GREEN SHEET - NorCal Fools

GREEN SHEET
California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection
Informational Summary Report of Serious CDF Injuries, Illnesses,
Accidents and Near-Miss Incidents
San Diego Unit
Engine Burnover with Burn Injuries
October 21, 2007
Harris Incident CA-MVU-010427
Accident Incident CA-MVU-010433
Accident Review Incident CA-CSR-000101
California Southern Region
A Board of Review has not approved this Summary Report. It is intended as a safety and
training tool, an aid to preventing future occurrences, and to inform interested parties. Because it
is published on a short time frame, the information contained herein is subject to revision as
further investigation is conducted and additional information is developed.
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SUMMARY
On October 21, 2007, a CAL FIRE engine company was entrapped while engaged in structure
protection operations on the Harris Fire. One civilian was injured and another died at the
accident scene. Two CAL FIRE firefighters were critically burned and the other two firefighters
were seriously burned as they attempted to evacuate the civilians. All firefighters and the one
surviving civilian were air lifted to the University of California, San Diego Burn Center for
treatment.
CONDITIONS
Location:
The incident occurred 1 mile south west of Potrero, California near Hwy. 94. The fire
was on private property in State Responsibility Area, (Latitude: 32°35'58.22"N
Longitude: 116°37'40.74"W). The accident site was on a ridge within a drainage branch
north of Potrero Creek Canyon, approximately one mile southwest of the Potrero CAL
FIRE Station.
Topography:
The area of the accident site was on a small ridge top with small drainages to the
north and south running east to west. Slopes ranged from 18% to 35% to the north.
Fuel Type:
The fuels within the area represent native California chaparral 3’ – 8’ in height
comprised mostly of chamise and associated species. The fuel type is USDA
Standard Fire Behavior Fuel Model SH7 (147), very heavy load, dry climate shrub.
The fuels are discontinuous, broken by rock outcrops throughout the area.
Fuel Moisture: 5% 10-hour fuel, 50% live fuel (WIMS).
Weather Observations: 12:14 PM from Potrero RAWS Station (1.2 mile NE)
Temperature: 69°
RH:
8%
Winds:
27 mph ENE, gusts to 51 mph.
Rainfall:
January 1 to October 20, 2007, 5.21” from Potrero RAWS.
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SEQUENCE OF EVENTS
On the morning of October 21, 2007 the San Diego Unit began experiencing Santa Ana wind
conditions. At 9:37 a.m. the San Diego Unit Emergency Command Center (ECC) received a
report of a vegetation fire on Harris Ranch Road, located east of Potrero in southern San Diego
County. The ECC dispatched a vegetation fire on a high response level. Engine 3387 was
subsequently assigned to move-up and cover the Dulzura CAL FIRE Station.
Based on witness accounts and radio transmissions, the fire was estimated to have burned from
the origin to the Potrero CAL FIRE Station, approximately 2.25 miles, within the first 90
minutes. A Fire Captain observed the fire cross Highway 188, 4.2 miles from the origin, within
the first 3 hours. Witness accounts describe the fire activity as a running fire with spotting up to
three-quarters of a mile, sheeting and limited area ignition. By 6:00 p.m. the fire was estimated
at 13,266 acres.
At 11:11 a.m. Engine 3387 was assigned to Strike Team 9330C and dispatched directly to the
fire from Dulzura CAL FIRE Station. Engine 3387 responded to the fire via Highway 94 and
arrived at scene at approximately 11:30 a.m. Engine 3387 drove through the fire and began a
mobile attack on the left flank, south of Highway 94. Unable to continue the mobile attack
operations due to terrain features, Engine 3387 then began structure protection and checked
roads for threatened structures to the west of Potrero on the south side of Highway 94. The
Incident Commander advised all personnel to use flanking tactics on the fire and not attempt a
frontal attack.
Engine 3387 proceeded south on a dirt access road from Highway 94 toward several residences.
They made contact with a Fire Crew Strike Team Leader (STCR). While the STCR and Fire
Captain discussed the fire behavior, they observed a white pickup operated by a civilian adult, an
all-terrain vehicle (ATV) operated by a civilian juvenile, and a San Diego Sheriff's Office
(SDSO) Deputy drive north on the access road to their location. Upon meeting the civilians, the
adult requested the Engine Company to check on his house, which was further south on the
access road. The adult told the Fire Captain there were still other residents in a second home
nearby. The Fire Captain and the STCR advised the adult and juvenile to evacuate out of the
area and Engine 3387 drove in to check the property. Despite the commands to evacuate, the two
civilians followed E3387 towards the structure on their ATV.
As Engine 3387 traveled midway down the drainage north of the residence, (“observation point”
noted on vicinity map) the Fire Captain observed black (already burned vegetation) on both sides
of the road. They continued into the drainage and the smoke became very dense. The Fire
Captain began to back out of the area. Suddenly, the adult and juvenile appeared at the side of
the engine. They advised the crew their ATV had stopped running. Engine Company 3387 took
the adult and juvenile into the cab of the engine (“abandoned ATV” noted on vicinity map). The
adult advised the Fire Captain of a good turn-around location near his residence and a good water
supply so the Fire Captain continued driving south on the access road toward the residence.
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The Fire Captain stopped the engine on the driveway just east of the double-wide mobile home
residence. He directed the firefighters to extinguish the vegetation in close proximity to the
northeast side of the residence. The Fire Captain then drove up the driveway to a position just
past the mobile home, where he directed Firefighter # 1 to deploy the 1 1/2" front discharge hose
line to extinguish vegetation next to the northwest side of mobile home. The Engine Company
instructed the civilians to remain in the cab of the fire engine for their safety. The Fire Captain
inspected the structure and observed smoke emanating from the attic vents. The windows on the
east side of the residence broke out revealing the living room heavily involved in fire. The Fire
Captain directed the firefighters to abandon the operation and get in the engine. Before the Fire
Captain returned to the cab of the fire engine, he saw a small, rubber-tired tractor operated by a
civilian in a clearing behind the engine.
The Fire Captain observed smoke and flame impacting the rear of the fire engine and could not
back out due to the proximity of the tractor. The Fire Captain moved the fire engine forward, out
of the direct flame contact and positioned the engine on the south side of the access road as far
from the structure as he could. Extremely strong winds accelerated the burning conditions in the
structure fire, and it rapidly became fully involved, with direct flame contact again to the
passenger side of Engine 3387. The Fire Captain directed Firefighter # 1 to use the front
discharge hose line to cool the structure while they backed out. Firefighter #1 exited the vehicle,
deployed the hose line, and sprayed water on the structure. The Fire Captain began backing out
and the engine stopped running, due to a lack of available oxygen. The Fire Captain directed the
two remaining firefighters to cover the windows on the right side with fire shelters. Before the
shelters could be deployed, the passenger windows broke due to heat, immediately filling the cab
with flame, heat and smoke. The Fire Captain instructed everyone in the cab to get out and take
refuge in a rocky clearing to the southeast of the fire engine. The Fire Captain assisted the
juvenile and met the two firefighters in the clearing. The adult was later found deceased near the
front of the engine.
Concurrently Firefighter # 1 became enveloped in flames that blew from the upwind structure.
He retreated to the west where he deployed his fire shelter in a pasture with sparse vegetation
(“shelter location” noted on vicinity map). The firefighter lost the shelter after about 10 minutes
due to the windy conditions. He located and took refuge behind large rocks.
At 12:28 p.m. Firefighter # 2 made a distress call to the San Diego (MVU) ECC on MVU local
net. The ECC cleared the air for the emergency traffic. The Fire Captain notified the Harris Air
Attack of the burnover on Air to Ground frequency. Hearing the emergency radio traffic, the
pilot of Helicopter 538 began searching for the crew from Engine 3387. The pilot discovered the
crew, found a nearby location to land, and loaded the Fire Captain, Firefighters #2 and #3 and the
juvenile. Helicopter 538 flew them to the Potrero CAL FIRE Station. Helicopter 538 returned to
the accident site to locate Firefighter #1. The pilot was notified by a STCR that he had found
Firefighter #1. Helicopter 538 landed, loaded and transported the firefighter to the Potrero CAL
FIRE Station. Approximately 40 minutes elapsed between the time Firefighter #1 escaped from
the structure fire until his evacuation.
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At the Potrero CAL FIRE Station, the crew and juvenile received medical care from a local
government ALS engine, assisted by CAL FIRE employees. They were then transported by
medical helicopters to the Burn Center at the University of California San Diego Hospital.
INJURIES/DAMAGES
Two firefighters were critically burned, two firefighters were seriously burned, one civilian was
critically burned, and one civilian perished at the scene.
One 1993 CAL FIRE Type III Model 15 was completely destroyed.
SAFETY ISSUES FOR REVIEW
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•
•
•
•
•
Situational awareness (scene size up)
Structure protection tactics (engine placement)
Personal protective equipment
Escape Routes
Communication (Proper frequency monitoring)
Safety Zones
INCIDENTAL ISSUES FOR REVIEW
•
•
•
•
Structure protection triage procedures
Risk versus gain analysis while in a wildland urban interface operation
Appropriate actions taken with onboard evacuees
Appropriate actions taken with evacuee informational input
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Fenceline
FF-1 Escape Route
Escape route utilized
by FC, two FF-1's, and
Victim #2
E-3387 Travel Route
Harris Serious Accident
Detailed Area of Accident Site
E-3387 Wildland Fire Burnover
CA-MVU-010427 - October 21, 2007
35 to 45%
downhill
Singlewide trailer
t)
e
(Approx ma
i
ly
te
-f e
70
pp
im
a
y
2
E- 33
87
Watertanks
35 to 45%
downhill
Small shed
Double-wide trailer
)
15 to 20%
downhill
E-3387
20%
downhill
Location of FF-1
prior to burnover
10 to 20%
downhill
Location
of Victim #1
(A
pp
ro
10 to 20%
downhill
et
1 7 0- f e
Approximate Location
FF-1 deployed fire
shelter.
Rocky area generally void of vegetation
tely
ma
10 to 15%
downhill
f r om
Pasture with reduced fuel loading
xi
(A
x
ro
l
te
00
-f
t
ee
Road
Approximate slope and aspect
Gate FF-1
escaped through.
Location where
FF-1 sheltered
behind rock.
Structure
fr o m
E-3
387 )
J. Martinez
2007.11.01
Wind Direction
(Not To Scale)
Rocky clearing area utilized by
FC, two FF-1's, and Victim #2.
Harris Serious Accident
Vicinity Map
E-3387 Wildland Fire Burnover
CA-MVU-010427 - October 21, 2007
Accident Site
State Highway
Access Route
Roads
Miles
0.5
oa
d
0
Ac
ce
s
sR
94
Shelter
Location
Eme
Observation Point
Abandoned ATV
ne
ry L a
Residence
Eme
r
188
or
Airp
ad
t Ro
y Ro
ad
S
S aa nn D
D ii ee gg oo C
C oo uu nn tt yy ,, C
CA
A
Accident Site
Wind
Direction
J. Martinez
2007.11.01