timely manner. My intention is that
these Reasons will directly address that issue. If not, I believe Ms. Mead’s Counsel will now
have a much better foundation to understand Mr. Meads’ activities. Additionally, these Reasons
will provide guidance on how this and other courts have responded to OPCA litigation. That, I
believe, will assist her in taking steps and seeking remedies that may be necessary to lead to the
early and efficient resolution of this litigation.
146
B.
Mr. Meads
[685] I will now review the litigation steps by Mr. Meads, to this point, and this Court’s
responses. This process will apply my survey of the OPCA phenomenon to the specific events
and materials in this action.
1.
Pre-Hearing Activities
[686] A number of documents were filed in this action prior to the June 8 case management
appointment hearing. My instructions in relation to these follow:
a.
The February 15, 2011 Document
[687] A very irregular document was filed with the Court on February 15, 2011. It does not
have the usual formalities associated with a proper court document, and instead most closely
resembles a letter, addressed to the “Chief Court Administrator/Clerk Queen’s Bench of
Alberta”.
[688] This document displays an extremely wide range of OPCA indicia, including:
1.
OPCA naming motifs: ‘dash colon’ names, the ‘family/clan/house’ format,
duplicate upper-case and lower case related names, copyright in name;
2.
irregular formalities: postage stamps without apparent function, a red thumbprint,
an unnecessary notarization;
3.
an atypical postal code;
4.
the writer claiming to be of ‘flesh and blood’;
5.
the author is the Postmaster General”; and
6.
the phrases “Notice with the Agent is notice with the Principal” and “Notice with
the Principal is with the notice with Agent”.
[689] Cursory review of this document would lead to the immediate conclusion that this
appears to be OPCA material. In the future, Court procedures may be developed and/or applied
which would immediately respond to such material. For example, I believe this is the kind of
document that may be ‘received’ by a court clerk, but not formally filed, and then diverted for
review by myself as case management justice, to determine its relevance and possible rejection.
147
[690] Review of the February 15 document discloses a number of important facts. First, the
document clearly shows that Mr. Meads subscribes to a ‘double/split person’ OPCA concept. He
says that one aspect, the ‘dash colon’ and ‘family’ named entity is the ‘owner/representative’ of
a “legal estate” named “DENNIS LARRY MEADS”. The author adheres to the ‘everything is a
contract’ concept, as is illustrated by a disclaimer that the use of a notary “... does not create an
adhesion contract with the any-state/province ...”. These observations suggest that
communication with this litigant in court will be difficult.
[691] Another interesting detail is that Mr. Meads describes his non-corporeal half as “a
Provincial Registered Event/ESTATE wholly owned by “Her Majesty the Queen in Right of
Canada”. That strongly suggests that Mr. Meads’ view of his other half is a “strawman”,
something shackled to him by the government. He presumably will attempt then to deny
responsibility for that aspect.
[692] The intent of the document appears two fold:
1.
it appoints a court clerk “Fiduciary Trustee Liable for the myself and one,
::dennis-larry:: of the meads family::”; and
2.
purports to unilaterally adjourn the proceeding:
For, on and in the record, I, ::dennis-larry:: of the meads-family:: as the
Administrator for the Office for the DENNIS LARRY MEADS’S the
ESTATE-Creditor in the instant matter at hand, do here and now Adjourn
this instant matter until further notice, from my office. May Almighty God
Jehovah bless all of ewe through His Living Son and Reigning King, Jesus
the Christ. Amen and Amen.
[693] The attempt to appoint the court clerk is a foisted unilateral agreement, and as I have
explained, has no effect. Similarly, Mr. Meads (flesh and blood) has no authority to unilaterally
adjourn the divorce and matrimonial property division proceeding. Further, the intent of this
document is vexatious. It denies court authority over its own processes, and, contrary to law,
attempts to place an obligation on a court employee. I declare that this document has no legal
meaning or effect.
[694] I further declare that the February 15, 2011 document is of no relevance whatsoever. If I
had received this document after issue of these Reasons I would have ordered that the document
has no legal effect and was irrelevant for all purposes, except for calculation of costs against Mr.
Meads, vexatious status of the litigation and litigant, and/or whether Mr. Meads has engaged in
criminal or contemptuous misconduct.
b.
The March 3, 2011 Document
[695] The next relevant document was filed with the Court on March 3, 2011, and is titled
“Good Faith Notice” in the Nature of an Affidavit. For an “affidavit”, it is highly irregular, and
148
instead again more closely resembles a letter than anything else. It is addressed to “Audrey
Hardwick/AUDREY HARDWICK BEING A CORPORATE ENTITY”. That is apparently the
assistant to Ms. Meads’ former lawyer.
[696] Again, the OPCA indicia in this document are obvious:
1.
OPCA naming motifs: ‘dash colon’ names, the ‘family/clan/house’ format,
duplicate upper-case and lower case related names, copyright in name;
2.
irregular formalities: a red thumbprint, an unnecessary notarization;
3.
an atypical postal code;
4.
the writer claiming to be of ‘flesh and blood’;
5.
the phrases “Notice with the Agent is notice with the Principal” and “Notice with
the Principal is with the notice with Agent”.
This is therefore another document that could be the target of specific court procedure as a result
of its OPCA indicia.
[697] The text of the document again indicates that Mr. Meads has adopted ‘everything is a
contract’ and ‘double/split person’ OPCA concepts. Mr. Meads demands that the recipient stop
attempting to enter into contract with him by correspondence. There is an aggressive tone to this
demand, as Mr. Meads says he will “make formal Criminal Charges” and “HOLD YOU AT
YOUR FULL COMMERCIAL LAIBILITY AND YOUR UNLIMITED CIVIL CAPACITY.”
[sic.]. This document also makes reference to and demands the recipient and the law office’s
“commercial bond number”. This language appears in other OPCA documents, but its origin and
meaning is obscure.
[698] This document has no legal meaning for either its recipient or the Court. A contract is not
formed by simply mailing someone a letter or other correspondence, so in this sense Mr. Meads
has nothing to complain about. Further, he has no legal right to use communication of that kind
as a basis for either criminal or civil litigation. The context of this document is unclear. I do not
know, for example, what communication from Ms. Meads’ lawyer may have triggered this
response. If that was a legitimate and typical litigation step, such as a request for disclosure, then
Mr. Meads’ response may be evidence of vexatious conduct.
[699] The threats against Ms. Hardwick and her employer clearly have no basis, and I can infer
from these materials a malicious intent to deter Ms. Meads’ pursuit of this litigation.
[700] As with the February 15 document, I declare the March 3 document is of no relevance
whatsoever.
149
c.
The April 27, 2012 Documents
[701] On March 29, 2012, Ms. Meads applied for appointment of a case management justice.
Her letter states that Mr. Meads has failed to disclose financial information as required by a
March 2, 2011 Order of Justice Ross. The February 15, 2011 and March 3, 2011 documents are
attached, “ ... to give you an indication of the difficulty in dealing with this particular self-rep.”
[702] A collection of documents filed by Mr. Meads on April 27, 2012 appear to be a response
to that March 29 application. The April 27, 2012 documents are more conventional in
appearance, and, for example, meet many formal requirements for documents filed in court. The
April 27 documents initially related to a May 25, 2012 application, but were instead directed to
the June 8, 2012 hearing. Justice Ouellette made handwritten notations to the cover page of these
materials that state “Fiat: Let the within documents be filed for the purposes of argument before
the A.C.J. Rooke at the case conference.” and that the date of that case conference has yet to be
determined. The manner in which these materials came before Justice Ouellette is not obvious.
[703] There are two affidavits attached, both titled “Affidavit in Support of Order to Show
Cause”, dated April 24, 2012.
[704] In brief, the first states that Ms. Meads’ Counsel, Ms. Reeves “... has failed to make
whole CRYSTAL LYNN MEADS ...”, court clerk Barb Petryk is a fiduciary of Mr. Meads,
which relates to the February 15, 2011 document, and that Ms. Reeves “... has not pursued this
remedy provided in good faith ...”. The remainder of the first affidavit quotes the instructions of
Justice Veit at a March 18 2011 hearing to determine interim support, and then requests a court
order to compel Ms. Reeves’ compliance with the March 18, 2011 instruction.
[705] The second affidavit seems to be a direct response to the March 29 case management
appointment application. Mr. Meads states:
1.
he has had no contact with Ms. Reeves, and will not interact with her “... without
the provision in writing of his/her Commercial Bond Number as well as the
Insuring Company that covers that Bond.”;
2.
he has not been difficult to deal with;
3.
Ms. Reeves has a legal remedy for her client via court clerk Barb Petryk;
4.
a refusal to enter into contract:
Michele J. Reeves appears to making an offer to Contract and/or
Enticement of Slavery (Title 18 United States Code and/or Article 4
150
Universal Declaration of Human Rights) which I do not grant and give
notice he/she will be held at full Commercial Liability and Unlimited
Civil capacity for such actions.
5.
his marriage to Ms. Meads was annulled by her infidelities;
6.
various statements about matrimonial property and Ms. Meads’ capacity to work;
7.
that Mr. Meads continues his spousal and child support obligations as ordered by
Justice Veit on March 18, 2011; and
8.
quotes from email communications from Ms. Meads, that in general relate to the
end of their marriage and difficult personal interactions; these are “disturbing
communications”.
[706] Mr. Meads closes the affidavit with this summary:
SUMMARY: ::Dennis Larry:: being a “Injured-Third-Party-Intervenor” LaymanLawful, Power of Attorney, Secured Party Creditor for: DENNIS LARRY
MEADS (ens legis) has provided remedy for Michele J. Reeves (alleged,
PERSONA-AT-LAW PERSONA) and the Court a mean(s) to make whole
CRYSTAL LYNN MEADS the Debtor and Grantor. These assaults appear to be
in bad faith and the emotional abuse, mental cruelty will have to be addressed by
Dennis-Larry: Meads the Secured Party Creditor if continued by Michele J.
Reeves (alleged, PERSONA-AT-LAW PERSONA).
[707] The specific relief sought by Mr. Meads is stated in a “Motion For An Order To Show
Cause” that is directed at Ms. Reeves, personally, as respondent, by “::Dennis Larry:: on behalf
of DENNIS LARRY MEADS”. It names “DENNIS LARRY MEADS (juristic person)” as the
“Movant”, who is “Represented by :: Dennis Larry:: attorney in fact”. Mr. Meads asks for an
order that:
1.
Ms. Reeves appear and prove why she “should not be held in contempt for
violation of false claims made under penalty of perjury dated March 29, 2012”;
and
2.
Ms. Reeves “... has violated the sanctity of the court ...” by taking “... full
responsibility/liability for CRYSTAL LYNN MEADS the Debtor and Granter”
and not applying the mechanism Mr. Meads has provided to discharge his
obligations: the fiduciary status of court clerk Barb Petryk.
[708] As noted, this document appears much more conventional on its face, but still exhibits
characteristic OPCA features, including ‘dash colon’ names, duplicate names that appear to
relate to a single person, and anomalous postal code formats. Again, these indicia could be a
basis for specific procedural response.
151
[709] As for the document contents, they continue to exhibit the clear ‘double/split person’ and
‘everything is a contract’ concepts that were previously observed in Mr. Meads’ materials. I
believe that what Mr. Meads is trying to convey is that he has told Ms. Reeves that she can pay
for Ms. Meads’ interim child and spousal support by billing court clerk Barb Petryk. That, in
turn, depends on the February 15, 2011 document. Ms. Reeves has failed to do that, and so Mr.
Meads now seeks a court order to enforce his instructions.
[710] Naturally, I refuse to make that order. Ms. Petryk has no obligation that results from the
foisted unilateral agreement of February 15, 2011. Ms. Reeves would be correct to not directly
pursue Ms. Petryk on that basis.
[711] I note that this correspondence illustrates how even a totally ineffective OPCA document
may have downstream toxic effects. Even though the February 15 document had no meaning,
until the issuance of these Reasons, it had not been rejected by the Court or challenged by Ms.
Meads. That is not to say that either Ms. Meads, this Court, or the named clerk erred by ignoring
a totally spurious document, or that they had any obligation to respond. Rather, my observation
is that if Mr. Meads’ February 15, 2011 document had been diverted into a process where it was
evaluated and rejected as having no relevance then, perhaps, Mr. Meads would not have pursued
this avenue. Of course, that is simply conjecture, and only experience will show whether these
kinds of preemptive activities are, in fact, helpful in managing OPCA litigation.
[712] Mr. Meads’ other request, that Ms. Reeves be held in contempt for the March 29, 2012
correspondence, is also rejected. If the “false claims” of which Mr. Meads speaks are the
allegation of breach of court order and that Mr. Meads was difficult to deal with, then the latter
fact was established by Mr. Meads’ conduct at the June 8, 2012 hearing. At that hearing he also
acknowledged he had not previously made financial disclosure.
[713] Mr. Meads’ April 27, 2012 documents and the associated application have a vexatious
aspect as they depend on a fictitious obligation from a foisted unilateral agreement. I could, in
compliance with the general principle that Mr. Meads should not be permitted to advance
spurious vexatious OPCA arguments and inflict unwarranted expense on his opposing litigant,
now invite Ms. Reeves to indicate the solicitor and own client costs associated with her response
to Mr. Meads’ April 27, 2012 documents. I note, however, that aspects of these materials also
reflect what I think are potentially valid aspects of matrimonial property division issues, and
child and spousal support. Those topics also emerged at the June 8, 2012 hearing. I therefore
leave the issue of costs open for future application.
2.
The June 8, 2012 Hearing
152
[714] I have previously commented in some detail on what occurred at the June 8, 2012 case
management application, and will therefore only make certain comments in summary. Mr.
Meads’ conduct included indica that are typical of an OPCA litigant. For example, he:
1.
denied court authority on several bases, including that it was an Admiralty law
court;
2.
said legislation has no hold over or relevance to him;
3.
said he was subject to a different law, “God’s Law”, the “Maximus of Law”;
4.
cited the UCC, Black’s Law Dictionary and the Bible as overriding authorities;
5.
invoked ‘double/split person’ concepts: he as the “flesh and blood man”
represented his “corporate identity”; and
6.
exhibited an apprehension that his cooperation with myself and Ms. Reeves
would lead to a contract (or “slavery”).
[715] Mr. Meads, in his submissions, applied a ‘reverse onus’. This is typical for OPCA
litigants. He demanded that I prove the relevance and application of law to him. If I did not do
that, then he would not obey.
[716] As for the substance of the hearing, certain topics emerged which appeared to be
potentially relevant in the ongoing divorce and matrimonial property actions. Other arguments
were simply OPCA irrelevancies. A new development was that Mr. Meads explained the
theoretical basis for an A4V money for nothing mechanism to pay his obligations. Obviously, I
had no reason to entertain that application or what were allegedly its supporting documents. I
note that Mr. Meads directed these materials to me, personally.
[717] The manner in which Mr. Meads introduced the A4V issue illustrates a problem with
OPCA litigants. They have a tendency to ‘ambush’ the court and other litigants with documents
in the middle of court proceedings. That, of course, interferes with the orderly progression and
management of legal disputes. I do not suggest that there is a uniformly appropriate response to
materials presented in this manner. I chose to refuse those materials, as was then my practice. A
potentially valid alternative may be to provisionally accept those documents for review, then
indicate to the OPCA litigant whether the documents are:
1.
accepted,
2.
rejected as irrelevant, or
3.
accepted but found to be irrelevant for all purposes, except for calculation of
costs, the vexatious status of the litigation and litigant, and/or whether the OPCA
litigant has engaged in criminal or contemptuous misconduct.
153
[718] Another alternative would be to refuse to accept materials that are not formally filed with
notice to the other litigants. This, certainly, is a safe response to material of uncertain character
and significance. I believe standard practices for this kind of commonplace OPCA activity will
evolve.
[719] As these Reasons indicate, an A4V ‘money for nothing’ scheme is entirely and absurdly
spurious. To attempt to discharge an obligation with those kinds of materials is a vexatious step.
I did not accept what may have been A4V documents, nor were those filed. If there had been a
formal application by Mr. Meads to discharge his obligation in that manner, and Ms. Meads was
forced to respond to that, then a cost award would be warranted to indemnify Ms. Meads. I do
not think Ms. Meads was injured, in this instance, by Mr. Meads raising the A4V concept at the
case management appointment hearing.
[720] As previously explained, I concluded this dispute was one that deserves case
management, and that was ordered. Mr. Meads did not oppose that.
3.
The June 19 and June 21, 2012 Documents
[721] I have already commented in some detail on the materials that I received by mail on June
19 and 21, 2012. These were personally directed to me, with copies to Court of Appeal Chief
Justice Fraser, the Alberta Public Trustee Cindy Bentz, and Ms. Reeves. The OPCA character of
these materials is immediately apparent. For example, the cover letter exhibits multiple OPCA
name indicia, Mr. Meads names himself in two related ways, and the letter is signed twice in
different colours and formats.
[722] Mr. Meads names me his fiduciary and demands that I discharge my duties by
implementing his A4V scheme, paying his child and spousal support obligations via that
mechanism, and “Divorce-Papers signed as the CRYSTAL LYNNE MEADS”.
[723] He also requests:
Debtor, being the CRYSTAL LYNNE MEADS and Michele J. Reeves DBA
contact via the any media with the living flesh and blood sentient - man, ::DennisLarry:Meads:: and/or the DENNIS LARRY MEADS (juristic person) and whenthere is the claim for a breach face the penalties as-is prescribed in the attacheddocuments.
I believe this cryptic passage is probably a demand that I enforce his ‘fee schedule’ against his
wife and her lawyer.
[724] As a whole, the cover latter to the June 19 and 21 documents is a foisted unilateral
agreement targeted against myself. It has no legal effect, but does further indicate that Mr.
Meads has adopted an improper and vexatious litigation strategy. I rejected receipt of this letter
and its associated materials. If I had accepted this document then it would be evidence of the
improper character of Mr. Meads’ litigation strategy.
154
[725] The attached documents have four strategic purposes:
1.
to formalize the relationship between the two aspects of Mr. Meads, DENNIS
LARRY MEADS and Dennis-Larry: Meads;
2.
implementation of an A4V scheme;
3.
a ‘fee schedule’;
4.
the copyright and trademark foisted unilateral declaration.
[726] I have previously described these items in some detail, and others are reproduced along
with the Reasons. The OPCA indicia in these items are plentiful, all contain the ‘dash colon’
name motifs, duplicate related names with stereotypic labels such as “a legal entity” vs. “a
personam sojourn and people of posterity”, and variant postal codes. Spurious application of the
UCC and other foreign and irrelevant law is frequent. Most use the “notice to the principal is
notice to the agent” and “notice to the agent is notice to the principal” phrases.
[727] In brief, the agreements between Mr. Meads and Mr. Meads are a monologue without
any legal relevance. The A4V scheme does not provide me with access to any funds that I could
then distribute on Mr. Meads’ behalf and for his benefit. The fee schedule cannot be legally
enforced, and an attempt to enforce it would be an illegal and potentially criminal act. Similarly,
Mr. Meads has no basis in law to demand $100 million per use of his name.
[728] The attached documents have no legal effect and since they were rejected by myself, are
irrelevant to the ongoing litigation. If these had instead been placed on the court file, then I
believe it would be appropriate that either I order they are irrelevant to the litigation, or only
relevant for calculation of costs, the vexatious status of the litigation and Mr. Meads, and/or
whether Mr. Meads has engaged in criminal or contemptuous misconduct.
[729] When I returned the June 19 and 21 materials, my letter informed Mr. Meads that the
Conditions and Guidelines did not permit submission of materials of this kind. I instructed him
that no further material of this kind should be submitted to the Court, noting that further actions
of this kind would be met with a formal court order to desist, and failure to comply may be
punished as contempt of court. Indeed further OPCA conduct has the potential of inviting a
vexatious litigant application under the Judicature Act, by Ms. Meads, or by the Court on its own
application.
4.
Conclusion
[730] Shortly prior to his exit from the courtroom on June 8, 2012, Mr. Meads told me he had
much to think about. He certainly does. While these Reasons cast a wide net, its mesh also falls
squarely on him. I hope that he will carefully review its contents and consider his next step.
155
[731] To repeat myself, the OPCA arguments he has advanced have no effect or meaning in
Canadian law. They offer him no rights, no indemnities, and certainly not a pot of gold or silver
to call his own.
[732] I did not accept his envelope of documents on June 8, and the subsequent materials
received on June 19 and 21. I hope he now recognizes the potential consequences that he risks if
he repeats that kind of exercise, as next time I will accept those materials, but only as proof of
his continued potentially vexatious litigation, contempt of court, and, potentially, criminal
misconduct. I have made every effort in these Reasons to lay out the general categories of OPCA
concepts that have been evaluated and rejected by Canadian courts. I hope that will help him to
better understand Canadian law, and respond to the questions he says remain unanswered.
[733] From the structure of the OPCA community and the nature of his materials, I believe one
or more persons are advising Mr. Meads. I hope he will show them these Reasons, and scrutinize
their response. I believe Mr. Meads has the ability to meaningfully evaluate their reply. Mr.
Meads may also benefit from speaking to and indeed retaining legal counsel.
[734] I would also suggest that Mr. Meads read Canadian caselaw. The majority of cases that
are cited in these Reasons may be retrieved at no cost at the Canadian Legal Information
Institute website: “http://www.canlii.org”. Earlier jurisprudence and other legal texts are
available at court law libraries that are open to the public.
[735] Unlike many OPCA community members, in court Mr. Meads was generally polite to me
and Ms. Meads’ counsel. He usually respectfully waited to speak, and while his answers to me
were not always satisfactory, he nevertheless conducted himself in a generally proper manner. I
did not appreciate his demands, or his claims that my conduct was unsatisfactory, but I have an
understanding of the context in which those statements occurred. I trust that will not recur. His
premature exit from the proceedings was not appropriate, however I understand the
misconceptions that may have led him to act in that manner. I suggest he remain throughout any
future hearing, as his absence will not assist him.
[736] In our discussions on June 8 he raised several issues in relation to matrimonial property
division, spousal support, and child support that I believe are potentially valid. I look forward to
assisting him and Ms. Meads to settle or, if necessary, take those issues to trial in a cost and time
effective manner. While I am not his “Fiduciary-Trustee-Liable Position with the highest and
with the greatest-level for the care”, I am the Case Management Justice on this matter, and I
intend to see that both his and Ms. Meads’ legal rights are protected and explored in the
resolution of this dispute.
Heard on the 8th day of June, 2012.
Dated at the City of Edmonton, Alberta this 18th day of September, 2012.
156
J.D. Rooke
A.C.J.C.Q.B.A.
Appearances:
Michele J. Reeves
Attia Reeves Tensfeldt Snow
for the Applicant
Dennis Larry Meads
self-represented
157
Appendix “A” - Meads’ Fee Schedule
[Note - the format and content of this document has been reproduced, as best possible, in an
accurate manner. Certain personal information has been redacted for privacy reasons.]
Registered Private Tracking Number - LT 679 966 085 CA
UCC-1 Filed in ALBERTA - Secured Transaction Registry Number- 11120912227
ATTENTION AND WARNING!
THIS IS A LEGAL NOTICE AND DEMAND
FIAT JUSTITIA, RUAT COELUM
(Let right be done, though the heavens should fall)
To:
All Provincial, State, Federal and International Public Officials, by and through
Province of Alberta, Lieutenant Governor, Donald S. Ethell and/or
Governor General, David Lloyd Johnston
TAKE NOTICE IGNORANCE OF THE LAW IS NO EXCUSE
THIS IS A CONTRACT IN ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION
Take a moment to read this before you proceed any further.
I do not wish to speak to you under any circumstances excluding federal judicial review
THIS TITLE IS FOR YOUR PROTECTION!
(1)
I, one Dennis-Larry: M eads [free man], the undersigned, herein request that you present anything that you say to m e
in writing, signed under penalty of perjury as required by your law as shown in this instrum ent. Notice to Agent is
Notice to Principal. Notice to Principal is Notice to Agent. Attachm ents are included and are part of this contract.
(2)
This Notice is in the nature of a Miranda W arning. Take due heed of its contents. If, for any reason, you do not
understand any of these statem ents or warnings, it is incum bent upon you to sum m on a superior officer, special
prosecutor, federal judge, or other com petent legal counsel to im m ediately explain to you the significance of this
presentm ent as per your duties and obligations in respect to this private, form al, notarized, registered Statute Staple
Securities Instrum ent. As per provisions under, NAFTA, UNIDROIT, UNCITRAL Convention, Title 11 USC 501(a),
502(a), 11 USC 7001, 7013, and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Sections 8-A, AND 13-A, the claim or presum ption
that I, Dennis-Larry: M eads, am a Debtor to Canada or any of its provinces, agencies or sub-corporations is forever
rebutted by this contract. This rebuttal is a counterclaim in Adm iralty.
(3)
Your Failure to tim ely do so leaves you in the position of accepting full responsibility for any and all liabilities for
m onetary dam ages, as indicated herein, that I incur by any adversely affecting injuries caused by your overt or covert
actions, or the actions of any of your fellow public officers and agents in this or any other relevant m atters as described
herein. You have thirty (30) days, from the date that this docum ent is received by the Clerk of the Public Record, to
respond and rebut the presum ptions of this contract by subm itting to m e signed, certified, authenticated docum ents of
the laws that rebut these presum ptions point by point. On and For the Record under penalties of the law including
158
(4)
perjury. This docum ent will be on file in the public record; and the clerk in charge of the public record is charged to
distribute this to any and all responsible parties, i.e., officers of the court, and /or law enforcem ent officers including
local, state, federal, international, m ulti- jurisdictional, or any and all officers, representatives, contractors, agencies, or
any such entity or person that m ay bring any type of action, whether civil or crim inal or other, against m e, and whether
in this county, state, region, area, country, corporation, federal zone, or in any venue and/or jurisdiction. Your failure to
tim ely rebut the statem ents and warnings herein constitute your com plete, tacit agreem ent with all statem ents and
warnings contained herein. Your presum ptions that I, the undersigned, am a "Corporate Fiction" or "Legal Entity" and
under your corporate "CANADA" jurisdiction are
now and forever rebutted.
I, the undersigned, tendering this docum ent, am a Private People of Posterity; a Sovereign Personam Sojourn; by fact; a
non-juristic entity, not as legal personality in fiction, or surety within; or subject for; or allegiance to; your corporate
"CANADA"; or to any de facto, com pact, corporate, com m ercial provinces, states, contracting therein; only to the
"canada," nonetheless carrying with m e exclusive, original, sovereign jurisdiction and venue having one suprem e court
and CANADA Court of International Trade. This is a m atter of public record, tendered by way of registered m ail to
Governor General of Canada David Lloyd Johnston and/or Lieutenant Governor of Alberta Donald s. Ethell.
These pages are recorded upon liber records and books in Register of Deeds Offices including but not lim ited to
Provincial
Court of Stony Plain and Queens Court of Alberta.
(5)
I, the undersigned, now tendering this legally binding Legal Notice and Dem and in hand am not a surety under your
jurisdiction nor a subject under your corporate veil "Color of Law Venue," being acknowledged by silence and
acquiescence of, Governor General of Canada David Lloyd Johnston and/or Lieutenant Governor of Alberta
Donald s. Ethell, also but not lim ited to any public officers, agents, contractors, assigns, em ployees, and subsidiaries of
your office, regarding m y Legal Notice and Dem and tendered by registered m ail with liber book num ber and page
affixed.
(6)
W hich silence of Corporate Office Governor General of Canada David Lloyd Johnston and/or Lieutenant Governor
of Alberta Donald s. Ethell ratifies severances of any nexus or relationship to de facto, corporate, com m ercial state
offices; being fraudulent conveyance by operating under " Color of Authority" upon affiant. Let this be known by the
“Good Faith (Oxford) Doctrine" to all m en and wom en. I do not consent to any warrantless searches, or searches
that are not com pliant with the "Constitution of Canada" and /or all of the am endm ents of the Honorable "Canadian Bill
of Rights," whether of m y dwellings, cars, land craft, watercraft, aircraft, m e, m ine, current location, property, hotel
room s, apartm ents, business records, businesses, or m y m achinery, vehicles, equipm ent, supplies, buildings, grounds,
land in m y private possession or control, past, present, and future, now and foreverm ore, so help you God.
(7)
By this record let it be known that I do not at any tim e waive any rights or protections, as acknowledged by the
aforem entioned Constitution of Canada and/or Honorable "Canadian Bill of Rights," nonetheless, dem anding that you
protect these as you swore an oath to do so. I accept your lawfully required Oath of Office, bonds of any type, insurance
policies, and property of any type for m y protection and m aking whole. Furtherm ore, should you witness any public
officers at this tim e, or any tim e past, present, or future violate any of m y rights or protections, it is your sworn duty (of
oath) to im m ediately arrest, or have them arrested. You are legally required to charge them as you should any law
breaker, regardless of officer's title, rank, uniform , cloak, badge, position, stature, or office; or you shall henceforth be
accountable for m onetary dam ages from , but not lim ited to, your m onetary liability, your corporate bond, com pensatory
costs, punitive procurem ents, and sanctioned by attorney attributions.
(8)
Note: A true and correct, notarized copy of this Statute Staple Securities Instrument is safely deposited in the
Register of Deeds Office in Province of ALBERTA. This security instrum ent has also been delivered to several
trusted friends and accom panied by sworn affidavits certifying m y policy of presenting this security instrum ent to each
and every public officer who approaches m e violating m y unalienable rights including, but not lim ited to, m y right of
liberty and free m ovem ent
upon any com m on pathway of travel. I have a lawful right to travel, by whatever m eans, via
land, sea, or air, without any officer, agent, em ployee, attorney, or judge willfully causing adverse affects or dam ages
upon m e by an arrest,
detainm ent, restraint, or deprivation. I will be granted the status and treatm ent of a foreign
Sovereign, a foreign diplom at, by all custom s officials. This docum ent or the deposited copy becom es an evidentiary
docum ent certified herein, as if now fully reproduced, should any court action be taken upon m e as caused by your acts
under color of law with you, your officers, and em ployees. Take note: You are now m onetarily liable in your personal
and corporate capacity. I, Dennis-Larry: M eads [Free man], the undersigned, a Sovereign under God, notwithstanding
anything contrary, abide by all laws in accordance with the aforem entioned Constitution of Canada and Honorable
159
"Canadian Bill of Rights" which are applicable to Sovereigns. I, Dennis-Larry: M eads, wish no harm to any m an. You
agree by your non-response to uphold m y "Right to Travel"; or you m ust rebut m y presum ption by lawfully docum ented
evidence in law On and For the Record, Under Oath and penalty of perjury, within the thirty (30) days as aforem entioned
in this Adm iralty Contract.
(9)
BE W ARNED, NOTICED, AND ADVISED that I rely upon, in addition to constitutional lim its of the "Constitution of
Canada" and/or the Honorable "Canadian Bill of Rights," governm ental authority, the rights and protections guaranteed
under Uniform Com m ercial Codes, com m on equity law, laws of adm iralty, and com m ercial liens and levies pursuant to
but not lim ited, to Title 42 (Civil Rights), Title 18 U.S.C.A. (Crim inal Codes), Title 28 U.S.C.A. (Civil Codes), and
additional ALBERTA constitution penal codes, in as m uch as they are in com pliance with the aforem entioned
Constitution of
Canada and/or "Canadian Bill of Rights." There can be no violation of any of these laws unless there
is a victim
consisting of a natural, flesh and blood m an or wom an who has been dam aged. W hen there is no victim ,
there is no
crim e or law broken.
Unless this is rebutted within the tim e lim it contained herein, and the conditions of
the rebuttal are m et, you, or any representative in any capacity of any agency, governm ent, corporation, or the like,
agree to abide by this contract anytim e that you interact with m e. I, Dennis-Larry: M eads [Free man], the undersigned,
am of lawful m ajority
age, clear head, and sound m ind.
(10)
Remember, you took a solem n binding oath to protect and defend the Crown as public trustee, and violation of said oath
is perjury, being a bad-faith doctrine by constructive treason and im m oral dishonor, infra, ¶13, ¶14 & ¶15. I accept said
Oath of Office that you have sworn to uphold. I declare that any and all presum ptions that I am citizen, subject,
resident, participant, legal entity, strawm an, fiction, or any such thing, of any and all jurisdictions of the CANADA OR
ANY OF ITS PROVINCES, SUBDIVISIONS, AGENCIES, ENTITIES, DEPARTMENTS, SUBSIDIARIES are now and
forever rebutted. You m ay rebut m y presum ptions by subm itting certified copies of lawful docum ents that have been
certified by
ALBERTA's attorney while under oath and on the official record and under penalty of perjury and waiving
all im m unities from prosecution. You have thirty (30) days to rebut m y statem ents as indicated herein; or m y
statem ents will stand as true, lawful, and legal in all of your courts and/or hearings.
(11)
This legal and tim ely notice, declaration, and dem and is prim a facie evidence of sufficient Notice of Grace. The term s
and conditions of this presentm ent agreem ent are a quasi-contract under the Uniform Com m ercial Code and Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act. These term s and conditions are not subject to any or all im m unities that you m ay claim , should
you in any way violate m y rights or allow violations by others. Your corporate com m ercial acts against m e or m ine and
your failures to act on behalf of m e or m ine are ultra vires and injurious by willful and gross negligence.
(12)
The liability is upon you, and/or your respondeat superior, and upon others including any and all local, provincial, state,
regional, federal, m ultijurisdictional, international, and/or corporate agencies, and/or persons of the foregoing, involved
directly or indirectly with you via any nexus acting with you; and said liability shall be satisfied jointly and/or severally at
m y discretion. You are sworn to your Oath of Office, and I accept your Oath of Office and your responsibility to uphold
the rights of m e and m ine at all tim es.
BILLING COSTS ASSESSED WITH LEVIES AND LIENS UPON VIOLATIONS SHALL BE:
(13)
Unlawful Arrest, Illegal Arrest, or Restraint, or Distraint, Trespassing/Trespass, w ithout a law ful, correct, and
complete 4th amendment w arrant: $2,000,000.00 (Two Million) CAD Dollars, per occurrence, per officer, or agent
involved.
Excessive Bail, Fraudulent Bond, Cruel and Unusual Punishment, Violation of Right to Speedy Trial, Freedom of
Speech, Conspiracy, Aiding and Abetting, Racketeering, or Abuse of Authority as per Title 18 U.S.C.A., §241 and
§242, or definitions contained herein: $2,000,000.00 (Two Million) CAD Dollars, per occurrence, per officer, or agent
involved.
Assault or Assault and Battery w ithout W eapon: $2,000,000.00 (Two Million) CAD Dollars, per occurrence, per
officer, or agent involved.
Assault or Assault and Battery w ith W eapon: $3,000,000.00 (Three Million) CAD Dollars, per occurrence, per officer,
or agent involved.
Unfounded Accusations by Officers of the Court, or Unlaw ful Determination: $2,000,000.00 (Two Million) CAD
Dollars, per occurrence, per officer, or agent involved.
160
(14)
Denial and/or Abuse of Due Process: $2,000,000.00 (Two Million) CAD Dollars, per occurrence, per officer, or agent
involved.
Obstruction of Justice: $2,000,000.00 (Two Million) CAD Dollars, per occurrence, per officer, or agent involved.
Unlawful Distraint, Unlawful Detainer, or False Imprisonment: $5,000,000.00 (Five Million) CAD Dollars, per day,
per occurrence, per officer, or agent involved, plus 18% annual interest.
Reckless Endangerment, Failure to Identify and/or Present Credentials and/or Failure to Charge w ithin 48 (FortyEight) Hours after being detained: $2,000,000.00 (Two Million) CAD Dollars, per occurrence, per officer, or agent
involved.
Counterfeiting Statute Staple Securities Instruments: $2,000,000.00 (Two Million) CAD Dollars, per occurrence, per
officer, or agent involved.
(15)
Unlawful Detention or Incarceration: $2,000,000.00 (Two Million) CAD Dollars per day, per occurrence, per officer, or
agent involved.
Incarceration for Civil or Criminal Contempt of Court w ithout law ful, documented-in-law , and valid reason:
$2,000,000.00 (Two Million) per day, per occurrence, per officer, or agent involved.
Disrespect by a Judge or Officer of the Court: $2,000,000.00 (Two Million) CDA Dollars per occurrence, per officer,
or agent involved.
Threat, Coercion, Deception, or Attempted Deception by any Officer of the Court: $2,000,000.00 (Two Million)
CAD Dollars per occurrence, per officer, or agent involved.
Unnecessary Restraint: $2,000,000.00 (Two Million) CAD Dollars, per occurrence, per officer, or agent involved.
Refusal of Law ful Bailment as provided by the aforementioned Constitution of Canada and/or Honorable
"Canadian Bill of Rights": $2,000,000.00 (Two Million) CAD Dollars, per day of confinem ent, to be prorated by the
hour as per Traficant vs. Florida, per occurrence, per officer, per agent involved.
Coercion or Attempted Coercion of the Natural M an or W oman to take responsibility for the Corporate Straw man
against the Natural M an or W oman Secured Party's W ill: $2,000,000.00 Two Million CAD Dollars, per occurrence,
per officer or agent involved.
The Placing of an Unlaw ful or Improper Lien, Levy, Impoundments, or Garnishment against any funds, bank
accounts, savings accounts, retirement funds, investment funds, social security funds, intellectual property, or
any other property belonging to the Natural M an or W oman Secured Party by any agency: $2,000,000.00 (Two
Million) CAD Dollars, per occurrence, and $100,000.00 (One Hundred Thousand) CAD Dollars, per day penalty until
liens, levies, im poundm ents, and/or garnishm ents are ended and all funds reim bursed, and all property returned in the
sam e condition as it was when taken, with 18 % annual interest upon the Secured Party's declared value of property.
Destruction, Deprivation, Concealment, Defacing, Alteration, or Theft, of Property, including buildings, structures,
equipm ent, furniture, fixtures, and supplies belonging to the Natural Man or W om an Secured Party will incur a penalty of
total, new replacem ent costs of property as indicated by Owner and Secured Party, including but not lim ited to purchase
price and labor costs for locating, purchasing, packaging, shipping, handling, transportation, delivery, set up, assem bly,
installation, tips and fees, perm its, replacem ent of com puter inform ation and data, com puter hardware and software,
com puter supplies, office equipm ent and supplies, or any other legitim ate fees and costs associated with total
replacem ent of new item s of the sam e type, like, kind, and/or quality, and quantity as affected item s. The list and
description of affected property will be provided by the Owner and Secured Party and will be accepted as com plete,
accurate, and uncontestable by the agency or representative thereof that caused such action. In addition to the
aforem entioned cost, there will be a $200,000.00 (Two Hundred Thousand) CAD Dollars, per day penalty until property
is restored in full, beginning on the first day after the incident, as provided by this contract.
CAVEAT
(16)
The aforem entioned charges are billing costs deriving from , but not lim ited to, Uniform Com m ercial Codes and Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act and this contract. These charges shall be assessed against persons, governm ental bodies, and
corporate entities supra, or any com bination thereof when they individually and/or collectively violate m y natural and/or
civil rights as an Am erican by declaration. The aforem entioned Constitution of Canada and/or the Honorable "Canadian
Bill of Rights" establishes jurisdiction for you in your norm al course of business. All violations against m e, the
undersigned, will be assessed per occurrence, per officer, representative, or agent of any agency that is involved in any
unlawful action against m e.
161
(17)
By your actions, you shall lack recourse for all claim s of im m unity in any forum . Your officers' knowing consent and
adm ission of perpetrating known acts by your continued enterprise is a violation of m y rights. This Statute Staple
Securities Instrument exhausts all state m aritim e article 1 adm inistrative jurisdictions and protects m y Article III court
rem edies including but not lim ited to Title 42 U.S.C.A, Title 18 U.S.C.A., Title 28 U.S.C.A., and Title 18 U.S.C.,§ 242,
which are provided for by the North Am erican Free Trade Agreem ent, UNIDROIT and the UNCITRAL Convention, of
which CANADA is governed by.
IGNORANCE OF THE LAW IS NO EXCUSE!
(18)
I, one Dennis-Larry: M eads [Free man], the undersigned, am the principal; and you are the agent! Fail not to adhere
to your oath, lest you be called to answer before one God and one Suprem e Court Exclusive Original Jurisdiction, which
is the court of first and last resort, not excluding m y "Good Faith (Oxford) Doctrine" by m y conclusive Honorable
"Canadian Bill of Rights."
(19)
This Statute Staple Securities Instrument is not set forth to threaten, delay, hinder, harass, or obstruct, but to protect
guaranteed Rights and Protections assuring that at no tim e m y Unalienable Rights are ever waived or taken from m e
against m y will by threats, duress, coercion, fraud, or without m y express written consent of waiver. None of the
statem ents contained herein intend to threaten or cause any type of physical or other harm to anyone. The statem ents
contained herein are to notice any persons, whether real or corporate, of their potential, personal, civil, and crim inal
liability if and when they violate m y unalienable rights. A bona fide duplicate of this paperwork is safely archived with
those who testify under oath that it is m y standard policy to ALW AYS present this notice to any public or private officer
attem pting to violate m e and m y rights. It is noted on the record that by im plication of said presentm ent, this notice has
been tendered by way of registered m ail to Governor General of Canada David LIoyd Johnston and/or Lieutenant
Governor of Alberta Donald s. Ethell. This is prim a facie evidence of your receipt and acceptance of this presentm ent
in both your corporate and individual capacity, jointly and severally for each and all governm ental, political, and corporate
bodies. Any other individuals who have been, are, or hereafter becom e involved in the instant actions or any future
actions against m e shall only correspond to m e in writing while signing under penally of perjury. This docum ent is now
on record in the Register of Deeds Office in ALBERTA, supra.
SUMMATION
(20)
Should you m ove against m e in defiance of this presentm ent, there is no im m unity. from prosecution available to you or
to any of your fellow public officers, officials of governm ent, judges, m agistrates, district attorneys, clerks, or any other
persons who becom e involved in the instant actions, or any future actions, against m e by way of aiding and abetting.
Take due heed and govern yourself accordingly. Any or all docum ents tendered to m e, lacking bona fide ink signatures
are counterfeit security instrum ents causing you to be liable in your corporate and individual capacity by fraudulent
conveyance now and foreverm ore. If and when you cause any injury and/or dam ages to the Natural Man or W om an
Secured Party by violating any of the rights, civil rights, privileges, or any term s herein, you agree to voluntarily, with no
reservation of rights and defenses, at the written request of the Natural Man or W om an Secured Party, surrender,
including but not lim ited to, any and all bonds, public and/or corporate insurance policies, and CAFR funds as needed to
satisfy any and all claim s as filed against you by the Natural Man or W om an Secured Party. This applies to any and all
agents, or representatives, individually and severally, of the "CANADA" or any of the subdivisions thereof, as described
herein.
NOTICE TO AGENT IS NOTICE TO PRINCIPAL AND
NOTICE TO PRINCIPAL IS NOTICE TO AGENT
162
(21)
This docum ent cannot be retracted by any em ployee, agent, representative, or officer of the court, or any individuals,
excluding the Natural Man or W om an Secured Party on this registered docum ent, for one hundred years from date on
this legally binding Statute Staple Securities Instrument.
Attention: All Agents, Representatives, or Officers, or such as, of the "CANADA" or its subdivisions including local,
state, federal, and/or international or m ultinational governm ents, corporations, agencies, and the like: You have thirty
(30) days to rebut any portion of this docum ent, or you stand in total agreem ent. Non response is agreem ent. Partial
response is agreem ent. Rebuttal m ust be in written form with legal/lawful, verified, certified docum entation in law, with
copies of said law enclosed. This docum entation m ust be provided under penalty of perjury. Notice to Agent is Notice
to Principal. Notice to Principal is Notice to Agent. Ignorance of the law is no excuse.
(22)
All other corporations including but not lim ited to telephone com panies, cable com panies, utility com panies, contractors,
builders, m aintenance personnel, investors, journeym en, inspectors, law enforcem ent officers, officers of the court,
m anufacturers, wholesalers, retailers, and all others, including all persons, are bound by all paragraphs, term s, and
conditions herein regardless of nature of lim ited liability corporations or affiliations as "DBA's," "AKA's," incorporations, or
any types of businesses in com m erce as deeded by this securities agreem ent and decree.
(23)
YOU ARE NOTICED having been given knowledge of the law and your personal financial liability in event of any
violations of m y rights and/or being. This Statute Staple Securities Instrument now in your hand constitutes tim ely and
sufficient warning by good faith, notice, and grace.
(24)
Dated this
22 day of Decem ber, in the year of our Lord, two thousand eleven. This contract being of honor is
presented under the "Good Faith (Oxford) Doctrine." I accept the Oath of Office of all officers of the court, including
but not lim ited to the clerk of the court; all judges and attorneys from all jurisdictions; all local, state, federal, international
law enforcem ent officers, and all agents of the "CANADA" or any province or subdivisions thereof.
(25)
Any agent, law enforcem ent officer, em ployee, contractor, representative, or the like "CANADA" or any of its subsidiaries
or sub-corporations, SHALL NOT ENTER, AT ANY TIME, FOR ANY REASON, ANY PROPERTY AT W HICH I AM
LOCATED, or LEASE, OW N, or CONTROL, W ITHOUT MY EXPRESS W RITTEN PERMISSION. Violation of this notice
will be considered crim inal trespass and will be subject to a $2,000,000.00 (Two Million) lawful CAD dollar penalty plus
dam ages, per violation, per violator.
(26)
Attention: Any and all lending institutions, brokerage firm s, credit unions, depository institutions, insurance agencies,
credit bureaus, and the officers, agents and em ployees therein: You have now been notified of the law as to your
corporate and individual financial liability in the event of any violations upon the rights and/or being of Dennis-Larry:
M eads. This Statute Staple Securities Instrument constitutes tim ely and sufficient warning by Good Faith Notice of
your liability regardless of your political affirm ations. All penalties contained herein will be subject to a penalty increase
of one m illion dollars per day, plus interest, while there is any unpaid balance for the first thirty (30) days after default of
paym ent. This penalty will increase by 10% per each day until balance is paid in full, plus 18% annual interest,
beginning on the thirty- first (31st ) day after default of paym ent. All penalties in this docum ent are assessed in lawful
m oney and are to be paid in one troy ounce CAD Dollars or equivalent in .999 fine silver or fine gold determ ined by
the value established ROYAL CANADIAN MINT, or by law, whichever is higher value at the tim e of the incident. Any
dispute over the par value will be decided by the Secured Party, or his designee. All definitions in Attachm ent "B" are
included as a part of this contract and will be applied as written herein. Any dispute of any definition will be decided by
the Secured Party. There is no contradiction of term s as written within the confines of this title pursuant to the
"Constitution of Canada." If any contradiction is found, the m eaning will be determ ined by the Secured Party.
Definitions as they apply to this contract·are enclosed in Attachm ent "B" and are included as a legal part of this contract.
163
LS: ____”Dennis-Larry: Meads”___________
_______________________________________
Dennis-Larry: Meads, Secured Party Creditor
Nam e: Dennis-Larry: Meads, Secured Party Creditor
Country: "CANADA"
Province: Alberta
164
NOTICE TO YOURFILINGCOUNTY COUNTY REGISTER OF DEEDS CLERK
(27)
Pursuant to the harm onization of this private contract to uniform law, W hoever, having the custody of any such record,
proceeding, m ap, book, docum ent, paper, or other thing, willfully and unlawfully conceals, rem oves, m utilates,
obliterates, falsifies, or destroys the sam e, shall be fined under this title or im prisoned not m ore than three years; or both;
and shall forfeit his office and shall be disqualified from holding any office under the CANADA, Canada, canada. After
thirty (30) calendar days, you m ay not rebut this contract.
(28)
SUBSCRIBED AND AFFIRM ED: On this 22 day of Decem ber, 2011 AD, before m e appeared Dennis-Larry:
M eads, known to m e or proved to m e on the basis of satisfactory evidence to be the man whose nam e is subscribed on
this Statute Staple Securities Instrument. W itnessed by m y hand and official stam p, signed, sealed, and delivered by
hand or by private, registered, or certified m ail, drafted by the above Secured Party Creditor with attached property
description.
NS:____________________________
Signature of Notary Public
Theodore G. Kaklin
Barrister & Solicitor
W e, the undersigned witnesses, do hereby swear or affirm that it is the policy of Dennis-Larry: M eads to present this “LEGAL
NOTICE AND DEMAND" to all law enforcem ent officers, agents, or representatives of "CANADA" anytim e that he has any
interaction with them .
LS: __N/A______________________
First W itness
LS:___N/A______________________
Second W itness
LS:___N/A______________________
Third W itness
Attachments: Attachment "A" - Property List
Attachment "B" - Definitions
NOTARY SEAL
165
LEGAL NOTICE AND DEMAND - ATTACHMENT "A" - PROPERTY LIST
ATTACHMENT "A" - PROPERTY LIST
ALL PR O PER TY BELO N GING TO TH E D EBTO R BELONG S TO TH E SEC U R ED PAR TY. D EBTO R IS A TR AN SM ITTING U TILITY. D EBTO R IS A
TR U ST. ALL O F TH E FO LLO W IN G PR OPER TY BELON GS TO TH E N ATU R AL M AN SECU R ED PAR TY AS IND IC ATED H ER EIN . TH IS IN CLU D ES
BU T IS N O T LIM ITED TO THE FO LLOW IN G :
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
All proceeds from Secured Party's labor from every source; from products, accounts, fixtures, crops, m ine head, wellhead,
and transm itting utilities, etc.;
All rents, wages, and incom e from every source;
All land in which Debtor has an interest, including the soil itself; all m inerals atop or beneath the soil surface; all air rights;
all waters on or in the soil or land surface such as a lake or pond, within the land boundaries;
All real property and all docum ents involving all real property in which Debtor has an interest, including all buildings,
structures, fixtures, and appurtenances situated on or affixed thereto, as noted in #3 above;
All cottages, cabins, houses, m ansions, and buildings of whatever type and wherever located;
All bank accounts foreign and dom estic, bank "safety” deposit boxes and the contents therein; personal security codes,
passwords, and the like associated therewith; credit card accounts, m utual fund accounts, certificates of deposit accounts,
checking accounts, savings accounts, retirem ent plan accounts, stocks, bonds, securities, and benefits from trusts;
All inventory from any source;
All m achinery, either farm or industrial; all m echanical tools, construction, tools, tools of trade;
All boats, yachts, and watercraft; and all equipm ent, accoutrem ents, baggage, and cargo affixed or pertaining thereto or
stowed therein, inter alia: all m otors, engines, ancillary equipm ent, accessories, parts, tools, instrum ents, electronic
equipm ent, navigation aids, service equipm ent, lubricants, fuels, and fuel additives;
All aircraft, gliders, balloons, and all equipm ent, accoutrem ents, baggage, and cargo affixed or pertaining thereto or stowed
therein, inter alia: all m otors, engines, ancillary equipm ent, accessories, parts, tools, instrum ents, electronic equipm ent,
navigation aids, service equipm ent, lubricants, fuels, and fuel additives;
All m otor hom es, trailers, m obile hom es, recreational vehicles, houses, cargo, and travel trailers; and all equipm ent,
accoutrem ents, baggage, and cargo affixed or pertaining thereto or stowed therein, inter alia: all ancillary equipm ent,
accessories, parts, service equipm ent, lubricants, fuels, and fuel additives;
All anim als and all farm livestock; and all things required for the care, feeding, use, transportation, and husbandry thereof;
All pets, including cats, dogs, birds, fish, or whatever other of the anim al kingdom has been gifted or otherwise acquired:
whether kept indoors or outdoors; with all fixtures, vehicles, and housings required for their protection, feeding, care,
transportation, shelter, and whatever other needs m ay arise;
All vehicles, autos, trucks, four-wheel vehicles, trailers, wagons, m otorcycles, bicycles, tricycles, wheeled conveyances of
any kind, m otorized or otherwise, in which Debtor has an interest;
All com puters, com puter-related equipm ent and accessories, flash drives, electronically stored files or data, telephones,
electronic equipm ent, office equipm ent and m achines;
All visual reproduction system s, aural reproduction system s, m otion pictures, film s, video tapes, audio tapes, sound tracks,
com pact discs, i-pods, phonograph records, film , video and aural production equipm ent, cam eras, projectors, etc.;
All m anuscripts, books, booklets, pam phlets, treatises; treatm ents, m onographs, stories, written m aterial, libraries, plays,
screenplays, lyrics, songs, m usic;
All books and financial records of Debtor;
All tradem arks, registered m arks, copyrights, patents, proprietary data and technology, inventions, intellectual property,
royalties, good will;
All public or private scholastic degrees, titles, credentials, m edals, trophies, honors, awards, recognitions, m eritorious
citations, certificates from apprenticeship training and/or continuing education program s, etc., from whatever source, for
whatever trade, occupation, work, or endeavor;
All m ilitary (Arm y, Navy, Air Force, Marine, National Guard, etc.) discharge papers, and the like;
All records, diaries, journals, photographs, negatives, transparencies, im ages, video footage, film footage, drawings, sound
records, audio tapes, video tapes, com puter production or storage of all kinds whatsoever;
All fingerprints, footprints, palm prints, thum bprints, RNA m aterials, DNA m aterials, genes, blood fractions, biopsies,
surgically rem oved tissue, bodily parts, organs, hair, teeth, nails, sem en, urine, other bodily fluids or m atter, voice-print,
retinal im ages, and the descriptions thereof; and all other corporal identification factors, and said factors' physical
counterparts in any form ; and all records, record num bers, and inform ation pertaining thereto;
166
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
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33.
34.
35.
36.
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39.
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48.
All biom etric data, records, inform ation, and processes not elsewhere described; the use thereof and the use of the
inform ation contained therein or pertaining thereto;
All rights to obtain, use, request, refuse, or authorize the adm inistration of any food, beverage, nourishm ent, or water, or
any substance to be infused or injected into or affecting the body by any m eans whatsoever;
All rights to obtain, use, request, refuse, or authorize the adm inistration of any drug, m anipulation, m aterial, process,
procedure, ray, or wave which alters or m ight alter the present or future state of the body, m ind, spirit, free will, faculties,
and self by any m eans, m ethod, or process whatsoever;
All keys, locks, lock com binations, encryption codes or keys, safes, secured places, and security devices, security
program s, software, user nam es, passwords, m achinery, or devices related thereto;
All rights to access and use utilities upon paym ent of the sam e unit costs as the com parable units of usage offered to m ostfavored custom ers, inter alia: cable, electricity, garbage, gas, internet, satellite, sewage, telephone, water, and all other
m ethods of com m unication, energy, transm ission, and food or water distribution;
All rights to barter, buy, contract, sell, or trade ideas, products, services, or work;
All rights to create, invent, adopt, utilize, or prom ulgate any system or m eans of currency, private m oney, m edium of
exchange, coinage, barter, econom ic exchange, bookkeeping, record-keeping, and the like;
All rights to use any free, rented, leased, fixed, or m obile dom icile, as though sam e were a perm anent dom icile; and to be
free from requirem ent to apply for or obtain any governm ent license or perm ission, perm it and otherwise; and to be free
from entry, intrusion, or surveillance, by any m eans, regardless of duration of lease period;
All rights to m anage, m aneuver, direct, guide, or travel in any form of autom obile or m otorized conveyance whatsoever
without any requirem ent to apply for or obtain any governm ent license, perm it, certificate, or perm ission of any kind
whatsoever;
All rights to m arry and procreate children, and to rear, educate, train, guide, and spiritually enlighten any such children,
without any requirem ent to apply for or obtain any governm ent license, perm it, certificate, any vaccinations, or perm ission
of any kind whatsoever;
All rights to buy, sell, trade, grow, raise, gather, hunt, trap, angle, and store food, fiber, and raw m aterials for shelter,
clothing, and survival;
All rights as outlined in the "Constitution of Canada” and the Honorable “Canadian Bill of Rights";
All rights to exercise freedom . of religion, worship, use of sacram ents, spiritual practice, and expression without any
abridgem ent of free speech, or the right to publish, or the right to peaceably assem ble, or the right to petition governm ent
for redress of grievances, or the right to petition any m ilitary force of Canada for physical protection from threats to the
safety and integrity of person or property by either "public" or "private" sources;
All rights to keep and bear arm s for defense of self, fam ily, and parties entreating physical protection of person or property.
All rights to create, preserve, and m aintain inviolable, spiritual sanctuary and receive into sam e any and all parties
requesting safety and shelter;
All rights to create, carry, and use private docum ents of travel of any kind whatsoever, inter alia: those signifying diplom atic
status and im m unity as a free, independent Sovereign;
All claim s of ownership or certificates of title to the corporeal and incorporeal hereditam ents, hereditary succession and all
innate aspects of being, i.e., body, m ind, spirit, free will, faculties, and self;
All rights to privacy and security in person and property, inter alia: all rights to safety and security of all household or
sanctuary dwellers or guests, and all papers and effects belonging to Debtor or any household or sanctuary dwellers or
guests, from governm ental, quasi-governm ental, de facto governm ental, or private intrusion, detainer, entry, seizure,
search, surveillance, trespass, assault, sum m ons, or warrant, except with proof of superior claim duly filed in the
Com m ercial Registry by any such intruding party in the private capacity of such intruding party, notwithstanding whatever
purported authority, warrant, order, law, or color of law m aybe prom ulgated as the authority for any such intrusion,
detainer, entry, seizure, search, surveillance, trespass, assault, sum m ons, or warrant;
All nam es used and all Corporations Sole executed and filed, or to be executed and filed, under said nam es;
All intellectual property, inter alia: all speaking and writing; All thoughts, beliefs, world views, em otions, psychology, etc.;
All signatures and seals;
All signatures on all applications for and all value associated with all licenses foreign and dom estic;
All present and future retirem ent incom es and rights to such incom es issuing from all accounts;
All present and future m edical and healthcare rights; and rights owned through survivorship, from all accounts;
All applications, filings, correspondence, inform ation, im ages, identifying m arks, im age licenses, travel docum ents,
m aterials, perm its, registrations, and records and records num bers held by any entity, for any purpose. however acquired,
as well as the analyses and uses thereof, and any use of any inform ation and im ages contained therein, regardless of
creator, m ethod, location, process, or storage form , inter alia: all processed algorithm s analyzing, classifying, com paring,
com pressing, displaying, identifying, processing, storing, or transm itting said applications, filings, correspondence,
167
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53.
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55.
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58.
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65.
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67.
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73.
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75.
76.
inform ation, im ages, identifying m arks, im age licenses, travel docum ents, m aterials, perm its, registrations, records and
records num bers, and the like;
All signatures on all applications for and all value associated with all library cards;
All credit, charge, and debit cards, m ortgages, notes, applications, card num bers, and associated records and inform ation;
All credit of Debtor;
All signatures on and all value associated with all traffic citations/tickets;
All signatures on and all value associated with all parking citations/tickets;
All value from all court cases and all judgm ents, past, present, and future, in any court whatsoever; and all bonds, orders,
warrants, and other m atters attached thereto or derived therefrom ;
All precious m etals, bullion, coins, jewelry, precious jewels, sem i-precious stones, m ounts; and any storage boxes,
receptacles and depositories within which said item s are stored;
All tax correspondence, filings, notices, coding, record num bers, all benefit from social security account # [social
insurance number];
and any inform ation contained therein, wherever and however located, and no m atter by whom
said inform ation was
obtained, com piled, codified, recorded, stored, analyzed, processed, com m unicated, or utilized;
All bank accounts, all brokerage accounts, stocks, bonds, certificates of deposit, drafts, futures, insurance policies,
investm ent securities, all retirem ent plan accounts, Individual Retirem ent Accounts, m oney m arket accounts, m utual funds,
notes, options, puts, calls, pension plans, savings accounts, stocks, warrants, securities, benefits from trusts, Em ploym ent
Insurance (EI), Canada Pension Plan (CPP), Canada Incom e Tax (CIT);
All accounts, deposits, escrow accounts, lotteries, overpaym ents, prepaym ents, prizes, rebates, refunds, returns, claim ed
and unclaim ed funds; and all records and records num bers, correspondence, and inform ation pertaining thereto or derived
there from ;
All stockpiles, collections, buildups, am assm ent, and accum ulations, however sm all, of Federal Reserve Notes (FRNs),
gold certificates, silver certificates; and all other types and kinds of cash, coins, currency, and m oney delivered into
possession of Secured Party;
All drugs, herbs, m edicine, m edical supplies, cultivated plants, growing plants, inventory, ancillary equipm ent, supplies,
propagating plants, and seeds; and all related storage facilities and supplies;
All fitness and/or sports equipm ent intended to increase vitality, fitness, and health; and whole food com plexes, vitam in,
m ineral, and other supplem ents to the diet for the sam e health and fitness purposes; and all juicers, grinders, dehydrators,
and storage and delivery devices or equipm ent;
All products of and for agriculture; and all equipm ent, inventories, supplies, contracts, and accoutrem ents involved in the
planting, tilling, harvesting, processing, preservation, and storage of all products of agriculture;
All plants and shrubs, trees, fruits, vegetables, farm and garden produce, indoors and out, watering devices, fertilizers and
fertilizing equipm ent, pots, collections of plants, e.g., bonsai, dry or live assortm ents of flowers and plants, or anything
botanical;
All farm , lawn, and irrigation equipm ent, accessories, attachm ents, hand tools, im plem ents, service equipm ent, parts,
supplies, and storage sheds and contents;
All fuel, fuel tanks, containers, and involved or related delivery system s;
All m etal-working, woodworking, and other such m achinery; and all ancillary equipm ent, accessories, consum ables, power
tools, hand tools, inventories, storage cabinets, tool boxes, work benches, shops, and facilities;
All cam ping, fishing, hunting, and sporting equipm ent; and all special clothing, m aterials, supplies, and baggage related
thereto;
All rifles, guns, bows, crossbows, other weapons, and related accessories; and the am m unition, reloading equipm ent and
supplies, projectiles, and integral com ponents thereof;
All radios, televisions, com m unication equipm ent, receivers, transceivers, transm itters, antennas, towers, etc.; and all
ancillary equipm ent, supplies, com puters, software program s, wiring, and related accoutrem ents and devices;
All power-generating m achines or devices; and all storage, conditioning, control, distribution, wiring, and ancillary
equipm ent pertaining to or attached thereto;
All devices, engines, fixtures, fans, plans needed for the production or storage of electrical energy;
All com puters and com puter system s and the inform ation contained therein; as well as all ancillary equipm ent, printers, and
data com pression or encryption devices, processes, and processors;
All office and engineering equipm ent, furniture, ancillary equipm ent, drawing tools, electronic and paper files, and item s
related thereto;
All water wells and well-drilling equipm ent; and all ancillary equipm ent, chem icals, tools, and supplies;
All shipping, storing, and cargo containers, and all chassis, truck trailers, vans, and the contents thereof; whether on-site, in
transit, or in storage anywhere;
All building m aterials and prefabricated buildings; and all com ponents or m aterials pertaining thereto, before or during
m anufacture, transportation, storage, building, erection, or vacancy while awaiting occupancy thereof;
168
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93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
All com m unications and data; and the m ethods, devices, and form s of inform ation storage and retrieval, and the products
of any such stored inform ation;
All artwork and supplies, paintings, etchings, photographic art, lithographs, and serigraphs, etc.; and all fram es and m ounts
pertaining to or affixed thereto;
All food; and all devices, tools, equipm ent, vehicles, m achines, and related accoutrem ents involved in food preservation,
preparation, growth, transport, and storage;
All construction m achinery; and all ancillary equipm ent, fuels, fuel additives, supplies, m aterials, and service equipm ent
pertaining thereto;
All m edical, dental, optical, prescription, and insurance records, records num bers, and inform ation contained in any such
records or pertaining thereto;
The Last W ill and Testam ent from any source;
All inheritances gotten or to be gotten;
All wedding bands and rings, watches, and jewelry;
All household goods and appliances, linen, wardrobe, toiletries, furniture, kitchen utensils, cutlery, tableware, cooking
utensils, pottery, antiques; etc.;
All m usical instrum ents, whether new or old, including brass, woodwinds, percussion, strings, etc.;
All children's toys, clothing, playthings, and possessions of any type or am ount;
All businesses, corporations, com panies, trusts, partnerships, lim ited partnerships, organizations, proprietorships, and the
like, now owned or hereafter acquired; and all books and records thereof and therefrom ; all incom e therefrom ; and all
accessories, accounts, equipm ent, inform ation, inventory, m oney, spare parts, and com puter software pertaining thereto;
All ownership, equity, property, and rights to property now owned or held or hereafter acquired in all businesses,
corporations, com panies, partnerships, lim ited partnerships, organizations, proprietorships, and the like; and all books and
records pertaining thereto; all incom e therefrom ; and all accessories, accounts, equipm ent, inform ation, inventory, m oney,
spare parts, and com puter software pertaining thereto;
All packages, parcels, envelopes, or labels of any kind whatsoever which are addressed to, or intended to be addressed to,
Debtor or natural man Secured Party, whether received or not received;
All telephone num bers;
All signatures on all applications for and all value associated with all certificates of birth docum ents of the natural man
Secured Party, and all said docum ents them selves; Registration Num ber [registration num ber]- Alberta.
All signatures on all applications for and all value associated with all certificates of birth docum ents of all children and
grandchildren of the natural man Secured Party, and all said docum ents them selves; [child #1] born [birthdate], [child #2]
born [birthdate]
All signatures on all applications for social insurance num bers, and all value. associated with all accounts, [social
insurance number];
All signatures on all applications for social insurance num bers for all children and grandchildren of the natural man
Secured Party, and all value associated with all accounts.
All value associated with the private contract trust account num ber of the natural man Secured Party: [social insurance
number w ithout spaces];
All value associated with the private contract trust account num bers of all his children under the age of twenty one;
[child #1] born [birthdate] [child #2] born [birthdate] natural man Secured Party;
All signatures on all applications for and all value associated with Driver License #: [driver’s license number] - Alberta;
All signatures on all applications for and all value associated with all passports for the natural man Secured Party Passport Num ber [passport num ber] and his children under the age of twenty one; [child #1] born [birthdate] [child #2]
born, [birthdate].
All docum ents as recorded in the public record by and for the natural man Secured Party as indicated herein;
All signatures on all applications for and all value associated with all m arriage licenses; [m arriage license num ber],
Registration Num ber [registration num ber] Alberta
All private and public m arriage contracts; [m arriage license num ber], Registration Num ber [registration num ber] Alberta
All signatures on all applications for and all value associated with all professional licenses;
All private addresses of the natural man Secured party as indicated herein;
All signatures on all applications for and all value associated with all public addresses;
All private, registered, bond/account num bers; and all bonds and notes tendered to any and all entities,
including the Departm ent/Treasury of Canada, banks, creditors, corporations, etc.;
Any and all property not specifically listed, nam ed, or specified by m ake, m odel, serial num ber, etc., is expressly herewith
included as collateral of the natural man Secured Party.
169
LEGAL NOTICE AND DEMAND - ATTACHMENT "B" - DEFINITIONS
ATTACHMENT "B" - DEFINITIONS
1.
Unlaw ful Arrest: Means restricting a m an or wom an's right to m ove about freely without the proper use of a lawful signed
by a judge of com petent jurisdiction while under oath. This includes unnecessary use of restraint devices, traffic stops,
raids, or any other type of interaction, when an officer is presented with and ignores a "Notice and Dem and," "Public
Servants Questionnaire," "Right to Travel" Docum ents, or other docum ents notifying the officer of the sovereign, lawful
rights of the Natural Man or W om an Secured Party, created by God, who is not to be confused with the Corporate Fiction
“Strawm an" which was created by the state. This includes arrest when a Natural Man or W om an Secured Party is
incarcerated for refusing to sign any citation; arrest due to contem pt of court when he or she is not violent or a physical
threat to the court; arrest by Internal Revenue Service for failure to produce books, records, or other docum ents; arrest
and refusal of Habeas Corpus; arrest for conspiracy of any kind without lawfully docum ented lawfully docum ented
affidavits from at least three (3) eye witnesses, signed under oath and penally of perjury.
2.
Illegal Arrest: Means sam e as above item # 1, "Unlaw ful Arrest."
3.
Unlaw ful Detention: Means restraining a Natural Man or W om an Secured Party's freedom of m ovem ent, and/or Right to
Travel, against his will for m ore than sixty (60) seconds without a property authorized lawful warrant signed by a judge of
com petent jurisdiction while under oath. This includes routine traffic stops, raids, random identification checks, security
checks, only after the officer, agent, or representative has been notified by the Natural Man or W om an Secured Party of
his status and after the officer has been given docum ents to prove said status, along with up to ten (10) m inutes for officer
to exam ine said docum ents.
4.
Unlaw ful Distraint: Means seizure or taking of any property that is lawfully owned or in possession of the Natural Man or
W om an Secured Party without proper probable cause, and/or due process, and lawful warrant. This includes any seizure
by any officer, agent, representative, in any capacity, or relationship with "Canada" or any of its agencies, contractors,
subdivisions, subsidiaries, or the like.
5.
Law ful W arrant: Means a warrant that follows the provisions of the uniform and com m on law of CANADA.
6.
Right to Speedy Trial: Means trial will com m ence within 90 days of the date of arrest.
7.
Interstate Detainer: Means the sam e as unlawful detainer as when involving a Natural Man or W om an Secured Party
and involving m ore than one agency or state of the corporation, or any representative, agent, or officer who has any
agreem ent with, contract with, or perm ission to act on behalf of any m unicipal corporation of "CANADA" or any subsidiary
or sub-corporation thereof.
8.
Unlaw ful Restraint: Means any action by any officer, agent, representative, contractor, associate, officer of the court, or
the like, to prevent, coerce, intim idate, hinder, or in any way lim it the right of a Natural Man or W om an Secured Party from
any type of freedom of legal/ lawful speech, travel, m ovem ent, action, gesture, writing, utterance, or enjoym ent of any
right or privilege that is com m only enjoyed by any m em ber of the public, or any Sovereign.
9.
Freedom of Speech: Means the right to speak open and plainly without the fear of reprisal. This includes the right of a
Natural Man or W om an Secured Party to speak at hearings and trials, before m agistrates, judges, and officers of the
court, agents, representatives, or the like, of "CANADA." It also m eans that no attem pt to suppress this right will be m ade
by any officer of the court or of "CANADA" corporation. No judge or officer of any court or tribunal will threaten contem pt
of court for free speech by any Natural Man or W om an Secured Party.
10.
Bank of Canada (CAD) Dollars: Means the currently recognized m edium of exchange as used by the general public at
the tim e of offense, at par value, equal to a one ounce silver dollar equivalent per each dollar unit, as represented in a
claim . All claim s and dam ages will be paid at par value as indicated. Par value will be established by written law or the
value established by the ROYAL CANADIAN MINT, whichever is higher at the tim e of the offense, for the purchase of an
official, one troy ounce, .999 fine silver or gold coin.
170
11.
Obstruction of Justice: Means any attem pt by any officer of the court or representative of any agency that represents
the "CANADA," or any of its subdivisions, agencies, contractors, etc., to deprive, hinder, conceal, coerce, or threaten a
Natural Man or W om an Secured Party in an attem pt to prevent any and every opportunity to legally/lawfully
defend him self by attem pting to produce and file lawful docum ents and or testim ony to agents, officers, judges,
m agistrates, the court, clerk of the court, representatives, or investigators in order to settle any legal/lawful controversy.
This also includes any attem pt by a judge or officer of the court to hinder the Natural Man or W om an Secured Party from
filing, recording, adm itting, presenting, discussing, questioning, or using any evidence, docum ent, paper, photographs,
audio and/or video recordings, or any other type of evidence that he desires to subm it as evidence in any type of court
proceeding. The determ ination of what is evidence and what will be adm itted is to be solely determ ined by the Natural
Man or W om an Secured Party. Any evidence will be tried on m erits of the lawful content and validity. Any judge or officer
of the court who attem pts to suppress or dism iss legal or lawful evidence will voluntarily surrender all bonds, insurance,
property, corporate property, bank accounts, savings accounts, or any corporate property of value to the Natural Man or
W om an Secured Party upon written dem and and surrender all rights to and defenses against said property. This also
includes evidence that is supported by case law. This includes attem pts by any officer of the court to m ake m otions, to
issue orders such as gag orders, or to use any other m eans of keeping inform ation suppressed from the public or the
official record. The determ ination of whether the acts of the court are an attem pt to suppress evidence will be solely
determ ined by the Natural Man or W om an Secured Party. This also includes the provision as indicated in item # 18
"Racketeering and Canada, Sections 467.11 to 467.13"
12.
Excessive Bail: Means any am ount of bail set at an unreasonable rate. This also m eans bail in excess of the am ount of
the fine, penalty, or penal sum that is associated with the alleged crim e com m itted. This also m eans that if a Natural Man
or W om an Secured Party has lived as an upstanding m em ber in a com m unity or area for m ore than one year, works a
regular job, or is a m em ber of or involved with a church group, civic group, com m unity enterprise, or can produce at least
two affidavits from m em bers of his com m unity or area stating that he is involved with his com m unity, he cannot be held
without bail as a flight risk or a threat to society. If the Natural Man or W om an Secured Party can produce at least four (4)
affidavits stating that he lives, works, and is involved in his com m unity, or the prior com m unity in which he lived, he m ust
be released on his own recognizance without any bail required. This provision does not apply to anyone charged with
rape, m urder, or violent crim es.
13.
Cruel and Unusual Punishment: Means physical violence of any type or form that is used against a Natural Man or
W om an Secured Party and that causes invisible or undetectable or visible physical injury, e.g., m arks, scrapes, scratches,
bruises, abrasion, avulsions, fractures, sprains, restraint m arks, dislocations, punctures, cuts, loss of blood, loss of body
fluids, etc. This includes any other type of physical stress to the body or any chem ically- induced, altered m ental state of
the Natural Man or W om an Secured Party. This also includes any attem pt to incarcerate; restrain; question; detain;
withhold food when requested; withhold drink when requested; withhold m edications as requested; withhold use of
bathroom facilities and supplies when requested; withhold reading and writing m aterials; withhold com m unication with
friends, fam ily, legal counsel, and religious counsel; withhold proper clothing as needed for com fort; withhold blankets
when requested; withhold hot and cold water for showers; withhold freedom when requested. This also includes ridicule,
coercion, threats, verbal insults, rude and offensive language, veiled threats, or any other type of m ental stress or
anguish.
14.
Conspiracy: Means the cooperation of two or m ore persons working together to restrict, suppress, inhibit, or in any way
deprive a Natural Man or W om an Secured Party of any right, benefit, or privilege that would ordinarily be offered by
CANADA, Canada and canada.
15.
Victim: Means any Natural Man or W om an Secured Party who has received direct dam ages to him self or his property as
the result of an unlawful or illegal act by another.
16.
Victimless Law s: Means any law that is passed or presum ed to be passed that creates a violation of law in which no
Natural Man or W om an Secured Party has been dam aged. This includes any statute, ordinance, regulation, policy, or
color of law provision. These types of laws will not be used in any action, of any kind, against any Natural Man or W om an
Secured Party.
17.
Aiding and Abetting: Means the efforts of any officer, agent, or representative of CANADA or officer of the court to assist
another of the sam e to hinder, coerce, restrict, resist, suppress, or deprive in any way, a Natural Man or W om an Secured
Party from receiving any and all rights, benefits, or privileges, as provided by Canada that would norm ally be offered to
171
the general Canadian public, or to a Sovereign. This also includes the provisions as provided in item # 18 "Racketeering"
and suppression of evidence.
18.
Racketeering: Means any attem pt by any two or m ore officers of the corporation to restrict, suppress, coerce,
m anipulate, inhibit, or in any way deprive a Natural Man or W om an Secured Party from receiving every right, benefit, or
privilege that is outlined by Constitution of Canada and/or the Honorable "Canadian Bill of Rights." This also includes any
effort by the officers of the court to hinder in any way the introduction of evidence, law, facts, affidavits, statem ents,
witness testim ony, or any inform ation that is considered relevant by the Natural Man or W om an Secured Party, or any
attem pt to prevent a jury from hearing this evidence. This also includes any attem pt to prevent this evidence from being
heard in a public forum and before any and all m em bers of the general public, as m any as can be accom m odated by the
m ain courtroom . All hearings, tribunals, or trials will be held in a public place; and any and all m em bers of the general
public will be allowed to attend, without restriction. This also includes questioning and/or interrogation by police officers
before, during, and after an arrest.
19.
Federal Zone: Means any land, property, building, area, zone, 911 zone, or postal zone that is presum ed to be within the
territorial jurisdiction of CANADA or any of its representatives as defined herein. This does not include any land, property,
building, structure, dwelling, area, zone that is held by deed, title, warranty deed, contract, or any written or verbal
agreem ent, or any such thing by a Natural Man or W om an Secured Party non dom estic to CANADA. All privately held
properties of any type that are being held by any Natural Man or W om an Secured Party are excluded from any federal
zone or any jurisdiction of any representatives of CANADA or any of its territories. This is fact and m ay be presented in
any court by affidavit of any Natural Man or W om an Secured Party of interest involved in any interaction with "CANADA"
or any of its representatives, as outlined in this contract.
20.
Province and Territories: Means any of the ten provinces and three territories areas known as CANADA which is not the
sam e as the "CANADA" corporation. The Natural Man or W om an Secured Party will also determ ine whether or not his
land is a part of the jurisdiction of the "CANADA"; and his decision shall not be challenged by any representative of the
"CANADA." The Natural Man or W om an Secured Party will determ ine if the alleged offense occurred within the lim its of
"CANADA." A violation of this provision will be Unlawful Determ ination and punishable as indicated by this contract
agreem ent.
21.
Trespassing/Trespass: Means the entry into or onto the dom ain, property, residence, area, location, grounds, dwellings,
buildings, barns, sheds, caves, structures, lands, storage areas, tunnels, autom obiles, trucks, safe houses, underground
shelters, autom obiles, m otor vehicles, recreational vehicles, boats, planes, trains, ships, containers, vans, heavy
equipm ent, farm im plem ents, culverts, driveways, trees, yards, real property, real estate, land, etc., of the Natural Man or
W om an Secured Party without his express written perm ission, or without a lawfully executed warrant. Any and all agents
or representatives of the corporation will fully and com pletely observe any and all protections as outlined in the laws and
statutes of Canada. Any personal property that is dam aged, lost, stolen, or m isplaced, etc., will be recoverable as
indicated in this Notice and Dem and docum ent. I solem nly swear and affirm that I do not have any illegal contraband on
m y property; I have never had any illegal contraband on or around m y property and never will. Any contraband, if it is
found on m y property, would have been placed there by the officers or agents during the tim e of trespass. I sim ply do not
allow it on m y property. Contraband or illegal item s if they are found in a search do not belong to m e and m ay not be
used in any attem pt in any claim against m e. Any and all officers, agents, and representatives of the corporation will be
held individually liable for the full am ount of dam ages as outlined in this Notice and Dem and docum ent for trespassing.
22.
Natural M an or W oman Secured Party: Means any flesh and blood, living, breathing Man or W om an, created by God,
who notifies any representative of the corporation, verbally or in writing, that he is a Sovereign, Non "CANADA" corporate
citizen, free m an or free wom an, and not subject to the jurisdiction of the corporation or any of its representatives. This is
not to be confused with the Fictitious Legal Entity that was created by Canada and/or a province and is represented by an
ALL CAPITAL LETTER NAME. Any attem pt to notify any officer, agent, or representative of the status of the Natural Man
or W om an Secured Party will be sufficient notice. Sufficient notice will be determ ined by oath, statem ent, or affidavit by
the Natural Man or W om an Secured Party; and the validity of such will not be challenged by any officer of the court.
23.
County, Tow n or City: Means any subdivision of a province or territory of "Canada." This subdivision excludes any
jurisdiction, zone, or territory of "CANADA" corporation that is described by the Natural Man or W om an Secured Party in
ALL CAPITAL LETTERS. Any dispute over any errors contained in spelling or gram m ar will be resolved at the discretion
of the Natural Man or W om an Secured Party and will not be challenged by any representative of the corporation.
172
24.
Agency, Entity, Department, Subdivision, Subsidiary, Contractor, Employee, Inspector, Investigator,
Organization, Officer, Agent, Authorized Representative, Policeman, Participant: Means any person, corporation,
or entity of any kind which works for, is com pensated all or in part by, receives funds from , collects funds for, contracts
with, receives any benefit from , receives any privilege from , participates with, has allegiance to, or in any way has a
relationship with the "CANADA or any of its subsidiaries, sub-corporations, departm ents, or agencies, etc.
25.
Contract: Means any agreem ent in writing that has been offered for review and acceptance by another party wherein the
offering party has ten (10) days or m ore, or as stipulated in the contract, to review, respond, accept, or rebut any
provisions of the contract as indicated in the contract. Non response on the part of the receiving party or agent of the
receiving party will be a lawful offer and acceptance of all the term s and conditions contained in said contract. Rebuttal by
the receiving party of any provision of the contract by any other m eans than is indicated in the contract will be non
response. Return of the contract unopened and/or without review will be acceptance of all conditions of said contract.
Recording the contract with the clerk of court or any public records officer will be a lawful offer and notification and will be
presentm ent to all officers of the court in that state or county.
Notice to Agent is Notice to Principal.
Notice to
Principal, is Notice to Agent.
26.
False Imprisonment: Means any attem pt by any officer of the court or corporation to incarcerate any Natural Man or
W om an Secured Party against his will and/or against any and all protections of the laws and provisions of the
"Constitution of Canada" and/or the Honorable "Canadian Bill of Rights".
27.
Representative: Means any agent, agency, departm ent, officer, investigator, entity, subsidiary, sub-corporation,
contractor, em ployee, inspector, individual, or corporation that has any affiliation or association with, collects or distributes
funds for, does any task for, receives any benefit or privilege from , of, or for the "CANADA." This includes anyone or
anything that represents the interests of, or is being funded by, or receives funds from , or has any attachm ent to the
"CANADA" or any of its subdivisions or sub-corporations.
28.
Corporation: Means any representative, agency, sub-corporation, contractor, or any person or entity that is em ployed by,
receives or distributes funds for, receives any benefit or privilege from , or has any relationship of any kind with the
"CANADA" corporation.
29.
Interpretation: Means if any conflict arises concerning the definition of any of the term s and/or conditions of this contract,
the conflict concerning the m eaning of the term or condition will be decided by the Natural Man or W om an Secured Party.
His decision will be final and not subject to review or argum ent. No liability or penalty will be incurred by the Natural Man
or W om an Secured Party due to his interpretation of such term s and or conditions.
30.
Corporate Capacity: Means acting for, or on behalf of, a corporation, or governm ent entity, while under law or color of
law.
31.
Legal counsel: Means anyone that a Natural Man or W om an Secured Party chooses to have as legal assistance of
counsel, whether counsel is licensed or not, or a m em ber of the Bar Association. Counsel m ay assist, represent, speak
on behalf of, write cases for, or perform any act in or out of court for the Natural Man or W om an Secured party without any
hindrance, threat, prosecution, charge, repercussion, etc., from any officer of the court, or representative of the "CANADA"
corporation, or any representative, officer, or agent thereof.
32.
Abuse of Authority: Means anyone who denies, withholds, refuses, deprives, lim its, inhibits, counteracts, conceals any
right, benefit, protections, or privilege, as protected by the "Constitution of Canada" and/or the Honorable "Canadian Bill of
Rights." This includes arrest or detainm ent without docum ented evidence that a lawful crim e has been com m itted by the
Natural Man or W om an Secured Party. This includes use of restraint devices on a Natural Man or W om an Secured Party
and/or physical abuse that m akes or does not m ake any m arks, scars, cuts, abrasions, or the like. This also includes
denial of lawful Due Process, Habeas Corpus, Excessive Bail, Unlawful Arrest, Unlawful Detention, or the like, as outlined
in this contract.
33.
Verbal Abuse: Means the use of offensive and/or threatening, spoken words, body language, and non-verbal gestures or
actions by any representative of the corporation as defined herein upon a Natural Man or W om an Secured Party.
lf a
controversy arises about an incident, the version told by the Natural Man or W om an Secured Party will be accepted as
truth and will not be contested.
173
34.
Assault and Battery w ith W eapon: Means any actual, threatened, or perceived use of any weapons, by any
representative of the "CANADA" corporation, against the Natural Man or W om an Secured Party or his, that creates an
atm osphere of fear for the Natural Man or W om an Secured Party. This includes non lethal weapons such as tazers, stun
guns, m ace, pepper spray, any chem ical used to incapacitate, rubber bullets, shock force weapons, electronic weapons,
or any other type of weapon that m ay be used to control or to create fear. If a conflict arises about the events, the version
told by the Naturel Man or W om an Secured Party will be accepted as truth and will not be contested.
35.
Unfounded Accusations: Means any accusation, charge, or claim , civil or crim inal or in adm iralty, that is alleged or
m ade by any representative of the "CANADA" corporation as defined herein that is not proven by written, docum ented
evidence presented under oath and penalty of perjury by an authorized agent or representative of the
corporation. The accuser has eight (8) hours to provide said docum ents to be reviewed and to put them into the
possession of the Natural Man or W om an Secured Party; and failure to do so will be Unfounded Accusations and subject
to the penalties contained herein.
36.
Encroachment: Means to invade, intrude, or in any way prevent a Natural Man or W om an Secured Party the full and
com plete use of property, including trespass or im peding ingress or egress to the property of a Natural Man or W om an
Secured Party; and to lim it the ability of a Natural Man or W om an Secured Party to freely access, claim , hold, possess,
use, convey, sell, rent, lease, barter, exchange, or in any way m ake full and unfettered use of his property.
This includes
the application of unlawful liens and encum brances of any and all property including wages; salaries; stocks; bonds; bank
accounts (foreign or dom estic); savings accounts; contents of safety deposit boxes; gold; silver; notes; insurance funds;
annuities; retirem ent accounts; social insurance benefits; m otor vehicles; autom obiles; recreational vehicles; land; real
estate; hom es; structures; roads; driveways; personal property of any kind that is held by title, deed, contract, agreem ent
(written or verbal), or is in possession of a Natural Man or W om an Secured Party. This includes, but is not lim ited to,
traffic stops; searches of vehicles; hom e invasion; confiscation of any lawful property owned by, in possession of, or under
the control of the Natural Man or W om an Secured Party.
37.
Assault and Battery w ithout a W eapon: Means the verbal abuse or physical contact, of any kind, upon a Natural Man or
W om an Secured Party without his express voluntary written consent. If a conflict arises about the facts involving the
incident, the version as told by the Natural Man or W om an Secured Party will be accepted as truth, without question, and
will not be contested.
38.
Abuse of Due Process: Means any action against a Natural Man or W om an Secured Party, when said action does not
abide by all the rights and defenses contained in or represented by the "Constitution of Canada and/or the Honorable
"Canadian Bill of Rights." This includes any charge, or claim , civil or crim inal, or in adm iralty, that is alleged or m ade by
any representative of the "CANADA" corporation.
39.
Denial of Due Process: Means any attem pt by any officer of the court and or corporation to deny, deprive, restrict,
prevent, or in any way inhibit the proper Due Process to any Natural Man or W om an Secured Party as outlined in the
"Constitution of Canada" and/or the Honorable "Canadian Bill of Rights." Any public law, statute, regulation, ordinance,
hom e rule, etc., that is incom patible with the aforem entioned Constitution of Canada and/or Honorable "Canadian Bill of
Rights" is null and void and will not be used in any action against any Natural Manor W om an Secured Party.
40.
Unlaw ful Detainer: Means any attem pt by any officer of the court or representative of the corporation to arrest, check,
hinder, delay, possess, hold, keep in custody, restrain, retard, stop, withhold a Natural Man or W om an Secured Party
without affording him every protection as outlined by the “Constitution of Canada" and/or the Honorable Canadian Bill of
Rights.” Any public law, statute, regulation, ordinance or the like will be null and void and will not be used in any action in
which a Natural Man or W om an Secured Party is involved.
41.
Reckless Endangerment: Means any attem pt by any officer of the court or corporation as defined herein to endanger,
attem pt or threaten to attem pt to endanger the life or property of any Natural Man or W om an Secured Party.
This
includes dangerous driving in a car, use or threatened use of lethal or non lethal weapons or chem icals, im proper use of
restraint devices, use of restraint devices on a non-com bative Natural Man or W om an Secured Party. If a conflict arises
as to whether or not reckless endangerm ent has occurred, the version of the Natural Man or W om an Secured Party will
be considered as truth.
42.
Failure to Respond: Means any attem pt by any officer or representative of the corporation to ignore, inhibit, withhold,
delay, or deny a request for inform ation from a Natural Man or W om an Secured Party.
174
43.
Failure to Charge w ithin Forty Eight (48) Hours: Means any attem pt by any officer or representative of a corporation to
delay, inhibit, prevent, or in any way stop a Natural Man or W om an Secured Party from being lawfully charged by the
court within forty eight (48) hours of arrest.
44.
Failure to Identify: Means any tim e a Natural Man or W om an Secured Party has interaction with any officer or
representative of the court or corporation, the officer or representative, m ust, upon request of the Natural Man or W om an
Secured Party, provide proper identification, written proof of authority, state what his business is with the Natural Man or
W om an Secured Party, com plete a "Public Servants Questionnaire" in advance of arrest or detention, provide
docum entation properly identifying the officer or respondeat superior’s nam e and contact inform ation, and any other
relevant inform ation as requested by the Natural Man or W om an Secured Party. The officer m ay not detain the Natural
Man or W om an Secured Party for m ore than ten (10) m inutes while he obtains and provides this inform ation.
Counterfeiting Statute Staple Securities Instruments:
Means any attem pt by any officer or representative of a
corporation to copy, duplicate, replicate any docum ent that has "Statute Staple Securities Agreem ent” typed, printed, or
hand written anywhere on the docum ent, without the express, written, voluntary perm ission of the docum ent's owner who
is the Natural Man or W om an Secured Party who filed said docum ent in the public record, or is in possession of said
docum ent, or who is the m aker of said docum ent. If a dispute about perm ission to duplicate arises, the statem ents of the
Natural Man or W om an Secured Party will be accepted as fact without question and will not be contested.
45.
46.
Coercion or Attempt to Coerce: Means any attem pt by any officer or representative of a corporation to threaten,
intim idate, deprive, conceal, or in anyway prevent a Natural Man or W om an Secured Party from receiving and/or enjoying
any right or privilege that is granted, outlined, or secured by "Constitution of Canada" and/or the Honorable "Canadian Bill
of Rights", or allow another to do so.
47.
Purchase Price: Means the new replacem ent costs of item s of property at the tim e of replacem ent. This includes
locating, packing, shipping, handling, delivery, set up, installation, and any other fee associated with total replacem ent of
property.
48.
Destruction of Property: Means any alteration, dam age, deprivation, defacing, rem oving, changing, breaking,
separating, rem oving parts from , erasing of files from , throwing, shooting, kicking, stom ping, sm ashing, crushing, or the
like of any property belonging to or in possession of the Natural Man or W om an Secured Party.
49.
Deprivation of Rights or Property: Means the concealm ent of, keeping from , hiding of, obstructing of any rights,
property, or privileges that are outlined or protected by the "Constitution of Canada" and/or the Honorable "Canadian Bill
of Rights."
50.
Concealment: Means withholding or keeping inform ation that should norm ally be revealed, about property and/or rights
from a Natural Man or W om an Secured Party. This includes keeping evidence or law from a jury that could favorably alter
the outcom e of a case to the benefit of the Natural Man or W om an Secured Party.
No officer of any court or
representative of any corporation m ay conceal any law and/or any evidence of any kind that is considered relevant by the
Natural Man or W om an Secured Party, and/or fail to disclose any law that benefits the Natural Man or W om an Secured
Party.
51.
Defacing:
Means the changing or altering the appearance of an item . This also includes changing or altering the
m eaning of laws, rights, property, docum ents, or any other thing that has value as determ ined by the Natural Man or
W om an Secured Party.
52.
Constitution:
Means, for the purpose of this contract, "The Constitution of Canada" circa earliest in history.
53.
Bill of Rights:
history.
Means, for the purposes of this contract, the original, Honorable "Canadian Bill of Rights" circa earliest in
54.
Rights and Defenses: Means one's legal and/or lawful right and/or ability to defend him self in any action.
Upon
agreem ent, the defendant in an action m ay give up his right to defend him self in a given action. This includes tacit
agreem ent or agreem ent by default; and the Natural Man or W om an Secured Party is never the defendant.
175
55.
W illingly: Means that a Natural Man or W om an Secured Party is in full knowledge, understanding, agreem ent, and full
consent, at all tim es, without fear of reprisal, threat, or coercion, during any interaction in which he is involved with any
agent, officer, or representative of any court or corporation, including incorporated governm ents.
56.
Individual Capacity: Means acting on one's behalf to do a thing. The officer, representative, agent, or the like m ay be
acting under law or color of law and go outside of the capacity of the law and take on a personal liability.
57.
Artificial Person: Means a fictitious entity that was created by the state for transacting com m erce. This Artificial Man or
Strawm an is represented by the ALL CAPITAL LETTER NAME that appears to be spelled the sam e as the nam e of the
Natural Man or W om an. W hen the Artificial Person is used in com m erce by the Natural Man or W om an Secured Party, it
is a transm itting utility.
58.
Agreement: Means any contract which is expressed in writing by letters or m arks, or expressed orally in spoken words or
utterances by a Natural Man or W om an Secured Party. Any question of any agreem ent or contract will be resolved by an
affidavit from the Natural Man or W om an Secured Party. His affidavit will be considered fact in any action or dispute,
without question by any officer, agent, or representative of any corporation including incorporated governm ents.
59.
Unlaw ful Determination: Means any statem ent, speech, gesture, writing, presentm ent, or the like that suggests an idea
that negatively represents the character, actions, plans, procedures, custom s, ways of a Natural Man or W om an Secured
Party, or group of Natural Men or W om en Secured Parties, that is not proven by docum ented, authorized, certified,
evidence, on and for the record under penalty of perjury. This includes off color statem ents, accusations, or rem arks by a
judge or other officer of the court and any other representative of any corporation including incorporated governm ents.
60.
Statute Staple Securities Instrument: Means an edict or proclam ation from a Natural Man or W om an Secured Party.
61.
Clerk of the Public Record: Means any clerk who records or files docum ents in the public record who is em ployed by a
city, county, province, state, m unicipality, federal governm ent, and/or international, m ulti-national, or m ulti-jurisdictional
corporation, including incorporated governm ents.
62.
Public Record: Means any docum ent or record that is filed or recorded into the public record by the Natural Man or
W om an Secured Party. For exam ple, when this docum ent is recorded at a Register of Deeds Office, it becom es a public
record.
63.
Presumption: Means legal assum ption or inference that places the burden of proof or burden of production on the other
party, but never on the Natural Man or W om an Secured Party. No presum ption shall prevail against the Natural Man or
W om an Secured Party without lawful, docum ented evidence that supports the presum ption which is certified by the
officers of the court, on and for the record under penalty of perjury.
64.
Unalienable Rights: Means Natural Rights given by God as acknowledged by the Law of Nations such as, but not lim ited
to, Right to Bear Arm s; Freedom of Speech; Right to Trial by a Jury of one's Peers; Right to Due Process; Right of
Habeas Corpus; Right to be Exem pt from Levy as a Natural Man or W om an Secured Party Creditor; Right to be Secure in
One's Private Papers and Effects.
65.
Right to Travel: Means the right to freely m ove about and/or control any type of craft by whatever m eans, via land, sea,
or air, without any interference by any officer, agent, em ployee, attorney, or judge that in any m anner willfully causes
adverse affects or dam ages upon the Natural Man or W om an Secured Party by an arrest, inhibition, detainm ent, restraint,
deprivation, prevention, etc.
66.
Disrespect: Means anything said or written to any Natural Man or W om an Secured Party, about him or his, that he does
not like, including body language, or anything that m akes him or any reasonable m an uncom fortable or fearful.
67.
The Placing or Filing of an Unlaw ful Lien, Levy, Garnishment, or Attachment: Means any attem pt by any officer,
agent, or representative of a corporation to place a lien, levy, garnishm ent, or attachm ent on the property or collateral of a
Natural Man or W om an Secured Party, herein referred to as Secured Party. Any said officer, agent, or representative
m ust first prove his authority to do so by lawfully docum ented evidence, furnishing all docum ents, form s, and papers as
necessary to prove his authority to do so to a neutral, three (3) Notary Panel, hereinafter referred to as The Panel,
selected by the Secured Party. Said officer, agent, or representative m ust guarantee in writing that the officer, agent, or
representative signing said docum ents will be personally liable for any dam ages due to his unlawful and/or illegal actions.
176
He m ust supply bonds or other lawful funds to be held in trust by The Panel until The Panel determ ines if any actions of
the officer, agent, or representative have violated any laws or caused dam age to the Secured Party. The Panel will have
the sole power to determ ine if any dam age has occurred and will release the funds according to The Panel's adjudication.
The decision of The Panel will be final with no recourse. The surety bonds and/or funds held in escrow by The Panel
m ust be at least four (4} tim es the estim ated value of the property that is liened, levied, garnished, or attached.
The
assessm ent of value will be recorded via affidavit by the Secured Party and delivered to The Panel.
The Panel's
determ ination and the assessm ent thereof will be accepted as truth without question or recourse. Said officer, agent, or
representative agrees to surrender, including but not lim ited to, any and all surety bonds, public and/or corporate
insurance policies, CAFR funds, or corporate property as needed to satisfy any and all claim s and/or assessm ents as filed
against said officer, agent, or representative by the Secured Party. Said officer, agent, or representative agrees that any
and all property or collateral with a current or existing lien will rem ain in the custody and control of the Secured Party until
such tim e as a determ ination has been m ade by a jury of twelve of the Secured Party's Peers as defined herein. In the
event that a jury of twelve of the Peers cannot be convened or has not been convened within sixty (60) days from the date
of the order of the lien, levy, attachm ent, or garnishm ent, any action against the Secured Party shall be dism issed with
prejudice; and every lien, levy, attachm ent, or garnishm ent shall be released within ten (10) days and all property rights
restored, unencum bered. The officer, agent, or representative who has authorized said lien, levy, attachm ent, or
garnishm ent agrees to surrender any and all surety bonds, public and/or corporate insurance policies, CAFR funds, or
corporate property as needed to satisfy any and all claim s and/or assessm ents as filed against said officer, agent, or
representative by the Secured Party.
68.
Peer: Means a Natural Man or W om an Secured Party who has recorded into the public record docum ents to prove his
sovereign status.
69.
Ignore: Means to refuse or in any way to deny a lawful request by the Natural Man or W om an Secured Party to have an
officer, agent, or representative provide com pleted legal docum ents.
70.
Natural M an or W oman: Means a flesh and blood, living, breathing, biological m an or wom an created by God, as
represented by the Upper and Lower Case Nam e, including "Natural Man or W om an," or "Real Man," or “Real W om an,"
or "Real Man/W om an." This is not to be confused with the Fictitious Legal Entity that was created by any “CANADIAN
GOVERNMENT" and that is represented by the ALL CAPITAL LETTER NAME.
71.
Debtor: Means the Fictitious Legal Entity that was created by any “CANADIAN GOVERNMENT" and that is represented
by the ALL CAPITAL LETTER NAME.
177
Appendix “B” - Meads’ Copyright and Trademark Notice
[RECORDING REQUESTED BY
AND WHEN RECORDED MAIL
TO:
Dennis Meads
without prejudice
c/o [...]-[...] Street
Alberta, Canada [T7Z 1L5]
NOTICE BY DECLARATION and AFFIDAVIT OF CONSEQUENCES FOR
INFRINGEMENT OF COPYRIGHT TRADE-NAME/TRADEMARK
And same are accepted for value and exempt from levy.
PLAIN STATEMENT OF FACT
I depose and say as follows:
I, Dennis Larry Meads, a natural man and competent witness, do state with the first-hand
knowledge the facts herein and in the nature of unalienable rights, claim, without prejudice, a
commercial unlimited possessory security interest and common law right of, in and to my
Copyright(s), Trademark(s) and Trade-Name(s) listed below.
I am the Secured Party of the herein said Copyright(s), Trademark(s) or Trade-Name(s), as
supported by a voluntary Copyright Notice in my possession, date December 22 , 2011.
Copyright Notice: All rights reserved re common-law copyright of trade-name/trademark
DENNIS LARRY MEADS© — including any and all derivatives and variations in the spelling,
i.e. DENNIS LARRY MEADS, MEADS DENNIS LARRY, DENNIS L MEADS, MEADS D
LARRY, D L MEADS, — Common Law Copyright © 2011 by Dennis Larry Meads. Said
common-law trade-name/trademark, DENNIS LARRY MEADS©, may neither be used nor
reproduced, neither in whole nor in part, in any manner whatsoever, without the prior, express,
written consent and acknowledgement of Dennis Larry Meads as signified by the red-ink
signature of Dennis Larry Meads, hereinafter “Secured Party”.
With the intent of being contractually bound, any juristic person, as well as the agent thereof,
consents and agrees by this Notice that neither said juristic person nor agent thereof shall
display,
nor otherwise use in any manner, the common-law trade-name/trademark DENNIS LARRY
MEADS©, nor the common-law copyright described herein, nor any derivative of, or any
variation in the spelling thereof without the prior, express, written consent and acknowledgment
of Secured Party, as signified by Secured Party’s signature in red ink. Secured Party neither
grants, nor implies, nor otherwise gives consent for any unauthorized use of DENNIS LARRY
MEADS©, and all such unauthorized use is strictly prohibited.
Self-executing Contract/Security Agreement in Event of Unauthorized Use: By this Notice,
both the juristic person and the agent thereof, hereinafter jointly and severally “User”, consent
and agree that any use of DENNIS LARRY MEADS©, other than authorized use as set forth
178
herein, constitutes unauthorized use and counterfeiting of Secured Party’s common-law
copyrighted property, contractually binds User and renders this Notice a Security Agreement
wherein User is Debtor and Dennis Larry Meads is Secured Party, and signifies that User:
(1) grants Secured Party a security interest in all of User’s assets, land and personal
property, and all of User’s interest in assets, land and personal property, in the sum certain
amount of $100,000,000.00 per each occurrence of use of the common-law
copyrighted trade- name/trademark DENNIS LARRY MEADS©, as well as for each
and every occurrence of use of any and all derivatives of and variations in the spelling of
DENNIS LARRY MEADS©, plus costs, plus triple damages;
(2) authenticates this Security Agreement wherein User is Debtor and Dennis Larry Meads
is Secured Party, and wherein User pledges all of User’s assets, land, consumer goods, farm
products, inventory, equipment, money, investment property, commercial tort claims, letters
of credit, letter-of-credit rights, chattel paper, instruments, deposit accounts, accounts,
documents, general intangibles, and all User’s interest in all such foregoing property, now
owned and hereafter acquired, now existing and hereafter arising, wherever located, as
collateral for securing User’s contractual obligation in favor of Secured Party for User’s
unauthorized use of Secured Party’s common-law copyrighted property;
(3) consents and agrees with Secured Party’s filing in any county recorder’s office wherein
User is a Debtor and Dennis Larry Meads is Secured Party;
(4) consents and agrees that said filing described in paragraph “(3)” is a continuing
financing statement, and further consents and agrees with Secured Party’s filing of any
continuation statement necessary for maintaining Secured Party’s perfected security
interest in all of User’s property and interest in property pledged as collateral in this Security
Agreement and described in paragraph “(2)” until User’s contractual obligation theretofore
incurred has been fully satisfied;
(5) consents and agrees with Secured Party’s filing, as described in paragraphs “(3)” and
“(4)”, as well as the filing of any Security Agreement, as described in paragraph “(2)”, in any
county recorder’s office;
(6) consents and agrees that any and all such filings described in paragraphs “(4)” and
“(5)” are not, and may not be considered, bogus and that User will not claim that any such
filing is bogus;
(7) waives all defenses; and
(8) appoints Secured Party as Authorized Representative for User, effective upon User’s
default re User’s contractual obligations in favor of Secured Party as set forth in “Payment
Terms” and “Default Terms”, granting Secured Party full authorization and power for
engaging in any and all actions on behalf of User including, but not limited to, authentication
of a record on behalf of User as Secured Party, at Secured Party’s sole discretion, and as
Secured Party deems appropriate, and User further consents and agrees that this appointment
of Secured Party as Authorized Representative for User, effective upon User’s default, is
irrevocable and coupled with a security interest.
179
User further consents and agrees with all of the following additional terms of
Self-executing Contract/Security Agreement in Event of Unauthorized Use:
Payment Terms: In accordance with fees for unauthorized use of DENNIS LARRY
MEADS© as set forth herein, User hereby consents and agrees that User shall pay Secured
Party all unauthorized use fees in full within ten (10) days of the date User is sent Secured
Party’s invoice, hereinafter “Invoice”, itemizing said fees.
Default Terms: In event of non-payment in full of all unauthorized use fees by User within
ten (10) days of date Invoice is sent, User shall be deemed in default and:
(a) all of User’s property and property pledged as collateral by User as set forth in paragraph
“(2)” immediately becomes, i.e. is, property of Secured Party;
(b) Secured Party is appointed User’s Authorized Representative as set forth in paragraph
“(8)”; and
(c) User consents and agrees that Secured Party may take possession of, as well as otherwise
dispose of in any manner whatsoever at Secured Party’s sole discretion including, but not
limited to, sale at auction, at any time following User’s default and without further
notice any and all of User’s property and interest, described in paragraph “(2)” formerly
pledged as collateral by User, now property of Secured Party, in respect of this
“Self-executing Contract/Security Agreement in Event of Unauthorized Use”, that
Secured Party, in Secured Party’s sole discretion, deems appropriate.
Terms for Curing Default: Upon event of default, irrespective of any and all of User’s
former property and interest in property, described in paragraph “(2)”, in the possession of,
as well as disposed of by, Secured Party, as authorized by “Default Terms”, User may cure
User’s default only re the remainder of User’s said former property and interest, formerly
pledged as collateral that is neither in the possession of nor otherwise disposed of by
Secured Party within twenty (20) days of date of User’s default only by payment in full.
Terms of Strict Foreclosure: User’s non-payment in full of all unauthorized use fees
itemized in Invoice within said twenty (20) day period for curing default as set forth in
“Terms for Curing Default” authorizes Secured Party’s immediate non-judicial strict
foreclosure on any and all remaining former property and interest in property, formerly
pledged as collateral by User, now property of Secured Party, which is not in the possession
of, nor otherwise disposed of by, Secured Party upon expiration of said twenty- (20) day
default-curing period.
Ownership subject to common-law copyright and Security Agreement filed in the office of
any county recorder. Record Owner Dennis Larry Meads, Autograph Common Law
Copyright © 2011. Unauthorized use of “Dennis Larry Meads” incurs same unauthorizeduse fees as those associated with DENNIS LARRY MEADS©, as set forth in paragraph
“(1)” under “Self-executing Contract/Security Agreement in Event of Unauthorized Use”.
Notice for tbe clerk for any county, town, city in Alberta and record court for original jurisdiction, is notice
for all.
180
NOTICE: Using a notary on tbis document does not constitute any adhesion, nor does it alter M y status in
any manner. The purpose for notary is verification and identification only; not for entrance into any foreign
jurisdiction.
I certify and solemnly affirm on my own commercial liability, under penalties of perjury by the
Laws of Alberta and Canada, that I have read the contents herein and to the best of my
knowledge and belief state same are true, correct, complete and not misleading.
“Dennis Larry Meads”
___________________________________
Dennis Larry Meads, Secured Party, All
Rights Reserved
Province of Alberta
)
) ss.
JURAT
On the 22 day of December, 2011, Dennis Larry Meads personally appeared before me and proved to me
on the basis of satisfactory evidence to be the person whose name is subscribed hereto and acknowledged to me
that he executed the same under oath or asseveration, and accepts the facts thereof: Subscribed and affirmed
before me this day. W itness my hand and seal this 22 day of December, 2011.
Stamp
________________________________
Notary Signature
Theodore G. Kaklin
Barrister & Solicitor