PDF - The German Marshall Fund of the United States
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PDF - The German Marshall Fund of the United States
Analysis Summary: The launching of TRT-6, the first Kurdish language television channel on January 1, marked a historic turning point in Turkey’s official stance toward the Kurds. However, many claim that the state-run station is merely a ploy by the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) to lure Kurdish votes in the run-up to the March elections. A key test of the new Kurdish channel’s success will be the extent to which it airs dissenting views. On the one hand, TRT-6 should avoid reducing its coverage to anti-PKK propaganda. On the other hand, it might for instance allow Kurds who advocate greater political autonomy for their kin to say so on screen. While much else needs to be done to woo Kurdish hearts and minds, if Turkey handles its TV card correctly it may just win the battle on the airwaves if not on the ground with the PKK. Offices Washington, DC • Berlin • Bratislava • Paris Brussels • Belgrade • Ankara • Bucharest www.gmfus.org Winning Kurdish Hearts and Minds: The Battle Shifts to the Airwaves by Amberin Zaman* ANKARA — “May TRT 6 be auspicious.” With these words uttered in Kurmanji, the main Kurdish dialect, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan launched the country’s first state-run 24-hour Kurdish language television channel on January 1. Opening numbers included a long proscribed tune from the exiled Kurdish nationalist bard, Shiwan Perwer. “It would not be far-fetched to say this is…a historical step,” wrote Salih Akin, in the liberal Turkish daily Taraf. His views are being echoed across a broad spectrum of Kurds and Turks, but not everyone agrees. Many claim that the station is nothing more than a ploy by Erdoğan’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) to lure Kurdish votes in the run-up to nationwide municipal elections that are scheduled for March 28. Main opposition leaders say that these broadcasts will lead to the dismemberment of Turkey, and the decision to permit them runs counter to archaic laws that proscribe the use of Kurdish even in a person’s name. For example, in June 2008, a sevenyear-old boy named Welat, the son of Kurdish migrant laborers working in Germany, was denied entry at Istanbul’s Ataturk airport because his name began with “W.” The letters “W,” “X,” and “Q” are not part of the Turkish alphabet and have therefore been deemed subversive. Set against this background, the inauguration of TRT-6 or “Shesh” (the Kurdish word for six) marks a turning point in Turkey’s official attitude to its estimated 14 million ethnic Kurds. It may even presage the beginning of a concrete plan to resolve the long-festering Kurdish problem. Why else would the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), the militant group that has been waging a terrorist campaign for autonomy since 1984 in the predominantly Kurdish southeast, sound so rattled? It has delivered thinly veiled threats to Kurds participating in the new channel, labeling them “traitors.” Mountain Turks For decades Turkey denied that the Kurds’ existed at all, dismissing them as “mountain Turks.” Led by various Kurdish tribal chieftains and religious leaders or “sheikhs,” sporadic rebellions following the inception of modern Turkey by Kemal Ataturk in 1923 were ruthlessly crushed. When the army seized power in its last direct coup in 1980, one of its first actions was to ban all use of the Kurdish language. Those who violated this rule were promptly hauled off to jail, joining thousands of Kurdish dissidents. Many ended up in the notorious prison at Diyarbakir, also a Kurdish city. Abuses against Kurdish inmates Amberin Zaman is the Turkey correspondent for The Economist and writes a weekly column for the Turkish daily Taraf. The views expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF). * Analysis ranged from brutal beatings and sodomy, to prolonged bouts of sleep deprivation and prisoners being forced to eat their own excrement. Not surprisingly, Diyarbakir prison became a prime recruiting ground for the PKK. It was not until April 1991, some eight years after the generals had transferred power back to the civilians, that the ban on spoken Kurdish was eased. Yet its use in schools, government offices, and prisons remains a criminal offense. subtitles, thereby preventing live broadcasts. Meanwhile, a swath of liberal-minded bureaucrats was dispatched to the mainly Kurdish regions. In a bid to reduce rampant illiteracy, cash subsidies and free school textbooks were distributed to poor families along with wheat, flour, and coal. Police were instructed to treat citizens with respect. The common bond of Islam was emphasized over ethnicity. And a statefunded program to repatriate displaced Kurdish villagers was accelerated. These and other changes persuaded the EU to start long-delayed membership talks with Turkey in 2004. A year later, Erdoğan became the first Turkish leader to acknowledge that the state had committed “mistakes” in its treatment of the Kurds. All of this bolstered the AKP’s standing in the southeast, where it clobbered the pro-Kurdish Democratic Society Party (DTP) in the 2007 parliamentary elections in many of its strongholds. The “Kurdish reality” As PKK violence spiraled in the 1990s, so too did state repression of the Kurds. By the parliament’s own reckoning, at least 800,000 Kurdish civilians were forcibly evacuated from their villages, their homes razed and livestock slaughtered during the army’s scorched earth campaign against the PKK. Many migrated to Western cities, such as Istanbul and Izmir, where a new generation of angry, jobless Kurdish youths provided fresh cadres for the PKK. Meanwhile, the power vacuum in northern Iraq resulting from Saddam Hussein’s loss of control over the breakaway Kurdish region during the 1991 Gulf War allowed the PKK to establish strategic bases there. It used these to launch increasingly effective attacks against Turkish military outposts across the border. Turkey’s failure to stamp out the insurgency despite the capture of the PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan in 1999 reinforced the growing realization among political and army leaders alike that military tactics were not enough to defeat the PKK. Successive Turkish prime ministers began talking of a “Kurdish reality.” Yet, little was done to address the Kurds’ grievances. An increasing number tuned into the PKK’s glitzy news channel Roj (the word for “Sun” in Kurdish) broadcast via satellite from various European capitals which bombarded them with a steady stream of propaganda about the glories of Ocalan and his Kalashnikov toting “freedom fighters.” The PKK strikes back Unnerved by its receding influence, the PKK ended its fiveyear truce declared in 1999, agreed to by Ocalan who was desperate to elude the death sentence he was handed by a Turkish court. (Capital punishment has subsequently been taken off the books in line with EU demands). If the PKK’s calculation was to draw the army back into the fight and to provoke the government—already fearful of a nationalist backlash—into abandoning its reforms, the gamble apparently worked. A string of bloody PKK attacks that killed scores of Turkish soldiers cowed the government into accepting the army’s clamors to resume cross-border attacks against PKK targets in northern Iraq. These began (with the agreement of the United States) in December 2007. Erdoğan espoused increasingly hawkish language against the Kurds and shunned DTP lawmakers. Meanwhile, court cases against DTP officials for “crimes,” such as issuing invitation cards in Kurdish, started and continue to pile up. The Constitutional Court is expected to deliver its verdict soon on a closure case filed against the DTP on the thinly supported charge that it is threatening the unity of the Turkish state. Not a single AKP official has uttered a peep even though their own party narrowly escaped closure on similarly specious grounds last year. And in an alarming turn, reports of unprovoked attacks against Kurdish civilians in Turkey’s western provinces are on the rise. Enter the EU and the AKP The elevation of AKP to overwhelming majority in the 2002 parliamentary elections gave fresh impetus to Turkey’s efforts to bolster its shaky democracy. Erdoğan pledged early on to make EU membership his party’s primary goal. This began a blizzard of reforms, among them laws that eased restrictions on publishing and broadcasting in the Kurdish language. Kurdish language courses were permitted for the first time. Private television channels were authorized to air Kurdish programming, albeit for a maximum of four hours per week and on the strict condition that it carries Turkish The army’s surprise response? 2 Analysis General Ilker Basbug, who became Turkey’s chief of general staff last August, is very much in keeping with his determinedly pro-secular predecessors. And he is every bit as hawkish when it comes to the Kurds, but with a twist. Although Turkish fighter jets continue to pound rebel camps in northern Iraq General Basbug has long espoused the view that it will take more than guns to beat the PKK. Indeed, it is widely assumed that his blessings played a part in the establishment of the new Kurdish language channel. If so, that is good news, for the army has long stood in the way of any explicit overtures to the Kurds. A key test of TRT-6’s success will be the extent to which it airs dissenting views. On the one hand, it should avoid reducing its coverage to anti-PKK propaganda. On the other hand, it might for instance allow Kurds who advocate greater political autonomy for their kin (naturally through peaceful means) to say so on screen. This would vastly enhance its credibility, not least because the competition, be it ROJ or other Kurdish TV stations, are nothing more than mouthpieces for their respective sponsors. To be sure this is a tall order for a government-run enterprise. That is why the next step should be to loosen restrictions on private TV channels. While much else needs to be done to woo Kurdish hearts and minds—a reasonable amnesty law for PKK fighters not implicated by violence would be an enormous step—if Turkey handles its TV strategy correctly, it may just win the battle on the airwaves rather than on the ground. Amberin Zaman, Correspondent, The Economist Amberin Zaman is the Turkey correspondent for The Economist and writes a weekly column for the Turkish daily Taraf. About GMF The German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) is a nonpartisan American public policy and grantmaking institution dedicated to promoting greater cooperation and understanding between North America and Europe. GMF does this by supporting individuals and institutions working on transatlantic issues, by convening leaders to discuss the most pressing transatlantic themes, and by examining ways in which transatlantic cooperation can address a variety of global policy challenges. In addition, GMF supports a number of initiatives to strengthen democracies. In addition to its headquarters in Washington, DC, GMF has seven offices in Europe: Berlin, Bratislava, Paris, Brussels, Belgrade, Ankara, and Bucharest. 3
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